To what Extent were the Principles of Successful Delivery Applied in Tanzanian education?

Overview of BRN Education

President Kikwete launched the Tanzanian government’s Big Results Now! (BRN) programme in early 2013. BRN was a transformational government programme which sought to adapt the successful Malaysian approach to economic development and improving service delivery. This involved a switch to ‘business unusual’, operating in a new, more open and accountable way and focusing on delivering tangible results in priority sectors. BRN initially focused on achieving a set of specific objectives by 2015 in six sectors: Education, Energy, Agriculture, Water, Transport and Resource Mobilisation.

A six week ‘Delivery Lab’ was carried out for each of the six priority BRN sectors –Education, Agriculture, Energy, Water, Transport and Resource Mobilisation6 . Facilitated by staff from Malaysia’s Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU) and McKinsey, each Lab involved the participation of key Tanzanian experts and government officials. Each Lab identified a set of priority actions and targets along with a detailed delivery plan (called a ‘3 Feet Plan’) setting out exactly what needed to be done by whom and when to deliver the proposed activities.

BRN arrived at a time when the Tanzanian education system was at a critical juncture. The past few years had seen a significant and rapid expansion of enrolment at secondary level where the number of students almost tripled in seven years from 0.68 million in 2005 to 1.8 million in 2012. Primary level enrolments had also increased rapidly in the early 2000’s following universal primary education (UPE) campaigns, but the rate had since plateaued around 8 million in 2012. Unfortunately these increases had not been accompanied by improvements in the quality of education received by the majority of Tanzanian children. Results in both the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) and Certificate of Secondary Education Examination (CSEE) had deteriorated markedly between 2005 and 2012 as Figure 2 illustrates. Exam results are an imperfect proxy for educational quality but they are the best national measure available in Tanzania which captures performance at the end of primary and secondary levels.7

This deterioration in pass rates sparked a national debate about the reasons for the declining standard of education in Tanzania. This debate dominated the national media and led to heated discussions in the Tanzanian Parliament (Bunge). The debate continued throughout the first half of 2013 and came to a head in the middle of the year with the announcement that the 2012 CSEE results were to be re-graded, a process which led to the national pass rate for 2012 increasing from 34% to 43%8. There were also a change of leadership at the national examination council.

Crisis events and ‘shocks’ are recognised in public policy theory as having the potential to catalyse significant changes in practices which would not be considered in a period of equilibrium. 9 If there is widespread acceptance and acknowledgement that there is a problem then this creates opportunities to challenge the status quo. Arguably the poor results and subsequent national debate on the state of Tanzanian education in 2013 created just such a window of opportunity for change and also contributed to education being included with the first six priority BRN sectors.

7 The current system could be significantly improved and strengthening Tanzania’s capacity to conduct robust student learning assessments and examinations is one area where technical assistance was recommended, but not taken up.

8 Typical headlines of the time read “Massive examination failure must be stemmed” (Daily News, 20th February 2013 and “Spectre of poor quality education stalks Tanzania” (The East African, 18th May 2013).

BRN Education Initiatives & Targets

It should therefore come as no surprise that the plan developed by the Education Delivery Lab in the first quarter of 2013 focused on significantly improving the quality of primary and secondary education. It planned to do this through nine activity strands including improved delivery of school capitation grants; greater focus on the 3Rs (reading, writing and arithmetic) during the early years of primary school through teacher training and assessment; the mass roll-out of remedial classes: entitled Student Teacher Enrichment Programme (STEP) for students scheduled to sit primary and secondary examinations and measures to address the significant number of outstanding teacher claims in the system. The overall aim of the BRN Education plan was captured in 3 targets to be achieved by the end of 2015 or early 2016, namely:

 To create transparency on 3R skills levels in Standard II.

 To achieve 80%+ pass rates in Primary PSLE Exams.

 To achieve 80%+ pass rates in Secondary CSEE Exams.

These targets were known as the ‘National Key Results Area’ (NKRA) for Education. In order to oversee progress across the six NKRAs (one for each target sector) Tanzania established a comprehensive BRN delivery architecture and regular performance monitoring regime. At the centre of this architecture was the President’s Delivery Bureau (PDB) headed by a prominent Tanzanian from the private sector10. The PDB was an independent unit in the President’s Office responsible for ensuring delivery of BRN objectives. The PDB monitored and reported on BRN progress and was the secretariat to the Transformation Delivery Council (TDC). Chaired by the President the TDC was intended to meet on a monthly basis and incorporated the Vice President, Minister of Finance and all relevant line Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. The TDC monitored overall delivery progress and problem solves difficult issues.

