IMVF Debates 1/2013 - Political and Military Dynamics in the Sahel - Ambassador Christopher Dell

Debates 1/2013 POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL: Implications for European and International Security Ambassador Christopher Dell Round Table, 5 June 2013

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POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL

Abstract A direct consequence of the unrest across North Africa has been the expansion of violent extremism across the Sahel. We are witnessing a worrisome development in the region’s security landscape as these violent extremist organizations grow and develop sophisticated networks. These emerging threats can be illustrated by the unique challenges facing Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia. The US Strategy to Africa and to security sector assistance goes well beyond terrorism. Through collaboration based on shared values and mutual goals, the US is finding that its efforts are more likely to be achieved if it pursues both bilateral and multilateral partnerships with African, European Union, and NATO partners.

Uma consequência direta das revoltas no Norte de África tem sido a expansão do extremismo violento pela região do Sahel. Estamos a testemunhar uma evolução preocupante no contexto de segurança desta região, à medida que estas organizações violentas e radicais crescem e desenvolvem redes sofisticadas. Estas ameaças emergentes podem ser ilustradas pelos desafios particulares enfrentados pela Líbia, Mali, Nigéria e Somália. A Estratégia dos Estados Unidos para África e para o apoio ao setor de segurança vai muito para além do terrorismo. Através de uma colaboração assente em valores partilhados e objetivos comuns, os EUA estão a perceber que os seus esforços terão maior probabilidade de sucesso se prosseguirem parcerias bilaterais e multilaterais, com os parceiros de África, da União Europeia e da NATO. Keywords: Africa, Sahel region, Security, Terrorism, U.S. and Portugal Palavras-Chave: África, região do Sahel, Segurança, Terrorismo, E.U.A. e Portugal

ABOUT THE PUBLICATION This publication should be cited as: IMVF (2013); Political and military dynamics in the Sahel: Implications for European and international security. Round table held in 5 June 2013 with Ambassador Christopher Dell, IMVF Debates 1/2013, Lisbon.

The text was edited by Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira and Fernando Jorge Cardoso. The views expressed in the publication do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the organisation.

This publication is the result of a partnership between IMVF, the AIP Foundation, EuroDefense-Portugal and AFCEA-Portugal, in the framework of a series of roundtables on "Strategy and Security vs. Internationalization and Investment". These debates aim at improving knowledge and thinking on various political and security dynamics that influence investment' decisions and the internationalization of the Portuguese economy. Ambassador Dell’s participation was sponsored by the U.S. Embassy.

More about IMVF at www.imvf.org

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POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL

ÍNDICE

1. INTRODUCTORY SPEECH

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2. DEBATE

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3. BIOGRAPHY NOTE

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1. INTRODUCTORY SPEECH Thank you for your kind introduction. It is great to be back in Portugal. For those of you who do not know, early in my career with the U.S. Department of State I served at the U.S. Consulate in Oporto and at the Embassy in Lisbon. My experience in Africa began in the early 1990s as the deputy chief of mission in Mozambique. And in 2001, I was posted as the U.S. Ambassador to Angola. So I am familiar with the Lusophone countries of Africa and personally aware of the strategic role Portugal has played and continues to play on the continent.

Our nations, Portugal and the United States, share the desire for a stable and secure Africa. As has been stated many times by the previous commander of U.S. Africa Command, General Carter Ham, “a safe, stable, and secure Africa is in the best interest, not only of African nations, but of the united states and the international community.” I truly believe this and I look to the strong relationship between our two nations to help ensure stability and security in this region of the world.

The Security Landscape in the Sahel Region Today I would like to talk about the security landscape in the Sahel region as it relates to the international community. I’d also like to briefly describe the U.S. Strategy toward Northwest Africa, and U.S. Africa command’s approach to implementing that strategy. And then finally, I would like to offer my thoughts on ways for the United States and Portugal to partner in Africa. As the on-going situation in Mali is relevant to all three of these topics, I’ll refer to this crisis and the international response to it throughout my remarks.

During the 15th and 16th centuries, when Portugal was playing a leading role in the European discovery of Africa, West and Northwest Africa were of strategic importance on the emerging global stage.

In recent years North Africa has once again emerged as a focus of attention, not only in the region, but again on a global scale. Much of this stems from the

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Mapa: A região do Sahel, África.

Arab Spring that began in Tunisia in December of 2010 and spread throughout North Africa and the Middle East. Unfortunately, it is also easy to see that a direct consequence of the unrest across North Africa has been the expansion of violent extremism across the Sahel. Violent extremist groups have capitalized on the security vacuum created when the former regimes fell.

We are witnessing a worrisome development in the region’s security landscape as these violent extremist organizations grow and develop sophisticated networks. Of greatest concern are the activities of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in East Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel, as well as the emerging threat of Boko Haram in Nigeria. These groups have targeted or expressed a desire to target western interests in Africa on multiple occasions and present significant challenges as individual organizations.

Now there is growing evidence that points to collaboration between the various violent extremist organizations. This is evident in the flow of arms, money and fighters, as well as the sharing of experience and tactical activity between these organizations. This growing network represents a great threat to regional stability across the Sahel.

And this emerging threat is only a short boat ride from Europe. If unaddressed, I fear these organizations may in time present a very real and dangerous threat to Europe and eventually to the United States.

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Perhaps I can better articulate that emerging threat to both our countries by delving into the unique challenges facing Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia.

In Libya, violent extremist organizations are seeking to take advantage of the government’s fragility as institutions marginalized during the 40 years of Kaddafi’s reign struggle to consolidate control over the country. External influencers, including AlQaeda associated elements, are attempting to establish networks and safe havens in Libya, most notably in the eastern portion of the country. The absence of effective local government and the proliferation of weapons following the revolution make Libya highly volatile, as the tragic September 11, 2012 attacks in Benghazi have brought into focus.

As a second case study, let me discuss how the coup d’état and the invasion by Tuareg rebels in Mali last year has contributed to the region’s security landscape.

