Dehumanization and social class animality in the stereotypes of 'white trash,' 'chavs,' and 'bogans' by Irakli Kavtaradze

Original Article

Dehumanization and Social Class This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Animality in the Stereotypes of “White Trash,” “Chavs,” and “Bogans” Steve Loughnan1, Nick Haslam1, Robbie M. Sutton2, and Bettina Spencer3 1

University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia, 2University of Kent, UK, 3 Saint Mary’s College, Notre Dame, IN, USA

Abstract. Three studies examined whether animality is a component of low-SES stereotypes. In Study 1a–c, the content of “white trash” (USA), “chav” (UK), and “bogan” (Australia) stereotypes was found to be highly consistent, and in every culture it correlated positively with the stereotype content of apes. In Studies 2a and 2b, a within-subjects approach replicated this effect and revealed that it did not rely on derogatory labels or was reducible to ingroup favoritism or system justification concerns. In Study 3, the “bogan” stereotype was associated with ape, rat, and dog stereotypes independently of established stereotype content dimensions (warmth, competence, and morality). By implication, stereotypes of low-SES people picture them as primitive, bestial, and incompletely human. Keywords: stereotype, dehumanization, class, working class, prejudice

The distinction between humans and animals casts a long shadow on the perception of groups. A large body of empirical work shows that people tend to view other groups as less human, and more bestial, than their own. In its subtlest form, the infrahumanization effect (Leyens et al., 2000), people deny outgroup members the capacity to experience uniquely human emotions. Some groups appear to be implicitly associated with animals in a more direct fashion (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007; Viki et al., 2006). Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, and Jackson (2008), for example, found that White Americans implicitly associated AfricanAmericans with apes. These findings echo the age of European colonialism, when non-European groups were located at a lower level on the scale of civilization. Jahoda (1999) argues that these “images of savages” persist in contemporary Western perceptions of groups that are perceived to be primitive and undeveloped. Indeed, Saminaden, Loughnan, and Haslam (2010) showed that people living in traditional societies were implicitly associated with animals and children more than those living in modern industrialized societies, an effect that was irreducible to “race” or negative attitudes. Such associations may also extend to groups within modern societies. Jahoda contended that savages “form part of a cluster that includes . . . the rural and urban poor” (p. 237). Although most dehumanization research has focused on ethnic, racial, and immigrant groups, the prototypical kinds of “savage,” other kinds of supposedly less-than-human groups have been relatively neglected. Social Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):54–61 DOI: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000159

One domain in which dehumanizing and animalistic perceptions might be found is social class. People of low socioeconomic status (SES) or working-class backgrounds – or the “poor,” to use Jahoda’s preferred term – may be subject to degrading stereotypes despite sharing the ethnic or racial category of their more advantaged peers. In the USA, for example, the “white trash” stereotype presents low-SES whites as stupid, coarse, violent, dirty, and sexually unrestrained (Spencer & Castano, 2007; Wray, 2006). In the UK, the stereotype of low-SES “chavs” pictures them as crude, unintelligent, feckless, and criminal (Jones, 2011). In Australia, similar deficiencies are attributed to “bogans,” who are “what the ‘lower races’ were to most whites a century ago” (Nichols, 2011, p. 12). These supposed groups may differ in some respects – “white trash” has a more rural connotation, “chavs” more urban and “bogans” more suburban – but they are all predominantly “white,” contain both men and women, and they are all stereotyped as bestial. Jones (2011), for example, shows how the sneering mockery and caricature of chavs often represents them as feral beings, quoting one newspaper report on “a pack of slavering chav-estate mongrels” (p. 125). Wray (2006) examines how the popular image of white trash is dominated by ideas of primitiveness and atavism. Often the animal metaphor is less explicit, either expressed humorously or indirectly by references to stupidity, indolence, mindless aggression, and sexual license. Nichols (2011) presents examples of how bogans are presented as forms of wildlife, © 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

