China Africa Partnership

China-Africa Partnership The quest for a win-win relationship

Editor James Shikwati

Inter Region Economic Network

Published by Inter Region Economic Network (IREN Kenya) Nairobi, Kenya China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

Financially supported by the Embassy of the Peoples’ Republic of China in Nairobi, Kenya, under the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation’s (FOCAC) “China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Programme.”

China–Africa Partnership: The Quest for A Win-Win Relationship Edited by James Shikwati ISBN: 9966-9834-7-3 (Hbk) ISBN: 9966-9834-8-1 (eBook) First published November 2012 by Inter Region Economic Network Nyaku House Mezzanine Floor; Argwings Kodhek Road, Hurlingham P.O. Box 135 GPO Code 00100, Nairobi, Kenya info@irenkenya.com www.irenkenya.com Phone +254 20 2731497 Design and Layout by Adams Namayi Printed by Talent Graphic Designers Enterprises Nairobi, Kenya © 2012. Copyright of individual papers retained by authors.

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. For permission requests, write to the publisher, addressed “Attention: Permissions Coordinator,” at info@irenkenya.com

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Table of Contents Preface v Acknowledgement vi The Great Significance of the Era for the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership

By Liu Guangyuan China-Africa Cooperation in Peace and Security

By Ahmed Haggag

vii xi

Abbreviations and Acronyms

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China–Africa Partnership: Why is a Win–Win Formula Important?

By James Shikwati

1

Trade and Development

4

China-Africa Economic Relations: Current Situation and Future Challenges, Infrastructure as an Example

By He Wenping

5

Africa Regional Integration and Sino-Africa Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges

By Tang Xiao The Experience of Chinese Support for Infrastructure: How Relevant is it for Kenya?

By Joseph Onjala China Geostrategic and Resources Interest in the Horn of Africa: SomaliaKenya Limits of the Continental Shelf and Implications

By Abdi Jama Ghedi

11 18

29

Sustainable Development and Sino-African Low-Carbon Cooperation: China’s Role

By Liang Yijian

37

China–Africa Relations: A Catalyst for Africa’s Integration

By James Shikwati

43

Peace and Security

49

China’s Engagement in African Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Achievements and Future Developments

By Zhang Chun

50

China’s Re-Engagement with Africa: The Search for Peace and Security

By Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie

58

Redefining China’s Role in Promoting Peace and Security in Africa

By Paul Odhiambo

71

Challenges on Peace and Security: China’s Role in Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Africa

By Wiseman Mupindu

81

Cultural and People to People Exchanges

92

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China and Africa: Cultural Similarity and Mutual Learning

By Li Anshan

93

The Ethnographic Study of the Contemporary Africa from the Perspective of China

By Shi Lin

98

Africa in China: Affirming African Agency in Africa-China Relations at the People to People Level

By Lloyd G. Adu Amoah

104

Reflections on China-Africa Relations

116

Arab Spring and Sino-African Relations: The Case of North Africa

By Hicham Hafid and Mustapha Machrafi

117

Understanding China’s Neo-Colonialism in Africa: A Historical Study of the China-Africa Economic Relations

By Eginald P. Mihanjo

130

China and India Engagement in Africa: A Critical Analysis

By Adams Oloo

137

Sino-African Development Cooperation: Negotiating for Fish-Hooks or Fish-Ponds?

By David-Ngendo Tshimba

146

Africa-China Mutual Attractions

By Macharia Munene

153

China-Africa Cooperation

By Denise A. O. Kodhe

163

Benefits and Challenges of Implementing the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference

166

New Impetus of African Development and New Path to Sustainable Development of China-Africa Relations

By Liu Hongwu

167

Kenya’s Implementation of the 4th FOCAC Plan of Action: Hollow Commitments and Lack of In-Country Support

By Joseph Onjala

172

Conclusion

183

A Win-Win Relationship with China Calls for Urgency on the African Side

By James Shikwati

184

China-Africa Dialogue Healthy

By Mme. Guo Wei

186

Annex

187

Beijing Declaration of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

188

The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)

192

Author Bios

206 China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

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Preface This book intends to give an update on China–Africa relations in the fields of trade, development, peace and security, and cultural exchanges. It brings together various points of view from scholars and thought leaders from both China and Africa, with the objective of contributing towards the discourse on China–Africa relationship and its meaning for Africa, China and the world.

As Africans grapple with the challenges of state formation, poverty amidst great concentration of geological resources and the quest for positive participation in the global arena; they find China’s status as the most influential developing country in the world attractive. Will China’s entry into Africa be any different from the traditional model where powerful nations have exploited the continent’s natural resources? Can Africans jointly with the Chinese craft a win-win strategy in their cooperation?

China and Africa evolved the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as a key platform to drive their relationship. The 4th Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC 2009 resolved to implement a China–Africa Joint Research and Exchange Programme to enable the academia and think tank leaders to share ideas, exchange advice and share suggestions on how to facilitate positive relations between the two sides. This book is expected to stimulate further exchanges between Chinese and African academia and think tank leaders.

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Acknowledgements I would like to thank His Excellency Ambassador Liu Guangyuan for his personal involvement and support for the seminar on China-Africa relations from which the deliberations are now captured in this book. I would like to express my gratitude to Counselor Cao Xiaolin, Mr Qian Jin and Mr Haibin Bao from the Chinese embassy who assisted in the workshop preparation and hosting. I thank the Inter Region Economic Network (IREN) team, Mr Josephat Juma and Ms Purity Karimi for corrections, proof reading and editorial work; Mr Adams Namayi for designing and typesetting the book; and, Ms Zaina Shisia for organising the seminar and serving as the focal point of communication for all participants.

While each individual author takes responsibility for the arguments espoused, as the editor, I take responsibility for typographical errors that may be detected in this publication and welcome suggestions for improvement.

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The Great Significance of the Era for the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership

By H.E Liu Guangyuan Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, Permanent Representative to the UNEP and UN-Habitat During the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) that was successfully convened in Beijing, China and African countries held deep discussions on how to further enhance the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership under the theme “Build on past achievements and open up new prospects for the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership.” They also issued two outcome documents. At the opening ceremony of the conference, the Chinese President, H.E. Hu Jintao, announced that China would take measures in five priority areas to support the cause of peace and development in Africa and boost a New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership in the next three years. The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC was indeed a new milestone in the history of the development of China-Africa relations. I’m very glad to have this opportunity to discuss the development of China-Africa relations with distinguished experts from both Africa and China.

I. Great progress in building the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership China and Africa have made great progress in building the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership.

At the FOCAC Beijing Summit in 2006, China and Africa decided to establish a New Type of ChinaAfrica Strategic Partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation, and cultural exchanges for mutual learning. With this partnership, China and Africa made a strategic plan for the development of bilateral relations and opened a new era for China-Africa friendly cooperation. Ever since, important progress has been made in realising this vision with the joint effort by both China and Africa. In my opinion, the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership has demonstrated strong vitality of the times in the following ways: First, the long-term friendship between China and Africa has gone deeper and has also become more profound. The traditional friendship between China and Africa, featuring sincere and friendly relations, equal treatment, mutual support, and common development, has guided the all-round, constant and in-depth development of China-Africa relations for over fifty years. In recent years, the relations between China and African countries, and between China and African regional organisations, have developed into a new level.

The two sides maintained frequent exchanges of high-level visits, deepened mutual understanding, rendered support on core interests and concerns and strengthened the practical cooperation with fruitful results in various fields, which have brought great tangible benefits to the people of both China and Africa.

Since I came to work in Kenya, I have had a very strong feeling that the China-Africa friendship has been deep-rooted. The hearts of the two people are getting closer and the common interests are increasing significantly. China-Africa relations can be described as the most solid and most cordial bilateral ties in the current international relations.

Second, the links on the economic and trade relations between China and Africa have become much stronger.

The total trade volume between China and Africa hit a record high of US$166.3 billion in 2011, compared to only US$10 billion in 2000. By April 2012, China’s total direct investment in Africa reached US$15.3 billion, about 30 times the figure ten years ago. More than 2,000 Chinese enterprises have their investments or businesses in 50 African countries. The eight measures for practical cooperation announced at the Beijing Summit of the FOCAC in 2006 and eight additional measures announced at the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC in 2009 have been effectively implemented, and have played an important role in advancing the economic and social development of African countries. Both the quality and quantity of China-Africa economic and trade cooperation reached a higher stage of development. The two sides have formed an inseparable win-win cooperation pattern of increased interdependence and closer integration of mutual interests.

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Third, the cultural and people-to-people exchanges between China and Africa have become increasingly dynamic. The past years have witnessed closer cultural and people-to-people exchanges between China and Africa at a higher level and with a broader scope, a more active atmosphere and a more fruitful result. The two sides have successfully held 5 cultures in focus events, 2 people’s forums and 2 young leaders’ forums.

Under China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan, 28 research projects have been carried out, and 14 international seminars held.

These mechanisms and platforms have enhanced the understandings between the Chinese people and the African people from all walks of life, who have fostered a more friendly relationship like brothers and sisters. Besides, each year over 5,000 African students receive Chinese government scholarships, over 700,000 Chinese tourists travel to Africa, while over 400,000 African tourists travel to China. Every week, there are more than 20 regular flights between China and Africa. The social base of China-Africa relations has been solidified, and more momentum has been gathered.

Fourth, the coordination in international affairs between China and Africa has been much closer. The two sides worked closely on the major international issues like United Nations reform, climate change and WTO Doha Round negotiations, among others, with the aim of upholding the common interests of developing countries and establishing the new international political and economic order. China firmly holds that priority should be given to increasing the representation of African countries in the UN agencies. China has intensified its engagement in Africa’s peace and security affairs, increased the number of Chinese peacekeepers to Africa, and actively carried out escort missions on combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. It has further demonstrated the strategic significance of the cooperation between China and Africa in the international affairs and global issues.

II. The opportunities and challenges faced by the relations between China and Africa in the new situation Currently, the international order and the economic globalisation are undergoing a profound change. African countries are committed to accelerating the development paces, with regional integration sped up and a closer interaction between Africa and the other parts of the international society. Africa has a stronger desire to achieve quicker development with external support. Against this background, the relations between China and Africa are now facing new situations and tasks. Looking at the past, the fast and deep development of China-Africa relations have benefited from the accurate judgment of the world situations, timely seizing opportunities and addressing the challenges by the two sides. Looking into the future, we should strengthen our consciousness of opportunities, challenges and jointly safeguard and further promote China-Africa relations. Of all the opportunities, the most important ones are: China and Africa attach greater importance to their bilateral relations. With a rising international status, both China and Africa value each other’s influence and roles in the international arena. Africa has been playing a fundamental role in China’s overall foreign policy. Most African countries regard China’s policy as one of their most important foreign policies. “Look East Policy” is getting more and more support from the governments and people of Africa.

The cooperation in economy and trade between China and Africa has become more complementary. In recent years, both China and Africa made great leaps in their own national economic development.

The complementarity between the two sides on resource conditions and economic structures become more and more highlighted. Since China has gone through the development stage which Africa is currently in, the capital, experience and technologies China has gained over the past years will dovetail the needs of Africa’s development. For example, there will be a promising prospect for both sides if China’s manufacturing industry is relocated to Africa. The cooperation in this field will help Africa to transform the advantage of huge energy and resource reserves and market potential to real development.

The FOCAC mechanisms are getting more mature. Since its establishment, the FOCAC has set up multi-tier and multi-channel platforms, such as the Ministerial Conference, the Senior Officials Meeting, Consultations China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

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between the Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of FOCAC and the African Diplomatic Corps, in order to guarantee an efficient and smooth operation of the FOCAC. Under the framework of FOCAC, the two sides held the Conference of Entrepreneurs and sub-forums on Agriculture, Science and Technology, Culture, Legal, Women, Think Tanks and Finance. These sub-forums have infused more substance to China-Africa practical cooperation and further promoted the cultural and people-to-people exchanges.

III. Major challenges First, the cooperation in some fields between China and Africa needs to be strengthened. Due to historical reasons, cooperation between China and Africa used to focus mainly on political exchanges and economic and trade cooperation. However, in recent years, both sides have paid more and more attention to cultural and people-to-people exchanges and security cooperation. This process still lags behind in general.

Strengthening cultural and people-to-people exchanges and security cooperation to inject more impetus to China-Africa relations is what China and Africa should endeavour to do right now.

Second, the economic and trade frictions between China and Africa have increased in the recent years.

The enormous volume of the two-way trade between China and Africa inevitably causes some problems.

Because of the different trade patterns between China and African countries, the trade deficits against China by some African countries are on the rise. Under such circumstances and affected by a few other factors, some African friends believe that the Chinese companies in Africa have grabbed business opportunities away from the local companies. They complain about the sub-standard quality of some Chinese cheap products. How to solve these rising frictions is an important task for the two sides.

Third, China-Africa relations have been disturbed by negative media coverage. The cooperation between China and Africa has yielded fruitful results and has been firmly supported by the two peoples. However, some countries and some persons with ulterior motives often make irresponsible comments, such as claiming that China is pursuing “Neo-Colonialism” and “Neo-Mercantilism” in Africa. Those groundless criticisms have misled the public opinions from the international society on China-Africa relations. China and Africa should work together to sweep away these noises and create favourable environments for the sound development of China-Africa cooperation.

IV. Suggestions on how to advance the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership.

With new opportunities and challenges on the way forward, China and the African countries should look to the future, highlight the “New Type,” address the challenges and achieve a win-win situation, in order to further promote the development of the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership. I would like to put forward some questions on how to advance the long-term development of the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership in various aspects: How can China and Africa mutually share the experiences on governance further? Both China and African countries are developing countries. We have similar historical experiences and hold common positions on many important international and regional issues. But there are also some differences between the two sides in terms of political systems, development levels and cultural backgrounds. The two sides should strive to enhance the exchanges of thoughts and policies, firmly adhere to general directions for ChinaAfrica friendship, and expand common interests, so as to find the best way on cooperation from a strategic perspective.

How can China and Africa expand the economic pie for mutual benefit and win-win situation? At the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced that in the next three years, China will provide US$20 billion in soft loans to the African countries to assist them in developing infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing and small and medium-sized enterprises, and that China will increase assistance to Africa and support the African integration process to help Africa to enhance capacity for its overall development. The two sides should have in-depth consultations on how to implement China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

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these beneficial measures and promote the restructuring and upgrading of China-Africa economic and trade cooperation, with the aim of yielding more fruitful results and bringing more benefits to the people of the two sides.

How can China and Africa consolidate the public and social support for China-Africa relations? The formidable strengths generated from the powerful people-to-people exchanges between China and Africa serves as a strong momentum to the development of the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership.

The cooperation in culture, education, media and women and youth exchange between China and Africa should be the priorities for the further development of China-Africa relations. I hope that scholars can come up with some suggestions on how to attract these people to actively engage in China-Africa friendship cause. There is a Chinese saying: “gossip can ruin a person.” There is also a Chinese idiom which states: “three people fabricate a tiger.” It means that if a rumour is repeated by three people, then people will believe it. Gossips are not horrible. It is necessary for us to dispel the doubts and explain the truth to the people who are not clear about China-Africa cooperation. Let us try to find ways on how to deal with people who spread fallacies, foment dissentions and deliberately hurt China-Africa relations.

Lastly, how can China and Africa enhance the popularity of FOCAC? The FOCAC is an unprecedented undertaking of the times. It has become a role model for mutually beneficial cooperation between developing countries. Under such circumstances where African countries are enjoying fast development and ChinaAfrica cooperation is making great strides, we should explore new thoughts and ways of promoting the development of the FOCAC. We should encourage innovation in FOCAC’s development concept and cooperation patterns, with the aim of drawing parties concerned to participate in the FOCAC, to support the FOCAC and to love the FOCAC, so as to make FOCAC more fruitful and follow the tide of the era, which is key to keeping an enduring vitality of the FOCAC. I have every reason to believe that with joint efforts, China-Africa relations will embrace an even brighter future.

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China-Africa Cooperation in Peace and Security

By H.E Ambassador Ahmed Haggag Secretary General of Africa Society, Cairo, Egypt When the Organisation of Africa Unity was established in 1963, many African leaders did not contemplate that the subsequent decades would witness a series of conflicts, coup d’états, ethnic wars and interstate wars among others, which would lead to suffering, great loss of life among African people, depletion of huge resources and energies, increasing poverty and deprivation. That is why the charter of the OAU did not include any mechanism for preventing or resolving conflicts. The OAU was mainly preoccupied by the liberation of many of its regions from foreign occupation and domination. The only clause in the Charter was creation of a Conciliation and Arbitration Committee which met only few times. It was meant mainly to mediate among member countries on border disputes, since they inherited borders left from colonial times.

The Charter prohibited the OAU from intervening in internal affairs of member countries. Therefore, the organisation could not intervene in internal conflicts because governments resisted that. Furthermore, the organisation lacked capabilities, material or financial, which could enable it to mount any intervention. This situation was aggravated by competing influences by major countries, or regional considerations in the continent, beside foreign interference.

With the advent of the African Union (after the failure of the OAU in coping with a number of intrastate and interstate conflicts) some measures were introduced to challenge the root causes of such conflicts. To be fair to the OAU, in 1993, it established a mechanism to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa.

But its Peace Fund which was supposed to finance its activities was almost empty. It did send some military observer teams to some countries like Burundi and the Comoros, but such limited measures were much less than what was necessary or desired.

The African Union established the African Peace and Security Council on the model of the UN Organ, but it did not include any permanent members. It boldly sent a peacekeeping mission to Darfur in the Sudan which was transferred later to the UN peacekeeping operation. It strengthened its cooperation with the United Nations, established an early warning system, and provided its Secretariat with more competent political and military experts. It sent, for the first time, a military mission to Somalia which fought terrorist groups.

It also created a standby force.

To establish a proper peace and security architecture in Africa, it should start at the national level. Prevailing internal peace is an essential precondition for inter state policy. Internal conflicts within states should not be regarded solely as a domestic issue. In this regard, democracy and civil society environment are essential.

The creation of the AU Peace and Security Council is the focus of the AU policy in the field of peace and security. It is the standing decision making organ for preventing management and resolution of conflicts. Its mandate as mentioned in its protocol is to:• • • •

Anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts Undertake peacekeeping and peacekeeping functions Authorise mounting and deployment of peace support mission Recommend to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances

China’s role in peace and security in Africa Since the end of the cold war, China’s bilateral relations with African countries have been determined by the principles of non-interference and respect for state sovereignty. Domestic political affairs are seen as the exclusive cancers of national governments. China already has to some extent an impact on the internal affairs of many African countries. Its own investments are placed at risk when these countries become unstable; therefore, it has a primary interest to see that they enjoy stability.

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During periods of violent domestic crisis in Africa, China’s policy has tended to recognise the legitimacy of the relevant government’s positions. Because of this, China has been wrongly accused of allowing crises to continue. Chinese officials and scholars reject the proposition that China is a passive actor and say that instead, it has started to use its influence to press for a resolution of conflicts. For example, after 2006, China played an important role in securing Sudan’s acceptance of peacekeepers in Darfur. She also played an active role trying to diffuse tension between Khartoum and Juba.

China’s military cooperation is modest compared with its wider engagements in Africa and the western military involvement. The content of this cooperation varies from country to country, but includes financial assistance for military infrastructure, de-mining support and training for African armed forces. Although China has contributed to peacekeeping operations in Africa and participates in anti-piracy efforts off Somalia, it maintains no permanent military presence on the continent.

Currently, most of China’s diplomatic engagement in Africa’s peace and security takes place at the UN Security Council, where mainly 60 per cent of the discussions focus on African security issues. China’s FOCAC commitments state that it will use its position at the Security Council to bring African conflicts to the attention of the international community. It has done so on Somalia and Darfur.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms ACET ACJA ADS AMIS AMISOM ASF AU CABQ CAP CCS CEN-SAD CEWS CNIE CNOOC CNPC COMESA CPC CSR DRC EAC ECCAS ECOWAS EMACS FDI FOCAC IAFS IBSA ICBC IGAD IGASOM

ISN ITEC KUJ LAPSSET MINURCA MONUC MONUSCO

NATO NEPAD OAU OECD OFDI ONUB PSC RECs ROP SADC SCAAP SOEs

African Centre for Economic Transformation All China Journalists Association Approved Destination Status AU Mission in Sudan African Mission in Somalia African Standby Force African Union China-Africa Business Council China-African Policy Centre for Chinese Studies Economic Community of Sahel-Saharan States Continental Early Warning System China NGO Network for International Exchanges China National Offshore Oil Corporation China National Petroleum Corporation Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Communist Party of China Corporate Social Responsibilities Democratic Republic of Congo East African Community Economic Community of Central African States Economic Community of West African States Enterprise Messaging and Collaboration Foreign Direct Investment Forum for China-Africa Cooperation India-Africa Forum Summit India Brazil South Africa Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Intergovernmental Authority Development Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia International Relations and Security Network Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Kenyan Union of Journalists Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo North Atlantic Treaty Organisation New Partnership for Africa’s Development Organisation of African Unity Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development Overseas Foreign Direct Investment UN Operations in Burundi Peace and Security Council Regional Economic Communities Reform and Opening Up Period Southern African Development Community Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme State Owned Enterprises

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TEAM 9

UMA UN UNSC UNAMID UNAMSIL UNCLOS UNDPKO UNFICYP UNISOM UNITAF UNMIL UNMISS UNOCIL UNTAG UNTSO WTO

Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement with Nine African Countries Arab Maghreb Union United Nations UN Security Council UN/African Union in Darfur UN Mission in Sierra Leone UN Convention on the Law of the Sea UN Department of Peace UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UN Operation in Somalia II United Task Force UN Mission in Liberia United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire UN Namibian Transitional Period Aid Group UN Truce Supervision Organisation World Trade Organisation

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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND China–Africa Partnership: Why is a Win–Win Formula Important?

By James Shikwati Director, Inter Region Economic Network, (IREN Kenya) Nairobi, Kenya Background The Inter Region Economic Network (IREN) was represented during the launch of the China–Africa Joint Research and Exchange Programme held in Beijing in March 2010. IREN was subsequently nominated to serve on the Provisional Steering Group (PSG) that organised and hosted the first conference in Africa with the theme “Towards a New Africa–China Partnership” held in Nairobi in March 2011. IREN has hosted a series of Sino–Africa brainstorming sessions jointly with Chinese institutions namely: China Institutes of Contemporary Relations (CICIR) in December 2010; Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (SIIS) in January 2011; and China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) in June 2012. The content in this book is an outcome of a seminar that was hosted by IREN in collaboration with the Chinese embassy in Kenya under the theme: “The path to the Sustainable Development of China – Africa Relations” on August 9, 2012, in Nairobi.

This publication has been made possible through the support of the Chinese embassy in Nairobi which facilitated the travel of scholars and think tank leaders from across Africa and China. The embassy’s support is courtesy of the China–Africa Joint Research and Exchange Programme, one of the eight measures launched at the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China – Africa Cooperation in 2009. This initiative supports the exchange and cooperation between the Chinese and African academic, research and think tank institutions with a view to further strengthen research and dialogue on China-Africa relations.

Africans view China’s renewed interest and influence in Africa with both admiration and fear.

The pattern of using Africans to aid their own subjugation, disruption of market order, imposition of foreign values and use of superior technology to conquer the continent is familiar to keen residents on the continent. The realisation that lack of a unitary and coordinated approach by the over 10,000 ethnic communities in Africa made it easier for a handful of colonists to control vast swathes of territory makes African think tanks to push for a single unified approach to China.

In many respects, China is different from Africa.

Africans are largely a coalition of the mirror images of the West and the suppressed self. China on the other hand, has a government that manages a population of over 1.3 billion people compared to Africa which has 54 governments managing 1.2 billion people. African governments’ legitimacy borrows from the Western model of democracy, while the Chinese govern through the Communist Party. China has the oldest tradition of statecraft with a unique combination of state and market, while its African counterpart has to continuously battle with international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to evolve its policies. China successfully evolved from donor driven initiatives to become a donor, whilst Africa is still bogged down with dependency on foreign aid. Africa joins the China–Africa

Introduction-Why it is important China and Africa have enjoyed friendship spanning several centuries. In recent years, China has deepened its cooperation with Africa in political, economic and cultural areas through the platform of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

Africans have been exposed to episodes of slavery, conquests, colonisation and exploitation through neocolonialism. The continent has been undergoing ‘modernisation’, a euphemism for Europeanisation since the General Act of Berlin Conference of 1885.

The modernisation experiment has put the African continent on the development path, but left the African people stuck in subsistence unable to utilise the vast wealth in natural resources to improve their living standards.

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partnership from a fragmented and weak position.

It therefore becomes important and urgent that a forum to craft a win-win formula be put in place.

Scholars and think tank leaders have this onerous task to make this possible through exchange of ideas to this end.

suggests that China and Africa ought to strengthen their cooperation in environmental protection.

James Shikwati discusses China-Africa relations as a catalyst for Africa integration. He points out that the continued erosion of national sovereignty by global issues and the firm grip of donor countries on the continent’s strategic agenda calls for an urgent repositioning of the continent through integration.

Contributors to this book This book is an outcome of presentations that were made during the seminar on China–Africa Relations in Nairobi, Kenya on August 9, 2012. The seminar’s theme focused on “The Path to the Sustainable Development of China–Africa Relations.” The book has five major sections:• • • • •

The second chapter is on peace and security.

From the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Zhang Chun’s paper “China’s support to Africa post-conflict reconstruction: achievements and future developments” outlines the changing dimensions of China-Africa engagement. China’s engagement with Africa has evolved from one dimension relationship that depended on emotional and ideological linkages in the 1950s to early 1990s, an all round relationship with an additional economic dimension of the 1994–95, to the social and cultural exchanges that include peace and security cooperation in the 21st century. Bertha Zimba Osei, UB, puts forward key questions in her paper on peace and security: why is China interested in Africa’s peace and security? Does China present a new alternative model to the West?

What should be done to improve the effectiveness of China’s role in future?

Trade and Development; Peace and Security; Cultural and People to People Exchanges; Reflections on China-Africa Relations; and, Benefits and Challenges of Implementing the 5th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015).

The first chapter contains trade and development ties between China and Africa discussions by He Wenping, CASS, on “China–Africa economic relations: current situation and future challenges with focus on infrastructure.” She argues that with the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Africa lost its much valued geopolitical status and continues to be marginalised in diplomatic strategies of major Western countries, a scenario that has witnessed China take greater interest in the continent. Tang Xiao, CFAU, contributes on “Africa regional integration and Sino–Africa cooperation: opportunities and challenges.” He points out that the combination of regional integration with Sino–Africa Cooperation is important to stimulate industrialisation, urbanisation, modernisation and sustainable development.

Paul Odhiambo, KIPPRA, points out that China’s role in promoting peace and security in Africa is encouraging but not adequate due to her vested interests and adherence to the policy of “non interference” in domestic affairs of other sovereign states. Wiseman Mupindu, writing from Zimbabwe points out that the slogan “an African solution to Africa’s problems” does not mean that Africa is untouchable by global forces. He discusses how China can promote Africa’s development, peace and security.

In the third chapter that focuses on cultural and people to people exchanges, Li Anshan, PU, holds that Chica and Africa have similarities in cultural aspects and can learn from each other. Shi Lin, CUN, in her paper “Ethnographic study of the contemporary Africa from the perspective of China” discusses the need for Chinese ethnologists and anthropologists to study African cultures so as to reduce the cultural misunderstanding between Chinese and Africans and pave way for the smooth economic, cultural and educational exchanges between the two.

Joseph Onjala, UON, discusses the role of Chinese aid to Kenya and the magnitude of its support towards Kenya’s infrastructure development.

Abdi Jama Ghedi, BU, points out that China has geostrategic and resource interests in the horn of Africa that present both opportunities and challenges for sustainable development.

Liang Yijian from Yunnan University focuses on the importance of environment. Africa, he points out, is at the important stage of protecting its environment while seeking to boost economic development. He

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Lloyd G. Adu Amoah from Ghana argues that Africa is apparently overwhelmed and hypnotised

by China’s overtures in what is presented as a chess game in which one side (China) is making all the moves. Lloyd points out that the African agency in shaping and influencing her deepening relations with China is either paralysed or non–existent.

He defines African agency as a process by which Africans shape and influence Chinese society.

the meaning and aspirations of development on the continent and points out the need for forward looking measures to put foreign aid to good use for Africa’s sustainable development. Denise Kodhe, IDEA, argues that the democratic collective leadership system of the Communist Party of China is an interesting area where Africa can learn from in terms of deciding the right political doctrine and policy to adopt without being coaxed or intimidated to, as is the case with the Western world.

The fourth chapter on reflections on China–Africa relations contains discussions on the state of affairs and future challenges faced with these two partners.

Macharia Munene, USIU, points out that the China -Africa economic ties are threatened by security concerns arising from both internal and external forces of instability. He argues that Africa needs China for real economic growth and as leverage against Western. Hicham Hafid writing from Morocco discusses the case of the Arab spring and Sino–Africa relations in North Africa. He points out that the “Arab Spring” showed the urgency of managing issues such as youth, unemployment, democratisation and development and the need for countries such as China to be decisive in creating necessary conditions for peace and security in the region.

Finally, there are two papers in the chapter on the benefits and challenges of implementing the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Beijing Action Plan 2013–2015. Liu Hongwu from Zhejiang Normal University points out that Africa is under the influence of forces of upward development and downward decline leading to a complex status.

He foresees a trend of imbalanced development where some African countries will attain “emerging economies” status while others will face constant instability. Joseph Onjala in his paper “Kenya’s implementation of the 5th Ministerial FOCAC plan of action: hollow commitments and missed opportunities” points out that the monitoring of the FOCAC process is largely driven by China. He blames this on Africa’s inability to have a FOCAC follow up secretariat.

Eginald P. Mihanjo, MUS, in “Understanding China’s neo-colonialism in Africa: a historical study of the China–Africa economic relations” dismisses the fears and claims that China is a neo-colonial power in Africa. Adams Oloo, UON, discusses the similarities and differences between China and Indian strategies of engaging Africa. Adams points out that both countries are interested in access to Africa’s markets, opportunities for development cooperation, strategic and diplomatic influence as well as resources security.

The contributions in this book illustrate that a win-win relationship is indeed possible if Africans engaged in a coordinated response to China.

Therefore, there is urgent need to dig deeper and evolve more scientific guided discussions on China–Africa relations. The discussions herein are meant to provide impetus for further research, deeper people to people engagement and dialogue in order to cement a positive relationship among the Chinese and Africans. This book is among the many first steps being taken to cover a journey of a thousand miles to facilitate better understanding of and strengthen the ongoing Sino-Africa relations.

Ngendo Tshimba David, writing from Uganda juxtaposes the debate on Africa relations alongside

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Trade and Development

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China-Africa Economic Relations: Current Situation and Future Challenges, Infrastructure as an Example

By He Wenping Professor, Director of African Studies Section, Institute of West Asian & African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China Abstract: With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Africa lost its much-valued geopolitical status.

As a result, the attention the West devotes to Africa has been constantly on the decline. The continent is being marginalised in the diplomatic strategies of major Western countries. However, China is always committed to developing relations with Africa. While cementing their economic and trade ties that began to expand in the 1980s, China sees great value in fostering an across-the-board relationship with Africa by forging closer political, cultural and educational links. resources and a huge market. However, having suffered from colonialism and regional conflicts, it is still mired in economic backwardness and lacks the funds, technology and experience for development. China has achieved a remarkable economic takeoff since the advent of economic reforms more than 20 years ago. Despite the progress, it faces new problems such as a severe energy shortage and escalating competition in its domestic market. Given these factors, the Chinese Government encourages Chinese firms to invest in Africa in various fields such as trade, agriculture, infrastructure construction, mining and tourism, while offering an increasing amount of assistance with no political strings attached.

1. Introduction The rapid development of China-Africa relations in the recent decade can be seen as one of the most important phenomena in modern international relations. Africa has been high on China’s diplomatic agenda in recent years. The year 2006 in particular, has been named as the “Africa Year in China.” Along with the release of the very first White Paper on China’s Africa Policy in January 2006 and the First China-Africa Summit of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in early November 2006, which brought more than 40 African heads of state to Beijing, the high profile activities of China in Africa have also included a number of high-level official visits to Africa by President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, other cabinet members and the members of the Political Bureau. For example, President Hu Jintao visited Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya in April 2006. Soon after, Premier Wen Jiabao toured Egypt, Ghana, Republic of the Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda in June 2006.

2. Current Situation of China-Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation

At present, trade between China and Africa is undergoing rapid growth. The bilateral trade volume rose from US$12.11 million in the 1950s to US$10.5 billion in 2000 and a record high of US$106.8 billion in 2008, and then over US$166 billion in 2011, leading China to become one of Africa’s most important trading partners after the United States in 2009 and has now overtaken most EU countries.1 In recent years in particular, China has increased imports from African countries and thus maintained a trade deficit with them, enabling these countries to earn a large amount of foreign exchange. African exports to China had gone up from US$5.6 billion in 2000 to US$43.3 billion in 2009. According to a Chinese expert calculation in common use, the contribution of China-Africa trade to African economic growth has reached around 20 per cent in recent years.2

Economically speaking, to develop Sino-African relations is the requirement for China’s economy to carry out sustainable development. China and Africa mutually benefit each other. Africa is a promising continent with rich natural and human

In recent 10 years, Chinese firms have redoubled their efforts to penetrate the African market. To date, the direct Chinese investment in Africa has grown from US$200 million in 2000 to US$1.44 billion in 2010, thus making Africa the fourth destination

The series of events speak of the great importance the Chinese Government and leaders attach to China-Africa relations. At the same time, they are indicative of the fact that China-Africa relations have moved into an era of rapid development characterised by cooperation, half a century after the establishment of bilateral diplomatic ties.

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for Chinese investments. By the end of 2011, China’s direct investment in Africa had reached US$14.7 billion, up 60 per cent from 2009. Nearly 2000 Chinese companies are currently operating in Africa, engaged in trade, manufacturing, natural resource exploitation, transportation, agriculture and agricultural processing. Africa is now China’s second largest overseas labour and project contracting market. Chinese companies have helped create employment opportunities in African countries, increase their tax revenues, introduce practical technologies to these countries, enhance the competence of local workers and improve their productivity.

and potential of a country’s national economic development. More importantly, it also has a direct bearing on a country’s attraction to foreign investment and key lever for the environment of investment. Actually, the correlation between infrastructure development, especially transport infrastructure, and investment, trade, growth and poverty reduction has long been discussed and widely recognised by decision makers, academics and the society as a whole.6 Poor infrastructure is one large obstacle hindering Africa’s economic development. The underdeveloped transportation industry and poor traffic conditions not only raise the cost of crossborder trade and domestic trade, but also hinder foreign investments in Africa. Insufficient and unstable power supply is common in many African countries. Due to lack of power supply, many African countries are completely dark at night, hence Africa being described as the “dark continent” by the Western media. An earlier assessment of Africa’s infrastructure requirement done in 2006 by the African Development Bank shows that less than a third of Sub-Saharan Africans have electricity, only 56 per cent have access to clean water, barely a third of rural Africans live near a road, about 4 per cent of Africa’s farmland is irrigated and the continent has less than a quarter of paved roads per km than other developing regions.7

Until the end of September 2009, China had spent RMB76 billion (US$12.2 billion) in assisting African countries and provided about RMB46 billion (US$7.4 billion) loan as well.3 Since 1956, China has helped African countries to establish nearly 900 projects, including textile factories, hydropower stations, stadiums, hospitals and schools, and more than half of them are related with the people’s livelihood.4After the establishment of FOCAC in 2000, the development assistance and investment in Africa have been improved and strengthened. At the China-Africa Summit in 2006, China announced the eight-point aid package which included China’s pledge to double its 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009, provide US$3 billion of preferential loans and US$2 billion of preferential buyer’s credits to Africa, debt cancellation and establishment of trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa, and establish a development fund of US$5 billion to encourage Chinese firms to invest in Africa, among others. At the 4th FOCAC meeting in Egypt in early November 2009, a package of new development assistance to Africa from China was issued. It put more emphasis on the projects that closely link with people’s livelihood and environmental protection, such as establishing 100 clean energy projects in Africa, providing US$10 billion concessional loans, setting up a US$1 billion special loan for small and mediumsized African businesses, and further opening up China’s market to African products (zero-tariff treatment to 95% of African products and starting with 60% of the products within 2010) in the next three years.5

The poor situation on Africa’s infrastructure suits perfectly China’s “going overseas strategy” and its internationally competitive construction industry.

“Build roads and profits will come rolling in.”8 It is from its own success in reform, opening up and economic development that China has learned the importance, necessity and great business potential of investing in Africa’s infrastructural development. On one hand, Africa is in urgent need of better facilities across the board but not financially capable as it stares at a funding gap of at least US$20 billion a year. On the other hand, with China’s “going-out strategy” and internationally competitive construction industry, there is a strong inter-complementary nature of economic cooperation between China and Africa. Hence China could suit Africa’s need perfectly in this regard.

3. Infrastructre: Key Area for Chinese Involvement in Africa

Actually, getting involved in Africa’s infrastructure is not a recent story for China. Early in the 1970s, China, despite its own economic hardship, provided assistance for the construction of the 1,860-kmlong Tanzania-Zambia railway, which is historical

Infrastructure is the foundation for national economic development and reflects the level

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evidence of China’s selfless help to Africa. Since the establishment of FOCAC in 2000, the pace has been marched largely forward ever since. According to the statistics of Chinese Ministry of Commerce, from 2000 to 2006, Chinese companies contracted over 6,000km of road building, 3,400km of railway building or renovation and seven electricity power stations with a total capacity of over 3.5 million kilowatts. Renovation work included Nigeria’s railway, the hydroelectricity station of Congo (Republic of), and the telecommunication network of Angola. In 2006, Chinese companies completed engineering and labour services worth US$9,500 million. 9

Development (OECD), showing a new trend in continued growth of South-South cooperation.

In 2006, the infrastructure resources provided to Africa by the emerging financiers jumped to around US$8 billion, while the ODA of OECD donors offering to Africa that year amounted to US$5.3 billion.12 While Western countries focus on “software” such as capacity building, China puts more investment in “hardware” such as roads, railways and other tangible infrastructure that bring direct and visible benefit to the host country. The China ExportImport Bank, founded in 1994, has played an important role in providing financial support for such infrastructure projects. By September 2006, there were 259 projects financed by the Chinese EXIM Bank in 36 African countries, 79 per cent of which were committed to infrastructure development such as railways (Benguela and Port Sudan), dams (Merowe in Sudan, Bui in Ghana and Mphanda Nkuwa in Zambia), thermal power plants (Nigeria and Sudan), oil facilities (Nigeria), and copper mines (Congo and Zambia). Most of these loans were issued as buyers credit with low interest (2%) to Chinese companies and are not classified as bilateral assistance by OECD Development Assistance Committee.

In 2006, a research report by the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University (CCS) stated that China’s involvement in Africa’s construction and infrastructure sectors has proved most effective in building relations with African governments.10 China’s investments have greatly improved Africa’s infrastructure as well as the overall investment environment and boosted economic development on the continent.11 The World Bank maintains that China has constructed many bridges, railways and roads in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where natural conditions are harsh to say the least. The total value of Chinese financial commitments to African infrastructure projects rose from less than US$1 billion per year in 2001-03 to around US$1.5 billion per year in 2004-05, which reached at least US$7 billion in 2006, then trailed back to US$4.5 billion in 2007.

Among an array of infrastructure developments, hydropower plants and railways are two key areas of China’s investment. With a total investment of US$3.3 billion already in place, the ten hydropower plants currently under construction can add 6,000 megawatts of electricity to the sub-Saharan region, raising its power supply capacity by 30 per cent.

Meanwhile, China is renovating the 1,350km of existing railways and 1,600km of new tracks will be a significant addition to the 50,000km railway network in SSA.

In his opening speech at the 5th FOCAC meeting in Beijing, President Hu Jintao announced that China will establish a partnership with Africa on transnational and trans-regional infrastructural development, support related project planning and feasibility studies and encourage established Chinese companies and financial institutions to take part in transnational and trans-regional infrastructural development in Africa. The US$20 billion loans promised by China to African countries, twice the amount offered by China in 2009, will also encourage more Chinese enterprises to pursue cooperation with African enterprises in the area of infrastructure. With these new initiatives, Sino-African cooperation in infrastructure will enter into a new stage.

4. Challenges Ahead

Furthermore, the World Bank report also indicated that apart from China, the leading investor in African infrastructure, India and a few oil-rich Gulf countries are also providing funding for a number of large-scale infrastructure projects in the continent. In terms of construction scale and total investment, these newly-arrived financiers have surpassed traditional investors such as members of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and

Even though Sino-African economic relations have been enjoying sound and rapid development, it is imperative that we pay great attention to the new problems and challenges ahead and consider the ways and means to deal with them. In suming up, the challenges ahead in the economic field, and in infrastructure in particular are as follows:

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a) Trade frictions and conflicts of economic interests

for improving people’s livelihood. Only when the roads are linked with markets, factories and schools, the infrastructure develop a “life” which becomes meaningful in real sense.

Some African scholars hold that China’s economic development constitutes both tempting opportunities and terrible threats to Africa.13 Take textile trade for example: the sustained increase of export from China to the US and the EU, the two largest markets for textile products, and the great increase of Chinese products to African countries where textile and apparel is the pillar industry has, to a certain extent, eroded the international market share of these countries, thus affecting the development of the textile industry in the local area and leading to bankruptcies and unemployment.

Indeed, with the ever expanding economic and trade cooperation between China and Africa, conflicts in trade and investment between the two sides are also becoming more prominent. China’s absolute advantage in labour cost and resources has rendered the textile and light industries in some African countries helpless. For example, in South Africa, a pair of pants made in China only costs US$1 including long-distance transportation charge and customs, while the same product locally produced costs ten times as much.14

The maintenance of the infrastructure projects is also a common challenge facing all the partners involved. Take Tanzania-Zambia railway as an example. This milestone project in Sino-African history has been constantly facing running deficits due to poor management, deteriorating equipment and brain drain of technical staff. In this sense, technical transfer is key to maintaining the programmes and ensuring the sustainability of the infrastructure projects. During the past, handover or “turn-key” projects were the main approaches for Chinese development assistance.

All Chinese experts would leave the country once the project had been completed and handed over to the local counterparts. Since the late 1980s, joint management and joint venture programmes have been introduced and are proving to be a better alternative for dealing with the issue.

At the China-Africa Beijing Summit in 2006, the Chinese government initiated to establish three to five economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa aiming at promoting Africa’s industrialisation and meeting the local content requirement. The initiative has been warmly embraced by African countries.

At the moment, six economic and trade cooperation zones are under construction in Zambia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia. Being the first one in Africa, the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone which locates in the copper belt region, has attracted more than 13 Chinese companies so far. These companies engage in mining, prospecting, nonferrous metals processing, chemical engineering, and construction, having made investment worth US$600 million, and providing more than 6,000 jobs for local people.15

Besides, certain African scholars including some from South Africa deem China-African trade relations a kind of unequal mode of “northsouth economic relations” for the reason that Africa mainly exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods. Although in the past decade the trade volume between China and Africa has increased so rapidly, the trade structure where China exports machinery, electronic products, textile and light industry products to Africa and imports oil, timber, mineral products and other raw materials from Africa has not been changed. b. Sustainability issue In the past five decades, a lion’s share of Chinese development assistance has been put on those relatively grandiose and prestigious buildings such as presidential palaces, government buildings and football stadiums, among others. Even though these projects help the host countries, infrastructure development assistance sometimes bears the risk of developing “white elephants” that do not add value to the local economy, failing to produce job opportunities and eventually turning into “unproductive investment,” as some argue.

In other words, buildings and roads themselves cannot generate jobs and offer any visible products

c. Technical transfer Technical transfer is another challenge, particularly to some Chinese companies, that is, how to improve the localisation of the company by increasing the employment of local labour and encouraging the interaction and communication with each other.

The enterprise culture of Chinese companies is indeed different from Western companies in many respects. For example, Chinese prefer to live together in their own circle and they are not so sociable towards their fellow local employees.

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Language is a big barrier for communication and it will take some time for Chinese companies to catch up.

have provided oil-secured loans to the government.

The Chinese loans to Angola–like the large package in the DRC, were different, in that they were never given in cash, but tied to development infrastructure constructed by Chinese companies (now with 30% reserved for Angolan subcontractors).18

Actually, apart from adapting more with local culture, technical transfer could be facilitated through training and compulsory regulations given by the host country as well. Through the establishment of training centres in the host countries and selecting outstanding local staff and sending them to China for job training, some Chinese companies have already trained a large number of local skilled personnel. For example, in Sudan, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has provided millions of dollars for Sudanese students to study undergraduate and master degrees in China, or receive short-term training. With the rich human resources of well trained local technicians and managers, the percentage of local employees among the total staff has reached over 90 per cent in some joint programmes.16 In Angola, the current agreement signed by the local government and the Chinese EXIM Bank, with the amount of US$2 billion to be spent on integrated infrastructure projects, includes a new regulation stating that 30 per cent of the work should be subcontracted to local companies. With such compulsory regulations, the management capacity and technical know-how of local companies could be greatly upgraded.

Furthermore, the debt issue in Africa began decades ago. Among the astronomical US$300 billion debt, African countries borrowed heavily from Western creditor nations and the international monetary institutions in the 1960s and 70s. China is just a minor creditor country and has been making efforts to write off African countries overdue debts in recent decade.

Actually, when we look at the other side of the coin, Chinese investment flows also frequently and objectively create new cash flows to finance investments for other areas in the country.

Moreover, Chinese loans closely fit the recipient countries’ ability to repay. Normally, the larger, less concessional loans are offered to countries such as Angola, Congo, Nigeria and Sudan, all with rich natural resources that guarantee their capacity for repayment (for example, the once war-torn Angola has been enjoying double-digit economic growth in recent years). Smaller, poorer countries such as Togo, Mali and Rwanda, among others, tend to receive grants and zero-interest loans. As stopping eating is certainly not the right recipe for curing the digestion problem, stopping aid and loans to Africa is not the right prescription to avoid a new round of debt crisis. Countries urgently need development capital for their economic development. Attention however ought to be paid to increase the impact of the aid and loans so that African recipients can improve their own payment capabilities through economic progress and step out from the vicious circle of piling on new debt to pay off existing debt. That is to say, development sustainability and development first, should be the priority concern.

d. Resources for infrastructure model and debt sustainability issue China learnt from Japan a variant of the “resources for infrastructure” arrangement in the early stage of China’s “reform and opening-up” process in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At that time, China exported its natural resources in exchange for Japan’s high technology equipment and advanced management skills.17 Considering the financial constraints that most resource-rich African countries are facing, China introduced the “resources-infrastructure swap” on the infrastructure development in Africa.

For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), China EXIM bank agreed to finance more than US$6 billion in infrastructure, using the copper and cobalt mining joint venture in DRC as a guarantee.

5. Conclusion While marveling at the great development of China-Africa relations today, China needs to be aware of the potential challenges. At present, being Chinese, we should recognise that the rise of the trade volume does not equate to the synchronised rise of the economic competitiveness. In other words, trade structure, technical advancement in economic and trade cooperation, environment protection, capacity for sustainable development, and also the training and cultivation of a large

Hence, there is talk of ‘China loans creating ‘new wave of Africa debt,’ or ‘rogue aid’, which often appears in media outlets and naturally causes concern on Africa’s debt sustainability.

Commodity-secured loans are not unique to China.

In Angola, dozens of international bank consortia

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number of legal and other experts are all essential for economic competitiveness. Meanwhile, in terms of infrastructure, one of the key challenges is how to maximise the spill-over effect of economic infrastructure to other broader social goals such as generating employment, improving education and health situation, among others. In short, to enhance China’s political influence, economic competitiveness, moral appeal and diplomatic relations in Africa, we still have a lot of potential to cultivate and a long way to go.

8

It is a well known saying in China since the “reform and opening-up” policy was adopted in late 1970s. The idea regards the infrastructure building as the prerequisite and guarantee to realise the economic development.

9

See press conference given by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce on Oct. 9, 2010. http://www.gov.cn/ gzdt/2010-10/09/content_1718314.htm.

10

Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University (CCS): “China’s Interest and Activity in Africa’s Construction and Infrastructure Sectors”, South Africa, 2006.

11

The World Bank Report: “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa”, Published in July 2008, http://www.ppiaf.org/content/view/438/462/.

Endnotes 1

African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET) Report: “Looking East: A Guide to Engaging China for Africa’s Policy-Makers”, Nov. 2009.

2

Jia Qingling: President of Chinese Political Consultative Conference (CPCC), speech given in the opening ceremony of “China-Kenya Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum” in Nairobi, April 24, 2007.

3

Chen Jian: Deputy Minister of Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Press Conference Speech, November 2, 2009, http://www.dzwww.com/rollnews/200911/ t20091103_5135515.htm.

5

Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at the opening ceremony of the 4th FOCAC meeting in Sharm ElSheikh, Egypt on Nov. 9, http://gb.cri.cn/27824/200 9/11/09/2225s2670969.htm.

7

13 Represented by Mr. Moeletsi Mbeki, Deputy Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs. See “China’s Journey to Africa”, in Yale Globalisation , Jan. 3, 2005.

Premier Wen Jiabao gave the number at the press conference after the opening ceremony of the 4th FOCAC meeting in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt on Nov. 9. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-1110/021419010123.shtml

4

6

12 Ibid, see the part of “Executive Summary”, pp XI.

14 Lin Zhishen: “Africa, Competition Not Only from China”, in Cankaoxiaoxi: Friction, the Pain of Chinese Textile Products, June 30, 2005.

15

See “China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation”, the White Paper issued by the Chinese State Council on Dec. 23, 2010, http://english.peopledaily.com. cn/90001/90777/90855/7240530.html.

16 “Oil Giant’s Commitment”, in China Daily, Special Supplement, Nov. 3, 2006.

17

Straub S.: “Infrastructure and Development: A Critical Appraisal of the Macro-level Literature”, in World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 4590, Washington, DC: World Bank, April, 2008.

Deborah Brautigam, “The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa”, Oxford University Press, 2009.

18 Deborah Brautigam: “China in Africa: What Can Western Donors Learn?”, A Report for Norfund, Aug. 2011.

Harry Broadman: “Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier”, in The World Bank, 2006.

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Africa Regional Integration and Sino-Africa Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges

By Tang Xiao China Foreign Affairs University, China Abstract: Regional integration is the way for Africa to seek peace and development through unity. While other regions have experienced great progress through peace and security, trade and cultural exchange among other avenues, Africa has been subjected to the distress of war, internal conflict, political instability and similar economic and industrial structure. This has not been conducive for internal trade. African regional integration has also been affected by the international financial crisis. China-Africa Cooperation and African integration are two great arms for Africa to make use of for Africa’s Development and rehabilitation. The combination of regional integration with Sino-Africa cooperation is important to stimulate industrialisation, urbanisation, modernisation and sustainable development. China and Africa need to carefully nurture their new relationship. The China-Africa Cooperation Forum is the framework and platform for China and African countries to conduct bilateral and multilateral cooperation. China and African countries can nurture and promote the combination of the China-Africa cooperation with African regional integration, to achieve bilateral cooperation complemented with multilateral corporation. The 5th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC to boost China-Africa ties highlighted China’s pledge to support Africa’s integration process and help the continent to enhance its own capacity for overall development. How to make the idea and policy measures into practice is the topic for further discussion and research.

2.

1. Introduction How can Sino-Africa ties be efficient and sustainable? During the 5th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in July 2012, the Chinese government proposed new measures in 5 priority areas to boost China-Africa ties. The third measure addressed China’s pledge to support Africa’s integration process; help Africa enhance its own capacity, establish partnership with Africa on transnational and trans-regional infrastructural development, support related project planning and feasibility studies, encourage established Chinese companies and financial institutions to take part in transnational and trans-regional infrastructural development in Africa, and help African countries upgrade customs and commodity inspection facilities to promote intra-regional trade.1

Regional Integration in Africa and ChinaAfrica Cooperation is Mututal Benefit and Mutual Assistance

2.1 Seeking peace and development through unity In 2002, the Organisation of African Unity was replaced by the African Union, an important step towards reviving Pan-Africanism. African countries have shifted from political cooperation to comprehensive cooperation and from “seeking independence and liberation” to seeking “peace and development.” In 2002, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was incorporated into the framework of the African Union, becoming the first African independently formulated strategic blueprint, guiding all round development in Africa.

ECOWAS, SADC, EAC and other sub-regional organisations are also important building blocks towards Africa’s integration.2 The international financial crisis, apart from bringing enormous pressure to African countries in their process of regional cooperation and integration, has also made Africa realise strengthening regional political consultation and accelerating regional economic integration will help reduce the impact of the international financial crisis. As the AU Commission chairperson Konare noted: Africa needs a new momentum and stronger determination

Regional integration is key to Africa’s peace, development and effective engagement with China. The combination of regional integration and China-Africa ties hold mutual benefit and win-win opportunities for China and Africa. On the other hand, the combination will also pose challenges to traditional China-Africa cooperation model mostly based on bilateral relations, requiring the participants to adjust to multilateral cooperation model and overcome their respective internal and external unfavourable factors.

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to keep on fighting for integration without which our people will have no future.3

organisational protection and institutional basis for AU to implement the independent peacekeeping mission. Second, the African Union has promoted peace and stability in Africa through the interventionism. Since 2003, the AU has actively pursued promoting peace in Burundi, Darfur, Sudan, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Somalia. Third, The AU has put forward the way of AU to resolve conflict by political mediation. In early 2011, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a post-election crisis, and subsequently, domestic conflicts occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other North African countries. The AU made use of political mediation as peaceful means to resolve the conflicts. The conflicts that for a long time plagued Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Southern Sudan, are gradually coming to an end. From 1960s to 1990s in Africa, only four civilian leaders were willing to relinquish power.

2.2 China-Africa Cooperation China and Africa are both developing countries, although in different stages. They are going through the process of industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation. They have complementary economic and trade structure. While China’s capital, technology, industry structure and products are suitable for economic development and market demand in Africa, Africa’s rich energy and raw material resources can meet the rapid growth of China‘s economic development needs.

Strengthening China-Africa Cooperation is a rare historical opportunity for Africa to achieve industrialisation and modernisation with the help of a strong arm, and is also an important tool for China’s rapid sustainable development in industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation at a higher level.

2.3

Regional integration is mutual benefit and mutual assistance

b) Regional integration in Africa is conducive to African countries speaking with one voice, and to China and African countries adopting a common position as developing countries in international affairs. With 54 seats, accounting for 28 per cent of the total membership of the United Nations, Africa forms the largest voting bloc at the United Nations. After the establishment of the AU in 2002, African countries have increasingly sought to speak with one voice on the international stage. On the issue of UN reform, the African Union actively promotes the UN Security Council reform process. AU has also played an important role in international political and economic issues in WTO negotiations and the international financial system reform. AU opposed the indictment of President Omar Bashir of Sudan by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity. AU members do not follow “Rome’s Protocol” of the International Criminal Court indicting Sudan President Omar al-Bashir provisions.

All these highlight African independence, and strong will of speaking with one voice on major international issues.

While Africa’s regional integration is key to the continent’s peace and development. African regional integration and China-Africa cooperation have common interests, which complement and promote each other’s interests. China-Africa cooperation in regional integration is an important step to promote each other’s development through larger scale investment, trade, and unified voice in international political affairs.

3.

The Opportunities it Brings to Sino- Africa Cooperation

3.1

Opportunities for Sino-Africa political cooperation

a) Regional integration in Africa is conducive to promote Africa’s political stability, which is the political foundation for ChinaAfrica Cooperation. First of all, since its inception, the African Union has vigorously advocated for African solutions to Africa’s problems; mandatory intervention of African Union member states in major continental crises (such as war crimes, crimes against humanity); aggression (the principle of nonindifference); the establishment of peace and security council; and the establishment of Africa’s standing army. These have provided

c) Regional institutional construction for a unified trade, investment and regulatory environment, could create a more favourable political environment for China-Africa economic cooperation. By January 2009, the

China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

12

AU Commission had adopted 33 agreements, conventions, charters and treaties in democracy, governance, human rights, national defence, natural resources, culture, anti-terrorism, trade, health, environment and economic development, among others.4 In NEPAD’s Constitution, the African Democratic Charter, AU has expressed its commitment to promote democracy, good governance, human rights, the right to development, constitutionalism, peaceful transfer of power, transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. In 2003, African leaders invented the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to assess the efficient implementation of these norms and principles. So far, at least 26 countries have joined, while eight countries have accepted the assessment.5 AU has also adopted the Convention for preventing and combating corruption, condemnation against the acts of unconstitutional changes of government, and adopted a series of resolutions and plans on African continent’s agricultural, infrastructure, energy, trade, investment development and other regional development programmes.6

depth for China-Africa economic and trade cooperation. Africa’s economic growth objectives and a clear development strategy, which clarifies development projects in the fields of energy, transportation, health, communications, and agriculture in the African continent, provide many opportunities for China-Africa to strengthen multilateral cooperation in infrastructure, Chinese technology transfer, people to people exchange and strengthening capacity-building in Africa, conflict management and ultimately regional development. b) Africa’s economic integration is bound to accord China a huge and untapped market. The expansion of Africa’s commodity markets will be beneficial to the entry of Chinese products into Africa. The effective operation of free trade zones and the common market in any regional group will provide a ready-made fruitful cooperation platform for China. Regional integration in Africa combined with ChinaAfrica cooperation will benefit Africa’s one billion people. In July 2010, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi officially launched the Common Market for East African Community, a single market with a population of over 100 million. This is another important historical event in the process of economic integration in Africa, following the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Free Trade Area established in August 2008.

Under the common market, member states will take measures to integrate the market, including further improvement of the customs union such as phasing out tariff, non tariff and technical barriers; allowing cross border free flow of goods, services, capital and personnel; implementing common external tariff; harmonising commodity quality standards, as well as coordination of finance, trade, monetary, education, employment and labour policies. The common market is bound to promote regional trade and improve the overall investment attractiveness and economic competitiveness.

d) The more progress is made in Africa’s regional integration, the more Africa’s implementation capacity will be strengthened, including the implementation of China-Africa Cooperation policies. AU and African subregional organisations have developed various conventions and agreements for coordination of regional development goals and priorities among member states. This helps improve the implementation capacity of African countries and regional organisations. Organisation pour l’harmonisation du Droit des Affairs en Afrique - OHADA - is an important regional transnational organisation that has made remarkable results in the coordination of domestic commercial law of the member states, especially in the promoting member states to adopt a uniform law. Since its inception, the organisation has adopted a lot of unified legal documents to ensure the certainty and predictability of commercial laws in the region, as well as the development of regional trade and investment.7

c) African economic integration is conducive to the promotion of investment and trade facilitation. The common market would mean that China will face a time saving and efficient unified legal and regulatory system when transacting. The common market agreement signed by the African economic

3.2 Opportunities for Sino-Africa economic cooperation a) Economic integration in Africa can provide opportunities and space in the breadth and

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13

community such as ECOWAS, COMESA, and free trade zone policies (such as the East African Community), provides opportunities for Chinese goods to enter more freely into the African market. In addition, bigger and more assured markets created by the economic integration will be more attractive to foreign investors (including Chinese companies).

4. Sino-Africa Cooperation Challenges 4.1 Challenges to Sino-Africa political and security cooperation For China, the first challenge to deal with is the relationship between Chinese non-interference in other nation’s internal affairs and the AU principle of non-indifference. The African Union and Africa sub regional organisations have for a long time operated under the dominant international management concept such as humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect or in summary, the principle of non-indifference. In 2010, the AU adopted a resolution asking the UN Security Council to slap sanctions against Eritrea for allegedly supporting young Somali Jihadists (terrorists). The UN Security Council adopted the resolution, and China abstained. During the 2010 Côte d’Ivoire post-election crisis, the Western countries could not wait to endorse president Alassane Ouattara, and took sides in the civil war.

ECOWAS and the African Union, particularly ECOWAS, threatened to intervene by force unless President Laurent Gbagbo resigned. In Libya, the Arab League adopted a no-fly zone resolution. The stands are different from China’s non-interference principle. China faces the challenge to maintain peace and security in Africa, while on the other hand, protecting her own national interests, and striking a balance between international responsibility and national principles.

d) Economic integration in Africa provides an opportunity for China’s economic and industrial structure adjustment and transformation. To enhance Africa’s internal trade, developing the manufacturing industry or raw materials processing industry is important. Since China’s manufacturing and processing technology is suitable for Africa’s needs of industrialisation, China can transfer some small manufacturing and processing industries to Africa, to achieve a win-win cooperation between China and Africa.8 3.3 Opportunities for Sino-Africa cultural exchanges a) Africa’s regional integration is conducive to China’s understanding of Pan-Africanism.

The tenets of Pan-Africanism (unity, selfconfidence, coordination, self-reliance and cooperation) will help China and Africa to seek common values, share and summarise the experience of development and consolidate the cultural foundation of the cooperation.

Secondly, China needs to strengthen the coordination of central government departments in the cooperation with Africa. The Chinese economic and trade relations with African states involve diversified players. In addition to the government agencies, there are state-owned enterprises, joint ventures and private enterprises which have different demands, inevitably bringing about some conflict. We do not have a strong leading agency guiding the coordination departments of central ministries.9 Therefore, it is very important to strengthen unified deployment and coordination among central government decision making agencies, and strengthen central government administration and management of state owned and private enterprises.

b) The expansion of China-Africa cultural exchanges and cooperation projects in the framework of FOCAC (such as the African scholars exchange programme, establishment of Confucius Institutes in Africa, human resources training programmes, as well as the cultural and sports exchange projects) will help deepen mutual understanding, eliminate the gaps between each other, and create equal, win-win cultural values. c) The China-Africa cooperation at the regional and sub-regional integration level will enable African countries to deepen their understanding of Chinese cultural values such as mutual respect, win-win cooperation, opening up, hard work, economic construction and balanced reforms.

Thirdly, China ought to properly deal with SinoAfrica relations, America-Africa relations; EuropeAfrica relations, and Indian-Africa relations, among others. AU diplomats point out that China should also consider the interests of other African partners

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do not match their financial and human resource, and very limited capacity to assist member states in the design and implementation of technically and economically complex regional programmes and projects. In addition, they lack adequate funding from the member states, thus relying heavily on donor funding. Since some countries are members of several regional organisations, these overlapping memberships block the execution of their respective regional integration plan.

(such as the West) when dealing with Africa. Africa stands to benefit if there is mutual cooperation.

The goal of integration of Africa is to win more external support and international partners, peace and development. Adversarial or zero sum relationship among major international partners will directly affect the interests of Africa. Africans would like to see competitive cooperation among international partners. According to some scholars, Africa leaders are glad to see that the West has a contender in Africa. Over the past 10 years, more infrastructure constructions have been experienced in Africa. If African countries can choose between their competitors, they can get more benefit than when they deal with one big partner. Quite different from the Cold War era, most countries in Africa now are not in the line up. African countries who have military cooperation with the United States and economic engagement with China, hope that they can benefit from both sides.10

NEPAD is a very good plan, but many of its deliberations remain questionable. Since its establishment in July 2002 as the supreme authority and the highest decision-making body, AU assembly has opened 17 Congresses, made 209 decisions and 36 statements. In contrast, other major decision making bodies such as the Executive Council, at the same time has made 469 decisions and 3 statements. For some reason, some of these decisions have been partially implemented, while others have not been implemented at all.11 It is necessary that Africa shuns making decisions that will not be implemented.

In Africa, there are some problems to be solved.

African countries need to solve their internal political issues (such as border disputes, negative ethnicity, high poverty levels, low level of effective demand, bureaucratic corruption) to create and maintain political stability and good governance.

Despite the fact that great progress has been made in these areas, the unrest in North Africa, border conflicts in several African countries and postelection crisis in some countries, indicate that a great deal of work still needs to be done to achieve political stability and good governance, which are crucial to economic development and regional integration.

4.2 Challenges to cooperation

Sino-Africa

economic

African political leaders need to express genuine political will. Some government ministers in Africa neither understand NEPAD nor take it seriously.

As some Africans claim, South Africa is allegedly very positive on regional integration because it benefits most, as opposed to some small countries.

The region needs objective (economic) drivers for regionalisation as well as the subjective ones (a domestic political elite promoting regionalism).

Therefore, it is a great challenge to have genuine political will which goes beyond the national boundary and lets all countries benefit from regional integration.

For China, the first challenge is to change her way of cooperation. Chinese investment and trade cooperation with Africa in the past few decades is basically on bilateral basis between countries.

Facing multiple or overlapping of the membership of RECs in the process of Africa regional integration, asymmetric country effects of regional integration, and uneven African sub-regional integration process, make it difficult for the Chinese government and companies to deal with Africa.

While China is familiar with bilateral cooperation, it is not certain about multilateral regional cooperation. China’s government departments and state-owned enterprises are generally worried about the complexities accruing from multilateral cooperation. China ought to therefore change her ideas, face the reality and explore new methods of cooperation with Africa’s regional and sub-regional organisations, otherwise she will not be able to adapt and take part in the irreversible historical process of regional integration in Africa.

At regional and sub regional level, African countries and regional organisations need to overcome the ‘paper tiger’ stance and resort to implementation.

The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have weak technical capacity, responsibilities that

To combine Sino-Africa cooperation with regional integration in Africa, China needs to increase investment in Africa. Africa’s infrastructure construction, agricultural food security and energy development are priorities in African economic

China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

15

4.3 Challenges to Sino-Africa cultural exchanges

integration. They need large-scale investment and cooperation with international partners. China can benefit from taking part in regional integration in Africa due to the continent’s regional scale and unified systems. If there is no investment at regional level, the cooperation will be incomplete. Largescale infrastructure and agriculture cooperation for example, can not be separated from the African regional and sub-regional organisations. If these issues cannot be solved, China-Africa cooperation in other areas will be affected. In addition, African countries have greater expectations of ChinaAfrica cooperation, but China’s national resources and the actual capacity is limited. It is a big challenge for China to further expand, promote and develop China-Africa Cooperation on the limited resources. Also, developed European countries and the United States have begun to re-focus on Africa in an attempt to seek more trade and resources.

Some emerging countries like India, Turkey and Brazil, driven by their own development interests and needs, have invested in Africa. This diverse competition is also contributing to China’s increased investment in Africa.

The image of China in Africa is getting more and more complex. Due to the diversification of the main cooperators in China, more and more private enterprises are joining the cooperation with different economic interests, but little knowledge about African culture. This is eliciting tension and conflict with local African workers, making China’s image more complex. How to crack this paradox and improve the national image of China in Africa will be a big challenge to China.

In addition, most African countries have Western multiparty democracy, uphold the principle of nonindifference, intervene in the internal governance of regional member countries, and have different values and attitudes on human rights and good governance. Mutual respect and learning from each other for common development is a task China should contend with, to consolidate Sino-Africa cultural cooperation.

As for Africa, the language is still a challenge to regional integration. There are many different languages in Africa; English, French and Arabic are the most popular official languages. French is the official language in West Africa, English in East Africa and South Africa, while Arabic is spoken in North Africa. These language differences are a reflection of different cultural history and the various economic alignments. In spite of the orientation to Francophone, Anglophone or Lucophone countries, African countries should practice extensive communication and exchanges.

African countries need to choose between relying on external assistance and being self-reliant.

NEPAD has always depended on foreign aid, especially from Western countries, to implement its projects. While Chinese aid is limited, the assistance from the West is conditional, and does not necessarily correspond to the priority areas in Africa. African countries should pursue selfreliance. They can adopt export-oriented strategy for the accumulation of funds through the export of primary products, by which they can invest in the development of manufacturing industry or valueadded processing industries, and then to optimise its economic structure.

5. Conclusion Through regional integration, Africa will experience peace, economic growth, security and benefits of cultural exchanges. Africa’s history of war, internal conflict and political instability, and similar economic and industrial structure is not conducive to internal trade and regional economic integration. While African integration has a long way to go, it is an irreversible historical process to the development of Africa. The Sino-Africa cooperation is an important strategic opportunity to spur industrialisation, urbanisation, modernisation and sustainable development in China and Africa.

China-Africa Cooperation Forum is the framework and platform for China and African countries to conduct bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Based on bilateral cooperation within the framework, China and African countries can nurture

African countries need to expand inter-regional trade. Most African countries externally trade in primary products such as minerals, timber, coffee, cocoa and other raw materials. Many countries have not diversified their industrial productions to address internal trade. Studies have shown little manufacturing activities and limited scope for complementary across the region’s economies.

This non-complementary economic structure is detrimental to the internal trade development of the African continent in future. Internal trade is an important engine to drive regional integration.

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and promote the combination of the China-Africa cooperation with regional integration in Africa, to achieve bilateral cooperation complemented with multilateral corporation, so that China-Africa cooperation will be more comprehensive and operate at a higher level, on the larger scale, with higher efficiency, and sustainability.

7

Zhu W.: “Commentary on OHADA”, Journal of West Asia and Africa, Issue 1, 2009. http://politics. csscipaper.com/countries/africa/7546.html.

8

According to the analysis of the World Bank and African Development Bank, the recent global financial crisis facilitates Western countries to reduce the direct investment and aid to Africa.

Developed countries are forced to pull out some of the funds from emerging markets due to the domestic economic downturn situation. The financial crisis brings both opportunities and challenges to Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa.

9

In November 2000, the Chinese Follow-up Committee of FOCAC was established. There are currently 27 member units: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Land and Resources, Department of Environmental Protection, Ministry of Transportation (including National Civil Aviation Authority), Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Health, People’s Bank of China, General Administration of Customs, State Administration of Taxation, State General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, China National Tourism Administration, State Council Information Office, Central Communist Youth League, China International trade Promotion Committee, the State development Bank, ExportImport Bank of China, Bank of China, the Beijing Municipal people’s Government.

Endnotes 1

President Hu proposes new measures to boost China-Africa ties, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/china/2012-07/19/c_131726133.htm

2

In July 2006, the Seventh Summit of the AU passed a resolution claiming that except eight Economic Communities (ECOWAS, ECCAS, ECCAS, SADC, COMESA, EAC, AMU, the Sahel-Saharan States CEN-SAD and IGAD), AU will suspend the recognition of other economic communities subordinating the development of the African sub-regional organisations under the framework of AU, making the development goals of sub-regional organisations compatible with the overall development strategy of AU.

3

Chang and Chen: “The AU is Committed to Accelerate the Process of Regional Integration”, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-06/29/ content_4763798.htm.

4

Okumu Wafula: “The African Union: Pitfalls and Prospects for Uniting Africa”, Journal of International Affairs, April 1, 2009.

5

Ibid.

6

Such as Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Programme (CAADP, 2003), Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA, 2010), Minimum Integration Programme (MIP, 2008), Second Decade of Education for Africa (2006), Consolidated Science and Technology Plan of Action (2005), The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), The Climate for Development in Africa (ClimDev-Africa, 2011), among others.

10 Mahmood M.: “Between China and the West, Africa Did Not Stand In”, http://www.dfdaily.com/ html/150/2011/11/3/690496.shtml.

11

Okumu, W.: “The African Union: Pitfalls and Prospects for Uniting Africa”, in Journal of International Affairs, April 1, 2009.

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The Experience of Chinese Support for Infrastructure: How Relevant is it for Kenya?

By Joseph Onjala Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Kenya Abstract: Kenya has been the focus of China’s development assistance over the last decade. The country has received millions of dollars worth of aid from China to expand infrastructure, develop industries and promote trade. This paper provides an analysis of the relevance of Chinese aid and investment in Kenya’s infrastructure development in the last decade. The paper examines the type and magnitude of infrastructure involved and raises questions on its role in development, considering the poor track record in maintaining such infrastructure in Kenya. The road network in Kenya has for many years been characterized by poor rehabilitation and high maintenance backlog. The analysis is based on existing data from secondary sources, government reports and academic literature. The author has previously conducted extensive research on Sino-Africa relations with the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) which has helped illuminate the analysis.

1. The State of Infrastructure Development in Kenya

rural areas, where the majority of the continent’s 920 million people live. The burden also falls most heavily on women.

Lack of modern infrastructure is a major constraint to economic development, achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and revitalizing of agriculture in Kenya and Africa.

Infrastructure needs are enormous. From rural roads, railways and harbours to irrigation systems, telecommunications, clean water, sanitation, energy and such basic social infrastructure as health, education, banking and commercial services.

Hundreds of millions of Africans lack even the most fundamental amenities. This is particularly true in

Modern infrastructure is key to attaining Kenya’s economic development. The infrastructural sector accounts for approximately 10 per cent of Kenya’s GDP (Government of Kenya, 2011c). Due to poor infrastructure, Kenya’s global competitiveness is still weak, especially in transport (road and rail), and energy (Government of Kenya, 2010). The level of infrastructural development in Kenya is similar to that of other Sub-Saharan African countries.

Table 1: Indicators of infrastructure development for Kenya and other Sub-Saharan African countries Indicator

SubSaharan Africa Kenya

South Africa

Tanzania

Uganda

Nigeria

Botswana

Transport • Paved road density

49

14.3

-

6.7

-

-

62

• Mobile teledensity

101

65

127

56

48

59

143

• Internet density

3

28

20.9

12.1

13

28.4

7.0

• Electricity access (%)

18

16.1

75

13.9

9

50.6

45.4

• Improved water (%)

60

59

91

54

67

58

95

• Improved sanitation

35

32

73

10

34

31

62

Water and Sanitation

Source: Compiled from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2012

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2. Chinese Support Development in Kenya

As shown in Table 1, the road network is characterised by low paved density of 14 per cent, affects the cost of transport and other economic transactions thereby impairing the competitiveness of goods and services. The cost of a poor urban transport system in Nairobi is estimated to be two per cent of GDP (Government of Kenya, 2010).

