Stability Operations Magazine Vol. 8, No. 3 (November-December 2012) by Jessica Vogel

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E NGAGING P A RT NERS G L OBAL L Y F OR S T ABIL IT Y , P E ACE & D EVEL OPMENT

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Global Perspectives

Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

24 Ending Human Trafficking in U.S. Government Contracts Implications for Federal Contractors Michele Clark

26 A West African Time Bomb

8 Strategy, National Security, and Social

Islamic Jihadists Establish an Al-Qaeda Franchise in Northern Mali

Change Exploring an Evolving Security Environment

Herman J. Cohen

Dana Eyre, PhD

11 Mentoring with the Goal of Stability

Interview

Lessons from Afghan National Army Training Lee Mersek

21 A conversation with Mark Kroeker

Police Training in an Evolving United Nations

13 Sandhurst in the Sand

Bringing British Training to Afghanistan Alan Capps

18 Post-Conflict Law and Order

Short Takes from a Recent Stimson Study Fiona Mangan, Dr William Durch and Michelle Ker

F From H Headquarters

From the Editor’s Desk

President’s Message

ISOA Member News & Jobs Board

ISOA Membership Directory

From Headquarters | From the Editor’s Desk

Reaching the Summit A Bi-Monthly Review of ISOA’s Activities: September & October Jessica Mueller ALL IS A TIME OF CHANGE. Leaves turn yellow and trees become bare. Students return to school. Congress comes back in to session. At ISOA, we hold the Annual Summit. And this year, it was truly a change—and definitely one for the better. The 2012 ISOA Annual Summit took on a new shape and format, and tried out a new venue. With the theme Learn. Adapt. Grow. it embraced the many changes that we have seen over the past year, and anticipate in the coming year. The focus on partnerships, business development, and strategic thinking was paramount, and the caliber of speakers across the board was unprecedented. In fact, the entire Summit proved to be unprecedented from a historical perspective as we broke registration and media coverage records. But the real takeaway was not on the quantifiable side. The real success of this year’s event came straight from feedback from the attendees themselves, from industry leaders to field implementers to policymakers. I personally heard comments from attendees that I had not heard before. Attendees were saying, “I’ve never been able to have conversations with these types of people before,” or “I’ve learned far more than I expected too.” That’s when we, the ISOA staff, knew that we had hit the nail right on the head—or at least as close as we could get. So how can we change post-Summit? We’ve all heard the old adage, if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it, and we wholeheartedly agree. But we are not satisfied with the status quo either. Using quantifiable data and survey feedback from the 2012 Summit, we look forward to creating a 2013 event that will be even better. Our members and all of the attendees from the 2011 and 2012 Summits know that this event isn’t just another conference—it’s an opportunity. Some attend for the engagement and partnership building; some attend for business development; and some attend to simply learn something. And the Summit provides a positive and conducive environment for all three of those goals. We plan to do it even better next year, and provide the opportunity for even more people from the wider stabilization, disaster relief and development community to take advantage of a substantive and valuable event. ■ For a full overview of the 2012 ISOA Annual Summit, see the Event Review on pages 16 and 17 of this issue.

ISOA Congratulates our 2013 Board of Directors Fall also means the annual Board of Directors election. Congratulations to Howie Lind of Fluor and Patrick Garvey of Triple Canopy who begin new 2-year terms on 1 November 2012! 2013 ISOA Board of Directors Chair: Pete Dordal, GardaWorld Will Imbrie, Dyncorp International Tom Callahan, PAE Rob Hood, CH2M Hill Jeff Grieco, IRD Howie Lind, Fluor Patrick Garvey, Triple Canopy Jessica Mueller is the Director of Programs & Operations at the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) and the Editor-in-Chief of Stability Operations magazine. Contact Ms. Vogel at jvogel@stability-operations.org.

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E NG AG ING P ARTNERS G LO BALLY FO R S TABILITY , P EACE & D EVEL OPMENT

STABILITY OPERATIONS MAGAZINE IS THE WORLD’S ONLY PUBLICATION EXPLORING TOPICS PERTINENT TO PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND NONGOVERNMENTAL SECTOR ACTORS PARTNERING IN PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS. SO IS PUBLISHED 6 TIMES PER YEAR BY ISOA, A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP OF PRIVATE SECTOR AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDING CRITICAL SERVICES IN FRAGILE ENVIRONMENTS WORLDWIDE.

Editor-in-Chief Jessica Mueller Assistant Editor Alaina Monismith Contributing Editor Naveed Bandali Publisher Doug Brooks Business Manager Jason Kennedy ISOA welcomes submissions for all SO magazine content. The editorial team reserves the right to accept or reject submissions for print and/or online use. The opinions expressed herein or on peaceops.com do not necessarily represent the opinions of ISOA, its officers, Board of Directors, members or affiliates. ISOA bears no responsibility for the editorial content. Views expressed in articles are those of the authors. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the Editor-in-Chief. ISOA members receive a limited number of subscriptions included in their membership package. Individual annual subscriptions are available for $30 (US & Canada) and $50 (International). Advertising packages are available. Contact ISOA for pricing and information. Formerly the Journal of International Peace Operations (JIPO) and the IPOA Quarterly. The Publication of the INTERNATIONAL STABILITY OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION 1634 I St. NW, Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20006, U.S.A. E-mail………..editor@peaceops.com Web site……..www.peaceops.com ISSN 1933-8189 Copyright © 2012 International Stability Operations Association (ISOA). All rights reserved. The ISOA logo is a trademark of ISOA. Stability Operations magazine (SO) and its logo are trademarks of ISOA.

From Headquarters | President’s Message

Mogadishu to Manhattan Achieving Stability After Disaster Doug Brooks

LTHOUGH the Stability Operations Industry is best known for the services it provides in support of international operations in places like Afghanistan, Somalia, the DR Congo and East Timor, our industry provides invaluable services for disaster relief operations as well. The Haiti earthquake, tsunami in Japan, floods in Pakistan, and – most recently – Hurricane Sandy in the United States.

Photo: Hurricane Sandy makes landfall. Credit: NOAA

Many people would be amazed at the number of services and the range of capability the private sector has available to address disasters. Generators, heavy construction equipment, modular housing, water purification services – a million and one services that are as useful addressing domestic catastrophes as they are serving war refugees and supporting peacekeeping operations around the world. The industry is called on for disaster relief for the very same reason they are involved in international stability operations – no government or international organization has the capacity to address every contingency or policy need; especially on short notice. Our industry specializes in rapid deployment with scalable capabilities and services. Even better, a government does not have to spend decades paying for services it may never need, but only for their actual deployment and use. Obviously

some services are so vital and necessary that governments prefer to ensure in-house capabilities, but some hybrid models also allow governments to pay a small amount to fund capacity within the industry that can be on-call at a moment’s notice, should the need arise. This certainly does not bypass or minimize the central role of governments in disaster management. Our industry does not make political decisions. Governments can be of real value when they make the vital preparations for

tion for the relief effort were left unutilized, contributing to the suffering of the shattered population. Ultimately the private sector resources used in Haiti were only a fraction of those typically utilized in international disasters such as the 2004 Southeast Asian Tsunami. Although some have argued that the international community needs to take charge in such situations to temporarily direct and manage emergency services, ultimately the decisions will be governmental, not private sector.

In the end, the industry provides enormously valuable, cost-effective services that support international humanitarian policies. addressing current and future disasters. Governments decide priorities in disaster relief, and fund private sector preparations for capabilities and services so to be available when disasters such as Hurricane Sandy hit. At the same time, poor governmental management or a lack of governmental capacity can have an extremely negative result, such as we saw in Haiti where billions of dollars of international relief were wasted due to political insistence that a devastated Haitian government be the sole decision-maker. Vast private sector resources activated in prepara-

If nothing else, Hurricane Sandy is a powerful reminder of how useful this industry can be as a tool of policy. From supporting humanitarian efforts in New Jersey to assisting peacekeeping efforts in Mogadishu, their role is the same. In the end, the industry provides enormously valuable, cost-effective services that support international humanitarian policies. And as always, the better we ensure a working partnership between government and their industry contractors, the better the humanitarian result. ■

Doug Brooks is the President of the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA). Contact Mr. Brooks at dbrooks@stability-operations.org.

