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Volume 46, No. 3 August -October 2006

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A F R I C A Q U A R T E R L Y !

Evolution of the African Union

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Western media’s reporting of conflicts

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Gender issues in Tunisia

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Mazrui’s perspectives on conflict

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In Conversation: Zimbabwean Minister of International Relations Obert Mpofu

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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to South Africa

Indian Council for Cultural Relations Azad Bhavan Indraprastha Estate New Delhi - 110 002 E-mail: africa.quarterly@gmail.com Registered with the Registrar of Newspapers of India Regd No. 14380/61

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Indian Journal of African Affairs Volume 46 No. 3, August-October 2006

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR CULTURAL RELATIONS NEW DELHI

Q U A R T E R L Y

contents

A F R I C A

BILATERAL VISIT: PRIME MINISTER MANMOHAN SINGH IN SOUTH AFRICA Prime Minister Singh and President Thabo Mbeki signed the Tshwane Declaration during the visit, which also marked the centenary of Mahatma Gandhi’s satyagraha movement.

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3RD INDIA-AFRICA PROJECT PARTNERSHIP CONCLAVE As many as 326 delegates from various African nations as well as nearly 400 from India participated in the event that discussed projects straddling various sectors. Officials said projects worth an estimated $17 billion were discussed during the conclave.

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TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF AFRICAN UNITY Ankush B. Sawant traces efforts at forging African unity and the evolution of the African Union to combat key problems affecting the continent.

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36 THE WEST’S REPORTING OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA Ibrahim Seaga Shaw writes that the Western media’s reporting of the civil war in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2001 was more evocative than diagnostic, and reflective of their biases.

13 DJIBOUTI JOINS INDIA-ASSISTED PAN-AFRICAN NETWORK

Djibouti has signed on for the ambitious India-assisted PanAfrican Network that aims to bridge the digital divide and dispense tele-education and tele-medicine to 53 countries of the African Union.

34 IN CONVERSATION: PERSPECTIVES 22 MAZRUI’S ON CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE Laurence Juma examines seminal ideas of celebrated scholar Ali Mazrui and maps out the path for conflict-resolution and peace-building in Africa that continues to reel under violent conflicts.

With Zimbabwe’s Minister of Industry and International Relations Obert Mpofu on how India’s developmental model is a source of inspiration for African nations –– and the need to encourage greater business ties as well as people-topeople contact, especially Indian tourists.

64 BOOKS & IDEAS 70 DOCUMENTS 76 INCREDIBLE INDIA 78 CONTRIBUTORS

THE VEIL AND THE RESILIENT WOMEN OF TUNISIA Rashmi Kapoor tells an inspiring story of how Tunisian women, helped by the state’s enlightened policies, have scripted their own destiny by deftly blending tradition and modernity in their approach towards life and work.

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Rates of Subscription Annual Three-year Subscription Subscription Rs. 100.00 Rs. 250.00 US $40.00 US $100.00 £16.0 £40.0 (Including airmail postage) Subscription rates as above payable in advance preferably by bank draft/MO in favour of Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi.

Printed and Published by Pavan K. Varma Director-General Indian Council for Cultural Relations Azad Bhavan, Indraprastha Estate New Delhi - 110002 Editor: Manish Chand Cover Photo: Stuart O’Sullivan Getty Images Caption: South Africa, Western Cape Province, Paarl, friends on Taal Monument

The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), founded in 1950 to strengthen cultural ties and promote understanding between India and other countries, functions under the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. As part of its effort, the Council publishes, apart from books, six periodicals in five languages –– English quarterlies (Indian Horizons and Africa Quarterly), Hindi Quarterly (Gagananchal), Arabic Quarterly (Thaqafat-ul-Hind), Spanish bi-annual (Papeles de la India) and French bi-annual (Recontre Avec l’Inde).

Africa Quarterly (Indian Journal of African Affairs) is published every three months.

The views expressed in the articles included in this journal are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICCR. All rights reserved. No part of this journal may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any from or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the permission of the ICCR.

Editorial correspondence and manuscripts, including book reviews, should be addressed to: The Editor Africa Quarterly Indian Council for Cultural Relations Azad Bhavan Indraprastha Estate New Delhi-110 002 E-mail: africa.quarterly@gmail.com

ISBN 0001-9828 6

August-October 2006

A F R I C A

Q U A R T E R L Y

■ From the Editor’s Desk

Rescuing Africa from conflicts and cliches

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frica continues to be a security nightmare plagued as it is by a hundred mutinies and ongoing civil wars that see no sign of ending.

A more creative approach to conflict-resolution and peace building mechanisms is, therefore, of paramount importance if this continent is to regain its confidence and its lustre on the global stage.

This is where ideas of Ali Mazrui, a celebrated scholar who has thought deeply and imaginatively about key issues of security, governance, corruption and human rights in post-colonial Africa, acquire an added resonance and deserve a fresh scrutiny.

Mazrui had an overarching holistic vision of the future of Africa that will permit the continent “full potential of intellectual diversity”, an acceptance of dissent, intellectuals educated into habits of self-reliance and “a new phase of indigenous creativity”.

But sadly, Mazrui’s vision of the future is betrayed by a contemporary Africa beset with many ethnic and fratricidal conflicts. In a thoughtful essay on ‘Mazrui’s Perspectives on Conflict and Violence’, Laurence Juma explores the genealogy of the so-called “tribal wars” and “ethnic conflicts” and examines seminal ideas on how the African continent can resolve its conflicts and build lasting peace and prosperity without shunning currents of modernisation. Juma also digs deeper into Mazrui’s critique of colonialism and its corrosive effects on the very fabric of African polity, society, culture and economy.

In the context of the chronic instability that continues to scar Africa, Ankush B. Sawant traces efforts at forging African unity and the evolution of the African Union that is now handling pan-African issues and fleshing out its strategy to exercise its weight in the U.N. and other international fora. Sawant places the theme of African unity in its larger historical perspective and shows how, despite mind-boggling diversities, the people of the continent managed to come together under the AU and formed various regional bodies to boost intra-continental linkages.

But this is at best a very generous estimate. Sawant scrutinises strides made by Africa in its onward march to unity and finds that while it looks impressive on paper, ground realities do not quite bear out this optimistic picture. He cuts through the seductive rhetoric of unity and puts in the forefront fundamental questions that impinge directly on the future of this continent.

“Besides, if African unity is not helping in mitigating the miseries of the people, that unity is illusory. And if we look from this angle, Africa has a long way to go in translating its otherwise impressive record of unity into ground realities,” Sawant concludes in his searching

essay on ‘Evolution of African Unity.’

Besides violence and conflict, Africa is also a victim of prejudice. And nowhere is this prejudice more evident than in the Western media discourse on Africa that gets reflected in stereotypes and clichéd descriptions that obscures the innate vitality of this continent and the complexity of issues involved.

Ibrahim Seaga Shaw puts the spotlight on this systematic bias in media’s representation of Africa by providing detailed and unflinching analysis of the Western media discourse about the civil war in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2001.

In his article, ‘The West’s Reporting of Conflict in Africa”, Shaw examines the reasons that lead journalists to employ what he calls “stereotypes and preformatted frames of analysis” and shows how these representations produced “communication obstacles” and influenced these journalists to do “more of evocative than diagnostic reporting”. His article revolves around a conference organised by a media advocacy group in London in 2001 that brought together several British and European journalists who were “bold enough to admit fundamental mistakes in judgement” in their reporting of Africa.

Shaw’s article also illuminates the larger issue of communications and image management in the media-saturated world and argues eloquently for freeing the continent from the tyranny of clichés foisted by those who control influential levers of public discourse.

Grand themes of peace and conflict apart, this issue of Africa Quarterly also has an inspirational story about the unwavering resolve of women in Tunisia to script their own redemption song. Rashmi Kapoor gently lifts the veil that has obscured the creative exuberance and resilience of Tunisian women and shows a “well-balanced traditionally modern Tunisian woman who is socially liberated and a pioneer in stepping out for dignified existence.” Read her article ‘Veils and the Resilient Women of Tunisia’ for an exhilarating story of how enlightened policies of the Tunisian government combined with their unstoppable drive for a better life have made Tunisian women what they are: Self-confident, modern, progressive and proactive in succeeding in what they do.

And for those who swear by the continuing strength and vitality of India-Africa relations, here is what Zimbabwean Minister of Industry and International Relations Obert Mpofu says in an interview. “India’s all-round development is a source of inspiration for us. Africa views India as a leader of developing countries,” says Mpofu.

Surely, it will take more than inspiration for Africa to reclaim its place under the global sun. But where there is spirit, there is way. Happy reading, and let a hundred ideas bloom and flower forth!

–– Manish Chand

August-October 2006

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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and South African President Thabo Mbeki on the ceremonial dais at a reception at the Union Buildings in Pretoria on October 2. The two leaders later signed the Tshwane Declaration that covers issues like defence, strategic cooperation and cultural ties.

India, S. Africa salute Gandhi, to strengthen ties

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elebrating the centenary of Mahatma The declaration expressed deep concern over internationGandhi’s passive resistance movement satya- al terrorism and trans-border crime and said India and South graha in Pretoria, India and South Africa on Africa would work towards adopting the Comprehensive October 2 pushed their strategic ties further Convention on International Terrorism under the United with two pacts and decided to explore ways Nations soon. to collaborate in civilian nuclear energy.

“The ultimate objective is total eradication of this scourge “South Africa and India reaffirm their commitment to a so that barbaric attacks such as the ones carried out on July 11, global order of peace, equality and justice,” Prime Minister 2006, in Mumbai and other parts of the world do not recur,” Manmohan Singh and South African President Thabo Mbeki the two leaders said. said in a joint declaration.

President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh reiterated their Called the Tshwane Declaration, the document (See conviction that peace and development were indivisible and Documents: Page 70) signed by the two leaders covers a host of good governance was the best-known way to ensure both. issues –– from defence and strategic The two countries signed two pacts –– cooperation to economic and cultural ties for establishing ties between the Indian Pacts Signed that go back more than a century.

Railways and South Africa’s Spoornet ■ Cooperation in the field of The declaration had a significant stateand cooperation in education –– and education. ment on nuclear cooperation stating the agreed to conclude a preferential trade ■ MoU between Spoornet and two countries agreed that nuclear fuel pact at the earliest.

Indian Railways They furthermore could play an important role in ensuring “It would provide a significant incennoted that the following agreesafe, sustainable and non-polluting tive to the business communities of the ments will be signed imminently, sources of energy to meet rising global two countries to explore mutually-beneonce the regulatory procedures demands. ficial commercial opportunities and conhave been completed.

The document not only reaffirmed tribute to the growth of bilateral trade,” ■ Exemption of visa requirements the inalienable right of all states to the the two leaders said about the trade pact. for holders of diplomatic and offipeaceful application of nuclear energy, They also categorically said that they cial passports. consistent with global commitments, but would soon sign two pacts –– to exempt ■ Programme of cooperation in also agreed to explore approaches for visa requirements for officials and diploscience and technology. cooperation with adequate safeguards. mats and design a programme of cooper-

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A F R I C A ation in science and technology.

The two leaders recalled that the Red Fort Declaration, signed during President Mbeki’s visit to India in 2003, had recognised the comparative advantages of the two countries and had resulted in doubling of bilateral trade and investment.

“They acknowledged, however, that the full potential in this regard was yet to be tapped and reaffirmed their determination to explore these opportunities to their optimal extent,” the declaration said.

The areas identified included energy, tourism, health, automobiles, components, chemicals, dyes, textiles, fertilisers, information technology, small and medium enterprises and infrastructure.

Q U A R T E R L Y

India was appreciated for its role in establishing the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme and for Manmohan Singh’s assurance that the number of such projects in South Africa would be increased from 55 to 100.

The two leaders saluted Gandhi on his 137h birth anniversary –– particularly for the global role he played by following the principles of truth, non-violence and self-service that form the core of the philosophy of satyagraha.

“It was the unflinching spirit of Mahatma Gandhi that contributed decisively towards the demise of British Raj (rule); similarly, it inspired the struggle against apartheid,” the two leaders said.

■ –– By Minu Jain

South Africa promises India support on nuclear deal

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ndia can expect support from South Africa when its civil nuclear agreement with the United States comes up before the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), South African President Thabo Mbeki indicated in no uncertain terms to visiting Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Pretoria on October 2.

The two leaders, who met in the South African legislative capital for bilateral talks that followed two days of interaction in Durban in connection with the 100th anniversary celebrations of Mahatma Gandhi’s satyagraha, discussed the possibility of civilian nuclear cooperation during their 75-minute talks.

While the restricted meeting between the two leaders and select officials went on for 50 minutes, several South African ministers, including the Trade and Industry Minister, joined later for the delegation level talks.

“After it (the civilian nuclear deal) is passed by the U.S. Congress, it will go before the Nuclear Suppliers Group of which South Africa is a member. I hope that when that happens, South Africa will take a sympathetic view of India’s concerns,” Manmohan Singh told reporters at a joint press conference with Mbeki.

Mbeki responded by saying: “We have discussed the matter. We are all awaiting the outcome of the processes at the U.S. Congress.”

“South Africa has no problem in that. When the matter is to be decided, South Africa will surely support it,” he added, saying that the matter had been discussed by the NSG in its meeting in Brazil.

Both Houses of the U.S. Congress has since passed the bill on the nuclear deal. It awaits a reconciliation meeting, tobe followed by a “yes-no” vote, after which it will be signed into law

by President George W. Bush.

The issue of United Nations reforms came up as well in the talks. “During our discussions, we decided to strengthen our cooperation in the reform of the U.N. system and, in particular, reform and expansion of the U.N. Security Council, without which the overall reform of the U.N. will remain incomplete,” Manmohan Singh said in his opening remarks.

Asked whether India would support South Africa as a per-

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and South African President Thabo Mbeki at a joint press conference at the Union Buildings in Pretoria on October 2.

manent member of the Security Council, he said: “South Africa is eminently entitled to that place by virtue of its standing.” Mbeki added in a humorous aside later to a question on satyagraha –– the passive resistance movement that Mahatma Gandhi began here a century ago –– that it was not necessary for India and South Africa to mobilise a campaign of civil disobedience. “We’ll use other means (for reforms in the Security Council).”

The South African President also laid stress on the need for sharing information on terrorism during the brief media interaction. Referring to the 7/11 Mumbai blasts and the subsequent investigations, Mbeki said: “The kind of work in Mumbai becomes important for our own law enforcement agencies. We would want to draw strongly on India’s experience.” He put forward the supposition that if the terrorist had flown in from South Africa and information was being shared then such acts could possibly be prevented.

“Sharing must be done as extensively as possible. When any act of terror occurs, surely the war against terrorism has not been won,” Mbeki declared.

In his opening remarks, the president expressed satisfaction at the trade and investment relations but qualified that by saying: “It is clear that more can be done in that area.”

■ –– By Minu Jain

August-October 2006

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‘Nelson Mandela is the greatest living Gandhian’

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escribing him as the “greatest living Gandhian”, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on October 2 met former South African President Nelson Mandela inn Johannesburg and conveyed to him the good wishes of the people of India.

“It is a privilege to meet you. You are the greatest living Gandhian,” Manmohan Singh told the 88-year-old Mandela during the 25-minute meeting that took place on the 137th birthday of Mahatma Gandhi.

“Your contribution to the welfare of millions in Africa and the world is aweinspiring,” Manmohan Singh told the South African elder statesman.

The Prime Minister also conveyed to Mandela the “warmest regards” of the people of India and the “personal regards” of Congress Party president Sonia Gandhi, the chairperson of India’s ruling coalition.

In his remarks, Mandela said he was happy to receive Manmohan Singh, who was in South Africa to observe the centenary of the satyagraha movement launched by Mahatma Gandhi.

“India and Indians have played a positive role in the growth and development of South Africa,” Mandela noted, and also fondly recalled the visit to South Africa two years ago of Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam.

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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with legendary South Africa leader Nelson Mandela in Johannesburg on October 2. At right is Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma.

Archbishop Tutu to receive Gandhi Peace Prize

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rchbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa has been selected for the Gandhi Peace Prize for 2005 in recognition of “his contribution towards social and political transformation through dialogue and tolerance”, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced on October 2.

The 75-year-old renowned human rights activist won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984.

The Prime Minister, on a three-day visit of South Africa, made the

announcement after inaugurating a permanent exhibition, ‘M.K. Gandhi: Prisoner of Conscience’ at the Old Fort in Johannesburg on the 137th birth anniversary of the Mahatma.

Terming Archbishop Tutu “a follower of the vision of the Apostle of Peace”, Singh said: “In recognition of his... contribution towards social and political transformation through dialogue and tolerance... the government of India has decided to award the 2005 Gandhi Peace Prize to him.”

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9/11 symbolises choice world must make: Manmohan Singh

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/11, which symbolises the twin evils of violence and hatred that Mahatma Gandhi rejected, also marks the anniversary of the non-violent protest movement he launched and presents a choice the world must make, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said.

The Prime Minister was speaking at the inauguration of a permanent exhibition ‘M.K. Gandhi: Prisoner of Conscience’ at the historic Old Fort where the Mahatma was imprisoned four times during his formative years in South Africa. “This year is the centenary of the movement, which the Mahatma launched in South Africa, which contributed to India’s freedom, influenced many liberation struggles of

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South Africa... But the question is sometimes asked –– are the Mahatma and the practice of satyagraha relevant today?

“The answer was given five years ago when the date on which satyagraha was launched became known almost universally as 9/11. (It) has come to symbolise the twin evils of violence and hatred that the Mahatma rejected.

“September 11 now symbolises a choice that the world has to make. Which is the path we should take –– the path of a peaceful struggle for justice, or the path of a brutal violence that targets innocents?” the Prime Minister noted on the occasion of Gandhi’s 137th birth anniversary on October 2.

“This is the legacy the city of Johannesburg has sought to preserve in this permanent exhibition,” he said.

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Q U A R T E R L Y

Projects worth $17 bn discussed at Africa Conclave

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three-day India-Africa “There is a new expectation and optiConclave ended on mism as modern India seeks to enhance October 11 in New its relationship with a resurgent Africa to Delhi with the two sides contribute to the development of a new discussing over 300 busiinternational order,” Narinder Chauhan, ness projects worth $17 billion and New Joint Secretary (West Africa) in the Delhi calling for “revitalisation of (their) Ministry of External Affairs, told delestrategic relationship” to build a new gates at the conference. international order.

The conclave, aimed at accelerating The third conclave on the India-Africa business and economic ties, was organProject Partnership saw 326 delegates ised by the Confederation of Indian from various African countries and 375 Industry in collaboration with the Export Indian delegates discussing projects stradImport Bank of India. dling different sectors, including infras“The new matrix of engagement tructure, information technology, agribetween India and Africa is so multiculture, banking, finance, insurance and faceted and has so many different and small and medium industries (SMEs). substantive elements that allow us to India’s Africa diplomacy got a big move from a largely political engagement boost with African delegates and minisof the period of colonisation to a strong ters profusely thanking New Delhi for engagement on a developmental agenda its support in empowering Africa through in recognition of their priorities which transfer of technology and capacityare relevant today,” Chauhan stressed. building projects.

Underlining “the tripod of technoloAnand Sharma, Minister of State for gy, trade and training” on which which External Affairs, said the India-Africa the India-Africa relationship rests, Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma conclaves were reflective of the growing Chauhan called for the setting up of an trade and investment ties between the institutional mechanism to enhance the two regions. The Minister said that future trade and invest- strategic relationship between India and Africa. ment links between India and the African nations would be “India would like to revitalise its strategy for collaboration governed by public-private partnerships. He added that India with Africa on an institutionalised basis so that we can bring had a key role in capacitating the different economic sectors in at the Pan-African level the same vigour and enthusiasm that Africa, particularly in the sphere of human resources devel- so happily coexists in India’s relations with African countries opment. on a bilateral basis,” she said.

The Minister said that while the inter-regional trade and Africa has institutional arrangements to meet with the investment potential was huge, the focus areas were ICT, agri- European Union, France, China and Japan and is planning culture and irrigation, healthcare and sanitation, and trans- similar institutionalised interaction with South America and portation.

South Korea.

He said that access to low-cost financing was imperative for India-Africa bilateral trade has risen from $967 million in promoting joint ventures. EXIM Bank has made this possible 1991 to $9.14 billion in 2005. India’s engagement with Africa to a considerable extent by extending large lines of credit ($250 in the area of infrastructure and development is growing and million) to a set of African nations. encompasses cooperation in the field of energy, water Minister Sharma said the project partnerships could lead to resources, road building and air connectivity. India has also beneficial results if there was adequate focus on the develop- offered to share its experiences in agro-engineering, irrigation ment of SMEs. Microenterprises help to generate huge technologies, water resources, management and seeds techemployment and promote decentralised growth processes. nologies to develop agriculture in Africa.

The SME sector houses 1.3 million industrial units that proBesides empowering Africa through Indian Technical and vide employment to 27 million workers.

Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme and educational The Minister also stated that India could help the African institutions through its Aid to Africa budget, India became the nations to bridge the digital divide. He assured the gathering first Asian country to become a full member of the African that the Pan-African Network (PAN), to which India has con- Capacity Building Fund with a contribution of $1 million to tributed substantially, will be operational “at the earliest”. The building capacity for sustainable development and poverty network will link up all institutions of excellence in diverse alleviation. fields and serve to democratise the access to information. The India is also helping build a pan-African e-network that will Minister acknowledged Africa’s efforts to step up conflict-res- bridge the digital divide to provide tele-medicines and teleolution in regions that have suffered long years of civil war. education to people of Africa.

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World leaders still failing to deliver on funding for HIV/AIDS, says ActionAid

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ithout urgent action, world leaders will fail to fulfil their promise of delivering universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment, prevention and care by 2010 according to the anti-poverty agency ActionAid. Every day 8,000 people die of AIDS related diseases yet the funding gap is still $10 billion short annually and only 20 percent of people living with AIDS are receiving anti-retroviral treatment.

“Rich countries are in danger of making a mockery of their own commitment to this fight,” said Aditi Sharma, Head of HIV/AIDS campaigns at ActionAid. “We cannot allow leaders to abandon the fight against AIDS as if it were some passing fashion.”

Africa continues to bear the brunt of the epidemic with 72 percent of global deaths caused by the virus, according to the latest 2006 UNAIDS report on the Global AIDS Epidemic.

Across Asia, only one in six people are receiving treatment while in India treatment remains at below 10 percent of need.

“More than a year after world leaders committed to universal access there is still no funding plan to finance this goal,” said Sharma.

Evidence shows that the response must focus on the rights of the most vulnerable groups –– sex workers, men who have sex with men and injecting drug users, to reverse the spread of AIDS, but governments are studiously avoiding them.

Young people between the ages of 1524 years now account for 40 percent of the 4.3 million new infections and two thirds of these are young women. But only 20 percent of all young women worldwide understand how to prevent HIV transmission.

“We must not allow prejudice and ignorance to diminish HIV/AIDS prevention efforts .

“Governments must allocate significant funds to back rhetoric on promoting the rights of women.

“The cost of treatment must be cut and healthcare must be accessible to prevent the death of millions of people,” added Sharma.

“While there is now some recognition that the fight against AIDS will not be won unless gender inequality and violence against women and girls are targeted, there is no government or donor around the world that is committing adequate funds or implementing the programmes needed to advance the sexual and reproductive rights of women and reduce their vulnerability,” she added.

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India to help Uganda host 2007 C’wealth Summit

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he Indian government has boosted Uganda’s preparations to host the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) with a donation of $2 million towards the transportation sector.

Ugandan Minister of Foreign Affairs Sam Kutesa was quoted by New Vision recently as saying the money will help purchase buses, garbage collection trucks and fire fighting equipment.

The Minister, who was briefing a cabinet sub-committee meeting on CHOGM chaired by Vice President Gilbert Bukenya, noted that preparations for the summit were on course.

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Ugandan Minister of Foreign Affairs Sam Kutesa

Bukenya commended the various committees for the progress in the

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preparations and urged for less bureaucracy in the implementation of CHOGM projects.

The meeting was considering financial allocations to the sub-committees that are due to receive funds for various activities under the summit preparations.

The government is estimated to spend some $70 million on hosting the summit that will see over 10,000 delegates visiting the east African country in a week.

The summit, involving 54 heads of governments is held every two years.

The last one was held in the November 2005 in Malta, an island country in the Mediterranean.

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Djibouti joins India-assisted Pan-African Network

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jibouti has signed on for the ambitious India-assisted Pan-African Network (PAN) that aims to bridge the digital divide and dispense tele-education and telemedicine to 53 countries of the African

The total project cost of PAN is estimated to be about $105 million, which will be a total grant from the Indian government. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs ministry is responsible for the project, while the TCIL is the implementing agency. Each country of Africa is expected to sign a counUnion. try agreement with the TCIL to participate in this project.

The agreement was signed between Djibouti and the The hub for the network will be located in Senegal.

Telecommunications Consultants “Bids have also been received by the PAN will consist of five (India) Limited (TCIL) in the Indian AU Commission to host the five regionregional universities, 53 Embassy in Addis Ababa. India’s ambasal leading universities and five Regional sador to Ethiopia Gurjit Singh was also super speciality hospitals (SSHs) of the learning centres, five present at this function which showcased network in Africa,” said a press release regional super speciality India’s information technology (IT) from the Indian Embassy. hospitals and 53 remote prowess and a new partnership with The network will consist of five Africa on the basis of technology and regional universities, 53 learning centers, hospitals in all the empowerment. five regional super speciality hospitals and countries of Africa. There 53 remote hospitals in all countries of Eleven countries in Africa have signed the agreements with the TCIL: Burkina will be six universities and Africa. There will be six universities and Faso, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, five super speciality hospitals from India five super speciality Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Mauritius, linked to the network. The six Indian hospitals from India linked educational institutions include the Tanzania, Senegal and Seychelles. to the network.

Many other countries of Africa have Indian Institutes of Science, Indira shown enthusiasm for the project that Gandhi National Open University promises to transform lives of ordinary Africans.

(IGNOU), Universities of Madras, Mumbai and Calcutta, The PAN, the brainchild of President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, and the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs). will be connected by a satellite and fibre optical network to proA pilot project has already been started in Ethiopia, which vide tele-medicine, tele-education and VVIP connectivity to will be the first beneficiary of the project in Africa. The nodal 53 countries of the AU. It is likely to revolutionize commu- centers for tele-education and tele-medicine will be located at nication and accelerate communication through out Africa the Addis Ababa University and the Black Lion Hospital and boost tremendous goodwill that exists for the country in respectively, with remote centers at Alemaya University and Africa.

Nekempt Hospital.

Suketu Patel of Seychelles elected president of COSAFA

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former Indian origin player of the Seychelles football team has been elected president of the Council of Southern Africa Football Associations (COSAFA).

Suketu Patel, re-elected as chairman of the Seychelles Football Federation on November 29, a post he has held since 1994, was up against 1988 African Footballer of the Year and Zambian legend Kalusha Bwalya and Namibia High Court judge Petrus Damaseb.

The election was held after Botswana’s Ismail Bhamjee stepped down from the post.

Patel, 54, a former Seychellois goalkeeper, has also served in the executive committee of the Confederation of African Football (CAF). He was also a member of the organising committee of

FIFA world under-17 championships.

COSAFA is a powerful football body comprising countries in the southern Africa Suketu Patel region.

Its 13 members are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique Namibia, South Africa, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

After his win, Patel, said he wants to change the way the Cosafa Cup is run.

“I’m bitterly against the current format and I don’t think the developmental aspect of the game is being fulfilled

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because we’re playing two matches in two days with amateur players basically,” he told BBC Sport.

“So, we have to work closely with all our members and to formulate plans that are acceptable to all of us and then move forward that way.”

For the last two years the Cosafa Cup has been played in a series of four-nation mini tournaments. The winners of each tournament, which are played over a single weekend, progress to the semifinals where they are joined by the reigning champions.

Patel admitted though that there are financial constraints involved and that he plans to discuss the matter with the various sponsors to find the best solutions to the problems. He said he would also consult Bwalya and Damaseb.

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Tracing the EVOLUTION of African unity Ankush B. Sawant traces efforts at forging African unity and the evolution of the African Union to combat key problems affecting the continent.

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he roots of African unity can be traced to an acute awareness among the African community scattered all over the world in general, and amongst black intellectuals in America in particular, of their suffering resulting from the slave trade, racialism and imperialism. This awareness gave birth to a race consciousness, which found its expression in a movement to “defend their rights, to protect their humanity, and to exhibit their fraternity”.1 Pan-Africanism had its origin here.

Though the first attempts to give the Pan-African movement an organised form were made as early as 1900, it remained dormant until it was revived by Du Bois, the most prominent intellectual leader and political activist of African Americans, after the First World War. In the inter-war period, Du Bois organised five Pan-African Conferences, all outside Africa. The first in Paris, in 1919, the second in London in 1921, a third again in London in 1923, the fourth in New York in 1927, and the fifth in Manchester in 1945. Although complete political equality for blacks, national self-determination, individual liberty and democratic socialism constituted the core elements of Pan-Africanism as expounded by Du Bois,2 he could not make much progress mainly because he largely relied on appeals and petitions to the European Governments and the League of Nations. His movement was mainly limited to the black “thinking intelligentsia”, and beyond this group he mainly depended on sympathetic white liberals to help restore the rights of blacks and seek their advancement.

Du Bois talked of cooperation with the white liberals and his moderate approach did not appeal to many black leaders like Marcus Garvey, a militant Jamaican black who wanted to meet white racialism with black racialism. Believing in racial purity, Garvey started a militant black movement. He advised blacks to go back to Africa. His slogan was “Africa for Africans, at home and abroad”.3 He founded a Negro “empire” in New York in 1920 and declared himself the Provisional President of Africa. Although Garvey’s was a real mass movement, it lasted hardly five years, leaving the field open to Du Bois’ PanAfrican movement.

Although Du Bois was not as militant as Garvey, he too was conscious of the race problem. This is clear from his famous

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statement: “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem on the colour line...”4 When he spoke of Africa, he did not refer it as a geographical expression. He referred to blacks in Africa. It was essentially a black identity movement rather than an African territorial movement. Therefore, north Africa was more or less out of the movement. In fact, states north of Sahara were considered closer to Europe than to Africa.

The Manchester Congress of 1945 By the end of the Second World War, the Pan-African movement had taken an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stance. This became evident at the Manchester Congress held in 1945. At this conference, some African leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, J. Annam, Kurankyi Taylor and S.L. Akintola, were present. The conference demanded national independence for all colonial peoples and asserted in unequivocal terms that the Africans were “determined to be free”.5 It gave a call to all colonial and subject peoples of the world to unite. This signified a new political dimension to the movement, which all these years had been essentially a black solidarity movement. The Congress also passed, for the first time, a resolution sympathising with the demands of North Africa.

Following the conference, political activities aimed at selfdetermination and elimination of Western rule emerged in various parts of Africa. This enlarged the scope for cooperation among the various nationalist movements in Africa, in both the Arab-speaking and the sub-Sahara regions. At this stage, George Padmore, a theoretician on Pan-Africanism, argued that the Pan Africanist rejects both white racialism and black chauvinism. It stands for racial co-existence on the basis of absolute equality and respect for the human personality... its perspective embraces the federation of regional self-governing countries and their ultimate amalgamation into a United States of Africa....6 Pan-Africanism at Home When Ghana became independent, Nkrumah made it clear that his country’s independence would not be meaningful unless it was linked with the total liberation of the African con-

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A F R I C A tinent. Ghana’s independence ceremony was attended, among others, by high-ranking delegations from several African countries. At the independence ceremony, Nkrumah held informal discussions with African delegations about the possibilities of convening a conference of African countries.

By mid-April 1957 Nkrumah had written to the heads of African states and governments about the proposed conference. He had further consultation with the African ambassadors in London at the time of the 1957 Commonwealth Conference.

The next milestone of the movement was the first Conference of Independent African States called by Nkrumah in April 1958 at Accra, the Ghana capital. The conference was to exchange views on matters of common interest; to explore ways and means of consolidating and safeguarding our hard-won independence; to strengthen economic and cultural ties between our countries; to find workable arrangement for helping our brothers still languishing under colonial rule...7 Invitations were sent to all independent African countries, including South Africa, which declined to attend the conference unless the colonial powers were invited. The conference was attended by eight independent African countries of which five were from north Africa. The conference was intended to be a summit meeting but was eventually conducted at the level of foreign ministers.

