Ethiopian Constitutional Development; A Sourcebook Vol. I by James C. N. Paul (1967) [Part 1 of 2]

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ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENT A SOURCEBOOK VOLUME I

Prepared By

James C. N.

Pallilli

B.A. L.L.B. Professor of Law, I-Iaile Sellassie I U11i,1ersit:y

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Christopher Clapi1am Lecturer

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B .A. D .Pl1il. La,v, I-Iaile Sellassie I Uriiversity

Published By The Faculty of Law Haile Sellassie I University Addis Ababa in Association With

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Ox.ford University Press t Addis Ababa 1972

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UNi./ SCHOOL LIBRARY

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'ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP ENT •

A SOURCEBOOK VOLUME I •

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Prepared By

James C. N.. Paul

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Published By The Faculty, of Law Haile Sellassie I University LAW SCHOOL LIBRARY Addis Ababa in Association With

O.xford University Press Addis. Ababa 1967

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Copyright by !.,aw of ty Facul The

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University I sie Sellas Haile 1972

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Printed at Addis Ababai Et.hio-oia l"\.rtlstic Printers Ltd. ,

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PREFACE This book is designed for students of constitutional law at Haile Se/lassie I University. Hopefully it may also be of some vali,e to tl1e legal pro_fes·sion i11 Ethiopia, and to scholars in other parts o_,f th.e }vorld. The basic plan o..f the book is to del,elop soi,rce ,rzateric1l arzcl text lvlzich will help students to understand bette,· the meani11g of in.�titutio11s and 1;1·irzciples established by the Revised Constitution and will J1elJJ to focus attention on problen1s of futi1re constitutional development. Selectio11 and 01·ganizatio11 of 1nate1·ial is obviously, to l some degree, a niatter of choice ana expe,·ience. T/1ese materials l1ave been four years in the making; most have been i,sed in class in one form or a11other. Book I presents what 1nig/1t be called a fra,nework for t/1e study of constitutional development in Ethiopia. It sketcf1es so,ne of t/1e important fJroblems of theo1·y, the origin and development of institutio11s }.,1hicl1 have found their way into tl1e ·Constitution­ or whicl1 appear to be doi11g so. Tlie final chapter atte1npts to ,·ecapitulate some of the issues which. ritn throi1.gl1 stz.1,dy of tl1e Revised Constitution. Boole II treats ivith the Revised Co11stitutio11. Tl1e o,·ganization of c/1apters is 1·athe1· conventional, but we hope it will be evident tl1at co11 siderable stress is laid on relating ongoing problems of political change and economic develop111.ent to the law of the Constitution. The Law School inEtJ1iopia is-at this writing-a little ove,·jour yea,·s old. 01·iginal sources of some of the material used here were unavailable to us, ancl we we1·e required to use secondar}' collections of cases and legislation. We are very grateful, pa,·ticularly, to the publishers who permitted this use. There is more material in the tlVO volumes than can be col,ered adequately in a first year course. But the book is prepared l11ith the kno»1ledge t/1at reading n1aterials on Ethiopian Constitutional Law are scarce and wit/1 the l1ope tl1at stude11 .ts will con­ tinue in their later careers to consult it and reflect on some of tl1e topics posed. After all, lawyers dedicated to their profession begin and end their careers as studei1ts. A subject is never completely mastered. Some of the Chapters /1 ave a special list of further readings. The,·e is also an appendix containing additional recommendations on outside readings and a more complete bibliography, which we hope will be of value. The printing of a work like this, at this· point in Addis Ababa, poses many diffi­ culties for local printers--and editors. We apologize for editorial e,·rors and l1ope readers will bear with some of the mistakes which may still be discovered-despite a long period of editing. • ••

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n me e r r11 th fo ve g i11 Go t, has donated rk wo tly e11 es pr ,er wJ la g un yo a ,i, ee Leonard Gr n of Volume I. Our Pas io at ar ep pr e th r fo nt ta sis as c/z ar se re d t time as a,z editorial 011 i Desta, have typed endless sh d Ye an n no m, Ga an Je , icz ow un cz ze Kr secretaries. Wanda r y the ntl eta cr ese se pr y n, ar o Fe ne ian f thefirst­ ar M iss M . rk lvo the of 1 / uc 2 n stencils of lls an Bi a Je s ar ha Cl t pu ct. oje it pr the through to ist ass big a en giv as J 1 , tor edi d me na rs to nte d rs an pri . ito ed ' et me the th bo promised 11g shi pu d an g tin edi reg, tin edi ssthe pre , deadlines. Margaret C. Paul l1as typed a great deal of final copy-volwztarily and despite her otlz er roles: ju!! ti1ne secretary (to another employer); f.lfll time-mother and wife; unintended, occasio11al victim of tlze vicissitudes which a project like this some­ times proxi,natly cai,ses, i.e. the frustration or irritation or inattentiveness of one of the editors.

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A Note on Ethiopian Sources of. Constitutional Law

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For the benefit of readers v1ho may not have immediate familiarity with th Ethiopian legal system, it .may not be amiss to point out that official, published docu� meotary 1n.aterial is at tl1is poi11t ratl1er scarce.

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Ther� a1�e no av ilable commentaries of other offi cia l legislative histories at � . the �onst1tut1on of 19.J I a11d 1955. The proceedings of Parliament are no t published ofticrally. Selected co11rt decisions l1ave be en published in the Journal . oif Eth·zopzan . . ·. · · La w s� nce Its rnaugu ration 111 1964. Legislation, since 1942 has been officially publi­ _ shed 1n the Negarzt Gazeta. The Faculty of' Law was opened in 1963. Until tl1at t·ime, 1n . a relatJ.ve sense, only a few Etl1iopians h.ad stud.ied 1aw, formally, at tl1e University level.

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Summary of Contents

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VOLUME I Chapter I:

Sources For. the Study of Con-stitutional Development-Political Theory.

Chapter II:

Sources of Ethiopian Constitutional Development: Foreign Experience.

Chapter ID:

The Constitutional Development of Ethiopia to 1935.

Chapter IV:

The Revised Constitution of 1955: An Overview of its Immediate Origins- and Future Evolution.

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VOLUME II

Chapter V:

Imperial Powers and The Distribution of Law-Making Povi/ers.

Chapter VI:

Executive Institutions.

Chapter VII:

Parliament and Legislative Institutions.

Chapter Vill:

Judicial Institutions

Chapter IX:

Civil and Political Rights-and Economic and Political Deve­ lopment.

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TABLE OF .. .

1'itle Page . . . ••• · · · . · · · · · Pref ace ts n nte Co of ry Su1nma •••

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••• • •• ts n nte Co Table of ... n io t la is g e L d Table of C�ses an ... · · · ·.. · · · Acknowledgements . .. ia p io l1 t E f o n o ti Revised Constitu

BOOK I

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t-Politica/ TlzeorJ' ... ... en n1 op el ev D l 1a o1 ti tu ti zs o, c of d y S tu 1 ie . r or F . s e rc Chapter I: Sou o l io ra sit nt of political po ce e th ! e' at St · a is it c . h W v ::>at St the . . . ... • • . .. Section 1 : Power an d nt n1ean.1ngs of Sovereignty po,.,ver, ditfere ance of la\li' and en nt e ai n1 Th ten nm er ov G e iv ut c e Ex of Section 2: Tl e f ctions s of �obbes; re�evance of �obbes' theo�y to �r�ca; t�e or�er;u�1 e v iew e as an active part1c1panr 1n at St e th ; ns tio nc fu al 11t n1e rn vc go of on extc11si · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · ·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . . . . . . 1t er n1 p dcvelo antages of ID??ar­ adv a11d _dis s age an� adv al ctic p�a onditi rfra a11d it) gsl1 Kin Sectio11 3: cl1y; tl1e divine rigl1t of kings; paternal i sm; Llle ill l portance of trad1t1on; . . . .. . .. ... . . . . . . . . . . . ica in Afr n itio trad ke; Bur of s view the •

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Section 4: Tl1eories of Den1ocracy-government by c onsent, responsive to the will

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of the people; representative governn1eot and the views of Locke; consent, n,ttural rigl1ts, a11d rebellion; Rousseau and tl1e theory of ''pure'' d.emo­ cracy; failings and insigl1ts of· tl1e General Will; limitations of popular government; tl1e balance between expertise and den1ocracy . . . . . . ... 38

Section 5: Tl1e Separation of Powers-Montesquieu's theory· analysis and applica·

tion of tl1is tl1eory; tl1e objects of separation and m�ns of achieving them; reJev ance of �eparation to Afric:1; tl1e need for integration of po wers even w1tl1 seperat1on; f ede ralisn1 . . ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . 46

Section 6: I-� �1_a 11 Ri_ghts-�hat are rigl1ts: examples of rigl1ts; rights as moral claims; d �flei ent kinds of rig.hts; tl1e nat 11ra l la \V basis for ri�l1ts; practica.l difficulties } tl1 nattiral �aw_ a l?pro_acl1; the utilitar ian approa;l1; tl1e views of Mill and � fhe ects of di�crin11nat1on; tl1e lin1itation of rigl1ts · tl1e conflicting de mands fl e c m m f t ?rig. h ts 1? _ tt!11tY, state sec11rity, and expert gover�111ent · the principle that 1m1t r1gl1ts' ·' probl_en1s of putt111g enforcing and . tion rigl1ts into c a . . · ' tl1e1n' th e a daptat1on of r1gl1ts 4 .. . 5 to cl1anging circumstances .. . . .. .. . Section 7: ; �o_no m;c Development and Political Developn1ent-P olitical Theories 1s� g . ron1 tl1e Ind11strial . e t . h � s lu vo Re n 11n! tio m_; mm Co rx r] and Ma , Ka Wel 1are state.' tl1e po . . 1itical econon1y of development; const1tutiona1 6 implic.:l' tions .. _ . . . 4 • • • •• •

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Chapter Il. S011rces or . 'J � 14 Etl11op 1 c1n Constitut. . · ' 011a . l Deve/opn-1e11t: Foreig11 Experience · · · ·· .. Part 1: The Instit11tio . ns of Par 1 ame t , Constitutional Monarchy and the idea of ''Rule 7 of Law'' .. . . .. • n . .. • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . ... • • • • •• 5 Section 1 : Cons tituti . onal Ch a ge s i p arliam ent; statu f _ t nder _ the Norn1an Kings-the development of of la w . . . . . t e �w �he King's courts; Magna Carta and due pro��� gO : . . - �. • • • •• •• • ••• • • •

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Section 2: The Develop1?en" of Parliamentary Sovereignty-Parliament underlthe Tudors; the issue of .3overeignty; parliamentary privilege; freedom of deba�e and from arrest; the dispute over the royal prerogative; Coke; taxation; the Petition of Right; the Civil War ru1d tl1e Revolution Settlement; the Bill of Rights ... . . . ... ... ... . . . ... ... ... . .. .. .

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Section 3: The Development of Principles of ''Rule of Lav,'' -judicial independence; due process and executive cot1rts; Star Chan1ber; u11lawful imprisonn1ent and habeas corpus; the liability at lavv of pL1blic officials; tl1e rule of law ... 117 Section 4: The D�velopment of Modern Parlia.n1entary Governn1ent-the extension of franc!lise and the growth of part1es; tl1e Cabinet and tl1e Primo 1'Ainister; the declme of the mon�rcl1 and tl1e I-louse of J...ords; tl1e place of constitu­ tional conventions; tl1e sovereignty of P�irlian1e11t .. . ... .. . ... ... 138

Part II: Judicial Enforcement of tl1e Constitl1tion as ''Su1Jren1e Lav;'' .. .

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Section 5: The Developn1ent of Judicial Review: Anglo-American Experience--the political theory of judicial review; its establisl1n1ent and operation i .1 the United States; Marbury v. P.ifadiso11; tl1e Englisl1 Privy Council . . ... 162 Section 6: The ''Reception'' of Judicial Revie\v in otl1er Countries-problems of adaptation; intro.duction and operation of judicial reviev1 in Japan; India; some African states; judicial review and tl1e rule of lav·, ... ... ... ... 182 Section 7: A Co mparison: the Rejection of Jt1dicial Revie\v in France-reasons for the French approach; French solutions to tl1e problen1 of l<eeping government under law . . . ... ... . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . ... .. . ... ... 201 Section 8: Judicial Review in Operation-illustrative cases; Loclzner v. Nelv Yorl<:and economic v. elfare legislation; ''just con1pe11sation '' and land refo1m in Japan; Terminiello v. C}zicago and freedon1 of speech; Cooper v. Aaro,z and . . . . .. . .. ... .. . 209 executive enforcement of constitutional decisio11s 1

Section 9: Limitations on the Exercise of the Power of Judicial Review-judicial povver and its limitations; justiciability; ''political qt1estions''; furtl1er requiren1ents limiting judicial review . .. .. . .. . ... ... ... .. . . . . .. . ... . . . 231 Part ill: Tanzanian Experience-A Contrast to Traditional Western Constitutionalism 247 Section 10: The Political Philosophy of Julius Nyerere-the single party; socialism; self-reliance; executive leadership; the role of tl1e civil service; the role ot� the constitution . . . ... .. . . .. ... ... ... .. . . .. .. . .. . ... . . . 248 Section 11: Constitutional Institutions and Problems-the Constitution; rigl1ts, ''rule of law'' and the c.ourts; the role of the Party; Parliament ... ••• • • • • •• 265 Chapter ID: The Constitutional Developme,zt of Ethiopia To 1935. ...

Part I:

The Traditional ''Constitution', of Etl1iopia ...

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Section 1 : Tlle Monarchy-religious and dynastic f oundatio11s; tl1e powers of t!ie Emperor, in theory and practice; tl1e ft1nct�ons. of tl1e Emperor, symbolic, ceremonial, executive, jt1dicial, military, leg1slat1ve, and as agent of cl1ange. 289 Section 2: The Traditional Government, ''Elites'' and Institutions-tl1e nobility, tl1e Churcl1 and tlie central administration; tl1e failure to develop a permanent administrative framework, and its causes ... . .. . . . . . . . . . . ·. . · · 326

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. 1 . . t - rigbts and duties in traditional Ethiopia ; ju dicial b . . . r . . . . . . . . . . . e . n . . t i . ... .. . . t a tus ? 3: e Ci � S� �� s · Th and ss ao n . c Sect ts' . r1 gh amilY f d an . t. s ... .. ... ... ... ... . · t1tu 1on 1ns ' rn' '' M ode .. to more tion . Transi . . Part n. The 1855 -1955-pol1t1cal centralisa tio ation s roi e Mo d . tions . of Condi t . ty and nobili he he t The Chu rch, 8� e �f declin e Section 4 : 0 al er i P ':" �he increased functions of gove rnment; otb e the rise of i il_lp change , nuc econo ... . .. . . . . .. ... .. . r and . . . , . . . . . . · · ... developm ents ... ··· · · · · stitutions of G ovemme�t -�h e found atio In Formal f n e�e� op�ent D e Th 5: s t t he Con t 1 ut1on of 1931; its eness; Section ctiv effe and rs owe �r p , e t h es � of the mm�str t he unp �blis hed Comm ent ary f ion; titut s J Con e th f o p r omulgation' tex_t � s titut ion; appraisal of the Constitution· Con the f s o g ri o 3 e s e n 19 1; Japa. . 5' 93 of ent en , pm liam elo Par dev t 1 he t 3 nt e ' 1 iam l r 19 Pa f the establ1shm ent °

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A11 Overview of its lnzmediate Origins and 5: 195 of rz tio itu ,zst Co d vise Re Chapter IV: The I · · · · · . · · · · · · · · · · · · · n ··· · · · · · · ·· .. tio · · · ·· · · 350 · i� Future Evolu

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Sectio n 1: Ste s Leading to Constitutional Revis ion-Parliament and l�gislation cast in � modern forn1; the execL1tive; the legal s�stem; the prov�ces and the churcl1; guidelines for the expancled p ro tection of human nghts ... ... 351

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Section 2: The Federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea-steps leading t o the federation; the federal act and tl1e legal structure of t he federat ion; th.e federation and expanded guarantees of civil rigl1ts; the f ederal courts and judicial revi ew; steps to\vards tl1e ending of federation . .. . .. ... . .. ... ... ... ... 366 l

Section 3: Drafting anc! Pro1nulgation of tl1e Revised Constitution-the Revised · t; Constitution in hist orical perspective; drafting of the Constitution; pro­ mulgation of the Constitution . . . . .. . .. ... ... ... . . . .. . ... ... 386 G

Section 4: The Co11ceptual Framework of th e Co ns titu � tio ns th tructure of the e Constitution; a conceptual outline; signifi can de velopments since 1955 . .. 393 t Section 5: Quest ions of Future C •• onstitutional Development : The Constitution as Sup_ren1; e Law-pr?ble1ns in tl1e ap plic at io n of tl1e theory of judicial review to t� iopra; re_troa:t1ve ap plication of tl1e Const itu ti on of 1955 to pre-Consti;ut i onal le gis lation; the cruci::11 ro le o f th e lawyer an d other p ob le 40 r ms. 1 Section 6: � �es�ons Future Constitution Development: Th R the Monarch, ol e of e e nd .Parliament-transition ����� � a � respon al steps towards ministeria l 'a lt ernatl\'e patterns of development: models and problems .. . 420 ,.,,

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TABLE OF LEGISLATION AND CASES REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OR DISCUSSED Note: Since some of the original sources of these materials are at this writing unavailable in our library, a secondary source is indicated. The abbreviation ''S. and M." is for Stephenson and Mar­ cham {eds.) Sources of English Co11stiti1.tiona/ History; the abbreviation ''Perry'' is for Perry (ed.) Sources of Our Liberties (1959). Grateful aknowledgement must be n1ade to tl1e copyright holders (Harper and Row and the American Bar Association) for permission to use tl1ese materials, as we have, so freely. Table of Legis/at iorz Act Habeas Corpus (1679) Stat11tes of t/1e Rea/111, V, 935f: 31 Charles II, C. 2, discussed, Page 112, 127. Act of 1487, ''Pro Camera Stellata'', 3 Henry VII, C. 1, discussed, Page 121. Act 31 Henry Vill, C. 8, (1539), discussed, Page 156. Act of 1641, Abolishing The Star Chamber, 16 Car. 1, 3. 10, Danby Pickering (ed.), from Perry, op.cit., pages 138-141, Page 123. Act Triennial, (1641), Statutes of the Realn1, V, 54f; 16 Charles I, C. 1, discussed Page 110. Act Erecting A High Court of Justice (6 January 1649) (Firth and Rait. Acts and Ordi11ances; I, 1253f.) in S. and M., op.cit., page 516, Page 124. Act, Reform 1832, Stati1tes of the U11ited Ki11gdo111, LXXlT, l 54f: 2 William IV, C. 45, discussed Page 139. Act� Factory, (1833) Statutes of the U11ited Ki11gdo1n LXXlll, 985p: 34 William IV, C. 103, discussed Page 139. Act, Parliamentary Refo1rn of 1910, Parliamentary Debates, HoL1se of Commons N. S., XIlI9 546-578 from S. and M., op.cit., pages 841, 850, Page 151. Act, Equal Franchise of 1928, Public General Acts, 1928, 27p: 18-19 George V, C. 12, dis­ cussed Page 140. Act, Government of India, 1935,. 25 and 26 George V, C. 42, disc11ssed in Basu, Con1n1e11taries on the Constitution -of India (1961 ed.) Vol. 1, page 114, Page 194. Act, Minister of Crown, 1937, 1 Edward 8 and 1 George VI, C. 38, discussed Page 152. ''Apology'' of the House of Commons to King James, 1604, from Jo11r11al 011 the HoL1se of Commons in S. and M., pages 418-422, Page 103. Assize of Clarendon (1 l 66) discussed Page 85. Bill of Rights (1689) 1 William and Marry, Session 2, C. 2, Danby Pickering (ed.), fron1 Perry, op.cit., pages 245, 247, Page 113. Code, Penal of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 158 of 1957, Negarit Gazeta l 6tl1 Year Ex­ traordinary Issue No. 1, Page 399. Code, Maratime of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 164 of 1960, Negarit Gazeta 19tl1 Year Ex-· traordinary Issue No. 3, Page 399. Code, Civil of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 165 of 1960, Negarit Gazeta 19tl1 Year Extraordinary Is.s1ae No. 3, Page 399. Code, Commercial of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 166 of 1960, Negarit Gazeta 21st Year �traordi nary Issue No. 1, Page 399. ·Code, Criminal Procedure of Ethiopia, Proclamation (unnumbered) of 1961, Negarit Gazeta �ls_f Year Extraordinary Issue No. 1, Page 399. ·Code, Civil Procedure of Ethiopia, Decree No. 52 of 1965, Negarit Gazeta 25th Year Ex­ traor("mary Iss.ue No. 1, Pages 94, 128, 243. 399. .

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· - ·Order No. 27 of 196· 2, (Termination of the Federal Status of Eritrea and the Application to Eritrea of the System of Unitary Administration of the Empire of Ethiopia), Negarit Gazeta 22nd Year No. 3, Page 385. Order No. 33 of 1964, (Ministry of Information), Negarit Gazeta 23rd Year No. 10, Page 397. Order No. 34 of 1964, (Livestock & Meat Board), Negarit Gazeta 23rd Year No. 13, Page 398. Order No. 43 of 1966, (Local Self Administration Order), Negarit Gazeta 25th Year No. 9 (B), Page 398. Order No. 44 of 1966, (Prime Minister, Powers), Negarit Gazeta 25tl1 Year No. 10, Page 391. Order No. 46 of 1966, (Ministers, Powers & Duties), Negarit Gazetc1 25th Year, No. 23, Page 397. Petition of Right (1628), 3 Car. 1, C. l, Danby Pickering (eel.) discussecl, Page 109. Proclamation of Emperor Menelik Il to Enst1re Tl1at a Worker is Respected on Account of His Work (1900 E.C.), Page 309. Proclamation Concerning Elections of Jan1es I, (1604), (Rymer, Foedera, XVI, 561f.) in S. and M., op.cit., pages 406-407, Page 49. Proclamation No. 1 of 1942, (Negar.it Gazeta Establisl1ed), Negarit Gazeta 1st Year No. 1, Page 352. Procla:mation No. 2 of 1942� (Ad111inistration of Justice), Negarit Gazeta 1st Year No. 1, Page 356. Proclamation No. 75 of 1945, (Agrict1ltt1re & Meat Board), Negarit Gazeta 4th Year No. 8, Page 355. Proclamatjon 107 (Ta,x) of 1949, Negarit Gazeta 8tl1 Year No. 12, Page 135. Proclamation No. 113 of 1950, (Ethiopian Grain Board), Negarit Gazetc1 9tl1 Year No. 9, Page 356. Proclamation No. 115 of 1951, (Highway Autl1ority), Negarit Gazeta 10th Year No. 5, Page 356. Proclamation No. 116 of 1951, (Development Bank of Ethiopia), Negarit Gazetc1 1Otl1 Year No. 7, Page 356. Proclamation No. 131 of 1952, (I. B. T. E.), Negarit Gazeta 12th Year N·o. 5, Page 356. Proclamation No. 139 of 1953, (Public Rights), Negarit Gazeta 13th Year No. 3, Page 380. ''Protestation'' of Parliament in 1621, C.D. 1621, JI, 509, fron1 Bowen, The Lio11 a11d tl1e Throne (1957), pages 452-454, Page 105. United Nations Declaration of Human Rigl1ts of 1948, Page 364. United Nations Resolution of December, 1950, (''The Federal Act''), Officic1/ Records of the General Assembly; Seventh Session, SL1pplement No. 15 (A/2188) New York, (1952), Page 369.

Table of Cases Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Page 226. ''Arc/1er's Case'' ' from Star Chc1mber Reports (1631) in S. and M., page 465, Page 123. Ashby v. White (1702-1703), from Holts Reports in S. and M., pages 638-640, Page 131.

Aslcwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936), Page 237. · ''Bonhan,z's Case'', (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 114a, from Roscoe Pound, Developmerrt ofC011stit11tio,1al , G1ie1ral1tee.r of _Libert.Y (1957), page 51, Page 119. •

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF 1BANKS FOR PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE Grateful acknowledgement is made to the publishers and copyrigl1t holders listed below for permission to reproduce from the works listed. Publisher

Author

Title

Date of P11blication

American Journal of Comp­ arative Law

Nathf\nson

Co11stiti1tio11al tio11 i11 Japa11

Appleton-Century-Crofts

Gettel I

History of Political TJ1011gl1t

Black, A. & C.

Keir

Constiti,tio11al History Moder11 Britai11

The Bodley Head

C.ranston

/1 Glossary of Political Ter1r1s

(1966)

Cranston

What are Hi1111a11 Rigl1ts?

(1962)

Knox (Translation)

Tlze Bible

(1954)

Cambridge University Press

Jennings

Cabi11et Govern1r1e11t

(1961)

Cambridge University Press ·

Maitland

The Constit11tional History of Engla11d

(1908)

Chicago University Press

Levine

Wax & Gold

(1965)

East African

Y.P. Ghai & P. McAuslan

Corzstitutional Proposals for a One-Party State in Tanzarzia

(1965)

Ethiopia Obse ·rver

Imru

Fita}vrari Belay

(1962)

Eyre & Spottiswoode

Mathew

Ethiopia, tlze Study of , Polity

(1947)

Faber & Faber

Perham

Tl1e Govern1ne11t of Etlziopia

(1948)

Harcourt, Brace & World

Chase

Harcourt, Brace & World

•

·Toe Bodley Head Bums & Oates & His Eminen.ce Cardinal Arch�ishop of Westminister

Law Joutn.al

Aclji1clica-

(1958) (1953)

of

.

(1961)

· .· Tl1e Tyra1111y of Words

(1938)

Knappen

Constitt1tiona/ & Legal History of Engla11d

(1964)

Harper & Row

Marcham

A

Co11stit1.1tio11a/ History of Mo<lern E11g/a11d

(1960)

Harper & Row

Sources of English Co11sti­ Stephenson & tutional History Marcham (eds.)

(1937)

Harvard · 1.aw Review

Cappalletti & Adams

Ji,dical Review of Legislation

(1966)

llatvard Law Review

Von Mehren

Tl1e Legal Order i11 Japan's Changing Society

(1963)

ffl�d University Press

Sutherland (ed)

Gover11n1ent Under Law

(1956)

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(1965)

McAuslan

Republicc1n Constitution of Tc1r1za11ia

(1964)

BovJen

Tl1e Lio11 & T/1e Throne

Von Mehren

Civil Lau, SJ 1ste1n

(1957)

Trevelyan

History of Eng/a11d (Vol. II)

(1953)

!vlacn1it�n

Dicey

T/1e LaH1 of the Constitution

(1959)

Norton

Kelly & t.larbison

The A111erica11 Co11stitt1tion: /rs Origin & Develop,nenr

(1963)

New YJrk University Press LY. A1r2rican Dar Foundation

Perry

So11rces of 0Ltr Liberties

(1959)

Oxford University Press

Nyerere

Freedo1r1 and U11ity

(1966)

Prenticel-Iall

Elliott & McDonald

Wesrer11 Political Heritage

(1949)

Prenticel-Iall

Ward & Jvlacridis

Modern Political Systems: Asia

(1963)

Sarkar

Basu

Co111111e11rc1ries 011 the Co11sri111tion of India

(1965)

Pankhurst

lnrroc/11ctio11 to the Econ01r1ic History of Et/1iopia

(1961)

Little, rrown Longn1,ns, Green

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I,I I I

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"'I ,I. .J

Sidg,vicl & Jackson

Becker

Stanfor< University Press

Moder11 History

(1958)

Lt1tl1er

Stevens

(1958)

Pickles

Erhiopia Today French Constitution

(1960)

Frenc/1 Ad111ir1. Lau, & the Co,11111011 La•v 'f,Vorld

(1954)

Statz.is, Divisio11 of Labour, etc.

(1961)

Co11rt & Constitution in Japa11

(1964)

Univcrsty College of Ad�is Ababa Etl1nological Soc1ev Bulletin Universty of Vlashington Press Wesleya1 University Press

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•

(1956, 1957)

Silver B1rdett

Stevens

. !

(1963)

Tat1zc111ia, A 011e-Party State /CJ Bulletin No. 23

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in Japa11 Von Mehren (ed) Law Report 011 t/1e Bangkok Confere11ce of 1965

(1965)

Little, rrown

l

Date of Pubf iculion

The DJ111c1n1ic Aspects of the Rttle of Lau, in 1/1e Modern Age

Internatonal Con1mission of Jurist: ly Intcrnatonal Law Quarter

I

Title

Autho r

Weident;ld & Nicolson Yale U1iversity Press

Scl1wartz

Pank11urst Maki

Mosley Pound

(1961)

Federalist Papers Haile Selassie

(1964)

The Deve/op111ent of Co11sti� tt,tiona/ Guaranrees of Liberty

(1957)

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PUBLICATIONS OF 'IHE FACULTY OF LAW PERIODICALS THE JOURNAL OF ETHIOPIAN LAW Three _numb �rs publis�e� annually at the Faculty of Law, Haile Sellassie I University in co­ operation with the M1n1stry of Justice, Imperial Ethiopian Government.

BOOKS MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF THE PENAL LAW OF ETI-IIOPIA (1965) Steven Lowenstein, Faculty of Law, I-Iaile Sellassie I University. ETHIOPIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1967) Robert Allen Sedler, Professor of Law, HaiJe Sellassie I University. AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHIOPIAN PENAL LAW (1965) Philippe Graven, Ministry of Jt1stice, Imperial Etluopian Government. ETIDOPIAN LEGAL FORMBOOK (1966): VOLUME ONE (FORMS OF LAW AND LEGAL DOCUMENTS) Kenneth Robert Redden, Professor of Law, Haile Sellassie I University.

MONOGRAPHS AN INTRODUCl10N TO THE SOURCES OF ETHIOPIAN LA\V (1966) Dr. Jacques Vanderlinden, Faculty of. Law, Haile Sellassie I University.

THE LAW MAKING PROCESS IN ETHIOPIA (1966) Kenneth Robert Redden, Professor of Law, Haile Sellassie I University.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS OF 'l'HE: FACULTY OF LAW AND 'l'HE INSTI'l'U'l'E OF E1HIOPIAN STUDIES THE LAND TENURE SERIES LAND CHARTERS OF NORTHERN ETHIOPIA (1965) G.W.B. Huntingford, D.Lit., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. PILOT FIELD STUDY OF CHORE (SHOA) (1965) H.S. Mann, Rural Institutions Officer, F.A.O., United Nations. STATE AND LAND IN ETHIOPIAN HISTORY (1966) Richard Pank.hurst, Director, Institute of Ethiopian St11dies.

All o,f the above works may be purchased in Ethiopia from tl1e � aculty of La':" or tl1e Institute _ �f ·Ethiopian Studies, Haile Sellassie I University, Box ! 176, Addis A:ba� a, Eth1op1a� or Interna­ tionaIJy, from Ox.ford University Press, Box 1024, Addis Ababa, Etl11op1a. .

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Proclamation Promulgating the Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia •

CONQUERING LION OF THE TRIBE OF JUDAH HAILE SELLASSIE I ELECT OF GOD, EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA WHEREAS, twenty-four years ago, at the beginning of Our Rei gn , We granted to Our faithful Subjects and proclaimed a Constitution for the Empire of Ethiopia; and WHEREAS, ALMIGHTY GOD, THE SOURCE OF ALL BENEFITS, has strengthened and inspired Us to lead Our beloved People, during Our Rei gn, through the greatest of trials and hardships to an era of great progress in all fields; and WHEREAS, being desirous of consolidating tl1e progress achieved and of laying a solid basis for the happiness and prosperity of tl1e present and future genera­ tions of Our People, We have prepared a Revised Constitution for Our Empire, after manv years of searching study and reflection; and WHEREAS, Our Parliament, after due examination and deliberation, has submitted to Us its approval of this Revised Constitution; NOW THEREFORE, WE, HAILE SELLASSIE I, EMPEROR OF ETHIO­ PIA, do, on the occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Our Coronation, hereby proclaim and place into force and effect as from to-day, the Revised Consti­ tution of the Empjre of Ethiopia, for the benefit, welfare, and progress of Our beloved People. GIVEN in Our Imperial Capital, on this the 4tl1 day of November, 1955, and on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Our Coronation.

HAILE SELLASSIE I Emperor

TSAHA FE TEZAZ TAFARRA WORQ Minister of the Pen

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THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF ETHIOPIA

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CHAPTER I THE ETIDOPIAN EMPIRE AND THE SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE ARTICLE 1. The Empire _ of Ethiopia comprises all tl1e territories, including the islands a.nd t �e .terntor1al �aters, under the sovereignty of tl1e Ethiopian Crown. Its sovereignty and territory are indivisible. Its territories and the sovereign rights therein are inalienable. All Ethiopian subjects, whether living witl1in or without the Empire constitute · the Ethiopian People. ARTICLE 2. The Imperial dignity shall remai11 perpetually attached to the line of Haile Sellassie I, descendant of King Sahle Sellassie, whose line descends v1ithout inter­ ruption from the dynasty of Menelik I, son of the Q11een of Ethiopia, the Queen of Sheba, and King Solomon of Jerusalem. ARTICLE 3. The succession to the Throne and Crown of the Empire by the descendants of the Emperor and t.he exercise of the powers of Regency shall be determined as hereinafter provid.ed. ARTICLE 4. By virtue of His Imperial Blood, as well as by the anointing which He has received, the person of the Emperor is sacred, His dignity is inviolable and His power indisputable. He is, consequently, entitled to all the honours dt1e to Him in accordance with tradition and the present Constitution. Any one so bold as to seek to injure the Emperor will be punished. ARTICLE 5. The order of succession shall be lineal, and only male, born in lawful wedlock, , the er ote re eld and rem mo the ore bef s pas ll sha may line d cee rest suc nea the le· ma ' . rn the line before the younger. In conforrnity with the provisions of this Article and tl1e �ollo�ing Articles 6..16� a special law shall deterinine the order of, and the qual1ficat1ons for the su ccession. . ,, .

ARTICLE 6 . .. .. · . Among those entitled to the succession s�all be r_eckoned also Jhe son unborn, �QQ s,hall immediately take bis proper place 1n the line of succession the moment he 11. ·�m into the world . .. '

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ARTICLE 7. e and Cro wn n ro 1e h tl T to n io ss e c c su is H th f e o ' . e m ti 1e ti t a , t . d the age of eighteen years, He sh. a 11, on t he day det In the even· t tl1a a v t_e� His succession�: ar af ye ha e n o s an th ro e r te E�p : �/� : �� la en t not v e :�: t b . 1 e provisions and details tl r, o er p m E D11ned s a ed n w o cr o d n a ' J d 1 t . e p h E ID ? l n t ia a n f o o e b m · o e . h re , e n C ly v n t o o ati ·i an n ro o t h e Cr C 1e tl in d e in e te rm d g 1n e b n io t a on r o the C er, 193 o. b m e v o N d n 2 ' Ortl1odcx C l1urcl1 of C ARTICLE 8. e ror is unable to exercis e the p m E 1e tl t a th t n e ev Re�ncy sll all exist in tl1e a b se n c e fro1!1 th e Empire, or by , ty ri o in m f o _ 1 1 so a " ,. Imperial Office, whether by re . ch il su In nc u ca o n C w , es ro C s e 1e th tl y b d erm 111e t de s a s es ln il s ou ri se cf reason d s an er w 1e l tl erogatives po al pr r, ro e p m E e 1 tl f o e m a n 1e tl in RegencysI1ail exe rcise, er to grant the title of w po no e 1 av l ll a 1 sl y nc e g e R e of the Crown, exc ept tl1at th s tie er e of the Crown th op pr s rd ga re as ly on e rs w po r e lc a t e r a c e v a l1 Prince, md sl1a ll e upon the cessation at in rm te lly ica at n1 1to a1 l al sl1 y nc ge Re r. ro pe m and of ·he E en ris e to th e Regency, in ac: giv g vin t·' ha s o11 iti 11d co e th of r, ro pe Em tl1e as regards ent article. Re gen cy sh. a ll be exercised s pre 1e tl of s ion vis pro the h wit cc dan cor respectiv;ly, in tl1e situatio11s as provided for in Articles 9 an d 11, by the perso� -' or by th: Cot1ncil, as provided for in Articles IO and 11.

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TIONAL LAW U T I T S N O C 0 F ETHIOPIAN

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. In t!:ie ev�nt t�at tl1e_ Emperor, or in tl1e event tl1at the Crown Prince or the Heir Pre:u�pt1ve, 1n the s1tuat1ons provided for in Article 11, sl1all not have attained tlie age �f eightee� year�, tl1e R ege11cy shall be exercised by tl1 e Council of Regency as prov1ied for 111 Article 11.

ARTICLE 10. · Of tl1e Empr ess Motl1er, the two desThe Council of Reoency sllac: ll • consiSt cendants of tl1 e line of s: i 11 e S. eII assi_e moSt 11early related to tl1e Emperor, as deter· mined b, tl1e Crown C nc i1 1 av g re a l1 of g in be nd e en a th e te f ag o gh ei i 7d � sound mnd, tl1e Archbi��o 111; Pri�ri�e M i nist er, �l1e e Senate and th of President the Presilent of the CllainbJr' O f D eputies. The _ Pr e s1 de 11t of tl1e Council of Regency shall be '11e E inpr ess Motl e 0 n H e r ab senc e, the Prin1e Minister. No decisions of the C)uncil o f Regenc� :ila1�, � e taken except by a majority vote of two-thirds of the nembers tllereof.

ARTICLE 11. . Reg,ncy sh� be e xercised by . ti 1e v e, as wn Cro _ pu sum nce Pre Pri t e case nay be, 111 case of or eir the H · · o us illness, � tl1e se r 1 or tl1e absence �f tl1e Empero r from t e Empre. Howe ver in tl1e even t tl1 at tl1e C . tive, · mp p n su Pre as the Cffie m �y b e, l111 row c� or the Heir r1n ' nself sl . · 1all be sub�ect ent abs to from the.Einpire or shall be serious shall illness or . not l I a ve attained l1is eigl1 teenth be e �ercsed by tl1e � egency s h all R the yea · Coun . cil of ts· ? 1 R 1 ege h 1 cy'. wl11c ru nctions to the crow · u1 · h s q relin sl1all ally atic om . aut n n Pri ce · or th e He1r presumpt�ve, as the case may be, upon the cessa..1· on of a11 . Y Suc�1 disability of t�ve) as the ca.;e · ay b e. tl P row ro Presu n Pr!n9e or the Heir i Ser � ous e illn ss of th� rown uve, as the ca:e i: Y be, p um Prince or the Heir Pres shall be dete rmined b Y the Cro wn Council.

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THE REVISED CONS'I'I'l'UTION OF ETHIOPIA

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ARTICLE 12. Upon th� birth of th� Cr�wn Prince, the Emperor shall designate the members of the Council of Guard1ansh1p to be convened and to assume its responsibilities only in the event of a Regency. The mother of the Crown Prince shall be ex-officio Counc�l. The Council of Guardiansbjp shall receive in trust for a member of such _ the Crown Pnnce one-third of the annual income and reve11ues received by the predecessor of the Crown Prince who has become Empero r ' in conformity with · the provisions of Article 19 (c). ARTICLE 13. (a) In t.he event that the Emperor shall, at any time, l1ave no male descendant, or no male descendant capable of meeting the reqt1irements for succession to the Throne, He shall, after having _previot1sly const1lted the Crown Council, publicly designate as Heir Presumptive from a1nongst His nearest male r. elatives, a direct descendant of Sah]e Sellassie, meeting tl1e reqt1ireme11ts for succession to t rie Throne. (b) The deter111inations as to the qualifications for succession shall be made by the Emperor, after ha,ing previo11sly consulted tl1e Crown Council. (c) In case of a deter111ination tl1at a male descendant is incapable of meeting the requirements for succession, sucl1 determination shall operate to exclude such male descendant in favour of the next male descendant, or, in favour of the Heir Presumptive. The designation of an Heir Presumptive shall become inoperative upon the subsequent birth of a male descenda11t. (d) In case of the minority of the Emperor,, the designation of an Heir Presum­ ptive shall, in accordance with the provisions of the present article, be effected by the Council of Regency. However, at the time of His coronation, and at any time thereafter, the Emperor shal] be free to designate, in accordance with the p1·ovisions of the present Article, another Heir Presumptive in replacement of the Heir Presum­ -ptive designated by the Council of Regency, or previot1sly, by Himself. ARTICLE 14. Throughout His minority, the place of residence of tl1e E_mperor shall be the Imperial Palace. Absence therefrom for travel or for educational purposes may be. authorized by law. Upon attaining the age of _twelve years the Em i:eror may make official appearances, attended by the CouncJl of Regency, the Princes, the ''Balabats'' and the Dignitaries (Mekuanent). ARTICLE 15. A.ny member of the Imperial Family, who, being eligible for tl1e succession,

marries a foreigner or who marries without the consent of the E�peror, of t� e R.egent, or of the Council of Regency, as the case may be, shall forfeit a.11 Imperial prerogatives for himself and J1is descendants. ARTICLE 16. _ The Imperial famjly shall include all direc! lineal ascen�ants and descendants, tog�hcr with their spouses, of the Emperor, with the exception of those wl1� h�ve ian op hi e Et th of t e no ar o wh or 15 le tic c Ar of s ll?fv p:rnplied with the provision '¾t lladox Faith. .

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ARTICLE 17 .

, es eg il iv emolum ents traV1.' pr s, ie it ] bi si on sp re eu s ie . ' ut d , n 10 ·t· 1 s , • o p , of t.he Imperial Fa u·1 s b er m e m f o The status d n a es c n ri n 1e P tl f o 1t e1 m · rt O · p to t'1me and th eir reco Y e t 1m m ·1 ro f abroad and de 1 c n u o C n w ro C le ti y b . d e r e 'd 1 s m- , n r o . o c r r f e c e io p e b e E h m rt t ll u ·h a to sl1 r d . te a o ti ic ac n u n. m m o c e b ll 1a sl n o re e mendations th

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ARTICLE 18.

ll _ n fu d of tio io �a er al p a e b ll 1a rn. ou sl m e e� th , or er p m E e 1 ti of 1 l Upon tl,e deat 1ng of s�x months, an d rn ou f :11 al l1 of d io er p a y b d ve irlg of three montl1s, follo\. na. l mourning ll t.Io fu . na d of 1o er :p a be l al 1 sl re 1e _tl s, es Jr nJ upon tlie deatI1 of tl1e E 1 s. th e ur on Th fo m of g ro in pe rn Em ou r m lf l1a of od ri pe a by ed w llo fo of two montl1s, g on in up rn the deathi ou l m na tio na lf ha d an ll fu of ds rio pe r se les sl1all proclain1 l na of tio d g. na rio urnin pe mo o n at th pt ce ex , ily m Fa l ria pe Irn e tl1 of s er of otl1er m.emb 1 an on e year from the date of the 1 tl re mo on ati ron co a ed 1 01 stJJ po be to may cause of ; age teen. the eigh ing ain att s Hi of or or per Em tl1e of 1 1 ow Cr tl1e to n sio succes ,· In tl1e event that tl1e coronation takes place during a period of full or l1alf mourning suc]1 period of rnol1r11ing shall be terminated seven days before tl1e coronation.

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(a) 1'�1e regalitl_ of _tl1e Crown, including all regalia of tl1e Empress and of the ' Crowr1 Prince, are 1nal1enable as belongi 11g to the Empire. . (b) F�oin tl1e date of tl1 e proclamation of tl1e present Constitution, alJ realiy · registered 111 tl,� �ame_ of tl1e Cro\v11 ( Bete lvfengist) are l1eld in trust for the Crown ·· under tl1 e adrrunistrat1011 of tl1 e Emperor and are inalienable. (c) lt is tl,e EinJJeror' s rigl 1 t to administer all of tl1e i 11alienable p ro pert ies 0f tl1e Crow11 and all pro fit 1 _s ar1d reve11t1es tl1eret'rom for tl1e benefit of the Cro\ VD d and tl1e E mp1· re . and to re. ceive anct administer 'd i ro · · an an11ual appropriation, as p v e · by law from ti' 1 1 TreaSliry, wl1i l 1 �l1all, �itl1 tl1 e aforeseaid profits an� . · u rev�nt1�s, be ad�� ua���; tlle ftilfilnie 1 1t of� l-:I 5 Con nt 1 s functions under tl1 e prese · ·1 1· tut1on · J 11 ca' se of a Regency' the civi • aw. I by ed 1st determin sl1all be annually . (d) All.properties held in t} 1 e nan1es of n· aI e th bnpe _ ' of the n1embers Emperor or ly F�mi are JJrivate pro Jert a 11 d_, ap as 1 , are t111der tl1e same regime as that Sucl pl1cable to all JJrOJJerti�s nationals of tl1e Em1)ire. . (e) TJ1e. Einpero r's Cot1rt slla · ch . su_ ke o11 and He may ma arrangements in regard ti1ereto 11 b e under I-:I1s directi 1nt 1 . ppo . a · as 1 He , . deems appropriate. r;e may, at w1 to, or d 1· sm1ss from all p . osts a t I-Its Court, Uch perso ns as He st1 alJ see fit. S

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........ · -::---:"" . TI AR CLE 20 · Upon tl1e establis all · 1 1me11t of a C · sh otincil of Rege11 ey, eacl1 n1ember ther:0f.. ed-· take ' 10 · t I1e pre�e1 1ce of bY tl e Arcl1b1sl1 op: the E mperor, the follow ing oatt1 wl1ict1 shall be ad m1n1st er � __,;:;;. -. . '·In tl1 e nam e of t 1 . k. o- -- venv. . � le Al m1gl1ty 0 ai1d as a member of tl1e Couneil -� R-:� and:i:, I l1e�e bY swear '. to defend e 1 1 all n1 1 inl �� ! v ' p�i , a � , ce h er s l1t ow p _ rig y of e t � : 1 s ajesty 11 of ,�l�� � t1n _1 Hi M d� ? � ] of Regenc y· th �per_o r, so long as .I shall rernru� � ;n".� at . will, at all times respect and-O. e . . · 0nF Constit ti t ion, a11d , U.O ��,: tha t in a 11'my act C,Q . ..,..,-.:;-:-:: _ ions and conduct. as n1ember of th�t-. _ . . .. -· ..•

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. THE REVISED CoNSTITUTION OF ETHJOPIA

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· I will eve� be motivated by respect for the Constitution and the firm resolve of pro�ec�1ng the rights, privile�es and inl1eritance of His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, so that they may be intact at the moment when He shall be annoint­ ed and crowned Emperor of Ethiopia. So help me God." The Archbishop shall himself take the sam e oath. ARTICLE 21. On the occasion of His Coronation, tl1e En1p eror shall take the following oath: ''In t�e name of Almighty God, v\1 e .... Emperor of Etl1iopia, swear that We will u_phold �nd def end tl1e Constitt1tion of tl1e E mpire; tl1at We will govern Ou.r SubJects with pat.ience and devotio11 to tl1eir general welfare and in ac­ c�rdance with the �onstitlltion and tl1 e laws; tl1at We will faithfully defend, wtth all th � me�ns 1n Our power� tl1e inte grity and territory of Ot1 r Empire; that We will fa1thfully see to the in1partia.l exect1t:ion of all laws ay,proved by Parliament and proclaim.ed by Us; that W e profess and will defend tl1e Holy Orthodox Faith based on the doctrines of St. Mark of Alexandria, professed in Ethiopia since the Holy Emperors Abrel1a a11d Atsbiha; that \Ve will ever promote th e spiritual and material w elfare and advancement of Our Subjects; and that, with the aid of tl1e Almighty, We will f ajthf11lly exec11te the promises which We have here undertaken. So help Us God." ARTICLE 22. On the oc-casion of the Coronation of tl1e Emperor, if over twelve years of age, the Crown Prince or th·e Heir Presumptive, as the case may be, all me;-n'h.f:'rs of the Crown Council and all mem bers of the Parlia1nent, shall individually take an oath of homage and fidelity to tl1e Emperor. ARTICLE 23. In pursuance of the requiremen ts of Article 22, t11e Crown Prince or the Heir Presumptive, as the case may be, if over the age of twelve, shall take the following .oath: ''In the name of the Almighty, I hereby swear tl1at I will faithfully observe all the precepts and directions of my Aug�st Fatl1er (''Sov�reig?'' in the case of an Heir Presumptive) an d will ever strive to respect .His � 1shes and se_ek not a.fter that which is not given to me, and be not so 1mpat1ent as Adon1as or so daring as Abeselom; that I will ever co�d11ct mysel� so as to be wort?Y of my Sire (''Sovereign '' in the case of an I-Je1r Pr�s11mpt1ve), of my I11:per1al Blood and of the high station which is (''m_ay be'' 11 1 th e case of a� H_e1r Pre­ sumptive) my destiny; that I will, at all times, �espect the Const1tut1on and the laws, and will ever profess and de·fend tl1_e Fa1tl1 o� our _ Ortl1odox Cl1urch. I swear that with the assistan ce of the Alm1gl1ty, I will fa1thft1lly execut e tl1e promises wh,ich I have here undertaken. So l1eLp me God.'' In the event that the aforesaid oatl1 shall not l1ave been !aken on· tl1� occasion of, th� Coronation, either by the Crown Princ e or by the Heir Pre�um pt,ve r as t�e ¢be-·may be it shall be tak en before the Emperor by tl1e Crown P� 1nce or the Heir · !t�trri'l'}Jtive: as the case may be, upon his attai ning· the age of e ighteen. . ..'..... . . .

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L LAW A N O TITUTI S N O C N IA THIOP E F O K OO B SoURCB

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A R T I C L E 24 . s er b e th of the Crow.em , m 2 2 le ic rt A f o ts en "II · em ir u q re e th f o e c In pursuan : h t a o g in w o ll . . fo e h . t e k a t ll a h s il c n u Co e d c n n a 1a ity to my g el e r d �l fi a a e sw y b re e h I , ty h ig lm A e th f o e m a n e th r e In b '' s a m l, of the CroWn e 1l m . w I _t a th d n a . . . y st je a Sovereign, His Imperial M o_ve a ll els� th e n.t er e st a n d welfare of Et_hiopia ab e c la ; p y ll fu h it fa l, ci Coun ec e t t h sp l C re l f Y h u t 1t st1 1a on , es m o ti . uti ll n· a t a , ill w I at · th n ig re ' ve So and f 1t s n re co t fid r ec · � _s l inforo n t�a en se o I c 1s · d I ·I 1 w I . at th nd a , re pi m and laws of the E es ti a nd positio n. So du al ci offi y m h it w n io ex nn co mation revealed to me in help me God . " ARTICLE 25. of the ers i mb e men th me rlia Pa , 22 le tic Ar of ts en em uir req tl1e of e nc In pursu a shall t ake the followjng oatl1: ''In the name of the Almighty, I hereby sw ear allegi ance and fidelity to my Sovereign, His Imperial Majesty . . . . and tha t I will, as member of the Parlia­ ment, faithfully place above all else the interest a nd welfare of Ethiopia and of its Sovereign; th at I will, at all times, faith fully respect the Constitution and laws of the Empire, and tl1at I will disclose no secret or confidential infor­ mation revealed to me in connexion witl1 my official duties and position. So . help me God."

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CHAPTER Il

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THE POWERS AND PREROGATIVES OF THE EMPEROR

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ARTICLE 26. The Sovereignty of. the Empire · ·is_ ve�ted .10 !l1e Emperor and the supr eme au· thority over all the aff . airs 0� tl1e Empire is exercised by Him as the Head of State, in the manner prov1ded for i n tl1e present C onstitution.

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ARTICLE 27. . 1st!i . . es, The Emperor determines th e or� . . a �izat1_on, powers and duties of all M1n executive dep artments and tlle m n s at1o ns of t� e Go vern ment and appo ints, r � 1 � � mo pro tes, transfers, suspend s a n dismisses th e offi.c1als of th e same.

ARTICLE 28. . . The Emperor appoi nts Je · . . . . M ayors of the n 129 of the present Consti . mun1c1pal1t1es referred to 1 Arne· , h-ca5L by the Municipal Coun tu1 ion, from three candid a tes presented ' in eac� · c·11 s th ereof. . -..-,:,.:�� ARTICLE 29 · The Emperor res . · .r nt -e --= s -: l erve . ' the t righ l an:>r ' to decl_ are war. He, wi·th _the advice a nd consent oLPa; � h furt er be mainta.ined, both th e �1 gl1� to decide what armed.f g�Jr"� in time' · ,,_ · �i n � , a od 10 time of war. As Command@ ,..r____ ,....,,., .. .

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THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF ET-HIOPIA

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of th:e Arn1ed Forces, He has the right to organize and command the said forces; to ·commission and to confer military rank upon the officers of the said forces; and to promote, transfer or dismiss any of the said officers. He has, furtl1er, the right to declare a state of siege, martial law, or a national emergency, and to take such measures as are necessary to meet a threat to tl1e defence 01� integrity of the Empire and to assure its defence and integrity. ARTICLE 30. The En1peror exercises tl1e st1pren1e directio11 ot� tl1e foreign relations of the Empire. The Emperor accredits and receives An1ba.ssadors, Ministers and Missions; He, alone, has tl1e rigl1t to settle clisptites witl1 foreign Powers by adjudication artd other peaceful means, and provides fo .r a11d agrees to 111ea.s11res of co-operation with foreign Powers for the realization of the e11ds of sec11rity and cornmo11 defence. He, alone, has the rigl1t to ratify, 011 bel1alf of Etl1iopia, treaties and other inter­ national agreements, and to detern1i11e ,,1l1icl1 treati�s and i11ter11ational agreements s .hall be subject to ratification before becoming binding upo11 tl1e Empire. However, all treaties of peace and all treaties and i11ter11ational agr�erne11ts involving a modifi­ cation of the territory of the Empire� or of sovereig11ty 01· jurisdiction over any part of such territory, or la);ing a bt1rde11 on Ethiopian subjects personally, or mo­ difying legislation in existence, or req11iri11g expenditures of state funds, or invol\1ing loans or monopolies, sha11, before becon1ing binding 11pon the Empire and the inhabitants thereof, be laid before Parliament, and if botl.1 Ho11ses of Parliament shall approve the same in accordance witl1 the p1·ovisions of Articles 88-90 incltisive of the pre-sent Constitution, s11all then be submittecl to the Emperor for ratificatio11. ARTICLE 31. (a) The Emperor alone confers and withdraws the title of Prince a11d otl1er honours, and institutes· new orders. (b) Witl1out His special leave, no Ethiopian subject, 11or any foreign natio11al in any Government service in the EmJ)ire, may accept any l1011011r, insig11ia of order, dignity, or title of or from, a foreign govern�ent. T�1e granting of any title, l1onour _ or or- der may exempt no on. e from tl1e con1mon duties and burdens of tl1e subJects, nor may it carry with it any preferential adn1ission to tl1e offices of tl1e State. (c) Officials wI1 o are released from office witl1 asst1ra11ces of ·rmperial favour, retain the title and ran.k of the office they },ave filled. (d) The Emperor also makes grants from . aban?oned properties, and pro­ _ perties in escheat, for the purpose of recompens111g fa1tl1f ul service to the Crown. ARTICLE 32. The Emperor ha.s the rigl1t to coin, pri11t ancl issLte 111oney. ARTICLE 33.

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· 1 ot more tl1an thirt\, da,- 1 1 for d. cr1 n c-. s11 to · --· d an . of . . ° 111::::i J ,�. n c p o 1 e I t e n o p t s o p o t ve t ol . 1t ·to diss e Chambe rs· gl th r1 r1gl1 lie · 1 s ha e I-l t 1 e, 01 3 · .. '" ·Ii ar , P r o n io , . s s e s y n a d ' ·t en ex d io e 1 .i1 r e, a11 �o t t1m e n1 sa po ap . 1ntn1e ni 1 g [tt tl1c ir _ ict ov 11r , r e d Or 11 or e1tl1er of tl� e m . 1 ber of De1 )ut� es, o� b ?th, as th e cast n 1a Cl w ne a of . l;e :1 ccti<)n � or tc a n e S w e n a f o n 1n io th ss ,¥1 r se a fou r _f fo r be 111 l 1a months C h e th of r1 lio ca vo . 11 o c e t may be, and or from tl1e date of t}1c Order. 1\.f{TICI_E 34.

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a11d 92 of· th 91 e , , 88 86 lcs sent · !ic }Jre /\r , of s o11 isi c>v pr e 1 1 tJ tll \1/i · e 11c ,. ci. r O · · . ce I 11 a n h to d an or t a · o a n te 1 · 1g1 I 1s l cg e r, · te 1 1 t ia 11t tt� l11 t l rig 1e �; ha r ro pe , 1 Ei � e th n b tio tu sti )n C( d b , n e ee 1 1av sse 1 1 pa s e 1a y the reso1 Lt iioi1s and to proclai111 all l,tvis. �tfter tl�c- s31�1 ' Parlian1e11t. Al<. TICLE 35. Tl1e Er11pcror J1as the rig l1 t and 1!1c dtity to 111,tintai11 jt1stice tl 1 rougl1 the courts;· �1ncl the right to gra11t pardons a11d c.1mnesties a11d to commute penalties. ARTICLE 36.

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Tl1e En11)eror, ::1s Sovercig11, l1as t l1e dt1ty to take all n1easures that may be necessary to enst1re, at all ti111cs, the defence and i11 te grity of tl1e Empire; the safety , and we lfc:1re of its inhabit.:ltlls, includi11g tl1eir e11jc1y1nent of tl1e l1urnan r ights and ft1nclan1e11tal liberties recognized in tl1e prese11t Constitution; and the protection of all His st1bjects and tl1 cir rigl1ts a11d i11terests abroad. Subject to tl1 e other pro· ' . visions �f tl1is Co11 stitutio11, i-lc l1as all t l1 e rigl1ts ::1nd powers necessary for the : accomp11sl1111e11t of tl1e encl s set out i11 tl1e present Article.

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RIGI-I l'S AND DUTIES OF THE PEOPLE ARTICLE 37.

No one sha l I be de11iecl Lhe cqt1al l)rotectio11 of tl1 e l aws. ARTICL . E 38. l�l1ere shall be 110 disc . ·. ect · r1n · p 1111 ati o · res 11 a1 no 11g wit st Etl 1iopia11 subjects h to ti,e enJoyn1ent of a I I civil rigl1ts. ARTICLE 39 . . . Tl1e . _ law shall deler1ni11 e t.l 1 � con�1t1.011s o .. . mt�. op i Etb f acqu1s1t1011 and loss of 11at1onal1ty a,,d of Etli iop··1 a1 1 c1t1zer1sl111).

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ARTICLE 40. . -�-. Tll�re sl1 all be 110 i 11 f' ence w . terf . ] 1.::r .;;�»:;�� itl1 t l 1 e exercise ' in accordance ·wjt h-1!1� of the rites of any re · · 1 rgio · n or · t'S�lL. ·· . �-. ·. cree I · , " b · �_,,. . rites be 11ot utiliz-ed f' · � " c a Y residents of t l1e Empire ' _prov1decl�IT.:i. . Or.. · J) 0 1 It.IC 'l I . .:..... .,! .:r,.illf;, .. PLirJ) oses or be not prejudicjaJ to JJt11i 1.� .rnoral1ty. !:-_. -. _·�: __ -�.�;a,;..

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THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF ETHIOPIA

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ARTICLE 41. Freedom of speech and of tl1e press is guaranteed througl1ot1t the Empire in accordance witl1 tl1e law. AllTICLE 42. Correspondence sha 11 be st1 bject to national emergency.

No one witl1in tl1e EmtJire due process of law.

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censorsl1ir>, except i11 ti1ne of declared

be clcr,ri\�(l of life, liberty or proJ)erty witl1out

ARTICLE 44. Everyone has tl1e right, \�1itl·1jn tl1e lin1its of tl1e la\v, to own a11d dispose of property. No one may be depriv·ed of l1is ·prOJ)erty except t1pon a findi11g by ministerial order isst1ed pt1rs11ant tl---i tl1e require1nei1ts of a SJJecial expropriation law enacted in acco.rdance witl1 tl1e provisions of Articles 88, 89 or 90 of the present pa.yme11t of just -compensatio11 determined, in the Constitution� and e.x.cept lrpor1 : absence of agreement, by jt1dicial proccdt1res estal)lisl1ed by law. Said ministerial order, to be effective, shall be approved by the Council of' Ministers a11d published Gazeta. jn the Negarit .... ARTICLE 45. Etl1iopian subjects sl1all J1a ve the rig11t, j n accordance witl1 the co11ditions prescribed b:,r law, to assemble peaceably and without arms. ARTICLE 46. Freedom to travel Vr' i tl1.in tl1e Empire a11d to change domicile therein is assured to all subjects of the Empire, in accordance witl1 the law. ARTICLE 47. Every Ethiopian subject has the right to engage i� any occupation and, to that e11d, to form or jojn associations, in accordance w1tl1 tl1e law. ARTICLE 48. Tr1e EthiopiEtn family, as the source of _tl1e mair1ten_ance and dev� lopn1ent of the Empire and the primary basis o· f educat1011 a11d social 11�1r.mony, 1s u11der tl1e ·special protection of the law. ART:ICLE 49. N'o .E·tl1iopian su.bject rnay be ba11ished from tl1e Empire. AR�flCLE 50. _ No Et.l1 io pian subject may be ex.tracfjted to a forei.gn countr)'r. No otl1er person _ zl_halt be extradited except flS provided by internat1011al agreeme11t.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PIAN ETI·IIO SoURCEBOOK OF

ARTICLE 51.

, excep t in cas e 0 rt a u y b co ed su is t n a rr a w a t 11 0 f' iti1 w d te es rr a ' . be y a m ed person shall be st re y ar N o 011e er E · v e. rc fo 1 11 1w l, t11e · of on ti la 'o vi . . s u io r e s rs h f u · o h.1s arre st. How . o t h e1g flagrant or � y rt f� 1 11 h t 1_ vv ty ri 1o tl u a l ia ic id jt ,e tl re o ef b 1 t l g 1 u ed n v o o bro the court by a fr m re 1s h _ 1c 1 1 w ' t) l1 ca lo a in ce . _ la p es k ta t es rr a e th if , er ev. n forty-eight hour� a ss th le t o n 1n t o fo n o ' 1) 11 0 d ·, · J . d1sta11 ce w111c· h call b e traverse exte 1 1d the per10 l 1ours._The period 1t 1o r�y -e1 f (:' � o d · to the court sJ 1ail llave discretion 1pr!so_nment imposed by 1n of r te � of e rt �� pa 1 1ed. as a_ o ck re be ll ,a sl n io 1 nt te of de l 1 e na rg a 1m 1a n cr cl l o ia tr e g 1 th . a1t11 e aw sol on 1s JJr 111 ld l1e be ll 1a sl e on sentence. No IJenalty for whicl1 is a fine. AIZTJCLE 52.

1 11 all cri1 ni1 1al prosecutio11s, tl1e acc11sed, duly submitting to tl1e court, shall l1ave tl1e rigl1t to ,l speedy trial and to be co11franted witl1 tl1e witnesses againsi · l1in1, to l1ave co1np11Jsory JJrocess, in accordance witl1 the law, for obtaini11g v.1itnesses in l1 is fa\'Our, at tl1 e expe11se of tl1e Gover1 1ment and to ha,,e the assistance of counsel for l1is defence, vvl1 0, if tl1e accuseci is 11nable to obtain the same by l1is own e fforts, or tl1ro11gh l1 is O\V11 ft111ds, sl1 a11 be. assigned and provided to t11e accused by the court..

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ARTICLE 53.

No person acct1sed of and arrested for a crime sl1all be presumed guilty until so proved.

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ARTICLE 54.

· . 1 1 Pu11isl1111e 11t is person wit . .·il ' N 0 one sl1a11 b e pun1sl1ed except i11 accordance ti1e l a,v a,1 d after conv1ct1on· of a11 ofl'ence comn1itted by I 1.1 m.

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ARTICLE 55.

· No one shall be punisl1 ed f Or a�y O �ence 31 �· I _ by declared wh1cl1 bee11 l1as 11ot to be 1Junisl1able before tile comm1. ss1on unis h p any of s11cl1 suffe offen r ce, or sl1all . 1nent greater tl1 an tl1at \.Vl1icl 1 was . " th� of prov ided by tl1e law i11 force at tl1e time co 1nmissio 1 1 of tl i e ofl'ence.

ARTICLE 56. No one sl1all be JJt1nisl1ed twice for tl1 e same offence. ARTICLE 57. No one sl1all be subjec ted to cr11el and inl1un1an i

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THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF ETHIOPIA

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ARTICLE 59. No se.ntence of death shall be executed unless it be confirmed by tl1e Emperor. ARTICLE 60. Confiscation of property as a penalty shall not be imposed except in cases of treason, as defined by law, agai11st tl1e Emperor or tl1e Empi1·e; sequestration of property as _ a_ penalty shall �ot be jmposed exce1)t i11 cases of property belonging to persons res1d1ng abroad and..conspiriog agai11st or engaging in deliberately hostile acts, �s defined by law, against tl1e E1nperor or tl1e E1npire. Attacl11nent proceedings covering the whole or part of tl1e property of a perso11, 1r1ade under judicial authority, to cover payment of civil liability, or liability arjsi11g ot1t of tl1e commission of an offence, or to meet taxes or fines, shall not be deemed a confiscation of property. ARTICLE 61. All persons and all private domiciles sl1all be exempt from unlawful searches and seizures. ARTICLE 62. (a) In accordance with tradition and the provisions of Article 4 of this Consti­ tution, no one shall have the right to bring suit against tl1e Emperor. (b) Any resident of the Empire may bring s11it, in the courts of EthioJJia, against the Government, or any Ministry, Department, Agency or instrun1entality tl1ereof, for wrongful acts resulting in substantial dam_age. In tl1e event that the co11rts sl1all find that such suit bas been bro11gl1t maliciously or v,1ithout foundation, the Govern­ ment, or any Ministry, Department, Agency, i.nstrumer1tality, or official tl1ereof against whom or which such suit was brought, shall have a right of action against such resident for such malicious or unfounded suit, and tl1e cou1·t shall, in such case, decree remedies or penalties according to the law. ARTICLE 63. Everyone in the Empire shall l1ave the rigl1t to present petitions to the Emperor. ARTICLE 64. Everyone in the Empire has tl1e duty to r_ espect �nd_ obey ! l1e C?nstit�t�on, laws, decrees, orders and regulations of the Empire. Etl11op1a11 subJects, in a� drti-on, owe loyalty to the Emperor and to tl1e Emp �re, and !1ave the duty o� defending tl1e Emperor and the Empire against all enemies, f ore1gn and d·omest1c, to perf o�m public services, including military services, wl1en called upo11 to do �o, � 11d to exercise the �ight of suffrage which is conferred tipon tl1em by the Const1tt1t1on. ARTICLE 65.

. · Respect for the rights and freedoms of. oth_ers and !l1� .re911irements of p� blic

orcter and the general welfare, shall alone Justify any l11n1tat1ons u.pon the r1gl1ts : p.aran;teed in the foregoing articles of tl1e present Cl1apter. ...

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AR'fICLE 66. 1 1 t a nd dis1niss t11e Pri_me Minister i po ap t, c _ le s� to t gh Tlle E n1peror 11 as tl1 e rj 1_01n sl1all, ?efor� entering l \v f o 1 cl ea , rs te 1s 1n M e ic V and "111d all otlicr M in isters 1 g ot tt 1n ity oa el ow ll fid fo to 1e tl , or lbe er np E1 e t�1 :e fo be ke ta J � ns tio 1c L11 f upon 1is EmJJeror and to tl1e Const1tL1t1on: 1ce and fidelity to ID) ' i a1 gi Ie aI r e,1 sw · by re l1e I y, l1t ig 111 Al e 1 tl of ''J 11 tl1 e 11an1e 1 1d tl1 at , as 111ember of tl1e Council a ... ... sty aje M ial 1 er 11p 1 l is I :Sovereigr1, st e d ere lfar an int tl1e we e els of all e ov ab ce pla y ull tl1f fai ll \vi 1 s, or Minister : fait}1ft1]]y respect tbe 1es tin all a.t l, wil I 1t tl1� n; eig ver So its of and pia EtJ1io ,: or no se ret clo consec dis l wil l t tl1a a11d c, JJir Em the of s law and ici11 tt1t ) 1sti l C' 1 fidential i nf'or111atior1 revealed to 1ne i 11 con nexiot1 with my official duties and J) c> siti(J 11. S c1 !1GI f) mc God . , ' ']�be appcJi 11tn1c11t, JJro1n<)tio11, tr�1nsfer, suspensio11, retirement, dismissal and disciJJli_ne <)f all otb<.:r Govcr 11 111 c11t officials arid employees sl1 all be governed by regulat1<Jns n1ade by tl1e Cou11cil of l\11 i nisters ,111d approved and proclain1ed b)' the Emperor.

ARTICLE 67. · r.ri_nces c_ligib1 1� for tlie Crown sl:all r1ot be ::i.p1 Jointed l\1i11isters in the Counlil o r �101sters. No c,�e wlrose J)arc11ts were not Etl1iopi,1n subjects at tl1e time of hi�: b1rtl1 sl1all be a1 Jpo1nted a Minister.

AR1�ICJ_.E 68.

· · Each Minister sl1all be ·1 · tic to 1 11ct·1 ··d d 1 an r ll ra 1) m E r or le e s o11s1b to. ·th e · p e � t � . , ·. · ·c e St• atefortli di·::i l1 a, rge o f t1le d t1t1cc of )11 s re,'.) e,xecu· e t h 1ng "� ecti p ve d' · 1nclu · 1111stry, M t1on of tl1 e laws 'n a tl d ecre . es co11cer.;) n1. ng tl1a.t Ministry. "'

AR1 ICLE 69.

Th e M .1111· sters sl1all form c 11 · it. l ct y . : sb� and tl1e i s ter nis of Mi cil un Co v�I � e f r E e t t ble 11si f spo r o 11 tii pe o a1 · aclv1ce ari� recon1i1Je11clatio11s given to �J� 1� , �ot1ncil. !he rules of pr�c;dl� -� ,eD n1s ?f M1 tl1e Cot1nc1l sl1all be drawn up by tl'1e in Counc!l and st1bmitted 0 ·t tl-1e · Emper·o 1· ro ,.. r approva

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ARTICL.E 70.

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f t·lle �rcl1bisl1op, sucl1 Prince:s} M:1:11:I _,_ �-. a. nd D .:. · " . ignita · r1es as , 1 . ma�>' be d,,.sia 11 ted en h e a ro y �r · fL ,_S \vn Cot1ncil s l1all be pr ;,,. ° b Him, and tl1e President of-t e:�� -4�1-cr .:, 1 cled over by tlle E . i.. 2�.:;.l§". bY .t-:t1n1 · � 0 :Sf ';: '1 .. n 1. mperor or by a me_!11 _,

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THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF ETHIOPIA

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ARTICLE 71. The Minist�rs sl1all discuss in Cot1ncil and, tl1rougl1 tl1e Prime Minjster, submit to the Emperor all matters of policy tl1erein discussed. !11 all cases in wl1icl1 leg.islatio11 is deemed to be necessary or appropriate, the decisions made in Council and app·roved by tl1e Emperor sl1all be con1mu11icated by tl1e Pri1ne Minister to Parlia­ ment in tl1e form of proposals for legislatio11. Al{ TICLE 72. The Prime Minister sl1all present to Parlia111ent proposals of legislation made by the Council of Ministers and a.pproved b)' tl1e E111peror. I-le shall also present to the Emperor the proposals of legislatio11 apJJroved by tl1e Parlja1nent a11d tl1e decrees proposed by tl1e Cot111cil of Ministers. He sl1all l1ave tl1e rigl1t to attend any meeting of either Chamber of Parlia111ent� or a11y joi11t meeting of tl1e Cl1ambers, or any meeting of a11y committee of eitl1er CJ1a111be.r, and to speak at sucl1 m.eeti11gs on any question under disc11ssion. 1-Ie· sl1all be obliged to a. ttend personc..lly, or by his deputy, either Chamber, wl1en his 1)rese11ce is reqt1ested by a majority vote of the members thereof and to a11s,ver, ,1erbally or in. writi11g, questions concerni11g his office. ARTICLE 73. The Ministers shall have the rigl1t to attend any meeting of eitl1er Cl1amber of Parliament, or any joint meeting of the Cl1a1n hers, or any meeting of any com­ mittee of either Chamber, and to speak at such meetings on any question concerning conduct of their Ministries; and tl1ey sl1all be obliged, in perso11, or by tl1eir dept1ties, to answer, verbally or in writing, questions concerning the legislation to be enacted. ARTICLE 74. No Mjnister, nor any person in a position witl1 or in the service of the Govern­ ment may: (a) for remuneration, compensation or benefit of financial value engage in any activity or accept a position in or with any enterprise or organization i n which there is no governmental participation; (b) enter into or be a part y to any contract or other arrangement with any governmental organization in t�e. Empire awardin �, peri_ni_tting. or recogniz­ ing any concession or monopol1st1c or other exclusive pr1v1lege 1n the nature of a concession or monopoly. (c) However such Minister or person sl1all be free to manage and develop l1is prop;rties so long as their 1nanagement or �evelo�ment is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the performance of his duties. AR�TICLE 75. _ d only before tl1e The Ministers, including the Prime Minister, ma)' be t1·ie Supr. eme Imperial Court upon charges of o�ences as dete1·rr11n�d by tl1e la�,. � on1· eir official functions. Sucl1 prosecution may be 1n1t1.ated mitted in connexion with 1h eitlet r by order of the Emperor or by a majority vote of botl1 I-louses of Parlian1e11t� A &,p¢eial prosecutor shall be appointed to that end, conformably to the 01·der ot

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AW L L A N O I T U IT T S N O AN C I IOP I-I £.T OF K BOO RCE

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s ber am Ch th Bo to e abl Applic s ion vis Pro SECTION 1 ARTICLE 76. s d e n ti a a u p e f D a o en � r e b te. 1n a l1 C a f o l c se o . 01 co be all 1 sl er of Deputies and b am t h n�n C 1e tl tl1 o b Tl1e Jarl1a1 f o p ember · 1 1eo ta l No one ctn be simti i �J:is : l�l meet togetl1 er �t the begi.nni 11g and the en d 1_am l C o w _t e h T e. t icl es 90 a n d 91, u po n the call a rt A n in Ii tl1e Se rt fo t se _ es ic t t t c r , c e 1 1 i in e ed by th in m m er ha et C d ­ be ay 11 1 s a of each. s6sion, J s ri � io as � cc o r ,e J I �� o t1 n a , r o r e 1 ;�:1 ate sl1a'- ll presicle at a ll joi11 t meetings of tl1e Chambers. of tl1e En1) _ d e1 l to t p . 1 f n e 1 s e )r e l1 T s. r e b ARTICLE 77. ir -th ty y e11 _da e d tw �l1 on e en nv t co l al 1 sJ 1 e1 n1 ia rl Pa of _ The ·cg11Iar sessio11s nt co e all d inu sl1 an 1re np e E1 tl1 l of ta p1 Ca e tl1 in ar ye cl1 ea of t of the n1o 1 th of Teken1 to t.he f1rs1 day of the 111011tl1 of Sene (8 J11ne). the h wit e anc ord acc in 1ed ve1 con and ted elec be ll sha ent iam l Y . Par 11e\ a til Un present C)11stitt1tio11 and tl1c electoral ]a\v to be enacted, the two Cl1ambers of Parlia1ne11, as l1eretofore co11stitt1ted, sl1all conti11t1e to sit and sl1all, i n accordance \Vitb tl1e µovisio11s a11d rocedures est�tbl isl1ed i11 Cl1a1Jter V of the present Consti· p and ft1nctions and ft1lfil tl1e responsibilities provided tuti�11, ex(rcise tl1e p�erogatives for 111 resi:ec� o� Parl1an1er1t. Tl1e first election to tl1e Cl1amber of Deputies shall be co111�lcted w1tl11n tw� years fron1 tl1e entry into force of tl1e present Constitution and 111 ac,ordance w1tl1 tl1e IJrovisio11s of tl1e el ectoral l aw.

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ARTICLE 78.

i am er c b� o � 11 the rlia cl t ll to 1en u d sl1a be ose �� f � : :� �� � �� ex ce; u;.� � e e Prime M 1111ster, or upon a decision by a maJor1ty y . vote of th,· Chan1 · be r of DC{JL1t1es or t l1e Se ct · . . ff t a n at h e, t e t as to l 1e be, case e n1ay No J01nl 11eeting of tlie ci1 1 a b ers_ _s1lal l be closed to tl1e pt1 bli c exceJ)t upon a r ue t eq s by the Prine Minister or a�ec to 1s10 n by tl 1 e 111a e jor ity Ch am of b the eac rs · l1 of that effect If' after a' quest 'on 1 r 1as i e n h bee 1t · ec d l of are e d to be Cl1a secret' a member . · \. wn t0 ti1e1Jt1bl 1c · ··111ber nakes it l·no ' e1t11er_ 111_ a speech: or by tl1 e pre�s: or b') wr1t1ngs, er in any otl1cr way, l1 e s · 11all be JJun1s� hed Penal Lav. accord in g to the prov1s1ons of 0

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ARTICLE 79 · Neitl1tr of tlie Cllam bers sl1all com . f any sessio1 ' tl t n e ti· da t_ ts fir l de · e s e th io tli at er on ib ns _ I � se � re � e nc p u k� _ �� of tw berations, )r o r s of its memb rs, e its e any vote on a11y continu or 7 of a majont of.its c eedi day of suc ce s r a11y session witl1out the p e e� 3 majority cf 11e me m embers. At joint m ��n O o gs e mb tl1e f , i Cl�ambers th pres�nce d rs of eacl1 c11 for voting �berat1on.s all a11;::r sl1 all be required for del1

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ARTICLE 80. If the quorum of Deputies and of Senators prescribed in Article 79 is not present on ·the day designated for the convening of Parliament or if thereafter either of the Chambers, or the Chambers in joint meeting, cannot contin'ue delibera: tions or vote for lack of the required attendance, the members present shall take such measures as may be authorized in the rules of procedure of the respective Chambers, to compel the attendance of a sufficient number of the absent members.

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ARTICLE 81. Every Deputy or Senator, before taking l1is seat in the Chamber to which he h�s been elected or _appointed, shall take, before the Emperor, or if directed by Him, before the President of the Legislative Chamber concerned, an oath of loyalty to the Emperor and to the Empire, and sl1all swear tl1at he will obey the Constitution and the laws of the Empire and will perform his duties conscientiously and without fear or favour. ARTICLE 82. Each Chamber shall determine its own rt1Jes of procedure and internal dis­ cipline. ARTICLE 83. Members of Parliament shall receive salaries determined by law. Any law increa· s·ing the salaries of members of Parliament shall be effective only from the date of the election of the next Parliament. ARTICLE 84. No action or charge may be brougl1t against any member of Parliament, or against any Minister appearing by rigl1t or upon the invitation of either Chamber, for words uttered or written statements submitted by him at any meeting of either Chamber, or any joint meeting of the Chambers, or any meeting of any committee of either Chamber. Nevertheless, every member of each Chamber of Parliament shall be obliged to respect all rules of order, conduct and procedure adopted by such Chamber for the transaction of its business and shall be subject to disciplinary action on the part of such Chamber for violation of such rules. No action or charge may be brought against any person or any newspaper for publication, by or under the authority of Parliament or of either Chamber thereof, as the case may be, of any thereof, of Parliament or either Chamber as repo·rt, paper, votes or proceedings ., the case may be. ARTICLE 85. No member of Parliament, during a session thereof, may be arrested or detained or sum moned to answer a criminal charge, unless the premission of the Chamber of which he is a member be obtained, or he be arrested in f/agran(e delicto. A copJ­ parable i· mmunity does not apply to civil cases. ARTICLE. 86. Laws may be proposed to either, or both Chambers of Parliament: . (a) by the Emperor, or . . · (b) by ten or more members of either Chamber of Parl1ament, . el:c;opt that eve· ry proposal involving an increase in governmental expe?d1ture or a ._new or increased ta-x shall first be presented to the Chamber of Deputies . ..

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ARTICLE 87.

e f th o ham be rs shal C g n ti ee m t in o j in . , . e1the °' ber or rn ha C t, sen pre ept exc ers mb as Prov1�e me 1n ers the matt of All Y d �e m a·orit t h r e of in otes, th presid g offi ce s a vote of v on by si vi di d q mine 1 l ua lI e deter n f o t even the In 131. e Articl in vote. g castin a have ARTICLE 88. f er o b m a Parli ament .ichaII h e C n o y b d ve ro p . ap n o ti a sl . gl le f o al s propo of to the . other Chamber· e t er h Every t en 'd s1 re P e th h g u ro th . ed d ar ' w � .1 o r · Y 1 · 1ate ' d d 10 of two montl·'·is 1n er a h it p w 1mme ts en m be . . d en m a t u o 1 l it L 11e o th er w 1 y b p · ed ov ppr · r te Mi to · e 1s th n im r e Emperor If It IS a e 1 t 1 h g u o r th d te a ic n t1 ro com y tl p m ro p . mperor to the Chambers e b ll la s 1e tl it l y E b d e rn tu re r o , w la s a d te a lg u . m ro p I . be I . (' er and sball. eith n o is t1_ r a eg l sa o o as p ro id p ov pr ew ed n : a l1 1t w r o , n eo er 1 tl s with His observation ament shall bt . s f li er o ar b P am l1 C 1 tl bo y b d ve ro p ap in Article 91. All laws duly t e en tl1 id r, es by te Pr is s of the in M e rn ri P e tl1 l1 ug ro th r ro pe Em forwarded to the w ch la su at all receive th sl1 t en e•1 e th In . te na Se e tl1 of d an ies ut Cl1amber of Dep blished by the Minister pu be l al sh it , or er np E1 e tl1 of re tu na sig d an the approval e e th tur ng of na x.i and Sig aili e th of l ita rec tl1 wi a., zet Ga rit ga Ne the of the Pen in crees and ial ter de nis all mi d an es cre De ial iJer Im All or. per Em tl e 1 of l Sea tl1e Great orders sl1all be publisl1ed in tl1e l"Jegarit Gazeta. ARTICL.E 89. If a propo�al _of legislation approved b y one Cl1amber is not finally acted upon by tl1e other _\.v1th1n the aforesaid period of two montl1s, the Chambers shall meet �ogeth�r to dis�uss the said proposal. If rl1e proposal is approved in such joint meet· g, witl1 r witl�out amendments, witl1in 30 days, it shali be communicated to the �mperor for action .in accordance witl1 Ar icle 88. t ARTICLE 90. If, witl1in the aforesai. d perio · d Of two montl1s, a proposal of legislation ap· proved b y one Chamb r, is ppr ve d r o· p id sa e by ts t th e 1 r en l1e dm , ot 1 en itl l w am posal sl1all be re turne� t �l e ilrSt Cl1 ambe� upon If, n. consid f?r eratio furthe r s�ch further consideratio� :; . r. 15 Cham� ap1)rov ed first w1th1n 30 days, by tl1e :v1th the said amendinents' it s 1al� b � communicate d to tl1e Emperor for action in accordance with Arti cle 8 8 1 ; wit!11n 30 days, tl1e am te� p � a not are end ments by the first Chamber, 111e 55 l 1 a' b �rs shall, d 1 to _ scu 1, together tl1ereupo1 meet the proposal. If, in sucl1 : ul joint. 0 eting, the proposal bo w1t or with ameo<lm ents, witl1in 30 da is aoproved r y ero mp sl 1all ? E tl1ereupon, b e co1n�u.nicated to the for action in accor dance �i��1 A rt1cle 88 . ARTICLE 91 • If a prop osal of I . . eg1sIat1on app o b;' . d t he other w·th'n e ect e d ·cle re� in is . o e n rs be f e am o _ th Ch o _ tw ; ; i 1 l nt uo s after it omn 88, or if a I r� t u d i , 10 Ar l . rucat1on provide to P�sal as it of legi t, 5 slation 15 not appr en after disctiss�ion dm n an1e · r1' · h or wit o 1n e ct t · hou wit a , v . . · Joint . ? mee ting .as pro on tl1e situati ull f s 90, �P n� A �1ded h all in and rticle 89 be pro mptly �o of both Cl1a; d rnmunICated to the Emperor by the pres1 e c1 iers of Parlia r may, thereupon ment th gh e ca tl1e t use and Prime ; .Elllpe}{ is � M inister, to ��� observations in � be tr ns ot, ille e a ed g to Parl 1 d both of � o to Cl1a1nbers t be transmitted st1cl 1 reports nd sucl1. r ca.:i. to :e Cl1a . t ion I pro , o egisla osal of mbers, a pr� p posal of legislation on the sa.llle subJ

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THE REVISED CONSTITUTION OF ETHIOPJA

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ARTICLE 92.

In ca.ses of e�ergency that arise when the Chambers are not sitting, the Em­ peror may proclaim decrees consistent with the Constitution, which shall have

the· force of la� upon publication in tl1e Negarit Gazeta, pending a decision on the same by Parliament. To that end, the text of each sucl1 decree shall be transmitted for consideration by. both Chambers of Parliament at tl1eir first meeting following each such Proclamation. In the event that, con.formably to the pro·visions of Articles 88� 89 or 90, of tl1e present Constitution, Parliament sl1all approve decrees, they shall continu-e in force and shall become law 11pon publication, in tl1e Negarit Gazeta, of said approval. In the event tl1at Parliament sl1all disaJ)prove any sucl1 decree, each such decree shall cease to have force and effect, ,1pon tl1e p11blication, in t]1e Negarit Gazeta ,. of such disapproval. SECTION II - The Chamber of Deputies

ARTICLE 93. Tl1e entire territor)' of the Empire, as defined in Article 1 of tl1e present Consti­ tution, shall be divided into electoral districts co11taining, as nearly as possible? two hundred thousand inhabitants. The location and limits of each. ·electoral district shall be determined by law and each such district shall be as regular in shape as circumstances permit. In addition, each town witl1 a popt1lation exceeding thirty thousand inhabitants shall be entitled to one Deputy and an additional Deputy for each fifty tho11sand in11abitants in excess of thirty thot1sand. p,_RTICLE 94. Each electoral district shall be represented by two Deputies. P1RTICLE 95. All Ethiopian subjects by birth, of t�enty-one years o� ag_e or more, who are regularly domiciled or habitually present In:- any electoral d1str �ct and who possess the qualifications required by the electoral law, �ha�l have tl1e rigl1t to vote 1n such e,Jectoral district for the candidates from such district, as member� of the Chamber of Deputies. The system of voting shall be secret and direct. Details of procedure shall be prescribed by law. ARTICLE 96. ·'To· be eligible as a Deputy, a person must be, by birtl1, an Ethiopian subject

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ARTICLE 97. . s11 all be elec ted for terms Of four years and shall be eligibl e for re· on of the qualifications set forth in Deputies . ss1 posse ntinued . o c 1r e l1 t to t c election subje Article 96. ARTICLE 98. ber am the Ch of of hip ers mb u me Dep ties the in u r c Vacancies that m�� � � l . la w o r a e l le c t e tl in e sl1all be filled as pro,,1

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ARTICLE 99. . Chamber of Deputies shall be the of t ·ct s en 1 es Pr e ic V o tw d an t The Prestde11 elected each year from and b y tile me mb er s of th e Chamber. ARTICLE 100.

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SECTION ill - The Senate

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The Senate shall co11sist of the Senators appointed by the Emperor for six year s.

ARTICLE 102. The Senate shall be composed of a nu mber of persons, n o t exceeding one­ half of the total number of Deputie s, to b e cl1o se n b y the Emperor fr o m among5l those who have, b y tl1eir acts, se cu red the confidence a n d esteem of the peop_le, a�d - fro!ll amongst those wl10 l1ave served tl1eir country a 11d tl1e go d1st1nct1on. ir vernment With

ARTICLE 103. !0 be eligible for appointment a s a m ember o f the Senate, a person by b1rtl1, an Eth1op1an t m subje ct wl1o: us be, ( �as rea hed the age of thirty-five � � ( ) IS a years; nnce or o th e r r Dignitary, o r a f o or 0 t er person a_ l , ffi c 1 r m o e r h l m ig a g e o h n v t e r n generally esteemed . services; and for l1 is char acter, 1·udgment and pubbc (c) is not disqua lified uhder any provision of the electoral law. ARTICLE 104. . T�e Senators :-�; 1mmed1ately after first appoin ted bY tl,e _E . . . . . m -" p er thei hall/ o r, :c . r s a s , first p 10 ro 1 v id 0f the flrst ti ed cl 1n A e r meeti ng ' be dlVI·ded . -, . group shall be o-1� · to tl1ree equal groups. The s·e� in 11at --"-",:. -� succeeded at Po10 · ted in · accordance with the prov. . the end ?f the second ye ar by se nato__rsi1l,ap·.'.,-"- · at the end of i5ions of Articl , the fourth year e 101 those of the secona,JJ� Year, so that one . , and tho se . -Ph J � -th ird be su Of the thir :e ;i.; :.a ---s r� .--­ d gro' up, a t the end ().(�,""'::::� cqe eded every second year.

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THE REVISED CoNSTITUTION OF EIBIOPIA

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ARTICLE 105 . Senators shall be e to their continued pos­ igible for re-appointment subject ! _ . session of the qual1fi.cat1ons set forth in Article 103. •

ARTICLE 106. Vacancies in the membership of the Senate shall be filled by appointments in the manner provided in Article 101. ARTICLE 107. The President and t,vo Vice Presidents of the Senate shall be appointed each year by the Emperor from amongst tl1e Senators. CHAPTER VI THE JUDICIAL POWER

ARTICLE 108. The judicial power shall be vested in the courts established by lav, and shall be exercised by the courts in accordance witl1 the law and in the name of the Emperor. Except in situations declared in conf oqnity with the provisions of 1-,\i-ticle 29 of t.he present Constitution, no persons, except those in active militaPJ service, may be subject to trial by military courts. ARTICLE 109. There shall be a Supreme Imperial Court and such other courts as may be authorized or established by law. The jurisdiction of each court shall be deter111ined by law. �ARTICLE 110. The judges shall be independent in conducting trials and giving judgment in accordance with the law. In the administration of justice, they submit to no other authority than that of the law. I

ARTICLE 111.

The judges shall be appointed by the E1:11peror. They �hall _be of the high_est character and reputation and shall be e� per1en�ed _ and sk1ll�d 1n the law wl�1ch they may be called upon to apply. Their nom1_nation, app�1ntment, pro� ot1on, removal, transfer and retirement shall be determined by special law governing the Judiciary. ARTICLE 112. Judges shall sit in public, except that in cases which might endanger public 0mer or affect public morals, they may sit in camera. •

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d ce u , d r e d o r e as re abolish..· c in , d se o p im . ost o.r exc1·se sl1a11 be · · t , os p ty d 11 1m or excise · , x ta y an f o N 0 ta' x ' duty 1111p t en m ,1y p om fr i1 o ti . m e . x e o p ' w . a 1 w a N I b Y e . d 1z r 1o tl u a e. d, except by s a t e c x e e! p te n a r g e b 11 h a s w a 1 11nposed bY ARTICLE 114.

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None of the µ11blic reve1111es sl1all be expended, exceJJt as autl1orized by law. ARTICLE I 15.

rfl1e fiscal year sl1all be fixed by special law. Tl1e Council of Ministers shall. eacl1 year, ,vitl1 tl1 e approval of tl1e Emperor, and in accordance with the require· 1nc11ts c)f the lawi present to Pr-�lia1ne11t a draft of a Jaw for tl1e approval of the bl1dget of tl1 e follovving }1ear, wl1icl1 budget sl1all accompany tl1e said draft of law. ARTICLE 116.

Eacl1 of tl1e Cha1nbers of Parlian1e11t sl1 all exami 11e tl1e said budoet in detail ,ind vote on it ite1n by iten1. Parlia ment sl1all u·ncter no circumstan;es increase the total �um set d_ow11 jn tl1e bt1dgct for expend{t11res. Tl1e a llowance for ;nforeseen ex1)ei1 ses 111 tl 1e said budget sl1all be fixed by Parlian1ent. Parliament shall complete begin· the bud er g t vo · tl1e e or SLI f b n11ssion · · to before tl1e montl1 Em1)eror one at least . ' 1ng of tl1 e ne\v fiscal year. l

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ARTICLE 117 . . . If the draft of law })resen ted ' as J.)rovided d ove appr been 1n 11ot l1as Article 116, by Parliament and procla. m d as l w a ri al ye c s fi h be w r ne 1g tl e 1i1 t n1 of gi :e be e f? a tl1e budget of t he previo u� y:ar sllall s ha v Ia, get cont111ue 1n force until a new bud been proclain1ed. ARTICLE 118 If ajdition'.al fu11d s are e b . t en urg , . t} y requ1 year . · re,d in . ._r or n1st fiscal 1\1.in.1· �te · the any co11rse of M1 ers co11cerned s11all p il o res_ent a s11pplementary budget to the C u?� . ' of M1u1sters, \Vho , witl1 tl1e r1 a r oval p pp p �f tl1e a r0R r r ate an E1npe o , may present draft of law to tl1e Cl1 be am r 0f D ep ut1es.

TI AR � CLE 119. . · . No . . loa·11 or pledg e, · i r ar y gu fi t an O w1th1n O : · hou� tl1 e r coIlateral the refore , n 1a y be contra_c ted -i� .b Empi re, y any except a: �t or1 o ernm_e nt al organiz ation within the_ B.inl2 ofy ed b z v � a law duly a opt�d Articles 88, si or 90 10 v1s 1 _i1 pro accorda the nce witl1 of tl1e presellt C --onst1n LL·1t100. - -:--=

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ARTICLE 120. Within four months after the end · of every fiscal year, the Council of Ministers shall presen_t to the Empe�or and to Parliamet?-t a detailed re1)ort on tl1e receipts and expenditures of the said year. Tl1e report sl1all be immediately 1·eferred to the Audito� General, who shall, witl1in three months, present his comments thereon to the Emperor and to Parliame11t. .. ARTIC�LE121. There shall be an r\�ditor General vvl10 shall be aJJpointecl by the Er.aperor. · tl1e 11igl�est cl1aracter, as well as to pos­ w o 1s known be of to He shall be a _person � _ sess the reqms1te: tecl1t11c�1l capacity. I-lis f11nctio11s sl1all be (ie:fined by Ja,v. They shall i !3clude the auditing of tl1e accou11ts of all Ivlinist1-ies, Departme11ts and Agencies of the Govern ment� and the r11c1ki11g of JJeriodical reports to tl1e Ernper,)r and to Parliament on the fiscal operatio11s of· tl1e Gove1·nment. TJ1e A1.1dit<·.�· General shall, at all times, be eniitled to have access to all books and 1· ecords re!a;..,ing to the said accounts. ClIAPTER

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GEN�RAL PROVliS:U:ONS "'�RTICLE 122. The present revised Constitution, together \Vitl1 those internatior1al ;::reatir,,s:) �:onventions and ·obligations to which Ethiopia shall be party, shall be the supreme law of the Empire, and all future legislatio11, decrees, orders, jt1dgments 1 decisions and acts incon.sistent therewith, shall be null and void. ARTICLE 123. The city of Addis .A,.. baba is the Capital of the Empire. ARTICLE 124. The F'lag of the Empire consists of th: ee ho!izont�l ban�s, t�e t�pper�ost green, the middle yellow and the netheimost red, 1n. s11cn detail as 1s dete:r1n1ned by law. ARTICLE 125. The official language of the Empire is Amharic. ARTICLE 126. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, founded in the fou1·t� cent11:Y, on the doctrines of Saint Mark, is the Esta'blished Church of the Empire an� 1s, as such, _ supported by the State. The Emperor shall alw� ys pr?fess the. �tl11op1an. ?rthod.ox Faith.- The name of the Emperor sha1, 1 be mentioned 1n all religious services. ARTICLE 127. . . , The organization an d sec. · ular administration of the Established Churcl1_ sh� 1c­ be; g�erned b,y Jaw. Th e Ar chbishop and Bjsh �ps shall be elected by the Eccles1ast _ al �11'ttora1 College c·onsisting of repr �sent?-!1ves of the cle:gy and of the la1�y of ed rm rfo be all n pe sh tio cra nse co l tua 1n · sp e1r Th t�c 11. urc h c . . Ethiopian Orthodox .. . . ..

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the of o per Em r al rov app of the i e th. r to e ect · ] b u s ecr0 · , w a L n o n a C e th o t g promulgate the decrees,·ed! � to right accordin · S l the � a l ror . e Emp t The ct . t n e i m t 1n o p p rning a conce those d an monas t excep tic · h Churc life ' e · h . t f a nd o s n io t la u g e r c li b u p . d n a s n o ti a tr is in m d a l a u it ir p other s A R T I C L E 128. . . r.eligious activities or organizations for commercial pu ; r, No one shaII ut11ize . w la y b d ze ri o th u a s a t. poses excep ARTICLE 129. ly �ed du on op ati ad isl leg �n acco rdance, by d l1e lis ab est s on iti nd co tlie Sub·ect to sent Const1tut1on, all towns , . the� prov1s pre · of the 90 or . 89 ' 88 s icle Art of s ·on 1 . with · . · h · r d co ance wi·t h sue legislation . ac 1n ed ish bl ta es s ter 1ar Cl by ted ra po or c in e b 11 a h s . ·c1pal ' · · · · ve I a cti y, 1n II pe res d, he mum · 1ties of, and municipal councils shall be establis the Empire. ARTICLE 130. (a) Tl1e natural resources of, and in the sub-soil of the Empire, including : tho se ben eath its vvaters, are State Domain. (b) Tl1e natural resources i11 tl1e waters, forests, land, air, lakes, rivers and po rts of the Empire are a sacred tr11st for the benefit of present and succeeding . generations of tl1e Ethiopian People. Tl1e conservation of the said resources is essential for the preservation of tl1e Empire. The Imperia l Ethiopian Government shall, accordi11gly, take all such measures as may be necessary and proper, in con· formity witl1 the Constitution, for tl1e cons e rvation of the said resources. . . �c) �one_ of �l1e said resources shall be exploited by any person, natural or Jur1d1cal, 1n v1olat1on of the principles of conservation established by Imperial Law. ( �) _All I? rope�y not l1eld and possessed in tl1e nam e of any person, natural . or JUr1dical, including all land i11 escl1eat, and all aban , whether pr op do ert ne ies d real or personal, as well as all products of the su grazing all bso an fo il, al d re l sts lands, wat er-courses, lakes and territorial waters, ar e St at e Domain. ARTICLE 131. [be fiCon �itution may be amended by an identic Joint Resolution adopted bY t ree- ourt s of_tl1e members of e Par · ac h . of C ha m ns be r se ss in se tw io pa o ra te liamen t and proclaimed with th � ap pr ov a I and authority of the Emperor. Give n at Addi · s Ababa, this fourth d ay o f November, 1955. HAILE SELLASSIE I TSARAFE T AZ TAF �� ARR A WORQ Mzn1ster of the Pen

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CHAPTER I SOUR.CES FOR THE STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL THEORY Summary of Contents Introduction:

The nature of political theory.

Section 1:

Power and the State - What is a State? tl1e central position of political power; different meanings of Sovereignty.

Section 2:

The funct ions of Executive Government - the maintenance of law and order·, . the views of Hobbes; relevance of I-Iobbes' theory to Africa; the exte.osion of government functions; the State as an active participant in development.

Section 3:

Kingship and Tradition - practical advantages and disadvantages of monarchy; the divine right of kings; patemalisn1; the importance of tradition; the views of Burke; tradition in Africa.

Section 4:

Theories of Democracy - government by consent, responsive to the will of the people; representative government and the views of Locke; consent, natural rights, and rebellion; Rousseau and the theory of ''pure'' democracy; failings and insights of the General Will; limitations of popular government; the balance bern : reen. expertise and democracy. The Separation of Powers - Montesquieu's theory; analysis and application of this theory; the objects of separation and n1eans· of achieving them; relevance of separation to Africa; the need for integration of powers even with separation; Federalism.

Section 5:

Human Rights - What are rights? examples of rights; rights as moral claims; different kinds of rights; the natural law basis for rights; practical difficulties of the natu.ral law approach; the utilitarian approach; the views of Mill and the effects of discrimination; the limitation of rights; the conflicting demands of the commu.nity state security, and expert government; the principle that 'rights limit rights'; pro'blems of putting rights into action· and enforcing them; the adaptation of rights to changing circumstances.

Section 6:

Economic Development and Political Development - laisez-faire; Marx and communism·, the welfare state; . the political implications of economic development in undeveloped countnes.

Section 7:

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t c u f ideas about d o e o r th p t, r a p in , is ia p io Eth f o n io 1t t1 ti s n o C rs. f a s e o d y n a s u o Tl1e Revised . th r o s d e r d n . men have be e n tl1 1nki·ng for 11u . . . h whic 1n1cing about some of th ese 1 tl y b w la c l1 b 11 p · · 011r sttidy of · in g b , e " re 1o , e is h gn t e · co · I re aw W e . t I1ere ist Id ex u e o sh y e l1 nc W ? e at . st '' a · is t ha W ' . , · n f o e o h s e . m · w 1 iv very bas 1c 1'deas, sue11 as I 1e ve � t !n r e v o e is rc e x e s te a st 1 Id 1 10 st rs e \v o p t a 11 w s? te se a o ld ho st th u w o of s sh ve er li w o p in t a l1 W s? er w o p se 1e tl ,, se ci .ld . · ,, r1 t h ts h tl1em ?. W I10 sl1·ould exer � · a t? W . I sh ou e g na 1a 1! 0 l1 w ls ia c ffi o 1e tl l o tr n the state exercise t o co l d il o w t go rote ction a p l1 w s 1t gl ri e es th ct te ro p it tlle state protect? WI1y sl1ould bring to society as a wl1ole? , y . l l� he _ a T cu de ffi e di th ar wi y 1e tl t bu e pl m si d 11n so ' a) m Qtiestio11s like tl1ese e _ th ed �1 cu IIllnds of , oc ve �a y l1e T . w la l 11a io ut tit ns co of tl1e essential problems tfu 1n a te gh ri ou w th d l an k in th to n ga be en m n l1e w ne 1 ti e tl1 thougl1tful 1nen since y the often diverge nt ud st l al sh we So ''. ns tio tu sti on ''c eir tl1 d an s'' te ta 1nan11er abo11t ''s t ve pu ha th rs for ke in th l ica lit po nt rta po im e n1 so l1 1ic wl s 11t me gu views - tl1e ar rious places va in es, tim us rio va s, at ion 1 est q1 cl ate rel 1er otl d 1 a1 1 tl ese to witl1 resJJect , apto us p hel y ma ort eff is Tl1 . ces ien Jer eXJ l ica tor l1is s iou var .and in tl1e co11text o .f g lic preciate more fully so1ne of tl1e basic contemporary problems of developin pub :law in Etl1iopia - and elsewl1ere i11 tl1e world. Tl1at is ,;vh y we start by briefly explor­ ing tl1e assumptions a11d tl1eories of so1ne celebrated political philosophers. Now some words of lvarning and advice about political pl1ilosophy. It is ver� e�sy to read about a partic11lar political philosophy and develop so�e su_perfic1al ideas a1?011t what you l1ave·read. It is also very easy, in discussing this SltbJect, to make noises tl1at sound impressive - to make the sounds for v.1ords ��cli_ a� '',�quality'', ''demo?racy'', ''freedom'', ''tyranny'', ''rigl1ts'', "justice'', socialis� , and so fortl1, \V1tl1out knowing wl1at you really n1ean wl1en you make tliese noises. You should not make word-noises like tl1ese. unless you know whai _you mean, ui1Ie�s you ktio,;v for lvl1at purpose )'OU are usi� o0 tl1e word ' unless you , l1ave so1ne specific refer may , e11t 1· n. min · ,, d . . example * . T 1e l word. '·den1ocracy'' for . , denote , ,n1an)_ tl_1 111gs: c 1v1l rigl1ts''; ''free elections'' .' ''parlia "party a ''. men ts · ' · • · 1 's system · maJor1ty ,.,.. Lii,.,, seau r · ' minori ty Rous r1gl1ts· Locke · 's view ''freed of om'' . ' " ' view of ''freedom'' and 8 _0. 011 TI ,. 1 e Greeks, (e.g. A:istotle) defined ''democrac y as rule by til e ma·�r J ity 0 f tl1e ·people, and tl1ougl1t it ,:vould lead to demagogues, mob rule and tyra · n11y tl· 1ro11gl1 a diet_ator \Vl�o wo11ld seize co11trol wl1en derno cr acy fell into tI1is corldition Greek perien e witl1 sup· surei den1o defin cracy ed tl1us � r ported tl1 is view arJd ·ti ie pro ein wI1rcl1 ' was it r troubled Aristotle was whethe '

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Consider the following fron1 Stu·1rt C 1ase l , Tl1e Tyranny of Worcls (1938).· "We. a·re continuall y confusing s u · 'ti1·e la'bel. \Vl·ti1 tI1e non ' · s verbal obJ'ect and so giving. a punocv, vaI,ct,ty to the \VOrd, as son1et . . ' t. When this te nd en t0 I·ct�nt,'fY exp��ds f ron1 dogs 11111g alive a nd ba! k'Ing In Its OY.'n righ , rnal to hi. _gher ete a bstr a ctions sucl1. as 'liberty', 'J·ustice' 'the . and impu tes l1vi ng breatl1Ing ' anyb o Ise • . ity ent to ti 1e1 1 1 t . . . , a�n1ost nobody knows wl1a �Y e n:ieans. Ident 1fication of word wit!1 th 1 !1& is '":'ell illustrated in tl1e cl1ild's remark •pigs are r Ightly nan1ed, since they such di rt� a n1n1a ls'. 0 g_den and Ricl1ards cont are .b a tecllnica_l term, the 'referent' by \Vhicll they mean t1Je ObJect ?r situ ation in the a ' refers. Indeed the g?al 1 c 1 tl1e l anti word labe or i ,vl l cs 'Ff;�ct t�� � _migl1t be stated as :�ich 1 referent'· When peop the thing on agree their words refer, minds le can . . n1eet. The commun1. cat1on . line 1s cleared."

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POLITICAL THEORY

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pos·sible �o achie�e some of the values of democracy while still avoiding the risks reflected 1n ex��r1ence. The Greek experience, reflected in Aristotle, teaches us that one set �f pol1t1cal valu �s �or ideals) may often conflict witl1 other values - e.g. the conflict between maJor1ty rule and minority rights. 7'!1us �o a Greek, ''democracy'' might connote mob rt1le at tl1e expense of _ rmnor1ty rights. But to a modern ''liberal'' it may co11note a system designed to give all men the opportunity to decide l1ow tl1ey sl1all be gover11ed. And to a ''soci­ alist'' it may mea� control by workers of factori�s and far1ns. Democracy is a word of m�ny conn �tat1ons, and shows tis tl1at we ca1111ot reconcile conflicting goals or explain complicated co_ncepts simply by maki11g tl1e noises for emotive words. We must have a referent i n mind, and we n1t1st be able to co111111t1nicate that referent. Another warning: it is very easy to stt1ff yot1r l1ead full of abstract information and abstract theories witl1ot1t being able to apJJ/y, tl1rough l1ard thougl1t, tl1is infor­ mation and these theories to tl1e practical proble1ns of co11stitutional development which concern us i n this course. For pt1rposes of law study you do not 'learn' unless you develop the capacity to use information and ideas to analyse solutions to relevant questions. Trus kind of tl1inking is one of tl1e l1ardest of human exercises. We are not interested ju your informational learning - in mere repetition of what you have read. We are interested in tl1e aJJplication of what you have read - the critical application ,of abstract ideas to concrete questions. It is important to recognize, too, that tl1is chapter only summarises the thought of some men who are generally recognized as provocative and influential tl1inkers samples of some of their argt1ments about desirable objectives in constitution mak­ ing. These '1iTiters express a1·guments, not proven facts. The political pl1ilosopher argues for what he thinks ought to be done. He stresses certain goals whicl1 he thinks are desirable and good. He argues on tl1e basis of social science assumptions, as well as other premises. His arguments may be strong or not so strong. Further, different writers have stressed different goals, different valt1es tl1011ght to be necessa.ry to the attainment of a ''just'' or ''good'' society. Marx stressed the value - the essential rightness - both of public control of \¥ealth-producing resources and of destroying tl1e ''classes'' wl10 may have owned and developed these resources. Locke stresses the rigl1tness and value of a constitution whicl1 respects ''property'' as a ''natural'' right of men a11d a11 element of ''freedom''. Locke also stresses the value of popular control over government; l1e argt1es tl1at this too is a ''natural'' right and tl1at under certain circumstances men l1ave a ''rigl1t'' of ''rev�lution'' to secure their 11atural rights if tl1at is the only way to sect1re tl1em. Both Marx and Locke justify revolution - tinder certain circt1mstances - but to attain very different goals. Burke deno11!1� es re� olt1tio11 or 1·cvol11tionary c!1ange and says that ''evolution'' based on trad1t1011, l11story and sl�'Y progress �s t_he o,nly sure way to improve political society; Burke sees or?er, st,1b1�1ty ,ind co11t1nu1ty as important values. Plato argues that if we want a ''Just'' society then 011ly the best educated and most talented citizens sl1o·uld 1·ule, for only tl1ey are capable of determining ''justice''. Bt1t Rousseat1 says _ tl1at no � over11me11t is ''jt1st'' u11_less ''sovereignty'' - the power to make laws - JS ve�ted 1n the people and exercised in accordance with what he calls the ''general will''. Roussea11 and Plato n1ake vecy· different assumptions about tl1e civic capacities of tl1e average citize?. Mill says that a maximum of human freedom js desirable, not because freedon1 1s good ia the abstra.ct bu.t because it brings about greater ''hum.an happiness'' and individual .' ' .

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NAL LAW TIO ITU T NS CO IAN ETHIOP OF K CEBOO SoUR

suggests t11a t free dom at s be ob J-I y. et ci so of d 1 h , k' t s be_ t�e g thin ch very whi � a consHtu t t improvement � os and cliaos is t l1at �xpen�e of at1tl1or1ty brin�b �:: t�kes a bleak vie�- of men_� a_nd l1as a lot of��� t n . e v e r p : s n o t1 t1c t 11s op y um all d ass e n 0 t ig en s s ess e i o pti d .Hview, 1s . s ke ma . Mill and 15 1 1 for ent in rigl1t be di l may B fferent way's torical preced _ oth view. is l ort pp ti s o t y r to 1s 1 l s e k o v in h e too i g po tin ew ic vi nfl co s; f nt o a vaciet , ty rie va a l itl w d te n o r . 0 .y t a ns Tl1us ' we are conf t· co a w h t10 t 1tu ou b a g ts ou en m gu ar ht t. of ty ie a v a 1 s a o , _ g d n a : o th all e wi ty of values dg ali fin d e an j11 { r s th ue iss e th a l al 'solve' · ·· s gu k u m u o y . · 1n t h t o · n o D o . d h c ue ea I o In f va t.h e different , e m , so , ht s1g 1n . e 1n so is e er tl1 ments; 1t may be tl1 at h s. c t u a t e o g n I · u t e m so e v a 1 l rs e l1 arguments; aII great Pliilosop s aJ 11t ic re lit l1e po a co e ilo ac ph br em hy. to op y tr t us m on ti tu ti ns co a , se ur co f O reedom, yo u m y attempt to se�u re f u� bo a 1ts e1 1m g1 �r 's ill � If you accept and valtt� � d te s by es gg su o ns M e� nt m e g �n t1s by . quieu. e.g , ty er lib al du \,1 a broad measure of ii1d1 ty, �n d tl1e value of� govern­ 11 u1 y, r1t c:1 se : es tiv jec ob r he ot e lu va o als y But you nia s_ of s�c1ety; and n tor tai sec cer to ly 1ck qt1 s g� an ch jor 1na ing ng bri of le ab ment cap 1 1s�1 adherence to M ontesq�1e� will pro duce \ sla a 1er etl wl1 n you may well qt1estio a gover11n1ent with tl1e c,1pacity to lea d 1n an era \Vhere leadersl1 1p 1� crucial. Can we, ther1 , strive for botl1 objectives, for tl1e objectives of both executive power and individual freedo1n? Perl1aps it is a m,1tter of trying to aclueve a realistic balance in satisfying variot1s valt1es. Tl1is process is diffict1lt, b11t it may be both inevitable and desirable. Centuries ago Aristotle s11ggested that there are no perfect consti­ tutional systems; i11 eacl1 ,1ge eacl1 state m11st strive to balance competing objects; and tl1e process rnt1st go on. Constitt1tional cl1ange is a law of life everywhere, and the _ politic�} cl1ar : 1 ges underway or desired for developing countries of Africa are an 1lius_trat1on. Indee?. developi11g 11atio11s, consciously or not, are probably creating tl1e basis for 11ew l)ol1t1cal tl1eory. In time these new tl1eories will be better perceived. better argued. �ere_ we are cI1i_efly concerned with tl1e theories now embraced in the Ethiopian Constitution, and \.�1tl1 tl1e particular bala11 ce or com p romise w11 ich the Con stit ution at en ts b�tween rival goals. Our e1npJ1asis is tl1erefore on tl 1e political philosophers � : � 0 a _ ve influenced tl1is Constit:ution; we pa y less at others - indeed te nt tl1 io to e n t 1 �re is not space enougli to give a comple e te an aly sis of tl1 e ideas ev en of thos p h Il osop 1ers wl1 om we specially. con�i· . te d er ,,... 1 11 us, tl1is cl1 apter gives only a ta_s o f some 1 of the maitl id s, bu n_ g certa nd t irily st no ? unde t r enou gl1 a i full f r any ;� o f tl1em. Accordin 1 st do. a good de al o f outside reading - bey�nd _this text. A list of sug !e ;te � bo� ive g sbot h 1s com n1e nta ry ma teri � al and sou rce at the end o f tl1e cl1apter. Ab e or all you e , s_ l 1oul d t try in to h deep w read ks ly mor e of tl1e writers we study _ t�: excerpts 1n tl1ese m a terials are on ly samples. Furtlzer, yoi, sl1oz1ld begin . . 1 Constit utiu11 - a careful . · nolv your. study of tlze actual text of the Eth1op : J1 � t to We. �ill nces be making frequent refere Constitution for the pu;i� e?quiring how it may a ttempt to implement an. of tl1 e values argued in our read1ngs. Remember again that w r a yer s c�;; cerne_ d witl1 the validity phe no t s, l w : � plliloso theologians or : fn of id a the abstract · Lawy ers are concerned with ed solution of the probl ems con with p . ra_ct·ica I ways to im franting u s here and now. Lawyers are concern f o le e°:t tl1eory. W e interpreting and apply le ar e concer ne d with pr o� ros the ing the �astc law governing government in Ethiopia -

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Constitu�io�. Our �xcursi?n into philosophy is only to help us acquire perspecti­ ves and 1ns1ghts with which to deal with .these current problems. How much you ultimately agree with the various values and theories asserted in these readings i� you� personal task. Bu t you are asked to engage in dispassionate, �ard-headed cons1�erat1on of their utility. In this study we are all students; there 1s no dogma; certitude about one's beliefs does not provide scientific certain· ty of their validity. SECTION 1: '

POWER AND THE STATE s of The common bas power constitutional law is the political theory and j . which some men exercise over others in organisations known as ''states''. Power the capacity to control the behaviour of others - is the vital subject-matter of them both. Constitutional law concentrates on the legal distribution of powers exercised by governments, and tl1e legal limitations on tl1ese powers. Political theory is largely concerned with broader questions of the justification of political power, and the way in which it ought to be exercised witl1in the state to achieve various ends. But what is a state? For practical purposes, we all know more or less what we mean when we use the word ''state''. We may think of a state as the �ort of entity vs1hich can clctim membership of the United Nations; such as India or Ethiopia or (to complicate matters) the United States.* But a rather more analytical approach to the question, ''What is a state?'', wil.l help us to gain some insight into what political theory is about. Firstly, we may say that a state comprises a defined geographical region under the administration of a common government. The term ''state'' may also include the people who are under the· same authority. The Ethiopian state, for instance, . may be said to comprise both the territories under the ''sovereignty'' of the Ethio­ p ian Crown, and also all those people who are ''subjects'' of the Emperor.** Of these two components of the state, the territorial one is more useful, both for pur­ poses of practical administration and because it provides a clearer definition of the extent of a particular government's authority. But these criteria for a state, thougl1 essential, are not enough, for many administrative units cover a given population and area (like the Municipality of Addis Ababa or the British Colony of Hong Kong), and yet are not states. So it. may be argued that what distinguishes a state is th� existence o� a � o� ernment �ith _ an e.ffective monopoly of the continuing use of leg1t1mate force w1th1n 1ts boundaries�

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_B.ut obviously United Nations Membership is not t�e test of statehood. The People's :Rept1blic . . ·o:r Orina is a state, is it not? What about Rhodesia? •• . .R.e.id Article I of the Ethiopian Constitution. •

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l 1 t�e in pu ts a?d outputs ug ro tl1 ns rti of th . tl1e. ll lic wl d . a 1 1 t � as ce d an he s 5. ce it co n ! ie al n s re d n force a ty li : al qu a ''Legitimate f i ec s t e ivii�g 11 th nt to te ly ex g on at m, th e rc fo e th syste e us . al ay rn state politic ts ni � e v 1 t· ra 1 l iz ry gn 1 Otl1e r adwn �! ito co rr re te ed a as as egal ed .'' fin de l system · • calso be • . y y a m e ''stat a · ate may still be cou st t a u y B a w 1s 1t. th s in d n nted pernut a ; es at st r . le tl o b o1 Y cont after 1960, it has lost the o go dent Con f r v l the r1 depen like 1 len, w en e es s o p r ti JJ as such for many rs . e d r o b s t i in l1 it w 1 capacity to gover1 e nc ry se ve of a es 1e tl is i lit po er ow p cal . or ce r fo t la tl · · · W11 at tl11s n1eans is t s a ssoc1· at1o ' en d t s u e a k 1 1 n or 2 y, et ci so y ar nt lu o v · · a · t 110 is ·t1ze ns _ f syst.em. For tl1 e state v o es r s ic it se y n a d c� m n a ern d to er w o p 1e tl as 1 J ly al su ti it self-l1 elIJ grotip; and to punish those on so d 11 a s, xe ta y a p c, cl ta they n1 ust defend it against at at every taxpayer has to have 1 tl n ea m t no es do lly ra who do no t obey it.* TI1is natt1 s are among the de­ xe ta t bu ; en em lic po by 1 in 1 l n o1 fr d te es his 1 11011ey forcibly wr a 11d orders set ou t by its rulers: s w 1 la e tl 11 i ed di bo em e ar 1 icl 1 mands of tl1e state w1 ay be a fine, impr isonment, rs m de or d an s law cl1 st1 g 1 1 eyi ob dis and the pe 11alty for 1 e ba sis of n1uch power, t}1otigh it usually tl is ce for of t rea 1 tl tl1e 1 t1s, Tl . rse wo or l1 as to be rei11forced by pOJ)t1lar acceJ)ta11ce of tl1e ''legiti1n acy'' of the government and tl1e rigl 1tness of its n1easures. Tl1e rigl1 t to mo1101)olise the t1se of force over a give1 1 territory is known as sovereig11ty. Tl1e political p11 ilosopl1 ers of tl1 e late sixteentl1 and seventee11tl1 centuries firs_t gave tl1e tern1 pro111i11 e11ce, as ''st11Jre1ne power over citizens and subjects unres· trained by tl 1 e laws," 2 and gener,tlly regarded sovereig11 ty as belonging to the king or �on1e ?tl1er ruler; late r tl1 e�rists SJ)Oke of tl1 e 'sovereignty of tl1e people'; others ha.\ e denied th�t tl1e concept 1s a L1seful 011e. T11e \Vord 'sovereignty' .must in aoy c� te be _u_sed \Vitli g\eat care, becat1se it can be used to express quite a nun 1ber of d111erent ideas. For instance:

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2) 'Sovereignty' is someti111 es tised · 11 1 a legal sense to deno te tl1e supr eme, �a · fettered, Iaw-nJaking_ power. 1 . n e Tl t1s tl11s o p : is ''P ropo siti on s v reig a rlia111ent in E 11 gland beca , t1se I t can mak e or cl·1ange a11y I aw at i.ts ple ast1 re. ,, 3) ,Sovereignt . y' n1ay refer to - . .1 ti le e/fectlve _regard . su1Jren1e power i n tl1e state, w 1houtl _ to moral rigl1 ts o. a g 1 gal _ e �� pro ce "T h �ures. Tl1us, tl1i s argt1rnent: sovere�g11ty of (tl1 e En ; l lis�) 1 l 111e po t s sovere.1g11ty of tl1e eic � , : n i only tolerated bec ause of tl1e huca ! torat .