S. Loughnan et al.: Dehumanization and Social Class

depicted as “amoebic plebs,” “subnormal apes,” or “wretched throwbacks.” Although the term “demonization” is sometimes used to characterize stereotypes such as these (Jones, 2011), they generally involve condescension more than hatred: “dehumanization” may be a better label. Interestingly, the labels applied to low-SES groups encompass a range of animals – apes, dogs, even amoebae. This multiplicity of animalistic labels contrasts with more focused derogatory labeling, for example the consistent historical use of apes when derogating African-Americans (see Goff et al., 2008). These animals seem quite different; for example, dogs are viewed as warm and sociable (Zebrowitz, Wadlinger, Luevano, White, Xing, & Zhang, 2011), whereas apes, rates, and amoebae are less likely to elicit these attributions. The considerable range of animals employed in labeling low-SES groups may indicate that it is the likening of the group to animals – regardless of the perceived characteristics of the specific animal – which may be central to the dehumanization of low-SES groups. Stated otherwise, what may matter is perceived animality, rather than likeness to a specific animal. The stereotyping of low-SES whites as bestial might imply an addition to dominant models of stereotype content. According to these models, social groups are distinguished on three main dimensions. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002) demonstrated that groups are ascribed warmth (broadly prosociality) when they are not in competition with one’s own, and ascribed competence (broadly ability) according to their status. Fiske et al. found that stereotypes of “poor people” portray them as lacking warmth and especially competence, characterizing them as relatively cold and incapable. Leach, Ellemers, and Barreto (2007) argue that morality is an additional stereotype content dimension, and to the extent that low-SES groups are seen as norm-violating they may be stereotyped as immoral. Work from a stereotype content perspective has explored the perception of extremely marginalized social groups residing in the low-warmth–low-competence quadrant (i.e., the homeless, drug addicts) and found that they fail to elicit neural activation in the same brain regions associated with other human targets (i.e., the mPFC; Harris & Fiske, 2007). Such neuroimaging findings imply a failure to humanize extreme outgroups, but they do not directly address low-SES stereotypes – they are not about class per se – and they do not establish that particular groups are perceived as bestial. Moreover, none of the three stereotype content dimensions straightforwardly corresponds to the perception of a group as animal-like. Indeed, there is some evidence that the perception of groups as more or less bestial is not reducible to the major stereotype content dimensions (Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008; Vaes & Paladino, 2010). The social psychological literature on class-based stereotypes and discrimination extends far beyond dehumanizing metaphors (see Bullock, 1995, for a review on classism). It is well established that low-SES individuals feel marginalized and stigmatized by wealthier others (Fiske, © 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

2011; Johnson, Richeson, & Finkle, 2011). The current approach, focused on animalizing, complements this preexisting literature on classism. We conducted three studies to test whether people from low-SES groups are stereotyped in a dehumanizing and animalistic fashion. The first study, run cross-culturally to examine the generality of any effects (USA, UK, and Australia), examined whether low-SES groups, referred to by derogatory colloquial labels such as “white trash,” were stereotyped as ape-like. The second study explored this effect using less derogatory class labels and a different, within-subjects approach. The third study focused on a single group (“bogans”) and examined whether they were perceived as animal-like in general rather than ape-like in particular, and whether any such perceptions were reducible to a lack of warmth, competence, or morality. We hypothesized that across cultures, lowSES stereotypes would have similar content, would be associated with stereotypes of apes and other animals, and that these associations would be independent of established stereotype content dimensions.

Study 1a–c The first study was conducted in three cultures, using nationally relevant low-SES group labels: “white trash” (USA), “chavs” (UK), and “bogans” (Australia). Otherwise identical materials were used in each sample.

Method Participants The Australian sample (N = 39, 27 women, 12 men, Mage = 18.5) were undergraduates who completed the study as part of a course requirement. The British sample were undergraduates (N = 150, 91 women, 59 men, Mage = 20.6) who completed the study as part of an unrelated task. The American sample were community members (N = 57, 43 women, 14 men, Mage = 29.4) who completed the study for a $3 payment. Participants were recruited using flyers around town to participate in a study on attitudes.

Materials Participants in each sample were randomly assigned to one of two versions of a questionnaire. In one version, they rated 40 Big Five personality traits employed in previous research (Haslam & Bain, 2007) on the following item: Please think about Humans and (nonhuman) Apes, and how they differ. Consider each of the following attributes and rate whether it is more characteristic of Apes (4 or 5), more characteristic of Humans (1 or 2), or equally characteristic of both (3). Social Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):54–61

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The response scale was from 1 (= Humans) to 5 (= Apes). In the other version, participants rated the same traits on a similar item:

Please think about the stereotype of [White trash/Chavs/Bogans]. Consider each of the following attributes and rate whether it is more characteristic of [White trash/Chavs/Bogans] (4 or 5), more characteristic of people who are not [White trash/Chavs/Bogans] (1 or 2), or equally characteristic of both (3). It does not matter whether you personally agree or disagree with the stereotype: please make your ratings based on the stereotype.