At this conference, Egypt, supported by Libya, wanted that Algeria be brought to the conference table and be given the status of a full participant. Other states, led by Ghana, objected to this on the ground that Algeria was not an independent country. Finally, evidently under Egyptian pressure, Ghana “reluctantly” agreed that Algeria should be allowed to testify before a closed session of the conference.

The Algerian question came up again on the passing of a resolution.

Egypt wanted the African countries to pledge “moral and material aid” to

Du Bois (above) talked of cooperation with the white liberals and his moderate approach did not appeal to many black leaders like Marcus Garvey (below), a militant Jamaican black who wanted to meet white racialism with black racialism. Believing in racial purity, Garvey started a militant black movement. He advised blacks to go back to Africa. His slogan was “Africa for Africans, at home and abroad”. He founded a Negro “empire” in New York in 1920 and declared himself the Provisional President of Africa.

August-October 2006

Q U A R T E R L Y the Algerians. Other participants, particularly Ghana and Liberia, were unwilling to do so. Ghana argued that it was enough to say that “every possible effort” should be made to help them. Nkrumah tried to explain his position by saying: “We do not have to tell the whole world the form of help it is going to take.”8 Hence, though the conference in its final resolution recognised “the right of the Algerian people to independence and self-determination” and reaffirmed its determination “to make every possible effort to help the Algerian people towards the attainment of independence”, it refused to commit itself to any “material aid” to Algerians as desired by Egypt.

The significance of this conference was that it provided for PanAfricanism a base in the continent and also raised it to the governmental level. It also ceased to be an exclusively black movement. From a race movement, it now became an African territorial movement. Not only Arab north Africa but also the white regime of South Africa were invited.

The fact that South Africa did not attend was a different matter.

In November 1958, Ghana and Guinea established a Union “as the nucleus of a Union of West African States” and agreed on the basic principles of an African Union. This agreement is generally referred to as the Conakry Declaration. The Ghana-Guinea approach to African unity alarmed Liberia’s President Tubman who took the initiative to call a meeting with President Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekon Toure of Guinea at Sanniquellie, Liberia, in July 1959. In the Sanniquellie Declaration the concept of a “community of Independent African States” was substituted for the “complete union” envisaged in the Conakry Declaration. Here the right of each member to “maintain its own national identity and constitutional structure was recognised. It was also decided to call a special conference in 1960 of all independent states of Africa –– as well as nonindependent countries awaiting inde-

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pendence shortly –– to discuss and work out a charter which would achieve their ultimate goal of unity between independent African states.9 The Second Conference of Independent African States took place in Addis Ababa from June 15 to 24, 1960. This time, the original eight countries were joined by Cameroon, Guinea, Nigeria and Somalia, which had recently attained independence. The anti-colonial tone of the conference was also strong. It decided to establish an African Freedom Fund to finance the liberation movement and to extend assistance to “genuine African political refugees”. The conference also adopted a resolution condemning South Africa’s shameful policy of racial discrimination, and approved a programme of sanctions against it.

But the African countries, which generally agreed on the question of decolonisation, differed when it came to the question of African unity. The concept and the best way to promote it became controversial. Ghana’s proposal to form a Union of African States was supported only by Guinea, with Nigeria calling it “premature”. Instead, the latter suggested an association of states. The two approaches became quite clear. One was to move swiftly towards unification, including political unity. The other favoured internal development of every country independently, and less binding ties between the states.

Thus Pan-Africanism now became a thing to be praised and advocated by everybody without specifying what it was. It was anything between a “political union”, as advocated by Ghana, and an “association of independent sovereign states”, as advocated by Nigeria. The conference did not endorse the Sanniquellie Declaration. It simply requested its president to address heads of African states to initiate consultation through diplomatic channels with a view to promoting “African unity”.

The discord which appeared at the Addis Ababa Conference deepened with the emergence of new states and new issues on the African scene. In 1960, 13 French territories achieved independence. This gave a new life to old issues, namely, the concept of African unity and Algeria. As these countries were mainly dependent on French economic and technical aid, they decided not to come out openly in support of Algeria. Their marked pro-Western attitude was also reflected in their stand on other African issues. The most pressing of them was the Congo issue.

The Casablanca Group The formation of the Brazzaville group caused hostility in some Africa countries, particularly Ghana, Guinea and Mali, which reacted sharply to its stand on African unity and to its conservative, pro-Western stand. The King of Morocco, who was also angry with the group for lending support to Mauritania, took the initiative and called a conference of likeminded African countries at Casablanca to consider the Congo situation, “fearing that aggression would spread to other independent African states”.12 The conference, held from January 3 to 7, 1961, was attended by Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali and Morocco. Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia did not attend since they preferred to remain neutral.

The Casablanca Conference affirmed its recognition of the elected Parliament and the legally constituted Government of the Congo. It urged the United Nations to disband the “lawless band” of Mobutu. They supported Algeria’s freedom struggle and Morocco’s stand on Mauritania.

But one of the most important decisions taken by the Casablanca Conference was the approval of the African Charter –– a step towards African unity. The charter, besides providing for a Pan-African Constituent Assembly, also set up four committees charged with the function of promoting effective cooperation among the African states in their respective fields. These committees were the African PoliticalCommittee, the African Economic Committee, the African Cultural Committee, and a joint African High Command.

The charter also set up a liaison office to promote cooperation among the committees.

Monrovia Conference

The Brazzaville Group To discuss these issues and, if possible, to take a common stand on them, the former French-speaking states met at Abidjan (Ivory Coast) in October 1960. At a subsequent meeting in Brazzaville, in December 1960, they decided to form a permanent association because they thought they had longterm objectives to achieve and should stay together to promote cooperation in economic matters as well as external policy.

The Brazzaville Powers, while paying homage to General de Gaulle, who began French de-colonisation, asked France to stop fighting and begin negotiations with Algeria. On the Congo issue, they saluted the United Nations, which was supporting Kasavubu, for its efforts “to save the Congo from chaos

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and anarchy”.10 As regards the question of African unity they considered it necessary “to affirm their political independence through the economic and social advance of their population”. To realise these objectives they wanted regional action, and in keeping with their political identity. They, however, wished to promote enlargement of inter-African solidarity by way of strengthening their existing economic ties.11 In short, they wanted close economic cooperation, but not political unity.

On April 14, 1961, Cameroon and Ivory Coast (Brazzaville group), Guinea and Mali (Casablanca group) and Liberia and Togo (Neutral) jointly sent invitations to all African countries to meet at Monrovia, Liberia. Egypt and Ghana rejected the invitation at the outset. Morocco did not accept it apparently because an invitation had been sent to Mauritania.

Subsequently, Guinea and Mali withdrew, presumably under pressure from Ghana. But in spite of all this the neutral African countries along with the Brazzaville group held the meeting at Monrovia in May 1961. And with 20 African countries attending it, the Monrovia Conference became a broad assembly of independent African states.

The most important resolution passed by the conference

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Q U A R T E R L Y

A graphic depicting the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as it appears on the web site www.us-africa.tripod.com.

was on the means of promoting better understanding and cooperation towards achieving unity in Africa. The six principles adopted were: ■ Absolute equality of states irrespective of size, population etc.; ■ Non-interference in the internal affairs of states; ■ Respect for the sovereignty of each state; ■ Unqualified condemnation of outside subversive action by member states; ■ Promotion of a continent-wide co-operation based on tolerance, solidarity, good neighbourly relations; and ■ Non-acceptance of any leadership.

Ideological Differences The formation and consolidation of rival groups in Africa institutionalised factionalism in African politics.

But the most important point of disagreement between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups of countries was their approach to the concept of African unity. The Casablanca group, perhaps under pressure of Kwame Nkrumah, laid greater emphasis on the political aspect of unity favouring rapid movement towards continental union than the Monrovia group. Like political independence preceding economic reconstruction, Nkrumah wanted political unity as a prelude to the integration of economic and social development. Hence they established the nucleus of African unity in the form of various committees to coordinate political, economic, military and social activities under the Casablanca Charter and its protocol.

The Monrovia group, in contrast, preferred a non-political approach, wanting economic and technical development to precede political union –– at least at that stage of the evolution of the newly-independent states. They needed the cooperation of European states for achieving this. Hence their opposition to the “political integration of sovereign African states”.

The Lagos Conference The settlement of the Congo issue and the country’s participation in the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned countries held in September 1961 lessened the tension between the two groups. The Monrovia Powers, when they again decided to meet in Lagos in January 1962, sent invitations to all the members of the Casablanca group except Algeria (which had not yet attained independence).

The foreign ministers of the Casablanca group met at Accra on January 20, 1962, to discuss the invitation. The next day they announced that they would not attend the Lagos meeting because all arrangements for the conference were made by member-states of the Monrovia group without consulting them and because the Provisional Government of Algeria had not been invited, which amounted to a collective insult to all the members of the charter. With Libya, the Sudan and Tunisia withdrawing on the issue of Algeria, the whole of Arab Africa went unrepresented at the Lagos Conference. But with the addition of the Congo and Tanganyika, the Lagos Conference was as large as the one held at Monrovia.

However, in spite of the differences between the two

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groups, there were areas of agreement. They had diplomatic, economic and cultural relations among themselves. On most of the issues they also held views which were similar. Thus cooperation among the members of the two groups, solutions to the main questions facing Africa, and the conciliatory attitude of some of the African leaders were among the factors that helped to bring the two groups together at Addis Ababa in May 1963.

The Addis Ababa Conference was held in two stages, first the foreign ministers of 32 independent African states met from May 15 to 22, 1963. Though they agreed on the agenda, they could not reach an agreement on the main issue: Namely, the establishment of an organisation of African states. They, therefore, decided to hand over the problem to the heads of state and government.

The conference of heads of state and government opened on May 22, 1963. It was attended by 32 states. The heads of state and government appointed a special committee of 10 foreign ministers to prepare a draft for the Pan-African organisation. While the special committee was carrying out its task, each head of state made a statement, in the plenary session, of his position and policies.

The four-day summit conference ended on May 25, 1963.

On that day, the heads of state and government signed the charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The charter endorsed the Monrovia approach to African unity. The membership of the OAU was limited to the Sovereign African States.

The five principles of the charter were: ■ Sovereign equality of members; ■ Non-interference in internal affairs; ■ Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; ■ Peaceful settlement of disputes; and ■ Unreserved condemnation of political assassinations and subversive activities.13

The aims and objectives of the OAU were: ■ To eradicate all forms of colonialism form Africa; ■ To defend their sovereignty, the territorial integrity and

independence; ■ To promote the unity and solidarity of African states; ■ To coordinate and intensify cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa; and ■ To promote international cooperation.

The four organs through which the OAU was to accomplish its aims were: The Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Foreign Ministers; the Secretariat; and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

We can thus see that, in the final analysis, a moderate alliance was stronger than a militant one. The Casablanca group was on a weak ground and on the eve of the Addis Ababa Conference as well as the crucial drafting stage as a result of King Hassan of Morocco, and Nkrumah’s isolation for an alleged hand in the assassination of Togo’s President. Nasser also adopted conciliatory approach, which suited his coun-

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try’s interest best. The OAU charter was, therefore, “a compromise between a weakened core and self-confident periphery”.14 To this original 32 OAU members, another 21 states joined gradually over the years, with South Africa becoming the 53rd member in 1994.

The establishment of the OAU was a historical moment for Africa. African leaders had finally decided on their concept of African unity. It was obvious that many states and their leaders were not willing to give up their newly-acquired sovereignty. Hence, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs were adapted as the basic principles of the organisation. The OAU was now supposed to work within the limits of these principles. All its plans and actions had to be within these limitations, and hence its success and failure was to be judged accordingly.

Though the OAU has been criticised in some quarters as a “talking shop” (this has also been said about the United Nations), it has a mixed record, though by the time the OAU was formed almost all parts of Africa were freed, Southern Africa, however, continued to be the citadel of defiance. The OAU charter, therefore, proclaims that the one of the purposes of the organisation was to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa. The OAU spoke out loudly and consistently against Western colonialism and South African apartheid. It not only supported and encouraged freedom movements, but also kept up the pressure at all international fora. The fact that colonialism and apartheid has been consigned to history is indeed a tribute to the OAU.15 Though the liberation of Africa was achieved, conflicts continued. Therefore, since its establishment the OAU had been confronted with a number of conflicts and disputes. The OAU was successful in solving some conflicts, such as the boundary conflict between Morocco and Algeria, between Somalia and Ethiopia, between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. The OAU had also been able to re-establish harmony between Uganda, Tunisia, Kenya, Chad and Libya. The international community appreciated the role played by the OAU in maintenance of international peace and security.16 As far as economic issues are concerned, the heads of state and government of African countries adopted an economic declaration on cooperation and development and economic independence on May 23, 1973, at Addis Ababa. The OAU also encouraged the formation of different regional economic groups in Africa.

The OAU Secretariat kept close cooperation with the U.N. Economic Commission of Africa, the African Development Bank and other regional institutions. It was also due to the OAU that the African countries harmonised their policies with regard to international bodies such as UNCTAD, UNIDO, ILO, IBRD, and IMF.17 The OAU also played an important role in the field of transportation, communication, education, health, science and culture.

It is also through the OAU that Africa had been able to respond to other challenges such as HIV/AIDS. It also dealt with humanitarian issues such as refugees, land mines, etc. It is, therefore, no wonder that the heads of state and government of the Assembly of African Union meeting in the inaugural

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session in Durban, while bidding the OAU a farewell, paid a not much was achieved on this front, the issue was bothering glowing tribute to it as a “dynamic force at the service of the leaders all along. As time went on, and with the emergence Africa”.18 of globalisation, the issue become more acute. Finally, in June The major failure of the OAU was that its policy of non- 1991, the OAU states signed the Abuja Treaty. interference in the internal affairs of independent African nations led it to do nothing about the abuses that various From OAU to African Union African governments inflicted on their own people. The OAU, in fact, showered praises on all sort of dictators in the contiThe Abuja Treaty established the African Economic nent. The OAU’s credibility hit rock bottom when it elected Community (AEC) to foster the economic, social and culturIdi Amin as its chairman. The OAU also failed in terms of fos- al integration of the continent. But since the AEC was movtering peace and security as well as integration of African ing slowly, the Abuja Treaty was endorsed in September 1999. economies.

It was decided by the OAU member-states to form the African The OAU could not do much on this front mainly because Union (AU) and a Pan-African Parliament (PAP). of the nature of the organisation. An international organisation At the fourth extraordinary OAU summit, African leaders of sovereign states cannot do more than what its members took a step towards unity by building an alliance between socidesire. As we have seen, the original idea was one of a union. ety and governments. A declaration pertaining to the creation However, when the founding fathers realised that it was dif- of the African Union was formulated. It was mainly based on ficult to achieve the union, that the the lines of the OAU Charter and the African countries, which idea of unity appeared to be more treaty that established the AEC. realistic, they established the organiThe African leaders felt a need to generally agreed on the sation of African unity. move faster towards greater cohesion, question of decolonisation, However, it became evident as cooperation and integration condiffered when it came to the early as 1979 that there was a need to cerning issues that gravely affected amend the charter of the OAU. In the continent. In July 2000, during question of African unity. The fact, in that year, a Review the 36th OAU summit of heads of concept and the best way to Committee was established in order state and government in Lome, promote it became to streamline the organisation to Togo, a Constitutive Act of African meet the challenges it faced. But Union was adopted. Following this controversial. Ghana’s despite numerous meetings, the event, a decision declaring the estabproposal to form a Union of charter Review Committee failed to lishment of the African Union was African States was supported formulate substantive amendments, adopted by the Extraordinary and when there was an urgent need OAU/AEC summit held in Sirte, only by Guinea, with Nigeria for amendment, the charter was Libya, from March 1 to 2, 2001. In calling it “premature”. Instead, the decision, heads of state and gov“amended” by being augmented the latter suggested an through ad hoc decisions of summits ernment specified that the legal such as the Cairo Declaration estabrequirements for the union would association of states. lishing the Mechanism for Conflict have been completed upon the The two approaches became Prevention, Management and deposit of 36 instruments of ratificaquite clear.

Resolution, etc. tion of the Constitutive Act of the However, this ad hocism could not Union. Nigeria became the 36th be an answer to the formidable challenges facing the OAU. member-state to deposit its instrument of ratification. This The realities that they found after the end of the Cold War and concluded the two-third requirement and the Act entered into the ushering of a globalisation revealed that the original struc- force on March 26, 2001. ture was not adequate to meet the new challenges. There was It was implemented in July 2001 in Lusaka, which proalso the need to integrate the political activities of the OAU claimed the birth of African Union. The Constitutive Act with the economic and developmental issues as articulated in replaced the OAU charter with a transitional period of one the Abuja Treaty. There was, therefore, a growing realisation year. With the establishment of the African Union, Africa that the need for greater efficiency and effectiveness of the entered a new era in its history. And finally on July 11, 2002, organisation required urgent action. an African Union inaugural session was organised at Durban Though the question of African unity became a controver- which praised the OAU as a dynamic force at the service of sial one, the debate surrounding it was not a wasted. It had cre- Africa in the pursuit of the struggle for the “total emancipaated sufficient awareness for the need for unity to solve the tion of the continent in the political, economic and social problems faced by the continent; particularly on economic fields” and bid farewell to the OAU. issues.

The African Union (AU) is to have the Assembly as the It was this awareness that led the African countries to adopt, supreme organ of the AU comprising of the head of states and in 1980, the Lagos Plan of Action and the final Act of Lagos: government; the Executive Council; Permanent A blueprint for Africa’s integration and development. Though Representative Committee; The Commission Representing

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Specialised Technical Committees, Pan African Parliament; Economic Social and Culture Council; Court of Justice and Financial Institutions.

Conclusions We can thus see that starting with a sort of protest against racialism, colonialism and imperialism, Africa ushered the Pan-African movement. However, all Pan-African Congresses that they organised took place outside the African Continent.

After independence, African countries had tried to coordinate their policies through governmental and non-governmental conferences, with the object of achieving unity among themselves. But having different socio-political backgrounds and following divergent concepts of unity, they remained divided into two main groups –– one following a moderate line and the other a militant one. However, these divisions got greatly bridged and they were able to establish the Organisation of African Unity at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 1963.

This organised African group, henceforth became a force in international relations to be reckoned with: Through the OAU they collectively played a major role in ending colonialism and dismantling apartheid. They also succeeded in forming regional economic groups. Finally, after the hard struggle for unity, they succeeded in establishing the African Union.

Now considering Africa’s geographical and socio-economic diversities and levels of developments, the African people’s march towards unity is quite impressive and commendable.

However, this impressive unity is on paper. A closer scruti-

References * For the historical background of this article I have substantially relied upon my book on Egypt’s Africa Policy: The Nasser Era (New Delhi, National Publishing House, 1981).

1. Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Africa: The Politics of Unity: An Analysis of a Contemporary Social Movements’ (London, 1967) p.7.

2. Jon Woronoff, ‘Organising African Unity’ (New jersey, 1970) p.15.

3. George Padmore, ‘Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa’, (London, 1956) p.346.

4. W.E.B. Du Bois, ‘The Soul of Black Folk’ (Chicago, 1903) as quoted in Colin Legum, ‘Pan-Africanism: A short political Guide’ (London, 1962) p.25.

5. See the Conference’s declaration addressed to colonial power, Legum, n-4, p137.

6. Padmore, n-3 p.379.

7. Conference of Independent African State: Speeches Delivered at the Inaugural Session, April 15, 1958, (Accra, n.d.) p.1.

8. Confidential Report, Conference of Independent African States (CIAS Report) Accra (1958) pp 561-66 as quoted in H. Scott Thompson, ‘Ghana’s Foreign Policy: 1957-1966: Diplomacy Ideology of the New State’ (New Jersey, 1969) p.36.

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ny reveals that what is on paper is, indeed, not that impressive if we test it against the ground realities. First and foremost, such a paper unity has yet to prove its mettle. Secondly, past records of the issue are not that promising. Will not the north African Arab countries find it difficult to totally merge with subSaharan Africa? What will happen to their close cultural bond with the Arab world? And if tomorrow the Arab world decides to go for Arab unity/union, what will be the position of these countries? Even within sub-Saharan African, things may not be that easy. We have seen that during all these years, while the efforts were going on to build unity, African countries could not avoid starvation of their people, civil wars, ethnic conflict, the growing menace of AIDS and many other threatening diseases/evils.

There is also much to be desired on Africa’s record on democracy, human right, economic development. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) are said to have been imposed on Africa. In reality, by mismanaging their economies, they almost invited it. Africa, in the words of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, is a scar on the conscience of the world.

Besides, if African unity is not helping in mitigating the miseries of the people, that unity is illusionary. And if we look from this angle, Africa has a long way to go in translating its otherwise impressive record of unity into ground realities.

The challenges of peace, democracy development and security are formidable. It needs a very strong will and unity to achieve this humungous task. One can only wish them Godspeed in their endeavour.

9. For the text of the Sanniqville Declaration see Legum n.4, pp 162-63. See also African Special Report Vol.4, no.8, August 1959, p.3.

10. For Brazzaville Declaration see Legum, no.4 appendix 13 pp. 179-82.

11. Ibid.

12. Casablanca Conference January 1961 (presumably Cairo, n.d.) p.7.

13. Organisation of African Unity, Provisional Secretariat, Organisation of African Unity: Basic Document and Resolutions (Addis Ababa, n.d.) pp 7-13.

14. Wallerstein, n.1, p.66.

15. See AU News Service, Africa Times, Press Release no.

004/2002, p.1. For the role of the OAU in liberation struggle of Africa see Ankush B. Sawant, ‘The Organisation of African Unity and Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa’, Africa Quarterly (New Delhi) Vol. 25, no 3-4, pp 36-44.

16. For U.N.-OAU collaboration in this field see Goulding Marrack ‘The U.N. and Conflict in Africa Since the Cold War’, African Affairs (1999).

17. There are many books/article/theses on the subject. For example Nyangoni, ‘Africa in the U.N. System’ (London, 1985); B. Andemichael, ‘The OAU and the U.N.: Relations between the Organisation of the African Unity and the United Nations’ (NewYork UNITAR, 1972).

18. See AU News Service, African Union Press Release 004.

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African Union: Factfile The African Union, or AU, is a pan-African organisation whose goal is to propel a united continent towards peace and prosperity.

!

! The AU supports political and economic integration among

its 53 member nations. It aims to boost development, eradicate poverty and bring Africa into the global economy.

The AU succeeded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963 by 37 countries, in 2002. In its later years, the OAU –– which originated in the decolonisation struggles of the early 1960s –– had been criticised for becoming a mere talking shop.

Leadership The Chairman of the African Union is chosen by the Assembly of the African Union, which consists of the heads of member-countries. The term of the chairman is for one year.

Structure

!

! Conceived by the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who proposed a “United States of Africa”, its structure is loosely modelled on that of the EU. ! It inaugurated a pan-African parliament

in March 2004 –– one of a number of proposed institutions. The body debates continent-wide issues and advises AU heads of state. ! There are far-reaching plans to set up a human rights court,

a central bank and monetary fund, and, by 2023, an African Economic Community with a single currency. ! The AU believes that conflicts must be settled before there can be a chance of achieving prosperity. To this end, it set up a Peace and Security Council in 2004. ! The council may intervene in conflicts, replacing the OAU

principle of non-interference with one of “non-indifference”.

The council can deploy military forces in situations which include genocide and crimes against humanity.

!

! It can authorise peace-keeping missions. The council plans

to have a stand-by rapid-reaction force in place by 2010. ! AU peace-keepers have served in Burundi and AU ceasefire

monitors have been sent to Darfur. ! The AU oversees the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, an anti-poverty blueprint which offers a bargain with the West: The promotion of good political and economic practice in return for more aid and investment.

AU at a glance Annual budget: $43 million (2004 figure) In 2000: AU Constitution signed in Lome, Togo In 2002: AU launched at Durban summit, South Africa Headquarters: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Membership: 53 African nations

! The AU is governed by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and the Pan-African Parliament, which are both assisted by the AU Commission. ! The AU Commission, in turn, constitutes one of the secretariats of the Pan-African Parliament. ! The current President of the PanAfrican Parliament, Gertrude Mongella, is the Head of State of the AU. Thebo Mbeki, President of South AFrica, was the first head of state of the AU. ! Denis Sassou-Nguesso, president of the AU state of the Republic of the Congo is the Chair of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. ! Alpha Oumar Konare is the current Chairman of the African Union Commission, which serves as the Secretariat of the Pan-African Parliament and a civil service of the AU. ! The AU covers the entire continent except for Morocco, which opposes the membership of Western Sahara as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. However, Morocco has a special status within the AU and benefits from the services available to all AU states from the institutions of the AU, such as the African Development Bank. Moroccan delegates also participate at important AU functions, and negotiations continue to try to resolve the conflict with the Polisario Front in Tindouf, Algeria, and parts of Western Sahara.

Political Structure Assembly: The assembly comprises the heads of state of member-countries, who meet at least once a year. It is the AU’s main decision-making body. Members of the assembly elect an AU chairperson, to hold office for 12 months.

Executive Council: The council comprises the foreign ministers of member-states, who advise the assembly members.

Commission: The administrative branch comprises 10 commissioners, who hold individual portfolios. The commission implements AU policies and coordinates activities and meetings. It elects its chairperson to a four-year term.

Institutions of the African Union * The Pan-African Parliament, Midrand; * The African Commission; * The Economic, Social and Cultural Council; * The African Court of Justice; * The African Investment Bank; * The African Central Bank; * African Monetary Fund For more information on African Union log on to http://www.africa-union.org

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MAZRUI’s Perspectives on Conflict and Violence Laurence Juma examines seminal ideas of celebrated scholar Ali Mazrui and maps out the path for conflict-resolution and peace-building in Africa that continues to reel under violent conflicts.

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INTRODUCTION

future of the continent.

In this article, I attempt to discern from Mazrui’s vast frican scholarship on peace and anthology some of his ideas on how the African continent can conflict is now widespread and resolve its conflicts and institute peace. And because indeed there is more writing, Mazruiana is not only about peace or conflict, its formidable teaching and research being done corpus tackling a whole range of issues, including economic today than was the case a decade or development, democratisation, the role of political culture, so ago. But one scholar whose international relations and even human rights, this article will work on the subject has attracted elicit from the various themes aspects of conflict-resolution considerable attention is Ali that have a bearing to the unique conditions of Africa. The Mazrui, now a distinguished contention here is that Mazruiana, with its eclectic blend of ideas, brings to the discourse on conflict Albert Schweitzer Professor in humania touch of “indigeneity” that balances ties and director of the Institute of Global international conceptions against homeCultural Studies at the State University grown strategies for conflict-resolution. of New York at Binghamton. Mazrui’s Morally, “indigeneity” is not just the writings, now popularly known as claim that local systems should demand Mazruiana, span the period between space in conflict-resolution processes, 1962 to present day. Mazruina is regardbut also, the idea that international factors ed by some to be the most eloquent criresponsible for local upheavals should be tique of African leadership on issues of firmly addressed.

“Indigeneity” security, governance, corruption and demands, as well, that external intervenhuman rights.1 Mazrui supporters tion in any internal conflict must take applaud the brazen approach that he takes cognizance of local conditions and in most issues and acknowledge that “his involve local polities in seeking solutions readiness to ask inconvenient questions to local problems. Ideologically, “indiand to look under the rug to see what geneity” is the brake to the fledging neounpleasant matters may have been swept liberal orthodoxy which has supported there”, is probably his greatest strength.2 Professor Ali Mazrui the ubiquitous rise of predatory corpoThey view his intellectual pedigree as counselling pragmatism in the construction of ideas germane rate systems and transnational networks — the purveyors of to the creation and sustenance of continental peace and pro- poverty and conflict to the south and prosperity to the north motion of development.3 Mazrui himself admits that his — while alienating sections of the world from their resources vision is of a future that will, “permit Africa the full potential and cultures.5 And because neo-liberal orthodoxy has never of intellectual diversity…tame our governments into accept- respected local peoples or their cultures, “indigeneity” rises to ing dissent, train outsiders into respecting our perspectives, confront the inequity: To balance the playing field and help educate our intellectuals into the habits of mental self-reliance, raise an understanding of the necessity of creating a homepersuade our people to explore new horizons, and prepare our- grown mechanism for dealing with African internal conflicts.

Like others theories borne out of the neo-liberal agenda, selves for a new phase of indigenous creativity”.4 Though such a vision may be far from realisation today than it was in conflict-resolution has fallen hostage to the pretensions and 1974, as conditions of armed conflict and violence, poverty, over-assumptions of the universalistic theories, some of which disease and famine have increased, there is little doubt that brand African conflicts with such essentialist terms as “tribal Mazrui’s work still inspires a great deal of thinking on the wars” and recently, “ethnic conflicts”. The nomenclature has

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created the perception that Africa’s conflicts are more of which comprise the main thrust of the study of African conintractable than those of other areas of the world. Also, it flicts today.9 Viewed from this perspective, conflicts are natdiverts attention form other factors that are responsible for the ural and inevitable phenomena of society. Indeed, conflicts eruption of violence in many African states. For example, the may embody the creative processes by which societies evolve.

1994 genocide in Rwanda, cast on a wider spectrum of Conflicts only become a problem when they are destructive enquiry, may elicit a plethora of troubling issues that ordinar- and the costs of change far outweigh its benefits. Therefore, ily conflict-resolution strategists informed by the concept of conflict can be said to have a dual nature: Functional as well ethnicity are likely to ignore. The Congo civil war, which as dysfunctional aspects. It can produce social order or instaassumed international dimensions and the ongoing upheavals bility, be unifying or divisive, progressive or reactionary. in Sudan, Somalia and Guinea, to mention but a few, are all According to one analyst, “conflict and order are inextricably branded as ethnic conflicts. Yet the factors responsible for interwoven — opposed and yet complementary”.10 Nieburg eruption of war in these areas could be far entrenched in the has written: It is self-defeating to study violence as if it were obscene, nor does politics of imperial adventurism of the past centuries and the recognition of its relevance condone or encourage it. Quite the coninchoate polities that succeeded them than the mere fact of trary is true. Like many things, violence is deeply ambiguous in all ethnic diversity.6 Analysing African conflicts from an “indigeneity” platform its aspects, containing both functional and dysfunctional tendencies, exposes their links to the imponderables of cultural politicicapable of both positive and negative outcomes.11 Mazrui shares this view. He identifies conflict as a positive sation, religious excesses, racialism, insecurity and economic impoverishment. Mazrui comes to peace studies with the mechanism responsible for societal integration. In an essay entitled ‘Conflict and the Integrative touch of “indigeneity” that exalts the position of an African in the realm of Popularly known as Mazruiana, Process”, he argues that the process international politics, security and the writings of Ali Mazrui, now a of national integration, especially in pluralistic societies, travels through economic development. In all what distinguished Albert Schweitzer the process of coexistence, contact, he has written, there is a demonstracompromise and coalescence.12 ble affinity to the notion that Africans Professor in humanities and have a right to be self-sufficient.7 director of the Institute of Global While conflict within a country is That he recognises African internal inherently disintegrative, he states, Cultural Studies at the State wars to be, as well, the product of an “No national integration is possible imbalanced international order — without internal conflict.”13 “Just University of New York at like one cannot make an omelette the altruism of a dichotomised interBinghamton, span the period without breaking an egg,” he argues, national order that exploits the peril between 1962 to present day.

“One cannot build and strengthen of the weak and gratifies the opulence of the strong — makes his conMazruina is regarded by some statehood without the stimulus of tribution to the field of peace studies to be the most eloquent critique conflict.”14 As far as he is concerned, the disintegrative capacity of conflict more compelling. In this article, I of African leadership on issues may in itself be negative, but its resexplore some of these parameters. I olution becomes an essential mechhave adopted an approach that elicits of security, governance, anism of societal integration.15 Thus, several themes from Mazruina and corruption and human rights. conflict-resolution processes are not discusses them in light of their releonly the instruments of abatement, vance to the study of peace and conflict. These themes cover areas of conflict-research that are but also of societal healing and development. Mazrui also deemed important in the general understanding of African poses an interesting variable to this understanding of conflict.

