Ashton for the EEAS “We must not delude ourselves” By Athina Bata*
Speaking to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 12th June 2013, Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice-president of the European Union, recapitulated, in three points, imperative reforms for the European External Action Service (EEAS)1. Taking the floor after the conclusion of a three-year review of the EEAS, she proposed the following recommendations: First, she argued for a discernible “strategic orientation” of the European Commission projects in development and neighbourhood policy. The “neighbourhood” contains five action zones: 1) countries from the Sahel to equatorial Africa, 2) the peace process in the Middle East, 3) conflict resolution in Caucasus, 4) peace consolidation in the Balkans, and especially in Kosovo, 5) achieving political transitions in Arab states, and the fight against all forms of terrorism 2 . If the question should be what the connection between foreign policy and development is, then the answer is that many of Europe‟s foreign policy and security interest are also development issues, where state fragility and illegal migration are only two examples. Ms. Ashton‟s idea follows the institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, which is meant to prepare the ground for a more coherent external policy of the EU. In this context, diplomacy, external trade, responses to humanitarian crises and development cooperation need to mutually reinforce one another. Foreign policy should be brought closer to development, combining the European Commission‟s technical expertise with the Council‟s political weight in a way that will increase the EU‟s global role. Development should be put at
* Athina Bata is a recent graduate of the Master 2 in International Relations and Security Policy at the University of Toulouse in France, and she also holds a bachelor degree in International and European Studies at the University of Piraeus in Greece. Her research activities focus on international security and defence, conflict prevention and crisis management, the European “Petersberg tasks”, whereas she has profound knowledge of the crisis in Middle East- especially the Arab Spring and the nuclear Iran. Within the framework of her Master thesis she has further deepened her research in the European military industry and aerospace and in the Common Security and Defence Policy pillar. She speaks English, French and Greek. 1 Euobserver.com, Rettman Andrew, “Ashton drops big ideas on EU foreign service”,13 June 2013 (date of publication), 8 July 2013 (date of access), http://euobserver.com/institutional/120484 2 Eeas.europa.eu, graphic presentation, “European External Action Service, graphic presentation”, 1st July 2013 (date of publication), 8 July 2013 (date of access), http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf
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the forefront of the EU‟s external action, while robust measures promoting policy coherence are needed to reduce development‟s vulnerability to crisis politics. The EEAS was meant to be a streamlined, results-orientated, efficient structure, capable of providing support for political leadership in external relations and facilitating decisionmaking in the Council. Instead, the current structure of the EEAS is too top-heavy, too inflexible and is marked by too many decision-making layers. What mostly lacks in the EEAS is adaptability. Occasionally, there is unnecessary institutional duplication, unclear lines of command and, consequently, the EEAS spends a considerable amount of money on high salaries without reaching in the end a comprehensive policy approach. The EU has not taken the utmost benefit of the means that the Commission and the member states dispose of, such as the European Defence Agency or the satellite center of Torrejon. What is more, the ex nihilo creation of a general director‟s post in the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination department and its extended responsibilities seem to marginalize the military and civilian crisis missions‟ structures (Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate). In order to make the EEAS capable of pursuing a comprehensive approach by the EU to today‟s external challenges and responsibilities certain reforms should be introduced. The role of the EEAS in defining the strategic orientation and in contributing to the implementation of the EU external financing instruments should be strengthened in line with the key lines of EU foreign policy. Within the EU there are three key players which have responsibility for aid and development matters: the EEAS, the DG DEVCO 3 and the European Community Humanitarian aid Office (ECHO). Concerns have been raised about coordination between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO and, in particular, the problems this poses for linking relief, rehabilitation and development. For example, problems were detected in the Sahel in the transition from humanitarian assistance to development aid4. Therefore, greater effort should be made to avoid duplication of efforts and structures between the EEAS, the Commission – in particular DG DEVCO and the ECHO – and the Council Secretariat. It is a problem which could be overcome by merging the equivalent institutions or at least by clarifying their roles in the programming process. What is more, the need for better coordination and good governance on development issues at the international level has to be reaffirmed. The EEAS should achieve a more efficient use of scarce resources through greater cooperation and economies of scale at EU and national levels. In this way the EU will speak with one voice and gain visibility. In addition to the above, there should be a thorough assessment of the political accountability of the EEAS towards the Parliament with regards to the extent to which the latter is consulted on strategic decisions and its views and inputs are taken into account. Parliament should be fully informed at all stages of the procedure for negotiations on international agreements, including the ones concluded in the area of Common Security and Defence Policy. Parliament‟s oversight over the EEAS is essential if European external action is to be better understood and supported by EU citizens. In a way, parliamentary scrutiny enhances the legitimacy of the external action. Additionally, the command structure of the EEAS should be simplified, whereas the role of the Executive Secretary General should be enhanced not by having extended responsibilities but by establishing a clear chain of command to support effective decision-making as well as timely policy response. In this context, with a view to 3