Each of the 6 BRN ministries then had its own Ministerial Delivery Unit (MDU). The Education MDU reported to the Minister for Education and was responsible for progress monitoring and reporting on the Education BRN plan, problem solving and analysis, supporting delivery capacity and communicating. Composed of a small team

9 See for example Andrews, M., Pritchett, L. & Woolcock, M. (2012) ‘Escaping Capability Traps through Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)’, Center for Global Development Working Paper 299 & Andrews, M. (2013) The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development of five staff from MoEST the MDU was headed by an internal MoEST appointee in its first year, and then by an external appointee put in place by the PDB until the dissolution of the BRN programme. The MDU acted as the secretariat for the NKRA Education Steering Committee, chaired by the Minister for Education, which met every month to look in detail at progress and issues against the Education BRN plan.

10 A former CEO of the Investment Climate Facility for Africa and Executive Director of a telecoms operator.

To what extent did Tanzania’s BRN Education plan, structures and approach adhere to the best practice principles of the Delivery Approach identified earlier in this paper?

Prioritisation and Resourcing

The BRN education delivery plan demonstrated a degree of prioritisation in that it contained a set of nine priority initiatives each with a dedicated set of activities and targets (see Figure 3 below for details).

The nine BRN initiatives contained a broad range of activities - from school construction to eliminating the backlog in outstanding teachers’ salary and non-salary claims and from teacher training to the public ranking of schools and the provision of related rewards for improved exam results.

These initiatives were then intended to contribute to a set of three headline results- improvement in the PSLE pass rate and CSEE pass rates to 60% in 2013, 70% in 2014 and 80% by 2015 and to create transparency on the 3R (reading, writing and mathematics) achievement of pupils in the second grade of primary schools. This latter result was important because, at the time of the Education Delivery Lab, there was no national achievement survey for the 3Rs in Tanzania. As we shall see, improvement in the 3Rs may be BRN’s most important and lasting achievement, however as a target it was often overlooked by the public, media (and, at times, the Ministry) as BRN came to be viewed as synonymous with improvements in high stake examination pass rate.

The broad range of BRN initiatives may have been considered necessary to bring about improved results but the focus across a relatively wide range of activities at the same time created several issues, particularly during the early days of BRN. These issues included budget (to prioritise funds across so many activities, and out of synchronisation with the government budget cycle), focus (limited capacity to focus on problem solving, data collection and getting the mechanics of delivery right) and understanding (limited awareness of all the specific BRN initiatives, in contrast the water sector BRN plan had only one headline- operational rural water points) There was excellent awareness of BRN’s headline objectives to improve exam pass rates amongst local stakeholders, but they were much less clear on the nine specific initiatives intended to achieve these11

The BRN Education delivery plan contained a number of unfunded and underfunded commitments when it was completed in April 2013. This caused significant concerns within MoEST, although it was able to reallocate existing resources to make a rapid start with a limited number of activities- including STEP training for secondary school teachers, clearing a proportion of teachers’ claims and producing the School Improvement Toolkit.

It was not until the approval of Global Partnership for Education (GPE) funds and Education Programme for Results (EPforR) funding in late 2014 that sufficient resources were available to make substantive progress against the majority of activities. The Government up to 2015 was unable to make sufficient resources available to meet the commitments in the BRN plan for capitation grants (enrolment based finance and books to schools). It was only following the election of President Magufuli and the introduction of the ‘Free Education’ policy, that schools began to receive their full allocation of capitation grant funds.

Despite these early funding difficulties one notable success of the BRN Education Plan was the way in which it provided a clear, Government-led focus for funding from development partners. Tanzania’s successful GPE application was structured around support for the BRN plan whilst DFID, the World Bank and SIDA collectively provided results-based financing support which was structured, at least initially to indirectly

11 Field survey reports by the Education MDU, late 2013 finance ex-post, BRN’s priority activities. This coordinated support from development partners (which in all likelihood would not have been as ‘joined-up’ without the clear set of Government-led priorities identified by BRN) meant that education did not suffer from the persistent financing gaps which afflicted progress in other BRN priority sectors12

Prioritisation and Resourcing- Adherence to Delivery Approach principles Principle

Limited

Priorities were identified but they had a wide scope. Overall results of programme (improvements in PSLE and CSEE results) clearly defined and understood.

Initial weaknesses with resourcing gaps and unfunded commitments addressed as programme continued. Provided a useful focus for development partner support.

