China India@60-jul-aug2010

INFOCUS | INDIA-CHINA@60 | COVER STORY

CHINA-INDIA@60

The Great Game India and China are like two players at a game of chequers where instead of crossing each other it would benefit both to move side by side.

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July-August 2010

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INFOCUS | INDIA-CHINA@60 | COVER STORY

A

Dr Mohan Malik is rofessor of Asian ec rit at the Asia Pacific Center for ec rit t dies in onol l These are his personal views

imbalance, resource scarcity and geopolitical S CHINA AND INDIA CELErivalry. Furthermore, Beijing’s opposition to InBRATE the 60th anniversary of the dia’s membership in regional institutions like the establishment of diplomatic relations East Asia Summit and international forums like between the two countries this year, the UN Security Council; China’s attempts to it is time to look at the balance sheet of the biscuttle the US-India nuclear deal at the Nuclear lateral relationship. On the positive side, there Suppliers Group; the increased militarization has been a dramatic increase in Sino-Indian biof Tibet, conventional weapons sales and conlateral exchanges since the 1990s at the political, tinuing nuclear/missile technology transfers to economic, military, and cultural levels — inPakistan in violation of non-proliferation treacluding high-level visits at regular intervals and ties and regimes, and Chinese naval forays into an overall improvement in the official rhetoric. the Indian Ocean region all have reinforced Both conduct a regular security dialogue, joint long-held Indian suspicions that China seeks to military exercises, and cooperate to mutual addeny India its proper place in the international vantage in multilateral forums such as the G-8 and the G-20, BRIC and the Russia-China-India trilateral on transnational issues such as energy and environment, the Doha round of trade negotiations, terrorism and global governance issues. At the recent Copenhagen summit on climate change, China and India cooperated to ward off international pressure on carbon emissions caps. In January 2008, India and China issued a joint document on a ‘Shared Vision for the 21st Century,’ pledging to promote a harmonious world of peace and stability and further strengthen their “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity.” Bilateral trade has risen from $260 million in 1990 to $52 billion in 2008, and is expected to touch $60 billion by the end of 2010. India and Manmohan Singh (second from left) at a meeting with Environment Ministers from BASIC (Brazi China have worked together with other emerging system. Issues that bring India and China closer economies to ensure they have greater say in inare also the ones that divide them. Far from celternational institutions of financial governance, ebrating burgeoning economic links, India is rethe World Bank and IMF. sentful over a yawning trade deficit and Chinese On the negative side, despite dramatic changcurrency manipulation. Mutual understanding es in the domestic and international contexts of each other remains shallow and distorted. since the early 1950s, little seems to have changed There exists in the Chinese mind a deep distrust in Chinese attitudes towards and perceptions of of India—with the converse also holding true.

India. Though leaders from both countries often This article argues that the gulf between rule out rivalry and repeat the ritualistic talk of China and India — in terms of perceptions, atenough space for both India and China to grow, titudes, and expectations — has widened over such platitudes cannot obliterate the trust defithe years. Chinese leaders and policy makers encit that dates back to the bruising 1962 War, Titertain doubts about the historical authenticity bet and the unresolved territorial dispute, trade

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of the Indian nation; show contempt for India’s great power ambitions; perceive India as a pawn in Western designs to encircle and contain China; and worry about the strategic ramifications of India’s growing power for Tibet’s future, a concern fanned by the March 2008 uprisings there.

Contrary to their declaratory posture, both see major power relations in zero-sum terms. That is the reason their supposedly common interests in many areas have proved to be insufficient to overcome their bilateral problems or their sense of rivalry in Asia. The fear of internal instability (Tibet and Xinjiang) coupled with India’s participation in wider forms of strategic encircle-

il, South Africa, India and China), countries in New Delhi

ment — real or imagined — aggravate Beijing’s insecurities. As a result, China-India ties remain fragile, unstable, and as vulnerable as ever to sudden deterioration as a result of misperceptions, misconceptions, accidents, suspicions, and eruptions of unresolved issues.

India’s future uncertain For all the millennial talk about friendship and strategic partnership, little seems to have changed in China’s view of India since the 1950s. Chinese leaders and officials in the early 21st century are as contemptuous of India’s so-

cio-economic achievements and as dismissive of New Delhi’s claims of being ‘the world’s largest democracy’ as were Mao and Zhou in the 1960s and 1970s. A powerful section of the Chinese national security bureaucracy continues to entertain doubts about the prospects of India’s survival as a nation-state over the long term, seeing it as a ‘soft state characterized by abject poverty, regional and linguistic cleavages, and religious fault lines.’ Many assume that plagued with insurgencies, terrorism and separatist movements internally and under pressure on multiple fronts externally, the Indian state would eventually unravel.

