Ethiopian Constitutional Development; A Sourcebook Vol. II by James C. N. Paul (1971) [Part 2 of 2] by jahrastafari89

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CHAPTER VII

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PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INS1�1TUTIONS

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Sun1mary of Contents

r o� Deputies - Th� r�tionale and fun?tions of 1 elected paJi,inient; Ch ap te Th e 1: �� pr ob leo1S Se.ction rt1 ap an on p d �t 1n at g 10 re pr es e rep t re� t.Jo n; � � of pol1t1c<1J parties ; th e electoral law �� and aclmin1s trat1on of elections; the conJpos1t.1on of tl1e Chainber. Section 2: Th e Senate :--. Rationales of bi-can1eralism; qualificatio11s and appointiient of senators; the compos1t1on of tl1e senate. Section 3: Organi�ation, Pr? ce�ures and Pri vi�e�es - Org� isatio11, officers ancconimittces, pro cedure 1n the leg1slat1,,e process; pr1v1leges and 1nl1erent po,1/ers of Ptrliament.

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1er to question exccutr,1e t's ov. Sectio� 4: Parliame� t and th.e Executi,,e - Parliamen officials; po\ver p _ to investigate the conduct of exect1t1ve affairs tl1rougl1 co111mittees, com1nissions and special commissioners; limitations on the investigatory po,ver, cxecuivc privilege and due process; power to influence national policy-making and executive J:adership through control over the budget and taxation; legal bases for exect1 tive infit1eoct over Parlian,en t, appointment of staff, dissolution and extension of sessions, cxccuti\C con1n1t1nication to Parliament.

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Section 5: The Future Developn1ent of Parliament - Proble1ns of theory, probJ�ms of developing institutions and procedures and conventio11s.

Introduction

Some of the problems of adapting foreig11 tl1eories 01· govcrnnent b)' ''co11sent'' and government responsive to tl1e ''will'' of ''tl1e JJeop l e'' J1a,e alr�adf' b�en noted in Chapters I and IV. Neitl1er Parliament 11or a col1nter1art 1nst1ttit10 1 1 looms large in Ethiopian history, and, in plan1iing a11d cxect1ti11g tl-e develoJJ111e1�t of political institutions, it is dangerot1s to ignore political traditons - e\�en 1 f one regards some of them as obsolete (cf. Cl1apter I, JJp.37-38 supri). Nor, 111 al locating responsibility and power to a Parliament, ca11 one i�ore :l1e cl�n_gers 0� ti� 01 _re!igio potenti �r ally tribal tl1at e divisiv r da11ge tl1e y forces societ within · · · · 1s region al Ioyalt1es : fact101 may cause an electe� assemb�y to splinter 1n�o antag),nistic , _ and preve nt the body from functio111ng efficiently and serv111g the 11 ationa'-1, iiJ. a/ . SifJJJ terest as opposed to various diverse ''s1Jecial'' interests cf. Cl1apter [,. P-�1 ( i 1Y oug r 18 111 ore P _ er 1ber� :ine11 it se wl1o has assembly · ot1t an ted that M ov , · ,, ·been poin . . · x e , 11 0 t1 a "rep· resentat1ve 1n a socia c · u �d f o s · rn - ,, l and econom1c sense, J . e.- 111 te l 1 1se ''exper he penence and occupatio n of most t 0 1 l f muc l ack of tl1e electorate, 1nay . · · s 'a11d J1ws 11 e eded t0 · and "persp - ective'' ici ·e po. 1 t 1 . e o -1 f so1ne necessary formulate to · aat.1· onal ''se spur f o <l' 11gers � e . )· ,.Tb SltJJra developm pJJ.43-46 ent I (cf Chapter · · . f frOI11 C \V ' O ]J l' Parating ,, - in il k aw-ina the sense of withdrawing - too .1nucJ 1 J . apter Cl 1 cf. �d he exec 0t" 1 been . utive and giving it to an untested legislatt 1re l1 ave also � � . 1( 'lry ce sotir L 49 . e ce r;; �f )·ead) � one_ concludes that the ex�c11tive mt1 �t perfo�i 1� e:i0 :f developershi p - 1f one concludes that Jt must articulate t le . Parof -ce t an ment an d gen 11np d' tl1e e th tl law :ra _ s te the the pla pre ns par and e . . ra) 11 . Ag ai sup l iament 30 .4 dim1n1shes (cf. Chapter p IV � apter 1 Cl and pp.33-34 I pre · of .' ber n · · ttit,on e m . o- . . ay argu.e that nl t a n. equ1re . r s 1nst1 ary 1ve me11t effect . parl1a 11 · condi 10 t a t n e m le p ¥\ · · . . • J, · tio · n s, .wh"1c1I are inadequately deve 1.oped t ocla' y, to permit ... . .. ... ,-,. ...-.�

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IONAL LAW T U IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E SoURCEBOOK O F

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theor · · 1c t · a e1nocr d tl1e of · ss re ma d mo mm co an cy 1ca era un lit re ns is tio mo of . t n . me lop ve de .1s reqt11red , the · · I go en t m a r!1 1s oc �e 1 d · qu 1re p re · s 1n d ire · t, _ en ci ; the effi of nt ie pn _reqt .iired. ti e develo n t1o c1a d so an as n, ter sio es ''in pr ex est ee fr of tiar s lit rig of t etl m op l J ve e d ' gradual · th k r h 1s e1 e w · es a r. I 1e · m t to 1n n �1 e� ti n ec ca el ns ze ti s ci on t 1a tl so , ed iir qt re is culation'' , y ert e ma ass st som mu , s_ 1on be d1t con better 1er otl and se tl1e _ nt me rlia Pa aiid to r te f. t ap (c h en , C _ !Y am l� 2 ar .4 P a pp p � el ). ev 30 d 8to ts p m te at e 11 0 re fo be establislled ng s p1 1� lo tr �e un d� _ co in n ca t� en m be 1,� rl pa at th te 1la t c e sp ay m cs ni cy , lly ila Fi . o e to ile ns ar ag t1o fr 1tu st to e 1n tl1 r su ; ps e ou viv ''c by d have been _ swept away e f re e, th s; or e er t� ad le ry ta m ili gu m ar by t er en w po of 1re t iz se or gs in ris up l na er : h �, 10 uc o nt m to te th at or w t ca be no e e ar us ns tio itu st in y ar 11t e am rli pa n, ru may _ e lve to th so r re s we es of th.e cr1 po of s cu lo al re e th ct e fl re t 11o do ies bl elected assem future.,: All of tl1ese argu�ents, like those of Locke, Ro:uss�au an? modern protagonists s. ny c om are Ma 1fi ax.1 ent sc1 based t no s ion e1·t ass a1·e ns, tio titu ins atic ocr dem of on assu111ptions abot1t social and economic conditions and the behaviour of people a11d so fortl1 - assumptions whicl1 are not easily susceptible of scientific proof, assum1)tions \¥l1ich are opinions and speculations. In any event, it is a legal fact tl1at a Parliament already exists in Ethiopia and bas for so1ne tin1e. We have noted that it does enjoy certain legal guarantees of independence ·(e.g. freedom of debate, various immunities and ''privileges'' or prerogatives) - powers v-1l1icl1, English expe rience su.ggests, are pre-requisites to tl1e developme11t of othe1· powers of control over the government (cf. pp. 97-103 supra). It is also a legal fact tl1at citizens of Ethiopia can elect deputies of their choice, and it is also a legal fact tl1at tl1ose deputies can, today, exercise considerable control or influence over tl1e condt1ct of government, e.g. tlrrougl1 their disposition of budgetary, tax and other basic legislative proposals of the government. It is also a legal fac_t tl1at Parliament e11joys wide powers to question tl1e leading officers of the exec11t1�e - and perl1.aps to i11vestigate in other ways tl1e activities of govern ment agencies.

Th11s law� implementi11g n111cl1 of tl1e tl1eo1·y of den1ocracy exist, and, as we shall see, Parliament has i11cleed begt111 to t1se the se law s to establisl1 a role for itsel f. !'J0_ :�0-�er, eyel! if one tak�s a pessin1istic ,,ie,v of tl1e viability of parliamentary 1ns,:1tutions, ,1t 1s wo_rtl1 ask 111g tl1e questio11: Can Ethiopia be expected to develop , � mode; 0 , effect.1ve go,,er11111e11t without a Pa1·liam e nt? If 01.1e agrees that a , odern ��vernn1e11t a11� ''�1odern'' political system ot1ght to provide for a pro __ � c ss of po�it1.cal comn1t1111cat1011 bet,veen people a11d governm ent, tl1en the c�e for_ a Parliam�11t beco1nes pretty strong. Tl1is a1·gt1 not rest on moral me do nt es --claims alone, i.e. tl1at l)eo1)le l1ave a ''nat t11 al _ ero es tat iv rep rig res l1t en '' ele to ct · powered to con�ent to tl1e ''laws'' o·f tl1e land. Tl ... �: � �i �n ex pe on 1e ar re G gu st m m ay en t a d 0�1 as t11111)tio11s of l1t1 man behaviot1r n 1 de s es ch e.g an . tl1 g at in the 1011g run � ve th g --=--f=' 1: _ e � �0 1nlpro e lo t of menin society ca n best be affected by a consultative proee. " st- =: w 11c1 ta.k es acco11nt of st·1011g IY 1cel t· · ,= t �"_ tha .:. · . d, , ecte wan ts aff and . w1sl 1es peo of ple the ar1.1 1'd1eo1ogy imposed from tl1e ·t ��"ff-· - :_ -,r.-a... "' · s;::: · op w1·11 not 1ast, tl1at, despite tl1eir lim1tat1on . . esentat1v · e asse1nbl1es are capable of making th e ki11d of basic judgment- s wJil_G�..;;:::�� f�e syste1n assumes will be made (cf. Chapter I., -- --�_::;:.;�� pp . 59-60 sup,.a). ----�=·--;p.p:..::::.. a i 0 · g �ecided o n � ; � e basis of some combination of considerations � · ��n,� ing ne s 1 1o tions of polit1cal ----- � ___ , =J &� ' mora1·1ty and practical wisdom tl1at- a Rar1·1aI11�I�",,ii;.:i.:4:� . -

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next questjon may be: What specific f1111ctions 1nay a Par l iament, the . l. de.sirable d , ecte exp to be perfor1n? now nd a ' here ·a 1 in EthiOP , ed. st ge be 1g s1 ay m les ro sic ba Three 1

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PARLIAM ENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

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as act a c/1�11ne l of co1n1ni 1nication ancl a vehicle for may it place , st fir the In _ _ .. e�'ucation between a govermuen·t a 11d its c1t1 ze11s. On tl1e one l1 a11d ' tl1e member CIVIC ,t , . . 1e part 1 �ular, strongly felt 111terests of some of his contl xpress e may t amen i of Parl views 011 tl1e govern force these to ment help so and nts 's atte11tio11; tl1e dep11ty t·tue • • SI , · .1 � a const1 tt1ency or a part1c1uar 1or n 1 1 1ter�st grot1p; I1e i s its respokesma_ her e is the presentat�ve _b�fore the central g�vernme11t. C�11versel y, P�l1a_me11t as a �l1 ole and deputies 1nd1v1dually and coID.Illlttees of Parl1ame 11t touring 1n t l1e prov111ces may help to persuade the people t� accept tl1e programmes of tl�e. gover11me11t. Parlia ment can educate, too, by serving as an ope11 forum for t h . e a1r 1ng of disputecl ques tions of policy and as a place where men1bers of tl1e gover11n1 e11 t or tl1eir s11p1)orters are openly pressed to explain and defend executi,1 e positio11s a11d actions. Ca1 1 didates for Parliament ma y also promote civic education wl1e 1 1 tl 1ey in tl1 r 11 are forced by voters to expl ain and defend their positions. 1 11 a cou11try wl1ere den1ocracy is ne\v and where the demands and dislocations of develoJ)ment and tl1e open expression of new wants are ne,v but growi11g phenomona, tl1 e communi catio11 and civi c edu cation role of Parliament may be very i111portant. This fu.ncti on may be combined wit l1 anotl1er: the revietv a11cl scruti,zy of gov ern,nent operations. In some political systems, tl1e SUJ)port of a n1ajority of the members of parljament is necessary for a gover1 1ment to remai11 :i11 office, but even in countries like Ethiopia (or the United States), wl1ere t l 1e exec11tive arid tl1e l egis lature are "independent'', the informi 1 1g and investigatory powers of Parliame11t can'·be very important. By vigorous-but wise-t1se of its powers to ''qt1estio11 '' �11 d th�. ��wers of its committees to study and ''investigate'', Parl ia1nent ca_11 SLibJect acuvities of government to scrutiny-and ofte11 prod or embarrass a m1 11.istry or ot�er g overnment agency to ''clean up'' or ''sort out'' some situation dee111ed tin satisf�ctory. ''Exposure for the sake of exposure'' ca11 , of co11rse, be a dai1gerous chn�que; �t �an be abused to tl1e injury and discredit of conscie1 1tious P:Iblic ser�: nts, but it 1s also valuable to combat tende11cies toward complacency, incompe. . tenc e-and corrupt1. .. on-1n J)Ubl'1c adD11n1strat1011 . A third fu1 1ction combines l iamen t Par 1em: t l from ps develo and two the other can. �erv e as a or counci l of tl1 e nation to aclvise revietv arzcl react co11cer,zing ,nai , ' · . po 1c1es an t ·s i e 1 t, 1)art· 1·� uI a�lY_ one . lacking 1 s co?fron r t s Ci z Parl1ame t1ng ntry. . the cot ex ert staff � nd exper1ence, may sel dom be able to prepare sat_1�fact� 1 Y l egi � lat1 ? 11 , bu� i t can ve atJ iSl leg iew rev (t) s ) (11 pre , s nts wa t for i su·bm.issjon of laws whicl1 proposal s eve d nt ine ic rlia wh Pa h as d 11 e A hav . emanat. ed fro1n s01ne otl.1 er so·urce · . · lo ps. (a) le peo more e ffect1·ve tec.h 111qt1es J) 1 1 twee e b t1011 for processing co1n 1nt1111ca and g e rn operat?V ment and (b) more acct1mul ated eXJ)ert ise in scrt1ti njsi11g govern111e 1 1ft ton s ' so . . . 11 bel 1al . l y .(0 ate ·t . 1 1 . eqt' . d a may more r . develop 1 ts capacity to reg1ste of it.8 . an d onst .. · c . ·. 1tt pol1c1est 1 ien ) me1 cies govern a ge,zeral cons·ent to part1 ct1l ar appr0 1 a o g r la (or L1 v · 1c rt a p d i a s f o app_ 1 ) . · roval of tl1e co11dt1ct overall, 011 ba ance, vernment' or a . part1c11Jar project . It is obv·i ous t·h at tl1e above paragraphs >resent. on1 Y an J1ypotl1esis - 11ot a dogma 1 . l1t arg. 1 . a s 11 1 wl1at abo ut. tl1e role of Parliament. Doubtless ma 1 1� n1 1g dilfe ren� � � 0t :]1ic·h yPotllesis, bl1t en ]Jam Par at least tl1 e tl1 eory of tl 1e fL1nct1ons of

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NSTITUTIONAf� LAW o C N lA P IO l lT E F O K SoURCEBOO

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c �. we can . organize disc l wh hin wjt t t ex on c · a ssi u s o e vid pro n in ve abo . ed r e ffi .s . t 1en ns er p . ai ce ex ag d ste te be an c h c i J wh '' , ' el' od .° .ithis C hapter, a n m n n s ro ting the de velo co m le ob pr f le e m l so ga · jly - 11 st-udy, IJrin1ar ,1, p ent . . 1 ,;v e . vv 1 e d d cr e b es t •1ons ov c ab , but obviousl y • fu . . n t l1� . r� fo · 1 ' pe 1.ll � 1. c1 11i w _ . of ,l ·parliainetlt · ld r ou la sh p ho m c te at s te t na to s1o as sp d1 e inv sti cial . If a u cr gat e ar · e i · s · oI ct fa l a , . 1100-1eg · · f. unc. t1ons ascribed to it? Or, ' h e g ! 1n � or rf pe ct fa 111 t en m ia rl Pa _ tlle qtiestions: Is n1 or e rf es ill th pe w s? ch sk l�1 ta w d pe lo be ve de be t 11 gh ga mi or ry ta 1 ei am rli pa a n ca s s: a n o t1 es 11 q l a eg -l 11 o n l1 c su g n ti a t11i 11k of investig ! n tio titu the d �ns of an rst de un lia Par ate tor c ele ment? l1e t es do ll vve w Ho 1) le ab a en sir cy having ,,alue as ag de en se be to e om c to ely lik it ls it seeii _ or is e y l iam l ta� va r_ o p� pr_ ap th ve lie of be to m� co I�ws le op pe ill W � le? oi) �� pe to tl1.e Is ? e at� 1m am rl1 g1t P� _le t en n. t being cem for en 1r tl1e ke ma to y sar ces ne is jndeed s es or nce sir te eva de ica gri un to the mm co to nel an cl1 a as re, mo d an Llsed. more ing eal ly of e ect app tic dir c pra to the al ion dit tra he t ng nti 1Jla sup it Is go,,e�nme11t? E1nperor to secure a 1·edress of grievances? 2) How well is Parliamet1t respected by tl1e go·vernment? What is its in flt1ence,-prese11t and potential-over decision-makers in the executive? Are leaders in Parlia1ne11t l1eard atte11tively wl1en they speak to the government? Do members by virtt1e of tl.1eir office - enjoy mucl1 ''prestige'' and ''status''? In what ways can tl1ese attributes be developed? 3) Is Parliame11t capable of developing t11e Ieadersl1ip, organization, discipline to operate effectively. C a11 it de\1elop tl1ese and otl1er resources ne cessary to e11hance its prestige - botl1 witl1 tl1e gove1·nment and around the countryside? Does the present electoral syste1n permit and encourage recruitment of political ''leaders'' into Parliament? Wl1at sort of intellect11al ability do parliamentarians possess? Do tl1e very different people wl10 make up Parliament share common goals suffi c�e11tl)1 to per�i� con1promises on differences o!� opinion? To pe1111it a coherent, vigorous expos1t1011 of tl1e ''1)ositio11 of Parliame11t'' on questions of importance? (Or, conversely, is Parliament con1posed of di,rerse, disorganized people, suspicio us of eacl� otl1er, "':110 ca11not u11ite to acllieve 1na11y objectives?) Do the members of Parl1a1:1ent e11Joy eno11gl1 access to tl1eir co11stitue11ts and other groups to carry ? ut func�1011s a�cri'becl to tl1e111? Do tl1ey e11joy access to other sources of ideas au<l 111formation wl1Jcl1 will l1elp the111 to de\1elop a se11se of objectives and a coherent programme? Acct1 rate a 1 1swers to tl1ese qt1es tions - based 011 data carefully colle cted . eh rd to find._As yet there has been little _systematic study of ParliamentL�� :� t etimes . l� n1ectst11·e of ecol� sp a co11s 1 eou� e1ab spect1lat1on (and perl1aps erron � · � .ion _ of .. S ) per me6 i� t �ate s d1sct1ss1011. St1rely constitt1tional lawyers - legal eng � _ _ l develo t. e ..r s �tlttlte J)Olltica mat e thes 1)me11 t - will have to kI1ow much more about � 111 the ftlture, a11d inter-discipli1.1ary stt1dies (la .;! g . e� fo es) c sci en so cial w an the d 811s\vers wo11ld see111 des � irable. "'

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ber ate with the deli sens cts e of tl1e natio11 , to expel ti1en1 con fli Whic h . . e . . her e�press 1 or v1rt a mannfficr , and eit . all u app oint tl1e1r successors. TJ1is is surely Y Y . e froJJl o enougl1 for the liberty of tl1e 11atio11. security and wer o ' am.Ple p . . .. .

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th1� chapter, the �1ea�s ,vJ11cJ1 tl1e Parliament of Ethiopia can einploy 1n later sider, a con ll We sh ese. funct1�?s. Indeed, 1t m1g_l1t be ar�ed_ tl1at, so far fron, considering a t out � carry to 1. �order as simp ly a ' legislature the proper fu11ct1on of w l�1ch 1s to n1ake tl1e Jaw, the legislative P 1iame , nntd other powers are no more than n1eans for· ensur ing that the govemn,ent ' in c arry i·ng · Power a · 1tse · If to d e bate ancl q11est1on1ng by the people's representatives . Par1i·asubm its e granun ro ' out .1ISP . ·ng or �rafting · laws then,selves; e sense · h .. 1n o t f 1n1t1at! aws, ''I "make rarely its business ments very pass t1pon tJ1en1, and one An1er1can Jcg1slator, quoted below, has even argued and discuss to r, rathe is that of a cot1rt of Ia,v. to us go alo an is ion sit po its that

From Moffat, ''The Legislatjve Process'', 24 Cor,1e/l Lalv Quarter/;, 223 (1938). The legislative process ... is, in its essence, a jt1dicial process.... Very little legislation ever originates witl1i11 a legislature itself. Tl1e legislature js tl1e tribunal to wruch are brought proposed cl1a11ges in tl1e rules gover11i11g our lives. T11at tribunal, weighing the arguments for and against, renders judgme11t by tl1e adoptio1 1 or rejectio n of the proposed amendment to the laws. Fr om Haile SeJassie I, ''Address to tl1e EthioJJic111 Parlia.1ner1t, 2 Nov. 1957'', in Ethiopia Observer, Vol. II, No. 2, page 90.

Your primary task, which is of paramou11t importance, is the in11Jle1nentation of our Parljamentary syste1n, so that it may furtl1er tl1e political develop111e11t of our Empire. Your supreme duty will consist, therefore, i11 creati11g ar1d e11suri11g the smooth and effective functionj11g of tl1e 1necha11ism e11trt1sted to you by Our Constitution and in impressing on it tl1e indelible i111pri11t of tl1e Etl1iopian spirit in the great Ethjopian tradition. You are tl1e link betwee11 Us a11d ot1r people i11 putting into tangible form the fruit of Our efforts and i11 enligl1te11ing a11d gt1iding Our people.

�e-re:id: Chapter _Ill, pp. 323-330, particularly the Emperor's earlier observations on the role and unctions of Parhament at the time when the institution '\Vas first created.

SECTION 1 THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

lntroductorJ, Note: The Rar·io·nale of an Elected Par/ia111e11t the t \vo Chambers of tl1e Etlliopia11 :Parli ament, tl1e Cl1a1nber of De1Juties Of · cI early 18 . . .· · f o le p o th e p e e 1 tl t 1a ti er ore b a111 · h C t 1n1por ant' since 1t 1s tbrougl1 tl1e m . . Eth1. op1a study y 11 are represented in the processes of governme11t and Iegis I at.ton .A · · . . of the l a of se ke l e l "':i o ao< i f , . pia 1io Etl io pat tici i par n t1 a modernisi11g the · opb lec · popular . · .. · 11 1a . 1J 0 11 tl E 1e ··t Pr ms a nd poss1b tl . f o as�s b · 1l1t1es of extending tl1e den1ocrat1c . s ate ' must therefore start witl1 the exjsting Chamber of Deputies. his e tion we , are chiefly concerned with q uestions of re�resentati��t-:ci Wh/�h� ul S c to pe�o � one have an elected Parlian1ent? Wl1at fu11ctio�1s �an_ 11 be o Wll r its to rm hat · \VO are the polit.ical conditions most co11d1ic1ve . d? should b e ' W · . ente repres represented 10 \1, be ey 1 · · tl tl1e Parliament ancl J1ow sb0 11ld· . · · vvhat 8·h ould ' 1· e p peo the d 1 a 1 be tIle relations ve between the elected representati

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IONAL LAW T U IT T S N O N C IA P IO H T E SOURCEBOOK OF

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e t th ou ab sin go bu t s es en m r11 ve of go g n or ld ou sh a i ow . H 21 s? nt se e pr r 1 1 e � whom g h tn at r e ar e wh th d an la s, pu ive sti n t ta tio en es pr re s of 0 i l n tio ec . e e tl e . ng t 1 a i . gu re and ec t A fi . sp d n �e h is _t. ? I na in s I , aw ly I w 1·a to ec el t �a 1e tl d so an rts n io t1t it st on C Revjsed er b an p1 am h 1o of C th E e . u th ep D to d te s? ec tie el 11 ee b ct fa irl ve of people ha Deputies a11d their Constituents

W/1 on1 s/1 ould a Rep1·ese11tatil1e ''1·e1;1·esent''?

Once a Deputy has been elected to Parliament,_ a. furt_her set of problems arises. How should he set abo11t fulfilling the mandate given him by the electors? Some political tl1eorists, and many practising politicians, h�ve !ak�n tl1e view that the Deputy is sin1ply the ''mo11thpiece'' for the people of h1s d1str1ct, and should there fore devote l1is energies to securing wl1at tl1ey want; he should vote as most of his constituents wo11ld l1ave voted, l1ad they been in his place. This view is taken by Roussea11, wjtl1 his belief that representative government is no more than an in adequate s11bstitute for tl1e participation of the whole people, and his insistence on frequent elections and immediate accountability of the representative to those wl1om l1e 1·epresents. A diffe1·ent theory has been most eloquently expressed by Burke, wl10 believed that the representative should constantly consult bis constitu ents but use his i11dependent judgment, and vote for whatever course he thinks best for tl1e general good, even if the mass of his constituents oppose him. The two readings below express these two conflicting points of view. From I(eefe & Og11I, T/1e Anierican Legislative Process, (1964) pp.62-63. '

The theory that representatives should serve manifestly as agents of their constit11ents, carefully mirroring tl1eir views, apparently stirs the hearts and in fluences the behavior of many American legislators. They see their job as that of advancing the cause of the people back l1ome. Lewis A. Dexter quotes a Congress man explaining l1is vote on tl1e Reciprocal Trade Extension Act of 11955:

M� first duty is to get re-ele cted. I'm here to represent n1y district . ...This is part of my actual beli ef as to the ft1nction of a congressman . ... Wl1at is good for the n1ajority of districts is good for tile country. What snarls up tl1e system is these so-called statesmen - congressmen who vote for what tl1ey think is tl1e country's interest . ... Let the senators do tl1at .... They're paid to be statesme n; we (n1embers of tl1e House) aren't.

Le�islators bel�eve tl1�ir records are J1ighly ,,isible to their constituents. One way to increase their sec11r1ty, tl1ey believe is to be certain that their records show that they 11av� b�en attentive to co11stitue�cy interests and effective in represent �ng them. r,11e point is made in tl1ese comn1ents by a.n Illinois Congressman reques�g support f. 0� an �mendme11t to appropriate $150 000 for studies of possible public works proJects 1n lus district: '

d e up in arms. They want at least a ey � T o n ot ms. h prob le stud these a y made of ��d e t n am vo ng I for wortl ly �ou projec ts tell all over d tl1e can Unit ed States, but I ! y mucll ';0 'J 00·t at, and unless I get some money stu t IS, Jlli rn no o bers Sout to he be spen in t dow n . · some of these problems' you may not b Mem e th of all e seeing mt.; here next year. I hope . w··11 1 . go a1 ong with n1e and vote for my amendment. eople

:r�� Edmuo<l �ur�e, Speec/1 to the Electo,·s of B1·istol (1774) (as quoted in.Keef� n gul, op. czt., p.63). ve Certainly gen. tle�en,_ it· ought to be the happiness tati esen repr a of glory and rd· to live in the'strictest union, the · e rv "":" esP :unr closest correspondence, and the most �

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PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

733

c�nstitt1ents. The�r wjs!1es ot1 gl1t to .have great his wi� h ion nica t unu . wei ght con with lliro; their ?l?1n1on�, lugh res�ect; tl1e1r b�s1ne�s, 1111re11utted attentioil ... But 1 n1 on, l11s mat11re Jt1dgment, l11 s enl1gl1te_11�d conscience, op ased unbi Ile otigllt his not to sacrifice to yo1:1, �o any man , or to an?' �et of n1e11 l1v1ng. ... y011r represeilta 1nd1:1 only stry , b�t l 11 s Jt1dgn1ent; a11d l1e betrays, hi� not you, owes instead of tive . servin g you, if he sacr1fic�s 1t to your_op111 1011 .... If gover111ne11 t were a matter of will upon an y side, yours, w1tho11t quest101�, ot1 gl1t to be SUJJerior. Bt1t government ai1d legislation are _matters_ of re_aso11 a11d Jt1d�111 e1�t, a11d 11ot of i11clination; and wJ1at sort of reason 1s tl1at, 1n ,vhicl1 the detern1111 at1 011 precedes tl1e disct1ssion · j11 w11 ich one set of men deliberate, and anotl1er decide; a11d ,vl1ere tl1ose who for1;1 the con clusion are per�1aps th:ee l111 ndred riles dista11t fro1n tl1ose wl10 l1ear tl1e argti ments? ... Pa.rl1an1ent 1s not a corzgress of a1nbassadors fro1n different and J1ostile interests; whlcl1 i11terests eacl1 m11st maintai1 1, as a11 agent a11d advocate, agai11st other agents and advocates; but Parliame11t is a deliberative assen1bly of o,ze natio11, with one interest, that of the whole; where, 11ot local purposes, 11ot local prej11dices, ought to guide, but tl1e general good, res11lting from tl1e general reaso11 of t]1e wl1ole. You choose a member indeed; but wl1en you l1ave cl1osen l1im, l1e is not a member of Bristol, but be is a member of Parlia,·nent. The Problem of Parties and Pressure G1·oups Re-read: Chapter I, pp.50-52

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Many political scientists have long poi11ted out tl1at tl1e official ''com1nands'' of government (i.e. laws, regulations, orders, decisions etc.) are sin1ply tl1e ''out puts'' of a ''political system'' - the results of many ''i11puts''. Tl111s a labot1r rela tions Proclamation approved by Parliament and the Emperor is a11 ''outpt1t'', but this ''output'' is a reflection a11d a result of various ''i1zpi1ts'', a11d (tl1e argt1me11t goes) it is tl1ese inputs which may really produce the law. For example: so111e person or some group of people, troubled by a problem, my argue tl1e desirability of a. new ''law'' to solve their problem; by various methods of JJerst1 asion (e.g. by d.1rect personal advocacy, preparation of memoranda or otl1er ''briefs''. i11 fa�our of a new law, by meetings, and various disc11ssio11s of tl1e problem wrth various government officials, trade unionists, employers, parliame11taria1 1s and otl1er ''in fl�ential'' people) a climate of opinion i n favo11r of tl1e law is developed; _tl1 e views of tl1ose affected are (presumably) considered; perl1aps vario11 s compromises �re ma�e, and tl1e measure becomes a government-sponsored draft law, �-nd leaders in Parliament are enlisted to put the draft legislation tl1rougl1 the various stages ?f the legislative process, and, of co11 rse, tl1e Emperor must then assent to tl1e issuance of the ''command' '. . The ability of i11puts_ in a JJoli to tl1e particular co11tribute to groups people and ti��l 8Ystem may be conceived in terms of ''power''. Similarly tl1e ca1�acity of t�a �tion s and deep-rooted opinions held by the ''mass'' of peoJJle may infltience the 10 d of i11 P1:1ts } , which exist in society. Thus, one might say: ''�l1e _Cl1urcl1 is a 'powerul factor In X society'' 1aps tl1 at (1) principles long esJJO�sed perl meaning a d tau gh� by the church l1ave profou�d infl.ue�ce on tl1e opi11ions an_d tl1us actiotls � eopl e in many walks of life; (2) the ''organiza�i�n'' (i.e. collecti?n f JJeopl�� h} ? 3) _ c h heads he church _ ti _ ( n, actio thus IJ�I and fl on op1n1 � has uence capacity t o in -u1 ar leaders in �100 the hierarchy have tl1at capacity (but, of co11rse, on careft1l 111ves�1 ga we _sources may decide that ''power'' withi1 1 t11e chtlfch is dispersed arooilg various according to some comple"< formula wl1ich we do not f11lly understa11d).

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734

AL LAW ON TI U IT ST ON C AN PI IO TH E OF K SoURCEBOO

oli t ic_ a l science (a nd s ociology and p in e tur era t li Ari increasin g o ' f c ex c on pt o w pl ce m is ' o th o f y p ud st e tl1 '' er ith w d ne . er nc o c 11 e be s 1 11a y) o cl 10 g t is o ne which h as influenced political i t bu dy stu o r f d fiel lt ficu "a dif PltsrIS, 110 doubt ' . nst S ocr�tes - the a a1 s . b t ' ut ur o s } 1u ac m sy ra Th l � al c (re to a Pl . conlmentators fr om at 1s right) t o Arist ?tle (the wh ke ma law e th d an s � law he t ke ma . :migt1ty in society ts o be sat1s�ed by es t ter in se er d1 ve l1a 10 f wl n e m o . 1· � 11e an m all state is made up of of le aders is ho w _t o manipulate th e inputs) m ble o pr l a r i1t ce (a lli ve c l1ia a M to the laws) o�h the "input'' an d th e ''o utput' ' b in r o we th wi ied t1p c c o e pi· s wa p o h _ to H obbes (w _ vest1g ate th e s ources of power 1 ly in tak ins a o p s lar c � l1o w� g s y -da n r de o m sei1se) to _ or the g overrung of a rty pa t n1s u · mm Co a o r y n1t 1 nu 111 o c al trib an ric Af within an e ich enc u l wh inf s rce deci�ion o f h r we o p t tha ds fin e � On � . city n ca larg e Ameri making - may derive fro1n many sources: o p1 ruons, values, customs, educational experience and upbring ing , tl1e ''elites'' in society (i.e. pe?J?le who are thought to be powerful by virtue of tl1eir wealth . or ancestr� or pos1t�o n etc. _ an_d who �re consciot1s of this positio11 an d thus c onscio usly exercise a speci al r ole 1 n 1nfluenc1ng decisions). Similarly, mass commu11ications, money, f orce (e.g. the threat of a strike or a riot), the perso1 1ality and ambitions of partict1lar leaders a nd ma ny other factors may influe nce official decisi on-n1aking.

an1ou11t of

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111 studying the develop1ne11t of Parliament in Ethio pia it may be important to be aware of tl1ese insigl1ts. For it m ay be important to remind ourselves that Etl1iopia has - at least so it is ustially asserted - e nj oyed a particular ''traditional'' ''system'' - or patterns - of power. Perhaps there are vari ou s unwritten rules or customs govern.in g tl1e ''i11puts'' of ·the traditional politi cal system; f or example, the actio 11s of tl1e central g overnn1ent, one mi g ht ar g ue, l1ave, by ta.cit agreement, long been i 11flue11ced by tl1e teacl1i11gs of the Cl1urch, and other attitudes and values (attitudes t owards n1ilitary IJrowess, authority, c ommerce, w ork etc.). There have been traditional ''elites''; mo1 1ey and elements of f orce may l1ave been at their disposal; their legitima cy was accepted, and all tlus has, i n the past, produced a ''system'' wl1ich people u11derstood and ''equ.ilibrium'' witl1in that system.

Tl1e introduction of 11ew laws sucl1 as tl1e Revised Cons titutio11 (e. g . Articles 41, 45 and tl1e varioLts articles creati11 g a11 electoral pro ces s and a Parliament and �iving it various _co11stitutio11al powers) creates a rzel-v legal basis Jo,· accepting inputs 11110 t/1e sJ,ste,11. If 011e co11cludes tl1at tl1e law now per 111its n1ore pen political debate o about_ wl1_at go_vern1ne11t 0L1gl�t to be doing , pern1its people to band t og ether into organ1z��1011s 1 11 . order to . 11111L1ence g overnn 1eut, notably Parliament, permits competitive elect1011s, J)er1111ts Parliame11t t o reflect tl1ese dem ands and to press tl1e Emperor's gover11 111e11t to do tl1is or tl1at, JJer 111its farmei·s to attack establisl1ed land te1Ju· re systems a11d artict1late new dema11ds f or 11ew services _ if the laws co11! emplate developn1e11t �t· sL1cl1 c o11ditions, a1 1d to tl1e extent tl1ey do , tl1ey are pa v1ng tl1e w,ty for �ra111at1c cl �a11ges. Ne\v ''elites'' 1 nay develop: educated me11 - _ or de1nagogues - w�tl1 � ca1J�1c 1ty to pe1·sl1,tde people of tl1e value of ''new'' ideas e.�. a ste_eJ? JJrogress1 ve 1nco111e tax, chan�e� in la11d law, a competitive civil service� Ne�. 01J1n1011s cl1alle1Jge _ old ones - op1111ons abollt religion, ethics a nd pro�r _ pol1t1cal bel1�v 1o ur �cw 1!1terest gro L1ps m�y develop to cl1allenge tlie old _orclet: _ . '. e.g . trade uruo11s, fa1111ers coope1·at1ves, tribal-based associations students. Thos._..._e� 'Nl1� seek to p. ro111o t� cl1a11 g es on a wider scale may g o f urther a�d attempt to or- �an1ze '_'p,:irt1es'' - _1.e. c1gg1·egates of i11terest g,·oups; and tl1roug h the device e. f_-- . tl:e party tl1e orga11 1zers m · ay seek to IJersuade masses o.f pe ople to accept- -a11.'cl -;;=.:r \v,1nt a11d demand - a broad programme of various actions fro governme.nt._______ -·�. m -

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PARI..IAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTI'fUl'IONS

735

' 'i11p new t ch an�. ne'Y sot1 rces of '"power''_ s u of '. ' u an0 nt opme devel � he T 1 1 _development ?f Parl1 an1e11t, 1t will �ffect tl1e \\'ay i 11 wllich 'er the t affec y ousl obvi will to_ lise - its po,�er, tl1 e dynan11 c� (forces) ,vitll i n ParIi� trie s or use s nt roe . rlia a ri·l e i � t the conduct of elections and select1011 a11d compos1 t1on of ti 1 e CI·1 amber n baroe ' l( oe Deputies_ and so on. perl1aps a probl. en1 •'"ace_d by tl1ose co11 cern�d wit· I1 pla1111ing loy of 1 an1e11t, 1s to evalt1ate tl1 e risks a11 d Parl notab ly ment, develo p advailt tional stitu con uti) ages of introduci ng all these new elements i11to tl1e }Joli tical systen1 - a11d to evaltiate ·_t1v · e '' 1 · · an a r e s p '' ''f e on '' com I e c: , Ut11 If • p 1 e t �nge. po 1t1cal syste111, 011c the tempo Of ch �e! may have to cons!der: What sorts �f d1�a_gr:�111e11ts, te1 1s1ons, I1atreds and suspicio,1s f a I ma y the system 1ntrod��e? �he , ·stab1l1ty of tl1e ?Id order 1uay be profot111dly in. upset, and while ''stab1l1ty'' 1� not,�g��d per !�, 1��1tl1er, nece ssa�ily, _is i11stabil�ty , fr�e , . compet1t1ve . system wl1ere .111 diverse parties l� e _tl1 Further , leading to chaos. �I or interest groups or candidate s vie w1 tl1 eacl1 otl1er 1n tl1c electoral process may be re more of a goal than a reali zable political fact. Political parties, for example, wl1icl1 in theory reflect the ''popular will'' may in fact be controlled by tl1 ose wl10 111ar1age or manipulate them: fifty years ago Robert Mi cl1 els, a keen Ger1na 11 sociologist, i r' n oted: Organization of bodies like ''parties'' or ''t111ions'' t1ltin1atcly prodt1ces 11ot more true democracy but a new ''oligarchy'' of leaders - tl1ose wl10 control tl1e .' parties and unions: ''the elected control tl1e electors'' (see i,if,·a this section). Again, there is the danger when one i11trod11ces a ''free '', ''competitive'' syste1n tl1at tl1e "rules of the game'' - the new rules, governing a systen1 of con1petitive electio11s will be misunderstood: tl1e losers may be less a loyal, official Opposition tl1an a group of avowed opponents of those in ''power''.

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The readings which follow explore a fe w aspects of tl1ese proble111s, ancl \VC have, of course, touched upon some of the111 be fore. We J1ave noted, for example, that constitutional development i n Tanzania now re flects t]1 e deli berate i11 trodt1ctio11 of a "one party'' system, and one reason for tl1is syste n1 was to rede fi11e the rt1les ?f the game and limit tl1e amount of disse11sion and tl1e ways i11 ,vl1i cl1 dissent or interest articulation could take a political for1n i11 that cot111try. Etl1iopia }1as started to develop i nstitution s of representative go,,er11111e11t and competitive elections a11d ?Pen, competitive political debate. In a legal ( co11 stit u ti o11 al) se11se , tl1e rules gover11ing the political systen1 l1ave i ndeed been cJ1anged. 111 practi ce, perl1 aps tl1 ere l1as been less change, so far. But new sources of po,ve r, new inpt1ts, may develop. To �orrow's political developers mt1st tl1 i 11 k l1 ard abot1t tl1 e i. 1uplications of tl1e Ia,v 10 the constituti on, the problems which may loom ,1l1ead; co11sti tt1tio11al lawyers must know more tl1an we t1s11ally do abot1t tl1 e ope ration of ''power'' witl1 in society an� the way in wl1icl1 new source s of ''power'' may develoJ) - and tl1 e co11s�que11c� s. It .ts not_ enough to es mak e bald assertions abot1t tl1 ese 1natters; systernatic sttidi are req uired, parti cularly in areas wl1ere our ignorance may be profoui1d, U1timately, of cou rse tl1 e lawyer is faced witl1 st1cl1 qt1estions as: H_ o,v \vill th e law esta bl. · par11an1 en t ?· 1s11 a system' (implemen t a tl1 eory) of re1)resentat1·01: 111 WI :;ay be candi 1�� to �evelo � � _ e t1 par If d? e es t dat ul� reg d. be w a11 s I1o 1 1 l ctio wil ele � ho: ll th l 1 co1 1es, � � ti' 1v1t act ial anc n w fi : t1 reg 1r e tJ1 n g. Iate e i �he r develop1 ent duct o� the �1r � _ pro 1 tl1e1 of t ten co11 1nter11al affairs tl1e 1 e1r leade rs tl of n electio the · ' · ·iametlt?· I-IO\\' Paganda? How w ·ll ' p, 1 po1 ,ic u 1 · i the law regulate e xternc:al press11res pt1 t • · gu W 1·1 1 1· t re · a 1 grotips ?· I_ ate - if at all- tl1e organization of· p11 rely tri bal-b,1sed po ·1itic H . 1_ r y des 1nay 1 � c 1 wl1i det ! , r cks 1 atta � � �ttack� by one group on anotJ1e r _ es�:ntr l 1� unity within society? Some t J1 ese problems are st1ggestecl 111 tl1e read1 1105 a of below, and · . . . considered in m.ore detail in Cl1apte r IX .

