Geopolitics

INFOCUS|INDIA-CHINA|GEO-POLITICS

XUAR will also ignite the similar tinderboxes in other ethnic minority regions like Tibet, undermining the national unity and stability.

New Silk Road, New Ambitions At the same time, from an economic perspective, China wants to narrow the developmental gap between its prosperous Eastern coastal provinces and its relatively deprived Western inland provinces. With respect to external trade, China wants to explore new markets as well as maintain and expand existing ones. China would like to move away from its trade dependency on the US, which is facing a relative decline in its economic fortunes. China also wants to diversify its trade connectivity from seaborne to inland routes. This attempt to diversify is in response to excessive dependence on the risky sea lanes for trade in commodity and energy, especially in context of the US’ thrust on the vital maritime Indo-Pacific region.

Revival of the Silk Road:

Implications for Eurasian Geopolitics An ambitious China is leaving no stone unturned for the development and sustainability of the ‘New Silk Road Economic Belt’ (NSREB) across continental Eurasia, even as the ‘three evils’–of international terrorism, religious extremism and ethnic separatism– threatens to turn the picture grim. The NSREB requires peace and stability in Eurasia for its smooth development and operation. |38| India-China Chronicle  January–February 2015

Anand V

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he Silk Road helped in shaping the history of the Eastern and Western ends of the Eurasian landmass through centuries of interactions, and this in turn shaped the history of Central Asia itself. China had a dominant position in this politico-economic system, especially during the Tang dynasty, with the tribute system guaranteeing safety of the routes.

However, this overland trading route became redundant after the discovery by the Europeans of new sea lanes of communication between Europe and Asia. This led to the colonization of Asia by the European powers and the eventual “Century of Humiliation” episode in China’s history, whereby its long held dominance came to an end by the 19th century. As a result, it can be seen that China’s overarching ambition with reviving the old Silk Road into the New Slik Road Economic Belt (NSREB) has deep, historical linkages, which are

nevertheless congruent with contemporary strategic considerations.

China has strong domestic security and economic imperatives to breathe new life into the old Silk Road. Primarily, China wants to ensure national unity and stability in its Western territories. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of Western China has considerable volatility in its security setting. This is because segments of the native Uyghurs, an ethnically Turkic population, has increasingly been turning hostile to the growing presence and influence of Han Chinese in XUAR. This hostility has been manifested in terror attacks

by Uyghur groups both against the Han settlers and their assets, as well as the government, which is perceived to be subjugating the Uyghur identity and repressing their Islamic faith. The vicious cycle of violence by Uyghur groups and the resulting crackdowns by the state have resulted in the growing precariousness of the security situation in XUAR. The Chinese government fears that any instability in

Central asian region is the hub of the eurasian geopolitiCal setting. by seCuritizing CommerCial routes, China plans to transform the regional seCurity as well as geopolitiCal destiny of adjoining Countries like india All these motivations also come under the larger ambit of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision of the “Chinese Dream”, which aims for the all-round rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Silk Road can therefore, act as a symbolic instrument and vehicle for China to implement and propagate its vision of a return to pre-eminence. The renewal of the old Silk Road was planned way back in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, it became at least partly manifested only when the “Western Development Policy” was launched as a predecessor to the NSREB in 2000 to solve the uneven

East-West development in China.

Because of its strategic significance, the NSREB has become an integral part of China’s diplomatic practice of late. The diplomatic visits by Xi and the Premier Li Keqiang and their engagement with Eurasian leaders over the past year have been well demonstrative of this trend. It was during Xi’s first visit to the Central Asian countries in September 2013 that he first espoused the concept of the NSREB in the international arena. During this visit, he presented a five-point proposal on the NSREB to these countries at the 13th annual Heads of States Summit of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) in Bishkek, Kyrgystan. These included strengthening policy communication, road connections, trade facilitation, monetary co-operation, competitiveness and people-to-people relations. China has also extended its Silk Road diplomacy to countries in South Asia, West Asia and even Europe during the visits of Xi and Li to the countries in these regions over the past one year.

The groundwork necessary for the establishment of the NSREB has started gaining momentum a year after Xi administration came up with the proposal. The NSREB’s main route starts from Xi’an, and passes through XUAR, Central Asia, West Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Europe to Venice. Therefore, China’s key work on NSREB abroad starts in Central Asia.

Over the past couple of years, China has established strategic partnerships with all the five Central Asian states.

New gas and oil agreements have been signed by China with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, respectively, and the China-Central Asia gas pipeline project has been further expanded. Apart from these, a China-Eurasia Economic Fund has been established and the SCO Agreement on Facilitation of International Road Transport was signed after ten-year-long negotiations. China has also signed an agreement with Serbia, Hungary and Macedonia for jointly building a landsea express passage linking China to Central and Eastern Europe.

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INFOCUS|INDIA-CHINA|GEO-POLITICS

China’s Gateway to the West

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hina’s infrastructure preparations for reviving the old Silk Road are also reflected in its domestic developmental activities in XUAR. The region is seen as the gateway to the West, due to ethno-geographic and trade links with the Central Asian states. The Chinese government is planning to set aside $16.3 billion for funding the domestic infrastructure build-up towards the Silk Road revitalization. Apart from a comprehensive modernization of the region and their rail and road connectivity to the Eastern coastal cities, China is planning two Special Economic Zones in Kashgar and Horgos, which will also act as transportation hubs of the NSREB. In addition, the Lanzhou New Area is being planned as the first Free Trade Zone of this type in Northwest China, and the first on the historic Silk Road.

