India China Chronicle May - June 2018

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Vol 5, Issue 4, May-June 2018 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Mohammed Saqib EXECUTIVE EDITOR Rajni Shaleen Chopra EDITORIAL BOARD Mani Shankar Aiyar PS Deodhar Prof Haixiao Song Dilip Cherian Shaodong Wang Amir Ullah Khan EDITORIAL TEAM Irfan Alam Audrey Tso Aishita Shukla DESIGN Manoj Raikwar OWNED, PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY Mohammed Saqib Registered with the Registrar of Newspapers of India under RNI No: DELENG/2011/43423 PUBLISHED FROM A-82, Zakir Bagh, New Delhi - 110025 ADDRESS FOR ALL CORRESPONDENCE India-China Chronicle B-59 (GF), South Extension - II, New Delhi - 110049 Telefax: 011-46550348 PRINTED AT Aleena Prints Mr. Naved Rasheed Block Z-II, 378, Shahadra, Delhi-110053 Mobile:+91-9582345886 E-mail : aleenaprints@gmail.com All Rights Reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without written permission is prohibited.

All advertising enquiries, comments and feedback are welcome at info@icec-council.org The information contained in this magazine has been reviewed for accuracy and is deemed reliable but is not necessarily complete or guaranteed by the Editor. The views expressed in this digest are solely that of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the views of India China Economic and Cultural Council (ICEC).

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India-China talk business, work at bilateral reset

hese are most interesting times to hit the stands again with the India-China Chronicle. Bilateral relations between the two countries are centrestage. Not just for the nations in the equation, but also for those in the Asian neighbourhood, and the global powers watching from afar. Top politicians, diplomats, strategy and security experts closely followed the all-new, refreshed and energized rendezvous between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at Wuhan in central China in the last week of April.

In 1992, Francis Fukuyama had argued that the advent of Western liberal democracy may signal the endpoint of humanity’s socio-cultural evolution and the final form of human government.

China has turned that analysis on its head. It has unshackled itself from the communist policies that guided its formative years under Mao. The global giant with superpower aspirations is now a controlled democracy with socialist moorings, a capitalist outlook and an autocratic leadership.

Issues that have bedeviled ties between India and China remain the same. But there are disruptions in the international geo-political and economic balances, and President Trump may make these disruptions the new normal. His bold stand on protectionism has the potential to hurt the US economy too. But for now, he has made the Chinese juggernaut pause.

The specter of high economic risks has made China consider some degrees of flexibility. This has created maneuver space for aspiring global powers like India.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been quick to seize the moment.

The unacceptable levels of mistrust between India and China could not be allowed to become the norm. Efforts to deepen strategic communication between the two Asian powers were imperative. No one expected that the breadth and depth of the diplomatic, political and military tensions between India and China would be resolved at the informal summit in Wuhan. What was significant was that right steps were taken in the right direction. The messaging that has emerged from Wuhan is both constructive and positive.

It will be simplistic to assume that the bilateral efforts between India and China for greater mutual understanding, respect and harmony, impact them bilaterally only. In the multi-polar world we have today, India and China stand as two mega poles. The nature of the association between India and China is a significant axis for Asia’s and also the world’s future prosperity and stability.

Greater and mutual economic engagement is in the national interest of these Asian giants. The Chronicle, as always, offers a holistic approach to enable broadranging engagement of people trans-nationally across many fields and vocations, and explore deeper layers of commonality and harmony. The diverse views and perspectives offered in the Chronicle seek to mediate contentious issues and points of conflict whilst placing them in perspective, in this period of economic and geopolitical change.

The Wuhan moment needs to be followed up with deliverables at ground level.

Prime Minister Modi and President Xi have taken a vital initiative to smoothen out political, military and diplomatic frictions between the two countries. They have exhibited political maturity and diplomatic skill in putting a difficult bilateral relationship on an even keel. This initiative must be followed up by tangible action by the political, diplomatic and military top brass of both nations.

Editor-in-Chief Mohammed Saqib

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utting a magazine together is such a wonderful, creative activity. And when the publication is as wide an umbrella as the India-China Chronicle, you know you have room to play with the varied ras of life.

Former Ambassador Lakhan Mehrotra, a gold medallist in Sanskrit, and fluent in Tibetan, Russian and Spanish in addition to Hindi and English, writes in this issue of the India-China relations in the global context.

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd) is one of the most respected and trusted voices of India on national security. For this issue, he has written on ‘Doklam, Wuhan and the geo-strategics of India-China relations’. Lt Gen Hasnain (retd), now a popular public speaker, strategic analyst and author, is India’s foremost scholar-warrior. Here, I am borrowing from Gen Hasnain’s lexicon. He used this term during his years in the Indian Army, to epitomize officers empowered with knowledge, skill and courage. With close to 45,000 followers on Twitter, Gen Hasnain is one of the most rational voices in the country as we battle polarization in our society, and insurgency in sensitive border areas like Kashmir.

Aarti Tikoo Singh is Senior Assistant Editor with The Times of India, one of India’s largest circulated dailies. She’s a ‘Liberal Libertarian, Secular and Atheist’, and has close to 21,000 followers on Twitter. The exponential growth in the use of social media has seen a proportional rise in political consciousness in India, with most people tending to identify themselves as ‘inclined to right’ or ‘inclined to left’. Aarti is among our few public intellectuals who cannot be boxed. She is vocal about her opinions, so at times, it’s the right wing that is offended, and other times, the ‘left-inclined’ cannot digest what she has said. That is part of the joy of living in a socially and politically rich and diverse country like India. We are like that only.

Harbir Singh was one of earliest people to have predicted, back in February 2016, that Donald Trump would be President of the US. This was when Trump was still back-running contender for the Republican nomination, facing five top favourites of the Republican Party establishment.

Contrast this with the Washington Post, which as little as 15 days before the general election was predicting that Donald Trump’s chances of winning against Hillary had reduced to nearly zero.

Harbir had articulated currents in the US culture and politics that were carrying Donald Trump ahead, and the fatal weaknesses of Hillary Clinton as a candidate for US president.

In June 2016, Harbir wrote why Hillary should not be the US President. In an article published in ‘The Nation’, a Pakistan English daily, he wrote about Hillary Clinton’s support for the doomed Iraq war, without concern for its inevitable consequences for the US and the world.

The idea for the story on the Chinese practice of taking on culturally appropriate names when in foreign locales, or giving local names to visiting foreigners, came from Audrey Tso, Executive Director ICEC. Her Chinese name is Cao Kezhen. When I learnt of her two names, I was flummoxed. Audrey told me that she has an Indian name too. I found this practice most remarkable. Irfan Alam, Member Secretary ICEC, spoke of more such instances, where Chinese professionals in India had taken on Indian names, to integrate better into the local culture. Aishita Shukla and Maitri Chebiyyam, who both know Mandarin and have been to China, write on this practice in this issue.

Aishita told me about the Chinese Tomb Sweeping Day to pay homage to the ancestors.

Indians have shraadh to pay homage to their forefathers and ancestors. The civilizational links between India and China are explored in the write-ups on these practices, by Aishita Shukla and Atharva Deshmukh.

And now about the ras of life.

Scholarly pursuits enrich us. But all work and no play would make us dull. So we bring to you Gupshup, about what tickled India and China in the last few months.

All this was plain black and white, till Manoj Raikwar lent his considerable aesthetic skills to the matter. The text transformed into beautiful pages with appropriate photographs and illustrations, all blending in harmoniously. If we have inadvertently violated copyright laws in any photograph or illustration, I offer my unconditional apology.

Hope you enjoy the issue as much as I enjoyed putting it together.

Happy Reading.

Executive Editor Rajni Shaleen Chopra

CONTENTS COVER STORY

The Wuhan Reset, And Where It Should Take Us

Rajni Shaleen Chopra

10 Will China heed the call?

12 The Warmth of Wuhan – Will It Stay?

14 India-China Relations in the Global Context Ambassador Lakhan Mehrotra (retd)

20 Doklam, Wuhan and the geo-strategics of India-China relations Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)

26 To Dare Dragon, Tiger Must First Win On His Home Turf

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45 The Rose has a new name, and loves it Maitri Chebiyyam

47 “I am Chinese with an English name, can I have an Indian one too please?”

Aishita Shukla

49 Tomb Sweeping Day in China Aishita Shukla

50 Ancestral worship days in India Atharva Deshmukh

Aarti Tikoo Singh

32 China and India: How did we become enemies after millennia of peace?

Harbir Singh

38 India and China in the Era of Donald Trump

52 Why many Chinese find it hard to work with Indians Prof Wenjuan Zhang

55 Gupshup 60 Major ICEC events in 2016-17

Harbir Singh May-June 2018 ▪

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â–ª May-June 2018

The Wuhan A Reset, And Where It Should Take Us

 Rajni Shaleen Chopra

The optics of the Wuhan summit were excellent, but the new model will be defined in actions, and not in words

midst all the political terminology that hit the Indian mindspace in the first half of this year, the ‘reset’ may rank among the most interesting ones. With the Wuhan informal summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping gave the ‘reset’ a unique SinoIndian flavour.

The Wuhan summit received extensive global media attention. Realists and realpolitik analysts have sparred over the outcome of this latest round of engagement between India and China.

The summit has laid on the table some important policy decisions that are vital for both nations.

While Pakistan continues to bleed India through its proxy war in Kashmir, the statements of Prime Minister Modi and President Jinping to issue strategic guidance to their militaries to strengthen communication, build trust and mutual understanding and enhance effectiveness in managing border affairs are important.

Significantly, India and China have agreed to open Afghanistan as a new area of cooperation, where the two countries will work on a joint economic project.

This initiative has great potential for strengthening our bilateral relations. India enjoys major goodwill in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has been consistently wary of India’s high credibility and activities there.

India and China’s joint partnership project in Afghanistan can have implications for Pakistan’s relationship with China.

At the end of the summit, China said it would not force India to accept the Belt and Road Initiative. This underlines the willingness of the two countries to overcome differences and put aside disputes while taking ties forward.

But to examine the Wuhan summit in terms of immediate paybacks alone may not be the right perspective. The India-China bilateral partnership cannot be seen only through the prism of what was spelt out at the end of the summit

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in black and white, or the deliverables that the two sides lay on the table. The summit was understanding-centric, not outcome centric. The initiative, taken with considerable leadership agency by both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi, was about exploring synergies in the bilateral relationship, and using them for maximum mutual benefit.

Critics called the Wuhan summit appeasement on India’s part, and a futile effort by India to stabilize what has been a complex relationship with an expansionist power. It is true that the China-India relationship is deeply asymmetrical. In the last few decades, analysts of SinoIndian relations have largely focused on their differences and conflicts – those in the past, in the present, and also the conflicts that may arise in the future.

The theory of appeasement undermines the vision and potential of national leaders to change course. For the Wuhan

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In the last few decades, dealing with the power juggernaut called China has not been easy for any nation.

India cannot match Beijing’s economic and military diplomacy in the Asian neighbourhood

summit, the big question for Prime Minister Modi was whether he can bridge the trust deficit with China, and its powerful leader, President Jinping.

For too long, the two Asian giants have allowed the shadows of the past to impact and determine their courses in the present, and influence projections for the future.

The key to how India and China shape their future discourse and engagement can possibly lie in a new modus vivendi – an arrangement for two of the most promising nations in the current century to co-exist and grow harmoniously, both in domestic and international spheres.

China outpaces India in terms of economic and military power. Globally, China and India rank as the second and fifth largest economies. Both nations together account for 36 per cent of the world’s population. On account of their huge population, the two countries rank as the first and fourth largest energy

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, wave at the media prior to their luncheon talks, in New Delhi

consumers globally. It is estimated that by 2020, China will emerge has the world’s largest economy, leaving the US at second place.

The only way the economies of the two countries can grow exponentially is through long-term cooperation.

A realistic assessment of the geopolitical reality in the first quarter of the new millennium will reveal that within Asia and beyond, China has emerged as a hegemonic power. The perception on the Indian side, not without reason, is that the Chinese juggernaut has been stepping on India’s toes repeatedly. The relationship has been fraught with tensions, most prominently over border issues, China’s support to Pakistan in areas blatantly detrimental to India’s interests, maritime sovereignty claims, diplomatic ties in the continent and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) section of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India

India enjoys major goodwill in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has been consistently wary of India’s high credibility and activities there.

India and China’s joint partnership project in Afghanistan can have implications for Pakistan’s relationship with China

and China have been competing with each other everywhere, from South Asia to Africa, from Southeast Asia to Indo-Pacific. There was a realization on both sides that things had reached a tipping point.

India’s effort is to put behind the 2017 logjam, and break free of a double whammy in its China equation. One, low economic engagement with China has been more detrimental to India than vice versa. Second, the hostility and wariness lands India with the added security liabilities to counter the ‘China threat’ and initiate an arms race. It drains Indian resources, severely obstructing its efforts to build vital social and economic infrastructure.

In the last few decades, dealing with the power juggernaut called China has not been easy for any nation. India cannot match Beijing’s economic and military diplomacy in the Asian neighbourhood. It

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INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA faces the additional stress of sharing thousands of kilometers of disputed border, and often clashing maritime interests.