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SoURCEBOOK OF E·n-110PIAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW

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P1·essure Gt·oups

j n e nd e s pe hi ul de in sh t t en � ud ? a1n �Ji Pa of er gment, he I 111b n1e �; a t llla s ve lie be e rk Bu 11 g 101 TJ 1 . e. most unreserved co mmunica � e th m Jiv uld sho ive tat en res rep a t tlla • ove ab ' . i d" ng < 1e rea ti . . . m es · gu ar b d t un � n gro th e on wee mm o co tw 1s ·· ere h t t con.fi ictmg · ittients'' an d lo tl11s ex len .t1011 w1'11·t I11·s const " 1 b s r ead ing e e wo t ow Th t? us d .tOc · . ou . r1e · . car be ' atten tion 1 101 cat 1n1 n1t corn 1 is tl t1ld sl1o 0\v views. B11t 11 on tl1is issue. Tile first readii1 g gives a sumn1ary view of how interest � ro�ps operate in Europe, England :and North America. The second is a case study of an Ethiopian pressure group.

From Wl1 eare, Legis!atu,·es (1963), pp.64-81. Leoislators 011ce cl1osen, a1·e seldom left for long to their own devices. We ·,vould �isunde;sta11d profoundly tl1 e working of legislatures if we thought of them .as bodies wl1icl1, between elections, tho11gl1t things out in isola ted t�anquili_ty, inde pe11dent, free to initiate or to decide matte�s as they th�ught fit, influenced only by me111bers' co11tact witl1 each other. Legisla tures are 1n fact constantly under pressure from perso11s a11d i11stit11tions outside themselves, and wl1 at they do is in fluenced greatly by tl1ese pressures. Elections are indeed but one of the ways and occasio11s of i11fl11enci11g legislat11res, and they are no t necessarily the most import .ant. To u11dersta11d tl1e life of a legislature in between elections, it is necessary to know of some of the forms in whlch influence is exert ed on a legislature. Legislators may begin life in a newly-elec ted parliament under the influence of pledges wl1icl1 ]1ave been given to tl1e electors eitl1er by themselves individually or by their party leaders 011 tl1eir behalf. Their freedom of act ion may appear to be restricted by tl1is legacy of tl1e election campaign. They may have obtained what is ·so metimes called a 'n1a11date' from tl1e electors for a particular course of action. Tl1e 11ature and validity of a mandate is very difficult to deter111ine. Can it be said that a mandate req11ires legislators to do wl1 at tl1ey promised, whatever the circum ·stances? Tl1ere can be few legislators \Vl10 tl1ink so. . .. Legislators keep in to11cl1 witl1 their local party oroan the with and izati ons 0 loca l elect orate while by visits not , 011ly \.vl1er also 1 the t leois bu latur e is rece i 11 ss ' 0 . . . .. 1t 1s 1n session. The extent to wl1icl1 tl1is is do11e ,,aries from country to country. 'Tl1e Britisl1 me1nber of parliame11t spe11ds 111auy week-ends in his constituency; · some members l1ave regular ''surgeries'' to wl1icl1 constituents are encouraged to come witJ1 tl1eir pro blen1s; otl1ers 11a,,e less f orn1alized arrangements. Contac �s are not co11fi11ed to _ elect ?rs o� tl1e n1e111 ber's ow 11 party; they are open to all �onst� tuents. Tl1ey pr �v1�e l11n1 w1tl1 a11 opJJort1111ity of knowing 11 0w people 1n h.is -e�ectorate ,tre tl1111k.i11g a11d feeling, while at tl1e sa111e time he can djscover from l1�s pa�ty s111Jpor�ers a11d organizers ,vl1a t attitude they tak� to the issues under d1sct1ss1011. Amer1ca11 Congressmen 1nai11tai11 close links witli tJ1eir districts. The y ·sta�t off _with �11 �dv�nt ge in this respect from the requirement that they mu st be � resident 1n their d1str1ct If �l1ey are to qt1alify for election. The locality rule ensu res that tl1.ey l1ave contacts w1tl1 tl1e communi ty wlticl1 the y represent. Moreover, the fact that tl1ey are elected for a short term of two years make it im portant tha t s . tl1ey sl1011ld. keep cl�selJ In touch with political condition in their district. Th s �Y regar� tl1�mselves pr1nc1pally as represe 11tatives of t he dis ric if they speak for it, t t; _ press its 111terests and obtain redress of its grievances, the y lia fulfilled their task ve .as Congressmen. . . . _-�_

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

En'-' · l

lr<� ..... ·'\ i t.f

e 11sed, n1ore over, as a 111eans of exJ)r ms � t�l _ e gra an d essing local ers . Lett . pol1c1es and no t merely to air perso11al or partictilar grievcal po liti out ab opini on ances. · · · A particular e�ample of tl1is m etl1od ?f i11f111e11ci11g legislato rs is tl1e presei1ta 1res are collecte � 1n supJ)Ort of a_ project or a pro test and S1gn at1 ons . petit i of tion or by J11111 t o tl1e legislatttre itself. presen ted either to a member of t11e leg1slatt1re · · · t 1e e 1?gt s l t ·� e 1cat o· ' 1 op1111 1 d f 011 UJJ011 tl1e partict1lar 111atter, a11ct 1n to is The object ar o use p�b l1c 111_t�rest and to e11co t1rage disct1ssion. M ost le gis to e tim same at the t o receive pet1t1ons - tl1011gl1 tl1e Irisl1 J) arliame 11t does 11ot. ed prepar are s lature \Vbat the effect of s11ch petitions is 11po 11 l e gislators is diffict1l t to estimate; it seld om _ f p�ti tio11ing tl1e legislatt1re is actively appears to be very gr�at. Yet the prac�ice o pursued in some parliamentary co11ntr1es 1n s1J1te of 1neagre rest1lts .... Associated \vith tl1e petiti on as a n1ea11s of inf111e11ci11g the legislatt1re is the march.Petitioners sometimes marcl1 ,vith tl1eir petitio11 to tl1e seat o f tl1e legislattire; marchers need not, but so me times do, bring a p etitio11 witll tl1e1n. B11t a marcl1 is a more formidable weapon tl1a11 a p etition and 1nost legislatL1res take steps to protect themselves against tl1e impact of marcl1ers. No legislature is prepared to tolerate intimidation by marchers, and i t is usual to fi11d sp ecial provisio11s i11 tl1e law concerni11g assembly near th e l egislative chan1ber....

Legislatures are also made aware of tl1e vie,vs of tl1e electorate by V11 l.1at ttre usually called public opin ion polls. There l1as been a good deal of criticisn1 of tl1en1 on the ground tl1at the y are inaccurate or 1nisleadi11g or disl1on est a11ci tl1at st1ch influence as they have is therefore bad.In so far as tl1ey provide a11 acct1rate assess ment of what the electorate thinks upon political issues, tl1ey wo11ld aJJJJear to be doing for the legislator what he tries t o do for l1imself. ...

i'>

737

. Some of the metl1ods of influe ncing tl1e legislature wl1icl1 J1ave bee11 me11tio11�d imply �l1e existence of organized gro11ps wl1ose ft1nctio11 it is, tl1011gl1 n o t necessarily exclusively, to try to influenc e legislators.It is wortl1,vl1ile to consider tl1e activities of these groups, f or the y play an importa11t part in tl1e working of le�is�att1r_es. They vary a great deal i 11 scope and metl1ods, and it is 11ecessary to d1st111�u1sl1 betwe en tl1em if their effect is t o be proJJerly 11nderstood.Tl1ey i11cl11de trade 11111011s, employers associations, professio11al and vocational associatio11s, gro111?s ?evoted to !he pr?motion of some object wlucl1 they b elieve to be i11 tl1e p11b l1c ! 1 1ter est, or 10 the1r own interest. Sometimes tl1eir sole f t1ncti o11 is to i11flt1e11ce l egislators; mor e often the influencing of legislators is only one an1011g 1nany _ways_ i11 wl1icl1 they �eek to promote their more o metime s tl1ey ca11 acl1ieve tl1e1r ObJects sts; intere s effectively by seeking to influence the gover 11111ent rat]1er tl1a11 tl1e legislattire._:rvloSt of these organizatio ns are permanent, b t1t otl1ers c o111e into existence for a partictilar purpose and go out of existence when tl1 eir cause is wo11 or loSt· e hes 11ction o f ft1 ir e tl1 of a org ,v vie n of 1t d e o 1 cl i i p od b e tl1 m e i o s fr z regar ed ' , exert!1n. g in · · fluence are often bb_ y' 'l · aine n _ 1 Tl ? 1es , · bb o l or 1ps' ' gro1 called press11r e , � ed ot! t 1 11 111 is d ed fro arri _ m t �e f�ct tl1�t t!1e activities o f t be gro11ps are ?fte11 � 'lob�I� � y of the leg1s�at1ve bu1ld1ng, to. obb d t�llce and met e b can rs � be m m e e wl1er in , isy the ail is 1be nen 1 h w1t r exp t tac con io ess or n 1g eti1 us � e e d to describ e tl1e 1n tafkin g to t�em . The word has de vel op ed a wider 11sage a11d 110w covers tJ!e wl1ole r · of o in fluence t t r d o� viti i11 on e s, ri�d car , n cl is : n1 j� t1ding entertai e11t wl1icl1 ac / � e e rs. o by 1s 110w us d Tl1 e. i1c ltie 111f rts �x� 1 1cl wl1 � e to descri be tl1e body ' b L b�o en a tra11sf erence eI e \Vll e plac e tl1 111g 1b scr e d 11 i11 meaning of tl1 e word fro1

I=��f

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738

IONAL LAW T U IT ST N O C N A l'l O ·II TJ E F O K SOURCEBOO

z o t 1· �i s_ ga re t� or n or io i� 1s at o1 rs w pe e th ch to hi d se ci er ex be to ht ug so as w i ilfltieilce fl e 11c ue 1s 1n ng w 1s1 110 erc ex of ca ess oc d pr rie . r the of rt pa t· ·ea · · gi A t . 1 · se ci seeks to exer · b . rt en � te a ' a1 n � Ie r te t ? en an m , r b) tte _le by g i11 ild bu e � tiv . 011 outside the legisla f 1 1 h s t e . 1n o or b b at 1s eg y g 111 \v o 1e rv e te th 1n s es el tl1 ,er e, ' · N 1 · on i· ss · cu · s di n1eet111gs a11d · · . · f o ue 1q I e 1n tin te er I ex f 1e t . o g rt · pa 1n 1t ar rt po 11n 1 a1 ill st is g in legislative build flue11ce. ... pt m to t� to se at wi e t flu i in � i11 tl1 e ll nc wi p ou gr a l1 1ic wl · on tip s ue iss e T11ere ar n, 1o r at fo uc p of ed am ue ex iss an le, n_ O e. ur at isl leg e th · of rt pa e rg la a tlle w1101e or , l_ rs ed al ?e ch m e_ o� m pr �p y lly ma 1� e� sp be ll wi ers cl1 tea e ar 1o wI rs \Vllile membe ue 10 education 1s 1nvolv , iss ed 1s ot 1g1 rel a If . i11g by _ lob me so e uir req to be expected y be ers . r1:1a ed lll:b of uir me req ps ou gr t ren e f dif to cl1 oa pr ap of ds tho different me d, 1ze ers lar oth cu be �1r may y 1na ers oth s, he eec sp for ial ter ma en giv Soine may be s d m ter a11 ve gra let e1 tele rec y ma s all or s 1er otl gy, ate str on n s.io ct1s dis to be called in · ion the zat y b _ ani or� and o� ati tig i11s _ tb_e at ts 11en stit con ir the n1 fro ns itio and pet ary all ent 1n liam s par ion rat ope r 1l1a am f are ese TI1 t1p. gro ed rest inte of tl1e cot1ntries. ... From Fecadu Gedam11, ''Tl1e Social and Cultural Foundation of Gurage Asso ciation'' (A paper presented to tl1e Third International Conference of Ethiopian St11dies, 1966). [TJ1e Sodo Gurage Association] began to undertake t 1e 1 responsibility of deve loping tl1e region.Their first target was to build a modern road from Addis �o\.baba to and tl1rough Sodo G11rage land.111 1945, tl1is aspiration was formally expressed. A tribal assembly was called to a meeti11g and eacl1 member was asked to co11tribute to the constructio11 of tl1is road for wl1icl1 $35,000 was raised.Then tl1e elders went to tl1e Emperor witl1 tl1e collectio11 i11 l1a11d to ask help from tl1e government.... The Emperor promised tl1em that l1e would order tl1e Ministry of Public Works to build the road for tl1e1n and ordered tl1em to desposit tl1eir collection in the same Ministry. They did as they were told, but no action \\'as taken during the next four years. In 1949 tl1e question was again ra.ised in the tribal assembly.... A start was made on the road as tl1e r11ral pop11lation bega11 gatl1ering sto11es and clearing the grot1nd. ... 111 1951 .. . anotl1er agreeme11t was reached betwee11 tl1e Mi 1 1istry of Public �orks and the Asso?ia�io11 tl1at tl1e Mi11istry sl1ot1ld allocate equipment and techni c1a11s and the Assoc1at1on sl1011ld bear ex1Jenses f. or labour fuel and materials.... A!1 ad�itional s�1m of $10,500 �as rttised. T.l1e elders agai� we11t to the Emperor w1tJ1 tlus collect1011 a11_d _co1111)la111ed tl1at tl1e 01�der of tl1e Emperor was not carried ot1t at all.... The M1111stry start�d clearing tl1.e grouiid llp to Butajera according "' tl1e ord to er o� tl1e �m1)ero1·. 1 J11s :"as soon interrtipted by tJ,e creation of a new agencJ, I1npe1·1al I-l1_gl1�ay At1tl101·1ty, 1·esponsible for btiilding and maintaining the l1.1gl1ways of Etl11op1a. J{e11ce tl1e bt1ilding of tl1 e Gurage road naturally went to tl11s neyr agency . Althougl1 th� Gurages Icept talking about it and brought it to tl1e attention of the I.I-I.A., 11otl11ng st1bstantial was done about it during the next ten years. �n 1961 tl1e Gt�rage representative of tl1e Chamber of Deptities presented tl1e case to tl1� first Parli� me11t elected by pop11lar vote. Parliament disctissed the matter and questioned tl1e I.I-I.A.[and] tl1e prev _ ious agreement was [reiterated] that J.R.A .. should s11pply tl1e 1noney for eq1111Jment aD;d technical planning ... [and] the

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I •

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE lNS'fl'fUTIONS

739

bear all otl1er expe11ses s11ch as for f11el, 111 aterial �11d tlle general oul_ d ] 1 [sl . association e e to t rcato M spre�d tl?ere was s 11cl1 excttemei1 t tllat a news this n � Whe Jabour. 1n 11 0 time a11� d11r111 g tl1at day alotJe $80,000 was c_ a lled was ly b m asse eneral un1nterr11pted constr11ct1011 of tl1e road t-, egan. the 1us l T ed lect l �o .

! '

Political Parties

••

The readin gs belO\V are suggesti\:ci ? 11ly, <?f � fran1e,vork for stt1dying problcn,s relating to the development of a systerr1 of parties m Etl11op1a.

From Report of tl1e Cornn1ittee Association (1950).

011

Political Parties, An1erica11 Political Scie nce

An effective party syste m requires, first� tl1at tl1e J)arties ,:tre ,tble to bring forth programs to which tl1 ey comn1it tl 1e1uselves and, s eco11d, tl1at tl1e parties possess sufficient in ter11al col1eston to carry ot1t tl1ese J)rogran1s. The fundamental reqt1iren1ent [i11 111alcing tl 1e parties accountable to tl1e l)Ll blic] is a two-party system in wl1icb the OJJpositio11 party acts ,1s tl1e critic of tl 1e l)arty jn power, developing, defining and prese11 ti11g tl1 e policy alter11atives \Vl1icl1 are necessary for a true cl1oice i n r eacl 1ing p11blic decisio11s. A stronger party S)'Stem is less likely to give ca11se for tl1e deterioratio n aL1d confusion of purposes which someti1nes passes for co11 11)romise bL1t .is really an unjustifiable surrender to narrow i11t erests. Co1npromis e 1:1111o ng i11ter ests is com patible with the aims of a fre e society 011ly wl1e n tl1c t ern1s of refere11ce reflect an openly acknowledged concept of tl1e public inte rest. Tl1er e is e v(�ry reaso11 to i11sist that the parties be held accountable to tl1 e pub]ic for tl1e co m1Jro111ises they acc ept. However, political conditions in Africa are very different fron1 tl1ose in western countries and it has been argued that European-style parties n1ay be ttnsuitable - or indeed positiv�ly harmful-to developing African states. This view l1as been put for,vard in tht reading later in tl1is Cha1)ter on the decline of "Westminster democracy'' in Africa. As a rest1lt, ne,v theori_ es have be� n developed on the place of parties jn Africa, most notably in tl1e ideas and practice of President Nyfrere of Tanzania. .

�e-read: Nyerere, ''Democracy and The Single Party Syste111'' suprr1, Capter lll, Part 3, pp. -49-252, an d the readings on T ANU pp. 275-280.

From Wheare, op. cit., p p 6 . 7-68. . Some parties - and the Communist Party is a good exaluple - COllt�ol tl1e . ct�o ns bers 10 t l� e of me1? e tl �egisla _of t work o rs_ e Tl� : b party jog elong their to � gislatur e 1s sub ord1�ate to the party orga111zat1on ot1ts1de t�l1e le� slat:1re. _! t 15 ! co m.mo �or m Co .murust members of a ]egislat11re to l1 ave place cl tl1e 11 re5igna_t1� 115: n u date d) 1� tl1 e l l: 1 SIIn� A d. e elect e r � e 1 l t 1 s wbe1 1and of the part y organization, �iar 15 � l antee is required of tl1e legislators be longing to s0111e soc1al JSl aiid labo tir J )art !� · g e t of tl1is kind e i1cl1 Fiftl , r tl1e n F o f o11 t1ti a stit con J f . 1e l t con lict wit 1 . . R�pub l�m n � ic, which states, i11 effect, th.at tJ1 ey are legally 1111 e11forceable. Then tl1ere are an .is _ a.itl Brit in y Part e ativ serv · cont rol tl1e party Jn tl1e ex ample .w here the parties ' of wl1ich the Con party · ' T out · atu 1egl�l side the legislatL1re does not · . . · e ans m re• l11)ugh t. l1e nati. a11y d by e r 1o igi t o n onal party orga111zat1on 1� it is 1iorie . i s� � _ g e 1 . .' tlle the less treat e d as s11 bordioate. Pol jcy is decided by the party in

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740

L A N IO T W U A IT L T S N O N C IA P IO JI T E F O K O SOURCEBO

ided prov is by e iplin the Disc ers. leade lead its rs by in ' tely ra u . cc a re o . .. m r o re latu ' ' e 1 atur I eg1s e t h c1s1n exer ide outs g on izati rgan o cont . o r y part l a y b t o , re u at sl 1 g le tl1e the by party ucted n instr z ni be orga not may atio L s ct � lator • egis · . over members 111s1 e. , no t ent "" ·h 1am .1or t 1 par e 1n ty ty par par tl1e for is out It e Vot o t e ar y I 1e t w o l1 1 t o 1 ab · · · . · ns f ut1o o o I a res e c Th e. er ons don be . to vat1 is 1 at wI ve ide dec t o t , . 1 e1 n1 1a 1 r pa side · · t Th en . ey 1 1am may par 1n b ty par e tl1e ted 1 1 trea u1Jo g 1 r 1 di n bt" · not , are e 1c 1 e er nt o c Party . . t an no d m e ry ar ey ato .. th .. t bu · l t1a e11 fiu 111 · e ov pr· ' y ma ey ti ·; 1 , t ec sp re wit.h

nce rie pe st Ex Pa th Wi ing t·et Parties e1p J11t : rica Af iri ent ·,i,n ve, Go i-y ,ita me Pa,·lia

g he yin d poli�cal develop stu_ one any , ent liam par ted elec � an of ess fuln use and e valu tlle Whatever nlent of present-day Africa has to con1e to tern1s with tl1e �act that m Af�1ca parl1a� �nts baye suffered quite a number of notable reverses, and l1ave oft�n e1t�er �n abolished by �I1ta� �c tatorsJ1ips, or reduced to virtual. no_thingness_ �1�der pres1dent1al r�gimes. The _follo�g ed1to�al reading, \\,hicJ1 you are certainly 1nv1ted to. cr1t1c�se, presents _one view .of the d1_fficult1es of parlra ments in Africa, and stiggests son1e ways 1n wh1cl1 1 ts effec�ivene_ss rrught be 1m_p!oved. In con sidering it, you sl1 otild also take account of some of tl1e d1scuss1_on of pre-cond1t1ons for demo cratic governn.1ent discussed in Cl1apter I and Cl1apter IV (Section 6).

From Clapl1 a1n, ''Notes on tl1e Failt1re of 'Westminster Style' Pa.rliaments in Africa'' (U11 pt1blisbed Essay) (1965). To eacl1 of tl1eir for1 ner colonies, tl1e departing Englisl1 tried to leave the beritage of tl1eir own political system, based o n the principles, well pro ved at West minster, of tl1e loyal opposition and of responsible government; these meant that the govern1 nent \¥011 ld l1 ave to keep the s11pport of a majority of tl1e members of Parlian1er1t in order to survive, while tl1e oppo siti on attacked the government and tried to i11crease its 1111mbers at elections 1111til it becam e tl1e majority and could forn1 its ow11 gover11 111e11t. Tl1e system de1Je1 1ded on the existence of parties, This system l1as proved a f ailt1re i11 every o ne of tl1e African co11ntries to which it l1 as been aJJplied. In some, sucl1 as Ta11ga1 1yika, tl1e two -party system on whicl1 Westmi11ster de1nocracy depe1 1ds was abse1 1t fro m tl1e start; but tl1e English system failed still 111ore con1pletely i11 territories wl1e1·e two parties were initially present, and wl1ere the likelil1ood of its s11ccess tl1erefo re see111ed greater. The cluef reason f or tl 1is was tl1e nat11re of tl1e political parties ,vhich eu1eroed and whicl1, almost witho ut exception, were based 011 tl1e tribal a11d ethnic div�io�s of the peoples of the co1111�ry.A p�rty syst. ern o r�a11ised alo 11g tl1ese lines was incapable of fulfillin g tl1e f11nct1011s wl11 cl1 tl1e Westm1nste1· 1 11o del de1 11anded of it. In tl1e first place, the op t11all. y 110 cl1a11ce of gai1 1i11 g oflice ' since in a tribal context it was . positio11 11acl vir. 111 a per111a11e11t 1n11101·J�Y-. T.l1ere \:\1 �t� 110 c l1ance of \¥i1111i 11 g men o one's own 1b t er s party wl1 e11 tl1e �leter1111 111�1g factor 11 1 JJarty n1e111bersJ1ip was tribal, since very �ew would_ desert tl1e1r o w11 tribal pc:1rty for tl1at of a tribe o r gr o up of tribes to wh1cb �l1ey d1d 1 1o t belong. A1 1d_ a ft1 rtl1e1· ince11tive to reject th e system, see1 1 at its cleare_st �n tl1e Co1 1go_, was pro ,,1 ded by tl1e fa ct tl1at eacl1 m in o i·ity pa rt y w ould rematn 1n control o f its J1o me area, and woulcl tl1us be encourag ed to break away. 111 tl1ese circt11nstat1ces, tl1e l o yal o ppositio n could faced jt Th no er e t ex ist . only the _l)ossibilities �f rebellion, of secession, or of o imRO a in gr t ad de tia cli l ne tence as its 111ore amb1t1ot1 s men1bers, wit11 110 future i 11 tl1 eir ow n party, went ov e-r t o tl1e govern1ne11t ben?l1es. T l1 e 01Jpositio 11 of G]1a na of tl1e f�&t is ex am an pl e process, tl1 e frag1nentat1011 of Co1 1go of tl1e seco nd at id 1 e den1jse of KADU. rn tl Kenya o f tl1 e tl1ird. Oppositi on 111a11aged to survive f01as mar1y as a fe,v years only

{

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74I

syst em preserved a series of regio11al parties eacl1 fede ral the re whe i· 1 11.r a i' ij • 1,1ger ' . · � 1n t h at t l11s · ·1s a dangero11s basis for stable cle111ocracy is. · area , own its 1 in d c o u: ensc � �y events in Nigeria since 1966. ,, prov e accelerated tl1 e I)roces�. 111 tl1e first place, Westhave facto rs of ber num A · �· 1 e. legacy of a departed olontal J)O\ve�, a11d c?iruna,1 ed tl was acy democ� � � �:. minster �ple or 1 pe fro1 t _ 1 l1e lea d ers_ ,vl10 l1ad ga111 ed �11e1r sta11ct111g _ either_ from pport . su little • e 1n _lead111g a struggl� for 111d�p_e11dence aga,11st tl1at very experienc al politic and did tl1 e concept of tl1.e op1Jos1t1on l1a ve very 111t1cl1 1 neanNor ment. govern lonial co di' t101 1a Idemocrat1c systen1s l1 ave al��ys �ested on a tra -�here nt ontine c a in , iog . of consens11s, a_n_d ,vl1ere 01J_e11 opJJOs1t1011 1s regarded, b11t_ n oppos1�1o basis not of 1 often rightly, as a sign of d1slo)1alty. In add1t1011, tl1 e n1a111te11a11 ce of an opJ)osition involved a waste of resources i n a co11ntry in wl1icl1 trai.11ecl 1na111Jower was at a pre mium, and in which the 11nited eff?rts of all were 11ecessary in tl1e efforts for tl1e· univers ally shared goal of econoilllc developme11t.

All of tl1ese f actors led to the single and fund an1e11tal fact tl1at West1ninster , , democracy created division in countries wllicl1 badly 11eeded unity. It led to regio11,ll , fragmentation in countries where the first essential was to establisl1 some l<i11d of· national consciousness within the often. artificial borders wl1icl1 tl1e colonial powers. bad left bel1ind; it led to a dissipatio11 of effort i11 internal bickeri11 g \Vl1e11 co11certed action was needed to fight the common e11emies of poverty a11d ig11ora11ce; to tl1e government, it often offered little constructive criticis1n and a great deal of att,tclc whic h government was ill-inclined to endt1re; to tl1e opposition, it offered 11otl1i11g beyond rebellion on the one l1and a11d oblivion 011 tl1e otl1er. S111all wonder, 1 t h en, that this constitutional model failed to worlc. And with Westminster democracy, parliaments also vvithere d. Tl1ey lost t .heir function as the forum where the arguments of gover11n1e11t and opposition are cleve loped �n� contrasted ; usually there was notl1ing bt1t solid votes 011 party li11es for· the policies presented by the leaders· t1seful disc11ssion too seldom took IJlace; and t!1e government party was usually p;evented fro1n exami11ing or an1e11di11g its posi tion by the need to present a u11ited front. Tl1e res11lt l1 as bee11 that tl1 e Parliame11ts. of newl� independent Africa l1ave often decayed, and tl1e leaders of tl1e ne,v states. have built up tl1eir positio11s to a point wl1ere they ca11 be overtl1row 1 1 only by a revolt of the army or thei ow su r n pporters. _Faced by this virtually 11nbroken reco1·d of fail11re, 011e is forced to ask wl1etl1er Parlia ment, or indeed 1 e, ar1d scei African tl1e democracy ' l1as 011 all at place any . . Whetber _t·he sacrifice of . ts i _ to d lea 1igl1t 1 1 system ster 1 mi1 any West nt eleme of tl1e resurre ction in one c,1n po111 t a side, new affi1·111ative and tl 1 e Africa1 1 form On · out that a gre a . . · · · systems t many African peoples l1ave forn1ecl and operated democratic f ·. � }� �ir o�n in the past, and tl1 at the Afr.ica11 011tloo�, in so _ far as one can n . 18 more fav?u 1 as been l l�Y. 1 � 1ffic d 1 T 1se. erw 1 le otl rab to democracy tl1an �� the in ab1l1 �, ty to 1g 111 a11y 1 ta11 1 co1 J_� state n rn orga e d ise mo such a system in a large differe nt eSiaelements and confronted with titive exec ro11s vigo a · the 11eed for b·l'16 hment. u it �s nece y cll ,vlJi l ode 1 11 � er inst st1n We � ssar tl1e to have mine tl1e features of exa out cl:ar:0 its <lownfa_ll wl1en confronted witJ1 the Africa11 sc_e11e. Tw_o of tl1ese sta�d y. Tbe firs� is the to able 1 tii ��e basis bal tr1 a fact that parties formed 011 bear the b . ! 1 al urden 11s iv1510 d wl 1 J)arty 1cl 1 hat t _ �l1e and ? t �� n, 1 model demands of tl1e. O her lines are not possible in Africa to day. TJ1e second. 1s tl1at tl1e e111bryo Par lia

742

SOURCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CoNSTITU'fIONAL LAW

d e loa th of g an tin or pp n su mi of ad ble pa ra ca ist t ye t no tion e ar ica r Af of ments t e fac Th at m. th a l1e on r t ve p� go 11s i ut tit ns co nment � '' r te � 1is 1 11i t1 . wl1 icl1 ''Wes rl1ament lea �s to _th� t1�e of political P 1n 1 ty Jor ma a on � ce en ist ex depends fo r its 1 sc1p�1n1ng of Parliae d th to d an d, ne airu ex dy a e r al ve l1a we ts fec de JJarties wI1ose r reco rding votes who se fo ce pla a n tha re mo no s me co be it r e e wb 1t . incilt to a poi1 l s efu les e. us a os s rp ve pu ser e t r i e A wh d an syste m , ion lus nc co e o11 eg or f a e ar resLilts s t ha fac in led nt me to a rlia Pa on e11d dep situation ent nm ver go tl1e ake n 1 to intended t. en m e rn tl1 ve of go ol to e tl1 an th e r o m 110 is nt 1 11e a rli Pa 1 icl i 11 wh For Parliament to re-en1erge, tl1e refore, the party system must change, or even the of ure n!Iy slat nde legi epe sen ind . cl1o be ce st On 1n11 ive ct1t exe tl1e and , r a ppe disa . , as ent s pen liam of hap Par ntly nde in the epe ind sen cl1o is te sta tl1e of er lead tl1e e om to bec lf more independent, itse t men a li Par w allo to e abl be will he t es, Sta ted Uni es1Jecially if tJ1e decline of political pa rties enables discussion to be carried out witl1 a flexibilit y ancl an application to the particular problems of the matter in l1a11d wl1icl1 rigid pa rty lines clo not allow. Under these conditions, the legislature might be able to take on its proper African form as the modem equivalent of the n1eeti11 gs of t1 1e village elders in tl1e former triba l society, seeking not to win a divi sio11 bt1t to reacl1 a.greement, and serving not as a source of disunity and an obstacle to tl1e l)rogress of the cot111 t ry, but as a forum for working out the goals of the society, and fo r exami1 1i11g a11d, if necessa. ry, cl1ecking the policies of the executive to the exte11t that tl1e conse11s11s of tl1e cot1ntry's opinion will allow. From Lewis, Politics i11 West Afl·ica (1965), pp.66-71. Tl1e autl1or, former Vice Cl1ance1lor of the Uni,,ersity of the West Indies, is an eminent economist and l1as spent much time in West Africa on various n1issions.:

. Plurality is tl1e principal p ro blem [of most developing countries]. Most of t!1 em _inclt1de _people wl10 differ in lang11age o r tribe o r religion o r race; some groups I 1ve side by side 10 a long tradition of hostility ... Anybo�y wlJo 1 1 as se�n \vl1 at a mess party politics ca11 make of a plural society n1 11st fin� 1111nself l1 a°:ker111g after ,1 pri11utive kind of den1ocracy in which people 1 elect tl1e1r representatives witl1 0 1t tl1e aid of parties ... !l 1e political JJarty is one of tl1e 11 1o re recent in,,entions of the human race a1 1d 1 s 1 1ot ot1r 1nost ,ttt ractive p roduct. Yet it cai1not be avoided in any m ass de mocracy. If 1 11asses of JJCOJ)le are to ,1otc, tl1ey J1 ave to learn llO\.V to use their vote, and to band toget11er ... l1at is :'r011g witl1 JJolitica_l _p,1rties in ne\.v states is ...... tl1eir [class warfare] � .1nl1e11tan ce f1 on1 E11ro1Jea11 pol1t1cal pl1ilosopby ... The djffere11 ce between tl1e pl11ral society and tlie class society bas a funda n1e111,1I effect on t l1e cl1oice of electo1·al a11d pa rlian1enta ry systems ... The st1rest ':!ay to kill tl1e idea of democ racy in pltlral societies is to adopt tbe Angl?-A1 11e1 1 can electoral systen1 of first-past-the-post. Under this system any party "':l11ch won 51 pe1· ce1 1t of tl1e vote i11 each constituency would win all seats 1 n Parl1 ame1 1t ... 1.� a pl�ra� society, pro1)ortional rep1·esentation with a fe\v large several-member [aocl] ities r mino constittieocies 18 bett�r · · · because ... it to gives mo1·e satisfaction _ . y apli geogr redlices tl1e geograpl11cal confl.1ct ... and otl1er differences wl1 icl1 go w·ith

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PAJ{LlA1'1ENT AND LEGISI-ATIVE lNs1·1·ruT10NS

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743

case of J-Vrig/11 v..Rockefeller, disct1ssed J11fra p. 745 the pare Coro

Parties (1962), pp.70-71, 72, 73. al itic Pol s, hel Mic From It 11 as been remarked tl1 at i11 . tl1e lo�er stages of civilizatio 11 tyrai1 ny is c an11ot con 1e 1nto e x1ste 11�e t1�1til tl1ere is attai11ed a ocr� cy Dem t. inan stibse dom deve! o_ ped stage ?f soc1,1� life. l�rced?ms and J)rivileges, l11ghl y more and quent le ge of taking part 111 tl1e cl1rect1011 of pt1blic aff,tirs and among these latter tl1 e pr1v1 1 • Re c�11t t}1ue s ;l1a ve b�e_11 e fe,\ _th t_ o restric ted �l1aracterizecl by tI1e graduai are at first extension of these privileges to a w1de11111g crrcle. 1111s 1s ,vl1,tt vve }(11ow as tli e era of democracy. But if we pass from tl1 e _spl1ere of tl1e state to tl1e sphere of party, \Ve may observe that as democracy cont11111es to deve lop, a backwasl1 sets i11. Witl1 the advance of organizatio11, democracy te11ds to decline. Democr,ttic evolutio11 bas a: parabolic cot1rse. At the pre sent tim e , at a11y ra te as far as party life is concerned, democracy is in t11e de scending pl1ase . It may be e11t1nciate d as a general rule tl1at the increase in the power of tl1 e leaders is directly proportio11al with tl1e extension of the organizatio11 . In tl1e various parties and labor orga11izatio11s of different countries the influence of the leaders is 111ai111y determined (a1)art fron1 racial and individual grounds) by the varyi11g developme11t of orgaruzatio11. �711ere organjzation is stronger, we find tl1at there is a lesser de gree of applie cl den1ocracy. As organization develops, not only do the tasks of tl1e ad1ui11istration beco1ne more difficult and more com_plicated, b11t, f11rtl1er, its cltltie s beco111e e11Iarged ancl specialized to sl1c]1 a degree tl1 at it is no longe r possible to tal<e tl1e111 all i11 at a single glance.

For technical and administrative re asons, no less tl1a11 for tactical reaso11s, a strong organization needs ru1 equally strong leade rship. As long as a11 orga11izatio11 is loosely con.structed and vague in its outline s, 110 1)rofessio11,tl leadersl1ip can arise. The more solid the structure of a11 organization becon1es i11 tl1e cot1rse of tl1e evolution of the modern poljtical party, tl1 e more m,1rked beco111es tl1e tendency to replace the emergency leader by the professio11 al leacler. Fo� d�mocr acy, however, tl1e first appe arance of profe ssio11al I.e ad�rsl1jp 1?3-��ks the beg1nrung of tl1e end, and tl1is, above all, on accol111t of tl1e log1cal 11nposs1b�I1ty of the ''representative'' system, wbetl1e r in parliame11tary life or i11 party dele gati�� J�an Jacques Rousseau may be considered as tl1e fou11de r of tl1is �spect of the criti ci� of democracy. He defines popular govern1ne nt as ''tl1e exercise o� tl1e general � :¥111 ' and dra\vs from this tl1e logical in.ference that ''it can never be al1 e 11ate d fro m itself, and the sovereign be only ca11 pt e conc tive collec a but ng who is nothj r�pre s�n�ed by himself. Conseque ntly tl1e instant a pe ople gives. itself to reJ?re enta � ay rves � , it 1� no longer free''. A mass whicl1 de ]egates its sovere1�1 1ty, tl�at IS to � r rans�ers its sover e1gn so,,er its tes bdica a s, idt1al indiv y eignt few a to of s the band .functions . Problems of Apportioning Representatjo11

Increased ·Representation f or Towns y _ rticle atior1 of ove: Lil po a tl1 wi wn to p y of an 93 the Revised Constitution, A . 30'�B0 inh abitants has the rjght to elect its own De ptity to �arlia1ne11t, whe. �eas rural area. s are entitled only to two Deputies for 200,000 inJ1ab1tants. 111 tl1e UtJJted

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744

NAL LAW IO T U IT ST N O C N IA P IO I J: T E OF SoURCEBOOK

I \

o ti e di al es r n . ad pr fo re n io io is at ov nt pr n l na io r ut fo tit ns co is e er 1 tI e er 1 States w1 ep -r tio er ta ch ov en su n es at tl1 is ld J ri en isc d be s l1a it s, ea _ � ar ! · or i)s ou � gr _ , partic�lar _ ee l of nt ua ra t eq 1a ec gt ot l pr 11a 1 n ut io t1t ns co e of th t ns ai ag ? ds 11 fe of . ld at miiiatory, 1n e or s, th w ia n op a1 s hi e Et tl1 111 ? n , so al n d n . Co ou f is � l1 uc wl ee nt ra 1a gt a _ tl1e Jaws'', _ es at n at ul 1o tl1 ip re 11t st l1e t1t ''t 11s Co d l ise al ev sh R e tl1 , in ga A ). 37 e cl rti A ee stitution (S t ec e to sp tl1 ym re ith jo w en ts t ec en bj su n ia of op hi Et t gs on am n tio t1a 11i ri1 sc di no be ti l ta na en es tio pr di re e ad on tl1 at th us e cla gu ar e to we e Ar ). 38 cle i·ti (A ' i ts' gl i 1· il civ all t a il 9f ht en civ rig ym e jo th en s oo (ch to t ec sp re tl1 wi '' 1·y ato in rim isc ''d is 93 le tic Ar of cy to e en in th ist ns co u in tit an ns Co s ce du tro in so d an t), e11 am rli Pa of e1· mb 111e a ing tion? ian of iop ge Eth sta t sen pre constitu tl1e in t, tha d ue arg be it can y, vel ati Altern o al ati ion ent dit res ad rep ing n to giv for s son rea id val are re the , e11t pm tional develo tl1e towns, tl1at tl1is not discriminatory? Su1·ely, a 11umber of possible reasons might be suggested fo1· increasing urban representation. You ma y care to consider the fal lowing reasons, and decide wlucl1 of them are consistent with your own ideas of de1nocratic government and the needs of Ethiopia at tl1is time. 1. Towns111en tend to be more educated than countryman, and so better un derstand political questions and the needs of democracy. 2. To,v11s1nen tend to be more ''progressive'' than countrymen, and so are more lilcely to s11pport meas11res for the modernisation and development of the country. 3. Townsmen are more affected by the activities of the go\1ernment than coun try1nen, since such facilities as schools and clinics a.re concentrated in towns, and to�n� are far more affected by government regulations such as health and �u1ld1ng measures; tl1erefore, towns1nen should have an -extra say in _ dec1d1ng on regulatory measures and distri·b11ting government facilities.

110

)

4. To�nsmeI� J.?aY more taxes tl1an countrymen, and so sl1ould have an extra say 1n dec1d1ng l1ow tl1e money is spent. 5. !owns _have special political interests whicl1 ought to be taken into account �n mak111g tl1e Ia:w , and because there are so few large towns in Ethiopia, it is necessary to give them extra representation so tl1at their voice should not be swamped by tl1e co11ntryside. Tlze P1·oble111 of' Rep,·esenting Mi1101·ity Groups · · · · • · In aln1ost :1ny country, tl1ere a re certau1 nun<? r1�Y gr oups - tribal, religious, racial, and so 011 - wh icl1 tend to stand a.I?ai·t f· ro 1 tbe 111a1o r_ity. Should such groups be guaranteed . rep rese 11 tatio11 i n Parliament by 11g J:em a special ele ctoral register or dra wing the bot1ndries of electoral distri�ts to otir th ein, or sl1oul d the minorities simply be lumped in with the res t? · ls o . · In a recent U.S. Supren1e C ot1rt ec1se the 1aintiff . · · .·. s broug�1t suit against various officia P f New Y ork, allegi 11g tl1at Congressional (I Iotis °i_· Re drawn p_ r esen so tat1v es) been had distr icts � that some districts were over 80%0 Negro p to 1 n tors. el in ec the ter!lls · � � f of o th rigin e e thnic o The pl�lll�iffs (a gr otJIJ of botll negro a�� ,!te ci. izens ) cl_ a 1med us ed to creat e that d meth th e o . tl1ese d1 str1cts was a violation of tlleir rigllt to equa\ ,pr te� t ion of the laws''. Tl1ey asked the Cou rt to order tl1e s ta te legislatu re to r edraw tlle g gr h ca� create new distric ts wi tl1, e.g. a more even �?str1�ut1� lines f?r Congressional distric� and thllS -. on of whites an d Negr�es. T�e i ncuroben.t � Negr? Congress1�1en . for tl1ese dist ricts interv n.ed as defe,7da, !ts, and �gued, 111te,r alia, that a dr�wrng of tl1e d1str1cts along the lines. den1 n by �1e ,�la1nt1ffs might result 10 fewer Negroe-s - ��e1ng elected to Cong ress, which' they sa·id \\Ott � 1�dresult in less equ.al p rotecti on'' to Negro elector s-- - ' 1 n New York.