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Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

Photo: Liberian National Police graduation ceremony Credit: UN Photo/Christopher Herwig

Training A New Generation for Sustainable Stability

ong term stability in any context is majorly impacted by the strength of the security sector—criminal justice systems including national armies, police, correctional facilities, and public access to the services that they provide. The struggle for a transparent, accountable, effective and sustainable security sector calls for constant innovation paired with effective monitoring and evaluation of security sector reform (SSR) programs; especially amid increasing globalization and an increasing number of high risk security environments. So what does this new security environment look like? Dana Eyre takes an innovative look at the evolution of national security paradigms from a broad view, asserting that security challenges worldwide are social change

problems. This new way of looking at security as being rooted in sociological and psychological issues will help those working in SSR to program more effectively in the future. Focusing on Afghanistan, Lee Mersek recounts his experiences in training the Afghan National Army. He emphasizes the importance of tackling security challenges with a focus on sustainability, by training locals in basic project management, leadership, and operating within realistic means. Capacity building is the key to long term stability—in SSR, and any stability operations programming. Additionally, the Afghan National Army requires extensive professional training in order to meet many national security challenges. Alan Capps reviews the ongoing process to

establish a professional military training facility modeled after the UK’s Sandhurst in Afghanistan. An officer training program will allow Afghanistan to develop a professional army that is sustainable beyond the 2014 withdrawal— just ask the ANA General who attended Sandhurst already. The United Nations has an extensive role in SSR worldwide. Fiona Mangan, Michelle Ker and William Durch review a recent Stimson Center and UN study exploring the increasing complexity of peace operations mandates that include police, justice and corrections components. The study finds that future SSR programming must take in to account the unavoidable impact that the operational environment has on the level of effectiveness and success of such programs. ■

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Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

Strategy, National Security, and Social Change Exploring an Evolving Security Environment Dana P. Eyre, Ph.D. HE CHALLENGE In the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union (a relatively recent event that seems as lost in the mists of time as the Middle Ages) and particularly since 9/11 there has been substantial public, and professional, reflection and debate over a critical set of questions about the pursuit of “national” (or human) security. Who is the “foe” and what is his nature? What are the most effective policies for the conduct of struggle? Indeed, what is the fundamental nature of the problem we face? What are "security" and "stability"? How do we attain them? Observers and critics have variously labeled the contemporary environment and particular struggles within it as “the global war on terrorism,” “the long war,” “small wars,” “global counterinsurgency,” “fourth generation warfare,” “war amongst the peoples” or “the five front war.” It seems that although there is no consensus on the label for the situation there is substantial agreement that it’s not the conflict that the Western militaries now fighting anticipated fighting in the days before 9/11. This debate has only gotten more complicated with the evolution of the “Arab Spring” of 2011; events in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Mali, Syria and throughout the region highlight the complexity of the contemporary security environment. This problem only gets more complicated when the focus is expanded to include longer-term challenges, such as Pakistan or most notably China, simultaneously America's vital business partner, only real potential military rival in the coming decades, and a land subject to enormous internal social and political tensions. Whatever one's view on the details, it's clear that the contemporary security environment is definitely not a simple one.

If there is no consensus on the label, there is at least substantial consensus on the characteristics of the problems we’re facing. It’s not 19th or 20th century conflict between states (an extended violent Olympics: France vs Germany, 1870, US vs Spain 1989, Japan vs Russia 1904, UK & France vs Germany (rematch) 1914, US, UK, France vs Germany, Italy & Japan (rematch) 1945, US vs USSR, 1948-1989) but between a struggle over the nature of social order, both at the level of the world (at least in the fantasies of some violent extremist organization believers) and at the local level in a variety of locations. The contenders are a complex amalgam of states (in an ever shifting mix of unilateral actions and formal and informal coalitions, with more than a few participants at least occasionally playing both sides), nascent and developing states, social movements, factions, terrorists, guerillas, militias, bandits, robbers and psychopaths. International law, far from a "self-imposed, imperceptible limitation hardly worth mentioning,” is a central preoccupation in today’s operational environment, and public opinion, always significant, is even more important in a world in which international non-governmental organizations can conduct a by-name audit of civilian causalities in a major operation, as Human Rights Watch first did during the NATO campaign in Kosovo in 2000. The most fundamental thing sought by our “national” security efforts is not a discrete set of objectives, but a broadly functioning social order, a social system in which people - be they in London, New York, Mumbai, Kabul, or Kirkuk – can go about their daily lives in peace and stability. And the roots of the current challenge come not from sovereign states and massed

armies, but from a complex and chaotic mix of history, social conditions, ideologies and “marginalized states of mind” – as likely to be found in individuals living in western democracies as they are under oppressive regimes and in the political and security vacuums arising from failing states. It is a complex socialpsychological emergent ecology of conflict – in which concepts such as globalization, the “youth bulge,” narrative and identity are as critical to our understanding of the current problems as “mutually assured destruction” was to the Cold War. The security problems we face are in essence “social change problems" – their origins lie, and they can only be understood as the complex product of social structures, social dynamics, social and psychological causes. Addressing these challenges often requires military forces - the use of force and violence – but they are much more than war. Reflections on the Contemporary Security Environment The dynamics of this environment can be captured relatively simply, though they can't be addressed with equal simplicity. The problem is “glocal,” and narrative and emotional, at its core. The connection between a preacher and his small church in a backwoods corner of Florida, USA, and a protesting mob in Afghanistan isn’t physical; it’s narrative and emotional. They are aware of each other (dimly, imperfectly) and act with regard to each other, yet at the same time each operates in their own local context. The conflict is simultaneously local and global. This phenomenon is clearly enabled by rapidly developing communications technologies. With a good story, a cell phone or a cheap camera, and 5 million YouTube hits anyone can be a star, or fuel the fire of a revolution on the other side of the world. The core dynamics are psychological and sociological. In an era where deliberate martyrdom has become a calculated means of conducting IO, killing our enemies provides

Dana P. Eyre, Ph.D. is a sociologist specializing in conflict transformation and strategic communications. He has worked in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and on projects from Papua New Guinea to Somalia.

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Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

The connection between a preacher and his small church in a backwoods corner of Florida, USA, and a protesting mob in Afghanistan isn’t physical; it’s narrative and emotional. tactical advantage, but is unlikely to end their strategic campaign or organization. Ultimately, changing the conditions that generate extremists is the only long-term alternative to an endless drone-based game of whack-a-mole. We need to counter the enemy in the critical psycho-social space, but perhaps more critically, we find our selves seeking to foster change in evolving social systems – building functional, inclusive government, enabling economic growth, healing the wounds of war and the divisions of sectarian and ethnic strife. We cannot directly bring the world we desire about through force, we must help partners build that world for themselves.

Social change is at the center of the problem and must be at the center of our thinking. General David Petraeus has observed that “we cannot kill our way out of this endeavor.” (Iraq COIN Guidance, 21 June 2008). Clausewitz offered the duel of the wrestlers as the fundamental metaphor for understanding war.

“War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will: his first object is to throw his adversary, and thus to render him incapable of further resistance. War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” Note a gap between the two statements. When others make comments similar to General Petraeus, such as noting that “people are the decisive terrain,” they too are recognizing a fundamental gap between the problems we face and the inherited vocabulary we employed to confront them. Continued on page 10

Photo: South Sudan police recruits at training. Credit: UN Photo/Paul Banks

These statements clearly imply that the vocabularies and theoretical frameworks necessary to understand our problems are

psychological and sociological (in the broadest sense). These insights are not new – every confrontation with ‘insurgency’ or ‘guerilla warfare’ offers another opportunity to relearn this fundamental lesson. But they are more urgent now, and more central, as the technology of mayhem (weapons of mass destruction, and the routine technologies of everyday violence – explosives and firearms) becomes more widespread.

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Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

Continued from page 9

Traditional security vocabularies, of states and politics, planning and rational interests, fire and maneuver, logistics and operations, defeat and victory, offer at best fragmentary understanding; indeed these vocabularies are potentially profoundly misleading when seeking to understand the core dynamics of the problems we tackle, be it Afghanistan or China's future stability and direction. Is there an alternative framing, an alternative or supplementary vocabulary and theory of our activities, that gives us greater clarity on how to address problems in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Somalia, the wider threat of terror, and the general problem of failed states and of building positive peace? Here, in particular, we would focus on the central question of social

change. If the problems we confront are rooted in psychological and sociological dynamics, if the solutions require people, and groups, to learn new skills, to tell new stories, to change behaviors, to cooperate in government, to reject violent ideologies, to embrace neighbors, and ultimately to build peace, are the projects we are engaged in not more fruitfully conceptualized as social change, rather than as war? The goals we have set for ourselves require change; we achieve success only if societies change, and societies change only if people change. We must therefore put the dynamics of personal and social change at the center of our thinking. People must think, feel, and practice their way into new behaviors, new modes of action. We need to redefine the

concept of victory or success. Stable, sustainable success must be rooted in a critical mass of popular disapproval of our opponents and the rejection of their ideology, as well as a positive will to reject them and to embrace sustainable, stable peaceful forms of social order and governance. Some may object to labeling what we are doing as “social change” – noting that social change cannot be simply managed, that it is difficult, or that it is not our job. We acknowledge all of these questions. But we would observe that the jobs we have undertaken, in response to the security environment we have found ourselves in, at the core require social change. Embracing a new government, rejecting an extremist religious ideology, resisting recruitment to violence, all are acts of individual and collective change. They do not become easier by ignoring the dynamics of change. Social change, particularly the form of most interest to militaries and their colleagues conflict transformation (as a specialized form of change - moving violent conflict into non-violent political conflict, as described in The Quest for Viable Peace: Covey, Dzeidzic and Hawley, editors, US Institute of Peace), isn’t easy, but it’s certainly easier to do if we have a vocabulary that helps us understand the dynamics of the problem and articulate meaningful solutions. Alfred North Whitehead’s observation clearly articulates the challenge: “the art of progress is to preserve order amid change and to preserve change amid order.” I would argue that we’re not engaged in the “long war” but the “long change.” ■ References Clausewitz, Carl von. 1989. On War. Reprint. Princeton University Press. P76 Human Rights Watch, Kosovo: Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, 1 February 2000, D1201, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ refworld/docid/3ae6a86b0.html [accessed 3 May 2011]

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Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

Mentoring with the Goal of Sustainability Lessons from Afghan National Army Training Lee J. Mersek

N AN EFFORT to promote long-term stability in a failed or failing state, many stability operations companies provide services that involve training and advising foreign counterparts. Even for the companies with functions that don’t normally incorporate foreign advisory, there always exists the potential to pass on knowledge and abilities to foreign partners. It often may be easier to conduct our stability efforts without being hindered by untrained, ill-equipped local counterparts, yet much of that hindrance may be attributed to the difficulty of undeveloped countries to comprehend and maintain our more advanced concepts. We can actually overcome these difficulties and create sustainable solutions towards long-term stability by encouraging our host nation partners to develop their own stability efforts, use locally available resources and take responsibility for implementing their own operations.