For more information on the institution see below: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm House of Commons, “EU aid instruments and organisations”, 8 July 2013 (date of access), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/1680/168005.htm 4
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achieving efficiency, clarity and coherence in decision-making, it must be ensured that the HR/VP receives political advice, for instance through a Political Council, from all the relevant institutional actors, thus allowing him/her to assess the impact of actions to be undertaken by the EEAS. In order to avoid extra personnel, this political council‟s role could be simply taken on by the EEAS Secretary General. It seems wise if the position of EEAS secretary-general were a political appointee rather than a civil servant, which is also in line with the demands of MEPs. It‟s a matter of experience in managing international aid operations. The EEAS secretary-general is expected to be a relevant commissioner – for enlargement, development and humanitarian aid – and the MEPs do not want an unelected civil servant deputizing for Lady Ashton at a parliamentary hearing on an important EEAS mission or appointment. Second, she insisted on the need for creating new deputies to represent her in European Parliament hearings and on some overseas trips by saying “I can remember a very sad day when I went to five countries in one day but I was still criticized for not being in the United States”5. Her call for assistance is justified since no single person alone could cope with such an overcrowded agenda. Hence, much of the focus will be on giving to Ms. Ashton‟s successor one or more deputies who will share the tasks and responsibility of the office. These political deputies will be empowered to act on behalf of the HR/VP, to ensure that RELEX Commissioners6 – a group, whose chairing should also be entrusted to the HR/VP – can fully represent the HR/VP for parliamentary matters and internationally. This recruitment of high quality staff is aligned with the need to ensure that the EEAS has the appropriate mix of skills for responding to conflict, in particular by developing skills in the area of mediation and dialogue. Apart from these internal issues, the European Parliament also considers a shortcoming the fact that sectors such as climate change, trade and energy policy do not lie under the HR‟s authority, something which could be overcome with extra Deputy High Representatives7. Many of the aforementioned issues may seem trivial to outsiders: staffing policies; hierarchy matters; and staff rotations between Brussels, the European capitals and the EEAS delegations around the world. But these matters, if resolved, would provide the EEAS structure with accountability, transparency and functionality and ease the development of joint policies8 . Nonetheless, what is even more important and should be borne in mind is that there is no ideal bureaucratic model. This remark would help to tone down expectations, and get across the idea that no reform can prove successful if it is not complimented by a political agenda. Apart from the functional improvements to be done, developing an “appropriate structure” integrates conflict prevention, crisis response, peace building, security policy and CSDP structures, while assuring coordination with the geographical desks. The goal is once again to enhance inter-institutional coordination and attain clarity of roles. Third and finally, Ms. Ashton backed the propulsion of the decision-making protocols on EU military and civilian crisis missions. The so-called Petersberg tasks (EU humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-building tasks) involve three principal stages: prevention, stabilization and 5
Euobserver.com, Rettman Andrew, “Ashton drops big ideas on EU foreign service”,13 June 2013 (date of publication), 8 July 2013 (date of access), http://euobserver.com/institutional/120484 6 Eu4journalists, “The Directorates-General>External Relations DG RELEX”, 8 July 2013 (date of access), http://www.eu4journalists.eu/index.php/contact_guide/english/C57/174/ 7 The Greens|European Free Alliance in the European Parliament, statement, Franziska Brantner, “Reforming the European External Action Service”, 13 June 2013 (date of publication), http://www.greens-efa.eu/reforming-theeuropean-external-action-service-10069.html 8 Euobserver.com, Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik, “External Action Service review: why it‟s important?”, 12 March 2013 (date of publication), 9 July 2013 (date of access), http://euobserver.com/opinion/119387
