International Affairs Review U.S.-China Policy Special Issue - Volume XXIII, No. 3: Summer 2015 by International Affairs Review

I NTERNATI ONAL AFF AI RSREVI EW U. S. CHI NAPOLI CYSPECI ALI SSUE VOLUMEXXI I I , NUMBER3 S UMMER2 0 1 5

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VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW ADVISORY BOARD J. FURMAN DANIEL VISITING ASSISTANT PROFESSOR THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY MARK GASPAR LECTURER THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY MARLENE LARUELLE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL ASIA PROGRAM RESEARCH PROFESSOR, IERES THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY KIMBERLEY L. THACHUK, PHD PROFESSORIAL LECTURER THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

_________________ THE INSTITUTE FOR COMMUNITARIAN POLICY STUDIES

The International Affairs Review is a non-profit, peer-reviewed, academic journal published biannually in Washington, DC. It is an independent, graduate student run publication sponsored by the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. Opinions expressed in International Affairs Review are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of International Affairs Review, the Elliott School of International Affairs, the George Washington University, or any other person or organization formally associated with International Affairs Review. Editorial correspondence and submissions should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. Submissions should include an abstract, the author’s mailing address, telephone number, e-mail address, and a brief biographical statement. Articles should conform to Chicago Style guidelines, be 4000-6000 words, and should be submitted electronically as Microsoft Word documents or in a compatible file format. All submissions become the property of International Affairs Review, which accepts no responsibility for lost or damaged articles. International Affairs Review 1957 E Street, NW  Suite 303K Washington, DC 20052 E-mail: iar@gwu.edu Website: www.iar-gwu.org Rights and permissions to photocopy or otherwise reproduce any portion of this publication for circulation are granted only with the express, written consent of International Affairs Review. A restricted license for limited or personal use is granted to librarians and other users registered with the proper copyright authorities. "鸟巢 Bird’s Nest (National Stadium) / 中國北京體育建築之形 Sports architecture forms in Beijing, China / SML.20140502.6D.31732.P1.BW" by See-ming Lee, used under CC BY 2.0 / Resized and text blocks added over original http://goo.gl/4KBwD5--- https://www.flickr.com/photos/seeminglee/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/legalcode Copyright © 2015 International Affairs Review All Rights Reserved. ISBN: 978-0-578-16216-4 Printed in the United States of America by Signature Book Printing, www.sbpbooks.com

FROM THE EDITOR’S DESK

ast spring, the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies came across campus and proposed a novel idea: a one-year partnership between ICPS and International Affairs Review to produce a special issue and event to explore U.S.-China relations. Intrigued, we immediately started plotting the logistics of producing a third issue in two semesters with our staff of volunteer graduate students.

We decided to frame this issue as a series of discussions circling the central question of how China and the United States can avoid conflict. You will find each paper paired with a response here, and we hope that conversation will continue at our event in late May and online in the coming weeks and months. Additionally, we present an interview with TX Hammes, a retired Marine Corps colonel and expert on the strategic dimensions of the U.S.-China relationship, and reviews of five recent books that engage in the academic debate. Because ICPS caters to practitioners and academics, we opened submissions to non-graduate students for this issue only, but featured graduate students in the responses and book reviews. ICPS offered the full-time services of the excellent Erin Syring as the issue’s guest editor, and IAR merged its normally separate web and print editorial staffs to spread the workload. Our authors were, to a person, incredibly responsive to our tight deadlines and editorial input. The web staff writers were particularly impressive as they researched, wrote, and edited their response pieces to papers that were themselves still undergoing intense editing. We are incredibly proud of this team and the issue they put out. International Affairs Review has been a graduate education in and of itself, and if we seem to know a little bit about everything, it is because of the wide range of quality work that has been submitted to us and that we have agreed to edit – and in editing, we have learned even more. We hope that our successors will find this as rewarding an experience as we did. Signing off for the last time, we are: Elizabeth Burnham, Editor-in-Chief Rick Berger, Managing Editor

MASTHEAD EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Elizabeth Burnham MANAGING EDITOR Rick Berger GUEST EDITOR Erin Syring, ICPS EXECUTIVE BOARD Mia Brown Will Harrington CONTRIBUTING EDITORS Joey Cheng Chelsea Dreher Shiyun Lu Isabel Martin del Campo Ludlow Peng Shen COPY EDITORS Amira Loutfi Shiyun Lu Sebra Yen LAYOUT EDITOR Travis Parrott STAFF WRITERS Nicole Golliher Andrew Ligon Genevieve Neilson Jordan Sotudeh CONTRIBUTING WRITERS Emily S. Chen, Robert Cronkleton, Davis Florick, Ryan Mitchell, Carolyn Posner, Michael Sampson, Doug Strub, Kelly Vorndran, DD Wu, Liyi Ye, Youlin Yuan, Chin Chin Zhang, Zhiqun Zhu EVENTS: Melissa Paul, ICPS

WRITE TO US: International Affairs Review Elliott School of International Affairs 1957 E Street, NW Suite 303K Washington, DC 20052 www.iar-gwu.org iar@gwu.edu The International Affairs Review accepts submissions year round, with a call for submissions occurring at the beginning of each academic semester and selection rounds shortly thereafter. For further information or to request notification, contact the editors at iar@gwu.edu. Back issues are available to individuals, libraries, and institutes; contact the editors with the year, volume, and issue number, phone number or email address, and mailing address. The International Affairs Review publishes short pieces weekly at www.iar-gwu.org and in the IAR Newsletter. Contact iarwebeditor@ gmail.com for questions, subscribe at www.iar-gwu.org, or submit items of about 1000 words to iarsubmissions@gmail.com.

CONTENTS VII

FOREWORD BY ERIN SYRING

REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO BUILDING LONG-TERM CONFIDENCE AND TRANSPARENCY DAVIS FLORICK & ROBERT CRONKLETON

SIMPLE INGREDIENTS FOR THE SINO-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP CHIN CHIN ZHANG

FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP: THE LESSONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING THE 19TH CENTURY MICHAEL SAMPSON

COMRADES OF CONVENIENCE JORDAN M. SOTUDEH

DISPEL DISTRUST: START FROM NORTH KOREA ZHIQUN ZHU

NORTH KOREAN DENUCLEARIZATION: A POOR OUTLET TO AVOID THUCYDIDES’ TRAP NICOLE GOLLIHER

AN INTERVIEW WITH T.X. HAMMES RICK BERGER

COOPERATION IN DEPTH, COMPETITION IN CONTROL: SHAPING “A NEW TYPE OF GREAT POWER RELATIONSHIP” IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES EMILY S. CHEN

REFRAMING “MAJOR COUNTRY RELATIONS” IN PURSUIT OF PARTNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY GENEVIEVE NEILSON

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REDEFINING PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT: THE “NEW MODEL” OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND THE OPPORTUNITY OF SHARED CONSEQUENCES RYAN MITCHELL

128

SEEKING TRUTH FROM FACTS: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS REQUIRE MORE THAN RHETORIC DOUG STRUB

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ASIA’S CAULDRON: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE END OF A STABLE PACIFIC BY ROBERT KAPLAN CAROLYN POSNER

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MAJOR POWER RELATIONSHIP大国关系 EDITED BY WANG JISI 王缉思 YOULIN YUAN

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FIRE ON THE WATER: CHINA, AMERICA, AND THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC BY ROBERT HADDICK KELLY VORNDRAN

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AGE OF AMBITION: CHASING FORTUNE, TRUTH, AND FAITH IN THE NEW CHINA BY EVAN OSNOS DD WU

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DEBATING CHINA: THE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS EDITED BY NINA HACHIGIAN LIYI YE

Framing the Issue: A Foreword Erin Syring Erin Syring is an Editorial and Research Assistant at the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies. She first joined the Institute in 2012 and became a permanent member of staff in 2013 after graduating from Mount Holyoke College with a degree in international relations and French. She resides in Washington, D.C. Four years ago, Graham T. Allison of Harvard University coined the term “the Thucydides trap” to describe a dynamic wherein an established hegemon so fears the growing clout of a rising power that it takes preemptive steps to circumvent it, thus triggering a security competition between the two powers. Historically, this competition has often escalated into outright military confrontation.1 The dynamic takes its name from Thucydides’ foundational international relations text, History of the Peloponnesian War, which states that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.”2 As China continues to rise, many of the most respected experts in international relations have offered a diverse range of contributions to the growing debate over whether the United States and China will fall into this Thucydides trap. Some prominent scholars and policymakers have suggested that United States and China will be unable to manage their security dilemma. John J. Mearsheimer, the “father” of offensive neorealism, speculated that though China is currently too weak to challenge the United States, it will eventually pursue regional hegemony in Asia. Mearsheimer does not believe that his preferred policy of containment will be able to prevent growing U.S.-Chinese tensions from devolving into direct conflict.3 However, most scholars agree that the United States and China can use careful diplomacy and policy initiatives to avoid the strategic competition and outright conflict that the Thucydides trap describes. Henry Kissinger, for example, challenges the idea that “a contest for supremacy between VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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FOREWORD China and the United States is inevitable” and asserts that it is entirely possible for the United States to “preserve its security” without confronting China.4 Graham Allison argues that the United States and China are confronting the “dangers two parties face when a rising power rivals a ruling power,” but that they can avert “catastrophe” through heightened dialogue and mutual accommodation of “irreducible” interests.5 Zbigniew Brzezinski once advanced the idea that the United States and China could jointly share power as part of a G-2,6 and he has since argued that the United States could promote stability by “[accommodating] China’s rising global status.”7 Fareed Zakaria holds that the United States’ relative power is declining, but that this does not preclude its flourishing.8 Hugh White has argued that the wisest U.S. response to China’s rise would be to abandon its current goal of primacy in Asia in favor of a regional power-sharing agreement, which could increase mutual respect between the two states and avert a crisis.9 An entire school of thought generally holds that the United States and China will turn toward a global partnership.10 Among policymakers, Chinese President Xi Jinping mentioned the Thucydides trap in a conversation with New Perspectives Quarterly in which he rejected the thesis that “strong countries are bound to seek hegemony.”11 President Barack Obama likewise has stated the importance of cooperation on a host of issues.12 Both states have crafted initiatives – the U.S. “Asia pivot” or “rebalance” and the Chinese “new type of major power relations” – designed to address mutual friction in the Asia-Pacific region. The issue promises to remain salient for years to come, as China shows few signs of returning to its prior weakness. China officially became the world’s largest economy in purchasing power parity terms in January, according to the IMF.13 Although its exceptional growth period has recently ended, the IMF predicts that China’s current growth rate will persist for at least two more years.14 Beijing has expanded its humanitarian aid and foreign direct investment, founded new international financial organizations, and crafted initiatives to bolster the economic infrastructure of countries along a dual mainland and maritime “Silk Road.” Its military viii

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ERIN SYRING spending is growing 10 percent a year,15 and its naval fleet will outnumber Pacific-based U.S. ships by 2020.16 The Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at the George Washington University has sought to launch conversation among experts and policymakers about how best to prevent serious tensions from arising between the United States and China. Toward this end, it has hosted a symposium on U.S.-China relations, and its director has traveled to China to speak with scholars and students. He also wrote and published a set of U.S. foreign policy prescriptions collectively known as “mutually assured restraint.”17 In this spirit, the Institute has opted to sponsor this special issue of the International Affairs Review, which is dedicated to exploring a range of perspectives and novel policy proposals to prevent the United States and China from clashing in the wake of China’s economic growth and military modernization. The articles that follow engage with the concept of the Thucydides trap as it applies to the contemporary U.S.Chinese relationship. Broadly, these articles challenge the offensive neorealist approach to the Thucydides trap, insofar as they hold that United States’ fear of China is not inevitable and propose mechanisms for avoiding conflict. Endnotes Graham T. Allison, “Obama and Xi Must Think Broadly to Avoid a Classic Trap,” New York Times, June 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/opinion/obama-and-ximust-think-broadly-to-avoid-a-classic-trap.html 2 Some scholars have outright rejected the applicability of Thucydides’ words to the contemporary United States-China relationship, notably Karl Eikenberry. See: Karl Eikenberry, “Thucydides Trap,” American Review, August 2014, http://americanreview mag.com/stories/Thucydides-Trap 3 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014). 4 Henry A. Kissinger, “The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (March/April 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137245/henry-a-kissinger/ the-future-of-us-chinese-relations 5 Graham Allison, “Thucydides trap has been sprung in the Pacific,” Financial Times, August 21, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d695b5a-ead3-11e1-984b-00144feab49a. html#axzz3W52BkJ00 1

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James Jay Carafano, “Why a U.S.-China ‘G-2’ Won’t Work,” The National Interest, January 6, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-us-chinese-g-2-wont-work9653 7 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Balancing the East, Upgrading the West: U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Upheaval,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (January/February 2012), http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/136754/zbigniew-brzezinski/balancing-the-east-upgradingthe-west 8 Joseph S. Nye, “Joseph Nye on Global Power,” Fivebooks.com, accessed March 31, 2015, http://fivebooks.com/interviews/joseph-nye-on-global-power 9 Yuen Foong Khong, “Primacy or World Order?: The United States and China’s Rise— A Review Essay,” International Security 38, no. 3 (Winter 2013/14): 153-175 at 167, http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00147 10 Michael Evans, “Power and Paradox: Asian Geopolitics and Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century,” Orbis 55, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 85-113 at 91-93, http://www.fpri.org/ docs/media/evans.asiangeopolitics.pdf 11 Quoted in Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Can China Avoid the Thucydides Trap?” New Perspectives Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2014): 31-33 at 31, http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1111/ npqu.11444 12 Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, “Remarks by President Obama and Chinese President Xi After Bilateral Meeting, June 2013,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2013, transcript available at http://www.cfr.org/china/remarks-president-obama-chinesepresident-xi-after-bilateral-meeting-june-2013/p30908 13 Joseph E. Stigliz, “The Chinese Century,” Vanity Fair, January 2015, www.vanityfair .com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy 14 “Why China’s economy is slowing,” Economist, March 11, 2015, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-8 15 “The new nuclear age,” Economist, March 7, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/ leaders/21645729-quarter-century-after-end-cold-war-world-faces-growing-threatnuclear; See also: Jeremy Page, “China to Boost Military Budget by 10.1%,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-boost-military-budget-byabout-10-1425457646 16 “At the double,” Economist, March 15, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/china/ 21599046-chinas-fast-growing-defence-budget-worries-its-neighbours-not-every-trendits-favour 17 Amitai Etzioni, “Mutually Assured Restraint: A New Approach for United StatesChina Relations,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 20, no. 2 (Spring-Summer 2014): 3751, http://www.brown.edu/initiatives/journal-world-affairs/issues/202-spring–summer2014 6

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Remapping U.S.-China Relations: A Holistic Approach to Building Long-Term Confidence and Transparency Davis Florick and Robert Cronkleton Davis Florick is a master's candidate in East-West Studies at Creighton University. His areas of concentration include, but are not limited to, East Asia and former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union states. He was recently interviewed, in print, by Voice of America regarding North Korean tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone and, on television, with Consider This… where he discussed the recent upheaval in Ukraine. He has also been published in International Affairs Forum, the World Business Institute, and previously in International Affairs Review. Robert Cronkleton is an undergraduate at Creighton University with a focus on environmental policy, renewable energy technology, and East-West relations. He will be presenting this summer at the Green Asia Conference in Bangkok on developing sustainable infrastructure in cities across Southeast Asia. He is currently working on interdisciplinary research concerning sustainable development in Asia, in conjunction with academic outreach for Creighton’s East-West Studies program. Abstract Over the last forty-five years the relationship between China and the United States has been largely driven by strategic and economic imperatives. Since reengagement in 1971 a number of programs have been instituted, including the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which have met varying degrees of success. Unfortunately, maintaining momentum has proven difficult. To alter the current ebb and flow cycle, building a healthy partnership will require cooperation on a wider array of issues The views expressed in, and pertaining to, this document are solely those of the authors and may not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Strategic Command, Department of Defense, United States Government, or Creighton University.

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REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS coupled with more pronounced and continual engagement. Strengthening defense, economic, and social ties holds the potential to affirm mutual benefit in the partnership, thereby reducing problems of asymmetry. In a similar vein, positing a number of short-, mid-, and long-term options in one, comprehensive accord will serve to promote a more active role on the part of policymakers on both sides of the Pacific. Introducing a new agreement symbolically represents a renewal in the broader U.S.-China partnership. Likewise, the options will be tiered based upon the probability of success. Progressively more difficult, but potentially more rewarding options, will be provided in the midand long terms. Utilizing a gradated approach to engagement may seem self-explanatory, but it is necessary to build momentum and enthusiasm, in both the United States and China, for bilateral cooperation. Emphasizing transparency and confidence building measures in the relationship holds the distinct possibility of redefining relations between Beijing and Washington. Only by promoting mechanisms to reduce misperception and mistrust can strategic stability be ensured over the long term. Introduction The relationship between the United States and China is unique in the annals of the international system. Holistically, never before have two states with such different cultures emerged as leaders on the world stage. While the United States and China have competing localized and shortterm interests, a multitude of strategic incentives motivate them to cooperate, even in the face of obstacles, because â&#x20AC;&#x153;a number of critical problems that the planet and individual nations face cannot be adequately addressed without Sino-American collaboration, among them global economic growth, world health, and environmental issues.â&#x20AC;?1 Cooperation between the two is imperative for the international community to move forward. The challenge is to preserve the focus on strategic priorities despite the tantalizing prospect of pursuing operational opportunities.

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DAVIS FLORICK AND ROBERT CRONKLETON The real question today centers on the means to encourage the maintenance and growth of such mutually-beneficial dynamics. Particularly “with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, U.S.-China relations are no longer anchored in a common threat.”2 Cooperation must be proactive and leverage broader justifications. Over the last twenty-five years both parties have intermittently sought to address the absence of unifying incentives. Unfortunately, the focus of much of this work has been on economic cooperation that, particularly by itself, runs the risk of creating asymmetric stakes. That is, when a state’s leadership feels they gain little from cooperation or the partnership means more to the other party, asymmetry emerges, and with it an increased risk of conflict. Defense, economic, and social programs in concert hold the potential to raise the value of cooperation to such a level that breaking off the partnership would prove too costly for both parties. To take engagement one step further, shaping U.S.-China relations based on a progressive range of opportunities is vital to reducing misperceptions and misunderstandings, because it provides a means of gradually building confidence and trust. Identifying a set of short-, mid-, and long-term options to address defense, economic, and social elements that can form the nucleus of future cooperation is essential to building mutuallybeneficial dynamics. Value in Cooperation Whether explicit or implicit, conflict prevention is at the heart of foreign policy. On one end of the spectrum, the mechanism to achieve peace is external negotiations, such as when U.S. Department of State officials conduct diplomacy with their counterparts abroad. On the opposite end, the mechanism is internal actions intended to assure allies and partners while deterring adversaries. For example, military professionals exercise and train as a show of force to deter action or inaction elsewhere. Although internal activities can work on their own, the likelihood of reducing misperceptions and misunderstandings is greater when combined with external mechanisms. In particular, seeking cooperation helps reduce negative emotions but can also engender and promote goodwill. In the wake of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, President George H.W. Bush VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS understood the value of cooperation. In a personal letter to Deng Xiaoping “Bush closed with an appeal for a continuation of the existing cooperation: ‘We must not let the aftermath of the tragic recent events undermine a vital relationship patiently built up over the past seventeen years.’”3 In this example, but also broadly speaking, the cumulative effect of positive reinforcement is that it encourages additional engagement, thereby reducing the benefits to disengagement. Developing a long-term plan for engagement enables the parties involved to harness momentum and to encourage long-term progress. Central to any vision for greater partnership is the need to take the first step. However, complex agreements require trust which can only be built through practice. A theoretical example for how this process might look follows: Transparency measures could take various forms, with a variety of tools and different levels of credibility. This means that transparency measures exist at various levels. Where political tensions persist, transparency measures could start with the least controversial and thus politically acceptable steps, such as holding seminars and declaring national nuclear energy policies. If a participant can acknowledge benefits from the first step of informal cooperation, this participant could have more incentives for the second step of cooperation.4 U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union and, later, Russia demonstrates how such transparency measures, absent a long-term implementation plan, work in practice. Work in less complex areas such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty improved confidence and trust between both parties and made feasible agreements such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Successful defense engagements between the United States and the Soviet Union promoted cooperation elsewhere and minimized potential conflicts. However, the two countries never created plans for the long term; the lack of a strategy made it easier for both parties to disengage, creating an asymmetric environment. This asymmetry has since undermined the parties’ existing programs of cooperation. A tiered approach towards cooperation creates an 4

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DAVIS FLORICK AND ROBERT CRONKLETON environment more conducive to partnership, thereby making asymmetry and conflict less likely. Chinese and U.S. Strategic Priorities Identifying some of both states’ vital interests is critical to highlighting potential partnership opportunities. Because these underlying objectives serve as the basis for policy decisions, both sides need to improve their respective understanding of one another. Identifying the trade space between Beijing’s interests and Washington’s will greatly inform potential transparency and confidence building measures (TCBM). Broadly speaking, China’s strategic priorities, as highlighted in China’s 2013 Defense White Paper “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” are:5  Safeguarding national sovereignty  Maintaining security and territorial integrity  Supporting China’s peaceful development Similarly, U.S. strategic priorities are, as summarized in the 2015 National Security Strategy:6  Ensuring the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners  Maintaining a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity  Fostering respect for universal values at home and around the world  Cultivating an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges Collectively, these strategic priorities represent the foundation for defense, economic, and social cooperation between the United States and China. To this end, “both countries [can] pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjusting their relations to minimize conflict. Neither side [will] endorse all the aims of the other or presumes a VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS total identity of interests, but both sides [will] seek to identify and develop complementary interests.”7 Where mutual benefit, necessity, and opportunity converge, Beijing and Washington can partner to further regional and strategic stability. China’s Justification for a New Engagement Strategy with the United States U.S. policymakers must understand the intricacies of Chinese decision making, especially why Beijing would want to seek new measures to promote strategic stability with Washington; this will help U.S. officials better communicate the proposal. In the past, “trust between the leaders and people of the two countries was overwhelmed by strident and abusive American invective and accompanying pressure against Chinese policies and practices as well as by bitter Chinese counterattacks on the United States and its policies and practices as the world’s ‘hegemon.’”8 Escaping the trap of poisonous domestic politics requires a greater understanding by senior leaders on both sides of their counterparts’ challenges. For example, China’s economy faces mounting obstacles to maintaining growth. Its tremendous supply of labor during the early reform years has begun to tail off, forcing wage ESCAPING THE TRAP OF increases that have raised costs for businesses and consumers. POISONOUS DOMESTIC Additional pressures, including POLITICS REQUIRES A the retirement bulge, migrant GREATER UNDERSTANDING BY worker populations, and SENIOR LEADERS ON BOTH healthcare vulnerabilities, are SIDES OF THEIR becoming increasingly insurmountable. Beijing can COUNTERPARTS’ CHALLENGES. break this mold, but it must come up with innovative ways to make its economy more effective and efficient. Greater cooperation with the United States presents an opportunity for continued momentum. Unfortunately, the United States is dealing with many of these same issues, as “both societies face the fundamental and long-term task of rebuilding themselves for a new age-economically, 6

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DAVIS FLORICK AND ROBERT CRONKLETON socially, and institutionally.”9 By working together on economic and social programs, the United States and China could find joint solutions in some of these areas. Similarly, territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific region present a hurdle for Chinese leaders. Only by working with Washington can Beijing acquire the credibility and trust amongst its regional partners to achieve amenable solutions to its territorial challenges. “If handled correctly, [the South China Sea] will demonstrate China’s capacity to maintain good relations with [Association of Southeast Asian Nations];”10 however, the chances of an acceptable outcome will be far greater if Beijing and Washington can effectively find, through partnership, common ground and broad-based solutions to regional security. Communication will address China’s strategic interests and bolster America’s assurance posture vis-àvis its regional allies. Dialogue on these types of issues reduces the likelihood of an arms race in the Asia-Pacific region. Fundamentalist Islam poses a more serious domestic security challenge to China than it does to the United States. China’s Uighur population, a Turkic and Muslim minority, has been engaged in a violent political struggle against the state-sponsored emigration of ethnic Hans into Xinjiang. Further compounding matters, some radical Uighurs are fighting with the Taliban.11 Fears over emigration combined with the training received abroad could lead to fundamentalist Uighurs becoming an even more grave challenge for Chinese internal security. These concerns over the Uighurs demand the Chinese Communist Party’s attention and engagement, but to reach amenable solutions it needs external assistance. Working with the United States could significantly improve holistic burden sharing while reducing China’s political footprint in combatting terrorism. Perhaps no two countries have a greater impact on energy and environmental security strategy than China and the United States. China finds itself in an incredibly resource constrained environment without the necessary environmental and resource management capabilities. Moreover, the consequences of environmental degradation are not limited VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS to any particular location and must be solved multilaterally to shape not only the United States and China’s own domestic policies, but also those of their global partners and allies. Beijing and Washington’s advocacy for things such as resource preservation and environmental sustainability is vital to raising awareness and funding. The long-term commitment required to solve these systemic issues further necessitates U.S.-Chinese cooperation. By developing joint resolutions, Beijing and Washington will stand a much better opportunity of garnering international support for real, positive change. The United States’ Justification for a New Engagement Strategy with China Finite budget limitations will motivate Washington to explore cooperative opportunities with Beijing to minimize defense expenditures, while, in parallel, embarking on further options for joint economic growth. Balancing the budget is no easy task for Washington policymakers. Domestic and foreign reasons make it extremely difficult to sacrifice enough programs to begin to run surpluses. To give but one example of a complication, the 2011 Budget Control Act’s significant impacts – “$500 billion over the next nine years, on top of $487 billion” – have already complicated defense procurement strategies.12 The United States can greatly benefit from cooperation with China by leveraging two mechanisms. First, elevating the level of economic cooperation and coordination between the two states will help both economies continue to grow by increasing the tax base. Second, by continuing to sell U.S. Treasury bonds to the Chinese government and private investors, the Unites States creates greater incentives on the part of the Chinese to support the U.S. economy’s success. For budgetary and economic reasons, cooperation between Beijing and Washington is to the United States’ benefit. The United States also faces a number of strategic challenges in the AsiaPacific region, which cooperation with China could help solve. Setting aside terrorism, the most serious one for Washington is assuring allies and partners that it will protect their interests. Deterring Chinese aggression is 8

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DAVIS FLORICK AND ROBERT CRONKLETON the best way to demonstrate U.S. resolve; however, rather than holding Chinese expansion in check through sheer force, Washington policymakers should establish de-escalatory mechanisms. Avoiding reminders of the “100 years of invasion by Western powers and Japan that [China] suffered before 1949” requires promoting TCBMs and collectively improving dialogue mechanisms.13 While creating forums to develop compromises may not be viable for all the problems in the region, e.g., Taiwan, it will promote strategic stability. In turn, creating dialogue mechanisms will bolster the U.S. position in the region and make it easier to negotiate with China. By proactively engaging with China on regional issues, the United States can begin the process of identifying cooperative solutions to a number of concerns. Finally, the United States is facing rising coastal water levels, desertification, and declining reserves of rare minerals and fossil fuels in a political environment hostile to peer-reviewed science. The near-constant election cycles limit opportunities to craft domestic political solutions to these increasingly ominous environmental degradation and natural resource allocation problems. Working with China for bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to better enact environmental protections and manage extraction of natural resources would help Washington policymakers reach out to audiences in parts of the world it would otherwise have no hope of persuading to adopt reform policies. The United States will need China’s support to create change in the increasingly complex and interconnected world of environmental and resource preservation. Negotiating and Launching the Accord The United States and China have a number of ongoing activities to promote bilateral relations. While each of these programs has been met with some success, many have shown little progress. Although forums like the U.S.-Chinese Economic and Strategic Dialogue can tout a number of deliverables, the policies, processes, and procedures within the bilateral relationship are not without their flaws. Today the challenge is two-fold. First, the relationship has deficiencies from a holistic perspective. VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS Successful economic endeavors best characterize the partnership, but gains in defense and social cooperation have been limited. While the emphasis on economic engagement has been pragmatic in the short term, it has limited benefits in the long term. This focus on economics will need to transform into a more diversified effort including defense and social mechanisms to preserve the long-term health of the relationship. Second, the relationship lacks a long-term, strategic focus. Identifying short-, mid-, and long-term goals could help outline a comprehensive plan for developing U.S.-Chinese relations. Growing the partnership will take time and energy, but it will be critical to preserving strategic stability between both states and in the region more generally. Putting the partnership on an ideal path toward success will require a clearly articulated, tiered series of TCBMs. Short-term endeavors will serve as the foundation for mid-term ones, and mid-term ventures will form the basis for long-term tools of engagement. Often, “the State Department avoids metrics to judge diplomacy’s effect,” but employing measurements will be central to the eventual success of this new U.S.China accord.14 Evaluating the success of earlier engagement options represents metrics that can serve as useful tools to track progress as the partnership develops. How success is quantified will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis to account for unique qualities of each TCBM, as well as potential changes to the strategic environment. Regardless, utilizing short-term mechanisms as a means to inform future work will enable both sides to better shape and scope later partnership opportunities. Approaching engagement through an evolutionary process will fortify the relationship with clearly defined objectives over a period of decades. Outlining a long-term program will not preclude the flexibility to craft future options that account for domestic politics. Some programs will need to be adapted, but the broader accord will endure. Minimizing constraints regarding TCBMs will give both sides the freedom to accommodate one another’s election cycles, party politics, and exogenous shocks. Adopting the principle that, to summarize a comment from Chairman Mao Zedong to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, “each side could arm itself 10

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DAVIS FLORICK AND ROBERT CRONKLETON with whatever ideological slogans fulfilled its own domestic necessities, so long as it did not let them interfere the need for cooperation,” will enable momentum on United States-China engagement, while satisfying domestic constituents.15 Beijing and Washington can utilize this accord to craft an ambitious and rewarding program for both parties’ benefit. The challenge will be to acknowledge the need for cooperation and to invest the requisite political will to realize the agreement’s potential. Short-Term Engagement Opportunities Today, Beijing and Washington have mutual interests in resolving a number of challenges while developing mechanisms to engender stronger cooperation and partnership. The challenging dynamics that will MECHANISMS TO EMPLOY motivate cooperation are not likely OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS to change in the short term – say, NEED TO STEM GROWING over the next two years. While INSTABILITY, DRAW DOWN negatives may push Beijing and Washington together, positive and MISPERCEPTIONS, AND holistic endeavors exist to encourage CREATE POSITIVE TCBMs; for example, cooperation MOMENTUM. with the United States can offset the “challenges of development” that China faces as it “enters middle-income status.”16 In the short term, a balanced approach predicated on addressing strategic necessity, fostering goodwill, and creating opportunities for mutual benefit and prosperity is of paramount importance to putting U.S.China relations on a cooperative path in the mid- and long term. Mechanisms to employ over the next two years need to stem growing instability, draw down misperceptions, and create positive momentum. TCBMs that address these facets of the relationship will pave the way for future engagements. Three examples include:  A quota system for naval and aerial incursions and a moratorium on personnel landings onto the disputed territories off China’s coast

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REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS  

Streamlining processes and procedures for firms from both states seeking to do business in the other state Making improvements to the U.S. college application process

This list is not all-encompassing; however, it represents a holistic approach to cooperation. Broad-based means and mechanisms serve to promote mutual benefit, and holistic engagement will minimize the chances of asymmetry. Particularly early on in this plan, reducing perceptions that the other party stands more to gain from noncompliance is vital. The first short-term step the United States and China can take to begin to reduce further instability in the South China Sea and over the Senkaku Islands is to implement a quota on naval and aerial encroachments and to bar states from relocating citizens, including members of the armed forces, to any contested islands, rocks, shoals, and other formations. Of note, patrols should be included if they are within twelve nautical miles, or another negotiated distance, of any of the disputed territories. Fears that states will establish jurisdiction through sheer physical presence and defense build-ups are motivating a race to patrol territory and place armed forces on key islands. For example, “China has stationed troops of the People’s Liberation Army on many of the disputed islands and atolls in the region.”17 Banning further personnel landings of any kind on disputed formations would help curtail competition over claiming islands, and a negotiated quota system on overflights and sea patrols would assure claimants that other states will curtail activities in contested territory. Both of these steps would demonstrate the willingness and patience required to make a resolution more feasible. Prioritizing the legal process over shows of force would in turn help China erode the regional perception of it as a domineering state, which is driving others to adopt a containment strategy. To achieve this TCBM there will clearly have to be participation from Japan. However, Tokyo’s involvement can be negotiated through U.S.Japan talks at a later date. Managing territorial incursions this way would also reduce domestic and foreign pressure on Washington to take a more demonstrative position on regional disputes. 12

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DAVIS FLORICK AND ROBERT CRONKLETON The second step the United States and China can take in the short term is to address corruption and to streamline business processes in each other’s territory. Xi Jinping’s fight against corruption and Barrack Obama’s attempts to improve transparency mean both nations have a vital interest in addressing business-government relationships. Where American firms in China are concerned, the Xi administration could broaden its anticorruption campaign by prosecuting government officials that seek kickbacks from U.S. business interests. Similarly, Washington could improve goodwill in Beijing by opening up its interagency and Congressional decision-making processes and approving the entry into the United States of more Chinese businesses. The case of Huawei illustrates this point well. A bipartisan Congress worried that Huawei’s products might pose a threat to U.S. security and U.S. companies; these concerns led to “formal investigations of proposed acquisitions by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.”18 In the end, Huawei’s leadership succumbed and withdrew its business proposals. As with many issues in Washington, the politics of Chinese business ventures in the United States trumped operational realities. Streamlining business processes to avoid this politicization would reduce barriers to entry and transaction costs, which would foster greater prosperity for all and lead to more goodwill. The third issue the United States and China could address in the short term is the complexities of the U.S. college admissions process; taking action could greatly improve Chinese perceptions of and approaches to this pivotal issue. Given China’s one-child policy, few decisions are more important for a family than where a child will attend college. Too often, the limitations on Chinese family planning place extreme pressure on all involved to find the right school for the child and do whatever it takes to improve the child’s chances of admission. All the energy, money, and time parents invest often leads to failure to gain their child admittance to the small handful of U.S. institutions with a global brand or recruiting footprint in China. Running advertising campaigns and otherwise raising awareness of the number of very strong American schools as choices for Chinese students would undercut some of the pressure caused by so many students pursuing access to only a handful of schools. Meanwhile, VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS Washington has reason to pursue this course of action because “America’s greatest long-term influence on China comes from playing host to the thousands of students who come from China each year.”19 Making college in the United States more accessible for Chinese students would increase their exposure to the outside world, thereby changing their view(s) and generating goodwill to be leveraged when these youngsters advance to senior private and public positions in China. Reform would also greatly benefit the United States’ promotion of both openness and stability. Working to reform the college application process in China for U.S. colleges would be a deliverable for U.S.-China relations. Mid-Term Partnership Trade Space In the mid-term, the United States and China must focus on building momentum. Beijing and Washington should tout early successes thus creating sufficient political capital to pursue more challenging ventures. Maintaining an approach that addresses defense, economic, and social disciplines in parallel will help preserve the mutually beneficial elements to this partnership. Policymakers on both sides of the Pacific must use the mid-term period to validate the success of cooperation developed in the short term while keeping an eye on grander engagements moving forward. Building on short-term successes will require diligent efforts by both parties. Ostensibly, a wide range of options can be adopted in the midterm. A few examples include:  Notify one another of major troop movements and strategic military exercises  Curtail protectionist policies in specific disciplines  Improve mechanisms for Americans to adopt Chinese children The elevated political challenges associated with each of these programs should not be understated. The foreign policies of both parties will need to devote particular attention to this stage of the program, because it represents a step forward in both risk and reward. How both sides manage their mid-term responsibilities carries with it the fate of the larger program, to a greater extent than do the short- and long-term mechanisms. 14

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DAVIS FLORICK AND ROBERT CRONKLETON From a defense standpoint, building communication mechanisms is the easiest way to avoid escalation borne from misunderstanding. A system by which each side communicates to the other in advance of significant troop movements or a major strategic exercise promotes greater shared awareness. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), of which the United States is a participating state, already incorporates a simple guide for providing notifications when there is involvement of “at least 9,000 troops, including support troops; or at least 250 battle tanks; or at least 500 armoured combat vehicles; or at least 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces [or] mortars”; a similar set of guidelines could be developed for the United States and China.20 As this TCBM develops, the need may arise for a physical center to manage notifications, which will open the possibility for further cooperation in the defense field. Admittedly, both sides will have to agree about what qualifies as “significant troop movements” and “strategic exercises,” but both are negotiable. Since Washington provides similar messages to Moscow as part of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, this should not be a difficult step forward for the United States. Likewise, because of potential benefits to China, this TCBM could be amenable to Beijing. Irrespective of the mechanism’s value to each party, this mid-term tool is a critical step toward longer-term cooperation.