Al-Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, and other violent extremist organizations took advantage of the rapidly deteriorating situation and briefly gained control of the northern two-thirds of Mali before the French government and a coalition of neighbouring African nations intervened to help the Malian military restore security. The United States is supporting these efforts by moving French troops and supplies from Europe to Mali, providing aerial refuelling support, and by sharing important reconnaissance information. As the European Union fields its training mission with the purposed of helping to build credible Malian armed forces, the United States is working in parallel to train the forces of the neighbouring states who are participating in the African-led international support mission to Mali, or AFISMA. As the French and AFISMA efforts transition to a UN peacekeeping mission, we will continue to provide our traditional high level support to UN operations. The recent UN Security Council resolution demonstrates that when regional security and stability are threatened, we collectively respond because left unchecked, these threats have the ability to jeopardize western interests in Africa, Europe, and the United States.

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My third exploratory case is Nigeria, where we see the emergence of Boko Haram as a growing challenge. This violent extremist organization continues to stage attacks targeting government officials, churches, and most notably, the United Nations headquarters in Abuja. Boko Haram’s increasingly violent attacks seek to discredit the Nigerian government and to impose a harsh interpretation of sharia law on the local populace.

Boko haram has also publicly expressed its intent to target western interests, making it clear that this group threatens not only regional stability, but also American and European interests and lives.

While we support Nigeria’s effort in neutralizing Boko Haram, we are at the same time increasingly troubled by the trend of human rights violations committed by members of the Nigerian military. Not only is this troubling from a humanitarian perspective, it reverses any efforts to counter insurgents, and win the support – the hearts and minds, if you will – of at-risk communities.

My final example of the networking that is occurring between these terrorist organizations is Somalia.

Al-Shabaab, a U.S.-recognized terrorist organization which is formally part of the Al-Qaeda structure, has increasingly strong ties to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and is increasingly linked to AQIM in the west. We believe Al-Shabaab remains one of the greatest threats on the continent. Al-Shabaab has professed openly their intent and desire to attack western interests, and indeed America and Europe.

Due to the combined efforts of the African union, regional peacekeeping forces, and Somali national security forces, today Al-Shabaab is in a greatly weakened condition. The African Union mission in Somalia, known as AMISOM and Somali forces have together reduced the ground held by Al-Shabaab and once again control the key cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Somalia now has a parliament, a prime minister, and a president, something not seen since the 1980s. This is a great success story of regional cooperation. It shows how collectively individual nations and security organizations can come together to successfully address a common threat.

But, Al-Shabaab is not yet defeated. They seek to undermine the progress that has been achieved.

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We must continue to apply attention and resources to AMISOM’s effort to assist the Somalis in focusing on governance, economic growth, and development of their security forces to ensure the continued improvement of the security landscape.

Al-Shabaab has recently renewed its attacks in Mogadishu itself, a troubling but timely reminder that the job is not yet done in Somalia.

These four examples demonstrate how networks between violent extremist organizations are materializing. To complicate our challenge even further, violent extremism is often closely linked to illicit trafficking of persons, drugs, and other commodities. And as violent extremist organizations earn a significant amount of their income from kidnapping for ransom and piracy, we begin to see the clear correlation between the growth of violent extremism and illegal activities.

This has a profoundly corrosive effect on security, economic growth, and strong governance in these crucial regions. This makes our efforts to disrupt and destroy these networks in West Africa a critical component of the fight against violent extremist organizations in the Sahel and elsewhere.

U.S. Strategy to Africa Permit me to turn now to my second discussion point of how the U.S. conceives of its strategy in Africa. Our policies in Africa are guided by the National Security Strategy, signed by president Obama in May 2010. It lays out a strategic approach for advancing American interests, including the security of the American people, support for our values, and an international order that can address 21st century challenges. This Strategy focuses on promoting common interests throughout the world to strengthen security and to promote the rule of law. This document also discusses the importance of disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliate networks which directly threaten the United States, our allies, and partners.

In addition to the national security strategy, we have three presidential policy directives (PPDs) that guide our approach to supporting security and stability in Africa. PPD 13 focuses on North Africa and the Middle East, and PPD 16 focuses on sub-Saharan Africa.

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A common thread throughout both is that the United States opposes the use of violence and repression against any group of people. Instead, we support democracy, transparent institutions, and economic growth and trade to promote durable systems that advance peace and security. We believe progress in these areas can set the conditions for our African partners to most effectively address the threat of violent extremism.

A third and final presidential policy directive I would like to share with you is our newest, it was just released last month. PPD 23 specifically focuses on the president’s new approach to security sector assistance. Unlike the PPDs on North and subSaharan Africa, this policy applies to our partnerships with all partner nations, not just those in a specific region. This directive aims to bring greater coherence across the U.S. Government to our effort in the security sector. It defines those national institutions that have the most significant impact on stability; it highlights the principal goals the U.S. will pursue in collaborating with partners; and it describes the methods we will use to conduct security assistance. The most salient theme of this PPD is that a comprehensive investment in assistance helps our partners meet their security challenges and can avert larger crises.

US AFRICOM’s approach to implementing this national guidance is multi-faceted; however, there is one salient element throughout: partnership. Our relationships with our allies and partners are at the centre of our engagement with the world, and with Africa in particular. These relationships are based on more than our shared opposition to terrorism.

We are focused on partnerships that are grounded in common values, and based on mutual interests and mutual respect. At the broad, conceptual level, partnership is about creating a framework to support and sustain the values that enhance longterm cooperation. It is an approach that includes many spheres of effort; some of which are inherently military in nature, while others are not. For example, strengthening defence institutions is an essential element in building a durable and reliable security sector. It involves collaborating along a spectrum of activities to address immediate threats, as well as identify and plan for future opportunities to prevent threats.

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These partnerships can only grow lasting roots if they are grounded in a nuanced understanding of the willingness and capability of our respective African partners to cooperate with us on security issues ranging from countering violent extremists to maintaining security through peace keeping operations.

will contribute to economic prosperity and security on land. To address each of these issues successfully, APS partners work together with a common purpose. There is a relationship between security of the sea; the ability of countries to govern their waters; and a country’s prosperity, stability, and peace.

