WINTER 2017 / XXV / 1 • Somalia’s Organized Crime Networks • Joint Crediting in Indonesia • Iran’s Support for Non-State Actor Violence
• China’s Nationalist Foreign Policy in a Globalized Era • Countering Digital Female ISIL Recruitment in Russia • International Law Reliefs
VOLUME XXV / NUMBER 1 / WINTER 2017
ADVISORS
Mark Gaspar LECTURER
The George Washington University
Kimberly L. Thachuk, PhD PROFESSORIAL LECTURER
The George Washington University
The International Affairs Review is a non-profit, peer-reviewed, academic journal published biannually in Washington, DC. It is an independent, graduate student run publication sponsored by the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University.
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International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
COPY EDITORS
Jackson Doering
Kimberly Bullard Olivia Smith
MANAGING EDITOR
Allen Tullos SENIOR EDITORS
Beryl Thomas Lubna Sheikh Miriam Wickman Alison Bartel Lesli Davis ASSOCIATE EDITORS
Mattisan Rowan Andrew Hilleary Gabriel Kelly Maurice Velazco Kimberly Bullard Alexandra Cantone Amanda Shaver Daniel Beno Matt Ciesilski Kylie Skorupa Olivia Smith Marin Okpali
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INTERVIEW EDITOR
Madeline Assi CONTRIBUTING WRITERS
Zhizhen Lu Amara Manoogian Songyee Jung Grace Chesson Sarah Chancey Reichenbach Horacio Oliveira Anne Margaret A. Wagner Adam Yefet Ken Ben Chao Liya Khalikova Daria Shcheglovia Warren Kessler LAYOUT EDITOR
Engin Creative
Volume XXV / Issue 1
From the Editor’s Desk You’re probably tired of hearing about President Donald Trump day after day. Quite frankly, we are too. A bi-annual publication like International Affairs Review cannot add to the political deluge of outrage and counter-outrage that restarts almost hourly. Instead, we seek to contribute something different; something a little more considered and even-handed. As graduate students, we are gifted with what many policymakers do not have: time to think deeply. Time allows us to critically examine the nuances and challenges of foreign affairs. It allows us to experiment with and develop novel solutions that haven’t been thought of yet. It allows us to methodically gather facts that support and sometime refute our preconceptions, so that we can present policy recommendations based in truth and fact. We still believe that carefully crafted analyses, like those written by our authors, represent the most hopeful contribution to bettering our world. Grace Chesson, Horacio Oliveira, Sarah Chaney Reichenbach, and Anne Margaret A. Wagner offer a complex picture of al-Shabaab’s criminal network in Somalia. Songyee Jung makes a compelling case for Indonesian low-carbon development. Adam Yefet analyzes Iran’s involvement in non-state violence. Zhizhen Lu comments on China’s nationalistic policy and its future in the global system. Finally, Amara Manoogian and her colleagues analyze US and Russian cooperation to combat female recruitment into ISIL. As always, this work would be impossible without the skill and dedication of our editors and authors. We thank you all for your tireless work in writing, editing, and assembling this journal. Our jobs would be impossible without your work.
Jackson Doering Editor-in-Chief Allen Tullos Managing Editor
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International Affairs Review Elliott School of International Affairs 1957 E Street, NW Suite 303K Washington, DC 20052 www.iar-gwu.org iar@gwu.edu The International Affairs Review accepts submissions year round, with a call for submissions occurring at the beginning of each academic semester and selection rounds shortly thereafter. For further information or to request notification, contact the editors at iar@gwu.edu. Back issues are available to individuals, libraries, and institutes; contact the editors with the year, volume, and issue number, phone number or email address, and mailing address. The International Affairs Review publishes short pieces weekly at www.iar-gwu.org and in the IAR Newsletter. Subscribe at www.iar-gwu.org, or submit items of about 1000 words to iarsubmissions@ gmail.com
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Volume XXV / Issue 1
CONTENTS
1 19 33 53 69 91
Somalia's Organized Crime Networks: A New Framework to Degrade al-Shabaab.
Grace Chesson, Horacio Oliveira, Sarah Chaney Reichenbach, and Anne Margaret A. Wagner
Joint Crediting in Indonesia: Supporting Low-Carbon Development Through Optimization of Energy Service Companies. Songyee Jung
Iran’s Support for Non-State Actor Violence —Interests, Goals, and Grievances: Iran's Relationship with the West in the 20th Century. Adam Yefet
China’s Nationalist Foreign Policy in a Globalized Era: Historical Logic, Confident Insecurity, and Domestic Politics. Zhizhen Lu
Swipe Left: U.S.- Russia Cooperation in Countering Digital Female ISIL Recruitment. Amara Manoogian, Ken Ben Chao, Liya Khalikova, Daria Shcheglova
Review: The International Law of Reliefs. Warren Kessler
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Somalia’s Organized Crime Networks
A New Framework to Degrade al-Shabaab Grace Chesson, Horacio Oliveira, Sarah Chaney Reichenbach, and Anne Margaret A. Wagner Grace Chesson, Horacio Oliveira, Sarah Chaney Reichenbach, and Anne Margaret A. Wagner are recent graduates of the Elliott School of International Affairs, having received Masters’ in International Affairs with concentrations in Conflict Resolution. Currently, Grace Chesson is a Program Assistant with the Africa Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Horacio Oliveira recently served as a Country Analyst for the Global Citizen's Initiative. Sarah Chaney Reichenbach is the Program Assistant for North Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). Anne Margaret A. Wagner is a Program Assistant for the Strategy, Performance and Capacity Building division at Social Impact (SI). ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes al-Shabaab’s organized criminal activities, addresses the nexus of organized crime, terrorism, and insurgency, and presents strategies to augment current approaches to marginalize the terrorist group. Capitalizing on the weakness in the rule of law in Somalia and the political economy of state collapse1, al-Shabaab (Harakat al-Shabaab) has maintained its presence as an influential actor within Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa, with implications for national, regional, and global security. The terrorist group’s violent campaign, however, is part of a larger transnational criminal enterprise, financed through a diverse portfolio of criminal racketeering, illicit trafficking, extortion, and corruption. Dismantling al-Shabaab requires a new framework that would incentivize the business and political elite to withdraw their support from al-Shabaab and instead operate within the confines of formal governance and economic institutions.
This paper analyzes al-Shabaab’s operations as an organized crime syndicate and offers new strategies to target the larger network of actors facilitating its criminal and terrorist activities (henceforth the “facilitation network”). Given the immediate security concerns posed by al-Shabaab, international actors and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) have focused primarily on militarized strategies and quick impact stabilization programs, failing to fully integrate policies that address the growing symbiotic relationship between International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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transnational organized crime and terrorism, forged by mutually beneficial revenue streams. Current efforts are failing to improve the security situation in Somalia, as evidenced by numerous large-scale terrorist attacks, violence against civilians, and splinter groups allying with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).2 Dismantling al-Shabaab and its facilitation network requires a new framework that incentivizes the business and political elite to withdraw their support from the group and begin acting within formal governance and economic structures. To defeat al-Shabaab, the FGS and international allies must take a two-pronged approach. First, the FGS and partners must degrade al-Shabaab’s capacity for illicit financing schemes and extortion of key Somali industries using specialized training for law enforcement and judiciary leaders and instituting increased financial oversight. Second, they should simultaneously support and legitimize formal governance structures at the Federal Member State (FMS) level of the Somali government by directly funding institution-strengthening projects of FMS legislatures and governing bodies. By increasing the costs associated with facilitating al-Shabaab and simultaneously strengthening formal governance and economic institutions at the subnational level, the FGS—with the support of its international partners— can more effectively and sustainably marginalize the organization and achieve political and state development goals.
BACKGROUND: AL-SHABAAB AND SOMALI STATE DEVELOPMENT Since gaining independence in 1960 through the merger of Italian Somalia and British Somaliland, Somalia has faced episodic violence and an exhausting list of challenges to state development. Although an in-depth historical analysis will not be provided here, it is crucial to note the resulting territorial partition and politicization of clan identity had a lasting effect on the trajectory of state development. Following the collapse of the military regime under Siad Barre in 1991, war profiteers and private and clan-allied militias proliferated, and the security and governance landscape was further complicated by the rise of Islamic governance and subsequent failure of Western intervention. This resulted in the complete breakdown of the federal government, followed by violent power struggles and the mounting influence of non-state actors. It is in this environment that al-Shabaab, capitalizing on the lack of governance and security, emerged and ingrained itself in Somali social, political, and economic structures. Al-Shabaab reached its zenith between 2007 and 2008, at which point it controlled most of southern and central Somalia. Designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 20083, al-Shabaab gained notoriety as a player in the global war on terror in 2012 when its 2
Somalia's Organized Crime Networks
leadership formally declared allegiance to al-Qaeda.4 Since then, domestic and international efforts to combat the jihadist group have made significant gains, as evidenced by the recapturing of key territories and the group’s diminished military capacities. However, despite extensive peacekeeping operations and the strengthening of the internationally backed federal government, al-Shabaab remains a persistent and formidable threat. Al-Shabaab simultaneously exhibits both highly structured and amorphous characteristics, with an organized hierarchy of offices (maktabad5) and a larger, less-defined underlying network of actors that facilitate the organization’s illicit financial operations and institutional infiltration. The elder members and stringent ideologues originated from a small network of Somali veterans of the Afghan war from 1979 to 1989.6 They hold al-Shabaab’s visible power base and determine the philosophical direction of the organization. Opportunistic younger generations make up a large proportion of al-Shabaab’s foot soldiers. Facing limited economic opportunity, these Somali youths often join the organization for economic reasons and are indoctrinated into the radicalized Islamist ideology over time.7 This centralized membership is surrounded by a broader network of business and political elite, both local and international, whose illicit criminal activities support al-Shabaab’s core operations. This facilitation network enables al-Shabaab to utilize illicit revenue streams and to infiltrate and extort industries and formal governing institutions. It is this network of peripheral actors that the FGS and its international partners should leverage to ultimately deprive al-Shabaab of the capital and political influence necessary to operate. Without addressing the root cause of instability in Somalia—the lack of an effective and inclusive system of formal governance and rule of law—alShabaab and the illicit operations that fund its operations will persist, despite the best efforts of the FGS, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the United States, and other regional and international partners. The Federal Government of Somalia, established in 2012 after multiple failed transitional governments, has articulated its determination to defeat al-Shabaab and bring stability to the country. However, as a country emerging from decades of conflict, Somalia’s formal state-building process continues to be a long and arduous one. Now, as the FGS endeavors to consolidate a federal state system and navigate parliamentary and presidential elections a unique window of both opportunity and vulnerability exists, with the political transition simultaneously offering hope for a strengthened, popularly recognized government and fear of heightened conflict financing and instability.8
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INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST AL-SHABAAB Major international organizations remain committed to Somalia’s political development and stabilization. The United Nations has maintained a base in Somalia since the 1990s, most recently establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in 2013 to support peacebuilding, democratic development, governance and rule of law, and increased capacity for human rights and gender equality.9 Furthermore, the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) oversees sustainable growth and development in Somalia during this time of state-building. Somalia has improved bilateral political relationships abroad, marked especially by the United States swearing in its first ambassador to Somalia in 25 years in June 2016.10 In September 2016, Somalia hosted the annual International Authority on Development Summit (IGAD) for the first time in 30 years to discuss continued development, election processes, and efforts for sustained peace.11 This marks a triumph in which Somali security forces were able to hold a high profile international event, and many experts and officials see it as an historic signal of Somalia’s stabilization and re-emergence in both the region and the world.12 Middle Eastern states—particularly Turkey and the Gulf States of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—play a significant, albeit complicated, role in Somalia’s development. Since 2011, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has commissioned infrastructure development projects in Somalia worth $500 million, including roads, bridges, mosques, and business partnerships, which last year alone totaled $72.3 million.13 While funding various humanitarian and economic initiatives, Turkey also invests in Somali security, as it broke ground on its first military base to help train the Somali National Army (SNA) in January 2016.14 The United Arab Emirates maintains a strong relationship with Somali President Mohamud, who has commended the work of Emirati NGOs to support and stabilize Somalia by building schools, clinics, and training police.15 Unfortunately, not all Gulf States act benevolently to enhance Somalia’s stabilization. According to the 2013 U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (UNMGSE) report, “President Mohamud had received several million dollars from Qatar, which was used to buy political support.”16 Qatar also leverages the Somali diaspora residing in Qatar to carry out their policies, rather than sending members of their governments or NGOs.17 Finally, some diplomats report that Saudi Arabian aid has been used as a political tool, evidenced most clearly in January 2016 when Somalia formally cut diplomatic ties with Iran on the same day it received Saudi foreign aid.18 While aid from certain Middle Eastern countries supports infrastructure projects and other positive developments, this support often comes with conditions as each state vies for political influence in Somalia, further complicating the landscape. 4
Somalia's Organized Crime Networks
While international aid agencies and bilateral assistance attempt to strengthen political and economic structures to combat al-Shabaab’s influence, the United States and international partners focus primarily on counterinsurgency strategies to degrade al-Shabaab’s military capacity. Led by U.S. drone strikes and AMISOM ground forces, the military campaign against al-Shabaab seeks to capture, stabilize, and retake seized territory. The United States partners with AMISOM to provide both intelligence assistance and military hardware, while American drone strikes remove key al-Shabaab actors.19 However, this heavily militaristic approach in Somalia has failed to diminish al-Shabaab’s influence, and al-Shabaab continues to rebound in the face of military setbacks, most recently conducting strikes against a military base, an intelligence officer, and a Kenyan border town in October 2016.20 Al-Shabaab’s survival demonstrates that a purely militarized approach is not enough to disrupt the organization’s abilities to endure and adapt. Despite internationally-supported militarized strategies and diplomatic global partnerships, the FGS has yet to strategically target al-Shabaab’s facilitation network. Opaque political processes and weak checks and balances against corruption enable al-Shabaab’s facilitation network to clandestinely work against reconciliation and capacity-building programs. Within the facilitation network, members of the business and political elite are intrinsically tied to alShabaab through clan relationships, and Somali officials within this patronage system often have more interest in making money and supporting domestic and foreign allies than in governing and building equitable, accountable state institutions.21 Thus, there is a strong correlation between the failings of the FGS, the pervasiveness of the facilitation network throughout Somalia, and the resurgent threat posed by al-Shabaab throughout the region.22
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM Facilitation networks engage in transnational organized crime (TOC) for profit, regardless of their partners’ political agendas. The fundamental differences between organized criminals and terrorists are their motivations and their visibility. In the case of al-Shabaab, organized crime is a means to fund a terrorist insurgency and to infiltrate Somali institutions to ensure survival. Organized crime groups do not operate solely by adhering to ideology, and al-Shabaab is no exception.23 This collaboration can “render irrelevant and ineffective the most common countermeasures state governments and international organizations traditionally launch against transnational terrorist groups.”24 It is critical that policymakers include an analysis of al-Shabaab’s organized criminal activities through the lens of TOC theory. Organized crime groups employ tactics along a spectrum to achieve their objectives—violence International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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at one extreme, and corruption at the other. Terror groups like al-Shabaab are adaptive and flexible, and can quickly change tactics to remain nimble in rapidly changing environments.25 Al-Shabaab intimidates local populations and drives away potential competitors, whether it is the SNA or locals seeking to profit on their own, through well-publicized mass violence. However, its penetration of the Somali government and economy through tactical corruption will prove to be more difficult to root out in the long term. Organized criminals cannot operate in an environment of absolute state failure, but they can thrive under the conditions of incredibly weak states.26 Al-Shabaab is adept at utilizing its networks to exploit an unstable Somalia. Given the recent declaration by the United Nations that Somalia has transitioned from a failed state to a “recovering fragile state,”27 al-Shabaab’s tactical corruption will likely become more effective if left unchecked.
AL-SHABAAB’S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES BUSINESS ELITE AND AL-SHABAAB’S FACILITATION NETWORK Without addressing corrupt business elites and weaknesses in Somalia’s financial infrastructure, a successful political transition will do little to diminish al-Shabaab’s terrorist operations. Support networks among Somalia’s business elites, formed voluntarily or through coercion, provide the terrorist group with important resources. Business elites, particularly in the telecommunications and real estate sectors, contribute to al-Shabaab’s finances and continue to resist necessary financial reforms. Telecommunication companies have steadily replaced conventional banking with mobile electronic transfers, requiring al-Shabaab to reimagine how it extorts payments. Mobile electronic cash transfers using American dollars have become the standard means to conduct everyday business, given the severely weakened Somali shilling and the country’s largely inaccessible financial sector.28, 29 At least 70 percent of the 2.5 million customers of telecom giant Hormuud’s customers have opened mobile transfer accounts, leading many to abandon the traditional informal hawala cash transfer system, which required users to locate a hawala office and pay as much as 5 percent to send or receive payments.30 Recognizing the shifting financial landscape and the threat to its cash payment rackets, al-Shabaab began a campaign to attack and coerce national mobile banking operations. The terror group instituted bans on mobile banking in its territories and threatened national telecoms in an effort to maintain a cash economy, where citizens and hawala operators alike could be more efficiently coerced for cash.31 Al-Shabaab’s mafia-like relationship with the telecom industry provides revenue and a powerful mechanism to coerce communities and threaten peace. 6
Somalia's Organized Crime Networks
In one case, al-Shabaab closed down the Hormuud Telecom Company’s branch in Jilib town, Middle Jubba region, and detained more than 15 staff members after the company failed to pay a $50,000 extortion fee.32 In 2014, Somalia’s Minister of the Interior and National Security called for the telecom industry to resist cooperation with al-Shabaab and recognized the industry’s role as an important revenue mechanism for the terror group.33 Additionally, without greater financial and regulatory cooperation from the industry, the FGS will never address the security implications stemming from a lack of transparency in money transfer operations.34 Telecom companies often avoid paying taxes to the government and instead funnel protection payments to al-Shabaab to avoid attacks on their facilities and personnel. As one information and communications technology advisor to the Somali government argues, “[p]aying tax is the foundation of any social contract, while the rule of law strengthens the government’s mandate to develop the whole country.”35 He contends that telecoms must begin submitting to FGS governance and contribute to rebuilding Somalia.36 The telecom industry’s continued cooperation with al-Shabaab and open tax avoidance weakens the government’s ability to impose financial regulations more broadly and severs an important reciprocal relationship between the government and marketplace. Without compliance from this vital industry, the FGS will continue struggling to obtain sufficient resources to finance security forces and development initiatives that constitute the bedrock for building business confidence.37 Additionally, real estate money laundering contributes to al-Shabaab’s income generation and financial fraud operations, paralleling a boom in the real estate sectors in Mogadishu and Nairobi. In Nairobi, new classes of cashpaying investors seek to safely store their money in real estate properties, which has raised new questions about the origin of vast financial sums, as well as their possible connection to illegitimate sources.38 In Somalia, Mogadishu’s tacit stability has brought back many wealthy members of the Somali diaspora, creating a new cadre of wealthy businessmen looking to buy homes and commercial property.39 While some investors amassed their wealth through legitimate enterprises, significant portions of this new wealth have traces to al-Shabaab’s organized criminal elements. Connections among corrupt, high-level business and political elites in both Kenya and Somalia allow al-Shabaab’s facilitation network to funnel finances into property markets in both Nairobi and Mogadishu.40 The network uses cash payments and mobile transfers to fund their operations and makes it increasingly difficult for governments to detect and track the flow of illicit funds within a shadow economy.41 Increased international financial scrutiny and new Somali anti-money laundering laws make it harder to obscure illegal cash flows; however, real estate markets require significant oversight as International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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they remain a prime target for criminal groups to hide their proceeds.42 As alShabaab seeks new avenues to generate and mask its revenues, greater financial intelligence capacity must receive higher priority if the FGS hopes to degrade al-Shabaab’s money-laundering partnerships with powerful business elites.
POLITICAL COMPLIANCE AND ILLICIT FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES Al-Shabaab’s imposition of pseudo-government structures and its engagement in illicit trade result in lucrative taxation and extortion schemes. These schemes finance their terrorist operations and also appear to exceed tax revenues of the FGS, preventing the Somali government from providing services and security to populations and damaging their legitimacy.43 At its peak in 2009 and 2010, al-Shabaab earned tens of millions of dollars annually from extortion in territories under its control.44 While al-Shabaab’s control has decreased in recent years, especially since its loss of the port of Kismayo to AMISOM forces in 2012, illicit taxation and extortion continue to be key revenue generators for the terrorist organization.45 Al-Shabaab’s governance resembles that of a local mafia, utilizing intimidation, extortion, and violence to control territory, prevent market competition, and ensure funding. Al-Shabaab collects taxes coercively, “incentivizing” Somalis to pay steep bribes. The group extorts shopkeepers, intimidates local populations with publicly-posted threats and text messages, and taxes individuals for daily activities, such as use of the village water well.46 In its strongholds in southern Somalia, al-Shabaab generates hundreds of thousands of dollars each month through extortion and threats of violence.47 These tactics divert desperately needed revenues away from the FGS, and in the absence of guaranteed security, local populations are forced to comply.48 In some areas, al-Shabaab provides a semblance of basic government services more effectively than the FGS by maintaining the capacity to oversee public health and education and by providing law and order through informal dispute resolution and policing.49 While these ad hoc services make the organization harder to root out, they continually lose public favor as al-Shabaab terrorizes the population through coercive tax collection methods and extreme judicial practices. Given these factors and the instability of any al-Shabaab “governance,” these services are not a sustainable substitute for legitimate ones provided by the government. In addition to taxing and extorting Somalis, al-Shabaab reaps enormous profits from the taxation of illicit regional trade. The group issues receipts and falsifies shipping documentation, working alongside local Somali leaders, Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), and international facilitators, particularly in the Persian Gulf.50
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Somalia's Organized Crime Networks
In the past, charcoal exports from southern Somalia were a mainstay of revenue for al-Shabaab and its facilitation network. Al-Shabaab taxed charcoal before it reached ports, taxed an additional $3-per-bag fee upon arrival, and issued receipts and falsified shipping documents to smugglers.51 Working within its facilitation network, the terror group split the profits within the Jubbaland administration and the KDF.52 Until recently, charcoal exports reached approximately 1 million bags each month and produced revenues of $24 million a year.53 However, due to the displacement of al-Shabaab from charcoal trade hubs in southern Somalia, a ban on the trade, and a fallingout with Jubbaland facilitators, revenues from charcoal have declined.54 Now, al-Shabaab appears to have declared its own charcoal ban in areas under its influence, which it enforces by imprisoning and attacking local burners and traders of charcoal, in an attempt to diminish the revenues of its former Jubbaland partners.55 Nevertheless, the organization and its adaptable facilitation network have found new revenue streams in the taxation of the illicit sugar trade, agricultural production, and livestock.56 Charging up to $1,500 per truck along checkpoints in Somalia from the port of Kismayo into Kenya, al-Shabaab is estimated to be generating between $12 million and $18 million in revenue each year.57 It is estimated that al-Shabaab and its facilitation network partake in a trade worth $200 to $400 million, with about 150,000 tons of illicit sugar smuggled into Kenya each year.58 Additionally, the organization is estimated to earn $9.5 million from taxing agricultural production in the Juba Valley, despite reports of increased resistance from and clashes with local populations.59 By weakening the facilitation network’s ability to engage in illicit trade, the FGS and its international partners would impose significant financial and resource shortages on the terrorist insurgency and cripple its operational abilities. It is key to target the network’s capacities to trade, rather than any one resource or market. As al-Shabaab has demonstrated, banning one illicit product simply leads the terror group to traffick and tax other commodities.