MAINTAINING AN APPROACH THAT ADDRESSES DEFENSE, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL

Protectionism in the business field and its carryover into politics has the potential to DISCIPLINES IN PARALLEL WILL poison the strongest of HELP PRESERVE THE MUTUALLY partnerships; in the case of the BENEFICIAL ELEMENTS TO THIS United States and China, PARTNERSHIP. policies intended to ensure the viability of domestic interests have enabled both sides to justify each other’s approach. One of the issues that agitates Washington the most is that “China has long used compulsory joint ventures, technology transfer and access to cheap land and loans from state-owned banks to boost companies in strategic sectors.”21 For Beijing and Washington to lift protectionist tactics, both sides must take VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS on powerful domestic constituencies; however, the success of the negotiation phase depends on both parties demonstrating their desire to strengthen the relationship. While there will be political risk, achieving this TCBM can serve as one such significant display of goodwill and trust in U.S.-China relations. The issue of Americans adopting Chinese children is extremely politically sensitive, but it holds tremendous social promise. In China, fear largely stems from European and American behavior and attitudes toward Chinese life in the nineteenth century. Scares over missionaries in China stealing babies and U.S. efforts to trick the Chinese into working on the railroads in the Western United States were tremendous social ills. For example, in dynastic China “orphans were the responsibility of their relatives, whose treatment of the children was their own business. It was incomprehensible to the Chinese that strangers should be able to take in boys and girls without the consent of their families and relatives. This practice aroused the darkest of suspicions. Rumours abounded that missionaries kidnapped children.”22 Within this context it is understandable that Beijing would make the adoption process incredibly complex. The United States, as a show of cultural empathy, can alleviate some of the domestic pressure to prevent contemporary “kidnappings” that Beijing faces by working with Chinese authorities to better identify ideal character traits for potential adoptive families and subsequently providing a better screening process based on the findings. As U.S. officials demonstrate a greater desire to understand the Chinese perspective, there will be a gradual erosion of the fear on the Chinese side. A little more work on the part of U.S. officials is a small price to pay in order to achieve a breakthrough. Long-Term Cooperation: The Fruits of Our Labors This phase represents the culmination of years of hard work; however, it is just another step in the process of improving U.S.-China relations. Longterm engagement, viewed as six years from now and beyond, should focus on solidifying existing partnerships while opening new avenues. Having gone through the ups and downs of short- and mid-term cooperative 16

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DAVIS FLORICK AND ROBERT CRONKLETON efforts, both sides will possess a greater understanding of the cultural and geopolitical factors that influence the other sides’ decision making processes. Empowered with this information, long-term cooperation can pursue bold changes across the full spectrum. In pursuit of enduring strategic stability, the United States and China will need to tackle a wide array of defensive, economic, and social issues. Given that long-term options for cooperation will be the most difficult to achieve, it is important to evaluate them based on their collective impact before going into detail. Also, venturing into this arena cannot occur until after both countries achieve considerable momentum. Consequently, while these options may seem challenging now, they will appear less daunting in later years. The ensuing examples are by no means a complete list:  Conduct joint counter-terrorism operations and increase intelligence sharing  Develop legal reforms in China and improve business information sharing  Engage in bilateral ventures to address climate change Successfully bridging divides in these realms is vital to changing the strategic landscape. The U.S.-China relationship is the most important in the twenty-first century and developing TCBMs like these will avert asymmetry and destabilization. The spread of fundamentalist Islam, most notably the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, threatens China’s core domestic security interests. If a sufficient number of Uighur Muslims become radicalized, policymakers in Beijing could acquire a far greater internal threat than it currently faces. The idea of cooperation on counterterrorism operations may seem unlikely today, but that is not necessarily the case. First, although it is rarely reported in the United States, “mullahs [in Afghanistan and Pakistan] frequently denounce” Chinese counterterrorism activities; therefore, cooperation will not hurt China’s image.23 Second, cooperation in the short and mid-term will make this option more practical. Because of a shared interest in deterring domestic upheaval, China and the United States can seek to exchange intelligence information regarding terrorist activity, which VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS would open opportunities to work together on counterterrorism operations. Broadly speaking, counterterrorism is vital for long-term United StatesChina defense cooperation. A number of serious issues prevent information sharing between U.S. and Chinese businesses in fields such as space. For example, the United States worries that commercial cooperation in these fields will lead China to obtain technologies that threaten U.S. security. This unfortunate state of affairs is the byproduct of a confluence of events: [US-China] commercial space cooperation got wrapped with fears at the time of Chinese spying at US nuclear facilities. […] The Congressionally mandated Cox Committee charged in 1999 that Loral and Hughes had provided know-how of direct relevance to China’s nuclear delivery systems. […] Legislation pushed through the Republican-led Congress re-categorized all space technology as munitions items under US International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) controls, essentially banning US–Chinese space commerce from that point forward.24 Policymakers in Washington concerned with potential dual use capabilities going to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains a paralyzing obstacle to commercial U.S.-Chinese cooperation. To date, the response has been to prevent virtually all information sharing in the space domain. Improving legal protections in China, such as separating information-sharing entities from official government entities like the PLA, is necessary to strengthen the credibility of its commercial and civil space entities. Likewise, the Administration and Congress can work together to reduce politicization and apprehension in Washington and help improve the United States’ ability to share information and, ultimately, improve its own space capabilities. Addressing ITAR restrictions will permit U.S. commercial interests to broaden their options for what technologies can be produced, and make it possible to manufacture equipment in China at lower costs. Dealing with these issues is important for economic growth and improving goodwill between both parties. 18

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DAVIS FLORICK AND ROBERT CRONKLETON Addressing environmental issues must be a seminal goal of U.S.-Chinese cooperation. This relationship must focus on developing policies and procedures to prevent future degradation as well as recover from some of the existing damage; achieving these goals will require a package of objectives representative of a global endeavor. As a first step, the parties should jointly focus on the Climate-Smart/Low-Carbon City Initiative to make changes in urban infrastructure that accommodate growing populations and reduce carbon emissions; they can convene a summit to identify high-value target cities, share best-practices, set new goals, and begin the collaborative mechanisms necessary to embark on sustainable societies. Beyond this, the United States and China should form other joint enterprises for developing more carbon neutral technologies. They could collaborate on solar and wind power, promote trade in green goods, enhance cooperation on hydrofluorocarbons, and expand joint clean energy research and development, for example. In a similar fashion, each side must work to better understand the other’s domestic projects. For instance, in China many view hydroelectric power as a means of providing clean energy and as a justification to move away from farming, particularly in areas where the land has been subject to extreme overuse. Planners from both hemispheres can and should engage in more fruitful discussions in order to define and develop sustainable infrastructure. Conclusion Enhancing the U.S.-China bilateral relationship must be a pivotal focus for Washington policymakers moving forward. Both sides have interests that can motivate and encourage cooperation; however, one party must take the lead and fully engage the other side in partnering. Furthermore, both sides can leverage current engagements and, in some cases, incorporate them into this broader approach. An accord that lists options in the short, mid-, and long term would be pivotal in mapping out a successful engagement concept. Most importantly though, developing an all-encompassing approach that includes defensive, economic, and social options is vital for placing the U.S.-China relationship on the best path. Beijing and Washington have a tremendous opportunity to reshape the strategic landscape through their bilateral partnership. The challenge will be VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

REMAPPING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS outlining a strategy for cooperation and being fully committed to it for the duration. Endnotes David M. Lampton, Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 231. 2 Graham Allison, Robert D. Blackwill, and Ali Wayne, Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2013), 44. 3 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 417. 4 Kazuko Hamada, "Transparency and nonproliferation in the Asia-Pacific region: Enhancing transparency, strengthening the nonproliferation regime," Progress In Nuclear Energy 50, no. 2-6 (2008): 660-665 at 662, http://dx.doi.org.cuhsl.creighton.edu/ 10.1016/j.pnucene.2007.11.053 5 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm 6 White House, “National Security Strategy,” 2015, www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf 7 Kissinger, 526. 8 Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein, China’s Challenges (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 248. 9 Lampton, 232. 10 Rowan Callick, Inside China’s Modern Communist Elite: The Party Forever (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 228. 11 Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 196. 12 “Defence Spending – Squeezing the Pentagon,” Economist, July 6, 2013, para. 2, http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21580460-wrong-way-cut-americasmilitary-budget-squeezing-pentagon 13 “Maritime Power – Your Rules or Mine?” Economist, November 15, 2014, para. 6, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21631792-trade-depends-order-seakeeping-it-far-straightforward-your-rules-or 14 Michael Rubin, Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes (New York: Encounter Books, 2014), 323. 15 Kissinger, 284. 16 deLisle and Goldstein, 122. 17 Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014), 23. 1

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Theodore H. Moran, "Dealing with Cybersecurity Threats Posed by Globalised IT Suppliers," Policy 29, no. 3 (2013): 10-14 at 10-11, https://www.cis.org.au/images/ stories/policy-magazine/2013-spring/29-3-13-theodore-moran.pdf 19 Allison et al., 46. 20 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Vienna Document 2011: On Confidence- and Security-Building Measures,” December 28, 2011, 20, http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597 21 “Protectionism – The Hidden Persuaders,” Economist, October 12, 2013, para. 10, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21587381-protectionism-can-take-manyforms-not-all-them-obvious-hidden-persuaders 22 Jung, Chang, Empress Dowager Cixi: The Concubine Who Launched Modern China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 91. 23 Rashid, 198. 24 James Clay Moltz, "China, the United States, and Prospects for Asian Space Cooperation," Journal Of Contemporary China 20, no. 68 (2011): 69-87 at 79, http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2011.520847 18

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In Response:

Simple Ingredients for the Sino-American Partnership Chin Chin Zhang Chin Chin Zhang is a M.A. candidate for International Trade & Investment Policy at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs in 2016. Strongly valuing economic incentives in international relations, she is passionate about commercial diplomacy and global capital markets. Her study integrates the political, economic and financial dynamics of global currents, with regional focuses on the United States, European Union and China. She worked in the financial services industry while earning her B.S. in Applied Mathematics from University of California-Los Angeles. Whenever interests between states get convoluted, scholars seize the opportunity to march ambitiously toward long-term relationship-building. They do so under the assumption that the best way to avoid great-power conflict is by emphasizing mutual interests in the long run. Unfortunately, too forward-looking an approach can easily diverge from the core issues at present, yielding ankle-deep analyses, biased standpoints, and vulnerable arguments. Florick and Cronkleton’s “Remapping China-United States Relations” offers hopeful cooperative ventures rather than pragmatic solutions to prevent a negative spiral in Sino-American relations. The authors fashion opportunities for collaboration in the defense and social realms to diversify the existing economics-heavy approach and to reduce mistrust. Yet the measures put forward by the authors do not factor in Beijing’s perspective and often demand total concession from China. Despite their optimistic vision across defense, economic, and social issues across different timeframes, the authors fail to acknowledge China’s strategic priorities. In radical contrast to the well-briefed U.S. strategic priorities from the 2015 National Security Strategy, China’s strategic priorities are only “broadly spoken” as to “defend sovereignty, maintain

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CHIN CHIN ZHANG territorial integrity and support development” – a very incomplete summary. China’s latest national security document states Chinese diplomatic priorities as, in order of importance: “Collaborate with Russia (联俄), Attract the EU (拉欧), Calm the US (稳美).”1 The strategy identifies China’s top national security …THE MEASURES PUT concern as “the U.S.-led Western attitude on China’s domestic FORWARD BY THE AUTHORS policies, territorial dispute and DO NOT FACTOR IN BEIJING’S ocean rights.”2 The low priority PERSPECTIVE AND OFTEN assigned to the United States on DEMAND TOTAL CONCESSION China’s diplomatic agenda contrasts with its top position as a FROM CHINA. defense priority. This evidences Beijing’s defensive stance toward a distrusted Washington, a stance that cannot be addressed by merely peripheral mutual interests. First and foremost, ongoing terrorism and territorial disputes challenge both nations’ priorities. For China, sovereignty issues reign supreme, while the United States is more concerned with terrorism and the stability of the international order. Florick and Cronkleton argue that China should join counter-terrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (ISIS), reasoning that Beijing may face a direct future threat from returning fighters. The scenario is not far-fetched, as Beijing was informed by Israel last year that about a thousand Uighurs had joined ISIS.3 Yet China will have little interest in cooperative counter-terrorism efforts until the threat manifests – and may believe that cooperating with those very efforts will make it an immediate target. In August 2014, President Obama labeled China a “free-rider” in the Middle East.4 To the Chinese public, such a label exaggerated China’s economic prowess and downplayed Beijing’s contribution in the post-war reconstruction effort in Iraq.5 Regardless of Obama’s true intention, perceived disrespect is enough to insulate trust. To move forward, Washington could initiate an open conversation with Beijing, express VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

SIMPLE INGREDIENTS FOR THE SINO-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP hopes of further cooperation in the Middle East, recognize China’s past contributions in the region, and offer future cooperation on combating terrorism aimed at China. Similar problems plague the authors’ identification of Chinese territorial disputes for short-term resolution possibilities. The authors suggest establishing a “quota system for naval and aerial incursions and a moratorium on personnel landings on the disputed territories off China’s coast.” This is an entirely U.S.-centric view absent recognition of China’s historical governance of the South China Sea that dates back to 210 BC – a fact that equals “effective governance” under international law.6 No other issue is more pertinent to Chinese sovereignty than the South China Sea dispute. If the United States desires shared leadership with China, it should maintain a neutral position on South China Sea issues to avoid unnecessary damage to mutual trust. In contrast to the defense and political spheres, economic factors are so far the most-developed aspect of the U.S.-China relationship. Massive trade flows already bond the two parties’ interests despite disputes in other arenas. The authors caution against weighting the relationship too heavily toward economic ties, but fail to realize that bilateral trade and investment issues hold the greatest potential for mutually beneficial partnership opportunities. Moving forward, both parties need to constantly adjust public-private dynamics to better meet market needs and accommodate firms from the other state within relevant legal frameworks. In the outlook for trade and investment, two general challenges remain, the larger of which is protectionist policies. The authors suggest that the United States and China “increase transparency and openness in businessgovernment relationships and lift protectionist tactics in the interests of cooperation and building good will.” This echoes the current trend in Sino-American relations. A Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), initiated in June 2014 and completed in March 2015, agrees to provide protections for the other country’s foreign investors.7 If the BIT transitions from paper to reality, China will attract increased foreign direct investment and reduce its heavy reliance on manufacturing exports and debt-financed investment, 24

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CHIN CHIN ZHANG while the United States could further penetrate the Chinese market and even gain early stakes in a liberalized financial market envisioned in Xi’s reform agenda. The United States needs to smooth concerns over its loss of domestic employment, while China needs to take serious measures to ensure fairness to foreign investors with the exact set of rules and protections agreed upon in the BIT. The second challenge today exacerbates Chinese distrust of American motives. Desperate U.S. efforts to persuade allies to avoid joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have backfired. The AIIB complements U.S.-led international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank (ADB) rather than competing with or replacing them.8 The AIIB is an initiative China took to address under-investment in infrastructure in Asia, as the annual need of $800 billion for infrastructure investment by 2020 has been inadequately funded by the ADB at less than $10 billion a year.9 In opening and funding 50% of AIIB, China demonstrated its potential leadership capabilities as a responsible superpower. Major European economies have recognized Chinese emerging leadership by joining the AIIB, and the United States should follow suit. Alternatively, the U.S. government could ratify the long-overdue quota and governance reforms for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as proposed by Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew.10 These reforms would lift China to the third-largest shareholder in recognition of its investment and support of the IMF. Lastly, education and cultural exchanges contribute to peace and cooperation for generations to come. Because of their low-risk nature, soft-power initiatives remain the most viable front to further bilateral engagement and promote mutual understanding. Florick and Cronkleton suggest immediately simplifying American college applications for Chinese students and propose long-term mechanisms to ease the process for American families looking to adopt Chinese adolescents. As the authors note, the current college selection system for Chinese international students suffers from its intricate complexity. The authors suggest widening the range of college choices as a general proposal. The VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

SIMPLE INGREDIENTS FOR THE SINO-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP suggestion is forward-looking and will help build long-term mutual understanding, but is nearly impossible to achieve in the short term. The authors’ long-term plan aims to increase the number of Chinese children adopted by American families. The program would work better if aimed at enhancing the rate of teenage student exchange, as the Chinese authorities may interpret the proposed adoption plan as a subtle attempt at brain drain. Meaningful work could be put into bilateral agreements that grant young adults 90-day visa-free privileges to experience the culture of each country. Complementary to an organized study abroad program, this legal freedom would grant young adults the flexibility to study the other culture during spontaneous traveling and socializing. A winning Sino-American partnership does not require a blueprint significant in scale, but rather a few A WINNING SINOvital steps toward mutual AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP understanding. Essentially, it is time for the United State to respect Chinese DOES NOT REQUIRE A sovereignty and trust China’s BLUEPRINT SIGNIFICANT IN leadership capacity in economic SCALE, BUT RATHER A FEW development. In exchange, China VITAL STEPS TOWARD needs to further liberalize its capital market, create a fair environment for MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. American and foreign investment, and consider some measures to assume more international responsibility in combating terrorism. The education front, with its fewer conflicts of national interests, provides a pragmatic starting point to build trust. After that, policymakers in both nations need to constantly keep in mind a mutually beneficial partnership when deciding each further move. Endnotes PRC Government [国际关系学院国际战略与安全研究中心], National Security Bluebook: PRC Security Report 2014 [国家安全蓝皮书：中国国安全研究报告] (Beijing: Social Science Document Publisher [社会科学文献出版社], 2014). 1

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CHIN CHIN ZHANG

Feng Zhongpin [冯仲平], “Our nation should ‘Collaborate with Russia, Attract the EU, Calm the US’” [专家提战略建议： “联俄，拉欧，稳美”], Sina.com.cn, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-05-07/075730076646.shtml 3 Luo yuan罗援, Associate Dean at Military Academy, was informed by Israel during a visit in June 25th, 2014 about more than 1000 Uighur recruited by ISIS. As quoted in: Qui Zhenghai [邱震海], “Should China Combat ISIS” [中国是否该打伊斯兰国], Phoenix TV [凤凰卫视], November 6, 2014, http://www.caogen.com/blog/infor_detail /64392.html 4 President Barak Obama, interview by Thomas L. Friedman, “China as a Free Rider” in “Obama on the World,” New York Times, August 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 08/09/opinion/president-obama-thomas-l-friedman-iraq-and-world-affairs.html 5 “Obama labeling China as ‘free rider’ in Iraq Issue,” Xinhua, September 4, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-09/04/content_18543889.htm 6 “The historical and judicial bases for Chinese claims over the South Sea” [中国主张南海主权的历史与法理依据], Guoqing.com.cn, April 11, 2012, http://guoqing.china.com.cn/2012-04/11/content_25115653.htm 7 US-China Business Council, “Bilateral Investment Treaties: What They Are and Why They Matter,” June 2014, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/our-conferences/ us-china-bilateral-investment-dialogue/multimedia/papers/bilateral-investmenttreaties.pdf 8 Lou Jiwei, China’s Minister of Finance, as quoted in Tetsushi Kajimoto and Ian Chua, “Australia signals approval of China-based AIIB,” Reuters, March 20, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/20/us-asia-aiib-idUSKBN0MG0CB20150320 9 Brij Mohan, “AIIB: Purpose, Structure and India’s Interest,” International Research Journal of Commerce, Arts, and Science 5, no. 11 (2014), http://www.academia.edu/ 9887353/Asian_Infrastructure_Investment_Bank_Purpose_Structure_and_India_s_Intere sts 10 “US Treasury Department Urges Congress to Pass IMF Reform Bill,” CRIEnglish, March 18, 2015, http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/03/18/3781s870494.htm 2

VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

From Competition to Partnership: The Lessons of Anglo-American Cooperation in Central America during the 19th Century Michael Sampson Michael Sampson is a final year PhD candidate in International Relations at Balliol College, University of Oxford, and former Procter Fellow and Fulbright Scholar in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. His research focuses on the strategic and distributional implications of international contracts. As a result he writes on Chinese trade contracts and the international political economy of East Asia more broadly. He has also written on 19th century Anglo-American diplomacy and published on cooperation theory with Oxford University Press. He holds a first class honors degree in politics from the University of Bristol and an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford. Abstract No reasonable person would argue that in 50 years the relative position of the United States in East Asia will remain the same as it is today. In large part this is due to one factor: the growth in the power of the Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Republic of China. The policy debate has consequently moved on from whether the United States needs to adapt to this emerging reality but rather how it does so. In the following article I point to lessons that may be learned from an historical example of two states competing for regional hegemony: Great Britain and the United States in Central America in the mid19th century. I argue that Britain, by abandoning its pretensions to a regional monopoly was able to peacefully secure a degree of restraint on the part of the rising power, the United States, and in so doing transformed a potentially volatile situation into one of constructive partnership which ultimately improved outcomes for both parties. I conclude by drawing out the policy implications for the United States from this historical precedent. 28

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MICHAEL SAMPSON Hegemony in East Asia The United States, as a result of its geography, history, and national interest, is a Pacific power, and as a great power it will continue to have legitimate interests in East Asia for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless its relative position in East Asia is changing due to the relative rise and growing assertiveness of China. As this transpires, there are many aspects of policy on which U.S. and Chinese interests will converge. However, there are, of course, important instances when the interests of the two powers will not.1

ANGLO-AMERICAN

RELATIONS ARE How can the United States manage this without creating PARTICULARLY FRUITFUL TO regional or global instability, a CONSIDER DUE TO THEIR damaging decline in bilateral NUMEROUS PARALLELS TO relations, or a significant THE CONTEMPORARY deterioration of its position in the region? I draw on the history of POSITION OF THE UNITED Anglo-American relations to STATES VIS-À-VIS CHINA IN suggest how the United States and EAST ASIA. China may coordinate on the many issues upon which their interests can be furthered more effectively through regional partnership than by pursuing their interests alone. These issues are sufficiently significant that both powers should abandon simplistic ambitions to exclusive regional hegemony and work toward a regional partnership. On issues where the difference between the two states’ interests is apparently irreconcilable, a useful ambiguity can and should be maintained, whilst areas of shared interest are emphasized. An examination of the evolution of relations between Great Britain and the United States in 19th century Central America can provide some useful lessons on both of these counts.

Anglo-American relations are particularly fruitful to consider due to their numerous parallels to the contemporary position of the United States visà-vis China in East Asia.2 In the mid-19th century, Britain’s hegemonic position in Central America was expected to deteriorate relatively, to the VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP benefit of the United States. However, like the United States today, Britain had an important economic relationship with its challenger that it did not wish to jeopardize through confrontation.3 At the same time, as a result of its growing power, the United States was increasingly wary of outside interference in what it considered to be its sphere of influence. Also, its foreign policy was in part driven by assertive nationalist opinion, particularly following the U.S. victory in the war with Mexico.4 Equally, like the United States today, Britain had to balance its obligations to local allies against broader geopolitical considerations, and though Britain retained its global military edge, its calculations were significantly affected by the growth of U.S. regional power. Despite this, also like the United States today, Britain remained an important regional power and wished to remain so for the foreseeable future. Finally, there existed mutual suspicion, a history of antagonism, and significant potential for conflict between the two powers but also many areas ripe for cooperation. Hegemonic Power Dynamics Before examining Anglo-American relations more closely, however, it is useful to consider the nature of hegemonic power shifts more generally. In any negotiations between two states, power dynamics play an important role in their strategies. A rising state is, ceteris paribus, incentivized to prolong negotiations and delay any agreement as its relative power position becomes more favorable. On the other hand a strong, relatively declining state is incentivized to conclude a deal as soon as possible before its position deteriorates further. How then can these competing incentives be overcome? One way this may be resolved is for the declining power to utilize the power advantage that it still retains to incentivize the rising power to engage in cooperation immediately, by offering concessions that the rising power cannot yet secure alone. Under such conditions the stronger declining state gets a worse deal than its power can command at the time, but locks in a stable and predictable equilibrium that is more favorable than it will be able to secure down the line. Conversely, the weaker state gets a better deal in the short term but must accept the restraint that the 30

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MICHAEL SAMPSON new partnership places on its future freedom. In terms of policy, this implies that the United States should consider the benefits that China will inevitably gain in the future as a result of its growing power and determine which of these it is willing to compromise on now in exchange for fostering partnership. Of course, even where a strong declining state concludes such a bargain with a weaker but rising state, the latter has an incentive to renege on the agreement as its power increases. This basic commitment problem is also at the heart of Thucydides’ trap: The declining power cannot be certain of the rising power’s future behavior and is thus wary of engaging in cooperation lest it be exploited when its position is relatively weaker.5 However, if cooperation can provide the rising power with material benefits, legitimacy, and certainty, this can halt, or at least significantly delay, reneging by the rising power. That is, it will be reluctant to depart from mutually agreed-upon principles for fear of losing the benefits provided by partnership with the existing hegemon. The benefits of the partnership can thus serve as a signal of commitment, as reneging will be costly. Crucially, though, the declining power must take the initiative to instigate such a bargain since it is already in a position to credibly commit as a result of its power trajectory. Such a strategy can be seen on the part of Britain in the 19th century and in particular in its negotiations of 1850 with the United States over the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. This treaty addressed the issue of construction of a waterway across the Isthmus of Central America in a region that Britain dominated but which had far more strategic significance for the United States. Although ostensibly designed to address a narrow technical issue, the treaty played a central role in shaping relations between the two powers in the region for many decades and was indicative of Britain’s general approach in this period.6 The case demonstrates that the British, upon perceiving their relative regional decline, were able to “buy off” the United States using precisely the mechanism outlined above; they supplied upfront benefits in Central America that the latter could not yet secure alone. These concessions: VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP [M]ade the United States an American power, equal in every respect to the only other first-class American power, Great Britain. To it, rather than to the Monroe Doctrine, the United States owes this position. 7 Britain made these concessions in part, to secure a regional bargain that implied partnership between the two states and ensure subsequent American restraint. The eventual regional arrangement secured benefits for both parties. It also ensured a degree of regional stability in a period when both states, particularly Britain, had more pressing concerns; promoted economic development; and prevented the situation from deteriorating into a zero-sum dynamic. This outcome, however, was by no means as inevitable or as easy to achieve as we may now think, and an examination of the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s history demonstrates this. Britain in Central America The English presence in Central America began in the early 17th century and was limited to trade in contraband and piracy along the Bay of Honduras and what was then known as the Mosquito Shore.8 Significant, formal involvement in the area began in 1742 when, whilst at war with Spain, the British seized the Bay Islands off the coast of Honduras.9 British possession of the Islands was contested until 1796, when the Spanish regained control; the Spanish thereafter retained this position until the independence of the Central American territories in 1821 when the islands passed into the possession of Honduras.10 On the mainland, British involvement in Belize (then British Honduras) grew from the mid-18th century as a result of its support of the activities of woodcutters in the area, even as the region remained under Spanish sovereignty.11 This situation continued until the conclusion of the Seven Years War in 1763, when Britain formally recognized Spanish sovereignty in return for concessions relating to woodcutting rights in the region. 12 In 1798 the Spanish attempted to expel the remaining British settlers from Belize by force, but were repelled with British military assistance. Later the British would point to this as the moment at which the territory of 32

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MICHAEL SAMPSON Belize passed to them by means of conquest. 13 However, following the independence of the Central American territories from Spanish rule in 1821, the successor states also claimed sovereignty over Belize. The new Federal Republic of Central America accordingly appealed to the United States in 1830 for assistance, but the United States refused the appeal; consequently, the British Foreign Office claimed the region for the crown.14

Figure 1: Central American Historical Borders.15 Finally, the Mosquito Shore became increasingly important in the mid-19th century as Britain and the United States began to consider construction of a waterway. British influence in this region stemmed from Spain’s failure during its rule to assert effective sovereignty over the coast; and in 1687 VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP the head of the Mosquito people “requested” English protection, to which the latter acceded. The English subsequently dubbed him king of the Mosquito lands in a ceremony in Jamaica, and through this the English attained indirect influence in a region that would come to hold the key to construction of the canal.16 Following Central America’s independence from Spain in the 1820s, Britain also expanded its role in the region, beyond its small territorial possessions and protectorates, through its informal economic supremacy.17 The states in the region at this time imported mostly British goods, their exports were largely sold in Britain, and the production and transportation of these goods depended upon British shipping and credit. Like the U.S. in East Asia today, Britain’s relationship with Central America in the early 19th century was thus both commercial and strategic.18 The largely informal and sporadic nature of Britain’s presence in the region, however, does not suggest that its activities failed to rouse the attention of the United States, particularly given the latter’s growing regional interests. As the two powers’ interests began to clash, a return to confrontation became a distinct possibility. The United States’ Growing Sphere of Interest Like China today, the United States’ growing interest in its immediate neighborhood in the mid-19th century was directly related, not to the activities of other major states, but rather to the growth of its own power. Of particular significance were its acquisition of the territories of Oregon and California on the west coast in 1846 and 1847, respectively. The need for a transportation link to the west coast consequently became more pressing, particularly following the discovery of large amounts of gold and silver in the region.19 The connection was thus viewed as essential by the U.S. government, not only to exploit these resources but also as a means to control the region more generally. Many in the United States thought a canal linking the Atlantic to the Pacific was the best means of achieving this as it was thought that transcontinental railroads could not be operated profitably.20 Following victory over Mexico, the idea of the “manifest destiny” of the United States to eventually occupy all American territory 34