He distinguishes between conflict of an internal nature (citiconflicts. zens fighting against citizens) and that of an external nature (citizens fighting foreign entities) and claims that the former CONCEPTUALISING CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE may disintegrate the state while the latter has the opposite In contemporary peace studies literature, the term “conflict” effect.16 The limitation of this exposition to conflict-resolurefers to the antagonistic state of action; the competition of tion is obvious. It is inconceivable that any nation in Africa will incompatible interests that may or may not result in physical engage in external aggression merely to consolidate statehood. action. More often than not, it may be a struggle over values, Ironically, Mazrui too admits that starting a war for the sake status, resources or even power. Lewis Cooper has defined of national integration is “unthinkable”.17 Violence as opposed to conflict speaks, without ambiguity conflict as a struggle over these elements, but where the parties involved aim, not only to acquire such values “but also, to of force, human suffering, and destruction: Conditions which neutralise, injure, or eliminate the rivals”.8 This competition readily come to mind when we talk about war or political for power may be violent, but not necessarily so; violence upheaval in Africa. For the purposes of this discussion, it may being the aggregate of paradigmatic factors such as cultural pre- be useful to envision as defined as the exercise of physical disposition, economic deprivation, and ecological factors, all force so as to inflict injury on or damage to persons or prop-

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erty.18 Wolff stretches this definition by incorporating the ele- hood, the notion that violence can be legitimate resonates with ment of “legitimacy”.19 According to him, violence is the ille- his other views on continental security, especially the idea that gitimate or unauthorised use of force to effect decisions against force could be used to restore order in circumstances where the will or desire of others. The use of force may only amount the national structure is crumbling.

But violence cannot be defined merely in reference to the to violence if it is proscribed by those who wield legitimate legitimacy of the action because violence can be both strucauthority. Thus political violence, for example, would be tural as well as inter-personal. Johan Galtung’s structural viogauged depending on the degree of de jure or legitimate lence theory points to the existence of a great range of social authority, which in many African situations may be hard to injustices and inequities, which may, in themselves, constitute define. The implication here, which might be puzzling to 27 When sections of society are denied access to violence. many conflict-resolution practitioners, is that violence is only violence when somebody says so. But, Wolff’s idea becomes resources and their lives are made immeasurably worse succinct when we consider the police, military or any organ- because those who control the means and technology are ised force and remember how unlikely it is for us to think of unwilling to share, or unsuitable conditions are visited upon their actions as violent especially if carried out within the groups not favoured by the political power, then violence of parameters of the law. When a government exceeds its author- a structural nature is said to exist.28 Galtung defines structural ity, a great majority of people may see as legitimate any force- violence as that which is “present when human beings are ful removal of its leaders.20 The politics of secession which being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisation are below their potential realgenerally legitimises the use of vioisation”.29 He justifies his views as Mazruiana, with its eclectic lence to create a nation state, finds follows: support even in the realms of interblend of ideas, brings to the However, it will soon be clear why we natinal law.21 And yet there is no discourse on conflict a touch of are rejecting the narrow concept of violence question that secession claims by eth–– according to which violence is somatic “indigeneity” that balances nic separatist all over the world often incapacitation, or deprivation of health lead to intractable civil wars. As one international conceptions alone (with killing as the extreme form), analyst has observed, such moveagainst home-grown strategies at the hands of an actor who intends this to ments exist in over 60 countries and be the consequence. for conflict-resolution. Morally, a number of them have developed If this were all violence is about, and into full-scale civil wars.22 The “indigeneity” is not just the claim peace is held up as ideal, highly unacceptKantian belief that “every man has that local systems should able social orders would still be compatible fundamental duty to be with peace.

Hence an extended concept of demand space in conflictautonomous”, implies that each perviolence is indispensable but the concept son must “make himself the author resolution processes, but also, should be a logical extension, not merely a of his actions and take responsibility 30 the idea that international factors list of undesirables. for them by refusing to act save on Thus, structural violence can responsible for local upheavals the basis of reasons he can see for 23 emanate from purely legitimate acts. himself to be good”. When the should be firmly addressed.

Recent studies have claimed that military in Ghana wrested power for structural violence accounts for more Nkrumah, many saw it as a legitideaths in developed nations than inter-personal violence.31 mate use of force to restore freedom. When Eritrea seceded The victims of structural violence rarely get the attention from from Ethiopia through the use of force, it gained internation24 the mainstream media or politicians.

Yet sociologists now al recognition as a new member of the United Nations. believe that there is a connection between the distribution of Mazrui pays homage to Wolff’s conceptualisation of viowealth and human behaviour.

The impact of decisions that lence by arguing that violence could have both positive and affect resource allocation and render sections of community negative attributes.

Although the minimisation of violence is one of our ideals, we destitute are as much responsible to the violent nature of those should remember that violence has positive as well as negative communities, as those individuals who rob and kill others for effects… as any revolutionary would tell us… it is because of this money.32 Mazrui does not get embroiled with the philosophical intripersistent but by no means inevitable linkage between violence and cacies of the term violence, he rather deals with the phenomrevolution that contemporary perspectives on violence have been 25 enal aspects of it in terms of functions, types, levels, contexts influenced by Marx and his followers. and categories.

One might say that, in a way, he appears to To this end, Mazrui envisions a progression of society from favour the structural violence theory by emphasising on the “primary violence” (disputes over political boundaries) to “sec33 But most of his ideas on the sub26 cultural aspects of violence. ondary violence” (disputes between partialised identities). ject revolve around inter-personal violence, and more so, on Such progression, he argues, is a prerequisite for national inteviolence as it relates to the machinations of state. A number gration. While this idea is not adequately developed to assign of writings on the subject of violence and conflicts are cona proper understanding to internal conflicts sublimed by the tained in ‘Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions competition for power and resources in the post colonial state-

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in Africa’. Here Mazrui distinguishThe Legacy of Colonialism es between four forms of violence: Political violence involving struggles What did colonialism actually to control central institutions; Civic bequeath to the Africans? Mazrui violence, during which private citiand a host of other scholars grapple zens take the law into their own with this issue from different theohands; Military violence meaning retical standpoints, but with a conactual war waged to promote military vergence that it engendered a proobjectives; and Deviant violence cess of political and cultural destabilinvolving transgressions against sociisation that decolonisation has not ety. This categorisation derives from been able to dismantle. Thus, coloMazrui’s recognition that violence nialism remains a malignant theme emanates from the wider environin the study of Africa’s endemic wars ment in which the community must and political upheavals. The justififunction. Such is the spill-over effect cation for this view is not hard to in Uganda from the civil war in find. The colonial enterprise perpeCongo in the early 1960s; mundane trated indifferences amongst the environmental imponderables such Africans people, dismantling the as floods, droughts and famines, and The theme that gets perhaps the most attention in reins of community peace-building the unfavourable international mar- Mazruina is colonialism. The idea that emerges is that, mechanisms and replacing them ket conditions.34 While admitting from the time Europeans first set foot in Africa, a with abstract allegiance to dysfuncof destabilisation propelled by the insatiable that these three categories of violence process tional centric authority and exotic need for wealth had begun. are seldom neatly differentiated, he cultural regimes. Accomplished asserts that a “quest for an understanding of the dynamics of through the system of “indirect rule” and implemented violent behaviour in African countries involves an effort to dis- through a myriad of assimilation and acculturation processes, tinguish between the levels and to explore which factors are the colonial enterprise imparted incongruent political identiamenable to ameliorative measures”.35 ty and sustained violence throughout its reign. Typically, the colonial baggage had religious, cultural as well as legal comCOLONIALISM AND ITS AFTERMATH ponents embodied in its range of “civilising” arsenals.39 Mahmood Mamdani, while examining the causes of the The theme that gets perhaps the most attention in Mazruina Rwanda genocide, has offered a sensible critique to the effect is colonialism. The idea that emerges is that from the time of the colonial venture in African. He argues that the Europeans first set foot in Africa, a process of destabilisation Hutu/Tutsi differentiation was much a factor of the colonical propelled by the insatiable need for wealth had begun. It is the enterprise, creating in its wake, “political identities that drive for profits and the establishment of hegemony over changed with the changing nature of the Rwandan state”.40 wealth-producing areas which necessitated the use of force. While relying on baseless theories of racial categorisation, the And therefore, violence, especially against the colonised, colonial state promoted the belief that the minority Tutsi’s became the defining character of the colonial enterprise.36 were physically and intellectually more superior to the majorThe tragedy of colonisalism is predicated on the fact that ity Hutus, and thereby encouraging the domination of one African countries still have no control over their natural group by another. resources taken away during that time. Mazrui argues that What emerges out of Mazrui’s discussion of colonialism is sovereignty over natural resources is a crucial function of the that the whole enterprise was steeped in European racism. In state.37 ‘Towards a Pax Africana’, a published version of his Ph.D. disSuch sovereignty was eroded during colonialism, and the sertation, he argues that colonialism, as visited upon the status quo is now maintained by the neo-liberal regimes. African continent, was a form of legalised violence. The acquiMazrui observes that “long before the African state failed to sition of territory did not respect the rights of those who had govern, it failed to control its resources”. indigenous claims to those lands. The law of the jungle or surThus the African state has become desperate, seeking hand- vival for the fittest was the basis upon which international outs from the same corporate oligarchies that milk its wealth. recognition was achieved. Thus, “the right to initiate violence Mazrui posits this question: “Did the Zairean state fail because became the prerogative that only a colonisation and statehood of its impotence in overseeing the country’s wealth?” The can bestow”.41 He paraphrases Lenin’s dictum, “Imperialism: answer is unreservedly yes.38 This is just one way in which The highest (monopoly) stage of Capitalism” as, “Capitalism Mazrui makes the connection between the ravages of colo- is the monopoly stage of warfare”, a propo to the era of Pax nialism and the political instability of nations created by it. A Britannica.42 Despite Mazrui’s belief that European dominamultiplicity of conceptions can be developed from this under- tion of the African is more fundamentally cultural than ecostanding and which form the core of the discussion herein nomic, it is the immorality that it embodies, which comes out below. more forcefully in his writings. He recognises that racism was

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indeed the greatest justification for the marginalisation of its elite’s were too far removed from the people: Rather it African communities and the dismantling of their social struc- occurred because they were too close. An ideal leader, in his tures. In ‘On Heroes and Uhuru Worship’, Mazrui cites John view, would be a person capable of sustaining legitimate rule, Stuart Mill’s ‘On Liberty’, who stipulated in the middle of the is the self-aware synthesiser of this multifarious cultural influ19th century that, “Barbarians have no rights as a nation except ences: Such a leader can take the best of both Western and a right to such treatment as they may at the earliest possible Eastern cultural influences and blend them with the best from period fit them for becoming one”.43 Hence in the age of within Africa. In this respect, Senghor, the first African presimperialism, “the law of the nations came to mean in effect ident to retire in a peaceful transfer of power, is the Mazruian the law of civilised nations”, which was to apply to the model of such a leader. As for Nkurumah, Nyerere, Kenyatta, uncivilised (barbarian) world unilaterally and with all the Obote and Idi Amin, Mazrui surmises that cultural forces “moral” fibre of social Darwinism and the self-serving righ- shaped the economic behaviour of their regimes. teousness known as “the white man’s burden”.44 Mazrui’s most sustained exploration of the question of Like Mamdani, Mazrui discusses colonialsm in light of its Africa’s leadership can be read from ‘Soldiers and Kinsmen in destabilising attributes and blames if for some of the conti- Uganda: The Making of a Military Economy’. Having lived nent’s problems.45 “The potential decay is partly a conse- and taught at Makerere University, Uganda, during the years quence of colonial institution without roots in Africa,” he of Milton Obote’s rule, as well as the first few years of Idi argued in a BBC publication in 1996.46 His view was that Amin’s dictatorship, he had the rare opportunity of observing, Africa’s collapsing infrastructure (railways, roads) should be first hand, the ruling of a civil and military regime in succesblamed on the shallowness of Western institutions, lopsided sion. According to him, what emerges out of his study of nature of colonial acculturation and the moral contradictions Africa’s military regimes can be summarised in the following of Western tutelage. According to him, Africa borrowed the three hypotheses: wrong things from the West. “We borrowed the profit motive ■ The emergence of the modern army in African countries is a critical variable towards the cenbut not entrepreneurial spirit… the acquisitive appeitite of capitalism and Mazrui considers the question of tralisation of power in the polity.

■ The emergence of the modern not the creative risk-taking.”47 legitimacy the key to Paradoxically, Mazrui does not conarmy in African countries has brounderstanding Africa’s political ken the correlation between political demn Western influence completeconflicts. Legitimacy is the ly. As far as he is concerned, capitalpower and Western education by ism gave birth to two forces: One authority accorded to rulers by interrupting the trend towards the basically evil and the other ultimatedictatorship of the educated class in the portion of population who ly good. The evil child is imperialism modern African history. share power... When a state ■ The history of modernisation in while the good child is liberal democracy.48 Mazrui seeks to give lacks the support of its citizens it independent Africa might well be a new meaning to the term decolonigradual transition from a political will tend to be authoritarian and supremacy of those who hold the sation, by dismissing a conceptualithus susceptible to political sation of it as mere winning of indemeans of destruction... to future pendence and the replacement of illegitimacy. Mazrui argues that political supremacy of those who national flag and anthem. Real control the means of production, and states may be authoritarian only ■ The embourgeoisement of the decolonisation, he argues, should be to “disguise the fact that it is militariat could help to restabilise the the total collapse of the colonial state political system in a technologically — “the cruel and bloody disintegrainadequately authoritative”. underdeveloped country.52 tion of colonial structures.”49 In this book, Mazrui marries the THE INSTABILITY OF POST-COLONIAL STATE concept of legitimacy with regime weakness to suggest that such a regime is likely to be authoritarian and ultimately Legitimacy and Political Consciousness amenable to violent challenge. The weakness here is perceived as synonymous to dysfunctionality; a major indicator of the Mazrui considers the question of legitimacy the key to the likelihood of political upheaval.53 Recent studies have showed understanding of Africa’s political conflicts. Legitimacy is the that some African polities have shown resilience even in the authority accorded to rulers by the portion of population who face of such weakness and illegitimacy.54 While adaptability, share power or at least political consciousness. A state is legit- the influence of regional organisations and the ability of autoimate to the extent that its subjects perceive it to be so.50 When crats in these nations to build instruments of political control a state lacks the support of its citizens it will tend to be author- has been cited by some studies to be the reason, the overall picitarian and thus susceptible to political illegitimacy. Mazrui ture still show strong linkages of widespread political upheavals argues that states may be authoritarian only to “disguise the fact to the improper governing structures. The Siad Barre military that it is inadequately authoritative”.51 According to him, the regime in Somali that had lost its goodwill by crushing its legitimation crisis of the African State did not occur because opponents ruthlessly;55 the dysfunctional Sierra Leone gov-

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ernment of Siaka Stevens;56 Master Sergeant Doe’s despotic oligarchy in Liberia;57 the corrupt Mobutu oligarchy in DR Congo;58 all of them exhibited authoritarian tendencies that ultimately attracted armed challenge.

food and excitement. These gangs are a ready pool for rebel or mercenary outfits seeking personnel to swell their ranks. An example would be Nairobi, the national capital of Kenya, which is currently besieged by such marauding gangs. Criminal outfits such as Mungiki, Jeshi la Mzee, and Baghdad, run the backEconomic Deprivation and the streets.64 Occasionally, they come to ‘Lumpen’ Ideology national limelight when rival political groups employ their services to In ‘Soldiers and Kinsmen in terrorise their opponents.65 But their Uganda’, Mazrui introduces the presence points to continued insecunotion of “lumpen-militariat”, which rity in the city; with an indisputable he defines as “that class of semiconnection to increased spate of organised, rugged, and semi-illiterate murders, rapes, robberies and genersoldiery which began to claim share al lawlessness.66 of power and influence in what Apart from the economic aspects would have become a heavily privi59 of conflict, Mazrui also makes a leged meritocracy of the educated”. divergent connection to culture, Idi Amin of Uganda and Okelo of which he pronounces as operating well Idi Amin Zanzibar are his examples of leaders into the political spectrum by infuswho fit into this class. The concept In ‘Soldiers and Kinsmen in ing into it the culture of war and conmay attract a wider interpretation flict.

He uses the notion of “warrior today. The civil war in Sierra Leone Uganda’, Mazrui introduces the tradition” as a prescient factor in (1991-1999) illustrates how the notion of “lumpen-militariat”, Africa’s history, culture and politics. lumpenisation of communities which he defines as “that class In the ‘Warrior Tradition in Modern helped fan the civil war. Long before the civil war, dire economic condiof semi-organised, rugged, and Africa’, he relates the tradition to mascultinity, androgynous liberation tion had created a “lumpen class” semi-illiterate soldiery which and re-Africanisation. He defines it amongst the youths of the country began to claim share of power as the “sub-system of values and ready to take up arms and fight just 60 institutionalised expectations which for food and, maybe, just fun. This and influence in what would define the military role of the indigroup of urban youths formed a have become a heavily vidual in the defence of his society, reservoir from which the RUF could 61 privileged meritocracy of the the martial criteria of adulthood, the recruit soldiers. According to some analysts, recruitments into the RUF educated”. Idi Amin of Uganda symbolic obligations of manhood in time of political and military occurred heavily amongst lumpen and Okelo of Zanzibar are his stress”.67 However, it may be debatyouth living in Freetown who were examples of leaders who fit into able whether the military coups in then taken to Libya for military train62 the continent were generally driven ing. Bangura has noted: this class. by a cultural predisposition and not Majority of those trained in Libya greed for political power and wealth. were either from the loosely structured “lumpen” classes or those with Such a consideration would demand that competition for troubled educational history… drawn from a stratum of Sierra wealth and political power in modern African states be factored Leonean society that is hooked on drugs, alcohol and street gaminto the cultural equation to explain why some communities bling. They have a very limited education and are prone to gangare not as violent as others.

Moreover, it could impute an ster type of activities — sometimes acting as clients of “strong men” 63 essentialist argument of ethnic orientation that still begs sciin society or leading political figures and government officials. entific support.

This is probably the most explicit connection that Mazrui SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN CONFLICTS makes of conflict and economic deprivation. He probably didn’t want to appear as an apologist to Marxist thinking, but the Almost all regions of the African continent are afflicted by idea that tensions in society could be bred by unequal districivil strife. From Morocco down to Sudan, the central African bution of wealth resonates with the Marxist theory of inhercountries of Rwanda, Burundi, the two Congos, and Angola ent class struggles in capitalist societies. Today in Africa, the are all embroiled in conflicts. The whole West African axis of lumpenisation of communities with its concomitant volatiliLiberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone is equally on ty is becoming an all too familiar feature in cities and towns. fire.

Some of these conflicts have been going on for decades Gangs of unemployed youth roam the streets scavenging for

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and have survived many peace agreeplex than the regional integration ments. The Sudan civil war begun programs that we see today. The secimmediately after independence in ond, which is probably the most con1956, and is still raging today.68 The tentious, is that of African re-colonicommon baseline for these conflicts sation and annexation. Lastly, is the is the resultant widespread death and creation of a regional body to funcsuffering, massive displacement, tion almost like a mini-United unparalleled destruction of infrasNations. It may appear as though truructure and the collapse of Mazrui is offering nothing new, regimes in power. Others, like the given that such polities have been Liberia civil war, appear to have attempted in various realms and we resolved but the peace is crumbling. all know their shortcomings. But But even in countries lauded as applied to the African situation, they peaceful –– such as Kenya, Nigeria, raise interesting considerations that Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and we would like to examine here.

Cameroon –– there are mounting political tensions that are threatenThe Idea of a Confederacy ing to explode into full-scale conflagrations as opposition groups clamAfrican internal conflicts often our for change of dictatorial regimes, involve groups. And because memor irreconcilable religious differences bers of any group will have a collecassume political dimensions. The tive approach to issues, be they the nature of these conflicts is as varied demand for basic human needs of The idea of a confederacy as the regions in which they occur. food and shelter, the need for secuThus, prescribing a uniform mearity, or just claim to recognition or emerges from Mazruina as a sure for their resolution is often least identity, the unifying factor in every response to ethnic polarisation. group will also be the greatest threat attempted. Even the structural funcHe suggests that smaller states to nationalism or state cohesion. tionalist approaches that favour mediation, reconciliation and other with tendencies to disintegrate Admittedly, claims to ethnic identialternative dispute-resolution mechty in many African states has providanisms have to take variance in the due to ethnic incongruity should ed the most fertile and portent be joined with their more stable ground for group formation. While manner in which they apply in different disputes. such groups may not be necessarily neighbours. In this way, their Mazrui recognises the complexity violent, situations have arisen that armies would be integrated into point to their volatility. The examof the African conflicts, a fact he bigger units incapable of almost attributes to the intricate ethples would be the Rwandan genonic configurations around national cide of 1994, where Hutu extremists fermenting ethnic bias. Mazrui boundaries, the cultural contradickilled an estimated 800,000 Tutsis in suggests Rwanda, Burundi and less than one year;70 the 1991 and tions, and the instability of the postTanzania be federated into a 1997 ethnic cleansing in Kenya colonial state, among others. He uses the metaphor of “broken post-coloUnited States of Central Africa. where Kalenjin warriors indiscriminately murdered Kikuyu and Luo nial taboos”, to illustrate this comsettlers in parts of Rift Valley and plexity.69 These are the taboo of recolonisation, with U.N. tutelage of Somali to reinvent its self- Nyanza provinces;71 and more recently, the massacres in the government; the taboo of sanctioned secession, with the cre- Kivu region of Congo.72 The idea of a confederacy emerges from Mazruina as a ation of sovereign Eritrea; and the taboo of “re-tribalisation” with the creation of a “federal” system in Ethiopia based on response to this ethnic polarisation. He suggests that smaller ethnicity. His view is that ethnic consciousness and problems states with tendencies to disintegrate due to ethnic inconof polticised tribal identity that have arisen in the context of gruity should be joined with their more stable neighbours. In multi-partyism portend a review of the taboo of addressing this way, their armies would be integrated into bigger units ethnicity with federalism. Despite this, he still views the prob- incapable of fermenting ethnic bias.

For example, Mazrui suggests that Rwanda, Burundi and lem of conflict as a structural one, which could be remedied simply by reorganising regional and continental polities to Tanzania should be federated into a United States of Central make them less amenable to political insecurity and equipping Africa.73 “In the longer run,” he argues, “one solution to them with suitable tools and organs to be more responsive to Rwanda and Burundi may well be a federation with conflict. His proposals revolve around three main ideas. The Tanzania.”74 In such a large political community, stability and first is the idea of a confederacy, something a little more com- even democracy could be easily achieved. As for Rwanda,

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Q U A R T E R L Y

Mazrui observes that its problems are more of a product of bi- of federation were forged, there would be mass movements polar ethnic competition. Within a federated union, the Hutus of people into new areas and this would transport the hostiland the Tutsis may as well discover that they are closer than ities to those areas. Remember that the West African nations hitherto imagined. He believes that the federation will cut the of Sierra Leone and Guinea were drawn into conflict by the genocidal frenzy, which these countries have witnessed in the movement of refugees from the Liberian civil war. past.75 The idea of a confederacy may appear reasonable on paper, African Re-Colonisation but its propriety does not seem to have been well thought out.

Moreover, as regards Rwanda and Burundi, it is not clear Perhaps the most controversial of Mazrui’s suggestions is whether Mazrui is actually suggesting irredentism,76 which is the idea that some African states should recolonise their counan ethnically engineered territorial adjustment, rather than a terparts with endemic wars and civil strife.80 Recolonisation confederacy. Practically, the idea seems just as difficult to under the banner of humanitarianism, Mazrui proposes, could implement as any irredentist project. Also, considering that arrest the spreading cancer of chaos. He suggests that the more states in the great lakes region, and particularly the East African stable states such as Egypt and South Africa could establish a region, have so much trouble formulating a limited system of big brother relationship with the dysfunctional states so as to economic integration, one wonders how less feasible a polit- exert pressure on the later to achieve a “Pax Africana”.

Some African countries will simply need to be temporarily controlled ical union would be.77 It would have been more useful if Mazrui could suggest by other African countries. Inevitably some dysfunctional countries will some incentive that would persuade nations to abandon their have to submit to trusteeship and even tutelage for a while as Zanzibar small oligarchs for a wider political union. Incentives are an did when it was annexed by Tanganyika in 1964 to form Tanzania.81 There are many troubling questions with this suggestion as important aspect to consider because African conflicts often do generate a momentum of their own based on what the par- a proper conflict remedying strategy. Did the Euroepans not come together at the Berlin ties perceive as their gains. Such gains are incentives for the perpetuation of A controversial suggestion is the Conference to share Africa as if it were a piece of cake? Is Mazrui sugthe conflict. Ultimately, a region may idea that some African states gesting that powerful African nations develop a culture of conflict as incenshould recolonise their like South Africa, Egypt and, maybe, tives multiply and parties redefine their interests and, thus, adopt vio- counterparts with endemic wars Nigeria should come together and lence as their way of life. The and civil strife. Recolonisation... share out their weak and impoverished counterparts in a similar way?

Burundi, Somali and Sudan conflicts Mazrui proposes, could arrest From the onset, the term coloniare examples of conflicts that have the spreading cancer of chaos. sation carries with it such an opprobeen associated with the culture of brious connotation, it is doubtful that conflict in those regions. Thus, the He suggests that the more any nation would agree to participate fact alone that peace is desirable may be enough for third parties who look stable states such as Egypt and in it. The alternative would be forced South Africa could establish a colonisation, similar to what the at these conflicts from far, but is certainly not enough incentive to spur in big brother relationship with the Europeans did to Africans in the past century. This probably is what the parties the need for any form of dysfunctional states so as to Mazrui has in mind because he sugnegotiation towards peace. For some exert pressure on the later to gests that African nations should African governments, peace is never consider unilateral interventions, the ultimate goal, but remaining in achieve a “Pax Africana”. “but with the blessing of the regionpower, no matter what it takes. And al organisation”.82 Rarely do unilatviolence could be the only means of eral military interventions guarantee peace. achieving this goal.

The U.S. led military intervention in Somali in 1992 Mazrui has suggested that unstable nations, such as Rwanda and Burundi, be federated into stable ones like Tanzania. (Operation Restore Hope) and the French in Rwanda in 1994 Labelling Tanzania as a more stable state could be misleading (Operation Turquoise) are examples of the failures of such considering the volatility of the political union of its mainland undertakings. Mazrui calls his ‘self-colonisation,’ which is still and the island of Zanzibar — a malignant sore in the political ambiguous terminology.83 Then, he proceeds to give the history of that country that seems to evoke tension and example of Tanganyika’s “annexation” of Zanzibar in 1964. widespread violence every now and again.78 The true ramifi- This example does not fit neatly into his classification of the cations of such a federation may be difficult to fathom but the union as a colonial enterprise. little evidence available indicates a possibility of violence The Mwafaka of 1964, a treaty signed between Julius spilling into new areas.

Nyerere and Sheikh Abeid Karume of Zanzibar, spelling out The spread of Somali refugees into the northern parts of terms of a union between Tanganyika mainland and Zanzibar, Kenya, and of Rwandan refugees to the Bukoba regions of guaranteed limited political autonomy to the island. It was not Tanzania have created instability in these areas.79 If any form a popular treaty by any measure, but its ingredients cannot be

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equated to the lopsided land treaties between the European colonialists and African indigenous chiefs in the last century. Also, there are major political problems between Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania, but I doubt if Zanzibaris see their island as a modern day colony of Tanzania.

is because of the availability of natural resources that keep the neighbours and transnational trade patterns hooked on that region.

(Conflict and political upheavals in Africa invariably follow patterns of natural wealth.) It was the illicit diamond trade in Angola and Sierra Leone that kept the civil war machine African Security Council and the in these countries humming for a Pan-African Military Force long time.87 In Mozambique, crossborder insurgents were very much a part of the civil war because they To distinguish his version of ensured as well a steady inflow of African re-colonisation from that of arms into the troubled zones.88 The the European, Mazrui envisions an simmering tensions in Burundi and African Security Council composed the genocidal violence in Rwanda of five pivotal African States — were all connected to the political Egypt, Ethiopia, Zaire (now Congo), dynamics of the great lakes region.

South Africa and Nigeria –– to overThus, the regional complexities see such an enterprise. The council and their connection to conflicts, would operate under a continental make a strong case for a regional proauthority to ensure that such an gramme of action that may be trigarrangement does not engender Mazrui envisions an African Security Council comexploitation and subjugation. The posed of five pivotal African States — Egypt, Ethiopia, gered by the eruption of violence, or council would have permanent and Zaire (now Congo), South Africa and Nigeria. The rea- by a preventative mechanism non-permanent members and soning would then be that the current African Union designed along the lines of the early (AU) — the launch of which is shown in the photo — warning system of the African would function as the United system is bureaucratic and slow.

Union, but no less reliant on the Nations Security Council, but with a mandate limited to regional security matters. Perhaps what acquiescence or goodwill of national political leadership. But Mazrui has in mind is a strong and relatively influential group such programmes must also contain the necessary component of African nations that would quickly convene and agree on of mediation and societal healing, to be triggered by the cessation of hostilities. This could be the peace-building phase of an immediate action in cases of crisis.

The reasoning would then be that the current African conflict-resolution: An important component of the whole Union (AU) system is bureaucratic and slow. The Security agenda for eliminating violence.

Many analysts agree that societies that have experienced Council would have at its disposal a Pan African emergency force ready for developyment in peacekeeping operations. In extreme forms of violence, such as Rwanda, need healing and, the words of Mazrui this would be, “a sort of fire brigade that of course, the erection of structures that will ensure lasting could be rushed to the site of conflagration in collapsed states peace. For example, the Hutu communities, like Tutsis, must or at outbreak of civil war and that could teach Africans the art be accommodated in an all-inclusive peace program if the of maintaining peace”.84 How this force shall be recruited, society is to recover from the trauma of its past. The ongoing trained or funded is not discussed. He only suggests that it prosecution of the Hutu extremists directly responsible for the should be trained to use minimum force. Mazrui does not genocide must be seen in this light too: As a process of healdraw any parallels to the U.S. conceived African Crisis ing that adopts the dual mechanism of punishing criminality Response Initiative (ACRI), which has been accepted by Mali, and at the same time forging an all-embracing community Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Malawi, Uganda and Cote D’Ivoire.85 integration programme.

Under the ACRI initiative African troops would be trained and How all these factors will fit into Mazrui’s scheme is not given non-lethal equipment for future peacekeeping opera- clear. Practitioners will definitely ask whether what he protions.86 poses can be realised through the African Union system, espeThe program has not been fully implemented, so its full cially with the revamped Peace and Security Council estabpotential may be difficult to appraise. However, the idea that lished through a protocol signed by AU heads of states and a military outfit which is professionally trained to deal with government in July 2002.89 According to the protocol, the conflicts may well be in the offing, underscores the need for PSC is expected to function as the fulcrum for all peace and a more intrusive study than Mazrui has provided in his pro- security activities of the AU. PSC will have the generalised mandate to undertake peaceposal for a Pan-African force.

Pan-Africanism and other forms of regional integration are making and peace-building activities, promote post-conflict clearly desirable, considering that most conflicts are a product peace-building and prevent resurgence of violence, and comof transnational linkages that spread across borders. Usually it bating international terrorism. More particularly, however, it

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A F R I C A was invested with powers to make recommendations to the AU Assembly of an intervention in cases of grave crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide; to institute sanctions; and to deploy peace support missions. Apart from the PSC, there are other institutions such as NEPAD and regional bodies including ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, which are not organs of the AU, but which functions alongside it. All these have a peace agenda built into their programmes.90 Perhaps what Mazrui needs to tell us is why Africa needs other institutions instead of strengthening and developing the ones that are already in place.

CONCLUSION

Q U A R T E R L Y

The regional complexities and their connection to conflicts make a strong case for a regional program of action that may be triggered by the eruption of violence, or by a preventative mechanism designed along the lines of the early warning system of the AU, but no less reliant on the acquiescence or goodwill of national political leadership. But such programmes must also contain the component of mediation and societal healing, to be triggered by the cessation of hostilities. This could be the peace-building phase of conflictresolution: An important component of the whole agenda for eliminating violence.

This article could never comprehensively cover all of the ideas and theories put forth by Mazruina.

However, from the point of view of a conflict-resolution strategist, the themes covered here offer an insight on how Mazrui views Africa’s contemporary conflict problems. Most importantly, he offers solutions, something that most analysts shy away from. But although his prescriptions are provocative, they are less intrusive to conjure any serious discussion on modalities of ending internal wars in Africa.