Improvements in exam results seen as the number one priority by citizens as they provide a clear means for students to progress to higher levels of education.

Data, Information & Routines

BRN put considerable emphasis on establishing effective performance management and monitoring routines at the centre of government. This included the creation of the President’s Delivery Bureau (PDB) and Ministerial Delivery Units (MDUs) in each key Ministry. At Presidential level the Transformation & Delivery Council (TDC) was the key means for holding Ministers to account for progress against plans. Within the education sector the monthly NKRA Steering Committee was the main accountability forum.

Chaired by the Minister for Education this Committee involved senior representatives from a range of organisations including MoEST, the Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration & Local Government (PMO-RALG), the Ministry of Finance, the PDB, the Teachers’ Union and the National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA).

The Education Steering Committee met regularly (although unable to maintain the monthly frequency of meetings which was initially intended) and proved a useful forum for identifying and addressing performance issues. Where the ability to address these issues lay within the authority and remit of those people in the room the Committee proved effective and made a series of notable decisions (such as the decision to implement a ‘direct to schools’ capitation grant delivery system which was eventually operationalised nationally by President Magufuli in 2016).

12 However only a partial overlap was evident in the education sector plan that underpinned the GPE application and the BRN priority education sector plan. Soon afterwards, political pressure was applied on local government officials to improve secondary school infrastructure, through a national campaign for science laboratory construction that was in neither of the former priority costed plans.

There were sometimes occasions however where issues could not be unblocked. Often these involved the Ministry of Finance whose representatives on the Steering Committee were not of sufficient seniority to make resource allocation decisions. These issues had to be escalated to the TDC, chaired by the President, which met increasingly infrequently as BRN progressed.

Whilst performance management and monitoring routines were established at the centre of government this was not the case at district level. In 2013 the Local Government system in Tanzania consisted of 25 regions and 164 Districts. Whilst efforts were made to establish Regional Delivery Units (RDUs) these had limited impact on the implementation and monitoring of the BRN education plan. Districts were not subject to a locally equivalent performance management routine as the one which was in place nationally. The Education MDU did disaggregate the national examination pass rate targets into a series of regional and district specific targets to track headline progress and introduce a monthly reporting regime. Districts were then given autonomy as to how they oversaw implementation at a local level.

The lack of timely and accurate information was a major weakness when the BRN Education Plan was launched. Within the Tanzanian education system the President’s Office for Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG)13 is responsible for basic education and thus had reporting lines to all primary and secondary schools through regions (Regional Education Office- REO) and districts (District Education Office- DEO). MoEST is responsible for setting education policy whereas PO-RALG is responsible for overseeing implementation. The weaknesses of this system and inconsistent reporting lines between MoEST and PO-RALG were quickly exposed when BRN implementation commenced.

The PDB insisted on weekly and monthly progress reporting from the Education MDU. Initially the only way to gather progress data on initiatives such as school construction and capitation grant delivery was to make ad hoc phone calls to PO-RALG officials. They in turn would make phone calls to REOs and DEOs. The result was confused and often conflicting performance and progress information. This undermined performance management particularly as PO-RALG initially played a limited role in the delivery structures. The PDB was trying to hold MoEST Directors of Primary and Secondary Education responsible for initiative delivery when these Directors had only a policy, not an implementation mandate. Attempts to bring PO-RALG more clearly into the performance monitoring and management structures were never entirely resolved and bureaucratic resistance was not overcome.

In 2013 the reporting structure between DEOs and PO-RALG was based on the submission of quarterly narrative reports on primary and secondary education. These

13 Prior to October 2015 PO-RALG was known as the Prime Minister’s Office for Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) reports were voluminous, running into tens and in some cases almost a hundred pages, with significant repetition. Being quarterly in nature also meant that they were far too infrequent to meet the reporting requirements of BRN. Districts stated that they rarely (if ever) received feedback from PO-RALG. This is not surprising given that at the time PO-RALG was woefully understaffed, dealing with all aspects of primary and secondary education delivery across 164 districts. Compounding the problem, there were clashes over the operation of the Education Management Information System (EMIS) between MoEST & PO-RALG while annual school census data was habitually late and inaccurate.

To address this, the Education MDU worked with PO-RALG to develop a simple onepage excel based reporting template specifically for BRN activities. The initial reporting template was then refined and training conducted for Statistical Liaison Officers (SLOs) in each district. These were submitted by email to the Education MDU and PO-RALG through REOs. The report was compiled centrally and submitted to the Minister for Education. Personalised feedback was sent to all Regions and Districts through dedicated email groups. This feedback was warmly welcomed by local officials who stated that they now truly felt part of a responsive national system.