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MICHAEL SAMPSON also became popular. At the same time, some in Congress began to reinterpret the Monroe Doctrine to imply the exclusion of any outside presence in the region.21 These combined factors explain the U.S. clamor for an isthmian crossing. It can be seen then that, as with the United States and China today, there were significant conflicts of interest between the two potential hegemons. The United States became increasingly suspicious of the British position on the isthmus, which they saw as an attempt to block a link between the east and the west.22 This suspicion was not entirely unfounded, as the British, for their part, saw the development of the western territories as a threat to their dominant trading position in East Asia.23 The British also suspected the Americans of using construction of the canal as a pretext for further expansion, while the Americans saw the British presence as an attempt to interfere in the U.S. sphere of influence. As a result of these concerns, U.S. agents made contact with representatives of Nicaragua in the late 1840s to begin negotiations over the construction of a crossing. This agreement would have given the United States exclusive rights to build and use any canal constructed within Nicaragua’s territory, which was thought to the most favorable location for the waterway. In return, Nicaragua asked the United States to guarantee its sovereignty, which it feared was threatened by the British. The United States ultimately spurned this arrangement, however, because it wished to avoid the entangling commitments that it would entail and the consequent risk of war with Britain.24 The U.S. government perhaps calculated that any arrangement that did not include Britain would ultimately be unsustainable given Britain’s favorable position on the east coast of the Isthmus. Anglo-American Negotiations Despite the outcome of negotiations with Nicaragua, U.S. negotiations were not entirely futile; the concern that the United States would make a private deal and use the construction of a canal as a pretext for further expansion of its influence into the region drove the British to the VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP negotiating table. That Britain now had to engage in these calculations was a sign of its weakening regional position. As in East Asia today, this instability required British policymakers to skillfully adapt to these challenges, and the path they chose is instructive. Van Alstyne neatly summarizes British foreign secretary Lord Palmerston’s calculations during this period: The foreign secretary was in reality interested in forming a pact of another kind with the United States. He had scant respect for the Monroe Doctrine and Hispanic American diplomacy, but he was keenly alive to the importance of good relations with [the U.S]. Its position as a granary, vastly enhanced by the repeal of the corn laws, and as a commercial nation with a very large merchant marine, able to help or to inflict serious damage on England in time of war did not escape him…and with the clouds on the European horizon growing threatening in 1848, Palmerston was solicitous that no quarrel should arise with this country.25 A delicate balance was thus required by which Britain could preserve its regional influence as far as possible while avoiding antagonism with the United States and maintaining diplomatic face.26 Britain held a very favorable bargaining position with respect to control of a potential crossing. The Mosquito Coast was a key component of what was at the time considered the most viable route for constructing a canal. As a result of Britain’s support for the King of the Mosquito Coast in the expansion of his territory in the 19th century, the mouth of the San Juan river passed into his possession and consequently under the British sphere of influence. Friendly relations also existed between Britain and Costa Rica to the south. Suspicious of British motives, representatives of the U.S. government began inquiries in London into Britain’s intentions and declared that the U.S. did not desire exclusive control of the isthmian passage but could not tolerate the exclusive control by another power. The British agreed with this view that the canal should serve as “a common highway to all 36

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MICHAEL SAMPSON nations.”27 Moving beyond these basic principles to more specific details, however, proved problematic, and negotiations made little progress. The British would not concede the territorial rights of the inhabitants of the Mosquito Coast even in the interests of securing an agreement according to which the canal would be open to all nations. Sir Henry Bulwer, whom the British government had dispatched to Washington in early 1850, responded by attempting to shift focus from the incompatible rights of Nicaragua (supported by the United States) and the Mosquito peoples (supported by Britain) to the issue of the construction of the canal itself; this strategy was more likely to succeed given the demand in the United States for a canal.28 The proposed treaty, which culminated from negotiations between Bulwer and U.S. Secretary of State John Clayton, stated that the future canal was to be neutralized and protected by both governments and that the ports at each end of the waterway were to remain free. It also precluded either country from using an existing or future protectorate or alliance to establish control over the canal and established a general principle whereby both parties extended the application of the treaty to any other potential means of transit across the isthmus.29 Crucially, the treaty further precluded either country from further colonizing or extending dominion over Central American territory in general. Both governments found these principles to be broadly acceptable, and each thought they had secured the better deal. Clayton saw the agreement as a precursor to Britain’s abandonment of its minor possessions and protectorates in Central America, whilst Bulwer believed he had erected a barrier to American expansionism in Central America.30 Despite U.S. acceptance of the agreement, American concerns remained that Britain would use the Mosquito territories to maintain control of the region. To allay these fears, Bulwer issued a memorandum stating that Britain had no intention of using the Mosquito protectorate to establish exclusive control over the canal.31 However, this alone did not resolve the differences of interpretation exemplified by Bulwer’s statement in the memorandum that “Her Majesty’s Government do not understand the VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP engagements of that convention as applying to Her Majesty’s Settlement at Honduras or its dependencies.”32 The definition of dependencies here was particularly important – did this refer also to the Bay Islands and Mosquito Coast? As a result of this Clayton was now placed in the position of either accepting the declaration or allowing the treaty to fail, which likely would have allowed Britain to establish a stronger foothold in the area. Consequently, Clayton offered a counter declaration stating that the treaty did not: Include the British settlement in Honduras commonly called British-Honduras, as distinct from the state of Honduras, nor the small islands in the neighborhood of that settlement, which may be known as its dependencies…It was intended to apply to and does include all the Central American states of Guatemala, Honduras, San Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica with their just limits and proper dependencies.33 The final sentence reflected the disagreement over the legitimacy of the Mosquito protectorate. The definition of neighborhood Clayton used here was unclear given the uncertain status of the Bay Islands. This ambiguity was not accidental; the signing of the treaty made clear that Britain did not interpret the agreement as implying the repudiation of its claims in the area. The United States, on the other hand, saw the treaty as restricting British influence in strategically important regions. This ambiguity was vital to the success of the agreement but would remain a point of disagreement that threatened the treaty’s very existence on a number of occasions.34 Despite these threats, however, the treaty ultimately endured for decades and fulfilled Britain’s objective of constructing a barrier to the southern expansion of the United States. Objectives and Strategy of the Declining Power The primary British concern that the United States would extend its influence into Central America meant that the British attempted to make 38

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MICHAEL SAMPSON the canal a barrier to U.S. growth. What upfront payments, though, did the British need to supply in order to secure such restraint on the part of the United States? At this time the British were still expanding their influence in the region, and the status quo certainly favored them; nevertheless, the British offered short-term concessions in order to achieve a more favorable long-term position.35 The agreement implied that Britain could no longer use its relations with the Mosquito peoples to establish dominant control over or block construction of the canal – something which it retained the power to achieve in 1850. The most significant strategic concession that the British provided during negotiations was the abandonment of its long-held plan to develop Central America exclusively in line with British interests and to “[harness] Latin America under British leadership.”36 The British abandoned their claims to sole regional hegemony in favor of an explicit Anglo-American partnership, whereby both states would patrol the waterway and neither would attempt to dominate a future crossing. 37 As a result of this concession, the United States secured de jure equal status with Britain in the region, which bestowed a degree of legitimacy on the United States’ future role.38 From the outset of negotiations the British also pursued multiple other objectives. One of these was to improve relations with the U.S. given “the angry feeling which…existed in the United States against Great Britain.”39 The British also saw the treaty as means by which they could arrest the relative deterioration of their position, especially given the prospect of the United States gaining Nicaragua and Honduras as protectorates at those states’ own invitation. This would have had a negative impact on the British position in the region and greatly increased the chances of war between the two powers. By means of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, then, Britain aimed to “bind the United States against further annexations to their empire from Central America-Honduras and Nicaragua being at that time desirous to annex themselves.”40 Because of this, the treaty was wide-ranging in its implications, was not temporally limited, and obliged the United States to share access with Britain wherever and whenever the final waterway was constructed. VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP Given the importance of the treaty to the British position, attention gradually turned to how it might be retained in spite of the objections of the United States, which came to see it as unnecessarily restrictive.41 Francis Napier, British minister to Washington from 1857 to 1859 was prominent in these discussions; he summarized the reasons for the British attachment to the treaty as follows: The English Race whether by direct movement from the Mother Country or by transmission through the United States will undoubtedly spread to the Central American Region, but under the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which can now be preserved by concessions insignificant if we turn from the past, and look to the future, that Region can never be annexed or associated to the North American Confederation, but will maintain a separate and neutral position so desirable if we regard the avenues which traverse it and untie the Oceans [emphasis added].42 Maintenance of the treaty would have the added benefit of protecting British possessions in the Caribbean from encirclement by the United States. By supplying concessions to the United States, Britain hoped that the United States “might be thoroughly conciliated and fixed in a position of cordial and benevolent neutrality.”43 Crucially, Britain achieved this by conceding something – in this case, rights to use the canal, recognition of U.S. legal rights in the area, and the abandonment of some British territorial claims – that the U.S. would have secured in time in any event. These sacrifices were demanded by the Democratic administration: …as a sort of a gratuity for remaining faithful to this partnership and for therefore submerging the budding American ideology of supremacy in the western hemisphere [and this sacrifice] was a secondary price which did not greatly disturb [Palmerston].44 Nor was this the final concession offered by the British in order to maintain the treaty. Britain gradually surrendered its claims to the Bay Islands and Honduras and eventually abandoned the Mosquito protectorate in 1860. These concessions served to allay the Buchanan administration’s 40

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MICHAEL SAMPSON misgivings, and the United States remained party to the agreement for decades to come.45 All of this is not to suggest, however, that the British policy of conciliation was always applied uniformly or that the policy was without its critics. Indeed, in later years the debate in Britain continued to focus on whether Britain should confront or continue to conciliate the United States in Central America and elsewhere.46 Nevertheless, the conclusion was always the same: the costs of confrontation would be too great. The same may also be said of the United States and China today. Lessons for Sino-U.S. relations Thucydides’ trap describes a dynamic created when the growth in the power of one actor creates fear among other powers. In their attempts to guard against this threat, the existing powers inadvertently increase the threat THE TIME TO to the rising power, and, unless arrested, CONSTRUCT THIS GRAND this dynamic can quickly escalate into PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN antagonism or even war. This article has THE UNITED STATES argued that Thucydides’ trap is a basic commitment problem that states can AND CHINA IS resolve through creation of a valuable THEREFORE LIMITED… partnership that makes subsequent defection from cooperation costly for both parties.47 The Clayton-Bulwer treaty is an example of one such partnership, which ensured that both Britain and the United States had less to gain and more to lose from engaging in subsequent confrontation. Today the United States remains the predominant power in East Asia; consequently a similar strategy could be relatively easy to achieve in the short term, should the United States wish to pursue it. However, as the United States’ relative power in the region diminishes, and the power and interests of an increasing number of actors start to come to the fore, this task will become increasingly difficult. The time to construct this grand partnership between the United States and China is therefore limited, and VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP both states should begin the process of creating a meaningful regional bargain, such that its resultant gains outweigh the costs incurred by mutual restraint. Fortunately, the United States may also find willing partners in China, some of whom share a preference for this exact kind of strategic partnership or condominium with the United States.48 On the other hand, in the absence of such partnership, China may continue its attempts to neutralize U.S. influence not through explicit hard balancing but through cooperative arrangements with its neighbors, like ASEAN plus three1 that exclude the United States.49 The issues upon which this partnership may be built are numerous and present significant opportunities for mutual benefit. First, as the two largest trading states in the world, the U.S. and China share an interest in maintaining the stability of the global economy â&#x20AC;&#x201C; of which East Asia is a fundamental part. The two powers can achieve more financial coordination, and the strategic and economic dialogue between the two countries provides a strong foundation upon which to build. A second area in which cooperation may be increased is maritime security. 50 In recent years both states have already cooperated in patrolling the Gulf of Aden to restrict piracy; this kind of cooperation can and should be expanded elsewhere, for example in tackling the problem of drug trafficking in East Asia.51 Third, cybersecurity will become increasingly important for both states; despite important differences, both countries share a basic fundamental interest in this area, which is a significant source of both countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; economic growth.52 Fourth, in terms of non-proliferation, both states have a clear interest in maintaining their cooperation over North Korea and the eventual denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.53 China, for its part, like the U.S. in Central America in 1850, will gain significant legitimacy from its cooperation with the existing hegemon in these fields, which will buttress its image as a responsible regional stakeholder. On the other hand, just like Britain, where fundamental interests collide such as on Taiwan or the South China Sea, the United States should pursue a policy of useful ambiguity in the same way that Bulwer 1

The forum that facilitates cooperation between ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea.

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MICHAEL SAMPSON stimulated cooperation between the United States and Britain by focusing on common interests and avoiding focus on irreconcilable disagreements. Relations between the mainland and Taiwan have improved significantly in recent years, largely as a result of economic interdependence; the United States must therefore take a pragmatic approach on this issue in order not to be left behind as and when relations improve.54 If the United States and China cannot agree on THE ANGLO-AMERICAN concrete measures to reduce the threat across the Taiwan Strait NEGOTIATIONS OF THE 19TH through, for example, mutual arms CENTURY ILLUSTRATE THAT reductions, they should place their SUCH SUBSTANTIAL efforts elsewhere until conditions DISAGREEMENTS DO NOT become more favorable. Likewise, in the South China Sea the United HAVE TO PRECLUDE States should continue to support COOPERATION IN OTHER regional stability whilst not making IMPORTANT ISSUE AREAS. the issue central to their bilateral relations with China. The Anglo-American negotiations of the 19th century illustrate that such substantial disagreements do not have to preclude cooperation in other important issue areas. East Asia is a vital and increasingly important region for U.S. national interests, as the recent pivot to Asia demonstrates. The prospect of China challenging U.S. regional hegemony would, of course, present grave dangers for the United States and in turn would jeopardize regional and international stability.55 China’s rise is seemingly inevitable, but this does not imply either that the U.S. role in East Asia must diminish or that U.S.Chinese confrontation is unavoidable.56 If the United States can maintain the initiative and foster a hegemonic partnership with China on a range of issues, it can cement and even expand its role in the region for decades to come whilst also reaping important rewards from deeper cooperation. The British approach to the United States’ rise in Central America provides a useful blueprint for such a partnership. Clearly any historical analogy is by its nature imperfect; the U.S. position in East Asia today is in many ways very different from that of Britain in VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP Central America in the 19th century. The United States has important and powerful allies in East Asia that may be wary of a U.S. partnership with China. East Asia is of far greater strategic importance to the U.S. than Central America was to Britain. Perhaps most importantly, the gulf in fundamental values between the United States and China is much larger than the one between Britain and the United States.57 As in the United States today, there were long-running debates in Britain regarding whether to confront or conciliate the rising power.58 Many rightly worried that the existing hegemon would make too many concessions and would project an image of weakness, thus provoking further challenges.59 There is no reason, though, that the United States cannot combine conciliation with a firm stand on issues of vital interests. Both China and the United States will of course defend BOTH CHINA AND THE their core interests but this should not UNITED STATES WILL OF preclude expanding their focus on to areas of shared interests. The example COURSE DEFEND THEIR of Britain in Central America CORE INTERESTS BUT THIS demonstrates concrete mechanisms by SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE which a clear delineation of legitimate EXPANDING THEIR FOCUS and shared interests can provide certainty, increase trust, and reduce the ON TO AREAS OF SHARED risk of miscalculation. It is worth INTERESTS. remembering too that Britain and the United States achieved cooperation despite historical animosity, strong suspicions on both sides, and the supposedly destabilizing effects of major power shifts.60 Whilst circumstances today are very different from those in the 19th century, such cooperation is achievable, would be hugely beneficial to the interests of both the U.S. and China, and would make an important contribution to international stability more broadly. Endnotes Prominent examples include territorial claims in the South China Sea and the status of Taiwan. 2 For a global rather than regional perspective on British management of decline, see: John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 18301

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MICHAEL SAMPSON

1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 3 Richard W. Van Alstyne, “The Central American Policy of Lord Palmerston, 18461848,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 16, no. 3 (1936): 339-59 at 350. 4 Ira Dudley Travis, The History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (Michigan Political Science Association, 1900), 79. 5 On the commitment problem, see: Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60 no. 1, (2006): 169-203, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ S0020818306060061. For a more detailed description of Thucydides’ Trap and its consequences, see: Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591-613 at 596, http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 204816 6 For more on this, see: Paul M. Kennedy, “The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy 1865-1939,” British Journal of International Studies 2, no. 3 (1976): 202, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096775 7 Richard W. Van Alstyne, “British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 185060,” The Journal of Modern History 11, no. 2 (1939): 149-83 at 168, http://www.jstor.org /stable/1872500 8 Robert A. Naylor, “The British Role in Central America Prior to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 40, no. 3 (1960): 361-82 at 365, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2509955 9 David A. G. Waddell, “Great Britain and the Bay Islands, 1821-61,” The Historical Journal 2, no. 1 (March 1959): 59-77, at 59, http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_ S0018246X00021786 10 Travis, 3-4. 11 Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915, (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 1916), 2. 12 Travis, 9. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 14-15. 15 Ira D., Travis. The History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Michigan Political Science Association, 1900. 16 Travis, 21-22. 17 Naylor, 364. 18 Ibid. 19 Travis, 60. 20 Ibid., 83. 21 Ibid. 22 Williams, 53. 23 Travis, 74. 24 Ibid., 63.

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FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP

Richard Warner Van Alstyne, “The Central American Policy of Lord Palmerston, 1846-1848,” 350. 26 Further adding to this vulnerability was the repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849. See: Arthur A. Stein, “The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,” International Organization 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 35586, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706445 27 Ibid., 97. 28 James J. Barnes, Private and Confidential: Letters from British Ministers in Washington to the Foreign Secretaries in London, 1844-67, ed. Patience P. Barnes (London: Associated University Presses, 1993), 44. 29 Travis, 119. 30 Barnes, 48. 31 Travis, 116. 32 Sir Henry Bulwer in ibid., 122. 33 Secretary of State Clayton in ibid., 123. 34 For more on this ambiguity, see: George F. Howe, “The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty: An Unofficial Interpretation of Article VIII in 1869,” The American Historical Review 42, no. 3 (1937): 484-90. 35 Fred R. Van Hartesveldt, “The Personal Factor in the Negotiation of the ClaytonBulwer Treaty,” The Proceedings of the Georgia Association of Historians 14 (1993): 158-68 at 159, http://archives.columbusstate.edu/gah/1993/158-168.pdf 36 Travis, 182. 37 Williams, 27. 38 Travis, 183. 39 Bulwer quoted in Van Alstyne, “British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,” 156. 40 Ibid. 41 G. F. Hickson, “Palmerston and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,” Cambridge Historical Journal 3, no. 3 (1931): 295-303 at 302-03. 42 Lord Napier quoted in Van Alstyne, “British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850-60,” The Journal of Modern History 11, no. 2 (June 1939): 149-183 at 180, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1872500 43 Van Alstyne, “British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850-60,” 181. 44 Ibid., 182. 45 Hickson, “Palmerston and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,” 302-03. 46 Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 181-83. 47 For an account of how commitment problems can lead to war see: James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995), 379414. 25

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Muthiah Alagappa, “Constructing Security Order in East Asia,” in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 70-106 at 96-97. 49 For more on ASEAN plus 3 and other regionalization projects in East Asia , see: Julie Gilson, “Strategic Regionalism in East Asia,” Review of International Studies 33, no. 1 (2007): 145-63. 50 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Need to Pursue Mutual Interests in U.S.-PRC Relations,” United States Institute of Peace, 2011, 8, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR269.pdf 51 On maritime cooperation, see ibid. 52 For more, please see Ian Adelson, Mellissa Z. Ahmed, Vivian Coyne, Han Lim, Zhifan Jia, L.C. Paisley, and Kim Truong, “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation,” School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, June 2014, https://sipa.columbia .edu/sites/default/files/AY14_CyberCooperation_FinalReport.pdf 53 Christensen, 2. 54 Austin Ramzy, “China and Taiwan Hold First Direct Talks since ’49,” New York Times, February 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/world/asia/china-andtaiwan-hold-first-official-talks-since-civil-war.html 55 For a more detailed exploration of the consequences of such competition, see: Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011). 56 For an exposition of such predictions, see: John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 4. 57 Friedberg, 1-2. 58 George L. Bernstein, “Special Relationship and Appeasement: Liberal Policy Towards America in the Age of Palmerston,” The Historical Journal 41, no. 3 (1998): 725-50 at 733, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639901 59 However, conciliation in one area may also make a firm stand in other areas more credible. On this, see: Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 345-73 at 368, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ S002081830458205X 60 Mearsheimer, 4. 48

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In Response:

Comrades of Convenience Jordan M. Sotudeh Jordan Sotudeh is a second-year master’s candidate in International Science and Technology Policy at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where he researches space, innovation and national security topics. He also has a certificate in Political Economy and a bachelor’s in International Relations (Honors), Anthropology, and French from New York University. Jordan has been published in SpaceNews, International Affairs Review, Inquiry, and Sole Literary Journal. He is currently a volunteer policy analyst at OSD(P) Space. “A rose is a rose is a rose,” goes the old line on the dangers of equivocation. Michael Sampson says as much in “Competition to Partnership,” which uses 19th-century British foreign policy in Central America, specifically the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, as a guide for today’s American policy in the Pacific. Sampson correctly argues for compromise, but overplays parallels between historical Anglo-American and contemporary Sino-American relations. First, the United States is even more entangled in the Pacific than the British were in the Western Hemisphere. Second, American conflict was continuous and ongoing throughout the 19th century. Third, there are fewer bridges and more governmental differences between the United States and China today than there were between the United States and United Kingdom in the 19th century. These factors all contribute to the difficulty of achieving compromise today. Geopolitically, the current American “pivot to Asia” is the opposite of Britain’s pivot away from Central America in the 19th century. The ideas expressed in this article reflect the author’s personal views, and are not official policy of the United States Department of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or any component parts.

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JORDAN M. SOTUDAH First, the United States is far more engaged with East Asia today than the United Kingdom was with Central America in the 19th century. The number and nature of American military and economic agreements with Pacific nations binds the United States to the region. Precarious imbalances in East Asian politics are further aggravated by contemporary economic arrangements wherein Washington leads the world financially and Beijing leads industrially. This is a challenge that Great Britain never had to face, having been the indisputable global leader of both finance1 and industry2 in the 19th century. Further, few of China’s neighbors see Beijing as a counterbalance to the United States, but as Sampson indirectly notes in referring to Nicaragua’s request for American protection from Great Britain, nascent governments in the Western Hemisphere shared a common goal of preventing European expansion. Also, Britain and America had a similar regional policy. The British suggested a joint declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, but Washington refused. Conversely, China’s neighbors have sought strong ties with the United States to counter Chinese irredentist claims. While Britain disengaged itself from the Americas except in its capital exports, the United States is doing the opposite in Asia today. Sampson notes that Central America was key to U.S. grand strategy, as the Panama Canal connected its two shores and navies. The strategic comparison of a trans-oceanic canal may be apt, as a Chinese company is currently attempting the very same route through Nicaragua that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was negotiated for. Despite current Chinese efforts to increase regional capital investments, there are no comparably large, local projects. By contrast, the United States was on far better diplomatic footing with its neighbors in the 19th century than China is today. Consequently, it had much better prospects for regional investment and related negotiations. In contemporary U.S.-China territorial disputes, China stands without allies and its concessions are politically expensive. In short, reaching compromise in East Asia now is much more difficult than accomplishing the same feat in 19th century Central America.

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COMRADES OF CONVENIENCE Second, the United States was involved in conflict in Latin America and beyond throughout the 19th century, which Sampson does not fully address. American expansionism was not limited to the Western Hemisphere and thus had outlets that potential regionally based Chinese expansionism does not. The United States projected military power far from its own shores as early as the famed First Barbary War of 1801 – AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM 1805. American expansionism WAS NOT LIMITED TO THE included the Sumatran Expeditions WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND 1832 & 1838, China in 1844, Japan THUS HAD OUTLETS THAT in 1858, and the colonization of Liberia by the American POTENTIAL REGIONALLY Colonization Society from 1821– BASED CHINESE 1867.3 China followed this model EXPANSIONISM DOES NOT. in the 20th century, but only regionally: Tibet in 1951, India in 1962, Vietnam in 1974 and 1988.4 China’s power projection never left Asia and has become less visible over time. Though China engages in intercontinental power projections, it does so through multilateral operations like United Nations peacekeeping missions. China has developed and relied upon its soft power as it pursued goals similar to those pursued militarily by Great Britain in the 19th century. A number of American conflicts – with the British and others – broke out in the Western Hemisphere before the 1898 Spanish-American War, most notably the Pig War of 1859.5 These cases demonstrate that the United States-Great Britain partnership that formed in Latin America was beneficial, but could not prevent conflict or war. If relations between China and the United States are to result in a similar pattern, the United States will be forced to compromise a number of important alliances to avoid a conflict with China. Sampson does not detail the history of Anglo-American confrontation that made détente possible. Unlike China, Britain had been forced into its preClayton-Bulwer treaty concessions by a series of military and diplomatic engagements. The Caroline Affair of 1837, the Aroostook War of 1838, 50

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JORDAN M. SOTUDAH and the Oregon Crisis of 1844-1846 each could have escalated, but instead produced an environment in which Washington and London grew accustomed to putting out the fires their frontier citizens would so often light.6 By 1850, many of the territorial claims between Great Britain and the United States had been resolved.7 China has only resolved its territorial disputes with Pakistan and the former Soviet Republics.8 Third, America and China are further apart today than Britain and America in the 1800s. There are fewer bridges between the United States and China, which makes compromise more difficult. America was more inclined to join the international system of the 19th century than to compete with the existing order. Sampson points out China’s attempts to produce alternative forums for economic and political entente and to set a time limit on the effectiveness of partnership through diminishing returns on compromise. Whether motivated by a desire for regional power, DIFFERENCES IN EXTERNAL dissatisfaction with the current PRESSURE RENDER THE international system, or both, it is U.S. PIVOT TO ASIA THE possible that China does not consider GEOPOLITICAL OPPOSITE itself likely to receive the sort of concessions the U.S. received from OF BRITAIN’S PIVOT AWAY Great Britain in the 19th century. FROM CENTRAL AMERICA. Compare the swift legal settlement of British support for the Confederacy9 to the never-ending World Trade Organization lawsuits against China.10 The changes the United States wrought on international order were in some ways less worrisome to the British than Chinese ambitions are to the United States today. Sampson does not integrate domestic concerns of 19th century Britain. The British had incentives to reconcile their differences with the United States in the 19th century because London faced perceived existential threats closer to home. Neither the United States nor China faces existential threats today. Differences in external pressure render the U.S. pivot to Asia the geopolitical opposite of Britain’s pivot away from Central America.

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COMRADES OF CONVENIENCE Further, cultural considerations cannot be ignored. Sampson quotes Francis Napier without drawing this conclusion in the paper: “The English Race, whether by direct movement from the Mother Country or by transmission through the United States will undoubtedly spread.” Cultural differences between the United States and China contribute to uncertainty in a pervasive and poorly understood way, making compromise more difficult. Great Britain and the United States did not have to contend with as great a cultural divide. Lastly, structural differences in the political systems of the United States and China cannot be ignored. Democratic peace theory observes that democracies rarely, if ever, fight wars against other democracies.11 The Selectorate Theory explains why the wider distribution of power makes democracies more risk-averse.12 The worrying implications of China’s autocratic government are tempered by Beijing’s reliance on its tax base for revenue, which gives Beijing an extremely strong incentive to address the welfare of its citizens.13 Any meaningful compromise between the United States and China will be unattainable unless officials from both nations understand how government structure drives their counterparts’ decision making. This level of mutual understanding between the United States America and China does not yet exist, and a better grasp of mutual concerns is where the development of future policy must begin. In light of these differences, Sampson’s central premise still holds: building a semblance of peaceful cooperation in the region is the best way to avoid unwanted conflict. However, American entanglement in the Pacific, historical differences in conflict, fewer bridges between the United States and China, and structural differences in domestic politics make repeating a 19th century British policy of compromise much less likely. Collaboration in the fight against terrorism, in addressing piracy, and in conservation of space security will slowly remove some of the opacity in the current relationship, but that will take time. Further, that Chinese irredentist claims are so tightly woven into its domestic concerns ensures lasting Sino-American friction. While the United States and China 52

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JORDAN M. SOTUDAH may write another Clayton-Bulwer treaty, they should both expect the occasional Pig War. Endnotes Albert H. Imlah, “British Balance Of Payments And Export Of Capital, 1816–1913,” The Economic History Review 5, no. 2 (1952): 208-39 at 234-239, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/2591057?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 2 Paul Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” Journal of European Economic History 11, no. 1 & 2 (Fall 1982): 269-333 at 275, 281, 284, 286, 288, 292, 294, 296, http://www.jeeh.it/articolo?urn=urn:abi:abi:RIV.JOU:1982; 2.269&ev=1 3 Allan Reed Millet and Peter Maslowski, chapters 4–10 in For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1984). 4 Tara Boland-Crewe and David Lea, “Chronology of the People’s Republic of China,” in The Territories of the People’s Republic of China, London: Europa Publications, 2002), 23-50. 5 E. C. Coleman, The Pig War: The Most Perfect War in History (Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: History Press, 2009), Chapters 2, 7, 10, 15, 22, 27. 6 Jon M. Flashnik, “‘Blood is Thicker than Water’: Anglo-American Rapprochement in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 1823-1872” (PhD dissertation, Arizona State University, 2014), 3-13, 38-65, 161-162, http://repository.asu.edu/attachments/137387/content/ Flashnick_asu_0010E_14124.pdf 7 Ibid., 39. 8 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 86, 140, 161, 165, 195. 9 Ephraim Douglass Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War (New York: Russell & Russell, 1958), 116-117, 138, 146, 151. 10 World Trade Organization, “China and the WTO,” (accessed March 15, 2015), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm 11 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics, 4th ed. (beta), (New York: CQ Press, 2009): 157. For a thorough review, please see 157-176. 12 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 2 (2009): 167–97, http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2806/BdM_Smith2009cps.pdf 13 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 4 (October 2010): 936-950 at 937. 1

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Dispel Distrust: Start from North Korea Zhiqun Zhu Zhiqun Zhu is Director of the China Institute and an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University. He is the author and editor of 7 books including China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Ashgate, 2013); and U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2006). He was a visiting senior research fellow at East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore, and a POSCO fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii. In the early 1990s, he was Chief Assistant to the Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai. Abstract The United States and China lack political trust despite repeated reassurances from each side. A case in point is the U.S. pivot to Asia, which many in China consider a U.S. strategy to counter China’s growing power. On the other hand, no matter how often the Chinese government repeats its “peaceful rise” mantra, many in the United States cite China’s aggressive treatment of territorial disputes for their belief that its rise will destabilize the region. How to bridge such perceptional and policy gaps? Actions speak louder than words. The two countries can start to dispel their political distrust by working jointly now to find a solution to the North Korea nuclear dilemma. The United States and China share the objective of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, but have different concerns about and visions of the Peninsula. They can begin by reaching an agreement about a future East Asian security landscape that does not harm their vital interests. With assistance from other relevant players, the United States and China can bring the North Korea issue to a satisfactory conclusion, building political trust in the process and laying the foundation for further cooperation in the future. 54

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ZHIQUN ZHU Deep Distrust, High Willingness to Cooperate Historically, rising powers and reigning powers have feared challenges and threats from each other. As China gains economic and military power, some have noted that the United States and China seem to be becoming increasingly mutually distrustful despite public statements to the contrary, which has undermined the success of cooperative initiatives between the two. China and the United States have repeatedly reassured each other of their benign intentions as a way to avert the conflict often associated with a global power transition; the United States has publicly welcomed China’s peaceful rise, and China has indicated that it does not intend to replace the United States or expel it from the Asia-Pacific region. Scholars such as David M. Lampton have characterized the U.S.-Chinese relationship as one of competition and cooperation.1 It is in both countries’ interests to manage their differences and expand areas of cooperation if they wish to avoid conflicts. The two sides’ major current efforts to accomplish this can be summarized as America’s “pivot” to Asia and China’s “new type of great power relations” framework. Through these initiatives, both the United States and China hope to promote cooperation so as to avoid the historical tragedy of Thucydides’ trap. Unfortunately, so far each side has poorly interpreted the other’s policy initiative, which highlights the existence of deep-rooted distrust between the two countries. While U.S. allies and most countries in Asia support the United States’ “rebalance” or “pivot” to Asia in the context of China’s rapid resurgence, China remains suspicious of U.S. intentions. The key components of this pivot include strengthening U.S. ties with Asian allies, deepening the United States’ working relationships with emerging powers, engaging with regional multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, forging a broad-based military presence, and advancing democracy and human rights. Though Obama administration officials have reiterated that the United States does not and will not contain China, many believe that the pivot strategy was at least partially designed to counter China’s growing power.2 Chinese leaders feel deeply uncomfortable that the United States has strengthened ties with most of China’s neighbors, especially those that have territorial disputes with China; that the United VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

DISPEL DISTRUST: START FROM NORTH KOREA States has begun shifting more naval and air forces to Asia even though it already has forward troops in Japan and South Korea; and that the United States has claimed that the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty covers the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands without maintaining a position regarding sovereignty over the islands. Chinese leaders also fear that these U.S. policies are emboldening and encouraging the adventurist behaviors of some politicians in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam as evidenced by these politiciansâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; confrontational approaches towards China. The Chinese leadership wonders what Washington has done to improve U.S.-China relations while consolidating the United Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; presence in the AsiaPacific region. These concerns may not sound interesting or sensible in Washington, but they are real and serious for many Chinese analysts and policymakers. The bottom line is the distrust between the United States and China has not declined as a result of the pivot.