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Those who deny th . : or� an f t sta believe that organis:dr1g . QC;\ . r l1t o te y to e 11 de r th· a? d ho "' 1 anythi government sllottld ng of its citizens and of anarchy are f: d��!�;��-- · e st a eat dis� e h I; , t;. rcl1i r1 r n know as re a a ��� tha y 7 � been able· t o get�l� � � an _ � s po t e enefits, thougl1 sor:n� pr1�11t1vc socie Jc;;i.:-'�..�· g, if undisturb ed, with Only ve Almond & C · olen1an, The -y weak political lmks. --:-: r . · �-, Pol,·r ,· ·cs o'.f tile --,---.-, ean J B D e 0 ct· vel in o 1 ng 'P· ·· (153 0 159 6) ",::-7"� Areas (1960) page 7. quote d In · Gettel] ' . Harvey & l3alb HISfory of Political TJrougl1 t (195:JLR� _l'.85.· _.-___ -: er, Tlte . British Co11 . · . vn,m

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Tl1'UTIONAL LAW S CoN N IOPIA ETH OF K URCEBOO o 3�2:_____ _�s���::����:_==--���=�=�=�-==-----, emy to eve ry en is an m y er ev . re he · .w ' ar W · of �tl.roe a t to n r e u h t c o ! se t y y n a n a �b e t _ . conseq� 1thou w What.thei' . e v li is n e fore m e ther � in re e r l1 elie u w 1 n 1t ch nd su co , l on al Whatsoeve th tim I th w . . , 1 m the 1e tl IS Do h is rn e nt. to fu qu e 11 a cons b s is e entiY no culture of the� u q se tbe sam inven tion n o c d n a own : in a rt thcrr ce own st rength, and because th e fru1. t thereof is un Sea; no commod ious Bullni•• , by ed r� po im be ay m place for Industr y, use of tl1e commod'_1t'es that o"llllf,i'. ce g no ed or wl ch no K ; u ire f e m qu re as · ings no Navigation normov1·ng and re n1ov1 ng1 suc h th . and wh'1ch 1s t Y, · · worst of ut e oc1 S no rs; tte Le . ,1 no f ' o nts ts Ar ume Instr 0 no tish� . , f r·1 , or sty y, po ar na lit nt so u br , an u acco m of e no lif ����11.' An<l th e <? 1 face of the Earth; n e e r o f vio g n a d d n a , r a fe l contin1.Ja th em [the people] from Ill d en fi e d o t short. le ab be ay m as er ow on p a ch ���ries of. 00� an other, and thereby to _ secure them in sueh sorta !he �nly way to_ erect su s h , c-0n ve t d d an n s em ve th s el sh ri e no li � ig e ay u r m o f ey th r_ o 1nvas1on the earth of ts ui fr b; e th � J d that by th_err own I� u s1G:; r pow er and strength· up on one man, or upon one assembly of men, . n e will o t ° n tentedly, 1s to con1er a u , es ic o v f o ty li ra lu p that may reduce all their wills, by

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s be e ri is th sc � de be rst wo ob H h ic h w an 1n y er ev t ns ai ag an m TJ1e war of every re n cu ca ch se der h1 or w t B , en m rn ve go y an d an e, in ag im n .sort of life whicl1 he ca i sel t t ree us o ag m ne yo er ev at 1 tl es gu ar e or ef er 1 tl in }1is vie\v better than tl1is. 1-Ie : ce. pea the ep n ke ca e on al it e us ca be , ej,' ob en th ll wi l al 1 icl wh ·up a government ent ernm gov in re sha r the 1 fur no ve 11a le op pe tl1e 11t, nse co of act l After this initia . view s' bbe Ho it. it1 ion pat tici par ic rat 11oc de1 to im cla any en up giv for tl1ey l1ave : i es rivalri and ons it amb ir the ng, ruli in t par ve acti 1 y a1 tal<e le peop 1 tl1e ould is that sl ·,vill destroy the frail u11ity of the state, and lead back to civil war. The �asic �unction of the state, in 1-lobbes' view, is thus to ''defend (th e peo ple) : fr�m the 1 n_vas1ons fo�eigners _ and the injuries of one another' '. The price tot( haid for th1 s protection 1s obed1enc� to the government, and the gover nment, _for . . s part, must have all the powers wl11ch 1t r1eeds in order to carry out tl1is function. , T e n�t�re, extent and distributio11 of tl1 ese powers form much of the subjec t matter p poli _cal th?ug?t �nd constitutional law. Most powers are distributed througn �1e 0� �inary 1 nst1 t11tion s of tl1e state - parliaments ' courts ' ministries special · agencies etc . but one of tl1e consequences of ' e rs �o. w the tl1at I:obbes' tl1 eory is .o f the gove;nment must ult· imately_ and. essent1all)' be unlimited and und1v id�� There must tl1erefore exist a overei 1• . wb� , me gn,. eitl1er 011e man or a body of n not subject to the law n ta{e o any � sa . action neces ( ) wl 1 r ihc · ry ich f think he s it or welfare o f tl1 e state a�J 1 n t_ be cl�;cked b _y any other brancl1 or unit of governd . ment. Tl1is ultimat� pow:r ;� c1 � , r ove , 1 , tl 1 bolds S�vere1gn person or body . above the l aws, is called � Illg 1� tl e a P: , ogat1ve power, and i t must exist, ccor� to .Hobbes, in any count ry wl1ic . I1 is not to risk collapse tl1roug internal d.issen �· • h s·ince t1 11s . sover eign powe . '5, . . r pP� s . o I to t1n l1m 1te the people; but Hobbes d, it can obviously b e used ' ICO ( cePargu es t l ac 1at tl1 e r 15 e b r ather tl1an tl1 e ris · to k ·n � 0 f is sucl1 oppression · k of anarchy If tl . p 1e it tl e argl1ably,_ r i ob sk _ of as H �S- ft.�ul � anarchy is as great acceptance �f the t1 U-:us; ;e accept l11s ris k of alte ( rna .ve.-:-_1r tyran . 0 ? better ny the is dile · JJ)) = . mma · r is tb ere · .. e tJJ of b0th � . anarchy a , !'" d som � middle wa y wl1ich avor' nd tyra n . = � ny? This to tlie 11eart of tl1e o est1on is a very important one, f �t- itL. prob lem of maki ci;1eedo ·depends in .�� ���. m e sibl pos on and � ac ocr dem � � � th Whe er we be i v ha�e as'I-for� �' the people of a particular coun� .._ 0uA · sa�s . �hey 6 dq, or whetl er unity, civic res t t ,� Pl§ aI� ns ey i�1. rna it ll to _ bil wi le be ab y � l 0 a , fsel restr int and and the existe n�� O} t� tial simila a essen r conditions state where p t-:;�� _ where courts can e Ii am e nts ex ercise a. good de� of :g��satl� ont rol the exercise� previously fixed � · -:-::t ' "! !.: f � g e. c � ov er rt nm e Y law. wh en -- w:i-.-�-t",:._;-:;:;,� ntal power . '

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y elected governmen rl la u p o p a at th e ir st e b · t e w : n ca . How ment. WJI, run the govern sl1 to pro mo te? Would you a rgu e wi le y ma op tll goals the d t ul ec el 1e gove nun, f�r , ho tl a pi io s th best promote E � of �: eople a r a e y n l\ rv: r s d il he ot civ a h hig s ter n s instance, tl1 at each . i , in M e ce Vi � � � M t rs is in t 1 1e tl . g n e , s r e d a e le v t e ti \ ur o u s f h Chamber of D ep exec be mem r t}1e � Iect tly s t t 1a l t_ y a w e m sa e ': ers j;: na ng e in th da t of ''r ou � egio t a� 1 ns cer con '' �� b�: }�� J n s o , le b ! s� o p e Apart f�om wer s 1 on io t a held elec on a i s 1f bia j s t n giou rel to · U· · or appea1s · 0� ''fact1onal1s1n b asis, and ap art from the strain thi s migh· y) nc ue tit ns co �1de (rather tba� a 1.m.ited m s to be considered. Wo ui� le ob p r l1e r ot e ar e er 1 tl in1pose o n tl 1e e ectoIra I syste1n i u be· nt, h be me by rlia d Pa cte ele t t me n ern e gov ' r a i; such an el ected gover11meI1t' o e of t.he people ? Wou]rl· ur ut e ·h f . d t an y tr un co e 1 tl of t en . one to ·gui·de tlie developm p d s -:- s.ucl1 as Iav.. yers, __ t e p 1 I · d . ex r ne ai . rr ly omats, ! 1 gl J11 (v ve ti ec ef( e 11s � it be ab· le to s tor tra the n1s 1m 1I servan ti ad c1v d an s ger 11a ma s ert exp ce an fin c ·s , 1 e 1n 1 a 1 eco1 1om1c p ' . . en m t? rn ve T n h e� go e d o C m y an · onstituwl1 ose continuing services are essential to . t tioi1, you will 11ote (see Arti�le 27), proceeds on a d1ffe�en theory The oflicerso!. gover11111ent - IVli11isters, Directors, etc. -. a�e re s l?ons1ble t? �he Emper or (and no,v, presl111 1ably, tl1e Prime IY1inister and C1v1l Service Con1m1ss1on un�e� the Em­ peror's delegations). 1�he ConstitL1tion presuma b ly_ contemplates a c1v1l se� iet: , recruited on tl1e basis of n1erit ;;1nd exper1e11ce and g1,1e11 some tenure and thus 1nde­ I)endence in otl1ce. Tl1e pro bler11 l1ere migl1t be pl1rased in terms of sec11ring a pro per balance be· : tween e.Y'.JJert ,gover111r1e11t ;;111d popz,1./ar gover11,11e11t. Tl1e i ssue is as old as Plato\ : Re1Ji1blic wherein Plato (throl1gl1 Socrates) rejects ''den1ocracy'' and argues that a good socieEy 11eeds ''good'' governors, and t11 at tl1ese gover11ors can only be select· ed on tl1e basis of a11 arduo11s eclt1catio11 and exper ie11ce a 11d proven merit, noi by POI)Ular cl1oice; for Plato tl1olrgl1t any otl1er basis of selection was essentially irra· · tional. Go,,ernment i11 }1 is viev1 is a11 ''art'' calli1 1g for wis dom . .... Tl:e argui:nents in favour of vesting power i 11 elected execLitives and elected . leg1slat1ve bod1es n1ay be st1m1narily r e -sta ted: 1) Arly no r1 de11�ocratic go�er11 ment i s lia ble · the if r; to po lea we to d of ab 1 e tl us e ?ureaucrc.l: cy IS n_ot S ti bJect to J)O})Ular con , it will te11d to act in it s own tro l interests or tl1 e 1 1:terests of classes an t th., , d gr ol al l}) lie S d w a itl is w 1 ic it l 1 l1 �x pens� f otl1 er interests, possibly is it ; tl1 os e ra of te a m el ec aj or to of tl ity f e 1 imposs1 b e to secure the incorrup tible guardians envi saged by Plato. 2) In -tl1e 1011g rtin a viable an · a'n d e1:r1.ective govern1n . ou" thr . · ent needs support · fl wI· despreacl J)art1c · 1pat1on i 11 it.: e \'eryoi1e c' sl1ould 11ave a cl1an�c� to 1 0 uen� . tl1e laws by wl,icl, 11 e inust . 1 ve, an no 111atter l1ow r ove g a fl1 t c1en good or e � 1ne11t n1ay be it is essentia/l � lWise to treat people a s cl1 ildren wl10 canoe·1 . llr govern tl1ems�lves: ''Onl Y . th) if ine n ar e all ow ed to go,,ern themselves, will begin to tliink o-f then1seY I ves and for ti 1e1:11se . .. . . .IS an racY ·n o l em ves . as 1nd1v1 duals. c ·d ed11cational process 1 wh. icl1 men _ will de,1elop interests of tl1eir o\VO 311 in this way extei1 d tile 1 � 1011201 1s of tl1e1r p ersonalities.,, 14 . 3 ) Tl1e most 11:11Po rtant problems wl11· . · pro 1 1 I c coi1front a sta te ar e 11 ot tecl1n1ca blems; tl1e 1ss11es involv . e c1 101ce between t� r e et h spe11d most of a limit values. The qu"'stion of wh · ed amotitlt of money on scl1ools or 011._,defenc e or on road �. 1

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14. I-lacker, Politic al Theory , page 576.

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is not the same sort of_ question as deciding whether a sick man is suffering from . mala!1a, flu or ty�ho1d fever. The latter problem must be solved by an expert and 1� would be silly to put the diagnosis to a majority vote; but the former quest1?n has no clear scientific solution; tl1e cl1oice, perl1a1Js, 011ght to reflect the wishes of the people most co·ncerned. Tl1us, tl1e decisio11s of civil se1·vants ought to be strictly limited to tl1e exec1ttio11 of policy, 11ot tl1e making of it. But to these arguments, the suppo1·ters of gover111nent by trai11ed experts selected by some ''neutral'' process may 1·aise all of tl1.e f. oilowing 011es: 1) Even �hen questions of val11es are i11volved, tl1e people ca1111ot n1ake tl1eir choice on their O\Vn; to make intelJigent cl1oices 011e 11eeds to l1ave tl1e issues and tl1eir implicati_ons �arefully explai�ed; other\.vise, 011e 111ay si1nply decide as a result of emotion, 1gnorance or 1rrele,1a11t considerations. Tl1erefore civil servants must guide parliamentary decision-making, a11d tl1e less capable tl1e parliament and the electorate, the 1nore the g11idance. 2) Government, and especially n1ode1·n govern1nent, is an increasingly complicated business; expe.rts of all kinds are needed. A glance aro11nd any 5overnment reveals experts in ever)' ministry - experts on everytl1ing, from agricultt1re to zoology. Even \vl1en the qt1estio11s to be decided do involve values, tl1e expert with bis detailed knowledge of tl1e facts, l1is long experie11ce, and l1is keener appreciation of the implications of the decision, may be better qualified to ans,ver than the man in the street. 3) Further, one may argue that the \V11ole de1nocratic process is one for wl1ich the people have to be conditioned througl1 experience and education, and the only way to produce that experience is to select a11 ''elite corps'' - the best 11niversity graduates coupled with the best of the traditionally recognized leaders - and produce a ''tutelary'' govemn1ent, a gove1·nment wl1icl1, in effect, will treat the people as ''students'' until it is time to grad·uate to a new stage of demo­ cracy. In all political societies, · b11t partic11larly in develop:i11g countries, a great deal of attention l1as been paid to the problem o.f developing a new ''elite'' group, selected on the basis of ability and specially educated, whicl1 is supposed to develop links both with the traditio.nal systen1 and with the new ideas, with the ''inert'' mass of people and a small, restless, ''pro-modern'' minority. Tl1is ''elite'' corps of civil servants would be in a unique position to g11ide the country's development, and to explain and adapt changes in accordance with its particular characteristics. 1 5 4) Finally, there are the arg·uments �uggested by_ our readi�gs n ��11gshi and ?, ? , tradition derived both fram the idea of 1nak1ng a11tl1or1ty leg1t1mate and from the' undesirability of jntroducjng politic,tl institutions o·t1t of keeping with the understanding and the expectations of the people. These arguments have to be evali1ated different}�, accor�ing to the sitl1ati?11 of the country to which tl1ey are applied. O?e poss1�le basis fo1· a c 111pron11se � solution has been suggested by J o.hn. Stt1art Mill (1806-1873), a democrat ·wl10 was yet l1 ighly aware of the tech.nical problems of gover11me11t: 16 •,

t s_1a w s (1963� ; '!'le l1e irz e11t m o vel De c1l itic Pol ls, Shi e: vic ser il civ � f 1 of tI e n ctio _ P_ � on this fun Syo·um Gebregziabher, The Structure c_i11d [ti� ctions of the C1v1l .�erv1ce 111 Etl11op1an Public Adrninistratio11 (unpublished Ph.D. d1ssertat1on). 16. · John Stuart Mill, Repres.ent,1tive Government.

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UTIONAL LAW TIT NS CO IAN IOP f TIE SOURC EBOOK OF

u nfi t, t h e prop er office of a ly al ic d ra ' 1·t 1·s · h� of publ 1 . I cl ,..,,, · t e ig , for 1 l ow 1r I t g, o t n ioverni n ment: g r ve of go n io ct l1c n t fu I f e o th d o Ins tea n d. �ontr a l l o f t l1em wl11ch any one l1 a c f t o a w on ti to is a · fic ti us ly cl J an ·f ti1 e n1en wh o compose represcnt at:ve ass en1b 1011 t os1 exp 1. I] , d an u e f , l a city on its acts: to con1pel nsure t em 1.f �o nd co nde m n ab libera te o nflicts witl1 the de c ich wl1 ce · � to b er n n · e; abl 01a considers cuestion n a t · ua 11Y appoint thei r i 1 l · 1 lfi u f t r r v1 o or t , · y l us s tr es r r ei either e,xp d an the governnent abuse th � ffi O from t )' of the na tion. r n libe e h t or tl1e pel lCv� f e r to x enou gl1 y urit sense of th: nation, se d n a , er w po le p m a ly re su is . is h rs T so es cc su 1s to de,1 p

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elo an . l ,s dic · r.. in, tJ1en of cot1rse, tl1e p ro blem . If ore acc�p ts Mil �ers tands ' i ts funct io n wl1icl1 i s capa ble o f ''tl1ro wing ificatio11'' of measures t 1s ''assembl;'' wl11c!1 _prOJ)erly tin jt ng , llj pe om , c nd a . t . g n e m rn e v go . 11 0 '' ty c1 l1 b t1 p t 1n )f d h c 1n t g u a nli t1 e o co th h 1t w e n o d e b t 1s 1t n is th t ti b . , t· n te e p m o c 1 · 11 , 1e , · . tl , , g ur1n · . n; ce E d b c y bl an ·a m st se . u s a m d te c le e 1e tl d n a e v · ct1t1 · e x E .., · J r>-. tl n e e tw e . . · b l e g ug r t · s I er · v po t1nua I t e 1e compro mise 1s rw 1e tl O . cy en d n Je eJ d 1nutua1 a e iz 1 gi co re d n a 1 er tl o t e · tl ec sp re theory \\On't v,1ork.

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Tl-IE SE.PARATJON OF POWERS Our 1isct1ssion of tl1e problen1s of bala11cing powers bet\veen elected repre­ oduce se11tatives and exJ)ert, i11depe11dently cl1osen adrnini strators l1elps to intr 1ernm ent go, of ns ctio fun 11t ffere i d ot1t y carr to ers pow re11t dif-fe tl1e the idea J1at can be ''s�parated'' by distributing tl1em to cliffere11t institutio11s of tl1e government.

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Montesquieu's theory ''Sep1ration of powers'' is a labei-pl1rase. Tl1e term can b e in,,oked for a variety of pt1rpo�s. 011e of the _ original propone11ts of a tl1eory of po\ver separation was the Earo1 de Montesqu1et1 (1689-1755). A famous JJassag e i n l1 i s book Tl1e Spirit of the La)Js r11ns as fallows: 11

In evey government tl1ere are three sorts of po\.ver .... By virue of the first, the J)rince or mag··1st rate e nacts tempo ral')' or pe.rpetual laws, and amends or abrogate; tJ1ose that have been alre d Y ena�ted . By tl1e second, l1e mak es peac or -y.,ar, sends or e es em:,assies , establisl,es tl1e receiv · · · publ1c � security and pro vi·d es aga�nst ·1�vas1ons. By the thir· d, he · . '. . punishes crminals, or determi nes the dis u tes hicli aris� be . t\\,een 1nd 1v1duals. Tl1e l a tt er w e shall call tl1e judciary power, and the otller sp in,p 1�Y �l1e ex_ecu tiv e po w er o f tl 1e state. . The POitical liberty of tl1e subject is a tran u·r . . 1 ity of q 011nd ar1s1 ng f ro n1 the opinion that each . person has ,f his safe ty· In order to have ti 11s · · . 1I berty it ·1s requisi ·tuted te consti tl1e gover so be n ment as on e mar needs not be afraid of aiiother. '

Wl!en .he legislative and executive powers .. ar • e uni ted in . tl1e sam e person or in the same body of m?gtSlra:es, there can be n o liberty becau se apprel1e�sions n1ay arise, le th same mon arch or senate s\ould enact tyra nnical laws,'· to �t e exect1te them in a tyrannical ma nner. . · . Again ·I,ere 1s no l'b 1 ert y 1f tl1e juct· · wcr e _not separat e d from the ]egjslative and . cu i_.ve. \Vee it join ed witl1 tl;e legislati� exe­ f �e n} �' t% � _ liberty of the subje .c t v.r ould l:e expoEed to a I�rary cer_itrol ; for the judge would � � n b e l'le �g,sla t or. Were it j o ined to the executive power. t ·�e Judge n1 gl1t behave with viole nce the and oppression. 17. MonttSquieu, The Spirit of the L GlVS, Book

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Chapter 6.

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Montesquieu's-contention must be analysed carefully, for it is only an argu­ ment, not gospe1, and 01._1r question is: how valid is it as a theory for constitutional �evelopment 1� develop1ng_ countries such as Ethiopia? To do tl1is, let us focus on three _ questions: what 1s meant in tl1is context by ''power''? Wl1at is meant by ''separation'''? And l!'hy sbot1ld we separate powers? Fi�st: �ontesqt1ieu _assumes tl1ere are ''tl1ree sorts of power'' in govern1nent: the l �g1slat1v� (law ''en _acting' '), tl1e j t1dicial (dispt1te settlit1g) a11cl the execl1tive (fore1gll: re�at1ons, pl1bl1c sect1rity ancl law e11forcing). No doubt tl1is functional categor1zat1on of ''power'' is helpft1l. B lit it may be a11 oversi1n1Jlification becat1se it is not alwa�s so ea�y to categorize all the powers exercised by 1noder11 gover111nents today, particularly if we n1ean (as Mo11tesqt1iel1 did) tl1at by J)inni11g tl1e label ''legis­ lative'' (or ''judicial'' or ''execl1ti,1e'') o .n a. specific f1111ctio11 we are thereby implying that tl1e power to carry Ollt t11at :fu11ction sl1ould be vested in a ''legislative'' (or ''judicial'' or ''executi,,e'') orga11 of government ''se1)aratecl'' from tl1e other two organs.* Second: Montesquiell does not tell us exactly wl1at l1e mea11s by ''se1)aratio11''. He assu.mes, apparently, t11at there sl1ould be tl1ree i11deJJe11dent branclzes of govern­ ment. Bt1t ,vl1at is their relationsl1ip to each other? For exa1nple, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution accepted Montesquiet1 's dictl1m tl1at tl1e powers of govern­ ment could, indeed, be classified as ''legislative'', ''executive'' and ''judicial'', and that th.ey could be divided accordingly a1nong three independent ''brancl1es'' of government, but tl1ey also envisioned a governme11t vvhere the tl1 r. ee brancl1es exercise controls over eacl1 other througl1 a system of c/1ecks a,1cl balc1nces. For example: the President exercises all ''executive'' power a11d is independently elected (in form th.rough an electoral college, in fact by the people): l1e is accou11table to the electorate. The Congress exercises (in theory) all legislative power and is elected -by the people. The Judiciary enjoys tenure in office a11d is, in tl1eory, accountable to the law and the judicial conscience. Thus tl1ere are tl1ree independe11t branches. But the President must propose a budget, and all taxes and government expendi­ tures must be enacted by Congress; all laws must be enacted by Congress; thus the Executive is made dependent on Congress for funds to operate government, for laws t o implement this progran1. Tl1e President can veto Acts of Congress but an extraordinary majority in Congress may override his veto. Thus the President can often effectively check the will of a majority opposing hin1 in Congress, but Congress can likewise ''check'' the �reside1_1t. The President appoints l1is cabinet but the Senate can refuse to confirm his appointments. In extreme cases the lower house of Congress can ''impeach'' (accuse) tl1e President of misdemeanors, and the Senate can try him and two-tl1irds of the Senate can 1·emove l1im. Tl1e President appoints judges - who enj� y life· !enure - but tl1e Senate (tl1_e llp� er house of Congress) must ''confirm'' his appointment before tl1e J11dge enJoys life tenure (subject to the removal process noted above). The laws of Congress and the

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C-0nsider Haile Sellassie I University. ls it a governmental body? Does it :xercise ''legislative'' _ powers? (lt n,akes rules governing academi� s!� n� ar?s �� t�� select1� n , promotion and d.ismis·sal of professors and students). Does 1t adJudtCA:'lte ? {It _ determines '_V hethe� th�se rules have been violated). Does it ''execute'' laws? (It � nforces all its rules). Is 1t a leg1slat1ve judjcial or executive organ of government? Can yo� think of otl1er examples of governmental agencies where Montequieu 's ''powers,, are combined - and probably should be?

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the Co11rts t o det er by '' ew vi re . al ici tid ''j . ect to b' st1 are e i� ed by the le is �n.e t 1a c e1 s w la e . acts of tl1 e_ Ex_ectit _ ar cl de ay m l tv ts � tir Co e th d 11 lity \vlJicll are deem ed i11con sistent with tl1e Con�itu�� e their const1tt1tion� ,; _ 1s or acts of exe�ut1:e o c1� unenforce able. * TJ1ese are only a few exa1nples o/on , 11 a l . 1 0 t1 tu 1 st n � c n u e b , n e reba h eat to c a to tem sys te �� r era ly lib de w t bu ) e '' · er J ow ' ate rc: a p e s to · Y Y l J) 1n s1 t o . . effort n . r e h t o 1e tl , r e v o l o tr 11 o c e m so s e eacl1 ''brancl1 ' exercis a very different int erd s 0a l1a ry eo tl1 eu t1i sq te on M . · In Franc"'1::, 110wever, tlJe ns a e -- an effor t 1· i se J t I er e or m a I n 1 11 t10 ra 1:>a . se . 0 nt ea 1n · s l1a . n t· io a ar JJ se . n o . t1 . i:>reta . d fr om e�c l1 ?tl 1er. Unt·1l the creation te la st1 111 e or n1 t 1 . P ti1 e or0aa11s of governn1e1 kce · · · t e er iv w 1 a is p� s eg wa , 1 8 ,.. 111 19 ) f o the n 1� t1t t1t or; ns Co e tl1 by ic bl pu Re 1 ftl of tt1 e Fi n �1o e le? of the cab inet. · tl1 se d lle ro r:t co cl1 l11 w 1t 1e1 an rli Pa e th in exclusively vested 1_cs,_ ''�xecuted" the l1t an p� t e11 a1n rl1 Pa n1 fro d � rce vo di , e vic ser il An execlltive civ y power (1.e. JUr1sd1ct1on) to review a11 ise erc ex to en idd rb fo re we ts tir laws. TJ1 e Co ts, t en bu ctm of ve ena ati isl leg of executive ly on t no , ity 1al io1 tt1t 1sti co1 or ty tJ 1c legali ght y t tur tau ti1a cen l1 the Courts , e11t l1te eig tl1e g rin du nce erie 1 exp r1cl 1:re l. wel :1s acts co11ld l-)c reaciio11ar)', a11d it \Vas tl1e tl1 eory of Fre11ch revol11tionaires that "judicial revievv'' in Lile co11stitt1tio11al se11se \Vas undemocratic, that judici�l ''interfere nce" coulcl frtislrale l-)otl1 JJrogressive go,1ernment a11d tl1e ,;vill of tl1e people. Therefore, tl1 e judges of the eslablisl1ed Jaw cot1rts \Vere denied any power to exercise aoy 1ent. No one could question the Iegaljiy of co11trol over the brc111cl1es of governrr . �iny official act i11 tl1c courts ...fl1e citize11 w]10 believed tl1at his legal rights \Vere · ;:1bric!gecl. \vas referred to a. syste1n of adJninistrative courts establisl1ed within the executive. Jt1st as the cc)t1rts ,vere inst1Iated fro1n otl1er brancl1es of governmenL so tl1e exectilivc est�1l1lisl1rnent - be11eatl1 .fv1inisterial Ie,,el - was divorced from P,1rlia111e11t. Tl-ius r,o lJ_ra11cl1 l1ad mt1cl1 direc.t co11trol or influence over the other.*' Tl1e cli,,er�e11ce be_t\veen French and An1eric;:.1n interpretations of Montesquieu s!10';: _l�s tl1ftt '·separ�t1�11 of p�1vvers'' is an an1biguo11s concept. Moreover, "separa· t1011 1s not a value 111 itself, s1111ply a means of securing desired ends. Tl1us tl1e tl1�rd and tl1e critical qt1estio11 \Vhich concerns lIS is: wliy should \\'r separate povi1 ers? What goals are \Ve seekino? b · lvlor� � qliie� ���1 tl:e passag e above) argued tl1at separa ote such pro tio wi n ll � . m t , :::1:. as 1 erty , 1ndividtial security'' an d pr otection against ''tyrannical'' govern· Otl1er objectives can also be sec� red . . . . . . _. b _Y d way� istr1b 11t1ng po\\'er in various or, conversely concentrat· g tliem "' 111 ''ariotis ways. For example·. if we behe,e � I ' that al l ba' sic Iaws and po11c1es of go\' "repre. er nme t 11 s l 1ou 1 a d b e developed through sentative'' an , d ''democrat1-c ,, organ o ' ) f a g o v !11 we ernn 1ent , tl1en to that extent argue 11ot only tlJat law , k ' g d t sc l ele<. po we n rs a � � ust be exerciseci by � Parliament, but tl 1a t Parli�e�� � sl�ii1: ei1J 0 Y otl1er direct controls o··ler the ex.e cutne, *

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This the�ry of "judic ial re view', is a s .1 ._ �dopte� 11;1 many otl1e r countries -in cf k in g elaboration on Montesquieu; it has n�\\' � UdLng, prest1mab ly, Ethiopia. Th e theory i s diSCU · m detail 10 Cl1apter 2, Part 2. _ This theo ry !ed to a nun1b . .. er of ra . '1l 1. es _during th e post-war period a,od was mt:e 1fth Republic Co n ii �f�� nc�ti (1; s 0 wh ic11 h as greatly increased th e pov,1ers O a . ormerly a figure-he tu . ffi - ) at tl1e expe se o Parliament, special tribunal (outside th e re ada oCo�ai as �to;�Jl­ b and � f gul r r 5Y5lem) to review the constitutionality of legt5latl

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suc· h as control over the selection of Ministers and other pol.icy-making officials. To the extent that _we favou� a constitutional system whicl1 guarantees basic rights for the people - rights relating to ''free expression'', ''due process of law'', ''pro­ perty'' and _ s o ?n, then we may argue, not only for ''entrenchment'' of these rights in the con_st1t�t1on, but for an independent judiciary vested witl.1 the power to enforce the const1tut1on as law through the exercise of tl1e power of j11dicial review. To the extent that we believe in classic ideas abotrt a civil service - selected, promoted and trans_f�rred sol�ly_ on the basis of ''merit'' (merit judged i11dependently of ideo­ logy, _P�l1t1cal _ affil1at10J?, personal status 01· i11flt1e11ce) - we n1ay try to establish the C1v1l Service as an independent constitt1tio11al orga11 of government. Conversely: to the extent tl1at we believe tl1c.tt tl1e dema11ds of ''development'' (and the dangers of trying to establisl1 a governn1e11t wjtl1011t a clear cut I-Iobbesian sovereign) req�ire centralized responsibilit)' for eve1·J,tl1ing wl1ich government may do, then we will argue for expansion of ''executive'' powers, e.g. tl1e power to pro­ mulgate decrees having tl1e force of laws i11dependently of Parliament, ''emergency'' powers of various sorts, the power to inflt1e11ce or cc,11trol parliament thro11gl1 such techniques as the veto, t·he power to dissolve Parliame11t or to appoint some or many of its members, the po,ver to remove or discipline j11dges (as well as appoint them). To the extent we believe - as son1e political leaders in Africa assert - that a single, official political ''party'' must be developed as a vehicle to develop a new national ideology, unity and commu11icatio11 between govern1nent and people, and to mobilise popular support and develop a sort of ''general will'' - to the extent we may believe in tl1is k.ind of Nee-Rousseau tl1eory of guided. pop11lar sovereignty we may, as some African countries are nov.1 trying to do, create a '"one pa.rty system'' by t.be constitution and give that party botl1 constitutional (and thus quasi-govern� mental) status and powers to control the selection of exec11tive a11d legislative leader� ship. Thus, powers may be distributed in many ways. Tl1e possible fo1-mulae for concentrating and separating are infi11ite. Se1;aration of powers is a technique to limit power and thereby accomplisl1 other objectives; it is not a goal or a good thing in itself, but only a means to an end. Tl1e starti11g point, we suggest, is to think first about the essential values we may wisl1 to secure througl1 separation, such as ''democracy'' or ''rights'' and then realistically to think about the prospects, the difficulties and the risks of attempting to implement tl1ose goals. We may believe m�nt, today, cannot in ''democracy'', but we may believe that an e�ected Parlia _ effectively discharge all the complex burde11� of pol1cy-_mak111g_ wh1cl1 m�dern govern­ ment and development impose on a Parliament wl11cl1 enJoys exclusive power to make all the laws. We may believe in tl1e value of ''rigl1ts'' and ''rt1le of law''. But ect, resp if a country lacks an adequate corps of wise judges wl10 will command _ _ and w11o are schooled and realistically prepared to enforce tl1e const1tut1on and and too mucl1 other laws, there are indeed risks in placing too l1eavy a respo11sibility · ' expectation on the judiciary. ­ om ary acc to ess y be nec ma n tio 1 : 1tr: ce1 con e som st lea at t tl1a see st mu ain we Ag ­ lop 11' eve tio ', ''d iza ern od ge' ', ''m cha l plish other' goals. For ''unity'', rapid ''socia � _ ment;' and extensive government regulat1011 or direct control of tl1e ec?11omy may be very important goals, too. Experience seems to teacl1 that tl1e acl11e�ement of thes.� goals depends to a c,onsiderable degree on a strong meast1re of exec�t1ve leader. ­ ship. Some concentration of power may thus be necessary. Tl1e precise form�la g r1n be em 1 rem rtl is wo . It ge an ch l ica lit po of ge sta y e ma �ave to var·y depending on th .

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rist (John Marsha ju n a ic er m A s u o m fa : a l,lJ t a h w . . e b t rna 11::_ . ' e ' s n to m e r o g c a fo e e r n u t�t1o d n e 1 t to It cons a d e n that g si e d t '' w � la Y er w p e m l ta rn u n e v o o l h g s f o n o it ti o u d ib te tr r . e teing of tlJ e dis ..... once asse ; . i e h ti l r lu a n o c o o v f ti e li t, o n p e m r ro te le ger n lo be a s�t! a te a t� c e f f e � 0 d � e n 1g s e d w la l a n o 1 a trans1t

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r e w f t o o p e P c n o C r e h t o n A wers o P f o n io t a r g te n I e Th ls � r tr e o n co mmands th o c s � e s n se l a g le a jn r e ow p f o d e iv e c n o c u ie u sq te n ed p o w er 10 terms of law Mo z ri o g te ca e h re o ef er h T . t en 1 n rn ve o g y b ed . · . . · r · g to the tas ks . h - accord 1n d 1rect. 1y exerc1s rt 1o so d n a g n 1 c l1 o p , g in lc a -m ty ea tr , g in g d ju , g makin whicl1 officials perform. e se to ry that power �o l th a n o ti u it st n co in t an rt o p It is possible _ and im e d fin ea de st wer ia in y po 1a n e W . se n se l ga le nno d an t can be defined in a differen y, et ci 111 ro so f ich r1g wh ti ill- , na 1a en , ce or f a as it e n fi de ay n1 e w e; ns a ''political'' se o at an a� em , ID: es e rc fo i or s, e� w po se he T . es do it fluences governme11t to do w l1at eligion, morality t r ou ab s ea id ld l1e 1ly o1 m m co , ed at lc cu in : part from cultural values s nd in ki of rta vs. e ce la\ rc fo en d an e ak m to t en m rn ve go a ce and justice may influen n thi ps wi iety ou soc gr m fro 1t b1 , re ltu cu m fro ly np si1 t no , ate an em Or the forces may . t ir as ep the ide acc to t en nm ver go e) erc co s me eti som v,ho attempt to influence (or , may ent one nm ver e go enc u l inf to ty aci cap 1 e tl has up gro lar ticu par a ent ext To the wer,, ''po e hav not y it ma ugh tl1o n eve tem sys al itic pol tl1e l1in wit '' wer ''po a l1as it say in a constitutional sense.* Tl1is idea of power is as old as Aristotle, w J 10 sl1rewd ly noted ''tl1e state j5 made 1:1P of_ all n:ia1�ner of m�n'' - meaning men witl1 differing desires, interests a°:d 0�1en:4�!t1on_ 1tl11n tl1e society �hat com1)rises tl1eir state. Many modern political � tl1at an essential concern of tl1e study of government must be sc1ent1sts believe the study of sucl1 power forces witl1in society, arid of tl1e 111etl1 0...,ds by which govern· ment accomn1od::-1tes these forces or controls tl1em. G��ups wl1ich seek to infl.11ence gover11me11 t are sometimes called "interest rou1Js and tl1e _attempt to inflt1ence may be· called ''interest articulation". Io . � ve opin¥ coui1trres tl1 e very pl1enomenor1 of de\1elopm ent - tl1e development ess o� e� ucat1on, ma�s con1m11r1ication, electio11s ' a n.1oney economy busin new · ' · concerns, trade ur1 1ons ''new elitPS'' "'" a �1 d so ? 11 - may create more and �ore desire� for ''interest articulati�n' '. Tl1e conc�rns of 111terest gr�tips n1ay be social (women�. organizations), reli ious tl1e iv o Cl1111cl1 · �, o ct1ltt1ra e l ec n m (writ artists) , rs and (trade unions) regfo11al � .. tr 1 tribal (Gallas)� or �d eo�ogical (students); or �ore likely a �onibinal.io� �� t�:�s�'concerns may g1\1 tempt_ to at . tl1e e -d1re ct1on to influence.*** TI1e attemJJt to 1��-fl tierlce may be n g ndt ' dep e ''la ' wfu l'' or ''unlawful botl1 on tl1e metl1octs used b)' le grotip and tl1e law regulati 11 g sucl1 activity. * **

Capacity to in �uence n1ay obvious . .U ! be . n1cct . su_ r ay ed in ma.ny ways: the group m be srna but �ave potential inilitary force at [s lacking n1uch m.ilit.-1ry strengt 1l . i dispis':;l it n1a!' derive its power from numbers, tho ut apparent mer.1.t - of its ideas. , it may e 1 nfluent1al siznp l y because of the app eal - I Influenced by suc 1l theorists as Karl Marx and Max \\'eber. Otl1er groups _ exis' ti ·rty· . ng or. potent1.al - u · c kl pe �s_ant tarn1 ers; bar associati . l e · � 1 Y com e to m.i.11d: business n1en; the b���.l"', ; no·"fll . · • ons , t 1 m111 tary ·, lllV,1. u s J •1m s; po]1t1cal ''parties'' or factions" Pa1 1amen l t •, and ,v1·th·1n group . s tliere may, of course, be sub-groups.

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To the extent we believe that the growth of interest groups and interest articula­ tion is:. 1) inevit�ble because of the natt1re of the process of development; 2) desirable because 1t per1111ts ''the people'' (who are not 11ecessarily a monolitl1ic, single-think­ ing mass) to express grievances, wants and hopes; and 3) desirable because govern-· ment needs to kno w tl1ese things not only to maintain ''consent'' and ''legitimacy''· but to make i1:1tel!igent decisions, then it becomes important to consider l1ow, in terms of const1tut1011al and public law instit·utio11s, govern1nent can take account M this phenomenon. Several types of institutions may be considered: I) government may provide,. as of right, channels of commt1nication for i11terest artict1lation, e.g. by permitting (and regulating) associations to be formed to esta'blisl1 comn1t1nication witl1 govern­ ment, by developing n1ethods whereby interests can be articulated before Parliament and indeed, ·before the Emperor and executive age11cies; 2) government may en­ deavour to recruit representati,1 es of in1portant grou1Js into important official posi­ tions, e.g. through Civil Service recrl1itment, tl1rough institutions like the Ethiopian Senate which was originally designed to give representation to traditional ''groups'> like the nobility and the Church but which now may be used to give representation to other important groups; 3) governn1ent n1ay provide, througl1 a system of local or ''federal'' government, a measure of at1tonomy to regional interests and thus let some groups within society solve some problems more or less according to their ow·n desires. We may believe that recognition of the increasing existence of interest groups. is necessary and desirable, but it is also important to note the diffic·ulties confronting government, perhaps government in developing countries in partict1lar. For interest groups, to the extent they operate openly and vocally, may introduce divisive forces or tensions within society (tribalism, regionalism, labour vs. ma11agement, new elites vs. old elites). Therefore ways must be found both to control interest articula­ tion and to produce in the minds of all people an overriding desire for unity and compromise in order to maintain the strength of the state. This can be attempted through direct controls on expression and activities of groups and a measure of suppression, or by indirect controls such as registration of organizations, attempts to require people to use prescribed channels of communications, and skilful pro­ paganda to promote acceptance of new primary valt1es such as loyalty to the in­ tegrity of the state.* Politics, Aristotle suggested, is the ''art of compromise''. If so tl1en ''powers'', in the sense we are now speaking of ''power'', must be ''inte�ated''. �gain, Arist�tle advised, ''reciprocity is the salvation of tl1e states'' - me_an1ng tl1at 1n the operat� on of politics (government in action), the people, more part1cula�ly tl1e groups making _ up society, must come to recog.nise that t_her� must be b?th give �nd. take, and tl1�t co-operation and compromise are essential 1f the state 1s t� ma1nta1n any organic vitality. This is sometim.es a hard lesson to learn . particularly f� r _ tl1ose ,v!10 adopt rig id ideological views and believe that those views mt1st prevail 1rrespect1ve of other deeply rooted interests in society.

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T}le so-ca11ed ''one party system'' _may b� co11�eived, in par�, as an effort to contain interest groups within a single quasi-offic1al, nat1on-w1de . organ1za.t1on_. Tl1e _party 1!1ay be used (as _p.erhaps it was in Ghana) to suppress groups which, fo� official or 1d �olog1cal reas _ � ns, the . Govern.ment does not wish to hear: or the party may, as 1s Dr. Nyere�e s _ stated vie� 1n T� o­ . 7.m:tia, be conceived as a more open grass-roots fo�Uf!l where competing interest art1culat1on is oermissible so Ion� a.s it ooetates w·ithin stated l1m1ts. ',

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ld a stat� be? , u o y ll sh ic h p ra g eo g . , � ig b . 11 0w : ed sk a . e ArtSlotl ago e e ps s rs ou ve gr di of ntir1 Jd 1zens I10 c1t Ce to lt cu ffi di it d 10 fi . 11t eared, mig � e 1 1 I , cy' e ma iti d eg g:at ''l an ity or th au 1re ct se Tl1e big to cult ffi di , . . t , n e m rn e ,, o a Je o 1 , r removed to geth er 1n der a s. 11 0 O r t· c institutions wl1en many c1t1zens are 1a _ lt t) establisl� d m7r� ; he ntral �o� ernment T c� difficu g. in ak -m on si ci de of is ct fo � �Ile a 1 c ti c a r p d a y ll a l1st s ruled ay r1a pl'.ys1c 1e w pe tl 1m h t1c m in ' s' ce 1 1 vi ro ''p g in tly ou � Y e 1 ru ve to 1 � 1 1e l t t l1 hand' m1g 1 e th l . n ot er s) O te ta es t an st di le ru s rd lo , nd , b.sentee la a r o s e 1r ( p �m g n u fl r fa n 1o . l at and reso urces pu po 1e tl ck la ld ou w it · l<· ea w be d · e woul · . vie11 econom1caIIy. the very :maII st.at s1 s1 1b sL · to s ce ur so re s� se ca e n1 so in , or , 10 defend itself es, to tl1e legacy nc sta y in an m in 1e, dL a, ric Af In y. da to ist ex s lem ob . . · S.1m1·11 r pr 1n d I arge states exper1enc1ng fi es t1m n1e so \Ve le, rL1 ial lon co d an e s ri da t111 bo of colonid tes sta all ted sm d fron fi11 con we d an , fied nti ide tle sto Ari icl1 wl1 ms ble pro cf the kind re. ir futu the ice jud pre icl1 \Vl1 ps dica r l1an 1e otl and es L1rc reso of lade 1 witl a A so)Jtion atten1ptcd in ma11y countries to tl1is dile1nma is a system of "fede­ ral isn1'' er a systcn1 of strong local go\1ern111ent. Small nations may attempt to unite t1ncer a single governn1e11t, ¥1l1ile still preserving their original go,1ernment and a me�s11re of J)o·wer within it; large cou11tries 1nay de-centralize power by creat ­ ing regioral governn1ents \Vitl1 at1tonomot1s powers. Tl1e constitution may be used to create t sys�em of at1to11omot1s local governn1ents witl1i11 a si11gle national state, belov.i the 11at1011al gO\'er11n1ent, a11d transfer some of the po\\rers of the central governmeit to tl�esc gover11mer1tal t1nits. Once tl1e co11stit11tio11 doe s tl1at it obviously becomes nore cl1ffict1lt to alter tl1 e system.* One iisad:'anta?e of co,7sti:i1tio11al federalisn1 is tl1e possibility of rigidit y in tl1e _s�ste�. !t is_ easier _to exper1n1er1t \Vitl1 a syste1n of lo oo ca ve l rn me · nt tl1rough 0 · ord1nctry :eg1slat1on wl11cl1· can be altered c:as ex per1ence d'1ctates. \Vl1et1er \Ve l l1ink i11 terms of const'1 ttit1· · ·zed or1a rali l fed era l1sn1 decen t . or sin 1pl y governmelt t11. 1d er a un1tt1ry co11 stitut· e ' . 1011, tl a · 1e b as1c ) · ng pr ob co len nfr o11 1s ti rg states wit� diverse peoples a'11d tr,1. d it1011s ar ve lop e tl1 e de sa n1 e: is to de it si ra bl e a system )f strong , loca, l , gover1. 1n1ents ? Tl1e ,d\1antages of local gover11m eilt ar e based 011 argt11ne11ts stressing greater ''i1· 1dividt1,l freedorn'', ''J)opular · """ · c o n tr o. l'', ,, P I ural1s1n'' a11d ''diversity''. The in· d1vidual, t is aroued ireI els · 010 . re I dent I ty WI. t11 I 11s . 11n111 . ed1a . te society , and he can /;;J

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Some :::oun lrics would ncve . con1e 1nto e a· ranteel a fe der· I systen1 - r 1lave ,· _x1 st en . ce a u1 1l es s tl 1eir constitution5 J1 d gu_fl each c1se en t P o es the United States an old e�arnple; Nigeria is a new one � 1 v ari : ot1s regions ins i ted \ �f tl�ey c1uld c��f r�I ' �asp_al rice on _region,11 (or siate) governn1ents wh of union into a I p There lre of ar ger na_t1on. rse a nun1b e1: of r ' vari ations o cde . . ns .l of the us's R ct�1� ,SA the di•ersity 'and � �nd _Nigeria (before tl1e� o ral1s1n : � con1pari son of the Con s_ut uU�t ps.e ? l Its �ove�n�ent in ] 9�6) w1ll re�de5 ons. Tl1e short-li il� yet a�ther ill ustralr pl 1 �t ved e er t n of Eth o 1 and Eritrea provl be ' n u ,l i� pa b � here federation const1t1tion; it was t� t 1 w a� us than pred1 possi cted ther ble on legislation ra Order: to dissolve it . . ria l quickly by legislation (indeed by an Jmpe .

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exert mor- e influence o n a local council than a national parliament· therefore decision-m�king can b� more easily related to the views of the peopl;; the smail self­ governi ng community can do more to shape its future according to tl1e traditions values, ''general will'', �nd hopes of its citizens than can the community governed _ ersonal, less concerned government. A pluralistic by the fiat of a more d!stant, imp _ m state (one �y argue) 1s ultimately stro11ger than a. state wl1icl1 tries over11igl1t to make poorly-integrated peoples conform to a si1Jgle set of 11ational 11orms. But, as witl1 all theories, fede1·alisn1 or de-ce11tralizatio11 l1as its risks and ex­ perienc� in many places, notably i11 Africa jn tl1e past decade, illustrates so1ne. Federalism, and often local government, 1nay aggravate J)roblems of tribalism, particularly where the territorial jurisdiction of local or provincial government tends to follow tribal population patterns. If tl1e process restilts i11 reinforcing local loyalties and centrifugal, separatist te11de11cies, it may lead to disintegration of those critical elements of power wl1icl1 tl1e 11atio11al govern1ne11t 1nust enjoy, not only to preserve the state as a state, but to drive tl1e state tl1rougl1 s11ccessive stages of development. The practice of Fecleralism wl1ere a cot1ntry has been in effect a federation of several large, traditio11al, pre-established political units, has produced notable failures in former French West Africa (tl1e Mali-Se11egal effort), in Nigeria (so far), in former British East Africa (so far), and apparently i11 Ethiopia. Tl1is is not to say it is unworkable, but certainly it is difficult. There a,re also practical objections. If provincial or local governments are to enjoy a degree of autonomous power, they must l1ave an ass11red supply o_f re­ venue - either they must get, auto1natically, a share of taxes raised national!)', or they must have a taxing power of their own (or enjoy a co1nbination of both) .. ::; This problem of distribution of revenue and reven11e sources is both basic and difficult, and illustrates the fact that in a legal sense, it is a complex job to arrange for exact distribution of powers in a constitutional system 1,vhich valt1es local govern­ ment. The creation of federal and local ·system creates a whole body of complicated law, and t_he necessity to use the courts ( or some other tribunal) as arbiters of inter­ governmental disputes. Further, the more powers are devolved on local govern­ ments, the more those governments, too, wi� l depend o� !rained experts - a civil _ service - to function effectively. In countries where c1v1l service manpower re­ sources are scarce, a decision may have to be made as to how many civil servants are available to work effec- tively in local government. One conclusion tl1en is that neither federalism nor local government is a panace a. The theory'may ;eflect values we espot1se. But, possibilities for att�inment _ s.. If loca� government 1s to . be risk rd h t ins aga of the objectives must be measured � _ undertaken there must be as in any const1tut1onal 1nnovat1on, careful planning to achieve the goal. And o�e ma y al�o no t� tl1at lawyers, p1·operly trained, may be an especially important manpower 1ngred1ent.

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Ha local government has no resources - n� ]and C? r merchants or peop]� ';\' �th money_ to tax, it avails little to give it taxing power. And JUSt so, 1f, for exarnp]e,_ respons1b1l1ty for pay�n g fo·r primary education is shifted to Ioca1 �over� me� ts, one must avoid the danger of creating _ _ a. situation where the wealthier commun1t1es w111 _e!lJOY substantially better schools and educa­ tional opportunities, and the poorest commun1t1es none at all. .• . .

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SECTION 6: HUMAN RJGI-ITS * ts? Righ are What

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1 setti11g out cerr l it d w 1e r1 e c n o c is n o ti u a� 11 stit o C d se i v e R le ti f o l il Cll apter 1 1apter III reflects the assump­ C . le p o e J) 1e tl y b d e y jo en , e b to re a l l i c li \v , ts l l o ri '' ed y e basic 0 ct b th te ro p 1stilution e o1 b C ld u 1o sl , ed 1 1 efi d e b ld u 1o t·10�, tllat certain ''ri ollts'' sI ment actio n rn w or ve la y go an 1d a1 t, en 111 ce or 1f 1 e al i as suprem·e 1avv'' , cil rotieal1 J·udic . presum�b 1 Y,. ,,. Dll II ar1d voi"d'' (Art1·cle 122), 1s, ' s' 1t gl ri '' se 1e tl l1 it \V t en inconsist 11e. o d 1s is th 1f r te et b e b l il w y et ci The assuini)tio11 is tl1 at so of ed ic t1s lit d ab po an al idllas. ed us t os n1 1 e tl of e 1 01 is 1ts gl i r of Tlle concept 1 n1_ea11 i11gs; tl1 e _defi11 i11 g of ''right�' ' and pro,rid- 1 1) a1 TI1e terin ''rigl1ts'' is cipable of m d ne er th nc on wi co rec ns tio es g n j qu cil lt ct1 ffi 1 d y 11 a n1 s ise ra 1 11 e 1 tl re cu se to iog 111ea11s . sts re te j11 l'' ia oc ''s or '' te ta ''s ', e' tiv lec ol ''c tl1 wi sts ·'i 11dividt1al'' i 11tere . ion is to look at the First, wl1at are rights? 011e way of exan1i1 1i11g tl1e quest 18 . 1es tin t 1 en fer clif at eci ert ass variotis rigl1ts wl1icl1 I1a\ e bee11

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John Locke, ti.le philosop.her n1ost oflen quoted as an autl1ority on the m atter, wrote of these ri!!hls as tl1e rights to 'life, liberty and J)roperty'. Various An1erican and French Decla rations of the Rightl of Man issued to\\·ards the end ,)f the cighteentl1 century named also tl1e rigl1t 'to pursue happiness'. Son1c of these clcclaraiions also 111entioned sucl1 detailed rigl1ts as the right of an accused person lo a S\.vift and i111partial trial.

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In 1948, the United Nations i sst1ed its own ·uni\1ersal Declaration of Human

�igl1 �s - a docLt 1 11 e11t subscribe_d to by most of tl1 e U.N·. n1e1nbers (including Ethio­ pia)_. l·lere are tl1 ree exa1UJ)les of I ts provisions - eacl1 dealin :::, o with a different "riobt" b having, perh,1ps, a different rationale i 11 society.19

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Article 9. No one shall be subject t o arbitrary arrest, detentio n or exile. � · · · Article 19. E ve ryone l1as the right to r e ,d 1 r e 001 01 opinio n and expression; tl1is right includes fret· . don1 to hold opinions \Vill t t r� r t o seek, receive and irnpart infom1ation and ideas through any media and r;;�rcti�s: 0� ��i�tfe��· · · · · · entitl · s Artirle 22. Everyone, as a n1e111ber of �o ie "t Y, .l,as tlie rigl1t ed to realisation, th rough national effort a d -n �ernational _co-op� t? social ecurity and 1s · ratio n and in accordance with the or ganisation and resources of each sta�; O� 111 e onon le for ic, b ensa so isp ind l cia al and l1ts tur rig c11l . , c � f t �c his dignity and the free dev elo p n o 11is perso11a hty.

It is important to recog11ise tl t lc1 1 . l declarat10 1 1s as tl1 is fail to defin e the S extent of rigl1 ts. Sticll pll rase }1�1b e�ty' , 'IJ�operty', 'arbitrary arrest' and 'the free development of til e persin:tit , Y are er 11ot1ve terms (you may note th at some students often bar1dy tllese ds fround as if tl1ey k11ew exactly what t he y were � ;: saying); but tl1ese terins by mse ves lack precise refere11ts and are thus open to * 18. 19.

I� order to �allow ll1is section 10· ' Y'OU n111st read and carefully study Etb the p1an Co nstitution. of 3765 Articles Maurice Cransto·' n A GIossary 01 · Political Tier,ns, ( 1966) page U111versa l Declaration 01 43 . ' ,r n uu,nan R. l t tea r clai ed b y N . !11· Uni the c of th� Gener al Assembly ��er 1�48. �he Dec{fr�:i � � m e e f �� o n�:\� c ares rights , e no t have int ernal lrga l force in any coun _ r s h whic i it i a gued sh u fd be s ber state· ecured by tl1e national law of each n:iefli 1

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differing inter_pretations. Nor does the assertio11 of 'rigl1ts' on paper secure them in fac�; a �eat many p�ople in different U.N. states have been st1bject to arbitrary detent.10:1 s1nce 1948 - In �outh Africa, in Gl1 a11a, i11 fiungary, even tl1ough political leaders 1n all tl1ese countries, whatever we thi11 k of tl1em 111ay stoutly talk about the 'rights of the people'. When w� talk of the right to 'liberty', the rigl1t to '.free s1Jeecl1' and so on, we are not assert1ng a_fact: we a!e 111aki11g a clai,12 - ofte11 a clai 1 n tl1at there is a parti­ cular area of our l1ves 1n wl11cl1 we are justified .i11 doi 11 g wl1at we like, and in wl1ic}J interference by the state or our fello\v citjze11s is u11j11stified. Tl1 .is claim may be a _ 1:1oral one, �or we 1:-1ay 11� fact be saying si:r1 1ply tI1at ot1r claim of freedon1 from 1nterferenc� 1s _a claim wl1 1cl1 tl1e state oi,g/1t to recognize and respect. Or we may p� t the cla1n� 1n. the clotl1es of '11a1ural 1·ig/1ts' � meaning esse11tially again, tl1at we think our . claim 1s s���orted by so111e basic conce1Jt of j11stice generally rooted in the conscience of c1v1l1sed 1nankind.. Suc11 clai111s mt1st be clearly distinguished from claims which the law will i11 fact recog11ise. A cla.imed ,iatural right only be­ comes a positive legal rig}1t wl1en it is confir1ned by tl1e law in our countr), by a law which in fact will be en.forced by tl1e cot1rts and res1)ected by the govern1nent. Thus, freedom of speech may b·e claimed as a 'natural' rigl1t by many me11; and presumably this claim can be converted into a limited positive rigl1t in Etl1 io1Jia, since Article 41 of the Constitution declares tl1at the right exists 'in accordance with' Ethiopian law (i.e. subject to the Penal and Civil Codes and othe1· laws); but the right must also be interpreted and backed 11p by the Ethiopia11 government, and if necessary in the courts by decisions whicl1 other agencies will respect, if tl1e limits of the right are to be made clear, and if the rigl1t, once defi11ed, is to be secured with some certainty as a condition of life. Another point to be noticed is that different rights include claims to many different kinds of things. Many rights are simply claims to be left alone; within the given limits of the right we are insisting that we be able to do \vl1at we want wjthout 9 interference; among these are rights to 'privacy', 'freedom of speecl1' and 'religion to a considerable extent rights to enjoy property are claims to be left alone. Other rights concern t.he procedures w]1ich we may claim when we, as citizens, come into ·Contact with the government; these include rights relating to procedures regarding arrest, trial and imprisonment and also cl�ims to 'no taxation witl1out represent�­ tion', and, in certain instances, 'equality' 1n treat1nent by tl1e government. In still another sense we sometimes speak of rights in claiming �he power to compel so�e other person to perform some act, e.g. a contractual prollllse; ?1· we may be_ asse�t1ng a 'right' to what in fact is a judicial remedy - as whe11 one claims tl1at ?ne 1s ent1t!ed to 'damages' or to a writ of 'habeas corpus'. Another category of r1gl1ts cons:sts of positive cla.ims to benefits from the state; these are bound to vary according to the condition an d resources of the cot1ntry concerned, bt1t an example would be the 'social security' guarantee of Articl� 22 �f . the, ·u11.ite? Nations D�claration (qu,oted above), an d some countrjes prov1de a right to universal education, poor relief, health services and other benefits. R.emember ·this very variable na.ture o f. ri_gl1ts: �f 8: ri�ht i �- to ?e., clai�ed we must ex-amine the basis fo r the particular c]a1m - its JUSt1�cat1on, its social con­ ��qu�<;;e,. the ways in wJ1ich th e claim is f or1nulated, how 1t can be granted, l1ow it s ;hould .be limited. For example if tl1ere are no t �no:1gl1 scl1ools and teachers. to Pto�i\i;t,· universal education for every child in Etl11op1a today, how can one give or.· c:�lim a 'right' to educatio·n? ;

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TITUTIONAL LAW CONS PIAN ---.... OF ETI-IIO O ·-- -= -= �· � K� �O B� E� C= R:: U� o� s� _s6______�

. ult ca 0 of rigl1ts is tl1e rigl1t to 'property'. T·his 1 A particularl_y diffi� . \�fs �1 1icll Locke proposed , but one may fairly \11� r tai1t ri 1n1po � as_ v t ha mos 1t gl u ou 1e th yo e l t Th w no ? one of ty � er op pr r ou d 1 o r yo� Is y?' proper t im (�s a stude nt) � � cla ur Yo 'Wl1at is ss? e � sin bu ? r o tio t ep� r 11r 0 Y ns tio ru efi )? D your l1ead? y! of 'propen � an (if � ns � tio ta c e xp e ce · 1eri in u_ r e t fu �u� Y '? We �stipend may note briefly 1� tl1is. on you e guid o, t h� e .g. a c�edit) an d ( s 1n the law d1ctionari�s n� hi t _ le ib ng ta in or 0� e fhings bl �� : t r fe re y a property m tl1 ese things, our t gh1 i ng us in e on i al let be i o t o our ri ol1t 1 m 1e t er v o rigl1ts to_ co ntrol . . rference, advantageous relation: i11te t l1ou wit oy e;J i to ;r e s c an . .. rm 1o ' . r r e I p d e is m t o pro . h c s t d w1 aim an s 1 . ea t er ests 0,1 d in law 11ch wl in y "va . e 1 Th . . of some eco11onuc va tie. c 1et y. An d precisely bec ause so r fo sis ba 1ic on on c e 1 · 1 es, of course, a1 . sort prov·d t 111s · ss · 1·ble rig po us rio 1e va ht t l er s which sid on c we 1 1e1 wl ise ar c . ns o i· t ca )l· 1 1n co t s · 1 of t I11s, va c ; or 1n every count ry, and ts 1 ep 11c co y rt e op pr 11s rio va o t t c pe es r men might er1joy in re con1pl ex, 0�1r co� cep t of property be­ o m s ow gr y t i tiv ac 1ic on on ec especially as 1 pe r1gl1ts must be ) -t ty er op pr y an m and at tl1 e se \Ve d comes more co 111plex, a11 law e y v. Th e ma la, tak of dy bo e t a ric awa)' int d a11 t vas a 1gl1 1 rot tl ted tila reo are _ some pr;perty altogether, tl,rot1gl1 taxatio11 or con1pt1lsory purchase or 'land re- : forms' of certain ty1)es, or it 111ay limit i ts tise i11 all so rts of \.Vays, as when we require ; ins1)ectio11 of cars ;:1s a JJre- ret1t1isite to tl1eir 11se or curtail tl1e cutting of trees or fu , tl1e price of n cornn1odit::>' i11 sc,trce sL1pply. 1-Io\v far sl1ot1ld we go in regulation? 1 It deJ)Cnds, does it not, on tl1e value, tl1e social good, \.Vl1 ich we see in permitting '. tl1e existe11ce cif a l)articttlar J)rivate J)rOJ)erty r igl1t, and on tl1e value which we see in lin 1iting or JJrol1ibiti11g the 11se of tl1at rigl1 t. But underlying this pragmatic approacl1, the ConstitL1tion may wisl1 to st1pply some general principles to provide ' botl1 certai111y a11d so1ne basic protections t o property. Consider in this respec! Articles 43, 44- aL1d 130 of tl1e Constit t1tion. Com�eti11 � v�lues and social den1ands l1ave to be balanced against one another ·. 11_ot only 1n tl11nk1ng ,l?out �roperty rigl1ts, but in tl1inking about otl1er kinds oi · rights a_ s_ well. I.n 1nak:ing t l11s balance, seve ral different political tl1eories can be · tak�n into ac�ot1nt :-- and sl1ould be In tl1is text we ca11not do justice to all the . . var�ous theories wl11cl1 are asserted to justify various rio w * lJt e will try now bu s t 0 ' to introduce a few.

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Tl1e Basis for Rights.. the N atural Law Approach

., Wl1y sl1ould men claim rights ?· W l1at forc e a11d justification do various claun) possess? . . One t heory is that certai11 r i l1ts are back�d by natural !av., and the cl aun, Justified as t l1ose grouiids sllo uld fe transl::1ted into po sitive law. *

Particularl y theories ab · · . · or culturalout ,property' _ tl1ere a�e vastly different theories depending eS· upon .I11stor1c io e1h , the' family), ide ol ogi (and in�eed theology; values (suc_h as ut s abo cal ide sys tem s, look a up the d ea of property' .in H es cf econo,1n1c gro,v�I1, stages � t l aw), s n� Oso· M in or us du lim of politic al l pher� from Aristotle onv.,ar t _ 1an ge, an d so on; almost all th grea 'poli i l bd t · t ca p ro!)Ci, · e · rol e 1n tl1e c tit� " · onal d , l1ave r1ed to wr t I-� �1t d h ion P!o per ty, and defi its nit syste an Jucfi11r­ m. For a read a�f to the Philos�'P n�1Y 0,�Lalv (Chap e, interesting summary see Pound, Jntr-o 11 1 V) . (Th·is is 0 career ·in l aw stud y.) . . a book you sho uld r g du rjn t read in any even

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The doctrines of natural law were developed in ancient Greece and Rome; perhaps they are best (and most succinctly) explained in the words of Cicero (106-43 B.C.), who was one of their greatest exponents :20 True Law* _is ri�ht reason in agreeme-?t with nature; it is of universal application, uncl1 anging and everlasting, 1t summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrong-doing by its prol1ibi­ tions upon good men ... , though neither have any effect upon tl1e wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, ancl it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by se11 ate or people, a11d we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different Jaws at Rome or at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and u11cl1angeable law will be v1lid for all nations and at �11 tin1es, and there will be one n1aster and ruler, tl,at is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its pron1ulgator and its enforcing jt1dge.

· The basis of natl1ral law is tl1e belief tl1at, above all existing Jaws and systern.s of government, there ex.ists a u11i,1ersal and u11cl1.angi11g 111oral law, derived from ethics, reason and tl1e common ends of hl1n1an existe11ce, by wl1icl1 the justice of exist.ing laws and gover·nments may be n1easured. An ·essential part of natural law is that it applies equally to all people - to Etl1iopia11s l1ere and now; and it directly opposes any application of existing laws contrary to its teacl1ing. The tenets of natural law are justified by 'reason', 'nature', our 'sense of j11stice' and beliefs about the 'ends of human life'; principles tl1us derived have been ·.used to justify 1nany of the constitutional rights with wl1ich we are concerned as la�; students. Take for example rights regarding one's treatment by and before tl1e Ia,N. * :1: (cf. _A.rticles 37, 38, 43, 51, 52 and 57 of tl1e Constitution.) If for example, tl1e positive laws of a particular country allow imprisonment without observance ot� the procedu1·es wl1ich the law calls a 'trial', one may argue tl1at such punisl1ment offends aga.inst a11 11n­ changeable natural law, and it is tl1erefore wro11g, and can rleve,· be right under any circumstances. This argument may be used· to justify tl1e arg·111ne11t that a 'rigl1t' not to be 'imprisoned' without 'trial' must in some form, be 1·ecognized in positive law.*** The concept of natural law suffers from several theoretical and practical ,vealc­ nesses. One weakness is that it is obliged to claim a definite universal view of what is right and wrong; yet there are all sorts of different views on thj s subject, and especially on the very difficult question of how to cl1oose between different degrees of rightness - or to assess the importance of one vall1e (e.g. freedom of speech), which may in a given case be patently incompatible _witl1 anoth�r value _ (e.�. preven­ tion of tribal hostility). (Does the right to. speak 1n?lude a r1gl1t to 1nc1te Gallas _ against Amhara.s or vice versa?) The exerc1s� of a right (e.g. a speech arguing for Eritrean autono�y) may conflict with national 'unity' a�d '_development'. How are we to decide where to draw the line between the competing interests? l11 1natters such as this, natural law claims to provide a black-and-white answer to questions

20. Cicero, The Laws (Loeb translation, 1928). •

What does Cicero mean when h e says ''true law''? In our study of 'due process of Jaw' - or what Englis� �awy�rs call 'natural justice' - we ·will see ho w a significant body of basic principles c,f ·adm1n1strat1ve law' are defended on tl1ese

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•••· By Jt·utting the terms 'right', 'imprisonment' and 'trial' in quotes, we mean to suggest some

of the difficulties here .

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· n atio n between different shade s . mi of 01-e . . . 1 r c is d 1 :tu e r a c n o . . d en t,l Y, wl11cl1 may dep ' t e d b tl y por sup is b ie r · e 1nd w a11s 1 ng force i ts t tl1a m clai y . 1a 11 w la l ra u an d tl1ougl1 n at prefer shot1ld one we wliy mor n o s al a e r o claj n . e . . b a ' . -Ill in e i er t 1 · v, y a\ I l ra o m . of ' tif ying Tanzan i a s preventive dete nt jtis in r e ye ion• to anotl, er. (E.g. �resident -� � � 1 t 'i 11nocent ' 1nen to jail (detentio i se ave Ii 1 n) or l aw, �andid_ly ad!11 rtted 111�� . �e � 'ro but, dissent; J1e argu ed, this is erred et d ve Ila ay h 1 1 ; J� 0 ; 'well intention ed_ men tion building and tl1e govern ment' s ',var na y', t i lIIl ' r e tl,e necessa,ry pr ice 0� . e s no t ar� ue tl1at prevent iv do e erer ·N)' Dr s n inea or_1 tl le ti e LIS J s . on po�erty_ , tl� e e nd t is righ t for Ta11zan 1 a here and no\\•.) i _ that Y _ only · re e 1 1 yw r c ev dete11 t1on 1s righ t . . v;r diiTicLil t to deri\'e actual e n force able 1aws f rom such vague Seco 11dly, � t is y '. I t is difficult to fi11d 'referents' here _ n easo ' r a;d , t e L t r n a . to general co11ce1)ts as ' . . ' , eagree �n \\1,at t.1 ,ese conceJ)ts l )recisely n 1ean: an d wl11·1e th ere ma y be a0eneral agre 'nature '' tl1ere is room for l1 ones1 me11 t.· JOr instance, th at ' 1nt1rder' o ffe11 ds ag�inst . • en ds, or \\,het I1er other argu111ent. over. w I1 e11 a11ct wbetl1er 111ur cier 1 11 war time o ff ,.. · · . · ·· c I n o t . s onnscat1on or f 1 d natt1re o f r om ed an IDOi are re�I a· ly deri·\, .a1 CI a1n1s · Justified · t 1 · Id b e JUS WOLi so, If · 11e "fi d reform'? d . 'la!1 l1 1n a soc1e�y in 'f e u dal' soci ety to accompli s � wliere farmers enjoy the opJ)OrtL1n 1ty to s ave money and b L1y l�nd . Indeed, why.is coi,fiscation offen siv e to 'n at ure '? Tl1e argu n 1ent s l1ere merge into tl1e already di s­ cussed difficulty of dee id i ng wl1at tl1e mo ral l aw is. 111 tl1e sa1ne way tl1 ere is tl1e problen1 of tempora .1 applic ation of 'natural law' doctrines ; this is parti ct 1 la.rly trt1 e i11 cle\1eloJJing co untries; societ y may be changing so mucl1 tha.t a law wl1icl1 is applic able at one time n1a y become quit e unsuited to tl1e se11se of jL1stice developecl at anotI,er ti n 1e; an d t his poses diffic11lties for natural lav1, wl1icl1 clai1ns to be applicable to all soc i eties at all times. (Floggin g, we may say. is brt1tal, but r1ccessa.ry, because it satisfies a traditio nal s ense of retribution until more n1er1 st1pport its abolitio11 .) Ever1 if it is grant ed tJ1at tl1 e e11ds of I1uman exis1 tence are now the same in Etl1iopia, E11 gland an d Com1nu11i st Cl1ina (ar e tl1ey ?), it is very difficult t o 111aintain tb�1t some clctions wl1icl1 are deen1ed rig l1t and n ecessary by popular se11time 1 1t i11 one of these cou ntries m1 1 st al so be de e med rigl1t and necessary under the very differe11t cor1diti oos of tl1 e otl1ers. If 11 att1ral Jaw is to achieve forceful practicable ap1)licability, mL1st not its proponer 1t pro,1ide clear-ctit cour ses of action for actual situations in Etl1iopia as \Vell as England? . All of these difficulties m�y prevent n at 11ral Ia\v d o ct ri n e from providi ng a sa11s_factory_ a11::;� w er to mar1y of 1 1s, to p art1c11lar r1ghts l1 ere and now. Yet tl1 probleins of j tistifications and definition of e doctri 1 1e 11 a s COilsiderable value in emphasis· 1 n g th� moral spec ts of law ai,ci go\1er11n1ent. To i � n si st tl1 at t here are, in s on1e cases, both rJgiltr a� o \vrong ends a11d metl1ods of governn1ent, w sl1? u1 take_ int_o a�cot1 �1t, n1ay l1icl1 actual p o sitive law s b e c o 1 1rageous a 11 d desirable ga1n resl1 life 111 s_1t1 1a�1ons_ wh tl : 1e d oc tr ine tends to modern South Afr1ca 1s 11s 1n g ere a govern· me11t ' like tl1at of· H·ilt e r 's Germany or p o51· t l\ · · ,e Iaw 111 a w ay so ' . • JI 1or 11n 1versa 1 c o11den 111at10 11 ca fl to ag r �r im a. s 1t n1 ly o ra l ..,.. . 1 �1 1e , d o t c_ ri · n e - sl1ou Id g� ts _ apJJly \Vl1ere som e J)ositive 1nudd 1e r whe11 w e ask· 110\V 1� . ia s s_Inlilar to _cl1 ose c ondemn ed in Sout h Afr1 ca (e.�­ preventive dete11tio11 l aws ar; ,beiilg lise d_ by a g o ve rnment alleg 'revolutionizing' ' 'nJOd"'r , ged 10 e n g a e d ly c; �izi11g and 'nat1on�building '. The Basis for Rights .· the - · Utili·ta.r1an Approach Further arguments for . ti le e�i· st nc e grounds, by c]ain:tin g tllat f rJ gl1ts n1ay be based · ca1 � . � cti pr 1:n or e on a. so Ie 1 wl11 � _ ong l1 r1g_ hts are gra nted will, at least I� th� run, have certai11 advai·lt � Y � l � ag s over a society 111 v;,I1ich tl1ey a re not. By 'advan. rage 1

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we m.ean that t �e allowance of tl1e right will promote conditions of life wl1ich give

men - and society - more tangible rewards and more inta11gible -satisfactions out of life; in other words a 'rigl1t' may be desirable becat1se it is deemed ''t1seful'' to prom·ote desired practical e11ds'. . One of the most eloquent def e11ders of l111111a11 .freedo.m on tl1ese gro11nds was John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). His most fan1011s essay 011 tl1e subject declares:21 Whenever the sphere of action of hu111an beings is artifiC<'llly circun1 scribed tl1eir senti1nents are narrowed and dwarfed in tl1e same proportion. If all mankind mi.nus one, w,ere of tl1e san1e opi11io11, and only one person we.re of the contrary opinion, mankind \Vould be 110 111ore jt1stificd in sile11ci11g tl1at one JJerson tl1an l1e, if he had tl1 e power, would be jt1stified in silencing n1ankind.... Tl1e pecL1liar evil of silencing tl1e expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the hun1 a.n race; posterity as well as tl1e existing generation· tl1ose who. dissent from the op�nio11, still more tl1an those \\1ho l10Jd it. If tl1e opinion is right, tl;ey are de prived of the opportun1t)' for exchanging error for trutl1 ; if wrong, tl1ey lose, wl1at is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier in1pression of trutl1 , produced by its collusion with error. It is an adherent condirion of human affairs tl1at 110 intention, however sincere, of JJrotecting the interests of others can make it safe or salutary to tie up their O\vn hands. Still more obviously true is it, that by their own hands on1)' can any positive and durable in1provement of tl1eir circL1mstances in life be worked out. Through the joint influence of tl1ese tv;o principles, all free con1n1unities have both been more exempt from social injustice and crin1e, and have obtained more brilliant prosperity, than any others, or than they themselves after they lost their freedom.

Here l\tlill is arguing that certain 'liberties' will promote human capabilities, knowledge of 'truth' and prosperity - and thus greater 'l1appiness', whicl1 Mill, as a utilitarian, argued was a desirable ultin1ate end. Another example of a la\v which restricts liberty and produces a 'narrowing of sentiments' (wl1ich Mill migl1t have in mind were he alive today) is pro,,ided by an extract from a judgment of Chief Justjce Warren; speaking for his Court, he condemns racial segregation in schools as a denial of rights to 'equaljty', and he argues for tl1is conclusion in terms which Mill might applaud : 22 To separate (children) from others of sin1ilar age and qualification solely because of their race .generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the comn1unity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone .... Segrega_ tion of whit� and c?loured children. in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the coloured children. The 1n1pact 1s greater- when 1t has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the �aces _ is . usually interprete? as_ denoting the _ inferiority of the Negro (minority) group. A sense of 1nfer1or1ty affects the mot1vat1on of a �l11ld to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefor_e, has a tendency to retard tl1e educational and mental development of Negro chjldren and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system.

The practical advantages of rights go well beyond tl1e ratl1er intangible benefits which Mill points out; their denial affects not only mental develo1?ment, but reduces the well-being of the people in a]I sorts o� ways. Can we not �emo? s!rate by otl1er arguments tI1at peoples who receive no liberty_ to express t�1e1r op1111on�, w�10 are hounded into conformity by 'police state' tactics a11d � re liable to be 1mpr1soned without tr·ial simply at the whim of the government, are 111deed worse off tl1an tl1ose to whom rights of free speech and due process of law are gra11ted? Furtl1ermore, a

21 •• Mill, On Liberty.

22. Brown v. Board of Education,

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St1p reme Cot1rt, 1954.

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les s peopl e prese11 t either a gr t iri sp . d an nted t c d or reb ellious. frustrated or �� f:�s� a greater liability to society. Tl1L1s it is very ��te1 ' nn1 �11 t gover l ea st s01ne J1 um an righ s t� at t to e sp . re dai,ger c to t e . . a nt '� va d g O\VO 111 I 956, and tl1e ov erth�it to tl1e gover�11 1ent 5 .i st goveri1 me11t of fl L1ngary 11�1tin �01 tl,e st n l es of tl1 e ver y dan eto�, p agai am e ex ,1y rebellio11 b m 66 19 in r g l 1,an a G o-11s ' 111 me i re . 's al1 g i:1 se t on I 1em I ves. Can Rhod , up g rin b of D r. Nkru ay m . ts r, ne ni er ov e siv op1Jres g 1 l 1 1� wl s of tl 1e Empe ror e word reactio11s tl1 In n? _ tio cc bj SLI ii, Ha� l it� pt ke are n1asses ng 1f sm c1 1t1 an JJrospe. r lo cr pt d ce ac to dissent canno,i ed ar ep pr ot n .·a Governn1en t w l1icl1 is Selassie, last lo11g'. 23 · l ways stress the valu e a nts me ern ov n ria ita lor l g 0,, 1 t ati . , e v s1 s re p JJ O e rs u o c Of s 1 ou rta vi y po ob e im ar . nt es l11 va We shall ' e es 1 , Tl . y' lit bi sta . , d n a ' er d . , , or , secur ity r e · m q e 'th u _ ents o f public h ir c · I 11 e w s 1 1t · r1 n o s n o ti g a it m li ,e tl . s I1ort 1 y b.e d·I sctis sing th 1 d o e er th ns er co "d s1 ut B .e of l�t ·r y. J St JU y 1a n '24 re lfa e w l ra r,e ae e · , , · , · · or der and ti1 o , y or d or rit er g cu se t1n 1 as e 1 t may uc od pr 'S a) \-v al t no es do on ssi e pr picture: op 25 . ilt st re te si po op 1 e tl ce prodt1

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ai l_ some small diminution of individual ent s doe y urit sec e stat of n otio 1 n pro the that It is true rty you have the more security vou frcedoni but fron1 this it does not follo\\' that the less libe have, or' that any increase in security n1ust bring a corresponding reduction of freedom.

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li1 the English-speaking \vorld, ordinary peo1Jle for generations have maintained that the , abridgn1ent of individual rights beyor,(l a certain small degree would not only not promote the ; security of the state but v1ould probably. jeopardize tl1e security of ll1e state. Popular scomfoi 1 foreign tyrants is not only a i11atter of cli�approval; it stems also fron1 a sense of the folly of lht , foreign tyrant's notion that security can. be gained by tl1e suppression of liberty.

A...rguments for Limiting Rights

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D espite tl1 e persuasi'lleness of tl1e argt1men ts just considered tl1e idea of righl!- · I1 as been opJ)Osed or ques�i�11ed not only by tyrannical rul ers, but also by quite a 11t 1 mb e r of tl1011 gl1 tful pol 1 t1cal tl1eorist s; and at1 exanli11ation of thei r views w�I ! he lp us to unde rstand some of t h e assumptions on \¥hich tl1e tl1eory of rights is · based. ' : � sseau , fo_r_exam�le, discou11ted tl1e val ue of indi t he com· rig ht vid s ua l � bu b e 11s 0P ? s1tion witl1 a passio11ate reedom' be lie 'f f in �� l1u fre m ed an o� 1 � d 1? ed. · acco � ing to R ousseat1. 111 l1i s vie\v m an retains bi s 'freedom' only by . o Sub�ect1ng l11m self complet e 1 , t 0 . t1 1e w. ll' · l bei� wel r of_ tl1e community; tl1e � of tl1e con1 mu11j ty is of ove r�di. n . it) nun imp ort anc conu e; g tl1e 1t is tl1e for ref ore to decide wl,at tile indiv'dua; s\ ther� 1� ul d be �ll owed to say or and ow n, his do on can be no question of st�e th eilin � �l,e individual agai1 1st the community b y al low; ing l1im partict1lar rigl,ts h 11s - )os1t1on re�ec u t g t s ts o wo aspects of Rousseau' h wl1icl1 a re very differ en t l recogniti�11 of rigJ1 ts. Fi;�r t ;at of tlie l1b�ral scl1ool wh . o argue so ferv ently f�� ouss�au believes tl1at the community co mes � and the 1ndivid11a .l 1186 n o gI,t of 1ndepend 00 d Rousseal1 belie,, enc ity e . com fro mun . Sec in: m tl1e e.s tllat tr ue freed . . . om cons1s ts not 1n doing what one 11 es, but doin g .wI1at 1s ultimately 'k best tor oneself and lll do e fre of the community. Tl 1is notion

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Speech to the parli an1ent of Trinid No 7 : 1966· ad aoct Tobago, reporte d Eth·.zopza n Constitution ' Art·lee I 65. Cranston What are ' Hun1 an Rights?, (1962), pages 91-92.

prtJ!, ,i w Wor in Ethiopia in the

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-is �ire�tly opp�sed to Mill's,_ arid Rou�sea��s argument can be (and has been) used · t o JUSttfy all kinds of coercion of the 1nd1v1dual on tl1e grounds that the coercion was f �r his own 'good �._ The Nazis used this argument to an extreme, but it has used 10 some developing countries to jt1stify repressive actions ·so�et1mes been _ ·which �re said to be needed for some I?ational benefit. !l1e creation of a 'one party system f<?r exa °:1-ple sweeps away the r1gl1t to express dissent tl1rot1gl1 an opposition party.. Censorship . of the J?res� may stifle the r igl1t to criticise. Censorship of t11e morality of films 1s often Justified on grounds like tl1is. A second form of opposition to rigl1ts co1nes from what we migl1t call 'neo­ Hobbesian' and 'Platonic' arguments, in favou r of strong, efficient and 'good' government, as opposed to democ ratic gover11n1ent. All' of tl1e argt1ments previously noted about the demands fo r more rapid 'development' migl1t be applied with equal force to questions of rights. Tl1e tl1eory of rigl1ts, like tl1at of democracy, assumes tolerance and that tl1e people are tl1e1nselves qualified to decide matters which some supporters of 'good gove rn1nent' would still leave in tl1e J1ands of experts. Plato, the leader of the 'good government' scl1ool (gover11ment by 'g 1ardians'), believed in rigorous censo rship and systematic indoctrinatio11 of children. Tl1ose who believe in government by experts will tend not to wo rry abot1t rigl1ts, but will instead tend to favour limitations on freedom, in the name of p rogress or some special theory abot1t underdeveloped countries. Others attack liberal theories of rights for less deep-seated reasons. Hobbes, for instance, is suspicious of their effect in limiting tl1e absolute pov.(er 1Jf tl1e executive, though he does grant some rights whicl1 l1e believes to be ba.sic to .rr.1an �::; nature. Burke holds that rights cannot be q.pplied universally, b11t 1nL1,st clepe11t1 on t.he conditions of the country concerned.

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Problems of Limitation

The gre.atest difficulties with rights arrive wl1en we try to p11t them into action into positive law; for this is the point at wllich the claims of inqividuals have to be adjusted with the claims of other citize11s and the welfare of the comn1unity as a whole. Since rights once recognised belong to all men as men and must be granted to all men equally, no right can be admitted in behalf of on_e pers?n wl1icl1 in_ter­ feres with the exercise of a simila r right by other people. Again, a right (e.g. enJoy­ ment of one's property such as a radio) sl1ould not ? e used to �nterfe r� too fa r w� tl1 another right. (Should you r r ight to enjoy your ra?10 be � xerc1sed_ to 111terf ere with another's privacy?) Even Hobbes, who in gene�a� 1s no f�iend to r1gl1ts, argt1es tl1at every man should 'be contented with so _muc� liberty a�a111st otl1er men a_s he would allo·w other men against himself'26 and perhaps you will agree tl1at the rigl1t to f�ee speech cannot justifiably be used to sho11t some other speake.r d� w11 or to tell �ies injuring the reputation and honour of another. These exa.mples 1ll�st� ate tl1e vital pri'nciple that rights limit rights;21 rights cannot ?e absolut� and unlimited_; free�ol? must be controlled if we are to enjoy freedom 1n a mean�ngft1l sense. Rigl1ts l1?11t r ights, but so too, says the Constituti� n of Ethiopia (ecl1? 111g t! 1e U� Decl�\ at1on _ and the views of others), do the requr rements of public order and welfa1e . -

�- Hobbes, Leviatl,an. · · · · ghts), whtch says Ri of on ati lar ec D N e U th on ed as (b 65 le tic Ar · i · ut·ion d const·t . , . . 1o · 27. . See Rev1.se s. · ht rig th er o ns on at ut 1 1n fy sti 'ju l al sh ' rs of othe . that. • res pect for the rights ,

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tl1at our rights ca n be li mited 0 d de ci de 1e� b 011 o r p s 11 tl p ti k � a us le e ? tt k t li ta way . The only l Locke il w is th tit B t t t e s n o c . y ll a ti 1� 1v for :c d t��a exa c ple t m _ sen con tl1e · wl1en w_e in ar pul po i� i 7 by d e n1 y a m l1 !c l1 w t. ts ur l1 t co g t Bu r1 en e m it rn m ve so go ? see ms n al ci offi l ar e i e rigl1 t to have 111s case t�i �d w�[ving l lis rigl1t to a fair trial, or l1is right no t too � 1 sen�ical to speak of a ci_ ti zen n ptiiiisllment; these ar e rights w hicl1 see m to adnu·: . a , t m 1u 1 in d an l 1e rt c to d te c b t a sub1e ou t a h w property righi ., d ag ai n, n A . • • J t. en ris co by �of no l11n1tat1on produced · · b t o r � e t ax o It a1·i d; but Ont v a to ! n s� n c� to ve l1a One maY say tl1 at tl1e people o refuse to pa y taxes, and Ye! t al du v1 d1 1n le ng si a of · . can scarce1Y grant tile rigllt ta by pported u s· t , xes, en m n er prov v o g . 1e tl ides. l1 1c l1 ,v es g ta an b enefit fro1n the ad,, ene ra lis ed to mean the consent of g e b to e or ef er tl1 s Locke's notion of co11sent l1a rs of be e r th em l1e m co mmunii,· ot ce er co to er w po e 1 tl 1 e av 1 en 1 tl · r1·t),, w110 ti 1e maJo · , · · 1 ts h · l · 1 11c r1g w 111 s are se ca r inten· ded · 1to 1Jay1·00a the same taxes. But there ar e otl1e 11 d.1v1·dua I ·. Th�s, d'fli . g thy ID I nt ere · c1n r1gb15 r e_ co 1n fro ity jor n1a e 11t tl1 eve pr precisely to d to di fferent extents. an ns aso re 11t ere d1ff r fo ys wa t en fer dif d in ite Ji 111 be 1 18.ve to to and l1ts l�fe rig e 1:'h liberty, for ys. wa 1er otl in d 1ite li11 be c to l1av o als ts 1 J Rig exa1nplc, l1a\1 e 11 owl1ere beer1 intef}Jreted as mea111ng tl1a t a tl11ef or a murder�, sho11ld get a\.v�1y 11npu11 isl1 e d ; a11d it is ge11erally accepted that government s are justjfied j11 co11scripti11g tl1 eir citizens i11 to tl1 e army i11 time s of emergency or even in J)eacetin1e. J-:lov1ever, there is roo111 for a \.\1ide ra11ge of disagreement over iht c]ai111s \Vl1icl1 a gover11111e11t is justified i11 making on its citize11s, and t}1e line bet,veea justified ,tnd unjt1stified interfere11 ce is therefore very fl11id. A closely related proble111 cornes fron1 tl1e needs to 111ai11tai1 1 tl1e stability and order of tl1e state . TJ-1e freer a people are, tl1e freer tl1ey are also to enda.nger the peac� a11 d security of their country, a11 d to JJreven t tl1eir gover11n1ent from carrying ot1t 1rs 11ecessary tasks. Ir it caI111ot carry ot1t tl1ese tasks, tl1e effective liberty o f �h� pe_oJ)le !s t1_nd��111in�d, a11_d tl1is raises tl1e basic qt1estio11 of l1ow far a governmenI is J�stified II1 l11111t1ng r1gl1ts 111 the nam e of law order in order to sect1re rights, now or In tl1e futt1re. 1-Iobbes' a11swer to tl1is qt1estio11 is sinlIJle :28 .

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· ·· l observe the cliseases of a co m n10 fl\\,e_aIth tI1at · · · proceed fron1 tJ1e poison of sed1t1ous doctn n�. . . whereof one is rhat ei,e,Y . pr,vare ,nan is Judge of goocl cine/ ev iI act io11s. . . . Fron, this falsc doctrine n1en arc dis . o sed to de�ate w1tl1 tl1en1selves and dispute the con 1rnand'.'. of the con1n1on\vealth, and' after;,ards � ,. shall think fit·, \vhereby the con,111 n\ t b_ey or disobey then,, as in their private judgments tbei O vca 1t11 is distracted and 1veakenecl. . ... A fifll1 doctrine, that tends t o . th e d isso • , lution of l l1e con1111onwealtl1 is thar t:·rery ,nan has 11" abso/ure propriery i11 !tis g00,,.•,.,, ,. Jllc1I as . . ' Every n1a.n ha� in da e.,c/ucleJ· r/z_e ,.,git ee · d I p�o priety that cxcluclcs the right o of the , sovereign. ,r . ier. f ever Y ot ht: po\\ Sllb Jec t; \vithout r.he protection \Vhcre of c and lie l1as it only fron1 the sovere ign e, !·ighl of l he so vereign also be cx clt ; clzd OlI1Cr n1.:in sl1ould l1ave eqt1al rig l1t to the saml.". But if!� ' i1� can not l)erfo rn1 the , ,vh1 �. is to d�fend then1 both fron1 into him offi put ce the J1av y e foreign e ncn1 e and e e 1 s is n o longer a con1 mon\vcahh. fron1 the injuries of one another; and conseque .nl} th r

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Tl1e pessin1i stic ,,iew of l1 .un1 an 11att1re \vl11cl1 t1nderlies Hobbes' theory rousr always be reme1nbered . bt t I ask about the exte11t to � 1·1 11_s co111me11ts are ,,ery releva11t. for tl1ey force us ll� 1 ic1 1 rigl lts can b e made effe a ili c ol p o ctive w l1;re there is n

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l-{obbcs, l�el'iathan .

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maturity _o! the people and the country concer11ed. If rights l1ave the effect of creat­ ing cond1t1?n� o! chaos, then th e government may be justified in limiti11g them and s�ch l�Illltat1ons are bound to affect not only ''political'' activities, but als� other liberties. Rights .are also bou�d �o vary according to tl1e partic11lar circt1mstances of their use. A s1:eech on tr1bal1sm in Nigeria n . 1ight be a sin1ple academic discussion under some_ c1rc11mst�nces, and an inciten1ent to n1assacre u11d er others; for one ha� to consider not simply tl1e words 011 their ow11, bt1t also tl1e ac tio11s by others. which they may cause. The dangers l1ere may vary greatly accordi11g to conditions. Problems of Enforcement To mak� the great jump f ron1 natural rigl1 ts, or desire d rights, to pos·itive rig/1ts 1 means t �at nghts g·ranted l1ave_ to be i1n1)le1nentecl; tl1at one rr1ust have some legal remedy 1n cases where one believes one's rigl1t s to 11av e bee11 i11fringed. Wl1at can this remedy be? o,ne important possj bility is tl1e situation in t11e Unit �d States where a Bill of Right s is ensl1rined as supreme law, and upl1eld by tl1e Suprem� Court (the Cot1rt enforc-es the Constituti on as law); we will consider this system of enforcing the constitution in a later cl1apter. A somewl1at similar system is presu1nbly contemplated for Ethiopia. But tl1e remedies of one col1ntry cannot always be applied to the problems of another, and you n1ay tl1erefore like to thinl<. about this comment on t he enforcement of rights in Africa : 29 Bills of Rights in independent African countries exercised a restraining influence by their mere presence, but their s1rrvival depended on how constraining they proved to be, Professor L.C.B. Gower said tonight in his third a_nd last Oliver Wendell Holn1es lecture at I-Iarvard. Professor Go\ver, a Britis.h La';v Commissioner, was forn1erly an adviser 011 African legal matters [and Dean of a Nigerian· University La\v School]. He said: 'If they are constantly invoked and if the co11rts apply them robustly, thus preventing gove.rnrnents from doing what they want to do, they will eitl1er be abolishe d i,z toto, or \vhittled away, or, what might be worst, the bench will be packed with judges that the governments think they can trust not to be robust.'

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At the same time, the Bill of Rights strengtl1ened tl1e l1ands of a government's legal advisers in their efforts to maintain the rule of law.

The theory of natural rigl1ts started out with tl1e ,1ssertio11 tl1at all men. have the same rights at all times; but by co11sidering tl1e natt1re and 11ses of these r1gl1ts, we have been forced to acknowledge tha t rig ht s cannot alwa_ys ?e tl1e sa1ne , be�ause they are affected by differing circ11msta11c�s. Of course, a_ flexible syste1n of. r1gl1 ts does not give us the firm principles on v1h1cl1 we sl1ot1ld like t� b�se our claims to rights. But rights, again lik e natural law, are obviously o·f crL1c1al 1n1portance, they fo�us attention on unchanging aspects of gover11111e11t and l1�rr.1an 11�.tur�, tl1ey provide a cl1annel for those moral claiins on tl1 e go_ver11111e11t \vl11ch we believe �o be right, and they have been us ed to g�in solid ta11�1ble acl�a11� es f� r,}:� O IJl_ � ,, as 1n the case ot� racial minorities i n ttie u 111 ted States. If tl1e exe�c1se of 11g l! ts does. en�: an� 1�1creases tl1e1r. re� pe�t strengther1 the capacity o.f people for selt·-governn1 _ for their government an d provides greater ''l1app1ness - 1f tl1ese assun1pt1� 1: s �re true, then no governnJent, no constitution, ca11 ignore tl1e pro�Iem or solv� rt with elusive generalities, or deny rights under tl1e guise of promoting tl1e public good.

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UTIONAL LAW IT ST N O C N JA OP SoURCEBOOK OF ETHI

SECTION 7: LO PMENT VE DE L ICA LIT PO . D AN NT ECONOMIC DE\'ELOPME !11trodz1ctory 1\'otc.

. .tions of olit ical developmer:t can hard ly be cons idered in In a developin g n�t.Ion q�� ;nd �oblems of econom ic change. A form o� g overn ns uo 1 . isolatio1 fron1 econom1c cond _ �ay not be ce, inst�n p appro for nate on� n1uni t)', co1;, _ a 1 r tu ul ic gr a , d re tte ca s a to m ent siited n and in dustri a l society, such development may ba ur n a as ng pi o l that conmunity b e gi ns deve r: gove ' rnmcnt _ the d i stribution of polit ical poweroi 11 r1 fo 1 i e t n · t i 1 l o b call ,forbasic changes i mately exerci se. it leg l ,, c"r tn e m rn vc go e th 1 11c and in the polvers ,v1 · l n tative government represe like goals I" l't'. a tc " 1 ? I? 1 at tl and ed ur n e Agiin' it has be � en ough food and shelter to meet freedon of specc 11, are o.f. !J ttle value 1 f !TICn cann ot �ecure . econon,ic changes fun1ish th e means to �rov1·de ·increased the elen entary_ i1ecds of life. A1;,d as vcrnnients will be subjcted to growing demands for materia. benefits � t. cheaper pnccs, 5 �. go of .1 niorc abundant l ife for alL These mounting better_ i_vi �g con�1uons a n� �11:, ��e�� �� era� ions of na tioi1al prestige may, in icl the vi ew oi i n1atcr1a1sl1c prcs.,u�es coup c . 1 t pr1� • ril}, o. n a na tion'. s agenda. soroc, iive cconom1c go als the l11g,1cs · " of· tl1eones of economic development to · " ti,e relat1 onsh1p \V, n1ust there1ore e11:a.r11.111\; . . theori�! of political developrnent. Th e discussion here can only suggest some of the compex J issues bat are faise:d.

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1c1e «.;tolvtJx of lindtistrial Economies and the Doctrine of Laissez Faire 'T\e inciustrial revoluiion, \vl1ic l1 began i 1 1 England ]ate jn tl1 e eighteen1h centur1 and spread qt1ickly to mucl1 of El 1rope and Nortl1 America, forced _e�o­ non1icquestio11s i11to tl1e J)oliticctl arena. It bro t1g l1 t a surge of invest1nent and r1s1ng prodt1,tivity, 11ot 01 1ly i11 ma11uf,1cturing but also in tra agriculture, and ns po an rt d it led b heavy move1nents of people fro111 th e co u11 trvside i 11 to new i ndl1strial town s. T1eo ris ts sougl1t to explai11 \Vl1at l 1ad I1a study pp en ed th , e an de ve d so lo pe d of eco1omics . .I11 1776, tl1e greatest of tl 1 e ea rl y eco11omists, A da m Smitl 1, develo �ed a tl1 eo·y_ t? explai11 �cono�ic growtl1 . 1-I e ,1rgt1ed t l 1a t growtl1 depended on increasi�g produ<t1v1ty. A1 1d 1 ncreas1ng produc tivity depe nd ed 0 11 efficient use of econom1 c r�so � r:es, on efforts �o pro�uce tl 1i� gs a t tl1 e lowest possible prices usi�g the rno5! effic1 ert means of d1str1but1011 . Tl11s result, Il e tl,ought w a s bes achiev ed when t· eacl1 r.ers o11 \.vas encoL1raged to p effect of gover111ne11t interve11tio , t1 rsue l1 is own individual eco11omic inter ests. The 11 o n tl1is \'iew, w a s usu t e efi _ c b en pr_ess,\1·es of tl1e market; a th ll d y to isto rt e � a n d faire � tha.t the governmen tl1t1s developed tl1 e tl1eory - know n as "la1 ss:z t should stand aside . 1� ;_ tl1e om n ec regL1la1? o fr o m a t a t a tt n e y m ; p dema11ds_ of tl 1e mark et would create th e i11cen v es or n c e s p�odutt1v1ty. Under tl1e ti f i r a th e infl t1ence o f such tl1 eories Englat1d in the first half of n1nete 1ntl 1 c: ntt� ry ' abo lisl1 ed Cl1ston1s tarif , be th e word t fs industrialized rapidly a 11d s r 1cl 1est country. u g re f W ' · · . oe h n d e r t s1 1n �l a o r ninete1ntl1 ce ntury othe r _ 111 tluences, in the latte r part d E ve· . l 1ro_pea11 e cou11t l oped an industrial r1es industrialized: and the U.S.A. la� t ' WllICil, br tl1at o· the entire WOrpl d �Ile earl y twentietl1 centllf)' nearly Ola tched 111 many basic I n dustries It is fashio nable t o with l1issez-faire capjta day t� d. e�i.d_e Adam S1· n1.th because of his 1dent ·-r1 ,c.ati oO th' lism' hic IS n � . ow an anachron1s_ n1 . But . Adam rni £ '

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perception of the importance of producti·vity - and the efficient use of capital and labour and other !esources· to secure more a11d more production remains important, and tl1at _ �l1 eory 1s �ot depende11t on doctrinaire p.recepts about capitalism. One of the cr1t1cal ne_eds 1n tl �os� developing cot1ntries whicl1 truly intend to ''develop'' is �ore 1:rodLtct1on. Et !11op1a, for example, is said to I1ave great potential wealth in its agr1cultL1re; and since the world appears to be e11teri11g a11 era where tl1e total demands for food :11ay begin to outstri·p, rapidly, the present output of food, this agricultt1ral potential may be a source of considerable wealtl1 - bt1t only if pro­ ductivity and tl1e means.of processing and 111arketing can ·be developed. Tl1e problem of how to get more capital, more tecl1nology a11d n1ore efficient labour directed to­ wards efficient agrict1ltural productivity and tl1e marketing of such prodt1ce remains. And l1ow to get surplt1s wealth derived from use of tl1e la11d invested in new enter­ prises to foster productivity in d.or111ant or now non existent sectors of tl1e economy. Adam Smith identified sucl1 problems - perl1aps in a quaint way - two centuries ago. They are crucial in Ethiopia today, and we will recur to them . •

Karl Marx and the Theory of Communism.

Tl1e ind· ustrial revolution produced unemployment, economic insecurity, urban slt1ms, disease, crjme and misery for many men, as well as a more abundant life for others. There were many wl1ose sl1are of the wealth produced by the indus­ trial revolution was scant in comparison with tl1at amassed by otl1ers. Tl1is imbalance between rich and poor, abundance and poverty, produced economic and political theories sharply opposed to laissez faire capitalism. The most important though by no means the only one of these was tl1e tl1eory of Karl Marx, a German, whose sweeping attack on ''capitalism'' both as an eco11omic a11 d as a social and political system came to have an extraordinar)' impact. Few political theorists have expressed their views as concisely and forcefL1lly as did Marx and l1is co-autl1or Engels in the A !anifesto of tlze Communist Pa,·ty: ''Tl1 e history of all hitl1erto existing society is the l1istory of class struggles. '.Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, gt1ild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, _stood in constant opposition to one another carried on an uninterrupted, now l11dden, now open fight, a figl1t that each time 'ended.eitl1er in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.... ''The modern bourgeois society that has s1Jrouted from the_ rt1ins of feudal society has not done away with class antago11isms. It l1�s but establ1sl1 ed new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle 1n place of tl1e old ones.... ''We see t11erefore J10 w the modern bourgeoisie is itself tl1 e product o.f a long course of de�elopment: of a series of revol�tio11s i11 tl1e modes of production and of exchange. ''Each step in the development of the bottrgeoisie �as acco1npanied by a corresponding political advance of that class.... T�1 e executive of tl1e moder� state _ is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeo1s1e. ''The bourgeoisie, historically, bas played a most revolutionary part.... '�Tlie bourgeoisie, by the rapid imi:rovement .of �II i11struments of production, by the immensely facilitated means or commun1cat1on, draws all, even the most 1

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tions and interpretations, ,:c and this pt1ts it in a ratl1er different category f1·om n1ore ''academic'' tl1eories.. Secondly, it claims to be a ''scie11tific'' tl1eory derived from actual facts abot1t ec?nomic and political develop111ent, ratl1er ·tl1a11 a11 argt1ment for what ?ught to be cto11e based on son1 e i11depe11de11t valt1e st1cl1 as ''natL1ral right'' or some 1ndepe11dent concept of ''jt1stice' '. This mean� tl1at tl1e tl1eory can, to s01ne exte11t, be 111easL1red against events and perfor_mance. Some of it l1as stoocl tl1e test of ti111e. Tl1e JJolitical i1n1)ortance of e.conom1c classes, a11d of eco110111ic conditio11s i11 ge11eral, is 110w al111ost t1niversal­ ly acknowledged. Bt1t Marx's predictio11s of i11e,1 itable advance in Et1ro1)e and America f ro1n capitalism to a classless co111111t111ist society failed; tl1e very countries at \\1l1ich the co1111nt111ist m,111ifesto \Vas n1ost. ai111ed - tl1e l1igl1Jy i11dt1strialised countries of tl1e ni11etee11tl1 centt1ry - are precisely tl1ose i11 wl1ich tl1e proletarian revolution did 11ot occt1r - and is 1111likely to occtir. I11stead tl1e comn111n.ist revolu­ tio11 has taken place i n coun. tries lvitlzoi,t l1eavy industrialisatio11, inclucling Russia and Cl1ina, \Vl1ere autocratic regimes l1 ad stifled 11ot 011ly JJolitical reform but also private ''capitalist'' initiative ru1d indttstriaJization. Tl1e basic failt1re of Marx's analysis - \llhicl1 was directed at wester11 Et1rope a11d Nortl1 An1erica - appears to be tl1e conclt1sion tl1at tl1e lot of tl1e indt1strial vvorkers wot1ld get steadily worse. Instead it steadily impro\'ed. Increased }Jolitical ''democracy'' i11 tl1ese countries led. to c.orrection - through gover111ne11t of tl1e abuses of laissez faire, to labo11r unions and to tl1e ''welfare state'' disct1ssed belo\V. Ind11strial j1npro\1ements led to n1ore mass prodt1ction and even more mass const1m1Jtio11 011 wl1ic]1 the 1Jreser1t day high living standards of people in i11dustrial democracies are based. A second problem '1vitl1 Marxism appears to be tl1e strai11 of utopianism a.bot1t what will happen once the conlffiunist revolution 11.as been acl1ieved. It '\Vas ::1ss1-L1ned that economic classes would simply disappear, and that tl1e power of tl1e state, being simply an instrument for class opJJression, will tl1eret1pon ''�vitl1er away''. The problen1 of wl1e11 and 110w the state may ''wither away'' is still plagt1ing Marxist theorists, at least those who treat l1is writings as dogma. 1-lowever attractive tl1is idea may be to a revolutionary whose tendency is to tl1ink of govern1ne11t as un­ desirable, it is far from being realised in any of the com1nt111jst cot1ntries. Govern.ments swiftly reconciled tl1emselves to tl1e exercise of vast powers to asst1re tl1eir security, their control over mass comn1unications, education, culture, plus all the additional powers entailed by government 1nanagement of the econon1y. It is also discovered that much the same tasks l1ave to be pe1·for1ned after the Revolution as before it and that in any country the efficiency witl1 wl1ich tl1ese are carried ot1t is guided b� rules whjcJ1 involve botl1 governme11t action a11d individt1al initiative and choice. Despite the difference in tl1eir approac11, tl1ere has tl1erefore been s01ne reapproachment between so-called ''capitalist'' countries (who l1ave abandoned the extremes of laissez faire and are increasing by ''socialistic'' i11 n1a11y 1·espects) and ''communist'' ones (wJ10 are obliged to find so1ne place for personal choice and, perhaps, an increasing role for individual political freedom.) But Marxism remains important for developi11g cot111tries. Tl1e proposition that tl1e resources of production - the sot1rces of poten�ia! wealtl1 of a p�es� ntly poor country - must be used for the benefit of a]l surely 1s important. Tl1e 111s1gl1ts concerning the basis for ''classes'' and class interests and class controls over botl1

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• The variations in ''Marxism'' in the 20th century are notable. For a collection of Marxist writings portraying the variation see, C.Wright Mills, The Marxists.

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ONAL L A W I T U T I T S N O C N IOPIA H T E OF OK SOURC EBO

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· mporta11 t. So are tl 1 e warni1 1gs of the abuse · s 1 e r a t · 11 · n1e · 11 r e ov :::, e a I t , , 1 c,� so d nomic and 1ng · . yz eco n I a a an f y o m s o n o e c ue 1iq e 1 11 l t l tec s ' , x r a M r n o i t u l o . v e r 1 n1 sts, but phil oso. no eco ly on t no · ed enc of tl,e in dust ri al nflu · · ndl y 1 1 } t o 1 o r p e . v a 1elop1 ng countries the de\ · c con In ept Political · pl1e11· on1 e na _i sc1. e 11 ti. sts. uri J d n a ts 5 l ' ·t s r o I e. A n d th oug I 1 t11e dogma soc1 a . .. · , s n a 1 r to 1s l1 1 , f s o r s 1 e pl1e r o e l . . i I er s e t ·v ct 1 1 t i w it e b l a · d ep te c c a s 1 g ay 1 � be questi onn n m 1 S ta n n la d an p 11 of 1i 1 Le . ll by d pe o el v l, ose de t ' ' y ia c e p s e m s i x of Mar 1e 1ne a sur es und ertaken by so-called t1 a) gm do as d es . pr en l y arl articul (p �� �J:ce rapid ec�non1ic cl1ange_ in society are worthy able r t o ts e m n r e v o g st a M rxi _ � {e itTe rei ,ce bet\ve en liberal Marxis ts a �d many p�agmatic } d ee d t y ttid l 1 e r a c . f o f1 � In ; i ev eloping cou�tr1es ma y , d of ems bl pro e tl for i1on-Ma rx1� ts over re cri t ons e \' en m or e In coming w rro na to d e cte xp e e b , ay 1n p d pe rI1 ps be 11arrowing - . a i . gical ed olo c all e ide sotl1 1 at e tl v lie be ns rso pe · ny ma 'lUSe : ' C b e b ,, ye. ars. In part t 111 s m ay . 1 · ) saf · h ces 1ces ne s 0 c es un po 1 1sn 1 1 n1u om ''c d an '' , ism al t i ap ' . ''c ·· c o11fl ·ict., · between . 'h b y d e ut as ver ea t gm I ly do on t no e · ct J e r to le b ssi o p is It s e · tri n oti c g in op to d eveI · · · · · · . f a I 1 1 ter aII Were 1es \1/llC or n tbe e1'? ror ?, �ne rda e-o ]Jr 1 ee1 tvv1 bc ose cl1o Sl t IJll. e on t tlla l11op1 a 111 n 1 1nd. 11 ever devel oped witl1 co 11 ntries lilce Et

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Marx was 11ot tl1e only socialist; there \Vere n1any otl1er s in Europe a11d An1eri�a \Vl10 accepted rn any of l1is criticisn1s of tl1e evils of ca1)italism but were less dogmatic a11d more prag111atic in s ee king w a y s to r e ctify abuses, and acl1ieve - tl1rough in11ovati on witl1 in th e syste111 - a f a r 111ore e\re11 dist r ibution of wealth and a far grea ter pu blic control ove r ''tl1e resot1rces of production''. Tl1e spr ead of such id eas, co11pled witl1 tl 1e ir 1cr ea sir1g political i11 flue11 ce of tl1 e wor}cjng classes, led to a rapid growtl1 of gove rn1 11e nt interve11tio11 in it1d t1strial affairs a t first for huma· nita rian reaso11s and l ate r beca use of tl 1e eco110n1ic nee d for o�erall directio n of tl1 e econo mic syste111. In tl1is way, i11 so -call ed ''capitalist'' cou iitries, tl1ere I1as gradu­ al ly develoJJed a v ast n�1111ber �f go ve r11n1ent age11cie re gulate tl1e econ°£!1Y to s �nd prot ect tl'. c eco11om1c sect1r1ty of al l J)eop le. Systenis of governinent social. 1nst1rance �rov1de be11efits fo r tl1e sick, injure d, disabled. Url en1plO)'ed , and the aged . L� bour u111011s barga in f0_r ev e r l1igl1e r ,vage s and t�o r ;11 orter worki11g \.veeks. �he . pr1c�s of in any_ co111111oci1t1e s or servic e s 111ay be requi r ed. Pr ogressiv e ta xation � wl11ch Ma rx v1e\.v e? as a basic step lth a we to w ar e c d s fo co r m 111 · to un 1·s1n) t e1· 1ds. into ne w sour· ces· of investinent · o · es. ·n1it tl1e am r otl1 er \v1se l1 tun fo r . al pe · assing of rson G overnment agencie s re otila te ba e sal O n 1 k' 1 1� t h e sto ck marke h t t, transportatio1 1, e__ _, , of farm products insttr 1 e co 1 i in np aii ies n an � d nc ] r 1 e a y ot 1er busi11 esses. I tl1rougl1 va rio tis t�clini ��i as !� �: _ v r11111 nts en ag e 111 planning to oversee tl 1e �- f-: : , lopm ent of tl1e ecoiiom\ i i; t1,: � itt � � a re . L l T l1 e pt tl? e � eo ce a r e_sul t qt1it e as mt.ic d � "S:, _, r l1as come _t� be a c li as a cau.se of tlle actual s1tuat1on - tl1 at 1t 1s tl1e governrn�n - ;,r business to secure tlie eco 1 � l we fa l e r of all its people tl1rougl1 wl1ateve r reg� �i��• of economic activity ma; �:� . e�essary fo r ""?-·.· -�.· JJJ � tl1_at end. Tllis d e velopmen t bas broug_ht forth pro bl ems of � _ se curing demo r autl ex� agenc1e.s w h.1cl� tl1is 11e w . . . crat1c controls ov er tl1 e array of- :� ":: c once t O , -::f P tl e powers and purposes of governm!W � call ed into existence. � �� - :;-; a� Some of tL1e technique . ·- � s of th � e ,, in many African countries. Th u �elfa.re State'', it appears, are beinJ;-��f£ �,��? s c untnes (and Ethiopi th:o �y � f permitting is one) wll:f���'i:.'/ ep ind end � t enl u gain1ng in labour relations mu t d rad.e nions an d relatively free_9_pJJj_����f'.: s evelop both . :".' and a govern ment _ _ _ _ :i.s _ � �1.-i� 1· . i. org an �c 1 Iaws to �-t au:. 1�1:1����=� agency to regu , _ late· abuse . s by e1t11er em�]0y , er.�<�l�:c::;:,:;..,J;J;: ,,i. -?..:·"" . : . ...-........... -�. �--...,, �:.,,. �--

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POLITICAL THEORY

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Countries which seek to pron1ote a trans_portation industry usi1 1g esse11tially, private investment but at the same time seek to curb abtises a11d regulate service and prices must' again develop botl . 1 organic laws and regttlatory age 1 1cies. Tl1e use of tl1ese techniques n1ay pose important constitutional proble1ns; how to secure fair11ess in the process of reg11lation, 110,v to make sure tl1at tl1e regt1latory age11cy develops a concept of tl1 e ''public .interest'' a11 d is respo11sive to policies a11d objectives laid down by the den1ocratic organ of governn1ent; how to sect1re efficie11cy a11.d .expertise in regulation, so tl1at regulatio11 does 11ot stifle de,1 eloJ)111e11t of tl1 e very sectors of tl1 e economy wl1ich tl1e govern1ne11t seeks to pro,note. .

The Political Theory of Economic DevelOJltncnt The Political Economy of Developn1ent

T he political i111plicatio 1 1s of eco11on1 ic cle, 1elo1)1ne11 t are likely to be even greater in the so-called ''developing'' cot1ntries, tl1an they l1a, 1e been i11 tl1e 111.ore indL1strialis­ ed parts of Et1rope a11 d Nortl1 A111erica. 1 1 1 tl1e 11i11ctee11tl1 cc11tury i11ciustrialisation \Vas a more gradt1al process, largel)1 t11 1dertakc11 by private e11terJ)rise a11d 011 ly forced 011 governn1 ents by tl1e social a11 d eco110111 ic co11ditio11s ,vl1icl1 it created; whereas the developing cou11tries are ft1nda1ne11 tally co111 111 itted to bringing about as fast a rate of eco110111ic gro,vtl1 as possible, ,1c. co1111J�111 ied by a good deal of �Lclive gover11me 1 1t interve11tion. Tl1ey arc co 111n1itted to tryi11 g to raise t!Je 111aterial sta11d­ ards of living o·f tl1eir people, a11 d l1 ence to raisi11 g per ca1Jit,t JJr<..1ductio11 , i11co1nc and const1mption. How is sucl1 rapid ecor1on1ic growtl1 i11 clucecl? There 111ay l)e a 11L11nber of possible prescriptio11s, ranging fro11 1 doctri11aire varia11ts of co111111 t1nis111 to doc­ trin,1ire c,1pitalis1n; but a11 increasi11g body of eco11011 1ic ,vriti11 g tells us Ll1at tl1ere may be otl1er exJ)la11 ations as ,veil. Wl1y for exa111 1Jle clid tl1 e i11 dustrial revolt1tio11 start i11 England - r,1tl1 er tl1an CI1ina? \Vl1y i11 tl1e 19t1 1 cc11 tury clid l111 pcrial Ja1Ja11 industrialise far 1 nore rclIJidly tl1 an l1nperial Rt1ssia? Js tl1 e r�1picl i11 clt1strialisation of Russia in tl1is ce11t11ry dL1 e solely to tl1 e .Revolutio11 of I 9 I 7? \,Vl1y is economic gro\vth in Jvf exico 110w far gre,1 ter tl1a11, say, Persi,1? Ma 1 1y econon1ists 110w argue tl1at tl1 ere is 110 sin11)lc ·' idcologic,1l'' a11 swer to such qt1estio11s. TJ 1e tl1eory ]1 as develo1Jed tl1 at societies mt1st 111ovc tl1 rot1gl1 "stages'' - or u11dergo certai11 cha11ges - i11 order to enter i11to a JJeriocl of r1:11Jid, conti11uing indL1strialisation a11d eco110111ic growth. A11 An1 erica11 economist, \V. W. Rostow expressed tl1 e idea a decade ;;1go i11 a co11 troversial book, T/1e Stc1ges· oj· Econo,nic Gro}vt/1. Otl1ers I1avc argL1ed tl1e esse11tial iclea bt1t ,vitl1 difl'ere11 t c1npl1asis. At one poi11t, it is argt1ed, all societies \Vere, in essence, '·traditional'' societies. In tl1e ,vords of Rostow: ''Tl1e central [econo,nic] fact of traditional societies was that a ceiling existed'' 011 prociL1ctivity. Tl1 e ''1)ote11tialities'' of scie11cc :1nd tecl1110logy were not developed, a11d, even wJ1e11 av,tilable tl1 ey \Vere 11 ot well c111ployed towards economic growtl1. Ma11y f,1ctors tended to restrai11 Ll1is ki11d of i1111ovation and by looki11 g at tl1 e1 n it n1ay be JJossiblc to idc11tify a cluster of co111 111011 co11ditio11s and problen1s co11froi1ting 111c:111y of tl1e L111dercle,1elo1)ed 11atio11s. By identifyi11 g some of tl1e problen1s, we car1 JJerl1aJJS see better the co11slilulio11 �1l i1111Jlications of possible solt1tio11s. These cond itior1s are .111any (ind co1111)l icatecl. ··Traclitional'' societies ten cl to share celebrated virtues otl1 er tl1an 11c:1tt 1r,1l scie11 ce, scie11tific rese,trch work, • 1nnovatio11 and technology; a political systen1. wl1icl1 is esser1tially at1tl1orit:1rian

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1 t an d 1n11ov at1on; a , e1 ss d1 ed iz 1 often allied �1tl 1 1 1 1 ga or eli r 1-0� ' oti rage e� t o ' n s oe J y b d � tits ]Jeavy stress o n ''f ate' an d thus su tl a system wl11_cl1 c l w o k o l t u o be f� � 1 � as gh 11 t w l o ou e th 1e t t � f e f 1s to J t or pl1iloso p ca be s ge f an Fo ch � 11 � o w d 1 i a e c ifi ce u r s c a Ia o o 11 d the o r • f o ssessi n p es ak m efforts to s l cl lli w c ystem 11 o c e _ n a t; n o ciety. Admi tteot s n o tio pa f . cc o e u i n a 11y e,,e pr a : d 1 \ i la c;;n es ak m , t 1 t 1 _ � e g ti s e Jr d : o n at r a I d v te it ec h re fin lt in ve a e l1a fl we s ie et a ci o ; nt ''trad i s l'' la i i o iti . c . �. re e LL I d , s n u r 1 t 11 e m u rg e a . l y \ er e pe sc th 1m des econo·� . . . t a c omn1on cluster o f c o n d .1t1o n s rn,. , . , but th e th e s1 s IS tha . ty ie o nal so c i it d a tr ly u tr a in . . change . o ss1 ble, a cco rd i n g to this argumenL p is 1 tl w o gr ic m Before substantial eco11o . ed g n 1a cl e b to e av 1 l s n tl1ese co 11ditio o ve r c o mmercial succes_s must soJllt. ss ve o, pr ry t,1 ili m s e lti A society wllicl1 va e to ne w ne ed s for e�c1ent engine{fi ag t1r o c al clu vi di in of a e 11ow adaJJt tile old id rkini wo g 1n r� d o , lea an w rk al u _ an D.1 s rd wa to e ss �, cla f and n1 anagers. Attitt1des o elite t1 o n, and delega1, ra pe -o n, co t1o 1sa an rg o s es 1 s11 bu t, 1 1 nc 1 st vc i11 s, on 11ew tecI111ologie c be bli pu ess o r private, sin bu a er 1 tl e l1 \V . les 11p 1 x� e r tl1c ft1r e vid pro 1ng autl1ority. it 111ust be efficient; a11d e fficicnc)' 1nay call, n1 o t o nly fo r new skills and ne\v pro­ cedures alien to tl1e society, bt1t also for 11e\\ valt1es and attitt1de s. Tl1cse J)robler11s of dcveloJJinent are aggravated in n1a11y u11derdevelopen countries by tl,c sin11Jle presst1re of popt1latio1 1; they are deali11g witl1 rates o/ popt1latio11 grovvtl 1 n1t1cl1 f,1ster tl1.an a11y tl1at tl1e a d,,a11 ced co untries have eYei 11,td to deal \�1ith. Tl1is n1cans tl1 at tl1eir eco110111ies 111L1st groJ11 faster than did thOR of tl1e advanced cot111tries at ,1 si111ilar stag e if tl1e:>' are to acl1ie,1e tl1e same rate of pr�grcss i11 ter111.s of per capita. t)rodt1ctio n. If tl1 e rate o f po pulation growih ?utstr1p� the_ ra_te of cco11omic _gro wtl1_, tl1e gai1 1s o f developn1ent may be \Viped 0111. Populat ion 1s therefor e a n1aJor facto r. Tl1er efore ec?1 10111ic growtl1 deper1ds t1pon tl 1e est.:1blisl 111 1e11t of "pre- condi· . t1011s for tal(e-ofl ''. (t? t1se Ro sto w's ter111 s). For ex an1ple, EnglaiJd of the 18th 1 century 1 1 ad 1011g rid rts�lf of feudalis1n and 111a11y inl 1ibiti11g traditions, and ba� no t o11ly_ d veloped co 11 �1�e_rable co111111erc ial activity, bu t, by a series of "sh ocks , � ls � s0111e i111t1a a11d t1pl1_ea,e lly tl1rust t1po 11 E11 ola11d fro1n witl1o ut (e g the Pro- : ·: the idea , st a11t '·revo!ut1011 ' ') - l 1ad co n1e to ac c e1Jt 11 1a� y i 11 1po rt a nt 11ew ,,alu�s �� at eco no1n1c prog . . red ress w as good �11d . atta,11able mo', oo d because 1t. pr o g individual diP-nit ( · , . 1c eas,�gly ��a�t o\\ . 1 _ e d), .:1!ta 1 1 were a U � me ir i f able 1 to innovate a�d :11c:�;���e� �� �11�a e 11 1 ac�1 �1t 1 es wl1 1cl1 wou l_ d pro 1note comn1ercd � 0 . ma1:ufactt1ririg a11ct so fortll a tta _ . 1 e · ag our tila bl e 1 enc t sectilar edt1ca t1o n was atta i nable if old cus·t.0111s -' a11d ! rs i f a\v I · s - wer� cl1a11ged. Si111ilar chang� 1�. occurre_d i n otl1er societies_ Ja dri P ca,1 ai1d Russia - befo ul re st1cc ve essf a wards 1ndt1strialisatio r1 \\'ac s 1 · ,1L111c 1 1ed. 1 . Tl1e yot1ng educ,at·e·ct c1. .LIZe1 1. t 001 . . 1s pro u . vi B · d e ge a 11 . ob v i cl1 an ou s aut.o1nat1cally. Hig I1er edt icat1· force f or (llt 1 011 t noted above. l-Iigl1er educat IllUS J)ay atte11tio n to tl1e b el1avi oural p robJe;,; 1 11 •• ' t· on 111ust ·1lso eds ' · J)a� atte11t1o n to ma11power ne oi saY, tl�e fi1eIds of agric ultur e b . e s or 11g111 eer!11g; a11d u11less th�. pr �c���est edu_cat1on acti1al/JJ preJJares ; ���: : c � asst1n1e pos i tions o f responsib 1l1t y 1 0 g·. s�ctors and t1nless tl1e JJ ro I ers . n0 ces · s Of 1 ecrL1 1t111e . h o su tion s quic· k·lY, t I1 e cou11 1 t try 111a find tl at . _ 11 1 n�, es trained perso11s into . ti�� 1 . It co 11t1nt1 es to lac k road build er s, fac nff managers and 111.achin ists edt1cated citizens see onty' des�·1te 1ieav� _outlays i n education to get tl1en1. If YfiJJ;1 O tl 1e 111o re tradition f al white co ll ar j o bs as tl1e pa th to o ' o11

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POLITICAL THEORY

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if they are lured to tl1e city, if tl1ey are repelled by provincial life, and 11nenthusiastic about assuming new and needed roles, then economic cha11ge n1ay Jag for lack of human resources. But of course tl1e inhibiting effect of some tr,1ditio11s js only one of tl1e problems. Other economists have noted tl1at, aside from social and political cl1anges, other factors may· have l1elped to establisl1 ''pre-co11clitions''. Societies wl1icl1 in­ dustrialised rapidly l1ad developed a11 infrastrt1ctt1re of roacls, and com11111nications. Even before industrialisation occurred a considerable part of tl1e wealth of the countries was being plougl1ed back into bt1siness activity. In the underdeveloped countries, lo\\' proclt1cti\1ity 111ay ,1lso be caused by a stark lack of capital: ft1nds are lacki11g, botl1 i11 tl1e pt1blic and tl1e private sector, to buy machinery and otl1er con1n1odities necessary to st,1rt industries and to establish the essential infrastr11cture - roads, electricity - for economic develop­ ment. A major difficulty here is that e,1ery dollar spent on capital investrr ent mt1st come eitl1er fron1 foreign aid - wl1icl1 may l1a,1 e its own disadvantages - or from savings from consumption; tl1at is to say, in order to in,1est it may be necessary to prevent people from spending tl1eir mo11ey on const1mer goods - such as cars, clothes, housing, even food - and tl1is i11 cou11tries wl1ere tl1e amount available for consumption is often already very lo\v. • Essentially, perhaps, tl1ere m11st be a long, long period wl1ere most of tl1e investment and wealth of t11e co11ntry is not co11sumed bt1t is invested eitl1er in businesses or in infrastructure s11ch as roads or education. Tl1e implicatio11 of this, of col1rse, is that a country which wishes to make in decades those cl1anges which required centuries must not only be prepared to force ne\v social attitudes and valt1es very fast b·ut in addition, the elites must be pre1Jared to n1ake great personal economic sacrifices - they may l1ave to accept n1odest i11con1es a11d see 1nost of the co11ntry's income ploughed back into develop1nent projects. A wl10Ie ge11eration, at least, may have to sacrifice heavily for a fL1ture tl1ey will never see, never enjoy. These are sorne of the problems - e11ougl1 to st1ggest tl1at eco11omic develop­ ment, if it is to keep pace witl1 the expectations of tl1e people, is a l111ge and complex problem facing government. And it is unlikely tl1at the free market mecl1anisms, which played st1cl1 a significant role i11 tl1e i11dustrial revolt1tion of 19tl1 century Et1rope, can produce the kind of economic revolution wl1ich developing nations now desperately seek. Government must do tl1e job - or mt1ch of it.