RECOMMENDATIONS Al-Shabaab’s existence fundamentally undermines the legitimacy of the federal government and has created a major obstacle in state development. Operating in the absence of the rule of law and any enforceable central governance, alShabaab has established itself as a dynamic, resilient entity that is likely to continue influencing the security and political economy of Somalia and the Horn of Africa for the foreseeable future. A report by the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed current militarized approaches, specifically those that target leaders of the terrorist group, saying:
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It is uncertain…what long-term impact the ongoing policy of targeting the Al-Shabaab leadership will have on degrading the group’s capabilities. Al-Shabaab possesses a robust and ideologically committed ‘middle management,’ capable of seamlessly stepping into positions vacated by assassinated senior leaders.60 Given the inadequacy of a solely militarized approach in the long-term, the FGS and international partners must address the political and economic influences of organized crime and promote the development of effective formal governance structures at the subnational level. The development of these structures will complement military efforts and counter the growth or continued operation of al-Shabaab. Crime-fighting strategies must be mainstreamed into conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions in Somalia, as the success of these operations is grounded in the ability to successfully tackle illicit activities and criminal enterprise.61 These approaches would alter the incentive structures that drive the facilitation network currently enabling al-Shabaab’s operations. By increasing the costs associated with engaging with al-Shabaab, while simultaneously decreasing the costs of business with formal governance structures, state reconstruction and sustainable conflict resolution are more likely to succeed.
DEGRADE AL-SHABAAB In addition to a shadow economy commonly found in fragile states, Somalia’s position is “further complicated by the capture of core state institutions and functions by political and commercial elites whose interest lies in the permanent weakness or absence of government.”62 Political entrepreneurs working alongside al-Shabaab survive by sustaining the price of loyalty to maintain allegiance and cooperation of other political actors, while erecting barriers to entry for new political entrepreneurs.63 Therefore, the main objective for international actors and the FGS should be to increase the cost of doing business with al-Shabaab by strengthening law enforcement and judicial capacities and enhancing financial safeguards. Training a transparent police force within Somalia has long been a high priority for the international stakeholders. From the United Nations to the U.S. Department of State, many programs exist to build management capacities and improve internal governance and oversight,64 as well as to “[build] the technical capacity of the Criminal Investigative Department of the [Somali National Police Force] to investigate complex crimes, including terrorism, and effectively prepare cases for prosecution.”65 The FGS and international partners must now ensure police forces are equipped to investigate and prosecute the financial crimes committed by al-Shabaab and its facilitation network. A newly-trained 10
Somalia's Organized Crime Networks
law enforcement force is ineffective if not supported by a strong judiciary with prosecutorial abilities. Underlying the training of law enforcement and judicial professionals is key for consistent, reasonable salaries, which provide a dependable means of income and make the individuals less susceptible to corruption encouraged by financial necessity. Persuading Somalia’s telecom industry to fully align with the FGS and away from al-Shabaab must be part of any strategy to degrade the terror group. Greater protection for the industry’s assets in exchange for adherence to federal taxation policy, along with offers of international technology exchanges, would incentivize telecoms to cooperate with the FGS and its cadre of international partners. If punitive measures are needed, evidence of the telecom industry’s connections and payments to al-Shabaab can be used to threaten Somali telecom shareholders with financial asset embargoes. Dahabshiil, a Somali cash transfer service, had its international operations halted for connections to al-Shabaab financing, demonstrating the power of legal sanctioning when companies are traced to terror financing.66 The FGS’s recent passage of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Act of 2015 marks a major milestone toward penalizing the illicit financial activities of al-Shabaab’s facilitation network, but greater legal and regulatory measures are still needed. The FGS must develop new legal systems to support efficient investigations and prosecutions of terrorist financing. These new laws and financial hurdles challenge the facilitation network, but significant resource commitments from international financial institutions and bilateral partnerships are now needed to empower Somalia’s Central Bank. Targeted asset freezes, imposed by the U.N. Security Council on individuals and entities in Somalia with insufficient financial assistance and institutional capacity, gained little traction without greater financial assistance and institutional capacity.67 The next step must be to fully fund, expand, and empower the newly created financial intelligence unit within the central bank. With adequate staffing and operational capacity, this new institution could effectively counter terrorism financing by rapidly exchanging confidential information between financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, and judicial authorities.68
SUPPORT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE Active measures to degrade al-Shabaab’s operational capacity and illicit financial activities must be paralleled by strategies to support the development of stable sub-national governance structures. Inter-clan conflict and political maneuvering, especially in the Lower Shabelle region, have become “fatally intertwined [in] the dynamics of the al-Shabaab conflict.”69 Al-Shabaab’s ability to leverage local-level grievances, particularly within marginalized clans, has International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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ensured its stronghold in many areas and exacerbated violent conflicts. While quick-impact stabilization projects are implemented at the local level and diplomatic engagement is targeted at the federal level, less direct international support has been offered to subnational governing institutions that play a critical role in facilitating or fighting al-Shabaab. The governments of the six federal member states (FMS)—Jubbaland, Southwest Somalia, Hiraan and Middle Shabelle, Galmudug, Puntland, and Somaliland—are in a unique position to serve as a “connective tissue” between the federal government and local communities, and the FGS and international partners should support capacity building within the federal member state administrations. With support, the various regional administrations can more effectively facilitate communication between the levels of government and gain constituency support for formal state institutions. The FGS under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime Minister Abdi Shirdoon has been neither representative nor inherently democratic and international donors should encourage the next administration to provide federal member states with the authority and appropriations necessary to effectively provide services for their constituents.70 Functioning, legitimate subnational institutions will win the support of the Somali population, delegitimizing the criminal and corrupt activities behind al-Shabaab and its larger facilitation network.
CONCLUSION Al-Shabaab has increasingly gained the attention of the international community as a dangerous, globalized terrorist network capable of executing lethal, sophisticated attacks. Its classification as a transnational organized crime group, however, has received less attention. The commodity smuggling, illegal taxation, and political corruption that fill its coffers have facilitated al-Shabaab’s rise as a formidable criminal enterprise, which will undoubtedly play an influential and violent role in Somalia and the Horn of Africa into the foreseeable future. By targeting the business and political elites within al-Shabaab’s facilitation network, the FGS and its international partners will hinder al-Shabaab’s ability to generate influence and resources. Political and economic cooperation with the FGS will become a more attractive option among elites when alliances with terrorists become less lucrative for personal enrichment. For too long, al-Shabaab and its facilitation network have openly benefitted from the political economy of state collapse at the expense of the Somali people. In this environment, political and economic opportunism have prevented greater advancements in fair governance and economic development. At this crucial point in Somalia’s political and economic transition from state 12
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failure to stability, hopes are high that the upcoming elections will signal a new chapter for the war-torn country. Those invested in the sustainable development of a peaceful Somalia should act now to combat the combined corrosive effects of organized crime and terrorism to ensure the transition’s success. Without fully addressing both elements of al-Shabaab’s operations, the country’s gains in stabilization and security will remain precarious at best. ENDNOTES
1
Matt Bryden, Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), 2. http://csis.org/files/publication/130819_ Bryden_SomaliaRedux_WEB.pdf
2
United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant o Security Council resolution 2244 (2015): Somalia, S/2016/919 (31 October 2016), available from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/919
3
As designated by the U.S. Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
4
Jonathan Masters and Mohammed Aly Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 13, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650
5
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat (IGAD Security Sector Program and Sahan Foundation, 2016), 13. http://igad.int/attachments/1413_ ISSP%20Report%20on%20Al%20Shabaab%202016%20FINAL3%20copy.pdf
6
Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005 – 2012 (London: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2.
7
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, “SRSG Nicholas Kay Press Briefing in Geneva,” October 24, 2013. https://unsom.unmissions.org/srsg-nicholas-kay-press-briefing-geneva
8
The elections were initially scheduled for August 2016, but were postponed due to “logistical and technical issues.” At the time of writing, national elections for members of Parliament are ongoing. The President will be elected on 30 November by members of both Houses of Parliament. Under the Provisional Federal Constitution, the mandates of the Federal Parliament and of the President of the Federal Republic end in 2016.
9
“Mandate,” United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, accessed September 22, 2016. http:// unsom.unmissions.org/mandate
10 Antony J. Blinken, “Swearing-in of Stephen M. Schwartz as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Somalia,” U.S. Department of State, June 27, 2016. http://www.state.gov/s/d/2016d/259123.htm# 11 George Mhango, “Somalia to Host IGAD for the First Time in 30 Years,” DW, September 12, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/somalia-to-host-igad-for-the-first-time-in-30-years/a-19546097 12 Ibid. 13 Abukar Arman, “Erdogan: The Hero of Somalia,” Al Jazeera, January 21, 2015. http://www.aljazeera. com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/visit-erdogan-somalia-2015121124331818818.html
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14 Michael Kaplan, “Turkey Helping Somalia Fight Al-Shabab? Turkish Military’s First Base in Africa Will Train African Soldiers,” International Business Times, January 19, 2016. http://www.ibtimes. com/turkey-helping-somalia-fight-al-shabab-turkish-militarys-first-base-africa-will-train-2270434 15 Gulf News, “UAE Role in Developing Somalia Lauded,” Gulf News, August 24, 2016. http:// gulfnews.com/news/mena/somalia/uae-role-in-developing-somalia-lauded-1.1884475 16 Malkhadir M. Muhumed, “Qatar’s influence in Somalia edges out traditional Arab power-house Egypt,” The East African, November 1, 2013. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Qatar-sinfluence-in-Somalia-edges-Egypt-/2558-2056248-item-1-ipknb1/index.html 17 Ibid. 18 Edmund Blair, “Somalia received Saudi aid the day it cut ties with Iran: document,” Reuters, January 17, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-saudi-iran-idUSKCN0UV0BH 19 Michelle Miller, “Uganda Provides Support to Mission in Somalia,” U.S. Army, April 26, 2016. https://www.army.mil/article/166753/Uganda_provides_support_to_mission_in_Somalia/;Spencer Ackerman, “US Drone Strike Kills Key al-Shabaab Leader in Somalia,” The Guardian, April 1, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/01/us-military-somalia-airstrike-al-shabaabterrorist-targets 20 Reuters, “Islamists launch three attacks in Somalia and Kenya in 24 hours,” Reuters, October 25, 2016. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-somalia-attacks-idUKKCN12P10X?il=0 21 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Saving Somalia (Again),” Foreign Affairs, June 23, 2015. https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2015-06-23/saving-somalia-again 22 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2182 (2014): Somalia, S/2015/801 (20 October 2015), 10, available from undocs.org/S/2015/801 23 Ibid, 151. 24 Robert Mandel, Dark Logic: Transnational Criminal Tactics and Global Security (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 156. 25 Ibid, 43. 26 Patrick Radden Keefe, “The Geography of Badness: Mapping the Hubs of the Illicit Global Economy,” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, ed. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2013), 103. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf 27 Associated Press, “Somalia No Longer a Failed State, just a Fragile One, Says UN,” The Guardian, December 22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/23/somalia-no-longer-a-failedstate-just-a-fragile-one-says-un. 28 Hamza Mohamed, “Electronic transfers improve Somalia economy,” Al-Jazeera, August 31, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/2013831141614925682.html. 29 International Monetary Fund, “Somalia: Staff-Monitored Program- Press Release and Staff Report,” May 2016. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16136.pdf 30 Mohamed, “Electronic transfers improve Somalia economy.” 31 “Somali Shabaab ban cellphone banking,” news24, October 18, 2010. http://www.news24.com/Africa/ News/Shabaab-ban-mobile-money-transfer-20101018
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32 RBC Radio, “Somalia: Al Shabab Closes Hormuud Telecom Branch in Jilib, Detains Staff Members,” February 2, 2014. http://www.raxanreeb.com/2014/02/somalia-al-shabab-closes-hormuud-telecombranch-in-jilib-detains-staff-members/ 33 Ministry of Interior and National Security, “Somali Minister of Interior Condemns Al Shabaab Internet Ban and Calls on Telecommunications Companies to Resist Coercion,” Somali Republic Federal Government, January 11, 2014. https://madmimi.com/p/d71464 34 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group (2015), 25. 35 Charles Wachira, “Dahabshiil Appeals Kenyan Suspension of Money-Transfer Services,” Bloomberg News, April 13, 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-13/dahabshiil-appealskenyan-suspension-of-money-transfer-services 36 Ibid. 37 Steve Liddle, “Somalia’s Other Pirates -- the Telecom Companies,” Gulf News, January 16, 2014. http:// gulfnews.com/news/mena/somalia/somalia-s-other-pirates-the-telecom-companies-1.1278269 38 “Find the Money: The Mystery of Nairobi’s Property Boom,” The Economist, October 3, 2015. http:// www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21670001-mystery-nairobis-property-boomfind-money 39 Agence France-Presse, “Somalia Housing Boom as Mogadishu Emerges from Ashes of War,” Daily Mail, January 2, 2016. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3382523/Somalia-housingboom-Mogadishu-emerges-ashes-war.html 40 Tom Mboya in discussion with the authors, March 10, 2016, Nairobi, Kenya. 41 Duncan Deville, “The Illicit Supply Chain,” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, ed. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer,(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2013), 66. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/ convergence.pdf 42 Ross S. Delston and Stephen C. Walls, “Reaching Beyond Banks: How to Target Trade-Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Outside the Financial Sector,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 41 (2009), 87. http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1237&context=jil 43 Matt Bryden in discussion with the authors, March 22, 2016, Washington, D.C. 44 Matt Bryden, The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), 1. http://csis.org/files/publication/140221_ Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf 45 Ibid, 12. 46 Felbab-Brown, “Saving Somalia (Again).”;United Nation, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group (2015), 70. 47 U.S. Department of the Treasury, National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment (Washington, D.C.: 2015), 15. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/National%20 Terrorist%20Financing%20Risk%20Assessment%20%E2%80%93%2006-12-2015.pdf 48 Agency official working in Somalia in discussion with the authors, March 2016. 49 Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (2014): 6. https:// www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-shababs-capabilities-post-westgate.
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50 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2111 (2013): Somalia, S/2014/726 (10 October 2014), 317, available from undocs.org/S/2014/726 51 Ben Rawlence, Black and White: Kenya’s Criminal Racket in Somalia (Nairobi, Kenya: Journalists for Justice, 2015), 3. http://www.jfjustice.net/userfiles/file/Research/Black%20and%20White%20 Kenya%27s%20Criminal%20Racket%20in%20Somalia.pdf 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group (2014), 41, 42. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid, 26. 57 Ibid, 26-27. 58 Rawlence, Black and White, 2. 59 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group (2015), 27. 60 Ibid, 11. 61 Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw, and Arthur Boutellis, “The Elephant in the Room: How can Peace Operations Deal With Organized Crime,” International Peace Institute, June 2013, 62-63. https:// www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/ipi_e-pub-elephant_in_the_room.pdf 62 Bryden, Somalia Redux?, 14. 63 Alex de Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 25. 64 “PSG 2: Security,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed April 27, 2016. http://www. so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/overview/ 65 “Somalia,” Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, accessed April 27, 2016. http://www.state.gov/j/inl/regions/africamiddleeast/218998.htm 66 Wachira, “Dahabshiil Appeals Kenyan Suspension of Money-Transfer Services.” 67 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group (2015), 5. 68 “Advisory Services on Money-Laundering,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed May 7, 2016. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/advisory-services.html 69 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group (2015), 161. 70 Bryden, Somalia Redux?, 4.
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Joint Crediting in Indonesia
Supporting Low-Carbon Development Through Optimization of Energy Service Companies Songyee Jung Songyee Jung is a master's student in the International Development Studies program at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, concentrating in energy, the environment, and development. She is currently the Program Associate at the Asian Development Bank, North American Representative Office in Washington D.C. She specializes in low-carbon development and renewable energy projects in emerging markets. She has extensive experience in working with the energy service company, major international organizations, government agencies, and think tanks. She has field experience in South Korea, India, and Indonesia. Ms. Jung holds a Bachelor's degree in international affairs from the University of Texas at Austin. ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the energy service companies (ESCOs) on the Joint Credit Mechanism (JCM)—which is a mechanism to appropriately evaluate Japanese contributions to GHG emission reductions by mobilizing technologies, markets, finance, and contributions to sustainable development of developing countries. The JCM is a newly established bilateral mechanism which operates first as non-tradable credit type, but these non-creditable credits can transition to tradable credit type mechanism once both parties reach a conclusion. Once mitigated GHG emissions credits are approved, they can be applied as part of their internationally pledged GHGs mitigation targets. This paper uses quantitative data from the previous JCM projects in Indonesia and a local Indonesian Energy Service Company’s energy grade audit. The analysis also examines the current Indonesia’s energy policy and environmental strategy to reduce GHG emissions and contribute to achieving low-carbon development. The market mechanisms are key to driving investment in clean technology and curbing emissions to meet the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) agreement. The JCM could be a catalyst for the new carbon market mechanisms and become an international carbon offset scheme if more countries put the JCM into practice. Because market mechanisms at the bilateral and regional levels are becoming more important, international institutions should scale-up actions in developing countries. To strengthen the growth of the JCM between Japan and Indonesia, the Joint Committee must continue to develop rules and guidelines necessary for its implementation, and approve proposed new project methodologies that are efficient. The government must actively establish effective policies, regulations, and incentives for low-emission growth, and multilateral development banks (MDBs) must take a role in financing the low-carbon development projects.
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INTRODUCTION The world is making significant changes to support low-carbon development activities after the awakening on the topic of global warming took place. Many governments are seeking ways to establish an effective policy, regulations, and incentives for low-emission growth. As such, carbon market schemes become increasingly attractive to governments. To fully mobilize technology, markets, and finance, the Government of Japan (GOJ) established the Joint Credit Mechanism ( JCM) in 2013. The JCM is a bilateral carbon market mechanism between the GOJ and developing countries to promote the greenhouse gas emission (GHG) reduction program, which is a relatively new concept being put into practice. Indonesia is the world’s sixth largest emitter of GHG and the largest archipelagic state with extensive low-lying areas. Thus, it is exceedingly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) has made significant efforts to create a National Action Plan on Climate Change Adoption (RAN-API), the initiative that has been the core of its National Development Plan.1 For Indonesia, the JCM appears to be a great pathway to private-sector development and technology advancement, as well as an alternative to support GHG emission targets. This tradable credittype mechanism can be mutually beneficial to both participating countries, since Japan can offer energy-saving technologies to Indonesia in exchange for GHG emissions rights, and the JCM can support both countries to meet their national emission reduction targets. After three years of negotiating the process, the governments of Japan and Indonesia signed a cooperation agreement in August 2013 for JCM programs in Indonesia. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) also established a new single-donor trust fund in 2014, the Japan Fund for the Joint Crediting Mechanism ( JFJCM), to support low-carbon technologies in Asia and to act as a catalyst for low-carbon growth. This research report presents an evaluation of previous GHG reduction projects under the Joint Credit Mechanism in Indonesia and suggests a new methodology: GHG emission reduction through the optimization of Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) in Indonesia. The report amends existing methodologies for enhancing access to the clean development mechanism (CDM) and examines the effectiveness of the JCM in multilateral carbon market schemes and how the ADB can contribute to making the JFJCM more efficient.
THE JOINT CREDITING MECHANISMS SCHEME AND INDONESIA’S INDC In 2013, the GOJ established the JCM to appropriately evaluate Japanese contributions to GHG emission reductions by mobilizing technologies, markets, finance, and contributions for the sustainable development of 20
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developing countries. The JCM serves three main purposes: 1) to facilitate the diffusion of low-carbon technologies, systems, services, and infrastructures, and the implementation of mitigation actions in developing countries; 2) to appropriately evaluate contributions to GHG emission reductions from developed countries through mitigation actions implemented in developing countries and to use those emission reductions to achieve emission reduction targets for both sets of countries; and 3) to contribute to the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by facilitating global actions for emission reductions or removals.2 As of September 2015, Japan’s JCM has partnered with 15 countries, including Mongolia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Maldives, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Palau, Cambodia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Chile, and Myanmar.3 There are seven developing member countries (DMCs) who are also in the ADB, and the majority of these partner countries lack innovative energy-efficient technologies to promote low-carbon development activities. During the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe highlighted the insufficient amount of advanced lowcarbon technologies in developing countries. Commonly, developing countries lack low-carbon technologies, because these technologies do not generally promise investment-return. However, implementation of the JCM will lower the burdens placed on developing countries by promoting diffusion of advanced low-carbon technologies.4 FIGURE 1. THE JCM SCHEME BETWEEN JAPAN AND INDONESIA
SOURCE: JCM INDONESIA (2015)
The JCM operates first as non-tradable credit-type mechanisms. After continuous consultation from both sides, non-tradable credits can transition to the tradable credit-type mechanism as soon as both parties reach a conclusion in such a consultation. It is important to recognize that both sides have established the Joint Committee ( JC) to operate the JCM. The JC consists of representatives from each side decides the rules and guidelines for the JCM. Once the JC mutually agrees and verifies reductions or removals from the JCM project, then those credits can be applied as part of their own internationally International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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pledged GHGs mitigation targets. The JC ensures fairness for both sides. As of May 2016, there is a total of 22 methodologies in eight countries that are approved as JCM methodologies by each JC, respectively. Indonesia uses 10 out of 22 methodologies, the largest share of all participating countries. The joint initiatives between host countries and Japan can prevent potential double-counting of GHG emission reductions and contribute to the NAMAs framework. NAMAs refer to a collection of policies and actions that developing countries are required to adopt to reduce GHGs.
INDONESIA’S INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION (INDC) As the world’s sixth-largest emitter of GHGs, Indonesia’s dedication to climate change mitigation by drafting the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) was a significant leap towards the global response to climate change. An INDC is a commitment among countries across the globe under the UNFCCC COP21 in Paris, which was held in December 2015. The INDC publically outlines all countries’ post-2020 climate action plans and their commitment to reducing GHG emissions. The INDC presents a significant goal, since it provides the measurement of each country’s achievements and determines whether a country followed a path toward ensuring successes in achieving a low-carbon and climate resilient future. Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the world, and it holds a pivotal geographic position in the global ocean conveyor belt; it is also has large tropical rainforests with high biodiversity. Indonesia acknowledges both the importance of combating global climate change and its location as vulnerable to natural disasters. Indonesia has already faced extreme climate adversities such as floods and droughts, and these events will continue to have a long-term effect; this, along with the negative consequences of sea-level rise, makes it more difficult for Indonesia to eradicate poverty. Most importantly, the poorest and most marginalized groups face the worst impact. Therefore, Indonesia’s Ministry of Environment and Forestry signed its new climate plan, the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), on April 22, 2016.