Part of this broader concept of partnership involves selecting the right nations with which to partner. A partner must have more than just a willingness to improve their institutions. An ideal partner has strong and capable institutions as well as a willingness to work together to achieve shared goals.

In order to partner strategically, we are working to define for ourselves the specific characteristics and institutions partners must possess, and combine this with our understanding of that partner’s impact on the stability of a given region.

Given Portugal’s long maritime history, where I’m going is no doubt already obvious to all of you – this is a natural area for deeper cooperation between our two nations and African partners. APS would be an ideal opportunity to collaborate together, as it brings partnerships into action through cooperation among many different nations and organizations, and promotes maritime governance around Africa. The oceans of the world are a common bond between the economies and countries of the world. 80% of the world lives on or near the coastline and 90% of the world's commerce is transported on the ocean.

We believe that security of the seas is essential for global security, but individual nations cannot combat maritime problems and crimes alone. APS is a direct response to the growing international interest in developing maritime partnerships, and is a way for the United States and Europe to respond to African leaders' requests to build a prosperous Africa.

Moreover, given the troubling nexus between criminal networks and violent extremists networks, helping our African partners better address the flows of illicit goods through their maritime borders can make a critical contribution to our counter terrorism efforts as well.

When we speak of partnerships, we have in mind not only our African partners, but our international partners who have a stake in seeing a stronger security landscape in Africa. Again, through collaboration based on shared values and mutual goals, we’re finding that our efforts are more likely to be achieved if we pursue both bilateral and multilateral partnerships with our African, European Union, and NATO partners. Through this approach, we find that our resources are better optimized, and most importantly, our African partners are the lead stakeholders. The joint efforts of the U.S. and the EU to provide training to the African troop contributing nations in AMISOM is a prime example of the kind of close, multilateral partnership we see as an emerging paradigm in Africa.

Another example of an activity that I’d like to share with you is our African Partnership Station, or APS. APS is a series of activities designed to enhance maritime safety and security in Africa by working together with African and other international partners. Our goal is to empower African nations to protect their own maritime security interests. APS responds to specific African requests for assistance that benefits the international community as a whole, not just the United States. It is inspired by the belief that effective maritime safety and security

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U.S and Portugal in the Sahel We place a great deal of emphasis on our international partnerships, and our relationship with Portugal is certainly one of our strongest. I’d like to spend the last few minutes of my time with you today discussing what we believe are our common interests in the Sahel region.

Turning to U.S.-Portuguese relations, I see opportunities for strengthening our traditionally strong partnerships. I realize that the news of a reduced U.S. Presence at Lajes has been the recent focus of attention, and that these operationallydriven changes in our force posture have been interpreted by some as a weakening of our relationship. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth. One testament to our strong relationship is last month’s 32nd session of the U.S.Portugal Standing Bilateral Commission. This meeting highlighted the importance of bilateral and international coordination on issues relating to global security and stability, including the present situations in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. Portugal's recent work on two bilateral agreements – your ratification of the “terrorism screening information exchange agreement” and your ongoing implementation of the “preventing and combating crime agreement” – is yet more proof of our strong partnership. But beyond simply asserting that “all is well,” in U.S.-Portuguese relations, I would like to urge you to join us in thinking critically about where we can further enhance our common efforts in Africa.

Our two countries’ objectives are well aligned. The U.S. Presidential policy directives on Sub-Saharan Africa and security sector assistance share goals found in the Programa de Apoio às Missões de Paz em África (PAMPA) such as: security sector capacity building, military training and education, cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations, and highlighting Africa on the agenda of international organizations such as NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. The fact that Portugal has contributed advisors to the EU team for the UN mission in Mali is evidence of this commitment.

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The United States recognizes it cannot, and indeed it should not, try to ensure security in the region alone.

Our former commander, general Ham, would often quote an African proverb, “if you want to go quickly, go alone; if you want to go far, go together.”

Because of the experience Portugal has in Western Africa, the United States knows that bilateral and multilateral efforts are the best approaches for all stakeholders.

I hope I’ve succeeded in making it apparent that the security landscape in North and West Africa is extremely complex and, moreover, that it has to be considered in a broader context. No single country, certainly not the United States, has the means to confront all these challenges alone. The United States values its relationship with Portugal, and views our collaboration as an important element of a networked, multi-faceted response to these challenges that can have real and lasting impacts in the Sahel. The terrorist threat in the Sahel, and the ripples it sends through the entire continent, reflect a network of extremists. The only effective response to a networked problem is a networked solution, comprised of partnerships focused on shared goals and desired outcomes.

I am truly honoured and have enjoyed the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward to hearing your thoughts, and hopefully participating in more dialogue throughout the day. Thank you.

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2. DEBATE On the debate participants have questioned Ambassador Dell on a number of issues and gave their own interpretation of the dynamics that occur in the Sahel. The questions and issues focused by the participants and by the speaker can be summarized in 10 groups: Question 1: a first group of questions was about Mali: the relationship between Al Qaeda and a number of radical Islamic groups operating in other countries, namely Boko-Haram in Nigeria and AlShabaab in Somalia; the reasoning behind the apparent change of position of the MNLA the National Liberation Movement of Azawad, which seems to be now working in close relationship with the French; the existence or non-existence of intervention of Iran and the Hezbollah in the region; the comparison with the situation in Guinea-Bissau and with the role of the EU, CEDEAO and the US was also brought to the table.

The ambiguous role that the MNLA is playing shows how complex the situation in Mali is and illustrates how terrorist organizations can exploit instability and insecurity. The MNLA represents the long standing aspiration of the Tuareg, who have a very difficult relationship with the southern Malians and often feel they are treated as second class citizens.