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lastly reconstruction. Unfortunately, in this area the HR did not live up to what was expected of her. So far, the EU missions under the Petersberg framework have not intervened preventively or on time to face the crisis situations they sought to address - representative are the examples of Libya and Mali. The EEAS failed to coordinate the Commission‟s and member states‟ scattered efforts and lend weight to EU foreign policy. Instead, the EU finds itself still struggling to gain diplomatic influence, while the operational decision-making and implementation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy are too slow due to structural and procedural deficits. This has become apparent once more with the crisis in Mali, in response of which decision-making procedures and funding decisions have not been swiftly adopted and implemented. The EEAS should be seen and further used as an opportunity to foster greater cooperation and synergies. In this end and to make full use of the synergy effect of the EEAS, the member states must finally envisage the possibility of qualified majority voting on CSDP matters. For the EU to take the lead on the defence of Europe, it must, on the one hand, develop the practice of joint technical and logistical services between institutions, with the aim to achieve economies of scale and improve efficiency. On the other hand, what the EU needs are sufficient military resources in order to underpin a credible CSDP. Nonetheless, military means alone can do little against the new threats of terrorism, organized crime and weapons of mass destruction. Given this, the member states need to train military personnel and deploy at the same time civilian resources such as police, civil protection, judges, customs officials, etc., without neglecting to develop adapted decision making procedures to make missions possible. Implementing the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty means pursuing a comprehensive approach that integrates diplomatic, economic, development and military means behind common Union strategic policy guidelines. To this end, the level of cooperation and integration should be strengthened and the EU member states should work on developing the EU capacity for planning and conducting operations and multinational Battlegroups, which have not yet been used. The various logistical services of the Commission and EEAS for early warning, risk assessment and security tasks covering events outside the EU should be in close cooperation and should also be put under a “single joint structure”9. Member states should mobilize credible civilian and military means and provide critical support to certain sectors such as, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), air refueling, strategic transport, and general interoperability. This way, a French mechanic, for instance, must be able to fix and work on a Belgian Hercules or a Czech Casa and vice versa. This procedure of pooling and sharing, where the implementation of certain tasks is entrusted to groups of capable member states, should be left to the European Defence Agency authority. In this way the armament programs of OCCAR (Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation, OCCAR in French) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation would be also boosted. A nice opportunity is given to them with the arrival of the new aircraft Airbus A400M military transport. In this context, in order to enhance common training for the consolidation of an esprit de corps among EEAS staff, the relevant existing training and educational programmes at EU and national levels should be reviewed, with a view to consolidating them alongside the existing European Security and Defence College. The EEAS, especially at times of budgetary 9
European Parliament, Report / Amendment 4, Elmar Brok and Roberto Gaultieri, “2013 review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS”, 5 June 2013 (date of publication), 9 July 2013 (date of access), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2013-0147+004008+DOC+PDF+V0//EN
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restrictions, should act as a catalyst for greater synergies, not only within the EU institutional framework but also between the EU and its member states. Last but not least, it is vital for the EEAS to create a permanent conduct structure to “house” its strategic thinking. A permanent military Operational Headquarters must be created, which could be co-located with a Civilian Conduct Capability, in order to allow the effective implementation of military and civilian operations whilst safeguarding their respective chain of command. In the end, before drawing conclusions, we should consider that, on the one hand, the EEAS is a new body of hybrid nature, which has no precedent and which therefore cannot be expected to be fully functional within two years of its establishment. Thus, a review of its organisation and functioning should be based on fair and constructive criticism. On the other hand, the review of the neophyte Ashton‟s work should also be based on fair and moderate criticism. Since 2010 she has been the focus of repeated criticism because of her low profile and lack of foreign affairs experience. For some, she appears to be out of her depth and she is considered as the most unsuitable top EU diplomat for the post of HR10. Yet, all that the current HR has done is comply with the dictation of the Lisbon Treaty which has, however, condemned the CSDP to an intergovernmental instrument subject to unanimity in decision-making. Well, it seems that Lady Ashton, whether incompetent or not, is right when saying “We must not delude ourselves. In a situation where there is absence of political will or of agreement between member states, there is a limit to what the EEAS can deliver11”.
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Der Spiegel (online version), “EU Foreign Affairs Chief „Out of Her Depth‟, 19 April 2010 (date of publication), 12 July 2013 (date of access), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-foreign-affairs-chiefout-of-her-depth-doubts-increase-about-catherine-ashton-s-ability-a-689764.html, // Daily mail (online version), Tim Shipman, “At last EU wakes up to „useless‟ Ashton: MEPS condemn indecision by foreign policy chief”, 25 April 2013 (latest update), 12 July 2013 (date of access), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2314043/AtEU-wakes-useless-Ashton-MEPS-condemn-indecision-foreign-policy-chief.html 11 Euobserver.com, Rettman Andrew, “Ashton drops big ideas on EU foreign service”, 13 June 2013 (date of publication), 9 July 2013 (date of access), http://euobserver.com/institutional/120484
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