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FIGURE 2. INDONESIA EMISSION POLICY SCENARIO (IN MT CO2E)
Indonesia’s INDC outlines its commitment to reduce 26 percent of its GHGs against the business as usual (BAU) scenario by 2020 and to cut emissions by 29 percent compared to the BAU scenario by 2030 (INDC 2016).5 Indonesia expects more enthusiastic support from the international community that could increase its contribution up to a 41 percent reduction in emission by 2030. Energy is a key focus for Indonesia. Its government embarked on a mixed energy use policy and hoped to utilize 23 percent of renewable energy by 2025 to support Indonesia on the path to de-carbonization. Additionally, Indonesia seeks to increase its current electrification rate from 82 percent to 99 percent by 2020. Therefore, Indonesia must increase the amount of power available to its people while still reducing its GHG emissions. Although the current government’s plans in the energy sector are not fully developed to achieve low-carbon development (LCD), its mandate clearly aligns with LCD. Indonesia’s INDC is a great starting point to appeal to Indonesia’s serious commitment to combat climate change. However, according to the World Resource Institute (WRI), there are some key improvements to be made in the INDC. The WRI recommends that Indonesia establish a policy regarding the potential future adjustment of the baseline scenario, modify the target to address unpredictable fluctuations in peat fire emissions, clearly state the land-use accounting approach and method, and further clarify how international market mechanisms will be applied towards the target.6
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ADVANTAGES OF THE JOINT CREDITING MECHANISM SCHEMES The JCM gives four key advantages to host countries and Japan; they are sustainable development in social, environment, economy, and technology. The JCM provides financial support by offering part of the initial cost, environmental support by reducing GHGs emission, political support by meeting international pledge goals of CO2 emission, and lastly, supports private sector development and the advancement of technology. Financially, the Ministry of the Environment of Japan (MOEJ) launched the financing program to cover part of the initial cost (up to half ) under the condition that at least half of the issued JCM credits must go to the government of Japan as a return.7 The draft budget for FY 2016 was 6.7 billion JPY (USD 56 million) in total by FY 2018.8 Additionally, the GOJ provides funding through collaboration with the JICA and ADB. ADB finances project under the JFJCM, which provides financial incentives for the adoption of advanced low-carbon technologies. Environmentally, the JCM schemes support both participants’ overall GHG emission reductions goals and contribute to the objective of the UNFCCC. Each JCM project indicates how much GHG emission has been reduced by reporting CO2 reductions on the JCM website. Indonesia has previous experience in the carbon market. By July of 2013, there were a total of 212 CDM projects approved by the Indonesian DNA, 128 projects registered, mostly of methane avoidance projects, and 28 CDM Projects issued their certified emissions reductions (CERs) worth 7.9 million ton CO2 that is mostly geothermal (Figure 3).9 These projects indicate that there are increasing opportunities from the voluntary carbon market. FIGURE 3. CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM IN INDONESIA
SOURCE: NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CLIMATE CHANGE OF INDONESIA
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Socially, the JCM can provide a better quality of life. Economic and GHG reduction growth are coupled together, and Indonesia must perform a GDP growth of 7% or more to not to fall into the middle-income trap after 2020. Therefore, the more the GHGs are reduced, the faster the rate of economic growth can occur. In Indonesia, deforestation and forest degradation produce the most CO2 emissions. The JCM project recently launched the JCM REDD scheme in 2015. REDD+ means reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in developing countries; and includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stock in developing countries. Through REDD+, there will be participatory monitoring of illegal logging, disaster prevention, and forest restoration. Burning fields by choice for plantation preparation is still seen as common practice in Indonesia, and standardizing the JCM REDD+ can improve citizens’ awareness and help change the toxic culture of land use. Lastly, private sector development and technology advancement will be greatly affected by the JCM. The JCM provides greater flexibility for businesses to meet their objectives, which can lower compliance costs, support employment when used in the context of green fiscal reform, and diffuse advanced lowcarbon technologies without imposing a greater burden on Indonesia.
HOW CAN ESCOS CONTRIBUTE TO THE JCM? Energy-related projects in the business sector can significantly benefit from the ESCO industry. ESCOs can be a great project participant since their core business and projects aim is to lower energy usage, address rising energy prices, and reduce GHG emissions. The major advantage of ESCOs is that they provide a variety of services such as auditing, financing, installing equipment, managing projects, training, and monitoring and verification (M&V). According to the Indonesian JCM Secretariat 2014 report, there are a total of thirteen projects in the pipeline, out of which nine projects are energy efficiency, and four are renewable energy. TABLE 1. JCM’S 9 ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECTS IN THE PIPELINE
SOURCE: INDONESIA JCM SECRETARIAT, 2014
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The JCM and ESCO projects share a similar business interest and aligned goals in promoting energy efficiency and diffusion of energy-efficient technologies. The majority of business for ESCOs (over 70 percent) is in the energy-efficiency sector.10 Notably, there’s been increasing adoption of ESCOs in some Asia Pacific and Southeast Asian countries, and the growth in Asia is expected to continue as long as more governments are interested in promoting lower carbon growth.
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE JCM VS. ESCO PROJECT IN INDONESIA In December 2014, the JCM project operated in Karawang West Java was called “Energy Saving for Air Conditioning and Process Cooling at Textile Factory by Introducing High-Efficiency Centrifugal Chiller.” Under the international consortium, two Japanese companies, the Indonesian textile industry, and one third party entity participated in the project. This JCM project replaced the existing 230USRt and 250USRt chillers with a high-efficiency centrifugal chiller 500USRt (Figure 4), which consists of a two-stage highefficiency compressor, economizer, and sub-cooler system. The textile industry is a major industry in Indonesia and produces a significant amount of GHG emissions. It is important to air-condition to produce a high-quality product. To reduce GHG emissions from the textile industry, a high-efficiency chiller is an excellent model to follow. FIGURE 4. HIGH-EFFICIENCY CENTRIFUGAL CHILLER PROVIDED BY EBARA REFRIGERATION EQUIPMENT & SYSTEMS CO., LTD
SOURCE: JCM
By applying a purge unit with activated carbon, nearly 100% of HFC245fa refrigerant with 0 ODP (Ozone Depletion Potential) is recovered for excellence in GHG reduction.11 The Japanese manufacturers Nippon Koei provided this advanced low carbon technology. According to the JCM website, 26
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replacement of the existing chiller with a high-efficiency centrifugal chiller is expected to reduce GHG emissions by 117 tons of CO2 per year.12 Despite some of the major achievements supported by Nippon Koei, during the International Forum for Sustainable Asia and the Pacific (ISAP 2015), Saito Tetsuya, the associate senior staff of Nippon Koei, presented the major challenges of the JCM project. Mr. Tetsuya stated that the JCM project is difficult to apply for small-scale projects that have large future potential, such as a biogas digester with a gas engine, an FRP boat with a high-efficiency engine, etc.13 Referring to Table 1, all the previous JCM projects in Indonesia solely focused on one energy-consuming system, such as introducing doublebundle modular electric heat pumps or replacing conventional burners with regenerative burners one at a time for each project. As you can see in Table 1, most of JCM’s energy efficiency projects are small-scale projects. The major barrier to disseminating low-carbon technology in the JCM project is the size of the projects. Additionally, the level of conservativeness is different in each technology, which means the energy saving by chiller was calculated very conservatively, which made cost efficiency look less attractive, presented by Mr. Tetsuya. Lastly, the problem with the international consortium is that when the proposing Japanese company cannot achieve a profit, then it is difficult for the manufacturers to formulate a JCM project directly with local companies. Also, the local partner must further put more effort and involvement into the project. To address such gaps, ESCOs can be used as a new methodology in the JCM. ESCOs have great advantages in term of project type, technology selection, and international consortium. For example, in 2015, an Indonesian ESCO company did an energy efficiency project and provided a comprehensive evaluation of the current energy system of a spinning factory located in Jakarta that produces yarn, greige, and denim. The ESCO evaluated potential energy saving opportunities in multiple areas, such as replacing the current system with new compressors, the constant load motors with high-efficiency motors, the belts on ring frame motors with 1-speed high-efficiency motors, the current system with higher productivity machines and installing a VFD on fan motors plus a direct compressed air humidification system. The spinning factory’s ESCO project was a large-scale project, so the cost of implementation of the energy efficiency project was IDR14 2.1 billion (USD 10.9 million). However, the cost of energy savings was IDR 39 billion per year (USD 3 million) for a total simple payback period of 3.6 years. Most importantly, the project reduced 19% of the consumption for the spinning section of the factory and mitigated an estimated 23,657 tons of CO2. An ESCO can efficiently manage the scale of the project and have a larger and faster impact on reducing CO2 emissions. It provides a large amount of returns from energy savings to its clients and also provides measurement and verification by using variable frequency drive (VFD). Third party entities have International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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been in charge of validating projects and verifying of GHG emission reductions for JCM projects, but ESCOs can offer its own measurement and verification (M&V) to save time and money. For M&V, an ESCO measures the baseline energy consumption (kWh/year) before retrofit can be established for each compressor. The after retrofit energy consumption is calculated for supplier data and verified with a one-time field measurement. Finally, the total energy savings are obtained by comparing these two energy consumptions. ESCO’s standard M&V is international performance measurement and verification protocol (IPMVP) provided by the efficiency valuation organization (EVO), a non-profit private corporation14. IPMVP offers common principles and terms that are universally accepted as basic to any good M&V process. Therefore, ESCO’s M&V is compatible with the GHG emission verification schemes, so there is no need to hire a third party entity, which can expedite the project process and offer a cost-efficient methodology. Efficiency-related projects in the buildings sectors can benefit greatly by partnering with the ESCO industry through targeting multiple energy consuming systems. Partnerships with ESCOs in JCM projects can create a greater result in GHG emission reduction since ESCOs have an advantage of tackling multiple areas of energy saving and optimizing EE by energy auditing, redesigning, counseling, financing, and retrofitting buildings and implanting energy efficient technology all at once. Utilizing ESCOs to the JCM projects has a multiplier effect on energy saving, GHG reduction, and demand-side energy efficiency (DSEE). According to ADB’s Same Energy More Power, it projects that by 2035, the share of developing Asia should increase from 34% in 2010 to as much as 56% (ADB 2013 a citing IEA 2012 and LEE, Park, and Saunders) and DSEE is growing in importance for many developing member countries (DMCs) of ADB. ADB has been trying to ramp up efforts in the region for greater utilization of DSEE (or end-use EE). Therefore, incorporating ESCOs into the JCM will be a great method to promote energy efficiency. With the active support from the GOI and multilateral development banks (MDBs), ESCO businesses can become a catalyst for low-carbon development; then, more factories will save energy, money, and reduce GHG emission.
THE WAY FORWARD OF JCM DEVELOPMENT: ADB’S ROLE In 2014, the GOJ announced it would invest 1.8 billion yen to ADB as part of the JCM. ADB has been an active advocate of low-carbon projects since November 2006 and launched the Carbon Market Program (CMP). The CMP promotes low-carbon projects such as renewable energy, EE, efficient transport, and other activities in Asia and the Pacific.15 The JFJCM is a sister component of the CMP and the first fund provided by MDBs for supporting GHG reductions with the CMP. The JFJCM offers incentives to DMCs by 28
Joint Crediting in Indonesia
introducing advanced low-carbon technologies, and helps developing countries to overcome the higher initial capital cost through a grant or buy down of the interest on the ADB loan. FIGURE 5. JCM FINANCING PROGRAMS BY MOEJ (FY2013/2014/2015)
SOURCE: GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN
As of January 12, 2016, there is only one ADB project in 2014 in the Maldives, called “Smart micro-grid system for POISED project in Addu Atoll.� (figure 5)16 There must be considerable investments made by international institutions and the national government to enable developing countries to transition to a low-carbon path. As such, ADB should finance more JCM projects utilizing the JFJCM. This green investment will actively support low carbon development implementation projects in Indonesia, supporting demand-side energy efficiency, and disseminating energy efficiency companies like ESCOs.
CONCLUSION The market mechanisms are key to driving investment in clean technology and curbing emissions to meet the COP21 agreement from Paris. The JCM is a bilateral and regional carbon market, but it could be a catalyst to the new International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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carbon market mechanisms, and become an international carbon offset scheme if more countries put the JCM into practice. Although Indonesia’s domestic carbon market development is still at the very early stage, the government has been actively involved in low-carbon development activities. Internationally, Indonesia joined the Partnership for Market Readiness as an implanting country. Domestically, Indonesia proposed a comprehensive study of the market-based initiative (MBI) study as a base for carbon market development and created the Nusantara Carbon Scheme (NCS) to provide GHG offset to interested parties and raise market awareness.17 Unlike bilateral and regional carbon markets, multilateral carbon markets, like the UNFCCC-led market mechanisms, are harder to be implemented. Therefore, market mechanisms at the bilateral and regional levels are becoming more important to scale-up actions in developing countries. To strengthen the growth of the JCM between Japan and Indonesia, the JC must continue to develop rules and guidelines necessary for its implementation, and approve the proposed new project methodologies that are efficient. The government must actively establish effective policies, regulations, and incentives for low-emission growth, and MDBs must take a role in financing the low-carbon development projects. Utilizing the JFJCM to develop a new project model, like optimization of ESCOs to support low-carbon growth into the JCM project, could be a great initiative that could expedite GHG emissions reduction, private sector development, and rapid technology advancement. ENDNOTES
1
Ministry of National Development Planning/ National Development Planning agency. National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation (RAN-API) Synthesis Report. November 2013. Republic of Indonesia. https://gc21.giz.de/ibt/var/app/wp342deP/1443/wp-content/uploads/filebase/ programme-info/RAN-API_Synthesis_Report_2013.pdf
2
New Mechanisms Information Platform. Basic concept of the JCM. June 6, 2016. http://www. mmechanisms.org/e/index.html
3
http://www.mmechanisms.org/e/initiatives/jcm.html
4
http://www.mmechanisms.org/document/20160203_JCM_goj_e_rev.pdf pg.8
5
Taryn Fransen. Indonesia’s Draft Climate Plan (INDC): A Good Start, but Improvements Necessary for Success. September 16 2015. World Resource Institute (WRI). (Accessed June 2016) http://www. wri.org/blog/2015/09/indonesia%E2%80%99s-draft-climate-plan-indc-good-start-improvementsnecessary-success
6
Taryn Fransen
30
Joint Crediting in Indonesia
7
Financing Program for JCM Model projects Public Offering Guidelines http://gec.jp/jcm/kobo/mp/ (tentative)Public%20Offering%20Guidelines.pdf
8
JCM Model Projects http://gec.jp/jcm/about/index.html#ID_AM005
9
IGES http://www.iges.or.jp/files/research/sustainable-city/PDF/20130710/Mr.Hindarto_DNPI.pdf
10 Wapner, M., and C. Wheelock, Building Efficiency: Ten Trends to Watch in 2011 and Beyond (Research Report, 4Q 2010), Pike Research 2010. 11 JCM. Energy Saving for Textile Factory Facility Cooling by High-efficiency Centrifugal Chiller. http://gec.jp/jcm/projects/14pro_ina_04.html 12 Indonesia JCM Secretariat. Progress of the Joint Crediting Mechanism ( JCM) in Indonesia. November 2015. JCM Indonesia-Japan. (Accessed 3 June 2016) http://jcm.ekon.go.id/en/uploads/ files/Document%20JCM/Media/Booklet_JCM_Nov_2015.pdf 13 Saito Tetsuya. Opportunities and Challenges under the JCM Scheme: From a Consultant’s point of view. Nippon Koei. July 29 2015. (Accessed June 1 2016). http://www.iges.or.jp/isap/2015/pdf/pl-5/ PL5_4_Saito_rev.pdf 14 Efficiency Valuation Organization (EVO). International Performance Measurement and Verification Protocol. June 2014. EVO. Accessed June 3 2016). 15 Asian Development Bank,Establishment of the Japan Fund for the Joint Crediting Mechanism,May 2014,Asian Development Bank, http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutionaldocument/174311/r52-14.pdf (Accessed May 29 2016). 16 Government of Japan, Recent Development of the Joint Crediting Mechanism, February 2016, Pg.30. http://www.mmechanisms.org/document/20160203_JCM_goj_e_rev.pdf (accessed June 1, 2016) 17 Dicky Edwin Hindarto. Indonesia Carbon Market Development and Joint Crediting Mechanism Status. July 10 2013.Pg. 6. Carbon Trade Mechanism Division, National Council on Climate Change of Indonesia. http://www.iges.or.jp/files/research/sustainable-city/PDF/20130710/Mr.Hindarto_ DNPI.pdf (accessed May 30 2016)
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Iran’s Support for Non-State Actor Violence— Interests, Goals, and Grievances Iran’s Relationship with the West in the 20th century Adam Yefet Adam Yefet received his M.A. in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and B.A. in Political Science from University of California, Santa Barbara. He focuses on the nexus of security and development in post-conflict states and the role of religious institutions in politics and policy. His favorite animal is cows. ABSTRACT
This paper examines Iran’s relationships with the West and how that relationship has led Iran to define its interests as fundamentally opposed to the United States’ interests in the Middle East. Following from this, it examines Iran’s relationships with non-state terror groups, especially in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and examines how the actions of those groups serve Iran’s perceived interests. It concludes with policy recommendations for the United States to pursue post-P5+1 nuclear deal to persuade Iran that its interests lie in further global engagement, not terror. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s relations with the international community were founded on defying international laws and norms. Just months after the new government was formed, the takeover of the U.S. embassy in November 1979 foreshadowed the antagonistic relations between Iran and the West, and asserted that Iranian foreign policy would not follow the West’s rules. Subsequent support for terrorism in the international community has led many policymakers and scholars to label Iran as a “rogue state,” a concept that evolved to describe states that sponsor terrorism, pursue weapons of mass destruction, and intentionally flout the laws and norms of the international community.1 This paper examines the domestic and international goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran that led it to support non-state actor violence across the region and the globe. First, it dissects the narrative history of Iran’s relationship with the international community in the
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20th century which drives its understanding of its interests with that community. Next it examines the groups that Iran has funded and their corresponding activities, ostensibly at Iran’s behest. Then it analyzes how these varied groups and their actions fit Iran’s interests and goals. It concludes with thoughts on U.S. policy towards Iran after the P5+1 nuclear deal.
THE ORIGIN OF ANIMOSITY Iranian hostility to foreign influence dates back at least to the middle of the 19th century, when Russia and Great Britain’s Great Game played out across the Middle East and Central Asia.2 In the 1870s, the Iranian people took to the streets to protest the granting of a monopoly on the nation’s industrial development by the Iranian king to a British corporate interest. Within a year and a half, the concession was rescinded. A similar situation unfolded in the 1890s over the granting of a tobacco monopoly, again to a British entrepreneur. Tobacco was a significant industry in Iran, employing “many thousands of poor farmers…a whole class of middlemen…and countless Iranians [who] smoked it.”3 Again the Iranian people engaged in popular protests, and again the deal was rescinded. Although Iran was not on par with the great powers of the day, its people demonstrated strong resistance to foreign exploitation of their nation’s wealth and industry. In 1901, however, a deal was completed with a British businessman that “proved in many ways to define twentieth century Iran.”4 William Knox D’Arcy was granted the right to explore for Iranian oil in exchange for a portion of the subsequent profits. When he finally struck black gold a few years later, he founded what would eventually become British Petroleum, still a major player on the global oil market. At the time, the company was christened the Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC). As Middle East scholar Stephen Kinzer notes, the presence of APOC and its exploitive influence on the Iranian monarchs’ governments, to name one factor, contributed to a rising hostility to foreign powers in Iran.5 From 1925 to 1926 and again in 1941 the British encouraged or even directed regime changes that crushed democratic movements and leaders that opposed foreign influence.6 This constant interference and Iranian helplessness in the face of its power continued to frustrate Iranians and tilt them against the West.
MOSADDEGH AND THE BEGINNING OF THE END In 1951, the Iranian people elected Dr. Mohammed Mosaddegh as Prime Minster. Among a number of social reforms, one of his central pledges, which he enacted almost immediately, was to nationalize the nation’s oil industry. Besides the significant economic windfall for the country, he asserted it “would also eliminate corruption and intrigue, by means of which the internal affairs of our 34
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country have been influenced” by foreign commercial and political interests.7 Mosaddegh stressed that the company would receive just compensation in the form of 25% of the profits, and that the flow of oil to the international market would continue unabated, but in the hands of its “rightful owners,” the people of Iran.8 After decades of foreign powers dictating Iranian domestic politics, Mosaddegh thought he had taken a revolutionary step for the country’s future. Unfortunately, like several Iranian rulers before him, Mosaddegh found that he too was still but a pawn in the Great Game. Despite months of negotiations and talks with international leaders, including visits to the White House and the United Nations, Mohammad Mosaddegh was overthrown in a CIA-backed coup at the behest of the British MI-6.9 Codenamed Operation Ajax and known to the Iranian people as the “28 Mordad 1332 coup,” which refers to its date on the Iranian calendar, the operation convinced the Shah to make a highly unpopular move to dismiss Mosaddegh as Prime Minister, replacing him with a pro-Western figure, and use constitutional emergency powers to take greater personal control of the government. The coup also backed staged clashes between pro- and antiShah forces and engaged pro-Shah military forces to take control of Tehran. Mosaddegh surrendered the next day. He was then tried, convicted, and sent to prison for three years before being transferred to house arrest for the remainder of his life, dying in 1967. Almost immediately, the new government signed a deal granting the United States and Great Britain significant control of the nation’s oil industry. In exchange, the U.S. and Great Britain granted substantial funding to the Iranian government. To the Iranian people, this was yet another instance, though the most significant, of Western interference—another national leader deposed and replaced by the West in a half century for having the gall to assert Iranian independence from colonial machinations. What followed was some 20 years under the Shah, who maintained a close relationship with the United States and the West, repressing his population with the Iranian secret police, the SAVAK. The United States’ overthrow of a democratically elected government in favor of an authoritarian regime permanently colored several generations of Iranians’ views of international relations, giving them a “conspiratorial interpretation of politics,” always suspicious and alert.10 How could an international system be legitimate if it could allow such heinous interventions into their sovereignty? In 1979, the Islamic Revolution deposed the Shah, and prominent cleric Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to cheering crowds. Just months later, protesters overran the U.S. embassy in Tehran in what was the beginning of the year- plus long Iranian hostage crisis. The hostage-takers claimed they were protecting the Revolution from further American conspiracies, which the U.S. validated when they provided refuge for the deposed Shah.11
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From the Iranian point of view, the hostage crisis sent a significant message to western countries that the Shah’s heritage and that of his allies were completely finished. As a consequence, in the early years of the Islamic Revolution, Iran had a radical strategy and ideology for its relationship with international society.12 Of course, the United States did not see it that way. The hostile act engendered immediate American antagonism towards the new regime. The next year, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, believing he had a strategic advantage, invaded Iran. This precipitated a bloody eight-year war that was largely a stalemate. During the war, Saddam directed missile fire at Iranian civilians and used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, killing thousands. Meanwhile, the United States continued to provide material support to the Iraqi army. Many in Iran even believed that the United States had encouraged Iraq to declare war in the first place. Again, the Iranian people saw the U.S. as bent on interference in their domestic politics and the international system as illegitimate for not standing up against Saddam’s behavior. Towards the end of the war, a U.S. naval ship mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian airliner, killing more than 200 Iranian civilians. Despite Iranian demands, the U.S. never apologized for the mistake, and the commander of the ship was later awarded a medal for his service, though the citation did not mention the downing of the plane.13 These are just a few significant examples contributing to a pervasive feeling in Iran that U.S. intervention in the Middle East is based in arrogance and colonial economics.