China’s India policy in the last few years had squeezed the space for political maneuvering by Delhi to limit confrontation. Beijing had consistently stonewalled India’s efforts to secure membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

There are other setbacks in India’s bilateral relationship with China. But none of these will suffice as a cogent reason for continued low mutual economic engagement. Korea, Vietnam and Japan – all have serious bilateral disagreements with China. But their points of convergence with China across trade, investment and tourism sectors far exceed that of India.

India has lost out on multiplier benefits that would arise from robust economic engagement with China.

China’s interests in India are more long-term in nature. In the coming decades, the Indian economy is expected to grow at a faster pace as compared to the Chinese economy. Beijing wants to reduce its dependence on the United States as a market, and explore opportunities for investment and markets in India instead. China and India can jointly examine new opportunities for bilateral and global trade and finance, energy and water-sharing.

China’s deepening ties with Pakistan should not limit Indian efforts to seek a prudent reset of its own bilateral relationship. New Delhi and Beijing expect trade and Chinese investments in India to see a boost in 2018, with political establishments on both sides scaling up the normalization process.

Despite being locked in an antagonistic relationship over Doklam, 2017 saw India-China bilateral trade scale up to USD 84.44 billion. This is a major milestone for both countries. The bilateral trade in 2017 rose by 18.63 per cent, well above the USD 71.18 billion registered last year.

India-China bilateral trade had remained stuck at around USD 70 billion

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China said it would not force India to accept the Belt and Road Initiative

India and China have agreed to open area Afghanistan as a new the of cooperation, where k on two countries will wor t a joint economic projec

China and India can jointly examine new opportunities for bilateral and global trade and finance, energy and water-sharing for several years. Both countries had set the target of USD 100 billion for 2015, so trade volume is still about USD 20 billion short.

A healthy development in 2017 has been the 40 per cent increase of Indian exports to China in 2017 totalling USD 16.34 billion, according to data of the Chinese General Administration of Customs. The trade deficit for India

continues to remain high at USD 51.75 billion – registering a growth of 8.55 per cent year-on-year in 2017.

India is now the seventh largest export destination for Chinese products, and the 24th largest exporter to China. China’s production strength requires a market. At this stage, China cannot risk a meltdown in its economy. It will be politically perilous for Xi Jinping. Beijing must maintain its current spate of economic growth and domestic political stability.

Domestically, the imperatives for India are the same. New Delhi seems

India and China can bu ild on their civilizational ties to successfully manoeuvre their curren t geo-political and geostrategic challenges

to have pressed the pause button on its China monitor, and moved into the review and refresh mode. It is time. India needs to engage with China smartly rather than emotionally. Strengthening the canvas of trade and economic engagement will offset some of the adverse forces in the India-China relationship.

China is has the technology and the outbound investment capital to help develop India. It is in the interest of both Asian giants to rise together, instead of rising apart. China needs export markets for its overgrown infrastructure and

It is in the interest of both Asian giants to rise together, instead of rising apart

countr y India is the only arket which has the m to and the strength ess exc absorb China’s tment ves capacity and in construction industries. India is next only to China in terms of a domestic market, offering long-term growth potential, and immense opportunities for partnership and enterprise. What it desperately needs is infrastructure investment.

In the Asian neighbourood, India is the only country which has the market and the strength to absorb China’s excess capacity and investment. India's economy dwarfs

that of the five Central Asian republics.

India's GDP of nearly $2.5 trillion is equal to all the ASEAN countries combined, and is rapidly growing. It is time for India to opt for an open and enabling regulatory framework, to ensure greater ease of doing business for both domestic and foreign players.

India’s deficit in physical infrastructure is a major point of worry for the government. We need roads, bridges, high-speed trains, well-equipped ports, power generation plants and large networks for efficient distribution of power. China has mastered the art of rapid economic growth, is a global leader in building infrastructure, and has foreign reserves of over USD 3 trillion.

It is time for the two continental powers to work together for mutual benefits. In October 2017, delivering a lecture on ‘Changing Asia’ at the India Habitat Center, Mr Ravi Bhoothalingam, Honorary Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, noted that an investment of just 4 percent of China’s reserves could raise India’s growth rate by 0.5 percent.

Chinese investment could offset, under the capital account, India’s large trade deficit with China on the revenue account.

India and China can build on their civilizational ties to successfully manoeuvre their current geo-political and geo-strategic challenges. Defence and foreign policy analyst Manoj Joshi recalled US Secretary of State John Kerry’s observation when discussing the new type of bilateral relations in 2014: “A new model is not defined in words. It is defined in actions.” The bottomline for assessing the reset in Sino-Indian relations in the times to come will correctly lie in actions, and not words. 

Rajni Shaleen Chopra, formerly with The Indian Express, is Executive Editor of the India China Chronicle.

She organizes programs for youth engagement in Kashmir. She is also the Consulting Editor for Wajd, a Sufi magazine.

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All unions based on mutual needs

Will China heed the call?

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eace is a natural effect of trade, said Charles de Montesquieu, 16th century French judge and political philosopher. “The natural effect of commerce is to bring peace. Two nations that negotiate between themselves become reciprocally dependent, if one has an interest in buying and the other in selling. And all unions are based on mutual needs.”

Montesquieu’s wisdom on trade continues to hold good. And if the natural effect of commerce be to bring peace, India and China are on the right track. The Frenchman’s words are remarkably accurate on the IndiaChina equation. Both have interest in buying, and also in selling.

While India continues to stare at a huge trade deficit vis-à-vis China, the buying and selling roles keep changing in the India-China equation. Salvatore Babones, associate professor in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Sydney, told China Daily, the English-language Chinese daily owned by the government, “China needs the customers. India needs the technology.”

The arrangement is not unilateral.

Where India scores high is expertise in information technology backed by a huge English-speaking population, software and medicines. For China, India is a crucial infrastructure and investment market.

Wuhan, admittedly, was more about optics than outcomes. But these enhanced atmospherics were much

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needed at this juncture after Doklam and other needling factors in the bilateral relationship. Wuhan was a great confidence building measure for the businesses in both countries.

Till now, the huge potential for investment opportunities in India (worth a trillion) has largely been unexplored

by Chinese investors due to uncertainty

about relations. Out of $36.32 billion worth of FDI India received in 2016-2017, merely $ 198 million of FDI was from China. The poor statistics in India’s favour remained despite the fact that globally, China was the second largest source of outward FDI, at $183 billion.

Hopefully, Wuhan will change the mindset of Chinese businessmen, and they may start looking for long term Greenfield investment in India rather than short term, and mergers and acquisitions.

With increased prosperity, China is looking at rising per capita income, and a simultaneous increase in labour costs.

India can be a natural destination for Chinese industries looking at controlling

costs. Labour intensive low value-addition manufacturing can be transferred to India, and India can be made part of Chinese global supply chain. Such a shift in manufacturing will also complement Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Make in India’ initiative.

The economy boost that India offers for China does not end here. With the sheer size of its domestic market and demand, India offers China the biggest investment opportunity for years to come.

In addition, India can complement the internationalization of Chinese business.

China can use India’s century old relations with Central Asia, Middle east and Africa with its diaspora, soft power and business relations. Some key watchers of India’s China policy also favour that it is time for India to be part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and leverage this partnership for its domestic economic development.

The Indian governmen’s ambitious ‘Make in India’ campaign did not really help in bringing Chinese investments to Indian shores, except for a few companies such as Oppo, Vivo, Xiaomi etc. The investments in this sector

happened because of trade policy changes rather than the ‘Make in India’ initiative. Chinese participation can be a key factor for the success of the ‘Make in India’ program. Almost 85 per cent of the Indian industry is in the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) sector.

Chinese technology, machinery and raw material is highly suited to their growth, and hence close cooperation with Chinese industry is imperative.

Both India and China have a lot to offer to each other. They comprise 40% of the world population, and are globally the fastest growing economies. One may be regarded the factory of the world, and the other, the office of the world. With thousands of years of shared civilizational ties and linkages, the combined strength of India and China can provide a perfect platform to lead the world.

China is India’s biggest trading partner. Despite the military and diplomatic hiccups in the India-China relationship last year, bilateral trade grew around 18%.

This shows the extent of the two countries’ dependence on each other. China can play a vital role in some major initiatives of Prime Minister Narendra Modi like Make

in India, Housing For All, Digital India and other infrastructure projects.

Tourism is a sector that remains largely neglected in our bilateral engagement.

One does not see any effective promotion in China, of India as a prime tourist destination. Tourism is a big employment generator for India and an important industry, but there is hardly any tourism between the two countries. The major percentage of tourists between both countries are business travelers, and there is some Buddhist tourism from China.

After the stupendous success of Bollywood blockbuster ‘Dangal’ in China, Indian film-makers are keen to use Chinese locations for shooting, and also use Chinese technology and coproduction. Cinematic ties between the two countries can be enhanced if the Chinese government allows more Indian films to be released in China. The Chinese government limits the number of foreign films releasing in the country to 34 a year.

Nearly 90 per cent of these are Hollywood productions. Non-Hollywood foreign releases make up just 1.5 per cent of the Chinese film market.  –Rajni Shaleen Chopra

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The Warmth of Wuhan – Will It Stay?

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India-China Relations in the Global Context The new constellation of international partnerships offers India fresh challenges as well as opportunities.  Ambassador Lakhan Mehrotra (retd)

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e live today in a dangerous world torn asunder by conflicts and rivalries. It is far removed from the dream of humanity enshrined in the UN Charter of a world free of the scourge of war, and moving steadily into the arena of peace and development. There are fires burning in every continent, some small and manageable, others furious, giving rise to the fear of major conflagrations engulfing us.

The phenomenal rise of China, which has harboured superpower ambitions from the days of Mao, has created a new situation in which international equations are undergoing a radical revision.

The US is no longer the indispensable and the unchallenged superpower that it was.

China is gradually but steadily moving into the USA’s international space and is posing serious challenges all over, be it in the Indo-Pacific Region, Asia, Europe, Africa or Latin America. While China considers the South China Sea as an integral part of its national territory, in contrast, the USA and its allies, as well as India, consider these to be international waters allowing for freedom of transit.

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To compound matters, currently the USA and China are engaged in a trade war, the ripples of which are resulting in recalibration or possibly even a reversal of policy. The USA, for example, is considering whether it should re-enter the Asia-Pacific Trade Pact which it had shunned earlier.

On the economic front, the Chinese Yen is moving ahead to challenge the authority of the American dollar. Brexit has shaken the assiduously built edifice of European unity over the last half century and more. The US relations with Europe as well as its special relations with UK have been under a cloud for some time. It is, therefore, turning its gaze on the Indo-Pacific region. The new constellation of international partnerships offers India fresh challenges as well as opportunities.

Adjustment of India’s Foreign Policy in the New International Environment India has been adjusting itself to this new situation step by step and with due

Wherever and whenever India and China have cooperated with each other on matters of common concern, the outcome has been mutually beneficial. It is necessary that both sides care for each other’s sensitivities, do not tread on each other’s toes, and look more and more for common ground than towards issues that divide them

caution. As China’s economic power grows and technology sharpens its military fangs, India has moved closer to the USA and Japan, and intensified its relations with Australia. Following its Look East Policy and now Act East Policy, India has established more friendly ties with ASEAN countries. The presence of the ASEAN leaders at India’s Republic Day this year to celebrate 25 years of the establishment of the dialogue partnership is symbolic of that new relationship.

Our relations with China have improved in every field, and there is potential for them to attain new heights in their bilateral and international cooperation. Yet, tensions remain. The India-China relationship today is at best a love-hate relationship.

The Indian economy of US$ 3 trillion now competes with China’s giant economy of US$ 11 trillion. China has grown into India’s largest trading partner, with trade between the two countries exceeding US$ 70 bn. However, India’s deficit in that trade grew from US$ 14 bn in 201011 to 51bn in the year 2016-17. India’s

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the ASEAN leaders at Rashtrapati Bhavan in New Delhi

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INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA exports consisting largely of ores, cotton, organic chemicals, mineral fuels and copper amounted to a petty figure of US$ 10 bn. Whereas China exports comprising mainly electric items, machinery, organic chemicals, plastics, ships and boats exceeded US$ 60 bn last year.

China has neither tried to reduce this gap through increased imports from India, nor has invested substantially in India to balance the outflow of India’s foreign exchange into its coffers. Since the beginning of this millennium up to March 2017, Chinese investment in India has been only of the order of some US$ 280 million out of the total FDI of about US$ 60 bn. In comparison, Japan had invested over US$ 25 bn during the same period and USA over US$ 20bn.

(Economic Times on July 16, 2017).

Lately, Chinese investment in India’s Start-Ups has increased encouragingly.

Chinese companies in the state of the art technology sectors like Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi, Vivo and Oppo are collaborating with their counterparts in India and have shown a great deal of interest in developing India’s capacity in critical segments such as artificial intelligence, e-commerce and finance technologies.

On the one hand, these collaborations

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may offer fresh opportunities to India for upgrading its technological base. On the other, they may overwhelm our own technological base, taking advantage of the weak regulatory structure in India.

There is, therefore, an urgent need to upgrade India’s regulatory structure to protect our security in sensitive areas of growth where these companies are injecting themselves. It should be possible to sustain Chinese interest even after proper regulatory mechanisms are in place in India to protect both its security needs and privacy.