Total water availability in Kenya is currently about ~937m3/capita, which is far below the average for Africa (~4,500m3/capita). The levels of access to improved water (59%) and sanitation (31%) in Kenya remains low compared to other SSA countries, South Africa at 91 per cent, 73 per cent; and Botswana at 95 per cent, 62 per cent, respectively (Government of Kenya, 2010).

for

Infrastructure

Kenya has a long standing and strong relationship with the People’s Republic of China covering key aspects of development cooperation in the economic, political as well as socio-cultural areas.

China currently tops the bilateral donors supporting Kenya. By the year 2011, the cumulative Chinese Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Kenya stood at US$622.9 million (Ksh49.83 billion). Over the years, Kenya has benefited substantially from this development cooperation through financial and technical support by the Government of China.

Through this support, China appears to have made a notable contribution to Kenya’s development agenda, enabling substantial achievements in many aspects of infrastructural goals.

Kenya derives its electric power from hydro, thermal and geothermal sources. Electricity is supplied at 240 volts, 50 cycles single-phase and 415 volts, 50 cycles three-phase. Other commonly used sources of power include solar power, biogas and wind energy. Hydro sources account for 730.0mw (56%) of the total installed capacity, while geothermal, thermal and imports from Uganda provide 158 mw (12%), 421.5mw (32%) and 30mw (2.3%), respectively. The effective capacity under normal hydrological conditions is about 1,300MW. Due to over reliance on hydroelectricity, the frequency of power outages is high (33% compared with the average for Mexico, China and South Africa, which stands at 1%). System losses, unaccounted for water losses average 60 per cent, while electricity transmission losses average 18.5 per cent.

The Development Cooperation between Kenya and China is currently anchored on the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Action Plan 2010-2012, also known as the Sharm el Sheikh Action plan. FOCAC aims at fostering friendship, consensus and cooperation between China and Africa, thereby responding to the changing international situation as well as meeting common challenges. The Sharm el-Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012) puts forward the guidelines, main objectives and specific measures for China-Africa cooperation in priority areas. These include: human resource development, agriculture, infrastructure development, investment and trade.

Over the years, a number of development projects have been supported by China as summarised in Table 2. Some of the projects are still ongoing. The projects have been financed on concessional loans and preferential buyer’s credit from Exim BankChina.

The electricity tariff in Kenya in 2011 was US cents 15 per kwh. This is higher than that of South Africa (US cents 8.55 per kwh) and Egypt (US cents 3.5 per kwh) who are Kenya’s major competitors in trade and services in East and Southern Africa.

India has very low and competitive tariffs at 5.5US cents per kwh. Italy and Germany have some of the highest tariffs in the World at 19.70 and 18.56 US cents per kwh, respectively. The high electricity tariffs in Kenya can be attributed largely to the volatility of the power supply from hydro sources and the resulting fuel cost charge pegged on the dollar cost of importing petroleum.

The construction of Nairobi Eastern and Northern by-passes project aims at decongesting the City of Nairobi, which has been experiencing heavy traffic jams due to inadequate road network.

The Olkaria IV Geothermal Field Production Wells Drilling Project aims at harnessing Kenya’s geothermal power potential with a view to reducing the power deficit.

Mobile teledensity and internet density have improved substantially in recent years and Kenya is catching up with the leading countries in SSA (South Africa and Botswana). Access to mobile telephony shows that there were 180,613 postpaid subscriptions against 19.9 million pre-paid subscriptions by the year 2010. The estimated number of internet users stood at 7.8 million by June 2010 (Government of Kenya, 2011a).

The Kenya Power Distribution System Modernisation Strengthening Project aims at the construction of new 132kv power transmission line from Rabai–Garsen and Lamu in the country’s Coastal region.

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Table 2: Chinese supported development projects in Kenya Year

Project Name

Cost

Sector

2006-2011 Construction of Nairobi Eastern and

Northern by-passes project

Olkaria IV geothermal field

production wells drilling project

US$125 million Ksh9.5 billion

Roads

US$96 million Ksh7.4 billion

Energy

US$90 million Ksh7.0 billion

Energy

The Kenya e-government project

The National Optic Fibre Backbone

Infrastructure (NOFBI)

US$36 million Ksh3.10 billion

ICT

US$ 36 million Ksh3.12 billion

ICT

1987 Moi international sports centre

US$29 million (RMB Yuan 137 million) app. Ksh1.16 billion loan

Sports/Culture

Not known

Roads

Construction of Kipsigak –Shamakhoko road

Construction of the Kima/Emusustwi

road in western Kenya

2006 Rehabilitation of the Moi international sports complex

Up-grading of Eldoret hospital as a

teaching hospital for Moi university

The rehabilitation and widening

of the Jomo Kenyatta International

Airport (JKIA)–Uhuru Highway–

UNEP road

(RMB Yuan 150 million) app Ksh1,425 million

Roads

US$19 million (RMB Yuan 35 million) app Ksh 297 million interest free loan

Roads

Procurement of equipments for the National Youth Service

US$50million Ksh4.24 billion)

Kenya rural telecommunications project

US$22million (Ksh1.68 billion)

Kenya power distribution system modernisation strengthening project

Tarmacking of the Gambogi –Serem road

Included in a loan package of Sports/Culture US$90million (Ksh 5.9billion) US$40million (RMB Yuan 38 million-app.

Ksh323 million)

Health/ Education

(US$19million Ksh1.52 billion) grant

Roads

ICT

Hospital facility 300 beds at Kayole, Nairobi Eastlands and two primary schools Grant one in Nairobi and the other in Kisii

Health/ Education

The Kenya power distribution system modernisation strengthening project

US$17.5million (Ksh1.38 billion)

Energy

Nairobi–Thika highway improvement project

Partial

Roads

Construction of maize flour processing factory in Bomet

US$1.3million (Ksh100 million)

Source: Government of Kenya, 2011b

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One of the most important components of the economic cooperation agreement between Kenya and China was the construction of the Moi International Sports Centre. It cost approximately US$52 million (Ksh 930 million), with Kenya meeting 48 per cent of the cost. It included a sports stadium with a seating capacity of 60,000 people, an olympic-size swimming pool, and a modern gymnasium. The project was completed in time to host the fourth All-Africa games in 1987. China’s contribution to the construction costs (52%) was funded by an interest-free loan. According to Chege (2011), between 2003 and 2005, most of China’s development aid to Kenya went into a rural telecommunications project that linked Kenya’s administration units. Other projects included rural and urban roads and rehabilitation of the Kasarani sports complex.

During the visit of H.E. Mr Wang Qishan on 18th March, 2011, a number of financing agreements were signed. The concessional loan agreements for rehabilitation and upgrading of equipment in the universities and technical training institutes– costing US$33million (Ksh2.47 billion) aimed at providing adequate facilities to tertiary institutions in order to offer quality education and training.

Also signed was the Enterprise Messaging and Collaboration System (EMACS) project at a cost of US$52million (Ksh. 3.88 billion). The project aimed at establishing Government Shared Service Application (GSSA) to improve efficiency of office collaboration and therefore reduce the operation cost of Government in this field.

The procurement of equipment for the National Youth Service entailed the procurement of road construction and maintenance equipment for the National Youth Service to replace ageing ones, currently being used by the service. In addition to the above ongoing and completed projects, the Kenya government has placed a request with the Chinese government for funding the projects (Table 3). The Development of Kenya’s second Port at Lamu and the associated infrastructure is part of a major investment comprising a resort city, pipeline, airport and a new railway line connecting Southern Ethiopia and Southern Sudan.

With time, the Chinese Government has extended a concessional loan to Kenya for the National Optic Fibre Backbone Infrastructure (NOFBI) project and e-Government. The NOFBI project aimed at linking most urban areas of Kenya to the global fibre optic network through the Nairobi. The National Optic Fibre Backbone Infrastructure (NOFBI) and e-government expansion projects were financed

by China, the agreement required the contract be awarded to the Chinese firm, among other conditions. The Kenya e-Government project was intended to interconnect 20 Ministry headquarters within Nairobi, primarily to support internal applications such as IFMIS and IPPD as well as applications that support oversight and decision making functions in financial management, assets and supplies management.

In July 2012, Kenya’s Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, witnessed the signing of cooperation agreements with leading Chinese firms, covering energy and road construction projects. The agreements signed in Nanchang, China, include a memorandum of understanding with China Jiangxi Corporation for International Economic and Technical Cooperation to develop a solar and diesel engine power plant in Kenya. The agreement also provided for a concessional loan for the construction of some of the projects (Table 3). They include: MbitaSindo-Magunga-Karungu-Masara road and SindoNyandiwa-Sori road in the counties of Homa Bay and Migori.

The Kenya Rural Telecommunications Project aimed at providing each district headquarters with a minimum of 2,000 lines to improve on communications. The Kenya Power Distribution System Modernisation Strengthening Project aimed at the construction of new power transmission lines from Meru to Kamburu and from Kisii to Chemosit with a view to strengthening and modernising the distribution system.

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Table 3: Projects proposed by Kenya Government to the Export-Import Bank of China for funding Project name Cost Sector Chinese implementing company Development of Lamu port and its associated infrastructure

US$1.50 billion

Transport

To be determined later

Construction of standard gauge railway from Mombasa to Malaba

US$2.5 billion

Transport

To be determined later

Kenyatta University Teaching and Referral Hospital US$106 million Education China Jiangxi Corporation

Enterprise Messaging and Collaboration System (EMACS) US$46.2 million ICT ZTE Corporation Nairobi Southern by pass road US$195.0 million Roads China Road and Bridge Corporation Kibwezi-Kitui-Mwingi-UsueniTseikuru Road

US$200 million

Roads

Sino Hydro Ltd

Procurement of 3 drilling rigs

US$89.6 million

Energy

AVIC International

Support to Technical Industrial Vocational Entrepreneurship Training Project (TIVET)

US$32 million

Education

AVIC International

Construction of 132kv power transmission lines (447km) US$83.4 million Energy

Construction of 132kv power transmission lines (472 km) US$102.4 million Energy

Kisumu stadium upgrading To be known after

Feasibility Study is done Sports

China National Machinery Industry Complete Engineering Corporation China National Machinery Industry Complete Engineering Corporation To be determined later

Construction of Mbita-Sindo-MagungaKarungu road

US$31.4 million

Roads

To be determined later

Kenya e-Government Phase II (NOFBI)

US$72 million

ICT

Huawei Technologies

Kenya Power Distribution System Modernisation and Strengthening Project (Nairobi 220kv Transmission Ring Project)

US$63.1 million

Energy

TBEA Co. Ltd

Source: Government of Kenya, 2011b

Kenya Railways Corporation, under an agreement that commits the state corporation to deal only with the Chinese company. The viability of the railway line that will be built according to the Chinese railway designs is based on the assumption that it will be part of a seamless system linking Kenya and Uganda as well as serving landlocked Burundi and Rwanda� (Kenyan Construction Review, 2012).

Kenya has also signed an agreement worth US$2.6 billion with a Chinese construction company to build a new standard gauge railway line between Mombasa and Nairobi. The new railway line, which will be completed in five years, will carry freight trains speeds of up to 80km/hr and passenger trains up to 120km/hr. Already, China Roads and Bridges Company has signed a commercial contract with the

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The Construction of the Kibwezi-MutomoKitui - Mwingi - Kyuso - Tseikuru - Usueni road aimed at facilitating easy access, mobility and transportation of goods and passengers from Coast Region to Eastern and North Eastern Regions and thereby open these regions to further economic development. The Project’s total cost is US$240 million (Ksh18.4 billion).

largely been through private means. China has integrated this policy into its overall approach to development assistance. China actively promotes the investment into certain sectors on the recipient country. The country SOEs are encouraged to actively seek investment opportunities that would have a direct correlation to the development of the recipient country. The encouragement, a form of development assistance, has been emphasised by many developing countries through pan-African organisations’ initiatives such as New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

Although not formally listed among the projects proposed by the Kenya government for funding, there are numerous projects for which either memoranda of understanding have been signed or are under discussion between the Government of Kenya and China. They include:

There are many Chinese investment FDIs currently operating in Kenya. The number of these enterprises is not known though Table 4 lists a number of them.

The Chinese firms are engaged in activities that cut across manufacturing, service sectors, mining and minerals exploration. Chinese companies operating in Kenya are not based on joint venture. Most of them are fully Chinese owned. There is very limited joint ownership or local capital. The employment level in such firms is very low for both Kenyans and Chinese. Most of the capital investment appears to be placed in the construction services and mining/ mineral exploration sub-sectors. Increasingly also, the structure of employment is gradually changing, with an increasing proportion of Chinese employees (Onjala, 2008).

a) Zhongmei Engineering Group Ltd which provides for a concessional loan for the construction of Narok-Masai Mara (C12) road to connect with Narok-Mau-Narok (C57) road. b) In July 11, 2012, China State Construction Engineering Corp. Ltd (China Construction) signed an EPC Commercial Contract with Regional Development Authorities of Kenya on High Grand Falls Multipurpose Water Project in Kenya, with a contract value of US$1.75 billion. Once completed, it will greatly ease Kenya’s power insufficiency and dry weather challenges. It will provide sufficient power for Lamu, the largest international port in East Africa, which is under construction, and service agricultural irrigation of 41,000ha.

In the telecoms sector, China-based firms such as Huawei and ZTE Technologies are gaining ground in the infrastructure market and are now moving to the retail segment with low-cost smart phones and internet modems. They are gaining market shares in the retail segment that has remained the domain of European-based brands such as Nokia, Motorola and Samsung, firms that are finding it difficult to match the Chinese brands on pricing.

Huawei began positioning itself as a key player in the gadget manufacturing space, riding on key partnerships with mobile service providers such as Safaricom to provide cheaper alternatives to established brands. The firm is now moving deep into products that target the mid and high income earners with gadgets such as modems and smart phones, in a strategy that is attracting both retail and corporate clients (Onjala, 2008). Huawei was awarded the contract to build a national fibre optic infrastructure that links Kenya’s capital of Nairobi with other towns in the country through the Wide Area Network (WAN) in the National Optic Fibre Backbone Infrastructure Project.

c) The state-owned Kenya Airports Authority of US$546 million commercial contract with China’s Anhui Construction, to build a new airport terminal. d) Grants for anti-malaria drugs, food stuff (particularly rice), capacity building and humanitarian assistance, including the cash donation of US$1.0 million for the Internally Displaced Persons. e) Construction of a railway line (standard gauge) from Lamu to Southern/Ethiopia and Sudan.

3. China’s Foreign Direct Investment in Kenya The focus on FDI is crucial to the transfer of capital to developing countries. FDI from China has flowed into Kenya from both State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), while Western FDI has

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Table 4: Some Chinese FDI firms in Kenya Company name

Activity

Victory River Company Ltd Crown Sea Enterprises Ltd Kenya Fulu Industrial Ltd Neo Smart Suppliers Co. Ltd Penguin Grain & Oil Processing Machinery Hgy International Co. Limited Chinese Huangpai Grain Processing Equipment Tisco Kenya Ltd Sun Yu Enterprises Ltd East Hegenoy Trade Co. Dong Fang Dev. Ltd China Victory King Stone Material Co. Thai Star Restaurant Ltd Newland Industries Ltd Chinese Centre for Promotion of Trade Newland Industries Ltd Laibao (K) Import & Exports Dev. Ltd An- Ning Holding Ltd Famonar pharmaceuticals Famonar Ltd China- Flying Dragon (K) Ltd Chang Sheng International Ltd Nantong Yuanxt Co Ltd Double Leopard enterprises Peng & Huo Medical Company Youngstar International Ltd China Farm Products Henan Company (K ) Ltd For You Chinese Restaurant Baus Optical Co. Ltd China San Yuan (Kenya) Ltd China Agricultural Technology Co. Horizon Ivato Supermarket Ltd Phoenipaper Ltd Changhong Electronics (E.A) Ltd Super Beauty Parlour Ltd Tianchi Health Products Aucma Digital Technology Ltd Go Africa Travel Limited Kenya Xianghui Manufacturing & Industry Beinparts Ltd Wu yi Kenya Company Ltd Crystal Bull Kenya Ltd China King Restaurant Kenya AA Electric Crane Company Kenplastics Limited Xin Yuna Construction Investment Ltd Greatland Pharmaceutical Ltd Newstar Ltd Lulu Development Co. Ltd Blue Wave Group of Companies Ltd Afri-China International Co Ltd Datang Optical Company Focus Motorcycle Manufacturing Co Ltd

Import and export of goods Shoe production Importation of TV, solar panels Manufacturing of PU shoes Import and selling milling machinery Import and export of Chinese goods Processing maize, wheat and rice oil Bicycle plant Diesel/petrol ext. from plastic waste Import and export of Chinese goods Import and export of goods Making ballast Chinese restaurant Manufacture of candles from wax Trade and investment promotion Manufacturing of candles Spare parts VCO and radio assembly Production/Distr. of textile Manufacture of intravenous fluids Manufacture of cigarettes Import of Chinese furniture Growing and exporting mushrooms Import and export business Manufacture of motor cycles Chinese clinic Manufacturing of mosquito nets Importing and process of farm products Export of coffee Restaurant Manufacturing of optical lenses Processing of farm products Imports Supermarket (wholesale and retail) Production of paper products Assembly and production of electronic goods Beauty Parlor Multi-level marketing of food prod Manufacture of Tvs, Dvd, Vcd Travelling promotions Manufacturing and assembling of motor car batteries Coffee growing Civil structural engineering contracts Glass manufacture Chinese restaurant Manufacture of electric machines and construction Recycling to protect environment Import and export of all kinds of granite Pharmaceutical and surgical wholesaler Manufacture of mattresses Textile manufacturing Manufacture of fruit juice, water & milk Recycling plastics Glazing and assembling of spectacles Manufacture of motorcycle

Source: Kenya Investment Authority, 2008; and Onjala, 2008

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After the visit by China’s president to Kenya in April 2006, the Kenya government allocated the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) exclusive rights, with no competitive bidding, to some of the oil exploration blocks in the country (Chege, 2011). These explorations appeared to have paid off with oil discoveries in 2011. In mining, a state-owned Chinese mining conglomerate, Jinchuan, acquired a controlling stake in Tiomin Kenya Limited, renewing hope that the Kwale titanium mining project that has been in limbo for more than 10 years will be in operation. The Beiqi Foton Motor Company Limited invested US$50 million in Kenya for the construction of its production base in East Africa in April 2011.

project is jointly funded by KFW and the World Bank. The state-owned Kenya Airports Authority recently signed a commercial contract of US$546 million with China’s Anhui Construction, to build a new airport terminal. In early 2012, the tender for the Kenya Police Services telecoms project was floated exclusively to Chinese firms. The tender for security contract stated that only Chinese companies were eligible (Business Daily, 2012).

4. The Relevance and Experience of Chinese Support to Kenya Recent body of research confirms the importance of infrastructure to the promotion of sustainable development. The World Bank landmark study on infrastructure (World Development Report, 1994) highlights the critical role of infrastructure in the development process and lays out an agenda for public-private partnerships in the provision of utility. The evidence in the World Bank report on the vital role of infrastructure in growth has been reinforced by subsequent research, for example on Africa’s economic performance. Development of infrastructure services contributes to growth, while growth also contributes to infrastructure development Moreover, investment in human capital and in infrastructure interact, each increasing the returns to the other (Jerome and Ariyo, 2004).

Jerome and Ariyo (2004) identified the various channels through which investment in infrastructure can contribute to sustainable growth. These are:

There is a notable presence of Chinese Contractors in Kenya. According to Chege (2011), the large ones include Jiangsu International Economic and Technological Cooperation Company, Sichuan International Economic and Technological Cooperation Company, China Road and Bridge Construction Company, China Import Export Group, China Import and Export Corporation, and China Wu Yi Construction Company. Among the Chinese construction companies in Kenya, China Road and Bridge Company is reputed to be most successful so far, having built more than 1,000km of trunk roads since entering the Kenya market in 1985. By 2005, it had completed 11 projects worth nearly US$200 million.32 Among these are the Gambogi-Serem and Kipsigak-Shamakhokho roads in western Kenya. So far, the most ambitious construction project by China Road and Bridge Company was part of the Nairobi-Mombasa road (highway), the Mtito Andei-Bachuma gate section of which, by consensus among Kenyan motorists, has been dubbed the best road in Kenya and Eastern Africa.

• • •

China Wu Yi Company secured a US$37.2million bid for the first phase of the modernisation of Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in September 2006. China Wu Yi is also responsible for the construction of Nairobi–Thika Highway Improvement Project worth US$132.5 million (Ksh10.6billion). The project aims at constructing a dual carriageway from Kenyatta University to Thika Town to improve traffic flows from Nairobi to Thika. The Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen) signed a steam field development contract with Synopec International of China worth US$145million (Ksh11.6 billion), after the Chinese firm emerged the winner in an international competitive bidding process. This

• • •

•

Reducing transaction costs and facilitating trade flows within and across borders; Enabling economic actors–individuals, firms, governments–to respond to new types of demand in different places; Lowering the costs of inputs for entrepreneurs, or making existing businesses more profitable; Creating employment, including in public works (both as social protection and as a counter-cyclical policy in times of recession); Enhancing human capital, for example by improving access to schools and health centres; and, Improving environmental conditions, which link to improved livelihoods, better health and reduced vulnerability of the poor.

There is generally a good correlation between infrastructure investment and national economic growth. Infrastructure is (DFID, 2006): a key component of the investment climate,

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• • • •

reducing the cost of doing business and enabling people to access markets; crucial to advances in agriculture; a key enabler of trade and integration, helping to offset the impact of geographical dislocation; fundamental to human development, including the delivery of health and education services; and, untapped potential for the creation of jobs.

seen as the primary strategy for attaining these long terms goals and the vision for the infrastructure development section is “to provide cost effective world class infrastructure facilities and services in support of Vision 2030.”

Infrastructure is also important in improving our security. Successful transition to Vision 2030 calls for a considerable shift in the manner in which Kenya deploys her resources to acquire the necessary capacity and access to infrastructure services (transport, telecommunications, energy, water, sewerage and sanitation and meteorological services) by firms and citizens in their wealth creation efforts (Government of Kenya, 2010).

Aid and investment in infrastructure also provide forms of social protection that move people beyond safety nets, especially when employment concerns are mainstreamed into investment policy.

Even where the overall policy environment is poor, such initiatives can reduce poverty. With careful attention to trade-offs, the physical capital accessible to poor people can be enhanced at the same time as employment is provided. Preference for sectors and technologies that are labourintensive is crucial where it is technically feasible and economically cost-effective. They have been most often used in roads (usually involving private contractors), but are also relevant to irrigation, drainage and sanitation, erosion control and water supply. These are sectors that can directly benefit the poor (Jerome and Ariyo, 2004).

A number of strategies are critical in the effort to improve the infrastructure services available and to maximise the economic and social impact of infrastructure development and management.

The strategies to be pursued include the following (Government of Kenya, 2010): •

Many participatory poverty assessments reveal how much the poor value infrastructure services which provide direct benefits to them. In a summary of the views and opinions expressed by the poor themselves in a recent worldwide survey, Narayan (2002) notes that “the lack of basic infrastructure– particularly roads, transportation and water–is seen as a defining characteristic of poverty.” The effects on women are often severe (Jerome and Ariyo, 2004). Infrastructure is a key determinant of convergence and of reduction in disparity across regions. Detailed evidence exists for Argentina and Brazil, where improved access to sanitation and roads is a significant determinant of convergence for the poorest regions (Estache and Fay, 1996).

There is also direct evidence on the importance of adequate infrastructure services in providing an enabling environment for business (Jerome and Ariyo, 2004).

•

Kenya’s 2030 Vision aspires for a country firmly interconnected through a network of roads, railways, ports, airports, and water ways, and telecommunications. By 2030, Kenya hopes it will become impossible to refer to any region of our country as “remote”. Investment in infrastructure is

•

•

• •

• •

Strengthening the institutional framework for infrastructure development and accelerating the speed of completion. Raising efficiency and quality of infrastructure projects, and increasing the pace of implementation of infrastructure projects so that they are completed in specified time frames; Supporting the development of infrastructure initiatives around flagship projects; Benchmarking infrastructure facilities and services provision with globally acceptable performance standards targeting enhanced customer satisfaction; Integrating information and communication technologies in the processes of infrastructure services provision; Implementing infrastructure projects to stimulate demand in hitherto neglected areas targeting increased connectivity and reduced transport and other infrastructure costs; Developing a national spatial plan to optimise the development and utilisation of infrastructure facilities and services; Enhancing private sector participation in the provision of infrastructure facilities and services strategically complemented by public sector interventions.

Development of a new transport corridor to Southern Sudan and Ethiopia. This corridor will link Lamu, Kenya’s North Eastern province, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan.

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Chinese companies and workers. Such employment produces conflicts with the domestic workers. So far, the experience of Chinese investment and infrastructural development in Kenya suggests the following:

Construction and infrastructure is the primary sector in which China has made its largest commercial footprint not just in Kenya, but in the entire Africa.

Infrastructure projects undertaken by Chinese companies have been financed by soft loans from the Chinese government, on condition that they are carried out by Chinese companies (Corkin et al., 2008).

i) China’s strategy has a clear advantage over western models, judging from the numerous development activities in Kenya today. ii) There is heavy presence of Chinese capital in the infrastructure sector. These activities cut across roads, transport, energy, ICT and mining activities. Incidentally, these are the most critical sectors for Kenya’s economic growth. Moreover, the activities are in tandem with Kenya’s long-term goals and strategy for future development as spelt out in the Vision 2030. iii) China’s apparent advantage globally, the competitive edge in services, manufacturing and now infrastructure, does provide Kenya with lessons to learn from the development experience.

Given the rapid inroads that they have made in Kenya’s infrastructural sector in a short time, it is evident that Chinese companies have a degree of competitive advantage over other market players.

The most important factors are access to capital, supply-chain costs and labour productivity (Corkin et al., 2008). According to Chege (2011), the Nairobi Roads Project, is a fine example of the “China way” of doing development, which has earned China’s aid popularity. As a result of these developments, there has been an unprecedented growth in the number of personal and business vehicles, particularly in and around Nairobi.

Overall, the main potential advantages with Chinese Aid and FDI in Kenya are: • It is in tandem with Kenya’s Vision 2030 and more targeted to important infrastructure projects with long maturity and long-term potential. For example, funded by China, …

References Business Daily, All Africa Global Media, Feb. 07, 2012.

Chege M. (2011), Economic Relations between Kenya and China, 1963-2007, Mimeo.

“The High Grand Falls project, lying in the middle stream of Tana River of Kenya, including such works as rolled concrete gravity dam, clay wall over-flow dam, houses for generators, power transmission and transformer of two kilometres, etc. The dam has a top length of 2,300m, height of 130m, total water volume of 5.4 billion m3 and total installed capacity of 5x10mw. Is one of the key works in ‘Kenya Vision 2030”.

Corkin L., Burke C. and Davis M. (2008), “China’s Role in the Development of Africa’s Infrastructure”, SAIS Working Papers in African Studies, 04-08.

•

Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Action Plan 2010–2012.

DFID (2006), “Infrastructure and Pro Poor”, Pro-poor Growth Briefing No.4, A DFID Practice Paper, April.

Estache, A. and Fay. M (1995), Regional Growth in Argentina and Brazil: Determinants and Policy Options, Washington DC: World Bank.

So far, Chinese support to Kenya has been less bureaucratic and with low transaction costs (Olu Ajakaiye et al., 2009).

Jerome A. and Ariyo A. (2004), “Infrastructure Reform and Poverty Reduction in Africa”, Forum Paper 2004, Development Policy Unit, Cornell University.

5. Conclusion China’s aid and investment has been welcomed in Kenya because it is viewed as an antidote to the failed aid prescriptions of the West. Although this new development aid is welcomed by many in Kenya, the consequences have yet to be studied and the negative impact of the China’s approach is yet to be analysed. Kenya, for instance, has a huge trade deficit with China. Another dilemma has been the infrastructure aid favours the employment of

Government of Kenya (2010), Kenya Vision 2030: A Globally Competitive and Prosperous Kenya, Nairobi: Government Printers.

Government of Kenya (2011a), Economic Survey 2011, Nairobi: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.

Government of Kenya (2011b), Project Briefs, Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030.

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Government of Kenya (2011c), Private Development Strategy, Government Printers.

Sector

Kenyan Construction Review (2012), www. constructionreviewonline.com/...news/...news..., Accessed Oct. 20, 2012.

Narayan D. and Petesch P. (eds) (2002), Voices of the Poor from Many Lands, The World Bank.

Olu A., Mwega F., N’zue F. (2009), “Seizing Opportunities and Coping with Challenges of China– Africa Aid Relations: Insights from AERC Scoping Studies”, Policy Issues Paper No. 1. African Economic Research Consortium-AERC. Onjala J. (2008), A Scoping Study on China-Africa Economic Relations: The Case of Kenya, Revised Final Report submitted to AERC, March.

World Bank (2012), World Development Indicators, Washington DC. World Bank (1994), World Development Report, Washington DC.

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China Geostrategic and Resources Interest in the Horn of Africa: Somalia-Kenya Limits of the Continental Shelf and Implications

By Abdi Jama Ghedi Economist and Environmental Planner; and Visiting Lecturer, Benadir University, Mogadishu, Somalia Abstract: While relationships between China and Africa were formally established in the 1950s, trade and cooperation between the two regions dates back to over 100 years. As China’s economy continues to grow and transform into a major global player, the country increasingly needs to secure reliable sources of resources to support its economic development, particularly Africa’s rich natural resources. There is concern that this growth may not be sustainable. In addition, natural resource exploitation competition could exacerbate border disputes, for example between Kenya and Somalia. Kenya illegally awarded offshore oil and gas exploration blocks in Lamu Basin to multinationals Total and Eni, and the concessions lie in waters claimed by Somalia. relations into a period of comprehensive and fast development. The third FOCAC summit, held in Beijing in 2006 (4–5 November) was attended by an impressive number of high-level officials from 48 African countries. It signalled the upgrading of China-Africa bilateral cooperation by setting up a strategic partnership and advancing concrete tasks to be achieved during the 2007-2009 action plan.

1. Introduction “…It is a bit hypocritical for Western states to be concerned about how China is approaching Africa when they have had centuries of relations with Africa, starting with slavery and continuing to the present day with exploitation and cheating …so that a cow in the European community gets a subsidy of US$2 a day and 60 per cent of Africa doesn’t get [earn] that” (Prof. Kwesi Kwaa Prah, Director of the Cape Town-based Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society, 2007).

1.1 FOCAC III action plan (2007–2009) Agriculture: Dispatch 100 agriculture experts and set up ten demonstration centres.

China-Africa cooperation predates the African continent’s fight against colonisation. China’s increasing engagement in Africa in development cooperation, trade, investment and migration has attracted great attention and given rise to mixed reactions at international level. With minimal reliable data and few empirical investigations, one of the central questions is whether China is effectively contributing to sustainable development in Africa. Is China’s primary concern to gain access to Africa’s raw materials and to open up new markets?

Investment: Set up a US$5 billion development fund to encourage investment by Chinese companies and establish three to five trade and economic cooperation zones.

Trade: Increase export items eligible for zero tariff entering the Chinese market from 190 to 440.

Development assistance and debt relief: Double assistance by 2009; US$3 billion preferential loans and US$2 billion in export buyers’ credits; cancel interest free loans due by end of 2005 by African Least Developing Countries (LDC) and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).

Surprisingly, many authors conclude that China’s engagement in Africa has a positive effect on Africa’s development prospects. They cite that China is making important contributions to the expansion of infrastructure; tapping hitherto unexploited resources and effectively integrating African economies into global value chains (Asche and Schüller, 2008).

Human resources development: Train 15,000 African cadres.

Education: Build 100 rural schools; double scholarships to African students to 4,000 a year.

Medical care and public health: Build 30 hospitals; provide RMB300 million in anti-malaria drugs; and set up 30 centres for the prevention and treatment of malaria.

China and Africa established mechanisms for longterm cooperation following the founding of FOCAC in 2000. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has propelled China-Africa’s bilateral

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Particularly, in the FOCAC Sharm el Sheikh Action Plan (2010–2012), the partners agreed to cooperate in the areas of energy and resources. China will continue to cooperate with Africa in keeping with the principles of mutual benefit and sustainable development, raising the added value of the energy and resource products of African countries, and enhancing their capacity for intensive processing.

independence and nationalistic movements in Africa. The existing literature, such as Larkin (1971), Ogunsanwo (1974) and Snow (1981), covers China-Africa relations during the cold war.

Larkin (1971) attempts to describe China’s relations with all African States from 1949 to 1970. From training “fighters for freedom” in the revolutionary 1960s and early 1970s, to providing scholarships to Africans, China has been exporting its values for years (Gu and Humphrey, 2006). Alden (2005) analyses and characterises the growing relationship between Africa and China and attempts to discover whether China will be a development partner, an economic competitor or a neo colonialist hegemon.

The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC V) was held in Beijing, China, from 19 to 20 July 2012. Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economic Cooperation from China and 50 African countries, and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission attended the conference. The two sides applauded the active contribution FOCAC had made over the past twelve years since its inception in consolidating China-Africa traditional friendship, strengthening political mutual trust, deepening practical cooperation, enhancing exchanges and mutual learning and advancing the comprehensive development of the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership.

As background to this paper, the following is a nonexhaustive review of the recent literature on China’s engagement with Africa through aid, finance, trade flows, trade policy, and FDI. A few authors (Wang, 2007; Brautigam, 2008; and Kragelund, 2008) have developed estimates of aid flows to Africa, which remain relatively small compared to aid flows from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members. Foster et al. (2009), using a new database based on information released by the press, estimate that Chinese infrastructure finance commitments to SSA totalled US$16 billion from 2001-2007.

Several studies, many critical of Chinese policy, focus on the nature and “quality” of Chinese aid to Africa. For example, McCormick (2008) and Penhelt (2007) are concerned that China does not take into account the quality of governance in recipient countries when allocating aid.

The Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) is a central pillar in advancing ChinaAfrica relations and constructive diplomatic interaction. FOCAC provides the foundation for building a long term “win-win” China-Africa relationship and evolving a common development agenda in a rapidly globalising international system (Centre for Chinese Studies, 2010).

2. Literature Review

Some studies highlight the positive aspects of Chinese aid. While Davis et al. (2008) acknowledge the debatable role that China has played in resourcerich countries like Angola and the Sudan, they find that “China’s approach has been one of mutual respect, also awarding small African countries with relatively little economic and political significance, with aid and investment support.” Wang (2007) and Foster et al. (2009) point out that China provides substantial funds for infrastructure, for example in power (mainly hydropower), transport (mainly railroads), and information and communications technology (mainly equipment supply), where traditional donors allocate relatively little assistance.

This paper briefly touches on the many explanations offered for the expanding relationship between China and Africa: the neo mercantilist quest for energy and markets, the effort to undermine the recognition of Taiwan, a realist grand strategy to challenge the United States, an effort to extend its soft power and ensuring its peaceful rise. While a large body of literature on general China-Africa relations exists, there is need for more studies that focus on particular countries and regions such as the Horn of Africa and Kenya-Somalia issues. This study attempts to fill these gaps.

Despite the fact that relations between China and Africa have existed for centuries, they have been stronger since the end of the Second World War. China’s will to export its revolutionary model, undermine both western and soviet influence and counter Taiwan, coupled with Africa’s quest for self-determination led China to support

The determinants and impact of China’s trade with Africa are discussed extensively in the literature. It is often considered that China’s engagement with Africa is driven primarily by its strategic search for raw materials (Kaplinsky and Santos, 2006; Asche

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and Schüller, 2008). Broadman (2007) is one of the few studies based on microeconomic data, using a survey of both Chinese and non-Chinese firms in South Africa, Ghana, Senegal and Tanzania.

alleviation and income distribution. Other authors such as Niquet (2006) also suggest that China’s actions in Africa have negative consequences “the impact of its (China) ubiquitous presence, the low cost of its products and services, and a total absence of conditionality are creating a true ‘Chinese Model’ throughout the African continent, which exchanges raw materials for consumer goods.”

Other authors such as Jaffe and Lewis (2002) put into doubt China’s actions in Africa and Beijing’s oil diplomacy.

Henley et al. (2008) survey of firms involved in FDI outside of the extractive sector reveals that Chinese firms are concentrated in the manufacturing sector (particularly in the textile and apparel industry) and (consistent with Broadman, 2007), many of them have set up export platforms in East Africa to take advantage of the trade preferential regimes granted by the US and EU to African countries. Chen et al. (2007) survey of Chinese firms involved in the African construction sector attribute their success to cost competitiveness derived from access to cheap capital, low cost labour, cheap building materials, and political support from the Chinese government.

2.1 Somalia-Kenya continental shelf limits and its implications The continental shelf is the shallow water (generally less than 200m) platform which forms the perimeter to a continental land mass. The legal definition provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) is that the continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin. Article 76 of LOSC expands this definition further in one and three. Many coastal states have been engaged peacefully in establishing the limits of their maritime jurisdiction. This is not only a historical milestone towards the definition of maritime sovereignty, but it also presents enormous economic opportunities for coastal states posing new environmental challenges and responsibilities.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) created a new regime in ocean affairs. In particular, Article 76 in Part VI states that coastal states shall delineate the outer limits of their continental shelf. The establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles has therefore been a great concern among lawyers as well as scientists around the world.

There is a division between authors who support China’s African Strategy and others who strongly condemn it. Fervent supporters of China’s actions often put forward the positive consequences of China’s involvement in Africa’s infrastructural development and economic growth. Authors who strongly condemn China’s actions suggest that China’s increased activity in Africa threatens human rights, encourages corruption and offers an alternative to authoritarian regimes that do not want to abide by the Washington consensus.

Wenping’s (2007) article on China’s African Policy is a good example of support for China’s African strategy. Obuah (2008) also suggests that China’s presence in Africa has a positive impact through the “development of human capital, increased financial assistance, formation of FOCAC, increased trade and investments, and huge infrastructure projects.”

Obuah (2008) distinguishes two different periods by which China-Africa relations can be analysed from an anti-imperialist posture to a neo-liberal realpolitik, in other words, from political activism to one of power and unprecedented need for resources.

Kenya’s purpose in seeking the outer limit delimitation of their extended continental shelf is motivated by the pursuit of finding oil. In the last few years, the government of Kenya has aggressively invested in oil exploration on its shores and most recently, in the offshore arena. An area of most concern to Somalia is the Kenya-Somalia Lamu basin (or the Lamu Basin) which stretches from the southern tip of Kenya bordering Tanzania, and extends far north into southern Somalia and westwards towards the interior of Northern Kenya (Map 1).

Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris (2006) highlight the emerging problems caused by the renewed Sino-African partnership. Kaplinsky et al. (2006) identify new challenges faced by Sino-African cooperation such as the threat that China poses to the African manufacturing sector, the resource curse due to the resource boom in some African countries, and the dangers of having a capital intensive mineral production, in relation to poverty-

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2.2 Kenya-Somalia offshore border disputes

and ultra-deep waters of the Lamu Basin, off the coast of Kenya. Eni’s entry into Kenya reinforces its presence in the exploration of the frontier basins of East Africa, which has recently led to the discovery of significant volumes of natural gas in the deep waters of Mozambique. Total announced the signing of a production sharing contract with the Kenyan government for Block L22, which it will operate with a 100 per cent interest. Covering an area of more than 10,000km2, the exploration licence is located on the offshore of the Lamu Archipelago in water depths of between 2,000 and 3,500 metres. The first phase of the exploration programme consists of a 3D seismic survey (Map 3).

Kenya claims that a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with Somalia’s Transitional Federation Government (TFG) in April 2009 set the border running east along the line of latitude.

However, Somalia claims that the MoU did not aim at demarcating the maritime boundary between it and Kenya, but rather to grant non-objection to Kenya’s May 2009 submission to the UN Commission on the limits of the continental shelf to delineate the outer limits of Kenya’s continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical miles limit (Each country’s claim requires proof of cooperation with its neighbours). Somalia claimed that the MoU did not have a legal basis if it was not ratified by the parliament. Somalia’s parliament later rejected this MoU in August 2009, claiming that Somalia was adhering to the appropriate requirements for delimitation of the continental shelf, not agreeing to a maritime boundary with Kenya.

Kenya has so far rejected the Somali claims to the area. “Kenya claims that the border runs east from the point at which the land border meets the offshore, similar to the maritime boundaries of other countries along the coast,” reports the World Markets Research Limited. In contrast, Somalia claims that the boundary should extend perpendicular to the coastline, giving it a large chunk of the waters claimed by Kenya. Although the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in 2009 which stated that the border should run east along the line of latitude, Somalia rejected the agreement. The contention between Kenya and Somalia is about acreages in the Lamu Basin, right in the Indian Ocean. In these same waters, International Oil Companies have, within two years, discovered-by their own submissionover 100 trillion cubic feet of gas, more than half of Nigeria’s gas reserves, off Mozambique and Tanzania.

The huge flow of foreign investment into the oil and gas sector, political and international relations analysts observe that it is creating unease between countries seeking control of the region’s natural resources. As East Africa becomes a hot spot for oil, gas and mineral exploration, the past three years have seen multimillion dollar foreign investments in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan and Mozambique.

Also, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) deal with Tullow Oil Plc for a one third interest in Tullow’s exploration areas for US$1.467 billion in Kenya closed in February (Map 2). The haggling over borders comes down to resources, intensified by the discovery of oil. Somalia is concerned about Kenya licensing oil exploration in the Indian Ocean, without an official border demarcation of the two countries territorial waters.

The oil and gas strikes, including some in neighbouring Ethiopia, have raised the strategic context of the conflict to a new level. In order for this issue to be resolved, Kenya and Somalia ought to agree on where the border should be demarcated and sign a treaty to that effect. However, this may be unlikely until Somalia has a permanent government and is able to address other political, economic, and security issues that would compete for the government’s attention. At stake are approximately 38,000km2 (23,600mi2) of maritime territory over which both countries assert the legal claims to sell rights for oil exploration and collect revenue from any discoveries.

Somalia’s government accuses Kenya of awarding offshore oil and gas exploration blocks illegally to multinationals Total and Eni because the concessions lie in waters claimed by Somalia. The four blocks were amongst the seven awarded recently by the Kenyan government, three to Italy’s Eni and one to the French firm Total (World Markets Energy: Kenya: 3 July 2012: and World Markets Energy: Kenya: 17 May 2012). The blocks in question are L21, 22, 23, and 24 in the Lamu Basin (Map 2).

Eni has announced the signing of three production sharing contracts, awarded by the government of Kenya, for the acquisition of exploration blocks (L21, L-23 and L-24), thus marking the entry of Eni in the country. The blocks are located in the deep

The timing of this maritime boundary dispute is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, it is a particularly inopportune time for Kenya to have a financial stake in where the boundary lies, given

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that it is currently involved in military operations in southern Somalia in the area adjacent to disputed waters. This is made worse by the earlier rumours that Kenya sought a “buffer zone” in that region.

Nonetheless, if Kenya’s motivation to invade southern Somalia was tied to its future aspiration to award offshore exploration licenses, this would come as a surprise. Second, this dispute between Kenya and Somalia may be the first of many similar disputes in the region, if Somalia is able to reclaim a voice in regional issues. These disputes may be over trans-border natural resource deposits (as in Kenya) or issues such as water rights and dam construction (between Ethiopia and Somalia).

development. At the same time, as China-Africa relations have gone into greater depth, many new problems and challenges have arisen in bilateral cooperation.

China-Africa trade relations have expanded rapidly on all fronts and have assumed a multilayered, wide ranging and all inclusive pattern, playing an indispensable role in economic and social development of the two sides. According to data from the Ministry of Commerce, as of 2010, China had established economic and trade relations with 54 countries in Africa, signed bilateral trade agreements with over 40 African states, reached agreements with 25 countries on inter-governmental loans, entered into agreements with over 30 countries on investment incentives and protected and reached agreements with over 20 states on double taxation avoidance.

3. The Challenges Africa’s new scramble for oil is heading east, where the potential could be huge and the risks higher than in the well established sector on the continent’s west coast. China’s increasing demand for natural resources and market opportunities presents to Africa both an opportunity and a threat for sustainable development and poverty reduction. Equally, it is widely acknowledged that there is weak governance of natural resources and limited capacity within African governments to develop, apply and enforce appropriate contracts and agreements (Collier, 2010 and the Natural Resources Charter, 2012).

Four pillars-four characteristics The four pillars on which the upsurge in ChineseAfrican relations rests are the intensification of a) trade, b) investment, c) development cooperation, and d) immigration. In combination, these exhibit the following four characteristics: i. A distinct underlying sectoral pattern with: (a) focus on securing resources (oil, mining, timber, and agricultural commodities); (b) a large variety of economic interests in almost all African industries and countries.

Analyst Alic (2012), reporting for energy Website OilPrice.com, observes that Kenya’s timing “will be viewed as suspicious in Somalia ... Abdillahi Mohamud, Director of the East African Energy Forum observes:

ii. Seamless complementarity of trade, direct investment, Development Cooperation (DC) tied to supplies from China, and immigration or the deployment of migrant workers.

It’s plausible that Kenya was hoping that its very successful assistance in pushing al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and a number of other key bases and strongholds would give it carte blanche to act on oil exploration in contested coastal waters. It’s a tricky situation that goes beyond the legal aspects on ownership of these waters. Kenya’s involvement in southern Somalia was designed to gain the upper hand on offshore oil block concessions that rightfully belong to Somalia as stipulated in the 1982 UN. Law of the Seas convention.

iii. Coordinated effort by Chinese state-owned corporations as trailblazers for private enterprises. iv. Huge deployment of state financial promotion instruments with fluid boundaries between preferential and commercial loans.

4. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

China has moved from the pre-Deng preoccupation with building relations with Africa as part of a coalition building exercise with the third world to a more refined strategic partnership that is derived from long term acquisition of natural resources for its emerging power in the global

China and Africa established mechanisms for long-term cooperation following the founding of FOCAC in 2000, which has propelled bilateral relations into a period of comprehensive and fast

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economy. China sees Africa as a strategic partner to help strengthen its global power credentials and economic might. The relationship, however, is complex, multidimensional and ambitious and should not assume to endure in the future based solely on shared ideological principles, unless those principles are beneficial for helping ordinary Africans achieve material benefits that are sustainable.

FOCAC Sharm el Sheikh Action Plan (2010–2012).

After decades of war, Somalia has been undergoing a peace and reconciliation process. A solution to a territorial dispute between the Somaliland region, which declared its independence from Somalia in 1991, and its neighbouring semi-autonomous Puntland region, could pave the way for resumption of oil exploration activities. Oil companies that were awarded concessions by the last government of Somalia, including Shell, ConocoPhillips, BP, Eni and Chevron, ceased their operations a decade ago after declaring force majeure due to unrest in the country. While Mogadishu says it still recognises permits awarded prior to 1991, it is not clear if concessions acquired post-1991 are considered valid, which include licenses granted to companies such as Africa Oil, Petrosoma and Jacka Resources.

Africa Oil previously drilled its Shabeel-1 well in the northern Dharoor block and said the well encountered several oil and gas shows, indicating the presence of a working petroleum system.

Henley, J., Kratzch, S., Külür, M. and Tamer Tandogan, T. (2008) “Foreign Direct Investment from China, India and South Africa in sub-Saharan Africa: A New or Old Phenomenon?”, World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University Working Paper 2008/24.

Foster, Vivien, Butterfield, William, Chen, Chuan (2009), Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC: World Bank Gu, J. and Humphrey, J. (2006), “The Impact of Africa on China”, Journal of Economic Geography 7.3:433-50, African Economic Research Consortium.

Jaffe, A. and Steven L. (2002), “Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy”, Survival, 44(1), Spring, pp 115-134.

Kaplinsky, R. and Santos-Paulino A. (2006), “A Disaggregated Analysis of EU Imports: The Implications for the Study of Patterns of Trade and Technology”, Cambridge Journal of Economics 30: 589-611.

Kwesi K. P. (2007), Director of the Cape Town-Based Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society.

Natural Resource Charter naturalresourcecharter.org

(2012),

http://

Niquet,V. (2006), “China’s African Strategy”, Politique Etrangere 1 (1), 1-10.

References

Ogunsanwo, A. (1974), China’s Policy in Africa 1958-71, London: Cambridge University Press.

Alden, C. (2005), China in Africa, Survival 47 (3), 147164.

Snow, P. (1981), The Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Asche H. and Schüller M. (2008), China’s Engagement in Africa–Opportunities and Risks for Development, GTZ.

Wang, J.Y. (2007), “What’s Drives China’s Growing Role in Africa?”, Working Paper, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Broadman, H. (2007), Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier, Washington DC: The World Bank, 391.

Wenping, H. (2007), “The Balancing Act of China’s African Policy”, China Security 3 (3), 23-40.

Chen, C., Chiu, P.C, Ryan J. and Goldstein, A. (2007), An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Construction Firm’s Entry into Africa, CRIOCM International Symposium.

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Appendix Map 1: Disputed continental shelf between Kenya-Somalia

Source: Haider, Somali oil expert library

Map 2: Oil exploration blocks and disputed territory between Kenya and Somalia

Source: Haider, Somali oil expert library China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

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Map 3: Licence Blocks for American and French oil companies

Source: Haider, Somali oil expert libra

Map 4: Somalia surrounded by oil

Source: Haider, Somali oil expert library China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

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Sustainable Development and Sino-African Low-Carbon Cooperation: China’s Role

By Liang Yijian Research Associate at the Centre for African Studies at Yunnan University, China Abstract: Environmental sustainability is very important for Africa and China. When we seek a solution, low-carbon development at this stage is an important approach. Although China faces great challenges in environmental protection, the country has made great achievements in low-carbon development. Africa is at the important stage of protecting its environment, while seeking to boost economic development, making low-carbon development a pressing task for African governments. Africa should avoid copying the Chinese experience of environmental protection after pollution. In respect to low-carbon development, there are many common interests and cooperation possibilities between China and Africa in the age of heightened Sino-African relationship. China’s hydro-power, solar, biogas and other clean technologies are suitable for low-carbon development in Africa. Sino-African low-carbon cooperation is highly complementary in the field of capital, technology, resources and markets. The Sino-African low-carbon cooperation will have broad prospects in the future.

Mauritius. Much of their cost is being provided by China at low interest rates.

The China-Africa cooperation in small hydropower is mainly implemented by the International Centre on Small Hydro Power (ICSHP) under the “light up Africa” project. China will construct 100 villagelevel small hydropower stations in 10 African countries (Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia), to provide electricity to rural communities in Africa. These projects will benefit a population of up to 100,000 people. China will build demonstrations of small hydropower stations in five African countries namely: Sierra Leone, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Cameroon and Nigeria. These will promote local social and economic development, and benefit over 300,000 people directly.2

1. Current Status of Sino-African Low Carbon Cooperation At present, Sino-African low-carbon cooperation is still at a preliminary stage. In recent years, China has cooperated in the fields of hydropower, biogas technology, solar power and wind power with some African countries.

1.1 Hydropower China’s low-carbon investment in Africa is mainly in the field of hydropower development. While China possesses hydropower technology, Africa has abundant hydropower resources. The China-Africa cooperation has seen China invest in more than 10 African countries’ hydropower projects. The total investment in these projects has been more than US$5 billion, with China’s investment amounting to more than US$3 billion. The largest hydroelectric project under construction is Nigeria’s Manmubila hydropower project expected to generate 2,600mw of power in 2018. It is followed by the hydroelectric project on Merowe dam in Sudan with a hydropower capacity of 1,250mw. In Zambia, too, more than 1,000mw of hydropower capacity is being developed between the Kafue Lower Gorge and Kariba North projects.1 Cooperation projects also include: Mphanda Nkuwa Dam on the Zambezi river in Mozambique, Congo River Dam in the Republic of Congo and Bui Dam in Ghana. The construction of two hydropower projects was also started in April 2012: one of them is Guinea’s largest hydropower project-Keller tower Hydropower, a water conservation project at Côte-d’Or in central

1.2 Biogas technology Since the 1980s, China has sent biogas experts to some African countries to promote biogas technology and implement many biogas projects organised by the United Nations, aided by the Chinese government, or bilateral cooperation.

These projects include rural household biogas, large biogas, biogas power generation, urban domestic sewage treatment, the establishment of a national biogas laboratory, biogas resources survey, the development of national biogas development strategic planning and various technical personnel training courses.3 In October 2011, the Chinese Embassy in Sudan donated 25 sets of household biogas devices to the Ta Bate village at White Nile State where animal husbandry is being practiced.4

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1.5 Other

The biogas cooperation between China and Africa can be divided into two kinds: the factory/farm waste biogas power generation project, and rural household biogas technology. While the first one can reduce environmental pollution and reduce energy costs, the second one helps to solve the problem of electricity in rural Africa and reduce environmental pollution. According to World Bank statistics, three-quarters of households in subSaharan Africa (about 500 million people) are yet to have access to electricity. Because of lack of electricity, each year Africa has to pay up to US$38 billion loss.5

Some African countries have the world’s advanced low-carbon technologies, such as the South African coal to oil technology. Sasol Ltd. in South Africa, the world’s biggest converter of coal into motor fuels, cooperating with Shenhua Group in China may complete China’s second coal-to-fuel plant by 2013.

2. China’s Role in Sino-Africa Low-Carbon Cooperation 2.1 China and African countries need to change their economic growth mode

1.3 Solar power

The world’s current economic development mode is a high-carbon mode. This economic mode is based on coal and oil as the main source of energy. Fossil fuels however damage the environment easily. With the continuous expansion of the socio-economic scale, this high-carbon development mode is not sustainable. It is likely to cause serious destruction of the ecological environment, and will affect the sustainable development of human society.

In recent years, China has developed a variety of solar technologies and products that meet international standards. China plans to build solar power projects in 40 African countries in order to reduce Africa’s dependence on fossil fuels, and open a new market for Chinese manufacturers.6 Solar water heaters and cookers can be widely used in the African region.

In June 2011, China’s Ministry of Commerce made a feasibility study on solar energy demonstration projects in Sudan, intended to provide a number of solar street lights.7 In August 2011, sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Gansu Natural Energy Research Institute hosted the 2011 Frenchspeaking African countries solar energy application technology training classes in Lanzhou. Twenty eight participants from Algeria, DRC, Burundi, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Congo-Brazzaville engaged in 56 days of training.8 China is willing to share her solar energy experience for the economic revitalization and sustainable development of Africa.

In the future, our world’s economic development mode will gradually change from high-carbon to low carbon, and China is trying to achieve the transition. Such a transition will also be an essential part of China’s modernisation. China can make these emission reductions within the tight constraints of a global 2ºC target, while still meeting development and economic growth goals over the next four decades.

A low-carbon transition presents opportunities for China and Africa to improve their energy security and move their economy up the value chain in the production of international goods and services.

The international community is working hard to control greenhouse gas emissions as well as research and develop new low-carbon technologies.

This trend indicates that low-carbon development is a new economic growth point that is the next strategic point of international competition, and an opportunity for China and African countries to change their growth mode.

1.4 Wind power China and Africa have abundant wind resources.

These provide a broad platform for China-Africa cooperation. In recent years, China’s wind power technology continues to progress. Wind resources in Africa account for 20 per cent of the world’s wind power capacity.9 The world’s fifth largest wind turbine manufacturers-China Goldwind Science and Technology Co. Ltd, has set up offices in Cape Town, South Africa, with a view of trying to increase the development of wind energy markets in Africa. The company will supply the required equipment and provide financing.”10

2.2 Sino-African prospects

low-carbon

cooperation

Power shortage has limited the economic development of Africa. Efforts to stimulate economic growth in all industries across the continent are being stifled by lack of reliable

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electricity. With SSA needing 270gw of additional electricity generation capacity to meet its rising power demand, an opportunity exists to use Africa’s readily available resources such as hydro, gas, coal and other renewable energy resources.11

for application in African countries. Policies and innovation strategies that encourage green innovation and investments are being introduced.

2.2.1 Prospects in solar power

African countries are eager to use small-scale renewable energy technology. Currently, many countries have invested heavily to develop smallscale solar, wind, and hydropower in a bid to provide energy to urban and rural populations.

These types of energy production are especially useful in remote locations because of the excessive cost of transporting electricity from large-scale power plants. The application of renewable energy technology has the potential to alleviate many of the problems that face Africans every day.12 China has made considerable progress in developing low-carbon technologies in a wide range of sectors. The country has a great deal of experience in the development of energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy. These technologies are appropriate, cheap, effective, and suitable

Africa has immense solar resources. The distribution of solar resources across Africa is fairly uniform. Africa’s 80 per cent land mass can receive about 2,000kwh of solar energy per square metre per year. Many African countries receive on average 325 days of bright sunlight per year.13 This gives solar power the potential to bring energy to virtually any location in Africa, without expensive large scale grid level infrastructural developments.

But in the world’s 15gw of total installed capacity of solar photovoltaic, Africa accounts for only 15mw. South Africa has some of the solar cell manufacturing plants but their production capacity is very limited. The majority of Africa’s largescale solar power generation facilities are mainly concentrated in South Africa and Algeria.

Map 1: Solar power potential in Africa

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China, one of the biggest countries of solar energy utilisation in the world, is a leading player in some solar energy technologies. China is the world’s largest user of solar hot water systems. The number of China’s solar water heaters ranked first in the world. In 2009, the annual production of solar water heaters in China exceeded 40 million square metres, accounting for 50 per cent of the world. The total number has reached 145 million square metres, accounting for about 70 per cent of the world. In solar cell technology, China’s photovoltaic battery output in 2011 accounted for about 50 per cent of global output, ranking first in the world for five years.

intellectual property, with the intention of creating an export market in Europe. Chinese companies have the ability to constantly move from “Made in China” to “Created in China” and from the domestic market to the international market.

2.2.3 Prospects in hydropower Africa’s hydropower resources have the potential to significantly contribute to solving the region’s power problems. Sub-Saharan Africa has a tropical climate and a significant number of perennial rivers, with a potential to generate 1,750twh. The resource uses proven technology and is easily accessible across the region. However, only seven per cent of this potential has been developed. Frost and Sullivan believe that the exploration of key rivers such as the Zambezi, Congo, Nile, and Niger could provide a solution to Africa’s power problems. The Congo River in DRC has the potential to produce over 100,000mw, which is sufficient to meet the energy needs of the whole of Southern Africa.

The Zambezi River can produce 10,000mw. Other examples include Ethiopia, with a hydro potential of 30,000mw, and Nigeria with over 20,000mw.16

China enjoys advantage in large-scale as well as small-scale solar power generation technologies that can help with day to day needs such as smallscale electrification, desalination, water pumping, and water purification.

2.2.2 Prospects in wind power Africa’s wind resource is best around the coasts and in the eastern highlands. Wind is far less uniformly distributed than solar resources. The availability of wind on the western coast of Africa is substantial, exceeding 3,750kwh, and will accommodate the future prospect for energy demands.14 Central Africa has lower than average wind resources to work with.15 It is in Mediterranean North Africa that wind power harnessing is developed. At the end of 2009, about 96 per cent of the continent’s total wind installations of 763mw were found in Egypt (430mw), Morocco (253mw) and Tunisia (54mw).

China’s hydropower industry has three major advantages: low cost, skills and the nation’s “going out” strategy. It also has a competitive advantage in the global markets. The Chinese Export–Import Bank and other Chinese financial institutions, state-owned enterprises, and private firms are now involved in at least 100 major dam projects overseas. Hydropower is readily available in many African countries, for both large and small scale projects. Hydropower is highly versatile and can be used to meet national electricity grid requirements, rural electrification programmes and industrial power needs. China-Africa’s hydropower cooperation therefore has broad prospects in the future. It can meet Africa’s electricity, irrigation and water needs.

In 2010, China’s wind power installed capacity is 18.9gw, and the total installed capacity has reached 42gw. Both are the first in the world. Targets for individual low-carbon technologies have repeatedly been revised upwards. Wind power growth has caught particular attention-with capacity rising from 13gw in 2008 to 42gw in 2010 (equivalent to half the power plant capacity in the UK). China plans to increase its wind power capacity to 100gw by 2015.

2.3 Reducing the cost of low-carbon products Low-carbon products (such as photovoltaic panels, wind turbines deep cycle batteries) are expensive.

Even when the relative difference in buying power, materials cost, opportunity cost, labour cost and overhead are factored in, renewable energy will remain expensive for people who are living on less than US$1 per day.

In terms of technologies, China’s wind power development lags behind European countries.

China’s homegrown wind turbine manufacturers such as Goldwind and Sinovel are now amongst the world’s top five, and have launched production of wind turbines based on domestically-developed

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Table 1: China’s investment in clean energy over the years Year

The amount of investment

Year-on-year growth rate (%)

Important Feature

2010 US$54.4 billion 39

In 2010, China accounted for almost 50% of the global wind and solar industry investment.

2009 US$34.6 billion 57

China tops the list of clean energy investment.

2008 US$12.8 billion 18

The growth rate of China’s investment in wind power market is ranked second in the world. China’s investment in solar power generation is ranked first in the world.

2007 US$10.8 billion 91

Most of the funds have been invested in increasing the installed capacity of wind power. The

installed capacity is twice that of 2006.

China has been increasing investment in lowcarbon development. China ranked first on the list of clean energy investment in 2010, having invested US$54 billion. Germany took second place (US$41 billion) and the US third (US$34 billion). China can continue to reduce the cost of low-carbon products and provide a safe, reliable and cost effective solution for Africa’s rural areas.

a historic opportunity. The transition to a lowcarbon economy will require large investments and advanced technologies but will also bring about substantial benefits, not only to China and Africa but to the entire world.

Endnotes

Cheaper equipment are more secure, and less vulnerable to attack. This can be an important feature in regions prone to conflict. Cheaper wind and solar power systems are simple to set up, easy to operate, easy to repair, and durable. Wind resources and solar resource are abundant to provide all of the electrical energy requirements of rural populations, and this can be done in remote and otherwise fragmented low density areas that are impractical to address using conventional grid based systems.17 Overall, China’s investment in Africa has both risks and opportunities. Chinese enterprises should actively and safely deal with the short term risks, and seize the long term opportunities. When analysing the four main motivations of investment (cheap labour, a vast local market, the supply of raw materials and abundant natural resources), Africa’s huge population, markets and resources are incomparable advantages to attract low-carbon FDI in the future. This requires China to carefully analyse the situation of the various development stages, and combine China’s low-carbon investment projects in Africa with the elements of China’s traditional strengths, special resources, and competitive enterprises. In the process of low-carbon cooperation, Sino-African low-carbon cooperation faces a monumental challenge and

1

Vivien Foster: “Building Bridges-China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa”, in The World Bank’s Trends and Policy Options, No.5, 2009, pp. 21.

2

“China Science and Technology Exchange Centre”, in South-South Cooperation on Science and Technology to Address Climate Change Applicable Technology Manual, 2010, http://www.cstec.org.cn/ Upload/manual.pdf

3

Zhang Mi: “China Biogas Technology in Africa Retrospect and Prospect”, June 28, 2011, http:// www.biogas.cn/Z_Show.asp?ArticleID=1148

4

Wu Wenbin: “The Biogas Lamp Lights White Nile, Oct. 14, 2011, http://www.biogas.cn/Z_Show. asp?ArticleID=1444

5

China’s Small Hydropower Expand in Africa to Address the Shortage of Electricity in Africa, http:// www.cccme.org.cn/news/content-159178.aspx

6

China Plans to Light Up Africa with Solar, June 8, 2011, http://www.iol.co.za/business/international/ china-plans-to-light-up-africa-with-solar-1.1080600

7

The Feasibility Study of Chinese Aid for Sudan’s Solar Demonstration Project, June 12, 2011, http://sd.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ jmxw/201106/20110607594888.html French Speaking African Countries, China’s

8

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13 Yansane A.: “Solar Power in Africa”, National Solar Power Research Institute 2007, http:// userwww.sfsu.edu/~ciotola/solar/asn_94nuclear. html.

First Solar Energy Technical Training Classes in Lanzhou, http://www.sourcejuice. com/1455560/2011/08/08/French-speakingAfrican-countries-China-first-solar-energytechnical/ 9

14 Background Information: Sahara Wind, http:// www.saharawind.com

Xinhua News: More and More African Countries Favour Wind, July 30, 2009, http://www. dietfastlossweight.com/2012/04/more-and-moreafrican-countries-favor-wind/

15 African Wind Energy Association Summary, http:// www.afriwea.org/en/summary.htm

10 Chinese Wind Power Companies Targeting the African Market, March 16, 2011, http://za.mofcom. gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/201103/20110307450321. html

16 Moses Duma: “Hydropower: Africa’s Solution to the Electricity Crisis!”, June 2, 2009, http:// www.frost.com/prod/servlet/market-insight-top. pag?docid=169253081

11 Moses Duma: “Hydropower: Africa’s Solution to the Electricity Crisis!”, June 2, 2009 http:// www.frost.com/prod/servlet/market-insight-top. pag?docid=169253081.

17 Howells M.I, et al.: “An Energy Model for a Low Income Rural African Village”, 2003, http://www. etsap.org/worksh_6_2003/2003P_howells.pdf.

12 Wikipedia: Renewable Energy in Africa, May 2012 , http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renewable_energy_ in_Africa.

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China–Africa Relations: A Catalyst for Africa’s Integration

By James Shikwati Director, Inter Region Economic Network (IREN Kenya) Nairobi, Kenya Abstract: The continued erosion of national sovereignty by global issues and the firm grip donor countries hold on the continent’s strategic agenda call for an urgent repositioning of Africa through integration.

Africans must evolve thought leadership to anchor the philosophical foundation of an integrated continent.

The conviction by Africa’s founding fathers to have Africans solve their own problems requires the courage to cultivate one voice from the continent. Africa’s unity is strategic for the continent to effectively participate in global issues, reap from the economies of scale and strengthen its negotiation position globally. The continent’s combined GDP stands at US$1.7 trillion compared to United States of America’s US$15 trillion and China’s US$7 trillion. The scramble for Africa by European powers amalgamated an estimated 10,000 ethnic nations to the current 54 nation states plagued with thousands of discordant of voices. Will China’s re-engagement with Africa contribute to a united Africa? China’s construction of the African Union headquarters at a cost of US$200 million and its stated goals in the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015) provide an additional platform towards the continent’s integration.

1. Background: Why Africa Integration is Important

markets. Countries from the South that were mostly recipients of policy prescriptions from the North are angling for effective participation and reform of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations (Lopes, 2012).

Africa has to rethink the proposition that it was in a global village (low risk space) and wake up to the reality that it is in a global jungle or high risk space (Baregu, 2011). The continuous erosion of national sovereignty by global issues such as migration, climate change, energy security, maritime pollution and international trading systems, among others, further makes it urgent for African countries to rethink confronting the world as individual entities.

Global issues know no national borders; they break up the clear division between international and national confines and transgress as well as challenge national sovereignty, interests and power (Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 2012). It therefore becomes imperative that the African countries integrate to leverage its interests in the global arena.

Africans’ interaction with external civilisations has witnessed episodes of people manipulation against their leaders (under colonial rule); leaders against their people (during the cold war) and a replay of people against leaders (under facebook and twitter generation). These episodes have provided minimal space for the continent to think through and actualise its philosophical foundation to act as one in confronting challenges from both within and externally. The African Union which is supposed to champion African integration is under the firm grip of donor countries with 97 per cent of its programme and strategic agenda budget supported by donor countries (Business Day, 2012).

The world is undergoing a crisis of ideas and institutions. Africans find themselves in a very precarious position due to lack of investment in indigenous thought leadership on whose theories the continent ought to anchor its way forward.

The continent risks becoming a battleground of competing ideological interests as the world readies itself for the next guiding paradigm. The resultant effect will be continued incoherence with each individual country bogged down by numerous ethnic interests; balance between the quest for legitimacy of its nation-state and pressure from global competing interests.

The end of the dominance of the United States of America and Europe in global affairs is a likely reality (Kupchan, 2012). The recalibration of global powers that have dominated Africa’s world view for centuries is a scenario Africans must prepare for. The likely outcome of a multi polar world calls for repositioning of African countries through integration (Lihua, 2012). The West is increasingly concerned with its internal problems such as slowed economic growth, stagnating populations, unemployment and huge government deficits

The Washington consensus paradigm on unconditional markets that shaped globalisation has been replaced with the quest for governed

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(Huntington, 1996). China is pushing for reforms at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It wants the World Bank reform to shift 3 per cent of the voting power from developed countries to developing countries. The shared voting power would thus increase the developing countries’ combined share of voting power from 44 per cent to 47 per cent (Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 2012). The ongoing global policy changes are likely to open up space for a more democratic global governance system in international financial institutions, justice systems (as in the International Criminal Court), trade and security.

(colonists) continues to limit the continent’s ability to produce value for itself and hampers interregional economic exchange. Pressure and influence from Western missionary-minded powers to superimpose their value system in Africans continue to raise legitimacy challenges against the continent’s state institutions and political leadership. The quest for Africa’s unity thus faces serious challenges as member states grapple with government legitimacy issues among their constituents, poverty and underdevelopment.

The challenge of nation building and legitimising of state institutions has contributed to overzealous national sovereignty policies exemplified in tariff and non tariff barriers against African nation states. Tariff and non tariff barriers contribute to inefficient delivery systems, epileptic crossborder trading and avenues for illicit/contraband to thrive. This ultimately harms the local and regional economy. Delays at ports of delivery, different working hours and systems of control across the continent, unnecessary police roadblocks and poor infrastructure condemn countries to prisons of inter-regional and intra-regional trade poverty. A continental free trade area arrangement is expected to boost intra-region trade by US$34.6 billion by 2022 and create a market size necessary for African businesses to thrive on (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa-UNECA, 2012).

The act of African countries negotiating and dealing with the world as individual nation-states is likely to sustain the old system where bigger players plunder the continent’s natural resources. Africa’s unity is strategic for the continent to reap from the economies of scale and strengthen its negotiation position globally. The continent’s combined GDP stood at US$1.7 trillion and expected to hit US$2.6 trillion in 2020 (Ecobank, 2010). Compared with United States of America’s overall GDP at US$15 trillion and China’s US$7 trillion in 2011 (Dolgow, 2012). The continent has a combined demographic dividend of 44 per cent aged below 15 years and boasts of the highest number of young people (Ashford, 2007). Individual African country’s GDPs make it near impossible to be effective in contributing to global issues and increases risk of countries being used simply as pawns in the global market place.

While border control agencies need retraining, respective governments need to integrate their processes. Long queues of trucks waiting to cross border points should not be used as an indicator of efficiency. For a loaded truck that covers 100km in an hour; a four hour wait at the border robs it of another distance of 400km it would have covered to make business. Increased distance impacts on the prices of goods at the retail end, hence limiting access to products to majority of Africans. Limited access translates to less freedom of choice. With modern technology, goods should be declared at the points of origin and receipt. Border points should simply have scanners to verify the content of containers. African entrepreneurs are subjected to longer travel schedules due to constant police checks and slow border processes. Protectionism, tariffs and non tariff barriers within the continent, sustains African market orientation towards external markets.

The scramble for Africa by European powers amalgamated an estimated 10,000 ethnic nations to the current 54 nation states (Meredith, 2005). The amalgamation of ethnic nations to nation states has not addressed the thousands of discordant of voices that plague the continent. China’s construction of the African Union headquarters at US$200 million indicates its contribution towards creating a big symbol for the continent’s integration. China’s quest to engage Africa as one entity is evident in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Action Plans’ pronouncements that address the continent as one single partner; but will this yield one voice?

2. Africa’s Self Imposed Blockade against Integration Africa retained its existing national boundaries and pattern of transport and communication from its colonial past. The retention of economic systems that were designed to serve mother countries

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3. China-Africa Relations: A Catalyst to Africa Integration

cooperation with African regional organisations such as the East Africa Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

China has joined Western countries and increased its participation in African integration process. China jointly with Africa resolved to engage in a new type of strategic partnership which in part seeks to take joint measures to promote Africa’s solidarity, harmony and strength through unity and support measures of African regional integration (Beijing Declaration, 2012). African countries welcomed the completion of the African Union headquarter complex in 2012 as a sign of China’s support for African integration and Africa’s enhancement through unity (FOCAC Action Plan 2013–2015).

The African Union Commission joined the FOCAC framework and China signalled willingness to host AU representative office in Beijing. The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015) offers catalytic components for Africa integration as follows:

China’s catalytic effect to the continent’s integration comes from its history of putting up giant projects such as the Great Wall and the Grand Canal with which Africans can emulate to put up trans-Africa initiatives. The Chinese also offer a template of how to run a country with over 1.3 billion people, manage numerous neighbours with competing interests and navigate global issues through strategies of peace and harmony. Beijing is offering one language of engagement away from Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone. Its quest to engage governments and recognise regional governments provides an ample anchor for countries to evolve own voice and a platform of integration. The Chinese selfish interests for the continent’s natural resources devoid of pretences to remould the African character through imposed value systems provide a momentum for the continent to raise its voice in global issues. The dream of Africa’s founding fathers for African Unity calls for a collaborative approach among states for joint regional projects.

Africans must evaluate the value they give to China in order to avoid playing traditional donor-recipient mindset.

1. Increase exchanges and expand cooperation with NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency in a joint effort to promote economic and social development and regional economic integration in Africa.

2. Strengthen practical cooperation with African Union and Africa’s sub regional organisations in the fields of the Pan African University and Africa’s transnational and trans-regional infrastructure development to scale up support for Africa’s integration.

4. Who is China?

China is a unique country with a civilisation that spans over 2,000 years. China successfully combined the state and market in its economic model; it has a governance system that enjoys high legitimacy. Its governance is anchored on the quest to sustain the unity of its civilisation-state away from the Western democracy model (Jacques, 2011).

The Chinese state plays an active and leading role in industrial and export oriented economic policy.

Unlike in the Western dominated world where state legitimacy depends on democracy, China derives its legitimacy from centuries of its civilisation that date back to 221 BC, making the Chinese the oldest in established tradition of state-craft. The country’s prowess in infrastructure construction dates back to its ancient history that led to the construction of the Great Wall and the Grand Canal. China, still largely a developing country, is already a major global power.

3. Support Africa in achieving connectivity and integration and developing more integrated infrastructure.

4. Establish a cooperative partnership in the design, inspection, financing and management of projects under the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa and the Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative.