Figure 1: Map of the Asia-Pacific, Including Selected 2012 U.S. Troop Deployments and Plans.3 56

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ZHIQUN ZHU It does not help that the White House’s signals have not been consistent. For example, officials from both governments considered President Barack Obama’s November 2014 visit to China during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to be a success, because the two sides signed a wide array of agreements on topics ranging from climate change and trade to energy cooperation and citizen exchanges. From China’s perspective, the United States and China reached these agreements on an equal footing, which suggested that the United States was willing to work with and treat China as a partner. Yet the United States has since made statements that suggest the contrary. In his 2015 State of the Union address, for example, President Obama publicly depicted China as a rival and framed U.S.-China relations as pure competition.4 According to this framing of the relationship, the United States would attempt to ensure that China obeys U.S.-made rules, does not make new regional trade rules, and stops proposing new international regimes or challenging the existing international order. In a later, written message, President Obama recapped his view that the United States, not China, should write rules for commerce in Asia.5 Meanwhile, the United States remains suspicious of and has not yet fully embraced China’s “new type of great power relations” proposal. ThenVice President Xi Jinping first sketched out this concept in his February 15, 2012 speech in Washington, D.C. Xi said that such a relationship would be characterized by “mutual understanding and strategic trust,” “respecting each other’s ‘core interests,’” “mutually beneficial cooperation,” and “enhancing cooperation and coordination in international affairs and on global issues.”6 Xi officially proposed the concept again during a summit with President Obama at Sunnylands, California in June 2013. However, China’s behaviors in international territorial disputes and its crackdown on domestic dissent in recent years have not been encouraging. The United States would have particular difficulty endorsing China’s “core interests” if Beijing defines these interests to include maintaining its political system and the communist party’s rule and defending China’s sovereignty in Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and ostensibly in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

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DISPEL DISTRUST: START FROM NORTH KOREA The United States also seems to distrust and has blocked China’s attempts to become a more responsible stakeholder in international organizations. Disagreement exists, for example, over China’s intentions regarding the international financial system. U.S. officials consider China’s leadership role in setting up new multilateral institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS Bank (the bank formed by leading emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), to be a direct challenge to the U.S.-dominated international financial system. Though the United States has reservations about China’s new initiatives, others, including major U.S. allies such as the UK, South Korea, Australia, France and Germany, are optimistic that these new institutions can complement existing ones and assist much of the developing world. According to some scholars, China’s policy does not seek to demolish or exit from current international organizations and multilateral regimes; instead, China is constructing channels for shaping the international order beyond Western claims to leadership.7 The United States seems to have difficulty facing the changing global power structure and moving past its distrust of China; as Wu Xinbo of Fudan University commented, the United States is not treating China’s rise properly, but is instead wooing its Asian allies to counter China and obstructing further economic cooperation in East Asia.8 Obama called China a “free rider,” but when China has attempted to play a larger role in international affairs, the United States has been reluctant to support China’s efforts.9 For example, when China proposed to set up the new AIIB, the United States did not endorse the idea at first and pressured its allies not to join the bank. As suggested by some scholars, Western countries should consider cautious involvement and participation in selected China-launched mechanisms.10 Indeed, key members of the existing financial institutions could more easily exercise leverage over these new institutions if they participate; participation is more likely to lead to better governance, transparency, and sustainability for these new institutions. While China’s mercantilist approach and its low labor and environmental standards should not become part of the norms of global commerce, the United States fails to realize that China is now the world’s second-largest economy and has global interests. Regardless of whether 58

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ZHIQUN ZHU China is a trustworthy partner, the United States can no longer singlehandedly dictate international political economy. The way China goes about pursuing a greater role in international affairs can also either exacerbate or alleviate the United States’ distrust of China. Inside China, some scholars have argued that the government should abandon Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of keeping a low profile in foreign affairs.11 Their rationale is that China is powerful enough now to demand a greater degree of symmetry in its relations with the United States. Military and nationalist scholars are especially strong in making these calls.12 Rising nationalism at home REGARDLESS OF WHETHER drives China’s high-handed behaviors externally, and China CHINA IS A TRUSTWORTHY tends to blame others for creating PARTNER, THE UNITED tensions in bilateral relations without STATES CAN NO LONGER sufficiently reflecting upon its own conduct. As an emerging global SINGLE-HANDEDLY DICTATE power, China has not always acted INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL humbly and responsibly. ECONOMY. Chinese foreign policy since 2010 has become a hotly-debated topic. Recently, a surge of scholarly publications has focused on analyzing why and how China’s foreign policy became more assertive after 2010, even though there is no consensus on such assertiveness.13 In 2014, as the world marked the centennial anniversary of World War I, many analysts penned articles and commentaries asserting that contemporary China resembled pre-WWI Germany. The implication of these articles was that the rise of China would destabilize and even lead to war in Asia. Indeed, according to the Organskian power transition theory, tensions between a rising power and the dominant power almost always ended in war.14 Defensive realists such as John Mearsheimer also believe that China’s rise will automatically challenge the United States, and that conflict is inevitable.15 Mainstream scholars and policymakers on both sides reject the premise that the United States and China are somehow destined for conflict. As Tom Donilon, then Obama’s national security adviser, commented in VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

DISPEL DISTRUST: START FROM NORTH KOREA March 2013, there is nothing preordained about such an outcome.16 Top American scholars such as Ken Lieberthal and David M. Lampton caution that the United States should continue to engage and cooperate with China and should not force Asian countries to choose between the two powers.17 Many Chinese scholars share this view. According to Jia Qingguo of Peking University, the foundation for cooperation between the United States and China remains solid.18 Politically, both countries’ elites are willing to cooperate and wish to avoid confrontation. Economically, the two countries have become inescapably interwoven, with bilateral trade topping $500 billion a year. Jia has pointed out that peaceful power transitions have taken place; the rise of the United States in the 19th century did not lead to war with Great Britain, and the United States welcomed and assisted the reemergence of Germany and Japan after WWII. China’s peaceful rise is entirely possible, Jia claims, because China defends the current international order and advocates an open international trade system. Even in disputed territories, China prefers to solve or manage the problems through negotiation, and after decades of growth and opening up, the differences between the United States and China over key values such as the market economy, the rule of law, human rights, and democracy are narrowing.19 Other leading Chinese scholars such as Qin Yaqing and Jin Canrong also suggest that China will continue to adopt a low-profile foreign policy and seek cooperation with the United States.20 No matter one’s school of thought, it is clear that current U.S. policy towards China does not fully acknowledge and accept the emerging new world order. How the United States responds to China’s policy initiatives going forward will greatly affect what China will do next. The Obama administration has failed to recognize China’s constructive approach and has been reluctant to fully endorse the “new type of great power relations” framework. As Cheng Li and Lucy Xu correctly point out, the United States’ suspicions of Chinese intentions are the key barrier to U.S. endorsement of the framework.21 Moreover, accepting it would suggest that the United States recognizes itself as a declining established power caught in Thucydides’ trap with a rising China, or possibly that the United States supports China’s core interests, such as China’s claims in the 60

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ZHIQUN ZHU disputed territories in the South and East China Seas. Finally, U.S. allies in Asia, especially Japan, would feel slighted by such an exclusive G-2 type of power arrangement in the region. The North Korea Conundrum Despite the willingness of China and the United States to cooperate and avoid confrontation, the two countries still lack political trust. They can start with their shared objective of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. North Korea presents a security challenge for both the United States and China, which is the very reason the two powers share a common interest in the issue and can help alleviate each other’s concerns about the future. Compared with other controversial issues such as Taiwan, historical and territorial disputes in East Asia, and piracy, over which the two countries are sharply separated, the United States and China share a goal of denuclearizing North Korea, and Beijing and Washington have a history of cooperating on the issue. In addition, with North Korea’s tests of nuclear devices and improved nuclear and missile technology over the past few years, the issue is increasingly urgent. A mutually acceptable solution to the North Korea issue could not only avoid the potentially calamitous consequences of a nuclear-armed North Korea triggering military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, but also provide a litmus test for whether the United States and China can work together more broadly to build trust between them and to promote security in East Asia. Many blame Pyongyang for developing nuclear weapons and posing a dire security challenge in East Asia; few admit that North Korea did not create the problem alone. The unfinished Korean War was a proxy war between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, and it has defined the East Asian security landscape for decades. During the Cold War, North Korea was skillful at playing China and the Soviet Union against each other and succeeded in squeezing aid from both powers. After the Soviet Union’s disintegration, China became North Korea’s only reliable provider of food and aid, while the United States and Japan refused to recognize North Korea diplomatically. Feeling insecure and isolated, North Korea aims to build a kangsong taeguk (strong and prosperous state) with a powerful VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

DISPEL DISTRUST: START FROM NORTH KOREA military and advanced economy, and after three successful nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013 it has declared itself a nuclear state, a status the international community has not formally recognized. Relations between China and North Korea have markedly deteriorated since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, and North Korea’s behaviors have hurt China’s interest in maintaining a peaceful regional environment. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea represented a rare opportunity to terminate North Korea’s nuclear program. Unfortunately, neither side held to its end of the bargain. The Six-Party Talks that started in 2003 have been stalemated since 2009; though China and the United States are interested in resuming the talks, they have been unable to work jointly and persuade North Korea to return to the negotiation table. With security, economic, and other challenges to deal with elsewhere, neither China nor the United States has treated North Korea as a priority issue since the Six-Party Talks broke down. In short, the current challenge posed by North Korea is the outcome of a series of events involving many actors, and the solution to the problem is not possible without cooperation from both major powers. The United States and China firmly oppose Pyongyang’s nuclearization, yet both seem unmotivated to take immediate and new action and instead have continued the same approaches they have used in the past. The North Korean nuclear issue has demanded enormous diplomatic resources from the United States and China; it is a major diplomatic and security headache in both capitals. China has grown increasingly tired of Pyongyang’s recalcitrant behaviors, yet it continues to provide aid to Pyongyang, which implies that North Korea remains strategically valuable and serves China’s security interest as a buffer state.22 Meanwhile, the United States keeps a wary eye on North Korea by maintaining a formidable level of force in the region and routinely holding joint military exercises with South Korea and Japan. It considers North Korea a direct threat to its national interests and those of its allies. As a result of the two powers’ lack of coordination and joint action, North Korea has refined its nuclear technology, and gross human rights violations persist. To permit the current situation in North Korea to continue is both dangerous and 62

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ZHIQUN ZHU unethical. It is also puzzling that the United States and China have not started to work together again on the North Korea issue when international talks, of which both the United States and China are part, are making significant progress on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program.23 There are a number of reasons the United States and China have failed so far to take joint action on North Korea, of which geostrategic uncertainty is the most significant. Korea scholar Stephan Haggard notes that President Obama was disgusted by the missile and nuclear tests in 2009, by the sinking of the Cheonan and the Yeonpyeong shelling, and also by the breakdown of the so-called Leap Day deal between North Korea and the United States in 2012.24 In addition, Haggard suggests, the Sony hack has played a much more significant role in U.S.-North Korean relations than most people realize.25 With a …TO WAIT FOR THE KIM Republican Congress in place, JONG-UN REGIME TO initiatives from Washington are unlikely unless North Korea makes a TAKE THE CONCILIATORY bold move, presumably such as a STEP FIRST, OR BETTER unilateral moratorium on nuclear or YET, FOR ITS COLLAPSE, missile tests.26 However, to wait for the IS NOT REALISTIC. Kim Jong-un regime to take the conciliatory step first, or better yet, for its collapse, is not realistic. Meanwhile, some analysts and U.S. officials suggest that China is not putting sufficient pressure on North Korea.27 China, indeed, is unwilling to abandon North Korea and consequently face a collapsed North Korea, which would potentially have tremendous political, economic, security and humanitarian costs to China. China’s leverage over North Korea may also be overblown, as North Korea does not seem to care about China’s interests. Western media routinely portray China as North Korea’s “only ally,” which continues to provide food and aid and forms the lifeline of the North Korean regime. A closer look at China’s evolving policies towards the two Koreas since the early 1990s reveals that China is shifting away from its traditional pro-North Korea position to a more South Koreafriendly policy. Warming economic, political, and strategic relations VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

DISPEL DISTRUST: START FROM NORTH KOREA between China and South Korea are clear indications that Beijing has become dissatisfied with the regime in Pyongyang and is prepared to change its North Korea policy under the right conditions. Such conditions include, among others, no sudden collapse of the North Korean regime, a politically neutral unified Korea in the future, and the significant reduction, if not total withdrawal, of U.S. troops from a unified Korea. Only the United States can help meet those conditions. U.S. sanctions against North Korea have not achieved their intended outcomes, while China’s continued support for North Korea has prolonged the defiant regime’s life. It is high time that the United States and China changed their approaches and brought the North Korean nuclear issue to a soft landing. Moving Forward The clichéd interpretation of the Chinese word for “crisis” is that it is composed of two characters (危机) that mean, respectively, “danger” and “opportunity.” So far, North Korea has been treated as a dangerous problem, not a hidden SO FAR, NORTH KOREA HAS opportunity for the United States and China to create BEEN TREATED AS A DANGEROUS lasting peace and stability in PROBLEM, NOT A HIDDEN East Asia through cooperation. OPPORTUNITY FOR THE UNITED The two nations once played a STATES AND CHINA TO CREATE leadership role in the Six-Party Talks. Now, they should LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY… behave responsibly by picking up where they left off and actively seeking a solution to the problem. The underlying cause of this poor coordination on the North Korea issue is strategic distrust between the United States and China and their inability to move beyond the old mentality. While the two countries share the objective of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, they differ on their views of North Korea today and in the future; the United States considers North Korea a direct national security threat, but some in China continue to view North Korea as a buffer state for China. Without a common endgame in 64

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ZHIQUN ZHU sight, neither the United States nor China knows what to expect from Korean unification or is prepared to deal with a collapsed North Korea. The United States and China, together with South Korea, need to map out a blueprint for Korea’s future first. If both Koreas opt to reunify, the only viable solution is a reunified Korea under the leadership of the South, but for both the United States and China, the foreign policy of the future reunified Korea remains a key uncertainty. Stability in the East Asian political, economic, and security landscape must be a priority to all involved parties. Therefore, a reunified Korea should maintain political neutrality and should establish good relations with both China and the United States, balancing their vital interests. In return, the United States and China must also prepare to cede the decision of whether U.S. troops can remain on unified Korean soil to Seoul; Washington should assure Beijing that any possible future U.S. force posture on the peninsula would be smaller than the current one and not based any further north than it is now.28 Establishing these intentions as part of a blueprint for Korea’s future is critical to the two powers’ success in working together to dispel distrust and promote Korea’s peaceful reunification. Once the United States and China have a common understanding of the situation, they can use both carrots and sticks to entice North Korea back to the denuclearization talks. Current U.S. strategies heavily rely on sanctions without offering anything promising or attractive to North Korea if it relinquishes its nuclear program. On the other hand, China hesitates to take a tougher approach to North Korea for fear of regional instability and massive refugee flows into China as a result of a sudden regime collapse in Pyongyang. These policies have so far failed to stall or turn back North Korea’s nuclear program; it is time for a change. The United States must offer clear and inviting incentives in return for North Korea’s reciprocal measures; these carrots should include concrete steps toward ending hostility, recognition of the North Korean regime, and eventually normal diplomatic ties. Recognizing a repulsive regime does not necessarily mean endorsing it; the United States has recognized and still recognizes governments that violate international laws and abuse VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

DISPEL DISTRUST: START FROM NORTH KOREA human rights. In fact, it is politically wise for a country to keep its enemies close, if doing so serves its national interests. Meanwhile, China’s recent shift from a party-to-party relationship to a normal state-to-state relationship vis-à-vis North Korea provides an opportunity to introduce sticks, thereby unambiguously dispelling the myth that China and North Korea remain allies. China should firmly oppose any North Korean policies and actions that would harm China’s national interests or regional security, reducing or cutting off aid and food to North Korea if necessary. Next, the United States and China must work with their respective allies and friends – especially Japan, South Korea, and Russia – to coordinate their policies so that North Korea cannot take advantage of inconsistencies among these countries’ policies. To ensure such a collectively successful North Korea policy, all parties TO ENSURE SUCH A involved must reset their interests and focus on tackling North Korea’s COLLECTIVELY SUCCESSFUL NORTH KOREA POLICY, ALL nuclear issue first. For example, if the Six-Party Talks resume, Japan PARTIES INVOLVED MUST should refrain from adding its RESET THEIR INTERESTS AND abducted citizens in North Korea to the agenda, which would complicate FOCUS ON TACKLING denuclearization negotiations. NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR Similarly, Russia should not take ISSUE FIRST. advantage of the cracks in the SinoNorth Korean relationship and whet North Korea’s appetite with additional aid. Russia’s coordination with other powers over the North Korea policy would improve its international image and lessen the distressing consequences of its Ukraine policy – but these objectives should be secondary to the goal of denuclearizing North Korea. The United States and China should also share other miscellaneous responsibilities associated with the North Korea issue. Both the United States and China should contribute to South Korea’s unification fund to help defray the high costs of North-South reconciliation and future reunification. The United States and Japan must also be willing to share the burden of hosting large numbers of North Korean refugees with China 66

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ZHIQUN ZHU and South Korea. Meanwhile, the United States and China should both take steps to welcome North Korea as an active member of the international community and help it expand economic and cultural exchanges with other nations so as to break North Korea’s isolation. North Korea will soon realize that its byungjin (parallel development) national plan of both economic modernization and nuclear development is not realistic; the United States and China should promptly and properly support North Korea’s economic and political reforms. Finally, both the United States and China should offer security guarantees for a North Korea that gradually opens up. A confident North Korea that feels welcomed and integrated into the international system will be more likely to pursue peaceful reunification and denuclearization. Conclusion Avoiding the sort of clash between an existing great power and an emerging power foretold by Thucydides’ trap has become the most serious challenge of the U.S.-Chinese relationship. For the United States, the task should be not to prevent China’s rise, but rather to ensure that the United States and its allies evolve with China in a way that maximizes peace and welfare for all. For China, the objective should not be to challenge the current international system or to replace the United States as the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific, but rather to work with the United States and others as a responsible power to extend peace and stability in Asia and beyond. Neither the United States’ “pivot” nor China’s “new type of great power relations” can succeed if the United States and China do not enhance their mutual trust. The United States appears to be facing a dilemma in its Asia policy: either work more closely with a rising China that does not always see eye-to-eye with the United States, or expand its alliances and friendships with other regional countries. The United States has yet to figure out how to achieve both objectives. China, on the other hand, is sometimes unsure about how to use the new-found power associated with its rapid growth, and needs the opportunity to accustom itself to its new role in international affairs. Both the United States and China should adjust to the changing power structure and emerging new world order. VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

DISPEL DISTRUST: START FROM NORTH KOREA Differences between the United States and China in terms of culture, history, social system, and level of development have contributed to their mutual distrust, as have conservative and hawkish politicians, media, scholars and military personnel, who are likely to continue to drum up nationalism and create obstacles for future cooperation. These deep-rooted suspicions will not disappear soon, and no one should assume that building trust will be easy. Political leaders must have the wisdom and foresight to ensure the negative forces contributing to U.S.-Chinese distrust will not hinder the two countries’ cooperation. Luckily, both sides are determined to avoid Thucydides’ trap and are willing to handle their complex relationship peacefully. Cooperating on North Korea will create a substantial opportunity for the two countries to lessen strategic distrust and help create conditions for a lasting peace in Asia that serves both countries’ interests as well as those of others in the region and beyond. Endnotes David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000 (University of California Press, 2001). 2 Harry J. Kazianis, “Why the Pivot Will Fail: Washington Won’t State Its Real Goal,” University of Nottingham: China Policy Institute Blog, February 3, 2015, China Policy Institute Blog, http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2015/02/03/why-thepivot-will-fail-washington-wont-state-its-real-goal/ 3 Congressional Research Service, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia, by Mark E. Manyin, et al., R42448, CRS, 2012, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf (accessed April 24, 2015) 4 Here are some quotes from President Obama’s 2015 State of the Union Address: “China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region. That would put our workers and businesses at a disadvantage. Why would we let that happen? We should write those rules. We should level the playing field.” “In the Asia Pacific, we are modernizing alliances while making sure that other nations play by the rules.” “No foreign nation, no hacker, should be able to shut down our networks, steal our trade secrets, or invade the privacy of American families, especially our kids.” “More than half of manufacturing executives have said they’re actively looking at bringing jobs back from China. Let’s give them one more reason to get it done.” Both explicitly and implicitly, China is viewed as a competitor and challenger. 5 President Obama: “Writing the Rules for 21st Century Trade,” the president’s message to the White House email list, February 18, 2015. 1

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David M. Lampton, “A New Type of Major-Power Relationship: Seeking a Durable Foundation for U.S.-China Ties,” Asia Policy, 16 (July 2013), http://www.nbr.org/ publications/element.aspx?id=650 7 Sebastian Heilmann, Moritz Rudolf, Mikko Huotari, and Johannes Buckow, “China’s Shadow Foreign Policy: Parallel Structures Challenges the Established International Order,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, October 28, 2014, http://www.merics.org/ fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_18_en.pdf 8 Wu Xinbo’s comments at the 2015 Davos World Economic Forum, reported on the website of Fudan University’s Center for American Studies, January 27, 2015, http://www.cas.fudan.edu.cn/view.php?id=2318 9 President Barack Obama, interview by Thomas Friedman, New York Times, August 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000003047788/china-as-a-freerider.html 10 Heilmann, et al. 11 For example, see the interview of Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University, conducted by Nikkei Asian Review, March 2, 2015, http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Perspectives/China-needs-to-purchasefriendships-scholar-says 12 China’s military is undergoing a technological revolution, and is a main target of President Xi’s “tiger hunt” anti-corruption campaign. The PLA refuses to accept the kind of surveillance that the Americans and Russians routinely carried out near each other’s territory during the Cold War. The Chinese military has succeeded in maintaining double-digit growth in recent years even though the Chinese economy has slowed down. 13 For example, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 7-48. Also, see Washington Quarterly (Winter 2015). 14 A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, (Alfred A. Knopf, 1968). 15 John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” National Interest, October 25, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204 16 Transcript of Thomas Donilon’s speech at Asia Society, New York, March 11, 2013, http://asiasociety.org/new-york/complete-transcript-thomas-donilon-asia-society-newyork 17 For example, see Ken Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” The Brookings Institution, March 30, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/ research/papers/2012/03/30-us-china-lieberthal 18 Zheng Qingting and Zhang Qian, “Jia Qingguo Refutes Proposition of US-China Confrontation: China Does Not Challenge Current International Order,” world.people.com.cn, January 6, 2015, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/0106/c100226333801.html 19 Ibid. 20 See Qin and Jin’s comments at http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/191816/392165/ index.html 6

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Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, “Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism: The New Type of Great Power Relations,” China-US Focus, December 4, 2014, http://www.chinaus focus.com/foreign-policy/chinese-enthusiasm-and-american-cynicism-over-the-newtype-of-great-power-relations/ 22 Beina Xu and Jayshree Bajoria, “CFR Backgrounders: The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 22, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/china/ china-north-korea-relationship/p11097 23 A framework was reached between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany in early April 2015, under which Iran would give up twothirds of its centrifuges used to enrich uranium and would reduce its stockpile of lowenriched uranium from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms. This is a “significant progress” according to the US Department of State, see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2015/04/240170.htm 24 On February 29, 2012, the United States and North Korea announced a “leap day” agreement that the United States would provide substantial food aid in return for the North agreeing to a moratorium on uranium enrichment and missile testing and a return of IAEA inspectors to Yongbyon, leading to a resumption of the six-party talks. Soon afterwards, North Korea launched a satellite to commemorate the late Kim il-sung’s 100th birthday, and the United States subsequently suspended aid to North Korea. 25 Song Sang-ho, interview by Stephan Haggard, “Seoul Needs to Take Initiative on N.K. Issues,” The Korea Herald, February 2, 2015, http://www.koreaherald.com/ view.php?ud=20150202000831 26 Ibid. 27 Scott Stearns, “China Can Do More on North Korea, Kerry Says,” Voice of America, February 13, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/kerry-miliatry-drills-should-not-belinked-to-korean-family-reunions/1850610.html 28 James B. Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon, “Keep Hope Alive: How to Prevent U.S.Chinese Relations From Blowing Up,” Foreign Affairs, 93 no. 4 (July August 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141476/james-b-steinberg-and-michaelohanlon/keep-hope-alive 21

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North Korean Denuclearization: A Poor Outlet to Avoid Thucydides’ Trap Nicole Golliher Nicole Golliher is getting her masters in international affairs with a concentration in Asia at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Her research focuses on East Asian Security and the impacts of historical memory on the region. In 2014, she graduated from Seattle University with bachelor’s degrees in international studies and political science. Currently, she works as the program coordinator at the United Nations Association, National Capital Area and is a senior editor for the International Affairs Review. As China continues to develop and gain in power, an essential issue facing the international system is how the United States and China will manage their relationship. Avoiding a conflict spiral benefits both parties, and that common interest provides the foundation for the United States and China to cooperate. History shows that cooperation between the rising and relatively declining power is possible, as was the case with the United States and the United Kingdom in the twentieth century. Attempting to build cooperation and to avoid future confrontation through an issue as complicated and failure-prone as North Korean denuclearization is not a wise course of action. Instead, the United States and China should focus on cooperating on issues they have reached agreements on before and jointly work to clarify mutual expectations. The United States and China share a common interest in denuclearizing North Korea, but this goal is likely impossible, especially in the near future. China took the lead in the Six-Party Talks, but “domestic policy constraints, differing priorities, and conflicting historical analogies among each of the [six-party talk] countries” have “severely restricted” the policy space necessary for China to “broker a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis.”1 Fundamentally, too many barriers and complications exist VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

NORTH KOREAN DENUCLEARIZATION to North Korean denuclearization to render it a sound outlet for improvement of Sino-American relations. First, North Korea’s isolation from the international community leaves the United States little leverage over Pyongyang. China, though having historically been one of North Korea’s few friends, also has less influence over North Korea than is typically assumed. These issues are compounded by differing policy priorities in Washington and Beijing. While the United States focuses on denuclearization and ballistic missiles, China places more emphasis on ensuring North Korea’s stability to avoid the refugee influx that would result from regime collapse.2 Second, North Korean denuclearization is far less attainable now that Pyongyang has the capacity to build nuclear weapons. Despite the poor chances for such a program’s success, China continues to advocate for the Ukrainian model in denuclearizing North Korea. China’s offer of “a multilateral security guarantee and associated economic rewards” prior to North Korea’s relinquishing its weapons could result in Pyongyang taking the carrot and giving up nothing in return.3 North Korea has failed to show credible commitment before, and there is little reason to believe they will show more commitment in the future. Similarly, the United States has also failed to show credible commitment to deals reached in the Six-Party Talks. Mutual distrust renders unlikely the prospect that North Korea will be convinced by any incentives the United States promises. This is illustrated by North Korean reticence in believing President Obama’s attempt to adopt a more positive relationship between the two countries after his 2008 election.4 Even if North Korea were to accept a renewal of talks spearheaded by the United States and China, Evans J. R. Revere, a retired American diplomat and Asia expert, asserts that Pyongyang will not be “eager to bargain away the nuclear missile assets that it has taken such risk in developing in defiance of the international community.”5 Finally, though China and the United States share a common interest in the denuclearization of North Korea, the involvement of Russia, Japan, 72

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NICOLE GOLLIHER and South Korea complicates the issue.6 Conflicting priorities between the United States and China are further complicated by Japan's focus on the abductees issue and Russia's self-interested goals, both of which obstructed previous Six-Party Talks from reaching successful agreements.7 Making future Sino-American relations contingent on Japanese and Russian cooperation would likely lead to further problems in this bilateral relationship. While North Korean denuclearization presents too many barriers, other issues may foster establishment of a platform of bilateral trust. Political scientist Gregory J. Moore argues that even though “hawks in Beijing” continue to protest against American troops in East Asia, Sino-American relations have improved since 2011.8 Moore cites common interests in counter-terrorism and economic interdependence brought the two countries closer. In fact, several areas of common interest provide fertile ground for future cooperation, but a number of factors will complicate the Sino-American relationship in the future. Mixed IF LEFT UNCHECKED, signals coming from both China HOWEVER, NATIONALIST and the United States significantly hinder the bilateral RHETORIC – EVEN IF IT IS ONLY relationship. These include the INTENDED FOR DOMESTIC discrepancies between President CONSUMPTION – WILL Obama’s positive deals with CONTINUE TO EXACERBATE China at the November 2014 APEC Summit and his negative UNCERTAINTY AND PRECLUDE comments about China during COOPERATION. his 2015 State of the Union address. Such inconsistency makes it difficult for China to trust the United States, but arguing that this is evidence of U.S. failure to adjust to China’s rise is not sufficient to explain the current state of the relationship. In Washington, it is politically untenable to praise China as a partner in global affairs. The same climate holds in China, where domestic nationalism makes it essential for the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its image of strength and commitment to global leadership. If left VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

NORTH KOREAN DENUCLEARIZATION unchecked, however, nationalist rhetoric – even if it is only intended for domestic consumption – will continue to exacerbate uncertainty and preclude cooperation.9 Policymakers can take a number of measures to prevent conflicting messages from hindering cooperation. For example, the United States and China should seek to build on the successes from their 2014 agreement to jointly reduce carbon emissions.10 Furthermore, the 2014 APEC Summit illuminated further areas in which the United States and China share common interests: a stable global economy, open sea lanes for global trade, a peaceful Asian-Pacific region, and a plan of action against environmental threats.11 These issues offer feasible gains and concrete opportunities for China and the United States to build cooperation. China and the United States would also benefit from discussing the nature of their relationship. During such talks, China and the United States could construct a written statement clarifying their relationship and their commitment to avoiding confrontation. This document, like the agreement reached in 1972 that re-established Sino-American relations, would help dispel some of the uncertainties plaguing the current relationship. That 1972 communiqué opened relations between China and the United States at a time when cooperation between the two seemed impossible. By once again creating a document that clarifies expectations for their future relationship and areas of potential cooperation, the United States and China can construct a solid foundation to overcome the seeming impossibility of avoiding confrontation. Constructing such a document would be no easy task. Certainly, some issues may be impossible to resolve right now, such as Taiwan and the East China Sea disputes. Rather than viewing these issues as barriers to trust-building, the document would provide a platform to clarify U.S. involvement in the region and Washington’s positions on intra-regional disputes. U.S. involvement in these conflicts has actually provided a stabilizing influence.12 So far, the United States has ensured that neither China, Taiwan, nor Japan have acted unilaterally or incited conflict.13 China benefits from the U.S. role in these disputes, especially in the Sino74

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NICOLE GOLLIHER Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Though nationalists in China call for the Party to maintain China’s territorial integrity and not yield on the island issue, a conflict with Japan would hurt both parties due to their extensive economic ties. Increased American presence in the region, as promised by the Obama administration’s “rebalancing,” will inevitably cause further uncertainty in China. Despite this, a future free of conflict in U.S.-Chinese relations is possible if the relationship is based on common interests and feasible achievements. Cooperation on North Korea denuclearization is welcome, but as it stands now, North Korea is not a feasible opportunity. Instead, jointly expanding on common areas of interest will provide a more feasible platform to continue and perhaps expand Sino-American cooperation in the future. Endnotes John S. Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks,” The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 75. 2 Ibid., 78. 3 Ibid., 85. 4 Evans J. R. Revere, “The North Korea Nuclear Problem: Sailing into Uncharted Waters,” American Foreign Policy Interests 32, no. 3 (2010): 8. 5 Ibid., 10. 6 Park, 78. 7 Ibid., 86-87. 8 Gregory J. Moore, “History, Nationalism and Face in Sino-Japanese Relations,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 15, no. 3 (September 2010): 287. 9 Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter 1989-1999): 116. 10 Mark Landler, “US and China Reach Climate Accord After Months of Talks” New York Times, November 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/china-us-xiobama-apec.html?_r=0 11 Jack A. Goldstone, “US-China Relations After APEC,” Diplomat, November 18, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/us-china-relations-after-apec/ 12 M. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,” in Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2010): 156. 13 Ibid., 150. 1