Reading his thoughts, one is left yearning for more, as if the treatises themselves have been rudely truncated. Some of them are less appreciative of the existing institutions and other structural arrangements that have made inroads into the peacemaking enterprise in the continent.

REFERENCES 1 See for example, Omari H Kokole, The Master Essayist in ‘Global African: A Portrait of Ali M. Mazrui’, 1-19 (Omari H Kokole eds., 1998) (hereinafter, ‘Global African’) 2 See Rupert Emerson, Book Review: Towards a Pax Africana, MAWAZO, Kampala Vol 1 No.1 June 1967 p. 56-7 3 See generally Chaly Sawere, The Multiple Mazrui: Scholar, Ideologue, Philosopher, Artist, in ‘Global African’, supra note lat 269-289.

4 Responding to one of his critics in a 1974 piece entitled, “Africa, My Conscience and I” in 5 TRANSITION (Kampala) 10-50 (1974) 5 See Laurence Juma, The war in Congo: Transnational Conflict Networks and the Failure of Internationalism, ‘Gonzaga Journal of International Law’, Vol. 10 (2006) (Forthcoming)

Others might even argue that taken as a whole, Mazruina is a repertoire of unwieldy thoughts traversing through a jungle of disciplines without making any distinctive mark on any one of them. I would be less inclined to support this view because conflict-resolution and peace studies in general traverse through many disciplines. And because conflicts are complex phenomena, their study necessarily takes on an integrative and interdisciplinary approach.91 Also, scholars in this field come from a variety of disciplines, and not a single one of them can boast of a clean break from his past.

However, recognising that conflict studies and theories have evolved to a point where their approach to conflict issues strive for a certain level of scholarly demarcation, it may be foolhardy to brand all writers who mention the word conflict in their work as offering any tangible contribution to the field.

Ideas must be tested against conventional conflict-resolution theories and appropriately assigned to their areas of relevance.

Whereas, in this article I demonstrate that Mazruina has passed this test, obviously there are some limitations. But on the whole, Mazrui must be commended because his work weaves cultural values and modern concepts of governance, law and human rights into the mainstream of African conflict research. And in the African landscape, where ideas tend to follow the fast-changing pace of political upheavals, integrative works such as Mazruina could be the basis for developing a more intrusive and pragmatic conflict-research agenda.

6 A recent book on the Rwandan genocide written by Mahmood Mamdani, ‘When Victims Become Killers: Colonialnialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda’, (2001) is a powerful illustration of how a motley of factors play out to occasion the most heinous event of history.

7 He even suggested at one time that Nigeria should acquire nuclear capability. See generally Ali Mazrui, ‘Africa International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change’(1977). He proposed that African nations should not heed the call of others to demilitarize. In his view nuclear capability gave some nations the power to dominate others.

8 See Lewis Cooper, Conflict: Social Aspects, in ‘Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences’ 232 (D Sills ed., 1968) 9 Anthropologists see conflict as a cultural phenomenon. They appraise an understanding of conflict based on norms, values, ideologies and world views held by actors in any conflict situation.

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10 See George Simmel, ‘Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations’ (1955) 11 See H L Nieburg, ‘Political Violence’, 236 (1969) 12 See Ali Mazrui, ‘Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions in Africa’, 102-21 (1969) 13 See Ali Mazrui, ‘Soldiers and Kinsman in Uganda: The Making of Military Ethnocracy’, (1975) 14 Ali Mazrui, The African state as a Political Refugee, in ‘African Conflict Resolution: The US Role in Peacemaking’, 9-25 AT 11 (David R Smock & Chester Crocker eds. 1995) 15 Ibid. at 20 16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 See Coady CAJ, The Idea of Violence, in 3 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 3-19 (1986) CITED IN ‘Violence and Its Alternatives’, 25 (Manfred B Sterger & Nancy Lind eds., 1999) 19 See Robert Paul Wolff, On Violence, in 66 JOURNAL OF PHILOSPHY, 601-16 (1969) 20 The question would thus be; who should determine whether or not a government has exceeded its authority. From a juridical perspective, judical review is the only process in which citizens could express their displeasure at a government action. It is an acclaimed process through which the judical arm of government checks the excesses of the executive. This process may work in systems where the executive is willing to surrender some of its authority to the judiciary.

In the context of military regimes or failed states, it may not be worthwhile talking about judicial review. Other than judicial review, the legislature is the only organ that could declare a vote of no confidence on the political leadership and thus remove it from power.

21 Secession is generally linked to the right to self-determination; a concept that found ample support during Africa’s struggle for independence. The right is enshrined in various international instruments: the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Oct. 24, 1970) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Right6s (21 GA Res 2200, Dec. 1966), Article 1; and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural rights (), Art. 1, See also Gregory Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-cold War Era: A New International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the Coherence of Experience, in ‘Self Determination and Self Administration’, 47 (Wolfgang Danspeckgruber & A Watt eds., 1997) 22 See Lloyd N Cutler, Foreword, in ‘Self Determination in the New World Order’, xi (Morton H Halperin & David J Schaffer eds., 1992) 23 See Wolff Supra note 19 24 the process of secession is far from over. In my view, the bitter border dispute between the two exemplifies how indeterminate action fraught with violence may nevertheless be acceptable. The test of legitimacy in a case such as this may at best be incongruent if not totally impractical.

25 See Ali Mazrui, ‘A World Federation of Cultures: An

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African Perspective’, 211 (1976) 26 Ibid.

27 See Johann Galtung, Violence, Peace and Peace Research, in 6 THE JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 168 (1969) 28 See Barbara H chasin, ‘Inequality and Violence in the United States’, 4 (1997) 29 See Johann Galtung, supra note 27 at 168 30 Ibid 31 See Barbara H Chasin supra note 28 at 5 32 Ibid at 9 33 See for example Mazrui Ali, Development in a MultiCultural Context: Trends and Tensions, in ‘Culture and Development in Africa’, (I Serageldin & J Taborof eds., 1994) 34 See Ali Mazrui, ‘Violence and Thought’, supra note 12 AT 96,97 35 Ali Mazrui, The Anatomy of Violence in Contemporary Africa, in ‘Africa: From Mystery to Maze’ 45-76 (Helen Kitchen ed., 1977) 36 Ironically, the violence was sanctioned by international law. See Makau Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Enquiry, 16 Mich j INT’L L 1113 (1995) 37 See Ali Mazrui supra note 14 at12 38 See Laurence Juma, supra note 5 39 for an extensive exploration of this fact, see Laurence Juma, “Africa, Its Conflicts and Its Traditions: Debating A suitable Role for Tradition in African Peace Initiatives,” in MSU ‘Journal of International Law’, Vol. 13 no. 3 (2005) at 417 40 See Mahmood Mamdani, supra note 6 at 73 41 See Ali Mazrui, ‘Towards Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition’, 197 (1967) 42 Ibid. at 196 43 See Ali Mazrui, ‘On Heroes and Uhuru-Worship: Essays on Independent Africa’, 38 (1967) 44 Ibid at 28 45 Some scholars have criticized Mazrui precisely on this account. See for example George B Ayittey, ‘Africa in Chaos’, 38 (1998) 46 See Ali Mazrui, ‘The Africans’, London, (BBC Publication, 1986) 47 See Ali Mazrui, ‘Cultural Forces in World Politics’, 5 (1990) 48 He expressed these views in talk he gave in Nairboi sometime in August 1998. The author was in attendance.

49 See ali Mazrui, supra note 14 at 11 50 Herbert Kelman, Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Socio-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy, in ‘International Politics and Foreign Policy’, 169, 276-88 (James N Rosenau ed., 1969) 51 See ali Mazrui, Political Engineering in Africa, in ‘International Social Science Journal’ 25(2) 293 (1983) 52 See Ali Mazrui, supra note 13 at 127 53 This thesis has many supporters. See for example, Samuel Hutington, ‘Political Order in changing Societies’ (1968) AND Charles Tilly, ‘From Mobilization to Revolution’(1978) 54 See Ted Robert Gurr, Theories of Political Violence and Revolution in the Third World in ‘Conflict Resolution in Africa’, 153 AT 158-9 (Francdis M Deng & I William Zartman eds.,)

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A F R I C A 55 See George Ayittey supra note 45 at 53 56 See Jimmy D Kandeh, Ransoming the State: Elite Origins of Subaltern Terror in Sierra Leone 81 REV AFR POL ECON 349, 351 (1991) 57 See Laurence Juma, Regional Initiatives for Peace: Lessons from IGAD and ECOWAS/ECOMOG, in 40 AFRICAN QUARTERLY 85, 88-92 (2000) 58 Laurence Juma Supre note 5 59 See Ali Mazrui supra note 52 60 See Yusuf Bangura, Understanding the political and Cultural Dynamics of Sierra Leone War: A critique of Paul Richards Fighting for the Rain Forest, XXII AFR. DEV. 114, 117 (1997).

61 Ibid 62 Ibid 63 Ibid at 126 64 See Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, Facing Mount Kenya, or Facing Mecca? The Mungiki Ethnic Violence and the Politics of Moi Succession in Kenya 1987-2002 in 102 (406) ‘African Affairs’ 25-49 (2003) 65 See Muthui Mwai, What Makes Mungiki Tick, ‘Daily Nation’, Nairboi, Oct. 23, 2000 66 See Tervil Okoko, Mungiki Sect Members Torch Slum Village, ‘Daily Nation’, Nairboi, Dec 9, 2000 67 See Ali Mazrui, ‘The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa’ 2 (1978) 68 See generally Laurence Juma, supra note 57 69 See Ali Mazrui, The Bondage of Boundaries, in ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1993 Vol. 2 at 28 70 See Gerard Prunier, ‘The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide’, 100-08 (1995) 71 See Laurence Juma supra note 5 at 494-495 72 See International Crisis Grup (ICG), North Kivu Into the Quagmire: An Overview of the Current Crisis in North Kivu, Aug. 13, 1998 73 See ali Mazrui, The Tutsi trigger: Redrawing Africa’s Colonial Map, in 14 New Perspectives Quarterly 48 Winter, 1997 74 Ibid 75 The US Congress has equally opposed the fragmentation strategy. A recent council on Foreign Relations study concluded that; While the creation may be necessary or inevitable, the fragmentation of international society into hundreds of international society into hundreds of independent territorial entities is a recipe for an even more dangerous and anarchic world.

Cited in Gidon Gottlieb, Nation against state: A new approach to ethnic conflicts and the decline of sovereignty (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993) at 2 76 See Donald L Horowitz, Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy and Law, in ‘Ethnicity and Group Rights’, 421, 423 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997)

Q U A R T E R L Y

77 For example, the Treaty of East African Co-operation (Kenya Uganda and Tanzania) establishing the East African Community (EAC) was signed in 1967. EAC collapsed ten years later. A new treaty was again signed in July 2000 after lengthy negotiations. See Louis A Kasekende & Nehemiah Ngeno, Regional Integration and Economic Liberalization in Eastern and southern Africa, in ‘Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization’ IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 148, 160-3 (Ademola Oyejide & Ibrahim Elbadawi eds., 1999) 78 See Shumbana Karume, Towards an Understanding of Contemporary Conflict in Zanzibar, (EISA publication 2005) Available on the web at http://www.eisa.org.za/EISA/publications/catop.htm 79 See for example Jeff Crisp A state of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya’s Refugee Camps, 99 ‘African Affairs’, 601-632 (2000) 80 See Ali Mazrui, The Message of Rwanda: Re-Colonize Africa, in ‘New perspectives Quarterly’, Fall, 1994 at 18 81 Ibid 82 See Ali Mazrui supra note 14 at 21 83 Ibid at 22 84 Ibid 85 See ‘Daily Nation’, Nairobi, Oct. 1999 86 See Paul Omach, The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and the Congergence of National Interests, 99 ‘African Affairs’, 47-71 (2000) 87 See Laurence Juma, The Human Rights Approach to Peace in Sierra Leone: The Analysis of the Peace Process and the Human Rights Enforcement in a Civil War situation, 30 (3) DEN J INT’L L & POL 325-376 (2000).

88 See generally Laurence Juma, supra note 5 89 See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, AU Assembly, 1st Ordinary Session Durban south Africa July 9, 2002 available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summitcouncil/secprot.htm 90 For example the recently concluded Treaty for the Establishment of East African community sets out in article 4 the “promotion of peace, security and stability” as one of its main objectives.

91 See Adebayo Adedeji, Comprehending African Conflicts in ‘Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts’ 3-21 (Adedeji eds., 1999) He writes, Interdisciplinary in approaches, necessitated by complex nature of conflicts, goes beyond simultaneous and parallel studies. It presupposes integrative methods of enquiry whereby specialists in different disciplines provide insights from their own investigations into other fields, thus enriching and validating the findings and recommendations.

Ibid at 18

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‘India a source of INSPIRATION’

Z

imbabwean Minister of Industry and International Relations Obert Mpofu first came to India as a dreamy idealist student in the late 1970s. More than two decades later, he visited India as a minister to attend the India-Africa Project Partnership business conclave and found a country that is fast emerging as Asia’s economic powerhouse and is, in fact, readying to assume what the Minister called its “rightful place on the global stage.”

“India’s all-round development is a source of inspiration for us. Africa views India as a leader of developing countries,” says Mpofu in this interview with Manish Chand.

The Zimbabwean minister also encourages more Indians to come and experience the breathtaking beauty of his country and invites Indian businessmen to explore opportunities of investment in different sectors, specially mining. Excerpts from the interview: Q: This is the third India-Africa business conclave in less than two years. What do you think this conclave has achieved?

Does it point to new business synergy between India and Africa?

A: It is clear that the conclave has focussed on all areas of development, including cooperation between India and Africa. This conclave has been very useful. Corporations of the entire continent were involved in it. The conclave helped businessmen and political leaders to understand the investment environment in each other’s country and explore business opportunities.

However, for this cooperation to be more fruitful and productive, what we need are skills and capacity-building and the transfer of technology from India to Africa. We must fully tap our huge natural resources for development and for providing a better life for our people.

Q: How do you see the state of relations between India and Africa? What are the promising areas of cooperation between the two countries?

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A: Africa and India have had a long, healthy relationship and shared a colonial past and the struggle against injustice and oppression of all kinds. We view India as a friend. We plan to cooperate in all areas, including agriculture, tourism and mining. Already, we are having a lot of interest from Indian companies. Following last year’s conclave, eight Indian companies have shown an interest in investing in Zimbabwe. We are hopeful that more and more Indian companies will come to Zimbabwe and exploit lucrative business opportunities there.

Some of the potential areas Indian businessmen would like to take a closer look at in Zimbabwe are oil extraction, ginning, spinning and textiles.

Agriculture is another big area of bilateral cooperation that needs to be exploited to its full potential.

In agriculture, we are getting agricultural implements, fertilisers, agro-chemicals from India. Agriculture contributes about 18 percent of our GDP and employs a large workforce. Our major agricultural exports are tobacco, horticultural produce, cotton, sugar, tea, coffee, et cetera.

Q: What opportunities are there for Indian companies interested in the mining sector in Zimbabwe?

A:There is tremendous potential for cooperation in mining of coal, iron ore, nickel, copper, diamond and uranium.

Mining accounts for 4 percent of our GDP and contributes substantially to our foreign exchange earnings. We are prepared for Indian companies participating in mining of any mineral resource, including uranium.

Q: Are you ready to export uranium to India? Do you foresee possibility of civil nuclear cooperation with India?

A: There is tremendous scope for exploitation of mineral purposes for civilian purposes. There was a recent conference in Zimbabwe to discuss peaceful uses of nuclear power.

Q: Zimbabwe is known for its natural beauty and a wide variety of wildlife. What are you doing to promote tourism in your country?

A: Tourism is another promising area. Zimbabwe has some of the most picturesque places in the world. Victoria Falls is regarded as one of the natural wonders of the world. The

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stone enclosures of Great India and China are experiencThere is tremendous potential Zimbabwe –– remnants of a onceing higher growth rates and transfor cooperation in mining of glorious empire –– are fascinating ferring their skills to Africa. We coal, iron ore, nickel, copper, cherish both. The Chinese have and are a big draw with tourists. We have fabulous wildlife. We want diamond and uranium. Mining been involved in mining, roads, stamore Indians to come to our beaudium and other infrastructure proaccounts for 4 percent of our tiful country and experience these jects.

GDP and contributes wonderful places.

Q: How is India perceived in Africa?

Besides, we have a literate popHas the image of India changed in substantially to our foreign ulation –– 96 to 97 percent of our the continent? exchange earnings. There is population is literate –– the highest A: I first came to India in the late also great scope for in Africa. People are warm and 1970s as a student. There is a masfriendly. One can expect a warm, cooperation in the agriculture sive improvement in all areas. welcoming reception here.

Academia has changed. sector between India and Q: China has enhanced its business Infrastructure has improved.

Zimbabwe. and energy relations with Africa.

We have a look east policy. This Beijing is also involved with some of entails looking at India as one of the big infrastructure projects in Africa. Do you see a new com- strategic focus. We are also part of regional blocs that help petition or rivalry between India and China for opportunities to promote bilateral relationships. There is the African in Africa?

Union, the Non-Aligned Movement and G-20.

A: We see the roles of India and China as complementary India’s all-round development is a source of inspiration in Africa. We view India and China as natural allies as our for us. In the last 20 years, India has made tremendous relationship with either of them doesn’t have a colonial past. progress. Africa views India as a leader of developing counIndia and China helped us liberate from colonial rule. Both tries. Africa wants India to take its rightful place on the globunderwent the same colonisation experience. al stage.

Zimbabwe: Factfile Geography Location: Southern Africa, between South Africa and Zambia Area: Total 390,580 sq km Land: 386,670 sq km Water: 3,910 sq km Natural resources: coal, chromium ore, asbestos, gold, nickel, copper, iron ore, vanadium, lithium, tin, platinum group metals Population: 12,236,805 Population growth rate: 0.62 percent (2006 est.)

Infant mortality rate: total: 51.71 deaths/1,000 live births Life expectancy at birth: total population: 39.29 years Total fertility rate: 3.13 children born/woman (2006 est.)

HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate: 24.6% (2001 est.)

People living with HIV/AIDS: 1.8 million (2001 est.)

HIV/AIDS - deaths: 170,000 (2003 est.)

Ethnic groups: African 98 percent, Shona 82 percent, Ndebele 14 percent, other 2 percent. Mixed and Asian 1 percent, white less than 1 percent.

Government Government type: Parliamentary Democracy Independence: April 18, 1980 (from UK) Constitution: December 21 1979 Legal system: mixture of Roman-Dutch and English com-

mon law Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal Economy GDP (Purchasing Power Parity): $24.99 billion (2005 est.)

GDP - Real Growth Rate: -7 percent (2005 est.)

GDP - per capita (PPP): $2,100 (2005 est.)

GDP - composition by sector: agriculture: 17.9 percent Industry: 24.3 percent, services: 57.9 percent (2005 est.)

Labor force: 3.94 million (2005 est.)

Labor force - by occupation: agriculture: 66 percent Industry: 10 percent Services: 24 percent (1996) Unemployment rate: 80 percent (2005 est.)

Population below poverty line: 80 percent (2004 est.)

Inflation rate (consumer prices): 585 percent official data; private sector estimates are much higher (year end 2005 est.)

Exports: $1.644 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.)

Imports: $2.059 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.)

Public debt: 30.1 percent of GDP (2005 est.)

Agriculture - Products: corn, cotton, tobacco, wheat, coffee, sugarcane, peanuts; sheep, goats, pigs, etc.

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The WEST’s reporting of conflict in Africa Ibrahim Seaga Shaw writes that the Western media’s reporting of the civil war in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2001 was more evocative than diagnostic, and reflective of their biases.

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his study analyses stereotypical representations and clichés within the context of evocative and diagnostic reporting, not only as media logics, but also as recurrent communication obstacles, found in the Western media discourse about the civil war in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2001. It argues that the journalists of the mainstream Western media rarely treated the political context of the war, which is the central concern of this paper. It is informed by the desire to understand the reasons that lead journalists to employ stereotypes and preformatted frames of analysis. What shapes their mindsets about Africa in general?

What shaped their worldviews about Sierra Leone in the wake of the civil war in particular? This study explores three hypotheses: Stereotypical representations informed the factors, which shaped the reporting of these journalists; these representations in turn produced communication obstacles; and finally these representations influenced these journalists to do more of evocative than diagnostic reporting.

INTRODUCTION: Theoretical Background Some journalists in the West readily admit that they have not been doing justice to their coverage of Africa. This is part of a series of conclusions drawn by the Oxford-based Reporting the World Project in its groundbreaking ‘Report on a Round Table Conference on the Topic: Is the Coverage of Africa Racist? Why the blackout on the crisis in the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo)?’ Organised at the Freedom Forum European Centre in London on May 16, 2001, the conference had speakers from the British electronic and print media, as well as other European media. The discussion topic, though somewhat rhetorical, constitutes in itself two potentially problematic research questions yet to be explored by mass media researchers. It was in fact borrowed from a passage –– used to open the RTW Report –– largely emblematic of the DRC as a kind of microcosm of all the problems facing Africa where cultural factors such as “us” and “them” in most cases influence the reporting of Western media journalists:

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“About four million people have lost their lives in what has come to be referred to as Africa’s big war (the civil war in the DRC). How can we explain the little information that we get about this tragedy? Is it because if ‘their’ problem and as a result ‘we’ don’t have anything to do with it?…1 Serving as a kind of preface for this study, this conference is important for two reasons: First, it was the first conscious effort by any media advocacy group to bring together a very large number of British and other European journalists who were bold enough to admit fundamental mistakes of judgement in their reporting of Africa; second, it brought to light some of the factors which normally determine their mindset in their reporting of this often forgotten continent, and at the same time opened the door for more research in this area. As a participant observer, I was visibly touched by the frank, but overtly hypothetical, admission by most of the Western media professionals present of the unfair and biased ways they have been portraying issues about Africa in their reporting, and call, as a matter of urgency, for a complete change in their approach.

Of special interest to this study are the five factors outlined here by New African Editor Baffour Ankomah: National interest, home government lead, demands from advertisers, ideology, and historical baggage, which he said shape the reporting of Africa by the Western media. Apart from the desire to give an empirical strength to Ankomah’s hypothesis, and in a way develop it further, this paper aims to stimulate debate among media researchers in an area arguably void of any serious academic literature. Save for a small volume of literature in the form of autobiographies and biographies by foreign correspondents awash with war hero mythical tales of their experience (Alagiah, 2001; Smith, 2003; Hess, 1996; Rosenblum, 1993; Cameron, 1997, etc.), and perhaps conference reports like the RTW one, this domain of mass media enquiry is still to receive the attention of academic researchers.

Drawing from a socio-analytical study of 22 British, American and French journalists who covered the civil war in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2001, this study will identify other factors, beyond the five outlined by Ankomah, which shaped their reporting of one of Africa’s most atrocious civil conflicts.

My choice of the RTW conference to provide the background to this study ostensibly explains my targeting of the

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Western media journalists, and not their African media colleagues, in my enquiry.

Moreover, media researchers have often focused on problems faced by the media in Africa, paying little or no attention to Western media correspondents working in Africa, who to a very large extent influence the way local journalists practice their profession. This study therefore aims to fill that gap.

Drawing from the rather limited empirical research data on war reporting involving correspondents of the Western media (P. Knightley, 1976; M. Pedelty, 1993; D. Morrison & H. Tumber, 1988; S. Allan & Berziger, 2004; Carruthers, 2000; D. Wolton, 1991; M. Palmer, 2003; G. McLaughlin, 2002, etc.), who have worked in other parts, particularly in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe, this study aims to shift attention to their colleagues who worked in Africa, with the civil war in Sierra Leone as a case study.

of crisis situations. Evocative reporting is that style of reporting which more or less concentrates either on spinning the national and geopolitical interests of the home countries of the Western media, or the humanitarian angle of the news, with the primary aim of sensitising public opinion. On the other hand, diagnostic reporting, while covering the national, geopolitical and humanitarian angles of the news, pays more attention to analysing its political context; that is putting emphasis on explaining why things went wrong leading to the crisis instead of just telling the story as it is. In other words, it provides the political context of the war, which people need to get a better understanding of how it all started, how to resolve it, and how to avoid it in the Some journalists in the West future. Little wonder, therefore, that readily admit that they have not this diagnostic approach in reporting been doing justice to their wars can be arguably identified as coverage of Africa. This is part indispensable in promoting what has come to be known as “peace journalof a series of conclusions ism”. drawn by the Oxford-based The choice that journalists often Presentation of the Problem negotiate between these two Reporting the World Project approaches of war reporting is often in its groundbreaking ‘Report This study seeks to provide determined by the type of news on a Round Table Conference answers to the following fundamenframes or stereotypical representatal research questions: What factors tions of that war, or aspects of it, they on the Topic: Is the Coverage shaped the reporting of the Western are ready to prop up. If, for example, of Africa Racist? Why the media journalists who covered the some correspondents decide to spin blackout on the crisis in the civil war in Sierra Leone between a stereotypical representation of the 1996 and 2001? Is there an association Sierra Leone rebels as nothing but “a DRC (Democratic Republic between these factors and some of bunch of rag-tag butchers and lootof Congo)?’ the stereotypical representations in ers”, they are more likely to focus the the news discourse of these journalsteam of their reporting on the evocaists? Is there an association between these stereotypical repre- tive, or rather humanitarian, angle of the story –– evacuation sentations and some of the disinformation spotted? Did these of expatriate staff and foreign, mostly Western countries’, representations influence the journalists in the study to do nationals, and above all the need to provide relief aid for peomore of evocative than diagnostic reporting? Media scholars ple apparently trapped in the thick of the unfolding crisis. On agree that there is indeed a mix-bag of communication obsta- the other hand, if some correspondents decide to spin a stereocles standing in the way of journalists in the day-to-day prac- typical representation of the rebels as being a group of “freetice of their profession. The result has unfortunately been a dom fighters bent on overthrowing a corrupt regime” they are surge in the production of biased and sometimes highly dis- more likely to opt for the diagnostic approach in a bid to get a torted journalism. better understanding of what went wrong, and how it can be To help answer the above questions, I will first explore the put right, while at the same time reporting the humanitarian two main approaches or styles of reporting wars and other angle of the story. As we will come to see later in this study, crises often used by Western media journalists: Evocative and this later approach was rarely observed in the case of most of diagnostic reporting. These two basic professional techniques, the Western media journalists who covered the Sierra Leone which generally facilitate the production and reception of the civil war. news, occasionally come into play, especially in the reporting Capital to the understanding of the notion of stereotypical

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M E D I A representation we often find in news discourse is the mathe- to continue to examine the interaction of media institutions matical theory of communication founded by C. Shannon with news sources in an agenda-setting framework to specify and W. Weaver (1975).2 That there are many theoretical mod- more precisely how issues and images originate, and how issue els of communication is beyond dispute among mass com- agendas are maintained over time. We need to understand betmunication researchers, but that of Shannon and Weaver glar- ter when media are likely to act as passive transmission belts ingly stand out as the one which has come to be called the gen- and when they are more likely to take active role in filtering eral system of communication. It is a model that is tellingly and shaping issues and images.” important in observing and analysing news production, parIn their agenda-setting role, journalists are often confrontticularly that which relates to the transformation of informa- ed with a host of news values, which normally determine the tion from the source to the audience or reader. It is in this pro- types of issues they cover, and what aspects of these issues they cess that we often bump on stereotypical representations of all are to spin at the expense of others. Setting the media or pubsorts, most of which are almost always punctuated with covert- lic agenda, Galtung and Ruge summarise these news values in ly unfriendly clichés. While Shannon was more or less con- their famous 12 criteria such as “frequency”, “threshold”, cerned with the “technical aspect” of this information trans- “absolute intensity”, “unambiguity”, “meaningfulness”, “culformation, Weaver was more contural proximity”, “relevance”, “preThe bottom line of our findings dictability”, “demand”, “unexpectedcerned with the “semantic aspect”, which F. Heinderyckx (1999) likened here points to a very limited use ness”, “scarcity”, “continuity”, “comto some kinds of stereotypical repreposition”, “reference to elite nations”, of the diagnostic approach of sentations such as “tiredness, distrac“reference to elite people”, “reference reporting. Moreover, standing tion, disease, intoxication, antipathy to persons”, “reference to something or sympathy, biases, tension, fright, negative”, which they say play an out glaringly in our analysis of etc.” capable of distorting the coding, important role in determining which the decoding, and above all the their news discourse juxtaposed events or issues are covered, and if with the data acquired from semantic decoding of the message so, from what angle. R. Fowler put across.

(2001), who is more interested in the depth interviews with some of Media effect in the news produclinguistic angle –– syntax and struction process, especially that relating to them is the fact that even on the ture of the vocabulary –– of news rare occasions where these the notions of agenda-setting, forrepresentation, argues that all that is mulated and developed for the first journalists attempted to give the said or written about in the news is time by McCombs and Shaw (1972), constructed from a particular ideopolitical context of the war, they logical position. He referred to the and news values within the context of tended to spin more of the the 12 criteria advanced by Galtung work of Stuart Hall and Greg Philo and Ruge (1965), has also been iden- internal than the external factors (1983) of the Glasgow Media tified as fundamental in understandResearch Group to emphasise the that caused the war, a ing the nature of stereotypical represorting out of what is new, and what representation influenced more is nothing new. The American media sentations we often see in news content. by their cultural and ideological researcher, Walter Lippmann (1922), According to Berelson (1948), who appears to nurse a more realist biases than professional “some kinds of communication on view about the role of the journalist considerations. some kinds of issues, brought to the in news production, sees the press as attention of some kinds of people “a beam of a searchlight that moves under some kinds of conditions, have restlessly about, bringing one episode some kinds of effects”. Relevant here is the cognitive, affective and then another out of darkness into vision”. “Men cannot and behaviourist effects of news content3 (see E.M Perse, do the work of the world by this view alone,” he asserts, “they 2001; Ball-Rokeach and De fleur, 1976; Chaffee, 1977; Roberts cannot govern society by episodes, incidents, and eruptions.” and Macoby, 1985).

This search light beam analogy is very much like the mirror Moreover, understanding the dynamics of the agenda-set- metaphor of real or fake images advanced by Locke and ting notion is necessary for a better grasp of the cognitive, Descartes, which shows that the problem of stereotypical repaffective and behaviourist effects of news content. J. Charon resentations and clichés is far from new (See also Ginniken, (1995) defined agenda-setting as a model which establishes a 1999; J, Westerstahl & F Johansson, 1994; Nwosu, causal relation between the importance which the media Onwumechidi & M’bayo). accord to certain issues and the public perception of the imporAlso worthy of note in the construction of stereotypical reptance of these issues; in other words, the relation between the resenations in news discourse is the political economy of the media agenda on one hand, and that of the public on the other. media, especially as it relates to the propaganda model of the Charon is in fact more interested in the causal relationship American media espoused by Herman and Chomsky (1988) between media professionals and their news sources, as we can who wrote: “The powerful are able to fix the premises of dissee here in his apt reference to D. Weaver (1987): “We need course, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see,

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A F R I C A hear and think about, and to ‘manage’ public opinion by regular propaganda campaign.”( See also D. Wolton (1991); P.Golding & G. Murdock, 1997; G. Reeves, 1979; J. Downing, A. Mohammadi & A.S. Mohammadi, 1995, etc.).

Method and Limits of the Study The methodology used in this study is largely eclectic, which allows the same data to be examined using different tools of analysis, in this case, ethnographic observation, debt interview and content analysis. The research approach is more or less descriptive, which is indispensable for an objective ethnographical observation and analysis of the experience of the Western media journalists who covered the civil war in Sierra Leone. Borrowing the style Mark Pedelty (1993) used in his study of the journalists who covered the war in El Salvado in the late 1980s, and that used by Morrison and Tumber (1988) in their study of the British journalists who covered the Falkland war, I observed and analysed the experience of 22 Western media journalists who covered the Sierra Leone war as a group of people sharing more or less the same professional and cultural characteristics.