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PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

745

1n� orn he Opinio11 of D ouglas, J. in �Vrig/1.t 11• Roc/cej'eller, 376 U.S. 52 (l965). lit: fr t o l�tical leaders find aclvantage i11 tl1is 11early solid p_ �egr_? tbat Negro in; 'flie fact 1ct 1s 1rreleva11� to 011r JJroblen1. Rotte11 borot�gl1s were long c� and Puerto Rican d1_strproces . ses. Ract,11 borot1gl1s are also at war witJ1 deinocratic !� ) a curse of democratic

11(1

[1•

standards.

What we have in tl1 e Seve11teent.l1 a11cl Ei_gl1teentl1 [Co11gressio 11al] Distr1 c 1s 111 .tvlan1Jattan is com_parable to tl1e Electo ral Reg1st_er Syste111 wJ!icl1 .Britai 11 j11troduced em ga�e a sel ?a�ate c o ns�1�11ency �t o �I�<hs, Mt1s1i111s, Aiiglo syst That o India. int Indians, Europeans, and lncLian Cl1r1�t1ans. Rel1g_1ous 1n 111or1t1es f ou11d comfort and safety in su cl1 arrangements. A Muslim De1Jutat1on 1 11acle the foll owi11g dema11d:

(I) That in the wh ole o f In�ia the Muslims nt1nJber ov er 62 n1illio11s or between one-:fiftl1 and one-fourth of the total populauon; (2) That as their numbers exceed tl1e entire population of a11y first-c]ass European Po,ver except Russia, Muslims might justly clain1 adeqt1ate recogt1ition as an in1portant factor in the State i (3) That the representatio.n hithert o accorded to them, almost entirely by 11onlination , had been inadequate to their requirements and bad no t al,vays carriecl with i t tl1e approval of tl1ose whom the nominees were selected to represent; and (4) that \Vhile Muslims are a distinct c ornn1unity with additional interests of tl1eir own, wl1icl1 are not shared by other communities, no Muslim wotLld ever be rettrrnecl by tl1e existing electoral bodies, unless he worked in sympathy witl1 the llindt1 n1ajority i11 all matters of in1portance. Lord Morley made the following reply:

The Muslims demand three things. I had tl1e pleasure of receiving a deputatio11 from tl1em and I know very ,veil what is in their minds. They demand an election of their ow11 representatives to these councils in all tl1 e stages just as in Cyprus, wl1ere, I tl1i11k, Muslims vote by tl1en1selves; tl1ey have nine votes and the non-Muslims have three or the otl1er way about; so in Bol1en1ia where tl1e Germans vote alone and have their own register; therefore we are not witl1out a precedent an d a paraUe_l for the idea of a separate register. Secondly, they want a nu mber of seats in excess of tl1eir numerical strength. These two demands we a:re qt1ite ready and intend t o n1eet in full.

Hindu s responded favourably. Tl1e Joint Report of 1918 stated:

_Some perso ns hold that f or a people, s ch a s tl1�y deem those of India �o be , so di�ided by race, � reli 10 n and caste as to be t1nab]e systen1 th ; der_ e_ interests of 8;DY 1:>ut therr O,:VD section, a consi to of . o�unal �lectorates and class representati on 1s not merely 1nev1table bu_t 1s actually best. Tl�ey tam that �t ev okes and applies the principle of de111ocracy over the widest range over ,vhich � J18 actually alive at all, by appealing to the instincts wlJicl1 are strongest; and that ,ve n1u5 l hope to ;velo�tbefiner, which are also at present the weaker instincts by using tl1e f orces that really �ount. r n to this theory co e ancl even a healthy stage 10 the l �1. evitab n i an mmu. is n g al n rlt ti cc� o repres n e deve opment of a non-political people.

As already �oted, the Electora Register System v.:as not p�cu iar t o Bri_tis� � l lndi Otl1 er natio 0_f eight h eac , 1011 vers ed difi o m ns a has used it. Le·banon today _ relj s ro s 1 ca11 tl fai at 1 tl of er mb me h a u s nly o l1 el e 1ic ctoral districts fro m wl be gh,oseng up a c for the legislature. at i al electoral registers lik iety a soc ili a in e plac c no u e o · hav 1 s one e re 10i o s h0norRs .th ' e t·incoln tradition - ''of the people, by the pe ople, for tl1e peop_Ie '': I-Iere . the i d al is important, n ot his race, his creed, or l1is col or. The JJrinciple of equaij�y�t�s u eg�o , a ?Y e t d 11 at se repre war � be must with the notion that District A as it is with th t ric iSt D n, ia as uc Ca a 0 by i ed ?t nt o e s n e e pr r at th District B m us t be Cby a Jew, � . 368, U.S 372 , ders r San D1st 1ct D by a Catholic, and so on. (Cf. Gray v.

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746

SOUJlCI�BOOK OF ETHIOPJAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

r e 11g o°: tes alo a cial lin more ,,o s J1t eig w m ste sy er ist eg alr r cto ele l � a ci r,t e _ 379). Th wh a tever na me 1t 1s called, 1s a di by te , ys 1a Tl . tes vo 1er otl s oe d � it 11 r_n a ? tl1 11ea,,ily _ d 1ffer eoces between c_and1d�t�s and vote rs 1ng 1a s1s 1Jl em ty, ni t1 mm co a n i . ce visive for f co ur se r ace, l1k e religion , plays an . O. 1se se1 al on Lrti tit ns co e tJ1 jn 1 t a 1 v ele irr tl1 at are a ke fr�m a mon g vario us m s ter v a idu 1 div 1 i1_ icl wh es ! oic cl1 t11e n i � Ie 1·0 nt . in1porta . _ _ cts tr1 1·al along rac 1aJ cand id ates. Bt1t go,,ernme11 t l1 as 110 bt1s111ess des1gn1ng electo a1s or religious li11es.... W11.en racial or 1·eligiot1s lines are drawn by the State, the mt1ltiraciaJ, multi religious com1nunities tJ1 at our Co11stitt1tion. seeks to _w_eld together as one be�� me se1)aratist; antagonisms tl1at relate to race or to rel1g1on rat_ber than to pol1t1� al issues a1·e generated ; commu11ities seek not the best representative �u� the b�st racial or religious partisan. Si11ce tl1at system is at war with tl,e democratic 1deal, 1t sbottld find no footing here.... Elections and the Electoral Law T/1e Ad1ninist1·ation of Electio11s· There are many references in Articles 93-98 of the Constitution to ·'the electoral Jaw'', and 10 matters wl1ich l1ave to be prescribed ''by Jaw''. The Constitution itself simply establishes guide lines and lays down a few general requiren1ents, leaving to the electoral law the numerous and in1porta11t practical details of reg1.1lating and acln1i11isteriog the elections. The electoral law is there fore a very important piece of legislation, and yot1 sl1ot1ld therefore study it carefully, in adclition to the extracts which are given below.

From the Cl1a1nber of Deputies Electoral Law Proclamation. No. I 52 J\Tegarit Gazeta 15t11 Year No. 12. ,

1956,

2. Starti11g witl1 tl1e 9th Jant1ary, 1957 a11d every four years thereafter on the 9tl1 January general elections sl1 all be 11eld tl1rougl1out the Empire for the election of Deputies t o tl1e CJ1 amber of Deputies o n the basis provid ed for in Article 93 of tl1e Revised Co11stitutio11. 3. TJ1ere sl1all be establisl1ed in tl1e Ministry of Inte.rior a National Board of Registratio11 and Electio11s, l1ereinafter desionated as the Central Board, consisti11 g of t11ree IJe rso11s appoi11ted h)' u; o ne of wl1om shall be tl1e Mi11iste1· of 111tc rior wl10 shall be cl1air111an a�d a notl1er a vice minister of the Minist1·y of I11terior, w110 sl1all be vice chairman of' tl1e Board. 4. TJ1e Ce11t1·al Boar� sl1a_ll J1 a,,e at1tl1ority to appoint stibordinate officials to serve tinder tl1e d1rect1011 of tl1e Central Board in eacJ1 of the electoral A w1·aj a of tJ1e Empire, as tl1ey sl1all be l1 erein after establisl1.ed to establish �wra�a Electo1·al B�,t1·ds j11 all electoral Awraja, to deterrriin e 'the localities 10 wl11cl1 st !cl1 Aw1·aJa Elect ?1·al Eoards shall sit, a11d to en gage and employ all secreta1·1al a11d other ass1stance for the Central Board as well as for the A wraja Electoral Board. The Central Board shall further I1ave authority to e�p�nd �11 funds wlricb ma y be placed at its dis�osal, fo� the purpose of adID.1n1ster1ng tl1e 1Jrese11t electoral law. 5. The Central Board shall 11ave the :esponsibility for applyin g and enforcitrg the pr �sent electo:al law, or assurmg tl1e holding of registratio11s, the pre s�ntat1on of ca11did ��ures and t�e holdjog of elections t11 roughout the Em pire, and of superv1s1ng all officials and employees of or appointed by the

Pi\llLIAMENT AND LJ::GISLATIVE INSTITUTIO NS

�'i, . ,

l. , (. •

747

Centr al Board. ... T11e C�ntra� Bo�rd sl1all _sit �s a boarcl of final appeals om reg1strat10? l1st s, a1)pl1cat1011 for caudidattlres, 1101ni fr_ ons rejecti all 00 _ pollin g l1sts 1 cl all other for malities required s1gnat ,11 t1res, ns, petitio ng nati _ t�e al Cent by tlie prese�t electoral law; � B oard sl1all �e r�sponsible and sllall �stabl1s_ l 1ment of elector ! the d1str1cts t11rotighout tile for r1ty autl1o � e v ha Article of \v1tl1 93 tl 1e Revised Co11stitt1tion and witll nce accorda in mpire E the provisions of the present law, and for n1odifying tl1e s,in1e from ti 111e to time as ren dered necessary .in the ligl1t of populatio 11 cl1a11ges; for tl,e issu ing of orders to all officials apJ)ointed by tl1e Central [3oard a11 d to all otber officials ,vl1ose assistance i s reqt1ired by tl1e JJrovisions of tl1e present law . and for the issuing of orders a11d st1bpoenas to all i 1 1dividuals who, in tli� opinion of tl1e Central Boa:d, must appear befor� it or one of tl1e A\.vraja _ Electoral Board s. Tl1e Pres1de11t or tl1e V1ce-Pres1dent of tl1 e Board sliall' further, have tl1e rigl1t to reqt1isitio11 pt1blic buildi11 gs ,111d if 11ecessary, temporarily, otl1er private edifices, in ,v11ole or in part, ,:vith compensation there for, for tl1e purposes of offices of the Central Board a11d of tl1e A \vraja Elec toral Boards and for electio n procedures and, generally, to clo anytJ1 j11g re quired for the application of tl1e present Ia,v, inclL1di11g to st1cl1 ends tl1e isst1ing of all regt1lations, decrees and orclers liee1ned by it to be necessary • or app ropriate. The Problem of Creati11g Electoral Districts

Even \Vhen the tl1eoretical problems have been worked ot1t, there remain tl1e thorny practical problems of app ortionment --: tl1e actual mapping 011t of a geo graphical district, the elect ors of whicl1 are entitled t o elect one or tw o DeJJuties to �he Parljament. We have already noted some of the d ifficulties of apportiomnent in the case of Baker v. Carr, 362 U.S. 186 (1962), and we 111ay l 1ere recall J11stice Frankfurter's d.issenting opinio n in that case: Apportionment, by its c.baracter, is a subject of extra-ordinary complexit7, involving - e� en . the fund t�r � a mental theoretical issues concerning wl1at i_s to �e represented 1n a re1Jresentative is l.ature ha ve_ been fought out or compron1ised - cons1derat1ons of geogr�pl1y, demography g c1ectoraJ.co�ven1ence , economic and social cohesions or divergencies an1ong particular l?cal gro�ps, eo�u nicatio ns, the practical effects of political institutions Jike tl1e lobby a11d the city macl1ine, · · anc1 ent t d' ra · 1t1ons and ties · · of settled usage, respect for provei1 incumbents of 1ong experience an d seor statu , m at ematical r� ... mechanics, censt1ses compiling relevant data, and_ a I10st of 0the h s CT0� partisan 1 �very strand of this complicated , intri�'lte web of valties 1neet the contendmg forces of po 1t1cs. over� d s .is tie � pti De e of o app r be am r CJ1 11 tio tl1e ment of electoral districts for Tl�ic b� Art le 93, and careful note sl1 ot1ld. be made both of tl1e 111etlzod by_ w]uc.11 dis · ts are to be tric to e hav s r1ct clist l1 st1c icl1 wl1 eria crit apportioned'. and ge11eral the of · · . to meet ana• who 1s l1ave jurisdjctjon over tl1is matter.

171e Voters �ead t\rticle 95 of the Revise d Constitution.

· From the .Law .Procla 111ation, /oc. c·i't.. · Cliamber of Dep11ties Electoral t a te o v o 6. Every pers t d e tl ti 1 1 e e b ll on y birtl1 ' sl1a b l . a an , 1011 Eth' · a 1 n 1an 1op . . · 11ts · e em · wr . ct req general ele ng 0 1 ions, provided that J1e shall sati�fy tl1e fol �� (a) for at least one year mediately preced ing st1c]1 elect1on, J1e sl1al1 1,.av � im

•

SoUI{CEBOOK OF ETI-IIOPIAN CoNSTI'fUTlONAL LAW

748

i·esided iii the electoral district jn wh.ich lie votes? (b) � b al! be at least twenty one years of age; (c) sl1all l1ave completed registration 10 ac�orda�ce with t and (�) shall not be d1sq 1al1fied for tlle requireme11ts of tl1e pr� sent law, _ a11 y of the 1·easons set _out 111 Article 7 he·re1nafter. ns tio in tl1 ec l el ra E 11e ge re y pi an in te , vo to y an � _ d ie lif � 11a sq di be 7. s11all _ ce nt , 1: se of 1 a pr g 1m vin ser so 1s ) (b or , rrment; 11e � sa in is (a) 1 o: wl person 1 s1o ns of the Ethiopian ov Pr e th to nt ua 1rs pl s, l1t rig il civ i is l st lo as 1 01- (c) 1 Penal Code. on ati ret se of erp the r int the ft1r on visi for ra, pro st1p s. d ote q11 , on ati a1n ocl Pr e 1 tl of e 5 ticl .Ar See

Tlze Carididates Read Article 96 of tl1e Revised Constitution.

Fro111 tl1.e Cl1a111be1· of Deputies Electoral Law Proclamation, foe.cit. 18. To be a-ca11didate fo1· election to the Chamber of Deputies., a person must, i 11 ,1ccordat1 ce with the provisions of Article 96 of the Revised Constitution, be by birtl1 an Etl1iopian st1bject, ro·t1st l1ave reached the age of twenty-five years and n1ust be a bo11a fide resident of an electoral A\\1raja, and owner in st1cl1 Awraja of immovable property of a value of not less than one thou sand Ethiopian dollars, or of movable property of a. value of not less than two tl1ousa11d Etl1io1Jia11 dollars and. is not disqualified under t.he provisions of Article 19 l1ereinafter. 19. Sl1all [sic] be disqualified as a candidate for election to the Cl1amber of Deputies� a11y perso11 who: (a) l1as faile� _or fails 01· is u11able to register. or to complete registration under tl1e J)rov1s1ons of A1·ticles 11 to 16 i11clusive; or (b) notwitl1sta.nding co111pletio11 of registration, is found, by tl1e A\vraja Elec to�al �3oard to wl1icl1 l1e has applied fo1· candidatt1re, at the time of his ap l)l1cat100 or at any ti111e tl1ereafter, to be insane; or (c) bas registe1·ed i 11 more tl1an 011e electoral Awraja; 01· (d) 11,:1s applied for ca11didatt1re i11 n101·e tl1an 011e electo1·al Awraja; or (e) is se1·vi11g a se11teuce of i111priso11111e11t; or (f) l1as been co11victed of a11 offe11ce l111der tl.1 e pi·ovisions of Article 44 of th.e prese11t electo1·al law; or (g) l1as bee11 de1Jrived ot� 11.is civil 1·igl1ts pt1.rs11a11t to tl1 e provisio11 of the Pen al Code; or tbi� tl1e � by (11) l1�s �een convicted ab1·o�d of an offence wl1ich is recognised r1 1 o IJ1a11 Penal Co_de as carry111g, as perialty therefor, a minimtlro term f ropar.s� · sonment of six months or more, or a n1inimum fine of Ethiopian D01J �· · one tl1011sand or 1nore; 01· (i) �s not [si?] an �1ndischarged bank.rupt, or is one whose propert y :in wn..@1�_pr: .. ·· '"·;,· 111 part, 1s s11bJect to court order for payments to creditors .

PARLIAMENT AND LEGJSL1-\TIVE INSTITUTIONS

' •

• "

749

present petitio11s for, or be a candidate in, 111o for , pp ly sJ1a ll e � on re tl1a11 No AwraJa. toral elec one El ec Aw to��l Boards to tl1e Ce�tra� Electora � Board, for ra ja om e� s � Ap p '' From . Report 011 tl1e Ca, 1y111g Ollt of tl1e Electiorz (111 AinI1aric), Mi iiistry , on Elecu 1961 ihe _ io ol at sl ho . an Sc n) tr aw (L 61 19 r, io ter In of ,it eJ er & K r re er Y J. oc Sh (i) c0111p!ai11t: Ato Gessesse Ainensl1oa, des.iring to ·become ,t ca11did,1te for tlie 1961 elect.ion, submitted llis appljcatio11 011 13 Yekatit 1 953 to tl1e B. oka11 \,Vorecla Gezat, and the Woreda Gezat i n t_t1rn_ s11bn1itted tl1e applicatio11 to tl1e Awraja Gezat, ,vbicI1 refused to accept the appl1cat1on because i t was said to be late. Decree of the Central Electoral Board: If Ato Gessesse An1e11sl1oa l1as fulfilled all the requirements dema11ded by Articles 6 to 7 and Article 18 of Procla1n.atio11 No. 152, J1e ca.n becon1e a candidate after tl1e details of ]1is a1 Jplicatio11 letter are trans ferred to the formal ''model 10'' application forn1.

(ii) Tigre - Raya & Kobo Con1plai11t: Grazmatch Gedie Woldt1 l1as com1Jlained tl1at Ato Asgedo111 Gugessa, a candidate in Raya & Kobo el ectoral A\vraja, bas tl1reate11ed tl1e IJt1blic by going to Ezebil electjon centre ca1·rying a IJistol in order to be elected. In adciitio11, he changed the s ymbol to be put on l1is box. Formerly, l1e c.l1ose to l1a,,e a sy111bol of 1Vlichc1el & Gabriel on bis box, bt1t later he cl1anged tl1is to a. !1011eycor11b syn1bol. Therefore he l1as inappropriately gai11ed votes and does not deserve electio11. Decree of tl1e Ce11tral Electoral Boarcl: If Ato Asgedo1n Gt1gessa J1as really l� reate11ed tl1e public by carrying a ·pistol a11d going into tl1e electio11 ce11tre a11d did disturb law and order, l1e sl1ould b e prosecuted on a criminal c11arge in co11rt ttnder lai,. The Awraja Electoral Board did not prevent him for t1sing tl1e l1?neyco�nb symbol on his box, and since also no other candidate used tl1at syn1bol, l11s elect1011 cannot be discredited or invalidated 011 tlus grot1nd. (iii) Slioc, - Tchebo & Gitragie Con-iplai11t: Kegoazmatch Bogale Aleme has legally regist red and desi�es to � become a candid ate but he was rejected from becoming a ca11didate due to 1115 old age and ill healtl1 ' . . Decree of the Central Electoral Boarcl: We hav e see11 tl1e appeal. It is 110.1 appr� a s_ JJrohr n tli� i er otli 11ds ar 11 gro ple a11y peo � on m fro es dat 1di ing ca1 om b bec to te _ pb�I 1ted by I a._w. The . . e1 tt le s 11 tl . 1n d ' te a t s· s 11 so e r ese t b ll a re, . _. refo . � 11d ersta 1f t1nd • p tl1e ople e . . of complaint and elect tl·1e appe]la·i Jt despite st1cl1 sl1ortco1n1ngs, t.I1 at 18 eiJtlrely tlle resp · o nSi·b·u 1 ty of the e lectorate. (iv) • •s·d L .ci,no - Wolla 1no does e l1 . e s t1 Coni1J laznt a · ·.· We have . c e . b te ' a d 1 · d 11 ca a reJected Ato Buri Segen1t1 as not Underst and the and the Gover111ne11t.

Decree of the

' .

relationship bet wee n tl1e peoJJle

Ce11 tral Electorc1l Board: The sa1ne as (iii) above.

750

SoURCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTI1'UTIONAL LAW

t 10 11 a ll o V J o ,n a id S ) (v , gh bo n1 ou le th A w al lo el e h . oj A as to h . A at th bsu d de ci de ve ha e W t. · a l Co ot o ly te ua ite eq t wr ad no , d es an do d l1e es ce sin n , ed ct ele be to n : z i·o z �p r l at d c , . 11 . . p p a s 11 1 111 tte . te a id d n a c a e m o c e b t o 11 ld t1 1o · aric, sl k11ow Amh . ) ve ii o e (i as ab m sa e l1 T : rd oa B l ·a o1 ct le E l ·a t, Decree of the Cen (vi) Ge111u Gojja - GojJa

Cor,1p/ai, 1 t: We l1ave 1·ejected tl1e appli�atio11 of Ato Ayele Teka to be elected, because his IJroperty is inadeq. uate a1 1d also s1nce J1e �as b�en se11tenced to 10 montl1s imprisonment by tl1is Aw1·aja Gezat Court and was 1mpr1soned. Dec,·ee of the Ce11tral Electoral Board: Since your decision is in conformity with tl1e Proclan1atio11 prol1ibiti11g persons of inadequate property and persons who were sentencecl to 6 montl1s in1prisonment and ha,,e ser,,ed such sentence, from being electecl, we affirm it. (\1ii) Ge,rii, Gojfa - Gojja

Co1111Jlaint: \1/e I1ave rejected tl1e application of Ato Bezabil1 Fino to be elected, beca1ise I1e was cl1arged for a criminal offence and served six months sentence of imprison111e11t afte1· being f 011nd guilty by a lawful court. Decree of the Ce11tral Electo,·al Boa1·d: According to what we read in the appeal, if the a1Jpellant served six 1nontl1s sentence of in1prisonment after being found guilty, "'e affirm tl1e de cision of tl1e Awraja Electoral Board. The above is only a sn1all selection fron1 the cases su bn1itted to the Central Electoral Board, for tl1e elections of 1961.

Practical Electio,i P1·oble1ns The pt1rpose of tl1e followi11g readings is to foct1s attention on s0111e of the difficu.lties of organising and adn1iniste �i 1:1g e !ecti ?11s, especially when a large proportion of the people are not used to this n1eans of part1c1pat1ng 111 tl1e governme11t.

Fro1n Repo,·t 011 t/1e Ca1·1·;,i11g out of· t/1e Electio,1, op.cit. T11.ere _are mat1y clefects conce1· 11ing candidates and electors. Tl1e main ones are tl1e f ollow111g: (I) A1t11otigl1 tl1e1·e i� ,l definitely growing i 11terest to become a candidate, many �mong tl1e �a�1d 1dates 11eve�· k11ew tl1e cause they were campaigning �or. 11 ecau �� of �11 ts 1111defi11e� line of campaign, n1any ca.ndidates were u.s1ng and atte mpt1ng to use ?Ivers unlawful an d immoral methods, by way ?f _ tl1reaten111g tl1e voters directly o.r indirectly. an d bribing in. order to obtain votes. Acc o1·ding to. Pr. oeIa 111at· · � e th '10 tl �a w, o. N 152 , l pro = Ele mu cto lga ra tin . g the . _ _ . Centr. al Electoial Board 1s also a Board of Ap peals for cases involving election mat-= .te1_s. W e l1ave tJ1eref ore · cI u ded so�e of the cases on " · e b t· to made was appeal � whicl1 � Boa.rd an . th . . e se · dec ree tho of the Boa rd wer e issu ed to settle them. Among the cases ? d"si qua,lif. yin g persons fro 111 candidature and claims e em t ana g mis m aga the ins n , ' t · of elect1ons.

751

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

I�

�,

(a) (b) (c)

i I

(d)

)

(e)

(f)

reg istered for botl1 tl1e Ii st a11d tl1e se�011d Geuerttl elec tor s of ber �um The (Z) �easons was expe tl1an cted . less Tl far 1 e 1 was for tliis are JTI,ltly: ElectJons do not t111dersta11d tl1 e valtie o f beco111i11 g a. ca,1didate or lly gen era l e peo p The m. the for new s It j or. elect an rt1mo t1rs goi1 1 g arot11�d tl1 at tl1e electio11 was �sle adin� been had for ti l e There pu rpose of recru1t1og soldiers for tl1e army, or for i11 creasi11g tl1 e La11d Tax. The peopl e di� not und:rst�r 1d tl1at tl1e)'. I1ad [t right to elect re1Jrese11 tatives under tl1e Revised Co11stJ.tt1t1 0 11 , a 11d so, s11 1ce so111e e1nployees of tl1e Elec tio11 Board challenged the peopl� w]1 e11 the� we11t to register, 1na 11 ;' peoJJle wi t li drew, or did not take part 1n tl1e elect1011 . It is srud that son1e govern1ne11t officials resident i 11 tl1e t0\\111 s J 1 ad secretlv spread bad stories about tl1e Dept1ties elected i11 l 957, sayi11g tJ 1at tl1e Deputie; elected in 1957 did nothing for tl1 e people apart fro11 1 bt1rde11i11 g tl1e1n witl1 a1.1 increased Health Ta:x, and tl1at if tl1ey \Vere to be re-elected, tl1ey woL1ld do nothing except tise tl1 eir office a11d t l1e salary obtai11ed fro111 it fL1r se1f-aggra11dizement . When the election personnel \Vere se 1 1di11g vari o t1s for11 1s, 1noclels a11d ite1us of election stationery to \Voreda election ce11tres for tl1c dt1e exect1tio11 of' tf1e elec tion programme, tl1ey did not send so111e necessary eqt1ip1ne11t 011 ti 111e, a11d tl1is very much delayed the registratio11 of tl1e electors. Tl1e idea bel1i11 d tl1is see1ns to ba \1e been that these people were tryi11g to l1 clp the ca11didate wl1 om tl1ey supported, while at the same ti1ne tl1 ey were tryi11g to l1 inder all Ji.is co1npetitors. It bas been said that the inte11tio11 here was to 1u:1l<e it possible for ma11y peo1Jle to register and vote at the place wl1ere tl1eir ca11didate is st1pported, and, on tl1e other hand, to make mass registratio 11 a11d voting i1n1Jossible at a place vvl1ere. they wanted a candidate to be u 1 1st1ccessft11. In the 1961 elections it is known tl1 at, except tl1e few electors who1n tl1e candida.te h�d urged to go and vote, a great majority amo11 g tl1e I.iterate IJOlJu]ation ei�l1er did not register or did not go out to vot e for a11y ca11didate. TI1 e reason_ g iven by these groups was that tl1ey had no 01 1e to cl1 oose a11 1011g tl1e ca11d1dales.

From Girma Tadesse, The Develop111er1t of Parlia111e11t i1z Et/1iopia (U· 111Jublished LL.B. Paper, Faculty of Law, l-1.S.I. U., 1966). Tbe au� hor bases the following one personal inter,,icws ,vitl1 candidates to Parliament.

i11

tl1c 1965 elections

o 1 l e� ectio11 ca er< .gen ird w 1 tl e 1 te dida tl 1 g � 1 s n dt1ri o J f io11 t arar f elec Iw 10 stood f r t llinkTthat the 11t ain . arl� e 1 � t P at 1 ] tl feel u at edt1c ey 1 tl se ed a people do 11ot reg1ster bec is und_ er 1?e . ' s e tJ 1 e JJoin� t" o n d? lu y abso e_ 1 tl re,_ te o ref trol Tl1e n co· e. of utiv the exec of regISter_i g : t\-VO catl 1 ese l 1 1. 1 to 01 t1t t1t n 1ns ct ele ss rle we res po rep s a ive t:1t en fo r such 1 ates d'd ·e gth a' re tl·1e . said th· 1' t parliainent .ts growj 1 1g stronger. Tl1e ev1·de 1 1ce of 1·ts str ,,n · re· e .tio· n e tl ei,d ai1d aiii gov ree dec , er fl b g 1 ggi1 I o nt .e nme t s bill n loa like of an tl1e tali c m�e nt of ' · · r tr> ma?� other gover ve , . I ro 1e J � ,at t ed add r · nment proposals. TJ1ey ft1rtl1e questio J etlt 50111c n i i arl l ,l J iste v es gi n rs cl 1 s law an d the rigl1t to consider b 1 ge t M contr oln ove r tl1e executi ve. d a \ der Vl�y ri Sl t ot 1 lltJ e 1 do t 1 p l1ey peo a 1ed it is dAses1r le al in rur · are 1 r 1ce co as h re as _far · · ' · · ' . abl io,,ed ab O ve S't1cl 10. l iave suc.b e 1t ' 1 ne dates 1 _ ! . ca�1d . an instittition. Tl1e two that th e pe · 11 1 a g eil be op s I,a le i on ati tax n rural areas complain tl1at no reductJon of ed, no roa i Ll ld sho ds have be en bt1ilt. y wl, tle arg as are al rt1r In fact, tl1e people i11 tl,e

(

SouI�Cl:IJOOK OF ETI·lIOPIAN CONS1"ITUTIONAL LAW

752

tt1c)' elect rcpresentn.ti\1es wl10 .inirodL1ce a J1ealtl1 tax witl1out providi11g th� m with t1ealtl1 cc 11 trcs. It is i11teresting to 11ote tl1at 011e of tl1e reasons for low registration i,1 t11 e seco11d o-e11er,tl electio11 of 1961 give11 by tl1e Ce11tral Electoral Board was tl1at sc.1111e cro,,er1111:ent e1111Jloyces disco11raged the pubJjc b y telling tl1em secretly that the pre, io�1 s Dept1ties did 11ot ,tcco1n111isl1 a11ytl1i11g otl1er tl1an introducing a l1ealth tax. T11c ·p1·oble111 wl1icl1 sce1ns to l1a�e sJ1own trp m? st cl�arly ii: m?st electo_ral A ,,,rajas is tl1at s0111e voters co11ceal tl1e1r ballot J)�pers 111 the1r �lotl11ng 111 tl1e ,1ot1ng bootl1 a11d so sn1uggJe tl1e111 011t for sale to ca ndidates or their agents. The closest f'rie11d 01· st1pporte1· of tl1e ca11didate Vi'ill smt1ggle the1n in again and cast them in bL1lk. Tl1e ca11didates susJJect tl1at tl1e ballot papers were being sold in Tej Bets secret ly at tl1e rate of $0.25. 111 some ]ocalilies a ballot paper was sold for $2 each. In Shire (Tigre Province) electo1·al Awraja the election officials allo\,,ed themselves con siderable latitL1de in searcl1i11g tl1e voters for ballot papers as a matter of routine. Tl1e voters were reqt1ired to ren1ove tl1ei1· sl1oes before entering the voting booth. Priests a11d Moslems were den1anded to put off tl1eir capes. There is no provision to tl1is effect i11 tl1e electoral Jaw, altl1ougl1 011e way of stopping thjs malpractice is by i11 fri11gi11g tl1e privacy of individt1als.

I ,;

Tl1e 1)robJe111 of electio11 e.,pe11ses is a ,.-ery di.ffict1Jt one, and in many countries it has been fou11d 11eccssary to li111it and control spending by candidates, in order to prevent the richest candi date from l1avjr1g an unfair advantage over lhe others. (T11is act,,antage need not invol\·e corruption tl1e ricl1 candidate 1nay be able to print better posters, emplo)' helpers, transport his supporters to tl1e po1ling bootl1s, and so forth, and so fortl1.) There is as )'et no la\\' controlling election spending in Etl1io1Jia, one of tl1e n1ain diffic11lt ies being tl1e lack of accurate information on election expenses, and tl1e follo\vi11g reading is tl1erefore of great i11terest.

l r

�

Fron1 Gir111a Tadesse, OJJ.cit. 751 Ever)' ca11didate be�trs tl1e cost of l1is O\Vn electio11eeri11g campaign. He does not obtai11 a11y fi11ancial sttpport ·fro1n any organizatio11. A ca11didate must be pre pared to s1)e11d betwee11 $3,000 a11d $5,000 to get elected. Tl1e candidates wl10 lost t11e electio11 beljeve tl1at tl1ose wl10 ,,,ere elected s1Je11t a11 e11or·n1ous amoL1nt of money. TJ 1e ca11dic[ates do 11ot ,tdn1it tl1is OJ)e11l) So111e ca11didates sell tl1eir land and cattle to �over tl1eir e]ectio11 eXJ)enses. 1-11ey t1sually cc.1 lc11l,1te tl1e salar)' tl1ey \\'ill receive dt1r1ng tl1e ft1ll fo11r-ye,1r term a11d recor\cile tl1eir ca111paig11 expe11ses. 1

•

I I

I.. • l

T/1e J�lectio11 E�YJJe11ses of· Ct111tlidate Ato AJ:alel1' of Dessie

1 Det)osit at tl1e A ,vr�tj,t Boar<.i $ 250 2. Ca1111)aig11 ])OS tcrs 300 3. Cost <.1 f JJOsti11g, c.i rct,1 ::1rizi 11g 10 4. lit1s f::1re (rot111d triJJ) to As111ara to l1a ve JJOsters pri11 ted 32 5. Fo<.1d a11cl lodgi11g 40 6. Loss of 3 1no11tl1s' s,1Jt1ry 900 $ 1,532 ous enorm Je11se. '!'lie ar11ou11t ex tJ1e basic fo1· figl1re is very secret is expei1se �J1is l _ _ and 1t 111c]ucles expe11ses for �nte1·ta,1n1nent or for pui·chase of ballots ,vbich may .a111ot111t to $3,000. Moreo,,er, 1f a ca11didate l1,1s a disiJute* }1 e bas to come to Addis to atJJ)eal to tl1e Ce11tral Electoral B . oard. ••

' )

� '

In tl1e Ogad�n case at N _o�� 27, Ato �yassu, the contestant, told me that he spent $800 since lie ca.me 8 times fron1 J1gJ1ga to Addis Ababa.

-�

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

-� .

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753

as Judge of Elections Deputies of ber . ,, 1 The C,1an . . . vised Constitution. Re e th of 0 10 . Read Artie1e Tadesse, 011.cit. a Girm from �o �stitution s tat�s tl1at :_ ''Tl1 e c11 a111ber of Rev ise d tl1e of 1�0 cle . Arti Dept ities f qua h e 11 1cat1ons a11d e 1 � t1011 of 1 ts 111e111bers. ,, s f t i b dge t le a Tlle Electoral � � sb JI e ? J , Ce�1tral Boa!d �ball sit as a �oard of fi11 81 _ a)peal 011 Tl: e tba ! vide s a pro all re . at1on lists, appl1cat1011 for L ,v _ reg 1str cand1datt1res, 11 o111 1111tir1 g J)etitiorls from tioJl S .J�Co u , p olling lists and all otl1er forI11,1litie· s· reqt1ired by tl1e J)·ese11t electoral' res at sig aw... ,, The Centra 1 .nooard re · I·1� d ?11 t 111s · pro,11s1011 a11d reft1sed to J)rodti ce doctil Depu 1n ties of respect_ to tl1 e co11_tested el ectio1 s of 1965. Tile Cban 1ber the to roents Director-General appeared before tl1e Selection Co1111111ttee e1n1)owe·ed to coiisider disputes on Ta�1isas 12, 195� to expl,1i1� tl1� positio11 of tl1e Ce11tral 3oard. He said that under Art1cle 100, Rev1sed C?11st1tt1t1on, tl1e Cl1a11 1ber of Deyt1ties can o.nly consider" cases 'vVl1ere a person w�1 ? 1s d111nb or deaf, or wl1 0 l1as bee11 deprived of l1is civil rights pursuant to tl1e prov1s1011 of t l1e Penal Code, is electecl to J1 e CJ1amber of Deputie s. He furtl1er said that tl1e case can be co11siderecl 011 ly if tl1e rro1)osal is st1pported b)' ten members as s11cl1; no11-me1nbers ca1111 ot bring tl1 eir c::1ses I-l e concluded by saying that the Central Board is a Board of fi nal ap1)e[tls by virt11e of Article 5 of the Electoral Law and as such l1e is 1111able to f11lfill tl1e :reqt1 est of 1l1e CJ1a111ber. * However, af t er exchanging considerable correspo11de11ce witl1 tl1ePri111 e T\1inister in accordance witl1 Article 72, Revised Co11 stitt1tio11, tl1e Vice Cl1air11 1a1 of tl1e Ce11tral Board and the Cliief Administrator were delegated to a11 s\ver qt1estic11s a11 d st1b111it any document necessary to expedite tl1e cases. It 111t1st be 11oted tl'at tl1e co11flict arose out of tl1e interpretatjon of Article 100, Revjsed Co11 stitt1tiorJ. a11d Artjc]e 5 of the Electoral Law. The Central Electoral Board arg·ued tl1at if Electoral.Law says that tbe Central Board is a Board of :fi11al appeals, it is clear a11 d 11eed; 110 i11tef])reta tion: tlJere cannot lie ft1rtl1er appeal t o tl1e Cl1a1nber. On tl1e otl1er l1 ,11 d, tl1e Cl1 an1ber of Deputies said that the Board l1as tl1e J)O\ver to give final decsio11 in respect to formalities since Article 5 of tl1e Electoral says ''all otl1 er form alites'' wl1 icl1 may be age or registration formalities.:;: :ic From Addis Zet11en, Saturday, 1st January 1966. T�e Cl1 amber of Dept1ties l1as rejected tw o a1 )1)eals filed against tl1e t\-vo_ re1)re �entat1ves for Bahr Dar dis trjc t in Gojjam. The ap1)eals were take11 totl1 e Parl1a111e11t ID accord ance with Article 100 of tl1e Constitutio11 . Fita wrari Ambacl1aw Jembere l1ad accused the 1-Ionotirabl! Ato . I(ebret Makonnen and the Honourable A1amayal 1 t1 Balay of using illegal neails in °rder to get_ themselves 1 0t be repre1 ulc co ore ref tl1e 1 at tl1ey tl d, d cte 11e ele arg d d an ba sentatives for that djstrict. . 1111co1 \-V,1s it tha uncl Th _ e .Cl1amber of De_pt1ties examined tl1e cl1 arge aild· f0 . . . e · e ·ed b a t a s with Ar t_icl� 100 of the Constitution.. The _aJJ pe � l � ��;��;a1fe �itavv�ri 136. A similar appe�l 1e l t 111st a Far1s Gessesse by Ato � � - 26 appeaIs 1 e Parlia tl at Yeku 0 A.m.lak was fil(d · two of _tl1e were also reJec_ t ed. Tl1�se : ruent u tl1e resttlt s of tl1 e third parl 1an1et1 tary elect10118·

:�!::�

]

•• : :Po�t of t�e Selection Com111ittee, Megabit 27, 1958 E.C. r erview with Ato Seyoum Ijjigu, Director General of Cent. ral Boai.cl, Dec. :965. •

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SOURCl�l300K Ol� ETl-IlOI>IAN CONSTI1"UTJONAJ.., LAW

754

s11ould there be any limits 011 tl1e Cl1a1nber's power to judge ''elections'' or ''qualific ations" of its 1nembers? Cf. B_o11d v. Floycl, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1966 (17 La wy ers' the war in Vietna m Ed. 2d 235). (State legislature cannot refuse to s�at a �ember who _oppon.sed al guarantee of free utio es stit lat con v1o ion act l1 suc ft; dra tl1e to nce ista res ed atid urg speecl1.)

Tl1e Compositio11 of tl1e Etltlopian Cha.mber of Deputies v no s s r utie mbe of Dep Cha the i of bers t 111em a ail the on tion m1a info 1ical rapl biog Detailed able, but tl1e following tables 111ay give son1e indication_ or wlzo gets elected . to �arliament. They ba,,e bee11 con1piled fron1 Central Electoral Board stat1st1cs and from official IJsts of members. Con1JJOsitio11 bJ J P1-ovi11ce.,;;

Adclis Ababa Art1ssi Bale Bege111der Eritrea Gerot1 Goffa Gojja1n Harrar Illttbabor Kaffa Sl1oa Sidamo Tigre 'vVollega Wallo Total

1961 & 1965

1957

10 Deputies 6 8 25 23 8 18 21 8 11 32 20 18 16 26 250

7 8 12 14

18 25 4 8 22 20 18 12

210

Note: Bale Provi11ce is .i11clud.ed ir1 Harrar for tl1e electio11 of 1957. Composition by rfitles (rt.t ti1ne of election) a.