The climate for Sino-Indian cooperation has survived the tensions occasionally generated by China’s hostile acts along our borders. China’s long-term goals and activities to expand their influence in our region have interfered with building a sound and steady cooperative relationship. Some major points of tension have been Chinese forays into the Aksai Chin area, the last one in 2014 even as President Xi was visiting India; their audacity to disturb the status quo whenever and wherever they can such as in Doklam last year despite their stand-still agreement with Bhutan on the subject; their policy towards Pakistan which includes building its military and economic muscle as a

counterpoise to India in the Indian Subcontinent; their consistent efforts to sour India’s relations with its neighbours and create political, economic and military space for themselves on their territory at India’s cost, be it in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives or Afghanistan – all militate against growth in IndiaChina relations. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor constitutes just another step that stalls that growth.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is part of the China Belt Road Initiative meant to increase China’s connectivity with the rest of the world, and is an instrument of its superpower ambitions.

The US $ 46 billion road covers a distance of 1100 kms. between Kashgar in Xinjiang and Gwadar port in Pakistan. It is meant to be a trade and transit highway. It will also provide strategic linkages for both China and Pakistan, not just between themselves, but in a significantly wider geopolitical and geo-economic space.

Its implications for India are quite severe. The Chinese have been developing Gwadar for years, to be used as its base of operations in the Arabian Sea close to the

Persian Gulf, and to lend it a commanding position in the Indian Ocean region. The project includes linking CPEC to Karachi as well. The Chinese naval presence in Karachi would pose a major challenge to the Indian Navy on our Western coast and its operations in the Indian Ocean region.

Only very haltingly have the Chinese come to condemn Pak terrorist groups led by criminals like Hafiz Saeed. They have helped Pakistan build its nuclear and missile capability, and have refrained from supporting India’s Membership of NSG, and Permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Similarly, while the Chinese navy cooperates with its Indian counterpart in checking piracy in the Indian Ocean region, and China works together with India on climate issues under the auspices of the Paris Conference, China continues to execute its plans to besiege India from all sides. It claims that India’s fears are based on its siege mentality and that the Chinese mean no harm to India. However, rather than building mutual trust, China’s activities on the ground effectively serve to corrode it. India cannot ignore the fact, for example, that CPEC passes through the part of Kashmir under Pakistan’s illegal occupation. It feels like a dagger thrust GWADAR PORT IN PAKISTAN: The Chinese have been developing Gwadar for years to be used as its base of operations in the Arabian Sea close to the Persian Gulf, and to lend it a commanding position in the Indian Ocean region

17

INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA Sino-Indian relations must build on mutual gains

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping visit the exhibition at Hubei Provincial Museum in Wuhan, China

into India's chest. Further, while the Chinese have asked India to join the project, they know full well that under the present circumstances India cannot do so.

To turn things around, China must inter alia abandon the habit of inducing hostility towards India among its neighbours, with whom India has age-old ties. In the Maldives, for example, ‘India first’ has yielded ground to ‘China first’, thanks to China’s neo-colonial ambitions born out of its economic and military clout. China follows a three-pronged strategy of first inducting huge funds to build infrastructure in the countries of the region using mostly its own manpower, then bringing their indebtedness to it to an unmanageable peak and acquiring land rights over their territory, and finally gaining a permanent foothold. The Hambantota Port and the Colombo Road projects in Sri Lanka as well as tourist islands in Maldives placed under Chinese administration with even an airport provided for the

18

▪ May-June 2018

exclusive use of Chinese tourists are glaring examples of this strategy. While paying lip service to their sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Chinese dragon creeps into their body-politic almost unnoticed, making it difficult for the national governments to move out of China’s clutches.

After the 1954 Indo-Chinese bilateral agreement on trade with Tibet, the Chinese swore by coexistence as a principle of Panchsheel, to which both nations are formally committed. Yet, almost six decades after their 1962 multi-pronged attack on India’s borders, the Chinese have still to relinquish their hold on much of India’s territory that they occupied.

India has no alternative, therefore, but to stay vigilant, building the necessary infrastructure, especially along the eastern part of the India-China boundary.

The Chinese have done that remarkably well on their side, arming themselves to the teeth throughout Tibet and very thoroughly along the Line of Actual Control.

To improve the climate for the growth of India-China relations on a permanent footing, the two sides must formally define and demarcate the Line of Actual Control as soon as possible. India has been quite forthcoming about it, but the Chinese have stalled progress on it for reasons best known to them. There have been periodic flare-ups along the border mainly due to the Chinese tendency ‘to move two steps forward before taking one step backward’.

Both nations derive satisfaction from the fact that the border, by and large, has remained tranquil and peaceful. It has been so mainly due to the efficacy of mechanisms in place to resolve issues as they arise including severe military stand-offs, as was the case in regard to Aksai Chin in 2014 and Doklam in 2017 when India stood its ground firmly. Both nations are aware that despite a conflict of interest on regional and international issues and difficult bilateral problems still facing them, both nations have to strive to coexist as peaceful neighbours.

They must cooperate where they can or thrive otherwise in a state of healthy competition as Asia’s largest political and economic entities. In this context, their recent decision to jointly bargain prices for Asian crude must be hailed as a step forward. Wherever and whenever they have cooperated with each other on matters of common concern, the outcome has been mutually beneficial.

It is necessary that both sides care for each other’s sensitivities, do not tread on each other’s toes, and look more and more for common ground than towards issues that divide them. 

The writer is formerly Prime Minister s Special Envoy and Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs

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INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA

Doklam, Wuhan

and the geo-strategics of India-China relations The criticism of the supposed Indian 'dovishness' in Wuhan is unnecessary. The Indian approach was pragmatic

20

â–Ş May-June 2018

 Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)

M

ore than anything else, Doklam and its terminal handling by both India and China had demonstrated maturity of a rare kind. This maturity has been carried forward by the two nations, culminating in the informal Wuhan Summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping.

The Summit has outlined more strategic guidelines for the two armed forces, and restored confidence in the mutual peaceful intent of both. India’s former Foreign Secretary had this to state – “One key takeaway was the agreement that the strategic communication between the two leaders will continue. Another was the understanding that India and China will respect each other’s sensitivities, concerns and aspirations”.

Foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale told reporters that Modi and Xi agreed that “it is important to maintain peace and tranquillity in all areas of the IndiaChina border region, and to this end, the two leaders decided that they would issue strategic guidance to their respective militaries to strengthen communication to build trust and understanding, to implement various confidence-building measures which have already been agreed upon by the two sides, and to strengthen existing institutional mechanisms to prevent and manage situations in the border areas.”

But to see the Summit in terms of a happily-ever-after in India-China relations will be inappropriate. The apprehension in India’s strategic circles is that 2018 will probably witness a Doklam 2, with a different model of coercion.

These fears have not entirely been laid to rest, given the history of transgressions across the perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), even as diplomatic parleys were in place, as in the past.

The Modi government has done

well with its strategic communication that Doklam has in no way incited Indian confidence to be proactively offensive in its approach after its successful handling.

There has been unnecessary criticism of the supposed Indian ‘dovishness’. To my mind, the Indian approach appears mere pragmatism. Yet steps such as controls over the visible Indian support to the Dalai Lama may appear to give an impression of loss of strategic independence.

Much will depend on how the agreement at Wuhan pans with reference to the situation at the LAC. India’s membership of strategic partnerships and participation in war games and military exercises must continue as a demonstration of that independence.

India needs to be aware that it lives in an international environment of strategic uncertainty.

My analysis is that the Chinese had no real intent of launching operations at Doklam. The manner in which they triggered the stand-off and kept escalation under strict control appeared to give an impression that there was a method in the madness at Doklam, perhaps much more than what appeared peripherally.

To analyze the real strategic value of the Doklam stand-off, we need to briefly examine the ground in comparison with other border areas between India and the Chinese Tibetan territory; China’s ambitions and India’s hesitation in focusing on the Chinese threats; the run of geopolitics up to the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China; and finally how China is likely to view its relationship with India considering the way the rest of the world views it (China), with the enhanced empowerment of Xi Jinping.

China’s strategic military posturing to keep the border issue alive has been more intense in Ladakh, with well-known points of transgression in Chumar, Demchok, Chushul and Depsang.

Similarly the Arunachal Pradesh area has been used more for politico-diplomatic posturing. Visits to the state by the Dalai Lama, the Prime Minister and even the Defence Minister of India have met with objections from the Chinese side.

May-June 2018 ▪

21

INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA Creation of tension over boundaries was never a part of the philosophy of Chairman Deng Xiaoping, who advised that China must promote peace and tranquility on the borders in order to allow its internal strengthening. However, we have progressively witnessed a departure from this over the last decade and more.

Analysts now offer the broad conclusion that as China’s comprehensive national power has increased, its intent to coerce neighbours for apparent strategic advantage has also enhanced.

The Geo-political and Geo-strategic Angle The international scenario which presented itself in mid-2017 was an interesting one. China’s President Xi Jinping was coming up for his re-election/ re-appointment for the second term. His ambitions were far higher than any other leader in the post Deng period. The 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was due in Oct 2017, and Xi’s ideas were about consolidation of his power in a way to give him control possibly beyond the structured second term.

The US, China’s major competitor for power, was and remains at a cusp in its transforming foreign policy. President Trump’s arrival on the scene brought an element of disruption in policy, with no clear indicator as to the direction it is heading in. Former President Obama’s policy of Rebalancing and Pivot to Asia had met with some degree of scorn.

Trump’s ideas were veering towards greater isolation, leaving Asia’s strategic space to be restructured.

It is only in the recent past that Trump and his advisors are back to focusing on the Indo-Pacific and perceiving it a priority. From 2011 onwards, China has undertaken a strident campaign on its claims in the South China Sea, with a displayed willingness to even use coercion. It culminated in the defiance it displayed against the international tribunal’s decision in 2015, where it again projected its readiness to use coercion and defiance in its concept of not adhering to a rule-based world order.

22

▪ May-June 2018

“

It is important to maintain peace and tranquillity in all areas of the India-China border region, and to this end, the two leaders decided that they would issue strategic guidance to their respective militaries to strengthen communication to build trust and understanding, to implement various confidence-building measures which have already been agreed upon by the two sides, and to strengthen existing institutional mechanisms to prevent and manage situations in the border areas

Vijay Gokhale, Foreign secretary

It will be prudent to very briefly keep in mind the state of Sino-Indian relations.

On its western border, India has had a history of reasonable clarity on its stance towards aggression, although in recent years the proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir has tested this sense of clarity.

With regard to the northern borders with China, India has at best been reticent about defining its strategy. Over the last few years, it has only hesitatingly increased its military capability to somewhat match China’s. However, in the field of missilery and rocketry, a fairly large asymmetric gap exists in favor of China. It is also only in recent years that the military oriented infrastructure has seen a level of focus. India’s military reticence has never given it the confidence of dealing with China on matching terms in a border standoff, although there are instances after 1962 when the Army has held its own. Nathula 1967 and Sumdorong Chu 1987 are two instances.

Last year, instead of choosing Ladakh for its yearly attempt at some kind of standoff with India, China chose the Sikkim sector. The necessity of yearly stand-offs which are taken to a point of brinkmanship by China do have a purpose. This needs some explanation.

The answer lies in the basic concept of keeping India fixated on the continental dimension of its security. To do that, it is important for China to draw India into such stand-offs to keep the threat of the PLA alive, and making it a ‘two front’ threat by also playing the Pakistan card.

This is the domain where India is all alone, as land boundary disputes do not draw as much international attention as maritime disputes, or the entire gamut of the maritime domain. The latter draws far greater concern with freedom of navigation, sea lanes, continental shelves and exclusive economic zones.

China's strength lies in the continental domain; that is the matter of detail that

Chairman Deng Xiao Ping, the father of modern China possibly overlooked, and did not direct as part of his four modernizations outlined in 1978.

Although the military domain was the last in priority among these, within that domain the PLA Navy received even lower priority. That was surprising, because China's actual security priority lies in the maritime zone. Its economy is dependent on energy transported by sea. Its disputes in South East and East Asia are both in the oceans. The Indian Ocean in its huge expanse is vulnerability for China because located at the crown is India, which with a strong navy can remain a threat in being against China’s sea lanes of communication (SLsOC).

These SLsOC carry almost eighty percent of the energy needs, especially to the welldeveloped eastern seaboard.

That is the reason for China focusing on its string of pearls strategy to enhance its footprint around South Asia, which

of late has received a bit of a fillip. None other than Raja Menon, the doyen of India’s maritime experts, has argued for long along the above lines. China’s New Maritime Silk Route is partially based upon the need for strengthening its outreach to overcome the weaknesses of its stretched SLsOC. Doklam was thus a possible experiment to ratchet up military tension as an annual reminder of the border dispute and focus India on the Himalayan front, with more obsession towards its land forces and land-based infrastructure.

What China fears are not individual nations of Asia or the Indo Pacific, but the collusion between them. The US-IndiaJapan equation is worrisome. Add to it Vietnam and Australia, and it becomes even more awkward. China has employed coercion of different kinds against Japan and Vietnam over the last few years, especially on issues relating to maritime boundaries. It was perhaps assessed that a coercive approach against India along the borders in a non-traditional area and ratcheted to level of potential use of force could achieve two things. First, browbeat India, show it in poor light for its inability to assist its ally Bhutan and to stand up to China’s might. Second, was perhaps to test the extent of the emerging cooperation between countries of the Indo Pacific and their ability to support a potential partner, India, against China.