These ratings were made on a scale from 1 (= much more characteristic of people who are not [white trash/chavs/bogans]) to 5 (= much more characteristic of [white trash/chavs/bogans]).

Procedure Australian and British participants completed the questionnaire in small groups in a laboratory setting. American participants completed the questionnaire individually in a laboratory setting. Participants required approximately 5 min to complete the questionnaire.

Results and Discussion Mean ratings for each of the 40 traits were calculated separately for the participants in each sample who rated the low-SES stereotype item and for those who rated the ape stereotype item. Correlations were then calculated across these mean ratings over the 40 traits. Correlations between samples indicated that the low-SES stereotypes had very similar content, ranging from 0.83 (chavs/bogans) to 0.96 (white trash/chavs), all ps < .001. There was also good agreement on the ape stereotype: rs = 0.82 (USA/UK), 0.44 (USA/Australia), and 0.48 (UK/Australia), all ps < .01. Importantly, the class and ape stereotypes were correlated positively in each sample, ranging from 0.35 (chavs, bogans) to 0.40 (white trash), all ps < .05. Study 1 indicates that there is very substantial cross-cultural generality in the content of low-SES stereotypes: American “white trash,” British “chavs,” and Australian “bogans” were all ascribed and denied much the same attributes. This degree of overlap is remarkable given the differences in national setting and implied urbanization in the three cases. The shared content of the three stereotypes also overlapped substantially with the content of the stereotype of apes. By implication, low-SES people are seen as differing from others in ways that parallel the differences between apes and humans. In short, low-SES people were represented as more ape-like than people of other class backgrounds, not merely lacking social standing and economic power but also sitting on a lower rung of the evolutionary ladder. Social Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):54–61

Study 2 Study 1 provided cross-cultural evidence that people view lower-class people as relatively ape-like. Studies 2a and 2b aimed to replicate this effect and address several limitations of Study 1. The previous study employed a relatively subtle measure of dehumanization; participants in two separate conditions rated traits which were then correlated. The current study adopted a within-subjects approach to investigate whether the tendency to see low-SES people as apelike occurs both across traits and within individuals. Further, whereas Study 1 primarily employed student samples, in Studies 2a and 2b we collected a broader, communitybased sample. The use of derogatory class labels in Study 1 raises the possibility that participants were only considering a disliked subgroup of low-SES people, rather than the class as a whole. In Study 2a we therefore employed less derogatory class labels to assess the generality of the lowSES–ape association, and examined whether this association held separately for positive and for negative traits, indicating that it does not simply represent antipathy toward low-SES people. Although the primary goal of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1 using a different methodology and different group labels, it also explored the possible basis for the low-SES–ape association. We framed this association to reflect the stereotype content of low-SES whites, implying that it is a widely shared representation of this group. However, an alternative possibility is that the association reflects a motivated process of dehumanizing the lower class, and that it is therefore held by some people more than others. Specifically, if the low-SES–ape association reflects a motivated process it might be stronger (1) among people who are relatively high-SES and (2) among people who believe that social hierarchy is legitimate and that people at the bottom deserve their low status. If the low-SES–ape association serves as a means for higher-SES individuals to derogate low-SES individuals, the association should be found among them more than among relatively low-SES individuals. If the association serves to justify and explain existing social relations it should be found most strongly among people high in social dominance orientation (SDO) (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). High SDO people believe that those who occupy society’s lower ranks are inferior to those at the top and are responsible for their low social position, thus justifying the status quo (Kay & Jost, 2003). Such system justification beliefs (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), could take the form of derogating low-SES groups as animals. Study 2 therefore examined whether the lowSES–ape association was stronger among relatively highSES participants and among those who were high in SDO. Failure to find such stronger associations would strengthen – but not prove – the contention that the association primarily reflects shared stereotype content. © 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