1,raditional titles 01· 11olJilitv •• Sl1t1m Ta1nbe11 Dejas1natch Fitawrari Kegnazmatcl1 Grasmatcl1 ·Bala111beras Lij Total

1957

17 15 12 7 4 55

1961 1 16 16 10 7

1965 .l I 8 8 5 1.2

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PARLI AMENT AND LEGISL.ATIVE JNSTITUTIONS

I t

ot11er titles . Agafar1 Aleka (Hamsa Aleka, Mato AJeka, etc.) Azaj easha Bejirond Haji Kes Memerie Meri G et a Negadras Shaleka Sharobt1I Sheik Total

: ... . '

: _.;·· ,, � ._::.: �· ,-

:·

]

178 1 179

193 2 195

7 210

2 250

250

Composition by Sex Men Wome11 Total

1957 208 2 210

1961 249 1 250

1965 248 2 250

Composition by Religion Christian Moslem unstated Total

1957 152 38 20 210

1961 214 36

1965 217 33

250

Composition by Occupation G o vernment Official Former Deputy Merchant Landlord Advocate Farmer Atbia Dagna Miltary Student Hous ewife Others None · unstated ·rrotal

1957 112 11 17 24

1961 102 59

1965

Total number of Deputies

l l'

5 I l 2

130 2 .l 32

d. Absent and unspecified

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I l J I 1

4 3 19

)

·1

1 4 1

J 5 16

c. No title Ato Woizero Total

755

6 20 210

101

87 20

12 11 10 5 3 1

250

i SOURCEBOOK OF E1'l-IIOPIAN CoNST11'UTIONAL LAW

:.::.::___�-------=--------. 756

Colnposition by Ecl11cation Illjterate Basic Elen1e11 tary ' Seco11da1·y Uni,,ersi ty: incomplete co1111)lete Total Composition by Lang11ages Spoken

1957

No Figt1res Available

210

1961 6

1965 4

244

250

(

160 45

9 I 250

)

(figures available for 1965 only) 1965

246

Amharic Ge'ez Arabic Englisl1 Fre11cl1 Italian Somali Swal1ili

19 49 83 7 52 2 I

Qt1estions and Problems T/1e Rationale of an Elected Pa1·lia1nent

I) WI1at are tl1e pitrposes of creating a ''representative'' elected parliament? What political values may be sect1red througl1 sucl1 an institution? 2) To wl1at extent do yot1 believe that s11cl1 concepts as the ''general will'', ''repre sentative government'' and ''majority rule'' are n1eaningful and valid for Iaw111aking i11 today's era of con1plex government? 3) Do parliaments have any new, useft1l functions i11 modern Africa? Are there any possible functions of parlia1nents whicl1 are particularly important in modern African co11ditions? 111 wl1at ,:vays may parlia'l11e11ts have to be adapted to suit tl1ese conditions? 4) Wl1at pre-conditio11s l1ave to be 1·ealised, in order to provide a firm base for an effective and st1ccessft1l parliame11t? To wl1at extent are sucl1 conditions met in Etl1iopia? I-low ca11 tl1is problen1 be 111ore effectively st11died? Deputies and t/1ei1· Constituents

5) What criteria sl1011ld a Dep11ty follow in deciding I1ow to vote on any given issue? Consider the following hypothetical problem: A bill is before Parliament whicl1 would amend the Penal Code by repealing the provision (Art. 120A) permitting flogging as a punishment (at the court's discretion) for aggravated theft. Should an elected Deputy vote on this bill the way a majority of his consti tuents wisl1? If so, how does he know the majority's wishes?

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

757·

l';--,..·\ I!

ad of �ic tl1e gover11n1et1t, especially .i1 e the to r def e lie uld it is based Sho nsidered stt1dy? co ly ep de or . rt pe on an ex jt1dgn1e11t of a co1n.1nittee, wl1icl1 J1 as carefJ th e w fol lo e 1 1 d ul Sho lly exain iii- meast1re ? the roved app ed and de of sir es p::1_rtict1la1: gro11ps of l1is co11stttierl ts, th e ct res pe he uld Sho sticl1 ed and help h1s elect1011? sored spon who e thos as Should he vote accor�ing t o llis party's i11str11ctio11s, ass11111i 11 f tI1 at Ji e ll as ' n1 or tf y rt la '? pa '·p a on ed ct ele been Should he vote solely according to l1is perso11al OJ)i11io11? Should he decide accordit1g to l1is conce1 Jtio11 of ''tl1e ]Jtrbli: i 11terest''? If so what do the words ''public i11terest'' really 1nea11? Is it possi)le to fra,ue a ge�eral de·finition? Ho,v can one discover wl1 at tl1e ''p11blic i 11t�rest'' is 011 this particular issue?

)

Should he follow some combination of all, or so1ne, of tl1esf factors? If. so, which of tl1em are particularly important in deciding 011 a11 i�s11e s11cl1 as this?

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I f

What difference \Vould it make if the meast1re i11 question is a p·oposed tax increase? Or if it is a Civil Proced11re Code? 01· if it is at1 i11\ est11e11t la\v? 1

6) Why does Wheare imply that ''marches'' a11d ''de1no11strations'' fre ge11erally regarded as poor ways to influence a pa1liame11t? \\1011ld yo11 defe1d tl1is \riew ) 1 in a student assembly? 7) What methods of influencing parliaments would you prohibit or co1trol? Wl1 at controls would you impose, in order to acl1ieve yot1r objectives wil1ot1t at the same time limiting ''rights'' or freedoms whicl1 yo11 believe to be cesirable? '·· I 8) What methods should be encouraged, in order to improve tl1e co11n1t111 ication .l of wishes and ideas between parliame11t a11d tl1e people? l} 9) Should debates and decisions in Parliament be widely p11blicised, tl1 ·otrgl1 11ews-· paper s, the radio, and so on? Or sho uld tl1ey be regarded as i11tem�l gove�nmen tal matters which are only marginally tl1e concern of p�ople ou:side Parlia ment? Should conflicting views be publicised? Or icleas whicl1 attacc t�1 e gover �ment? Or ideas which might endanger 11ational 11nity? Or ideas iVluch seen1 Just silly? I 10) ShouId · · -· d a t a l1 ' W J · ty · par I 1tica 1· po Ethio·pia have political parties ' or a single ,, · · an_d .·,,10 te�st gro11ps vantages and disadva ntages wo11 ld formation of l)arties uc� as labour unions or tribal-based ''improve111ent associations, ,--wJuell seek �0 influ ence parliaments?

,.'

Pro blems

,, I

1 Representation

11) Do you n· entatio re1res 1al agree _with the part of Article 93 whicl1 grants additio1 representa-· to to ns? W th 1'tional dd a or ts ' " i men uggested argu i . which. of the . nw · s tio do you agree o r disa gree?

r-. .. ..

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758

•

SOUl"lCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

t en ist be ns ps co ou or gr ity or co i11 in 1n r fo 1 o1 n at t1t se e · p1 re � ed te an l 2) Would guar . ll er as we as I pt II l1a C lt ap su Ch on (C r n? te t1o 1tu st on C d ise ev R e th th wi nt te sis V on this subject . ) ity in or ps r m fo ou gr n in tio ta t en es pr re �e ed 1te a1 ar gu y an t or pp su tl yo . ld ou _ 13) W at th he a u <le t ur or pp su 1ty ers 11 yo 1ld ! 0L \1/ ! s? tie � pu De of r be 1am Cl n pia Ethio ad ste , of in ies or ut ep 10 adD o tw n ow ei tl1 ct ele to le ab be ld ou 1 s1 � tes ua grad dition to voting i11 tl1e ordj 11ary elections? Electo,·s a11d t/1e Electoral LalV 14) Could the Cl1amber of Deputies Electo1·al Law be amended or replaced by a Decree tinder Article 92? 15) W/10 makes tl1e law, required by Article 93, which divides the Empire into electoral districts? Wl1at problems \Vould confront those who must actually draft tl1is law? l 6) Wl1 0 is responsible, under tl1e existi11g law, for actually deljmiting the boun daries of electoral districts? How much discretion do they have in creati11g tl1ese districts? \\1h:1t c1·iteria are tl1ey obliged to follow, under Chapters III and V of tl1e Revised Constitution? l 7) Wl1)' sl1 ot1ld an electoral district be ''as regular in shape as circumstances per mit''? Wl1at does ''regular in sha·pe'' mean? 18) Why sl1ould fl-VO Deputies be elected from eacl1 district·? Is there any ad\1antage or disadvantage jn dividing a district and having one Deputy from each half? 19) Suppose tl1at a tow11 ]1as 40.000 inbabita11ts. Is it possible to reconcile the re qtiirement o.f Article 93 tl:at it shot1ld l1ave 011e Deputy, ,vith the requirement of Artjcle 94 that eacl1 district sl1ould have tll'O Deputies? 20) Precis·elJ' wl1at standards and qualifications must an Ethiopiru1 citizen enjoy in order to vote in an election to the Cl1an1ber of Deputies·? May an itinerant, sucl1 as a 11on1adic l1erdsmaL1, vote? 2 l) \Vi1y shot1ld t11e rigl1t to vote, and to be a candidate, i n elections be restricted to Etl1iopia11 subjects bJ' /Jirt/1? Do you agree or disagree with tliis provision? ·w11 at steps would be necessary to extend tl1e right to vote to tl1e inhabitants of areas incorporated in tl1e En1pire before, or after, the promulgation of the Co11stitt1tion? WJ1at is tl1c J)osition of i11l1abitants of Eritrea wl10 at their birth were subjects of Ll1e t)1 e11 Italian colony? 22) Can a Jaw prescribe c111J1 qualifications, otl1er tl1an tl1ose stjpulated in the Cons titl1tion, ,vitJ1 respect to who is entitled to vote? Is it constitutional for the Electoral Law to exclude tl1e ''insane'' from the right to vote? Would it be un constitutio11al to restrict the ,,ote to tl1ose who could satisfy a simple test of literacy? 23) What is tl1e purpose of having a property qualification for candidates for the Cl1amber of Deputies? \i\'l1at is tl1e existing property qualification? Are there 1 e property qualification which may be imposed by law? What tl any limits upon . to a prospective parliamentary candidate wh co �rses of _action would be ope11 � _ believed lumself to be unfa1rly prevented from standing for election by this qualjfication? What courses of action would be open to a majority of the members of Parliament who thought tl1at the qualification prevented otherwise able and suitable men from becoming candidates?

(

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PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

' '

I )

759

you wo _ t1ld s�ggest t o p�event ricl1 n1e11 from ''buying'' tlieir r�s mea su Wh at 4) 2 way into P�rl1ament by ga1mng a11 unfai r advantage over poorer ca,1didates? What practical problems would attempts to regulate SJ)e11di11g by ca11didates h ave to meet? ept1 ties r of a su b� CL1a m . the Is � },table body to be ''sole jt1dge of tlie qualifica 5 2) tions a�d ele�t1on of 1t� 111embers ? Wl1at are t]1e adva11t ages a11cl disadva11tages of placing this power 10 the l1ands of tl1e Cl1amber itself? WI1at otl1er mea11s, if any, would yot1 suggest for finally determi11ing tl1e electio11 of De1Jt1ties?

SECTION 2

THE SENATE Introductory Note

The Se11ate is clearly tl1e seco11d Cl1amber of the Etl1iopia11 P,1rli,11ne11t, altl1011gl 1 its President presides at joint meetings of tl1e Cl1ambe rs. It is appoi11ted ratl1er tl1an elected; it bas at most only half as many members as the Cl1an1ber of De1)t1ties (,1nd may th us be o·utvote d at joint meetings); and i11deed it is 111e11tio11ed second ,1l1nost wherever the two Chambers appear in tl1e Constitutio11. However, its JJowers are the same as tl1ose of tbe Chamber of Dept1ties, except t]1at fi11a11cial n1atters are pre sented first to the Deputies, and its positio11 in the Jaw-1nak.i11g process is tl1e refore important. In this Section, \Ve shall examine the possible reasons for tl1e existe11ce of tl1 e Senate, by refere·nce both to other countries a11d to tl1e Revised Co11stitt1tio11 ancl tl1e working of the Senate in Etl1iopia. The Rationale of a Second Chamber: Foreign Experience

Differing Ideas of Bica1neralisn1 From Wheare, op.cit., pages 197-214 . Most modern legislatures have two cl1ambers. Eve11 tl1e revolt1tionar� states, like tl1e u·.s.S.R., whicl1 claim to ]1ave broken witl1 the bad old past, l1ave a bic am� ral legislature, so that we find the Supreme Soviet composed of a Sovie t o[ tl1e Umon an� a Soviet of Nationalities. o· stro11g is tl1e t1rge towards bicameralism �hat tl1e s !eg1slature in Norway, the ''Stortiiig '', which is elected a� on_e body, breaks itself up to t�o parts, a ''Lagting'' of tl1e wl1ole 1s selected by I :? wl11cl1 members 1t eig thirty . S'tort ing'', and an ''Odelsting'' i11 w11ich the remaining 112 n1embers of tl,e ''Stort ing'' sit....

The dominant doctrine in Britain and ot11er Commo11wealtl1 cot111tries is that a secoo<l chamber l dea d � a be ttld wo re Tl1e t. firs the n tl1a should be less powerful � � . of argument about tild ,vo t it tl1a eed agr be 11ld wo y the t bu what its powers should be ' be fi001·1sh to make botl1 houses equal in at1tl1ority..· · es tri un c� 11y n1a e i11 her d ,111 in ita is Br in y, v wh we ho n er, so a fundame·ntal rea , T 0: the Com1nonwealth, it is assumed that second cl1ambers n1ust be st1 bordinate to t e first; or, to put it more generally, tl1at, if there are two cliambers, one mu5 't be

760

SOUilCEBOOK OF ETI-IIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

m t rn ne t ve bi ou ca go ent. There ab s ea id eir th m fro s · ise ar It e r. li ot · su bor·d 1 11ate to tJ1e . e t government, t11 e cab'1nei 1n b ca e 1s t 1er 1 . at 1f th es tri 11n co e s e tl1 is a strong bel ief i11 e ly th st be u lar m e pu po us lected e ho at tl1 d. · an ly, on e us ho e on to e bl isi oi si) ca11 be re 1 ses, un less t11e y we re really cl1osen on 1 ho d cte ele l y lar pu po wo t e r e \V e r e l.1ot1se. If tll . . · · · o 1c ns p 1 t1o ur 1 st ux mu ss e tl in 1m po a r e � � .? � _ ide ritical l ines - wllic11 seems ratl1 _ s, 111 e 1t 1t1 ': or aJ oss · m rty mp pa nt ble re ff � ? di e 1 l av y e th � g sin po � ip St . ise � ar y el at di e m 1 ch ho us e rs the cab inet 1 wl to ot, nn ca u yo 1f d An 1. l t bo to e bl 1 1si spo e t 1· to get a cabine to be responsible ? This line of r easoning gains st1pport f1·om tl1e exp erienc� of countri�s wl1ere a syste1n of two c11an1bers of equal authority is operated 1n pr act i ce. The U ?Jted States, l es of this system. It mp exa of r 1be nun st e at gre e 1 tl s e pli sup es, stat nt _ e pon com its in abou11ds in seco11d cha1nbers not only of equal powers w1.tl1 the first, but al so elected tipon the sa111e fra11chise, tl1ough not usually from the same constituencies. And in the Se11ate of tl1e U11ited States itself is tl1e great marvel - a second chamber more IJO\Verft1l tl1an tl1e fir st. Tl1 is seems to fit into the pattern exactly. The executive in the United States, both in Wasl1i1 1gto11 and in tl1e state capitals, is not responsibl e to the legislature; it is not 11ecessary to calcul ate its major ity in one house or the other. Its term of office is independe11t of tl1 e party composition of tl1e legislatt1re and it is elected inde pend ently. Tl1e field is ope11, tl1e refore, for each of the two houses to make the most of its powers and to assert itself, if it wishes, against the other. Botl1 are elected upon the same fra11cllise, and though t1pper ho11ses a1·e us11ally smaller than lower houses and are therefore cl1osen from lar ger constitt1e ncies, each can cl aim t.hat in some sense it is r epresentative of tl1e peopl e, or at least tl1at it is just as representative as tl1e otl1 e1·. In the absence , therefore, of any legal dift�erentiation in the powers of the two cl1amber s - save tl1at tl 1e Senate of tl1e United States is actually gi\1en greater legal power s tha11 tl1 e I-Io1 1se - and i11 the absence of a system of cabinet govern111e11t, it is not s11rprisi11g to find in the state legisl att11·es of the U11ited States examples of two cl1 ambers eqtial or at any 1· ate comparable in power to each otl1er. Switzerland g!ves ft1rtl1er evid ence of tl1e influe.nce wluc11 cabinet government, or tl1� absence of rt, c�11 l1ave t1po11 tl1e balance of power· betwee11 two cl1ambers in a leg1slatt1re. The Swiss Feder al Asse1ubly is bica1neral, witl1 a National Cot1ncil ele cted proportionately to IJO}Jt1l,1tion a1 1d a Co11ncil of States eqtially representative of eacJ1 of tl1e cantons - n1t 1cl1 011 the l i1 1es of tt1e two 11011ses of tl1e American Con gress. Tbe Swiss exect1tive, t�1ot1gl1 elected by tl1ese two J1 ot1ses in joint session, holds office fo1· _a _fixed ter m ancl 1s tl1erefore 1 1ot deJJende11t for its continuance in office upon reta11111Jg tl1e confi : d.e11ce of one l1011 se or tl1e otl1e r. ... TJ 1�re is a SJ) _ecial 1·e,tso1 1 wl1y tl1e power of the u1)per Iiouses in the United States . and S�1tzerla11d �s a 1ua �te1· .of some co11cern to tl1eir citi zens. Tl1ey are bot·h federal countries and t?e1r _co11st1tt1t1 �ns embocly tl1e p1·i11ciple that a mere numerical majority of tl1e pop�1l at.1011 1s not by �tself a s11fficieot a11tl1or ity for taking a decision in tl1e federal leg1slatt1re: TJ 1ey bel1 �,,e tl1at tl1<?ir �ifferences are so i i nportant that safe guards sl1011ld be in.traduced into the leg1sl at1ve proce ss ·by wI1icI1 the less populous parts of the cot1 11 �ry �ho11ld be given a greater a11thority in tile legisl at·ure than mere members wo11ld Justify. ...

Son1e cr itics of the way in whicl1 tipper ho11ses are composed would say that no upper I1ouse composed upon the basis of territorial constituencies can offer a second· ,.' ,I

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761

co11 side it Bill rs whe s \.Vlucl1 l1 ave been l)assed llJ) to it by a n valt 1e grea t of n opinio ouse which also is based 011 territorial co11stitt1e11cies. Wl1at is 11 eccled l · ' ·tl ey • lower h 1, er.- re11t l111es and .providino b. er con11)ose d 011 q111te d ·Ifie 1a m . l c nd seco a . o a' di'f15 . �, argue, . Tl 1 ey 11 ave propose d wl1at l1 as bee11 called a vocatioi,al entat1?n. repres of t nt sor fere al seco11d cl1 �111ber or a11 eco11 01nic secoi1d cllainber. functio 11 1 a amber, 1 cl d secon represe 1 t people 111 ter1ns. o.f \Vl1ere tl1 ey Jive; upper 11 1 sar, ey 1 tl s, house ouses Lower 1 0 terms of �10,v the� get �1 l1v1ng �11 d w11at tl1ey live for. They tl1em ent repres uld sho have been led also to advocate tl11s vocat1011al or ft111ct1011a1 or eco110111ic cl,ainber as a third cl1amber , eitl1er beca11se tl1 ey l1ave tl1ougl1t it better to avoid tl1 e contro versy i11volved. in trying to abolisl1 a11 exist.i11 � seco11d cl1a1nber, or beca11se tl1ey I,ave believed tJ1at, 1 n some cases at any rate, ex1st111g seco11d cl1 ambers n1ay J)erform so111e 1 useful functions, .tl1ougl1 tl!ey ca1111 ot perfor1n tl1 ose wl1icl1 tl1e ft111 ctio11al type of 1 > chamber .is pec11liarly qualified to do . 1

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The F1,nctio11s of a Non-Represe11tative Seco11d C/1a111ber The British Ho11se of Lords, like the Etl1iopian Senate, is neitl1er elected, 11or ex1-1licitly represent ative of particular interests in the country. It is con1posed part})' of hereditary ti tle-J1olclers, and partly

of distinguished public figures 1rvl10 are made men1bers for life. These i11clude tl1e senior judges and bishops, and such people as retired politicians and civil serva11ts, trade 11nior1 leaders, successful military officers, and industrialists. Tl1e powers of tl1e I-louse of Lords are severely limited, in that it has no control over financial n1atters, and delays oll1er legislation only for a year (and in IJractice only very rarely does so).

From Jennings, Parliarnent, page 445 •

... In the Bryce Conference of 1917-18 tl1ere was general agree111e11 t tl1at tl1e fol lo,ving were the functions of a Seco11d Cl1 amber:

I. The examination and revision of Bills bro11gl1t fro1n tl1e I-:Io11se of Co1111nons, a function \.Vhicl1 l1as become more needed si11ce, on 1nany occasio11s, duri11g the last th.irty years, tl1 e Ho11se of Con1111ons l1as been ob]iged to act u11der special rules limiting debate. 2. TlJe initiatjon of Bills dealing witl1 s11bjects of a practically 11011-controversial ?haracter w11ich may have an easier passage tl1ro11gl1 tl1 e IJ011se of Commons if �hey have been fully disct1ssed a11d put i11to a well-co11s1dered sl1ape before be.1ng submitted to it. 3· !he interposition of so 1nuch delay (a11cl 11 0 n1ore) i11 tl1 e pa�sing of a Bill into law as ma y be needed to enable tl1 e opinion of tl1 e nation to be a�e qu�tely expressed 11pon it. Tl1is wo11ld be spec�ally 11�eded as reg a�ds � 11 �� wl11ch affect tl1 e fundame11tals of tl1.e Const1tt1t1on or 1ntrodtice ne\, P1.inci pies of legislation; or w11icl1 raise iss11es wl1ereon tl1e 01Ji11ion of tile cotlntry may appear to be almost eqt1ally divided. 4. Full_ and free c11ssion 1 ose of tl as cl1 s11 1s, io1 est q11 t n · rta po im d an of large dis foreign policy, at mome11ts wl1en th e Ho11se of Co1111nons inay l,ap1)eJl .to be s? mt1ch occu )ied tl1at it cannot find s11:fficie11t ti1n� for tl,em. Sticll dis 1 e os vvh bly ein ass 1 CliSSions may a1 1 11 ted t1c nd co if often be all tl1 e mo re 11seful . deba tes and divisions do 11ot i1 1volve tl1e fate of the exec11t1ve G·overnn1ent. t i.� b 10 mean ln� sa e tl1 ed ur sec ve ha d t1l wo s certain that these propositions � t1nan�· llllty �thirt y years later . ..

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Sec·o,-id Cl1an1bers in Develo[Jing Coi1r1t1·ie.s· From de Sinitl1, T/1e .Ne•v Comn-1onM1ec1ltf1 a11cl its Constitutions, pages 123-124. ... It would be si11gL1larly 111u·easonable to expect an upper_ House in a new Co1n111011we:1ltl1 co11 ntry to sta11 d out as a p.i1![1r of tl1e c;onst1tut! on. Even modest 11o1)es may be disa1)pointed. J·f tl1e ideal second cl1a�1ber 1s co11ce 1 ved of as a grave body of emi 11ent elders, deb,1ting 1natters of � tate 111 serene detac_hm:nt from the 11urly-burly of partisan controversy and applyJng _them�elves consc1ent1ously to �he n1i1111 tiae of leg· slative revisio11, it is likely to remain an ideal. Persons e� do� ed with tl1ese rare qualities will be i.11 sl1 ort supply and may be better employed 1n still more responsible cap,1cities. ! 11 any event it 1nay be difficult e� ough to find suitable ca�di dates for tl1e pop11 larly elected Ho11se. In some countries, tl1erefore, the establ1 sl1ment of a seco11 d cl1amber may 11ave to be ruled out as an extravagant use of scarce resot1rces. If, 011 tl1 e otl1 er l1and, a second chamber is advocated primarily as a l1a\1 en for regio11al interests, traditio 1 1al elen1ents or mi11 ority groups, further considerations must be taken into accou 11t. Ge 11.1 1ine attempts to reflect regional points of view n1ay be tl1warted by tl1e facts of national party politics, a::, tl1e records of the Austra li::1 11 a11d Malayan Se11ates a11d tl1e Indian Raj.,va Sabha have indicated; but the re cords of tl1e U11ited States Se11ate, t11e Swiss Stande1·at and the West Ger1nan. Bund esrat sl1ow J1ow, i 11 a climate of political plt1ralis111, a second cl1amber can become a major factor in tl1e governme11tal l )rocess. Tl1e effect of a strong second cl1amber will almost certai 1 1ly be to make it 1nore difficult f 01· t11e government to govern. A second cl1an1 ber co1nposed of cl1iefs will do1 1 btless endeavour to appl)' a 'brake to radica.l legislation; a particularist seco11d chamber will probably obstruct central economic 1)lanni11 g. :But tl1 e government of a developi11g countr1r i11 Africa or Asia will seldom tolerate a revival of tl1e c111cie11 regi111e in modern dress; it ·will smell a separatist in tl1e regio1 1al zealot; it will invariably seek to equip the legislative machine witl1 a s11 1)ercl1arger a 1 1d ove1·d 1·ive i11 preference to disc brakes. In. the friction th.at is likely to be ge11erated if an upper Ho11se asserts its fo:r1nal authority, the special interests tl1 at it js desig 1 1ed to reJ)resent n1ay sufler st1 bsta 1 1tial damage. If tl1e interests r�presented in an active 11pl?er I-Io11se i11 cl11de tl1ose of u 11 popular co1nmu11al minori"' ties t �e da1nage 1nay be ser10_11s. He11ce tl1ere is a presu111ptiot1 against attempting to 111 a new state n1 ai11 ly for tl1 e purpose of shielding mino 1b r c ?nst_ 1 tute a second cl1ar � � _ r�ty 1!1terests fro111 d1scr11n111atory tre _atment by tl1e political 111ajorjty. The presump tion 1s reb �1 ttable, but 011ly wl1ere t!11s __1netl1od of constitutio 11 al protection is known to be readily acceJ)table by tl1e 1naJor1ty 01· ,vhere a11 agreed co11 stitutio11 cannot be constrt1cted by �11 y otl1er n1ea11s. If tl1e establisl1111e 11 t of a second chamber is thought t?_ be worth �J1J_le 011 otl:1er _grot 1nds, i t_ 111ay be very appropriate to guarantee a mino _ rity represe �tat1011 J)fOJ)Ort1onat� to 1 �s stre11 gtl1 _i11 tlie coutltry. BLit minorities may well be advised to look for tl1e.1r 111�1Jor co11stitt1tional safeguards elsewhere.

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Fron1 T/1e Constiti1tio11 of LibJ,a, of 7 October I 951.

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.. Pro e thre 1 all consist of the sl twe1 1 1 1ate ty-four of Tl1e S meu1bers. Eacli � . 94. v1nces of the Kingd1Jm of Libya sl1all l1 ave eigl1t n1 embers. 95. Tl1e Ki11g aJ)poi11ts 011e l1alf of tl1e mem·bers. The other members shall be elected by tl1e Legislative Councils of tl1e Provinces. 96. A Se 11 ,1tor must be a Libya11 and l1ave coinpleted the foi·tiet11 year of liis age and possess sucl1 qu.alificatio11s as are provided i 11 tl1e federa electoral law. l

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS 1

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763

Fam ily 1nay be appoi11ted to tl1e Se11ate btit ma y not Roy al tl1e of ers b Mem be elected. Sen ate shall be appointed by tl1e King. Tlie Senate tl1e f ent Pr�s id The ? _ 97 _ es1de11t�. Tl1e �esult of tl1e �lect1on sl1all be subinitted to tlle V1ce -Pr two elect shall _ appo of 1n�m tl1e ent Pres The 1dei1 t at1cl oval . lie � elect1011 of tlle two King for appr a period of two years and tl1e Pres1de11t 111c1y be reapJ)Oitltf�r be sh_ a ll ents resid Vice-P nts 1nay be re-elected. 1de res e-P V1c two the and ed 98. Membership of tl1e Se11ate sl1all be for eigl1t years. I·lalf tl1e appointed Senat ors and half the elec�ed Se11ators sl1all be replaced every fot1r years. Retiring Senators may be re-appointed or re-elected. of Representatives� 99. The Senate sh'1ll meet at tl1e same time as the I louse its sessions shall close at the same ti1ne as tl1e ·Hot1se of Representatives. A Note

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Tanzal1ia

The Constin1tion of Tanz::mia rejects bi-ca.meralisn,, but n1akes provision for t1ppointecl rnen1bers of the assembly. Re-read and co11sider the rationale of Articles 24 (c) (d) (e) and (f) of tl1e Interim Constitution of J 965 (see p. 267). l

The Appointment and Qualifications of Senators in Ethiopia

The Appointn-1ent a11d Ten1,re of Senators

Read: Articles 101, 104, 105 & 106 of tl1e Revised Co11stitution.

Appointments of Senators by tl1e En1peror ]1ave since 1957 been 1Jt1blisl1ed i11 lhe Negarit Gazeta, and have included a 11umber of re-ap1Joint111e11ts for second or subsequent terms of office. The provisions of Article I 04, by wl1ich a tl1ird of tl1e Senate is replaced every second year, appear to be derived from tl1e following provisio11s of tl1e Constitution of the United States of America.

From the Constitution of the United States, Art.icle I, Section 3. The Senate of the United States sl1all be composed of two Senators fro1n eacli Slate, chosen by the Legislature tl1ereof, for six Years; ... lmmediate]y after they shall be assembled i11 Co11seqt1ence of tl1e first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be i11to tl1ree Classes. T]1e Se:1ts of tl,e Sena tors of the first Class sl1all 1e tl of r, Yea nd seco the of o11 irati EXJJ the be vacated at s�co�d Clas s at the Ex tile at s Clas d tl1ir tl1e of a11d r, Yea Expiratio11 of tl1e fot1rth piration of tl1e sixth Year, so that one tl1ird may be cl1osen every secood Year.

Senat? rs are now directly 1osen by th e cl g bein of ead inst te, Sta l, eac elected by tbe voters of Stat e Legislatur . e

Allbough Ethiopian nators are appointed fo r ter�s of six ye�rs, it ap_pears Se _ to be possibl e for them to leave office before tl1e end of tl1e1r term, for 10star1ce 111 tlle manner iD<licated by tl1e fol.lowing readings. · . . From the Niegar.1t. Gazeta (various issues): Deja;� �ctober 1 958 (General Notice No. 241 of 1958) a Yemane Hassen to be Member of the Senate.

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) 9 5 9 f . 1 o 5 5 2 . o N ce ti o N l ra 1e e1 (G 9 . tl1 Jt111e 195 20 of l e era th. e11 kla r-G Te . rno ve 1 Go typt1 De iz Gh be to at en ass I I. e a11 y 1, en . c h 1a 11 z a J De of Gojjan1. ) 61 19 of 3 28 o. N ce ti o N l ·a e1 en (G 60 19 22nd N· oven1ber te na Se e th f o r be em M be to n se as DejazniacJ1 Yeinane H From YaPa1·/ar11ent Ze11a, 1956 E.C. (1963-1964), page 8. Tile follo\ving _Me111 bers retired fro1n tl1� Senate, on pensions, in 1956 E. C. (1963-1964) The dates of tl1eir appointme11t are added 10 brack.ets.

Dejazmacl1 Geresu Duki (appointed 31·d August 19,..61) Blatta Deressa At11ente (appointed 26tl1 October 19:>7; re-appointed 4th November 1961) Dejazmacl1 Tademe Zelel<e (appointed 5th Ma y 1959) Fitawrari Imagnou Yimmer (appointed 6th May 1959) Sl1eik Abdel Mejid Abdulla (appointed 31st October 1957; re-appomted 20th · November 1963)

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T'hu-teen other Me1nbers of tl1e Senate retu-ed at tl1e same time, of whom two 'were appointed in 1959, one in 1960, and ten in 1961.

T/1,e Qitalifications of Senato,·s

Read Articles 102 & 103 of the Revised Co11stitution. Articles 102 a11d 103 lay down a number of qualifications which Senators must fulfil, and these qualifications may indicate the ki11d of Senators which the Consti tution intends to be appointed, and l1ence tl1e ki11d of body wluch the Senate should be. Tl1e criteria are most clearly expressed i n Article 135. The age qita!ification of tl1irty-:five years lays some emphasis on the values of 111aturity and experience, and perl1aps also 011 tl1e more ''traditional'' outlook which some of the older legislators n1ay be ass11med to possess; it n1ay be noted, however, that the age reqt1irement is not so l1igl1 as for· s0111e other legislatures, including the Libyan Senate noted above. The ''P1·i11ce or other DignitarJ,'' q t1ali:ficatio11 indicates that the Senate may l1ave been intended, partly at least, as a fort1m for tl1e views of the nobility and Ch�rcl1 of Et �1iopia, �11 _ tJ1e grot1nds tl1at tl1ese views still represented a signi!icant section of national op11uo·n. Tl1e exte11t to wluch noblemen have taken a part 1n the Senate may be infer1·ed f1·on1 tl1e figu1-es, later in this Section, on the titles of Senators. Fo1·1ne1· l1igl1. gove1·11ment officials l1ave also been well repres�nted in the Senate, as later :figures sl1ow, and this qualification may indicate the value of governmental expe1·tise in tl1e Senate, perhaps maki11g 11p for tl1e lack of it in the elected Chamber of Deputies.. Tl1e final general qualification under Article I 03 (b) is presumably intended to show tl1at tl1e earlier categories are not exclusive, and that the Emperor is free to appoint anyone to the Senate if l1is character, judgment or services warrant it. .. The requirement tl1at a prospective Senator be not disqualified under- any-pr.�� v1s1on of the electoral law may raise some problems, since the only such law ""yeUQ -

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765

. th e Cha,11ber of Deputies Electoral Law Procla1nation of 1956 , wl11c · 1 1 n1ak es 1s . ar e . t e a n S e P e th to e n _ r. e ap e oo� � The Rationale of the Senate· in Ethiopia ·

,Tire· Rep,·esentat1011 oif ''Ell't es ' ' ·?

n e pos si?Ie justificat�o11 for _ a 1 1 a �po i11ted seco1�d �l1a 111b�r i11 a cot,rl try su cJ1 O pe! 1ru 1t tl1e tte d th� rep t be res e1.1tat10_ 11 1 11 Parl1a111e11t of i inportarlt t mig h pia Eth .s io 1 ty wl11cl1 a1·e no t represented 111 tl1e ordinary n com 1nu e 1 tl of wa y tllrotigl1 aect1·ons • · · · s e Chamber of Dept 1t1es. Tl11s · wou Id ta ke 1t as a pre1111se tl1at EtI1ioIJia is 110t · · v i ew th '', an_d l '' . i a en a r1 d 1o Ii eg 11 cr ta tl ac f y to t_ 1at tl1ere are cert,1i11 gr�tlJJS . tted yet cornmi . � within the country wl11cl1 ar.e by tl1e1r nature o.f SJJec1al 11nportance, a11cl wli ose views should there.fore be taken into _ acco�1nt. Seve1·a1. sucl1_ grou1Js 111ay be i r 1dicated by the qualifi��tions f�r members.hip wl�cl1 \Ve l1a�e JlISt d.1sct1sse�.. For i11sta11ce, so Jong ce 1n t11e cot111trys1de, deve]op1ne11t JJlaris : as the nobi lity retain a great deal of 111fl.11en and other government meast1res may require tl1e st1pport or acqt1iesce 11ce of tl1e nobj lity if they are to have any practical effect, a 11d fo1· tl1 js reaso11 it 1nay be desirable to make the views of the nobility known in Parliament. A similar reaso11 n1igl-1 t be give11 for the representation of the Etl:riopian Cl1t1rcl1 , tl1ro11gh its Bisl1ops a11d so111e other Churchmen, in the Senate. On the other l 1 and, more ''111oder11 isi 11g'� gro11r)s n1ay also need to have a special voice i n the affairs of a develop.i 1 1g col111try, a11cl t11is may explain the p resence of experienced former civil servants, si11ce a developi11g co1111try, as ,ve noted in our readings on the limitations of democracy i11 CJ1apter I, may l1a, e to depend to a large extent on experts. Tl1ere migl1t also be a place in the Se r1ate for s01ne of the younger a11d more radical elements in tl1e co1111try, tl1011gl1 ,1t prese11t this possibilit)' is limited by tl1e age reqt 1irement of tl1irty-five yec1rs. A11otl1er gro111), the representation of which bas sharply risen in rece11t years, 11,ts been tl1e arn1ed forces, the opinions of wl:ricl1 may also be of great sig11ifica11ce. These suggestions may help t o illt1strate the way in wl1.icl1 a11 apJ)_oi11�ed S_e11ate c�n, if the appointment power is used for th.is purpose, add extra qt1al1tat1ve d11ne 11s,ons to the ''representative'' c11aracter of Parliament.

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The Senate as a Cl1eck on t/1e Depitties

. · Any second Cl1amber which is no t to be vi1·t t1ally powerless 1n11st to son1� extent li mit the freedom of act ion of the first· and si11ce tl1e Etl1 io1)ia11 Senate 11as virttially the same legislative powers as the Cha�ber of Deputies, tl1ere is rooin for one Cb ain er to act as a chec k on tl1 e other. Tl1 ere are several reaso11s for wl1icl1 the outl��i boft g su e hav we e as , ate e Sen Tl1e b ; b S nators may differ from that of the Deputies. pt tte ct y tru O b� y �a e d an e !i e; m m or expert in technical atters, ! \ � � �·e t� b _m p u i es t o interfere with technicalities wl:rich ' at least 1n tl1e view o_f tie b en :Ote ' ·1 ep_ut � d o not un derst . i on, t e ct ele ir tlie of and Or again becat1se of tl1e means n '' o 1 g e r e so e . y � 1 ay l 1 l 1.ic wl a or m app·rove measures w l:rich favour their own position, l ' n a o 1 t a n or . provin ·�al slant, e 1n 0 s e e s o t bett�r ab le_ _ . be c may where as Senat ors . i 1od o f etl po1n� of view n d 11s . On the other ha nd because of th ei r qual1ficat10 � favot1r the o P _ p ; ! nt ment, Senators may be mdre ''traditional'' in ou!look, �� n:, �a� help to Io n t aken i ng llow The by x . f:�� t t he ver nm e e;11 ecutive go �a rs �; Cl1a mbe il r te so two 1 w on ons a me as occ of i se g the differences ' by showin 0f Parlia ment h ave disagreed.

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766

SoU.RCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

From tlie .N.litiute.s of tl1e Legal Com,nittee of the Senate, 24 Tahsas 1956 E.C. (Material kindly st1pplied from the Archives of the Senate) (Law School translation). . The Con1n1ittee is giving its decision on a number of pro� osed amendments to the Chamber of Deputies Electoral Law, wl1ich had been passed by the Depu� 1es, and then referred to the Senate; tl1e coritent of tl1e proposed a111endments appears from the Mmutes.

1. Article 3 of tl1e draft Electoral Law says that: ''any government employee wl1 o e11gages himself to be elected as a deputy has to res_ign from b,is post''. Nevertl1eless, a civil servant, even thougl1 he presents himself to be elected as a deput)', migl1t not be elected, and if it is said th.at he has to resig·� from I1is post, tl1en l1e would be in a very serious position if he were not elected. If l1e is elected, then according to the Electoral Law, No: 153, Article 34, ''tl1e elected deputy or deputies if they are government employees would resign from their post within a week and be sent to the wor.k for which they were elected''. For tlus reason, as tl1e draft law sent by the Chamber of Deputies is inl1uman, tl1e Committee has decided not to accept it. 2. According to tl1e draft Electoral Law, Article 4, ''the government employee who I1as failed i11 tl1e election would be transferred from his electoral district to a11otl1er''. Article 5 of tl1e same draft says ''the government employee wl10 \Vas not elected as a deputy would not be allowed to return to his offi cial d11ties i11 tl1e same area for four years''. The reason why the Chamber of Deputies passed tl1e above law is to prevent the government employee wl10 l1as not been elected from carrying out cruel and inhuman actions against tl1e people who did not elect l1im. But as indicated in Article 24 of tl1e Electoral Law, the election is carried out by secret ballot, a.nd the civil servant wl10 stood as a candidate in the election would therefore be unable to ide11tify tl1e IJeople wl10 did not vote for him. For this reason, the Legal Co1nn1ittee l1as rejected tl1e proposed draft. Tl1e Senate as a wl1olc, later accepted tl1e reconm1endations of this Committee.

From YaPar/ame1zt Ze11a, 1956 E.C. (1963-1964). Healtl1 Tax - tl1e Cl1a111ber of De1J11ties decided tl1at the Health Tax should. be spent in tl1e prov.i11ce i11 ·wl1icl1 it was collected. Bt1t tl1e Se 1 1ate said tl1at the amount of 11�altl1 Tax collected i11 tl1e 1J1·ovj11ces is very s1na11, since most of tl1e money is gover111nent, tl1e by sugges tl1e accept not did contr1buted view in a11d tl1ey tltis, of _ . e1Jt1ties. Tl1ey sub1nitted their decisio11 to tl1e Office of the tion of tl1e Cha111ber of D Prime Mi11ister. Tl1e following cases are taken from tl1e editors' notes. I.

The Pen�l Code (Penalties) D �cree, No. 45 of 1961, whicl1 instituted flogging as a puojsl1me�t for_ certain offe11ces, was st1bn11tted to Parlian1ent in accordance with Article 92 of the Co.nsti tution. It was approved ? Y tl1e Senate in May/June 1962, a .nd tl1en went to the Chamber of . _ Dept�ties, _where it was disapproved on 21st November 1962. Further readings on this Decre e are given 10 Cl1apter V, Section 4, p. 479.

A drat:t loan agreen1ent, by �l1ich Ethiopia would borrow$ Eth. 35,000,000 from a consortium of Ital�an banks, w�s submitted to the Chamber of Dep11ties for approval in May 1964. The _ ts eputr es at first proJec � reJected the Loan, on tl1e ground that they were not told for what It ·Would be used, but after the Government had given them this information, tl1e Loan was , finally accepted. The draft agreemer, t was then submitted to the Senate, which voted�a�t_

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t,1

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

767

e 1964, and after being urged to reconsider its decisio 11 Ju n 9t h by tie Govern·� . Ju 27 T ne he on th . Lo os an � cot1ld not there.o � �d the prop al f re be pu t �nto effe rnent �' re ection of th e agreement appeared to be ba ct. . se :a S j d Jarge)y on patrio·ic gTOlln(JS war. tJ1e ,· i.- ,,__- · Th� m (!enved r.ro tJ , �,

. 00 1 . t.ID accep

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The Composition of the Ethiopian Senate

r f;',

Titles bv osition (i Comp ��\ Traditional Titles of Nobility a. Ras Bitwoded �· Ras Wag Seyum Leul Dajazmach Dajazmach Fitawrari Kegnazmach Grazmach Balambaras Lij

1�,

1957

1961

1966

1 3 l

I l

Total

9 2

Total c. Church Titles Ahuna Kes Liqe Ketsela Liqe Liqawnt Liqe Siltenat Liqe Tebebt Melake Nibur'ed

Haji Seyd Sheik

Total

I 1

28 15 6 4 2 2

5 -

5 I

2 4

2 I I

2 4

I 3

[

' �

!-·,:

f,.