I was, however, forced to cope with some difficulties while conducting this research: Lack of access to all the journalists studied for debt interviews; limited time and space to study the whole duration of the almost 11-year civil war (March 23, 1991-January 15, 2002) ; and above all my level of attachment to the topic discussed as a Sierra Leonean journalist who happened to witness and report some of the events covered in the study4. Attempts nonetheless were made to surmount these difficulties in such a way as to render them incapable of undermining the strength of the research findings. The periods studied were arbitrarily selected, but of course taking into account our research problems, to cover the last five years of the war, that is between 1996 and 2001, largely considered as the peak period of the war during which the worst atrocities were recorded: ■ The November 30, 1996, Abidjan Peace Accord to the AFRC coup of May 25, 1997.

■ ECOMOG’s military intervention to remove the AFRC junta and return the elected President Kabbah to power between February 4 and March 15.

■ The rebel invasion of the Sierra Leone capital Freetown on January 6, 1999, until February 10.

■ The kidnapping of over 300 UNAMSIL soldiers, and attack on Sankoh’s juba hill house by a large crowd of angry civilians up to his arrest on May 8, 2001.

The Western Media Correspondents’ Political and Humanitarian Discourses of the Civil War (1996-2001) This section examines the professional experience of 18 journalists covering the Sierra Leone civil war between 1996 and 2001 as correspondents for some of the leading British, American and French media. It is divided into two parts: The first looks at the political discourse of the war as it relates to its political context, in other words, the factors that provoked and

Q U A R T E R L Y

sustained it on the one hand, and as it relates to external political factors such as national interest and geopolitics of home governments, which, as this study shows, dominated the reporting of the war by these correspondents on the other; while the second part looks at the humanitarian discourse of the war as it relates to looting, the misery of poor victims of amputation and kidnapping, the exploitation of child soldiers, child and maternal mortality, as well as other desperate situations of the victims of war.

The Political Context of the War Our analyses of the four main periods of the war selected for this study show little political context in the news discourse of the 18 Western media correspondents studied in this section. The bottom line of our findings here points to a rather very limited use of the diagnostic approach of reporting. Moreover, standing out glaringly in our analysis of their news discourse juxtaposed with the data acquired from depth interviews with some of them is the fact that even on the rare occasions where these journalists attempted to give the political context of the war, they tended to spin more of the internal than the external factors that caused the war, a representation, as this paper seeks to prove, influenced more by their cultural and ideological biases than professional considerations.

The accounts advanced by these journalists to explain the war fall under two categories: Internal and external factors, but for them the emphasis was on the former (corruption, state collapse, tribalism, poverty and underdevelopment, etc.) and not the latter (the unfair exploitation of the natural resources by Western multinationals, national interest and geopolitics of the home governments, unfair trade, harsh regulations set up

by Western financial institutions, etc.). As this section will show, the upping of the internal factors ante by most of the journalists studied here was more or less influenced by the recurrent stereotypical representation in the mainstream Western media news discourse that tends to put the lion’s share of the blame for Africa’s wars, and by extension, predicament, at the doorsteps of local players.

In her coverage of the November 1996 Abidjan Peace Talks, the military coup that ousted Tejan Kabbah’s government in May 1997, and the devastating rebel invasion of Freetown on January 6, 1999, Michele Leridon, AFP special correspondent and Abidjan deputy bureau chief between 1996 and 2001, propped up the corruption and exclusion from the country’s mineral wealth factors to explain the civil war, and in this way relegated to second place the role of the international community, including that of regional players such as Liberia’s Charles Taylor, a position which she also echoed in her interview for this study. Most of her colleagues studied here went along with her on this.

Leridon’s husband, Thomas Sotinel, French quality daily le Monde’s West Africa correspondent (1996-2000), however went beyond the corruption factor to that of the low salaries for the national army due to misplaced priorities, the exclusion of youths, “blood diamonds”, and the role of some foreign players to explain the war. Our analysis of Sotinel’s dis-

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M E D I A patches reveals a relatively fair presence of political context of the origins and continuation of the war. Coming for special mention here is a dispatch he wrote on Johnny Paul Koroma’s military coup d’etat on May 25, 1997, an event which completely changed the course of the civil war. Dated 28/05/975, the article throws light on the factors, including corruption, which he said provoked the coup against Kabbah’s elected government.

In another article dated 29/12/986, barely 10 days ahead of the notorious January 6, 1999, rebel invasion of Freetown, Sotinel evoked the role of regional players such as Libya, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Liberia but stopped short of pointing fingers at his country France, which was accused of pulling the strings and propping up the regimes of at least the last two countries. A mistake which he, however, made up for in the interview which he granted for this study, where he went the extra mile to lampoon what he called the “clandestine activities” of Jean Claude Fortuit, French Ambassador in Sierra Leone at the time: The British and the French discretely participated in the war in Sierra Leone. The British Gurkhas and the Sandline mercenaries who respectively fought on the side of the governments of Strasser and Kabbah suggest that the British were involved in some clandestine operations in the country. Some French politicians on the other hand have been accused working closely with the RUF through some secret French agents.7 That Sotinel was bold enough to say these “hard truths” in the interview, but not in his news copy, shows how the influence of stereotypical representations in news media discourse is more evident in the news production process.

In his article dated 02/11/01, Washington Post correspondent in Sierra Leone, Douglas Farah (2000-2001), peppered the “blood diamond” factor of the war with a terrorism angle bringing to light some very strong accusations from the American intelligence community of the involvement of some Al Qaeda operatives.8 Quoting CIA sources, Farah revealed that some diamond dealers working directly for Bin Laden’s network have been for three years engaged in buying gems cheaply from the RUF, and reselling them in Europe and elsewhere netting huge profits which they used in their terrorist operations. But Farah, while conveniently picking on regional players such as Libya, Liberian and Burkina Faso in this “conflict diamonds” trade, and by extension in the conflict and world terrorism, failed to see the role of the big Western powers in the broader picture. However, his colleague, Washington Post managing editor, Steve Coll, attempted a cover up for this short-coming in his article dated 09/01/009 where he took a swipe on the international community for abandoning the country to what he called a gang of local and foreign wolves. But, here again, Coll was not able to see any direct role of the Western powers, beyond this them-and-not-us attitude, in the outbreak and continuation of the war, despite his admission in an interview that their trip into rebel held territory was in fact arranged by an American businessman working for the RUF. Africa correspondent for the British quality daily, The Independent, Alex Duval Smith (1999-2001), was the only jour-

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nalist who stood out of the pack of 18 examined here to come so close to producing a report that can qualify to be truly diagnostic. Dated 22/09/0110, the article describes how children of school age are exploited by diamond merchants by forcing them to dig and wash diamond gravel for just 12 pence a day in the gem rich town of Koidu. The diagnostic value of this piece would however had been rendered more holisitc had it pointed fingers at Western mulitnational players in the blood diamond trade rather than just singling out local and regional actors. Moreover, the high marks that were scored in this report were apparently watered down by her earlier report dated 30/05/9911 where she reduced the urban krio vs rural (upcountry) dichotomy to that of a tribal problem drawing inspiration from Graham Green’s novel ‘The Heart of the Matter’12.

Of note also in this section is Duval Smith’s stereotypical representation of the Kabbah government as “angels”, leaving readers to suggest the opposite “devils” for the RUF in her much earlier dispatch dated 10/01/9913, where she appeared a bit critical about how long the British propping of the Kabbah government would take, and the role of the British government’s implication in the “Arms to Africa affair” involving the mercenary company Sandline, but ended up justifying their bursting of the U.N. arms embargo if only it meant overthrowing the military junta in favour of the democratically elected Kabbah government which enjoys the backing of the British government, hence upping the national agenda ante.

Times special correspondent Anthony Loyd (1997-2001) evoked the problems of the exclusion of the youths, weak state institutions and mass unemployment as the principal causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone in an interview with this author in London on November 8, 2003, but failed to factor any of these in all his despatches on the war. Save for a Times editorial dated 11/06/9714, which partially referred to his reports, describing Sierra Leone as a “rich but unfortunate country,… as anarchy is almost everywhere…political stability has proved as impossible as economic prosperity…, despite prospective mineral wealth”. As we can see from its editorial, the vision of the Times for Sierra Leone, was one of pessimism, a stereotypical representation which dominated the British, and the rest of the Western, media at the time.This description resonates well with those by George Alagiah’s “war for wealth” BBC documentary exposing the exploitation of child combatants, and by Francois Picard (RFI) describing Sierra Leone as a “rich country, poor people” in an interview in Paris, quoting a relief worker he met in Abidjan before going to cover the country’s civil war.

National Interest and Geopolitics Our analysis of the news media discourse of some of the Western media journalists in this study reveals a dominance of events and issues of national interest and geopolitics15 of the home government countries. Essentially put under the microscope here are the highly mediatised evacuation of foreign, mostly Western, nationals; the liberation of foreign troops kidnapped by rebels, the political divergence between Great

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Britain and France, the relation between France and West of his colleagues, was ready to go to promote the geopolitical Africa, between francophone West Africa and Nigeria, and angle of his reporting of the civil war, which is more or less finally the Sandline affair and the implication of the interna- likened to the close cultural proximity criterium of Galtung tional community. and Ruge (1965), since Norway is deemed to be culturally closThe evacuation of foreign nationals: At issue here are er to Great Britain than Zambia. four dispatches: The first by French quality daily Le Figaro Geopolitics: France-Great Britain/France, Francophone special correspondent Patrick Saint-Paul dated 20/05/0016 on West Africa and Nigeria: The civil war in Sierra Leone turned French President Jacques Chirac’s intervention to evacuate out to be a pawn in the chess game between Britain and France, the family of Eunice Barber, the Sierra Leonean-born French whose rivalry in Africa dates as far back as ‘Fachoda’ in Egypt athlete, gold medal hopeful in the 2000 Sydney Olympic towards the end of the 19th century. Small wonder, therefore, games; and the other three by AFP’s Michele Leridon dated that our analysis of the news discourse of four of the 22 jour30/05/9717, 31/05/9718, 03/06/9719 where she reported the nalists in our study reveals a very strong media interest in the emotional evacuation of some 2,700 foreign, mostly Western, historic meeting in the Ghanaian capital Accra between British nationals on board an American Marine ship in the wake of Foreign minister Cook and his French counterpart Vedrine the AFRC coup that ousted the democratically elected regime with the main aim of reconciling their strategic, or geopolitical, of Tejan Kabbah. The evocative manner in which these two interests in Africa. Providing the background to this meeting, events were reported smacks of nothing short of the desire to according to Michele Leridon (AFP),23 was the ‘Saint-Malo boost the national interest and geopolitical agendas of the Declaration’ signed by French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the end of their meeting Western home governments. in the western French city in December The Liberation of foreign Most of the humanitarian 1998 where the two agreed in principle to troops kidnapped by rebels: put an end to their rivalry in Africa.

Attempts by the British discourse of these journalists The Accra meeting was important not Government to launch raids with turned out be largely punctuated only because it sought to kick-start this the aim of liberating their offiwith stereotypical new spirit of harmonising the African cials and troupes kidnapped by policies of these two Western powers, but rebel militias provided yet anothrepresentations and clichés, er opportunity to see how con- most of which are pejorative and also because it brought into the limelight once more this geopolitical rivalry in the cerns of national interest and misleading to say the least. The West African sub-region between these geopolitics shaped the reporting of the journalists. Of special note result of this was the overriding two foreign powers, and how this rivalry helped to shape the reporting of the war here are the largely evocative dominance of evocative by the Western media correspondents in accounts offered by Duval Smith reporting simply aimed at our study. Moreover, the fact that (The Independent), Sam Kiley (The Times), Chris McGreal (The sensitising public opinion on the Nigeria, largely considered as the region’s “Big Brother”, was excluded from attendGuardian), Anton La Guadia humanitarian crisis of the war ing the meeting of British and French (Daily Telegraph), Douglas Farah (The Washington Post) and Patrick with the ultimate aim of boosting diplomats convened by the visiting foreign ministers exposed the rivalry Saint-Paul (Figaro). The kidnapthe relief donations. between this country on one hand and ping of 40 people, including five British officials, by the Wide Side Boys20 played into the hands francophone West Africa on the other. At the centre of this of Times Africa correspondent Sam Kiley who used it to rub- rivalry was of course the conflict of geopolitical interests: While bish the Lome Peace Accord of July 7, 1999, and blamed his the francophone West African countries led by Ivory Coast and country’s authorities, among others in the West, to have given Togo, and allegedly supported by France, prefered a diplomatic it their support.21 solution to resolve the Sierra Leone civil war, Nigeria, with the Chris McGreal (The Guardian), who apparently covered the alleged backing of Britain, opted for the military one. France kidnappings more than any other in the pack, was even more and francophone West Africa emerged as the real winners of upfront in spinning the national and geopolitical agendas of the this meeting since it prepared the ground for the signing of the British government as seen in his article dated 06/08/9922, historic Lome peace accord in July 1999 endorsed by the U.N., where as we can see in the headline, the emphasis was on the Britain and France among other Western powers, which in five British, among the 34 hostages, kidnapped. Moreover, turn ended up giving the RUF rebels far-reaching concesMcGreal’s article evoking the plight of Cmdr. Gjellestad, the sions, including a blanket amnesty from prosecution. Our 57-year-old Norwegian hostage freed after three weeks in findings show a general endorsement of this position in the RUF captivity, with his arm “bandaged because the wire used mainstream Western media, especially the French media, to tie him up cut so deep that it turned septic and swelled to which set the agenda on this, although there was a huge outseveral times its normal size”, without saying anything about cry from the New York-based Human Rights Watch. any of the many Zambian hostages, who formed the bulk of The Sandline affair and the implication of the interthe 300 taken captive, shows the extent to which he, like most national community: Most of the British media, and of

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M E D I A course their counterparts in France and the U.S., questioned and clichés, most of which are pejorative and misleading to say the morality of the British authorities in assisting the British the least. The result of this was the overriding dominance of mercenary company Sandline to burst the arms embargo evocative reporting simply aimed at sensitising public opinion imposed on Sierra Leone by the U.N. by supplying the arms on the humanitarian crisis of the war with the ultimate aim of that were used by pro-government troops, including merce- boosting the relief donations, with little or no regard to the naries, to remove the AFRC junta and restore the elected gov- diagnostic approach –– the putting of this crisis in a political ernment of Tejan Kabbah. Despite this morality question context –– necessary for a better public understanding of not involving what came to be known as the “Arms to Africa only what is going on, but also what is behind it, and how it Affair”, nonetheless, the findings of this study suggest that the can be resolved. bucketful of sympathy of the Western media lay more with Michele Léridon, for example, gave a very evocative descripSandline and the British government than with the elected tion of the plight of the victims of amputation, but to do this government that was eventually restored to power. Sam Kiley she had to dot her account with stereotypical represenations of the Times, for example24, in a grave effort to safeguard and clichés. In what she referred to as her best dispatch for the Britain’s national interest, tried to reduce the impact of the AFP in terms of market value26, Léridon portrayed the damage caused by this scandal by arguing that at least the arms amputees waiting in the Netland hospital corridor for their were used to flush out the rebels. At issue here are the two turn of the “krukenberg operation”27, more or less as a peoimplied stereotypical representations of the rebels as the “bad ple without any hope, a representation often reserved for vicguys”, and the elected government as the “good guys”, hyped tims of African wars. The images evoked here are very much as the main focus of media attention over the bursting of inter- like those George Alagiah categorised as template report28 showing a hungry-looking mother trying to calm a crying, national law, which took second place. emaciated child, images that are capaIf the Sandline scandal was the AFP reported the emotional ble of invoking sympathy from even most discussed issue of the war in the evacuation of some 2,700 the stone-hearted potential donors to British media, the same could be said relief efforts. to be true in their French counterforeign, mostly Western, Also at issue in the stereotypical parts of the documentary film by Philippe Diaz ‘New World Order… nationals on board an American representation of the humanitarian Marine ship in the wake of the angle of the war story is the agendaSomewhere in Africa’ (commissioned setting model which I identified in by the French relief agency Action AFRC coup that ousted the the spinning by most of the journalContre La Faim), which won an award at the prestigious 2000 Film democratically elected regime of ists of the French media in my study Tejan Kabbah. The evocative of the intervention of the French Festival de Cannes. The aim of the relief agencies to treat the victims of film was to bring to the attention of manner in which these two amputation at the central Connaught the world the suffering of the people of Sierra Leone inflicted by the civil events were reported smacks of hospital in Freetown, but who nevnothing short of the desire to ertheless had the time to lampoon war, which according to the producer, did not attract the attention of the boost the national interest and local doctors for demanding money before offering this service. It is like international community until the geopolitical agendas of the representing the French doctors of “kidnapping of some 300 U.N. troops Western home governments.

Medecin du Monde as “angels”, but by the rebels”. Most French journaltheir local counterparts as “devils”. ists, however, dismissed the film as nothing but propaganda for the rebel cause. Sotinel, for instance, Moreover, these journalists only took onboard the versions criticised the film for ignoring the plight of child combatants as offered by the French doctors and thus failed in their journalvictims of these rebels, and for helping them (the rebels) escape istic duty of getting the version of the other side (the local docjustice.25 But there is an apparent contradiction here as this tors) before going ahead with their stories. Hence this view, flies in the face of Sotinel’s criticism of what he called the “clan- which could not have been necessarily reflecting the reality on destine” role played by some British and French diplomats in the ground, dominated the mainstream Western media in an the civil war in the interview he granted for this study, which agenda-setting way. confirms, rather than disputes, the film’s central thesis.

Another good example of this model can be seen in the manner in which BBC’s Mark Doyle was able to tactfully lull The Humanitarian Discourse of the War Mary Robinson, the head of the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRHC), to say on tape that the war in Most of the 18 journalists studied here employed more of Sierra Leone caused more loss of lives than that in Kosovo. the evocative approach of reporting in their handling of the Doyle told me in an interview that he deliberately did this to humanitarian discourse of the war, the findings of this study give his story more credibility, which he said it would have show. Moreover, conspicuously standing out is the fact that lacked had he himself directly given this point of view. Doyle most of the humanitarian discourse of these journalists turned thus effectively used this to condemn the inertia exhibited by out be largely punctuated with stereotypical representations the international community to the situation in Sierra Leone,

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Q U A R T E R L Y

Evacuees from Freetown, Sierra Leone, are directed from a CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter across the flight deck of the USS Kearsarge, on May 30, 1997, during Operation Noble Obelisk. Over 900 people from 40 different countries were evacuated. The event got disproportionate coverage in the Western media.

which was not the case in Kosovo, where, according to Mary Robinson, the situation was relatively far less worse. This example shows how media professionals can themselves help in the agenda-setting process while dealing with their sources of information.

The news value model of Galtung and Ruge, which helps journalists manage their selection of what story to carry, and from what angle, was also particularly evident in the journalists’ humanitarian discourse of this civil war, albeit not without some contradictions. The bottom line is that the “cultural proximity” criterium factored in a major way in answering the question why the Western media paid more attention to Kosovo than Sierra Leone, particularly when the crises in those two countries peaked almost around the same time –– towards the end of the 1990s. However, if we allow the analogy made

by Mary Robinson in the same online BBC article by Mark Doyle29 in which she said the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone was worse than that in Kosovo, then Sierra Leone as a nation may well come on top of the newsworthy “threshold” criterium, which in turn contradicts, or downplays, the “cultural proximity” criterium.

The History, Culture and Myth of the War Correspondent in the Context of Sierra Leone This section examines the historical, cultural and professional factors that shaped the world view of the Western media correspondents who covered the civil war in Sierra Leone.

These factors include: Historical baggage, risk and security concerns, the myth and culture of the war correspondent, the source of information, and the level of attachment to the story.

Historical Baggage The term “historical baggage” was first used by the former BBC Africa correspondent George Alagiah30 to mean the stereotypical representation in which most people in the West view Africa in the historical context of the 16th and 17th century during the dark days of the slave trade. In other words, issues affecting Africa today are largely conceived by the West with a historical mindset, and it is like anything that fails to fit that perception is ignored.

The findings of this study point to an overwhelming influence of this historical baggage on the Western media reporting of the civil war in Sierra Leone. A case in point is the article in the Atlantic Monthly31 by the famous American journalist Robert Kaplan in which he reduced the Sierra Leone war to that of the Malthusian theory of population explosion in the West African sub-region with criminal anarchy becoming the order of the day. Largely accentuated in Kaplan’s article are clichés and stereotypical representations such as “anarchy”, “withering away of central governments”, “rise of tribal and regional domains”, “the unchecked spread of disease”, “growing perversiveness of war”… dominant in the mainstream media discourse of the war in Sierra Leone. Washington Post’s Steve Coll32 underscored the geopolitical significance of

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M E D I A Kaplan’s article by saying that it went resentation of Africa as a hell of a The findings... point to an a long way in distorting Washington’s place where even the life of a jouroverwhelming influence of this nalist is worth nothing. Our findings official thinking of the problem, historical baggage on the which, according to him, largely show the Sierra Leone case is no explained the inertia of the internaWestern media reporting of the exception to this phenomenon. Also tional community to intervene and at work here is the “cultural proximend the war at an earlier stage. Coll civil war in Sierra Leone. A case ity” news value in which the killing of in point is the article in the noted that the “hopeless” and “total Western journalists Kurt Shorck chaotic” picture which Kaplan paint(Reuters), Gil Moreno and Myles Atlantic Monthly by... Robert ed of Sierra Leone must have had a Tierney (APN TV) attracted more telling influence on the mindset of Kaplan in which he reduced the media attention than that of the local Sierra Leone war to that of the Congressmen, diplomats, political journalists, including Edie Smith analysts and journalists, who were Malthusian theory of population (BBC local stringer) and Ibrahim apparently made to believe that nothAllieu Kamara (Reuters local stringer). explosion in the West African ing can be done to change things.

The generalisations often made in Coll, like most of the correspondents sub-region with criminal anarchy Western news media discourse also in this study, admitted to have read becoming the order of the day. sometimes prove to be problematic.

Kaplan’s article, among others, before Most journalists in this study agree venturing into Sierra Leone, Largely accentuated in Kaplan’s that they found it extremely difficult article are... stereotypical although he said he did not share his to tell the difference between the local “pessimistic” view of the country. pro government militias, commonly representations such as Kaplan’s thesis was, however, seriknown as kamajors, and the rebels of “anarchy”, “withering away of ously criticised by British the RUF since they all spotted rag-tag central governments”, “rise of Anthropologist Paul Richards for civilian clothes, except for some few narrowing the cause of the war to that of the former who some times had tribal and regional domains”, of an environmental problem. talisman dotted around their clothes. “the unchecked spread of Richards blames the war on the War correspondents often fall as easy disease”… dominant in the “exclusion of the Sierra Leone youths preys to factions who may see their from the country’s wealth”. But most mainstream media discourse of work as inimical to their interests.

British journalists who read him Kurt Shorck and Gil Moreno were the war in Sierra Leone. before going to Sierra Leone refused reportedly killed in an ambush to go along with Richard’s explanamounted by RUF rebels33, although tion. In fact, Sam Kiley (The Times) dismissed it as a mere jus- Shorck’s dispatch for Reuters34 only two weeks before this incitification of the war. Alex Duval Smith’s (The Independent) dent painted a negative picture of the role of the local kamajor spinning of the tribal factor to explain the war, a view she bor- militias, describing them as “rag-tag”, “ruffians”, “ill-dressed”, rowed from Graham Greene’s ‘Heart of the Matter’, also high- “ill-disciplined” and “unpredictable”, overtly pejorative clichés lights the importance of the historical baggage factor in the often specifically reserved for the RUF rebels, who were largely seen as the devils in the context of the Sierra Leone civil war reporting of the Sierra Leone war. as reported in the mainstream media.

Risk and Security Concerns The Culture and Myth of the War Correspondent Concerns of risk and security also played an important role The cocoon ideology of the West about Africa being a place in influencing the reporting of the Sierra Leone war in the Western media, our findings show. Research statistics show where the only thing that is real is violence also stood out as a that war correspondents represent by far the largest number major determinant of the Western media reporting of the war. of journalists killed in the line of duty. In Sierra Leone alone, This was especially true for special correspondents who were over 15 journalists, including three foreign correspondents, literally parachutted in at short notice by some U.N. or ECOwere killed; some by friendly fire while others were just sim- MOG choppers. Apart from the risks involved, there has been ply murdered by armed militias, mostly believed to be loyal to a growing tendency among war correspondents to associate the RUF. Many were also kidnapped and later released after glamour with their work. Wherever they go to report conflicts they have a tendency to cling together sharing the same hotel, reaching some kind of deals.

This fear factor is, of course, often used by some foreign cor- sometimes using the same fixers and translators, and above all respondents as a perfect alibi for not venturing into the front- visiting the same pubs and other leisure places. The Sierra line to see for themselves what is going on, which then leaves Leone war no doubt provided a typical example of this with them with the alternative of relying on secondary, mostly offi- the Mammy Yoko and later the Cape Sierra hotel, the Paddys cial, sources to tell their war stories. Moreover, this also often beach bar serving among the most popular attractions. As our feeds into the wider and far more exaggerated stereotypical rep- case study shows, there are both ups and downs in this front-

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A F R I C A line journalistic fraternity. On the upside, they can complement each other by sharing sources of information, but not leads, as Sam Kiley and Mark Doyle admitted; they can forge relationships as we saw Francois Picard and Alyson James tying the wedding knot in Sierra Leone, a country they said they quickly fell in love with.

On the down side, they easily end up working as a pack pursuing more or less a mainstream or pack mentality approach in their reporting even where this ends up producing distorted stories. Any deviation from this approach is often taken to mean rebellion against the normal reporting. When Steve Coll stood out of the pack to venture into rebel territory before coming to the government controlled metropolitan areas bringing something fresh (the angle of the rebels –– the devils) into the Western news discourse, he was targeted for arrest at the airport on his way out but narrowly escaped. Moreover, it would appear that Kurt Schork paid with his life when he openly turned the venom of his pen against the pro-government kamajor militias.

Sources of Information Sources of information, be they official or private, normally play a very vital role in shaping news media discourse. As we observed in this study, the choice of articles about, and the angle of reporting, the war largely influenced the choice of official and unofficial sources by the correspondents themselves.

Perhaps more worrying is the finding that the often distorted and pejorative stereotypical representations and clichés borrowed by these journalists from these sources largely widen the gap between these journalists and what is really unfolding on the ground. A typical illustration of this is Mark Doyle’s experience with Philip Winslow, U.N. official spokesman, whose piece of disinformation about “rebels reaching the gates of Freetown” he broadcast to the world, which he, however, corrected couple of hours later35.

In his interview, Doyle said Winslow, who was sacked from his job immediately after that incident, was a mere victim of circumstances since he was only a messenger, or better still a scape-goat, used by the Nigerian officers “who wanted to spread panic and undermine the efforts of the Indian commander then heading the U.N. force because of jealousy for not have been allowed the chance to lead it”. That this frank talk from Mark Doyle did not form part of his dispatches to the world makes it obvious that at least his in-depth interview, unlike his copies, did not pass through the agenda-setting filter of the BBC. Our findings also show that when the correspondents rely heavily on secondary sources, their information is more likely to carry stereotypical representations and clichés that are often very misleading; on the other hand, when they decide to get to the frontline, their reporting is often closer to the reality, as they are able to better appreciate the plight of the suffering victims of the war. To demonstrate this, we compared the reporting of the notorious January 6, 1999, rebel attack on Freetown by Rod-Mac Johnson and Michele Leridon, AFP local and foreign correspondents, respectively.

We discovered that Johnson’s two dispatches on this attack,

Q U A R T E R L Y

sourced to both officials and victims on the ground, were much closer to the reality on the ground than those by Leridon that were mainly sourced to President Tejan Kabbah in a press briefing at the Lungi airport, where he and some of his officials had relocated. Her quoting of Kabbah, for example, as saying “the central Connaught hospital, Fourah Bay university of Sierra Leone, Police Headquarters and State House are in flames” turned out to be a piece of disinformation, as only the Criminal Investigation Department was on fire, while all the other structures cited remained intact. We see here Leridon serving as a mere transmission belt of this misleading information since, as Jonathan Fenby (1986) put it, “accurate attribution to sources of information is not only honest, it is also wonderful protection against being held responsible for originating false news.”

Level of Attachment to the Story War correspondents, like all journalists, are obliged to respect certain professional guidelines in carrying out their work, although most hardly bother to follow them to the letter. Moreover, the level of attachment to the events and issues they report often determine their choice of either objective (neutral and detached) or honest (subjective and attached) reporting. Our findings show a strong preference for the former by the American journalists and strong preference for the latter by the British and French journalists.

CONCLUSION It is now well over four years since the civil war in Sierra Leone was declared officially over. However, the question that is yet to be answered is whether the consumers of news in the West understood what really went in wrong in Sierra Leone that produced such a devastating chapter in the country’s history. If we take into account the findings of this study, our response would be negative. This research reveals that most of what went out in the form of news in the Western media about the war was punctuated with stereotypical representations and clichés that were often distorted and smacked of negative connotations.

My study of 22 Western media correspondents is not necessarily representative of all Western media correspondents in the strict sense to allow a generalisation of the research findings. Nonetheless, I wish to offer some conclusions that could be useful in helping us understand the work of Western media correspondents in their reporting of conflicts in developing countries. The findings of this study have been able to prove the following three hypotheses of our study: That there are links between most of the stereotypical representations and clichés these journalists employed and the factors that shaped their reporting; that there are links between most of these stereotypical representations and clichés on one hand and communication obstacles on the other; and finally that all these constrains do not help the correspondents to put more emphasis on the diagnostic approach of reporting conflicts.

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M E D I A NOTES 1. Report, Reporting the World Round Table conference: ‘Is the coverage of Africa racist? Why the blackout on the crisis in the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo)?’ London, May 16, 2001, p.1 2. C. SHANNON et W. WEAVER , ‘The Mathematical Theory of Communication’. 1949, 1975. Central to the preoccupation of Shannon are the three main positions in the entire cycle of news production –– the message sender, the transmission belt and the audience.

According to him, the source of information passes on the message, which the message sender codes and transforms into a kind of signal, which is then taken through the transimission belt where it is decoded before being passed on to the audience or reader. However, Shannon’s model, which appeared more “technical” was further developed by Warren Weaver who gave it a “human face” by adding a semantic receiver of the information between the technical receiver and the audience or reader.

According to Weaver, this samantic receiver subjects the message received from the technical receiver to a second decoding deliberately aimed at making sense of the words used, and at giving semantic elements to the message with possible semantic inputs from the audience.

3. Cognitive effect involves the acquisition of information; affective effect involves the making or shaping of attitudes or evaluations (positive or negative, and also such as emotional responses to media content); behaviourist effect involves observable actions linked to the mediation of news content.

4. As author of this paper, and at the same time publisher and editor-in-chief of Expo Times, Sierra Leone’s largest circulation newspaper, who saw with my own eyes some of the events or episodes of the war reported by the journalists in the study, I found it rather difficult to detach myself from the study, but I was obliged to try as best as possible to do just that, if only to make it pass the academic test.

5. Sotinel, Thomas, ‘In Sierra Leone, the intentions of the putchists remain unclear: the international community condemns Major Koroma’s coup’, Le Monde, 28/05/97.

6. Sotinel, Thomas, “War, terror and banditory in Sierra Leone for control of the diamond trade: Sam Bockarie’s rebels threaten to overrun the capital’ 28/12/98, Le Monde.

7. From interview with Thomas Sotinel at the Le Monde office in Paris on 11/07/03.

8. Farah, Douglas, ‘Al Qaeda Cash Tied To Diamond Trade: Sale of Gems from Sierra Leone Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say’ (Washington Post, 02/11/01).

9. Coll, Steve, ‘Peace Without Justice: A journey to the wounded Heart of Africa’, Washington Post, 09/01/00.

10. Duval Smith, Alex, ‘Without a conflict to fuel, diamond miners still work for just 12p a day’, The Independent, 22/09/01.

11. Duval Smith, Alex, ‘Nostalgia rises from smoking ruins of Graham Greene’s hotel’ daté du, The Independent 30/05/00.

12. Duval Smith added that Graham Greene, author and former civil servant for the British colonial administration in the 1940s, was a critic of the British colonial system.

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13. Duval Smith, Alex, ‘Britain continues to back Sierra Leone –– but for how long?’, The Sunday Independent (10/01/99).

14. Loyd, Anthony, ‘African Abyss: Sierra Leone awaits outside intervention’, Leading Articles (The Times, 11/06/97).

15. Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary definition of geopolitics: “The study of how politics is affected by geographical factors.”