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Method Study 2a participants were 42 American adults (20 female, 22 male, Mage = 34.62, 100% Caucasian) and Study 2b participants were 48 American adults (19 female, 29 male, Mage = 33.10, 100% Caucasian)1. All participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and paid 50c for their time. Participants in both studies were presented with two lists of the same 20 personality traits (10 positive, 10 negative) taken from previous research (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). In one list they were asked whether the trait was more characteristic of apes (1 or 2), more characteristic of humans (4 or 5), or equally characteristic of both (3). In the other list, in Study 2a they were asked whether the trait was more characteristic of “lower-class whites” (1 or 2), more characteristic of “non-lower-class whites” (4 or 5), or equally characteristic of both (3). In Study 2b they were presented with the same wording as the US sample in Study 1 (i.e., “white trash”). The lists were presented in a counterbalanced order. To explore a system justification account in Study 2b, we asked participants to complete two additional questionnaires. To directly measure system justification concerns, an eight-item system justification scale was taken from Kay and Jost (2003). To measure broader beliefs about social hierarchy, participants completed a 16-item Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994). Participants also provided basic demographics. In Study 2a, subjective SES was measured by asking participants whether they felt that they were (a) financially and (b) in terms of assets poorer or wealthier than average on a 100point sliding scale. In Study 2b, we additionally measured pretax income from “below $15,000” to “above $55,000” in $10,000 increments. Participants also self-reported their social class on a 100-point scale (0 = Lower, 50 = Middle, 100 = Upper)2.

Results Within-subjects correlations were computed to measure the extent to which participants’ ratings on the humanape distinction correlated with their ratings on the lower class–non-lower-class distinction (see Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009). This technique yields a correlation coefficient for each participant. A single-sample t-test testing against a correlation of ze1

ro revealed a significant positive within-subjects correlation between the two trait sets; Study 2a, t(41) = 4.73, p < .001; Study 2b, t(47) = 8.30, p < .001. This effect held regardless of the order in which the questions were asked, ts(19–24)2.90, ps < .01. The effect was also present for both positive traits, t(41) = 4.37, p < .001 (Study 2a); t(47) = 8.41, p < .001 (Study 2b), and negative traits, t(41) = 3.19, p = .003 (Study 2a); t(47) = 5.25, p < .001 (Study 2b). Across both studies, participants robustly associated the ape-human distinction with the low-SES distinction (see Table 1). This finding replicates Study 1a–c and shows that it holds at an individual (within-subjects) level. Table 1. Mean correlations between the low-SES stereotype and animal stereotypes, Study 2a–b All traits

Positive traits

Negative traits

Study 2a

0.22

0.24

0.16

Study 2b

0.33

0.42

0.25

To examine whether the low-SES–ape association was stronger among relatively high-SES participants, we first median split the Study 2a sample on the two-item subjective SES measure (n = 21 high, n = 21 low) and repeated the single-sample t-tests on total, positive, and negative trait correlations. Both high (r = 0.15 to 0.25, ps < .05) and low (r = 0.17 to 0.25, ps < .05) groups significantly associated low-class people with apes, on all measures, with the exception of a marginal effect for high wealth participants on negative traits (p = .052). An independent samples t-test revealed that these two groups did not differ in the extent to which they held these associations, ts(40) < 1.00, ps > .50. In Study 2b, we median split the sample (n = 24 high, n = 24 low) on a subjective SES scale constructed by summing standardized scores for four items: self-reported finances and assets (as in Study 2a), self-reported pretax income, and self-reported social class (Cronbach’s α = 0.90). Both high-SES (r = 0.20 to 0.38, ps < .011) and low-SES (r = 0.30 to 0.47, ps < .001) groups significantly associated low-SES people with apes across total, positive, and negative trait sets. A t-test revealed that these two groups did not differ in the strength of these associations, ts(46) > 0.80, ps > .21. This finding that higher-SES participants did not hold a stronger low-SES–ape association was largely replicated in both samples when participant SES was treated as a continuous variable and when the sample was split into lower and upper thirds.