Therefore, it can be seen that China has been directing its efforts at home to be in sync with its efforts abroad so as to facilitate the development of a shared base for setting up the NSREB.

China has further extended the tentacles of its Silk Road infrastructure into Western Europe. In addition to the Chongqing-Duisburg cargo rail link opened in 2011, the Chengdu-Lodz and the Yiwu-Madrid cargo rail links were launched in 2014. The NSREB, together with its sister project on the maritime realm, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is worth US$21 trillion and will together encompass a market of 3.8 billion people across more than 50 countries.

As a result, China is setting up a $40 billion Silk Road Fund, the country’s largest-ever inter-governmental cooperation fund for financing projects in these two initiatives.

Threats to the Sustainability The NSREB requires peace and stability in the Eurasian heartland for its smooth development and operation.

For this to be achieved, China needs the partnership of each of the major stakeholders along this route. Most of the threats which exist in the region which will seek to undermine this initiative are shared, and therefore requires a joint effort in confronting it. The “three evils” of international terrorism, religious extremism and

ethnic separatism are understood to be the biggest threats to the establishment of a sustainable NSREB. Of late, a string of terrorist attacks took place in China by groups affiliated to the Uyghur cause, including the Kunming knife attacks of March 2014 and the Urumqi suicide bombings of May 2014. The terrorist groups which are targeting China in general and XUAR in particular, have been said to have their safe havens along the NSREB, from the Ferghana valley to the tribal regions of Pakistan. In addition to this, the withdrawal of the US-led forces from Afghanistan has added to the volatility of the pivotal region encompassing the NSREB. China’s inclusion in the target list of the Islamic State of Iraq and The Levant (ISIL) has also heightened the threat perception for the NSREB plans.

In this background, China has started its efforts to securitize the route.

This pursuit of China was initially articulated during the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in May 2014 at Shanghai, where Xi called for the creation of an Asian led “new regional security cooperation architecture.” More recently, during

|40| India-China Chronicle  January–February 2015

the 13th meeting of Prime Ministers of SCO held at Astana in December 2014, Li called for a new centre which would foresee future security challenges to Eurasia.

Since a joint effort is warranted to securitize the route, China will have to bring together the organizations which could cater to the security needs of the Eurasian region. The SCO does not have a joint security force structure similar to the likes of NATO and the Russian led Central Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, going

by Li’s statement in Astana, the SCO seems to be only the nodal organization so far which will be capable of coordinating security co-operation between the nations and regional organizations involved in the future protection of the NSREB. Through the China-centric organization’s probable new role, China will certainly seek to recreate the tribute system-based cooperative security model for the old Silk Road from history.

This model will provide impetus for an enhanced regional security system in the Eurasia. Since the threats are shared, the resources for countering them will also be shared, with China assuming the lead responsibility for

obvious reasons. On the other hand, the development of the NSREB itself may turn out to negate, to some extent, the threat which may seek to undermine it.

The development of the renewed Silk Road may not only solve the domestic economic disparities in China, but also the inter-regional developmental imbalance between Central part of Eurasia and its Eastern and Western rims. In short, the establishment of the NSREB may itself result in the creation of a self reinforcing system in Eurasia, integrating developmental and security ends and means.

Implications for India Though the main artery of the NSREB is not planned to pass through India, the setting up and the securitization of the route will have considerable implications for India.

The plan for establishing BangladeshChina-India-Myanmar (BCIM) multimodal corridor from Kunming to Kolkata through Mandalay, Chittagong and Dhaka, though it precedes the NSREB by a decade, cannot be seen as separate from its larger futuristic vision. This is because, even though it started as a track-two initiative in the 1990s, it was taken over by India and

China at the official level for planning and implementation only after the Xi administration came to power and Premier Li visited India in 2013.

In the case of the MSR, the competing strategic interests of both the countries in the Indian Ocean have resulted in India taking an ambivalent stance. In contrast, the economic interests and security concerns are shared for India and China with respect to the NSREB. Firstly, India is seeking membership in the SCO, the probable centre-piece of China’s securitization strategy for the NSREB. Secondly, Afghanistan is an area where Indian and Chinese security interests converge, as both countries want to keep the country stable for pursuing their reconstruction, mining and infrastructure investments.

Thirdly, what Kashmir is to India, Xinjiang is to China when it comes to preserving the national unity and stability. In both these cases, threats come from the “three evils”.

Pakistan’s connection to separatist and terrorist groups targeting India and Afghanistan is well established and is major point of contention between the two. Of late, it has also been revealed and acknowledged by China that Uyghur terror groups, in

addition to operating from Central Asia, have also been operating from the territory of its “all-weather” friend, Pakistan. This has led to China formally taking up the issue with Pakistan. The way NSREB is heading, it is certain that there could be more attacks planned against China, and this may lead to China increasingly pressurizing Pakistan to take serious action against terrorist elements on its soil.

Thus, the securitization of NSREB has the scope for effectively bringing China on the same page as India, the way the 9/11 fallout made the US toe the Indian line against terrorism originating from Pakistan a decade ago.

While it remains to be seen what role India will play in the NSREB as well as its securitization, it can be said that the country will stand to benefit from the initiative. Considering the bigger canvas, history seems to repeat itself as the Silk Road once again seeks to integrate the Eurasian landmass into a single developmental and security network.  Anand V. is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Karnataka

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