5. Assist African countries improve facilities for customs and commodity inspection and provide support to African countries in enhancing trade facilitation, with a view of boosting intraregional trade.

China–Africa cooperation consists of bilateral and multi-lateral relations: that is, China relates with each of the 54 countries; the continent’s regional blocs and the African Union. China solidified

China is a rising giant. China’s economy valued at US$1.33 trillion in 2010 surpassed Japan’s US$1.28

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nationalist leaders for continental decolonisation and African unity. At independence, nationalist leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Ahmed Sekou Touré of Guinea, Modibo Keita of Mali and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, among other African leaders, championed Pan Africanist ideas on the continent.

Differences in approach in the quest for African unity were exhibited early with Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana leading the call for immediate political federation and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal calling for a gradualist approach.

trillion to become the second largest economy in the world after the United States of America (Bloomberg, 2010). In energy consumption, China surpassed the USA in 2009 at equivalent of 2.265 billion tonnes of oil compared to USA’s 2.169 billion tonnes in the same year (The Guardian, 2010).

The increased role of China in Africa is credited to Madagascar’s push for the formalisation of ChinaAfrica relations in 1999 that led to the formation of the FOCAC in October 2000 (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2012).

More Chinese have allegedly come to Africa in the last 10 years than Europeans in the last 400 years (The Economist, 2011). The presence of more Chinese in Africa might lead to conflict for space on the continent.

Chinese entry with its flagship state owned corporations come at a time when Africa is reeling from the negative impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that championed privatisation in the 1980s. Small and medium sized enterprises that filled the void left by the impact of SAPs are now threatened by well-oiled Chinese onslaught.

The Chinese appetite for natural resources and interest to grow markets in the continent provide a bargaining opportunity to promote Africa’s quest for integration. African unity can be obtained only if Africans adopt a long term view to its engagement with China.

Despite the differences in approach, the founding fathers of African states sought the unity of Africa by establishing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 25, 1963, in Addis Ababa Ethiopia. The OAU aimed at promoting the unity and solidarity of African States; coordinating and intensifying efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; defending their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; eradicating all forms of colonialism from Africa; promoting international cooperation, giving due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and harmonising members’ political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and defence policies (Africa Union, 2012).

The most recent push for a formal political federation of Africa under the auspices of the United States of Africa was spearheaded by the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya (Reuters, 2010). Discussions on whether the integration focus should be put on economic integration or political federation gave rise to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the transformation of OAU into the African Union in 2002. The formal steps towards having Africa act as a single unit is captured in the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 which aimed at salvaging African states from negative colonial legacies, reliance on raw material exports and dependency on external forces on member states’ internal economic policy formulation.

5. Pan Africanism and Search for African Integration Forced migration of millions of Africans as slave labourers to Europe, the Americas and the Caribbean laid the foundation for Pan Africanism and Black Nationalism (Adogamhe, 2008). The Pan Africanist movement is traceable to the founding of the African Association in London in 1897 and the hosting of the first Pan African Conference in 1900 by a Trinidadian lawyer, H. Sylvester Williams. W.E.B. Dubois, an African American Scholar, organised a series of Pan African Congresses between 1900 and 1945 which brought together people of African descent from the United States of America, Europe and African nationalists (African Union). Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in the 1920s became a platform that promoted African nationalism and pushed for indigenous African self governance.

African member states adopted the Abuja Treaty of 1991 that provided the framework for the establishment of African Economic Community.

Regional Economic Communities in Africa serve as building blocs towards the realisation of a unified Africa. According to Africa Union’s integration status report of 2009; Regional Economic

Pan African Congresses organised between 1900 and 1945 provided ideas and the impetus to African

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Communities namely COMESA, ECOWAS, SADC, EAC and ECCAS have achieved free trade area status among its membership and IGAD and CENSAD are finalising on their agreements.

COMESA, SADC and EAC have already initiated a tripartite free trade area envisaged to cover Africa populations from Cape to Cairo (Africa Union, 2009). The overall goal is to achieve the target of a continental customs union by 2019. The momentum towards African integration is an ongoing process.

magazine/articles.php?article=6100, Accessed on Nov. 4, 2012.

Bloomberg (2010), China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Economy, Available at http://www. bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/china-economy-passesjapan-s-in-second-quarter-capping-three-decade-rise.html, Accessed on Oct. 30, 2012.

Business Day (2012), Foreign Funds Shock for DlaminiZuma, Available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/world/ africa/2012/10/29/foreign-funds-shock-for-dlamini-zuma, Accessed on Nov. 6, 2012.

6. Conclusion

Dolgow, M. (2012), The Last Years of America’s Historic GDP Reign, Available at http://www.businessweek.com/ articles/2012-07-17/the-last-years-of-americas-historicgdp-reign, Accessed on Nov. 4, 2012.

Africans must evaluate their value proposition to China to avoid the trap of donor led integration initiatives on the continent. The quest for Africa integration must go along with investment in indigenous thought leaders to provide the much needed philosophical foundation for one Africa.

Africa has the potential of becoming an independent growth pole in the burgeoning multi polar world (Lihua, 2012). This calls for clear vision and strategy on global issues and how they impact the continent.

It is not the responsibility of China to unite Africa and safeguard the identity and productivity of the African person. The seed for African Unity was planted in Africa from Africans in Diaspora. It gained momentum with the continent’s founding fathers who realised the importance of a united Africa in the global dispensation. The Chinese have placed their interests on the table and it is now up to Africans to cultivate advantage and seek not only the economic kingdom, but also the uniting philosophical paradigm for the continent.

Ecobank (Undated), Mobile Payments, Available at http://www.fleminggulf.com/cms/uploads/conference/ downloads/Ecobank_Jaimal%20Shergill.pdf, Accessed on Nov. 6, 2012.

FOCAC (2012), The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015), Available at http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/ t954620.htm, Accessed on Oct. 30, 2012.

Huntington, P.S (1996), The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order, New York: Touchstone Books.

Jacques, M. (2011), How China Will Change the Way we Think: The Case of the State, Available at http://www. transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/ Jacques%20Bosch%20Paper.pdf, Accessed on Oct. 30, 2012.

Kupchan, A.C. (2012), The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance, Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2012/03/the-decline-of-the-west-why-americamust-prepare-for-the-end-of-dominance/254779/, Accessed on Nov. 4, 2012.

References Adogamhe, G.P. (2008), Pan–Africanism Revisited: Vision and Reality of African Unity and Development, Available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Newsletter/EA/ Vol2%20No2/Adogamhe.pdf, Accessed on Oct. 30, 2012.

Lihua, Y. (2012), Africa in a Multi Polar World and Prospects of Sino-Africa Cooperation.

African Union (2012), AU in a Nutshell, Available at http:// www.au.int/en/about/nutshell, Accessed on Oct. 30, 2012.

Lopes, C. (2012), Is there a Post-Washington Consensus?, Available at http://www.african-geopolitics.com/therepost-washington-consensus, Accessed on Nov. 4, 2012.

African Union (2009), Status of Integration of Africa, Available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/conferences/2009/ mai/ea/07-08mai/status%20of%20integration%20in%20 africa%2027-04-09.pdf, Accessed on Oct. 30, 2012.

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet and authors (2012), FOCAC Twelve Years Later: Achievements, Challenges and the Way Forward, Discussion Paper No. 74, Uppsala: Peking University School of International Studies.

Ashford, S.L. (2007), Africa’s Youthful Population: Risk or Opportunity?, Available at http://www.prb.org/pdf07/ africayouth.pdf, Accessed on Nov. 4, 2012.

Reuters (2010), We Can Build United States of Africa Gadaffi Says, Available at http://www.reuters. com/article/2010/07/27/us-africa-summit-gaddafiidUSTRE66Q70620100727, Accessed on Oct. 30, 2012.

Baregu, M. (2011), Africa: Surviving the Global Jungle, Available at http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/

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Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (2011), Global Review, Shanghai.

The Economist (2011), Trying to Pull Together: Africans are Asking whether China is Making their Lunch and Eating, Available at http://www.economist.com/node/18586448, Accessed on Oct. 30, 2012.

The Guardian (2010), China v US Energy Consumption, Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/ datablog/2010/aug/03/us-china-energy-consumption-data, Accessed on Oct. 30, 2012.

UNECA (2012), Assessing Regional Integration in Africa V–2012, Available at http://uneca.africa-devnet.org/ content/assessing-regional-integration-africa-v-2012, Accessed on Nov. 4, 2012.

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Peace and Security

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China’s Engagement in African Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Achievements and Future Developments

By Zhang Chun Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of Centre for West Asian and African Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, China Abstract: In the 21st century, both the external and internal conditions of African development are changing quickly, calling for a shift in focus from conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction. Along with these developments, after half century development, the China-Africa relationship is facing great pressure to explore new areas of cooperation and protect China’s growing presence in Africa. The newly emerging China’s engagement in African post-conflict reconstruction has built some valid bases for future long-term cooperation, in spite of lingering obstacles.

1. Introduction

a. Changing security-Development relations

China’s engagement in Africa is approaching a more comprehensive direction: from a one-dimension relationship with emotional and ideological linkages (1950s to early 1990s), an all-round relationship with an added economic dimension (1994-1995), a social and cultural exchange laden relationship (since the early 21st century) to peace and security cooperation. While most literature focuses on the economic, political, and strategic dimensions of the China-Africa relationship, this paper shifts attention to the growing role of China in African post-conflict reconstruction.

The end of the cold war made the world united and interdependent. During the Cold War, security and development were thoroughly institutionalised as separate “policy fields” with distinct objectives and means of intervention. Schematically, one may say that the Cold War effectuated a broad geographical ordering of security and development in which development concerned North-South relations, while security concerned East-West relations.2 Following this geographical ordering of world politics was an institutionalisation of two distinct fields of operations whose areas of concerns and modes of intervention diverged so as to create a conceptual political and cognitive division of labour as “development studies”3 on the one hand, and “security studies”4 on the other. These studies were partly funded by the respective agencies in both policy fields.

Most of the existing literature regards all recovery efforts from failed or collapsed states as post-conflict reconstruction. For them, obstacles to post-conflict reconstruction and nation-state building revolve around social, political, and economic factors. By specifically defining many of these attributes such as failing or failed states, the nature of involvement by international organisations, security issues, good governance, and infrastructure investments, perhaps a clearer picture of post-conflict reconstruction and nation-state building may be ascertained.1 However, the author adopts a narrow definition of post-conflict reconstruction—that is, the efforts to rehabilitate a state emerging from conditions of extended conflict to realise conditions of stability, peace, and economic development.

This situation has been changing since the end of the Cold War. The prevalence and persistence of conflict in some of the world’s poorest areas has both frustrated development efforts and inspired a desire to understand and harmonise the objectives of security and development. Now, security and development concerns have been increasingly interlinked. Governments and international institutions are increasingly aware of the need to integrate security and development programmes in policy interventions in post-conflict situations as well as the growing category of failed and potentially ‘failing’ states. Two previously distinct policy areas are now increasingly overlapping in terms of the actors and agencies engaged and the policy prescriptions advocated. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan says:

2. Calls for China’s Engagement Since the end of the cold war and especially after entering the 21st century, three main developments call for China’s bigger role in African post-conflict reconstruction, at the international level, African continental level and China-Africa bilateral relationship level.

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In the twenty-first century, all States and their collective institutions must advance the cause of larger freedom-by ensuring freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity.

In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development without security and no security without development. And both development and security also depend on respect for human rights and the rule of law.5

killed by the effects of diseases and malnutrition intensified by displacement.7 In the 21st century, with the help of the international community, Africa has ended most of its wars and conflicts. Most of the former war-torn states are now re-building their countries. Post-conflict reconstruction is full of obstacles. Armed conflict continues to affect countries such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan with devastating humanitarian and economic costs. The unforeseen political transition in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya has cast northern Africa’s stability in a different light. In other regions, localised and communal violence, low-level insurgencies and politically-related violence occur with alarming frequency.

Thus, the framework of the “security-development nexus” has been hailed as a way of cohering national and international policy-making interventions in non-Western states, which have two significant policy implications: securitisation of development policy, and development of security policy. This calls for more consideration about the security environment, implications, and consequences of China’s engagement in Africa.

With African security challenges changing, the needs for China’s engagement are also shifting from mediating to supporting post-conflict reconstruction.

b. Changing African security needs

c. Changing nature of China-Africa relationship

Africa is more peaceful today than it was a decade ago. The continent has made progress in overcoming the twin challenges of conflict and insecurity. While conflicts continue, African security challenges have shifted from wars and conflicts in the last decade of the 20th century to post-conflict reconstructions entering the 21st century.

After half century developments and under the shadow of international system transformation, the China-Africa relationship is facing at least three transitions: from ideological/emotional based relationship to economic interest based one, from economic interest promotion to economic interest protection, and from asymmetrical interdependence to symmetrical interdependence.

With the end of the Cold War, Africa was freed from the influence of the bipolar system which made conflict the main characteristics in much of Africa.

Christopher Clapham summarises:

China–Africa relationship is transforming from an emotional and/or ideological intimacy to an economic one. The China–Africa relationship from 1950s to early 1990s was emotional and/or ideological. Due to the geographical distance and weak economic conditions of both parties, the economic dimension of China-Africa relationship was quite weak. In 1950, the bilateral trade volume was only US$12.14 million; in 1989, the figure was US$1.17 billion. Between 1994 and 1995, China paid much more attention to her economic relations with Africa. In 1996, bilateral trade volume increased to US$4.03 billion, nearly 4 times that of 1989.8 Since then, the economic relation grew very fast and reached US$10 billion in 2000, US$100 billion in 2010, and US$166 billion in 2011. With economic linkages growing, bilateral trade frictions increase as well, which to some extent, diminish the emotional foundations of this bilateral relationship,

As the administrative reach of African states declined, with the shrinking of their revenue base and the spread of armed challenges to their power, the number and size of such zones increased, … in the process creating a new international relations of statelessness.6 There were armed conflicts in sixteen of Africa’s fifty-three countries in 1999; most of them defying the classical definition of war occurring between states. Since the early 1990s, Africa has suffered three particularly devastating clusters of interconnected wars centred around West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire), the Greater Horn (Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan), and the Great Lakes (Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire/DRC, Uganda). Most casualties of these conflicts have been women and children, usually

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violence and is characterised by the provision of emergency humanitarian services, stability and military interventions to provide basic security.

Internationally, such responses also include the deployment of peacekeepers. ii) The transformation or transition phase is a period in which legitimate local capacities emerge and should be supported, with particular attention needed for restarting the economy, including physical reconstruction, ensuring functional structures for governance and judicial processes and laying the foundations for the provision of basic social welfare such as education and healthcare. iii) The final phase or the period for fostering sustainability is a time when recovery efforts should be consolidated to help prevent the resurgence of conflict. Military actors, particularly international peacekeepers, withdraw and society begins to “normalise” during this phase. 13

along with the power shifting from the first generation leaders to the second generation leaders across the African continent.9 The second transition that China-Africa relations is facing is the fact that the economic relationship is shifting from promoting to protecting. Since the late 1990s, China initiated a “going global” policy for promoting Chinese economic interests worldwide.

The establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 strengthened this effort in Africa greatly.10 Since then, the fast growing presence of China’s economic interest is being witnessed all over the African continent.

However, the security concerns of China’s presence in Africa are rising under the circumstance of global and African uncertainties, including energy security, civilian protection, investment security, and others.

In 2009, Africa’s oil exports to China represented 33 per cent of China’s total oil imports, and 60 per cent of total Sino-African trade.11 As has been the case with oil companies from other countries operating in Africa, Chinese oil installations and the Chinese citizens who work on them, have been targeted in numerous countries including Nigeria, Ethiopia and Sudan.

According to these standards, China’s role in African post-conflict reconstruction can be divided in three types and falls into the first two phases, including: a. Strategic consensus building The most important dynamic that has driven the fast development of China-Africa relationship is the political exchange based on the spirit of mutual respect and trust. In the past decade or more, this strategic consensus has lifted ChinaAfrica cooperation to new stages continuously. In 2000, the two sides proposed to establish “a new long-term stable partnership of equality and mutual benefit”; in 2003, the two advocated “a new type of partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit and all-round cooperation”; and in 2006, the two were committed to “a new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa featuring political equality and mutual trust, mutually beneficial economic cooperation, and cultural exchanges.”14

With different growth projections, ChinaAfrica interdependence will become more and more symmetrical. According to the Scientific Development Outlook, China’s economic growth rate will gradually slow down and the dependence rates on oil and gas, and other natural resources, many of them imported from Africa, will ease up in the next decade. Together with “Africa rising,”12 most of the current economic exchange models will be changed accordingly, erasing most of the current criticisms towards China-Africa relationship.

The ongoing transition calls for deep thought about the future of China-Africa relationship, especially how to maintain the current positive dynamics and create new momentum. One area that needs attention is the post-conflict reconstruction, which China is good at.

Such a strong strategic consensus laid down significant foundation for China’s engagement into African post-conflict reconstruction. China always attaches great importance to African peace and security. In July 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao proposed at the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference that the two parties should promote peace and stability in Africa and create a secure environment for Africa’s development and declared that China would launch the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security.15

3. Achievements of China’s Engagement While other methods of evaluating post-conflict reconstruction efforts exist, the 2002 Post Conflict Reconstruction Framework of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) identifies three phases of activity between the “cessation of violent conflict and the return to normalisation,” or post-conflict reconstruction: i)The initial response comes immediately after the end of widespread

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Along with these detailed proposals and action plans, the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security will provide large rooms for future China’s participation in African post-conflict reconstruction.

As a field of bilateral cooperation, post-conflict reconstruction appeared in 2006 in the FOCAC process for first time. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) dealt with this issue as a development assistance affair, declaring that China would “actively participate in bilateral and multilateral assistance plans for African countries in post-war reconstruction, humanitarian rescue and relief and poverty reduction.”16

b. Direct participation in African post-conflict reconstruction Using terms of the 2002 Post Conflict Reconstruction Framework report, China directly participates in African post-conflict reconstruction through two ways: sending peacekeepers and supporting economic reconstruction.

In 2009, post-conflict reconstruction was moved to peace and security cooperation. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012) declared that China would strengthen cooperation with countries concerned in the UN Peace Building Commission and support countries in their post-war reconstruction processes.17

China began sending in late 1980s, when it sent her first election observers to Namibia in 1989. Since 2000, it has increased its troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions twenty-fold.19 Many of these troops are deployed in Africa, where they help resolve some of the continent’s most persistent peace and security challenges. China has sent personnel to peacekeeping operations in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, Sudan, Western Sahara, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Under the framework of new strategic partnership between China and Africa, currently China participates in 6 peacekeeping operations in Africa with more than 1,500 peacekeepers and is the biggest peacekeeping troop contributor in the 5 permanent members of UN Security Council (Table 1).

The 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference combined the peace and security dimension with the development assistance dimension of post-conflict reconstruction, which means China’s engagement in African post-conflict reconstruction will be enhanced greatly in the near future. The 5th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (20132015) declared that the two sides “reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen cooperation in… preventive diplomacy, peace keeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation” and China would “provide, within the realm of its capabilities, financial and technical support to… management and resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and development.”18

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Table 1: China’s participation in peacekeeping operations in May 2012 Mission Troops Police Military experts on mission

Total

MINURSO

10

10

MONUSCO 218

16

234

UNOCI

6

6

UNAMID 323

323

UNMIL 564

17

2

583

UNMISS 347

14

3

364

Total 1,445 31

31

1,520

MINURSO: The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; MONUSCO: The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo; UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire; UNAMID: African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia; and UNMISS: United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/may12_3.pdf, May 2012.

To strengthen further China’s participation in African post-conflict reconstruction, President Hu Jintao promised at the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference that China would deepen cooperation with the AU and African countries in peace and security in Africa, provide financial support for the AU peace-keeping missions in Africa and the develop the African Standby Force, and train more officials in peace and security affairs and peacekeepers for the AU.20

The Chinese emphasis on fostering stability in post-conflict situations has found her most publicised expression in the large-scale financing of infrastructure across the continent. As Premier Wen Jiabao stated at the Opening Ceremony of the 4th Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs on July 18, 2012: Notable progress has been made in cooperation in financing, and cooperation projects launched by China better meet Africa’s development needs. The Chinese government delivered on its commitment of providing US$10 billion of lending of a preferential nature to Africa and supported Chinese financial institutions in increasing commercial loans to Africa…

China’s economic engagement with Africa has made an important contribution to African postconflict reconstruction, especially through its infrastructure financing projects. There is a close relationship between development and conflict. A previous study by Saferworld, IANSA and Oxfam concluded that between 1990 and 2005, armed conflict cost SSA countries US$300 billion, more or less the same amount Africa received in aid during the same period.21 Through its trade, investment and development cooperation, China is contributing to African economic growth. It is hard to argue that this is not positive, and in post-conflict countries where infrastructure has been destroyed, investment has ceased and employment for young men is nonexistent, China may play an especially constructive role. At the same time, proper development cannot be delivered in a context of insecurity, and there is danger that the supposed benefits of economic assistance will be used to justify inaction, on other equally important fronts.

Chinese investment in Africa, made in increasingly diversified areas and ways, has registered strong growth. By June 2012, China had invested US$45 billion in Africa, including over US$15 billion of direct investment...

China has stepped up assistance to Africa, with greater emphasis on promoting sustainable development… We have trained a total of 21,000 African personnel in various fields… We offered assistance to and have completed a group of agricultural demonstration centres and nearly 100 clean energy projects in Africa.22

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c. Indirect supporting efforts

4. Future Developments of China’s Engagement

Besides the direct participation in African postconflict reconstruction, China also provides indirect support for such effort, including mediating African crisis, supporting African peace and security architecture building, and providing emergent humanitarian assistances.

With change in international conditions, growing African needs and shift in China-Africa relationship, China can and will contribute more for African post-conflict reconstruction based on the existing achievements. Meanwhile, there are still some obstacles ahead.

To promote African post-conflict reconstruction, China always joins hands with other parties to mediate crises in Africa. The most visible example is China’s mediation efforts in solving the Darfur crisis in Sudan. China helped push the Sudanese government, the AU and the UN to reach consensus on the deployment of the hybrid force to Darfur in 2007. From mid-2006, China began to persuade President Al Bashir to moderate his position.

The two times they met at the first China-Africa Summit in November 2006 and Chinese President Hu Jintao’s Sudan visit in February 2007, President Hu talked to President Al Bashir about Chinese concerns over the Darfur crisis and hoped the Sudan government would accept the arrangement of a hybrid UN-AU forces.23 Finally, the Sudanese government agreed to accept it in mid-2007. This did not come easily and Chinese efforts have been applauded by the international community.

a. Shifting focus Looking at the mid-long term future or 20-30 years time frame, China’s support to African postconflict reconstruction may change because of the fast changing environment. Traditionally, China’s support for African post-conflict reconstruction concentrates on peacekeeping and infrastructure assistance. However, there is pressure to shift current traditional support focus from two fronts.

On the one hand, China has not yet contributed any combat troops to UN missions. Her peacekeepers instead hold positions as military observers, civilian police, with the majority acting as ‘force enablers,’ that is, units that provide infrastructure, medical, logistical and transport support. With the progressing of China’s engagement in African postconflict reconstruction, the need to send combat troops will be growing.

China also plays a positive role in Africa’s continental and regional peace and security architecture building, including the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Africa Standby Force (ASF). Even though regional mechanisms for responding to conflict and insecurity have suffered from weak capacity, limited resources and in some cases absence of political will, their role and influence are slowly growing. China is increasingly engaging with them and has provided modest amounts of financial support for peacekeeping operations and capability building efforts. For example, China has provided the AU with US$1.8 million for its peacekeeping mission in Sudan and given smaller amounts of money to the AU mission in Somalia and West Africa’s sub-regional peace fund.

On the other hand, as the 2002 Post Conflict Reconstruction Framework indicates, after the transition period, African post-conflict reconstruction efforts will shift to the final phase to foster sustainable development. Such a situation now is to some extent launching thanks to the rapid development of African economy in the past decade or more. As Vice Governor of National Bank of Angola, Ricardo De Abreu, points out, for example the Angolan economy will enter into its sustainable development period from 2012.24 In other words, the fast growing African economy requires that China’s focus points change from the current ‘hard’ infrastructure assistance to some ‘soft’ or social infrastructure assistance. b. Trilateral cooperation

Finally, China insists on providing emergency humanitarian assistances to Africa. The most recent example is that China provided 443.2 million RMB yuan worth of emergency food assistance to disaster-hit countries in the Horn of Africa through bilateral and multilateral channels, helping people in need.

Both FOCAC and country-to-country relations are bilateral approaches for promoting China-Africa relationship. With its great success, the pressures for trilateral or even multilateral cooperation are growing, including the African post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

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Thus, to understand what role China will play in future African post-conflict reconstruction, one has to keep an eye on the evolution of China’s non-interference principle. While this principle and policy will not be changed, the practice will possibly become more flexible in future.

First of all, the nature of African conflicts is largely multilateral. Due to the legacies of colonialism, African conflicts, both domestic and inter-state ones, involve regional powers because of either ethnic considerations, border disputes, resources competition or other reasons. Thus, to participate in one country’s post-conflict reconstruction, to some extent, influences the third parties, which calls for trilateral cooperation.

Endnotes 1 On the definition of post-conflict reconstruction, see Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull: “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States,” International Security, Spring 2008, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 106-139; S. Barakat and S. Zcyk: “The Evolution of Post-war Recovery,” in Third World Quarterly, 2009, Vol. 30, No. 6; S. Barakat (ed): “After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War”, London: I.B. Tauris, 2005.

Secondly, post-conflict reconstruction efforts in general ask for trilateral or multilateral cooperation and coordination. For example, peacekeeping or peace building operations normally include at least three parties, the conflict-torn country, peacekeepers sending country/countries, and UN Peacekeeping.

Currently, except for sending peacekeepers, most of China’s participation in post-conflict reconstruction in Africa is bilateral.

2

Thirdly, given the fast development of ChinaAfrica relationship, many international actors call for trilateral cooperation with China in Africa, including the European Union, the United States of America, Japan, South Korea, and some international organisations, both governmental and non-governmental. Meanwhile, these actors established their trilateral cooperation to pressure China to start trilateral cooperation with them.

Geir Lundestad: “East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

3 Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (eds): “International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge”, California: University of California Press, 1998.

4 Pinar Bilgin and Adam D. Morton: “Historicising the Representations of ‘Failed States’: Beyond the Cold War Annexation of the Social Sciences?”, Third World Quarterly, 2002, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 55-80.

It’s important to note that Africa’s side is unwilling to have such trilateral cooperation that makes China to be cautious when considering such a possibility.

5 Report of the Secretary-General: “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, New York: United Nations, March 21, 2005, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm.

c. Non-interference principle

6 Christopher Clapham: “Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival”, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

As is well known, China officially holds as a central premise of its foreign policy that governments should not interfere in the ‘internal affairs’ of other countries. This principle is welcomed by most African countries and people, while many western scholars and policymakers claim that China’s interpretation of non-interference and respect for sovereignty has affected, not always positively, modes of governance as well as ongoing conflicts.

7 Paul D. Williams: “Africa’s Challenges, America’s Choice,” in Robert R. Tomes, Angela Sapp Mancini, James T. Kirkhope (eds): Crossroads Africa: Perspectives on US-China-Africa Security Affairs, Washington, DC.: Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2009.

8 Ministry of Commerce: “Fifty Years of ChinaAfrica Economic and Trade Relations,”, July 16, 2002, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ bg/200207/20020700032255.html/; Li Yanchang: “The Present Situation and Prospects of the Sino-Africa Economy and Trade Relationship Development,” Journal of Shanxi Administration School and Shanxi Economic Management School, 2003, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 45.

In recent years, China has become somewhat more flexible in its interpretation of non-interference and has shown willingness to take a more active diplomatic role in the resolution of internal conflicts. As already noted, Beijing eventually deployed significant diplomatic pressure in Khartoum to push the Sudanese government to accept deployment of UN peacekeepers.

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9 Li Weijian et al.: “Towards a New Decade: A Study on the Sustainability of FOCAC,” West Asia and Africa, Sept. 2010, No. 209, pp. 8.

17 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012), Nov. 12, 2009, http://www. focac.org/eng/ltda/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm.

10 Kerry Brown and Zhang Chun: “China in Africa– Preparing for the Next Forum for China-Africa Cooperation,” Chatham House Briefing Note, June 2009, pp. 5-6.

18 Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015), July 23, 2012, http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/ t954620.htm.

11 Such a dynamic is not unique to China. In 2008, oil accounted for 80% of all imports from Africa to the United States, the continent’s second largest trade partner after China. See Standard Bank: “China and the US in Africa: Measuring Washington’s Response to Beijing’s Commercial Advance,” Standard Bank Economic Strategy Paper, 2011; Standard Bank: “Oil Price to Remain at Two-and-a-half-year Peak,” Standard Bank Press Release, Feb. 21, 2011.

19 Bates Gill & Chin-Hao Huang: “China’s Expanding Role in Peace building: Prospects and Policy Implications,” SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 25, 2009.

20 President Hu Jintao: “Open Up New Prospects for a New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership,” Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of The Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation, Beijing, July 19, 2012, FOCAC website, http://www.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/hyqk/ t953115.htm.

12 The Economist: “Africa Rising,” Dec. 3, 2011, http:// www.economist.com/node/21541015.

21 IANSA, Oxfam & Saferworld: “Africa’s Missing Billions: International Arms Flows and the Cost of Armed Conflict”, London: Oxfam Great Britain, 2007.

13 CSIS: “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework Report”, Washington, DC: CSIS, May 2002, http:// csis.org/images/stories/pcr/framework.pdf.

14 President Hu Jintao: “Open Up New Prospects for a New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership,” Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing, July 19, 2012, FOCAC website, http://www.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/hyqk/t953115. htm.

22 Primier Wen Jiabao: “Deepen Result-Oriented Cooperation and Promote Common Development,” Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Fourth Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs, Beijing, July 18, 2012, FOCAC website, http://www. focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/zyjh/t952868.htm.

23 Gareth Evans and Donald Steinberg: “China and Darfur: ‘Signs of Transition’,” Guardian Unlimited, June 11, 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ index.cfm?id=4891&l=1.

15 ibid 16 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), FOCAC website, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/ t280369.htm.

24 Ricardo De Abreu: “Speech at Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC., Sept. 23, 2011.

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China’s Re-Engagement with Africa: The Search for Peace and Security1

By Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie Professor of Political Science & Chair of the Centre for Culture and Peace Studies, University of Botswana Abstract: The paper analyses the contributions and impact of China’s peace and security role in Africa by discussing its policy, motives, mechanisms and challenges. Peacekeeping is instrumental to sustainable peace and security through conflict resolution, prevention, preservation, reconciliation and reconstruction.

The challenges of peacekeeping include adhering to international norms and practices; providing adequate human, financial, diplomatic and material resources; and flexible responses. The United Nations is the major actor and source of support for peacekeeping activities in Africa. The crucial questions are: Why is China interested in Africa’s peace and security? Does China present a new, alternative model of peace to the West?

Does China, the UN or Africa benefit? What should be done to improve the effectiveness of China’s role in future?

1. Introduction economic inequalities, deprivations and poverty have contributed to civil strife and violence in Africa.

China’s re-engagement with Africa has broadened the continent’s relations in the economic, political, social, cultural and security spheres. While the engagement initially started as the search for Africa’s strategic natural resources, especially oil and minerals, it has diversified and expanded to production, manufacturing, infrastructure, cultural diplomacy, peace and security. China has joined the international community, particularly the United Nations (UN) to contribute to resolving and stabilising the continent as part of a larger goal of global security. Africa, since independence in the 1960s, has experienced a cycle of conflicts, with no apparent sign that there will be a complete end to the violence.

The UN is charged with the responsibility of guaranteeing global peace and security, with sub regional organisations playing a complementary, yet increasingly significant role. The UN relies on peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as integral processes, to promote international peace and security. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are adaptations of the collective use of force, enshrined in the UN Charter, to suit the changing nature of conflicts and context of the international system. Originally tasked with resolving inter-state conflicts, the UN has to deal with intra-state or civil wars prevalent in the post-cold war. Through the UN’s field experience and desire to be effective, the UN peacekeeping has changed from the traditional lightly armed missions to humanitarian assistance to civilians caught in the war, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding in post conflict societies. Such an evolution demonstrates the UN’s responsiveness to the demands of conflict situations.

2. Peace and Security While peace and security are intrinsically valuable, they remain elusive, hence the worldwide pursuit of both negative peace, in terms of the prevention of war; and positive peace in form of systems and mechanisms designed to resolve grievances and conflicts (Cousens, 2001). According to Galtung (1990), peace is the absence of structural violence, primarily, no economic inequality, exploitation and poverty. Feminists conceptualise peace as a condition of justice, economic equality for all, especially between men and women and ecological balance (Reardon, 1990). The liberal democratic peace thesis professes that democracy and capitalism are sources of peace and security (Selby, 2008). The African experience has however shown that democracy and capitalism do not guarantee peace and security. Instead, they are the causes of instability and insecurity. Electoral competition and

The agenda for peace identifies preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping as the means for resolving, preventing and preserving world peace. Preventive diplomacy involves stopping conflict from culminating into violence, while peacemaking entails use of peaceful means to resolve conflicts. Peacekeeping requires deployment of UN staff, military, police and civilians into a conflict zone. However, such an intervention has to have the consent of all contending parties, or at least the host government.

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Peacebuilding and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have been adopted as additional tasks by the UN resulting in larger and complex peacekeeping missions (Saferworld, 2011a). Peace building refers to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction to achieve durable peace (UN Secretary General, 1992, Osei-Hwedie, 2011a). This, in turn, paves way for socio-economic development and post-conflict reconstruction. The R2P of 2001 emerged out of the appreciation for humanitarian intervention to protect citizens from grave violations of human rights by their own governments (Teitt, 2011).

East, Nigeria in the North and Delta regions. These show that West Africa is the most turbulent region on the continent.

3. The Context and Motives of China’s Foreign and Security Policy Chinese foreign and security policy has been reshaped since the 1978 economic reforms and opening up, which ultimately resulted in active participation in multinational peacekeeping in the 1990s. In a typical realist and neo-realist explanation, Chinese foreign policy is determined by domestic and nationalist factors, and changes in the international structure, power configurations, roles, and demands (Morgenthau, 1973; Waltz, 1979, Zhimin, 2005). Zhao (2009) posits that nationalism is the “driving force of Chinese foreign policy.” Primarily, its foreign policy is targeted at defending its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and opening up opportunities for its economic development (Dethlefsen, 2004).

He points to the primacy of its national interests.

Access to foreign natural resources critical to its economic growth and development, is of strategic importance such that China would do everything to reduce or eliminate security risks (Dethlefsen, 2004). Therefore, economic security is of great importance to China and forms a large part of its global foreign policy.

Whereas the UN peacekeeping missions follow the traditional notion of security-state security-the UN has, overtime, embraced its re-conceptualisation as human security (United Nations Development Programme-UNDP, 1994). This has led to an active role by multilateral and international organisations, and global civil society, especially non-governmental organisations. Human security is viewed as a manifestation of development, and therefore, a basis of peace (UNDP, 1994; OseiHwedie, 2011a). However, it should be noted that there is always tension between conceptualisation of security at the domestic, sub regional, and international levels, which necessitate balancing all priorities.

The fact that the majority of UN peacekeeping missions are in Africa is an indication that the continent is characterised by instability and insecurity. This is seen as one of the reasons why the continent is unable to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and promote development because peace and security are necessary conditions for growth and prosperity. Saferworld (2011a) states that conflict and insecurity undermine development due to direct costs including military expenditure and destruction of infrastructure; and indirect costs such as declining foreign investment, capital flight, malfunctioning of the market, rising unemployment and poverty. Africa suffers mostly from intra-state conflicts, with some inter-state wars. The insecurity is caused by a combination of arbitrary borders inherited from colonial masters, struggle over the control of natural resources, historical-cultural factors such as ethnic or tribal rivalries, disputed elections outcomes, political elites’ manipulation of social groups as they compete for political power, and religious rivalry between Christians and Muslims. Currently, the trouble spots include Sudan, South Sudan, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the

In addition, China’s global foreign policy is based on “five principles of peaceful existence” that calls for respect for sovereignty, non-interference and non-aggression; “new security concept” that seeks “a new post-Cold War international security order” and “strategic partnership”; and creating a “harmonious world” through its commitment to global peace and stability and establishing “a more just and equitable international system” (China Balance Sheet, undated). These suggest the need to strive for both national and global security (Wu, undated). Its aim of contributing to a peaceful international environment is informed by the need to concentrate its efforts on tackling domestic challenges (China Balance Sheet, undated).

China’s Africa Policy of 2006 forms an important part of its global foreign policy (Gill, Huang and Morrison, 2007). Therefore, China’s foreign policy towards Africa, as articulated in the Africa policy, is geared towards forging a strategic partnership with African states based on mutual benefit or win-win formula in order to protect its economic interests in strategic natural resources, investments,

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markets, and to create allies for diplomatic support in international forum including the UN and the World Trade Organisations (WTO). The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) of 2000 is the institutional framework for articulating and implementing the partnership on a variety of issues, including peace and security.

UN interventions. Through China, its allies including African countries have also acquired a voice in the UNSC on voting and deployment of missions. Furthermore, China recognises that its economic growth and development is intertwined with a stable, peaceful and secure international system, especially in the age of complex interdependence and globalisation. Therefore, China appreciates that UN peacekeeping promotes its strategic interests, including economic and security, through promoting peace and stability in countries which host its investments and are trading partners. The DRC and Sudan provide perfect examples. However, it is equally true that China’s participation extends to non-strategic countries such as Western Sahara and Somalia (Saferworld, 2011a; He, 2007). In a nutshell, three motivations underlie China’s policy on UN peacekeeping operations, namely, “being a responsible power, strengthening the UN and sharing common concerns for peace and security” (He, 2007).

There are other underlying motives for the growing Chinese involvement in peacekeeping in general, and Africa in particular. The reforms and opening up resulted in a global foreign policy that paved way for a “more engaged, pragmatic and constructive” (Gill and Huang 2009) foreign policy to demonstrate its status as an emerging and responsible global power. Peacekeeping is one of the best ways to exhibit responsibility, responsiveness, and “a peaceful rise” as a great power. This was to assure other big powers, especially the US, that China’s status as a great power was not a threat to the status quo. By the same token, UN peacekeeping allowed China to shoulder its responsibility for global peace and security. Contribution to peacekeeping signifies China’s endorsement and support for multilateralism, not unilateralism, international norms and international laws as tools to resolve and prevent global security problems, including terrorism.

Similarly, contributions to global peace and security enable China to improve its bilateral relations with host countries, which gave consent to peacekeeping missions. This, in turn, boosts economic relations, and builds a South-South partnership (Saferworld, 2011a). Generally, peacekeeping promotes China’s desire to achieve economic and political influence in foreign countries (Wu, undated). Additionally, China is motivated by the benefits accruing to its army, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). By participating, the PLA, which is relatively new to peacekeeping activities, has been able to acquire practical experience and the much needed new skills, and worked with experienced national armies, thereby improving its operations and gaining confidence (Saferworld, 2011a). Some of the newly acquired skills include ways to control urban disturbances in order to restore public security.

China’s involvement in peacekeeping has made its soft power, in the form of monetary power, dialogue, persuasion and diplomacy, visible globally. The use of its soft power has further boosted China’s stature as a responsible and peaceful great power, and allowed it to pursue international leadership positions commensurate with its status as the second largest economy in the world, and a rising nuclear power. Thus, its international image and confidence have been greatly boosted to the extent that it might claim a moral ground when soft power is contrasted against hard power, which is readily resorted to by the West, especially the US.

4. Africa’s Peace and Security: Multilateralism and Bilateralism

Equally compelling is the fact that global peacekeeping provides China with an opportunity to compete and challenge US hegemony, especially in Asia and Africa, in spite of its acceptance of US global dominance. The competition has increasingly manifested itself as Beijing Consensus vs. Washington Consensus. Also, its participation gives China a voice, influence, and high status in the UN system of organisations in general; the UN Security Council (UNSC), and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) in particular, on deciding what constitutes legitimate

The post-Cold War era opened up an opportunity for China to be an active global actor, influence and support international action to resolve threats to international peace and security. This is the era when intra-state conflicts became prevalent and the major threats to global tranquillity. China has utilised two main instruments for promoting peace and security in Africa. Most of its efforts have been channelled through multilateral mechanisms, primarily the UN, and to a considerable extent, the African sub-

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and regional organisations responsible for peace and security. The bilateral way is another, in the form of government to government cooperation.

However, it is overshadowed by the multilateral one. This is because more influence and impact is made through multilateral than bilateral channels, and multilateralism has increasingly gained prominence surpassing bilateralism as the best means to resolve global problems, including insecurity. It is through these channels that China contributes human, material and financial resources, as well as renders diplomatic support to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

five (P5) members of the UNSC, since the 2000s.

This shows that China is the staunchest supporter of multilateralism, which forms part of the Chinese foreign policy (Dethlefsen, 2004). This is in sharp contrast to US’s unilateralism prevalent during President Bush Junior’s presidency. China has provided non-combat troops, including civilian police, military observers, engineering battalions, medical units, and transport staff (Gill and Huang, 2009). In December 2010, there were a total of 1,955 Chinese personnel in nine UN missions.

Of these, 94 military observers, 175 engineering and 43 medical personnel were with MONUC; 275 engineering, 43 medical and 240 transport personnel formed part of UNMIL; 275 engineering, 100 transport, and 60 medical staff were at UNMIS; and 315 engineering troops for UNAMID (Information Office of the State Council, 2011).

The 1990s marked the beginning of China’s active contribution to international peace and security.

China moved from a posture of refusal to partake in global peace and security through international peacekeeping in the 1970s; to muted interest in the 1980s and 1990s; to active involvement since 1999 (He, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2009; Saferworld, 2011a). Regarding the UN, China was first involved in Africa in 1988 when it sent 20 civilian observers to the UN Namibian Transitional Period Aid Group (UNTAG) to oversee the conduct of the general elections (Karlsson, 2011; Hellstrom, 2009; Saferworld, 2011b). Since the 2000s, its contribution to the UN multilateral peacekeeping in general, and Africa in particular, has grown substantially. Liberia, Sudan and the DRC are the biggest beneficiaries because seventyfive percent of Chinese peacekeepers serve in UN missions in Africa (Gill, Hunag and Morrison, 2007). In 2003, China sent 175 servicemen to the UN peacekeeping mission to the DRC; and 3,975 to Liberia; and Sudan. These are: the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO); UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); and UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and Africa Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Chinese personnel have also served in other missions, including, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), UN Operations in Burundi (ONUB), and UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad-MINURCA (Karlsson, 2011; Singh, 2011).

China has also rendered financial support to UN peace activities. It contributes slightly more than two per cent to the total UN peacekeeping and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) budgets. Beyond this, China’s support has been felt through multilateral and bilateral diplomacy.

Multilaterally, China has been at the forefront in urging the other P5 to allow African sub- and regional organisations for peace and security to pre-dominate in solving conflicts in their respective areas, and accord them the necessary assistance to accomplish their tasks. Saferworld (2011b) states that “China has played a constructive role in encouraging the international community to support African regional and sub-regional actors in tackling security threats,” based on African solutions for African problems. These include the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This is the reason why China has readily used its veto power to push through, protect and uphold African issues and positions. It has championed African sub and regional organisations’ positions on Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe when the remaining P5 held a contrary view. For example, reflecting the AU’s positions, China supported an arms embargo against the Ivory Coast in 2004 and Eritrea in 2009; endorsed the handover of AU peacekeeping in Darfur to the UN in 2006; and called for UN intervention in Somalia. It was the only UNSC member in favour of UN intervention in Somalia, while the rest were unwilling to do so (Van Hoeymissen, 2010) given the high levels of violence and the disastrous experiences of US and UN missions in the 1990s.

China is the biggest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions accounting for threequarters of peacekeepers in Africa. It has contributed more personnel to UN peacekeeping and African missions than the other permanent

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It has also supported and shielded Sudan from UNSC sanctions. Similarly, it has consistently opposed criminal indictment of Al Bashir, Sudan’s President. In 2008, China vetoed a UNSC resolution designed to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe (Wuthnow, 2011). These gestures have made Africa believe that China expresses African views and positions, puts African conflicts on the UNSC agenda, uses its veto to protect African interests, and supports deployment of peacekeepers to African conflict situations. For example, China voted for the UNSC Resolution 1725 and the creation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) (Gill and Huang, 2009).

Eritrea, Ethiopia and Mozambique (Gill and Huang, 2009). Also in 2004, ECOWAS received electronic equipment costing US$120,000 from China to improve its communications capabilities for peacekeeping. In general, China has provided training and financial assistance for military infrastructure, de-mining support, and training of African armed forces.

At the bilateral level, China has relied on its close relationship to persuade its allies to accept international decisions; particularly, negotiated solution to conflicts. For example, China convinced Sudan to accept UN peacekeepers in Darfur, and engage in political solutions resulting in the Comprehensive Agreement of 2006 which brought about cessation of war. In 2008, China persuaded the DRC and Rwanda to peacefully resolve conflicts in Eastern DRC where Rwandasupported rebel groups were the cause of instability (Saferworld, 2011b). More important, China is a source of arms for the national armies of friendly African governments.

The same pattern of support is replicated at the sub regional level. China has become a good source of financial assistance to African peace and security sub regional organisations. The funds, in the form of donations, are mostly for capacity building, mediation and peacekeeping activities.

The biggest beneficiaries of Chinese aid include the Africa Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a total of US$1.8 million by 2008, and African Mission in Somalia (AMISON) with US$700,000 in 2009.

This compares unfavourably with the European Union (EU) and the US who gave US$444 million to AMIS in 2006 and the EU gave €35.5 million to the African Peace Facility for AMISON (Van Hoeymissen, 2010). In 2005, China gave US$400, 000 to the AU for continental peacekeeping activities. In 2006, China provided US$3.5 million to the African peacekeeping mission in Sudan’s Darfur as budgetary support and humanitarian emergency aid. Of this, US$2.5 million went to humanitarian emergency to help the refugees, and US$1 million for budgetary support of the AU Peace and Security Council-PSC (He, 2007; Kagwanja, 2009).

5. China: New, Alternative Model of Keeping the Peace and Security in Africa A change of policy from none participation to active involvement in international peacekeeping signalled that China had accepted the UN as the most effective instrument for resolving global security problems, including those in Africa.

Therefore, it presents itself as not challenging international institutions, norms and practices. By adhering to traditional principles of sovereignty, non-interference and consent, accompanied by UN authorisation, China fits in very well within the international framework. It is apparent that by “accepting global norms” and international laws of peacekeeping, agreeing to “strengthen global peace operations, it contributes to peace and security in Africa and other developing countries and expands its multilateral military cooperation ...” and by allowing itself to “become even more integrated into the international community” and declaring that it was a responsible global leader with its peaceful rise, China had embraced the status quo.

Similarly, its pro-status quo stance manifested itself when China rallied behind international consensus, whenever its interests or those of its allies were not threatened as in the case of its vote for peace enforcement for humanitarian assistance to Somalia through the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM) and United Task Force (UNITAF) under the US and coalesced with fellow P5 when pressured by demands for the UNSC reform (He,

Furthermore, China has contributed to capacity building of African peace and security organisations and national armies active in peacekeeping in Africa. Chinese equipment sold to African governments has boosted African peacekeeping capabilities. In September 2008, the President of Ghana signed a US$160 million agreement with the Chinese government which re-equipped the Ghana Armed Forces and enhanced Ghanaian multilateral peacekeeping abilities. Zambian troops relied on Chinese-manufactured WZ-551 armoured carriers in their peace support operations in Sudan. China has also given landmine detection equipment to Egypt and mine clearance training courses to engineers from Angola, Burundi, Chad,

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2007; Wuthnow, 2011; Ayenagbo et al., 2012).

Moreover, China is a fervent believer in the Westphalian principles of peacekeeping of neutrality and impartiality, voluntary consent to adhere to sovereign equality of states, non-interference in domestic affairs of a state, and minimum use of force, as well as the UN as a multilateral framework (Karlsson, 2011; Sicurelli, 2010; He, 2007). Thus, China prefers to rely on the UNSC and sub and regional organisations as avenues for promoting peace and security. This makes China the greatest supporter of multilateralism and attendant international norms and laws. Its efforts are geared towards buffeting multilateral global order which is anchored on regions led by regional great powers, such as South Africa; and resolving security issues through multilateral channels (Kuo, 2012).

The Chinese model departs from the Western intervention driven by two frameworks: the military framework of UN multinational peacekeeping forces and political framework of preventive diplomacy, mediation and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) (Osei-Hwedie, 2011a). The Chinese model is limited, selective, comprehensive and averse to the use of force to paint a picture of peaceful rise and responsible power that respects international laws, and engages in peacekeeping activities in response to human needs in volatile environments. Chinese peacekeepers include noncombatants such as engineering, medical, transport and police personnel. For example, they rebuild roads, bridges, and schools, and offer medical care to the UN blue helmets and local communities (Huang, 2011; Karlsson, 2011). China does not avail combat troops to the UN peace missions.

Provision of non-combat troops may be a reflection of China’s soft power approach and the desire not to be involved in external wars in order to help build a ‘Harmonious World,’ where peace prevails.

The soft power could be the Asian model of power projection on the global level, as Japan too follows the soft power approach (Osei-Hwedie, 2011a).

However, it is equally true that China does not fully embrace liberal peacekeeping as espoused by the UN, based on Western values and laws. It has its own interpretation. It presents a new and alternative model of peacekeeping based on the use of soft power, and adherence to the traditional aspects of the international peacekeeping framework that suit its image of a responsible global power and peaceful rise. It offers a competing model to that of the West, in the form of an Asian model given the similarity between China’s and Japan’s involvement in global security (Osei-Hwedie, 2011a; Kuo, 2012). The Chinese model is labelled as the Eastphalia versus post-Westphalia (the West) (Sicurelli, 2010), or soft power versus hard power (West), and even Beijing Consensus versus Washington Consensus. China does not acknowledge human rights and peacebuilding in its peacekeeping activities, in spite of the fact that its peacekeepers are engaged in reconstruction of social and physical infrastructure and medical care, all part of peacebuilding. In contrast, the West have adapted traditional principles to changing circumstance that incorporates universal human rights and justice, or R2P as a whole (Karlsson, 2011; Sicurelli, 2011) as the source of legitimisation of UN interventions. The EU, for example, prefers the “norm of pooled sovereignty as a peacekeeping tool” to allow for intervention without consent of a host state (Sicurelli, 2010), especially in grave humanitarian situations. This places the international community, the UN, above the state and accepts R2P. The US has increasingly turned to unilateralism, abandoning multilateralism since September 11, 2001 following the terrorist attack in the US, and 2011 in the fight against rebel group of Joseph Kony in Uganda.

China undertakes political and comprehensive missions (Pengtao, 2009), which have the consent of conflicting parties or at least the host government, and directed at finding a political solution to achieve sustainable peace and stability, to both inter and intra state conflicts. Such missions aim to create durable reconciliation between contending parties, not merely a ceasefire, which China views as offering a temporary solution. Therefore, compared to the use of force in peacekeeping by Western powers and the UN, China prefers a political approach in which dialogue and negotiations are emphasised and sovereignty and non-interference are upheld. This might account for China’s absence in ceasefires, and DDR of combatants. The Chinese model tries to create a balance between principles of sovereignty and non interference, and promoting global security through multilateral peacekeeping (Pengtao, 2009).

China also differs from the West and the UN as it holds that dialogue and justice lead to peace and development (Osei-Hwedie 2011b), and that economic growth and development are the only guarantors of durable peace and security (Sicurelli, 2010; Saferworld, 2011b). China posits that underdevelopment causes conflict and insecurity.

Therefore, economic development is the only answer to peace (Sicurelli, 2010) and does not

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accept democracy, capitalism and human rights as conditions for a secure and peace-able society. In addition, China offers a new concept of security, departing from current hierarchical power and economic structure commonly held by Western scholars, powers and the UN. The new security could be seen as a reflection of the changing power configurations, from the West to the East. Winpeng (2009) argues that China is “promoting a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation and shaping an international environment favourable for common development.” This is the win-win formula, which mirrors collective security stipulated in the UN Charter. It is part of the Beijing Consensus that seeks to present alternative norms for conducting international relations. This is a departure from the West who are suspicious of non-Western powers including China and Russia, therefore, unwilling to cooperate with them. Similarly, Western powers have the tendency to assume leadership position, and take inequalities and uneven development, both within and between states as products of a normal functioning of a neo-liberal global system.

Therefore, Western powers have an aversion to cooperation in preference for dominance, unilateralism or reliance on few allies, as in the case of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

readiness with which African countries and their sub regional organisations have embraced the Chinese model. This is due to the fact that, like China, African countries and their organisations jealously guard their sovereignty, and resent Western intervention in their countries, under the pretext of human rights. Also, like China, African countries and organisations, such as the AU, place peace before justice, as their immediate concern, because without peace, justice is untenable.

6. Impacts, Challenges and Future Patterns of Behaviour While China alone cannot bring about sustainable peace and security given the complexities of African conflicts and wars, it is important to assess its impact, the challenges preventing better performance, and possible future patterns of its contribution. When analysing relations between a big power and the UN on one hand, with Africa, on the other hand, the old age question that arises is: who benefits? Specifically, does Africa benefit?

This is even more important given the controversy that surrounds China’s relations with Africa. A discussion of China’s motivations above suggests that China has reaped enormous benefits from its contributions to world peace and security, and specifically, Africa. However, it is equally true that benefits have also accrued to the UN and Africa.

Lastly, the Chinese model of peacekeeping targets every African country without discrimination.

All African states are considered important and strategic. This might explain why all African states, with no diplomatic relations with Taiwan, were invited to the renowned 2006 Beijing Summit at which FOCAC was promulgated. Unlike the West which selects few pro-West or strategic African countries as deserving recipients of peacekeeping operations, Chinese peacekeepers have served in all regions of Africa, whether poor or rich. China has sent peacekeepers to Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Western Sahara (Pengtao, 2009).

China’s active engagement in UN peace efforts came at the appropriate time when African conflicts were no longer important to the Western members of the UNSC, especially following the debacle in Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s. Instead, the West had turned their attention to the former Soviet Union bloc, particularly the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, China’s entry into UN peacekeeping was timely because it has helped to meet the demand for UN peacekeeping which outstrips the supply. UN capability has been overstretched with a spiral in conflicts and violence worldwide. Primarily, the UN has insufficient human, financial and material resources to effectively provide peace missions to all conflict zones. Therefore, China has become a new source of human, financial, and material resources for resource-deficient UN. China has availed engineers, transport battalions and field hospitals which assist the UN to fulfil its mandate.

The Chinese model seems to be a serious competitor to the Western model of peacekeeping.

Sicurelli (2010) states that “the Chinese model of peacekeeping appears increasingly attractive for African governments and regional organisations...

China is emerging as a competing norm promoter on Africa states and regional organisations, which provides the latter with an alternative model of peacekeeping.” The West seems dismayed at the

To the UN’s benefit, China’s engagement has improved the image and legitimacy of UN peacekeeping missions due to the disciplined,

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professionalism and scandal-free behaviour of Chinese peacekeepers (Pengtao, 2009; Gill and Huang, 2009; Saferworld, 2011a; Huang, 2011). The UN’s reputation was damaged following allegations of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, corruption and plunder of resources by its peacekeepers (Gill and Huang, 2009; Pengtao, 2009; Huang, 2011). For example, 60 to 70 per cent of Liberian women were subjected to physical or sexual violence by combatants, UNOMIL peacekeepers, and humanitarian workers. In the DRC, 140 cases of alleged sexual abuse were reported between December 2004 and August 2006. Similarly, peacekeepers of UNISOM II, Mozambique and Sierra Leone were implicated in rape of civilian women and creating illegal sex industries in these countries (Nkechi, 2007: 2009). Thus, Chinese UN peacekeepers paint a positive picture of the UN in contrast to “Belgian, Canadian, Italian and Pakistan peacekeepers” who “were implicated in egregious acts against civilians, including torture, murder and rape” in the DRC, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (Nkechi, 2007).

Equally significant, the participation of “Chinese peacekeepers sends a reassuring message and helps the missions to project an image of being inclusive, impartial and genuinely multilateral” (Gill and Huang, 2009). As a developing state which was colonised in the past, its involvement makes peace missions more acceptable and not viewed as neocolonial interventions to developing countries, including African countries (Saferworld, 2011a; Saferworld, 2011b).

375km of roads and medical team has performed 900 laboratory tests on patients and provided free medical services to the local community. China also donated US$50,000 worth of medical supplies and recreational materials to a local community. In return, the Liberian government has renamed roads and bridges with Chinese names, in appreciation.

Also, the Chinese peacekeepers provided logistical support to the government during the November 2009 senatorial elections, which were conducted smoothly and administered efficiently. In 2010, President Sirleaf Johnson commended them for their reconstruction and development role (Ayenagbo et al., 2012; Saferworld, 2011b).

Undoubtedly, China’s participation has contributed positively to African peace and security. However, there are numerous challenges faced by China in UN peacekeeping activities in Africa. The biggest problems rest with preferred principles of peacekeeping, nature and quality of China’s contributions, China-host state relationship, complexity of African conflicts, and the international environment. China remains steadfast to the three traditional Westphalian principles of sovereign equality, non-interference and consent of host, plus UN authorisation as the basis for intervention. Unfortunately, this does not allow for flexibility in responding to situations where consent is not given, there are human rights violations, and deprivations of social justice. Such situations necessitate the use of force, which China does not support. This means that the implementation of the R2P becomes problematic. In reality, strict adherence to principles and norms of sovereignty, non-interference and consent, run counter to realisation of global stability and security; and fails to appreciate the changing international norms, values and responsibilities.

Much more commendable is the fact that grassroots also benefit greatly. The engagement of Chinese peacekeepers has been valuable in countries and regions suffering from conflict and violence or postconflict states because lives of ordinary people and their existence have been saved and protected. They have helped to end civil wars, provide precious medical and transport services to UN combatants and local communities, and refurbished social and physical infrastructure. For example, Chinese, as part of UN peacekeepers, were instrumental in ending hostilities in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and reducing conflict in Darfur and the DRC. In addition, through policing and training of local police in postconflict societies, such as in the DRC and Liberia, Chinese peacekeepers have contributed to public safety of ordinary citizens (Saferworld, 2011a).

Essentially, Liberians, Sudanese and Congolese of the DRC have benefited the most. In Liberia, the Chinese transport unit has carried more than 14,000 tonnes of materials, engineering team has rebuilt

It is the contradictory role of China as a contributor to peace and security on one hand, and supplier of arms, on the other hand, which is most puzzling.

This contradiction negates its image of a responsible world leader, and contravenes the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs of a sovereign state, advocated by China. By supplying arms, it is taking sides, therefore intervening in internal affairs of a sovereign state, regardless of the good intention of strengthening the defence of host country. As a supplier of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) to its allied African governments, it causes both inter- and intra-state conflict and insecurity, thus creating a cycle of violence on the continent. For example, China is blamed for prolonged war from

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1998 to 2000 between Ethiopia and Eritrea as it sold arms worth US$1 billion to these two countries in contravention of the UN arms embargo against them (Saferworld, 2011b).

role and commercial interests so that they do not clash and threaten peace and security. In Sudan for example, China’s neutrality and impartiality has been questioned because of the support for Al-Bashir’s government at the exclusion of rebel groups in Darfur including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (Hirono, 2011). This has resulted in mistrust of the Chinese by the rebel groups and local population, which impacts negatively on its peacekeeping role. Its peacekeeping role could be undermined by negative public perceptions of the Chinese government as a result of its support for incumbent despotic governments and its businesses with poor labour and environmental practices.

Arms sales to African governments undermine domestic tranquillity and security in three ways: first, repressive African governments in Sudan and Zimbabwe, for example, use the arms to suppress civil uprisings and protest against the governments.

The Zimbabwean army has allegedly used Chinese weapons against urban protests to restore civil order and harass the political opposition. In 2004, China sold weapons and equipment amounting to US$200 million in contravention of US and EU arms embargo against Zimbabwe (Kagwanja, 2009).

Furthermore, in April 2008, a scandal surfaced of a Chinese ship full of arms to Zimbabwe, which was denied docking rights at Mozambican, Namibian and South African ports (Saferworld, 2011b). Second, although incumbent regimes use Chinese arms in self defence, the availability of arms prompts them to continue fighting the war, accelerating violence which spirals out of control. Third, arms sold to governments become a source of arms supply when they fall into rebel groups’ hands. This contributes to a cycle of conflicts and wars in African countries, and makes it difficult to stop wars. For example, in Sudan, Chinese weapons have been used to violate human rights and international humanitarian law by government forces, militia and rebels groups, in Darfur (Saferworld, 2011b).

The danger is that its commercial interests might take priority over peacekeeping goals. It should be reiterated that one of the major reasons China is involved in peacekeeping duties in Africa, is to realise its economic security by protecting its investments and access to strategic natural resources. This is the reason why the DRC, Liberia and Sudan have hosted the largest number of Chinese peacekeepers than any other country. Related, is the fact that China’s friendship with recipients of peace missions prevents it from collaborating with other major powers for efficient and effective peacekeeping in Africa. China has been accused of withholding information on MONUC by other UNSC members. It has the tendency to safeguard African states with poor governance reputation and endowed with strategic resources such as the DRC, Liberia, and Sudan through the veto power and diplomatic ties. The new scramble for Africa by the major powers indicates that power politics among the P5 greatly influences UN peace and security operations.

It should be noted, however, that China is not the only UNSC member that sells arms and trains African armies, thus contributing to instability, the US and France do the same. For example, the Guinean army accused of killing protestors in 2009, has bought arms, and has been trained, by China, France and the US (Saferworld, 2011b). Likewise, Chinese trained commandos in Guinea killed 150 protestors in 2009; and Chinese trained armed forces in the DRC are alleged to have violated international humanitarian law (Saferworld, 2011b).

An equally important challenge is China’s personnel and financial contributions. China does not contribute combat troops, primarily because it relies on soft power. Therefore, it is unwilling to support or use force, unless on humanitarian grounds and authorised by the UNSC as in the case of Somalia.

China voted for UNITAF and UNISOM II which “were authorised to use force” as in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In this way, China demonstrated that it could be flexible on use of force for humanitarian assistance, “as long as its own core interests” were not threatened (He, 2007). It provides relatively few numbers of noncombat troops, approximately two per cent of the total contingent. This is far less than its large conventional force and contributions of other big powers. Its financial contributions are

Another challenge is the discrepancy between being a neutral and impartial peacekeeper in conflicts involving friendly governments fighting against rebels, on one hand, and the necessity to support host African countries where there are enormous Chinese investments as well as sources of strategic resources for China. This brings up the question of how China balances its bilateral military ties with African recipients of peacekeeping, peacekeeping

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estimated at less than three per cent, again below the contributions of the other four UNSC members, with the US accounting for the highest of 25 per cent of the total cost of UN peacekeeping operations (Ayenagbo et al., 2012: Singh, 2011; Huang, 2011; Hellstrom, 2009). However, the contributions of the US and other Western powers declined in the mid and late 2000s. The ad hoc, eclectic and informal approach to disbursement of funds, in the form of donations, to African peace and security organisations is another limitation. This prevents such organisations from planning peace operations as there are no guaranteed funds from China. China’s approach compares poorly with the formalised and orderly arrangement of the US and EU through the Global Peace Operation and African Peace Facility, respectively (Van Hoeymissen, 2010). This means that its financial and manpower contributions do not match its resource largesse, with the largest conventional army in the world and monetary power, with enormous foreign reserves totalling US$ 3 billion in 2011. Consequently, its influence is affected accordingly.

to engage in liberal peace building. Such selective involvement questions its true intentions and position as a responsible world leader.

The biggest hurdle to active Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping operations emanates from the external environment. Some big countries and their mass media, especially the US, are suspicious of China’s increasing involvement in international affairs, particularly peacekeeping through the UN. They believe that China is using UN peacekeeping to advance its hegemonic aspirations. Therefore, it might pose a threat to the status quo. Equally, they think that China aspires to wield influence in host states in the post conflict period. The US mass media’s reaction was in direct reference to the participation of Chinese Police Force Unit in the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as evidence of spreading its influence to Haiti, an “American backyard.” The “China Threat” theory, inhibits China from being “assertive” and instead, keeps “a low profile” and “never taking the lead” to avoid misinterpretation and maintain an “international image” acceptable to the international community (He, 2007). The China Threat theory helps to explain why China prefers “to adopt a rather conservative and retrained policy on the UNPKO ...” and “its reluctance to send combat troops” for UN peacekeeping (He, 2007).

The other problem is the newness of China to multilateral peacekeeping which suggests that it does not have the requisite peacekeeping skills and capability. For example, China has limited air and sea lift capability critical to rapid deployment of large numbers of troops to far off places such as Africa (Ayenagbo et al., 2012). Furthermore, China’s inability to fully embrace the changed conception of peacekeeping which includes peace building is a challenge. Thus, although China contributed US$3 million to the UN Peacebuilding Fund from 2007 through 2009, it does not embrace the peace building role. The peacebuilding activities it is engaged in are part of its peacekeeping roles, which have produced dividends in the DRC, Liberia and Sudan through repairs of social and physical infrastructure. Lack of commitment to peace building arises from China’s refusal to accept the Western concept of peace building based on liberal democracy as the best form of government and market capitalism to drive socio-economic development; and an active role for global civil society (Selby, 2008; Osei-Hwedie, 2011a). Both China and the West recognise the need for strong state and economic development in African postconflict societies. However, China subscribes to a strong government with a selected leadership and building the capacity of a state as the best guarantor of economic development (Saferworld, 2011b).

What is bewildering is China’s participation in liberal peacekeeping (not all aspects) but reluctance

The future trends of Chinese peace and security activities and roles are subject to speculation.

However, it should be recognised that China’s involvement is a learning process which might produce changes in the future. As China acquires experience, skills and capacities, better appreciates the global realities, and consolidates its international leadership and responsibilities, revisions of its policy are likely to happen. Demands of a responsible global leader might prompt China to adopt more flexible, realistic and pragmatic positions. There is evidence that China might, over time and gradually, deal with the challenges by modifying its current stance. Huang’s (2011) argument illustrates that China does not want to be seen as a global outlier and wants to be recognised as a contributor to, or at least not an inhibitor of, global peace and stability. Gill and Huang (2009) appreciate China’s increasing responsiveness to international expectations.

Regarding the use of military force, it has been reported that since 1999, Chinese officials have been softening their position by appreciating the need to intervene “earlier, faster and more forcefully.” This

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modern equipment. Third, it is necessary for China to adapt and accept the changing conceptualisation of peacekeeping, including flexibility to Westphalian principles, peace building and R2P. This necessitates the use of both soft and hard power in accordance with the demands of each conflict. Fourth, China needs to adopt firm and consistent stance instead of the current inconsistent and selective posture; collaborate with the other UNSC members for coordinated efforts to fulfil UN mandates; build the capacity of African sub regional organisations so that they can take responsibility for their own peace and security problems; and accommodate indigenous methods and civil society in peace building as the current trend in the UN demands. Lastly, international organisations and community as a whole should ‘encourage’ China to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, given the misgivings about its role. This would lead to confidence-building and acceptance of its participation (He, 2007).

was said by the Chinese Ambassador to the UN in 2003 when commenting on the increased instability in the DRC and Liberia (Huang, 2011; Saferworld, 2011b). In 2005, President Hu Jintao announced that China would pursue a comprehensive strategy featuring prevention, peace restoration, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction (Huang, 2011). The fact that China has signed the R2P gives hope that it will adopt a more flexible response to gross human rights violations in conflict situations. Hellstrom (2009) succinctly presents an optimistic scenario when he concludes that in 2000s, China’s own experiences with peace support operations convinced it that it would have to resort to the use of military force to protect peacekeeping force that includes Chinese citizens.

Similarly, Hirono (2011) thinks that changes are already under way when he states that China’s peacekeeping policy has taken “a more flexible stance in relation to the notion of sovereignty.”

Gill and Huang (2009) also hold the same optimistic view, arguing that “China has ...supported increases in authorised troop strengths ...because its peacekeepers are active there and are directly aware of the needs of the missions. ...deploy combat troops to UN missions ... and is likely to do so in the future if asked by the DPKO.” Hellstrom (2009) also argues that there are indications that China would support strengthening the UN peacekeeping regime. For example, it has promised to increase finances and personnel to the UNPKO (Hellstrom 2009). Therefore, there is the likelihood that China would be an active participant in peace building.

However, He (2007) maintains a pessimistic argument that it is unlikely to drastically discard its Westphalian norms of peacekeeping and the non use of force.

7. Conclusion Undoubtedly, participation by Chinese peacekeepers in UN peacekeeping in general, and Africa in particular, has resulted in positive outcomes for China, the UN, host states and their citizens. Therefore, China has emerged as a significant strategic partner to resolve African conflicts to have durable peace and stability.

China’s active African policy on peace and security was a result of changes in its foreign and security policy, and the post cold war international system; desire to assume leadership position in global security commensurate with its emerging military and economic power; the need to protect access to Africa’s oil and mineral resources for its growing economy; eagerness to compete and challenge US hegemony; realisation that its economic security is closely linked to global security, and determination to exert influence in the UNSC and DPKO.

To improve its influence and impact effectively on future African multilateral missions, assume influential leadership position in the UNSC and DPKO, and live up to the international community’s expectations, policy shifts are imperative. First and foremost, China has to increase its monetary, human and material contributions commensurate with its financial and troop strengths, and UNSC and global stature. Specifically, its share of funds, and non-combat troops should be relatively equal to contributions of the other Security Council (SC) members. Moreover, it should avail combat troops as well whenever they are requested for.

Second, it should develop appropriate and adequate peacekeeping operational capabilities through training for skills acquisition and procurement of

China has preferred multilateral channels to give its support to peacekeeping in Africa, primarily through the UN, as the most effective way.

However, some of the financial support has been allocated to African peace and security sub regional organisations, especially the AU. This has helped China to promote its national interests.

China presents a new, alternative model to that of the West, the soft power approach, consisting of non-combat troop, multilateralism, Westphalian principles, political solutions, non-discrimination of any African state, none adherence to democracy

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and capitalism, little or no peace building role, dispatch of batches of peacekeepers at intervals, and disciplined as well as professional staff.

Gill, B., Huang C., and Morrison S. (2007), “Assessing China’s Growing Influence in Africa”, China Security, 3, 3: 3-21, Summer, Availble at www.wsichina.org/cs7_1. pdf, Accessed on April 28, 2012.

While China has filled the void created by the West who have become preoccupied with peacekeeping in the former Eastern Europe at the expense of Africa, its involvement has been faced with numerous challenges. These include meagre funds and few non combat troops, no combat troops and adherence to traditional principles of peacekeeping.

Moreover, except for Liberia, others, especially, the DRC and Sudan, continue to face instability and insecurity, thereby limiting its impact. Other shortcomings are due to contradictory role of a peacekeeper and arms supplier, tension between neutrality and impartiality and protection of its commercial interests, support for regressive host governments, limited or no role in peace building, and inadequate skills and capacity in peacekeeping.

He, Y. (2007), “China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations”, Institute for Security and Development Policy Asia Paper, July, Available at www. silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/.../2007/YinHe0409073. pdf, Accessed on April 28, 2012.

Hellstrom, J. (2009), Blue Berets under the Red Flag: China in the UN Peacekeeping System, Stockholm: FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Hirono, M. (2011), “China’s Charm Offensive and Peacekeeping: The Lessons of Cambodia–What Now for Sudan?”, International Peacekeeping, 18, 3: 328-343.

Huang, C. H. (2011), “Principles and Praxis of China’s Peacekeeping”, International Peacekeeping, 18, 3: 257270.

Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China (2011), China’s National Defense in 2010, First Edition, March, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press Company.

Endnote The paper makes use of some ideas in an article by the author published by the Special Issue of Global Development Studies, 2012.

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International Crisis Group (2009), China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, Asia Report, April 17, Available at www.crisigroup.org/.../asia/...asia/166_chinas_growing_ role_in_un_, Accessed on April 28, 2012.

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Redefining China’s Role in Promoting Peace and Security in Africa

By Paul Odhiambo Policy Analyst, Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), Kenya Abstract: Though China’s main priority in Africa has been economic interests, it is increasingly getting involved in peace and security issues in the continent. This paper examines how China promotes Africa’s peace and security. Currently, China actively participates in the UN peace support operations, AU peacerelated activities, bilateral military cooperation and addressing development challenges. However, Beijing has limited participation in anti-piracy operations, anti-terror campaigns, mediation and conflict resolution, peacebuilding activities and addressing non-traditional security issues. China’s role in promoting peace and security in Africa is encouraging though not adequate due to her vested interests and adherence to the policy of “non-interference” in domestic affairs of other sovereign states. In order for China to engage more actively in Africa’s peace and security activities, it should enhance capacity building of African security institutions and work closely with African state actors, international institutions and African non-state actors.

1. Introduction

and security in considerable parts of Africa. Though China has had a steady economic cooperation with Africa for a number of decades, its involvement in Africa’s security and peace activities is a recent initiative. As Beijing deepens its relations with other countries, there are indications that China will play an important role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Observers contend that the deepening of Sino-Africa relations means that Beijing’s new role in African affairs will most likely transform its engagement in the continent’s peace and security issues as shown in China’s Africa Policy and the 2009 Action Plan of the Fourth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) deliberations and other policy documents.

In the last decade, the peace and security situation has relatively improved in several parts of Africa.