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Dr. T.X. Hammes on U.S.-China Relations Interviewed by Rick Berger Dr. T.X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Dr. Hammes specializes in future strategic concepts, irregular warfare, and humanitarian aid/disaster relief. Hammes served in the United States Marine Corps for 30 years, retiring as a colonel. He is widely published, having written over 120 articles and the curriculum staple The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Dr. Hammes is also an active and leading participant in the ongoing debate over U.S. strategy in the Western Pacific. Rick Berger currently works on the defense budget as a Research Assistant at the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He holds a master’s degree in security policy studies from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. He is the outgoing managing editor of IAR’s online publication. _______________ RB: Many of our authors have differing views on whether the U.S. military has so far done a good job of committing to military-to-military exchanges with the People’s Liberation Army. How do you assess the effectiveness of the U.S. military in this area? TXH: The U.S. military and, in particular, its officers have bent over backwards to support military-to-military exchanges. This is evident in the Navy’s inviting China to join in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise in 2014, but the effort has spanned all sorts of arrangements. For instance, the Navy has allowed PLA Navy personnel to board U.S. aircraft carriers and in doing so probably improved both their understanding of how the U.S. military fights and its own capabilities. The U.S. military has pursued this relationship to the extent that American hawks have clamored about the 76

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RICK BERGER military being overly trustful of the PLA, but the effort has been largely successful. RB: Recently, U.S. Pacific Fleet’s former chief intelligence officer, Navy Captain James Fanell, set off a media firestorm by publicly assessing that the Chinese military is preparing for a “short, sharp war,” alluding specifically to an amphibious assault of Taiwan. Fanell’s comments drew quick attention from interested parties and were later seemingly walked back by other U.S. officials and officers. Were Fanell’s comments really that significant? TXH: Remember, Fanell’s latest comments in February 2015 were made at his retirement ceremony. If we start policing what officers say at their retirement ceremonies, I think we’re THE UPROAR OVER THE getting into an area in which we have some bigger problems in terms of CHINESE LAND freedom of speech. Fanell’s original RECLAMATION PROJECT commentary that made waves came at IS UNWARRANTED. the 2014 West Conference in San Diego, but he didn’t say anything there that he hadn’t said before or released in unclassified intelligence assessments. Further, Captain Fanell didn’t say anything that PLA officials haven’t said themselves about what the Chinese military is doing in terms of training and preparation. People in both the United States and China are somehow getting upset about a guy making comments that were essentially a direct summary of what Chinese officials had already said. I don’t think there’s a story here. RB: In early March 2015, incoming Pacific Command chief Admiral Harry Harris delivered possibly the strongest statement yet by any U.S. official on Chinese actions in the South China Sea, in particular its land reclamation project on islands in the area. How do you assess the islandbuilding project? TXH: The uproar over the Chinese land reclamation project is unwarranted. We need to understand why the Chinese are engaging in this project, how they justify it, and what new capabilities this project provides VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

INTERVIEW WITH T.X. HAMMES them. To start, China has essentially said that they’re building up islands in the same way that other nations have, and they’re not entirely wrong. This isn’t new behavior. Several South China Sea claimants have already engaged in island-building, to differing degrees. Second, the land reclamation project is more political than military. It anchors China’s more problematic claims about the extent of the nine-dash line by improving their ability to exert de facto control of the area, but doesn’t at all affect the competing claims under the UN Convention on the Law of Sea. Militarily, these new islands don’t give the Chinese military much more to work with. They may be able to launch a few more patrols and do some work on studying the littorals to IT DOESN’T HELP THAT improve their anti-submarine warfare THE U.S. CONGRESS capabilities in the South China Sea, but the islands aren’t particularly STILL HASN’T RATIFIED significant in a military sense. In the UNCLOS, EITHER. Offshore Control strategy, which denies China access to the first island chain through reciprocal antiaccess/area-denial, these islands would be well within the denied zone. In a shooting war, any useful military infrastructure would be hit immediately by the United States. The real thing to worry about in the South China Sea is the extent of the nine-dash line claim and the fact that Manila’s legal protest doesn’t legally bind Beijing to argue its claims in court. It doesn’t help that the U.S. Congress still hasn’t ratified UNCLOS, either. RB: Over the past year, we’ve seen several deals between a diverse set of countries to include the United States, Australia, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Do you view these deals as stabilizing, in that they prevent U.S. partners and allies from acting unilaterally, or destabilizing, in that they stoke Chinese fears of encirclement and containment? TXH: No, I don’t view these partnerships and deals as destabilizing. To the extent that these things are occurring, it’s a direct result of Beijing’s 78

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RICK BERGER behavior, so they have no one to blame but themselves. There are a lot of reasons for the continued success of Abe and the conservatives in Japan, but a serious contributing factor is Beijing itself. We also have to remember that cooperation between East and South Asian countries in some areas may not translate to other areas. Many of these countries, even some that have signed deals in the past two years, have very significant disagreements that aren’t likely to get solved anytime soon. RB: A number of our authors recommend further “soft” initiatives, such as cultural & student exchanges, to build trust and foster Sino-American relationships. Do you see these sorts of programs as having potential, or are they simply lowrisk, little-gain initiatives?

THERE ARE A LOT OF REASONS FOR THE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF ABE AND THE CONSERVATIVES IN JAPAN, BUT A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS BEIJING ITSELF.

TXH: I think these programs are of immense value and should be pursued with vigor. For starters, we’re talking about two very different cultures, and to the extent that exchanges can be pursued to improve cultural understanding, we should invest in them. Particularly for the hundreds of thousands of Chinese students who study and live in America, these programs are useful in that they tend to ruin mischaracterizations of America offered by Party propagandists. A Chinese student comes here believing – because she’s been told this – that the United States is planning a replay of the Chinese century of humiliation. She quickly finds out that Americans aren’t particularly interested in foreign affairs; they’re watching “The Biggest Loser” or checking on Paris Hilton; there is no concerted anti-China feeling or effort by Americans to undermine China. Second, these programs create relationships, especially business relationships, which will be critical down the line. RB: In January, DOD shuttered the AirSea Battle Office and reassigned it to the Joint Staff under the name of Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, a written articulation of which should VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

INTERVIEW WITH T.X. HAMMES arrive by end 2015. Do you view this as merely an expression of interservice politics or a vindication of your repeated warnings about the provocative nature of the ASB operational concept? TXH: AirSea Battle has been misunderstood from the beginning. My work in “criticizing AirSea Battle” wasn’t necessarily criticizing the operational concept itself. The AirSea Battle Office and those in the joint staff working on the new Joint Concept are definitely doing fine work in terms of improving interservice cooperation. The main target of my criticism was the idea that AirSea Battle itself was a strategy or the idea that it was the correct response to an unavoidable problem. By identifying one aspect of the strategic landscape and attacking that problem, the idea of AirSea Battle as an entire strategy was indeed very escalatory. First impressions matter, and I don’t know how long the tension-inducing AirSea Battle characterization will live on in the debates that Chinese and other regional strategists are having. RB: Given the method of victory in your Offshore Control strategy, do you think that current U.S. policy in the Western Pacific focuses too heavily on China to the exclusion of allies and, in particular partners? TXH: No, the United States is constantly looking for partnerships, whether bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral. Especially on the military side, DOD is always inviting new participants to an expanded list of exercises and training programs. For instance, the naval-based Malabar Exercise was a formerly a U.S.-India bilateral exercise; in 2014, the Japanese joined for the first time since 2009 and Singapore and Australia often show up. RB: Several of our authors have discussed how domestic politics in both the United States and China render execution of a long-term foreign policy strategy difficult. To what extent is the current political landscape in the United States limiting the country’s foreign policy? What practical recommendations do you have to minimize the mixed messages coming from Washington? What are the major domestic challenges for political leaders in Beijing? 80

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RICK BERGER TXH: Our own political and economic troubles are our biggest strategic weakness. Whatever strategy we pursue vis-à-vis China, our adversaries, allies, and partners no longer treat our word as ironclad. The political problems in this polarized Congress are of particular concern; they impede our ability to follow through on what we say we will or will not do. This hurts us both domestically, in OUR OWN POLITICAL AND passing laws and budgets, and abroad, in signing treaties and ECONOMIC TROUBLES ARE OUR speaking with one American BIGGEST STRATEGIC WEAKNESS. diplomatic voice. The state of WHATEVER STRATEGY WE Congress makes worse our PURSUE VIS-À-VIS CHINA, OUR military procurement ADVERSARIES, ALLIES, AND problems, which are already bad. Many of these problems PARTNERS NO LONGER TREAT don’t currently have long-term OUR WORD AS IRONCLAD. fixes applied to them. To fully restore this area of former American strength – a bipartisan governing structure – you probably have to fix the way we do primaries. The current structure forces candidates to run well to the left or to the right to get past the primary. You probably have to address the absurd amount of money in politics right now, too. On the other side, the Chinese have two problems that are somewhat intertwined. The largest problem that the political leadership in Beijing must address is the widespread corruption interwoven in every inch of the Chinese economy. That has to be first. The corruption seriously impedes China’s ability to respond to its economic problems, which are growing. It will soon face the same problem as the United States and Europe, but on a much larger scale: a shrinking workforce supporting a growing number of older citizens. Economic growth is already slowing down in China, and the effects of these major structural problems aren’t even being felt yet. For that reason, I think those who believe in the inevitability of a power transition or conflict between the United States and China are unlikely to be proven right.

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Cooperation in Depth, Competition in Control: Shaping “a New Type of Great Power Relationship” in Favor of the United States Emily S. Chen Emily S. Chen is the 2014-2015 Silas Palmer Fellow and a graduate student in East Asian Studies at Stanford University with a focus on international relations. Her research interests and publications revolve around China’s foreign relations and fall into four categories: SinoJapanese relations, Sino-American relations, cross-Taiwan Strait relations, and U.S. foreign policy towards Northeast Asia. Her writings have been featured in CSIS’s PacNet Newsletter, The National Interest, The Diplomat, Stimson Spotlight, East Asia Forum, Stanford International Policy Review, and China Hands. Abstract With a fear of impairing its national interests from being provocative toward others, a country is obligated to deal with international relations with caution in the current world. The novel concept of “a new type of great power relationship” between the United States and China is a product of such an era. Even though the notion was first introduced by China to unleash itself from existing Western-led international agendas, the United States can proactively frame it in its favor by creating a framework of “constructive engagement,” in which cooperation and conflict management are emphasized, thereby preparing the two nations for an extensive political and economic partnership in the long run. Introduction U.S. policy toward China is often characterized as an alternative between containment and engagement. Containment centers on a coercive policy designed to prevent China from weakening U.S. influence in Asia. 82

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EMILY S. CHEN Meanwhile, engagement aims to legitimize Chinese intentions in order to form an East Asian order that is conducive to U.S. interests and is distinguished by the “peaceful resolution of conflicts of interests.”1 Between these two extremes, recent U.S. administrations have made major policy shifts in the face of changing international contexts. During President George W. Bush’s administration, there was a clear difference between the United States’ perception of China before and after the incidents of 9/11. Prior to 9/11, the United States positioned China as a strategic competitor, while after the attacks on 9/11, it encouraged China to be a responsible stakeholder, thereby placing collaboration ahead of competition to obtain China’s cooperation on the global war on terror. When President Barack Obama assumed office in 2009 in the face of a rising China, he continued to see China as a responsible stakeholder, regarding China as anything but an enemy and demonstrating a tendency to adopt a policy of engagement in lieu of one of containment. Given the current state of globalization and interdependence, three features should be taken into account when analyzing U.S.-China policymaking. First, ideology is no longer a determining factor in the postCold War policymaking process. Instead, each state pursues national interests in interstate competitions for world status.2 For instance, China's commitment to Marxism-Leninism has had less impact on its foreign policy decisions than its national interests since China acceded to the United Nations in 1971, which put itself under the regulations of the existing world order. Second, China prioritizes domestic issues such as economic reform, corruption crackdown, and carbon pollution reduction. This domestic focus translates into a Chinese interest in global stability and explains its largely positive engagement with the existing international system. It also implies that China will be unlikely to challenge the world order in the coming decades, offering the United States a continued advantage in the post-World War II world order. Third, given the increasing salience of an ever-broader range of issues in U.S.-China relations, the two powers have become so interdependent that stressing their conflicting interests will “not only hurt the other side but also itself.”3 Currently, Obama has four global priority issues that require VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

COOPERATION IN DEPTH, COMPETITION IN CONTROL China’s cooperation. The most crucial one is spurring U.S. economic recovery and rebalancing the global economy. According to the United States Treasury Department, at the end of August 2014 foreign countries owned nearly 35 percent of U.S. debt; China was the largest foreign holder of U.S. debt at 7.2 percent.4 Second, the Obama administration seeks to halt or curtail the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. China has leverage to affect these two countries; it is Iran’s largest trading partner and the only country with a significant relationship with North Korea. Third, the United States needs China’s cooperation to end the genocide in Darfur. President Obama has held the conflict in Darfur to be important since 2007. In responding to the Darfur conflict, then-Senator Obama said “the United States has a moral obligation [to act] any time you see humanitarian catastrophes,” and failing to stop the conflict leaves “a stain on our souls.”5 China’s large oil investments in Sudan would give it a voice in Khartoum; China has not yet raised this voice against the Darfur massacres, but it could. Last but not least, China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases since 2009, is undoubtedly a necessary partner in coping with the problem of climate change.6 While it is clear that, against the backdrop of an interdependent world, U.S. policy toward a rising China cannot consist of mere economic blandishments, military capabilities and pressure on human rights, a policy that overstresses indulgence, enduring assertive Chinese conduct, or indifference to its internal evolution could also embolden China to engage in malignant behavior. A continued policy of constructive engagement, seeking ways to manage differences while attempting to widen common ground between two countries, would provide a pragmatic policy approach for the U.S. to effectively and jointly tackle growing transnational challenges with China. “A New Type of Great Power Relationship” in the United States’ Favor In June 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed at the Sunnylands summit in California the establishment of “a new type of great power relationship,” which offered an opportunity for the United States to deploy 84

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EMILY S. CHEN a constructive engagement policy. Since the concept has yet been clearly defined, the United States can take the initiative to define its meaning and to frame it in its own favor. Built on common interests and shared beliefs to “manage properly […] conflicting interests,” the concept of “a new type of great power relationship” may well be regarded as a transitional arrangement to construct a “wide-ranging political and economic partnership” in the long run.7 This interim stage accentuates pragmatism to avoid the inflexibility of a lopsided engagement policy. Easing Strategic Distrust: Starting From Direct Exchanges Relations between the United States and China have long faltered due to mutual mistrust, which brews potential conflicts and adds more vulnerability to an already-volatile relationship. According to Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, the mutual mistrust between the United States and China stems from three sources.8 The first is fundamental differences between the two countries’ political systems, which are the products of different political traditions, value systems, and strategic cultures. To the United States, China’s “authoritarian system of government,” occasional “suppression of dissent,” and non-transparency make its government untruthful.9 To China, the United States’ pressure on these issues is a bid to sabotage China’s legitimacy and autonomy.10 The second source of distrust comes from each government’s misperception of the other’s foreign relations; each side tends to see the other’s moves as strategically designed, even when they are not. As Lieberthal and Wang indicated, the investments from China’s state-owned enterprises in the United States are often regarded doubtfully as part of the Chinese leadership’s grand strategy, not as economic activities driven by commercial interests. 11 The perception of a narrowing power gap between the United States and China also brews strategic distrust. According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, pluralities or majorities in 33 out of 39 countries say China has replaced or will replace the United States, and 47% of Americans perceive that China has replaced or will replace United States.12 Whether or not the perception that the United States’ relative VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

COOPERATION IN DEPTH, COMPETITION IN CONTROL power is in decline is accurate, it is certainly widespread. While the United States may have concerns that China has ambitions to challenge its world position, China also harbors apprehensions about whether the United States intends to thwart China’s development. Leaders in Washington and Beijing are discreet about assessing their countries’ power and position in the world. Nationalists in both societies, however, often characterize bilateral relations as a zero-sum game, calling on the government to restrain its contact with the other country.13 In the democratic United States, political leaders subject to NATIONALISTS IN BOTH regular elections are forced to SOCIETIES, HOWEVER, account for public opinion, even marginal viewpoints that have OFTEN CHARACTERIZE media or financial support, in BILATERAL RELATIONS AS A assessing policy options. In ZERO-SUM GAME, CALLING authoritarian China, public ON THE GOVERNMENT TO impressions of a foreign nation are highly influenced by the RESTRAIN ITS CONTACT government, and the government WITH THE OTHER COUNTRY. itself has encouraged nationalism to serve its policy ends. If Beijing does not carefully manage Chinese nationalism, domestic unrest could threaten regime legitimacy. Therefore, in both nations, there is a limited set of feasible policy options available to top leaders. The United States and China must eradicate their mutual mistrust in order to lay a solid foundation for improving relations. Given that strategic mistrust runs deep in U.S.-China relations, the two countries should take intermediate, more feasible steps first. One such step is to cooperate on “common or complementary grounds” and manage “conflicting interests” to avoid disputes.14 By enhancing the frequency and transparency of their communication – including frequently holding strategic dialogues among military leaders and senior government officials – each side could come to better understand the other’s systems and intentions. This would facilitate the initial process of cooperation and conflict management.

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EMILY S. CHEN The United States already recognizes the benefits of doing so. In fact, as Daniel Russel, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, suggested in July 2013, the United States has already placed “a premium on trying to build a cooperative partnership with China through direct and high-level dialogue” and has worked hard to “develop a candid dialogue on areas of disagreement.”15 Constant contact between the two countries can not only help to tackle and hopefully narrow gaps in interests and perceptions but also work as a manipulative instrument to serve for several implicit objectives. In the past, the leaders of the United States used bilateral exchanges to smooth the way to effectively implement agreements when dealing with an often poorly coordinated Chinese international affairs apparatus. The United States could BY KEEPING THESE also identify Chinese senior DIALOGUES OUT OF officers who “had the authority DOMESTIC MEDIA, BOTH THE and inclination to solve problems” through bilateral exchanges, and UNITED STATES AND CHINA make efforts to approach those AVOID OVEREMPHASIZING Chinese officers to bring bilateral MARGINAL VIEWPOINTS THAT deals to a satisfactory conclusion.16 COULD DERAIL MEASURES TO

Dialogues conducted out of public ERASE MUTUAL DISTRUST. view on sensitive issues can also allow for “more freedom of action to explore options for great cooperation and compromise with one another.”17 The domestic media often has both confidential access to sources close to the discussions and a vested interest in dramatizing minor issues to increase viewership. By over-hyping the disagreement and providing incomplete context and analysis, mass media can raise the public discussion to a point where it restricts policy options. By keeping these dialogues out of domestic media, both the United States and China avoid overemphasizing marginal viewpoints that could derail measures to erase mutual distrust.18

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COOPERATION IN DEPTH, COMPETITION IN CONTROL Cooperation in Depth, Competition in Control Addressing a mixed relationship with common interests and disagreements requires a consensus between both countries. Such a consensus can help to identify potential fields of cooperation and disputes between the two countries. Substantial cooperation on areas of common interests could facilitate a closer relationship between the two countries and function as a buffer against future clashes. In areas of conflicting interests, neither nation should overstress the gravity of competition, but rather should attempt to control the tensions that conflicting interests produce. Liberal realism offers a practical approach to the ideas of cooperation and conflicts management. A country’s self-knowledge of its strengths and limits, according to Joseph Nye, forms the foundation of a foreign policy guided by a liberal realist paradigm. The United States still retains military dominance, but economic and transnational power have been “chaotically distributed,” such that many of the United States’ interests require “cooperation among governments and international institutions.”19 Developing an overarching strategy that underscores multilateral and bilateral approaches as well as “smart power” – a combination of traditional military power with an increasingly important soft “attractive power” – could effectively manage the four aspects of constructive engagement policy mentioned in the following sections.20 Human Rights and Democratization The United States has long criticized China’s authoritarian political system and its human rights condition. Ongoing accusations of China’s human rights violations include the “excessive use of violence by public security forces,” “unlawful detention and torture of detainees,” “arbitrary use of state security laws against political dissidents,” “state control of information,” and “religious and ethnic persecution.”21 Although having opted into the international human rights framework by signing up to a wide range of human rights treaties, China continues to insist that human rights should be implemented according to a country’s national conditions, 88

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EMILY S. CHEN arguing for priority to be placed on socio-economic rights and the right to development. In the past, the United States has insisted that China take democratizing steps as a prerequisite for negotiation. U.S. policy-makers expected that with China’s economic growth, the United States could expect support from a rising Chinese middle class who demands more political power in Chinese society. However, without credible military or economic leverage, these U.S. demands met an authoritarian government with media support that could take credit for the state’s economic success and therefore consolidate its power. The social unrest caused by widening income and regional wealth disparities in China could not drive the Party to initiate or allow for fundamental political liberalization, either.22 Stability has been one of China’s core interests and is directly linked to the survival of Communist regime. To pacify social discontent, the Party is likely to promote patriotic campaigns to link the concepts of patriotism and allegiance to the Party, persuading people to believe that it is the “presence of Communist Party rule” that maintains order and TO AVOID UPFRONT prosperity in China.23 CONFRONTATIONS WITH CHINA, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD

Because Chinese leadership is COOPERATE WITH INGOS TO unlikely to allow for sudden democratization in the coming PROMOTE VALUES OF HUMAN decades, international RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION nongovernmental IN CHINA. organizations (INGOs) and foreign governments can use information technology to create incremental change in political liberalization in Chinese society. According to political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, transnational advocacy networks can pressure states and international organizations to hold them accountable to international norms or institutions.24 Advocates that have little political influence to press for changes to a non-democratic government’s practices can channel their needs and information through the foreign media or the rising domestic independent media and the internet to transnational actors such as INGOs and foreign governments, VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

COOPERATION IN DEPTH, COMPETITION IN CONTROL which in turn can impose international pressure on the state; Keck and Sikkink call this the “boomerang effect.”25 To avoid upfront confrontations with China, the United States should cooperate with INGOs to promote values of human rights and democratization in China. This, along with the prevalence of information technology usage among advocacy groups in China, could enable the United States to avoid Chinese accusations that the United States is interfering in China’s domestic affairs, to maintain a smooth bilateral relationship for economic issues, and to successfully realize the values of democracy and human rights. The Taiwan Question On the issue of Taiwan’s independence, the United States should hedge its bets to maintain stability. Despite the fact that strategic distrust lingers in U.S.-Chinese relations, the Obama administration has continued to adopt a strategy of strategic ambiguity on one of China’s long-held core interests: the Taiwan question. The U.S. government has made clear that it opposes unilateral moves by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo and to disrupt peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Washington has committed to providing Taipei with arms so that Taiwan would have confidence to negotiate with China and potentially deter an attack by Beijing. However, it has made no reliable commitments about the circumstances under which U.S. armed forces would defend Taiwan, so as to prevent Taipei from provoking Beijing. However, China’s increasingly assertive public statements and actions in recent years have induced a heated debate in the United States over this strategy of strategic ambiguity. Some experts stress the strategy’s potential for cooperation, while others hold that the ambiguity exacerbates the likelihood of strategic competition between the United States and China. According to Shelley Rigger, experts fall into five distinct schools of thought on the issue; each school grew out of a particular strain of optimism or pessimism about the future of U.S.-Chinese relations or crossStrait relations. 90

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EMILY S. CHEN Generally speaking, under the current leadership of Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, China and Taiwan watchers have raised hope that the favorable momentum between Beijing and Taipei can “create the possibility that they can find a solution to their six-decade long dispute.”26 This optimism mainly stems from engagements between China and Taiwan for the past seven years, especially over political issues. At an official level, both sides agreed to mutual visits by senior officials from Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and assented in principle to establish a MAC office in Beijing and a TAO office in Taipei. Unofficially, Chinese and Taiwanese think tanks have discussed sensitive political issues.27 In particular, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a robust opposition party in Taiwan that advocates for Taiwanese independence and has long held a grudge against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), seemed to move in a more pragmatic direction toward the CCP to win the presidential election in 2016 and to regain the trust of the United States. On March 6, 2015, DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen stated that if the DPP wins the 2016 presidential election, it would fulfill its responsibility to maintain peaceful and stable relations between Taiwan and China.28 While this favorable movement between Beijing and Taipei has created stability in the Taiwan Strait, which fits the United States’ broader interest in peace and stability in the western Pacific, present cordiality between China and Taiwan cannot guarantee future peace. 29 Strategically speaking, warming cross-Strait relations could even pose a challenge to the United States’ dominant role in the area and cast doubts on the United States’ current policy towards Asia, if it were to appear that the United States failed to counterbalance China’s leverage in the region. Furthermore, regardless of the United States and China’s commitment to forging a positive and cooperative relationship, the two countries have yet to fundamentally eliminate their strategic distrust. The United States’ interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue thus encounters uncertainties. Even though the U.S.-China relationship appears favorable toward cooperation, it is still in the United States’ political interest to maintain security ties, though unofficially, to Taiwan. A failed commitment would raise doubts about the credibility of the United States’ mutual defense VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

COOPERATION IN DEPTH, COMPETITION IN CONTROL commitments among other regional allies, like Japan and South Korea. The United States should therefore continue its current approach: strategic ambiguity. Other Security Issues On other security issues, meanwhile, the United States and China should establish constant direct exchanges. Much debate in recent years over China’s rise has revolved around whether China will be a great-power strategic rival to the United States in the future. However, the debate misses a critical point: that any crisis between two nuclear-armed countries should be considered a dangerous, pressing concern. As Avery Goldstein suggests, confrontations between the United States and China in present days verge on a “genuine crisis” that carries the risk of war.30 Two aspects determine whether a confrontation between the United States and China is likely to evolve into a “genuine crisis.” First, misunderstandings about either side’s vital interests increase the chance that one side will “take steps that it believes are safe” but that the other treats as undesirable provocations.31 China normally identifies its “core interests” as “sovereignty, security and development,” as well as “reunification of Taiwan.” See, for instance: On March 29, 2015, responding to Nepal for its crackdown on anti-China activities by Tibetans and its promise to stop activities supporting the exiled Tibetan leader, Dalai Lama, President Xi Jinping of China awarded nine-hundred-million yuan for Nepal to “appreciate Nepal’s firm support on issues concerning China’s core interests, including issues related to Tibet and Taiwan.” 32 It is unclear whether the United States and China should understand China’s persistent claims to contested portions of the East China and South China Seas as being among China’s core interests. Meanwhile, the United States’ own interests in the western Pacific region are somewhat unclear. The United States’ vital security interests in East Asia have always been off its coast. In February 2014, Daniel Russel, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, clearly pointed out that as a maritime country with “global trading networks,” the United States has a national interest in “the maintenance of peace and stability; respect for 92

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EMILY S. CHEN international law; unimpeded lawful commerce; and freedom of navigation and overflight in the East China and South China Seas.”33 However, it has demonstrated ambivalence about its security ties with Taiwan and has taken a confusing stance on the maritime disputes among its allies and China. Although the United States is trying to signal to China its neutrality on the territorial disputes between China and Japan in the East China Sea, public reassurances that it will provide mutual defense to its regional allies make it difficult for China to guess whether a particular action will be construed as innocuous or provocative. Second, where interests overlap, genuine crisis is more likely; the national interests of the United States and China overlap in the seas near China. For the United States, to command sea lanes and prevent the rising of a regional hegemon to achieve a “favorable balance of power” has always been in its interests.34 Likewise, as indicated in its 2012 Defense White Paper, China lists three core interests in the area: “protects maritime territorial sovereignty, secure maritime resources for China’s sustainable development, and safeguard the security of international sea lanes of communication.”35 Of its three maritime core interests, the first two are closely related to the East and South China Seas. Since the vital security interests of both the United States and China overlap in a common maritime region, the potential for a conflict of interests between the two is likely to rise in the years to come. Direct dialogues and bilateral exchanges can prevent crises from developing at the outset. The United States and China have always had communications, but most of the time these attempts were in vain: after the two presidents’ hotline failed to achieve effective communication, the two countries came to rely mostly on limited “public statements” or “tacit signals sent through actions.”36 Both of these are flawed mechanisms for communication. Public statements must cater to multiple audiences, including nationalists, must be inflexible in the stances they advance, and cannot “discuss politically sensitive proposals.”37 Communicating through actions, on the other hand, can generate misinterpretations and cause strategic distrust over time. Direct dialogues – including talks between political and military leaders to clarify each side’s vital interests and VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

COOPERATION IN DEPTH, COMPETITION IN CONTROL intentions, and military-to-military exchanges to become familiar with each other’s military systems and practices – would avoid these pitfalls and would be the most effective approach to boost familiarity, avoid potential “genuine crisis,” and diminish strategic mistrust in order to build a foundation for cooperative relations. Economic Issues On economic issues, the United States and China should deepen their existing engagement in order to maximize their interests. Economic symbiosis in bilateral relations has expanded since China gained entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. More and more Americans view the economic relationship in a detrimental light, though; they worry about the United States’ mounting trade deficit with China, China’s currency manipulation to benefit Chinese exports, China’s use of its massive foreign exchange reserves to purchase U.S. treasury bonds, and China’s ongoing failure to protect intellectual property rights. These concerns are understandable; the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship may seem to primarily benefit China. Indeed, the U.S. trade deficit with China rose to $315 billion in 2012, nearly four times greater than in 2000.38 China possessed $3.3 trillion in foreign currency reserves as of the end of 2012, including $1.32 trillion in United States Treasury securities in March 2013, which accounted for 7.9% of the United States’ total THE CURRENT ECONOMIC outstanding debt.39 PLAYING FIELD HAS BRED NEITHER AN ABSOLUTE

However, economic interdependence between two countries is by nature reciprocal. That is, there is no SUM GAMES. standing beneficiary in economic interdependent relations; rather, due to the close ties between the two economies, each side is vulnerable and susceptible to the other’s economic situation. For example, the trade gap between the United States and China is fraught with certain intrinsic considerations that complicate China’s exploitation of the economic relations. For example, China’s trade greatly rests on large inflows of foreign direct investment, which in recent years WINNER, NOR ANY ZERO-

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EMILY S. CHEN have streamed into the manufacturing sector. Also, most of China’s exports to the United States, though manufactured in China, are under the brand of foreign companies. As one part of the production chain, China “pockets only a small part of the gain,” most of which “goes to the foreign companies and the consumers.”40 In short, the idea that China is exploiting its economic relationship with the United States is misguided. The current economic playing field has bred neither an absolute winner, nor any zerosum games. Consequently, for the United States, neither a retaliatory economic approach toward China nor self-reclusion and protectionism to avoid harms from the volatility of world economies can secure the United States’ national economy. Deepening economic exchanges with China through multiple channels would best serve the United States’ economic interests. As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once described in a statement about the U.S. policy of “strategic rebalancing” to the AsiaPacific, the United States’ “economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of U.S. firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base in Asia,” where China’s large market will occupy an essential position.41 In practice, bilaterally, the United States should continue undertaking its highest-profile dialogues with China, such as the Strategic and Economic Dialogues, so that both the United States and China can regularly understand each other’s positions on a wide range of economic issues and “find areas of common interest and manage differences.”42 Multilaterally, the United States should also take advantage of the WTO’s mechanisms to resolve trade disputes and should encourage China to “assume responsibilities commensurate with its growing global impact and its national capabilities” by conforming to international norms.43 Conclusion “Interdependence breeds caution, but it doesn’t guarantee peace,” Susan Shirk suggested in her 2007 book.44 Because pursuing national interests could be interpreted by other countries as provocative, countries should proceed with caution in the era of globalization. The novel concept of “a new type of great power relationship” between the United States and China is a product of such an era. Even though China first introduced the VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

COOPERATION IN DEPTH, COMPETITION IN CONTROL notion to unleash itself from existing Western-led international agendas, the United States can proactively frame it in its favor by creating a framework of constructive engagement, in which cooperation and conflict management are emphasized, thereby preparing the two nations for an extensive political and economic partnership in the long run. Endnotes Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), 176. 2 Mark Leonard, “Why Convergence Breeds Conflict: Growing More Similar Will Push China and the United States Apart,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 5 (September October 2013): 125, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139650/mark-leonard/why-convergencebreeds-conflict 3 Robert G. Sutter, “Dialogues and Their Implications in Sino-American Relations,” Issues & Studies 49, no. 3 (September 2013): 1-34 at 28-29. 4 Mike Patton, “Who owns the most U.S. debt?” Forbes, October 28, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2014/10/28/who-owns-the-most-u-s-debt/ 5 Austin Bay, “Time for Obama and Ambassador Power to account for their Darfur failure,” Washington Examiner, January 28, 2015, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ time-for-obama-and-ambassador-power-to-account-for-their-darfur-failure/article/ 2559434 6 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 21. 7 Donald S. Zagoria, “National Committee on American Foreign Policy Fact-finding Mission to Seoul, Taipei, Shanghai and Beijing, ” October 11-25, 2013, December 2013, 3, http://www.ncafp.org/ncafp/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/NCAFP-Asia-TripReport_November-2013.pdf 8 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” Brookings Institution, March 2012, 34-38, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/ files/papers/2012/3/30%20us%20china%20lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf 9 Susan V. Lawrence, “U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service Report, August 1, 2013, 2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/row/R41108.pdf 10 Lieberthal and Wang, 34-35. 11 Ibid., 36. 12 Pew Research Center, “Will China Replace U.S. as World’s Leading Superpower?” July 18, 2013, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-4-global-balance-ofpower/#china-superpower 13 Lieberthal and Wang, 37. 14 Yan Xuetong, “Strategic Cooperation without Mutual Trust: A Path Forward for China and the United States,” Asia Policy no. 15 (January 2013): 4-6. 1

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“US, China working hard to build cooperative partnership: senior US official,” Global Times, July 23, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/798310.shtml 16 Sutter, 4-5. 17 Ibid. 18 Lieberthal and Wang, 34-35. 19 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Toward A Liberal Realist Foreign Policy: A Memo for the Next President,” Harvard Magazine, March/April 2008, http://harvardmagazine.com/2008/ 03/toward-a-liberal-realist.html 20 Ibid. 21 Thomas Lum, “Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 113 th Congress,” Congressional Research Service report, June 19, 2013, 2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ R43000.pdf 22 Ibid. 23 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 53. 24 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics,” UNESCO 1999, 93, http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/ docs/icb.topic446176.files/Week_7/Keck_and_Sikkink_Transnational_Advocacy.pdf 25 Jackie Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 73-74. 26 Richard Bush, Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 7. 27 Zagoria, 8. 28 Sophia Yeh and Elaine Hou, “DPP Vows to Maintain Cross-Strait Peace if It Returns to Power,” Focus Taiwan, March 6, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/ 201503060009.aspx 29 Alice Miller, “Contemporary Issues: The Taiwan Question,” class lecture, “China in World Politics,” Stanford University (Stanford, Calif.), November 20, 2013. 30 Avery Goldstein, “China’s Real and Present Danger: Now Is the Time for Washington to Worry,” Foreign Affairs 92, no.5 (September/October 2013): 136-144 at 136, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-presentdanger. 31 Ibid., 137-8. 32 “China rewards Nepal for curbing Tibet activities,” Phayul.com, March 31, 2015, http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=35919&article=China+rewards+Nepal+for +curbing+Tibet+activities&t=1&c=1 33 Daniel R. Russel, “Maritime Disputes in East Asia,” testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, February 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm 34 Aaron L. Friedberg and Robert S. Ross, “Here Be Dragons,” The National Interest no. 103 (September October 2009): 25.