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They took the initiative and pushed against the government in the wake of the coup by Captain Sanogo last year, and then created the fertile conditions in which AQIM can operate, the exact relationship between the AQIM and MNLA is, as described, always shifting. They are partners of opportunity, probably don’t share fundamentally the same goals, as Tuareg is essentially about a nationalist aspiration whereas AQIM represents a global jihadist ideological perspective. However, they have been willing to make common cause some of the time in Mali, and there is a lot of debate in Mali, between the Malian, the French and others in the region about working with MNLA, trying to co-opt them and divide them from AQIM, but the government in Mali see the Tuareg threat as more important than the terrorist threat. This underscores the volatility and fragility of the situation that complicates the work of the international community in helping restore a democratic effective government in Mali and satisfy at the same time the aspiration of the Tuareg minority.

The influence of Iran and Hezbollah is less obvious in the Sahel at this juncture, nonetheless there is extensive evidence that a lot of foreign fighters are flowing between the Maghreb, between Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and that there is a counter flow of experienced fighters coming from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria into the Maghreb itself. So it’s not possible to articulate that this is a one way flow of

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influence; the influence is circular and there are exchanging experiences, tactics, resources, finances and weapons in a great movement that really encompasses an arc of crisis, from the Atlantic all the way through central Asia, with growing and worrying actions between all of these groups.

On why the international community has dealt with Mali in one way and with Guinea-Bissau in another, two things were stressed: one, most of the international community recognizes that the AlQaeda threat in Mali has much wider ramifications, it is a very short boat ride from North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula and beyond, so it’s not very hard to imagine the implications of these particularly for Portugal, Spain and also for the rest of Europe; two, another difference between both situations is the French choice to intervene decisively in Mali, something that continues a long standing pattern of French role in their former French colonies. GuineaBissau, in contrast, seems not to be recognized widely by the international community as representing the same systemic threat, as Mali does.

In Guinea-Bissau there is no one who is prepared to intervene in the same way as the French have chosen to do in Mali. The recent arrest by the US of the former chief of staff of the Guinea-Bissau military, who is holding in New York with charges of drug trafficking, certainly represents a significant increase in the US attention to the problem, but there is no anticipation that the United States is going to choose to intervene directly; rather it will probably work with partner countries, the nations surrounding Guinea Bissau, to try to strengthening their ability to contain this problem.

Another challenge is how to think of this problem beyond the sphere of just Africa, as a transatlantic challenge, because of the drugs traffic that is flowing from Latin America, from Brazil, from Colombia to Africa, and through Africa into Europe. The chief of staff in Guinea Bissau who was arrested was plotting with the narco-traffickers to bring weapons back to Colombia in order to attack the government there, what shows the connection between criminal networks and terrorists, who are finding a new theatre in Latin America. But this is not a problem that can be thought of in simple terms of one region or even the regions of Africa and Europe, it has to be thought in transatlantic terms.

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As Brazil right now is almost entirely focused on other matters, such as the upcoming World Cup and the Olympics, it has focused on developing its maritime patrol resources and shows very little interest in this transatlantic problem, except in participating in the Africa Partnership Station – the Brazilians did send a frigate to participate in the APS last year. This is an area where Portugal could possibly take out the role to encourage Brazil to step up and to deal more forcibly with the drug and weapons traffic problem across the Atlantic.

Question 2: A second group of questions was about the nature of the answer to the terrorist threats. As “spring” revolutions occur on the Arab and the African soil, the power vacuum they create allowed for the emergence of extremism of varied colors.

While the European Union, living in a deep crisis, is answering case by case, sometimes supporting violent and extremist movements instead of creating a global coherent policy, the US elaborates conceptual PPDs, based in values. In the presence of possible future crisis, the answers the EU and the US are giving seem to be fragile and too much diplomatic, instead of showing a strong political and operational attitude.

The number of US forces deployed in Africa rose from about 4.000 up to 6.000 recently. They are deployed throughout the continent, including in ships off the coast of Africa and 2.000 on the only permanent US military facility in Africa (in Djibouti), some in particularly small units in the Maghreb, assisting the local military and the French to get after the problem of the terrorists operating in that region. The Defense NATO ministers recently were discussing how to respond to the Libyan government’s request to train 5 to 8 thousand Libyans, to create the core of a new national army which is a challenge for the Alliance. The US would like to see this became a question of multilateral partnership, to include conducting the actual training somewhere in Europe, rather than in Libya itself, because of the security challenge of sending forces into Libya in large numbers, that could be a visible target.

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These numbers and the creation of the AFRICOM represent for some the US is militarizing its policy towards Africa. For others, the US is not doing nearly enough. After more than a decade of constant war for the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is very little appetite in Washington for involvement in another large scale war in the struggle against Al-Qaeda. The most effective responses to security problems in Africa seem to come when Africans devise the solutions and the international community helps them develop the capability to implement those solutions that they have created in the context. It is much better that Chad, Niger, Burkina-Faso, Senegal, Mauritania work to contain the problem in Mali than the US or France themselves, taking into account the consequences of outside interventions, the way these unfold and how complex they get and the negative effect they have.

Although the outside response was not as effective as the threat probably calls for, it seems that the US response has been more effective than the European response with the very notable exception of the French intervention in Mali, probably because not only of the economic crisis and the inward looking focus of the EU right now, but also for the fact that after all the Europeans have participated through NATO in these wars over the last decade or so, and they are just as tired as the American people are.

Nonetheless, Europeans and Americans have to face the fact that this is a persistent threat that is not going away and needs network solutions to these networking problems.

Question 3: This group of questions focused on two aspects: one, about lessons learned in Somalia for the new security threats in the Sahel, taking into account the correlation between violent extremism and international criminal activity with piracy in nongoverned maritime areas; two, on how shall the present militarization of the US response to African problems help to solve more long-term issues such as the de-radicalization of extremist groups, including youngsters who adhere to militant ideologies more on search of a salary or a way of subsistence.

A part of the US response to questions of security in Africa - particularly illicit flows of people and weapons and contrabands of all forms - should not have a military response. These are law and

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enforcement challenges at least in US thinking where a clear distinction is made between the role of military and the role of law and enforcement agencies.

