Water(y) politics and India- Pakistan relations: Learning from history

By Ashok Behuria

At a time when vernacular media in Pakistan is abuzz with a neologism “Aabi Dahshatgradi” or ‘water terrorism’ by India, it is not by happenstance that an Indian scholar has come out with an engaging treatise on history and hydrology of the Indus river and its basin, pointing perhaps to the futility of the dance of politics at the banks of an epic river across centuries, from Alexander to Nehru and beyond, that lends its name to a country and a subcontinent.

Such work only revives faith in human capacity for learning from history rekindling hope that humankind may not be condemned to repeat it. Dr Uttam Sinha, well-known for his work on non-traditional security issues of transboundary nature, in his recent book, titled Indus Basin Uninterrupted, has relied on archival data to piece together facts hitherto underutilised that compels one to look at the tremendous possibilities of cooperation that can overcome divisive politics and stitch together a robust framework for peace and understanding, based on trust and goodwill.

A backdrop to hydro-politics around the river systems that water the two states of India and Pakistan is apt here. It was only a quirk of fate that both countries, despite deep disagreements, could pull out an agreement in 1960 under the auspices of the World Bank in September 1960, that settled the issue of river water dispute between the two countries, after several inconclusive sessions of talks spread over 13 long years. Finally, the solution to the issue was not to share river waters, but to divide six rivers of the Indus system between the two countries.

The waters of the eastern rivers- -Sutlej, Beas and Ravi--were entirely allocated to India for unrestricted use, while India agreed to allow unrestricted flow of waters on the western rivers—Jhelum, Chenab and Indus—subject to minimal nonconsumptive use of water for irrigation, limited storage (3.6 million acre feet) and production of hydel power (mainly run-ofthe-river type). Out of the 3.6 MAF that India could harness, 1.60 MAF was allotted for hydro-power, 0.75 MAF for flood moderation and 1.25 MAF for general storage for non-consumptive uses, including power generation. Interestingly, India has not been able to store as much even today, after nearly 51 years, despite advances in technology and availability of resources.

Based on data between 1950s and 1960s, as per the treaty provisions, India was allowed exclusive rights over a combined average annual discharge of 33.8 MAF in eastern rivers, while Pakistan was given exclusive rights over annual discharge of 135.6 MAF (measured on the Pakistani side with water collected on the rivers from the Pakistani side of the basins) flowing in the western rivers.

However, by 1960, the line of control (LoC) had come up as a line that effectively divided the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir between the two countries and Pakistan was allowed to build the Mangla dam and even India agreed to partly pay for its construction.

The Indus Water Treaty proved an interesting agreement that honoured the sensitivities of the upper as well as the lower riparian countries. There is no such example available in the entire world where the upper riparian country has been as accepting of the needs of the lower riparian. Whatever the considerations and higher allocation of water to the lower riparian was traded off for exclusive use of lower amount of water in the three eastern rivers. It begs mention here nevertheless that the people of Kashmir felt bypassed while the two countries engaged in hydro-politics and hydro-understanding.

However, the relationship between the two countries, especially the way it has developed over the years, has subjected the agreement to strains from time to time. Changing climatic conditions leading to receding glacial cover and reduced discharge in the rivers and Indian efforts to build run-of-the-river facilities to produce hydel power has led to suspicions in the especially since the 1970s have led people to say in Pakistan that India is stealing waters assigned by the treaty to Pakistan.

Propelled by anxiety about reduction in per capita water availability estimated at 1,017 cubic meters —close to the scarcity threshold of 1,000 cubic meters (compared to about 1367 cubic metres for India (decline from 1861 cm in 2001)— the people in Pakistan are both open to unfounded rumours about Indian machination and oblivious of the fact of poor internal water management that allows in excess of about 29MAF water downstream Kotri — the last structure on the Indus system for water regulation — flowing into the Arabian Sea every year. Due to siltation existing dams are storing less water than before. For example, the storage capacity of Mangla has dropped from 9.7 MAF to 7.3 MAF.

India-Pakistan enduring rivalry notwithstanding there are silver linings in the cloud thanks to the decision of the governments of both countries to stick to the Treaty, which provides “difference and dispute” settlement mechanism (vide Article IX and attendant Annexures F and G) in three different ways: resolution of differences: (i) through mutual consultations in the Permanent Indus Water Commission established under the Treaty; (ii) through a Neutral Expert acceptable to both or appointed by the World Bank in case of disagreement, and (iii) resolution of any ‘dispute’ by a Court of Arbitration. Pakistan has used these provisions on numerous occasions to obstruct many projects being planned by India, well within the treaty provisions. India has obliged Pakistan with information regarding its projects from time to time.

In the last 61 years, despite the regular and asymmetric wars and surgical strikes, the Indus Commissioners of both countries have met every year at least once, as per the treaty provisions, excepting perhaps last year due to the pandemic. The photo released to the media on the occasion of the latest 116th meeting held on 23-24 March 2021, showed the two Commissioners laughing away, indicating perhaps that there is still room for the two countries to tide over mistrust if such opportunities are leveraged well.

Today, when constituencies in both countries are busy whipping up antipathies against each other and clinging on to their exclusivist positions, positive exchange of views in such forums can act as building blocks for reconciliation and understanding. The real challenge is beating the governmentality in Pakistan that seeks to use anti-India sentiment at one level to retain its hold on power and pretend it is interested in peace by offering to talk at another. There is a need to attempt transformational politics in both countries aimed at changing the existing narratives, build constituencies of peace, move away from nurturing a culture of hatred and proxywars and resort to humanitarian politics. Real politic and climate science would teach us that possessing nuclear weapons and playing irredentist politics would not ensure us more water in our rivers but cooperative dialogue on basin management will help us manage our common resources better.

Dr Ashok Behuria is Senior Fellow and Coordinator, South Asia Centre at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi, India. The views expressed are his own.