POST 9/11 The U.S. – Iranian relationship changed drastically in the first years of the 21st century, and a grand opportunity was lost just as it appeared. : After the events of September 11, 2001 and the Taliban’s refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden, the United States government began planning its invasion of Afghanistan, taking the first step towards rapprochement. The Bush administration quietly began meeting with a group of Iranian diplomats in Geneva who provided a great deal of intelligence on Afghanistan and the Taliban and contacts with the Northern Alliance opposition force. The Taliban was a long-time antagonist of neighboring Iran and the Iranian’s were only too happy to help in their ouster. However, the uneasy alliance was dashed in January 2002 when President George W. Bush gave his State of the Union address and declared Iran as part of the “axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”14 According to the New Yorker, this marked the end of secret meetings and of any hope for rapprochement during the Bush administration. The United States already had troops operating in Afghanistan, on Iran’s eastern border. The push for war in Iraq, on Iran’s western border was beginning. Iran feared it might be next. 36
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These fears contributed to the continuation of a confrontational political path with the West that Iran had been on for decades. A 2010 State Department report determined Iran to be the world’s most significant state backer of terrorism. Its funding for violent non-state groups, the report said, “had a direct impact on international efforts to promote peace, threatened economic stability in the Gulf, and undermined the growth of democracy.”15 These may have been the chief goals of the Iranian strategy. Their foreign policy principal of overt and covert support for non-state actor violence will be examined below.
IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR NON-STATE ACTOR VIOLENCE Since the revolution, the Islamic Regime has supported non-state actor violence, directly by providing human resources and training through their elite special Quds Force, and indirectly by providing capital to groups beyond its borders. Iran has engaged a variety of groups in different countries to further its geopolitical goals without being accountable for the deplorable methods the groups use. Iran uses these methods to manipulate international norms that allow countries to avoid direct responsibility for their proxies’ actions to fight Western interests in the Middle East and drive their forces out of the region. It is also able to claim itself as a strong defender of the Palestinian cause by putting pressure on Israel, the United States’ favorite son in the region. A brief analysis on Iran’s actions through non-state actor proxy groups reveal how the accomplishments these groups achieve align with Iranian interests. This section reviews the significant groups and activities Iran supports.
HEZBOLLAH In 1982, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon, seven years into Lebanon’s communal civil war between Maronite Christians, Sunni Arabs and Shi’ite Arabs, all of which had a variety of armed militia groups supporting their regional sectarian allies. Iran, a nation led by Shi’ite Muslims, materially supported the Shi’ite groups along with neighboring Syria. The Israeli invasion in the south of the country united several of the Shi’ite militia into what would eventually become Hezbollah. The invasion also united Syria and Iran’s support behind the group. Hezbollah was and continues to be one of the Jewish state’s main adversaries, representing a sizeable faction in the Muslim Middle East that wishes to see the outright destruction of Israel. When the Taif Agreement ended the civil war in 1989-1990, it stipulated that all militia must disarm, with a specific exemption for Hezbollah, which could continue the fight against Israeli occupation in the south of the country as a ‘resistance force’ rather than a militia.16 Hezbollah did so, eventually forcing the withdrawal of Israel in 2000. Since then, the group has continued operations harassing Israeli forces on the tri-border area International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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of Lebanon, Israel, and Syria, firing missiles towards Israeli military and civilian positions, and even brazenly crossing the border to kidnap two Israeli soldiers in 2006, which resulted in a fierce Israeli campaign of destruction in response. Hezbollah is not, however, constrained to Israeli targets. The group has operated around the world, especially in South America, cooperating with Venezuela’s Chavez regime in the 2000s and in Argentina, where Hezbollah bombed the Israeli embassy and a Jewish community center in the early 1990s. The organization was also implicated as cooperating with Iranian forces in the Khobar towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996, which killed 19 U.S. military personnel and injured several hundred Americans and Saudis. Matthew Levitt, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who focuses on counter-terrorism asserts that after 9/11, Hezbollah toned down its international acts and focused on Israel so as “not to be caught in the crosshairs of Washington’s “war on terror.”17 However, by 2010, Quds forces and Hezbollah operatives had begun a new campaign directed at attacking Western interests and targets beyond Israel. They have initiated plots to kill Israeli tourists in Europe and targeted Saudi diplomats abroad, including a foiled plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States.18 Iran has maintained Hezbollah as its proxy for some three decades. Its leaders insist that the ideology of the Revolution, velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, or the idea that a theological figure should rule the state), is at the heart of their organization.19 However, its survival as an armed group after the Taif Agreement depended on the influence of Syria and Iran. Indeed, Hezbollah has benefitted Iran’s immense financial and technical backing ever since. Sources indicate the group receives at least USD 100 million per year, and its coordination with Iran gives it access to a wide swath of training and intelligence resources. In return, it has worked for Iranian interests abroad, responding to threats on behalf of the Iranian regime.20, 21 Today, at Iran’s behest, Hezbollah supports the Assad regime in the four and a half year civil war in Syria. The group provides hundreds, if not thousands, of well-trained foot soldiers, coordinating with the Iranian covert forces in the country.22 Assad plays a crucial role as Iran’s only ally, and Syria, under his control, is Hezbollah’s lifeline to its Iranian benefactors. Both Hezbollah and Iran understand the importance of keeping this friendly regime in power, and Assad’s regime would not have been able to last as long as it has without the substantial support it receives from Iran and Hezbollah.23
PALESTINIAN GROUPS Other crucial groups that receive funding and training from Iran are Palestinian extremists that oppose the existence of the Jewish State of Israel. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have both received substantial funds from Iran 38
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to continue their uncompromising stance towards Israel. Both groups provide interesting cases because they are offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Islamist organization that broadly has an antagonistic relationship with the Iranian Shi’ite theocracy. This demonstrates that Iran prioritizes its geopolitical interests in the region over its ecclesiastic interests. Iran’s legitimacy rests on its claim of defending the Palestinian people, and fulfillment of that goal takes precedence over managing the Sunni-Shi’ite divide. Iran is also in competing with Saudi Arabia for this role and cannot let the Saudis monopolize funding. Though Iran’s ties to Hamas and the now nearly defunct PIJ are more tenuous, Iran has provided regular operational funding and training to the two groups for over a decade, and their working relationship stretches back even further.24 Palestinian groups receive funding from all over the Middle East and the broader Muslim world. Their cause engenders sympathy and funding from many sources, and support for Palestinian statehood and against Israel is fundamental to domestic politics across the Middle East. Iran’s desired role in the region and in the world necessitates support for Palestine, but the method and direction by which it wields that support suggests the role it wishes to play in fighting Western influence in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Iran’s actions are designed specifically to undermine the progress of peace by funding and providing arms to Hamas and PIJ, which target civilians and refuse any recognition of Israel. “The Iranian system has viewed this support as an essential part of the Revolution’s responsibilities.”25 Both groups have conducted attacks against Israel with rockets and suicide bombers for years, targeting civilians both physically and psychologically. In 2006, Hamas captured an Israeli soldier and held him for nearly five years, eventually releasing him in a prisoner exchange with Israel in which over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners were released, many of whom had ties to terror.26 Some of those released have rejoined the fight against Israel and again engaged in terror again.27 Hamas, whose political wing won the election in the Gaza strip in Palestine’s first and only elections in 2006, has also engaged in a campaign of violence against the PLO, its older terror-organization turned political- party counterpart, and the governing body established after the Oslo accords, the Palestinian Authority.28 Even as the international community has condemned Hamas violence and tried to delegitimize these groups relative to the Palestinian Authority, Iran has remained a steadfast backer of Hamas and PIJ.29 It must be noted, however, that the relationship has somewhat frayed since 2011 due to the sectarian conflict in Syria. Hamas’s Sunni leadership is opposed to the Assad regime, which has stood against the Muslim Brotherhood of which Hamas is an affiliate and the Syrian regime has long empowered the minority communities of Syria over the significant Sunni majority in the country.
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MILITIA IN IRAQ After 9/11, the U.S. – Iranian relationship stood at a significant crossroads. Iran offered its condolences and as mentioned, Hezbollah essentially abandoned its international terror profile. In Afghanistan, which rests on Iran’s Eastern border, Iran provided contacts with the opposition parties to the Taliban, and even strategic advice; their cooperation was crucial to the smooth American and NATO operations that quickly swept over the country.30 Their support could have been crucial to the planning and operations of the invasion of Iraq as well, had it not been for the infamous “Axis of Evil” line delivered by President Bush in his second State of the Union address in 2002. That speech stymied collaboration on both fronts. Iranian diplomats who had been secretly meeting with the State Department’s Ryan Crocker for months declared they were done. The intelligence sharing stopped immediately. The United States, already bogged down in Afghanistan, decides to open a new front in Iraq. After a quick, decisive victory the U.S. designated provisional government of Iraq deconstructs the bureaucratic infrastructure of the Iraqi state already crippled by two decades of war and sanctions. When the threat of invasion of Iran receded and the American quagmire in Iraq became apparent, the Iranians became an antagonizing force for American occupation troops.31 New Yorker writer Dexter Filkins reported “recalling that time, Crocker shook his head. “We were just that close,” he said. “One word in one speech changed history.””32 Scholar Stephen Kinzer notes that the invasion of the two countries was a “huge favor” to Iran, as the regimes toppled in both countries were deeply hostile to the Iranians.33 It strengthened their geopolitical position and provided them a critical expansion in influence, not only eliminating two adversaries, but replacing them with friendly governments inclined to working with their powerful neighbor. The vacuum created by American intervention in Iraq was a chasm-sized opening for Iran. The coalition government led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer disbanded Saddam’s Baath party, the only legal political party in Iraq for decades, and also disbanded the largest, most powerful organization in the country, the Iraqi Army. Without this key security and management infrastructure, coalition troops, mostly Americans, were entirely responsible for public safety in Iraq, filling the position of not only peacekeeper, but police force as well, a role the U.S. armed forces are ill-equipped to play. Iranian unconventional forces were easily able to step in and create chaos for coalition groups. Iran and Saddam’s Iraq had an adversarial relationship, stemming from their eight-year war in the 1980s. As such, each spent the post-war period seeking to undermine the other’s power, including through the heightening of ethno-sectarian tensions. Iraq’s majority Shi’ite Arab population had been ruled by its Sunni minority for decades, well before Saddam Hussein, and attempted political uprisings had been crushed many a time, often brutally. Revolutionary 40
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Iran had often sheltered Shi’ite opposition figures on the run from Saddam and provided material support to dissidents and resistance groups operating in Iraq, including the Daawa party and one of its leaders, Nouri al-Maliki, who became Prime Minister of Iraq from 2006 to 2014.34 While the relationship between Iran’s government and Iraq’s Shi’ites was not always smooth, their joint history and Iran’s influence in Iraq would prove to be very important. Two militant Iraqi Shi’ite groups were the Badr Brigade, and the Mahdi Army. The Badr Brigade had historical ties to the Iraqi Daawa party of which al- Maliki had been a part, and the group fought on the Iranian side during the Iran-Iraq war, something very few Arab Shi’ites did.35After the war, they maintained their ties with the Iranian army and after the coalition invasion they fought against Sunni insurgents and former Baathists, generally staying out of conflict with American forces.36 On the other hand, Filkins reports that the Mahdi army, also backed by Iran and led by a firebrand Shi’ite cleric whose father had been executed by the Saddam regime in 1980, quickly engaged against the Americans. The Iranians found him difficult and unpredictable to work with, so they extended their support to other groups.37 This demonstrates that Iran wanted to have close coordination and control of those it funded. Fighters were trained in Iran by the Iranian military or in Lebanon and Syria by Hezbollah militants. Filkins notes that the control the Iranian Quds Force general had over the Iraqi militias “at times appeared to be total.”38 Iranian support was not limited to Shi’ite groups. Sunni groups that wished to fight the Americans were encouraged and enabled by the Iranian command, including al-Qaeda elements operating out of Iran: they struck not only in Iraq, but also in Saudi Arabia, which was providing critical logistical support to American forces.39 The Kurdish groups in the North of the country, who spent years fighting Saddam’s regime in a bid for independence and who sometimes took refuge in Iran, have also worked in collaboration with Iranian forces, even as they received substantial support from the American government. However, they expressed dismay at the pressure that Quds force operatives had put on them to cooperate. Iran’s power and reach in the region meant they were difficult to deny.40 The Iranian regime’s tactics are not limited to solely engaging their ideological fellow travelers. Support for any faction is about accomplishing strategic goals. The Iranians will work with, and forcefully encourage if necessary, groups who they think will further those goals.41 For some time leading up to the American withdrawal from Iraq, the Maliki government in Iraq was able to gain some independence from Iran and its proxy militias, but with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq’s Sunni areas and the conflict in neighboring Syria, the militias became crucial to the survival of the fledgling regime. At the same time, Iranian influence was endangering International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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the stability of the government because the armed sectarian groups further alienated the Sunni populations they were supposed to be liberating. Ali Khedary noted in Foreign Affairs that Iraqi Shi’ite militias, “now likely outnumber the official Iraqi security forces.42” It is also likely that many of these militias have direct or indirect ties to Iran as the country has expanded its involvement. A 2014 tweet by an Iranian journalist showed a picture of the Quds force commander General Qassem Suleimani in Iraq with the leader of the Badr Brigade.43 Iranian influence in Iraq will continue, as it will across the Middle East, wherever they seek advantage with strategic violence and terror. But how does all of this investment, and all this violence, pay off for Iran?
POWER AND REPUTATION Iran has given substantial aid to violent non-state groups, sending personnel, money, and arms to support factions in intense conflicts and terror operations against civilians. Why is Iran doing this? What are the strategic goals being pursued? Through examining Iran’s support for these groups, this section attempts to glean Iran’s goals and interests, both regionally and globally. It should be clear that Iran’s leaders, and its people, view Western influence in the Middle East as corrupt, arrogant, violent, and antagonistic to both its interests and those of the entire region. After all, their experiences of resource exploitation and regime change are not unique to the Persian country. With the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, France and England cut up the map as they saw fit, and the region is still suffering from the countries formed by the Sykes-Picot agreement, lacking cohesion and national identities. The states created pushed divisive sectarian groups together, often with one in power over the others, and installed leaders who owed their position to colonial influences and the sale of their nations’ resources for personal fortunes and power. The same ills befell Iran. Additionally, the Muslim Middle East saw the change of hands of Jerusalem to the West, a potent symbol of their religious history that had been under Muslim rule since the time of the Crusades. The establishment of the state of Israel and the treatment of Palestinians were significant signs of their lost power. Thus, to the Iranians, the conflict with Israel is only a battle, albeit a significant and highly symbolic one, of the larger war against Western influence in the Middle East. At the end of the 20th century, the sharp domestic and intra-regional divisions in the Middle East had kept it weak, divided, and under the thumb of Western power. Regimes from Israel to Saudi Arabia to Kuwait remained afloat thanks largely to Western influence, and they repressed their people’s will with Western aid. The post-revolution Islamic Republic of Iran perceives itself as the regional bulwark against Western tyranny, and wants others to maintain the 42
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same stance. It views the dependent regimes, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, as tokens of Western power that need to be removed for the sake of the broader Muslim Middle East. Iran, as the largest and most populous country in the region, holding dear to its memories of past empire, wants to take its ‘rightful place’ as the regional hegemon. The Iranian regime’s priorities are to push the West out of the Middle East and to be the leader of the Muslim world in the region. However, Iran knows it cannot challenge Western military power on its own, and it does not want to invite a more powerful actor to act on its behalf, as that would just be another foreign influence. While it views the international system’s laws and norms as illegitimate because of its failure to protect Iran’s sovereignty in the 20th century, it is exploiting the same rules to fight the West through non-state groups from which the state can technically separate its responsibility. If this is Iran’s larger goal, and these are the rules they must play by, the overall strategy can begin to be understood. Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah has allowed it to build up a professional fighting force and international terrorist operation outside of its borders with proximity to Israel and Western Europe, while maintaining a position that allows it to disavow responsibility. Though Iran may support a Hezbollah operation with money, arms, and intelligence, Hezbollah must bear the consequences of its actions. Iran would rather pass responsibility to a non-state actor in a country with a government in paralysis and a civilian infrastructure that has been repeatedly destroyed by its civil sectarian conflict and Hezbollah’s own clash with Israel. This allows Iran to take advantage of international laws and norms, wherein nations are not held responsible for their proxies. Matthew Levitt notes that operations of the renewed Hezbollah-Iran strategy include “retaliating for attacks on Iran’s nuclear program and convincing Western powers that an attack on Iran would result in—among other things— asymmetric terrorist attacks worldwide.”44 By setting up a proxy organization that could independently develop a terror network around the world, but undertake operations at its behest, Iran gained a useful offensive and deterrent capability that can strike without reprisals targeting Iran. The five and a half year civil war in Syria today highlights another payoff of Iranian investment in Hezbollah. As President Assad’s forces have weakened under the strain of war and defections, Hezbollah has picked up the slack, deploying soldiers thus far crucial to the regime’s survival. Hezbollah’s welltrained cadre of fighters, experienced from the long-running conflict with Israel on Lebanon’s Southern border, have flowed across the border to back up Iran’s Arab ally. A final strategic goal Hezbollah fulfills is in remaining Israel’s most effective enemy. The organization came into being in its role staving off the Israeli invasion and survived the Taif Agreement to continue fighting the International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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Israeli occupation.45 Its operations eventually pushed Israel out of Lebanese territory in 2000, and it was able to portray this as a major victory.46 Ever since then, it has continued to use aggressive rhetoric and strikes against Israel, engaging in tit-for-tat combat strategy. Today, with an enormous stockpile of missiles pointed at the Jewish State, the group has been able to constrain Israeli action on the tri-border area.47 Maintaining pressure on Israel heightens Iran’s position as a defender of the Palestine and attacker of the most symbolic institution of Western influence in the Middle East. Another key strategic positioning against Israel is Iran’s support for the uncompromising terror groups Hamas and PIJ. Both groups have been critical in undermining the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority’s control and the progress of the peace process. Their defiant attacks on Israel have often succeeded in pushing Israel into short destructive conflicts, three in Gaza in the last eight years. These maneuvers are tactically designed to result in Israel inflicting high rates of civilian casualties, destroying civilian infrastructure, and driving Israelis and Palestinians further from the negotiating table. This helps Iran maintain its strong rhetorical position against Israel and hinders the finalization of a two-state resolution which would be a major victory for the West and the United States, ensuring the permanence and stability of a Western-oriented democracy in the Middle East. In Iraq, Iran’s interests are clear. The U.S.-led coalition did the dirty work of overthrowing Saddam’s regime, but they could not rebuild Iraq in the West’s image. The poor post-war planning and the difficulty of occupying the country as it devolved into communal civil war gave Iran ample opportunity to leverage its ties with Iraqi Shi’ite opposition forces. Iran was able to use its influence and Iraqi supply lines to make life very difficult for the Americans by, for example, supplying insurgents with high-tech armor piercing IEDs.48 In 2008 President Bush signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SFA) with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that agreed to the withdrawal of American combat troops in 2011. New Yorker reporter Dexter Filkins reports that Iran was heavily involved in both the formation of the Maliki governing coalition and the refusal of an SFA that allowed Western coalition forces to stay.49 This was a major victory for Iran. It demonstrated the folly of long-term American military interventions in a region that is tired of America’s presence and tremendously weakened the primary purveyor of Western intervention in the Middle East. The denial pushed coalition forces out of the region and ensured that Iraq will remain in Iran’s sphere of influence for the foreseeable future.
U.S. POLICY GOING FORWARD The United States needs to engage Iran diplomatically while fighting Iran’s offensive strategies in other theaters around the world. U.S. strategy needs to 44
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take into account Iran’s history and interests to effectively counter their efforts. From the Iranian perspective, Western influence has had a corrosive effect on its own state as well as the broader Middle East. Therefore, it has sought to degrade and remove Western capacity wherever it can. Iran’s support for violent nonstate groups seems to have been markedly successful in the strategic weakening of American and Western influence in the Middle East. The concerted effort to develop a terrorist and fighter network in Lebanon, the stymieing of the peace process between Israel and Palestine, and the disruption of coalition efforts in Iraq are all potent examples of the Iranian strategy. Looking forward, how should the United States craft its Middle East policy? The United States needs to make a careful strategic analysis of its interests in the Middle East. It must assess that wanton interventions in the development of nations and intraregional politics have left the Middle East a flaming wreck. From the overthrow of Mosaddegh, to the propping up of the Gulf monarchies and dictators from Saddam to Mubarak; from recruiting and training the Arab world in irregular warfare tactics to fight the Soviet Union, to playing Iran and Iraq off of each other in the 80s; from overthrowing Saddam in 2003 to its decades long failure to accomplish a two-state solution in Israel/Palestine, each intervention has warped and disfigured the political economy of the Middle East. The United States must come to terms with this history and reconcile its role there. The Middle Eastern states and their domestic institutions as well as the region’s bilateral and multilateral institutions developed since World War II have rested on foundations of preventing a regional hegemon and keeping the flow of oil stable. Those foundations may broadly continue, but the strategy and tactics used in the last 70 years will have to be reevaluated and changed sharply if shaping a peaceful Middle Eastern order remains a high priority for U.S. policymakers going forward. These interventions served two primary purposes: preventing the spread of Soviet Communism and ensuring the global supply of oil that comes from the Middle East. For all the folly that both purposes have sown in American foreign policy, the United States can now safely dismiss the worries of communism. However, the worries over stable oil supplies can also be questioned. As David Stockman points out in a 2015 op-ed in the Huffington Post, events have proven in spades that it doesn’t matter who controls the oilfields… Every tin pot dictatorship from Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela to Saddam Hussein, to the bloody-minded chieftains of Nigeria, to the purportedly medieval Mullahs and fanatical Republican Guards of Iran has produced oil—-and all they could because they desperately needed the revenue.50
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The continued interventions have served only the interests of the shortestterm thinking, damaging America’s long-term interests by supporting brutally repressive dictators and fanatical religious zealots, and directly or indirectly helping crush efforts at democratic reforms. The United States should move forward with engaging Iran diplomatically and economically, while continuing effective global anti-terror policies, especially partnering with other nations to increase funding for multi-lateral information sharing and policing efforts. The nuclear deal is just the first step in a long process of forcing Iran to rebalance its economic, political, and ideological interests. Diplomatic engagement will not work unless Iran continues to feel international pressure against its non-state terror tactics. It is of prime importance that all parties to the nuclear deal hold up their ends of the bargain. Iran has already shipped off most of its nuclear fuels for disposal and in exchange has received monies held from it internationally as sanctions have begun to be lifted.51 The P5+1 countries must use the mechanisms of the deal to their fullest extent to monitor Iranian activity and the proscribed consequences for violations must be followed through with. Likewise, the same countries must do as they promised, ending international sanctions that were put in place specifically because of the nuclear program. If one or more of the P5+1 countries fails to follow through on its commitments, it will not only result in Iran crying foul and likely returning to its pre-deal push for nuclear weapons, and therefore possibly war, but it will weaken global faith in the western countries and weaken resolve for future multilateral efforts. Another goal the United States cannot abandon in this context is the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a two-state solution. Continued efforts on the part of the United States are crucial to changing perceptions in the region, but the efforts need to turn into a permanent solution. The conflict carries with it enormous symbolic weight across the Middle East. The renewal of the Arab Peace Initiative multiple times since 2002 demonstrates the resolve of the Arab countries to reach a final agreement. It also represents an attempt to isolate Iran by the Sunni gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia, because the group that is able to reach peace first will hold a large banner of victory for the Palestinian cause and will reap an immediate boom of trading with the region’s most tech-savvy and developed neighbor, Israel. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into strategies and tactics to reach peace in this historic conflict, but the specific mechanics of a peace deal will carry immense strategic weight in either delegitimizing Iran’s signature cause or crafting a deal in which Iran is a strategic partner and guarantor of security and development. Either will aid in forcing Iran to re-evaluate the costs and benefits of its non-state actor terror offensive policies. No matter what, a peace deal must remain a high priority for any U.S. strategy in the region.