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Kimberley Hsu, Craig Murray, and Matt Wild, “China’s 2012 Defense White Paper: The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 3, 2013, 3, http://www.uscc.gov/Research/china% E2%80%99s-2012-defense-white-paper-diversified-employment-china%E2%80%99sarmed-forces 36 Goldstein, 141. 37 Ibid. 38 Russell Flannery, “What Can Be Done about the Big U.S. Trade Deficit with China,” Forbes, August 3, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/russellflannery/2013/08/03/whatcan-be-done-about-the-big-u-s-trade-deficit-with-china/ 39 Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs, “Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,” April 12, 2013, 17, 27, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-policies/Documents/ Foreign%20Exchange%20Report%20April%202013.pdf 40 Shirk, 26-27. 41 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/ 42 Lawrence, 10-11. 43 Tom Donilon, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon—As Prepared for Delivery: President Obama’s Asia Policy and Upcoming Trip to Asia,” The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, November 15, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2012/11/15/remarks-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon-prepareddelivery 44 Shirk, 34. 35

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In Response:

Reframing “Major Country Relations” in Pursuit of Partnership and Accountability Genevieve Neilson Genevieve Neilson will graduate with a Master’s in International Affairs from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs in August 2015. Her research interests include international migration, climate change adaptation and energy policy with regional focuses on China and the South Pacific. She received her B.A. (Honors) in international relations and political science from Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand. Genevieve is a 2015 Presidential Management Fellow Finalist and a board member for the Australian and New Zealand Studies Association of North America. Since Chinese President Hu Jintao launched the idea of creating a “new type of great-power relations,” scholars have sought to extrapolate what the concept means for the United States. Perhaps to quell the concerns of those who see China as a threat, President Xi Jinping later renamed the construct to a “new type of major country relations.” Even prior to Hu’s articulation of this concept, though, there was significant policy debate on whether the United States should engage with a rising China as a competitor or partner. Emily Chen’s “Cooperation in Depth, Competition in Control” contributes to that debate by advancing a framework called “constructive engagement,” meant to ensure that the concept of “great-power relations” is defined in a way that benefits the United States. Through this framework, Chen finds the following areas of potential cooperation: human rights and democratization, Taiwan, and security and economic policy. By emphasizing increased dialogue in these areas, the framework provides a consistent starting point for the United States. Yet a U.S. approach to “major country relations” should understand China as a complex state that is undergoing a transformation into a responsible VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

REFRAMING “MAJOR COUNTRY RELATIONS” stakeholder in the international order. Rather than concentrating on precluding conflict, the framework should emphasize collaboration and promote accountability between the two powers. Skeptics believe the concept of a “new type of great-power relations” is a trap designed to give China the ability to establish new rules of RATHER THAN CONCENTRATING international affairs. They ON PRECLUDING CONFLICT, THE argue that it allows China to FRAMEWORK SHOULD select areas in which it seeks to EMPHASIZE COLLABORATION cooperate with the United States while avoiding other AND PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY issues. This view assumes that BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS. China will catch up to the development level of the United States. For example, Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff wrote in Foreign Affairs that U.S. accession to China’s definition “offers ammunition for those in Beijing and beyond who promote a false narrative of the United States’ weakness and China’s inevitable rise…[it] grants China great-power status without placing any conditions on its behavior.”1 Chen expands upon this criticism by arguing that Washington should define and shape the concept in a way that favors the United States. Otherwise, she writes, a commitment to China’s version of the framework could tie Washington to a lopsided cooperative agreement that might drift away from areas of U.S. interest, such as human rights and democratization. Such arguments ignore that China is what David Shambaugh calls a “partial power.”2 While China may catch up to the United States economically within the next several decades, it currently lacks the military capability, alliance networks, and soft power outreach needed to attain its aspirational status as a leader in international affairs. Beijing’s increased international economic and security leadership, as evidenced by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, demonstrate its willingness to contribute to the international architecture rather than pursue a wholly unilateral foreign policy. Yet Shambaugh recently predicted that the “endgame of Chinese communist 100

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GENEVIEVE NEILSON rule has now begun,”3 identifying the frailty of the political system as a significant domestic hurdle to further expansion of Chinese global influence. Nonetheless, the United States was put in a tenuous position by China’s slogan. If Washington accepts the concept, it may signal to regional allies in Asia that it is succumbing to Chinese influence. Total U.S. rejection of the concept would impede cooperation with Beijing, add to existing distrust, and damage U.S. interests in the region.4 The United States can still accept and use the concept as a way to transform Beijing into a responsible stakeholder. Chen rightly highlights areas of mutual mistrust, but discounts the ability of domestic rhetoric to hamper progress. Citing Kenneth Lieberthal THE UNITED STATES CAN and Wang Jisi, she writes that both STILL ACCEPT AND USE THE countries should increase the CONCEPT AS A WAY TO frequency and transparency of TRANSFORM BEIJING INTO communications, as mistrust stemming from political differences A RESPONSIBLE and the narrowing power gap will not STAKEHOLDER. be removed swiftly. Indeed, the United States invites China to military exchanges such as the 2014 Rim of the Pacific exercise5 and promotes people-to-people ties, as seen in the 100,000 Strong Educational Exchange Initiative.6 Yet while these initiatives and the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue deepens macroeconomic cooperation and strengthens trust, U.S. officials often wield currency manipulation as a political issue7 despite its relative irrelevance to U.S. businesses trading with China.8 Issues that appeal to a domestic audience perpetuate mistrust and hamper higher-level progress. As a way of managing conflicting interests, Chen’s framework of “constructive engagement” exemplifies the current narrow scope of U.S. policymaking. First, the use of non-government organizations and Internet technology to promote American values to the Chinese public already raises suspicions within Chinese leadership. By contrast, China cannot VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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REFRAMING “MAJOR COUNTRY RELATIONS” engage in such a campaign because it lacks similar non-government organizations; even cultural groups are considered the Chinese Communist Party propaganda vehicles. U.S.-China public-private cooperation supporting Internet governance would be more useful. Second, Washington remains unable to determine the direction of China-Taiwan relations and thus endorses the status quo. Lastly, Chen overstates the negative consequences of economic interdependence; many U.S. companies operating in China take advantage of cheap labor while profiting from local demand, which does not increase U.S. vulnerability. For the author, in some areas the United States and China should basically agree to disagree. The framework also forgoes an adequate discussion of how the United States can support China as a “responsible international stakeholder.” Chen offers examples of crises in Sudan, North Korea, and Iran as areas ripe for security cooperation. Yet China stood in the way of United Nations action against Syria over the past several years, including by vetoing a draft resolution to refer the crisis to the International Criminal Court (ICC). While Washington heavily criticized Beijing and Moscow for the veto, the United States is not a member of the ICC and only agreed to support the resolution after assurances that Israel would not also be referred to the ICC.9 Other international arenas offer more promise. Cooperation related to climate change, sustainable growth, and finance in the post-2015 development agenda are areas which China has more recently taken leadership positions and can continue to serve U.S. interests. The article might have benefited from a brief historical discussion of the concept of “congagement,” which suggests that the United States should both engage with China and hedge against it.10 Congagement is similar to the liberal realism approach supported by the author, which “embraces China as a responsible stakeholder, but hedges against possible hostility by maintaining close relations with Japan, India, and other countries in the region.”11

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GENEVIEVE NEILSON The article also falls short in addressing the recent change in terminology to “new type of major country relations” and President Obama’s subsequent silence on the topic. In November 2014, President Xi articulated new terminology and outlined priority areas for the relationship that place more responsibility on Beijing to become an active stakeholder in the international order.12 Yet Xi remained stalwart on his requirement that each side “not act against each other’s core interests.” While the United States never vacated the Pacific, its “rebalancing” to the region was a direct response to China’s increased international influence and assertiveness. Washington can still nurture China’s leadership ambitions and support China as a responsible stakeholder. The concept initiated by China is not an act of caution to avoid confrontation, as the author posits, but it is a proactive method for China to equalize itself with the United States and create a framework for accountability. For the United States, pursuing a “new type of major country relations” with China can be a constructive way to challenge traditional thinking by envisioning Beijing as a true partner. Endnotes Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff, “Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China’s ‘New Type of Great-Power Relations’ Slogan,” Foreign Affairs, October 9, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142178/andrew-s-erickson-and-adam-p-liff/notso-empty-talk 2 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 3 David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crackup,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198 4 Dingding Chen, “Defining a ‘New Type of Major Power Relations,’” Diplomat, November 8, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-a-new-type-of-majorpower-relations 5 Phil Stewart, “China to Attend Major U.S.-hosted naval exercises, but role limited” Reuters, March 22, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/22/us-usa-china-drillidUSBRE92L18A20130322 6 U.S. Department of State, “100,000 Strong Educational Exchange Initiatives,” http://www.state.gov/100k 7 “Debate over China’s currency manipulation part of international trade pact,” South China Morning Post, March 9, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/ 1733705/debate-over-chinas-currency-manipulation-part-international-trade-debate 1

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The U.S.-China Business Council, USCBC 2014 China Business Environment Survey Results, “Growth Continues Amidst Rising Competition, Policy Uncertainty,” 2014, https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/USCBC%202014%20China%20Business%20 Environment%20Survey%20Results%20%28English%29_0.pdf 9 Ian Black, “Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to International Criminal Court,” Guardian, May 22, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ may/22/russia-china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court 10 Zalmay Khalilzad, “Congage China,” RAND, Project Air Force Issue Paper,1999, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/issue_papers/2006/IP187.pdf 11 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Toward A Liberal Realist Foreign Policy: A Memo for the Next President,” Harvard Magazine, March/April/2008, http://harvardmagazine.com/2008/03/ toward-a-liberal-realist.html 12 Xinhua News Agency, “China Marks Six Priorities for New Type of Major-Country Relations with U.S.” Beijing Review, November 13, 2014, http://www.bjreview.com/se/ txt/2014-11/13/content_652603.htm 8

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Redefining Pragmatic Engagement: The “New Model” of U.S.-China Relations and the Opportunity of Shared Consequences Ryan Mitchell Ryan Mitchell has earned a J.D. from Harvard Law School and a B.A. from the New School. He is currently a Mellon Foundation Humanities Fellow and Ph.D. in Law Candidate at Yale University, researching early 20th century political philosophy, international law, and comparative constitutional theory. He has studied and worked in various parts of China, and is fluent in Mandarin. He is also a member of the State Bar of California. Abstract Since the 2013 meeting of Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping in Sunnylands, California, one phrase has come to define both the vast potential for bilateral cooperation and the failure to realize that potential: the Chinese proposal for a “new model of major country relations” (新型大国关系). While China has presented the concept in terms of “win-win” cooperation, U.S. skepticism has broadly centered on two critiques. First, U.S. policy makers are concerned that associated language regarding “respect for core interests” represents an attempt to procure concessions regarding longstanding differences of opinion on Taiwan, Tibet, and similarly fraught topics. Secondly, the United States has made clear its position that bilateral ties “should be based not on slogans but on the quality of the cooperation”: pragmatic, concrete results should come before rhetoric. This article compares three different ways of understanding this “concrete” dimension of political engagement: 1) Policy “realism,” as manifested in dominant strains of policy analysis in both the United States and China that, while distinct, share many

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REDEFINING PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT important common premises; 2) the “empiricist” positions of those who argue the need to take into account various underlying trends which counterbalance realist considerations; and 3) the more thickly “pragmatic” model proposed here, in which rhetorical factors rejected in the above models are themselves regarded as empirically significant in the conscious development of “public, objective and shared consequences.” Embracing China’s “new model” language may, itself, thus enable otherwise unlikely pragmatic achievements. Introduction What “liberté, egalité, fraternité” meant to the French Revolution and to the making of modernity in the West, “wealth, strength, and honor” have meant to the forging of modern China.1 That statement comes early in Wealth and Power, Orville Schell and John Delury’s account of China’s nearly two-centuries of reform and “selfstrengthening” (自强) efforts aimed at restoring the nation’s historical greatness.2 As they go on to write, this underlying difference in political values between China and its Western observers has meant, “Chinese reformers tended to inhabit what looks to Western eyes like a pragmatic kingdom of means, rather than an idealistic world of ends.”3 This basic difference in perspective recurs throughout the bilateral relationship between the United States and China. Most recently, the debate and controversy surrounding Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for a “new model of major country relations” (新型大国关系) has brought the difference into especially sharp relief.4 The Xi administration first rolled out the phrase in domestic speeches outlining its foreign relations agenda, and Xi directly presented it for U.S. consideration during his 2013 “informal” meeting in Sunnylands, California. Chinese diplomats have continuously presented the concept as the key to establishing a win-win bilateral relationship and to avoiding the 106

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RYAN MITCHELL Thucydides’ trap of conflict between rising and established powers.5 Nonetheless, the United States has remained skeptical. Aside from a few non-committal early uses of the phrase “new model of major country relations,” such as National Security Director Susan Rice’s use of it in public remarks on November 20, 2013, and Vice President Joe Biden’s mentions of it the following month during a visit to China, the United States has declined to formally adopt it or to endorse it in any systematic fashion.6 Indeed, U.S. officials almost totally abandoned mentioning the new model after critics portrayed those early uses of the phrase as giving China an “opening” to pursue aggressive regional policies such as territorial disputes and declaring particularly stringent air defense RATHER THAN DISMISS identification zones (ADIZs) over CHINA’S POLITICAL disputed territory that compete with 7 SLOGANS AS EMPTY neighbors’ existing ADIZs. RHETORIC, IT IS IMPORTANT

This paper argues that reluctance to TO NOTE THAT THEY OFTEN use the phrase is largely unjustified. INAUGURATE VAST Locating resistance to the new INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES model so far in a realist interpretation of bilateral relations AND COORDINATE STATE that relies upon an overly narrow ACTION. conception of the two states’ respective interests, this article next makes the argument that this conception misunderstands the practical function of Chinese rhetoric. Foreign analysts certainly should not interpret major ideological directives such as the “new model” in an overly idealistic fashion. Yet, excessive skepticism is equally empirically unjustifiable. On the contrary, as China’s history of pragmatic self-strengthening demonstrates, previous political vocabulary shifts have often created the conditions for concrete achievements, both domestically and in the realm of interstate diplomacy. The proposed “new model” terminology offers similar opportunities. Rather than dismiss China’s political slogans as empty rhetoric, it is important to note that they often inaugurate vast institutional changes and coordinate state action. This has, in fact, been a feature of political VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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REDEFINING PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT cooperation in China throughout the country’s long history, with pithy phrases such as “restoring the ancient” or “self-strengthening” serving to unite disparate individuals and groups into situational alliances. For example, Communist Party leaders’ periodically use nationalist slogans such as “never forget national humiliation” (勿忘国耻) to great effect to harden ties and build up popular animosity against former colonial powers such as Japan.8 By contrast, however, Party leaders have at other times used conciliatory or non-confrontational slogans like the “new model” to propose periods of renewed openness and diplomatic engagement.9 First, this paper will outline in further detail the evolution of the new model platform and the realist concerns, particularly the divisive topic of core interests that are preventing U.S. endorsement. Second, it will critique this position of realist reluctance through the lens of empirical trends of ongoing Chinese integration. Third, it will explain in further detail the rhetorical innovation’s potential value in affecting Chinese political realities. Finally, it will suggest that this disparity between policy and facts results from an overly narrow account of pragmatism, and that reevaluating pragmatism may promote bilateral progress. Realism in the New Model Debate Few U.S. or Chinese policymakers explicitly advocate confrontation as a desirable objective. Yet U.S.-China bilateral relations feature several fundamental disagreements. On the U.S. side, for example, many foreign policy analysts characterize China as an expansionist power seeking territorial and economic hegemony in Asia. This has given rise to both direct advocacy of Cold War-style containment policies by some U.S. security analysts,10 as well as arguments that U.S.-China competition might be stabilized into, for example, the less volatile form of a “Cool War” featuring both competition and cooperation.11 To the degree that advocates of either view hold that China is contemplating a new “Asian Monroe Doctrine” or something similar, they emphasize that this is inimical to U.S. values and interests and recommend a proactive American response.12 108

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RYAN MITCHELL As Suisheng Zhao notes in a recent article outlining this context of “strategic rivalry” and its relation to the Xi administration’s “new model” initiative, one of the primary topics of contention between the two powers is the Chinese term “core interest” (核心利益).13 The Chinese media have defined core interests as constituting “the bottom-line of national survival” and being “essentially non-negotiable.”14 The term, which was rarer before the current decade,15 was “[o]bviously chosen with intent to signal the resolve in China’s sovereignty and territorial claims that it deems important enough to go to war over,”16 and Chinese leaders have applied it with special emphasis to China’s ongoing contested maritime claims.17 In the context of China’s ongoing territorial disputes, Obama administration officials have seen deployment of the phrase as a form of escalation. Indeed, when China’s foreign ministry first openly applied the term to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in April 2013, U.S. observers considered the language to be “raising new tensions in [the] region.”18 Meanwhile, the United States and its regional allies continue to express concern that China may apply the term to its territorial claims in the South China Sea.19 This anxiety is supported by the fact that some Chinese foreign policy hardliners have associated U.S. opposition to China’s core interests with calls for regional “de-Americanization” (去美国化), verging on the “Monroe Doctrine” analogies noted above.20 The above developments underlie what Zhao calls his “realist reading of the new model of big power relations” (an alternate translation of 新型大国关系).21 Although it is a matter of debate whether full-scale deAmericanization is really a long term goal for Chinese policymakers (the term is seldom discussed by authoritative official outlets), it is far clearer that the foreign policy debate in China has settled on a general consensus that “denying regional hegemony of other powers” is desirable.22 Zhao ties this aim to common realist analyses of international power relations, which hold that if a state cannot attain hegemony, it can at least deny it to strategic rivals.

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REDEFINING PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT Based on this realist analysis, Xi Jinping’s 2013 presentation to the Obama administration about the “new model of major country relations” platform appears to constitute “a challenge to U.S. primacy in the Asia–Pacific based on China’s rising capacities and deeply rooted suspicion of the US containment.”23 The U.S. foreign policy establishment has widely shared this view, which was reinforced both by the announcement’s timing – coming as it did in the midst of a tense stand-off between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands – and by the fact that one of three principles constituting the “new model” was respect for core interests. As noted, this term then and now has constituted the greatest stumbling block to U.S. embrace of the new model. In Xi’s first presentation, the three principles listed in full were “no conflict and no confrontation; mutual respect, including for both countries’ core interests and major concerns; and win-win cooperation.” Interestingly, “core interests” appears to be the only term in the list that could be seen as constituting a diplomatic term of art. Although China’s foreign policy establishment revised the principles that make up the new model of major country relations in November 2014 to replace these three with six specific areas of potential cooperation, the continued inclusion of “core interests” has been perhaps the most important factor preventing serious consideration of the language by the United States.24 Stephen Hadley and Paul Haenle argue in Foreign Affairs that if “Chinese leaders are willing to remove the references to core interests, U.S. leaders should not dismiss the proposal out of hand.”25 As Hadley and Haenle note approvingly, President Obama was initially willing to consider the new model despite establishment skepticism “both because [the model] came directly from the Chinese leader and because it aimed to address the historical tendency of destabilizing competition and war between rising and status quo powers.”26 Hadley and Haenle contrast Obama’s openminded first reaction with the United States’ later refusal to adopt the new language without clarification of its exact practical ramifications. This reservation, however, goes beyond the term “core interests” by itself; as this paper will go on to argue, the general United States reluctance to sign onto seemingly vague agreements risks forfeiting the chance to determine 110

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RYAN MITCHELL the meaning of such agreements, up to and including their most problematic provisions (such as “core interests”). Instead of waiting for the unlikely abandonment of specific terms, the United States should rethink with greater haste its refusal to commit to the “new model” idea. In the context of China’s own demands, this U.S. refusal poses a serious challenge to bilateral relations. Hadley and Haenle portray the two countries’ contrasting objectives as a catch-22: The Chinese desire a new official language of “strategic partnership” before embarking on specific cooperative ventures, whereas the U.S. demands clarity over the scope and content of the partnership before making any broad official commitments. That the two sides have these opposite approaches in formulating new policies risks exacerbating the historical tendency towards confrontation. That “historical tendency,” otherwise known as Thucydides’ trap, has itself become a rhetorical mainstay of U.S.-Chinese relations.27 Indeed, Chinese official media have taken to explicitly portraying the current “new model” platform as an attempt to evade the pattern of confrontation associated with such historical conflicts as that between Athens and Sparta, Britain and Habsburg Spain, or imperial Germany and the Western European colonial powers.28 Xi himself mentioned the “trap” by name in his comments at Sunnylands, where he presented the “new model” language. This, however, presents a puzzle that has so far been under-explored. Why is it that, while most U.S. and (non-governmental) Chinese policy analysts have adopted a straightforward realist reading of the new model of major country relations, the Chinese side officially presents the new model as an alternative to policymaking based on realist assumptions? In the following section, this paper argues that “realism” itself fails to explain real processes of existing cooperation: the new model can thus potentially be viewed as a development from observable, positive trends of engagement. China’s ongoing integration into global institutions and acclimation to the international system demonstrate that its foreign policy is not primarily based on the narrowly-defined interests that so concern the U.S. side.

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REDEFINING PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT Empirical Integration The empirical trends of the U.S.-Chinese relationship challenge some key realist assumptions. International relations realists since Hans Morgenthau (who considered his theory of political interaction to have originated with the Greek historian Thucydides) have tended to argue that all state behavior is intended to secure “interest defined in terms of power.”29 Thucydides’ trap invokes this basic conceptual framework. Yet, China has not always pursued “power” per se. Rather, the Chinese foreign policy establishment’s official statements and policies have tended to construe China as already in the process of carrying out a historic “power transition,” while focusing on …THE CHINESE FOREIGN securing desirable changes to the POLICY ESTABLISHMENT’S international status quo to address sources of “dissatisfaction.”30 OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND POLICIES HAVE TENDED TO

Though foreign policy analysts often consider such dissatisfaction to be ALREADY IN THE PROCESS more nebulous than realist conceptions of power, it in fact has OF CARRYING OUT A many empirical dimensions and HISTORIC “POWER applications. In particular, the TRANSITION,”… variable of satisfaction in power transition theory is useful for characterizing the significance of formal hierarchical relationships that affect state behavior, even when they do not translate into practical economic or political power dynamics. For example, China’s refusal to integrate into a U.S.-led Asia-Pacific free trade area – it has opted instead to found a rival Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) grouping whose reception has so far been lukewarm – can be seen as dissatisfaction with being relegated to a noncentral regional role.31 The same is also true of China’s far more successful efforts to set up an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to the considerable embarrassment of the Obama Administration.32 CONSTRUE CHINA AS

At the same time, general status quo dissatisfaction does not necessarily cause non-cooperation in particular settings. China has made increasingly 112

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RYAN MITCHELL extensive use of international institutions that offer it the ability to pursue interests on an equal footing with all other participants. When there is no perceived center to an institution (as is the case with the World Trade Organization, for example), or where China perceives itself as indisputably part of the institutional center (as is true of most U.N. bodies), Chinese engagement has steadily increased and shows no sign of slowing.33 In contexts where further integration poses no perceived hierarchical disadvantages and thus does not effectively subordinate China in other ways, non-cooperative behavior prompted by status quo dissatisfaction has been rare. Scott Kennedy, the Chairman of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) has described China’s relationship to the status quo of international institutions, in language reminiscent of power transition theory, as a search for “a greater voice (huayuquan) internationally.” 34 The Chinese term Kennedy translates as “voice” might be more literally rendered as “right to speak” (话语权), and official commentary on the international system frequently invokes the term. In light of process-based theories of individual state compliance with and integration into the international system, China’s pursuit of a right to speak should lead to increased institutional interactions and, thus, increased integration.35 Participation as a WTO litigant, for example, both puts China on an equal footing with other members (thus avoiding a priori status quo dissatisfactions) and leads directly to increased Chinese engagement with and socialization into the WTO as an institution.36 Indeed, more recent and nuanced versions of realism, even, tend to acknowledge that power-based interests do not best describe patterns of cooperative behavior, as per Morgenthau’s model. Kenneth Waltz, one of the most influential neorealist international relations theorists of recent decades, reframed the traditional realist emphasis on relations of power into a more nuanced focus on dependence. As he wrote in 1979, “[s]tates do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.”37 Some international relations theorists have held this

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REDEFINING PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT formula, which focuses on avoiding dependence upon other states, to be more apt in describing Chinese behavior than traditional realism.38 Importantly, it is not necessary to choose any of the above-described alternatives to the traditional realist view in order to appreciate how they deepen analysis of Xi’s new model of major country relations. More nuanced considerations of hierarchy-satisfaction, the right to speak, or independence all indicate that the “new model” more closely resembles successful integrationist initiatives such as the WTO than disfavored efforts such as the United States-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or attempted hierarchical reversals like China’s FTAAP and the increasingly promising Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. As a China-proposed initiative premised upon status equality, the new model does not raise hierarchical, expressive, or dependency concerns, and it would promote active engagement. The following section will examine the political practices and circumstances that may determine China’s actual goals in pursuing the new model of major country relations, and in particular the crucial issue of its definition of “core interests.”