Most of the security problems are law and enforcement problems for which a military organization has no mandate to act. AFRICOM have some authority to act on narcotics and terrorism by working with the US Coast Guard, which is a Law and Enforcement agency, on the maritime realm. The solution lies not so much in strengthening African militaries as in strengthening Africa law and enforcement institutions, meaning not only Coast Guards or Police but also Court Systems. It is no good to apprehend economic criminals in the Gulf of Guinea who are bunkering oil in huge quantities and arrest them – this doesn’t lead to anything, they are just released when they are on shore, so this requires the development of an entire legal system that has to be created in these countries so that they become able not only to interdict and detain criminals on the high sea but also to prosecute them and lead to punishment on land. That is the approach that governs US strategy for the Gulf of Guinea problem - some Coast Guard officers are working in Stuttgart with AFRICOM with the aim to strengthen the entire legal sector of African countries. It begins with military operations off and on, boarding vessels on high seas but bringing them on the court room or the jail cell.

The second part of the question, is outside the authority of the AFRICOM, and it means inoculating large parts of the population against the temptations of terrorism and extremism, in people living in desperate conditions looking for answers, looking for hope, that are often attracted to these ideologies.

USAID has been doing extensive research into these risk populations in Africa trying to figure out what makes them out of risk and what proper responses are. The problem is actually much more fundamental than simply poverty or the lack of job prospects; the USAID Officer Transition Initiatives has done some particularly creative research in this complex area and it’s really a problem of development, it is a problem of sociology. It’s not a military problem, is not something that the AFRICOM, or the US military or the Portuguese military should be intervening; these are long term societal challenges and should

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be understood from that perspective and addressed in that way. It seems there are not yet very good answers to fight against the growing popularity of the extreme views on the Islamic world for a particular generation, and this remains one of the fundamental challenges in the coming years.

Question 4: The fourth group of questions was also about two correlated issues: one, of a more strategic nature, on how to organize a bi-multi response to the new threats, meaning a more effective cooperation between international institutions and states on security and development issues; a second one, more operational in nature, if the creation of an African rapid reaction force to complement the African Stand-by forces could be a good contribution to the security in Africa and the Sahel.

There seems to exist a strong correlation between both issues. AU is very much what the EU was in its early days. Its aspirations thus far are much greater than its ability to implement them. There were the aspirations and the slow growing in the way to implement them, from the coal and steel community until the Lisbon treaty and the EU of today. The AU is somewhere closer to the Coal and Steel Community and there is a spectrum here until the aspirations come to something more effective, more ambitious.

Experience shows that the sub-regional organizations of the AU, ECOWAS, SADC and the others, have not yet demonstrated the institutional capabilities to be the vehicles for organizing multilateral forces. US has its own particular problems, some of the organizations do not want to work with America and the US do not work with some of them – for example, US will not engage with SADC as long as there is a problem called Robert Mugabe; ECOWAS was the strongest organization but now has weakened as a reflection of the weakening of Nigerian military along the last few years. So these elegant concepts have not yet the capability to sustain the burden that a truly multilateral rapid reaction force or rapid reaction brigade would impose on them.

So, this is a long term ambition that the US shares with Africa by working with the regional organizations to strengthen these organizations at the regional or at the AU level. But more important

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is to define how to helping Africa work through the various real operational challenges. For example, Angola sees itself as a most important, if not the most important player in Africa, their ambitions are enormous. They long to have recognized not only their potential and their wealth, but what they perceive as their role. Africa does not need their battalion of rifle men to form an effective multilateral response force, where Africa lacks the strategic lift, air lift, ready to move materials and troops at long distance quickly: this is something that Angola possesses. However, they have had a fairly unhappy history of unilateral attempts to intervene around the Continent and that has not enhanced their reputation in ways they would like it to have.

The US role here is to help them think through how they can make an effective contribution, the ways to do that and to get those more in line with the AU approach which indeed will serve not only AU interests but also the Angola’s. This should be seen as the famous win-win kind of solution.

Again it comes to a carefully analysis with all the African states of both their willingness and their ability – willingness and capability have their tricks, the military always were taught to think in these terms, early on at the staff college – you have to match the two, both willingness and the ability, and identifying those countries who are both willing and capable of making a contribution. And when such an analysis is done, it leads to approach the situations in different ways: in some cases it is just a matter of military training, of teaching how to shoot, manoeuver and communicate; but in others it is more of a diplomatic response, finding mutually agreeable ways.

Question 5: A fifth group of questions concerned the approach on security and development that according to the Portuguese position, stated into a national strategy paper, should require an integrated approach; how the US approaches the 3 “D” (development, defense, diplomacy), taking into account the diversity of agencies that operate in the field and how military operations incorporate other dimensions, namely development.

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There is a clear linkage between the 3 “D”. Actually the correct order should be diplomacy, development and defense. The US military, any military involved in these challenges really should be the last resort; it is not the first response, except in the sense of strengthening local institutions. Good governance in the defense sector can only succeed in the context of good governance more broadly in a country; good governance meaning respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights, respect for gender, respect for civilian control of the military, transparence in the financial transactions of the government, and so on.

Governing a country by the rule of law, and not by the rule of personality, is a necessary foundation to build strong defense institutions that can deal with security challenges. Too often in Africa the equation has been put the other way around: building a strong army and strong police forces and use them to solve problems. This only postpones the problems or imposes solutions when pressure builds underneath them. Portugal possesses a strategy, the US doesn’t. The new US PPD 23 is an attempt by Washington to pull this together and develop an integrated strategy. Usually everyone talks about uniformity of effort, whole-of-government approaches, nobody is in favor of disunity of efforts; and yet the unity is yet to be achieved. How to get development and defense working together?