Nine participants used the same number to rate all traits (n = 6) or all positive traits (n = 3) in the human-ape list and therefore correlation coefficients could not be calculated for them. One participant reported a correlation more than 3 SDs below the mean and was excluded from the analysis. We also excluded all non-white participants (nstudy2a = 11; nstudy2b = 9). These participants were excluded for all analyses in the two studies. Both studies contain a considerable range of socioeconomic status. In Study 2a there was sufficient variance in asset value (M = 32.97, SD = 20.02, range = 82) and financial wealth (M = 39.36, SD = 17.98, range = 80). In Study 2b there was sufficient variance in self-reported social class (M = 42.05, SD = 19.81, range = 88), asset value (M = 40.48, SD = 23.60, range = 87), and financial wealth (M = 42.12, SD = 20.11, range = 87). Pretax income was measured on a five-point scale and showed sufficient variability (M = 3.44, SD = 1.97, range = 5).

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Study 2b additionally examined whether the low-SES–ape association was stronger among participants who are more prone to system justification. Both the system justification scale and the SDO scale showed good reliabilities (α > 0.87). Neither participants’ tendency to system justify (rs(48) = –0.19 to 0.23, p > .11) nor their SDO (rs(48) = –0.15, to 0.17 ps > .25) significantly correlated with the total, positive trait, or negative trait low-SES–ape association. This failure to correlate makes it unlikely that beliefs about social rank or maintaining the status quo underlie the association.

Discussion The results of Study 2 replicate and extend the notion that low-SES people are stereotyped as relatively bestial. Using a within-subjects design revealed that the link between low-SES people and apes held at a within-subjects level; people think that the attributes that distinguished low from higher SES people are the same as those that distinguish apes from humans. This link replicated across two studies and was similar in magnitude. The use of less derogatory labels (Study 2a) and a mix of positive and negative traits revealed a robust association between apishness and class. Although the primary goal of Study 2 was to replicate the basic association, its findings also challenged the possibility that the association is motivated by class-based derogation or system justification. Consistent with the notion that the low-SES–ape association is primarily a shared stereotype, rather than a way for higher-SES people to derogate lower-SES people or for system justifiers to account for class hierarchy, the magnitude of the association was unrelated to participant SES, SDO or system justification. It may be that dehumanizing stereotypes of the poor are endorsed across the economic and ideological spectra.

Study 3 Study 1 obtained strong support for a cross-culturally consistent association between stereotypes of low-SES groups and apes. Study 2 replicated this finding, extending it to the individual level and dissociating it from simple antipathy. Study 3 explored this link further, through a deeper analysis of one stereotype (“bogans”). First, we examined whether the association between bogans and apes persisted after controlling for established dimensions of stereotype content. If animality is a distinct component of low-SES stereotypes, the bogan-ape association should not be reducible to a perceived lack of warmth, competence, and morality. Second, we examined whether the association was specific to apes or generalized to other animals, choosing dogs and rats as animals that are commonly used as offensive metaphors (Haslam et al., 2011). Finally, we employed a different and larger set of traits. We expected that animal stereoSocial Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):54–61

type content would predict the bogan stereotype independently of other stereotype content dimensions.

Method Participants Participants were 80 Australian undergraduates (49 women, 31 men, Mage = 20.4) who were asked to complete a questionnaire in a laboratory setting for a $5 payment.

Materials Participants were randomly assigned to one of four versions of a questionnaire (ns = 20). Each version required participants to rate a new set of 60 traits (12 markers of each of the Big Five dimensions: McCrae & Costa, 1985) on four items. In version 1, the first item assessed the Bogan stereotype using the same wording as the equivalent Study 1 item on a scale of 1 (= more characteristic of nonbogans) to 5 (= more characteristic of bogans). In versions 2, 3, and 4 the first item assessed animal stereotypes with the same wording as the equivalent Study 1 item but using either apes, dogs, or rats as the relevant target, on a scale of 1 (= humans) to 5 (= [apes/dogs/rats]). In all four questionnaire versions participants then rated the 60 traits on three items assessing stereotype content dimensions of competence (“How motivated, intelligent, energetic, and organized do you think a person who possesses this trait is?”), warmth (“How sociable, warm, friendly, and caring do you think a person who possesses this trait is?”), and morality (“How honest, trustworthy, and sincere do you think a person who possesses this trait is?”), on a scale from 1 (= not at all) to 5 (= very much so). Wording for these items was drawn directly from published sources (Fiske et al., 2002; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Leach et al., 2007). Thus, 20 participants rated the bogan and animal stereotypes and 80 rated the stereotype content dimensions.