Full-blown civil wars decreased considerably in the continent in the late 1990s and 2000s. Today, countries that once experienced armed conflicts such as Mozambique, Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone have realised considerable development in the post-conflict reconstruction era. However, Africa still faces peace and security threats such as transnational organised crimes, terrorism, arms flow, Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea piracy, sectarian or communal violence, electionsrelated conflict, exponential growth of militias, military coups especially in West Africa, and illicit trafficking networks. Stability and security is still fragile in Egypt and Libya that experienced the Arab Spring in 2011. Despite the secession of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan in 2011, the two countries still have tense relations that compromise peace and security, especially on their international borders and in contested regions such as Abyei. Peace, security and stability are yet to be fully restored in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Mali and Guinea Bissau.

2. Africa Peace and Security Architecture Since China has developed interest in working with African Union (AU) institutions and subregional organisations to address the problem of peace and security, it is important first to examine Africa’s peace and security institutions. The launch of the AU in July 2002 marked a turning point in the history of post-independence Africa. African leaders initiated a new African security regime for maintenance of peace, security and managing conflicts in the vast continent.

The recent spate of violence in Nigeria allegedly caused by Boko Haram is a manifestation that radical groups can be a threat to peace, stability and security. Somalia has not had an effective central government since its civil war that followed after the ouster of President Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991.

What remains to be seen is how the involvement of the regional peace support operation (African Mission in Somalia - AMISOM) will contribute to peace, security and reconstruction of the Somali state. In a nutshell, there is still fragility of peace

During the first Assembly of the AU in July 2002, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established as a standing decision making organ.

The PSC Protocol came into effect in December 2003 after it was ratified by the requisite 27 AU member states. The PSC is a collective security and an early warning regime to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. Key functions of PSC include

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promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; anticipation and prevention of conflicts; promotion and implementation of peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction activities, coordination and harmonisation of continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism, development of a common defence policy for AU, and encouragement of democratic practices, good governance, rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Moolakkattu, 2010).

and to settle disputes instead of resorting to use of force that can lead to insecurity and instability.

Moreover, internal affairs of a sovereign state should be addressed by citizens of the country concerned without influence from external forces.

In addition, China believes in international diplomacy based on equality in which countries treat each other as equals, since all countries across the world are equal members of the international community under international law. Peaceful coexistence is the hallmark of China’s foreign policy.

The PSC gets support from the AU Commission’s Chair and its Peace and Security Department; a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); an African Standby Force (ASF) and Peace Fund. The Military Staff Committee is also critical in advising and assisting in matters related to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in the continent (Golaszinski, 2004). The PSC is also supported by the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) including East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority Development (IGAD), Economic Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). The RECs are expected to play a crucial role in the formation of the sub-regional standby forces namely EASBRIG (East Africa), ECOBRIG (West Africa), SADCBRIG (Southern Africa), North African Brigade and Central African Brigade. Generally, African Standby Force is supposed to be a network of sub-regional standby forces, offering a real prospect of African solutions to African problems.

2.2 China’s reluctance to UN-led peacekeeping operations After taking over the Permanent Seat of Security Council from Taiwan in 1971, China was opposed to the establishment of United Nations peacekeeping missions for various reasons. As a result, the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) neither contributed personnel nor material resources to the peacekeeping operations. The involvement of the UN in the Korean War in early 1950s, confirmed China’s fears that multilateral peacekeeping operations were partial since the UN forces sided with South Korea against North Korea in the war.

In the early years of China in the UN Security Council, China viewed peacekeeping operations as the theatre of USA and Soviet Union’s superpower “power politics” globally.

Since developing countries had supported China’s quest for Security Council permanent seat, Beijing felt indebted to these countries by not intervening under the UN auspices as this could constitute violating the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-intervention in domestic affairs of sovereign states and equality of countries in the international community (International Crisis Group, 2009). By not supporting UN peacekeeping missions, China was able to maintain good relations with developing countries. In other words, Beijing argued that peace and security in newly independent African countries would be guaranteed through upholding and respecting the principles of inviolability of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs.

2.1 China’s basic principles of foreign policy The key principles of China’s foreign policy (also known as Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence) are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in domestic affairs of a sovereign state; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

China advocates for a world where sovereign states respect each other by respecting the independence of other states, whether they are big or small, rich or poor, militarily strong or weak.

2.3 Policy shift China began participating in UN peacekeeping mission in 1981 when it cast its Security Council vote in support of Security Council Resolution 495 that led to the extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). In

Chinese leadership contends that consultation and dialogue are necessary in enhancing mutual trust

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1982, China made its first financial contribution for UN peacekeeping operations. Further, Beijing was accepted as a member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 1988.

Chinese UN peacekeeping personnel comprise military observers, engineer battalions, civilian police units, medical teams and transport companies. So far, China does not send military combats to UN peace support operations. In the last two decades, China has increased its UN peacekeepers to the extent that it has overtaken the other four veto (permanent) members of the Security Council.

China deployed non-military observers in 1989 as part of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to monitor elections in Namibia. In the same year, China deployed five military observers to support the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East. Between 1992 and 1993, China had a contingent of engineering troops and military observers in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia. The involvement of China in the UN peacekeeping was captured in a white paper entitled China’s National Defence in 2004. In this document, China contends that “the UN peacekeeping operations should abide by the purpose and principles of the UN Charter and other universally recognised principles governing peacekeeping operations.” Figure 1 demonstrates how Chinese UN peacekeepers have increased dramatically in recent times.

Figure 2: Peacekeepers from the security council permanent members in 2011

Figure 1: Chinese participating in the UN peacekeeping operations

Source: UN peacekeeping (www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ resources/statistics)

3. China’s Contribution to Africa’s Peace and Security China is actively involved in promoting peace and security in Africa through contributing to the UN peace support operations in the continent; supporting AU peace-related activities; bilateral military cooperation and engaging in development activities in Africa as a long-term solution to underdevelopment and conflict. On the other hand, China has had limited engagement in promoting peace and security in Africa in antipiracy campaigns, war on terrorism, mediation and conflict resolutions, peacebuilding activities and non-traditional security issues.

Source: UN peacekeeping (www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ resources/statistics)

China argues that the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping including consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality and non-use of force should be met before multilateral peacekeeping personnel are deployed. In order to be effective in the multilateral peace support operations, Beijing has established Peacekeeping Office under its Ministry of National Defense to oversee the management and coordination of People Liberal Army’s participation in UN peacekeeping activities.

3.1 United Nations peace support operations China’s involvement in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa has been quite remarkable in the last two decades. Today, Chinese multilateral peacekeepers in Africa are more than its contribution

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years, peacekeeping interventions have changed dramatically as peacekepers find themselves in more challenging environments. Today’s peace support operations are not only deployed in the cessation of an inter-state conflict to oversee implementation of a peace agreement, but also in a country emerging from civil war in which an integrated action is needed to rebuild the State. Peacekeepers engaged in post-conflict reconstruction are most of the time working on conflict resolution initiatives. In some cases, the mandate of peacekeepers might be enhanced to include peace enforcement in which they can use force against one or more parties to the conflict. Under certain circumstances, the peacekeepers might go against the three principles (consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality and non-use of force) of traditional peacekeeping.

in the rest of the world. China has also stated that enhancement of regional peacekeeping in Africa to deal with the challenges of security and stability is Beijing’s priority. In China’s Africa Policy (2006), China reiterates its support to and participates in UN peacekeeping in Africa and argues that multilateral peacekeeping is one of its security cooperation tools. When engaging in peacekeeping missions, Beijing endeavours to strike a balance between upholding the principle of non-interference and “the Responsibility to Protect” norm. In February 2009, China had 1,745 peacekeeping personnel in Africa assigned to six of the UN’s seven peacekeeping operations in Africa. Currently, Beijing is engaged in the UN operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), Liberia (UNMIL), Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and the Western Sahara (MINURSO).

In the past, Chinese peacekeepers have also served in UN peacekeeping missions in Namibia (198990), Mozambique (1993-94), Liberia (1993-94), Burundi (2004), and Sierra Leone (1998-99 and 1999-2005).

3.2 African Union peace related activities China works closely with the African Union and sub-regional organisations in the continent on peace-related activities. China has reiterated that effective and sustainable solutions to African peace and security threats should be found within the continent, meaning African governments, politicians and civil society have a responsibility to ensure that Africa has durable peace and security.

During the fourth FOCAC meeting in Egypt, China appreciated the concept and practice of “solving African problems by Africans” in the 2009 Sharmel-Sheikh FOCAC Action Plan. During the 2003 FOCAC meeting in Addis Ababa, Beijing resolved to cooperate and work together with the UN, AU and other sub-regional African organisations in preventing, mediating and resolving conflicts in Africa. Beijing also pledged financial and material assistance as well as relevant training to the AU’s Peace and Security Council (FOCAC Action Plan, 2003).

Chinese personnel taking part in UN peace operations have been involved in activities such as monitoring the cessation of hostilities, implementation of a cease-fire agreement, disarmaments, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation, consolidation of peace and sustainable development. Engineer battalions often engage in construction of roads, bridges and airports; provision of water and power supplies and overall improvement of infrastructure. Chinese peacekeepers often train local police forces in postconflict states. This is an important contribution as the trained police officers provide public security in these societies. Some of the strengths of Chinese UN peacekeepers include professionalism, adequate training and high level of discipline.

Language barrier is a major limitation to Chinese UN peacekeepers. Moreover, China’s adherence to the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention is seen as a limiting factor to its active involvement in peacekeeping, as presently Beijing only contributes non-combat peacekeepers. China’s skepticism of multidimensional peacekeeping operations seems to contribute to its cautious approach towards an integrated multifunctional peace support operation.

China contends that sub-regional African organisations are better placed to resolve regional conflicts through good offices and peacekeeping operations. Since AU replaced Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) in 2002, there have been three African peace support operations namely the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The AMIS evolved into a hybrid United Nations Africa Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Regional approach to peace support operations in Africa is entrenched in Africa Peace and Security Architecture. At global level, China has used its permanent seat in

While China favours classical peacekeeping, the UN’s agenda for peace and security has expanded tremendously over the last two decades. In recent

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and African countries in carrying out military related technological exchanges and defence attaches based in Chinese embassies (Saferworld, 2011). Military cooperation also entails financial assistance for military infrastructure, de-mining support and training African military personnel in order to guarantee their security (China’s Africa Policy, 2006). Chinese military also support African militaries in developing their peacekeeping capabilities. Beijing has established a Civilian Peacekeeping Training Centre in Langfang, Peacekeeping Centre in Huairou and International Relations Academy in Nanking (Aning, 2010).

The institutions are not only for training Chinese peacekeeping personnel, but also for exchanging peacekeeping experience.

the UN Security Council in supporting the idea of addressing security challenges through regional and sub-regional organisations. China supports the establishment and deepening of the strategic partnership between the UN and AU in maintaining peace and security in the continent.

One of the positive outcomes of Chinese quiet diplomacy was the formation of a hybrid United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007 (Wenping, 2010). Despite criticisms, Chinese scholars and policy makers contend that China’s “non-interference” policy has become more flexible as it sought peaceful solution to the Darfur crisis. China and AU also cooperate in the exchange of intelligence to address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges (Aning, 2010). Information sharing on intelligence is vital in multilateral approach in the fight against international terrorism and other transnational crimes.

While it is important to train African militaries in order to strengthen African states’ security sector capabilities to fulfill their constitutional mandate, it is equally critical to ensure that African security sector receiving support from Beijing does not undermine security of the civilians. The deployment of African military by repressive regimes to trample on the rights of civilians has been seen as a major challenge to China and other development partners who support African countries in modernising their security institutions (Alden, 2009).

Beijing has made some modest financial contribution to AU and African sub-regional organisations’ peace-related activities. In 2006, China provided US$1.8 million to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). China donated US$300,000 to AMISOM in 2009. Beijing’s donation to AMISOM in 2010 was US$1.3 million (Saferworld, 2011). China also gave US$11 million in aid to address the Darfur humanitarian crisis. In addition, Beijing donated US$300,000 million to the Kenya Red Cross in January 2008 after the AU appeal for support to address challenges related to post election violence (Aning, 2010).

3.4 Development challenges

China’s National Defence White Paper (2010) recognises China’s cooperation with foreign countries in defence-related science, technology and industry on an equal, mutually beneficial and win-win basis. The White Paper emphasises that the purpose of assisting a friendly state is to enhance its capability for legitimate self-defense, but not to undermine peace, security and stability of the region where the recipient state is located. The National Defense policy document also points out that China conducts military exchange with developing world including African countries.

Chinese leadership and scholars observe that underdevelopment and poverty contribute to various forms of conflicts that might undermine peace and security. One of China’s long-term strategy in promoting peace and security is contribution to African economic growth and development through trade, investment and development assistance (Saferworld, 2011). Currently, China supports a number of infrastructure development programmes in a number of countries in Africa. Beijing is also engaged in the economic dimension of peace building in post-conflict countries. For instance, China has made tremendous contribution to the reconstruction of Liberia, Angola and Sierra Leone through debt cancellation, providing zero-rate loans, investment, construction of infrastructural facilities (such as telecommunication networks, roads, railway and hydroelectric power stations) and boosting employment among others.

China’s bilateral military cooperation is also incorporated in the China’s Africa Policy. In this policy document, Beijing underlines the importance of high-level military exchanges between China

One area that China and Western partners should give special attention to is the exploitation of natural resources in African countries. With more discoveries of oil, gas and minerals in new frontiers

3.3 Bilateral military cooperation

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in the continent, several countries from outside Africa are already investing in the extraction of these invaluable resources. The exploitation of these resources has the potential of starting or escalating conflict between communities, where the resources are found or between local communities and national governments. It is on record that many African countries that discovered oil and other natural resources some decades ago such as DRC, Angola, Liberia, Chad, Sudan and Nigeria, among others, were consumed in armed conflicts or various forms of instabilities, while foreign companies either did business with the ruling elite or rebel leaders controlling territories in conflictridden states. It is therefore imperative that external actors involved in Africa’s resource sector engage in best practices that encourage equal development and benefit common citizens. The signing on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by China and other development partners might be a good move in order to improve transparency in the exploitation of natural resources in the continent.

will contribute to long-lasting maritime security and safety of international shipping.

3.5 Anti-piracy operations

While China’s participation in the anti-piracy efforts might have been motivated by geo-strategic interests, Chinese scholars contend that Beijing‘s willingness to share the burden of upholding international peace and security demonstrates that China is a responsible power (Saferworld, 2011).

India Ocean is strategic for Beijing in that 85 per cent of China’s imports and 60 per cent of its exports are routed through the Gulf of Aden (Piracy Watch, 2011). Beijing is the major importer of crude oil from Middle East and Africa. Therefore, lack of maritime security could disrupt trade that China badly needs for its continued economic growth. The safety of sea routes is critical for global trade since most of the merchandise goods for many countries are transported through the seas and oceans. Although China’s contribution to the antipiracy campaigns is still modest, the willingness to cooperate in the eradicating piracy menace is a move in the right direction.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, pirates from the war-torn Somalia became a major challenge to maritime trade, hence countries that have trade interests along the sea routes felt the need to secure the waterways through deployment of warships and naval personnel. Somali pirates’ attacks cover a vast area including the Gulf of Aden, southern Red Sea, off Yemen, off Oman, Arabian Sea, off Kenya, off Tanzania, off Seychelles, off Madagascar, off Mozambique, Indian Ocean, off Indian west coast and off Maldives west coast (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2011). International Maritime Organisation reported that there were 120 confirmed pirate attacks, 600 seafarers kidnapped and 43 ships hijacked in 2010. By deploying two destroyers and supply ship, Beijing demonstrated its readiness to cooperate with other countries in the anti-Somali piracy operations and in upholding international peace and security.

China got involved in the anti-piracy campaigns in the Gulf of Aden in late 2008, in order to boost counter-piracy international cooperation. China deployed its first naval vessels for anti-Somali piracy operations in December 2008 to escort Chinese shipping in the Gulf of Aden. In 2009, Beijing deployed three ships, DDG 171 Haikou and DDG 169 Wuhan, missile-armed destroyers, and Weishanhu, a supply ship to contribute to antipiracy operations at the off coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Christoffersen, 2009). Other countries and organisations that have deployed their naval warships to fight pirates in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden include the US, NATO, China, Japan, India, Australia, Iran, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. There are various anti-piracy missions including Operation Ocean Shield (NATO and partner states), Atlanta (EU and partner states), Combined Task Force 151, Enduring FreedomHorn of Africa and independent missions of China, Japan, Russia, Iran, India, South Korea and Malaysia. China encourages the international community to support coastal states such as Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti and Tanzania in enhancing their legal capacity in order to discharge their roles adequately when prosecuting suspected pirates.

China has also emphasised that the root cause of Somali piracy needs to be comprehensively addressed by the international community as this

3.6 Anti-terrorism campaigns China supports efforts towards preventing and combating terrorism in Africa. China’s Africa policy indicates that terrorist threats can be overcome through increased intelligence exchange and closer cooperation between China and Africa. Beijing also supports the adoption of a counter-terrorism convention. China has supported the establishment of a centre of studies and research on terrorism in Algiers in Algeria (FOCAC, Addis Ababa Action

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Plan, 2004-2006). Since terrorism is a threat to peace and security of all states, there is need for effective cooperation in fighting the crime.

Government of Sudan. In 2007, Beijing appointed a Special Representative for Darfur to strengthen dialogue and coordinate with stakeholders to find amicable solutions to the Darfur crisis.

In September 2001, China developed a position paper against international terrorism in which it states categorically that terrorism is a serious challenge to human civilisation and a threat to international peace and security. China contends that the war against terrorism calls for protracted and concert efforts of the international community.

Beijing emphasises multilateral cooperation and coordination in the anti-terror campaigns. For the world to defeat terrorism, China observes that the United Nations and its Security Council must play a leading role in the fight against the crime.

China advocates for a harmonious world where there is durable peace and common prosperity.

According to this world view, harmonious world can be realised when countries respect each other and treat each other as equals. Secondly, countries should cooperate with each other to make economic globalisation a win-win process that benefits all countries. Thirdly, countries around the world should draw on each other’s strengths, seek common ground and promote dialogue and respect for diversity (Saferworld, 2011). Fourthly, countries should trust each other, strengthen their cooperation and settle international disputes and conflicts amicably.

According to Guang (2004), anti-terrorism has become an important agenda in China. Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing’s participation in multilateral anti-terror cooperation has increased over the years. In the 1990s, China had begun expounding the new security concept. Chinese leadership noted that the new concept of security has expanded from the traditional military security to comprehensive security. That is, security has become a mutual dependence network of political, economic, military and cultural relationships. The new security concept is not in favour of unilateral military strength. In the globalised world, one country’s security is increasingly entangled with global security. This new security concept informs China’s perception of dealing with terrorist threats that endanger national, regional and international security.

Beijing contends that consultation and dialogue should be upheld to enhance mutual trust, reduce differences and settle disputes. What unique mediation culture does China bring to the regional and international mediation processes? Wu and Qian (2010) contend that Confucianism and Taoism-based value systems are wellsprings of China’s mediation culture. Due to emphasis of harmony, the Chinese heavily rely on the third party to help resolve conflicts. Chinese mediation entails social harmony, moderation, respect for authority, humility and benevolence. Today, China is recognised as possessing the most comprehensive mediation programme in the world. The values and norms of Chinese mediation is strongly embedded in China’s diplomatic mediation system which is non-aggressive in nature, peace-oriented and honouring rules of nature. It remains to be seen how China will use its influence to promote mediation in resolving conflicts in Africa.

3.7 Mediation and conflict resolution The involvement of China in mediation as a means of conflict resolution in Africa is still limited.

While China emphasises the importance of peace, security and stability in its foreign policy, it has not proactively engaged itself in peace processes (Large, 2008). Instead, Beijing has offered a secondary support role through assistance to the peace processes so that it does not involve itself directly. Beijing prefers to participate in mediation and conflict resolution under the multilateral framework or tripartite mechanisms. For instance, China supported trilateral mechanism that was established in 2008 to address issues relevant to the formation of United Nations/African Union in Darfur (UNAMID) and cooperation of the Government of Sudan. The tripartite mechanisms comprised officials from the UN, AU and the

3.8 Peace building activities Historically, Beijing viewed peace building as a form of interference in internal affairs of other countries. While Beijing advocates for poverty reduction and resolving unemployment as the most important tasks at the end of conflicts, the West’s view of peace building involves a number of activities such as rebuilding State institutions, legal and constitutional reforms, holding elections and supporting the development of civil society among others. Despite the differences on what constitutes peace building, China is set to play a more active role in peace building activities. The 2009 FOCAC

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Action Plan indicates Beijing’s willingness “to strengthen cooperation with countries concerned in the UN Peace Building Commission.” Moreover, China is ready to support countries in their postconflict reconstruction processes, though it maintains that the host country should play a leading role in the post-conflict era.

national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.” While Chinese scholars such as Zhao Lei argue that China and Western countries have different understandings over what constitutes peace building, it is critical that the two sides build on their similarities on the concept of peace building so that their convergence in understanding the concept could enable them to influence more effectively peace building processes in Africa.

According to UN Secretary General’s Policy Committee (2007), peace-building constitutes “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening

Table 1: A Chinese view of differences between Western and Chinese approaches to peace building Peace building issues

Western country view

Chinese view

The goal of peacebuilding

Liberal democratic system Priority of market economy

Priority of economic development

The focus of peacebuilding

Good governance

Good government

The principles of peacebuilding

Principles of democratic promotion

Principle of aiding

Principle of intervention

Principle of non-intervention

The strategic culture of peacebuilding

Pre-emptive

Reactive response

The main ways of Interaction between up and Top-down approach: improve peacebuilding down: amendment of the administrative functions

constitution, holding general of the national organisations

elections, establishing multiparty of the country concerned and

systems, strengthening enhance the capacity

civil society building of the country concerned

Source: Saferworld (2011)

3.9 Non-traditional security issues

are critical in the fight against non-traditional security threats.

The Addis Ababa FOCAC Action Plan (20042006) points out that the complexity and profound background of the non-traditional security issues will be addressed effectively with an integrated approach of political, economic, legal, scientific and technological means and through extensive and effective international cooperation. The Beijing FOCAC Action Plan (2007-2009) included refugees and displaced persons to other non-traditional security issues. The Action Plan emphasises that the new security concept with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and co-ordination at its core should inform the approach China and Africa employs to address non-traditional security challenges. China has been working with Southeast Asian countries in

China and Africa have recognised that nontraditional security issues pose new challenges to international and regional peace, security and stability. Chinese leadership has demonstrated its commitment to deal with non-traditional security challenges. This commitment is laid down in China’s African policy and various FOCAC Action Plans. China is committed to collaborate with African countries in addressing non-traditional security issues such as small arms trafficking, drug trafficking, illegal migration, transactional economic crimes, infectious diseases, and natural disasters. In China’s African Policy, Beijing contends that increased intelligence exchange, coordination, closer cooperation, intensified dialogue and joint action between China and Africa

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dealing with non-traditional security issues. Beijing could bring in the experience from East Asia and Southeast Asia to Africa in dealing with the new security challenges.

Although China’s engagement in Africa’s peace and security issues is limited, it is important that China identifies areas it can support Africa rather than getting involved in almost all security issues.

For instance, China could start with three issues in areas where it has limited engagement, then gradually expand to other areas.

4. Policy Recommendations As a major global power, China should heighten cooperation with development partners in ensuring that their engagement in Africa neither escalates conflicts nor undermines peace and stability, especially in areas they are engaged in extraction of oil, natural gas, minerals and other natural resources.

On the other hand, African countries should have coherent and clear policies that promote effective development emanating from the continent’s natural resources. Moreover, African states must strive to add value to their natural resources in order to maximise profits in international markets.

China’s approach to peace and security issues is still state-centric. It is important that China employs an integrated approach that will enable it address effectively new challenges to security. China may need also to adopt a new concept of human security where civilians become an important variable in addressing the problem of peace and security in Africa. In working with AU, sub-regional organisations and African states, China should not lose focus of civilian security.

5. Conclusion

African leaders should ensure that they take the primary role in ensuring that Africa has durable peace, security and sustainable development.

African leaders have the responsibility to ensure that the African peace and security architecture becomes a reality and benefits all residents in the continent. Since China has shown interests in supporting AU and sub-regional organisations in addressing peace and security issues in Africa, it is critical that African leadership cooperate fully by prioritising the development of peace and security structures to create a conducive environment for development.

China has made considerable contribution in promoting peace and security through participating in UN peace support operations, supporting AU-related peace activities, bilateral military cooperation and addressing development challenges as a means of uplifting the standards of living, hence minimising root causes of conflicts. However, Beijing has also made modest contribution to anti-piracy operations and antiterror campaigns in Africa, mediation and conflict resolution, peacebuilding activities and addressing the non-traditional security challenges. China has shown interest in dealing with new security challenges in Africa as it deepens its economic and political ties with Africa. China’s African Policy, FOCAC Action Plans and other policy documents have shown Beijing’s commitment to engage more in Africa’s peace and security issues. However, the Asian powerhouse is yet to demonstrate how it will actualise the good intentions outlined in various policy documents to promote peace and security in Africa. One of the major steps in getting more involved in Africa’s peace and security issues might involve new interpretation of its policy of noninterference in domestic matters of other sovereign states, as it is already engaged in several African countries through intensive economic activities and trade relations.

China has rich experience in mediation and conflict resolution though it has not yet fully utilised that experience in Africa. African states should find ways of tapping the knowledge and expertise from the Chinese experience. AU’s Panel of the Wise and other non-judicial systems of conflict resolutions could learn a lot from China. AU should also establish institutions where many Africans can be trained on mediation and conflict resolution.

Such institutions could combine African, Western and Chinese experiences in promoting peace and security through mediation.

China has shown interest in addressing nontraditional security issues. It is important that Beijing comes out clearly with the programme of dealing with each issue. A clear policy and strategy will show how the issue of drug smuggling, transnational crimes, illegal immigration, natural disasters, refugees and displaced persons will be dealt with.

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Christoffersen, G. (2009), “China and Maritime Cooperation: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden,” in Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economy Consultancy, Berlin, Available at www.ispsw.de, Accessed on May 10, 2012.

People’s Republic of China (2007), China’s African Policy, Available at http://english.peopledaily.com. cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234894.html, Accessed on March 20, 2012.

FOCAC Action Plan, 2004-2006 (2003), FOCAC Peace and Security Agreements, Available at http://www.focac. org/eng/ltda/dejbzjhy/DOC22004/, Accessed on March 26, 2012.

Piracy Watch (2011), China Beefing Up Military Presence in Indian Ocean, Available at http://piracywatch. net/2011/12/21/china-beefing-up-military-presence-inindian-ocean-china-news, Accessed on May 9, 2012.

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Guang, P. (2004), “China’s Anti-Terror Strategy and China’s Role in Global Anti-Terror Cooperation”, Asia Europe Journal.

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Challenges on Peace and Security: China’s Role in Peacekeeping and Peace Building in Africa

By Wiseman Mupindu Post-Doctoral Fellow, Public Administration, Faculty of Management and Commerce, University of Fort Hare, Zimbabwe Abstract: This study strives to unpack issues concerning Africa’s peace and security challenges and the role that China plays in addressing these matters. China’s engagement with Africa has increased significantly since 1998. For African states, this engagement presents prospects and challenges at a critical point in the continent’s history. This study examines China’s foreign policy in Africa and its effect on factors that drive conflict and promote peace. The study focuses on China’s role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and draws views and perspectives from Chinese, African and international experts using desktop survey research methodology of secondary literature. The study discusses insights on how China can promote Africa’s development, peace and security.

1. Introduction

2. Background of the Study

Challenges of conflicts on a global scale and in Africa are not new. What is new is the nature of the conflicts encountered. Article 22 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, formulated in 1948, upholds the view that every member of society is entitled to social security and peace for well being.

However, Africa is overwhelmed by some of the most terrible and aggressive conflicts in the world, which require international intervention through peace and security operations. Some of the most challenging conflicts over the past two decades have been witnessed in Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda and Sudan.

2.1 China and Africa: A historical overview and literature review China has had numerous historical incarnations.

China is the oldest continuous major world civilisation, with records dating back to ancient times and progressing gradually based on common historical experiences. The country has always had a strong sense of its identity and place in the world. Chinese civilisation, with a history of 4,000 years, has proved itself to be the most enduring and resilient in the world, making China one of the world’s most extraordinary and unique countries (Pere and Shelton, 2007). The bilateral relations between China and a range of African countries are not new.

This study deals with the role of China in Africa’s peacebuilding and security in select African states.

The study starts out by situating conflicts and peace operations on the African continent from an economic hegemony theoretical framework. It then discusses the challenges faced by China in African peacebuilding and security, with emphasis on the reasons why China should intervene.

China is contesting Western economic hegemony.

Despite many shifts in the factors underpinning the relationship between China and Africa, certain principles have remained constant. To judge China’s strategic/diplomatic considerations in its relations with Africa, it is important to understand both aspects of continuity and change in China’s policy towards Africa. Therefore, the paper acts as a decision making tool targeting audiences in both Africa and China.

In Beijing, on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China (Pere and Shelton, 2007). The then government assumed control of a people exhausted by two generations of war, social conflict, and an economy ravaged by high inflation and disrupted transportation links. A new political and economic order modelled on the Soviet example was quickly installed. In the early 1950s, China undertook a massive economic and social reconstruction programme (Pere and Shelton, 2007). The new leaders gained popular support by curbing inflation, restoring the economy and rebuilding many wardamaged industrial plants.

The fact that China managed to control its domestic problems gives it credibility in the eyes of African countries that need help in maintaining peace and

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security. Warfare has compromised African states’ capacity to provide security and political stability to its citizens. Importantly, China’s image in Africa has remained positive. Peacebuilding is of necessity, a lengthy process that involves security and political arrangements as well as socio-economic measures (Ali and Matthews, 2004). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China is the largest standing military force in the world. As of 2012, China has the world’s second-largest economy in terms of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP), totaling approximately 47.2 trillion y uan (US$7.47 trillion) according to the country’s National Bureau of Statistics.

developed to respond to the problems may differ from one country to another. China has therefore called on the developed countries to pay more attention to Africa and respond more energetically to the continent’s socio-economic problems. The challenge for African governments is to respond to China’s engagement, with effective and appropriate suggestions for the development of positive interaction. China’s challenge is to provide support and advance a ‘win-win’ relationship with African states, while at the same time pursuing its obvious national interests.

A stable mutually beneficial relationship will translate into a long term political and economic alliance, providing the foundation for both China and Africa’s economic prosperity. China’s own very successful development programme offers Africa a wealth of experience and knowledge in advancing this process. Each country hoping to regain peace and stability after a period of civil conflict must contend with a set of challenges. These, according to Holstag (2008), include bringing an end to generalised fighting, demobilising and disarming the warring factions and creating a general environment of trust and confidence.

On the African continent, Egypt became the first African nation to establish diplomatic relations with China and the intergovernmental relations between China and African countries were inaugurated (Anshan, 2007). China positioned itself on the forefront of the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and revisionism in the developing countries. She sought Africa as an ally in its struggle against imperialism and economic hegemony. “China’s contribution was not only limited to the liberation of Africa, but also to the economic development of the continent” (Pere and Shelton, 2007).

Further, these comprise building a set of institutions and political arrangements that assure the establishment of a political process that is open, inclusive, and able to cope with conflicts in a peaceful manner rather than resorting to arms (Kurlantzick, 2006). These policies also encompass fostering reconciliation among previously warring communities and thus helping to build a sense of community and common identity. Further, the policies assist in eliminating abject poverty and gradually easing the economic inequalities that may have been at the heart of the conflict.

The people of China have always been reliable friends to the community of Africa, as Africa has constantly been a trustworthy friend of China and its people. China is providing free and unconditional aid to Africa through supporting political struggles for African independence. No matter how civil wars end, the task of building an enduring peace cannot be escaped (Ali and Matthews, 2004). Civil wars are as the World Bank reminds us, one of the main causes of poverty in Africa. Peacebuilding is a complex historical process of socio-economic and political renewal involving global as well as local dynamics of coercion and consensus. Not only can peacebuilding be understood as a phase in the conflict cycle and as a long term process, it can also be seen as a set of challenges facing war torn societies.

Notwithstanding the above, the study will try to address the following two research questions: What role has the international community including China played in the peacebuilding process for African states? How effective has this involvement been? China has helped African countries build a number of landmark structures such as stadiums, hospitals and conference centres. These projects are more than just bricks and mortar constructions.

They are national symbols of independence and embody the spirit of cultural decolonisation.

Pere and Shelton (2007) observe that Beijing has pointed out that the advancement of global peace and development is not possible without addressing the growing economic divide between North and South. Countries emerging from a long period of civil war are confronted by many problems that have to be dealt with effectively, if the recurrence of war is to be averted. The policies and programmes

China provided military combat support training to most African countries during their struggle for independence. The relationships still stand because there is empirical evidence confirming

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principles of sovereignty and equality; promote common development on the basis of mutual benefit; increase consultation and cooperation in international affairs; and work to create a more peaceful, stable, secure and prosperous world.

that African military personnel are trained both in small arms and support weapons, including artillery weapons in China. Further, the Chinese are now part of the training staff at many Military Staff Colleges in Africa. China is also contributing towards the development of Africa through offering major construction projects, such as the national parliaments or national sports stadiums of many African countries.

The Chinese President indicated that without peace and development in China and Africa, there will be no global peace and development (Legwaila, 2006).

This could be interpreted as strategic partnership between China and Africa from which China identified four fields of cooperation:

From 1949 to 1978, China’s policy towards Africa focused mainly on politics, fully supporting the independence movements in Africa, which went beyond mere moral support and extended to the provision of military weapons (Pere and Shelton, 2007). The exponential growth of the Chinese presence and influence in Africa over the previous years has led to renewed interest in these relations, considering the results the relations will have in the international system and in traditional donors approaches towards Africa. China’s increasing presence has a crucial impact on Africa because it offers African countries the potential to take advantage of the counterweight offered by the Chinese development cooperation, as well as other South-South cooperation, potentially gaining more policy space and wielding greater leverage in bargaining with both traditional and emerging donors.

• • •

Deepening of political relations on the basis of equality and mutual trust.

Broadening of “win-win” economic cooperation.

Expansion of people-to-people exchange for cultural enrichment in education, science and technology, culture, public health, sports and tourism.

Promotion of balanced and harmonious global development by enhancing South-South cooperation; promoting North-South dialogue; urging developed countries to honour their promises on market access, aid and debt relief; striving to meet the Millennium Development Goals, and steering economic globalisation in the direction of creating prosperity for all (Legwaila, 2006).

“After the Second World War, and following the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, independent African countries forged a new phase of relations with China, which included moral and material support for different generations of national liberation and independence movements” (Pere and Shelton, 2007). China and Africa were brought together by their familiar experience of oppression at the hands of colonial Europeans.

Hence, China would be the victor of conquered Africans against European rule and of free African governments against European influence. Africa and China are also joined in their normative quest for a more just and equitable international political and economic order, and in fostering new norms of global governance to ensure peace, security and development. Despite the fact that China and Africa continue to confront a range of complex developmental challenges of their own, their richly textured rapport presents a solid platform of mutual trust and understanding that augurs well in a fastchanging and globalising world. According to Pere and Shelton (2007), the relationship between China and Africa can be summarised in five points which include: to promote friendship; respect the

Specialists perceive security in many different ways in order to come up with relevant strategies of promoting peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

In security, there are many overlapping issues including arms availability and proliferation, nature of governance, contested control of economic and natural resources, conflicting ideologies, ethnic divisions and others. Most African governments have narrow perceptions of security based on considerations of military defence and regime stability. Security threats are both internal and external. Virtually, all conflicts in Africa contain elements of both. Threats are both immediate and long term. One of the contributory causes of insecurity is the fact that governments in Africa are unpredictable. Underlying reasons for insecurity include poverty and thus conflict over scarce resources, vulnerability to external economic shocks, weak institutions and poor governance.

Underpinning these weaknesses is the absence of a clear strategy for promoting national security in most African countries.

Peace and justice must be discussed, not in terms of any abstract identification of what is necessary and

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sufficient to bring it about, but by the pattern and progress of this struggle against reactionary forces.

Unless a holistic approach is pursued, it remains extremely doubtful that security, in its restrictive meaning, could lead to any long lasting peace for the involved parties. Translating peace agreements into concrete gains also requires that greater attention be given to the cultural and traditional practices employed by the local inhabitants in dealing with issues of conflict and peacebuilding.

Although the struggle for peace and justice at this historical period must address itself first and foremost to the political struggle, it cannot succeed unless the political struggle is also coupled with the economic struggle, the technological struggle and the struggle in general for the transformation of the productive forces (Kurlantzick, 2006). Unless this is done, the tendency will be to win the political struggle but not to have the economic capability to sustain that victory. Inevitably, such a fragile success will collapse, setting back the cause of peace with justice.

hegemony from Western approaches, offering new opportunities for African governments to diversify their development partners. In the decisions to intervene, there may be ideological or political interests (Soderbaum and Tavares, 2011). China’s increasing role reflects changed foreign policy priorities as well as pragmatic considerations.

China’s growing footprint across the African continent has provoked much controversy, and even consternation in some quarters observe Pere and Shelton (2007). The primary focus of this study is on efforts made by China in different African countries to build a structure of peace after a lengthy civil war. Both Africa and China are significant forces for global peace, development and security.

The two need to sustain the momentum of this trend by maintaining close friendship, treating each other as equals and working closely to promote mutually beneficial cooperation and common development, thus, elevate China-Africa friendship and cooperation to higher level. The cases have been limited to Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Note that these cases are divided equally between countries where fighting stopped as a result of negotiations and in those where the civil wars ended through military victory.

According to Pere and Shelton (2007), the following sum up the contributions made by China to some of the African countries in order to create and maintain peace and security in Africa: • • • • •

• •

Unconditional aid support, donating computers and the new African Union building in Ethiopia Infrastructure upgrade and provision of affordable goods Provision of credit facilities and trade partnership Strategic management education and psychological warfare approach Military aid to developing countries, confirming the competency of developing countries’ military equipment, providing military equipment (such as radar systems) for peace and security, giving of software equipment to military academies and military staff colleges in Africa and technical training of security personnel on arms.

Political-economic assistance through funding the Defence ministries in Africa Member of the UN Security Council

Although a political settlement has not been reached at the national level in Somalia, it is included in this study as one of the cases as it provides an interesting contrast between successful peacebuilding (in northern Somaliland) and the collapse of efforts to build peace (in the south and at national level). In this study, South Africa has been added because of its overall importance for the entire continent, its interesting parallels with Zimbabwe and its unique character as a country torn by civil war that ended through negotiations, but without third-party involvement. It would be instructive to include Angola and Sudan, cases in which a peace settlement has been reached, but has subsequently broken down. “Comparing the collapse of two negotiated agreements in Angola, in 1991 and 1994, with what ultimately proved to be a failed experiment in peacebuilding in Sudan between 1972 to 1983, the study hopes to reflect on the fragility of such settlements and to draw lessons for present day experiments in peacebuilding” (Ali and Matthews, 2004).

Over the past twenty years, China has become an active participant in United Nations (UN) peacebuilding and peacekeeping, a development that will benefit the international community (International Crisis Group, 2009). China’s presence in Africa challenges the economic

At the same time, China’s role in Africa today is much more profound than in the past and is facing challenges that come with heightened complexity.

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From the outset of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China to the present day, the Chinese government has pursued a foreign policy that has conformed to the interests and needs of Africans to a greater degree than any other external power (Alden, 2007).

The first interpretation (development partner) holds that China’s involvement in Africa is part of a long term strategic commitment to the continent, one that is driven by its own economic needs, a commitment to transmit its development experience to the continent and a desire to build effective cooperative partnerships across the developing world.

Edigheji (2005) notes that most post colonial African countries are underdeveloped, in fact, many may be described as developmental failures.

Further, the peace that ended the civil wars in Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda emerged as a result of military victories rather than negotiated settlements. Civil wars, lack of peace and insecurity of potential investors contribute a lot to the pace at which Africa is developing economically. The impact of recession and high inflation rates is a cause of concern in Africa. While most countries in Africa acquired political independence, they are still fighting an economic war. The intervention of China is a strategy to promote peace, security and development in African states, most of which are former colonies of European countries.

The second interpretation (economic competitor) holds that China is engaged in a short term ‘resource grab’ which, like some Western counterparts, takes little account of local needs and concerns, whether developmental, environmental or with respect to issues like human rights. Coupled with Chinese manufacturing and trade wherewithal, this approach suggests that African development gains are being challenged, but not undermined by Chinese competitiveness.

The third interpretation (coloniser) emphasises that China’s new engagement in Africa is part of a long term strategy aimed at displacing the traditional Western orientation of the continent by building partnerships with African elites under the rubric of South solidarity. From this perspective, this is a process that will ultimately result in some form of political control over African territories.

Only as war becomes patently more destructive and more costly will men be moved to take the first difficult steps towards a permanent peace notes Gallie (1979). In fact, Africa is very important to China from an economic hegemony theoretical framework. China wants to contest the west’s economic hegemony. The relationship of China and Africa is based on equal treatment, respect for sovereignty and common development. And with that, Alden observes that the China-Africa Summit was held, signalling the public arrival of a new era in Africa’s relations with the outside world.

Claims that China is planning to colonise Africa are spurious and overblown. In particular, the hallmarks of colonialism, the ideology of a ‘civilising mission,’ the accompanying territorial imperative and forging of exclusionary trade relations are distinctly lacking in China’s African policy. If China is able to adapt itself to African concerns, while pursuing its role on peacebuilding and security on the continent, then its presence will continue to be well received

by Africa’s ruling elites, not the ordinary poor Africans. In any case, unlike in the past, it is African ruling elites, as opposed to Westerners, who will determine the nature and depth of China’s engagement in African affairs. The much-vaunted rise of China has fostered an overriding sense that African ruling elites ought to tie their fortunes to a Chinese future rather than a Western past.

During this time, the Chinese government committed itself to an ambitious programme centred on provision for US$5 billion in loans and credits, the doubling of its development assistance by 2009, and in a bid that would make ChinaAfrica’s single largest trading partner, increasing two-way trade to over US$100 billion by 2010 (Alden, 2007). Chinese businesses have been on an acquisition spree for resources across the African continent since 1996. The existence of ChineseAfrican relations has provoked much discussion in policy making, as well as scholarly circles in Africa, Europe and the United States. Underlying much of the existing analysis of Beijing’s new role in continental affairs are three contrary strands of thought which can be summarised as follows: China as a ‘development partner,’ China as an ‘economic competitor’ and China as a ‘coloniser.’

Since China is contesting the economic hegemony with the Western countries using Africa as a political playground, it is important to unfold some of the current debates on China’s foreign policy. Of particular interest to the West is China’s increasing growth into Africa’s oil markets. It should be pointed out that even though oil is a key and noticeable source of Chinese interest in Africa, it is far from being the only one. China is

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Africa because it opens the mind of human beings through realising that fighting is not a solution to the problems in Africa. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), global development network on the ground in 177 countries and territories, is in a unique position to advocate for change, connect countries to knowledge and resources, and coordinate broader efforts at the country level (Adar and Yoh, 2006).

actively seeking resources of every kind including copper, bauxite, diamonds, aluminium, manganese and iron ore, among others (Taylor, 2006). In addition, Chinese textiles and clothing companies are investing heavily in Africa, while China is also becoming increasingly politically engaged with the continent. A look at China’s top ten trading partners in Africa reveals that with the exception of South Africa which has well developed industrial economy, Beijing‘s main trade connections in Africa are with oil producing states.

Most conflicts in Africa highlight the need for early intervention, especially the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. China has the capacity to calm these challenges. However, there are limits to the extent to which China is willing to authorise intervention.

China has not contributed any combat troops to the United Nations missions (Hansen, 1987). Further, China needs to substantially increase the proportion of peacebuilding in the peacekeeping missions and to play a wider role in activities beyond peacekeeping. China and the Western countries have different understanding over what constitutes peacebuilding and security (Pere and Shelton, 2007). While China wants to contest the economic hegemony of the western countries, the country is also using Africa as a political playground by giving aid to corrupt regimes without asking any questions. For example, Angola, one of the most corrupt countries in Africa, which has been in war for decades, has been a recipient of military and humanitarian aid from China.

This appeal has been based on China’s role as a countervailing force both to Western conditionality and to the continent’s reliance on Western sources for foreign investment and development assistance.

Furthermore, with China’s much publicised surpassing of the French and British economies in terms of sheer size, African politicians, intellectuals and business community increasingly believe that the Chinese example is more suited to African conditions and can serve as an inspiration for Africa’s own development ambitions. From the promulgation of Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ policy to the blossoming of Chinese language studies in Nigeria, the African continent is eagerly embracing the Chinese capital, its diplomatic entreaties and even cultural trappings at an unprecedented rate.

Development in many developing countries, particularly in Africa, has come to a dead end due to the dearth in peace and security. This is articulated in expressions such as the ‘demise of the development theory’ (McMichael, 1996), ‘myth of development’ (Rivero, 2001) and failure of the ‘development industry’ (Rihani, 2002).

African leaders should dedicate their professional and political career to the cause of Africa, all the time searching for innovative ways and strategies for improving the conditions of its deprived and marginalised communities.

China has defined its foreign policy and managed its international affairs. China accepts the fact that America’s domination and undeniable power are cold realities that it has to live and contend with.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, relations with the United States pose a special challenge for China’s diplomacy. In such an ‘anarchic’ environment, a country like China will tend to balance its position against the dominance of the hegemonic power, and as states become more enmeshed in what is after all a zero-sum game of winners and losers, the natural tendency is to emulate their rival’s successful policies observe Pere and Shelton (2007). China has achieved remarkable and breathtaking economic success and has accelerated its defence modernisation. It is alleged that ‘China’s primary foreign policy goal today is to weaken American influence in Africa relatively and absolutely, while steadfastly protecting its own corner.’

The study aims to provide recommendations on how China’s engagement can better support the objective of peace, security and development in Africa, through achieving one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) number eight, that strives to develop a global partnership for development (Hansen, 1987). The MDGs provide a framework for the entire United Nations (UN) system to work rationally together enroute for a common result. To achieve this, Africa must learn to recognise the MDG on universal primary education. Education is a powerful weapon that can be harnessed to achieve peace and security in

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3. Research and Methodology

Union and China. It is estimated that economic growth has risen between one and two per cent due to Chinese involvement and this can not be negligible in a context of international crisis and African marginalisation in the world market economy (Ferreira, 2007). In this context, this study will certainly be an opportunity to evaluate the results of the commitments made in the previous years.

This paper is an analysis of challenges on peace and security initiatives in Africa from a human security perspective and economic hegemony theoretical framework. It is particularly concerned with teasing out China’s level of engagement and role on peacebuilding and peacekeeping in Africa and the impact of these initiatives on African communities The peacebuilding initiatives of the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Commission (PBC) of 2005 form a key component upon which the analysis is built. Due to time and funding constraints, the data is derived primarily from a desktop survey of secondary literature and reports obtained from the UN website. The paper offers an entry point for re-examining peacebuilding and peacekeeping initiatives in Africa from a vantage point of the citizens for whom they are intended. Nevertheless, because it is not based on primary research with those directly involved or local communities, it has inherent limitations. It can be viewed as a snapshot of peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

The challenge is, as always, how to manage peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes in a way that has real impact in African people’s security, since a win-win partnership for governments does not always mean a win-win for their people. In fact, the question is not so much if Africa benefits from Chinese engagement, but rather which Africans, which sector, and under which circumstances these benefits occur. Analysis should therefore focus on approaches more than on statistics, because it is only the latter that currently determines most contemporary perceptions about Chinese involvement in African peace and security matters.

Multilateralism has become central to China’s efforts to project its influence abroad, pursue its interests and cultivate its image as a “responsible great power.” Participation in peacekeeping serves these ends as a relatively low-cost way of demonstrating commitment to the UN as well as to international peace and security (Pere and Shelton, 2007). It has also served to counter fears of China’s growing power, that is, the ‘China threat,’ by deploying military personnel for peaceful ends.

While China’s expanded role in peacebuilding and peacekeeping is welcomed by the UN and many countries, there are some concerns. China’s support for problem regimes in the developing world has fed suspicions that Chinese peacebuilding and peacekeeping is primarily motivated by economic interests.

4. Discussion The central aspect that must be considered is how the Chinese foreign policy is changing the parameters by which Africa relates with the West, and the way the West approaches African partners.

Most of the research tends to sway between extreme positions, presenting China as providing an opportunity for economic growth in Africa or as a threat to democracy and to the proclaimed ‘western values’ (Ferreira, 2007). Nevertheless, research fails to focus on what Africans themselves think about Chinese foreign policy, benefits and challenges. China’s security aid and investment is in many ways more attractive to African countries than that of traditional western partners. It offers faster implementation of peacebuilding and peacekeeping programmes in comparison with the western unfulfilled promises of scaling up peace and security aid to Africa.

While China benefits from its involvement in peacebuilding and peacekeeping, particularly in terms of helping its military and police professionals, train and gain valuable field experience, there are several constraints on its capacity to do more. Although willing to shoulder more of the responsibilities for international peace and security, it worries about overstepping the boundary between responsible and threatening.

There are also practical difficulties in training personnel, particularly in the necessary language skills. A further limitation is the division along different branches of the Chinese government on

Some studies suggest that Chinese security aid and peacebuilding investment are also more flexible, take a long term perspective and are fast in execution, since they are not dependent on heavy bureaucratic procedures, such as those of the European institutions. In sum, many of the criticisms made against China mirror, to a certain extent, Western mistakes, and therefore should not be subject to a “blame game” between European

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Further, observers also claim that Chinese troops fulfil their tasks well, but rarely take any initiative.

Perhaps the most notable deficiency is language skills. One UN official remarked about Chinese peacekeepers in the field, “they have a very strong work ethic, are professional and very committed” (International Crisis Group, 2009). The one area where they are often hampered is language, English in particular. On their daily routine, they operate well in missions, but during meetings and planning, they cannot contribute much. They could make useful contributions were it not for this language barrier.

the issue of peacebuilding as well as peacekeeping and the extent of Chinese engagement.

Overall, China’s growing role is assisting in filling the growing shortfall in capacity and resources.

The lack of available and qualified police for peacekeeping is one area in which China is already making a significant contribution. As a low-cost and effective means of contributing to international peace and stability, China should be encouraged to continue increasing its participation in peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Further, the UN and the Western countries should continue to provide support to and encourage China in its peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

China has not yet contributed combat troops and has been unenthusiastic about providing air transport units. However, its decision to deploy its navy in December 2008 as part of the multilateral effort to help combat piracy off the coast of Somalia is a significant step. While China’s personnel contributions are still below those of the top troopcontributing countries, its potential is great. Despite contributing the bulk of the peacekeeping budget, Western countries contribute very few personnel.

Particularly, since the costly failures of UN peacekeeping in Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995, during which the massacre in Srebrenica occurred, they are more reluctant than the developing countries to send troops to serve under a UN commander and incur casualties in military operations that do not serve their direct strategic interests,. They prefer to deploy troops in peace missions over which they have more political and operational control (Thompson, 2005).

Whereas during the Cold War 25 per cent of the UN peacekeepers came from the West, today that number is less than two per cent.

4.1 China participation on peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo In November 2008, the ninth peacekeeping team from China to MONUC arrived in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and yet China first began participating in UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC in 2003 (International Crisis Group, 2009).

The group had 218 peacekeepers comprising engineers and medical staff who concentrated on building and maintaining water and power facilities, roads and airports as well as working in hospitals. According to the online Free Dictionary China also had 16 military observers in Mission de I’Organisation de Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du Congo (MONUC). However, MONUC only got humanitarian gesture out of this.

Chinese peacekeepers’ performance in the field has received mixed reviews. According to accounts of those who worked alongside Chinese police, reports indicate that they are highly professional, well trained and able to work effectively in difficult operational environments (Pere and Shelton, 2007).

Chinese medical teams and equipment are the state of art, with separate facilities for contemporary and Chinese traditional medicine. Chinese peacekeepers compare favourably with some of the traditional troop-contributing countries. Their motivation is not monetary remuneration. Chinese peacekeepers have not been the subject of any scandals.

Participating in peacekeeping has been a public relations success between China and Africa. It has given China an important boost domestically and helps massage its image internationally. In contrast to consistent negative media commentary on Chinese foreign policy that appears in the West, China’s peacekeeping efforts have received credibility. In Darfur, although China initially used the concept of Sudanese consent to peacekeeping to delay the deployment of such an operation, by mid 2007 it helped secure the government’s consent to a peacekeeping operation (Wild and Mepham, 2006).

When the situation in Darfur went out of control in 2004, China’s primary goal was to maintain good relations with the government of Sudan. China used its position on the Council to substantially

Nevertheless, observers have frequently criticised the propensity of Chinese troops to segregate themselves from other peacekeepers as well as the local population. This tendency, also noted of other countries’ contingents, can prolong the time necessary to begin to contribute to the mission.

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shield Khartoum from targeted sanctions and other punitive measures by insisting that the conflict was an internal matter and on government consent to any peacekeeping operation.

and a closer understanding between South Africa and China, enhancing the official state-to-state interaction.

4.2 China and South Africa

Building on the solid foundation of a shared global political vision and accelerating economic interaction, China and South Africa are set to expand collaboration at all levels. With perseverance and dedication, Africa and China have in recent years endeavoured to promote peacebuilding, security and development on the continent (Raine, 2009).

They have achieved remarkable progress. China is the biggest developing country and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries. Both Africa and China are important forces for global peace, security and development.

The Chinese are a peace loving nation believing in co-operation and harmony.

South Africa has emerged as an essential strategic partner in China’s Africa policy. Diplomatic relations between Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC) and South Africa were initially established at the consular level in 1992 and upgraded to ambassadorial level in 1976 (Pere and Shelton, 2007). Following the establishment of formal relations, China and South African links across a range of areas grew steadily. Trade and investment showed a substantial increase and defence contacts led to a large number of South African military personnel undertaking specialist training courses in China.

China is dedicated to peace, security, development and co-operation. The Chinese people are ready to work with the African people to build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.

The Chinese foreign policy urges the international community to implement the Millennium Development Goals and support other developing countries in fully tapping their strengths to speed up their development (Wild and Mepham, 2006).

China and Africa should jointly address global security issues through enhanced dialogue and coordination, and resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiation to uphold regional and global security and stability.

Given that by 1991 the South African government had made clear progress towards dismantling apartheid through the termination of key legislation, Beijing proposed the establishment of semi-official offices in each other’s countries, with a view to expanding and consolidating communications observe Pere and Shelton (2007). The following year, China set up the centre for South African Studies in Pretoria, and South Africa established its centre for Chinese Studies in Beijing. Concerned about a possible recognition switch following the 1994 elections, Taipei made a very substantial contribution estimated at US$25 million to the election campaign of the African National Congress (ANC). Most observers believed that this contribution was important for the ANC victory in 1994.

China’s increasing interest and participation in peacekeeping is a positive development for Africa, the UN and the international community. The world today is undergoing complex changes. The human society is becoming increasingly interdependent.

The pursuit of peace, development and cooperation has become the trend of the times and the priority of all countries. The diversity of the world should be respected and upheld. All countries in the world, big or small, rich or poor, strong or weak should respect each other, treat each other as equals and live in peace and amity with each other (Thompson, 2005). In addition to this, different civilisations and modes of development should draw on each other’s experience, promote each other and coexist in harmony. The adherence of China, the

China had supported South Africa’s liberation struggle from the start, regarding it as an integral part of the drive for national independence and political liberation of the African continent. The then ANC president Oliver Tambo visited Beijing in 1963 and South African Communist Party (SACP) members maintained close links with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In this context, the CCP’s interaction with the SACP through a party-to-party framework provided a solid foundation for positive relations between Pretoria and Beijing. The partyto-party relationship has led to a deeper friendship

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world’s largest developing country, to peaceful development and the commitment to Africa, a continent with the largest number of developing countries, to stability, development and renaissance are in themselves significant contributions to world peace and development.

•

In addition, •

5. Conclusion Developing a robust framework for regional peace and security in Africa is a major challenge.

The challenge for Africa is confronting the call for ‘thinking the unthinkable’ and being creative in responding to these challenges. The slogan ‘an African solution to African problems’ does not mean that Africa is an island untouchable by global forces. It is a call for African ownership and originality in these matters. Peacebuilding and security are a human right. Peacekeeping is intertwined with coherent international and regional security policies. Public policy as a set of praxes created by social conditions will then be a reality and not simply symbolic. In this way, a practical situation becomes more open by bringing together people who are dedicated to policy innovations and implementations. For the purpose of promoting friendship, peace, cooperation and development, the study has reviewed the sincere friendship, solidarity and cooperation between China and Africa over the past half century. Further, the study had fruitful discussions on the common goals and direction for growing China-Africa cooperation in the new paradigm shift era.

•

•

•

Adar, K. G. and Yoh, J. G. N. (2006), Somalia Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects for the Reconstruction and Restoration of Legitimacy, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Alden, C. (2007), China in Africa, London: Zed Books Ltd.

China should:

• •

Future studies should analyse African perspectives towards China and Europe’s engagement in the continent, as well as how these two players mutually perceive their African policies, as essential to building peace and security.

The international community should encourage and support Africa’s efforts to pursue peace and development and provide greater assistance to African countries in peaceful resolution of conflicts and post war reconstruction.

The establishment of a new type of strategic partnership will help enhance solidarity, mutual support and assistance as well as unity of the developing countries and contribute to durable peace and harmonious development in the world.

It is important to adopt the Beijing Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation from 2007 to 2009.

References

6. Recommendations

•

Support African countries in implementing the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programmes.

Ali, T.M. and Matthews, R.O. (2004), Durable Peace: Challenges for Peace Building in Africa, London: University of Toronto Press.

Ensure political support to UN peacekeeping by performing a more active role in responding to current peacekeeping challenges, both in terms of the continuing improvement of UN peacekeeping doctrine in the Security Council and the development as well as review of specific peacekeeping mandates.

Increase significantly financial, material and personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Encourage regional and international cooperation and sharing of expertise on peacekeeping training for police, combat troops and non-combat troops including prioritising language training.

Anshan, L. (2007), “China and Africa: Policy and Challenges”, China Security, Vol 3, No. 3, Summer, pp 69-93, World Security Institute.

Edigheji, O. (2005), “A Democratic Development State in Africa?”, A Concept Paper, Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, Available at http:www.cps.org.za/cps%20 pdf/RR105.pdf, Accessed on April 20, 2012.

Ferreira, P.M. (2007), Global Players in Africa: Is There Scope for an EU-China-Africa Partnership?

Gallie, W.B. (1979), Philosophers of Peace and War, London: Cambridge University Press.

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Hansen, E. (1987), Africa Perspectives on Peace and Development, London and New Jersey: The United Nations University.

Rivero, O. (2001), The Myth of Development: Non-viable Economies of the 21st Century, Claremont: David Philips Publishers.

Holstag, J. (2008), “A Paper Tiger for Africa”, BICCS Asia Briefing, Aug., Brussels: Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, Available at www.vub. ac.be/biccs/document/A%20for0forAfrica.pdf, Accessed on May 13, 2012.

Soderbaum, F. and Tavares, R. (2011), Regional Organisations in African Security, London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.

Taylor, I. (2006), China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

International Crisis Group (2009), “China’s Growing Role in UN Peace Keeping”, Asian Report No. 166-17, April.

The Online Free Dictionary, acronyms.thefreedictionary. comMONUC, Accessed on May 14, 2012.

Kurlantzick, J. (2006), “Beijing’s Safari-China’s Move into Africa and its Implications for Aid, Development and Governance”, Policy Outlook, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Legwaila, J. (2006), Beijing Summit of the Forum the China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), New York: African Union Secretariat.

Thompson, D. (2005), “China’s Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the United States”, Africa Renaissance, Vol. 2, No.4, JulyAug.

McMicheal, P. (1996), Development and Change: A Global Perspective, New York: Pine Forge Press.

United Nations (2009), Report on Human Security and Peace Building in Africa: The Need for an Inclusive Approach, New York: United Nations.

Pere, G.L. and Shelton, G. (2007), China, Africa and South Africa: South-South Cooperation in a Global Era, The Institute of Global Dialogue.

Wild, L and Mepham, D. (2006), The New Sinosphere China in Africa, Institute for Policy Research, Available at www.ippr.org/articles/index.asp.

Raine, S. (2009), China’s African Challenges, London: Routledge.

Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations (2007), United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index. shtml, Accessed on May 10, 2012.

Rihani, S. (2002), Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice: Understanding Non-linear Realities, London: Zed Books.

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Cultural and People to People Exchanges

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China and Africa: Cultural Similarity and Mutual Learning

By Li Anshan Centre for African Studies, School of International Studies, Peking University, China Abstract: In Africa, we have seen a lot of good signs rising, such as the GDP growth that has continued to grow at four to five per cent for more than a decade. Many countries in the continent have established a rather stable political structure. Countries such as Rwanda, Ethiopia and Angola have made great economic progress, while others such as Nigeria have paid off their foreign debt. Africa’s economic growth accelerated after 2000, making it the world’s third-fastest growing region. Many countries enacted microeconomic reforms, and this was correlated with more rapid growth, observes Mckinsey Global Institute. Africa’s collective GDP was US$1.6 trillion in 2008, while its consumer spending was worth US$860 billion in 2008.

Additionally, the West’s interference in African affairs as seen in the bringing down of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime has brought about great disorder in the Sahelian belt.

1. Introduction “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.”

This is an oxymoron which the great British writer Charles Dickens used to describe the period he was writing about. We are now living in a similar period. In China, on one hand, we have achieved a great deal in the economic field, people are getting richer and living a better life. We have various ways to express ourselves and enjoy more freedom than ever before. This is “the best of times.” On the other hand, we are gradually losing many good things such as virtue, friendship, generosity and endurance. There are concerns about the security of our food, the basic need for our life, the environment, the basic conditions for our survival, distributional consequences and the basic requirement of social stability. The latter indicates “the worst of times.”That is why Premier Wen Jiabao made his remarks after the National People Congress in March 15, 2007 that although China had experienced steady and fast growth, she cannot remain complacent. He continued that China’s growth is “unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable.”1

The international economy is now in its worst crisis since the Great Depression. The Euro zone could break up with very serious consequences for the world economy; and the US economy has suffered a high level of unemployment five years after the great financial meltdown. On the other hand, both African and Asian economies are better off. Growth is forecasted to be about 8 per cent for China and 5.8 per cent for Africa in 2012. The Chinese word for “crisis” is made up of two characters, danger and opportunity. Times of danger usually provide opportunities to those who are ready and able to use them to their advantage.

During this ambiguous time, could China and Africa learn from each other? This is the subject this article is going to address. First, the paper analyses the similarities in cultural aspects between China and Africa. Since “culture” is a rich yet ambiguous term, and has countless interpretations, the paper narrows down to a more concrete meaning. Samuel Huntington considers language and religion as two major factors of any culture or civilisation.4 In this paper, “culture” means specifically “values”, more related to what Richard A. Shweder thinks about culture as community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful and efficient.5 The challenges that both China and Africa are facing are discussed.

Thirdly, the paper will discuss how China and Africa should learn from each other.

Africa’s mobile phone subscribers have reached 316 million since 2,000 and companies with revenues of more than US$3 billion have reached 20. What’s more, Africa’s share of the world’s uncultivated and arable land is 60 per cent.2 The Economist even published a special issue entitled “The Hopeful Africa-Africa Rising.”3 At the same time, there are very serious problems in the continent. The majority of people have not enjoyed the result of economic development and are trapped in poverty.

Several resource rich countries on the continent are experiencing a “resource curse” which has either resulted in socio-political disasters.

First, there are similarities between China and Africa in cultural aspects. I am going to discuss four elements: collectivism, respect for the elderly, sense of equality, and finally, tolerance or forbearance.

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i.

Collectivism: China and African values emphasise collectivism more than individualism. Collectivism can be described by different terms, such as communalism (Ujamaa), nationalism, and socialism, or expressed in different ways such as Blyden’s black consciousness,6 Lembede’s philosophy of Africanism,7 Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism,8 Senghor’s negritude,9 Nyerere’s Ujamaa10 or Mazrui’s Pax-Africana.11 In China, collectivism as a basic concept and skill of survival has existed for thousands of years. Additionally, China embraced socialism as her leading ideology. Africa has shared values across individual, national, regional and continental levels. Although the first level is individual, that is “the values include those inherent in universal and inalienable human rights,” yet many contents reflect collectivism, such as tolerance, participation in governance and development processes, reciprocal solidarity in times of need and sharing, dignity and respect, justice, fairness, equality of persons, respect for the elderly, integrity, community cohesion and inclusive societies.12 The famous African proverb; ‘If you want to walk fast, walk alone, if you want to walk far, walk together’ vividly expresses the idea of collectivism.

equality is a modern concept, and one of the most important concerns in social movement and human history, both Chinese and African people have a long history to cherish the equality. The concept was embodied in ancient Chinese philosophy and expressed in various ways. Zi Xia, one of Confucius’ students, once said that “all men under the Heaven are brothers” and there is a strong sense of equality in Confucianism. Confucius himself claimed this principle as his educational philosophy, “education for all”, or “to teach everybody without prejudice.” In another case, he even treated teacher and student as equal by saying “teaching and learning improve each other.” As another Confucian thinker and a typical equalitarian, Mencius was famous by his ideology of min beng (people oriented) community. He once described his ideal society by saying, “treat your elders as elders, and extend it to the elders of others; treat your young ones as young ones, and extend it to the young ones of others.”14 It is noticeable that here, every elder is equal, so is every youngster.

The principle of equality has been understood as that of socialism, and also claimed as the guiding principle of the Chinese Communist Party. In African shared values, reciprocal solidarity in times of need and sharing, dignity and respect, justice, fairness and equality of persons all indicate the importance of equality.

Human beings should care for each other and treat each other as equals. That is the ideal world for both China and Africa. While the principle of equality is lauded the world over, when it comes to international politics, ‘might is right.’ Chairman Mao Zedong always emphasised the similarity between Chinese and Africans. The Chinese and Africans are both coloured, had similar historical experiences and were despised and bullied by imperialists from the West. China and African countries are equal, the mutual relations between us is that of brotherhood, not father-son relations.15 So are other Chinese leaders. 16

ii. Respect for the elderly: China and Africa share the value of respect to the elderly. In China, “to respect the elderly and cherish the young” is one of the leading principles of virtue. Both good and bad people are required to respect the elderly. In Africa, many proverbs describing the same principle abound. For example, “an elderly is a library” (Tanzania and other countries); “if you want to learn proverbs, ask the elderly” (Nigeria); “bald headed and whitehaired people should be respected because they are symbols of excellence” (Liberia); “when a person gets old, the wisdom comes” (Congo); “the elderly can tell the best stories” (the Swahili); “an old hunter won’t fall in the trap” (Southern Africa); and “advice is the salt of dishes” (Ghana) among others.13 Both Chinese and Africans realise from their tradition that time creates experience, and the elderly’s knowledge can serve others and the whole community, thus provide best lessons. That is why respect for the elderly is one of the content in African shared values.

iv. Tolerance and forbearance: China and Africa both stress the value of tolerance or forbearance.

When Zigong asked Confucius about the most important doctrine in life, Confucius answered that it should be “forbearance,” that is, what you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.17 In the contemporary world, the concept of “tolerance” and “forbearance” is important since some countries like to use their

iii.

Equality: Both cultural values emphasise equality and a sense of sharing. Although

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are several points that China should learn from Africa. First, Africa strongly believes in the balance between nature and human-beings. People are part of nature and the two are linked in various ways.

In traditional belief, land belongs to the community and is passed through generations. Land and people belong to the world. The act of African women working in the field does not necessarily indicate male chauvinism as the outside world usually thinks, rather, it is because women (as mothers of children) are believed to have a closer linkage with land, of which, all the people are children. There are various rituals in relation to land or nature.

own value standard to judge other cultures. In Africa, “tolerance” is a tradition, a philosophy as well as a way of life. Only by practising this principle, can African people maintain their community cohesion and inclusive societies.

As an important principle of social relations in the daily life of the Chinese people, this doctrine has also left some print in China’s foreign policy. The most criticised policy in China’s relationship with African countries is the principle of non-string attached or nonconditionality. For sure, China follows its own principle of non interference, thus attaches no political condition to its assistance to Africa.

However, certain countries like to criticise others for their own interests, be it economic, political or cultural. The criticism is usually carried out under the cover of “universal values” or “international standard,” taking the West doctrines or principles as universal.

Although this practice has worked for some time in modern history, it is no longer effective.

In China, although people stressed the linkage between human beings and nature in ancient times, their sense was much weaker, probably because the harsh natural conditions and high population forced people to get food and other necessities from nature.

In addition, after the founding of The People’s Republic of China, the philosophy of “humanity will conquer nature” elicited dire consequences.

To make things worse, the rapid development since the reform of the early 1980s put great pressure on nature owing to the increasing demand of energy, which obviously threatened the balance between human beings and nature. It is only in recent years that the concept of scientific development is gradually taking the lead. To respect nature is the first thing that the Chinese should learn from Africans.

Secondly, both China and Africa are facing similar challenges. In Africa, “whereas in traditional communities there had always been a sense of belonging and sharing, these communities are also experiencing deprivation, powerlessness, violation of human dignity, social isolation, gender inequity, corruption and ineffective service delivery systems; thus leading people to increasingly turn to state institutions, development partners and CSOs for their survival.”18 These are the same challenges that the Chinese society is facing. On one hand, the traditional communities are still existent and play an important role in social life. On the other, every tradition is experiencing erosion from the process of development. Besides this dilemma in terms of tradition and modernity, there are other contradictions embodied in development itself, such as that between collectivism and individualism, economic growth and environmental protection, state control and free market, among others. How to make these contradictions harmonious is a tremendous challenge to both China and Africa.

Secondly, African people have a very strong sense of family, a sense that the urban Chinese are now losing. No matter how rich a man is, or how high a position he holds, he has to take the responsibility of his family and kins. We have heard of some government Minister who has to take care of the whole extended family, feed various relatives who come to his house, and even offer scholarships to those in need. Doubtlessly, the Chinese in the countryside are still tied to the family which occupies a very important position in their mind.

Yet, individualism is eroding the sense of family gradually, especially with the rapid urbanisation and strengthening of materialism. As the basic element of social structure, the family plays a very important role in human development. The position of family defines the balance of social structure in terms of development. To stress and maintain the role of family is the second point that China could learn from Africa.

After the analysis of the similarities of Chinese and African values and the challenges, we can ask the question: could China and Africa learn from each other? The answer is positive.

While the conventional thinking is that China is developing very fast and Africa should learn from China, this is a lopsided view. In fact, both China and Africa should learn from each other. There

Thirdly, China should learn from Africa that women generally enjoy more rights in African countries.

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China, there is a long tradition of prejudice towards women. After the founding of People’s Republic of China (PRC), there was a great change of the concept of ‘superior male and inferior female’.Yet, the prejudice against women still exists in various aspects, especially in employment in recent years after the reform.25 In the political field, some positions are reserved for the female, yet very few women occupy the top position.

This may sound strange to some Chinese who have heard a lot of stories about the prejudice suffered

by African women. As Chinese women, African women played a key role in sustaining their family and kingdoms in history. In a recent lecture, the new African Union Chairperson, Nkosazana DlaminiZuma, mentioned two historical facts: In North Africa, in 690 AD, Dahia Al- Kahina of Mauritania, an African woman freedom fighter resisted the invasion of the Arabs. She commanded her forces in the battle. She was a ferocious and courageous fighter who eventually took her own life rather than admit defeat to the Arabs. The great African city of learning, Timbuktu of Mali, is actually named after a woman called Buktu, and in this city of scholarship is the medieval mosque Sankore, also founded by a woman.19

Country borders in Africa are a very serious heritage of colonialism. According to statistics, about 44 per cent of Africa’s border lines are drawn by longitude and 30 per cent by geometric straight lines. Only 26 are done by natural markers such as rivers or mountains.26 This left enormous problems for Africa after independence, such as the separation of ethnic group in different countries, problems of natural resources including mining, water and grassland, among others. Just think about various border wars that happened in Europe! The first generation of African leaders used every means to prevent such wars. The OAU Charter makes it clear that every country should respect the existing border lines. African leaders have saved many lives with their wisdom and tolerance. China has border lines with 14 countries, yet there are some conflicts with neighbouring countries both in land and sea. In this aspect, China can learn from Africa’s attitude and skills.

During the anti-colonial period, African women contributed a great deal to their motherland. After independence, African women surely enjoyed the political rights much earlier than their European partners.20 Although women in some countries are still looked down upon, as early as 1969, Liberian woman Angie E. Brooks was selected as Chair of the United Nations Assembly, and she claimed that she was proud of her continent, her nation and her gender.21 African Princess Toro Elizabeth Bagnya Nyabongo is a Ugandan lawyer, politician, diplomat, model and actress since the 1960s. As the first female lawyer in Uganda, she was appointed Foreign Minister of Uganda in 1974.22

Africa is a continent with a long history of civilisation.27 Of course, the African culture has made a tremendous contribution to the world in music and dance, paintings and sculpture, among other arts. While the West has borrowed a great deal from Africa, China has just started realising this treasure house. China has a long way to go in the learning process. There are some other aspects that China can learn from Africa, optimism is not only an attitude of Africans, it is a way of life and value system, which is another important feature that the Chinese should learn.

During the 1970s and 1980s, African female ambassadors in Paris caught the eyes of other countries.23 Now more and more African women are involved in social and political activities, and have become world well-known as Nobel Prize winners and ministers of their own countries, and two excellent women, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Bingu wa Mutharika are the President of Liberia and Malawi respectively, and Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is the Chairperson of African Union, a very unique phenomenon in the world politics. In addition, in African Union and several African countries, more women are now serving the interests of Africa in general, and their country and gender, in particular. There is even a quota of position reserved specifically for women. For example, in South Africa more women become civil servants. There were 2,382 members in the Foreign Ministry with 1,300 female and 1,082 male.24

Africa on the other hand, can learn from China.