1 -

•

5 •

I l

d., Moslem Titles

1 28 30 6

Total

1 1

b. Other Traditional Titles Afa Negus Bejirond Blatengeta Blata Kantiba

l, SOUllCEBOOK OF ETFIJOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL L.A W

·168

{

e. )

Local Titles Jantirar (Wollo) Sl1asl1a Rasl1a (Kaffa)

Total

I I

Military 1 itles Liet1te11ant Ge11e.ral Major Ge11eral B1·igadier General Colonel Liettte11a11t Colo11el Sl1a111bul

2 1

,g. No Title Ato Total Nt1mber of Senators Note tl1at i11 tl1e period 1957-1967,

2 2 1 11

110

2 1

117

122

Total

j '

women were appointed to tl1e Senate.

-Co111position by Occupatio11

This list is co1nplete fo1· tl1ose appointments published in the ."fvegarit Gazeta, but may be incomplete in otl1er ways; the totals for Moslems, for instance, could only be obtained by noti11g Senators witl1 clearly Moslem names. Since a great many :Senators l1ave held different occupations, tl1e totals do not ad. d up, but where a sub total adds 11p, tl1is figt1re l1as been given. a. The Legislatrtre Senators before 1957 Dep11ties before 1957 Deputies after 1957

b. rfhe Jt1diciary

Forn1er J11dges

c. Tl1e Central Government Vice-Mi11isters and above below Vice-Mi11iste1·

< l. .'

The Provincial Government Governors-General Awraja Governors Directors & Bejironds

1957

1961

1966

23 8

5 5 14

11. 4

13 10

9 23 3

11 37 8

•

12 42

•--!•

'\r.- ------------------� PARLIAMENT AND LEGISI-ATIVE INSTITUTI ONS

. ft :

atic Posts lom Dip e. Ambassadors, Co11st1ls, etc.

Pos ts ry J\,1ili ta f. Brigadiers-Genera l a11d abov e Colonels and below

g. Court Posts Liqemakwas, Ligaba, etc.

h. Church Posts

' \

J. ·-·

·,

5 14

14 9

23 Moslems Pre-1936 Office-holders

10 8

Total Number of Senators

117

122

Bishops Others

. I.

769

,.,_)

3 -3

The above material was gathered by La,v Stt1den ts tinder the direction of tl1e editors.

SECTION 3

ORGANISATION AND PRIVILEGES r

The Organisation of the Cl1ambers

. The internal organjsation of e ach Ch am b er of Parlian1ent is determi11e d by its rules of procedure issued under Article 82 of tl1e Co11stitt1tio11, st1bject to tl1e 0ther a rticles of the Co nstitution wl1icl1 b e ar on tl1e st1bject. Tl1ese readings are �ot concerned with the de tails of parlia1n e11tary procedt1re, for i11stance i11 co11sider ;g _dr�ft legislatio n, whlcl1 may be _fo11nd in � edde , T/1e �al-v-Malcing Process i tit ht�pza JH.S.U. 1966). The law-mak111 g power, 1nclud�111g Art1cles 88-92 of tl1e Cons� ution, has already bee n considere d . i n Cl1ap ter V. The President and Vice-P,·esidents nder rticle 99 of f hDe A tl1e Constitution, tl1e President and two Vice-PresidetltS �h �r n Chamber of Deputies are elected e acl1 ye ar by tl1e members from _ amoiig Jai� ·d um�er. The proc edure s for t J1 eir election, an d tl1eir po\\'ers aud duties_, ��: own in the rules of procedure. In the e arly years of tl1e elected �liamber, ,_ Pre 1dent w as often a figure with considerable government co11nect1ons a�d - ex � . Per1ence· the . ' fi rst p_resident, Lej Haile-Mar m Kebede, 1..s_ now ( 1967) a M 101ster of St a . ya . . abre t . e os ist lJr -C . . 1 r . a str �itawr � i _ �� t , d ? of seco11 , y ru tl1e M � e h Wo}de i a Interior and gr _ k il, was tl1e brothe r of the then Cl1i ef Executive of �ritrea:, W1th tlJe_ e 1 1e ec-�:��g ;<p erience of th.e Cl1ambe. r i11 r ecent years, tJ1is coniiectio� has been less l : p�:t� � �� e strtigg e fierc evide11t, and there has often bee11 a

(

SOUJlCEBOOK 017 ETI-IJOJ> J.AN CONSTJTUTJ.ONAL LAW

770

r e be th of m ,a or Cl flo e . tl1 n o ec El es ur fig tio r 1la JJt po ns e or 111 or O t\V tl ee tw be s1·dency ,.. . re h ap d , t p a ar d . e s st to te n 1 co y g 11 ha ro ve � st � n � ee b so ,ll e v a 1 f t 1 i e d si re P efor Vic n r io ei ct J th 11 le rt se . pa e 1n s0 ay p] to s i11 ig or al ci in ov pr r fo been a tei,dency ly t ct in re po di e ap ar ed te na by Se e tl1 of the ts e11 sid _ re -P ce Vi 1d a1 t _ _ Tlie Preside11 · s t so J1a en a1 1d e va Pr 111 e Th ( 1 ly o1 i iab ut t tj t1s Co e tl1 _ ? of · 7 10 � le tic Ar r de i ur . E Jnperor _ _ . nob1I1ty, and the V1 re -P ce en s1d 1an op h1 Et ts e tl1 of rs be em 111 11g di Iea e tl, of e been 011 l ta en m rn ve rie de go pe wi ex tl1 wi rs nce. l1e ot d a11 rs ste 11i ni 1 er· rm fo ed t1d ,cl i i 1,a\re often

Co1n111it tees

A great deal of tl1e day to day work of almost a11y legislature is carried out by its co111nlittees, wl1icl1 are able to scrutinise draft legislation and other proposals witl1 ,1 care wl1icl1 is 11ot possible for tl1e whole Cha1nber. On the effectiveness of its co111111ittees, tl1erefore, 1nuch. of tl1e actual JJower of tl1e Chamber depends. The Co11stitutio11 1nal(es several references to committees of the Parliament, for instance in Articles 72 a11d 73, bt1t leaves tl1eir establisl1111ent to the rules of procedure of eacl1 Cl1a1nber.

Fron1 Inter11al Regi1/atio11s of Senate, 1955 E.C. (Law School translation). Article 39. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Tl1e Se11ate sl1all l1ave tl1e following Standing Committees:

Legal Committee Foreign Affairs Con1n1ittee Defence Com1nittee Econo1nic and Fina11cial Con1mittee Budget Con1mittee Social Develo1Jment Com1nittee A Comn1ittee to select members for tl1e Committees., whicl1 sl1all l1ereafter be called tl1e Selection Co1nmittee.

sl1all Co1nmittees Standi11g above co11sid.er ar1d report on all draft legisla Tl1e . t1011 a1�d other matters sen! to tl1e1n by tl1e Senate. T11.e Senate may appoint Special Co1nm1ttees to stttdy spec1t1l cases. E �cl1 Sta11ding Com11iittee 1nay elect its own Chai1·1na11. Members of Standing C ?n1nuttees sl1all be elected yearly. Me1nbe1·s 1n.ay be elected to one or two Com IDJttees. sl1all Committee Selectio11 Tl1e 40. e l Artic_ of consist 1 e President, the two t1 . . V1 ce-Pres1de11ts, tl1e Clerk of tl1e E[ouse (Aqabe Gt1bae) and a further nine members of tl1e Se11ate to be cl1ose11 by secret ballot from a list of twe11ty ca11didates submitted by tl1e President. The Selection Con11nittee shall select and inform tl1e House of a list of candi dates t? serve in eacl1 Standing Committee. If the Senate decides to create a new Com011ttee, the Selectio11 Com:mmittee shall select and recommend the persons to serve 011 this Committee. Other Committees to be appointed by tl1e Senate shall be established in-th6 manner prescribed above.

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PARLIAMEN'f AND LEGISLATIVE 1NST1TUTIONS

771

a q u ort11u. All n�atters .i 11 tl1e Selectior Cominit for!ll sl1all bers tee . e 01 em . Nin ttee shall .be deter11 . 1111e d Com ITIJ by ma jori ty ding vot e Stan in tlie even . · I , t 1 · . · . · · d eac . 0 1 1 . 1a Cl e rn1a11 sh al 1 l1ave a cast1 11 g ,,ote. an votes, th of on 1 divis of an equa1 .. . . . . a dd1 t10 ,1 to 1t d11t 1 es specified ,lbo,�, Commtt_tee, 1 11 n ctio Sele sl1all also ; · · The a11d s 11a 11 be re.�e1 red t� as t_11e Discip. iilary ComCo1u1n1ttee, �ry ciplin the Dis such. Any Me1nb�r l1av111g a direct 1 1 1terest ir tile matter as g actin when � e may �1ot take part in tl1e l)roceedi 11 gs. mittee Com the :Fo�e Article 41. The Legal Committee sl1all co11sist of seven 1ne111 rers, fottr of m 11 . r 1o t q a m r o f ll a sh i n o h w �I, .;� All draft legislation shall be referred to tl1 is Con1n1ittee, lo be gi�n the rorm dealt legisla it� tio11 1er co111 1 11ittees, witl1 tie exceJJtio11 by otl includ ing it, by ofla,v � �� udget, Est 1 1nates, or otl1er Gover11111e 1 1t \ccot1nti 11 o , pleme11ta B . ry Sup Budget, the of : r·. 0· t, which will not be refe.rred to tl1 is Comn1ittee. . Article 42. TJ1 e Committee on For eig11 AtTairs sl1 all co11sist of Ji\e me1nbers, three of whom shall f<.)fUl a quorum.

.. If! ,

I/� '

• '

Tbe following legislation a.nd 1nessages sl1 all be referred to tl1 is :::.·on11nittee:

(a) Projects or1 inter11ational treaties a11d agree111 e11ts, a11 d ger1(ral Iy otl1 er foreign relations and aflairs stipt1lated i 1 1 Article 30 of tl1 e C)11stitL1tion;

(b) Obligations connected witl1 tl1e Unjted N,ttio 11 s a11d otl1er i 1 ter11atio11al

organizations.

Article 43. The Defe11ce Committee sl1all co11sist of se,,e11 111e11 1bt rs, foLtr of wh.om shall fo rm a quorum. Matters affecting natio11al defe11ce sJ1all be referred to this Committee.

Article 44. Tl1e Econonlic and Fina11cial Co1n111ittee sJ1all co11sst of 11ine members, five of whom shall form a quoru1n.· Tl1e following 111atters �l1aJI be re ferred to this Commit tee: .

(a) Develop ment of tl1e national econo1ny a 11d resoL1rces: (b) Matters affecting economy and finance; (c) Public works and communications; (d) Matters affecting commerce and j 11dustry; (e) Matters affecting international eco110111ic co-operation. ,.\rticle 45. The B udget Co1nmittee sJ1 al l co11sist of se�en n1er?beis. 011.e . of the m embers e, itte . n1 m Co. rs Tai A1 1 g1 re1 Fo ll ha tl1e at. the same time be a member of s 0 ne of th nt e . m p lo . . e (v D l ia c o S e e E ti f co . O i norruc and F1nanc1al Co1n1n1ttee, one . Com · . or Lrm · qLr 1 a nuttee and one of tl1e fence Committee. :Five me1nbers sball f0111 De r o jt d u A . e tl 1 · Bud get and supple 11 o r f s t r )O _ reJ 1d a1 es at tim es y ar et nt dg me bu General abou t public finance shall be referred to this Con11111 ttee. m e 1n e in 1 f o t · Arti J is ns · co I J 1a sl e te T it nm o1 C t he en al m ci op So el Dev . e 46 · ·fivec of be rs, whom shall form a qu or u m . · , 11 10 t a 1c t . d . e g n i . 11 r � e Matter.s aliect1ng socia l v p ment, espec1al� o11c c ose l · t y , i de elo . Public h ealtb and agricultu re, shall be referred to this Co1111 ntttee.

772

•

SoURCEBOOK OF E1·1-110Pi.AN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

he on eit ir te, the 11a Se n the ow of s tee t nit ini m1 Co � g 1 ia� 1 i nd Sta le Tl . 47 e 1. ic r t. A . . . . . . f c 1n er h u 11 o s t m e1 ng ti D ee 11 m tt t e in e JO d 0 ol l1 � ay 1n , nt de si re P 1e tl l1 tlg ro J tive or t1 throttgl1 sL1b-co111111ittees.

tJ1e sam e fu n�tions, and Articles 38 th wi ees itt mm co 1e san tl1e s l1a s tie i)tl De of ber ? Tl1e c11 an1 ..,e �f tho 7 the Se of 4 to 39 te, les tic Ar to y e�ceP,t sel clo nd o sp rre co n �� tio t1la reg l na _ ter ii, � to 47 of its e Selection (or Steenng ) Th . ers mb me n tee ur fo l1a ee 1tt n1ID. co s t1e pt1 De � of r be 111 tllat each Clia _ 1ty vote of the whole Cl1amber an d recommend s the _ _ ConuJlittee of the Deputies is elected by n1aJor sele�t10� h� bee n a matter n ?W 1ts ; ber am Cl1 tl1e by ent ntm Joi aJ) for ees 1itt 11n 1 co 1 er l otJ n,embers of . g es t. din 1ca ing rea 1nd low fol the as , s'' ion ent nv ''co n tai cer by ed ern gov of controversy,

F1·om Tl1e Et/1iopia1z Herald, 9 Nove111ber 1962. Tl1e members of tl1e Steeri11g Committee were elected from all the Governates Ge11eral of tl1e En1pire except Sidamo, incl11ding Addis Ababa. Tl1e representative from Sida1no tl1e11 tool( tl1e floor a11d expressed l1is disappointment for not· having bee11 able to be a 111e1nbe1· of tl1e Steering Committee. He emphasised that since Addis Ababa is sitL1ated in Sl1oa, there is no need for both Ad.dis Ababa and Shoa bei11g me111bers of tl1e Stee1·ing Committee. ''The representative of either Shoa or Addis Ababa sl1 ould be expelled to give chance for t h. e representative of Sidamo, '' he added.

. . . The flonot1rable Gir1na Walda-Giyo1·ges said that Article 39 of the Parlia n1e11tary 1Jrocedt1re merely stated tl1at tl1e Steeri11g Co111mittee consist of fourteen n1en1bers. It does 11ot stipt1late that it sl1ot1ld be rep1·esentative of tl1e fourteen Go vernates Ge11eral. ''Tl1ere v.. ill, tl1erefore, be no need to l1ave tl1e repre-Seotative of Sidamo as n1ember of tl1e Steering Committee,'' l1e added. 1

But aln1ost all tl1e 1ne1ubers of tl1e Cl1.amber of Deputies objected to tlus and asked for an an1end1ne11t of Article 39 of tl1e Parliamentai·)' procedu.re. Tl1e Assembly adjo11rned for a fifteen mi11ute dttratjo11 to gi, e ti111e for tl1e men1bers to discuss it over. After tl1e recess was over disc11ssion ce11t 1·ed on tl1e inclusio11 of Sidamo in the Stee1·i11g Conunittee. Tl1e Preside11t tl1e11 asked for a vote 011 the Sidamo case a11d Ato Demissie Gabre fro111 Sidan10 was elected by 139 votes it1 favour, 2 agai11st, ,vitl1 4 abste11tions. 1

[Tl1e re_presentative fro111 Addis Ababa was tl1ereafte1· excluded in his favour.] Tl1e rt1les of proceclt1re also JJro,1icle_ for joint con1mittees, consisting of an equal number �f n1embers of eacl1 Cl1a111ber, �o 11?eet t? d1sct1ss qt1estio11s con1.ing before a joint session. If a bill 1s �eclarecl to b� e111erge11cy l �g1sJat1�11, e1tl1er by tl1e Prin1e Minister or by a n,ajority of tl1e Cl1amber, 1t may be clel1berated 011 cl1rectly 111 tl1e ft1ll CJ1an1ber, ,vitl1 otit go.ing t.o a con,n,ittee.

Meeti11gs, Qitoru111 ancl J/oting

Read: Articles 34, 76, 77, 79, 80, 87 of the Re·vised Co.nstitutioi1.

•

"•

f'l1ese st1bjects a:e all _ fairly . clearly explained in the Constitlltion, and further _ details of tl1em are g1,1en 111 tl1e internal regLtlations of eacl1 CI1amber. Tl1 e l)�rio d of eigl1t or 11ine 1no11tl�s f01· wl1icl.1 the Etl1ioi:>ian Parliament meets _ _ ach year 1s lo11ger tl1an for ma11y parlia1nents, and some African parliaments.,_ like. � _ that of Tanzan1 a, now 1ne:t only for very sl1 01·t periods. Full meetings norrna�y _ o�ly take place 1n the 1norru11g, ho,vever, and the 11u1nber of liours w.l1jcl1 tl1e EtluQ::--_ pian Parl1ament spe11ds i.11 session each day is comparatively few. Tber��s-notb;ip._g__:j .

- -*

)

PARLI AMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUT IONS

..�lto\� • r

. ti1 e ''fi libusters'' of the American Congress, which may make sittitlgs t:()l'ntn,1t'i approaching days or the all-night sittings of tl1e Englisl1 I-Iot1se of Conu 110118 . ' �: t for severa 1 . Ias embers, ne�essary for 111e�tI11gs a11cl vot.i 11 g, is a co111_ ru the m lf ha u of m \� e o yea1s a�ter 1957 1t ,vas somet1111es diffictilt, som e for and one , h hig q �tel · . lot�� para� Y n th e Senate, to find the nece.ssary nt1111ber of 1Jeople. Ii1 tlie Eiiglisl1 �\ · . d � es all{u i b on w1tl1 ca_ e r only a very �11 1all JJrOJJortio� ?f tile r1ed often e is at ) � � d , t . �indi� 1 Par am r . rap1 I-Iot1 fi dly l ls the se l1e11 a11 1n11Jorta11t ,,ote 1s 111 tl,e thou gl1 vv ! t esen ' ers p �ti, roemb . ffing o a sl1ow by of_ eith�r _ p lace l1a11ds or. b� a roll-cal I; 011 1110st takes Voting . t\ � asions, a show of band s 1s enot1gl1 to 1ndicate a 1uaJor1ty for or against the � o :.1,· ·C:, ccti oo ' bu t on djsputed votes a roll-call may take place, i11 vvl1 icl1 tl1 e 11ar11e of eac11 • · c� t�- mo · · w h tl e 1er 1e 1 e says IS 1or d h or an out, agatnst, or a b read sta1n111g is . ·�::�1 ;, member '• . ·, ' ( ··-·

': •--.•.•

. i:�· ,.� ·t.1 � '.. ... � ._. . '••,' :·... ,.,, . ,,.,

Consult Redden, The La•v Maki11g Process 111 Et/1iopia (I-I.S.J.U., Fact1 l ty of La\v) (1966) for a more detailed discussjon of these aspects of Parlian1e11tary procedt1re .

, •J '

\' , ._

ParliamentarJr Privilege

....... j

•

•• \

•:_ II

••

•--' I

Under the Revised Constitution, the Chambers of Parlia111ent and their individual 111clnbers receive certain "privileg es'', not granted to ordinary citizens, incltiding freedon1 fron1 arrest during sessions and freedom from a.oy legal action or prosect1tion co11cerni11g proceedings jn Parlia111ent. These privileges are conferred with a purpose, as the follo\.ving reading makes clear . 1

From Jain, I11dian Co11stitutio11al La1v, page 67 (1963).

With a view to enabling the Parliame11t to act and discl1arge its lugl1 fL111ctions effectively, witl1out any interference or obstr11ction f ro1n a11y qt1arter, certai11 privi are attached to eacl1 Ho11se collectively, a11 d to tl1e 1nembers leges and immunities t h ereof individually. The privileges are conferred 011 tl1 e 111embers for tl1e obviot�s reas?n that a House cannot function effectively witl1011t L111i111peded 11se of tlieir services and so the members have somewhat wider J)ersonal liberty a11d freedon1 of speech than an ordinary citizen has. Privilecres are co11ferred 011 eacl1 f[ot1se for �he protection of its members to perform tl1eir fu11c_tio�s un- so as to �hem enable impeded and for tl1 e vindicatio n of its own a11t l 1ority, 1Jrestige, power ancl clignity. · · · The Rationale of ''P rivileges'' · Privileges are a means of protecting tl1e incle1Je11cle11ce of Parliaineiit, froin 1 nterfer ence d, lts� be caniiot by Tliey the . cjtizens. executiv howe e ' tl1 e co11rts ' or ordinary · If , or one of 1 ts v e r, t0 prote ct members from the actions of Parl1ame11 t itse Ch a ers as r_t tlle ss a y tlie � _ ar; cle m kes 1na le rtic R b 84 of the evised Constitutio11 J r·rgh ts of , · A l a u . 1d . 1v 1d 11 Parl e th f o iam . om . tl ey b eloiig ·.. members .18 s ent to manage Its own affairs, and t 1 1e f reed . 1 1 icl1 wl to ect er nb to 1a1 Cl e th e 1ol l wl ro e nt tl1 of co Th us, free domubj . to t1�e ru les of proced ure o f . . . . s11bJec O f speech \V1th1n t . Parliament 1s the Ch a . .s st b"ect t 1 ne1 er t� mb concerned.. freedom to publisl1 proceedj11gs 111 Parl1a1 ee 11are 111ee to th e autho t d ' to ower ings s ecret· rity 0f par 11ament or either Cl1am�er, and .tl1e1· r ct, resiJe tliis , _ and freedom from 11 . .. . I 1 11-1be P, Cl1,t tl1 e · · by ed waiv · the Eth·1op st be arre may es · i r t . coun otl1er · 1an const1· tt1t1on in substantially echoes tl1e position h e foll· owi· . 11 1 !ave been gra11te d to . T . . ng . readings examine the pr1 v1leges wluc . t he Etlti · con1are op tan P arlia ell Iii w ment, as well as a nu· mber of otl1er privi 1 eges

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SOUllCEBOOK 01;- ETI-IJOPIAN CO.NSTITUTIONAL LAW

774

of e s liam ege vil par pri nts e Tl1 th e. ]1er e . ew els nts me rlia world , _ J) 1 11 t r. d 11 t1 1o mo11ly o u s g H s h o f e Li C E e t h o f o m m se o o n th s , _ m o fr and ed iv · er d y ll a c ri to is . � l1 I I over. are p Ch ., e p ay 10 secur1ng t e 1nde t 1ey rt pa the . d a11 ng bei pen o int e ' cam es . -1 eg 1 v r1 p se 1e tl · . d an 1 g 11 E 10 y ch ar n o m 1e tl om fr t en am li ar dei1 ce of P

_Freedo,n of Speeclz Read:

Articles 78, & 84 of tl1e Revised Co�s!itutioo; Articles 2044, 2046 & 2048 of the C1v1l Code; Ai·ticles 404, 405 & 406 of tl1e Penal Code. II lle-read: Cl1apter , Section 2, pp. 97-105, 115, supra. From Jain, op.cit., page 68. Freedom of Speech: Tl1e esse11ce of pa.rliamentary democr·acy is a free, frank a 11 d fearless disc11ssion in tl1e legislattlre. To enable members to express themselves rreely a11d to e.11sure a free competitio11 of ideas witllin the legislature, it _is ess�ntial to free tl1e 111en1 bers from tl1e fear tl1at tl1ey can be penalised for anytb1ng said by tl1e111 in tl1e legislatt11·e. ... 111 India, Art. 105(1) ex1)1·essly safeguards !1·eedom of speech in Parliament.... l:;-11rtl1er, according to Art. 105(2), no 111ember of Parliament is liable to any p·ro ceedi11gs in a11y court for anytl1i11g said 01· a11y vote given in Parliament or a com mittee thereof. Notl1ing said witl1i11 a Ho11se is actiona,ble or justiciable. The freedo111 of speecl1 e11joyed by a n1e1nber it1 Pa.rliament, l1owe,,er, is subject to tl1e provisio11s of tl1e ConstitL1tio11 . One sucl1 constitut.io11al restriction on this ·freedon1 is th,at 110 disc1lssio11 can take place in Parliament witl1 respect to the con duct of a Jt1dge of tl1e St1p1:en1e Cot1rt or tl1e :High Court in tl1 e discl1arge of his duties except \vl1e11 a 1notio11 to prese11t a11 ,tdd.ress to tl1e President for his removal is t111der consjderatio11 i11 tl1e I:-lottse. SL1cl1 a safeg11ard is very essential to maintain and ]Jrotect tl1e i11tegrity of t11e jLtdiciary so tl1at it ca11 functio11 witl1ot1t being subjected to JJolitical JJresst1res a11d criticis111s wlticl1 it can11ot n1eet or answer publicly. Further,· tl1e rules of }Jrocedttre of a 11011se 111ay also ct11· tail tl1e t�reedom of speech.... Cla11ses ( 1) ,L11d (2) of Art. 1 05 p1·otect wl1at is sa id witl1in the House. They do not protect wl1at a 1ne11 1ber of P,1rlia111 e11 t 1nay say outside tl1e House and thu s a � en1 b�r �]10 re�_Je,tts 01: pttblisl1es 011tsicle Parlia 1ne11t a slanderous speech made by 111m w1th1n Parl1an1 ent 1s not J?rotected. tle may, 1,owever, be protected un der Art. I 05 (3) for words spoke11 011ts1de Parliame11t if spoken in th essen tial performance e of duty as ,t n1en1ber. NewsJJGJJe1· ,Re1Jo1·tir1g o_f Parlia111e1·1ta,·y P1·oceedings Read:

Articles 78 & 84 of the Revised Co11stitutio11 · Articles 2044, 2046 & 2048 of the Civil Cod�.

Fron1 Wason v. Waite,·, 4 Queen's Be11cl1 73 (1868). The main questio�s f�r 011r decision is wl1etJ1er _pu�Jic. _ _ a in rt re fa a po fu itl l 1 _ wspaper of a clebate 1n e1tl1er ne l1ouse of parliament, containing matter dispa:r�gtl!��-=

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pARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

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, 1 avjng been spoke11 in tl1 e cours! of tl1 e l as idua l indiv an deba te f o ' ' ter ' . . b . . a r a c c \Vhose c 11 aracte1 l1 as tl1l1s bee11 caled 111 qtiestion party the of t sw iO the. . the . at . able n' a ct1 ° is, ar of op1·ruon tl1at 1t .1s not. ... . . e . �\e t 1t 1at 1s l b t f ou o d JJ,1ra to mot111 t pt1blc and 11 atioiial ssible impo us to 1 se t . I : :h at the proceedi11gs of th� l1 ol 1ses _of parli�111 e11t sJ1all be comin tinicated ortan 01p 1 e deepest interest 111 k11 ow111 g wJ 1at JJ,1s�s wit1 1j11 tl1 eir tl 1 have ho w u _bli c , e to th p g that on wl1at is tl1ere sa.id and do11c tl1e \Velf,1re of ·J1e con1 rnt1 11ity \\'all s, see1n d epends. 1. 7 s 0 e 7 g a p it c n o n l· a · J , r· ' From 1aso11 v. U1alter] was �1 ot followec.l i11 .l1 1cli rT [of l. Tl1 t1 s i11 Dr. le h T is princip 1e Calct1tta r.I1gl1 Cot1rt tl 1eld tl1 at ' 1' 10 ptiblicatio11 l Goa/a, Pi111it . v. dra Cha,i . " 11 uures . . a p llbl'1cat1011 ,1t1t I:or1se? by tl1: L egi_slattlre '.'. 11 1s su 1 e�s �un e o protected is p rts f re o A faithful report th�refore In a ne,vspaper_ of a debate 1�1 a J-Io_use o· Par11 ame11 t 15 not p rivileged and � sucl1 a report co11t�1ned 111�1tter d1s1Jarag1 11g tc tl1 e cl1aracter of an individ ual \.Vhicl1 had been spoken In tl1e c.ot1rse of tl1 e deba.te :t is actio11able for d efamation under ... the Indjan Penal Code. ... Tl1t1s, 1111 cler Art. l 05 (2) tl1 e fact that the report is a report of proceedings in P,trlian1ent affords 10 J)rivilege or protection if it is not published tinder tl1 e at1tl1 ority of tl1e I-Iot1 se of Parlia111e11t. Trus state of law came to be regarded as unsatisfactory. It \.;as felt t11at tl1 ere were many advantages to the community if newsp,ipers cot1lcl be e11a:>led to pt1blisl1 in good faith reports of proceedings of Parliame11 t. Accordi11 gly, Par.ian1e11 t J)assed the Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Pt1blicatio11 ) ActJ 1156. It enacts that no person shall be liable to any proceedings, civil or crin1i11 ::1l, in a11y cot1rt i1 1 respect of the publication in a newspaper of a substantially trt1 e rep)rt of tl1 e 1Jro ceedings of either House of Parliament, unless tl1 e pt1blicatio11 is r-roved to J1c1ve been mad e \Vith malice. Also, if the p11blication of any n1atter is 11ot fer J)t1 blic good, it will not be protected.

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Ethiopian La1v of Nelvspaper ''Privilege'' to Report Par/ic1111e11tc11y J.J.·oceetli11gs

In Ethlopia, to the best of 011r knowledge, no c,1se 11 as yet aris�11 cl1 allenging �he P 0:Ver of the press to publish proceedings in Parli,11ne11t. Accot1rts of' ,1ctivit_ies 10 Parliament have frequently been published in botl1 tl1e A1nl1aric a1d tl 1e Engl1 sl1 newsp�p ers in Addis Ababa, and several readings from s11ch publications ca11 be �0 �nd 10 these materials. Reports of parliame11tary activities l1a,,e ne,ertbeless b�en rief, fr�gmenta ry and practice in rrost cou�tries, tl1e ic with rad spo ed par com ,vbere fairly full accounts of happenings in Parliament can us11 ally b� fou�d 1n t!1e newspapers. Ethiop ia is also unlike most countries in tl1at tl1ere is no public official of procee�ings in Parliament; by contrast, Jlc1nsar1 in_ En�l111d, the <;onan Afr most i� Ir ns cat1o publ1 1 n 011s S the 1 I d g Recor d tonal Unite tates and analo d ot i er ou ��ch � � ntries, provide a compl�te, verbatim, day to day rec?rd �f e verythI?g 15 s id a d es tiac deq J ina i; iot ser n bee 1s ide T th1 dec e hav d in Parliament. l1ere ·in the avai�I ' n· ab1l1ty of reports of parliamentary proceed11 1gs. Secrec y of Deba tes From Ja1n , op.cit., pages 75-76. s er 1g a str 1 de clu ex to l1t rig e a s tes: Each I-louse of Parliament l1a ba f? of y fromp��vac proceedings and hold its sittings in camera. · · ·

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NA L LAW IO T U IT T S N O C N IA P JO I IT E SOURCEBOOK OF

776

at e u th lv p i so at re lic ' b e on tim y of an at its ay 1n s p on rom . m Co f o e s t1 o · H e 1 l T . 1 e ·b th 11 1t o pu bl" b pr 1o at 1c Y e n er th of d an po re ge rt ile iv pr s its of l cl ·ea 1 b · a i s . ceed.111gs d 1a n f t o I C our as h e d h upreme I that s · The e . tt. · · · · w s g i n . ' . re d e e c o r p . r . 1e tl o r o s e t a d. eb r ge or we ile po iv e pr th of of e e th nc te is ex e tl1 us · Ho t . ou ab e t ub do or n . 10 t· . s 1e t q 1 s no . cat1.on of it . in g s . d e e c o r p s to forbid pL1bli . 1

?. w n 1 a ia p o hi t f E o t en m te a st te ra u W0u ld the above b e a n acc

Freedo1n fi·o11i Ar,·est

Read:

; n o ti u it st n o C ed is ev R e th f o A1·ticle 85

From Jain, OJJ.cit., 73. a il d on civ ste re in ar be eed oc pr ot nn g ca er mb me A t: res Ar nt fro Freedom e of th sio !f se a ses ou er and aft ys . if da d 40 an re fo be � ys da 40 of d rio pe a n thi wi s t of thi Jec e e leg ob . Th ivi sed pr ea rel is be to is he d, rio pe s thi n tl1a r lie ear ed est arr to secure tl1e safe arrival an d 1·egular attendance of members on the scene of their parliamentary q.L1ties. Tl1e privilege extends only to civil arrest. There is no such rt or ven cou pt . m pre of fro tem con for or , rge cha l ina crim a on st e ar1· m fro n do1 free tive detention.

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The provisions of tl1e Revised Constitution in this respect differ very markedly both from those of the Co nstitution of 1931, and from those of the English House of Commons, from, which the Indian privileges are directly derived. One gives immunity only in· criminal, the o thers only in civil, cases. Botl1 systems seem to accept that some pro tection from arrest is req uired, but they take con1pletely contrary views ,Ls to the types of cases in which this protection sh ould be given !

The Rule-NIal,ing Powe,·

l�ead:

Articles 80, 82 & 84 of the Revised Constitution.

From Jain, op.cit., 71,78. "'

Rule-making Povver: ... 1 he · India11 Constitt1tion at1thorises each House of Par�iament to make es ru 01· 1·egt1lating its own procedure and tl1e condll;ct of f ! _ b��iness. This rL1le 1�ak1;11g power can be exercised by a House subject to the pro v1s1ons of tl1e Const1tut1on. . .. Fundamental Rig�ts a�d Pri,1ileges: U11der A.1:t. 105 (3), Parliament may pass a law to defit1e its I)r1v1leg es. ... The Indian Constitt1tion contains a Chapter . 0� �unda ental Rights and a11y law lid inva is righ ts inco nsis tl1es tent with any of e � It will tlierefore ineau that a l,1.w passed by Parliament to d e. fine its privileges· can �e tested uude1· tl1ese r. ghts.

The i? ower 0f �ach Cl1amber o f tl1e Etl1iopian l>arlian1ent wn r ules of proce· '' o its det erm t o ine d tlfe and 111t erna 1 discipline'' marks a 1 · · . . · nstiover the Co c ear cl:d ,,ance 1n p,trl1amentary independence · . L u tution o f 1931 bY w111,�L1 t·liese were dete rmmed e thi� of r limi ts by t�e Emperor. However, tl1e u es, makin g . P ower·' a� not clearly defined by iss rtant tl 1e C onstitution ' and this may raise impo _ · since 1t a1nou11ts 10 effect' to 'a qu�siveto · I�ttve · Iegis · power w or_ �a I _ appro hich is no t subject to the . of tl1e Em ero r.' Prob]e�s ary li ina �rise espe_cial}y over the extent of the regulatory an� d1�cip � powers wh1ct1 this rov s1 of tl e 1 e gives Jl t st1tut1?n may give to the Chambers. Clearly it Con 1 D: f 1 ) l disciplinary powers t ieir o wn members, since by _Article 80, each Chamber 1:11ay tak� �ea�ures to compel the atteiid��:� 0 abs� t 1?1ember_s, and Article 84 makes members subJect to dis�i�lin:: action by their Chaniber f VI?� at! on of its rules. A m o re controversial case O?jght conce� po�er o f .a CL1a1nber t o di��ipl as d t e are Its perman.ent st_aff, who under present practice :1:,e(S ordinary civil ser va11ts. Final! � i:: Y, ere may b� a very 1mpo.rtant questi_ on over whether the C · -

pARLIAMENT

AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

777

exten cont d.cer rols over ordin�ry citizens and governn1ent offici tain way this .o ; in can ment 't1 , of �a. rlia . ub noenas to compel their attendance before _111vesl.1gatory comn11t_ tees or by pun als' i · s111· 0g , · · ' � · b issuing s· r if they f_a1· 1 to appear or otI1erw1se Y 1,a,rzent · · 1?fr1nge wl1at tJ1e a1 amber Par of ernpt cont for · re f, them latter questions are explored n1ore f11ll)' 1n the next section These ges. privile sits � regarsa d

Subpoenas . 76-77. pp p.cit., Froro Jain, o I Inquiries: The �ouse of CoD?illons l1as p_ower t_o i1Jstitt1te i 1 1qt1iries and to order 1, attendance of the witnesses, and 111 case of d1 sobed1ence, to bring st1ch witnesses i 11 custody to the b�r ?f tl1e Ho11se. U tl1ere be a cl1arge of co�tempt �nd breacl1 of pri vilege, an order 1s issued to tl1e perso11 cl1arged to answer 1t, and 1 f tl1ere is a wilful disobedience of that order, the House has power to take tl1 e perso1 1 into ct1stod y, I and the House alone is tl1e proper jt1dge of wl1e 11 tl1ese powers are to be exercised. Rule 270 of the Lok Sabl1a Procedure lays dow11 tl1at a parliamentary committee I J . 1 shall have p ower to send for perso11s, papers and. records. According to Rule 272, ! all evidence is to be taken on oatl1. '. Inquiries and

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These powers are not expljcitly granted to Parliament in Ethiopia, except for the po\ver to call for the Prime Minister and other ministers, or tl1eir deputies, to answer questions 11ncler Artic]es 72 and 73, which we shall consider in detail later. Our JJUrpose l1ere is to draw attention to the place of privilege in securing the investigatory powers of Parliament, and to raise tl1e question of whether this particular privilege should be granted to tl1e Parliament of Etl1iopia. The wl10Ie sub ject is treated in more detail in the next section. Contempt of Parlian1ent

From Jain, op.cit., page 78

Power to pun·ish for contempt: Tl1e Hot1se of Com111ons l1 as power to pt1nisl1 a person, whether its member or not, for l1js ''contempt'' or ''breacl1 of privilege'' �n_d this power is truly described as tl1e ''keystone of parliamentary privilege'' for it 1s used by the House to enforce its privileges. This power is available to tl1e I-louse "i� v�rtue of its inl1erent and essential right to control its own proceedings and_ maio !atn its own dignity''. A similar power is available to tl1e Ho11ses of Parliament 1n India . . A case o.f contempt of the House arjses when any act or omission obstructs or impedes it in the _performance of its functions, or obstrt1cts or im1)edes any _mem ber_ or_ officer of such Hot1se in tl1e discharge of Iris duty, or l1as a tend�ncy, d1 re�tly or m<lirectly, to produce st1cl1 rest1lts. Comments i n tl1e ne\vspaper casting reflection on the indivjdual members or on tl1e wl1ole House or its officers n1ay constitute contempt. If somethjog has_ been said wl-uch is calculated to lower tl1e ?restige of a member and thereby the prestige of tl1e Ho11se in the eyes of tl1e pt1blic, a cas� of cont�mpt of the House may arise. Premature publication of a report of a comm1 ttee meeting before the 1nay also constitute con Ho11se same tl1e to l1as been presented tempt. It is for the ular factual �ittiation con�ti partic House any to er clecide wl1eth t such an affront mem?�rs 1n tl1at c�pacity its : or to the I-louse the dignity of � · _mounts to a the Hotise of pr1v1leges the contemp of any t When of the House. S disre !is c garded or infringe d or attacked by any individual or autl1ority, the off ence alled a breach of Hotise in tl1e saine way as the privilege by punisl1able and is contempt. ... he P�nisb·me� · �s which. a I-louse may iJllJ?Ose on its non-members �or its �? 11temp1 are. admon1t1on, repriman . d and impr1 sonment. On members, Jn add1t1on

778

TITU"'fIONAL LAW S N o N C IA P IO H T E F O SoURCEBOOK

t ... m n o ls fr p o m ex d e an H th n i u o ns , pe se us i ou of s 1 ay w J· y by es lt 1 a ( L1 e so a. to these, p c• s c o ntem p1 cannot be for � fixe it r iO e_ s 11 o �I a by t 11 � d n 111 tel'lll; so rj np Ii d. se o be imp. en H e d wh th se lea re be se ou o t led 18 tit en o pr lly ica at ro m o t gued ati ·s r ne r1so tl1e o r breach of p r ivilege i s ve r y rar . t m nte o c JJ r f o t 1e11 nn 1) . o I ris ? l i e or d ssolved. . . . Im y g rt n d' �n 1e pa ct:: 01 h d e t f an o e gy th o l o ap e tl1 tt ma s pt ce ac er i� e 11s o H e th , lly u· sua on is h ed . m d e a b y a m y rt a p 1e tl s, se ca s I closed. 111 ve1.·y seriot1 ·•,UCL

•

SECTION 4

PARLIAMENT AND THE EXECUTIVE Int,·oditctory Note

In a narrow sens e Parliament is concerned wit h ''making the laws '', but enough has been sho,vn to indicate tl1at Parliament and the Executive share in making many of tl1e basic policy decisi ons wllich mus t unde rlie the laws which parliament enacts,-e.g. tl1e making of the budget; taxes ; laws dealing with internal security; ''ratification'' of treaties ; legal implen1entation of g overnment economic policy throt1gl1 a11tl1orization of expenditur es, creation of g overnmental economic deve lopment agencies and regulatio11 of private economic activity by law.

