Clerics pose little threat to Khamenei | Meir Javedanfar | Comment is free | guardian.c... Page 1 of 2
Clerics pose little threat to Khamenei Even if Hashemi Rafsanjani could rally Iran's clergy against the supreme leader, they are unlikely to try to topple him Meir Javedanfar guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 30 June 2009 20.00 BST larger | smaller
There are persistent reports about a plan being hatched by Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani to oust Ayatollah Khamenei as the supreme leader of Iran. These reports state that Rafsanjani is lobbying the clergy in Qom, with the hope that they would back this plan. Legally speaking, such a move is possible. The assembly of experts, which comprises 86 senior clergy, can technically do this if enough votes are collected. Although Rafsanjani would be looking to use the legal powers of the assembly of experts to replace Khamenei as the supreme leader, many of his supporters would see this as nothing short of a new revolution. To see whether Rafsanjani has the leverage to do this with the help of the clergy, we must first look at their power. In his recent article for Newsweek, Fareed Zakaria states that "it's not 1989 in Iran". In other words, the post-revolutionary system is not about to collapse. When it comes to measuring the current power of the clergy in Iran, the appropriate description is also "it's not 1979 in Iran". In other words, the clergy don't have the power they had at the beginning of the revolution. This means that even if Rafsanjani does get his vote at the assembly of experts, it would not guarantee that Khamenei would be deposed. He, more than any other Iranian politician, enjoys the support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Basij (people's militia). They are key in achieving and maintaining power in Iran. Khamenei was one of the creators of the IRGC and it is unlikely that they would allow him to be removed. None of the other clerics could persuade them otherwise. There is also the question of Khamenei's replacement. The only person who currently has the credibility is Ayatollah Montazeri. Before Ayatollah Khomeini died, when it came to the question of choosing his successor, Rafsanjani was in favour of Montazeri, whereas Khamenei favoured a council of clerics to take over. Under house arrest since the mid-1980s, Montazeri is known to be a divisive figure. Although many people in cities support his calls for the supreme leader to have a more supervisory role and for human rights to be respected, there are many clerics who disagree. They see him as being too reformist, even more so than Mohammad Khatami, and fear that his appointment as supreme leader could lead to full democracy in Iran. There is also the possibility of a council of clerics being formed. This option faces several problems. Senior ayatollahs and clergy – such as Ayatollahs Amoli, Shahroudi, Mohammad Yazdi and Mousavi Ardebili – have wide-ranging views on social and economic affairs. Such an arena could easily turn into a forum for self-promotion, creating even more division, slowing the decision-making process and weakening the entire system even more. Last but not least, there is Rafsanjani's own standing. To westerners, he is seen as a pragmatic force. However, to many people in Iran who were around when he was president, he appears as power-hungry as Khamenei. It was Rafsanjani who eliminated the post of prime minister when he came to power as president in 1989, because he did not want to be second-guessed. It was also Rafsanjani and his henchman Hojatoleslam Fallahian who ordered the killing of reformist figures in 1998, in what later became
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/30/iran-khamenei-rafsanjani-cleri... 01/07/2009
Clerics pose little threat to Khamenei | Meir Javedanfar | Comment is free | guardian.c... Page 2 of 2
known as the chain murders in Iran. Although he is the most senior figure who seems to be standing up to Khamenei, taking his murky past into consideration, it is very unlikely that he would have sufficient credibility to lead such a movement. Though relations between Khamenei and the clergy have soured over the years, what equally concerns the clergy in Qom is an alternative that could lead to instability or full democracy. To many of them that would be far worse than Khamenei staying in power. In the short to medium term, Khamenei's future does not seem to be in great danger from Rafsanjani and the clergy. What the supreme leader has to look out for are the people demonstrating on the streets. Their continued oppression could lead to strikes and, judging by the 1979 revolution, if these spread to the oil sector the supreme leader could have a serious problem on his hands. For now, the clergy should learn from Khamenei's mistake by ensuring that their policies and opinions are compatible with what the people want. If they want to pressure Khamenei, they must ensure that they have the public's backing. Furthermore, by building confidence among the public, they could become an important stabilising force that in the long term could save the revolution from itself. guardian.co.uk Š Guardian News and Media Limited 2009
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/30/iran-khamenei-rafsanjani-cleri... 01/07/2009