Back to human rights and defense of the rule of law in African defense institutions, everyone agrees this is important, everyone agrees the US Africa Command should play a positive role helping to do that, and yet no one agrees whether the Defense Department should be doing that or the State Department should be doing that or the USAID should be doing that… When someone says the military should not do human rights, the military doesn’t do the rule of law, and so there is neither clarity on the US government, nor an integrated approach, although the effort around the PPD 23 intends to be the effort to define that. To do defense reform, to help African militaries to develop their culture of respect for the rule of law, right now there are these prohibitions on USAID working with the military sector, just as the military is prohibited to work with Law and Enforcement agencies, but

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everybody knows that in Africa Law and Enforcement authority is often given to the military.

There is a lot of conceptual work to do at Washington to break all these barriers on the US institutional approach.

But probably the greatest efforts to integrate the 3 “D” remain in Africa. If Portugal has a positive experience on this, it should share it with the US Embassy because it will affect embassies all over the world – this process calls for an integrated country strategy, which is going to be written by the Embassies not just in Africa, but all over the world.

That is the only place where the US Government comes together as a whole in foreign policy: it is at the level of a country team at the Embassy, where a strong Ambassador can make the Aid mission, the Department of Justice people or the Department of Labor people, the defense organizations work together and have a single unified approach. But this is going to be a huge work for the US, a working process.

Question 6: Round six of questions was again focused on piracy in Somalia and the Gulf of Guinea, questioning whether the involvement of Al-Shabaab and Boko-Haram could lead to an international intervention in the Gulf of Guinea similar to that in Somalia, including a naval force if the piracy escalates to terrorist operations affecting international interests.

The problems in the two regions seem to be very different. The situation in the Horn of Somalia is piracy pure and simple, while in the Gulf of Guinea is high seas’ criminality, and this is an important conceptual difference. Piracy is about lawless people seizing vessels on the high sea and high seas’ criminality is a complex problem. It’s land basis on its origin, it’s about Nigeria, it has to do with the Nigerian weak state and there are many people in positions of power controlling the high seas’ criminality.

NATO intervention in Somalia has been effective; piracy is down markedly in recent years. It is also down in the Gulf of Guinea, but once again appears to be growing. It appears to be related with the end

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of the amnesty program in Nigeria itself, the financing to the groups that were given amnesty is ending and once again they are resuming criminal activity related to robbing petroleum, both in land and sea. NATO will not likely respond organizing a second naval intervention; the proper response (since a navy response in the Gulf of Guinea would be attacking the symptoms and not the cause), is to face the question of institutional corruption and the weakness of the rule of law in the states of the region. These are two different sets of problems, although both of them involving criminal activity at the sea. Better to organize a response built around African institutions; the navies are weak there but the response should be to organize more effective coast guards law enforcement capabilities, either than naval capabilities pure and simple.

Question 7: It was asked whether there are security issues foreseen for the next decade that could affect direct private investment in Mozambique, taking into account the growing Islamic influence in that country.

Mozambique stands now at a crossroad; Renamo appears to be pressing the government and threatening to resume the fight from Gorongoza and the bush. The situation in the East coast of Africa is complex, taking into account cultural and trade patterns. The weakness of the states in Mozambique and Tanzania is troubling and there is a huge movement of narcotics from central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as people into Tanzania, and then moving towards Europe and the West.

What is seen time and time again is the corrosive impact of that kind of activity, the money that represents on the state structure. Tanzania is a fairly successful state, President Quet Masire has done a great job there, but the kind of money this represents is troubling, and what this can do to undermine a reasonable successful state is troubling - more so in the case of Mozambique where the state is not that strong, the institutions are not strong, the economy is not that strong, the kind of situation is more challenging, as money and drugs are beginning to flow through and corruption follows inevitably in their way. It is going to be a challenge in the coming years, especially when Mozambique tries to simultaneously develop this massive new offshore

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resources now discovered.

Thankfully the drug problem did not follow in Angola what diamonds and oil did; one does not know what Angola would have become If it faced this sort of narcotic challenge at the same time as all the other resources have started to flow at a massive scale on the course of this last decade. However, one should not be so much gloomy as one should be thankful for suddenly Mozambique is confronting this problem of vast resources. Hopefully some countries, such as Norway which has a vast track on this, can help them to manage these inflows in ways that strengthen the state and foster development, rather than undercut the state and lead to massive corruption problems, weakening the rule of law and condemning people to poverty.

It is going to require a significant intervention by the international community. When someone from Washington shows up in Luanda and says “I’m here from Washington and I want to help”, the reaction is not 100% welcome given the history of involvement of US with Angola during the cold war. The US ability to help Angola achieving common goals improves when the US works multilaterally. It is less threatening to Angola, Mozambique or South Africa if the US partners with them, in their multilateral processes, rather than trying to bring out US bilateral processes or to create US multilateral processes.

Partnering with South Africa in ongoing multilateral maritime exercises or involving India and Brazil is more acceptable in Pretoria than the US saying “hey let’s organize a naval exercise together”. Something similar is probably true with Luanda, where participation with the US in the multilateral processes that involves partners with whom the Angolans feel more comfortable (Brazil, Portugal, Italy, whoever) is a model that should be looked collectively more seriously, as a way forward to help countries addressing the challenges in a way that is more on their comfort zone, where they feel more comfortable working. Given Portugal’s historical ties with these places, it could take the lead on organizing multilateral efforts, which the US could then support but not dominate, as domination of the US is what these countries feel threaten by.

Mozambique is a country the world is not paying enough attention to, and is one of the coming challenges.

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Question 8: the eighth round of questions evolved around the linkages between security and economic interests. Will third countries be ready to intervene on security matters without a vested commercial agenda? And foreign intervention linked to commercial interests will not bear the risk to be seen as foreign occupation? On the other hand, offering military training to fragile democracies will not result in armed forces acting at the political level? And how can we control the transference of civil technologies that can be used for military purposes?

Security is the fulcrum for many states, but security can only be thought in terms of the 3 “D”: security comes more through diplomacy and development than through defense; at least that is what one would like to see in the case of Africa. The instinct of too many African regimes is to put all the emphasis on defense rather than fund the other 2 “D”, or improve the level of life of people in those countries.