…ASIDE FROM ITS CONCERN OVER CORE INTERESTS, THE UNITED STATES’ AVERSION TO

The Importance of Rhetorical Innovations

Arguably, something like a hierarchical “right to speak” also VAGUE SLOGANS HAS BEEN plays a determining role in the ONE OF THE OTHER MAIN Chinese Communist Party’s REASONS FOR UNITED STATES’ internal development of official RELUCTANCE TO EMBRACE THE policies and foreign relations platforms, in a manner that those NEW MODEL OF MAJOR who doubt the new model’s COUNTRY RELATIONS. political significance seemingly underestimate. As Hadley and Haenle note, the “United States has long reiterated that the relationship [with China] should be based not on slogans but on the quality of the cooperation.”39 Indeed, aside from its concern over core interests, the United States’ aversion to vague slogans has been one of the other main reasons for United States’ reluctance to embrace the 114

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RYAN MITCHELL new model of major country relations. This position, however, ignores the extent to which slogans and rhetorical shifts have not just reflected but actually preceded and contributed to previous cooperation patterns. To give perhaps the most famous example of the impact of rhetorical shifts on cooperation, former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping promoted China’s rapprochement with the United States and other foreign states on an avowed policy of “hiding our capacities, biding our time, and accomplishing things where possible” (韬光养晦，有所作为).40 Deng invoked this phrase, borrowed from ancient Chinese literature, as a strategic justification for decisively avoiding confrontational Mao-era policies.41 Deng’s phrase provided a firm internal political basis for pragmatic cooperative behavior between China and bourgeois powers. His evident success in thus establishing a dominant intra-Party ideological position – a “new predominant practice consciousness” – demonstrates the potential importance of specific political terminology and its effect in mobilizing practical results.42 It is important to note, as well, that Deng did not initially intend this phrase for mass consumption. Deng consciously phrased the directive (implying as it did China’s momentary weakness) in a “cultivated” classical idiom and in reference to Three Kingdoms-era strategy, in order to appeal to sophisticated and informed Party leaders.43 In short, Deng’s ability to convincingly persuade the Party leadership to follow the new strategy of engagement in large part depended on coordinated acceptance of the “hiding our capacities” concept – vague though it was. Two primary factors support the importance of specific innovative language. The first is the general importance of unifying “hegemonic” terminology in establishing the intra-Party consensuses that lead to political action. Following Michael Schoenhals’ theorization of this phenomenon, sinological literature has frequently explored the importance of “doing things with words in Chinese politics.”44 Under this understanding, much Chinese political action depends on the assertion of innovative language which, though not fully defined, requires a yes or no

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REDEFINING PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT vote from leaders and indications of compliance from the entire Party hierarchy.45 The second factor that suggests the potential importance of the new model of major country relations in establishing the conditions for increased Chinese cooperativeness has to do with the multiplicity of voices in Chinese foreign policy debates. Indeed, Chinese foreign policy is characterized by far less unanimity than almost any other major political arena. In one now-famous example of this lack of unanimity, former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates remarked on the Chinese military’s launch of a stealth fighter test-flight during his 2011 meeting with President Hu Jintao – only to find that Hu was unaware of the provocative military maneuver.46 Military independence in the arena of foreign affairs, along with the presence of influential “hardliner” political constituencies in political circles and the population at large, mean that leaders’ attempts to facilitate diplomatic engagement meet with internal resistance. 47 Xi Jinping and his administration thus face significant obstacles to uniting the Chinese Communist Party, state bureaucracies, and other major social interest groups behind a single definitive platform, just as they face challenges from other international actors.48 On the other hand, however, a significant precedent exists for Chinese political actors successfully pushing agendas of both domestic reform and diplomatic engagement when given major international cooperative opportunities such as WTO membership and hosting the Olympics.49 If Chinese leaders really put stock in their statements that the new model affords the chance to avoid Thucydides’ trap, they could use the language of the new model to rally support for engagement. With regards to the stumbling block of China’s “core interests” language, the above discussion also indicates the degree to which such apparently formalized terminology is open to redefinition. Indeed, as Schell and Delury note in Wealth and Power, “self-strengthening” reformers like Deng Xiaoping have often managed to effect political changes throughout Chinese history by means of contextual redefinitions of key ideological terminology.50 One useful analogy for analyzing potential future development of the “core interests” concept is the process by which 116

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RYAN MITCHELL Beijing’s propaganda authorities have defined the concept of “socialist core values.” The very process of situationally redefining “core” values, in this case, has allowed a great deal of pragmatic leeway.51 It may thus be shortsighted for the United States to view the uncertain content of the new model proposal as a sign that it conceals hidden powerseeking motivations. Rather, the United States should take note of the degree to which, in order to affect anything like a Deng-style reformulation of Chinese foreign THE FIRST STEP IN policy, Xi Jinping will have to reenact his feat of uniting disparate ARTICULATING A COHERENT interests behind a single new PRAGMATIC APPROACH rhetorical platform. Just as ongoing SHOULD BE ATTEMPTING A processes of integration into FULLER THEORETICAL international institutions have been EXPLICATION OF HOW IT based upon Deng’s call for “biding our time, and accomplishing things DIFFERS FROM INTERESTwhere possible” – in other words, DRIVEN REALISM. accepting opportunities for cooperation as long as they do not produce undesirable status quo consequences – so too might future cooperative progress depend on similar success for Xi’s vaunted new model of major country relations. U.S. embrace of the new model would considerably aid this process, while excessive reservation risks producing additional resistance within Chinese policy circles. Reevaluating Foreign Policy Pragmatism As noted above, Scott Kennedy has pointed to the importance of “voice,” or the “right to speak,” as a factor in determining Chinese approaches to institutional relationships. Taking this factor into account, Kennedy calls for the United States to adopt a “pragmatic response” to China’s pursuit of interests that are not always aligned with American ones. Similar to the commonly-accepted dictum that China has, since Deng, itself adopted a generally pragmatic approach to domestic reform, Kennedy seeks to assert the potential bilateral benefits of a similar ethos in the U.S.-Chinese VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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REDEFINING PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT relationship. The final section of this paper supports and deepens this call for a pragmatic approach to U.S.-Chinese relations, in light of the theoretical and practical considerations noted above, and especially in reference to the potential for pragmatic cooperation offered by defining the new model of major country relations. The first step in articulating a coherent pragmatic approach should be attempting a fuller theoretical explication of how it differs from interestdriven realism. As a philosophical movement, pragmatism originated especially in the thought of the American philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Peirce coined the term to describe what he called “[t]he method…to trace out in the imagination the conceivable practical consequences, – that is, the consequences for deliberate, selfcontrolled conduct, – of the affirmation or denial of [any] concept.” Those consequences, according to Peirce, constitute “the whole of the purport of the word, the entire concept.”52 Ideas only have meanings inasmuch as they decide acts. Though James later popularized and expanded the idea of pragmatism as a philosophical method, he and Peirce were later to part ways over the latter’s view that James had departed from the method’s original formulation.53 Though scholars are divided about how justified (or meaningful) this split actually was, they treat the respective philosophical oeuvres of Peirce, James, and the American philosopher John Dewey as related but distinctive interpretations of the basic pragmatic enterprise that enjoy roughly equivalent legitimacy.54 In particular, Dewey’s attempt to articulate a vision of Chinese-Western rapprochement based on the specific insights of philosophical pragmatism contains untapped and invaluable critical potential.55 Dewey’s variant of pragmatism is distinguished by a focus on the socially-situated, contextual nature of all ideas about “values.”56 Indeed, he confronts the difficult problem of elucidating the political and social implications of pragmatism in a way seldom attempted by Peirce (who focused more on the concept’s metaphysical implications) or James (who tended to stress individual experiences). By contrast, Dewey devoted significant effort to the exploration of the notion that “political action has an aesthetic element.”57 118

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RYAN MITCHELL Arriving for a two-year stay in China in 1919, during which he had a profound and lasting influence on Chinese political and educational thought, Dewey wrote that in order for any of the country’s Westernizing political reforms to succeed, it “must be a transforming growth from within, rather than either an external superimposition or a borrowing from foreign sources.”58 Going on to counter what he called (in language closely approximating China’s later anti-realist justifications of the “new model” platform) “the fatalistic belief that conflict…is predestined,” he further advocated that Western countries and China seek to “really understand each other, [and find] some way of cooperation for common ends.”59 Dewey’s concepts thus suggest a reevaluation is warranted of the relative importance of values and interests in foreign policy. While a traditional realist view assumes that these are distinct but occasionally overlapping categories, a Deweyan pragmatic approach instead views the creation of values (or, in other words, shared principles guiding cooperation) as a dynamic social process. Because in all political action “there runs a sense of growing meaning,” the interlocking dialectic of action and reflection generates values themselves.60 This perspective, in tandem with a postrealist focus on the dynamic structure of international institutions explored in the second section above, should inform future policy. It is precisely the uncertain character of political platforms such as Xi Jinping’s “new model” initiative that, despite being so troubling to realists who suspect uncertainty masks hidden interests, makes them capable of spawning genuinely new and beneficial consequences. As political theorist David Pan writes, for Dewey, “[a]n aesthetic resolution can only result when there is a situation of uncertainty that still offers elements of order.”61 In the context of political actions, this means that no genuine politics is ever completely reducible to its explicit goals; an excess aesthetic value of “experience” always allows those goals to be dynamically redefined. In a way, this theoretical position articulates something resembling the power of rhetorical innovation in Chinese politics: the process of defining new language can create new possibilities for practical action. VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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REDEFINING PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT Certainly, Dewey does not hold that political action is free from selfinterest or coercion. But his key insight is that in order to be effective, political acts continuously implicate a process of persuasion whereby their “qualities as perceived have controlled the question of production.” 62 To the extent that modern politics has made direct, brute-force coercion difficult, all polities, even those that disavow the formalities of electoral democracy, engage in aesthetic/persuasive acts. Thus, according to the tenets of Deweyan pragmatism, the indeterminacy or uncertainty of the “new model” platform is one of its greatest strengths. Rather than raising alarms over possible hidden meanings underlying the text, the United States and China should adopt the language and focus on the now-shared problem of managing the initiative’s aesthetic “qualities as perceived” by the U.S. and Chinese people. Both sides would be equally invested in making the model appear to be working, and in making it a coherent and meaningful concept. Uncertainty would create space for pragmatic innovations. The difference between mutually embracing an unknown variable and signing formal treaty agreements on a more specific range of issues is the difference that Dewey explores between “absolute values” and reversible moral judgments in The Quest for Certainty.63 There, he links “the spirit of cooperation” with discursive judgments made “on the basis of public, objective and shared consequences,” without any pretensions to eternal legal or moral validity.64 To the extent that China and the United States embrace these shared consequences by agreeing on a less-than-fullydetailed plan for “new model” relations, they actually bind themselves before the U.S. and Chinese publics to give this “new model” a compelling and broadly acceptable meaning. Though both countries contain elements that see conflict as inevitable, it behooves U.S. policymakers to recognize that affording recognition to apparent reform efforts can further enable cooperation-minded Chinese political interest groups and individuals “to find new openings for reform”: a process highly dependent upon internal political maneuvering and one which the U.S. can influence only indirectly.65 120

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RYAN MITCHELL Although U.S. embrace of the new model would open it up to Chinese criticism if, for example, it were to counteract new Chinese expansionist moves in the South China Sea, uncertainty over the importance and definition of “core interests” in the platform would allow the United States to provide its own interpretation of this provision. Depending on both sides’ image management processes and mutual willingness to compromise, the new model’s consequences for practical conduct could include redefinition of such terms as “core interests” based on the exigencies of practical cooperation. Indeed, the fact that the second version of the new model greatly reduced the apparent importance of core interests greatly supports this possibility. Because definitions arise from practice, practical interaction changes definitions. Conclusion No political action takes place against a backdrop of unmitigated selfinterest. Game theory-inflected realist analyses at times run the risk of portraying just such a virtual or game-like scenario of pure competition. Increasingly, however, new developments in U.S.-Chinese bilateral relations take place in an environment of diverse international and transnational institutional activity. New forms of engagement between the United States and China will necessarily take the form of re-definitions of their relationship, rather than ex nihilo acts of creation. That the “new model” language is so important to the Chinese side while seeming so vague to the U.S. side is, while not ideal, simply one of many existing facts that both sides must work with. Certainly, China’s own pragmatic focus on consequences rather than first principles such as liberty has deterred its progress towards U.S.-style constitutionalism. This characteristic feature of China’s internal ordering has understandably provoked skepticism among foreign policy analysts over the extent to which China can commit to international institutions in a permanent or quasi-legalized manner. At the same time, the situational reform ethos that has limited consolidation of the Chinese legal system actually appears well suited to the polyphonic realm of international relations. Thus, it may actually be the case that other states have VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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REDEFINING PRAGMATIC ENGAGEMENT something to learn from China regarding the pragmatic management of a fundamentally anarchic system. Rather than attempting to determine the exact content of Xi’s proposed “new model” and its principles, as if these were already-existing entities, the United States should instead accept that all such content will only come later, as part of a discursive process actively establishing shared consequences and facts. Endnotes Orville Schell and John Delury. Wealth and Power: China's long march to the twentyfirst century (New York: Random House, 2013), 8. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. The implicit reference of the phrase “kingdom of means” is to Immanuel Kant’s influential moral-philosophical concept of the obligation to “legislate” one’s behavior such that one is always treating other individuals as “ends, rather than means.” See, e.g.: Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 3rd ed., trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, [1785] 1993), 30. 4 See, e.g., “Interview: New model of major-country relations no abstract theory”, Xinhuanet, December 28, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201412/28/c_133883096.htm. Various other subtly-nuanced English translations have been suggested, including “new type of great power relations” and “new model of big country relations,” etc. It should be noted that, while prominent official state endorsement is new to the Xi administration, the phrase itself has been used for decades (without a single consistent definition) in Chinese international affairs studies. See, e.g. 杨成绪［Yang Chengxu], “世界更迭与大国关系变化” [“Global change and the transformation of major-country relations”]," 国际问题研究 [International Studies] 1 (1999): 2-10. 5 “China, U.S. can avoid ‘Thucydides Trap’”, Xinhuanet, July 9, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-07/09/c_132525236.htm. 6 “Remarks As Prepared for Delivery by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice”, Whitehouse.gov, November 21, 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/11/21/remarks-prepared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice. For discussion of occasional early use of the phrase as a sign of “mixed messaging from the core of the Obama administration,” see also: “U.S. struggles to offer single voice in Asia policy”, The Yomiuri Shimbun, March 24, 2014, http://www.asianewsnet.net/ann_news. php?a=http://www.asianewsnet.net/US-struggles-to-offer-single-voice-in-Asiapolicy&id=58365. 7 Ibid. (“ambiguity in the Obama administration’s stance offered China an opening”). [ibid to Rice or Yomiuri?] [Yomiuri, newspaper]. 8 Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 54, 205. 1

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David Scott, “Soft language, soft imagery and soft power in China’s diplomatic lexicon”, in China's Soft Power and International Relations, ed. Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu (New York: Routledge, 2012); Suisheng Zhao, “China’s foreign policy as a rising power in the early twenty-first century: the struggle between taoguangyanghui and assertiveness,” in ibid. 10 See, e.g.: Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “How to Deter China,” Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2015), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143031/andrew-fkrepinevich-jr/how-to-deter-china 11 Noah Feldman, Cool war: The future of global competition (New York: Random House, 2013), xiii. 12 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s unpeaceful rise,” The Realism Reader 105, no. 690 (2014): 464-467 at 466. (“We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine…”). 13 Suisheng Zhao, “A New Model of Big Power Relations? China-US strategic rivalry and balance of power in the Asia-Pacific,” Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 93 (2015): 377-397 at 381. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. Previously, this phrase was used to refer primarily to Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang in the context of refuting local dissidents’ calls for increased political autonomy. 16 Suisheng Zhao, “From Hide and Bide to a New Model of Big Power Relations,” University of Nottingham China Policy Institute Blog, November 18, 2014, https://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2014/11/18/from-hide-and-bide-to-anew-model-of-big-power-relations 17 See, e.g.: Editorial Board, “China’s Evolving ‘Core Interests,’” New York Times, May 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/opinion/sunday/chinas-evolving-coreinterests.html 18 Ibid. 19 Paul B. Stares, “Is the South China Sea, like Taiwan, a core national interest now for China?”, Council on Foreign Relations, July 29, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/china/southchina-sea-like-taiwan-core-national-interest-now-china/p31159. 20 See, for example, 徐仲伟 [Xu Zhongwei] and 李璐［Li Lu]. "去美国化, 世界格局发展的必然趋势." [“De-Americanization, a Necessary Trend in the Development of the Global Situation”] 重庆邮电大学学报: 社会科学版［Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications: Social Sciences Edition], 26, no. 3 (2014): 6-9.26, no. 3 (2014): 6-9. 21 Zhao, “A New Model of Big Power Relations?” 378. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 The expanded list of six factors included managing Iran’s development of nuclear capabilities, overseeing North Korean denuclearization, cooperating to stabilize 9

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Afghanistan, undertaking counterterrorism initiatives, working to stop climate change, and preventing or controlling major public health crises. 25 Stephen Hadley and Paul Haenle, “The Catch-22 in U.S.-Chinese Relations,” Foreign Affairs, March 1, 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143167/stephen-hadleyand-paul-haenle/the-catch-22-in-us-chinese-relations 26 Ibid. 27 Graham Allison, “Thucydides’s Trap has been sprung in the pacific,” Financial Times, August 22, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5d695b5a-ead3-11e1-984b00144feab49a.html 28 “专访基辛格：没有国家可凭一己之力打造世界秩序” [“Exclusive interview with Henry Kissinger: No country can create a world order by itself”], 腾讯网 [Tencent], March 23, 2015, http://news.qq.com/a/20150323/049715.htm 29 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), 5-9. 30 See generally the analysis in: Yves-Heng Lim, “How (Dis) Satisfied is China? A power transition theory perspective.” Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 92 (2015): 280297. 31 Solis Mireya, “The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP,” Brookings Institute, May 24, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/24-chinatranspacific-partnership-solis 32 Ying Ma, “An Influential Voice Slams U.S. Handling of New China-Led Infrastructure Bank,” Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/ 03/19/an-influential-voice-slams-u-s-handling-of-new-china-led-infrastructure-bank 33 Scott Kennedy, “Thoughts from the Chairman: How to Pragmatically Respond to Greater Chinese Activism on the Global Stage,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 13, 2015, http://csis.org/publication/thoughts-chairman-howpragmatically-respond-greater-chinese-activism-global-stage 34 Ibid. 35 This relationship is explained in detail in the context of WTO rules in: Julien Chaisse, “Compliance with International Law as a Process: Deconstructing the obligation of conformity,” Fordham International Law Journal 38, no. 1 (2015): 57-98 at 67-82. 36 Harold Hongju Koh, “Internalization Through Socialization,” Duke Law Journal (2005): 975-982. 37 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 107. 38 Cf. the discussion in Derek McDougall, “Responses to ‘Rising China’ in the East Asian Region: soft balancing with accommodation,” Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 73 (2012): 1-17 at 3. 39 Hadley and Haenle. 40 Shin Kawashima, “The Development of the Debate Over ‘Hiding One's Talents and Biding One's Time’ (taoguan [sic] yanghui),” Asia-Pacific Review 18, no. 2 (2011): 1436 at 30-36.

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Interestingly, some U.S. analysts have persisted, even into the 21st century, in interpreting Deng’s “hiding our capacities” language as “concealing” a coherent strategy of eventual anti-U.S. aggression. Yet most Chinese and foreign analysts agree that no such hidden strategy exists, and that this “persistent anxiety” ill reflects reality. See discussion in: James Steinberg and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 5. In this sense, anxious U.S. interpretations of Xi’s “new model” have resembled some reactions to Deng’s “hiding and biding.” 42 Xiaobo Su, “Revolution and reform: The role of ideology and hegemony in Chinese politics,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 69 (2011): 307-326, citing Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 145. 43 Perry Link, An Anatomy of Chinese: Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 266. 44 Michael Schoenhals, Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1992). See also, e.g.: Juha A. Vuori, “Three Takes on the Counter-Revolutionary: studying asymmetrical political concepts in the People's Republic of China,” in Asymmetrical Concepts After Reinhart Koselleck: Historical Semantics and Beyond 20, eds. Kay Jung and Kirill Postoutenko (Deutsche Nationalbibliothek, 2011), 115-140 at 115. 45 As Schoenhals’ emphasis on “doing things” shows, these uses of official language are often condensed summaries of, and starting points for, massive policy undertakings and acts of political organization. They should thus be seen as going beyond what David Shambaugh has described as efforts to “force uniformity of thought and language.” See: David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 46 Elisabeth Bumiller and Michael Wines, “Test of Stealth Fighter Clouds Gates Visit to China,” New York Times, January 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/world/ asia/12fighter.html; See also discussion in: Andrew Mertha, “Domestic Institutional Challenges Facing China's Leadership on the Eve of the 18th Party Congress,” Asia Policy 14, no. 1 (2012): 1-20 at 12. 47 See, e.g.: Michael Swaine, “China's Assertive Behavior—Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy,” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor, no. 36, January 6, 2012, 8. For a more nuanced point of view on the trope of new Chinese “assertiveness”, though, see: Alastair Iain Johnston, “How new and assertive is China's new assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 7-48. 48 Jian Zhang, “China's new foreign policy under Xi Jinping: towards ‘Peaceful Rise 2.0’?” Global Change, Peace & Security 27, no. 1 (2015): 5-19, http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/14781158.2015.993958; See also: Emilian Kavalski, “Conclusion: Recognizing Chinese International Relations Theory,” Asian Thought on China's Changing International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 230-246 at 235-238. 41

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See discussions in: Xiaoxiao Li, “Adaptation to WTO Standards”, in Modern Chinese Legal Reform: New Perspectives eds. Xiaobing Li and Qiang Fang (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 151-170; and, generally, China's great leap: The Beijing Games and Olympian human rights challenges ed. Minky Worden (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2008). Though most scholars writing in the latter argue that the Olympics did not lead to significant domestic reforms, they do note the existence of internal and external pressures associated with hosting the Games, and that these presented new opportunities for reformers. 50 For a description of Deng’s reappropriation of the wartime concept of “special zones” (特区) in order to launch major economic reforms: Schell and Delury, 293. 51 Cf. Hou Yong and Jian-run Wang, “Universal Values and Socialist Core Value System in Terms of Value Philosophy: the ‘Destructuring’ and ‘Structuring,’” Journal of Yangzhou University (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition) 4 (2010): 5-9 at 6-7. 52 Charles Sanders Peirce, “A Definition of Pragmatism,” in Louis Menand, Pragmatism: A Reader, (New York: Vintage Books, 1997),56. 53 See, e.g. ibid at 430. 54 Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2010), ix-xi. 55 For a fascinating and wide-ranging account of Dewey’s relationship with China, see Jessica Ching-Sze, John Dewey in China: To Teach and To Learn (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005). 56 Matthew Festenstein, Pragmatism and political theory: From Dewey to Rorty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 40. 57 David Pan, “Political Theology for Democracy: Carl Schmitt and John Dewey on Aesthetics and Politics,” Telos 2012, no. 161 (Winter 2012): 120-140 at 137, http://dx.doi.org/10.3817/1212161120 58 See Ching-Sze, John Dewey in China. 59 John Dewey, “Transforming the Mind of China,” in The Middle Works, 1899-1924: 1921-1922, Vol. 13 (Carbondale: SIU Press, 1983), 218-19. 60 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Penguin, 2005), 40. 61 Pan, 138. 62 Ibid, 139, citing Dewey, Art as Experience, 48. The aesthetic dimensions of political action are taking on increasing importance in theoretical debates over the role of publicly perceived legitimacy in politics and law. See, for example, Paul W. Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 130 (describing the exercise of political sovereignty as a form of “[c]reative—that is, aesthetic—production [that] is always unique”). Citing Kahn, David Pan describes the process of such aesthetic production as succeeding if “a sufficient unity among the people can be created so that the decision can take hold and establish the metaphysical basis for existence.” Pan, “Political Theology for Democracy” at 130. The present article can also be seen as attempting to infer some international conclusions from the above understandings of political decision making: If “a sufficient unity among the people[s]” of two countries can be created, perhaps via successful persuasion towards the 49

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genuine mutual endorsement of a broadly-defined program of iterative cooperation and integration such as the “new model”, it may then also be the case that this “decision can take hold and establish the metaphysical basis for [co]existence.” 63 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action: Gifford Lectures 1929 (London: George Allen & Unwin Limited, 1930), 48. 64 Ibid. 65 See Paul Gewirtz, “What China Means by ‘Rule of Law,’” New York Times, October 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/opinion/what-china-means-by-rule-oflaw.html.

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Seeking Truth from Facts: U.S.-China Relations Require More Than Rhetoric Doug Strub Doug Strub is a second year M.A. candidate in the International Affairs program at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Relations. His research interests are East Asia, emerging markets, and U.S.-China relations. He recently returned from spending seven months in China studying Mandarin and working at the China Economic Review. Prior to his return to higher education, Doug spent five years in Los Angeles working as an audio engineer and Pro Tools editor. In “Redefining Pragmatic Engagement,” Ryan Mitchell suggests that the United States and China should set aside their differences and embrace the cooperative, “win-win” language associated with China’s proposed “new model of major country relations.” Using a theoretical approach of social constructivism, the author suggests that “embracing China’s ‘new model’ language may, itself, thus enable otherwise unlikely pragmatic achievements.”1 While Mitchell presents considerable insight into the U.S.-China relationship and a wonderfully optimistic policy recommendation, basing the future of this relationship on an arrangement that relies too heavily on rhetoric and too little on substance raises several concerns. Three major complications arise from pursuing this constructive power of language as grounds for policy while discarding more concrete and tangible aspects of progress. First, China has not yet demonstrated its ability or willingness to act in accordance with its own rhetoric on a wide variety of issues. Second, the United States stands to gain little from committing to an undefined new type of relationship, while China would benefit greatly by announcing itself the equal of the United States. Mitchell’s recommendation would allow China to take advantage of the 128

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DOUG STRUB new model’s vagueness to redefine the relationship in terms favorable to itself. Finally, the author’s own hypothesis rests mainly on the optimism that this approach may produce favorable results. Rather than basing the future of Sino-American relations on hope, a more specific and concrete policy option should be implemented that will either satisfy both actors or make tangible progress toward such ends. In this regard, the United States has pushed for the two parties to “operationalize” the concept, though this has encountered pushback from China and results in the “Catch-22” discussed by Mitchell. 2 A more palatable option would see both actors simultaneously make any RECENT HISTORY necessary concessions. This approach can PROVIDES MANY be carried out incrementally using a series of minimal but concrete and well-defined EXAMPLES OF CHINA’S agreements implemented over time, ACTIONS DIVERGING complemented by gradual elevation of the FROM ITS RHETORIC… rhetoric used to define the relationship to match these new realities. It is highly unlikely that the United States will agree to elevate the status of relations purely out of goodwill. If China desires to declare itself a global power equal to the United States, it must begin acting like one, not merely pledging to do so. Recent history provides many examples of China’s actions diverging from its rhetoric, a fact that drives American demands for Beijing to demonstrate its intentions through concrete actions. Under president Hu Jintao, China’s rhetoric shifted from Deng’s “hiding our capacities” to Hu’s concept of “peaceful rise,” and then two years later to the less threatening version of “peaceful development.”3 China’s 2011 white paper outlining the official policy of “peaceful development” offers a perfect example of the disconnect between policy rhetoric and empirical reality emerging from Beijing. This document makes many bold assertions that contradict China’s actions and thus minimize incentives for the United States to buy into a rhetoric-based “new model” of relations. The white paper asserts that China “never engages in aggression or expansion, never seeks hegemony, and remains a staunch force for upholding regional and world peace and stability.”4 VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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SEEKING TRUTH FROM FACTS Yet this document was released in the immediate wake of China’s welldocumented 2009-10 “period of assertiveness.” As noted by prominent China scholar David Shambaugh, during this period China “picked fights and irritated ties with… virtually every one of its neighbors.”5 More recently, China continues to show signs of aggression that are clearly unwanted by its neighbors: the dispute with Vietnam arising in early 2014 after China placed a state-owned oil rig in contested waters in the South China Sea;6 a series of 2014 military confrontations with India regarding a long-running border dispute;7 the pending Philippines arbitration against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague; 8 and the highly publicized island disputes with Japan that have led both to China’s 2013 unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone covering the contested islands9 and the recent expansion of Chinese military capabilities into the area.10 Just as the observable dichotomy between rhetoric and action regarding peaceful development diminished the overall impact of that policy, the same issues arise with this “new model” of relations. In November 2014, China held its first Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs since 2006, during which president Xi outlined his foreign policy vision. The speech made many broad claims regarding the building of “a sound and stable framework of major-country relations”11 and “win-win cooperation,”12 but contained almost no specifics as to how such an approach would be built or what it would consist of. Additionally, Xi presented several ideas that not only conflict with themselves, but also with real-world events. Regarding China’s core interests, he promised to “firmly uphold China’s territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests...properly handle territorial and island disputes…[and to never] allow China’s core interests to be undermined.”13 Meanwhile, he pledged to “uphold justice and pursue shared interests”14 and to “promote peaceful resolution of differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation…”15 Analysts struggled to decipher the contradictions both within the speech itself and between the speech and recent acts of aggression. The New York Times depicted it as a show of assertiveness.16 The Financial Times 130

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DOUG STRUB offered a more optimistic analysis entitled “Xi Jinping tones down foreign policy rhetoric.”17 Finding middle ground, Rory Medcalf of the Lowy Institute stated that the speech was “at least as much about diplomacy as about power.”18 While the substance of these individual analyses is not important, what does matter is that in China’s most significant foreign policy speech in eight years, the policy articulated by president Xi was so vague and contradictory that it can be interpreted as signifying either increased aggression or a renewed dedication to peace and cooperation. Under Xi’s leadership, the continued demonstrations of assertiveness coupled with uncertainty over a vaguely-defined policy have amplified mistrust and tension and further created a sense among smaller neighboring states of having to choose between the United States and China. In sum, China’s rhetoric of peaceful development and win-win cooperation does little to advance the trust and collaboration necessary for elevating the U.S.-Chinese relationship to a new status based upon these qualities.

…CHINA’S RHETORIC OF

The second point of concern PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT AND regarding Mitchell’s policy of WIN-WIN COOPERATION DOES embracing the “new model” LITTLE TO ADVANCE THE relationship arises from the TRUST AND COLLABORATION unequal gains associated with acceptance of such an NECESSARY FOR ELEVATING arrangement. Adopting this THE U.S.-CHINESE strategy elevates China to a RELATIONSHIP TO A NEW perceived status of global power STATUS BASED UPON THESE equal to the United States, thus granting Beijing significantly QUALITIES. more authority in the creation and enforcement of international rules and norms. Given Beijing’s recent demonstrations of assertiveness and refusal to participate in international arbitration, granting China more power to act freely in the international system could prove dangerous. Conceding to some sort of undefined equality based on an ambiguous new model of relationship benefits only

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SEEKING TRUTH FROM FACTS China, and opens the door to potential abuses of the new relationship rather than guarantees of cooperation. Finally, Mitchell argues that “Embracing China’s ‘new model’ language may, itself, thus enable otherwise unlikely pragmatic achievements,” and “…that reluctance to us the phrase is largely unjustified”.19 This kind of reasoning is not, in fact, a pragmatic way to approach such a crucial issue. Considering that both the United States and China have expressed the idea that confrontation between a rising power and an established power is inevitable, simply relying on optimistic rhetoric could ultimately prove quite dangerous.20 The U.S.-China relationship has not yet reached a point of trust and cooperation wherein rhetoric alone can serve as a driving force for grand strategy concerns. Terms such as “may” and “largely unjustified” fail to appreciate the importance of the relationship or the seriousness of the situation and thus fall well short of providing acceptable motivation for policy formulation. Mitchell’s recommendation, while contributing significantly to the intellectual discourse on China’s rise and its effect on the U.S.-China relationship, falls short when it comes to the practicality of real world implementation. Several other more pragmatic and viable approaches exist, including gradual operationalization and elevation of relations to make tangible progress toward a specified target. Agreeing to a “new model” in hopes that it eventually facilitates change merely exchanges immediate progress for the hope of future improvements. If both China and the United States are serious about this issue, an agreement should be reached on what terms will satisfactorily define a “new model,” followed by the concurrent signing of commitments to these arrangements and elevation of the status of the relationship. If, on the other hand, one or neither of the actors is in fact genuinely committed to this concept, then no amount of optimistic linguistic manipulation will solve the issues confronting them. A new arrangement of “major power relations” cannot come into existence overnight merely by declaring it so. Rather, this relationship must continue to grow gradually and define itself through empirical realities as opposed to rhetorically labeling it as something new 132

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DOUG STRUB in the hopes that the act of doing so will eradicate the associated complications and produce a mutually acceptable outcome. Endnotes Ryan Mitchell, “Redefining Pragmatic Engagement: The ‘New Model’ of U.S.-China Relations and the Opportunity of Shared Consequences,” International Affairs Review 23, no. 3 (Summer 2015): 114, http://www.iar-gwu.org 2 Andrew S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff, “Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China’s ‘New Type of Great-Power Relations’ Slogan,” Foreign Affairs, October 9, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142178/andrew-s-erickson-and-adam-p-liff/notso-empty-talk 3 B. R. Deepak, “From China’s ‘peaceful rise’ to ‘peaceful development’: The rhetoric and more,” South Asia Analysis Group, no. 5336, December 25, 2012, 1, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1102 4 “White Paper: China's Peaceful Development Road,” The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, September 2011, http://www.gov.cn/ english/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm 5 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 77, 99. 6 Hillary Whiteman, “How an oil rig sparked anti-China riots in Vietnam,” CNN, March 19, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/19/world/asia/china-vietnam-islands-oil-rigexplainer/ 7 Gordon Fairclough, “India-China Border Standoff: High in the Mountains, Thousands of Troops Go Toe-to-Toe,” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/ articles/india-china-border-standoff-high-in-the-mountains-thousands-of-troops-go-toeto-toe-1414704602 8 Adam Rose and Ben Blanchard, “China denounces Philippine ‘pressure’ over sea dispute arbitration,” Reuters, December 7, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2014/12/07/us-southchinasea-china-philippines-idUSKBN0JL03X20141207 9 Jun Osawa, “China’s ADIZ over the East China Sea: A ‘Great Wall in the Sky’?” Brookings Institution, December 17, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/ 2013/12/17-china-air-defense-identification-zone-osawa 10 Ting Shi, “China Building Base Near Isles Disputed With Japan, Kyodo Says,” Bloomberg, December 21, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-1222/china-building-base-near-isles-disputed-with-japan-kyodo-says 11 “Xi eyes more enabling int’l environment for China’s peaceful development,” Xinhua, November 30, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/30/ c_133822694.htm 1

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Ibid. Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Jane Perlez, “Leader Asserts China’s Growing Importance on Global Stage,” New York Times, November 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/01/world/asia/leaderasserts-chinas-growing-role-on-global-stage.html 17 Tom Mitchell and David Pilling, “Xi Jinping tones down foreign policy rhetoric,” Financial Times, December 1, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b95a3730-792f11e4-a57d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3XlrjOb2S 18 Rory Medcalf, “China’s Challenge to the Global Order: Taking the ‘Careful’ Approach?” National Interest, November 30, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/chinas-challenge-the-global-order-taking-the-careful-11758 19 R. Mitchell, 114-115. 20 Erickson and Liff. 12 13

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Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific by Robert Kaplan Reviewed by Carolyn Posner Carolyn Posner is an M.A. candidate in International Affairs at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. After receiving a B.A. in History from Wellesley College, she worked as a Coordinator of International Affairs through the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program. Carolyn’s academic interests include regional conflict in East Asia and energy security. In “Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Asia Pacific,” Robert Kaplan forecasts rising tensions in the Pacific, with growing Chinese naval capacity increasingly challenging U.S. regional dominance. The book takes a fresh approach to U.S.-China policy analysis, with comparisons of naval strength offered alongside vivid descriptions of Southeast Asian culture and perspectives from top-level military commanders. While Kaplan offers few predictions for the future, it is clear that a more assertive China will force the United States and its regional partners to make difficult decisions about strategic alliances and military development. Throughout the book, Kaplan highlights the essential role Pacific-based U.S. forces play in maintaining the regional military balance. The work offers insights based on Kaplan’s meetings with political and military leaders throughout the Asia-Pacific. U.S. partners in Southeast Asia consistently touted the importance of bilateral security relationships with the United States: Singaporean officials told Kaplan that the U.S. Navy is defending globalization by protecting open sea lanes, while Filipino commanders emphasized their need for U.S. cooperation to maintain a “minimal credible defense” (130) against Chinese encroachment. Kaplan underscores these regional perspectives with one of the more declarative statements in the piece – that the withdrawal of even one U.S. aircraft VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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ASIA’S CAULDRON carrier from the West Pacific would be a “game changer” (12) for the region. The stakes are getting higher as Chinese economic growth pushes a drive for resources and provides funding for military modernization. Kaplan makes the case that the South China Sea’s shipping lanes, which currently provide passage for more than 50% of global oil shipments,1 are more important than the hydrocarbon and fishery resources found there. Still, estimates put oil reserves in the South China Sea at upwards of seven billion barrels and natural gas reserves at 900 trillion cubic feet,2 both of which are important resources for industrial development. Projections estimate that China’s increase in energy consumption will account for 50% of global energy demand growth by 2030 (9), making resource acquisition a necessary condition for sustained economic prosperity. With increasing demands on limited resources, regional competition over access to the South China Sea’s oil reserves may drive tensions in the Pacific. China’s rapid military development is also fueling a regional arms race, which has reached what Kaplan calls an “action-reaction” (31) phase. In recent years, China’s military expenditures have been second only to those of the United States, and the recently announced figures for 2015 confirm a 10.1% increase in the military budget.3 Since some military expenditures are not included in the official statistic, some scholars estimate that total spending is 40% to 55% higher than stated.4 In response, many of the East and Southeast Asian nations embroiled in territorial disputes with China are watching current military deployment trends with concern. In the meantime, these countries have increased their investments in modern military technologies, primarily warships, missiles, and missile defense systems. Assuming consistent rates of development, Chinese naval ships will outnumber that of the U.S. Pacific Command by 2020 (35). Advances in China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which could prevent the United States from intervening in regional conflicts near China’s border,5 heighten concerns among Asia-Pacific leaders about effectiveness of United States as a military partner.