The important experience for China’s success in its development is its ability to combine the positive elements of a state strategy, a market economy and social stability. This is the most important experience that China can offer for Africa. Reform is necessary of course, yet reform is an ongoing process of learning - not copying, but just learning good things and lessons from your partners or any countries.28 Africa has a bright future with its rich human resources and natural resources, if the

While progress has been made in Africa, the situation in China somewhat has retrogressed. In

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leadership can combine its capability, responsibility with hardworking people.

16 Li Anshan: “Cultural Heritage and China’s African Policy”, in Jing Men and Benjamin Barton (eds): China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors?, Ashgate, 2011, pp.41-59.

Endnotes 1

17 Zhigong asked in Confucius, Analects, 15(24).

Wen Jiabao: “The Problem of Being Unsteady, Unbalanced, Uncoordinated and Unsustainable in Development is Still Serious”, March 5, 2011, http:// news.cntv.cn/20110305/105099.shtml

18 African Union Commission: “Strategic Plan 20092012”, May 19, 2009, pp. 30.

2

McKinsey Global Institute: “Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies”, McKinsey Company, 2010.

19 “Lecture by incoming AU Commission Chairperson, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the ANC Women’s League”, July 29, 2012. http://www.safpi.org/news/ article/2012/nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-auc-lecture

3

The Economist: “The Hopeful Continent-Africa Rising”, Dec. 3, 2011.

20

4

Samuel Huntington: “The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, 47.

5

Richard A. Shweder: “Moral Maps, ‘First World’ Conceits, and the New Evangelists”, in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds): Culture Matters, How Values Shape Human Progress, Basic Books, 2000, pp.163.

6

21 A.A. Mazrui (ed): “General History of Africa Africa since 1935”, UNESCO, 1995, Vol. 8, pp.915. The first Chinese female ambassador is Ding Xuesong, who became the ambassador to Netherland in 1979.

E.D. Blyden: “Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race”, Edinburgh University Press, 1967 (1888), pp.221,276.

7

Gail M. Gerhart: “Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology”, London, 1978, pp.54-64;

8

Kwame Nkrumah: “Africa Must Unite”, London, 1963.

9

L. S. Senghor: “Negritude or Humanism”, Paris, 1964.

22 Princess Elizabeth of Toro: “African Princess: The Story of Princess Elizabeth of Toro”, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983.

23 A.A. Mazrui (ed): “General History of Africa Africa since 1935”, Vol. 8, pp.20. The first Chinese female ambassador is Ding Xuesong, who became the ambassador to Netherland in 1979.

24

10 J. Nyerere: “Ujamaa, Essays on Socialism”, London, 1968.

11 Lindah Mhando: “Pax Africana: Reflections on Paradoxes of Violence and African Cultural and Moral Values”, in Seifudein Adem (ed): Public Intellectuals and the Politics of Global Africa: Essays in Honour of Ali A. Mazrui, London, 2011, pp.131-161.

12

We understand that the European women only enjoyed universal suffrage following a long struggle after the modern state was set up, Russia in 1918, Germany in 1919, Britain in 1928, France in 1945, Italy in 1946 and Belgium in 1948. C. L. Mowat (ed):“The New Cambridge Modern History”, Cambridge University Press, 1980, Vol.12, pp.23.

Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa: “Strategic Plan 2008-2011”, pp.22. Quoted from Zhang Weijie, “African Agenda of South Africa’s Diplomatic Strategy: With a Focus on the Relation between South Africa and African Union”, School of International Studies, Peking University, PhD. Dissertation, 2012, pp.44.

25 Liu Xiao-nan: “Feminist Legal Theory: From Centre to Margin, Hebei Law Science, 2005, Issue 8; Guo Yiling: “Analysis on the Reasons for Present Women’s Employment Discrimination in China”, Journal of Women’s Academy at Shandong, 2009, Issue 2.

African Union Commission: “Strategic Plan 20092012”, May 19, 2009, pp.31.

13 Li Baoping: “Tradition and Modernity: African Culture and Political Transformation”, Peking University Press, 2011, pp.39.

26 B. Boutros-Ghali: “Les Conflits de Frontieres en Afrique”, Paris, 1972.

27 Cheikh Anto Iop: “The African Origin of Civilisation: Myth or Reality”, Lawrence Hill Books, 1974; Graham Connah: “African Civilisations: Precolonial Cities and States in Tropical Africa: An Archaeological Perspective”, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

14 Lianghuiwang, “Mencius”.

15 Mao Zedong: “Mao Zedong on Diplomacy”, Beijing: Documentation Office of Communist Party of China Central Committee Publisher & World Affairs Publisher, 1994, pp. 490–492; Li Jiasong (ed):“Big Events in the History of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China”, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2001, Vol. 2, pp.432-433, 438.

28 Li Anshan, “China’s Experiences in Development: Implications for Africa”, June 18, 2009, http://www. pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/57079

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The Ethnographic Study of the Contemporary Africa from the Perspective of China

By Shi Lin Director of World Nationalities Research Centre, Central University for Nationalities, China Abstract: The African study has for a long time been marginalised by Chinese ethnologists and anthropologists. In particular, there is lack of fieldwork and ethnographic case study conducted virtually in Africa. However, the indepth survey and comparative analysis of African culture based on first hand data is fundamental, and is essential for the Chinese to understand African customs, psychology, behaviour and social structure and to gradually get an objective and comprehensive view of Africa. This paper first introduces the Chinese University students’ “impression of Africa.” It then elaborates fieldwork conducted by the author in Zimbabwe, in an effort to explain the view that against the backdrop of the globalisation and continuous development of the Sino-African cooperation, Chinese ethnologists and anthropologists urgently need to go inside Africa to conduct indepth fieldwork and case studies guided by the principles of “equality, friendship, cooperation and mutual benefit.”

1. Introduction

knowledge of African cultures, reduce the cultural misunderstanding between Chinese and Africans and pave way for the smooth economic, cultural and educational exchanges between the two.

The African continent is the cradle of the humankind. With its numerous ethnic groups and diverse cultures, the continent is an ideal place for the study of Ethnology and Anthropology.

Many western scholars have written important ethnographic works based on fieldwork done in Africa a long time ago. The works vividly depict the lives and cultures of Africa and contribute to the development of ethnology and anthropology in ways such as data accumulation, research methods and theory paradigm, among others.

2. Impression of Africa Observed from Several University Surveys In order to know the true situation of ordinary Chinese (especially the young ones) knowledge and understanding of Africa, several small scale surveys among university students from 2010 to 2012 were done.

Chinese ethnologists and anthropologists have embarked on a different development course.

After the founding of new China in 1949, Chinese ethnologists and anthropologists went to China’s vast western part which is mainly inhabited by ethnic minority groups to study their various cultures. Despite the fact that their study achieved a lot, the study on Africa was barely touched.

On the questionnaire, the respondents came up with various keywords on Africa. The most common were: poverty, hunger, war, plague, primitivity, underdevelopment and wildlife among others. They also mentioned HIV/Aids, Libya (or Gaddafi), food crisis, humanitarian assistance and Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. In the eyes of many students surveyed, the African continent has many serious problems such as the undeveloped economy, hot weather, epidemics, frequent clashes and social turbulence.

Against the current backdrop of globalisation and increasing integration of China into the international society, Chinese ethnologists and anthropologists must not limit their research within China. They ought to go abroad (including Africa) to conduct in-depth research and cross-culture comparative study.

The respondents explained that when they surfed on the internet, there were many negative reports on Africa. Many of them had seen disturbing pictures on Africa, showing bleeding and crying people in wars, or miserable scenes in the refugee camps, or ill women and children reduced to skin and bones.

In the minds of some respondents, the UN always gives assistance to Africa, and most of the activities between China and Africa are related to assistance.

Students who had broader interests, searched on tourism websites and watched. Discovery channels

Chinese ethnologists and anthropologists urgently need to go to Africa to conduct indepth fieldwork and case study. This will not only be helpful for the collection of the latest and basic data of different African regions and ethnic groups, but it will also be conducive for Chinese people to have a better

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knew that Africa boasts of a beautiful landscape and its ecological environment is much less affected by civilisation. Such students are eager to visit Africa to see its teeming wildlife.

African Study in Western countries mainly starts from “entering Africa” to understanding the ethnicity and culture of Africa. Many explorers, missionaries, colonial officers and businessmen who were among the early comers to Africa wrote many things about their travels, exploratory experiences, African races and customs. Later on, western ethnologists and anthropologists came to different parts of Africa, conducted fieldwork in different ethnic groups and tribes, and wrote much classic African ethnography. These works were based on first hand materials and provided a relative detailed and accurate description of African culture and customs, marriage and family, social structure, ethnic psychology, character and economy among others, which gradually constituted a relatively complete African cultural panorama. The long time fieldwork and ethnographical research on Africa provided a solid basis for the westerners to know the real situation in Africa and understand African cultural characteristics. They were thus able to deal with African affairs, facilitate their contacts with Africa in different areas and colonise Africa.

Although the in-class surveys were informal and small in scale, they still showed some important information. Firstly, the respondents’ overall concern about Africa was not high enough. Their answers showed that they did not care much about the happenings in Africa since the African continent is far from China and is not closely linked with the daily life of the ordinary Chinese. Secondly, the channels and contents for the respondents to know about Africa are relatively limited. They usually get information on Africa from Chinese and English websites. These sites mainly focus on political activities, emergencies, economic difficulties, and social and environmental issues.

However, with regard to the real African society, the great development and progress Africa has made in the past decades, Africa’s value-add to the world there are not many timely reports. While some respondents said that they probably had not carefully read such positive reports on Africa, they also observed that some negative reports are easier to attract their concern because of the eye-catching headlines. Thirdly, almost no respondent mentioned the rich and colourful African ethnic groups and cultures. This is really a surprise because the students taking the survey enjoyed a typical multicultural background.

China’s study of Africa follows a very different development path. While it develops quite fast in some specific and applied areas such as macro policy research, its perspective of ethnology and anthology is much less popular. We really lack field study in Africa, lack direct observation, and comparative analysis of the ethnic and cultural details of different regions and ethnicity in Africa.

The lack of a detailed ethnic and culture research based on first-hand materials has produced a series of consequences such as a shallow understanding of Africa in Chinese research. It is consequently easy to cause deviations when we formulate and implement concrete policies on Africa, since we always run into the transparent wall of culture. Therefore, it is imperative that the Chinese academic community urgently extends its basic research on Africa, and contemporary African ethnography.

The result of the survey made me ponder: Why do Chinese university students with relatively broad knowledge, large amount of information and concern of international affairs, still have some deviation and limitation in their understanding of Africa? The students showed lack of knowledge on African ethnicity and culture. This “impression of Africa” does not tally with the important position enjoyed by Africa in reality, or the overall and speedy development of the Sino-African relations.

3. Fieldwork in Zimbabwe

Objectively speaking, various complicated factors cause the deviation of the impression on Africa among Chinese people. However, from the perspective of academic study, comparing China with Europe and US in terms of African studies, we can see clearly that there exists an obvious difference and gap. This can be attributed, to some extent, to the different status and role of ethnological and anthropological studies.

From January 2011 to March 2012, I conducted three field studies in Africa for almost 180 days.

The focus of the surveys was in Zimbabwe.

Focussing on its capital Harare, I visited other important cities like Mutare, Masvingo, Bulawayo, and Victoria Falls. I also went to the border areas between Zimbabwe and Botswana, and between Zimbabwe and Zambia.

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Being an anthropologist, I had read a few African ethnographies. But, when I first set my feet in Zimbabwe, walked on the streets and talked to various people, I felt a strong “cultural shock”.

Indeed, the true and lively Africa is so different from the Africa depicted in books and imagination.

3.1 Scope of field studies Zimbabwe’s national and social situation: In order to have a solid and comprehensive understanding of Zimbabwe, I visited organisations such as museums, universities, orphanages, hospitals, markets, tobacco auction floor, stores, companies, factories and farms, and extensively contacted and interviewed local people of different occupations. I also conducted several indepth community studies.

For example, Kuwadzana is a typical community for normal black population in Harare. I went to many families in this community to survey their customs, economic activities and expenditure, and the education of their children, among others.

Zimbabwe’s ethnic issues: There were difficulties in this regard, such as lack of statistics and the current data being too old. I collected information on the population, languages, histories of ethnic groups, cultural differences between different ethnic groups and their views towards each other, ethnographies of Zimbabwe’s biggest ethnic groupthe Shona; their marriages, families, costumes, dietary habits, customs, festivals, religions, and economic activities.

Chinese immigrants in Zimbabwe: As a Chinese economic anthropologist, I am very interested in the old and new Chinese immigrants in Zimbabwe, their economic development and culture adaptation of Chinese companies. Upon learning my field of interest, many Chinese immigrants showed their support and invited me to visit their homes, schools, shops, restaurants and factories where they work. I also visited large Chinese firms in Harare, where I interviewed some directors and some Chinese and Zimbabwean employees and learnt about their views on Chinese enterprises’ administrative issues and frictions resulting from cultural differences.

3.2 A Case of Zimbabwe My fieldwork in Zimbabwe encouraged me to think about how to study African ethnic issues from the point of view of a Chinese scholar. First, I started from the survey of basic situations of Zimbabwe’s ethnic groups.

I was lucky to begin my study on African ethnic issues from Zimbabwe, because it is not as complicated as in many other African countries which have dozens, even hundreds of tribes and ethnic groups. Zimbabwe’s ethnic composition is relatively simple with two major black ethnic groups-Shona and Ndebele, which constitute the main body, to be exact, nearly 96 per cent of the Zimbabwean population.

When my research went deeper, I found that there were many issues to discuss. For instance, Shona is further divided into many tribes and language branches whose formation and development have been influenced by ancient civilisations and a longterm colonial history of this region. Since the 15th century, the Shona tribes fought with early Portugal colonists. Even the origin of the word “Shona” is not quite clear. Initially, it was the name which Ndebele people called someone they defeated. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why Shona people did not like this name at the beginning. Even today, some of them still prefer to call themselves by their respective chiefdoms or dialect systems. Some scholars thought that it is the British colonists who extended the usage of “Shona” to call all the tribes in Zimbabwe.

Traditionally, the various tribes of Zimbabwe have a relatively clear territory of their own. However, in recent years, along with economic development and urbanisation, a large rural population has moved to cities like Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare, and many Zimbabweans have gone to South Africa and other neighbouring countries for job opportunities. As a result, the current Zimbabwean ethnic distribution has undergone some significant changes. Moreover, in addition to the two main ethnic groups of Shona and Ndebele, there are more than 10 other ethnic minority groups living in Zimbabwe, such as the Tonga and the Kunda people, European descendants, Asian immigrants (including immigrants from India, Pakistan and China), and some mixed blood people. Their numbers and distribution are more complex and in constant change, and no accurate and timely data could be provided.

Although the information available is not comprehensive, I am still enlightened by the basics of Zimbabwe’s ethnic groups. I realise the complexity, particularity and variability of African ethnic issues. Africa, the cradle of mankind, boasts of hundreds of large and small ethnic types with distinct characteristics and at different stages of development. For Chinese ethnology

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and anthropology research, African ethnic groups constitute an ideal “the other.” By researching the basics of African ethnic groups, we are likely to think beyond traditional views of ethnology (many of which are based on the special circumstances of Chinese ethnic groups), and to enhance our understanding of the concept of “ethnic group” and even refine the criteria for ethnic classification.

village could be extended to the whole Shona group in Zimbabwe. However, because of the obvious trend of “heterogeneity” of the Shona people in recent years, the case of a special village is not enough to reflect the Shona group as a whole, and multiple ethnographic investigations of urban and rural communities and continuous follow-up study need to be conducted to address this issue.

3.2.1 Zimbabwe’s Shona culture

3.2.2 Zimbabwe’s ethnic economy

The classic ethnographic research method entails selecting a typical village or community, conducting a comprehensive survey on kinship and village organisation, the traditional laws, regulations, medicine, witchcraft, beliefs, means of livelihood, the tribal political system (such as the chiefdom system), wedding and funeral ceremonies, and recording the cultural details mainly through participant observation and description.

Cultural changes are always closely related to economic development. Zimbabwe’s ethnic economy is typical among African countries.

During the fieldwork, I found that in the past, the Shona ethnic economy had long been a small scale traditional agriculture and village economy featuring simple tools and less-developed production technologies, with animal husbandry and fisheries in some areas. The Shona people mainly grow sorghum, maize, rice, beans, peanuts and sweet potatoes. Maize is their staple food. Most of the tribes breed cattle, which is not only a symbol of personal reputation but is also used as dowry.

Shona was conquered at the end of the 17th century by the Ndebele and in 1889 by white settlers.

Their traditional economy was forced to shift to a colonial economy. A large number of fertile lands were plundered, and the Shona people limited to the reservations, worked for the white people on their farms or as servants.

The research was mainly conducted in accordance with the norms of ethnography. For example, in order to understand the food culture of Shona, I visited the homes of ordinary citizens at kuwadzana community for participant observation and interview. I recorded their kitchen style and utensils layout, their time for meals and the food at their table, especially the cooking process of the most common staple food ‘Sadza’, which I tasted. To get the views of the local people towards marriage and family, I spoke to Shona families of different income levels to know the amount and types of dowry, the wedding rituals, and how the dowry is paid.

I gradually realised that the Shona ethnic culture has its rich connotation and distinctive features, particularly in marriage and family, kinship, living habits, rituals, religious beliefs, witchcraft (witch doctor), chiefdom, and traditional laws. All these are worthy of study, especially in terms of comparative analysis with the Chinese minority cultures. In addition, today’s Shona ethnic culture is the result of a complex historical process, from the period of isolated development of ancient civilisations, the colonial era with conquest and slavery, the national liberation movement to the development of the nation after independence. Therefore, Shona culture is not ‘frozen’, but constantly changing.

While conducting an ethnographic survey, one must add the “historical dimension” and elaborate from the perspective of cultural change. There was a higher homogeneity within the Shona group in the past, and the research discoveries in one Shona

After independence in 1980, Zimbabwe embarked on a path of independent development of the national economy. Since then, Zimbabwe has tried to gradually get rid of the control of the external economic forces, in order to achieve genuine national economic emancipation, but the road has twists and turns. From the failure of a moderate redemption policy in the 1980s and 1990s to the implementation of “fast track land reform” (which later led to severe economic turmoil); from the “economic indigenisation” policy to the announcement of a tougher ‘nationalisation’ approach in recent days, Zimbabwe’s economy has experienced ups and downs like a roller coaster.

Some even called it a “gamble.”

Given the macroeconomic situation, the traditional economic life of Zimbabwe’s ethnic groups continues to change, especially in economic ideas, career choice and women’s economic status. I was particularly impressed by some cases. In a village near Mutare, I visited local farm families and found that almost no one was left but women

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and children. In one family with a dozen members of four generations, all of them were women and children with men having migrated to work in the city. Things were different in urban communities. A Shona woman living in the Kuwazana community told me that her husband earned unstable income by doing odd jobs, and the economic burden was all on her. Every month she had to take a bus to a South African city to sell sheets and quilts door to door, in order to maintain her family. Another woman, a secretary in a Harare company, earned twice as much as her driver husband, but the husband emphasised in the interview that he had more ‘economic rights’ at home because “I paid a few heads of cattle to her family when we were married, and she must respect and obey me.”

During the fieldwork, I realised the unique path of Zimbabwe’s economic development, the complex economic problems it is facing, the lessons learnt in dealing with Western countries, and the changes and transformation of Shona traditional economic life at this stage. This constitutes a typical case of the “multi-type” ethnic economic development in Africa.

3.2.3 Zimbabwe’s ethnic relations Zimbabwe’s ethnic relations can be generally discussed in terms of the relationship between the two major ethnic groups (Shona and Ndebele), relationship between the blacks and the whites, as well as the relationship between immigrants and the natives.

I learnt that the Shona and the Ndebele enjoy a relatively harmonious and stable relationship.

People I interviewed said: “There’s little difference between us, the languages are somewhat different, but we can understand. I have many Ndebele (Shona) friends. My neighbour is a Ndebele, and I’m totally fine with it. Getting married is no problem, and there are actually quite a lot of couples like that.”

I was also interested in how the Asian immigrants adapted to Zimbabwe culture. For example, many Indian and Pakistani immigrants have been in Zimbabwe for several generations. They are good at business, and mostly engage in real estate, transport, trade and retailing. The Indian and Pakistani immigrants have largely kept their

traditional culture and religion intact. I attended the wedding of a Pakistani immigrant, where the wedding dress, food, music, dance and ritual were almost the same as in Pakistan. Ninety five per cent of the guests were of Pakistani origin except a few black and Chinese friends (all of whom were the groom’s business partners). The population of Chinese immigrants in Zimbabwe is growing rapidly. Most local people are friendly to Chinese immigrants. However, because some businesses and shops of the Chinese immigrants may have affected the interests of the local people, conflicts sometimes occur. Some Chinese communities are already talking about the possibility of establishing a ‘Chinatown’ in Zimbabwe.

4. Conclusion Thanks to the fieldwork and case study, I began to have a new understanding of the research of contemporary African ethnography conducted

by Chinese scholars. I believe, unlike African ethnographies written by Western scholars, the works by Chinese scholars would have distinct Chinese features with a trait of the times.

First of all, in view of value orientation, China and Africa understand and respect each other, because they share similar experiences. For example, both are developing countries and suffered colonial exploitation. Chinese scholars thus uphold the value of “equality, friendship, cooperation and mutual-benefit” in their ethnic cultural research of Africa. This is ultimately different from the traditional Western ethnography which served colonial domination, nationalism and hegemonism.

Secondly, in view of research, although Chinese scholars are not so experienced in doing field work in African countries at present, we do have many successful research experiences in China.

We enjoy a comprehensive theoretical and methodological system of Chinese ethnology and anthropology. We have developed a large number of sub-disciplines with Chinese characteristics such as the Marxist Ethnic Theory and Ethnic Policies, Ethnic Economy, Ethnic Education, Ethnic Religion and Ethnic Art Studies. Chinese scholars have undergone systematic and specific trainings in ethnology, and have accumulated rich experiences of field work in regions of both Han and ethnic minorities. They know how to go to the

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field, make contact with local people, learn about their society, economy and culture, as well as carry out qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, transcultural comparative research and so on. Therefore, Chinese scholars researching on African ethnic cultures would become an innovative practice of Chinese experiences in Africa.

Thirdly, in view of research object, what the Chinese scholars are facing is no longer the ‘old Africa’ in the traditional Western ethnography, but a “new Africa” in the wave of globalisation and informationisation. “Development” has become a new key word, taking the place of ‘primitive,’ ‘backwardness’ and “colonisation.” Therefore, the Chinese scholars would emphatically observe, describe and analyse the process of social and cultural development and transformation in the present “new Africa” and make unprecedented

comparative research with the Chinese ethnic and cultural phenomena.

In brief, I believe, contemporary African ethnography with a Chinese view would be a ‘knowledge production’ benefiting both China and Africa. In the practical aspect, it would help the Chinese people to learn more about the rich connotation of African ethnic cultures, form a more objective and accurate “impression on Africa” and promote the rapid and steady development of ChinaAfrica friendly cooperation. In the academic aspect, it would help provide the Chinese ethnologists and anthropologists with a broader angle to compare, reflect on the cultural traditions of China and understand research methods and thought in Western schools so as to make the “Chinese consciousness” and “Chinese angle of view” clearer, and to make due contribution to the new development of the world’s ethnology and anthropology.

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Africa in China: Affirming African Agency in Africa-China Relations at the People to People Level

By Lloyd G. Adu Amoah Department of Business Administration/Arts and Sciences, Ashesi University, Berekuso, Ghana Abstract: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has served as the key institutional vehicle through which China has engaged Africa at the highest diplomatic and political levels since 2000.

Underscoring the importance she places on her relations with Africa, China released in 2006 a white paper on China-Africa Policy. China has invested heavily in the extractive (especially oil), telecommunications, infrastructure and manufacturing (to a lesser extent) sectors in virtually all parts of Africa. In all these, Africa is apparently overwhelmed and hypnotised by China’s overtures in what is presented as a chess game in which one side (China) is making all the moves. The African agency in shaping and influencing her deepening relations with China is either paralysed or non-existent. Is this the case? This work argues to the contrary and suggests that the literature must begin to take into account and unpack African agency in Africa China relations.

1. China Emergent: The Material and Ideational The facts on China’s emergence in the last two decades as a geo-economic and political heavy weight are striking. China has posted an average GDP growth rate of nine per cent in the last two decades. For a global economy ravaged by a worldwide financial crises triggered by America’s sub-prime catastrophe, China is serving as a growth motor. In 2005, China overtook the US economy, the most dominant economy in the last hundred years, as the largest consumer of key commodities like meat, steel and coal, among others. In terms of nominal Gross Domestic Product figures, China in 2011 dislodged Japan to become the world’s second largest economy. China has become the factory of the world.

Beyond an essentially materialist focus on China’s emergence (on account of its global economic significance), some scholars are beginning to look at the ideational consequence of contemporary China’s impact on the world. Brautigam (2011) raises some of these questions. Her interest here is China’s undisguised assault on the underlying logic of the global aid architecture in which the flow of financial and technical resources to developing countries is explicitly linked to Western notions of human rights1 and good governance (in its expansive, multi-sectoral interpretation). In the Chinese logic on aid, a dialectical and pragmatic approach is used which recognises and respects local political, cultural and historical specificities.

In economics, Herrmann (2010; 2011) argues for what he terms a “third culture” in economics on account of the lessons that can be learned

at the conceptual level from China’s economic rise: “China raises questions of some established standards in economic theory, especially in contrast to certain basic assumptions in the so called Washington consensus of development economics…” This “third culture” inspired by China’s contemporary economic empirics should bring morality (some Western thinkers have begun to make a case for the return to Adam Smith, the moral philosopher), cultural embeddedness and specificity2 back into economic policy making.

Amoah (2011) has introduced the “Strategy Approach” as an alternative framework for public policy formation for developing polities derived from the Chinese policy making experience. The examples cited show at the very least clear signs of the ideational impact of an emergent China.

2. China in Africa 2.1 A perspective on the Chinese interest in Africa3 The strategic forces shaping China’s heightened interests in Africa must be understood as a diptych: forces internal and external to China. First, we ruminate on our understanding of these internal factors. The Reform and Opening up Period (ROP) (gaige yu kaifang), which essentially was given the stamp of approval as official policy of China at the Third Plenary Session of Eleventh Central Committee which convened in December 1978 (Government of China, 1985), provided the policy framework for the fast paced growth of the Chinese economy in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The ROP implemented under

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Deng Xiaoping in its essential points ensured that the organisation of China’s economy and society was directed away from a doctrinaire, inflexible Maoism and Lenin-Marx-Stalin ideas. As a consequence, the market allocated scarce resources through price signals, but the ever present reality of market failure was headed off by allowing planning in strategic areas of the economy. This calibrated and pragmatic approach to economic policy management laid the basis for the emergence of coastal regions such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Shanghai, among others, as economic centres of mainland China.

By the 1980s and 1990s, the ROP had began to bear and show ample fruit (Wang and Zhou, 1985; and Wu, 2005). From a miserly and parlous 381 yuan (US$60.58) in 1978, China’s per capita income rose to 16,084 yuan (US$2,557) in 2006. China’s official figures indicate that from 1986 to 1996, China’s economy grew at an average rate of 10.1 per cent.

In spite of such a phenomenal transformation in a generation (of a hitherto impoverished society that was scarcely given a chance to succeed), pressing challenges have emerged. While the coastal areas (especially Eastern Pearl River Delta and parts of the Yangtze Delta Area) and by extension the urban centres of China have flourished, the Eastern and Western (essentially rural and interior) parts continue to face grim socio-economic challenges.

It must be added to provide perspective however that World Bank figures indicate a consistent decline in the number of people living in absolute poverty in China since the ROP. The reality of the welfare gap between the urban and rural areas however remains in spite of significant strides achieved by China in dealing with poverty. These welfare challenges are further complicated by environmental degradation, rising population, increasing urbanisation and ethnic tensions among other socio-economic and political challenges. The implication of all these challenges is for the Chinese leadership to, at the very least, maintain China’s economic growth track record in the last two decades to provide the material basis for society wide socio-economic transformation. The constitutional adoption by the Chinese government of the Scientific Outlook for Development4 underlines its grappling with the challenge of constructing an inclusive and equitable society in the midst of rapid economic growth. Failing this, the Chinese Communist Party will have to contend with possible challenges to its continued hold on power since the founding of the Republic in 1949. Africa with its vast, untapped

natural resources, huge market and pressing capital, technical and other needs could not have escaped China’s strategists both in and out of government.

Historical ties with Africa especially in the anticolonial era and camaderie stemming from third world solidarity of yore minimise the risks in China’s strategists’ calculations in utilising Africa as an economic beach head to cauterise potential domestic political pressures.

In pursuing its geo-strategic interests far afield, China is a late comer to the game in contemporary times. However, flush with deep pockets (China’s foreign reserves have been steadily growing and are valued currently at over US$3trillion) in the last two decades Zhongguo (China’s name in Mandarin) has developed the logistical, technical and organisational capacity and with it the confidence and the will to pursue, protect and maintain her economic and other interests in far reaches of the world, including Africa. The capacity to do this has a critical bearing on domestic realities in China as well as geo-strategic repercussions. This paper uses oil supplies to underscore this point. China must guarantee access to cheap and reliable oil sources or undermine any current or future economic projects (Shaofeng, 2008). Africa presents an obvious but difficult option because Western oil companies have been benefitting from first mover advantages for decades. Oil resources in oil rich states such as Nigeria and Iraq are a case in point. The evidence (in the first half of 2010,5 China imported 32% of its crude from Africa) suggests that China (through its National Oil Companies) has employed out of the box moves to outmaneuver her Western rivals in securing oil supplies in Africa (Jiang and Sinton, 2011) and is indeed corralling existing and emergent oil fields on the continent (Angola, Sudan and South Sudan present a classical example).

China’s engagements with Africa must be seen also in the light of a country that has always seen itself as a global power (Maddison, 2007), if not a super power, and seeks to demonstrate this. On the admixture of China’s oil forays in Africa, her national interests and geo-strategic ambitions Clarke (2008) is perceptive: “Corporate strategy goes hand in glove with state ambitions.”

2.2 The empirics of China in Africa The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has served since 2000 as the key institutional vehicle through which China has engaged Africa at the highest diplomatic and political levels. The Chinese government convened the first FOCAC

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Ministerial Meeting in Beijing in October 2000.

The FOCAC has since been institutionalised through regular Ambassadorial and Ministerial meetings every three years, and Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) every two years, the last two of which are alternately held in Africa and Beijing.

It must be noted that it is these FOCAC meetings which spawned the Addis-Ababa Action Plan 200420066 in 2003, which elaborated wide ranging cooperative ventures between Africa and China encapsulating geo-political, socio-economic, trade, security, technological and other issues of mutual concern to the two sides. China followed up all these with the release of the China-African Policy (CAP) document in January 2006. In the CAP, China asserts that it will ‘‘establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership (my emphasis) with Africa, which features political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange’’ (Government of China, 2006).

These institutional and policy measures provide the backdrop for China’s7 focused investments in the extractive (especially oil), telecommunications (latest estimates indicate that China has sunk in US$3billion), infrastructure and manufacturing (to a lesser extent) sectors in virtually all parts of Africa (China is beginning to eye the banking and finance industry as well). By 2010, China had essentially cornered the telecoms market in Africa with a strategy anchored on providing hardware (which offer long term maintenance and servicing opportunities) to public and private organisations in Africa. The World Bank claims that by 2007, 17 per cent of China’s financial resources were directed at the telecoms sector. Financial intermediaries like the China Exim Bank, channel such resources to leading China telecoms companies like Huawei, ZTE and Alcatel-Shanghai Bell, which have significant investments in Africa.

China’s role as a major oil player in the horn of Africa underlines that country’s deeply veined strategic interests in the sector in Africa. Reports in early 2012 indicate that China is navigating a complicated geo-strategic economic and political terrain, following the independence of South Sudan which now possesses three-quarters of Sudan’s (hitherto China’s second largest source of crude oil in Africa after Angola) oil resources. Juba seeks to avoid the 1,600km oil pipeline passing through Sudan’s territory to Port Sudan, by constructing a 2,000km replacement linking Lamu Port as part of the Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET). The President of Kenya

(Emilio Kibaki) has asked China to invest in the LAPSSET project (Obwacha, 2012).

On the banking and finance front, one of China’s top banks, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) is building a bridgehead into Africa’s still evolving financial universe through the Standard Bank Group. The ICBC purchased a 20 per cent stake8 (valued at US$5.5billion and reportedly the largest Chinese investment in Africa) in the Standard Bank Group in 2008, which made the Chinese bank the single largest shareholder in Africa’s largest bank. Through its linkages with ICBC, the Standard Bank of South Africa brokered a US$1billion loan facility with four Chinese banks (reflecting instructively African penetration into the Asian financial market) namely; Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Macau) Limited, Bank of China, China Development Bank, and China CITIC Bank. ICBC’s growing influence was symbolically marked by the opening of its first offices in Africa in Cape Town in 2011.

Africa is probably overwhelmed and hypnotised by China’s overtures in what is presented as a chess game in which one side (China) is making all the moves. In other words, African agency9 in shaping and influencing her deepening relations with China is either paralysed or non-existent. The theme10 for a conference held in June, 2011 in Uppsala, Sweden organised by the European Conference on African Studies (the fourth in the series) sought to interrogate this problem. Inevitably, China’s role in this unfolding process came up for discussion and stridently so that nation’s increasingly influential presence in Africa which has bifurcated the literature along almost antagonistic lines, to which I now turn.

3. Africa-China Relations Literature: Fear Factor Versus New Possibilities Frontier It can be argued that the literature on contemporary Africa-China relations in the last few years can be grouped into what I label the “Fear Factor” and “New possibilities Frontier” camps. Ampiah and Naidu (2008) describe rather harshly this bifurcation as the product of a “Manichean psychology.” In the former camp, the common thread running through the arguments suggests that China is set to exploit Africa’s natural and mineral resources; truncate the continent’s putative current breezy strides towards good governance (as understood in Western terms) and ultimately emerge as an overbearing imperial power in a gory 21st Century re-enactment of

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imperialist incursions into the continent five centuries ago (Alden, 2007; Norberg, 2006; and Taylor, 2005, 2006, 2008).

The good governance derailment argument can on occasion be over stretched. Taylor (2006) is a case in point in his averment that “Beijing is an actor in Africa that does provide a discourse that effectively legitimizes human rights abuses and undemocratic practices under the guise of state sovereignty and “non-interference.” Taylor’s basis for such an expansive claim is a quote from the Chinese scholar He Wenping quoted by Servant (2005):11 “Common sense about human rights and sovereignty is only one of the common values shared by China and Africa…There is no doubt that China’s success in Africa has partly benefited from it.”12 It is arguably quite a logical stretch to claim that a commonsensical understanding of human rights and sovereignty implies unethical13 political, trade and economic relations between China and African nations (Taylor, 2006 and Servant, 2005).

He clarified this by saying that “compared with the Western world that over-stresses the universality, individuality and supremacy of human rights as well as ‘human rights stands above sovereignty.’” China and many African countries attach greater value to collective human rights such as national rights and rights for development, as well as cherish the rights of protecting our sovereignty.”14 As Amoah (2008) has argued, the discourse on governance in Africa is undermined by the refusal of some analysts to acknowledge that governance in Africa and other parts of the world will evolve in an idiographic manner conditioned and constrained by historical, cultural and other factors. This view is as He’s position regarding the consensus between Africa and China on good governance than a consensus on promoting misgovernance as Taylor makes us believe.

On the resource front, China’s putative imperial designs in Africa have been expressed in the literature through exaggeration (in the face of compelling facts to the contrary) and on occasion outright disingenuousness. The Chinese Mozambique land grab claim is a case in point.15 Lora Horta, a researcher, made claims that China sought to acquire swathes of arable land in Mozambique for the express purpose of using that country as a reliable source of food crops (International Relations and Security Network -ISN, 2007).16

Subsequently, the other articles in the series received further exposure on the websites of the Centre for Strategic International Studies17 and the James Town Foundation.18 Horta’s claims were cited (Cotula et al., 2009) by an authoritative study of land-grabbing in Africa, by a joint FAO-IFADIIED19 team and another by two Standard Bank researchers Freemantle and Steven (2011).20 The key claims on this Mozambique land grab matter such as China planning to invest US$800 million in 2008 and having sent as many as 100 agricultural experts to the southern African country, proved patently false. When Horta was asked to produce evidence in the form of notes or source materials, he claimed to have lost them. It is arguable that African agency in the Fear Factor camp is discounted completely or taken into account only blithely, if at all.

Scholars in the latter camp focus on the new possibilities (albeit conscious of the challenges that China’s growing presence and influence in Africa portends) for rapid development that Africa-China relations present. Close watchers of Africa-China relations who focus on the opportunities China presents tend to affirm Africa’s agency as the parties interact (Amoah, 2010 and 2011; Brautigam, 2011; Edoho, 2011; Sautman and Yan, 2007). This is ultimately critical for what Amoah (2010) has been proposing: “a far more sophisticated and nuanced view” of China’s presence in Africa, beyond the simplistic and simplifying binaries of good and evil. While African agency has been highlighted, the focus has tended to be on what Raine (2009) aptly describes as “elite-to-elite” or high level contacts in a preponderantly uni-directional pattern of engagement, focusing on African policy reactions to China’s moves and not the reverse.

Crucial is the contention in this work that is subtle, subterranean and far reaching, Africa is affecting China and the Chinese at the people to people level.

Through migration and diasporan framework, a variety of scholars are examining the various ways in which Africans are directly shaping and influencing Chinese society in both mainland China and SARS21 (Bodomo, 2003; 2009a; 2009b; 2010 and 2012; Bodomo and Ma, 2010; Edmonds, 1993; Lam, 2010; Le Beil, 2009; Morais, 2009; Quayson, 2012). Within this burgeoning literature, Ghanaian scholar Bodomo’s (2010 and 2012) cross-cultural bridge theory of migrant-indigene relations offers a compelling framework for disaggregating and understanding the myriad ways in which Africans are influencing the Chinese at the people to people level. Initially derived from the presence of Africans

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in Guangzhou, the bridge theory claims (Bodomo, 2010) that “Africans in Guangzhou, through their activities either intentionally or unintentionally, serve as linguistic, cultural and business links and connections between their Chinese hosts and Africans in their home countries as well as those who arrive newly in China. In other words, Chinese in Guangzhou perceive African culture and business practices in the first instance through these Africans who live among them, and Africans in Africa and those who newly arrive in Guangzhou can perceive Chinese culture and ways of doing business through the Africans resident in Guangzhou.” The Bodomoan theory has subsequently been tested in Yiwu, Shanghai, Beijing, Hong Kong and Macau albeit reflecting in the process a fixation in the literature essentially with African agency in firsttier Chinese cities which have driven China’s growth after the ROP. This work attempts to add to the literature on African agency in Africa-China relations by arguing that the Bodomoan theory finds some useful empirical validation and enrichment22 when extended to inland second tier, Chinese cities (landlocked) that have not historically attracted cross national migrants (on account of initial complications of access, the absence of booming cities, ports and the other attractions which serve as pull factors). The city of Wuhan (capital city) in central China’s Hubei province is used as a case study in preliminarily unpacking African agency in shaping Africa-China relations on the Chinese mainland, along the Bodomoan axes of language, culture and business.

4. Africa Remakes China23 4.1 Context An active African migrant population is emerging in Wuhan (made up of three districts: Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankou) which may potentially add to the makings of an African diaspora in contemporary China. In Wuhan, this migrant African population is constituted fundamentally by students24 (comprising a dynamic fashion of those pursuing their course of study and those who stay on after graduation). The pull of China as a destination of choice for African students in recent decades can be ascribed to a variety of reasons. For Amoah (2008), one of the key drivers is the drastic reduction in the quantum of public resources directed at institutions of higher learning in the 1980s in Africa (at the behest of the World Bank), which led to acute challenges in terms of access, affordability and quality.25 China (her emergence as a global power has arguably

reinforced the attraction) offered an attractive alternative for Africa’s young who had qualified for higher education, could not gain access but could self-finance their college education.26 In addition to this sample, “a raft of bilateral agreements between the Chinese and African governments-some dating back to the 1950s”27 (Amoah, 2008), has served to catalyze the flow of African students into China under various scholarship schemes funded by both China and African governments.28 4.2 African agency in Africa-China relations: The cultural axis29 in Wuhan There are two schools of thought (Hsu, 1983) regarding the impact of the West and therefore the beginning of China’s modern era. One school dates modern China from the Opium War of 183942, while the other school places emphasis on the initial contacts forged by European explorers and missionaries from the 14th century. Hsu (1983) calls for reconciling these two approaches eclectically, since both have merits. The key point here is that in China’s modern evolution, her isolationist posture was undermined. The ROP was to mark a decisive turning point as China opened up in an unprecedented fashion to international business and with it cultural30 influences from foreigners (wai guo ren in Mandarin). In the cultural sphere in the last thirty years, the replacement of the Mao with Western suits as the official outfit of choice for China’s political, economic and academic élites could be interpreted (at least symbolically) as the Middle Kingdom’s embrace of non-Chinese cultural products. Africans in Wuhan can be said to be reinforcing this cultural embrace beyond the East-West pole that has become standard fare in especially Western and Asian popular and academic discourses on cross cultural interaction. If it had not become a trend, there were at the very least, several instances in which young Wuhan ladies put on African fabrics and braided their hair in African style. Undoubtedly, the African presence in this Chinese city deep in the maw of China was having some very visible cultural implications.

An interview with some of these ladies about their tastes for African cultural products in China, where some advertisements project Western brands and tastes31 revealed that the young ladies found it hen ku (very cool). Their choice showed that they were avant-garde, cosmopolitan and even modern in their fashion tastes and preferences. This African cultural influence in Wuhan has been facilitated in no small measure by the annual Wuhan University

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Autumn International Cultural Festival. This flagship festival serves as a useful institutional vehicle for showcasing cultural products of the countries represented in Wuhan and attracts visitors from other parts of Hubei and surrounding provinces.

There is also the African somatic/phenotypic effect instrumentalised via marriages, especially those between African men and Chinese women in Wuhan. Wuhan is yet to have its Chocolate city (Morais, 2009), but it is not a stretch to anticipate its emergence in the coming decades as the progeny of these marriages make Wuhan their home. One particular couple who the researcher observed and interacted with over four years (and continues to be in contact with) provides interesting insights into African agency in Africa-China relations at the people to people level. For the Chinese lady (a native of Suizhou a prefecture level city in rural Hubei), marrying her African husband, a graduate of Wuhan University, provided social and economic mobility (a critical intervention given rural poverty in China). In interviews she talked about looking forward to travelling32 (lu you in Mandarin) to Africa with her husband. If one understands the centrality of going abroad or indeed travelling in Chinese culture and leisure, the importance of Africans in providing fresh perspectives and horizons through travel for Chinese women, beyond the often cloistered Chinese context, comes into sharp relief.

4.3 African agency in Africa-China relations: The language and business axes in Wuhan The language barrier standing between Africans and the Chinese is being bridged. For African students in China’s facility in Mandarin, it is critical for both practical and academic purposes. Most Chinese universities offer structured and intensive courses in Mandarin and require HSK (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshe)33 competence for graduation.

Increasingly, unlike earlier African generations, contemporary Africans are beginning to speak and write Mandarin. Communication in Mandarin offers a rare window into the African world for the Chinese in which Africans themselves explain their worldview and experiences (unmediated by third parties as has historically been the case); an opportunity is created for undermining stereotypes and myths that both parties have of each other.

Based on my experience in Wuhan, African students have assisted Chinese students with English (oral

and writing skills). For the Chinese who consider mastery of English a critical competitive advantage in a globalising world in which their country is playing a central part, the presence of African students response to the financial burden of going overseas to hone their English skills. Here, in a rarely mentioned fashion in the literature, Africa is having an impact on China instead of being the perennial respondent to China’s moves. As Bodomo (2010) informs us, this trend is noticeable in Guangzhou where Chinese traders speak noticeably African inflected English. In Wuhan, the linguistic exchange34 is between the future elites of Africa and China. Some of these Chinese students eager to gain further from Africa’s language heritage, relocate temporarily to African cities like Accra to hone their English skills working in Chinese restaurants and other commercial outlets.35 On the trade and investment front, African SMEs are beginning to show interest in penetrating the vast Chinese market on the mainland. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) facilitated one such charge in 200836 in Hankou, Wuhan in the central province of Hubei, China. The African presence in Wuhan proved of vital strategic value in this first encounter as it provided a pool of translators and valuable insights into the mores and ways of the city and province. If this interest by African SMEs in the central China market succeeds, it will be interesting to track how this will frame and condition this section of the overall China domestic market, which has remained quite impenetrable upto now. Already one of the most famous night clubs in Wuhan, Blue Sky,37 is run by an African from Mali. When the researcher was leaving Wuhan in 2009, another plush night club was opened by a former Wuhan student from Gabon.

5. Policy Recommendations The inchoate emergence of an African migrant community in Wuhan coupled with its more mature counterparts in other coastal cities of China, demonstrates the significant ways in which Africans are shaping contemporary China’s society like never before in the historical encounters between these peoples. This social reality has obvious policy implications. While government to government interactions between China and African nations are important, African nations as a matter of strategic policy necessity need to focus on the people to people dimensions generally, and in particular, the emergent African China diaspora in the broader context of Africa-China relations. The role that

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China’s own diaspora played in her economic takeoff is instructive. Quoting Dorléans (2002), Ma Mung (2008) reports that in 2001, 63 per cent of China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) valued at US$47 billion came from China’s diaspora. China is actively using her Approved Destination Status (ADS)38 policy to encourage people to people contact with African countries and has made such contacts one of the central planks of its ChinaAfrica Policy (2006). The African Union also declared the African Diaspora its sixth region in 2005.

A crucial first step for African nations regarding people to people engagement in Africa-China relations is the need for recognition at the highest policy levels of the real and potential value of the presence of Africans in China. Without such an active awareness, policy formation on this matter will not be focused, sustained, creative and strategic. Following this, the next crucial policy step lies in the province of immigration rules and procedures, which is a key part of migration. African foreign ministries must engage (in concert with their embassies in China and other relevant state institutions) their Chinese counterparts, in interrogating and rationalising (where unfavourable) immigration laws that constrict unnecessarily the capacity of Africans to legally live and work in China. This has been a sore point (leading to violence in documented cases) for people to people relations as Africans migrate to China in increasing numbers. Africans who are interested in penetrating the Chinese domestic market need to be aided by their governments.

Setting up bureaus in the relevant home institutions to focus solely on immigration issues should not be complicated. The Chinese government (Blanchard, 2011) supports Chinese businesses going global.

Why don’t African governments do the same for their own citizens?

Cultural interaction via institutionalised vehicles to foster cultural understanding should not be overlooked. A Ghana or Kenya Year in Beijing should not be out of place. This will allow the Chinese to be exposed to the outstanding range of the intellectual, scientific and artistic exertions of Africans across the centuries. The sporting arena should be added to such cultural interactions and given the heightened interest in sport (Chinese students in their first year of college are supposed to engage actively in a chosen sport as a prerequisite for moving on to the second year; and sporting facilities are a common sight in most

neighbourhoods) on the mainland; this should prove a boon. For a football loving nation like China that is yet to find success on the international stage, organising football clinics led by stars like Ghanaian international Michael Essien of Chelsea FC or his Ivorian team mate Didier Drogba (who are recognisable names in China) will go a long way in enhancing the people to people linkages between these two partners.

6. Conclusion This work has attempted to demonstrate that African agency in Africa-China relations cannot be dismissed or taken lightly. The African presence in Hubei province’s Wuhan city was employed as the case study to explicate the ways in which African agency as construed in this work is being expressed. As China makes her presence felt in Africa, the continent (Africa) is also influencing Chinese society and business in both obvious and not so obvious ways. The literature tracking the interactions between these two parties must begin to take due account of this and interrogate it robustly.

This is necessary to dispel the interpretation of Africa “under the sign of crisis” (Quayson,) in popular and academic discourses in general and specifically, the patronising idea of Africa as a clueless, pliant and suppliant partner in AfricaChina relations. Ultimately for Africa then, this has implications for policy formation in suggesting critical areas (beyond the traditional ones) that have hitherto not been focused on or all together ignored as the continent’s nations engage China in pursuit of their national interests.

Endnotes 1.

According to Bessis (2003) Western thinkers were the first to attempt to “theorise the supremacy of individual over collective exigencies” which “sanctification of the individual as the horizon of all things enabled the secular ideology of human rights to make global headway.”

2

The Chinese scholar Zhang quoted in Gardells (2009) argues along the same lines.

3

This section draws heavily on Amoah (2010).

4

China Daily (2008) description of the Scientific Outlook of Development is worth quoting: “A concept initiated by the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2003. It stresses a comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development that is people-oriented. With priority on addressing the needs and protecting the rights of

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people, the country will not only grow in economic terms, but also in political and cultural terms. The growth aims to bridge regional disparity, the urbanrural gap, protect resources, and the environment.

This policy is at core of policies of the CPC’s current leadership headed by Hu Jintao. At the 17th CPC National Congress in October 2007, it was formally included in the Party Constitution.”

5

Jiang and Sinton (2011).

6

The Beijing Action Plan of 2013-2015 is the latest.

7

The data on China’s investment in Africa draws heavily on information provided in several issues of the Africa Research Bulletin cross-referenced with other information sources.

8

9

10

The two banks have subsequently been instrumental in major financial deals on the African continent including the extension of a syndicated loan to the Cocoa Board of Ghana (COCOBOD) and the building of the largest coal fuelled power station in Botswana. By the end of September 2011, the total value of signed financial agreements brokered by ICBC totalled over US$7billion and made ICBC one of China’s most influential banks in Africa.

African agency in this work is construed as the processes by which Africans shape and influence Chinese society within the ambit of Africa-China interactions including the actions that Africans take in order to benefit collectively and individually in their engagement with China.

African Engagements on whose terms?

11 This quote is only one of two (article has 10 in text quotes in all) in the whole article without any references.

12 The English language version of Servant’s article can be found at this link: http://mondediplo. com/2005/05/11chinafrica 13

Sautman and Yan (2006) argue that China is labelled as amoral in its dealings with Africa to anchor a charge of colonialism aimed ultimately at displacing critiques of colonial legacies and neoliberal policies imposed on Africa.

14

He’s response was in quotes which suggests that she was quoting from an official Chinese line on this subject. On debates on Confucian versus Western notions of human rights see Chou (2004, 2006, 2008).

15 The discourse here draws heavily on Brautigam (2011, 2012).

16 See http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/

Security-Watch-Archive/Detail/?id=53470&lng=en 17

See http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_ cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35042%20 May%202009 t

18

See http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_ cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35042%20 May%202009 t

19 Report written by Cotula et al. (2009). The copy downloaded to its credit rejects the massive ChinaAfrica land grab (Cotula et al., 2009) although it still refers to Horta’s work.

20 See https://m.research.standardbank.com/ DocumentReader?docId=1671-E1AFB8F7AF0747 A98326A4419C169FE0&view=&pageNum=2 21 China’s Special Administrative Regions.

22 Bodomo (2011) has undertaken a pilot study of students in Chongqing in order to test the claims of his bridge theory beyond his initial African trader focus.

23 This section is derived from participant observation, numerous informal conversations and interviews spanning a five year period (2004-2009) during which the researcher visited and stayed in China first as a government official and later as a student.

24 This is an educated guess stemming from this researcher’s interaction with African students on and off campus in Wuhan in his capacity as the president of the African Students’ Representative Committee of Wuhan University. The data is not readily available as this migrant population is under-researched and is still in the process of formation. Wuhan has over a dozen universities, world class infrastructure and more crucially a comparatively low cost of living compared to the coastal Chinese cities such as Shanghai.

25 See McKinley (2008).

26 China’s Ministry of Education indicates that selffinancing students have become the main stream of foreign students in China. See http://www. moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/ s3917/201007/91575.html 27 See the full text of the Chinese government’s paper on its Foreign Aid under the “Human Resources Development Cooperation” subsection http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-04/21/ content_1849913_5.htm 28 If one takes “professionals” to mean students, then official China data sources claim that 11,000 African students (for short term and degree

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courses) are trained in that country yearly since 2004. The data on African students however, needs serious disaggregation to provide researchers with a true picture of Africans studying in China

Long Term”, African Agenda, March, pp.5-8.

Amoah, L.G.A. (2011), The Strategy Approach: A Response to the Challenge of Ghana’s Rapid Transformation by 2037, Paper Presented at the 4th European Conference on African Studies (ECAS4), Available at http://www.aegis-eu.org/archive/ecas4/ecas4/panels/121-140/panel-126/Lloyd-Amoah-full-paper. pdf.

29 See pictures in the appendix 30 Culture here is construed in the Gyekyean (1997) sense as “…a complex of shared meanings that people in a given society derive from or attach to their experiences, the ground by which they understand themselves and interpret their experiences. It is the specific embodiment of a people’s way of life in its totality.”

Ampiah, K. and Naidu, S. (2008), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Africa and China, Kwazulu-Natal: Kwazulu-Natal University Press.

Blanchard, J. (2011), “China’s MNCs as China’s New Long March: A Review and Critique of the Western Literature”, Chinese Journal of Political Science, 16, pp.91-108.

31 Some adverts in the Chinese media promote cosmetic products purported to make the user’s skin white (bai).

32 The couple and their child have since migrated to Quebec, Canada.

Bodomo, A. B. (2003), Introducing an African Community in Asia: Hong Kong’s Chungking Mansions, A Squib to the International Scientific Research Network: The African Diaspora in Asia (TADIA).

33 Mandarin Proficiency Examinations.

34

The stock of languages in these exchanges include: Swahili, Arabic and French. It will not be long before the Chinese start learning Akan, Yoruba, Hausa and other African languages.

Bodomo, A. B. (2009a), “Africa-China Relations: Symmetry, Soft Power and South Africa”, The China Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Greater China, 9(2), pp.169–78.

35 In 2007, during fieldwork in Accra, the researcher met three Chinese students working at the Dynasty Chinese Restaurant on the Oxford Street in Osu, Accra honing their English in the Ghanaian capital city.

Bodomo, A. B. (2009b), “Africa-China Relations in an Era of Globalisation: The Role of African Trading Communities in China”, West Asia and Africa, 8, pp.62–7.

36

ECOWAS has followed this up with the second forum which was held in Accra in 2012.

Bodomo, A. B. (2010), “The African Trading Community in Guangzhou: An Emerging Bridge for Africa-China Relations”, China Quarterly, 203, pp. 693–707.

37

This night club is for night time revellers in Wuhan and has the distinction of attracting expatriate clientele like no other club in the city.

Bodomo, A. B. (2012), Africans in China: A SocioCultural Study and its Implications on Africa-China Relations, New York: Cambria Press.

38 Approved Destination Status (ADS) is a bilateral tourism arrangement between the Chinese Government and a destination whereby Chinese tourists are permitted to undertake leisure travel in groups to that destination.

Bodomo, A. and Ma, G. (2010), “From Guangzhou to Yiwu: Emerging Facets of the African Diaspora in China,” International Journal of African Renaissance Studies, 5(2), pp.283–9.

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Ma Mung, E. (2008), “The New Chinese Migration Flows to Africa”, Social Science Information, 47(4), pp.643-659.

Wu, J. (2005), Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform, Singapore: Thomson/South-Western.

Maddison, A. (2007), Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, Paris: OECD. Mckinley, D. (2008), “Class Wars”, Focus on Africa, Oct.-Dec., 2008, pp. 47.

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Appendix

A Chinese lady with African braids

The Gabon stand at the Wuhan University Cultural Festival

African braids and fabric on display

A young Chinese boy at the Ghana Stand Wuhan University Cultural Festival

The billboard for the Second Wuhan University Cultural Festival

African-Chinese couple in Wuhan

A Chinese lady poses with Ghana’s famous Kente at the Cultural Festival

Chocolate family!

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African students on the Wuhan University soccer team The ECOWAS delegation at the ECOWAS-HUBEI Trade Forum

A Mandarin class in Wuhan University Business match making at the ECOWASHUBEI Trade Forum

African graduands at Wuhan University African Students at a meeting in Wuhan University

Africans socializing with their Chinese friends in Wuhan

Africa-China people to people interactions: what will the future hold?

Photos: Author’s Own

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Reflections on China-Africa Relations

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Arab Spring and Sino-African Relations: The Case of North Africa

By Mustapha Machrafi and Hicham Hafid Institute of African Studies-Rabat, Morocco Abstract: The year 2011 marked a turning point in the reconfiguration of political structures in North Africa. Indeed, several countries in the region have known speedy (in some cases abrupt) changes. This new situation leaves us wondering about the future of Sino-African relations and Chinese cooperation in the North Africa region. The majority of North African countries require a favourable climate (political institutions, infrastructure and investment, cooperation programme) for reconstruction, peace and stability.

In this perspective, the responsibility of world economical and political powers like China is decisive for creating the necessary conditions for peace and security in the region. Also, the “Arab Spring” showed the urgency of managing certain issues such as youth, unemployment, democratisation and development.

Therefore, African governments and their partners (in this case China) should give concrete answers to these issues.

1. Introduction In the 1960s, China had few partner countries in Africa. The countries included Tanzania, Guinea, Congo and Mali, among others. Today, however, the story is different. After reforms undertaken since the end of 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, majority of African countries have warmed up to China.

Since China commenced the Open Door Policy, during the last decade, the special relationship between China and Africa has been strengthened and concretised through historical, political, economic and geopolitical factors.

Historically, China never colonised Africa. As recalled by Chinese President Hu Jintao at the third FOCAC in Beijing, “Despite the geographical distance, the Sino-African friendship is rooted in the depth of the ages and continues to deepen over the years.” Therefore, since the introduction of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000, the relations between China and Africa inaugurated a new period of cooperation. Indeed, at “the Chinese level, after more than two decades of last economic growth, China stood firm on her way to rise. The common destiny of China–the largest developing country and Africa–the continent with most of developing countries, has brought China and Africa closer together as well as called for both sides to coordinate their effort for common development in a world dominated by Western developed powers. In the light of this new circumstance, a new mechanism of cooperation is badly needed for China and Africa, so as to facilitate further development of China-Africa relations in the new century” (Qiang in Machrafi Zaoual, 2008).

On the political level, and unlike the traditional powers, China takes skillful diplomacy, peaceful and pragmatic (soft power) based approach,

advocating for a “win-win” relationship, neutrality, mutual respect, and non interference in the internal affairs of the partner state.

Economically, the growing presence of China is explained by its growing economic strength on the world stage, and its interest in Africa’s resources to sustain its growth and development.

China’s continued growth is attributed to external factors (such as the increase in global demand for manufactured goods at low prices and technology transfer) and internal factors primarily related to proactive economic policies. Today, China is the second largest trading power in the world.

In geopolitical terms, the Sino-African relations are explained, in the first plane, by the strategic geographic position and resource endowment of Africa, as well as the large number of African countries. In addition, “A related approach is to locate China within the long history of Western colonial domination and exploitation that was experienced throughout Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean. This “common experience’ of China and Africa, and the other countries of the South, has long been the recurrent theme in official Chinese foreign policy pronouncements from earliest days of the visit of Zhou Enlai to Africa, in 1960s...” (Keet, in Fantu and Cyril, 2010).

Moreover, despite the divergent interests of developing countries, China has always sought to preserve its status as spokesperson for developing countries within international organisations like the WTO. The year 2011 marked a turning point in the reconfiguration of political structures in North

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Africa. Indeed, the majority of North African countries are experiencing an increase of Islamists movements. They are moving from an “Arab Spring” to an “Islamist Spring.”

North African countries consequently require a favourable climate (political institutions, infrastructure investment, and cooperation programmes) for reconstruction and stability.

In this perspective, the responsibility of world economic powers like China is decisive for creating the necessary conditions for peace and security in the region. “China’s Africa policy can be succinctly characterised as a policy of continuity and change: a policy that seeks to apply influence without interference.” (Kwesi in Fantu and Cyril, 2010).

Since the “Arab Spring” showed the urgency of managing certain issues such as youth, unemployment, democratisation and development, African governments and their partners (in this case China), should give concrete answers to these questions.

This paper addresses three main questions: i. The inventory of the Sino-African cooperation in North Africa at the political and economic levels ii. The new challenges of Sino- African cooperation in the region: the case of investment. iii. Current status of trade and FDI flows between China and Africa 2.1 Trade flows between China and Africa The Chinese trade with Africa has grown more than tenfold over the last decade, from US$10 billion in 2000 to US$127 billion in 2010, making China one of the largest trading partner to Africa. Trade between China and Africa grew rapidly to reach US$160 billion in 2011. Chinese investment in Africa has averaged US$1 billion annually in recent years, while this figure was US$50 million in 2001.

Figure 1: Breakdown by country of Chinese exports and imports in Africa (2007)

Source: Renard, 2011

•

China’s engagement with Africa varies with regions, states and actors involved (government, businesses). The Chinese trade with Africa is diverse (Figure 1). About 82 per cent of Chinese exports are for three sub-regions including: • West Africa (35%); this includes Benin (5%) and Nigeria (10%).

•

Southern Africa (24%), of which South Africa (21%).

And finally, North Africa (23%); this includes Egypt (10%), Algeria (6%) and Morocco (5%).

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Figure 2: Chinese export trend to Africa between 2009-2011

Source: Authors’ computation using data from TradeMap

When observing the structure of Chinese exports to Africa (Figure 2), the largest share of exports are manufactured goods, finished consumer goods such as textiles and electronic games, semi-finished products particularly chemicals, machinery and transport equipment due to the strong presence of

Chinese enterprises in the sectors of infrastructure (Figure 3). Sectors of telecommunications, construction of roads and public buildings are the most important.

Figure 3: Chinese exports, by products, about Africa, 2011

Source: Authors’ computation using data from TradeMap

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As for the structure of Chinese imports, 88 per cent of these imports are from three main sub regions: Central Africa (39%) including Angola (31%) and Republic Congo (6%); Southern Africa (39%) including South Africa (20%); and finally,

East Africa (11%) including Sudan (10%). This high concentration of energy products reflects the importance of crude oil representing almost all of China’s imports from Angola and Sudan (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Development of the Chinese imports coming from Africa

Source: Authors’ computation using data from TradeMap

Figure 5 shows a significant change in exports of sub-Saharan Africa between 2009 and 2011, an increase of 44 per cent. However the unrest in North Africa (Arab spring) had negative economic relations, reducing trade figures between China and the region by 16 per cent between 2010 and in 2011. This change occurred after China, from the beginning of events in Libya, ceased all economic

activity in this country. Two months after this declaration, the number of Chinese companies present in Libya fell by over 45 per cent (Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 2011). As in the case of Libya, the evacuation of Chinese entrepreneurs severely undermined Sino-Egyptian trade relations that have experienced a sharp plunge since the events of Egypt in January 2011.

Figure 6: Chinese imports, by products, coming from Africa 2011

Source: Authors’ computation using data from Trade Map China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

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North Africa is theoretically well positioned to enable China to ensure its supply of resources, particularly oil. As shown in Figure 6, the constituent countries are among the largest producers and holders of oil reserves, gas, phosphates and iron ore. Algeria and Libya are the largest oil producers in the region and among the top twenty producers in the world (their cumulative production, Algeria and Libya would rank as the fifth position, just behind Iran). For gas, Algeria and Egypt are among the top twenty producers in the world. With regard to phosphates, Morocco and Tunisia are ranked second and fifth, respectively. Their proven reserves are among the largest in the world.

It is important to note that in addition to having abundant natural reserves, the countries of North Africa enjoy a wide margin of exports of these commodities, as their offer far exceeds domestic demand.

Figure 7: Chinese imports coming from North Africa, 2011 (by products and country)

Figure 8: Chinese exports to North Africa, 2011 (by products and country)

Source: Authors’ computation using data from TradeMap

2.2 The Indicator of Regional Preference The Indicator of Regional Preference is, in this study, to assess, the regional orientation of trade towards Chinese African sub-regions from other sub regions; and, the regional preference of China in North Africa. It can be calculated by the following formula:

The variables mean: Xri represents the value of Chinese exports of product into the region; Xr represents the value of China’s total exports to the region; Xmi represents the value of Chinese exports of product i to the rest of the region; and,

Source: Authors’ computation using data from TradeMap

As well as exports to sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese exports to North Africa (Figure 7), are extremely focused on three product categories including: consumer finished products, industrial equipment and semi-finished products.

Xi represents the value of total exports of China to the rest of the region.

The indicator takes values ​​between 0 and infinity.

The higher its value, the higher the regional preference is strong for the product in question. If it is set to 1, then the intensity of exports will be identical to the region and the rest of the region.

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Table 1: Indicator of regional preference for China (by under areas)

North Africa

West Africa

2009

2009

2011

Central Africa

2011

2009

2011

Southern Africa East Africa 2009

2011

2009

2011

FDT1 0,85 1,04 1,4 1,24 1,78 2,47 0,77 0,58 0,43 0,36

MLFAP2 0,04 0,12 6,1 7,52 0,4 0,1 0,94 0,45 0,28 0,3

APV3 0,31 0,65 5,0 3,36 0,44 0,53 0,50 0,39 0,25 0,58

SFP4

1,06 1,08

0,8 0,67

0,98 1,06

1,11 1,05 1,15 1,28

FIG5 1,04 0,97 1,0 1,14 1,09 0,99 0,91 0,97 1,06 0,99

FCG6 1,10 1,12 0,8 0,71 0,86 0,91 1,27 1,28 1,01 1,01

Average 0,73 0,83 2,5 2,44 0,93 1,01 0,92 0,79 0,70 0,75

Source: Authors’ computation using data from TradeMap

1.

2.

3.

FDT: Food, Drink and Tobacco MLFAP: MinĂŠral Lubricating Fuels and Additional Products APV: Animal Products and Vegetable

Table 1 summarises the indicators of regional preferences of the different sectors of the Chinese economy. From this table, we find that, for semifinished products, finished products and industrial equipment of finished consumer goods, the IPR is close to 1 in all sub-regions. This means that the intensity of Chinese trade is identical for all these regions.

For animal products, vegetable and mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, IPR is greater than

4.

5.

SFP: Semi-Finished Products FIG: Finished Industrial Goods

6.

FCG: Finished Consumer Goods

1, this reflects a strong preference for the Chinese West Africa, especially for food and live animals between 2009 and 2011.

RPI fell slightly in West Africa, Southern Africa and East Africa. However, it rose from 0.85 to 1.04 in North Africa and from 1.78 to 2.47 in Central Africa, which means that the intensity of Chinese exports is high for Central Africa, and almost identical to North Africa.

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Table 2: Indicator of regional preference for China (by country)

Algeria Egypt Morocco Lybie Tunisia

2009 2011

2009 2011 2009 2011 2009 2011 2009 2011

FDT

0,86 1,63

0,64 0,46 3,22 2,83 0,35 0,30 1,02 0,83

MLFAP 0,19 0,08

7,98 7,89 0,1 0,02 0,61 2,14 0 0,27

APV

0,22 0,21

5,31 2,2 0,49 1,2 0,14 0,16 1,32 1,21

SFP

0,74 0,8

1,43 1,28 0,95 0,94 0,82 0,67 1,04 1,02

FIG

1,05 1,25

0,93 0,88 0,9 0,91 1,08 0,69 1,18 1,14

FCG

1,21 0,84

0,81 1 1,06 1,01 1,14 2,14 0,62 0,74

Average 0,71 0,80

2,85 2,29 1,12 1,15 0,69 1,02 0,86 0,87

Source: Authors’ computation using data from TradeMap

Table 1 and Table 2 show the evolution of regional preference indicator of the different sectors of the Chinese economy for the countries of North Africa.

It shows a strong regional preference to Egypt for all products except food. As for the regional preference for Morocco, we find a low-intensity commerce in mineral fuels and lubricants, and a strong evolution of the IPR between 2009 and 2011 for the semi-products and chemicals for the rest of the products. IPR remains almost identical over the same period.

With regard to the IPR for Algeria and Tunisia, China has the same regional preference for these two countries, except for animal products and plants where China has a strong regional preference for Tunisia.

Finally, to Libya, we find that the GPI rose from 0.69 in 2009 to 1.02 in 2011. This means that China has tried, in recent years, to strengthen its trade relations with Libya, while trying to overcome the political problems between the two countries. This consolidation of trade intensity is based, primarily: mineral fuels, lubricants and finished products for consumption, in particular, electronics and games, among others.

3. From Trade to Investment: Investment in North Africa

Chinese

If we look closely at the statistics provided by UNCTAD (2011), we can say that Chinese FDI in Africa is strongly linked to trade and development assistance, to the extent that FDI flows. As we noted in the previous section, Chinese investments in Africa vary from one region to another. They are

based mainly on natural resources, infrastructure investments and to a lesser extent, services.

Increased Chinese investments in Africa are characterised by the increase of Asian investments in Africa. Some Asian countries have begun to show interest in investing in Africa. A number of studies (such as UNDP, 2007) show the FDI stock in Africa by selected Asian developing economies that are major investors in the continent. Total FDI outflows from developing Asia to Africa were estimated at an annual average of US$1.2 billion during 2002-2004 (UNCTAD, 2006).

“Singapore, India and Malaysia are the top Asian sources of FDI in Africa, with a combined investment stock estimated at US$3.5 billion (accumulative approved flows from 1996 to 2004), followed by China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. In the case of the Republic of Korea, since the late 1980s, chaebols have also set up marketing and production facilities abroad, though foreign investments in Africa have been mainly limited to market penetration efforts, largely associated with electrical and electronic products and automobiles.

As for Chinese and Indian firms, it is likely that more Korean firms will soon be seeking to secure their own natural resources from Africa. India has long had economic relations with much of Africa, especially East Africa” (UNCTAD, 2007).

This situation can be explained by the continuous effort of some Asian countries to develop their cooperation about taxation, and the negotiation of some treaties as shown in Table 3.

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Total World

Developing Countries

Developing Economies

Viet Nam

Thailand

Taiwan Province of China

Sri Lanka

Singapore

Phillippines

Pakistan

Nepal

Mongolia

Malaysia

Korea, R. of

Korea, D.P.R. of

Indonesia

India

China

South East and South East Asia

Pa Ec rtne on r / om Re g io y

n/

Table 3: Double taxation treaties between South, East and South-East Asia and Africa, as of 1 January 2006

Algeria 1 x 14 8 25 Benin - - 2 2 Botswana - 3 3 6 Burkina Faso - 1 1 2 Cameroon - 1 3 4 Cape Verde - - 1 1 C. A. Repblic - - 1 1 Chad - 1 - 1 Comoros - - 1 1 Congo - - 3 3 Congo DR - 1 1 2 C. d Ivoire - 1 8 9 Egypt 7 x x x x x x x 17 23 48 Eritrea - 1 - 1 Ethiopia - 5 2 7 Gabon - 2 2 4 Gambia 1 x 1 6 7 Ghana - 1 7 8 Guinea - - - 1 Kenya 1 x 2 9 11 Lesotho - 3 2 5 Liberia - - 4 4 Libyan A.J. 2 x x 4 1 5 Madagasca - 1 1 2 Malawi - 1 7 8 Mali - 1 1 2 Mauritania - 2 1 3 Mauritius 10 x x x x x x x x x 26 10 38 Morocco 2 x x 14 23 40 Mozambique - 2 1 3 Namibia 1 x 3 4 7 Niger - - 1 1 Nigeria 2 x x 2 11 14 Senegal 1 x 9 4 13 Seychelles 4 x x x x 7 3 10 Sierra Leone 1 x 1 3 4 South Africa 6 x x x x 29 34 68 Sudan 3 x x x 10 1 11 Swaziland - 3 2 5 Tanzania 1 x 4 6 10 Togo - 1 1 2 Tunisia 4 x x x x 22 23 46 Uganda 1 x 5 8 13 Zambia 1 x 5 14 19 Zimbabwe 1 x 3 9 14 Africa 50 7 9 5 1 5 5 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 3 2 209 256 491

Source: UNCTAD, 2007Â China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

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Figure 9: Flows of IDE bound for Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa

Source: OECD, 2012

There are some specifics in investment in Africa.

In the last decade, the development of oil and the abundance of natural resources have made subSaharan African countries, the primary beneficiaries of the investments on the continent. Southern

Africa and West, alone, received 55 per cent of total investments in 2011. Only four countries in these two sub-regions including Nigeria, South Africa, Angola and Republic of Congo constituted 42 per cent of total (FMI, 2011).

Figure 10: FDI inflows to Africa, by sub region 1980-2005 (US$Millions)

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The implementation strategy of Chinese companies has followed several stages.

“In the early years of China’s economic transition to an open and market-based system, Chinese firms started with small investments abroad, mostly in neighbouring countries and regions […] at that time, Chinese firms were new to the world economy and lacked the competitive advantages necessary for FDI as well as its related knowledge and experience [...]. From the mid-1980s, outflows increased only slightly. Just a few Chinese FDI projects exceeded US$5 million before 1990, and none of them were undertaken in Africa. After 1990, China’s FDI outflows grew remarkably in both value of investment and the number of projects. By the end of 2000, Chinese companies had undertaken 6,296 FDI projects in 140 countries and regions. Of China’s total investment outflows in 2000 in terms of value, 25 per cent were to economies within Asia, including among others, Hong Kong (China) and Macao (China),

while North America and Oceania accounted for 37 per cent and Africa (17%). In terms of the absolute amount of flows, Africa has become an important FDI location for Chinese enterprises only in recent years. As of 2005, China’s FDI stock in Africa had reached US$1.6 billion, with increasing outflows to the continent in recent years. A number of African countries have received FDI flows from China” (UNCTAD, 2007).

In the last decade, we can observe that the Chinese investments have increased.

“China becoming the largest provider of new Overseas Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) to Africa in 2008 with over US$5 billion, and by the end of 2009 Africa has come to occupy 4 per cent (the same total as it has in Europe) of China’s total outward investment stock. And, when you remove OFDI to Hong Kong, Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, China’s OFDI stock to Africa is closer to 21 per cent” (AfDB, 2012).