In both cases, the benefit to be reaped for China and for Xi Jinping personally would be greater strategic prestige in a world where the US is undergoing strategic uncertainty and the latter’s allies (Japan and South Korea) are unsure of its dependability. Its biggest neighbour’s (India’s) ambitions would be shown in poor light. It would also be read as China’s coercion against India’s lack of cooperation on Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt & Road Initiative (BRI).

The progression of events at Doklam is by now well known. However, two aspects need to be highlighted. First is that India steadfastly stood by Bhutan and responded with a level of political and strategic maturity, refusing to be

May-June 2018 ▪

23

INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA baited into a showdown involving use of force. Secondly, the splurge of brash information warfare used by China on the basis of its well-known doctrine – War under Informationized Conditions, came a cropper. The propaganda employed was both ham handed and poorly conceived, leading to a ‘hatch down’ approach by India which withstood it and in fact subtly used it to advantage.

The Strategic Spin-Off of Doklam Doklam ended with victory for none because it wasn’t a situation in which victory could be defined. However, it potentially prepared both India and China far better for a future standoff which could be triggered by events or simply by intent. The strategic spin offs are many as described below.

It could be debatable, but a deduction does arise that China may well have achieved its larger goal of keeping India even more focused on its continental security instead of venturing into prioritizing its maritime domain. However, as the concept of a quadrilateral cooperative mechanism involving the US, Japan, Australia and India firms up, India may be constrained to look at the maritime far more. There are already moves afoot for the acquisition of greater maritime capability with tentative allocation of Rs 45,000 crores.

My analysis is that Doklam was never part of a strategy for any outcomes, but rather a ploy for advancement of Xi’s personal agenda at the 19th Congress. The inability to browbeat or coerce India at a crucial moment is unlikely to leave Xi’s memory. If anything, it will impose some caution on him. The alacrity with which walk in operations to claim lines by PLA had become a routine may still continue, but with more contingency planning. Walk in operations will also need to be more carefully calibrated. It will leave both sides more tentative and sensitive to incidents such as the one which led to unarmed violence between troops of both sides.

What Doklam has done is that it has given a boost to India's self-perception in a couple of domains. First is the ability

24

▪ May-June 2018

to combine its military and diplomatic posturing more adroitly without too much noise. It could have played the victim card by bleating to the world about China's coercion; it did not. Quiet diplomacy won it much more support although justifying the stepping into Bhutanese territory, disputed or otherwise, proved a challenge. The progressive actions as part of the response have probably given many lessons at the operational and tactical level. Advancing the operational alert of the Siliguri based 33 Corps, by almost two months, was the culmination.

The limited gains in strategic confidence that the handling of Doklam gave India can actually give a fillip to its resolve to enhance its military capability.

The stalled mountain strike corps will probably reach its slated strength and capability in faster timeframe, as will the pending infrastructure. Field Army and Corps level war gaming will probably be executed with a new vigour and conclude with a perception that if it comes to a border war limited to the Himalayan region, the Indian Army with adequate support of the Indian Air Force is capable of holding its own. Where asymmetry could hurt India is in the field of missilery, rocketry, cyber, and possibly even special operations. The latter is a domain in which India's Special Forces may have displayed high tactical and even operational capability, but the strategic domain of their employment remains a grey zone. The raising of Special Forces Command is almost an imperative.

There has been tremendous interest generated in Pakistan’s strategic circles.

Word has it that the Generals were surprised by the decisiveness with which Doklam was handled by India. If Pakistan has been watching with focus, it would realize that there has been a progression in handling and decision making; from the Manipur raids in Jun 2015, to the surgical strikes in Sep 2016, Doklam in 2017, and the Modi-Xi informal summit in April 2018. Obviously there is display of greater decisiveness, and that should worry Pakistan to the extent that the whole idea of the strategy of

India has displayed a progression in strategic handling and decision making: surgical strikes, Doklam, the Modi-Xi informal summit collusion between Pakistan and China would need a relook.

China is likely to be forced to reexamine its complete approach towards coercion as a tool to handle tricky borders. The handling of South China Sea and the lack of response there gave it an out of proportion confidence of repeating that strategy in the continental domain.

While it is accepted that every situation in a different environment has its peculiar dynamics, many of the nations with which China has territorial or maritime differences would probably study Doklam more comprehensively. It may not give pointers towards change in strategy, but a tempering of approach could well follow.

China would definitely not like Doklam as the point of reference for other nations to evolve their strategy. This is the only worry because China under Xi Jinping may wish

to demonstrate and thus communicate through action that Doklam was a oneoff event. This demonstration can be anywhere, not necessarily on the Sino India border.

Returning to the post 19th Congress strategic environment, it is unlikely that China will wish to alter any status quo in a drastic way. It will probably carefully watch the development of partnerships such as the quadrilateral between US, Japan, Australia and India, and work towards the security of its SLsOC. Xi Jinping’s pegging of 2050 as the year by which China’s armed forces must be fully modernized and capable of winning wars indicates that as in the case of Deng Xiaoping, it is patience which will be virtue.  (This is an updated version of the article which appeared in the Chanakya Journal of the Chankya Centre for Strategic Studies, Jan 2018)

The writer is a former General Officer Commanding of the Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with the Vivekanand International Foundation and the Institute for Peace & Conflict Studies

May-June 2018 ▪

25

INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA

To Dare Dragon, Tiger Must First Win On His Home Turf

China and India may continue to be ‘frenemies’, and can live together peacefully, with enough opportunity for both to be global leaders in their own right  Aarti Tikoo Singh

I

n her popular autobiographical book ‘Wild Swans’ that spans three generations of China, Jung Chang while describing the Mao cult during the Cultural Revolution, wrote, “Many people had been reduced to a state where they did not dare even to think, in case their thoughts came out involuntarily. Even if they did entertain unorthodox ideas, few mentioned them to their children, as they might blurt out something to other children…”

One would think since his death in 1976, Mao Zedong who was responsible for the death of over 70 million Chinese, the nature of the Dragon would have changed due to technological revolution.

But the more it changes, the more it stays the same. And therein lies the rub.

Though President Xi Jinping is neither Mao nor Deng Xiaoping, but China under him sibilates the same philosophy and world-view as theirs. At the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th congress in October, while consolidating autocratic power for himself in the constitution, to a degree not seen in China since Mao, Xi for the first time articulated the modern China's aspirations as a global power and as a model for governance that other developing countries should adopt. In other words, Xi made no bones about China's ambition to challenge the world order established by the liberal democratic West.

The world China envisions is what it practises itself—a Communist authoritarian regime which repressively controls and regulates freedom of thought and speech, media, internet, religion and to

choose one's representative democratically. The state cannot be questioned and those who do, face crackdowns, arrests, criminal prosecutions and executions.

Thousands of jail inmates are estimated to be executed each year and their organs used for transplantation.

The absolute lack of transparency surrounding imprisonment, torture and executions makes it almost impossible to ascertain the extent and nature of human rights violations committed in the name of development and governance.

In the Muslim dominated Xinjiang region where China faces an armed rebellion for secession, Chinese authorities have detained thousands of Muslims

“

Many people had been reduced to a state where they did not dare even to think, in case their thoughts came out involuntarily. Even if they did entertain unorthodox ideas, few mentioned them to their children, as they might blurt out something to other children...

Jung Chang

in internment camps under a mindrewiring programme to brainwash them against their religious identity and culture. Apart from the dangers that come along with the territory of totalitarianism, if China replaces the Western liberal order led by the US and becomes the hegemon it aspires to, within a century or so, the entire human species could be rewired to think and believe that we are Chinese Communists. This may sound like paranoia but from Mao to Xi, if there is anything China has demonstrated, it is steadfastness and consistency.

From that perspective, many would say that historically, except the 1962 war, China has reliably shared proximity and mutual respect for coexistence with India.

And therefore, like the two economically prosperous neighbours, the US (nominal GDP around $19 trillion) and Canada ($1.7 trillion), the two Asian neighbours can also live together peacefully, with enough opportunity for both China and India to be global leaders in their own right.

The problem however is that China is not the US and India is not Canada.

The US and Canada share similar philosophies and values, unlike India and China which despite being geographical neighbours are divided by an ideological wall. As against China's, Indian culture, which is exceptionally rich and diverse, post-independence has been largely shaped by parliamentary democracy and its institutions. Though in the last four years under the Hindu Right-wing government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, communal polarization has led to the fears that India may be on its way to become a fascistic majoritarian state, a large section of Indian society represented by the opposition, acts as a countervailing force. India's heterogeneity along regional, caste, tribal and religious lines, creates a dynamic which poses both severe challenges and also enables an inbuilt mechanism for checks and balances. As a result, India may struggle through the competitive identity politics, but democracy ensures that no single political party is able to take the voter for granted. In other words, the only way for

27

INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA

Post-independence, India has been largely shaped up by parliamentary democracy and its institutions

any political group in India to ride the Indian Tiger is through the ballot box.

So, if China and India are ideologically and structurally different, is their future relationship likely going to be adversarial over territorial disputes and regional supremacy? The answer is both yes and no. Why Sino-India future will be ridden with thorns is a no brainer! As the West, especially the US under President Donald Trump, aggressively pursues to contain Chinese expansionism, India as an ally of the democratic world, will be the first to invite the wrath of China. That is why China continues to protect Pakistan's interests at the United Nations over its terror groups aimed against India, and China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) calcifies the Sino-Pakistan relationship. The Doklam stand-off and China's constant obstruction of India's membership in NSG, are also the consequences of India's alliance with the US. Now, why India can or should still have a working relationship with China even as neither are truly friends nor truly enemies.

There is an old Confucian saying, 'The man who moves a mountain begins by carrying away small stones'. Prime Minister Modi at the moment has way too many small stones to carry away in his own backyard before he begins to move the mountain that he aspires to. In modern foreign policy, the same principle applies – realpolitik, and not bluster, matters.

As the second largest economy with the largest exchange reserves in the world, China's nominal GDP is over $14

28

Xi Jinping made no bones about China's ambition to challenge the world order established by the liberal democratic West

trillion, that is around seven times more than India's, which is mere $2.8 trillion.

Incidentally, while China is India’s largest trading partner at $84 billion, it is the biggest contributor to India’s trade deficit, with the imbalance crossing $50 billion.

Militarily too, India lags far behind, but even otherwise, no Indian Prime Minister can afford war on both its western and eastern fronts. Given that hostilities with Islamabad are not ending anytime soon due to Pakistani Army's cross-border terrorism policy against India, it is in New Delhi's interests to have a decent working relationship with Beijing. The word that can best describe them is 'frenemies'.

Also, in a region where India's neighbours like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives for their own national and economic interests are hugely dependent on Chinese investments, it is imprudent to make an

enemy out of China. India, therefore, must humbly acknowledge that it is really a distant competitor which can't catch up with China anytime soon. More than anything else, if India wants to be an ally of the West in curbing hegemonic ambitions of China, it must first deal with its own internal challenges. It cannot expect to ride on the shoulders of the US or the West, without competing economically and militarily first. 

Aarti Tikoo Singh, Senior Assistant Editor with The Times of India, one of India s largest circulated dailies, has a Masters in International Affairs from New York’s Columbia University. She writes on international relations, politics, economics, war and terror.

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T This is a reali ity we have tto face.

Presidentt of China Mr. X Xi Jinping

“We, thee present geeneration, h have the resp ponsibilities to act as a trustee of tthe rich nattural wealth h for the futture genera ations. The iissue is not merely abo out climate cchange it is a about climate justice.”

Minister of Ind dia Prime M Sh. N Narendra Mo odi

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direectly managed by the CPC Ceentral Committtee of China wiith the registerred capital of USD U 2.9 billion. By the end of 2017, 2 CDT’s asssets both in operation and a constructio on are distribute ed in 31 provincces in China an nd in overseas (ie. Myanmar a and Cambodia etc.) with the total ees, and total in nstalled capacity y more than140 0 GW, surpassin ng the threshold d of 100,000MW W to asssets of $110 billion USD,over 100,000 employe beccome an extra-la arge scaled pow wer generation enterprise e in the e world. In 2015 5, CDT is listed as No.392 in Fo ortune Top 500 0 companies.

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Businesses:   

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CDTE –C CDT’s Overseas/Domestic prroject entity too provide comp prehensive One-stop BOT/EP PC (+F) servicces.

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 Completed in nstallation of FG GD for 173 unitts of Power plants of total 54,,000MW.  C Completed inst tallation of Den nox for 153 uniits of Power plaants of total 57 7,000 MW. DTEG haas commissioned 1st FGD sysstem in India off 600 MW unit of ILFS Power p project of 2X60 00 MW at Cudd dalore Tamilnad du.

DTEG also hass vast experien  nce of operation n and Maintenance of FGD syystem for manyy power plants in China.

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INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA

I

ndia and China are eternal neighbours, but their civilisations and power centres have been so completely separated by the impassable Himalayas and the barren, desolate expanse of Tibet that for thousands of years, the two have existed entirely in their own worlds. Apart from the Dogra general Zorawar Singh who conquered the independent kingdom of Ladakh and attached it to the Sikh Empire and then ventured disastrously into Tibet, there has been little adventurism of historical significance by either side into the sphere of influence of the other.

