Weaknesses and Challenges

The previous chapter has set out some of the undoubted achievements of BRN education but it is also important to identify the weaknesses and challenges which BRN failed to overcome, these are set out in the paragraphs below.

The structural weaknesses of education delivery system remained unaddressed

Perhaps the biggest obstacle to effective BRN implementation was the tension and lack of collaboration between the two leading government actors: the MoEST and PORALG. The separation of roles and responsibilities between a policy setting Ministry based in Dar es Salaam (MoEST) and an implementation Ministry based in Dodoma (PO-RALG) was an accountability vacuum waiting to happen. The ‘grey area’ between policy development and implementation provided an ideal opportunity for officials in both Ministries to blame the other for a lack of progress and results.

It was especially problematic that the initial Education Delivery Lab failed to adequately address the realities of this delivery system - with undue emphasis being placed on the role of the Minister for Education and policy-focused Directors in Dar es Salaam. Attempts were made to address this by seconding PO-RALG staff into the Education MDU and by assigning PO-RALG Directors with named responsibility for BRN initiatives but in many ways the damage had already been done.17 There was an abiding sense across PO-RALG that BRN Education was driven by MoEST and was therefore a MoEST responsibility. Requests for regular performance data exposed significant data and reporting inadequacies. As PO-RALG held the direct reporting relationships with Regions, Districts and Schools, MoEST Directors responded to data requests by passing them on to PO-RALG officials. These were handled in an ad hoc manner: by making phone calls to district officials, rather than through systematic and verifiable channels. The result was multiple and sometimes conflicting figures for BRN indicators which were then used to hold MoEST Directors to account.

The working relationship between MoEST and PO-RALG did improve over time as both Ministries established a more effective working relationship underpinned by improvements in monthly BRN reporting. By mid-2015, when the Education Program for Results (EPforR) TA Team began operating there was a noticeable improvement in the working relationship and understanding between the two Ministries. While this improvement generally continued into 2016 (after President Magufuli had reconfigured PO-RALG so that it reported to the President’s Office rather than the Prime Minister’s

Office) the structural weaknesses of having two Ministries (each with their own set of Ministers and priorities) persisted.

In addition to the coordination issues between MoEST and PO-RALG, there were other systemic weaknesses which remained unaddressed by BRN. Most prominent amongst these was the issue of teacher claims. Clearing the backlog of teacher claims was a BRN priority initiative but the 3 Feet Plans failed to address the root structural causes of this backlog. As a result once funds had been released to clear the original backlog of claims, new outstanding claims continued to accumulate throughout the BRN reporting period. It was not until April 2016 (once BRN had officially ended) that MoEST and PO-RALG (supported by the EPforR TA Team) conducted an in-depth analysis of Tanzania’s teacher claims system and identified the root causes of the persistent backlogs (MoEST & PO-RALG, 2016)18

Consistency of Presidential engagement and willingness to tackle financing gaps

The personal interest and drive of President Kikwete was a major factor in the initial publicity and prioritisation of BRN within government and by stakeholders across the education system. The requirement to report progress on a weekly basis to the President’s Delivery Bureau (PDB) and for the Minister and PS to then be held to account by the President on a monthly basis at the Transformation and Delivery Council (TDC) was a major incentive to deliver results.

The initial TDC meeting had a very positive impact on the Ministry as it engendered a real sense that the President considered education to be a priority and took a personal interest - even to the extent of specifying the content and format of a high profile National Education Week. As BRN delivery extended into 2014 and 2015 it became noticeable that, whilst regular BRN Education meetings continued to take place, TDC meetings were regularly postponed and cancelled. This weakened the sense of downwards accountability between the President’s Office and MoEST.

18 The final report on the ‘Assessment of the Effectiveness of Teacher Claims Processing Systems and Practices in Tanzania’ (MOEST & PO-RALG, 2016) identified 4 main findings, namely:

1. The payment of non-salary claims is not prioritised in some Councils while others have inadequate funds to pay claims.

2. There is a lack of effective and timely sharing of information between Councils and PO-PSM with a weak linkage between the Teachers Service Department in Councils and PO-PSM in executing the latter’s delegated mandate of teacher discipline and promotion.

3. The absence of automated systems for processing leave, transfer and retirement claims generates bureaucracy and leads to delays and inaccuracies.