Table 4: Sectoral distribution of China’s FDI Flows to Africa, 1979-2000

UNCTAD, 2007

We can observe that in the case of the North Africa countries, OFDI flows from China to North Africa are more significant in continental terms as they represent 15 per cent of all flows to Africa, up from 10 per cent in 2003. However, Chinese investments in Africa face different problems. In the case of

Chad, in January 2012, the Chadian Minister of Petroleum announced the closing of the refinery Djermaya citing “persistent differences” with the Chinese partner about the selling price of the products on the market (IFRI, 2012). East Africa, despite its lack of natural resources, has a lot of

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investment, not only in the exploitation of natural resources, but also in services, infrastructure and construction. This wave of investment destined for East Africa is due to other reasons such as

diversification of its economy, a cheap skilled labour and its geographical proximity to the Middle East, India and China.

Figure 11: Chinese FDI flows to North Africa

Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics)

In the case of Algeria and Egypt, the Chinese government has encouraged investment, particularly in energy and construction sector. In the two countries, China has established the official Chinese Economic Trade and Cooperation Zones where we can find Chinese manufacturing and assembly plants.

The internationalisation of Chinese enterprises that has accelerated in recent years, driven by various motives (including market, asset, efficiency, and resource-seeking) and encouraged by the “going

global” strategy of the Chinese Government (see below), is expected to continue. The importance of China’s foreign reserves (at US$1 trillion at the end of 2006, the largest in the world) is also contributing to the expansion of Chinese outward FDI. Indeed, China is set to become a major foreign investor in the developing world (UNCTAD, 2005). Chinese investments in developed countries are also set to increase, as suggested by transactions such as the acquisition of IBM’s Personal Computer business

by Lenovo in late 2004 (UNCTAD, 2007).

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Box 1: Chinese investments in Algeria and Egypt

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce indicated that the value of newly contracted projects in North Africa and the Middle East decreased by 53.2% year-on-year to US$3.47 billion from January to February 2011, notably with a 45.3 % decline in Libya and 97.1% in Algeria.

Most dramatically, with the onset of violent demonstrations and outright rebellion in Libya, China announced it was ceasing all economic activities in that country. Chinese officials indicated that the number of Chinese companies engaged in Libya shrank by more than 45% in the first two months of 2011, hence pushing China to announce the suspension of its activities in Libya.

Egyptian-Chinese trade, too, has experienced a sharp downturn since the events in Tahrir Square in January 2011. Like Libya, the evacuation of Chinese citizens hit commercial relations very hard.

However, this broader observation needs to be balanced against the role of China as an investor in the region. Chinese OFDI has been intensifying over the past few years – especially in Algeria, Libya and Egypt – and has reached 15% of Chinese total FDI in Africa in 2007 compared to 10% in 2003. And while Chinese investment has been aimed primarily at the energy and construction sector within North Africa, there is a small, but growing proportion moving into manufacturing and services. This is especially the case in resourcepoor Egypt and in Algeria.

The fact that China’s investment has moved outside of the energy and mineral sectors in some North African countries, providing capital to set up manufacturing and assembly plants in areas as diverse as textiles and automobiles, is a potentially encouraging sign. Moreover, the Chinese decision to establish some of its flagship Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones (ECTZs) in the region, linked to meeting both the growing domestic demand in these host countries and as a platform to access other consumer markets, demonstrates a willingness to engage in long term deepening of its economic engagement. Two countries in particular, Algeria and Egypt, have been targeted by Chinese firms who have chosen to set up businesses both within the newly founded ETCZs as well as outside these structures.

Source: AfDB, 2012

The countries of North Africa suffered from political and economic uncertainties associated with the “Arab Spring.” The total investment increased from 15.3 per cent in 2010 to 8.9 per cent in 2011.

With the exception of Morocco, all countries were concerned. Egypt has been hit hardest, dropping 60 per cent in 2011.

development activities and services to small and medium enterprises This reinforces the potential of technology transfer and increased productivity that plays a central role in economic growth, creating employment and reducing inequalities in African countries, especially those who are poor in resources.

The economic structures of North Africa remain strong and bode well for investment opportunities once the region stabilises. Investments in Morocco should continue to increase, due to the fact that the country was protected from the disturbance of the sub region.

North African countries have the means to potentially increase their competitiveness as a region to better exploit the flow of foreign direct investment, including Chinese investment. In this perspective, attention to technical and vocational training should be given in the educational system for forming a skilled labour in the fields of management and engineering, to meet the needs of Chinese enterprises and other settled in the region.

Chinese FDI in Africa must focus not only on trade, but strengthening the private sector

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Policy makers should not consider China as a threat but an opportunity to improve their competitiveness in third markets, to take maximum advantage of the opening plants by Chinese investors.

From a regional perspective, African countries should use the infrastructure projects funded by Chinese investors in order to improve overall regional infrastructure and facilitate intra-regional integration. “Chinese interests are a matter of developing trade by increasing aid “without political conditions” within a non interference policy that accepts the survival of authoritarian regimes, persuading the international community to increase its support, and defending Africa’s position on the world stage. But given the fluidity of certain issues (especially security) in Africa, and the speed with which they can change, it is important to be aware of examining how best to regulate and align its policies to reflect African realities” (Fantu and Cyril, 2010).

China has proven itself to be an economic powerhouse–after 30 years of growth averaging 9.6 per cent annually. Its economic power has made itself felt throughout the world: the words ‘Made in China are found everywhere [...]. However, as China’s leaders will themselves confirm, this rapid growth has given rise to factors that threaten to destabilise the system, factors that are difficult to manage in a society that is becoming more complex each day” (Niquet, 2008).

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Understanding China’s Neo-Colonialism in Africa: A Historical Study of the China–Africa Economic Relations

By Eginald P. Mihanjo Associate Professor in History and Strategic Studies and Deputy Principal for Academic Affairs, Stella Maris Mtwara University College, a Constituent College of St. Augustine University of Tanzania Abstract: Twelve years ago, in June 2000 the Communist Party of China (CPC) had a meeting with six friendly African ruling parties from six African countries namely Tanzania, South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Ghana. This important meeting defined China’s future economic relations with Africa. In this forum, China explained its economic agenda and policy roadmap for Africa. The result is China’s current growing economic strength and dominance in Africa that has overshadowed the Western powers.

China’s economic upsurge and penetration into Africa is raising concern and debate on whether China has become Africa’s new neo-colonial power. This article addresses this fear by pointing out China’s non colonial purpose and ambitions in Africa. To demonstrate this, the article uses the case of Tanzania’s long ties with China since independence in 1961 that peaked with the building of Uhuru railway (The Tanzania Zambia Railway) and the Friendship Textile Mill (Urafiki) in the 1970s, and more recently in the 2000s, by China helping Tanzania build the national stadium. The article concludes by pointing out that Africa should proactively seize the opportunity provided by China’s economic penetration.

with the West European countries.

1. Introduction

Is China a neo colonial power? This is a fundamental question that must be addressed. This is particularly so because it is true that China’s involvement in Africa has trebled in recent post 2000s years. However, is China’s increasing role in Africa making her a neo colonial power? Has this outpaced the Western European classical colonial and neo colonial powers role in dictating Africa’s socio-economic and political conditions? Is the relationship between China and Africa new? What lesson do Africans learn from this discussion?

China’s growing economic might and its rising economic influence in the world, particularly in Africa, is raising debate not only on how it has achieved such growth in a short time, but also on whether it will overtake the USA in the near future to become the world’s economic superpower.

China has overtaken UK and become Africa’s third most important trading partner, after the US and France. Its trade with Africa totalled US$100 billion in 2008.1 China is now a major investor in Africa, accounting for 10 per cent of all investment in Africa.2 On the other hand, Africa provides onethird of China’s oil supplies. China invests in a distinct manner. She applies energy diplomacy, a close connection between business and the central government, and gives state-financed infrastructure and loans to oil producing countries. As part of the package deal of oil investment, Beijing offers an alternative development model that contrasts with the “strings attached” Western versions.3 This draws African countries away from attachment

Some scholars and politicians especially in the West, concerned by China’s increasing role in Africa, are asking whether China is Africa’s neo colonial power.4 The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, during her visit to Zambia in June, called for Africa to beware of a “new colonialism.” Asked about China’s growing influence in Africa, she said: “We saw that during colonial times it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders and leave.” Although Clinton avoided naming China in her remarks, the suggestion that it could be fostering colonialism in Africa was immediately dismissed by Beijing.5

2. Is China-Africa’s New Neo-Colonial Power?

Neo colonialism refers to a situation whereby an independent country is politically independent, but economically dependent on another country and or is tied to imperialist domination and exploitation. This is a common characteristic of Third World countries. It is an outcome of longbuilt historical processes and relationship of exploitation between the neo colonial states and the colonising metropolitan states. It is based

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on the history of unequal development between the two which favour the metropolitan state and put the periphery colonial state in a situation of perpetual dependence on the metropolitan state in many forms–political, economic, social, technological, military, diplomatic and cultural.

Dependency is a historical phenomenon in which a country is unable to manage its welfare and relies on another country–economically, socially, and politically. Despite the fact that neocolonialism is a historically constructed relationship, neocolonial dependencies are perpetuated through diplomacy, political coercion, economic coercion, cultural and psychology, and technology.

China has more than doubled her economic and trade relations with Africa and surpassed Western Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

To some scholars, the relationship is in favour of China. Africa’s dependency on China makes scholars term the latter a neo colonial power. Some scholars do not trust China’s move in Africa. It is argued that China is having a capitalist orientation.

Yiching Wu argues that: ‘... market reforms have subverted Chinese socialism and that the Chinese government’s programme of market reform which was allegedly to reinvigorate socialism, has instead led the country down a slippery slope toward an increasingly capitalist, foreign dominated development path and capitalist marketisation...’6 It is such assessment and conclusion that make the West see Chinese influence over Africa as a competitively capitalist venture that is not only consolidating China’s colonial or neocolonial ambitions, but also challenging the Western capitalist dominance in Africa.

This concern must be historicised. Is China a neo colonial power over Africa? Admittedly, it is true that China’s interest in Africa has grown. It is true that the volume of China’s trade in Africa is comparatively bigger than that of Africa to China.

Furthermore, China’s investments in Africa are outpacing other world powers. However, all these facts do not make China’s growing economic interest and venture in Africa a neocolonial relation. There are many reasons to demonstrate this, but the following two are the basic ones: first, the relations between Africa and China have grown for a long historical time as Third World countries based on south-south relations. Second, ChinaAfrica relations are not the same as West/North and

Africa relations. For Africa, relations with China address the continent’s pertinent challenges. By contrast, USA and the Western European powers are not addressing pertinent issues in Africa. The West and USA must become pro-Africa. President Barack Obama must take a pro-active policy that encourages more engagement with Africa and advocate for more US investment in Africa.7 We are witnessing a decline of the USA’s influence in Africa because it is being edged out slowly by China, Brazil, Russia, and others.8 While the USA’s strategic shift from looking at Africa as a continent for humanitarian aid to a vital strategic continent for its national interest is important,9 it must translate this perspective into practice and stimulate Africa’s economic growth and development, as China has done. This is the only way that the West can compete and outpace China’s current position in Africa.

What Africa needs is economic growth. Africa needs to create jobs and get out of dependency.

‘While aid is important, partnerships based on trade, investment, and joint ventures are much more important.’10 Africa will continue embracing China because China is contributing significantly to Africa’s growth. The capitalist crisis, primarily the crisis of liberal capitalism, is the main reason for its competitive failure. From a critical Marxist framework, all social systems are historical and no social system can last forever. Capitalism, as a social system, is not an exception.11 Capitalism is apparently in crisis and is in her stages of decadence. In addition, the attempt to address it through the monetarist approach that made deregulation the panacea in the euphoria after 1980 notably in Britain and USA, was a very unfortunate mistake.12 Entrepreneurial capitalism, a type of capitalism where entrepreneurs provided radical ideas that meet the test of the market place, played a central role to the West in the 1990s and the turn of the 21st century. The less developed countries seem to handle the crisis in a better way through stateguided capitalism that organised the economy.13 China took up this approach, while the West declined because they could not adapt quickly.

Since World War II, USA has been a partner in Africa in terms of investment and development programmes, but in the last five to ten years, China has literally outpaced it in all aspects. The United States’ influence in Africa, particularly commercial relations, is declining.14 China experienced a similar decline in the 19th and 20th centuries. It had long historical ties with East Africa before

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Western European colonisation suffocated it. After the post independence period, China maintained low influence over Africa with exception of few countries in southern and eastern Africa. During this period, China identified herself with the Third World countries so as to rebuild her country on the basis of the south-south relations. Her economic reforms in three decades and in the 21st century successfully transformed China. Her long ties support and relations with other Third world countries, especially from Africa, became the springboard for closer Sino-Africa ties.

China’s success and strategies are in contrast with the West. Her rise over the past quarter century has been unprecedented. During this time, China’s annual economic growth has averaged somewhere around 9.5 per cent, giving her a competitive edge over other world powers.15 On the other hand, Africa’s past experiences of development failure that was modelled and supported by the West is the other reason for the continent’s search for alternatives from other Third World Asian and Latin American states. The performance of the European market economy model in Africa has been miserable.16 Recent allegations that European humanitarian organisations are involved in a conspiracy to keep Africa in the throes of poverty confirm further that Africa needs an alternative approach. Peter Mandelson, the ex-EU trade commissioner, told a summit on Africa in London that European charities opposed his attempts to renegotiate trade agreements that would afford Africa more commercial opportunities.17 He pointed out that, “When I tried to re-negotiate EU’s trade rules, which were expiring; were not delivering on economic development, who were the people trying to silence me?... It was the European NGOs. It was shocking!”18 Such an experience encourages Africa to look for new partners like China. The Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone models aimed at maintaining dependency and unequal relation between the metropole and the periphery. By so doing, the mass of African people were uprooted from the governance and national resource accountability architecture, and the resulting consequence has been corruption and a nonfunctioning financial aid.19 Such has been the frustrating experience of the African people that even after two decades of uninterrupted liberal democratic rule, African leaders have failed to steer the continent in a way that positively impacts on the material conditions of the people.20 Furthermore,

the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) model of the 1980s continued structuring minimalist states in Africa that restricted the provision of public social good and instead provided an enabling environment for private sector-driven production.21 Such constructions from the West negatively impacted on Africa and its people.

Western Europe must notice the changes taking place in Africa. Asia and Europe need Africa’s resources. The dramatic rise of BRIC–Brazil, India and China as emerging new powers in the world economy is an alternative to Africa. Africa, once described as the “hopeless continent,” is now attracting the attention of emerging Southern powers and the traditional Western trading partners.

This rapid economic transformation partially rises from the significant progress in governance reform and a reduction in armed conflicts in Africa. Peace has brought with it the opportunity for development and democratisation. Moreover, rising commodity prices, increased investment in vital infrastructure

by China and India and access to information by ordinary citizens through the mobile phone revolution, have opened up new opportunities for rural producers to increase production and market their goods at the local and international levels.

This domestic dynamism has in turn contributed to significant growth in the number of Africans who view themselves as middle class. With increased opportunities for employment and rising income, large numbers of Africans have become the new consumers, further spurring on the domestic economy.22 These changes are partly attributed to the good partnership with China, which has significantly invested in Africa’s infrastructure and the country’s affordable goods are in most African shops.

3. China and the Regional Powers The world is changing and regional powers are emerging. In addition, Africa is also changing.

Instead of looking on China’s increasing involvement in Africa as a neocolonial venture, the West, in particular USA, should rethink their policies that have looked at Africa in colonial lenses, treated them harshly, overridden their interests and hooked the continent on aid. Africa must be seen as an investment destination and equal partner in economic growth.23 The USA and the West must grapple with the changing world dynamics and new geopolitical configuration as new regional powers such as China, India and Brazil set in Africa. The Chinese yuan and Indian rupees are increasingly

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finding their way into Africa’s economies and the Western powers are losing influence in the resource rich continent. The need for natural resources, trade opportunities and political alliance is a normal traditional panacea in all nations. China and newly emerging regional powers such as India and Brazil are pursuing their national interests in Africa by opening up links with the continent. Consequently, while Western countries are still important players in Africa’s energy sector, the deepening engagement of China in Africa’s infrastructure, mineral sector and telecommunications is creating “deep nervousness” in the West. 24 With time, China and other emerging powers have learnt how to competitively outsmart competition from Western international multinationals. The competition in Africa usually pits big Chinese enterprises that are financially backed by Beijing’s deep pockets against Western companies that often have shareholders to consider and are by-and-large acting independently of their governments’ desires.

It is argued that: “... If the Chinese government wants to encourage an engagement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, they can make it happen. If the United States wants its companies to get involved in the DRC, all they can do is say ‘look, there’s an opportunity there, why don’t you go explore it’ and if they want to explore it, they do and if they don’t they don’t ...” 25 This different system of government “does create anxieties” because “the United States and the West see China filling all kinds of voids that it thought they (the West and USA) would eventually fill.”26 The statistics about this are plenty. For example China overtook the United States as Africa’s biggest trade partner in 2009, according to OECD figures, whereas in 2000 the United States’ trade with Africa was three times that of China’s. India’s bilateral trade with Africa jumped from around US$1 billion in 2001 to about US$50 billion last year. The European Union still accounts for more than 40 per cent of Africa’s trade but the share of Africa’s trade with the EU and USA fell from 77 per cent to 62 per cent over the last decade. At the same time, the share for new economic forces (China and India but also countries like Brazil, Turkey and South Korea) rose from about 23 per cent to 39 per cent.27 While all this is taking place, these new powers came late into Africa as a result of Western European

mindset that downplayed Africa. For example, China’s first official aid project in Africa took place in the 1960s, and in 1975 when it completed the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway.

In the early 1990s, when headline-writers would often label Africa as the “failed continent,” Beijing stepped up its foray into the continent, filling the gap left by an exodus of Western investors.28 Richard Dowden, Director of the Royal African Society, argues that “Just as Western companies were mothballing mines, walking away, certainly not bringing new investments, China plunged in and dared to go where the white man feared to tread.”

It was quite amusing to see the Western mining companies, who’d been shrugging their shoulders at Africa and looking elsewhere, suddenly rushing back in.”29 The emergence of China as a major player in Africa is the factor that forced Western countries to change their thinking and tactics of linking with Africa. Richard Downie, the Deputy Director of the Africa programme at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies points out that: “Earlier on, you heard (US) officials maybe talk about China as a threat or as a competitor in Africa… all the language from officials now is about Africa as a place where competition is good ... and all the efforts here (in the United States), at least in public, are about seeking areas for cooperation and collaboration with China - so the language has shifted.”30 Thanks to China’s push into Africa, the continent’s image in the global world has changed. The continent is now a strategic partner. The scramble for the continent is on. It is up to the people of the continent especially Africa’s political leadership, to strategically position the continent, define and protect African peoples’ interests, and seize the opportunities available now in the global world economy. What the South Commission failed to achieve in many years can now be achieved through concerted efforts of the Third World countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

China’s dominance in Africa is a black-spot for the West. “The US is very sensitive about it at the moment and Africa is the corner of the world where declining US influence is most evident.31 Ayo Johnson, the Director of Viewpoint Africa, also points out that the growing influence of emerging players has left the West feeling “very rattled” and

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this puts African countries in a stronger bargaining position. It is argued that: ‘... It’s becoming very difficult for the West to deal with Africa from their usual perspective … When you’ve been used to doing business in a particular fashion, when you’ve been used to dealing in a certain way and then there’s an injection of a third or fourth player who risk the entire dynamic ... that’s exactly what has happened with India and China and now made it so much easier for Africans and their leaders and their communities to choose among the various investors...”32 Furthermore, Shinn argues that to the eyes of many African leaders, China’s capacity to move fast, coupled with its policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, often makes Beijing a more attractive partner than the West, whose policy in the continent is usually linked to conditions about good governance and human-rights reforms.33 Dowden, on the other hand, underscores that: “... one of China’s big advantages is that the Chinese have no mission, no intention at all to change Africa …There’s still a narrative in our minds in the West that Africa is backward and Africans have got to become like us ... we have got to change them ... I think that Africans feel that and the young African generation that’s coming through are now very resentful of that...”34 While all these are suddenly happening in the eyes of the West, it is also important to underscore the fact that China is an old friend of Africa. Tanzania, for example, has a long history of friendship with China both as a political partner in the liberation struggle and economically in search of economic independence. Jamie Monsoon shows that after attempts by Tanzania to secure financial support from Western countries, USSR and the World Bank failed, it was finally China that agreed to support the building of Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Uhuru Railway) in 1967.35 The 1,060 mile railway constructed between 1970 and 1975 played a major role in the opening of the landlocked Zambia and its copper. The venture cost about US$400 million of long term interest-free loan from China.

to Tanzania. The confidence of Tanzania on China was more consolidated by the Chinese support in the liberation struggle in the south, and in many other aspects such as in the economic front (that of building of Friendship Textile Industry) Urafiki, UFI and a number of industries in Zanzibar; in the sports and cultural field; and, the construction recently of the National stadium in Dar es Salaam. This happened during the peak of neocolonial bondage, cold war and economic crisis.

Consequently, for most Africans and Tanzanians, the support that Tanzania acquired from China was not only a gesture of true friendship, but also of a real friend in need.

China’s successful economic transformation and growth is a blessing in disguise for Africa. She is not only trusted by African governments, but she also provides full opportunities without the strings that the West usually offers. In addition, China’s industrial expansion has already generated higher incomes for Africa’s commodity exporters and reduced the world’s price of manufactured goods, with cheaper products now available to African consumers.36 This is what the people of Africa need, higher incomes and cheap goods that are available in remote rural areas.

4. Conclusion China is an important traditional ally of Africa.

China’s growing influence, if managed well, will bring significant benefits to Africa. China is not Africa’s neo colonial power. China’s economic growth is felt globally and not just in Africa. Her expansion is experienced not just in Africa, but also in USA, Western Europe and the rest of the world. China is well accommodated in Africa because of her long connection and partnership within the Third World and in the south-south relations. Finally, China’s model of development gives African countries an alternative model of development that is both workable and with no strings attached. All these reasons make African countries to warm up to China as opposed to USA and Western Europe.

Endnotes

More important, it was the human relations factor that the TAZARA project inculcated. It brought about between 30,000 and 50,000 Chinese railway workers in Tanzania and Zambia, who finally found roots of friendship among the Africans in Tanzania and Zambia. These relations brought China closer

1.

Callie Amanda Wang: “Fuelling the Fire? Civil War in Africa and the People’s Republic of China”, Master of Arts Thesis in Security Studies, Edmund A. Wash School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University, April 19, 2010.

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2

Anonymous: “The New Sinosphere: China in Africa” in African Business, Feb 2007.

22

3

Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong: “The Forest for the Trees: Trade, Investment and the China-inAfrica Discourse”, in Pacific Affairs, Spring 2008, 81, 1.

23 James Butty: “Assessing Obama’s Africa Policy, Looking at 2012 and Beyond”, in Africa, January 11, 2012.

4

Ibid.

24 Teo Kermeliotis: “Is the West losing out to China in Africa?”, in CNN, Sept. 9, 2011.

5

Teo Kermeliotis: “Is the West losing out to China in Africa?”, CNN, September 9, 2011.

25 Ibid

6

Yiching Wu: “Rethinking Capitalist Restoration in China”, in Monthly Review, Nov. 2005, 57, 6.

7 8 9

The Nordic Africa Institute: “The Rise of Africa: Miracle or Mirage?”, in Annual Report, 2010.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid

James Butty: “Assessing Obama’s Africa Policy, Looking at 2012 and Beyond”, in Africa, Jan. 11, 2012 Ibid.

28 Teo Kermeliotis: “Is the West losing out to China in Africa?”, in CNN Sept. 9, 2011.

Jose da Cruz de Arimateia, Stephen Laura K., The US Africa Command (AFRICOM): “Building Partnership or Neo Colonialism”, in Journal of Third World Studies, Fall 2010; 27, 2.

30 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

10 James Butty: op., cit.

33 Ibid.

11 Minqi Li: “The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy”, London: Pluto Press, 2008, pp. XVII

34 Ibid.

35 Jamie Monson: “Africa’s Freedom Railway”, Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2009

12 Bruce R. Scott: “The Concept of Capitalism”, London, New York: Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 75.

36

13 William J. Baumol, Robert E. Litan & Carl J. Schram: “Bad Capitalism and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity”, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2007, pp. viii.

References Animashaun, M. A. (2009) “State Failure, Crisis of Governance and Disengagement from the State in Africa”, Africa Development, Vol. XXXIV, Nos 3 & 4, pp. 47–63

14 James Butty: op., cit.

15 Paul J. Bolt and Adam K. Gray: “China’s National Security Strategy”, 2007.

16 Tabu Butagira: “EU Charities Want Africa Poor”, in Daily Monitor, March 27, 2012.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

Anonymous (2007), “The New Sinosphere: China in Africa”, African Business, Feb. Arimateia, J. C, Laura S. K. (2010), “The US Africa Command (AFRICOM): Building Partnership or Neo Colonialism”, Journal of Third World Studies, Fall, 27, 2.

Baumol, W. J., Litan R. E. and Schram C. J. (2007), Bad Capitalism and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

19 Ibid.

20 Mojeed Adekunle Animashaun: “State Failure, Crisis of Governance and Disengagement from the State in Africa”, in Africa Development, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3 & 4, 2009, pp. 47–63 21 Ibid.

Anonymous: Feb 2007, op.cit.

Bolt P. J., and Gray A. K. (2007), China’s National Security Strategy.

Butagira, T. (2012), “EU Charities Want Africa Poor”, Daily Monitor, March 27.

Butty, J. (2012), “Assessing Obama’s Africa Policy,

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Looking at 2012 and Beyond”, Africa, Jan. 11.

Kermeliotis, T. (2011), “Is the West Losing Out to China in Africa?”, CNN, Sept. 9.

Li, M. (2008), The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy, London: Pluto Press.

Monson, J. (2009), Africa’s Freedom Railway, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Sautman, B. and Hairong, Y. (2008), “The Forest for the Trees: Trade, Investment and the China-in-Africa Discourse”, Pacific Affairs, Spring, 81, 1.

Scott, B.R. (2009), The Concept of Capitalism, London, New York: Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg.

The Nordic Africa Institute (2010), “The Rise of Africa: Miracle or Mirrage?”, Annual Report.

Wang C. A. (2010), “Fuelling the Fire? Civil War in Africa and the People’s Republic of China”, Master of Arts Thesis in Security Studies, Edmund A. Wash School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University.

Wu, Y. (2005), “Rethinking Capitalist Restoration in China”, Monthly Review, Nov., 57, 6.

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China and India Engagement in Africa: A Critical Analysis

By Adams Oloo Department of Political Science & Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Kenya Abstract: This paper teases out China and India’s engagement with Africa, while exploring why Africa is embracing China, the similarities and differences between Chinese and Indian strategies of engagement, and the resultant implications not only for Africa’s development, but also for its traditional allies in the West.

Both countries are interested in access to Africa’s markets, opportunities for development cooperation, strategic and diplomatic influence and energy as well as resource security.

1. Introduction Sino-and-Indo Africa relations have matured in Africa in the last decade. China and India, two emerging global economies, have become Africa’s most important economic partners, and their growing engagement with the continent is transforming Africa’s international relations in a dramatic way.

This relationship has evolved over time and is currently dominated by competing interests in trade, investment, economic cooperation and the quest for influence. Trade between China and Africa is believed to have grown from about US$20 billion in 2001 to US$120 billion in 2009.1 In the same regard, estimates suggest that trade between India and Africa rose from US$9.9 billion in 20042005 to US$39.5 billion in 2008-2009.2 While securing energy resources is a critical factor in China’s and India’s expanding relations with Africa, both countries are also strengthening trade, investment and aid ties with Africa through various bilateral and multilateral forums such as the Asia-Africa Summit, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the China-Africa Business Council (CABQ), the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), the India-Africa Project Partnership and the India Brazil South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum.

2. End of the Cold War and Rise of China and India in Africa China and India are rapidly integrating their huge labour forces into the world economy and growing swiftly. Each year since 2001, their combined contribution to global output growth has been around 30 per cent. Moreover, this contribution has facilitated the world growth above the 4 per cent threshold, which is critical for improving the terms of trade for primary commodity producers.

Consequently, Africa, which is still largely connected to the world economy through raw material exports, is benefiting from the China driven ‘super cycle,’ which is reinforced by India’s emergence.3 Africa’s position as a centre of East-West competition raises the question of whether there exists a coherent African strategy for harnessing the potential developmental spin-offs that could accrue from increased investments, trade and aid from the Asian giants, and if one does not exist, what should be done to create one. Another related question is whether new engagement between Africa, China and India will amount to the continent replacing the dominant Western presence in her economy with Eastern domination.

Out of the two Asian giants, China’s engagement in Africa has attracted more attention. According to Naidu, this is because India is a democratic state and is thus viewed as less of a threat.4 Apart from possible ideological concerns, some Western commentators are critical of China’s “no political strings attached” aid and its noninterference policies, which they note are largely “supportive of illiberal regimes” and “undermine efforts by international organisations to promote accountability, sustainable development, and environmentally sensible projects in Africa.”5 Others are less enamoured of the view that China’s resource diplomacy often thrives on supporting regimes with poor human rights records such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, or undercuts Western businesses by selling at low prices in Africa. They argue that Western anxiety is partly driven by perceived threats to their own competing interests in African resources, markets and spheres of influence. Although China’s economic ties with Africa are more extensive in comparison to India’s, the latter is moving quickly to expand its presence in Africa and close the gap with its Asian neighbour.

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For much of the cold war, India’s own regional and domestic pressures made it inward looking.

However, with economic liberalisation in the 1990s, India’s mandarins realised the importance of a foreign policy that resonated with its economic ambitions. Opening up to overseas investment also meant strengthening external relations that could help her realise her political and economic potential.

Like China, India’s post-cold war foreign policy has been aligned to the principles of non-alignment and South-South cooperation. Linked to the unilateral character of the post-cold war international order, India has pushed for a multilateral world order.

And just as in the past, relations with Africa and the South are now based on shared mutual interests to fight against the inequities of the global order.

However, this time around, it is directed against underdevelopment and poverty as a result of an unbalanced global economic system.

China and India are not newcomers to Africa. Both countries have had long historical, political and economic relations with the continent. The most recent phase in relations has been characterised by the determination of both countries since the end of the cold war to articulate and pursue clear Africa strategies hinged on South-South solidarity, win-win equal partnership and mutual respect and benefits. This new policy thrust is also directed at enhancing China and India’s global status as great powers in their own right. In the case of China, this was in furtherance of its “Go Out” policy aimed at ending the country’s isolation, winning more friends and promoting its peaceful rise as a global power. On India’s part, it marked a turn from its rather political approach to a more pragmatic economic one that sought to connect the needs of its rapid industrial growth with its global aspirations, including support for its quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

This shift in attitude was reinforced by the visibility of Chinese and Indian companies investing heavily in the much neglected infrastructure sector of many African countries, from the construction of dams to major transport and telecommunications projects, which are critical for raising productivity and reducing poverty. The Chinese and Indians have been able to address the critical infrastructure gap cheaply, less bureaucratically and in a shorter time frame. These strategic investments and increased trade have helped some African countries such as Angola and Sudan register impressive growth rates for the first time in many decades. The positive

growth rates have further been fuelled by China’s and India’s demands for African resources to feed the appetite of their growing economies. Indeed, China has emerged as Africa’s second largest trading partner and is currently the biggest lender and investor for infrastructural development on the continent.

The core findings show a rapid increase in AfricanAsian trade. Indeed, there is a marked shift of African trade from Europe and USA towards Asia.

Asia’s exports to Africa have been growing at a rapid pace being over 18 per cent per annum. This is higher than with any other region.6 To sum up, China and India’s growing demand for commodities has brought about a significant redirection of African exports towards Asian markets–away from OECD markets, even though Africa-China and Africa-India trade patterns are quite different. Chinese imports from Africa show a very clear pattern in terms of commodity structure which is consistent with the latter’s Ricardian advantage in commodity production.

By contrast, African exports to India are much more diversified and labour intensive than those to China. Nevertheless, Africa’s trade reorientation may also hold some drawbacks. First, it may derail the endeavours by African commodity producers to diversify away from traditional exports. Second, shortage in world shipping capacities and the rise in freight rates charged to commodity exporters and importers is drawing ships into the Pacific and may drive up shipping rates, to the detriment of African competitiveness. Deepening the reliance on commodity industries has been shown to be at odds with poverty reduction. Third, the increased presence of the Asian giants in the resource rich countries may increase the rents earned by an elite that commands access to those resources, rather than by the population at large. It is important to note, however, transparency scores have not deteriorated during recent years when the presence of the Asian giants became more visible in Africa.7 3. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC): Progress and Challenges The formal links between China and SSA go back to the Bandung Conference in 1955. Until the mid-1990s, the link was directed by aid towards Liberation Movements and to further the desire to politically isolate Taiwan. But since the mid 90s, aid appears to be increasingly directed towards broader strategic objectives, and in particular,

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towards the development of linkages with the resource-rich SSA economies.8 Tull argues that since the 1990s, China has pursued a more active foreign policy, extending especially to closer ties with the non-Western, especially African states, given their numerical strength.9 Besides this, China fears for its ascendancy as a global political power in the context of US hegemony.10 In 1998, a White Paper of the Chinese Ministry of Defence proclaimed energy security as an integral part of China’s overall security resulting in stepped-up efforts to expand its oil imports and to diversify its oil suppliers, increased oil imports from Africa, and augmentation of its African suppliers. China’s global economic, foreign and security policies have become clearly intertwinned.11

interference in other countries’ internal affairs and lack of lending conditions on governance or fiscal management has elicited positive reactions from several governments.15 Moreover, there are various other mutually advantageous interactions such as promotion of democracy that is not an objective of China’s foreign policy.16

Aid and FDI are being packaged with the trade deals by China to bind strategic allies more closely and to secure supplies of materials for their everexpanding economy. Chinese FDI in Africa grew from US$20 million in 1998 to US$6 billion in 2005 and it is largely related to resource extraction and low-cost infrastructure construction involving Chinese labour. Chinese aid to Africa has increased from US$107 million in 1998 to US$2.7 billion in 2004.12 Moreover, China has also cancelled bilateral debts for 31 African countries totalling US$1.27 billion in 2004. In 2006, Chinese government passed a policy to encourage and support investment in Africa, including provision of preferential loans and buyer credits.13 China has therefore become a major player in the field of infrastructure and construction activities (ranging from stadiums in West Africa to Presidential Palaces in Kinshasa) and small scale entrepreneurial investments. Many of these projects are not commercial and are financed by ‘tied aid.’14 Chinese enterprises currently number more than 700, operate in 50 countries and employ close to 80,000 Chinese workers (Zafar, 2007).

China’s increased presence in Africa is a political development that may not contribute to the promotion of peace, prosperity and democracy on the continent. There are various ways that China’s economic interaction with Africa may undermine governance. Promotion of democracy, for example, is not an objective of China’s foreign policy. China’s defence of sovereignty, often to the benefit of unsavoury regimes is likely to undermine existing efforts at political liberalisation. Revenues from trade and taxes, development assistance and other means of support widen the margin of manoeuvre of Africa’s autocrats, and help them to rein in domestic demand for democracy and the respect for human rights, as in Zimbabwe. These mutually advantageous interactions are however at the core of China’s attractiveness to African leaders, but they are likely to be detrimental to ordinary African citizens.17

China-Africa Cooperation Forum was established in 2000 to bolster the trade and economic relations between them. By 2005, China had bilateral trade and investment agreements with 75 per cent of African countries and it has embassies in all African countries, except six, that have established diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Mwega, 2006).

The third forum was held in early November 2006 in Beijing and involved 48 African presidents and heads of government. China’s distinctive approach involves a combination of aggressive diplomacy and the cultivation of friendly ties with a no-strings attached financial and technical assistance package. China’s pledge of non

Economic transactions however provide the most powerful evidence of China’s increasing interaction with the continent. The impact of China on Africa is postulated to operate mainly through four main channels: (i) trade; (ii) foreign direct investment; (iii) foreign aid; and (iv) migration, including the overall implications of these economic interactions on governance in Africa.

4. The India- Africa Forum Summit (IAFS): Progress and Challenges India has a long history of trade and investment with modern-day Africa, particularly in East Africa, where there are significant expatriate Indian communities. The current scale and pace of India’s trade and investment flows with Africa is unprecedented even though it constitutes a very small part in comparison to China and the world economy. Even today, tariff levels of India on African products are higher than China. After being dormant for 45 years (since Jawaharlal Nehru’s last visit), higher level delegates including the Prime Minister of India made a visit to South Africa and Nigeria in mid-2007, for bilateral engagements and negotiations.18 Unlike China, India has not pursued any aggressive policy to engage with Africa for its

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energy security even though India too needs oil, uranium and raw materials. India is still trying to enter into infrastructure development like road, railways construction and telecom in Africa.

Currently, India does not have any policy like China’s Africa Policy to promote and engage vehemently and strategically with Africa. The Trade and Economic Relations Committee (TERC) of India is discussing ways to increase India’s trade engagement with African countries, and decide to engage Africa with the progress on India-US economic dialogue. Even though India enjoys the advantage of a large expatriate business community throughout Africa, especially in South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania; and it can offer Africans a mix of growth economics and political freedoms, this has not been the case due to lack of a targeted policy which has made her lag behind in the SinoAfrican engagements.19 It can be concluded that there is a gap between China’s and India’s foreign and strategic policies, which clearly explains the differences in Sino-China and Indo-Africa engagements.

In the case of India, the establishment of the IAFS did not take place until 2008, eight years after China had kicked off its forum for engaging Africa. Like FOCAC, the IAFS emphasised a new partnership based on equality, mutual respect and understanding between both sides. Since 2008, India has intensified its efforts to engage Africa at the regional, bilateral and people-to-people levels.

The India EXIM Bank has partnered with the Indian government and the Confederation of Indian Industries (CU) to organise the Conclave on IndiaAfrica Project Partnership, which has acted as a catalyst in India’s economic relations with Africa.

The Conclave has held annual meetings involving many African states since 2005. The meeting held in New Delhi from 15 to 16 March 2010, attracted 380 participants, representing thirty-four African countries to discuss business transactions and about 150 project investments to the value of approximately US$10 billion.”20 India’s relations with Africa include relatively modest but highly valued aid, economic cooperation and technical assistance programmes. This includes the Focus Africa Programme launched in 2002, through which the EXIM Bank supports Indian trade missions to Africa and extends lines of credit to Africa’s regional economic blocks such as the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

The Focus Africa Programme has also supported the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement with nine African countries (TEAM 9), launched in 2004, and has provided training and technical assistance to African countries through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme (originally established in 1964 to promote South-South cooperation). Such lines of credit support India-Africa trade. Similar initiatives include the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme (SCAAP) and the Pan-African e-Network Project in partnership with the African Union, aimed at building an Africawide electronic network to provide tele-medicine and tele-education through wireless connectivity.21 India has also consolidated its presence in Africa through the IAFS. Though modest by comparison with the FOCAC of November 2006, IAFS demonstrated India’s commitment to making its mark in Africa amid competition with China and with developed countries to secure energy and other raw material resources to fuel its growing economy. During the Conclave meeting in Delhi last year, India seized the opportunity to set the agenda for the next IAFS in 2011, where it hopes to further extend its gains in Africa. The Indian private sector has expanded investments in the African agricultural, power, pharmaceutical, information and telecommunications sectors. Small and medium scale enterprises in some African countries have also been the focus of the renaissance in India’s policy towards Africa.

5. Africa’s Look East Policy: Why? China and India were warmly welcomed to Africa amid an emerging shift in attitudes towards the Western world on the part of a growing proportion of Africans. Disenchantment with the poor track record of Western development cooperation over the past fifty years, the double standards that Western governments practice in their relations with African states, and the tendency to give aid with one hand and to retrieve it from Africa with the other through unfair trade practices, capital flight and debt structures, has generated a lot of debate among Africans over the past decade and has served as a rallying point for pursuing an alternative and independent African development agenda.22 Africa is yet to recover from a decade of socially challenging structural adjustment and economic reform policies.

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Although these policies opened up the continent thanks to the adoption of liberal investment policies, the impact of economic reforms on local industry, infrastructure and state welfare services was largely negative. From an African perspective, the emergence of China and India as potentially important development partners came at a time when Africans themselves were engaged in a major soul-searching exercise to find out what had gone wrong with Africa’s development in the past halfcentury. China’s and India’s historical experiences, respectively as a former semi-colony and colony, and their spectacular development experience since the mid-1970s, have raised hopes among African nations that they too can one day break away from the shackles of poverty, underdevelopment and aid dependency.23 This shift in attitude was reinforced by the visibility of Chinese and Indian companies investing heavily in the much-neglected infrastructure sector of many African countries, from the construction of dams to major transport and telecommunications projects, which are critical for raising productivity and reducing poverty.24 The Chinese and Indians have been able to address the critical infrastructure gap cheaply, less bureaucratically and in a shorter timeframe. These strategic investments and increased trade have helped some African countries such as Angola and Sudan register impressive growth rates for the first time in many decades. The positive growth rates have further been fuelled by China’s and India’s demands for African resources to feed the appetite of their growing economies.

Indeed, China has emerged as Africa’s second largest trading partner and is currently the biggest lender and investor for infrastructural development on the continent.

Equally important is the demonstration effect of China’s and India’s own development experiences to African countries. What has been central to the economic success of these Asian countries is the role played by the state in guiding the market and the willingness of the state to intervene and experiment with heterodox policies to revive the economy, compete in global markets and reduce poverty in the process of moving in a free-market direction.25 Heavy investment in infrastructure, education, research and development (as opposed to the deflationary and austerity measures demanded by the Bretton Woods institutions) were complemented with adjustable policies designed to enhance the competitiveness of local producers through technological retooling and workers’ retraining, then deregulating the market accordingly.

These factors have helped rekindle interest within Africa in the role of developmental states and the importance of experimenting with heterodox economic policies in order to successfully navigate the cold currents of economic globalisation, as China and India have both done successfully. The two Asian giants have made great progress in transforming their backward economies and have been able to reduce absolute poverty dramatically (particularly in the case of China) in a relatively short period of time, under the guidance of a strong, development-oriented and activist state.

There is also a growing view that African countries can learn a lot from the Chinese and Indian economic reform programmes of the past thirty years without having to import either the “Beijing Consensus” or the “Delhi Consensus” to Africa in their entirety.

Chinese and Indian aid to Africa, though wrapped in the rhetoric of “no strings attached,” is however not completely unconditional, even though it holds some appeal based on the view that it supports the developmental aspirations of African states.26 6. Areas of Convergence in Africa-India Policy towards Africa The relationship between China and India is complex. Throughout history it has encompassed collaboration and extensive trade as well as hostility and border disputes.27 Their economic growth and current strength were built on different industrial strands: the state engineered Chinese development process focused on manufacturing and on foreign trade, while India’s economic reform was driven largely by the private sector.28 The two emerging powers have recently turned to engage with Africa, and the volume of trade between the two countries and Africa has witnessed an exponential increase over the last decade, with the value of trade between China and Africa increasing by an average 24 per cent between 1995 and 2007. Total trade now stands at approximately US$74 billion in 2007.29 Bilateral trade between India and Africa rose from US$967 million to US$9.14 billion between 1991 and 2005 and over the period 1997-2005, exports from Africa to India doubled.30 Before running the risk of overplaying its significance, it should be noted that part of the explanation as to why the numbers illustrating the growth of India and China’s trade with Africa are so dramatic is because the development started from a low base.

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Indian and Chinese activities on the continent have three primary channels; trade, aid and FDI. These are interrelated; trade is closely linked to the integration of African, Chinese and Indian investments into global value chains, and often Chinese and Indian aid offers are underpinned by market-seeking purposes.31 Both China and India are currently modernising and growing at a fast pace. The Indian economic reform started in 1991 and encompassed a gradual liberalisation of markets and removal of industrial regulations. Private enterprises were encouraged to take on a more important role, and software and biotechnology industries recorded important growth (Biswas, 2007).

7. Areas of Divergence in China-India Policy towards Africa India and China have similar comparative advantage over Africa, but there are noteworthy differences in their relations with Africa, in terms of policy approaches, trade structure, and regional preferences. China’s contribution to global output is almost treble to that of India, hence Indian engagement with Africa has smaller implications when compared to Chinese.32 The process of economic evolution in India and its growth rate has been different from China which had led to some of these differences. Moreover, although Indian connection to Africa has been far stronger to Chinese in the past, China has pursued more globally oriented foreign policies pertaining to export-import structures and its growth and composition.

Both China and India seek to present themselves as equal partners promoting mutual interests in their interaction with African leaders. However, there is a perception that China has been more proactive in its relationship with Africa, and that this is difficult for India to match since it does not have “the command economy where state-owned companies can be ordered to pursue the government’s directive regardless of their own bottom-line.”33 Similarly, Singh argues that the Chinese aid for oil strategy is difficult for India to compete, with Indian officials admitting that India does not have the resources to compete barrel for barrel with China in West Africa.34 Singh goes further to state that India has to develop other strategies in the relationship: “to work the politics better, keep people on the ground on a long term basis, […] [and] courting local politicians etc.”35 Thus, while it certainly seems that

competition is unfolding between China and India in the African continent, the question is whether it actually reflects a ‘rivalry.’ Some point to India feeling the pinch of China’s economic largesse across the continent. In this regard, the Angolan example may have some relevance.

While some of the strategies that China and India employ to extend their influence in Africa may appear similar, they are not identical. Naidu points out that similarities can be found in their demand for resource security, trade and investment opportunities, forging of strategic partnerships, and the spirit of Bandung Conference, African-Asian solidarity and South-South Cooperation.36 Both countries emphasise their historical ties with the continent, underlining their solidarity in the form of an equal partnership based on mutual respect and equal benefits.

One difference between the two countries’ activities in Africa is that, like their patterns of economic growth, the Indian investments are largely driven by the private sector, whilst many of the Chinese business initiatives are state-owned or state-supported with low interest loans and massive infrastructure projects.37 Furthermore, China’s engagement is different to that of India in that it is more capital intensive, while India’s is labour intensive. Another important distinction, acknowledged by Broadman, is the way Chinese and Indian firms integrate themselves in the African market. Indian firms tend to be less vertically integrated, procure supplies from local or international markets and conduct more sales with private African entities than their Chinese counterparts. Chinese corporates tend to privilege their economic interactions with African states.38 In 2004, India made a bid to buy an Angolan oil concession for US$620 million. Concurrent with the Indian bid, the Chinese were also negotiating with the Angolan government for the same concession and offered more than double (US$2 billion).

The Chinese offer had however very important sweeteners to it, namely it promised development assistance to the Angolan authorities. This resulted in Angola’s state-owned firm Sonangol exercising its anticipatory rights and blocking the Indian bid.39 As Sirohi notes, India may boast of historical links but China wields more influence. He also suggests that it is not just in influence that China has an advantage, but also in service delivery. China delivers before it announces a project, while India announces and often does not deliver for years.

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This is exemplified by the 2002 promise made by the former Prime Minister Vajpayee of US$500 million in lines of credit for Africa that to date has not been completely delivered.40 Furthermore, China and India have also become major players in the field of infrastructure in Africa through projects such as roads, railways, stadiums and power plants.41 With the objective of situating Sino-Indian relations with Africa in a wider perspective, Pham notes that India’s advances in Africa are driven by many of the same motivations as China’s, including quests for resources, business opportunities, diplomatic openings and strategic alliances. What is different, however, is that, given the dynamics of the emerging US-Indian strategic partnership, New Delhi’s increased African engagement, unlike Beijing’s, ought to be welcomed in Washington.”42 Like China, India also stresses that it is a developing country but with a functioning democracy. Although the latter is a moot point given the complexities of India’s social fabric, which sometimes makes it seem a chaotic democracy.

Chinese investments in Africa are rather complex, but have been dominated by large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These tend to operate in the extractive (oil and mining), construction, agriculture and capital equipment sectors. Indian investments in Africa are largely driven by the private sector.

Although the Indian state has stepped up its support for the private sector’s efforts to penetrate the African market, it has not been able to match the deep pockets of the Chinese state. Thus, Chinese investment has been more aggressive, with SOEs enjoying both political and financial support to undercut other competitors in the African market, including Indian private sector investors.

China’s strategy for promoting investments in Africa includes the establishment of a China-Africa Development Fund (CAD) to support companies wishing to invest in Africa, the provision of low interest or interest free loans through the Bank of China, the Exim Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank, and the establishment of bilateral agreements with African countries. Such agreements usually cover large-scale projects and double-taxation treaties to promote Chinese direct foreign investments in Africa.43 India’s approach to investments in Africa is also tied to its rhetoric of true friendship with the continent, but distances itself from the Chinese strategy of

state backed resource diplomacy (and extraction). It also refers to a renaissance in India-Africa relations that is underpinned by India’s sincere intentions towards respect for Africa. While emphasising its cooperation initiatives aimed at capacity building and technology transfer to the continent, India uses several strategies to promote investments and trade in Africa.44 The competition between China and India in Africa can also be seen from the strategies they have adopted in pursuit of their energy security interests. China is the world’s second largest importer of oil (importing about 46% of domestic oil consumption), while India is the world’s sixth largest (importing 70% of domestic oil consumption). Energy security is prominent in the strategic interests of China and India, as both seek to diversify and expand their sources of oil and gas from the Middle East to Central Asia, Russia, Africa and South America. Africa is particularly attractive as the latest frontier in global oil, where new oil fields are being discovered in the context of an investor-friendly climate.

There are noteworthy differences between India’s and China’s relations with Africa. Sino-Africa engagement outsmarts Indo-Africa engagement in terms of trade growth and trade deficits. During 1997-2005, India’s imports from Africa are only about double compared to China’s more than ten fold increase, and Chinese trade deficits with sub-saharan Africa observed more than seventy fold increase. India’s trade deficits has seen a very moderate overall growth of 24 per cent. The Sino-Africa and Indo-Africa trade pattern differ significantly in its import composition as gold dominates India’s import, while oil and metals dominate China’s. India’s trade engagement is highly skewed in terms of regional linkages in Africa. On the economic side, the differences in China’s and India’s processes of economic evolution in the last decade mirrored in their trade engagements. First, India liberalised its economy after a gap of almost a decade in comparison to china. Second, the gap between India and China’s growth rate in the last two decades impacted their trade orientation and resource needs. Third, the growth has been led by different sectors in both countries. China’s emerging manufacturing sector and its need of primary commodity and oil boosted Sino-Africa trade, while India’s booming sectors (services, IT) did not cater for African needs.

Fourth, Indian SEZs are in their stage of infancy in comparison to China’s EPZs/SEZs.

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On the political side, China has pursued a more globally oriented foreign policy than India even though India has enjoyed stronger linkage with Africa in the past. China proclaimed energy security as an integral part of China’s overall security and looked towards a better tie-up with Africa for the same, while India lagged behind. Unlike India, China offers African countries a series of package deals with trade comprising FDI and aid. As a result, Chinese FDI and aid is growing at a high rate in comparison to that of India, consequently boosting better trade engagements. India also lacks in terms of integrated and aggressive policy like China- Africa’s policy which also explains the differences in their trade engagement with Africa.

Thus, it can be concluded that the gap between China’s and India’s trade engagements is explained by the differences in their economic processes and political policies.

rest of the economy, labour absorption and skill formation – merits careful policy attention.

8. Conclusion

•

The growth of Africa’s exports is narrowly correlated with the growth of its major commodity exports–oil, industrial as well as precious metals, tropical woods, and cotton-to China and India.

Africa is linked to the Asian drivers’ demand for primary commodities via two channels, namely through raw material prices (which are increasingly governed by China’s net import demand) and through the growing trade dependency of Africa on China and India. Africa’s income in terms of trade may well have benefited from Asia’s emergence as an economic power that has led to the demand for raw commodities. This has translated into higher export unit prices that has led to urban consumers gaining from cheaper consumer goods and investors benefiting from cheaper capital goods. The benefits of China’s and India’s rising global demand (net imports) for Africa-relevant commodities are, nevertheless, attenuated by the volatility of demand of the Asian giants, partly due to cyclical variations and arbitrage between home production and imports.45 This study has shown that on balance, quantifiable effects of the Asian Drivers’ rise in the world economy are largely positive for Africa. However, it neither implies that those benefits will persist, nor that they lay the ground for better economic performances on the continent. While those effects are positive for Africa, their interaction with a number of future policy challenges – governance standards, diversification, back and forward linkages between modern-sector enclaves and the

In this context, African policy makers, donors, and the business community should devise appropriate policy responses along three main axes:46 •

•

First, considerable room for improvement exists with respect to exploiting African natural resources in a sustainable manner. Making the case for diversifying African economies should not indeed prejudice a more efficient exploitation of available natural resources on the African continent, especially once African relative factor endowments are factored in.

Second, African diversification and trade strategies should be rethought in light of increasing Chinese and Indian competition in sectors which used to be regarded as potential avenues for Africa’s diversification.

Third, donors’ support, in particular in the realm of “trade as aid”, should be enhanced so as to facilitate African economies’ adjustment to rising Chinese and Indian competition on third markets. Upholding African access to OECD markets is the key in this regard.

Endnotes 1.

Cheru, F.: “The Rise of China and India in Africa: What Should be Africa’s Response?”, The Nordic Africa Institute, 2010, http://www.nai.uu.se/forum/ entries/20I0/06/29/the-rise-of-china-andind/index. xml.

2.

Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) News Update: “India Has a Key Role in Africa’s MSME Development” (CII: March 13, 2010), http://www. cii. in/PressreleasesDetail.aspx?id=2692&gid=&.

Sec torID=S000000084®ionid=&conid=&nrid=&S tateID=.

3

Goldstein, A.; Pinaud, N.; Reisen, H.; and Chen, X.: “China and India: What’s in it for Africa?”, OECD Development Centre, 2006.

4

Naidu, S.: “India’s African Relations: In the Shadow of China?” in Cheru, F., and Obi, C., (eds.)

The Rise of China and India in Africa, London: Zed Books in association with Nordic Africa Institute, 36, 2010.

5

Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong: “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” African Studies Review 50, No. 3, 76, 2007; Linda Jakobson: “China’s Diplomacy towards Africa: Drivers and Constraints,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9, No. 3, 406, 2009.

6

Roy, S.: “China and India–The Emerging Giantsand Africa: A Note”, in Jadavpur Journal of

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International Relations, Kolkata/Calcutta, India, Vol.10, 2006.

Africa and China, Scottville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008.

7

Goldstein et al.: 2006.

26 Cheru: 2010.

8

Kaplinsky, R., D. McCormick, et al.: “The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa”, China Office, UK Department for International Development, Beijing, 2006.

27 Price, G.: “Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid”, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, 2010.

9

Tull, Denis M.: “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences”, in Journal of Modern African Affairs, Vol 44, No. 3, 2006.

28 C. Alden, D. Large & R. Soares de Oliveira (eds): 2008.

29

10 Zafar, A.: “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment and Aid Links”, in The World Bank Research Observer 22(1): 103, 2007.

30 Pham J. Peter: “India’s Expanding Relations with Africa and Their Implications for US Interests”, in American Foreign Policy Interests, 29, 2007, 341–352.

11 Mwega, F. M.: “China, India and Africa: Prospects and Challenges”, AERC-AFDB International Conference on Accelerating Africa’s Development, Tunis.

12

31 Kaplinsky et al.: 2006, 23.

Toye, J.: “China’s Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa’s Development: Trade, Aid and Politics”, Oxford, Department of International Development, University of Oxford, 2007.

13 PRC: “China’s African Policy”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006.

14 Kaplinsky et al.: 2006.

15

Naisu: 2010.

32

Mwega: 2006.

33

Singh, S.K.: “India and West Africa: A Burgeoning Relationship”, in Chatham House Briefing Paper, April, 2007; “India-Nigeria Relations”, Indian High Commission in Abuja, October 2010, http://www. indianhcabuja.com/docs/Nigeria-Fact-Sheet.htm.

34 Singh: 2007,10.

35 Broadman, H.: “China and India Go to Africa: New Deals in the Developing World”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 2, March/April 2008, pp. 95–109.

Zafar: 2007.

16 Tull: 2006.

36 Naidu: 2010

17 Tull: 2006.

18 Dutta-Ray, D. K.: “Don’t Ignore Africa. Times of India”, New Delhi, Oct. 31, 2007.

37 Tharoor, Shashi: “India Not Competing with China over Africa,” March 15, 2010, http://tharoor. in/ press/shashi-tharoor-india-not-competing-withchina-over-africa/.

19

38 Broadman: 2008.

Dutta-Ray: 2007

20 C. Alden, D. Large & R. Soares de Oliveira (eds): “China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace”, Hurst, London, 2008.

39 Singh: 2007,10; Kaplinsky et al.: 2006, 30.

21 Anand Sharma, “India and Africa: Partnership in the 21st Century,” in South African Journal of International Affairs 14, No. 2, 13-20, 2007; Naidu: 2010a, 34-49.

41 Kaplinsky et al., 2006,18; Biswas: 2007.

22 Cheru: 2010.

23 Paul Kagame: “Why Africa Welcomes the Chinese,” Guardian (UK), Nov. 2, 2009, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/02/ aid-trade-rwanda-china-west.

40 Pham: 2007.

42 Pham: 2007 43 Tharoor: 2010.

44

Tharoor: 2010.

45 Goldstein et al.: 2006.

46 Goldstein et al.: 2006.

24 Cheru: 2010.

25 Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu, “The SinoAfrican Relationship: Towards an Evolving Partnership?” in Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds): Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

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Sino-African Development Cooperation: Negotiating for Fish-Hooks or Fish-Ponds?

By David-Ngendo Tshimba Department of Good Governance and Peace Studies, Uganda Martyrs University, Uganda Abstract: Over the last few years, China has assiduously pursued stronger economic and diplomatic relations with many Asian, African and Latin American countries. In part, this is fuelled by its extraordinary economic growth, which has led to a boom in domestic resource demand, and the search for profitable markets and investment outlets. China’s vastly increased involvement in Africa over the past decade is one of the most significant developments on the continent. The involvement contradicts the idea of international marginalisation of Africa and brings significant economic, social, and political outcomes. This paper focuses on the newly formalised Sino-African cooperation under the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Juxtaposing the debate on China-Africa relations alongside the meaning and aspirations of development on the African continent, the paper argues for some forward-looking measures to put foreign aid at good use for Africa’s sustainable development.

1. Introduction Development is a continuous process involving a series of activities to effect positive change in different spheres of life. Development ought to be understood as a non-concluded conclusion. No doubt, the influence of the famous Marshall Plan that assisted in the reconstruction of Europe after the second imperialist war (the so-called World War II) has been far-fetched. Since the plan, which basically was about investing capital in a dilapidated nation state, worked with great satisfaction for Europe, it was thought as logical that this orthodox economic remedy would work in developing countries (and moreso in African nations) as well, because they were dilapidated by poverty.

Today, almost half a century after the legendary introduction of international donor agencies, the socalled development aid continues to make no much difference, and in other instances tragically worsens already bad situations, in the lives of people in lowincome countries. Africa still remains the poorest continent, plagued by diseases, hunger, a highly illiterate populace, and economies that are on the verge of collapse. It is against such a background that a new paradigm-shift in both development theory and practice has lately been conspicuous on the African continent with the triumphant entry of China in Africa’s development trajectory. Although the Chinese encounter with the African continent in relation to trade has been recorded in history since ancient times, the recently accelerated Sino-African cooperation on a number of development sectors, including trade and environmental sustainability, constitutes the focus of discussion in this paper.

China’s phenomenal economic growth rate has

seen the country rise to world leadership status, causing many analysts to ponder its regional and international intentions and goals. China’s unique position in the community of nations means that it is able to straddle both the developed (as a member of the UN Security Council) and the developing worlds. Its linkage with the developing world dates back to the Bandung Conference of 1955. China shares the developing nations’ sense of humiliation, the urge to restore dignity and a determination to take control of its own destiny. China is capitalising on its linkage with the developing world, and most especially in the form of high-level official exchanges, trade and cooperation with African countries. It is argued that China sees Africa as a partner in the fulfillment of its strategic goals, namely: energy, trade and geopolitical interests (Muekalia, 2004).

This paper also underscores the fact that time has come for Africa to reckon with the lordshipbondsman relationship previously characterised by division, exploitation, and prejudice as it now endeavours to secure a long lasting profitable development partnership with China. Igniting sustainable development in all spheres of the African continent firmly recognises that Chinese partnership with Africa has to ascertain genuine inter-dependence through institutional capacitybuilding for sustainability (fish-ponds) and not merely through meagre foreign aid and direct investments (fish-hooks).

2. Tracing the History of Cooperation Little is known about ancient Sino-African relations although some pieces of evidence for

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early trade operations between China and Africa exist. In March 2011, at a conference organised by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) in Nairobi, Professor Mohamed Salih, reviewing the growing body of literature on China-Africa relations made the revelation that of the 900 more or less recent publications, only 7 per cent were produced in Africa; the remaining 93 per cent were produced outside Africa and primarily by non-Africans.

Hence, even today’s knowledge about China is still limited. China and Africa have had a history of trade relations, sometimes through third parties, dating back as far as 202 BC and 220 AD. The first mention of Africa in Chinese sources was found in the Yu-yang-tsa-tsu by Tuan Ch’eng-shih―a compendium of general knowledge where he wrote about the land of Po-pa-li in reference to Somalia (Snow, 1988). Archaeological excavations in Mogadishu, Somalia and Kilwa, Tanzania have recovered many coins from China; the majority of the Chinese coins date to the Song Dynasty, although the Ming Dynasty and Qing Dynasty are also represented (Pankhurst, 1961). Further still, archaeologists have found Chinese porcelains made during the Tang dynasty (618-907) in Kenyan villages; these were believed to have been brought over by Zheng He during his 15th century ocean voyages (CCTV News, 2002).

In the 14th century, it is reported that Moroccan traveler and scholar, Ibn Battuta, made a long journey from Africa and Asia. He reached China in April 1345, after a stay in India before serving as an envoy of Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq of the Indian Tughlaq dynasty to China. The following were his words regarding his visit to China: “China is the safest, best regulated of countries for a traveler. A man may go by himself on a ninemonth journey, carrying with him a large sum of money, without any fear. Silk is used for clothing even by poor monks and beggars. Its porcelains are the finest of all makes of pottery and its hens are bigger than geese in our country” (Keat, 2004).

The establishment of modern Sino-African relations dates back to the late 1950s, when China signed the first official bilateral trade agreement with Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Morocco and Sudan. Zhou Enlai, then in-charge of China’s Foreign Affairs, made a ten-country tour to Africa between December 1963 and January 1964. Relations at that time were often reflective of China’s foreign policy in general.

China began to cultivate ties and offer economic,

technical and military support to African countries and liberation movements in a bid to encourage wars of national liberation and revolution as part of an international united front against the then superpower Europe (Muekalia, 2004).

With reference to Sino-African diplomatic relations, early modern bilateral relations were mainly affected by the Cold War and the then communist ideology. China originally had close ties with the anti-apartheid and liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), in South Africa. As China’s relations with the Soviet Union worsened and following the ANC’s closer move to the Soviet Union, China shifted away from the ANC towards the Pan-Africanist Congress (Taylor, 1998). While investing in infrastructural projects in some parts of Africa during the course of the Cold War, China did adopt a number of measures in support of the independence of African countries.

In exchange, in 1971, the support of many African countries was crucial in the effort of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) restoration of its lawful seat in the United Nations Organisation. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), an official Sino-African ministerial meeting, held in Beijing in October 2000 was the first collective dialogue between the PRC and African nations.

The second roundtable on Sino-African cooperation in November 2011 saw more than 500 participants, including government officials, former diplomats and the business community from China and more than 30 African countries, gather in Wanning in south China’s island province of Hainan. The conference concluded with the issuance of the Wanning Declaration which explicitly captured the deep-seated desire between the two parties (China and Africa) to enhance mutual understanding as well as encourage Sino-African relations on a peopleto-people (cultural diplomacy) basis (ChinAfrica, 2011). The Declaration did appreciate the rapid development of Sino-African cooperation since the establishment of FOCAC. According to Liu Guijin, the Special Representative of the Chinese Government for African Affairs who has been involved with Africa since 1981, the main players in the bilateral cooperation changed profoundly in the past decade, consisting of a dynamic shift from governments to state-owned and private Chinese enterprises right after the establishment of FOCAC. China is also seeking diplomatic support in challenging the inequalities of ‘global’ governance.

For better and worse, China’s rise will lead to changes in the present structures and loci of power in

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an uneven world. Today’s China-Africa’s interest is part of a recently more active international strategy based on multi-polarity and non-intervention.

Increased aid, debt cancellation, and a boom in Chinese-African trade, with a strategic Chinese focus on oil, have proven mutually advantageous for China and African countries. By offering aid without preconditions, China has presented an attractive alternative to conditional Western aid, and gained valuable diplomatic support to defend its international interests; however, a generally asymmetrical relationship differing little from previous African–Western patterns, alongside support of authoritarian governments at the expense of human rights, make the economic consequences of increased Chinese involvement in Africa mixed at best, while the political consequences are bound to prove deleterious (Tull, 2006).

3. The Meaning of the Pursued Development Although often used in both academic as well as non-academic debates, the meaning of the term ‘development’ is still covered by a thick blanket of indistinctness. Academics and practitioners have encountered immense frustrations and little satisfaction in their explorations of the meaning and translation of ‘development.’ The result of such confusion and misunderstanding of ‘development’ has always been at our own disadvantage as humans. Such a misunderstanding has analogically been captured by Moore’s contention. The reason why philosophers disagree is that none of them knows what they are looking for; they disagree on the meaning of the terms they are discussing (Moore, 1993).

The concept of development is so extensive that it touches all facets of life. Eventually, in designing pathways to development, one cannot focus on one aspect to the detriment of others, because such an approach will not only fail to be holistic, but will also fail to address any particular developmental issue. On the other hand, as a process of change, development has so much to do with enlarging people’s choices, capabilities and function in what they can choose to be and do in order to become their best possible selves with respect to their surroundings. The objective of development therefore seems to suggest the well-being for all members of the biotic community. In fact, Sen (1999) argues that seeing development as the qualitative and quantitative increase or improvement in the level of goods and services fundamentally narrows the meaning of development. Equally narrowed is

the idea that views development in terms of the growth of Gross National Product or per capita Gross Domestic Product or with the rise in levels of industrialisation, technology, or with social modernisation. In quintessence, development requires the removal of major sources of poverty, tyranny, institutional disgrace including unsound policies, systemic historical injustices, neglect of public facilities and moral duties, intolerance by structural social exclusions, and disharmony with the ecosystem.

Discussing the predominantly Western development paradigm, Nduhukhire (2003) points out that there is nothing more illustrative of the inherent conflict between two societies with different dominant modes of production, than their attitudes towards material goods and services. The goods and services in any society are the produce of people’s work expanded on natural resources. However, capitalist attitudes towards land and labour (the two major means of production), the circulation of the material goods and services, and ultimately the question of money and its impact, make an interaction between the advanced or so-called developed capitalist system and the non-advanced (or so-called developing) one quite problematic.

Development, which is taken as a process that goes well beyond the economics of simple production, distribution and exchange in the market place, must be put in the context of the dominant social system and its peculiar interests vis-à-vis those of the dominated. Authentic development is human-centred, environmentally sound, embraces historical changes in which a particular society increasingly, though sustainably, accumulates and equally distributes capacities and capabilities, as a means to escape from poverty and marginalisation as it meets its basic needs. Hence, although production, distribution and exchange through the market are an important part of the development process, they are insufficient in themselves. .

The PRC has increasingly built stronger economic ties with African countries at the dawn of the 21st century. Undoubtedly, today’s China is Africa’s largest trading partner before the European Union and the United States. It is reported that in 1999, the total Sino-African trade volume was US$6.5 billion. By 2005, it had reached US$39.7 billion before increasing to US$55 billion in 2006, making China the second largest trading partner of Africa after the United States, which had trade worth US$91 billion with African nations (Servant,

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2005). China’s increased engagement with Africa is well documented, with trade between China and Africa exceeding US$110 billion in 2010, a tenfold increase over the past decade (ChinAfrica, 2011).

For many in Africa, China represents a complex mix of problems and opportunities, which will play out differently for different sectors including manufacturing and extractive industries, in different countries such as oil producers and non-oil-producers, and between different actors including leaders, elites and ordinary people; rich and poor; consumers and producers; importers and exporters; local populations and Chinese immigrant communities, among others. The extent to which China joins, changes and/or undermines international regulations and codes of practices on, for instance, trade, the environment or arms sales, will all have major implications for the African continent (OECD, 2006). Conspicuously, few African countries are taking a sufficiently strategic approach to securing their interests and much of the interaction is currently driven by China.

However, for some observers, this may change as the relationship deepens, and others see tremendous potential (Shelton, 2006).

4. The Paradox of Development Aid in africa A cursory glance at the map of Africa’s mineral resources shows the abundance of natural resources which Africa is endowed with. Amidst such riches, the suffering of the African people remains immense.

Africa, even after colonisation, has vast natural as well as human resources which if developed and well managed, most of the problems in Africa can be resolved by Africans themselves without resorting to foreign aid, grants and continued loans. Africa has become the underdog of humanity because its leaders have not played their role as they should.

What is even more disheartening, as Kisekka (2008) points out, is the litany of lamentations by many African leaders blaming the colonisers for Africa’s quagmire; they unfortunately fail to realise that most of their efforts are spent in planning how best they should cling to power. Little wonder that there is a tendency to accept any imposed policies that may not necessarily be compatible with their countries’ visions, provided these can help them stay in power longer than the stipulated period, at the expense of their nations’ developmental itinerary.

Africans have observed with dismay as five decades of aid have generated high-risk, high-interest-rate regimes in shallow financial sub-sectors that have

crowded out tax-paying business and constrained GDP expansion that could create jobs. The aid infrastructure has furthermore killed producer and marketing co-operatives, which promote value addition, and also seen off public–private partnerships (PPPs), which have been dismissed under the wave of donor driven privatisation as ‘unviable parastatals.’ Key infrastructure development challenges in Africa have also been left to the so-called ‘private sector’ and multilateral institutions, unlike elsewhere in Asian emerging economies. The past five decades of increasing aid in a declining Africa with shallow financial subsectors have, in contrast, seen falling amounts of aid for increasingly prosperous Asian economies with deepening financial sub-sectors.

With regard to the euphemistically called “development assistance,” Kisekka (2008) further reiterates that it is very common to hear of African leaders referring to donors as “our partners in trade or development.” “What type of partnership is this that reflects complete imbalances?”, he asks.

In most of Africa, such partnership could frankly be referred to as a partnership of exploitation.

Additionally, the phenomenon of modern industrial production and exchange can today be atomised and quantified. Each atom, including personoriented inputs, is represented in monetary terms as cost inputs, unit sales and so on. Money has become the sacrament of the modern society and an effective sign of the bourgeois culture as far deep as in the African village. The dependency theory recognises that underdevelopment is not a condition but an active process of impoverishment linked to development, whatever the meaning of development!

Contrary to radical approaches which maintain that corruption is best understood in the context of prevailing hegemonic relations of private accumulation, Nduhukhire (2003) echoes Mazrui (1990) by pointing out that the problem in most of Africa is not simply how to liberate and activate the profit motive, but also how to control and restrain the prestige motive. No wonder for the case of Africa, a continent ever at the receiving end, development aid, at its best, has only helped fuel corruption (Moyo, 2009). The bottom-line reality is that Africa’s poverty-stricken masses do not see the aid flows in any way. Kanyandago (2008) points out that money lost in corruption in Africa could pay back the external debt of about US$250 billion! With special mention of Western nations’ (Europe and North America) foreign aid to Africa,

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quoting Vandana Shiva, Kanyandago (2008) still stresses that US$50 billion of ‘aid’ trickling North to South is but a tenth of the US$500 billion being sucked South to North, thanks to interest payments and other unjust mechanisms in the global economy imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Being Africa’s largest trade partner today, China is no exception in this aid infrastructure. Put differently, the socalled developing countries of Africa are giving more than they are receiving from the advanced nations including China, to the extent that one is left to wonder who is giving who. Or, who then should be presented as the donor and the receiver.

Undeniably, the African continent’s high rate of return on investments, even after adjustment for risk, increasingly suggests that the aid imperative needs to be revisited, reviewed and negotiated appropriately, instead of being reinforced.

5. Arguing for Capacity Building for Africa’s Sustainable Development: A Conclusion Establishing a China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) to encourage and support Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa, was one of the eight measures implemented to strengthen ChinaAfrica cooperation pledged by China at the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006. It is reported that the fund became operational in June 2007, with a first-phase funding of US$1 billion, expected to ultimately reach US$5 billion, provided by China Development Bank-CDB (ChinAfrica, 2011).

During the past four years, through extensive cooperation with companies at home and abroad, CADFund has exceeded its first-phase investment task of US$1 billion and committed more than 40 projects in nearly 30 African countries. Whereas the influence of CADFund continues to grow, it however remains paramount to establish a strong bridge for sustainable partnership between Chinese and African enterprises.

Statistics from the Ministry of Commerce of China show that China became Africa’s largest trade partner in 2009. In the following year, bilateral trade reached US$126.9 billion, while in the first half of the year 2011, bilateral trade hit US$79 billion, half of which was contributed by private enterprises, mainly through exports. However, new predicaments have already arisen with this increase in bilateral cooperation, including irrational trade structures and sheer lack of information to crack down on illegal business activities, and calling upon

the need for standardising operational activities of some Chinese enterprises, especially private small and medium companies (ChinAfrica, 2011).

This paper thus maintains that investment cooperation through the committed projects by Chinese businesses to Africa constitutes the type of negotiation for fish-hooks rather than that for fish-ponds, through promoting economic and social development of African countries with a significant stake played out by the African populations themselves. At the continental level, a tailor-made institutional capacity building for Africans to stir up their own development trajectory remains cardinal in order to forge a novel type of Sino-African strategic partnership long overdue.