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The P5+1 nuclear deal with Iran is an important accomplishment and the first successful engagement with Iran since the revolution, following an unfathomable number of missed and squandered opportunities. The deal must be seen as a building block towards further engagement. One area to build on may be security cooperation with Iran in fighting the Islamic State, or Daesh, which reports indicates may already be occurring on a military to military level. Economic development will be another area for improvement, which alone will force difficult choices on the Iranian government. For example Iranian financial institutions which are mostly state-backed will need to get into compliance with international banking standards if they wish to interact with global markets.52 The nuclear deal opens up many opportunities for Iran to trade with the world, but any increase in trade will need to be accompanied by dramatic changes in government economic policy. This is exactly what the deal was designed to facilitate. American foreign policy can no longer afford the arrogance and belligerence of the last few decades, and morally, it should turn away from these stances. If it wishes to end Iranian support for terror, the United States must evolve its positions in the Middle East to accommodate the military and diplomatic realities of Iranian capabilities, interests, and behavior, engage diplomatically, find common ground where they can work together, and resolve problem areas through a balance of force and diplomacy. Current policies that ignore these realities play right into Iranian hard-liners’ hands. By engaging with Iran diplomatically and using targeted military and economic tools, the United States will empower Iran’s domestic factions that desire friendly relations with the United States, forcing a complicated conversation between the regime and unfriendly parties. Iran is a regional powerhouse with a society unhappy with its theocratic leaders, primed for democratic reforms. It is a far more secular, pluralistic, and educated state than any in the Muslim Middle East today and has a recent history of democracy, one subverted by the United States.53 As Edward G. Shirley argued in 1994, economic engagement with Iran will pivot the country towards the United States in ways no military intervention can. President Richard Nixon’s efforts at détente with China provide an interesting parallel. After years of complete shut-off from the West, engagement with China opened the doors to economic liberalization and stymied China’s ideological commitment to universalist and expansionist communism. Since then China has developed tremendously, the fastest in the world, and lifted millions out of poverty through vast manufacturing development and trade. Today China is a major figure in the international system and a crucial partner in global trade. Though it is still sometimes antagonistic to Western interests, war with China is almost unthinkable as China’s and the United States’ economic fortunes are tied so tightly together.54 Through enticing Iran into the international economic and political system while fighting its proxy offensives, Iran’s rulers will be forced to face difficult choices between continuing diplomatic International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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engagement and economic development or continuing its ideologically-based geopolitical offensive.55 Kinzer advises in his foreword to the 2008 edition of All the Shah’s Men that the democratic reformers in Iran see an American military strike as their worst nightmare because it would rally the Iranian people to the regime and push them even further from the West.56 In regards to the nuclear deal, all signatories must be unwavering in their commitment to close observation and enforcement. The U.S. must firmly communicate that if Iran violates the deal, it will suffer the consequences agreed to. Likewise, the United States must demonstrate its honesty and trustworthiness in holding up its end of the bargain. With careful monitoring, the United States should lift the sanctions as the deal calls for them. This deal is a trust- building exercise for both sides and is the key to future engagement. It is also a trust-building exercise for U.S. allies in the Middle East, the Gulf monarchies led by Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The U.S. must make clear its support for their post-deal security through public assurances, the increase of military and economic aid, and joint military exercises. The United States must recognize that it is has not acted as an honest broker in the past, and it must end its policy of explicitly supporting regime change and violent intervention. These policies are not only inherently immoral, they are also ineffective at accomplishing American goals and run counter to longterm American interests. It cannot continue to deal only with the elites of these countries and ignore or aid in the repression of their peoples. The United States must develop diplomatic relations with these countries through engagement and economic trade. These same policies eased tensions with the Soviet Union and China in the past, bringing about significant changes in those countries and economic boon for the world. If the United States desires the same for the Middle East and the ensured existence of Israel, it must recognize and abandon its past corrosive role and change paths going forward, lest more blood and treasure be spilt only to further fan the flames of hatred. ENDNOTES
1
McLaughlin Mitchell, Sara, and Peter F. Trumbore, “Rogue states and territorial disputes,” Conflict Management and Peace, July 2014, 31 (3) 323-339, 323-324.
2
Peter Hopkirk, “The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia,” (1992), Kodansha International.
3
Stephen Kizner, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken, N.J..: John Wiley and Sons, 2008 edition, pg 32
4
AmirMokri, Cyrus, and Hamid Biglari, “A Windfall for Iran?” Foreign Affairs, 2015, 94 (6). 28-29
48
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5
Kinzer.All the Shah’s Men, 2004. 2008 edition 38-53
6
Ibid, 43-46
7
Giambruno, Nick,“It was the first time the CIA overthrew a government,” Casey Research, International Man, 2015, http://www.internationalman.com/articles/it-was-the-first-time-the-ciaoverthrew-a-government (Accessed December 2, 2015)
8
Ibid
9
Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 2004, 3-4
10 Quoted in Suzanne Maloney,“Iran’s Long Reach.” Washington, D.C. United States Institute of Peace, 2008, Chapter 4: “U.S. Policy toward Iran,” 128. 11
Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 2004, 2008 edition, 202-204
12 Amin, Zana Tofiq Kaka, “Analyze Iran’s behavior since the Revolution in 1979. Is its behavior rational or that of a rogue state?” Global Security Studies, 2015 (6) 1. 26 13 Moore, Molly”2 Vincennes Officers Get Medals; Citations Do Not Mention Downing of Iranian Airliner That Killed 290”. The Washington Post, 23 April 1990. 14 Raymond Hinnbusch, and Rick Fawn (editor). The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences. US: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2006. 1-17. Print. George Bush, 2002 State of the Union Address 15 quoted in Manni, Nathaniel F. 2012. “Iran’s Proxies: State Sponsored Terrorism in the Middle East.” Global Security Studies 3, no. 3: 34-45. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center. pg 34 16 Manni, Nathaniel F., “Iran’s Proxies: State Sponsored Terrorism in the Middle East,” Global Security Studies, 2012 (3) 3, 30. 17 Levitt, Matthew Hizballah and the Quds Force in Iran’s Shadow War with the West,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2013, (123).2 18 Ibid, 2-3 19 Ibid, 2 20 Manni, “Iran Proxies,” 2013, 37 21
Amin, “Analyze Iran’s behavior since the Revolution in 1979”
22 Sullivan, Marisa, “Hezbollah in Syria,” Middle East Security Report 19, April 2014, Institute for the Study of War, Washington, D.C. 26 23 Ospina, Grey, “Strategic Alliance” 32-33 24 Manni “Iran’s Proxies” 2012, 36-40 25 Amin,“Iran’s Behavior Since the Revolution” 2015, 27 26 Pileggi, Tamar, “Palestinians freed in Shalit deal killed 6 Israelis since 2014,” Times of Israel, July 20, 2015, http://www.timesofisrael.com/palestinians-freed-in-shalit-deal-killed-6-israelis-since-2014/ (accessed December 2, 2015) 27 Ibid
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28 Melhem, Ahmad, “The Deepening Rift Between Fatah, Hamas” Al-Monitor, March 20, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/palestine-hamas-fatah-plo-accusations.html# (accessed December 3, 2015) 29 Manni “Iran’s Proxies” 2012, 36-40 30 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” 2013 31 Ibid 32 Ibid 33
Kinzer,All the Shah’s Men, XVI, preface to the 2008 edition
34
Larry Kaplow, “Iran Iraq”, Newsweek; June 15, 2009, Vol. 153 Issue 24, p58-60,
35 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” 2013 36 Ibid 37 Ibid 38 Ibid 39 Ibid 40 Ibid 41 Ibid 42 Khedary, Foreign Affairs, 36 43 Shahid Ahmed, Akbar, and Ryan Grim, “What’s Wrong With This Picture? For U.S. Fight Against ISIS, Everything,” Huffington Post, November 23, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/23/ obama-isis-iran_n_6165352.html (accessed December 5, 2015). 44
Levitt, Shadow War, 3
45 Ospina and Gray, “Strategic Alliance”, 29-30 46
Goldberg, Suzanne, “Chaos and humiliation as Israel pulls out of Lebanon,” The Guardian, http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/24/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon (accessed December 6, 2015)
47 Harel, Amos, “With Iran Out of the Picture, Hezbollah Tops Israel’s Threat List” Haaretz, April 26, 2015 http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.653478 (accessed December 6, 2015). 48 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” 2013 “In 2004, the Quds Force began flooding Iraq with lethal roadside bombs that the Americans referred to as E.F.P.s, for “explosively formed projectiles.” The E.F.P.s, which fire a molten copper slug able to penetrate armor, began to wreak havoc on American troops, accounting for nearly twenty per cent of combat deaths. E.F.P.s could be made only by skilled technicians, and they were often triggered by sophisticated motion sensors. “There was zero question where they were coming from,” General Stanley McChrystal, who at the time was the head of the Joint Special Operations Command, told me. “We knew where all the factories were in Iran. The E.F.P.s killed hundreds of Americans.”” 49 Ibid
50
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50 Stockman, David “Blowback -- the Washington War Party’s Folly Comes Home to Roost,” Huffington Post, November 17, 2015 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-stockman/blowbackthe-washington-w_b_8582296.html?utm_hp_ref=homepage (accessed December 6, 2015). 51
Morello, Carol “Iran ships uranium to Russia, fulfilling a key provision of nuclear deal” Washington Post, December 28, 2016.
52
Bozorgmehr, Najmeh, “Iran’s ‘outdated’ banks hamper efforts to rejoin global economy,” Washington Post, January 19, 2016.
53 AmirMokri, Cyrus, and Hamid Biglari, “A Windfall for Iran?” Foreign Affairs, 2015, 94 (6). “But the most promising indicator of Iran’s economic potential is its human capital. Iran has a population of 80 million, comparable to Germany and Turkey. About 64 percent of Iranians are below the age of 35. The population is 73 percent urban, a percentage similar to those of most industrialized countries. And that urban population is well educated. Iran’s literacy rate is 87 percent overall and 98 percent for those between the ages of 15 and 24. Of the roughly 4.4 million students enrolled in universities, 60 percent were women as of the 2012–13 school year, and some 44 percent are majoring in one of the STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics). After Russia and the United States, Iran is the world’s fifth largest producer of graduates in engineering (reliable statistics for China and India are not available, but it is likely that they occupy slots one and two)—although the education they receive in Iran is not always of the highest quality. Still, some 7.5 million Iranians, or about 13.3 percent of the country’s working age population, have completed a university level education, making Iran the most educated country in the Middle East. For the sake of comparison, Mexico’s university graduates make up 12.5 percent of its working age population Brazil’s, 11.7 percent and Indonesia’s, 6.9 percent.” 54
Hudson, Michael and Mimi Kirk Gulf Politics and Economics in a Changing World, 2014.
55 Edward G. Shirley, “The Iran Policy Trap,” Foreign Policy, no.96 (Fall 1994). 13 56
Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, xvi, preface to the 2008 edition.
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China’s Nationalist Foreign Policy in a Globalized Era Historical Logic, Confident Insecurity, and Domestic Politics. Zhizhen Lu Zhizhen Lu is a graduate student in the International Trade and Investment Policy program at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. He is passionate about the international political economy of trade and globalization, with regional focuses on China and the US. He is also experienced in the research of IR theories and foreign policies. He has extensive experience in working with major international organizations and think tanks in both China and US, such as the European Union Delegation to China, European Union Chamber of Commerce and the World Resource Institute. ABSTRACT
On 12 July 2016, the South China Sea arbitration reveals a dangerous relapse of the country’s nationalist tendencies in foreign policy. Cultural topography, an intelligence analysis technique, allows us to integrate existing findings into a systematic analytical framework from a fresh perspective. Three cultural elements are juxtaposed in our study: historical logic, the “confident insecurity” mentality, and the problematic domestic political situation. We conclude that protecting national pride through nationalist diplomacy is stereotyped in a positive way in Chinese historical logic; the power of ancient Chinese empire and the Century of Humiliation jointly created the country’s misguided obsession with national dignity and its ingrained distrust of foreign countries; and nationalist foreign policy as an extension of domestic political propaganda has facilitated economic and political capital tradeoff, which has maintained social stability. Our findings indicate that a departure from the reliance of nationalism as the only integrative ideology is strategically beneficial for China in the long run. For the international community, the cultural topographic analysis of China’s nationalism can enrich understanding of China’s underlying foreign policy motivations, so as to make better decisions according to their own strategic outlook.
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Nationalism is the underlying logic behind China’s foreign policy and makes the country’s behavior unpredictable to international observers. The ruling on the South China Sea arbitration, which was decided by an international tribunal in The Hague on July 12, 2016, has triggered another bout of nationalism in China. China’s social networks are imbued with a nationalist sentiment that strongly objects to the ruling. Jingoistic opinions calling for immediate war against the Philippines and the United States create worrisome and precarious tensions on the internet. Enthusiastic nationalist groups have boycotted in front of a KFC, claiming that it is “unpatriotic” for the Chinese to eat in an American restaurant. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken a relatively moderate nationalist stance by reiterating its previous claim that the arbitration was “illegal” and that China would “not recognize, nor participate in the arbitration.” Setting aside the legal issues concerning the territorial and maritime disputes between China and the Philippines, the failure of China’s diplomacy is evidenced by a negative international image and heightened tensions between China and its neighboring countries. Fueled by a nationalistic concept of foreign policy, in the long run China’s aggressive strategy in the South China Sea arbitration will create more diplomatic challenges (in terms of strategic, security, political, and economic interests) for China than for any other country involved. Accordingly, Dr. Jiangyu Wang, an associate professor of law at the National University of Singapore and a leading expert on the Chinese and international legal systems, argues that since the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is at the heart of the issue, China should participate, at least in the preliminary phase, in the arbitration, because “the best position is not avoiding the relevant international legal process, but making the most out of it.” Furthermore, Wang recommends that China also pursue its national interests in the South China Sea by promoting regional integration, leveraging geopolitical interests with economic influence, and building rapport with neighboring countries. Unfortunately, China has taken a non-participatory position in the South China Sea arbitration case, in accordance with its propensity for impulsive foreign policy decision-making focused on short-term excitement and satisfaction of national pride. To fully understand the role of China’s nationalism and its influence on foreign policy decisions, it is imperative to delve into the cultural and social constructs behind the nationalist sentiment of Chinese political elites. A number of studies have made meaningful efforts to explain how China’s nationalism plays an instrumental role for a deteriorating communist ideology, in such a way that it then becomes a symbolic banner bringing the whole nation together. For instance, two internationally recognized social scientists, Davide Ravasi and Majken Schultz, have substantiated the formative effect that organizational culture has on identity, especially concerning the renewal of members’ perception of the organization during environmental 54
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changes. We can also apply their cultural analysis approach and findings to help us understand the interaction between China’s cultural identity and its nationalistic personality. Along these lines, China’s nationalism is sustained by shared views of history and traditional culture. Therefore, when China’s open economy ushers in an influx of ideas that challenge the prevailing communist ideology, China’s political elites respond by resorting to their shared culture and history to build up a new cohesive national identity. From our cultural topographic analytical approach, we find that China’s nationalist motivations stem from historical and cultural backgrounds, and serve as a convenient response to domestic political needs. In the long run, fitting China’s historical and cultural heritage into a collaborative and inclusive globalized world will be a significant step to move away from the constraint of nationalism in the realm of foreign policy. Moreover, decreasing the reliance on nationalism as an overarching integrative ideology can also deliver longlasting social stability in China. Lastly, the international community will be able to better calculate policy implications and interpret China’s behaviors on the international stage.
CULTURAL TOPOGRAPHY AND THE ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE Many decisions in international affairs are closely associated with cultural factors that derive from the specific historical and societal backgrounds of a state actor. Because culture is so stable and profound, it is not easy to avoid when one tries to make decisions, no matter if the person is an ordinary citizen or a head of state. This “cultural inertia” is the theoretical basis of our cultural mapping of China’s nationalistic tendencies in foreign policy. By employing the intelligence analysis technique of cultural topography, first we will “isolate and assess cultural factors at play.” We will then integrate existing research findings into a systematic analytical framework from a fresh perspective, from which we can develop a judgment of the nationalistic behaviors characterizing China’s foreign policy. Furthermore, three cultural elements are juxtaposed in our study: historical logic, the “confident insecurity” mentality, and the problematic domestic political situation. We begin by surveying the shift from ancient and subconscious cultural elements to more contemporary and visible ones. Next, we evaluate each of the three cultural elements against four criteria: identity, norms, values, and perceptual lens. Finally, we assess all cultural factors holistically, which will allow us to arrive at an informed understanding of China’s nationalist foreign policy trajectory. Our aim is to understand the origin of the collective perception of nationalism in China and how it is accentuated in Chinese foreign policy decisions. However, for the completeness of the analytical framework, we International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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deliberately chose a vaguely defined actor—China’s political elites who have the power to influence China’s foreign policy formulation—as a proxy for understanding nationalist tendencies in China’s foreign policy circle. We chose China’s political elites, because the collective cultural identities are ingrained in their foreign policy decisions. Moreover, since Chinese elites have an enormous influence on public opinion and national discourse, they foster the socialization of the cultural identities.
HISTORICAL LOGIC: HISTORICAL NARRATIVES (SHI) AND ANCIENT CLASSICS (JING) Contemporary nationalism first appeared in China after the Opium War in 1840, when Great Britain forced the Chinese empire to concede its national sovereignty. China’s historical logic, which formed as the result of centuries of continuous cultural inputs, has a profound influence on China’s nationalist thinking today. Gries, who is the director of the Institute for U.S.-China Issues at the University of Oklahoma, has noted that nationalism as a tool of communist rule greatly oversimplifies reality and has highlighted the importance of historical context in understanding China’s nationalist sentiment. China’s historical logic, especially its view of political history, is a mechanism of three important elements derived from ancient philosophy: historical narratives as the “mirror” (in Chinese, yi shi wei jian), the unity of divinity and the secular world (tian ren bing fu), and ancient classics (yin jing ju dian). Because the emperor represented the connection between divinity and the secular power, the linkage between humans and divinity ceased with the abdication of the last Chinese emperor; therefore, the second element has little influence on present-day Chinese historical logic. Now, a political event is evaluated mainly from only two coordinates: historical narratives (shi), which provide a horizontal timeline containing a myriad of past analogies, and ancient classics (jing), which establish a set of criteria to verify if the event is in line with traditions and moral standards.
HISTORICAL NARRATIVES Nationalist diplomacy has been stereotyped positively in traditional Chinese accounts of the past. Historical role models offer compelling analogies for such narratives. Yanzi, the renowned prime minister of the State of Qi during the Spring and Autumn Period (770 BC to 476 BC), once traveled to the State of Chu as his state’s envoy. Aiming to establish diplomatic superiority, the emperor of Chu schemed to insult the envoy. But Yanzi, being extremely intelligent and eloquent, was able to tackle those challenges by proactively satirizing the emperor of Chu and without compromising the dignity of his 56
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state. The story of Yanzi has been passed down for generations. The logic behind the story encourages a tit-for-tat strategy whenever the Chinese feel that the dignity of their country is at stake. Although this has proven to be an effective strategy in the past, it sends an aggressive message in a rule-based and consensusoriented international system. The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi exemplified this type of historical narrative, when he castigated a Canadian reporter who asked a question about China’s human rights situation. Worrying that the dignity of his country might be compromised, Wang indignantly berated the seemingly “hostile” reporter as “full of prejudice against China and an arrogance that comes from I don’t know where.” While it seems to be very unbecoming for a seasoned diplomat to express acerbic castigations outright, the historical narrative of nationalist diplomacy justifies his tough attitude towards the Canadian reporter, who he believes has defamed China with biased arguments.
ANCIENT CLASSICS The second aspect of the historical logic – ancient classics – strongly buttresses nationalist sentiment through a well-structured and deeply-internalized moral evaluation system. Derived from Confucianism, the foundation of the Chinese ancient political and social code of conduct is mainstream classics, consisting of nine books: The Four Books (Si Shu) and The Five Classics (Wu Jing). The moral standards revolving around these ancient classics have infiltrated everyday life for centuries and thus have become powerful social norms. Firstly, loyalty (Zhong) was the most important value for Chinese traditional ethical evaluation and required people to steadfastly honor the emperor at all times. The emperor, who was also referred to as “the son of heaven (Tianzi),” was the divine and symbolic representation of the nation as a whole. With the abdication of the last Chinese emperor, patriotism, which implies honoring and supporting the Communist Party and the government, became the contemporary manifestation of the ancient concept of loyalty. Secondly, filial piety (Xiao) encourages people to respect their parents, elders, and ancestors. With this cultural discourse, China as a country is regarded as an inheritance from its ancient forefathers. Therefore, preserving the integrity of the country is imperative, because it shows respect and gratitude for China’s ancestors. Both loyalty and filial piety contribute to the dream of a strong, integrated China, which is the basis for the rise of national pride. When foreign powers challenge China’s national pride, integrity (Qijie) incites unyielding spirits to stand up against humiliations. Popular culture has hardened this collective reaction through adages such as, “[the scholar] may be killed, but he cannot be disgraced” (shi ke sha, bu ke ru); in other words, pride weighs heavily over both the lives of individual citizens and the country’s decision makers.
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CULTURAL TOPOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS China’s distinct historical logic is so entrenched in its national identity that its political elites are compelled to look for analogies in historical narratives and ancient classics when formulating foreign policy. For instance, Party elites embraced nationalism as a pragmatic response to the Communist identity crisis in the post-Mao period. When communist ideology was challenged by greater economic openness and the collapse of the Soviet Union, returning to traditional values turned out to be an effective strategy. More specifically, historical logic gave Chinese political elites an identity as the defender of traditional values, and when the values were challenged by the ever-changing dynamics of international affairs at the end of Cold War, nationalism surfaced. With this identity in mind, the political elites took a hardline on foreign policy in the face of external challenges. Today, nationalism continues to be the most convenient and politicallycorrect choice for China when facing international challenges, evidenced by Chinese foreign policy makers’ perception of external powers as having malign intents. In this way, ancient Chinese culture has led to systematic interpretations of the world through the formation of idiosyncratic historical logic. Nevertheless, contemporary nationalists’ overemphasis of national pride limits their strategic thinking in international relations.