4. Limited communication with teachers as to the status of their claims means that the majority of them feel demotivated and frustrated

The cancellation and postponement of TDC meetings also contributed to a sense of frustration and powerlessness at the lack of traction on financial matters. In some ways education was in a better situation than other BRN priority sectors due to (i) the availability of funds from the Education Levy (a transaction tax placed on mobile data services and initiated as part of the BRN initiatives) and (ii) the presence of donor funded initiatives (initially GPE and subsequently EPforR). However there were still significant BRN activities which required the support and buy-in from the Ministry of Finance, in particular for fund release for capitation grants and textbook procurement.

The Ministry of Finance was a standing member of the Education NKRA Steering Committee but this failed to resolve issues such as the continued underfunding of the education system through low levels of capitation grant release to Districts (in the 2014/2015 financial year for example only 38% of the budgeted amount was released). While there were evident macro-fiscal constraints, relatively small education budget lines prioritised under BRN were not in reality a priority in the central decision making process. It took the election of President Magufuli in late 2015 to unblock these issues with the Ministry of Finance and ensure that education received the levels of government funding specified in guidelines and the annual budget.

Lack of connection between some BRN activities and improved educational outcomes and absence of focus on falling attendance levels

Whilst some BRN initiatives dealt with self-evidently important aspects of the education system such as ensuring adequate school level financing (capitation grant) and improving the quality of teaching and learning in the early grades (3Rs assessment and training) this was not universally the case.

As an example, evidence of the impact of the School Improvement Toolkit on the quality of leadership and management in primary and secondary schools is limited to say the least. The BRN Lab identified a critical issue- the quality of leadership and management in schools- but its proposed solution (the production and distribution of a simple guide to school leadership to every school in the country) is not supported by any evidence base as to its impact. To be effective such a guide could have been completed by a package of mentoring and support, overseen by District offices and utilise various community of practice approaches. A more nuanced solution was not considered during the Lab, perhaps because of the desire to come up with neat, easily measurable national ‘solutions’ which could be rolled out rapidly nationwide.

So while the BRN reporting system diligently measured the number of schools every month who had received a copy of the ‘School Improvement Toolkit’, this indicator was effectively meaningless in determining whether there had actually been any measurable improvements in leadership and management in government schools.

Limited community engagement and use of ‘bottom-up’ accountability mechanisms

Whilst BRN proved largely effective in harnessing ‘top down’ accountability measures to influence behaviour at school and district levels it did not adequately consider the role of ‘bottom up accountability’ as a driver of change. The impetus to conduct BRN activities and report on progress was transmitted from national government down to regions, districts and schools through formal communication channels. Whilst there was general publicity about BRN transmitted through newspapers, radio and television there was never a concerted effort made to engage communities in bringing about and monitoring school level activities.

The lack of community knowledge of the specifics of BRN activities at a local level was highlighted through field research ( Integrity Research, 2016). Community members could talk in general about BRN’s aim of improving exam pass rates but they were not able to talk in detail about activities which had taken place locally or how their community’s school was performing in relation to others. BRN did increase the amount of information which was publicly available on schools but as this was displayed in government websites it remained inaccessible to most Tanzanian citizens. The EPforR Programme is trying to address this issue, recognising the power of local communities to enforce accountability and bring about changes in behaviour in schools. Methods of achieving this include the involvement of community leaders and simple visual displays of school performance displayed within communities or on school premises.

Uneven willingness and inconsistent incentives to drive change combined with lack of dedicated capacity to drive necessary system improvements

Whilst some staff in Government wholeheartedly ’bought in’ to the BRN approach, this was not universally the case. Indeed there was covert and overt resistance from several staff, some in quite senior positions, within Ministries. On the whole Districtbased staff appeared to embrace BRN initiatives more enthusiastically than some of their national colleagues, perhaps because it increased the attention and resources dedicated to local delivery. Over the period in question it was noticeable that some staff who had been either overtly or covertly hostile to BRN were transferred away from positions of authority within the education sector.

The lack of willingness to embrace BRN was compounded by the fact that the most competent and capable staff within MoEST and PO-RALG were over-burdened with existing activities and were not re-assigned in sufficient numbers to deal with its initiatives.19 As a result some of the progress made during the BRN reporting period, such as the development of an effective monthly reporting system, was not sustained or embedded within existing staff responsibilities.

19 This lack of capacity was exacerbated by the earlier phased transfer of responsibility for basic education from MoEST to PO-RALG in the 2000s, without the consequent transfer of staff. There were not resources to relocate families the 500km to Dodoma. Large scale transfer of staff from MoEST in Dar es Salaam to PO-RALG in Dodoma mitigated this situation in 2016.

It can be argued that the Education PforR programme and its provision of financial rewards linked to the achievement of specific tasks by national and district staff proved a more effective incentive than BRN in addressing critical issues such as EMIS and equitable teacher deployment.