The JJurpose of this section of tl1e Chapter is to focus more closely on the tecl1niques whlch Parliament may use, constitutionally, to influence the Executive and vice-versa. We m11st r ealize tl1at while, in a sense., t.he Con.stitution may provide for a ''separation'' - or ''compartmentalization'' - of ''powers'', still, realistical ly, it may be wrong to tllink - as M ontesquie u did - in terms of ''sepa rated and insulated'' JJowers. To provide effective, efficient p olicy-making, Parliament needs information. and needs to increase its capacity to communicate regula rly to the Prjme Minister, to express its views col1e rently and to increase its prestige so that its views �ill hav e weight. In tl1e san1e way tJ1e G ove rnment will be concerned re gularly w1tl1 atten1pts to inflt1ence Parliame11t. The G over ninent will want to get its_ legislative !Jrogram enacted, to enlist ge11eral Parliamentary support - and to �his end to ''inform'' and ''perst1ade'' Parliament. A G overnment which cannot infltience Pa�liament to this extent may 11ot be able to ''lead''. And if a Gover n ment - particularly in a developi11g co11ntry - cannot ''lead'' ' what will happen to the ''developn1ent p rocess'' ? The material wliich follows examines Parliamentary - Executive relatio ns from two perspectjves. First, we l?ok at tl1e pro·blems fron1 the view of Par liament. We examine the poy.,er� of Parliainent and its committees to seek information. There may be tw� 0 ?Jectives_ for tlie tise of thls power: (a) Parliament may wish to seek facts �r o pi mons y.rhich . are r�levant to deliberation on pending leg lation; (b) ��rliaroen� s i y wish t? in�estigate some matter primarily for the purpose of deter1111mng whe :�r a _law 18 ly pe pro bei ng pr o is per ly enforced or whetl1er a government program . � 10 d � �ruster�d. We t�ien loo� at other techniques whicl1 Parliament may use to . : u nee na�onal policy-making; Parliament's un an e ar e pow e r s ove r public financ portant point of focus fo r these purp oses. -

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PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

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I ,"Ill J I �;

779

problems �f Pa rlia1n e11t - Exectitive �elations, fron1 the at look we second, particularly government, fro1n tl1e offic e of its leaders, e.g. the of e ectiv the pp.ersp Minister to see what powers ca11 b e 11s ed to pt1t ''legitin1ate ' ' pressure on · e run . the ' Parliament.

iei'i ;I'

�· Ii

Parliament's Informing and Investigatory Functions and Po,vers

Introductory Note

In order to carry ot1t its ft1nctions effectively, as regards botl1 co11trol of tl1e executive and scrutjny of legislation, a parlia1n ent 11 eeds to k11ow tl1e facts. If tl1ey are to criticise, or even to examine, the activities of go,ernme11t, 1n e1nbers of parlia1 ment need to know the actions whicl1 were taken, tl1e reasons for them; tl1ey may also need a mass of backgrot1nd information against wl1icl1 to jt1dge tl1e v\1isdom of: gof vernment policies. Similarly, members can only carry ot1: a11y 111ea11i11gful exa1ni11alio11 of a ne\v law if they l1ave at tl1eir fingertips all tl1e coosideratio11s wl1icl1 \vent into it s making. The search for information is tbt1s most in1portant: most of a parlia ment's time is usually taken up with it, and much of a 1Jar liame11t's real importa11ce may be gauged by its ability to uncover the facts wl1i1�l1 it 11eeds to k11ow to carry out its duties. The following readings give examples Df son1e of the 1neans of in;, vestigation which are; tinder the Constitutio11, open 10 the Etl1iopian }Jarliament. You should bear in mind that Parliament's power tc i11vestigate may be affected by many powers - such as its po\ver to st1b1Joena, co11sidered briefly in the last Section, and you sl1ould refer to ot1tside readings for 1l1e IJractice of foreign parlia ments which may influence f t1t11re developme11t of tl1e Etl1iopia11 legislatt1 re.

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The Power to Question Ministers

Read: Articles 72, 73 and 84 of tl1e Revised Constit11tion. From The Internal Regulations of tlze Senate (Law School Translatio11).

Ministers shall l1 ave the rigl1t to attend meetings of tl1e Se�1ate, 24. le i �iu: c t 0 r a Joint session of the two Chambers, or a meeting of a parliamentary CoroID1ttee, a� d may speak about matters affecting tl1eir respecttve Mi11istries in accordance with Article 73 of the Constitutio11. Tl1 ey or tl1 eir de1Juties mt1st also ·be present when dr aft legislation is · her r consideration and must answer questions eit tinde orally or in writing. Prime M i1uster, Minister s, 1he for Special prepa�·ed seats mt1st be or their deputies whe.n tl1ey attend Parliamen . t . ...

e f ol tlJ t pec res to ed lig ob E i be e le y r all 1 sl m e t lja 1 1 er t c o mb f Pa r Me Ar rules33. v I owi· ng und er Article 84 of the Constitutio11: ...

(c)

•••

(e)

·u nauJy repeated or irrelevant q11estions sl1all not be address ed to �1 persoi1 present during a session for questioning;

Questions shall not be trivial or imprecise; speecl1es may no! r�fer to _ be � personal cha.racter or condition of any person, d1rectly or ID<lirectly, Ill· SUc h a way as to give personal offence. (f) 1 que9 lion time, , ioi eSt qu ng bei son per the to e dt1 r the respect and honou � e shall be fully mainta ined.

Sou1iCEBOOK . OF ETI-IIOPIAN CoNsT1.T·u�rIONAL LAW

780

ich wh he ion est i�e ns qu co y_ an rs t ou to vio late le ru y a . m nt de esi Pr e Th ( g) r ks o s_ be as d e an m a 1s 1f or co se t, an ev el irr nded, it be °;l to 01 les rll tile 1 scuss 1 on. d er h rt fu t 11 o h it w te vo to ct will be subje any � atter referred to a standing co_ nunitte abou! N· arise sl1all qttestion o e (11) , until tlie committee J1as :finished its work thereon, and subnutted it to Pa 1 ·lian1ent. appear in deputies their Parliament or s Ministe1· Whe11 for questjons (i) a.nd cxpla11ations under Articles 72 and 73 of the Constitution: I. All questions sl1all be based on correct information; 2. If a q11estion h,1s been declared secret by the Minister or bis Deputy, tl1e meeting sl1all be declared closed to the public by th.e President of the Senate. • ••

When a committee st·udying a bill is of the opinion that the com ments attacl1ed to it do not give sufficient clarification, they may request the person who s11bmitted tl1e bill 01· ]1is depttty to appear in person for the purpose of clarifi cation. In t l1e same way, tl1 e person who submitted the bill shall ha\'e the right to ask to ap_pear in person a11d give explanations orally or in writing. Article 51.

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Article 63. As provided in Articles 72 and 73 of tl1e Constitution, tl1e Senate after deciding by majority vote may invite tl1e Prime Minister to appear or send a

de1Juty to a11s wer q11estion s orally or in writing.

After sucl1 decision of tl1e Senate, the President shall sen d . the invitation to the Prime Minister at least tl1ree days in advance. A s11m ·mary of the reasons why the attendance of the Pri1ne Minister or I1is dept1ty is required shall be enclosed by the Pre sident in tl1e i11vitatio11 to the Prime Minister. In tl1 e s ame way, tl1 e atte11da 11ce of otl1e1· Mi11 isters or their deputie s may be requested. by tl1e Senate. Tl1e President 1nust explai1 1 to tl1e Ministers the reason s for such reqt1ests. . Article 64. A�1y Me111ber s11 all l1a,1e tl1e 1·igl1t to question the responsible _ Mini �ter abotit _a bill befor e tl1e Senate . 1 1 1 tl1e san1e \\'ay, a. Member i s entitled to que stion tl1e PrJme Minister as p1·ov.ided for i 11 Article 63 above. . Article �5. Qties tio1 1s sl1all be give11 to the President in writing; however, during a s�ss 1 o1 1, 01·al qt1e s tio1 1s 111ay be addressed to l1in1. The President shall pass suc11 quest_io11s to_ tl1e Mi11iste 1� co1 1cerned. S11cb Mi1 1iste1· shall be entitled to ask for so1ne time w1tl1in w11icl1 to co1 1side1· the question. Article 66. On the day appointed for questio 1 1ing, the Preside nt 11?-aY _cal] .the Men 1ber w�o l 1ad asked tl1 e q11estion, and sl1 all ask l1im to r ead the queSfIOll, he ; ai1swers will �e gi,,en by tl1e Prin1e Minis ter, tl1 e Minister, or bjs deputy, a,5 he case may be, e1ther orally 01· i 1 1 writi11g. -= Article 67• A qllestion to a Minister must be strictly relevant to the s _iibjec.t. .:.,_ 5 cle 68 T 1e � . l �im and object of asking qt1estions and supplementa��7!� � : ��

tions f 1?e M ii i �ters 18 f?r the larificatio a . s per u to n � and of ��':eJil certa poin in ts, �? "'to car ry out certain esse 11t1al dl1t1e es tlrp s coming under their functions and_res12onstb � - --·. ''(-· m-b� .

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PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

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781

1, 1958 E.C.

agenda of �e daily ,vork [of tl1e Cl1amber of Depl �aily the g ducin 1ties], In intro �omo, president of tl1e C 1 1amber of Deputjes, gave Be1s�a Ato rable an ou hon the er pow to tl1e House. mg t1on ques the of u·oo a � 1 � said he �ive th�t n, prev�o�1sly, wl1en a c1arificatioi1 was anat io°: expl the In re quired , or � legal ?p1n1on, H.�. the Prime Minister_ w�s asked to appear in But 1� we read th� Const!tut1on by co�l )aring 7_ 2 . Article �1th [the ce l accordan Amharic] with . t�e English version, tl1e President said_ H.B. tl1e Pr1111e Minister whe� the att�r only c�ncer11s_ l11s department. Therefore, ns op1ruo give � should :-Iouse, clarrfi ad�e� If cat1on , Is he requir , ed by onward tl1e s I tJie isstie from now will be referred to the M1n1s�y �oncerned, _pt1r?l1ant to a combi11ed reading of Article 68 and 73 of the Constltu t.Ion and tl11s will be more he]pft1l. I-le aiso said th at for the future the House must use this metl1od to clarify issues. The House unanimously accepted tl1e opinion of the Preside11t.

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.....

From Proceedings of tl1e Senate, Session of 23 Ge11bot 1953 E.C. (31 May 1961), Law School Translation.

....

H.E. Ato Yilma Deressa, Minister of Finance and I-1.E. Ato Minasse Lemma, Auditor General, were present to answe1· qt1estions.

The Akabe Gubae announced that the members 1)rese11t are 58 and according to the Constitution sufficient to constitute a quorum and start deliberatio11s. Tl1e proceedings started accordingly. _The item on the agenda was ''Report of the Comn1ittee on I11con1� Tax''. T!1e Cha irman-President asked whether there is objection to tl1e report ,vl11cl1 ,vas dis tributed to the members. . Like Kestela Wolde Medhin read out 31, 44(b), 74(e) p.23 and asked tl1e _ Minister of Finance as to what ''special circumsta11ces'' mea11t. at tli is �d 11t �se pr w 110 An er n tio of es qu H.E. Ato Yilma Deressa: Tl1e � . in certain cases, according to Article 44(b) a person may not receive 111s s�lary.011 n tio lia sit h SUC rs ve y co h1 ont e J tjc Ar basis _ and since be is no t paid regularly, tl1e :ad fixes special period for payment of tax. Like Kestela Wolde Medhin read Article 74 and asked 11ow tlJis arrange ment can apply retroactively. t n u o_ cc a id sa 1e tl · Answer of H.E. the 1 r fo le ab se tl1e tax JJa) ca r· y te an is · In in M es J tic r A read ing y ear· comp1 you if However, e. om jnc t ed le ab by tax i e rat th g pro :1 73 and 7: y ou w1 1 1 understan ? d it better. tl1e to not cl ail Like Kestela Wolde re tti fLi e 1 tl to ly on is t : It s effec hin ed M st n a P o e?• raised on . qt1esti e . · · Belatta Mersae Hazan W/Kirkos explruned tlJat . tiJ . bout taxab b y 1HE le ' a · 1s k . 1sst1e Tl1e J e KesteI a appl es to 15 es l · Art1 me cases referred 1n inco � al ! annual inc o aotJti able tax e h T . · . me e 10 ticl A gnculture is covered by Ar s tarts from Meske rem.

SoUilCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

782

Ato Makonnen Gebrehiwet asked that if agricultural sectors are exempted,

does it mean tl1at soldiers are also exempted?

Ans,ver of H.E. Ato Yilma Deressa: If inco�e from Agriculture is exemp t

fronl payment of tax it does_ not_ mean that a soldier shall be exempt. But now it meai1s this law can 111alce lum liable. Ato Makonnen Gebrebi,vet: D11ring these months the salary of the soldiers

has bee11 raised at the expense of deducti11g from the civilians. Secondly, this draft Jaw increases income tax from employment. In view of this, how can it (salary of civilians) be s11bjected to two deductions? Answer of 1-1.E. Ato Yilma Deressa: It is only 11ntil this law comes out.

Once this law comes into effect, tl1e old one shall be repealed. The Chairman-President asked those who are in favour of the resolution trans1nitted by the Chamber of Deputies and accepted by the Committee of the Senate to vote for it. It was supported by 61 votes.

Parlian1.e11.tary Co1n1nittee /1zvestigatio11s Using T/1e Questio11ing Poli,er to Scrutinise Details of Existing Gove1'l1111ental Policy.

From Minutes of tlze Finar1c·e and Econon1ic Con1111ittee of tlie Senate, Meeting of 24 Genbot 1956 (Law School Translation). The Comnlittee was convened to study the Proclan1ation ratifying a Loan Agreement between the Ethiopian Governn1ent and tl1e Italian Credit Organisation. The Senate in its 66tl1 session of 1956 recomn1ended that tl1.is s.hould first be studied by the committee before being presented to tl1e Cl1amber. Tl1e committee establisl1ed started to work accordingly. H.E_. At? Mulatu Debe� e, Vic �-Mioister in tl1e Ministry of Finance, was present for further expl� nat1011 111 accord ance �1tl1 Article 73 of the Constitution. Tl1.e follo\'\1ing questions were put _ to hin1 by tl1e Comnuttee w1tl1 tl1e responses indicated:

Oi1estion I - [asks whicl1 countries l1ave given loans to Ethiopia] �

- [gives a list of tl1ese co11ntries and loans] Questio,1 2 - I-low 1011g is it since Ethiopia started to ra.ise these loans? Answer

It is now twelve years since we started to raise these loans. Ethiopia �1as so far ft1lfi.lled l1er obligations by payi11 g both the loans and the 1n te1· _ es ,� 011 tl1e !11· �o this extent the foreign magazine called ''The T�mes .b.as IJmd tr�bute to our country, saying that of all the coun tries w�1ch have raised �cans so far, Ethiopia is the only one which has_�bided_ by her prollllsed word and paid back her loans. Because of this , while many other countries l1ave often asked for loans which l1ave not been granted , Ethiopia's requests for loans have never s,o far been refused.

Questio11 3 - Of the co1111tries whi_ch have so far granted u,s loans, J1 ave a11y extend

ed tl1e payment period beyond nine years, ru1d had an interest rate of less t11an 5.5%? . ..

AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

pARLIAMENT I )

_ [explanation of the _different �incis of loa 11s, and tl1 e reaso11s w11y Ethlopia needs foreign loa ns 111 order to aclueve ,,ariot1s goals of tbe Five Year Plan]. 0uest1·on

I }

( A11s1ver

783

from the portio1·1 of tl1ese loa11s wl1icl1 l1as bee11 co11verted rt 4 _ Apa • into use, wl1at do yol1 1ntend to d o ,v1· t 1.1 tl1e rest a11d wl1ere Jias j t gone? - From the loans wl1icl1 we l1ave received so far, so1ne J 1ave bee11 converted into use; tl1e rest will also be 11sed in new enteq)rises a11d also to carry out tl1e ,vork wl1 icl1 l1as already been started, a11d tl1erc is no need to worry tl1at it l1as been 1111wisely or extravagantly spent.

Ouestion 5 - It has been said that some of tl1e mo11ey l1as bee11 co11 verted into

·� ..,

A11s1ver

use; what kind of schemes bas tl1 is 1no11ey bee11 s1)e11t UJJ011, and have tl1ese schemes given fruit?

- [details of the uses of tl1e loans raised fro111 tl1e World Bank, U.S.A., Yugoslavia and Czecl1oslovakia] . •

,' Question 6 - We wo1ud be very glad if yo11 wo11ld separate for 11s tl1e loa11s \.vl1icl1 we have borrowed i n tl1e name of t11e Gover11me11t from tl1ose vvl1icl1 we have borrowed as gt1ara11tors of Cl1artered Orga11isations. AnSlver - [the vice-minister explains tl1at all loa11s req11ire tl1e g11arantee of the State, under Article 119 of the Constitution, and tl1at tl1ere is nt) point in separating the categories in tl1 is ,vay]. Question 7 - Wl.1at is the reason for 011r borrowi11g tl1is sun1 from tl1e Italia11s, at a high.er rate of interest, before tl1e Ioa11 given b�, tl1e U.S.S.R. is fL1lly converted into 11se? Anslver - The U.S.S.R. does 1 1ot give llS tl1e 111011ey i11 casl1, b11t in tl1e for1n of goods, and tl1ese goods cost tl1ree times as n111cl1 as tl1ey do on the world market. The only goocls useftil to 11s wl1icl1 ca11 be bot1ght from R11ssia are I1 eavy i 11 dustrial mac11ines, wbicl1 eve11 if bougl1t . are not so useful if tl1e spare parts are not 111ade i11 ot1r co11t1try; to bring tl1e machines for oil refining at Assab took us nearly 1 ½ years, and we were aske d to pay $74,000,000, vvl1icl1 after 1011g ba.r gaining was red11ced to $34,000,000 . Questiorz· 8 - on · . . proposed ·1 oan ?· what proJects do you want to use thJS Answer - (I) Power plant using et1calyptus wood $ 14,000,000 $ 1, 600,000 Ambo water (2) distillery and · b ottle factory ,., $ 3,500,000 (:, ) Meat factory $ 2,000,000 (4) Investment B an k $ 4,000,000 (5) Development Bank $ 2,000,000 (6) Glass factory for making wi11dow panes (7) Food oil pressing factory a11d j11te $ 1,000,000 fibre factory The ren1aining $ 6,900, 000 is to be used for bl1yi11g the �achinery for the cotton spinning and fibre factory, and for macl1111 ery for building l1ouses.

I\ 784

SOURCEBOOK OF ETI-IIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA·w

, ed an e pt lo th ce d ac an d ne y sig s wh wa r t we e11 e1n re ag e is th re fo Be 9 11 tio s . i1e Q ,,._, ed be lly us cia to is offi n loa s disclosed thi l1 1ic w] r fo cts oje pr the 110t to Parliame11t '? Eve11 tliougl1 tl1e projects for wb�cl1 the money is to_ be used have been decided ·upon, ft1rtl1er studies have to be carried out before tl1e decision can be fully implemented. Further, the engineers who prepare tl1ese p1·ojects l1ave to be paid, and if these. a�e hired before the loan is agreed, we will be at a loss to pay them if 1n the end it is 11ot granted. Tl1at is why we fo·und it e� sen�ial to arr�nge the loan and prepare tl1e projects before presenting 1t to Parliament.

l I

Oitestioti IO - In the draft of tl1e Agreement, Section 10, it is stated that if a dif _, fere11ce arises regarding tl1e payment of the loan, the case is to be settled llnder the Italian law in the Italian courts. Why was this done? - If contra1·y to 011r obligation, w e refused to repay this loan, we have both agreed to select arbitrators and the case is to be deter111ined 1111der Italian Civil Law. Whether this will create prejudice or dan1age to 011r nation l1as been well studied by legal experts who vve1·e se11t to Italy to st11dy the tern1s of the Agreement before it was signed. All in all, st1cl1 cases would arise only jf we refused to honour ot1r obligatio11s. Qi,estiorz I I - Tl1is Agreement was signed 11early a year ago, and bas not been brot1gl1t be.fore Parliament in all this time. W11y is it now brought to t1s at the same time as tl1e B11dget for 1957? I1litially, we wanted tl1is loan for the seco11d stage of the Koka l1ydro-electric I)roject, b11t for tlus scl1e111e we found a long term loa11 fro1n tl1e World Ba11k witl1 ,1 lower interest rate. Tl1us, instead of 11si11g tl1e loa11 for tl1is project, it was decided to use it for the pro· jects en·u1nerated lt11cler Q11estion 8, whicl1 are still being studied. The loan was tl1e1·ef01·e not brotight to Parliament until now, because �11e projects f o_r wlrich it would be used were 11ot fu1ly studied, and 1t was 11ot del1be1·ately delayed after tl1e plans were fully prepared. ,Qitestio11 12 - WJ1en tl�e I)rojects for_ wl1icl1 tl1e loa11 is to be used start giving re · �ur11s, w1ll tl1e s11111 1·a1sed fro1n tl1en1 be e11ougl1 to repay the loan; 1f 11ot, l1as 011r go,1e1·n111e11t got 1·ese1·ves sufficient to repay it? - The projects fo1· w11icl1 t11e loa11 is to be used need deta.iled stt1dies, so as to ascertain if they will repay tl1e debt. If ho\vever, a calamity s11cl1 �s a11 eartl1qt1ctke occ11rs, t.hese factories would be insured, and tl1e risk of 11011-1Jftyrne11t col1ld never arise. Question 13 - Co11ld Sectio11 IO of the Agreeme1 1t be amended in sucl1 a way as to say tl1at tl1e arbitrators in giving tl1.eir decision would be bo·und by tl1e prese11t law? Tl1� Italian law was e11acted f01· tl1e people of Italy, and could n.ot be 11nproved 01· cha.nged for the sake of foreign nationals. O · . ...,uestion 14 - If· tl · 1e cu1·re11cy exchange rate increases or decreases in one of tbe two countries, l1ow could payment be made?

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

Ansv.ier

785

_ This is controlle d by i11ternatio11al law ' a11d is cio·t a, t th e mercy 1 1t · 1 1appens, matters wotild be d of any one party. Eve n ·r ec 1·de d u11der • • 1. t1 o prese nt· condi · ns o r tt 1e co11d1t1ons prevailing wl1en tl,e agree me nt d . s1g ne was

After t!hese qu estions had be en asked and the answers giver1, lhe Commjttee decided by a that end the sena te accept the Loan Agreement D 0 reco mm to 1 to 8 of ty ' · , · you th·mk the (JlllJOD · ons. a Wh t o th ques f I u· ? er u questi use ons might be asked? Co IDJlllttee asked alcl, 5 April 1963. r fle ian 1io Etl p The From

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Telecommunications (IBT), includi11g tl1ei r l1eadquar ters, \vare l1ouses , garages, the radio communica.tions and otl1ers. Tl1ey will also lJe i11terested i. 11 aski11g sectional chi efs and employees questions related to the organisation. In order to acqt1aiot themselves witl1 tl1e ge11eral set tip of tl1e Telecom1nt111ica tions, members of the Committee heard last \veek tl1e t'-111< deuvered by Ato Negassi Desta and Ato Kidane Alamayahu of tl1e IBT. Ato Negassi, Fi11a11ce Ma11ager of the I.BT. said to the Economic Commit tee of tl1e Parlian1e11t tl1at tl1e j,1sti tt1tio11 \Vas largely run by Ethiopian experts. According to tl1e 11ews release fro111 Parlian1cnt, the Finance Manager is quoted as having said tl1at ot1t of tl1e 90 foreign experts who were engaged at the beginning, only very few were left now.

If one assumes that the Parljament should develop and strengthen its role as <1; ''\.va� cl1dog'' over efficiency, honesty and con1petence withjn public adn1inistration, tl1en careful co11s1derat1on 111 uSl be given to the question whether powers for ''informing'' and ''investig�ting'' need !ob� developed. For the moment we make the ass11n1ption (it can, of couTse, be questioned; and it W}� �e, later) t!tat Parliament ca..n and should play a strong part ip investigati11g governmental activities. Consider, now, the questions below.

Pro ble111s: 111 Ade/ition To Its '' Ouestio11i11g Po1rvers'' - J;Jl/1at Ot/7 er Kiiids of Procedztres A11d Powers for J11fo,:;at ion-Gat/1eri11g Mig/1t Parliai 77ei7 t Develop ?

-�•

A sirrular committee will visit tl1e different sectio11s of tl1e I1111Jerial Board of

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A committee of 42 compose? of Se11�tors and Depu ties fron1 botI1 Ho tises of parliament i_s pre�ently �ngaged 1n p�el?ar1n� a report to t_ l1e I-Iot1ses after 1,aviiig visited and 1nvest1gated into tl1e adm1n1strat1ve a1.1d tecl1111cal establisl1men t of tlie Ethiopian Electric Light and Po\.ver Authority, earlier last 1nontl1. Tl1is was in line ,vith the policy of getti11g to kno,v l1ow variol1s co qJorate orga11isations t1tilise development funds in exect1ting tl1eir projects as well as tl1eir futt1re p]ans.

ASSume you are a lawyer ·assigned to the staff of Parliament. Y� tir duties �re tion ne� con lo_ furnish legal advice in it i me lia r Pa of when reques ted ' to members · ' i w th · their · official tasks. In the course of a session tl1e fol 1ow111g ma·tters have ar1se11 blisl 1ed pu 1 t ctin1 e1 d t · en rec 1 S.ix men1bers of· Parliament have sl1o � · wecl. yot1 a ' C 01,11011 Ecli1 cat . l iiltii ra · ,c A y gi ,.,. , ,r .1 ,,e b th e Government of Kenya: Rep ort 01 . ·. 1· t d by 1 11ss1o �;r ;� �r: vide missio� �1967). This report w_as prepared 1?� _a Co1nn the M101ster of Agricult11re · 1t st1rveys fac ilities aDd JJrogr d lopineot · ev c m econo 1 trainjng for farmers · Acting 'on tl1e premise tl1at tl1e u . : i n d cl1 1 1013 t uc ·· · · d agrict1ltural JJfO of Kenya depeods l1eav1ly on increase 1 in tL1rn jcl 1 wJ ds etlJo turn depe 11ds, in pa.rt, on improvement of farm _.ing 'm nds mm e o rec rt dep en· ds, in part 011 better educatio11 of far111ers, tl1e ReJJ � nd ' a · s rm r a · 1, ion t various steps to develop extension serv.1ces, demonstra

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> JAN CONS1�ITUTIONAL LAW SOURCEBOOK OF ETIfIOJ

786

n. 1 e MPs ask you: io ct TJ ru st in of ls ve le y an n1 at 'f1 tio i ,: ltc ed · ultL·ira, l · . agr1c ,, · h r p ste M e 1 a_ n.1 tm 1n e th to n d of e � a � om � ec ''r ! e er 11 t e � 111 � lia � ca11 Pa.r � _ , ? t s1s 1t n 1n . s Ca n m . le Ca ob it ap pr r 1la s1m y 11d st to 1 1 10 1ss 111 1n co · ai 1 11· ·. t? en am li ar P to rt po re to on si is 1n n1 co �iint its own, Several MPs have co1ne to you aski11g wl1�tl1er Parliam.ent can ''investigate tile affairs'' of a certai11 t1·ade u.nion w11�ch _(yo·u may assume) has been _ properly orga1uzed 11nder tl1.� relevant Eth1 o_p1an_ laws, but w�.1ch (accord ing to vario11s allegatio11s). 1s not conduct1�g its �seal affairs :p roperly: specifically (it is alleged) 11n1011 officers are us1ng uruon fu11�s for 1mpr� per jf not unlawf11I pl1rposes, and 11nion members J1ave complained to var.1ous MPs. :B and C (botl1 MPs) tell yo11: ''The In estmen� Corporati n of Ethiopia � y _ (a go,,ern1ne11t-ow11ed share company) 1s 1nv�st1ng 1:11oney 1n all sorts of enterprises. We want to find 011 t: in what specific business have state funds been i11 vested · a1·e these b11sinesses contributing efficientl11 to the national welfare and e;onon1ic development; who are the d .irectors; are they doing tl1ei1· job well?'' D wants to l<now wl1ethe1· he can ''sect 11·e jnforn1ation about tl1e operations of the American i11stallation at Kagnew - W11at does it do? Who is responsible for it? etc." D says: ''l want to question the American Ambas sado1· and otl1er officials - intensively i11 Parliament." E, anotl1er MP, comes to you, saying: ''It bas now bee11 o\rer :fi\ e years since tl1e Civil Code was enacted. We in Parlian1e11t must share, with tl1e government, a responsibility to see wl1etJ1e1·, i11 all of its man.y, complex aspects, the Code is properly st1ited for Ethiopia. We need to fi n d out if any Articles need amendme11t or clarificatio11. We 11eed to study col1rt decisio11s inter preti11g t.l1e Code and fi11d 011t wl1at is happe11ing. ''

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Wi th re spect t o tl1e pr oblem s above, one mig11t initially a sk - and you should certainly �sk - --: A �e a11 y (or all) o� the 111at ters raised by the MPs p1·oper subjects for Parlia,nentary 1nv �st1ga t1on? �h ould Parl1a1:1ent - as a11 i11stitution - assume the jurisdiction which th.e MPs . are cla1 1:1111 g? Can_ Parl fa1ne11t asst1111e tl1e jurisdiction, under the Constitution? If those que�ti �ns re�e 1v � an aff1r1nativ e a 11swer, �1e_11: Wl1a.t procedures migllt Parliament use to get the 1nfor1:1ation 1 t want s? A :e tl1 ere an y [1.n11ts on Parliame.nt's power to demand information? The readings below are d e s1g11ed to e xa111ine tl1is subject.

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Pc11·liamentary l11veJ·tigatio11s·: Tf1e Use of· Cornmittees To Investiga ancl Tlze Conte te1n1;t Po111 e1· to Co1n1;e/ Testi111onJ1.

McGrai11 v. Daug/1e1·ty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927)

Daugl1erty, tl1e �rot l 1e r o� tl1e Attor?-ey Gener,:tJ, \\'a s Stlnmi one d by subpoena to te stify before _ a Sen ate Com�.1ttee 1nvest1ga �mg a.lle,gat101?s of corruption in the Attorney General's office. Daug herty refL1sed to a)?JJear �efo1e tl1e �on 1n11t tee. The Sen ate t11e n ordered t1le arrest of Daughert y _ wl10, �1 1Jon arr�st, 1mn1ed1�tely pet1 t1oned f or habea s corpus. release, Th his e low ed er ord co e tii· t r but his custod1a11 , a n official of tl1e Senate, appealed to t11e Su and tbe pre fac me ts Co Fu rth urt er relevant Jaw appear fron1 tl1e Cot1rt's decision .

From tl1e _ Jl1dgment of the Supreme Court by Van De,,an ter, J.: Harry M._ Daugherty became tl1e Attorney Ge1ieral M arc h s, I 921, and l1eld ·. · · tllat �ffice unt.11 Ma1·cl128, 1924, w�1en he resigned. Late -:= i 11 tl1at period varjous ch at�s- �� of mi sfeasance and nonfeasance 1n tl1e Department of Jt1stice after he became =i�·-. ·:_;,=7�

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pARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

787

att e nti�11 �f tl1e Se 11ate by i11di:idtial _ senator s the to brou g _ h ere ! \ d hea � g sin ervi sup 1ns1stent demand tl1at tl1e depart111e11t b e investigat ed to a11 of s basi the · · and 01a de de fic_·1enc1es · w h·1�I1,_ ��c �rcl111g to tl1e cl1ar�es, were s an d pract1c : the that _ . _ ibe eod a to prevent or 1mpa11. its r1gl1t of ad111J111st1at1011 1n1gl1t be defit11t ely as ·· , n n er op � d and that appropriate and effective m east1res 111igl1t be taken to re111edy . certaine gar r d . , .g�s as grave ... a11d ... adoJ)ted ed t·I 1e cl 1cll e Sen�te . h T . ev1 the � ! te a elimin . and d1rect111 g a select or 1ng co1111111tte e of five se11ators: author1z tion resolu a

d facts, and report tl1e sa111r to _tl1e Sen�tte, conce rning the allegccl rcumstances ci ate investig 10 � Attor11ey _General of tl1e Unite� States, to prosecute properly failure of Harry M.Daugl1er�y, violators of the ... paws] against n1onopol1es a11d unlawft1l restrrunt of trade; tl1e alleged neglect and failure of tl1e said I-Jarry M. Da�gl1e r_ty, Atton1ey General of tl1e �nited States, to ar rest and prosecute Albert B. Fall, Harry F. S1ncla1.r, E.L. Dol1eny, C.R.. �orbcs, and tl�eir co-conspi rators in defrauding the Government, as ,veil as tl1� all�ged neglect ancl failure of tl1e said Attorney General to arrest and pro secute many otl1e rs for v1olat1ons of Federal statutes, and his alleged failure to prosecute properly, efficiently, ancl p�on1ptly, an? t_o defrnd, all manner of �ivi_l and cri1ninal actions \vherein the Government of the United Stales IS Inte rested as a party pla1nt1ff or defendant. And said committee is further directed to inqt1ire into, investigate and report to tl1e Senate tl1e activities of the said Harry 1-1.Daugherty, Attorney General, and any of l1is assistants in tl1e Departn1ent of Justice which ,vould in any manner tend to impair tl1ei r efficitncy or influence as representatives of the Government of the United States.

The resolution also autl1oriz ed tl1e committee to se11d for bool<s a11d pr1pers, to subpoena �:vitnesses, to administer oatl1s, and to sit at st1cl1 ti1nes and J)laces ,1s it migl1t deem advisable.

In the course of the inv estigation the conmuttee issued a11d catised to be duly served on Mally S. Daugherty - who \Vas a brotl1er of Harry M. Dat1gl1erty a11d president of the Midland National Bank of Wasl1ingto11 Court House, Ol1io - a s� �poena commanding him to appear before tl1e com.Inittee for the pur.pose of g1v1ng testimony bearjng on tl1e subject unde r i11vestigation, a11d to bri11g witl1 l1im the "deposit ledgers of the Midland National Ba11k si11ce Nove1nber I, 1920; also note files and transcript of owners of every safety vault; also record s of income drafts; also records of any individual accot1nt or accounts showi11g witl1drawals of a1nou11ts of $25,000 or over during above period''. The witnes s failed to appear. A little later ju the course of tl1e investigation tl1e committee iss t1ed and caused to be d�Jy served on the same witness anotl1er subpoe11a co111ma11ding him to a p1)ear �efore It for the purpose of giving testjn1ony relati11g to tl1e sl1bject tinder cons1dera tion -�othing being said in tl1 is subpoena abo11t bringi11g-records, boo_ks or pa�)ers . T�e witness again failed to appear; a11d 110 excuse was offered by l1Jm for eitlier failure.

The �ommittee tl1en made a report to tl1e Se�ate stating tl1at tl1e subpoen�s had been 1 ssued, tl1at accordi11g to the office r's ret11rns - co1Jies of whicl1 accoinparn he report - the witness was p rso11ally served; an d tl1at l1e lia d faile� aDd �e e ;is: . d to appear. After r ecitt1on ol11 s re a d 1)te ado ate Sen a ing these 1, .i:-:a cts and pr reading of the r eport, tl1e oceedi11g as follows: · .1s n1aterial . and 11ecess'1: ry .10 Where s the appea

ce and testimony of the sai d M.S.Daugl1e r ty ran order t·ahat the · . ·t an tain 10ob av n1 d · 1 co mm ' tipon d ittee 1n1p_ o se may properly execute the ft1nct1ons formati ecessary as a basis for such leg isl at iv e and otl1e r action as tl1e Senate 111a� yJ de•cnl ne _ CCSsary ��dnproper: Res olve d h t e T h�refore be it . . t . . le Se. gean . 1g tl · 1and 11 1n con t ran war r ue i T l11s esid p ss ent of the Senate ro tempore at Ar ' �ts h P ;oti nd' eve ler \Vl ty r he d tig Da p r h; e �ty to take into custody tl1e body of th e said M.S. and r, r st1ci1 �tng �e ans to e r the the said M.S.Daugl1erty before the bar of tl1e Senate, then and r

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788

SOURCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

rder the . may te Sena ident of the Senate Pres the . . as iry inqu � der 1 ul r atte 1 e n t 1 .1 to _ questions pertinen� 1 y 111 custod rty to augl1e M.S.D a� a1t the further said tlie keep to atld c: ' d. . 0 t1 o p o 1 . p to pro ten1pore order of tl1e Senate.

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e solution tha t t�1e warr ant was to be r e tl1 of 1s 1·n e t 1e tl in fro d �ve sei ob vi·11 be I t . a l te stimony of the witness n rso e pe th in o L bt, to ort eff lie t of ce 1 i . � ft,· r·tllera issued 1n · · · · I 1 act. .fro m 11 1m t x e production e d _t o e d en 111t t 11o s wa , e na o bp su iJd _ co e s the aild, like o ena. bp st e su fir th . 1n ed m a 11 rs e p a IJ 11d a s ok . bo s, d r co e r· of tll e variotlS and w as addressed simply 11 tio olu r:s _ e h t to ly eab e gr a e d 1 iss1 s t wa n i·ra wa Tlle to tl1e Sergeant at Ar1ns. That officer on rece1�1ng tl1e wan:an.t end.orsed ther_eon a direction that it be exect1ted by Jol111 J. McGra111, already l1 Js deputy, and delivered. it to l1im for execution. Tlie dept1ty, proceeding t111de1� tl1e w�rr�nt, t?ok the witness into c·usto�y at Cincinnati Ohio witl1 tl1e p11r1)ose of br1ng1ng 111m before the bar of the Senate a s comma�ded; �l1eret1po11 tl1e witness peti tioned t11e federal district court in Cin cin11ati for a writ of l1abeas co1·pt1s. The ,vrit was gr anted and the deputy made due 1·eturn setting fortl1 the warrant ._and tl1e c ause of deten�ion. After a h�arjrig the cot1rt l1eld tl1e attachment a11d det ent ion unlawful and discharged the wi t ness., the decision being pt1 t on tl1e ground tl1 at the Sen ate i n directing t he investigation and in orderi11g tl1e att acl1me11t exceede d its powers under the Constitution ., 299 Fed. 620. Tl1e deputy prayed and was allowed a direct appeal to this Co11rt under S 238 of tl1e Judicial Code as tl1en existi11g. We l1ave give11 the Cclse ea.rnest and prolonged consideration becau.se th� prin cipal questions involved are of 11nusual importance and delicacy. T11ey are (a) wl1e tl1e1· t l1e Senate - or tl1e Hot1se of Representati ves, both being on the same plane in tl1i s regard - l1as power, tl1rot1gh its own proce ss, to co111pel a private i ndividual to appear before it or one of its co:rnmjttees and gi\1e testimony neede d to enable it efficiently to exercise a legislative ft1nction belonging to it 11nder tl1 e Constitution, and (b) whetl1er i t st1fficiently appears tl1at the process \Vas being emp · lo·yed in thls insta11ce to obtain tes timony for tl1 at })Urpose. . . . Tl1e fir st of the pri11cipal qu estions - the 011e wl1icl1 ·tl1e witness particularly IJresses on ot1r atte11tion - i s , a s be fore sl1ow11, \.Vl1 etl1er tl1e Senate . or the House of Repr�sentative s, botl1 being on tl1e sa111e pla11e i 11 this regard - has power, tl1r?·ugh its ?Wn proce s �, to co;1t1pel a JJ 1 ·ivate indi\rid ual to appear before it or one ItS . COllllllitt�es ancl g1 �e testIIl�OllY needed to ena ble it efticiently to exercise a leg1 sJat1Ve ft1 nct1on belong1ng to 1t 1111d er tl1e Constitutio 11• . Tl1 e co1:1stitutio11. provid<:s fo_1· <l Congress coiisisting of of H ou se nd Se a a a n te R�1�rese11tat1�es a11d In�;sts 1t ,v1t_l1 ",ill l islatt,,e po Q ui te � w th er e s' to ' nt gr a ed �� . �tates a 1: d V:1t�1 power . to ma .ke al l laws wl11cl1 s11 all be ,, 11ecessary and proper �?r �arry 1_ ng . 1nto e��cut1011 thes e :rowers ''and all otller powers,, vested by the Cons t1tut1on In the U _ 111ted St�tes _ 01· In any departnient or officer thereof (Art. I, secs. !, 8 .) �·ut !l1e1·e 1s no IJ1·ov1s101� expressly investing eitJ1er ho u se with po�er t . m e 9 � 1 nv 1 es ! ga t1o n� a nd exact test�mony to tl1e end that it m ay xerc . _ isl� t1ve leg its e ise fun�t10;11 advisedly and �ffec�1vely. S� the q11estion arises whether this power 1s s·o far 1nc1dental to the leg1slat1ve function as to be implied.

IJ-?. actu�I. l egislative practic� power to sec1ire nee · s: ea ¢ su ch de d information by n, has lo�� been t :eated as an att1·1bute of the er to legislate. It was so rega-r:d�!!l==··'"··- ·- _ P?W · the Br1t1sl1 Parllament and 111 the Colon_1al legi s latures before the American R&vo: lu-- --= - -

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789

LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS AND AMENT ARLI p

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carried been into a�d iled effect in preva bot.ll llotises of as h view e lik a _Tl1e and legislatures. arguments ,.,..state advanced the in · of : support ost � - ! uon; m din , eo0gress an are fairly reflected by the following. e xcerpts fro1n tl1e debate [in tlle i of the �ow�� wer to compel testimony]: po its g din ar reg . . . l � i1 5e0ate 1 n 1 9 . you stop? . Stop, I say, Just at tl1at po1nt . w11ere we ' Maine. Where will ne-..... 1

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of 11a,,e den en fess . · l1 we were created; a11d tl1ese J)uriJoses · h t he purposes f or ,v l11c gh to accomplis u gone is legislation. There are 1 the Constitution. Wh�t � they? Tl1e _gr�at pt1r Jose n are� th er thing s, but I speak of �egislation as t:he }Jrmcipal pt1rpose. Now, wl1at clo we p ro s: o here? v_le pro po� to legisl�te u pon,a give n �ta te of f�crs, ��r 11aps, �r tinder a given p to do Well sir proposmg to eg1s 1 a1 t e, \\e \Vant Ill forn1at1on. V,ve 11ave 1t not ourselves ·ty g d e i o��iio � �i{��r�:J� �j;�lf �� :x;:f:��- i,!"�a�t g et It? �he Sen�tor_ says, ask for 1t. I an1 read)' to aslc for 1l; but SUIJJ)ose the to we How are to tis; wl1at �l1e1�? J·Iave \ve _not po\ver to coilipcl 1 in,_ to �t give not �vill ask we whom person l1as b�n exercised by Parl1a�11en�, a�d by all legislative come beforv us? Is this power, wh1�h bodies down to the present d�y w1thot1t d1spt1te - tl1e po\.vcr to 111qt11re into subjects tipon ,vhich they are disposed to legislate - lost to us? Are we not in tl1e possession of it? Are we deprived of it simply bCC<'lUSe \ve l1old our po\.ver l1ere under a Co11sitt1tion \vbich defines what our duties are, and what we are called t1pon to do? Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky. The n1�'l.DS of carrying i nto effect by Ja,v all tl1e granted pov1ers, is given where legislation is applicable and necessary; bt1t tl1ere are subordinate n1atlers, not amounting to laws; there are inquiries o f tl1e one House or tl1e otl1er I-louse, ,vl1icl1 eacl1 1-Iouse bas a right to conduct; ,vhich each l1as, fron1 tl1e beginning, exerci£ed tl1e povver to conduct; and each has, from the beginning, summoned \.vitnesses. Tl1is l1as been tl1e practice of tl1e Government from the beginning; and i f we l1ave a right to st1111111on the \vitness, all the rest follows as a matter of course. ,,.. jYU•

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The deliberate solution of the questio11 on tl1at occasio11 l1 as been acceJ)ted and followed on other occasions by both l1ouses o:f Congress, and l1,1s never bee11 ) rejected or questioned by either.