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The Constitutional Implications of Development What, then, are the co11stitt1tional implications of tl1e cl1allenge of economic development? Whatever tl1e government, hard and often unpopular decisions will have to be made, Government will have to force tl1ro11gl1 laws on s11ch n1atters as: the owner­ ship or control of the majo r enterprises within the economy; the direction of labo11r, the control of labour relations; population controls; tl1e cl1annelling of educated men into careers they may not seek; expropriation, involving perl1aps not sin1ply the break-up of absentee landlord estates, but also perl1aps tl1e reform of all tenure systems which create inefficient farming 11nits. Tl1e scope and speed of the change

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__ a i u d to re is a p t nc re n p r e m rn e v o g 1e tJ li ic li w . . to t t s'' , but of peas s tere in d ste ''ve may_ depend upon tli_e _ exte; al ion t di tra a:�; of ly n i si t n t can incur - tl1e l1ost1l� r d rigl1tf a11d l1 abits it wjsl1es to destroy and for that matt-� and otl1 � � wh��f cl:�:.�:� yoL1 11g elite wJ1 0 may be sl1arply divided on the Pro; . ed f ty o 1e ulativ el y l� . d m a cu , o le e p � 1 st e o m l 1 p so e th 1r 1 t 1 s wil l 1 L t 1 o si ci e d . J ; r o in A . . 11 · 1 ng '' new e I'ttes'' a) . Jud 1nc y f n a m patllS to �tOl l OW o s l s e r e 1t 11 t J1e h it ' w e r e f r te in y a m n o ti a combin . '' s te li e l a n io it d a tr '' s a well . . ?. s n 1o 1s c e d l1 c Who, tl1en, s l1ould take su It 11as of ten been argt1ed tl1 at t l1 is sitt1ation call� fo: ''s trong'' gover n1nem, • that the governn1e11t must J1ave t_l1� po\\1er� and det �rm1�at1on to take and enforce, witliou t fear or favour, t l1e dec1s1ons wJ11c l 1 tl1 e s1tuat_ 1 on call�. for. O?ly _such a government, it is said, 'NOt1l d be able_ to ove�come tl1e op_pos1t1on wl11c� �sonly to be expected, a11d to retai11 tl1e na tional t1n1ty of countries whose basis 1n an) case is ofte11 fragi l e. 011ly suc l1 a gover111nent would be able to uproot ineffi.cienc, and corrup tion, and actually carry i ts plans into effect, instead of limiting itself t o vague a11 d t111rcalisable policy stateme11ts. T l 1ose wl10 tl1ink in tl1is sort of wa) tend to opt for a ''rlobbesian'' solution, often it eventually involves the military.

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But otl 1er in1plicatio11s may be st1ggested. lf strong leadersl1ip is to be expected. strong leaders n1a:y clemand sanctions to cornpel unity and limit dissent. The scope of rights pertaining to speech, dissent and political association may be limited. If tl1e econo111y i s to be l 1eavi ly rcgt1lated, for instance by t axes which deliberate ly discrimi11ate agains t abse11 tee la11 d lords, tl1e scope of ''property rigl1ts'' is affecte d. To tl1e extent tl1at t1niversity graduates are ·'drc:1fted'' into various careers and ordered to different }Jarts. of t be cou11try, t l1eir ''liberty'' is affected. If the court� �re used as forums to resist gov�rnn1ent econon1ic policies tl1ey n1ay be converted . into governn1ent co11trol led b o dies for furtlieri i 1g government policy. These _are . · view. of point only a few examples to sugges t tl1e co11sti tutio11al in11Jlications of tl1is On tl1e otl1er s_ide, it is so1neti11 1es urged tl1at develo p11 1ent requires above all ' el e the consei�t � 111?eed _tI1� ba�king and participatio11 of t l 1e people. No amou nl ; ' tu s impe o governme11t d1rec� i on, it is said, cai1 do tli e job un l ess i 11fused by the h at o�l y a t ruly 11at1onal Ino\1 e1ne11t can give. I 1 nposed developme11t ,vill only lead • �o res1s�ance' · wl1 ereas popu lar con1 n1 i tine11 t wil l ma ke it possible to overcome . . �a"· , many d1ffi1cu1 ti· es and n1uc11 of tl le 0PJ)OSitio \ f O sort · i1. T l 1ose wl10 tl1i11k in tl1is · te · sta · r.0r a ''Rousseau styl e'' so1 u · tend to opt 1' y t par 10 1�, per l 1aps involving a one! , , with considerable ''grass roots orga11 i sa t1on. . . 1 tual· Tl1is view tends to lead to otller roblems. Can tl1e 11ecessar:y entl1us1as n aG s.- . _ · l) ly be devel oped? Can t il e unir of t e��\ l1e e: p fac t un co ry , e 1 e tl b in. tained in ma . of tribal disagreen1ents or con-n�·icts . sea . ous_,. ales·•· between econom1c Interests? A gain R . . , so1ut·10n 1s very ll a rd to ma.Int ain . , and there is always tl1e danger that tbf}..SIJ!;-'-'. party may dege11era te into a or t nd u d�sp _ o tic _ mak in� oligarcl1y, r:� .c , n,vd-demands on t l1e people 011 �h� ��f . � � P ext tllat 1t 1s fo r tl1e1r ow n ''re:il goo . 110� �� . All tl11s_ suggests some of tl1e 11�rd d i.lernmas. that an �fiii� ,-: carefu lly ote l�i�g p�em1se of all these ar � t e um · t s e r is tl�at bette ? � m n -ai=m · the rapid ,1,zaterial citizen 1s an overriding va 1ue. � men 1s TJ1 J)re nuse, of· course, is op�o to ar g��<li�s!i_· ,,cou rse ,��ter1a. 1 · te bet r ment is im . rrgllts 1n society and tile va Portant. But tl1 e value of having soll@,c.lll�--�=� . ,�.--=� � 1 ue � of :: . par1· e11 ·: . Sent ative 1am ts may also be gove_rnment by ''consent'' tl1roug;:1I�1� ." ·. •, very important t.o peop.1.e, ·ev-cO.d.1 , onQe -� l= ,..@__. � - -"::":"� ...;i:...;�.

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enjoy tl1em. Tl1e total quality of life enjoyed by society is presumably tl1e final end and men may enjoy material tl1ings a1 1d yet be enslaved in otl1er ways. So the process. of constitutional development involves more tl1 a11 a ''railway track'' line of develop­ ment logically designed simply to bring material betterment irrespective of the cost to other values in society. As with otl1er problems of theory, compromises. may have to be reached. And lawyers, inti 1nately i11volved i11 tl1e sl1aping of actual institutions, have often played a vital role i 11 acl1ievi11 g appropriate compromises. Jiurther Readi11g Since this Chapter only outlines some of tl1e problen1s of political tl1eory and develop111ent, you must fill it out with_a great deal of additional readi11g. A selection of readings from tl1e major political theorists, with notes, comments and questions designed as an i11troduction to tl1e study of Etl1iopian Constitutional Law, is provided by: Paul, Readings for Public Lalv I, Chapters 1-8, numeograpl1ed by I-Iaile Sellassie I University, Faculty of Law, 1966. The study of political theory also requires co11siderable readir1g from the works of the major political theorists themselves, since these impart a flavour and a conviction whicl1 is lost in extracts and commentaries. An effort should be n1ade to read at least two or three of the following: • Plato, The Republic Aristotle, The Politics Machiav·elli, The Pri,1ce Bodin, The Republic Hobbes, Leviathan Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Governme11t Montesquieu, The Spirir of th"e Laws Rousseau, The Social Co11tract Burke, Reflections 011 tlze French RevolLition Marx & Engels, Tl1e Commi111ist Ma11ifesto Mill, Essay on Liberty and Representative Gover1z1ne11t _ . . Most of these works are available in a great many different ed1t1ons. Extensive readings from these and other political �heorists, usua�ly accompa_niedby con1mentaries may be found in a great many anthologies, of which the following are particularly recommended.� Ebenstein, Modern Political Thouglzt, the Great Issues, New York, 1954. Elliott & McDonald, Western Political Heritage, New York, 1949. There are also many histories of political thought, and commentaries on the views of political thin.kers. For ou.r purposes, we recommend: Bowle, Western Political Thought, Oxford, 1948. Gettel!, History of Political Thought, New York, 1953. Hacker, Political Theory: Philosophy, Ideology, Scie,zce, New York, 1961. Sabine. A History of Political Theory, New York, 1960. . All of these bo ok s are ab ou t ''Political Theory'' in �he more restricted sense of the term_, ·and f�r. an introduction to ''Politics'' in a wider sens e, incltid1ng some of tl1e prob!ems of a�ply1ng pol1t1cal theories to practical affairs, students are strongly recommencled to read· Soltau , An Introduction to Politics, London, 1951. e 0 ht g i I the in d die stu be to c ds h nee cal ory liti the �!� �in e mu7 po 1 . ,tt was wntten, we also suggest a few general works on Europ th'C} necessary background: . �ker J Modern History, New York, 1931 an d later editions. Bri.trton, A Histor_v of Civilizaticn, 2 vols., New York, 1960-

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Suniniary of Contents

l Develop ment a n o ti u it st n o C n ia p io th for E s e rc 11 0 s l a n o t· 1 t u t' I s n o Part I : Eng l.1sh c istory H l a n o ti u it st n o C 1 sl li g o f En Introduction 1: An Outline pment of Parlia nieot· lo e ve th de gs in K an m or N e th e r und es ng ha C l na tio itu st on C u e process of law. Section I: d d n a a rt a C a n ag M ; ts ur co st au te law; the King's t under the Tudors· en m ia rl Pa y nt ig �e �e So y ar nt 1e an rli Section 2: The Development of Paparlian1cntary pnv1ege; freedom of debate and from arrest'. the issue of Sovereignty; n io tit e of Right·� th Pe n; tio xa ta ; ke Co e; ' tiv ga ro e pr l ya ro e th er ov the desJ)Ute hts. ig R of ill B e th t; en em ttl Se n io ut ol ev IZ e th Civil War and The Development of Principles of "Rule o f La\.v'' - judicial independence· due Section -3.. process and executive courts; Star Chan1ber; unlawful in1prisonment and H�beas Corpus; tl1e liability at Ja,v of public officials; tl1e rule of Jaw. S·ection I

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'fhe Developrncrtt of Modern Parliamentary Government - the extension of the franchise and li1c grov-1ti1 o:- partie.s; tbe Cabinet and the Prin1e Minister; the decline of ::he 1non:irct1y 2.nd the House of Lords; the place of constitutional conventions·' tlis: sovereignty ,)f Parlian·1cnt.

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Part ll: Judicial Enf'orce111ent of the Constitution as 'Supre111 e La\v'

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Introduction Section 5:

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. . . Tl1e :oevelop111cnt of Jud·,·. �(;IaI R.ev�· e,v -Anglo-An1er1can experience - t11e politJcal .

. lisl1n1ent n d theory of ·udicial rev·"' c 1 n e United States; Mar· tio ra th in pe ? , � � bury v: dadison ·' th� i� g�fs· fs 1 �rivy Cot1nc1l s Judgen1ent in the Liya 1age case. The '' Reception'' of Judicial R e .i_e�v .in o�l1er �ountries - Problems of adapta�on; introduction and operation< of l. u� 1 cia1 revie,v 1n Japan; India and some African states; ·judicial revie,v •and tl1e ·ru 1e of ]av,,'' • A Co1nparision: the !�ej ection 0f J . Fren ch · . udicial Rev1e,v . . 1n France r e asons for the approacl1 '· French solut·ions to the ) . under ]av.• . I roblems of keeping government . . Jud1c 1al Revie . w in Operat'ton - illUSlrati�e o· econ and York cases; Loch11er v. New inic \velfarc leg islation·,;. u st . Ter1nin:e/lo co at1 ens on an m d Jap a11 d in ,' lan orm ref 1) .ons v. Chicago and fr ce<10'111 Jof speecl1 ' · ' coope,. v. Aaro,z and executive relati . ' · . Lin11tat_1ons on the Exercis f he 11 Po r ! r �n� po\ve 1_ of Judi�ial Review - j udicial �ra_n�e1s ru_Jes; ·' just icia bifi t�,,, ' � �� nng Iuni political nts ' e m q11esl1ons reqt1ire '; f urtl1er Judicial rcv1e\v. 1

Section 6: Section 7: Section

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. J>art ID·. Ta' nzan1a n Experiencc - a Contrast to Tr·act·1 ·1on<1 . I Western Constitutionalisn, 1 Introduction £

Section 10: Section J J:

· ��..:: The po1·tt1cal · Philo so P11 . Y -.. of _,.re1·,l3"" - -� -= Julius Nyere re _ tl1e . self-executive lead ers'h.1p,_ . single party·' soc1a1Ism·' - -· _.=-,, the ·rol e o f the c1. v1_ :,j 1 servic · e; tl1e constitution. -� . . _. �·.:... a.. . Constitution'al 1nst1t. . - P0l-;�.,.:;:; .........�-ut10ns a11d 'Pro b! .; " .· ht s' and J uct· 11g ive ems - the Constitt1tion •· execut ical revic v the ,,ru t ;:� � n1en 1e of J aw , , ; the role of tl1e Party;-Far1:11 ;� ;:

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ENGLISH SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

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Part I I

fflE INSTI'l'U'l10NS OF PARLIAMENT, CONS11'1'0110NAL MONARCY AND THE IDEA OF ''RULE OF LAW''

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A Study of the Development of Certain English Constitutional Institutions as Sources to Aid Understanding of the Development of Certain Ethiopian Constitutional Institutions Introduction

from materials Part Englisl1 excerJ)ts he are mostly legal doct1ments; i1 � � � . h1stones and compar1sons with tl1e Etl1iopian Constitution. _ They foct1s our attentiot1 on several basic problems of co11stitutional develop­ ment:_ (I_) the dev�lop�e�t of the institution of parliament; (2) tl1e development of pr1nc1ples and 1nst1tut1ons u11derlying a ''constitutional 1no11archy''; (3) the development of concepts of ''r11le of law'' and i11stitt1tions to tra11slate that idea into law in action; (4) the developme11t of certain traditional constitutio11al ''rigl1ts'', such as ''due process'' of law and /1abeas co,pus, whicl1 are found, preslimablv, in Ethiopia's Constitution; (5) the importance of ''co11ventio11s'' in COTl\'erting a tradi­ tional monarchy into a modern democratic gove1·nment. The development of these institutio11s of Er1glish Cor1stitutio11al la\V 11a\-'�: profoundly influenced tb. e development of otl1e1· written constitutions, Ethiopia is an example. You will also note that England l1as no written constitution. Hovv can we say, then, that there is an English Constitutio11? Reflection upo11 this question - as we progress in the chapter - may help one to develop a better apprecia.tion of ·the function of a constitution and the role of constitutional law in a11y country. You should also appreciate the fact that tl1e modern constj tutio11al instit11tions of England are the product of a long, long evolutio11., and they can best be u11der­ stood by studying them in historical context, by tracing their slow and difficult growth over centuries of controversy and sometimes periods of bloodshed to resolve fu.ndamental disagreem.ent. This may serve to remind us of many difficulties which confront those who must attempt similar constitutional cl1anges - often ·quite radical changes - within only a few decades ratl1er than centuries. In order to understand the readings in this part yot1 should try to fit tl1em into their historical context. This is the purpose of the paragrapl1s below, with the obvious caveat tha t centuries of history cannot really be conde11sed, and such i11terPretations are always open to debate. ,.

A Brief Outline of English Constitutional History

· ·. English constitutional history beg.ins for our purposes in 106�, when Engla�1d ·was conquered by the Normans fro m nortl1ern France. The folloV:! ng fou,� centuries , l c ntr da n ou feu a he s wa d an En ). � 85 -14 r � 66 (10 A . � _ nown. as tb_e Middle ges _ 3re k . 81��lar- in, some important respects to the trad1t1�nal society which has existed _in _ . 'Et�opia � But the ·Norman k ings wh o ruled dt1r1ng tl1e 12th an d 13th centuries . . ..

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1 ey created institu tl ly us io nc co 1 u1 or o . ti ly is . ot _ . ci s n co s r to a v 0 1 1 1 n I o n g, central ro yal gave !ls. r st f a o ' were co11st1. t11t 1o n � t en m p o l ve rn de 1 1 a t 1 1 1 e ,, e e 1 tl e l whi. c I1 made p . .o ssib loca 1 fie d I institutio ns . For exampIe, t11_e Norma11 s established n1ent, t1e er?_ sion o f � = rnment by appoi11ting ''sheri ffs'' and o ther local a1 g v 1 f O s n io � a 1 d n s o o f his realm· th: rt e f pa s ou ri th va in s st re te in 's Jg K . i i ?� lJ e t 11 1 t t1e 1 royal cep � ;. � � � ;�� 1n udge s out to t;ave� oyal sent r and j urts o c royal of e s e t u I . s i n s Normm t l1 011gl1 t to co m e .u11der the cog niz. e er w l1 ic 1 l \V es us ca ' ,, ,, . . aro unc tl1 e king do. m and J·1e ar 1e t . d ry I e s Ju te op I ys ve de s m e dg as a Ju 1r 1e tl d an 11s na i · i o N e th , 1g . 11 a11ce o ·. t l1e K. ·r I e,�aI pro cedures we,re rm 1o 1 un r l1e ot s; 1 rt 1 co l ya o r part oi tlle J)roce dtir e u se d by 1e c o mmon law', tl ed ll ca as ,v at h w e rc fo en to 11 ga e elo � e d, ail d tlle judges b v de s to m s o r o n rul es allege dly 1 c1 on m 1 · n co on ed s ba d an gl i.e., a h,v com111011 to all E 11 I ar� d to b e ''common": ec d s d ge · · 1e _JU tl 1 cl 1 1 wl s e Jl ciJ in pr r o s 1 n sto derivec fro 111 c11 o nal la w \.Vh1cl1 wa� both efficient 1 at 1 1 of 1 n ste sy a d pe lo ve de ns na t.I 1us, t:ie N o r 1 ced al 1n for , loc en laµ courts, ary tom is e CL 1 il an 1 rl ar l JJu pO re mo ole 1 \vl e and or tl 1 11 otalJl'. tl1e coLtrts of tl1e local 11o bilit y. Tie Norn1an l<i11gs follo,v e d tl1e prece dent es tablisl1ed by earlier kings of con­ ver1i11g ''great cou11 cil s'' of tl1e ''big n1en'' o f tl1e realm. But tl1e Nor mans used tl 1ese 'great cot111cils'' i11 a systernatic \Vay to levy taxes to s 11pport tl1e king and to resd\1e sig11if1ca11t legal or pol icy iss ues. T11 11s ,vas initiated tl 1e institution which ca111e to be k1 1own as Parlian1e11t - o riginally a great ''court o f tl1e ki1 1g'' composed of lord; a11d otl1cr lesser ''vassals'', and weal tl1y representatives of tl1e n1ajor to,vns a11d bi:l101)s of tl1 e cl1t1rcl1 ,:: - all summo ne d by tl1e I(i11 0 wl10 wanted (and who usL1all)' secured) tl1eir asse11 t to royal n1east1res dee111ed ess;ntial to tl1e realm. Most notabl�, Parliament b e �am.e _tl1e institution 10 gra11t ''supply'' to tl1e ki11g, i.e. to detern111 e and l evy 11at1011-\v1de taxes t o support tl1e royal g o verninent. But Parlia­ m�n_t ,lso became a fo rL1m to discuss otl1er grie,,ances. I11deed Parliament was o_r1g1118!ly see11 as a gr�at cotirt of law as \Yell as body \VllicJ 1 ad\'ised tJ1e k.ing. Solu· �ions to n1a11y o f tl�e issues brougl�t before it in a l egal context were promulgated _ l 111strun1e11ts wl11c}1 1n tl1e brm _of l e g,1 eventtially developed iii to ''statute s'' - 0oencral dedarat1 011s o f law, bi11ding 011 tI 1e \\'llole kingdoin. T!·; re \Vere co nstai1t· power struggles bet,vee1 1 tl1e ki11 o t •v d uri· ng bil i o n e tl d a1 1 s 1 O ti1e M1.1 dle A ges 0 ne of tllese stru . gg Ies l ecl to i\1a 011a Carta (1215) when the k ing h ·. · t g rante:·, cer a1n_ r i g ts to tl1 e baro 11s a11 d i11 e � de ed 'fr g s ee n e 1 l ri t l1t o a s l ' m n" of. -' . . E ngl a1µ. l n ma11y respects Mao '011a Cart a is a fet1dal d o cu111ent co11firm1 ng man� feudal i11stitutio115 bLi t it be a1 11 e a sy1 n o 1b u b l o s wa of e tl1 11 ea w id cro at e tl1 tl1 to pre�rve certai;1 tr·�'Ld1't1o· 11ca l bas1_ c r1� d n a gl1t s · s · ,111d t11ne-l101 1 oured JJro ced11re -: d i11 tl1 at se11se a synlbo l o f ti le .d a s 1 o wly devel o )ed, tl1at tl1e king ruled '·un �,r � 1 law''. 11ag11a C«:-ta also caine t� � ; law ti l e sou rce of tl1e of s es pro c rigl1 t to ''due Des1)itt tl1e se early cotl; t it tit. o � a developments, Engl a11d remained, in n 1ao�, . _ � 1 ways, t feudal society tl1e r o 1 a co rt Y � � i _ a i d m tl 1 e co in m stitutions of the we re, br seve ral centt;ries pre; on ) \\ ty _ l)fllUitive, jt1 dged by ' were p!riods of civil war a' 11d d moder11 standar· ds. Th_ e� re ec 1 t 1ne e n of m cen t ra1 roy,11 gover.ninent. Parl1 � · 0• . .. p�es�ne d �nly tl1e gre at 11o bl r en1e 1 1 (i n tl1 e Ho 11s n v1nc1al sq111 res (balab bats p ' '1 a 1d s1 1 1101s) a11d tl1e e of ·Lords) an d the wns or tlie n (i ricl 1er citizens' of tl1e to,v

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House of Commons). The ''people'' had no direct voice in Parliament's selection. Still, cert �in institutions of vital importance for tl1 e later developn1ent of modern democrat1� government had been created, indeed, became fir1nly rooted. It is well worth noting that the �l1eory of representative govern1nent (e.g. tl1e theory as deve­ loped by Locke and M1!l) followed long after tl1e legal i11stitt1tions to implen1 ent tl1e theory l1ad been established. The middle ages ended with tl1 e civil wars of J 460-1485, after wl1icl1 national unity was restored and strengthened t111der tl1e Tt1dor dy 1 1,tsty (1485-1603). The Tudors managed to weaken the power of tl1e great 11 o·blen1e1 1, and tl1ey ruled throt1gl1 the s�pport of th� lesser 11obility, provi11 cial sqt1ires and wealtl1ier 1ne1 nbers of a growing commercial class. They encot1raged tl1e growtl1 of Parliame1 1t, especially the Commons, be�ause they were able to tise it, botl1 ;:1s a11 institt1tio11 to develop unity and as a taxing and law-maki11g body ust1ally obedie1 1t to tl1e royal will. The Tudors also led tl1e Englisl1 schism witl1 tl1e Ro111a1 1 Catl1olic C 1 1t1rcl1; allegiance to the Pope was severed; tl1e Cl111.rch of E11 gland \Vas established a11d atta,:l1ed both symbolically and constitutionall)' to tl1e crow11 as a state protected reli:�io11. Whereas the Tt1dors successfully ruled witl1 Parliament by controlli11g it, tl1e next dynasty, the Stt1arts (I 603-1688), failed to co11trol Parliament and tried to rule without it. They eventt1ally failed in tl1at endeavour. Tl1e Stt1arts believed in the ''divine right of kings'' and in tl1e supremaC)' of tl1eir royal ''p1·erogative'' powers, and they attempted various meast 1 res to enable the king to rule indepen­ dently of Parliament. Our readings explore some of tl1ese measures \Vl1icl1 raised opposition from Parliament, from ma11y 11otable la,vyers a11d otl1ers \vl10 opposed the Stuarts for constitutional, religious a11d other reaso 1 1s. Tl1e cot1rts, too, Oli occasion opposed the will of the monarcl1 i11 variot1s political trials. Tl1e resulting conflicts between the crown and Parliame1 1t (and often the cot1rts) ,vere very im­ portant in defining the position of Parliament and n1 onarcl1 , as ,vell as the civil rights to be enjoyed, under what had. come to be t 1 nderstood by tl1e lawyers as the ''constitution'' of England. The opposition to the Stuarts \Vas in a real sense, a ''legalistic'' opposition, stressing tl1e traditional ''legal rigl1ts'' of people and tl1e traditional ''legal'' power of Parliament to e11 act taxes a11� approve all laws: t�e opponents of tl1e Stuart kings insisted that tl1ese legal pr 1 11c1ples were rooted 1n the past and were the basis of tl1e monarchy. In 1642, a civil wa 1· br?ke out between King Charles I and Parljament. Tl1e king was defea�ed ,1nd lat�r tried and executed by Parliament . The execution of tl1e ki11g w,1s a radical revolt1t1onary act� probably quite unpoptilar; and it Jed to a military dictatorship, and rapid dise11cl1antment with any constitution whi.cl1 dispe1 1sed witl1 tl1e mo11arcl1y. 111 _166� tl1e 1no�arcl1y was restored witI1 overwl,elming popt1lar supJ)Ort. �ut by tl�1s t1n1e,. Parl1am�nt 11sl1 to dispense w1 tl1 \\ 11ot did JJlc peo s]1 1gli 1 E the _ � as also stronger tl1an before; _ _ l1c ted 1 p11b l,: tl e lct1 1 11 1sca art St11 1t either; and when King James JJ - again ,l : . feeling and tried again to weakei1 tl1e power of P�rl1,1me11 t llt1d t� re11 1troduce the unpopular Ro ma n Catholic Ch11rcl1, l1e was easily overtl1rowr1_ 1n �111 aln1ost _ ed t� 1 1 1v1 e ng Tl1 k . 88) (16 '' bloodless coup_ called ''the glorioL1s re�o]t1tio11 � _ � ,, succeed James I[ was asked �tt the same t1rne t() �1ck11owledge a 13111 ot �1gl1ts_ wl1ich establislled the ultimclte sLiprcn1acy of Pr1rli:1n1e..r1t as well as cer�a1n basic ''rig, hts'' of tile people. Tliis settle �1er1t of tl1e rcvolt1 t10 1 1 of 1688 11,1s since g� 1 1e _ o s of tl1c l7 _ tl1 Centl1ry prodL1 ced tln'.cha lle_nge.d. Tilus t11e otitcoinc of tl1 c revo11.1t1 _ � ffii:tny bi1sic, accej:)ti.:d pri 11 ci 11Jcs l)f tilC Cl 1 11Slllllt!Oll._ ly 11s io ev re pr 1t1 we s wl cr 1st 1n 111 l1c t ]. 32 18 96� [I . D lt ri 11 g tile 11e,xt I 5l) ye(.lrs �-1.:le_ctc�i by._ ti l e K in. g. c�tinc to h� cli <)Sl'tl 111l)rc t111<.i 111c)re, f'rc)1n ·p�1rlia111c11t. a.11d .•

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. c e n or be a use.the y h d d an 1 e or n1 C en os l 1 . a 1•I . . dates for po I·i tica. 0 ffice v. ere l I · · _ j 1 1 Parl1an1ent . These ministers st ll candi es arti backing of strong. fac t i��! -:::ri;ment po lic y collecti�ely. Instead of t aking ��� c .. � d �o r 1e tl 1 b le to tl1e cr own an e g s 11 to o sp t e re e m to e m ca be d � ey l pa tl y ll 1�. _� J tl ! iv , in . g r in l< e l1 t 11 ices 1 c t pra witl1 roval as ,, . , ese Tl1 orders f r o r . '' iste min e m i s � in k 1� tl l1 g t1 o c pe ted practice s. Thus·�ni. · e d an ment tl1r , x ed pt ce ac 1ner, · Pt� , i ·e· M' es · c · 1 c a r · p 1 a 11 p 0 t1 n ime r a y b e became ''con,,e 1st 1n t en 111 r11 r ve go d an of hl: m ste sy d 1 1 1 e is . bl a st . e ' rr. y i t d en an re was gradually am inc as n gl ·� il fro m Parli aw dr � ' ly ge ar , Cabinet, a ''go,,ernn1 ent _ . po11sible to it . ti, cern re ry co we to stly 11s 1. mo 1sl . g J En n l of s rie 1tL1 18 1 ce . Tl1e 16t.11, - 17 tll a11 d th po w n d er o . s ,a f o_ 1 t1o _ n p Pa rb� �em 1e t_l s , n _ o t! t1 �t st in f o 1t e1 1m sl li b � a t ,vith tl1e es ce en 11d of· the Judioiarv· . pe ae 1e 1n Ll , 1ts gl r1 l 1a ot v1 1 d 11 1 o in t ec ot pr v • • � a11cl the Croiv,11.. la'v 1 zat1on - tl1e exten_s1o n of suffra� t ra oc m de on as ,v nt ce ac e tli , ry 1 11 tile l9tll cei1 tu i cr e n 1o th at on e of ce 1 1 he d _ an a 1t) 1 go, 1e an rli ernPa of (tile rigJ1t to ,,ote for Men1bers te eli p an �n r ou tl1 e _ gr tl1 ra o� en fran­ le o� pe le 1o \Vl e 1 l t to e bl 1ta t1 1 co ac y tcl la tin ul 11t 1 11e . re l1 t �e s r1g de i t ma ng vo In 1 n ses l8J2 rea i�c l , tra ad cl1isec.l JJrOJJerty O\v11 ers. Gr te t o women In tl1e 20t h centu� ' vo tl1e of 1on ens ext e 1 l t l1 \vit a11d 4; 188 1867 a11d u11iversal> adult SLtffrage \Vas acl1ieved. Witl1 the gro\vtl1 of tl1e electorate cam e tl1e devel�pn1ent of modern politic� parties ,vl1icl1 deri\1ecl thei r strer1gtl1 fro111 1nass suppo r t , local organization and local party leaclcrs as \Vell <ls party leaders in Parliame11t. Tl1rougl1ot1t this period there were 11suaIIy 0111:ytv..,o JJarties \Vl1icl1 e 11joyed mass st1 pport and wl1jcl1 vied for control · of Parliar1 1c11t. ''Tl1ird'' parties or splinter groups \\'ere unable to muster manr votes at electio11 t irne. Tl1e forrnation of par ties produced a furtl1er development in t I1e Cabinet syste111. 'Tl1e leader of tl1e party I1aving a majority in Parliament, b, con\1 e1 1tion (not by written lav,,) is asked b)' the n1011a rcl1 to forn1 a ' 'government' ' , by aJ)JJointi11g a cabinet a11d cert ain otl1er l1ib011 officials. At the same time ihe . . . . n1111ority ar y 1n _Pa:!1a1ne11 � beco _mes ''Hi_s �ajesty's loyal Of>position ''. The "g� ·. vern111ent R s�tays in pow_er , t111t 1l there 1 s eith er a cl1ange 1n party members�!� produced by ai1o tl1_ e r �lect1011 or u11til parlian1en t, by its vote on some controversila issue deemed to sig111fy confidence in tl1e 0overnn1e11t cal in effec t for a new ls , · 0 ' ' ''go,1er11n1en t'' - a ne� cab'ine t.. All of tl1ese · deve wer e con utio sti ns t uti t onal insti ,, pe d' n� t th,r,ougli written laws bu t tl1 roug lo l1 adhere11ce to prac tices \Vhic b became · conventions . In tl1e 2 0 tl1 cer1t ury the po itica ·1 -· 1 PO\Ver of tl1 e Hot1se of Lords was sharJ!.Iv lin1ited · in a fl. : �r t e dget ar1d taxes i11 1909-11, tl1e Prime Minister, w1t , th e backi 11g o���s � r�� :; e �� ous of Co111n1011�, forced a balking �ous e �, f 1°':: to accept th e governme � n:' �s � ! inea l _ Sl�re s ve a by _ a K sk11 '�dis sol 1 g t_I1e Pr!· ing to men t , wi1 11 1ing t l 1e eil stiin e \:�� . 1?0 wliich den1onstratin tl1e public's u�w1lLinr_ r to s�pport the Lords, a ng d t0 c111g tl1ro igh a11 g Act of Parlian1ent wl11ch s e,erel� t restricted tl1e role wll iclJ tl e 1\ o�se of Lords cot 1l d play measures wl1icl1 tl1e Commol opposing gov er n��, in 1 1I s pa sed. er ; � � Tl1us , nobility was drastic ally r tl1e political power of the b ed 1 8 1 l w_ . 1 ed le. tl1at paradoxically, tl1_e Hot1s e f tl1e _populace was inc�ea� .e:; ? . �f t�rd s is st1ll a11 _ _infl� 1nfl.t1ent1al body; perl1ap s 1ts n:1�Y grow; tl11 s 1 s because tl ed b ie u1 o a rcl 1ng � e c1t1 ze1 1s and elder state can 7? d1st 1 and appo often int does sme !ll 11 as I s I . � ti m e on matters are often of a peers; an d the debates of the Lords l1igl1 qua}1ty. J ust as tl1e power of .. ti nob 1l1ty as a spec or are<l so the position of tl1e ial poli t ical group has now evap n� n1�:arel1 I1as cl1anged f rom a royal person wh 0 w a.s 0 �

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deemed �o be ''sovereign'' in fact to one who is so,,ereign only in tl1eory and for ceremon�a] purposes _ - _ but a monarch who is still a 11nifying symbol and a central eleme_nt 1!1 the const1tut101:1al system. It is l1a.rd for most E11glisl1men to see l1ow tl1e constJtut1on would work if tl1e Q11een were not there as tlie head of state. And it may be - give� certai1_1 k_ind� of political cr i. ses [e.g.' the inability of a11y party to must:r a w�rk1ng n:aJor1ty 1n Parliament] -- tl1 at tl1e Mo11arch n1igl1t l1ave to exerc1se cons1der_able influence to bring party leaders togetl1er and sectire tl1e forma­ tion of an effective government. In any eve11t, tl1e 111ai11te11a11ce of some traditions, whether �hose tra?it�ons are '''ratio11al', in a logical sense or 11ot, is often a vital elemen_t. 1n . establ1sl11ng ''legitimacy,', ''1111ity'' a11 d ''purpose'' ,11nong a JJeople. The �til1:at1on of precedent and traditio11 is a sig11i:fica11t characteristic of tl1 e Englisl1 const1tut1on, and_ so�e understandi11g of tl1at pl1 e11on1eno11 111ay be significant to students of const1tut1onal developn1ent l1ere - wl1ere a basic set of issues are con­. cerned with the fut11re development of the institutio11 s of co11stit11tional 111onarchies. This brief historical disco11rse also sl1ows tl1at continuous constitt1tion'll change, like other change, is probably a Ia,v of life. Change continues. Today tl1e Eritisl1 system, lilce otl1ers, is conf. ronted with adaptation and change to meet ne,v co11ditio11s a11d needs of moclern gover11ment. The theoretical supremacy of Parliament m11st be adj11sted to political ·realities which call for an increasingly strong executive and an increasi11g amount of policy­ m.aking by the executive, and an i11creasing devolution of povver to specialized executive organs of go,,ernment - or to i11depe11dent agencies like government corporations or boa.rds which are not directly responsible to I\1Iinisters or to parlia­ ment. Today government is deeply involved i11 regulating co111plex economic �tnd business affairs, in complex \velfare programs, i11 edt1cational and scientific develop­ ment, and in m.a.ny other activities. Both domestic and f oreig11 affairs grow in­ creasingly intricate and specialized, and the range of decision-making becomes increasingly difficult for the ''avera.ge man'' to con1prehend, increasingly removed from direct popular control througl1 parliament. The future constitt1tio11al l1istorian will better perceive tl1e impact of these changes on tl1e constitution. And in fact in Ethiopia, as we shall see; in later cl1apters, tl1e same problems exist - indeed they exist a fortiori precisely because. Ethiopia _is a developing co1:ntry ":'�icl1, P:e­ sumably, requires a pervasive executive establ1shme�t, a well tra1�ed c1v1l ser_\'I�e with a more and more ''specialized'' as well as a v1gorous executive leadership 1f rapid development is to take place. But somehow the constitutional lawyer n1ust remai11, to a certain degree, a ''generalist'' in an age of ''specialists''. He must try _to t�nderstand s_ometl1ing �bo�t a.II the important tasks of government; lie must_ ma111ta1n an overview �f tl:e 1�1st1tutions of government and he must l1elp in a v1tal wa� to sl1ape tl1 ose _ 111st1tt1t101�s and for111ulate procedures for carrying on gover�ment 10 accordanc_e w1tl1 a co�1st1tut_ional theory which reflects not only desirable 1<l� als bt1t als? a�!� 111a�I� prac�1ce�. , be completely th� sovereign _ now, 1� tl1e 111st�­ It 1s no use saying Parliament must tution cannot yet carry the load whicl1 ''sovereignty'' rmp_oses on rt. E11gl1sl1 co?st1tutional experience teaches us something of tl1e value of using l1a.rd-headed, pract1ca , ! Pr�gmatic, legalistic techniques - as ell as abstra t tl1eory - to develop a const1� _ � tut1on; it teaches the value of Jawyer-I1ke compromise to resolve conflicts and_ move succ�ssfully from one stage of political evoluti_on to another. Of co11rse, tl11s ap­ proach' ·· can be overstressed. But it cannot be ignored. . •

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W A L AL N IO T U IT T S N O C N IA OP I I IET OF OK SoUR CEBO SECTION. 1

N A M N R I K O N E f GS: lT R E D N U ES G N i-JA CONSTITUTIONAL � PA RL[A:tv!ENT, LAW AND MAGNA C AR TA ' Or T EN PM LO THE DEVE t ues nq Co 11 a r111 No e T/1 · · 11 0 '/1· f c i, c. o r t /11 .il li.a m f N orm andy (Norn1andy was a ''duk .edon1 '', or, puerhap·�'. V ht e � rig tl1 ed to r le E n1 e lai � ) u ce c an D Fr al y r u t � iev n ed e n1 c h ? t f 1 1 e t 1 h do e 1n ects h t resp w red y a w1t p_ man �om in ' ' tive imi i r ''pr �� ! K1� l!1 h a , m'' g�o ''kin the realist�cally n ab ro gland _ a land \vh1ch ,vas, np �.Eng\�·nc l Jiad been peopled and ruled by successive "1�vaders" ns e ma th or lo� n,e !: 66 N e ded. 10 v In e inv . d ns l xo a a Sa r u ' lt u c es an D n a e p o r tes u Jti · E , 1· s n a · e; h'1s po 1c1es - and those of m · o R s n o it r B " ' t n 1e · c n lin a e l his 11a cl ar on ni · g th i nclud1n w ne d a e I c i, u f ' n axons a � � al law in Engla nd. The ion ut tit ns co '' rn de io ''n Willian1 defeated the S of t ,en pn l v 1 t r fo e ag st ns and , tio e titu th ve i11s cti t e f ef se of ion at re e th c at th successors t fac f e tl, �in o �rC: d � 1 � y ll ra t. en m p o Norn1ans gene el ev d d n a ge n 1a cl al � o procedures are cruc1a t� �::St1tuti The Development of Parliament

T/1e S11111111011;11g o,( Par/ia111e11ts s 60-63. ge pa ), 08 (19 d m1 1gl E1 of ry sto 1/i l 11a tio itz1 nst Co e Tl1 , nd itla lvia 1 Fron

] the as . A.D I 066 [in nd, gla En e of ron 1 e tl 1 tl med clai y and 1 rn No of William l1eir no1ni11ated. by tl1e Confessor [an earlier S axon king]. That title tl1e English ' [Saxons] did not admit; it l1ad not bee11 law amon g tl1 em tl1at a king might appoint l1is st1ccessor. Harold. was cl1osen ki11g.Tl1e battle of I-lastings was fought. William [the ''Co11qu eror''] proceeded to seek tl1e recog11ition of tl1e divided and dismayed witan [Sax?11 co11ncil].He was cl1osen and was crowned, swearing that he would l1old fast r1gl1t law, and 11tterly forbid rapi11e and untigl1teous judgment .... In fact '!'e may rega:d o�r Norman �ings_ wl10 follo wed William as despotic; when there 1s not despotism [1n a fe11dal s_1t11at1?n] �here is anarchy; stil l a certain semblance_of another forn1 of government IS' ma1i1tained, governnlent by a king who rules with the counsel and co11sent of l1is barons. Now tl1'? t�pical f�u �al king, if \Ve n1 a)1 have d sh m ou ak l e su ab cl1 str an ac tio n · . a court cons1st111g of I11s im n i edIa .-· ' . . ow t e vassa1s, liis h , · or mu ch te� ant s 1n cl11 Ho ef. w little l1e will be infltienced by tliem, wl , ther 1e�her t�1ey wi ll be utterly powerles s or whe he will be b11t the first r ove al , is a ol d1ft1cu lt contr questi such on, but ' him as tl1ere is will be t�;��:�t� ; -�f 0 a court tl1us form ed. It wou ld seem then, a�· cording to tl1is idea that tli.e c his tt� t of �l1e Englisl1 f o ted ki ng should have consis tenants in cl1ief. Bti't tli e te � tl1 e result of tl1e Conquest:� 5 �� cllief were in England very numer ous : t�s w� , � 1 sttbsequent grants ed eit there were not j11st a few for f of de lan em ed ds · ru 1 ers rae d owners of vast pr an i, I a number w]10 l1eld single k a e we r ov , the inc re es· · • , · ht s fees and · nig single manors holden directly of the ]cing. * gMaitl and is referrm· g an° ra�ts out "estates''tototl1eh.'.·feud al' ' system wh re y the . . d ost IantfS to is. officers and m s'' ''own king, y, _ th�1r officers - and theor in b � aIIie who in turn may gra smaller est_a. o tt1 seize the lands of th soS on.Since William had nt 'on �arl B�cker describ� ��on na�bility and grant t�emquered_ the Saxons, he was in a pos1tIO to h1s ''vassals'' - his officer s. eud l1sm'' in his Mr Thus in the course ll�: o U History (1935 ed.) pages 25-26, � f�terP ,z gurope by the eleven��:�uries arose the 'fe��ei ��yste�', which . ) a system of Feu was well established tet1urt5 ; social clas�es �and dalism was ee things in one: (1) a form of Ian furoP: ' (3) a method of government.Everywhere in western ,r

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This should be remembered, for it affects the constitt1tion botl1 of tl1e House of Lord� and of the House o� C?mmons in later days.The body of military tenants in cb1ef _was �rom the beg111�1ng a very l1eterogeneo11s body.If it i11cluded great feudator1es with �ast p�ssess1ons and 11umero11s vassals, who migl1t aspire to play the part of sover�1gn princes, it i11cluded also a large 11umber of n1en who were by no �eans very r1c� �r very powerful.This m11st J1ave rendered it practically im­ possible that tl1e king s court sl1011ld l1ave becon1e a powerft1l definite body formed strictly on feud al lines.The Conque1·or we fi11d l1olds an ordinary court tl1ree times a year at the three great festivals.... BL1t we ot1gl1t to rernember that attendance i at court is no coveted privilege.We m11st be caref .11 11ot to introclt1ce tl1e notions of modern times in wl1icl1 a seat i11 parlia1ne11t is eagerly clesired.This would re11der a good deal of histor)' t1ointelligible. ...Wh.at see111s to tis from tl1e 111oder11 po.i11t of view ,t valt1able political rigl1t [i.e. the right to attend tl1e ''great cot111cil of tl1e ki11g''], seemed to those who had it an onerous obligation. The great baro11 agai11 l1ad 110 partict1lar desire to be abo11t his lord's court; if, as \Vas too ofte11 tl1e case, l1e was 11ot very f aitl1ful to his lord, l1i.s lord �s court was tl1e very last place in whicl1 l1e would wisl1 to be. In point of fact we do not hear from the Nor1na11 reig11s a11y. assertio11 of an individual's rigl1t to attend the court.The king insists 011 bringing arot1nd l1im tl1e most powerful of his tenants in cbjef ....He thus keeps l1is eye 11pon tl1e1n, a11d it strengtl1ens his hands in dealing \vith tl1e refractory [i.e.the rebelliot1s nobility] that his measures are taken with the counsel and co11sent of tl1eir peers. Under tl1e Norman kings counsel and co11sent may l1ave been little rrtore tl.-ic:1.n formality, and the king may have exercised tl1e power of s111n11-1011ing only st1ch of his tenants in chief as he pleased - still sucl1 few legisl,1tive acts as we have from this period are done with tl1e col1nsel and. co11sent of tl1e great. tl1ere was the great feudal '"lord'' (duke, e,1rl, n1arqt1is, cou11t, m,:1rgrave, etc.). On his estate or ' "manor'' lived the peasants, tilling the soil, subject to tl1e lord's control, and owing hirr1 ''feudal dues''· (services and payments in money or in kind). He \Vas tl1e overlorcl of the land, they were servile 'tenants (feudalism as a form of land tent1re). I-fe was noble and privileged, they were common and tinprivileged (feudalism as a syste1n of social classes). He \vas rt1ler, tl1ey were subject (feudalism as a method of government). As ruler the noble lord was supported by other nobles, whose clomains were held ''in fief'' lf the vassal of �orne power­ _ from him in ;ettirn for allegiance and military_ aid. The Jor�_was hin,se ful overlord to who m he in turn owed allegiance a.nd 1111l1tary aid. Tl1e overlord might perhaps be called a ;,king''. But the king was ust1ally � king in nan;ie �nly, since he often fougl1t - and often in vain _ to keep his powerful vassals 1n decent st1bJect1on. As a method of govemn,ent, ' of e , vat ten r.' pri sys ted wa ula a reg n tha re mo le Jitt s wa feudalism in the tenth century As Maitland explains, the Norman Kings developed tl1� pr�ctic_e o� sun�moning_ tl1eir barons a �d ''tenants in chief'' to a ''great coL1ncil'' w11enever tl1e �111g,_ 1n l11s ,�l1s�ret1�n., desired to sect�re 1h1c 1 es nt or \\ st1r , to asse l11m n1ea 1ng ont f con 1s blen pro � either advice with respect to important � _ _ he proposed to undert,:tke. Th1Js the kings often fot1nd it expecl1ent to sect!re tl1c assent of tl1e nob1l1�Y - or a segn,ent of the nobility - before raisi� g ne\v taxes or aclop �1n�, son1 � other �easure of 1 m.portance. TJ,ese meetings of the Great Council c,tmc to be know11 ,is _Parl1a �en�s . ctice of 1sst11ng an· order pecl t}1e pra elo dcv g kin the ed, ven con be en Wh to ere l ·a Par ts I men w . . . . . , ' o I f th '' e 1 t coun 1es c e to his· ''Sheriff'' (his ersonal deputy responsible for ma1�tc11_ n1ng pe,1c ,n e.:1 -:-_ which were similar 0 the provinces of traclitional Etl11op1,1). Tl1e order wot1ld cl1rect tl,e S11er1fl l� summon all the ·'Knights·' (lesser nobility) and other 1n1portant _n,� n of the_cot1ntry an d (to d and 1l 1ng goo two s 1nc . K Cot the ore bef · ,, JSSllC e com to · se cati . qu·ote. n ''summons ''to 4) 125 · d ·10 . 1or_th'1s p11rd·iscr eet. Knights of the Shire [cotinty], wl1om the n:ien of the co_tinty s_] ,a ]I . J 1ave ch osen c at er wh of res 1ts oth shi 1gl tl1c kn h wit ng alo er sid e r>as con to i:ri m the of tt . d of aII ,tn , d ea.ch . _ 1e. s. t·ea. ald [i.c" (axe�] they will grant the King''. . , .

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L LAW A N O I T U T I T S N O C IIOPIAN IT E F 0 K O O B SOURCE

tees of· Liberty (19 51), rz a r a u l G a rz io t it it t s n o ' C 0'J-r t n e 1 11 n !o e 1' v e D , d n From Roscoe Pou u al co nci l were n io at . 11 e th pa ge 16 · f o 1s 1 or� io m ct 1 1 , fu . le ti . · · gs . k 1n . . 1 1 1a rn o 1 � 1 � g tax at1 on and r 1 t 10 u under tl1 e N a 1n n o t1 a 1p 1c rt in a p f o rm fo e 1 tl t 1 t B l l. W m l l 1a 1 b mina.l than rea an d Henry I Y s no. aw 1 ld o f o t n e dm i e amen tl In · d 1 e 1 1 a t re � s w t l1is day a statute to , as leg1�lat1on d te ci re is s ·1 an on ar b e 1 tl of .. se11 t 11 co d ' e s n u o c I a r1 o e m the 1mm s, d r t 1 o h e sp1ntual and f · . o t n se n co d an ce vi ad e 1 tl . . ' ted by rec1·tes that ·I t ·1s enac I 1e E n g 1·1sh _po1·1ty there t f o g 1n n 1 11 g e_ b e 1 tl m o fr 1 s t 1 l _T mmo11s. tenlporal, and tli e co l 1e Cont 1 oent, b�ed f t o rs y� vr _a 1 t 1 1s a1 m o R 1e tl of e 1 1 i s a protest agai 11st tile doctr1 t se ha w ea at s the king pl th , ng ki e th on up er w po ve ti on d evoltitio11 of al l legisla has the force of lavv. 1

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3 25 225 s ge pa I, l. Vo )� 53 (19 d a11 1gl E1 of r_v sio , lli n a Fron 1 Trevely ,' e jan renc to n stin i refe Ju sl1 glj En e 'tl1 led c,1l n bee 11,ts 7) 130 72(12 I Eclvvard law man old Ro of n on atio ific cod the . gl1 1 ro11 tl ried car 0 v1[1 5) 7-6 (52 ror tl1e E111pe royal a g in bein pe toty pro lus led mb rese t leas at ,rard Edv .... lir1c dec its of eve the definer of tl1i11gs legal. He did not, it 1s tr11e, perpetrate. anytl1ing so definite as a cod e , \Vl1i.cl1 .is L1r1st1ited �tlilce to tl1e cl1ildhood of a nation* and to the pla stic genius of English lav1. Bt1t l1e gave closer def-i11ition to Ollf land la\v, ot1r public law and 011r Parlian1e11t. Under l1i1n the institL1tions of tl1 e n1ediaeval State, l1 itl1erto fluid, began to take forn1 . Henceforth the disti11ction bet,\1een Par liament and Council is for practical purposes clectr. Law. Statute of our Tl1e first eigl1tee11 years of Edward I sa\v tl1e beo--innino 0 Su_rrounde� by gr�at lawyers, native a11d foreig11, tl1; l egaJ minded K_jn g, in ihe prime of _I11 s mag1:1fic� nt m_,1nhood, ·passed Statute after Statute tl1rougl1 his Parlia­ n1ents, w1�h � leg1slat1ve vigour con1parable, accordiiig to Maitl a nd, only to thai of tl1e Wl11gs 1 n tJ1e first few yea rs after tl1e Re fori n Bill. These _Stattites are a new pl1enon 1enon , for tl1ey alter t l1e very substance of the law. I-I1tl1erto tl1ere l1as always bee n 'law', Ang 1o- Da111s · or1· g1·n, tra 1'd t1·onal� · 11 1n t0 ry, unwritt · ei1, n1uch of it local, most of it obsolete· and there l1as been ���d ff a aw, a 1 so ct1s ton1ar)'; more rece11tly tl1ere l 1as be ca 'laVt'' made by pro­ en s� . al trea-us· e·\ . not1ncemen .ts of fan 1ous royal J·tidges, aiid ' coi11me11ted ssi on 011 profe _t· 1n like those of Gia'11v 1·11 and B racton [two g reat ''tex · t s · fir Jtir1 · the ts s wl10 ttem pted a . books'' on E1 1glisJ 1 law as it ti en ]_; tl1 ere l1ave been pt1blic treaties, like-the,,� ted IS �X Mag na Carta, purporti�g on� t re tate and 1 perbaP gl ou en tl1 ree rc e fo w, tl1 la . S in fact enlargin g it ' tllere 11a' ,, eY 6ee11 roy · g 1 egal p ro· al As. sizes or _or d 1·nances a 1ter1n der cedure, substitt1ti11g f or i nstailce tri . 1 Edward I we get for tl1 e first time ,� b� Jury for trial b y batt l e. Bt1t_ no � u�_ =-it·��_ aws undoubtedly competent. to alter Ia,v self. . . . __ Tlze Develop1ne1zt 0'Jr a concep( of Representative Govern1 . ne11t From Trevelya n, op. cit., page s �260_263_ -:---� :·=i� ... Before long [i.e. by the l centur y] a man l 14t proud 7:>��� summoned to Parl.iament tl1a n was . more 0f being one of the in numerable ten aats�}a.� _,!-:: - ;;.:;,.

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And the King had more prestige as head of the executive and as the holder of

Parliament than [he did] as tl1e supposed universal [feudal] landlord. From a feudal society we were becoming a Parliament nation. ... The most important fact in tl1e early l1istor)' of our instit11tions is that the English Parliament, unlike analogo11s asse1nblies of tl1e same period in Europe, divided itself, durin� the later Plantage11et reigns, 11ot into tl1ree Estates of clergy, nobles and bour�eo1�, but i11to two Ho11ses of Lords and Com1no11s. Tl1e greater part of our const1t11t1onal and social history .is :i11 so111e se11se eitl1er cause or effect of th.at unique arrangen1ent.

In the continental system of 'Estcttes', all the 'ge11tlemei1', as we shot1ld call them, were represented in tl1e estate of the '11oblesse'. But tl1e 'noblesse', in the large sense whicl1 the V.'ord bears on the co11t.i11ent, was i11 tl1e English Parliament divided in two. The baror,es 1·11ajores, eacl1 st11nn1011ed by s1Jecial writ, sat in the upper l1ouse. Tl1e bL1rv11es 111i1101·es, e,,en tl1ougl1 tenants-in-chief, sl1ared. with knigl1ts, gentry and 'fratlklins' tl1e liability to be elected as k11igl1ts of tl1e sl1ire. Tht1s the forms of Englisl1 Parlian1er1tary life abolisl1ed tl1e distinctions of feuda.lism. Even a tenant-in-cl1ief might be found sitting a11d working with the burghers of the to1vvns. ... Tl1e k11igl1ts of tl1e shire, a semi-fe11dal class, were acting as elected repre­ sentatives of the ru.ral yeomen, and were sitti11g cheek by jowl witl1 tl1e citizens. of the borot1gbs. That is wl1y tl1e Hotise of Co1111nons was able to assert its i1nport­ ance at a very early date, wl1e11 burghe1·s and yeon1e11 l1ad small politica.l prestige t1nless tl1ey were acting in association with l(11igl1ts. Tl1at also is wl1y tl1e Englisl1 Civil War of Stuart times was not a class war; and v1l1y tl1e Englisl1 of ·Bt1rlce's time could not understand what ir1 tl1e \Vorld the Fre11cl1 Revolutio11 "v"'las abot1t. ... From l1umble beginnings in tl1e reig11 of Edward I tl1e House of Commons attained -in tl1e next ht1ndred and fifty years to a great place i11 the constitution. The consent of its members became necessary for all making of Statutes and for all extraordinary taxation; tl1eir ow11 JJetitions very frequently received tl1e assent of the King in Parliament; and eve11 tl1e hjgl1est a.cts of State like tl1e deposition and election of Kings took place with tl1e Commo11s as parties to tl1e deed.

The Development of Legal Institutions Creati11g The Founclations of a System of Cou,·ts From Maitland, op.cit., pages 63-64. . .. [During tl,e Norma11 period] a s1naller per1nanent body collects rot1nd the king, a body of ad.ministrators sel�cte? fro _ :11 the ran�s ?f t?e baro11age and �f the clergy. At its head stands the ch1ef-3ust1c1ar, _tl1e kin�� r1gl1t-l1and_ man, 111s viceroy when the kin g is, as often he is, in l1is fore1g11 do1n1n1ons. Tl1ere 1� also tl1e king's clJancellor, tlie head of a body of clerks wl10 do all the secretar1a� work; - are the g,reat officers of the royal housel1_0Id and otl1ers wl�orn the k111� has there ; c�os_ en. Under Henry I this body · becomes organ1c; tl1� orderly rol1t1ne of adm1n1stra­ �- pn _begins ev en to be a check on tl1e kin� 's power �1<:1ng]_ Stepl1en [an �arly Norman - rngJ d·iscovers this when he quarrels w1th th e min1ster1al body. T111s body vvl1e11 k '

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Excl1e que r (scaccariu n1), so called e tl1 urpos e . p l ia c n a n fi r � � 1 es on the tab le , con ve11i ent for the counting of i t sits fo 1c w ll t lo c d e r e u a q ri . nd cotir t of Ja w fo r tl1e. k in. g, it is cu gis' th,I Re from t11e cl1e . unc1 1 a o c a s m r o f t · 1 es of th1s court. Un r ic st Ju r o s r ia ic money. Also st ju . de st itiarii, i , · e ar s e b king's co11rt, and its m� m t� e 0{intries to colle ct t axe s and to hold pleas [i.e. hear 1 � to t n e s e r a y e h uring the who! P t I s. y D e nt · ra ne 1-Ienr iti i t ri ia i t us . ,ites ' 1 , �ra er : . 11 r a t1 z t s u 1 n e t h the sessio ns of tbi� ot b . cas�s] ; tl1ey are l1. . r ve co to e d us y el os lo s s eem s g m r e t e ci11 1a IRe r period tl1 1i ef [i. e . tl1 e assembl y which cl in n ants e t he t se mbly of s a 1e · nd· t d n a Y d o b t n d e d as r Perma. ne a ga e r b e sta s ap 1 n2• e rh p ay n1 ' r e n · 1 r fo h e t ]· t' ,,p n e ar 1iam ' later IS called comniittee of the lat te r. 11'' La11• - Tl1rough tf· i1, 110 111 o, l ·'C 11a io at N a ' i of tlie Kirig's LaH

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From. Maitla11d, OJJ. tit., !)ages I 05-111. ngs. ,an Ki rn No the g tin ron nf co on ati situ the g bin cri des by s gin be nd tla i rvrn e verr ancieni tl1 n are ere Tl1 (1) ki ds. at gre 1r fot of 1ris cot s,1y v . ma we are There r st1ll better. o rts, cou r ula pop l cal y ma we se tl1e � ci dre l1un the and e sI1ir tl1e of rts cot1 commtrnal col1rts - tl1ey are courts \.Vl1icl1 i11 tjme past l1ave been constituted by tl1 e free men of tl1e district; they are coti r ts wl1icl1 are now cons tituted by the free·o .l1olders of tl1e district: but a good many of tl1e l1undred co11 rts l1ave fallen in� pri,1 ate l1ands. (2) Tl1 er e are tl1e feudal courts, courts wl1icl1 have their origin 1n tenure, in tl1e relatio11 betwe en ma11 and the ma11or, in wl1icl1 tl1ey .sit as judges: there is tl1e l1all-rnoot of custornary court of the m anor for tl1e te11ants in villeinag e, i n wh i_ c11 [at least according to tl1e tl1eory of late r times] tl1e lord's steward is the only Judge. (3_) �l1�r � are tl1_e k�ng' s O\v_n. ce11t�al cou rts . (4) Tl1ere are the court: l1eld by tl1e k111 g s 1t111erant Jt1st1ces - v1s1tatorial courts. we n1 ay for the mom eni call tl1em. . ·:· Aft�r tl1c Nor�a1: Co11quest tl1e king's coL1rt l1as, we may say, thre e -�ain functions_: (1 J as _ o f_old it 1s ::1 cour t of last resort i11 case of defat1lt of justice, (u) on fetid�I principl� It 1s _ a cou rt f?r tl1e tena11ts in cl1ief, (iii) it is adn1itted t hat tber � are er certain.c_auses 111 \Vl11cl1 tl1e k111g l1,1s a special i 11terest an eith me co 1icl1. rnus t wl d before l11s own court or before a cot1rt l1eld b the are se he t ·. y some offi 1cer of h.JS. .'---- pleas of tl1e crow11.

We have n. ow to watcl1 tl1e growt·l1 o - . . . . f thi s royal Jur1sd1ct1 on . . . . ... Und er tl1e Norma11 ki i1�s, tlle . ., c� was . . . . Justi m_ o de of br1ngmg a cr1 m1oal to called ·an appeal [ G/Jpel/iini ]. tl11s p l f_ --:: 1 01: to \.Vo rd 1 s 11ot us ed in o·ur modern way tl1e going f ro111 011e court to' a s tipe . e_ rio r c our t - bu t means an· accusa t.I.o n f crJ]ll -- d5-"brougl1t by ti1 e _person wl10 l1a aoQ s been wr o nge d e whos = ':l -g., e tl 1e , erso have been stolen or wl10 l1as b ee1 I :p : seem to iie.: 1 W otinded . Well, tl1e k - -� i ng' s Ju st ices allowed an y ,lppello.r to make u se of tl1e words =\���:�; 'in the ki11g's pea,c e' * wJTen--- ------- --·---·M�

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* Maitland is referri 11 g to th prac ��-�� ti e . . r with ': br��in g the ki ng's peace''�T���c eb� tl1e acc11ser (''a_pp�llo r_") co�ld cbarge-r.h��c�"�Y�� the King s Judges rather than s a mean, s of cla1n11n g that cr ime should �-h·-"'r(@.� wa e . ot_Iler cou rt (fe �ers) would say that this is "J.so uda] local or eccles1·a·stical). In ell���'ffl=liF -lJ i:nd a J ' P� • ' al on tht . goes on t o show tha�.-.� . J udg �, ·! n ·I � 1 �· eff. or t to ·en'la.r g erisro 1ct1I . .· ' _c �im . A.nd Mrutland -, · -, 0,�� . d 11s �::::: Jt1 tl1e (1ur1sd1ct1onal) claim 1on 11_:: 1ct �� rt , ul wo � da �� d t fen de no it the rm pe that the e l ,ar m c ged was a "breacl1 ''of '·tbe. Kiog .� �e;..:-.. . ·,.-. ...· ·. ,,: · . 1r

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p.leased, and did not allow the appellee to take exception to these words - did not allow him to urge that thot1gl1 he migl1t have committed tl1eft or l1 omicide still he or person, peace, against a since tl1e do11e deed was 11ot had n?t broken the king's _ at a time or plac� which was :o,,ered by tl1e king's peace. Fictions* of this kind are.very c ?rr:m ?n 1n 0111· legal history, tl1ey are tl1e me,t11s wl1ereby tl1e courts amplify their Jttr1sd 1 ct1on. Any deed of viole11ce tl1en, a11y use of crin1i11al f 01·ce ca 11 be converted into a breach of the king's peace a11d be brougl1t witl1 i11 tl1e c�gniza11ce of the king's own court. Further, under Henry II \Ve fi11d a 11e1vv crin1inal procedure growi11g up by tl1 e side of t.he appeal, once a specially royal procecl11.re - tl1is is tl1e procedure by way of presentment or indict1ne11t. U11der tl1e Assize of CJare11 do11 [a Royal Pro­ clamation] royal justices are sent tl1rougl1011t England, to i 11 quire by tl1e oaths of the neighbo11rs of all robberies, and otl1er violent 1nisdeeds; tl1ose wl10 are accused, presented, indicated by tl1e swor11 testi111ony of the neigl1bours, by tl1e ju· ies of the [local communities], are sent to tl1e ordeal [trial]. This is an immense step in tl1 e history of criminal law. A crime is no longe1· regarded as a matter merely between the criminal and those \Vho have directly s11ffered by l1is cri1ne - it is a wrong against the nation, and the king as tl1 e natio11's represe11tative. Tl1 is procedure by indictment the king keeps in his own l1ands; it is a specially royal procedure; those who are thus accused of crime m11st be brougl1t before tl1e lcing's own justices. . . . I think we may say that from tl1e beginning of the tl1irteenth century on­ wards all causes that are regarded as crimi11 al are pleas of tl1e crown, [and tl111s subject to Royal Court jurisdiction]. The Development of a Legal Profession From Trevelyan, op.cit., pages 254-255. From tl1e time of Edward I [in the late 13th century] onwards the co11rts of Common Law, ... were manned by persons not in l1oly [churcl1 ] orders ... The norn1al movement of legal promotion in England was no longer from outside, but from bar to bench whereas in many countries of Europe to this day judge and pleader belong to two distinct and mutually exclusive professions. In tl1e pro­ fessional atmosphere of the king's courts in Westminster Hall, wh�re Englisl1 law was perpetually on the anvil red hot, tl1e corporate � ense of _tl1e Middle Ages was for1ning pleaders and judges into a single selfconsc1ous society. Jealous of out­ siders, rivals to the ecclesiastical lawyers, 'learned brothers' to one anotl1er, makers and guardians of a great intellectual and m?ral traditi�n, acquirin� too all the fa tilts and all the unpopularity of powerful and h1gl1ly organized profession, they were not a close 'noblesse of tI1 e robe', but offered to any Englisl11nan of brains and i11dustry a ladder to wealtI1 and greatness as attractive as tl1e Ch11rch l1erself. The common lawyers were, as a class, the first learned lay :111en [i.e., the first learned group outside the cI1urch], and �s st1�h we�e of grea� importance to tl1e growth of the nation. Their place in English h1story 1s only a l1t�le lower tha� tl1 at _ of the Parliament men. Without the .lawyers ne1tl1er tl1e Reforma� 1on nor the victory of Parliament over the St1_iarts would ever have been accomplished. . ..

• What is meant by the term ''fictions''? All legal systems may indulge in ''fictions'' - may they y? ? y Wh not the y ma ent pm elo dev al leg for ' s t l too i t n a. ort mp s',. be n y ma ·. no _?, " Fictio. . .. ... . . .. . : .'�.. . . . .� . . . ,... -

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AL LAW

' w a r L e d n ·u g n i e th � f o a e d I e J1 T : a t r a Magna C s u p r o C s a e b a -I 1 d an tv a L f o ' ' s s e c o r P e ''Du

1-Jistorical Bc1c!cgro1.,11d . -5 1 s e g a p ), 9 5 9 (1 s ie rt i/Je L r i, O f o, s e c r i, o ' S , d e , y Fr om Pe rr . t�st against tl1 e arbi!r ary ro p a f o n o ti ,1 n 1i ln \V,1S tl1e cu 5] 1 2 I n [i a rt a C Magi1a ad been established l1 h 1c l1 w s er \v �0 � ta 1 e1 n 11 1 1 over g g n si u s a vv o I1 w , il h Jo g in K rtile of n queror, He11 ry I, and o C 1e tl am l1 1l \V , 1 1 o ti 1 1glisl1 11 a E e 1 tl f o s er d il ti b at re g b y tlie 1 �se abuse� took the tl , al er en g 1 11 �. se )O rJ tt J-Ier1ry II, for sclfisl 1 ,1 11 cl tyran11ical p ing est abl ished feudal as re ec d d an 1s 1 0 t1 ga li ob {),lttcr11 of i 11 creasing custo 111 ary fe11d�1l a_xes ab ov � tl1e 11su al rate, t ay p to ed rc fo e c;r w s on 1r b, . rigl1 ts a11 d J)ri,;ilegcs. l�he 1 as restri cted. Tl1 e k1 11 g exerted pres- \· v. s nl 11a te r ei 1 tl r fo t and their righ t to l1 old cour 1a1 1ts o f Lo nd on \Vere bu rde ned cl er 1 n 1 c Tl s. 11 tio ec el cl1 1 t1r cl st1re i11 order to i 11 flue11ce 1 ileges we r e c11rtailed. To a limited exte n t even i\ 1)r ng di tra eir by ! 1eavy taxes, a11d tl1 1is confiscation of cl1 urch pro­ l e 11s ca be red fTc st1 cts bje sL1 's 11 l1 Jo the ]o\vest <)f l(ing 1 ad dit ion , Jol11 1's adminis­ . I1 ief rel or J)O of e 1rc so1 l1le ila ava 1:y 1 01 tl1e l l)erly destroyec 1scrt1pulous foreign u1 yed plo em e 1 l d a11 t, 1 1 cie i ff i11e d 1 a1 sed ani org dis s \V�t tratioi1 . land the of t)' n cou ry eve 11 i l iffs bai a11d s f 1 erif sl �1s cl 1 ,11 cers i adventurers i.1S roy::11 off ns Baro l1e t and g Kin 1 tl1e vee1 bet\ ta ion fron n co ed arm 1 :: 1 1 d to e l_ t [Tl1ese ab11ses which ter'' r a 1 ·'Cl a sig11 ed o t agre 1111 J 0 , I<.ing figl1t tl1a11 lier Rat n1. 1i l sed \Vl10 OJ)JJo v,1as lz11 0\V11 as tl1 e ''Magna Carta'' or '·Cl1arter of Liberties''.] .... T11e a1:na�i1'.g vita�ity �f l\tlag11a Carta l1 as gi,,en it an importa11ce in the 1 een v. t be diSJ)lite JJ r_otec_t1011 of 1i1d1v1d11al liberties far transcendir 1 g its r ole j11 tlle I<.ing Jol1n a11d . tl1 e barons. Ti1:1 e after ti1 11 e it l1as bee 11 called 11p011 wl1en liberty . 1 ed by_ despotic powe r , and its pr ovisiOilS 11 a\'e been linked \Vith l1as bee11 tl1reate1 · son1e of tl1 e 1nost esse11 t1al libert ies 11 0w e111bodied in A1n er 1�a11 � onstI't ut·io nal Ja\V o� . Tl1e fact tl1at this l1 as not·· �ll\vays bee11 don e witl1 co ffil)1 ete l 11s t or1cal accu.racy d not dimi11isl1 tl1 e debt owed to Magna Carta. Tl1 e establisl1111ent of certain · principles . 1 011r 1aw was greatly i.:lssist.ed b y ti 1e. g · D · of 1.b 1 er ty 11 ur1� a. J)restige of Magna Cart tl1 e fourtee11tl1 centur it was rel ie� P n b_y Parliar1�e1 1 t as a guara11tee tl1at definite limit ations existed 11 p�11 tl1e - ve r o� tf1e ki_ 11g a11d l1is c o11ncil. A nurnbe� of statu te � in sltJ)po rt of Mag11a Carl�l ,�e� � a d d\iririg_ tl1e century and tl1ese f urn1sh ed n1any. of the materials 011 wJ 1ich late r i1 1 1:��1 t1 11 s , ere ba tu� � ce l1 nt ee n t ve 11 1e se d. tl I �e , v : �� � � ye l m s i r e aw 11 th Parlia ei1 t 311swere tti�rt s claimed ''di:ine rig�1t _of king s by poi11t_ing to Mag1 1a Carta as a <lei ra i n tl_ 1 0 UP? ol).S i at substa11tJal restr1ct :� monarcl11cal J)OWer existed. Sir Edward �oke e a��s tre � S iled co11d Institute, a de�a _ � � on Mag11a Carta comJ)leted i il 1628 set . fortl1 tl1at i great awyer' s 1nterpreta1 �n... l of tl1e docun1 ent. His work iiJflti 1 d Ilot 0� a 1l y th� legal tl1inking of his O\VO � .y but also l1 el1Jed sl1ape tl1e coilstitt� Ii�al tl1 eo r 1es wl11cl1 de,,eloped i11 America dur•?.�.. ·· · . tl1e seventee11th and eigl1tee11t · l1 centur1e s. ....: :·· �o clause o�_Magna Carta l1 as ·i . ee.JL__ been t n . c ar ted a gu more a as ften o tl1e l1bert1es of tl1e citi zen tha l pter 3 5 wl iic l1 1 be ca h in n e c 29 h ap t e :-�� �j-�. ? ter 0� Henry III i11 1225. Tl1 is cl! � :� t r �vides tl1 at no freeman sl1all be im_p�1�� ·� dispossessed, banisl1ed, or destio ed or b�, tl1 e l�V:' of t l1 e land'' .... A� ear except by tl1 e legal judgment of bJs� P��: l s �he fo� r teenth century the ' 'la�g rgh land ,�rov1s1on_ �as considered to } �J be d� ntical tl1 the . '�due of cept "'J��-il: co11 �! w a l . I a . dd1t 1 J on, tl1e I rote ction of tl1 · � ?f 1s prov1�1�11 wa s extended to��?,!5� instead o� Just to tl1e ''fr�eme n', wl1 0 we ' These things occu rred i n 1354 wh p:� � very l1m1ted grou·p in m ed iev·- :� 1:""""����� en - . ..- · --� � �·-· �··-·-;· "'�- -=·-,c· --·liament declared: - ·---· ---·-··

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87

That no man of what estate or condition that l1e be, shall be put out of land o� teneme �t, nor take� nor in1_prisoned, nor disinl1erited, 11or put to death, without being brought 1n answer by due /J1·ocess o_f tl1e law (emphasis added).

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Excerpts fro,n Magna Carta From Perry, op.cit., pages 11-18. 1 e son1etl1ing of tl1e flavot1r of excerpts are reprinted here, to gi, selected Only

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Joh�, �y the grace of G �d, king of E11gla11d, lorcl of Irela11d, duke of Normandy �nd_ �qu1ta1ne, count o � A11Jot1, to tl1e a1·cl1bisl1ops, bisl1ops, abbots, earls, barons, JUSt1�1ars, foresters, sl1er1ffs, �eev�s, �erva11ts, a11d all bailiffs and l1is faitl1ft1l people greeting. Know that by tl1e 1nsp.1rat1on of God a11d for tl1e good of our sot1l and those of all our predecessors a11d of ot1r l1eirs, to tl1e l1011ot1r of God a11d the exalta­ tion of _holy cl1urch, a11d the impro,1e111e11t of ou1· ki11gdo1n, by the advice of our venerable fathers, etc. . .. 1. In the first place, we l1ave granted to God, a11d by this our present cl1arter confirmed, for us and _for our l1eirs forever, tl1at tl1e Englisl1 cl1t1rch shall be free, and shall hold its rights entire and its liberties uni11jt1red; a11d we will tl1at jt be tl1us observed; We h.ave granted moreover to all free 1nen of our kingdo111 for us and otir heirs forever all the liberties vvritten below, to be l1ad and l1olden by tl1emselves and their heirs from us and our l1eirs. 2. If any o. f our earls or barons, or otl1ers l1olding fro1n 11s in cl1:ief b}' military service shall have died, and whe11 l1e l1as died his heir sl1all be of ft1ll age and owe relief, he shall have his inheritance by tl1e ancient relief; that is to say, tl1e l1eir or heirs of an earl for t11e whole barony of an earl a l1undred pounds; tl1e heir or heirs of a knigl1t for a whole knight's fee a hundred shilli11gs at most; and wl10 owes less let him give less according to the ancient custom of fiefs. 9. Neither we 11or our bailiffs will seize any land or rent for any debt, so long as the chattels of the debtor are sufficient for the payme11t of the debt; nor shall the pledges of a debtor be distrained so long as the principal debtor himself has enough for the payment of the debt; and if tl1e principal debtor fails in tl1e payment of the debt, not having the wherewithal to pay it, tl1e pledges sl1all be responsible for the debt· and if thev wish they shall have tl1e lands and the rents of the debtor until they sh�Il have be;n satisfied for the debt �hicl1 tl1ey have _b �fore paid for him, unless the principal debtor shall have sl1ow11 himself to be quit 1n tl1at respect towards those pledges. 13. And the city of London shall have al! its ancient liberties and free �� stoms, as well by land as by water. Moreover, we will an? g_rant tl1at all otl1er c1t1es and _ _ boroughs and villages and ports shall have all their l1bert1es and free customs. 17. The common pleas shall not follow our court� but sl1all be held in some certain place. < We, or if we are outside of the kingdom our princip l justiciar, ill send two � � u · J s,ti-ciars ·_through each county four times_ a year, wl10 w1th four knights o� each county" elected by the county, shall h ld 1n the county and on the day and 1n the ? . Place o·f the county court the aforesaid assizes of the county.

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N A L LAW IO T U IT T S N O C N IA P ETHIO F O K 0 0 I3 E C R U So

. l 1eld witl1in tl1 e day of the cou ntv be 110r D , cl C s e siz s . a ' d i a s e r 1o (' a . 1e tl if d 1 i . s and free-I1 olders rem ain from th ose II sha 19 . A . . who . t l1 1g . 11 k f o r e ct· t d en I s, gm 1e t JU court, a stiffic1e11.t 11 u 11 1b cor e ac giv to y da 1ng t ia l as t n o t r ti o c ty 11 u o c e h t were p resent at the busi11ess is n1ore or less. l off e nce, except in propo rtion smal a for d e 1 fi 11 ' e b t o n ll a 1 l s n 1a 11 e e fr 20. A be fined shall in proportion l1e nce e off oreat i a d an 0 e; 1c to t!1e measure of tl1e ofef _1 hant merc a in the same and old; 1 freeI 11is s iJc e ff e to tl1e mag11it�1de of tl1 � � d �;��� l lein s hall be fined in th e sarne way, saving ,vay, savi11g 111s 1nercl1 a11 dise, ail 1e abo ve fines shall be impo sed tl of e non and . , r 1 at e �b l l1is wainage, if !1e sl1al � tl1e r1eighbourl1ood. :� �� �� h except by tl1e oat s o f l1011e . . proport100 . . f l y by tl1eir peers, and onIy 1n on ned i · e b 11 I ia s ns to ba d an rls ll . Ea to tl1eir offer1ce . j , or outlawed, 39 No f ree rna11 sl1a11 lJe taker1 or im1)riso11 ed or disposs essed · or banis11 cd or j 11 ,tny \V8.y destroyed, 11or \Vill w e go upo n l11m , nor sen d upoo llim except 'by tlie legal j11dg1ne11r of 1'1is peers or by tl1e law o f the l �nd� . . '40. To no 011 e \vill we sell, to no one \Vill w e deny, or delay r1gl1t or Justice. 45. '\/le v1ill riot n1al.ce justiciars, co11stables, s l1eriffs or b�iliffs except of such as lcnow tl1e lav,.., of tl1e real1n a11d ar e v.;ell inclined to obs erve 1t.

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Ma g,1a Carta c1s a Source o_f ''Due Process oj·Lal-v'' atzd Habeas Corpi1s

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In 1642, Cok:e' s Second In s titute [a fa1nous treatise 011 Englisl1 law] conta1rung l1is comme11tary on Magna Carta, was published by order of the House of Commo �s. This commentary was gr eatly re lied lipon in the controve rsie s between the co lonies and the British government before the Revolution an d furnished much o th 1 f , · material for our American bills of rigl1t s. It is a fo un datio1 docu 1 n1ent for the histo ry of our con stitutional law. The !)art es pecially no te wo rtl 1y is tl1 e lo ng comment ary on chapters 39 and 40 in wl1icl1 l1e takes tl1 em ll ) 0W, h w sh o cl at rse s an cl by d au se l they have been _interprete d _and developed_ by legislation of Parliament, in �he la; books, and by Jt1d1c1al dec1s1on. He cons ide rs th e m ea ni ng of /ex terrae, , law the la11d'', and sl1ows tl1at as far back a e "d u s tl 1 e as e re ig r n p h of E dw ar d III tlie · · s e quiv p r�;ess of law' '. w� s sed a ,it ale nt .... No o n e is to b e p ti t o u t of h1s freebol. d � � _ · or put from his hvehhood except b y lawful proceeding of which h e has full noO � �nd m which he has full and fatr hear ing. He expla ins the wo rd "liberties " as mea°s mg more than freed_ om of the physical person fro m arrest . i mprisonm ent. 1 or meanmg of liberty 1s of the first impo Th _ O nc ab rta l e e and he d 10 -1 f II and goes rately : to the legal re1nedies. But � he shows that i t ��:d : � :een co stru cover tl1e freedoms tl 1at n1en y a n _e<l_ tn I1ave ''. * � �. • •

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•. We will, in this Chapter, read more abou t s·ir Edward � � a vigorous exponent of the . � filJQ 1 r . k . �o e He wa s a great 1aW) e an t�� -remac f h l theory of divine right of kinsup gs, the p��e/ � �w a�d par liament and a vigorous oppon.•Ef-ri' fu1 ·c � 0. t e Kin� to opponent of tl1e expan sion of edJc make law by l11s personal a roy l rerog a aul _.;;.,.. �f the Institutes - treatises wllicl1 biame _�ve Power 1n 17th century England. He wasll i.C e...i!SP�·-..=­ wi elY accepte d as t1onal development. g reat tex ts on English la\v ano � �; E1'i;;; . -n Y of th�':';;�� C�;,a ��r�i:::. t�i��ei:;a;d lnS/itute (see ve) insisted that Cla� �� abo 1 h s e Cok vie':" was accept ed, and � " fundam ental Pnnci ples 0 of English c ou . stl?',1' �,-·� great const1tuttonal doctiment Magna Car ta became kno wn as '''the grea despite the O b sole . t cha rter _o ��"":-:;-::r/t, scence of mo st of it. i -�."'.;:;:.;::�::;;���, . � \A lI. ._ _j�

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·From Coke, Second Institute, commentary

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89

Clause 39 of Magna Carta:

That no ma n be _tak en or imprisoned, but ''per legem terrae'' [by law of the land] ... because the liberty of a mans person is more precious to him, than all the· rest that follow, and therefore [there sl1ould be] great reaso11 that l1e should by· la� be �elj�ved therei_n. . . . [Coke go es 011 to say that ''great reason'' should also exist to Justify the taking of_ a 1nan's land or property or l1is legal rigl1ts. Sucl1 action, can only be tak�n according . to the Cl1arter (Cla11se 39), ''11isi per le gem terrae' '. Coke then e xplains the meaning of tl1at term.] 'Nisi per legem terrae.' But by tl1e law of tl1e land. For tl1 e true sense and exposition of tl1ese words, see tl1e statt1te of 37 E. 3 cap. 8 wl1ere tl1e words, by the law of the land, are rendered 'witl1ot1t due process of law' for tl1ere it is. said, though it be contained in the great cl1arter, tl1at 110 man be tak�n, imprisoned, or put out of his free-hold witl1out process of tl1e law; ... Without being brou.ght in to answer bt1t by due process of the common law� Now it may be demanded, if a man be taken, or committed to prison ''contra legem terrae'', against the law of the land, wl1at remedy hatl1 tl1e party grieved? ... He may have an 'habeas corpus' out of tl1e [law courts] ... upon which writ the gaolor must retourn.e [answer to the court] by whom l1e [tl1e prisoner] was com­ mitted, and the cause of lus imprisonment, and if it appearetl1 [to the court] that his imprisonment be just, and-lawfull, he shall be remaunded to the former gaolor, but if it shall appeare to the court that he was imprisoned against the law of the land i.e. [contrary to due process of tl1e law] they [the jt1dges] ought by force or­ this statute to deliver him: if it be doubtful! and under consideration, h,:; may be bailed. To conclude this point, with t\VO of the 'maximes' of the common law. 1. 'Le common ley ad tielment admeasure les prerogatives le roy, que ilz no tolleront, ne prejudiceront le inheritance dascun,' the common law hath so admeasured the prerogatives of the king, that they should not take away, nor prejudice the in.· heritance of any: and the best inheritance that the subject hath, is the law of the realm e. 2. 'Nihil tam proprium est Imperii, quam legibus vivere' [''Notl1ing is so properly characteristic of (good) government as living by laws'']. The De,velopm.ent of a written Constitutional guarantee of ''due process'' in A,nerica� Coke's interpretation of Clause 39 was (as Pound indicates), accept.'!d as the true meaning of Magna Ca rta i n the 17th century. And Coke, as we shall see, was son1ething of a l awyer-hero to English ''revolutionaries�' of the 17th century and American ''revolutionaires'' of the 18th cen­ the ion of United States tury. Thus ' after the American revolution, the framers of the constitut . (and the framers of many state constitutions) inserted guarantees stating: ·'No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process oj'/aw." (U.S. Consti­ tution, Amendments V and XIV). . The constitutional guarantee of ''due process of. law'� has been tl1e st1bj�t of considerable JUdicia.l interpret ation over a long period of time by .Nl?er,can c�urts. Indeed 1t _n1ay be regarded as one of the most important clauses (in tha t Const1tut1on) relating to human liberty. It is diffict1lt to summarise briefly the meaning which has b�n, ascrib�d to tl1e term ''due proc�ss o· f �law.'' We shall, in later readings devote c�nsidera?le _attention t?. t111s guara�tee ��tise of its lly s ntia pro due sse � great potential significance to Ethjopia of this constitutional prov!sion. � _ of law. '' in Anglo-American law came to signify a guarantee of �dn1in1strat1on of the l�w accord1!1g � established procedures designed to secure fairness, or, as English lawyers say: according to ''pr1n­ crp� ot natural justice." . •

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AL LAW N IO T U l' T l S N Co N IA ETHIOP . -.. � RCEBOOK OF � --�S�o�U�::_����:�==--...

a lead ing constitutional ster, \Yeb iel Dan by med . la . . .· a:,��a o ' defin1ti l st n m ere ays ''th alw America : � wl1 be , � said rl y e a J1 aw e a s'', An proces e u o T ren��rs J�dgment only after lria)• • d an iry qu in of tile earl y 19tl1 century. wl1ic on up l1. r oceeds � s n protect� m the , e �]. ht d es n rig 1t1 r de un co m un [ im or y ert op pr hears before it P11. �. e liberty, 1� 11 d l o l1 l l 1a sl n , Anotller early Supren1e Court defin1t1on held: "As to� so that "every citize_ ,' . ty ci so e rn v o g 1 cl 1 . tl1e du e process guarantee] the y were intended h w ! s of general rule [i.e C rta a -a M e] th f o 39 se au [C � l m tl1e powers of government unrestrained bv words f ro of ise xerc e t l1e fron1 ual vi ind� � �: ,1, � tiler famous early constitutional c'?mmentator (Cooieyi � the e to secur Sti the establishe� I? r 1nc1_ples of · · · JU du� ang ed . . but only with du.e regard 10 the ch be y 01a s] aw l al · wrote : "Adn11n1strat1ve and [proceection of citizens [from unjust la w enforceme nt]."* land.n1arks established for the prot

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T/1e Evolvi11g Co,zcept of ''Due Proce

ed to n1a ny concrete cases . Thus "due pr0ce& li pp a en e b e c sin e v 1a · c_ ·1p1_ es l t Tl1ese general pr1n fairness in l a\V enforcement embodying many speojt. of 1ara ntce · · I . · · of. law'' has con1e to s1gn1f Y a g ' 'th a. er or c1v1·1) threate-m cnmm acti on ( e 1 . tal 1en rnn e v go en l1 \V oy · enJ l d ti sho I ua 'd 1v1 ct· · 1n an 1 , · 1 rights w111c , ng . e.g. , · , , ts 1 ty er " op to deprive hin1 of sio-nificant " liberty or pr to "confront'' one's accusers and end def to ty uni ort opp · and ing ear 1 1 , e c , ti o i;, 11 l t 1 o 1 · rig 1) tl1e 1 1 h · ht t ,, rig o counse e l" t . e ent rec Y, r mo , and e enc and those giving adverse evid 2) the right to be judged by an in1partial tr ibunal; 3) the right to be protected by 1J1e principle "11ulla poen a sine Iege'' (no punishment without lavi). ' 4) the right to be protected against laws wl1icl1 are_ eit?er discriminatory or so umeasonably vagu0 as to be capable of discrin1inatory appl 1cat1on; 5) the right to habe"1s corpus as a ren1edy to secure release from i lleg.al imprisonment 1n later readings dealing \-vith judicial revie\v, civil rights and problems of administrative law, vie \Vil! take u1J thes e due process rights, and study some ill ustrative cases in detail. �11.

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Article 43 of the Constitution of Etlliopia (tl1e Engl isl1 version) pro, ides that "no persons� be deprived of lif e, liberty or property without due process of Ia,v. '' Tl1e An1baric version of Article �3 is an1biguou� and seems to state literally tl1at no one n1ay be deprived of liberty (etc.) "except rn accordance \Vlth the la\X1''. Presumably, 110\vev er, the Amharic version of Article 43 is an attempt· ed tra��lation of th� English rather than vice versa . (How would yor, translate the term "due process ?f l aw on_ tl1e �as1s of_ what )'Oll now kno\v ?) Presumabl y (for reasons disctisse more full l t d y a er) 1t was tl1e 1ntent1on to incorporate a du e process la c use into t11e Revised Constitution. We kn?W for exam_ple th�t draf ts �f tl1e Constitution of 1955 were pre pa red i lish by the help of forei� n En g exper�s, 1nclud1n� Amer1�an�. We know tl1at tl1e gu arantee of ''due pro ces s of law'' had alr��dJ b�n 1ntroduc�d 1�to. Etl 11op1an la\v as a fu11ctan1en tal gu a rantee th ro ug h the Federal Act (un11111g Eritrea_ to Eth1op1a) 1n 1952 and tl1e Public R igt 1ts Pr oc l an1 atio n of 1953. (See Chapter 3 �r,fr�}, ( here is th�s �mple reason to suppose that the fran1ers intend pian Ethi o int o at in e ed co rp to or aw a const1tut1onal guarantee pa tterned on ust C]a ti le . A ng l o-An1er1·can · om fr s . s h tern · con w 1c cep t h 39 of Magna Carta. 1

''Dz,e Process'' ancl ''Habeas C orpus''.

In tl1e r eading above Sir Ed\vard · pnson· C o k d .b esc � ri _ e s h_ab� corpus as the remedy for �y un men t in violation o f "tl1e J aw of tlle land ' - or in v1o lat1on of ''due process of law =. It is important to see 11O\V 1 1ab . OS· • eas llO • corpu s. becam e a recognLZed proceeding to remedy viola of due process - and thus to see the h0 t�e right to habea co f right to enjoy "due process s rpus became an integral part O of the aw .

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. SI� . cal d1scus s one 10?� the case of Hurtado v. California 110 �-S. · the first American Supre me Court dec1s10.n inter pretat1on to the due proces specifi s to discuss at length an d give c s clause.

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. Consider the excer �ts below from the Opinion and Judgment of tl1e U.S. Supren1e Court in Price v. Johnsto17e. In this habeas corpus case the Court disct1ssed at lengtl1 the proposition that an applicant for habeas corpus who alleged that his trial (and subseqt1ent imprisonment) were in viola­ _ tion of due process of law was entitled to l1ave his clai111 considered on its merits. The Cot1rt's Opi­ nion tells us more about the n ature of l1abeas corpt1s; ancl it demonstrates, l1istoricalJy, the ''t1nion _ of the right to due process drawn from Magn,1 Carta and tl1e ren1edy of l1 abeas corpt1s. ''

From U.S. Supreme Court, P1·ice

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Jo/i11stone, 304 U.S. 266 (1947) (1'/f urpl1 y, J.).

We do ':"ell to bear in mind the extraordi11ary prestige of the Great Writ, l1 aLeas corpus, . . . 1n Anglo-Amerjca11 j11risprude11ce: ''tl1e most celebrated writ in tl1e English law." _3 Elackstone Com111entaries 129. It is ''a writ antecede11t to statute, and throwing_ its root into the ge11it1s of our. co1nr11011 law ... It is perl1aps tl1e most important writ known to the co11stitt1tio11al law of Engla11 d, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or co11fi11 eme11t. It is of immemorial antiq11ity, an insta11ce of its 11se occt1rri 11g i 11 tl1e tl1irty-tl1 ird year of Edward I." Secretary of State for }Io 1 ne Affairs v. O'Brien (1923) AC 603, 609 [HL]. Received into 011r own law in tl1e colo11ial period, give1.1 explicit recog11 ition in tl1e Federal Constitution, habeas corpus was early co1 1fir1ned by Chief Justice John Marshall to be a ''great co11stit11tional JJrivilege''. • . It is no accident that habeas corpus l1as time a11d agai11 played a central role in national crises, wherein the claims of order a11d of liberty clasl1 1. nost acutely ... Although in for1n [habeas corpt1s]. is sirnply a 1node of 1Jroced11re, its history is inextricably intertwined wjth tl1e growtl1 of funda1nental rigl1.ts of personal liberty. For its function l1as been to provide a pro.m1Jt and efficacious re.medy for ,,,.1 hatev·er society deems to be intolerable restrai11ts. Its root pri11c.i1:>le is tl1at in a \�i,;i!ized society, government must always be accot1ntable to tl1 e judiciary for a rr12,n 's i rn ­ prisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to co11f01·n1 vvi th the f1111damental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his imn1ediate release. Thus tl1ere is nothing novel in the fact tl1 at today l1abeas co1·pus in the federal cot1rts provides a mode for the redress of de11ials of due process of law. Vi11dication of due process is precisely its historic office. In 1593, for exam1)le, a bill was introdt1ced in the House of Commons, which after deploring the f reqt1ency of vjolatio11s of ''tl1e Great Charter [i.e. Magna Carta] and ancient goocl Lawes a11d statt1tes of tl1is rea1me'' provided: ''Fore remedy whereof be it enacted: T11at. tl1e provisio11s and prol1ibitio1�s of the said great Charter and otl1er Lawes 111 tl1at bel1alfe made be dul1e and inviolatelie observed. And that no person or perso11s b� hereafter com­ mitted to prison but it be by sufficient warrant and Authorities a11d by dt1e co11rse and proceedings in Law ... ''And that the 1·ustice of anie the Queenes Majesties Cot1rts of Recorde at the common Law maie awarde a writt of l1abeas corpus for tl1e deliverye of a11ye person. so imprisoned ... '' Although it was not enacted, tl1is bill accurately prefigtired t/1e union o_f t/1e ri.ght to due pi·ocess drawn from Mc1gna Cha,·ta and tlze re11-iedy o_f l1abeas corpus accotnp/i.s/1ecl· in tf1e next cen tu,�y [emJJhasis adcfed]. Of course standards of due process l1ave evolved over tl,e ce11turies. _B1!t tl1e n�ture and _pur·pose of 1,abeas corpus l1ave �emained r�.rnarkably �011stant..I-I1story re.f�tes tlie 11otion that ttntil re.ce11tly the writ \.Vas available 011ly 111 a very 11arrow . class of .lawless imprisonmer,ts. For example, it is 11ot trt1e that at c.011101on law .. . ,.

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ITUTIONAL LAW CONST OPIAN ETHI OF K CBBOO SoUR

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l w la ons on m. · o c t a re g · · e l1 t · c1·pIe t hat JU ct·ic1al as 1 e pr1n Tl was .early 11sed by . ts . ur co or ll ri We fe in of r de r o I] c: ' , h Bu 1 n io e ic ss at re xp am in dr s e detained ? Y [ur1 I a� LU ed iv ce re lls l er ab le to in e b y a m ts a te Trials 999 (1670). B_U.shel as exec utive restrain t S l 's el w o H 6 , 6 00 l 1 p e R g n E 4 1 12 5, 3 , n 1a d r f o an ye rt O er [a Case ' Vaugl u e o T C e th rnu re n o ef b d el }1 l ia' ' . tr e th ·n l rs o . · · ir Jl · e 1 t 1 . f o e n o as d w·I11·ia� Mead on w n , en p m a li J� � f o y, le ai B criminal trial Court] at tl1 e Old n d otl1er [polit�cal ] cr.imes. ;.z he n t he Jury br ou�b t . a assemb ly cl1 arges of tumul tuot1s d te r it fo te m n m co co rs p m ro Ju t [1.e. e 1 tl ed e� rd o t ur co e l1 t , ty l i gu t in a verdict of no u� hell soug �t habeas. � ]. rt u o C e th f o 1 t� gr te in 1 imprisoned for u1 1dermi11i11g tl e m a bl e o p1n1on by Chief Justice r o em a 1n s, P ea l corpus, and tl1e Court of Common c ustody. m o fr ed rg l1a sc di m I1i ed er rd Vaugl1 a11 , o [Cl1ief Justice Vaughan declared:] he Court, and up on return t to us rp Co s ea ab 1-I by ht ug bro is . 1 1 n1a a e11 ] h [W '' .. e ars to the Court, that p ap n] dia sto cu r's ne so pri e l1 t of er sw a11 1 e tl on up . [i.e of it l1e was against. Law imprison'd and detain'd, ... he sl1a ll never be by the Act o f the Cot1rt remanded to l1is ltnl awful imp risonment, for tl1 en tl1 e Court sl1ould do an act of Injustice in in1prisoni11g l1in1 de r1ovo, agai nst Law, w herea s the great Charter is, Qt1od nullus l ibet homo in11Jriso11ett1r nisi per l egem terrae ... This is the p resent case, a11d tl-iis \Vas the case upon all tl1 e [precedent s ] produ c'd a nd many more that · migl1t be prodt1c'ci, where t1pon Habeas Corpus, many l 1a ve been discharged .... 't Mr. J11stice Hol mes expressed the ra tionale be hind such decisions in language that st1ms up virtuall y tl1 e v1l1ole l1istory of the Grea t Writ: '' ... [H]abeas Corpus cuts thro11gl1 all forms a nd goes to the very tissue of the structt1re. It con1 es 1n from the outside, not in subordina tion to the proceedings, and although every form may l1a ve been preserved opens the inquiry whether they l1ave been more than an empty shell ... ''

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Questions and Problems

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1) It is i11teresting to note tha t ti 1 e 11· 1 st1tt1t1o · · n of Parliament was first developed1 an d was used by strong n1edieval E ng1 · sh k . owerh 1 p roy 1ngs of a a .1 s an instrument to raise taxe� witl1 ,,consent ,, and to bin ·1ty and th e cbUfC t d a fi d eu a I _nob·1 1 . l1ierar cl1y to the king through dec . . . 1s1011s made in Par l iament. Thus Parl1 arnenh was a c reation of tl1 e 0 a c l1 t u� m ly ng �n re st en tl1 t. ra en m nt l rn ce ve go ? later, after Parlian1e11t a� �est �Ybli slled d . di n, as a viable f unctioning inst1tut1o J)olitical tl1 eories de,,elop st sing t l1 � ,,a �ue of ''democratic'' a nd "rep rese nta; tive'' gover11n1ent. Would :� ay 11 1 1s kind of e�ol utior:i l1as been true of �e developrnent of Parliameni ii � . . 1 tlltopia? Sl1ould 1t continue to be true of h . ft1ture development of p. 1 iam nt? Sl1 oul d tl 1is understanding [of hoW .1 � worl d's first Parlian1ent de�:1 ope� . es o ] affect one's thinking a bout pol itical tbe o 2) Look up t.l 1e term ''feuda , , . . ote N li s m . 10 ·ca tl1 e En cyclopedia of Social Sciences. that some scl 1olars irlsist O n l 0 s i g tlle terin ''fe udal '' �n a very strict a nd tec� \,se se n se. O thers use it looseI � � y ? enote a cl uster social systems. Note a ce of conditions comm on to dive l' J ording to the Encyclopedia of systems l1ave ex isted all o Social Sciences, "fe uda tl1e Middle East and A · ver t?e worl d. Example s ar e drawn· from Euro� ; "" en sia. O utl 1 ne some o . 01 f the important, comm.o n eIe

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of these y�ri�us eudal systems und_er such l1eadings as: ''land tenure'', ''king and _nob1_l1ty , . a system of allegiance'', ''law'', ''Cl1urcl1 and edt1cation'', ''social hierarchies, roles and status''. In w11at respects may ''fetidal'' England ?f the 11tl1 century be compared to ''traditional'' Ethiopia in the I9tl1 - and 1ndeed the early 20th - century? Consider tl1 e i11stitutions whicl1 tl1 e Norman kin�s develope?, �r att�n:ipted to develop, to stre11gtl1 en royal power and cen­ tralise the nation s political system: the creation of Parlian1ent and the use of it to enhance _ the taxing powers and law-maki 1 1g J)owers of tl1e royal govern­ m �nt; the creation of !l1e fot1ndatio11s of a ''civil se.rvice'' of Royal officials with more or less specific and i11creasi11gly specialized f t1 nctions; tl1 e c.reation of� system of loca � governn1e�t _; tl1e developn1e11 t o.f a 1111ified cot1rt system and ·uniform law. Consider the val1d1ty of a.rgun1e11 ts to tl1e effect tl1at tl1 e successful political modernization of a traditional monarcl1y depe11ds i 11 tl1 e first instance on reducing tl1e political power of tl1e fet1dal nobility, stre11gtl1eni11 g tl1 e power of the monarchy, creating a strong central govern111e 11t a11d winni 1 1g tl1e J)rimary allegiance of the people.

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3) Consider the fallowing: ''For1n is tl1 e sworn e11e111y o( caJJrice, the twin sister of liberty . . . Fixed forms are tl1 e scl1ool of discipline and order, and t/1 ereby of liberty itself'' (empl1 asis added). [A quotation from Jl1eri 11g a famous legal philosopher.] What does tl1 is mea11? Wl1 at kinds of ''for1n'' migl1t Jl1ering be talking about? How n1ay ''fixed forms'' help to establisl1 liberty? \Vitl1 reference to English Constitutional develop1ne11t ,vl1 at ''fixed forms'' vvere developed which later produced ''discipli11e' ', ''order'' and '( t/1e1·ebJt''' ''liberty''? Does Jhering's observation apply to Etl1iopia? 4) In what ways can creation of a system of 11 nified, national law contribute to constitutional development? To what extent migl1t one argt1e that a systerr1 of uniform national la\v is a pre-condition to co11stitutional development in a ''feudalistic'' or ''traditional'' country? If constitutional law is not part of the working legal system, wl1at problems may arise? With reference to Etl1iopia can you think of concrete fields of law whicl1 11eed to be 111ade u11ifor1 n i 11 fact (not just on paper) in order to implen1e11t co11 crete objectives and provisio11s of the Revised Constitutjon? 5) Would you agree with arguments to tl1e effect _ tl1at tl1e _development of a re�­ pected (and respectab]e) national legal pro!ess 1on . re�r1 11ted from all ranks 1n society and sharing common values and attitudes, _1s 1�11Jorta!1t to _tl1e develop­ ment of bot11 a national legal system and a const1tut1011 wl11cl1 ·�111 co1:1n1and pop1ilar support? The readi11gs above i11dicat� - and l_ate� readings will em­ _ phasise _ the role played by lawyers 111 En�l1s�1 co11st1t11t1011 al development. But is the English experience relevant to Etl1 1op1a?

6) Consider the fo]Jowing Ethiopian case, [name witl1l1eld] v. Ministt·J' of .Posts, . Jour,zal of· Ethiopian Law, Vol 2, �2� [Hig}1 Co11_rt? Addis �b_aba, 1956 �-�-] P]aintjff was an employee of the Ministry. Th� Mi11 istr�, _ l,el1ev111g tl1at Pla111t1ff owed it money due to his alleged �isl1andl1ng. o( M 1 111str_y fL111ds, ordered a . . _ series of montJ1Jy deductions fror:i his pay Pla1nt 1 ff stied 1n tl,e .l-11gl1 Court. The Court enjojned ftirther deductions and ordered payme�t of the _st1� s al_ready . deducted. The Court said, in part: ''No one s11all be deprive� of 11 1s life, liberty �)r ,pr·operty witlloul due process of Jaw. N? one ca11 be p� rty, Jttdge a11? execti_ tor , :,none and the same case." Wf,y do yo t1 think tJ1e Co11rt cited a 1 1d ap1)l1e(i Article . .. . . .. ' . .' ' .',',. .· . . . � . . ·.· . . .-.. . . ..· .. . ' ,

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NAL LAW O I T U T I T S N O C N IOPIA H T E F O K OO SoURCEB

t? c e � fl , e a Can you expl r c e th s e o l � ip � in r p ic s a a1r: b � t a : l1 W ? e s , ca s 1i s tl s e c in o r 43 p . e u g n 1 k o v 11 i r o f s n o s a e r e h t ly l u f e mor ask �d _ b y _ the M inist e r e w ts s o P f ? y tr is in f !" 1e tl ry r fo er y w la a s a d If you, 1p a d c d s n _ 1s e n n u f l1 d t e emploYee:'.s a r1 p ro p JJ � JS m er v o c re t n e m ''WlJat can we do to e s of ''due proce&i ir e u q th e r ld u o W e? iv g u o y ld u o w e ic v . d a t a li w '' X e Mll· lI· Stry 10 lik ' empI ore�s I1andle, daily� y !l a m h . h IC W . a en rd t1 b ly d u 1 1 u '' w la t1 of a r1 p 0 ro 0 p p y a a 1s r m m fo s be gre�i; n o ti ta p m te e er 1 l w d n a ey n good deal of mo s 177 7t se�] �xpressly pro. le ic rt A e d o C re u d ce ro P il iv [C ia p 1io tl E f o ,v Ia e J1 T 7) nsider 1_t 10 more detail l_ co al e sh w d an , us rp co s ea �b 1 l vides for tl1e remedy _ o f 1e quest1�n: even 1f the Civil Pro­ tl k as ay m e 1 01 t, 1 11 po later. I-Io\vever, at tl11s e e th nc 1n se en ab ev , of us rp co isl ·. Ieg as be l1a r fo e id ov pr t ,zo d di e od C re cedu y as of ed be m ha re u e rp tl1 co at s h�. th e gu ar e on d ul co t ec bj su e 1 tl on n tio of the Constit ution� 43 le tic Ar of e rtu vi by law � ia1 iop 1 l Et o 1 int t been brot1gl e history of !ht th ge of l�d ow k� a d a11 e ov ab gs ad re e tl1 do ct pe res 1 In wl at !� ck to ba 1ng rly a e_ �0 , law ?f interpre· , e�s oc pr e du of t ef nc co n 1ca 1er A� An_glove tat1011s of _Clause, 39 01 M2.gna Carta aid 1n s11pply1ng an affirmati answer to tl1 at quest1011?

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SECTION. 2

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TI-IE :OE'I/ELO.l) fviE1·�T OF· PARLI AMENTARY SOVEREIGNT·Y li· a m e1:1 t <:1nd its po,ver� over a criUa!i T liis · section traces the gro,vth of tl·e · t·t t·to n 1r p ar · . �� � f � � t tu i s ng J: of o n ) i n pnie�t. T�1 e pr1nc�pal purpose, 1s to sho\� ho" l sh co ti �entury (th e 17th znstitutions \Vere developed to secure: tile in\.Vdepe_nd ence 01 Parl ian1ent, _its �o n trol over Ja w mak1ng­ '·sov�reignty'' in the legal sense_ and a orking sy5lem for a �onst 1 tutional n1onarchy. By und�· stand 1 ng hov-,1 these institutions wer"' n t Ie elo ed,_ \Ve n 1 ay b� in_ a better position to consider t!16r present appl icability to Ethiopia t�r:� gl� � e [ evised Con stitt1t 1on. The problems aad quest10D.1 � at the end of the section shoul d be s·t ucried carefu lly to I1elp relate wl1 a t we read here to co nstitutional problems in Ethi opia.

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Origins and Issues

Tl1e Grolvt/1 of Par/ia111e11t u11de1· t/1e Tudors

. The ''Tudor'' line of 111onarcl1s, s nn. ng �l1e l6t l 1 ce ntury, included H e11ry YID (who broke 1 · 1�h tl 1e R o1n an Catholic Cl 1urcl1 a i; establisl 1ed tl1e ind ependent Church of England), and � abeth I (\vhose v . tr ' h na y fought o the r ain . T� � f s a perio� o[ econon1 ic gro��l�� r : �:da 0.f Spain and _broke the powe� of Sp ).1ou decl ine of feudalism, growin g national con� -f \V P n�ss�;:f1�;�. m, �?ur1sh 1ng of the . ta1n s, � arts It a a th p c a sea o e t rea l e, trade� of r vers1t1es - and of n1any other � � � !, S 1akespear of g l:i rt� b po i� im e 1 n ngs of n1odem institutions Engl nd l 1e � � � r do s u J) e ,ver opular . Tng in par f"Cau se they helped to establish a nallO d consc i entiou;J�; .�l nio Englisl1men in pa rt b us t a� en am rU pa ca the law courts to e c l y t 1e ol tr w to e le on re ab plement their p�licies � hic we�e generally popular. The following P�fer "J may sh o,v ho vv P a:f ia1nent _was su bordinatedw to th e w_1 s lies of the king. It may have teen a ll o stamp'' but at the s n1e t1�e tl deeply imbedde d in :he fabrtc the institution of parl iament was becoming better understoo d 3 1.·1 "sovereign'' ' who.:�e comniand o f English go �� -t. And the u l timate question loomed, ,vho is law? TJ1at ;;� � ing or that of his Parliament?

From Keir, Co11stiti1tional H· . . zstor;, of Modern Brztazn 141. 135pages (1961) . Recot1rse to the au tilority . · ra· of tl1e C wn in_ Parliament is a fu11_dam ental cb� n cteristic of Tud or rt1le and � tl1 e st1preme ��USlrati e" ver on of tl1e co-operation of so

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an d . subject on W?ich it reste�. It was the instrument by wl1ich tl1e religiot1s revolt1tion was accompli �hed · · · parliamentary activity was stimulated to an l1 nprecedented extent, and some!imes, as, fo-: example, in Acts enabling the King to repttdiate J1is debts, and �rranging and altering t �e successio11 to tl1e tl1ro11e, in an entirely arbitrary _ m�nner� wit� a d1sreg claims of morality and co11scie 1 1ce almost as striking ��d of the _ its iolat1on ?f spiritual 1�depende11ce. . R�lyi11g as they did 011 the strengtl1 of· as � _ this IDJghty �n �1ne of so�ere1gnty, tl1e re1g111ng dynasty 11aturally emphasised its power and d1gn1ty, and did everything to pro1note tl1e efficie11cy witl1 wl1icl1 it per­ formed the tasks they set it. ... The s-ixteentl� century proved a more i.1nporta 1 1t cl1a1)ter in tl1 e J1istory of the Com �ons !han 111 tl1at of tl1e Lords. Its 1nen1bersl1iJ) i 1 1creased in nt1n1 bers, and election to 1t wc:1s more keenly sougl1t for and n1ore l1igl1ly J)rized. Its procedt1re became better defined, its privileges were an1plified a11 d 111ade capable of enforce­ ment by the independent action of tl1e House itself. B.otl1 JJrocesses were promoted by the systematic recording of its blisiness begu11 in 1547 i11 tl1e Co111mons' J 011rnals. In the Journals, the first scanty entries, n1ai11ly heads of bills i11troduced, gradually developed into elaborate stateme11ts of action taken, i11 qt1iries n1ade, and orders given by the House in the condt1 ct of its affairs. Here, a11d 11ot by reference to otl1er· authorities, the House began to find tl1e true basis of its procedt1re and the founda­ tion of its privileges, both individual and co1·1Jorate. These indications of a11tonomy reinforced the nee·d, already evident 011 1nore general gro11nds, for the Cro,:vn to attempt to make its influence felt over the electio11 of 1nembers a11d tl1e t1se to \l1J1 icl1 they put their powers.

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The membership of the House was added to both by statt1te and by prerogati·v·e� ... Men were in fact now eager to sit in tl1e Commor1s. Electio11s v,1ere kee11ly and not too scrupulously fought, betwee11 candidates whose rivalry was not so much based on political differences as 011 personal ai1d family co11tests for ascendancy " in local affairs. ... The chief gainers fro m tl1ese changes we1·e_ �l1e l�nded class. B11t the� did not wholly monopolise membership. Merchant c1t1es, l1�e ��11do11 and B ristol, returned their ow n townsmen as members, and op11lent 1nd1v1duals of tl1e same type were returned by similar constituencies, sucl1 as Coventry a�d Leicester, whetl1er _ ed t�emselves _ 111 th� H�t1se, mem­ ish abl est resident there or not. Lawyers securely bership of which could be combined witl1 tl1e professional dl1t1es which 1n any case required their pre.sence in London. Tl1ey were ?�ubly valua?le to !l1e Commons, i? helping to elaborate tJ1eir procedure a11d pr1v1leges, and_ 1n f�r�1ng a personal link between the House an d th e courts of Common Law wl11�l1 re1nforced tl1e c�m­ mon interest already binding these two institl1tions togetl1er. 1n matters of const1tl�tional principle. The Issue of _"Sovereignty'' Arises in t/1e l 7t/1 Century From. Maitland, op.cit., pages 297-301. , gs tin t1s ri w ro go s vi hi in s, be ob H ry tu In the middle of the [seventeenth] ce°: had sharply stated th e theory that a sovereign there must be - some man or b?dy . g, 1n w t llo fo ea gr d no ha s be ob of, men. w H gh ou th . d ·. hose command s are Jaws _ an strll th:is theory told on the world. Now I think that at the outset of our per1·od [of _ '·

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TIONAL LAW U T I T S N O C N A I F ETHIOP ___________ ___

_::___ �U� R�C:E� B�O� O=�O � =S o � 99i6 --- -

-....._ , t� gn ei er f v (I) tl1e king (2 ) . so r o ts n a im a cl ree 1 .ht ti re w tl1ere claims the of and king �s a matter of J1istory � the 17th ce?tury] that seen e the practicft:ia. av h _ il We . king i11 par!1am ent, (3) ti �: nded f o best to m e e D e th r! n s o o p en ou s po wer � u s si a h p em me�t certainly le ib rr te a o id f la d 1a s 1 s r o d u o T d t o e n It h ld t . u u f co co Jd dis t en pot1sm o am li ar p at 1 tl 11 ti s s w here the place could t c it chur h u i�ve . � ;: � �f cl1�rcl1 and state, ·parliam�n - t d it coul s tt e t royal succ t i n c , _ Ia e esru o� . th : t of � on � � gi d li re he t !� �� !i!ld e m a e u o ay a ga1n. J c "." a it , g in k _ ,e tl to . rs e ow . p e v ti la is g le te a le e s d a ld m u o h 1r h, �ad d is- , T it S it co ss m e S n it w , n g re 's 1 tl i e b a z Eli f o n e sm te a st ! 1 11 1 t a tl _ k e e v o m b thin re a , p th e king d su ly te lu so b a s a w an , t en m ia rl a p in g in k t 1a tl d tinctly l1el b e said - more, as I th ink, . to l a � d t a re g a s a ,v e er th above tl1e law. Still for the king to allow, and this even _apart fro1n those theoriei , ed in cl in e ar rs e t ri w n er d o than m . Those theories: ; ty al ar 1c _p ch ar n o m e th y b d el l1 y ll ra of divine riglit wl,icJ1 were gene ; e ey d� n n th o lo _s1 n be o e g av le t her t1s rat m e w I, es m Ja r de un nt re ir ct e whicll becam l na . w t1o la tu t1 ns of It is t co 1a tl to re mo 1 '. a1 th , hy op s ilo ph al ic lit po of n ai to tile don1 ha rd . feat to conceive of a en be ,,e l1a t us m it at tl1 e rv se ob within our scope to ider how very much ns Co y. bl m se as ry ta en am rli pa 1e tl in d ste 50 ,,ereignty as ve stence, on the king's will .. i ex ry ve its r fo n, io ut tit ns co its r fo s e nd d pe that assembly i e bid s it go; h e makes temporal lords l 1en wl ars pe p a. dis it it, ls cal e li 11 J1e It com es w es, lie cl1arters new boroughs to send as ple 11e ps ho bis at \vh s ke 111a l1e e s, as }Jle as J1e gly the of kin er� on pow ati an em an t bu dy bo s tl1i t no is , all er Aft s. tive e nta res re1J The king does well to consult a ·parliament - but is tl1is mo re than a moral obliga· , tion, a dictate of sound policy? . . . I ]1ave said. tl1at there was a tl1ird claim ant for sovere ignty, namely the law. If the lawye rs of James I's day l1ad been forced to consider Hobbes's theory, tl1ey v1ould, I tl1ink, have_ denied the n ecessity for there being any man or body of me11 a_bove tl1e law. Tl11s, _so far as one can discove r it, was the position of the great t�p1�al lawyer C?ke. It 1s always diffict1lt to pin Coke to a theory, but he does s ee :11 d1st1_nctly_ to claim t]1at the common law is above statute, and above prero· g�ti�e - it a�signs a �lac� to botl1 king and parlian1ent, and keep s tl1en1 in it. Coke d1st1nctly claims tl1at the Judges may hold a statute void, either because it is again st , reason and natur�l law, o r because it trencJ1es on tI1e royal prerogative. He alleges preced _ e11ts for t�11s - cases in w �icl1 statutes llave beeii held void. I do not think t?at tl1ey bear 111m out. I do not think that tli e judges of the Middle Ages ba d con· 1�ered tl�emselves free to question tl1e validity of a statute on the ground of its 1 eing against natu�al l�w . As to tl1e r: prerogative, Coke' s case wa s somewhat stronge · , and, as a 1 ready said I take I· t to .1 1ave b ee n tl1e lawyer s doctrine of James,s tune ' tl1at the courts had 'power to decide that a statute had ry theo this was not law · If been genera11 y accepted the JU · d ges would have become tl1e ultimate l aw gi· vers Of ·. the realm_ in declarin 1 w ey �ould haV� d ,voul have made law, whicl1 they upheld even against stafut: ;� :y did 110t �xpressly claim legi slative power, 1�� . did not even conceive tllat tiiis as tlle�r claim; they claim ed to declare that I�w ad law, con1mon law, natural law a nd h eo th1� was, a s we hav e seen, the old th ry) .11 an existence of its own indep ( d ent ot the will of man , even perhaps of t �e "'� of God. The difficulty befo e ;°1 . 1 O t 11 tli�ory was tl1at the j udges could not poin e lp � the limits to the power 0 51 la or relic of the [Coke] theory lives on in B ck . �1 {an 18th cent ur y judge ��d � Ja, hold a statute void if it co:;: on law ] - tl1e judges, he seems to think'iI11' �;ned the law of nature, but by Blackston e 5 · tl1is had become an imp - ra c 1.icable speculative tenet, ...

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The Dispute over Parliamentary Privilege Peter We11tlVOl'tl1 A,·gues for the Rig}1.ts c1ncl PrivilegeJ' of· M . embers of Parliament. The ac �unts whi�h folio� reflect the atten1pt of one man Lo (tssert the independence of Parlia­ control of a Tt1dor Monarch. The language ve ment at a time when rt �as sttll n1ucl1 t1ncler the � _ Jo�rn t arcl1aLc; yot1 may find it diffict1lt reading. N'evertheless, Wentworth's style o l 1s a br and � the � _ case _is a.n interest_ing Llltistrat,on of problen1s wl1icl1 were not, in tl1e long rt1n, to be laid to rest by sending the rebell1o�s Peter Wen�worth to tl1e To,:ver of Lonclon - tl1e official prison for enemies of the state at that t1n�e. Read this excerpt as a legal cloct1111e11t anci iclent·ify the precise legal issues which Wentworth raised.