India cannot compete with China Another dominant belief in China’s strategic circles is that as in the 1950s, there is more hype than substance to India’s rise, generated mostly by the Western media. Official China loathes being spoken of in the same breath as India. Chinese media commentaries deplore Indian economy, society, polity, and military. India plays no part in the vision projected by Beijing of the 21st century as a Chinese one. Whilst China already strut the world stage as a superpower, India remains far behind in all indices of power. Traditionally, China has never looked at India as an equal, but merely as an upstart wannabe that likes to punch above its weight and needs to be constantly reminded of its place.

Officials in Beijing and Delhi hew rival visions of the future, each seeing itself as pursuing the more durable political and socio-economic model of development. What irks the Chinese elite apparently is the international praise showered on India’s democratic model. The Chinese argue that their economic success proves that China’s political cultural and governance system are far superior to India.

China’s political system has succeeded in lifting 400 million people out of poverty between 1981 and 2001 — an unprecedented, historic achievement in itself — thus leaving India far behind. The successful weathering of the ecoJuly-August 2010

BILATERAL TRADE HAS RISEN FROM $260 MILLION IN 1990 TO $52 BILLION IN 2008, AND IS EXPECTED TO TOUCH $60 BILLION BY THE END OF 2010.

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INFOCUS | INDIA-CHINA@60 | COVER STORY

ISSUES THAT BRING INDIA AND CHINA CLOSER ARE ALSO THE ONES THAT DIVIDE THEM. FAR FROM CELEBRATING BURGEONING ECONOMIC LINKS, INDIA IS RESENTFUL OVER A YAWNING TRADE DEFICIT AND CHINESE CURRENCY MANIPULATION.

nomic crises of 1997 and 2008 reinforces this belief.

A commentary published in June 2009 in the Communist Party mouthpiece Renmin Ribao, that serves as a window into the thinking of Beijing’s insular leadership, mocked India for failing to keep pace with China’s economic growth: “In 1947, when India won independence, it was one of the global industrial powers, ranking among the Top 10 in the world and far ahead of the then backward China. But today, China’s GDP has tripled that of India and…the wealth gap between China and India has increasingly widened.” This is the reason, says Li Hongmei, Indians harbour a mix of “awe, vexation, envy and jealousy.” Chiding Western powers for inciting India to challenge China, Li laments: “To feed its ambitions, the West has gone so far as to devise ways to extol India as a potentially No.1 democracy in Asia, but intentionally plays down China’s social and economic progress.” In a similar tone, an editorial in Huanqiu Shibao asked “frustrated India” to back off: “India likes to brag about its sustainable development, but worries that it is being left behind by China. China is seen in India as both a potential threat and a competitor to surpass. But India can’t actually compete with China in a number of areas, like international influence, overall national power and economic scale. India apparently has not yet realized this.” Militarily, the PLA judges Indian military inferior to the Chinese in combat, logistics, equipment, and war-fighting capability.

The Chinese defence budget is supposedly 3 to 4 times the size of India’s annual military expenditure. China also boasts a robust military-industrial complex. Although China claims India a third-tier security priority, far behind internal insecurity and challenges in the East Asian littoral, the Dalai Lama’s presence in India and Beijing’s fears of losing control over Tibet seem to elevate India to China’s first-tier threat.

The geopolitical divide The biggest obstacle to Sino-Indian amity is that both giants aspire for the same things at the same time on the same continental landmass.

China wants access to markets and resources to sustain its growth. To protect those markets and resources, it is imperative for China to acquire military might and overseas bases. Put it simply, Chinese foreign policy today is driven by its quest for markets, resources, might and bases.

In fact, China is playing the same old game that other industrializing European powers and Japan played over the last 200 years. Rising powers, by definition, do not like peer competitors.

Instead, they seek to keep other powers con-

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tained, divided, subdued and distracted. China’s strategic culture also necessitates distrust of strong, powerful neighbours and shows preference for small, weak and subordinate or client buffer states.