We have referred to the practice of tl1e two l1ot1ses of Co11gress; and 1vve novv shall notice some significant congressional e11actme11ts .. ..

In January 24, 1857, [by] c. 19, 11 Stat. 155 [Co11 gress] passed ''An f\ct 111ore effectually to enforce the attenda11ce of witnesses on tl1 e st1mmo11 s of eit11 er l1ot1se of Congress, and to compel tl1 em to disco,,er testin1ony.'' Tl1is act J)ro,,ided_, first, tbat any person summoned as a witness to give testi111ony or prod11ce _paJJers 111 any . matter under inquiry before either house of Congress, or ar1y co1nn11ttee of e1tl1 er �ouse, w�o shoul� wilfully m�ke �efault, or, �f app�a_ring, sl1ot1ld !·eftise to ans\.�er ny quest10n pertinent to the 1nqu1ry sl1ot1ld 111 add1t1on to the pains and penalties · · ' ' then �xrstrn g, be deemed gt1ilty of misden1eanor. ... In _Kilbo urn v. Tl1ompson, 103 U.S. 168 .. . t�e 9-t1es�ion ... w�s wl1e tl1_�� 1 .the House of Repr ru 1 1 c?1 1ts of e . d1rect111g 011 10 er tati pow esen its ed ves had eed exc . tees to make a part1c . . 1 c1ples 1 r1 p · e h T · u1ar 1nvest1gat1on. d a h ·t · 1 t . tl a 1 was dec1s1on TJ1e �n, ounced and es s ses pos s res rJg Co 1 of se ot1 1 applied in the cas 1 at 11either 1 tl · are e · 1 at t11e '' · · tl a generaI power l zet citi ' tl1e . · of · 1rs a f af of making inquir e vat pri y the o int ·h . . e t 1 Powe· r actuall 1 1c h . w · f o s r e t · t a m 0 · es reIat1ng. t .- . '. possess ed · 1nqu1r1 Y 1s l1m1ted to take Particu1a ouse y ma 11 f t u g Y. 1 it �J li l uc wl J of s ha ect '' 1 i res ict in isd d jur on an '' h � ot her actio · h · · Id u o c s s e r d e r r o f 1e n , t at if the inquiry relates to ''a matter w 1 1ere111 re1 . . t be had only bti , s t� of by a jurucial proceeding'' it is not withi n t1!e range �� v��erii must e left to . n 1o t a ar _ sep , na l t1o l1e rtu 11st co fc ter of , rts cou e th ly to ab t. rm nfo co l rnentab ar 1 ' cl l · · Pow ers·, an d th c 1a t esse11 e 1 t.l ing · at 1or the purpose o f d�ter1run the inqui .macle c is it ll wlJi ·· . ry recourse may be er d . un r orde or had to the resolut1011

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790

ONAL TI U . IT ST LAW ON C AN PI IO I TI E OF OK BO SOURCE

sis e o ba e th tl1 l s cu wa rti pa h c � lii ar n qu tio in lu so re e iry, th _ ied _w i i am ex t ur co 1 e Tl e at a iv d t to pr te -es la al re re ry te t11 nq 1 e th ol po at th m � o i· ef or er th _ ed in _ rta ce as and d . an ha Co st & e ere ok Int Co 1n y Ja the . bia lum Co of pool ict str Di tl1e ·n 1 p · 11 · ·s1 1 par t11e . ' · · f · se o ur a d In co t1 s tra wa rus ID.1 ate es 1r on tl1e d aI1 in ! a . but liad become bankrt1pts, ate St ern ed ov ut [G U 11e Ja, ment] wa_ s va syl 11n Pe � � in t � l1r co ? y ptc ru nk ba federal e t d g th s, d1n Um ate clu St 1n s, or were dis dit cre e tl1 of � me So . s · i o dit cre one of their ed int urt po J Co rem ut t [Su e tha Th nt. me � the tle set � _ rt] · u p [co t11e th wi ed . isfi sat t10 d ] 1ga ine est nta 1nv co ee itt no sugmm Co e tl1 for g llin � ca te na Se tlie [of 11 tio resolu t e pec 1n 011 s res r wa to tte ma tl1e t which tl1a n; tio isla leg ted pla tem con of n oestio d the an e's ate ste est ' tru pts kru le ban sett tl1e t tl1a ; had be ld cou n tio isla leg ;0 valid _ ment were still pendi11g in the bankr1 _1ptcy _ cou�t; and that th� United States and otl1er creditors were free to })ress their clai ms 1n that proceeding. And on these o-rounds the Co11rt l1eld that in undertaking the investigation ''the House of Repre :e11tatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed power which co11ld onl y be p1·ope1·ly exercised by another branch of the government, because it was in its nature clearly j11dicial''. The case l1as bee11 cited at ti1nes, and is cited to us now, as strongly intimating, if 11ot l1oldi11g, tl1at 11eitl1er l1ouse of Congress has power to make inquiries and exact evidence i11 aid of contemplated legislation.

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Next in 0 1�der is /11 1·e Chapman, 166 U.S. 661. The inquiry there in question w,1s conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to charges, published in the press, that senators were yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill tl1en before the Senate and were speculating in stocks the value of which would be affected by pending amendme11 ts to tl1e bill. Chapman appeared before the com mittee in response to a subpoena, b11t ref11sed to answer questions pertinent to the i11 quiry, and was indicted and con,1icted llnder tl1e act of 1857 for his refusal. The Court sustained the constitutional validity of the act of I 857, and, after referring to the co11stit11tional provision empoweri11g either house to punjsJ1 its members for· disorderly behavior a11d by a vote of two-tllirds to expel a member, held that the inq1riry related to tl1e i11tegrity and fidelity of senators in tl1e discharge of their duties, and tl1erefore to a matter ''witltin the range o.f the constitutional powers of tl1e Se11ate'' and in res_pect of wl1ich it could co1npel witnesses to appear and te�ti�y. In overruli11g _ an objection t11at tl1e inqu· iry was witl1out any defined or ad m1ss1ble purpose, 1n tl1 at tl1e prea111ble and resolutio.n made no reference to any co11ternplated ex1Julsion, censt1re, or otl1er action by tl1e Senate, the Court held tl1at !l1ey adeqt1ately �isclosed a s11bject-matter of which tl1e Senate Iiad jurisdic tion, tl1at 1t was not essential tl1at tl1e Senate declare i11 advance what it meditated doing, and tl1at tl1e asst11n1Jtio11 cot1ld not be i11dulged tl1 at tlie Senate was making the in q11iry withot1t a legitjn1ate object. �l1e ca�e i � 1·elied 011 l1ere as f�lly st1staining the power of either house to con duct est 1n 1ga 1on s and exa�t t�st1mony from witnesses for legislative purposes. ! � _ _ W1�l1_ this review of the leg1slat1ve practic e, co11gressional enactments and court dec1s1ons, we proceed to a staten1ent of o·ur conclusions on the question. We �re of opin.ion tl�at the I?�wer of inquiry - with process to enforce it - is an essent1al and appr. opr1ate aux1l1ary to the legislative function. A legislative body _ ca11n�� leg1slat� wisely or effectively in the absence of information respec ting the co�d1t1?ns which the legi�lation is intended to affect or change; and where �he leg1slat1ve body does no t i tself possess the requisite information - which not in�

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PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

791

mu st be had to otl1 ers wl1 0 do J)ossess it. Exi)erien rec our se trtie is ntly e ce . • frequ . . s st1c t 1or � l re9u l" . es 1wor -l" n1at1on o fte11 mer� tli�t are 11nava1J1 11 g, aiJcl also ght bas tau 'Yhicl1 1s vol1�teered 1s �ot always acc1 1 rate or c?ITIJ)lete; so some on mati infor that esse t ntia o obtain wl1at 1s 11eeded. All tli,s was trtie before l ar� 1s10� con1 pu of s mean ed was fram tion and stitu . Con pted ado the en 1 wl and The contention is earnestly made 011 bel1alf of tl1 e \Vit 11 ess tl1at tliis po\\'er of inqujry, if sustained, may b� abusively a11d oppressively exerted. If tl1 is ·be so, it . igl1t be directed affords 110 ground for d_eny 1 ng the po\ver. Tl1e same co11tention m against the po_wer to legislate, �D:d of .cou;_se wo11ld be unava.iling. A 11d it is ,1 11 e cessary deduction from the dec1s1ons 1 n K1lboz1r1z v. T/1 01111Jsori a11d 111 re C/1ap111a11 that a witness rigl1tfully may refuse to answer \Vl1 ere tl1e bo1 111 ds of tl1e po,ver arc exceeded or the questions are 11 ot pertinent to tl1 e matter 1111der i 11 quiry. We come now to the question whetl1 er i t sufficiently appears tl1at tl1 e J)t1rpose for whicl1 t1Je witness's testin1ony was sought was to obtai11 i11fo.rmatio11 i 11 aid or the legisl a tive function. The co11rt below a11 swered the qt1estio11 i11 tl1e negative ,tnd put its decision largely on this gro11nd, as is show11 by the follo\vi11g exceri)ts fro 1n its opinion (299 Fed. 638, 639, 640): Wba( the Senate is engaged in doing is not investigating tl1e Attorney General's office; it is investigating the former Attorney General .... Wl1at it l1as done is to p11t hin1 on trial before it.... In so doing it is exercising the judicial function. Tl1is it l1as no po\ver to do .

We are of opinion that tl1e court's ruli11g 0 1 1 tliis qt 1 estion was wrong, a11d. 1l1�rt it sufficiently appears, when tl1 e proceedings are rigl1tly i11 terpreted, tl1at tl1e object of the investigation and of the effort to secure tl1e witness's testi111ony \Vas to obta.in information for legislative pu rp oses. It is quite true tl1 at tl1 e resolution directing tl1 e i 1 1\1estigatio1 1 does not in tern1s avov;, that it is intended to be in aid of legislatjo11; bt1t it does sl1 ow tl1 at tl1e s11bjec1 to be investigated was the administration of the Depart 111 e11 t of J11stice-wl1etl1er its fu.nction� were being properly discl1 arged or were bei 11 g 11eglected or 111 isdirect�d, a nd part1cular1y wl1etber the Attor11ey General and liis assistants \Vere J)erforn�1ng or neglecting their duties in respect of the institution a11d prosect1tio11 of proceedings to �uni�h crimes and enforce appropriate remedies agai11st the. wrongdoers spe_cific 1�stances of alleged neglect being recited. Plainly the subJect _was one_ of wh� ch legislation could be l1ad and would be materiall)' aided by tl1 e 111forma� 1 0,11 which the investigation was calc11 lated to elicit. Tl1 is beco1nes 11 1anifest \Vile� It 15 reflected tl1at tl1e functions of tl1e Departn1e11t of Justice, tl1e JJO\vers and dlttles_ of the Attorney General 1 ?n and tl1e 1 ties of I1 is assista11ts, ,tre all SLibject t� regli!a� d1 by con�essional s legislati on, and 1 e departn1ent is 1nai11tained and its ,tctivitie tl that are carried on under such appropriations as in tl1e jt1dgn1ent of Coi1gress are iieeded from year to year. e 0 Iy legiti mate object the i atio � esti iiiv tlie g 1 eri1 ord i11 e l1av 1ld ate co1 Sen _ . � w s tTb � � pre aid t11e tl1at it cl1 1 a in. legislating; and we tliink t l1e s ·ubject-matter vvas st sum . ptJ_o n should· be ind1 of l wa av s s �re 1 Iged tha t thi s wa s the rea l obje�t. An ex1 � th ?bJ:ct _ would have bee1 1 better; b11t in vie w of tl1e l)art_icli]ar Sll �Ject-matter was no� ind1spens�b al, avow no d ru11� con le. n lt1t1o r�so In the he t re pm whe Cha an case, � this o rt p : _ te Sen 1 l e 1cl 1 � wJ 1 1 11 o ted tter ma ectout that it plainly related to a sub � � _� � had � 1s � the 1ct1on , and of act1 tl1� 0� at 1 tl rd reco ''W this said on d S n aJllr e cannot assume te Was 1 1I� n ot 11e�es 1 a1 witl cert was : out ''it t tha a ti also legi mate object''; and s ry that _ . 11 g 1 do �lie resolution sl1ould d ate dit me te na Se the 1at wl ce declare in advan Wh en the •nv estigatioi1 was concl11 ded'' (166 U.S. 669-6?0). · · ·

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.792

L A N IO W T A U L IT T S N O C . N IA P IO H T E F O SoURCEBOOK

nt ra r ar no �o w ve ki gi in th s ng di ng ee oc pr e d th an n tio lti so re e tll k in tll We al er at en r 1ts G ey ba r11 tto or A e th fo be y tr to re g in nd te in or t lg i pt m te · at , s . Senate wa · 1n a 1t we k t h" l va. "d o 1 d or N obJ . ect g io in o d g n n ro w r o e m ri c y n a · r fo 1·t S COllllll1·ttee d . d" ' ng r 0g l ro o J e 01 w 1m on hi cr s e os c 1s . y rt pa b s1 os p ht ig m it at th 11 io to the investigat � at tim a gi r t le fo jec d ob re d� ; or s at wa th n tio ga sti ve in e th at tl1 de lu We conc ee 1tt e re m �h °:1 �o � co be an fy sti te s d wa an _ ar pe ap to d se ft1 re ly t1l gf on wr · s es tn the wi e I? o t m st1 ve y te gi m hi t1n er �e ha to n d le tit en 1s te na Se e th at tl1 � la,vfully attacl1ed; t e d th at ct an th tr1 ; d1s ee ur itt m co m co e th re fo be or r ba its at r to the inqtiiry, eithe t. en m ch ta e at th r de un y od st cu om fr m hi g in rg l1a sc er 1·ed in di t ur ing ict co arg str i e d. ch th dis n i r de or al fin e tl1 at th es uir req id sa en be s ha t ha W tl1e wit11ess f1·om c11stody be reversed .. 1e Opera til ecu ' Ex se' xpo ''E r to we Po ry nta me rlia Pa and Note to tli e ''McG1·ai1i case'' tions

i pe l com to te Sena the er in pow ided prov essly expr ion titut cons rican Ame the of No prov sion Daugl1erty to testify. How tl1en could the Court hold, as it did, that this power was ''an essential p on its com u w besto could e the Senat which ress Cong of 1 n'' Linctio f ... ary a11xili ate Jropri ap and n1ittees? Note in tl1is respect the Court's reference to history - including the historic practice in Parlian1ent i n England. Note carefully tl1e CoUI·t's disct1ssion and disposition of two precedent decisio.ns, the Kilbourn case and the Clzap111an case. Are tl1 e rt1lings in those t\\10 cases and DaL1 glu!rty's case consistent with each otl1 er? Can the tl1ree cases, studied together, be said to establisl1 logically consistent principles of constitutional la\-v? If so, what are they?

From Wilson, Congressio1ial Gove,·nment 303 (1885) as quoted by Frankfurter J, in. United States l'. Runiely, 345 U.S. 43 (1953): Tl1e author (Woodrow Wilson) was President of the U.S.A. during the period 1912-1920. Be_fore tl1at (�nd �l1en l1e wrote tl1e \Vork cited above) l1e was a Prof essor of Political Science at Prrnceton Un1vers 1ty, and later President of tl1at University.

It is tl1e proper d11ty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of _ govern111ent and to talk m11ch abot1t wl1at it sees. It is 1neant to be the eyes and voice, and to embody tl1e wisdo111 and will of its constituents. Unless [it] bas and uses eve y means of [jnyesti�ating official acts and agencies] the country must be l1el1?less �to learn l1ow 1t 1s be111g served .... Tl1e il'1fo,·m.i11g functiori [emphasis added] of Co11gress sl1011ld be p1·efer1·ecl e\re11 to its legislati,,e fu11ction.

�ote Wilsori's app�rent asst1111ptioos: (1) tl1at tl1e legislative branch can be the princi pal . z n_vest igator of tl1e executive; (�) tl1at pi1blicity is thc- principal device to correct improper or inefficient d�s �harge of government bt1s111ess. Are tl1.ese asst1n1 ptio11 s valid in Ethiopia now? Can the con- d1t1ons to s upport tl1e1n be establisl1ed? Ilo - w?

A C,·itiqite of Legislative ''l1tvestigato1·J1'' Com.111ittees

Fro1u Beloff, Anierican Fee/era! Go1,ernment, (1959) p. 138.

�� autlior of !}us excerpt is a Professor of ) .._ T p_ra ( su cited _ _ ; Gove rnme book nt is his Oxfor at d . · a critique of the strong commit tee'' system, seen through the eyes of a foreign observe,r. ·

I� a�ditioi�_ to tl1� powers tl1at Congressional committees have arising dire9-�!�� fro their ftinction� w1t�1 regar� to [s�ud� and re_commendation on pro1-1o. sed�giS.s �-'-'=-'= _ lati�n] there are tl1e1r cla1 s as 11vestigat1ng bodies. Most mo ts_ li�� . , �. e go ve rn de rn � 1:1 � � ittl�e · _ n as developed some form of 111vest1gat1o � a prelt1de to legisla.tion or ad m.t-mstr_ ..:::- �� ..--:c

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793

. ted Stat es, enquiri e s may be set on foot by tlle Execll Uni the t· _ direct1. y ive a: i ref o�· I n m Bu t any investigations are djrect]y , ess. . . . Con gr with s 01 ored bY tly t� 1 joUl r � I o e condt1ct e d ei th er by standi11 g committee b ma y �� se . e Th s no s r · es ma a ct Y ng Congr 01 � ' l � l o s ee m1i t r t y b mi hoc acl com , co c es itte l t Q , through �pecial sub p ·by ongres . s 1or . 1 e e 1 1a t l r s . 1 ars a so b · e? t �� e�n an i ncr easing t�ndency rec Of o_ s e. ' of purp Con gress . the �:', t stre ss its respons1b Il�tJe� fio r �eneral overs1g!1t of tl1e a<l :3-u111strative process. ... 1 o . field within \Vh1cb bot h stand111g an d special co111111·1 ttee s 111ay there 15 a. ' . . . 11 d o o.ere �I d1gg1ng up in �t� nc�s of �a ste or even corrL1ptio 1 1, especially i11 in work able valu .. t " ,· t,11 act1,,1ty 1s r�p1cl]� expand�11g, b_tit ... governmen when s tllis worlc may period _ . ed by the .har1r1 done by_ 111ves t.1gat1�11s .1_11 wl1icI1 tl1e i niportance dow versh a o to I be ' b e seco11da. r y to tl1e de s ire for tl1e l 1 1nel1gl1t of indiviclltal c 0 may ved achie 11gress be men or Senators . l Two sep�rate �ssues of great constitl1tional i_111p�_rta11ce arise fro111 t11e develop ' 'l ment of the 1nvest1gatory as oppos ed to the le g1slat1ve vvork o.f conimittees. From r the administration's point of view ther e i s tl1e qt1e stion (qltite apart fron1 tlie furtlier I wear and tear imposed upon its servants) of l1ow far tl1ere ca11 be li 111its imposed the po,ver to investigate in tl1e nan1e of tl1e 11ecess.ity for secrecy i 11l1erent in upo n ' some important operations of gov ern1nent, and rigl1 tly cl1eris]1ed by certain of its '• departments. A subpoe11a directing the prodt1ction of docL1me11ts ca1 1not be enforced government officials [ag·ainst a claim of ''execl1 tive privilege'']; b11t it is JJossible upon ,' for a committe e or sub-committee to go a long way i11 rendering tl1eir lives into lerable.... There is also tl1e que stion as to 11 0 \.\' far some of tl1e JJroceecli11gs car ried on under the title of inve stigation, and supported by Co11gress's JJower to [compel testimony under pain of contempt], may not a111ot111t to an infringe.n1ent of tl1e civil liberties of tl1e individual.

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Should Parlia1nent In Ethiopia E11joy A Polver To Investigate Gover111ne11tal Opera tions? Issues of La�; a11d Policy.

The Britisl1 Parliame nt, d11ring tl1 e forn1ative period of coostitt1 tio11_,1l deve lopme nt in t11e 17th century, asserted f. or itself broad !Jower s to co1npel d1 sclostire of i nfor mation. Or iginally the theo ry of tl1is assertion of power. may l1av� bee? based on the historic concept of Pa rliament as a ''court'' - fo1· �n early times Jt �as conceived as a council of tJ1 e ki11g exercising ''judicial'' f. t111�t1 ons (the_ r_esoltl tion ?f _ serious dispute s) as well as ''legislative'' functions, an d 1ndeed, origii1ally, the distinction between the se two ft1nctions was not so clear. (See CJiapter II, st,pra, p. 82), �ut later the justificatio11 for Parl ia ment's ''contempt'' powers vvas to preserve its ''privileges' ' an d p o w ers. . 1r e st lo c is d l e p in o c to r e . Irrespective of the historical origins of Par1.1ament' s JJOW . _ · . · milar s1 a _ d ne of inf or ation the A t s 1 s � 11) t see ve m merican Supreme Co urt ( as we ha d an te ga sti ve in to power for tl1e American r we JJo 1 11d th at tl1e . o1 gr e t]1 re on ng ss Co k , s w a ' l e a m seek infi . to ' r e · w o JJ . · ormation was an e sse ntial ''auxr·1 1ary' p ar t Of tl1e 1 s_ ct· · . I e p m o c o ' thus' th t r e vv o p · 1at1v · e I egis · e branch was sai d t o ]1ave an , ,·inh erent ' 1e J t n i e r u t a I · cl ure of 'info 1 e i 1 _ t m . aid ;;�; t gh ni.i 11 tio a m on r o ati '' inf rm e t ' where h nts . e rlia Pa de ;: 0 ed sse a 11 e_ n t be Pm of s a e . r leg isla A tio po n w b similar � �/ �nstitittion of India, lse�� ere 1 n t h e world. (See e.g. Ba s u's Com111-e ritar1es o n 1e y0 1 • 31 9 (1961 ).) . n i '' ' ' y r a i l . i x 1 l a '' 1 ·1ng sucl Wb t are �l1e . argume s r and ag_a1nst recogn1z · nt fo heren• t''�,1.nvest1g atory'' po wers in Ethiop1a?

SOURC'EE'OOK OF ETI-IIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

794 l

ise e ev th R er tit nd ns u · Co � . r io l1e ut et . 1 wl · n er id ns co ch u s· y tsl ot vi ob t tls nl we ·st Fi i e tiv r of ga be ne . m gu nu ar A ts w. la en m of r te at m y a ma as , y da to · . · wer e xi·sts, po . . . g 1n w o l] 1.e fo tl te a lu a ev d 11 a se ly a n A be asser·ted. we r to s po fo co ed ne e tl1 s el ize mp gn co re � dis dy ea alr n io tit tit ns Co . 1e TJ a) is to k th ea ; sp int po 73 1d a1 �hey ex� 72 les tic Ar n; io at rm uo 1 i of closure t se e tha �he u� ass uld o . articles say sb we d a , s 1· we J)o n tai cer ? pressly give . le tic le, Ar 73 �p exa tes for sta s, t11u t; the Jec sub tl1e on say to is re all t.I1e , d ed we an ion est qu should not be n ca ter nis Mi a h 1ic wl r de u11 s condition assun1c that by the device of a ��n1mittee_ investigati?�, Parliament could compel i11formation from a M1111stry wruch the M1mster would not be obligecl to furnisl1 11nder AI·ticle 72. b) Under the U.S. Constitu.tio11 - and the British Constitution - it may be that all ''legislative power'' is vested in. the legislative organ; in Etlliopia that is not so; there is 11 0 such scl1eme of ''separation'' of powers; the Constitt1tion divides legislative power between tl1e Crown and the Parlia me11t; tl1erefore we sl1ould not readily assume any gener· al ''inherent'' po,vers in Parlia1ne11t, especially powers which might be used to expand ,,astly tl1e activ.ities of Parliament beyond the role envisioned by the Consti tution. Cf. e.g. Revised Constit11tio11 Articles 26, 27, 33, 34, 36, 88, 92, 115. c)

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Articles 27, 66 and 68 give tl1e En1pero1 · responsibility for organizing Minis tries a11 d tl1e departme11ts of gove1·nn1ent and prerogative powers to appoint officials, distribt1te go·vernn1ental powers and by clear implication, to oversee and ,·eview the activities of the executive. Since this responsibility is given to tl1 e Emperor, it sl1ould not be assumed by Parliament.

2. It migl1t also be argued tl1at Parliament in Ethiopia is not well equipped to orga11ize formal i11vestigat.ions; it lacks staff (lawyers, experts and other admi nistrati,,e perso1111el) necessary to l1elp a committee function effectively. Further Parlia111e11t l1as 110 t1·aditio11 01· expe1·ie11ce as an ''j 11 ,,estigatory'' body, the only real e�perie11ce it l1 as enjoyed is use of tl1e questioni11g power. Therefor·e Parlia1nent 1s 11otJJ1·e1Ja1·ed to develofJ Arne1·ica11 .stJ'le legislatil,e i11vestigations and should n.ot be allowed to do so 1111der tl1e gt1ise of so.n1e 11.itherto unknown, unexercised ''in11erent'' power.

3. �arliame11t migl1t ab11se ''i11,,estigato1·y powe1·s'' if tl1 ese we1·e recognized �1tl1er_ no� or ,tt _some fL1ture poiut. ( Note tl1at tl1 e readi11gs, infra, show bow 1n.vest1gat1011 s - 1f tl1ey ,tre 111isl1a11dled - can do 11 arm to .innocent people.) 4. It is better, i11 a develo1Ji11g c0Lt11try, to leave .it to some special executive age�cy . sucl1 as tl1e Attorney Gener·al or some s1)ecial officer - the power to 111 �est1gate JsOV�r11ment operations. To rely 011 Parliament for condu ct of _ tl11s vital fu11ct1011 1s to lea11 on too slender a reed. 5. Compare t�1js proposition: the development of a st1·ong, independent Par1!a ment reqmres develoJ?meot of a panoply of investigatory powers. Only with . re sucl1 IJOWe:s ca!1. Parliament gain stature and infiue11ce executive action. The ai·e son1e s1 tuat1ons �here the ''q11estioning power'' (Cf. Article 73) is not ad�-. quaJe. Ft1rtb.er, detailed questioning of tl1e Minister (or l1is deputies) ��d�·r _ Article_ 73 may 11ormally prodt1ce the desired results - b· ut not alway s.�NfanY: ·_·� cotin.tries provide a questioning power, but tllis does not preclude exerrux:�f=�

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.1nvestjgatory procedures wl1ere perso11s otl1er t11an m.injster; sh ouId be other question ed. . . . Cons of Tanz tituti ania on (set forth p. 271. supra). Se 67 of the le Artic a1so p. 279 compare

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Chapter II.

s .dec1? ourt 1on ' . . . C 1� t 11e Daugherty case supra (viz t the for s son rea . hat The the 6. : w r to subpoena mfo1iJnat10:13- 1� a n 11zl1ere11! el�1nent ?f tlle power to decide po e what the law _should be) _are JUSt as con1pell111g 11� Ethio pi a as in the U.S.A. IIllpl1es �!early ,1 �ovver to establish committees IArticle 83), n stitu�o Con The and the question 1s whether _co�n11ttees can demand info rmation relevant to determining tbe 11eed for legislation n11 d to legislative goals.

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Co1n111ittees a11d t/1e Qi1estio11i11g Po1-ver. Jrzvestigator;, on ations LinJit �ecla: ecl tl1e po;;1er to �on1pel _ In the Daugherty case the Cotirt _ testin1ony ,s part of an . "investigation" must be exercised 1n atd of tl1e leg1slattve [1.e. law-maki�] function". But the Court also seemed to say that so long as tl1e "subject" of an inve;tigation was a "subject" on which Congress co11lcl (in its discretion) legislate, tl1e Court \Vo1ld "indul<Y0e" in "the pre-sumption" that the "object" of the investigation was "legislation'. In fact, i n later cases, the Court has gone further to "indt1lge i n the presun11Jtion" frat ordinarily the "object" of a Congressional inquiry will not be revie\vecl juclicially - s� long as the investigation n-za}' yield facts warranting new legislation. Thus tl1e Court ias in effect condoned investigations where it has appeared that Congress was more interestecl in "investigating" and "exposing" th.an in developing any specific legislation But a few years ago, in a far reaching decision (see belo,v) tl1e Court re-established sone limits on the investigatory power.

From Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), This is a complicated case. Only some excerpts fron1 tl1e Court's judgn1ent arcgiven 11ere to suggest some of the problems in.heren t in a situation wl1enever a citizen is called before an i11vestigat ing body - legislative committee or otherwise - and co111pellecl to give testimony.

Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered tl1e opinion of t]1e Court.

This is a review by certiorari of a convjction u11 der 2 U.S. Co cle [!ection ] I92 f or "contempt of Congress''. [Tl1is statt1te n1akes it a cri1ne to _refuse to answer any ''pe rtine nt'' question asked by a Comniittee of Congre ss :vhicl1 hm been_ em powered _ by Congress t o subpoena wi t11esses a11d com1)�l testimony.] fJ1e 1n:1 sde �eanor 1s alleged to have been committed during a l1 ear1ng before a c?1gres�1onal investigating committee. It is n ot tbe case of a truc11le11t or contu111acJ)US WJtness w_ho .refuses to answer all qt1estio11s or w11 0, by boistero11s or discotl teo 1: 5 cou<lt�ct, :.o_r refus ing � diSturbs the dec· orum of the co mmittee room . Petitione r was J)rosectited . to make certain · of tl1e ty r1 1c tl u a Je tl d . 1 eyo b e i b . · .· · ffect d1sclos11res which he asserted to s 111 e 1 q11e ttee to demand 01 st of o be1 11m lc n [The Committee as ed a cca mmi · e rs b m me llin g upon Watki ns · · el be ve lia to d ve lie be l1e 1 on wb t� ns fy · nti rso pe ide · th e · o. f t h.e C0 . r e w 1 s · t1 mmurust Party many years earlier; Wat·k·ins r eft1sed to questions]. ositio11 : p l 1 cl s1t lie (Petitioner) plain k o t o ex ed to tl1e Subcommit tee w l 1y he o�er Jr 1 e l t _ e id ... I re fuse to answer ts ou e tJ1at .I believe ar s on n ti ai es rt ce qu 1cl1 h w s 11 10 t . . . s e scope Of your COlllil1l. t1 q y n w1l1 answer a · I s. e's t1e tte 1v1 act ut o , b a . ns o 1 t s e t his committee 1 q1 · puts to me about myself. I wjJ] al so a11swer

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t is e un th m of om y C rt rs Pa be em m d an be to ew kn I m ho W S 11 . . . those perso _ _ er y sw an e an qu , st�on with er ev o l1 1 110 1ll w I � e. ar _, ,vliom I be lieve still t t. do no I ve s e pa lie th be 1n d te at ia th oc s as I m l1o w 1 itJ w rs he Ot · o t respect · o h w m sons pe y In b a f out the y t1 te s to e m s ·e i1 � u q � re y tr 11 l1 co s 1j tJ aiiy law in e g is d en rw ge he ID ot or rs om C be em m y 1·t Pa t � s i un n m oi C en past J1ave be f d lie e an ve be dg ha le o ng kn lo st be y m to ho w t bu � ity tiv ac y rt Pa muiiist t. en em ov st m n1 t1 m om C 1e tl om fr es lv e s m since 1·emoved tl1e I do not believe that sl1cl1 questions are relevant to t�e work of this com mittee nor do I believe tl1at tl1is committe� J1as tJ1e :I��t to undertake the public exposure of J?ersons beca11se of their past act1v1t1es ...

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[Tli e ConJmittee Cl1airman told Peti tione� to a�swer the question� or else suffer prosecution. The Chairman did not expla!n precisely w�y the que��ons � ere relevant to tl1e terms of 1·eference of the Committee or the obJect of 1ts mvest1ga tion' '. Petitioner continued to 1·ef11se to answer, and he was convicted for contempt and tllis judgment is now under review, Tl1e issue i s whether Petitioner had a cons titutional right to refuse to an.swer the ql1estions.. We start with several basic premises on which there is general agreement. The power of tl1e Co11gress to cond11ct investigations i s inherent in the legislative process. Tl1at power is broad. It encompasse s inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys 01· defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy tl1em. It comprehends probes into department of the Federal Government to expose corr11ption, inefficiency or waste. But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no gene,·a/ authoritJ' to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in te1·111s of tl1e fu11ctions of tlze Congress.

This was fr eely conceded by the Solicitor General in his argument of this case. Nor is the Congress a law-enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the ex ec11 tive and j11dicial d e partments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it �11st be related to and in f111·tl1 eranc e of a legitimc1te task of tl1e Congress. Investiga tions cond11cted solely for tl1e personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to ''puni sh." tl1ose investigated are indefe 11sible. It is unquestion�bly tl1e duty of all citizens to co-ope rate witl1 the Congre�s . . 1n its �ff?rts to . ob�a1n tl1e facts need e d. for intelligent legislative action. It is tl1e1r u11ren11tt1ng obl1gat�o11 to res1)011d to s11bpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Con _ �ess and its co�IDitt�es and to testify f11lly vvith respect to matters within the pro vi11ce of pro1Jer 1nvest1gation. Tllis, of� col1rse assumes that the constitutional rights ?� witnes� es w� ll be r s pected ?Y tl1 e Congres's as he justice. of ! court tliey a in are � _ B1�l of Rights 1s applicable to 111vesti�ations as to all forms of governmental action. . Witnes�es cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves. The y cann ot be subJected to unreasonable search and seizure. Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of s peech, press, religion, or political belief and ·association be abrid ged. The rudiments of th� po�er to punish for ''contempt of Congress'' come to us fro� tlie pag es_ of Engli sh l11story. The origin of privileges and contempts exten�s _ the perio ba�k into d of the emergence of Parliament. The establishment of a legis lative body which could challenge the absolute power of the monarch is a long _ and bitter story. In that struggle, Parliament made broad and varied use of the contempt power. -- · --

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see n a remarkable restraint i n l1a ve s tim e the lise bY .par1.1 ame11t der n .. ...,o . 1vl ' of I a n 1 · nv t t r es · o · 1ga t t1 p m o . ns ow . , er lik e th o p se condtictecl · 1 Ai er1ca pt tem h ! o by n made are t tees by o commit yal � � R n , r c s j g e ssio nal Con1missions of Inqt 1ry. Tl1ese a' 1 ' co . are o · rce i n t n s o 1 f -"" · . I b P? � u tur 1t1c 1 s 1e an t d part1sa11 co11siclerations. m n,-� fro d . ove Sel do rem m '( 1on be c0 s Illll11 en giv s� e n tl1e at1tl1orit y to co these e hav inpel tlJe testinlo� t, er, ev ' if Y . n o tio uc e f docum 11ts. the prod or es ess ng I n wit of The history of contempt of tl1e legislat11re i11 tl1is cot111try is riotably d'ffi . t tl1e ear ly days of the United States, tl1 ere lingered � In nd: Eng la of that lU). f from 111 d��:�t eff ect ab of sol s evi ute l the power. Most of tl1e i,,staiJces of use of of e 'Ied g l� t knO" tl 1_e first Co.ogresses co11 cerne� m_atter:s _affe by s pro �es ulso rr cti i1 g the qttalifi corop J catio n or 1 nte�r1ty of t�e1r members or cai ne abo11t 1 11 111 qt11ries dealjng witll sus (.t. ,'"".•,, d corruption or m1sn1a11agen1ent of gover 11 ment officials. Unlike the Etlglisll pecte ' .��1-; ice, from the very 011tset tl1e 11se of co11te1npt power by tl1 e Jegislatt,re was prac t ' •. , •. j -�:· subject to judicial re vi ew . .. d me dee I... �,', .. Abuses of the investigative process n1ay imperceptibly lead to abridgment of ... protected freedoms. The mere st1mmo1 1ing of a witness a11d co111pelling J1im to ) testify against his will, about llis beliefs, expressions or associatio11s is a 1neasure of government al interference. A n d when tl1 ose forced revelations co11cern matters hat are unorthodox, u npopular, or even hateft1l t o tl1e ge11eral l)ublic, the reaction .. t .... in the life of the witness may be disastrous ... This effect is even 111ore I1 arsh wl1en ••' I< it is past beliefs, expressions or association s that are disclosed and jt1clged by cur rent standards rat.her than tl1ose contem1:>orary \Vitl1 tl1 e matters exposed. Nor does 'J -·. the witness alone suffer the conseque nces. Those who are ide11 tifi.ed by witnesses and thereby placed i n the same glare of pt1blicity are eqt1aliy subject to ptiblic stigma, , ' scorn and obloquy ... '. I The statement of the Committee Chairman in tl1is c::1se, jt1stifyi11g tl1 e den1 and that petitioner answer the question i n res1:,onse to petitio11er's protest, \Vas \voeftilly '·, inadequat e to convey sufficient info rmation as to tl1e perti1Je11cy o� tl1e qt1esti�11s to ;' •' the subject under i nq11iry. Petitioner was thus not accorded a fair 01)portt11�ty_ to \. ( determin e whether he was withln ms rights in refusing to ans\ver, and l11s conv1ct1on ··· ent 11dm Ame is 1 Fiftl tl1e of sarily se neces Clat1 ess Proc lid inva Due the r unde { A measure of added care on the part of the House a11d tl1e Se11�t: in authorizing th.e use of compulsory process and by tl1eir committees i11 exerc1s111g t�1at_ power i nciples of pr the 1 old 0 l t1p �ld to s ve ce ser it suffi . That is a small price to pa y if 'Y li�ted, constitutional government wi thout constricting tl1e power of the CoiJgress to inform itself ... . Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed and case rema11ded to DiStrict Court with instruction [to dismiss the prosecution]. . · ·

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Note to the Watkins case. tl1e id d s d n t :ro g e 1 is c 1 re p 1a t I · The core of the . 0� \.V decision is in the last fe\v paragraplls st�ia. wer? o p s it '' se u b a " " e te ·i onlffiJ l Court order dismissal of the prosecution? In what ways did t 1e . 1 n o fr y n o n1 t.1 s te · l e 1p 11 o c 2· U. comm1t_tees to . r :e \\ O p 1 tl en were 1 of Etb.i opia ta ntial Parliament in �v i a insubs an or � tial h subst �1t er public officials or private citizens, d o you think that t iere s anger that the power would be abused? po\ver the . and ' ,, s n o . t1 . a g t1 . s e v · 3. What 1Inutauo ns may the Constjtution 9f Ethiop1a . put upon ''in t/1at tIze Note lly? enera er po to compel testimo ny such ad 1 t � I 11g that Parliamen assumi r if Parliament o i body ' or gy a tg sa'?1e problems eSl iizv t/ze s ate cre e may st if the executiv (Wilb Imperial approvexi al) creates it.

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SOURCEBOOK OF ETI-IIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW !

: r e w o P y r to a g ti s e v 11 [ e /1 T Fi1rtl1er Limitatio11s o,i 1 e pr oposit io n th at ter� s o� re�erence tl h is bl ta es to s 111 e se l. The Watkins case b e l ss1 th r: po ea c e e d a m 1s eg be ve ati 1st m1 e tte mi in co ry . to ga sti ,,e · in n o·f. a 1 1 1 ,1 ''th ns t t· c r d n� '' _ o a? , se t� ' po r pu at e th th d an , l1 rt , fo t se be ; t us 1 n ' e' � pui·pos � , ' an 't as ns JU d its ' 1t 1?n ot 1ct ' . p� ''s t 1 us m ) 1se o1 H ll ft1 e 1 tl y (b . ee Coinrnitt 1 s 1 e Comnuttee se by tl es tn to wi t pu ns tio es qu nd A '. y' rit la ·ti ''stifficient p,trticu e t) th to an tt mi lev m re Co ly_ s a� ee' cle e. (i. t'' en tin er ''p be to ¥n o, 1 s1 . be t ti; : � � es s tn ha w1 a n n ?w sh 1s 1s y tb wa s es nl U . ns io 1ct tr1 ins d a11 ce e11 fer re of terms 1sh r°: !n s ,fu ula 1�n �1c e�t pa qu er r sw an to d un bo tydu is he � er eth 1 wl ing of know _ ge to y l�t Jud na �s acts m1 f_ cn o _ rd da tan ''s no be uld wo re the d 11 an o informati n for t1o v1c refusing to con l na m1 cr1 a so pt; tem con th wi d rge cl1a 1 be shot1ld 1 e answe1· (i.e., for contempt) would violate tl1e requirements of due process. 2. 111 practice Congress has now recognized that otl1er elements of ''pr�cedural due process'' must be applied to a witness summ_oned befor� a comnutte� for interrogatio11 - e.g. tl1 e right to counsel, to be advised of prec1sely what subJects are under inqt1iry. 3. For· some otl1er possible limitations on legislative power to investjgate, see, e.g., S\veezy v. New Han1psl1i1·e 354 U.S. 234 (1957) which raised problems con cerning tl1e power to investigate university lecturers. Warren C.J. declared (for the Co11rt). ''It is particularly important that power of compulsory process be careft1lly circ11mscribed when the investigative proc·ess tends to impinge upo11 sucl1 higl1ly sensitive areas as freedom of speech ... and freedom of com111u11icatio11 of political ideas;'' Gibsorz v. Flo,·ida Legislati1·e Investigatio,z, 372 U.S. 539 (1963), wlticl1 raised problems concerning tl1 e power of a Committee to investigate a private organization and compel i1lformation about its members ''withot1t any sho,vi1Jg of a meaningf11l relationship between tl1 e organisation and ... [any] illegal activities'' wllich tl1e Committee migl1t wish to investigate). In Bare11blatt 1,. U11itecl States 360 U.S. 109 (1959) tl1 e Court said: ''the issue [wl1etl1er a citize11 ca11 be 1·eq11ired to disclose information despite l1is objections that disclosure may violate one of 11.is basic co11stitutional riohts] in,,olves a b_alacing of tl1e competing priv�!e and p11blic interests at stake in the particular c11·c11111stances sl1ow1.1 ... tl1e cr1t1cal elen1ent is tl1e existence of, and tl1 e wejght to be ascribed to, tl1e [I)ltblic] inte.rest of [tl1e i 11 vestigation] ... '' 4. !11 Kilboi,r,i v. T/10111JJJ'Ofl (cited and discussed i 11 the Daughe,�ty case, supra), the Court �e_cla�ed t_l1c1t tl1e matte1· under· i11 vestigation was a stibject which was under l1t1g�t1011 111 tl1e courts and tl1e ''power attemJJted to be exercised [by tl1e Com1ruttee] was 011e confided by the Co11stitution to tl1e [judiciary]''. The Court we11t _011 to defe11� tl1e s�pa_rat.i_o11 and indepe11dence of the j·udiciary. C�n yot1 define tl1e bo1111dar1es of l1lllltat 1 011s fot1nded on. pi·otection of judicial ''111depende11ce''? 5. !�e top�� of the ''ex�ct1tive's p�·ivile�e'' _to r�fuse to supply certain kinds of 111format1on to a parl1 amenta1·y 1nvest1gation 1s treated imn1ediately below.