However, Zorawar Singh did start the chapter of territorial friction between India and China, upon which later British Imperial interests built a script for a future Sino-Indian conflict.

China's growth trajectory over the last few decades has made it an economic and military rival to the United States. India is proud of its robust democracy and the freedom of its people. But India’s geo-strategic advantage relative to China has diminished, thanks to China's wealth and diplomatic clout. Many observers of Sino-Indian relations believe that globally and also vis-à-vis India, China holds most of the cards. From an aggressive posture on the Line of Actual Control to enabling Pakistan to defy the international community as it wages jihad against India, to the

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crushing weight of Chinese industrial might, India has few options beyond trying to maintain a military and political status quo. And work towards greater mutual trust to make the relationship better.

However, if China is impervious to any levers that India has, it is not yet an unchallenged superpower. US President Donald Trump is on an "America First" crusade that has rattled the world. China, in particular, has attracted Donald Trump's ire. if what Trump has started doesn't wind down soon, the Asian juggernaut faces a deeply uncertain political and economic global environment. China is facing having to readjust its posture on a great many things if it is to come out unscathed, and that will have wide ranging implications for its foreign policy, including its relations with India.

In this section, Harbir Singh discusses how India and China came to have hostile relations after millennia of peace, and what the era of Donald Trump means for these Asian neighbors and for their future relations.

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China and India: How did we become enemies after millennia of peace?

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 Harbir Singh

T

he acrimonious relations between India and China are, in historical and civilisational terms, quite an anomaly. For thousands of years India and China have been neighbours. In all that time they have each minded their own business, with very little violation by either into the geographic space of the other. Mighty empires have risen and fallen in both India and China, barbaric invaders suffered and assimilated, territories and trade fought over, but the border between the two has been stable and inviolate for thousands of years. No neighbouring civilisations of such scale and longevity have been so benign towards each other for so long. So how have we come to rancour and blows in this era of great progress and prosperity?

The Indian version of the story narrates China’s bullying belligerence, and proud India’s determined defence of its territorial integrity.

Indeed, the official map of India, proudly capped by a crown shaped by Aksai Chin to the North East of Ladakh, and Baltistan, Gilgit and Hunza to the North and West of Kashmir, is bitterly

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INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA defended by the Government of India from modifications showing the crown as Chinese or Pakistani held territories.

Indians can scarcely stand to look at the map of India depicted minus these territories. It jars and looks unfamiliar, almost like looking at the decapitated body of something essential to ourselves.

In our psyche, China took our territory of Aksai Chin. When we sought to retrieve our territory, the Chinese waged war on us. The collective Indian belief is that the Chinese don’t stop. They want territory in Arunachal Pradesh. They’re at it at Doklam. They aid the villainous Pakistan to wage its nefarious, endless war on us.

Indeed, all this is true. But again, it begs the question, how have India and China come to this after so many millennia?

Well, for one thing, for the first time outside mythology, India developed a national self image during the independence struggle that spanned the subcontinent, a cohesive vision and voice of all the people speaking out of who they were (Indians) and what they wanted (freedom and self governance). This New Consciousness needed a precisely demarcated geographical space that defined India, the place where Indians lived, ruled themselves, and where it was their right to repel invasion and occupation.

However, India had not yet made peace with its own history and had no idea how to do that, while clutching its national consciousness. While it was clear that Lahore, Delhi, Mathura, Agra,

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Patna, were all in Hindustan, the limits of the extent of Hindustan were not so clear. A number of minor and major kingdom states peppered the periphery of Hindustan. Some were clearly within the sphere of Hindustan. Others were outside it, only recently conquered and annexed by adventurers from Hindustan, or later by the British. How India’s borders got defined by events prior to independence set the stage for the conflict with China.

In the 19th Century, the British were paranoid, justifiably, that the borders of Tsarist Russia, expanding rapidly

into Central Asia, swallowing up Khanate after Khanate, were steadily drawing closer to the Crown Jewel of Britain’s empire, India. If the Russians took Afghanistan, or found routes into Kashmir across the unknown passes of the unexplored Himalayas, Punjab – and thence the great flat expanse of the heart of Hindustan – would lie open for Russian forces determined to take Britain’s prize.

British victory against such an invasion

by Russia was by no means a sure thing.

The British decided that the Russians would have to be met in the mountainous barren wilds that surrounded India to the North and West, before they ever made it to Kashmir or Punjab. So started The Great Game, the race between Russians and the British to take control of territories holding the routes that Russian cavalry possibly could take into Punjab.

The Great Game led Britain to its history with Afghanistan. It led the British to take Gilgit and Hunza, which were notionally under the suzerainty of the King of Kashmir, but were in reality quite fiercely independent, protected by ferocious mountains, and also a propensity of the leaders for violence and

there was not even detected till it was very well advanced. There was simply no one there to see it to report it up the Indian chain of command. When India did find out about it, Jawahar Lal Nehru went apoplectic. Rhetoric about India’s territorial integrity and defending it against Chinese aggression flowed heavy and thick.

The Chinese made a strong diplomatic effort to influence Nehru to negotiate a settlement. Zhou Enlai, the first Chinese Premier, visited Delhi to urge Nehru personally to come to some sensible arrangement. It was the Chinese view that the boundary between China and India had been defined by the British for British imperial interests, and it behoved the neighbours

banditry. It was the Great Game that led the British, looking to block off the routes into Ladakh from Yarkand in Xinjiang, to attach Aksai Chin to India by the terms of a treaty with Tibet in 1914.

The Russian Revolution ended the Great Game a few years later, but perhaps not soon enough for good Sino-Indian relations in the future. At the time, the Chinese state was weak, and the writ of Beijing in the far territories had collapsed.

Tibet had started acting independent and self governing. The Tibetans perhaps believed that an international treaty with the British Empire, the superpower of the world at the time, would mean international recognition as a sovereign state. The Tibetans entered into a treaty with the British, by which the Aksai Chin region of Tibet was agreed to be under British sovereignty as per the McMahon Line that – according to the British – was the border between India and China.

The Republic of India inherited Aksai Chin notionally as part of British Maps of British India. China, however, thought nothing of Tibet’s treaties with European imperialist villains who had caused so much humiliation to China, and it thought

nothing of India’s belief that Aksai Chin was a part of India. When it had mustered its strength by the middle of the 20th Century, it brought Tibet back under its heel, and then proceeded to build a road to connect Tibet to Xinjiang, through Aksai Chin, the only route that could be open year-round.

Aksai Chin is so remote and so desolate, that no one in India in 1913 would have seen it except British officials, and the men who ran the caravans through it and traded in Leh. Aksai Chin is so empty and so far away that the Chinese presence

to mutually agree to their boundaries and not be bound by what the British had done. Accordingly, Beijing offered to concede to India various bits of Chinese territory, particularly in the North East, that the British had taken, in return for keeping Aksai Chin as Tibetan, not Indian territory.

Nehru refused. The prospect of giving up provinces, on the grounds that their connection to India was primarily due to British activity, was unbearable. India was at threat of flying apart because people of this ethnicity or that religion or language had an argument about how they wanted out of the union that they’d been drafted into.

Could Nehru have made a deal with China that would have prevented the disastrous state of relationship that we

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INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA Disputed border

Disputed territory

GH AN IST AN

Aksai Chin

Controlled by China and claimed by India

AF

CHINA

Arunachal Pradesh

Controlled by India and claimed by China

Tibet McMahon Line

PAKISTAN New Delhi

Tawang

NEPAL

BHUTAN

BANGLADESH

INDIA MYNAMAR

SRI LANKA

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Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru

have had to suffer, and still been able to contain the centrifugal forces that wanted to spin India apart? Whatever the answers to that might be, in the event, Nehru refused, and the next thing we knew, we had been defeated in war, we had not got Aksai Chin back, and China had become our clear and unequivocal enemy, for the first time ever.

China’s relationship with India ever since has been straight out of Chinese manuals on war and statecraft. The Chinese, like the Indians, are not territorially expansive people. They have a clear notion of the geographical extent of China, and they are not interested in conquering and then administering anything outside China. If territories outside China are to be made subservient to Chinese interests, it is done through making vassals out of the ruling classes of those territories through the use of money, mandarins and policy. The Chinese have no interest in conquering Indians and then having to run the administration over their Indian subjects. Its belligerence towards India is a strategic, long term play to preserve the status quo of 1962.

The Chinese, like the Indians, are not territorially expansive people. If territories outside China are to be made subservient to Chinese interests, it is done through making vassals out of the ruling classes of those territories through the use of money, mandarins and policy To the Chinese, it is very simple: The goodwill and peace that China offered and India refused before the war would now not be offered after it, unless there be some definite benefit for China to do so. China’s status as the victor who had taken India at its mercy in war, and had

then ended the war by its own choice, will not be surrendered unless there is some definite benefit for China to do so.

China isn’t actually desperate to acquire Ladakh or Tawang. Its military incursions and official tough talk is the strongman rattling India’s cage and keeping it paranoid, tense, coiled to spring in response to Chinese aggression that China would rather not have to make.

Its assistance to Pakistan makes sure that India’s ability to come barrelling back at China with marshalled strength, and challenge its prestige on the world stage, is well diluted.

China has no incentive to change its policy on India. What India could not win by spurning a negotiated settlement, it will not be simply given after military defeat. There is little India can do to alter China’s posture. However, there are larger forces at work in the world. The big one that has scared the Chinese giant: Donald Trump. Circumstances for China in the era of Donald Trump may change enough to invalidate its India calculus since 1962 and open up a new era and a new relationship between India and China. 

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India and China in the Era of Donald Trump

 Harbir Singh

C

hina’s economic growth and its rise as an industrial powerhouse has been nothing short of staggering. What is vital here is that China managed to race far past all the other major economies and become a powerful rival to the United States, all without bothering with democracy, human rights, clean government, freedom of speech, intellectual property rights, and political dissent.

When China opened itself for business, arranging labour, infrastructure, subsidies, and currency policies to make Chinese labour a hugely scalable export commodity, American companies got busy thumping the Bibles of free trade and globalization, shipping off their manufacturing to China and raking in bonuses for the CEOs and the profits for Wall Street. The American government got busy borrowing money from China to finance American spending on everything – from Chinese-made consumer electronics to its wars without end.

The control that China established on America’s freedom to act has been breathtaking. American companies have compromised on essential values such as state censorship in order to keep the profits flowing. Many have handed over crucial intellectual property to Chinese government-backed firms as the price for doing business in China. The profitability, and rich returns on the stock exchange, of vital American companies are now fundamentally dependent upon manufacturing operations in China.

American college towns are full of wealthy Chinese undergraduates driving eye-wateringly expensive sports cars.

American university professors tell of having to censor their lectures so as to not offend Chinese students with talk of democracy and human rights – their universities don't want these young Chinese nationalists to take their money somewhere else. A number of American universities have opened campuses in China where they are are busy selling American intellectual horsepower to the highest bidder.

In the meantime, China has been waging military and industrial cyberwar against the United States, stealing top secret data on the latest military hardware, for example, and miraculously producing advanced cutting edge weapons such as the J-20 Stealth fighter, a remarkable achievement considering that the state of technology in China is such that it hasn’t yet been able to perfect jet engines without imported technology and knowhow.

For years, China has been testing American resolve and finding it weak.

From military provocations to defiance on charges of currency manipulation, China has routinely and deliberately caused anguished hand-wringing in Washington about the untenability of the situation, but also the compulsion to avoid any action against China for fear of rocking the globalisation boat. America has been compelled to moderate its response to China's behaviours, effectively to the point of complete paralysis, despite the

China has been daring the US to take a bold step against it. It has always left the Americans telling themselves that it's best to do nothing because trade wars and uncertain military conflicts are bad for profits

threat to American economic vigour and socio-political values that China presents.

For perhaps two decades now, China has been daring the US to take a bold step against it. It has always left the Americans telling themselves that it's best to do nothing because trade wars and uncertain military conflicts are bad for profits, till it became a standard narrative around the world that America no longer had the ability to tackle China.

Indeed, the Americans have made it an industry to peddle labour rights and environmental protections at home and get their iPhones made for cheap in China where labour is poorly paid and poorly treated, and the environment is turning into an industrial wasteland.

Donald Trump, however, has put China on notice that the game is up. Economics professors are gnashing their teeth and screaming about trade wars. The New York Times is bleating about the damage Donald Trump is doing to decades of diplomacy. But Trump has let China know that he is willing and able to take things where the Chinese have spent decades training the Americans to not go. He has called China’s bluff.

Donald Trump is banking on the one truth that the narrative of the Chinese phenomenon has tried to re-write. That truth is that the modern world is built on American technological ingenuity and the American cultural paradigms of free thought, free inquiry, opportunity for the talented, an obsession with driving the state of the art forward, and taking all humanity along for the ride.

China can put millions to work, cause vast power projects and whole cities to spring up in no time, set and change policy with totalitarian clarity and ease, share the spoils with Wall Street to get it to dissolve American political resolve, and steal American intellectual property.

But it has not been the one to invent the iPhone, Facebook, Twitter, Google, Intel microprocessors, Android, self driving cars, artificial intelligence, or really anything at all that the Chinese economy depends on getting from America to fuel its own labour machine.