The Chinese seem upset over their southern neighbour’s all-consuming passion to become “a big power.” China’s approach, according to Yang Dali and Zhao Hong, “is to develop economic and strategic ties with South Asian nations, ensuring that India is surrounded by countries friendly toward China.” A high degree of suspicion, mistrust and conflicting relations between India and its smaller South Asian neighbours has provided Beijing with enormous strategic leverage vis-à-vis its southern rival. China’s strategic leverage prevents India from achieving a peaceful periphery via cross-border economic, resource and transportation linkages vital for optimal economic growth. As India speeds up its industrialization to sustain its economic growth and create millions of jobs, it finds itself engaged in elbow bashing with China in the competition for resources, markets and bases.

Historically, the rise of a major continental power — especially one with an authoritarian regime nursing historical grievances with active

territorial disputes — has always resulted in geopolitical alignments, and led to the formation of a coalition of maritime powers to counter it.

China is no exception to this rule. By and large, countries on a rising power’s periphery tend to either balance against or bandwagon with the rising power. Some, of course, choose to do both. Given China’s centrality in Asian geopolitics, ‘hedging’ or ‘balancing’ vis-à-vis China is becoming the most preferred option, without giving up on the many benefits of engaging Beijing. The US-India rapprochement, the growing warmth in India’s ties with Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Australia under India’s ‘Look East’ policy are all part of this — an inevitable response to the rise of China. A Great Game for power, influence, and dominance over continental and maritime Asia is currently underway. The growing geopolitical divide validates the view that China and India’s simultaneous rise may not be peaceful or tension-free. Many believe that India and China are now locked in a rivalry which could result either in the voluntary submission of one of the rivals to the other, or a test of wills, or an agreement on keeping out of each other’s sphere of influence or perhaps, a trial of strength by ordeal of battle.

India as a Western stooge Chinese exhortations to India not to become a pawn of the West to contain China are not new but have gained new currency since the turn of the century. China’s ‘peaceful rise’ diplomacy has long sought to prevent Asian countries from banding together and/or entering into alignment with the United States in order to countervail China’s power. India’s high economic growth rates and New Delhi’s efforts to forge strategic ties with the United States, Japan, and other ‘China-wary’ countries in Asia since the late 1990s forced Beijing’s mandarins to focus on the strategic implications of India’s rise for China. As Jing-dong Yuan noted: “Indeed, India’s rise presents serious challenges to China’s security interests with regard to territorial disputes, energy security, and regional and global power realignment.” Apparently, Chinese leaders were led to believe that China’s growing economic and military might would eventually enable Beijing to re-establish the Sino-centric hierarchy of Asia’s past as the United States saps its energies in fighting small wars in the Islamic world, Russia and Japan shrink economically and demographically while India remains subdued by virtue of Beijing’s ‘all-weather relationships’ with its South Asian neighbours. Overawed by China’s growing wealth, might, presence and influence, India and others were expected to acquiesce to China’s primacy in the Asia-Pacific, paving the way for the re-emergence of a hierarchical order resembling the traditional Sinocentric tributary system. Only those who sought to balance China by banding together or aligning with the United States would invite Beijing’s wrath and retribution.

From the Chinese perspective, the US-India nuclear energy deal and other defence cooperation agreements — once implemented — could bring about a major shift in the power balance in South Asia that is currently tilted in China’s favour. Seeing these developments as ‘destabilizing’, China’s India-watchers warn that Beijing “should not take India lightly any longer.” Said one commentator: “At present, India is still a lesser power than China in terms of economy and, military, both conventionally and unconventionally. But it is evident that the US has been tipping the balance between China and India… [by] feeding India’s ambition to match China force for force by its ever burgeoning arms sales to India.”

In an article in Guoji Wenti Yanjiu in March 2008, Cheng Ruisheng, former Chinese ambassador to India, cautioned that the US offer to sell India the advanced F-16 and F-18 fighter planes, P-3C antisubmarine patrol planes, the July-August 2010

CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM HAS SUCCEEDED IN LIFTING 400 MILLION PEOPLE OUT OF POVERTY BETWEEN 1981 AND 2001 — AN UNPRECEDENTED, HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT IN ITSELF — THUS LEAVING INDIA FAR BEHIND.