Photo: UNMIL peacekeeper talks with young girl Credit: UN Photo/Emmanuel Tobey

Local Development A story was passed on to me in Afghanistan about a project conducted by a Western organization. In one particular village, the women walked one hour to the nearest water source and then walked another hour on the return trip. The kindhearted Westerners built a well in the village to reduce the women’s burden, but when they returned to the village they received scornful looks from the women. What the organization didn’t realize was that the two hours spent retrieving water was the time that those women used to socialize away from the men of the village, and where they often arranged marriages and resolved disagreements between families. All concepts or programs that we conduct with host nation partners must be developed by them under our mentorship. When we try to impart large budgets and advanced technologies on emergent economies and security services, we forget the progressive steps that our economy and security

services had to make in order to reach our own advanced capabilities. This inflexibility causes us to overlook inexpensive and simplistic solutions that may better address instability, and may even prolong it when our operations lack local support. Participation from our counterparts will ensure that local capabilities and environmental considerations we might otherwise ignore are factored into the development of our stability operations. This increases the sustainability of our efforts because our host nation partners are more likely to comprehend and accept a program that is developed at their skill level and within their society’s framework. These operational concepts will thus be mastered much quicker than anything our counterparts haven’t developed themselves. The final product may not precisely mirror what we utilize in our own country, but it will be adapted to our partners’ country, and will outlast concepts not tailored to their political, economic and cultural environment. Local Resourcing As a U.S. Marine Corps embedded infantry advisor to the Afghan National Army (ANA), my team’s mission was to pass on knowledge and skills rather than funding and materials. However, other coalition forces made plans to build operations centers for the ANA. These buildings, filled with computers and flat screen televisions, would be paid for by the U.S. government. Although the Afghans agreed to this plan, we later conducted a successful brigade-level mission with an operations center consisting of a carpet, a radio, a map, and a pot of tea. Our counterparts gained confidence in their ability to conduct a largescale mission with materials they could easily requisition themselves. Utilizing local funding and readily available resources can minimize the costs for most stability efforts while ensuring that our partners Continued on page 12

Lee J. Mersek is currently working for New Century U.S., and is assigned overseas to conduct security stability operations.

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Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

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can sustain themselves. Our host nation counterparts will more readily master a method that involves equipment they can procure themselves, rather than struggle to operate and maintain equipment beyond their means. In many impoverished societies, money serves to be a distraction, and the fuel for corruption. Teaching our partners new concepts within their own budget removes these distractions, limits opportunities for corruption and increases their commitment to the solutions they have developed. Very often, the most basic concepts prevent a reliance on foreign subsidies, equipment and maintenance. Local Implementation In Afghanistan, the abilities of ANA leaders often reflect the amount of responsibility that is assumed by their mentors. While some officers

have gained confidence in their abilities and authority, others who have had impatient advisors develop and execute solutions for them lack this self-reliance. A common mistake of some mentors is to focus on implementing their own perfectly envisioned plan rather than focus on developing their counterparts. This of course raises the concern that some Afghan officers may be unable to conduct their jobs without foreign assistance. The old adage of “give a man a fish and he eats for a day; teach a man to fish and he eats for a lifetime” certainly holds true. Rather than conducting stability operations ourselves, training a cadre of host nation supporters multiplies our own efforts in that country with counterparts who contribute to their own stability. Host nation leaders learn basic project management and leadership through our mentoring, while the work force involved in our

operations develops skills from our training. Encouraging our partners’ participation provides opportunities for them to assume responsibility for their country’s stability. Once a capability has been developed with host nation concepts and resources, our partners must implement it to break over-reliance on foreign support. The involvement, and ownership, of our counterparts in stability efforts serves to improve their abilities as they learn from their mistakes. As they gain proficiency and confidence, our partners can win support and legitimacy from their own countrymen. Sustainability is achieved when our mentoring and training enables our partners to maintain their own stability. Conclusion The notion of developing sustainable solutions is not limited to any particular stability operations sector. A military or security service must first learn how to conduct missions on foot before they can incorporate aircraft into their operations. Foreign medics must learn to operate without advanced medical technology, and foreign construction companies must be able to work with tools and materials they can readily supply. The ultimate goal may be improved life-saving abilities and safer engineering standards, but a country facing instability must first develop and maintain its own methods in order to create the foundation from which to learn advanced techniques. While a failed or failing state’s dependence on foreign assistance may promote business for stability operations companies, progressively developing host nation partners actually creates business opportunities for advanced training and equipment. With open minds and a focus on training and mentoring, we may even discover new concepts from our partners and their methods. By developing tailored solutions, utilizing host nation resources and encouraging the local implementation of those solutions, our mentoring capabilities can increase the sustainability of our work and more effectively foster long-term stability in foreign nations. ■

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Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

Sandhurst in the Sand Bringing British Training to Afghanistan Alan Capps

developing core military skills in Officer Cadets. This is what Lt. General Sher Mohammad Karimi, current Chief of the Army Staff of the Afghan National Army, remembers about his time at Sandhurst. He graduated in 1967 following a two-year course, at that point in time only the second Afghan ever to attend the academy. Now, 45 years later General Karimi wants his country to establish an officer academy modeled on Sandhurst, a project that has already acquired the sobriquet of “Sandhurst in the sand.”

Photo: Afghan Honour Guard Conduct Training Exercise Credit: UN Photo/Eric Kanalstein

Relating his experiences at Sandhurst to the Daily Telegraph’s Kabul correspondent, Ben Famer, in March of 2012, General Karimi said,: “I sometimes joke with my non-commissioned officers these days, I say “I will believe in you when you have a yard stick in your hand like those British NCOs and walk on the drill square to measure the steps and give the command of ‘quick march!’ and ‘slow march!’” The twin pillars of ceremony and tradition, still an omnipresent and integral part of the British Army, also left their mark on General Karimi. “We were not allowed to go to the dining hall in the evening without a tie or proper jacket of evening dress,” he recalled. “In the British Army these traditions are very, very well developed and well observed. Many people may not like formalities and ceremonies, but I love to see it. It’s part of the military life.”

O OFFICER CADET who has graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) in the United Kingdom forgets his or her time at RMAS. Sandhurst creates, in the words of Sir Arthur Bryant, the noted British historian and columnist, “the martial habits of discipline, courage, loyalty, pride and endurance.” Its motto is “Serve to Lead,” and since its establishment in1947 as the British Army’s newly re-organized post World War II officer cadet academy, Sandhurst has continued a tradition and history of training the British Army’s officer corps that dates back to 1741 when the original Royal Military Academy was first established. The parade ground at Sandhurst has always been the great leveler. Regardless of whether a cadet comes from royal lineage – British or foreign – or has ‘a family history’ with a particular regiment, or increasingly in recent years, enters RMAS with a university degree in -hand, no one escapes the eagle eyes of the Academy Sergeant-Major and his staff of experienced Warrant Officers and senior Non-Commission Officers (NCOs). They form the bulk of the instructing staff and command a fearsome reputation for their level of professionalism, experience, and abilities in teaching and

General Karimi’s idea initially won the approval of American and British commanders with the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). U.S. Army General William B. Caldwell, who held the post of Commander, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, as well as Commanding General, Combined Security Transition – Afghanistan from 2009-2011, was a strong supporter of General Karimi’s goal. Commenting on the plan in a story in The Guardian newspaper in May 2011, General Caldwell said, “General Karimi would very much love to build Sandhurst in Afghanistan. Continued on page 14

Alan Capps is currently writing his PhD dissertation in US History at George Mason University.

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Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

Continued from page 13

I’m supporting him. He thinks so highly of Sandhurst, he would love to model it and build it here.” The idea also won the approval of Afghan Defense Minister, General Abdul Rahim Wardak, and subsequently President Hamid Karzai. During a trip to Afghanistan in late March of 2012, UK Defencce Secretary Philip Hammond signed a statement of intent with General Wardak on Britain taking the lead in establishing an Afghan National Officers Academy, which will be modeled on Sandhurst. The new academy will be located in the Qargha district of Kabul and is currently planned to be operational in 2013. It is projected that at least two thirds of the instructors, possibly up to 200 members of the British Army, will form the core of the initial instructing staff. A budget for the project has not yet been disclosed. In an interview with BBC Radio, the Defence Secretary also pointed out

that this project continues to reaffirm Britain’s commitment to “an effective transition to Afghan national security forces,” and that “the UK’s role in officer training would continue after 2014, as would financial support for the new facility to illustrate its commitment to Afghanistan’s longterm stability.” While no specific plans for any proposed course structure have yet been announced, it is fair to say that the Commissioning Course at Sandhurst will in all likelihood form the basis, albeit with modifications where appropriate, for the Afghan National Army’s new officer academy course of study. The British Army’s website page on the Sandhurst course states that its purpose “is to develop an Officer Cadet’s character, intellect and professional skills. At the end of the course a newly commissioned Officer will be qualified to lead and manage soldiers while at the same time upholding the British Army’s core values of selfless commitment, respect for others, loyalty, integrity, discipline and courage.”