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INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA Donald Trump understands that while China is mighty, its might relative to the United States is grossly exaggerated. It hinges upon the lack of political resolve on America’s part to actively resist China getting rich and powerful by benefitting from American intellectual and creative output. Trump’s declaration of a trade war against China may seem arbitrary, but its targets are well chosen to communicate to Beijing in no uncertain terms that China can’t handle the ways in which Washington can, and is now willing to, push.

A prime example is the US Department of Commerce's assault on the Chinese telecom giant, ZTE. The department banned any American business from selling products or services to ZTE. The multi-billion dollar giant was forced to shut down the majority of its operations within days. It could not buy components and software for its networking equipment and smartphones from Qualcomm, Broadcom, Intel, SanDisk, for example. ZTE phones running the open source Android operating system wouldn’t be allowed access to the Google app store, and it couldn’t have American apps in its own app store.

While the liberal press is losing its collective head in outrage, leaders of countries that have for decades relied on American policy paralysis to exert influence on the world, have all got the message that Trump is capable of and serious about kicking over the table. North Korea, for example, pledged to destroy its nuclear test site and made peace with South Korea.

Developments that had seemed impossible for decades suddenly materialised out of nowhere as Pyongyang decided not to risk having its bluff called by Trump.

China, which had enabled North Korea’s regime for so long, and had put on such a convincing act of being the only restraint on Kim’s nuclear madman routine, suddenly found itself with no seat at the table, even as major Chinese technology companies, ZTE and Huawei, were facing catastrophe.

Shortly before this writing, Trump asked the US Commerce Department to find a way to spare ZTE and arrange for it to return to business. He very smoothly

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threatened but then avoided turning ZTE into a first fatal blow in a dangerous trade war, but the message has been received loud and clear in Beijing.

While China too can put the hurt on American companies and the American economy, the Chinese are well aware that they are now in uncharted waters. They don’t know how things could go. And they are aware that while America could - after a bloody, damaging economic war - find and build manufacturing capacity and raw material sources, China’s economy cannot survive being starved of access to and appropriation of the technologies, innovations and the socio-cultural dynamics that America is driving in the world.

Although ZTE was spared and a trade war seems temporarily to be averted, Trump has shifted the stakes again. Any

Trump’s declaration of a trade war against China may seem arbitrary, but its targets are well chosen to communicate to Beijing in no uncertain terms that China can’t handle the ways in which Washington can, and is now willing to, push effort that Beijing might have been making to get Kim Jong-un to show Trump some spine blew up after the the US President suddenly pulled out of upcoming talks with North Korea, leaving no room for North Korea to make demands or play hard to get, and create leverage for Beijing in its dealings with Trump.

All this puts China on very uncertain ground. It needs to be cautious and flexible as it faces Trump’s determination to end China’s free run at the expense of American vitality and influence. But there is really no telling what might happen and

what might be the right course of action.

In these uncertain and unnerving times, China finally has a reason to reconsider its relationship with India and its policy of keeping up a hostile, damaging posture with India. It may be time for China to set aside its post-1962 policy on India and start looking for cooperation and mutual benefit everywhere it can, while it tries to find a sure footing to grapple with the American Sumo.

The probability that India will get Aksai Chin back is virtually nil. Its importance to China for the Tibet-Xinjiang road link is too great. Beyond that, however, China would be assessing which of its postures inimical to India are worth keeping up at a time when it is going to be buffeted by economic and policy crises.

At the forefront of the Chinese imagination would be the peril of Trump arranging an international coalition to corner China. Trump has already demonstrated his ability to get Europe to fall in line.

He opened up a trade war with the European Union, threatening the crucial auto industry of Germany, the economic and political stabilizing centre of the fractious and unstable European Union. Just as the European Union was starting to bravely voice defiance of Trump on that front, he dumped on the EU the unilateral announcement that the Iran Deal was dead.

On the campaign trail in 2016, Donald Trump had announced his opposition to Barack Obama’s Iran Deal. The virtually uniform response had been that it was a done deal. The Europeans would now never agree to a return to the pre-deal posture on Iran. Investments had been made, large long term business deals with major economy-anchoring European businesses were in full swing. The US could withdraw unilaterally, but undoing the deal was politically and diplomatically impossible. And yet, here we are in 2018, the deal is dead, with little noise of defiance from European capitals.

The smell of surrender is in the air. Playtime is over. America is done playing the liberal game of internationalism, where its friends and enemies all enrich themselves while American vitality is drained away by

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a cabal of liberal leaders and totalitarian regimes, all living off the global economic engine that America drives, and in the world order that the US preserves.

American foolishness in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 gave Europeans a validation of their sense of moral superiority over a compulsively war mongering, oil drinking America. Obama’s benign androgynous liberalism signalled to them the sunset of American power in this interconnected, globalised, multicultural world. Trump has shattered the illusion.

It has dawned on Europe’s parliaments that Western civilization will stick together under American leadership, whether it likes it or not. Donald Trump has cracked the whip, and the major NATO countries know they’re going to get in line.

None of this has been lost on Beijing, which has suffered a similar assault on its economy and its own arrangements with an international pariah, North Korea in this case. Trump hasn't done anything yet that would be catastrophic for the Chinese economy. ZTE was almost driven out of business till Trump gave it a reprieve, but the war is on. China is going to have to give, otherwise Trump will escalate the stakes. The dance to that point may take more steps yet, but the assault is underway already.

Donald Trump is clearly a dangerous foe, and it would be perilous for China to rule out anything he might do that would profoundly disadvantage China. It is hard to imagine what might be arranged between India and the US that would seriously disadvantage China, but that is precisely what makes Trump so dangerous.

What has been unimaginable hitherto can be a quid pro quo next month.

India has traditionally dealt with major global events by keeping to itself and minimizing its involvement and commitments on the world stage. What Indian mandarins see as India’s fierce independence from the influence of the selfish powers is seen by those powers as the knowledge that they can’t count on India to play on the team or even be clear about what teams it is on.

Although India craves a permanent

seat on the UN Security Council, it's been mostly a craving for prestige and stature.

India has had very little cultural, social and political will to take a prominent role on the world stage, which would mean committing to strong positions and seeing them through, in intense conflict or deep cooperation with the other countries of the world.

What is most likely in the era of Trump is that India will continue to seek to navigate the waters with as little incident as possible, and try to stay on the best possible terms with both the US and China. It is in China’s interest to encourage India, with offers of friendship, to keeping sitting out the game without picking any team. Hence the recent ModiXi meeting at Wuhan.

What is most likely in the era of Trump is that India will continue to seek to navigate the waters with as little incident as possible, and try to stay on the best possible terms with both the US and China India has had its own tense moments with Trump. India’s been reminded about the BMW and KTM motorcycles built in Indian plants that have found a big market in the US, and it has been rattled on that most cherished dream of its vast Middle Class: children settled in America on H1 visas, in a long long line for American citizenship.

But it is also possible that after Iran, Trump will train his guns on Pakistan with an intention to wreck its neverending game of suicidal brinkmanship and state-sponsored jihad. It might come with pressure on China to stop enabling this rogue state, and an opportunity for India to reap the fruits, if it joins in to lift its share of the load in whatever way the

situation requires and makes arrangements on trade, such as cutting import cuties on American built motorcycles.

The symbolism of the Air India flight scheduled to fly over Saudi Arabia to Israel ought not be lost on the reader. The first scheduled flight to Israel permitted

by Saudi Arabia to overfly its territory coming alongside rumours that Saudi Arabia, itself convulsing internally under a reformist new ruler, was considering officially recognizing Israel, shows that India has at least some small role to play on America’s side in this new great game.

Hopefully, it is no small role in the end.

As a liberal democracy, built on the freedom of citizens who are ruled by leadership of their own choosing, it is in India’s interest that the United States prevail in this clash of civilisations. A sustained but uneasy peace with China still only means living in the shadow of undemocratic and powerful autocrats. That is a place that India has been in for far too much of its long history, and it is in India’s interest if China is forced to submit to, rather than to defy, the powers of democracy and human freedom.

But in event that India can’t find the vision and courage to take bold leadership alongside the US in the cause of democracy and freedom against the growing power of totalitarians, such as might have led to India standing with US and Israel on the UN regarding the US moving its embassy to Jerusalem, we can always fall back on the comfort of the millennia of peace between India and China prior to the conflict triggered by Aksai Chin, shake China’s extended hand, and just hope that China won’t have cause to change its mind later about goodwill and cooperation with India. 

Harbir Singh is a New Delhi based political analyst and commentator on international affairs. His work has appeared in Swarajya, the Times of India Blogs, New Delhi Times, and The Nation (Pakistan).

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O

ne of the canons of Chinese thought is asymmetrical thinking. This is part of the great Chinese learning. The practice of giving, and also taking on cultural names is part of the same Chinese knowledge system, the asymmetrical thinking. Foreigners who visit China for a longer period, or those who learn Mandarin are given Chinese names. The practice is pragmatic and convenient. It may be easy for the outsider to charge that the practice is also racist. Not so.

In a foreign locale, the Chinese adopt an English name, and at times, names drawn from the local culture. Indians are amused to find some Chinese introduce themselves as Amit, Varun, or other names drawn from the Indian culture. Indians are intrigued by this Chinese custom.

The Chinese, on the other hand, find nothing unusual about it. They are used to it, and take the practice for granted.

Maitri Chebiyyam and Aishita Shukla comment on this Chinese practice from their perspectives.

The Rose has a new name, and loves it  Maitri Chebiyyam

I

n 2013, I joined O.P. Jindal University as a student of International Relations where I had the opportunity to learn Mandarin language as a part of my course. I recall how on the first day of attending my Mandarin language class, all of us students were awarded Chinese names. I found it curious. I had not expected that my learning Chinese would also involve taking on a Chinese name for myself.

I was given the name ‘车’ 美晴 pronounced ‘Che Mei Qing’ which meant a beautiful (美) bright day (晴), and the 车 stood for my surname. I instantly fell in love with the name and its significance. It somewhat reverberated with the warmth that my original Indian name ‘Maitri’ carried. That day we were set with the task of learning how to write our names using traditional Chinese calligraphic paint brushes and ink. This fun activity made us all accept our new names cheerfully, and fall in love with their aesthetic beauty too.

Quite similar to the tradition of giving names in India and much of Asia, Chinese names are based on two major conditions. The name should either carry a significant meaning or should sound melodic. And in some cases, both. I did not think much about this practice of

giving names to foreign language students learning Chinese until much later, when I travelled to Taipei to learn Chinese on a scholarship. I was accepted as a student at National Cheng Chi University, which was attended by students from various parts of the world.

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All the foreign exchange students were given individual Chinese names. I found that the teachers did not name us randomly. The new names were given with thought, and a degree of solemnity.

Some students, particularly those hailing from the West, had common names such as Anna, James, Rose. They were either given similar-sounding names, or names with similar meanings. For students hailing from Asian nations like Japan, Korea and India, the name-giving had a richer dimension. The teachers asked us what our names meant, and how they were pronounced. Based on these considerations, the teachers selected appropriate names for us. Since I already had a Chinese name, I was not given a new name.

It was here that I found myself thinking that giving names drawn from the local culture was a pragmatic step towards introducing us to a new language and welcoming us to a whole new world.

The names gave us a sense of belonging.

They bestowed upon us an identity which helped us fit in with the local people and its culture swiftly.

Both these aspects are extremely important. While learning a new language and culture, it is of utmost importance to feel one with the said culture. To achieve this, what can be more simple and

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effective than taking on a local name?

The name of a person plays a significant role in identity formation. Research has shown that a given name helps a person in developing a sense of oneness with the land and its people.

In India, there is great excitement among parents over naming the child.

For many parents, selecting the name of their choice begins long before the child is born. The parents pore over name books, consult friends and family, to find a name which carries a beautiful meaning, and is pleasant to the ears. Then a grand naming ceremony is held where family and close friends are invited. The Gods of auspicious tidings and prosperity are invoked, and the name is bestowed upon the child.

Much like India, in China too, parents consult books with more than 10,000 words carrying different meanings, and a name is selected carefully. Typically, a Chinese name has two to three syllables, with the first being the surname and the following being the name. The Chinese people did not limit giving names to just people. Centuries ago, they gave names to foreign countries and even cities.

India is called ‘Yindu’ (印 度 )，Japan is called ‘Riben’ (日本)，Singapore is called ‘Xinjiapo’ (新加坡 ) etc.

These names can be found mentioned

in old historic scripts and records, when the Chinese explorers gave these names to identify the new places they discovered on their trips. I was intrigued to note that not all students were enthused about the practice of giving Chinese name to foreign students. They argued with the institute administration that giving Chinese names to students was an act of “passively aggressive racism”. They also charged that the administration refused to acknowledge their original given names, and even showed reluctance to learn the original names.

The dissenting students felt that this practice was akin to erasure of identity.

They further argued that using the original names of people from different countries would have helped the students learn more about other cultures and their name meanings, and therefore would celebrate diversity. The administration, on its part, explained that giving Chinese names was merely to help students blend in with the society, encourage them to embrace the culture of the other, and make them more enthusiastic about learning the language.

In addition, the Chinese phonetic system was not vast enough to include the phonetics from all over the world, making it impossible for the locals to pronounce the foreign names correctly.