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INFOCUS | CHINA-INDIA IT SECTOR | REPORT

Indian Minister for External Affairs SM Krishna answers reporters after delivering a speech at the China Institute of International Studies

TO FEED ITS AMBITIONS, THE WEST HAS GONE SO FAR AS TO DEVISE WAYS TO EXTOL INDIA AS A POTENTIALLY NO.1 DEMOCRACY IN ASIA, BUT INTENTIONALLY PLAYS DOWN CHINA’S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

Patriot antimissile system, and transfer of other advanced military technology would not only “substantially promote the fighting capacity of Indian military…but also make India become an important strategic stronghold to guard against China.” All this would, according to Cheng, deter China from gaining the dominant role in Asia.

Ambassador Cheng warned that “[s]hould India enter into a new rivalry with China upon India’s forming an alliance with America and Japan, that would spoil India’s peaceful environment, and make it difficult for India to realize its goal of becoming a developed country in the twentyfirst century.” Lan Jianxue of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences also reached the same conclusion: “As both sides increase their deterrent power [wei she] against each other, problems that involve core interests of the two countries will gradually emerge.” Reacting to the conclusion of the Japan-India Declaration on Security Cooperation in October 2008, one Chinese expert argued that “Japan is economically stronger today but a declining power over the long term.

In contrast, India is economically and militarily weaker at present but a rising power over the long term. So, a carrot and stick policy would induce Japan to cut a deal with China to safeguard its future, but a rising India could be more difficult [as a peer competitor in the future] to contend

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with unless counter-measures are taken now.”

A serious escalation in tensions and warnings and threats to India to mend its ways from the Chinese state-controlled media during 2008-09 should be seen against this background.

Not surprisingly, a long dormant border dispute has been re-ignited, supposedly ‘settled’ issues of Sikkim and Kashmir are being reopened. Despite protestations to the contrary from India and the United States that New Delhi is unwilling and unlikely to play the role of a closely aligned US surrogate as Japan or Britain, China’s Asia strategy has come to be based upon the premise that democratic maritime powers such as the US, Japan, Australia, and India would eventually form an informal quadrilateral alliance to countervail continental China. Since India is seen as the weakest link in this evolving coalition, it is bound to receive special treatment. The relentless Chinese print and electronic media campaign against India permitted by the Chinese government censors — unusual in its sarcasm and ridicule of Indian aspirations of becoming a global power — has had a negative impact on large sections of public opinion.

Chinese Checkers 2.0 From Beijing’s perspective, as long as New Delhi understands that China is the sole pre-

President Pratibha Patil presenting the Padma Bhushan award to Tan Chung for promoting India-China friendship during the Padma Awards 2010

eminent great power in Asia, and India keeps her subordinate place in the hierarchy, both will enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship. However, should India aspire to emerge as China’s equal or peer competitor — and that too with help from the West, then the entire gamut of issues are open for review and recasting. Convinced that India has opted for the latter course, Beijing has unveiled a comprehensive “Chinese Checkers 2.0” strategy with the following key elements: Encirclement: strengthen China’s strategic presence in Tibet, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, and in the Indian Ocean island states.

Envelopment: China’s strategic and economic envelopment of South Asia through trade, aid, infrastructure development, security alliances, arms sales and bases in the region.

Entanglement: exploit India’s domestic contradictions and fault lines to keep it preoccupied with multiple security concerns within the confines of South Asia.

The major objective is to undermine India’s

will and sap its energy to compete with China, preferably without striking a blow. It signals to Asia and the world that India falls short in being a ‘balancing power’ so that no country looks towards India as a counterweight to China. For the foreseeable future, it is safe to conclude that the India-China relations will continue to be characterised by competition, perhaps tensions, interspersed with endless border talks, and limited cooperation on issues of mutual concern.

According to one Chinese analyst, Dai Bing, “while a hot war is out of the question, a cold war between the two countries is increasingly likely.” Although neither side seeks overt competition or open confrontation, the future of China’s relations with India appears uncertain and unpredictable.

Nonetheless, given the negative attitudes and perceptions, it is indeed remarkable that China and India have kept their diplomatic engagement on course by downplaying irritants and highlighting the positives. Despite the sparring on stapled visas for Kashmiris, harsh words on the Dalai Lama, border incursions and denial of market access, temperatures have cooled and saner voices have prevailed. More importantly, leaders in both countries exhibit a shared interest in not allowing tensions and frictions to overwhelm the relationship as a whole.

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IT IS INDEED REMARKABLE THAT CHINA AND INDIA HAVE KEPT THEIR DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT ON COURSE BY DOWNPLAYING IRRITANTS AND HIGHLIGHTING THE POSITIVES.

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