The Commissioning Course is 44-weeks in length and divided into three ‘terms.’ The first term sees Officer Cadets acquiring basic military skills with introductions to leadership, tactics, map reading, living in the field, weapon handling and extensive physical training. There is also an emphasis on personal administration such as polishing of boots and ironing kit, which ought to bring a wry smile to General Karimi’s face, as will the exposure of new Afghan Officer Cadets to the hallmark of Sandhurst’s training regime – the Non-Commissioned Officer instructors – who are among the best in the British Army and bring with them unique experience, skills and insights into the training of potential officers. The pressure is intense with very little free time. Apart from the daily rigors of the first term the first major hurdle to continuing on the course is the drill test known as “Passing Off the Square,” which occurs at the end of Week Five. The remainder of the term continues to build on the basics of the first five weeks with a marked

Photo: Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst Credit: Flickr/Ewan M

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Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

General Karimi also understands, however, from personal experience, that if the Afghan National Army is to survive post-ʹ ͲͳͶ ϐ of ISAF, the ANA must be a modern and highly professional force designed to enhance Afghanistan’s long-term stability and security. emphasis on Adventure Training outside of the Academy and physically testing exercises where teamwork and confidence building are keys. Term Two revolves around an emphasis on building leadership initiative and moving cadets along the path from being raw recruits to commencing to gain an understanding of the role of an Army Officer. It is at this juncture that academics begin to be brought into the overall curriculum with classroom subjects such as conventional war studies, international affairs and leadership being taught. Classroom assignments do not, however, mean a lessening of the physical activities which continue including physically demanding field exercises.

or is built into the overall Commissioning Course. Equally, the selection process to gain entry to the proposed academy will also have to be given a great deal of thought. Whether the British Army’s well-honed three and a half day Officer Selection Board process will be employed as a template, will have to be decided upon. General Karimi understands that to replicate an institution such as the RMAS with its rich historical legacy, traditions, ethos and culture of training officers will be far from easy. General

Karimi also understands, however, from personal experience, that if the Afghan National Army is to survive post-2014 and the final withdrawal of ISAF, the ANA must be a modern and highly professional force designed to enhance Afghanistan’s long-term stability and security. That requires a professional officer corps whose motto must reflect that of RMAS and one which General Karimi learned as a young officer cadet in the late 1960s; they must Serve to Lead. ■

The third term sees Office Cadets being assigned more responsibilities. There is also a shift towards topics such as unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency. The physical activities continue unabated although the emphasis is increasingly placed on the individual to maintain the appropriate level of fitness through personal exercise and team sports. Arduous field exercises also continue including live-fire exercises. The term concludes with the Passing Out Parade, known at Sandhurst as the Sovereign’s Parade, and the awarding of a Commission. From the perspective of the British Army after completing the Commissioning Course all new officers attend a Young Officer’s course wherein they learn the disciplines and craft of their chosen part of the Army. Completion of this course results in the new officers going off to assume a Platoon Commander assignment. How this stage will be handled from the perspective of the Afghan National Army will have to be thought through to decide whether it remains a separate course after commissioning

ęĆć ĎđĎęĞ ĕĊėĆęĎĔēĘ NOVEMBER-DECEMBER ‘12

HE 2012 ISOA ANNUAL SUMMIT was

of expertise and opportunity for dialogue at the 2012

operations. These included supporting the civil affairs

held in mid-October at the National Press

Summit would not have been possible without the

community, growing regionally aligned forces, and

Club in Washington, D.C., bringing together

support of the Summit sponsors, ISOA member

refining law enforcement to fill critical gaps, among

experts and practitioners in the stability operations,

companies, and industry

others. The subsequent breakout panel on

development, and foreign policy fields to discuss

leaders in attendance.

transitions in development and security in

lessons learned and challenges ahead. This year’s

Collectively, attendees

Afghanistan was of particular interest to

conference followed a unique two-track format, with

and speakers openly

many attendees looking to conduct new

one set of breakout sessions themed Policy &

shared their practical

business there, and boasted an impressive

Strategy catering to CEOs, COOs, General

knowledge to address

lineup of panelists including Undersecre-

Counsels, Government Relations professionals, and

challenges as well as

tary of State for Management, Patrick

Compliance Officers, , while the other track themed

suggest innovative ideas for future success in the

Kennedy; Marc Grossman, Special Envoy to

New Realities & Demand focused on budgets,

stability operations community.

Afghanistan and Pakistan; and Mohammad Haneef Atmar, former Minister of the Interior for Afghanistan.

funding, cost and procurement topics, aimed at Business Development Directors and Contract

A RAINY OPENING LEADS TO

Ambassador Kennedy praised the Afghan govern-

Officers.

BRIGHT DISCUSSION

ment’s use of private security contractors to

The entire 2 day program encompassed poignant

The Summit kicked off with a rooftop networking

Afghan sovereignty. Mr. Atmar was not so optimistic,

views from more than 55 speakers, and gave

reception in downtown Washington, D.C. that

reminding the audience that all of the progress made

academic, nongovernmental, public, and private

provided attendees the opportunity to meet

to date in Afghanistan is fragile and reversible, and

sector attendees the opportunity to network, share

professionals from a variety of sectors within the

that good governance is crucial to continued growth.

experiences from working in fragile environments

stability operations community. Despite the inclement

worldwide, and discuss best practices. Notable

weather and inevitable downpour, attendees from

The afternoon kicked off with a luncheon keynote

speakers included Dr. James Schear, Deputy

South Africa to the United Kingdom to just down the

address from Ambassador John Negroponte, drawing

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership

street in Virginia discussed partnerships and

from his over 50 years of experience in diplomacy

Strategy and Stability Operations; Ambassador John

common goals.

and foreign policy. Subsequent breakout sessions

strengthen non-diplomatic missions as a symbol of

were held, discussing DCAA Compliance, and

Negroponte; Assistant Secretary General Edmond

congressional appropriations trends for foreign

Operations; and Ambassador Princeton Lyman,

address delivered by Dr. James Schear, in which he

assistance and stability operations – specifically, the

Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan. The range

laid out key ingredients for improving stability

advantages and disadvantages of Lowest Price

ISOA Thanks all of the 2012 Annual Summit Sponsors for supporting our most successful Summit yet!

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SPONSORED SECTION: 2012 ISOA ANNUAL SUMMIT REVIEW

SILVER

The following morning, day one began with a keynote

GOLD

Mulet of the UN Department for Peacekeeping

15-17 OCTOBER 2012 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB WASHINGTON D.C. Technically Acceptable (LPTA) versus Best Value

operations, especially for long-term economic growth.

mitigating risk in frontier environments. The afternoon

contracting.

Jim Bullion, Director of the Task Force for Business

closed with a unique debate-style panel featuring Dan

and Stability Operations at the Department of

Runde, Co-Chair of the International Assistance

The afternoon wrapped up with a fascinating panel,

Defense, summed up this goal well when he posed,

working group for the Romney-Ryan Campaign, and

Strategic Rebalancing: From the Arab Spring to the

“Let’s try to get Afghanistan off of the front pages and

Doug Wilson, Co-Chair of the Defense Working

Pivot to Asia. After a brief networking reception

onto the business pages,” a strong call for economic

Group for the Obama-Biden Campaign. Both

encouraging more intimate discussion and reflection

growth after over a decade of conflict. Subsequent

campaign representatives gave their perspectives on

on the day’s panels, Assistant Secretary General,

breakout sessions included a focus on lessons

U.S. policy for stabilization, development, potential

Edmond Mulet, engaged Annual Summit Dinner

learned and challenges ahead in Iraq, as well as

sequestration cuts, and foreign assistance in the next

attendees on trends, challenges, and opportunities in

procurement needs for the UN and US government.

presidential administration.

The lunch keynote address, delivered by Ambassador

LOOKING FORWARD TO 2013

UN peacekeeping missions.

LEARNING, ADAPTING, GROWING

Princeton Lyman, Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, provided the audience with a comprehensive

Day two kicked off bright and early, with Breakfast

overview of the ongoing struggle between Sudan and

Workshops on the technical issues of Compliance

South Sudan. Ambassador Lyman discussed how the

and the ANSI PSC Standard.

international community, threat of

Afterwards, Jessica Mueller,

economic downturn, and ongoing

ISOA Director of Programs

negotiations backed by the African

and Operations, delivered an

Union paved the way for dialogue

ISOA Year-In Review,

to begin between Sudan and South

followed by an update on the

Sudan. He expressed optimism

ISOA Middle East Chapter

about the opening of the border

from Pete Dordal, Senior

between the two countries, which

Vice President of ISOA Member GardaWorld and

gives people a unique prospect for better livelihoods

incoming ISOA Board Chairman, and Tobias Beutgen, President of ISOA Member American Glass Products. Following these remarks, panelists

and promotes new business opportunities. After lunch, breakouts focused on the future of

discussed the return on investment of stability

about the most prominent topics facing the stability operations community today. As we move forward, success in the industry will be drawn from the sharing of ideas and building of partnerships that is encouraged at the Summit, and elsewhere throughout ISOA’s programming. Stability is derived from the positive relationships built between governments, private companies, nongovernmental organizations, military professionals, academics, and the ultimate beneficiaries of stabilization: citizens living in fragile environments. The ISOA staff looks forward to even greater success for the stability operations community and its beneficiaries in 2013, as we continue to learn from past experiences, adapt to current changes, and grow for the future.