16. Saint-Paul, Patrick, ‘SIERRA LEONE: Following Jacques Chirac’s intervention, Paris evacuates Eunice Barber’s family’ Le Figaro, 20/05/2000, p 2.

17. Leridon, Michele, ‘Noria d’hélicoptères à Freetown pour évacuer des centaines d’Américains’, AFP, 30/05/97.

18. Leridon, Michele, ‘L’angoisse des ‘oubliés’ de l’évacuation’, AFP, 31/05/97.

19. Leridon, Michele, ‘1,220 personnes fuient les combats en Sierra Leone’ à bord du Kearsarge, AFP, 03/06/97.

20. The West Side Boys was a rebel militia made up of renegade soldiers loyal to Johnny Paul Koroma’s former AFRC junta operating around the okra hill area, some 47 miles to the capital, Freetown.

21. Kiley, Sam, ‘Sierra Leone kidnappings expose folly of making peace with gangsters’, The Times, 07/08/99.

22. McGreal, Chris, ‘British troops in U.N. team held by Sierra Leone rebels’, The Guardian, 06/08/99.

23. Leridon, Michele, ‘Historic visit of British and French Foreign Ministers to Ghana’, AFP 10/03/99.

24. Kiley, Sam, ‘Sandline weapons still being used to crush rebel force’ The Times, Overseas News. 11/05/98.

25. Sotinel, Thomas, ‘Détournement de bonne cause –– Nouvel ordre mondial, un documentaire sur la Sierra Leone qui soulève le coeur et suscite bien des interrogations’, Culture-Cannes 2000, Le Monde, 17/05/00.

26. Leridon, Michele. ‘Sierra Leone-Violence: Réparer l’horreur, comme en 14-18’, 30/09/98-12:56 Paris Time. In her interview with this author, Leridon disclosed that this despatch scored the highest demand mark above all others she wrote on the Sierra Leone civil war, which shows the market value justification for hyping the humanitarian angle of war reporting.

27. The krukenberg operation was used by foreign doctors working with the International Committee of the Red Cross to operate hundreds of amputees at the Netland hospital in Freetown. The name of the operation is derived from the name of the German doctor who first used it to operate wounded soldiers in the Second World War. 28. Alagiah, George. Contribution at a conference organised

by Reuters Foundation titled ‘Dispatches from Disaster Zones: Reporting Humanitarian Disasters Conference’ in London, May 27-28, 1998. He explained template report: “It implies that there is a formulaic way of reporting a humanitarian crisis. It conveys an impression that there are a set number of ingredients and all a reporter does is turn up in a disaster zone and pick this thing off the shelf and he or she has the humanitarian story, the template story. And the ingredients, well most of us know them practically off by heart. You’ve got to have the emaciated child, preferably crying; you’ve got to have a feeding centre where mothers with shrunken breasts are trying to calm their children; you’ve got to have an aid worker,

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Q U A R T E R L Y

usually white, usually a woman who is working against the odds and yet has the time to come tell us, the reporter and the audience, how difficult it all is; and you have a breathless and shocked reporter saying how awful the whole thing is. And that is supposed to be the template report.”

29. Coll, Steve of the Washington Post also commented on this, in fact condemning it as the double standards of the international community.

30. Alagiah was quoted by Baffour Ankomah (editor, New African) in his presentation at the ‘Reporting the World Conference’, May 16, 2001.

31. Kaplan, Robert, ‘The Coming Anarchy’ in the Atlantic Monthly, 1994.

32. Coll, Steve, ‘Peace Without Justice: A journey to the Wounded Heart of Africa’, Washington Post.

33. Sullivan, Tim, ‘Gunmen Kill AP, Reuters Journalists’, AP –– Freetown, Sierra Leone (25/05/00).

34. Schork, Kurt, ‘Sierra Leone irregulars fight with M-16s and gin’, Reuters, May 14, 2000.

35. Doyle, Mark, Three BBC World News copies (07/05/2000) 01 :37 :52) (07/05/2000 04:44 :03) (07/05/2000 17 :17 : 52).

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Veils and the resilient women of TUNISIA Rashmi Kapoor tells an inspiring story of how Tunisian women, helped by the state’s enlightened policies, have scripted their own destiny by deftly blending tradition and modernity in their approach You can tell the condition of a nation by looking at the status of its women.

–– Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru

notations and express lack of parity of status between women and men. Even an independent identity is denied as women have been constantly defined in relation to men. Whether they are similar to men, different from or complementary to them; exual asymmetry in society has created men, masculinity and male behavior are always the reference material disadvantage for women. These points (Mc Dowell and Pringle 1992). disadvantages are said to be harsher on Simone de Beauvoir (1953) believes that the universal subwomen in the Arab world. In such soci- ordination of women is due to her identification with the eties, traditional social scientists would domain of nature and its relationship to the domain of culture. emphasise the marginal and peripheral Nature is viewed as passive and culture being active. Women role of women in the social system, reproduce and procreate and so are related to nature. Men have underplaying been successful in transforming their economic importance. This Women in developing countries nature and controlling it, so can conarticle attempts to understand the statrol nature (women). Thus in the are still struggling to make tus and role of women in Tunisia as context of the nature\culture dualthemselves “visible” and prove ism, women are identified with integral constituents to the functioning of the social system as a whole. It nature and, therefore, are considered themselves to be “actors” and will assess the contributions made by passive beings, and men being relatnot passive receivers in their women in Tunisia and how they are ed to culture, so are active. Since men emerging economies. Despite slowly but surely trying to dismantle cannot reproduce themselves, this male superiority. It will also argue unique need for women makes them unfavorable conditions, an that economic independence and increasing number of women in ambivalent towards women. Hence education have made them visible in men simultaneously exalt and denithese countries is becoming the public domain, which has actualgrate women, but they always end up ly empowered women to take their circumscribing their roles, controleconomically active and own decisions and become proactive ling them the way they want to confinancially independent –– in all spheres of society. trol nature (Ibid.). Also, the persisPresumed innate differences giving them opportunity to rede- tence of patriarchal values, social conbetween men and women have creditioning of girls into gender roles, fine their sexuality and ated a socially unequal relationship disempowerment of women and reproductive roles. between them. The unequal relamale sexual antipathy have all contionship prejudiced men to relegate tributed in continually maintaining women to an inferior position ever since the Platonic age to the control of men over the women. the present modern times of globalisation. The common The similarity of inferior status of women cross-culturally denominator of women remains female subordination, is understood to be a result of a basic and continuing sexual although unequal power between men and women has been division of labor related to the universal facts of childbearing expressed and experienced in different ways in different peri- (Rassam 1984:3). But such universal explanations cannot ods of time. The various synonyms often used to describe account for the wide variations that exist in women’s status. women are “subordinate”, “inferior”, “subservient”, “second Neither do they explain the origin of centrality of the role of sex”, “non-actors”, “passive” and “non-thinking beings”. The men and imputed diminutiveness of women’s work. Most commonality of all these terms is that they have negative con- developed countries, being in the advanced stage of develop-

S

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ment and globalisation, are in a posiPearson 1981). It has intensified and tion to provide women with some recomposed the subordination parity in opportunities and better livthrough the authority of men in the ing standards. But women in develmanagerial position, but has also oping countries are still struggling to decomposed the subordination of make themselves “visible” and prove women by undermining family themselves to be “actors” and not structures and by delaying marpassive receivers in their emerging riage/childbearing (Ward 1984). economies. Despite unfavorable conThus, the combination of factors ditions, an increasing number of such as social inequalities between women in these countries is becommen and women, development of ing economically active and finanthe global capitalistic system and cially independent. Consequently, patriarchal relations together deterthis independence has given them mine and define the status of women opportunity, though limited, to redeand her productive and reproductive fine their sexuality and reproductive role in the society. roles.

Ward (1984: 22) argues that past 1: Status of Women in Arab Countries scholarship on the status of women has assumed that economic growth The predominant religion in and development led automatically Middle East countries and in Arabto a higher status for women (Inkles Africa is Islam. Some academic studand Smith 1975; Mauldin and ies on religion, secularisation and Berelson 1978), but newer studies gender equality assert that countries Tunisian women in traditional attire. have concluded that women in develin the Islamic world are most resisoping countries have usually suffered severely negative con- tant to the achievement of equality between women and men sequences during underdevelopment (Boserup1970; Papanek (Norris and Inglehart 2005). “In Muslim societies there is a 1976; Van Allen 1976; Matayepse 1977; Saffioti 1978; Lindsay very strong contention that women are different beings –– 1980). The new commodity form of production has facilitat- different meaning inferior in legal status and rights –– which ed greater male access to and control of economic, education- strengthens social barrier to women’s achievement” al and political institutions, and hence reconsolidated the patri- (Moghadam 2003:4). The prescribed role of women in Islam archal control over women (Hartmann 1976; Young 1981). is often argued to be a major determinant of women’s status.

The patriarchal relation can be defined as the institutionalised Amal Rassam (1984), an Iraqi anthropologist, examined the patterns and ideologies of male dominance and control over Islamic ethos that reflects a widely-shared male view of female resources that have generally empowered men to define the sexuality. Women’s sexuality is believed to be specially powproductive and reproductive roles and behavior of women erful and potent. Unless controlled and socially channeled, (Ward 1984). Childbearing remains the central female labor female sexuality is capable of causing havoc and social disrupactivity and children belong to the family. The ideology that tion. Women are also believed to lack great powers of reason the women are considered a form of property further justifies and self-discipline. Men are, therefore, charged with the duty the resulting sexual inequality. to protect women (and society) from the consequences of When women’s dual roles, productive and reproductive, unbridled female sexuality. “Protection” of women translates are both economically necessary and socially legitimate, then into their control through an elaborate code and sexual modthey continue to be defined by patriarchal values and delimit- esty which revolved around the cult of virginity and strict ed by the prevailing mode of production (Ward 1984:16). The material fidelity. Here then it is significant that a beautiful dialectical relation between woman’s productive roles outside women is often referred to in Arabic as fitina, a term that can the home and reproductive roles within the home is facilitat- also mean “social chaos”. This concept is similar to that of the ed via patriarchal control because the socio-economic value of femme fatale (Ibid.). Since she is considered by Allah to be a women’s production in the paid labor force reinforces the destructive element, she is to be spatially confined and excludvalue of women’s production and reproduction within the ed from matters other than those of the family. The women’s home (Sokoloff 1980). access to non-domestic space is put under the control of the In the integrated world economic system, a large number males (Mernissi 1977: xv). from among the female labor force is being recruited for The perception of women as both passive and yet having the MNCs and global assembly lines. As a result, women’s work capacity to disrupt the moral and social order is used to ratioand reproductive roles are now being directly shaped by inter- nalise the institution of veiling and segregation of women, national organisations. The production processes at global seen as necessary to the preservation of society (Amal Rassam assembly lines are affecting gender relations. It may intensify, 1984). This fundamental belief system shapes the attitudes decompose, or recompose gender subordination (Elson and towards sex roles. Hence the customs, values and male atti-

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tudes circumscribed by religion are important variables in explaining women’s inequality in Muslim society Leila Ahmed once concluded that Islam is incompatible with feminism –– even with the more mainstream/ modernist notion of women’s rights –– because Islam regards women as the weak and inferior sex (Moghadam 2003:7). But Nawal el Saadawi (1980) also insists that women in the Middle East are oppressed due to the patriarchal class system and not due to the rule of Islam. Fatima Mernissi (1977) and Fatna Sabbah (1985) stressed that the idea of an inferior sex is alien to Islam.

It was because of their “strengths” that women had to be subdued and kept under control. Many Islamic feminists argue that the Quran is genuinely egalitarian, but patriarchal interpretations since the Middle Ages have attributed low status to women (Barlas 2002; Hassan 1996; al-Hibri 1997). Hence the subordinate status of women in Muslim countries should not be attributed to the presumed intrinsic properties of Islam but to the kin-ordered patriarchal structure and other developmental issues like the extent of urbanisation, industrialisation and proletarianisation and also political will of the leaders.

appears to be at variance to the status of women in other Arab countries.

Still women in Tunisia share the same stereotypes and similar status with women in other Arab countries. At the same time, they display certain specific characteristics which are also changing. Since Tunisia has integrated its economy with the international division of labor so has to adopt and adapt to the culture attached to it, passed on through the still powerful French language and purveyed, in particular, by the mass media (Baffoun 1984). These influences seem to have a positive impact on the evolving Tunisian woman.

The status of women in Tunisia can be estimated by the access of women to employment, educational and political resources. The fertility trends, employment patterns, educational levels and public participation of women will show the extent of realisation of socio-legal measures adopted by the state for the enhancement of the status of women.

3: Trends in Employment

Access to paid work is a pointer to a society’s development levels as it helps in elevating the status of individuals. Women’s role as economically active members of society is highly releTunisia is geographically in North Africa but is culturally vant indicator to understand women’s position in the society. more close to Arab countries. It is also a part of group of Middle To strengthen women’s right to work in Tunisia, on February East and North African (MENA) countries. Most of these 7, 2000, Law No. 17/2000 repealing certain articles of the Code countries are Arab and are predominantly Muslim. Tunisia is of Obligations and of Contracts was passed in order to remove economically dependent on international capitalism and has a the provisions which required a husband’s prior consent for mixed oil economy. It is middle income country that exports his wife to work and gave him the right to terminate, if he so labor. Political scientists have described the state in Tunisia to wished, any contracts she might have signed with her employbe “authoritarian-privatising” er (Report of Tunisia and Table1: Economically Active Population/Thousands/Rate which has strong capitalistic Morocco, Beijing +10). It Year Total Both sexes Males Females features. facilitated more number of Pop. nos. Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % The human development women to enter the labor 6454 1860 (49.7) 1509 (80.2) 351 (18.8) indices of Tunisia are very 1980 force.

7332 2148 (48.8) 1718 (77.8) 430 (19.7) impressive. Its population was 1985 The unprecedented eco8219 2462 (48.3) 1932 (75.7) 530 (20.8) nomic growth in women’s 9.9 million in 2003 and the 1990 8977 2858 (48.6) 2191 (74.3) 667 (22.8) activity exhibited over the last annual rate of growth during 1995 2000 9563 3327 (49.9) 2482 (74.3) 844 (25.3) few decades can be related to the period 1975-2003 was only 10102 3875 (51.8) 2807 (75.0) 1069 (28.6) industrial expansion and 2 percent. The total fertility 2005 rate for the same period was 2 demand for cheap labor in the Source: (BA) Labor Force Survey, 2003 percent, whereas life growing tertiary or service expectancy at birth was 73.3 sectors. They rely heavily on Table 2: Female Share of Total Employees years. The adult literacy rate the work of women, both in was 74.3 percent. Immediately waged and unwaged, in forYear Percent 1970 6 after independence, women mal sectors and in the home, 1980 15 received the right to vote and in manufacturing, and in 1990 17 stand for elections in 1957 and public and private services.

1994 23 then, as early as 1959, the first The phenomenon of increase Source: Moghadam V.M. 2003: 51 woman was elected in the in the large number of government. The average age women in industrial and serTable 3: Women’s Employment by Economic Sectors of marriage for women and Year vice sector has been termed Sectors of Economy (%) men is 17 and 20 years respecas the “feminisation” of labor Agriculture Industry Service tively. Gender segregation in 1980 (Moghadam 1999:370).

52 31 17 22 32 44 public is not a norm in 1999 The entry of a large num20 40 40 Tunisia. Thus the social posi- 2001 ber of women in the labor Source: ILO (LABORSTA, 2005) tion of women in Tunisia force may not have necessar2: Status of Women in Tunisia

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ily improved the women’s labor in some countries; the Figure 1: Female Share of Total Employees status. Since the sex-specific fall in real income and the demand for the female labor escalating levels of poverty, in was created by the growth of particular because of falling oil the service sector, the growth revenues; high unemployin women’s employment ment among men; the weakopportunities has meant ening of traditional channels unequal employment of of solidarity; and the growing women and men (Ward flexibility of the labor market, 1984:24). Also, the expropriawhich therefore attracts more tion of unpaid home producwomen (United Nations tion under the expansion of Economic Commission for capitalism merely transplantAfrica 2005). ed “women’s work” to paid Though the female share of Figure 2: Women’s Employment by Economic Sectors labor in the service sector the total labor force increased, (Sokoloff 1980). These new it still remained small in comtrends provide a greater parison to men. This implies insight into the position and that labor force participation role of women in the econohas been a predominantly my and society in Tunisia. male activity. There may be These may be further undersome methodological flaws stood by analysing the particlike undercounting of women ipation of women in econoin the urban informal sectors my, proportion of women in or in the agricultural sector in different sectors of economy, rural areas, or non-inclusion disparities in salaries between of unpaid women’s work. A women and men, and contribution of women in informal sec- large proportion of women working in agriculture are not tor of economy. considered as “working women” or employees, since their labor is considered as a part of everyday tasks (Moghadam 3(a): Economic Participation of Women in Tunisia 1999).

Besides the lower proportion of women in the total labor Economically active persons are defined as those supplying force, they have a limited access to wage employment. Women labor for the production of goods and services during a spec- constitute only small percent of the total salaried work force ified reference period or at some specified date (Traver in Tunisia. Table 2 shows that between 1970 and 1994, the 1996:151). Like most regions of the world, Tunisia has wit- female share of total employees increased consistently from 6 nessed a rising trend in the women’s activity rates, especially percent to 23 percent, but it still remained small (Figure 1). since the 1990s. More women are entering the labor market.

The proportion of women in the working population has been 3(b): Women’s Employment by Economic Sectors continuously rising from 18.8 percent in 1980 to 28.6 percent in 2005 (Table 1).

The female working population was mainly agricultural There is an increase in the numbers of both females and until the 1960s, but there has been a sharp falling off. The parmales in the economy, but there has been a substantial differ- ticipation of women in agriculture still remains considerable, ence in their activity rates since the 1980s. While women’s but the proportion of women has declined (Moghadam 1999). activity rate increased to 28.6 percent in 2005, men’s activity There is a marked rise in those working in services. Table 3 rate fell from 80.2 percent in 1980 to 75 percent in 2005 (Table shows that 52 percent of women were working in agriculture 1). Women’s activity rates have been historically higher, for in 1980, which declined to 20 percent in 2001. In the indusgrowth has been based on more diversified sectors such as agri- trial sector the proportion of women increased only slightly culture and industry, especially the manufacturing industry, from 31 percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 2001. Whereas in the which requires a large workforce, and in particular a female one service sector the percentage increase of women was substan(World Bank 2004 b). tial, from 17 percent in 1980 to 44 percent in 1999, and then The sudden rise in women’s activity rates appears to be the a slight drop to 40 percent in 2001. Above 30 percent of active combined effect of more recent events such as women’s access women were consistently found in the manufacturing field to education and to professional training; the growing pro- (mainly textile, clothing and leather) during the period from portion of young women in the population structure and 1980 to 2001.The interesting fact is that the same percent (40 hence in the active population; the decline in fertility and the percent) of women were engaged in industrial and services secrise in the age of marriage; the expansion of the service sector; tors in 2001 (Figure 2). The decline in women working in the the expansion in manufacturing industries relying on female agricultural sector results in a corresponding increase in the

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proportion of women workthe rate of women’s employTable 4: Proportion of Women in Salaried Work Outside ing in other areas, especially ment is increasing rapidly, Agricultural Sector, 1990-2003 salaried work, in self-employidentification of this populament and as employers. tion and its hierarchical orderYears 1990 1995 2000 2003 The ILO and the U.N. Percent ing on the scale of increase is 23.5 24.0 24.5 25.3 have confirmed the effects of difficult. This is so because the Source: United Nations, Statistical Division, 2005 (www.un.org) the textile and clothing secaccess to paid employment tors on the feminisation of the and skilled occupation for Table 5: Female Service Sector Employment By industrial workforce in severmost working women, both Sub-Sectors (%) al studies (UNDP/UNRISD in the agriculture sector and 2002). Women with low or no Years outside it, is recent. Women’s Trade, Transport, Finance, Community Restaurant, Storage, Insurance, Social and education have provided the activity has changed in terms hotels Communication Real Personal major sources of labor for of age system as well. In Estate Services these sectors. They are pre- 1980 Tunisia, young women begin 6.0 5.3 24.6 21.0 ferred to men because there is 1990-1994 8.1 to leave the labor market 21.9 24.6 21.0 a tradition of women working when they reach the age for Source: UN, Women’s Indicator and Statistical Database (WISTAT), 1994 in these sectors and because marriage and start a family women are considered more (United Nations Economic flexible, more docile and cheaper than male workers are Commission for Africa 2005).

(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2005).

Favorable circumstances for providing initiatives have led to 3(c): Wage Employment of Women establishment of processing factories (especially textiles) employing skilled young women in Tunisia. The rise of the Salaried work is increasingly becoming the major source of industrial sector has been encouraged by a code of investment employment for women. In Tunisia, the proportion of women granting relief to firms which create new jobs and, as a result, in salaried work rose from 40 percent in 1984 to 68 percent in a large percent of the female labor 2001 (UNDP/TUNISIA; the force is employed by industry World Bank 2004 a). But data Figure 3: Informal Employment as a Proportion of (Baffoun 1984: 51). However, on the share of women in wage Non-agricultural Employment, 1994-2000 women’s work is still “urban” employment in the non-agriand concentrated in two sectors cultural sector indicate a very of the economy: The service slight increase between 1990 and administration and the and 2003. In 2003, women in industrial sectors. Girls’ access wage employment were about to schooling also encouraged 25.3 percent as compared to their employment in non-agri23.5 percent in 1990 (Table 4). cultural sectors (Ibid.).

“Many researchers have However, the apparent eronoticed that to the extent that sion of women’s employment women are employed in Middle in the agriculture sector may be East and North African due to the statistical underesti(MENA) countries, they tend mation of rural women, who to be concentrated in profesmore often do not receive sional occupations, mainly in Figure 4: Structure of Informal Employment wages. The greater part of what are known as community,

by Sex in Tunisia, 1994-2000 women’s farming work remains social and public services. The invisible and is not recorded, high incidence of women workbecause it nearly always takes ers in the ‘professional, techniplace on the family farm, or as cal and related workers’ group impermanent seasonal work in most countries could have and often receive no payment been the outcome of occupafor the work they perform tional stereotyping prevalent in (Baffoun 1984: 51) . The diverthe region, where women clussity of women’s duties makes it ter around specific jobs such as difficult to determine their teaching and nursing” share of agricultural production, (Moghadam 2003: 48). much less place an economic Contrary to this view, value on their work (Todaro women in Tunisia work in 2000:381). In Tunisia, where many diverse fields. Table 5

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shows an equally high conshare (both absolute and relaTable 6: Percentage Distribution of Informal Sector centration of women in protive) of this sector (ILO 2002 Employment by Employment Status and Sex, Tunisia 1997 fessional jobs in transport, a).

Women (%) Men (%) storage, communication (21.9 A large proportion of Employers 14 24 percent) and finance, insur- Own Account Operators women who work in the 27 36 ance and real estate (24.6 per- Unpaid Family Workers informal sector (51 percent) 18 9 cent) during the period 1990- Employees are self-employed, working 37 23 4 8 94. Also, a similar percent of Others either for themselves or as Source : Charmes 2003 “contributing family workers” women are in traditional women’s occupations such as in informal businesses. A large Table 7: Salaries and Discrimination, Public/Private Sector community, social and permajority of them work for sonal services (21 percent). In wages (49 percent on an averRatio of Women’s Difference in Salary not the sector of trade, restaurant age). Although the majority of to Men’s salary due to Productivity and hotels, women’ presence Public Sector men working in the informal 1.28 31 is still low at 8.1 percent. Thus Private Sector sector (52 percent) are self0.78 57 in Tunisia women are enteremployed, the proportion of ing diverse fields but the subinformal wage-earners among Source : World Bank 2004 stantial gainer is sub-sector of men (48 percent) is only transport, storage and communication, where only 5.3 percent slightly lower than women. Thus as far as informal sector is women were employed in 1980. During the period 1990 to concerned, the proportion of women in self-employed and 1994, women’s employment in this sector rose sharply to 21.9 salaried jobs are similar to that of men (Figure 4). percent. This can happen only when women have equal opportunities in all the different fields of education and their employ- 3(e): The Gender Segmentation of the Informal Economy ment in newer work areas is not stigmatised by the society.

Women tend to be employed in different types of activities, 3(d): Informal Sector Employment of Women associated with different levels of earning, than men, with the result that they tend to earn less even within specific segments The informal sector is characterised by a preponderance of of the informal economy. Data for Tunisia for the year 1997 self-employed workers and a majority are engaged in micro illustrates the gender segmentation of the broader informal and small businesses, family businesses and survival activities, economy comprised of small, unregistered enterprises with no work contracts and no social security benefits. Work (Charmes and Lakehal, 2003). In the informal sector there are in the informal sector involves women as much as it involves fewer women employers (14 percent) compared to men (24 men, and the gap between the two being very small in Tunisia. percent) (Table 6). Most women in the informal sector are This sector employs, on average, almost half of women (39 employed in the lower strata as unpaid family workers and percent) and men (53 percent) outside the agricultural sector employees (together 55 percent), while most men in the infor(Figure 3). However, given that agricultural activities represent mal sector are in the upper strata as employers and own an important source of employment for women, their exclu- account workers (60 percent). But the highest percent of men sion from the data relating to informal work considerably are own account operators (36 percent) and women are reduces the size of the informal sector and hence women’s employees (37 percent) (Figure 5). The data depicts the genFigure 5: Percent Distribution of Informal Sector Employment by Employment Status and Sex, 1997

Figure 6: Number of Businesswomen in Tunisia, 1970-2000

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der segmentation of employment where women are over-represented in the lowest segment of the structure and under-represented in the top segment of the informal economy.

3(f): Salaries and Discrimination, Public and Private Sector Public sector is the main employer of the female work force.

But the concentration of females is increasing in the private sector. If the private sector is to be the main source of jobs in the future, there is a danger that women’s incomes and working conditions will deteriorate (U.N. Economic Commission for Africa 2005). The gender-based income gap is found mainly in the private sector, whereas the public sector tends to reward women more equitably (Moghadam 1999: 367-388).

In Tunisia the ratio of men’s salaries to women’s shows that in public sector it is 1:1.28 whereas in private it is 1:0.78. Hence a very sharp gap in salaries in the two sectors (Table 7). Percent difference in the salary of women and men not due to productivity is 31 percent in public sector but in private sector it is as high as 51 percent. Some of the income difference in the income gap is certainly based on lower education and intermittent employment among women workers. Yet gender bias accounts for much of the difference in earnings. Labor market segmentation along the gender lines perpetuates the income gap. (Pearson and Mitter 1993:50).

In Tunisia, two different industrial sectors (textiles and mechanical and metallurgical industries), showed that men’s salaries were 1.7 times higher than those of women. According to the survey, women with higher educational qualifications were employed as mere unqualified manual workers, and when compared in terms of qualifications, men proved to have better jobs (UNDP/Tunisia and UNIFEM/North Africa 2003)

a sector similar to that in which they previously studied or worked as salaried workers. This trend can generally be explained in terms of a combination of two main factors: The access of women to employment and education; and the growth of the private sector’s share in the economy, especially that of the services sector.

3(h): Unemployment Amongst Women:

The available data for the year 1997 shows that the national level unemployment rate was 15 percent, unemployment level for men was 15.4 percent whereas for women it was the highest at 16.7 percent (Table 8). The data available on unemployment rates show that more and more women are looking for jobs, that they have more difficulty than men in finding work and that they are more vulnerable to economic restructuring (U.N. Economic Commission for Africa 2005). This situation is worrying, for unemployment is often a determining factor for poverty and social exclusion. In fact, over the last few years, women’s unemployment rates have risen and they are in all cases higher than those of men (Figure 7).

The high rates of unemployment among women can be explained in terms of the factors such as: Recent entry into the labor market of a large number of educated women of working age in a context of only moderate economic growth; the rate of unemployment among men, which might be supposed to “push” women into looking for work in order to compensate for their families’ loss of income; staff cuts in the public sector; a preference for men among employers, who consider a woman’s salary to be merely complementary income, and feel that it is more important for a man to have an income, supposedly the breadwinner of the family (ILO 2003 c; CAWTAR 2001; WB 2004 a).

3(g): Proportion of Businesswomen in Tunisia (1970-2004) In Tunisia, participation of women in labor market has increased steadily, but their participation rates are still lower Some studies emphasise than men. The increase in the Table 8: Unemployment Rates, 1997 that businesswomen, like strength of women in the businessmen, are an emerglabor force has not reduced Rates (%) 15.0 ing category. Women were National Level the qualitative disparities with 15.4 responsible for the setting up Men regards to the status of 16.7 of 7 percent of the total num- Women women and men at work.

Source: Tunisia 2004 ber of businesses registered Disproportionately higher and approved in 1989 and 13 numbers of women are repreTable 9: Girls in Full Time Education percent of those in 1993 sented in low-paid jobs, in the School Level 1975 (%) 2003(%) (U.N. Economic Commisinformal sector and in tempo38.6 47.7 sion for Africa 2005). Figure 6 Primary Level rary and casual forms of work.

Secondary Level 32.4 53.0 shows that the number of Higher Education Men tend to concentrate in 25.8 57.9 (2001) businesswomen has risen managerial positions and Source: Tunisia Online from 287 in 1970 to 2,633 in technical jobs. In the public 1990 and increasing to 10,000 sector, women’s participation Table 10: Proportion of Girls in Higher Education in 2004 (Tunisia 2004). In is increasing due to state meaYears Percent 2000, women headed 6 per- 1974-1975 sures but discrimination is 25.8 cent of industrial enterprises 1988-1989 widespread in the private sec37.2 48.3 and 6.6 percent for business- 1998-1999 tor. Not only gender segrega57.9 es employed more than 10 2001 tion in employment is eviSource: Compiled from: Tunisia Online, workers (Idem 49). dent, but they hold different National Statistical Institute Businesswomen often opt for positions in the same fields.

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A F R I C A The concentration of women in lower-paid jobs and informal sectors is not empowering them as part of their activity remains invisible in national accounting.

Despite unequal access to economic resources, a rapidly changing world economy has greatly altered the women’s labor market status and given women more bargaining power.

Q U A R T E R L Y

sponsored economic development, state-directed legal reforms, and women’s educational attainment (Moghadam 2003). Other plausible reasons for the fertility transition may be mortality reduction, reduced economic contributions from children and opportunity costs of child bearing (Ibid.). The surprising fact is that the steep fall in the fertility rates is observed at the 4: Changes in the Fertility Rates time when patriarchal values persist and religion has not lost its Figure 8: Girls in Full Time Education There exits a dialectical relation hold. between women’s productive Not only is the status of and reproductive roles. When women enhanced by controlling women have a lesser share of ecothe number of children but the nomic resources outside the nation as a whole benefits from a home, they will be disadvantaged phenomenon known as demowith regard to reproductive decigraphic bonus or demographic sion-making within the home. dividend (Nandozie 2003:109).

Nadia Youssef (1978), an When a country experiences Egyptian sociologist, insists that declining youth dependency burwomen –– who occupy a clearly den, an increasing workforce of subordinate position in the social, political and legal domains educated young people are able to save and usually have fewer –– nonetheless derive great respect and a measure of power children. The country saves by providing social services for from their marriage and maternal-related roles. Women derive fewer children and is not yet saddled with the burden of oldstatus from motherhood even when divorced and rejected for age dependency, which serves as an impetus to economic a second wife. In developing countries women continue to growth. have children and consolidate their status and position It is not that women in Tunisia are undermining their repro(Safilios-Rothschild 1982). The socio-economic value of chil- ductive role and status acquired through it, but they are trying dren remains for both women and family. Then the status of to explore other sources of prestige and status. It is through women and that of children are two possible alternatives for education and increased participation in the labor force that women to have control over their environment (Newland they are asserting themselves and weakening the clutches of 1977). Thus status of women in society is a major determinant tradition. Dramatic change in the status of women can be seen of the fertility patterns. as women can control their sexuality and define their role in In most developing countries women have no choice economic development. Access to higher education and the between their reproductive roles (motherhood) and produc- monetary sector of the economy has empowered women. As tive roles (economic). Both are socially and economically nec- a consequence, fertility rates of Tunisia have declined. essary (Dixon 1995; Newland 1977). Women’s economic roles are, in large part, compatible with child-bearing duties. They 5(a): Women and Education in Tunisia are mere extensions of their household work like rural agricultural and cottage industries. These kinds of work have only Education is a human right and an essential tool for achieva negligible effect on the fertility rates. On the other hand, in ing the goals of equality, development and peace. “It is an developed countries, the gradual decline in fertility has been effective tool for improving women’s living standards and attributed to later age at marriage, expanding educational and enabling them to exercise greater ‘voice’ in decision-making occupational opportunities for women and increased use of in the family, the community, the place of paid work, and the family planning measures (Westoff 1978). public arena of politics. Basic literacy and other basic skills are The world fertility survey conducted between 1977 and absolutely vital to women’s empowerment, and without the 1982 found high fertility persisted in MENA and Sub-Saharan skills acquired in secondary education, women cannot obtain African countries compared to other regions. Surprisingly, better paid employment” (UNIFEM Biennial Report).