Sneha Rao, a student learning Mandarin found the Chinese practice of giving cultural names to foreigners resourceful and utility-driven. She did not agree with the foreign students who had dissented to the practice. “I don’t think they have any wrong intentions. I too believe that giving Chinese names to students will help them easily integrate with the society,” she told me. 

Maitri Chebiyyam is a freelance translator. She spent an year in China on scholarship to learn Mandarin, and is passionate about learning different languages and cultures.

“I am Chinese with an English name, can I have an Indian one too please?”  Aishita Shukla

I

t was my first day in Mandarin class, and the teacher asked me my name. The Next day, she gave us Chinese names, and we were barely able to pronounce them ourselves! It seemed funny at first. But it was only when I landed in China that I realized having a Chinese name made things so much simpler. Making friends at the university started by knowing the English name of the Chinese, and them knowing my Chinese name. One may assume that the Chinese name given to us would somehow indoctrinate us into being Chinese. But such was not the case. It was when they offered their English name that you realized that they too understood the difficulty faced by foreigners in pronouncing and remembering their native names.

But the Chinese amazed me further.

I found that when in India, they happily integrated themselves into the local culture by giving themselves Indian names. For example, the India head of a mobile gadget giant company likes to be called Vivek – so much so that it’s his name on LinkedIn too! I was amused

by this pragmatism of the Chinese. In addition to convenience, it also sounds like a good business strategy to enter into non-English speaking markets.

In the same way, the head of a Chinese multinational in telecommunications equipment has taken on a popular Indian name – Rajiv. I discovered that this way of doing business in India makes the Chinese more culturally acceptable among their clients, business associates and most importantly, their Indian colleagues in their daily interactions.

We are in the era of globalization, where there is need for greater oneness.

We must break the barriers of culture and language, by learning more languages and exploring their cultures. I was an exchange student at Tsinghua University in China. I was surprised when many of my fellow students asked me to give them Indian names. They were highly enthusiastic about it. That’s when I got to know the sense of belonging that the name created. It was a great way to enhance people-to-people interaction.

I had a similar experience when a group of students from China visited our university for an exploratory trip. It was their first time in India, and they made the most of it by making many enquiries

about the local culture, language, food and attire. For me, the most memorable time of their visit was the time they gave me the meaning of their Chinese name, and asked me to give them an Indian name with similar meaning.

One of them said the meaning of his name is ‘kind’, so I gave him the name ‘Daya’, meaning kindness in Hindi.

Having an Indian name excited him so much that he changed his WeChat account name, and prefixed Daya to it. It was then that I observed how happy it made all them to have an Indian name – it gave them a sense of inclusivity. I saw our cultural borders dissolve when I called him Daya for the rest of the group’s visit. And they called me ‘Aida’ (爱 妲). 

Aishita Shukla is an Associate at ICEC. She works on strategic planning for strengthening India-China economic and cultural ties by developing and executing B2B exhibitions and business initiation arrangements.

Fluent in Mandanrin, she hosts the visiting state delegations from India to China and China to India.

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INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA

T

he archaic image of India as a land of snake charmers and China as the land of martial arts trainers are stereotypes that are best forgotten. But put together, they tell a tale. A tale of the two largest epicentres of Asian civilizations. The Indian and Chinese nation states are both descendants of civilizational glory. The components of this glory such as traditions, values and customs live on in the two nation states in unique ways. While the civilizational character of their history binds them together, it is rather interesting to note the varying trajectories of the continuity of rituals and traditions on either side of the Indo-China border. The sway of the elephant and the swirl of the dragon have carved out uniquely distinct yet occasionally akin cultural landscapes. Landscapes that are alike and unlike in more ways than one.

One particular component of civilizational heritage that is common ground for India and China is ancestral worship.

Aishita Shukla speaks of her experience at the Chinese Tomb Sweeping Day. Atharva Deshmukh speaks of the Indian tradition of Shraadh, when prayers are offered for the ancestors and the forefathers.

Tomb Sweeping Day in China  Aishita Shukla

D

uring my time at Tsinghua University as an exchange student, I came to know about the Tomb Sweeping Day, also known as the Qingming Festival. At first, I believed that this was the day to remember and pay respect to our ancestors. Later, I found that there’s a heart-wrenching story behind this festival.

As per the legend, Jie Zitui, a loyal defender of Duke Wen of Jin (697–628 BC) rescued Prince Chong'er who was on exile and was starving to death. Jie Zitui cut a piece of his flesh, cooked it and served it to the Prince in order to save his life. Later, when the Prince regained power in his kingdom, he forgot about the man who had saved his life. When he realized his mistake, he decided to go meet him, but Jie Zitui refused. The prince set the mountain Jie Zitui resided in on fire. He felt that his saviour will come out running, and they will meet.

Tragically, he ended up killing his friend and his mother. This day was marked as a day of a memorial ceremony for the tomb, where people would thank the dead and offer gratitude to their ancestors.

This story reminded me of the folklores our grandparents used to tell us. They always ended with morals and life lessons.

The Chinese tradition made me realize that we too must thank our forefathers for their contributions to the world. That day, sweeping the tomb of my friend’s grandparents and thanking the dead was a new experience for me. The process of sweeping felt like we were paying homage to them, cleaning their tomb, placing

flowers and burning incense sticks.

Cold food is eaten on Tomb Sweeping Day, thus we prepared Qingtuan, a kind of dumpling made of glutinous rice mixed with Chinese mug wort or barley grass. From beating the dough to making the perfect shapes of the Qingtuan cakes and steaming them, it was a fun experience.

This day is also a time for new beginnings. Tomb Sweeping Day in mandarin is written as Qingming Jie (清明节), which means clear and bright.

The sky was full of kites on that day, making it a colourful sight. The university football ground was filled with youngsters flying kites. I hail from Ahmedabad, and the sight took me back to Uttarayan celebrations, where we welcome spring with new colours of the kites. I told my

Chinese buddy Ricky about Uttarayan. On this festival back home, we ate cold food, but for different reasons of course. Ricky acknowledged our cultural similarities, and was glad to know that we share similar practices.

The holiday holds significance in Chinese tea culture too. This specific day marks the fresh green teas by their picking dates. Towards the end of the day, Ricky gave me something special. It was home-made jasmine tea in a little box from her home. She had got her mother’s handcrafted jasmine tea all the way from her hometown in Hubei province, especially for me. That’s when I saw that for my Chinese friends, it wasn’t just about helping the international students settle in. It was about making them feel like they are home. 

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INFOCUS INDIA-CHINA

Ancestral worship days in India  Atharva Deshmukh

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he cyclical nature of human existence is one of the foundational bedrocks of the worldview within Hinduism.

By extension, this belief also posits that death symbolizes a transition into another stage of existence. Hinduism sees death as the union of the soul with the Supreme Soul. It is regarded that the physical aspect of death, however, has a certain degree of impurity attached to it. A set of rituals, collectively called ‘shraadh’ are performed to purify and aide this phase of transition.

‘Shraadh’ is a Sanskrit term that refers to a specific desirable state of mind that embodies faith in the action being performed. ‘Shraadh’ also refers to a set of rituals comprising food offerings, reciting prayers and reading texts. These rites are aimed at the benefit of the deceased

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and are symbolic in their content and purpose. For instance, the food offering called ‘pind’ is believed to symbolize the supply of strength to the spirit of the deceased individual or ‘pret’. Today, the practice lasts for 12 days after the death of an individual. In the past, it occupied a much broader time horizon. The 12th day is believed to symbolize the merger of the deceased into the realm of the ancestors. Thus, conceptually, ‘shraadh’ is also an expression of gratitude directed at the deceased.

These ritual practices are also performed during ‘Pitru Paksh’; a fortnight of ancestral worship during which Hindus show reverence for the deceased. Beginning on the first day after the fortnight following the Ganesh festival, ‘Pitru Paksh’ ends on the moonless night known as ‘amavasya’. During the ‘Pitru Paksh’, ritual practices of ‘shraaddh’ are performed in the presence of priests.

Auspicious activities within a Hindu

household such as weddings are rarely held during this period.

In India, cities such as Varanasi, Agartala and Kolkata often witness a mass influx of devotees during the ‘Pitru Paksh’. In Kolkata, for instance, crowds in the thousands can be seen gathering on the banks of the Hooghly river to make an offering known as ‘tarpan’.

Advancements in technology and the advent of urbanization have added a dialectical edge to the tradition.

Devotees, constrained by time and work commitments, have prompted a renewed search for alternatives. The use of social media to circumvent geography is one such example. In 2016, devotees wishing but unable to attend the ‘Pitru Paksh’ sent the names and other details of their ancestors to priests who would then perform the rituals on their behalf. Consequentially, popular ritual centres such as Allahabad and Haridwar welcomed less number of devotees relative to past occasions.

“

The continuity of such traditions is much higher in the rural areas.

Urbanization has had a profound impact on the way rituals are performed.

For instance, in Pune and Mumbai, environmental concerns such as river pollution have prompted responses from the local administrations in both cities. They now have ‘kund’ or vessels placed along river banks to serve a purpose hitherto served by the river

Chaitanya Deshmukh, Interior Designer

In August 2017, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), in collaboration with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), published a survey that was aimed at assessing the continuity and changes in the attitude and outlook of the Indian youth. Among other results, the survey found that there appears to be a tussle between the forces that hold on to traditional practices, and the ‘mall, multiplex, and café’ culture of the urban youth.

Rituals such as ‘shaadh’ will arguably become objects of negotiation between these two opposing forces.

Given my own upbringing in the bustling metropolis of Pune, practices such as ‘shraadh’ hardly featured on my mental landscape. Any introduction to the traditional practices of my ethnicity remained confined to an occasional tale from my grandmother or a paragraph here and there in a textbook. Once each year, traditional fervour would overwhelm my household during ‘Ganesh Chaturthi’.

The elderly would explain the symbolism in each rite, and lavish spreads of recipes that had been passed down for generations would fascinate our palates.

However, this was where it ceased. Traditions and cultural heritage were limited to a few weeks in September. This tale is not unique to me, my city or my faith.

India’s cultural landscape has changed in the past decade. High-rise structures, expansive malls and picturesque cafes have

“

According to the Ved, an individual is born with three debts: debt to God, debt to sages and saints, and debt to one’s parents and ancestors.

The ancestral rituals are an attempt to create an awareness of one’s duties and responsibilities.

Hinduism will sustain for very long, and existing rituals such as ancestral worship will constantly adapt themselves to contemporary times

Girish Thakur, Software Developer

cast their shadow over the urban populace whose millennials know little of what their traditions or culture has to offer.

The scope of continuity of these traditions and rituals especially in a rural context can hardly be questioned.

It is, however, the nature and content of these traditions in the expanding cities of an emerging market that could possibly undergo a seismic shift. 

Atharva Deshmukh is currently an Exchange Student at Leiden University, The Netherlands. He has a flair for languages, and loves writing.

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THINK EXPLORING HOW INDIANS AND CHINESE THINK AND ACT DIFFERENTLY

Why many Chinese find it hard to work with Indians  Wenjuan Zhang

I

t is true that the Indians and the Chinese have had a long history of rich interaction over centuries. But this won’t help in the people-to-people contact in the present times, since both nations have pursued different political paths for their modernization. It is unfortunate that due to some tragic conflicts, India and China almost closed the doors of

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communication with each other for vital years, when they were in the critical stage of new nation building.

As one of the few Chinese working as a full-time faculty at an Indian university, I have tried to share my learning and reflection in India with the Chinese community back home, through social media.

In one of my recent articles, I shared my perspective as a Chinese toward Indian thinking. The essay, titled ‘Why Chinese Find it Difficult to Interact with Indians’, written in my native language, went viral on Chinese social media.

The article resonated with most of the Chinese who have worked and/or lived in India. It was received with hundreds of comments. Multiple reproductions by big and popular social media and online media portals such as Epaper, Sohu.com etc further multiplied its readership.

In this essay, I reflected on three fundamental differences of thinking among the Indians and the Chinese, based on my personal experience, my interaction with Indians, and also my interactions with other Chinese who had lived and/or worked in India.

On Promises Unlike the Western culture based on professionalism, both Indians and Chinese usually do not say a clear ‘No’ to any-

thing, for reasons of courtesy. However, in terms of dealing with promises, the cultural pressure on their implementation is different in India and China.

In India, promises are usually given as an expression of positive attitude or for courtesy. The Chinese find that the Indians will respond to any matter with a highly positive expression, and speak of it in very concrete, reassuring terms. The Chinese assume this to be their promise

on the issue, and not mere courtesy.

This can be reflected in words regarding sticking to a specific time schedule for tasks, or as a promise for specific actions. In India, there is no cultural pressure in case there is failure in fulfilling what was promised.

Indians find it hard to say ‘No’. Therefore, they always give some response even if they do not know anything. The main method of saying ‘No’ in India is dragging.

When a typical Chinese is working with a typical Indian, the former will experience four stages of being: happiness, anxiety, disappointment, and fury.

In Chinese culture, an individual will be looked down upon, if he or she breaks a concrete promise. In the Chinese culture, if people want to dodge their responsibility, they usually express positive things in an ambiguous way, and do not use any concrete or promissory terms.