The monthly reporting system proved very labour intensive for the MDU but proved highly successful in enabling the centre of government to access timely progress information with useful narrative descriptions of implementation challenges. Over 95% of districts submitted their reports on time each month and it worked effectively for a twelve month period. Unfortunately the MDU did not have sufficient numbers of staff to sustain the system and provide monthly feedback so monthly district level reporting was discontinued in late 2015 as the final BRN targets deadline drew closer.

Data, Information & Routines- Adherence to Delivery Approach principles Principle Assessment of Adherence

Establishing effective performance management routines

Quality data and metrics to measure what matters

High/ Medium

Effective routines established at national level but not within Districts where monthly reporting was used as main lever to drive performance.

Medium

Significant weaknesses with reporting initially but improved considerably from June 2014 with the introduction of excel-based monthly district and regional reports. MoEST and PO-RALG were unable to sustain the intensive effort required to analyse reports and provide feedback to districts.

Analysis and Understanding of Delivery Issues

The BRN Education programme was launched through a large, lengthy and high profile ‘Delivery Lab’ conducted in the first quarter of 2013. The Lab was a six week planning session with 34 participants from a wide range of organisations including MoEST,

PMO-RALG, NECTA, Tanzania Education Authority, various universities and teaching colleges, development partners and civil society. It can be argued that the costs of the Lab were too high and that it could have been shortened to a week or two (with subsequent planning and detailed preparation of activities carried out be dedicated working groups) but there is no doubt that the process was very successful in establishing a high profile consensus over the issues that needed to be addressed in education. It also engaged a wide range of relevant stakeholders in analysis and planning.

The requirement to present the final plan to the President and have a signing ceremony where the Minister of Education took responsibility for delivering the results and targets was a very good way of getting high level endorsement. For all of its undoubted flaws (which will be touched on shortly) the BRN Education Plan was authentically and definitively the Government of Tanzania’s own plan. Indeed there is anecdotal evidence that in-country development agencies, (who were accustomed to supporting longer-term plans developed over many months and drafted in large part by external consultants), found the whole government-led pace and momentum of the BRN process alarming.

While most of the proposed activities in the BRN education plan displayed a good understanding of the education delivery system, some: i.) were always likely to have minimal impact on examination results, at least in the short term; ii.) failed to address the underlying systemic causes of issues and instead dealt with the symptoms.

An example of the former would be the production and distribution of the School Improvement Toolkit. While it is undoubtedly positive that all school principals have a concise guide setting out their roles and responsibilities it would be naïve to think that the simple act of delivering this Toolkit would have a meaningful impact on the quality of school leadership. In hindsight perhaps the BRN plan could have focused on the Toolkit as the entry point and then designed a district-based programme of training, twinning and mentoring.

An example of a BRN initiative which failed to address the underlying systemic cause of the issue was teacher claims. While funds were made available to clear the immediate backlog of outstanding teachers’ claims, no action was taken to analyse and improve the teacher claims system. The inevitable consequence was that, over time, the number of outstanding claims increased again and required a significant investment of Education PforR funds in 2015 to clear again. It was not until April 2016, once BRN had ended, that a thorough analysis of the teacher claims system identified the significant flaws which were leading to the constant backlog of claims.

The presence of these somewhat flawed initiatives should not distract from the fact that there were BRN initiatives which had a major positive influence on education performance in Tanzania. Such initiatives include 3R Assessment and Training, STEP remedial classes and capitation grant delivery (where the original BRN plan did not address the underlying cause of the problem but where the scrutiny provided did give a very significant momentum and eventual action).

One aspect of BRN delivery that could be called into question was the level of prescription and detail in the original ‘3 Feet Plans’ produced in the BRN Education Lab. The logic of producing a very detailed and prescriptive implementation plan is clear in that it enforces accountability and ensures that activities do not stall. This approach undoubtedly works well in Malaysia, which has a strong central government. In Tanzania, which has a more decentralised and diffuse education delivery system, the approach was not as effective. The ‘3 Feet Plans’ produced at the BRN Education Lab were very prescriptive and rapidly became out of date.

The BRN approach as implemented did not allow for much flexibility in reviewing and amending plans. The plan focused almost entirely on actions taking place at the centre of government and neglected communication and interactions with districts and schools. It is not surprising therefore that the most successful activity (STEP training for secondary schools) was one of the few activities where MoEST was directly responsible for implementation. The views of teachers, principals and local government officials were not adequately represented in the original 3 Feet Plans. However the lack of local delivery structures did allow for creativity as to how individual schools and districts implemented activities.