From D'Ewes, Joz.11·11al of the P1·oc·eecling5· o_fPa1·/ia111e11t, i11 SteJJl1enson and Marcham, Sources of Englis/1 Constitutional Histo,·;, (1937), pages 367-370, 372. [8 February 1576] ... Peter We11twortl1, esql1ire, one of the bt1rgesses for the borough of Tregony in tl1e col111ty of Cornwall, was, for unreverent and un­ dutiful words uttered by l1in1 in tl1is l1ot1se of our sovereig11 lady tl1e queen's majesty, sequestered*, that the l1ol1se migl1t proceed to conference and consideration of his said speech [which in part follows]: 'Mr. Speaker, I find written in a little volume these words in effect: ''Sweet is the name of libert)1 but tl1e tl1ing itself a val·ue beyo11d all jnestimable treas1.1re." So much the more it behoovetl1 us to take care lest Vle, contenting ourselves with the sweetness of the name, lose and forgo the tl1ing, being of greatest value that can come unto tl1is noble realm. The inestimable treasure is tl1e use of it in this house ... 'l was never of parliament but tl1e last, and the last session (of tl1is parliament), at both which times I saw the liberty of free speech, the which is the only sal"ve to heal all the sores of tl1is commonwealtl1, so much and so many ,vays infrir1ged, and so many abuses offered to this honourable council, as hatl1 1nucl1 grieved me even of very conscience and love to my prince and state ... . .. 'Amongst other, Mr. Speaker, two tl1i11gs do great hurt in this place, of the wh.icb I do mean to speak. The one is a rumo11r wl1ich ru11neth about the l1ouse, and this it is: ''Take heed what you do; tl1e queen's n1ajesty liketl1 not sucl1 a matter; whosoever prefereth it, she will be offended with l1im'' . [or !l1e cont�ary]: ''Her majesty liketh of such a matter; whosoever speaketl1 against 1t she will be mucl1 offended with him. " The other: sometimes a message [From the Queen's Coun­ sellors or Ministers] is brought into tl1e house either of commanding or inhibiting, _ n. I would to God, Mr. atio very injurious to the freedom of speech and consult rumo11rs and messages; for Speaker, that these two wer e buried in hell - I mean _ wicked undoubtedly they are. The reas�n is the devil was t�e first author of tl1em, from whom proceedeth nothing but wickedness. Now I w1ll set down reasons to prove them wicked ... tain 'The queen's majesty is the head of th� law and m11st of neces�ity main _ th� .law; for by the law Iler majesty is made Justly ou r queen and by 1t sl1e 1s most chiefly maintained. Hereunto agreeth the most excellent words ?f B rac�on, [an _ l ua h1s r eq kingdom. 1n no ancient text writer] wh o saith, ''The king hath no peer

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JJAN CONSTITUTIONA L L A W l IO I J]' E F O SOURCEBOOK

1is autl1?rity of co n1m a�ding, sith l se lo t gl1 mi e 1 I se wi 1er otI enr e He 11atll no equal , fo r 1 1s eq11al. T l1 e k1ng oug 1 er ov t en 1n nd ma m co of le ht 001 rti no that ail equal 11at l1 _ law , beca11s� t]1e law maket h tl1e r d� un d ar1 d Go der 11 11 t him to be under man, btl _\vh1?h the law �ttribute law the t? t tr1a te ibu attr e for , iere l g t ki, 1 e 1 tJ et , L g. Icin a th unto him: tl1at is, don1 inio11 and power; for he 1s not a kin g in w}1om will an d not tl1e law dot l1 rt1 l e. A 11 d t l1 erefore he ougl1 t to be under th e law ... ' 1ere11 d r�gar d o� her majesty' re\ cl of ot1t , s hono ur, . l:011se 1 tl , e 1 cl e spe 1is l )on t u . 1 stopped I1is f11rther JJroceeq1ng before l ie l1 ad ft1II� fi111sl1 ed 111s speecl1 ... Mr. \\l ent- · wortl1 being seq11estered ... for l1is s,1id sr)eech, it "'as agreed and ordered by the l1011se 11po11 the qt1cstion ... tl1 at l1 e sl1011ld J)resently be committed to tl1e serjeant\ �1,trd as priso11er a11d, so re111ai11ing, s l 1ou Id be examined t1pon l1is said speech.... [A co111.rnittee of tl1e qt1ee11 's co1111 cillors] were aJ)pointed to meet this afternoon betvvee11 two and tl1ree of tl1e cloc lc at tl1e star chamber, and to make report at this holtse to- 1 11orro,�1 11ext. ...

[1,he Cornmittee the11 s11111111011ed We 11 twortl1].

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Corn111ittee ... : '.Here yo11 l1a,,e uttered certair1 rumours of tl1e q11een's majesiy. \1/l1ere a11d of ,vl10111 I1ear d yo11 t l1en1 ?'

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V./er 1twortl1 :_ 'If yo11 l 1onot1rs ask me as co1111cillors to I1 er n1a jesty, you sh all pardon

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inc: I \VIll n1 ake yot1 no ans\ver. I will do no sucl1 injury l1 e place from t to wl1ence I ca me ,· for I '· 1' no J) r1va ·:1m 1 1 0,,v · te per son . I a1n a publ i· c. and a councillor . . to tl1e wl1 ole state 1n tl1at _place wl1e re it is la\vfu l fo r me to speak m y inind freely �n n t for y u s cotttlcillo�s to cal l me to a_cco11 nt for anvtl1ing tl1at I do speak � � � ; 1 l1 1ou�e . _n t 1ierefore, if you asl< n1e as l co un ci ll o rs " to m a er 11 ou l aj : es ty i y sh rd n 111e. l \VJ l l n1ake 11 0 a11swer B11t if· you ,. P ' as k me as committees froru the I1ouse , I wi l l make y011 tl1e best ans\ver ·1 can .'

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. Comn1ittee: 'We ask you as co1n 111ittees fro 1 11 t11e I1 ouse., Wentwortl1 : 'I \Vil ! t l1e 1 1 answ er you ... ' [9 Fe?ruary.] T l1is da y Mr. Treasti r r . . . . in r l t t 1e n e ye day appo111 ted for tl1e exan1i11 n1e of all tl1 e conmuttees s _ c� , ; atio 11 of eter We_11twort�1, b11rgess of Tr�gony, de clared t l 1at all t!1 e said comin it te e s did _111eet yesterday star chamber according to tl1eir the . in in tl1 af e ter no on c aoct t l1e�e, exa11 1ining tl1 e said Peter �fJl. . w�rt l1 toucl1ing _tl 1e viol ent o11 m . � a 1 1� ����:d 1 words yesterday pro11ot1nced by h� _- .• this I1ouse touc l1 111 g tl1e qtie , . . e 11 s n est , a 11d . speec l1 es, it was order Y t l1ere t 11pon, a f�� · · ��J � · dispu after sundry e d u sl 1ould be committed close p · P 1 tile qu es ti on tl1at tl1 e said Peter W ent1v.ortb · r1so11er to t l1 e Tow . . . u nt"1 l s�cl1 tin:-e er (:" 1 or l11s sa id offence, tl1ere-to. .r@- _ ain - · as t l 1is l1ouse s110u Id I e f�rthe� consi �pon, 1 m�ed1 at� l y tl�e deration of hin1. A said Peter We���. ortl1 , b e 11 1g b ro u g l1t to the bar by-:-t -�e�� -Jeant, received lus said judg m e above-recited. And so Mr 1_ 1t accordingly b y tl1e moutl1 of M r . Spea e . L ie11te11ant of k ( . ==-;Th= :.'.=� :tlie cust OdY �f t. l1 e said ·I t 1 e ;' . T e� ow � er r& . cb w a as . pr es Peter en tly Wentwo th by tl1e qtieen s special fav our, restoreJ ag- �llt the _sai_d Peter WentwortJ1 was�¥{�� � ain to l11 s liberty a n p th��� � in la d c t} W

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On We<l:nesda�, the _first day of March (1582), Mr. Wentworth delivered unto Mr. Speaker certain articles which contained q1 1 estions to11cl1ing the liberties of the hot1se ... : \Vbethe� this col1.ncil be not a place for any me1nber of tl1e sa1ne l1ere assembled, freely and without con!rolment ?f any perso11 or da11ger of laws, by bill or speech to utter any of tl1e griefs of this co1nmo11wealtl1 wl1atsoever touc11ing tl1e service of God,_ the safety of tl1e prince, and this noble r. eal1n. Wl1etl1 er tl1at great l1 011our may be done_ un!o God,_ and _benefit a.11d service u1 1to tl1e ])ri11ce a11 d state wit11out free speecl1 1n tl11s co11nc1l wh1cl1 may be do11e ,vit.11 it. Wl1 etl1er tl1ere be any co1 1 ncil whicl1 ca11 make, add to, or din1inisl1 f1·om tl1e la\.vs ot� tl1e real 111 , b11t only this co1111cil of parliame �t. ... �l1etl1er tl1e s_peaker 111ay overrule tl1 e ]1011se in a11y n1atter or cause there 1n quest1or1, or ,vhetl1e1· l1e is to be r. 111ed or overruled i 11 a11 y ·matter or not. Whether the prince and st,1te can co11ti11l1e, sta11d, a11d be mai11tai11ed without this council of pa.rliament, not alteri11g tl1 e gover11111e11t of tl1e state. . . . These questions 11r. Pt1ckering JJocketed up a11d sl1owed Sir TJiomas Heneage [a Cot1ncillor of tl1e Quee11] wl1 0 so l1a11dled tl1 e matter that Mr. Went\\rortl1 \Vent to tl1 e Tovver ·a11d tl1e q11estio11s [were] not at all moved. ...

Quee11 Elizabeth's Vielv· o_f F1·eeclo111 of Debate From a royal message to t.he I-louse of Commons in 1593, from D'Ewes' Jou,·nal, in Stepl1enson and 1v'Iarcl1am, OJJ.cit., pages 372-373. Her gracious majesty ... saitl1 there be two tl1i11gs in a man n1ost bel1oveful if they be well used, a11d most deadly if tl1ey be ill 11sed: wit and to.ngt1e, they are those. ... she wills you take good heed i11 wl1at sort sl1e permits [liberty of speech] ... For liberty of speech her 1najesty comrna11detl1 n1e to tell yot1 tl1 at, to say yea or no to bills, God forbid tl1at any man sl101tld be restrained or afraid to ansvver accord­ ing to his best lilcing, with some short declaration of his reaso11 tl1erei11, and therein to have a free voice, which is the very true libe1·ty of the l1 ouse; not, [empl1 asis added]. as some su_ppose, to speak there of all ca11ses as l1im listeth, a11d to frame a form of religion or a state of government as to their idle brains sl1all see1n n1eetest. She saith no king fit for }us state will s11ffer such absurdities; ...'' '

King James I and Parliamentary Elections James I ascended the throne of England in 1603, and following traditio11, . he sumn1oned a parliament. Almost immediately. a quarrel developed between crown and parliament. The readings which follow illustrate how this quarrel arose over narrow issues and gradually came to involve a fundamental dispute. Below are excerpts from James' Proclamatjon calling for the election and �onve!ling of a parliament. Note the qualifications for membership of t�e Ho�se of Corn�ons_ wl1�c� King �ames saw fit to require, and the constitutional principles which tl11s proclamation 1mpl1c1tly asse1 ts.

From James I, Proclamation concerning Elections, 1604, in Stepl1enson and Marcbam , op.cit., pages 406-407. ... We do hereby straitly charge and admonisl1 al� per�ons interested in the _ choice of gentlemen [or] knights* [to represent] the sl11res [1n Parl1ame11t], first,

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or '·�entlemen '' • A knight is a lower rank of nobi]ity. T'he King is ass�ming that_ only k.nights _ · Yv'ill be elected. The higher ranks of nobility were entitled, by virtue of their hereditary rank, s. on mm - . to s.1_ t in the of Co e t1s e Ho th to d cte ele be t no uld House of Lords an d co i

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IONAL LAW T U IT T S N O C N fA HfOP T E F O K O O B E SoURC

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· ty wherein the y ar un co at th n hi it w y it il ab it c e ffi s f o · ·· e b ] n e discretion witho ut ao: d an y nc cie suffi f that [those chos � of : n me � d e b e _ c 1 o l1 c t ll things ... e e a v _ o b a d n a t x e chosen; and, tha N w do . .. . n o ti a in b m � c is i o t p artial respe c t s or fac � gre t care taken to av oi d the choice of any persons either er� e 1 tl t 1a tl _ l1 is n e o r ul m ei rb th d tu t humours r a n o fo r ls . o a , ay w e on . : es s dn n 1 s 10 ! t1 S r e p su . ts will disturb all the discreet noted for tl1e 1r ri spi e t ui unq and ly e J i � e b _ t se u a c e b s; y a om c r, he o ther w l. rt we ci Fu un do co e st . av gr d an t ; es at � ;� e g s y and modest proceeding in on an rs en pe os ch [who illlJ ot n be e er th at th d a 1 e b' mand tl1at an express ;a[� i use of any crin1e including failure to pay debts, d ba�krupts or outlaw� ' i.e . �c� la' vi] but [only] men of known good behaviour · e h d e n u e m cr a en h t i whicI1 was and sufficient livelihoo d . · · · 1in tt d oo G is 11c ra F ir S of e as C Judge of Electio11s: Tire

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_g �I�ction ,,, a �ew Parl�nt 1 nsu e the d an ra sup n tio ma cla o p r s' ? 1 e n Ja Shortly after I<.ing gn­ desi were ich ges e l wh 1 1v rt r ·p e s as d to rte sta nt e n1 a li r Pa \v ho w o sh , lov d Th e excerpts be n . convee p nd ent position \1/itl1respect to t h e crown. ed to establisl1 its indee

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[22 March] ... Mr. Speaker \Vith all submissive reve rence to l1is �ajesty taking leave * l1e �1itl1 the cornmo11s departe d to their usual place. And there b eing assembled: the fi�st n1otion was made by S ir William Fleetwo o d , one of the knights returned for tl1e county of Buckingham on the bel1alf of Si r Franci s Goodwin, knight. ... [It was claimed that S ir Franci s ] wa s electe d tl1 e fir st knight for that shire; bu�. the return of l1is electi on being n1ade, it \.Vas refused by the clerk of the crown, quia utlagatus [i.e. because he had bee11 ''outlawe d'' - in tl1is case for non-payment of debts]; and ... Sir Jol1n Fortescue, upon a s ec ond [ballo t] was elected and entere� in that place. [It was move d ] tl1at tl1is [election re sult] might be examine d and �tr Franci s Goodwi n rec eive d as a men1ber of tl1e I1ouse. The house gave way [i.e. agree�]. to tl1e 1:1otion; and, for a more delibe r ate and jud icia l proceeding in a case of pr1v1lege so important to tl1e l1ouse, ordered tllat tlle serjeant [an office r of the Ho u se], sho�l d gi�e warning to tl1e c lerk of tl1e crown to app ear at the bar [o_f the House) at �1ght o clock the next morning, an d to br ing wit him all the writs 0) h summons, 1ndentur� s, an� returr1s of elections fo r tli e county of Buckingham ma� and return_ed for tl11s pa rliament** and to give wa rning a lso to Sir Franci s Good\Vlll to attend 111 person, ,vhom tl1 eir pleasure was to h ear .. . _ h· Tl1is being a 1!1o tion t �nding to matte wit d nde ; r of pri vi lege,*** wa s s eco anot�er oy Mr. S�rJe ant Sl11rley, touc I1ing l l S ch an m s re ar a t M th e e ad th r f as! . ,· t . o f Sir Thom as Sl11r ley, ( who he r. wa s tllen] elected [ as] one of th. e burgess es ·o -. . · ·� • ••

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"...with all submis sive reverence tO . . � � i ;E;I · h. t s ma Jest i y taking lea ve,'' i.e., the King � as JUS·-:· s-=g �;:.:: his "speech fr om the th rone ' a t cl1amber and is starting del i.he' ra' ti_nd tile e lected Hou·s e of Com mo11s ha s rellf� !P- 1------�-�. ons or the new �---·· . . ss se i . on · ·� �11� � Note tl1at t he House of Com mons . i ; (a roy�l _official) to appear be f s ssrmzng here the P?Wer to order the ''°clerk o.f !!1::;;.. rused.ffi. o re , n a s m 1 1lar_ case wou ld Parliament �r ;,;t� ent_ to �rovt�e _information. Suppose�:::_:_:-:�: ! i iop e_n oy s1rp1Iar p � ? 1.e. the �ot1 on wa� '_'priv ge , ! � � _ : ��-;:-:.°1.p.$-.-:, �he motion be "pr1v 1legedile d ,. Wh t does �pr1v1Iege '' mean �1n this t contex ?+��?::,' :fof:� '' d un er ! th l Procedural law wh ich Par,liamCiit..,.had:itself? ��:o _0•••:."*"'"""""� -�------

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borough �f S�eyning in the_ county of Sussex .... And [it was] prayed that the body of the said Sir Thomas migh� b e freed �ccording to the known privilege* of the house. Hereupon the house, in_ affirmation of their own privilege, assented, and ordered that a warrant, according to the ancient form, should be directed under the hand of Mr. Spea�er to the clerk of the crown, for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus** �o bri�g the ?ody of the . said Sir Tl1omas into the house upon Tuesday next at eight o clock 1n the n1.orn1ng ... [23 March] ... Sir �eorge Coppyn, knigl1t, clerk of tl1e crown, ... appeared ... and prod�ced all tl:e writs o� summons, indentt1res, and 1·ett1r11s 1nade of the knights for Buckingha.msh1re for this parlian1e11t; wl1ich were severally read by tl1e clerk of the house. And the n the clerk of tl1e crown [was] com1na11ded to retire to the door; and ... Sir Fran cis Goodwin hin1self ... was called in ... In the meantime the wl1ole case was ... argt1ed pro et co11t1·a ·by sundry learned and grave members of the house, and after st1cl1 dispt1te tl1e question was agreed upon: ... whe ther Sir Francis Goodwin [l1ad been] lawft1lly elected and returned one of the knights for Buckinghamsl1ire and 011gl1t to be admitted and r �cei�ved as a member of this house. Upon tl1is qt1estion it was resolved in tl1e affirmative, that he was lawfully elected and returned and de _ji,,·e ought to be received. Hereupon the clerk of the crown was commanded to file tl1e first indenture of return, and order was given that Sir Francis should presently take tl1e oath of supremacy usual and his place in the house; which be did accordi11gly ... [29 March] ... Mr. Speaker relateth wl1at l1e l1ad delivered to the king by [order of] ... the house the day before toucl1ing their proceedi11g in Sir Francis Good\vin 's case, and his maj esty's answer ... I-le said he [told the king tl1at] ... Sir Francis has since been chosen, admitted, and [l1as] served as a member of this house in ... several [previous] parliaments ... The outlawry [for debt] [should 11ot be a dis­ qualification, and the precedent was that Parliament] should not take notice of it. ... His majesty a n swered be was loat h he shoul� ?e forced to_ alte1· his tu�e, * * * ...He had no purpose to imp eac h [Parliament's] pr1v1lege; but, since tl1ey derived all matters of privilege* fro m him, and by ltis grant� l1e expected they sl1ould not .be turned against him. . .. that Sir �ranc�s Goo�win �tan�eth 01:tlawed according to the Jaws of this land. In conclusion, 1t was his maJesty s sp�c1al charg_e unto �s that, first, the course already take n should be truly reported [1.e., that Str Francis should be disqu.alified] ... . s on e as n th at r� t1o th es 9u e tl1 n o up d lve so re g in be [30 Ma,rch] ... The house . of their precede nt resolution touching the return, admittance, and re_ta1n1�g- of Sir Francis Goodwin as a m em be r of tl1is house should be set_ down 1n wr1t1ng, these co mmittees w ere specially appointed to perform tl1at s�rv1�e, ... . ?oo G s ci an r 1n Fr Si e us ho e th of g n di ee oc pr [ 3 Apri·11 ... The r eason s of the . " rmer ord er, brought 1n 1o to g in rd co win's case pe ned b the committee were ac cl1 n lti io [w tit pe a of m r fo d in . e ct e r di rk cl; · e th · Ye and read by · M . r. p ranc1�s M oor by reads as follows:] t ? g e is ex le ivi js t h pr d 1 l ot sh hy W ce? n e t n se is t h Wha. dt oes ,, ·vi· le eg ,, m n ·n ht e co ntexto f t ha W '. s' pu cor s ea ab t of ''h i wr a ue ss i t o r e w po t e t s h t: . t. h a p i:t mes1 t ha .1t_ha t arPliame nt assuea ••· N·oe ••• legal theory would support this r,_ower? ' ?' ne t u s hi e g n ha ''c t o m hi ' ' g cin r i 0 ''f Why did the King think that Parliame�_t �as. , , , here ? . e g ile iv pr n r1 te e In . what se se does the King us e th n •

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e w s le n r is tha t ... all ? a m u r b u _ . O . : : ty s je a m t n e ll e c x e t s o m t 's n e 1g i1 m _ ... Th� power of � l1 r a e p l1 t To the k _ to in e I_ b a n 1r t\ e r ] e r [a s it r w ] 11 o ti c ] [s 1n a [1n Parliament] r m � r s n o ti c parliament [ele le e f fo o e in m r te e d d 11 a e jn . .. y a d 1s l1 t o t parliament to exa1 11 d e · · d n u o p ex s y , · a lw a n e e b 1 tl a 11 . . ] . vv a [l so the � n � 11 a �o w a co �.mandea re y b , e c n se b a is l1 1 t! xcuse e r e k a e p S r. M l] ri p A [5 1s maJesty 10 this effect : 11 m o fr e � a ss e m 1 tl e g 11 r1 b d r1 a , y st je a m . is 1 I n o p u d en tt m _ e o to a r] fr th e p a f p o ce house.. .. ie p � . .e [1 t en 11 1 l1 rc a JJ a tl1at tl1e king l1 ad received t e a b h .1g re 1n 1e tl t conference 1a tl , g in k e 1t l1 so b a an as , J1 e desired and co111n1 anded 's in w d s o ci o se]; and n G ca ra F ir S e in am ex o [t s ge d ju ie between tl1e !1011se and tl d d ne an ve ar ra le g of e rso te pe it ns n1.Tll co ct le se a e b l1t ig n1 re 1e tl e, os tli at, for tl1at purp 011t of tl1e l1011se; ...

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to be sworn as a mernl:ti cis :1n Fr r Si v.' lo al to d se fu re ng I(i e Th . The dispute was not resolved: n /or S\1 e b to e ac pl d in liis and Parlian1cnt refused to allo\v the n1an certifie

Arrest� :Tlze Case o_t· Sir T/10111as SlzirleJ' llJiclert1, J)agcs •414--415. order by ed ard aw rly me for , pus cor eas /1ab of t \Vri tl1e day is Tli ] rcl1 . [27 Ma mem­ the of one , rley Sl1i s ma Tl1o Sir of y bod tl1e of i11 gi11g 1 brin c tl for se, l1ou of the be�s of tl1� l1 ol1�e arid [presently a] priso 11er ... \Vas ret11rned by tl1e warden of the [pr1son]. 1he _r,r1s011er l11mself [was] bro11gl1t to tl1e bar : .. The writ and return \Vas read by tl1e clerk ... .J It �as averred tl1at ... Sir Tliomas was elected burgess; tl1at ... [l1e had been arrc5led f 0� no11 �pay1;1e 1 1t of debt�] ... tl1at tl1e serjeant [wl1 0 arrested l1im] ... under· 11! 5 n1 aJe5t y s proclan1at1on t!1 at no person outla\¥ed for . .. debt ... ought :�o�� 1tted a �11 1ber of tl1 e parl1a1nent, and \\'as tl1ereupon induce d t o thi nk tl1at s·1 �i1_01nas S�11r 1 ey, sta11ding outl,1\ved, sl1ot1ld not be elected or admit ted a burges ;; . _ · h . ·. a 1nolion [\vas p,1ssed] tI1 at a spec , ia · I comn11ttee migl1t be r1amed forte consideratio11 of 'all tll e q tiest·ions a11d doubts i11 tl1is c.ase . . [I 6 AJ)ril] Moved tli at a bill I 11 ·,gl1 t be dra,vn .111 tl1e matter of Sir Thoma; . . Sl1irley, wl1 erei 11 was to be conSi dered only two tl1ings: justice of privilege a.no justice to tl1 e party. .. : After .. . co11sicleratio11 · · · tl1; l� o �se agreed UJJOn tl1ree questions: (1) \Vb�· tl1er Sir Tl10111as SI1irley sl1 all 1 av r hi !· p s i i \'e l1a eg l , al sl1 v er e th [l1 1e wL ) (2 * e' l r t v_ilege] prese11tly or [to] be defe�1 r l -� 1 ftirtl1er order; (3) wl1etl1er we shall be p� � , tioners to 11is 1 11ajesty, accord i11 g_�o or111er unnc sec of J)receden ts ' for some , course. tl1e debt to tl1e pa· rty c.and s a v111g }1 se·· h T � on]. .• arm • I ess the ward en of t11e [pris questions, be111g severally J)llt' were . ** .. . . - . al l resol,,ed in tl1e affi rmat1ve. · · . · Tb( The disputes betweei1 Crown d n1 �oat b gt1n witl1 Goodwin's case, contin.u�%,\-� Journals if p 1·':tn11e,� sl1 v tha i an Co e 16� �e � t n Jun di� ; �; e th ed communi�atio�o� r o p s 0 ap 10 1n n of o C .&-:. ' n � � u in o -; -: o ' � 1 } g to t be n se ', to ·K g an1es. Tl1e docume11t gives son .. tion of the issu'es :� ic� ·h a�J)ari� seny' , and til e Po si tion of Parliam t c-· . en on them. .

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.. . �o the �ing's most excellent majesty: fron1 tl1e J1ouse of commons as­ se,mbled 1n parl1a?1ent. M?st g�acious sovereign, . .. your con1n1ons of England, represented no� in us their _knights, citizens, a11d bl11·gesses, do come with tl1is humbl� _declaration to yo�r h1gl1�ess and in great asst1ra11ce of yol1r 1nost gracious dispos1t10�, that your maJesty w1tl1 benignity of n1ind correspo11dent to o·ur ·duti­ fulness, will be pleased to pursue it. . .. . . . Misinformation open�y. deli,,ered _to yol1r Mc1jesty l1atl1 bee11 in three tl1ings: first, that we hold not our pr1v1leges of r1gl1t, bl1t of grace only, re11ewed every par­ liament by way �f do11ati,1e [i.e. a gift fron1 tl1e King] ltpon petition, ... secondly, that our proceedings l1ere are 0111)' to acts a11d 1ne1norials, a11d that the attendance o[ f persons suc h as royal officials] witl1 tl1e records is courtesy, 11ot duty; and, lastly, that the examination of the retur11s of writs for k11ights a11d burgesses i:; without our compass, [ j urisdiction] ... Against wl1icl1 assertio11s ..., te11ding directly to tl1e utter overthrow of th.e \'ery f undan1e11tal privileges of our hot1se - and therein of the rights and liberties of the wl1ole comn1ons of yol1r realm of Engla11d, - we, the knights, citizens, and b11rgesses in tl1e house of· commo11s assembled i11 parlia­ ment, and in tl1 e name of the ,vl1ole conunons of the realm of England, with uniform consent for ourselves and Ollr posterities, do expressly protest .. . we 1nost truly avouch that our privileges and liberties are our rights and dt1e inl1eritence 110 less than our very lands and goods; that they cannot be \vitl1held f1·orn 11s, denied, 01· impaired, but with apparent wrong to tl1e wl1ole state of the realm; ... ... The right of the liberty of tl1e commons of E11gla11d in parliament con­ sisteth chiefly in these three things: first, tl1at tl1e s11ires, cities, and boroughs of England ... have free ch'oice of sucl1 per�ons as tl1ey shall put in trl1st to represent them; secondly, that the persons chosen during the tin1e of the parliament, as_ also of their access and recess, be free from restraint, arrest, and imprisonment; thirdly, that in parljament they may spea.k freely their conscien�es wit]1out chec� or con­ trolment, doing the same with-due revere11ce to the sovere�gn c?urt of parliament that is, to your majesty and to bot h the houses,.wl10 all 1n tl11s case make but one politic body, whereof your highness is tl1e head ...

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of � e l th w s on [ ?k bo is H . 3� 16 in . ed di . w as born in 1552, an d t ns e f o h 1tutes t t. is ns l s, co 1e 1t or th au e bl ra ne gla En ve . ted as . . . nd . ]., wh.1ch w . ere soon trea �n fot;tr parts - the first th e celebrated commenta�y on L'ittieton ,s Tien.ures (1628) the seco d commen. tar on ri·ou s statutes ranging from Magna Carta to James _ ts .· · l1r co . us rio va the on se ati tre a rth fou ,· 1:·'·..· the· v� al law, the �- account ofy ·th e cnm1n �;ld.1. .an t . u.r

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The Dispute over the King's ''Prerogative'' From rhe question of parliamentary privi]eges, the disp1;1te ,between K!ng,, and Parlian1ent s�on moaved o·nto more dangerous ground _ the extent of the King s ''prerogative_ po�ers, and especial­ ly his power to act independently of Parliament. One of !l1e leading figures 1n this controversy �as ut1t e nt ns of tl1 ne co po op t ea a gr d an n, ria Sir ta en am rli pa Edw d an ce ard coke, Iawyer, ch·er 1 Justi . ttonal theory of the Stuart kings.

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prove the taxes hewa:nlbl to ap t en am rli Pa g in ad su r p in e c ssful s s y a v l\ a t o n s .:a v es m we re ingenious at devising new fo� a rs King J iso adv g's Kin � r 1e l T ro � g p to e? h is w e h s w la ew special taxes to support the R oyal go� or n on Jay to � ts or eff d ��s of "ben evo_len ces'' which we_re s:s:��rts and asserted that onl y wit h Parliamentary consent couM _ or indeed compe lled to do or abstain from any action. Tm me n t. Parliament oppos ed tl1 ; ta x an�one be co_mpclled d p9w�r to make the l�w o f England t ha ho W ue: l iss ra ne g the d ose e �Y i orify auth s senes of particular �r�l p ing' K on the e th dges Ju g on am s on ssi cu dis reflect T he e exc r ts fr mq�ol<e' s Re arts 1e King ha d as ke d for advice .in the hope of securing su_ppon · • · T.l s k e l aw P oclamat1oJ e ps by ?,· r . ament. to ma from tl1e law courts in his dispute w1tl1 Parli

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ge 1. pa t., , 44 .ci am op cl1 ar Ivi d an on ns he ep St in , rts JJo Re 's From Colce hat . the of sai� g] ter t Ki? por sup a , on Bac s nci Fra [Sir Tl1e lor d chancellor e·very prece dent l1ad first a com1ne11cement an� tha t he . would �dv1se. the Judg�i . to maintain tl1e power a.ncl prerogative of the k1ng, and 1n cases 10 w h1c� there �1 no authority and precedent to leave it to tl1e king to order in it, accordmg to hii \visdo1n and for tl1e good of l1is st1bject, or otherw ise the king would be no more than tl1e duke of Venice; ... f\nd all concluded tl1at it should be necessary at tha1 time to confirm the l(ing's pr erogative witl1 ou r opinions, although that there were · not any former preceder1t or authority in law; for every p rece dent ought to bal'e a comn1enceme11t. To wl1ich I a11swered that true it i s that every precedent hath a con1mencement; but, when authority a11d precedent is wanting, there is need o! great_ consider�tio11 before tl1at anytl1ing of 11ovelty shall be established, an d 10 1 provide that tl11s be not agai nst tl1e law of tl1e land. For I said t/1at tlie king c�0; change any part of tl1e co,nmon lalv, nor create a11y offe11ce by /1is proclamation whi� was 1zot a,z offence before, lvitl1out parlia1nent [empl1as adde ... is d] It was resol�e d by tl1e two cl1ief justices, ch ief baron, an d Baron Altham, upc� conferenc� betwixt the lords of tl1e p riv y t l1e king by bi> , co un th at ci l th an em d proclamat1on cannot create any offence theo for re; wl1ich wa s no t an offence befo l1e may alter tl1e law of tl1e la nd by n roa be if , l1i r s pr oclamation in a hi gh point.. Fo · create an offence wl1ere non_e is, so A} JII. t · en oD.lll upon tl1at . impr 1s . ensu es and fine the law of En I d · div ? ed ! 5� , nto tl1ree parts: d n a , w common !aw, statute la But the king'� ��oc\: ; 0 is �011e of_ them. . .. lso 1t was resolved tha t t�e 0 8 A hath no prerogative b�: t\�at 1 WLlich th e law o f th e land allows him. Tlze ''Protestatio,z'' of Parlia111e11t in 1621

Dispute betwee n the Ki . . Jal¢·. g d � �': Parlian1ent continued throug ut the re s ost famou of �ong the n1 ho s ign I{iD gili.lIt'.: spu te Ing m�rriagc of the King'was ove ' son 1: d _ r Parli ament's power to di scuss the rumoured tbe_Kil!S s n e o f Spain. F�r. religiou s and ot l1e r rea� 1r to �l1e thr�ne, Prince Char ]es, to the daug hter of in·��· on s th1s marriage wa s ry ment. A petition was sent . r among roanY e<fbJ un po ve pu la to Y tl1e King wa d Cok e, who at t oppo sin g the marriage. The petition had been d� 1,uttll; i:1 t is time w h mo ��ld n1an. C<;>ke ha d been Chief Justice of ed 1 l � i�. e ::i Coke do� � 'NO� to ��e, �� en the ion r ,�o Pa l1_arnent . In an effort both to �n. par�King appo inted hi The excerpts below are as Cou�c il l?r of State'' - a royaJ official frorri a read e. ab� and fascmat1ng k · o C J.11 d r Edw a biography of Sir

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Th Li e on and the Throne, {1957) pages ow en , B oDl fr 452-454. ... Three day�. later tl1e C?m m o�s [received the] reply of tl1e K in g [t o it p s et i­ It e h d Q _ u o ee p e n E li It z b et °: � tion]. � h s words, spoken on tl1e famed occasion when she had replied in L�11?- to a n insolent Polonian ambassador: ''Legatum expecta:­ bamus, heraldum acc1pimus [W e expected an ambassador, we are confronted by a herald]''. Remember, Ja°;,es w ·rote, that ''we are an old an d experie11ced King, needing no such lessons. Th e Commo11s l1ad better have listened to the Privy Councillors among th�m, ra ther t?an to certain ''tribt111itial orators''. The pri11ce's match was no fit subJect for parliaments to discuss. As for freedo1n of speecl1 and privileges, _ "we ?annot, allow of the style, calli1�g it yot1r 'antient a11d undoubted right and 1nher1tan�e; b11t could ratl1er l1ave w1sl1ed. that ye l1ad said, that your privileges were derived from tl1e grace a11d permission of our a11cestors and us, for . most ''of them grow from pr ecedents, wl1ich sl1ows ratl1er a toleratio11 than in hentance . This time th ere wa s no mistaking. No false messengers could be blamed; tl1e king's 'Nords lay before them. ''Sitl1ence tl1e beginning of this Parliament,'' said Coke, ''l never spa ke but mine own conscience. Tl1e privileges of this House is the nurse and life of all our laws, the subject's best inl1erita,11ce. If my sovereign will not allow me my inh eritance, I must fly to Magna Charta and entreat explana­ tion of his Majesty. Magna Charta is called Charta libe1·tatis quia liberos facit, ... The Charter of Liberty because it maketh freemen. \'{hen the King says he can11ot allow our liberties of right, this strikes at tl1e root. \Ve ser"'/e l1ere f\Jr tl1ot1sands a11d ten thousands.'' 'We serve for th ousands.' Twenty years ago or even ten� Col(e could_ not l1 ave said it· the Commons had not been ready. Tl1e imn1ediate question was vvhat to do abo'ut the King's letter.... 'Let us s�t do,vn wh_e1·�in our privileges are imp�ached,' the and present Journals the In Coke said. 'Let .us make a Protestation, .enter It . , Journals to the King - but not as requ1r1ng a11 ans\ver. Tl1e Com­ . d Parliament On Tuesday, December eighteenth, !ames adjourne _ _ . ht· lelig by cand mons sat late, that day, and finisl1ed their Protestation

· ,_The Common� . . l iam ent .. . do make this Protestation following: That Par now '75� mbled �e l1?ert1.es, f�anch�ses, pr1v1leges a� m. . di·ctions of Parlian1ent are the ancient and un�oubted d �uris gI d. and tha t tl1e a rduous and urgent affairs conbtrt�ght and_ 1nher1tance of the subJects of lan d, and the mainten­ Eng of 1 rcl cI1u the J of � · n::i, an cerrung the King, state and defence of the r�Er a ance and making of laws and redress of IDJSChlefs a d ·evances whicI1 daily happen within this . and t l1at in tl1e handling ent iam l a P r �� in � b e realm, are proper subjects and matter of counsel and and proceeding of those businesses every mernb er Of the·House of Parliament hath and of right t eason and b ring to concl11sion the same: ought to have freedom of speech, to propoui:id , and that the Commons in Parliament have like r:rt rand freedom to treat of these n1atters in s_uch order as in their judgments shal! see.c:n fitteSt.! a cithat every member of the said Ho11se l1ath cens11re of �he by n tl1a r he (ot like fr�dom from all ion tat les mo �d nment imp�cbment, IIDP!180 ing ch rs tt� tou ma or r tte ma a ny ing lar dec or g � 1 Rouse 1�self) for or concemJng an!' speaking, r eas?F · the P�rl�ment or Pa:liament bus1n�ss ;_ and t�at, 1 a of the said members be compla1� ed of and qn�ttoned for anything done or said 1n Parliam�t ' �be same is to be s11ewed_ to t�e King by the edence to c e giv ng IG tl1e e for r be t en advice and assent of 1. iam Par 10 ns assembled mo Com all the any Private info r111ation.' c . ten, ,,

ot rg 1o ve . . na ou . ''Y e. ok C r fo . t en lm os� 1mmed1ately, Privy Council A ;uty of a Councillor of State and �he ?11ty they told l11m, ''the duty of a servant, the . ord 1n L ed ck lo as w e 0 fa H . er ow T e th subject".... Eight guards escorted him e ok C as n; he tc ki a as ed us Cob h.am 's old n ee b quarters. One of t he rooms ��d 1

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e n d th o le w door: ''This ra sc g io l1 et m so . guar ds he s aw . ro 01!! 1s 11 h it w d 1e l c a o r app wa nts a cook.'' il Chamb er, tl1e LordstJ c n u o C n i g n ti it s d n a a ll a l1 e it l1 W n to d e m a e . h ls a T r rn le u C o The Kin g c J k s o n o f m m e o th 1e C t} · ¾ no ed d n a em d , · m 11 1 · g " e r d it fro m the book n to a it d a e Judges surround1n r s e m a J . n o ti a st , te ro . p e th t a n e p o e g ly to e er b tt u d n l aid the pa nihilat ed,, a an ls a ri o em m ll a f o t u o d ze ra e b · A ,, to '' 1 ·d a le 1 i ' la t d p fi n n x a e g as t in n e m rl.ia that 5 OllJt a P e th g in lv so is · d d e . . ate 1I bert·1es wit · 11 our 111·gl1 prero prociam at�10 n 'was 1 ssii , tive ". ga n ord1n 1 '' en k ta d a l1 '' rs e particul ar n 1emb re u it d en l p a x y E o R d n a n o ti a x a T er ov l o tr on C or f le g g u tr S e Tli In 1625 King Cl1arles I succeeded �in¥ Ja!11cs. �harle� experienced ev�n greater ?ifficulty than his father in securing co-operat_ion \v1tl1 �11� 1n�reas1ng!Y. independent_ Parl1ar:nent, �vh1ch mistr hin1 for several reasons: (I) l11s Cathol1c-1ncl1ned rel1g1ous tendenc1�, whi�h might lead hi u.ned m n from Rome; (2) of E��land his of the Churcl1 betray the independence foreig policies, especiallyto his alignment \.Vitl1 France; (3) his fiscal pohc1es, on the ground that he was extravagant· (4) his

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conduct of the ,var against Spain; and (5) his belief in tl1e t 1l eory of the ''divine right" �f kines Parlian1ent atten1pted to control the. Ki�g by limiting his rc_venue - ref�sing to vote "supply�•: ! .c. money, for his use - and by using its fiscal powers to influence vanous royal policies. The I(ing, hov,cver, \vas deter111incd to do ,vithout such interference.

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Tl1c 'f�1dor 111onarcl1s l1ad assu111ed JJowers for tl1e protection of the middle clas_ses agai�st tl1e gr�at _la ndo wners and for the support of the national church Hga1n�t fore1gn eccles_1ast1cal orga11izations. Elizabetl1 I had generally acted with sag_��1ty a n d _moo erat1011, but s11cl: n1atte rs as the power of the crown to levy im· position s, w111cl1 \'v1er� customs duties 11ot voted b y Pa rlia1nent, the power to remove Jt1dges . . . all co 11ta1ned germs of oppr ession. 1

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Abuses occurre? �v!1en these powers came into the hands of less scrupulo us ul� rs. h� se �tent_ialities b ecame manifest during tl1e reig n of James I (1603-25). �wice Juring )11s reigi1 _ I1 e . rai_sed a benevolenc e ''pr b n1ea s eals'' ' which y ivy ns of . were stron gly worded 111v1tat1ons f,or d 011ations to tl1e crown conveyed in letters fr om the Privy Council. .. . Problems arising in t11e rei f J ames I_ continued, and even became 1nten· sified, du ring tJ 1at of Cha 1es I 625-49). with the con· ( � Parl1an1ent issatisfied was d d11ct of th e ,var witll Sp; n 1111d tl e n1 anageme nt of tl1e king's chief advise r, the Duke of Buck ingl1am. Th� fi ; : r t liament of �l1_arles' rei�n sl:owed its dis�ont enl : by failing to grant supplies t� �lle ting. In r etal1at1on tl1e ki ng di ssolved Parl1 am e�t. By 1626 tl1e ki ng's ne ed fo r o · n i a rem Jiad b���me pressing, but tl1e Commons ed_ ada1nant. rfl1ey focused � ��{1 e 110st 111t1 es UJJ011 tl1e Duke of Buckingham [t� Ki ng's principal Minister] wl101n � 1ey pr oceeded to imp eac h The king again dis· solved Parliam en t and \.Vas soo 1 · e ' ' ati i 1orc ed to resort · og · n * 1·n order to se to various forms of prer ter taxatio rai th: money he let a ed issu needed. l1e In Ju]y 1626 requesti11g l1is subj ects to n l \Vilf e a �ree gift of money. Tl1i d o of tl1e people fciiled ' so l1� f ; appe;I to tl1e go ° innled iately issued a commission for tl1e co]lection

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u _ndage, a duty on exports and imports. In September, 1626, be and _ age P? onn ! _ . 1 ss_ issued a -�om1:l1 1on for the coll�ct1on of a forced loan, which was a compulsory · gran-t to the k1�g 1� accor�ance with the subject's ability to pa.y, for whicl1 the lender had only th e k1ng s proffiJse to repay at a later time. A number _ of persons refused to pay tl1e forced Ioa11, an d were imprisoned by order of the king. Among these_ were five me11 of a11cient families and great in­ flu�nce. They � ro�ght the question of the legality of tl1eir impriso11ment before the Court of Ki ng s Bench on a writ of habeas corpt1s. Tl1is proceedi11g is referred to as the ''Five .Kn ights' Case'', or son1etin1es as ''Dar11el's Case''. The court re­ turned the prison ers to jail, and tl1e c,1se beca111e a ''cause celeb1·e'' w11ich focused public attention upon the rigl1t of perso11al liberty and led directly to tl1e Petition of Right. Althougl1 the ''Five Knights' Case'' presented tl1e cl1ief grievance, otl1er matters a.fef cting the rights of the subject also were before Parlia n1e11t dt1ring its 1nomento11s session in 1628. Cl1ief amo·n g these \\1 as the complai11t agai11st the quartering of troops in private homes. Like tl1e question of arbitrary imprisonment, this grievance arose indirectly from the lack of sympatl1y of Parlia1nei1t with tl1e aims of tl1e war with Spain and its conseq11ent failure to pro,1ide sufficie11t fu11ds for the commanders to billet soloiers in inns, as was the practice wl1e11 tl1ere was sufficien t money. Tl1e billeting of soldiers in private l1omes cat1sed many serious abuses. In additio n , the martial law was sometimes applied to civilia11s botl1 as a code governing their right to obtain redress against soldiers v1ho l1ad injured. the1n and as a means for pu11ishing infractions of the Ia,v by civilians. When the Commons met in 1628, atte ntio11 was th11s focused upon s1)ecific grievances that had arisen since Charles I l1ad corr1e to the throne. On Jan11ary 2, 1628, seventy-six persons who l1ad been impriso11ed for f ailt1re to pay the farced loan were released, and a numb er of these, inclt1di11g some of the parliamentary leaders, were present when the session opened. The members were determined that their actions to remedy these grievances should be based upon the fundamental principles of the English constitution. The opinion of many members was picturesquely phrased by Sir Benjamin Rudyard: 'For mine own part , I shall be very glad to see that old decrepit La� ''Magna Carta,' � wl1i_ch hath been kept so long, a,nd lien bedrid, as it were, I shall be glad to see 1t walk abroad again with new vigour and lustre.

The intellectual leader in the House of Commons at tl1e session was Sir Edward Coke then in his late seventies and at the height of his career. In the Peti­ tion of Right' are embodied Coke's views of the concept of ''due proce�s of law'' as that right ha d developed since Mag n a Carta. On March 21, Coke introduced a bill which provided that, except by the sentence of a �ourt, no person s�ould be detained untried in prison fo r more than two montl1s 1f he co_11ld fin_d bail or for more than three months if he could no t. ... The case of the Five Kn1gl1ts was de­ b ated_ at length. Coke denounced th� ide3: of imprison. 1?e�t at the _king's command as ''the utter subversion of tl1e choice L1berty and Right belonging to every free born -Subje.ct of this Kingdom''. d of �a i ng st ki e_ to th n io tit pe of ay w by d ee oc pr . .. . Coke urged that tL1 ey � . by a,n ordinary bill. This procedure was based on the assumption that al l the Commons really desired was a confirmation of the laws as they then stood and no t · a Change in the laws. -

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1e same committee which had draw tl by l1t w.:: i� R f o n o ti t� e e ll T P was presented to the Common� It �� � ect. �� subj l erti b li e th n o l il b r e i rl e a e th a confer ence. Tl1e Lords agre ed for meet to d k on May 8, and tl1e J_,ords to add a clause pro tecti er, bowe� , desired :y 1 1 a; ng etiti p e th f o e c an st b su e 1 tl to aroused the opp osition ately immedi oposal r p . 1 I s 1 T the sovereignty of the king: of the Commons. Alford srud: . .1s Sovereign . r? what Powe are, they e

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Bodm saith, s and see wllat rd R e th to in ok lo us et ? 'L � ;, dge a Regal as well as a Legal Power: owle ackn shall we this ion <lit ofl T11at it is free from a ny <; ore.' m i no d an , m hi ves gi w � 1e t at . tl1 ng Ki e th Let us give tl1at to

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. . . · 'l know tl1at Prerogative is part f the Law but Sovereign Power 1s no Parliamentary word: In my opinion, i t w�akens " �a gna � t ,, and all our Statutes· for they are absolute withoui :,; now add what the Lo;ds request we shall weaken the ' any saving of Sovereign Power . a o<l_ sllafl . m us·L nee ds fall· take we heed what we yield unto, d h 1 1ng u1 e B t then "Magn a and of Foundation Law, • ·, , .., Carta'' is sucl1 a Fellow, tl1at he will !1a·ve z10 Sovereign. · e Lords agreed to tbe PetiTh · · was rewarded. T1e pers1·sten c·e of t he Co111rnons . , · · · t ion of Rig11t ,.vitl101Jt tl1e clal1se reserv_ing th� k�ng s rigI1 �s o f sovereignty, a n d tI1e king vias placed in tI1e positio11 of -e1tl1er y 1 eld1ng or losing t l1e support of the e11tire nation. l

The Petitio,1 of .l{ight From 1·oz,r11als of t/1e Jloz,se OJ'.Lordr;, i11 Stepl1e nso11 & Marcham, op.cit., page 453. [2 Ju11e] His majesty, b eing sea te d 011 l1is roy al tl1 ro11e , delive re d unto the clerk of parlia1nent l1is ans wer unto tl1e Petition of Rigl1 t, exl 1ib ite by l1e l ord s and d t commo1 1s tl1is parliament. The co n1 mons, ,vitl1 tl1 eir spe aker, came. His majesty made a sl1ort speech unto the lords and commons. Th e lo rd ke e per then conferr ed with his maje sty and declared unto t l 1e lord s an d co n 1 m on s ... The lord keeper having ended l1i s speech, tl1e clerk of tl1e crow11 re ad tl 1e Petition of Right ..., an d t he clerk: of the parliament tl1 e king's a11swe r, ''in I1aec ve rba, viz.'' ''The king : willeth tl1at rigl1t be done according to tl1e la w s and customs of the realm; and th�t the statt1tes b e put in d t1 e_ execution, tl 1a t I1is subjects m a y liav e 11 0 cause to compl ain of �ny wrongs o r oppressions, co1 1 trary to tl1eir ju st rigl1 ts a n d li bertie s, to tl1e preser· vat1 on whereof he l1olds himself ... as well obliged a s of ll p is er o g at ive ... " r [7 June]_ The king's majesty r� bes, and tl1e co111mons w1t_ l1 b�ing placed i 11 l1 is r o y a l tl1rone , the lords i� th�ir tl 1e 1 r sp eaker p r e se . n t tile lord ke epe r, sta nding JD his .place as a peer, �p_oke a s followeth, viz.: "M ma�esty! tl1e lor_ds s·p1r1tua l a/ i t p le a s e y o u r most excellent and temporal and , nt t aking into tl1e1 r e comm m ia l a n ar s p a ss in e l n d b considerations tl1at l o _ t 1e oood in t.e llig esty and your pe ople dotl1 m m aj 1 . � y o u e nc r e e b t w1 t x ucl 1 de�end upon y n o of Right' iorme o u r · J m et a r. . e st y 's answer unto the. P ittd rIy presented \V1th . an unan1mous cons o now become most l1un1 sty m aJe e nt unto y o u r b l sui·tors unt o your m�jesty to give a clear a nd sat isfacti d e as ple e that b will you ry answer there -unto 1n full parliament.'' *

Why does Coke con.s t antly cite "Mag such a Fe llo\v, tl1at , , ii _ a rta n .Carta ? What does he mean: ''M he will hav O. agn of the law''? In wl1at � So art sense ac�o��-in �ere�gn. '' :'Vhy does he a dmit that "Preroganve 15 p_:.. g O oke, 1s ''p ' rerogative'' a parl of the law?

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This _being spoken by the_lord keeper, his majesty said: ''The answer I have already given you �as made with so good deliberation, and approved by the judg­ ment of so many _wise !11en, that I could not have imagined but that it should have given you full �atisfact 10J?.; but, !o avoid all ambiguous i11terpretations and to show you that t �ere is no doubleness 1n my meaning, I am willing to please you in words as well as 10 th� substance. Read your petition, and yot1 sl1all 11ave sucl1 an answer as I am sure will please you." Th�n the clerk of the crown read tl1e said Petition of Rigl1t. And the clerk of the p�r�1�1;!ent read_ and prono11nced the ki11g's answer, viz.: ''Soit droit fait comme est desire. [Let Right be done as is desired.] From The Petitio11 of Rigl1t, in Perry, op.c·it., pages 73-75. To tl1e King's n1ost excellent majesty. HUMBLY shew un�o our so,,ereign lord tl1e King, tl1e lords spiritual and temporal, and' commons 10 parliame11t assembled ' That whereas it is declared and enacted by ... the good laws and statutes of tl1is realm, your subjects have inherited this freedom, _That they should not be compelled to contribt1te to any tax, tallage, aid or other l1ke charge not set by common consent in parliament. II. Yet nevertheless, of late divers commissio11s di1·ected to sundry commis­ sioners in several counties, witl1 instructions, have issued; by means whereof your people have been in divers places assembled, and required to le11d certain sums of money unto your Majesty, and many of tl1em, 11pon their ret'11sal so to do, have ... been therefore imprisoned, ... 111. And where also by the statute called Tl1e great c!1a1·ter of tlze liberties o.,f England, [Magna Carta] it is declared and enacted, That no freeman n1ay be tal(er1 or imprisoned, or be disseised of I1is freehold or liberties, 01· his free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or in manner destroyed, but by tl1e lawful judgment of his peers, or by the-law of the land. V. Nevertl1eless against the tenor of the sai.d sta�utes, and otl1er _tl1e good laws and statutes of your realm to that end provi9ed, divers of your sttbJects l1ave of late been imprisoned without any cause sl1ewed; (2) and when for their deliverance they were brot1ght before your justices by your Majesty's wr�ts of l1abeas co,·�us . ; . [and although] no cause was certified, but tl1at they were detained by your MaJesty s e r ed ye and wer retu special command, signified by the lords of yo11r pr�vy council, � _n _ back to several prisons, without being charged with anytl11ng to wh1cl1 tl1ey m1gl1t make answer according to the law: X. They do therefore humbly pray your 111:ost excellent Majesty, Tl1at no ma n �ereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, lo�n, benevolence, tax, or such­ like charge, without common consent by act of parliament; (2) an d tl1at .none be called to ·take answer, or take such oath, or to give attendance, or be co11:fined, of; t ere or othe: r wise molested or disquited concerning. the same, or_ for refusal � _ (3) and that no freeman, in an y such manner as 1s before-mentioned, be 11npr1soned or detained ·' eir sty tl1 t as aje en M ell ex st mo ur yo of . ay XI pr � y bl m l hu Al t ich wh they mos . ng �ts a·nd liberties, according to tI1e laws and statt1tes of tl11s realm; and tl1at your MaJesty wot1ld also vouchsafe to declare, · · · .

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The Final

s 11 o ti /u o v e R /1 s /i g ii E Tlie · 4 7 l6 s e g a p . it .c , p o From Becker, ) 49 16 as w 0n 64 o (1 ipit ated ti ec pr lu ,,o re l1 is l g 11 E st fir ie l seem t · t may Strail ge a s 1. of Scotland, the Sco1, g in as . K es rl l1a ,v C J1 11g 0 tJ1 l ' land · A ot Sc 1 11 g . .· 1n rr 11 cc o ts · h the clergy · c by even h 1r w J ' in 11c 11 CJ n ia 1 te y sb re P 1r 1e l t 1 l g 11 o 1r tl es lv se m 1e l t ed n er v o g really u ld never be able to govern o w e h t a th ew kn s le ar Ji C were eIe cted by tlie peo.ple. · seIf. to govern 1n · t ed by .h1m o p ap s p 1 1o is b re e _ ,v e i er l t l ti un Scotlalid as lie did England, tcl 1 cl!urcb into some­ o Sc l1e t _ e 11g 1a cJ to d ie tr re o ef er th lie tli e Scotcli clergy. J 1 1 1637 i on rose up 10 defen se of its t na 1 l c ot Sc l e l 1o vv l1e T l1. 111rc t ll iii g l ik e t li e Eri gl isI1 Cl l1e country, the Scotch army t r ue 11q co to y m ar 1 �1 11t se religio 11; �1nd \vl1en Cl1arl es d se fu d re to go home an d, an gl En rn l1e rt no d 1e 1p ct oc y, m ar s g' in ( l defeated tJ1e uld i les co ne ar ther fight Ch ey on n1 t ou ith W ). 39 16 , ar J¥ S' until it '-''as l)aid (Bis/10JJ 1itl 1 tl 1em. I--Ie was tl 1er efo re forced to call the English \\ e ac pe l,c 1na r I1o tl1e Scots g Parliament" on s ''L ou fam the s wa 1is 1�1 t. otr !1im p I1el o t it e l ,is cl a11 11t 111e Parlia (1640), \vl1icl1 l-,ega11 tl1e revoltition. Tl1e P11ritar1s a11d tl1e co11ntry ge11tlemen now l1ad Charles in a tight place. Of co11rse tl1e:y rcft1sed to give l1in1 any money for the Scotch war until he promised to beliave better ir1 tl1e futt1re. Tliey forced I1i1n to agre e to certain new constitutional ]a,.ys. 011e of tl1ese was tl1e Trie1111ial Act (164 I), \Vl l icl1 provided tl1at Parliament sho11Id be ·called at least 0 11ce every tl1ree yeats. Other laws abolished ship money and n1ade it ill egal for tl1e king to levy taxes witl 1out t l1e consent of Parliamen t or to irnprison peopl e without a fair trial in tl 1e courts . ... CJ1arles l 1ad to agree lo tl1ese la\vs, beca11se l1e needed mo11ey and because tl1e members of Parl iament were all in favor of tl1en1. _After tl1ese co11stit11tional laws were passed, t l ie Parliament divided into t,vo p�rties. The �xtreme Puritans wisl1ed to limit tl1e king's power still more, and th ey wis_hed espe�ially to reform tl�e cl111rcl1 by abolisl1jng the bisl1ops and adopting a simple �uritan forn1 of \Vorsl 11p. But tl1e 11obles and mos t of the country gentlem en ouglJt tliat enotigl� had been done. N·ow tl1at tl1e kin g could no longer rule withoul ��e 0 sent of Parlra�ent, tl1ey TI? l onger feared the bishops, and they ne ve r had · 11.� �J tfie extreme :Pttritans \Vl10 w1sl1ed to ma ke -life sad an d sober by doing a,va}' 1 SJ)or ts and amt1sen1e11t s clnd pictures and i11usic of ch urch qu est ion the So on ;;;;0 rni, the co · ' · ere 11ntry gentle111en parted ?0mpany w1tl1 w d a , tl1e extreme Puritans n ready to side w itli tll e k.ing a 11d '.tl1e b1sl1op s. · .. Cl 1arles migl1t l1ave ended the . to 1 r w1l · revolu t1 0 °: now if he had b�en ?ghteo keep quiet. E ut lie was bound t et ?ack all of his old power. He tried to f rig � Parl iament by brinoing som so�ie_r 51 s to into the House of Commons i n order ar re d five·o f tl1e cliief le:ders of t� p � urita1:1 JJarty. When tl1is failed, he left Lon don 3 .� began to gatl1er troops in O er t? 1 ssolve parliament by force. Parliament leYI troops to resist the king' an� so c1v1l wa.r began (1642) . . . · · · bV . \Vl1en Cl 1arles surrendered' .ID �. 6�6, no one dream of punishi: ng hu. ll uld ed cutting off l1is l1ead. His enemies o w ere -w he wil ling 1f to e res tor thr e him to his on agree to certain terms. · But now Parliam ent could · d . ve 0 n ot . impose its terms on· the king because [O nree Cromwell [comander of the · ai,· par1iamentary ar m y] an ot n ld d the soldiers wou 'I<)

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to them :* Most of the sol diers were members of the various ''dissenting'' religions Separatist � or Independents, Baptists, or Fifth Monarchy Men. They had joined Cromwell s army beca�_se they had _ been persecuted for their religion, and they had _ _ thought they were fighting for rel 1g1ous l iberty. They had fougl1t well, tl1ey felt that the y ha� won t_he war, and th�� were therefore unwil ling to agree to any peace �hich d1d not �1ve them the re�1 �1ous fre �dom for wl1ich they l1ad fo11ght. This was JUSt what Parliament .was unw1ll1n� to give tl1em. Parliament had been willing to have these ID:en fi�ht its battles for 1t; but now tl1at tl1e war was over, it was ready to fine a�d 1mpr1s�n these old veterans and c11t off tl1eir ears unless they joine d the established Puritan Churcl1� No wonder tl1e soldiers refused to disband! Cromwe. ll , who was a member of Parlia.me11t, and tl1e n1ost trusted l eader of the soldiers, propose� a plan ,vhicl1 he tl:1011ght all parties n1igl1t agree to. ''Let ·us restore the k_ing to his throne," l1e _said in effect, ''a11d let tl1e king in future agree to govern with the consent of Parliament. Let us restore tl1e ol d cl1urch with its bishops, since that is what n1ost of ·tl1e people want; but si11ce the Puritans and S eparatists and Baptists l1ave served us wel l in tl1e war, let tis not persecute them any more but l et them worsl1ip as tl1ey like , outside of tl1e established churcl1. And so l et us have peace and liberty." Tl1is was a wise pla11, but it was not wl1at either king or Parliament or sol diers wa11ted. Would it not,_ then, ha,,e been a good plan to dissolve Parlia1nent, l1ave a ne11-1 election, and let the people decide wl1at sl1 011ld be done? Perhaps it vvould l1ave been. But neither t.he sol diers nor the Puritans in Parliament •Nould do this, because they knew th.at the great majority of the IJeople were no\v ready to s11p1Jort the king rather than the Parl iament or the army. The peo1Jle wer·e tired of war �1.ncl re­ volution; they were sorry for the king who l1ad been so long a captive; they disliked the meddling of the soldie rs in politics; tl1ey were not in favor of religious tolera.tion or of a Puritan church. If the peopl e had been allowed to decide, they would have disbanded the army; they would have restored the king and the ol d ctrurch; and they would have re fused. to grant religious tol eration. Cromwell and the sol die rs were bound to have religious toleration for them­ selves at all costs; and since they had the power they got their ,vay. Thinking tl1at the king was the cause of all their difficulties, they decide d to get rid of l1im. In December 1648 Col onel Pride, with a troop of sol diers, came into the Ho11se of Commons' and drove out those m embers wl10 wo11ld not agree to this (P,·ide's Purge, Dec.6, 1648). The few remaining members, known as the ''R11mp Parlia­ ment'', then d.eclared that they represented the ''people''. I�1 the name of the people they declared the king guilty of treason and condemned him to death. On January 30, 1649, he was execute d. . .. For nearly ten years Cromwel l governed England by m il itary force. ''I am as much for government by consent as any man,'' Cromwell once said, ''but wl1ere shall we find that consent?'' It is not quite true tl1 at Cromwell was �or �overnme_nt by consent. He wanted the people to consent to his government, wh1�l1 1s not qwte the same thing. H e tried several times to get the people to consent to his government, bu t they never did. And so the Commonwealth was not a commonwealth at all,

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ha ever been. t of C a th e�cept in an th e r e v e s t¥ IC ::d a r c to u a re • • o m , d1ctatorsl11p ty o f t he peo�le lo r� o a m t a e J r g e h t nged foi , 58 6 1 in , d ie d l el w m d Wl1en Cro ' an g a in k li a ar P ad h a d a 1 l en m ey t h t en I1 W w h en es m ti · d ol d o o . g 1e tl f o n 1r t tt a re ·· e eve s and pries s read.ing the Pr I s n I w a in s p o l1 ave. '· l 1 witl1 bis c r u · b c a d a l1 d a y h e m th Id custo s . o w o ll fo to d e t it m r e p n e e b d a l1 y e th n e h w d n a , k o Bo . 1e arn.1y, and th.eref tl l ro nt co , t no d ul ore o c d, h·, ar ch I R , n so s 1 1 e w . .. Crorn ea I P? Wer tiell to Ge � e Th t. n e m n r e v o g f o m e nera st sy 's ll l e 1w n ro C n o y rr a c t o n ld u <;o e th� ki ng , s1n�e that was r o st re to er tt be wh ai be Monk, wlJo tll o ugl1t it wotild d a Parl1am�nt wh1ch decla red that e bl m se as re o ef er t}1 most people wanted. He n om , the gove rn k1 �d 1e tl of s w la l ta en am n? fu ment d , ''according to the ancient an s. e s�n o f Charl es i Th on m m co n s, rd lo � � , ng ki by of England is and ought to be eturn, an d 1n 1660 he was r to ed t v1 1n s wa , ce an Fr in wl1o 11ad been living in exile o wn as t h e Stuart Restoration of 1660. n k is t en ev 1is Tl II. les ar Ch proclaimed King e loving, cynical, and faithless.... ur as e pl t b11 nt, ige ell int r.>' ve s wa II . . . C11arles ... Charles found it [increasingly] less easy to manage his Parliament. People feared tl1at he v1as trying to r11le wi thout the co nse nt of Parliament, and that he vvas perhaps to establis11 tl1e Catholic religion i n En gla nd.... A strong IJarty lc11ovv11 as tl1e ''Wl1igs'' gained contro l of Parliament, and introcluced tl1e Exclusion . Bill, to excl11de [Cl1arles' bro ther] Jan:ies from the throne ,vl1en Cllarlcs died. Cl1arles finally pers11aded Parliament not to pass the Exclusion Bill; but in order to do so l1e had to s11bmit to the Whigs. Am ong other things, he had to agree to tl1e Habec1s Corpus Act ( 1 679), which made it illegal for the king to imJJriso11 an)1one without giving him a fair trial by jury. It is said. that tl1e Habea� CorJJUS Act \vo11ld have been d efeated in tl1e I-louse of Lo rds if the tellers who cot1nted tl1e \1otes l1ad not in jest counted one fat lord as ten. If so, this w .as, as Trevel ya.11 says, tl1e ''best jolce ever made in Engl and ." ... [Charles died in 1685, and was succeeded by l1is brotl1 er, James II] · · · If James II could l1ave kept tl1e goo d\vill of tl1e bisl1ops and country gentle· m as 11arl es had done, he_ also migl1 t l1ave governed as he liked. But James ,vas a �ath.0 ic,. and 11e was fo?l1sl1 enougl 1 to t l1ink tl1at he could make England 8 at ?11c. co ntry.He �ppointed Ca tl1olics to office in the arm and in the chur ch. y � e � is sse� two of :1 i1 s loyal Sllppo rters because they ref11se d to become Cathol ics . rru . · He issue d a D ec larat 1on of Ii1d · uloe r::i nee, granting freed om to CathOliest worship of . and l1e o rdered the b s l101 s to read _ tl1e declaratio11 in th e cl1 urcl1es. These me asures � e alarmed everyone an� s even of tl1e bi_sl1ops and the country gentlenien; Seven bisl1 oiJs, w110 as�� t: :��u �d fro m reading tl1e de claratio n, were, arrest : and tried for sedition Tile seve11 : isl1ops became popular heroes, and e ven t e tl king's soldiers cl1eere wl1en tliey liear<l s op bish tha t tl1e jury ha d declared the ''no t guilty''. So tl1e Englisl1 decided to d k a e go another re volution rat l1er th?.n be vern\. by an autocratic king w110 was : e�t on es tablishing t l1e Cat l1olic religion. Jame s b · da11gl1t er, Mary, was a Protest nt and 1 n:; Ora she was married t o Willia m of tl1e ruler of tl1e Netl1erla ' � nds w o was also P 16 e, Jun a rotestant. Tl1erefo re, in seven pro1nine11 t Englisli men 'w o t a 1 et er l J � �o William asking I1im to con1 e to Eng �:d with an army. William accepte � t�e .1nv1tat1on, an d wl1en l1 e landed, James , d �se �i og· by everyone, even l1is soldie rs, tried t o esca1Je t o France.- Some fishermen, th1 nk e

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·to please William, caught James and sent him back to London. Bu t William was too shrewd_ to ma ke a hero of James by cutting off his head, as Cromwell had made a hero of �harles I. So he set James free, and James obliged him by running off . a second time. The English did not want to call themselves revolt1tionists. Parliament tl1ere­ fore declared th� t Jame,� 1!;-d ''abdicated tl1e government''. by ''withdrawing him­ se � out ?f the kingdom . .a. he throne was tl1us vacant, not because the people had dnven him off from the throne, bt1t beca11se he l1ad left it of l1is own accord. Par­ liament then offered the ''vacant'' thro11e to 'William a11d Mary, on condition that they would agree to a ''Declaration of Rights''. In 1689 tl1e Parliament enacted the Declaration of Rights into law under tl1e title of a .Bill of Rigl1ts. . .. The Bill _of Rights, like tl1e 1v1agna Carta (1215) and tl1e Petition of Right (1628) and the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), is one of tl1e great charters of English political freed om. . . . The Bill of Rights settled the political question of the relations of king and Parliament. After 1689 no Englisl1 king ever seriously tried to rule without the consent of Parliament. Bt1t the religious [toleration] question \Vas not settled. In 1688 the people were ready to accept the ideas of Cromwell. So the Parliament of 1689 abolished the censorsl1ip of the press, thus, establishing freedom of speech and the press. And it passed tl1e Toleration Act wl1ich granted religious freedom to all Christians except Unitarians and Catholics. After 1688 even Unitarians and Catholics were not jn practice interfered with rnucl1 so long as they were Joyal to the government. The Bill of Rig/,zts

From Perry, op.cit., pages 223-236 .

. . . The Bill of Rights and the other documents constitt1ting the Revolution Settlement represented tl1e triumph of the principles for which ti.le recently formed Whig party had struggled against Charles II (1660-85) and �ames II_ ._ These _ do­ cuments asserted the supremacy of Parliament over the claimed d1v1ne right of kings. The royal prerogative was sharply curt�iled, �nd even the_ possession of the crown became a statuto.ry right, not a l1ered1tary right. Toleration for Protestant ilissenters was assured and a number of individual liberties, insisted ltpon as among the rights of the subjedt were given formal recognition as part of the law of the land. The documentary counterparts of several of these rights appeared later in the Constitution of the United States .... One of the most serious grievances which the document _sought t� corre_ ct w�s the use of the royal prerogative for the purpose_ of su�pe11d1ng an� d1spens1ng with laws. In the past English kings ha.d often e_xerciscd �ithout question � rath�r vague dispensing power, that is, a power of making exceptions to the l�ws 1n part1cul� cases. This power was closely rel�ted to the p�wer of par_d�ni�g offenses a�a1nst the Jaws. The power of su.spend1ng t�e laws, 1n theory distinct from the dispensin g power, was broader t.han tl1e dispensing p�wer. As that po�er was assert­ ed_ by the Stuart kings, al l persons might be authorized -to treat part1ct1lar laws as beTng nonexistent. ng di en e d sp th ne su em nd s_ co ht ig R of ll Bi . e th .. by e Th first two rights listed . P'OWer and the dispetlSing power as it ha d been exercised of late. .

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� l th il in B ed in �a of �ghts w .' n c� ts h g ri . cla se in the list of The High Co mmission h� .. . The thir� n. s1o llls ml Co gh Hi of t � · C e t 1 sl li o b a ve court the purpose of Wh �h · ti inten?ed to oga rer a ) _ as p i 49 625 1 � e 1 r a h C s ed hi os o o wh royalist the o . flourished under e os p th p d an ts 1 en n o. was to persecute theologica o pptl1e Hi'gl i Commission to plac e England's two ne.s . great d e s u s e un r J .. t n e m � · g of the Anglil'!l ft n 0f _gov�r f ru o r . s a le ld 1o gl n ro st th o b _ ge d ri "llll b · am C d · d an r .:� o 0 iu es t1 1 igton. probably no other acti 1· un1vers1 re ic o � at C e th on 1 ation of i1 m do e 1 tl r de �n h Churc m t h o w e o fr rc u cr h c n. ed sh li b ta es e th te a en li a to � of his reign d id more rd o e 1n w al th in e _f n th lo e ok g contest sp s 1t gl ri f o st li e th in se au cl l tl ur ... The fo e er n th w of tio po es of qu e e king th th _ on ts ec bj su r 1 ei tl d an s ng ki h lis between Eng t . en am li ar P f o t n se n co 1e tl ut to raise money witho , � ng to t� ki lis ab ns �st tio eti hed nt se by re to p ts ec bj su p all f o ht rig 1e Tl ... n ve e s Se th op sh of Bi h wt ro ' tg ou e se," tl1 Ca s wa s, ht rig of t lis e th in e us cla 1 tl the fif a ver too k place at e am th dr al ric sto hi t tes ea gr e ''th d lle ca en be s ha 1688. That trial the led e cal cas y ula aca "an event M rd Lo '. rt' cou V la\. sl1 gli En zed ori 1 l before an aut ·..vl1 icl1 sta11ds by itself in our l1istory''. When James issued his second Declaration of Ind11lgence in 1688, 11e ordered all bisl1ops to have cop ies distributed throughout il1eir dioceses, wl1ere it ,vas to be read in the cl1urches. Although obedience to the l<ing l1ad long been a cioctririe of the Cl1urch of England, the widespread belief that the clccl,1ratio11 1-vas illegal ind:..1ced Arcl1bisbop Sancroft to recommend universal disobecli1�:uce of ti1.e lcing's order. Sancroft and six bisl1ops sent a petition to the king .1.1hi(;l1 stated: ''Your IJe:titionc::rs therefore most l1umbly and earnestly beseech yciur majesty that yo·u \11iii be gr[1ciot1sly pleased 11ot to insist upon their distributing and readi11g yot1r 111ajesty's said declaratio11 ... '' Despite the respectful language of tl1e petiti.011, the bisl1ops were tried on a charge of seditious libel before the Court of IUng's Bencl1. All t�1� judges of tl1 at court had been specially chosen by the king because of the probab1l1ty tl1at tl1ey \Vould render decisions favorable to the crown. Two o� the judges, ho\�ev<:r, instructed tl1e jt1ry in favor of the bishops - an . act for whicl'�. tl1ey we�e d1s_n11ssed - and tl1 e jury returned a verdict of not gtulty . The verdict met \V1th widespread pop11lar approval. ·· · The ?lause of the Bill _of Rigl1ts prol1ibiting excessive bail and cruel and unuSu�l punishme11ts was co pied verbatim in tl1e constituti ons of many of lhe e�i a ] states at tl1e time of tl1e American R evol ears as a it an ut d io n pp �F ie e1g� t fl amendment to tl1e Constitution of tl1 e United· St�tes. ... Tl1e prol1ibition of crtiel and unusuaI · l1ments was based on the Ion g· pun1s standing principle of Eng1.is11 1 aw tl1at tl1e punisl1rnent should fit the crime . From Tl1e Bill of Ria0 fzts ' in Perry O , ip.cz·t ·, pa ge s 245247. � act f or declaring tl·1e rights . e . th . ing a n d l1bert1es of the subJect, and settl· succession of tlie cr o wn. WH�REAS the lords spirit t n . se u a l and temporal, and commons ... ?1d unt o their Majesties, then ca ··· $ ill i llfll ll e d a nd kn ow n by th� names a�d stile_ of and �ary, p�ince and princess rdS o o f Orange, · ·. a cer tain declaration ... 1n the VI following; viz.

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WHE�AS the late Kin . e�� �..i Ja � s e me s div the r f Second by the assistance o counsellors, Judges ' and . • vvi b . Illln1ste su rs employed b y 'him, did endeavour_ t0 and ext1rpate the protes tant tll· o d religion, and the law s . . and liberties of tht s k ing ..

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And whereas. the sai� late King James tl1e Seco11d l1avi11g abdicated the government, and the �hrone being tl1er�b7 vacant, l1is l1igl111ess tl1e prince of Orange ... did (by the advice of the lords sp1r1tt1al a11d temporal, a11d divers principal persons ) on cause lette�s to be writte11 ... for tl1e choosing of st1cl1 persons to s co mm the of represent them, as were of r1gl1t to be sent to parlia1ne11t, ... And there�pon the said lords spirit11al and ten1porctl, a11d co111mons, pursuant to their respective letters and elections, being 110w asse111bled in a ft1ll and f1·ee re­ presentative of this nation, taki11g jnto tl1eir 111ost ser.iot1s co11sideration tl1e best means for attaining the ends aforesaicl; do .111 tl1e first place (as their ancestors in like case have usually done) for tl1e vi11dicati11g a11cl assertj11g tl1eir ancient rights and liberties, declare: 1. That the pretended power of suspe11di11g of laws, or tl1e execL1tio11 of laws, by 1 egal authority, witl1out conse11t of parlia111e11t, is illegal. 2. That the pretended power of dispensi11g with laws, or the exect1tion of laws, by regal at1thority, as it hath been asst1111ed and exercised of late, is illegal. 3. That the comn1issio11 for erecting tl1e late co11rt of commissioners for ecclesiastical cat1ses, a11d all otl1er con1n1issio11s and co11rts of like 11ature are illegal and perniciot1s. 4. That levying mone)' for or to tl1e t1se of tl1e cro\V11, by prete11ce of prero­ gative, without grant of parliame11t, for lol)ger time, 01· in other m.an . 11er than the same is .or shall be granted, is illegal. 5. That it is tl1e right of tl1e st1bjects to IJetition tl1e I(i11g, a11d all com1nittments. and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal. 6. That the raising or keeping a standi11g arn1y v1itl1i11 tl1e kingdom i11 time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is agai11st law. 7. That the subjects whicl1 are protesta11ts, may l1ave ar1ns for t11eir defence suitable to their condjtions, and as allowed by law-. 8. That election of members of J)ar liame11t ot1gl1t to be free . •

9. That the freedom of speecl1, and debates or proceedi11gs in parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any co11rt or place ot1t of parliament. · 10. That excessive bail ought not to be reqL1ired, nor excessive fines in1posed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 11. That jurors ought to be duly impa11elled and ret11r11ed, and jurors whicl1 pass upon men in trials for higl1 treason 011gl1t to be freeholders. • 12. That all grants and promises of fines a11d forfeit11res of partic11lar persons before conviction, are illegal and void. 13. And that for redress of all grievances, a11d for tl1e amending, strengthe11ing, and preserving of the Jaws, parliame11ts ought to be l1eld freqt1ently. . · And they do claim, demand, and insist upo11 all and _ si11g11!ar tl1e premi�ses, as t�1eir undoubted rights and liberties; and th a�· no declarat1011s Judg1n�11ts, doings ? ?r p roceedings, to the prejudice of the people 1n any of the said premisses, 011g } 1t .. tn any wise to be draw11 l1ereafter into conseqt1ence or example. · · · •

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s n o i t u l o v e R /1 is l g n E 1e t/ · f o e c n a c fi i n The Sig 74. 2 3 7 2 s e g a p , ) I .I l o V ( d ,i a ! g n E if o y · 1 or 7. /S From TreveIyan, /'J is th h in u o y I , II er e ev rg eo G te 1 at e1 ev mpted . t o 11 , g jn K 0 0 s rd a w n o e e s u th o f s of Comm ons.. o H te From 1689 o v 1e tl to y r a tr 11 o · · c . . l t, o r · i e m a i' rl a P t u l 10 't 1 w n er v o g to e h le th w an imme nse gai� n o p u s a w ? er w o p ry ra it rb a ry The victory of la\v over e to th ic re v o f o d n a aw s r _ a � e y _ d an d re d r11: n 1 ol t h 1 t ex n le ti r fo t u b ; y it n a m u h r fo s t�ey were, in the day; : s a g n 11 tl f o n o t1 a 1r m d a e u d 11n _ _ an d ce u d ro p s st re te in d te es v s wh �] appealed j0 · st ri e Ju e [w m o h w f o : ll a , 11 o of Blackstone, :Burke and Eld s the final st a n d ar d 1n human affairs. a 11 o ti lu o ev R e v ti a rv se n co t a the gre s�d er a�ions, gained greatly · n co ty ar p l al om fr ed rc vo di Justice and I1un1anity, al Judge who supporteo 1c nn a r_ ty [a ys re ff Je d an es m Ja of fro111 tl1 e signal overtl1row . wn e ro th C 1ll of ials were w Tr e th at le ab ov m re be to ed as ce s ge 1d James]. Tl1 e· J1 l ue s. es Cr ings and 1 gg irn flo fa ith w le 1o wl e th 1 01 d 1 a1 y 11c ce de conducted witl1 ics. In 1695 the Censor- · lit po y rt pa of on ap we l ua 11s a be to ed as ce es fin exorbitant 1 at Milton's dr ea m of 'liberty of un­ tl so se, lap to ed ow all as v ,, ess Pr e 1 ship of tl ) l erfu Wh the ce pow of io lan ba en ev e Tl1 . nd gla En d in lize rea ;as v ng 11ti 1Jri d licer1se · and Tory IJarties protecte� - �ritics of government wl10 spoke from either camp...� /->i.frer a tl1ousai1cJ years, rel1g1011 \Vas at le11gtl1 rele ase d from tl1e obligation to practise crL1elty_;:11 1Jri11cipl�, by tl1e adn1ission tl1at it is the incorrigible nature of man 10 l1old d1rtere11t OJJ1x1 1or1s 011 specL1lati\1 e subjects.

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Questions and Problems

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1) Tl1� e cerpt at tl1 e begi1111�ng of tl1is sectio11 on the ''Issue of Sovereignty'' (from , : sli ould be studied carefully, again, after you I1ave digested the whole Maitland)

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_ tl1e Sect1011. ' '? Wl1at is 1nea11t -- in t/11·s e,-c · t - by t I 1e term ''sovereignty . c ·p. �, o, . . : ry ro co�ceive of YOLirself, 110w, as a ''co11stitutio11al lawyer'' in England a� t 1e outset of tl1e l 7tl1 Centt1ry. If: 1) 1 yot1 ,vere li:1wyer· for tiie ·King · , wl1 at argu1nents could yot1 deveIop . · favo11r of sovereig 111 nty for ''tl1e .K1" 11g ?. '' 1·1)· you were a lawyer . 11 p ar1·ia1ne11t, \Vl1at arou.me11ts could you dev elop � o . in favo11r of so - vereignty fo r ''ti 1e K11 ' 1g . 1 n Parliament?' ' iii) you were Cok · e 1low could YOlt argue tl1at ''tl1 e law'' was sovereign. . 1ese '' ' . . the sens W 11 · I c . 1 1 of tl . . . cl a1 0 n 1a s t ·' ' to sovereignty 1s ·'sovereign'' (111 _ � . . 1n wl1icl1 sovereigilty is used 11ere) tinder tl1e Revised Const_itution ° Etl1 iopia?

2) (a) �l1at were tl1e SJJecir.;c legal . 'J' issues raised i11 , \1 'v e11two rtl1 's case? ) .� • ) Goodwi n's case? · �! . 111) Sl1 irley's case? · (b) I-low wot1ld e acI 1 o f. tl1ese o· thi . . E f cases b. ° . ? ut1on _e d ecided . Const1t L111der tl1e pia (W ofll l1 at are tile releva nt · e r Articles?) Ho,v, if at all, do they diff 71h tl1e co11stitu tional posit· ff rbe 0 _ e tak in n ?Y tl1e Englisl1 Parliament ry ntu ? 111 � . nal hisiof, wl1 at ways � 0°tile � readings fron1 Enolish utio . ') constit aid t1ndcrsti1nding 0 ._ <)f ti--1esc ')ro · s of tl1e l�cvised Constitut ion· 1 ''·1s10n

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(c) Consider tl1e followi11g argument; ''\Ve often l1ear disct1ssio11s about tl1e 'ind :pendence' of P[1rliam_ent. Tl1e establisl1n1e11t of an 'independe11t' Parl1�ment !11�ans tl1e est �bl1sl1ment of certai11 basic co11stitt1tional principles creating pr1v1leges and 1mmttnities for Parli,1n1e11t as a11 institution and· for Members of Parliamc11t inclivicl11ally. 111 01·cler to create an effective Parliament, it is first necessary to establisl1 tl1ese ·pri11ciJJles a. s 'worki11g legal institutions.'' What, in yot�r. o,vn words, does tl1is argt11ne11t 111ea11? Do yot1 agree wit11 it? What pr1v1leges and i1111nt111ities :.:1re provided for Parliame11t, now, in Ethiopia? I-fow can tl1ey be secured ,1s 'worki11g legal i11stitutions'? 3) What, precisely, was Coke's argt1111e11t in tl1e Cczse o_f Procla111ations? 011 wl1at did he base it? Could the sa1ne argt11ne11t be n1ade under tl1e Constitution of Ethiopia? The co11cept of ''prerogative powe.rs'' of tl1e mo11arcl1 is developed in the Constitution of Etl1iopia, is it 11ot? (In ,vl1icl1 chapter?) Does, tl1en, the monarch l1ave the power to ''cl1ange a11y part of tl1e law''? To ''create offences'' where there were none before? Does tl1e n1onarcl1 l1ave only sucl1 prerogatives as those ''which the law of tl1e land allows l1im''? 4) Comment on this propositio11: ''It was tl1rot1gl1 developme11t of its control over the purse strings of govern1ue11t tl1at Parlia1nent gradually won con­ trol over the governing of England.'' Is tl1is true? If so, ex·plain. Does ParliB.­ ment in Ethiopia have control over tl1e ''purse strings of government''? Vvl1at are the relevant articles of tl1e Constitution? 5) Consider the following observation: ''Tl1e readings in Section 2 (above) l1elp us to understand certain basic co11cepts of constitutional 1nonarchy. But tl1ere are important differences \vl1ich distinguisl1 the situati?n in Engla11d in the l 7tl1 _ century and in Ethiopia today. We cannot expect Etl1101)1a to follov, the sa� ne paths of constitutional development as England." Do yot1 agree? Explain.

SECTION 3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF ''RULE OF LAW'' Introduction · nt n1e in tra vern go res to . · s sections Jaw 11se to n ga be t en am rli Pa w In previou h we h��e seen e.g. the Magna Carta, the Pet1t1on .:>� Ri_ ?ght the Bill of Rights. In this section we explore f11rtl1er ts. rigl1 e ... tl1os re l;'ect1 to s''· e edi' ''rem d an the devel opment or 10 ts · · , 1 . h. ,, ig ''r na I t1o d'1v1ct ua1 , const t u . . and · a lega'. l process operat. de pen dent .I'tidiciary A comp lement to this was the development of an 1n . in tra d res an l1ts e 11r r1g sec to s cie en ag me co ing be ts tir co e · w'th th L 15 1 a Iarge measure o f autonomy. Th government - forcing it to act within the confines of the law. · e, and 11nevenl):', tjrn of iod per g lon a er ov · ed The development of these 1nst1tut1ons occurr . . ·. this area on the Revifed Const1B. U! we can trace considerab e influence of nglo- mer1c in Jaw n l A A_ � tution. The. readings below focus _ot1r a!tention,_ not on he eas er;era l izations of ''rule of J aw'', l evant articles re to it ate to rel t !; att st mu o al on y ma ?Ut sp�rfic problems. In studying this teri �lconstitutionfl law in Etl1iopia. The problems int he Revts.ed stitt1tion and to the deve 1op�ent O Con . ss e oc pr at iDd questions th lp l1e to d ne sig e d are at t.he en d of the section -. '\,

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ned of the interfev lai , mp nd co gla En of cl1 1ur CI f the roft 11ead o � n a B p o r h is b ch A e former were constan tly issai n� · th ls; na I n 1605 bu tri l ca sti sia cle ec t w1 1 the c la con1mon c· e co ur t o rder s) f o rbidding the Cl1ur ch Courts from entertaj! in w ��� � of tl1� the k.ing'_s name "prohi it t��!\ ��5·,01aintained, belon ged in the established law courts. KingJ ni o ld them that tbeyw erebis"� t case� wl�1cl1, as the comn10 s, ge ud ej tl1 o r f nt se l1e · e· sid � s 15 1l o p' 1b'� l re . A l 1e t e k · ta to ed in cl . 11c }1 cour t cases should go was in \V} o de c1"d e to t , ng ki 1e tl , 1im t r 0r 1' r· gates'', and asked wI1y 1·t \Vas no .

s 8 ge ., 43 it pa , 7.c 43 op am ch . ar M & on ns he ep St in , ts or ep R Fron1 Coke's p of Ca.nterbury con­ ho bis h c_ Ar ft, ro nc Ba by 1n lli to de n1a 11t lai n1p . . . Upon co ] ers t, vis a 1n th_ ad rta e c� wh [�y ? n the 111e or inf s \Va 1g ki1 tl1e , ns cerning prohibitio iza ve gn s l1a co ge ud nce :·· the al t�c as 1 _ J �es ecc _ tl1e rs tte 111a 1at \vl of s] ise question [ar geS � JU � ; ? d t�a an son e t per al r?y l11s 1n 1t ide dec 1y 1n, ] ded ad f,;ng !1 i1nse!f [e111pl1;1sis are bt1t tl1e ,Jeiegates of tl1e lc.ing, a11d tha t the Icing ma y take [jur1sd1ction over] \'tl1 .:1t cause;s 11.e s}1all i_Jlease ... and 111ay deter111ine tl1em l1imself. And the Archbishop said tl1at tl1is \VJS cJ.e,1r ir1 divinit)i, tl1at st1cl1 a11tbority belongs to the king by the ,vord of G<1d i11 t11e Scriptt1re. ,..fo \Vl1icl1 it was answered by me [Coke] in the pre· sence a11d ,,vitl1 tl1e cle::i.r co11se11t c,f all tl1e jt1dges of England and barons of ihe excl'1eq uer� tl1at 1l1e kir1g 111 I1is own l)erson cannot adjudge any case, either criminal ... or bet\vixt party and J)arty ... ; but tl1is ougl1t to be determined and adjudg ed in sorue co1Jrt of jt1stice ,:1ccordit1g to tl1e l aw and custom of England ...

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TI1en tl1e l(ing said tl1at l1e tl1ot1ght tl1e law ,vas founded upon reason, and that l1e and otl1ers had reason as well as tl1e judges. To wl1ich it was answered by · me [Coke] tl1at true it was tl1at God had endowed llis majesty with excellent scie nce 1 a:1d great endowments of nature; but_ l1is majesty ,vas not learned in the law s of : lus realm of E11gland, and causes wl11ch concern tl1e life or inheritan.ce or goods · or _ fortunes of l1is_ subjects are not to be decided by .natural reason, but b the arti· · y ficial reas�n and Judginent of law - which law is an act wl1icl1 requires lon g study and experience, before tl1at a 1na11 ca11 attain to tl1e coonizance of it - and thal the law_ was the gold�n m�twa�d a11d measure to try the causes of the subjectsi a d which protec�ed I11s maJesty rn safety and peace. l y gr e at wa s kin W g itl wh th 1 icl e 1 � oded, an d �aid tl1at then l1e sl1011ld be un de r the �� - which was treason to law �' as l1e said. To wl1om I said tl1at Bracton sa debet esse sub ''q u x no ith n re od hOIDine, sed sub Deo et lege'' [Tha t tlie k' er d · n u but Ing oug man ht , 11ot und er to be God and tlle Iaw. ] The Case of Co1n111endams From Maitland, op.cit., pages 270_271_ I n 1613 Coke was made Cl11· e . th 1 .�.f JUSttce of the King's Bench, see l1ope that in a more exalted ming ly · �0pe po si _ion Ile woul� prove more pliant. But the was vain. In Peacham 's case a;!1 1 ob Je ed to the Judges being asked singl _ an d for their opinions as to a y t ma��er w _ :ch wa s to ll judic1a y.fo0n· later day, when he was no com e the bef m ore lo ger a udge, he 0 suiting the judges about � obje practi cted to the whole C? ed ro su matJters - bu t at this time he merely obJ ect

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t�eir bein� consul!ed one by 0!1e: �s .solicitor a11d attorney-general I1e had ofte11 1 th e Judges for tl1e1r op as ke d n sel f 1 ? _ 1111ons. �l1e p_ r,1ctice, however evil it may seem 1n our ey�_s,. was an old, well-establ1s_l1ed J)ract1ce, and it was eve11 J)Ossible to contend that the Judges _ we re bound by tl1e1r oat11s to give the ki11g leg.... al advice wl1enever he asked for 1t . . . The� i11 1616 can1e tl1e case of the ''co111menda1ns' '-Bjs}101J Neile of Lincoln ]1ad received tw? be 11efices [grants of tJroperty] from tl,e ki110- to be l1eld ''i11 com­ that 1s to s�y, togetl1er witl1 l1is bishopric. A11 actio�1. was brougl1t against '', endam � l11m ?Y two 111en, Colt and Glo�er, �t10 co11tested tl1e legality of tl1e royal grant, .and 1n _th� cou�se of tl1e proceedings 1 t \.Vas reported to J ,1mes tl1at tl1e co1111sel for tl1e pla1n�1ffs d1sp1 1 ted the royal 1·jgl1t to gra11t a ''co111111endan1''. Coke a11d J1is fel­ lows rec �1ved orders no! to proceed w1tl1 tl1e l1eari11g of a11 action i11 wl1ich tl1e king's prerogative was q11est1oned ... From Acts of t/1e P,·iv_y Council, in Stepl1e11son & Marcl1am, OfJ.cit., page� 442-443 . o report This is t�e . . _ � the case of _con1n1endan1s ,vl1en tl1e judges appeared before the Prt\'Y Council, 1.e. the K1ng·s Royal Cot1nc1]. I-Iere ,,,e sc.e vvl1at happened between tl1e Chief Justice and the King.

His Majesty and tl1e lords [of tl1e co11ncil] tl1ougl1t good to ask tl1e judges severally their opinion, the q_uestio11 being put i11 tl1is n1an11er: wl1etl1er, if at any time in a case depending before tl1e jt1dges ,vl1ic11 l1is 111ajesty concei,1ed to conceri1 him either in power or profit, and tl1ereupon reqt1ired to cons·ult witl1 ti1em ftnd that they sl1ould stay proceedings in tl1e meanti1ne, tl1ey 011gl1t not to stay accordir1g­ ly. They all (the lord c}1jef justice [Coke] 011ly exceJJt) yielded tl1at tl1ey \\'Ould, ar1d acknowledged it to be their duty so to do. 011ly tl1e lord cl1ief jt1stice of the l<i·ng's bench [Coke] said for answer tl1at when that case sl1ould be, l1e wot1ld do ¥1hat -should be fit for a judge to do. Coke

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Judicial Review

From Roscoe Pound, op.cit., page 51. Next, in 1610 came Bonham's case, in wl1icl1 Coke sat as cl1ief justice. Here an act of Parliam�nt, confirmi11g tl1e cl1arter of tl1e Royal College of Physicians, gave the incorporated society of Pl1ysicians power to i1npose fines 11pon pl1ysicians offe·nding against its rules, the fines to be payable l1alf to the crow11 and l1a!f to tl1e society. �r. Bonham, having been jmprisoned �or 11_onpayment. of a fi11e 1mp_ose� under th1s prov sion, brougl1t an action for false 1m1Jr1so11me11t. Tl1e Cot1rt of King s Bench held the imprisonment wro11gful 011_ tV:o �r�11nds: (1) tl1at tl1e cl1arter,. �on­ 1s1c1ans ) of ege Pl1 tl1e all of 1 101 1ct 1scl <; JUr e firmed b·y the statute, did no t extend tl1 beyond those practicing in London, and (2) tl1at tl1e sta!t1te wl11cl1 1nade tl1e c�llege, which got half of the fine, judge of its own case,_ co1npla1nant, p_.rosecutor, _a11d Judge, was against common right and reason an d vo1d. _Tl1e court c1!ed, 011 tl11s last pro­ position .. . a case in th e reign of Elizabetl1 in wl11ch �:i statute 111 ge11eral tern1s was h€ld· not to be 80 constru.ed as to reach a result contrary to dt1c process of law. B11t ' 'li0nham's cas. e did no t involve a mere matter of interpretatio11.. Tl1e q11estion was �hetber Parliament could validly enact that 011e sl1ould be botl1 Judge and party · Judge in his own case. :

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173. page 1dix, 1 Appe , ibide111 , Reports Coke's . . . udges to . . From . d 5 ministe rs, a11d parties, giv _ e J sen te e b t o n n J� �:1�1 m011s; and parties to l1�ve tl1e moiety [i.e ; Tl1 e censor� ?a_ . e 5 a in to rs e st 1 11 1 m �; n e m g d 1 at i_ n ma11y cases, the colt. l or ju s o bo o t r u � 1 1 i · _ s ear a it d il A · · · ] e n [fi re t1 1t e rf fo 1 e of tl 1net1mes adJL1dge tl1em to be .. s0 and lt ' i\finei P· I, ar f Utte o ls r e ml · ,t l u o tr 11 o c 1 1 ·1 I W 1 w a n m� 1t . l d an r!g n ?o 11o 1 rea m co n, st 1 1 i or a ag is ug rep t eil n. ain rli Pa f o ct a 1 1 a 1. e1 l1 w r fo : id vo 1 Iaw will controul 1t, and adjudci or comm tile ' ned 1 r f o r e . °'' a1 1t o r impossible to b e p suci1 act to be voi d · · · land had the power to declare an Act of Par/fu. Eng of ris cou e ti 1 Note that oke decl a,.ed t 1 t

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C rigl1t''. This proposition was latcrre , "corn111on ' � ,� n and o ' O r cont r� yt 111e11t "void'' if i� ,v�s ��sngs fr�111 Dicey on ''Parliamentary Sovereignty'', later� r s e l e: pu_diated by Eng_t,sl:J�1�_ges ( did influen� Ame�ica�_jarists-and ' review' al "judici of �f,eo�' s k 1ele h C ter (i'1eC1 1erican revolt1tion. And, presumably, the idea of JUd1c1al supreman � is bap 0 ).d/Jo; a t was a? Pl� . _ tc'.ar l.1cle 1112 2 of the Ethiopian Constitution. We shall, of course, devote mu� in1a y be tn1p 1 1c1t in att ention to thi s problem 1n later cl1apters.

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' reading fron1 the .,1cts ·of t!tc Priv;1 Coun' cil (for th.e year 1616). These record! ·A gain · ,ve are ' lost patie · nce '' wit y · h S ·tr Ed ward Coke. ll n fina s Jan1e King that fact the t reflec cil cou of the king's

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Privy Cou11cil, in Stepl1e11son & Marcham op.cit., pages 443-444..

Sir Ed\vard Col(e, knigl1t, cl1ief jt1stice of ti1 e king's bencl1 , presenting himseU this day at tl1is board upo1 1 l1is l< 11 ees, Mr . Secretary Winwood signified unto him tl1at tl1eir lordsl1ips l1ad n1::1de repc)rt to l1is majesty of tl1at wl1icl1 passed on \\'�­ nesday last at 'Nl1itel1all, wl1ere l1e \Vas cl1c1rged by l1is majesiy's solicit or with c�rtam tl1i 11gs Vi1herein l1is 111ajesty was mt1cl1 t111satisfied ... l1is majesty was no \vay sat1sfied witl1 ... tl1e a11swer l1e offeretl1 to excuse l1is uncivil a1 1d indiscreet carria.g e before l1is 1 najesty, assisted witl1 l1 is privy council a 1 1d l1is judges, but that tl1e charge lie!b , still upon l1im, notwitl1standing anytl1i11 g contained in l 1is said a1 1swers. Ne,1ertl1eless, sucl1 is l1is 111ajesty's cle1ne1 1cy and goodness as l1e is pl ea sed no t �o proceed heavj.l y agai 1 1st hi111, bt1t ratl1er to look upo11 tl1e n1erit of his form� r .1 ser,11ces, a11 d accord11 1gly l1atl1 decreed ... tl1at Ile do forbear to ride this s rs 1 umm e circ . t1it as jus�ice o� assize; ... tl1at duri11g ti1is vacation ... lie take into ]1is considera· · tion and rev_iew l11s book of re1Jorts, ,vl1 erei1 1 (a s l1is majesty is informed) t her�-� many exorbitaiit 31 1 �xtra,,aga11t opi11io11 s se t down a1 1d pu bl isl1ed for pos iu�: and good law. A11d if, 1n tl1e review an d readi11g tl1 ereof l1e fi1 1d a1 1)1 thin g fit to.Ot altered or 311:e�de�, tl:e correcting tl 1ereof is left to l1is discretion ... An d ha ving corrected \\'l1at 11 1 111s �1scretion l1e fo u11d 111eet i 11 tl1ose reports, l1is n1ajesty's ple_ asur� was tl1at l1 � s110.uld br1 11g tl1e sa1ne re th e _ pr r iv at el y id e . to l1in1self, tl1 at l1e migl1t cons of a s in l11s pr111cely Jttdgmer1t sl1ot1ld b e fou11d expedient . . . o tl1 lord ? l1ie o . r jt1 p st ic e y n 1a de ili � a 1 1s w er tl1at l1 e did in all hum t ;� trate�1��· ��� t 0 f. 11 s lllaJeSt)' s go e . re o d de c p le as u re ; th tl 1at l1e acknowledged e be JUSt ...

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'I'J1e Developn1ent of J> rinciples of Due Process of Law lntroclz1crio 11

At tl1is point it is i n1por ngnJ Nf f Carta and to some of tl1e tant to �efi�r back to Coke 's interpre.ta tion of Clause 39 °t te!'1ll · . · spe� ific pr1nc1pIes tha which can1e to b e in TI1e "Act Abolishing Tl 'th·n ' w1 d at . e co rp n! or tn . r St a r o C h a1 11 ber' further interpretation of . P "d:�e process of ', discussed and se t out below,- refle cts an Jtll la\\,.,,

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Execittive Cou,·t5': T/1e '' Star Cl1c1111be1·'' a11d its /vi etli ods fro m Perry, op.cit., pages 125-136. ... The C �ur t o f Star Cl1tt111ber w,1s ,1 1 1 oJTsl1oot of tl1c Ki11g's C OLlllCl·1 ... . _ ddl A 1. e M � ge t . h l s t 1e Cot111c1 l exercised broad a11d trndefined exect1 tive During_ legislative an� JLldtctal power. As gover 1 1111e11tal ft1 1 1ctio 11 s beca 11 1e better defi11ed' t� ere were split off fro m tl1e Cot111ci l se\1er�1l �o ttrts, eacl1 l1avi 1 1g a distinct j t1risclic� _ we th re e he co se ur ts of Excl1eqt1e.r, K.111g's I3e11cl1, tl1e Co111111011 I)leas. Tl1e t1011. ! establ1�hmen� o� t_hese cot�rts, l1oweve 1·, clid 11ot take �tlJ jt 1 cliciaJ bt1si 1 1ess fro111 tl1e Council. �ts �u�1cial fLt11ct, 101 1s \vere largely t111 i 1 11paircd, a11c.l it co11ti 1 1t1ed to acl1ni­ nister jt1st1ce 1n 1 ts ow n fash io11 - ,t fasl1io 11 wl1icl1 ci i ll'erecl radically fro1 11 tl1e 1 netl1ods of the comn1on la\v. * Its powers and p 1·ocedl1res a� ouse(i opposit.io11 as early as tl1e fo11rtee 11 tl1 centt1ry. The common �aw co11rts were Jealo11s of its jt1tiicial !)Owers; Parliament looked up�n it as a11 1nstr11ment,1J ity o� 11rerogati \1 e gover11111 e11t; l,1wyers were suspiciot1s of its encroacl1n1_e11 ts �1 pon tl�e1r leg�1l b11siness; a11d. lay111e11 feared its arbitrary procedur es and 1ts m1gl1ty d1scretio11 ,1ry JJowers. .. . As earl)' as tl1e fourtee11tl1 ce11lt1ry tl1e 11,1111e ''Star Cl1a1nber'' was tised to designate the roon1 in \\1estn1i11ster Palace v. l1ere tl1e Cot1ncil sat as a judicia·1 body. The Star Cl1amber e111erged as a separate court dt1ring tl1e 11ext ce11tt1ry.... The principal statt1te afnrn1ing its powers \\'as tl1e Act of 1487, ''Pro Ca1nera Stellata' '. ... During tl1e reign of Elizabetl1 I tl1e Star Cl1an1l)er oftei1 acted as tl1 e champion of perso11s oppressed by overbear.ing and corrupt me1nbers of tl1e 11 obility. For many years it was considered to be botl1 a 11ecess�1ry a11d an efficie11t institt1tio11 ,. and it l1eard a large ntunber of cases botl1 great a11d small. By tl1e end of tl1e sixteentl1 century its procedures bad beco111e well defined. ... The power of the court to issue a11d e11force proclamatio11s ga\ e it i111portant legislative and executive functio11s i11 addition to its jt1dicial duties. ·r11ese ft1nctions were not much different from those exercised by .tl1e Privy Col111cil. ... During tl1e reign of Jan1es I (1603-25), [royal] procl,1mations were isst1ed much more freq·uently tl1an during tl1e Tt1dor period. Tl1ey ,vere enforced by the

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Dicey's summary of the procedure of tl1e Council is as follo\\1S: ''Tl1e Council ,tcted in one of two modes. The most summary was tl1e proceeding 'ore ten11s'. On tl1e recei)tion of a cl1arge by the Council - one grounded, it might be, on 'common report,' or on secret inforn1ation, the accused person was privately arrested, a1:d. broLight _before tl1e . CoL111cil Board. Tl�ere l1e was exam.ined. If he confessed, or made adm1ss1ons considered eqL11-v1alent to a confession, l1e was condemned 'ex ore suo' and judgment was given agai11st l1in1. I-le kne\v neitl1er his acc11ser nor the crime of whicl1 he 'was accused, and J�Je was subjected to an exa111ination \Vl1icl1, as even Hudson admits was conducted with scanty fairness to tl1e l)risoner. He n1igl1t, indeed refuse either to confe;s or to a 1 1swer any questions. If so, l1e was 11ot conden111ed, b11t re111,1ndeci to prison, that the Council mig ht adopt a11otl1er course. . . . 1as 1t of A ]a11 . bill b� n1p bill o \\ d c_ cee pro to was n, utio sec ''This, the second mode of pro addressed to the Council, signed by a Councillor. Wl1en t_he bill was filed, or 1_n son1e cases even before its filino tlle accused was summoned by a writ of st.1bpoena. On l11s appearance the defendant was b�und to answer on oath the plainti_ff's ?ill. If l1e refL1sed to n,ake a re1Jly, he was committed to prison; and, after some delay, his cr1me was tr�ated as ackno�vle_d?ed. If �e put in an answer, his case was not much better; _l1e was ex�m1n�d by tl1e pl�111t1fl ?n wntten interrogatories a refLrsal to reply to any.of wh1cl1 . led. to 1m_pr1sonment of 1ndefin1te and sometimes life-long duration. A,fter the plain_t1ff' s ex�m1n�1t1on, witnesses, whose cl1aracter the accused was not allowed to shake, were pr1vately examined. T�e ca��se was ! hen read� �or determination, and after, it might be, a long delay, sentence was given. Tire Pr1V)' Courrczl (London, 1887), pages 102-3. . ':. •

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ty rie of va cs J)i a tO d . The se in 1 re ve co 1 s 1 io at am cl ro . J . ,e Tl . r e b i i i a h � . r uct ) ct ct o ta 1 e co ndu f municipa l ele tl d Court of S an ses es i i isi bt d l i n a . s t: d _ tr f _ o 11 0 t1 �. la :� u pri n of tl1e tio fo ula reg e os 1 r � __ tl ed tl1e reg re we r� j de or n ts 1ng, f ° t tn t, r O 1 nJ . 1 t s o 1 11 . · . . An1o1 1g tl1e ) .. e u d ns l1a 1o en at be 1 i la oc d ss n r at 111 e tl1 d ie . i ai pl in · . ea1. co t 11 c 1n I. a I . . r a P O 1 6 I 11 I · · 11 a1tie s imposed were great er th J)e · · t tl1a :i: v la\ · tlie ' an . 11ew offe11ses L111 k 110,v11 to . . . · . 1 t 1or1zed trib 111 a au d b un j 1e tr , g 111 be re we s l on una rs pe . t s. 1 : ' li· t · cl 11 · a , . w 1 a Y b . d ze . 1 · dge ·ISJU aubt 11or 1e s. p Iy. of the Judge· Tl . h re to s 11 1 0 at 11 1 a cl o )r fJ o · tiestioi1 �, · d · ct · · J a1 11es SLt b 11 11·tted tli e q · J t o ry of 1n 1v1 ual bbert ir, 11s ·I 1e t 1 11 rk 11a l1 · 11c 1�1 cl d re le :·· .· deI:i,,ered b)' Coke' 15 coiisic t t I I t ·I d le ya ,a an ro s, 1:e 11 er c1 pr w 11c at te og ea cr 11 · e t i1o d 11l co 1g 1 k.i e tl1 _ t 1a tl ed at st e I-l ed to 1s be ft re und by thll{, s bo ng ki rt ua St l1e T 11d ]a J ie tl of v a, v · · ...,., • �ect t o tli""e ' w. as· s11-b. . 1ss ' co•11t·1• 1 1 ucd to 1 ce d r. c11 1 or proclan ation.s 00 an L1e cr 11b 1 a 1 c1 , ar . 11111 1tar10 11 s. Tl1 e· St l o tr . 11 co se ci er ex to d l1c is \.v g 11 1zi e th 1 cl l1i w 311y stibject O\'Cr 11re of [Star C .hamber] was ed ?c JJr e th of s re 1tu fcr ic ist ter ac ar ch e tl, of . . . Oiie lJe? the oath e.tojficio. s ca \1/a 11s Tl . th oa s l1i on t1p 11t 1da fc1 clc tl1e of o11 ati 11 tli c exa111i 1s 011 any subjeci: 101 �st e� qu sw an o t_ ed 11ir req be t gh n1i 11t da fen c!e the 1 tl oa it t1y th� 1 1qu1re. The oatb ex officio 1 to l1ed w1s 1rt cot the ich ,vh 1t boL 1 ::: ng, 1ati i 1i rin inc cr vev ho\ r d ical ast rts lesi cou tl1e ecc of u ing ure ced ]Jro tl1e of t p�1r as hacl bee11 clevclc>pcu Ll·1 e thirLec11th ce11rury. It \\1as not 1111li] tl1e seve11tee11tl1 centu 1·y, ]1owever, that stre· nuous ol)jcctil,JlS to its t1se were ri:1ised. 011e of tl1e earliest objectio11s was made by tl1e f-irst }) arlia111ent c)f J,1111cs I i11 160�i. It presented a petition to the king asking 1l1at "the oatl1 e.\: o_/jic:i<J, v.;l1crc:by 111e11 �ire forced to accuse tl1emselves, be more Si)a ri 11gl:')1 llSCd.'' ... Objcctio11s to tl1e oath e.\: o_/]icio \Vere li11ked ,vitl1 objections to other prac.· Lices or rl,c court. Tl1e objectio11s bcca111e scriot1s i 11 tl1e early seventeenth century as the result of th� operatio11s of tl1e coL1rt LI11der Ja111es I a11d Cl1arles I. The mos! notable l)rotest against Ll1e o,1tl1 vvas 111,1de l)y Jol1n Lilbt1rne d11ri 1 100 l1is trial in !63i 011 a charge of JJri11ti11g or i 1 111Jorti11g certai11 l1eretical and seditious books. Although l1e ,vas vvilli11� to a11swc!· qL1estions concer 11 i 1 1g tl1e cl1arges 111ade against l1im, Lilburne J)rc>tes�ed �lg,�ins t_ quest1 0 1 1s clesig11ed to obtai 11 info r1 11atio11 co11cerni11g otl1er matier; _ 1g 11,1ture. of a11 111cr1111111at11 After l1e J1ad de11ied tli e cl,arges n1ade, lie said:

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you to any n1orc of tl 1ese qt1estio11s ' becat1se I see you go abo ut -· · ·. 1 c�n1 � ot \villing lo ans\vcr . . l I11s E xan11nat1on to ensnare n1e·• f or see,ng ,ell -tor ,vl11cl1 pro e · · 1 t 1c b l I 11ngs cannot . in1pris I oned an1 • er • . e othe r n1attcr out of n1y cxan1 in::1tion: and tl1erefore if you will not ask mt t !f;�·�ts ll�� �h���� 1�::� 111 Y cl1arge, l shal l ans\.ver ' i1 110 n1ore ...

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· · · · Pe rl1 a uon Js tl1 e nlo t s - · r111 -· -1 g defe11se of tl1e privileoe ag,1i 1 1st self-incr1m1na st1 1 · �· . ec,,t ce 1 ��OJ�1;; 1 ent 1 �:� 1 ltLi ry wa s wr L itte 11 by ilb11r�e i 11 1653 in l1is �amr �. ��:� 7 : _ 1 e11 ce o J o 111 L1lbur 1 1e' '. He sai ,v11 s ict d, i n describing l1 is confl Cl1arles I:

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Ano her fundan1enta l rigJ1t I then l:Y:· . nce ought to Jl."!. ded for, t cont e1'. ,vas tl1at n o man's conscie tacked b y oaths iniposecl ' to an ' s,ver to questions concern p ing himself i n n1atters criminal, or rended to be so. Tl1e ancient kno1,vn right and it Ja I la v 0 � England being, tl1at no n1an be put to his defe nc� a ui UJ?On any n1an 's bare saying, ; iihf �r lt IJ 11 l11s oatl1, but f b) an by witness brought for the san1e presentment of lawful men, d _ � in fa ce t J; _ a l a v _ hat an power m_ay a! pl easure rake into nd l ,: , known right, witl1out '"'hich _ y c e5!lllt, the r ts of every man for n1atte r to destroy life l1bert Y, or ciiti ·· · now it being my lot to b e dra( n ou t and req a t t to questions against my self uir re ed t k d t o a e oa h and to be r;qui o �:ttI. and ? ; crs whon1 I li ty, as resolved l y persisted tl1e honoured ' · · · I stood'' firm to our true ·Eag sbd 'If• i.ar· rein, endttring a n1ost n a barous 1· n1prisonm ing, · · cru gag el g wl1ipping, pilloring, ent, rather tJ1an betra . • Y tlie rJghts a.11d liber tie s of every man ... * Cf. The Case 0'Jr proe1 a111at1ons' in Sect·ion 2, above.

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An E.,"(GrJ1JJ!e of Sta,· Chambe,· in Action . Ca se: er' s J,trc }z. .· .

. · Con sider �he foll��vin¥ _wl1!�h is a !�pical repor� of a cas e l1eard by tl1e Star Chamber. The case doe� �ot 1nvholv� · sedition . or pol1t1cal oppression. Rat11er it .reflec ts a n1ore ro11tine exerc ise of juris?1ct1on:.t e tr!al and pun1sh1:-1ent_ of a_ n1an who l1oar-ded gr11in. A sk yourself: wl1at is legally wrong, 1f anything, with tl1e proceedings 1n tl11s c ase? Could tl1is kincl of c ase occ t1r t1ncler tl1e Revised eonstit11tio n?

fron1 Star Chambe,· Repo,·ts, i11 Step.l1enso11 & Marcl1a1n, OJJ.cit., page 465. One Archer of Sout.l1cht1rch i11 Essex was brot1gl1t 01·e ten11s�:, bei11g tl1e11 cl1arged i11 l1is co1·n a11cl co11seq_t1e11tly for en11a11ci11g by Mr._ Attorney General for kee·pic1g _ the price of c�rn tl1e last year; wl11cl1 offe11ce J\/11·. Attor11ey affirn1ed to be of ]1igh nature and evil co11sequence, to tl1e t111doi ng of tl1e J)oor a11d 111a/i1111. in se [evjl i11 itself, i.e. evil irrespective o·f the law] a11d. the11 desired l1is exan1i11atio11 taken before the lord keeper migl1t be read. His exa111i11atio11 purported tl1at l1e l1ad see11 at the time of l1is examining a presentrne11t tl1at was 111,1de agai11st l1im by tl1e gra11d jury at the last assizes in Essex before Jt1stice Vero11 for the said offence of kee1)i11g in his corn and enhancing [increasing its pr.ice]; a11d for t11at l1e l1ad made a bargain to sell tl1e poor of tl1e town wl1ere l1e dwelt rye for 7s. a bt1s11el, a11d afterwards refused to perform his bargain t1nless l1e 111ight l1a,1e 9s. a busl1el. I-:Ie denied this bargain, but for 11.is exct1se sajd l1e sold to tl1e tow11s abot1t }1i1n, for the poor, wheat at 7s. and 8s. a bushel, and at tl1e latter e11d of tl1e year for 5s.; and rye for 7s. and 6s., etc., and some for 3s. and 6d. tl1e bushel. He co11fessed l1e ke1)t i11 l1is corn till June, and tl1at he had 8 quarters of wl1eat, 60 qt1arters of rye, a11d 100 q11arters of oats; and that his family we1·e himself a11d l1is wife and daugl1ters, two maicls and · ford f·I11ndred a man. He confessed t11at he sold no11e or very little of l1is corn in Roch where he dwelt, thougl1 l1e were com111anded so to do by tl1e earl of Tv-/arwicl<. Yet for his defence he furtl1er alleged tl1at l1is barn was 11ot visited by any jL1stices or officers according to his majest)1 's late proclamation and orders for tl1at purpose. {i.e., he was never ordered to sell any of tl1e st1r1Jlt1s l1e l1ad stored.] Justice Harvey . . . \Vas of opi11.ion tl1at tl1is man's pL1nisl11ne11t and example will do a great deal more good than all tl1eir orders wl1icl1 tl1ey migl1t l1ave made at the sessions. And therefore l1e cleared his offence to be very great and fit to be punished in tl1is court; and adjudged l1irn to pa)' 100m. fine to the king a11d 10 to the poor, and to stand upon the pillory in Newgate Market an l1ot1r. witl1 a JJaper, wherein the cause of I1is standing tl1ere was to be written, put t1pon 111s l1at - ''�or enhancing [increasing] the price of cor11'' - and then to be .led th1·ougl1 Cl1eaps1de to Leadenhall Market, and there likewise to stand upon the p1llo1·y one l1ot1r more ...

The Act of 1641 Abolishing t/1e Sta,· C/1amber From Perry, op.cit., pages 138-141.

an1e11t, � * !t is es _ confirmed i� p�Lrli _ WHEREAS by the great charter m�ny tim _ e11acted, Th at 00 freeman shall be taken or 1mpr1son�d, or d1sse1se� of 111s free­ h<)ld or liberties, or free customs, or be ou.tlawed or exiled or otl1erw1se destroyed,

,. · To answer in person.

Note· th.e many references to Magna Qirta in the A c t. Be sure you �an �.race th� p�ec1 1sehc onnec­ . tion between Clause 39 and the Act. A nd �onsider wl1a� c�t1st1t11t1ona_ 1 p�·1�c 1p e t at .A ct :. seeks to establish. Is tbat princip]e reflected 1n the Const1t11t1on of Eth1op1a • What are the relevant .articles ?

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; t by lawful judgrn u im b h n m e d n o c r o , iro 1 1 n o p u t ss ' T,T: p a nt t 0 11 11 • I \V g n u r . . 1e l t and tl1at . . . . d n l a e l1 t f o v e ]a\ 1 l t y . ble o r determinable bef b r o , s r e e p is h f o e or e an11n a th ex . rs s te at m d ai ll a , s a 1 1 c t1 1n s a r 1o II. A 11 d " ar- c1 1a mber, �a y ha ve tl1eir Propq st e 1 tl ed ll ca . ·J u dges or in tl1e court commonly n, by the com m io ct e rr d co n a t n e 1m sl 1 n t1 p ue o d . ' ir n e th d n a s, s · e r d re · d ; (2) and forasmu e r _ \1/ e h I e s remecty an e e c t1 s f J� o e s r t1 o c y r_ ch a in d r o 1e tl 1 i1 d n , a d n uance of that coun n law of tl1e la ti n d n co a n io ct re e 1e tl g n ci u ind s ve ti o m d 11 a s 11 o as re e 1 tl as d ecrees _of that cour , ve g n a s re su n e c , s g ha in t �d ce ro p e l ti r 1d a ) (3 e: s do now cea en to the subjects, an d the means l1 rt u b le b a r le to in n a e b to d un fo 1 1 ee b e nc ie er p ex y b · · t; n e m · rn e v o g d n a er \v o p to introdt1ce an arbitr ary t en is of es th pr ty a ri rli l1o pa ut a 1e tl nt me by ed ct a n e nd a ed in da or it III. Be io l ct al d di an ris ju r, be n, m 1a cl ra st we; po e 1 tl ed ll a c y nl . o m m co t ur co d TI1at tlie sai y , or by an u� e co e m th j udges, sa e tl1 in ed s i rc e ex or , to un g in ng lo be ity 1 or and autI e 1n th ar t of ye us 11g r A ou of d d a Lor y · st fir e tl1 1n fro be f, eo er tl1 s er ist in m or s, officer arly and absolutely dissolved-.... e cl , e on d an rty fo ed dr 1n I11 six God one tl1ousand enc efo rth no court, council h m fro t tha ... e cl, act en ise e'vv lik it be d An IV. 1it hin ted or oin ted itu app nst \\ co d, ine a ord d, or place of judicatt1re, sl1all be erecte all have, use or exercise thf sl1 icl1 wh. les, Wa of ion nin do1 or l, /anc Eng of ln1 rea 1 is tl same or tl1e lik.e jt1risdictio11 as is or hatl1 been u sed, practised or exercised in the said cot1rt of star-cl1amber. V. Be it likewise dec l ared and enacted by a t1tl1ority of this present p arliament, Tl1at neitl1er I1is 1\1ajesty, nor l1is privy cou11cil , have or ougl1t to have any jurisdic · ti?11, power or a11tl1ority, by Englis/1 bill, petitition, articles, libel or any other ar · b1trary way whatsoever, to exami11e or dra\1/ into question, determine or dispos� o� tl1e la11cls, teneme11ts, l1 ereditan1ents, goods or cl1attles of any the subjects o f this k1n�do?1, bt1t tl1at tl1e sarne ougl1t to be tried a nd determined in the ordinary court� of JL1st1ce, and by tl1e ordinary course of tl1e l aw. • • •• • ••• •

VIII .. And be it �l so provi_de� a11d enacted, Tl1at if any person shall h ereafter be con1n1 1tted, restra111ed of 11 1s liberty, or suffer i ini)risonment, by the order or ecre of a11 y st1cl1 _cot1rt of star-chan1ber, or otl1er court afo resaid DO\V or at an) � e �1 ere�fter tim , 11 avin� or pretei1di11g to l1a ve tl1e same or like J·�risdiction' pow ei • 1 ran or aut1 1or1ty to comn1rt or lillJ)r·iso11 as a1oresa1d, war cor (2) or by tl1e command . . . . of tl1e King 's maJesty, 1 11s l1e1rs or successors in tl1eir com · the by · or ow n per son' · , 11� ' 1 mand or warra11t of tl1e c t111c1·1-b?ard, or of others o � or a11)' of lords tl1e Majesty's privy cot1ncil . � eJ mitt a 1 �ver c�m 11 so sucl1 ci:1se every person � restrained of ! 1is liberty' 0� )SL�� �. ng 1 1 � sonment upon de mand or r_not1on m� 1:1)ri r e by I1is cou11sel, or otllc; e in )l o :� by o 111n 1 1_ for tl1at l)Urpose, t1nto tl1e Jud ges f Y · cottrt of I<.i 11g's bencll or c leas In open co ur t, sl1all witl1out de la y, fiu�� l ar�y prete11 ce \vl1atsoever, fo ��1���d ? ; fees _ 0 inar ha ) usually paid for tl 1e san1e, ve w1tl1 gra11ted unto )1 j01 a wr1.t of / zczbeas corpils ... Legislative Coi,rts: T/1e T .. I a� d· E:tecutio,z of Ki11g C/1arles I (1649) · Refer to the readings in tlie ; 1, · I 1 c· war.

latsitasection' ctescri·b·tng b tl1e causes and aftermath of the Eng1·15 ·

Fron1 Act Erecti,zg c, J-ligli Court r· , a vf r O . e (6 Janua ry 1649 , j 11 Stepl1e nson & if Ju_ Slrc c h a111, op.cit., page 516. , ) . of a . . Tl1 e act o! tl 1e comm ons of. Engla od assembled in parliament for erect ingJand· :· liigl, cotirt of Justice for ti 1e g o tryiilg aod judgi11g of J3 of Cl1arles Stt1art, king • ,I .-

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125 -�-- - -------------- ------=-=ENGLISH SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL L AW

Whereas it is notorious th at Charles Stt1art, tl1 e now ki11 g of E 1 1gla11d, not content with th._ o�e ma ny encroacliments whicl1 his predecessors l1ad made upo 11 tl1.e people in tl1e1r rights an d freedoms, }1ath _ had a wjcked design totally to st 1 bvert tl1e ancie11t and fu�darnental laws �nd l1bert1es of this natio11 and in tl1eir place to introduce an arbitrary_ and �yran�1cal governn1ent, an d tl1at, besides all otl1cr evil ways and .rneans t? br!ng this design to pass, l1e l1atl1 prosec11ted it witl1 fire and sword, levied and ma1n ta!ned a cruel wa r 1n t �e lan d agai11st tl1e parliame11t a11d kingdo1n ... : ore of tl1e like or greater inco 11ve11ie1 1ces ' a11.d to tl1e e11d no for prevention theref . chief office� or 1:1ag1strate wI:iatsoever n1ay l1e1·eafter J)rest1n1e traitorot1sly a11d 111aliciously to 1m�g1ne �r contrive tl1e e11slavi11g or destroyi11g of tl1e Englisl1 nation, and to expect 1m �t1�1ty for so doi11g; be it 01·dai11ed and e11�1cted by tl1e con1mo11s in parliament, and �t 1s l1er�by ordai11ed a11d e 11 acted by tl1e at1tl1ority tl1ereof, that Tl1omas Lord Fairfax, OI1,1er Cron1 well, I-Ie 1 1ry Ireton [a 11d others] sl1all be and are hereby appointed a11d req11ired to be co 1 n1nissio11ers a11d judges for tl1e J1earing, ·trying and adj11dging of the said Charles Stt1art.... a11d to take order for tl1e cl1arging of him, the said Cha.rles Stt1art, wit.11 the crin1es a11d treaso11s above .r·1e11tioned. On January 21, 1649, Ch.arles \VJS brougt1t before tl1e ''co11rt'' created by the above Act of Parliament. His sole defence, tl. 1e only defence lie \vould offer, WclS as follo\vs.