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CAROLYN POSNER What do increasing Chinese Naval capabilities mean for the future of the Asia-Pacific? Kaplan views China’s recent naval assertiveness as nationalistic posturing and sees little chance of large-scale conflicts breaking out over uninhabited islands and open ocean. Instead, the book describes a potential “Finlandization” of smaller nations, in which China’s economic and military power might prompt its neighbors to align Chinese policy preferences without military conflict. Economic coercion is a particular concern for Taiwan,6 given its extensive economic integration with China. However, any of the small Southeast Asian nations may feel vulnerable to Chinese pressure if the United States is perceived as anything less than a stalwart ally. As Kaplan rightly points out, China’s presence in the region is a geographic reality, while the U.S. presence is contingent on domestic political support (61). While Kaplan convincingly demonstrates the challenges associated with China’s naval expansion, this book will frustrate those looking for policy guidance. Going forward, it is clear that the U.S. presence will be a key factor influencing regional dynamics. However, readers are left with more questions than answers about the U.S. response to regional tensions: Are U.S. interests in the region best served by continuing to deploy significant force levels in Asia-Pacific? If China pressures Taiwan, Vietnam, or Indonesia into more China-friendly policies, should American policymakers really care? While Kaplan avoids answering these more challenging questions directly, his analysis of power relations in the Asia-Pacific suggests that the United States must maintain a significant military presence, or risk an explosion of regional tensions as smaller states try to balance against China. China has adopted a cautious strategy of naval expansionism, chipping away at the territorial status quo. Chinese actions in disputed waters are carefully calibrated to avoid provoking U.S. intervention, and to exploit the ambiguities of U.S. defense commitments. This strategy is exemplified by the 2013 conflict surrounding a Chinese oil-drilling rig placed 120 miles off the Vietnamese coast, near the disputed Paracel Islands. Despite clear violations of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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ASIA’S CAULDRON China is a signatory, the United States did nothing but call China’s actions “provocative.”7 China has also established de-facto control of the disputed Scarborough Shoal, after a standoff with the Philippines in 2012, which the United States watched from the sidelines.8 China will continue to push boundaries in disputed waters as long as there remains virtually no cost to doing so. Without U.S. intervention, China will keep pushing towards a regionally based order, giving itself room to dictate the rules of engagement. This will clash with the U.S. preference for international legal norms, which supports U.S. economic interests in Asia. The U.S. Navy is likely to continue the collaborative efforts with the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other nations in the region. However, encouraging – or demanding – naval buildup in any Southeast Asian nation is likely to trigger a renewed arms race in the South China Sea. Given this reality, the United States must begin to more proactively respond to Chinese provocations against U.S. allies in Southeast Asia. This might include deploying U.S. Naval ships to support allied fleets in confrontations against China. While it is difficult to predict exactly how China will respond to a more active U.S. policy, it is a safe bet that this will not improve U.S.-China relations in the short-term. It may also spill over into other cooperative efforts, undermining U.S.-China cooperation on climate change efforts or in the Middle East. Still, this is a risk worth taking. By making the “costly sacrifice” of jeopardizing the U.S.-China relationship in the short-term, the United States can demonstrate its commitment to upholding international legal norms regarding sea access and territorial claims at sea. In doing so, the United States will reaffirm its commitment to the region and its allies. While this will not prevent all escalation in tensions, which Kaplan sees as an inevitable consequence of China’s military rise, it might forestall the acceleration of a regional arms race caused by uncertainty and insecurity. Robert D. Kaplan. Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific. New York: Random House, 2014. 138

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Endnotes Beina Xu, “South China Sea Tensions,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 14, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/p29790 2 Ibid. 3 Jeremy Page, “China to Boost Military Budget by 10.1%,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-boost-military-budget-by-about-101425457646 4 Sam Perlo-Freeman, “Deciphering China’s Latest Defense Budget Figures,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2014, http://www.sipri.org/media/ newsletter/essay/perlo-freeman-mar-2013 5 “ Harry Kazianis, “Welcome to Chinese A2/AD: Version 2.0,” University of Nottingham: China Policy Institute Blog, February 13, 2014, http://blogs.nottingham .ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2014/02/13/welcome-to-chinese-a2ad-version-2-0/ 6 Bruce Gilley, “Not So Dire Straits: How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security,” Foreign Affairs 81, No. 1 (January/February 2010), http://www.foreign affairs.com/articles/65901/bruce-gilley/not-so-dire-straits 7 Paul J. Leaf, “Learning from China’s Oil Rig Standoff with Vietnam,” Diplomat, August 30, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/learning-from-chinas-oil-rig-standoffwith-vietnam/ 8 M. Taylor Fravel, “China's Island Strategy: Redefine the Status Quo," Diplomat, November 1, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-thestatus-quo/ 1

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Major Power Relationship大国关系 Edited by Wang Jisi 王缉思 Reviewed by Youlin Yuan Youlin Yuan is a first year Juris Doctor student at Yale Law School and a Student Fellow at Yale China Center and is interested in China’s foreign policies and judicial reform. He received his pre-college education in Shanghai, China and then completed his undergraduate studies at Somerville College, University of Oxford, graduating in 2014 with First Class Honors in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Ever since the concept of major power relations first appeared, during then Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States in 2012, it has been a central part of Chinese discourse on U.S.-China relations. Though receptive to the concept at first, U.S. policymakers have become wary of adopting it in recent meetings with Chinese leaders. Part of this skepticism could be explained by the lack of Chinese clarification of the concept. In this context, the most recent book edited by Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, is a most welcome addition to both international relations academia and the policy making arena in Washington and Beijing. Wang positioned this book as political commentary, not academic work (viii). The discussions are structured in a way that reflects its core political agenda of forging a new model for major power relations. As editor, Wang organized a cautiously optimistic volume that conveys the general contour of a non-confrontational relationship, characterized by mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation. The essential element in achieving this goal, Wang maintains, is not diplomatic effort or mutual recognition, but the development paths for Chinese and U.S. domestic politics, economics, and society (vi). Nevertheless, the book is unlikely to assuage the existing U.S. skepticism. It still leaves essential elements undefined: How is this “new” type different from an “old” type, and what is the “old” type? What is a “major power” (大国), and how is it different from a hegemon (霸权)? 140

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YOULIN YUAN A key goal of Wang’s book is to present an overview of the history, context, and theories of U.S.-China relations, from the perspective of both countries (vi). Though written by three different authors, the first four chapters achieve this goal in a consistent fashion. Chapter one offers a literature review of the major schools of thought on U.S.-China relations: pessimistic, optimistic, and alert. Dr. Wu Shengqi (Peking University) presents an impressive array of arguments from U.S. and Chinese scholars and policymakers. Pessimists have three major concerns. They underscore the historical fatalism of conflict between major powers, the inevitability of a clash between ideologies, and the existence of strategic competition. Optimists emphasize that China is both unwilling and incapable of challenging U.S. supremacy. Moreover, economic interdependence, international organizations, and nuclear power are all powerful deterrents. Wu adopts a view closer to the center, and refers to it as “alert.” This view maintains that conflict between the United States and China is far from inevitable, but instances of strategic distrust will evolve into major conflict if not carefully managed by both sides. These instances include Chinese distrust of the United States on Taiwan, Tibet, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea, trade friction, exchange rate, and the United States’ Strategic Rebalance to Asia. The United States also distrusts China based on its nationalism, economic neocolonialism, and supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region (35-36). Wu’s chapter sets the tone for the entire book. It highlights that opportunities, risks, differences, and similarities co-exist in the bilateral relationship, demanding careful management. From a historical perspective, chapter four is optimistic that these instances will be carefully managed. Dr. Ma Yan (Peking University) points out that, in times of recurrent crises, institutional mechanisms and common interests serve as stabilizing factors (147). For instance, in the 1970s, the United States and China recognized the Soviet Union as a common enemy, despite a decades-long ideological clash between communism and capitalism. A common realization that stability in East Asian security would lead to greater economic opportunities similarly trumped a crisis in the 1990s that was driven by Republic of China VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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MAJOR POWER RELATIONSHIP “President” Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University. There is particular cause for optimism at this historical juncture. Leaders on both sides increasingly take a pragmatic attitude toward the relationship. Further, both sides’ strategic, especially economic, need for the other serves as ballast (压舱石). A glaring omission from the historical discussion is the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, and their subsequent impact on the relationship. When considering the Chinese political climate, this omission is definitely understandable. However, the protests are a key factor in the U.S.-Chinese relations crisis of the 1990s. Media coverage of the protests damaged Chinese Communist Party’s image in the United States. The incident highlights how differences in domestic political systems impact bilateral relations. Professor Xu Qiyu (National Defense University of People’s Liberation Army) provides a comparative perspective in chapter two. The argument discredits Ancient Greek historian Thucydides’ central analysis of the Athens-Sparta War, that war between an existing power and an emerging one is structurally inevitable. Xu, instead, emphasizes the role of strategic miscalculations and misjudgments in such conflicts. These include Britain and Germany, before World War I; and the United States and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War. The discussion strongly reflects the author’s view that, with proper institutional arrangements, the U.S.-Chinese relationship could imitate the peaceful U.S.-U.K. relationship in the late 1800s. While the first half of the book looks backward, the second half zooms in on the current challenges of constructing a new model of a major power relations. Major power status, most importantly, entails shouldering global responsibilities. In sharp contrast to China’s traditional foreign policy strategy of “hiding one’s capability and biding one’s time” (韬光养晦), chapter six takes an expansive view, and stresses the need for bilateral cooperation on a wide range of international and regional issues. These 142

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YOULIN YUAN include the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, the Iran nuclear issue, Syria, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine, and climate change (210-29). Joint shouldering of these responsibilities, while creating more cause for cooperation, will also give rise to new instances of strategic distrust. The U.S.-Chinese split in the United Nations Security Council over Syria and Libya is a recent example. Against this backdrop, the author points out the necessity of re-conceptualizing major power relations. The most central element of the authors’ outlook on major power relations is mutual respect and non-interference. Chapter five refers to Kissinger’s view of “co-evolution,” in which the United States and China would individually, without interference, explore their own suitable development paths (159). In the epilogue, Wang appeals to the concept of mutual respect by returning to Ma Yan's optimistic take on history: “despite vast differences in political values and social institutions…both countries have established adequate mechanisms of crisis prevention and management” (266). Although individual issues will be challenging, Wang believes that “[the] U.S. should respect China’s domestic order, and China does not need to fundamentally challenge the international political and economic order initiated by the U.S.” (263). The contour of major power relations is therefore consistent with China’s founding Premier Zhou Enlai’s central foreign policy tenet of “seeking common ground while reserving differences” (求同存异). In his opinion, any U.S. attempt to change China’s domestic political and social institutions is taboo to the major power relations. While a basic contour of major power relations is provided, two key questions remain unanswered, which limits the explanatory value of the book. The first regards the “old” model to which this “new” model of major power relations is defined. It is natural to think that the old model is part of the international political and economic order led by the United States. Thus, advocating for a new model can be seen as equivalent to implicitly discrediting the old model, and by extension the U.S. leadership that formed it. Wang explicitly denies this implication. Nevertheless, Chinese efforts in building tighter relationships with African countries and between the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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MAJOR POWER RELATIONSHIP Africa), as well as its recent initiatives in establishing an Asian Infrastructure Development Bank and a Silk Road Economic Belt, add to worries that China is seeking to lead a new international order. Additionally, chapter six claims that China also needs a global “rebalance” to achieve strategic objectives, like making the Indian Ocean an essential component of China’s chessboard (237). An explanation of the relationship between the current model and the new model is therefore essential. Second, what is a major power (大国), and how is it different from a hegemon (霸权)? A literal translation of 大国 is “big country,” but it is key to consider what the criteria for “big” are. Is it being defined in terms of economic development, political influence, military prowess, or even global hegemony? The answer affects U.S. suspicion that China is using this concept to justify its military expansion and regional, or global, hegemonic influence. In the Three Joint Communiqués, the most important China-U.S. documents to date, China specifically affirmed that it would never become a “super major power” (超级大国). The same stance is also repeated in Wang’s book, but the line between a “major power” and a “super major power” seems to be a really fine one. The absence of answers to these questions limits the explanatory power of a book that purports to explain what a “new model of major power relationship” means. Nevertheless, this book is still a must read for anyone with an interest in the U.S.-Chinese relationship. For the Chinese audience, Wang offers a candid and sober analysis of the U.S. perspective on the relationship. For others, he draws special attention to how much China values respect for its domestic political and social institutions. Moreover, the non-accusatory and non-ideological manner of the book exemplifies the practical attitude both the United States and China will need in furthering the bilateral relationship. Wang, Jisi (王缉思), ed. Major Power Relationship大国关系. Beijing: China CITIC Press中信出版社, 2015.

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Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific by Robert Haddick Reviewed by Kelly Vorndran Kelly Vorndran is a master’s candidate in Asian Studies at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Her research interests include Chinese foreign policy and Chinese military modernization. Following her graduation with a B.A. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia, she lived in China and Taiwan and was published by The National Bureau of Asian Research. The 21st century will be the Asian Century, characterized by a shift in the geopolitical center of the world from Europe to Asia, and an increasingly confident China. It is evident most keenly in the U.S. rebalance policy, an initiative that will likely outlast the Obama administration, as American policymakers have nearly unanimously come to recognize that the tensionfilled Asia-Pacific theater is where a small conflict could escalate into a broader regional or global war, and is therefore vital to maintaining U.S. national security. Robert Haddick’s Fire on the Water is artful account of this shift, why America and the world should care, and what these changes mean for the U.S. military. Haddick details the impressive rise of China over the past three decades, but focuses on the modernization of Chinese military forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), vis-à-vis U.S. military capabilities. Additionally, he points out how China has become increasingly assertive in pursuing its interests, particularly territorial integrity, which is considered critical to Chinese national identity. The “salami slicing” strategy “to systematically establish legal legitimacy” (81) over disputed territory in the Near Seas, defined as the South and East China Seas, is cited as evidence of an increasingly aggressive China. Chinese action in the Near Seas has begun to cause disruptions in regional order and increase the chances of conflict. Conflicts in the Pacific will most likely involve the American military, VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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FIRE ON THE WATER specifically the U.S. Navy, which has been tasked with maintaining free access to the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). The argument made in Fire in the Water is that PLA modernization programs are designed to create a force capable of defeating the United States in any military conflict in the seas or skies between China and the first island chain, and that these programs have been successful. Haddick reasons that the U.S. Navy must begin to implement programs that will counter China’s new capabilities and act as a deterrent to Chinese aggression. With his experience in the Marine Corps and with the Department of Defense Special Operations Command, Haddick’s argument for focused development of the U.S. military to counter China’s modernization programs, and to overcome China’s increasingly effective AntiAccess/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, is succinct and persuasive. Nevertheless, while Fire on the Water is overall a balanced account of U.S. capabilities vis-à-vis those of China, it has several flaws. One of the main flaws is that it presumes an inevitable conflict between the United States and China. This presumption overlooks the domestic problems that will claim China’s attention and capacity and leads Haddick to propose courses of action for the U.S. Navy that are highly likely to spark an unnecessary conflict. The biggest weakness of Haddick’s argument is embodied in the very first sentence of the book: “The risk of war in East Asia is rising” (1). This statement, along with many others in the book, contend that a military conflict between the United States and China is inescapable, due to a clash over the Chinese salami slicing of contested territory, for control of the SLOCs. Furthermore, Haddick incorrectly dismisses the interconnectedness of Chinese, American, and global economic interests by pointing to the example of Germany in WWII. He uses Germany as an example of a state that went to war with its neighbors, despite massive trade and economic enmeshment with them prior to World War II. However, China is not Germany, and Haddick has failed to understand that Chinese strategic thought is oriented towards using economic rather than military means to solve most of its problems, as seen in its economic rather than military engagement with Taiwan. 146

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KELLY VORNDRAN The United States can, through its network of allies and partners, form a strategy that is less antagonistic towards China than increasing the U.S. military’s presence in the region and deal with the territorial issues through international organizations and law. While Haddick is correct that the United States needs to plan for the development of a military that can overcome A2/AD networks, it also needs to increase cooperation and military exchanges with China. Communication and understanding, rather than blinded arms race, is the first step towards deterrence Additionally, the U.S. military needs to understand that China is reticent about undertaking actions which would disrupt its development. The lack of attention and consideration given to China’s state of development is another weakness of Fire on the Water. China’s society is in midst of rapid urbanization, growth of a middle class, widespread corruption, environmental challenges, and the difficult transition from an export-led to consumption-driven economy. These transitions have historically proven disruptive to societies. With its current economic slowdown, China will doubtlessly suffer from societal growing pains, which often result in unrest. In his book, Haddick does not address any of these domestic issues, or the attention that the Chinese government will be forced to give them over the coming decades. The only concession Haddick makes towards China’s domestic challenges is his encouragement of the U.S. military engaging in irregular warfare, through incitement of Taiwan, Xinjiang, or Tibet, all of which could exacerbate instability in society and are crucial to Chinese territorial integrity (148). Haddick states that his book is meant to lay out a strategy for “preventing conflict in the region by bolstering deterrence” (213), but many of his proposed courses of action would result in dramatically increased tensions, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of Sino-American conflict. He outlines the need for the U.S. military to develop a stealth bomber and long-range fighter jet, to restart the Low Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS) program, to increase U.S. naval presence in the region, and to improve the capabilities of U.S. allies and partners. While Haddick’s plan of action may seem reasonable to U.S. military planners, it will appear threatening to the Chinese government as it may be perceived as an

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FIRE ON THE WATER attempt to contain China. Increasing patrols without first establishing lines of communication and rules of conduct with the PLA in the Near Seas increases the chances of confrontation that might lead to larger regional conflicts. Already, there have been safety issues between U.S. and Chinese flight and sea patrols. While several of Haddick’s proposed options increase the likelihood of conflict, his inclusion of U.S. allies and partners in any plan is a positive step. He criticizes the U.S. military’s plans to deal with China’s A2/AD capabilities, such as the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), AirSea Battle Concept, and Distant Blockade Concept, as all falling short, because they lack the critical inclusion of regional allies and partners. As an expeditionary power in the Asia-Pacific, the United States needs to rely on its allies and partners to support its missions. Further, the inclusion of allies and partners in any strategy for dealing with China will increase the economic and political cost of any conflict or attempt to change the current global order. Fire on the Water is an accomplished work, which illustrates importance of the Asia-Pacific, the expanding capabilities of the PLA – especially its missile capabilities – and what strategic changes the United States needs to make in its force planning to counteract these new capabilities. Haddick slightly overreaches in his portrayal of the inevitability of conflict. With China’s growing domestic challenges, the Chinese Communist Party has minimal desire to modify a global order that currently costs it little, but allows it to reap large benefits. Overall, the book is recommended for its overview of Chinese military capabilities, compared to U.S. capabilities, but should not be taken as an accurate account of the future of conflict in the Asia-Pacific. Haddick, Robert. Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014.

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Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China by Evan Osnos Reviewed by DD Wu DD Wu will graduate with a Master's in Asian Studies at The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs in May 2016. Her research interests center around East Asian topics. She worked as an editor in an influential market-oriented daily newspaper in China before she came to the United States to pursue her master’s degree. Nobel-winning Chinese prisoner Liu Xiaobo once told New Yorker journalist Evan Osnos that “ninety-eight percent of Western sinologists are useless” (158). If Liu’s sharp observation is credible, Age of Ambition demonstrates that Osnos remains one of the two percent whose works are truly valuable. Unlike those “sinologists” who barely speak Chinese and write dozens of books based on short visits, Evan Osnos moved to China in 2005 as a correspondent and lived there until 2013. In those eight years, he witnessed the dramatic transformation of China and its people. Some “small potatoes” became millionaires or opinion leaders; some former celebrities ended up as enemies of the nation; millions of ordinary people are still striving for some meaning in their lives. For Age of Ambition, Osnos followed and interviewed Chinese individuals from all walks of life: dissidents such as Liu Xiaobo, Ai Weiwei and Chen Guangcheng; social elites such as economist Lin Yifu, magazine founder Hu Shuli and the young generation’s idol writer, Han Han; and finally, Osnos sought out the grassroots – his neighbors in Beijing and ordinary citizens, such as a street sweeper. By depicting their struggle and success over eight years, Osnos gives the reader a compelling look at a highly complicated and constantly changing China.

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AGE OF AMBITION Given their training in unbalanced and unbiased reporting, journalists tend to be less willing to make judgments and render conclusions than some political scientists are. Osnos once confessed that the true story of why he got interested in China “is a little bit impolitic in the sense that it has a lot to do with Tiananmen Square.”1 However, in Age of Ambition, Osnos selfconsciously tries to restrain himself from judging too quickly: For an American writing abroad, it is tempting to envy China’s strengths where America feels weak, and to judge the country harshly where it grates against my values. But I have tried, above all, to describe Chinese lives on their own terms (7). This recognition allows Osnos to understand China not through clichés or concepts, but through the everyday lives of its citizens. Osnos shows great empathy in his writing, which allowed him to befriend people from different classes in China. Incredibly, he pays the same amount of attention to the common man and the elites, both in real life and in the pages of his book. For instance, a young man named Michael, from a poor miner family, regarded Osnos as a true friend. When Michael asked Osnos whether he should be viewed as “low society,” Osnos firmly replied “No.” Instead, Osnos told Michael that he should be called “aspiring middle class” (353). Complete with self-control and empathy, his portrayal of the people and the nation was profoundly authentic even in the eyes of a native Chinese. In Mandarin, “野心 ye xin”, the direct translation of “ambition,” carries a negative connotation of a person who strives for personal success by all means. In English, according to Merriam-Webster, “ambition” simply means “a particular goal or aim: something that a person hopes to do or achieve; a desire to be successful, powerful, or famous; a desire to do things and be active.” So when a native Chinese finishes the book, she cannot help but agree that the generalization based on English language is largely fair and reasonable: millions of Chinese are chasing fortune, truth, and faith in today’s complex China. 150

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DD WU No wonder, then, that Age of Ambition appeared not only on the reading list of President Obama’s daughters, but also on the lists of thousands of Chinese readers. Osnos has become a bright star in Chinese society. If you search “Evan Osnos” on Baidu.com – the Chinese equivalent of Google – you get 904,000 results. Even when searching with Osnos’s Chinese name, “欧逸文,” you still get 397,000 hits. Hundreds of Chinese journalists have interviewed Osnos and privately discussed why no Chinese journalist has ever written a similar book. These journalists sadly concluded that while there might be hundreds of writers like Osnos in China, there is no New Yorker in China. Worse yet, Chinese journalists know that coercive censorship combined with a competitive market means that a Chinese New Yorker is likely still a ways away. Age of Ambition could not have been written in China, as all the dissidents covered in the book remain taboo subjects in Chinese media. Even Hu Shuli, “the most dangerous woman [in the Chinese press],” cannot report on any dissidents if she wants to preserve her magazine’s existence (121). On the business end, Chinese journalists envied the ability of Osnos to write longform journalism. While most Chinese journalists must constantly cover breaking news, Osnos was allowed to follow his subject for eight years. Luckily, today is the age of internet and globalization. Osnos’s Age of Ambition, together with the taboo stories of dissidents, spread among both American and Chinese readers. The book not only inspired the American readers to review contemporary China and its millions of citizens from a vivid and accountable perspective, but also gave the Chinese people a chance to reflect on themselves. At the end of Age of Ambition, Osnos quoted Michael’s words to conclude: “I will completely accept everything I was born with and I will do my best to change it” (335). Osnos vividly used Michael to embody all ordinary Chinese individuals. If Osnos’s examination is right, then these aspiring ordinary individuals might push China toward an unpredictable VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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AGE OF AMBITION future. In the process, Osnos himself actually has also become a factor that contributes to the transformation, as he has advanced mutual understanding and stirred self-reflection within the two nations. The book is resonating among both Chinese and American readers for multiple reasons. In 1784, the Empress of China sailed from the United States to China and the two nations started a long joint journey that saw periods of both love and hatred. 2 The relationship has swung from “a supra-cultural friendship based on common traits and values and mutual respect”3 in Chiang Kai-shek’s era to a complete breakdown in Mao’s era and decidedly mixed feelings today following China’s open door policy. The book’s success in both nations shows once again that no matter the era, the people in both countries have always retained a keen interest in each other. Mutual interest is a positive sign for the U.S.-China relationship, because interest leads to exploration, exploration to understanding, and understanding to reconciliation. While some government officials and political scholars in both nations obsess over the idea of unavoidable conflict escalation between the two powers, Osnos's book opens a window for potential rational dialogue. This window is especially important to the Chinese people. Due to the absence of a free market of opinions, fraudulent Chinese “America hands” can easily distort public opinion by claiming that they have lived in the United States and therefore know the American scheme against China well. Similarly, many American writers with serious bias do hold extreme positions against China, which are used as evidence by those fraud “America hands” to demonstrate their points. Osnos’s comparatively fair and unbiased position in his book can greatly help Chinese people to counter those fraud ideas. The promotion of understand helps to neutralize inaccurate claims about each country and lessen the chance of runaway public opinion. Last but not least, it is quite possible that Age of Ambition may motivate many aspiring young Americans to leave for China, see the country there 152

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DD WU with their own eyes, befriend young Chinese, and even find their significant others – just like Osnos had found his wife in that unpredictable nation.4 Osnos, Evan. Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2014. Endnotes Evan Osnos, interview by Project Pengyou, February 25, 2013 http://projectpengyou .org/evan-osnos-hooked-on-china-post 2 U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “Chronology of U.S.-China relations, 1784-2000,” https://history.state.gov/countries/issues/china-us-relations 3 John Fairbank, The United States and China, (Harvard University Press, 1983): 318 4 Vincent Mallozzi, “Sarabeth Berman, Evan Osnos,” New York Times, July 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/fashion/weddings/sarabeth-berman-evan-osnosweddings.html 1

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Debating China: The U.S.-China Relationship in Ten Conversations Edited by Nina Hachigian A Review by Liyi Ye Liyi Ye is a first year master’s student in East Asian Studies at Stanford University, concentrating on Sino-American relations and China’s economic transition. Liyi completed her undergraduate degree at New York University Stern Business School, where she majored in Finance and Accounting. Delicate U.S.-China relations elicit the interest of diverse audiences. Beyond the myriad of news reports and books, there is now a special volume – Debating China: The U.S.-China Relationship in Ten Conversations – that navigates the key issues of contention through vibrant and sometimes clashing conversations between world-renowned American and Chinese scholars. The collection, edited by Nina Hachigian, provides insights on significant challenges in Sino-American relations such as trade and economic relations, political values, human rights, climate change, military dynamics, global investment, potential conflict over Taiwan and Tibet, and regional security in Asia. While the back-andforth exchanges reveal genuine mutual appreciation between experts from both sides, Debating China voices a palpable sense of distrust between the U.S. and China. That distrust is already apparent in the opening conversation between Kenneth Lieberthal of the Brookings Institution and Professor Wang Jisi of Peking University. Lieberthal is quick to characterize current U.S.China relations as “mature,” “dense,” and “expanding,” but still “distrustful” (2). He admits that Americans have a natural inclination to distrust authoritarian states, but emphasizes that the United States has engaged in ongoing efforts to improve trust with China. Wang, while agreeing with Lieberthal’s overall characterization of the relations between the two nations, questions American intentions. He maintains that 154

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LIYI YE the United States is only welcoming the global integration of China to interfere with Chinese domestic politics and push it to become “more like America” (10). The conversation between Professor Michael Green of Georgetown University and Professor Wu Xinbo of Fudan University reflects the same mistrust. Wu states that China and America should try to reach an agreement on the changing regional dynamics in Asia-Pacific through “enduring, candid, and constructive dialogue” (216), but the United States should refrain from exploiting the South China Sea disputes and forming alliances with China’s neighbors to undermine its regional power. Meanwhile, Green contends that “there is no mainstream support in the U.S. today for a policy of containing China” (206), a sentiment less appreciated by Wu. Another trenchant debate between Professor Andrew Nathan of Columbia University and Professor Zhou Qi of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences further substantiates such distrust. Zhou argues that two ideologies – “American exceptionalism” and “classical liberalism” – have shaped U.S. foreign policy to promote democracy abroad. She asserts that the self-imposed responsibility of the United States to intervene with the internal affairs of foreign governments is viewed by other nations as part of an attempt to secure “world hegemony” (46). Zhou then explains that China, as an emerging power, attaches more importance to economic and social rights rather than civil and political rights. In response, Nathan argues that abuses of human rights not only offend American values, but also violate international law, which the Chinese government officially recognizes. Nathan does agree with Zhou that human rights are also violated in the United States, but claims that independent media, fair courts, and civil organizations strive to curtail injustice in the country. However, Nathan indicates that such countermeasures are strictly prohibited and even punished in China. The debate regarding military dynamics between Christopher Twomey, who teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School, and Xu Hui, a professor at China’s National Defense University, also features strong disagreements VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015

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DEBATING CHINA and irreconcilable differences. Twomey believes that China lacks a legitimate reason to rapidly modernize and expand its military, especially considering its significantly improved security environment. In response, Xu states that China’s official total defense expenditures are quite low compared to what the United States spends on military development both on an aggregate and a per capita basis. Xu argues that if China is expected to stop developing its military because of a relatively stable security environment, the United States, having achieved absolute military superiority for decades, “should have given up its military transformation a long time ago” (163). Some disagreements between the Chinese and U.S. scholars are caused by divergent social and political values, while others result from different interpretations of history. One prominent example is the exchange between Professor Jia Qingguo of Peking University and Alan Romberg of the Stimson Center over the question of Taiwan. Jia comments that Washington supports the definition of the “One China” (181) policy, but never defines the scope of that policy. He indicates that the U.S. arm sales to Taiwan to maintain its “strategic ambiguity” (182) are detrimental to Sino-American relations. According to Jia, Beijing suspects that the United States is trying to undermine its authority over Tibet under the guise of promoting human rights. On the issue of Taiwan, Romberg contends that the United States supports neither independence nor unification. However, the United States cannot stand aloof if the Chinese government resorts to force to attain its goals, because of both its sense of responsibility and its alliance with Taiwan. He explains that Washington does “acknowledge” the “One China” principle, which includes Taiwan, but it never “accepted” it (188). Romberg then emphasizes that the United States never questions the authority of the Chinese government over Tibet. However, he argues that the United States, as an international advocate for individual rights, is obligated to protect the human rights and religious freedoms of the Tibetan people. Although many of the conversations have an undertone of mistrust, the discussions on economic relations, media, climate change and clean energy, global development, and foreign investment demonstrate more 156

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LIYI YE convergence than contention. For example, both Yuan Peng of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and Hachigian, the editor of Debating China, acknowledge Chinese efforts to achieve more international cooperation with the United States and the rest of the world. Hachigian supports Yuan’s suggestion that the United States and China should solve problems “case by case” and “step by step” (94 and 101), while proposing that the United States and China maintain a broad yet close cooperative relationship in order to keep rivalry, mistrust, and friction under control. Overall, Debating China is the first account of Sino-American relations that explores arguments and insights of the intellectual elites from both the United States and China. Participants are experts with a lifetime of interaction and engagement with the other side, resulting in informative and inspiring discussions about Sino-American relations. The conversations reveal the entrenched mistrust between the United States and China, which is caused by the difference in ideological, cultural, and political differences further compounded by the geostrategic challenge posed by the rise of China. Given the unique comparative presentation of Debating China, the reader can effectively follow the back-and-forth exchanges and understand where the opinions start to diverge. However, anyone looking for absolute frankness from Chinese experts in the book might be disappointed; the Chinese participants tend to be less forthcoming with acknowledging flaws and mistakes of the authoritarian regime and remain very careful with toeing the line of the Chinese government. Because of such reluctance to admit real problems, there is no solution reached to eliminate or minimize the tension and distrust in Sino-American relations. Nevertheless, the book remains an encompassing and informative resource for anyone seeking a comprehensive view of significant challenges in managing the U.S.-China relationship. Nina Hachigian, ed., Debating China: The U.S.-China Relationship in Ten Conversations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

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