BRONZE

SUPPORTING

contingency contracting, and assessing and

This year’s panels fostered a dynamic discussion

PHOTOS: NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, NATHAN MITCHELL

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Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

Post- Â&#x2018;Â?Ď?Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013; Â&#x192;Â&#x2122; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Short Takes from a Recent Stimson Study Fiona Mangan, Dr William Durch and Michelle Ker

asked to deploy quickly into places where politics can prevent the quick actions that peacebuilding precepts dictate, or with resources inadequate to substitute for critical public security capacities that government lacks. It is, in turn, difficult to attribute change to particular actors where many have been at work, but the study does identify areas where the imprints left by UN missions are larger than those of other players. How lasting those imprints may be is a separate question. We defined short-term impact for this study as an outcome that persists while a mission is deployed; long-term impact is an outcome that persists after a mission departs. Since most of the missions examined in the study are still deployed, most of the studyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s findings relate to short-term impacts. Factors Enabling or Inhibiting Impact

VER THE LAST DECADE OR SO, the UN Security Council has issued increasingly complex peace operation mandates for police support and development, assisting restoration of criminal justice systems, and advisory support to corrections systems. Growing complexity, however, has not always been matched by careful analysis of what approaches do and donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t work in these three areas, and under what conditions.

The study was set up to search for "minimum essential tasks" - those that 1) always seem needed in comparable ways across missions; and 2) seem to consistently have the desired effects on the host country's approach to police, justice and corrections. It found that while certain tasks may always be needed, their implementation often depends on characteristics of a mission's operational environment, which the mission cannot exert direct control over. Missions face difficult dilemmas in being

Physical environments into which missions deploy often pose their own challenges. Decisions on mission resources are difficult and logistics are often stretched where infrastructure is limited, damaged or insecure. UN Headquarters (HQ) support and mission relations are important determinants of mission effectiveness. HQ needs to upgrade its abilities to provide the right kind of support, analyses and tools to be most helpful to missions. Missions and HQ must ensure quality flow of essential information and, smart systems to manage knowledge, process data, provide

Fiona Mangan, Program Officer at United States Institute of Peace and former Field Analyst with Stimson Center, Dr William Durch, Director of Future of Peace Operations Program at Stimson Center, Michelle Ker, Research Associate, Future of Peace Operations Program at Stimson Center.

Ä&#x2122;Ä&#x2020;Ä&#x2021; Ä&#x17D;Ä&#x2018;Ä&#x17D;Ä&#x2122;Ä&#x17E; Ä&#x2022;Ä&#x160;Ä&#x2014;Ä&#x2020;Ä&#x2122;Ä&#x17D;Ä&#x201D;Ä&#x201C;Ä&#x2DC; NOVEMBER-DECEMBER â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;12

Photo: UNPOL on patrol in Haiti Credit: UN Photo/Logan Abassi

Stimson's Future of Peace Operations Program worked with the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) in the UNâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Department of Peacekeeping Operations and, in particular, its Police Division and Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service, to begin to answer these questions (Durch et al. 2012). This article discusses some of its key findings. (The full report is available from the Stimson Center website.)

In post-conflict societies, governance may have severely eroded, presenting challenges for UN peace operations to engage with central governments, at the local level and with customary institutions. National and local ownership of reform and rebuilding the state in the wake of violent conflict are keys to longterm impact. However, ensuring local ownership of new policies and processes can be challenging when leaders are focused on shoring up power and control, balancing the interests of competing groups, and trying to manage instability and prevent violent outbreaks.

Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

ϐ ǡ since limited resources are competing with overwhelming need. helpful feedback, and track progress. Building institutional memory requires comprehensive handover protocols and assignment overlaps, especially for positions with frequent turnover, such as UN Police (UNPOL) on six- to twelve-612 month rotations. Neither was apparent in the missions studied.

specialist civilian posts within some missions’ police components. But mission plans should focus more on early support for institutional integrity building encouraging basic accountability mechanisms through vetting, basic training and probationary periods for new officers and transparency mechanisms for fundamentals such as budget and payroll.

Police Components UNPOL mandates have broadened significantly since 1999, with mission responsibilities now extending to all aspects of host state police development and elements of police operations. The resulting comprehensive picture of UN policing is of an enterprise that is overextended, under-resourced and lacking sufficient institutional support. Police development often requires difficult decisions and prioritizations, since limited resources are competing with overwhelming need. Supporting the development of individual host state police capacities fits within current UNPOL capabilities, although Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) have tended to second general-duty police officers to serve in UN operations, rather than specialists in training or institutional development. Police with specialized operational and training skills are in short supply even within PCCs, so general-duty officers end up in complex roles as mentors and institution-builders. Secondments are often for six- to twelve-6-12 month rotations and good procedures for capturing field experience and building UNPOL institutional memory are generally lacking. The secondment system is simply not prepared or resourced to consistently support either institutional capacity building or its essential counterpart, institutional integrity. In the short term, UN Police Division and field components need to address fundamental issues of necessary skill sets and abilities to plan and manage support to host state policing. Some of this need has been met by creating

Second, mission police components should support stronger foundations for institutional growth. Research indicates that giving 500 host state officers quality, locally-driven, long-term basic training has more likelihood of generating sustained, positive impact than giving 2,000 officers short-term training. Host state police also need locally developed and maintainable, simple recordkeeping systems from the outset. Third, the Police Division needs to find UNPOL leadership who support and enable adaptive change in police components approaches to solving the multiple and shifting problems that their people face daily. The success of UNPOL’s work depends on its ability to adapt to context, to return any temporary policing responsibilities as soon as judged prudent and to accelerate that process with the regular transfer of knowledge. In the longer term, UN HQ needs to fundamentally rethink: a) its approach to recruiting and deploying international police whether as individual officers or as formed police units; b) the tools they provide to help UNPOL meet mandated goals, including strategic leadership, planning and models; and c) definitions, implications and limitations of UNPOL roles in comprehensive mandated tasks such as protection of civilians and in advising and mentoring. In these areas, UNPOL must lower its expectations as well as the expectations of the international community and host state government and people regarding what can be achieved with the resources made available to most peace operations in seven years, the

duration of the average contemporary peacekeeping operation. Justice and Corrections Components Justice and corrections components in missions have generally increased in size in the last few years as the UN’s approach toward rule of law has grown ever more holistic. Although they tend to be mentioned and treated in the same space, justice and corrections institutions have different characteristics that strongly affect their predisposition to and interest in externally suggested reform or advice. The justice sector is relatively impermeable to international intervention, partly because its stock in trade is confidentiality. Judges prize their independence and legal systems—formal and informal—vary a great deal across countries. In most countries where the UN sends missions, investigative capacity is marginal at best and the historical alternative has been selfincrimination by the accused. Post-conflict criminal justice systems are often characterized by combinations of arbitrary arrest, the absence of concepts of bail or parole, poor recordkeeping, sluggish or dysfunctional case flow through the courts and prevailing assumptions that arrest equals guilt. In most of the countries covered by this study, such factors have led to prison populations with 80 percent or more in the pre-trial and/or pre-charge phase. Faced with decayed and overcrowded prisons run by untrained volunteers, political appointees or prisoners themselves, alert UN corrections advisers have in a number of cases improved prison conditions, helping to keep more prisoners among the living. Several missions have provided transport and logistical support to mobile courts whose sittings inside prisons have the potential to reduce prison populations, Continued on page 20

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Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

Continued from page 19

if they work expeditiously. Increasing the number of public prosecutors and defenders has had some success in improving rates of case flow. Ultimately though, it remains difficult to convince host governments to dedicate adequate resources to prisons when their average citizen lives in poverty. Strategic planning is an area where missions have the potential to impact justice and corrections systems. UN missions have access to, and potential leverage with, senior political leadership, while being viewed as more politically neutral than other international actors. In countries where host state officials engaged in strategic planning and where a corresponding action plan was developed for timed program implementation, these practices were observed to diffuse across the broader national framework of government, as well as NGOs. Support to legislatures and national reform commissions is among the most difficult but potentially most important elements of UN missions’ support for rule of law. Law reform has the power to provide long-term solutions to issues that host governments and missions find themselves hard-pressed to address. For example, law reform can reach some of the root

issues in pre-trial detention and prison overcrowding by introducing alternatives to incarceration, adjusting or tightening sentencing guidelines. However, the best technical advice cannot overcome political or procedural obstacles to enactment of reformed laws nor is the mission’s leverage alone likely to do so. Mission programming to improve access to justice mainly focuses on improving capacity and processes of the formal justice system. It seems time that UN peacebuilding efforts pay greater attention to informal justice systems, as functioning customary justice reflects the social ties that bind communities and is the form of dispute resolution that large majorities of the populations in mission countries use day to day. Customary justice may be the only remnant of effective governance left when the mission first deploys. The “do no harm” principle alone suggests that greater time and effort be devoted to understanding the post-conflict roles of these institutions. Finally, if donors could be made to overcome their prisons-last mentality, prison assistance offers potentially big and reasonably quick wins for UN operations. Investments in long-term prison guard training, in-house mentoring programs, prison farms, mobile courts,

paralegal training programs and public defenders have led to improved prisoner treatment and substantial drops in prison populations over time. This article has given a snapshot of some of the findings from Stimson’s study of the impact of police, justice and corrections in UN peace operations. The full report is available in PDF form on the Stimson website at http:// www.stimson.org/books-reports/understandingimpact-of-police-justice-and-correctionscomponents-in-un-peace-operations/. ■ References Durch, William J., Madeline L. England and Fiona Mangan, with Michelle Ker. Understanding Impact of Police, Justice and Corrections Components in UN Peace Operations (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2012), http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/ understanding-impact-of-police-justice-andcorrections-components-in-un-peace-operations/. Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation (OECD/ DAC, UNEG, World Bank IEG, and the International Organization for Cooperation in Evaluation), NONIE Guidance on Impact Evaluation, 2009, http:// www.worldbank.org/ieg/nonie/guidance.html.