From Rushwortl,, Historical Col/ectio11s, i.11 Ste1)he11son & Marcl1a1n, op.cit., pa.ge 517. _ There is no proceedi11g just agai 11 st any men but wl1at is warranted eitl1er by God's laws or the municipal laws of tl1e co1111try wl1 ere l1e lives .... How the l1ouse of commons can erect a court of judicat11re, whjcl1 was never one itself (as is well kno\vn to all lawyers), I leave to God and tl1e world to judge. .And it were f11ll as strange tl1at tl1ey should prete1 1d to make laws \Vitl1011t king or lords' house, to any that have l1eard speak of tl1e laws of England. And adn1itti11g, but not granting, that tl1e people of E11gla11d 's commissio11 could grant yot1r l)re­ tended power, I see notl1ing you can sl1ow for tl1at; f�r certai1 1Iy yot1. never asked the question of the tenth man in tl1e kingdom; and in tl11 s way yot1 ma111festly \vrong even tl1e poorest ploughman, jf you demand not l1is free conse1 1t ·:. Tl111s you see all my that I speak not for :-.1y own rigl1t alone ... but also for tl1e true l 1 ?erty_ of _ subjects - wl1ich corisists, not i11 the power of govern1ne 1 1t, bt1t 10 l1v111g und �r such laws, such a government, as ma y give themselves the best ass11ra11cc of tl1e1r lives and property of their goods ...

It is probably accurate to say that the trial and execu tion of tl1e k_ing, ul it n1ately t1nde_rn1ined t an a�1y otl1er ac .t T_he King s argt1n1ents 11lt�m�tely Crom well's revolutionary government more h prevailed. What we re the legal principles 11pon wl11ch lie based his defence ?. Are tl1ese pr1nc1ples in any way embodied in E t h iop ia's Cons titL1tion?

of t en m op el ev D he T om ed re F l na so The Right to Per . nt 1e nn so ri p Im l fu w a nl U om fr ns io ct .l,egal Prote From Di. ce1·, T/1 e La,v of The Constitutiori (1959 ed.) pages 206-210

· Profess,or Dic y was a great 19th ce1itury expouocler o_f tl,e E11glisl�. Consti t11 t!on. His �riti_ngs . 1on t _ lt1 1 t n� 1 Co 1sl l g_ 11 En 1lte \vI 1111 the g S'f0"'tlt1v he I e·d t I e . ce d1n an rst de tin · g ancl es1· 1n tl f . c. sy s 1011al tt1l t 1 ns Co sh gl1 Er1 e of t n 1ne op vel . cle e t h e on c ' t en ftt1 z 1 , o ann.1mpor an t 1n p�o , were . �,· sense p .. 1s ,wr1t1ngs, h tht.{ ·in Ia\\· � .. .

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. w 1 1.� c11 a E glishman enjoys fo r personal freedom does no t U r�� Y . y an d ne ai nt . co on The sect1r1ty in iti os w op pr l ra ne � any ge ; ri ne I e n a 1n 1g r o r o n o p u 1 d i e p de document. . .. d n n la g ea n m s E in in d o o st e� d n �ub stance 1 1: s a ty er b li l a n so er J) Tl1e rigl1t to , st or other physical coe re ar t, en 1m 1 s0 r1 p 1m to ed ct ie rib st be , · to t J o • n · · t 1 1 g . ri s , n o rs e p a. 1 st1fication. . .. Now pers · Jt I ga le of 1t in . ad t on no es al do at th er 1n 1 a m . y n a c1on 1n th b e · 5tric d � a I Y E �g � · · in in ma d re ten cu se s 1 u ance 1 ter 1 e tl of e ns se is th 11 j freedom pt ed n ce o ex 1s 1n due COUllf pr r _1m o ed st re ,1r e b n ca n -� ?1 of tile principle tI1 at no w r e de m un d) so e _ l de ga 1n le s rm te l ra ne arrant ge 1 n very 11 a1 ag g in ak pe (s . i.e , w la of cured b)' tl1e provi sion s� s 1_ 1t , c� en qu se 11 o c e or n1 r fa of is or aut lJority, and, w I1 at .. e. . pl c1 1n s 11 pr tl f o t en 1 e enforcem tl r fo ns 1 ea n l ga le te t1a eq ad f o n of an English lord tio ga sti i � tl1 at 1 ad l ire lta Vo 25 17 in t tha e �s � . . . . Supp u]d not have needed wo He 1 11 Paris. d ate tre s wa 1 l e as on nd Lo 1 11 d bec1.1 treate tl1e_ favour of the on up or ds en fri his of l wil od go e 1 tl on t1p s res red for d to depen ta by uld g co kin He the es. urs co proper o t\v of e on 1ed rs1 pt1 ve l1a 1ld cot He . try Minis steps !1 ,1 ve cat1sed all l1is assailants to be brot1gl1t to tria l as criminals. He could, if l1 e l 1 a.d preferred it, l1a,;e brot1gl1t an action against eacl1 and all of them: he could l 1ave sued tl1e 11oblen1a11 wl10 ca11sed 11im to be thrasl1ed, tl1e footmen wl10 thrashed l1irri, tl1e po]ice1ne11 w l10 t l1 rew !1i111 into gaol, and tl1e gaoler or lieutenant who kepi hi111 t l 1ere. 1"\lote J)artict1larly tl1 at tl1e actio11 for tresp'ass, [i.e. the private action for da111ages] to wl1 icl1 Voltaire would l1ave 11 ad reco11rse, can be brought, or, as the technical expression goes, ·'Lies'', against every perso11 ·. tl1rougl1out tl1 e realm.- It ca11 _ a11d l1as bee11 brot1gl1 t against governors of colonies, against secretaries of state, against �fficers wl1 0 11.ave tried by court-n1artial perso11s 11ot subject to militaD1 l aw, aga111st every kincl of official l1 igl1 or lo\V. Here tl1 e11 we come across another aspect of tl1e ''rule of law''. No one of Voltaire's enemies would if l1e had been iiij�red_ in E_11gl a�d, l1 ave been able to esc::1pe fro 1n respo11sibility on the ·p lea of act111 g 1 1 a11 official cl1aracter or in obedie11 ce to J 1 is official superiors. Nor ,vou!d ariy 011e� of _t l�en1 have bee11 _able to say tl1 ,lt tl1e degree of }1 is guilt could m any \Va), whatever be deterrn1ned by a11 y 111ore or less official court. Voltair e1 10 keep t� our �xamJJI�, \VOt_ild 11:ive bee11 able i 11 E11gla nd to l1 ave brougl1t each aod all of I11s assa1la11 ts, i11 clud111g tl1e officials wl1 0 ke pt l1i 1 n i 11 pri nary ord i an bef ore son ourt, ;,n? tlJerefore before jtidges and jt1ry111e11 wl1 0 i to h el r lik all we a' ot t 11 e y t nk �l 1at o c1a1 zeal _or tl1e orders of official stiperiors were eitl1 er a legal or a moral � exctise I or brea k111 g tile la\v.

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T/1e ''Grec1t Writ'' of· f/c1beas Cor JJllS ibide111, pages 214-228.

· � e g a d l o c .oal t1 n . 1e 1 1 ts . J c o . 11 st,ttltl g ve t 1 le best • . xpla 11c:lt1o . f n and 1llustrat 1on ° eoof pr1nc1p_les. We s11 all do well ti � ; 7 lere ore to examine with care tl1e following coPY a writ of habeas corptis :*

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!)icey is here referring to ie$. the 1 t . ous p nis n " u l1a1ent'' of Voltaire by son1e of hi:i cn�;0d. � �re- r�v?lutionary 1:-"rance. �� �r; t e, tl:c celeb�at.ed scl in l11s �r1t1ngs, antagon 10Iar, writer an d pamph�etee in¢ ized cer tai f n �I,e 1nfluent1al nobles. r re� hjJll a.nd :with _the help of h thro men The ug , se th�1 � 1als, captured Voltaire on the streets of Pa ris, an 1n 1 P�1sonecl him. governn1cnt f r:d# t Apparently t�e a o 0 w f F_ra1:c e, at that time, offered lit�le ho� rventioP �� o1 tai!e· The onl y way he c ould s u!e his libert y ,nte t he King. Or son1eo te ultima tl1e as thro u gh w ne close to ti1e�K i · . ng.

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· ''Victoria, by tl1e Grace of God, of tl,e united Kingdo m of Great Br1ta1n · and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith' To J.K., �eeper of Otlr G�ol at Jersey, in tl1 e Island of Jers ey an to , d ; J. C . Viscount of said Island, �reet1ng. W e com 1 nand you tl1at yo11 J1ave tl1e bo dy of . . C.C.W. detained 1 n our prison under your cust · ody ' as ' it 1·s sat·d, together ·h - wit . t I1e day and ''cause of. h"IS bei·ng taken a11d detai11ed, by wl1atsoever 11a1 ne 11e n1ay be called or known, 1 1 1 our Cotirt b�fore us, at West1ni11ster, 0 1 1 the l8tl1 day of Ja�uary next� . to undergo and receive c:tll a11 d singt1la1· s11cl1. matters and tl1ings. wh1cl1 our said Co�rt sh�ll tl1�n and there co11sider of 11i111 in tl1is bel1alf; and have tl1ere then this Writ. W1t11ess THOMAS Lord ENMAN, a t westm 111 · ster,. . the 23rd day o f December 1n tl1e 8tl1 year of ot1r 1·eig11. By tl1e Court, Robi11s011 At tl1e instance of C.C.W. F�.M.R." W.A.L., 7 Gray's In11 Square, London, Attorney for tl1e said C.C.V\T." The characte.r of the doctr.me11t is pate11t 011 its face. It is an order isst1ed. in· the particu�ar inst �ce, by t11e Cot1rt of Q11ee11's Be11cl1, calling t1pon a perso11· by who.m a prisoner 1s alleged to be kept i11 co11fi11e1ne11t to bring sucl1 prisoner - to ''l1ave his body'' hence tl1e name l1 a.beas corJ)US - ·before tl1e court to let the cot1rt know on what gro11nd tl1e prisoner is confi11 ed, and t11l1s give to the cot1rt tl1 e opportunity of dealiIJg witl1 tl1e priso11er as the law 111ay reqt1ire. Tl1e essence of the whole transaction is that the cot1rt ca11 by tl1e writ of ]1abeas corpt1s ca11se a11y person who is imprisoned to be actl1ally brol1gl1t be.fore tl1 e Co11rt and obtain k . 11ow­ ledge of the reason wJ1y l1e is imprisoned; and tl1en l1aving l1i111 before the cot1rt� either the11 and there set 11im free or else see tl1at l1e is dealt witl1 in wl1atever ½'ay the law requires ! as, for example, brot1gl1t speeclily to trial. The writ can. be isst1ed on tl1e application eitl1er of tl1e prisoner l1i1nself or of any person on I1is behalf, or (st1pposing tl1e prisoner ca11not act) tl1en 011 tl1 e applica­ tion of any person. wl10 believes l1 i1n to be u11lawfully i111priso11 ed. It is issued. by the Higl1 Court, or during vacatio 11 by any jt1dge tl1ereof; a11d the cou1·t or a judge­ should and will always cause it to be issl1ed on bei11g satisfied by affidavit tl1at tl1ere is reason to suppose a prjsoner to be wro11gfully deprived of l1is liberty. Yot1 can11ot say with strictness that the writ is issued ''as a matter of cot1rse'', for son1e grot111d must be shown for supposing tl1at a case of illegal imprison1ne11t exists. But tl1e writ is g ranted ''as a matter of right'' - tJ1at is to say, tl1 e cou1·t wil l always issue �t �f prima facie ground is sho wn for sup:po�ing that the �erso11 011 wl1ose bel1al.f 1t 1s asked for is 110Jawfully deprived of b1s liberty. TJ1e _wrrt 01· or ?er o� tl1e_ _cot1rt can be addressed to any person wl1atever, be l1� a11 offic1c:tl or a ?1·1vat� 111 d1v1dual, who l1as, or is sup_ posed to J1ave, anotl1er 111 11.1s c11stody. A11y d1sobed1ence to the­ _ _ :r7r1t exposes the offender to summary p11n1sl1 mc11t for co11 tempt ?f cot1rt, a11d �tlso ... . ed ev gri 1 n many cases ag rty pa tl1e by ble era ov rec s tie 1al to l,eavy pe1 _. .. The rig11 t to the writ of J1abeas cor1Jus existed at com13:1on la\v 1011g be �ore the passing in 1679 of the celebrated H'abeas Corpt1s Act, ... pr1or to 1679 tl1 e r1�l1t to �l1e writ was often tinder various pleas and exct1ses fD:ade of no .efef ct. The aim . (rf lh·e Habeas Corpus Acts ha s been to me et al I tl1e devices by wl11�l1 the effect of t e w r t can be evaded, either on the part of t11e judges, wJ10 ought to issue the same, i h

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PIAN IO ETH SoURCEBOOK OF

1 r e le o th f a o r g o rt a p th o er person th e n o r o r e n so ' ri p . ie tl e g r · a 1 1 c ' 1s d y r a : s s e c e n 1f d an Y. d 0 t S u c i n r e n o is r p ra st s te lu tl1e p red o min who l1 as tl1e s il u rp o c s a b e a b f o t ri w · story of tl1e n . 1 t . sa 1 d e 1 m 1o 1 , w t s a 1 1e ie . ... d th is e , m '' t re o to '' o e 0f titutio11 · s _ n o c l1 s li g n E e · w l1 1c h y · d b n to a r tu t, h attent·1:0 1 1 pa1 d un. de·r1 tl1 g n a m erely 1 r1 a g le a r �o t c e p s re re 11 c s� to l1 ic l1 w y b re u d proce 1 t. · · · l 1g r l a e r r o e v ti .. c e ff e nomin a l i nto an 1 ca l conf11cts of the seve ntee th 1t l _ o p e th t 1a tl as w n 1 it y h w e se w o n n ca e W ... e y d h n th w a le might , tt es ba g � JU _ 1e tl f o � o ti �i o p e century oftei, raged rotin d th e 1n q1 1 1ry, wl:at m.Jgl1! be a proper retur n to a writ 1 tl as l a ic 11 1 cl e t o s t n i po a on tt 1 r 11 d �n nce to be co nceded ep � 1n d n a ty �1 o h 1t at f o ee gr de 7 of habeas corptis. Upon tl1e s. n o t1 u o 1t T st r 1n u o f supporters, o g 1n rk � w d 1 a1 r u lo co 1 e l t d de to tl,e Bene!, deJ)e1 1 uently in.nova. t eq e fr no er un w n, o ac B ke li 1 0, l w e iv at og 011 the one liand, of tl1e prer e e n kn th ea ea w m ss of the to ed ar J)e ap e nc de 1 1 pe de i n al ci di 1 j1 � tors or reforn 1ers nservative legalism1 co e tl1 of e at st he t t ou 1 l 11g ro t11 e nc na executive, and t l1 e predo111i e 1 1ta ry leaders, on the other am rli Pa 1e Tl . e k Co in e tjv \Vl1icJ1 f01111 d a representa h nc s th.e sole e Be wa th of ce en nd pe de i11 e th at tl1 , tly nc sti di s les or e 1or l 1and, sa\v, n law, whicl1 was nothing else t han lhe 1on mn co e tl1 of ce n a ten 1 air 1 n the for security nt, and that Coke n1e rlia Pa of ts Ac by ly on d ifie od 1 n 1ns sto ct1 g 1in lisl f1b est cJf rule i 11 battli r1 g for tl1e pov1er of tl1e judges was asserti11g tl1e rights of tl1e nation; ...

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1:-ron1 So111ersetr's Ca.Ye ( 1772), in Stepl1e11son & lvlarcl1 am, 011.cit., page 710. James S�n1ersett, a. negro slave belonging to Cl1arles Stewart of )amaica 1 \\'as brot1gl1 t by 11 1 s n1aste�- to Englar1 d. Tl1ere Somer sett ran away, but he ,vas captured and put for safe-keep1 ng 011 board a sl1ip lyi11g in tl1 e Tl1ames. Friends of Sornersell �he� obtained_ a \Vrit o_f l1c1bec1s corpz1s addressed to tl1 e captain of the vessel who, in the return �o t ,l1e writ, set fortl1 tl1e facts as above. Here follo\\'S tlJe jud gment of tl1e cot�rt of king s be 11cl1 , stated by Cl1ief Justice Mansfield. The counsel for Somer· set� pointed �tit tliat tl1e 0 11 ly �or�. of slavery kno\vn to Englisl1 law was villein age, wl11cl1 l1ad disappeared from Jt1 d1c1 al l)roceedings since 1618. ' · · . · . 1eni. - . . Tl1e 01 1ly qt1es · tion b eiore f' 11 s 1s \VI1etl 1er tl1e cat1se on tl1e return 1s suffic - is, If it . t1,e negro must be re1nanded; if it is not l1e n 1ust be discl1arged Accordingly, tI 1e return s tates tl1at tl1 e sla' ve d eparted a11d 'reft1sed to serve· whereupon he ,vas k���, to be sold abroa1. So l,igl1 a11 act of donlinion mt1 st be r�cognjzed by t he law . 1e cot1ntry wl1ere it 1_ s 11s· ed· Tlle J)ower Of a master over l11s 0 has been ex· slave trer 1 1ely difef rent i rl d I· lle ;ent coL111tries. Tl1e state e u nat a r that such of of slavery is . it is i 11 capable of be1 11 g 1 11 trod ced o11 a 1 1y ason only_ by ut b al, ic in re lit po s , al or or -' ' e tun JJositive l;w' ,v l1icl1 Preserves �i ts 1orce long a ft · d n a .0 , sion occa er tl , 1e ons reas . . - eIf fro11 1 wl1e1 1ce it was c;e-�t c1 is er� 1ts 10= t11 n° s�d fron1 111e1nory. It is so odious that ca11 be st1ffered to SllIJPO · I � �t positive , fo e r e tl1 es, la.w. Wl1atever inconvenienc � may follow from tl1e deersi n, c 1 an rJot say tl1is case is allowed or appr oved b y e � law of England·, ai ' 1d tl,ere1ore t l1e blac ' ·k must be d1.scl1arged. A Note on llabeas Corpus i 1 1 E·t/llOJJl . a From Civil Proceclure Coc·le l?f 1J1 e Ern11ire of Ethiopia, 1965. Art. 177. - A1111licatio11 "or l . s COl'flllS JI .1abea . . . by 8,ll)' ' (a) A n· appl1cat1on for l1abeas � or. rt pus may be made to tl1e High Cou def pe_rson restrained otl1erwise un tl11s Code or tl1e Crim.i 1 1 al pth an in pursua11ce of an order duly made roce du re Code.

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(b) The application shall be accomp�tnied by an affidavit by the applic ant . th name of tl1 e person under whose custody he is, tl1e nature and plac stating � e of the rest�a111t an d tl1_e n�mes of the persons, if any, who can testify to t11e facts alleged 1n tl1e appl1cat1on. (c) Where the person restrained, if for \\'.l1atever reaso11 t1nable to make the application and/or affi?avit l1imself, the sa111e may be macle by a11y person on his bel1alf a�d the affidavit sl1all tl1e11 state tl1e 11a111e of tl1e person restrained and that he .1s unable to make tl1e application a11d/or affidavit l1imself. Art. 178. - Sunimons to GJJpear (a) On receivi�g a� application u11der Art.177, t11e I-Iigl1 Court sl1all fortl1with .issue a summons d1rect1ng the person t111der wl1ose custocly tl1e restrained person is to appear b�fore tl1e Higl1 Cot1rt togetl1er witl1 tl1e latter perso11 on sucl1 day as shall be fixed 1n the s11n1n1or1s a11d to sl10\::\, cal1se wl1y tl1e person restrained sl1ould not be released. (b) Sumnionses shall also be issued fo1· tl1e appearance of sucl1 persons as ll)ay be able to testify to the facts alleged i11 tl1e a_pplication. Art. 179. - Hearirzg of a11d decisio11 on, GJJJJlicatio11 (a) On the day fixed in .tl1e sum1nons isst1ed under Art. I 78, tl1e court sl1all investigate the truth or otherwise of tl1e facts alleged in tl1e application and may make with regard to evidence sucl1 orders as it thi11ks fit. (b) Where the court is satisfied tl1at tl1e restraint is unlav1ful, it shall order the immediate release of the person restrai11ed, and the person under whose cust­ ody the person restrained is sl1all, notwithsta11ding any ot11er orders or instruc­ tions to the contrary by any person or a11tl1ority, fortl1witl1 release tl1at person. (c) Wl1ere tl1e court is in doubt as to the trutl1 or otl1erwise of the facts alleged in the application, it may order tl1e release of tl1e person restrained on his ex­ ecuting a bond, with or witl1out sureties, tl1at l1e will appear in any court on any future day on which his appearance may be required and con1ply \Vitl1 sucl1 otl1er order as the court ordering release may tl1i11k :fit to make in tl1e circt1mstances.

The Liability at Law of Public Officials Unlawful Searc/1es and Seizures: Tl1e Case of E11tick v. Car1·i11gto,1 Entick was suspected, i n J 765, of operatin g an i lleg,11 print.i ng press ::1nd p rintin g se ditious pa.n1phlets. The government (throtigh Royal official c,1llecl tl1e Secrete.try of State) _ 1ss11e d ,vl1at ,vere called ''general warr::tn ts'' autl,orizi ng the ··King's n1esse11gers'' to arrest E nt1ck a11d searcl1 an)'­ where for evidenc e of his alleged se dit ion. (''11,e King's n1essengers'' \\:ere tl1e cou nterpart ? f \Vh� t today mi.gl,t be called '·sectirity pol ice''). En tick was arrested, a:1 d th� � ,esse�gers broke i nto his _ house and carried off a gre<.lt nia ny of 1,is iiapcrs. J::nt1ck bro11gl1t ;1 c1v1l ac110 _ _11 f()r dan1nges (an ''action in t respass'') ag::tinst tl,e ··Messengers'' (C:-arrington and otl1ers) c!a1n1 �n g tl1t1t , 111� arrest. 1 10l�tt1on of 11 1s 11gl1ts of r , ,1 refo tl1e and l eg,1 rch 1ll cJ was ers f pap � his hottse ,tnd seizure of the ;�_ _ tl1e fan ,011s _1udgn1ent of Lor d Cnn1clen. 1 fron ty are �1ber '' w belo ts erp exc anli y''. ivac The ''pr . Chtef Justice of tl1e Court of Comn1011 Pleas . .

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Trials Pagc. 5 State s ' Holvell 19 From 705-710. e � o protect themselv es d a nJ t p e� tt � 1e tl in by failed g in v a 1 l , ts n a d en ef d y it o f the warrants al g The le e th in ta n ai m to d ty Un si es ec n er a er d n u e ar , . · .. * tl te t a e t [ t h t a s w f o issue d the War. the t·a ry o � . r � � se h e_ t . a � th w o sh to d n a d te ac e av 1 l ey th h e d e iz th en whic se ef d to n ' o nt t1 a 1c s sd :1 papers, JU a d a l1 s u re fo e b w o n e c rants] in tile instan e officers are as much t th a th r ea cl s 1 _ w la 1e t� o11, ti ic sd ri ju l cl su o n ad h e 11 If or. r1 e J u s ir e th s a 1 ss a sp e tr responsible for tl1e t interesting question in os 1:11 e _th is , lt cu ffi di t os m e 1 tl Tllis, though it is not � o ur o f th jurisdiction, fa :1 11 ed 1 1: ru rr t� de be ld ou sh � t in po 1 is tl if e, us ca be e; us ca e th 10 th is ki ng do m will be thrown t ec bj su y er ev of s i:1u tl1e secret cabinets and bure r y e ar ve th et ne cr se he w er ng of state se es m a of n tio ec sp in d 1 aI 1 cl ar se e tli open to t o be the author, printe r, or on rs pe a t ec sp su to en ev shall tl1inl< fit to charge, or 1 de r l1is ,¥arrant, is command ed to u1 , er ng se es n1 1e Tl el. lib s ou iti sed publisl1er of a o be examined before ' rs t pe pa s hi th wi m i 1 l ing br to d 1 ar d ibe scr de n seize tl1e perso 1e ho us e must be searched; the lock tl 1 tl is, of e nc ue seq 1 co1 n I . . 1te st:: of tl1e secretary all ; the en ers and op pap n ke bro be st mu nl< tru or x bo m, roo ery r e'. of ors and do its to r, ing teno musi ord acc ed cut exe be nt rra wa e 1 tl if , io11 ept exc 1t l10L vvit ks boo be seized a11d c[1rried away. For it is observable tl1at notl1 ing is left either to the discretion or to tl1e hui11a11ity of tl1e officer.... . :r11is power, so claimed by tl1e secretary of state, is not supported by one single c1tat1on fror11 any law bool< extant. It is clai111ed by no otl1er magistrate in trus king· dom bt1t l1imself. . .. And it is furtl1er i11sisted that tl1is po,ver is essential to o-overnment a.nd the orily means of quieti11g clamo11rs and sedition. Tl1ese argum�nts, if they can be call_ed argt �ments, �hall be all taken notice of, because upon this question I am desirous 01 remov111g every colour or plausibility. �efor� I s;�te. tl1e q11 estio11, it will be necessary to describe the power claim ed by this w a1r�n� In its full extent. If l1 onestly exerted it is a power to seize· that man's · ', · bel · b e th e autl1or papers w1 10 Is charged upon oath to · J' 1 us a sed1uo of publ1sl1er or · · . · 1 y 1t acts agains 1·r oppressive · so described in the warrant, · t eve_ry man wl10 is though . . he be innoce nt' . It' . �s executed against tl1e party before he is heard or even summoned. And tl1e informat1011 as ,vell as ti1 e .infio�n1 ers, 1s. u11known. It is executed by m e.s· the sengers witl1 or witllout a [regu1 ar police] or nce prese the ... constable in , absence of tlie art n s eii�ers sl1 �ll tl1ink fit, and witl1out a witness to testify wl1at pasies a�'tl�! t��:e o7 ti1e on a e papers 1 tra1 r g i _ sact1 on; s o tl1at, when the as tl1e only witnesses are the trespassers, r 0 t with ou p ? : tl1e party injured is left If this injt1ry falls tipon an i_· nnocerlt person, �e is as destitute of remedy as th e guil�d and tl1e \Vl1ole trar1sactioo OU 0 s� cer offi e th at th y er if OV SC ?i st ain ag ed .r<l 1; r al �� O , to sed be dispo carry off n 15 _ 1 ' he n1ay d o 1t with r impunity, since the e man capable of proving eitlie; th e taker or th e th in g taken. . S uch IS the power, and tl1erefi to la or � one should naturally expect that the \\'., warrant [perm JJ it] it s1 1ould b e c 1ear nt . a 1 · t b'· · · · 1n proportion as the power is exhor . · I aw, 1t will be fo 1·1 is W· · . . Ja und 1n our books · If · t o n 1s It 1s · n o t to be found there, 1t •

Tl1e Court has conclud ed . n . . , th iSS t part of its judgment that no statute authoriz ed the of "general warrants•• 6£: : cretary of State. �Y th

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Accordin� to th!s re�soni1:1g, it is now incumbent upon the defendants to show the Jaw by which this seizure 1s warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a trespass. Where is �he written law that gives any magistrate st1c.h a power? I can safely answer there 1s none. I c ?me now �o the p�a�tice since the Revolt1tion, wl1icl1 l1as been strongly urged with _ this emphat1cal add1t1on, tolerated and hat an 11sage . f rom tl1e era of liberty, ! _ continu�d downwards to this time tl1ro11gl1 tl1e best ages of tl1e co11stitution, must necessarily have a legal comme11cement. * If t11e practice bega11 tl1en, it began too late to be law n o w . To search, seize, �nd carry away all tl1e papers of tl1e s11bject upon tl1e first warrant: that sucl1 a right sho11ld l1a\1 e existed fron1 tl1e time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, and 11e\1 e1· yet have fou11d a place in any book of law, is incredible. As, t11erefore, no atttl1ority in 011r books can be prod11ced to support such a doctrine, and so n1any star cl1amber decrees; ordinances, and acts have been thought necessary to establisl1 a power of search, I cannot be persuaded that such a power can be justified by tl1e con1n1on law. Lastly, it is urged, as an argument of utility, that st1ch a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. In the criminal law such a proceeding was never l1eard of; and yet there are some crimes - such, for instance, as murder, rape, robbery, and housebreaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury - tl1at are more atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no paper-searcl1 in tl1ese cases to help forward t11e convic­ tion... [Judgment was rendered for the Plaintiff.] Rights and Re·medie�: The Case of Ashby v. White 1n·1102 Mr. Ashby brought an action for damages, in the Queen's Bench Cou.rt, against W11ite and others. Ashby c.Iaimed that White, who was a constable, had, without legal autl1ority, prevented him (Ashby) from voting. The court ruled for the defendants by dismissing the case (see if you can determine why after you have read the excerpts below). Holt C.J. dissented. On ap:i:eal this judgn1ent was reversed. Chief Justice Holt's judgment, which is reproduced, in part, below was adopted by the court on appeal and became the law of the case.

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From Holt's Reports, in Stephenson & Marcham, op.cit., pages 638-640. The case is truly stated, and the only qu� stioi:i is whether or not,_ if a burgess of a borough, that has an undoubted right to �1�e his vote for the choosing a burge_ss _ of parliament for that borough, is refused g1v1ng his vote, [he] has any remedy 10 the king's courts for this wrong against the wrong�oer. All �y brothers �gre� that he has no remedy; but I differ from them, for _ I think tl1e action well ma1nta1n�ble t� at t.he plaintiff had a right to vote and t?at, 1� consequence thereof, the law gives _ him a remedy if he is obstructed; and this action 1s tl1e proper re1nedy .... And here, the plaintiff having this right [of vo�ing by virtue o_f bi's burga� tenu:re], it is apparent that the officer did exclude him from the enJoyment of 1t;

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Defendants argued that the practice of searching for s_editious parnph1�f s pu�suant to ''ge� er� ! warrants'' was well established and not been abolished after th� Glorious Revolut�on of 1688, but' had continued. Since the practice was so well establ1�hed, defendants claimed _ that the court should rec.ognize its legality, th�re �e1ng n� law which expressly forbade the _ Practice and no prio.r court judgment rev1ew1ng its legality. I

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i 1t i1 1e la tl ff . And it is not p o t g n o r w t 11 b , ll e w e . 1 as do,, at . 1 e 1 1 y . sa 1 d 1 -1 w 1e 1 re te e o . d o s n w _ v o e 1 . h v 1 ,a c e n , or like! I wl1 ereii . u o w e I1 t ,a tl e t a 1e can d1? Y tl r s 1 e � h tl 1 e l , w l a d t ri f � re 1a d 1 11 te tl � e 1n a ll n1a h e b h � 1d , 1 a inju e 1n a s l 1e t _ s 1 1t I g ri s iff g n 11 in tl a to imagine lhe� v a to b e ; fo r tile plairlt ' s .i It . d � e m re e v a ? 1 t to l g 11 o e 1 l l1 ic l1 w r fo im 1 l do11 e l1t a�d w_ant o f r e1ned y are convertj 1g r f . o t 1 1 a v , r fo . y; cl 1e n re a t t l o l, it w t ll edy to maintain i1· e m should be rig iv re l g il w w Ja 11 o m m co e 1 l1 t, tl g ri a s e iv g e 1t tL a st a If bles. tl1 er e ca� �e . no petitio� � n A e. g � m a d a s rt o p 11 i1 it , ry 11 1j i1 is e 1 er tl er ev er l1 \V and e f g o d u th�s InJur y, or �Ve , t] en 1n 1a rl a [p ey h t _ n ca r o 1 1 t; � n in tJ1 is case to tJ 1 e p�rli_an1e ie !l pa r liament, yet it is to es at el r r te at m 1 1s tl 1_ gl 1 1 0 1 l lt damages to t l1 e pla111 t1ff. A ry ta en m ia r rl e te at pa er m l1 ": 1d s a1 1 t; com e e1 �1 1 a li r pa 1 e tl to t1s eo 111 , d ce e pr an injtiry ty e er of th op 1e u bject .. , pr tl s ng ni er nc co on ti ac of e 11s . before Lis as i11 cident to a ca t no t be deterred; .but ar� us 1n e ,v y, r ta en 11 1 ia rl pa e b t l1 011gl1 tl 1e i11cide11t matter ar ul t in ic rt no pa s, ta ist 1s ins 1 co \V nces la e 1 l T e it. in 1n er et d to s tl1 oa r ou by d boun 1 er� a_ m an is i 11 jured i11 one sort of right'. wl if, d 1 a1 1 1; e1 tl1 e s l rL1 t !1a 1 t bl1t in t l1e reaso1 1 a11ot l1 er? A nd tl1ou gh the house 1t 11 ve l1a ot 11 1 l e l al 1 sl 1y \Vl n, tio ac l1 e l1 as a good s , ye t tl1 ey ca nn ot jud ge of th .e charter on cti ele e cid e d to l1t rig e av 1 l ns of com1no ; d tl1erefore, \Yhere an on cti ele the of n tio ina rm e t e de 1 tl 1 i1 ly i r 1da 1 o 1 sec t b1 y, all origin 1 no t i n tl1is case, they h.ave nothing otl it d as e, e bat d in ne cor t no s doe n tio lec e an to do. A11 d we are to exert and vindicate tl1 e queen's jurisdiction, and not to be fr_ighted because_ it u:iay come in q11estion i11 parliament. And I know n.othing to l11nder lIS fro111 Jt1dg1ng of matters d epend ing on cl1 arter or prescription

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Conclt1sion: ·''Tl1e Rule of Law'' · _!l1e �dea of '.'rule of law'' is f'?'?ted in antiquity, but it l1as been very n1uch revived in modern ' .times. ! is sonietimes used for �ol1�1ca l principles in a very broad sense· and it certainly connote; ' � many I eas about \.Vhat a const1tut1on sl1ot1ld do - or seek to do. . One person \Vl1.0 . greatl y influenced thinking about tl1e natu.re of ''rule of l aw" was Professor 01cey, \V l1ose expos1t1on of "ru l e of tav;'' as a· "fundanienta l pr1nc1p · · le'' 01 the unwritten "con�utu· � eSls tllat "rul e of _la\v'.' l1as three in1portant mean�gs. tion'' of Eng land is deve l oped bel l-l ·e su�� You should think about the soci�\:nd o l itic � l v� l ues en1bo?1ed 1n tl1ese n1eanings, and consider � whether and ho\v similar principles a re 1.::n1 bo d 1ed 1n tl1e Revised Constitution of Ethiopia.

From Dicey, op.cit., pages 202_203_ . ) . . �l1at ·'rt1le of law'', then vvli icl 1 �orrns .,l f. ttndarne11tal pr111c1pl lish [Eng e of the · 1·) . const1t11tio11 , J1 as t··1i,·ee mea,111n oin gs ' ' or n1a'Y b e regarde d fron1. tl1 ree different p of view. :· It means, i11 the first place tl1e ab s lLt te " ular r f 1ce o eg f d � ' ::illI)remacy o111ina1 pre or · ence o law as opJJosed to tJ 1e ii1 flLte11cc of ·1rbitra . . ry . er, 1 e ex1st tl JJOW es 1d . a1 lu d exc arb1trar1ness, of prerogati,,e ' or e,,e art . i' i of ,vide discre p e th n tionary authority· o ' of tl1 e governme11t. .,...., F11 g 11· 5 1 1men are rt il ed · y ·I1 0n � o t e law, a11d l1y tl1e law alo n e; adung . us l,e pt1nis l1e may with d for a b reacli 11o · for of d l,1w, e but punish be can e i l else. . It 111ea11 s, equality before tl_ le 1 aw.> or t l1e equal SL1biectio11 of a11 classes to ih!� ord i nary law of tl 1e lar1d ad • J·3'v . ' iru· t11stered b Y tl1e or.d . of 1 e ''rule inary · set1se exclL1 des tlie · tl courts· w la. · t 11 1s J in ol}' . d .., . .r . J dea of a11)' exe 1ption th f 01 officia ls o r others fron1 e n 0f 0 bect·°' _1 1:nce to tl1 e law wl� 1· cIl o n ti gover dic o ns o t l 1 er jtiris citiz e 11s or fron1 the the orcl 1nary trib11 11a l s . tl1e e th: o t a1 1 _ �e g with us nothing really correspo ndin 1 /· ''ad·ministr�1t i ve la\\,', ( droi� � a 1111111stratif) or the ''a d1ninis t ra e trib l ' ( ti tiv una s

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huna·ux_ ad,ni,i��tratifs) of Fran�e. * The notion wl1icl1 lies at the botton1 of the ''admi­

nistrative law _know 11 t o foreign countries is, tl1at affairs or dispt1tes in wl1icl1 the government or its s�rvants are_ concerned are beyond tl1e spl1 ere of tl1 e civil courts and must be dealt with by special and more or less official bodies. This idea is utterly unknown_ !0 tl,e law of England, and i11deed is ft111dan1e11tally i11consistent with. ot1r trad1t1ons and ct1stoms. T�e ''rule of law'', lastly, ?la� be t1sed as a for1nt1la for expressi11g the fact that with tis the law of �he _const1tt1t1on, tl1e rt1les wl1icl1 i11 foreign co11ntries nat11ral­ l� forn1 p�r. t _o� a. const1t11t1onal code, are not tl1e sot1rce btrt tl1 e co11sec111e11ce of tl1 e . r1_ghts of 1n�1v1duals, as clefin_ed arzd en.forced b;, t/1e coi,rts; tl.1 a.t, in sl1ort, tl1e prin­ ciples of private law hav� w1tl1 t1s bee11 b;, tlze actio11 o.f t/1e co11.1·ts and Parliament so extended as to determine tl1e position of the Crow11 a11d of its serva11ts · tl111s tl1e constitution is the rest1lt of tl1e ordinary law of tl1e la11d [empl1asis add�d]. Questions and Problems The Jndependenc·e of· the Ji1dicia1·J'

. ing's �-interest'' in tl1 e Case o.f Co1111nendan1s? Reconstruct 1) What was the K the arguments f avouring tl1e ·prerogative of tl1 e King to den1and consultation witl1 the courts. What are tl1 e objectio11s to tl1ese argu111ents? Would consulta-· tion violate ''due proc.ess''? 2) Assume that the issue of tl1e Case of Com1ne11da111s arose today i11 Ethiopia, and you are asked to prepare a memorandtim on tl1e po\,,er of the Emperor to summon judges for consultation in cases wl1 ere tl1ere is pendi11g, before the court, a case involving tl1e legality of tl1e exercise of a ])rerogative powe111nder Chapter li of the Revised Co11 stitution. What are the relevant articles of the Constitution? 1-Iow should tl1ey be interpreted? (See the case of Graz. �1oube Walde Selassie ,,. Dejaz. Kefelew Wolde Tsadik, 2 Jour11al o_f· Ethiopian. l,alv 54, 1965.) 3) In Ghana i·n 1963 various high gover11n1ent officj,tls were cr1arged witl1 treason. After a long trial several of them \Vere acquitted. President Nkrun1ah tl1en dismissed the Cl1 ief Justice of Ghana (who was JJresiding jL1dge at tl1e trial) on the grot1nd that the Chief Justice J1ad refused to advise Dr. Nl<.rt1mal1 of tl1 e court's pending decision before tl1e final jL1dgen1 e11t was rende1·ed. Nkrun1al1 argt1ed that both the natior1a] .interest (p11blic secL1rity) and the prestige of the gover11meot were adversely affected by the co11rt's decision, and tl1at tinder tl1e circu111stances tl1e Chief Jttstice was derelict i11 l1is dL1ties wl1e11 l1e failed to co1:1st1lt the President. (See :Har\1ey, L,al11 a,1d S'ocial Cf1a11ge itz G/1a11a} 1966.) Assuming tl1a,t botl1 ''sec11rity'' a11d ''prestige'' are a·ffected, what do yo11 tl1ink of tl1is argt1ment?

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Dicey believe<:I, aJJparently, that tliere coulci be 110 rL1le of Javv if tl1e '' orcli11ary law coL1rts'� cJid not exercise jurisdiction ptirs,111t to ''ordin� r_y lav1'' over all r1ct� of'_ governmen�. J-::e w'1:s a severe critic of French law wliicl, held tl1at a c1t1ze11 cot1ld 01,ly st1e tl1e go,1� r111:ne11t 1n ad1111nistrative cotirts'' ancl whicll created a special bo�y � f rt1les gover111_ n tl1e l1ab1l.1t_ of gove1·nr _ � _ , me11t. Compare Articles of fl1e Ethiopian Const1tut1?� of 1931 (�.C.) w1tl1 Art1cl e 62(b) of_ _ t�� �evised ConstitLrtion. Dic� y ap·pears to have J_TIIS.Jltdgec� lh� Fre11ch syste111. Fo ft:ller � . _ � s J_aw of the r..r1t1c.1sm .see Wacle's introduction to the 1959 ed1tJon of D1cey Const1tt1t1on.

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�13:4:______s��:::::-=-----..... . ng in mind that at ri ea B s? on ti bi /1i ro P of · t e Case l tl . e su i e h 4) �hat was � � o��ts were f unctioni ng tribunals exercising an ill-defi hat e n o h A is r b p h e c th a rt o d p p �i�e !h � c1 su th o u ments t rg a e h t e er : i; : to e . e .J cid ok J urisd_1 ctio�, · t C de C r fo ri ju '' w · ·io&. la sdict of ss e oc . pr n ue ''d of n 10 t a 1 ? 10 v a ue . Was 1t s is t a s a w t r u o c D \V O is l1 f o n o ti ic d is r u j e th when le ic rt of � �9 er d n u e th r � r� O Revi sed 11 a_ e� u s is r ro e p m E e th 5) Assume that rta.�n _areas; that the 10 w �e la y ar 1t l 1_ _m g 11� �l l1 b ta es Const itution of Etlliopia, e r cer tain cr1D11n�l cas�s;_ tha v o n ? �1 1c sd r1 JU � k _ t ta y gl . in rd co ac s rt u co ry milita rts f r ?m exerc1s1ng Jurisd ic. u co y ar t l1 u n e th 1n J0 tlle civil cou rts attempt to en en rv te e in this juris­ r 1.n to �o pe m E l1e t n io t i t e p s u rt co tion; that the mjlitary s e t h e Emperor on his cons­ v1 ad to d ke s a e ar u yo t ha t dictional dispute; and e. su is al on ti ic d is 1r jt 1e tl e id ec d t itutional power to 1ar1t articles of tl1e R ev ise d Constitution? On the ba�is e\ l re e 1 What are tl ? ve gi u yo lcl u o w ce vi ad t l1a \V e, es th of ttee wo rking on suggested amend­ i mm co a of er mb me a are t1 yo t tha me u s As 6) ments to tl1 e Revised Constit11tion, and t he qtiestion arises of what powers sl1 ould be vested in tl1e Emperor to supervis e t l1 e admin istration of justice. This ge11eral c1t1estio n is t r1en broken down int o two issu es: (a) wl1ether tl1e E1nperor sl1ould be vested witl 1 any'-''judicial power'' to decide cases comi11g to hin1 tl1ro11gh the courts; (b) v.1l1etl1er tl1e Emperor (or l1is Minister pursuant to delegation) sh ould Ir. vested \Vitl1 any sp�c i �c powers to ensure the integrity of the legal process in tl1e c?urts (by _pun1sl11ng corr uption, protect ing the judg es from attempts at coercion, ensuring tl1at the courts administer just ice prop erly and efficiently, etc.). What recon1n1endations would yot1 make to the con1mittee on these sub· . Jects? . E n:ibody these recommendations i11 draft amendment s to the Revised Const1tut1on.

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0f and proce dures wl11cl1 1n. yo u r opinion, · c t e A h t t enac 1 ed Parliament to ' . l 1641 WI1at was tl1e const1t�1t1011al significance ona ituti of t l1is Act? What const Prin� iPle , if any, was Parl1arnent trying to establish? · · 8) In wl1at \Vay i s tl1e Ac t of 1641 1 f r� ated to tl1e deve lopment of the conceP!, �''due process of law'''> I-low 1nay . ted to Montesquieu's tl1eo ry of 5 it be rela paration of powers';? . . 9) Sta� Cl1amber was a ,, rero . . ' ere . . . . . . o iv� ' ,co urt; its . or1g111 an d Jur1sdict1 n : h, at � � ?er1ved from tile exercisf f t Ki ng s .i o reas one n u� prerog�t1 Th was v e s . � t becan1e unpopular i tl tlle � 17t 1 centu�y. But 1t was also condemned b�a as 1t exercised jL1dicial powe h Ir \� s g as n l1ou ' ng , a] t and m nt son e pri i im fi not an establis)1ed com�� StC}l e 15 aw c�urt. Tl1e Act of 1641 not on]� _abo 'ke �ta_r <:;hamber but also forb7 li a d s creation of an y g s1 xer otl1er tri bunal ''e c1 n Jur1sd1 ction''. Do _y�u tl1 ink that d n a . all adnun 1strativ e trib Parliament. meant to forbi d future creation of aDY �d aJ this, i n your opinion ' �� s �ttach ed to the exect1tive govern ment? Wo a wi se provision? .�·

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10) In his famous prot:st against h is treatment b y Star Chamber, Joh n Lilburne argued that no Englishman could be compelled to giv e evidence against himself. Why not? D o y o u agree with this prop o si ti o n ? T o w hat extent' if· at all' R does the evised Constitution support tl11s rigl1 t. in Etl1iopia? J 1) Assume that y_ou are a government lawyer, and are asked to com1nent on a Ministry o f Finance proposal ,vl1ich states:

'·There is evidence of mt1ch incompetence an d co rruption i 11 tl1e adn1inistration of the income ga �e an in d ro �es o ti To t ot taX, _ 1t this _corruptioJ.?, �l1e Co�1ncil of Ministers is asked to suggest th at His Imper1a] MaJesty appoint a Sp ecial Conm11ss1on to investigate tax ad n1 in ist ration and identify co rr or pe up offi te t ci nt al s and see to their proper pt111isl1ment. Tl1e 1ncom Co mmission should have an all po d we r other powers necessary to do its job well.'' -subpoena

Commen t on t11is proposal, i.n the light of tl1e readi11 gs and any relevant constitutional articles. 12) In Ethiopia, as in most countries ) tl1ere are specialised administrative tribunals attached to the executive brancl1 of gover111nent with special j11risdicti Jn to settle disputes arising i11 tl1e enforcen1ent of a particular ]aw. For examp1e, tl1e Tax Appeal Commission of tl1e Mi11istry of Finance hears complaints by taxpayers of an improper income tax assessment; a11 appeal lies to tl1e co11rts. (See Procla­ mations 107 of 1949, 173 of 1961.) Why do you suppose the law creates a Tax Appeal. �ommission, ratbe � than have tax disputes go directly to tl1e regularly established courts? What is to prevent the Tax Appeal Corrunission fro1n becomi�g a ''Star Cha1nber''? What does the Constitution l1ave to say on that question? 13) In a case arising under the 1949 Tax Proclamation it \Vas ar�ued that decisi?ns of the Tax Appeal Commission were final, and_ ''not su_bJect to the con�rol ' or scrutiny of the courts' . The Higl1 Court re3ected tl11s argt1ment, saying, inter alia, that:

of ;a v\ ''it is the riaht · 0, of the subject to apply to the courts of la\1/, a_nd it is the �uty of the courts · • to ensure that the law IS com plied wit · h and tha1... powers vested In any public officer are not abu.,e d . Thus if it can be shown that a person has �een ta�ed . on r fitc- in his business when it has been p �ch a decision would be an arbitrary 1 cl�r�y proved ... that there were no profits _1 n th e dec1s1on and would not be upheld b y a court of l aw.�� ( �J�ocate of Ministry of Finance v. Nicola ) Sarris' 1 Jo11rna/ of Ethiop 4. 196 1 -20 200 w La , ian ·

· · 11, 1· f any , could tl1e Court have cited · t10 nst1tu What articles of th e Rev1sed Co • • as authority for this propos1t1on ?.

The Right to Personal Freedoni and ''flabeas Corp us '' . . . . eas m ab ter ''h tl1e ne defi t no es do 14) Note that the Eth1op1an de Co r d Proce C1vJl 1 iopia differ in an)' ' l Et in s pu cor � � as a r _fo corpus '. Does the procedure � ure as· described by Dicey? Is it fair essential respect from th e English �race '' the common. law' in tl1e sense . to ar¥'1e that E th.1op1a? 1 aw has . ''introduced . u rt co h s e t ise ar ns io is ov pr e ov ab e th t.h,at 1f a problem of 1nterpretation f as be l1a of w la e . tl1 of s ce ur so an c should make reference to Anglo -Ameri corpus? 15) Consider the following problems: son m de t en ud st a o f sce1 1e , the at d e ( a) Ato A is a Jaw stude�t. He wa s arrest A . to d A w o cr e th p u e k ro b ce li o p tration by s-ome policemen, after the

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is n e H n pe . ys . da di 4 r fo en . e s n n e b t g 1 1 w un s er a u e l tl1 n ar e1 ab e s � . al ci or ? � offi i e lic Po but . ll'1 ng se ca s 11 1 f o n o t1 h a g 1nvest1 ' fa1111Jy asks yolt, a l awyer, r1or elp. is t o conf1ri 111 t·l11. s 1r.act · 1LJ ? s u 1J r o c s a e b a l1 te a Can you i11iti 1e tl of ft ic pl ra d ap n a io at re . pa re p ', s' e ''y is r . · t ,, ,, .I.f yot1r a11S\�e ? a h p e 1s 1· ap o ,, Wh 1c n . t . 11 t1 ga s e l 0 \1,1 at are til e essential al t' n ? e ') d n o sp re "· r (o ' t' n a d 11 e f e d ;l�o ts tl1e '' J1a s been de11ied bail by the com­ e T-I . ft 1e tl l1 it w i arged cl 1 e, be i as l B to A (b) n1itti11g judge's order. ? d te a ti 1i i1 e b s Ju r1 co s ea ab l1 Ca11 m h d nce h nte t uc se i ur wl co 1e Tl e. m cri a of y ilt gu (c) Ato K 1 ,as b een fou11d e d by the Penal ish bl ta es um im ax 111 e tl1 of ss ce ex 1 1 i ce en nt e 11as fix ed a s Code. Tl1e ti111e for a1JJJeal l1as lapsed. Can l1abeas corJJLIS be ir1itiated? to produce either lhe s use ref or ays del '' lia11 stoc ''ct1 ged alle tl1e 1 se p1Jo St (d) priso11er or evidence concer11ing l1is det entio11. WJ1at sl1ould tl1e court do? 16) Su1JJJose i·n a l1abeas corpus case it is acl1nitted tl1at tI1e imprisonment is illegal, bL1t the ProsecL1tor insists it is i11 tI1e ''public intere st'' tl1at tl1e accused be de· tained till further evide r1c e can be gatl1ered. Does tl1e coL1rt l1ave discretion to order furtl1er dete11tio11?

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1 7) Refer back to tl1e readings on l1abeas corpus and Magna Carta. Consider the foll�wing l1y1Jotl1etical argt1ment made by a l1y1)otl1etical advocate in a hypo· tl1et1cal case before tl1e Supreme In1perial Cot1rt:

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"In inte�p�eling Article 43 o� the Constitution, \Ve n1ust n1ake recourse to the English versio n even th0ugh rt is_ not the control!ir,g version. As in tl1e codificalion process, it is very probable imt tl1e f ran1ers worked f ron1 a foreign language _ in this case rlglisll _ dra ft into Amharic. Mo�· ve , t�, tern due process of la \.V'' is a ter111 of art: i t is a pl1Erase wl1icl 1 h�s a n1e.:1ning dr a\VO from e a� , I is�ory. :;;1e tern1 "due process of la\v'' is an Anglo-An1e la� fron d 1 rica dev n elo con pe cep t ( i 3 of M agna Carta · the "due l)rocess of la· v,, , , vith '. ce n 1 eans . t 1 e acco an 1 e11f in orcen1en law t of rd . certain procedure s desi n l secure f�1rncss _111 tl1e legal proc ess. Tl1ese procedures can1e tontnd elude, an1ong others: tlfe �f I�� t ade �lctlc heard"" �ot ice of e t�1c to offe nce b righ cl1a t rged the , to present a defence the ri!ht t� confIonta t1on, tl1e r1g l1t to a11 in1partial tribunal. ' . e fran1e _If th rs of the Constitutio n f 1955 � E0oli • c. sh . thi;; . used 1n tl1e law' tern1 ''due process of ve n of Arti cle 43' they 11 1ust I1avc 111c·1n · rsior r th Consnttl· t th a ' t " d ue e o, proc ss part law v,,as a of ' _ t1on; ·�r if they had vanted to 111ake _• _ _· h· ihe 1t t \ l t n , g l s 1 ve_ r s1on E \\ _ l e 4 en ,·th equiva of Articl 3 literally Amharic, they would have had ·t h e 1 (ti e ghsl1 version) r�ad something like: "in accorda�t� i� la e � 43 But i� \v'". if �h tlt Article n1ean s s l in a c Y � �rdance w ith t l1 e law. it probably n1eans ven. ,ion indeed. Ratl1er we s!1ould assun b of "due process of law'' into ie that . eC<'luse 11 is not possible to pro �ide an exact short t r ans 13. An11ar1c 1 ' lve 1nust use tie . version to explain t,11 e A.· 111l,afl<· I ·11g/1sh E I-Iabe·'1s C orpus was defende . r olla d in r Engl an l d t0 Clause 39 of M agna C . (b Y C oke and n,an)' otl1ers ) as an integra c� e,ral arta. T11i s int retat1o n _pr�vailed. Habeas Corpus i s therefore. an l��:·43. coroll�ry to _Article 43 of the � � Even if Par/ia,nent repealecl Conslitu i ��[E thiopia. Habea.s Corpus i s guaranteed by Arll�d dill s 177 ' and 179 of tl1e Civil Code the Consritutio 11 .,·oil · guarantee the right of habArticle <'as corPllS. ' . 1 Therefore , we must. assu I · n,e that Artie! e 43 nCilP co and I,, sl1aII now try to makes reference to the Aaglo-An1er1c . an _ th�· , explai n to the C ourt llow the to ply case. p Anglo-An1eri can concept would a

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o y�u agr �e with this line of argument? Constrt1ct a l1ypotl1etical factt1al J? . s1tuat1on 1n wl11ch an advocate for tl1 e prisoner migl1 t l1 ave to make tl1 is argt1ment . '·Privacy'' a11d the LiabilitJJ at Law o.f Pi,blic Servant.-:;

18) What was �he n�t:1re of tl1e action started i11 tl1e E11tic·k case? Was it a J)enal 1t a c1v1I case? If so, 011 wl1at tl1eory of law was it based? Wl1 at was case? Was _ the evidence before tl1e Cot1rt '? Wl1 at was tl1 e releva11t law? Wl1at was tl1 e issue? Wl1at was tl1e decision on that isst1e? Wl1at were tl1e reasons for tl1e decision? 19) Entick recovered a large su1n of da11 1ages. ·w11y '? How wot1lcl a Court reacl1 an appropriate estin1ate of tl1e ''da1nage'' do11 e to E 1 1tick? 20) Why were tl1e ''genera] war1·ants·' illegal? Wot1ld st1cl1 warrants be illegal under tl1 e Etl1iopia11 Co11stitt1tio11? Wl1 ,1t are tl1e relevant Articles? Wl1 at is the difference between a ''ge11e1·al wa1·ra11t'' isst1ed by tl1 e Secretary of State and a searcl1 warrant isst1ed by a Cot1rt? 21) Tl1e underlying asst1mptio11 ot' Lord Ca111den, i11 l1is judg1nent in the Entick case appears to be: a n i11dividL1al is ordinarily e11titled to exclusive control and enjoyment over· l1is l1ome, office, personal effects a11d otl1er property of a similar nature; tl1e la\v will not co11done i11terfere11ce by a11other vvitl1 tl1 ese rights; any permissible interfere11ce 111t1st be clearly autho.rised by law; govern­ ment officers, no matter what tl1eir statio11, are as obliged to obey this pri 11ciple as other citizens. Why s/1011/d tl1e law pl,1ce st 1 cl1 ,l l1igl1 valt1e 011 ''privacy''? Entick was probably engaged in seditiot1s activity - was he not? SL!f>pose the security officers found i11 crin1ina.ti11g evide11ce a1no11gst l1is personal papers evidence proving a violation of tl1e law; would tl1ey still be liable? Sl1ould they be? 22) Consider carefully I-Jolt's opinio11 i11 As/1by's case. \Vhat isst1es does tl1e case raise? What ''law'' does tl1is decision create? If Asl1 by's case arose in Etl1iopia would tl1e Revised Constitution of Etl1iopia gt 1 ara11 tee a remedy in da1nages? Can the Civil Code alter the conditions t1poh \Vl1ich tl1at ren1ecly 1nay be gra11ted? IfWhite acted witl1out intention to bar Asl1by illegally, did l1e act ''wrongft1lly''? Should he still be forced to pay damages? 23) Dicey argues that public officials wl10 violate tl1e legal ''rigl1ts'' of citizens must be subject to the jurisdictio11 of tl1e ''ordinary courts'', and tl1eir legal liability should be established u11der the ''ordinary law''. Tl1e Ashby and E11tick cases illustrate thjs prjnciple jn action. What ways, other tha11 actions for dan1ages., are tl1ere to make public officials accountable to the law? What are the advantages and disadva11tages of tl1e Fre11cl1 syste1n, wl1icl1 y �0� 1rt�, �nd esta­ 1a. prohibits legal actions against pLtblic officials in tl1e ordi1 : _ blishes a system of administrative tribunals to exercise tl11s Jt1r1sd.1ct1on? When Dicey speaks of the ''ordinary law'', wh�t �aw is tl1is_? Wl1ere �011ld one find this ''ordinary law'' in EtJ1iopia? If tl1e ?rd111ary l�w 10 the ord1n,1ry cot1rts governs the liability of officials, wl1at sp�c1al rt1les will be 11ecessary !o govern that liability? Should a judge �110 �ec1d�� a cas� �rroneo11sly but 1n _ _ good faith be liable to t11e party who 1s '' t�JLI:ed _by tl11s JUdgme�t? S�ot1ld . a policemen wJ10 in good faith arrests A, thinking h1m to be B, be liable .

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1 h f 3 it 9 o w 1 n o ti tu Article 62 of ti s n o C n ia p io l1 t E e l1 t f o 4 5 le ic rt A 24) Compare . 5 5 9 1 f o n io t u it t s n the Revised Co se l n e e ic e th rt tw A ? e b es e c n re e iff d e th f o e c n a c i ·f 1 1 n · 1g s e 1 1 . t Wl1at 1s SECTION 4 Y R R E A V T O N G E N M A I NT L E R M A P N R E D O M F O THE DEVELOPMENT Introduction

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s in the developm ent of English ne to es il m e. th of e m so ed ay tr or p Tile readings in Section 2 11a vc easing po\:ver o� Parliament O\'er th e go v� rnment_ of England cr in e th d an ns tio itu st in e iv at sl gi ent - Westrrunster demo, le ?,1 rn v� go ry ta en m _ 1a rl pa em od n1 by the end .of t11e 17tl1 century. But on1 tl1e ··Glor1011,:> l{evoJ_ut1on of 1688 or 1!'om any other cracy'' _ did no t spring full-grov.n frok t\,VO an d a l1al1 centuries of fu rther evolution to p rodoce' oarticular event \Vhicl1 follov.cd. lt to y. rhc constitutional institutions of toda ich brought the people in· wh nt me lop ve de ic om on ec of te ra t fas a tl1 vvi Firslly, i11 l<eeping ss was gradual· oce pr cal liti po n the i ate cip rti to pa l1t e rig 1 tl t, 1en nn ver go i.:rcasiugly into contact \.Vill1 1e people entitled to vote for mem· tl of n rtio po pro e 1 tl ing end ext by ed icv . l acl s \.Va ly extended. Tl1is local l nd nob n b eme d ate Y . lin don n bee y a usl vio pre l1ad 1 icl w!1 s, 1on n1n Co bers of lhe J-iouse of de a more "repre· ma was t 1en lian 2, Par 183 in i:r1g i11n bcg 1s" forn ·•re dic 1 i<. per . by s, 'fhu 1ando,vners were gradually sentative'' body in the sense that: (n) property q11a!i.fications on the right to vote centlll)', to 20th the in l.ly, fina es, and mal lt adu all to cl ndc cxte \Vas e chis fran the l unti ed inish din1 r on ed rtion appo were ed elect were 1bers men l1 wl1ic icts e from 1 tl dist (b) and ; as \1/ell er1 1 adult \Von number a ,.more equitable basis so that eacl1 :tvlember of Parliament represented roughly the same 01 people as any otl1er. T_his extension of (be franchise led, seco11dly, to tl1e growth of political parties through Vt'hi� lbe �111 of tl1e_ J)eople can1e to be expressed. Candidates for Parliament stood as the nominees ol particular parties, and the Prin1e Minister, wl1ilc appointed by the n1onarch came in fact to bet� duly selecled leader of tl1at party ,vhicl1 commands a majority in tl1e Hou� of Commons. Universal adult st_1ffrage and tl1e party system 11ave had profound eifects on the system of ¥ove�nn1en�, one of wl1icl1, p�ad_oxically, l1as been a decline in tl1e independent power of Parliament ' . ly itself, for s1n I\1e�1bers of _Iarltan1ent arc elected on party grounds, they liave come automatical 1e P011:Y of tlleir 0:vn party, and tl1us tl1ose of tl1e n1ajority party become sub ord inate o upport t!� �o t� e � Vt;rnn1ent \vh1,�h consis�s of their _ p�rty leaders. Th is has been one res ult?� the ; s. Ystf,�1 �� ��: , i ;�t govern111ent , by ,vh1cl1 the pr1nc1ple l1as developed that the · Prime Mm1istere 'bl n JS c e iacto l1e.1 d of the govern111en t and }1e and respo s y coilectivel tl�e otl�e� n1inisters are J to Parliament for the c onduct of ti1e governn1cnt s aflairs . ·has betn lea · n ,' Another 11atural result of t} 1e "den1 c .at i· atio t�m ys of tl1e Britisl1 political s s . � ; l l e in in r ? e c the powe bo tl1 of the monarc 1 11 of tl1e _H;ous e of Lords ; for when the will of th� peoP 1s regarded as supren1e there is little P 1a e ror ''privileged'' "11;Y its in an� st would bodie which s t The I lou - se of Lords effectively challenge� the House e t c tv.• e nt un,. .I en h of Commons early in the ro and lost . The position of tl1e nlona'rcl1 l1as been gove the efin red rom f ed a s a 1ea I o s d f tate se.parate men t ; . w I11·1e tl1e n1onarc}1 alone has the le gal acts . ·SC(! manY nn power perfo to n1ake and many orders essential to the operation of the go. \ern , ment, n�vertheless, by ''convention,, this powe r is exero only in accordance witl1 tl1e ad , vice of tl1e Pr1n1e Ministe . . r . O . . statutt ne m ust cont1nt1ally bear in nlind th at 1 . . . . · .111tro wri tten tf � 0 _ w, 1tte11 const1 tut1on and no single . du�ecf _these changes. Indeed tile b . 011d P� a_ s z_ c s pr,�ic ip/es parti of e nt cabi,1 gover nme et responsibtl11y to Parlian1ent a, 1' ti . '""s·· c e· t11eYpos1t1on oj tl1e· 1no11arcl1 ' have no explicit' source in /aW· following readings trace ve'ry ,br1 aoo � ·w 1nst som e 1 st rn · e� s ' in the mod_ e _em�rg�n� of these pS they .s110w t11a� n1uch of what is called nolrun_g more, and s o t11ey l1elp us to ''the English Const1tut1on'' 1s really convention, a �dnsY"'.. ;""tll mo_re important, they l1elp us to m understa�d. the concept of constitutional conventio t .fO; ia, ak � f� E t1� which n�ay hel_p us to understand that e ��mp_ans 1ons with the Revised Constitution ofpar ar· con itut1on, and theories of ent, 1y �h�or1es wl11ch call for greater dev elop m futu its re .u,·· par1·1amentary powe , and a u thro gh r ility n1 r ter cabinet m who heads tl1e gove ment. responsib M1 s 1

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The Vote and the Party System

Economic Development and the Extension of· the Franchise he notable chan�es of t �e nineteenth century, which transformed tl1e English ! . pol1t1cal sce _ne, had their roots 1n economic development. After the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, which marked th� close of the wars wl1ich l1ad ravaged Europe for a quarter of a century, England_ swiftly _emerged as the continent's leading industrial power, and was soon e�port1ng textiles and other ma11t1factured goods to every corner of the world_. T�1s development _was accompanied by a movement of people from the countryside into the towns, 1 n order to provide labo11r for tl1 e new machines, and a steady process of urbanisation l1as go11e on si11ce tl1at time. A new urban working class emerged, and witl1 it anotl1er new class of mercl1a11ts and manufact­ urers, which controlled the ne\v rnetl1ods of production. It was not long before these cl1anges came to bear upon tl1 e political system, which in the ea.rly nineteentl1 century was still largely co11trolled by country land­ owners. Politics were important to tl1e new classes, not as a sot1rce of status or a traditional pursuit: but be·cause government policies could strongly affect trading conditions and the standard of living of industrial worl<ers, which was giving great concern to social reformers such as tl1e Earl of Shaftesbury. A few sons of man11facturers, among them Robert Peel, founder of England's first modern police force, started to make new influences felt in Parliament, and witl1 the 1820,s a11d ea.rly 1830,s came an increasing movement for parlia1nentary reform. The Hou.se of Commons at this time still reflectecl the outmocled. conditions -of the eighteenth century, and anomalies and abuses wl1icl1 dated from. long before that. Voting was restricted to a very small segment of tl1e JJopulation, tl1ough the requirements varied widely from place to place, and many seats in Parliament, the so-called · 'rotten boroughs'', were in the hands of landowners who could give them to whomever they pleased. This system had not worked badly in tl1e eigl1teenth century, when the landowners were in any case tl1e major political force in tl1e cot1n­ try, but it swiftly became inadequate when large industrial towns sprt1ng up \Vitl1out any voice in the government of the country, and fresl1 interests clamoured for repre­ sentation. The injtial result of these pressures was the Reform Act of 1832, ,vhich was passed by a liberal majority in the House of Commons, but was blocked by tl1e House of Lords until widespread rioting and the king's threat to flood tl1e House with newly created lords who would pass tl1e Bill, frightened them into approving ti y nar it. But despite the popular pressure which preceded it, this was no revolu � _ measure. The vote was given to the richer members of the commercial nuddle classes, and seats in Parliament were given to the new towns at the expense of the more notorious rotten boroughs. But democracy was far away, and tl1ough there was considerable working class agitation for the vote for several years, expresse� throu�h the Chartist Movement it was not immediately successful. The new forces 1n Parlia­ ment nevertheless mad; themselves felt witl1 the passage of tl1e first Factory Acts to regulate Jabour in factories, an d with 'the repeal of the Cor:n Laws, whicl1 impo �ed c�stoms duties on com imported into Englan�, in 1846. This w�s a popular action d With the urban on har ver l 1t t fel bu ad, bre of ce pri the d � ere low it ce s sin classe the farmers who then�eforth had to compete with cheap imported �o:e1gn f?�d. t\nother important aspect of the repeal of the Corn Laws was the pol1t1cal act1v1ty

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1 t abot1t b y a ''press ure r gl ou br re su ea m .it. fo . . \ a s in lar e ap ly to to body techniqu p �l1 was t1 1 e first r v es go�up , \ Vl11cl . 1 l�d l 1i w 1e agt e aw ro. ' L 1 or1 ons n uest that lay political I . P i q tl1e Ant1-C I a to n isatio es�on 1 ga1 or e l · a c -s e g r a l e d is an d · an in rg o e b this need W. Paga11da a11d . to ad ' 1 l te ra to ec el e ai. : ro la a e . e c in s , e r 1 tt for the fu . s e ti r a p l a c ti li o JJ 11 r e the ge11esis of mod e }1 1e r tl it m w o ca ef R rm fo re m l ra to ec ct el A f o f ge . sa o d I r ie av o Je , d il co A se s older 1n tl1e t?wns, foll owed h se u o l1 st o 11?to ed d n te ex 1867, b y wllicll tlle vote was ion w_hich had pt 1e u d t! rr te co n ve re p h 1c l1 w t, lo al b a fe w years later by tlJe s� cret y to dec�are h�s_choi ct. cl li b u p d a h r te vo 1 cl ea 1 1 e l1 w taken JJlace a t earlier elections t !1 p1 en lo s 1n politi cal 01. ve de r 1e l t_ ur f rs te vo of r be m nu e 1 tI Witll tllis increase j 11 1 e L 1be ra l. Party 1n tl1e �reat industrial tl b� d de �a 1 l rea sp r, fo ganisation were called ly been �1ttle more than us io ev pr d l1a h 1c 1 l w s, 1e rt JJa al ic lit Po city of Biriningl1an1. g in al to of pe ns ap t he large ea m e m so d fin to ad 1 l t, 1 1 ne ar rli Pa in gs in loose grotip g e on nc re am he ers of co mb r te me ea gr r fo d 1 1 l1a 11e 0 e 1 tl 1 1 0 d lle ca 1is Tl electorate. ing lac r rep de !he local conlea gle sin a r de 1 1 1 1 ies lic po 11 0 1nn1 1 co tl \Vi , rty pa each 1 er hand for partv otl the on d an 11t, rta 1Jo i1n re n1o 1 1 e be r lie ear d l1a 1 1 icl \vl 1s 1 io 11ect orga11is,1tio11s \vhicl1 worked an101 1g tl1 e voters, trying to persuade tl1 e electors ";1 tl1e grass roots'', and e11 cour,1gi11 g sL1p1Jorters to con1e out and vote for the party's car1didate 011 pol li11g day. As a mernber of a great party macl1ine, committed io st1pporti11g ,1 given aclmi11istration i11 tl1e l-Io11se of Con1mons, individual Mernberi of Parliament lost 111ucl1 of tl1eir earlier i11depe11dence, a11d it becan1 e possible to cou11t tl1e stre11gtl1 of eacl1 !)arty in Parliame11 t simply by cot111 ting the numbei �f �.P.s who belo11 ged to eacl1 sicle. An associat ed developn1ent ,vas the crysial· l1 sat�on o! the tv10-party syste1 n, i11 \vl1icl 1 t\VO great partjes, ratl1er than the many parties ol 11111ch of Europe or the sir1 glc JJarties of mucl1 of Africa. competed for tl1e \'Oters' atte11 tio11. At first tl1ese were tl1e Liberal and tl1e Conse�vative Parties. but witl: the gro\\,ing JJolitical consciot1sness of tl 1e t1rban working classes - another �c01101�1c ?evelo�1111e11 t of great political sig11ificance - tl1e Labour Party came into �eing in tl1� early.t:7'1 entietl1 centL1ry, a11d bJ' tl1e 1920,s }1ad replaced the Liberal Party as tl 1e c.h1 ef IJOl1 t1cal grott}Jing of tl1 e left .

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Mea11wl1ile, furtl1er i11creascs ir1 t l 1e electorate took place \>lith the extension . 'b . ··on of tl1 e vote to rt1ra' l vvorkers, 111 uu · · 1884, acco111pa111ed by a co11siderable red1str1 f e . � �O �11:1re tl1a (' ea�l1 CO 11S ti tt1e11�y \Vas of approxi 111ately tl1e san1e size ai t tha r: as not ur1t 1I after tl1e F1 rst \Vorld War (1914 �11 )� ;t \ e · J eve · l1ovi1 -1918 ) · · any wo111en got tJ 1 . t"' 11d \ tl ll e� ��: all � 28 1 19 t al of a e 1 ct Fr 1is A 1 cl �q � . t l Vi . rr: , 1en on er ov tl e a \V -l .::,'1 111ec � tl1e r1g1 1t to vote, witl1 tl1 e exceJJtion of cr1m1na .. l t111 c1tics ' an(l n1 e�bers o r t 1,e 1•1 ot1 se of Lords.

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' £D Througl1ot1t, the inost 11otable �e be . . . ha: . �tem _ a ti sy , e t . of , e 1 t1 pol1t1cal l 1 Engl1sl . tv th e way i11 which voting. re Lti ·ie retJle l ts llave kept Jace witl1 cl1a11ges 111 th e so1,ban , q � 1 a t large. As tl1e 11iiddle cl' 1ss es e u�,e' e th e 7 186 l 11c fra 2, �n 83 \ ed 1is by 1 i11 so _ i� working classes \-Vere reoard l as V 1 1 e tak JJoliti to cally able 111att 1 be re 1 e1 1 to g}1 ot own res1)011sible lJl·:1.ce 1''1 1· tfc � 1� !s0 ''Cr1 11 11e11 t of the coL111try and tl1is mea sure 'd'11i. sl1ortly fol lowed by' ti1 e J)ro,, e ' . rt a . 1s1 0 11 0f LIOI 'ersal . . 1.s was regs· ..,,i· edt1cat1 011 ' since tl1 as essent1c1l if tl1 e electors \ \ 11'' • e ver 1ce to · 1 ttse tl1e·1 ·1 11e\v-1ou ' c- 11 d votes witl1 1nte111ge I arI Y, t11e enfra11 c11iseinei1 el h t 1 t °_f � n1e 1 1 f ollo�ed j )· ic wh . par t 1 tl side e hacl taken i11 ma1111i 1 1g 1 10 rab le e co11 h . t � e m in h ries nd c;11.,1� . w \Var l 1 dt rl F r1ng 1e d grew to so111 etl1ing appro � tl US Wo irst � . a,cl 11ng eq1_1 a1·ity w1t n a , erc, . spl1 l1 c away many of the con\, inen social 1 in the n ent·io ns \V l1 1cl1 l1ad p \1i I h re ously I in1ited them to t e io

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A second featt1re. l1a. s be. en the way i11 w h··1 c11 t}1e orga111s · at·1011 of po 1·t· 1 ·1c 1 s 1as f?llowed from t he d1str1bu tio n of tl1e vote. Wl1en a Membe.r of P�rliament l1ad simply to rely 0� tl1e support of a fe': local landowners or tl1e backing of a11 i1nport­ ant lord, he retain�d � great �eal of 1ndepende11ce, and l1ad no 11eed for tl1e· comJ)li­ cated }?arty orga�isation wl11cl1 l1as fallowed tl1e u11iversal fra11cl1ise. Nowadays, a �and1date I,as virttially no cl1ance of bei11g elected to Parlia1ne11t l111less l1 e is no­ pa a rty b , :1sually 01�e ?f tl1e two large _politic�1l parties, ancl once in Par­ na ted j1 � l1ame�t, his con?uct 1s greatl� l1m�te? b� tl1e 11eed to obey tl1e party policy a11d follow � he dictates _0� 1!S _ leaders, _s�11ce it 1s l11_s first co11cer11 eitl1er to 1nai11tai11 l1is party in office or, if it 1s in oppos1t1on, to do l11s best to n . 1ake st1re tl1at it is strongly J)laced to challenge tl1e governme11t and e,1 e11tt1ally take over fr·on1 jt _ The Executive: Cabinet and Prime Minister The Developn1e11t of' Cabinet Gove1·11rr1e11t

From Maitland, op.cit., pages 394-397

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... Cabinet government, i11 our modern se11se, is bt1t slowly perfectecl; our idea of it involves several principles \Vl1ich were by 110 n1ea11s acknowledged prin­ ciples ... until late in tl1e last century. 111 the first J)lace tl1ere l1as been a furtl1er change in the mode of conducting bt1siness. Willia111 and A11ne were l1abitt1ally present at the meetings of tl1e Cabi11et Cou11cils, wl1icl1 also, as we l1 ave j11st seen, were legally meetings of the Privy Co11ncil. Bt1t tl1en tl1ere co1nes a cl1ange. George I [in the 18th century] cea.sed to attend tl1e meetings of tl1e Cabi11et. He and George II could not speak E.nglish, and felt little concer11 as to tl1e i11ternal policy of England; they were more concerned for }Ianover. The Cabinet tl1e11 begi11s to meet witl1011t the king's presence. The results of its discussio11s are, vvl1en tl1is is necessary, con­ veyed to the king by one of tl1e ministers. If an Order i11 Council is wa11ted, then a few ministers are got togetl1er, and wl1at is formally a11d legally a 1neeti11g of the Privy Council is held under tl1e ki11g's preside11cy. But tl1e b11si11ess of such a meeting becomes merely formal; it is 11eld in order that it n1ay register a foregone conclt1sion, a conclusion debated i 1 1 the Cabi11et and com1nt1nicated to tl1e king. George III, though he l1ad a will of his own and stro11g views of policy, did 11ot i11terfere with this arrangement. At the deliberative 111eetings of tl1e Cabinet Cot111cil the l<i11g was not present· tl1e formal meeti11gs of tl1e Privy Co11ncil at wl1icl1 l1e was present were not meetin�s for debate or discL1ssio11, bt1t n1erely meeti11gs at wl1icl1 tl1e king would give his formal assent and autl1ority to m.atters \vl1icl1 l1ad been already be­ fore the Cabinet and about wJ1icJ1 tl1e king's pleasure l1ad bee11 already taken. is a id ity Tl1 sol solicla1�ity of tl1e Ca?i11et g win gro n � Tl1e the ice in not aga 1st we m1 _ ._ . (I can find no better word for it) we 1nay a.nalyze 111to tl1 ree pr111c1ples: (1) pol1t1cal una nimity, (2) common responsibility to parliament, (3) st1bn1.issio11 to a con1111on head. �I) Only by degrees does it come to ·be consi?ered tl1at �h� ki1_ 1 g 011gl1t to,cl1o?se all 111s mi11isters from one of the two great p,trt1cs. TJ1 e m1n1str1es of An11e s re1g11 are partly Whig, partly Tory. TJ1 e \1'/11ig ad1ninistratio11 of Sir Robert Walpole s�ts the precede nt for party ministries a11d tl1cncefo rward, tl10L1gl1 tl1 ere are occa_ 51011al aberrations, tl1e bonds of party are dr,1w11 t1gl1tcr. · · ·

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sp re on m on m : co sibility to of e pl ci in pr e th i s i pa{r1 atnen1 1'th th s d cte C�nne . dy bo (2J will resign in a . d te ea ef , 1 if d y, tr is in m 1e � l t by wlucl: I� meant tll at ly admi tted until the last century was far adv an: [non ful ot . a e l 1p c n on �t et legal] pr1 ot l th nn wi ca r pa g he m i e s n u a ca be et ; � V: signing re e s � un n e n o �ay fi n d not q uarrelling with the' Wh� is m hi . th g wi lin l rre qu a i l11s colle�gt1 es reta1n ffice � uppor t l1is cau se. We must remember in. tbj s cm,o nor s nd o bou r u o t n 1o l 1n e,ne , y 1e tl n re a th by k s as on w m 1 C om ng f o _ fi o i s d1 d l s he e e ?� H i1 t 1 rs te is in m of ce en es pr tl1at tl1e er sw to e h er an t or their doings th{ , rs te us ir m ve a h to ng hi is w House. So far from l l1anged; the House wishe d o 'h c l ea id e th t Bu em th t e ud c ex to ed . a · l g g \ ' u t r c s e s u o H b t a d ve em e b h " or eJ. to 1t e om st cu ac to suppo n e am bec _ it re fo be s the minister ard them not merel g �e to le, 1o wl a as em tl1 rd ga y as t ht re to , them, to attack tll em ative s of a party, so tha t a t en es pr re e th s a l so a btit g, kin defeat representatives of tl 1e a p ar ty . of at fe de a be d l ou w r te is of a min a lmost of nec essity involves some degret try 1:is mi a of n tio a z ani org l1 Suc (3) of subordination and very slowl?' 1 t becomes a_c�nowledge? no t _h� law, but by : parliamentary practice tl1at t11ere 1s a mong the m1rusters a Prime M1111ster , one who has a certain amount of au tl1or ity over his fellows , o ne who, to a certain exten� stands betv1een tl1en1 and tl1e king. But this is the gradual outcome of practio:. Walpole, for example, thougl1, a s a matter of f act, he had great authority over J1is colleagues, protested against being called Prime Minister, and to this day the la\v k:nows no sucl1 person. Lord Sal isbury, we say, is Foreign Secretary a nd Prime l\11inister; to the l:::1 \V lie is rnerely one of H.M. principal Secretaries of Stat e, and V11J1atever power he 111a)' ha�;e over his colleagues is not legal power - he has no . more legal power to give them orders than they h ave to give him orders; he has no more power to dismiss them than they have to dismi ss him. Still, before the end of the last century constitt1tional practice required tha t there should be a Prime Minister.. and in the present century l1is ascendency h as become still more marked....

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Cabi,zet atzd Prime Minister in tl1e Ninetee11 tl1 Century

From Marcham, A Co11stitutiona! History of Modern Engla nd, 1960, page s 313-325, . The significance of_ tl1e ninetee11tl1 century in the hi story of the cabi net �es . �:�wo developme�ts. �irst, during tl1is pe rio d the cabinet became a policym3k!o g .Y. an� acte? . with li�t_le regard for tl1e lling tro con Th e wi shes of the monarch. 10: 1� ��1::�� p�litJcs w as passing to Pa in�on; oi'el t pu rli bli am c op en an d v �d · e c 1 rcumstance s, tl1e cabinet had means of exercising influenh�; Seco , the ca' b n e t b ecame r e t i spons ·b le "or a fa r grea s es 1 bus n · of ge ter ran 1 i · t 11 e e.1gl1 l1ad come bef ore J· t in teentl1 century . ... Before w e consider tl1e . · ii ry . ro1e_ of tlie cabinet during the ninetee nth ce �: ci\t wil l be well to answer the queSlion: what was th e ab d a eh ri(II{ wa s in It c et body varying in size from t ? . mini ster wl10 wa s free to ;elv7 to nineteen, according t o the decision of the5 �oulJ . d e have seats in tJ1e cabinet einlin� wl1icl1 ?f the persons chosen to hold offi � 1 it n n a br · · ief , i du rin c g t n e b� �s te(}- . came a distinc t group the cen tur ne y tee ? nth wh s members were pu t mi��t tt , It had _status in the cabi ne blic as ly kno wn politi ca� �1� of �lle country. ve r�� tio S cause 1t regularly go th e It in sta ha tu d s a performed unctions u5 J1J and Parliament · The l vita l to the worki ng of the adI111 aw, however• d'd 1 not recognize it . ...

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If �e ask.the question, wha� did t.he cabinet do in the nineteenth century, the answer 1s that it of policy the directed and formulated the govern1nent. ''Formulated'' _ here means d�scussed and a �eed upon. The cabinet met, as a rt1le, once or twice a week to del1be�ate and decide upon the policies to be undertaken by the govern­ ment. _In the period b �fore about 1840,_ tl1 ougl1 some important acts were passed, the_ chie� m�tters considered b � the c �b111et w�re admirtistrative; that is, tl1ey dealt with act1on in the field of f oretgn policy and 1n regard to st1cl1 domestic affairs as taxa �ion and other �spects _of pu?�ic finance. After 1840 administrative problems cont1nued to be _con�1�ered; 1n add1t1on, Iegislatio11 beca1ne important and tl1e cabi 11et discussed the bills 1t intended to st1pport. J?irection of J?O�icy �y t.he cabinet i11volved two 111ajor activities: tl1 e continuing oversight of adm1n1strat1on and th. e n1anagement of Parliament with a view to gaining support for the cabinet's policy. ... In theo �, and for the mos� part, i11 practice, tl1e cabi11et presented ct united front to Parliament. However divergent tl1e opinio11s of ministers migl1 t be, they were expected to draw then1 together in a single policy before tl1ey faced Parliament... The unanimity achieved by tl1 e ministers before they met with Parliament was often gained after a struggle between a majority and a 1ninority. In Parliame11t the minority found themselves tinder obligation to support policy tl1 ey would l1ave opposed but for t_he need for unanimity.... The unanimity of the cabinet before Parliament was not a mere stratagem of politics, but a vital expression of the solidarity of tl1e cabinet. It demonstrated tl1c1.t the cabinet had a policy and that all members were worl<ing togetl1e1· to put tl1at policy into effect. In a sense, it was proof of tl1e devotion of the mi11isters to a com­ mon cause, and that each one of tl1em was ready to stand or fall on the actio11s of bis colleagues. They accepted common or collective responsibility' for the policy they had determined. . .. The cabinet itself was responsible to Parliament; it remained in power so long as a majority of the House of Commons supported it. Here also the rule became more exact in the course of the nineteenth century. As late as the 1850's tl1e cabinet had much leeway i n de- tennining what was proof tl1at it had lost support of a majority in the House of Commons. It could treat defeat upon a motion in the house as not decisive. On this account, Russell disregarded twenty-five defeats in the period 1850-1851, Aberdeen thirty defeats in 1853-1854, and Palmerston fifteen defeats in 1856. The pattern changed quickly. By the end of tl1e century, the cabinet and the opposition regarded defeat on any issue as a gr�ve matter. The on� u�ed ev�ry means to keep its majority present and ready for v�ting; the other used its 1ngenu1ty to catch the majority off guard and force defeat In an unexpected vote. .. . In the course of the nineteenth century, tl1e position of the prime minister in relation to his colleagues grew stronger. He was free to assign tl1em to n�w offices or to ask them to resign if they persjsted in d:itfering_ from the agreed policy of _ the . cabinet. He was free to decide whether to bring an issue before the whole cabinet or to settle it in consultation with one or more chosen ministers. . .. w-hatever t.he degree of authority exercised ?Y a prime n1inister, or the methods _ he used to assert clear that Ill the latter part of the n1neteentl1 it Js evidence the �entury the prime minister occupied a position of more general i portance in public � life than had his early nineteenth _century. L1�e the�, !1� usually the predecessors in held the office of First Lord of the Treasury. Sometimes he held an add1t1onal of-

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o sio tw ca 1 oc 01 ns, and Sali b r t1e eq ch Ex e tl, of . r llo e fice;_ Gladsto11e was Cl ,anc member of tl,e House of Commons, l1e was ac�uury a 5 a w e l1 lf . ry ta re c dally a· h . foreign se le e tit tl w He ld l1e as 1 r ste ni nu the r l1e e of "" ' anot , 1s e ev c_n if • t I 1o 1e t f o er th.e lead e1 opment of the party syste ev d . "d p1 ra e th of ew vi rn. . ·nence came from a cl1ang · 111s party - 110 1 1g11 t t ask 111 e in politi ea! 1 ef en u 1 cl is l1 t ti B s. 1d 11 ft y rt pa He co11trolled tl1e 1· · · · · · 1 methods. an po pa c1 c1 1t1 111 1n pr e tl1 a y, t1r r� nt pa ce tl1 •• en te i,e ni · · · · "J, 1. w e tl, Of e s ur I11 tl1e co n times 1n particular, contests t1o ec e I at ; ls bo m sy s y' rt pa at tll of . canle, in a sense, one n ee ts es tw nt be co as or e party Iead"'?t> m d an e or 1n " ed rd aa re e er w s t·e I . o' t een par be'\V o e tw es tl1 n rti ee pa tw �e s ue wa iss e tl1 viewed 1en wl st fir e tl1 s wa 41 18 of , Tl,e electioi rs tl1e at cto th ele id �oted t? ?ecide sa ne sto ad Gl , 57 18 of on cti ele the Of y. v,1a in tliis 1 ton ers �s lm me pr� Pa . ve ha t no uste uld rrur wo r: 1 ''\vli etI1 er tile col111try would or f and D1srael1 were the per­ sel lum ne sto ad Gl , on ati 1er ge1 xt 1 ne e tl of ch mu 1 1 j d An s011alities 011 wl1om elections tt1r11ed. Political leaders brought into play many of the arts of J)ublicity a11 d propaga11da dt1ring elections. They addressed the voters i 1 1 formal electio11 stat.e111e11ts a 1 1d gradt1ally adopted tJ1e pr. actice of touring the country, even acldressing crowds at railroad stations, mucl1 to the distress of Queen "v'ictoria, at least v1l1e11 Gladsto11e was tl1e speaker. She tl1ougbt it improper for hin1 to s1)eal< ()lttside l1is own co11stit11ency. Gladstone replied in the manner of , a true politician by stating that not l1is party but tl1e other l1ad ''established a rule of \Vllat n1ay be called J)OpLtlar agitation by addressing public meetings from time to ti 111e at plc1ces witl1 wl1icl1 tl1ey were not connected." The trutl1 was that politics l1ad become tl1e bt1siness of tl1e wl1ole 11ation; a11d, because the principal politician in a party l1ad con1e to be acceJ)ted as tl1e syn1bol of the party and the guarantor tl1at tl1c · part)' program \Vould be put i11to effect ' tl1e electorate wished above aU to see l1in1 a11d l1ear l1in1. �I1e 11ineteentl1 �entl 1ry \Vas tl1erefore a perio d of important develop ment_in the I11story of tl1e cab111et systern. Tl1 e cabinet became identified in a new way \Vtlh tl1e _forn1u�ation and directi_o11 of policy. It formulated administrati\'e policy over a� increasin� ra11g� of topics and sketched out extensi,,e legislative programs. I� dire�ted policy by !ts co11trol of tl1e administrative system. In its management 01 P�rl1ame�t tl1e cabinet _ relied little upon tl1e i i,fluence the of and mo na rch of the ar1stocrat1c g1: l1ps_ w�1ch l1ad _domi11 ate d Parli ament in tile eigl,teenth cent uJJi � aod �ore 011 its tie� wrtli organized opinion t.he in and mo in ns tl1 e Hou · be 01·neconst1tuences. The Jlid0gmeot 0 f commentat . . se of Com 10 t ors . on govern BrLt1sh ment t e h en�_ury 1� tl, t from abotit 1870 th e cabinet controlled Parliament, wbe�� � i� ��rli�r times arlia t· ine ment 11ad controlled tl1e cabinet cab the ' · In organization · became more compact d · tli e n1neteentl1 century; at least_, by th_ e end f th e , century, tl1e unity of a c�·����t wa ! ve bo l s taken to be .a measure of its effic1_ency. all, tl1 e prime ininister assumed _ ublic i p a new im the portance in the cabinet and 1n life of tl1 e cotintry. , 10,

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1ne 1\1onarch;, From Knappen, Constituti 19 onal a·nd Legal szst 415 · ory of England, 1964, pag. es A.lth Ol1 g11 ... tl1e crown l n e . retained cons1der ble i flu o vertlJil ' g the of Eng�and during tlie e ov er en ce diS � � ighteenth century, e the 1nsaruty of George III and t b c bY ·. solute incompetence of b· is sons weakened tl1e institution of the ·British JllOllar

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it h �s n ever b een ��le to recov th a sl t y ri o u se · so er much of its former political im­ porta nce.No t o nly d .1d tl1e fu ll pol1t1cal power sl�� into the l1ands of th C e a b in et . nd 1 83 18 � 7, 10 b� n t th e w ee _character and act1v1t1es of George IV bet an d J1 is b ro th er a d n a te li e th so ei r s m tt bJects tl1at when these n1onarcl1 Willia s did try to interfere st at th o e ey were often forced to give way in m atters f b ef o re tl 1 e opposition of tl1eir su ministers. Fro� ch a defeat of Willian1 IV over tl1e qt1estion of the co n 1position n et C m ab �y i b e ne ·da�ed tl1e establisl1111ent of a defi1 1it of a w e pr ec ed en th t at th e n o d t sh n o i te u l rf er ar e ch 1n mon 111atters tl1at a.re the st1bject of J)olitical contro ve rs y. tr ue re is _ , ga it i n ed ria , m Victo . t1cl1 of the lost pop11larity o·f tl1 e royal l1ot1se, and in 1839 did succeed 1 n preventi n g tl1 e fa ll of a 1 ni11istry l1eaded by l1er favorite states ­ . M el bo d t1r . ne Lo . . r Bt1t after Victoria's 111ar1·iage to l1er Gern1an co m an, us in Albert she accepted good ad,rice fron1 l1er l1usba 11d 011 tl1e dt1ties and limitations of her position as a constitt1tional 111011arcl1, a 1 1d unde1· his careful coaching she may be said _to have created tl1e modern Englisl1 role for tl1at part. Even so, bel1ind f ex sh er e es ted n so sce n1e in luence wl1en disct1ssi1 1g ministerial changes with the her various Prime M inisters, who disliked to cross l1er imperious will any more than necessary. The part of Edward VI I i11 foreign affai.rs has already bee11 suggested. In the reign of George V par ty lines becan1e somew11at mt1ddled because of the rise of a third party and the eco11omic crisis. In l1is capacity as sum1noner a11d ad­ viser of ministers ,vhen a ne'vv ''gover 1 1111ent'' was to be formed, it is generally sup­ posed that, like hjs Hanoverian forebears, George exe1·cised co11si_ derable influ�nce. He is tl1ought to have been particularly respo11sible for tl-ie format1011 �f t�e national government in 1931, altbougl1 the 11istorian must wait f 01· the :pu bl1cat1on of the . memoirs of those concerned before l1e can speak w1tl1 confidence. In �ny case, tl1ere is no doubt that thougI-1 the· monarcl1 is so weak in l1is own d?.n1es�1c spl�ere that, like Edward VIII, he cannot e,,en do thin gs \Vhicl1 are legal �or his su�Jects,. the modem English sovereign who l<ee1)s .� go�d JJersonal reputat1011 can still qui etly exert, on occasion, a n important pol1t1cal 111flue11ce. 1::.,

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From Maitland, op.cit., pages 397-398.

Note that in the late nineteenth cent11ry, when Maitland wrote, some of the conventions of _ which he speaks were not yet fully established.

· I . gro_wtl1 of tl1e pri11ciples, wl1icl1 of course Then again, we have to notice 11e ar e no principles of law _: (I)_ t!iat tJ1e kttlg is b:�:d (at least i n all grave matters) t cl,oose..1,is ministers, or rather t� act on the advice of h1s m1n1ste_rs, (2) tl,�t l,e not We can ns. imo Con of use H 1 1 ll w the � st his fii minister, in accordance with s p�rsonal will and pleasure_ has trace step by step the I?roce_ss wl,ereby t � e come to count for very little .1n Otir government. �l,e i·eigns of tl1 e two Hanover1ans, George I and �eorge II, had much to do 1'ti ·t George Ill's atte111pt to govern as well as to re1g11 was, we may_ now say, : r:t��gradc attetnp_t; it is improba?le 1i cl1 we are speaking l w of s es oc t hat we shall see such an attempt pr l1e T e _ 1!1 the fu ��k� a s �s a very gradt1al p·rocess, and 1t 1s very 1 ult to y with any accuracy how_ far tle w lit ho or 1 cl nu 1 w J1o w io ki it has gone. \v 11 Fe indeed are the people ,vl1 0 rea e er th ill St ... . t en m 1 r1 ve go of h qu se u� ! e een's [Victoria's] ow n wish es affect t� e �� � :iv ac cep t sh ou ld sh e s ma tte r 18 no e I r 1 dou bt tl1at it is expected of l1er tllat 11 w � e h se to ts en d u st l ga le s the advice a s tt s ern c? nc of 1 er mir1isters. It mucl1 ratl1er l 1a rl a p t u 1 o l it W . ts en em g n a th·1·3 no n.. rr a ' . . I ega l 1 l wit d e t nec Jegal rt1Ie is 1·nt1n1ately co11 . t u h o · it w t. o fo n o t ep k e b n ' ca y The · n·· t's consent give n year by year, no standing arm v ne o m g h u o n e t · o n te ra v n a �. t a the gra nt of or . ev on m no ve l1a su�plies the k i 11g w i11

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am s li u J1 ar p T e nt, and in t. en m n er ,, o g f o rk o i.. ' w , e th n Part o y r r a c to k ec up on the kin_ g s a ch nt cie to enabl e 111m effi st mo a s h � , s ctio n o m . n m o C f o 1. e . s u o H d e n a th m r t m o o a la n co u c ld a u m co o rit h w J rs 1 n the te y is in · m ce ffi o 1n p . e e k . ef e r Id . us to u co An attempt to rene w the A se ou I-l 1e tl : il fa · ly di ee sp ld tmv ou · '"" S -,, n 1o n m o C f o e s r u e t o s_ H u 1e m1ru o co� an� h rr e w v o _ to t p m e t� _a n A �. � ie l p p su t n ra g to se fu re r o t, c A ost 1mportant ch·oice u1a he m T n. io sh fa r la rL 1 nu s1 · · a . n 1 et . · m · , be t 1 . g1 . · sueh a maJor1t y rru , er e st M th . rru e e r ministers 1:11 th �1 o P a f o e_ ic o ch e th w o n is a Icing can have to make ? en an r, ev e he seld om te er us h 1r � � m ri P e th y b im h r are practically chosen fo ce at ti th ac pr n al he on w t1 1;1 a mini strv 1t st :° co as n ow d id la en ev is It bas mucll choice. e person named by the oui- . th to p h1 rs 1e em pr e th r e f of to resigns, the king otight going minister. e ly t rules of la,w· ar ar no cle t os m l1 1ic v,l les rt1 g on am s e elv rs ou d \J../e here fin s or the convention; m sto e_ cu th or , ity al or m l na io ut tit ns co of s e l ru 1 we may cal l tl1err y an d of defi.n itene&s : nc ge in str of ee gr de y er ev of em th d fin e / V. . ion of the constitut t y tha ite the fin de so d an t practically en ing str so les ru are re e tl1 nd ha on tl1 e one 1 ve hardly yer ha 1icl es wl rul are re tl1e nd ha er oth tl1e on 1; lav of es rul operate as is . jch able wl1 put of dis nce ste For exi y ver the d an or!, 1iti og1 rec l era gen obtained i11stan.ce, we 1nay 110,x,1 talce it as a wellusettled understa11ding that when a bill bas l)assed both 110L1ses of parlic11n.ent, the Icing will not withho l d his assent. The lasi occasion 011 1,vl1ich such asse11t was \Vitl1l1eld occurred so long ago as Queen Anne\ reigr1, [in tl1e early ejgl1teer1tl1 ce11tury] wl1en sl1e rejected a Scottisl1 Militia Bill, We nov; expect t!1e roJ1al asse11t as though it were a· mere matter of course, and (to say_ tl1e least) ti1e cir?un1�ta11ces �,rould l1a�e to be of a v e f)' extraordinar y character wh1cl1 would allow tL1e l(1ng to withhold 111s royal assent without a breach of a well· �ettled cor1stitutional understanding. On the other l1and, we seem to see a rule grow· 1ng up to tl1e effect that the House of Lords ot1ght not persiste ntly to resist the \�II 0 th� I--Iouse of Commo1?s �bout matters of first-rate importance. At present this � rule, if rule we may cal l 1t, 1s of a very vagu e c l1aracter; ... ''

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Tlze House of Lords From Keir, op.cit., pages 411-413, 477-480.

. . The increasing stren· g·L h of part e ·i ,s, ene1g1s bli· � · pu th on . e e e relianc d by tl1eir · · n v 1 d the of e i ns op e nce rat ed no! influe on l y the to dimin isl1 6��: b�� :fs� tl�ft �� �� ; Lord8: 11 tli e eighteenth century t11e Upper House had been ascribed a constitut1· 11a l s t1011 not o \ve p l fi ci an n pt ce a t ex its in ec of sp re , : very seriousl y inferior to �11 at OP[ t{le Lower. s r \V tl1e Lo t act l 1at as thoug t ht d I · · · · as an e ffective count e O i se t0 tile popu 3 , tio l ar Hou se in a bal anced constitu n as ''check on the people � tl .inte res�� 0 of tl1e King and upon the House of C oDlill? � in the intere sts of King a�� eop e s o � n c the It u · wo · at l r, th ve d, we ho m see · · � J � tional status of tlie Lor ds en e e on b ntu l � half-ce � ?w decl ine during the ry ;e the Reform Bill. Tli eir p eclili:� ac their non-representative cha t cessibi lity to royal influence tende d to undfrai· N er.. ·: · The House ... see med to stand too P ;;. fo� the interests of property ��� p l r v il ege and to l ose i s a er a f c its ormer charact knit group of l1ere ditary counse l l ors of the Cr own. . . . .1 Tl1e effect of the RCJr0rm· e' b ted :r, Act was t 0 d ma nue-S inanY eepen the cleavage thus tween tl1e Houses. The harm . on w so ., t,.11li· J cb had be en nat en � w ated e e ura � mbers of the Com mons cr �_ lly e �oIIllnees of the Lor wer tion of so many nominat·ion ds was destroyed with the a boroughs and the en l argement of the franchise.

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The pre �ensions of this non-elective assembly - numbering over 700, of whom only a fraction ever attend debates - to exercise an aut.hority co-ordinate with th�t of the Commons _ became ever less easy to defend. That rivalry which after 1832 replaced_ the anc1e·nt h �rmony_ o� t�e two Houses was further emphasised after 1867.With a Conservative maJor1ty 1n the Conunons the two Houses could be t�.ned i!lto u��ni�ity. With a Liberal majority tl1ere tl1ey came into repeated conflict. E.1Jher s1ruat1on was detrimental to tl1e status of the Upper House. The first made it a �ere appendage of the Lower, tl1e second placed it in the invidious. position of seern1n _g to chal�enge the will of the electorate.... With a Liberal govern­ ment once more In office In 1906, tl1e oppositio11 of tl1e Lords to the Commons. began a�ew.... In 1907 the Commons carried a 1notion tl1at '<in order to give effect to the will of the people as expressed b)' their elected representatives, it is necessary that the po �er of the other House to alter or reject bills passed by tl1is House should be so restnct e_ � by law as to secure tl1at witl1in the lirru_ts of a single Parliament the final dec1s1on of the Commons shall prevail''. Tl1e introduction of payment of members was soon to reinforc.e the Lower House b)' men wl1ose antecedents. and interests sharply oppos,ed them to the propertied and privileged classes domin­ ant in the Lords, and made them less patient of their opposition.

It is possible that so long as the Lords l1ad confined their opposition to non­ financial m.easures such as those hitherto rejected, the resolution of' the Commons. in 1907 would have been barren of result. In 1909.howe,.rer, tl1e Lords were tempted into occupying a less defensible position.After 1671 tl1ey l1ad been formally denied the right of amendm . g moneJ' bills. ... They still, preserved povver to reject such bills outright. Since ... 1860, all money bills had been combined in a single budget� . Piecemeal rejection of individual money bills was no longer possi ble. The bt1dget must now be accepted or rejected as a whole. Its.rejection must ob,1iously be attended to serious risk of a life-and-death struggle v1ith the Lo,;ver Hot1se. That ris1< the Lords, in view of t.he principles of taxation involved in the 1909 Budget, finally decided to take. Their .decision had few precedents even before 1860, vvhen the re­ jection of money bills was easier, and none later. The general election which fallowed their rejection of the Budget was intended by the Lords as an appeal to the electorate against the Commons, and so accepte_d by the Government. The Lords' resistance was based less on the gro·und of their constitutional parity with the Commons than on their ass11med right to ensure that !he Commons really represented the will of the nation. .: . The Government, though 1t lost heavily, retained a majority .... In the new Parliament, the Lords accepted the electorate's decision and passed the Budget. They now found themselves. t�reatened by a Parliament Bill ... designed to_ extingui�h their power over finance bills and limit it over others.... When the Parliament Bill react1ed them, the J-'ords, without rejecting, attempted to amend it. Their amendments were rej ected in the Commons, and the two Houses were irreconcilably at odds. The constitutjonal practice of the past provided only one expedient likely to be of help to the governm ent in this dilemma. ... The precedent of 1832,_ based _ 01!- t�at of 1712, exercised a compelling influence.In th_e debates on the_ Parliam�nt B�tll 1n. the Commons the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, made public a promise gi·ven before the election by King G�or�e V to creat_e a sufficient,,n�mber ?,f peers t� ov.ercome the s rd Lo rd -ha die the t ea thr s th1 e for Be . ity f Jor . resistance o the ma gave way, and the bill p assed into law. '

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in d case of doubt m an , lls bi y e on m . ed n fi de a e the d d ap The Parl1� me�1t. Ac t an un al fin e a al r pe tu na ble in this of is ll .bi �t ti witl1 o ut amendme abcoun passed Speaker s cert1�a e ;: not if , should nt bills � sucl1 tl1 t he y ya h iv it ce w of law. � p_rov1 ed re rt o f e th , h ed e iv e c re ro l g 11 ei b ir 1e tl f o 1 tl o 11 a L?rds w1 tl1111 a � 0 ls bi r it otl1 e e11acted o t l ssen1 if gard tl1 W r e itl1 at nce · · · e 1curr · ssen P a . ho u t th e Lord s c 1 it w i o s ss e ns thJey sliould r . e successive re th 10 1s . o1 nm oi C eceive (:' - d pr?v1·d �d that no. by tlle 1n tl1e same 1orm t_ less tha n two e '!-,or s, �h by d e ss pa t 11o jf tl1 e royal asse11t even ion and the.1r final re d· ss se st fir e tl1 1n g in ad re nd co se in� a years 11ad eIapsed SI.nee tlleir. s. n o m m C o 1e 1 t d e ss a p y 1e tl in the third sessio n in wh1cl1 etween the t wo House s, and to f rm b e nc la ba e th st ju ad re o t o Tll ougl1 intended e th ct of s A e ha om tc been to redu� ou e th , 1se ot J-I er pp U e tl1 f o m or ef r a a prelude to e on k tb ec ch Lowe r Hous e. Since a as t ac to r e w o p its t in po g in sl1 ni al most to va e Lords' support, or reeard tl1 n o ly re to d e ed e n s ha t en ni rn ve o g no 1911 iii fact e ess�nti�l p�rpose of the th s wa 1is Tl . ce en ist ex its ng eri ng da en as ion tli eir' opposit o 11se of a le g1s]ative impotence. H r pe Up e 1 tl 011 n tio lic i11f tl1e 11 t11a Act ratl1 er

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The following readings are tal(en fron1 the speeches of the Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) and the Leader of the 01Jposition (Mr. Balfour) in tl1e House of Commons debates on the reform of the I-louse of Lords. They illustrate a number of tl1ings about the workings of "Westminsier' parlian1cntary den1ocracy, and about tl1e place of conventions in it; in particular. they may show how constitutional institutions continually evolve, to n1eet the pressures or needs created by chang­ ing public attitudes and ne\v social and econon1ic conditions .

From Parlian1e1ztary De!Jates, 1 -loitse of Cot11111011s, in Ste phenson and Marcbarn, op.cit., pages 841-850.

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[2 December 1909J Tl1e �rim e mi11ister [Afr ..4.sqi,it/1] n1 oved that tl1e action of the h?use of lords 111 refu�1ng to pass into law tl1e fi11ancial [Budget] provision made �Y this h ouse �or tl1e ser\'ICe of tl1e year is a breac l1 of tl1e c onstitution and a usurpa· t1on of tl1 e r1gl1ts of tl1 e comn1 0 1 1s. [He said_:] \Ve a�e n1et here, this after11oon, und er circun1stances which are e mpled II� tl1 e li_Istor� of _tl1e Britisl1 parliarne11t .... W l1en a short time o �g ��e � nail_ce 8111 rec eived Its third reading, a11 d as it lef t this ·11ouse it re presente�­ . ve, 111 a greater d ' I bel1e : tured . eg re n1a e tl ia e · n can e th b e sa1 m 'd ti our of any n1east1re of . the well sifted tl1·e deli berate work of a11 overwheln1ir1g inajority of th e representa tives of tl1 : , l � l on ,1 inatter wl1ic l1, by tl1e custom ot� generations and by th� :�� � \� c o urse of t a n� � u11b r?ke11 autl1ority, is_ tl1e p o se. v h this f o u r o inc a e _ f¥ this l1 ouse alone' . ��1 tl;e co tirse _ wh� of a week, or little more tl1an a week. the �0 r this fabric J1a s been tll to tile groti11d. For the first ti m e in_ English bJ: __:. the grant of tl1e w11 0 1e o f��l:� . ro ays an d 1 nea11s fo r tl1 e st1pply and service of the ye i-,ee � grant made at tlie re tiest o f l 1e cro� 11 to as ons tl1e cr o com wn tl1e by m - � ase intercepted a11ct nttllifi� b y � r ody wl11 cl1 admitte r t dl l1as not tl1 e p�wer o ioc eane or diminisl1 one single tax anY to for prop . o se ve a11y lternat1 substitute or �1 · of tl1e taxes. Tl1 e l1 ouse of' "'rn· crO' '"' ' commo11s w ould , in_ · y5 · t_he JUdgme11t of l1 is roaJest ment, be ·unwortl,y of its · :' n and i t t of tl1e ��� uct _ trad1t t� 1 e 10 od tl cus is � doeS 11s it the trustee, if it allo wed whicl o 1 ; t �r d_ay to pass without making it clear tbat-'r �ot mean to bro ok tll e . urpa· . 11s great est . t gan i11d 1g111 ty and, I will add ' the most arro · - -_t1on to ,vl1icl1 ' for more · ti 1an two cent1.tr1es , it l1a s been asked to subm.1t ··· -·

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... T�e only co1:1rse -whjcJ1 .in th � ci!ct11nsta11ces it is open to the governmen t, . w1tbout either b�eaking the law or sacrrfic111g constitutional principle ... is to advise, as we have _adv1 s�d tl1 e c.rown, to di_ssolve this p,trlia1nent at tl1e earliest possible moment. His m�Jesty ha s be e11 graciously pleased to accept tl1at advice, and the result, I trus�, will ?e that tl1e ne w .hot1se of commons will asse1nble at such. time as to make 1t possible for it to l?rovide, botl1 retrospectively a11d prospectively, for the nee�s of the ctirr�nt fina11c1�l ye,1r. If we ar·e fortt111ate e11 ougl1 to enjoy its confidence, its first .ac t .wi ll be to reimpose, as fro1n tl1is week, all taxes and duties which _were embodied in the Fina11ce Bill and to vr1lid,1te all past c0Jlectio11s and deductions ... Bu t I go _on no w to s�y- tl1at. _the pt1rpose of my 1notio11 to-day is 11ot to complair1 of the financial and adm1n1strat1ve l1 ardsl1ip wl1icl1 tl1e l1ot1se of lords has so }1eed­ lessly inflicted upo n tis ... No; mine is a totally cliffere.nt pt1rpose. It is to ask the hot1se, in vindication of tl1e first principles of tl1e constitt1tion and i11 assertion of its own .immemorial rights., to e11ter ,1 pro111pt and sole1nn protest ag,1inst the wl1ole proceeding. We l ive in this cou·ntry, a11d ,ve l1ave lived for centuries v.:1st, under an unwritten constitution ... It is of course true tl1at we have upon the statute book great instruments like 1 Iagna Carta itself, tl1e Petition of Rigl1 ts, and the Bill of Rigl1ts, which define and secure 111a11y of our rights ,1nd pr.ivjleges; but the great bulk of our constitutional liberties - and, I would a.cld, of ot1r constitution,tl prac­ tices - do not derive their validity and sanction from any bill wl1icl1 l1as received the formal assent of king, lords, and co1nmons. Tl1ey rest t1po11 t1sage, upon ct1stom, upon convention ... And let n1e poi11t ot1t ft1rtl1er ii is an essential i11cident of such an unwritten constitution tl1at tl1ere sl1ou.ld be powers wl1icl1 are legal powers ..., yet which in the course of time ... first of all came to be fitftilly and intermittently used, and finally ... became dormant, 1noribt1nd, a11d for all practical purposes dead. A fa.miliar illustration of this, well known to everybody, is tl1e veto of the crown. There is not11jng whatever to prevent n1e, or any other mi11.ister, from advis­ ing his majesty to-morrow to refuse his asse11t to a bill wl1ich has JJ,tssed tl1roL1gh both the house of commons and the house of lords. 1-\nd if l1is n1ajesty were to take that advice and so refuse his asse11t, that bill could not take its place 011 the statute book and would not ha,.,re its effect i11 law. I tl1i11k, however, tl1e n1inister who gave that advice would deserve to be impeached,_ altho11gl1 i11 poi°:t of la_w the right of the crown to veto a bill is j11st as 11nqt1est1011able to-day as 1t was 1n the time of Queen Elisabeth. But t\VO h11�dr�d years of �esuett1�e and contrary practice have made it a leg al rjght 11ot constrtL1t10.nally exerc1sed or r. ollowed now .... · , Tried by the test wh ich I 11ave been endeavc)11ri11g to cles_crjbe - tl1e test of t_l1e s not doe 111s usage, the test of convention, the test of 11nbroke11 unde.rst??d · recent act i. on of tlle hotise of lords i .n rejecting tl1e Fi11a11ce 8111 cleserve tl1e descrip­ tion which I have given to jt in my reso] L1tior1? Is it 11ot a breacl1 of tl1e constitution? ... Mr. .f:J., J. Balfour ... The right }1on.ourable ger1tl�1nan anr d !1is party .have a perfect passion for tl,ese abstract resolutions. Tl1ey b1·111g tl1er 1 [orward at 1r1ter­ r he 1et t wl 11b I clo . cly ?o r1? rt. hu y the ; dy h bo no J, y Vals. T ey bind nobody; the elp t�,ey enc()Urage arlybody, and I am sLire that they d� not fr1gl1ten a11ybody ..... The ?f ces a _ sp ge r1hgt_ honourable gen lar lgh o1 thr ly 1ck q11 d an y sil ea d ve . tleman mo Engl!sh h i· story: 'he went back to 1628 and he came dow!1 to tl1 e pa� er <.it1t1es. Dld �� h fs rc lo nf � hf'. giv· e a· si· 11g-1 e 11� l1n e rh 1 r.l 111 · w · P. rs t1 co . e , iat th · d.1cat'1 ng tl arg11ment 111 1

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lu e so th f re o n o ti e g a u g n is la ab h e th . 11 j h ic 1 l w e o eac J a I ' 1s n o � s? m e . m e u ? .. th co h r f o u p y ts h tl g n ti h rece f tl1e ri o � o ti �� a rp � su drawing in not a e wrong distin,,} o_f the const1tut1or1 an utely 1.11 . absol 0n � is . man e tl n e g . e l b a r t th a t u s e u n e o b n e k t o 1t r o w r1ght hono 1s and that h 1� l1 w � n o t1 t1 it st n o c r u between tl1at !)art. of o wllich is not written on th e s.tatute boo k , or coru se there . n · io t· . u t 1 ,.· s1 n o c r u t o 1ten on th� statute 1 o f o � 1. t h ; r JC . h i pa f t V � n ? t1 u 1t st n co e �h in l1 it w t u B . n io h ct n ti is h w , u IC e s sI � is that d o p stant1ally no. l l Y a 1� n h c te e r a l1 1c l1 w boolc there are some thin. gs re are other th in g s which are done every day. And body v;ould recommend The neither to tl1e fi rst n o r to the second cl�s of things ­ there is a tliird class belonging t t? be part o f our eve�-�ay pract1�, _bu_t which o n t gh u o ly n ai rt ce h ic h w things , n t o u n b t1 hi u it 1t w st n s e it irit co th sp f o w I� en tt ri w e th ly e er m are clearly witliii1 not . y a w e k li n a sm te a st d n a d a interpreted in any bro s ie nc ue m st tit e ns th co at be con, u th g in ar cl de in s, rd lo of e us ho e th ... Ras t e gh w to ou ch ve hi w lea ns to tio a nc fu e th nd yo be ne go , re su ea m is suited on tl1 ld ou ey sh th 1 be d at ise th erc ex er op pr be ay m it ly re ra r ve second chamber, l1owe ve ll ha to ine. wi try term de un co e th ich 'Nh t in po e th is 1at Tl ... t Ti1at is tl1e real poin . er nev all er in sh wav I .. r ve ate wh ts 11b do no ve l1a y all du i·vi ind I i11t po t tl1a On ly n s rare bee nt, ha I gra , ich r wh we po a r \\'e pO its of se rci exe tl1e the belief tl1at in h own has er s mb cha d on sec the ed on nd aba n bee er exercised, but v,1l1icl1 has 11ev to ber cham nd seco a of y dut the is it t \Vha of inct inst nd sou and r clea ly fect a per do. T�1ey l1ave done it fearlessly, and I believe they 'Will be supported by the 1:;ountry. . ..

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(Parli�mcnt -.vas ''dissol,icd'' by order of the King (on the Prime Minister's rccommendatlo o). New elect1on,5 \Vere h�ld. :rv'Ir. Asquitl1 's party was returned with a majority, again. The debates on v1l1at to ao about tl1e House of Lords' power to ''veto'' legislation were re-opened.)