The Education MDU and PDB Delivery Team provided a support and challenge function to MoEST and PO-RALG at a national level. The Education MDU also played a support and challenge role for Districts based upon i.) feedback on monthly performance reporting and ii.) field visits to Districts. The ability of the Education MDU to provide this function to Districts was constrained by the fact that the MDU never had more than 5 staff to visit 164 Districts. With hindsight greater efforts could have been made to provide a support and challenge function to regions and districts, perhaps through peer networking and analysis sessions.

Analysis & Understanding of Delivery Issues- Adherence to Delivery Approach principles Principle Assessment of Adherence

Stakeholders are actively engaged in analysing delivery issues and owning outcomes High

The BRN ‘Education Lab’ which developed the education plan was a high profile, six week session with senior representation from a range of stakeholders. It ensured that the BRN education plan was truly ‘owned’ by the Tanzanian government.

Clear understanding of delivery Medium Whilst most activities displayed a good

Analysis & Understanding of Delivery Issues- Adherence to Delivery Approach principles systems understanding of the education delivery system there were several BRN initiatives which failed to address the underlying systemic causes of issues (e.g. teacher claims and capitation grant delivery). The initial BRN education plan also did not fully account for some of the difficulties involved in implementation caused by the structural and spatial differences between MoEST and PORALG. Some initiatives (School Toolkit and School Construction for example) were always likely to have minimal impact on examination results.

Understand and involve frontline workers

Effective support and challenge function

Low

High/ Medium

The ‘3 feet plan’ produced at the BRN Education Lab was very prescriptive and rapidly out of date. The PDB/PEMANDU approach did not allow for much flexibility in reviewing and amending plans. The views of teachers, principals and local government officials were not adequately represented in the activity plans. The lack of local delivery structures did allow for creativity as to how individual schools and districts implemented activities.

The Education MDU and PDB Delivery Team provided a support and challenge function to MoEST and PO-RALG at a national level. The Education MDU also played a support and challenge role for Districts based upon i.) feedback on monthly performance reporting and ii.) field visits to Districts. Coverage was constrained by the fact that the MDU never had more than 5 staff to visit 164 Districts.

Communication & Culture Change

Communications and culture change was arguably the greatest strength of the BRN programme. BRN had a very high profile launch in 2013 across all sectors and featured prominently across the print and broadcast media. Within the education sector MoEST and PO-RALG made a concerted effort to rapidly disseminate information on BRN initiatives and targets through their formal dissemination channels. Official letters were written to all District Education Offices and, a two-day BRN education launch event was held in Dar es Salaam. This launch was attended by at least 3 officials from every District and Regional Education Office. Performance contracts were signed by national, regional and district education officials as a sign of their commitment to deliver BRN initiatives and targets.

These communication efforts clearly had an impact because when the MDU TA Team carried out district-based fieldwork in December 2013 education officials, principals and teachers in remote rural areas of the country had all heard of BRN and knew that it was intended to drive up pass rates in primary and secondary schools. There was a clear sense that teachers, head teachers, principals and district officials would be held accountable for these pass rates, with some officials stating that BRN should stand for ‘Better Resign Now’ because they did not believe it would be possible to achieve these ambitious targets with their current level of resourcing.

Despite the high levels of awareness of the overall BRN programme and objectives there was much more limited awareness of the detail of the specific BRN initiatives and accompanying targets. In part this was due to the top-down formalised nature of communications through the existing education delivery system which meant that messages reached key officials but did not always permeate to the wider community. A study showed that the stakeholder groups with the lowest levels of understanding of BRN were communities, parents and pupils (Integrity Research, 2016)

Communication & Culture Change- Adherence to Delivery Approach principles

Principle Assessment of Adherence

Effective communications strategy

Public awareness of BRN Education’s objective of improving pass rates was very high, penetrating down to even the most remote rural areas. The key message about collective responsibility for improving education was also well understood. There was much more limited understanding of the 9 BRN education initiatives (such as School Ranking) particularly at school and community level due to the ‘top down’ nature of communications and reliance on government reporting lines.

Right balance between planning & delivery

The 9 BRN education initiatives contained a mixture of activities which would be like to have a short-term impact (school ranking, STEP classes) and longer term impact (3Rs Assessments and Training) on educational performance. Some of the proposed initiatives (most notably teacher claims but also capitation grant delivery) failed to address the root structural cause of issues and instead tackled the symptoms.