Photo: UNPOL training session with Liberian National Police Credit: UN Photo/Staton Winter

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Q&A | A Conversation with Mark Kroeker

Police Training in an Evolving United Nations A Conversation with Mark Kroeker ISOA Editorial Team Does the international community put adequate emphasis on police training?

ark Kroeker is Senior Vice President for Justice and Rule of Law at PAE. Following thirty two years of service in the LAPD, Mark served as Deputy Commissioner of the International Police Task Force in the UN’s Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He later became Portland Oregon's Police Chief.

Photo: Mark Kroeker Credit: PAE, Inc.

How has the quality of UN police training evolved over time? Kroeker: The evolution has been significant. I have watched it for more than 20 years now, and I have seen a big shift. The major way I would describe this shift is from monitoring to mentoring, from a simple training to capacity building. It has moved from peacekeeping in missions, civilian police as part of the military structure, to a much more sophisticated capacity building, mentoring, advising and training in the broadest of functions.

Kroeker: It does and it doesn’t. I would say yes, in a certain way it does put emphasis on training. But, the problem is that it defines it imprecisely. In other words, sometimes we have a tendency to measure all the wrong things precisely. The measurement of training is not in the numbers of people trained or the numbers of hours of training or the numbers of courses offered. But rather what is the state of the learner? What is the state of the institution the learner represents? Because we have a tendency in post-conflict situations to want to build institutions very rapidly, we measure the wrong things, and we come to the things that are most easy to measure. You can quickly measure what is the size of the police? What is the size of the population? There’s a ratio there. That is very deceiving. The other thing we measure easily is how many people have been through a certain training. For example, Afghanistan. You read reports in the newspapers saying we have trained this many police. And always behind that there is a question to be asked. To do what? How are they doing? What would be a better measurement? Kroeker: The more relevant measurement in my view comes from a more sophisticated approach to looking at the institution, at the police itself. What are the various competencies of a police organization, and how are they doing in those competencies? How are the individual members of the organization performing as a result of the training they are getting? Is this person who has been recruited, selected,

trained and deployed operating under standards of internationally approved law enforcement capacity, or have we just made an assembly line where we put that person out there and they leave the organization, they don’t show up to work, they fail in some significant way, go back to old habits or really show a clear failure to learn whatever is was intended for them to learn? How can the international community better utilize private sector capabilities for security sector reform? Kroeker: As you consider the international community, much of it is private, nongovernmental organizations. The contractors that work there, the business interests that seem to follow a conflict as contractors come in. The idea is not necessarily what sector is represented, but the authenticity of the partnership involved. When we look at everyone engaged, for example, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United Nations, the non-governmental organizations, contracting organizations, civil society, all of these have played different roles. I think sometimes people have a tendency to disparage any one of those. Disparage NGO’s, disparage government, disparage contractors. All contractors are this. All DoD is that. All NGO’s are this. The fact is that every one of them, if working together on a common purpose, a common objective, with individualized lanes they can work to a common synergy that produces monumental results after war and after the military engagement winds down. Unfortunately there is a tendency to point fingers rather than join hands. There’s a tendency to occupy very sequestered roles rather than looking for ways to have mutual consolidated objectives. When that happens then we have dysfunction that has marked a lot of post-conflict situations in the history of the 20 years or so that I have been watching it.

Continued on page 22

PAE, Inc. is a company that conducts contractual activities in a wide range of disciplines in 65 countries.

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Q&A | A Conversation with Mark Kroeker

ϐ rather than join hands. There’s a tendency to occupy vary sequestered roles rather than looking for ways to have mutual consolidated objectives. Continued from page 21

Which do you think were the most successful police training programs, and why were they particularly successful? Kroeker: I think of Kosovo as a prime example. The Kosovo police today, if you look at them, are a fairly well-regarded police organization. As one police officer said to me when I was there on my last visit “over the years, this Kosovo police has earned the respect of their neighbors in the region. So you might even say that they are the best police organization in the Balkans.” That, I think, is a substantial remark, although it’s not an empirical remark. It’s an anecdote based on one police officer telling me something. But as I observed the Kosovo police and looked at its various functions in the various times I’ve been there, I concluded that there is something to these observations. This is a very good organization. What Kosovo did was have an executive mission with the United Nations where the UN police was the police, and where

the Judicial arm and correctional arm was done by international engagement. So international judges were hired, and so forth. When that executive function took over, and then a careful phased transition to local ownership took place, while the construction was going on, the result was a phased ownership that today if you look at Kosovo would still international engagement there. To a substantial degree, the engagement is less and the local ownership is more. The capacity of that organization is strong. One of the reasons that they are strong is because the linkage was made right at the start between the Kosovo Police Service and its rule of law partners, the correctional side and the judicial side. There’s another one that stuck out in my mind. I’ll give you the Liberia model. I happen to know something about the Liberia model because I was police commissioner of the UN Mission in Liberia right after the war. That war took some 250,000 lives and stretched over 14 years, and it rendered the police entirely dysfunctional and

all of their assets were looted during the war. When I arrived, we truly started from zero. With the launching of the UN mission, we had five police officers and me. That was the police component. When I left, there were about 1,100 or 1,200 UN police officers. That was about a year and a half later and we had gotten started. I was just there last week in Liberia, and I have seen the growth in the Liberian National Police. I met with its Police Director, its Police Chief, and with several of the police officers. I saw the police academy that I helped to start when I was there now under full ownership of the Liberian National Police. I heard about the Judiciary operating more capably. I heard of the various competencies of the police: salaries being paid, promotions being made on the basis of merit. The secret to that success was not only the military that helped stabilize the nation that was part of the UN peacekeeping force, but we had foreign police units that arrived. The Formed Police Units (FPU), under the UN’s Police Component helped put out those disturbing civil unrest brush fires that could have led to larger disastrous effects. The Formed Police Unit that came later that I recruited when I was at the UN headquarters was from India, an all-woman FPU. That FPU unit brought a lot of credit not only to India, but to the idea of crowd control, the fact that an entire unit can be not only male but all female and made significant points in that arena. But the FPU’s work across the years stabilized the nation while law enforcement development capacity building police training was taking place, one of the reasons Liberia National Police is on the right track today. They are not what they should or could be, but incrementally the movement has been very positive and it has been substantial.

Kroeker: Number one, I think, always is corruption. Corruption is an impediment and it stands as a show-stopper, or slow down lever, on many different fronts: the political front, the government’s front the legislative front, the rule of law front, including the police, especially with low salaries and a vacuum of leadership. Since

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Photo: Afghan police training Credit: Flickr/DVIDSHUB

What have been the greatest impediments to successful police training?

Photo: UN peacekeepers day Credit: UN Photo/Gonzalez Farran

Q&A | A Conversation with Mark Kroeker

the first and most visible face of government is law enforcement, where corruption is rampant in law enforcement, it is hard to produce that transparency that we speak about, the commitment to integrity that we train, and the absorption of core values that we believe and try to imbue. It’s hard to institutionalize these things when the common enemy is always corrupt power structures that present an alternative to accountability to the community, to government, to peace and to ethical standards of police operation. Corruption is a strong impediment. The other strong impediment is the international community. As much as we like to think we work together and solve problems, sometimes the dysfunction that we have as a community serves to hold things back as impediments. We operate on different channels. We can’t work in authentic partnerships, we work against each other. The result is not incentivized. We have a tendency to hold ourselves back by our inability to work together toward a common

objective. I see the international donors, for example, being in what I call a problem of donor interference rather than donor support. In other words, I’m going to give this particular product or this particular construction project and it doesn’t really fit with an overall plan. In places like Afghanistan there is a constant friction between those who advocate focusing on military skills that will help the police survive in areas of conflict, and police skills that make them effective and welcomed members of the community. How do you see this tension? Kroeker: Well I see the tension as tangible. It is real. It is a tension that arises out of a classic disparate view of post-conflict situations. There’s a tendency among the military to view law enforcement as an exit strategy. So the question is how soon can we stand up a law enforcement structure so that we can leave. The other view is that law enforcement capacity building is generational. It cannot be done by

Christmas. It cannot be done by next year, or 2013 in August. This is a generational sort of a thing. Like raising your family. It’s a 20 year transformational challenge. That doesn’t mean that significant things can’t happen right away, but I think the most important thing in law enforcement, and where the conflict exists, is that law enforcement structures have to be demilitarized. They have to be depoliticized. They have to move away from the political and military dominance that seems to take place, or from warlords and handed over to the communities. Yes political oversight in the good and proper way, but not political interference in the corrupt way. So there’s the conflict. The helpful effective members of the community are not found in counterinsurgency fighters. They are found in local police officers who will provide access to justice, who will make arrests of low level violators, who will solve community problems together with the community. That is a tension and it is the tendency in training to measure the numbers trained rather than the capacities built. ■

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ϐ U.S. Government Contracts Implications for Federal Contractors Michele A. Clark N SEPTEMBER 25, 2012, President Barack Obama signed an executive order designed to end human trafficking among government contractors overseas. This order, Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts, together with pending Congressional legislation, the End Trafficking in Government Contracting Act of 2012, changes the way U.S. contractors do business overseas.