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house� this that March.1910 [2� moved ministe: J?rime Tl1� ]_ Asquit/1) (Mr. . 1rmned1ately resolve 1tselr into a committee to consider the relations between ihe two houses of parliament and the question of the duration of parliame nt ... . We l1ave had :vithin the !�st six months ! first, and by way of climax toa long senes of acts by wh1cl1 tlie dec1s1ons of tltis l1ouse have been flouted and set at naught, an encroaclunent bJ' tl1e hot1se of lords up on a d oma1n · w hich h as come to. be re. .. . garded by universal consent as enti.rely outside . nce prov i tl1eir constitutional ··. W e have as a first and urgent step t� �eal with things as they ��e, din an e particular to deal with tl1e l1ouse o_f 10rds as It 1s and to prevent a repettt1on of th unconstitutional raid of la t ear into _the domain have to sec� We finance. of as against tlie house of lord: ' ill�t the wish of aw � !he b the peo_ple, as expressed y and reiterated decisions of t1;f�r elected n t1 la leg1s be o repres e ntatives, shall in all predominant. We have as 1 1 at th e sam� time to provide by ade qu a te :� �' guards tliat the elected iiouse s� 00 all in� a are t outstay These its ... authority 0 wlucl1 were clearly brought b efiore t ° an , n le 1 elec tio con stitu enc ies last the at . which we believe this hou e is prep ared to pass· an immediate verdict... . � . Fun atl d en am t . a 1 c th h es ang in this country , as . . ly nothing illustrates more cle ar 85 1 this _controversy, are slov, to brin� . 1 · the of into effect. There was a story current b01' parliament, which in this conn on ec� . bears repetition. It was told of a new me� · of tl1e then house of conuno s t t 10 l906 he witnessed for the first ti me the 1 . mony of opening parliamen� , � h e �as a man of very advanced views a nd aS , , g�d upon that unique and o t e mpre • • �sive spectacle felt constrained to mutt r.1n&·1 : neighbour, a man of li. ek O p1n isb 1ons with himself, ''This bol a of' lot will ta k e a

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So it will. It was a ver� shrewd observation; but I am not sure he had mastered the real lesson of the occasion. So f a.r as outwa rd vision goes, o ne would seem no doubt in the presence. of such a cere mo ny as that, to be transplanted to the days or th� framework is the same; the setting �. lantagenets [king_s of the 15th century]. The _ 18 almost the same, the ver � fig11res of the picture - kings, peers, jtidges, commons _ are t�e same, at any rate,. in name_. But tl1at external and superficial identity masks a- senes of the great�st t r ansf ormat1o ns tl1at have been recorded in the constitutional experience of mankind.. The sovereign sits_ th·ere o n the tl1ro ne of Qt1een Elizabetl1 who, as l1istory cells us, o n one occ�s1on at the end of a single session opposed the royal veto to no less than forty-eight out of nir1ety-011e bills which had received the assent of both houses of parliament. Tl1at royal ,,et o , tl1en a11d fo r long afterwa rds an active and potent enemy of popular rigl1ts, is literally as dead as Queen Anne. Yes, sir - and has the mo narcl1y . suffered? ... There is not a man among us, in whatever quarter of the ho use he sits, ,vho does not know the crown of tl1is real:n with its hereditary succession, its prerogatives adjusted fron1 generation to ger.e;ation to the needs of the people and the calls of the empire, is I1eld by our gracious sovereign by a far securer tenure than e,,er fell to tl1e l ot of any of his Tudor or Stuart ances­ tors. The liberties, again, of the commons which yo11, sir, only a month ago once more claimed and asserted at the same bar in time-l1o noured phrases ... - the libertjes of the commons, slowly and patiently won, in tl1ese days newly threatened and invaded ... - are only in danger if, unlike our forefathers here, we refuse to take the necessary steps to make tl1em safe ... The absol11te ·veto of the lords must follow the veto of the crown before the road can be clear for the advent of full­ grown and unfettered dem ocracy. Mr. A. J. Balfour There "\\1ere pl1rases in tl1e peroration of' the right honoure able gentleman which suggested that he had approached tl1e great constitutional issue, which he has raised by these resolutions, in the spirit of a constjtutio11al minister. But I confess that, neither in the proposals tl1emselves nor in the arguments by which in the main he has supported them, do I see any of that wise power of adapting institutions to the changing need of the community which has been the glory of this country. ... · It is madness for us to mak e a change in the constitution which may entirely remove all the safeguards which the right l1ono_u r�ble gentleman himself thin�s ought to exist as regards legislatio n i n general; 1t 1s n1adness to remove them 1n regard to finance. I agree that their exercise o:1ght to be rare, that they sho�ld _ be used with the utm ost caution and circumspection; but that we should make 1t im­ possible that they should eve r be used ... seems to me to be the height of f olly. . .. [14 April.] The chairman, pursuant to the order o f tl1e house o f the 5th day of April, repo rted the resolutions to the house: 1. That it is expedient th at the house of lor?s _be ?isabled by law . from rejecting ot be taken all n sl1 law by n t1o 1ta or amending a m oney bill, bu t that any sucl1 l11:1 _ to diminish or qualify the existing rights and pr1v1leges of the hou�e of commons . ... . 2 That it is expedient that the powers of the house of lo:ds as _ respects bills [othe r] than money bills be restricted b� law, s� that any suc? bill, which has passed the hou se of commons in three successive sessions and, hav1�g been sent upi_ ,? _the h ouse of lords. at least one month before tl1e end of the sess1? n, has been reJected by that house in each o f those sessions, shall become law without the consent of tbe house of lords on the royal assent being declared; ... • -

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�15�2�---�=:.:-- =� ------- I ia t rl a e� � f m · to o � io ;t ve fi ra u d ye .,. . e s . Qlle . · th ar .it m Ji to 1 t , ie · d e st1 or 1 e 1n d th sai e re . e itt t mm olu co 3. Tha_t It 15 exp ' s ion e 1 tl 1 tl h · t wi ee e · agr 1 1 h ot ol!se b ouse 1 l tl11s put, that , . 44 2 Noes, divided: Ayes, 347; it sh li st g n n o E C tion u m e d o M e th f o ts c e General Asp

ve1ztions Con utio1zal Constit T/1e Place of pages 1-8. 1961, 1nent, Gover11 , Cabir1et

From Jennings al em on st ti sy � it st It n . co is 1 sl ti e th ri B e 1 p tl su of re rellle co 1e tl is t ne i ab C he T 1 se b e a l1 eterogeneou s coll· rw l1e ot ld ou w t . l1a w es ·,on at ect gr te in . It · y t i· or · th au g 1n t· ec 1r d . . prov··d e t u s s. n I 1 it 0 y 0 t1 � to n fu th f e Brit�h o ty e ri a v st a v a g n i is rc e x e s e of autlloriti y bl re m se we as nt to ue tit ns set co a t ou e, or ef er in 1 tl , .a Jf . . . t. en . m rn ve ao f . . em t o o sys 1 tut100, as 1t 1s act?ally oper ated, the st �n C sh 1t1 Br t en es pr e written docun1 ent til n the C�b1net and still more, e: I ac pl n! ne I . om p! a in r fo ed id ov pr . ! Cabinet would be r. ste 1 It 1s 1n he o wh 1s primarilv 1 1s tl1e Pnrne M o1 rs pe 11t rta po irn t os m tI e 1 out of it tl 1 e subjects whi ch the Cabi� · tl1 wi t, ne bi Ca a of n io at rm fo co11 cern�d with tl1 e e Cabinet and bet ween the th d an n 1ee Q1 the een tw be s on ati rel tl1e tl1 wi s disct1sse ry e ne of tl1 chi n ma tio ina of govern­ rd -o co t11e 1 tl vvi d an t, 1 1 me rlia Pa d �n et 1 Cabi1 n be a give uld , wo too , prominent He et. bin Ca tl1e of l tro con tl1e to t jec J sul ment place in a written constitution. . .. Neither tl1 e Cabinet 11or the office of Prime Minister was established by legisla· tio11 � nor !1as eitl1er been recog11ised by tl1e courts of law. Until 1937 the Cabinet \Vas not even n1entioned in any Act of Parliame11t; and the Ministers of the Crown Act, 1937, did no more tl1an provide higl1 er salaries for those ministers who were n1en1bers of tl1e Cabinet, wl1eret1pon it became necessary to define which ministers were �f tl1 e Cabinet. U 11til tl1e same Act provided a salary for tl1e Prime Minister and !1.rst Lo�d. of tl1e i;-reasury, tl1 ere l1ad been only two incidental references_ lo the Lr1n1e Minister . Ne1tl1er the Cab i net nor tl1e Prin1e Minister as such, cla1D15 to exercise any powers conferred by law. Tl1 ey take tl1 e decisions, but the acts whicn have .legal effect �re_ taken by ot 11 ers - tl1e Queen, tl1e Privy Council, a m!nis�er. a stattitory comm1ss1on, and tl1 e like. Tl1ese perso11s are under no legal obhgauo� to obey, �ut tl1�Y do obey. Tl1ere i s a wl1oie complex of rules outside "the law n�where inconsistent witl1 it bt1t nowl1ere recognised by it which can be st31ed witl1 aln10st as 1:11.t1 cl1 precision as the rules of law. Sucl1 r�les have been set oul by nla_11Y aulh�rities; tl1ey are d i scu ssed i 11 Parliament· tl1ey are appealed to ,vhen· ' fe� ever dispute arises · TI1e Y are ca11 ed b Y various 1 mo now co m n Y re are nam but es, . ,, . to as const1t· t1t1onal co11ve11tions' '. oolY St1cl1 co.nventions d eveI_op arou11� 'de 1 rov sp la n1o st The con stit uti ons w . n ioe . a fra.mework tl1ose I P;t tile ework� law s into fram ope r�ti tl1e on give e; and fill in tli � inters;�c:� 1lose th � wl • 1o take dec1. s1011s create precedents whic:. e the tend to follow aild 1 i a 1e 1 1ave b en followed v, y b yr t�e � c gh ou en g lon : ; a �! � :;� ; y sanctit and tl e resp .16 '"" i It) of age. fl1 ey but ed follo w to not 011ly are to be follo\ved · Tl1e mor e r · o I/If · · t s I e c · i e 11 t rac tict accord wit11 moderil co d . . t tl1e 1 egal fra1nework, the more like I Y the t\ 10ns ._ Tl1e law will state tl1 e practice, �nd �1'. � ; will follo Bti . . w t11 e law . t i t 1 us (in England) tl1e legal framework 1s in manY · 5 pl� of anc1e11t origin T 110ug11 ci n m ny cl1anges l1ave been made by legislation, the��� 8go, : · of tl1e law laid down f by ! le courts were be c00.· established nearly three centur The change from monarc hical to parliamenta ry governme t - or, if th8t n •

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re co gn iti on �h e th e rights of Parliament - was incorporated into the s, tio u ten go ve rn m en ne t is th e c?nse9uence of parliamentary government, bu t t Ca bi w. la this cha nge was no t effected by leg1slat1on or recognized by tl1e courts. It was an e�e d al -leg _ lop1:11ent; ��d though the administrative legislatio11 of Parliament xtr a e and t�e adID1nistrative decisio�s of the cot1rts a�s11n1e a Cabinet systen1, tl1 ey neit11er establish nor formal Y recognise tl1e rules wl11cl1 gover11 its operatio11 . The distinction. be�wee.n laws _ and co11ventio11s is 1101 really of fundamental _ n necessarily rests on acq11jesce11ce, wl1 etl1er it be establish­ imp ortan ce. A const1ttit1o ed by ref�ren�um _ or tacit approval or force. If an organised pt1bl:c opinion 1·egards it as noxious rt will b� overtl1ro\\'n. If a Lot1is Napoleo11 or a Mussoli11i or a J-Iitler considers th_at he can induce ?r _ co1npel acq11iesce11ce i11 a cl1a11ge, l1e wjll 11ot l1esitate to overturn 1t merely beca11se It IS enacted as law. Wl1at is law and what .is convention are primarily technical questions. Tl1e a11swers are k11ow11 011ly to tl1ose whose business it is to know them. For tl1e 1nass of tl1e people it does not matter \vl1etl1er a rule is recognised by tl1 e judicial autl1orities or not. Tl1e tecl1nicia11s of government are primarily concerned. For t11e tech11icians, the differe11ce appears to have three aspects. In: the first place, laws commonly have a greater sanctity, and tl1ere is a greater reluctance to break them. This disti11ction is largely psychological. A rule of ]av1 has no merit mereIv., because it is a rule of law: it is co11tei1t a11d not form that matters . The fundamental conventions of Cabinet governn1ent are among the bases of the constitutional system; they are as important as tl1e fundame11tal princiJJles of tl-1e law. Their importance is, indeed, recog11ized. A person who proposed to sl1bstitute himself for the Cabinet - to make, that is> a cha11ge Vi1hicl1 co11ld be brougl1t abot1t without any alteration of law - would be regarded as a dangerous revolutionary. Yet it cannot be doubted that, as between laws and conventions of equal co11stitti­ tional importance, the law l1as the greater sanctity. Obedience to law is a ftrndamental duty; it is less frequently realised tl1at obedience to conventions is also among tl1e political virtues. In the second place, it is the recognised duty of certain persons, especially of judges, to consider whether acts ar� legally valid and to take sucl1 steps as they can to see that the law is obeyed. While it is eqµally the duty o� J?ublic authorities to obey the conventions, there is no formal metl1od of determ1n1ng_ whe�l1er they are broken or of setting in mo tion the train of conseq11ences wl11cl1 this breach should bring. It is commonly said that laws are ''e;1forced'' and that conv�nt�o_ns are ri_ ot. This method of stating the cas e is a little !oo s1m�le ... Tl1e efficacy ofJ�d1c1al decisions in important governmental matters lies not 1n enforcement, bu t 1n t�e Pr�ci_sion of judgement, the recognised s_anctity of law, an? the P.ower ?f �t1bl1c opimon. To break the law is to do something clearly a�d. obv1011sly un�onst1tut1onal. ��less there are special circumstances, such as a polit1� al or_ fi. nanc1al_ e11;1-erge�cy � . It 1s the subject of blame; it is possible to arouse pub11c opinion to 1nd1�nat1on, the b�each would be proclaimed from every_ platform and b�azo11ed fortl1 1n every h�dl1ne. f reaches of constitutional conventions are l�s.s obv1�t�s and can be more eas1]y clo. uded ha law a �t 1?th 1? c1s de l � c1a _ d1 ju A g. . in nd . sta by a fog of misunder . been broken leaves no room for argument. save as to its pol1t1cal Jt1st1:fic_at1on, n of tio sa cu ac an .�usation that an by et m be ay m en ok br a convention has been n­ ly co al rm fo en b� s factious and libera ha ho w l ge an de te misrepresentation. The :�� is no longer an angel; in the absence offormal condemnation he m ay protest 1 11.J ured .inn ocence. .

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cisely formulated. It is re p rt a p st o 11:11e tl r fo usual!, re a s w la , e c la d ir th '. e w out of and are modifiJ In th ro g ey l1 T _ s. n o ti n ve n co te la u rm fo to fs ne si u b l. ay whether or n ot a pract,· s o n o body lt cu di t be ffi y a m it e tim n ve gi y � an t a d . . n o t true of a 11 c n ent · ons. Certa1.n ce . n a e c b y practi is , n of ai ag is h the T . n o ti n ve � 1 n � o c a � m o has bec s o t e . omm o nwealth are er b �m m g on am s on ti la re conventions governing tl1e Statute of Westrrunster. Others are formally reco d rde e tli · · · to e bl m ea pr 1e tl 1n . set out e ater �rec1s1on _ than 1s gr e h er t. e er H . es nc re fe th wi on C al ri pe Im of s rt po re in tlie t1on that 1s fortifi ed en a v n_ , se co ca y_ an 1 I1 . w la on m m co e some of the rules of tli ns tio ee la e tw re th be g n in rn the ve go e os een th Qu as l1 c su , ts en ed ec pr f o s as m by a s e e le of the common t� o� ru on: s _ as ed fin �e _ ly se lo c as t as le at is t, en nm and the Gover n n ct 1s fa t1o i ry tu ve st1 on C Gh like sl1 1t1 mu Br e th of m ste sy l na tio en nv o c e Th law. the system of the common law.... in erm ation of con­ the det for l na bu tri e tiv rita tl1o au no is re the t tl1a t fac Tl1e e ctic and thei r exist­ of pra out w gro ey Tl1 . ties cul diffi ate cre r, .-;ve v . 110, s, doe ve11tions t e, ativ orit not like auth are s he ent ced pre h Stic . e11ts ce(l pre ence is deter1nir1ed by "' 1 precede11ts of a i;;outt Jf l a'v''v". 1 11ere are precedents which hav e created no conventions, a11'-i tl·1err: are cor1'1e11ti0:i:is b;;1std �)r1 precedents whic h hav� f allen into desuetude.... Every ,1ct js a prcceder.1t� t,t1t riot every precedent creates a rule. It can hardly be co11tet1ded. 1bat if Ot1Cc tlir: 1-Jouse of L o rds agrees with the House of Commons it is l1enc-.,efortl1 bot.ir1d to agree. witl1 tl1e lower House. Again, the fa ct that George V aslccd. Mr. Baldvvi11 and ncJt Lord Curzon to form a Government in 1922 does noi o� i�self imply tl1at tl1e I(ing must never in future appoint a peer as Prim e Minister. S1Illllar_ly, tl1� fact that in 1924- the King granted Mr. MacDon ald a dissolution does not o� 1 tself 11nply t}1at in future l1e l1as no right to refuse. It is more importa�t that t�ere is a course or precedents. The fact tl1at tl1e King assented to the Parliament B 1_Il of 1910�191 I_ a11d the Home Rule Bill of 1914 does not of itself prove that the King rnust 111var1ably assent. It is a stronger f act that no monarch since Qu een Anne_(I 791-1714) has ''vetoed'' a Bill. Tl1e facts that no Government bas been dismis· se� since. 1?83 · · ·, tl1at no peer since tl1e Marquis of S alisbury (in 1902) has been Prime Minister, tliat a dissolution has not definitely bee n refused for at lea 5t a century, and so on, are impo rtant. . log y , Even so , pr�edents do no t definitely pr ana lik e nt ov ''P e an rec yth ede · ing · ' s r a d re y l co nclusive'' a·ct v s · nt 1 e o c t de un ece pr r 1e sl l1 w on y 1 it , E as or n w a th au 0 � the confide11tial advis�r Of t� d ard VII reate a ru vy c an� eden�s George c Pre V. 0 because tl1ey have been r�co nised u as creating a rule. It is sometime s eno � y show that a rule has c e J ne a n fo ge y r al acc e�tance. P r t i_ or th au � _ s of on rs . e a ce_ ntury have asserte� ��: right es, a oll� � a l of the his Prim e choo se M1n � 1ster to while recognising in tile o a u rch t e _ � � nominations. Pers ons of u orit i p o wer to offer strong opposition to 10:ve Jdu tY y .ave never, so far as is known, asse rted ;. of tl1e m o narch to -gr ant a issolut1on on · request u tD· . s . But such gener al reco nit'ion cannot always ,'oe rov 11 p ed. There �an h<: �ent � c1�nt general recognition �f will overthrow a long-sta d. a recent �recedent. Occasionally , a single Pf em· � rule. Until Mr. Disraeli resigned in 186�, n� -- � ment had resign ed on l� nP � � d:r:�g at t _ arli ame �i}B�� �� polls and_ without m�ting P 1932, n o m�dern Govern � t men had _agr�ed to d1�er''. Was 1t possible �o s�Y ��"0�= that Mr D sraeli's act w as u nc onst _. _1 itutional, or 1n 1932 that the Cabinet 5 a"'cicligr ·.· unconst1tut1onal? Tl1 appro ach to these racteristic r iropu ta11_!fp.: an questions vl. : indicates of co�ve·nt1�0 ns T h . .: . . ey d 0 not ex1st for their own s ake but. t,eca!lse.·.·. : are go od reasons fo r . them. . .. !

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The precedent of 18 68 was d�e to the recognition of altered political conditions. Th.e precedent 0[ _ 1932 was du e to exceptional political conditions. There was in existence a Coalition Government, for1ned of three parties with distinct org�nisa­ tio ns. !t was created �or what were all�ged at the time to be specific purposes. It was said that the question of general tanffs was not one of the main problems which the Government ha d been formed to r�solve, _ but was merely incidental. Accordingly it was agre�d �hat me_mbers of the Cabinet migl1t speak and vote against the proposal -0f the maJonty, which became t�e proposal of the Government. The precedent did not, t�erefor�, change th e ord1�ar� rule of collective responsibil ty. It provided .an exception to 1t, capable of application only where conditions were similar. For this exception special reasons were given; tl1ey may not be convincing, but in 1932, as in 1868, there were reasons. Precedents create conventions because tl1ey l1ave reasons of a general nature which relate them to the existing political conditions and because they are generally recognised to be sensible adaptations· of existing conventional rules to meet changed or changing political conditions. The Sovereignty of Parliament

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From Dicey, op.cit., pages 39-68 The sovereignty of Parliament is (from a legal point of· ·viev;,1) tl1e dominant ,characteristic of our political institutions. . . . Parliament means, in the mouth of a lawyer (thotegh tl�<� �l,ord rt;::1s ui'ten .a different sense in ordinary conversation), tl1e Queen, the f.'1,)11.se of Lords 7 au,1 the House of Commons; these three bodies acting togetl1er may tJe aptly ciescrif)e,d .as the ''Queen in Parliament,'' and constitute Parliament. The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than -this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. A law may, for our present purp·ose, be defined _ a s ''any rule wh� ch will be enforced by the courts." The prin-ciple then_ of Parliamentary so�ere1gnty may, looked at from its positive side, be thus described: Any Act of Parliament, _or any part of an Act of Parliament which makes a new law, or repeals or modifies an ·existing law, will be obeyed by the courts. The same .principle, looked at from its negative side, may be thus stated: There is no p �rson or �ody of persons wl10 can, under the English constitution, make rules wl11ch _ove�r1de or derogate _from an Act of Parliament, or which (to express the same th111g �n other words) will be en­ forced by the courts in contravention of an Act of Parliament. · · · extract from e following Black­ is the classical passage on this subject � -s_tone s Commentaries:-

nscende nt and so tra is ke, Co rd wa Ed Sir s say ''The e nt pow , me rlia Pa f · r o · an d Jurisa·1c·t·10n 1..._ _· .a-� · r this 0 - 1ute, that it cannot be confined, either for caus� or persons, WI'th"in any b. o� nd�.- •. And . . high court. he a, n1tatem. 1m s1 d1g 1ss ust vet est , ctes spe m ate uit tiq a n ,51· , "d , add s, 1·t may be tru1y s.a1 .. ·

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sovereig� and u�c_ ontrollable au bath It ,a.' . cissin capa . .1ct1on� est tho.�ly d 1s Ju Sl ; 1a r in 1 ss � xpo ti and v1n r� , restraining, abrogating, �pe�l ng, rev1 g, e un est l1onora i la en d gssi"ble denon,inations eccles1ast1cal or temporal, civil mil'h� in the making, confirn 11 ng, g o g ll a f o � rs e tt 1a n g in � rn _ �""i, ce n o _ otic er, pow whic h us t absolute desp of Ja,vs, c that re wt,e ce 1 p e 1 � ��.a;I these A o kingd n s. of m itutio const n,aritime, or crin1inal: this b ein, is ,e t r� tlie y ll m t b d i u e ere vh e,. 11 � so . e � d si r e ts n e th e ordinary course of the laws, are governm cend rans that t 5 e wit� m r� d an � n io at er op s, ce n va e i gr _ the el d mod an s ucce�sion to the Cro .. ul ate or newre c�n 'It · b i tr g m. It can alter the established religi the reach of �l11 s extr�ordin� �1h.J and Willia m on of� r e n y of _ n ig e r e th 111 . as was done e reigns of king flenry Vlli. and h is three childr en th in s tance" s v 1 of � stitution of the kingdon, and of parliaments them land; as was done a ari ety selves: It c an chang e an d create a�esl1. ev en�the c�n v utes for triennia l a.nd se ptennial elections.fi stat ral e e th e s and io as w�s done by the act ? un �� s ble; and t he refore some have not ossi imp rally natu scrupled ,ot 1 can, 10 _ short, d o every t!11n g tha l 1 h e omnipotence of Parliam en t. True it is, that what l b t , o d too r 1 e t ra ,, to call its po,ver, b y a J1gure . · · · o. C.:'lI1 un� . the Parliane1 nt doth, no at1thor1ty upon e artl1 . .

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� e s10 qu res te� e�p gr� n a 1 r which has tte 1na e 1 tl up d me sum De Lo]111e Jias becon1e almost proverbial. ''It is a ft1ndame11tal pr1nc1 ple with Engl1sh la\\'Yers1 that Parlian1ent can do everytl 1ing bLtt n1ake a w oma n a man, and a man a woman."

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Legislative autl1ority origi11ally resid_ed i_n tl1 e King �n Co �ncil, an_d eve:n a�er t!1 e con1n1e11ce111e11t of Parlia1ne:ntary leg1slat1 on there existed side by side with 1t a system of royal legisl[Ltio11 u11der tl1 e form of Ordinances, and (at a later period) of Proclan1 ations. 1�11ese !1ad rnucl1 tl1e force of law, c1nd in tl1e year 1539 tl1e Act J 1 Henry VIII.: C.8, formally crnpo\,1ered tl1c Crow11 to legislate by n1eans of proelamations. �fl1is enactn1ent n1arl(S tl1e l1igl1est point of legal autl1ority ever reached by the Crown, a11ci, I)robably because of its· i11 consistency witl1 tl 1e wl1ole tenor of E11glisl1 law, was repealed in tl1 e reign of Ed\vard tl1e Sixt l1 (i 11 tl1 e 16th century]. It is ctirious to notice l1ow revolutionary wot1ld l1ave b ee11 tl1e results of the statute had it remaine d in force . It mt1st l1ave beer, follow ed by two consequen ces. An Englisl1 king vvot1ld !1�tvc beco1ne ne,1rly as despotic as a Frencl1 monar ch. The statt1te wot1ld ft1rtl1 er l1ave establisl 1e d �l distinctio11 bet\veen ''laws'' pro perly so called as bei1_ 1g 111�de by tl1e Jegisl�1t ure and '·ord inances'' 1,aving the force of law. tl1ougl1 11ot 1n _str1ct11 ess la\VS as being ratlier d ecrees of tl,e executive power than , �cts of tl1e l egislatur e. Tl1is distinction exists in one f or m or anotl,er in most con· t111�ntal states, ancl is not wi�l1ot1t great practic al utility. In foreign countries.the leg1slarL:re ge11erall� confi11es itself to laying do wn general principles of Jegis lat1on'. ' and leave then, �1tl1 great ad vant ::1ge to ree s dec by tl1 e pu bl nt ic nt t ed su o 1 pp be le � n� \vl11cl1 ar � r.regulatio · e tl1e work of tl1e executi\,e. T he cum pro an d ss bersomene l� x1t y of E11 gl1sl1 st�1tute law is. due i11 110 r· pa of rs sn 1a ll in vo u eas ur e to futile endea l1a1ne11t to work _ot1t t l1e details of l,1rge legislative cl1anges Tl1is evil has become so apJ)are· nt tl1at 1n n1oder11 tiines A · s n isio c ts . o f prov 1 P a . 1. , r 1an1ent cons · tant 1 y cont· a1- 0 . p wer ng tl1 e Pr�:Y C?u 11�1. l, tl1e er jL1dges, o r son1e ot l1 er body, to make rul � und �: �� t .} or tl1 e deter nt. m111at 1011 of details w l1 ic me a ar l1 l1 can11o t b e settled by P B ut ti11s 1s only a11 awkward m · ee · at1011 of a11 ack11 owledged evil, and the su b sran ,·tig -" if no Jess tl1a11 tl1e forn1 of ti 1e l · eu aw wo11lcl it · � ro ba bl e, b rov p I e a good de I ·m tl1e _exect1tive gover11n1ent of , England cou' I d , \ 1{e tl1 cr e es de � f O at of France, by mean_s ord1n,tnces, or proclanlatio . Jiaa· s liaving t!1 e f?rce of la . · w, w or k out the d etailed tion of tJ,e gerleral pr 1 1c � a& s llbod d in 1e 16 tl Acts of tl1 e legislature. In 1 � i7 in some otl1er ir1stance � ;�s� . e� r of royal J)ower, are at 'the ����ons wisely placed by our forefathers on _th e� the nt day tlie cause of unnecess rain ts d·..red action of tl1 e executive go P re st ar y v governmental legislatior ernrnent . For ti 1e repeaI of 31 Henry VIII� cg, reo v to 1 ' with a 11 · its defects and merits, imJJossible, ·and left

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proclamatio�s only s�ch wei�h t as they might possess at co1nmon law. Tl1e exact auth ority was indeed fo r some time dotibtftil · In. 1610 1s extent of tl1 · · , 1 1owever, a . . · protest Of t 1le Judges [c1t1ng Coke's report of T/ e solemn opinion 1 Case of Pro� clamations] establish ed th e modern doctrine tl1at royal proclamatio11s J1 ave i n no sense the force of law; the� serve to call tl1e atte11tio11 of the pt1blic to the law. bu t they cannot of th emselves impose t1po11 any 1na11 a11y legal ob]jgatio11 or duty not impo sed by common law or by A ct of Parlian1ent. ... .. . Expressions are constantly used i11 tl1 e co11rse of political discussions whicl1 imply that the ?ody of :per�ons e11title� to cl1oose n1embers of Parlian1e11t possess under t11 e English const!tut1on son1e kind of legislative autl1ority. Such language is, as we shall s�e, not w1th o11t a real n1eaning; it poi11 ts to tl1 e important considera­ tion that the w1sl1es of the co11stitt1encies i11flt1e11ce t11e actio11 of Parlia.ment. But any express�ons wh .ic·� at�ribute_ to Parlian1entary electors a legal part in tl1e process of law-making are qwte 1ncons1stent witl1 tl1e view take11 by tl1 e law of t11e position of an __elector. The sole legal right of electors under tl1 e Englisl1 constitution is to .e]ect members of Parliament. Elector s l1 ave 110 legal means of initiating, of sanc­ tioning. or of repeal.i·ng th e legislation of Parliament. No court will consider for a moment the argument tl1at a Ia"v is invalid as being opposed to the opinion of tl1 e electorate; their opinion can be legally expre ssed tl1ro·ugl1 Parliament, and through Parliament alone. This is not a necessary incident of representative gover11ment....

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. . . A large proportion o·f Engli sl1 law is in reality .made by tl1 e judges, and · l1oever wishes to understand the nature and the extent of j11dicial legislation in w England, sl1ould read Pollock's admirable essay on the [Science of Case Law]. !J: The topic is too wide a one to be considered at any length i11 tl1 ese lectures. All that we need note is that the adhesion by our judges to precedent, that is, tl1eir 11 abit o·f · deciding one case in a.ccordance with tl1e principle, or supposed princjple, wl1ich governed a former case, leads inevitably to the g1·adual formation by tl1 e courts of fixed rules for decision, wl1ich are in effect laws. Tl1is judicial legislation migl1t :appear, at first sight, inconsistent witl1 the supremacy of Parliament. B·ut this is not so. Eng. l isl1 judges do not claim or exercise any povver !o repeal a Statute,_ \.vl1ilst Acts of Parlia.ment may override and cons tantly do override tl1e law of tl1 e Jt1dges. Judicial legislation is, in short, s ubordinate egislation, carried on \vjtl1 the assent and subject to the supervision of Parliament. d ose y o pp are tl1e if ? ali inv ar� ed, ert a ss en be . s ha it nt, ct s me of Parlia .. A _ , en m . . rl1a la al Pa on at1 n er_ 1nt f o· s e o trin c t do the e ! to or � ple ity ! h princi s of moral 1t is in effect asserted, cannot make a Jaw oppos ed to the dictates of pr.1vate or public morality. Thus Blacks tone [a famous judge who wrote a fa1nous b�ok called Com­ mentaries on the Laws of England] Jays do wn in so many �ords tl?at '·tl1 e law of na�u­ �e being coeval wi th mankind, and dictated by God l11�self, 1s of co_t1rse superior 1� oblig ation to any other. It is binding over al l the globe, 1� al l countries , and at all times: no human laws are of an y validity if contrar� to this� and sucl? of th�n1 as are valid derive al l their force and al l their authonty, n1ed1ately or _ 1mmed1at� ly, �rom th.is original''; an d expressions are sometimes 11s�d by modern Judges � h1�l1 rts 1 l1m er op pr e nd th yo be g in go s ly te tu sta t e rc fo en h�t the courts might refuse to P � _ (tntern:ationally eaking) of Parliamentary authority. But to w?rd� s ucl1 as t�os e sp ed tfi al qu ry of Blackstone, d ve a ve t gi us m we h, nc Be e tI1 of an to the ''obiter d.icta''

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y that_ judg �s, as exp r o e th e h t r fo s on s! a b e l a g le ts o n i s re e of n l1 T . n o ti ta re h t e .1c b g ? g a ll w u interp Il g n a em to. se L t. n e m 1a rl a P f o ts c y morality, may overrule A othing more than th e as sertion that the jud ges Ullpl W n h to . � ty li a re in t s n u o m a d n to e tllis a x t ffi ea c of Parli' � � b A to g in n a e m e th is t a am, n attempting to ascertain wh id n o t intend to violate th e ordinary rules of mor a d t 11Y en m ia rl a · P t a th e m u s · will pre , t b ere,"ore whenever p ossible . : 11 1 w d an , w la al n 1o · ternat or the principles of 1n e consi�te nt with th� J: b y a s m a_ t en m ct a en ry to tu � st such an interpret_ation to a ty. A modern Judge wo uld e li ra o m l a n 1o at rn te 1n f n trines botl1 of private and o v� au bec e t as n lid am w li a va P in f . o r ct A an at th se ed It 1 gu ar · ho w r te i s rr ba a to n te lis · entary authority, ... P f m 1 ar 1a o · s 1t · 1m 1 e b t d on ey b t en w 1t e s u was immoral, or beca 1 i. mp c t en am of rli Pa ts i h c wh A in ed s i u n e be l . .. Language has occasionally es u d he b y by uc be an to t no su n ca s h ic wh s w that one Parliament can make la an existing Par!:=· ' of ity or th au e tiv sla i g_ le e th re efo er th at th d an t,. Parliamen s ors. es ec ed pr s it of t s en tm ac en e th by d 1te l m may be 1 n ten ded an d endeavour ed to pass i ce on tha n re mo e l1av s en� liam Par a� Th Acts wl11ch should tie tl1e l1ands of their successors i s certain ' but the endeavour has always ended i:11 fail11re. ... Par1ia1nentary sovereignty is tl1erefore an undoubted legal fact. �

Questions and Problems

· for voters: · " - · �may be used 1n 1) Wl1at arguments 1avour or,.. a property · · qual1ficat1on · the vote gradually 0 · dvantages of extending and d1sa 2) What are. tI-1e ad·vantaaes . . to incre asing numbers of people' rather than. grantin g univer s_al adult suffrage ... a sys te1n for a developing country such straight away? Would You f avour such as EtI1iopia? . . 3) Study carefully Order No 44 f 1966 , hicl 1 1s s�t out in. Cha� ter 4, and c?mpare it with the readings on the BJ .sh_ C �i ne t. M t�and recognises three pr1nc1ples � ,, � � ·� whicl1 make for Cabinet ''so'l,1_ arity · (I) pol1t1cal unanimity''; (2) ''common re sponsibility to Parli'amen t and (3) '' s u b · · head". mon com a to s1on IIDs . ' (a) Give concrete I-11ustrat. 1o n s. of . k'ing of each of these principles. . .tl1 e wor (b) Arc tl1ese princi 1 s �m:.11c1t i n the E thiopian s ystem? (c) Should the Engl�s� ine t? sySte m be regarded a s a goal for Et hiopian cons titutional develop� ent . 4 ) Maitland notes .· ''the presenc was ns e Of min.1s mo · · Com t ers in the House of Iong disliked by tl1e Hous e t i hed o 1t s w e se th ou H l ea 1 id d ge he ... an ch t B ;, have the Ministers before it . (a) :'lhy di� the Hous e .. n,S cba change 1't s positio and n? What new conditions 1� constitutional the ory par· in may ers have nist caused it to want the Mi l1ament? (b) To wl1at· ext�nt can . ttf , . . . . . a d other Ministers Parlia?lent in Eth1op1a compe l the PrllIIC r,IUU�hi to � re evant articles of the Cbe 1� �r ''before'' Parliament? What are onstitution?. (c) For what reasons . I 8 U ct a Illlght Parliam. ent not as e members Of Parliament · _ want to have Minist rs ' 10 E th1op1a?

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By co!1vention, says ·Maitland, there d�velopOO: the principles: (I) that th e K in g a e ll m a 1� tt , er s, acts on the advice of his Ministers; (2) that h e choose � � � s. M ru m st i e er in accordance with the will of the House o f Com bis Pn mons. (a) How and why did these principles develop in Engl and? (b) Could such conventions be developed in Ethiopia under the Revised Constitution? ' (c) Is it better to develop such principles by ''convent.ions'', or by written ''rules of law''? (d) Under the Revised Constitution, cot1ld the Emperor, by Order (cf: Order No.44) est ablish su ch rules? What co�sti�uti�na l issues were involved in the controversy over the House of Lords reJect1on of the 1909 budget? What would the position have been had a similar clash taken place under tl1e Ethiopian Constitution? What functio_ns can a non-elective second chamber perform? Is the Ethiopian Senate potentially a more useful chamber in this respect than the Entlish Houseof Lords? Jennings notes th at ''Conventions develop a1·ound most constit·utions''. (a) How does he define ''a convention''? What is the difference between �'pre­ cedent'' and ''convention'·'? (b) Do conventions develop around ,vritten constitutions? Can you give­ examples? (c) What are the advantages of conventions as 01Jposed to constitutionml amendments? (d) In what are·as might conventions be especially important in bringing about new ·developments in the Ethiopian Constitution? When Dicey s ays that Parliament is ''sovereign'', in wl1at sense does he use­ the term ''sovereign''? Do you believe that Parliament should be ''sovereign_"? List some of the risks and problems, as well as any advantages, of transplan_t1ng the English ;'Westminster'' system of constitutiona� government, especially the idea of parlia mentary ''sovereignty'', to a developing country.

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Part II JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT. OF THE CONS'ITl'UTION AS ''SUPREME LAW'" Some Foreign Experience Relevant to Development of Judicial Review in Etltiopia. Introduction .

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'' upe ar ns 1o 1s ov pr s it ! at th s re la The Const't dec 2) 12 . (Art . · l op1a i u ion th o f E 1.. . . ns 1s1o dec ts en · g d . , ers m JU d or es, cre de n, t1o '' · d th an _ at ''all future leg1sl a law ' rerne _ , · : · nc1 · on a. ·· acts inc 1t would seem: the us Th '' 'd voi d n a · l nul sistent therewith shall be rn ve g f o . Constitution i,s part es h nc a br l Al e. pir � Em e th of ld ng ''law'' ; wo e th of . nte nt - p··ar a ll officials of . 1·1ament, nd a s, . rt ou C e th nd a · rs te 1 ·s ·. ru i· the eo· unc1. o f M . .

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and administrators of alJ s rs o n er v go . l ca lo , ce li o . o n\ rs t ! 1 . 11 M s or s t w le la e n ru rc e fo m w en n r e hi ch ar c gov ' �fficial can make o r � : e o n. y e b o t ct s n aw io d 1d 1 ut an it u st 1 o L b a . o C, r are 1e ns tl io in n �, w d do e � . id I la ter. ' ' v' I v a . e n 1 e r , p 11 s 1e d. vo1"d'' n o a 11 f u no trary t o tl n e r a ect and eff 10 1 t _ 1 it t s n . o C e 1 l t _ to � n o d 1s t1 en u 1t am st n ed to rern �� · ined to be contrary o m C e th l t1 11 u d 1 ar ss o e , unle l b a e rc " 1o n � e 1 1 u e r 1o e r t he . . the '' 1ncons1stency '' n lf o is ti se u it w it l� st n ? , C e an 1 tl d ce n si si nee : rs ea p ap n o ti si o p ro p er A furtll er or h th o ot n au ity to 1t bm (Art . 111011 su d an s ,v Ia 1e t1 ce or nf e to . . . 1 p o w e r'' (Ar t I 08 (emp hasis addedn, Ju · dges are bound ,a !c d ·. JU 1e t/ '' _ 1 l it w d e t es v re a s rt u o and since c et pr d enfo rce the er to an 11t 1 . er w po e th 1s ly ab um es pr ' and since ''judicial power' efore_ bound to enfo l'Cf er th e ar t.s ur ?o e th s, es oc JJr l ga le laws throLtg11 tl1e established ent officials al]ege dly act m rn ve go 1f s, 111 Tl '. ' ,:v Ia e m re tl1e c0 11stitLitio 1 1 as ''s11p n s tio at ct if ac f e th d af an 1 1 a 1 tio rti­ 1 pa tit 1s o1 C e tl1 of '' w la 11e 1 e1 pr 1 ''s e 1 tl to y ar co 11tr e t tion of the th ns ola ai vi ts ag ur co e th in dy ne 1 re a e ek s ay m 1e l 11 1e tl cular citize 11 . l power" whic� cia l1e di ''t ju g in cis er ex t, ur co 1 e tl k as ay m e l I)). (b 62 Iav,1 (cf. Art.' ed eg utio all stit e con tl1 un re nal cla de to ) 08 I rt. (A s 11rt e co 1 tl in ts s ve ion tut tl1e Co11 sti ate ef, pri reli rd­ pro iff ap acco int pla tl1e e giv to d an ', id' vo 1d 1 a L1ll 11 '' be to action ure il ced . ) Civ Pro Code . tl1e e.g ( e pir Em tl1e of lavv ial 11ed 1 re and al dur e c {Jro e 1 tl to i 11 g I 11deed tl1e ConstitL1 tio 1 1 tells 11s tl1 at 11ot only adminis trative ''acts'', but also offici� action carried out JJL1 rs11a 11t to ''rules'' or ''legislation'' (proclamations, orders a 11d decrees) m11 st be ''co11sistent'' \Vitl1 the Constitution or e]se ''null and void" , (Art. 122). If tl1e constitutionality of a r11le of law laid do\1/n by legislation is pro· ' perly cl1allenged i 11 a case properly brougl1t, tl1 e courts, it would appear, have the po\ver to declare tl1e legislative provisio1 1 to be ''null and void'' and unenforceable. !11 effe�t tl1e court 111ay say tl1at a com.mc:.11d embodied in legislation cannot be en·11 forced if tl1e court concludes tl1at tl1e comn1and \vould violate the higher "supreme lavv wl1ich tl1e judges are bou 11 d to follow. T! 1 is extra_ o rdi11ary pow er of tl1e courts to e 11force the Constitution as "supreme ,, . law is _sometimes called tl1e power of ''judicial review of constitutionality" -or often, s11nply, the JJower of ''judicial review''.* . �Li_r task in tl1i� c�apter is to explore tl1e implications of tl,is power of ju_dic!al rev1 e\.\ tl1 c�11st 1 t11t1on�l s�nse. Obviously, tl1e problem is of very great s1gn1n· n e. �� e ;e� 1se? Co 11s�1�t1t1 on, i11 tl1is respe ct, may l1ave departed considerably �:O � pas '- : Et 1l 1 op1an pol1t 1cal tradition. lo''J11dicial Review'' in tl1e const·It · A n y u�io 1 1al se11se develope d originall _ 1_0 � · . Americatl legal exiJerietlce W11 11e � l1ere &W r 1al d is 11 0 power of constitt1 tio11al ju .1c e ; ,e in England (si ilce tliere i� � \vritten 1 e law cor ' isti , tut ion, no ''supreme ') w sho�d seen tl1at E1,glis11 traditioil � 1d develop tl1e principle tl1 at tl1e government be ''under law'' tllat 11 1ere were ven· co n . b n1any · p d · r_ 1 1, 1 pte nc1p · Y ' e , I es w acc h 1cl1 were " t1on, as binding 00 govern l 1t · 1n A · nde erica, u m�; in r a\\e nt tl1is idea of ''governn1e was integrated witl1 tlle id e p 1 t governme�t d an y should be establisl1ed b o :d · p11rsuant t o a writteri con:�1-t ; u ion. Tl1e written constitution of tl1e U.S.A. -

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unv ' action y o me ot� t he exercise by a court to ''review'' on a�Y fora t ax assessment could er government al bod y Thus '' ·udicial review 1-'!11 _ 1''" ' J · · tsS refer to ass a review. bY the courts · . pursuant to the existi of the legal ity of the ng tax Procl amat . 1on

* Technica . .lly' "·JU d1c1a · · 1 revie w,' refi the lega lity of an b s e rs ! l

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w th rld e 's of fir st, ne modern, writt_en. cons�itutions - was declared to wa ? s jt � , law _ e , and, at an early st�ge 1n Amer1can constitutional develop­ e su pr the � be ment, the JUdicia�� ass�rted the power to .1nterpret tl1e constitution and enforce it as ''s�preme law . a_gainst _ al� _otl1er _brancl1es a11d officials of government. This assertion of constitutional JUdici�I. review gave tl1e co11rts a most significant power a.nd an exal!ed government�! pos1t1on. for certain purposes. For the judges - parti­ cularly th� JU?ges of t�e l1igl1�st �our! - clain1ed tl1e fi11al say on the meaning of the Constitution a.nd .1ts appl1cat1on 111 a partict1lar insta11ce where tl1e constitu­ tion ality of governmental action was q11estioned. In this_ Ch_apter, w_e sl1all study the theory a11d development of the power of judicial rev�ew 1n America, the co11ntry w11ere this conce1)t first developed and where i! is mo�t h�g_hly de�eloped today. We s�1�ll also explore experie11ce with the importa­ t1 �n of J�d1_c1al review to Japan, a trad �t1onal society wl1ere tl1e concept was wholly alien until its development 111 tl1e relatively 11e\V (1946) post-war constitution. Like Ethiopi�,. Japan _ h�s b�en_ an authoritarian system; in comparative terms it has re­ , cently '1ndustr1al1zed its econon1y and even mo1·e recently ''modernized'' its political system. The insertion of tl1e institution of judicial review into the post­ war Constitution, coupled with the creatio11 of n1a11y constitutionally guaranteed rights, marked an abrupt departure from past constitutional tl1eory and past political tradition, which in theory vested supreme power in the Emperor and in fact had vested it in executive government. We sl1all also briefly examine some other con­ stitutional systems which have eitl1er adopted or rejected· tl1e idea of judicial review and note the increasing acceptance of some sort 0f system of co11stitutional judicial review - a limited or a broad power - in most parts of the world today. We shall then focus on several concrete problems of judicial review in action. If courts are to be given the responsibility and power to enforce a constitution, their most controversial and difficult task in exercising the power will proba'bly be that of interpreting and enforcing constitutional quarantees relating to l1uman liberty. Civil liberties cases call for interpretation and precise application of broadly state d principles, for artic·ulation of theories to define these generalities, for adjust­ ment of sharply competing social and political interests. Civil liberties cases are often ''sensitive'' and '''controversial''; they may bring courts into potential collision with government and jeopardize tl1e development of judicial review and judicial ''independence''. By examining a few of these problems, we may obtain a more dramatic appreciation of the difficulties of judicfal review in action - an? a� the same time, we will be examining some very difficult problems of const1tut1onal development in a developing country. We shall then examine some of the ancilliary doctrines and problems of judicial r�view problems such as: when is it p oper for: courts �o r�fuse �o de de co �tit ­ � � � � � t1_on�l issues; concepts such as: ''stand1 ng to ra1se c �st1tut10!1al issues and ?cJU_st1? . c1ab1l1ty of the issue'' the difference between a dec1s1on fi�d1ng a law ,, unconstitu­ tional.per se'' and a decision limited to deciding the constitutionality of a law (or administrative rule) ''as appljed' '. Knowledge of the e matters is ve y necessary � : . for a lawyer to nature of judicial review - and the l1m1ts of this understand the po.wer. d ile e ta or de m to a , rn t� to n io sit po e a in b ith � jll w these readings in mind, we _e1a s er lem rth ob fu pr r de 1s1 co to d a11 1Utnation , IV er pt - o·f the Eth.iopian law in Ch a . � ap ter Ch of 5 d an 3 ns io ct se t ul ns co v ld ou sh u n . Yo pi re lo he g judicial review �e e in the course of these readings. .

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SECTION 5 : O L W G IE N V A E R -A L M IA IC E D JU RI F N O CA T N E M P O L E V E D THE . . EXPERIENCE in w e ie v th e l ed Sta� R ia nit ic U d u J f o ry eo h T l ca ti li o P The Origins and Introductory Note e theories of philosopJ-in _th _of di g en bl s a , \1/a see ll wi U � )'O as , ion ut tit ns T he American Co st1c ideas of English jutists lib a!1 re Ieg mo e th th 'rvi 1 iet qu tes 011 tv1 d an t1 sea like Loclce, Rous Coke. r I'}' ila VC arc sim ion - in some in.stanas ut tit ns Co t tl1a of 1s io1 vis pro nt rta po im A nun1ber of countries operate under a wrilten th Bo n. tio itu nst Co ian iop J::th tl1e to cal nti ide they are ecuting laws; both have constitution; both constitutions appear, on their face, to b e self-ex al "equ ' and ess' proc protection"cla uses­ e "du l tica iden e l1av both ses; clau cy'' rema ••sup similar other provisions dealing v1itl1 crin1inal procedure are readily comparable and in certainim'. portant aspects, the articles establishing the judiciary a.re similar. As our total course develops, •,ve·will be reading a number of American cases dealing with various constitutional clauses and conceots \Vl1ich botl1 countries share in common. To undei, stand tl1cse ,::ascs, and to understand tl1e role of tl1e courts in expounding the constitutioo, it is necessary to understand sometl1ing of the l1istory and theory underlying the institution of "judicial review".

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The 1-fistorical Or;gf11s oj· the .4.111erican Co11stiti1tio11

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F'rom Kelly and Harbison, T/1e A111erican Co11stitutio11: /ts Origin and Developn1ent : (1963 ed.) pages 36-37, 39 -40, 45-47, 63-65, 89-90' 93 ' 94., 98-101 ' 103 ' 106' 112- 1131 137, 1 39, 141-142, 146. · · · Of great . i�1po�tance for tl1e future of An1erican constitutional theory was ' the body o_f 1�ol1t1cal ideas developed in colo11 ial times. Colonial political theory had two prin��Plt? sotirces: seventeentl1 a nd eigl1 teentl1 century writers on natu ral law, and certclln ideas derived fro111 Englisl1 Iegalists. The ·heo rv_ 0 f a· I aw- Of nattire or natu ral lav:., first arose in the ancie nt woroJ'. l . b ts 1 asic concept :was tl1�t certain eternal principles of law were inl1erent in the very nature of tl1e 11n1verse Itself, n1an-n ral natu f 1a · de la w b e111g a mere affirmat1on o_ .. b . , law. In the ''Rep·ublic ,� Plato advar1ced tl1 e stice whic con abso cept lute ion ju of an eg;��: th_e · t d 11et 11er or ?ot It found expressio11 in ro, Cice ... an y h111nan enactment . : · 1·n hi\ R man essayist orator, and states�an: notion expressed essential tl1e ''De Legibus'' w11ere' i1 e st a.� t d. ! 11at the �1nd111g quality of civil law rose out O 1t harmony with' tl1e eterna'" l J)IIncip es 1 of r1gl1t a n d justice. , · - - Moder11 11atural-law tile r)' tu cen ory: .however, _arose in the late sixteent� The great problem confrorlting ; h t modern national state Wll icl1 1 a politic �l theor1ests of the day was the rise of en· l d freed itself . of feu contr eccle ols, a siasti cal d dectial tralization, and theo;etical 1; a e �tance to tl1e Holy Roman Empire. The essen .•• poljtical q11ality of the new 1 · . . ) pDll . · nat1011al st ate ("1n Europe] was its �overe1gn irre s . I 1ty,_ t�1at 1s, its refusal to ackn b'l . l ca i it l o ow _ledge superior controls exercised by a,oy or rel1g1ous body Jean Eod'1 telY p s xtee�th cent�ry Fren cl1 theorist, first ade�1 ns 1 defined �he new s�vereignty � i ze r 1d t and subJects unrestrained by �� that It was ''supreme power ove c : the 1a •

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·:. An importan_ t [counter �rgument to this _ idea of absolute sovereignty] was _

the distinct for�ulat1on of the idea of natt1ral r1gl1ts, hitherto not given clear and . n io s s e r p x e e iv is c de In 1690 I:ocke p�blished his ''Second Treatise 011 Gover11me 1 1t'', written some ten years e�rl1er, which no\\', �erve? to justify tl1e Gloriot1s Revolution. It spoke of natural rights as those of · _ life, l1b�rty_ and estate'', tJ1 e last term being a general one for proper�y. !l1e doctrine of 1nal1 enable natt1 ral rigl1ts was later to enter Am erican const1�titional law, eve 1 1tually becon1ing identified witl1 tl1e dL1e process clause of the Fifth a11d Fourteentl1 ame11dn1ents. cke associated his doct�ine _ of 11at�1ral rigl1ts witl1 the concept of limited L � . leg1slat1�e power, also of great s 1 gn1fica11ce 111 An1erican co11stitutional development. The leg1sla �ure,. he contend�d, cot1ld . 11ot l,L\vfully enact ''arbitrary'' or· unjust measures v1olat1ng natu :�l r1gl1t, and 1 t n1t1st rule tl1rougl1 pro1nulgated sta1 1ding laws, not through capr1 c1ot1s decrees. It could take 110 1nan 's IJro1Jerty without his consent, and it could not delegate its legislative autJ1ority to any otl1er person or body. Locke also drew a sl1arp distinctio11 bet\vee11 executive and legislative functions, and thus contributed to tl1e growth of tl1e doctrine of separation of po'.vers. . .. . . . In the course of the eighteenth century natural-law a11d compact theory* assumed a position of increasing importance in tl1e minds of colonial statesmen, lawyers, and clergymen. Educated colonials in New E11gland, and the other colonies as well, read and adopted as their O\VO. tl1e ideas of Locke, ... and tl1e 0th.er notable political theorists of the day. Locke, l1ardly known in A 111.erica be.fore 1740, became familiar to the generation of Americans before tl1e Revolution. Tl1e }Tevv E11gland clergy in particular filled their se1mons with references to the law of nat11re, govern­ ment by compact, natural rights, and the rigl1t of revolution. To this body of ideas the colonists added one of their own - the notion of a written constitution. . .. They had been accustomed to form governments upon written compacts . . .. The colonjsts thus beca me accustomed to vie\ving the cl1arter as a visible embodiment of the compact setting up government, whicl1 specified and gt1 aranteed certain natural rights presumably derived ttltimately from natural ·1aw and reserved to the people. The fr;me of government and the rigl1ts specified in the_ w:ritte� consti­ 1 tut1on, 1n other I1e const tution could not lawful.Iy be altered by the government. : _ _ word s, was supreme, and government was fixed and l1ID1ted by its te1·ms. . . . Sir Edward Coke, the great seventeenth-centur� a�thority 01:1 t �e common law of England, also contributed substantially to colon1al ideas on l1ID1ted gove: n· ment. In his ''Institutes'' Co ke contended tl1at the Magna Charta l1ad embodied ce� a.in fupdamental prin�iples of right an d justice, and tl1at the common law con­ tained a further expression of the same principle�. Magna Charta and tl1e co1nn1on law, he argued, were therefore supreme law, l1av1ng such force tl1at tl1ey controlled both the king and acts of Parliament.** • The compact theory held that political societies were founde� on a ''compact:' reflecting the · �gr �ment of the people to their form of go:'er� m�nt. Thus, 1t wa� argued t�c:1t _ some sort of . . ·'8-0ctaJ contract'' should underlie polit ical 1nst1tut1ons, and a written const1tut1on was seen as a reflection of this contract� -· Cf. Dr. Bon.ham's Case discussed above, p.p. 119-l20. ..'

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ial America in n lo in o c ty ri o th u a l a g . le . 1 a p ci iJ . ri p .. . t · the 1e tl . ''Inst1tu es '' and ''Commentar1es ... Coke beca1ne o s 111 e us ca be the . rt . pa . 1n ry t ce11 e1gl1teentl1 ,� , 0 tl1e very few legal works accessible to colonial la! s ..1er 11g . · 1 a e wer . aw · w n: L on on o f rt C L 1n s ou nn Comm d e I on h t · · at w la ' hi:re d ie ud st s . st ni lo co y n a . 1 011gh many o f th em Wer ti n 10 part because 1n e v e , y c n e rr t1 � e no e id w 11 e . iv g l il st re e w Coke's ide,1s e. c ti c a r p l1 s l1 g n E 1 i1 d e lo11ger ge11erally recogniz in re ed e ce w y complex..., n ex gl o ti lu o ev R n a ic er m A e th .. . The forces produci11g a1 1 ding social and s st gn . lo ax im cl a to 1t gl as 11 cl ro b in ta ri B 1 l it w l re ... Tl,e quar 1d n 1a a1 er cl ?t er at t rn pl y l1 lt as cl ea w 1e ses tl n 00 ee w et b , es iii lo co ie tl i1 l,i it w coilflicts ps n u n the othtr. ... o sa o gr ti ar 1d a1 r, re u o b la , er 11 r1 f,1 ll na the one 11and a11 d the s1 al l as el av w he as a political up al ci so al rn te in an re fo re 1e tl as w n Tlie Revoltitio break witl1 Britai11. ic and social 1om on o1 d ec se ba t jc nfl co a s wa 11 tio lt1 vo Re e tl1 ile However, \\'h at can s gre of nifi wa sig s isi cr ce l na in io t1t tit 11s co e tl1 , ds un gro l ca liti po as ll as \ve l ra , tu hts na rig pam s on ea com id l ica lit po al 11i lo co t gh ou br It . ry sto hi n ica An1er ed x fi d an them firmly ity tur ma to m lis era fed d an n, tio iita lin e tiv isla leg , ory tl1e in tl1 e A111.erica11 mind. I1n111ecliately following tl1e Revolution tl1e poljtic al conceptt developed a11d expressed dt1ring tl1e crisis found application in tl1e creation of state gover11ments, tl1e Articles of Confederation, and tl1e fed eral Constitution of 1787. . . . Tl1e Declaration of I11dependence was mainly the work of Thomas Jefferson .... Tl1e opening paragrapl1 in \Vords of solen1n 111agnificence reveals at on ce the purpose bel1ind tl1e Declaration: 1

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�hen in the co�rse of human events, it beco111es necessary for one people to dissolve the pol· 1t1c.'ll bands \.vl11ch have connected tl1en 1 witl1 anotl1er, and to assume among the po\vers of tl1e eartl1 tl1e separate and equal station to whicl1 the Laws of Nature and of Nat ure's God . the�, � decent respect to tl1c opinions entitle of n1ankind requires that they should declare the causes wl11ch impel them to the separation.

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Jeffers 11ext presente? a co11densed staten1ent of tl1e natural law - compact on . pl11losophy tl1en prevalent 1 n America:

' · en We hold tl1ese trutl1s to be self . -evi· d ent, t 11at all men are crec-ited equal, that they arean1l . <lowed by the·1 c . t rtaii1 unalienabl_e rigl1ts, tl1at an1ong th�e �re life, liberty, the_pursuit of �al)���e��. ;��t � s ure tl1ese r1gl1ts, governn1ents are 1nst1tuted . among� � deriving their just powers f t 1e consent. o_f the governed . That \vhenever any foJ11l lisb governn1ent becomes destruct��:of these ends, alter or to abooDN it 1 s �he t to rigl1 peop of le the it, and to institute new overnn e t ts ! �r e n m vern go e nc de t , 111deed, ,vi ll dictate tha l � f · · · �ni 0 established sl1ould not b� change_ u long a or_ a 1 igllt and transien t causes; ... But when ;iJei!I abuses an d usurpations pur; . g i�var educe and t _iabl y_ t�e s desig n a , �e obje vinc ct es a r e o under �bsolute despoti;111 it �� l t 1e1r r1gl1t, it_ 1s their duty, to throw off such government, to provide new guards fo; the'tr future security.

JaW Tl1ere are fot1r f undam·en· ta1 po1. . . l ura nat. itical of ideas doctrine l1ere: t}1e r a J and natural rights the c mpac . 0 t 1 r i l e : of P ry eo in of ctr 1 tl do e e te, th sta _ i � sovereig nty, a11 ct t i,� rigllt f n to n'� ttti on. mo Th ese com we con r_e cep tio ns all seventeentl1 at ld eigllte;��l� o � century natural-law tl1eonsts, bu.t !,eff;eversl pl1raseology was closely niod elled on Jol1n Locke's ''Second Treatise of Jefferson's most tellin g l · .sa Y• ·, 5 r P Jefferson had in fact succee� �ses w�re borrowed directly from Locke esn� e I e admtrably in condensing Locke's fundal11 argument into a few l1t1ndred words.

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... Tl1e .formation ?f legally constituted state a11d federal governments was patr 1 ot leaders as a strategic move i 11 tl1e revol t1tio11ary process . by gnLzed reco early ._.. In al l_ the states _ an? in t l 1e -�ongress as well, tl1e J)ro bl e.tn was sol ved by draft.tog a w�itten .const1tu�on .erect111g a goven1me11t, JJrovjcli11g for its 1nain 0L1 t­ lines, and st1 pulat1og certau1 r1gl1ts reserved to tl,e peOJJle. ... Prevailing political pl1ilosopl1y i n 1776 also e 11cot 1 ragecl tl1e creation of new governments by � formal compact. Locke a11cl otl1e r recog11ized pl1ilosophers had hel� that rev�ltition destr?yed all existi.t1g politica l co1n1Jacts, altl1ou · gl1 not necessarily the soc1 a l �on1pact 1 tself, a11d left tl1e peo1Jle f· ree to e1 1ter into a new political compact sett 1ng t1p gove.r111nent once 111ore. . . . Tl1e revolutionists were also much concerned with nat11ra! rigl1ts._ Tl1ey \\1ere fa111il iar \Vith. E11gljsl1 charters, notably Magna �I1art� and �h� Bill of R1 gl1ts, gra1 1ti1 1g certai11 rigl1ts to tl1e }Jeople, and -�pon breaking _ with . Br1 ta1n tl1ey ha ste�1ed to reaffir111 i11 writing 11ot only tl1e trad1t1onal l y recognized r1gl1ts bl1t al so certain 11ew 011es - tl1e product o f the recent quarrel with Britain. . .. Some of [these] constit11tions specified tl1e disti11ct existe11ce of tl1e three principal departments of government. Tl111s tl1e Virgi11ia co11stitutio 11 provided that '·The legislative, executive ancl judiciary dep art1ne11ts, sl1al l be separate and distinct, so tl 1at neither exercise tl1e powers properly belo11ging to the otl1er''. Pro­ Aisions of this kind were in part tl 1e JJroduct of co11tempo .rary political tho11gl1t as exempli fied by Montesquieu; i n part tl1ey were the prodt1ct of 1nore tha11 a centt1ry of colonial practice i n \vhicl 1 executive and legislat t11·e l1ad de1·i,,.ed tl1eir a.11thority from separate and distinct sources, tl1e C rown and the electorate, a11d in wl1icl1 the differences between the two branches l1ad bee 11 acce11tuated by recurre11t conflict . ... An in1portant constitutional practice v1as tl1e new i11stitutio11 of jL1dicial review, which, although not en1bodied in. tl1e 11ew constitutions, attai11ed formal recognition in several state cases between 1778 and 1787. J1· idicial reviev·.' v1as ft1nda­ mentally an outgrowth of co lonial a11d Revolutionary p olitical pl1ilosophy. Its basic postulates were the supremacy of tl1e constitution, tl1e limited power of the legislature, and the independence of the judiciary, achieved throt1gh _tl1e separation of powers. If one a-rants that tJ1e constitt1tion js supren1e, tl1at_ tl1e legisl ature ca11not modify it or act ;gainst its provjsions, and tl1at tl1e jt1diciar� is . an independe11t branch of the governi nent, w ith the rjght to i11terpr�t tl1e const1t_t1t1?�, tl1e gro1111d­ work is established for judicial revjew - for tl1e r�g�t of . the Jt1d1c1ary to_ re�t1se to recognize a legisl ative enactment wh.icl1 in i ts op1n1011 violates tl1e const1tut1on . . .. While the various states drafted constit11tions, tl1e Co11gress took steps to establish a regu lar government for the entire 11atio11. _ of tl1e , ... The [resulting] Articles of Confederation were largely a legali�ation 11tl1 Co w1 I e 178 for ad be g lon ed lo1 ho ve de d J1a 1 icl wh c t en ? '' [national] governm _ ' gress as its center. The Article s p laced t}1e f t1ll at1tl1or1ty of tl1e Co11f�der_at 1on· gover1111lent in the hatlds of Congress, wliile t .he principl e o· f state eqt1a l1ty 111 t�at bo�y, 1 g n be on t I ga ele d te st sta ch ea re , ed ain ret so al iz cogn ed in September 1774, was � lowe.d but one vote. ··. _Two extremely iinportant powei·s, taxat�on and tl1e reg t1latio11 1of conlfilerce, se Were W1thheld tl1e of t]1 I,o s. re 11g Co n 1 ro f n] o 1. rat de nfe Co � [b y the A1ticl es of . . _ �owers had but recently been invol ve d in the d 1sp t1te w1tl1_ Engla11�, and_ tl1e new 1e Tl .. .. 1t e1 l:ates wer e app-a 1n 111 ve go al 1 nt ce 1y a1 to em th rent]y reluctallt to grant .

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· UTIONAL LAW ·1 1 · 1 s N Co IOPIAN _ K OF ETH _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ : lll6�6�---�S�o� U:R�CE:B:0 0:: :-_:_:__ ...............

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�m and independen d ee fr , ty n ig re ve so '' e th . r fo ,, ' . ed d vi o r p ce y t' ll ul a c 1n ry ifi ed eo c d th as the lllla e regar er w es at Articles spe st e th t ' la tl e c te n d e 1 v e _ , s e t a t s e t a r a p e of the s . ty n ig e r e v o s f o s ie r o reposit · serably a s agents of the national governme nt · 1'L J.ll �· u n · d 1 1 e · . · .. a n o e b The states 1 th p e y u Co 1 �d · v e I s n o 1 t 1 ngr s 1 u ss q � e e r ..... l a u n n . a . n o t c li e r e d l ba t en i m chron to rn in ve go n c were . r.epeated o nL at er ed i f on C e th ,. t pu ey th Y t a th t n to such an exte ruptcy. es ci f the national , o en as es ag at st e th f o n io at in im el The solution la y in tlle government. al fat 1 ze gn co re to e m ad co h i en m es at st g Thus b y 1787 the cou11try's leadin . on , an d the movement for reform had t1 ra de fe on C of s le ic rt A e th 11 _ deficiencies i crowned e ts er to or w eff e be os h w on ti en nv co al on ti tu ti ns finally resulted i 11 a co witl1 spectacular success.

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ention i s omitted. These problC!ll.l nv co e th g in nt ro nf o c 1s len ob pr the of on ssi cu [A long dis included: the state governments for its exislen(r, on ent end dep t no nt, me ern gov al ion nat a 111 for to 1) h.ov.,i rcise most of the es to exe stat the to ers pow rve rese o t v 110\ e tim e sam the at and , nce fina or for then traditional powers of govern1nent; es that their in!el'C:lil 2) l1ow to satisfy tl1c absolute, unyielding demands of many of tl1e smaller stat v,1ould be protected in tl1e national legislature against domination by the larger, more populom states; o\.vers indep enden t of the legislative bran ch or whether p with tive execu chief a create to 1cr '.vl1etl 3) the executive should be directly accountable to the legislative; 4) ho:"' to s�tisfy the conflicting dema11ds of "democrats'' (on one side) who favoured a legis­ !at�ve \vl11�h wottld be regularly and, directly acco untable to the people an d elected, if not by universal (n1al�) suffrage at least by br oad based suffrage, and ''conservatives'' who feared sucl1 an expe�·1me�t and favoured stricter qualifications for the franchise, e.g. higher age and property qualtficat1ons and longer "tenure'' in office for n1embers of the legislature. The convention managed to compron1ise these issues for without compromise lheI? would have been no constitution, probably no ''united states' ,, _ but rather a loose federation of weak, sn1all states. The compromises incltided: l) creation°! a_ natio nal go�ernment <;Iirectl� responsible to tl1e people, not the states, but a govern· 2 n1ent· of /1,nrted powe:s in don1est1c affairs, \Vith other powers ''reserved'' to the states; , ) �ve of . creat10n o[ a senate 1n wh · ecu · ich each s t at e \vou Id be g.iven equal representation (1rresp · ) th a · sf t 011�e�ns of n:iany ,vl10 fe ared tl1at the national governme nt would � h� :� t{/�7s �7tf s a es, particularly sn1al id: !rr �i ) l states; 3 creation of a chief execut!:e ele� " ed by tl1e people (throt1gh electors) and a system of "oheck5. and balances'' between th p : 1 �• ent and tlie legislative branch; . t � 4) creation of a bi-cameral 1e iS� g lative brancli (Congress): tl1e House of Representauves � elected by the people· the S ate �o assu was it be cl1osen (and by the legislatures State that the states ,vould ;end 111;i� senior statesme n to the Sen · at e)· . uy b'' (Today all n1en1be rs of Con ress d universal suffrage. The terms of Iepr , Repr�ntatives and Senators, are chosen f u: 810; �entatives are for 2 years only the te nns ? n are 6 years, and in any given 2 e Y ar period only l /3 of tl1e Senate stands for re-elec tion. )] 1

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· · · [One] more serious and d · e in def to 1ffiicult problem remained. Wl10 was 1 a11d safegua rd tl1e respective t n e J1)1Jl sp1leres of tl1e states an d the national gove d · · · After [mucl1] debate . . . ' ea r . . h] C tl 1 e delegates · [wbJ n prov1s1o accepted [a] as follows: This Constitution, and ·ti1e .U1 pu. oa�-e . . La. . .

ws � f the United States which shall be made �ni thereof; and all Treaties made � Slates, 5 l1all be_ the supren1e �:r whtch shall be made, under the Autho rit)' of the i,ound \' the Land, and the Judges in every State sba�I · thereby, any thing in the � di n Constitui�n or La,vs of :ta wit not any State to the Contrary

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ultimately appeared in A· r ticle VI of the finished Constitution . ion rovis p e Th . .. The SU}?remacy �lause of Article VI, ... later became the cornerstone of This occurred because the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided reignty. sove al ion nat courts to �he federal jt1dic �ary, and finally to the Supreme state fro als � appe for States. The ultimate . eff e ct United of tl11s to statute was give tl1e Supreme the of rt Cou _ the natio al ?f governn1ent, tl1e final power to interpret the extent agent an � rt, Cou national authonty under the Constitution... . and state of Closely related to the whole n1a �ter of tederal so,,ereignty right of and the . appeals from state to federal courts 1s tl1e question of wl1 etl1er the Convention intended to �est the fede_ral judiciary with t/1e polt,'er to deter111ine t/1e /i,nits· of state and congresszonal authority under tire �011sti!ution (en1pl1asis added). This problem _ bas usually been assumed to be 1dent1cal with that of ,vl1etl1er the Convention in­ tended to bestow upon the federal judiciary tl1e po\l1er to cleclare acts of Co11gress void. However, there are reasons for ql1estio11ing this assumptio11. There is substantial e\'idence in tl1e debates of tl1e Convention t111t many of the delegates believed that tl1e federal ·judiciary would have tl1e right to refuse to recognize an unconstitutional federal law. If we grant for the sake of argt1ment that most of the delegates assumed tl1is power to be inherent in tl1e jt1diciary, tl1is question remains: Was the power to declare void an act of Congress recognized as ta11tan1ount to a general power to interpret the Constitution and to define tl1e 11ltimate lirnits of 11ational and state authority? Direct evidence 11pon this point is small.... In tl1e twentieth century ''the Constitution is what tl1e Supre1ne Court says it is'', to q·uote (former Chief Justice). Charles Evans Hughes. But this C:ondition came abot1t only as the _result of a long process of evolution whicl1 was not freely co11fir1ned until the latter portion of the nineteenth centu.ry. It was a de\1elopment not foreseen by the members of the Convention . ... [Thus, an] important issue wl1icl1 gre,v out of tl1e vague solutio11 of the problem of respective spheres [of the three brancl: es _of gover11ment] was that of the role of tl1e judiciary i11 relation to tl1e Const1tut1011. From 1803, wl1e� Jol1n Marsha]! expounded at length the dictum that the federal courts l1ad a r1gl�t to declare void an act of Congress, dow 11 to 1937, wl1en the great battle over President �oosevelt's attempt to curb the judiciary was fo11gl1t,_ a11d tl1e role of the fed_eral Judiciary in constitutional interpretation became at 111tervals a matter of bitter co ntroversy. The Political Tl1eo1·y U1zde1·lying Judicial Revie�v

From Hamilton's defence of Judicial Review in Tl1e Feclera/ist .Pa1Je1·s, No. 78.

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ng di n lea (a lto mi r Ha de an ex Al by bly ta no en itt wr ts ' he ,Ie pl . re pam T Federa1·is·t papers we 1· . . . d of 1�hom,as Jefferson. 'and .New York la\\,yer) and James Mad ison (a Virginia po 1t1c1a11, fr1e� ade Am_er1cans rsu pe to en itt wr re V:'e !s �ater t11e third President of the Uoit pe pa e 1es T1 s). ate St . ed 1n 1787 that th ey shoul d support adoption of the const1tut1on, and th ey �re of great interest d the philosophy oJ ;he ve{; to modern stud t1n po ex y e th e us ca e b ents of the U.S. Constjtution ( Y ow pt e r ce e ex tl1 I� .. �es sta l ra e ve s e men iw ho pressed har dest for its ratification by th fiao) lto·n) an effor t is made to explain tf1e role anJ _pow�;s 0� the J� d/ctal �r�n� �� fi��e::e�t i c tl. �.der the propose d constitution. See if you cai:i tc!entJ Y t _e �Olfl?S WhIC Are they releva.nt to our thinking about the Etl11opian Contitution · .

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ITUTIONAL LAW T S N O C N IA P IO H T E SoURCEBOOK OF' r

nents of power mu rtr pa de t ren . ffe cii e til "fS 1 t 5 ·d co ive ly 11 l1 atte t oev �r � . e wllicl tl1ey are separated from eacl1 oth: JleiW l n i0 ne ��} n be ys t �ei�e� tl 1at in wa l t �e as l l le a i w da _ s, 11 _ tio 11c u t· ger its �: ��: v: of �� a lu t l � o t as JUd1c1a��' fr e in le b a l 1I w p rt ca acity to an e 1s at ec b 11: io 1t tL ti 1s 1 co oi: swn he tl1e_ p?l1t1cal rig! 1{� of tl1e , rs no t e ho bu th u s ld s se ho en sp di t 1ly o1 t i1o ve ti cu e x e e 1 . m or inJure tl1c · e tl1 ds an m purse, but prescn· �� 111 co 1ly o1 ot 1 1 e u l at is r eol � · of the commun1ty. T l 1e 0 . 1z� en are to be regulated Th ·t c1 y er ev f o s ]1t r10 . d n a cs iti o . e the ruIes by wI11c11 tll e dt . t he r t_h e sword or the purse e1 r e v o ce en t1 1fl 1 i o , n s a l1 no ry a tr 11 co e t l1 n o ry ia ic d ju y, d et an ci n so ca e _ f o th ke no ao1iv e . �a lt ea w h l t 1� of or l1 t 11g re st e tl1 direction eitl1 er of e r rc no er Fo Il , but merel 1_ 1t� W ne ve l1a to id . sa be l y t1 tr ay m It y resolution wl latever l 1e aid of tl 1e executive ar m even t on up d n pe de ely at tim Lil t us judgnle n t; an d m for tl1e efficacy of its judg 1 11ents. l im�ortant consequences. ll era sev ts ges sug r tte n1a l 1e t of w vie IJle sim iis l T 1son tl1� weakest of the par co� d o bey is r)' !cia jt1d l t 1e at l1 t y l tib tes 1 co1 11 i s ove pr � tJ1 ree cieJJart1ne 1 1ts of power; tl 1at 1t ca11 11ever atLack :V1tl 1 success �1ther of the othcr two; and tl 1at ,tll possible care is requisite to enable 1t to defend itself against their attaclcs. It equ,1ll y proves, tl 11:1t tl 1ot1gl 1 i 11dividual oppression may now a .nd then JJroceed fro1 11 tl1e cot1rts of justice, tl 1e general liber ty o f tl1e people ca11 never be e n dangered fron1 tl1at quarter: 1 n1ea11 , so long as tl1e judiciary remains truly d.istinct frl1 11 1 botl1 tl1e legislative a11d exect1tive. For I agree ,vitl1 (Montesquieu) that "there is 11 0 liberty, if the JJower of jt1dging be no� separated fron1 tl 1e legislative and executive powers." A11d it 11roves, i n tl1e last JJl ace, tl1at as liberty ca11 have nothing to fear from tl 1e jt1dici,1ry al one, bL1t ,vould l 1a,,e everytl1ing to fear from its union witl1 eitl1er of tl1e otl1 er clepartn1e n ts; tl 1at as al l tl1e effects of st1cl1 an uojon mus1 ensure fro111 a depe 11 dence of tl 1e former on tl1e latter, not,vitl 1sta11ding a nomin al a11d apparc11t se1J�tr,1tio11 ; tl1at as fron1 tl1 e 11att1ral feebleness of tl 1e judiciary, it is in contin11al jeoparcl y of bei11 g overpo\vered, a,ved or inflt1enced by its co-ordinate brancl 1es; an d tl1at as 11otl1 ing can co11tribt1te so n1t1c l1 to its fir111ness and indepen · de11_ce,. as JJer1na1:e n cy _i11 o.ffi�e, tl 1is qt1ality 1n,1y tl1erefore be justly regard�d as an 111<l1s1Je n �a�l e 1_ngredient 111 its �onstitutio11; �1,1d i,1 a great measure a s the citadel of tl1e public Jltst,ce and tl1e JJublic sectirity. ' We proceed llO\\' to a11 ex�1n1i11atio11 of tl 1e jL1diciary de sed ro p partme nt of the po . govern1nent. ..

c ord _ ing t� the _[pro1Josed co_11stitution], _ p� oioie� , � l l j t1dges wl10 may be a a t b tl n1ted States ar e to l1ol d tl1e1r offices i 1 10- go od bel 1aviour· which is con, ; du r r ma_bl e to tl1e 111ost a_JJproved of tl1e st e c o d ooo , at : d o1 r 1 st sta it 1e n ' T tio l 11s · a · · f g 1 f tl1 c cont1 1 1ua11 �e 11· 1 0 bel1a, 1our or ne I, n o ta ff' c 1�e · of tl1 e jud icia l 1nagistracy, is c er t· ) Jl l, of the n1ost val uable 0f ti'1e me _ 111oder11 1 1nproveme11t �, ·�11 t 11e pract1:e n oover · f o _o , In ,t 1110 11 arcl1 y it is a11 excelI_c . b . Hr b u 11t ,arr1er to r . t l1 i e J e de s pr Jo in t1s c of n1 th e : n a ep re· it is a no less excellent b 1r 1er to tl1e e11�ro,tcl11ne11ts a 1 1d oppressio11s of the re�ro· l · : 1 ' · i . c ve sentati body. A 11· l ·t 1s t 1e b . vc . o g . est exi) e y d . an 1e 1 _ 1 t . w 111cl1 can be devised 1n . · ment, to sect1re ,1 stead · . _ Y, llJJrigllt, ar1d 1n1partial adm inistration of the law s. ·· 11 i l . �l1e con11Jlete i11depe11 de11c_ e� 0f t. ile � , . i . . . ra "'o t1rt s arl y of pec a l1m1ted Constitutio11· 1-.)y uli Jus tic e 1s essen r"•ini . · a t con . 11n1ted · 1 C . 1 · ° 11c 11sr ,· i 1· t· w ut1o r1, I 1111d.ersta11d 011e certain specified exceptio al b · t . 11s as . t o t11e legis ,, � l at1ve at1tI1or1ty; st1cl 1, for 1�stao ce 1t· s1_ 1 3:II p�ss 110 bills of 0ns 1i attai ilde.r, 110 e.x 'po st 8 1 f,1cto'' law s. and tl 1e like. LtJ. ll'.l �julll of this kind can be preser d of cot1rts of jttstice' wl1ose ve. 1.11 pr,1ct1ce 110 otl1er way tl 1ar1 tl1rough th e 01e11ii"& 3 dtity it n1t1st be to n1 th e declare al l ac ts contrary to

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tenor .o �the Constitution void. Witho�t tl1is, all tl1e reserv,ttions of particular rigl1ts or pr1v1leges would amount t o noth1ng. Sor:ne perplexity respecting the rigl1t� o� tl1e cottrts to p1·onott 1 1ce legislative acts void, be �ause cont:ary to the Const1tut1o n, J1as arise11 from an imagination that the doctrine would 1n:iply a . superiority of tl1e judiciary to tl1e legislative power . It . is urged that .tI1e authority which can declare tl1e acts of a11otl1er void, must neces­ sarily be superior to tl1e 011e whose acts 111,1y be declared void. As tl1is doctri11 e is of great importance in all tl1e Ainerican co11stitL1tio11s a brief discussio11 of tl1e ground on which it rests ca11not be L111acceptable. There is no posit�on wl1icl1 depe11ds on clea1·er pri11ciples, tl1a 11 tl1at every act of a delegated authority, contrary to tl1e te11or of tl1e co1runission 11nder wl1icl1 it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, tl1erefo1·e, co11trary to tl1e Co11stitution, can be valid. To de11y this, would be to affir111, tl1at tl1e dep11ty is greater tl1an l1is prin­ cipal; that the servant is above the 111aster; tl1at tl1e reJ)resentatives of tl1e people are superior to the people then1selves; that 111e11 acti11g by virt11e of powers, n1ay do not only wl1at their powers do not a.uthorize, but wl1at tl1ey forbid.... Nor does this conclt1sion by a11y means suppose a sL1perior.ity of tl1e judicial to the legislative power. It o nly supposes that tl1e power of tl1e people is superior to both; a.nd that where tl1e will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, star1ds in opposition to that of the people, decla1·ed in the Constit1ttio11 , the jt1dges ot1gl1t to be governed by tl1e latter ratl1er tl1a 11 tl1e for1ner. . .. From The Constitz-ltio11 o_f t!1e United States. Only some provisions are reprinted here. See ho\v 111a11y simil,tr co11nterparts you can find in the Ethiopian Constitution. Note how many provisions are traceable to Englisl1 l1istory. Note also that the first l O arnendn1ents - the so-called An1ercan ''Bill of Rigl1ts'' - were adopted immediately after the ratification of the Constitution in recognition of tl1e fact tl1at tl1e original document contained inadeq11ate sets of guarantees of personal freedoms and rights. The 13th, 14th and 15th a.mendments were adopted nearly 100 years later in the in1mediate aftermath of the American Civil War . . . . . .. . . . .

We the People af the United States, i11 Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for tl1e co1nn1on defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Bless�ng� o.f Liberty to ?urselves a11d our Posterity, do ordain and establjsh tl1is Const1tut1on for tl1e United States of America. Article I.

Section I. All legislative Powers I1erei11 gra11ted sl1all be vested in a Con�ress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and Hot1se of Representatives. ' Section 2. (I) The House of Representatives sl1all be co111posed of Membe:s chosen every second year by the People of tl1e several States,. a11d tl1 e Electors 1n each State shall have the Qualification s requisite for Electors of tl1e n1ost 1 1L1merot.1s Branch of th e State Legislature. /o t,1 of ed os m co be all sl1 es at St cti Se d p ite Un on 3. (I) The Senate of tile .Sen ato rs from eac1l State cllosen by the LegislatL1re tl1ereof, for six Years; a 11d eacI1 Senator shall ve �ne Vote. (Superseded by Amend. XVII.) ha . �ection 5. (I) Each Hottse shall be tl1e Judge of tl1e Election�, Returns ,1r1d um 1or Qt a e tL1t Qua.lrfic ations of its st1 . n co all sh cl1 ea of y rit ajo M a d own Members. an •

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d jo d a an d y a n 1,_ m rn er b m u . N · r le �Yut al m , s b r In sueh M anne m e e M t n e s b t o do B. usiness; but a s e Attendan a f o e c · I and 1 r ti l e p m o c e id v o authonzed t o y a : m P e s u o H h c a e s a s ie lt a n e P h c u s under e f s o s ce it le ro u P R e g �h in d e in m s, er et d ni PU ay m sn se u o H ll ac E (2) rr u e c c n n e o e C of tw o thirds, th h it w , d n a r, u io v a h e B y rl e rd o js D r fo s er b em M its expel a Member.

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Section 6. (1) The Senators a11d Representatives.shall receive a Compensatio n

for tl1 eir Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the united States. T11 ey sl1all in all Case�, exce�t Tr�ason, Felony and B�each of ihe Peace be privileged from Arrest d11r1ng the!r Attendance at tl1e Session of thcir respe�ti,,e Houses, and in going to and returning fro:11 the �ame; and for any Speech or Debate in eitl1er House, tl1ey shall not be questioned 1n any othe·r Place. • • • • • •• • •

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Secilion '7. (I) fa�ll l3ills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of ltepresentatives; b1.1t tl1e Se11ate may propose or concur with Amendments as on otl1c:r I;ills. (2) E·,;eryf Bill vvl1ich sl1all have passed the House of Representatives a11d tl1e Sen21te, sl1alJ, be. ,Jr0 it be<.:on1es a Law, be presented to the President of the TJnitecJ Sta·i:es; jf l1e approves l1e sl1all sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objection to ;:lie .tl<Juse .ir1 v111icl1 it shall l1ave originated, wl10 shall enter the Objec­ ti<)11s at large on f'l1eir Jour11al, a11d proceed to reconsider it. If after sucl1 Reconsi· <leration tv10 tJ1irds of il1at I-louse sl1all agree to pass tl1e Bill, it sl1all be sent together witl1 tl1e Objectio11s, to tl1e other Hotise, by wl1icl1 it sl1all likewise be reconsidered, a,1d if ,ipprovcd by two tl1irds of tl1at House, it sl1all become a Law. Sectio� 8. Tl1e Congress sl1all have Po\ver ... [Here follows a detailed listing ' -0f tl1e subJects on wl1icl1 tl1e Federal Governme 11 t may make law _ thus a listing -0f tl1e powers of tl1e National Governme11t as opposed to the States]. Section 9.

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· sus be t no (2) Tl1_e Privilege of tl1e Writ of Habeas Corpus shall re· y roa y Safet per:ide�, unless wl1er1 in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public quire 1t. (3) No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed . .. . . . . . . . . Article II

Section 1. (1) Tl1e Exec11t· "' e p 0.�er sl1all be_ vested in a President of the Vn�·ternl Stat es of America. He sllall 11� d d a e togetl1er witl1 tl1 e Vice-Presidei ; Is office dur111g tl1e Tern1 of four yas r/'uows 0 c , osen elected for tl1e same Term, be {procedure for election follo\vs].' i .......... nd Section 2. (l) Tl1e President a nto Navy of tl1e United States and O slla1 1. �e. �ommander in Chief of tl 1e ArrrtY i l a tl 1 e M l1t1a of tl1e several States, \Vl1en c � � of i the actual Service of the n 1 � t ri d tates in l �!tiog ; l�e _ w 1nay require the opinion, t he princip�l Officer in eacll �; th ect ret eVe5 . e ecut x i\'e subj , � departments any upon to the Duties of their respective i ReP o · nt ces, and he shall have Power to gra t. a11d Pardons for offenses agai.nst 11 e til e United States, except i n cases of Irnpeachlll

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· (2) He sha�l have J?OWer; by and with the advice and consent of ·. Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; ke m to ate, � Sen the and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall nominate, shall he and other public Mini�ters and Consuls, judges of the Supreme ssadors, Amba nt ppoi a Court, and a�l other. Officers of the Un1ted States, whose appointments are not provided for, and wh i ch shall be established by Law; but the Con­ ise otherw ein . her gress m�y by La � vest the a ppointment of sucl1 inferi or Officers, as they think proper, 1n the President alone, 1n the courts of Law, or in tl1e Heads of Departments. Section 3. He s?all from time to time gi ve to tl1e Congress Informati on of the State of the Union, and recomme11d ·to tl1eir co11sideration sucl1 measures as he shall judge necessary. and expedient; he may, 011 extraordi11ary occasions, con­ vene both Houses, �r either �f the1n, and i11 case of di sagreeme11t between them, with respect to the time of adJournment, l1e may adjourn tl1em to such time as he shall think proper; he shall recei ve Ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the L-aws be faitl1f11lly executed, and sl1all Com1nission all the officers of the United States. Section 4. The President, Vice President a11d all civil officers of tl1e U11ited States, shall be removed from Office on Impeacl1ment for, and conviction or, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdeme. anors. Article ID.

Section 1. The judic i al power of the United States, shall be vested i11 011e Su.r,ren1e Court, and in such inferior Cou rts as the Congress may fro. m time to ti me orda,in and establish. The judges, both of tl1e Supre1ne and inferior Courts, shall holcl their offices during good Behaviour, and sl1all, at stated times, receive for tt1eir Services, a Compensation, which shall not be dimi nisl1ed during their conti nuance ii1 office. Section 2. (1) The judicial power shall extencl t? all cases, in Law an? Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treat1es n1ade, or which shall be made, under their Authority; ... (2) In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls and those in which a State shall be Party, tl1e S upreme Cot1rt shall have origin;l jur,isdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the � upreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law a11d Fact, w1tl1 stich exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. • •• • • • • • •

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Article VI.

d States which ite e U th of ws 1:a e th d an � n, tio itu 1st (2) This c01 de be ma all sh 1 1cl wh or d e, ma s tie ea Tr all f' e reo d the an e nc a ; rsu shall be m d in Pu a : _ under the Authority of the united States, shall be the st1pr�me. law of tl1e _La �d , n and the Judges in t1o t_ tu 1 ns e Co th 1n g in Th y an , by i·e he d un bo � ery State shall be ev . o r Laws of any State to the Contrar·y notw1tl1stand1ng.

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Articles in addition to and Amendment to tl1e Constituti on_ of the Un ited s of th e re tu la 1 eg e th by St.ttes of A tifi r a � � nd � r ss a .

� merica , proposed by Cong � several States . n o t1 u 1t st 11 o l C a 1n g r1 o e th f o le ic , pursuant t o the fifth Art . .

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(Artic 1m en t of religi on l is bl ta es an g tin ec sp re or Pro1. 11 m a ke no law . · a t1 s s i s Congre h, e m f d _ o re h f o �p e o t ec e g 1n of g d abr1 r t he r o f eo ; er th se ci er ex hibiting the fr.ee d to t1 e, an t1 bl pe m on the Gove se as to y bl ea ac pe le op pe rnpress; or the rig11t of tlJe. s. e c n a v e ri g f o ss re d re a r fo t men (Article IV.) Tile riglJt of tlle people to be sec�re ju thejr JJersons, h?uses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and se1zt1res, shall not b e violated, an? no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir�at1on, and partj. cularly describing the place to be searcl1ed, and tl1e persons or tl11ogs to be seized.

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(Article V.) No person sl1all be 11eld to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un.less 011 a presentment or indictme11t of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising i n tl1 e land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public da11ger; 11or shall a11y perso11 be st1bject for the same offence to be twice put i n jeoparc\y of life or ljmb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a \Vitness agai11st hi1nself, 11or be <le1Jrived of life, liberty or property, without due process of_ law; 11 or sl1,111 pri\1ate property be take11 for ptiblic use, without just compensat1011. ( ,i\.rticle VI.)

:[n a!l crimi11al .prosec_t1ti�ns, tl1e acct1sed sl1all enjoy tl1 e rigl1t to a speedy and public trial, by an 1mpart1al JLiry of tl1e State and district wl1erein tl1e crime shall have bee11 �ommitted, whicl1 district sl1all have bee11 previously ascertained by law, , _ be _i11forn1 ed o! tl1 e _11att1re and ca11se ot� tl1e accusation; to be confronted to a�d �11th. the wi tnesses agai11st l1 1m; to have co111p11lsory process for obtaii1ing witness6 111 l,is favot i r, aiid to have tl1 e Assistance of Co11nsel for l1is defe11ce. (Article Vlll.) Excessive ba�l s11all 11ot be required, nor excessive fi 11es jmposed. nor cruel and unust1al pt1n1shn1ents inflicted.

(Article XIV.) Section 1. All persons b01. 1 or . . iralized . ·eci . . b �. !iU . natt a11d _ 111 tl1e United States, to tl1e jt1risdictio11 tllereof ar ! . citizens of tlie United States and of tl1e State ��e rei� tl1ey reside. No state sllalt' � _ or e or ii u ities of ' r�� eJr _ nf ce_a�y law wl1ich shall abridg� the privile� citizens o e _ 111t d States, ers :iun � e nor sl1all any State depriv any p on o� li �e, _l i berty, or propert , w·1 1 � ers p t Y lou t y dt e an pr oc ess to of law; no r deny w1tl1in its jurisdiction tile equ � a protection of the laws . 1 The Establishment of Jud' icia . 1 po,,·ers to Enforce the Const itution Introductory Note . In 1800, Just before l1e ,. giniB . left offi ia?er _nan1ed Jol1n Marsh all to bec�h �res1de-?t Jobn Adams a ppoi nted a well known V�ronB ef !ust1ce of t he Supreme Court. Marsh all w� a of ,� a� st - or nation alist : h a t orough indep t�oC:g t of Alexander Han1ilton· , a u thoYr of hendent and vigorous man an adJtllrer t e Federalist Pa p ers. · · '

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In 1803, the S�preme Cour� w as presented witl1 a case containing an issu e whicl1 at first un no ttc bu ed os t an t iss alm ue of great moment to the Court and tlle pol·t went · I ica 1 deve1op_ . y tr n u e o th c f o t meo 111:e case wa s Marbury_ �- Jv!adison. Marbury had been ap1Jointed by President Adams t� a _nunor g?vernme�t po3 ition Ju st a few hot1rs before Aclams Vclcated l1is office (at tl1e ex­ p1ra�1on ?f hi s term) in favor _of th e n� wly elected President, Tl101nas Jefferson. Upon taking Pres1dent1al offi�, Jeffers<?n . directed hi s ne w Secretary of State, Jan1es Madiso11, to refuse to deliver �a.rbury s commission - tl1e paper appoit1ting l1i111 to office - which Adams I1ad . already signed. Marbu� then s �ed �adiso� for a sl?ecial co11rt or cler (called cl Writ of Mandam to us) , , _ compel Madison to do his d11ty an d del1,,er the co1nn11ssion ar1d tht1s permit l1im (Marbury) to take office. Marbury initiat�d hi� case in tl1e S11prer11e Court instead of starting I1is action in the lower federal court. He did th�s because an i-\ct of Congress (tl1e J'udiciary Act of 1789) expressly at1thorized people to bring origit1al actions for Writs of Mandamus in tl1e Supreme Court. At the first argument of the a,1se. tl1e issue arose ,vhetl1er Congress coL,ld in accordance with the Constitt1tion � authorize the initiatio11 of original st1its in tl1e SL1preme' Court since Article III of tlze Constitution limited t/1e ji1r:sdictio11 of t!ze Supre,ne Court to appellate cases except in very specified instances, not relevant to this case. Thus it was suggested to tl1e Co11rt tl1at this partictilar part of tl1e Congressional statute the clause authorizing Marbury to bring an original action in the Supreme Court - was in con­ flict with the Constitution; tr'1erefore, it ,vas argued, the statute was i111constiti1tional a11cl there­ fore unenforceable. In the excerpts below see i f you can understand l1ow this issue \Vas raised and ho\v Chief Justice Marshall answered it - and why the case was of such dramatic importance.

Tl1e Case of �ft,,,fa,·bury v. Macfiso11, I Crancb 137 (1803).

From the Opinio.n of Chief Justice Marshall, ... jt remains to be inquir ed, Whether it (the Writ of Mandamus) can issue fro� tl1is court. . The act to establisl1 the judic-ial co11rts of the Uni ted States autl1orrzes _ _ tl1e Supreme Court ''to issue writs of ma1 1damt1s, in cases warranted by tl1e pr1nc1ples and usages of law, to any courts appointed, 01· persons holding office, 11nder the authority of the United States." The Secretary of State, being a person J1olding an office u �d�r the aut? ority_ of the United States, is precisely \Vitl1in the Jetter of the descr1pt1011; �nd 1f tl11s court is not authorized to issue a writ o·f manda1nt1s to sucl� an officer, 1t n1ust. be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolL1tely incapable of confer�1ng the authority, and assigning the duties whicl1 its words pt1rport to confer and assign. The constitution vests tlie wl,o]e jLidicial power of tl1e U�ited St�tes i11 o�e Supr eme Court, and sucll jnferior cotirts as co 11gress sl1all, from _t�me to ttme, ordain and establish. Tllis power is expressly extended to all cases ar1s111g u�der tl1e la\vs of the United States . an. d consequet1tly, in some form may be exe:c1sed over tl1e Present case; becaus; tlie rigllt claimed is given by a �aw of tl1e U111ted States. t1 11 S. Co e U. tl1 of I II cl rti (i In � d re tl cla de 1 � e is � it r u ib we distr tioi1 of tllis po ? _ . _ tut1on) that ''tl1e 1 0�1 111 a�l cases affect 111g t d1c r1s JU l na igi or ve l1a Supreme Cot1r·t sl1al] ll 1a e · ters and coi1suls ' and tl1ose 1 n wh1cl1 a st sl at ambassadors , oti 1er pL1 bl.1 c n11n1s . · ,, · · bea Party. In Li risdiction. · ·· J e at ll pe aJJ ve l1a l ,ll sl1 t ur Co all otl1er cases tl1e Supren1e ··· To enable tl,is col;rt, tl,crl, to isstic a 111a11damL1 s, it must be sl1own _to � an exer':ise o.f appe llate jurisdictiorl, or to be 11ecessary to enable tl1em to exercise Ppellatc Jurisdiction. ...

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UTIONAL LAW T CONSTI OPIAN ETI-II SoURCEBOOK OF

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e a e a t s 1sbj dr n m e e u b at sl e gi re th le at f It l1_as o th l il w a . e . tl1e b an amu� it if t a 1 tl " d n a · , s m r . · Tl s e . d y 11 b e is e o u e b tr , 1n a variety of 1 o st y u m et 1 1l t w he t. � th , se n o ju rp u p s. ; t a th r fo d s e 11 sl1011ld be . . 1nal. . 1g r o t o n , e t a . ll e . p . p . , diction . must be a t a , th 1t n se vi s and corr t1o re 1c sd r1 JU te a ll . e p p a f o n o e ch . It 1s t11e essent·1a l crite ri t o es n d o te d ea n a cr , d th at cau, : t� u 1t st 1n y ad e lr a e s u ca oceedings i n a h rt s yet to is sue such-: u _to co d te e� 1� d e b ay m s u m a a mand , re fo re 1e tl 1, gl � � l1 I l� a � • u e m th e ct sa as e to 1n ain s 1 r, s e ff st ap p a e f o ry ve li e d n e th r fo r ce offi n writ to a n o t to belong t_o appellate, s m _e s e re fo e r e th . d b � ut e r, a al? p at th r fo n io ct a original n such a ca se as this, to enabl e the 1 y ar s _ es e� n _ 1t . 1s r 1e 1tl e N to original jurisdictio11 . . n o t1 1c d 1s 1r Jt e t la el JJ p a s it se court to exerci urt, by the act es�ablishing Co 1 e 1:1 re 1p S1 � tl1 to en v gi �, or ef er tl1 Tlle aLitI1ority, us m to da an ic m bl �f pu its wr e u _ ce 1ss offi t� ij1 e s, at St d e t ni U e tl1 of ts 11r co l tl1e jLidicia e co me s n �cessary to inquire b 1t d an ; on 1 t1t t1t 11s Co e tl1 by ted an aJJI)ears riot to be wa.rr n be exercised. ca s) es gr n Co y (b d re er nf co so on vv1I1 el l·1 er a -it1risdicti J nstitution, can become Co tl1e to nt a n ug rep , act ctn 1er l et \vh r1, tio ·r11e c1 ues tl1e United States; but, tl1e: i.. a\''· c>f' tl1e Land� is ::1 c1ucstion deeply i nterestj ng to . It seems onJy nece.ssa�1 st n tere i its I1ar:-pily·; nc•i: ,)f [in i!1tr.ica1::j, proportio11ed to i well and shed, , establ long h been e v a to osed supJ) , iples to re-.:;or;(1izf. cr:-rl,.ii ri IJtir1c 7.(1 (1tcidt: !L. '['!1ziL tb� ·t)�r,p}i:; I1r:l.Ve ,111 origi11al rigl1t to estab lish for thei r future government, , sucl1 T,)riricir)Jcs ,�s, j.11 thc.ir (>!)inion; sl1 all most conduce to their own happiness, , is tl1c b[£sis or1 \v!·1ic11 tr1e \vl10Ie ,\1nerican fabric l1as been erected. The exercise of ' tl 1is origir1�i rigl1t_ is. ,l very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently , repeaiec.i. 1 l1e pr1nc1ples, therefore so establisl1ed, are deemed fundamental. And ' as t11e �uthority from w l1ich tl1ey proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they ' are designed to be permanent. . Tl1is original a11d s�preme �ill organizes tl1e government, and assigns, .to diffe�ent. d�partn1ents� tl1e1r respective powe rs. It may eitl1er stop here, or e st ablish · certa111 l1nuts not to be transcended by tliose departments. Tl e veri1ment of the U nited State s is of tl1e latte r de scription. Th e p owers akeDi 0f �1 1e ;eg s at r e are de?ne_d a�d li1nited; an mist be ot n d tl1a t ma tl1o v i1ni se ts l � � or orgotte n, tl1 e const1tL1t1o. n is . written T o w hat pu rpose are po· .wers limited, and. ·. to what purpose is that 1-- 1�11t i n comn11tt any t , ma ed y t o writ ing, if tl1ese limits a � � time be passed by tllo e 11 .e11. e to be re�trai11ed? o · g a en bet we Th dis e tinc tion : men; wit l 1 limited anJ n� imited. po\vers not ! do a bo imits co . ne isl1ed , thos l e if IS �\ tl1 e persons o n wllom e re impo_s_7d, f a nd if �cts prohibited and acts allo\V�'. are of equal obligation. I� s : pr at the con l� posit1011 th too p contested, la i n to be tution controls a11 y legislativ ac � l 1 a y rept ture tgnant ma � legisla to it; or, the tl 1 at the constitution by arl O rd111ary act. Betwe en tl1ese alter11atives ti . · s eitbef ,1 . · er e IS no o n 1. evcl u tu_ i st_ le dd n e co u Th �ro d. n 1ru l a _ superior, paramount law unc i l1a �geable by ord1�ary means, or it is o n _a ature w1tl1 ordinary legislative acts' i5l g a Ie nd lik e the otl1er acts, 1s alterable when shall please to alt er it. If the former part of th . tJ1111 1 t t r native be true, the n a legislative a c c�� s to the constitution is not 00 � � 0 t 1 law:' i t le latter part be n5t co n writte ft true, then tu a �r� �bsurd attempts, on tlle part of the n people to limit a power in its own 1ll1rrutable. a

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JUDICIAL REVIEW

175

Ce�ainly all those w h o h a v e framed written constitutions contem p la te tl 1e m fu nd am th e en ng ta l an d paramount law of the nation, an as formt d co ns eq ue nt ! s r c y h ev g ov 0� � � _ ernm en t mtist be that an act of tl1e legislature, repugnaJ the theory to the const1tut1on, 1s void. This t?eory is esse1:1tially attached to a written co11stitutio11, and is cons eq ue nt ly re by d, th is on court, as one ?f tl1e ft1ndan1ental principles to ?e c side . of ot so 1r ci et y. re th to be lo st stgl1t of 1n tl1e furt11er co11sideration It 1s not erefo of tl1is subject. If an. act of �he l: g!slatu�e, rept1g1 1ant to the co1�stitt1tio11 , is void, does it, not­ . and1ng its _ .1nval1d1!y, bi nd tl1e co11rts, a11d obI 1 ge tl1e1n 1th st to give it effect? Or, � _ th _ . 1n other w�rds,. ough it be 11ot law, doe� 1t const1 tt1te a rL1 le as operative as if it was a law . This wotild ?e to o,,ertl1row 111 fact wl1at was established in tl1eory; _ too gross to be i1 1sisted on. It s11all howand wot1ld seem, at first view, an abst1rd1ty ' ever, receive a more atte11tive consideratio11. It i � e.mphatically the pro,1ince an d duty of tl1e judicial depart1nent _to say wl1at the l�w 1s. Those w.110 apply tl1e rt1le to I?art1_ �ular cases, 1nust of necessity expound and interpret that rule . If two laws conflict with each otl1er, tl1e courts must decide on the operation of eacl1. So, if a Jaw be in opposition to tl1e Constitt1tion; if both the law and the Constitution apply to a pa rti,cular case, so that the court n1t1st either clecide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitt1tio11; 01· conforn1ably to the Constitution, disregarding the law; the court n1ust detern1ine whicl1 ot· these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the vet)' esser1ce of j11dicial duty. If then the courts are to regard the Constit11tion; and the Constitt1tion is su1Jerio1· to any ordinary act of the legislature; the Constitution, and 11ot s11ch ordinary a.ct, must govern the case to which tl1ey both apply. Those then who controvert the principle that the Constitutio11 is to be con­ sidered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitt1tion and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act, wl1 ich', according to tl1e principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, con1pletely obligatory. It would d�lare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, sucl1 �c�, not­ w1tl1standing the express prohibition, is i11 reality effectual. It wotild be g�v1ng to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, wi!l1 tl1e s�1�e b�e� tl1 wl11ch pro­ �esses to restrict tJ1eir powers within 11arrow limits. It 1s prescr1b1ng l1m1ts, and declar­ ing that those limits may be passed at pleasure. That it thus reduces to nothing wl1at we have deemed tl1e gre�test in1prove­ II: ent on political institutions _ a writte11 constit11tio11 - wo�ld of 1tself be suffi­ c7ent, in America where written constit11tions have been v1e,;ved wit_ h so mt1cl1 rev� rence, for reje�ting the construction .. E ut tl1e peculiar �xpressio11s o! the co�sti­ _ tuttons of the United States furnisJ1 additional arguments 111 favour of its reJect1on. Tl1e judicial powe r of the united States is extended to all cases arising under the C onstitution. . . Could it be the intention of those wh o gave this power? !o say tl1at, in usin� it, �e C onsti t1ns Co tl1 r d un ng 1s1 ar se ca a at Th � � o? int d ke tio _ tution sho tu n should no t be loo uld be decided without examining the instrument under wh1cl1 1t arises? 'this is too extravagant to be maintained . .'

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looked into by the jud be st u m n io ut it st s. And on ge C 1e t1 e th � e s a en d id rb to y fo 111 some c 1e tl read ' or to 0 he e . ar it f o t ar p at l1 w il ' � t . . a Y t 1 . n e r p o n a c y 1c tl if · ch e hi rv w se n 1o 1t to illustrate st1t1 on C e th of s rt ' pa r th � Tl1ere are 111any Othe subject. ·c Ies exported from an y t1 n o ar ·d 1 1 a e b l l 1a sl ' t; u d r o It, is dec lared tllat ''no tax port of cotton, o f tobacco, or o f flour·' and . ex as 1e tI · n o uu y ut d a se o p . be re nder ed in . gmen! t� state., S11p · eb a case? Ought ilie su d JU ht ug i nstituted to recover it. O e the law? se ly n ? d n a n o �1 u 1t st n o C 1e tl n judges to close tl1eir eyes o l of attainder or ex post facto Jaw shall il b o ''n t 1a l t s re la ec Tile Constitution d be passe d ." ld on ou rs sh pe a be d an pro ed ss pa be secuted d l ou sl1 ll bi a 1 cl su er ev If J1 ow m s e 1o th tim wl vic i e nst os Co tl1 l1 at de tution to 1n en d n co t 11r co e th st nu under 'it; 1 endea\1 ours to preserve? l be convicted of treason unles1 l ha ''s , on uti tit ns Co tl1e s say n," ''No perso n sio fes on , in open , or con act ert ov e sam the to ses 1es 1 wit o t\v of 11y 011 tl1e testi mo

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Here tl11� la11g11agc of tl1e Constitution is addressed especially to the courts. lt }Jrescribes, clirectl)' for tl1�m, a rL1le of e,1i d ence not to be departed from. If the Iegislattire sl1ot1ld cl1,tnge t�at rt1le, and declare 011e witness, or a confess ion our of cot1rt, sufficie11t for conviction, must the constitutional principles yield to the legislative act? 1::;,rorn the se, a11d many otl1er selections wluch might be made, it is apparent, tl1at tl1e frarners of the Constitution contemplated tl1at instrument as a rule fm the govern1nent of coi,rts, as well as of tl1e legislature. WI1y _otl1erwis� do_es it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This · oatl1 certain!� appl i es, 10 an especial n1anner, to their conduct in their offici al cha · ' racter. I-low immoral to impose it on tl1em, if tl1ey were to be used as the instru· ments, and the knowing instruments, for violating wl1at they swear to support! '. TJ1e ?atl1_ of o�c�, too, imposed by t11e legislature, is completel y dem onstrative ! of the le�rslativ� ?P 1n1 ?n �n tl1is subject. It is i 11 tl1ese words. ''l do solemnly swear ! tllat I will adi:iun1s!er Justice witl1ot1t respect to persons, and do equal right to the · , �r � nd to the ricl1; and tl1at I will faitl1ft1lly an.d impartially discharge all _tbe , ��ties incumbent on me as ... accord ng1 and1 rst und ing to tl1e best of my abilities and e , agreeabl y to the Constitz,tio11, and laws of tl1e U nited States. ' , 0 Wh d s · d wea_ to �isc�arge l1is duties agreabl y to the Consti::� ; . of tlle Jnit;J s�f�� ' � lat �ons�itution t for ms no ru le for his governme n ? closed upon hiill , a11ct cannot be Inspec ted b )' l1 in 1 ? . · pres If st1cl1 be tl1e real state or tl i·ngs, . . o ery. T l this moc k 1s wor n se sole than m cribe, or to take tllis O atl1, become 1 s e q ually a crime. : . �I , It IS also not entirely unwort sh . . t . h l1 a Of observation, that 1n d eclaring Y 0 01 be tl1e si,pren1 e law of tile 1and d ned t le a ' i Con stitu W tion men ti first itse o l ; �in pur·· , f is tl1e laws of tl1e U nited States gen eral ly , but tho se onl y which shall be made suance of tl1e Constitut·ion, h ave tl1at rank. , ates Thl1s, tl1e particular bra_se� St d te l ogy of the Constitution of the U . � coll� · coI?-firms and strengtllens 111� . ten incip writ l e, all sup_ p os_ e d as to t? be �ssential tut1ons, tl1at a l aw repugnant �� ell w . s the �onst1tut1on 1s void; and that courts � ·s¢1,l . other deJ)artments, are bound bY that instrument. [Petition for Mandamus dis J]ll

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Notes to Marbury v. Madiso11 The narrow decision _ i n _ the case is that Marbt1ry cannot start his lawsuit in tl1 e Supr em _ e th on e se sti tu be t1o ca n u � provides only for ''appellt1te j,,risdiction'' in tl1at court (with Cour_t _ ce �t �1n ex�ptio�s irrelevant here). Bt1t Congress by statute hacl at1tl1orized tl1e brjnging of ren1e Cot1rt. �ht1s, tl�e Cot1rt was reqt1ired to clecid wl or1g1nal ac.ions In the Stip _ e 1etl1er to give sta tut e wh ich the clearly conflicted w1tl1 the Constitt1tion. The Court decided tha it effect to , t the s oo tat tite, tl1at tl�e clauses of tl1e slatt1te giving ''orig.'rra j11r,·sclic should n;ot ey tio l the to 11'' _ C?u!t �1olated the express prov1s1011s of tl1e co11stitution a11tl1orizi11 g only ''c1ppellate juris­ d1ct1o n . The Cotl�t e_xpounded at lengtl1 tl1e docrri11e: (a) tl1at co11gressional statutes which violated t�e Constitt1t1_on �ere ''t1nconstitt1tional '', ancl (b) tl1at tl1e Cot1rt l1ad tl1e power, where the issue wa s raised tn a c,1se before it, to clecicle wl1etl1er a statt1te was in fact uncon­ stitutional, and (c) to declare ,in u11constitt1tio11al statt1te to be '',,oicl'' - ancl or ''t1nenforceable''. Th�s doc�rin:. - or theory - of judical po,,•er is k11 ow11 as the ''cloctrine of constitutional jt1di�1a! r� v1ew· ·. In a broader se11�e, � l1e same tl1eor)' a1)JJ]ies, not only to reviewing the constit­ ut1 onal1ty of statutes, but to re,11ew1ng tl1e actio 1 1s of governn1 ent officials as well - ,vhen it is alleged tl1ey l1ave acted in ,,iolation of tl1e Consritution. Chief Ju�tice Marsl1all 11otes t11at l1is Court is endowed witl1 ''jt1dicial power'' and that it is ''emphat1cally tl1e province of jt1diciary'' to interJJret tl1e laws. Tl1 e inference is that only a ''cot1rt'' ca.n render an 11lti111ate judgn1ent on tl1e interpretation of the Constitution :.:i.nd its applicability to a given case. This is because ''the jt1dicial power'' is ''vested'' i n the courts and not in tl1e Iegislati,1e or tl1 e executive. Cases which follow in this cl1apter will illustrate the extra6rdinary role which the Court has to come play in the United States - a role ,vhich developed from a contint1ed use, and, to some extent, e.'<tensio11 of the basic tl1eory asserted by Cl1ief Jt1stice T\/farshall in Marbi1ry v. Madison. The power to declare void acts of tl1e state legislc1tt1res is qt1ite different fron1 the power to invalid.ate Acts of Congress. Tl1 e power to invalidate state laws is much more easily deducible from Art. VI. sec.2, of the Co:1stitt1tion than is the power to inv;1lidate Acts of Congress. Also, arguably, the institution of judicia1 review is essential in a Federal system where powers are divided bet\veen a national and a local government by tl1e Constitution. 0/ve ,vill rect1r to this point when we come to see how jt1dicial review was established in Ethiopia dL1ring the period of Federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea.) Consider an observation by Jt1stice Holmes ''I do not think the United States would come to an encl if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do tl1ink tl1e Union \VOt1ld be in1peril1ed if we cot1ld not make that declaration as to the Ja,vs of the severa 1 states."

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The case of Eakirz v. Rai,b: dis.'ie11t to Ma1·b11rJJ v. Madiso11 A famous Pennsylvania Judge, Gibson C.J., undertook to state a clissenting opinio� to the judgment of Marshall C.J., in the Marb11ry case. His opinion is of re]evance because 1t helps us to see some of the problems with judicial review. The_ case was Ea!(irr v. R�11b: St1preme Court of Pennsylvania (1825), which is reproduced in part 1n Fret1 11d et al, Co11st1t1111011al Lal1': Cases a11d Materials (1961). The official citation is Some important excerptq follow:

The Constitution is said to be a Jaw of s11perior obligation; and, consequently, that if it were to come into collision with an act of the legislatt1re, the latter wo11ld �ave to give way. Tllis is conceded. Bttt jt is a ·fallacy, to suppose tl1at tl1ey can come into collision before the judicjary. .. . . . . The constittltion and the riglit of t11e Jegislatt1re to p �tss !lie act= 111ay be 111 col_ lision . But is tl1at a ,? tioi ina erm det 1 icia jt1d for ject st1b ate itim leg .. . To affirm that the jLidiciary ha s a rigl1 t to judge of tl1e existence of sL1ch coll.1s1011, .1s to take for granted the very tJ1ing to be pro,,ed. . . . r 10 sce to y, 1ar d1c Jt1 1e t � ?f t Btt � ess sin b11 ! it e th s y � ha al] tic ha · p em en be said to be .and .. pronounc e wl1at tl1e law .is: a11d tl1at tl1is necess,1r1ly 111vol\:es. a c�11s1? erat1on of the const 111to a11y e t11r 111q 11 w1 a1·y ici j11d tJ,e lf ? far w lio tio � itu n. 50 :· bu t es It do : rbi ng besicfe the for1n of enact1nent, w11cre shc:111 it st0P? ,•

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n io e of at th ol vi ns Co in titutio W t ac e iv sit po a do � d . en e l1 t t o s n n w ha ee e la b th a o p d if t ed o ss N B�t ? w la ac�� al n o ti u it st � f� n J� n . tl1e Con stitutio n. The fault is im putable to the legislatrd1ng they give effect to � ure � 1 d . l . . 1e bl 1s a t s e s m r . o f e h . s t s to t e r y l e v 1 1s t l c x e y t 1 1l 1b s n o p . s e r e l1 t it . 1 . e usurpatio n o and n. but public opi· . . o e1�1ectual. oaiiard against leg1s at1v . n1on. . . , n y ns \ o er e sc n There 1s rru io ct t n uc sa tr ion of 1 � to as t p u rr co so . e b Once _ 1et _pub l1c o pinion ·s1ature] an d abuse of power which the temptation of Inc? . g1 le . e th [ b Y n 10 t u to be predo nu.nant, Will const1t en p p 1 1a _ y a m h 1c l1 w y rt a p e th d n a , te ta ic d y a m C t n s] rt e u o to th . mome rest it in i� : .e ar [1 er w o p t en 1d e1 ep d a f o laugh at tlie puny efforts course.

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in e er s th rt ow al ou p C ci di ju e th '' g in st ve '' The Consequences of

ea�ly . case in which the U�ted Staki r he ot an om fr n lce ta is w lo be g The short readin . In the course �f Its opinion. on uu �t ns Co e tl1 e rc fo en to r we po its Supreme Court reiterated e courts, althoagh it was left to th m " ted es "v s \va r" �ie po al ici jud e "th t the Court noted tha of the. Americaa e . icl III A.J: re pa o� (_C ts. ur co the to ion ict isd jur to Congress to allocate:! tion.) Would It, then,� titu ns Co n pia hio Et the of 109 d an 108 les tic Ar h Constitutio11 wit r the constitutionality of lhai iev. rev to on icti isd jur y den to ess ngr Co possible for an Act of , the case in e the Coun issu in not was n stio que tl1is ugl1 ltho \ 1rts? cou all or any to Act noted:

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From lvfarti11 v. f/1J,1ter's Lessee, I W/1eat 304 (1816). The judicial power must, tl1erefore, be vested in some court, by Congress; and to supJ)OSe tl1at it was not an obligation bindioo on then1 but mieht, at their ple�sure, be on1itted or declined, is to Sltppose tl1at, u;der the sa'nction of the consti· tut1on they nugl1t defeat the constitutio11 itself; a construction which would leao to sucl1 a result cannot be sound .... Staits! United . If it is tl1e duty of the of Congress pO\\'er to vest tl1e judicial . it is a_ d� ty to v�st tl1e wl1ole jud_icial po\ver. Tl1e language, if imperative a� to on: part, 18 imp_erative as t_o all. If it were other,vise, tl1is anomaly ,vould ex1st1 tha, Co gress 1ru? l1t successtv�ly _refL1se to vest tl1e jurisdiction in any one class of ca5es enu�merated Jn tl1 e co11st1tt1t1011, and thereby defeat the jt1risdiction as to all. The English Privy Council's J11dge111e11t in Liya11a ge v. T/1e Queen

The "Privy Council'' is a co urt in . · ds of ar · aLn · England whicl1, histo�ically, heard cert ha,t, peals _from colonial courts. More h t i !" u reiJ)! 1o rece ntly , so�n n e_ 1n ber Co� the of nati ons �� after independence, continued to Sp as a il Court'' for various ptirposes. eyrcce.P.t tlie JUr1sd1 ct1on of the Privy Counc C on is one of tl1ese countries. l· rrc5I� In 1962 , a coup d'etat was atteillpted . a d . ted an � detec in were Ceylon. The offenders Tlzereaft er tl1e Ceylonese par rament l ti _ i enact ed c retr a oa new ve which r� penal statu te heavier penalties on tl10s.e convi .,, srid 101� by cted wh1� · h 1n · effect repealed for tl 1e of att empts to overthrow the govemm ent al proteetio!i i purpose of tl1is trial a great many procedur furn1shed by the Crimin�I p rocedt1re Code. . bicb Jic!� . Tl1e defend ants were conv . , w stitutJCw that the Act of t l1e CeyJ011es picte.d and a)?pealed all the ,vay t o the Pnvy Councilc� 1iament violated the �ey�onese �onsti�ution. The I of Ceylot\ di? �ot provide eXP� ceable const1tut1onal bill of rig hts , O! f�r �� _ power of Jud1c�al review e�he�an e nfo� Xs on onIP'of 1tat1 the J1rr1 C onst1t t1on. �deed, it contained no expre ss nc i u P<;>we! of Parliament. Nevert � stitutional. Excerpts fron1 hel:t.:' th -s P�rt�cular Act of Pa.rliament was held to .' the p Y Council Judgm ent are given belo,v .

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Counsel for the appellants succinctly summarises his attack on tl1e Acts in questio� a� _follows. The fir�t Act wa� wl1olly bad in tl1at it was a special direction to the JUd�c1ary as to the trial of pa�t1cular prisoners who were identifiable (in view· of the White Paper) and charged w1tl1 particl1lar offences 011 a particular occasion. The pith_ a?d substance of both A�ts was a. legislative pla11 ex post facto to secure the co�v�ct1or:1 and enhanc_e the pt1111shn1ent of: t11ose partic11Iar individt1als. It legalis­ ed their 1mpr1sonment wl11le tJ1ey were awaiti 1 1g trial. It 111ade ad 1nissible tl1eir state­ ments inadmissibly obtained dt1ring that periocl. It alterecl tl1e fundamental law of evidence so as to facilitate tl1eir co11viction. Ancl fi11ally it altered ex post facto the punishment to be irnposed 011 tl1en1. The alterations [in the cri111inal law of Ceylo11] constitt1ted a grave a11d deliberate incursion into the jt1dicial sphere. Qt1ite bll1ntly, t.l1eir aim was to ensure tl1 at the judges in dealing with these particular persons on tl1ese particular cl1arges were deprived of their normal discretion as respects appropriate sentences. Tl1ey were compelled to sentence each oflender on co 11viction to not less than ten years' im­ prisonment, and compe]led to order confiscation of l1is possessions, even tl1ough ms part in the conspiracj; migl1t have been tri,,ial. One might fairly apply to these Acts tl1e words of Cl1ase, J., _in tl1e Supreme Court of the United States in Calder v. Bull: ''These acts were legisla.tive j_11dgments; and an exercise of judicial power.'' If such Acts as these were valid, tl1e judicial power could be \vl1olly absorbed by the legislature and taken out of tl1e ha11ds of tl1e judges. \Vl1at is do11e once, if it be allowed, may be done again and in a lesser crisis a11d less serio11s circums­ tances; and thus judicial power may be eroded. Sucl1 an erosion is contrary to _the c]ear intention of the constitution. In their lorclsl1ips' vie¥/ tl1e Acts were 11ltra v1res. and invalid. Problems and Questions

l) l-Iamilton 's argument in the Fede1�a/is·t rests on several basic assumptions: What are they? 2) Would Montesquieu agree wit_h ��milto1! tl1at the tl1eory of separation of power leads to the theory of JUd1c1al rev1ew? 3) Hamilton appears to argue that a Constitution, once ratified, ottght to be treated as positive law, an d a.s supe,·ior lciw. The _ govemme�t �ught to be bound by this law because the Constitution presc_r1b�s the l1n11t� of power of government. One could argue tl1at a Const1tut1on shot1ld s11nply be framed on the theory that it should be, no t a !a�, bt1t a plan. �f �overnn1ent_ an� a e t1v sla e g1 (th I� � zen , nn ve go e tl1 to itp 1s it at th t sta ement of guiding principles, an d _ _ , ce an st ar in t1l 1c rt pa y an 1n , er tl1 he w de and the executive branches) to deci ts en m gu � ar o:' e ab tl1 of 1 c1 Ea . ed w llo fo the dictates of th e constitution m us t be . . em st sy al 1c l1t po e tl1 1n i el 1r ct se be may stress certain underlying values to What values? 4) Hamilton appears to argue that the Constituti�n, if it contains. a '' �upremacy clause'' and if it is approved b y so m e appropr1ate procedt1re re:flect1ng popu'

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ION AL LAW T U IT T S N O C N IA P IO ETH F O K O O B E C R U So

, . '' nd le A op since the pe o pe 1 e l ''t y b d . becomes law ordaiiJe 1 e by s , ll , � n o ti n ; tu co ti e it lar .w tl � ec b om ' d 1 le l ' e _ s:itution l1 ave ''wi r o o c ri e n p a su m a m d ', t' c a hic h re::� p w 1 o c '' � 11 m l.e so a f o ;��iyirngtl�:�1 a���e ly solemi. 1 amen dm t l ua eq y b ed 1fi od 1n en s· . � o11 go, er11ment tinless b1nd1ng because to d. o s o would v1o: a od part , in it obey to ged l i late . . ob . are n r e v o g 1 0 l \V e s o th n. Tl1us enforcemen 1o 1t t1 t1 ns co r ei th in . d se es pr . ot a n ,, Llndemocrat·IC,, . act, bec t 01, tl. 1e w111 of, the peoiJle ex . ary is _n se the au c1 di ju e tl1 ;' b n io 1t tt i t the cons . le �m1ng that a const i­ p ss eo A p 1e tl f o l l 1 ,v ng di ri ve o e 1 constitt1tion reflects tl n - this �ct of ra �cation ca or es do , '' le op pe 1e tl _" � ? ttition is approved by 11sed e e\ t!1 R n l . to i �s am H Co If by t tnu ed m st1 as ion ity l a qu e tli it ve gi reall y g ly �ppr oved �a lik_ in lID he er ov d an , w ro or m o ely t � would that act were· put to a pl ebiscite, of ific ation rat l1 s11 pp or t_.) c st1 r fo d l<e as 1t 1 e m rn ve oo e til resul t if ing w r°: g la ve in go nd gover nment1 bi a clS ty i di l va l ta en m da 11 L 1 f its g; an cli really l1elD11ngly ratifie d the � er ov e I_ op pe e th e, l p 1 an ex r tl1e 1o 1 a e In GI1 a1 1a, to tak t en am - and conte m­ rli 1n Pa r we po t ea gr 11g sti ve o n ti i tu st 1 1 co e nc de en ep ind 1est n1i nster'' syste1n. Th ere aft er the� overwhelmingly \ '''; rty JJa 1lti mt a ng i at l p approved a Presidenti al systern a11 d gave Dr.Nkrumal1 special, extraordinary J)OVver to promt1lgate a11y Ia,-v l1e saw fit irrespective of tl1e wishes o f Parliament. (See Art.55 of tl1 e Rep11blica11 Co11stit11ti on of Gl1ana) Opposition parties ,vere 1ed _amendments 1er wl1 el min gl y ro, app o le peop tl1e ter reaf Tl1e , ba1111 ed. wl1 icl1, it1t er a/ia, per1 nittecl tl-ie President to ren1ove judges at his discretion. Sl1 ortly after tl1at a 111ilitary coup occurred and tl1e ne,v government suspended tl1e Co11stitL1tio11, cl aiming ''po1)ular support'' (wh.icl1 qt1ite possibly it could nov.' 1nuster if by tl1at is mea1 1t a ''Yes'' ,,ote at a pl ebiscite ,vhere the govern· me11 t ''asks'' tl1e people to vote ''Yes''). Tl1is sl1ifti11g of ''p opular" view� st1g�ests tl1at ::1 popt1l ar referendt1n1 011 a constitution ma1, be an ambigu ous bt1s111ess. 011e n1ay assume peopl e ,vil l i ngl y ,,ote ''Yes'' (or ''No '') in a given referendu111 - tl1at tl1 e vote is, des1Jite son1 e possible abuses, not a coerced 1 one 110r a fraud. Wl1a� n1ay �e 1nore difficult is tl1e assun1ption tl1at a referendum : e_ ff ecr ote 0 st1cl1 �1 in co� n l1cated is 1sst1e issue as_ a 1 e consti 1 tl i tut (wl ere on � }� � ta½e it or lec1ve it - no alternatives, 11 0 qt1al i ficatio11s al lowed) constitutes by itself_ aii act 011 tl,e })art o f people an1ou11ti11 o to tl1e framing of a solemn o . . ''compact'' b111ding t I 1e gover11n1e11t a11d lat er ge11erations of ,,oters. 1 5) :8�1nilto11 l,as �rgLied tl1at tl�e j11diciary is tl1e ''least da11gerot1s bra c n h'_', ��· 1� Juciges are ?iven tl1e sect1r1ty of l ife te1111re tl1'ay w1·1 be ''neutral'' "dispa�) 1 . · . ' .' . t1o or� na te ''. o ffi1.c1� Is wl1 ? will _s�1u acc , n · ply ut1o 1 1 1terp . ret cons t1t a11d e e1 l1 1 forc t e ) thl Jng to its. sp1 r1_t,_ _tl1e1r dec1s1011 s will ca Is ct. rry tl1e weigl1t of public respe L• ei t, re_alist1c for Etl ,io g� jud If ? JJi a? 1 res 0 t 1 \Vl1 at assumpti ons does it . . :�: : 11 1 be g1 \ en t 1e lJOwer to 111�rpret js on · ut1 co11st1t and e l1 t enforce important to co11 s11·cter st1cl1 qt1est1 ons as: Wl10 are tl1e j L1dges? Ho w are tl1ey edt1cated? . Wl1 at val t1es sl1ot1ld tl1ey ?· l1old A� . . · Are tl1eY no w respected 11 pt;V velo 1 societ Y - 1-f not, ca11 respect be de ba.n�e, · 111 a fast charJgitlg . . . " . l tl1e JUclges · soc·ie�y, wil c witli be abl e to keep pace or will they 1nst1. nct1vel . to 1]Je Sl1 ot1ld 11ot so me of tile y te:11 d, t·o resist change? 10 d u1te 11ation s recr very best talent be . judiciary? . How can tl1 is be done'•)

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ming Hamilton's tl1eo1·y does t1nderlie Articles 122, 108 , 110 of Asstt tl 1e ons c t1· · k one can argtte tl1at tl1is tl1 eory is tut1on, do you 111in - or could _ be well ttnderstood by !11e peo_ple '? Do�s tl1e :Rev.ised Co11stj tt1tio11 l1 ave tl1e signi­ ficance and all�iga_nce 111 tl1e n11nds of tl1e people wl1icl1 I-Ia111ilto11 tJ1ougl1t tr1e U.S. �onst1tut1on ,vou]d 11 8;\'e for A111ericans? If yotir answer is ''No'', should tl1 1s be a problen1 of co11cer11? If yot1r cti1swer to tl,at is ''Yes'', wl,at would yot1 propose to do to 1neet tl1e ]Jroblein? Do�s ��1� ·u.s. Constitution expresslt pro�ide for tl1e doctri11 e of ''jt1dicial r� v1ew . On what clauses does tl1e Court, 1 n tl1e 1\;farbitrJJ case, base its deci­ sions? Are tl1 ese clat1ses ope11 to ,l co11 trary co11strt1ction? Re-read tl1e views ot� Sir Ed-v,1 ,trcl Coke i11 D,·. Bo11/1a11z's case set 011t Part 1 Section 3, supra. What is tl1e dif�l erence betweer1 Coke's t11'eory of judiciai review and Marsl1all's? Is the ''doctrine of j11dicial revie\v'' an t1nde111oc1·atic institt1tion? Is it con­ sistent witl1 the idea of �ajority rule? J? oes it 11ot give tl1 e Cot1rt very great power - and to whom 1s tl1e Cot1rt t1lt1n1ately respo11sible v.;hen it exercises that power? Wl1at were Hamilto11's argt11ne11ts on tl1ese points? How can a Court enforce a jt1dgn1e11 t co11strt1ing the Constitt1tion if tl1e Executive and the Legislative brancl1 stro11 gly disagree witl1 the Cot1rt's con­ clusion? What sanctions does a court J1ave to co1npel tl1 e gover111nent to comply with its decisions interpreting and enforcing tl1 e Constitutio11? Whicl1 clauses of the Constitution is tl1e Cot1rt 1nost lil<:ely to interpret i11 exercising its judicial re\1iew power? In tl1 e Marbury case, tl1e cont1ict between the statute and the Constitution was clear. But st1ppose - o.s is mo1·e t1st1ally the case - the issue is whetl1er a statute ( or a rLtle designed to enforce a statute) violates the ''due process'' clause of tl1e 5tl1 or l 4tl1 an1end1nents? Or the ''Free speech'' clause of tl1e First? If tl1e Constitutio11 does 11ot give a precise answer to t.he question of wl1etl1er a giver1 statt1te or exect1tive act is or is not constitutional, then must not tl1e court itself decide precisely \Vhat the Co11sti­ tution means? And does not tl1js power to i11terp1·et tl1e Constitution, in fact, give the Court ver y extensive powers in sl1aping political institutions? (a) Suppose the American Congress passed a statt1te which declared: ''No court shall entertain on its merits any claim wl1atsoever tl1at any provision of this statute is unconstitutional." Wl1at would be tl1e effect· of st1cl1 a law on the power of a court to review tl1e constitutionality of any part of this statute? o ''N d: r cla 1 1 de cl wl 1te t sta ! d sse pa � ss re ng � (b) Suppose the American Co � court, except the Supreme Cot1 rt, sl1all enter�a1n on its _me�1ts a1 �r cla1n1 wl1at­ soever that any provision of this stat11te 1s unco11st1tt1t1 ?nal. Wot1ld you reach the same conclusion as you have reached to question (a) above? Suppose that questions 12 (a) and 12 (b ) arose i11 Etl1iopia·. Wl1,lt w0uld your conclusions be? Courts in Ethiopia ar e endowed with '�tl1e jud}cial powe.r'': Con1pare Revised Constitution, Articles 108 an d 11 O, w it h Article I.II, Section 1 , of tl1e U.S. Constittttion. Putting aside fo r th e moment tl1e pow�r of the Emperor 1111der t 1a tl n ea n1 ts ur co 1e tl in '' er w po _ l ia Article 35, does tile ''vesting'' of •'judic _ tl1e courts can never be deprived (e.g. by Act of �arl1ame�t) o� this _power to en.force the Constitution? C an yo u think o f techniques wl11cl1 nugl1t (1 n tl1 eory)

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UTIONAL .LAW IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E � ;· O O K OF _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ B E C U�R: :::_:_ :=__ ��S�Z�---�S:o:

. the courts of ''judicial power'' in constitutional ca&e ve " ri dep 11 to. e od to C e y ur sa ed used oc th Pr be at ivil C e th d e t ::�� a l r on the provisions of th:�cou� Pa_ 1 based m ould. clai � F ri e a11y in , i St o� s ju s c rt u f a o co d h re su o ri W e in °?th,1o, f1a tl dic oh n1 deprive 1 t en m a li ar P a e gu n th la y ]l ge u tut10� . Co f . re ca of 1 te rt o A (N 09 · s? rt t1 o C . l1 g ' . 1 H ? . of AwraJa courts . . ) n o 1 t u 1t t s n . o . C tile Revised ad e by Gibson C.J· in "� '-· m ts in o p ey k 1e tl e ar t 1a I w '41Y.Ui s rd o w , n ,v o r u o y n I ) a 15) ( . v . Raub? . E ? hi in t 1a y p 1t lid" o a s s le r o e r o m e v a � h ts n e m u rg a . is h o D (b) e lo n g run, ''t�e people,, ar th _ in 1� t, a th g in rt se as e 1t in l g ri ., .J c , n so ib G Is 16) r s , rt 1e n _ u _ tl o co ill t1 t1 w 1t st p _ n co e ov 1e tl � f to o n io ct te ro p s d ar w to ic apatllet ill d st ca is an vo i th ad e te ed nc co d "ju e on ci� 1ld o1 C n? tio ec ot pr ' y' ti n a ''p review''? SECTION 6 ER S TH TRIE O IN UN · E CO VI RE W L IA IC D JU OF '' ON TI EP EC ''R --rI-IE I11troductory Note

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y a prodoo inctl clist h.as been it, ed min exa far so e hav we as e\v, revi icial jud of idea The to Ethiopia, wemll!i of tl1e Anglo-An1erican legal tradition. If ,ve are t o assess itsv relevance j' therefore ask ourselves whetl1er tl1is concept can be, as it , ere, ''exported", and �peciill whether it can be ex1Jected to take root in the very different setting of the developin g couni­ ries. It may tl1erefore be l1elpful to examine its introduction to other judicial systems, lncludit!J Japan and India, and to take a brief look at provisions for judicial review in the comtiw­ tions of sorr1e of the new countries of Africa.