Results Mean ratings of the 60 traits on each of the items across the participants who completed them were calculated and the mean ratings used for all further analysis. Correlations between the items are presented in Table 2. The stereotype content dimensions all intercorrelated positively, reflecting their shared positive evaluation. However, they failed to correlate with the three animal stereotype items, with the exception of a modest negative association between rat and warmth. Thus, the animal stereotypes are substantially independent of these dimensions. The bogan stereotype was correlated with low competence, low morality, and the ape and dog stereotypes. We conducted hierarchical linear regression analyses to assess © 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

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Table 2. Correlations between the Bogan stereotype, stereotype content dimensions, and animal stereotypes, Study 3 Bogans 1

1. Warmth

–0.15

2. Competence –0.34*

0.67*

3. Morality

0.89* 0.65*

–0.41*

4. Ape

0.33* –0.06

–0.22

–0.04

5. Dog

0.43*

–0.20

–0.22

6. Rat 0.13 –0.33+ –0.13 Note. *p < .01, +p < .05.

0.00

0.04

0.82* 0.74* 0.66*

whether the animal stereotypes predicted the bogan stereotype independently of the stereotype content dimensions. At step 1 (R2 = .42), we entered the three dimensions as predictors of bogan ratings. Warmth (β = 1.19, p < .01), competence (β = –0.30, p = 0.03), and morality (β = –1.28, p < .01) were all significant predictors. At step 2, we entered each animal in a separate analysis. Every animal added significantly to the prediction: ape β = 0.30, p < .01, ΔR2 = 0.09; dog β = 0.36, p < .001, ΔR2 = 0.13; rat β = 0.21, p < .05, ΔR2 = 0.03. These effects correspond to significant animal-bogan correlations – partialing out warmth, competence, and morality – of 0.39 (ape), 0.48 (dog), and 0.27 (rat)3.

Discussion Study 3 supports and extends the findings of the preceding studies. The content of a low-SES stereotype was again associated with the content of animal stereotypes. Study 3 indicates that this association is not specific to apes, but generalizes to other demeaning animals and thus reflects a broader animality. Most importantly, Study 3 demonstrates that perceived low-SES animality is independent of the well-established dimensions that have guided most recent research on stereotype content, although these do indeed capture the class stereotype to some degree. Bogans were not associated with apes, dogs, and rats simply because these animals were seen as cold, incompetent, and immoral. Rather, the stereotype content of these animals added unique elements to our participants’ stereotypes of low-SES people.

General Discussion Our findings imply that one cross-culturally valid component of low-SES stereotypes is a perception of animality. 3

People who hold these stereotypes may not recognize that animal metaphors underlie them, but these metaphors are present implicitly. Similarly, Goff et al.’s (2008) White participants associated African-Americans with apes despite being unaware of the historical provenance of the Africanape metaphor. Unlike Goff et al.’s (2008) work, our findings do not appear to relate to a specific kind of animal, although the ape metaphor was indeed implicated in low-SES stereotypes. Thus, these stereotypes appear to reflect animality rather than being specifically simian. However, the three kinds of animal examined in Study 3 are a tiny and unrepresentative sampling of the animal world. Our findings are probably specific to certain classes of animals or senses of animality. Indeed, there was some evidence in Study 3 that the bogan stereotype was more closely associated with ape and dog stereotypes than with the rat stereotype. Low-SES stereotypes may be most strongly linked to animals seen as demeaning but not necessarily despised, whereas other dehumanizing stereotypes may be more linked to disgusting animals (see Harris & Fiske, 2006; Hodson & Costello, 2007). This possibility is consistent with research showing that the perceived offensiveness of animal metaphors is a joint function of the revulsion felt toward the animal and the dehumanizing intention behind the human-animal comparison (Haslam et al., 2011). Rats were among the most disgusting metaphors, whereas apes and dogs, which are not seen as intrinsically disgusting but serve as offensive comparisons, were among the best exemplars of the demeaning metaphors. This study provides a new perspective on class-based prejudice. It is well established that people can derogate others on the basis of their perceived social class (Bullock, 1995), and that social class divides people and hampers social interaction (Fiske, 2011). Absent from this literature has been an appreciation of the role of dehumanizing metaphors. Dehumanization can serve as a powerful barrier to harmonious social interaction (Leyens et al., 2007), especially in instances of conflict (Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009). The use of dehumanizing metaphors for lowerclass groups constitutes a previously unidentified form of classism and may represent an important barrier to interclass interaction. Given that classism is a well-established form of prejudice, it seems pertinent to ask if these findings reflect more than simple disliking of low-SES people. The results reported here appear unlikely to be reducible to antipathy for several reasons. In Study 2 the same pattern of results emerged for both positive and negative traits, indicating that valence is not playing a central role (see Leyens et al.,