Perhaps there is a fourth “D” that should be used in this context that is Democracy. It will be unlikely to achieve security without a proper development, democracy and diplomacy as well.

On the question of “who pays and who are the partners?” there is a need to identify willing and capable partners. Part of their willingness is grounded in common values and mutual interests. It is much easier to think of a longer term security, developmental, democratic partnership with a country like South Africa, which has a relatively strong democratic institutional framework and where good governance is relatively strong in the African context. It is much easier to think of developing a much more enduring partnership with South Africa than it is with Zimbabwe. When the military sometimes talk about capacity building as teaching them how to do this and to do that, one should ask, for example, if you teach the Burundians to be snipers what can prevent them to turn the guns on you the next week, unless you focus on the building of this enduring relationship?

Why has NATO succeeded so well? NATO exists today, long after the Soviet Union disappeared as a threat because it developed those habits of cooperation, because all of its members share common values and there is a relatively common

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perspective on the world. That doesn’t mean there are not differences in particular issues, but all allies believe in democracy, good governance, the rule of law; and if there is not fundamental work to develop those kind of partnerships with African countries, than anything one does in the defense area is built on sand, because it will be eroded the first time the regime changes, and the regime will be fragile in the first place, and likely subject to change if it’s not the kind of stable democracy. Democracy really represents the best hope for Africa and for the peoples of Africa. Effective investments in strengthening democratic institutions and in the rule of law are the most effective way to build security in Africa. To the extent that can be done, then African countries will want to invest less in purely military park, buying guns, tanks, airplanes, helicopters and all the nice toys that soldiers like to have. Because the regimes feel necessary to defend themselves against their own people in the first instance - which is after all where this money is spent, not defending the borders of the nation against some national external enemy, but really having a strong security apparatus to defend the regime against its own people.

The question on dual-use technology is always been a difficult one, and even more complex in the information age, when much of the high technology and much of what is done in terms of security really relies on informatics, on information, on computers and networks, and the line between civilian use and military use is getting ever more blurred.

Question 9: The questions focused on security situations in the Mediterranean and the Sahel and the absence of a common international answer, sometimes with lack of consensus on the nature of the issues and the response strategies. After the spring revolutions in the Maghreb and the terrorist threats in the Sahel, a process of redefinition of EU policies started with the concept of Extended Neighborhood implying the extension of cooperation to the neighborhood of the countries with which the EU establishes partnerships (the Sahel). The 5 + 5 initiative is developing its Cooperation in the military and defense spheres, but dialogue is yet to be effective. How to build a new cooperative concept and create synergies, among US, EU and NATO to answer to these new threats?

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It is possible that things will get worse before they get better. The recognition that challenges in North Africa require multilateral solutions is not yet acquired, as the North African partners don’t yet recognize the threat, and countries like Nigeria and Morocco do not yet show the willingness to tackle these problems; they are still trying to deal with them independently, internally or see other problems as more significant and don’t share a common assessment of the nature and seriousness of the threat. Possibly things will have to get worse before they are ready to come to the table and join with the US and the EU in the kind of multilateral network solutions that have to be built.

For a countless of times over the last thirty years a lot of people talked about Marshall plans, but the main reason why there’s never been a second Marshall plan is probably because there is never been a second set of conditions that would make the Marshall plan succeed. One of the fundamental flaws of the concept of development, philosophically, is the idea of applying Marshal Plans to different situations. The reason why the Marshall plan worked so well is because Europe already had the education levels, already had the experience and the basic business institutions to become prosperous. World War II simply took away the means, so one had to restore the means, and the basic conditions were already there. However, what is now on the table is to create the basic conditions and provide the means at the same time, and there’s a world of a difference between those two models.

The Marshall plan was not just about development, it was about providing a lone to Europe to get back on its feet - the bicycles in the factory and everything else was gone as a result of the war but the Europeans already had all the knowhow. If the question was just a couple of billion dollars, the money could be found, but it is more than that.

Question 10: the last set of questions was around the nature of the religious war in the Sahel and the North of Africa.

Since the change in the priorities of International security induced by the 2001 terrorist attack to the US, the nature of the terrorist war has been equaled to a war between radical Islam and the West; this simplification hides the fact that there is a struggle

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within political Islam that is possibly more crucial than the “Huntingtonian” civilization clash. This kind of struggle is evident in the Sahel and the North of Africa and what is at stake is the existence of opposite concepts about the relationship between religion and politics. So, when someone asks whether Hezbollah and Iran are involved in the Sahel, one misses a fundamental point, the point that the Shiite interpretation is considered an enemy to the radical Sunni groups acting in that region. If we add to this situation last week decision in the EU Council to approve bilateral military help to the opposition (mostly Sunni) groups in Syria, we see some European countries disregard the probable route those guns will follow to the hands of extremist anti-western terrorist groups attacking western interests and European people as it has occurred in Libya. We are, therefore, in the presence of a complex mix of security and strategic conundrum where what goes in Middle East ends in the Sahel and the African vicinities.

So, how does the US look at the situation in the Sahel? What should effectively be considered a greater danger, the Iran and Hezbollah or the radical extremism of Al Qaeda kind of groups – which by the way were initially trained and armed by the Americans in Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight against the former USSR)? How does the US see this ongoing struggle within political Islam? A second question that ultimately relates with the region we are discussing has to do with the broad security and economic implications of the US decision to attain self-sufficiency in the production of oil and gas by 2020, taking advantage of the new technologies used in Shell deposits – is this decision changing the course of the relationship and the US strategic positions towards the Middle East?

Samantha Powers became well known when she wrote a book about the genocides in Africa called “A problem from Hell” - probably she chose the wrong subject for that title, because the issues we are talking about are really the problem from hell, because “we are dammed if we do and damned if we don’t”: we are in hell either way. The various tensions within the Islamic world, between the Shias and Sunnis, Wahhabis and Salafis and all the other different tendencies actually represent two different visions not only in religion, but of governing of the state.