Problems of Adaptation to Judicial Review

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One of the ma�� pro!,Jlems in introducing judicial review to countries outside the A!Jt, Amercan legal trad�t1on, 1s tl1at of reconciling it witl1 the legal system which the countrY �­lfl rea_dy po ssesses. This �ro?lem arises at a great n1any levels: Should all courts have the pol . to_ inte�pret the Cons_t1_tuti?n, or o11ly some special cot1rt? Should constitutional roatterS � oll5 of� r�1s ed in adversary l1t1gat1 on, or disposed of i n gener al terms decisi the Shoul d ? · · leAil.· ot ... A l11gher courts be binding on th d n rw v e · I O\ er ones (tl1e doctrine of stare decisis)? . w·11 I i·t be p ossi�le !o entrust to tl1e san1e judges the very different respon sibilit ies o f appl)'ID! a Code an d en1orc1ng a Constitution?· . . reVl-� of itt · . Tl1ese question s are r ais . · d ·in an especially acute manner when jud1c1al � e;JPr Constitu tion must di g d mbined epen n !¢, � tially on Codes Tlli��i �f1e c se _ ,n and reconciled, with a legal system ther oestioP , un ? a l opi era tl1i sev i in e is o cas als It the . ; E : � Europe and els�, vhere vhi �l 1 ave recently . eq review judicial adopted of some form which this adoptioi1 has raise <l are tl1erefore of interest to us

Judicial Revie lv an d t11e Ron1a11 Law Tflorld .•

From Cappelletti and Adams, ,, .. Judicial Revie w of Legislation : ,� Europe an Antecedents and ¢ 6). (19 6 7 Ad a1) tat 120 io . ns Re ," v. 79 L. H ar v. . te sys We now turn to a brie n a e . p f . a Eur na oI o ysis . n of the recently established e of judicial revi' ew cone b p 1b rni ts o ourselv e e � s principally with three as� c f ;e pru1 menon: (I) tlie o�gans in � 2 1 w ch , des of the it5 e< f ) ( i res er pow w vie of l e icia jud r s ure by wl1ich questions f <l f e t ) con stit ' ut � ionality ·are. resolved ' and (3 h ific finding of unconsti'tu t � l.i<')""' 1ona ec . on the 1 aw under review and on the sp l1ty there be one) tliat gave rise to tl1e con stitutional question. A,,cf, �

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The· organ or. or�ans tl1a_t are empowered to j11dge the constitutionalitv of Jaws may b� a nation s regular courts or a specially created co·nstitutional co�rt.* In the America� sys�em th e regular co �rts J? erform this f11nctio11 [i.e. a constitutional isslie may _ be ra�sed in any court] an d tn tJ11s respect tl1e American practice has been follo w�d 1n Swttzerl�nd, Norway ar�d Dne111ark, as well as in suc.11 non-European countries as Australia, Canada, I11d1a and Japa11. The reas_ons for relying on tl1e reg11lar courts for jt1dicial review are quite con­ _ _ g. All Judges mtist apply [all] the la\,, to tl1e case at l1 a11cl. Wl1 en tl1ere are v.1nc1n contrasting laws tl1at appear applicable tl1e jt1dge mt1st decide wl1icl1 sl1 ould prevail. The si1nplicity and logic of tl1is reaso11ing are sucl1 tl1 at at first it may be difficult to u �de�stand why � n11n1ber of Et11�opea11 cott11tr.ies tl1at 11ave adopted written const1tut.Ions ha �e [ailed to �mploy tl1e A1nerjcan syste1n, and I1ave gone to the trouble of establ1sh1ng a special co11stitt1tional court [so1neti111es] outside the regular judicial system. It appears that one reaso11 f01· tI-1is develo1J1nent is the fundamental incompatibility that exists betvveen t11e American system of judicial review and the legal systems based on Roman la,v. U11der tl1e A11glo-A1nerican doctrine of stare decisis, a decision by tl1e ltigl1est cot1rt i11 any j11risdiction is binding on all lower courts in the same jurisdiction and thus as soon as tl1at court has declared a law unconstitutional, no otl1 er court ca11 apply it. Stare decisis, however, is not no.r mally part of tl1 e Roman law systems, and thus in these systems the cot1rts are not generally bound even by the decisions of the highest court. Under tl1ese circumstances the American system of' judicial review can lead to grave u11 certaint) and conft1sion, as one court 111ay decide to enforce a statute tl1at another court will find invalid. Another difficulty of quite a di.ffe1e11t natt1re is also likely to arise wl1en the American system of judicial review is superi1nposed on typical European systems. In such systems the magistrates form a career service, the l1igl1er ecl1elons of whicl1 are composed of elderly men who l1ave reached a position of eminence based in large measure on their ability to interpret laws with logic and precision. They have been trained in the execution of the law as it stands, and tl1 ey tend to shy away from the type of policy-making decisio11s tl1at are involved in judicial review. It is difficult and perhaps distasteful for these magistrates to cl1ange their wl1ole mode of thinkin g from the tradit.ional one of applying any law that has been duly enacted, to that of questioning and determining tl1.e validity of legislation:. Tl1e ?orms in e t es 1 1cl wh Ith s r1:1 no al � leg the m fro rn 11t ode ere :'7 diff ite o qu uti � constit ns are _ Judges have long been in th e 11abit of dealing. Modern const1tut1ons �o not l1m1t th�mselves to a [precise] statement of tl1e law; they are. �011cerned with [general pr1�ciples and] ultimate va l·ues relating to tl1e ft1tu1·e act1v1ty of the state an d the so ciety. This new European system, wruch establjshes a si11gle specia� court to judge the constitutionality midway betwee11 the A:rne1·1can sysJem and lies of thus laws the traditiona l approach of 'the Roman Jaw cou.ntries, exemplified by France.** 1

on s on isi ov pr e th re pa m Co • R.ofer to the w. lo be t ou t se n provisions of the Kenya Constitutio . ·• • ·. t_he S· upreme Court of Dahomey in the same section. . . . _ The French rejection of j,Jdicial review, which w e consider 1n Section 7 below, illustrates this · R.om an la1.v appro-ach. . . . . ',

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ures us ed in the America ed oc pr e th . n e e tw e b st ra nt co a o ls a is re e l1 d an_ T a� n an l ic ga er le m A di lo tra 11g A tio e h is ew . T vi re · _ l ia ic ud er f J o s em g�c Euro�ear� sy�t io ut e tit J1 ns T co . le y ip lit 1c na 1 i pr of eral n ge a aw is of r s e tt a m f o . · 1 ' 1 1 · 0 t1 a 1c d to adJu o e d 1n · 1 v 1nv ct Y 1re d a specific conlluc:. 1s 1t s les 11n . ion est qu . · le ·ab 1 11 t. • · not cons1dered a JUSt1c · 1 · t e so e issue in a ca se· h t no y ua II us . is . e t tL1 sta a · rather. 1 u t'10na11ty of , . . Thus. the coost·t c e getting down to dec1 r 1o be ed er sw an e b t us d1n m at g th� tl1 o io st 1e qt a as s i�e it ar . s1)ecific conflict at l1a11d. . . es e rti !h pa �t th to r c� th� dispute in 1 t 1:1ay oc m ste sy an ric e Am e tl1. r e Und ed 1nc1dentally are not 1� a p d ci de _ be II w1 w la a of ositio n )' lit i1.a wl1icl1 the constitutio at e c?nc�rne� w1 �h the tl1 �r ts �s ter 1� p �u gr d an c bli pLi us out- , rio to represei1.t tlle ,,a 1 c e 1nl 1er en t In t!iis s1tuat1on IS les senc,j t us 111J of er ng da tl1e t Bti come of the issue. e a ble to intervene by petitioning � y �a rty pa � e st ere int 1y 1 a t tl1.a ity bil ssi po by tl1.e * . ef i br e rza cu i1s 11c a11 an e fil to t en tl1e court for cons Tl1.e American system - wl1icJ1 considers ''non-justiciable'' any constitutional qt1estion 1 1ot arising from a co11crete case -. in pract�ce de�ies a cit�zen _th.e right to l1is day i11 cotirt wl1e11ever the cost and 1 nconven1 ence involved in disobeying a law and figl1ti1 1g it througl1 tl1e co11rts are too great. On the other l1and, the Europea 11 systen1 - \Vl1icl1 requires tl1 e ge11e ral determination of constitutional questio11s in tl1e abstract - may place tl1e constitutional courts in the dangerous, e1nbarr.:1ssing, a1 1d perl1aps u11realistic position of attempting to settle by judicial procedt1re a conflict of power bet\1/een high constitutional organs. Obliged to enlei the field of po\ver politics, tl1e co11rt 1nay endanger its prestige and its reputation for i1111)artiality, a.nd may be led to re 1 1der decisions that are prejudiced and perh aps even u11e11forceable. We t�rn _ n _ o w to _the final 1Jl1as e of ot1 r analysis, wliich concerns the different effe�ts of JUd�c1a_l review t1nde� tl1e America11 and European systems. A s we_ �w 1 earlier, the:e 1 s little _rel�va11ce 1n tl1e fact that under tlie latt er system the dec1s1on tl1at a la;; . 1s t1 1 1co_nst1tut 1 011al l1as _v�lidity erga 011111es, wlie reas under the America n systein, in a st:1ct se1 1se, a dec1s1on on a constitutional question l1as relev�cy , only for !l1e parties to tl1e case.'' I11deed, wl1.en tl1. e maxim of stare decisis pr evails : the practica� effec_t of tl1 e An1erican system i s similar to tl1a of tl1e European. Only · t those co_i�11tr1es i1s1ng t�1e A111erican �yste111 a11d rzot ...1pp /Jli1zg stare decisis are in �anger of suf(e1 i_ng /�0111 co11t1111./ed u1zcerta111t;, as to tl1e nabl e t1o que s of law /ic of a GJJp atio,z co11st1tut�o�1a!1ty �o a specific case. [E1up l1asis added.] Jud1c1. al review is in essenee an e t . . . h lio 0• t e · n b 1n d e law · 1t1v of uIt.1mate \1a1ue s. It 1. s tl1.e mea. i1s b eav. ot1r to Judge pos 1D. 1 . . ed ess Y expr wl11 cl1 as . hum asp an 1rat 1on s · const·t 1 ut1011a 1 absolutes are ,,concret�z . . . . '.�n In tb e p as!, · ed , , 111 to a l1v1n� c�11_st1tut1 . states l1ave existed and ere� w1tl1out benefit of JU�1c1al review, and anY 1 v ) ;J PJ � will probably co11tinue to so n 1 !1e future. Tl1ey deprive themselv es, ho� er of tl1e sobering and ei1. bl'1 g � cts a ir e against tl1ei r l)rinciples :�d � - x� erier1.ce tl1�t befa lls tl1ose wl10 check th� bt of rive in performing tl1e forrner never to lose sig the latter. 1·

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• �n an1icus curiae sn Y brief is the present . b ) ation of � n argument (in writing and/or oralli' v� inte�ested J?art y (or roup of per�ons). The g -r bu t, : , of liis - or its - activit case c:! ''a m 1c us '' th e is r no pa to a t rt y ies , "•' th e }\Ill"' . · commo n anucus n1ay be inte 1· t is · reste d to l1ave ''ami cus'' 1n the outcome of the case. I n aniiccll5 , prOi'll' �g uments are offered by the Attoa,rg un1ents pres�n ted in importan t cases. Fre_quent ,b. rney General, civic associat inent lawyers. ions and even s1rnplY y

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Tire Role of t/1e Leg·al Professio11: tlze Case of· JaJJa,1 From Takaaki Hattori, ''The Legal Professio 1 1 i11 Japa 1 1 '', i 11 von Mel1re11. Lal1' in Japa11 (1963), pages 129, ·132, 139.

The Const�tution of Japan, _enacted i11 1946 011 tl1e bc1sis of JJroposctls n1acle by the occupation forces_, ca1ne_ 1r1!0_ effect 0 1 1 i\11'ay 3, 1947. As i 1 1 otl1er areas, it brou gl1t radical reforms 111 tl1e Jltd1c1al syste111, c1nd tl1e govert1i 11 g statutes a 1 1d tl1e �unctions of all bra 1 1cl1es of tl1e legal 1"�of�ssio 1 1 l1ave t111 dergo11e co11siderable cl1ar1ge. In tl1e first pl�ce, ltnde_r tl1e �ew Co11 st1t t1t 1 0 1 1 tl1e cot1rts are tl1 e excl t1 sive c1dj t1dicators of all legal d1spL1tes, 1nclt1d 1 11g tl1ose bet\:vee11 citizens a 11 d tl1 e state arisi11g otit of administrative acts. ... Finally, tl1e new �01�stjtt 1 tio11 ascribes great i11 1porta 1 1ce to J1t11na11 rigl1ts. Of course, tl1e old Const1tut 1 011, too, _gt1ara 11 teed various rigl1ts and freedo 1 ns of tl1 e citizen� but t11ey w�re always st1�ject to restriction to legislative act, a11d legislative acts could not be ignored e\1 en 1f tl1ey ,ve1·e co 11 trary to tl1 e Co11 stitutio11's spirit. Under tl1e new Constittition, oppressi,1e legislatio11 ca 1 1 be attacked; a11y law restrict­ ing human rigl1ts and freedon1 is i11valid. T.l1us tl1 e legal J)rofessio11 clearly l1as a larger role in protecting hltn1an rigl1ts tl1a11 it l1ad before World War II .... The key question ,vl1ich l1ad to be dealt witl1 i11 developi11g a 11ew systen1 \Vas that of tl1e qualifications reL1uired for judicial appoint1nent. As 1\rtl1 t1r \ 011 Mel1ren has remarked i11 connection \Vith Germa11 j t1dges, it ,vas tl1ought t1ncier tl1e pre\va1· system that the Japanese judge had adeq11ately discharged l1is duties if he were ''merely to apply the legislatively given text or, \\1l1ere tl1e text was obscure, to dis­ cover the legislator's intent.'' Under tl1e new Co11 stitution, howe,;er, a11 oblig,ttion is imposed upon all judges to do creative ar1d original '.,\,·ork, particularly i11 JJassi11g upon the constitutionality of statutes. . .. The Constitution involves a f u11dan1e11tal commitment to a society organized on the rule of law, and tl1e degree of tl1e co1nmunity's awareness and acceJJtance of this commitment is basic to any co11sideration of tl1e legal profession's role i11 Japanese society. Also, unless persons of sufficie11t potential are recrL1ited into (and retained in) the profession, legal problems will not be solved in a manner tl1 at wi_ll satisfy the commt1nity's conscio11sness of law; t1_11der such conditio_ns, tl1i� �?n­ sc1ousness would soon become a sterile thing. Nor will perso11 s of st1ffic1e11t ab1l1t1es, once recruited be able to solve tecl1nical law problems well t111less tl1ey are a,vare both of the p�ssibilities and the obligations of tl1eir roles, give11 adequate trai11 ing to perform them well, and then co-operate wiil1 011e anotl1er i11 pert'ormance. . ..

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From von Mehren, op.cit., page 424.

t1rt of _Jap�11 is affected Co 1 me As pre SL tl1e with of rk wo tI1e any , tion titu ins . by Its structure and memberst1ip. TI1 e Cot1rt is con1posed of fi!tee11 JL1st1ces, of wl1om fiv_e are ... career 1 e la� l1eld by tl of on pt1 1ce co1 tl1e tl1 Bo s. yer law e fiv d ges an jud tl11s g�o up and its conditioning experiences lead tl1e la�yers and _career Jt1dges to be hesitant to declare leg,islation ui,constitutio11�l or to interfere w1tl1 gover 1 11ne11tal Process on const n_ tl1 a� tl1e Japa11ese bar does 1 1�t Th e sugges�1o ds. nal oun tio r g· itu _lit1gat1 111 st1 c_l1 a ma ner e are the com 1to fac � al ? on uti stit con p ex � of : p _ L�ate � issues � wise resolution by tile courts inay also reflect 1 nexper1ence w1tl1 tl11s type of case•

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w n a ie in v p e a l J R ia ic d u J f o t n e Tlie Developm Introductory Note

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of ear�y Japan� constitutio nal devei e nc ue in 1e _tl e !n am ex In the next Cl1ap!er,. we nst1tut10�: I-I�ere . we_ examine. Japan s post-war const co itu( an p1 1o th , E st fir e th on t al en er a a m rli lib to n pa t1o 1tu ta men ry sysiem o:i J1 Const e1 M 1e tl . om fr 46 , 19 n 1· re and n io ut tit Japan,s departu al 1 ns a co er a ar l'b 1 gu e rc ntees of human , to enfo er w IJo 1 it1 w . y ar ci di u J· t en nd . . mp from the C ?nst·t · depe . 's J� to an in . ! ut1on of 1931.to the conia op hi Et an tl1 p m liberty, was a far greater ju d econom�c d1ffer�nces bet�een thet� �n al ci so _ st �a e ar e er th �e �r co stitution of 1955. �f cy m Jap�n �s very high_ . ra es ite nc _L re !fe d1 l �� 1o ut t1t ns co id ar al _ countries to explain pol!t1� h n e of 1te s th n a t c 1ta or r pe d: I io n a 1 e1J ? e th M g � rin � aracttr The country \Vas industr1al1zed du lmg ol1garchy of c1v1I seniants, militaiy ru � o nt �e lop ve de � e tl1 d_ an n tio titu of the Meiji Cons . 1ons took root, and . there were political ?1t tra tic cra mo and business leaders, certain de an,_ of_ course, 1s. not Ethiopia, bill J�p ns. t1o I� ted tes con en op ile, \vl1 a � IJarties and, for 1ng�h1� 1 s stron� 1n both countrie!. ' of . 10 d1t tra � e Th ies rit ila � sim nt rta . po im there are 1onal 1nst1tut1ons - but 1n both countries m. d1t tra dal feu m fro ed erg em ve l1a ies ntr cou th Bo ions. Japa.n, like Ethiop1a � dit tra n ria rita tho u a· ing lud i11c , ant ort in1p y ver l stil is <lition e e''irnported'' - originally - a great deal of its modern law. Its civil cod onc French in ori�n­ is no-1, largelj' based on Germar1 law, but witl1 provisions drawn fron1 French, Swiss ande.'tn the Con1rno11 Ln•;v. "fl1e pe11al code also draws from Frenc.h and German sources. Civil and ly, by American , criminal procedure hc.s been influenced by botp continental and, increasing ' lav1. 1\Jtbougl1 Ja.pa�1 op�rate:, under a "code system'', the ''decisional law ' of the·courtsii beconiing ari incrcasirtgly i111JJorrant aclditiona/ source of law - a means of interpreting and shapi_ng tl1e i,!v1 to meet !oca! conditions.

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�::-rom Tal�ayanagi, ''_A. Century o f Innovati on: The De velopment of Japanese Law'\ 1n von Mehren, op.cit., pages 6, 12-14.

, T!1e r,;I�iji Cons titt1tion Vi'.as dr�wn up witl1 tl1 e utmost secrecy and promul gated

· a� a gift of the Eznper or to his subjects. S ove reignty r es ides in tl1e Tenno ' the here· · d1tary n1 onarch'... not in tl1e people. Tl1 e Co nstitution take s scrupulous care 10 guaran�ee ex ecuLive sup� emacy, wl1ich had been the po.licy of the Meiji gove� · · will ment since the Restoration ' bY rec ogn1z111g 1s · Th' · · s. i broad 1mpe r1al prerogat ve str·k ti 1e P � sent generation of Western obs ervers as higl1ly antidemocra ti c, aod �i s ts ar e apt_ t o poi·1.tic 1 r a ea see in tl1e do cument a selfish attempt to perpetuat e, � e h eb hin d a w ester n con s t1tut·Iona1 f; T h ·a_cade , tl1e political p ower of tl1e oligarc s._ ·cal ·Constitution i s ce r tain} Y conser vative; but, o r c o . Japan p ese mpa the ht� ed with . on regime prior to the Rest orati o i. t was n d . i d e�nitely a step f orward in the rec sel1 �, of dem ocratizing Ja an It ovide� for o�P:d a ous Die _ t, L �er incl H e, udi o n a c g er of elect ed represe�t�ti,;es . ); u pr� I ed for tl�e usual bill of ri ghts, though . · r re servation of tl1 e law , , It provi�e� o it� h ug vince was strictly limit�d in �onfor . f or �n Independent judiciary, t ho t a d� -� ns, to the trial of civil and �r. na mity with the French and tontinental r _ si� iU case s and administrativ l e matters were out t 1� , _jurisdiction. If it was n ot ��e ru le of law i�1 the English sense of the term, a _justice acc ording to law was gua r anteed · · · · a The Constitution of 1946 w ith . w . 1 on, dra a fte 1:s d occ u dur ing All ied p the � f �af" vie� to the democratization _ of pan. �p�rt fr om article 9--renunc1at1on ell which has a curious llistory of fi s o ..-11 � its s o t n, e It a 1s . � l n ot s o radica a docum n .Id 1r"'vl"' pos sup ed. · e Lik . . the · · J Mei 1 Const1tut10 . . · n_, it 1s a brief document. Its outwar . deis s1m11 ar to that of the old . C mocratic. Closely examin ed . 0� stitution, but its contents are certainl y rnor �eth· eo ' 1 t 18 a standard constitution befittin g a tw

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de mo cra tic sta te. lib era . . l, . Th e em perorsl1ip .was retained btit only as tur y cen . ''the· symbol of t11e State and of tl1e unity of tl1 e people.'' ... U�der the ol d Constit�1tion, howe�er,_ t?e legitin1ate sot1rce of tl1 e En1peror's autJ1or1ty was tl1e n1ytl1olog1cal a11d sem1rel1g1ot1s tl1 eory t11at J1e was tli e descendant of the Sun Godde�s. Under tl1e 11 ew Constitutio11, 11 is positio11 rests on tl1e secttlar doc of trin popt1lar will. Tl1e tl1eory cl1a11ged, bt1t tl1e institt1tion itself e cal pol iti and . remains. . . · In tl1e second place, tl1e exect1tive st1pre111acy co11ten1plated by tl1 e old Consti­ tution ,va� replaced i � tl1e n�w. by legislative �t1p1·e111�cy ( l'iz. a Parli,11ne11 tary system of cl100s1ng tl1e Pr1n1e M1n1ster and Cab111et� w1tl1 exect1tive respo11sibility to Parliament ). In the tl1ird place, the co11stitutio11al positio11 of tl1e judiciary v1as co11 siderab]y elevated, and rt1le b;,, law {l1ocl1isz,1gi) u11der tl1e old Co11stitt1tio11 was replaced by rule of law (/10 no s/1i/1ai). The latter idea see111s to be 111ore usually expressed in tl1e United States by st1cl1 expressions as ''gover1111 1ent u11der law,'' ''supremacy of the law," or ''due process of law." Tl1e rule of law provided by tl1 e new Consti­ tution is of the type jt1dicially de\1eloped i11 tl1e United States. Tl1 e classic rigl1ts, ·with some additions, are e11t1n1e·rated by tl1e Co11stitutio11 and ar. e to be guaranteed by the judiciary. i\s befits the constitutio11 of a twentietl1-centt1ry 111dt1strial state, the Constitution of 1946 imposes on tl1e state not only tl1e 11egative dL. 1ty to refrai11 from violatjng ht1n1an rigl1ts and fu11damental liberties bt1t also tl1e positive d11ty to promote the eco11omic and social welfare of its citizens to enable the1n to enjoy those rights substantiyely as \Vell as for1nally. •

From the 1946 Constiti,tion of Japan. Cl1apter III Rigl1ts and Dt1ties of tl1e People ••• • • • • • •

Article 13. All of the people shall be respected as i11dividuals: Tl1eir 1·igh� to life,

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness sl1all, to tl1e e�ten� tl1 at_ 1t �oes not � nterfere with tl1e public welfare, be the supreme consideration 1n leg1slat1on and 111 otl1er governmental affairs. Article 14. All of tJ1e people are equa-1 under tl1e Ia,v and tl1ere sl1all be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations becat1se of race, creed, sex, social status, or family origi11 . . . . .. . . . . .

r y he all an ot sl r 11 y, ert lib or � e lif of d ive � pr de icle be all . 31 No person sl, . � . cr1m1nal penalty be imposed� except accord111g to procedure establ1sl1 ed by law. Article 32. No person shall be denied t11e right of �ccess to tl1e co\1rts. d t ue �y n . iss ra ar l n po 1 pt ce � ex d de _ en eh pr e ap icl Art 33. No person shall be a competent judicial officer which specifies tl1� �ffe11 se w1tl1 wl11cl1 tl1 e person 1s charged, unless he is apprehended wl1ile committing the offe?se. . g e on at in be r1� 1o 1tl w ed � in ta d� or e ed cl st _ 34 re Arti ar _ be . No person shall _. . •n�o:rme d of the charges against l,im or witl1 ou t the 1mmed1ate pr1v1lege of cot1nsel, tlor shall h b·e n, y rso an pe of nd ma de ? ; n O lIJ? n a e us ca q te e detai11ed witl1out ade ua !llth �ause must be immediately shown in open court 1n his presence and the p resence f. hrs Counsel. •.,

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e i11 tl1eir l1omes p·t 1r cL se be to s 1 o1 rs JJe . l al , LPers, a. . · .ht of. ' . . Article 35. Tl1e rig n t no b e o ,. 11 s a. h pa im res zL1 se1 d ire d 1 a1 , es 1 exc rcl sea ent 1 upo . s.t "e11 tri·es efef cts a�a1n ing tl1e pla ce to be rib sc de ly ar ul ic rt pa d an e 1,; ca ' sear c1i warrant is.sued 1or ade'qL1a' ;e 33 r I e ic 1· A b y d ·d . e 1 v ro JJ s a t 1J e c x e r o d , e · . ed and tI11 11gs t o be seiz te warrant issued by a , 11 1ade L1po11 separa be l al sl, e ur eiz S co m. Eac I 1 sear C,1 Or . petent judicial officer. r fice c d of bl1 an pL1 a el Jlunishmen by cru tire t tor of on cti 1fti 1 i e Tl1 36. Article u are absolutely forbidden. all joy sl1 en the right to a speed, sed cL1 ac e tl1 ses ca l na mi cri all In . 37 le Artic 1 al. t11 ib tr al ti ar 1J i1n an by l ia tr ic and publ shall e n all 11e ses xa 11e? e wit m! ty _ uni a t? ort opp d h l ft1l , ted n,it per J-Ie sliall be 1g witnesses on his behalf at pub!� 11 a1n obt for s ces pro y sor pt1l com i of t rigl tJ1e e hav expense. At all tin1es tl1e acct1sed sl1,1ll have tl1 e assista11ce of compete nt counsel woo shall, if tl1 e acctised is Linable to secure tl1e same by 11is own efforts, be assigned to , l1is 11se by t/1e Sta.te. Articic 38. I\fo perso11 sl1all be con1pelled to testify against himself. Confcssio11 made ·u11der compt1lsion, tortt1re, or tl1reat, or after prolongro arrest or cletention sl1all 11ot be admitted in evidence. No person shall be co11victed or pt111isl1ed in cases \Vl1ere tl1e only proof againsi 11 im is l1is own confessio11. Article 39. r'1'o perso11 sl1all be l1eld crin1ii1ally liable for a11 act which was , law�ul at the ti111e it \.Vas committed, or of \.\'l1icl1 J1e has been acquitted, nor shall he, 1n a11y way� be placed in dot1ble jeopardy. _Article 40. Any person, in case l1e is acquitted after I1 e I 1as been arrested oi , detained, may sue the State for redress as provided by law.

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. : :'-rticle 76· TI1e wliole judicial power suer in and is co urt ve ste d su in pr em a e in�er1or cot1rts as are establisl1e d by la : \v. t:o extra?rdinary_ trib 111al L sl1all be ·establisl1ed ' no r sl1all any orooan or agency ! of e execL1t1ve be g,,,e11 fi11a l jt 1dicial power · A ll jt1dges sl1all be i rl de�e11 d . . ll ba . . · d � ei1t 111 tl1e exercise of their conscie nce ao be bot1nd only bY tl11s . · Co11st1tut1. on a1 1d tl1e , laws Article 77. Tl1e SLtpreme c . er d . n . · u , ou . rt we IS p ve r ste d o kin g . w1 rul tl1 e-m tl1e a wl1icl1 it determines tile rul iDg lat s .o procedure an d of practice, an d of m� tters � dioi� to attorneys, tl1 e i1 1ter1 1al d7 ;. U f J S in e Ct ) of tl1 e , co ur ts an d the administration° J afaf irs. Public procur ators sl1all OJC re up b e s su b' �ect to tl1e rule-making power of the Court. . Tl1e Supreme Court ur!$ . o c ma d e I Y i ega te tl1e to SL1ch courts. power to m ake rules for i nfer or eSi oJ . . � icle 78. Judges sl1all not be r u Jud1c1ally declared mental �moved except by public impeachlll�nt, durie!· lY Or physically incompetent to perfor m o ffioial

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No disciplinary actio11 against judges sl1all b e administered by any executive organ or agency. cle 79.· The Supreme _ Court shall consist of a cl1ief jt1dge an A rt i d sucI1 11umber . of J udges as r�ay be detei·Illloed.. by law; sucl1 jt1dges, exce1Jting tl1e chief J·ud e g' sl1all be appointed by the Cabinet. The appointrne11t of the jtidge� of the St11Jren1e Cot1rt sl1 all be reviewed by the_ people_ at th e first general elect�o11 of tl1e _ 1-lotise of Representatives following the1r appointment, an_d shall be reviewed a gain at tl1e first general election of the Hot1se of Represe11tat1ves after a lapse of ten years, a 1 1d i 11 tl1 e same inanner tllere­ after. In cases . me_ntioned in _th e foregoit1g paragrapl.1 , wl1en tl1e 111.ajority of tl,e voters favors the d1sn11ssal of a Judge, .l1e sl1 all be dismissed. Matters pretaining to revi. e\\1 sl1 all be prescribed by law. Tl1 e judges of tl1e St1pre111e Co111·t s11 all be retirect u1Jo11 tl1 e attai 1 1111ent of tl1 e age as fixed by law . All sucl1 jt1dges sl1 all receive, at regt1lar stated intervals., adeqt1ate compensation which shall not be decreased during tl1ei1· terms of office. Article 80. Tl1e judges of. tlJe joferior cot1rts sl1 all be ap1)oi11ted by tl1e Cabi11et from a list of persons nominated by tl1e StIJJreme Court. All sucl1 judges s11all hold office for a term of te11 years witl1 privilege of reappoi11tment, provided tl1 at t]1ey shall be retired upon attainment of tl1 e age as fixed by law. The judges of tJ1e inferior courts sl1al� receive, at regular stated i11tervals, adequate compensation wl1icl1 ·s11all 11ot be decreased during their tern1s of office. Article 8 I. The St1preme Court is tl1 e cot1rt of last resort with l)OWer to deter­ mine the constitutionality of a11y law, order, regL1latio11, or official act. Article 82. Trials sl1all be conducted a11d j11dg1nent declared p11blicly. Wl1ere a court 1111animously dete1·1nines publicity to be dangerot1 s to public order or n1orals, a trial may be conducted JJrivately, but trials of' political offenses, offenses in,,olving the press, or cases wl1erein tl1e rights of tl1e people as gt1aranteed in Chapter TI.I of tl1is Co11stitution are i11 q11estio11, sl1all always be condt1cted publiclv.,

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Cl1 a1)ter X Supre111e Law Article 97. Tl,e ftindamental l 1 L1ma11 riglits by tl1is Co 1 1stitL1tio11 guara11 teed to the people of Japan ar� fruits of tl,e _age-old _s�rt1ggle of 1na11 to be free; tl1 ey_ have st1rvived the many exacting tests for dt1rab1l1_ty a!1d _are co11ferred tI]JOn tl11s anct futt 1 re ge11eratio11s in trust, to be I1eld for all time 111v1olate. Article 98. Tl,is Constittition sliall be tl1e st1pre1ne law of tl1e 11,1t1011 a11 d 110 la·w, ord inan ce, ii nperial rescript or other act of g()Ver 1 11ne11t, or p,1rt tl1ereof. contrary 1 ercof, tl law� ordi11ance, imp rt pa or , 11� n1 rn ve go of t ac � e rial rescript or otl1er C,)ntrar)' tt) tl 1e provisio11s hereof�, sh,tll l1ave legal force or validt�y. tl1 t fa l 1 be al sl s on 1t1 11, of s w la 1 ed isl bl f_ ultyThe treaties cc)iicl tided by Japan �11,d esta cil)scr,1ed.

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UTIONAL LAW IT T S N O C N IA P O TI-II E SoURCEBOOK OF

�--�=:==.:.:..------l---------� . ; el as mirusters of state m w as t n ge re e th . or · The enlperor

rn� : T\il.: Artie_1e 99 �s e i th at ve lig ha ob on to r J:"o'\, t . ges? and otller public officia ls an d . of tl1e Diet, JUd upJ1oid tl1is Constitution. . . of the Japanese Constitu ti (Chapter vn s icle art . r _very l icia jud the n,_and �u11 d vis Re ap Conside e er of th Ch e � VI t t ar rp te ( o ns i opian coun C h Et its 1 r tl w e denied E ian. Ution). compare it care or

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n io it d ra T t s a P m ro f k a re B e h T es ag , xv, xvii-xviii. p 4) 96 (1 n a ap J in n io ut it st on C d an From Maki, Court , 47 d_ 19 3, ay ate M cre on th� ted ga l S_ upreme u om I?r , on uti t!t ns Co n's pa ... Ja e se th o t ne p� � Ja ne rs d1c we JU po 1 ary . The d an ns tio nc fu th wi it d ste ve Court and y r er e ev aJo lik m d, nes an pa Ja , 47 e gove rn. 19 4, t us ug A on ce en ist ex to in Court can1 e s been �re�ted since World ha a� th y ac c� mo de e th of on uti tit ins l ica lit po mental· �nd lly t ua It 1s �an eq . n1fi s1g n tio pa cu that, lik e oc 1e l t to . e nc ste exi its es ow War II, it ati ocr on a dem ilt bu non c predecessor s wa urt Co the ns, tio titu ins 1er otl most of tl1e . n tio . pa d .. cu an oc t, fea de r, \Va of t igh we "'l1icl1 collapsed under the Perl1aps the most serious limitation on the independence of the courts [before 1945] was tl1at tl1 ey -\vere all under the direction of the Ministry of Justice, an executive agen.cy . Since under la\v tl1e Ministry controlled judicial budgetary an� admin istrative matters, including appointment and promotion, the weight of . executive pressure on the courts ,vas great. Although some critics maintain that · tl1 e courts remained indeJ)endent in their exercise of the judicial po wer, that is to · say·, in l1 anding down of judicial decisions involving the interpretation of law, others : aver that. some judges1 at least, tended to think of themselves more as bureaucrats ; tha11 as judges. ' . Conspict1011sly absent from the powers of the Court of Cassation was jurisdic· : t1on over prob�ems of constit11tionality . Tl1e Meiji Constitution was a fundame ntal law tl1at permitted no room for interpretation jn t11e true sense. It was presented : to tI1 e Japa11ese as a gracious gift from tl1e Emperor himself; it was no t an.instrume ni wrested from a reluctant ruler by a people clamoring for democratic right� aotl freedoms. The document, flowing directly from the source of sovereignity itse�, was �egar?ed as the supreme_ exp�ession of tl1e imperial sovereign will. Giv�n th� premise_ s, rt wotild have bee n illogical and in contravention of the concept of impen� sovereignty for tl1e cot1rts--clearly 011ly tl1e mo11tl1piece of the soverei gn-to have . . been empowered to rtil e on tl1e meani.ng o f tl1e Const1tut1on. From Ward ·'Japan '' ' in · \:;\!ard & Macridis, Afoder11 Political Syste111s: Asia (1963) pages 103_104_ an, · T h e Jap · ju d ic ia l s y stein· ' 1 ike so m�11y of tl1e other institutions of pr�� ar ·· gb� was greatly changed b tt1e i r 1 ol1t 1ca were Y Occup p ation. . T and . civil, he legal, . of Japanese citizens were grea t l y expanded; the government and its servant s 111pl made f a r more accountable e1 a1t . s o u f,or tl 1e1r ser1_ · a�tions; and, le in general, a · · ip was made to introduce · i11to . c o rl· n p g Japane s forei e society the almost completely of tl1e rul e o f 1aw. . .. fll· In pre-wa° r Japan tl1 ve o . . g 1 n o cour ti _ t s l 1ad _ n been ff , ; the a of in _ a f 1 941, e ect an arm ment, admiii I stered y t fle st�Y of Justice. U nder the Constitu tion °.. i n a tl1is was completely c hange · Article 76 vests ''the whole judici al power 11

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Supreme Court �nd_ i� such inferior courts as may be establislled by law. This pro­ vision cre·a�es a Jud1c1al branch ?f the gov ernment with an independ ent st atus th at is substa.nt1ally equal to that enJoyed by the legisl ative or executive branches. • •• • • • • • •

From a political standpoint, f ew judicial isst1es ha ve aroused more comment· an� contr�ve:sy th an the Sup:eme Court's An1erica11-inspired power of judicial review. Th1_s 1s_ complet ely foreig n to tl1e Japanese legal tradition and many ll ave ·watched with 1_nterest to see whe!her or 11ot tl1e Sup _ reme Court wotild actually· make use of this power an d occa�1o�ally declare a11 act of tJ1 e Diet, of a Ministry, or of a loc�l govern_�ent. unconst1tut1onal, tl1us asserting its right to play a positive· role in national polit1�s, in the \Vay that tl1e U11ited States Supreme Court does. ... . Judicial Review in Practice

From M aki, op.cit., p ages xxi-xxii, xxxix-xLv. Of the twenty-nine justices [of tl1e J' ap anese Supre1ne Court] ... i\ll were· grad uates of f aculties of l aw. ... I n addition, no f ewer than fourteen had travelled abroad to study or observe foreign systems of law or cou1is. The long experience of the justices in the area of jurisprudence \<Vas 11ndo·ubtedly one of the principal reasons why the Co11rt was a.ble to l1andle new and. 11nfamilirtr legal and constitutional concepts as effectivel;' as it did after its creation 011ly t¥10 years after the end of World War II. Many observers - Japanese ancl foreign alike - had fear ed that it would be a n11mber of Y•�ars before tl1e Co11rt v,ould be able to de al · effectively with the issues prese11ted by the 11evv Constitution. That the justices were able to sl1ift from tl1e old to tl1e new so r apidly· and smoothly was a remarkable achievement. All of them 11ad dealt in a professional capacity with a system of law and courts completely different from the 011e they had to administer after 1947; only two had been edt1cated in a system of l aw, E nglish law, related to the new system, and those two presumably had not dealt pro-· fessio�ally with th at system for a number of years. Tl1or?:1gl1 con1petence an? l�ng. experience in the field of law, and understanding. of the sp1r1t of tl1e new Const1tut1on and the battery of laws relating to it, and an undoubte? will to op�rate tl1e new system effectively and to make jt permanent were the rn aJor ele1nents 1n the success. of the Supreme Court. ... I approach my own limited critique of the work _of tl1� _S�preme Court in tl1e· a�ea of constitution al review by stating the two m aJor �r1t1cisms that l1 ave been . directed at it by botI1 J ap anese and foreig·n observers:_ first, 1t l1as not fot1ght ,,al1antly �nd aggressively for the protection of indiv!dual r1_g!1ts nd rreedoms gt1�ra�teed � 1n. the Constit . second it h as not effectively utilized 1ts r1gh� of const1�ut1onal ution eview to check rth th� power' of tile executive ��d le?islat_ive bra11cl1e�, p art1ct1larly· e fo_rmer. Eve n a casual reading of the dec 1 s1o11s 111 tl11s volu_1n� w!ll reveal tl1at there ts abu both are ndant ground for both criticisms. I do i�ot deny their Jt1st.1ce. However, based on the assumption or the expectation tl1at tl1e Stipreme Court of ap a sho ld . u follow the pattern of the Supreme Cot1rt of the u· nited_ St�tes on w�1ch :t � Was modeled, p articularly in respect to the k ey power of const1tut1onal review. It ste'm s to me that the work of th e Supreme Court of J apan in the vital a �ea of const ituti onal interpretation can only be understood witl1in tl1e context peculiar· .

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STITUTIONAL LAW N O C N IA P IO H T E SOURCEBOOK OF '

t1tional decisio s tit It ns . co w la d an s, ic lit : po e rnnlent y the a11d iews that the J�s�:ve t b v e cont x j tl1at �� i c : 1 1 n e st 1 t x y 1 eth e r tl1e a re - to quot e e 1 w s, rt , a p S l! m xa d n a : p] t x te n co e t p f o ce 1e n tl ���� !n tl1 e \vl1ol 1e co tl p Ja e m es e fatni]. lu an o v 1s 1 tl 1 1 j s iJ io is ec d · Y . ni b from soine �f tile . 1e r tl c of tu e na is ys of al an o s al ic e 1 oiog t I yc ps d · · an Y, Oi al ·c . 11 1 p o s 1 o 1 1 1 p a m e st y s Of 1aw. s t in o p w o r r a n f o i fine ly spt1n inte rpretatio11s c h as v e 1 o� f t ti ef nc no d y fu s e ha ti t 1r t o1 C l e e : tl at 1 tl 1 e To re turn to tli e criticisn a� It d s bad neither 10 �h te l1a no ld b� ou l1 s it s, om ed e fr al 1 guardian of constittitioi DOi 1 n m l na 1o ut t1t v ns go 1c co a r ern o , n e t de c 1 t r de 11n cre ate the coiJce pt of free don1 pm e nt of a large body lo v� e de tl1 h 11g �o th m do ee or fr of g to btiild up tJ 1e 111e anin e ed om 1n gen:ral_ an d a wide range fr e n : � e er _w e l op e p e pre cede nt. TJ 1e Japanes n 1o ut t1t e 11s of tl1 Co e r d un e 47, whic� s 19 1t1 un m 11n nd 1 :: s 1 n do e fre , t s 1 I rig c cifi e sp of at s tl1 a om l1_ ed en fre be d an ped ht o el rig dev tic ra oc n1 e d t 1 . a1 c 1 ifi ig1 s ry v e e ies od e nib e of speec}1, · re l1g1on, assembly , and os 1 tl as 1 cl st1 1s on ed fre er old e h in tl1 e West. T. �1ssociatio11 a r 1d tJ1e nevver ones s11ch as acade mic fre edom an d tl1 e freedom of labolt lr to organize a11d to bargain. collecti,iel)', we re all incorporate d into the Constitu ion of J alJa11 witl1 011t l1 aving de velope cl \Vitl1i11 Jap ane se socie ty. The Supreme Court- ' to say notl1ing of otl 1er organs or bra11cl 1es of the Japane se gove rnment - had no rol e to pla)' i11 st1ch vital JJolitical, social, a11 d econon1ic de ,ie}opments as the emaac i· · JJatior1 of won1e11, s1Jecifically tl1e e xte11sion to tl1em of political, social, and economic 1 rigl1 ts; tl1 e creatio11 of sta11dards for l abo11r; tl 1e control of monopolistic practices; and the devel op1ne 11t of a broacl program of social we lfare . . to Japa �;J:J1:�� 1

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Al l tl1e above rigl1 ts c111 d fre edoms and political, social and economic develop111ents \Vere i11 trod11�ed jnt� Japan by tl1e occ upation. Conse quently the Supreme · Cotirt �ad no rol e _ 111 cre ating tl1e conce pt of free don1; establishing the basic rules , gove rni_ng tl1e relat1011 be t\ve e11 tl1 e state and the pe ople, or in defining the nature . ?f � �crfic f:eedoms. �l1e Col1rt did 11 ot l1ave to figl1t to create freedom or to defeod \ _ liberty_ a�ainst tl1e state. More l or ndi,id ctua u�I 1 a1 ad l 1 ov e r, all legislation that a '., � a _J)Otential restrictive e ffect on co11stitt1tio11 al rights a11d free do111s were provided witl1 safeguards tl1at ,lt le ast retarde d tl1e develop111ent of that effect. . hal Tl1e respo11se of .tl1e Japa'11ese �eop1e to tl 1e occt1pat1on-s1)onso os re1orr t red r: · · r leci to ti . �a J)IC· 1 cr�atioi1 of a \Vorktng syste n1 of vou fa democracy was in1mediate, � e bl s e v 1 1 e rest1lt 11as . bee 11 a soci he t 0 ety tl 1at is truly free, w re err·� :ta�d;:� r::���� ; f·. · ye 1 0 den1 ocr a cy are widel y eiljo The · d rcise e x e y 1 f d ree an d · ct1111sta11 ces of tlie I� · · t rodt1 ct10 . 1? of de111 ocratic freedom s and of their sub sequeie1 enjoyment 11 ave ti e � or c s de r o f� e rol y bl ive c 1 sit il po ta ur � l l1 d e tia t 1 e po � • �:� : as Supre1ne Cotirt a; ;l�e iar 1 n ?f tl1e 7 t Cour the Co� less, 1 l1e st1tt1t1 Nevert . n . 0 , . pl ayed a J)romine rlt rol! der 01 e 11:te�1)retat1011 of tl 1e meani11g �� free ?0 uind5 l the Constittttiori, a role 111�; � 1 as :P10 �1ded 1na1�y. of tl1e Court's cr.1t1cs with gro nr . for mai11 taining� not alto ethe _ r fai_rly •n n1y op1n1 n, tl1 at 1t I1a� _te�ded to uorle:)Jlir ne-. tl1e 11e w fre edoin ai,ct lib;rt y. i ? t do , Tlla t rol e I1as been 1n tl1e reconc1l1at1011 of the of tl1e J)ttblic we lfare wit] tl 1 ,e guara11tee of ft111dan1e11tal rigl1ts and freedoms. Tlie Cot1rt l1as consiste ca� . re . l� nt} e ew tl 1at tl1e public w aiPU0(Ill;i•• , the vi be t1secl as tl1e J·ustific,,at·1011 c Y st!PP0 rted . ior plac ' 11 1 g 1· 11 . of 6.,J'', of 1 11ted re strictions 011 tl1e e xercise mental fr.eedon1s No aric 1 · t· I e of tl1e C 0 11s ob· r tI�e P r. t·1tut1on deals solely with ti 1 e �ubl1c we lfare, defi · ,e . \ e w . rl in g tile ve. con d1t1 0 11s t inder wl1 icl 1 it is opera ti certain key arti cles cont . J-Ioex·erd5t' a1n tl1e pl1 ras '· e as a 1·1mitatio 11 011 the e njoyment. ofOf freedon1.

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provisions �s a basis, tl1e Cot1rt l1as consistently e Using thes taken tlle view _ we lfa r �, that 1s, th e ge11_eral good _of all tl1e meinbers of the bl1 c p the � tliat society, can not be 1nterfe! ed_ V:Ith by th e unrestricted exerc.1se of a constittitionally guaranteed free dom by an 1nd1v1dual or a grot1p. However disq11ieting th e Supren1e Co11rt's 1rti)ization of tl1 e concept of tile public welf�re may _ be to n1any JaJ)anes�, tl1e fact ren1ai11s tl1 at it l1as not rest1lted in t11e practical abr1dgeme_nt . of tl1e exerc1�� of a11y co11stit11tio11ally gttara11teed right or freed om. Althou_g� this 1s no t a positive co11tr.ibt1tio11 to constitutio11alism by the Supreme C?ur�, 1t 1s, nevertl1eless, a far cry fro111 a betrayal of its 1·ole as guardian of the Const1tut1on. If its interpretation of the doctri11e of tl1e pL1blic welfare has been its most important contrib11tion to the en1erging idea of freedo1n in J,Lpan, tl1e S·upreme Court's interpretation of tl1e principle of legislative s11premacy l1as been its most significant contribution to t11e developn1e11t of tl1 e worki11g relatio11sl1ips among the branches of tl1 e new governme11t. Tl1 e position of tl1e Cot1rt can be described as follows: tl1ough the legislative po\ver is supreme, eacl1 of tl1e tl1ree J)OWers, execu­ tive, legislative, and judicial, is independent i11 its ow11 area; the judicial power must not be interfered with by eitl1er of tl1e otl1e1· two powers; b11t, jn turn, the judicial po,ver should not intervene in the legiti1nate spheres of tl1e otl1er t\10. 1

One striking result, from the sta11dpoint of tl1e American obser·ver, is that until 1961 the Supreme Court l1ad never found a Diet-enacted law or an executive action to be unconstitutional. Altl1ougl1 a nt1mber of decisions \Vere l1anded dov1n upholding pleas of unconstitutionality, tl1ey all dealt witI1 cases involving cabinet orders issued as a result of directives from occupation l1eadq11arters. On the otl1er hand, the Court has never been the object of executive pressure, and only once has the National Diet attempted to interfere ,vith co11rt activity. The Court's refusal to act as a checkrein on eitl1er tl1e legislative or tl1e executive process has been regarded as a weakness i n that it is take11 to be a re.fusal to exercise power, particularly the power of co11stitutional review, granted to it by tl1e Consti­ tution. However, the Supreme Court in the development of its position on the separation of powers bas never held that the l�gisla�ive an� executive brancl1es of the governme nt are to be responsible to no one 1n tl1e1r exercise of power. Notably in the Sunakawa Decision it held that the executive and legislative brancl1es of the _ �overn ment are politically accountable t� tl1e e]ect�rate f�r tl1eir act� Su�h ; pol1t1cal accountability, the Court declared, 1s to the ' s?ve!e1gn people. This, too, is soundly grounded on a basic principle of tl1e Co11�t1t11t1on. It can be argued _ that this concept of political accountability to the peopl� In general_ elections comes clo ser to the realization of the principles of dem?crat1c, respo11s1bl_e governme�t th�n does the concept of judicial supremacy, exercised tl1ro11gh tl1e r1gl1t of consti­ tutio nal review. As a result of the research that has gone into this volu1ne, �. h_av � come to tl1e oncl d fie t tl1 In 1al1s spec no11 a_ of that ! is it 1 h otig � tl n eve � usion_ - valid, I iev , be J � _ _ ha� tl1e two main 011 o tut1 I 1st1 fiel co1 the 1n t1rt Co � � me pre u s· � the of ns utio trib con rev1ew are that n t 1o_ 1t and tha 1tL1t nst Co e 1 tl of t ten con the to ng it ani me has given has consiste ntly striven to establish the rule of law under democ.racy 1n Japan. nd fot1 be to r are on in acti t t1rt C� e rem r St1p se ane Jap tJ,e ore gs concrete readin on he , m 1Fu � the Court's judgments, several of which are given later in this Part.

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w l ie ia v e ic d R u J f o t n e m The Develop In India ti tu ti s n 11 o o d e C il ta e D A f o le p Arz Exam t n e m d n e m o A T le b ti p e c s u S · More

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e d on t th an or is sh _ whole rather"� , ' d, �e o n_ ve ha ill \v u yo n, tio itll: st on , The American C . ts � ri 1l v c1 ed te n a r _ a . n o f gu o ti . la u rm . fo s it in � y rl la � cu ti n ar of io at or t d e ab ile el s ta ht de ng � or m a1ns a_ P The Japanese Constitution co�t s of rights ar e deeply entrenched,. 1.e., these ill &llatan1!1l In botll Constitutions the ''b . . . ed d en am .. ly si ea r o y l<l cannot be quic rn Court dec�1 0� even \i'f.ti to ov ertu ch an br �e at.J. 1sl Jeg e t� r fo . lt cu ffi di As a result, it is to o far 10 the wrong d1rect1on in llll!/. go s on 1s1 c _ de e_ th k in th ay m ive at isl leg e a majority in tl1 the e, ad U.S. Suprem e Court ta dec st pa e �l1 1n tl1 w1 ,_ I?le am ex r Fo . on uti tit ns Co preting the ee of freedom of speech andUt nt e ara th gu rng ret erp 1nt 1n w vie an ari ert lib ely taken an extrem ions of boo�llers �d- film exhibitol'!(q ict nv co ,vn do ng iki str urt Co the of 1s io1 cis De press. g ns ikin isio str dec d down "lor� an s, film or s ok bo ne sce ob ly ged alle g ,vin selling or sho ged crimes oJ sooj� alle ts for nis mu com of ns tio vic con ing ers rev r1s isio clec and ', oaths' support proportl l1nve cu11.1uiatively aroused tl1e ire of m.any in Congress - but not enough to amend111ents designed to •·reverse the Court'', by r�vising the Costitution. Jt is p<)Ssible to proceed on a different constitutional theory - a theory which as5lllil:I that if ,1 n:i�jority, or an extraordinary n1ajority, disagree with the Court, that majorityrnrj imrr1ediately a1nend tl1e Constitution. Tl1e Indian Constitution proceeds on that theory. Ar1otl1er wa.y of limiting tl1e power of the Courts is to leave fewer provisions of thee& stitution open to argu111ent and judicial interpretation . For example, instead of guaran!�i fre;;don1 of speecl1 in general terrns, the Constitution, i11 t/1eor;1, could attempt to lay do'A1 1nore detailed guidelines. It cot1ld also spell out in great detail, the powers authorised/1 various units o� government. Again, the Indian Constitution ref]ects this approach. The 1T1ater1als below are designed to illustrate the Indian approach to these probkm!· and the theory that tl1e Constitution should be both an elaborate law while still a very fitn.'llt 1 la\v in the sense that it can be changed witl1out referring the change to ''the people".

The Indian Constitution From Ba 5u, Coinmentaries On Tlze Co11stitutio11 of J11dia (I 961 ed ), Vol. 1, page ��t . e 1 excerp ts below first sl1ow tl1e division of opinion bet\veen Indian leade rs and_B� · T�

C01 0° 1� 1 Ia,vyers on the advisability of having judicial revie w· at all .They then descri be l!f · .on. , reso ut1on of the problem in · I nct·1a ,s 111 · dependence (and present) Const1 tut1 · · 1 At t!1e Round Tabl the Gove!P"

e Conferer1ce that preceded the making of · m ment of India Act ' 1935 , ti1e I 11ct·1an 1 eaders the r· · 1n R1ghts · of a Pill pressed for · decl�· . t10 . 11 . · . : posed Const1tu with certain . nfil. . .AIct ' i· n � rder to b ind the adm1n1strat1on 1 tio e ns of ir1d ivi d ernm I _u� Gov rig 1 ts. TI11 s was, l1owever reiected by the [British . ' 'J S1 mon C0111n11ss1on · iJl!W .. . rs . The Joint Parlia .entar� C h e L fo!O. t it o1111111tte e a greed w that h _ followed Com mission a d state� tl1e i sst1e] the IIl ts as Rigl1 to the value of a Bill of � of a dilemma. I

. � '': .. Either tl1e declar or ed ff .is of so abstract e ation of r i. g11t� al , le no has g � 0(t·· 1 a nature that it k1n_d, or its legal effect w·ll e o p b to the t!I imp ose on . an n by emb arra rest rictio ssing d legislature and to create �. grave i � inv � red ' ri k decla that a large number of Jaws mav be courts becau . s e of incons1ste ncy w� • . " 1tt1 0ne or oth er of the rights e so declar d

1 d\ • Th.ts, � f cours�, i� of' ;. ees t the ''class ic ,• argument . . . . . .l]y enforceable guaran glisbffe ri¥ht� in const 1tut1ons. _ aga.inst Jud1c1a E,n The same point was ma . st1tut1on. de by Dicey in his writings on the

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These observations were quite natural for Englishmen. B·ut wh�n the nationalist leac;lers o� India were called upon to frame a Consti­ pe nd en re ce ally came, 1t was no t possible for them to forget their 1nd r � aft e on tuti en [w ce here there were _ no ''�uaranteed'' rights]. Naturally, there­ exp eri l] oni a [col fore they preferred to follow the American view represented by the famous words of Jefferson: ''...The i�conveniences of the declar�ti�n of rights, [i.�. tl1e bill of rights in the Constitution] are, that 1t ma y cramp g�vernme;11t � its .useful exertions. But tl1e evil of t11is is short-live d, mo?e?te an� reparable. The 1nc:o nven1eoces of the .want of a declaration are permanent, affl1ct1ve and 1rrep �ble. They ar� �n constant progression from bacl to worse. The executive in our gov �mments_ 1s not the sole, 1t _is scarcely the principal object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the legislatures 1s the most forn11da,ble dread. . .. "

Ibidem, pages 9-10, 13

... The Constitution of India has tl1e distinction of being the lengtl1iest written Constitution of the world so far produced. Tl1e original Constitution contained as many as 395 articles and 8 schedules (to whicl1 additions ,vere made by subsequent amendments). EYen after the repeal of several provisions by the Constitution (seventh amendment) Act, 1956, it still contains 380 articles and 9 schedules.�: t� This extraordinary bulk of the Constitution is due to several reasons: i) ... The framers sought to incorporate the accuml1la.ted experience gatl1ered from the working of all the known Constitutions a11d to avoid all the clefects a.nd loopholes that might be anticipated in the ligl1t of those Constitutions. Thus it v1as, that an elaborate Bill of Rights was engrafted upon a Parliamentary syste1n of government and a federal system wa.s st1pplemented by a provisio11 for centralisa­ tion of power whenever the national interests demanded the strength of a l111itary system. ... ii) ... Not contented with merely laying down the fundamental principles of governance (as the American Constitution does), the authors of the Indian Consti­ tution followed the Government of India Act, 1935, in providing matters of admi­ nistrative detail, not only because the people were accustomed to the detailed provisions of that Act, but also because the autl1ors had the apprehension that in the existing conditions of the country, th� Constitution mig�t b� perverted unless the form of administration was also provided by the Const1tut1on. ... The Constitution (of India) can be amende? according to the pr� ced� re P�escribed by Art. 368, which is nothing but the o� d1nar_y proced� re_ for leg1slat1on _ with the additional requirement of a special maJor1ty, viz., a m�Jor1t_y of the total membership of not less than 2/3 of the members present and vo 1n , 1n each o_f the � � two_ Houses of Parliament. It is thus evident that under our Const1tut1on the ordinary Legislature has been also given constituent power. ··· • Note Jeff;rson' s choice of a djectives here: decisions of t�,e Co11rts which ''cramp'' the govern­ ment are ''short-lived'' ''moderate'' and ''reparable . What does he mean? Would you , agree1 The. American Constit on nsists of some 7,000 words only, wit� 7 original _articles !nd 22 co uti the ile es wh icl a.d�.ed b� aruend, art 03 s tam n co � 6 194 of n tio itu nst . The Japanese Co nts me . _ les. Constitution of the Fifth artic 92 only s ude incl 8) (195 c.e n Fra Republic of

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CON STITUTIONAL LAW OPIA N ETH I OF EBOO K SoURC

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ve ry Fundamental Rights i ,e tl t 1� tl i s e ur at fe n Pa n UJ _ ... The .roos. t i1oticeableamended 1n ence, s_o 1011g as there is a . ay w is th fl be . . n ca on t t1tu s Co_ n s �l1e_ g �on of . o ng di e en tl1 am e oc at pr th ss id sa is ·be t ly o rd . t ca n ha . 1 r1g 1 powe r, 1d maJor1ty in io s. prog res for . ded nee 1,at is t e cl1an g any . : of admit ·1 tY of our c011stitution 1s 1ll11strated by the fact that even d . · · 1 unno . Tl1e flex1b·t d d · � en e n am ve n se ee b e tim aS' h s 1t ·· ng ki or w · ' · the first seven year S Of its Ibide111, page 118

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t �n to am nd Fu �g ati � �el ght Ri n tio t11 sti s_ .is more Co r ou of III � ... Part er h g Constitution ot_ y st1n an ex1 1n d_ ine nta co ts gh Ri of l Bil tl,e n of elaborate tha dth of wi e Th the . s_ 1 top jec of ?11b ge h t ran e as been wid � a s \'er CO and nce rta po im e tt1r and cul n, ial 1g1o soc rel of ms condit ions of ble pro l cia spe tl,e to due ily oar prjr . ts en em el 1s o1 ne ge ro te he of n tio la pu po ge l1u a sucl1 Some of tl1e provisions of tl1is Part are i n the nature _o� :constitutio na l limita­ tions' upon tl1e autl1ority of tl1e State, such as the _prolub1t1on of discrimination or of denial of eq11al protection, of conferment of titles. From the standpoint ol ' while tl1e rest of the Part con­ ts righ ative 'neg ed ter1n be may these the individual tains the 'positive rigl1ts' of the individual, such as freedom of speech, protection of life and personal liberty. TI1ere is, however, no clea.r-cut division between the two grot1ps of JJrovisions and many of tl1e rights may fall under either group. Bm provisions whicl1 are strictly in tl1e nattire of constitutional limitations are binding 11pon tl1e State witl1out any exception and any act of the State (legislative or execu· tive) whicl1 contravenes any of these provisions would altogetl1er void, to the exieo! of sucl1 contravention (Art. 13 (2)). On the otl1er hand, the provisions in the nature of individ11al rights are subject to regulation by the State itself w.ithin certain prescribed limits (e.g. Art. 19 (2)-(6)), tl1ey cannot be held to be void on accounl of bei11g in contr_ave11tion of the constitutional guarantee of tbe rights in que st_ion. �h� guarantees, 1n sl1ort, are subject to regulatio11 by the State within prescnbed l1rn1ts. ... 1Vote

!ht By of way f i llus 19 trat i n of Art. Bas u 's var iou ? s belo obs w, erv con <;> atio side ns, r . _ 1nd1an Co�Slit�tio n � �l11cl1 deals with some very fundamental rights. Article 19 has t,eeo e :�:��e�' since its or1 ?1� al enactment in 1947, and, with respect to the parts which have� ode.i ot aroe tlle orig inal and � the � the ame nde d with ver sion side by are . ' · set out , side version .1n 1tal1cs. From T/1e Constitutio,i of J,1dia. Article (19) All citizens s11all l1ave the right -­ a) to freedon1 of speecl1 an d expression . b) to assemble peaceably an d witl1out a�ms . c) to form associations o r unions . d) to move freely t hroug ' . h o u t tl 1e te rritory of India·' . e) to reside and settle . . 10 any pa rt of the territory of Inctia; . f) to acqu1 e, hold an d dispose of property . and � or ' e g) to practise any pro d . a tr fiess1·on, or to carry on any occupat1. on, business.

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(2) Nothing in sub-clause \a) of clause (1) shall a�ect the op�rat1on of any as 1t far so relates 1n to, or law g tin ex-is preve nts the State from making any libel, to slander, defama­ ng relati law tion' contempt of .Court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines t·he security of, or tends to overt. hrow, the State.

(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I) s�iall affec t the operation of any _ ex1st!ng law, or prevent the State from n1ak1ng a ny law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the ex�rcise of· the rig/it conferred by the sazd sub-clause in the interests of the se curitJ' of the State, publi c order, decency 01· 1norality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to a11 offence. (3� _Nothin� i� ·sub-cl�u�e (b) of the said clat1se sl1all affect tl1e operation of any ex1st1_ng law �n so far as 1t 1m�oses, or prevents the State from making any law impos­ ing, 1n the interests of publ1c order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. (4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operat; on of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law impos­ ing, in the inter�sts of public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right confer.red by the said sub-clause. (5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of tl1e said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or preve11ts the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the �xercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses eitl.1er in tl1e interests of the general public or for the pro­ tection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. (6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the (6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the_ said clause shall affect tlie operatiorz said clause shall affect the operation of of any existing law in so far as it any existing law in 9 so far as it imposes, i1nposes or prevents the State from or prevents the State from making making any law imposing, in the any law imposing in the interests of the interests of the general publi c, reasori­ general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred able restrictions on the exercise o_f the righ t conferred by the s aid sub-clause, by the said sub-clause and in particular, and in particular, nothing in the said nothing in the said sub-clause shall s ub-clause, shall affect the ope:ation of affect the operation of any existing any existing law in so far �s 1t rela� es law in so far it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent to, or prevent! the State fro,n ,nakzn g th� State from making any law presany law relatin� to, . .ical q��/1cnbing or empowering any authority (i) the P_rofessional or techn to prescribe, the professional or technifica tzons nec_essary Jo,· pr�ct1szng cal qualifications necessary for practising any profess!on or carrying_ on any occ·upat1on, trade or business, �y profe ssion or carrying on any operatiool trade or business . .. '' or . (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or con­ trolled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whe­ ther to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. . ..

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Kenya a y n e K f o n o ti tu ti s n o From tl1e C e ct io n (6) ?f th.i� s�tion if s b �u f o s n o si vi ro p any Article 28 _( l) Subject to the isions of sections 14 to 27 (1nclus1ve [1.e. the · ov pr i l Bi · e til Of · y an t 1a tl es g e 11 · a n o I p ers ·k 1 e . to 1. y or is _ be g. in be contravened is , en be s l1a n io t u it t s on C is s]) of th ht ig R of ·m (or, in tJ1e case of a person wl10 1s detain ed, 1f any ot·her pers . on · 1 11 t o 0 t· 10 a 1 · re 10 ers?n ) ,_ then, w1 thou pr ed p 1ne eta d tl1e to ion ! lat e r � n n o ti n e av r nt co 1 cl su s ge le al 1 cl 1s lawfully available. h1 r w te at m e m sa e th to t ec sp re 1 itl w n tio judice to any otller ac preme Court for redr�s: , Su e th to y pl ap ay m ) on rs pe r he ot that person (or that : on ti ic sd ri ju al in ig or ve l1a l al sh (2) The Supreme Cot1rt y erson in pursuance p an y b de ma ion cat pli ap y an ne n1i ter de d (a) to l1ear an of subscctior1 (l) of tl1is se c.tion; ('i)) to deier.111ine any question arising in tl1e cas e of any p erson which is referred ' to it i11 1:,t1rsL1ance ot· subsection (3) of tllis section. and m.2.y rna.l<l; s110h orders, issue such -..:vrits and give such directions as it may co11sid 1�r ap)_)rvr)riate for tl1e purp()Se of enforcing or securing the enforcement of �r1y of tl1e prc,visic1r1s of sections 14 to 27 (inclusive) of tllis Constit1:1tion. (3) lf in ;J.11y J)roceedings in any subordinate court any question arises as to tl1e contravention of any of tl"!e provisions of sections 14 to 27 (inclusive) of this ·Constitutio11, Ll1e person presiding in tI1at cou rt may, and shall ·if any party to the proceedings so reqt1ests, refer the question to tl1e Supreme Court unless, in his opinion, tl1e raisi11g of tl1e question is merely f rivolous or vexatious. (4)_ \:\/here a11y. quest�on is referred to tl1e Supreme Court in pursuance of subse?t1011 (3) of tl11s se�t1on,. tl1 e Supreme Court sliall give. its decision up on t�e quest10n and -�l1e court �n. w]11ch _ t l1e question arose sl1al l dispose of the case in acc�rdance w1tl1 t�1e dec1s1_on _or, 1f that decision is tlle subject of an appeal under sect1?n 180 of _this Co11st1t ut1on to tlie Cou rt of Appeal for Kenya or (whet�er mediately or direct) to the Judicial Committee in accordance with the decis ion of tl1e Court _of Appeal for Kenya, or, as tl1e case 'may b , of the Judiciil Committee, e ion (5) Parliament may co11fer upon the ddit a in rs e Supreme rt such pow Cou t tI1ose conferred br this section as may l a des ir . r o ap � pe ne ar ces to be sary • • b econfor· t e purpose of en abling that coti rt more i::r • • on · 1cti d is r Ju ei(ect1vely the to exe cis e r ferred upon 1·r by tl11·s secti.on. (6) The Chief Jt1stice may a k rc . . edu pr 1 e ru1es w1tl1 respect to tl1e practice and oc jt . · 1: of the Supreme Cotlrt 1 r 1at_ion d on li· e e to � tl1e. con juri sdic tion f i: pow ers and by or under tliis section ( n f c udi 1g h rules with withi n respe \V t b)aPP ct to tl1e time ·cations may be brotiglit � n� re ; t erences sha ll be ma de o . ur e C Sup rem the .. o1 to Article 182 · (I ) Sub� ect t1° ec s . to 1s · tl1 1 e t I · · ns of subsection (2) of prov1s1o an appeal s l1 all li· e as of r1g bY en · l1t to tl1e Sup r�me C giv s : . on 1on · ec1 d s · ourt fi11al f r om any subordinate cour t or a . dingswal o rt martia I_ 1n any e pro � c inal crim civil or questions as to tl1e interp et t� 0� fil' st1 ion of t s qu� g t bein stitu Con � ion (not sti �ave been referred to the St � r:_me Court in pursuance of s ection 175 of_ t111s � o 21 t�on) �r as to tl1e cont rav� t t o n of a�y of the provisions of sections � the (1nclus1ve) of this Constituti�; to ( not Supreme Court i 11 purs uanc ?emg questions that have been referr . e Of section 28 (3) of tllis Constitution) -.

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(2) An appeal from a decision given by a subordinate court or a court-martial in any of the cases referred to in subsection (I) of this section: (a) shall no t lie �irect to the Court of Appeal for Kenya; and (b) shall no t lie direct to the Supreme Court if, under any law: (i) an appeal lies as of right from that decision to another subordinat e court or court-martial; or (ii) an appeal lies from that decision ·to another subordinate court or court-martial with the leave of tl1e court tl1at gave the decision or of some .other court and that leave l1as not been withheld. (3) An appeal shall lie as of right to the Supre1ne Court from final decisions given by any sub _o�dinate court in any case in whicl1, if the decision of the subordinate court were a dec1s1on of the Supreme Court, tl1en, subject to the provisions of subsec­ tion (5) of section 181 of this Constitution, an appeal would lie as of right to the Judicial Committee under the· said section 181. Provided that: (a) an appeal shall not lie to the Supreme Court from a decision given by a subordinate court in any such case if, under any law: (i) an appeal lies as of right from that decision to the Court of Appea] for Kenya; or (ii) an appeal lies from that decision to tl1e Court of i\ppeai for Xenya with ihe leave of the court that gav,e tl1e decisi.011 or c,f som.e other court and ·that leave has not been ,vithrield; a11d (b) an appeal shall not lie direct to the Court of Appeal for K.enya or direct to the Supreme Court from a decision given by a subordinate court in any such case if, under any law: (i) an appeal lies as of right from that decision to another subordinate court; or e court with inat ord sub (ii) a.n appeal lies from that decision to an?ther _ the leave of the court that gave the dec1s1on or of some other court and that leave ha s been withheld. (4) An appeal shall lie from a subordinate court or a court-ma1tial to: (a) the Supreme Court; or (b) the Court of Appeal for Kenya, . . . in such cases (other than the cases referred to 1n subsection (1) or subsection (3) of this section) as may be prescribed by any law· Some other Commonwealth countries in Africa retain the English tradition of the s�prem �c y of Parliament; but some of them retain a form of judi�ial review through the English Priv y Council, in t he manner illustrated above in the·case of L1 yanage v. The Queen.

Dahomey

_to re p er ow d ibe scr pre en s giv n bee n e hav ev t:s urt r Co a e ; I s cr 1· Fra· ncophonic states the Sup em the ,. . COnstitut1onality of laws or propose.d I a_ws. So . m· e Supreme Courts h ave been given ,��_nal powers e.g., to review the const1tut1onal1t y of a·�oposed treaties ·to appoint the Pre&'lw::nts of the legislative chambers, and to a.ct as the au 1 or. Consider the following provisions of the 1964 Constitution of Dahomey.

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st o e l1 th u ig a 1e h ty tl ri e b f ll o a sh . the Sta� ' rt u o C . e in re p u S . . e Art ic1e 83 . Til d in th e acco unts o f s an er tt a m l . 1a 1c d . JU d an e iv at tr is in the , m ad , al 11 o ti u it st n in co State. m e r e r p e u u o S th C f t. o s 11 io is c e d m o fr l a e p p Tllere shall be no a s, ie it on or up th l u al } _a t� en ri m ju rn ve go ic sd 1e f tl n Ioni Jo ui g in d in b e b l al sh They s. t 1e 1 r 1o tl u a I · 1a · 1c d . · d Ju n a e v ti a tr is in ·. m d . a ll a n and u p o 1o ut 1t st l may be pro. : on e na b nc u to d re la ec d n ee b as l1 1 cl No provisio11 whi mulgated or implemented. n at io e th in est of �· s op it qu re ve gi l al sh rt ou C ne e1 pr Su e Th . Article 84 r promulgation. ei re th fo be S \1/ la of y lit 11a io t1t tit 11s co e th on Head of State es ls, cre d l bil de an al on o nt ulat me reg rn ve n, Go l 1e t by ed ult ns co be all It sl1 · 1 l s. cia ter di at d ju m an e acts and, more generally, 011 all adminjstrativ It may finally, upon tl1e request of tl1e I-lead o f State or of the Governme nt be et1trt1st ed with tl1e drawing up a11d codification o f all legislative and regulato; texts prior to tl1eir ex,.:1.mi11ation by tl1e National Assembly. Article 85. Tl1e Supren1e Court sl1all include four Chambers: tl1e Constitt1tio11al CI1amber; tl1e Adn1i11istra.tive Cl1a1nber; tl1e J·udicial Cl1amber; the f\.ccot111ts Cl1an1ber. A law sl1all stipulate tl1e co1npositio11 organization, powers and functioning of tl1e Supreme Court. Artic]e 86. T�1e President of tl1e Supreme Court sl1all be appoin t ed for su , years by tl1e President of tl1e Republic. h Tlie _functioi1 s of President of tl1e Supren1e Court shall be incompat ib le wi�1 e _exer ise ?� any parliamentary mandate, of a11y public employment of any pro}iesSlOna f act1v1ty and of any higl1 ofllce of national rep resentation. ' Article 87. The President s Of tie I c l 1ambers and the Counselors shall rt· appointed by tile pr 1.de11t of tl1e Rept1 blic on the proposal of the President_of the Supreme Court · ��� ey may not be removed law shall dete('llllll"t from A office. the statute of t'le • inag1strates of tl1e Supreme Court . . . n� . . Article 62. Tl1e financial I_aws s11 a1I ources a.� res fi determine nancial the obligations of tlie State R gu 1at s n a c� fin e th 1 sl l of al l n ro tio nt ta co e en th em pl im ! · laws subject to tlle sub �eqie11t aui�it ou C me of the Nation's accounts by the Supre . . 1n . 0f the • La'Ns perta1n . g to national 1ann11 es i v objec 1g shall P the �. ine determ t economic and social action f tt1e , State . , 6 lh . Article 65. Tl1e Gover11ment . . sk may aID r , 10. o�der to car ry out its prog , � ¢ National Assembly to autlloriz . e 1!, for a l tlll ted period, t o take. througl1 ordioaII . measures tl1at are normal!y l wit111n t h e domain of law. . d The _ordinances sl1all be . . aft . enac cted in meetings of the Council of M1n1stersb 'C$' . consultation with the Sup 1 l u p reme . ·r ourt l b Th e n e t upo h s a ce tion bu t shall become null e for 11 com o ·,1� int y · . to P'arliament before t l1e �nd void if tlie bill for their rati fication is not subIJlf · da e set by the enabling act.

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the time limit o refe red to in n the fi r st paragraph of the xpiratio � � the At � nances m y be modifi e d ord1 only by law the in those matters which rt1cle, � t _ sen � pre _ are within the leg1slat1ve domain. Article 6!. Bill� �nd amend��n�s. which do not fall within tl1e domain of 1nadID1ss1ble. InadID1ss1b1l1ty shall be decided by the President of the be shall law National Assembly. In cas � of dispute, the .Supreme Court, at the request of tl1e Government or of the National Assembly, shall rule witl1in a time limit of eight nt Preside the of days. Article 94. If the Supr�me Court, the matter havi11g been referred to it by _ the President o � the Republ1c or b � the President of the National Assembly, shall c �mm1�ment co ?tains a clat1se contrary to the Consti­ d�lare that an 1n!ernat1onal _ tution, th.e authorization to rat1fy th1s commttment may be given only after amend­ ment of the Constitution. Judicial Review and the Rule of Law

F rom International Commission of Jurists, The Dyna,nic Aspects of the Ri1le of Law in the Modem Age, Bangkok Conference, 1965, page 179; (Conclusions of Committee I). This Committee has reached tl1e following furtl1er Conclusions relating to the guarantee of individual freedom and dignity ,vithin the framework of a repre­ sentative government: (1) In a State in which the Rule of Law prevails there should be effecti· e machinery for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, ,.rvhett1er or not the�e rights and freedoms a.re guaranteed by a written constitt1tion. (2) In countries where the safeguards afforded by well-establisl1ed constitu­ tional conventions and traditions are inadequate, it is desirable that the rights. guaranteed and the judicial procedures to enforce tl1em sl1ould be incorporated in a written constitution. (3) While governments sb.ould of their own volition refrain from action infrin ging fundamental rights and freedoms, the ultimate determination as to whe­ ther the law or an executive or administrative act infringes those rights and freedoms shoul� be vested in th e Courts. (4) The ultimate protection of the individual in � society �overned by the Rule of Law depends upon the existence of an enl1gl1tened, independent and _ _ _ cour�� eous Judiciary, and upon adequate prov1s1on for the speedy and effective adm101stration of justice. 11

SECTION 7 A COMPARISION: THE REJECTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN' FRANCE Introductory Note

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French constitutional theory has affected the constitu!ional de:velopment of all French­ SJ)eaking Africa n states; further, by exploring it, we c3:n gain some idea of some of the argu­ men ts against the theory of judicial review, and consider the relevance of these arguments to develo ping co untries like Ethiopia.

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ial Revie w ic f ud o J n o ti ec ej R ch n re F 1or the Reasons r s r e w o P f o n o ti a r a p e S f o e in tr c o D 1 / c n e r F e h T on m e th om C aw L d an ld or W aw } L (A e ( g iv at • tr is in m d . A • z 1 t), I J' c n e From Schwartz, rr;-r n tio ra e pa th of powers fo se , ld or w w a -l on m m co . nns a ved ece I n Franee, as 1· 0 the , �r s h h a e ev er w o th , e 1n r tr c d i e h ? T an . sm li a n o ti u it st n co f o rn���tone co n o r I m ye w m a co e 1s h t h u ic h acc w rn.,i1.1.1. to sto t a 1 . tl e k li n u y ll · o h w · 1nterpretati0 0 attempts b� 1e�1·s1ature and of d r o c e r a _ is . ry to 1 1s l l a n Anglo-American constitutio the execut ive branch. French const1t ution aJ the ory> courts to r estrain excesses by fluenced by tJ1e memory of consta nt obst ructi in on en be 1 as 1 , d n ha r he ot e 00 th ts of appeal under r aw u. -l co on m m co e th -ts en 1n le ar P e th by _ w as fe�t that they had u.nduly oppo� of the executive brancl1 1t , ly ng ro w or tly 1 l ig R e. im eg R n ie nc A the er to r ns de co or 1n ve s ir the rm fo own re e v i at tr is in m d a y ar ss ce e n d ar w to s rt o f ef es gl e ug es str th e. (i. �f y or en we em bet !-11e th is ... t ''� s. ve ti ga ro e pr d an es g e il iv pr t on the country 's ec l ta eff en m tri de e th Ot d an ) ive ut ec ex e th d an s the Par/eme11t ent ich equ wh bs su th wi t French us str di p ee d e th i11s pla ex c h 1i v1l n adm.i11jstratio ed ult at ich · the res wh d time of an s, itie tiv ac al ici j11d all d \ve vie ers alc n-m Constitutio l icia jud and adminis, of the ly on t no n tio ara sep te ple com a in on uti vol e lt tl1e First ." ons icti isd tive [Citing jur stra ini adm d an l icia d ji1 e th of also but 11s, ctio 1 ft11. trative \Valir1e, Droit .,tJ.dn1i1zistratif]. In tl1e Anglo-Ame rican world the struggle of the com­ mon-law courts ,,1,1itl1 tl1e e,�ecutive led to the supremacy of the courts over the execu · tive. In France a lilce con,flict l1as led to tl1e opposite result. 1�11e r1ecessity of destroying tl1e Parlen1e1zts was one of the dominant ideas of the Co11stitt1ent 1.\ssernbly of 1789 ... Tl1e consequence was the enactment of tl1e basic la\'v' of A.ugust 16-2,i, 1790, tl1at proclaimed the separation of administrative and judic�a� fun?tions: ''Jt1dicial functions are an d will always remain distinct �rorn adII:-1n1strat1ve ft1nctions. Judges may not, under penalty of forfeiture of office> inter[e�e in any manner with tl1e workings of administrative bodies, nor summon adnun1strators before tl1 em in connection witl1 the exercise of their functions.'' But_ �her e_ di d t�is enactment I ea,,e tl1 e i 11divi d ual citizen ad versely affected by adnu? istratrve �ctio_n? In actual fact l1e was left with· only whatever remedy was availa?le t� I111n 1n tl1e admi11istration itself. '' Actually, though the reform was procl�1 1? ed �n l790, it was only l1alf realized : the J·udges were indeed prevented from adrrun1ster111 g ' but tl1e adnunis · ..On · · trators were not prevented from J·Udg1ng - o - ntrarr, the y were gi. ven ev ery i11centive to jud ge To be specific let us imagine the � ot cann a ci_ tze _w 10 has _a complaint against tl1e administ;a s law' court Th 1 tio e n o t ce1ve l�s complaint; to wl1on1, but y ed then can l 1e bring it? rem no . �� H� ha s · · or . e a pet1t1on, a l1umbl e request of ed · · e'1the : ': V1t h· !he autl1or of �be act_ comp1ru� ,.'' ' witl1 l1is s11p erior. . . . Tllu s t 11e. ad e. g d n J o m1n1s trat1o n its w u I nted was appo i [Quoting from Waline] Tlze Absence _of an Enforceable Bill o.t · Rights . �he view prevailing in Pre ·'tea" at . . · t! nc h cot1st1tut1onal theo ry that the judges were pote n 111odi· tion�ires'' or enemies of po ul P� fied in the 5tl1 Republic co�stf ien1ocracy was coupled with the view (now sornewbat peo 0 w�s s_upren1e The implic ation �� io_n ). that the le�slative branch as the orga_n of,!� econ· I . t his i s that the re 1s no enforceable ''bill of rights s�itut,on cannot ' �duaJ'S st op the ]e g · 1a right s in France depend up �� :::;e from _enacting any la\v. As Basu put it: "The ind1v1 er1' � sove re i gn will of the legislature as in Engla nd... : rvidual , o o visi pro n for the annulment f a � 1 a es on on the �Otlnd that it encroach up ti0n0 of� �etty.'' While the government ''�ol � ( g t� o f Man'', the Revolutio · emn Y affirms'' its dedication to the "l)eclara · t,e tbt­ essent1al huma n rigl1ts' the "D nary docu ment which .decla res what were thought to, . .eclaration'' has no real law ble cea status as enfor

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er nm ent under Law; a Civilian View'', in Gove ''G ov , Tu ne m Fro rnment under iaw. (1956), pages 36-38, 41-42.

... Strange as it m�y appear, the French system of government failed, during n1 th ne of e tee�th ce n!ur y and t�e first half of the twentieth pa rt er lar g e th _ , to gjve _ pr ot ection against legislative action contrary to the constit e pe op l th e to ution. ... The justificatio� of judicial_ r �view of legislation given by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison seems, 1t 1s tr. ue, to have a paramount value .... [Mar shall's] �iew s ha ve an intrinsic strength wl1ich 1nade them valid anywhere. They . are shared_ �n F� ance. 1:h_e reason l1owever, why tl1ey were given very little The control the Par/ements exercised by prac�cal recogn1t1on 1s a po!ttical one. _ the highest courts of the A_nczen Regim_e over royal ordinances introducing needed reforms had been so reactionary that Jt resulted in a great popular dissatisfaction with !he courts. T�e �evolutionary l�gislation tl1us led to the attribution of a rigid mea n1ng to the pr1nc1ple of separation of powers. Especially was erected a wall barring the. judiciary from interference witl1 any legislative or administrative action. In the theory of the revolutionary legislation--which happily was no longer the theory of the drafters of the Code-the judiciary \Vas entrusted only witl1 tl1 e mechanical application of a statute. . .. Such an author as Duguit, stressing the importance of the principle of legality, devotes fifteen pages to the rigl1t of the people to resist oppression, considered as the u/timum remedium against illegality. . .. It must be added that, if the last few years l1ave \vitnessed a definite increase in judicial review in European countries - its principle has been adnJ.itted by the Italian Constitution and it is already in operation in Germany - the Frencl1 constic tutionalists remain faithful to their tradition. Everyo11e agrees tha.t, tl1eoretically, a statute contrary to the Constitution is not law and that a system of go,1ernment which does not permit the courts to disregard an unconstitutional statute binds the courts to the will of the legislature and leaves the latter with powers tl1eoretically unlimited. Most writers, however, although contrary vie,:vs \.Vere held a few decades ago, balk at the difficulty of organizing a satisfactory control. The legislature must be deemed to obey the law. If, therefore, the courts are authorized to pas� on the matter, they do so, to a certain extent, as courts of appeal from the legislature. They ''review'' the legislation. They assert a judicial ''supr�ma?y'', w�1i�h does n?t seem to conform to the constitution any more than a leg1slat1ve unl1m1ted pov1er. So functioning the courts can curb the legislative will though the legislatu r e l�as been vested with the exercise of popular sovereignty. Courts ca11 be a ''negative chamber''; they can establish ''government by judiciary'', �ardly less danger _ �us under nor mal circumstances than an uncontrol]ed power given to tl1e leg1slat1ve bod y.

The Rejection of Judicial Review by th.e C onstitutional Assembly Which Framed the Fourth Republic Constitution From the Debates of til e Constitutional "commission (Sea,ice de la Con1missio11, 19 a tra , m 57) ste (19 Sy w il La Civ e Tl1 n, hra Me V on d ate in nsl and reproduced s 46) Pages 1 61-163.

. The following discussions of the problem of the constitutional review of legislation occurred . dllri_ ng the drafting · 1946 ber Octo of 27 tion stitu Con c ubli Rep of the Fourth

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itu e te it m om C nt . A al n se · o ti tu ti s ns Co m. blyj e . th f o ( n Sessio : 6 4 19 ly u J 1 1 , y a d s r u l1 . . on T h w ac o n re e control of e th -W .t) 1s al c1 so , ip il l1 P tht The Chairman (A ndre s. w la f o ty li a n o ti u it st n o c ed to the_ princ�pl e of ch ta at ly rm fi is P R M he the Coster-Floret (MRP).--T r to is � f n th ra _a gu . t �s he co T it �. w a l_ io ut of ity al naU� , on ti tu ti ns co control of th e em -d ti an an 1s tic is ra th oc e; ic st o Ju pr of t ur cedure.. co e em pr su a . shouId not be " th e, e. op or 1 W pe e, e er th y e, sa to op pr is at tl1 ose a : n. ig re ve so e th be ly on It can control by popular referendum. 1 ne et ) an ys ale i c_ pa n s? io ct 'a d _ . 1 -- I believe : � ica b� pu re e up ro (G x ou rd Ba Jacqties _ mr op1mon, the custom, ; a. In ul rm fo nt c1e etn 1n an is ] AL OS OP PR . .P .R tI1at tliis [M ced , du orr ro uv int po de ces ex i1r before the po rs ou rec e th to ct pe res at least witl1 it nal tio the itu of nst ol co ntr co y of law�. ' the s ard tow p ste t firs tl1e is at, t 'E. Conseil d n tio all to isla d leg n e· ext this control o t c ati ocr em ti-d an be uld wo it w ho I fail to see wl1icl1 11as entered i11to our traditions by the side-door. During the electoral campaign I l1ave bee n able to establish that, far from beirig indifferent to tl1is question, tl1e people desire a legal guarantee for their rights. As for determini11g wl10 shall pronounce upon the constitutionality of laws1 tl1is is a point on ·,;1hich X am ready to compromise. I have, however, prepared a draft statute providing for a suprerne court of justice, and would be glad if it were 1 gi,1en your fa,1orable attentio11. Sucl1 a cot1rt, in my opi11ion, sl1 ould no.t l1ave for its sole role the reviewing of tl1e cor1stitu1.ionality of laws; I am much more attached to democratic principl e.1 tl1an some of my colleagues seem to believe. But I tl1 ink it would be possible lo i· entrtist this t::1slc to a court tl1at would have other functions - for instance the functio n �f adjudicating co11flicts of competence between civil add adrninistr;tive jurisdic­ �1011s, or �gai11, following a11 idea cl1erished by our cl1 ariman, tl1e function of verify· 1ng election procedt1res. For me, anyway, i� se�n1s more exact to speak of a plea of unconstitutio na_liry . a of control 0� constittitionality; le cJp prin the b·ut I repeat tl1at, wh ile maintaining �� � pro Y posal, 1 am ready to con1promise in working out tl1e details. hU rig any case, it i? imposs�ble tl1 at tl1ere sho uld . be of guarantee oth er no tl1a. I� cou r? e !o 111surrect1on set fo rtl 1 in· 1 D i s ee[l15 Ri gh tl ts e ecl of ara , tio wh n ch �� �i � to 11 c l11ldisl 1 and dangerot1s.

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' the Paul Bastid (Radical Socia1-ist . to p pa�, arty).--! _a1n _l1ostile, for my ow11 , control of tl1e conslitutio11alit elll ooi O f • laws, wh1c h 1s contrary to our rno5r a Y custo�s. But if yoti i tl sist on it icsl o b � t e questions whicli do n o t depend at lea�t do not entrust to a referendum thes ee5econo . tbe on to pop ula r it st suf f r age entr . u Wh y not C assembly? 0 ca 1:'he Cl1air m . ri . an.--I insist u P On recalling e • • J1l A the ) In my perso11al name, that e· xctperience witl1 the Supr till , t s . ru . . · · · e1ne C ourt has p ent . O us t _ rov�d dangero JU 1c1ary w1tl1 the that 1t 1s d'. ·u control of the const1t e 1 ut 1o e nt na l1t y. ' Sucl1 a govern?'1 b� ;1},s--:l1#P . (Gouver: ne111ent des ..Tu es et � 1 f:urte co,1tre Ia Legis g Social eat,x studell1 : (1921) 1s the title of an lat ion of An1erican law) enharl influl�;tial book written by Edouard Lam bert, � d. o\1111 , s ces t powers of the 10 s nd , reactionary forces , a

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ds progress.* In m� opinion, the control of the constitutionality towar n �tio evol anY d , can onl y be exercised by referendum. accepte if ws, of Ja But as to what should t�is contr?l- be _ ex�rcised ? It would be very difficult to apply _wherever the De�larat1on of Ri?hts !s 1nvolv�d. This Declaration procl aims certa1� !1u?1ber of l_ 1 bert1es. 3: of an d likewise establisl1es that tl1.e l a·w ence exis� the (JoiJ. will d�terID1ne the �irmts of their exercise. There wol1 ld tl1us be tl1. e danger of b eing �bl1g�d t� submit almost every law,. fo_r exa_mple _l�ws relat i. ve to the press or to nat1onal1zation, to a referendum ... (deletions 111 or1g1nal). Btit tl1.e abuse of the referendum could be dangerous for the democracy. Jacques Bardoux.--Consider·ing the present tl1i11ki11g of tl1e Committee I do not demand a vote upon tl1e questio11 of setti11g tip a j11dicial control .

French Solutions to the Problem of Keeping Government under La,v

·rhe Conseil d'Etat and Review of Adrni11istrati1-1e Acts From Tune, Joe.cit., pages 43-45, 51, 53-54. .. . In the formulation of the principle of legal ity as made by Duguit this .appears in a striking manner: ''No organ of the State may render an individual decision which would not conform to a general rule previously stated." Althougl1 Duguit bas previously considered, almost as a tl1eoretical matte1�, the problem of unconstitutional staiutes; when l1e comes to express the p1·inciple of Government under Law, he seems to think only in terms of control of executive or adr.a.i11istrative action. To the principle so understoo d, he gives the greatest importance. He sees in it the fundamental protection of the individual. ''One can assert, he writes ''that it does not, it cannot, it must not, receive any exception. A society v1hicl1 woul d not accept it or would accept it only with limitations or exceptions, would not actually live un der a government of !av,s.'' He specifies elsewhere that there is no government of laws if the principle is not enforced by means of a l1igh court, offering full gu .aranties of learning, independence and impartiality, and able to pass on any decision asserted to have been made outside tl1e legal �tandards. But it remains true that as there he refers only to the control of executive or ad­ ministrative action he expresses the principle of legal ity. in sury_risingly 1:arrovv terms. Nevertheless, the French pride them.sel ves 011 the1� trad1i1onal review �f admin istrative acts and feel in this review ·they l1ave a s11ffi.c1ent safeguar d for their liberties. . .. Is this view justified ? It seems so, at least in the Frenc_h _ system of government and in French pol itical life. The liberties of a group of c1t1zen� may, to be sure, � threatened by the legislature. The danger i� not m�rely theoretical. It .1�, however, highly exceptional in a democracy and, as said prev101:1sly, F:encl1 experience leads to the general opinion in that country that tl1e remedies against the danger w? uld be as dangerous as the danger itself. On the other ha!ld,. tl1e powers to make e1 tl1er regu�ations or individual veste d in the Prem1�r or the !ne1ub7rs _of tl1e decisions, a C binet, the ''Prefets'', wh. o represent tl1e government 1n the various d1str1cts of 9 '

cial di ju of re • Refer to the r tu '' na tic ra oc em nd '·u or '' tic ra oc em ''d . eact·tngs in ct·ion 5 on the . Se . . · . tra te tl1e sam re�ew, and to the readings from actual cases in the ne xt Section w h.tcl1 ma� 1:·11us '. ·de . Point , especially Lochner v. New York; consid er also other, 111or�,recent ? �c1s,1f ns of the Un�!e � a as ll we as e siv States res og pr a be n ca t ur p Co Su reme Court which m ay show that the ; .actJ onary'' influen . ce

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t. They may be great er--alt h , an rt o p im ry ve e . ar s or ou �\ • a M e 1 l t d n a , , n an ed n o th th us te ti of e e or m si t h e Na st . lea la mi r· at r pow tii_1 � --o lt ' c� � di . is 1 1 o 1s r a p City ou rs o n y a th 1e d M a l t e , rs a general co. 1n o rn e v o e th G C ' es ri ta re ec nc1h S ie tl , t e n d P 1 s e r s u t· n o 1 e o u t c a h in t t re ea f a 1r o rs e to w o p in se e th vi dlla] di t, n e v e y n a 1 11 e s. t ta S e �r th , rd o ct o in t11e United !a ep f d o er i tt at a rt m a on of s a t, o n l il w t n e 1n ia rl a P t t w n o l e n il b t�e liben: I .b t·1 The m ur 13: c _ rl a P e h T l. il w r o ri te In e th f o ry ta re c e S e i, e; _ � : �li r e ration al dist ri a o m g in av h f o se o p ur p _ 1e l t ti bu r fo on , ay m r o ay M 1e T l s. er ak b of s n er 1� k o tl a _ n b e and may not� rd u b � re a h 1c l1 w s le ru of b read in tlie city, make id n a_ buses, forb id o ai rt to av ce , ay � e H . st re te in c li ub p mav n sufficient])' justified by tlie , en h h w am ic a er m al n ca 1o ag ss !e i ro p y b by ser ss pa f o es tir ct pi f o g n ki ta the 1 ual v y s �r _ t te la ga gu ul re or om pr di in y il da id or ay M or t fe re P . re su ea m a tic as dr o be to m of rel1g1on, or freedom · �o ee fr 1, cl ee sp of m do ee fr ge in fr in measur es w li ich may . s on or n rs ai pe rt in ce rta d ce ar w to id y t_ ili eas1 st ho of e tis ca e b r e h it e y, l b m se as of m 1s n do ate ee re e. Fr th ac ed pe e l1 t much 1g t11 ec ot 1)r of e sir de le so l1 t e th v,1i 11 e ev or ive ut e ec th ch ex of an br rs ce of offi , st the lea at , or rs ce offi l ca lo of 11s mor e by actio gover11 me11 t, tl1ar1 by legislative actio11s. ... action e ativ istr 1ide for suc l1 cases, it l1 as be en n ecessary to pla ce admin To pro\ il 11se Co the D'Etat] have . [i.e s urt co l cia spe ce an Fr in l Btr l. 1tro co1 al under j11clici t rge cha of con­ in are s, r cou ry ina ord n tha ly cal cifi spe re 1 n1o icl wl1 , been i11stituted trol of tl1e legality of exec:utive and administrative action. . .. The Co11seil d'Etat sti ll remains an advisory body of the Government under : denl depen i fully a as acts it n e, judg a as acts it e r, 1 v owe n, } Wl1e s ance 1rnst ctrtai11 circt . court. Tl1 e Co11seil is e\1en divided into administrative sections and ju dicia l sections. , : nl importa most tl1e in only s; section l judicia the by e are mad cisions e d l judicia The cases do four 111 e111bers of t l1 e administrative sections unite with the Vice-Presidenl '1 and nine members of the judicial sections to arrive at a decision. If tl1e Cons�il d'Etat i11 its judicia l capacity may be considered as an in depen ?�n l cou:t, the _question,then may be asked ,v l 1y jurisdiction on t l 1e legality of admi rus· o a . r t l s legi trat1ve action s l 1ould not be given to the normal judicial courts. If t11e . no fou be now· !rusts a �ourt, wl1y not tl1e ordinary cot1rts? Tl1e answer should not o� l y in t l1� �eig�t of tradition. It is true tl1at no one today fears politica l interferen� . w_itil a?m1 111strat1:1e action by t l 1e cot1rts. The jt1stification for tl 1 e existen ce 0� a�I· . 10 ned trai n str�t! ve c? urts IS now diff y ere 1 , t. I: lies i11 t l1 e need for judges speciall . � ob!� a 1!11n1str_at1ve law and e11dowed w1tl1 ready understanding of the special pr n · . Adm. . rtat ce w111c l 1 arise from administ rat·1ve action 1 n1strative law is not on l y a : . . . udge5 · fieId of t h e Iaw a fie1 d in wI11c · l1 Iaw_ c_a11 b� properly adrn1n1stered only by J an� , wl1 0 know tl1e i1 1 tricacies of tl1e adirun1strat1,,e t c str its u ure fl!I ' in n1acl1inery botl1 �t ·1on1· ng. Fortuna .1 n 1·ts f un..., gene y b tely Or t ' it d e · 1 1as be�ome a_ special law, inspir . . , allY n legal principles, bu t ada pted to tie fi 10 inatter with wh 1cl1 it deals and which,_. allY l1as deve l oped special rttl me�be�s of tl1e Consei/ d'Etat, tl1en, are tr_ adia;: o f t appointed after an exa;���liin di t oin ap ertn g from tl1e for that � p :IIl l]lell used ordinary jt1dges, aild mtich ore n the dif ficu lt. �ro l m T 1ey Y?� inon come no w wl10 l 1ave g011e throu 11 the rr;l ni s e -of. nu Ad ea o s N l e na th io at dy stu of f � � �� d e Sc l 1ool (Ec ol Natio,1';1e d'A nii,zzSr�, kn t len xcel atzon) ; e an they attain have ed ledge of ad111inistration and an excel l ent prepa.ration for t l1eir functions.

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As Professor ,:-unc indic rt . . at . . . , . . ates th e Conse_,I_ d Eta.I 1s a special adm1n1str 1� co�ejud� at the apex of a hierarch y of infer·1 r a <:> dministrative courts - all of them out side tbe bran�h 0� government and there�0.: 10 theory not a Yet , ystem judicial exerclses Judicial functions part of the s . lf and pri es itse on its ''independence••.

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We shall consider the functions of the Consei/ in more detail in 1 t h ex mine some problem� of_ administrative law. For the moment _we�=; �o�r��r: �t e��: t e � ca n not declare leg1slat1ve enactme nts - or government . acts val 1di y p�rfio.......... sezl rnl�d purs?ant . be unc onstitutional. It doe s review the legal i't y 0 r adm1n1s ra to legislation - to t t1v e actio n · . · . t orc fi n e e th e con · n. o stit oes uti on aga1nst a clear legislative com.. mand. but 1t d or y appears to hold that o rdinary ·udges Note too, that French the · are not espec1a 11 · y 3 , . · · czs re e e v1ew c�m�tte d to the c_on_sei/. A special corps of ''e]ite'' law e� 1 th �ropet�nt tf o exth yer s i . 1s ro e, and t h e _fteld 1s seen as a d1st1nct specialized branch caII'ing not on 1Y is recru1ted or for specialized tribunals, but for specialized, career lawyers.'

The Constitutional Council - an ad ho c Age11cy to Revie�v t/1e Constitutionality of Proposed Laws From the Constitution of the F(ftli Republic, 1958. Article 56. The Constitutional Council has nine members wJ1ose term of office lasts for nine years and is n o t renewa?le. Its meinbers are a;pointed by tl1 irds every three year�. Three membe:s are n.on1.1nated by tl1e President of the Republic, three by the President of the National Assembly, tl1ree by tl1e President o f tl1e Senate. In addition to the nine mernbers provided for above, former Pr�sidents of the Republic are ex officio life-members of the Co11stitutional Co11ncil. The President is appointed by the President o f tl1e Republic. I-le has a casting vote. Article 57. The functions o f a member of the Constit11tio11al Council are incompatible with those o f a Minister o r member of Parliament. Other positions incompatible with membership of the Council are listed in an organic law. Article 58. The Constitutional Council supervises tl1e electio11 of the President of the Republic, with a view to ensuring its regularity. It investigates objections and proclaims the result. Article 59. The Constituti onal Co uncil decides, in disputed cases, on the regularity of the election of Deputies and Se11ators. Article 60. The Constituti onai Council supervises tl1e cond�ct of referenda with a view to ensuring their regularity, and proclaims the results. Article 61. Organic laws, before their promulga�ion? and the rules of pr?cedure of the Parliamentary assemblies, before their appl1� at1on, mu?t be_ submitted t? the Constitutional Council, which pronounces on their c onform1ty with the Consti­

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ti o_nal itu st on e th o t ed itt bm su �e ay m s w <; la r F� the same purpose , [ordinary] C�u�c11, before their promulgation, by the President o f the Republic, tl1e Prime Minister or the President either assembly. onstitution�l C 1e tl , hs ap gr ra pa g in ed ec pr In the cases provided fo r in th e two Council decides within a month. At th e request of tl1e Government, ho wever, 1f the matter is urgent, this period m ay be reduced to a week. . . . o­ pr l ci n ou l C na 1o ut 1t st on C 1e tl to In thes e above-mentioned cases, reference l ongs the period allowed for promulgation. ed at lg u m ro p e b t o n y a m al n o ti _,Affi_cle 62. A provis·ion declared unconstitu or a i:,pI1ed. e ar ey l. ea p ap o t_ t je b � � su t � n� . re a l ci n io u is o C ns al n o f ti o u e it st th n o C b'1n· d1�ng� s . 1e 1t or th au l 1a 1c d Ju d an e iv at tr is o n public authorities an d o n all admin

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0 Wo1 Article 63.A ·n orgai1ic r�. · rr f r e e b 11 to · ow es cd ur d 1n 10 e oc e pr e tl 1e in . of t·he Const·t . . g . I·onal Council t u . I matters . . ' . ing t . d es pu is ay . 1 h m I c. 11 be aid be fore w 11n l 1t ,v its lim etim 1e tl it•• to it and in particular •,., j . 3 s -3 e 2 g 3 a , p ) 0 6 19 ( , n o ti tu ti s n o From Pickles, Tl1e Frenc/1. C 1 t v n se ai r en s _ ce an in . no t so in al � is a i� ion l'he ... Tlle c011stitutional Counc . ch e, hi te w it nc�ioned _only on� m f� om C l na io ut it st on C a ad 1 1 : Foltrtll Reptiblic r wh1c� 1t was inventtd · fo es os rp pu e tl1 r fo or es nc sta m cu cir �. . . and then not in tlle tem ys to _ s i�h a l wh ia nt se ace es pl 1s s 1t, e as lik g in 1 l et m so much ,1 or , dy bo w ne e Th r fth ic, Fi e bl t pu _ an s Re i oe p d as haJll h rs ? we s po of e n tio -enlphasis on t11e separa et r pl om fa m fr 1s co e. n ... tio ra pa se e th e us ca be l ia nt se es e or m e th l .al is cil un in no Co l na tio sense a Supre me · it� nst Co tl1e t t11a te no to 11t rta po im It is , ers t h mb sen me ug pre tho its Of . h all at t rt mos cou a t a\t ' no is it , eed Ind Court. p has d one a ial h. y dic J onl j1 e, tim e ex som at g inin erienre, tra al leg of orrn f e so1n l1ad Tl1ough its rt1lings are bindi11g on courts of law, to the limited extent to which thev are lilcely to concern those courts, it l1as no control over them and receives no� fro1n tl1 em. /� Frencl1 constitutional convention arising from provisions of the -Co11stitutio11 of 1791 l1as led French courts consistently to refuse to consider any plea alleging the ·unconstitt1tionality of a law, and the new Constitution does nothing to 1nodify tl1is traditio11. The Constitutional Council is best tl1ought of as an adjunct to tl1e Prcside11t ir1 l1is functions of endeavouring to ensure respect for the Consti· tution. It can consider only a limited number of matters. . .. It can be set in motion (ex?ept ir1 �l�c_to�al disputes) only by a very limited number of people and canno! 1 of its �wn 1n1t1at1ve take up any poi11t. It is therefore an error to compare it in an� way vv1th the Supreme Court of the ·u .S.A ....

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1) Why does Professor Pickles conclude that tl1e Constitutional Council "is 001 a court at all'' but ratl1er a ''Presidential adjunct''? , 2) In Ameri_can, Indian and _ Japanese experience, as we shall see, cases calling · for a review of tl1e const1tut1onality of a legisla tiv enactment in the ab&lr�r.l e : �t are �a�e. T�e �sual constructional case ra ise ec sp a whether of s iss th ue e prov1s1on of leg1slatio11' as app 1·zed 111 . aniP� n . e A nal. · a sp ecific case IS const1tut x l · 1o · of .. th·1 s ffi·lg1 lt be a law ,vl1icl1 delegates i a to rs ge ne po ral censorship we . part kin c�d� i M1n1ster. suppose tl1e la' w says . ''Tl . . e th e t n a 1e M des1g 1n1ster rule may by a · of material 1 · 11 1'!1 be_ censored.'' U�constitutional? �ossibly n;t, : : � �� Court in Et11 i n1! g 1 ' w sely, eme hol d: extr 1 ''w IS hile del the ega tion slf l it does not necess � � m a e tl1_e la� unconstitutional.So long a� t�e ,. does not promulg # s P rul e s ti wh1 cl1 _ it vio l Con ate st u . on d aol' . free dom the of g u a r a n te e s' the 1aw is valid We (t . . an law h l1 e C e t. . ourt) wt·11 only review hl 1 rules promulgated under_ . · g . ·o i llen g it l-vlz en cha and if we get a specific case · law as applied to a specific complainant.,' a ) Can you s e e why thIS ? e · may be a wis e approach for the Court to tak · .. . . 9 I b) Assumzng � . . ot this is the w y w all ........ · � const1tutional adjudication us u y tituM 0pP . countries which er i � � lt, can you see why the French_ �'Cons� in Council '' may noi rov l . _ x d e (p th e zen sa cit m i e full protection to the of his constitutiona) , rigllts) as a system of judic review? ial -·

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c) Note again Pro�ess?r T?nc's imJ?lic�tion that it is less important to worry about th e const1tut1onal1ty of leg1slat1ve enactments than about the const·1· · �tfat1v tut1· ina1·1ty . '?f �d� · e r�les an d acts exercising delegated powers. io i pr n n 1 o IC e t sa N ot e 1 g y � ha t de ci sio ,, ns � of the Council are binding y ; � � ! . 3) , , on all adID1n1strat1ve and �ud1c1al authorities. What does this mean? If cases do not �ome to t�e �o_unc1l from ''judicial authorites'', if there is no appeal to the _ Cou�c1l fro� a Jud1c1al authority (e.g. the Conseil D'Etat), in what situa­ tions 1s Article 62 likely to have any application? om r m yo end establisl1mc11t of a Constitt1tional Council for Ethiopia? u Wo uld � 4) Why? AssuID.lng one were to be created, wl10 sl1ould serve on it? Does the existence of such a council preclude a system of judicial review in the courts?

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SECTION 8 JUDICIAL REVIEW IN OPERATION

CASES ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF THE COURTS TO INTERPRET AND ENF ORC E THE CONSTITUTION UNDER A SYSTEM OF JUDICAL REVIEW '

Introducto,·y Note In the pages which follow we will study four different cases v1hicl1 reflect the role and responsibility of the judicial branch of government t1nder a Constitt1itional system wl1ich entrusts the courts with powers of judicial review. Eac.h of the cases dealt with an issue of great importance, in a political� social or ecc,norriic sense, to the country. The opinions stating the decisions of tl1e court ar1d the opinion2 of dis­ senting Justices will afford an opportunity to see l1ow constitutional la-vv is developed tl1.rough the judicial process, how courts analyze Gonstitution al issues and the methods bj' whicll tl-ie�1 resolve them, how a cou.rt ''finds'' or ''fashion s'' the ''law'�, the values v-1hich courts may invoke to interpret and give meaning to broad general principles of the Constitution.

Example No. 1. The U.S. Supreme Court's Abortive Attempt to Interpret ''Due Process'' as a Limitation Against Economic Welfare Legislation Introductory Note Critics of the i nstitution of Judicial Review often arg11e that it exalts the judiciary to the positio n where ''c.onservative'' judges can frustrate social ref orms and economic policies adopted by a progressive governmen t. Critics may poin t to past Amercan experience - now largely a closed cl1apter of U.S . constitutional history, and sometimes not wel! u_nderstood - when the court developed the theory of ''substantive due process'' i.e. the. principle that th� d�e pr�cess guarantees of the 14th and 15th ame ndments (cf. Article 43 of the Revised c;o�stit�t1on) 1nclude_d n ot only_proce­ at1ve) proceedmgs affectmg :in �ur�l guarantees assuring fairness in judicial (and adm1�1s� , , g rantees th t any regulation . 1.nd1y1d� als' liberty or pro perty rights, but also ''s1,bstantzve � �� , _ imp1ngzng on one's liberty or righ.t to enjoy pro� erty must be rea�onab/e · . This principle _ deceptively simple to state - in volved th� court 1n .econ omic conl!oversy for about 60 years. U ntil about 1935 the C ourt developed an 1nterp;Ctat1 on of substantive �ue Process that often exalted ''property rights'' at the expense o f desired government regulation of business activities a.nd labou r relations. · . . During the Presidency of Franklin Ro osevelt the Supreme <;�w:t came under 1ncr�1ng �r1ticism, and Roosevelt himself threate ned t o ''pack the cou�t with younger, more liberal o urt from 9 to e th of e siz ud e t� e � as cre n i to n b o ati riz o s �Just�es y ee king C ongressional auth bit ices: �lthough the majority i n C ongress were sympathetic to Roosevelt s_ c��cem_, a �d , _ ro � ing ck pa his t ep acc terly cntical of the Court, a majority n C ongress still refused to _ . tu st1 n e co th t er bv st1 �osal on th e theory that it would create a most dangerous precedent to tion al role of the Court and its ''independence···

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Several of the older ultraconserva ti '. ot' ''mo ame bec . n h a' e of 70 or above). So the membersh ip of the Courtve1udtts The issue, l 1owever, soo t 1 l c a re r e ft (a d � �� re t b equ h ?en (w resi th� P ted oin it y app died o r reti s r j ! � ce � usti � i l1 e 1� s an se � ca l "" ra h tu · h a d� ar n n r wh isio s lie dec ish gu e a tin ich dis throug � to overule or " labii s� a e b � l! a g c ti a m e st sy government regulation of pr on s Approval) on tati i . Iim s '' cs roc e OJlerty" ed sucl1 strict "substantive du P . . ri ghts. . .1mmed'iately below are designed to 1·11 ust ra te th'1s experience briefly· Tl1e readings . . . . g problems 1n const1tut1onal developmen tin . res inte of ber um n a ts s he ex per1e s s olved in Eth iop ia, Assu� be e e ted t �u r l1 ge� sug ms ble pro l e tia �ss n ���er t1f;: _ d n T 1 y f er ma e use � be l en ul an c 1 xp r1_ _ n t eveloping 1� An 1e pia l,io Ii �:��w is to exist i n Et !in 1ons of the at ret erp 1nt l rcra Jud sti tuticn af Con � le rab esi und id avo 10 11 110, , t Jk ou b a th 1n .1ng ' ,r economic· develoip111lru d an s ,1e ,1 01 uem z t, JV, 1 1 : e 'bf patr co,n are ' ich i lvl Jzts g ,· ·.. "protected propel.1Y r

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l'. New York. r 11e c/1 Lo of se ca t/1e to 11d oi1 gr clc Ba ffistorical From Kelly and Harbison , op.cit., pages 496-498, 501, 511-512.

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In the generation after tl1e Civil War (1865) a gigan tic economic revolution tra:i1sfor1r1ed tl-ie U11ited States from an agrarian republic i n to the world's leading indtistrial !1ation. ... \:Vi1erea:1 ir1 1860 tl1,=re l1ad lJeen 11ot more tl1an 30,(X)() miles of railroads in th.e lJnitecl States, t)y 1900 there \Vere about 200,000 miles.Population gro\\1h and urba11izatio11 r1acl kept pace witl1 industrial development. In 1860 there were sor.ne 31,000,000 peo1Jie i11 the United States, of whom approximately 16 per cenl lived in cities; by 1900 tl1e nation's population exceeded 70,000,000 of whom almost 50 per cent lived i 11 cities. . Tl1e indL1stria1. re�olutio1 1 opened a new c l1apter in An1erican constitutio�al , h1stor�. Tl1e Const1tut1on of 1787 was written for an eigl1teenth century agranan republic of less than four million people. TI1 e same doc un1ent now had to serve as tl1e fra 111� of gover11ment for a 1 11oder11 urb an i 11dustrial society with all the new co1nplex social and economic pro blems i11l1e re11t i 11 .sucl1 a civilization.... . ;Yhat btisi!iess needed was a n1e�ns wl1ere by tl1e pre vaili11g doctrine o� '_'laissez: , fair� ecor1.0 m1 c theory could be written int o con pro ive pos it a as sti tt1tional law tect1on against ''unreasonable'' Iegislatio11 .. .. Tlle d_ue process clatise in tl1e firs t se ct io n of tl 1 e Fourtee n Amendme nt wf t s ve _tl11s purpose. I n a series of e1 '. 189 d a 18 oc 73 l1making decisio11s between n la tf1�� pieine _Co� rt revolutionized tl ) o� es� 1 e pr oc l1i st or ic � du e i te n rpr et at ion of an t� 111s establ1sl1ed tl1e Fourt ona u 1tu . e e n const th · Ai11endment. as t11e spec1"fic . autl1orization fo r tlie doctrine . of vested rigl1 ts. · . Tl11s constitutional r voI t.· f the · o 1on 1 1 t wa�, n �t a co?spiracy .It was a reflec _ the f 1 0 Ll � 1 g 1 ailin rev p econ on ic l i l . a o h y D of tl cupa l�1ssez-fa1re'' and the preoc country witl1 tile raJ)� · de��f) 1 Sll � n e opn1e nt of lt� na tu ra l resources. No gro p O 1 down togetlier and 1 tte d � � SIY tl1 e D changes 1n constitutional i n terpretati on Jp to extend niaximun1 �;0 1 rD t· n to tlie_ l?roperty of �m Th e � of erican industry. was a gradual one, in S t Jl w��c;� th_e decisions.resp uJile a e 1 tl onded slowly.to many �ifferent attorneys ,vl �g of v1!� l� came be for e it and to ch a nges 111 the poi n� ·cafitI� of tl1e Judges wlio were a . pp ed to tl1e courts. So involved in legal tee J1llhard� was the shift in tlle mean i} � ue process _tl1at most judges and lawyers s eef s reBI to have been aware of in es w�at was happeni n g. no wa s Yet th e revolution ·

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gr ad wa l s an d it unconscio·us; and when it was conpleted, the cour e �� u ec a � .b ts occupied a new pos1t1on of po we r and prestige in "�erican lfe as th e guardians of property.... Befor� 1850 �u� process was generally assumed to be pro:edural rather than a subst�nt1�e restriction upon governmental authority. That is, it g·uaranteed certain protectiv e nghts to an accused person before he could be deprivcl of his life, liberty, or property. Aft�r 1877, t�e Court gradually gave more a11d more recognition to the substantive_ conception of dt1e process of law and its identificaticn with the doctrine of veste _d r1g�. ts. Between 1877 and 1898 a flood of cases came up from the lower courts, 1n which ap pellants att a�ked state statutes attempting tc regulate corporate property or some pnvate vested interest. Always tl1e claim was tl1e same: t11e statute in que� tion? by imposing some limitation upo11 tl1e use of private property, constitut­ ed a v1olat1on of the due process clause of tl1e Fourtee11th Ame1dment.