CHINA’S “CONFIDENT INSECURITY” Christensen uses the phrase “confident insecurity” to describe Beijing’s tough attitudes in the international arena and insecurity in domestic politics. Similarly, this term also explains the paradoxical thinking behind China’s reaction to international events. China’s nationalism, on the one hand, is fueled by its assertiveness in regional dominance. On the other hand, the country resorts to a nationalist sentiment because of its deeply-rooted insecurity. Additionally, the clout of an ancient regional empire, along with the painful Century of Humiliation, give rise to a mixed feeling of confidence and insecurity towards the current international system. Having been an influential regional power for thousands of years, China is eager to restore its past glory and aspires to have a greater voice in regional and global affairs. However, the miserable history of being bullied by western imperialists etched deep-seated prejudice, suspicion, and vigilance for westerners in the hearts of the Chinese people and has created serious skepticism towards the current western-based international system. In this section, we will analyze the paradoxical mindset that helps to motivate China’s nationalism—arrogance derived from Sino-centrism and insecurity that originated during the Century of Humiliation. 58
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CONFIDENCE China’s assertiveness comes from the Sino-centrism, an outgrowth of the longstanding belief that China is the center of the world. Zhongguo, or the word for “China” in Mandarin Chinese, means “Middle Kingdom” or “the Kingdom of the Center” and reveals how the Chinese people view themselves and their country as a whole. For two millennia, China prided itself as the center of the imperial Chinese Tributary System of China, a regional system in which many of the states in East and Southeast Asia were affiliated to China. Those satellite states paid tribute to China periodically, and in return, the generous Chinese emperor would reward them with precious gifts and provided them security. This tribute system was not only a political system that linked China to its peripheries, but it was also a cultural union. Moreover, this regional foreign relations system embodied a broader Chinese world view that classified its peripheries into three major groups: the Sinic Zone, the Inner Asian Zone, and the Outer Zone. Strict hierarchy was implemented in this system, in which the Chinese Empire was the absolute center, followed by the Sinic and Inner Asian Zone states. Lastly, states from the Outer Zone were referred to as barbarians (Manyi) and were a marginalized group of states that had the least cultural and political attachment to the Chinese Empire. Such mindset helped to instill the idea of Chinese supremacy, which was based on non-egalitarian relations between the central empire and its periphery. This meant that China took a leading role in East Asian affairs. Another aspect of Sino-centrism is that the country seeks respect and acknowledgement to satisfy its self-complacency. Being the political and cultural center of the East Asia tribute system, China was indulged in extolment from its peripheries for thousands of years. In a globalized era with frequent exchange of different perspectives, China can hardly swallow the fact that its views are constantly challenged by other countries. To stimulate national pride, sino-centrism motivates China to impose its own view to other countries in an authoritative manner. In his Washington Post article “New Sinocentrism: The Ideology That May be Driving China to Hack Foreign Media,” Max Fisher interprets the Chinese government’s hacks on foreign media as trying to control the perception of China abroad. Despite the bad international image these operations produce, China acts in this way since western media often produces negative or embarrassing news stories about the country and its leaders. Dr. Christopher Ford, the chief legislative counsel for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has also pointed out China’s double standard with respect to “internal interference” and connected authoritative tendencies to Sino-centrism. For example, Chinese officials, in many circumstances, have urged Japan to constrain right-wing parties and align the description of the Second World War in historical textbooks with China’s perspective. Ford International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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considers this behavior another form of the internal interference of which China claims to be a victim. While a Chinese general’s remark is representative of the view held by most Chinese officials, claiming that Beijing’s demand is by no means interference in internal affairs of other states, since China is affected by how other states depict the country. The sensitivity of national confidence prevents China from accepting different perspectives. Instead it often regards international relations as an extension of identical values in domestic social and political narratives. This hubris contributes to nationalism which prevents China from taking a more cooperative approach in international relations.
INSECURITY Brewed in a century-long history of humiliation, insecurity is another important cultural element that has considerable impact on the nationalist tendency of China’s foreign policy makers. The country’s political elites frame all of their policy decisions, foreign policy included, in one overarching objective— the rejuvenation of the nation. This political goal has an explicit linkage to the embarrassing history. From the Opium War to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China the country has been afflicted by incessant wars, poverty, and unequal treaties with foreign countries. Unlike domestic conflicts, perceived mistreatment by foreign countries can best incentivize nationalist sentiment. The narrative of nationalism, which originated during the Century of Humiliation, is so powerful and persistant that it still has a significant influence on today’s nationalist foreign policy. It has developed into a complex form of mistrust and vigilance towards foreign countries. China’s skeptical attitude towards the South China Sea arbitration, as well as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, articulates its suspicion of western countries and international institutions. Throughout the heated debate on the South China Sea arbitration, China has repeatedly said that the whole arbitration is a well-orchestrated farce aiming at undermining China’s territorial sovereignty, which is diametrically different from western narratives. Dai Bingguo, a former State Councillor and Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Office, delivered a speech in which he recalls the Treaty of Versailles that fails to return Shandong back to China and the League of Nations that acquiesces Japan’s invasion in China. All of these painful precedents in which western countries game the international system for their own benefit provide plausible, but misguided analogies for China’s foreign policy makers. Their refusal to participate in any legal contact in the South China Sea arbitral tribunal shows enormous skepticism and insecurity towards the international ruling.
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CULTURAL TOPOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS With a mixed sentiment of confidence and insecurity, China’s political elites hold an ambivalent attitude towards the international system. On one hand, China is actively exerting influence on various international organizations in recent years because the country believes that integration into the international system is a manifestation of a strong and responsible China. On the other hand, among China’s foreign policy makers there is a well-established skepticism of the international system being manipulated by the West; therefore, they tend to hold a different position to the West. With regard to the values of Chinese foreign policy makers, they associate nationalist pride with the capacity of imposing their will on other countries—as is said by Barmé, “to screw foreigners is patriotic.” In the heyday of China’s ancient empire, it has a strong cultural and political influence on neighboring states, if not the rest of the world. Restoring China’s influence in the world is the rebound of national self-esteem that has been suppressed for over a century. Lastly, “confident insecurity” fundamentally impacts how Chinese political elites perceive foreigners. The ancient cultural hubris propels China’s political elites to espouse “China exceptionalism”, maintaining that Chinese culture is so profound that foreigners cannot possibly understand. Therefore, the West is in no position to point fingers at China. Meanwhile, the elites hold a skeptical attitude towards foreigners and international institutions because encounters with the West are perceived to endanger the country to another humiliation.
THE ROOTS OF NATIONALISM IN DOMESTIC POLITICS It is generally believed in China that “diplomacy is an extension of domestic politics.” Therefore, failure to incorporate China’s domestic politics into the discussion of nationalist foreign policy would result in an incomplete picture. Nationalism in China is generally interpreted by western scholars as filling the ideological vacuum left by disillusionment with communism after the Reform and Opening Up. Christensen maintains that “since the Chinese Communist Party is no longer communist, it must be even more Chinese.” Zhao resonates with the idea that nationalism was invoked by Chinese political elites because the country lacks “an integrative force to compensate for or replace the declining communist ideology” in the wake of the Opening Up and Reform. Ai argues that cultural nationalism derived from the political use of traditions is employed by the country’s political elites to “generate a sense of belonging” for all ethnicities in China, since the influence of ancient traditions is too strong to be ignored. All these studies indicate an instrumental role of nationalism in China’s domestic International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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politics, but fail to capture the dilemma faced by China’s nationalist foreign policy in today’s globalized world.
CHINA’S CONFLICTING INTEREST IN ECONOMIC OPENNESS AND SOCIAL STABILITY Politicization of nationalism is by no means an invention of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); all countries in the world selectively employ nationalism as a political tool. However, nationalism in China is different from both western democracies and ironclad dictatorships. For western democracies, nationalism is among one of many political weapons within a diplomatic arsenal and is only invoked as a complement to conventional foreign policies. The United States used nationalism to mobilize the country after the Pearl Harbor and September 11, 2001 attacks. In response to an influx of immigrants and worsening security situations, the triumph of Brexit supporters is also a form of nationalist foreign policy in the United Kingdom, signaling more inward-looking and protective policies in the country. On the contrary, in dictatorships extreme nationalism is a normality. North Korea’s diplomatic discourse is highly unpredictable, jingoistic, and irrational, which is in close conjunction with its constant inculcation of nationalism. In the case of China, the role of nationalist foreign policies in domestic politics reflects the conflict between its responsibility as a major global actor and the poorly informed and narrow-minded population at home. As a result, China’s foreign policy is often derailed from realistic and strategic concerns by nationalist sentiments. A case in point is China’s short-term rare earth embargo in 2010, arguably in retaliation against Japan’s detention of Chinese fishermen in disputed water. This extreme measure, motivated by nationalism, has had a more severe impact on China than on Japan. Responsible for over 90 percent of the world’s supply of rare earth, the embargo undermined China’s position as a reliable supplier. Moreover, the embargo has hurt China’s rare earth miners since Japan found alternatives in other countries including the United States, France, and Australia. To further illustrate the point, increasing economic openness and engagement in global institutions demonstrates China’s political will to implement pragmatic diplomacy. Its participation in a variety of international organizations requires the country to respect other countries and cooperate with them. Unfortunately, decades of patriotic education and media censorship prevent the Chinese public from understanding the other side of the argument and developing sensible judgments of the situation. Moreover, since foreign affairs is a vehicle that conveys China’s international importance to its domestic audiences, foreign policies should be consistent with the Party’s propaganda and “patriotic education.” For example, back in 2012, China and 62
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Japan started to discuss the possibility of establishing a currency swap union to enhance monetary resilience for both countries in future financial crises. In the same year, China, Japan, and South Korea announced the negotiations of the trilateral Free Trade Zone. Major players in East Asia seemed to agree on greater regional integration. However, the Diaoyu (or Sankaku) Island crisis resulted in a drastic decline of Sino-Japanese relations. The ensuing surge of nationalism in China intensified territorial disputes between China and Japan, and created political tensions between the two countries. China and Japan failed to finalize the currency swap agreement because of declining SinoJapanese relations. Additionally, the trilateral Free Trade Zone negotiations were significantly handicapped by the lack of political trust amongst China, Japan, and South Korea. Parochial and short-sighted public opinion resonate with the government’s nationalist propaganda, which encourages political elites to continue nationalist foreign policy, and consequently becomes a constraint to smart foreign policies in a globalized era.
NATIONALISM AS A STABILIZING POLICY China’s political elites encourage the growth of nationalism among its population with education and propaganda policies. In turn, they have to appeal to public opinions with nationalistic foreign policies, for fear that instability would ensue if they failed to do so. Fairbank observes that “China’s external order was so closely related to her internal order that one could not long survive without the other,” since domestic rebellion would rise up when its external situation was not stable. Nationalist foreign policies not only serve as an integrative tool generating unified national identity, but also as a stabilizing force that diverts grassroots attention from domestic issues. This inverse relationship between openness and stability in authoritarian regimes can be found in the below “J Curve.” FIGURE. 1: "J CURVE" AND CHINA'S STABILITY DILEMMA SOURCE: BREMMER, I (2006). THE J CURVE: A NEW WAY TO UNDERSTAND WIHY NATIONS RISE AND FALL. NEW YORK: SIMON & SHUSTER PAPERBACKS
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Due to its relatively closed political institutions, China is still on the left side of the curve.1 China’s political elites are well aware of the danger that more openness would expose the country to greater social instability because social injustice and income gaps are dangerously polarizing within the society. Nationalism gives people who exist in the lower tier of Chinese society a channel to vent their anger from a high moral ground and direct it towards foreign powers. If we look at patriotic movements in the wake of the Diaoyu (or “Sankaku”) Island incident, many people who spread jingoistic opinions on the internet, protested in the streets, smashed Japanese cars, and boycotted Japanese goods were extremely violent and restless.2 At the end of the day, these patriotic movements do not have any substantial effect on foreign countries. Rather, the Chinese suffered the most since a number of shops and restaurants were destroyed and a few people, who tried to protect their assets, were severely injured.3 Nevertheless, for Chinese political elites, it is better that these people unleash their indignation on international issues than on the government itself. Finally, the dilemma between openness and stability motivates China’s political elites to employ nationalism to gain political capital, hedging economic capital spent on the economic reform. Economic capital mainly refers to the resilience of the society to temporary economic downturns during the transition from centrally-controlled economy to market economy. Political capital is the public opinion towards the government’s legitimacy. Shifting from authoritative economy to market economy can be a destabilizing movement.4 There is a need for vested interests to be destroyed and social norms to be reshaped. Also, new winners and losers would emerge in the new system. Conflicts among interest groups are inevitable. Therefore, economic reform consumes the country’s economic capital and destabilizes the society. Similarly, political reform has the same destabilizing effect. While spending economic capital on economic reform, China hopes to maintain its social order by imposing stricter political controls.5 A myriad of social and economic problems emerged after the fast growth of China’s economy over the past 30 years of increased economic openness. Increased social tensions discouraged the willingness of China’s top leadership to materialize political reform. Moreover, even without the objections from the vested interests, it is also risky for the society to carry out drastic political reforms. According to the “J” curve, limited openness creates even more social instability.6 Without a peaceful power transfer mechanism, any effort in the political reform may catalyze serious social conflicts. On the contrary, a series of policies, nationalism included, are implemented to tighten the government’s control over the country. Consequently, China is increasingly open on the economic front while strict political regulations persist. Nationalism is an important element of China’s political propaganda. Because nationalism is closely linked to endorsing the Party’s rule and forming a unified identity, the country’s elites hope to gain 64
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more political capital so as to achieve a tradeoff between economic capital and political capital. Nationalistic foreign policy, too, is a part of the broader domestic politics. It has to project the image of a strong China to domestic audiences so as to forge national pride and unity, which would then translate into social stability.
CULTURAL TOPOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS China’s nationalistic foreign policies are greatly influenced by its domestic political environment. While China has made significant steps in integrating itself into the international community, the efforts are often set back by nationalistic public opinion. The struggle between openness and social stability determines that Chinese political elites value domestic stability more than international acknowledgement. They use nationalist sentiment as a political asset to forge a unified national identity and palliate various social conflicts. Lastly, as compared to domestic stability, China’s political elites are indifferent to the negative impacts of nationalistic foreign policies because domestic unrest poses the most imminent threat to the country’s security and development.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS Nationalism may effectively constrain China’s strategic choices and diplomatic gains from international cooperation. Christensen maintains that a nationalist approach in foreign policy may jeopardize China’s grand strategy and international image.7 In the short run, there are limited policy tools to overhaul the negative effects of nationalism in China’s foreign policy, due to a lack of incentive from leadership and social instability. However, in the long term, minimizing the perverse influence of nationalism in China’s foreign policy would allow the country to have more flexibility and consistency in strategic choices, preventing other countries from misinterpreting its intentions. As discussed above, nationalism, if used selectively and properly, can be an effective unifying ideology that instantly brings the country together under extreme circumstances. In the beginning of the Reform and Opening Up, when communist ideology was at stake, the use of nationalism as a temporary integrative force was justifiable. However, the side effects of nationalism, such as parochialism (if not xenophobia), can also be significant and far-reaching. Nowadays, nationalism is part of the problem rather than the solution in establishing constructive foreign relations. The continuous promotion of nationalism—by spreading arrogance and anger in its people—makes it harder for China to cooperate with neighboring countries. Cultural topographic analysis offers policy implications for China and its international counterparts on how to move towards a closer relationship. International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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With regards to China, its national identity should be reflected and redesigned to cope with the changing international environment. Traditional values and classics do not automatically incentivize nationalistic sentiment; it is the selection and interpretation that produce and propagate nationalism. In fact, Chinese ancient classics contain numerous narratives on “harmony but not uniformity” and “mutual respect between countries” that could potentially foster cooperative approaches to international relations.8 Its new historical logic should be purposely designed as commensurate with the image of a cooperative, responsible and peace-loving country, moving from zero-sum towards positivesum thinking. Moreover, Sino-centrism should be restrained to the minimum because bias and bigotry have little positive impact on effective diplomacy. In light of domestic political concerns, nationalism offers a temporary solution to a variety of instabilities. Over the long run, a gradual movement beyond the tipping point of the “J” curve is the only viable choice to perpetuate a stable society. The departure from nationalism would make China’s commitment to a peaceful rise more credible to its international counterparts. China’s foreign policy will also have more flexibility and choices to respond to the changing international situations with rational thinking, rather than nationalistic impulse. For the U.S. and many international observers, cultural topographic analysis is critical to understand intangible motivations of China’s erratic foreign policy. China’s distinct historical logic explains the country’s drastic reactions to protect its dignity, at the expense of more diplomatic tensions. Sinocentrism contributed by both “confidence” and “insecurity” results in China’s craving for enhancing its self-image by soliciting international compliment or debasing other countries. Nationalism is also a convenient tool to divert domestic attentions outward. It is difficult to provide universal policy choices in dealing with China’s nationalistic foreign policy because countries, with their distinct strategic interests, cultural backgrounds, ideologies and values, will have different interpretations of the outcome of cultural topographic analysis. But substantial knowledge on cultural factors driving China’s nationalistic behavior definitely helps other countries to better negotiate with China and minimize strategic miscalculations.
CONCLUSIONS By following the analytical framework of cultural topography, we are able to conclude that China’s nationalist foreign policy is driven by the three cultural and social factors. Firstly, historical narratives and ancient classics offer a compelling evaluation system of current political events. With nationalism socialized in a positive way, it is hard for Chinese political elites to escape from the powerful cultural tendency. Secondly, “confident insecurity” prevents China from having a realistic evaluation of foreign countries and their intentions. Being unable to 66
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accommodate the glory of the ancient empire within the current international system, the Chinese have a high expectation of Chinas international image. Nationalism emerges when national pride is not satisfied. Moreover, a history of humiliation increases China’s deeply-rooted distrust of Western countries and the international system based on Western concepts. As a result, nationalist foreign policy has been an effective solution to the disagreement between China and the West on international issues. Given that, increased social tensions have not allowed China’s political leaders to move beyond nationalist thinking. They continue to use nationalism as part of a political agenda to maintain a cohesive and integrated society, which requires foreign policy to serve as an extension of domestic politics and to comply with the domestic nationalist propaganda. Although the negative effect of nationalism has become more prominent, we find no instant short-run solution due to the underlying social and political conditions. In the long run, overcoming the reliance on nationalistic policies would lead China to develop rational foreign policies and maintain social stability. This can be achieved by incorporating ideas that foster openness and inclusiveness from historical narratives and ancient classics. For other countries that are worried about China’s nationalism, cultural topographic analysis enables them to have better judgments on the negotiation table with China. ENDNOTES
1
Ibid.
2
Spegele, B., & Takashi, N. (2012). “Anti-Japan Protests Mount in China”. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578000092842756154
3
Qin A., & Wong, E. (2012). “Smashed Skull Serves as Grim Symbol of Seething Patriotism”. The New York Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/world/asia/xian-beatingbecomes-symbol-of-nationalism-gone-awry.html?_r=0
4
Bremmer, I. (2006). The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
5
Wang. Z. (2014). “Tiananmen as the Turning Point: China’s Impossible Balancing Act”. Time. Retrieved from: http://time.com/73594/china-tiananmen-square-25-years-later/
6
Bremmer, I. (2006). The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
7
Christensen, T. J. (2011). “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy”. Foreign Affairs, 90, 54-67.
8
Zhang, L. (2013). “China’s Traditional Cultural Values and National Identity”. Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. Retrieved from: http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=53613
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Swipe Left: U.S.-Russia Cooperation in Countering Digital Female ISIL Recruitment Amara Manoogian, Ken-Ben Chao, Daira Shcheglovia, Liya Khalikova
Amara Manoogian will graduate in May 2017 with an M.A. in Global Communications from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. She holds a B.A. in International Affairs with a Security Policy concentration, also from the Elliott School. Amara studies public diplomacy and the Olympic Movement, as well as media coverage of cybersecurity. Ken-Ben Chao is a senior at Stanford University studying political science and history with interdisciplinary honors in international security studies. Daria Shcheglova is a Ph.D. Candidate at Moscow State University in Moscow, Russia, studying social philosophy and political science. She holds an M.A. in Economics from the Institute of Economics and International Economic Relations at the Southern Federal University in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. Her interests include nation branding, Middle Eastern studies and ethnic studies. Liya Khalikova is currently pursuing her Master’s degree in international political economy and development at Fordham University as a Fulbright Scholar. She holds a B.A. in political science from the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. Her interests include political and economic development with a focus on the MENA region. ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the feasibility of and proposes a strategy for cooperation between the United States and Russia in the field of countering ISIL in the digital sphere. In doing so, we have identified female recruitment through digital networks as a niche area in which both countries may have overlapping interests and face comparable challenges. Our research consists of a literature review of existing academic studies regarding ISIL and terrorist network recruitment, conversations with both American and Russian experts in public diplomacy and international counterterrorism , an examination of recruitment narratives in the media, and a content analysis of Russian and American social media channels. Our research shows that the US and Russia may increase awareness of this issue among the public in both countries by
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highlighting stories of women who have survived life under ISIL and have escaped. It is crucial to create digital content that shares forms and methods of ISIL recruitment, and potential warning signs on social media, in simple and understandable language. We propose the creation and regular management of a micro-site and accompanying social media campaign to aggregate the stories of these women authentically and credibly, encouraging buy-in from the communities that most need this information. The Stanford U.S.-Russia Forum commissioned this paper in a Track II diplomatic effort between young scholars in the United States and the Russian Federation. Today, relations between the United States and Russia are the most strained they have been in the past ten years, and therefore, there are few opportunities for the two countries to find common ground on mutual international challenges. However, due to the existential threat that some of these challenges pose to both nations, it is clear that there must be cooperation on these key issues in order to work toward global stability. One of these areas of critical attention is the situation regarding the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Middle East, which has quickly expanded into a global threat. The Russian and U.S. governments are diametrically opposed regarding ways in which to seek an end to the conflict. Therefore, we see greater potential for a partnership between the two countries on a non-governmental level. According to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the problem of fastgrowing international terrorist networks that thrive in unstable political climates is the most pressing issue in the Middle East. Terrorism is considered one of the greatest threats globally, destabilizing political and social order and is no longer seen as simply a regional issue. For Russia and the United States, fighting terrorism has been a top priority domestically and internationally. Both countries have experienced terrorism first-hand – Russia’s struggle against terrorism has grown since the beginning of the first Chechen war in the 1990s and the unstable situation in the Caucasus. The United States has been waging its “War on Terror” since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Currently, the rise of ISIL and its use of digital media to spread propaganda and recruit supporters and fighters has taken the problem of terrorism into uncharted territory. The terrorist group’s aggressive, previously unmatched methods of online recruitment of both men and women, its possession of land, and its role in the rise in international terror attacks have made ISIL a grave threat to the global community. As both countries face serious repercussions as a result of ISIL’s growth, countering violent extremism digitally may be a niche area for cooperation between the United States and Russia. We came to this conclusion after conducting an analysis of ongoing anti-terrorism initiatives being implemented domestically by both countries, as well as initiatives of the United Kingdom and other Western nations; conversations with experts in public diplomacy, digital diplomacy, and counterterrorism; and media content analysis, which included analysis of social media platforms popular in both the United States and Russia.
