How Communication Saved the World: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Wynne-Penkovsky Espionage By Kat Jivkova The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the US and the Soviet Union into a dangerous standoff lasting thirteen days in October of 1962. Known as the ‘biggest Cold War confrontation’, the origins of the crisis lay in the alignment of Cuba with the Soviet Union under leftist leader Fidel Castro. US officials anticipated that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev would use Cuba to establish a military presence in the Western hemisphere, thus directly threatening American national security. On 14 October, these suspicions were confirmed. After weeks of hunting, the American U-2 spy plane finally captured images of missile sites near San Cristobal in Cuba. In the days to come, communication between Khrushchev and US president John F. Kennedy would be the most critical factor in deterring a large-scale nuclear war. On a smaller scale, the communication between spies Oleg Penkovsky and Greville Wynne was undoubtedly the most productive espionage of the crisis, enabling the British and Americans to obtain crucial Soviet intelligence. The correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev during the crisis reveals the importance of communication in times of nuclear confrontation. Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted to start a nuclear war. Khrushchev provided Castro with ‘defence capabilities’ in order to protect Cuba from future invasions, and Kennedy interpreted this decision as a direct threat to the US – Soviet ballistic missiles had a range of over one thousand miles, hence could reach most major American cities within mere minutes of launch. At the beginning of the crisis, the two leaders exchanged a series of letters blaming one another for the crisis. A “flurry” of messages on both sides of the confrontation were sent over both formal and informal channels, resulting in dangerous misunderstandings, mistakes and misinformation. This is most evident following Kennedy’s decision to place a naval blockade upon Cuba at the beginning of the crisis. Kennedy had consulted a newly created National Security Council known as ExComm – to assist him in the best course of action – following the discovery of missiles in Cuba. Over the next five days, Kennedy and his council made the decision to place a naval “quarantine” on Cuba in order to prevent any more missile shipments from entering the country. US Navy ships positioned themselves eight hundred miles from the Cuban shore in order ‘to remove the threat
to the security of the nations of this hemisphere,’ according to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Tensions rose further following Kennedy’s televised speech to the US public regarding Soviet plans in Cuba. Kennedy ended the speech by directly addressing Khrushchev: ‘I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man.’ In response to Kennedy’s speech, Khrushchev responded that he did not intend to respect the blockade: ‘The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind towards the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war.’ The crisis escalated even further on 25 October during an emergency session held by the UN Security Council. This session was the wake-up call that Khrushchev needed. US and Soviet ambassadors, Adlai Stevenson and Valerian Zorin respectively, engaged in a tense discussion over the existence of offensive nuclear weapons within Cuba. Zorin repeatedly tried to evade the question but was finally bested by Stevenson, who unveiled a presentation showing the U-2 spy plane photographs US forces has taken. Stevenson said: ‘We know the facts, and so do you, sir, and we are ready to talk about them. Our job here is not to score debating points … it is to save peace.’ Khrushchev was surprised by American response to Soviet missiles in Cuba. He was convinced that he would successfully be able to install missiles in Cuba secretly, leaving the US with no choice but to concede to Soviet presence in the country. He stated: ‘we just wanted to intimidate them, to deter the antiCuban forces.’ Khrushchev understood the severity of the crisis and decided that a better course of action would be to negotiate with the US. He sent Kennedy his first conciliatory letter on 26 October. The letter was long and filled with emotion. Khrushchev mentioned that he had no wish to relive the trauma of war, and reassured Kennedy that the Soviet Union had no intention of attacking the US from Cuba. He proposed that if the US removed the naval blockade and promised to not attack Cuba, then he would remove Soviet missiles from the island nation: ‘We and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the
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