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The ''cl�ssic'' case, giving a concrete illustration of the historica trend noted above is reproduced, 1n part, below.

Locl1ner v. New York

198 U.S. 45 (19Q5) Mr. Justice Peckham delivered the opinion of the Court .... The inclictment, it will be seen, charges that tl1e plaintiff ii error violated the I 10th section of Article 8, chapter 415, of tl1e Laws of 1897; lno·\;vn 8.S tl1e Iabo1· law of the state of New York, in that he wrongfully and. unlavft111y requi.red and permitted an employee working for him to work more tl1an �ixty ho·L1rs in one week .... [The New York statute] is not an act merely fixing tl1e nurrber of hours which shall con.stitute a legal day's work, but an absolute prohibition 11pon the employer permitting, under a.ny circumstances, more than te11 hours' \\Ork to be done in his establishment. The employee may desire to earn the extra noney whicl1 would arise from his working more t11an the prescribed time, bt1t tl1is statute forbids the employer from permitting the employee to earn it. The statute necessarjly .interferes with the rigl.1t of contract between tl1e em­ ployer and employees, con c_erning tl1e number of hours in wlicl1 tl1e I_ atter 11?-ay labor in the bakery of the employer. The general rigl1t to make acontract 1n relation to his business is part of the libe rty of the individua� protected by the 14th Amend­ _ ment of the Federal Constitlition. Allgeyer v. Lou1s1ana, 165 US. 578. Under tl1at due t l1ou wit ·ty pe or pn erty r li , life � of son sion per � o ctny no e riv can te dep sta vi P proce.ss of law. The rjght to purchase or to sell labor 1s _J)art of t1e l.1berty protected by this ame ndment, unless there are circ11mstances wl11ch excluJe tl1� r1gl1t. T1!ere are, however, certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of_ea�l1 state 1� tl!e 1?"111011, so�e\vhat vaguely termed police powers, tl1e exact descr1pt1or and l1m1tat1on of W�1cl1 hav e not been attempted by tJ1 e co11rts . �110s� �ow�rs, \roadl� stated, a11d W1tl1out, at presen.t, any attempt at a more spec1�c l1m1tat1on, 1elate to t _he safet �, _ �ealtb, morals, and general welfare of the J)Ubl�c ..Bot]1 prop�ty and l_1berty are held on s·uch reason le conditions as may be 1mposed by_ !11., governtilg power ab den n1 of the state in tlle A t11 e 14 tl1 s 01 1t1 nd co 1 cl su th wi d an exercise of those powers Inent Was 11ot designed to interfere. . · ·

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to it e th lim lid va a is e ercise of th er ex 1 tl at th · ed ed nc co e · . n.ust of course, be g th n n 1s rru ge It ce n al co er te u p is d proposition. o n is e er . J1 . T . e at st . I n y e� cy . ev police p)wer' by tl1 e ca se that co e o ffi n e_ av . 1 1 _ d l ou w t mes en dm en m A 1 tl 14 �� 1e tl Otl1erwi;e IS c ar ac ter is c?ncerned, f o � 10 ! la 1s g le e r e h and . r ef ore, w e 1 tl t, r u o c is h p h t t e g before u o , t1 so es IS u q n _ n � t1 u n 1t st n o C ss ece l a er ly ed ari F . e tl f o n io ct te l ro p e tl wllere se o _ f the. police power of ci er ex e at ri op pr ap d an , le ab on arises: ]5 this a fair, reas a� tr d b1 ar an terfer ence with , in ry sa �s ec n un e, bl a _ on as re un the statt, or is it an r te to to those contracts en in ?r , ty er lib al oD: rs pe s hi to al du 1: of tl1 e indivi gl ri e th y r a. ss or r ce e fo at ne ri op th e support pr ap m hi · to em se ay m 1 cl hi w r bo la In reIa1·I �n to . I g t re 1n c to t at ra n 1 co f or o ab y rt lud es be 1· inc 1 • t 1e se ur c::> f O ? ily m fa s lli d an f of liimsd e other to sell labor . , th se as ha rc pu to ht rig h uc m as s l1a e on e Th it. both paties to of rt the nt cou me for dg 1 ju e tl that g t 1tin of t sti sub of ion est qu a. t no is T11� sta te it is valid, although the tl1e of r v,e po the thi wi be act n the If e. tur i�la Ieg the ent of h ctm the suc ena to a law. sed po op ally tot e b_ l1t mig rt cou the of j 11dgmert er the of pow ice state? And pol the hin wit it Is : ain ren1 l stil ,ld ,vot n stio que But the that qu{stion mtist be a11svt1ered by tl1e court. i th s in passed ed and reach been has r po\¥e e polic the Vie thinlc the limit of case. 1�.iere is ) in. ot1r judgn1ent j n,J reasonable foundatio n for holding this t o re 11ecessary or appropriate �is a healtt1 law to safeguard the public healtl1, or the health ()f the i1di�v1idt1als \11ho are: following tl1e trade of a baker. . .. Wethin1c that tl1ere can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker, in and of itself, is not an t1nhealthy one to that degree wl1ich would authorize the legislature to inte�r: �ith th� right to labor, and with the right of free-contract on the part of �11e 11d1v1d11al, e1th�r as employer o r employee. . .. It might be safely affirmed t l1at alnost all occupations more or less affect tI1 e health. There must be more than tl1 e me� fa?t 0� tl1� possible existe11 ce of some small amount of unhealthiness to warra_nt leg1slat1ve interference with liberty. It is unfortunately t rue that labo r, even In _any department, may possibly carry witl1 it the seeds of unhealthiness. �ut are_ e •1 , 0� th_at account, at the mer cy of legislative majorities? A printer , a un· mit�',' � oc smith,_ � ca;renter, a cabinetmaker, a dry goods clerk, a bank's , a fawyer � or a phys1c1ans cle l r k� or a cle rk in almost an y kind of busine ss, wou d . all cornt under the p o w . er of the 1eg1s1 ature, on th is assumption. :. . � · · · 'l"ot only tl1e l1 ot1rs of em_p1 0 uld co , ers rees, employ but the of l1ours regulatei, and doctors la w s, lete-5 th a s well a scientis!s ged as ' , all men, professional and ar tsans could be' D r J�� e_n to 1 pro by fatig ue their brains an� bo�ies l1ou rs cf ex� rcise, lest tL�e /iol1 tion o: O . ting S!ren�tl1 of tl1 e state be 1mpa1red. w_e J1J� he these e,treme cases because n t 1 e el� eve fa ir co � nt te t W ll no on n i� do m tre e � ex e. soundn<ss of tl1 e vj ews whic� upl 1 old tl�1s la�. .. . 1:he act is not, w1th1n �e�n_ini of the term, a l1ealth law, s of . the _ rig Kt � but 1s an illegal Interference with r 1nd1vidtals, botI1 employer bO ta g s a � employees, to make contracts regaf<lin _ the upon stch terms as they th �11 nk best, n t up _ o or whicl1 they may agree other pirties to such cont:�r _ ting JJli � the horrs in whicl1 grown s. �tatu�es of the natu.re of that under re�1 ev.-:, � � , n g Jivi · a r nd 1 thei 1:1,tellige earn nt men may labor. to mere m.-ddlesome inte-11.eren . " . . . ces with the . li . . f ng . tl1e o ts · Ind1v1dual. teS [k Ths a d n i_ t s of] interference n t e . al e s e part of the Iegislatu.res of the � : - ... with t�c ordinary trades � rease · and occ� at_ion� of the 0 1_ the on be to people seems jn It 1s r �anife o � st f to . us that the l1 tb1 s section of tl1 e statu tat1on of the hours of labor as provtded)ai,ntld � p te under which th th e an d e indictment was found,

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has no such direct relation to, and no such substan ict ed , co nv o r err · in . tia l ffi t th of e em he ployee, as to jus�ify us in regarding the section as ;ea alt h the n, upo �f y see to ms us It that the real obJ�ct and purpose was simply to regula law . lth hea a te bet we lab en or the master and his employees (all men be·Ing, SUJ JUflS , of our s h the. . · · . · ') us i-ne no d t angerous In any degree to morals, or in any real an d in a pn�ate b . ss, to egr the health of the employees. Uoder such circumstances the ee d tial stan sub freedom of master_ an d e�ployee to contract with each other in relation to their employme.�t, �nd in defining the same, cannot be prol1ibited or interfered with without violat1ng the Federal Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York, as well as tl1at of the... [trial co�rt] must . be re�ersed a�d the case remand ed to the [trial court] for furtl1er proc eedm gs not 1nconsistent with thls opinion.

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The �ssent of Justice Holmes i� a cl�c s�tement of the objections to the majority'& interpretation of due process as we will see, this view ultimately prevailed.

Mr. Justice Holmes

d issenting:

I regret �in�rely that I am unable to agrf-e with the judgment in tl1is case, and that I think It my duty to express my dissent. This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I sl1ould desire to stud y it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody tl1eir (>pinions in lav,. 1 It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state !a1rvs may regulate life in many ways which we as legalists might t.hinl{ as injudicioiJS9 or if you like as tyrannical, as this, an d whicl1, equally with tbis, interfe1·e with the liberty to contract. Sun day laws [requiring businesses to close on Sundays] and usury laws are ancient ex.amples. A more mode1-n one is the prollibition of lotteries. The liberty of the citizen to d o as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whetl1er he likes it or not. The 14th Amen dment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics. The other day we sustaine d the Massachusetts vaccination law. Jacobson v. Mas­ sachusetts, 197 U.S. 11. Unite d States an d state statutes an d decisions cutting down the liberty to contract by way of combination [i.e. anti-monopoly laws] are familiar to this court. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197. ... Some of these laws embody convictions or preju dices which judges a�e likely to sl1�re. Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic tl1eory, h�ber of paternalism an d the organic relation of the ci�ize°: to t?e st te or of � .�la�ssez faire''. It is ma de for people of fun damentally ?�ffer1ng views, · a� d the acc1d.�nt of our fin ding certain opinions natural an d famil1ar,. or novel, and even shocking, ought not ju dgment upon the q�est1on wl1ether statutes to our conclu d e embodyin g them conflict with tl1e Constitution of the United States. . �ene ral propo sitions do not d ecide co11:crete cas�- The de�ision wi�l depend 0 a d �_ Ju gment or intuition more subtle than' any art1cu! ate maJor premise. But I ;h1nk that the proposition just stated, if it is accepted, will carry u �ar to a d tl1e ';, � � nd- Every _ : opinion tends to become a law. I think that the word liberty, 1n tl1e

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· t ven pre the to ld . 11e natural outC O 1en i t is wI d rte e v r l4tl1_Amend� e_nt , is Pf .1 can be sai d that a rational and fair m an rneoi a _ in on, n dominant op �faru, pr� tal n en am nd fu ge fri in d ul wo _ � t r e�� ed os op pr te t� s 1 would a d r le ou op of pe � _ ns an tio di tra our law� it� e th by � d � oo � t ��s d �n e tl1ey have 1• d emnation ca n be n ng co pi ee sw 1 c1 su no at th ow sh . h to rc a se e r d e P�tj not ne ht h · t ig m nk 1 it o an · pr _m a le ab r pe on eas measiu, r . A us re fo be e ut at st uPon tl1e d no t pronounce un r ea o n, ,1 l cou ly tain cer I om wl1 s �,L · on t 1 e score of llealtll · Men · n of t.he hours of ene ra I r eguIat1o g a of t en lm sta in st fir a Wor t woul d upl1old it as ge e ar to th ch of Inequality 1 m en op be ld ou w it ct pe as er tt la he t thi Whetller iil it unnec essary to discuss.

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The LocJ1ner case has been in1plicitly over-ruled. See, e.g. West <: oasl Hotel v. Parrcl , 300 U.S. 379 (1937) w11 ich upheld a minin1um hour s la� for wo�en and 1n the process indica� tllat ·'due process'' was not evidently a bar to regulating cond1t1ons o� empl;?yment. Not oa)· that, but in the last tl1rce decade_s, the Cou�t �as alm�st completely �1scred1ted the underiyiti tl1eory of the Lochner e:1.se. J11st1ce I-IoLmes view (as ID many other instances where he ora dissented) is pre-,.sun1ably "la\v'' today. r1�his ,.11:eruling ::).f 111e; laoci1ner case raises the interesting problem of whether the doctrirt: , of stare derisis (adherence to previous precedents) should appply to decisions interpreting I!! cor1stit11tion. Ir1 tl1c FV't.j·t C'ocisl .flo!el case (supra), the dissenting judg es objected to theei, plicit ovcruiing of s-:.::vcrai JJrcvious cases \.Vl1ich, like the Lochner decision, had held minim� wage a11d l1ours lav,,::; to be 1,nconstitutional; Sutherland J. said:

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It is tirge d that tl1e question i11volved sl1oul d now receive f resh consideratio� am ong other reasons, becaus e of ''tl1e ec o nomic conditions which have supervened0 b11t tl1e mea11i11g of the Co11stitution does not chanoe witl1 the ebb and flow of ecv nomic eve11ts. We fr e que11tly are told in more gen;r al words that the Constitutio� must be co nstru ed i11 tl1e ligl1t o f tl1e present. If by tl1at it is meant that the Con,�· !ution is made up of living words tl1at appl y to e ver y new condition which lftJ include, tl1e �tat�me nt is q11ite trt1e. But to say, if tl1at be inten ded, that the wo� · of the Co nst1tut1on mean today wl1at tl1 ey did n o t mean when written -that 1� �h at they d o n?t apply to a situation now to wl1 icl1 th wo have applied then·1 ey uld is to rob tl1at instrum ent o f the essential elem e 1� as ce for in nt wh icl 1 continues it p�ople have made it tintil tl1ey, an d 11ot the i r official agents, l1ave mad e it o!her· wise. ... ;

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The judicial fui1ctio11 is _tl1at of interpret t clude tb� po�'tf ; a in no io do n t it es erld ent 11� der 111� gu e is e of in of te r t pr T i e ta tio po n. i tl1 n1 o iss e � � ,tr ren: ���t�:n tre two is t o in iss all tl1at tl1e pl 1 r as e '' sup r eme law of the la o<l s . �n · · . o 1or and to convert wlia t was in nt i . tes . tended as inescapable and enduring manda 1 n1ere mora I reflections. If tl1e Constitutio11 111 . the l·ght of th � · te11·igent 1Y �11d reasonably construed 1n i principles s tands · · tll'e on p u t w ay 0� desirable legisl st bl a_tion, tl1e ame. mu �� tefill� · that instr�m eht a�� t 15 up on til to e co ur t di ng fo r enforcing it accor The remed.y jn til at sit:�-I o ; ns& co n - and tl1e only true rem t ie 1 end am to is edy tution. ... '

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. p�t: . On_ the other hand the Court . has frequently changed its mind and set aSJ.dewrong (s{); wh.i�h, 1t thought, were ording to the c11rrent vi·eeither o bsolete because of changed conditions or ctearlY llJlg pr. Gt,i w . o f ru. . ' . . . t h e ove Cour..1.) • A d efence of a liberal view towarels c edents was stated by Bra . nd a very famous judge) in Burnett v. Coronado Oil a Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932): ndeis J· (.

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,,Stare decisis is us·ually the wise policy' because 1· 0 most matters 1· t 1s· more ap 1 1ca I p 1e le t b th rt1 at le of law be_ settled than tllat it be settled ri ght .... an t o� irnp tru ev on en e ly wh er e om th m e error 1s a matter of serious concern, prov1'ded c 1s Th is ' · can_ be had by legi· sI�110 · . · · B �· ut 1 ? cas_es 1nvol�1ng tl1e Federal Con correction stitution, where correction t�rough. leg1sl�t�ve action 1s practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier d�c1s1ons. The Cot1rt bows to t11e lessons of experience og niz ing tha t tl 1 e process of tri'al and error, and the force of better reason· 111g, rec . . · h ys1 p I 1 · ca 1e sci ences, is a1)propr1ate also in tl1 e judicial function." · t so frwt fuI in Concrete illustrations of ho\v tl1e law \Va.s cl1a.nged by the Cotirt may be traced ·1n many · . . , , cas k e '' oo ar b d d f o A mer stan 1ca n Co n st1t1t1on al law. Some issues presented to the of the _ � Court 1n the past 30 years include: a) may govemn,ent comma nd the payn1ent of a 111i nimt1n1 wage? b) may government regulate maxin1un1 l1ours? c) may gove�n ment requfre <?tl1er \\'orking conditions, e.g. safety rules, I1ea1th rules, en­ forced holidays , even 1f this causes eco non1ic loss to tl1e employer? d) may government require employers to bargain witl1 unions? 1op'' contract - a collective bargainsl e) !Ilay governn1ent �equire �bservance of � ''union _ mg agreement ,vh1ch req111res n 1embersl11p 1n a union as a conditio n of employment? f) may governme n t require en1ployers to provide accide11t and social insurance? g) n1ay government regulate prices tl1rough price control Jaws? h) may government regulate the sale of stock'? i) may government forbid discrin1ination in tl1e sale of hot1sing? jJ n1ay goverrunent regulate the use of land through '�zoni11 g'' lav1s - i.e., regulate the size, structure of de1vvllings to be built, prohibit certain lcinds of land t1se (e.g. ind tJ strial) in residential areas, prohibit a landowner from qt1arr�1ing rock 011 his prvrJerty if it i.s located in an urban area? In each case - and these are only a fe\v exan1ples - the ar1s·v.·er �,�1s yes, ar1d st1bst,tn·tive due process objections were swept aside. Tl1e 5th Ame11drnent protects ;.,prop,erty'' fro1n ''cor1� fiscation'' without ''just'' con1pensation (con1pare Article 44 of tl1e Revised Constitution). But it would appear that government regulation of '' JJroperty'' sl1ort. of ''confiscation'' is per­ missible against due process objections unless objectionable on grounds of procedural un° fairness or because it is djscrimin atory (lack of eqt1al protection) or it violates some other const1tutional right.

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Example No.2. The Courts in Potential Conflict with Government Measures To Promote Land Refor111.

Difficulties In Interpreting Co11stitutional Guarantee of ''Just'' Compe11sation: Land Expropriation vs. The Economic Necessities of Land Reform. In the excerpts below, an American professor who l1as tatigl1t and studied in Japan reviews one of the significant cases which was thrust 11pon the postwa� Supreme _Court. . The case presents an issue wllich n,ight wel] aris� in _Ethiopia (cf. Article 44 of tl1e Revised Constitution and Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution).

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/ 11a ur an Jo ic er ,n A , '' n pa Ja in on ti ca di u From Natha nson ''Constitutional Adj Comparative Law '195 (1958). s: n io is v g ro p in w o ll fo e th s in ta n co Article 29 [of the Japanese Constitution] , in w la y b ed fin e . d be l al sh ty er p ro P . le ab The right to own or to hold property is inviol conformity with the public welfare. ·· on there1"or. ti sa en p m co st J·u n · o p 11 Private property may be tak.en fo r publ.1.c use

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, e d le si ic a o rt fr a is m. passing m .. th f o s n io is v o r . p · o . tw · · enti 0al h. l d B a d App a.rent Iy the fi rst na 1o ut t1o t1t JU 1ca ns co n . u als of t nn t a e tll ' . e . . in y r o t 1 thi r r te · in g r� ir s se o f J ca t e ea r are still v an ap g e h se t f o co one tituf � . ns of t ec bj su e tl1 en be l 1a owners unsuccessfully chal e:: an d ' ' d e t i a r p o r p ! x e '' l f o p u o r g a e , s a ; ; 1� P : i fa��1 .] w a L m r o f e R d n a L the government's ''Farm t at ec th p rices to be p eff n i ed d vi ro p aw L m or aid fi ef th Farm Land R ed e ce t th ex o l n a _ nu ld an ou sh re am l val: . gr nta ro p se a ch · r u p nd la le ti ; de land �n s. he ld T e d fi ti n es la p qu � r on to be� . fo _ 48 y b d n a d n l a y d d a p r fo 40 multiplied b y r mula met the constitutional fo g 1n r1c �p 11:d I a y or ut at st e · mined was whethe r th t] ur rst �onced es that jWt e fi co th of [ n 1o 1n op l1� T n. tio a guar anty of just compens t en ll ;y� of �a pa tio °:t ra ou c y am e bl o a t ui eq mputed n a s te a pl em nt co n tio a compens s on at a given time. Tu , 1t1 nd �o 1� om on ec r de 11n e lu a v t ke ar m e on the basis of th at e nt th th ou on 1t1 am os op of pr e t th by paymen ed ifi al qu ely iat ed m im is n sio conces g nin e so e. th Th rea lu va t is ke r ma at, sill(t to d o11 sp rre co e lj' s eci pr ys a lw a t no need. th ty wi the c mi bli or pu nf co in weliare law by ed n fi de be ll sha l1ts rig ty pro1Jer sed po n be im y upo ma the ri� ns tio tric res , 29 !e rtic 1. fa of 2 l1 Tap rag, JJa to ing ord acc . y his pert of, if pro e y pos ssar dis nece nd a of, s t fi pro J tl1e <e tv , use to l1er ow tl1e of for ti1e public \Velf�1rc:. T111s .rneans. also that p roperty rights may be subjected t o sucl1 price control� tr.1.a t tr·ee IIlc1.rlcet prices do not obtain. Since the land-prieing forn111la \\1as d1�1.i_\tcd frc;n:1 t!1e re,rised Agricultu ral Land Adjustment Law of Decem­ ber, 1945 c1nd \V}lS L1�;iijgned to ca.n·y out tl1e prevailing national policies of lana reform, it is quite n'"\1:urr1J, according to the opinion, that the method of valuation ' adopted should \Vorl< for ti'le benefit of self-tilling fa rmers rathe r than for the pro­ tection of landlord fJrofits. After _these disarming gene ralities, the opinion proceeds to a considera tion · ?f the specifics of the land-pricing fo rmula , somewhat as follows: The pri ce structure 1 s b�sed on tl1e fi�e-ye ar _a�erage yield of r ice du ring the period 1940-44, the price or,... rice, �nd . ce rtain subs1d1ary adjustments for income from side cultiv ation. The price of rice is ?f course, tl1e officially est ablisl1ed p rice under tl1e Foodstuffs Manage­ ment Law. TI1�s ':" as regarded as a reasonable price wl1en the land reform program wa� adopted; It i_s untenable to _argue tl1at tl1e official price cannot be a measuit ' . � avera of JUSt compensation. Tl1 �s tl1e price-fixing and ve formula is b ased on objecti s an� rds, as well as reliable statistical dat a ; it is not necessary tl1at the paymenb � � e 1 free °:arket_ price of eacl1 and eve:y piece of l and �r :h�; :1 1�; sh��l� ���1e;�e� �in consideratio n of gene tun he t at ends r t ral economic l th I d r 1 s la urtl1 rmore, eve in addition to tl1e statutory price, ry nd ofl 3 �� ri � � ! �� � f � � re ui d e t un er tl1 statutory provisio11, receives a governme ra:a � set according to tl: r a o ; the l�11d ad r p o : tan 220 Tl1i s is pe � r yen �nab�- . �� � f:nd and 130 yen per ta11 f re: ·s � a l ve � �s. fi g Tlus p a to i yment design ed is . � con1pensation in terms 0 capita 1 an gs, inc rement as we ll as lost earnin based on objective and average : standa rds. . . on of sA . . Finally, the opinion add . · enti resses cont _itself to difficult tl1e most nan1ely, tl1at even if tile stat uto�y prices were reasonable at the time· of th; ori� i,elo1 , enactment, tl1e economic sit uatio n o ha � r n c!1 an we ged e the so y tl1a w ·�r 1J . t j11st. com�ensation. In the ram rst g ce pla , t 918; pro s the t siz pha a th em t ed I . 1 reform and control of lanJ prices sta rted even before the war, � �arlY coJJl®: . was. gradually strengthened · a8 t 1 le war neared an end· and was w1th1n the -rtilffit n plat1o . of national pol·ic1es "J.Or a Iong t·1me, aI though. ' . finally brought to.., 1 J"'· . f it was nation, as a drastic measu o e __ u re for a government purchase program, by virt . _ ·

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Po Al w lie rs d af ter th th e e wa r. In sl1ort, tl1e rights of landowners to of � ve ti ec ir d an dis d po pr of se i � of s, lan ds l1ave been progressively narrowed down the e tak use, s pn ha no ve ce t be et en �l ow ar � ed to o b m ta i1 1. Tr°:e, the opinion concedes, fre e _ _ d . n a _ ric ha d e of be en pr re ice vi se d se ve ra l t imes dur111g the interval between cia l offi he t he Fa of rm La nd Reform Law ��d t he issua11ce of the purchase t . ctm � �n ena .the ticular appellant. Bu t such rev1s1ons were c!c pa r thi s to er signed to counter-· ord cos cre t s of production resulti11g f ro1n post\var ase d in the e anc economic changes. bal and thereby to pr�tect farm producers. It doe_ s no t follow tl1at t11e land prices sllould be revised ac�ord1ngly, for_ landlords have little to do witl1 agriculttiral production. It may be desirable t�at_ prices controlled by law sl1ot1ld go along witl1 general trends in the �ono�y, but 1t 1s too mucl1 to �xpect t!1at_ st1cl1 prices sl1ould always realize econ om.JC ga1os for the owners or precisely co1nc1de with market value. Therefore the argument t�at _ the st atu_tory land-pricing forn1t1la falls far sl1ort of just compen� sation because 1t 1s not adJusted for general eco11omic t rends cannot be sustained. The opinion of the Court appare11tly assumes witl1out explicit discussion that the taking involved in t .he Land Reform Program, is for a public use, witlu� the meaning of Article 39. This point is, l1owever, specifically debated in the concur­ ring opinion of Justice Kuriyama and tl1e dissenting opinion of Justices Inoue and Iwamatsu. The latter state their view tl1at the taking clause of the Constitution was designed to authorize only tl1e taking of particular land specifically needed for public projects, such as the building of a railroad, rather tl1an to authorize such a revolutionary measure as the Land Reform Law which takes lands from landlords throughout the country and turns them over to tenants. This, they say, is 11ot a purchase for public use but a purcl1ase for resale to tenants, and therefore does not come within paragraph 3 of Article 29. The term ''for public use,' is not coextensive with t he ter1n ''for the public welfare''. In any event, wl1en there is a taking in tl1e constitutional sense, just compensation must be determined by the fair market price, differentiated according to the quality of the lands, and asce1·tained by expert surveys and estimates. Furthermore, in the case of a dispute as to the amount, there must be recourse to the courts for a final determination . But under tl1e Land Reform Law, as generally construed, and as now interpreted by tl1e majority of �he court, the aggrieved land owner i s denied his right of access to th� c �urts, bec�u�e the court cannot award compensation in excess of !l1e st atutory l1m�ts. �f this 1 s to stand as an interpretatio n. of paragraph 3 of Article 29, the way 1s wide open to _ the legislature to employ repeatedly the same method, and thus to make an empty shibb oleth of paragraph 1 of Article 29. . These dissenting justices also pay their respects to t he argument presented in the opinion of the Court to the effect that the Land Reform .Law was but t he �gicaJ, although dr-:15tic, culmination of a Jong deveJ_ opment limiting. landlord's ghts and encouraging owner farmers. TI1 . e y emphasize tl1at tl1e .P��t1cular land P�rch�se progr am here in isstte was th e rural Land Reform Law in1t 1ated . by tl1e dir� t1ve of the t ou r1e car s wa and rs we Po d ie_ All � the of Supreme Commander ntir ed tor res en be s �a n ely pa Ja of ty gn re1 ve so s out ide the Constitution.... Since the : nd e authority t t1r Co tl1e t, en ist ex er og l 11 is ? r de an mm Co � of the Supreme ean th not enforce a statutory provision whicI1 i. s unconst1tut1onal. Apar t fron1 do11bts �} to the validity of the la w in appropriating land from la11d l_ or�s f�r tl1e b� 11� fit t na ts, they 1 n prescr1 b ng on ut1 t t 1 ns Co e tl1 to t a ! conclude, it is certainly repug� t?- . � n _ a hig .�ly disputable pricing formula an d proh1b1t1ng recours� t? the courts for Lhe Purpose of obtaini·ng compensation in excess of s tat utory limits. ' '

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w n o ti si o p d ha e th to in dec.1de · f el . es n · o ce a 1 p . t o . s ie tr e n o f I e se a or f ca d ev1li shly cont. .. m o ve ei nc co to lt cu . . ffi di . is rived it d ' t e 11 se re JJ s h u s t e su is . of the 1and rei"?rm the cess C LI S e Th . d s e g u j s ti o program . ti n ie c s n o c f o le tt e m 1e tl oc ul m sf de es cc ·to t rY su ratizat ion of JaPan. e th to l ta en m da tn · fL · · . was genera11y re garde· d as t S s ic r g JU ga n d re t1 n . d isse ing tl1e validity � 1e tl � o o tw y b d se es pr ex Despite. tl1e doubts e s f th ge o o d � st Ju er o w m a n 1 tl ve t t ie ­ el in b S _ to Ym d ar 11 is it , am gr of the entire pro e t av h en painfully aware us be m so al y l1e T . e iv ct je ob � l _ 1ta patl1y with its fur1dame1 for�, ?r of burd ening the re r na 1o ut ol ev _r � s 1 tl1 g in tt se tip _ of tlie impraticability of ns 1o o at a! , c 1g bl an or fin of ed at � 1p 1c vi gi nt na u ng a d an e rg la ll it w e at st lg ·strugglii n 11. O he t10 s1 he ot po d re � r er e� pr , a nd ha rs ne \v d they Ja 11 e th g � on am s rd ha few diee to n tl1 e I pe nc de rta po e im nc de e tl1 ? of of the _ us c1o 11s co ly en ke en be ve must ha r d tfo an s 1gh les tra ar fe a rd wa o� ? , ew vi applic are l c�a di ju of ty ili vir e tl1 d an ry judicia n io at ns for propert y taken pe m co St JU of t en m 1re qt1 re al ion ut tit ns co the of tion � nc ri� ia JJe of In� the ex in ce sin nd fou ] be [ to inde­ is gy alo an An . .. use c bli . for pti ; a const1tut.1on which reco gnizes m gra pro orm ref d lan a s l1a o als ia Ind . 1ce pende1 ' one the as of ty' per pro fundamental of e pos dis and d l1ol e uir acq , ''to t the righ ect to constitutional resp h iew wit rev l icia jud of ion itut ; i11st tl1e and ens citiz of ts rig11 questio11s. However, the Constitution of India now contains a provision to the effect that no lav.' JJroviding for compulsory acquisition of property for a p ublic purpose "Nhicl1 eitl1er fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles o n which compensatio11 is to be deter1nined, ''shall be called in q uestion in any court on the ground that tl1e compensatio11 provided by tl1at law is not adequate.'' This provisions was adopted as an Ame11dment of tl1e Constitution in 1955, as a direct result of decisions of tl1e S11preme Court invalidating certain statutes. The cynic might be temJJted to suggest tl1at tl1e Japanese Supreme Court has arrived at about the same result w�thout going tl1ro11gl1 so painful a process. However, the Ja panese Court j has retained at least the tl1eoretical p ower to examine the basis of compensati on I establis�1ed by tl1e legislature, and it may yet be inclined to exercise that power more vigorously thari it did in the Land Reform case whenever it deems the cir· -cumstances more propitious. . ..

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Example No.3 Construing Constitutional Protections of Freedom of Speech.

Introductory Note

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. . Our purpose now is to cons· d er . � probl s which courts, exerc1s1ng a "J. ud1c1 ·:I review'' · of power, face when tlley are asked .:0 en�or �?1 its nn r ce free speecl1 •• guarantees and defin � �� . . go ve rn m en ta l control ov : The . t1v1t ies_ i: i ty wl11 ch ''�c thre u ate� ''pe a� and ,., :'order'' set out _below is present:J : v :C: ·Competing values and risks w�. �llicle to exp�se issues tn this area of const1tut1ona1 �wcasts, of and the pros and cons of entur��-1 m_u5t be �e1gl1ed by judges in reviewin g free speec rs u o c nt g the law of free speech_ ass· . � Judges wi_tl1 the ultimate power to declare th� o ·� nu�g- ree speech 1s to be given constitutional p rotection. . a.nY The problem is very ct _ 1 t in �h lcu an� ld soc iety �nd wou particularly difficult, it developing country where seem _ , �e ere may ex.1st cond1 t1ons whic h are fficiently different as to some su assumptions about the va1ue of · f�ee speech in society open to review. _ . ch su witb . The problem of defining law m this area . may include defining Jaw which deals . varied activity as: 1) the hol�i�g of a meet· mg' 2) the exh1b1tion ofpublic . m0t·ion pictures· 3) the d'istribut1on · of o1itical p�opag . soci�1y: ' anda; 4) the distribu tion of ), · · 10 oo s .wh ch may to 5 ) the holding of manY ble tiona be morally objec i demo n.stra tions· .',.. '

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6) the organi�tion of associations fo r political purposes to protest for or again · s t some n; tio ac al offici . . 7) picketing by a l_abor union.; or by some other group; 8) freedom to discuss all these problems in the classroom; 9) control over lib!aries - school libraries, university libraries - what books should be bought by public funds? What books should not be bought? 10) control of poetry r eadings over Television programmes; 11) control over ''defamatory'' attacks against individuals. You can easily add to this list. Note, too, that the method, the types, of governmental controls n1 ay vary. Som� controls �ntail di�ect censo� ship, _ or what are called ''prior restraint'' controls. An example 1s a law which req:uires a motion p1ctt1re fiJn1 to be approved (licensed) before it may be shown._ Other law s are 10 the natt1re of p�n.al controls wl1icl1 pt1nisl1 only it a ''llarmful'' result h� 11;1 fact occurr�d as a resttlt of th� ac�1v1ty. Tl1e 11a_t11�·e of the control may be in1portant in cons1der1ng whethe. r 1t should be const1tut1onally per1n1ss1b1e. So perl1aps should the nature .of the activity. One demonstration n1ay be pe rfectly peaceful, another n1ay contain the elements of ''spontaneous � ombustion.'' A book may express the same words as a street-corner speaker _ but a demagogic book n1ay pose less of a problem to society than a demagogue speaking before a crowd which is being whipped into a frenzy. Some people seem to thjn k the ''right'' to freedom of speech means the right to say or think anythin�. Obviously that is an untenable proposition. Surely, as Holmes J. said: a man cannot shout 'm'' in a crowded theat re. Society has many interests whlch it must p rotect in addition to the values realized by free discussions. · Free speec. h (and free press) compete with other ''values'' - or ''interests." Some of these -competing interests are: the interest in p rotecting peoples reputation (by la�1s prol1ibiting ''defamation''); the interest in protecting deep-seated standards of morality (by anti-obscenity la'vvs); the interest in p rotecting public order; the interest in protecting political stability (\.vhich is very in1portant in any country, parti.. •cularly a developing country is it not?) the interest in preventing tribal or ethnic hostilities fron1 becoming physical hostility. those ar e only e xamples. Consider them carefully - a�d _t�e implications and possible importance of protecting those interests, at the expense of l1m1�1ng .- through legal controls the exercise of rights to write, publish, speak, demonstrate etc. This will help you to see tl1e con­ stitutional problems - and the difficulties of defining tl1e guarantee of ''free speech'' through _juclicial review.

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Terminiello v. Chicago

337 U.S. 1, (1949). The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that ''liberty'' shall not be denied by any state ·except by ''due process 01 law'' ha s Jong been interpreted by the Supreme Cour! t� mean that no state could deny the rights of freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amend­ ment against Congress and the Federal Government. In other words, tl1e Fourteentl1 An1end­ ment. W� are ment ''incorporated,, the Fi.·st and applied it to action . by a state or Jocal govem _ de loped. we .no t here concerned with how this inte resting substa11t1ve dt1e _pro�ess doctrine ve are simply concerned with the court's inte rpretation and appl1cat1on of the guarantee of free 'Sl)Cech of the First Amendment to the facts of this case. In reading. the case make no te s (either physi�al or mental) s_o _that you understand: 1) th: e charge, tl1 wa t ha te. na nat 1g1 or se C<'l � e ur is th d di � of the roceding _ in a legal sense liow _ _ 1e - and how 1t was raised and how ·aence,. .4). th 2) the rel�nt Pia.w, · e legal 1sst • 1 ev nt 3) eva e rel . th · s son rea the 6) it as ra1 e· cas the of n itjo s spo d' d . an i 1on �� on appeal; 5) the Court's �ec1s fur.w the dec1s1on; 7) the argument of the dissent. •. .�_,,,. . :·. -:.., .-··- , . .. -,'...' . ,, ,

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� = = : � � : s:o � 22-:2�0�-- -.. --...... . rt u o C e th f o n · o · op1n1 d the re delive as Mr. Justice Dougl erly cond uct in Viol rd so di of y ilt gu . d un fo as . . er afte r JUry w .a· a l ia tr ·. tJo ; Pet1t1on re w out of an add g se ca e Th · d e · fin . d an resi o . 6 Ch1cag , : of ne n a in d r o _ y es of ic e sp th au of !=1- cit e th ristian Vet Ch r de un o ag ic Ch ': in m ·u 1 _r o t I u a n a n i � re e n v tio l1 ic e ten bl at d pu . The audito� le ab er sid coo d de an n m m co u : g ni 1n t e e m 1e l T a c ri e m A f n se t. Others w ere turneo o s re n p so er p d re d n u h t h g ei er v o l1 it w ty ci a p ca t� d le l fi as w s� u e o n nd perso n s th o th t u o _ ab f o d w o cr a ga m u ered ri o it d au e th of e id ts u O . ay n eet aw e� as gn w s1 en as m m ce l to o e p th f o i n rdo co A i g. n ti ee m e th t i ns ai ag st te o p r to ve r al t se ur en st ev di pr to le n ba ab t o n . ces e er w Th t ey th ut b ; er rd o n ai nt ai m to rbulent. tu d n a ry g n a s a w e crowd outsid e d of th ow t cr c u_ n� co d e tsi ou �h d e and ne em d n co 1 cl ee sp s hi in Petitioner d al l ci an ca ra 1t1 o� p _p ou us gr io r s va d o� ze wh ci i�i �r ,_ sly ou ci vi ot n jf , ly us ro vigo . re fa el s w on ti na e th to al 1c 1m 1n activities l1e de nounced as e'' the ac s pe of sist con ch rea ''b of any at th ry] ju e [th ed arg ch t ur co al The tri d decorum''; and tha t the "mis­ an e ac pe c bli pu tl1e es lat vio ich wl1 or ''misbel1a,,i c to bli pu the rs anger, invltei sti t i if ace pe the of ach bre a t1te stit con v ma bel1avior m ce, or ban it if tur olests · a dis s ate cre or est, unr n of o diti dispute, brings about a con the i11l1abitants i 1 1 the enjoyme nt of peace and quiet by arousing alarm.''* Petitioner did not talce exception to that instrt1ction. But he maintained at all times that the , ordinance as applied * * to l1is conduct violated his righ t of free speech under the Federal Constitution. Tl1e judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court (332 III App 17, 74 NE2d 45) and by the Illinois Supreme Court. 396 111 41, 71 1\fE2d 2, 400 Il I 23, 79 NE2d 39. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the question presenied, _As we l1ave noted, the statutory words ''breach of the peace'' [of the Chica�o Ord1nan�e] '\Vere de�ne� in i nstruction s to the jury to include speech which "suis tl:e pt1bl1c to anger, 1nv1tes di sp11te, brings about a condition of un rest, or creates8 disturbance . ' ' I . , Tl_1at.co nstruciion of the ordinance is a r uling on a question of state l�w thai is as binding on us as though tl1e precise word s l1ad been written into the ordinano: , 5lt See /-Jebert v. Louisia,za ' 272 US 312' _,�17.' YYll1 507 I -,. r v k 333 US rr/· ters v. 1velV .1.or ' • Th _ e viatality ?f civil and political institutions in our society depend n s o ftte 1 s Lis o . usti . ce Hughes wr ot e in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 ufs.i; �� ; ;l 1t � ��ef; ' 1 . is only througl1 free d ebate an d f ree exchange O 1 thatff n n ns re nsive to the will of the people and pe aceful ffr_�Iy _ and to is e ::� �: �i���� o ro d ea pro d mote diversity of i � � p !m�, , · is therefore one of the c::; ct1st1nc , reF_ t1on r1an s ta that total1 sets us apart from . , 10 s Accord111gl)' a function of f ree i t d itioD , i nvite dispute. It may indeed est s sp�h _under our system of governmen rve Its h ��h purpose when it induc es a .00 nMDp!t. of u nrest, creates dis satisfact?ion � with cond1t1ons as they are, or eve n stl!S r -

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. .l)'i� !he trial judge h a s the resp 1 ·i ty_ of explaining t to !11f �lf',@ · Jury then determines whethons·t�b·1 the sta gu leg nda al rds of il �yj$i¢ er VtO .evide nce dant stan�a�ds. ll1 this case th warrants a finding that the defen :

e o 10 ce on d punishing a "breach . '' isorderly conduct" contain ed a pitf, . ' of the. r �? •• ''the ordinance as ace • The trial court is d efining that tenn to the ',t .ar,'J. · ' - wpehat do s · g tm' � ''as· app1·ied'' and applied' _' : · this e attackin mean? i Why petition. e r s not tl1e ordinance itself? ' , ...._

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ten pro . vo is of ca ech tiv e an Sp d e ch all en gin g r It . ang ma e y str ike t. . a t pr e u · d ice s p ec� an ha d ve pr ofound unsettling effects as it presses for a J : d pr n ce tions ccep tance .af an idea. That is wh y f1eedom of speech tho · ugh· , not absolute, c·,,,1ar.p,z. ns k y v. N ew o · [ Y S PP 571, 572, 86 L _ed I 034], is nevertheless protecte 31 5 e, mp shi : Ha d against nt, unless shown likely to produce a clear a·nd presen pun ish me or p orsh i """ ns -""" t danger · · . . · stan t1ve ev1 ·1 t h at b nse s far above public inconvenience su us sen o a . , annoyance, of . 'd v. a c zJ ges ornza , 314 US 252, 262, 86 L ed 11r. rz ee S B est. unr 192, 202; Craig v. .or Harney, 331 US 367, �73_, 91 � ed 1546, 1550. There is 110 room tindei· our Consti­ res t:r1ct1ve view. For tl1e alternative would lead to standardization mo re _a for n tutio of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or commtinity groups. Th� ordinanc� �s constru� by t�e t�ial court serio11sly invaded this prov· ince. It per1ru�ted conv1ct1on of petitioner 1f h1� _speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought abo11t a ccnd1t1on of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not stand. ...

·�· As we ha�e s�id, th� gloss which �llinois pl�ced 011 the ordinanc� gives it a meaning and appl1cat1on which are conclusive on us.• We need not consider whether as c onstrued it is defective in its entirety. As construed and applied** it at least con­ tains parts that are unconstitutional. The verdict was a general one; and we do not know on this record but what it may rest on the invalid clauses.... Reversed. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting.

The Court reverses this conviction by reiterating generalized approbations -of freedom of speech wjth which, in the abstract, no one vv1ill disagree. Doubts as to their applicability .are lulled by avoidance of more than . passing referenee to the -circumstances of Ter111iniello 's speech and judging it as if he l1ad spoken to persons .as dispassionate as empty benches, or like a modern Demosthenes practicing his Philippics on a lonely seashore. But the local court that tried Terrniniello was not indulging in tl1eory. It was d�ling with a riot an d with a spe ech that provoked a hostile ffi:Ob.and i?cited a fnendly one, and threatened violence between tl1e two. When the trial Judge 1nstr11ct­ � the jury that it might find Terminiello guilty of inducing a breach of the peace if his behavior sti rred the public to anger, invited dispute, ?rought about unrest, created a disturbance o r molested peace and quiet by arousing alar�, he _was not speaking of these as harmless or abstract conditions. He was addressing_ h1s words to the concrete behavior an d specific consequences disclosed by th e evidence: He was saying to the jury, in effect, that if tllis particular speech added fuel to the s1tuath on y rit 1o 1tl at l 11a fi e _th is t ur co e em pr su � • Unde! t he Federal system in the U.S., each state , 1101 the fina se ur f co ? _1s t ur co e at st e th n ut B tneani g and inte retation o f a state statute. a�th� r1ty ?D the �eaning and interpretation of the Federal Const1tut1on - and thus the c0n. ,, st1tu tional1ty of the State ., . . law. 1 0: tSl leg t : of :,? / ity lid va e t th �� �� g i in ga in t �: rm � y e y e nl d ur e Th co t is o n: i 8 t� -�� a e d ,,uat does th is mean? Would it be possible to apply the or inance ce n a in rd o e th w 0 11 s u ll te rt u co . this . - 10 . 1 .way - a .·...o.astitu·ti·ona . . case.? If 80 , does tlle . rt? shOlJld have been ''applied'' by the prosecutor and the tna1 cou .. . . .., .

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et o n e it COUid t a re th . aI ready so inflam ed as to e li g h t of th e evid ence n o'�+ h t n e t1on_ h . uc1·ng.a breacl1 o f p eace. W � · � , "'-tltll ' · · · " d 10 I d c is ses it ,. o at undern eath n th 1o 1n p pun1sl1ed as o s t r u o C e h t on p u n w ro th a r o is rt u o C rk m e n lu so h r e a f m o ll b. the o d fi t d e undre h st is h d n 1ar . a . o ll e ru n i ·n Y e T o f e u 11tt1e iss t a peopI e who valu e both n ro f n o c n a c t a lih,..;. th s n io st e u llJ. q l a n o ti u it st n o c reaching em.tes of e� ch other and to n e s a se e th rd a g e r be� to . s em se of rt . u o C l·s h T r. e d r o d an erty. S P 1·t fixes_ i ts eyes on a con� lib e v ie h c a o t r e d r e go o r fo t s u m e w t a th w ie v th era te n o concession to society's necj l o t to s a id g ri so ch ee sp f o m o d ee fr f o n ; ti for public order. . .. e st , b u t re vealed at t he trial to� ri P c li o l1 at C a as . ed TerroinJello, advertis m o ag om ic fr h C t !o gh ir u B ro b ham, g in as w p, ho is B s hi y b under suspension se on to a call signed b, sl? re �n ed bl � se as t ha t ng ri e th ga a s es Alabama, to addr ita tor] ... ag g in w t gh r1 a tr ul an 1·m e G opr [a h, it Gerald L. I(. Sm tio ns und er which he spoke. i nd co e th s ow sl1 y on m sti te Terrniniello's own So far as material it follows: tely fifteen or twenty min� ' a xim pro ap ] e c pla ng eti me e [th re the t go e W '' ... ere was a crowd of three or . Th ce. ran ent nt fro the at ed p1J sto ca.r e Th l1t. eig past k eting. ... pic and g sin cur d an ing t u sl1o re the ed gat gre con d dre l1l1n four G'Wl1en \Ve got there the pickets were no t marching; they were bod y to body a·nd covered tl1e sidewa.llc completely, som e on the steps so that we had to form.a flying vvedge to get tl1rougl1. Police escorted 11s to the- building, and I noticed four or five others tl1ere. ''Tl1ey called us 'God damned Fascists, Nazis, ought to hang the s o and sos'. When I entered_ tl1e building I l1eard the howls of the -people outside .... There were four or �ve I)lal11 clotl1es officers standing at the entrance to th e stage and three or four at the entrance to the back door. ''The officer� tl1reatened that if th ey broke tl1e door again they would ams! them an<l every t�me tl1�y opened the door a little to look out som ething was throWD at tl1e officers, including ice-picks and rocks. r 00 d back ''I saw a nu mber O f win e · th d ows saw broken I s by e missil or stones . g 1o '" rced open, pusI1ed be1n open. ks wert · ''Between tl1 e time the fi rst spe aker spoke and I spoke, ston es and brte · t i • n roee thrown in all th e 1. e. 1 star�ed to speak e £ th er about 35 or 4 0 minu tes af t started ' a little la::1r tl1an nine o'clock. , . .. , w� o . cr The court below in addition ' to this recital, he ard o ther evidenc e, that th e ,aitn , reached an estimat ed nu ber of l, 500 . P�cket lines obstructed and interf1urliDI access to the building �h crowd g mob � . constit howlin '' ut e d surging a , epithets at those wllo � 1 1� 0 . nter � o and s tri e e d th to o cl ff ar " On��ell· t e thei r woman's coat was torn 0 a � sh e ha d to be _assisted in to the meeting by Po\�e itlL t rhose_ inside the hall could �e ar the lou� o e t h u s thto"11 noises and hear thos e on Fascists, Hitlers!,, and u through tl1e windowpanesc �se words like :'damn Fascis ts.'' Bricks were ,mt1oi\'S t efore o a�d Ab ,. 28 wa ffiorl u dur aking. ing t he sp e ":ere broken. The street was black wi th :peopl e on both sides for �t 1ea st. on'� either way; bottles, stink r bo mbs and olice brick we e �, bats w ere thrown. P to control the mob wh·ic h � · out tl1e speak er's 0ice · k �pt breaking the ·windows at t ·he meeting ball,ordrO,oi� ilit o a t times a nd b d k bac reaking in through the . aud1·tor1um. · About I 7 0f the group outside w ere arr ested by the police, .

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in ie llo made a long speech , from the. I{no wing of this enyironment, Term . . . h d w h 1c f or om o_ 1't reIat 1veI y innocuous passag I rec 1 c h ap ogr es and add em Phasis. . sten ecially provocative: esp ms see t wha to ''father T�rm_iniello: �ow, I �m going to whisper my greetings to you, Fellow 1nt e�ret It._ I s aid, 'J:='ellow Clzristians', and J wi ll I ans . rist i suppose tllere are Ch by got in 1n1s scu take, so 1 want to tell a story about the scu,n: m the of e som ... ''And no!hing I could s ay _tonight _ could begi11 to express the contempt I have for the slimy scum that got 1n by mistake. :·· ''The _ subj�t I want t? talk to yo u tonight a?ou t _is tl1e attempt that i s going on nght outside this hall tonight, the attem pt th at 1s going on to destroy America by revolution. . . . ''My �riends, i t is no longer true that i t can' t happen here. It is happening here, and 1t only depends upo n you, good people, who are l1ere to11ighf'., depends. upon all of us together,. as Mr. �mit h said. The tide is cl1anging, and if you and I turn and run from that tide, we will all be drowned in this tidal wave of Communism which is going over the world. ''I know I was told one time that my winter quarters were ready for me in Siberia. I was told that. No,v, I am talking about tl1e fifty-seven .varieties that we have in America, and we h ave fifty-seven varieties of pinks and reds and pastel shades in this country; and all of it can be traced back to tl1e tvvelve years we spent under [Pre�ident Roosevelt' s] New Deal, because that ,vas the b11ild-up for wh at is going on in the world today. *

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''Now, let me say, I am going to talk abou t-I almost said, about the Jews. Of course, I would not want to say that. I-Iowever, I am going to tallc about sorr1e Jews. ''Now, t his danger which we face-le t us call the1n Zionist Jews if yo11 v,ill, let's call them atheistic, communistic Jewish or Zionist Jews, th en let 11s not fear to condemn them. ... ''We are strong enough. We are not going to be tolerant of their smears any longer. We are going to stand up and dare them to smear us. ''I speak of the Communistic Zionistic Jew, and t hose are not American Jew�; We don't want them here; we want them to go back where they came from. · ·· Suc h was the speech . Evid.ence sh ow ed that it stirred t he audience not only to cheer and applaud but to expressions of immediate anger, unreSt and ala�nl. · · · r _ o do e in �h of y an m ss le t b . ou D t rm Te is sc fa a l iel g in in o, of course, disclaim s be . audience were not consciously su ch . His speech , however, followed, w1tl1 fidelity th.at is more than coincidental, the pa t tern of European fasciSt I�aders. . . Th e street mob, on the other hand, included some who den� being commuru� ts , St � un m but T�rminiello m �o s ":a n io at �tr on m de e th t to pr ov e tl1a fie sti ed te er d off d an orgaruzed nd n lli ca s on 1 t �a n1 ga or g 1n w ftle of a. comm unist-led. He offered liter�tt1re � �hers to meet and ''.mobi�ze" fo r instruction as pickets and exhorting followers· out to figh t Fascist Sm.tth. '' .. nt1es h ? a e u! t a st d an s l ca lo s e bl sa s di hi . at th se ca le ru e d id s nw o re ti la a na ec · ftomA tn · t o n 1c st 1 al re n 11 is it d in k s h · Pu ng 1�ts �f th is fl' ' · . con i · 1 .· conduct produces which to . tak e account of the nature, m ethods and obJect1ves of the forces invo1ved This . .. -,

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IONAL LAW T U IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T SOURCEBOOK OF E

ion of political rac· is ll co ed nd te i n u n d n . a s ou ne ta on . p d ! r an n d f a �w o d rl o o w ti ta n e es id if an a � � l rn ca lo st a �s w � lt � : :: �! s � ri :i : � ���l c a on ary fanatics, each of n, & t lu vo re i of s p ou gr zed ni ga or o hic tw · " � n ee tw e b t c · fli. · d con h 1 e e � q ev _...... e� ru e op in the strugg1t . te m ar gn ro st e th y tr n u has imported to this co � as1n gly, Amer1ca .n _citi cr In . e p ro u E d t� a es ha\t as devast h d in k r ei th h ic h • c p by w ze ru r e g he th n t ot ee ga 1 , or s , s a i a m · m s es i iz n ga or · 1ets n io ct f a , · ne O t · . 1 th 1 w e to cop e _ o t her s piekets; parade is h t ct ra te n u co to s d a lllei u sq es iz n a rg o ch a e ; it s s to h ara at1ons h_as the :potenti ality, r st o� m de ss a m e es th ana \vitli counterparade. Each of . is � h ce uq T en br ol tec vi e appeals noi _ nd a er !d �o di of e, os rp pu 1e tl more than a few of ow f�rce desig ned to, bully sh a s 1 ch a e 1 t; !1 sp ob m nd a s ar fe . to reason but to t re�ort to speculation as no ed ne e W . nt re ffe d1 1n e th we a er ov adversaries and to r no as to their co nsequences. ed at ul lc c a e ar s ic ct ta e es tl1 l1 1ic wl to tl1e purposes for s bo th . ... e at tr s on m de y or st hi s an pe ro Eu I' Recent This drive by totalitarian groups to undermine the prestige and effectiveness . of er r m eith the eve en wh can win ced van ad is nts me ern gov c ati ocr dem al loc -0f ' . ia\s se offic the This of er is pow such the zes aly par ch ,¥hi ng n1li a rt Cou this from .a c,lse. The group of whic11 Terminiello is a par t claims that his behavior, because i . . . ies. orit auth l of loca h reac tl1e ve abo is • it involved a speech, Rioting is a substantive evil, wl1ich I take it no one will deny tl1at the State , :and tl1e City have the right and the duty to prevent and punish. Where an offense ' is induced by speech, tl1e Cot1rt has laid down and often reiterated a test of the power of the aut�orities to deal witl1 t11e speakin g as also an offense. ''The question in ' ,ever)' case 1s wl1ether tl1e \vords z,[Sed are used in suc/1 circun1stances and are of su� a_ 11atz�r � as to create a clear and present danger that they \.Vill bring about the substai: t1ve e_v1ls tl1at Con¥1"ess [or tl1e State or City] I1 as a rig.h t to prevent." [Emphasis ·Supplied.] Mr. Justice Holmes in Sc/1e11ck v. United States' 249 US 47 52' 63 L ' ,ed 470, 473. . . . . In t�is case the evide11ce proves beyond dispute that danger of rio ting an� ·ate. "1olence 1n response to tl1e speec 1] was cle ar present and. 1n1med · 1 , Tl1is absence from tl1e C onst·itut 1· on of any expressed power to deal wit· b ab� . ,of freedom of.· sp_eecl1 l1as enab led tl1e Court to soa·r aloof from any con si derauon , · · l 0f the abuses \Vh1cl1 create pro loca O f blems fi ·o� t1 1e states and to indulge in dent_a· 1 s bi :autli ority some of h" 1 ee to m e cl i s arl w � tio nc fu _ iden t in th e light of ov pr im ' n: ! � ;� : t l ca lo gov ernmen s u . relied on to perfor1n for o t1r free society. quite 8 from any otl1er merits or d ects rece unzet1 1 f n , tel . t deci com sion ple s y Jl1Ill hav alm e ost this battle for the stree ts ;rom a n y for111 o f control. . .. ' . �his case demonstrates also tI . . .. tiaJlj . . ess 1 s 1at_ . tI1 h 1 � Cou spee ,1 c rt 's ser, ce to free f(ft; e�f negative a11d ca11 consist 1 But n s._ Y ?f ate revie,v gistr ing actions by local ma � speech is to be a practicaf rea _ity a ffirmative and immediate prote ction 15 req ·..J 1 , .and it can come oii·ly f rom 111t· r taJ · main · sources. I t depe11ds on local po1I�, \� ; bY Iaw-abiding taxpayers nonJttdicial il d wl o re risk theJJl frOll1 , a ss , dle r s ling fee of tl1 : n � ow eir i 0 in inta ma ! supremacy e aw . Te spe k 1 �m n1ello's tl1eoretical rigl1t to a f�o so iffe, 1nterfere 11ce would hav . no r ality if Cl1icago ts office rs � � i w sl1 other section of tl1e cit� ou wi ld thd ra . e � tile m�� 1 _ assigned t':) t_he task sl1oul d look � way when th� �rowd tll;e�;e� men at Terrrun 1ello's serv . s· 1:'erm1111ello. Can society be expected. � o k�� 1Jlf1 r ic whJG force the1n into da11gerous e I. it has nothing to say of l1is behavio· r: ·_. · act1011?

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No · one will disagree that the fundam�ntal , permanent and overriding policy c ourts sho uld be to perIDit and enco11rage utmost freed an d ice pc l of om of u tte rance . ... But we m. ust bear in. m.ind als o. that no serio us o utbreak of mob vi ol ence' race · pu 1c o o bl r d Is r d er ng 1 IS keIy to get going without help of so me speech1 yn ch i rioting, l s o f peo pl�. A street may be fill ed with me n ma s om e s to g aki and women and the m n crowd s�ill not be a m o?. Unity �f purpo se, passion a11d l1atred, which merges the many nunds of� cro�d Into the mindlessness of a mob, almost i11variably is supplied by speec�es. It 1 s_ naive, or w o r se, to teach that orato ry witl1 tl1is object o r effect o libert�. No m o � l 1as e�er pro tected a11y l iberty, eve t ce ser vi a n its own, is but if not put down 1t al ways winds up 1n an orgy of law] essness whlcJ1 respects no liberties. In considering ab_use o f fr eedom by p�ovoc�tive utterances it is necessary to observe that the la,v 1s m o re tole rant o f d1sc11ss1on tl1an are most individ11als or communities. Law is so indifferent to subjects of talk that I think of none that it it should close to discussio n. Religi o us, social and political topics that in other times or countries have n ot been open to lawful debate may be freely discussed here. Because a s ubject is legally arguable, l1owever, does not mean that public sentiment will be patient of its advocacy at all times and in all manners. So it happens that, while peaceful advo cacy of con1munism or fascism is tolerated by the lav1, both of these doctrines arouse passionat e reactions. . .. When conditions sho w the speaker that this is tl1e case, as it did here, there certainly comes a point bey ond which h e canno t indulge in provocations to ,;iolence without being answ erable to s o ciety. Determination o f such an issue inv olve s a l1 eaV)' responsibility. Courts must beware ]est they bec o me mere organs o f popular intolerance. !\Tot every show of opposition can justify treating a speech as a breach of peace. Neither speakers nor courts are obliged al ways and in al l circumstances to yiel d to p1evailing opinion and feeling. As a pe ople gro w in capacity for civil ization and liberty their tolerance w i ll grow, and they wil l endure, if n ot welcome, discussion even on topics as to which they are committed. They regard convictions as tentative and know that time and events will make their own terms with theorie s, by whomever and by wl1 atever !Mjor ities they are hel d, and man y will be pr oved wrong. But on o ur way to this id�alistic state of tol erance the police have to deal with men as the1 are. The �r�wd mind is never tol erant of any idea which does pot conform to its l1erd op1n1on. It does not want a tolerant effort at meeting of minds. · · · l e vi olence sl1ould prevail ab b pr? hen m fr? the om ed fre to ht y rig o iet f oc s W . over the right of an individual to de fy o pposing op1n1on_, presents � problem tl1at alw ays tests wisdo m and often cal ls for immediate and v1goro11s act1011 to preserve public order and safety. . . .In �he long run, aintenance of free spe ech will b� more endan?ered 1f the m .�9pula�1o n can have no protection fr o m tJ1e ab11 ses wl?1cl1 l ead to v1ol�nce. _No lib eryt is mad e more secure by holdin g that its ab11ses ar� 1nseparabl_e _ f rom its enJ oy­ en t. We must sk � s � at th es 1t1 un 1!-1 m co ic at cr o m de e fre � not forget that it is the ed 1_n _ this g ga en ns st tio ac � e th t 1a tl l t d an em 1 to maintain peace with liberty b. oat� llo le are not inter er n1� to e r t ID.1 T t_ ma it uld wo t 11a W ested pe r1nanently in eitl1er . l f ht t . 1 s ts un m e p ·01·ice m co e th . rf , d _ an h .. er h ot 1 1e ba--tterup batter up some c o mmun1sts or, on t. so me poljc emen? Either res·ult makes grist for 111s mtll ; e1tl1er would help -. .

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1 ds ho in t a e de m g lin with his n g- arm ro st . r fo d an ro d 1 1e t d n a 1a r te s y l1 te u n is t a gitators to lose r.advcr. , o m m co e th prom e av h nd, ha � tr r he . o o e th ma n o t, a l1 w d n A saries. ? · e ic 1 e th 1 l it e n · at ri th ct e do battle ': th l vi ci g in t rty libe p ce ac d ar w to r n �:. m'l�t s This C ourt as go·ne fa m c l lo a a t ll te a th at d n a p t s d w o to cr e es th m o fr ts · · n 1 a tr s e 11 r f a o � IQlJl , · l a -0 v . n ee o m _be re e th · . s h 1� o h t . T o e n e 1t c tw e th 1z f o ty _ er b li e th f o ts en n1er � � � u here order are impairm . c It r u a � n h n ei � _ er er � r o T 1tl1 � w ty er b li n ee tw be is It . � t and liberty � _ a 1c 1� " e g n w 1r c o ttle Practical . s i� r e p m te t o n es o d rt u o � danger that, if the C f � a 1ts 1n o su1c1 d e g 1 f o pact. 1 1 B J . a n o ti u it st n o c e th t er v wisdom, it will con I v1ould affirm tl1e conviction. • • . n o 1m p o s 1i tl in s in jo 1 1 to t1r B ce Mr. Jt1sti

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em bl ro P ch ee Sp of z n, do ee Fr e tl1 on rzs io Furtlzer Opin : 19) S. (19 U. 47 9 , 24 S. U. k v. nc lze Sc in J. , es lm I-Io of on ini op e th From . . . tJ 1 e character of e\1ery ,1ct deJ)ends upon the circ umstances in which it u c]Cille. . , . r!�he :triost stri:ngent J)r,Jtection of free speech should not protect a man , i11 fai�:,�ly sh.1)11tir1g fire in a tl1ef1tre, B.nd cau sing a p anic. It does not even protw. a n1,1n ·fr<)n1 a11 ·inj11,�l1on against uttering words that may have all the effect ! of force .. ". Tl1t� c1uestit)n in e·very case is \vhether the word� used are used in suah circ..11nstances and a.re {)I sl1ch a 11ature as to cre ate a cle ar and present d anger that ' they v,rill bring about the substa11tive evils that Congress has a right to prevenl , It is a question of proximity and d�gree.

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From tl1e opiriion of Holmes J., in Abra,ns v. U.S. 250 U.S. 616 (1919): Persecution for tl1e expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical._li ' you have no doubt of your premises or yo11r power and w ant a certain result w1� �11 your heart you na�u:ally express your wisl1es i n law and sweep away all opposi· , �ion. To allow oppos1t1on by speech seems to i ndicate tl1at you think the speec� impotent, as when a n1an says tl1at lie l1as squared the circle or that you do not care �hole-heartedly for the result, or tl1at you doubt either' your power or �o� · premises. But wl1en �en I1ave realized tl1at tim e has upset many fighting f� 1 they may come to believ_e even more tl1an tl1ey believe the very foundations oftbeir wn c n ct tl1at the ultim�te good desired is be .,,. id� i in tra de fre e tte re ac r by hed � � t t t s f tru Is tl1e 0 po we r of the tl1ought to ge t itsel f accep�; ; · ��:.;et�tio � 0 ; :11� ar�et; and that truth is the o nly ground upon wbic_ . +ion wisl. 1es safely can be :arr1ed out. That , LJ stttu . Con r at any rat e, 1s t ou f o h 1e t eory I . � , . e It 1s an experiment as all li fe is an ba ay. , w edt , exp y eri me d nt. E eve ver r, t r y no ye if a to wager our salvatio11 upon som l o V/hile tl1at experiment is art of e prophecy b ased upon imperfect kJ1e WrnsllJ vigilant against attemp ts i l1 ou r system I think that we should be ;e ano : l?�edia� the k we re exp hat on ssi t s o ini �f n o� � le ?elieve to be f raugb t wit}� Interference witl1 the lawful � ' unl_ess they so 1m nunently threaten ! edja� an pressing purposes of the law that an iIIUil chec k is required to save the country.... ', From the opinion of Erand · . � 19 eis J., In Whitney v. Calif ( 7 5 . · . 3 U .S . 2 7 4 or n ia . �: . Tl1ose who won our inde e den te a st . h ce � . of el 1 to m.ake men free to develo h ? eved tha t the final end t e ·delit,era' P t eir faculties; and that in its government the .

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!h e over _ a prevail rb it ra ry. They valued liberty both as an end should ces for tive be lie ved l1? !h ert y ey to be the ean s. sec ret of happiness and courage to m a as and bel !h 1ev libe �y ed rty tha . t of fr� edo m to think as you will and speak ret sec the be 1nd 1sp me ens ans abl e to �he d1�covery and spread of political truth; are k thin u yo as �nd ass em sp� bly h d1s free cus �1o n w�uld be futile; that witll them, out with that ord1nar1ly adequate protection against the di ssemination of noxi­ affo rds sion cus dis gre ate me t _t�e nac e tha to t _freedom is an inert people; tllat public e; tri� d o� ous· � dut y, pol1 and t1ca tha� l this sl1o_uld be a �undan1 ental principle of a 1s o� ussi disc The nt. y recogruzed tl1e risks to \Vh1cl1 all I1uman institutions gov ernm e n erica Am the are subject. But _ther kne� that ord�r _cannot be secured merely tl1 rough fear of punishme�t f?r its 1nfract1on; that 1t 1s l�azardous to discot1rage t11ougI1t, hope and imagtnat1on; that fear breeds repress1011s; tl1at repressio11 breeds 11ate; that hate menaces stable govern11:ent; t11at tl1e patl1 of safety lies in tl1e opportunity to discuss fre�ly suppose? grievances and . pr?po�ed remedies; and tl1at the fitting remedy for e�1l c?unse�s IS good ones. Eel1e:11ng In the power of reason as applied through public d1scuss1on, they eschewed silence coerced by law - the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing tl1e occasional tyrannjes of gover11ing majori­ ties, they amended the Constitution so that free speecl1 and assembly should be guaranteed. . . . If there be time to expose througl1 discussion tl1e falsel1ood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can ju stify repre ssion. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled 'r'liti1 freedo1n. Sucl1, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution. It is the.refore alvvays open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speecl1 a11d assernbly l))i sho, ving tbat there was no emergency justifying it. ... 1

Example . No. 4: \Vhat if Executive Officials flout the court's ruling? In Cooper v. Aaron 358 U.S. 1 (1958) various ��ate officials including the State govern­ ment refused to support an order by a Federal court requiring termination of segregation in public schools. There was much local hostility to the court order, and the defendants asked the court to postpone its order, claiming thai both officials disapproved and the possibility of hostility justified the action. The Supreme Court unanimously held that this \Vas no defence, declaring, inter a/ia:

The controlling legal principles are plain. The comm_an? ?f �he_ F?u�eenth Amendm ent is that no ''State'' shall deny to any person w1th1n its JUr1sd1ct1on the eq ual protection of the laws. . .. In short, the constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school admission on groun�s of race· or colo:1r [as declared by this Court in an earlier case] can neither be nullified open�y an? d�rectly by state legislators or state executives or judi�ial officers, nor nt1ll1fi � 1nd�rectly � by _them through evasive schemes for· segregation whether attempted 1ngeniot1sly or inge�uously." Sm.ith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, I 3i. Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the '·SuJ?rt:me Law of' the L_and.'' , urt Co s ou 1m a11 un a for g kin ea sp In 1803, Chief Justice Marsl1a11, ref�rnng to the Constitution as ''the fundamental and paramou11t law of tile nation,'' declared , 177 , 137 cll an Cr I ,i, iso ad M v. in th e notable case of Marbury y sa at . t? _ t en rtm pa de ''it l cia di jti is e th phatically the province and duty of em � · hat tbe law ry cia di J� l er� fed e th at tl1 le cip in pr sic is.'' This decision declared th e ba s 11 sup e e in � � pl ci in pr at th id ai n, tio the exposition. of th e law of the Constitu :v· er :Incme s­ d.t in d an nt ne a _ rm pe a as ry nt bee � ou C . . Pe.nsable f n respected by this Court and the e ature of our constitutional system. It follows. tl1at the interpretation of '

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rt is u e . o .. th C is p th su y b rem·e 1aw. oftl d e at ci n ti . en · t en m d n e m A . m a kes I t o f b'Ind ing efliect·on the r� 1 "l t n e te r u o F e h t n o ti ta S u it st n o C e th f o I V a d Art the C?ntrary notwithst: to e t_ t� S )'. an f o s w a L r o �, n o ti u it st n o C e th r ce 1s offi I solemnly com mitt ��i�g fn 1a 1c d JU d an ve ti u ec ex d g, an ed r to · 1 1s g e 1 � te , ta s y u it , is Ever st th n n o o rt C ti o p p . su to '' 3 p I V rt · A , to 1t . r . oat1l taken pursua� 1tut.1on w.ithout viol af st on e C th . t ns ai ag ar w n ca mg l!!l�:. · N0 · · · [ptiblic official] c r e o k 1o sp a una ni mous \{I-,\J , a I s h ar M e 1c st u J f ie h C . it u n undertak.1ng 1- 0 support t �y es t a 1 m at 1 w . -11 s ra ve se l e nu an h t of the es ur a� sl gi le jud� ' 1e tl f '. ''I : at th ng yi in sa ts 1e tl gh 1 red �ndertho�: y ri q� ro ac st de d an , es at St d te n! U i� tl ments of the courts 0� , United Sta/f.! ry ke n oc m m le .. . so a es m co be f el its judgmeiltS, the constitution er s w rt a p� se �o as l ho nu w y r lif no er ov a G federal A 6. 13 5, 11 h nc ra C 5 , rs v. Pete , said Chief Justice Hug� er w po �h su d �1a � If� . ed in ra st _re rly ila cotirt order js sim e th t of at fia th a t te Governor fes sta ni ma 1s 1t t, t1r Co s ou 1m an u11 a r fo o als , 32 in 19 e e em th pr d su be law ul wo s, ate hel St oft d ite Un anl e th of o11 11ti tit ns Co the t and no se e rci th on exe of up te ion sta ut tit po� ns Co l ra de Fe the of s on cti tri res tl1at the , tin S. 7 U. tan 378, 397-398.... 11s Co 1'. i11g erl St '' ... 28 es ras pl1 1t te1 po im t bu be wo11ld

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I) Exanline tl1e arg11ment developed in tl1e majority opinion in Lochner. Wbai was the major prerrrise? What was tl1e minor premise? In adopting eachpremist · v:1hat assu:11ptions did tl1e court make? Did the court ma.ke assumptions abou1 the rnea�1ng of ''property''? About the meaning of ''due process"? About the relation bet\veen ''l1ealth'' and ''work''? Why did the court saythe staruie wa� ''.me�dleson1e''? Sl1ould a judge ever cl1aracterize a law adopted by s maJor1ty 1n the legislature as ''meddlesome''? 2) Con�ider I-Iolmes' disse11t. Wl1at did l1e mean wl1en he said ''tl1e 14th Am en�· ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's social statics''? (If you don.1 • kn?w who Herbert Spencer was - look l1in1 up in a textbook on econo� pllilosophy or the Encyclopedia of Social S ciences· ) Holmes was a greai' · nl r · · ro op po ne nt of argun1·en.ts wh icI1 proceed from broad (sweeping) ''general P t", . . ,, . Loc,1iner �· · . s1t1ons . Why?· If J-Iolmes \.Vere wr1t1 . ng a majority opinion 1n · not s a_ dissenter, wl1at would l1e _ar r vie w his in ha ve said? Where � 3) the l1m1ts to goveriime1 1t ,,regt1 . 1at1on '' of ''property' '?· 11 ?0r Is the ''sale'' f yot1r 'labor'' a property -'gs ' of ''co ' ntr act ' sal e for the ' � '' mpl could tl1e Cou� ar u sin way b i yn1ent' q ' fferent ? n . �:� di a y uite different set of w s to �es cribe tl1e relationship? . J\l' 4) put yourself 10 the shoes p ng of a 1 a�yer worki?,g �or a com�ssio� d af. ti posed amei1dmeiits for ! 1 re�e!stl' �li e Revised _Const1tut1on. Assuming J�dic u 1s to be the law of Eth.iop o : c ia and assuming Article 4 3 is to be kept 10 _t e [llurh tution - can tlle issu 0� tlie Lo�l1ner case be avoided? How? Is th ri oJI'' · likelihood today tha� 05�u o e c e ated th C 11 would ''read into (Art.43) the LocJ'1ner doctr1� ? Judges · . . values ?. ne · D oes 1t express ex1st1ng .Ji � i� 5) In a developing ou try JOi�� be given the statu� ; , to what extent should a · Constitutio n _wb h s ri e rem t law g , pro tect individuals' prope; Y ��1ioC government contro f? ,i of prope rty (i.e. guar� part ,:r0:n,, protections against outnght cototecriai . nt ees of fair compensation) should there be P· ., .

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. m1inst ''regulation'' which is no t confisca tory? For t· hat matter som e regu1a· at:,. ,, or se t y a fi ,, t o co n so m e ex te,it, may 1t not? If govern e b y a m tion t s p e ale i of e lan on d, t� the � ilin g landowner may Jose "properr:1�� ·r : c ce pr a ceiling is below a rise 1n the ''m�rket'' v alue. Or if you, as an emJoy�r 0� ser are �a nt, required by a new law to pay a minimum wage e� old ho us ur yo . hi gher than the present prevailjng w age the g overnmen is wh ich him to t arguably bas _ "t�ken'' your property to give it t o the serva�t? But Article 44 of the Const1�ution should not be interpreted by a court to operate in such cases should it? AssmDe that a law is passed permit ting the municipality of Addis Ababa t o 6) regulate use of all l�nd. No o ne may build ho uses or busin esses unless with permit from _ the , Cit�. Furthermore, a ll development of land must be in accordance with the city plan. You �wn undevelo ped land in tl1e city. In yo ur view, the land has now reac hed a higl1 market value and you can sell it to a company which wants t o put up an office bt1ilding. The Mu nicipal:ty advises it will not issue a per11Jit for such a building. The Mu11icipality says tl1at accord­ ing to its ''land use plan'' for the develop1nent of Addis, the land should only be used to erect an apartment dwelling f or ''middle income'' families. I-Iowever, at the moment, you cannot find any p11rch ases who vvot1ld be willing to buy the land for this use, and you are desperately an xiot1.s to sell in order to get cash. Should the Con.stitution give you any protection agair1st the Municipality? Does it matter if the Municipality's ''land µse plaxJ." vvas prepared 'vvith the advice of some academic, f erenji ''exper t'' \vho had n.o pr::itic(:11 kno\vledge of land economics here a.nd who se ' 'plan'' may l1ave been a pooi· or1e? Should a court become involved in such and issue? 7) Assume that you are ab o ut to graduate from the Un.iversity. ·TI1e government has just enacted a law requiring you - as a lJ nive1·sity trained graduate to work for government and at a modest salary for 10 ye ars. You have received a very good offer fro m a priv ate business a nd also a foreign scholarship. Should the Constitution be cap a ble of judicial interpretation whicl1 would hold that your ''legal skills'' are you r ''property'' and th at govern1?1en� ca.nnot en_act this kind of ''control'' over such ''property''? Or should this -kind of question be withdrawn from ''judicial review''? 8) To what extent should courts ha ve power to review the constitutionality of e.g.: - government price control l aws? - mirumum wage laws? - maximum wage laws? . . - co�servation laws, e.g. prohibiting cuttin� of trees except w1tl1 a per_mit; Wh at 1s the value in autho rizing judici al review here? What are the risks ·

The Jarpanese Land Ref orm Case

9) Lan d ri:forru w as as opula� � politi�al deman� amo_ng _ progressive educat:d p or°:1 � Y f re ld at 1: a. pi io th o E 1n le be o t 1n g in m st co po 1s p 1t ar a a s n Ja w pe Wellp involve expropriation. The E thiopian Constit�tio n permt ts expro �:iation� o p ex � t l1e o _ t e te an ar gu _ s s b1 T pur! .uant to law and witl1 ,�j ust c ompensat ion''. 1 a c1 a� n g fi in d ar t re lt ated'' landlord may. if ·honoured, im po se ver� d�ffic·t1 t Pobsta7 1all nt se es as e t _ re rp te i� . is ' s. le n' i? : at ns � pe P m a ' co i rt c t us ly 'j if ar ul . _ lllea mng current market value. Is the deterro1nat1o n or what 18 J USt compensa

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s e rt rc fo ou C en e e th th if . is Co . t (I ? t't1 ut1.00, · ns . ,, a ''JUd 1c·a on ti es qu ' l' . 1 ·uestion? (It certai· n1Y shou1 d be, sh o . 11 t. 1on q d ul ' ' al it ic . it ol ''p a nop ·t 1 s ) ? . 1 . · t · 1t no t s I a I ?) · questio 1 y . v1ous n for (Ob ? n " o i t s experts•;! e u q ' ' ic m o n o c e '' n a Is it eory should a cou rt" .· . th at wh on d an t ten ex at wh v,�· � r (A a·in obviously?) To m re, an econo ic li u ss l re ca p ti li o p f o ct u d ro p po � n which is the . C'f an 1eg¥1s1at 10 ? s u s . n e s n o c y r ta n 1e n a li r a P a d n a is s ly a n expert a st re te in seei�g to it tha t llit er in th o r � ic m o n o ec l, ca ti li po 10) Is there a social, er we think the land] th r he te w at m 1t s oe D t? en tm ea tr ' 0� . landlord gets ''fair' n t 10 . sa ea e p t he past? h t '' d e 1t 0 1 p ex '' as h d an ' 1' sl lfi se has been '' is in th ew c v� rti re pa al ci di ju r area ma· ula of l� ro e tl1 g in fin de of lem ob pr I 1) TI1e e.l on ce an of st r op in he pr ot ex an of i riat k in th we · be a bit more difficult if y tel w iva no nd pr la ld e he til fer m by a iar; en nd co to s nt wa nt me rn ve the go h t alt ep no we exc ve ha the land. Tu o wh rs me far ce ten sis sub all sn1 of group lled tro tion nta con pla cly bli pu a called foi ld bui to is e pos IJUr s nt' me gover11 by the 5 Ye�tr Plan. But the government can ill afford to pay high prices foi tl1e l.and if the pr,)ject is to go forward. Should a different formula for "fair" c:Jmpen�ai:1,)r.1 f.::-.:: tised tiefJ�nding on wl1ether land is owned by an absentet Iar�dJ.,Jrd t)f a r,oot fJ(�as.ant? (�Cf. Article 37 of the Constitution). Is it wise 10 tl'ttust this t�ir!i'J r.:;f �:it1e:stion 011 the co11rts? Can it be avoided - without abolish­ i11g ''ji:,tli(:i�I rt?;�.,��:��?/''? 1

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12) As sl1 ov-1n b)' tl1e Terminiello case, the Holmes-Brandeis ''philosophy" ano the ''clear and present test'' for wl1icl1 they contended have come to be accept� by the U.S. Supreme Court. ls the Holmes-Brandeis approacl1 a wise approach to adopt in Ethiopia a sv,er the <:Iuestion: Wl1at sl1all the constitution provide with respect to ��· e � w regulatin g freed om of speecl1 and freedom of tl1e press and relal� · . ao bro free doms? Wlio sliould decid g cisin e tl1at qt1estion - the Courts exer _ . are cas,1 in powers to 111terpret const't 1 ut·iona 1 guarantees of freedom which . . lO or the form o_ f generalities. Or sl1ot1ld it be left ch? bran the legislative to the Executive under a delegation from Parl iament to make rules? ' . ns 13) Assu111e the same ,,facts,, as io . . ovis · . 10 tlie Ter,111111ello case ' and assume the pr of the Cl11· cago 0rd1n . anc·e are a part of the Etl1iopian Penal Code: .on . convi ct1 · . . you are t1 le advocate of AtO his T from llo in,e ng erm eali app in tl1e Higl1 Court to the S upreme Court· · ut1 · ·on tilt , �a_ n you argue tl1at tinder . st1t · Article 41 of the Revised Con ll' o b conv1ct1on sliould be _reve' rsed? W 65 le Ar tic l1a t is the argument?. Cf. does it apply. to tile issue at l1and?· . � t n Article 41 says tllat f e d uara m are of g ''spee ? ch'' and ''tl1e press'' ''i n accorda nce witli t/ : : 1e 1 ., yout Does this mean that . ? ff ct an a law en y be ed· os1,0· 0o; limiting may speech answer is ''Yes'' tl1en d . P 0 oes r not P ess Art I 1 c 4 e ' 1 become a meaningl . ti°' E\len -if Par1iame ,' ,: re disa nt d and the .E mpero1 may exercise very broa lll · determining what Jll 10. o r. p laws be l r . gated, the courts must . e �ulatmg tl1e press and ''speech'' shal st1ll interpret those laws ? . ..

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pl e, '' whosoev er ... .forments dissension' arouses . · If the la.w says, for exam . . vi o f t s ac o 1 en up ce st or irs po 1 · 1ti ca I racial or religious disturbances' on , d e hatr _ me Cf. enal C ' od cr e, A a rt s. � of 48 0, 481, the court still has the task, � is guilty et in wh 1n g te en the defendant �as engaged jn the rp r o t; � n it s ? doe pr os ci· i be d . acti vity, 1.e. did the_ sp�h d � w�ht wa s �r.oh1b1ted. And in deciding what is a speech ''foD?ent1ng d1ss�ns1on _ . or ''political disturbance'' the court must no th its at t, dec 1t m 1s1on m ay be ''strict'' (in favour of a nairow us t ize , gn eco r interpretation of th�,p�nal provision and t�us liberal in favour of tree speech activity) or ''broad 1n fav?�r of expan_d1n� tl�e governments discretionary power to use the pen� prov1s10�. In �a.k1ng its 1nterpretat.ion, should not the Court decide whet�er 1t was _t� e 1nte�tion an d purpose of Article 41 to promote and protect the k1nd of act1v1ty wh1ch the defendant engaged in? Beyond that, can it not be argued that Article 41 is not the only relevant provision of the Constitution; Article 65 also applies; Article 65 lays down a standard which controls both a) the kind of laws which may be enacted to regulate ''speech'' and ''press'' activity, and b) the interpretation and application of those laws in a particular case. Consider the above argument very carefully. If the above argument is correct, then do we not come to tbe conclusion that the Imperial Supreme Court is faced, inescap2bl�y wjtl1 a task of i11ter­ 1 ''J)ress ''speech'' free of guarantees related r othe: (aud, constitutional preting . . act1v1ty ?). . If that proposition is true, then it is obviousJy i1·ripc11"t.:;lx:t ii) c,JTusider: a) possible theories of constitutional interp:retation o.lf tb.ese articles, and b) the difficulties which this function imposes on th� Judiciary an � the strain which the function may impose upon the pol1t1cal system (since, in free speech cases, the court js being asked, by the defende�t. _, t� rule again,st the gove-rnment in what may often be a very ''sens1t1ve or ''controversial'' case). �

SECTION 9 LI,MITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW Introductory Note

Th e case of Coooer v. Aaron, discusse d above, gives us a �oncrete exampl e of the ts cou e t e wh ls r cia offi ib nt me ty ern gov � Poss ili of clashes b etween courts and other � � y ! ma s c a ny ma ' e o To e. k o li not ce do ial s ffic stit n con o r the ich nal wh utio decisio s to nf :� � d r T e �he br stitu�ion s�ks o con akd the w �h h n of w e the y tem s sy ver � i e th e: :s o ti ita : l� n ·. hie� follo w suggest � ai �� ce ing s ways to decrease this dange� by _impo .exer cise of the power of judicial review of constitutional 1.ssues.

'' m is iv ct A '' l ia ic ud J . v ' l t' ia in Judic ''Restra ) From lYest r?• • • 3 4 9 (1 , 4 2 6 . .s u · 9 1 3 e tt e n , . r a B Y1rgin1a State Board oif Euucatzon v. ,,_ ' n re d il ch ll . a d e . ir u . eq r . h ic · h h w T is sue 1n this case n stitut1onal1ty of a state l w was the co e th g n ti in PUbl� lu sa f o e is rc e x e e th , � , mo sc ch ho ea I l?e r�o nn to e� d un. pain of dismissal �J��eir children enrolle d in the flag a · J 1 � an :n I' edging alletgiance to it. The plaintiffs (parents

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ich believed that such e h w. up) gro s giou reli (a s e ss itne xe . , hova e e re odus :n:ardogmas of tl1eir religion; (See Ex Chapter 20, ve rses !ISes �ill school) w . J contrary to fundam. . nct' to restrain the State s School Board from enfo rcing th . \, sued in court for an IDJ�1 ;��hat the flag salute yi?lated their ri�hts guarantee d b eso5)� Y th e f."lli! flag-salute law They a ;!nts (free exercise of religion an � consc1 en� ). d ously previ and Fourteenth Amenear had sustamed a sim ilar Ha t Cour e m e Supr the 1 . On_ly a f�w years .S.586_(1�39). But �la�tiff s carri ed &�sa!i.!tl U s 310 ti v. c Gobi ;;;, t law, Mznersvzlle Ss hool D Ciourt believing that a maJ�r1 ty of the JUStices had cha�� o � app_eal to th� ii �e:�e had been decided. This beli ef was f?�d on dicta pronoullted�i. mmd s10� th e � 1 i e w Justices had been appoi· '°" � n e som t tha t fac the s plu es cas n�� the court m ot her 10tervening r p ese e th ��1� �ntral issue in both the Gobitis case and the_ � n t case y.ras whe_ther th e'� each pat r1 ot1 sm and na�1onal unity (Th t to d tho me l ona uti stit con e C-0� , s�lute ,, wa5 a valid d e to use ans m attain the end). of the ty idi val the y onl _ l goa t tha t' n io es qu t no · ·s1·on _ a1?d h�Id th a.t the compulsory did 1 c1 de s itz ob G �g e th d le ru er salute ov t ur h i . The Co . tect ts d e pro ngh s nt1ff by the First and Fom. was an unconstitutional violation of the pla1 ; teenth Amendment.

Mr. Jt1stice Jaclcson delivered the opinion of the Court: The Gobitis opinion - reasons that '�national unity is. the . basis of natioll!l sect1rity," tl1at tl1e a11tl1orities l1ave ''the r1gh� to select appropriate means for iu attainn1ent," and l1ence reaches the conclusion that such compulsory measure; toward ''natio11al unity'' are constitL1tional. Id. a t 595. Upon the verity of thisa1sumption depends 01.1r a11S'v'ier in tl1is case. ' Natio11al t1nity as a11 er\d whicl1 officials may foster by persuasion and examp� : is not in questiort. The }Jroblem is wl1etber under our Constitution compu�ioo ; as l1ere em1Jloyed is a pern1issible means for its achievement. ' Struggles to coerce uniforrnity of sentiment in support of some end thou�i ' essential to their time and country l1ave been waged by many good as well as bJ . evil men. Nationalis1n is a relatively recen t pl1enomenon but at otl1er times a..� . p�aces the end� have been racial or territorial security, support of a dyna sty or� ·. � i gi1:1e, and pa�ticular plans for saving so ttls. As f rst and 111oderate method� to 81�: , unity _ l1ave failed, those bent on its accomplishment n1u st resort to an ever 1ncreas�: severit�. As gover11mental J)ressure toward t111ity becomes greater, so strife beco� more bitter as to whose t1nit)' it sl1all be. Probab . peop . our of div isio n de ly no eper could_ proceed fron1 a11y provocation tl1a 11 fron1 finding it necessary to cho ose wh;; do?tri?e ao<l wl1ose progra1n public ou_ t li. y el com p ed t1cational officials shall �, It, unite in embracing. Ultimate futil 15 c� rcn co he ity of sL1cl1 attempts to con1pel 1 lesson of every sueI1 e 110 as :. 1nr · 'J · Ct' rt from tl1e st1a n 1 Chr 1 Ro . ot1t ma n dri sta ve . mp to . · disturber of 1ts pagan tin·1 t a.lli . . . dyo nd . tl 1e a Inqti1sit1011, as a mean s to re11g1ous Y, unity, tll e S'b . 1 erian exile . s as a rnea11s to Russia11 unity down to the fast . n ueff o�t fih od' ,.,t' of our present totalitaria11 of en em tio n ie s. i na T l1o 0 se � eli m w i l1 begin oercive . ·i i _ � ; soon 1f 11d tl1emselves ex t t · · pin . o · on of erm ina t1n at1 g dis un sen 1fic ter s Co mp . uls ory achie ' ves on 1y tl1e unanimit y of the graveyard. ·lf , . U! It seems trite b t nec�ss ns o C ary to say th at tl1e First. Amendme�t �o our � tion was designed to avoid these ends b y avoiding these beg111ni s ng . r···n.,:'1 , · ·. Freedon1 to <lift · . . cn, u ro er 18 not l1m 1ted ter. ,0 di�� to tl1ings that do not 1nat. would be a me slia d 1 t h w ff rig fr ee do m th . e T he te st of its substance is as to tl1ings tl;:t t � ouc 1 t le heart of t h e existing order. �· e . :�1. If there is any fixed w o o . n t st a.r tha Itl 1 ou r 15 1t co high o,: petty' can . 11s tit io ut n, io . co · na ns l reli te t "· lla . t 111 prescribe wl1 at sl1all be 15 ' 1 01 1 na ti a ortl1odox in politics, '

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op ini fo on or rce of cit ize s ns. to confess by word or act th att er . m r the o e1r . c or · there are any cir 1a1th · cumstances which pe . rmit an excepti'on , they do . e·in· · If ther no t s. u to ur oc c w no W e think the actio� o� th e l?c�l a_uthorities it: compelling t1 1e flag salute and ut on 1 n al st1 l1ID c 1ta sce t1o nd ns s on tl1 e1r tra po n wer and i11vades the sphere � � ge pled . _ . wh 1t ich 1s sp1 �he r1t pu rpo se an d of tl1e First Amendinent to our Consti­ llec t inte of all l m cia fro offi l. tro rve con rese to n tutio The decision of this C?urt. in �inersvil�e School .Dist. v. Gobities and tl1e hold­ cur 1am per ?e_ c 1�1o few ns wl11cl1 preceded and fore-shadowed it are e s tho of s ing overruled, and the Judgment enJ01n111g enforceme11t of tl1e Wes t Virginia Regulation is affirmed· •••••• • ••

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting: •••••••••

Were my purely personal attit11de relevant I sl1ould wl1oleheartedly associate myself with the general libertarian ,,ie,vs in tl1e Court's opinion, representing as. they do the thought and action of a lifetime. ... As a member of tl1is Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them.... It can never be empl1asized too much that one's. own opinion about the wisdom or evil of a law should be exclt1ded altogetl1er when one is doing one's duty on the bencl1 .... Most unwillingly, therefore, I must differ from my brethren with regard to legislation like this. • • •• • • •••

The admonition that judicial self-restraint alone limits arbitrary exercise of our autho rity is relevant every time we are asked to nullify legislation. Tl1e Consti:.. tution does not give us greater ,,eto power wl1e11 deali11g wjth one pha se of ''liberty'" than with another. . .. Our power does not vary according to the particular provj­ sion of the Bill of Rights which i s jnvoked. Tl1e right not to have property tal(en without just compensation has, so far as the scope of judicial power is concerned,. the same constitutional dignity as the right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the latter has no less claim tl1an freedom of tl1e press or freedo m of speech, or religious freedom.

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_The reason wl1y from the beginnjng even tl1e narrow j�dicial autl1ority t�· nullify legislation has been view ed ,vitl1 a jealous eye is tl1at It serves to preve1:1r the full play of the c rati mo� _ e tind an be may it at 1 tl fact The . cess . atic pro 1ocr den . . aspe�t _ of our scheme of government doe s I1ot call for Its reJ�ction or Its diSues. But 11 1 s the bes t of rea s ons ' as tl1is Court l1as frequently recog111zed, for tlie greateSl caution in its use. . . . Under our constitutional sys tem tl1e legislat�re is cbarg�d ?olely_ witl1 civi� concer �s of society e t nlo pro to r _ e 1 l ei� IS se rpo p� _ legislative . sic . rin int If ed the ow av or �o discour age some religious comm11nity or creed., It IS clearly \V1�l1 1n tl1e co11st1}Utional restrictio ns imposed on legislatures and cannot stand. 811t it ?Y �10 _ n1�an s. �l�ows that legis ry t� ina rim !sc n-d 11o ral ne ge a cr ev 1en wl ive ng lat nti wa r is we po · . c1v11 reguJatio · · . 1n . n a f o fs 1e el b s 11 0 igi 1 re or es_ 1 n p scru 1n s t1ou t fac c1en s che u s con to· . cl. ly .prese1�ts o div· _ a o te 11b ?o un f a lie be ou or r gr s e pl �� ru p. sc 1 rd cl � su ga r fo Re l t of I1t io t e most reas at od m m co ac · e _ i� at sl g1 le . of n tio er l ex � � ab on e s e th m r . ai fo cl iB o . ., v pr by n ne o u , r ,re s 1 1 s req, � �k���� e,�ernp_ct1o_ 011r e, beyond our· power to rewrite tl1� State' _ _ salute or by m . g. s for tl1ose who do 11ot wish to participate in the f1,,g .

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CoNS'II'I'UTIONAL PIAN ETH IO SOURCE.BOOK OF

LAW

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. That wisdom mig ht _ ples scru ir the et me to · ons 1 t a d o s comm ac er t o ggest some � schoo l admin istra . that tion and u ation s wou mmo d ld n . k co ac h e su f o · o i n ot a the m y · on e th m re ce fi n or ai nt ai m o th t k ye se 1d a1 t no em tl1 e a n1 ret S to lt cu 'ffi t d t oo ·1 fi. nd I .. ut the .. al re question i , t · est gg su B to ce. in ov pr r ou . w s o �ng to con �orm, 1s outside tu la e is th g ? le r o re . s . . l1e court t s n o ti a ' d k o m m o e JS to m a e suel1 ac d an r t sla gi ters have_ conflicti le vo cl1 l1i w to � ? as rs te at m ith w n .... . ··we are dealing !ons on where wisdom l 1ct nv co g on str r ou se po im to es ie.s.� . views. Are we as J·udg · ve r si C t es ou s cc t su 1 o e i iv f ie to d e . em thi wi se d l1a n per. o ag s _ ar . ye e re tl1 1 cl hi w t Tl1a n� d1 e c1 th ift of opinion of de y sh b ed w tl� ou w no is n tio sla gi le of missible areas eir or ey th th es a cc th su ve s lie sor be to ! e er th may not is n so rea t i1a w s. ce sti two Ju ed s em �a l1 de to 1 wh be of so fund a­ at th Is e? nc he � ars ye few a w vie r lle ot an have to dure for all times to on en uti tit ns Co e th o int n itte wr be to as e tur na a mental be tl1e sport of shifting \Vinds of doctrine?

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e unco11trollable power wielded b y this Court brings it very close to the d ion m slat fro to legi eal app As adju irs. a aff .ication lic pub of s area itive sens most becomes more freque11t, and its consequences more far reaching, judicial self-res­ traint becomes more and not less important, lest we t1nwarrantably enter social a11d political don1ains \-Vholly ol1tside ot1r concern . 1

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Jefferson's opposition to judicial review has not been accepted by history, but it still serves as an admonition against confusion between judicial and political functio11s.As a rule of judicial self-restraint, it is still as valid as Lincoln's admoni · tion. For those who pass laws not only are under -duty to pass laws. They are also under duty to observe the Constitution. And even tl1ougl1 legislation relates to civil liber!ies, our duty of defere11ce to tl1ose wl10 l1ave the responsibility for making the Ia,Ns 1s no less relevar1t or less exacting.And tl1is is so especially wl1en we co n· sider the accidental contingencies by \Vhich one man may determine constituti onaJi . ty and thereby confine the political po\ver of the Congress. • • • •• • •••

·· ·. Co�sta�t preoccL1pation with tl1e co11stitutionality of legislation ralber than wit� its w1sd?m te11ds to preoccupatio11 ... with a false value. Tl1e tendency 0� focus _ sing attention on constitutionality is to make constitutionality synon�ous w1tl: _w1sdon1, to. regard a law as all rigllt if it is constit s1ste�� pe r . a y l On .. . ut io na l posit� ve_ transl�t 1on of tl1 e_ fa. �tl1 of a free so cie ty in to tl1e convictions and h�bt� aod actions of a con1ID�r�ity 1s tl1e ultimate tation. p tem ed _ un re lia ab nc at ag e ai ns t .., tter tl 1e l 1un1an sp1r1t. to 1e . ! The above ec1se sl1ould be co s1· d. lyz i n . f . . ana . d _e� at this po!nr,. pnmar1ly_ for the �� ose oFrankfurter some of the proposi tions about � f ., u d_ici:i sel f-restramt , o op1 ou

set t 1n the ru n ? . J. Consider very carefull . 1e fo . es ll w 5 o 1s prop � s �nal_ ituti s tion in . ding d�i ! const 1) A Judge shoul d neve{-� t ?<;>18 m� pr!�ate not1on_s <?f policy into the const1tut.1o n · I 2 ) A Ju dge's "opinion of �� : . . i on 3 ) A Judge's exercise of carefu ,,1sdom o� a .��w IS irrelevant; isi . ec d l ,, 1lrarY rest � rrun t IS t�e onl y way to prevent ..ar� -. or decisions wllich otllers or exrtl �� w rs il eem t? be arb1 trary, and. if too many legislato oed; .., t1ve offici�Is dee m the cou e r to w be d rbi trary, the courts w ill be attacked an � � 4) the exercise of judicial re � , p ,,j�w may se e to r pr�vent the full play of the democ at! and therefo re there mus t . rv_ " .. be reat_ ca�t10 in. Its ; ' � ) tl1e use court mus t beware of th! r:iJld 5 : � p . . --t logical 1m pl1cat1on s of I_ts dec1s1?ns .- be a broadly sta ted ,vill in v i waft: � te al l so s of , 6) tl1e Court should clru. <;>th er ytJr. al con trov con ersi st1tu al W t1o n � r fe never e prev a i unless the prior decisio °�;:11 �us precedents within the space of on Y n clearly said to be unreasonab le ; -.

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JUDICIAL REVIEW

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on the assumption that legislators and executi· ve . 7) the Courts must act om · tcta 1 s are equally n· io ut tit e ns th co ey ob · ' to sworn de fer ence to legislative judgments on constitutionalit du e pa y us t .m rts Co u S) Y and should not unless they judgme are nts unreasonable; reverse such and executiv� organs develop r�s ect for the ive leg isl a th e s un les � 9) p constitution, there is . · little the courts can do to preserve 1t - and that propos1t1on ' too ' counsels J·udi'c1· a1 restrain t · on · s are n1ore, or less, persuasive · k f: ::anlcfurt�r J's propos1t1 Do you thin _ as advice fo; n ca 1n )? en -, m es (ti A dg Ju es Ethiopian judg

Judicial Power and its l,imitat1ons 1er l » ia o ic P ud J · oj t J, ce on C The

Re-read_ /,.,!ticle _ 108 of the revised co�stit1;-1tion. The courts are ''vested'' with ''the judicial

power''. This � s plamly � �,�nt ?� a certa1�, kind of governmental powe �. �ut note that the courts ,�re onl) vested with J_ ud�c1_al power . They do not under the Ethiopian Constitution, exercise any power except ''Jud1c1al po,ver'' do they? Wha� then is '_'judicial power''? Obvious� y o_ne could �efine �he word in many wa.ys. But _ _ a und er ste oper of atm con g st1��t1onal Jud1�1�l review, it is, perhaps, important in co�tr1es �,):' �. to � ea�se that the concep� of J_u? 1c1al po":"er. - th� defin1t1on given to the term - may serve to lmut the role of courts m dec1d1ng constttut1onal issues. Thus in India, Japan and America the courts have declared that they cannot and will not decide a constitutional issue just be� cause a party before the court demands or asks that tl1e court decide the issue or just because the issue may be important. The court does not sit as veto agency, nor to advise tl1e government or parliament. The court sits to settle litigation and i t only interprets tl1e constitution as an incident of this function. Furthern1ore, the court will confine itself to issues \vhich are susceptible of resolution by a court: it must not, u_nder the guise of exercising judicial reviev,, decide issues which are beyond the competence of·judiges to decide.

From the Opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Coleman v. Jv/i!le;" 307 U.S. 433 (1939). In endowjng this court with �judicial power' tl1e Constitution presupposed an historic content for that phrase and relied 011 ass11n1·ption by the judiciary of authority only over issites which are approp1·iate _(01· di.s·po.riition by _judges. [E1nphasis added.] The Constitution further exolicit]y indicated tl1e lim;ted area ,vithin which judicial action was to move - however far reaching the conseq11ences of action ith w _in that area - by extending 'judicial power' only to 'Case' and ·Contr�­ �ers1es' ... Judicial power could come into play only in matters that were tl1e tradi­ tional concern o f the co u rt s ... . It is not our function·, and it is bevond our power, to write legal essays ?r to give legal opinions, however solemnly reque5ted and however grea t the national emergency. ·... Unlike the role allowed to j·udges in a few state courts an� to the . � �preme Court of Canada our exclusive business is litigation. The requisites of \1 tigation are not satisfied 'when questions of constitution�lity thot1 gl1 convey�d hro�gh the out ward al cot1rt proceeding do not bear �pecial tion s ven form con a of ��l�ti_on to a r doctrine �� ou of ce uen � seq con an la ticu pe par ig r sco e lit Th . _ _ ant J _dicial rev.iew r ve fast1 e obs us e mak uld sho on acti r ove 1ve slat leg1 executive and o r usl �he b ounds of the r t� mat ed n fi N? c�n . a e r we hich w n ithi w litigious process v o sen sly infringement of the Co nstitution may be called into _q�eS!t�n, th1s ou w is not �he tribunal for its challenge except b y those who have so�e spec1al1sed inte rest of t heu- ow n to vindicate, apart from a political concern w.hich belongs to all · · · ih-e ''Bran deis Rules''

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�eep the ex�rcise of udicial power _within �<;finable 0��ds, :: �:;c��P:r'��;;u�: J! bas j , ing uni d ope es, 1 , ru tai cer d ose . n . mp lf-i ''se atio ''cu nary, canst·ttuttonal . . summed these up 10 tis opinion .f: o am a Judi cial Brandeis review . Justice Louis B.

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ITUTIONAL LAW T S N O C N A I P O I H T E F O K O O B E C R U O S

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A �o a . case 6) 4 ,3 88 2 . .S U 7 29 � . � Y .A � .t.. ral} .in 1936. (Ash_w ander V.T.V ai .s . , 1n d ra f . ro h t ld u o o B s r u e C th uclS J es su is l a n o ti tu t· , > s n o c · u a _ nm e d 1 c e d t �e • i. ' o t · · bee� Court nave ''rule5'' _ g n followi the d that . satisfie . . . 7 ., .A 9 V 2 . T . v er d n_ a U S 2&S. J% w h n s i A is e � n a r B e c ti s u J , From . the Opinion of · . . (1936). · ned fr a n t; f la o on is g li le o i it ty a st n n co ti u · e th i · n l o up s as p t � l il 0 � i1 t ur · l. The C o . . . . g in d e e c ro p · . .tott.o l . · , ry a rs e v non-ad tl na _ w ns f la o co _ o in t1 es n u � � ad a e a� p �i ti � 'a _ t o n l il w rt u 2. The Co . . . . . . 1t g 1n 1d ec d f o . . . of tl1e necessity n�l law broader than ii �1 t1o ns tu co o� le �u a e at ul rm 'fo t nq . 3. The _Court will . . .. . ed l1 p p � _1s 1t h ic h \v to s ct fa se ci . required by tl1e pre n g t1o ou es l th qu n� al 1o ut h t1t ns co perly a pro on up ss pa t no ill w rt ou C e Th 4._ r he e nd ot m ou so gr t en es pr upon wbic� so al is e er th if rd co re e th by presented , tl1e case may be disposed of. . .. on te up the tu sta a ! of plain ity com lid va e th on up ss pa t no ll wi t ur Co e Th 5. n tio . era y op its b ed ur inj is he at tl1 , ov sh to ls fai 10 of one wl 6. The Court vvill not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one ,vl10 has availed himself of its benefits. 7. When tl1e validity of an Act [is cl1a)lenged] ... this Court will first ascertain whetl1er a construction of tl1e statute is possible by winch the question mayb: avoided.

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Tl1e li1nitations may be summarised as follows:

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I. Tl1e qtiest�o 11 must be raised in a n adversary litigation 2· quest101� must not b� l1ypothetical and the contr�vers y mus t be � 3· Cour� wi_ll not e11 ter�a111 a cl1allenge to tl1e constitt1tionality o f a law unles) · 1lt e const1 tt1t1onal quest1011 involved is ''substantial , , . 4· Th- 6��:;on_ of c nstitutionality will be determined �nly in t he la5t reso�: � 5· TJei: I 11 : o ss 11 r>on a �urther than ,vhat } · .1 i const� on tutiona quest ; � � ;� n cess ary f 1, i osal of t e p rt1cular of · . it. re fo se l be ca � 1 . cy a1 I 6. Tl1e Petitioner n1ust 111 ave a ' stand t ng' to cl1allc nge the const itu ion i tl1e law. · U sc · ro 7. Tl1e i11j11ry tI1 at th I · e P1 aintt· ff complains of 1nust be an inju ry to h· individually. 8. Tl1e pleadi11g must be adequ 9. Tl1e cl1allenge of unconsti .ate. . tu . jional 1 ty mt1st be specific. 10. The question must be a 1s .. at tl1e proper stage. �. 11. The question mt1st be ; JU� 1c1able'. 12. Tl1e presum 1. o t tu _lity. a i n o i_ � � �f � !! � ; ) ec . p es t for 13 R i la v at1on. . er1111n 14. Respect for 1 ong-st · . g and1n I �gis 1 at1ve practice. lS · The cloctrine of stare d . . eczsz · s 16. Tl,e doctr1n e of severab·l1.I·ty.

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Tb� Limitation of ''Justiciability�' . y'' .. iciabilit ''Just of concept The · en,. 328 U.S. 549 (1946) re v. G e ov r eg ol C From _

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The number of re presentativesin t hel ower house . of the Unti edSt ates congress is . fixc d se . s e t .. a s u ho h a ,_[re a . s t s c t � a � e e r 435 om a t t � � 1 a ll r y . ed s i s 3 . t 4 r i b ut ed t a ·a m on g . h t e st a t ein s . con i:rmt1 w�th� congres1 :ad ac a t l opt s d e on 0 1 19 11 . B ut Co ngress _leaves t oeach state the . o f c e o ess o l s � to wh1eh tha_t state is e nt of o u d� s �b rna l inte i t l : ed . S ome st ates : �r ; � � � � no a e1:, ma 1p e . q a o t1, 1 z � r�presentat1�namong tl1e vari 1 0s1 , n otab l y 1:)1D: o uscongres� i l I t h at s mee po to 1 on. l? u t l l ts f s . mots h da �ailed .to re-district'si nce . sional di�tnc 190 1 . c o n g re di ss1 st r <:> c i n t a l a l r� �t h a d 1ts a . populatio.n n�ne tn� ies as large as its 50 tah t . _ . smallest , th us givmg a yoter 1nthe smaller Cong1ess1onal Ds1trc1 t nine tinle sthe voting influ ence of _the_ vot� 10 the f om1er. The case below arose wle1 n Illni o s i vo et rs chal len­ t of ht eold 1911 law an�- asked a fe?eral distrci t cou rt to rets ra tu o i �1� e _nstit ged t h co i n the g � ce� rd if y 1 o f r °:'l � co m nd;: ctn1� � elect101?- under thi s o l dl a wgoverning Illinois J:imary . _ �l a �1s 1nt � iffs t r ic c l t s. zume a d 1 s on den q ial Congres ?f e u l a protection of tile laws''. The _ s d e t hen: �omplamt. Appeal fron1 this decree w sa taken to the Unitee Sta t es trial court dis mis SupremCe ourt. The dec1s1on 1s excer pted be low.

A{r. Justice Frankfurter announced the ju.dg1nent of tl1e Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Burto,1 concur.... We are of opinion that the appellants ask of this Court what is beyond its competence to grant. This is one of those .demands on judicial power w11ich cannot be met by verbal fencing about ''jurisdiction.'' It m1:1st be resolved by considerations on the basis of which this Court, from time to tin1e, has refused to intervene in controversies. It has refused to do so because due regard for the effective v1orking of our Government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and there­ f ore not met for judicial determination. . .. Of course no court can affirmatively re-map the Illinois districts so as to bring them m ore in conformity with the standards of f airness for a representative system. At best we could only declare the existing electoral system invalid. The res11lt would be to leave Illinois undistricted and to bring into question, if the Illinois legislature chose not to act, the choice of men1bers for the House of Representatives on a state­ wide ticket. The last stage may be worse tl1an the first. Tl1e upshot of judici�l action may defeat the vital political principle which led Congress, more than a n11ndred years ago, to require districting. This req11irement, in tl1e language of Cha11c�llor Kent, ''was recommended by the wisdom and j11stice of giv�ng, as fa� as possi�le, to the local S11bdivisions of the people of eacl1 state, a d_ue !nfl11ence 1n t_l1e cl1oice of representatives, so as not to leave the aggregate minority of the people 1 n a state, �ough approaching perhaps to a majority, to be wl1olly over·power�d by tl1e �om­ bined a ion of the l ona nati 1 e tl in r teve wha e voic 1 a11y 1� numerical majority, witl10 . �, ��ncils. · · . .Not�ing is clearer than_ that thi_s cont�oversy concerns matters tllat e t roi 0u s � n . sts � 1te co1 rty pa g 1tl1 w _ to ,mmediate an d active relations in r:t � dnn eten:nination of such issues this Court has traditionally l1eld ,Lloof. It is 110st11e nd e . ople tl1e oc A f p� o· tics poli m atic y tl1e 1 r system to involve the j1 diciar in d .beisa not i!�. less pernicious if such J·udicial intervention in an essentially r>ol.1t1cal contest . · · dressed up 1n aw. · · · 1 the tl1e of abstract phrases · . . s s e . r g n o C f o . th'1s action g in To sus trun e b y r ve · . would cut very deep into th· e Co u s �ll disirn 1fa 111 t gh r fo not to e"nter this politica. l thicket. The re�edy trict: �� e ok I�v o o pe to sec. ure State legislatures t l1�t ":' ill apportion pr ��d ; the a o t n b are at s Jp�! wer s o co o any s l1� n m s 1tut1 f TJ1e Const es P Congr . �·�ons and purposes enforceabl � n co e 1 it u tl co de ts1 ou ts y l the fal u ca y be arl r cle se ·e Y

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UTIONAL LAW IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E SOURCE B OOK OF·

of nd tl1e executi ve a ma de 'on . 1us TJ . . ion act . ct11 sc .' uth .tf, . t d .1 1 1r c that t er St �te �o deliver up a fug itiveo� sis a of ty du ? . f 1e :.� l t : 1 : t is � � a ro� -, S , � . rt ly al c1 IV d1 r be JU fo en . ot _ nn ca � . d ce 1 ty dL s K 1i en tuc l t of t en 1 n l fi ul f 1; J t1st1c� . I�1 1 t t! l1as le ft tl1 e performan ce o f many dky_i. n tio itu st on C 1e 66 . Tl · · ·· UIJf! . 7 w 4 I 0 2 nison' en D t I o 1e f y ut e ec 1 1·t ex . iv fid 1 e I 1e . t on d an nd pe de . ; leo . 0 1 · e m . 1 Je o•Sati11l sc 1 a t 1 1 e . 1 n rn . e v o g r u o 1n • e In 1 op erc1s1ng th1:ir po'·111i· pe ex t 1e 1 f o e nc la g1 1 ,; · e tI1 1 01 � action a111..,.J1, uIt1111atelv. , rigl1ts. · · . d e rm ffi a is t · in la p rn o c e th f r, l sa is m is D

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rove v. Green a:nd r leg Co 9 t1le �r ov tly ici pl im t ur Co e tl1 rr, Ca v. r hcM 1 ter case Bake 1 ' n' s tio ue iss could be entertainedbj , al protec qu ''e ng isi ra y erl op pr ses ca n't me on �ti :o tl1 at ;p the courts.

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Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (l962t "· r ke in Ba n na en Dr 1 ce sti J1 of ion Jir1 1 o y rit ajo M tJ1e From 1 st iciable, the Distri,i t s 11o j1 wa t SLti s tlu of ter t 1na t 1jec s11l tl1e t 1 tl1:: 1g 1 i o1d 1 I In t per curiam cases.... \Ve uen seq sub and ra, sup e,1, Gre v. ore egr Col on ed Court reli t111dersta11d tl1e Dist ric t C o11rt to l1ave read the cited cases as compelling the c-0n, clusion tl1at sir1ce tlJe appellan ts sough t to have a legislative apportionment heM 11ncor1stitt1tional, tl1eir strit prese11ted a ''1Jolitical question'' and was therefore no11justiciable. We l1old tl1at this cJ1allenge to an apportionment presents no no11jusliciabl e '·nolitical ql1estion' '. . .. Of cotirse tl1e n1ere fact tl1at tl1e suit seeks protection of a political right doo not mea11 it JJresents a JJoiitical q11estio11. S11 cl1 an objection ''is little more thana play u1Jon words. " Nixo,z v. fler11do11, �73 U.S. 536, 540. Ratl1er, it. is argued t�a! ap1Jortionrrie11t ca.ses, wl1a tever tl1e ac tua l wording of tl1e complaint, can invoht ' no federal co11sti tt1tional rigl1t exc e11t one resting on th e guaranty of a republican form of gover11rn.ent, and tl1a. complaints based on t11at clause h.ave been held lo , 1Jrese.11t political q11estions wl1icl1 are 11onjsticiable. . . ¥.::. hold �h,it : · · ,;\ppe!la? ts'. clai?1 tl1at tl1ey are being denied equal P:otectio� is JUSiJi..;Ial-:,le, und_ if d1scr1�1nat1on 1s s11fficiently sl1own, the rigl1t to rehe � uo�,r i tl1e equal prot�c�ion c�ause 1s 11ot dinunisl1ed bv t l1 e fact tl1at the disc rimination relates to pol1t1ca l r1gl1ts.

From tl1e dissenting opinion of Justice Fra11kfu rter. d zen � Tl1e C 0 � rt today reverses a a by u11iform co11rse of decision established . . . t· cases, incl ud111g o11e by w11ic · l1 tl1e ver)' cla i m 110w sustain· ed was unani mousIY re,ec � ,ke w ed on1 Y five vears ago Tlie ·)mpres 1· ted r�flec nveeo , �e ide bo? � y as of cas t ru l ing thu s s eqt1al l y unif;rm cours� o o 1 r p o . l1 1 c�l l11story regarding tl1e relati onshi p bedeniil : _ POJJulation a11d legislativ: p1 � esentat1on - a wl1olly �if!'erent matter froro ssiVI . �� of the francl1ise to individu be l� a rna i , aus e u of r rac c e, , e r s col x. or el1g o 1on S rep11diatio11 of tlle expe 1. 1 e � 0vt 0 l . 0 our w�1ole past in asserting de s�ruc 11ve , U' judicial JJower dematlds � � � ! l nst � fS t� ur c iled an al �s1_s o� th e o 1n rt Co u r ro le of this tional scl1en1e. Disregard O; ou c he nl t ere nt i , l rm1t_s 1 n tl1e e ffecti ve exercis� of_ esscD: '�judicial Power'' not onl . 6 t1ally political conflict 0} �resages tl1e f�t1l1 ty of judicia] intervention in�t n � . o ce� by which the r elatio between pop ula� f rn� n represe11 tation 11as time out O ; i w 1n the Court's position as the � d been an d now is determined. It may �.ndr' in •mate organ of ''the supreme _Law of the . DJ'- (ll.l tha_t vast _range of l egal 1 li p ro� e s, oft en lar strongly entang led 1n p opu f� .Jl�ith�- · which thi s Court m ust : � ro un e. The p of the purse nor the s '!rt�ill � utl1ority - possess:,;dw-Court' s a word - ultun · . at eI Y r ests on sustained pub1·1c c01w · · .. -

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. moral sanction. Sucl1 feeling must be not. 1risl1ed by tI1e Colirt's comp1ete . . fa�.t and Jn de1ts · pe an · p ar ce a f , ro m 1 J?O 1t1c al .entanglen1ents tn ent , a11 d . . by ab ste nti o tac hm n l t e c l 1 h as o f po 111t� f l 1t1c l a. l itse forc es g in political settlements. ectin inj m fro

doc in tl1e trin e, form in wl1icl1 repeated decisions 1 rov e Col eg e ·r · ·h 1ave . · · . sett 1 ed ····· _not an_ 1�n · rep esen ts 1 ng J t1d1 1al tl1?t1gl1t a vat1_on. It r o 11 ct exJJerience. Frorr ? as it, w � 1 , Cot 1rt has this co11 s1ste ons ntly op1n 1 1eco g111z ecl ,1 class o·f co11 trovers1es est earlJ . 1·t s . · . . . . . LI e to d ves 1 the 1c1a ms l standards J ,11 1cl Jucl1c1al re111edjes�. To not ]end Whl ch do cl · r . ass1 y · ,, . ·1nstanc:s as ,, po1·1 · 1 1c� l questions 1s ratl1er a for.in of ous vari stating tllis conthe s. si f ly g o a n n li a ea v re n 1a tl clusion

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determining !his. issue non-j.u�ticiable, tl1_e Cot1rt was se 11 sitive to tlle same con siderations to which 1ts later _dec1s1011� 11�,,� g�ve11 tl1e varied applicatioiis already discussed. It adverted to t]1e del1c.acy of Jlt_d!c1al 111terve11tio11 i11to tl1e very strticture of government_ . It. �cknowledged that trad1!10� �1ad 1011g entrusted questions of this nature to nonJ11d1c1al processes, and tl1at Jt1d1c1al processes were 11nstzite-J to tlleir decision.

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Wl1at, then, is this questio11 of legislative apportion1ne11t? Appellants invol<e tl1e right to vote and to ha,,e tl1eir votes co11nted. But tl1ey are permitted to vote and their votes are counted. Tl1ey go t o the polls, tl1ey cast tl1ei1- ballots, they send repre­ sentatives to the state counci]s. Tl1eir complaint is sin11Jly tl1at tl1e representatives "' are not sufficiently ntl1Ilerous or powerful - in sl1 ort, tl1at 1 ennessee has ado·p­ ed a basis of representation with wliich tJ1ey are dissatisfied. Talk of ''debasement'' or ''dilution'' is circular talk. One can11ot speak of ''deb,lse1nent'' or ''dilution'' of the value of a vote until there is first defined €:l standard of refere11ce as to wl1at a vote should be worth. What is actually asked of the Court i11 tl1is case is to choose amo11g competing bases of representation - ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy - in order to establisl1 an appropriate fran1e of government for the State of Tennessee and there by for all tl1e States of the Union. •••••••••

''Justiciability'' and ''Political Questions'' Re-examirzed i,i Japanese La1,,v

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\var and by it� ed'' ounc ''ren r le Unde peop the , le tion Artic stitu 9 Con nese of the Japa . Art!c!e 9 the Constitution prohibited the maintenance of ''armed forces'' (See tl1e �uzukz decis1o nJ. An interesting decision of the Japanese Supreme Cot1rt was concerned with the constitutionality of the U.S. - Japanese Mutual Security Treaty. By t �is treaty Jap�n agreed to pennit certain U.S. armed force bases to continue in the country (this was at the time of the Korean war). The Constitutionality of the treaty was attacked tinder Article 9. The Supren1e Court dismissed this contention.

From the opinion ki, Ma in , 59) (19 3 225 12, . No II XI u ish of the Court Hanre ' op. cit., pages 305-306, 317-3 . 21' The co?tent of the above Security Treaty l1as a n extre�ely imp?rtant relation . to· the ecun the to i,, tur 10 d, an 11 t10 na s ty and pe ace of our country as a sovereign :;_.r0?ndation of our existence. Again, in respect to tl1e c?nclusion [of tile treaty� . e ra ot pr r e � t af � an et s on a isi ov pr t t j l na at . tio tu ti t ns co e, on of m e � th sis ba h bt� n c� 1 otiat o p tan o mp an � as � ns i m for . �_o o � l u with the United States executed it in due in �1 10 at er 1d co ntry. Subs eque ly ns co 1l ft re ca n ve nt after'having been oi theo; u e , n 1o s 1s ct 1s d a � in d u · tatives' a n d the Hou. se o f Councillors, incl it. r�""�ves of Re presen e11t, as m t1 r t s n 1 r h e c1 p 1 o ..� r p t ts Well k e consen t of the National Diet as a 1awf LI1 an. d . .no·wn.

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