WHY COLLABORATE THROUGH NON-GOVERNMENTAL MEANS? It is widely understood that there are very few realistic opportunities for cooperation between the United States and Russia in the field of counterterrorism, especially through traditional means.5 This limitation exists due to several factors. First, Russia’s 2014 military doctrine6 lists NATO and the United States as major foreign threats, which seemingly all but eliminates the possibility of forming a 70
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military alliance to fight terrorism.7 Second, both countries have differing longterm strategies and alliances in the Middle East region. In the case of Syria, the Russian government strongly supports the Assad regime, while the United States’ position has ranged from demanding that “[Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad must go ”8 to crafting a political transition that may or may not include Assad.9 Due to these strained relations, we assert that the best way for the two countries to collaborate on this issue is in a less-formal manner through non-governmental organizations, ideally through digital channels. Countering ISIL in the digital sphere is equally as important as using traditional military means, as the quasi-state has not only gained large swaths of physical territory, but also maintains a strong presence in all corners of the Internet. Therefore, this digital counterinsurgency effort should not be considered as an afterthought to both Russia’s and the United States’ military operations in the region, but as a critical component of the overall strategy to degrade ISIL. Furthermore, analysts and other professionals working for both governments who are trained in digital counterterrorism will be able to adapt their skills and apply them to countering other terrorist networks that operate in digital spaces. According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, the territory controlled by ISIL has the highest number of foreign fighters since Afghanistan in the 1980s, with recent reports estimating that 20,000 fighters are foreign recruits, nearly 20 percent of which are from Western countries, making a digital counterinsurgency aimed at curbing recruitment a top priority.10 However, countering ISIL digitally should not only be designed to stop the recruitment of foreign fighters, but should also work to counter propaganda motivating people to commit acts of violence and terrorism outside territory under ISIL control (i.e. attacks taking place in Western cities, etc.). We chose to specifically focus on the recruitment of women into terrorist networks because of the current lack in academic research on the topic. Although women do not make up the majority of individuals recruited by extremist networks, the tactics and processes by which women are recruited are important to examine to better understand the holistic nature of the rise of ISIL. Countering the ISIL narrative, particularly with regard to female recruitment, must come through sharing stories of women and girls impacted by ISIL and similar groups. The content must tell the stories of all women, whether they were recruited or held against their will. This digital platform can also serve as a grassroots tool to empower communities of men and women to stand up against extremism, and in particular, protect the rights of and empower women and girls who have been oppressed under ISIL. Countering the ISIL narrative through government-sanctioned or government-labeled counter-messaging has proven counterproductive. A government or multilateral organization like the United Nations cannot International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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solely generate material aimed at countering terrorism, as there would likely be a lack of buy-in from an already skeptical audience. We recommend the creation of a digital campaign, designed and maintained through collaboration between Russian and American private citizens, that would provide a forum for women and girls to share how extremism, and ISIL in particular, has negatively impacted their lives. This platform would create an online community where these stories can not only be shared with the public but also allows women who have had similar experiences to communicate with one another.
LITERATURE REVIEW In order to understand the landscape in which we will seek to forge this collaboration, we analyzed several schools of thought regarding countering ISIL recruitment, specifically female recruitment, in the digital space. We came to the conclusion that the current discussion in academia regarding ISIL online recruitment is focused on a range of topics that can be divided into four distinct groups: victims, content and recruitment methods, the profile and ideology of recruiters, and counterrecruitment efforts. However, none of the literature we reviewed offers policymakers comprehensive, actionable solutions to solve the conflict. For example, Saltman and Smith11 from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue explore the topic of gender and radicalization by focusing on women recruited by ISIL. They analyze ISIL propaganda specifically targeting females and investigate case studies from the United Kingdom. Even though Saltman and Smith claim to analyze the effectiveness of various countering tools and provide recommendations on de-radicalization and further counter-narrative work, it is brief. In their study, they specify at-risk groups and suggest the use of general online marketing tools already used by large international businesses in the prevention of radicalization, but do not specify those tools and the ways in which they could be implemented as part of existing counter-messaging strategies. Bergen, Schuster, and Sterman paint a portrait of Western foreign fighters joining ISIL.12 This research is one of few pieces that explains the threats foreign fighters pose to their countries of origin and/or other states, highlighting the impact that foreign fighters have on the U.S. While the content of the paper is quite informative, their recommendations are too general, too idealistic, and too hard to implement. For example, they suggest stemming the flow of fighters from Muslim countries to reduce ISIL manpower. However, this type strategy would likely be almost impossible to carry out successfully. Thompson does an excellent job of exploring why social media serves as an ideal platform for radicalization and recruitment, but his final recommendations are vague and do not provide clear policies for governments.13 The Brookings Institute conducted research on Twitter usage by ISIL supporters,14 which provides a useful overview of the demographics of the social media platform. 72
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The authors also suggest methods to discover, analyze, and deactivate ISIL accounts on Twitter. However, the research does not provide policymakers with either a systemized database for tracking these accounts or possible actions or policy recommendations on how to counter ISIL in cyberspace. Another major part of existing literature is dedicated to the history of the terror group15 and focuses on its recruiters. El-Badawy, Comerford, and Welby have conducted deep analysis of the values and ideologies of ISIL recruiters.16 They also compare recruiting strategies between al-Qaeda, ISIL, and Jabhat al-Nusra.17 However, one major flaw in this paper is that ideology is analyzed as a set of unchanging beliefs, and fails to trace changes in the rhetoric of these groups since their rise. While Alberto Fernandez18 has published a thorough outline of potential responses to ISIL propaganda and William McCants19 goes a step further in illuminating why ISIL propaganda is more successful than U.S. counterpropaganda, overall there are troubling gaps in the existing literature, the majority of which is theoretical, not practical. The literature does not provide analysis of what counter-methods work and reasons for their success, and methods are sporadically mentioned and not envisioned as part of a holistic counter-strategy. Further research should explore how social and digital media can be used to counter radicalization and recruitment beyond simply denying recruiters access to these platforms. It should include innovative ways to communicate a counter-narrative that shows the harmful effects of ISIL’s governance and recruitment. Further research could also seek a better understanding of the specific psychologies at play in the recruitment process and the specific strategies that recruiters use on social media. Given the lack of literature on designing and implementing effective policies to fight extremism online our research will outline a pragmatic and comprehensive approach to the narrative presented by ISIL in its recruitment.
ISIL’S RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES Western media has reported about ISIL’s successful recruitment process since 2013, when the terrorist group significantly expanded in Syria and Iraq, declaring itself a “caliphate.” Since then, ISIL has overshadowed its parent organization, al-Qaeda, and broadened its digital recruitment operations from the Middle East and North Africa to Western countries and Russia. 30,000 foreign fighters have gone to the Middle East to join ISIL and other terrorist groups since 2011. ISIL’s successful online recruitment efforts led to approximately half of these foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria to join the group in 2014. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shabab, and other terrorist organizations have since adopted the recruiting techniques International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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that ISIL uses. ISIL not only uses social media to spread its messages and recruit followers, including Westerners, but also to empower supporters to advocate on their behalf.20 ISIL’s online recruitment and strategy in social media has become a digital phenomenon that some scholars refer to as “Online-jihad 3.0,”21 even though spreading propaganda online and recruiting via social media on a global scale was first done by other militant groups, most recently the Free Syrian Army (FSA).22 The FSA spread their alternative vision of the conflict in the region and recruited locals to fight against the Assad regime, starting its own Arabic YouTube channel and releasing its own e-journal. The group’s online propaganda and recruitment methods, seen as highly efficient, are hard to combat and counter and were adopted by several militant extremist groups in the Middle East region including Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (Army of Emigrants and Supporters), Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar ash-Sham (Islamic Movement of the Free Men of the Levant), and others, including ISIL. While ISIL’s core doctrines and jihadist concepts are shared by a number of other Salafi-jihadist organizations, in many ways the group has redefined modern terrorism, specifically with regard to recruitment strategies. Many aspects of ISIL’s online strategy were developed while the group was still part of al-Qaeda. The more these two groups drifted apart and began to compete for power and influence in Iraq and Syria, the more their online strategies diverged, especially with regard to the use of social media.23
AL-QAEDA VERSUS ISIL ONLINE RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES ISIL still bases its propaganda on materials developed by al-Qaeda, including a manual written by al-Qaeda in Iraq called “A Course in the Art of Recruiting”.24 Local recruitment and propaganda sharing by al-Qaeda is mainly done offline through imams and madrasas and word of mouth. According to Weimann,25 al-Qaeda still relies heavily on “older” online platforms like websites and forums to communicate with potential recruits. ISIL takes these methods a step further by creating content that is platformspecific. Content is tailored to each different social media platform, includes translations and employs the use of propaganda photos and videos of ISIL territory and the people under their control. One of the main differences between ISIL and its predecessors is an approach to engaging young audiences through social media and “branding” itself. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban only posted theoretical literature online which rarely reached young audiences because the content was difficult to read.26 Below are five specific ways that ISIL has branded itself as different from any other terrorist organization operating today:
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1. 2.
3. 4. 5.
The declaration of a “caliphate” and its aim to establish a new world order that proclaims an Armageddon ideology. ISIL urges others to join the “State” as new citizens, not as members of a terrorist organization.27 Implementation of “smart” propaganda: ISIL packages its digital content into an easy-to-read format to reach all socio-economic demographics and takes into account the countries of origin and native languages of potential recruits.28 A focus on recruiting both locals and members of the international community (including non-Muslims). The group uses foreign recruits as propaganda in their digital communications system.29 ISIL recruits from the international Muslim community and also allows non-Muslim recruits to convert to Islam. Female recruitment plays an important role in the advancement of ISIL.30 Over 550 women have joined ISIL as migrants or foreign fighters.31
ISIL has successfully mobilized its brand and utilized a wide variety of online platforms with global appeal such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, YouTube, and Instagram, as well as platforms with more niche audiences, such as the biggest social network in Russia, VKontakte (VK) by: • Posting a wide variety of content specific to each online platform • Examples: Violent videos made to parody American blockbuster films and video games on YouTube; ISIL fighters with cats and flash mobs on Twitter • Posting content in local languages • Examples: Arabic, English, Russian, Pashto, French, Spanish • Engaging with and motivating individual users • Examples: Commenting on statuses, answering questions through direct-messaging within platforms32 ISIL developed a new and very successful model of online propaganda and recruitment, which was adapted by other terrorist groups and may be employed not only in the Middle East, but elsewhere as well. J.M. Berger of the George Washington University says that the group grooms new members by looking for potential supporters in Muslim-oriented digital networks to surrounding targets with a small community that interacts with them and then encourages the recruit to take action. Berger outlined the specific steps that ISIL takes online to recruit fighters in what he calls a five-part template: 1.
Discovery: ISIL recruiter discovers a potential recruit, or a potential recruit discovers ISIL.
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2. 3. 4. 5.
Create micro-community: ISIL supporters flock around potential recruits to surround them with social input. Isolation: Potential recruits are encouraged to cut ties with mainstream influences, families, friends, and local religious communities. Shift to private communications: ISIL supporters encourage targets to take their conversations about ISIL into private or encrypted messaging platforms. Identify and encourage action: ISIL supporters probe to identify what the target is most likely to do on behalf of the group (travel to join ISIL in the Middle East, or carry out lone wolf attacks at home) and encourage them to take action.33
ISIL’S RECRUITMENT OF FEMALES ISIL recognizes that women are a strategic asset in the success of their governing structure. However, women are often overlooked in Western counterterrorism efforts. There are several push and pull factors that influence women to join extremist groups like ISIL. Saltman and Smith from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue outline the following factors:34 Push Factors: 1. Feeling isolated socially and/or culturally, at times specifically with regard to Western culture 2. Feeling that the Muslim community is being persecuted and unfairly treated 3. Anger, sadness, and/or frustration over perceived lack of international action in response to unfair treatment of Muslims around the world Pull Factors: 1. Idealistic goals of religious duty and building a utopian “Caliphate state” 2. Belonging and sisterhood 3. Romanticization of the experience Romanticization of the experience, such as “falling in love,” “making new friends,” “getting married,” “finding people who understand,” etc. – is the pull factor most often used by ISIL recruiters. According to Saltman and Smith, there are at least four ways females can be used in ISIL (in many cases two or more roles can combine): • As wives and mothers - sometimes called sex jihad (e.g. Eva Robskih, Anastasia Kalabuh from Russia)
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• As recruiters, to communicate with potential newcomers via social media and convince them to join ISIL (e.g. Maria Pogorelova and Oksana Panina, both from Russia, or Aqsa Mahmood from the U.K.) • As matryrs or members of fighting groups (e.g. Diana Ramazanova, the perpetrator of an Istanbul terrorist act and Tashfeen Malik, one of the suicide attackers in San Bernardino, California) • As members of the all-female religious police Al-Khanssaa Brigade, whose job it is to fight on the front line or to make sure women abide by ISIL’s interpretation of shari’a law and punish those who do not (e.g. Aqsa Mahmood from the U.K.) • As professionals such as doctors, nurses or teachers, although this is rare (e.g. Shannon Maureen Conley from the U.S. who made an unsuccessful attempt to travel to Syria and join ISIL as a nurse)35
ISIL ONLINE RECRUITMENT AND COUNTERRECRUITMENT: RUSSIA CASE STUDY According to Soufan group’s data36 out of 20,000 foreign fighters that have joined ISIL, 2,400 are Russian and the numbers are still growing.37 Terrorist recruitment is a delicate question for Russia. Since the beginning of the first Chechen war in the 1990s, long before the appearance of ISIL, the issue of terrorist recruitment has been of great concern to Russia. Initially recruitment was done through local channels inside of the region, mainly in the Muslimpopulated Caucasus republics. First, males were recruited primarily to fight in the the Chechen civil wars and plan terrorist attacks across the country. Females were usually recruited after their husbands or family members had been recruited.38 Recruitment in Russia is not restricted to a specific geographic region, and ISIS recruits in many Russian regions and cities ranging from Moscow and Saint Petersburg to smaller towns further east. For example, Yekaterinburg, a city in the Ural region, was called the “third Russian capital of IS recruitment” by the media,39 after a story broke about the neutralization of the biggest ISIL cell in Russia, which consisted of seven men. However, the North Caucasus region actually produces the greatest number of new foreign fighter recruits for ISIL.40 In the Caucasus, direct recruitment, rather than digital, is the main channel. New fighters are recruited in mosques, via radicalized local leaders and friends. While online cases of recruitment exist, this is not the main method of recruitment, and is usually underreported in the media if the recruit is male. However, our research revealed that when a female is recruited, there is greater media attention.
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The issue of ISIL’s online recruitment and female recruitment in Russia caught public attention after spring 2015, when a Moscow State University student named Varvara Karaulova attempted to join ISIL and was caught, along with thirteen other Russian recruits, at the Syrian border. For Karaulova “falling in love” and “getting married” were the primary factors that inspired her to travel to Syria. She had been recruited by a man she met online on a sports forum.41 There are dozens of other examples42 and nearly all of them involve young females being recruited and trying to leave Russia to join ISIL in Syria or Iraq. However, a considerable number of female recruits, especially those who originate from the Caucasus, are recruited locally or through family members.
What are the main channels used for spreading ISIL propaganda in Russia?
Over the past few years, ISIL has intensified its propaganda across Russia with the intention of attracting more foreign fighters from Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union.43 Following English and Arabic, Russian is the third most common language of ISIL propaganda, according to the head of the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center, Andrei Novikov.44 In 2015, ISIL changed its approach and began to focus on engaging potential recruits via social media and various online channels by creating a large number of websites and content for traditional media (e.g. daily ISIL news radio stations, ISIL online magazines, CDs with subtitled videos). To recruit new people and maintain communication with loyal supporters, ISIL combines its usage of public networks such as Vkontakte (VK),45 YouTube, or Instagram, with adopting secure encrypted or hard-to-track tools like WhatsApp, Telegram, Skype, or Zello online radio.46 Unfortunately, there is not yet public data on the total number of ISIL followers on Russian social media and no information on their gender distribution.
What content is the most attractive to foreign fighters in Russia?
ISIL’s recruitment strategy towards Russians consists of interconnected tactics. The group maintains social media accounts for recruitment purposes, communication with supporters, and spreading videos and other types of content, which it also produces. ISIL’s recruiting methods and targeted content depend on the type of recruits – “cannon fodder” soldiers or “professionals.” To recruit potential members and increase its mass of loyal supporters, ISIL relies on propaganda videos distributed over social media. Initially, Russian language video content was translated from Arabic language sources, but by the end of 2015, ISIL’s media center for Russia and Post-Soviet states, al-Furat,47 began producing original videos.
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Who counters terrorism/ISIL in Russia?
In Russia, only governmental structures work in the area of countering terrorism. Center “E,” the Main Department for Combating Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, which was first started in the 1990s during the Chechen wars. Center “E” hunts down extremists online and offline, works undercover within extremist groups, takes down individuals through covert operations and attempts to de-radicalize individual recruits.48 They confront online propaganda mostly on Internet forums, specifically Islamic forums where Muslims search for wives, by tracing suspicious posts. Members at the Center work individually and immediately block newly formed extremist groups or individual accounts on VK, but this method is not effective in tracing the whole network of supporters and recruiters.49 A major problem with this strategy is that the organization is housed in the Ministry of Internal Affairs whose operatives are trained in law enforcement, but are not experienced in digital media. While their expertise is steeped in Russian law regarding terrorism, they are not considered the most effective conduits of counter-ISIL narratives, especially with young people. Upravlenie “K” (Management K) is also a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and one of the most secretive units. Management K specializes in cyber security, but is not very active in countering terrorism. Management K tends to use conservative methods when countering ISIL such as instant blocking of suspicious groups and accounts rather than using connections with these recruiters to expose whole cells of ISIL recruiters. Additionally, Russia’s Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs has created a new digital initiative designed to encourage Russians to report extremists, terrorism recruitment, and digital propaganda. The newly created Ministry of Northern Caucasus Affairs also works to combat ISIL recruitment in that region specifically.50 There are no substantial non-governmental initiatives we are aware of in this field in Russia. The Russian government insists on direct control and management of all counterterrorism efforts. As for indirect methods, some Islamic media outlets, like Kavkazskiy Uzel portray a more moderate version of Islam that contrasts with ISIL’s jihadist ideology. However, these media outlets are often not based in the Caucasus and Volga regions, where majority of Russian Muslims reside.
COUNTERING ISIL RECRUITMENT IN RUSSIA In recent years, the government has produced documents, such as the “Russian National Security Strategy until 2020” and “The Concept of Counter-Terrorism in the Russian Federation” and adopted several federal and regional laws, the most significant being “On combating terrorism,” “On Combating Extremist Activity,”51 that address counter-terrorism.”52 International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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Russia has established a de jure regulatory framework allowing the government to effectively prevent, combat, and minimize the consequences of terrorism and extremism online and offline on federal and local levels. In practice, however, Russian counterterrorism efforts are done regionally, addressing radicalized individuals rather than working to prevent further radicalization; local governments mostly focus on offline communication. Specialists in this field work closely with the Muslim community, including imams in mosques and other community leaders. Developing a strategy for countering ISIL both offline and online, and preventing further radicalization is a relatively new strategy for the Russian counter terrorism community. TABLE 1. COUNTERING EFFORTS IN RUSSIA
ISIL ONLINE RECRUITMENT AND COUNTERRECRUITMENT: UNITED STATES CASE STUDY ISIL recruitment in the United States is less physically networked than in Western European countries, possibly due to a more integrated American Muslim community and the sporadic, geographically-limited presence of radicalizing agents, like radical mosques and extremist imams. The system is much more decentralized and less professional than in most European countries. This however, does not mean that Americans are not being radicalized; it means that extremists are utilizing measures other than physically meeting with their recruits. According to the Soufan Group’s data, recruitment within the United States has mostly been reliant on digital channels. Recruiters connect with ISIL members, loyal supporters, and potential newcomers via social media, following up with peer-to-peer communication.53 80
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ISIL’s recruitment strategy proved successful; as of fall 2015, some 250 Americans have traveled to or attempted to travel to Syria/Iraq to join ISIL. There are more than 900 active investigations against ISIL sympathizers in all 50 states.54
What are the main channels used for spreading ISIL propaganda in the United States?
It is estimated that several thousand Americans consume ISIL propaganda online daily.55 The most popular ISIL recruiting tool in the U.S. is Twitter, but other social media platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook, and YouTube are also utilized to share video and other English-language content. The Program on Extremism at the George Washington University spent six months following ISIL’s online presence in the United States with a specific focus on 300 Americans identified on the Internet as ISIL sympathizers. The report found that ISIL “activists and sympathizers are active on a variety of platforms— including open forums, private messaging apps, and the dark web—but Twitter is by far the platform of choice.”56 Women purportedly operate one third of the tracked accounts in this study.57 However, since March 2016, the number of active Twitter accounts associated with ISIL propaganda, identified by their use of any of seven hashtags, declined from an average of 24,271 in August 2015 to 14,700.58
What content is the most attractive to foreign fighters in the United States?
Although the number of ISIL supporters on Twitter (46,000 in 2014) is a small fraction of the total number of Twitter users, the tactics used by ISIL to recruit Americans have proven particularly effective. In June 2015, Rukmini Callimachi, a reporter at the New York Times, wrote a story titled, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American,” which told the story of a young woman in Washington state who was convinced to convert to Islam by someone she met online. She was encouraged to leave her home to move to ISIL-controlled territory. For her story, Callimachi interviewed former ISIL recruiters, who told her “We look for people who are isolated. And if they are not isolated, then we isolate them.” Tweets and messages encouraging recruits to immerse themselves in learning about Islam or ISIL and its leadership, as well as conversations that provide a feeling of companionship, as opposed to brutal beheadings and suicide bombing videos, have proven to be the most effective when recruiting women.59
Who counters terrorism/ISIL in the United States?
In the United States, many government agencies and structures, as well as nongovernmental organizations and private businesses, counter ISIL recruitment. International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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The Center for Global Engagement (formerly called the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications60), which is housed in the public diplomacy section of the U.S. Department of State, is the interagency body charged with publically countering ISIL propaganda on behalf of the U.S. government. The State Department has been attempting to push anti-ISIL propaganda by creating several social media campaigns and using multiple digital platforms including Twitter and the State Department’s blog, DipNote.61 In February 2016, the White House hosted the “Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.”62 However, because of the connotation that the U.S. Department of State branding carries, the CSCC’s efforts are often not considered credible by populations that are already at risk of being enticed and recruited by ISIL Outside of the government, non-governmental organizations and private corporations are working to stop the use of social media and the Internet in general for terrorist recruitment and the spread of Islamic extremism. One of the most prominent NGO’s in the United States for counter-ISIL efforts is the Counter Extremism Project (CEP).63 Headed by former ambassadors, CEP shares research on foreign fighters and counterterrorism efforts in various countries, and runs campaigns designed to take action against terrorist organizations and encourage social media companies to do the same. Twitter has shut down more than 125,000 accounts “for threatening or promoting terrorist acts, primarily related to ISIS.”64 In June 2015, the Obama Administration convened the top minds in the U.S. film industry, social media, and premium cable TV to brainstorm how to counter propaganda, as ISIL often rips off Hollywood by mimicking blockbuster films.
COUNTERING ISIL RECRUITMENT IN THE UNITED STATES U.S. efforts to use digital media to counter ISIL have evolved over the past three years. These efforts began with very government-centric messaging, with the State Department dictating the tone and tenor of American anti-ISIL messaging. The then-Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications produced counter-ISIL content that was shared across digital platforms, beginning with the unsuccessful “Think Again, Turn Away” campaign. This campaign’s cornerstone was a video called, “Welcome to ISIS Land,” which mocked ISIL’s promises of a utopian society using graphic images of life on the ground. Alberto Fernandez, a former diplomat who ran the center, explained that it was meant to “like a war room in a political campaign—shake things up, attack ads, opposition research.”65 The backlash from this campaign was massive. Critics within the White House and State Department saw the use of these graphics as aiding ISIL, and the campaign as a disturbing embrace of the enemy’s playbook.66 Eventually, this communication method proved to be counterintuitive and other parts of the executive branch, including the White 82
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House, began to strategize other ways to counter violent extremism through a combination of online and offline tactics. On September 29, 2015, the White House hosted the first ever Leadership Summit on anti-ISIL and Countering Violent Extremism. During the UN General Assembly, the State Department and the Counter Extremism Project co-hosted the Global Youth Summit, which convened young people from around the world who are fighting extremism in their local communities. These summits and high-level meetings all presented similar conclusions: the best way to fight extremism in the digital space is to create content that promotes the stories of young people living in the region and have experienced the real impacts of ISIL or stories of people who have been recruited by ISIL, but eventually stood up and fought against extremism.67 This campaign, titled “Why They Left Daesh”, is a digital collaboration between the United States, the United Kingdom, and NGOs, such as Quilliam. Thus far, the campaign includes 13 videos and 36 social media banners. In January 2015, the organization re-branded itself as the Global Engagement Center (GEC). Rather than using its digital platforms to use similar imagery to counter ISIL’s propaganda, stories about “#LifeUnderDaesh” are shared with the public that show the stresses and challenges that people living within ISIL-controlled territory face on a daily basis. GEC’s Twitter account has 26,476 followers, which is significant for a government organization that has undergone an intense rebranding process.68 However, this account is only one amongst a sea of ISIL propaganda accounts. TABLE 2. COUNTERING EFFORTS IN THE U.S.