Advanced countries, paradoxically, have been dependent on developing countries, the so-called Third World, and Africa in a special way is a rather an undeniable fact. Time is therefore up for Africans to make good sense of this irony, if Africa is interested in meeting the Millennium Development Goals before the deadline expires.

Many decades over, donor nations as well as international aid agencies, have persistently remained slow learners. Furthermore, Burke and Ahmadi (2006) contend that both aid and debt relief appear to have had virtually no effect on investment and/or growth, or even poverty reduction. This has been proven, they say, even among the relatively buoyant Southeast Asian economies such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Africa is not and never will it be an exception in this regard. Given a combination of apathy, greed, and mediocre contentment, enthusiasm among various stakeholders is now dwindling due to resource (especially financial and human) inadequacy and in worse cases, fund misappropriation. Also, certain endogenous development initiatives begin with a grand vision; however, when these development projects/programmes are executed at very low standards and expectations, stakeholders are seriously demoralised. The eventual product is barely functional even after plenty of resources have been depleted.

In a bid to rectify the structural mistakes embedded in the predominantly orthodox aid paradigm, this paper consequently suggests the establishment of an endogenous “development consultancy team” to improve aid effectiveness through holistic coordination: needs assessment/baseline surveys, project formulation and planning, resource mobilisation, project financing, and eventual

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project appraisal. The consultancy team would act as a conduit between possible project funders and proposed project owners. Project or programmes donors/funders could make a background check to appreciate the consultancy procedures for selection as well as follow-up on previous financed projects.

This, it is believed, could give the eventual funder(s) a clear understanding of how project funds would be handled, appraised and then documented for accountability purposes.

Such consultancy would benefit from a younger administration between ages 25 and 35. The importance of such a younger team is threefold.

First and foremost, not only that the youthful population constitutes a huge demographic yet less fortunate majority in Africa, but what is even more enchanting is the fact that a younger team will be much more willing and able to carry on extensive groundwork, including field travels from place to place to ensure all the projects/programmes they would have eventually approved, are genuinely verified with potential smooth run.

At the end of October 2011, the planet’s seven billionth baby was born, with China having the largest population in the world and Africa having registered its first billion population (ChinAfrica, 2011). It should be noted that high unemployment among youths in today’s Africa is deeply rooted in social and economic policy shortcomings rather than demographics per se. Secondly, since these young people have less commitments and responsibilities (compared to the much older generations), they are less likely to accept bribes from project/programmes owners or designers in order to approve project proposals under scrutiny.

Thirdly, such a team of young people, at the beginning of their careers, fully know that their reputations are hinged to the success of a given project; hence, the consultancy cannot, at any rate, afford to deliver below the expectations. The consultancy team would have runners to visit local communities where different projects are being proposed and would subsequently document the conditions under scrutiny as well as assess whether a given project proposal would achieve its intended goal or not. Additionally, the team would meet with local stakeholders to gather further insight into their respective aspirations in a way to evaluate project needs in the utmost participatory manner.

Ultimately, as an incentive, the Consultancy team would be financed with a percentage from a given project. Project success will therefore become

propriety as the Consultancy would eventually earn much credit with many more successful completed projects. In so doing, such an endogenous development consultancy team would play a vital role of go-between towards economically selfsustaining development projects in Africa.

References Burke, P. J. and Ahmadi-Esfahani, F. Z. (2006), “Aid and Growth: A Study of South East Asia”, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 350-62.

CCTV News, “Zheng He’s Voyages”, Available at http://www.cctv.com/english/TouchChina/ GloryofChineseCivilization/HistoricalCelebrities/ MilitaryLeaders/20021224/100353.html, Accessed on Dec. 13, 2011.

ChinAfrica (2011), “10 Years of WTO: China and Member States Benefit from Decade of Trade”, Beijing Review, Vol. 3, Dec. ChinAfrica (2011), “The Sizzle Factor: Africa Feels the Heat in Combating Climate Change”, Beijing Review, Vol.3, Nov. 2011.

Kanyandago, P. (2008) “Challenges Facing African Leaders”, Unpublished Inaugural Lecture delivered at Uganda Martyrs University on Oct. 18, 2008 at the 15th Anniversary of Uganda Martyrs University (UMU), Research Directorate, Uganda Martyrs University.

Keat, G.O. (2004), Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor, ABCCLIO. Kisekka, J. (2008), “A Reflection on the Concept of Development: Implications for Africa”, Journal of Science and Sustainable Development, Vol. 1 (1), pp. 79-88.

Moore, G. E. (1993), Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moyo, D. (2009), Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa, London: Penguin Books.

Muekalia, D. J. (2004), “Africa and China’s Strategic Partnership”, African Security Review, Vol.13 (1), pp. 5–11.

Nduhukhire-Owa-M. (2003), Growth and Maldevelopment: Uganda’s Experiences, Nkozi: Uganda Martyrs University Press.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2006), The Rise of India and China: What’s in it for Africa?, Paris: OECD. Pankhurst, R. (1961), An Introduction to the Economic

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History of Ethiopia, London: Lalibela House.

Sen, A. (1999), Development as Freedom, Oxford: OUP. Servant J. C. (2005), “China’s Trade Safari in Africa”, Le Monde Diplomatique, Available at http://mondediplo. com/2005/05/11chinafrica, Accessed on 03 November, 2011.

Shelton, G. (2006), South Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?, Paper Presented at ‘Chinese Scramble’: The Politics of Contemporary China-Africa Relations, July 12–13, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, UK. Snow, P. (1988), The Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa, London: Weidenfeld and Nicoloson.

Taylor, I. (1998), “China’s Foreign Policy towards Africa in the 1990s”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.36 (3), pp. 443–460.

Tull, D. M. (2006), “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44 , pp 459-479.

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Africa-China Mutual Attractions

By Macharia Munene Lecturer, United States International University, Kenya Abstract: Africa and China have developed close ties in all areas, particularly in the economic sphere.

Economic ties, however, are threatened by concerns arising from both internal and external forces of instability. That threat, as well as historical confrontations between the Euro-powers and the Chinese, tend to bring Africans and the Chinese close in order to reduce obstacles to economic growth. In many instances, the calculations on both sides are hardnosed rather than sentimental and are void of insults and hypocritical moralising. The acquisition of Chinese materials by African states and the presence of China in hotspots where its interests may be threatened tend to be open rather than behind the scenes, as it used to be. This trend is likely to continue.

1. Introduction Africa and China are increasingly attracted to each other, not on the basis of equality, but on the basis of need. Although there are substantive differences between the two, the points of convergence of interests are growing, while points of divergence are decreasing. This seeming development is due to a number of factors, both internal and external to the two sides. The increasing convergence can mean growing sense of peace and security.

Every political unit juggles between “security,” survival, and “interests” which refer to the values that distinguish that unit from any other. Of the two, it is “interest,” particularly core interests that takes precedence in the sense that the purpose of “security” is to secure “interests” of the given unit.

To do that effectively, the unit needs “economic and political influence” and to have the “political courage” to use its forces.1 Since each state would like to secure interests, particularly the major ones who decide “the world order,” there is intense competition of all types and, “frictions are unavoidable.”2 In the process of handling unavoidable frictions, the powerful countries claim what amounts to a prerogative of the mighty to throw their weight around and assume they are right and rational because they have might and technology on their side.3 They act “big” by displaying power to control others and still claim they are maintaining “international law.4 They then design and make rules, or international laws, for others to follow and still believe they are not bound by such laws because what counts is the ‘rule of power,” not the “rule of law.”5 In protecting core interests, big powers act as if they have natural rights not only to ignore “international

law,” but also to limit the amount of freedom and democracy to be enjoyed by those considered “lowlife.”6 Strong states have an inherent right to ignore international law if it is deemed to be against their national interest. They are actually obligated to disobey, because they are big.7 Democracy should be denied to those who are “irresponsible” enough to vote for the wrong people who jeopardise American interests.8 Value, which is normally good in itself, is not necessarily optimised when it is maximised …. There are … potentially desirable limits to the indefinite extension of democracy.9 The idea of doing almost anything to protect core interests is well captured in US President Barack Hussein Obama’s May 2010 National Security Strategy document stating that “The United States will protect its people and advance our prosperity irrespective of the actions of any other nation.”10 It is the Euro-arrogance that helped Africa and China to gravitate towards each other, although not on an equal footing. The Chinese have become big and as the second largest economy in the world, acquired the prerogative of the mighty that has aroused increasing resentment among Europowers. In their resentment of Chinese success, however, the Euro-powers tend to use Africans as outlets for that anger and try to tighten control by warning Africans against the Chinese.11 Such warnings seem like attempts to subject Africans to new racism that justifies continuing or return of imperial control camouflaged, as in the 19th century, in humanitarian garb.12 No wonder the two sides are attracted to each other. All is not rosy, however, for there are points of friction as well as cooperation.

Will the Chinese exercise their prerogative of the mighty and behave like other major powers in throwing their weight around?

So far, China has been straining to prove that it is not like other powers that become big and then

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aggressive, that it is not a threat to anyone, and that all it wants is world harmony.13 It appears ambivalent on its big power status. Following the advice from US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, it tries to become “a responsible power”14 and seemingly seeks acceptability in the “international community.” It thinks of Africa in terms of “aid” and “aid,” as in the West, it is an instrument of projecting foreign policy.15 Although it deliberately downplays its power,16 it finds itself using language and “catchy” phrases that are very similar to those used by other powers. Thus, Zhong Sheng of The People’s Daily writes of “pervasive corruption on the continent” as partly being due to “historical, tribal and cultural factors.”17 With a growing number of influential Chinese calling for an assertive international posture, points of convergence and divergence between Africa and China are likely to become pronounced. For one, the Chinese have acquired the prerogative of the mighty, only that they are reluctant to use it at present, but the Africans have not.

2. Convergence and Divergence Despite China’s big power proclivities, Africa and China have points of convergence that bring the two sides together and also divergence that can be sources of friction. That relation can be examined in four segments: the histories, the geopolitical factors, economic realities, and ideological orientation. In each segment, both sides have had ups and downs. They, however, reciprocate each other’s overtures and, on examining long term interests, decide to deal.

2.1 Histories: Ancient and recent The histories of Africa and China are long and very old. Africa, particularly Eastern Africa, is reputedly the cradle of man, where organised living started.18 African histories, however, are regionally and time fragmented rather than continuous. The identifiable ancient ones include the Nile Valley, closely followed by Egypt, Tropical Africa, and Southern Africa. Each was remarkable in its time and place.

Amongst them was Mali in West Africa, whose mariners led by Abubakar II, reportedly crossed the Atlantic Ocean around 1315.19 On its part, China claims to have the longest continuous and identifiably centralised organised living in the world, running for roughly 4,000 years.20 It too produced mariners who distinguished themselves a century later, after Abubakar II. Their

world-wide travels and maps reportedly helped European travelers. The best known Chinese mariner was Zheng He, the Hui eunuch who visited Eastern Africa and returned with a giraffe.

Thereafter, the Chinese became complacent in the belief that others were barbarians who should learn from and pay tribute to the Middle Kingdom.21 The Euro-powers subjugated and exploited both Africa and China but the intensity differed. The Europeans, awaking from doldrums, had engaged in prolonged imperial ventures, rewrote the past, created myths of their greatness,22 and produced an imperial offspring, the United States of America.

They saw no socio-ideological contradiction between ideals of liberty for white men and the reality of enslaving others.23 In China, subjugation was by controlling the ports, mainly after the British orchestrated opium war and the subsequent imposition of unequal treaties.24 The Chinese way, however, was largely left intact.

It was in Africa where the exploitation was intense.

Considering Africa to be a rich source of needed raw materials and a potential market, the Europeans developed an urge for territorial colonisation25 and partitioned the continent through terror, while claiming they were doing it for humanity and civilisation.26 In tune with the prevailing Social Darwinist mindset in which subjugating Africans was supposedly a favour to humanity, they tried to destroy self-image by forcing Africans to imbibe European heroism and to “unremember” the past by renaming everything.27 Euro-powers also subjected Africans to famine as a control mechanism to ensure that they became materially and mentally poor by blocking avenues of independent economic activities and dehumanising the Africans into submission.28 Colonial authorities believed they had rights to enslave and reshape the Africans29 and that they were legitimate trustees to people they considered “retarded,”30 “perpetual juvenile delinquents,”31 and with little prospect of breaking from presumed condition of “infinity transition.”32 The colonial powers created new legal systems that lumped all Africans together as “natives” serving colonial interests33 and also made “tribal” distinctions amongst the “natives” when it came to political issues that challenged the colonial state.34 They thus planted the seeds of post-colonial crisis.

2.2 The Geopolitical Factor The two areas have different values to competing geopolitical interests and therefore the forces

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pressuring them vary. In terms of proximity, China and Eastern Africa are closer to each other than either is to Western Europe and North America. The contacts between them go as far back as the travels of Zengh He. The two have different experiences in which one, China, has stopped being a victim of forces and is a global player. The other, Africa, continues to struggle but still remains the arena for others to play in.

China is one centralised country having over 1.3 billion people broken into 56 ethnic communities, with the Han as the dominant community. The third largest country in the world, covering 9.6km2, among the countries bordering China are Russia, Mongolia, India, Indochina, Pakistan and the Korea. Across the seas are Japan, The Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. It claims 7,600 islands that include Taiwan, Hainan, Diaoyu and Chiwei, and Nansha islands.35 It is thus both a land and a sea power that has attracted and continues to attract big power interests as a force to be commercially seduced, conquered, or contained. It was seduced before the 19th century, conquered and decapitated in the 19th century, and contained in the 20th century.

In the 21st century, however, China is the attention of both commercial/economic seduction and attempted containment but not conquest. It succeeded in rising to the top, being second only to the United States in terms of economic power.

This success puts China in a precarious position as “the High Land,” as Wang Yizhou claims,36 that is the envy of other powers and the subject of assorted geopolitical chess games. It finds itself confronting both The Philippines and Japan over ownership of some islands. Several Chinese strategists have responded by urging Beijing to flex its naval muscles as a warning to chaos engineers using proxies in Asia.37 Africa, is a large continent with a population of roughly 1 billion people comprising thousands of ethnic groups in 54 different countries. It is endowed with a lot of natural resources that are of strategic and industrial value to other continents, but they have hardly been exploited by the Africans. These resources are attractions to competing big powers who would like Africans to remain weak, poor, and easily exploited. The potential in African resources and the fear of white people killing each other in the Congo area led to the meeting in Berlin in 18841885 where representatives of white powers agreed on the rules for grabbing territories in Africa38 without fighting.

With no central authority, Africa is a collection of former European colonies that still have strong Euro identities. These identities are symbolised by such labels as Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone zones. There is also the Arab zone in North Africa that tends to identify more with the Arabs than with black Africans. Despite the effort to create African unity, first the Organisation of African Unity and now the African Union, the stiff competition between countries and zones makes it easy for external forces to penetrate the continent.

Africa’s weakness is an attraction to all the big powers.

As the focus of external interests, there have been accusations and counter accusations on who is exploiting Africans. For Americans, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton observed, “represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage.”39 The US embassies, the State Department instructed, were to pay close attention and analyse Chinese activities in Africa.40 The US did not like some of the things it found.

Apart from becoming Africa’s biggest trading power in the world, the continent appeared like a testing ground for China’s greatness and status as a power.41 While China was no military or security threat to US interests, Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson claimed in 2010, it “is a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals…. China is in Africa for China primarily. A secondary reason for China’s presence is to secure votes in the United Nations from African countries. A third reason is to prove that Taiwan is not an issue.”42 Guentar Nooke, German policy coordinator for Africa claimed in 2011 that there was a large Chinese land grab that contributed to drought in the Horn of Africa.43 The Chinese have returned the favour in terms of accusations.

Dai Bingguo, China’s State Councilor, denied that China had any desire to create a “sphere of influence” or repeating the West’s exploitation of Africa.44 It is the West, argues Sheng, that occupies more than 30 million hectares of land which is roughly 15 per cent of farmland in Africa. The Western powers try “to impose their ideologies and values on African countries, which can be regarded as a form of ideological hegemony.”45 The accusations and counter accusations are strange, but the Chinese appear to have the upper edge, given the record of Western exploitation on Africans. China’s success is an example for

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Africans to learn from. This point was stressed by Ikiara of University of Nairobi, who discounted the German claim and wanted Kenyans and other Africans to learn from the Chinese success.46 What is to be learned from the Chinese? It is how to assert independence and to protect and advance interests without worrying excessively what rivals may want. It is to determine own destiny independently and then act on it despite the huddles along the way.

2.3 Economic Realities China is thus attractive to Africa partly because it is an economic example of success out of focused determination. It is a challenge to Eurodominance; a stimulant to African economies and a message to other powers to stop taking Africans for granted. Now Africa’s largest trading country, partly because it is perceived to deliver without insulting the intelligence of the Africans, and at reasonable costs, Africa is where China’s “soft power” is increasingly evident.47 This did not happen overnight.

On liberating itself and emerging from prolonged civil war in 1949, China managed to reorganise its economy in a focused way irrespective of external forces and now controls those forces. The first roughly 30 years were dominated by Mao Zedong and experimental attempts to survive in a hostile geopolitical environment. With the hostility coming from both the capitalist and communist camps, China was isolated. The period however laid the foundations for later economic skyrocketing after 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s injunction to ignore the colour of the cat as long as it caught the mice. With a large domestic market, China managed to mount industrialisation that devoured natural resources in and out of China. In the process, it has become the leading creditor nation and the economic stimulant to its power rivals. It is a new centre of power in a growing multi-polar world.48 In contrast, the economic experience in most African countries after independence in the 1960s is one of dependency. Agitation for independence aims at removing white political rule but not challenging colonial structures. Departing colonialists had groomed pliant “leaders” to inherit the colonial state and remain attached to colonial powers economically and socio-politically in a master - state client - state relationship. The French were very good at this as they imposed “Colonial Pacts” that gave Paris 85 per cent control of the local currencies, all mineral rights, and control of

defense and foreign policies.49 The Colonial pacts were signed by the groomed “leaders” who, being mesmerised to sink into “aid addiction” with “aid” supplied by the “aid peddlers”, could not challenge the exploitative relationship.50 Those leaders who thought of freeing their countries from the stranglehold, such as Patrice Lumumba, lost their jobs, died, and were replaced with pliant ones.

Thus, while China rebuilt its economy first from within and then expanded to other countries by adopting the “go global policy” in the 1990s,51 Africa remained economically tied to and dependent to former colonial authorities in the West. In China’s economic outward thrust and Africa’s Look East for alternative economic relations, the two sides converged. This convergence is symbolised by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC. While there are many visible investments, China’s concentration on Zambia by rehabilitating the mines is unique. It considers Zambia to be one of its seven “special economic zones,” an economic hub in Africa complete with elaborate infrastructure and industries, where resources are pumped to ensure success and make Zambia a showcase for China.52 Such investments occur at the very time that the West is busy pulling out ostensibly because of instability and other supposed African shortcomings.53 2.5 Ideological Orientations Both sides have been victims of European manipulations and racism in the last 160 years.

Although the lure of Chinese wealth sent Europeans to China by way of Africa, it was European domination of both places that brought the Africans and the Chinese together. The scramble for Chinese ports had led the United States, which was late in grabbing some ports, to suggest a collective policy of open doors to China for all the Euro-powers.

The one place where the open door was applied, however, was in Africa where the Europeans scrambled to claim different parts of the continent.

In that period of domination, both the Africans and the Chinese were treated as second class citizens in their own countries and had to struggle to liberate themselves. Common struggles led to Afro-Asian solidarity and liberation from euro-control. The sense of struggle against euro-imperialism is still strong.

Of the two sides, China can claim to have led in liberating self and then being very clear as to who or what was in control. All institutions, including

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the military, were to be guided by the Communist Party of China.54 This requirement was entrenched in the constitution and became part of Chinese “revolutionary” tradition. CPC official, Sr. Col. Wang Yongsheng in July 2012, argued that our army belongs to the Party, but it also belongs to the state and to the people and cannot be depoliticised.55 The leader of that kind of thinking was Mao Zedong who, in October 1949, proclaimed the creation of a new China that would determine its own policies.

Under Mao’s direction, in the first 20 years after October 1949, China developed and tried to export its own version of communism. It wanted to escape the diplomacy of humiliation which China had experienced before 1949, starting with the “opium war”, by adopting an independent foreign policy. It stressed “cleaning up the house before entertaining guests,” “starting anew” and “leaning on one side” which was the Soviet side.56 It initially saw itself as a revolutionary country confronting imperialists who were mainly capitalistic and colonialistic. In this, it identified with the colonised world in Asia and Africa and was a major participant in the 1955 Bandung Conference that founded the nonalignment anti-colonial movement.57 In the growing agitation for the release of Jomo Kenyatta from jail, for instance, China’s Premier Zhou en Lai asserted that “six hundred and fifty million Chinese resolutely support the noble course” for which Kenyatta was dedicated.58 With Tanzania leading the way, the Africans eventually returned the favour by, as Mao noted, carrying China to the United Nations.59 Many of the Africans who carried China to the United Nations attained independence in the 1960s, although the routes to independence varied. They were actually reciprocating China’s support for and empathy for Africa’s anti-colonialism. There were those, such as Kenya against the British and Algeria against the French, who engaged in physical fighting to convince the colonialists to go. The anticolonial struggle for other was less violent, but the end result was the same. The colonialists left and Africans were free to deal with China.

With independence, however, several former African anti-colonialists differed with China’s advocacy of “revolutions.” The advocacy appeared like an attempt to destabilise fledgling states, particularly when Zhou En-lai, in his 1964 tour of 10 African countries that included expansionist Somalia, talked of Africa being “ripe for revolution.”

Kenya, for instance, was not amused and the net

effect was deterioration of relations between the two countries. Kenya pointed out that it already had its anti-colonial “revolution” and did not need another one. The Senators condemned Zhou’s “ripe for revolution” remarks. As China, in 1966, plunged into the chaotic Cultural Revolution with the Red Guards disrupting everything in China and abroad, tension increased. Both sides protested and held demonstrations against each other’s embassies in Beijing and Nairobi. Windows were broken, diplomats were expelled, and diplomatic relations broke down in 1967.60 The 1970s were different as China started toning down its revolutionary rhetoric and joined the United States mainly against the Soviet Union that was seen as a social imperialist, in the north.

Mao proclaimed a “Three World Theory” that placed the United States and the Soviet Union as the first world, Western Europe as the second world, and China and the rest as the third world.61 It also adopted state capitalism, with Deng terming his ideological shift as “socialism with Chinese characteristic” that stressed initiative and rewards within a controlled political system. Discarding equalisation policies, Deng reportedly asserted that “to be rich is glorious” and that “some must get rich first” and that people or regions “should eat in different kitchens.” Adopting capitalistic ways, however, did not mean abandoning or threatening the communist political system.62 When in 1989, with Soviet communism collapsing in Europe, intellectuals and students, some returning from or inspired by the West, tried challenging the political status quo, they were snuffed out at the Tiananmen Square.63 In Africa, there was no one consistent ideological line, not even within individual countries. There were multiple ideological interpretations of what should or should not be. Expansionists wanted to disregard inherited colonial boundaries, with Somalia propagating Greater Somalia idea at the expense of its neighbours. Somalia eventually failed and collapsed into chaos. Others insisted on the in-contractibility and fixity of the colonial borders as a way of keeping the peace. The OAU agreed to maintain colonial borders and adopted the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of sister states.64 There were also debates on varieties of “socialism.”

In the process, there were many accusations of neocolonialism which was popularised by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to refer to African

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countries that continued to be tied to the West.65 Nkrumah and his ideological rival, Felix Houphey Boigny of Ivory Coast, entered into a 10 year wager in 1957 on which country will be better off.

No one collected on the bet because Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966.66 In Eastern Africa, the ideological rivalry was between Kenya and Tanzania, debating different versions of socialism. In Kenya, Kenyatta wanted nothing to do with scientific socialism and had, in his first Madaraka Day speech, June 1, 1963, warned that the “Marxist theory of class warfare” was irrelevant to Kenya and added: “attitudes which were appropriate when we were fighting for independence have to be revised.”67 To terminate the debate on socialism, Kenyatta’s government issued the 1965 Sessional Paper Number 10: African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya that made it clear that African socialism meant capitalism with an African twist and that there was no room for scientific socialism.68 Kenyatta then proceeded to tell those complaining about scientific socialism to keep quiet.69 In contrast, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania came up, two years later with the 1967 Arusha Declaration which was more anti-capitalistic. Nyerere’s Ujamaa experiment was a more serious attempt at “socialism”70 than Kenya.

The ideological debates in Africa continue but under new garb, especially with the presence of leaders who have conflicting loyalties. There are those who appear beholden to the West, mainly the “aid addicts,” and would not want to be seen to rock the boat by challenging dictates from Washington, London, Brussels, or Paris. They believe they have no choice but to toe the Western line and enjoy what former British High Commissioner to Kenya, Edward Clay, termed “valuable and civilised relations” with Washington and London. If Kenya “wants to be part of the modern world,” Clay had argued, “it is necessary that it has relations with people like British and Americans,” and that Britain had had a “valuable and civilised relations” with former President Daniel arap Moi.71 As Clay’s clear threat to Kenya’s Mwai Kibaki implies, there are those who do not believe that having “valuable and civilised relations” with the West means agreeing to everything the West tells them. Such people question the premise of not only the colonial pacts, but also the inherent dependency on decision making. These tend to look for alternatives in their international relations.

They tend to Look East and seeing India and China

emerging as global powers, would like to deal with them. And in “Looking” at that “East,” there is a strange convergence of ideological positions between Kenya and China. Though coming at different times, Deng’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” appears much like Kenya’s African socialism; both are endorsements of capitalism with special twists that suit each country’s perceived interests.

3. Prospects for the Future Common interests between Africa and China continue expanding. Perceived China’s interests in African raw materials and perceived African interest in Africans accessing Chinese technology, efficiency, and respect and leverage in international dealings bring the two sides together. The Chinese presence dominates mainly because of the projects that have been delivered. Whether it is a showpiece building like the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa or the highways in different countries, questions that arise is why this had not been done before.

This, it appears, has stimulated the West to deliver more than before which explains the flurry of “discoveries” of oil, gas, coal, and other minerals in places that had been ignored. The discoveries, it seems, are meant to stop China from discovering and developing them.

The two sides also face problems of security, both at home and ashore. The challenges at home are of political nature although they at times have external inspirations that tend to destabilise the state. The external challenges involve other countries directly or through proxies. Both confront common threats in the Indian Ocean, where piracy menaces trade and thus affect economic relations. There are also questions of Chinese operations in such zones of instability as the Congo and Sudan. While China’s presence in Africa’s conflict zones shows the depth of its interest in African official interaction as well as resources, there is no reciprocal African involvement in China’s trouble spots at sea.

Africans have been careful not to take positions on the disputes between China and Japan or China and The Philippines over islands. In part, this is because Africans have no capacity and are not deeply involved in Asian matters.

There are points of friction between the two sides.

China needs to explain itself better than it does, mostly in Africa, not in Europe. The perception that it is part of conflict entrepreneur enterprise does not help and although it tries to discount it,

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the perception persists. Despite denying it, some of its attitudes towards Africans are very similar to those of the West. When Zhong Sheng asserts that “it is Africa’s historical, tribal and cultural factors as well as lack of effective law enforcement and supervision that have led to pervasive corruption on the continent,”72 he tries to exonerate China by blaming the Africans, just as the West does.

Despite the above points of friction, the prospects for strengthened ties between China and Africa are very high. China needs Africa for ideological and international political reasons as well as the natural resources. Africa needs China for real economic growth and as leverage against Western dictates.

The two are mutually attracted to each other, even as China becomes more confident in asserting its power on the globe.

10 President of the United States: “National Security Strategy”, Washington: White House, May 2010, pp. 40.

11 Zong Sheng: “China-Africa Relations: Far Cry from Western Colonialism,” in People’s Daily, Sept. 7, 2011, http://china-wire.org/?p+15632 accessed Oct. 2, 2012.

12 Darby: “Security, Spatiality, and Social Suffering,” pp.461.

13 John Chan: “Chinese Leader Denies Any Aim to Replace the US as World Hegemon,” in World Socialist Website, Dec. 17, 2010.

14

Endnotes 1

B. Raman: “India & the Indian Ocean,” in Global Security News, April 7, 2011, http://global-securitynews.com/2011/04/07/india-the-indian-ocean/ accessed 2/23/2012

2

Wang Yizhou: “Multi-polarity Does Not Equal an Anti-U.S. Position,” in The Global Times, Beijing, Summer, 1999.

3

Philip Darby: “Security, Spatiality, and Social Suffering,” in Alternatives, Vol. 31, 2006, pp.463.

5

Jan Nederveen Pieterse: “Neoliberal Empire,” in Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2004, pp. 121.

6

15 Dorothy-Grace Guerrero and Firoze Manji: “Introduction: China’s New Role in Africa and the South,” in China’s New Role in Africa and the South: A Search for a New Perspective, Nairobi: Fahamu, 2008, pp.3 16 Macharia Munene: “How China Downplays Global Power,” in Business Daily, Sept. 4, 2012.

Stephen Chan: “Out of Evil: New: New International Politics and Old Doctrines of War”, London: I.B. Tauris, 2005, pp. 21.

4

David Shambaugh: “Beijing: A Global Leader with ‘China First’ Policy,” in Yale Global, June 29, 2010, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/print/6397 accessed 9/13/2012; David H. Shinn, “The United States Reassesses the China-Africa Relationship,” Jan. 18, 2012. http://www.internationalpolicydigest. org/2012/01/18/the-united-state, Sept. 20, 2012

17 Sheng: “China-Africa Relations.”

18 Stephen Oppenheimer: “Out of Eden: The Peopling of the World”, London: Constable, 2003, pp.

45-46; 50-52; Marq De Villiers and Sheila Hirtle, “Into Africa: A Journey through Ancient Africa”, London: Phoenix, 1998, pp. 369-371.

19 Ivan Van Sertima: “They Came Before Columbus: African Presence in Ancient America”, New York: Random House, 1977.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse: “Hyper Power Exceptionalism: Globalisation the American Way,” in New Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 3, Nov., 2003, pp. 314.

20 Foreign Languages Press: “China” Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2011, pp. 34.

7

Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner: “The Limits of International Law”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 4.

8

Walter Isaacson: “Kissinger: A Biography”, New York, 1992, pp. 290; William Blum: “Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II”, London: Zed Books, 2003, pp. 209.

9

Quote in Michael Kearney: “Politics, Utopia, Emancipation: A Review Essay,” in Critical Sociology, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2001, pp. 133.

21 Gavin Menzies: “1421: The Year China Discovered the World”, London: Bantam Books, 2002, passim; Henry Kissinger: “On China” New York: Penguin Books, 2011, pp. 9-11, 16- 20; Neil Ferguson: “Civilisation: The Six Killer Apps of Western Power” New York: Penguin Books, 2012, pp.28-33; Dun J. Li, “The Ageless Chinese: A History”, 2nd Ed., New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, pp. 281289, 370.

22 Susan Martin-Marquez: “Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity”, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale

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University Press, 2008, pp. 12-16; Sophie Bessis: “Western Supremacy: Triumph of an Idea”, London: Zed Books, 2003, pp. 12-14 23

Mark Duffield: “Development, Territories, and People: Consolidating the External Sovereign Frontier,” in Alternative, Vol. 32, 2007, pp. 228

24 Kissinger: “On China”, pp. 45-56; 25 Gearoid O. Tuathail: “Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space”, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 38 26 Aime Cesaire: “Discourse on Colonialism”, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1970, pp.

9-12; Crawford Young: “The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective”, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994, pp.165-166; Duffield: “Development, Territories, and People,” pp. 229-232; Macharia Munene: “The Truman Administration and the Decolonisation of SubSaharan Africa, 1945-1952”, Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, 1995, pp. 13-16.

27 Ngugi wa Thiong’o: “Remembering Africa”, Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 2009, pp. 4 28 Alex de Waal: “Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa”, Oxford: James Currey, 1997, pp.27; Macharia Munene: “Aid Peddlers and Aid Addicts: A Discourse on Postmodern Colonialism in Africa,” in Journal of Science Technology Education and Management, Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan. 2007, pp. 183-184.

29 Archille Mbembe: “On the Postcolony”, Berkeley: University of California press, 2001, pp. 28-29; Bessis: “Western Supremacy”, pp. 16.

30 Neil Ferguson: “Civilisation”, pp. 165-166 31 Okello Oculi: “Discourses on African Affairs: Directions and Destinies for the 21st Century”, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2000, pp. 3

35

Yin Zhongqing: “China’s Political System”, Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2010, pp.6-9.

36

Ding Ying: “The View From on High”, Beijing Review, No. 24, June 14, 2009, http:// www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2009-06/14/ content_202466.htm, accessed Oct. 2, 2012.

37 Bhaskar Roy: “China’s Foreign Policy Debate,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 5038, 2012, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers51/ paper5038.html accessed Sept. 25, 2012; Antoaneta Bezlova: “China Worried about US Unilateralism,” in Dawn, March 12, 2003, http:// archives.dawn.com/2003/03/12/int14.htm accessed Sept. 9, 2012.

38 Macharia Munene: “Mayi Mayi and Intrahamwe Militias: Threats to Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region,” in David J. Francis (ed): Civil Militias: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005, pp.

233-234 39 Hilary Clinton: “America’s Pacific Century,” Nov. 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2011/10/11/american_pacific, accessed Sept. 20, 2012.

40 Shinn: “The United States Reassesses the ChinaAfrica Relationship”.

41 “China-Africa Relationship in the New Era: Touchstone of China’s Rise,” in International Channel of People’s Net, August 1, 2012 http:// www.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/opinions/t957236. htm 9/25/2012 42 Quote in Shinn: “The United States Reassesses the China-Africa Relationship.”

43 Wang Guanqun: “African Experts Reject German Claim Blaming China for Worsened Famine, Drought in Horn of Africa” , Aug. 3, 2011, http:// www.focac.org/eng/xsjl/t845367.htm, Accessed Oct. 2, 2012

32 Gerry Simpson: “Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 159, 259.

44

Dai Bingguo: “Remarks by State Councilor Dai Bingguo at Dinner Hosted by the Vice-President of Zambia,” 2010, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/ zyjh/t721613.htm#, accessed Sept. 11, 2012.

33 Mahmood Mamdani: “When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and Genocide in Rwanda, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001, pp.

22-28.

45

Zongh Sheng: “China-Africa Relations: Far Cry from Western Colonialism,” in People’s Daily, Sept. 7, 2011.

34 Macharia Munene: “Historical Perspective on Ethnic Relations in Kenya”, in Wajibu: A Journal of Social and Religious Concern, Vol. 7(3), 1992, pp. 2-6.

46 Wang Guanqun: “African Experts Reject German Claim Blaming China for Worsened Famine, Drought in Horn of Africa,” Aug. 3, 2011, http:// www.focac.org/eng/xsjl/t845367.htm, accessed Oct. 2, 2012; Xinhua: “Africa’s Industrialisation Could Benefit from China’s Growth Model,”

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47

Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.capitalfin.co.ke/ business/2012/10/africas-industrialization, accessed Oct. 2, 2012.

58 James Frank: “Scram from Kenya: From Colony to Republic, 1946-1963”, Sussex, UK: Pomegranate Press, 2004, pp.328.

He Wenping: “The Balancing Act of China’s Africa Policy,” in China Security, Issue 7, 2008, http:// www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_ content&view=art, accessed Aug. 11, 2012.

59

48 Yizhou: “Multi-polarity”.

49

Robert Mugabe: “Good that Outtara is the Cote d’Ivoire President but What about the Colonial Pact,” May 7, 2011, http://greatlakesvoice. com/?p=908, accessed May 18, 2011; Gary K. Bush: “Cote D’Ivoire: The French Freemasons and Neo-colonial Wars,” Jan. 5, 2011, http://www. africaresource.com/rasta/sesostris-the great-the egyptian-hercules/cote-divoire...,, accessed May 18, 2011.

50 Macharia Munene: “Aid Peddlers and Aid Addicts: A Discourse on Postmodern Colonialism in Kenya,” in Journal of Science Technology Education and Management (J-Stem), A Publication of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Vol. 1, No.1, 2007, pp.

181-190.

51 Jian Jumbo: “Greater China: Beijing’s New Overseas Imperative,” in Asia Times, Feb. 17, 2012 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/NB17Ad01. htm, accessed Oct. 2, 2012.

52

Mark Leonard: “China’s New Intelligentsia,” in Prospect, March 28, 2008, http://www. prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/chineseintelligentsia-i, accessed Sept. 27, 2012.

53

Jumbo: “Greater China: Beijing’s New Overseas Imperative”.

54 Zhongqing: “China’s Political System”, pp.1-3.

55 Chen Jie: “Ministry of Defense: Outside Intervention Not Welcome,” Ministry of National Defense: The People’s Republic of China, Press Briefing, Aug. 1, 2012 http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ Press/2012-08/01/content_4388224.htm.

56

Zhang: “China’s Diplomacy”, pp.16-18: Kissinger, “On China”, pp.92-112, 303-304.

57

Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu: “Introduction: Africa and China in the Post Cold-War Era,” in Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds): Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, Cape Town: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2008, pp. 6.

Zhang: “China’s Diplomacy”, pp.112-113; Adekeye Adebajo: “An Axis of Evil? China, the United States and France in Africa,” in Ampiah and Naidu (eds): Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon?, pp.228.

60 Bruce D. Larkin: “China and Africa 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the Peoples Republic of China”, Berkely: University of California Press, 1973, pp. 135-140; Michael Chege: “Economic Relations between Kenya and China,” in J. Stephen Morrison, Jennifer Cooke, and Indira Campos (eds): US and China Engagement in Africa: Prospects for Improving US China Cooperation, Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, July 2008, pp.15-17; Zeng Qiang: “China’s Strategic Relations with Africa,” in Axel HarnetSievers, Stephen Marks and Sanusha Naidu (eds): Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa, Nairobi: Fahamu, 2010, pp.58.

61 Xinning Song: “European ‘Models’ and their Implications to China: Internal and External Perspectives,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, 2010, pp. 756.

62 Ravindra Sharma, “Chinese Intellectuals: State versus New Left,” Mainstream , Vol. XLVII, No. 42, Oct. 3, 2009 in http://www.mainstreamweekly. net/article1676.html accessed Sept. 27, 2012; Mark Leonard: “China’s New Intelligentsia,” Prospect, March 28, 2008 in http://www.prospectmagazine. co.uk/magazine/Chinese-intelligentsia-i…, Accessed Sept. 27, 2012.

63 Kissinger: “On China”, pp.408-439.

64 Macharia Munene: “How Somalia Slowly Disintegrated into Small Pieces of Troubled Nations,” in Africa Review, July 1, 2010, http://www.africareview.com/AfricaAt50//1001198/992230/-view/printVersion/-/x9vj15, accessed on Oct. 23, 2010.

65 Kwame Nkrumah: “Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism”, New York: International Publishers, 1965.

66 Young, “Ideology and Development in Africa”, pp.1-3.

67 Quotes in Munene, G.M.: “Constitutional Development in Kenya: A Historical Perspective,” in Vyas, Y., Kibwana, K., Okech-Owiti, Wanjala, S. (eds): Law and Development in the Third World, Nairobi: Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi, 1994, pp. 58-59.

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68 Leys, C.: “Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 19641971”, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1974, pp. 220-224.

69 Kenyatta’s Statement on “African Socialism” in Kenyatta, J.: Suffering without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya Nation, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968, pp.273.

70 Julius K. Nyerere: “Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism”, London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

71 See Clay Interview with Nation TV’s Louis Otieno, in Sunday Nation, June 29, 2003.

72 Sheng: “China-Africa Relations.”

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China-Africa Cooperation

By Denise A. O. Kodhe Executive Director, Institute for Democracy and Leadership in Africa- IDEA and Editorial Director, Flashline News Agency (Private media organisation in Africa), Kenya Abstract: The cooperation between China and Africa is a two way traffic in the sense that both sides need each other and that both parties have something to gain from the relationship. While China is a world power, it needs Africa as an ally and business partner in terms of providing an outlet to its products. On the other hand, Africa requires China for its infrastructural and industrial development. China is also viewed as an alternative partner as most African nations are not comfortable with their previous allies from the West. Historically, most African countries were colonised by the British, French, and Germans and to some extent Italians and Portuguese. As a result of such colonial history, many African countries adopted certain colonially inherited socio-economic and political patterns.

1. China-Africa Cooperation In many ways, Africa has a lot to learn from China’s reform agenda of 1978 and its impact on China’s economic development, political stability and industrial revolution. Through the reform agenda, China is now opening up to the international community attracting more investment.

The democratic collective leadership system of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is another interesting area where Africa can learn from China in terms of deciding the right political doctrine and policy to adopt without being coaxed or intimidated by the West.

Infrastructure and industrial development is key to Africa’s development. China has demonstrated its expertise in engineering and has been involved in various infrastructural activities including building wonderful roads in several African countries. In Tanzania, China built the Tazara railway line and in Sudan, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya, it has built good roads such as the Thika superhighway in Kenya. The Tazara railway line in Tanzania, as most rail systems in East Africa, has since collapsed due to poor maintenance and bad management. It would be remarkably in order if African nations prioritised industrial and infrastructure development as the basis for cooperation with China.

The coming in of China to Africa is a great relief to many African leaders because of the Chinese government’s policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal matters. Yes, it is a good policy by the Chinese but sometimes contradictory in the sense that good governance practice in Africa is still alien and not understood by many African leaders whether civilian or military.

Many Western countries have criticised China’s entry into Africa and described it as exploitative and selfishly driven. Their argument however, has no basis since every country has liberty to choose its partner. It is not the prerogative of any foreign person or country to decide who Africa should associate with.

Former South African President Nelson Mandela at one time cautioned the West against deciding who South Africa’s friends should be. The West, especially America, is not the custodian of Africa and therefore should desist from interfering with African affairs let alone trying to decide the fate for Africans. It is up to Africans to decide their own destiny, but of course, with caution. China should not operate in isolation when dealing with Africa because it also requires to learn from the experience of the West in dealing with Africa.

For Africa to develop and mature politically, it requires genuine and honest friends that will caution and sometimes take disciplinary measures against it when it misbehaves. Many African people are still living below the poverty line despite attaining independence from the colonialists.

Good governance and visionary leadership are crucial in Africa for prosperity, political stability and development. China should not just come in as a soft landing forum for corrupt and dictatorial African leaders. China’s cooperation with Africa should go beyond just giving aid and supporting infrastructure development in Africa and demand certain ethical behaviour and etiquette in leadership from African leaders. A good friend criticizes where necessary, and offers correction where needed.

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China should teach Africa how it manages to contain the corruption vice as well as a huge population of over 1.3 billion people. In terms of peaceful coexistence among ethnic communities, Africa should also learn from the Chinese experience especially on how it has managed to unite its fifty ethnic communities.

In cooperating with Africa, China needs to open up more so that Africans can understand it better.

Africans sometimes react negatively to China but this does not arise from hostility; Africans simply do not understand the Chinese.

Many Chinese people are not conversant with local languages, making communication difficult.

It is argued that the tone of the Chinese language is usually harsh compared to English, Kiswahili, French, Lingala Kiswahili or Arabic. This should not make Africans China-averse. The Chinese would similarly view some African dialects in the same light.

It is splendid that the Chinese government is establishing Confucius institutes around Africa.

China ought to transform these institutes to bigger institutions like universities to provide more opportunities for Africans to learn the Chinese culture and language. The spirit of People to People cooperation through Chinese and African NGOs is a positive step towards creating more awareness and better understanding of Chinese and Africans.

During the 2nd China-Africa NGO international Conference in Suzhou, China, Chinese Vice President and other delegates stressed on the importance of strengthening joint NGO activities between China and Africa to enhance and strengthen China-Africa cooperation. During the opening ceremony of the conference, H.E. XI Jinpin Vice President of the People’s Republic of China said that so far, China has become the largest trading partner of Africa and that Africa is the fourth largest destination of China’s overseas investment. He added that both China and Africa must seek all round cooperation for an all dimensional development to enhance their relations. The Vice President urged both Chinese and African NGOs, civil society groups, politicians, media, researchers and academicians to be instrumental in championing people to people cooperation.

According to Dr Jacob O. Ole Miaron, leader of the African delegation to the conference, NGOs play a pivotal role in development and supplement government efforts. NGOs are grassroot oriented,

community based and have more impact on the ground.

Dr Jacob Ole Marion recommends the establishment of a conglomeration or consortium of African NGOs in the name of “Africa-China Network for International Exchanges” to work, collaborate and partner with the “China NGO Network for International Exchanges (CNIE)” for development purposes and also to further explore and enhance China and Africa’s NGO relations. The exchange programmes organised by China through NGOs, are very educative and productive. Anybody who has had a chance to visit China under the exchange programme has a lot to talk about upon returning back to Africa. The Chinese government should make it mandatory that government officials and delegations including visiting China do not go to China just for holidaying, but to learn something to bring home and to implement. Travelling through long tunnels in Qinglin mountains in Western China in Shian province is fascinating.

African leaders should take advantage of Chinese friendship to build such tunnels and good roads in remote areas of Africa, where both transport and communication is inaccessible. African leadership should take advantage of China‘s good gesture and do something for themselves.

Despite the various allegations against the Chinese in Africa, African people appreciate and value Chinese people and their products very much.

Chinese culture, medicine and sports such as judo, township, Kungfu are very much admired

by Africans. Increased social interactions between Chian and Africa are necessary to create trust and confidence among the people from both sides.

The Chinese should not confine themselves or be limited to top government officials and diplomatic contacts only. The relationship should go beyond government and officialdom.

NGOs and other civil society groups should be the prime targets for Chinese investors so as to reach the people at the grassroots and community levels by initiating projects that benefit the people directly.

Chinese investors’ interest should not be seen to be profit making oriented only. Some portion of such profits should be ploughed back through Corporate Social Responsibilities (CSR) projects aimed at helping and benefiting communities in Africa.

Equally, African governments must protect Chinese investors and give them relevant information

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regarding investing in Africa. To avoid sad cases like in Zimbabwe where one Chinese investor lost his life as a result of labour and industrial dispute, it is the prime responsibility of African governments to induct and educate foreign investors, Chinese included, about local labour laws, customs, culture and traditions.

The media has a fundamental role to play to ensure the success of China-Africa cooperation. People need to be informed and educated accordingly on issues and available opportunities. Journalists from Africa and China should establish exchange programmes as colleagues and professionals to enable them exchange knowledge, ideas, information and experiences.

Chinese media especially leading media companies and organisations like the People’s Daily, Anhui TV, Xinhua News Agency, Radio China and CCTV should invest in Africa to provide African journalists with opportunities for employment and career growth.

According to Dr Deng Yaping, the Deputy Secretary General of People’s Daily and the President of jike. com, both Chinese and Africa media have a significant role to play in ensuring the success of China-Africa cooperation. In 1998, the Kenyan Union of Journalists (KUJ) together with All China Journalists Association (ACJA) started an exchange programme to bring journalists from the two countries together to share information, ideas and experiences and also to promote national values of the two countries by highlighting positive and development issues.

It will be necessary to revive such important journalistic and media exchanges and cooperation among journalists from Africa and China. Both China and Africa need to harness media to effectively articulate the objectives and principles of China-Africa cooperation.

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Benefits and Challenges of Implementing the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference

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New Impetus of African Development and New Path to Sustainable Development of China-Africa Relations

By Liu Hongwu Professor and Director of Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, China Abstract: Africa is under the influence of forces of upward development and downward decline, leading to a complex status. This trend is likely to yield imbalanced development in various African countries. While some countries will most likely become “emerging countries” with a large impetus of development and lead in stability and active development, other countries will face continuous instability and even go into the abyss of disruption.

1. New Impetus and New Opportunities of African Development In the first decade of the 21st century, the African continent experienced ten years of economic development. This was encouraging to the world.

However, in the second decade of the new century, the politics and economies of the African countries have become more complex and cloudy. The uncertainties of its development have reappeared as manifested in the upheavals in North Africa.

The development progress and road of the 50 countries in Africa will thus be unequal, which is a cause of concern.

1.1 New trend and new hope of African development The active trend is naturally quite apparent. In the first decade of the 21st century, the African continent has experienced ten years of lasting economic development and relative stability. In this period, Africa’s GDP maintained its stable growth rate of four per cent to five per cent, which is above that of the whole world. Some African countries developed even faster. In the year 2011 for example, six African countries were rated among the world’s fastest growing economies.

Ghana, a West African nation, had a growth rate of 13 per cent, while the economic growth rates in most of the European countries was lower than one per cent. In US, the rate barely exceeded one per cent. It is estimated that in 2012, Africa is going to be one of the fastest growing regions in the world with the growth rate of six per cent, which is approximately the same as that of the Asia. This is attracting unusual anticipation and imagination for the future of this continent.

In 2011, South Africa joined the Golden Brick nations and became the first African country to join

the global emerging nation club in Africa. Nigeria, one of Africa’s “emerging nations” which is also called the “Lame African Giant,” has speeded up its development pace during the past ten years and has an economic growth rate of seven per cent. Nigeria aspires to be the economic power in the world by the year of 2030. Niger is predicted to be the next Golden Brick nation in Africa. Some African countries, such as Angola, Ghana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Kenya are gradually showing the development tendency of “emerging nations in Africa” in various degrees.

In the long term, the over fifty African countries will not develop simultaneously. Some countries might go into decadence and disruption, while others will become the pioneers and beneficiaries in this round of growth, joining the league of emerging countries in Africa in respective regions or subregions. Africa’s fast development is attributable to a number of factors such as political stability and close business cooperation with global emerging countries, especially the new type of South-South cooperation with Asian emerging countries.

2. The Emergence of Potentials and Advantages of African Development From the perspective of the medium and long-term development worldwide, Africa has great potential and special advantages to make it develop. This potential is emerging day by day with the driving force from the global emerging countries in recent years.

First, let us talk about the African development potential in the aspects of population and labour force. Africa currently has 54 countries and a population of approximately one billion. According

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to the present growth rate of the African population, by the year 2030, 60 per cent of Africa’s population under the age of 30 years will be concentrated in Africa. Africa’s labour force is projected to hit close to 1.1 billion by 2040. This will be larger than the labour force in China and India. As other regions experience problems associated with the aging population and scarce labour force, Africa’s bulging population holds great hope for the continent, if political stability and investment in basic education and vocational education for promoting the quality of labour force is prioritised.

Second, the development prospect of Africa’s agriculture and animal husbandry is quite large.

Africa has over 9 billion mu (603 million hectares) of land that can be cultivated, but the current cultivation rate is less than one quarter. Presently, 60 per cent of global uncultivated land is concentrated in Africa. Just take the Democratic Republic of Congo as an example, the area of the land which can be cultivated in this country is 1.8 billion mu, which is approximately the same as the bottom red line of the total amount of Chinese land that must be protected. The population in this country is 67 million, which is only about five per cent of China’s population of 1.3 billion. It is apparent that, if the resource of the vast land can be developed and utilised, it will greatly spur food security and improve livelihood in Africa and around the world.

Third, Africa has rich strategic resources. Although the risk of investment in Africa is high, the return rate is also high. Africa, respectively, accounts for 40 per cent, 10 per cent, 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the world’s reservations of gold, oil, chromium and platinum. The continent’s vast grasslands, clear and uncontaminated rivers, lakes, and oceans, pristine and fresh air, unique culture, and high and large mountains, are key to the continent’s development. In fact, over the past many years, the overall investment return rate in Africa has been relatively higher than that in other countries, among them fast-growing and developing Asian countries like China, India and Vietnam.

Fourth, the development potential of the African market is also very high. In 2011, the overall African continent’s GDP reached the US$160 million, approximately the same amount as that of Brazil or Russia. The African urbanisation level is approximately the same as that of China, and the urban population is undergoing rapid growth. The African continent currently has more than 300 million mid-class people who have a relatively

stable and growing purchasing power. For the next 20 years, this number is going to reach over 800 million, which probably will make Africa to be a new emerging market with the biggest potential in the world.

Fifth, although Africa is relatively underdeveloped in the world, its space for improvement in the future is big. Although the economic and social development status of Africa is in the bottom level in the global development order, the space and scale for its upward development is huge. Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP per capita is less than US$1,000 currently. However, in the next 20 to 30 years, Africa’s development will definitely bring big changes and impact to the whole world, even if the amount of GDP per capita can be increased only to the level of US$3,000 to 4,000.

3. New Impetus and New Opportunities of African Development Fundamentally, the core impetus to advance this round of Africa’s development comes from the long-term accumulation of active internal factors of Africa, as well as the organic combination and benign interaction of internal and external factors.

These internal factors can be observed from the following aspects: From the perspective of the country structure is nation polymerisation and culture identity. Over half a century of tortuous development since their independence, many African young nations have generally made historical progress. Although African countries experienced many wars, conflict and turbulence during the past decades, most of them survived and preserved their unity and solidarity. For instance, in some African countries, the modern political structure, sovereignty, the people’s sense of belonging, identity, regional integration progress, self-respect, subjective and independent awareness of African people, cultural and psychological elements in modern development, patriotism and political responsibility have all slowly and powerfully grown up under the efforts and pursuits made by African generations during the past decades.

African countries have become more and more mature and stable. Today, over two-thirds of African governments come to power by elections.

Although election chaos is still common in Africa, generally speaking, multi-party election seems to be recognised by Africans as key to regime change.

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In the past ten years, China, India, Brazil and other emerging countries have gradually expanded their cooperation with Africa in the energy, mineral, agriculture, finance, telecommunication and infrastructure sectors. These countries have a strong demand for Africa’s resources, market, labour force and land. These obviously lift the international competition platform of Africa’s resources and extend the value chain of African development essential elements. The resource demand and business investment from Asian emerging countries have gradually and increasingly become the important source of impetus in the realisation process of Africa’s economic growth.

From the perspective of benign interaction structure in global development, if the evolution of the world economic system becomes more lenient and open, and if a kind of benign interaction situation, mutual benefits, and win-win situations based on multilateral cooperation can be formed among the “three worlds” (the western mature and developed countries, the emerging and innovative countries with a rapid increase of the economy, and African countries with great potential), Africa is probably going to enter into a new and sustainable development era. The international community believes that Africa will be the new continent of economic growth in the next 20 to 30 years, hence becoming the hope for the new round of global economic growth in the long term.

development. The other one is that the functionality of improving civilian’s living conditions and national economic structure is usually not obvious through the growth of GDP, which is achieved by the extensive economy growth.

Second, the African economy still heavily relies on western developed countries and the international market dominated by these countries. Since 2008, the European financial crisis has created shocks to Africa in many aspects and the impact is continuous.

With the continued downturn in the western economy, the investment, trade and aid to Africa from the western countries has declined sharply.

Under this background, North African countries that heavily subordinate to Europe in economy, have been the first to be affected. Domestic troubles and foreign problems led to the sudden change of the political situation in North Africa in 2010, from the Maghreb countries, to Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia in the horn of Africa. In future, the sovereignty, regime security and unity in some African countries are going to face new challenges.

Although Africa’s economy has experienced a relatively fast development pace during the past ten years, factors hindering African development still ubiquitously exist.

Third, external intervention and powerful countries’ involvement will make Africa’s future full of too many uncertain factors. Until now, for example, the civil strife in Libya is far from over. Libya faces disintegration. A huge number of refugees and militants from Libya fled into neighbouring countries. This poses danger to neighbouring regions as seen in the military coup that happened in Mali, a West African country, on the brink of splitting. Africa once again faces the comeback of western neo-interventionism and neo-colonialism.

If African countries’ sovereignty cannot be protected effectively, African countries will further disintegrate into smaller counties, killing Africa’s development prospects.

First, despite the relatively fast development pace witnessed during the past ten years, Africa remains mostly underdeveloped. Three-fourths of the most underdeveloped countries worldwide are concentrated in Africa. Poverty, famine, war and conflict still ubiquitously exist in the continent.

The millennium development targets issued by the United Nations are far from being achieved in many African nations. Most basic livelihood problems such as a large unemployment rate, illiteracy, illness and environmental degradation have not been fundamentally resolved. The skewed trade order that involves Africa exporting raw materials and importing finished products still reigns.

This resource-oriented growth pattern restricts

Fourth, Africa’s solidarity suffers from numerous challenges making its integration progress difficult to achieve. African countries have many poor people. Some countries are located far inland, raising transport and communication challenges. Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, always said that Africa should unite or die. This unity is not easy to realise due to the long-term influence of former colonial powers. Individual African countries’ interests are driven by external Lord countries, causing “proxy wars” in Africa. Since the allied forces intervention in Libya and indictment of Sudanese president, Omar Al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court, Africa is greatly divided. The authority and effectiveness of the African Union is consequently

4. The Uncertain Factors and Main Barriers of African Development

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doubted and challenged, further weakening Africa’s collective security.

Fifth, Africa is plagued with non-traditional security problems such as food crises, drought, the spread of HIV, the deterioration of ecological environment, weapon proliferation and the increase of refugees.

Terrorist activities have reached the peak, especially in East Africa, North Africa, and West Africa.

Sixth, ineffective governance is restraining Africa from realising sustainable development. There is a big disconnect between political leaders and their subjects. The effective power of the central government cannot consequently penetrate into the substrate society and remote areas. In some African countries, governance systems exist by name only but their function on the ground cannot be seen.

Respective countries’ populations can thus not be fully utilised in the absence of well-coordinated national goals.

Africa ought to address the following aspects: the need of a new ideology that explores African solutions to African problems based on the actual situation in Africa. Africa must cultivate the spirit of self-reliance. African nations must demand accountability of their leaders, be patriotic, shun negative ethnicity and cultivate national cohesion.

African countries ought to embrace economic development as their central task. Wealth creation must not be sacrificed on the altar of skewed political ideals. The construction of African security and peace can only finally be realised through economic development and social unity. Lastly, African countries ought to develop and pursue a long-term national development strategy. The countries must not allow themselves to be sidetracked from this.

5. Enhance African Studies and Advance China-Africa Humanities Exchange and Cooperation The future of Africa will depend on how the continent navigates local interests with international interests.

China and Africa need more understanding about each other. They ought to take active measures to strengthen African studies in China’s universities and institutions and vice versa. They should enhance the exchange and cooperation between China-Africa think tanks.

Knowledge, innovation and self-recognition are key to the revival and development of Asia and Africa.

The act of Confucius, one of the Chinese ancient philosophers once said that if terminology is not corrected, then what is said cannot be followed.

If what is said cannot be followed, then work cannot be accomplished. The world is entering into the “post western era” of global development after 200-300 years of western countries led development trend. Great changes are occurring in the world’s socio-political and economic front.

The opportunity, space and platform of China and Asian-African countries in this aspect are also noticeably increasing. The condition of creating original theory and globalisation ideology in Asia and Africa is more and more mature. As the advent of “post western era,” the Asian and African knowledge and wisdom are gradually going to acquire sufficient respect. The dominant western knowledge system needs to make self-reflection and rectification and embrace the ancient wisdom and modern development experiences from Asia and Africa. This will usher in the “new global integration” of human knowledge and ideology.

Students in Chinese universities are showing great interest in African knowledge and studies.

Curricula related to Africa offered by many Chinese universities are very popular among undergraduate students. If the career of African studies in China wants to acquire sustainable progress and development, it has to consider the following aspects.

It is necessary to establish a number of stable and well-funded professional research institutions in African studies, with policy assurance. The institutions ought to integrate talent cultivation, academic research, policy consultation and international exchange in their operation.

Research teams with different academic backgrounds in politics, history, education, sociology, anthropology, economy, management science, natural science and technical engineering should be cultivated These people should have visited African countries and have a good practical knowledge of the continent after conducting fieldwork, research and investigation there. They should have experience on African culture and civilisation and are able to develop collaboration and multi-discipline research work and talent cultivation from different perspectives.

China needs to greatly strengthen the cultivation of post-graduate students with different majors related to African studies. These students should be

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provided with various approaches to practice and carry out fieldwork in Africa. Chinese universities can jointly train these students with African universities. This will enable the students to learn Africa’s local language and experience local society and culture. Chinese universities can combine this work with the assignments of Chinese language teachers and volunteers to Africa by Hanban to select Chinese language teachers from the postgraduate students with the major related to African studies. This would help the students to complete their theses, research, and writing by using this opportunity of teaching Chinese language in Africa.

We need to construct some libraries of African studies, professional African museums, the centres for African films, and the network databases for African studies. Translation centres for African studies ought to be established in some universities to develop the systematical work on ChinaAfrica document translations, publications and recommendations.

China government is keen to actively and continuously support universities, government and NGOs of Africa to establish centres for Chinese studies. China will also actively reinforce the localisation progress of the Confucius Institute, and help the institute be transformed to the foreign language college of the local university, which is similar to the situation that the languages of English and French stay in the foreign language colleges in Chinese universities.

China and Africa need to jointly establish newspaper press, publishing houses, radio stations, and TV broadcasting stations to expand ChinaAfrica industrial cooperation on culture, media, publication, video, network, and so on, and thus make the Chinese and Africans to better understand each other through more approaches.

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Kenya’s Implementation of the 4th FOCAC Plan of Action: Hollow Commitments and Lack of In-Country Support

By Joseph Onjala and Mediatrix Tuju Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi; and Mediatrix Tuju is a PhD Candidate, Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Kenya Abstract: In the FOCAC 2009 declaration, specific commitments were made pertaining to enhancing China-Africa trade engagements. The implementation of the 4th FOCAC Plan of Action Plan 2009 has been a critical component of these relations. This paper provides an analysis of the implementation of the commitments in Kenya. On the one hand, many of the trading initiatives by Kenya in the post 2009 platform are not in direct response to the 4th FOCAC action as they existed long before the FOCAC platform. On the other hand, several years after the implementation of FOCAC, Kenya apparently lacks a coordinated approach and action plan in response to the 4th FOCAC commitments. Kenya’s FOCAC Secretariat situated at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Headquarters seems preoccupied by issues of diplomatic relations rather than pursuit to FOCAC commitments. Kenya has not put in place clear measures to leverage gains from such an African wide initiative.

1. Background The sustained global interest in the relations between China and Sub-Sahara Africa is attributed to the fact that the ties have taken a distinctive process characterised by grandiose meetings between Chinese and African leaders. There is growing consensus that despite the much publicised FOCAC engagements, African scholars have not yet set up an emphatic follow-up mechanism to assess the specific impacts of the engagements and to ensure that they have enough in-country support to effectively undertake the FOCAC programmes.

Numerous studies have been conducted across the world to examine the impact of China’s engagement with Africa. The global discourse on China-Africa relations is currently subsumed in stylised facts on the extent and nature of the relationship. Nearly all of the analyses in these studies have not been aligned to the FOCAC commitments which have provided a framework for China’s engagement with Africa. So far, the monitoring of the FOCAC process is largely driven by China. This oversight is not China’s fault, but rather, the result of a lack of an African counterpart to the China-based FOCAC follow-up Secretariat.

Like a handful African countries, Kenya has long standing trading relations with China. Kenya is ranked third among the 24 Southern and Eastern African countries that trade with China. Despite the growing economic ties between Kenya and China, the overall impact of China’s trade with Kenya has exhibited a mixture of significant gains and losses (Onjala, 2010). This outcome is important for trade

and development policy in Kenya, especially in interrogating the implementation of the FOCAC commitments which were designed to make the trading engagements mutually beneficial to all the trading countries. This paper is intended to fill the above gap by analysing the FOCAC 2009 commitments for Kenya, implementation, possible impacts and challenges as it applies to bilateral trading. The analysis includes a comparative analysis of trading between India and Kenya in order to gauge the effectiveness of FOCAC commitments by China.

2. Comparing Platforms

China

and

India

Trading

In the FOCAC 2009 declaration, specific commitments were made pertaining to enhancing China-Africa trade engagements.

These commitments provide the basis on which to evaluate the implementation of FOCAC Plan of Action 2009. The commitments are as follows: Trade promotion: The two sides committed to continue to promote trade between China and Africa and broaden economic cooperation which is currently dominated by trade in goods, so that it becomes multipronged to include trade in goods, investment, trade in services, technology and project contracting. This promise created an expectation that beyond trade in goods, there would be rapid expansion of trade in services and increased Chinese investments in Africa. Furthermore, the two sides committed to the smooth implementation of the tariff exemption policy towards Africa, which has generated increasing benefits to the least developed countries.

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Trade mix: The two sides will continue to improve the China-Africa trade mix and promote trade balance. This commitment means that there will be deliberate effort by both parties to ensure that trade is diversified in order to address the trading imbalance between China and Africa, particularly the non-mineral exporting countries in the SubSahara Africa.

Open market: The Chinese side promised to further open its market to African countries. It offered to grant tariff exemption treatment to 95 per cent of the exports from the least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China, in phases. As the first step, the goal of the zero tariff treatment for 60 per cent of the products originating from there would be met in 2010.

Customs cooperation: The two sides agreed to further enhance cooperation in customs, taxation, inspection and quarantine, and to conclude and implement relevant cooperation agreements for the sound development of China-Africa trade.

China is ready to establish cooperation mechanisms with African countries on the supervision and administration of imports and exports as well as strengthen the regulation of product quality and food safety in imports and exports to the benefit of consumers in China and Africa.

Trade centre: An African commodities trade centre would be established in China and preferential policies such as fees reduction and wavering be adopted for participating African enterprises to promote export of African commodities to China.

Logistic centre: The Chinese side committed to establish three to five logistic centres in Africa to help improve business facilities in African countries.

Trade disputes: The two sides agreed to properly handle trade differences and frictions through friendly consultation under the principle of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. The two sides also agreed to encourage the usage of national and regional arbitration organs in resolving contractual conflicts between Chinese and African enterprises.

In view of the above FOCAC commitments, questions remain on how far these have been implemented; if not, whether there has been sufficient in-country support among the African partners to drive the process. These questions are examined in relation to Kenya.

Since the 1980s, Kenya has had trading commitments covering a range of issues with India.

Some of these issues are: • The signing of an India-Kenya Trade Agreement in 1981 under which both countries accorded Most Favoured Nation status to each other.

• The setting up of an India-Kenya Joint Trade Committee (JTC) at Ministerial level in 1983 as a follow-up to the Agreement.

• The setting up of a Joint Business Council in 1985 by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KNCCI).

• An India-Kenya Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) was signed in 1989.

The KNCCI signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) in 1996. The IndiaKenya Joint Trade Committee (JTC) has met six times since, the last in October 2010 in Nairobi (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India).

3. The Evolution of Kenya’s Trading with China in the Post FOCAC 2009 Commitments on Trade in Goods, Services and Technology Since the FOCAC commitment, trade between China and Africa is still dominated by trade in goods (International Trade Centre-ITC, Data from UN Comtrade Statistics, 2012). The bilateral trade increment between China and Kenya increased from 39.6 per cent in 2010 to 33.3 per cent in 2011.

The bilateral trade between the two countries rose from US$1.31 billion in 2009 to US$2.43 billion in 2011, representing an increment of 32.6 per cent. China was among Kenya’s top three import trade partners in 2009 but by 2011, the country had become the top import trading partner (Table 1).

All the leading import partners for Kenya – China, United Arab Emirates, India, South Africa and Japan are impacting on the trade balance negatively, with China exerting the largest negative effect.

Kenyan exports to China rose from US$29 million in 2009 to US$65 million in 2011. Although this increment in exports to China was 65.4 per cent in 2011, it is still a minor component of the export trade in both China and Kenya. The leading export partners are Uganda, United Kingdom (UK), Tanzania, Netherlands and United States of America (USA). Among the export partners,

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Uganda, Tanzania, and the Netherlands have a trade surplus with Kenya, while USA and UK have a trading deficit with Kenya. As seen in Table 2,

among the export partners, Uganda has the largest trade surplus with Kenya.

Table 1 : Kenya’s leading import partners, 2010 Rank Leading Import

partners value

Imports Imports as a share as a share of total of world imports (%) imports (%)

Growth of imports in value (% p.a.)

Growth Number of of imports imported in volume products (% p.a.)

Share of Share of top 3 top 3 imported supplying products (%) countries (%) 35.5

Net trade

0 World 12,091,915

100

0.08

14

3,874

24.7

1 China 1,522,509

12.59

0.01

39

2,572

18.1

-1,490,831

2 United Arab Emirates 1,462,863

12.1

0.01

8

1,418

87.9

-1,225,029

3 India

1,301,555

10.76

0.01

26

2,316

47.5

-1,194,631

4 South Africa 754,233

6.24

0

13

1,638

22.9

-723,428

5 Japan 734,543 6.07 0 16 714 38.1

-6,923,293

-708,172

Source: ITC calculations based on UN COMTRADE statistics

Table 2: Kenya’s leading export partners, 2010 Rank Leading Export

partners value

0 World

Imports as a share of total exports (%)

Imports as a share of world exports (%)

Growth of exports in value (% p.a.)

Growth Number of of exports imported in volume products (% p.a.)

Share of top 3 exported products (%)

Share of top 3 export markets (%)

5,168,622

100

0.03

10

3

2,883

31.7

1 Uganda

657,265

12.72

0

14

6

1,665

25.7

540,961

2 United Kingdom

507,201 9.81

0

7

261

65.5

-119,066

3 Tanzania, United

Republic of

420,167

8.13

0

13

7

6.56

0

5

0

0

-1

4 Netherlands 338,899 5 United

States of America

284,933 5.51

1,337

30.7

Net trade

-6,923,293

13.4

287,191

148

72.9

106,174

265

32.3

-211,045

Source: ITC calculations based on UN COMTRADE statistics.

4. How is the Trade Balance between China and Africa Evolving after the FOCAC 2009? Is the Balance Still in Favour of China?

Figure 1 illustrates the current status of Kenya’s merchandise trading with China. Kenya’s imports from China have grown tremendously since 2006.

Although Kenya’s exports to China have been growing at a rate higher than imports, these exports are still a minor proportion of the trading between the two countries. As a result, the trading imbalance between the two countries has been growing at an alarming rate.

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Source: Calculations based on UN COMTRADE statistics

There is a similarity in the evolution of trading patterns between Kenya and China with those of India. Until 2005, the trade between Kenya and India was gradual and Kenya’s exports remained a significant proportion of the total trading. This pattern can be seen in Figure 2.

Since the year 2006, the imports from India have risen rapidly, while Kenya’s exports have stagnated.

The result has been a trading imbalance that is growingly in favour of India. The trade deficit has been growing at the same rate as the growth of imports from India.

Source: Calculations based on UN COMTRADE statistics

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The patterns of Kenya’s exports to India and China are shown in Figure 3. Details of the exports are shown in Table 3 and 4. Kenya’s main exports to India include: soda ash, vegetables, tea, leather and metal scrap. The major exports to China by Kenya are iron pyrites, waste and scrap, wet blue hides and skins, macadamia nuts and frozen fish fillets. Of the

leading 15 exports to China, only three products are zero rated by China: iron ores and concentrates, other than roasted iron pyrites, non-agglomerated (HS 260111); waste and scrap, copper or copper alloy (HS 740400); and logs, tropical hardwoods (HS 440349)). Of the leading 15 Kenyan exports to India, none is zero rated.

Source: Calculations based on UN COMTRADE statistics

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Table 3: Kenya’s leading exports to China Product Product Value in HS label 2011, Code USD value

thousand between

Annual Share in growth in China’s imports, tariff % applied 2007-2011 % p.a.

Equivalent ad valorem

by China to Kenya

TOTAL

‘260111

All products

59,691

18

Iron ores&concentrates,oth than roasted iron pyrites,non-agglomerated

13,804

0

0

‘740400

Waste and scrap, copper or copper alloy

9,085

88

0.1

0

‘090240

Black tea (fermented) & partly fermented tea in packages exceedg 3 kg

6,403

27

19.4

15

‘530500

Coconut, abaca Manila hemp or Musa textilis Nee, ramie, agave and othe

5,703

11

2.7

4.8

‘391590

Plastics waste and scrap nes

5,356

68

0.2

6.5

‘410411

Full grains, unsplit and grain splits, in the wet state “incl. wet-blu

4,297

15

0.6

5.3

‘410621

Hides and skins of goats or kids, in the wet state “incl. wet-blue”, t

4,026

56

9.4

14

‘440349

Logs, tropical hardwoods nes

1,824

0.2

0

‘210120

Tea or maté extracts,essences & concentrates & preparations thereof

1,221

64

17

32

‘030429

Frozen fish fillets (excl. swordfish and toothfish)

776

37

3.3

10

‘051191

Fish,shellfish&aqua invert prod nes&dead anim of Ch 3 nt for hum cons

726

-2

3.6

8

‘080260

Macadamia nuts, fresh or dried, whether or not shelled or peeled

618

-21

2.6

12

‘130219

Vegetable saps and extracts nes

602

-1

2.5

11.5

‘130190

Natural gums, resins, gum-resins and balsam, except arabic gum

598

-6

5

10.2

0

Source: ITC calculations based on UN COMTRADE statistics

Table 4: Kenya’s leading exports to India Product Product Value in HS Code label 2011, USD

thousand

Annual Share in growth in India’s value imports, % between 2007-2011 . % p.a

TOTAL

All products

10,7517

5

0

‘283699

Carbonates of metals nes; peroxocarbonates (percarbonates) of metals

53,273

1

81.5

7.5

‘252922

Fluorspar, containing by weight more than 97% of calcium fluoride

13,776

12

28.5

5

‘090240

Black tea (fermented) & partly fermented tea in packages exceedg 3 kg

9,669

15

61.6

100

‘410510

Skins of sheep or lambs, in the wet state “incl. wet-blue”, tanned, wi

3,921

7

17.1

10

‘410411

Full grains, unsplit and grain splits, in the wet state “incl. wet-blu

3,445

117

9.4

10

‘510119

Greasy wool (other than shorn wool) not carded or combed

2,615

4

19.2

5

‘071390

Leguminous vegetables dried,shelled,whether or not skinnd or split,nes

1,608

27

8.1

30

‘410621

Hides and skins of goats or kids, in the wet state “incl. wet-blue”, t

1,439

-4

64.1

10

‘530500

Coconut, abaca Manila hemp or Musa textilis Nee, ramie, agave and othe

1,229

39.2

10

‘090111

Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated

1,228

7

3.1

100

‘090190

Coffee husks and skins, coffee substitutes

1,054

83

64.7

100

‘780110

Lead refined unwrought

999

59

0.5

5

‘071310

Peas dried, shelled, whether ornot skinned or split

996

-9

0.1

50

‘780199

Lead unwrought nes

933

-25

2

5

Source: ITC calculations based on UN COMTRADE statistics

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Equivalent ad valorem tariff applied

by India to Kenya

Kenya’s imports from China are dominated by electricals and accessories, vehicles and their spare parts, steel, plastic, rubber, chemical fibre and shoes. The items of export are minerals, cuprum, peltry and leather, coffee tea and spices, botanic fibre and yarn and plastic. India’s main exports to Kenya include pharmaceuticals, steel products, machinery, yarn, vehicles and power transmission

equipment. The imports from India were higher than those of China until 2010 (Figure 4). Indeed, Kenya’s merchandise imports from India rose much more rapidly from 2006 than those from China, yet there have been greater concerns in Kenya over the Chinese imports than those from India over the same period.