U.S. contractors working overseas liable for acts of sex and labor trafficking. Unfortunately, little has changed. Reports from the Commission on Wartime Contracting and the inspectors general of the Defense and State Departments provided detailed accounts indicating that Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in the employ of U.S. contractors notably in Iraq

Federal contractors will be required front-load human trafficking prevention programs into their proposals before a grant is awarded. The executive order ups the ante on monitoring and accountability while the legislation strengthens criminal sanctions against offenders. Now, prime contractors are liable for the actions of their subcontractors all the way down the supply chain. These initiatives are timely and necessary. Background

Sustained Indifference The primary reason for ongoing instances of abuse is that contractors have not been directed or expected to abide by the standards of existing legislation. The numbers of contracts released without clear anti-trafficking clauses allows for endemic indifference to exploitative practices in the supply chain. Nick Schwellenbach, Director of Investigations, Project on Government Oversight (POGO) remarked that “The DoD IG has found that a substantial percentage of the contracts they have audited do not have a mandatory trafficking in persons clause.” As one business development specialist for a large contractor told this author, “I remember seeing something about trafficking in the solicitation, but we never did anything about it and no one asked for it. It just wasn’t on the radar.” Another challenge is that many acts of trafficking take place throughout a labyrinthine supply chain, beginning with the recruitment of TCNs in their home countries by third party and often-unlicensed recruitment firms. Traditionally, the prime contractors have not been liable for acts of trafficking at the end of the supply chain. According to Sam McMahon, a former government fraud prosecutor now focusing on government contracting and corporate

Michele Clark is an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University and CEO of Third Space Creative, LLC, developers of web-based learning and training solutions with a focus on human rights, social change, and education.

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Photo: An Iraqi man carries ice at a work site. Credit: Flickr, US Air Force

The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 marked the United States Government’s official declaration of war against human trafficking. Originally intended to guide U.S. foreign policy in combating human trafficking internationally, and provide assistance to foreign victims inside the United States, the Act has been fine-tuned at each of its three subsequent reauthorizations to keep pace with increasingly complex human trafficking practices. Following the brutal killings of twelve Nepalese contract workers in Iraq and allegations of large-scale labor exploitation, the 2005 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) introduced provisions related to extraterritorial jurisdiction over federal contractors, making

and Afghanistan have been subject to exploitative treatment equating to debt bondage and human trafficking. The Commission delivered a resounding censure of anti-TIP measures currently on the books by declaring “Existing prohibitions on such trafficking have failed to stop it.” In response to such criticism, the House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and Procurement Reform held its first of two hearings on November 2, 2011. In his introductory remarks, Rep. James Lankford stated that the goals of the hearing were to answer two questions: Whether or not the U.S. Government “has become an enabler of human trafficking, or if we have knowingly turned a blind eye to trafficking?” According to expert witnesses, the answer was a resounding “yes” to both.

Liana Wyler, Senior Analyst with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, outlined ten years of USG antitrafficking legislation including the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), three reauthorizations, a Zero-Tolerance Policy, and a Presidential Directive, and concluded by saying that, “Despite ongoing efforts to combat human trafficking associated with government contractors, recent annual reports on trafficking in persons by the U.S. Department of State acknowledge that government contractors and subcontractors continue to be implicated in allegations of forced labor and sex trafficking.”

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compliance, there has been no incentive in previous years for the prime contractors to get involved. Doing nothing carried few risks whereas reporting a human trafficking violation opened the door to complex investigations, rendered even more so by conflicting interpretations of responsibility; if reprehensible practices were being carried out by subcontractors and labor recruiters, the primes did not feel obliged to accept blame. Furthermore, the harm, as is the case in most instances of human trafficking, was largely invisible. TNCs were housed in separate labor camps and access was heavily controlled. Language and culture created barriers of silence between the workers and the rest of the base populations. Those military and contract personnel who did question certain practices often did not know where to report allegations of abuse, or were told to mind their own business if they tried. New Requirements On March 27, 2012, the same Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and Procurement reform held a follow-up hearing, with a different cast of characters. The purpose: to introduce the End Trafficking in Government Contracting Act of 2012. The Executive Order and the legislation share similar objectives. They both focus on prevention of trafficking and increasing accountability among prime contractors and subcontractors. The legislation also imposes criminal penalties beyond the scope of the executive order. The legislation provides for stronger enforcement mechanisms that expand the criminal prohibitions against fraudulent labor

practices and make clear remedial actions should acts of trafficking occur. These include removing the employee from the exploitative working conditions, suspending payments under the grant, terminating the contract for default or cause, or referring the matter to the agency for disbarment or suspension.

Addressing the potential for noncompliance in this new environment establishes the duty of contractors to set clear expectations throughout their subcontracting networks that a business culture that tolerates trafficking will not survive for long. ■ References

Contractors will now be required to take proactive measures to prevent trafficking in persons throughout their supply chain and to display evidence of such plans prior to receiving an award. These measures will indicate how they intend to prevent all forms of trafficking, or “acts that directly support or advance trafficking in persons.” Contractors will be responsible for preventing actions such as destroying immigration papers, failure to repatriate an employee upon termination of employment, making fraudulent job offers, charging exorbitant recruitment fees and providing inhumane living conditions. Implementation carries with it many new challenges — including significant implications for compliance, contract and human resources offices with recruitment posing the most immediate problems. Industry is asking the question: How far does the accountability go? And the answer is: very far. All recruitment and related practices, including advertising of overseas positions, contracts in diverse languages, wages, terms and scope of work, and transportation of workers must now be subject to intense scrutiny to ensure fair practice and informed consent. These new anti-trafficking initiatives establish a road map for contractors to addressing human trafficking in a systematic and effective manner.

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Final Report to Congress: Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, August 2011 Rep. James Lankford (R-Okla.): Are Government Contractors Exploiting Workers Overseas? Examining Enforcement of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Introductory remarks before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and Procurement Reform of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. November 2, 2011 Liana Wyler (Senior Analyst, Congressional Research Service): Are Government Contractors Exploiting Workers Overseas? Examining Enforcement of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.: Testimony give before the house Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and Procurement Reform of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. November 2, 2011 Nick Schwellenbach, Director of Investigations, Project on Government Oversight (POGO): Are Government Contractors Exploiting Workers Overseas? Examining Enforcement of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Testimony give before the House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and Procurement Reform of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. November 2, 2011

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Global Perspectives: West Africa

A West African Time Bomb Islamic Jihadists Establish an Al-Qaeda Franchise in Northern Mali Herman J. Cohen SLAMIC JIHADISTS affiliated with AQIM, the Al-Qaeda franchise in North Africa and the Sahel region, are in control of northern Mali. Their intention is to spread their control to the rest of Mali and then on to neighboring Mauritania and Niger. Everyone agrees on what needs to be done. There must be a military intervention to defeat the insurgents, known as Ansar Dine, who control the key towns of Kidal, Gao and Timbuctu. Negotiations are neither possible nor desirable. The governments comprising the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have identified 3,000 military personnel who could participate in such an intervention. All of the governments have agreed that such an operation must take place as soon as possible. But organizing to undertake the operation in an area that is so far away from military bases, and so vast, with limited logistical capacity, appears to be a daunting objective at the present time. The French government, which maintains close economic, diplomatic and military ties with the French-speaking countries in ECOWAS, has

we know that AFRICOM surveillance of Ansar Dine is already taking place from temporary bases in neighboring Burkina Faso, a country that is also threatened by the Islamic Jihadists next door. ECOWAS’ leader in military interventions in the West African sub-region has traditionally been Nigeria. This oil rich country has the largest military establishment. But the Nigerian army currently has its hands full with a home grown Islamist insurgency known as “Boko Haram” that has been spreading terrorism in the country’s northern Moslem majority states. So far, the Nigerian army has not yet gotten the situation under control, and is therefore likely to have neither the troops nor the command structures available for an operation in northern Mali. French military sources tell me that the francophone African countries have a way to go before they can gear up to intervene in northern Mali, but they understand the necessity to act quickly.

There must be a military intervention to defeat the insurgents, known as Ansar Dine, who control the key towns of Kidal, Gao and Timbuctu. openly expressed the intention to support an intervention by African forces, but has not offered to put French fighters on the ground. The United States administration has also ruled out any direct US involvement in a re-conquest operation, but is apparently keeping the door open to intelligence and logistical cooperation via its geographic command AFRICOM. Indeed,

Public statements by the American administration have been somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the US recognizes the need to act militarily in northern Mali. On the other hand, the US wants to see the restoration of democratic legitimacy in Mali as the highest priority. In other words: democracy first, military intervention second.

What does the US administration mean by its insistence on the restoration of democratic legitimacy to the government of Mali? Back in February-March 2012, Malian Touareg fighters, who had been mercenaries in the Libyan army of Moamar Gaddaffi, came back to Mali with their arms and vehicles after the successful “Arab Spring” uprising in Libya. In northern Mali, they found the Malian army totally unprepared for the defense of the three main cities. They were able to take over the cities easily, with the Malian army retreating to southern Mali via the border town of Gao. The Touareg fighters returning from Libya declared independence for their northern region as the Republic of Azawad. Their political movement was called the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). In view of their humiliation, which they blamed on their corrupt political leaders, younger Malian army officers staged a coup in the capital of Bamako on March 22, 2012 and took over the government. President Amadou Amani Toure was forced to flee the country one month before a scheduled presidential election in which he was not eligible to run. Under pressure from ECOWAS, the military officers agreed to turn over power to an interim civilian government led by the democratically elected President of the National Assembly. However, it is clear that the military officers continue to exercise the real governmental power with the politicians as front men. Moreover, the military is popular with the Malian people who are fed up with the venality of the elected the civilian regime that has been in power for 10 years. I am assuming that the US Government’s position on the “restoration of legitimate government” means that the military officers who continue to exercise power should return to the barracks and allow the civilian interim regime to be fully in charge as it prepares for a transition back to electoral democracy. I do not believe that the US Government wants the entire process of reconquest of the north to

Ambassador Cohen is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and is President of Cohen & Woods International.