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Digital counterterrorism efforts in the United States and Russia differ significantly; Russia prefers to keep the effort tightly managed by the government, while the United States encourages coordination between the public and private sectors, as well as stand-alone efforts by social media companies, NGOs, and government. TABLE 3. HOW DOES COUNTERING WORK?
ISIL “narrowcasts” their digital media, which means that their campaigns “micro-target” certain groups based on gender, where they live, socio-economic status, and other factors.69 By implementing new counter-ISIL digital strategies, Russia may be able to prevent early cases of radicalization. In order to successfully counter the ISIL narrative and recruitment strategy, especially with regard to women, both countries should use messaging that shares individual narratives of the women and children impacted by ISIL on the ground in the Middle East, as well as stories of individuals who have fled or defected. A great deal of ISIL’s success can be attributed to their eye-catching graphics and engrossing videos. Therefore, to not only counter the group’s narrative, but also its innovation and technology usage, we recommend a strategy that empowers individuals from multiple disciplines, including graphic designers, artists, political scientists, communicators, grassroots activists, and others who can leverage their skills to craft and share creative, engaging content across multiple platforms. While this may prove to be a difficult venture, we believe that this multidisciplinary approach is wholly necessary to create a successful approach to countering ISIL in the digital space in both the United States and Russia. Since there is little cooperation between the governments of the United States and Russia on the subject of digital counter-ISIL efforts, we recommend the creation of an online platform or website that is both desktop and mobile 84
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responsive, which is used to share the stories of women and girls who have been affected by the spread of extremism and ISIL in both the Middle East and around the world. We envision utilizing a platform similar to “Syria Deeply,” a news aggregation site developed by Lara Setrakian “designed to provide you with a complete understanding of the Syrian conflict from all angles, including all the major players, issues, and drivers of the civil war.”70 Similar to the “Syria Deeply” platform, it would share creative content created by multidisciplinary stakeholders that is ‘narrowcast’ for different groups in an effort to directly counter ISIL’s recruitment efforts. While we understand that there are obvious benefits to shutting down Twitter accounts and other ISIL propaganda-sharing accounts on digital platforms, we believe that the space for collaboration between stakeholders in the United States and Russia exists in creating a distinctly separate narrative that elevates credible, individual voices that would normally not be heard in the fight against ISIL. ENDNOTES
1
This article is based on a presentation delivered at Stanford University on April 20, 2016. We thank Yury Barmin, Leonid Isaev, Igor Zlatojev and P.J. Crowley for expert opinions and thoughtful comments on the research.
2
“Kissinger: Russia-U.S. dialogue must focus on shared future, not conflict,” Russia Beyond The Headlines, February 4, 2016. http://rbth.com/politics_and_society/2016/02/04/henrykissinger_565099
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Ban, Ki-moon. “Remarks to Security Council High-Level Summit on Foreign Terrorist Fighters.” Speech. September 24, 2014. Accessed November 5, 2016. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/ speeches/2014-09-24/remarks-security-council-high-level-summit-foreign-terrorist-fighters#. VCRbKPldV8F.
4
Office of the Press Se. “FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.” The White House. February 18, 2015. Accessed November 05, 2016.
5
See scholars J.M. Berger, and Fiona Hill.
6
The President approved new edition of Military Doctrine, Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, last modified December 26, 2014, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47334.
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“Russia’s New Military Doctrine Lists NATO, US as Major Foreign Threats,” RT International, December 26, 2014, Accessed May 10, 2016. https://www.rt.com/news/217823-putin-russianmilitary-doctrine/
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Scott Wilson, and Joby Warrick, “Assad Must Go, Obama Says,” Washington Post, August 18, 2011, Accessed May 10, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/assad-must-go-obamasays/2011/08/18/gIQAelheOJ_story.html
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Josh Rogin, “Obama No Longer Seems Sure Assad Must Go,” Bloomberg.com, December 7, 2015, Accessed May 10, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-12-07/obama-no-longerseems-sure-assad-must-go.
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10 Stevens, Tim, and Peter R. Neumann. “Countering Online Radicalisation A Strategy for Action.” ICSR. 2009. Accessed November 5, 2016. http://icsr.info/wp-content/ uploads/2012/10/1236768491ICSROnlineRadicalisationReport.pdf. 11 Erin Marie Saltman, and Melanie Smith. “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’ Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, February 2016, Accessed May 16, 2016, http://www. strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_ the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf 12
Peter Bergen, Courtney Schuster, and David Sterman, “ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism,” New America (2015), Accessed May 25, 2016, https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/11813-isisin-the-west-2/ISP-Isis-In-The-West-v2.b4f2e9e3a7c94b9e9bd2a293bae2e759.pdf.
13 Robin L. Thompson, “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 167-190, Accessed October 17, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1146&context=jss. 14 J.M. Berger, and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper No. 20 (2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isistwitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf. 15 Truls Hallberg Tønnessen, “Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The Relationship Between al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/ pt/index.php/pot/article/view/443/874 16 Emman El-Badawy, Milo Comerford, and Peter Welby, “Inside the Jihadi Mind: Understanding Ideology and Propaganda,” Center on Religion and Geopolitics, Tony Blair Faith Foundation (2015), http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Inside%20the%20Jihadi%20Mind.pdf 17 Emman El-Badawy, Milo Comerford, and Peter Welby, “Inside the Jihadi Mind: Understanding Ideology and Propaganda,” Center on Religion and Geopolitics, Tony Blair Faith Foundation (2015), http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Inside%20the%20Jihadi%20Mind.pdf 18 Alberto M. Fernandez, “Here to Stay and Growing: Combating ISIS Propaganda Networks,” The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, U.S.-Islamic World Forum Papers (2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/10/combating-isis-propagandafernandez/is-propaganda_web_english_v2.pdf; Alberto M. Fernandez, “Four Ways to Counter ISIS Propaganda More Effectively,” The Brookings Institution, accessed May 25, 2016: http://www. brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/11/16-countering-isis-propaganda-fernandez?cid=0090001 5020149101US0001-1116 19 William McCants, and Clint Watts, “Why the United States Can’t Make a Magazine Like ISIS,” The Brookings Institution, Accessed May 25, 2016: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/ posts/2016/01/13-us-magazine-like-isis-mccants-watts. 20 “Hashtag Terror: How ISIS Manipulates Social Media,” Anti-Defamation League, Accessed May 25, 2016: http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/international-extremism-terrorism/c/isis-islamic-statesocial-media.html 21 Elena Zinovieva, “«Online-jihad 3.0»: kak IGIL ispol’zuet sovremennye media,” (in Russian), MGIMO University, March 17, 2015, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://mgimo.ru/about/news/ experts/269383/ 22 Leonid Isaev (Expert on the Middle East region; Deputy Head of the Laboratory for Monitoring the Risks of Socio-Political Destabilization, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia), in interview with authors, December 2015. 23 Laura Ryan, “Al-Qaida and ISIS Use Twitter Differently. Here’s How and Why,” National Journal, Accessed May 25, 2016: https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/619843/al-qaida-isis-use-twitterdifferently-heres-how-why
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24 This fact was mentioned in an article by Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American,” The New York Times, June 27, 2015, Accessed September 17, 2015: http://www.nytimes. com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online-recruiting-american.html?_r=0 25 Gabriel Weinmann (professor of communication at Haifa University, Israel) cited in an article by Laura Ryan, “Al-Qaida and ISIS Use Twitter Differently. Here’s How and Why,” National Journal, October 10, 2014, Accessed May 28, 2016, https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/619843/al-qaida-isisuse-twitter-differently-heres-how-why 26 Yury Barmin (Analyst of Russian strategy in the Middle East, Russia), in interview with authors, December 2015. 27 Katherine Leggiero, “Countering ISIS Recruitment in Western Nations,” Journal of Political Risk, 3, no.1 (2015), http://www.jpolrisk.com/countering-western-recruitment-of-isis-fighters/ 28 Laura Ryan, “Al-Qaida and ISIS Use Twitter Differently. Here’s How and Why,” National Journal, October 10, 2014, Accessed May 28, 2016, https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/619843/al-qaida-isisuse-twitter-differently-heres-how-why 29 Laura Ryan, “Al-Qaida and ISIS Use Twitter Differently. Here’s How and Why,” National Journal, October 10, 2014, Accessed May 28, 2016, https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/619843/al-qaida-isisuse-twitter-differently-heres-how-why 30 Erin Marie Saltman, and Melanie Smith, “Till Martyrdom Do us Part: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2015), http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/ uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf 31 Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” The Soufan Group, June, 2014, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria. pdf; For a discussion on numbers, see also: Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s,” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, January 26, 2015, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://icsr.info/2015/01/ foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/; See also: “CIA says IS numbers underestimated,” Al Jazeera, 12 September, 2014, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ middleeast/2014/09/cia-triples-number-islamic-statefighters-201491232912623733.html 32 Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. “Russia’s ‘Facebook’ Cracking Down on ISIS Accounts.” Mashable. September 12, 2014. Accessed November 05, 2016. http://mashable.com/2014/09/12/isis-islamicstate-vkontakte-russia/. 33 J.M. Berger, “How terrorists recruit online (and how to stop it),” The Brookings Institution, November 9, 2015, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/11/09countering-violent-extremism-online-berger 34 Erin Marie Saltman, and Melanie Smith, “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’ Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon,” 9-13, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, February 2016, Accessed May 16, 2016, http:// www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_ and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf 35 Erin Marie Saltman, and Melanie Smith, “Till Martyrdom Do us Part: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2015), http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/ uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf 36 “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” The Soufan Group, December, 2015, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/ uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf 37 Number of foreign fighters from Russia and former Soviet Republics in Central Asia has risen significantly; some estimates suggest a near 300 percent increase since June 2014.
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38 Bhattacharji, Preeti. “Chechen Terrorism (Russia, Chechnya, Separatist).” Council on Foreign Relations. April 08, 2010. Accessed November 05, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/separatist-terrorism/ chechen-terrorism-russia-chechnya-separatist/p9181. 39 “Igil etazhom vyshe. Kak Yekaterinburg stal stolitsei radikalizma,” (in Russian), Sobesednik, February 21, 2016, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://sobesednik.ru/rassledovanie/20160221-igil-etazhom-vyshekak-ekaterinburg-stal-stolicey-radikaliz 40 “Islamskoe gosudarstvo i vihodtsy s Kavkaza,” (in Russian), Kavkazskiy uzel, March 25, 2015, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/251513/; Amanda Paul, “Foreign Fighters from the Caucasus,” NRT News, July 21, 2015, Accessed May 28, 2016. http://nrttv.com/EN/birura-details. aspx?Jimare=1358 41 More about “Varvara Karaulova case”: “Russian philosophy student turned ‘ISIS recruit’ arrested on charges of aiding terrorist group,” RT, October 28, 2015, Accessed May 25, 2016, https://www.rt.com/ news/320000-isis-recruit-student-arrested/ 42 For example, Anastasia Kalabuh, Oxana Panina, Tatiana Ivanenko, Eva Robsky from Kuban region, Russia joined ISIL: Alexandra Proskurina, “Specreportazh: Verbovka zhitelej Kubani v IGIL,” (in Russian), Kuban 24, September 29, 2915, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://kuban24.tv/item/ spetsreportaj-verbovka-jiteley-kubani-v-igil-132373; Maria Pogorelova from Saint Petersburg, “Jevoljucija protesta: ot skinhead-girl do «beloj» shahidki,” (in Russian), Fontanka, April 15, 2015, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.fontanka.ru/2015/04/15/119/ 43 Joanna Paraszczuk, “Isis launches Russian-language propaganda channel,” The Guardian, July 13, 2015, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/13/isis-russia-caucasuschechnya-syria-progaganda-channel 44 “Russian Becomes One of Main Daesh Propaganda Languages,” Sputnik International, February 10, 2016, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://sputniknews.com/world/20160210/1034512514/russia-cisterrorism-propaganda.html 45 VK is a Russian-based social media platform, and is the second-most used social media platform in Europe behind Facebook. 46 Zello on-line radio works as a radio set letting to send voice messages to a channel. According to Middle East analyst Yury Barmin, one of the popular formats distributed through ISIL Zello channels is live-reports from Syria told by ISIL fighters. 47 More about Furat: “«Islamskoe gosudarstvo» razvernulo propagandu na russkom jazyke,” (in Russian), BBC Russia, October 20, 2015, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/russian/ international/2015/10/151020_islamic_state_russian_propaganda. 48 More about Management K kea areas of work: “Osnovnye napravlenija raboty Upravlenija «K» BSTM MVD Rossii,” (in Russian) MVD Official site, https://xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/mvd/structure1/ Upravlenija/Upravlenie_K_MVD_Rossii. 49 According to Yury Barmin (Analyst of Russian strategy in the Middle East, Russia), in interview with authors, December 2015. 50 More about Management K kea areas of work: “Osnovnye napravlenija raboty Upravlenija «K» BSTM MVD Rossii,” (in Russian) MVD Official site, https://xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/mvd/structure1/ Upravlenija/Upravlenie_K_MVD_Rossii. 51 Oliker, Olga. “Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. January 07, 2016. Accessed November 05, 2016. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy. 52 Oliker, Olga. “Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. January 07, 2016. Accessed November 05, 2016. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy.
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53 “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” The Soufan Group, December, 2015, Accessed May 28, 2016, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/ uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf 54 Temple-Raston, Dina, and Steve Inskeep. “Report: 250 Americans Have Gone To Syria And Iraq To Fight.” NPR. September 29, 2016. Accessed November 05, 2016. http://www.npr. org/2015/09/29/444398846/report-250-americans-have-gone-to-syria-and-iraq-to-fight. 55 Kaylen Tanner, “Detailed Report Looks at the Methods Used to Spread ISIS Propoganda on this Social Media Website,” Rare, Accessed May 25, 2016: http://rare.us/story/detailed-report-looks-atthe-methods-used-to-spread-isis-propaganda-on-this-social-media-website/. 56 “From Retweets to Raqqa: The American ISIS Twitter Scene,” Program on Extremism, George Washington University, accessed May 25, 2016, https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/ downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Twitter.pdf 57 Ibid. 58 Doug Bolton, “ISIS Twitter Activity Declines by 40% After Crackdown – but the Battle Continues,” The Independent, April 14, 2016, Accessed May 25, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/ gadgets-and-tech/news/isis-twitter-propaganda-crackdown-accounts-social-media-a6984736.html. 59 Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American,” The New York Times, June 27, 2015, Accessed September 17, 2015: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-onlinerecruiting-american.html?_r=0. 60 Fernandez, Alberto. “Terrorist, Regime, and Western Media: The War of Ideas in the Disinformation Age.” Speech, Conference at the Newseum, Washington. December 11, 2013. Accessed November 5, 2016. http://www.state.gov/r/cscc/releases/218606.htm. 61 Hussein, Rashad. “Utilizing Partnerships and Messaging Centers to Combat the ISIL Narrative.” Dipnote: The Official Blog of the U.S. Department of State. November 23, 2015. Accessed November 05, 2016. http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2015/11/23/utilizing-partnerships-and-messaging-centerscombat-isil-narrative. 62 Office of the Press Se. “FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.” The White House. February 18, 2015. Accessed November 05, 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism. 63 Counter Extremism Project, http://www.counterextremism.com 64 Krishnadev Calamur, “Twitter’s New ISIS Policy,” The Atlantic, February 5, 2016, Accessed May 26, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/02/twitter-isis/460269/ 65 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-a-propaganda-war-us-tried-to-playby-the-enemys-rules/2015/05/08/6eb6b732-e52f-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.html 66 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-a-propaganda-war-us-tried-to-playby-the-enemys-rules/2015/05/08/6eb6b732-e52f-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.html 67 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/29/leaders-summit-countering-isil-andviolent-extremism 68 Global Engagement Center. https://twitter.com/TheGEC 69 https://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/ 70 https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria
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Review: The International Law of Disaster Relief Edited by David D. Caron, Michael J. Kelly, Anastasia Telesetsky Warren Kessler Warren Kessler is a 3L at The George Washington University Law School where he serves as Editor-in-Chief of the Federal Communications Law Journal. He earned a B.A. in International Affairs from GW's Elliott School of International Affairs ('09) and has interned at the Department of Justice, Federal Communications Commission, and the United States Senate.
A common thread that runs through this impressive collection of scholarly works is introduced early on; the legal framework for disaster response is nearly as random as the events themselves. Whether it is the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, or this year’s devastating droughts in East Africa, there seems to be no shortage of human victims of natural disasters. Additionally, disaster response at times looks similar to the aftermath of a car accident, with survivors and witnesses left to pick up the pieces. However, despite the omnipresent threat of natural disasters, laws at the international and domestic levels are inconsistent at best and, at worst, can even exacerbate the crisis at hand. What is the best course of action for a host state and the international community before and after a disaster occurs? What rights must be protected and what kinds of corresponding duties and obligations are present? It is these questions, along with their many uncertainties, affected parties, and the legal and philosophical underpinnings of potential legal frameworks with which the contributors and editors of The International Law of Disaster Relief wrestle. In response to the devastating 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, which caused the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown, the Four Societies - consisting of the international law societies of Australia and New Zealand, Canada, Japan, and the United States - decided to focus on the international law of disasters for their 2012 conference. This resulting volume is a comprehensive and wide-spanning collection of 17 proposals, policy papers, International Affairs Review / Winter 2017
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and case studies. The individual contributors tend to come from at least one of three general backgrounds: academia , government legal advisory positions, and non-governmental organizations - and the individual articles certainly reflect this. Nearly every article discusses the individual roles of experts, governments (both host nations and outside nations), and the increasing scope and power of NGOs in times of disaster. The contributors offer compelling, and oftentimes opposing views of these roles, as well as thoughts on the efficacy of each of these actors in past actions. Additionally, while the selection of contributors provides the reader with effective case studies of individual government frameworks or approaches to disaster response, it is no shock that nearly all of these case studies are based on the actions of governments of Four Societies member states. It should also come as no surprise that a great deal of ink is dedicated to the Japanese response to the 2011 events. There is a great deal of overlap in the introductions and histories of some of the legal frameworks and guidelines that are regularly referenced, such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance, as well as the UN Draft Articles on Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters. The fact that these two frameworks in particular were regularly re-introduced by the contributors and the decision to include both texts in full as appendices will be particularly helpful to a reader that is being presented with these materials (or this topic) for the first time. While the articles themselves are effectively organized in five separate topics (legal theory, local to global response, right of access, anticipatory responses from state actors, and anticipatory responses from NGOs), there are four main ideas that run through nearly all of the articles: the inadequacy of the status quo, the importance of preparedness and planning ahead, the humanitarian roots of disaster relief law, and the conflict between sovereignty and outside relief.
INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM/STATUS OF FRAMEWORK Nearly every contributor notes that the current framework is a hodgepodge of non-binding laws, guidelines, and recommendations are not sustainable and are not nearly as effective as they should be. For every botched recovery, delayed flight into a disaster zone, or episode of political grandstanding prior to allowing a response team into an affected nation, lives are lost. While discussing disparate topics, nearly every contributor addresses this problem. Imogen Saunders, when discussing sources of international law, refers to the current infrastructure as “scarce” (29). In her chapter addressing 92
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the Japanese response to the release of nuclear material into the Pacific, Yukari Takamura credits the confusion to “lacunae in international rules” regarding nuclear pollution (109). Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu effectively argues that the current legal framework regarding economic emergencies has led to “inadequate” responses (316). Additionally, several contributors discuss the conflict between the “topdown” approach of creating rules and principles at the international level with the purpose of effecting individual domestic frameworks and the “bottom-up” approach of developing such laws and principles at the domestic level with the expectation that these will develop into regional and international norms. (86) Preparedness Immediately in the first chapter, Daniel Farber introduces his “cycle of disaster law,” placing a premium on the risk mitigation aspect. (10) He, along with several other contributors, remind the reader that the first step to lessening the severity of a disaster is preparing for it ahead of time. While some contributors argue that one aspect to preparedness comes in the form of a legal framework, Paul Govind, argues that widespread climate change adaptation funding as the most effective way of preparing for (and mitigating) the effects of disasters. Despite their differences, these two methods share in their goals of reducing vulnerability and the promotion of sustainable economic development. Preparedness is explored in a variety of ways. Several chapters are devoted to the importance of preparing for disaster by developing legal frameworks and international norms to assist the most vulnerable, including the disabled, women, and migrants. Brian R. Israel offers an interesting insight into space-based remote sensing technology and argues that preparedness means developing frameworks for utilizing and sharing technology with efficacy and agility. (236)
PRINCIPLES OF DISASTER RELIEF ARE BASED ON HUMANITARIAN LAW When justifying the importance of a legal regime or framework, many of the contributors remind the reader that disaster relief, as a doctrine, is based on the same principles and norms of humanitarian law, a much more developed area of international law. Whether it is Katie Sykes’s exploration of deriving protections and rights for migrants from existing legal frameworks in times of disaster (191), or Akiko Ito’s discussion of the specific vulnerabilities and challenges that disabled individuals face,, the book regularly reminds its readers that while disasters are often reviewed in a macro way, these events hurt individual people (and some types of people more than others).
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CONFLICTS OF SOVEREIGNTY Several chapters discuss the importance of working with and around the idea of national sovereignty when dealing with disaster-stricken nations. In Catherine Shanahan Renshaw’s aptly titled chapter “Disasters, Despots, and Gun-Boat Diplomacy,” the author uses the response to Cyclone Nargis to discuss the limits of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and shows that, based on Myanmar’s opposition to outside assistance directly after Nargis in 2008, it is incorrect to assume that a disaster-stricken country will always want outside assistance. Brian Israel’s chapter on space-based technology also deals with the understandable discomfort states may feel when being observed from space by a different nation or a private satellite, even in the case of an emergency. The collection of articles states clearly that despite the fact that sovereignty is a time-honored tradition and is at the root of international law, it can also greatly limit the ability of outside nations and groups to alleviate suffering inside an impacted nation.
CONCLUSION Another idea that is brought up in nearly every chapter (between the lines if not explicitly), is the fact that the need for a legal framework for disaster response is growing increasingly dire every year due to the conflict between anthropogenic climate change and unsustainable development. The intensity of storms will only continue to grow and the severity of droughts and corresponding food shortages will become even more painful. In the past, publications such as this may have used hedging language, warning about the potential for disasters if humans don’t get their act together, or the possibility that some are more vulnerable than others to the effects of potential climate change. The contributors to this book do not mince words; humans must adapt to climate change and if we do not, disaster response will become much harder to navigate. It seems that every month there is another city being wiped away, or another nation on a fault line crumbling at its seams. The Four Societies has put together an all-encompassing and accessible guide to the current state of the law of disaster relief and many of its applications and controversies. For any reader interested in this emerging and desperately-underrepresented field, The International Law of Disaster Relief serves as an excellent introduction and source of reference.
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