Source: Calculations based on UN COMTRADE statistics

From 1996, the trade balance in Kenya has been deteriorating for both China and India (Figure 5).

The trade deficits for both trading partners were gradual prior to 1996. At the time, the deficit for China was slightly higher than for India. After the year 2006, the trading deficit for Kenya and India was higher than that of China until 2010. This

observation is contrary to stylised facts which have portrayed China as the single most important source of trade imbalance in Kenya. Despite these differences, both India and China have contributed substantially to the growing merchandise trading imbalance in Kenya.

Source: Calculations based on UN COMTRADE statistics China-Africa Partnership: The quest for a win-win relationship

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5. Trade in Services and Technology China has made attempts at technology transfer through collaboration with institutions of higher learning in Kenya. Similar benefits have been derived from China’s investments in telecommunications (HUAWEI) and vehicle assembly. HUAWEI signed technology cooperation with 3 different universities: University of Nairobi, Moi University and Kenyatta University. There is ongoing capacity building through seminars and workshops and agricultural research institutes in drought areas. In the last 5 years, over 800 Kenyans have benefited from the technology transfer programme.

India also has a long history of technology transfer through numerous manufacturing firms in Kenya.

Tata Chemicals Ltd. acquired Magadi Soda Company Limited in 2005. Several leading Indian public sector insurance companies participate in KenIndia Assurance Co. Ltd. More recent investments by Indian corporates in businesses in Kenya include Essar Energy (petroleum refining), Bharti Airtel (telecom), Reliance Industries Ltd. (petroleum retail) and Tata (Africa) (automobiles, Information Technology, pharmaceuticals, etc.).

Several Indian firms including Kongu Engineering College, Kalpataru Power Transmission Ltd., Kirloskar Brothers Ltd., Mahindra and Mahindra, Thermax, WIPRO, Jain Irrigation System Ltd., Punj Lloyd, Emcure, Dr Reddy, Cipla, Cadila, TV Sundram and Mahindra Satyam, among others, have a business presence in Kenya (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India).

6. Kenyan Government’s Approach and Response in Ensuring a Better Coordinated Trading with China Since the FOCAC forum in 2009, Kenya identifies with China by promoting herself through campaigns and advertisements. Currently, there are promotional campaigns for tea, tourism and coffee exports. The normal WTO trade rules apply. Due to numerous restrictions, it is difficult to export goods in their raw forms to China except flowers. In 2009/10 financial year, 15 trade fairs were conducted in Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, DRC, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania, China, USA, Egypt and Korea Zaragoza in Spain and Germany. In addition, product catalogues were developed and diagnostic studies on supply chains were conducted on all sectors (Government of Kenya, 2011).

The Export Promotion Council (EPC) has participated in linking Kenyan exporters with other

regions such as the COMESA, EAC, Asian and USA markets. There have been trade promotional events in Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Rwanda, Congo, China, America, Egypt, Korea and Sudan (Government of Kenya, 2011).

The Kenyan authorities have organised trade missions and business fora between Kenya and South Africa in Nairobi and Pretoria; between Kenya and Democratic Republic of Congo in Kinshasa; between Kenya and India in New Delhi; between Kenya and Iran in Nairobi; between Kenya and Singapore as well as Kenya and China in Nairobi. These fora have brought together business communities to exchange ideas on business opportunities, business challenges and how to address these challenges, in order to strengthen trade between them (Government of Kenya, 2011).

There has been widespread publicity for Kenyan tourism in China. The CCTV channel has produced a major documentary on Kenyan tourism named “Glamorous Kenya” and played it in all of China.

Besides, the Kenya Airways started the air cargo between China and Kenya which took effect in February 2012. The bi-weekly flight can carry 120 tonnes. This has provided a platform to develop the flower market in China. The Chinese government is willing to have scheduled flights between Beijing and Nairobi.

The Chinese government has also made additional efforts on bilateral trade. The China Export Commodities Fair is the most famous and authoritative fair in the world. Since 2009, the fair offers free tickets for Kenyan cooperation to attend.

7. Trade Facilitation Arrangements China’s tariff exemption policy towards Kenya: In Africa, there are 30 least developed (LDC) countries in the world, Kenya is not one of them.

Therefore, Kenya has not had the privilege which accords the duty free policy of 60 per cent on export goods. China operations with Kenya in this regard are under WTO rules.

Cooperation in customs, taxation, inspection and quarantine: There is currently collaboration in Quality Inspection between Kenya and China.

The Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) and Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) are in cooperation since the signing of the MOU in August 2005. The cooperation is intended to strengthen the import

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and export quality inspection. As the authorised organisation, China Certification and Inspection Company (CCIC) has a long term collaboration with KEBS since they signed a contract of PreExport Verification of Conformity (PVOC) in 2008.

A number of stakeholders including Kenya Government officials interviewed indicated that China is a difficult country to deal with.

Documentation processes when dealing with China take too long. They cited a case in 2010 when the Kenya government wanted to take a lion’s skin to an expo in China. The process of documentation took 6 months whereas in other countries, it would have ordinarily taken only 3 months.

A logistic centre was to be established (with headquarters in Ethiopia) to help improve business facilities in Africa. The status of the centre is not known. However, a China trade centre was established in Nairobi and its utility remains ineffective due to competition from similar ventures.

The existence of trade disputes between China and Kenya are acknowledged by different stakeholders including officials at the Chinese Embassy. The main reasons for trade disputes are the authenticity and credibility of business partners, no contract or unclear contract, undefined inspection/shipping/ payment and language of transaction. Despite these increasing episodes, there have been few solutions to disputes pertaining to international commercial activities. It has also been difficult for the parties to choose litigation and arbitration mechanisms when disputes arise because of time, manpower, cost, distance and enforcement of arbitration. Even though the FOCAC 2009 highlights this as an important area for action, there has not been followup in Kenya to develop a platform for intervention.

Even in the aftermath of the FOCAC 2009, the trends in exports and imports trading flows between Kenya, India and China have remained the same. Kenya’s imports from both China and India have been quite rapid in the periods 20062011. Both China and India are the leading import partners for Kenya, ranking 1st and 3rd, respectively.

Unlike China, India is an important export partner for Kenya, falling in the top 10 among the export destinations. Trading between both China and India is still dominated by trade in goods.

The export products that are zero rated by China are non-agricultural and are those products in which Kenya and other African countries have very limited export capacity. These products include the scrap metal for which the export is very low. Furthermore, the impacts of zero rating was negative in Kenya as unscrupulous businessmen vandalised power and railway infrastructure in order to create scrap metal.

China is bound by the WTO rules making it impossible to develop preferential trading packages for individual trading partners who are not among the least developed countries. Under these rules, Kenya does not qualify under the WTO rules and therefore does enjoy tariff exemption policy by China. The above notwithstanding, China has zero rated tariffs for specific import products from all countries.

There is an apparent conflict of policy when products discouraged by Kenya in order to protect the local industries–wet blue hides and scrap metal –are zero rated by China and India. As seen in Table 5, there is clearly lack of harmonisation of trading interests between Kenya and China.

8. Analysis and Overview of the Progress Made in the FOCAC Implementation 8.1 Hollow and ineffective FOCAC commitments Many of the trading initiatives by Kenya in the post 2009 platform are not in direct response to the 2009 FOCAC platform. Most of these initiatives existed long before the FOCAC platform. For example, collaboration in Quality Inspection between Kenya and China, Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) and Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) have been in existence.

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Table 5: Progress in the FOCAC 2009 implementation FOCAC Progress Ineffective commitment commitments

by China

Lack of in -country support by Kenya

Challenges

Trade promotion Low

Trade promotion remains very general to all countries

Policy not focused on FOCAC

Tariff exemption poor Little or no follow-up

to insignificant exports

Only applies

Technology transfer

Low

No clear strategy to access

Not targeted

Trade in services

Moderate

Mainly tourism

Trade mix

Low

Not targeted

Moderate

Supported

Open market Customs cooperation

Trade centre Good

Not given prominence or emphasis

Logistic centre

Not known

No follow-up

Trade disputes

Poor

No follow-up

8.2 Lack of in-country (Kenya) support Kenya apparently lacks a coordinated approach and action plans in response to FOCAC commitments.

Kenya has a FOCAC Secretariat situated at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Headquarters.

The secretariat seems preoccupied by issues of diplomatic relations rather than pursuit of FOCAC commitments. There are no clear measures put in place by Kenya to leverage gains from such an African wide initiative. For example, a trade centre was established in Nairobi but has not been effective due to competition from other trading enclaves in the city.

Trade disputes between China and Kenya are acknowledged by different stakeholders including officials at the Chinese Embassy. There have been few solutions to disputes pertaining to international commercial activities. It has also been difficult for the parties to choose litigation and arbitration mechanisms when disputes arise because of time, manpower, cost, distance and enforcement of arbitration. Even though the FOCAC 2009 highlights this as an important area for action, there has not been follow-up in Kenya to develop a platform for intervention.

In terms of specific trading commodities, technology or services, the FOCAC 2009 commitment remains hollow and does not have clear or tangible goals to be achieved unless Kenya develops a framework on how to respond to these. No specific measures have been put in place to take advantage of these commitments in Kenya. A coordination strategy to exploit the commitments of the 2009 FOCAC is needed in Kenya.

9. Recommendations Kenya should lobby China and India for zero rating of export taxes on products on which it has comparative advantage or products in which potential export capacity is large.

Many Chinese firms still complain of the poor business environment in Kenya, with numerous impediments making it risky to start a business.

A lot needs to be done to understand the business cultures of different investors and why Kenya is perceived as a risky destination for investments.

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References

FOCAC (2009), Declaration of Sharm El Sheikh of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 12 Nov., 2009.

Government of Kenya (2011), Trade, Tourism and Industry Sector: Sector Report for the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2011/12-2013/14.

ITC, Data from UN Comtrade Statistics, 2012.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Available at www.mea.gov.in/ mystart. php?id= 500413887, Accessed on June 6, 2012.

Olu Ajakaiye, A. O., N’Zue F. and Manda D. (2008), “Analysis of China-Africa Trade Relations: Insights from AERC Scoping Studies”, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Policy Issues Paper No. 3, Dec. Onjala J. (2010), “The Impact of China-Africa Trade Relations: The Case of Kenya”, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Working Paper No. CPB_05, March.

Onjala J. (2010), “An In-depth Analysis of ChinaKenya Trade Relations”, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Working Paper No. SSC_0-, March.

UN COMTRADE Statistics, 2012.

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Conclusion

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A Win-Win Relationship with China Calls for Urgency on the African Side

By James Shikwati Inter Region Economic Network, IREN, Kenya Observations and Remarks The papers in this book help illuminate the different aspects of China–Africa relations. They try to highlight the threats and opportunities and the urgency to have Africans develop a coordinated approach in response to its relationship with China. They also point out albeit in a subtle manner that the African people are at crossroads; between a world view that is largely Western and new paradigm that is Chinese.

Africans need to be modest and work even harder to understand themselves and to understand China.

China is already overburdened with its 1.3 billion people and it may not be in its interest to have Africa as an additional burden. Africans on the other hand, are in the process of building their societal organisation systems and may not want their continent transformed into a battlefield of value systems between West and East. China comes to Africa with an advantage of thousands of years of experience in state craft, while African countries, as currently constituted, are on average, half a century old. The Chinees exhibit “democratic centralism” that promotes internal freedom of discussion and unity of action on agreed upon goals. Although it depicts itself as a developing country, China is a reemerging power that was first to use the compass, gunpowder, rockets and had larger shipping fleets compared to those of Vasco Da Gama and Columbus.

Africa in the international order has traditionally played the role of world supplier of unpaid for labour (during slave trade) and raw materials during colonial and post colonial period. These are roles the international systems assigned to Africans compared to China’s role as a “World factory.”

More work is needed on the African side to make a win-win scenario play out. I propose some entry points: • Africans should leverage on the relationship with China to determine and drive their role in the international order • Africans should evolve predictable policies that protect both the interests of Africans and Chinese • Africans should evolve a multi-polar mindset • Africans must put in place a mechanism for a coordinated response to China and the rest of the world

More work within Africa is required to drive up an integrated and coordinated response to the continent’s engagement with China. Africa must urgently evolve a system for a coordinated and joint response on global issues such as migration, climate change, environment and pollution, conflicts over natural resources including water, ideology (value systems), cyber warfare, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism among others.

Discussants in this book and the seminar took the liberty to address African concerns as though the continent already operates as one. Below are the key issues that arose from the seminar on the path to the sustainable development of China–Africa relations: • Africa should position itself to capture Chinese factories that have traditionally targeted low end consumers in China; • Africans should review their development paradigm on consumption and export to help expand their economic pie away from overreliance on raw material exports; • Africans need to recalibrate their governance systems to ensure legitimacy of its governance system to facilitate predictability of policies and true representation of its peoples’ interests; • Aid cannot help Africans develop the ethic of hard work. This is in line with the saying that ‘resources are the mother of wealth and hard work is the father of wealth–only the two combined produce wealth; • There is urgent need for Africans to evolve their own cultural centres both in Africa and China; • There is need for China to clarify on its non interference policy given the fact that the presence of China and on the continent are in themselves an interference;

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•

There is need to jointly work towards cultural understanding between China and Africa; • China ought to twin with the Africa Peace and Security Council; and, • Africans are interested to work with China to review the design and dominance of the International order.

Africans must identify areas where the continent’s interests converge and diverge with those of the Chinese. Where Chinese and African interests converge, there sure will be a win-win relationship.

So as not to be hypnotised by Chinese as one contributor aptly pointed in this book, it is important to conclude with a quote from the first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah: “We face neither East nor West; we face Forward.” China–Africa relations should promote the culture of a multi-polar world with calculated gains for its respective citizenry.

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China-Africa Dialogue is Healthy

By Mme. Guo Wei Director of the Office of Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of FOCAC, China I wish to thank my colleagues from the Chinese Embassy in Kenya and friends from Inter Region Economic Network (IREN), who worked so hard to make the China-Africa Seminar on The Path to Sustainable Development of China-Africa Relations and the production of this book a success. Our thanks also go to all the prestigious scholars who constructively participated in discussions and contributed many enlightening views and ideas.

When addressing the opening ceremony of the 5th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC held in Beijing, Chinese President, Hu Jintao, announced a package of new measures to support Africa’s development and promote China-Africa relations, covering investment, aid, social development, African integration, people-to-people exchanges, peace and security, which will undoubtedly reinforce the current momentum of fast growing China-Africa relations.

The act of scholars from China and African countries sharing views on how to promote ChinaAfrica cooperation, people-to-people exchanges, in particular, how to implement the follow-up actions of the 5th FOCAC Ministerial Conference is relevant to the status quo of China-Africa cooperation.

I am very happy to note that, many suggestions and comments made by scholars are inspiring and constructive in terms of broadening our consensus on a number of critical issues concerning the long term and sustainable development of China-Africa relations. It is of great importance to carry on with this kind of frank dialogue and forge stronger links between the Chinese and African academic institutions, think tanks and scholars against the backdrop of ever-growing China-Africa relations.

Since its inception in 2000, FOCAC has served as a premier mechanism for collective dialogue and practical cooperation between China and Africa

in the new era. As a result, China-Africa relations have recorded all-round and rapid development and greatly benefited both China and Africa and two peoples. In order to enhance cultural cooperation and people-to-people exchanges, Premier Wen Jiabao announced China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Programme at the FOCAC 4th Ministerial Conference in 2009.

Since its launch in March 2010, the Programme has played a very positive role in promoting two-way academic exchanges. During the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in July 2012, President Hu Jintao announced that China will continue to implement the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Programme, and will sponsor 100 Joint Research and Exchange projects from 2013 to 2015.

I sincerely hope that more and more Chinese and African academic institutions, think tanks and scholars will be involved in this Programme, foster stronger and closer cooperation, and provide more intellectual support to the development of China-Africa cooperation, for we all have every responsibility to take good care of and further promote China-Africa partnership based on equality and mutual benefits. I am confident that, with great support from all sectors including academic communities, the new type of ChinaAfrica strategic partnership will embrace a brighter future.

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Annex

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Beijing Declaration of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 1. We, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers in charge of economic cooperation of the People’s Republic of China and 50 African countries and the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, met in Beijing from 19 to 20 July 2012 for the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

2.

We express our thanks to H.E. President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China and H.E. President Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma of the Republic of South Africa, H.E. Thomas Boni Yayi, rotating Chairperson of the African Union and President of the Republic of Benin, H.E. President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, H.E. President Ismail Omar Guelleh of the Republic of Djibouti, H.E. President Mahamadou Issoufou of the Republic of Niger, H.E. President Alassane Ouattara of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, H.E. Prime Minister José Maria Pereira Neves of the Republic of Cape Verde, Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Raila Amollo Odinga of the Republic of Kenya, and H.E. Mohamed Kamel Amr, Special Envoy of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, for attending the opening ceremony of the Ministerial Conference. We welcome the participation of the Republic of South Sudan and the AU Commission for the first time as Forum members.

3. Under the theme of “build on past achievements and open up new prospects for the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership,” we reviewed with satisfaction the development of China-Africa relations, evaluated the implementation of the follow-up actions to the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Forum held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt in November 2009, and agreed that the goals set at the Fourth Ministerial Conference had been accomplished. This has further consolidated the basis of and opened up even broader space for the development of ChinaAfrica relations. We also held discussion and reached extensive consensus on the ways and means to further deepen China-Africa relations.

4. We believe that the development of the new type of strategic partnership between China, the largest developing country, and Africa, the largest group of developing countries, is of great significance for the peace, stability and development of the world and serves the fundamental and strategic interests of both sides. As an important platform for collective dialogue and an effective mechanism of practical cooperation between China and Africa, FOCAC has played an irreplaceable role in promoting China-Africa relations.

Both sides are ready to strengthen the building of FOCAC so that it will continue to steer China-Africa relations towards greater development.

5. We have taken note that the international situation is undergoing profound and complex changes. Peace, development and cooperation are the calling of the times. The balance of power in the world is moving towards more equilibrium. Developing countries are playing an increasingly important role in international affairs. We call for further changes in the international system and order to make them just and reasonable and suited to the political realities of the world. We underscore the importance for Africa to assume its rightful place in the international arena.

6. We are deeply concerned about the turbulences in certain regions and reaffirm our commitment to upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the basic norms governing international relations. We maintain that crises and disputes must be resolved peacefully through political means and advocate the security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.

We oppose interference in other countries’ internal affairs and wanton use or threat of force in international affairs.

7.

We stand for upholding the UN’s core position and role in international affairs, and reaffirm the need for reform of the United Nations.

In this regard, we reaffirm that the historical

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negotiations on the basis of upholding the Doha mandate and locking up the existing achievements, and fully accommodate the interests and concerns of developing countries, African countries in particular. We call upon the developed countries to refrain from taking steps in trade protectionism.

injustices endured by African countries should be undone, and priority should be given to increasing the representation of African countries in the UN Security Council and other UN agencies.

8.

9.

We are concerned that the global financial crisis is still spreading and deepening, and the world economic situation remains grim.

We believe that countries around the world should work to pursue peace, promote development and resolve differences through cooperation, with a view to achieving stability and recovery of the world economy.

We believe that the North-South imbalance in development is an important factor hindering the strong, sustainable and balanced growth of the world economy. We reaffirm the priority of the issue of African development in narrowing the North-South gap. We call on the international community to earnestly increase input, and give support and help to African countries in their efforts to realize the UN Millennium Development Goals.

10. We appreciate the attention paid by the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, which was held in June 2012, on the issue of sustainable development in Africa. We hope that the international community will, in keeping with the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” take concrete actions to implement the outcome of the Conference.

We call on the international community to, under the leading role of the UN, take seriously the inefficient implementation in the field of sustainable development, show the political will and commitment to build consensus, and reach agreement on the implementation plan of the post-MDG framework of sustainable development. We also urge the developed countries to honor their assistance commitments to developing countries, African countries in particular.

11. We believe that a fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system is of critical importance to consolidating world economic recovery and sustainable development. We appeal to the relevant parties to demonstrate political sincerity, overcome difficulties and obstacles, actively advance the WTO Doha Development Round

12. We stand for necessary reform of the existing international financial system, and the establishment of a fair, just, inclusive and orderly international financial system. Efforts should be made to truly increase the voice and representation of developing countries in international financial institutions and the international monetary system, and strengthen the functions of the international financial institutions in development and poverty reduction, in an effort to narrow the NorthSouth gap. The African side supports the BRICS countries in exploring the possibility of setting up a new development bank for mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS countries and other emerging economies and developing countries, for the purpose of supplementing the existing multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development.

13. We have followed closely the question of increased threats and challenges brought by global issues such as climate change, environmental degradation, energy and resource security, major infectious diseases and massive natural disasters. We congratulate South Africa on successfully holding the UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, and believe that the relevant parties would, in accordance with the principles and provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, faithfully implement the consensus on such issues as the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the Green Climate Fund, the technical mechanism and adaptation. We are willing to strengthen the comprehensive, effective and sustained implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, and jointly promote the process of international cooperation on climate change in accordance with the principles of equity and “common but differentiated responsibilities.”

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14. We are pleased to see the achievements China and Africa have both made in the political, economic, social and other areas in recent years, and have full confidence in each other’s future development. The African side highly appreciates China’s commitment to the path of peaceful development and its contribution to world peace, stability and economic growth. China applauds the effective efforts the African side has made in such areas as maintaining regional peace and stability, achieving higher growth rates and seeking strength through unity.

15. We believe that the China-Africa cooperation, featuring mutual benefit, equality, openness and inclusiveness, demonstrates the solidarity and mutual support between developing countries. It should be appreciated and supported by the international community.

We call on the international development partners to draw on each other’s strength and have sound interactions in Africa to jointly promote peace and development in the continent.

16. We reaffirm that China and Africa will continue to deepen the new type of strategic partnership of political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges. To this end, we will: • Further strengthen political consultation and strategic dialogue, increase high-level visits, enhance the sharing of experience in governance, and respect and support each other’s core interests on such issues as sovereignty, independence, security, unity, territorial integrity and national development, so as to increase the political trust and strategic consensus between China and Africa.

• Increase the exchanges and cooperation between the two sides in operationalizing Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture, continue to support and assist African countries in increasing their capabilities for maintaining peace and security, and enhance coordination and communication in the UN Security Council and other multilateral institutions. We call on the international community to support the efforts of African countries and regional organizations in independently resolving African issues.

• Strengthen China’s cooperation with the AU and sub-regional organizations in Africa, take joint measures to promote Africa’s solidarity, harmony and strength through unity, and support measures for African regional integration and sustainable development efforts through AU/NEPAD. • Fully explore and utilize each other’s comparative advantages, expand mutually beneficial economic cooperation and balanced trade, adopt innovative ways to boost cooperation, improve cooperation environment, and properly handle problems and difficulties arising in cooperation. We will conduct even richer and more fruitful cooperation in response to the adverse impact of the global financial crisis and bring benefits to the Chinese and African people. Building on the achievements we have made, we will deepen our cooperation in trade, investment, poverty reduction, infrastructure building, capacity building, human resources development, food security, hi-tech industries and other areas, and elevate our cooperation to a higher level.

Continue to strengthen people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two sides. We will vigorously carry out the dialogue between Chinese and African civilizations, launch a new round of exchanges in culture, education, sports, tourism and other fields, and forge closer ties between the young people, women, non-governmental organizations, media organizations and academic institutions of the two sides, with a view to deepening the understanding and friendship between the people of China and Africa and promoting the diversity of the world civilizations.

• Further strengthen the cooperation between the two sides in international affairs, take into full account each other’s legitimate concerns and aspirations, strengthen coordination and mutual support, and work together to promote democracy in international relations and build a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity.

17. We have, in the spirit of this Declaration, formulated and adopted the Beijing Action Plan of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2013-2015).

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18. We express our thanks to Egypt for its contribution to the Forum’s development and China-Africa relations since the inception of FOCAC, in particular during Egypt’s chairmanship of the Forum from 2006 to 2009 and its co-chairmanship from 2009 to 2012.

19. We express our thanks to the Chinese side for the meticulous preparations and thoughtful arrangements for the Conference, and convey our congratulations on the fruitful results and great success of the Conference. We decided that the next ministerial conference of FOCAC will be held in South Africa in 2015.

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The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015) 1. PREAMBLE

1.1 The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Beijing, China, from 19 to 20 July 2012. Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers in charge of Economic Cooperation from China and 50 African countries and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission attended the conference.

1.2 The two sides applauded the active contribution FOCAC had made over the past twelve years since its inception in consolidating China-Africa traditional friendship, strengthening political mutual trust, deepening practical cooperation, enhancing exchanges and mutual learning and advancing the comprehensive development of the new type of ChinaAfrica strategic partnership.

1.3 The two sides reviewed with satisfaction the implementation of the follow-up actions of the Fourth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in the recent three years, and were pleased with the comprehensive and effective implementation of the Forum onChina-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012) adopted at the Fourth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in Egypt in November 2009.

They reiterated their commitment to continue to view China-Africa relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and deepen the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership.

1.4 In order to implement the outcomes of the conference and chart the future course of China-Africa cooperation in all fields in the next three years, under the theme of “build on past achievements and open up new prospects for the new type of ChinaAfrica strategic partnership”, and in the spirit of the Beijing Declaration of this ministerial conference, the two sides jointly formulated and adopted with consensus this Action Plan.

2.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

2.1

High-level Visits and Dialogue

2.2

2.2.1

Reaffirming the great significance of highlevel exchange of visits and dialogue for promoting bilateral relations and deepening the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership, the two sides agreed to maintain the momentum of mutual visits and dialogue between Chinese and African leaders to enhance political mutual trust and expand strategic consensus.

Consultation and Cooperation Mechanisms Appreciating the enriched and strengthened China-Africa dialogue mechanisms of diverse forms, the two sides agreed to improve the mechanisms, such as the bilateral joint commissions, strategic dialogues, foreign ministries’ political consultations, and joint/mixed commissions on economic and trade cooperation so as to enhance the planning and guidance for the relations between China and African countries.

2.2.2 The two sides will continue to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the United Nations and international financial institutions and on other international occasions and increase coordination and collaboration on major international and regional issues to safeguard the common interests of developing countries.

2.2.3 The two sides appreciated the smooth development of the mechanism of regular political consultation between Chinese and African Foreign Ministers and emphasized that the mechanism is very important for improving the strategic planning of China-Africa relations and enhancing communication and cooperation between the two sides on major international and regional issues. The two sides agreed to hold the third round of the political consultation in 2013 on the sidelines of

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the United Nations General Assembly to exchange views on major issues of common interest.

2.3

Contacts between Legislatures, Political Parties and Local Governments

2.3.1 The two sides will continue to expand the exchanges and cooperation between the National People’s Congress of China on the one hand and African national parliaments and the Pan-African Parliament on the other. They will give full play to their respective strengths and influence to create a favorable environment for enhancing the traditional China-Africa friendship and promoting mutually beneficial cooperation.

2.3.2 The two sides support better understanding and broader exchanges and cooperation between the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the China Economic and Social Council on the Chinese side and the Union of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions of Africa, the economic and social councils and other similar institutions in African countries on the African side, with a view to furthering the relations between the two sides in this regard.

2.3.3 The two sides will continue to expand the scope and diversify the forms of exchanges between political parties, deepen political dialogue, consolidate political mutual trust, enhance experience sharing on governance and national development and promote practical cooperation.

2.3.4 The two sides will further promote exchanges and cooperation between local governments. They have decided to hold a China-Africa forum on cooperation between local governments at an appropriate time, and will actively support the establishment of sister province/city relationships between the two sides.

2.4 Consular and Judicial Cooperation

2.4.1 The two sides will strengthen consular cooperation and carry out consultations on consular matters in order to create more favorable conditions for personnel

exchanges, and will continue to work together to fight illegal immigration.

2.4.2 The two sides will take concrete and necessary measures to protect the life, property, assets as well as rights and interests of the people and businesses from each side.

2.4.3 The two sides will promote exchanges and cooperation in the judicial, law enforcement and legislative fields, including preventing and fighting transnational organized crimes in accordance with bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions.

2.4.4 The two sides appreciated the proposal by the Fourth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC for a FOCAC Legal Forum and the successful holding of two rounds of this forum in Cairo in December 2009 and in Beijing in September 2010 respectively.

They agreed to further strengthen the institutional building of the Legal Forum and increase cooperation in the fields of law research, legal services, training of law professionals and the mechanism of nonjudicial settlement of disputes.

2.5 Cooperation between China and the African Union and Sub-Regional Organizations in Africa

2.5.1 The two sides recognized the important role of the African Union in safeguarding Africa’s peace and stability, promoting Africa’s development and advancing the African integration process, and support a bigger role and greater influence of the African Union in international and regional affairs.

2.5.2 Appreciating the comprehensive development of relations between China and the African Union, the two sides agreed to maintain the momentum of high-level exchanges, enhance strategic mutual trust and practical cooperation and increase coordination and cooperation in international and regional affairs to take the relations to higher levels.

2.5.3 The African side expressed appreciation to the Chinese government for the series

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of measures it had taken for strengthening practical cooperation between China and the African Union, including the construction of the African Union Conference Center and the announcement of the provision of 600 million RMB yuan in free assistance to the African Union within three years starting from 2012, believing that they fully show China’s firm support for African integration and Africa’s self-enhancement through unity.

The two sides agreed to work together to put the relevant measures into practice.

2.5.4 The two sides noted with satisfaction that the Strategic Dialogue Mechanism between China and the African Union progressed smoothly and achieved positive outcomes.

They agreed to enrich and improve the mechanism and carry out sub-sessions on (but not limited to) such topics as foreign policy and peace and security affairs under the framework of this mechanism.

2.5.5 The two sides welcomed the African Union Commission’s joining FOCAC, and agreed to strengthen dialogue, consultation and cooperation between China and the African Union under the FOCAC framework.

2.5.6 To facilitate the development of relations between the two sides, the Chinese side welcomes the African Union to establish a representative office in Beijing at an appropriate time.

2.5.7 The two sides highlighted the important role of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in promoting African development and integration and applauded the cooperation between FOCAC and NEPAD. The Chinese side will increase exchanges and expand cooperation with the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency in a joint effort to promote economic and social development and regional economic integration in Africa.

2.5.8 The Chinese government will continue to strengthen practical cooperation with the African Union and Africa’s sub-regional organizations in the fields of the Pan African University and Africa’s transnational and trans-regional infrastructure development

and will scale up support for Africa’s integration.

2.5.9 The Chinese government will continue to increase support for the capacity building of the African Union and subregional organizations in Africa through various forms such as human resources development. .

2.5.10 The two sides noted the good relations and sustained exchanges between China and Africa’s sub-regional organizations, and agreed to establish and improve mechanisms of exchanges and dialogue between the two sides.

2.6 Cooperation in the Fields of Peace and Security

2.6.1 The two sides shared the view that the challenges confronting peace and security in Africa are increasing and reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen cooperation in policy coordination, capacity building, preventive diplomacy, peace keeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation on the basis of equality and mutual respect to jointly maintain peace and stability in Africa. The Chinese side will continue to support African countries’ effort to combat illegal trade and circulation of small arms and light weapons.

2.6.2 The two sides expressed their appreciation of the leading role of African countries and regional organizations in resolving regional issues, and reiterated support for their efforts in independently resolving regional conflicts and strengthening democracy and good governance and oppose the interference in Africa’s internal affairs by external forces in pursuit of their own interests.

2.6.3 To enhance cooperation with Africa on peace and security issues, the Chinese side will launch the “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security” and will provide, within the realm of its capabilities, financial and technical support to the African Union for its peacesupport operations, the development of the

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African Peace and Security Architecture, personnel exchanges and training in the field of peace and security and Africa’s conflict prevention, management and resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and development.

2.6.4 The two sides reiterated the significance of increased exchanges and cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in the field of African peace and security. The Chinese side will continue to support the United Nations in playing a constructive role in helping resolve the conflicts in Africa, take an active part in the peace keeping missions of the United Nations in Africa and intensify communication and coordination with Africa in the UN Security Council.

2.6.5 The two sides appreciated the efforts of the Chinese government’s Special Representative for African Affairs in actively engaging in mediation efforts in Africa’s hotspots, and welcomed his continued constructive role in Africa’s peace and security endeavors.

2.6.6 The African side also appreciated China’s counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and in waters off the coast of Somalia in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and encouraged China to increase its efforts in this regard.

The two sides reaffirmed that these efforts are conducive to security of the shipping routes in the waters concerned and peace and security in the region. The Chinese side stands ready to strengthen cooperation with Somalia, the African Union and relevant African sub-regional organizations in this field.

3.

COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

3.1 The two sides will work together to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and other universally recognized norms governing international relations and promote a just and equitable international order.

3.2 The two sides will work together to uphold the central role of the United Nations in international affairs and promote multilateralism and democracy in international relations. The two sides reaffirmed the need for necessary reforms of the United Nations and reiterated that the historical injustice against African countries should be redressed and priority should be given to increasing the representation of African countries in the United Nations Security Council and other institutions.

3.3 The two sides expressed concern about the deepening and spreading of the international financial crisis and the grave world economic situation. They urged the international community to pay attention to and minimize the damage caused by the crisis to developing countries, particularly the least developed ones. The two sides will work together to advance the building of a fair, just, inclusive and well-managed international financial system. The two sides stand for greater representation and say of Africa in international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and support greater dialogue between the G20 and Africa and Africa’s participation in G20 affairs. The African side stressed the urgent need to increase the representation of the G20 and other existing international economic mechanisms. The Chinese side expressed its full understanding for this need and stressed that the existing international economic order should be more balanced to ensure the fair representation of Africa.

3.4 The two sides will work together to encourage the international community to earnestly implement the outcomes of the UN High-Level Plenary Meeting on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) held in September 2010 and the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in June 2012. The two sides call upon the international community to pay greater attention to the issue of sustainable development in Africa and other developing countries. They also call on the international community, especially developed countries, to fulfill the pledges

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of assistance and debt relief as quickly as possible, provide more financial support, foreign direct investment and technology transfer and help African countries strengthen capacity building and meet the MDGs at an early date. Furthermore, the two sides call on the international community, under the leading role of the United Nations, to show the political will and commitment to build consensus and agree on the implementation plan of the post-MDG framework of sustainable development.

3.5 The two sides will continue their cooperation on tackling climate change.

They jointly call upon the international community to follow the relevant spirit of the United Nations Climate Change Conference successfully held in Durban, South Africa at the end of 2011 and keep to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol, the mandate of the “Bali Roadmap” and the principles of equity and “common but differentiated responsibilities.” The two sides will urge the relevant parties to earnestly act on the consensus regarding the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the Green Climate Fund, technical mechanism and adaptation, and will make a joint effort to advance the international cooperation on climate change.

3.6 The two sides will work together to push the WTO Doha Development Round negotiations toward early progress and ensure that the interests and concerns of developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, will be truly accommodated. The two sides emphasized that the results achieved in the Doha Round negotiations during the past ten years must be upheld and the single undertaking approach must be observed in the related negotiations.

3.7 The two sides will work together to urge the international community to adopt active and effective coordination measures, stabilize food prices, guard against speculation and price rigging and increase support to African countries in terms of

3.8

capital, technology, market and capacity building to uphold global food security.

The two sides will strengthen dialogue and exchanges in the area of human rights.

They reaffirmed respect for the principle of universality of human rights and support for all countries in choosing the path of human rights development in the light of their own national conditions with the priority on the right to development, and oppose politicizing human rights issues and setting double standards.

3.9 The two sides will strengthen communication and cooperation on fighting all forms of terrorism. They stand for taking a holistic approach and addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism, and will strive for new progress in international cooperation against terrorism. They support the United Nations and its Security Council in playing a leading role in international counter-terrorism cooperation and helping African countries build counter-terrorism capacity.

4.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION 4.1 Agriculture and Food Security

4.1.1 The two sides noticed that the issue of food security is particularly challenging for African countries and stressed that agricultural development is crucial for food security in Africa. The two sides decided to continue to prioritize agriculture and food security in their cooperation.

4.1.2 The two sides spoke positively of the important achievements in the cooperation between the two sides on agriculture and food security over the years.

4.1.3 The two sides commended African countries’ progress in implementing a growth-oriented agricultural agenda under the framework of the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP), and pledged to work together in support of CAADP.

4.1.4 The two sides pledged to engage in agricultural cooperation and exchanges at multiple levels, through multiple channels

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and in various forms. Efforts will be made to continue to support and help Africa in improving agricultural production, strengthening Africa’s capability to ensure food security, and expand cooperation between the two sides in technical exchanges and human resource training in agriculture, agricultural development plan and system building, agricultural processing and promotion of agricultural machinery to create a favorable environment for African countries to realize long-term food security supported by national agricultural production and processing.

The Chinese government has decided to take the following steps:

• Continue to send agro-technology teams to African countries and step up efforts to train African agricultural technicians.

• Send teachers for agricultural vocational education to African countries and help Africa establish an agricultural vocational education system.

• Build more agricultural technology demonstration centers and continue to give play to the function and role of such centers and jointly carry out production demonstration and technology dissemination.

• Help African countries improve the capacity for independent development and provide technical support in grain planting, storage, processing and circulation.

• Encourage Chinese financial institutions to support cooperation between Chinese and African companies in agricultural planting, processing of agricultural products, animal husbandry, fishery and aquaculture.

• Actively support the agricultural development programs of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) in Africa and work with African countries and regional organizations on food security under the framework of the UNFAO “Special Program for Food Security”.

• Facilitate access for African agricultural products to the Chinese market.

4.2 Investment and Enterprise Cooperation

4.2.1 The two sides expressed satisfaction with the steady growth of two-way investment between China and Africa, especially the fast increase of China’s investment in

Africa in broader areas since the Fourth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in 2009.

They maintain that this helps intensify economic links between the two sides and boost local economic development and employment.

4.2.2 The two sides promised to continue to encourage and support mutual investment, and will actively explore new areas and ways to expand investment cooperation.

The two sides will continue to push forward negotiations and implementation of bilateral agreements on promoting and protecting investment, foster an enabling investment environment and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of investors of both sides.

4.2.3 The Chinese government will continue to encourage and support capable and reputable Chinese companies to invest in Africa, and guide Chinese companies to establish processing and manufacturing bases in Africa, help raise the added value of African exports, and increase investment in such service sectors as business services, transport, consulting and management to raise the level and quality of cooperation.

4.2.4 The Chinese side will continue to make good use of the China-Africa Development Fund and gradually scale it up to US$5 billion to strengthen China-Africa cooperation.

4.2.5 The Chinese side will continue to support the development of overseas business cooperation zones established in Africa and, in addition to helping entry of Chinese and African enterprises into the zones, support them in fitting into the strategic focus of the zones to realize faster utilization of the zones so that they contribute towards rapid industrialization and economic restructuring in Africa.

China will encourage enterprises joining the zones to increase links with local enterprises and communities, strengthen technology and experience sharing on the shop floor and enhance technology transfer and job creation.

4.2.6 The Chinese side will continue to strengthen cooperation with Africa on technology

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and management, step up technological support and experience sharing and help African countries enhance their capability for independent development.

4.2.7 The two sides noted the positive outcomes of the Fourth Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs and will further encourage the business communities of the two sides to strengthen cooperation. The Chinese government will continue to guide Chinese enterprises to actively fulfill social responsibilities and give back to the local communities.

4.3 Infrastructure Construction

4.3.1 The two sides agreed to prioritize infrastructure in China-Africa cooperation and strengthen cooperation in transport, telecommunications, radio and television, water conservancy, electricity, energy and other areas of infrastructure development.

4.3.2 To support Africa in achieving connectivity and integration and developing more integrated infrastructure, China and the African Union will establish a cooperative partnership in the design, inspection, financing and management of projects under the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa and the Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative, strengthen relevant dialogue and exchanges, and provide support for the project planning and feasibility study.

4.3.3 The Chinese government will continue to encourage capable Chinese enterprises and financial institutions to participate in transnational and trans-regional infrastructure construction in Africa and provide preferential loans to support infrastructure building in Africa.

4.4 Trade

4.4.1 The two sides were pleased to see the vigorous growth of trade between China and Africa, particularly its sustained healthy growth despite the international financial crisis, which has given a strong boost to the economic growth of both sides. The two sides highlighted once again

the significance of promoting balanced development of China-Africa trade.

4.4.2. The Chinese side decided to implement the “special plan on trade with Africa,” and will send investment and trade promotion missions to Africa as appropriate, expand imports from Africa and support the holding of African products exhibitions to help African countries export their competitive goods to China.

4.4.3 The Chinese side will work with Africa to strengthen the building of brands and sales channels of China’s exports to Africa, improve the structure and quality of exports to Africa, and protect intellectual property rights.

4.4.4 The Chinese side will actively extend aid-for-trade to African countries, provide technical support for the intensive processing of African agro-produce and industrial raw materials, encourage Chinese enterprises to help increase the added value of Africa’s primary products by means of investment, help Africa increase export of products with high added value and intensify exchanges with African countries in trade and industrial policy planning.

4.4.5 The Chinese side promised to further open its market to African countries, and decided to phase in, under the SouthSouth cooperation framework, zero-tariff treatment to products under 97% of all tariff items from the LDCs in Africa having diplomatic relations with China. To ensure the effective implementation of zero-tariff treatment, the Chinese side will establish with African countries a consultation mechanism on the place of origin for goods enjoying zero-tariff treatment and improve the cooperation mechanism to implement zero-tariff treatment.

4.4.6 The two sides agreed to further enhance cooperation in customs, taxation, inspection and quarantine, standards, as well as verification and certification and conclude and implement relevant cooperation agreements. China is ready to establish with African countries

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cooperation mechanisms on inspection, quarantine and supervision of imports and exports, and strengthen supervision of imports and exports quality and safety, sanitary and phytosanitary regulation and food safety inspection, and, on the precondition of safeguarding the interests of consumers in China and Africa, work actively to facilitate access for Chinese and African agricultural products to each other’s markets.

4.4.7 China will help African countries improve facilities for customs and commodity inspection, and provide support to African countries in enhancing trade facilitation, with a view to boosting intra-regional trade.

4.4.8 The two sides agreed to increase trade missions from China to Africa and vice versa and properly handle trade disputes and frictions through friendly consultation under the principle of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation.

4.5 Finance and Banking Sector

4.5.1 The two sides were delighted to see the steady progress in China-Africa financial and banking cooperation in recent years, which has played a positive role in supporting the growth of businesses from both sides and boosting China-Africa business cooperation.

4.5.2 China will expand its cooperation with Africa in investment and financing to help boost Africa’s sustainable development.

China will provide a credit line of US$20 billion to African countries to mainly support the development of infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, and development of small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa.

4.5.3 The two sides applauded the success of the Forum on China-Africa Financial Cooperation and agreed that the financial institutions of both sides will continue to strengthen the consultation mechanism and enhance cooperation.

4.5.4 The Chinese side will strengthen cooperation with the African Development Bank and sub-regional financial organizations, and

explore new cooperation mechanisms to support the regional economic integration effort in Africa and the capacity building of African countries.

4.5.5 The two sides will encourage their financial institutions to bolster business exchanges and open more branches in each other’s countries on the basis of mutual benefit, and will strengthen personnel exchanges and training between the financial institutions.

4.5.6 The two sides will encourage their financial institutions to provide financing support for China-Africa cooperation in energy, mineral exploitation, agriculture, processing, manufacturing, telecommunications and infrastructure, such as electricity, railroad, highway and port facilities.

4.5.7 The Chinese side has an open attitude towards the currency swap cooperation with the central banks of African countries and encourages businesses of the two sides to settle bilateral trade and make direct investment in local currencies by their own choice. Support will be given to Chinese financial institutions to provide loans in RMB to the African side. The Chinese side has an open attitude towards capable central banks of African countries investing in China’s inter-bank bond market and including the RMB into their foreign exchange reserves.

4.5.8 China will encourage Chinese financial institutions to continue to provide financing support for the growth of African SMEs.

4.6 Energy and Resources Cooperation

4.6.1 In view of the strong complementarity and cooperation potential between China and Africa in energy and resources, the two sides will encourage and support joint development and proper use of their energy and resources by enterprises of the two sides. They will consider the establishment of a China-Africa energy forum under the framework of FOCAC to promote ChinaAfrica energy exchanges and cooperation.

4.6.2 While engaging in cooperation, China pays high attention to enhancing African countries’ capacity for intensive processing

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of energy and resource products to raise the added value of these products, helping African countries translate their energy and resources strength into development strength, protecting local eco-environment and promoting the sustainable economic and social development in these countries.

4.6.3 The two sides will actively advance cooperation in clean energy and renewable resources projects in keeping with the principles of mutual benefit and sustainable development.

4.6.4 The two sides agreed to cooperate in underground water exploration, irrigation development, comprehensive planning and management of water resources, disaster prevention and reduction, small basins management and small hydro-power projects and increase exchanges in terms of experts, technology and research findings in the above areas. China will provide financial and technical support for the development of water and energy resources in Africa and facilitate the participation of Chinese companies in relevant activities.

The Chinese side will continue to provide assistance for Africa’s well-drilling and water supply projects.

4.7 Information and Communications

China will enhance cooperation with the information, communications, radio and television departments of African countries, step up training for African personnel in the information field and actively support and encourage competitive Chinese information, communications, radio and television companies to participate in the building of information infrastructure in Africa and engage in mutually beneficial cooperation with their African counterparts.

4.8 Transportation

4.8.1 The two sides will continue to encourage and support more flights and shipping links to be set up by their airlines and shipping companies, and capable Chinese companies will be encouraged to invest in ports, airports and airlines in Africa.

4.8.2 China will tap its advantages in railway technology to support Africa’s efforts in

4.9

developing and modernizing its railway networks in order to facilitate cost-effective and efficient traffic and trade flows in the continent.

Tourism

4.9.1 The two sides noted the good progress in China-Africa tourism cooperation in recent years, the fast growing number of tourists between the two sides and, in particular, the visible increase in Chinese tourists visiting Africa and Africa’s becoming an emerging tourist destination for Chinese nationals. African countries welcomed such development and will encourage their citizens to travel to China.

4.9.2 The two sides will continue to step up bilateral exchanges and cooperation in tourism and conduct cooperation in information sharing, tourism investment, skills training, tourism safety and quality guarantee.

4.9.3 The two sides will continue to take concrete measures to make travel between the two sides by their nationals more convenient and support tourism promotion activities in each other’s countries.

5.

C OOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF DEVELOPMENT 5.1 Assistance

5.1.1 The African side highly appreciated China’s longstanding development assistance in diverse forms, which contributed to Africa’s economic and social development.

5.1.2 China pledged to scale up its assistance to Africa and to create new ways of assistance and make the assistance more effective.

5.1.3 China will make active use of the grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans to help the development of African countries.

5.1.4 The two sides spoke highly of and appreciated each other’s support and help in various forms in countering major natural disasters. China will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to African countries as its capacity permits.

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5.2 Human Resources Development

5.2.1 China and Africa reaffirmed their commitment to the enhancement of human resource capacity as a priority for African countries. The two sides noted with satisfaction that with the joint efforts of the two sides, the scholarships, workshops and training programs in agriculture, industry, health, education, communication, media, science and technology, disaster prevention and reduction and administration that China sponsored had made positive contribution to the human resources development of Africa.

5.2.2 The Chinese government will implement the “African Talents Program”. In the next three years, China will train 30,000 African professionals in various sectors, offer 18,000 government scholarships and take measures to improve the content and quality of the training programs.

5.2.3 China will provide assistance for Africa’s vocational skills training facilities, train professionals and technical personnel for African countries and, in particular, help African young people and women enhance their job skills.

5.3 Science and Technology Cooperation and Knowledge Sharing

5.3.1 The two sides applauded the success of the FOCAC Science and Technology Forum and recognized the important role of the China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Plan in strengthening the science and technology capacity of African countries and advancing China-Africa exchanges and cooperation in science and technology.

5.3.2 China will launch the science and technology for a better life campaign in Africa to enhance cooperation and exchanges with Africa in the science and technology areas that concern people’s well-being.

5.3.3 China will continue to implement the joint research and technology demonstration projects, invite African personnel to China for postdoctoral research and

offer research instruments to the African scientific researchers who return to their home countries to work upon completion of their long-term joint research tasks in China. On its part, Africa will welcome Chinese visiting scientists to African research centers for higher-level teaching and research activities.

5.3.4 China will continue to encourage and promote knowledge sharing and the transfer of advanced and applicable technologies with African countries, host training sessions on applicable technology and science and technology management, share experience in the development of science parks and help to raise African countries’ capacity in R&D (research and development) innovation.

5.4 Cooperation in Poverty Reduction

The two sides will step up cooperation and exchanges in poverty reduction. China will continue to share experience in poverty reduction with African countries through seminars and training sessions in order to make poverty alleviation efforts more effective and raise capacity for common development.

5.5 Medical Careand Public Health 5.5.1 The two sides noted with pleasure their deepening cooperation in the health sector.

In particular, Chinese medical teams to Africa, training of African doctors, nurses and administrative personnel in China, the hospitals China built for Africa and the medical materials China provided for Africa played a positive role in improving the health of African people and promoting the health development of African countries.

5.5.2 The two sides will step up high level exchanges in the health field and hold a China-Africa high-level health development workshop at an appropriate time.

5.5.3 The two sides will expand their exchanges and cooperation in the prevention, treatment and port control of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other major

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communicable diseases, health personnel training, maternal and child health, health system building and public health policies.

5.5.4 China will continue to provide support to the medical facilities it has built in Africa to ensure their sustainable development and upgrade the modernization level of the hospitals and laboratories.

5.5.5 China will continue to train doctors, nurses, public health workers and administrative personnel for African countries.

5.5.6 China will conduct the “Brightness Action” campaign in Africa to provide free treatment for cataract patients.

5.5.7 China will continue to send medical teams to Africa. In this respect, it will send 1,500 medical workers to Africa in the next three years.

5.6 Climate Change and Environmental Protection

5.6.1 The two sides noted the positive response of both sides to the initiative of establishing a China-Africa partnership in addressing climate change and closer policy dialogue and exchanges in the area of climate change.

The two sides will explore the possibility of putting in place a consultation mechanism on climate change at an appropriate time, work together for positive outcome at the international climate change negotiations and jointly enhance capacity to tackle climate change.

5.6.2 The two sides expressed satisfaction with the progress in cooperation in protecting the environment and addressing climate change in recent years and underscored the willingness to continue exchanges and cooperation in these areas. China will help African countries enhance capacity building in meteorological infrastructure and forest protection and management, and scale up assistance and training to Africa in disaster prevention and reduction, treatment of desertification, ecological protection, and environment management.

5.6.3 China will continue to adopt measures to help African countries build capacity for

climate change adaptation and mitigation and sustainable development.

5.6.4 China will advance cooperation with African countries in environment surveillance, continue to share with African countries the data from the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite and promote the application of the data in land use, weather monitoring and environmental protection in Africa.

5.6.5 China will actively share with African countries the experience of applying space technologies to disaster reduction, conduct exchanges and cooperation in remote sensing drought surveillance technologies at an appropriate time and upgrade drought surveillance capacity.

5.6.6 The two sides realized that strengthened cooperation on disaster reduction and relief is an effective way to raise the capacity for natural disaster prevention, poverty eradication and sustainable social development, and promised to strengthen cooperation in the relevant fields.

6.

CULTURAL AND PEOPLE-TOPEOPLE EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION

6.1 Culture

6.1.1 The two sides noted with satisfaction that China-Africa cultural exchanges and cooperation registered vigorous development with fruitful results in recent years. The two sides agreed to promote dialogue between the Chinese and African civilizations and mutual learning between the cultures of the two sides while respecting the cultural uniqueness of each other, work together to uphold the diversity and progress of human civilization and contribute to the development and prosperity of world culture.

6.1.2 The two sides noted that the first FOCAC Cultural Ministers’ Forum had been held in Beijing and achieved fruitful results.

They believed that the Forum provides an important platform for China-Africa cultural cooperation, and agreed to continue with the Forum at an appropriate time for

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in-depth exchange of views on cooperation in the cultural industry.

6.1.3 The two sides will continue to deepen cultural exchanges and cooperation. They have decided to:

Maintain the momentum of high-level intergovernmental mutual visits and dialogue in the cultural field and continue to follow through on the implementation plan of the China-Africa bilateral government cultural agreements.

Propose to implement a “China-Africa Cultural Cooperation Partnership Program” and promote the building of long-term paired cooperation between 100 Chinese cultural institutions and 100 African cultural institutions.

Raise the profile of the “Cultures in Focus” events in China-Africa cultural exchanges, and hold “African Culture in Focus” events in China in even number years and “Chinese Culture in Focus” events in Africa in odd number years.

Continue to implement the program of China-Africa mutual visits between cultural personnel, and strengthen exchanges and cooperation between the administrative personnel and professionals of the cultural and art communities.

Speed up the building of Chinese cultural centers in Africa and African cultural centers in China to put China-Africa cultural exchanges and cooperation on a regular basis and promote their sustainable development.

Strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the preservation of cultural heritage and hold the “China-Africa Cultural Heritage Preservation Roundtable” in due course and promote the signing of government cooperation agreements in this field.

China will provide assistance for the development of Africa’s cultural facilities.

6.2 Education

6.2.1 The two sides noted with satisfaction that cooperation of higher quality and in more

diverse forms on education was conducted between China and Africa since the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference. The two sides agreed to attach more importance to cooperation in education and push for new progress in China-Africa education cooperation.

6.2.2 The two sides will continue to implement the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education, improve the cooperation mechanism between Chinese and African institutions of higher education, encourage Chinese and African universities to carry out cooperation in regional and country studies and support African universities in establishing China research centers.

6.2.3 The two sides will continue to promote the establishment and development of the Confucius Institute and Confucius Classrooms in Africa. China will extend active support in terms of teaching staff, personnel training and teaching materials and equipment.

6.2.4 China will provide US$2 million annually under the framework of the UNESCO trust fund to support education development programs in Africa, in particular higher education in Africa.

6.2.5 China will continue to help African countries build educational and training facilities and provide more opportunities for short, medium and long-term training and scholarships.

6.3 Press, Publishing and Media 6.3.1 Noting the important role of the press in increasing mutual understanding between people in China and Africa and fostering favorable public opinion for China-Africa cooperation, the two sides will continue to enhance exchanges and cooperation in press and media, encourage press organizations of the two sides to step up objective and fair coverage of each other and intensify the communication of information on China-Africa relations and China-Africa cooperation.

6.3.2 A China-Africa Press Exchange Center will be established in China. The two sides

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will promote exchanges and mutual visits between Chinese and African journalists and press professionals and support exchange of correspondents by their media organizations. The African side welcomes the opening of CCTV Africa in Nairobi, Kenya.

6.3.3 The two sides will hold the “China-Africa Radio and Television Cooperation Forum” in due course and make it a regular event to strengthen collective dialogue and friendly cooperation in this field.

6.3.4 China is ready to share with African countries and the AUC its achievements and good practices in the digitalization of radio and TV and provide support in personnel training and technology application.

6.3.5 The two sides will strengthen cooperation in film and TV production. China will actively participate in the film and TV festivals and exhibitions held in African countries and hold Chinese film and TV festivals in Africa. China welcomes and supports African countries to produce programs, conduct exchanges and promote their films in China.

6.3.6 The two sides will strengthen cooperation in book publication, actively carry out China-Africa cooperative translation, printing and publication programs, and engage in publication cooperation in such fields as medical care, health, agricultural technology, culture and education. China will take an active part in international book fairs in Africa and welcomes African countries to participate in the Beijing International Book Fair.

6.4 Exchanges between Academia and Think Tanks

6.4.1 The two sides noted with satisfaction that the China-Africa joint research and exchange plan has been successfully launched and implemented, which has effectively strengthened cooperation and exchanges between scholars and think tanks of the two sides and provided strong intellectual support to China-Africa cooperation. The two sides agreed to continue to implement the plan and decided to:

Sponsor 100 programs by academic institutions and scholars of the two sides in the next three years covering topical research, international symposiums, mutual visits of scholars and publication of works.

Propose to implement the “China-Africa Think Tanks 10+10 Partnership Plan” to select 10 Chinese think tanks and 10 think tanks from African countries to establish long-term paired cooperation relationships.

Encourage and support scholars of the two sides to conduct joint research and publish the results of their joint research in international academic journals and other publications.

6.4.2 The two sides noted the holding of the first FOCAC Think Tanks Forum on the sidelines of the eighth FOCAC Senior Officials Meeting in Hangzhou in 2011 and its results and believed that the forum created a new pattern of interactions and exchanges between the academia of China and Africa.

The two sides agreed to institutionalize the forum and promote the building of longterm and stable cooperation between the academia of China and African countries.

6.4.3 The two sides welcome and encourage more enterprises, financial institutions and academic institutions to provide support for academic interactions and people-to-people and cultural exchanges between China and Africa.

6.5 People-to-People, Youth and Women Exchanges 6.5.1 The two sides recognized that people-topeople exchanges are an important part of China-Africa cooperation and an important bond and channel for deepening ChinaAfrica friendship, and agreed to continue to strengthen China-Africa people-to-people exchanges.

6.5.2 The two sides will launch the China-Africa people-to-people friendship action, and encourage and support exchanges and cooperation between non-governmental organizations, women and young people of the two sides by jointly undertaking

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small and micro social programs and promoting mutual visits between people’s organizations of the two sides.

6.5.3 The two sides noted the holding of the first and second China-Africa People’s Forum and the important declarations issued and believed that the forum serves as an important platform for comprehensive exchanges and practical cooperation between people’s organizations of China and Africa. The two sides agreed to institutionalize the forum to give new impetus to the China-Africa traditional friendship.

6.5.4 The two sides will further enhance dialogue and exchanges between the young people and provide facilities for the young people of China and Africa to learn from each other and increase friendship. The two sides noted the holding of the first and second China-Africa Young Leaders Forums and the important declarations issued at the forum and agreed to institutionalize the forum to build a platform for the dialogue and exchanges between the young people of China and Africa.

6.5.5 China will continue to send young volunteers to African countries and encourage them to play a positive role in community building, social programs, and cultural, scientific and technological and health services in these countries.

6.5.6 China will continue to hold symposiums oriented toward young people and invite more representatives of the young people in Africa to visit China for study tours by such means as holding workshops for young leaders of political parties of African countries.

6.5.7 The two sides expressed satisfaction with the achievements in the China-Africa women exchanges in recent years. The two

6.6

sides will continue to enhance exchanges and strengthen cooperation and promote the common development of women on both sides through dialogue between women leaders, paired exchanges in various sectors, study of women-related issues, practical skills training and other forms of exchange.

Sports

The two sides encourage and support sports exchanges and cooperation, with specific activities to be decided by the sports authorities of the two sides.

7.

FOCAC

7.1 The two sides noted with satisfaction that since the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, the Ministerial Conference, the political consultation between Chinese and African Foreign Ministers on the sidelines of the UNGA, the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), and consultations between the Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee and African diplomatic missions in China have continued to operate in an efficient and smooth manner.

7.2 The two sides noted with satisfaction that important progress has been made in the building of sub-forums under FOCAC and agreed to set up new sub-forums under FOCAC or promote the institutionalization of existing sub-forums in the light of needs of both sides so as to broaden China-Africa cooperation and bring out new dynamism of China-Africa cooperation.

7.3 Following the FOCAC follow-up mechanism procedures, the two sides decided to hold the Sixth Ministerial Conference in South Africa in 2015 and before that the 10th and 11th SOMs in South Africa in 2014 and 2015 respectively.

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Author Bios

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H.E. Mr Liu Guangyuan is a graduate of Zhengzhou University where he studied Bachelor of Arts (1982-1986). He was also a student of Diplomacy Training Programme in China Foreign Affairs University (1986-1987).

He has worked with the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs; Information Department and Bureau for Chinese Diplomatic Missions Abroad; Chinese Embassy in the Republic of Ghana and Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He was Third Secretary, Deputy Director, Director of Asian and African Division, Department of Personnel, MF ited States of America (2000-2002); Deputy Director General, Department of Personnel, MFA; Minister, Chinese Embassy in the United States of America (2007-2010) and now The People’s Republic of China’s Ambassador to the Republic of Kenya; Permanent Representative to UNEP and Permanent Representative to UN-Habitat. Mr. Liu Guangyuan is married with one son.

Prof. Liu Hongwu is General Director of the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University (IASZNU); Vice-President of The Chinese Society for African Studies; Director of The Chinese-African People’s Friendship Association; Director of the Centre of African Studies, Yunnan University and Adjunct Professor of China Foreign University. He has taught at Lagos University (1990-1991) and Dar es Salaam University (2002— 2003). Professor Liu has visited over 20 African countries and was awarded a “China-Africa Friendship Contribution Award-Move to Africa, 10 Chinese”

by Chinese-African People’s Friendship Association. He has been published widely in the disciplines of Sino-African Development Cooperation, African Art, African NGOs and Sino-African Relations, Sudan-Darfur issues, History of Nigerian State and Swahili Culture in East Africa among others.

Prof. Li Anshan (PhD. History, Toronto) is Professor of School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Afro-Asian Studies and Centre for African Studies at Peking University. Besides various Chinese publications, his English publications include FOCAC Twelve Years Later: Achievements, Challenges and Way Forward (Uppsala, 2012), A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911 (New York, 2012), Chinese Medical Cooperation in Africa: With Special Emphasis on the Medical Teams and Anti-Malaria Campaign (Uppsala, 2011), British Rule and Rural Protest in Southern Ghana (New York, 2002) and articles in various journals and networks. He is a speaker on on China-African relations as well as African history. He was a distinguished guest at FOCAC--Beijing Ministerial Conference (2000), Sino-African Education Ministers Forum (2005) and FOCAC-Beijing Summit (2006). He holds various academic positions such as Academic Consultant to the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the State Council, among others.

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Dr He Wenping is Prof. and Director of African Studies Section at the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies (IWAAS), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), specialising on Africa’s relations with China and major western powers, and African democratic transition. She has served as a visiting scholar at Yale University, London University and the Nordic Africa Institute based in Sweden and German Development Institute. Apart from being a regular lecturer on Sino-African relations in various African human resources training classes, Dr He’s perspectives on Africa are regularly featured on Chinese Central TV Station (CCTV) and Chinese Central Radio Broadcast. Dr. He’s publications include: The Study of African Countries Democratisation Process, and the English papers of The Balancing Act of China’s Africa Policy, China’s Perspective on Contemporary China-Africa Relations, Overturning the Wall: Building Soft Power in Africa, The Darfur Issue: A New Test for China’s Africa Policy, China’s Aid to Africa: Policy Evolution, Characteristics and its Role, etc.

Prof. Tang Xiao studied World History at Wuhan University (1980~1987).

He is currently Director of Postgraduate Student Department, Professor of Political Science and Director of African Studies Centre at the China Foreign Affairs University. He was also Fulbright Professional Associate at the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, U.S.A. and has worked as Secretary at the Chinese Embassy in London. His publications include Contemporary Western Political Systems (first edition), first author, World Affairs Publishing House, Beijing, 1996; Fundamental Principles of Political Science, first author, World Affairs Publishing House, Beijing, 2007, Parliamentary Supervision, World Affairs Publishing House, Beijing, 2009; Introduction to Contemporary Western Political Systems, RenMin University of China Press, Beijing, 2011; and a host of academic papers on the West’s political systems and China-Africa relations.

Dr Lin Shi is Professor; supervisor of Ph.D. students and Director of the Teaching and Research Section of World Ethnic Issues at the College of Ethnology and Sociology of the Minzu University of China. She received her Bachelor’s degree in the field of economics from Beijing Normal University, and Master and Doctorate degrees from the Minzu University of China. Dr Shi has been a visiting scholar at the University of Houston (USA). At the School of Ethnology and Sociology at Minzu Univerity of China, Dr Lin Shi teaches Economic Anthropology, Ethnology, English of Anthropology, and Development Economics. Dr Shi has received numerous awards and published 5 books including Economic Anthropology (2002), Development Economics and the Asian Drama of Development (2002), and The Comprehensive Study of American Ethnic Minorites (2006). She also published many articles such as The Study of Culture, ethnic culture and market culture (1995), The American Economic Anthropology and its Application in China (2003) and The Study of the Development of China’s Ethnic Economics (2006).

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Dr Zhang Chun is Senior Researcher, Deputy Director, Centre for West Asian and African Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS). His researches focus on China-Africa relations, African peace and security, China’s foreign policy, and international relations theory. He got his Doctorate in International relations in 2006, MA in 2001, and BA in 1995. He holds the prestigious First Class Award of the Ninth Excellent Philosophy and Social Science Publications Award of Shanghai. He has cotranslated three books from English to Chinese and published more than 40 academic papers. He was a Visiting Fellow of Chatham House in 2009, South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in 2011, and Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2011.

Dr Liang Yijian is Research Associate, Centre for African Studies, Yunnan University, Yunnan, China. He is PhD graduate of Centre for African Studies, Yunnan University. He has researched on the Opportunities and Challenges Facing Sino-African Cooperation (commissioned by China State Social Sciences Fund). His publications include: “African Peer Review Mechanism in the Perspective of Soft Pressure”, West Asian and African Studies (Chinese), No. 1, 2009; “The Dilemma, Origin and Characteristics of African International Relations Theories”, World Economics and Politics (Chinese), July, 2008 and “An Outline of African International Relations Theories in the 20th Century,” World Economics and Politics (Chinese), January, 2007, among others.

Mr James Shikwati is the Founder and Director of Inter Region Economic Network (IREN Kenya), a think tank that focuses on and develops ideas and strategies to enhance quality of life for people in Africa. He is also the Founder and CEO of The African Executive, a leading online business opinion magazine that focuses on African issues, and the Country Director of Enactus, a free enterprise programme present in 16 Kenyan universities.

A self taught Kenyan economist, his main area of focus is development economics in Africa. He is driven by a firm belief that A Free Human Mind is the Ultimate Capital. He serves on a Pan Africa Select Committee that network African Think Tanks, Research Institutes and Scholars keen to evaluate Africa’s engagement with China and other emerging economies. He has authored several books and hundreds of commentaries on public policy, economic development, environment, trade and agriculture. He recently co-edited a book with Prof. Jurgen Runge on “Geological Resources and Good Governance in Sub Saharan Africa.” He was named among 100 most influential Kenyans in 2007 by the Standard Newspaper, and recognised as a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum in 2008.

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Prof. Lloyd G. Adu Amoah is an Assistant Professor at Ashesi University College (Berekuso, Ghana) and the Founder and Executive Director of the Think-Tank Strategy 3 (Accra, Ghana). Lloyd holds a Ph.D from Wuhan University. His research interests focus on public policy and Africa-BRICS relations among others. Lloyd’s work has appeared in Administrative Theory and Praxis, Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Journal of African Affairs and the Ghana Policy Journal among others. A freelance journalist and photographer, he has been published in the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Focus on Africa magazine, Jeune Afrique’s The Africa Report, Third World Network’s African Agenda magazine and other local and international publications. Dr Amoah is a fellow of the International Institute for Advanced Studies (IIAS), Accra, Ghana and the African Studies Centre, Leiden, Netherlands.

Mr Abdi Jama Ghedi was born in Obbia (Somalia). He obtained his Masters Degree in Economics and Commerce from the Florence University, Italy. He has worked at the Ministry of Finance as a local economist and lectured at the Somali National University on International Economics. Mr Abdi got a two year research scholarship on Somalia’s post-conflict recovery and reconstruction programmes from the Italian Development Cooperation; studied Social Science at the Stockholm University; did an MSc course in Environmental Engineering and Sustainable Infrastructure at the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm and worked for the Swedish Protection Environmental Agency as an Environmental Economist. Currently, Mr Abdi is the Project Manager for Daryeel Associates, a Swedish-Somali consultancy firm working with IOM and other UN agencies on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction programmes and projects. He also lectures at the Benadir University in Mogadishu on Economics and Environmental Studies.

Mr David N. Tshimba is a Great Lakes of Africa region dweller, having chiefly lived in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya. Passionate about durable peace and collaborative development in his home-region, David holds a Masters degree on Sustainable Peace and Conflict Management from the Uganda Martyrs University where he is now working as African Great Lakes Conflict & Peace Researcher. He is a fellow at the International Summer School on Religion and Public Life, and volunteers with Global Peace Festival Foundation, Uganda Chapter.

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Prof. Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie is Professor of Political Science and the Chair of the Centre for Culture and Peace Studies at the University of Botswana.

She received her B.A in Political Science and Public Administration from the University of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia; Master of Arts in Political Science from Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; and PhD in Politics from Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA. She has taught at the University of Zambia and St Paul’s College, Lawrenceville, VA, USA. She has authored and coedited 6 books, written 34 book chapters, 29 peer reviewed journal articles, and 4 monographs, among others. Her research and publications are on democracy, state and development, gender and development, international cooperation and integration, peace building, poverty alleviation, security, corruption, and HIV and AIDS.

Amb. Ahmed Haggag joined the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1957 and served in Bonn, Vienna, New York, Kenya and the Seychelles.

Amb. Ahmed Haggag was elected three times by the African Heads of State and Government as Assistant Secretary General of the OAU (1987- 999).

He is a member of the Egyptian Council for Human Rights, Board of The Institute of African Studies of Cairo University and Advisory Committee of the Institute of Security Studies of South Africa. He has participated in many meetings and seminars on African issues in China, India, Malaysia, Britain, Italy and USA among others.

Prof. Eginald Pius Mihanjo is currently the Deputy Principal for Academic Affairs at Stella Maris Mtwara University College (STEMMUCO), a Constituent College of St Augustine University of Tanzania (SAUT). He served the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) for 23 years and rose through the ranks to Senior Lecturer. He joined SAUT in 2009 and then St John’s University of Tanzania (SJUT) up to April 2012 when he joined STEMMUCO. A Professor of History and Strategic Studies, Mihanjo has published over 15 articles in books and international journals and 10 consultant tasks. Besides teaching and lecturing, Prof. Mihanjo is a national political adviser as well as policy designer. He was Deputy Director, Internal Programmes, Centre for Continuing Education (UDSM); Director of Studies and Programme at Mozambique Tanzania Centre for Foreign Relation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; Director of Studies, Institute of social Work–Ministry of Health and Welfare; Dean, Faculty of Humanities and Education, Deputy Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Acting Vice Chancellor, SJUT. Prof. E. Mihanjo is currently the President of the US based Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, Tanzania Chapter.

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Mr Paul Odhiambo is a Policy Analyst (Trade and Foreign Policy Division) at Kenya Institute for Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA). Previously, he worked at Jesuit Hakimani Centre in Nairobi (2004-2006 and 2010), Uganda Martyrs University in Nkozi, Uganda, and as a lecturer and a coordinator for Distance Learning Programme (2007-2009). He has BA Philosophy (Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, Italy) and MA International Relations and Diplomatic Studies (Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda).

Prof. Macharia Munene studied in Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington and Ohio University. He lectures at the United States International University in Nairobi and has been Visiting Professor at Universitat Jaume-1, Castellon, Spain; National Defence College, Karen, Nairobi, Kenya and University of Nairobi. Professor Munene is an accomplished publisher, writer and editor whose work has been published in both local and international press and academic journals. He features regularly on local and international TV and Radio broadcast media and has received numerous international and continental Grant Awards.

Mr Denise A. O. Kodhe holds a Bachelor of Education degree as well as Diploma in Journalism and Sales & Marketing certificates. He also has Advanced Certificates in Liberalism and Liberal Democracy (Germany), Administrative Management (UK), and Japanese Culture and Language Studies. He is currently Executive Director of the Institute for Democracy and Leadership in Africa (IDEA).

Dr Joseph Onjala is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi. Dr Onjala has wide research experience in development issues and played a role in the preparation of a number of Human Development Reports with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on Human Security and Development.

Dr Onjala has worked on China-Africa projects with the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC). He has contributed chapters in a number of publications such as China’s Diplomacy in East and Central Africa (Ashgate Publishing Ltd.) and Strengthening the Civil Society Perspective: China’s African Impact (Fahamu Networks for Social Justice, forthcoming.

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Dr Wiseman Mupindu holds a Doctor of Philosophy Social Science in Development Studies, a Master of Social Science in Development Studies, Bachelor of Education Management Specialisation and Diploma in Education. He has been widely published in accredited peer reviewed journals such as Online Journal of Social Sciences and International Journal of Asian Social Science, among others.

Prof. Mustapha Machrafi is a Moroccan Economist and Professor at the University Mohammed V Souissi-Rabat. He is also a researcher at the Institute of African Studies. His research focuses on African migration, climate change, South-South co-operation and Asia-Africa cooperation. He is member of many scientific networks such as Africa-Brasil Dialogs and has authored and reviewed several publications.

Prof. Hicham Hafid is Professor at the Institute of African Studies, University Mohamed V Souissi, Morocco, and has a doctorate in economics. He has written on trade between the North and the South: The Case of the Moroccan Economy and South-South trade, particular East-Africa.

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