Tunisia being part of this region is still different and progres- Women’s education has been viewed as critical and integral to sive and has been successful in reducing its fertility rate to 2.0 building human resource reserves. Thus, equality of access to in 2003 (UN 2003), similar to those of developed countries. and attainment of educational qualifications is necessary if In Tunisia, the demographic changes, including patterns of women are to become more effective agents of change. management and fertility behavior, have followed from stateEducation has been considered an important variable that Figure 7: Unemployment Rates

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will eventually help change ing where all –– public, private Table 11: Literacy Rates for Ages 15+ the situation of Tunisian and NGOs –– participating. and Gender Equality Rates, 1990-2000 women and guarantee them a It has also been observed Years Literacy Rates For 15+ Gender Equality better future. Even the Quran that the lack of co-ordination (%) Index does not deny educating between education and the job Female Male Female/Male 46.4 71.7 0.65 women. ‘Elm’ in Arabic is 1990 market and the predominance 53.0 76.0 0.70 similar to meaning sciences, 1995 of traditional values has caused 60.1 81.4 0.74 knowledge or education. 2000 the girls to take up so-called 2003 65.3 83.4 ‘Elm’ appeared in the Quran “female” subjects in school Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1999, 2003.

854 times. Never has it been rather than opting for sciences used to deprive women of and commerce or other fields Table 12: Illiteracy Rates (%) education. On the contrary, it of the so-called male bastion.

1966 1994 2000 2004 has been used to persuade Years Thus sex stereotypes have Female 82.4 42.3 34.7 31.0 them to educate themselves Male been reproduced and rein67.9 21.7 16.5 14.8 (Algadi 1979). Tunisia is conforced even in higher educaSource: Tunisia Online sidered today to be the leading tion, women are oriented Arab country as far as towards domestic roles rather Table 13: Women in Lower House of Parliament women’s education is conthan towards skill-based, techYears Percent cerned. Political will and 1990 nical courses (Boserup 1970; 4 statistics show a picture of 1999 Dixom 1975; Tinker 1976; 11.4 22.8 rapid educational expansion 2005 Boulding 1977; Coser 1981) Source: Compiled from UNDP Human Development Report 2005 in Tunisia. The country has Despite the increase in succeeded in providing both female education, the maleTable 14: Women in the Chamber of Deputies the sexes equal opportunities female enrollment gap is still at all levels of education, train- Years striking. The gap widens with Percent 1.82 ing and retraining, to improve 1966 each higher level of education.

4.26 their qualifications so that 1989 The female-male ratio in net 1994 7.0 they have better chances of primary enrollment is 1.00, in 1999 11.5 entering economic channels. net secondary enrollment is 2004 22.7 In the first few decades after 1.11, and in gross tertiary Source: Tunisia Online Tunisia became independent, enrollment it is 1.28 (UNDP the government sought to guarantee education for all Tunisian Human Development Report, 2005). Surprising is the data of children. Currently, the government is seeking to improve the combined gross group enrollment ratio for primary, secondary bases of education, so that it is better adapted to market needs and tertiary school for 2002-03: 76 percent of females to 73 perof employment, while promoting equality between girls and cent males. Thus there is almost parity of enrollment between boys in rural and urban areas. Since the reform of 1991, the males and females at the primary levels but the proportion of principle of non-discrimination has been applied to subjects girls decreases with an increase in the level of schooling. taught and methods used (National Report, 1995).

In 2003-2004, 99 percent children were in full-time educa- 5(b): Literacy Rates tion at the age of 6 for both genders. The data for girls’ full time education for the year 1992-93 is compared with that of the The Education Act of Tunisia stipulates that school is year 2003-04, it is found that there has been a substantial mandatory for all girls and boys aged 6 to 16. Those who fail increase of full time education for girls. It increased from 85.2 to enroll children, or remove them from school before they percent in 1992-93 to 99.6 percent in 2003-04 (Tunisia reach 16, are liable to a fine. This measure is designed to keep Online). The gender gap has almost disappeared. Comparing girls from dropping out of school at an early age in rural areas the full-time education of girls at different school levels, it is (National Report, 1999). In 2003, the literacy rate among found that at all the three levels the increase is significant. But females increased to 65.3 percent from 46.4 percent in 1990 the steepest increase is in higher education where it increased (Table11). In comparison to female literacy rates, male literafrom 25.8 percent in 1975 to 57.9 percent in 2001, indicating cy rates are higher: In 1990 it was 71.7 percent which consisthat more number of girls is able to continue with higher edu- tently increased to 83.4 percent in 2003 (Figure9). cation (Table 9 and Figure 8).

Even the proportion of girls in higher education has more than doubled during the period from 1974-2005. It has increased 5(c): Illiteracy Rates from 25.8 percent in the year 1974-75 to 57.9 percent in 2001 (Table 10). Thus proportion of females entering the university All levels of education, from primary to university levels, levels is consistently increasing. Vocational and training oppor- have shown a gradual increase in the number of female stutunities for women in Tunisia have also been steadily increas- dents. Due to the progressive changes in the educational sys-

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A F R I C A tem and similar opportunities for girls and boys, illiteracy rates have been consistently falling. But comparing the male and female illiteracy rates, female rates are still higher at 31 enrollment in 2004 as compared to only 14.8 enrollment of males who were illiterate (Table 12). For females illiteracy rates have fallen down drastically from 82.4 enrollment in 1966 to 31 enrollment in 2004.

Similarly for males it fell down from 67.9 enrollment in 1966 to only 14.8 enrollment in 2004. It should be noted that the illiteracy rate among women has declined by more than 40 points in the past 30 years (National Report, 1995).

Thus the economic develop and state measures, have not yet produced equal educational access for women in secondary and higher levels of education. Women remain less literate than men in Tunisia.

Women’s share in secondary and tertiary levels is lower. Though illiteracy rates are falling, the gap between female and male illiteracy rates still exist.

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Figure 9: Literacy Rates for Ages 15+

bers in the Chamber of Deputies, as compared to 11.5 percent in 1999, 7 percent in 1994, 4.26 percent in 1989 and only 1.82 percent in 1966 (Table 14). As many as 15 percent of the members of the Chamber of Advisors are women. In 2005, there were 7.1 percent women in government at the ministerial level (UNDP Human Development Report 2005). In Local Councils there were about 21.6 percent of women in 2004 as compared to only13.6 percent in 1990. Some 11 Even the proportion of girls percent of the members of the in higher education has more Economic and Social Council are women. There is one women goverthan doubled during the nor. Women in the RCD (the majorperiod from 1974-2005. It has ity party) were about 26.4 percent in increased from 25.8 percent 2003 as compared to only two members in 1998 (Tunisia Online). in the year 1974-75 to 57.9 Interestingly, the first time when a percent in 2001 (Table 10). Thus woman was elected to Parliament proportion of females entering was as early as 1959.

The democratic process and a the university levels is strengthening of civil society has consistently increasing. encouraged the formation of associVocational and training ations concerned with women’s issues and their development. The opportunities for women in enthusiasm of Tunisian women for Tunisia have also been steadily such organisations, the degree of 6: Political Participation of Women increasing. maturity they have reached, and an The political status of women is awareness of the importance of their related to their economic status. It playing fully their role in confirming can be estimated by women’s access to and integration with the values of civil society is unmatched (Ministry of Women political institutions and by legislation. Tunisian women have and Family Affairs). The many measures that have been taken enjoyed the same right to vote as men since independence in favor of women since the beginning of the 1990s have con(Tunisia Online). tributed to imparting a new vitality to their participation in Also, Tunisia is considered a pioneer in ratifying interna- public life and to improving their image in society. tional conventions concerning women’s rights and the estabThe above figures show that women in Tunisia enjoyed the lishment of the mechanisms required to reinforce women’s same voting and eligibility rights as men since 1956. Compared participation in political and public life. This very full range of to developed countries only handful of women gained access laws and mechanisms has helped strengthen the presence of to the higher levels of government. women in the field of political action (Ministry of Women and The integration of women into all levels of political instiFamily Affairs). But it has not produced the anticipated inte- tutions has been limited. Most women at the ministerial level gration of women into the government. are dealing with issues such as family, children and elderly To widen the participation of women in public life, affairs, or are in-charge of social promotion, public health and President Ben Ali adopted several measures in 1987. Women education. There are only two Secretaries of State, one each took this opportunity to participate in the decision-making to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Women. process by entering the political hierarchy at various levels. The Hence women are not proportionally represented within the seats in Parliament held by women in the lower house grad- government. Such few women at the secretarial level can have ually increased from 4 percent in 1990 to 11.5 percent in 1999 only a limited influence on the government. to 22.8 percent in 2005 (Table 13). There is almost 5-and-aBetter educational and employment opportunities of half times increase in the number of women in just 15 years women had little impact on increasing women’s representa(UNDP Human Development Report 2005). tion at the higher and more powerful levels of government.

At present there are about 22.7 percent of women as mem- “State feminism” in Tunisia gave women wider range of rights

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than in other MENA countries. But the recognition of women’s political rights and the strength of their voting numbers is nowhere reflected in their direct role in government in Tunisia, when compared with the political status of women in developed countries. If Tunisia is compared with other developing countries, it has a very impressive record. Tunisia played a ground-breaking role, very early on, in enacting truly avant-garde legislation to reinforce and confirm women’s rights (Ministry of Women and Family Affairs). This orientation has become still more pronounced since the beginning of the new era, with ratification of the principle of equality and partnership between the sexes and striving to eliminate any remaining discriminatory practices (Ibid.). Women in Tunisia are increasingly being integrated into political institutions, as the above data shows. This has helped to effect legislation pertaining to enhancement of their status. Besides, women in government serve as role models for others.

These amendments have confirmed the position of women as citizens who are in full possession of their rights and who are responsible partners in the family and society. To provide a firmer foundation for the principles of gender equality, respect of women’s rights, and equally-shared responsibility in the conduct of family and children’s affairs, President Ben Ali promulgated, in 1996, another extensive series of social measures in favor of women and the family.

The importance of the protection of girl children is manifested in the components of the development plan and 8th Plan. This shows the great efforts made by the political leadership in the sectors of childhood, youth and women, a concern which has enabled the Tunisian girl child and young women to benefit from all the measures targeting any of these categories (Ministry of Women and Family Affairs). This privileged status has contributed to a perceptible improvement for girls in many vital fields, as is revealed by indicators concerning education, training, health and employment.

7: Socio-Legal Status of Women Divorce is a strictly judicial matter; extra-judicial talaq has no validity. The occurrence of three Divorce is a strictly judicial The principle of equality between divorces between a couple creates a matter; extra-judicial talaq men and women with respect to citpermanent prohibition on their has no validity. The occurrence future remarriage. No divorce may izenship and before the courts is expressly stipulated in Tunisian legal be decreed until after the family judge of three divorces between a texts. Tunisia is the only country appointed by the court has tried and couple creates a permanent where the principle of equality failed to reconcile the couple. Where prohibition on their future between genders has been consecratdivorce is not by mutual agreement, ed in legal texts. President Habib remarriage. No divorce may be the court may award compensation Bourguiba adopted an approach to for that injury. decreed until after the family empower women as part of broader The status of women as a key elejudge appointed by the court efforts to modernise the country. As ment in comprehensive developearly as 1956, the Code of Personal has tried and failed to reconcile ment has taken concrete form in their Status established a new organisation active participation in defining goals, the couple. Where divorce is of the family based on equality of identifying choices and intensifying not by mutual agreement, the rights, through a series of provisions programs and projects. This has been that included the abolition of court may award compensation made possible by amending the legal polygamy; the establishment of judisystem to keep pace with the changfor that injury. cial divorce proceedings, granting ing needs and times. The new both spouses the right to request amendments strengthened the place divorce; in the case of death of the child’s father, granting the of women still further, confirming the principles according to mother the right of custody of their minor children (Tunisia which their rights are inseparable from those of men, elimiOnline). The minimum age of marriage is 20 years for males nating legal provisions that could be interpreted as discrimiand 17 years for females. The age of legal majority is 20 years natory and sexist. for both males and females, but marriage gives rise to legal majority for matters of personal status, civil and commercial 8: Women in Films and Sports transactions provided the party concerned is over the age of 17 years (Article 153). Marriage can be proven only by official docTo know about society is to read its cinema. Cinema reflects ument as prescribed by law. During that time, these were pro- society in a border framework of schemes and presents a sociogressive measures not only for Tunisia but for the whole cultural discourse. Cinema in Tunisia came into being with world. the national independence in 1956. The dialectical relationship President Habib Bourguiba adopted these measures in 1956 between men and women has always been part of any cinema and empowered women as a step to modernise the country. industry. By default it reflects on the role and perceptions of Continuing these efforts, President Ben Ali, in 1992, women in the society and expresses the quest for sexual idenannounced broad legal amendments (the Code of Personal tity and emancipation of women as existing at the time.

Status, the Labor Code, the Nationality Code, the Penal Tunisian society is changing very fast and so are women.

Code), and the establishment of institutional mechanisms to Tunisian cinema is projecting these changing images of promote female human resources. women as interpreted by the society. Thus, in the short span

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of only five decades of tion continues.

Tunisian cinema, one can The impact on women of clearly identify three different improved social and judicial phases of changing women’s conditions in the society is position and status in the sociclearly reflected in films like ety.

‘Soumt’ in 1994 and Bent In the earliest phase of film Famlia in 1998 (Discacciati). history, very few films dealt But films like ‘The Season of exclusively with women’s Men’ directed by Monfida issues. Women were used as Tlathi shows that despite accessories rather than makpolitical and social revolution, ing any significant contribuwomen did not achieve libertion to the film. Due to the ation (Steady). dominance of patriarchal valSports are the other area ues and unassuming women, which reflects the nation’s the only acceptable represengeneral policies towards The Tunisian women’s judo team members celebrate after winning the tation of women was her African Judo Championship in 2003. Women’s participation in sports women. There are certain stereotypical subordinate role. is a good indication of their status in a nation. sports in which women have This further reinforced the been participating for several social, political and religious values. Women in Tunisia have taken up decades. But other games like football The next phase, that can be seen have always remained a male bastion. football and formed leagues. around the 1970s and 1980s, was a Women in Tunisia have taken up According to a male university football and formed leagues recently. revolutionary phase for women all over the world due to widespread lecturer, the entry of women into According to a male university lecinternational interest in promoting turer, the entry of women into footthe cause of the underprivileged and football is to keep pace with the ball is to keep pace with the symbol symbol of Western superiority, of Western superiority, that has been exploited. Women’s rights at this time began to be understood within established by countries such as the established by countries such the border framework of human United States and France. What is rights. The International Women’s as the United States and France. commendable is the fact that allowYear in 1975 and subsequent devel- What is commendable is the fact ing Islamic women to run around in opments greatly influenced women. that allowing Islamic women to shorts in public is more a tribute to The two different images of women the country’s general policies towards run around in shorts in public is women (CNN). emerged in the films of the time. more a tribute to the country’s As a consequence of modernisaThe changing images of women tion, the joint family system gave way represented in films and the freedom general policies towards to the formation of nuclear families, of women to participate in the sports women. and a subsequent sense of insecurity of their choice mirror the substantial because of the loosening of tradichanges in the perception of women tional values. in Tunisian society.

In a nuclear family, the “wife” plays a central role and is a This has been facilitated by the implementation of progreskey provider of the family. Films often projected this, like sive socio-legal and economic measures by the Tunisian state, ‘Shams al-diba’ by Beni (Hyenas’ Sun. Tunisia 1977) and ‘Dhil education and paid employment opportunities. These meaa-Ardh’ by Louhichi (Shadow of the Earth, Tunisia 1982) sures provided for equality of all and removed claustrophobic showed the protagonist of the film in the role of family-ori- practices legally that undermined the status of women. In the ented wife (Discacciati). process, women in Tunisia have shed their family cocoon and On the other hand, so-called social films depicted women their “invisibility” and metamorphised into “visible” and ecoas modern and Western-oriented working women having their nomically active individuals to finally being assertive and own identity and contributing effectively to the economy. The empowered to fight for their rights as integral part of human issue of rebellion, the thirst for freedom and the ultimate rights. emancipation of women from the clutches of impeding traditional practice were successfully addressed in the films such as Conclusions ‘Aziza’ by Ben Ammar (Aziza, Tunisia 1980) and Ben Mabrouk’s ‘al-Samam’ (The Trace, Tunisia 1982).

Amartya Sen, a noted Indian Nobel prize winning The recent phase of Tunisian cinema represents women as economist, argues that the economic, political and social parthinking and active individuals and no longer “idealistic or ticipation of women is a necessary precondition for the develtheoretical constructs”. The quest for identity and emancipa- opment of a country.

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I S S U E S

Also, development issues should focus on women’s betterment, their autonomy and mobility without undermining the role of culture and religion in shaping their status. Valuing these views, the State in Tunisia taken upon itself the need to rectify the neglect of women and enhance their status in the society.

Enlightened policies towards women by the successive governments of Tunisia contributed to its markedly superior record in developing female human resource and their eventual economic growth.

The investment in girls’ education and the fall in fertility rates had a rapid and powerful impact on women’s activity.

Also, women in Tunisia do not face any legal barrier to their access to economic activity. The increased interest in acknowledging the importance of a productive role of women has given them greater decision making power and weakened the existing social prejudices. Social stigma attached to women working in industrial and service sectors as paid labor has been reducing. This reflects an attitudinal change in the Tunisian society and a firm commitment of its people for equitable society.

But being part of Arab world, Tunisian women evoke

images similar to that of other Arab women. The commonly held view is that Arab women are confined to the domestic sphere of life, with almost negligible role in the economy and the decision making process and so are always tangential to the development of the country. Consequently, their inferior status leads to their unequal access to political, economic and social resources. Discrimination expressed by way of segregation and veiling further reinforces their unequal status.

Behind this impervious veil of Arab woman, surfaces a selfconfident, modern, progressive and proactive Tunisian woman who is trying to mark her presence in all the domains of society, and that to, not without success. Her variable and changing status is a testimony to her efforts in deconstructing her passive and subjugated image, and reconstructing economically active, politically assertive and socially emancipated female force to reckon with.

The strength of Tunisian woman lies in her precarious balancing of the coexistence of tradition and modernity, neither undermining tradition nor obscuring modernity. She is a perfect fit of a well-balanced traditionally-modern Tunisian woman who is socially liberated and committed to continue to be pioneer in stepping out for dignified existence.

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B O O K S

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I D E A S

A selection of new books on Africa and by African writers from www.africabookcentre.com Attacking Africa’s Poverty: Experience from the Ground Edited by Louise Fox & Robert Liebenthal; World Bank Publication; 389pp; Paperback; £26.99 DRAWING ON the findings from 12 case studies, this publication sets out examples of successful poverty-reduction strategies in Africa, in order to learn from these experiences and to highlight the reasons why they succeeded and ways in which they can be reproduced and enlarged. The publication is organised into three sections: An integrated overview of Uganda’s experience over the last decade; issues relating to improving the investment climate with examples from Rwanda, Senegal, Kenya, Botswana, Mauritius and Tanzania; and strategies to tackle social exclusion and deliver services to poor people in Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda, Ghana, South Africa and Zambia.

Grasping Africa: A Tale of Tragedy and Achievement

By Stephen Chan; Tauris, UK.; 185pp; Paperback; £16.99 AFRICA IS huge, vital, potentially rich and powerful yet mired in failure –– political, economic, social and even cultural. Yet the story of contemporary Africa is not just one of global tragedy but also of enormous hope. This stimulating book on Africa today and its relationship with the West explores the many complex reasons behind Africa’s failure to fulfil its potential –– it is a continent blighted by colonialism, exploitation and the interference of great powers in the international relations of the region –– and offers some genuinely original and well-argued suggestions for ways forward.

The Enemy Within: Southern African Militaries’ Quarter-Century Battle with HIV and AIDS Edited by Martin Rupiya; Institute for Security Studies, South Africa; 218pp; Paperback; £14.99 THIS BOOK is the product of an action research focusing on the phenomena of HIV and AIDS and how these relate to the Armed Forces of a number of key African states.

The findings have been extrapolated from an assessment of the situation in the militaries of five Southern African countries. These are Botswana, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It looks at how HIV and AIDS have impacted the militaries in these nations.

■ Editor’s Pick House of Stone: The True Story of a Family Divided in War-Torn Zimbabwe

By Christina Lamb; Harper Perennial, U.K., 290pp; Paperback; £8.99 NEW IN paperback. A powerful and intensely human insight into the civil war in Zimbabwe, focusing on a white farmer and his maid who find themselves on opposing sides. By tracing the intertwining lives of the Nigel and Akwe –– rich and poor, white and black, master and maid –– Christina Lamb not only presents both sides of the Zimbabwean dilemma, but captures in achingly intimate terms her own uplifting conviction that, although savaged, there is still hope for one of Africa’s most beautiful countries.

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Unbowed: One Woman’s Story

By Wangari Maathai; William Heinemann, U.K.; 314pp; Hardback; £17.99 BORN IN a rural Kenyan village in 1940, Wangari Maathai was already an iconoclast as a child, determined to get an education even though most African girls then were uneducated. In her remarkable and inspiring autobiography, she tells of her studies with Catholic missionaries, earning bachelor’s and master’s degrees in the United States, and becoming the first woman both to earn a Ph.D. and to head a university department in Kenya.

August-October 2006

A F R I C A

Of African Refugees and British society From Outside in: Refugees and British Society Edited by Nushin Arbabzadah; Arcadia, U.K.; 256pp; Paperback; £11.99 This book is both a personal and social history of the migratory tracks that have gone into creating the contemporary identities that form our –– British –– society today and an unflinching reminder of what it is to be an outsider.

The narratives in the book poignantly depict the twin mechanism of loss and hope faced by newcomers to the British shores, as they simultaneously search for ways to hold onto memories of lives no longer lived and in turn inhabit new ways of being.

Importantly the refugee experience is shown to be multifarious, not simply in its involvement of different races and nationalities but in the attitudes and reactions of those involved.

Q U A R T E R L Y Farming Systems in Namibia

By John Mendelsohn; Research and Information Services of Namibia; 80pp; Paperback; £14.99 The Namibia National Farmers Union (NNFU) commissioned this book with several aims in mind: to describe and emphasize the variety of farming systems in the country; to better inform decision-makers, development specialists, agriculturalists, and resource managers about the diversity of farming practices; to improve awareness of environmental, historical and economic features that affect farming.

Gratitude and admiration for British democracy and cultural diversity is mixed with pain at the racism and ignorance encountered while integrating into the country. Includes essays by people from Uganda, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and Somalia.

■ Photography David Goldblatt: Photographs

By David Goldblatt; Contrasto Productions, Italy; 256pp; Hardback; £40 The long-awaited anthology of David Goldblatt’s works, published on the occasion of the 2006 exhibition in Arles. Goldblatt is South Africa’s most important photographer. He has produced a body of work that is an original and extensive study of South Africa during and after apartheid. Goldblatt’s photographs are in the collections of The Museum of Modern Art, New York; The South African National Gallery, Cape Town; the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris; and in The Victoria and Albert Museum, London.

The Southern Development Community: The organisation, its policies and prospects

By Gabriel Oosthuizen; Institute for Global Dialogue, South Africa; 402pp; Paperback; £36.99 Complements the burgeoning literature on regional integration in Africa.

It is the most up-to-date guide to SADC's history and institutions, its policies and programmes, legal underpinnings and position in unfolding continental and global affairs. It offers a frank analysis of SADC's shortcomings, achievements and prospects and reviews its extensive restructuring.

Trade Liberalisation and Environmental Linkages: Implications for sustainable development

By Michelle Pressend; Institute for Global Dialogue, South Africa; 206pp; Paperback; £35.99 This book presents a compilation of papers summarising the discussions that took place at a workshop that considered the implications of sustainable development in relation to trade and environmental linkages.

The papers offer a wide range of views and perspectives on the impacts of trade liberalisation and the WTO rules on the environment and natural resources citing both threats and opportunities.

Mother and child

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B O O K S

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■ Fiction/Biography

New Fiction emerging from Africa Measuring Time

By Helon Habila; Hamish Hamilton, U.K.; 383pp; Hardback; £16.99 MAMO AND LaMamo are twin brothers living in a small Nigerian village, where their domineering father controls their lives. With high hopes the twins attempt to flee home, but only LaMamo escapes to live their dream of becoming a soldier. Mamo, the awkward, sickly twin, is doomed to remain in the village. Gradually, he comes out of his father’s shadow and gains local fame as a historian, embarking on a “true” history of his people. But when the rains fail and famine rages, religious zealots incite the people to violence –– and LaMamo returns to fight the enemy at home.

Miss Kwa Kwa

By Stephen Simm; Jacana Media, South Africa; 246pp; Paperback; £8.99 MISS KWA Kwa (or MK) is learning that in a country supposedly so black-andwhite, there are a million shades of grey: ‘Coconuts’, ‘Wiggas’ and ‘Buppies’ are a few examples. But behind the simple facade of the rural, charming Miss Kwa Kwa lies a mind as sharp as a panga and just as deadly –– and somewhere in this Rainbow Nation is a pot of gold with her name on it. Unaware that several people are chasing her, MK begins stalking a politician who has just checked his wife into rehab.

Utterly charmed by MK, he takes her to the top-secret Studio 94 with its exclusive clientele. Throw in coincidence/fate, skulduggery, a crazed prostitute named Leeyann, a terrifying thunderstorm and a blackout, and it’s a recipe for disaster.

Africa in 1814: A 36-year-old German missionary exploring what is now southern Namibia marries the 20year-old Zara, a Nama woman, whom he had baptised. She helps him with translations and in transcribing her language into a written form, bears him four children, and dies in 1831.

Those are the bare bones of a story that Ursula Trueper has fleshed out with the results of her research into this fascinating account about the African woman and her German husband. The missionary, Johann Hinrich Schmelen, was sent to South Africa in 1811 by the London Missionary Society. He is recognised today as a pioneer in the study of Khoekhoekowab, the Nama language, as well as for his evangelisation of southern Namibia.

■ Health

■ Faith and Politics The Caged Virgin: A Muslim Woman’s Cry for Reason

By Ayaan Hirsi Ali; Pocket, U.K.; 187pp; Paperback; £7.99 Raised a Somali Muslim but increasingly outraged by her culture and religion’s hostility towards women, Ayaan Hirsi Ali has now become one of the most admired and controversial political figures in the Netherlands. Now available in English for the first time, this collection of essays brings together some of her most passionate and compelling writing on a wide range of issues concerning Islam.

Between Faith & History: A Biography of J.A. Kufuor

By Ivor Agyeman-Duah; Ayebia, U.K.; 394pp; Hardback; £25 An account of John Kufuor's journey from Oxford-educated lawyer to Ghana's Deputy Foreign Minister at 30, detention, emergence as leader of the Opposition's New Patriotic Party and subsequent election as President in the first democratic elections in nearly 40 years of military intervention and dictatorships.

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The Invisible Woman: Zara Schmelen African Mission Assistant at the Cape and in Namaland

By Ursula Trueper; Basler Afrika Bibliograhien, Switzerland; 118pp; Paperback; £23.50

August-October 2006

The Politics of HIV/AIDS and Implications for Democracy in Kenya

By Henry Kiragu Wambuii; Edwin Mellen Press, U.S.; 260pp; Hardback; £74.95 Taking the responses against HIV / AIDS as a political arena for the interaction between the state and civil society in Kenya, this book explores the relationship between the resulting mobilisation against the pandemic and the ongoing process of democratic consolidation in Kenya.

Evidence from the country's mobilization against HIV/AIDS in the early part of the 21st century reveals an explicit positive impact on the build-up of democracy in that country.

A F R I C A

Q U A R T E R L Y

Bestsellers in India Delhi University professor Navnita Chadha Behra tops the list of best-selling authors in the non-fiction category with ‘Demystifying Kashmir’, while Man Booker Prize winner Kiran Desai’s ‘The Inheritance of Loss’ is the fiction favourite this season.

TOP 10: NON-FICTION 1. ‘Demystifying Kashmir’ Author: Navnita Chadha Behera Publisher: Longman Price: Rs. 425 2. ‘The Last Mughal: The fall of a Dynasty, Delhi 1857’ Author: William Dalrymple Publisher: Penguin Viking Price: Rs. 695 3. ‘The Indians: Portrait of a People’ Author: Sudhir & Katharina Kakar Publisher: Penguin Viking Price: Rs. 395 4. ‘Partition and The South Asian Diaspora: Extending the Subcontinent’ Author: Papiya Ghosh Publisher: Routledge Pric : Rs. 650

Works for Everyone’ Author: P. Chidambaram Publisher: Penguin Portfolio (The Express Group) Price: Rs. 495 7. ‘Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam’ Author: Zahid Hussain Publisher: Penguin Viking Price: Rs. 395 8. ‘Making Globalisation Work: The Next Steps to Global Justice’ Autho : Joseph Stiglitz Publisher: Penguin Allen Lane Price: Rs. 595 9. ‘Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India’ Author: Stanley Wolpert Publisher: Oxford Price: Rs. 495 10. ‘The Oxford Companion to Economics in India’ Author: Kaushik Basu Publisher: Oxford Price: Rs. 2,750 TOP 10: FICTION

5. ‘Gulbadan: Portrait of a Rose Princess at the Mughal Court’ Author: Rumer Godden Publisher: Tara Press Price: Rs. 650

1. ‘The Inheritance of Loss’ Author: Kiran Desai Publisher: Penguin Books Price: Rs. 395

6. ‘A View From the Outside: Why good Economics

2. ‘The Barn Owl’s Wondrous Capers’ Author: Sarnath Banerjee

Publisher: Penguin Books Price: Rs. 395 3. ‘Love in Torn Land’ Author: Jean Sasson Publisher: Doubleday Price: Rs. 660 4. ‘Shantaram’ Author: Gregory David Robert Publisher: Abacus Price: Rs. 470 5. ‘Conspiracy of Calaspia’ Author: Suresh & Jyoti Guptara; Publisher: Tara Press; Price: Rs. 495 6. ‘The Bancroft Strategy’ Author: Robert Ludlum Publisher: Orion Books Price: Rs. 255 7. ‘Shopaholic & Baby’ Author: Sophie Kinsella Publisher: Bantam Press Price: Rs. 620 8. ‘Motor Mouth’ Author: Janet Evanovich Publisher: Harper Collins Price: Rs. 680 9. ‘Sisters’ Author: Danielle Steel Publisher: Bantam Press Price: Rs. 980 10. ‘Ishq and Mushq’ Author: Priya Basil Publisher: Doubleday Price: Rs. 95

(Source: Bahri Sons, New Delhi, www.booksatbahri.com. All the books listed above are available online)

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D O C U M E N T S The Tshwane Declaration on reaffirming the strategic partnership between South Africa and India. October 2, 2006, Pretoria.

1. In commemorating the centenary of the launch of Satyagraha, and in the spirit of the strategic partnership that was established during the historic visit of South Africa’s first democratically-elected President, Nelson R. Mandela to India in March 1997 and carried further by the visit to India by President T.M. Mbeki in October 2003 and the visit to South Africa by President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam in September 2004, South Africa and India reaffirm their commitment to a global order of peace, equality and justice.

2. President Thabo Mbeki and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid tribute to the global role played by Mahatma Gandhi through the implementation of the principles of truth, non-violence and self-sacrifice, as enshrined in the philosophy of Satyagraha. Gandhi’s influence was felt throughout the world and inspired numerous leaders and renowned personalities like Martin Luther King, Albert Luthuli, Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. It was the unflinching spirit of Mahatma Gandhi that contributed decisively towards the demise of the British Raj; similarly it inspired the struggle against apartheid, particularly during the Defiance Campaign.