Given that the stereotype content model (SCM) maps groups on multiple dimensions, we decided to test the metaphors against the interaction effects of the SCM. A regression model using Bogan as the DV and the SCM dimensions, their two way interactions, and the three-way interaction as predictors was constructed, with all predictors mean-centered. This model reveals that the three SCM main effects were significant, ps < .05, and none of the higher order interactions were significant, ps > .15. However, dog, rat, and ape all independently emerge as significant main effect predictors in a model containing all of the main effects (3 variables) and interactions (3 two-ways, 1 three-way) from the SCM, ps < .05.

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2007). Further, the three SCM dimensions share a common, positive core, and in Study 3 the animal metaphors predicted beyond these dimensions and their interactions. Finally, the robust association of a low-SES group with both dogs (valued, positive animals) and rats (disliked, disgusting animals) means that there is not a simple “disliked animals go with disliked groups” pairing in effect. It seems unlikely that dehumanization is redundant with the disliking of lowSES groups. Although our findings suggest that animality is a component of low-SES stereotypes that is distinct from warmth, competence, and morality, they do not challenge the key role of these dimensions in clarifying those stereotypes. The stereotype content dimensions accounted for much of the variance in the bogan stereotype in Study 3, and as the stereotype content model would suggest (Fiske et al., 2002), that group was viewed as lacking competence. They were not, however, seen as necessarily lacking warmth. The stereotype content dimensions have broad relevance, but additional dimensions may contribute to the unique content of stereotypes in the domain of social class, and perhaps in other domains as well. Determining what those other domains might be is a matter for further investigation. One limitation of the current work is the restricted categorization of the low-SES group. We focused exclusively on a single ethnicity (i.e., Caucasians), despite considerable evidence that ethnic and national groups can differ in their degree and type of dehumanization (see Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2007 for reviews). Further, although prior research showed that gender does play an important role in dehumanization (Reynolds & Haslam, 2011), we did not examine dehumanization for male and female low-SES targets separately. Of course, low-SES groups contain both men and women, Caucasians and non-Caucasians, children and adults. Given that prior work has shown that ethnicity, sex, and age are all associated with judgments of humanness (for reviews see Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2008), future work should explore whether these subsequent categorizations serve to moderate the low-SES–animal association. The lack of evidence for a stronger low-SES–ape association among higher-SES participants in Study 2a + 2b was interpreted as evidence that the association is widely shared rather than being restricted to people motivated to derogate those less well off. Alternatively, this same pattern of results may reflect that people do not invest the category “SES” with strong social meaning. Stated otherwise, class or SES is not considered an important way to differentiate people. We think this unlikely because of the central role that class and status play in our lives and the important consequences that flow from social rank (for a recent review Fiske & Markus, 2012). Future research could directly address this issue by directly assessing people’s identification with SES-based groups and exploring whether this identification affects the strength of the low-SES–ape association. One interpretation of our findings is that they reflect a perception of low-SES people as more primitive and less evolved than others. This is a vertical differentiation akin Social Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):54–61

to status, but represented in terms of lower humanness rather than lower competence. Low-SES groups are, indeed, implicitly seen as lower, but on a phylogenetic scale or a chain of being (Brandt & Reyna, 2011). People may be using their understanding of order in the natural world to understand order in the social world.

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Received: November 5, 2012 Final revision received: April 5, 2013 Accepted: April 6, 2013 Published online: June 14, 2013

Steve Loughnan University of Melbourne Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences PO Box 917 Parkville, VIC 3052 Australia E-mail sloughnan@unimelb.edu.au

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