With increasing commercialization in China, contract violations are not rare.

One will find liars and cheaters aplenty.

For example, earlier the rights of migrant workers were commonly violated, because the sub-contractor did not keep his promises towards their payment or welfare.

However, based on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report, contract enforcement in China has been among the top five globally for several years,

On Results

Indians find it hard to say ‘No’. Therefore, they always give some response even if they do not know anything.

The main method of saying ‘No’ in India is dragging which is very impressive for a society which has seen such rapid economic and social transformation.

Legal pressure helps to ensure strict implementation of contracts. But moral pressure is equally significant when it comes to guiding social conduct.

As a Chinese who has grown up to value keeping one’s promise, I feel confusion in my daily interaction with my Indian colleagues and students. The confusion is regarding how much I can trust their ‘promises’. My experience of working in the global university taught me that the more an Indian had been exposed to an international environment, the higher were the chances that he or she would keep the “promise”.

China and India are almost on the two extremes in the pursuit of legitimacy, which heavily influences people’s thinking and actions. While the Chinese prefer outcome-based legitimacy, Indians are inclined towards procedure-based legitimacy.

Outcome-based legitimacy implies that you are evaluated on the basis of the outcome that you have achieved. Procedure-based legitimacy implies that you will be evaluated on whether you have followed the specified procedure faithfully.

In China, the traditional culture and also the political philosophy favour outcomebased legitimacy. The revolution part of Confucianism is merit-based instead of gene-based legitimacy. This is why China developed the first examination for civil servants named Keju. Chinese constitutional governance is party-state plus parliamentary sovereignty. These exclude external political checks, but focus on self-reflection and performancebased legitimacy. The challenging part of this model is that it may be at the cost of procedural justice and adequate protection of minorities.

In India, the co-existence model of cultural diversity and the political philosophy of liberal democracy demand and also strengthen procedure-based legitimacy. In India, on the World

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THINK

Bank of Ease of Doing Business, its best performed indicator is “protection of minorities”, which is a positive evidence of this philosophy.

But when it comes to personal and professional interactions, the pursuit of procedure-based legitimacy may exhibit itself in diverse ways. From the perspective of a Chinese working in India, this may be confusing.

I have often found that my Indian colleagues will perform his or her individual part of a given task. But few take ownership of responsibility for the final outcome.

A recent experience was typical of this attitude. We needed to shift the venue of a conference from Conference Hall A to Conference Hall B, half an hour before it began. I informed my colleague at the International Office about it, and she promised to do it. I assumed that she would take the ownership of getting it done.

Five minutes before the conference, I asked her if she has posted the notice regarding the shifting of the conference hall. She replied that she had informed the event team, but they told her it was too late to shift the conference venue.

Right there, I took a piece of paper and wrote on it, ‘Conference Room for Environmental Governance Shifted from Con-

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When a typical Chinese is working with a typical Indian, the former will experience four stages of being: happiness, anxiety, disappointment, and fury ference Hall A to Conference Hall B’. The task didn’t need any fancy logo or frills. All we needed urgently was neatly mentioned information, which would serve the purpose of guiding participants to the right room. I think I should have a talk with her some day to understand why she thought this simple task could not be done.

On Rights I have observed that the Indian society is rights based. In China, it is duty-cumrights based. In India, an individual’s life is ruled by family dynamics and social dynamics. Within the family, the members are bound towards each other, both by duties and rights. For example, Indians are very committed to family functions.

Beyond family, though, people-to-

people interaction is mainly rights based.

In the political and economic zone of activity, individuals are committed to fight and get ahead to best secure their self-interests.

This divided life attitude can be evidenced by the constitutional designing and the framework of laws which govern social and personal life. On one side, India uses universal adult suffrage as the pillar for social revolution. On the other hand, it is ambiguous toward personal law. Hence, personal accountability is not a strong force, either in the society, the economy or the political sphere.

In China, values and rules guiding the family have been socialized. The family and the state function in the framework of similar logic.

The political philosophy of Leninism further emphasizes the idea of collective rights rather than individual rights, and also strengthens duty-oriented tradition.

The consciousness of rights and duties are reflected in the reciprocity-based daily interaction in China. Many Chinese feel disappointed in their interactions with Indians, because they feel that Indians lack the sense of reciprocity.

My observations on how the Indians and the Chinese think and act differently is essentially an attempt to make both understand the other, and bridge the two cultures. My purpose is not to judge the Indian culture, but to explore the nuances of cultural differences, and their impact on daily life. I personally look forward to more interactions with Indians who have had rich experiences of Chinese life and culture. I would like to explore the difficulties they have faced due to our cultural differences. Such efforts will enrich cross-cultural understanding on both sides. 

Wenjuan Zhang is Associate Professor at Jindal Global Law School and Executive Director, Center for India-China Studies, Sonipat.

GUPSHUP

INDIA'S MOST CHARMING EXPORT TO CHINA IN 2018 Some Chinese bloggers who are frequent visitors to India got to know of Priya Prakash Varrier, the girl who conquered a nation of more than a billion people with her wink in a high-school romance video. They shared the song and Priya's pics on their blogs. Within days, India's National Crush was trending among many bloggers in China.

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CHINA'S MOST AMUSING EXPORT TO INDIA IN 2018 A Chinese woman journalist showed her contempt for a fellow reporter's softball question so dramatically that videos of her facial expression broke the Internet in China. Soon, the video was trending on the Indian social media, causing much hilarity here.

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â–Ş May-June 2018

THE PRANK THAT MADE INDIA ROAR WITH LAUGHTER, BUT SCARED THE CHINESE As hype over the Wuhan summit peaked, a prank on a headline in The Times of India, one of India's largestselling dailies, went viral. The original headline read 'Modi, Xi will meet 6 times in 24 hours'. Some prankster played with the headline. Early morning onwards, the news circulated on social media had a revised headline: 'Modi, Xi to mate 6 times in 24 hours'. The photoshopped image looked deceptively real. Within hours, India was roaring with laughter. By noon, The Times of India had to issue a clarification on Twitter that all their editions carried the correct headline. The headline had been photoshopped. Many Chinese bloggers, though amused, refused to share the pics and the joke. The media in China is state-controlled, they said. They said they are not going to take any chances poking fun at the leader and the party.

For Indians, undeterred by any such fear, the fun carried on, with several ribald memes cropping up and being circulated thick and fast.

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LITTLE LOLITA MONKEY GOD UNCLE On March 2, 2018, Indian block-buster Bajrangi Bhaijaan opened in 8,000 cinemas across China. The comedy, titled 'Little Lolita Monkey God Uncle' in China, was a major hit in China, earning $2.8 million on its first day. In less than a month, the movie made a total collection of Rs 281 crore at the Chinese ticket counter, and was still running at cinema halls across the country.

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MOST POPULAR BOLLYWOOD ACTOR IN CHINA Aamir Khan, who first made inroads into China in 2002 with his Oscarnominated period film 'Lagaan', is the biggest Bollywood crowd puller in China. After the stupendous success of 'Three Idiots', 'PK' and 'Dangal', his name is like a golden pass to Chinese movie goers.

May-June 2018 â–ª

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ICEC ACTIVITIES

Major ICEC events in 2016-17 – Smart Urbanation 2017 Pride of China”

ICEC Council in association with Smart Cities Council organized a three day exposition and convention on 15 – 17 March 2017 at Pragati Maidan, New Delhi.

tural Shandong-India Agricul Products Trade Fair

ICEC Council in association with FICCI hosted Shandong Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products Demonstration and Shandong-India Agricultural Products Trade Fair in New Delhi

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Smart City Study Tour to China

ICEC Council in association with Embassy of China in India and supported by Ministry of Science and technology, organized study tour to China for officials from Indian Smart cities to give them an understanding of how China developed their smart cities and also to explore synergies to work together in smart city development.

7th South Asia-Sichuan Business Promotion Roundtable Conference – November 2016

As part of The 7th South Asia – Sichuan Business Promotion Round-Table Conference, held in Chengdu, Sichuan, ICEC organized a special session on “INDIA INVESTMENT PROMOTION” which focused on showcasing investment. The session was inaugurated by H.E. Mr. Sailas Thangal, Consul General of India.

Study Tour of Chhattisgarh Housing Board to China – October, 2016

ICEC Council organized a Study Tour to China for the high-level delegation from Chhattisgarh Housing Board in October 2016. The delegation comprised of senior officials from the board including Mr. Bhupendra Sawanni, Hon’ble Chairman; Mr. Siddhartha Komal Singh Pardeshi, Commissioner and Mr. R K Rathore, Deputy Commissioner.

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EVENT REPORT

CHINESE INTEREST IN INDIA’S URBAN DEVELOPMENT

EXHIBITORS

ICEC Council hosted a high level business delegation of more than 50 Chinese companies from various domains of smart cities like water and waste management, power, green energy, electronics, infrastructure and IT sectors which participated at the 2nd Smart Urbanation – Convention & Expo 2018, held in Hyderabad on March 22 and 23, 2018.

Officials from Invest India, Federation of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FTAPCCI) and Environment Protection Research Institute (EPTRI) addressed the Chinese delegates about the Indian scenario, current projects and investment openings in key sectors of infrastructure, energy and environment at the event.

"There has been a keen interest among Chinese companies to explore India as an investment destination especially in urban development projects," said Mohammed Saqib, Secretary General, India China Economic & Cultural Council.

He further elaborated, “This is a significant initiative which is being provided to create opportunities for growth and employment in Telangana. It will also facilitate trade and enhance prospects of

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• Chengdu Spaceon Electronics • Sichuan Junhe Environmental Proctection • Government of Karnataka • Research Institute of Environmental Engineering • Maipu Communication Technology • IVIS • Sichuan Senpu Pipe • Tomtom • Chengdu Dazhanggui Trade • Shandong Hareom United Energy Equipment • Paytm • Linyi Haiqian Commercial and trade company • Linyi Liandong Commercial and Trade Com­pany • PTS India • ICEC • Prince Pipes • Crompton Greaves • Sunniva Renewables • Big Data Bees Consulting Services • Delta Electronics • Chowgule Construction Chemicals • Visaka Industries • Madras Security • Sheung Shui Energy Technology Ltd.

▪ May-June 2018

sharing knowledge and technical advancements between Telangana and China”.

Renowned Chinese companies like BROAD Group; ZTE Corporation; China Datang Corporation; Powerchina International Group Ltd.; China ENFI Engineering Corporation; China Road and Bridge Corporation; Changsha Veega Group; Hunan Lake Weil Group; Yantai Jialong Nano Group; amongst others participated in the Expo.

On the side lines of this expo, ICEC Council along with the China Council for Promotion of International Trade – Hunan Sub-Council organized the India China Economic Forum on the evening 22nd March for cooperation between Hunan Province and Telangana in investment and trade opportunities. Mr. Zhang Bin, General Manager, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, India addressed the gathering on why to invest in India and the Keynote address was delivered by Shri Bala Vinod Sudam, Chairman Real Estate and Infrastructure Sub-Committee & Executive Committee Member FICCI – Telangana State Council shared about the development of Smart Cities in India and the investment potential in the affordable housing sector.

• Foshan Shunde Midea Water Dispenser Manufacturing • Yantai Jialong Nano Industry • China Datang Corporation • Acer India • Ramky • ESRI India • Think Phi • Everest Industries • Ultratech • Broad Group • HP International • LEA Associates • Changsha green Hunan Environmental Protection Technology • Changsha Country Tianshun Environmental Protection • Hunan Tosea Drilling Network Technology • Hunan Yuanli Assembly Engineering • Comtom Electronic • Hunan Aerospace Kaitian Water Service • Changsha Victory Electricity Technology • Aerospace Kaitian Environmental Technology • Changsha Yiqun Information & technology

• Hunan Lake Weil Environmental Protection Technology • Hunan Liangyu Environmental Tech • Changsha Veega Environmental Protection Technology.

• Changsha Yuxiao Environmental Protection Technology • Wild West Media • Project Happicities • ASAPP • Hunan Jiaqi Information Technology • Hunan Lushun Environmental Technology • Changsha Yuanjunkang Environmental Protection Technology • The Hindu • Urban Update • Hunan Dachuangxianyi Intelligent Technology • Online Media • Hunan Zhongjia Huayue Environmental Protection Technology • Media Lounge • Changsha Xingjing Environmental Protection Technology • Hunan NewWorld Science and Technology

INNOVATION HUB START-UPs PRESENTED AT INNOVATION HUB • ThinkPhi • Kabadiwalla Connect • Project Happicities • Zyme Technologies Pvt. Ltd. • Team-Up! • Cytilife Inc • Smider Technology Pvt Ltd • DineSmart • Momenus Food service

• OCEO WATER • Ukids • Econaur Build Solutions • Wild West Media • Bigdatabees Consulting Services • Gayam Motor Works • XYZ Innovations • IndiaOnline.in Network

The Innovation Hub witnessed more than 40 solution demonstrations.

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EVENT REPORT

PRESS COVERAGES

PRINT MEDIA • The Hindu • Telengana Today • Hindu Business Line • The Hans India • Eenadu • Andhra Jyothy • Times of India

TELEVISION • ETV • V6 • Studio N

ONLINE MEDIA COVERAGE • The Hindu • The Hans India • Telangana Today • Eenadu • Andhra Jyothy • Business Line

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