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Global Perspectives: West Africa

Photo: Mali arrests alleged Al-Qaeda informants Credit: Flickr/Magharebia

It’s kind of ironic. Al-Qaeda has apparently been marginalized in South Asia and the Middle East only to pop up in sub-Saharan Africa to take advantage of opportunities in Somalia as el-Shebab, in Nigeria as Boko Haram and in Mali as Ansar el Dine.

await a full-fledged transition leading to an election one year from now. That would not be wise. On October 12, 2012, the UN Security Council voted to request ECOWAS to prepare a plan for military intervention in northern Mali within 45 days. US support for this resolution indicates to me that Washington’s advocacy for “democracy first” is soft. What about Algeria that is observing events in Mali from the north of the Al-Qaeda occupied territories? Algeria went through a bloody 10 year internal war against the same people currently trying to implement extreme Islamism

in northern Mali. Should they not be interested in eliminating this threat? The Algerian constitution forbids the use of Algerian armed forces outside of Algeria. That makes it impossible for the Algerian army to join in the battle again the Islamist insurgents in Northern Mali. But certainly they should be able to contribute to the effort in some other way. Perhaps, in a perverse way, the Algerians are pleased to see AQIM and Al-Qaeda far away in Mali and not causing havoc in Algeria. What I would hope is happening right now behind the scenes is military planning support to ECOWAS by the Americans of AFRICOM

and their French counterparts. This support should also include ongoing intelligence, training, and the delivery of weapons and vehicles to appropriate staging areas. It’s kind of ironic. Al-Qaeda has apparently been marginalized in South Asia and the Middle East only to pop up in sub-Saharan Africa to take advantage of opportunities in Somalia as el-Shebab, in Nigeria as Boko Haram and in Mali as Ansar el Dine. One conclusion that we can reach as a result of these early experiences is that Al-Qaeda in Africa is an alien body that cannot take root among the African Moslem populations who totally reject this type of extremist medieval religious politics. ■

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ISOA invites ISOA Members to send us news for the Member News Board at communications@stability-operations.org.

ISOA Member News from September - October 2012

BAE Systems Inc. was awarded a contract to reset up to 146 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. CH2M Hill, Inc. was awarded a contract for the design and construction of an advanced water treatment plant and conveyance at USMC Base Camp Pendleton. Chapman Freeborn supported a humanitarian airlift of medical supplies to Hanoi, Vietnam in conjunction with the St. Anthony Health Foundation and Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI). The Best Lawyers in America 2013 Recognizes 44 Crowell & Moring Attorneys. DLA Piper LLP was honoured in ϐ for "Compliance Investigations" at the Award Gala at Alte Oper in Frankfurt , Germany. DynCorp International was recognized as one of Military Training Technology’s 2012 Top Simulation and Training Companies.

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Engility was awarded a contract to support the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWARSYSCEN) Atlantic, Charleston, S.C. EOD Technology Inc. was awarded a contract to provide for the top secret security guard services. Fluor’s CEO David Seaton and former CEO Alan Boeckmann were awarded the H. Neil Mallow Award by the World Affairs Council of Dallas/Ft. Worth. IAP World Services, Inc. awarded BPA task order its GSA Envi Schedule for the Nat’l Oceanic and ǯ ȋ Ȍ ϐ Int’l Affairs. International Relief & Development ϐ children in Jordan as part of the USAID-funded Jordan School Construction and Rehab Program. Onsite OHS ϐ participant in the Veterans First Contracting Program. PAE, Inc. and Triple Canopy have ϐ ʹ Ͳͳʹ

GovCon Awards Contractor of the year (greater than $300m). PwC LLP announced recognition in 4 Oracle Excellence Awards categories at Oracle OpenWorld 2012. Sallyport is awarded a contract from the U.S. Army Contracting Command for the maintenance of administrative facilities and service buildings. URS awarded a contract to provide maintenance services in support of ϐ Security Cooperation.

MEMBER JOB POSTINGS Visit the Careers with ISOA Members page on the ISOA website to find the career pages at ISOA Member organizations. Current Job Postings:  IAP Worldwide Services

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The ISOA Membership The International Stability Operations Association The International Stability Operations Association is proud to have a multisectoral membership that represents the various aspects of operations performed in conflict, post-conflict, disaster relief and reconstruction efforts. The Membership Directory provides a visualization of the different roles that our member organizations fulfill in contingency operations by using the icons below to classify each member’s activities. Armored Vehicles

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ACTCO

Website

ISOA Point-of-Contact/Designated Delegate

American Glass Products

Membership approved

Chapman Freeborn

Dubai, UAE

Ras Al Khaimah, U.A.E.

Fort Lauderdale, FL

www.afghancontainers.com

www.agpglass.com

www.chapman-freeborn.com

Gaurev Kukreja

Tobias Beutgen

Christopher Fisher

June 2012

April 2008

December 2011

Agility

BAE Systems

Clements Worldwide

Safat, Kuwait

Rockville, Maryland

Washington, D.C.

www.agilitylogistics.com

www.baesystems.com

www.clements.com

Richard Brooks

Mary Robinson

Smita Malik

January 2006

October 2010

November 2011

Air Charter Service PLC

Burton Rands Associates

Crowell & Moring LLP

Surrey, United Kingdom

Washington, D.C.

www.aircharter.co.uk

www.burtonrands.com

www.crowell.com

Tony Bauckham

Nicola Lowther

David Hammond

March 2010

December 2008

May 2008

AMECO

CH2M Hill Inc.

DLA Piper LLP

Greenville, South Carolina

Englewood, CO.

London, United Kingdom

www.ameco.com

www.ch2m.com

www.dlapiper.com

Paul Camp

Tia L. Hutton

Tara Lee

July 2005

April 2011

January 2009

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ISOA Membership Directory DynCorp International

GardaWorld

International Relief & Development

Falls Church, Virginia

Dubai, UAE

Arlington, Virginia

www.dyn-intl.com

www.garda-world.com

www.ird.org

William Imbrie

Peter Dordal

Jeffrey Grieco

April 2007

September 2008

October 2010

Engility

Global Fleet Sales

KGL Holding

Chantilly, Virginia

Bankok, Thailand

Safat, Kuwait

www.engilitycorp.com

www.globalfleetsales.net

www.kgl.com

Tom Baker

Nicholas Ling

Scott Beverly

January 2003

June 2009

July 2011

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EOD Technology, Inc.

Global Integrated Security—USA

Lenoir City, Tennessee

www.eodt.com

PC M

Erik Quist January 2006

Fluor Corporation

PC M

Irving, Texas

www.fluor.com

PC M

Howie Lind February 2012

Frank Crystal & Company HQ W PC M

Reston, VA

London, UK

www.globalgroup-gis.com

www.lonrho.com

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Geoffrey White

April 2011

December 2011

HART

PC M

Lonrho

Mission Essential Personnel

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Columbus, Ohio

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contact@missionep.com

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New Century U.S.

Washington, D.C.

Cape Canaveral, FL

Arlington, Virginia

www.fcrystal.com

www.iapws.com

www.newcentcorp.com

Jeffrey Wingate

Chuck Dominy

Scott Jacobs

July 2010

July 2012

July 2008

FSI Worldwide

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Olive Group

Dubai, U.A.E.

Ras Al Khaimah, U.A.E.

Dubai, U.A.E.

www.fsi-worldwide.com

www.interarmored.com

www.olivegroup.com

Nicholas Forster

Sally Stefova

Matt Fey

May 2008

June 2007

December 2005

HQ W

G4S

International Defense Technologies

OnSite OHS, Inc.

Palm Beach Gardens, FL

Marlton, NJ

Princeton, Indiana

www.g4sgs.com

www.internationaldefense.com

www.onsiteohs.com

Phil Rudder

Elizabeth Piñero-Doyle

Michelle Prinzing

August 2003

April 2012

October 2011

HQ W

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ISOA Membership Directory OSPREA Logistics

SupplyCore

Reed Inc.

Cape Town, South Africa

Leesburg, Virginia

Rockford, IL

www.osprea.com

www.reedinc.com

www.supplycore.com

Salih Brandt

Marius van der Riet

Mike Paul

August 2010

April 2006

March 2012

OSSI, Inc.

Sallyport

Triple Canopy

Miami, Florida

Bridgeville, Pennsylvania

Reston, Virginia

www.ossiinc.com

www.sallyportglobal.com

www.triplecanopy.com

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Doug Magee

Patrick Garvey

October 2005

August 2011

July 2008

Overseas Lease Group

URS

Shield International Security

Fort Lauderdale, Florida

Seoul, South Korea

Germantown, Maryland

www.overseasleasegroup.com

www.shieldconsulting.co.kr

www.urs.com

Tracy Badcock

Lucy Park

Iggi Husar

February 2008

April 2010

April 2009

PAE, Inc.

SOC, LLC

Unity Resources Group

Arlington, Virginia

Chantilly, Virginia

Dubai, U.A.E.

www.paegroup.com

www.soc-usa.com

www.unityresourcesgroup.com

Thomas Callahan

Derek Johnson

Jim LeBlanc

October 2010

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December 2006

Pax Mondial

Vertical de Aviacion

SOS International Ltd.

Arlington, Virginia

Reston, Virginia

Bogota, Colombia

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www.sosiltd.com

www.verticaldeaviacion.com

Paul Wood

Michael K. Seidl

David J. Burachio

January 2009

November 2007

September 2012

Principal Risk Solutions

New Member Organization

Cardiff, United Kingdom

Washington, DC

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John Smith

April 2012

September 2012

PwC LLP HQ

McLean, VA

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Marissa Michel

May 2012

EA M O C E B

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Washington, DC

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John Smith

September 2012

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