Above all, it was the strong message of non-violence contained in Gandhi’s Satyagraha that helped to bring about a peaceful transformation in South Africa and the realisation of truth and reconciliation between the destructive human divisions that had been spawned by apartheid.

3. In sharing the fundamental values espoused by Mahatma Gandhi, President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh stress their continued and unfaltering belief in the peaceful resolution of disputes and the recognition of the rights of nations to self-determination and freedom.

4. President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh express their belief that South Africa and India draw their strength and inspiration from the diverse, multi-cultural societies constituting their respective nations; and that the best assurance for continued peace and prosperity lies in the adherence to democratic governance that is rooted in the respect for human dignity and the fundamental rights of all people, as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

5. The two national leaders furthermore reaffirmed their belief in the growing partnership with the signing of the following bilateral agreements/MOUs: ■ Co-operation in the Field of Education.

■ MOU between Spoornet and Railways They furthermore

noted that the following agreements will be signed imminently, once the regulatory procedures have been completed.

■ Exemption of Visa Requirements for Holders of Diplomatic and Official Passports.

■ Programme of Co-operation in Science and Technology.

6. Conscious of the need to make the partnership more result-oriented and of greater direct benefit to the peoples of South Africa and India, President Mbeki and Prime Minister

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Singh have today decided to intensify co-operation and committed themselves to raise the existing level of friendship and partnership between South Africa and India to even higher levels.

7. Both leaders noted that the political interaction between India and South Africa, marked by an exceptional degree of understanding, mutual trust and confidence, had gathered further momentum and substance. The number of Ministerial visits exchanged had increased significantly since the milestone visit of President Mbeki to India in 2003. They expressed their satisfaction at the continued and steady consolidation of bilateral relations. Besides the deep political bond that was first forged more than a century ago, the partnership now extends to the economic, human resources development, public administration and governance, urban and rural settlement, health, defence, cultural and science and technology fields.

8.1 Recalling that the Red Fort Declaration had recognised that the economies of South Africa and India have certain comparative advantages, complementarities and resources which can be exploited to mutual benefit through trade, investment and transfer of technology, they noted with satisfaction the progress that had taken place in these areas, resulting in more than doubling of the total bilateral trade since 2003 and a significant increase in investments in both directions. They acknowledged, however, that the full potential in this regard was yet to be tapped and reaffirmed their determination to explore these opportunities to their optimal extent, particularly in the following priority sectors: energy, tourism, health, automobiles and auto components, chemicals, dyes, textiles, fertilisers, information technology, small and medium enterprises and infrastructure.

8.2 They urged the private sectors of both countries to gain better awareness of each other’s strengths and to set themselves ambitious targets. It should be possible at least to treble the volume of bilateral trade by 2010. In this context, they welcomed the scheduled third meeting of the India-South Africa CEOs’ Forum in Johannesburg on 2 October 2006, which would contribute towards this goal.

9.1 Recognising the major priority attached to the health sector in both countries, they agreed that the Agreement on Co-operation in Health and Medicine should be implemented expeditiously.

9.2 Further, South African and Indian companies providing health services, including diagnostics and medical care, would be encouraged to work jointly to provide affordable health care to nationals of both countries as well as in third countries.

10. Recalling the important Agreements, which were signed in October 2003 to promote co-operation in the fields of hydrocarbons, electricity and power, they agreed that these should be implemented at the earliest.

11. They noted the progress made in bilateral defence cooperation as reflected in the report of the India-South Africa Defence Committee, which met in June 2006 in Pretoria.

They agreed that South Africa and India should work towards closer co-operation in the defence sector, including the possibility of joint research and development. Furthermore, the

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South African 15. In the critically Government expressed important field of appreciation for the Science and Technology, training provided by President Mbeki and India on U.N. Prime Minister Singh Peacekeeping and operaagreed that a more extentions of modern subsive and active network marines. between relevant institu12.1 Lauding the tions of the two countries efforts of the South would be promoted by African Government for the concerned promoting broad-based Departments. economic and social They noted that development through President Abdul Kalam the Accelerated and had delivered the second Shared Growth Initiative Philip Tobias Lecture at of South Africa the invitation of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and South African President Thabo (ASGISA) and the Joint President Mbeki and had Mbeki signing the Tshwane Declaration in Pretoria on October 2,.

Priority Skills called for greater coAcquisition Initiative (JIPSA), Prime Minister Singh reaf- operation between scientists of South Africa and India in meetfirmed that the Indian Government was ready to be a partner ing the challenges of development, including in partnership in these initiatives and to provide assistance in building up in the Pan African e-Network and the World Knowledge scarce and critical skills identified by the South African Platform.

Government.

16. In addressing wider areas beyond the bilateral realm, the 12.2 President Mbeki welcomed the growing co-operation two leaders agreed that every effort would be made to conclude within the framework of the Indian Technical and Economic the India-Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Cooperation (ITEC) Programme and Prime Minister Singh’s Preferential Trade Agreement as soon as possible since it indication that India would increase the number of ITEC would provide a significant incentive to the business comslots allocated to South Africa from 55 to 100, with 50 of these munities of the two countries to explore mutually beneficial slots earmarked specifically for the JIPSA Initiative. commercial opportunities and contribute to the growth in 12.3 Noting with satisfaction that the visit of the Deputy bilateral trade.

President of South Africa to India from 9 to 13 September 17. President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh welcomed 2006 had helped identify further avenues through which India the launching of the Southern African Development could contribute to ASGISA and JIPSA, the two leaders decid- Community (SADC)-India Forum in the Republic of ed that a Programme of Co-operation addressing growth and Namibia on 28 April 2006 to promote technical co-operation skills would be drawn up by designated co-ordinators from between SADC and the Government of India in all fields of both sides. economic activity with the empowerment of the people in the 12.4 To identify means of co-operation in capacity build- SADC region and in India as a key priority. ing and skills enhancement in the key ICT sector, they 18. The two leaders agreed that the consolidation of the requested the Working Group set up under the MOU on African Union (AU) held the key to the development of the Information & Communication Technologies to convene as continent. South Africa welcomed India’s willingness to supa matter of priority. port the objectives of the New Partnership for Africa’s 13. They expressed satisfaction at the increasing cultural Development (NEPAD), the AU’s primary programme exchanges between the two countries and decided that the aimed at consolidating the African agenda.

Cultural Exchange Programme, which expires in 2006, would 19. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the outcome be renewed; and that academic exchanges between the two of the first IBSA Summit held in Brasilia on September 12, countries, particularly through University-to-University link- 2006. They welcomed the emergence of IBSA as an effective ages, would be promoted. instrument for promoting ever-closer co-ordination on glob14. President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh expressed al issues between these three influential and diverse democtheir satisfaction on the opening of the South Africa Tourism racies of Africa, Asia and South America. Both sides also agreed office in Mumbai in 2005 and reaffirmed their belief that to intensify consultations and co-operation at multilateral increased tourism would not only bring commercial benefits forums such as NAM, Commonwealth, G-77, G-20 and the to both countries, but also enhance the warm people-to-peo- New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) with a ple relations between South Africa and India. In this context, view to jointly addressing global challenges. they welcomed the imminent opening of an office of the 20. The two leaders shared the view that international ecoInternational Marketing Council (IMC) of South Africa in nomic relations continue to be characterised by inequities and Mumbai. inequalities with large sections of the world yet to reap the ben-

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D O C U M E N T S efits of globalisation, which has led to economic crises and Africa and India would continue to work towards the early instability in several developing countries. The two leaders adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on International agreed that to be sustainable and successful, the globalisation Terrorism (CCIT) in the UN General Assembly. process must address, not perpetuate or aggravate the existing 23. President Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh reiterated inequalities. They, therefore, deeply regretted that the Doha the unwavering commitment of South Africa and India to the Development Agenda negotiations had been suspended which goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a comhad pitted the interests of corporate agriculture and large prehensive, universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable manindustrial enterprises of the developed countries against those ner and expressed concern over the lack of progress in the realof small and the vulnerable producers that predominate in isation of that goal. They emphasised the necessity to start developing countries. This constituted a grave setback to the negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimidevelopment promises of the Round and a serious disap- nation of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time pointment for developing countries. Failure to conclude the to eliminate nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, negotiations in accordance with the mandate will deprive production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or developing countries of fair and equitable conditions for fully threat of use, and to provide for their destruction. realising their comparative advantages across agriculture, 24. They agreed that nuclear energy could play an imporindustry, and services. Both leaders emphasised that substan- tant role in ensuring safe, sustainable and non-polluting tial and effective reductions in all forms of trade-distorting sources of energy to meet the rising global demands of enerdomestic support provided by the major subsidisers is an gy, particularly in developing countries. They reaffirmed the unfinished agenda and must be secured to meet the agreed aim inalienable right of all States to the peaceful application of of establishment of a fair and marketnuclear energy, consistent with their President Mbeki and Prime oriented trading system in the globinternational legal obligations. They al agricultural sector. agreed to explore approaches to coMinister Singh express their 21.1 Convinced of the vital belief that South Africa and India operation in the peaceful uses of importance of the role of the United nuclear energy under appropriate draw their strength and Nations in promoting world peace, IAEA safeguards. They further stability and development, the two agreed that international civilian inspiration from the diverse, leaders welcomed the creation of the nuclear co-operation, under appromulti-cultural societies Peacebuilding Commission and the priate IAEA safeguards, amongst constituting their respective Human Rights Council, as well as countries committed to nuclear disthe progress made in the areas of UN armament and non-proliferation nations; and that the best Secretariat and management reform. assurance for continued peace objectives could be enhanced The leaders noted the importance of through acceptable forward-looking and prosperity lies in the increased focus on development and approaches, consistent with their the alleviation of poverty. respective national and international adherence to democratic 21.2 They reaffirmed the need for governance that is rooted in the obligations. a decision regarding the expansion of 25. In conclusion, President respect for human dignity. the Security Council, without which Mbeki and Prime Minister Singh no reform of the United Nations reiterated their deep conviction that would be complete. They reiterated their conviction that the peace and development are indivisible and that good goverSecurity Council must be expanded to include developing nance was the best-known way to ensure both. They emphacountries from Africa, Asia and Latin America in both its per- sised that under-development could not be addressed in isomanent and non-permanent categories, so as to reflect con- lation, but that its eradication was a factor of numerous social temporary realities and make it more democratic and repre- and environmental influences, including education, health sentative, and resolved to continue to pursue a decision in this care, basic infrastructure and amenities, capacity building and regard. skills enhancement, political participation at all levels, advance22. The two leaders expressed their deep concern over ment of indigenous culture and social organisation and access international terrorism, extremism, trans-border organised to natural resources, clean water and air for all. They emphacrime and illicit trafficking in humans and in arms and drugs. sised further that the right to freedom had an important ecoThey viewed terrorism as a serious threat to sovereign states, nomic dimension, as it embraced not only political freedom international peace, security and development. They agreed but also the freedom to lead a life with dignity, unfettered by that counter-terrorism efforts by the international communi- domination and discrimination. They noted that the strategic ty under the auspices of the United Nations should be glob- partnership between South Africa and India was guided by the al, comprehensive and in conformity with international law, common vision of a global order marked by peace, security and human rights and humanitarian law. The ultimate objective equity. To tackle these multiple challenges, they reaffirmed is the total eradication of this scourge, so that barbaric attacks, their commitment to enhance their co-operation bilaterally as such as the ones carried out on 11 July 2006 in Mumbai and well as multilaterally, to build a better, safer and more prosother parts of the world, do not recur. To this end, South perous world for present and succeeding generations. â–

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A F R I C A St. Petersburg G-8 Summit — Indian Non Paper on ‘India’s Partnership with Africa’. July 16, 2006.

1. India’s relations with Africa are built on the strong political foundation of the past. We were close partners with Africa in the fight against colonialism and apartheid. The goodwill of the past is evident in the close relationship that India has today with the countries of the African continent.

2. India is today looking at the more contemporary challenges of economic and social development in its relationship with Africa. The relationship is not one of donor-recipient but of partnership for mutual benefit.

Technical Assistance 3. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC) is almost four decades old. It has enabled us to share a wide range of training facilities and project expertise with our friends from Africa. India’s development experience has a special relevance for African requirements. Over the last five decades, through an incremental process of trial and error, we have forged a development paradigm that — within the context of a diverse, pluralistic democracy — is truly unique. Our approach has focused on strengthening ‘SouthSouth’ linkages and promoting self-reliance through transfer of technologies appropriate to the needs of our partners. In monetary terms, we have spent over a billion dollars on our cooperation programmes with Africa and continue to provide training annually to almost 1,000 officials in various capacitybuilding programmes. This is apart from the over 15,000 African students who join Indian Colleges and Universities every year.

Lines of Credit 4. We recognize that technical assistance alone is not enough. The process of economic development also requires access to low cost capital. We are not a rich country in terms of per capita income but the accumulation of a relatively comfortable level of foreign currency reserves has enabled us to offer concessional lines of credit. Taken together with our lines of credit to individual countries, our offers of $ 200 million for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and $ 500 million for Team 9 [Techno-Economic Approach for African Movement - an initiative that brings together India and 9 countries of West and Central Africa] add up to almost $ 1 billion. This is being used as a catalyst to build genuine, productive and sizeable partnerships in sectors like railways, construction, electrification, irrigation, food-processing, agricultural machinery and cotton spinning.

Pan-A African Satellite-b based Connectivity: 5. Our scientists have placed us in a leadership position in a wide range of satellite-based technologies, Our communication, educational, remote sensing and meteorological satellites are enabling us to bring the benefits of tele-medicine, tele-

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education, resource mapping and weather forecasting to some of the remotest parts of our country. During the visit of our President to Africa in September, 2004, we announced our willingness to share the benefits of these technologies with our friends in Africa. The Indian Space Research Organisation has developed an ambitious plan to connect the 53 countries of Africa through a network that uses satellite, fiber optic and wireless links. We would, in partnership with the African Union and individual countries of Africa, be establishing a network that links learning centers, Universities and hospitals in every country of Africa with counterpart institutions in India that have a proven expertise in these fields. After many rounds of extensive discussions, the Government of India and the African Union signed the MOU for the project on October 27, 2005. Project execution is presently underway.

Projects: 6. India provides assistance for project related activities, such as feasibility studies and consultancy services, apart from actual project implementation. The assistance provided is comprehensive and includes training as well as deputation of Indian experts. India has contributed to a very large number of projects in Africa. An illustrative list of projects established with Indian assistance is as follows: ! Lilongwe Water Supply System in Malawi ! Ebene Cyber City Project in Mauritius ! Kofi Annan IT Centre for Excellence in Ghana ! Entrepreneurship Development Centre in Senegal Nigeria Machine Tools in Nigeria ! Plastic Technology Centre in Namibia ! India Farmers Project in Burkina Faso ! Village Electrification Projects in Soune and Touly in Senegal ! Gandhi Memorial Hospital in Ethiopia Peace-K Keeping Operations: 7. We fully recognise the importance of a stable polity as a pre-requisite for economic progress. The legacy of longstanding conflicts has left its scars on many parts of Africa. We hope that the vision and determination of the African Union and of Africa’s contemporary leaders will soon make such conflicts a thing of the past. From our side, we will continue to support peace-keeping efforts wherever required. We have done so from the time of the conflict in Biafra. In more recent times, the contribution of our troops has been widely recognized in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Eritrea. Even now we have over 3,500 soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo and and over 1,500 Indian soldiers on the EthiopiaEritrea border. Our defence personnel have not only worked with troops from other nations to bring peace but have also distinguished themselves for the exemplary fashion in which they have contributed humanitarian assistance and participated in development activities in the areas where they have been deployed.

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D O C U M E N T S Joint Press Communique, 1st IBSA Summit Meeting, Brasilia, September 13, 2006.

The Prime Minister of India, H.E. Manmohan Singh, the President of Brazil, H.E. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and the President of South Africa, H.E. Thabo Mbeki, met in Brasília on 13 September 2006, for the historic 1st Summit Meeting of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA).

They expressed their deep appreciation with the consolidation of the IBSA Dialogue Forum.

2. The three leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the promotion of peace, security and sustainable economic and social development in the world and in their respective regions. They reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism and the pre-eminent role of the United Nations. They also discussed the reform of the United Nations and of the United Nations Security Council and the successful conclusion of the Doha Round in the WTO, with the development dimension at the core of its outcome.

3. The Heads of State and Government reiterated their support for the comprehensive reform of the United Nations and welcomed the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council. They reaffirmed the need for a decision regarding the expansion of the Security Council in both its permanent and non-permanent categories, so as to reflect contemporary realities and make it more democratic, legitimate, representative and responsive. They reaffirmed their commitment to continue to jointly pursue a decision on Security Council expansion on an urgent basis.

4. The Heads of State and Government unequivocally condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. They stressed that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any act of terrorism. They shared the view that the international community must further intensify efforts and cooperation to fight this scourge. They called upon all member states to seriously work towards an expeditious finalization of the text for a comprehensive convention on international terrorism.

5. The Presidents of Brazil and South Africa also expressed their outrage at the barbaric terrorist attacks, carried out on 11 July 2006 in Mumbai and other parts of India. They called upon the international community to undertake all necessary measures to bring to justice perpetrators, collaborators and sponsors of these and other acts of terrorism, as well as those who incite the perpetrators to commit them.

6. The Heads of State and Government reiterated their strong commitment to the Action Against Hunger and Poverty Initiative and, in particular, the Millennium Declaration and the 2005 World Summit Outcome. They noted with satisfaction the progress towards creating an International Drug Purchasing Facility to respond to the challenges of AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.

7. They also committed themselves to further enhancing trilateral cooperation in the field of HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis and to explore the possibilities of concluding a trilateral instrument for collaboration among all three countries for research and development of HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis diagnostic tools, drugs and vaccines. This would

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pool the significant capabilities that exist in the IBSA countries.

8. India, Brazil and South Africa, elected to the newly formed Human Rights Council, share common visions regarding the promotion and protection of human rights. The three countries share a common vision to reaffirm the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the realization and operationalization of the Right to Development and the special protection of rights of vulnerable groups.

9. India, Brazil and South Africa share similar views regarding the importance of achieving sustainable development, particularly through the eradication of poverty, the promotion of economic growth and the protection of the environment.

They urge the donor countries to meet their Official Development Assistance targets and to mobilize new and additional financial resources.

10. The Prime Minister of India and the Presidents of Brazil and South Africa took stock of the global security situation concerning disarmament and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The leaders reiterated their commitment to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They emphasized the necessity to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and verifiable manner with a specified framework of time.

11. The Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States to the peaceful application of nuclear energy, consistent with their international legal obligations. They agreed to explore approaches to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under appropriate IAEA safeguards. They further agreed that international civilian nuclear cooperation, under appropriate IAEA safeguards, amongst countries committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives could be enhanced through acceptable forward-looking approaches, consistent with their respective national and international obligations.

12. The Heads of State and Government deeply regretted that the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda negotiations have been suspended. Failure to conclude the negotiations in accordance with the mandate will deprive developing countries of fair and equitable conditions for fully realizing their Right to Development. Distortions affecting agricultural trade and production should be expeditiously eliminated and agriculture should be fully incorporated into the rules of the multilateral trading system.

They called upon countries that have not yet done so to substantially and effectively reduce their expenditures on agricultural subsidies. India, Brazil and South Africa shall spare no effort to resume the suspended negotiations.

13. The Heads of State and Government reiterated their commitment towards a fairer global trading system, to the benefit of developing countries. In this respect, and taking into account the spirit of the Brasilia Declaration, they welcomed the progress achieved so far in the São Paulo Round of the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP).

14. The Prime Minister of India, the President of Brazil and

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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, second from right, with South African President Thabo Mbeki, third from right, and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, third from right, at the 1st IBSA Summit in Brasilia on September 13. the President of South Africa reviewed initiatives for trilateral sectoral cooperation. They expressed deep satisfaction with new, concrete results achieved during the 1st IBSA Summit in the areas of Energy, Agriculture, Transportation, Trade, Science and Technology and Information Society. They decided to further explore additional opportunities for trilateral cooperation.

15. The Heads of State and Government expressed their deep satisfaction with the signing, during the 1st IBSA Summit, of the IBSA Action Plan on Trade Facilitation for Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment.

16. They expressed their full support and commitment to the expeditious establishment of the Working Group to focus on the modalities for the envisaged India-Mercosur-SACU Trilateral Free Trade Area.

17. They reaffirmed, in parallel, the importance of ongoing India-Mercosur and Mercosur-SACU negotiations with a view to broadening and deepening existing Tariff Preference Agreements.

18. The three countries expressed their satisfaction with the presence of important and high level business delegations from India, Brazil and South Africa at the “India, Brazil and South Africa Business Summit”, organized by the Brazilian Confederation of National Industry (CNI) with the support of ASSOCHAM, CII and FICCI from India, and BUSA, from South Africa. Furthermore, the Heads of State and Government held a meeting with business delegations from the three countries and had a fruitful exchange of views on perspectives and challenges for the expansion of trade among the IBSA countries.

19. The Heads of State and Government expressed deep appreciation for the signature, during the IBSA Summit, of a Memorandum of Understanding on Biofuels, with the decision to create a Trilateral Task Force on Biofuels to work on concrete areas of common interest.

20. The Prime Minister of India and the President of South Africa praised the Ethanol international initiative launched by

Brazil and agreed on the need to work together to promote and enhance the use of ethanol and biodiesel.

21. The Heads of State and Government agreed that the Memorandum of Understanding on Trilateral Cooperation in Agriculture and Allied Fields, signed during the IBSA Summit, will be an important instrument to promote socioeconomic development and South-South cooperation.

22. The Heads of State and Government welcomed the signing of the IBSA Trilateral Agreement Concerning Merchant Shipping and Other Maritime Transport Related Matters.

23. They also emphasized the importance of implementing the Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Aviation as soon as possible, through the establishment of regular air services linking India, Brazil and South Africa. They encouraged airlines from the three countries to continue working towards this goal.

24. The Heads of State and Government expressed their satisfaction with the signing of an IBSA Framework of Cooperation on Information Society, which provides the basis for future trilateral work aiming at reducing the digital divide in their societies.

25. The Heads of State and Government emphasized the fact that the IBSA Facility Fund constitutes a pioneer and unique initiative of South-South cooperation. In this regard, they expressed their satisfaction with the initiatives in GuineaBissau and Haiti. The Prime Minister of India and the Presidents of Brazil and South Africa underscored their countries’ commitment to allocate at least US$ 1 million a year to the IBSA Facility Fund. IBSA members encourage developing countries, particularly the Least Developing Countries, to submit projects to the IBSA Fund.

26. The Heads of State and Government expressed their satisfaction that the 4th Meeting of the Trilateral Commission would be hosted by India, in the first quarter of 2007. In addition, they considered the possibility of holding the 2nd Summit of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, in South Africa, on a date to be set through diplomatic channels.

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I N C R E D I B L E

I N D I A

MADURAI

City of Temples

O

ne of South India’s great temple towns, Madurai is synonymous with the celebrated Meenakshi Temple. Situated on the banks of the river Vaigai, Madurai has a rich cultural heritage passed down from the great Tamil era more than 2,500 years ago. Madurai was an important cultural and commercial centre even as early as 550 AD. It was the capital city for the great Pandya kings.

The Pandyan King Kulasekarar built a great temple and created a lotus-shaped city around the temple. Legend has it that, on the day the city was to be named, Lord Shiva blessed the land and its people, and divine nectar (Madhu) was showered on the city from his matted locks. This city, also famous for its jasmine flowers, was henceforth known as Madhurapuri.

Madurai is famous for several other temples too. The Aappudaiyaar Koyil Tevara Stalam and the Koodalazhagar Divya Desam are important temples that are a must for visitors.

In the vicinity of Madurai is Tirupparamkunram, one of the six padai veedu shrines of Murugan (glorified in Madurai Sangam Nakeerar’s Tirumurugaatru-ppadai). Also nearby is Alagar Koyil, one of the prominent Divya Desam shrines of the Sri Vaishnavite faith.

walls of the temple. The 48.4 metre high southern gopuram is the most spectacular and has over 1,500 sculptures.

You can even climb the gopuram to get a panoramic view of the city.

Mariamman Teppakulam

ATTRACTIONS Meenakshi Temple: Located at the heart of the city, the Meenakshi-Sundareswarar temple has long been the focus of both Indian and international tourist attraction; it is also one of the most important centres of Hindu pilgrimage and is at the hub of the religious and cultural life of the city.

The temple is an excellent example of Dravidian architecture, with gopurams (large gateways) and mandapams (multi-pillared halls) covered from top to bottom in a profusion of multi-coloured images of gods, goddesses, animals and mythical figures. Spread over six hectares, the temple has four entrances.

Of its 12 gopurams, four of the tallest stand at the outer

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Mariamman Teppakulam: Some five km east of the Meenakshi temple is a tank called the Mariamman Teppakulam. The tank has an idol of Vinayaka, or Vigneshwara, installed on a platform in the centre. It is also the site of the temple’s annual Teppakulam float festival.

Tirumalai Nayak Mahal: The palace of Tirumalai Nayak is about one km from the temple. This IndoSaracenic building was constructed in 1523 and was originally four times as large as it is today. The palace displays the architectural style of the Nayaks.

The Swarga Vilasam (the audience hall) is one of the most remarkable features of the palace. Its dome rises up to a height of 20 m without any support and is an engineering marvel in itself. Here you can watch sound and light shows on the life of Tirumalai Nayak, as well as see Silappathikaram (a Tamil classic). These shows are held every evening in both English and Tamil.

The Gandhi Museum: Housed in the old palace of the Rani Mangammal, the Gandhi Museum provides a historical account of India’s struggle for independence. There is a shop in the premises where you can buy books on Gandhi.

Thirupparankunram: Eight km south of Madurai is Tirupparankunram. Here you can find Pandyan rock-cut shrines dating back to the 8th century and a later Nayaka Hindu temple. The temple has a wide range of Hindu gods carved on the walls. The Subramanya cave temple has a shrine dedicated to Durga, with the figures of Ganesh and Subramanya on either side. Located atop a hill, the temple is believed to be one of the six abodes of Lord Subramanya.

Azhagar Koil: Azhagar Koil (also, Alagarkoil temple), 21 km north of Madurai, is dedicated to one aspect of Lord Vishnu. This ancient temple is placed atop a picturesque wooded hill called Alagarmalai and has many beautiful

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sculptures of Vishnu.

Koodal Alagar Temple: Koodal Alagar Temple is an ancient Vaishnavite temple located two km west of Madurai. The temple has many beautiful sculptures depicting Vishnu in three poses –– sitting, standing and reclining –– one above the other.

Vaigai Dam: At a distance of 69 km, on the way to Thekkady, you will come across the Vaigai Dam. It is a beautiful picnic spot and is very popular with tourists and locals alike. You can laze around in the well laid out gardens.

TOURIST INFORMATION HOW TO GET THERE

BY AIR: Madurai has its own airport, located 12 km from the city center.

BY RAIL: Regular trains connect Madurai to all major cities of south India.

BY ROAD: Madurai is well connected by roads to all major towns of Tamil Nadu.

CLIMATE: Dry and hot, with rains during October-December.

SUMMER TEMPERATURE: Max: 37.5 Deg. C., Min: 26.3 Deg. C. WINTER TEMPERATURE: Max: 29.6 Deg. C., Min: 20.9 Deg. C. AVERAGE RAINFALL: 85 cms.

WHERE TO STAY: Hotel Royal Court, Hotel Chentoor Hotel The Madurai Residency GRT Regency

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A F R I C A

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■ Contributors

■ PROFESSOR ANKUSH B. SAWANT is a former Director of the Centre for Africa Studies, University of Mumbai.

Currently, he is heading Centre for International, Strategic and Development Studies, a Mumbai-based academic NGO. He has authored many defining studies on Africa, including Egypt’s Africa Policy: The Nasser Era and India and South Africa: A Fresh Start.

■ DR. IBRAHIM SEAGA SHAW is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the School of Media and Cultural Studies of the University of the West of England in Bristol. His article is a summary of his Ph.D. thesis which he defended with honours on January 28, 2006, at the University of Paris, Sorbonne, and which he is currently working on to transform into a book.

■ LAURENCE JUMA is a Lecturer at the Department of Private Law of the National University of Lesotho.

■ MANISH CHAND is Editor of Africa Quarterly. He writes on foreign policy, politics, culture and books. He has also worked with The Times of India, The Asian Age and Tehelka. His articles have been published in leading national and international dailies.

He has reported extensively from within India and abroad.

■ MINU JAIN is a Senior Editor with Indo-Asian News Service (IANS). She writes on a variety of subjects, including politics, foreign policy and culture. She has also worked with The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Sunday Observer and Sunday. She has reported extensively from within India and abroad.

■ DR. RASHMI KAPOOR is a lecturer in Swahili in the Department of African Studies, University of Delhi. Her field of specialisation is African sociology in general and Swahili language in particular. She has recently visited Mauritius for her field work. She has extensively written on Indian Diaspora in Africa. She is a member of the Sudan Study Unit in the Africa Studies Department of the University of Delhi.

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Q U A R T E R L Y

Note to Contributors Africa Quarterly, published since 1961, is devoted to the study and objective analyses of African affairs and issues related to India-Africa relations. Contributions are invited from outstanding writers, experts and specialists in India, Africa and other countries on various political, economic, social-cultural, literary, philosophical and other themes pertaining to African affairs and India-Africa relations. Preference will be given to those articles which deal succinctly with issues that are both important and clearly defined. Articles which are purely narrative and descriptive and lacking in analytical content are not likely to be accepted.

Contributions should be in a clear, concise, readable style and written in English.

Articles submitted to Africa Quarterly should be original contributions and should not be under consideration by any other publication at the same time. The Editor is responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles, but responsibility for errors of facts and opinions expressed in them rests with authors. Manuscripts submitted should be accompanied with a statement that the same has not been submitted/accepted for publication elsewhere. Copyright of articles published in the Africa Quarterly will be retained by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR).

Manuscripts submitted to Africa Quarterly should be typed double space on one side of the paper and two copies should be sent. A diskette (3 ½” ) MS-Dos compatible, and e-mail as an attachment should be sent along with the two hard copies. Authors should clearly indicate their full name, address, e-mail, academic status and current institutional affiliation. A brief biographical note (one paragraph) about the writer may also be sent.

The length of the article should not normally exceed 7,000 to 8,000 words, or 20 to 25 ( A-4 size) typed pages in manuscript. Titles should be kept as brief as possible.

Footnote numbering should be clearly marked and consecutively numbered in the text and notes placed at the end of the article and not at the bottom of the relevant page. Tables (including graphs, maps, figures) must be submitted in a form suitable for reproduction on a separate sheet of paper and not within the text.

Each table should have a clear descriptive title and mention where it is to be placed in the article. Place all footnotes in a table at the end of the article. Reference numbers within the text should be placed after the punctuation mark.

Footnote style: In the case of books, the author, title of the book, place of publication, publisher, date of publication and page numbers should be given in that order, e.g. Basil Davidson, ‘The Blackman’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State’, London, James Curry, 1992, pp. 15-22.

In the case of articles, the author, title of article, name of the journal, volume and issue number in brackets, the year and the page numbers should be given in that order.

In addition to major articles and research papers, Africa Quarterly also publishes short articles in the section titled News & Events. They may not exceed 2,000 words in length. Contributions of short stories and poems are also welcome.

Contributors to Africa Quarterly are entitled to two copies of the issue in which their article appears in addition to a modest honorarium. Contributors of major articles accepted for publication will receive up to a maximum of Rs. 5,000.

Contributions may be sent by post to: The Editor Africa Quarterly Indian Council for Cultural Relations Azad Bhavan Indraprastha Estate New Delhi-110 002 Contributions may be e-mailed to: africa.quarterly@gmail.com

August-October 2006

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Volume 46, No. 3 August -October 2006

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Evolution of the African Union

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Western media’s reporting of conflicts

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Gender issues in Tunisia

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Mazrui’s perspectives on conflict

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In Conversation: Zimbabwean Minister of International Relations Obert Mpofu

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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to South Africa

Indian Council for Cultural Relations Azad Bhavan Indraprastha Estate New Delhi - 110 002 E-mail: africa.quarterly@gmail.com Registered with the Registrar of Newspapers of India Regd No. 14380/61

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