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Iran clearly sees itself as a nation state in the first instance, a deeply religiously founded nation state, but a nation state above all else, not part of some larger Islamic caliphate (as it is really the aspirations of Al-Qaeda, to recreate the caliphate and to export Islam again to the world, in some aspects recreating the earlier success of Islam in the centuries after Mohammed).

Do Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, the other sort of traditional nation states really have more in common than what divides them, even if they don’t see it because they look at it from religious perspectives? And if that is the case, how do the outsiders articulate that in a way that actually permit them to see it and to agree with it, to recognize that the goals of Al-Qaeda movements are actually more a threat to them that it is to others? This provides a very interesting perspective to reimagine responses to the immediate violent extremist threat that is complicated further by the fact that Iran plays both sides of this issue - they certainly have shown that they are no friends of Al-Qaeda, they have shown that they are no friends of the Taliban, they have not acted decisively to hurt the US in Afghanistan over a decade now, because the US presence there is less of a threat to Iran than the Taliban state was. The present US relation with Iran has a lot of particularities that go back to 1979 where the US traditionally had more in common. Iran was one of US bastions of relationship with the Middle East – it may that the answer for being foes lies with the US so much as it lies with Iran.

The oil and energy question is also very crucial, as it is obvious that if you could develop alternatives to Middle Eastern oil, the Middle East will fall away as a geostrategic issue. In the same way, Russia becomes less important, less powerful, if the Russian oil and natural gas supplies that Europe depends on, are substituted by other forms of energy. We are probably witnessing a geostrategic shift in the balance of power globally, as the discovery of shell gas start to minimize the importance of the holdings of the Middle East and Russia; now, is not enough to make a go away completely… We all know if it took Saudi Arabia off the oil grid, the world will collapse, because they still represent a huge proportion of the energy consume; but the shift is beginning.

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The interesting questions are: will the environmental concerns lead to the American government for example not developing these new shell gas resources? People will oppose the fracking technology when they debate, or not? The American sort of love affair with the automobile may lead to the conclusion that the US will develop the shell gas and probably develop on a scale that allows major exports to Europe and thereby minimize Russia ability to use gas as a geostrategic weapon against Europe. The reasons why the CEO of Exxon or Mobil are not bending the future of their corporations on the cleaning asset, behind developing alternative energies, tells us how American industry has lost sight of a sort of corporative responsibility and is totally focused on answering the shareholders bottom line today.

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3. BIOGRAPHY NOTE About the Speaker Christopher Dell a senior U.S. diplomat is Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Ambassador Dell was appointed as the civilian deputy to the Commander on September 15, 2012.

As U.S. Africa Command’s DCMA, Ambassador Dell directs the command’s plans and programs associated with health, humanitarian assistance and de-mining action, disaster response, security sector reform, and Peace Support Operations. He also directs Outreach, Strategic Communication and AFRICOM’s partner-building functions, as well as assuring that policy development and implementation are consistent with U.S. Foreign Policy.

Previously, he served as the Ambassador to the Republic of Kosovo from 2009 to 2012. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Kabul from 2007 to 2009. Prior to that, Ambassador Dell was the Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe from 2004 until July 2007, and from 2001-2004, he was the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Angola.

A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, with the rank of Career Minister, Ambassador Dell also served as the Chief of Mission, U.S. Office, Pristina, Kosovo from 2000 to 2001. Prior to this post, he was the Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Sofia, Bulgaria from 1997 to 2000; Deputy Director, Office of Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs from 1994 to 1996; and Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Maputo, Mozambique from 1991 to 1994.

In addition, Ambassador Dell served as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs from 1989 to 1991 and as Executive Assistant to the Special Negotiator for Greek Bases Agreement, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs from 1987 to 1989. Ambassador Dell was also the Desk Officer for Spain and Portugal, Bureau of

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European and Canadian Affairs from 1986 to 1987; Staff Assistant, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs from 1985 to 1986; Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Lisbon, Portugal from 1984 to 1985; Vice Consul, U.S. Consulate, Oporto, Portugal from 1983 to 1984; and Vice Consul, U.S. Consulate, Matamoros, Mexico from 1981 to 1983.

Ambassador Dell has received numerous awards, including the Ibrahim Rugova Peace Medal by the President of Kosovo, Kosovo’s highest order. He also received the Meritorious Service Medal of the Kosovo Security Force for his contributions to the development of the KSF upon the completion of his service in 2012. Ambassador Dell was awarded the Presidential Distinguished Service Award in 2004 and in 2003 he received the State Departments Robert C. Frasure Award for his role in helping Angola through the aftermath of its civil war. In 2000, the President of Bulgaria granted Ambassador Dell the Order of the Madara Horseman, First Degree. Ambassador Dell also received a Kellett Fellowship from Columbia University (for study at Oxford University) in 1978.

Ambassador Dell graduated in 1980 from Balliol College, Oxford University, where he earned an M.Phil. degree in international relations. He received his B.A. in 1978 from Columbia College, Columbia University, where he graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa. He is fluent in Spanish, Portuguese, and Bulgarian.

SOBRE O IMVF O Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF) é uma fundação de direito privado e uma Organização Não Governamental para o Desenvolvimento (ONGD) que realiza ações de ajuda humanitária, de cooperação e educação para o desenvolvimento económico, cultural e social, realiza estudos e trabalhos científicos nos vários domínios do conhecimento, bem como fomenta e divulga a cultura dos países de expressão oficial portuguesa.

ABOUT IMVF Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF) is a private foundation and a Non-Governmental Development Organization (NGDO) that carries out humanitarian aid and economic, cultural and social development cooperation and education. It also conducts studies and produces scientific papers on several fields of knowledge, and promotes and disseminates the culture of countries whose official language is Portuguese.

Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr Rua de São Nicolau, 105 1100-548 Lisboa Portugal Tel.: + 351 213 256 300 Fax: + 351 213 471 904 E-mail: info@imvf.org www.imvf.org