To What Extent NlaJl The Executive Refuse To Disclose Jnfo,·inatio,1.? Problems a_.,,, I. 1ssu1ne that yot1 are a legal adviser to Parliament. In the course of .consider_ _ t1on of tl1e b11dget, the Com1nittee 0 11 Finance l1as asked the Minister of Defence

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PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

concernin� ''the 111"!1bers of solcliers 110w 00 r�atio� _info ed � etail 1 d .ro _s.u p�Ji J Shiftas rn the pro�1nc e of X an d the cost of military mbatm� co en� t acuve . y nst Sh.iftas over tl1e past six mo 11tl1s a11d tl1 e ex1)ected cost 1 1ext agai . s · · ration 1atj,.• e . 1. 0 1 p r s t re e e d 1� 1� 1· · . ''Tl1e 1nforn1at10 1 1 you seek P ,, Assunze that the .M1n · { 0t year nf ) d1sclos1 1 re 1n1gl1t set a bad ].)recede11t arld point; this at sed isclo d ction·; ca_��t be security secrets or endanger tl1e "f>llblic secL1 rity. '' A.r;sz11ne tJ1at the al reve lllit 1 est 1 011s to tl1e Mi 11 ister now seeJ(s unanswered qL the put liich ��roittee w Ila,•I•. I your advice. o� l . �b r 2. A sume that during deliber,1tio11� i11 tl1 e Cou11 cil of Mi 11 isters over tl1 e natio,,al 1011 prepared as a ''cor,jide,zt ictl clocL1n1ent '' a Ed�cat of Minister the et �¾ ( bido ,' stro;g me morandum protesting tl1�t tl!e proposed allocati?11 f'or J1 is l\1i r1 istry ,va s inadequate. I-Iowever, t11 ese obJect 1 0 1 1s \Vere o,1errt11ed 111 tl.1 e Cou11ci1, a11d the Ministry's figure in t11 e bl 1 dget st1 bmitted to Parlia1ne 1 1t was 1 1ot j,1 creased. But ,vord of the existence of tltis 1nen1ora 1 1dum l1 as reacl1 ed tl1e Fi 11 a11 ce Cor11for [ mittee of Chamber, tl1at Con1mittee l1as reqL1ested tl1e Mi 11 ister to appear the and :) i\ij f to ans,ver q·uestions concerni11 g tl1 e conte 1 1t of tl1 e 1nemora 11 d t1 n1. Tl1 e Jvfinister ) of Education asks the Prime Nlinister for advice. As.si,111e yo11 are a lawyer i1 1 tl 1 e Prime Minister's office and are asked to prepare a 111 e1nora11d l1111 of advice for the Minister. I

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·I From the opinion of Marsl1 all C.J. in 111arbttry v. 111acliso11, l Cra 1 1cl1 137 ( 1803).

You will recall this case - which established the doctrine of co11 stitt1tional jt1dicial revie\v from Chapter II, Section 2. Review the facts of tl1e case, set ot1t on p. 173 (CI1a1Jter J_, supra). A subsidiary issue in the case was whether the Court cot1ld order tl1e incon1ing Secretary of State (Madiso n ) to deliver the "commission'' (i.e. official docun1 ent) appointing tl1 e tJlaintiff (ivlarbury) to a judicial position in a minor court, tl1e comn1ission I1a,,i 11 g been signed and sealed by IVladison 's P�ecessor 1n office. When Marbury sued, Madison arguecl, i11ter a/ia, tl1a t tl1e courts l1ad no ?05mess tellin g him ,vhat to do and sl1ould decline jt1risdiction 011 tlzat gro1111cl. On tl1is JJarticular issue, Marsha ll, C.J. wrote:

"�he intimate relation [existing] betwee11 tl1e Preside1 1t . .. a11d . .. l1eads of : ( fexecuhve] departments, necessarily renders any legal investigation of the acts of f one of these [executive] officers peculiarly irkso1ne [to tl1e exec11ti\ e] as Vl'ell as del i _ cate [for the courts - and also presumably tl1e legislative?]; a11d excrtes some ' ' · he81.t tio � · n with respec t to the pro1Jriety of t 11e i. nvestigatio11 ... [Cotirts] sl1otiId 110t inqu �re 110 w ··· executive 111[e iotz ret dis ave 1 l y tlze lz lzic v 1in s tie � officers perform du i h �si a� tl1e to d rtte 1 ded]. Questions in b1� [sti be er � nev : can tl1eir nature political ... � n,n� a ie issl to .I r� cou a bid for ��sdicti?n of] this ] rt. [to cou t re Bu ... wJ1 at is tJ1e _ ! ct· ius.[simply] d1rectjng t11e performance of a dl1ty 1 1ot de1Jend111g 011 exec utive . ra l ts· cretio n ··· b.ut on [tl1e] part 1. 1e t1 . d n a ' 0e1 1e ] 1 · 101 1· a s I 1 eg 1 o. . f cL1lar [reqL11re111ents . c 1ples Pr1n of law?'' tions . la llow much O f M re ve ti la is g e -I e v ti ecu ex . applied to 1

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arshall C.J's reasoning can be . t e c nduct of and to th e o 10 b n tio en r erv int l e ,tiv islc leg u f sti im g e on: what are the l its o q � of executi ve ene affrurs?•

(1951) w vie Re ; �� tr eet, "State Secrets - A w La ern od M ", dy Stu ve ati ar mp Co l 1 1 of io t At com: on 1 1c L d o r p Je l t · t c li f a aw rul es d cu e the re t sep ara we � re wo ··: 111g t1ld 1 1ot be st1bject o me nts. ftrst co , ve i at og �y, er pr t an d � e th its ow of Cr ·n, by virt11e e 1 l t r e o or· er tor d d in t e d a . in iscovery. Nor did the rules of the Stipreme Court r

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n w e r as ro th w 1e C a tl y l1e . rt w pa , ly to nd co Se ig lit n. w ro C a- . e tli cl · n bi c s t· A . e t . 1 · tt a J.tld1c if n d t me f 1'ts pro duct1o ocu a · o n n tio duc pro wo tI1e uld use ref d oul ·1 c 1 , t o n r t1on o . . t. es er 1t 11 c li b u p 1e tl to ry a be contr l el m rd am ai n v. C L ca itn & . is Co e ul , nd co Ltd. se e tI1 D_ on se ca oiil ad le � The :1d sa on m Si 1t u1 co is V 1 cl l1i w i11 4] 62 . .C [1942 A nts d at me th t cu is se ca ery ev ? in ? �erwise ed 1Jlj ap be to Jle cii 11 i pr 'TJ1e c the bli ed if pu 1n uc od pr st be ere t no st mu 11 tio t1c od � pr to l ble lia d a11 t an ev rel nd to be ou be ed y isfi ma t sat tes is Th d. � 1el tl1l wi be ld ou sl1 y tl1e t tl1a es reqtiir nt r me ula rt1 cu pa do the of nts , or nte co tl1e to ard reg g � vjn l1a by (a) eitl1er (b) by tl1e fact tJ1at tJ1e document be!ongs to a class whic�, o � grounds of pt1blic interest, n1t1st as a class be withheld fro m product1on. Viscou11t Si1no11 laid down t11e principles which should be fallowed by Ministers in deciding wl1et]1er to object to production:'It is not a st1.fficient grot1nd that the documents are ';State documents'' 01· ''official'' or are n1arked ''confidential''. It would not be a good ground that, if they \.Vere prodt1ced, tl1e consequences might involve the department or tl1e Gover11111e11t in parliamentary discussion or in public criticism, or 1nigl1t r1ecessitate tl1e attendance as witnesses or otherwise of officials who J1ave pressi11g dt1ties elsewhere. Neitl1er would it be a good ground that pro duction migl1t tend to expose a want of efficiency in the admi11istration or tend to lay tl1e department open to claims for compensatjon. In a word, it is not enough tl1at the Minister of tl1e department does not want to have tl1e docume11ts prodt1ced. T11e Mi1uster, in deciding whether it is his duty to object, sl1ot1ld bear these considerations in mind, for he ought not to take the responsibility of witlll1olding production except in cases where the pl1blic i11terest wot1ld otl1erwise be damnified, for exa1nple wl1ere rusclosure wot1ld be injurious to national defence, or to good diplomatic relations, or wl1ere t11e p1·actice of keepi11g a class of docume11ts secret is necessary for tl1e }J1·oper ft1nctioni11g of tl1e pll blic service.' Wl1at is called for is a bala11cing of.. tl1e conflicting interests. Military and diplomatic secrets exce1Jted, tl1ere is 110 justification for tl1e assumption that govern me11ta� i11terest overrides all o!l1er co11siderations. Tl1e judge sl1ould be empowered to dec1de wJ1etl1er tl1e product1on of any official informatio11 would be injurious to tl1e p11blic �11terest. Tl1e clain1 to 11011-disclosure could be made by affidavit, and, if a party obJected, !l1e matter col1ld be raised on an ex parte application. The docu ments a11d a detailed state111ent of reasons for non-disclosure could be forwarded t1nder seal to tl1e jl1dge wl10 wot1Id decide in l1is private room whether the documents should be p1·oduced. This procedure would see1n not to imperil the public safety 1n a11y way, a11d would ,lt the same time prevent excessive executive interference with the administration of jt1stice. Fron1 Bishop, ''Tl1e Executive's Right of Privacy - An Unresolved Constitutional Question'', 66 Yale Law Jour11al 477 {1957). Att no orneys General the constitu ave, surprisin�ly, supported invariably � ! . _ tional right of the executive to w1tl1hold information from the Congress. Congress, as noted above, l1a.s by statl1te declared its right to require information. And a recent study by a committee of Congress came to the equally predictable conclusion that

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

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(1) There is little reaso11 to believe tl1at, in practice, tl1e lack of a11 absolL1te I)O\.Ver to compel the executive to prod11ce i11formation apJ)reciably l1a11dicaps Co11gress in tJ1 e exercise of its legislative fun ctio11. It is obviot1s tl1at i11 a large majority of cases i t is greatly to the adva11tage of tl1e exec11tive to co-operate witl1 Con gress, and in a large majori ty of cases it does so. Co11gressio11al co11trol over appropriations and legislation is an excellent gL1ara11tee that tl1e exect1tive will not lightly reject a con gressional request for information, for i t i s \vell aware that sucl1 a rejectio11 i ncreases tl1e chance of ge tting ei tl1er no l egislatio11 or u ndesired legislation.

tio11al authority to reqt1ire tl1e l1eacls of exectitive tt1 con stj has ageiici · es · · Cong ress · t1on 11pon terms an d conct·it1?11s n1� prescribe� by c011gress. Tlle i�for se relea to n1bled a pa11 el of lear11ed )rofessors asse 111de ed, tee, t uni a11cl cou e111inei1t l . � e :,aro . . unsel all of \Vl10111 espoused s1n111ar views - altl1ot1gl1 tl1ey did so 011 grotltlds �1polit y and expedien�y, �or, �1nl!�e tl1e_ Attor11eys Ge11er,1l, tl1ey frankly recogi1ized thor1tat1ve Jt1d1c1al 1)1ecede11t.... a of nce u e abs the In fact, it is tl1e view of tl1e v.1riter that, wl1ereas tl1e J)rese11t sit11atio11 is c.1uite tolerable, t111li n1ited co11gressional access to executi,,e i11forn1atio11 (wl1et11er ''secrets of state'' or merely ''ofl1.cial i11for1natio11' ') \¥ould al1nost certai11ly be i11tolerable. A 01imb er of practical conside ratio11s support tl1ese J)rOJ)ositions:

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(2) Congress n1ay not be a safe re1)ository for se11sitive infor1uation: tl1ere c,1n be

no guarantee that information com.iog i11to tl1e l1a11ds of Con gress or tl1e \.Vl1ole membership of one of its major committees will long remai11 secret.

(3) There are serious weaknesses in tl1e assu111ptio11 tl1at p11blic J)olicy ot1gl1t to

draw a sharp distinction betwee n ''1nilitary a11d di1Jlo1natic secrets'' on tl1e one hand and all other types of official informatio11 011 tl1e otl1er, giving Co11gress free access to the latter. In tl1e first place, tl1e li11e is by no n1eans e:1sy to draw, even \.Vhen tl1e best of faitl1 is 11sed.More f1111damentally, l1owever, tl1e exec11tive's interest i n the privacy of cer tain other types of i11formatio11 is 11ot Jess that its interest i n preserving its military and diplo111atic secrets. 011e obvious example is the data, derogatory or otherwise, in tl1e sec11rity files of individt1als. Another, perhaps still more important, is t l1e record of deliberatio11s i11cidental to �11� makin g of policy decisions. Undoubtedly tl1e official \vl10 makes su_cl1 a d��1s1on should be answerable to Congress for its \visdom. Bt1t t�e s11b_ord1nate civil servants who advise l1im sl1ould be answerable 011ly to l11m - i.e. tl1ey s�ould be able to present u11palatable facts and 1nake ttn JJopular argu11� ent! WJtbotit fear of being dragooned by tl1e first Con gress1nan \.vl10 needs a I1eadune.

l I \ A

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�Becau_se it is esse ntial to efficient and effective admin istration tl1at employees of tl1e c t e ra c be o n n a position to be complet ely cand id i n advisin g witl� each othe� n i h B 1v � ;J o a ma ers 1 r c onv�rsations tl1� of ny a tl1�t a d erest i11 h pt1 bec t c a n use bli it is e n ! in t t t_t o or c � l m�n1cat1ons or any documents or reproductions co ncern1ng su�J1 aclv1ce be d 1 sclo�ed . : You ill i nstr�ct e n1ployees of your Department tl1at i n all of their �ppeara nces_ befor e the b comm1tte e _of the Senate C omm ittee on G over nment Operations rega rd! ng . t11e inqufu ry now before It they i ons or c offi:IDun1cat1ons ersat conv sucl1 any are o t not tify te o t s or t od e a ny su ch d oc e , l1 to dent Presi t the om r f , ter t ... Le s n . ts ctio u d umen epro or uc r Secr�tir of. D of tllis �o s efe�se, May 17, 1954. N.Y. Times, 1vlay 18, 1954, p. 24, �ol. 1. Tl1e weight So astute an 1derat1 on see m s to have become apparent only i 11 compar at1 v�ly r ec�n� years. o oks 1 t. See Wig.more, overl tely comple · ore ' for le examp Ev,·dence comm entator as Wi grn ' . 2378a (3d ed. 1940). [Bishop's footnote].

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802

so fes r Bernard Scl1w art2. Pro by ted sta ly ent qu · elo s wa e cas 1 e . ti f d O Tl. 1e otl1er SL e · r mat1on o f t I 1e H ouse Comn1o . I nt " me ern v Go on ee itt 1m on bc 11 s test1fy1ng before ti 1e . . . 1d . sa e J-I s. 11 10 at er p O t 11 1e 11 rn ve o G n o mittee . ,[T]l1e overt. -1·d·10g da11ooer is not congressional abt1se but tl1e vesting of · . · · · y h 11 rec t a sec wi its d n a rou 1st1r ct1v Lo ive cut exe ,e un1r::ettered d1scret·1 0111·11 t·l ties. . .. �;Tl,ose wl,o are co11ce 1-11ed witl1. tl1e JJOssibility of Jegis]ative abuse i�11or_ e e tat the of su l1 ers w1t t tl1a i_ ts , 11ry e11t 1t se1 JJre e 1 tl of � il IJer ii,g rrid ove � tlle 11 p� rvas1ve its cks on che any by ed a111 st e · 1ru , o1, ati istr 1 i � ui adi nt ote omnip � _ � regulatory activ ities, so v1v1dly pictured by Ge o rg e Orwell 1n h1s 11ovel •

'1984'' ' .

Tl,e plain a11 d s11.ort a11sw er to tlu� is tl1� t neither can there be a 1nenace to coi,stittltional governiue11t by an exect1t1� e which h�s to go to . Co�gress for every cent it spends, wl1icl1 has no 1Jower by itself to raise and ma1nta1n armed forces and wl1 ic11 ca1111ot j ail its citizens except under _ a l�� passed by Congress and after proceedings presided ov er by a11 independent Judicia ry. A situation so an1big11ous and muddled cannot f a il to djstress the tidy-minded coostitt1tion alist. And y e t tl1ere is ev ery l)rospect that jr ,vi11 continue for some ti1ne to come . T/1 e Britis/1 Met/1od: Par/ia111e11t a11d I1ifo1·111atiorz-Gat/1e1·ing T/1roi1gh Co1111nissions

Fro1u Young, T/1e Britis/1 Parlia111e11t, pp. 2 1-22. Tl1e information r ecei, ed by Parliament is [usually] supplied ... by the Govern ment, sup1 )lemented by the pleas of presst1re groups and tl1e information which Members can st1pply on their own accot1nt. Tl1e Government feeds ir1to the maw of Parliament a steady strean1 of facts in tl1e form of Wl1ite Pape rs, departmental reports, reports of royal con1missions, cou1·ts of e11quiry vvo1·king groups, study groups, com1nittees of tl1e Privy Cou11cil, ar1d the like. Tl1ere are few areas where Parliament itself attempts to n1oblize i11formatio11, a11d tl1ese areas are mostly con cerned witl1 the Select Co1U1nittees J1a ving control functions. The underlying assump tio11 is tl1at the Government J1as tl1c J)rimary rcspo11sibility for supplyi11g Parliament witl1 tl1 e information reqt1i1·ed for c11acting legislation and debating policy; it supplies tl1� facts _and 1nakes tl1e 11ecessary ratio11ale. Parliame°=t n1ay itself create a committee to 111 vcst1gate a11d 1· e1Jort, altl1ot1gl1 tl1e 1nore usual method is to persuade tl1e Govern ment to undertalcc an enqt1iry. Tl1e creation of a commission o r tribu11al m ay reduce politic�! _teml?ers� �nd Pa1·lia111ent may refrain 1·rom debati 11g tl1e matter while the 1

COil1Dl.lSS10n IS s1tt1ng. . ..

�tl�ot1gl1 tl1e �overnment does not a!ways give in to pressure and create a comfillss1on of enq111ry, or a Royal Commission (o r whateve particular form r the may be), Parliament is frequently able to persuade tl1e Gove further loo k rn to me nt into a contro\1ersial subject. One may note: fo r instance th Parliament e su of cc es s in :ecent y�ars i11 persuading tl1e Government to inv� oversjal co nt sti r ga su te cl1 topics as wire tapp1ng, tl1e b a11k-rate leak, th e use of on en la G be ov ls er nm en t velopes, tbe sale of scrap wi1 e by the London Electricity allegation : Bo th e ar a1 d, 1d . of the alleged assaul t on a c1t1ze11 by two policemen. •

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803

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1 System'', 18 U11iversitJ' of C/1icago Lall' .Revieiv 521 (l9Sl). Britisl e 1 ''Tl 01i1 From finer, tl1 at since tl1 e e_arly rart of tl1 e l9tl1 ce11ttiry J1 ardly �ay to_ tr11e ably prob is It statu te polit of a11y 1111 J)01tance lias bee11 drafted aild inical or mic, econo · a1 . C. 1 . a so ' nt o!l1 erw1s� �Ilc:111 as t I1 e re:;�Ilt �f reco1n1�1e11datioi,s of a P_ a rliame into_ uced trad tl1e form Tl11s 1s _ o f Inq111ry. 111qu1r� 11sed I n Great Britai11 o� 1ss10? Comro Royal tl1e and explor[1t1or facts of of po]1cy i11 political problems t1on invesUga tl1e er cov to e. c n ta r o p im ss la c trs fi f o ! A Royal Co111mission of Inq11iry is 11s11ally _set up ,vl1 e11 1)arlian1 e11tary opi 11ion or the convjctio11s of tl1 e govern1 11ent or of ailJ' single depart111 e11t of tl1e gover1111 1ent ,vithin whose p11rview tl1e subject falls, l1a,,e 111,tt11red to tl1e point wl1 erc 111orc i 11for mation and guidance of an imn1 ediate sort t1po11 l)olicy are regarded as essential and �kl 00 longer postponable ... 111 a democracy wl1 ere the basic assttn1ptio11 of govern '(: all men are eq11al, tl1e opportt1nity is gi-.,en to tl1 ose wl1 0, by reason of th�tt is ment '•J ..... '., their interest in p11blic aft�airs. and tl1 eir s11perior k1 10\vledge aI1d se11sitivity to tl1 e .•,,;p need for action, ,visl1 some refor111 to take place. T11 e 11 11mber of leaders i1 1 a de1no cracy is potentially equal to tl1e total nu111ber of ,,oters or to tl1 e total 1111111 ber of tl1ose ,vho have a right to vote; but only a few l1u11dred tl1 011sa11d, J)erl1aJ)S 011 ly a fe,v -�·"' t11ousand, are sensitive leaders of public 01)i11 io11 . Wl1e11, by a 10 11g a11 cl mysterious ..'• .' process, s11cl1 leaders become pervaded witl1 tl1 e idea tliat son1 etl1i I1 g ot1gl1t to done or at lea.st preparations, by improven1 ent of tl1 e mii1d, sl1 011ld be u11dertake11 , tl1 e I Governme11t, at tl1e instance of Parliament or letters to tl1 c great 11 ewsJJapers, or prompted thereto by its friends who are not i11 tl1e Go,1er11111 e11t, n1ay establisl1 a Royal Commission of Inquiry into tl1e s11bject. A Royal Commjssion is, in legal form, a co1111na1 1d by the Crow11, 011 tl1c initiative and responsibility of ministers or a 1niniste1, req11iri11g tl1at certai11 J)erso11s '• named shall examine into a s11bject of i11quiry, ,,1l1icl1 is the11 stated in ,vliat are called �be Terms of Reference. Thus i11 its legal for1 11 tl1 e Royal Co111missio11 is ,1n execL1tive instrument whicl1 establisl1 es, tl1rot1 gh tl1e executive:, a body of n1 en and \vomen who are to make an inq11iry i1 1to a s11bject \ VJ1 ose tot111ds a11 d sco1)e are stated in .' tlle commis sion. Tl1is at once disti I1 g11isl1es tl1 e Roy,.l Co 1 nn1issio11 of I11q11iry from the parliamentary committees of all ki 11ds - wl1 ic]1 are set lIJ) by tl1 e I-Io·use of Com mons and manned by members of tl1 e Ho11se. Tl1e Ro)ra] Co1111nissions of Inqt1iry are manned by people wl10 are not members of Parliame11t. Parlia1 11e11 t rarely inter venes in tl1e process of the establisl1 me11 t of a Royal 2011111 1ission excepting to make 1 a rafber I 1umble s11ggestions as to the establisl1me11 t of a Co111 missio11 and eve11 inore rarely Suggestio11 s tl1at different regio11s of tl1 e co1I 11:ry sl1011ld. be represented, tli�t women as \Veil as men sh practic1lly 11 ever st1ggests 11 a1nes. It I S it all ted; be appoin �iotlers�ood that si 11 ce all parties desire tl1at a Royal Co1n111issio11 shall. reiider .a ii i mpa rtial report, Parliament itself 011gl1t to ren1 ai11 impartic:il i11 its cl1 o1ce leavii1 g to tile Govern ment tl1e responsibility of objectivity ancl co1111)etence. · · · Tlie Co�s_ sion is at� ons i11vesrig _co1nmittee sharply tl1e fron: ed disting11isl 1 und r a e tjm: � � � w1tl11n tl1e body of tl1e Ho Lise o·f Co1n11_011_s itself by tl1 e fact . tl1at 1 1� 1!mit 16 set upo11 tl1 eir proceedings. Royal Comrn_1ss1ons last as �Oilg as JS 11eces ry t� c_ou<l �� uct and. co11cl11de tJ1 eir investigation a11� s11b1 nit tl1e11� report. So 111e 0Un.1s s1ons, therefo re, are of extremely sl1ort dt1rat1on; otl1ers q u1te 1011 g. J e problem b el. o11 pers its � of oice 1 cl tl1e nes e r1ni efor dete the T :ssi; Commissio11 c0011111 ons m.ay be divided· 1·nto t· he three main grot1pi11gs of representative, · ·c 11 expert and gen eral ·Royal Co1 n1111· ssIO I 11 w ilS civic . In tl1 e first category are tl1ose 'is'

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SOUf{CE.BOOK OF ETI-IJOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

ly te ia im d ed y an m . irl fa d e le er t se wh be t_ 11s e 1n gr at tl1 � at n lei ob pr a tli wi d are face rm e, fo pl re m of l xa r ca fo lo t, ic nfl co ve 1n go ar s t_ es m er in l � 11a tio di ti·a � � id ai existing e s y ar o_ or th se 1o te wl ca d o n_ pr co se e tl1 � blem g. 111 s1n · s e11 lic r � 110 Iiq of m i· meilt or refo 10 at 1sl te , 1a leg d ed an m m 1 r ere fo wh ll ca t no do the � l1 1ic wJ e, _ ot m re e or in tle lit a ,tre al t1c of a c a. y pr er r ov mp 1sc co e th an th omise nt rta po im � e oi· m e ar ct fa of isslies e h a tut ug hr sta d a11 d y an lic po wh nt 1ne r11 re ve go � ! i11 ed nt me ple im � be y ma � wllicl1 _ lly tua 1a 1s a vir soc hat uct ?f d !-sc1ent1fic con tl1e in ded 11ee � is dge wle expert kno l . e am In ex third group, an 1s ion lat pu Po on �� ion iss � � mm Co l ya Ro researcli. TI1e y 1c ilit c1v ab ral and ene t b cul!ure , ded nee e a1· ery ov d isc tl1� tru ¥ � of ties ali q11 tlie all _ ss. the I 1 Pre on n ss1o IDID.1 _ Co yal Ro the on � le, mp � exceedmg exa for d as, , e uir req are s1on yal rn1s Ro Com a to , though ted oin app ent liam par of er mb me a find to e ly rar it has occasionally occurred. The size of the Co1n1nission varies witl1 its terms of reference ... ... Tl1e Chai1·n1an a11d tl1e members of the commission draw 11p the lines of the inquiry a11d co11sider and decide on the persons a.nd bodies who ought to be qttestio11ed by tl1em ... Al111ost invariably the Commission announces that it is pre1)are d to receive evidence and to invite tl1e submission of memoranda from .in terested 1)erso11s and civic orga11izations. Tl1e secretary will, at the request of the Commission, 01· by taki11g tl1e initiative wjt}1 st1ggestions, make connection with peo1)le wl10 are prepared to give evidence and to submit memoranda in advance. Son1e Co1nmissions i11form tl1emselves by q11estion11aires. The use of memoranda of evide11ce preceding tl1e ap1Jearance of the writers or of their colleagues and spokes men before tl1e Commissio11 for cross-examination has been recognized as a parti c11larl)' desirable p1·ocedt1re beca11se, wl1jle it d oes not prevent the com1nissioners from asking q11estio11s outside the scope of tl1e memora11dum s11bmitted, it focuses the 1nin.ds of witnesses 011 the writte11 for1nt1lation, and is both stimulating and guid i11g to tl1e comrnissioners, some of whon1 may 11ot be familiar witl1 t.his special section of tl1e evide11ce. I11 s0111e cases, research workers l1ave been employed to make field investigations, in otl1ers, to do docuu1e11tary researcl1. The eviclence on tl1e st1bject (fact, opinions and recon1mendatjons ol' policy) is tl1en elici �ed by t �e IJractice of public l1eari11gs. Tl1e Comnussion may find it neces sary from t11ne to t11ne to condt1ct l1eari11gs i11 closed sessio11; it is exceedingly rare. Tl1ere tl1en apJJe �r �ef�re tl1� go �e1·111ne11tal officials a 11 y witnesses tl1e Commissio_n may find 11seft1l 111 1ts 1nvest1gat1on, 1ne11 a11d wonien wI1o come forward in their own 1·igl1t a� ac:knowledged. experts 011 tl1e st1bject, and tl1e regular representatives, tl1e secretaries, tl1e SJJokes111en of various economic, political a 11d social groups are of a ''lobbying'' type or not, and academic expe.rts and specialists wl1etl1er tl1ese _ of establ1sl1ed re1)11te ... ... Tl�e 11et 1·esults of a Royal Co11imissio11 consist of its minutes of evidence, the verbatim tra11scri1)t of tl1e he,1ri11gs a11d t11e 1nemoranda, wluch I, personally, regard as tl1e 1nost valuable co11tribt1tio11, becat1se as it wei·e, they are life witho ut � l1�0ry, ancl tl1ey offer a11y reade1· n1ate:ial for I1is ow n jud gment. TI1e second res?lt 1s the �eport. T11e Repo1·t 1nay be_ t111a1111no11s; tl1ere may be a majority and mt_ n�r�ty reJJo,:t, or tl1e Report may be spl1t even mo1·e ways t11.an two, t11e several minor1t1es offering notes, adde11da, and reservatio11s. At any rate most of the facts are there. Tl1e Report, majority or 111i11ority, presents a reasoned and sober statement of the t :uths, 1sst1e�, IJroble111s �11d perplexities, evaluates them, a11d makes recorome�da. tions regard111g the practical policy wl1icl1 1night be adopte d in" view of tl1e vanous ends to be sec11red . . .

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a Pern1a11ent La1rv Revisio11. Co111.111ission:

s from a famous speech of Jt1stice Benjamin N. Carcloza of the U.S. Supreme excerpt .Belo,v 35 Harvarcl Lalv Revierv 113 (1921). C:'1.rdoza \.Vas not only a distinguished in � blished 0>urt bu� als o a legal philosopher of Note ancl at1thor of a wiclcly-reacl book The 1Vature of the Ju dge, Judicial Process. :t,.1inistry of below, of a ''Justice'', l1e is not using that lern1 in the ce C 11 speaks, s za ardo u ti J ,1 h en . e.,\:ecut 1ve . agency of gover11n1et1t. Cardoza is s as1c r. t b o a to re1er op1a, u thi . E in using . sense l't 1·s ed . 111 "depencle11t con1n11ss1011 \V1·1· 11c 1 1s to report to tl1e legislative branch . the term to refer to a pern1anent

... Today courts and legislature ,vork i11 separatio11 a11d aloofness.Tl1e IJe11alty is paid both in the wasted effort of prodt1ctio11 a11d i11 tl1e lower qt1ality of tl1e pro duct. On the one side, the judges, left to figl1t against anachro11ism a11d i11jt1stice by the n1ethods of judge-made law, are distracted by t l 1e co11flicti11g IJromp ti11gs of tl1e of and n1ercy, and tl1eir labot1rs bears and logic, out1J11t consistency justice of ; , l: 1 the tokens of the strain. On the otl1er side, tl1e legislatt1re, informed 011ly cas11ally HI and intermittently of the needs and proble1ns of the co11rts, witl1011t expert or resl£1I p onsible or disinterested or systematic advice as to tl1e worki11gs of one rule or a110ther, patches the fabric here and tl1ere, a11d mars often wl1e11 it wot1ld me11d. Legisla ture and courts move on in proud and silent isolatio11. S01ne agency 1nt1st be found Ii, I to mediate b etween them. -... ,I .•

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... Tllis task of medjation is tl1at of a 1ninistry of jt1stice [i.e. a Law Reforn1 Commission]. The duty must be cast on son1e 111a11 or group of n1e11 to watcl1 tl1e law in action, observe the manner of its ft1nctioni11g, and report the changes 11eedecl �hen function is deranged. The tl1ougl1t is not a new one.A1nong ot1r own scl1olars, 1t has been developed by Dean Pound witl1 fertility and power. Otl1ers before l1im, as he reminds us, had seen tl1e need, and t1rged it. Be11tl1an1 made provisio11 for such a ministry in his draft of a Constit11tio11al Code. Lord Westb11ry re11e,ved the plea. Only recently, Lord Haldane [a fan1ous British J11dge] l1as brougl1t i t to tl1e fore ag�in. 'There is no functionary at present w l 10 ca11 pro1Jerly be called a 111i11ister responsible for tl1e subject to Justice.' ... I have spoken in generalities, bt1t instances will leap to vie,v. Tl1ere are fields, known to us all, where tl1e workers in tl1e law are l1ampered by rt1les tl1at are out worn and unjust. . .. What, then is tl1e remedy? Surely not to leave to ·fitft1l cl1,1nce tl1e tl1i11gs that meth0d and system and science and adjt1st. Respo11sibility 111ust be order shot1ld centered some where. Tl1e only doubt, i t seen1s to me, is wl1ere. Tl1e attorneys-gene al ··: are overwh elmed with otJ1er dt1ties.Tl1ey l 1old tl1eir places by a tenure that � ittle continuity, or permane11ce.... We sl1al] reach tl1e b�st restilts if "v_e l?dge �� p [to Pro _ pose reform s] in a grot1p, wl1e�e _tl1ere_ 1nay be 111terchange of vi�w�, and ;her� difef ir tlie J1av to ce 1an l c_ a t ren e hav � w1l es typ 1g of 1011 tra 1 ht tl oug and s ·ay ··· Disch � a gy, enei ar1d arge t1n1e of of ure 11d1t expe such a an ires task requ · sin gle-hearted 1 ce • t· c J.?ra t· 1ve ac 111 n 111e · se con f o l c ecte tion exp cra , be not reaso11ably to It e acts oo, li ose t n 1nd fot i be to a 11 ofte la scho 11ot p rsl1i arch rese and a l1abit of i x sed, �in llt ottg k tas ie l t ie t�, var qLta e d_ i11a d e wer ies. d11t s ! io� Eve11 if tl1ese object n �;� be left. to a es. pos IJur ss cro at g rk1n o w_ , ber m tees 11u· un1t of volu11tary co1r Recommend�t.1 re ino nd una con uld ns wo o 1ty, l1or 11ld at1t wo r come witl1 1nt1cl1 greate gen ral ac�u e �'er 111 tl1 1esc e 1nad wl10 ence e th?s if on ies, the bod part of legislative cha;ge �1th � cl 11z ga o be tile tild sl1o r e tte � es iw com e ljt l ibj � ons ies of office.A si11g as a � lllSlr � J.? _ y of Justice. Certait1 at least it is that we mt1st come to soine official

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L LAW NA O TI U IT ST N O C AN PI IO TH E F O SOURCEJ300K

f eir of oo th y pr cit e pa giv ca y ar nt d lu an vo e ar at tI1 will s cje e11 ag e til · · s les 11 tt )' agenC r t po its to op uty es k a ur d aw an r ba e tl1 ss po le un wer. e 1rg pt d 11 a n ar w 1d ai to watcll , t e se th no of ur of co is, en , ess ed ut tit ns ce of co be ld ou sl1 ee itt mm co How tlle ot n l ss n tl1 ld t ou s11 0, s er a ist rh in pe m e th ps at th � is � :1 n io ot n1 1 w1 0 y M t. ec . llle proj 1 1 ce 1n a en sc! n 1tic p tes or titu law � of ies of t1lt fac tl1e � of � ee, thr as ny ina even as e th lc on wh ip try sh rus lar ho sc e � tl1 d must fin we all sh re l1e ew � els ly rd learning. Ha , l , if ble ou be ssi sh a po e 1er Tl t. retes rep � e tl1 11d sta to is k 1· wo its if aw dr to le ab be _ at ent ve or res ati rep ent s res ive rep a be of t1ld sl1o re tl1e d an cl1; ben tl1e of ive 1 tat sei the bar. Such a boarcl wot1ld no t only observe for itself the workings of the law as administered day by day. It would enlighten itself const�ntl y !hrough all available rs ola h sch ugh wit n thro atio sult con h oug tl1r 1; tio1 ruc inst and e anc uid o of rces sot1 0 study of tl1e law 1·eviews, th� jot1r;11al� of social sci:nce, the publicat�ons of t�e l�ai:n ed generally; and tl1rougl1 111vest1gat1on of remed1es and methods 10 other Jur1sdictions, foreign a11d domestic ... ... Men are iosisti11g, as perhaps never before, that law shall be made true to its ideal of jt1stice. Let 11s gather up the d1·iftwood, and leave the waters pure.

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T/1e E!:i,tablis/1111e11t of Tf1e E11glisli a,zd Scottislz Lali' Revieli, Co1111nissions

From Proposals for E11glish a11d Scottis/1 Lalv Co111missions, Command Paper 2573, January 1965. A ''Command Paper'' is in the nature of a report, made in theory to the Crown and submitted ''by command'' of tl1e Sovereign to Parlian1ent. Tl1e paper 1nay - as does the one below - present in detail the case for specific legislation. Tht paper belo\v ,vas prepared (nominally at least) by the Lord Cl1ancellor and tl1e Secretary of State for Scotland.

On.e of tl1e l1allmarks of an advaL1ced society is that its laws should not only be jt1st bt1t also tJ1at tl1ey sl1ot1ld be kept up-to-date and be readily accessible to all ,¥ho are affected by tl1em. Tl1e state of tl1e la,v today cannot be said to satisfy tl1ese req uire111 e11ts. Tl1er� is at prese11� no body cl1arge� \>litl1 tl1e d11ty of keeping the law as a whole L111 der rev1ew a11cl 1nak111g recon1n1endat1ons f01· its systernatic reform. Each Govern ment depart111er1t is responsible for keeping under review tl1e state of the law in its own field and fr?111 ti1ne to tir1 1e Royal Conunissio11s or i ndependent committees are set 11p to cxa1n111c and 111,:1ke 1·econ1t11endations on particular subjects. The Government _ tl1�_refore pro1)ose, subject to tl1e approval of Parliament, to set up a La\.v Com1n1ss1on for Engla11d a11d Wales. Tl1is will consist of five lawyers of· !1igl1 standing appoin _te � by tl1e Lor d Chancellor wit11 an adequate legal staff to _ assist tJ,e�. Tl1e Co1nn11ss1?ners will be required to keep the "{hole of English law . �oder re�1e\.v and to st1b1mt to tl1 e Lord Cl1ancellor progran1mes for the examin� �100 of d1.ffere11 t braocl1es of tl1 e law witl1 a view to its reform. The programmes will _ 1nclt1de reconunendat1011s 011 tl1 e best 1neans of carrying them out. When a pro gramme J1as been approved by tl1e Lord Cl1ancellor after const1lting other Ministers coocer11ed it will be laid before Parliament. T11e Commis_sio°:ers will also be charged with tl1e duty of pressing forward the taslc of co11sol1dat1on a11 d stat11te law revision. The object of the latter is to prune

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e11actn1ents, · .v l1ile obsolete co11solidatio11 con:;ists and dead of ook b te a all tl1e Act of enactme11ts 011 a partict1lar brancl1 one e n in : er ! togeth g � ngi : i of the Jaw. tl1e field �n that of la,v r�fcrn1 n1t1cl1 valt1c1.ble gl1ida11ce agree d y erall gen It is e of otl1er cot1ntr1e�.... enc eri exp the m fro ed ain obt n ca be

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Reconsider: Article 21 at the Admin �stration of Justice Pro:;l .an1atio11s No 2 of 1942, Negarit Gazeta 1st Year, No 1. (The establ1shn1ent of a "Consulatrve Con1n1ittec for legislation''). See Chapter IV, Section 1, P 359.

Questions

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l. What is the difference between ''L1.,v Revision'' a11d "Law Consolidation''? in Etluopia? there a need for ''consolidation'' ,. - IsIs there .. a need for ''revision''? Give concrete illustrations to support yo11r ans,vers.

A Proble111: Parliatrze11t as a Foruni for Ve11ti!atio11 of C:itize1z Co111JJlai11ts

Ato A, a conscientious MP from Addis Ababa, tr:es to l ceep in co11stai1t tot1cl1 with his constittients. During tl1e year variot1s co11s1itl1ents l1a\1e ap1Jroacl1ecl A with problems like these: a) X complained that the officials of tl1e Ivll111ic!1Jality of Addis Ab,tba 11a\1e refused to grant (or deny) an application for a building JJer111it to co11struct a restaurant. b) Y, a butcher, has complained tl1at some inspectors fron1 tl1e Ministry of

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Public Health condemned meat i n one of his sl1ops arbitrarily a11d \vitl1out proper evidence to sl1ow that tl1e meat actt1ally was t1nfit for const11nption. c) Z complained that his s011s have arbitrarily beei1 dis1nissed from a local government scl1ool - ''thereby destroyi11g :l1e.ir opportt111ities for tl1e future''. • � has tried to investigate tl1es e and other co111plain ts brought to bin1 by llis const:It_uents, but he complains to yot1, a lawyer employed by Parl�a1nent: ''I do1:1't have time to be an 'errand-boy' for all my constituents all tl1e time; thi.s service may be part of the job of an MP in other cot1ntries, b�1t in Etluopia it is very diffi ��t for us _to i n�estigate com_plaints of tlus sort. Can Parlia1n�nt do sometlii�g to P . MPs 1nvest1gate complaints brought t o tis by oJr const1 tue11ts and to force consideration of them?'' ''A Parliamentary 0 1nbudsn1a1z''? Britis/1 Propo sals Fro m Com_mand . [A Govern N (1965) o 11an''? 2767 ''Ombuds1 A . Parlianrzentary " ment White'' paper presented to Parliament by tl1e Prin1e Min ister, October 19651· I. The Go�em ment have decided to introdt1ce legislation for the app.ointm�nt a arliamentar �i· e P � Com� issioner for Admini� tration. Thi� Wl1ite Paper explai:°� reasons for this Coinn118 the for .envisage dec1s1on ttey wl11ch and the role s1oner .... 4. In B ·t · .. ain, Parli��ent is the of tl1e cit ize 1:1 es a11c v _ grie tl1e ti11g tila ven e 1:1 plac for b history, trad1t1011 and past an d present practice. It .1s on� of the.functions the elected Membe r of Parliament to try to secl1re tl1at 111s constitue11ts do

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SoURCEBOOK OF E'fI-IlOI> IAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

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. nt e . e Th p nm er · ov ed G oc r . e th es of ur nd l1a of e �11. at , Parliace sti ju in r ffe Stl t no es bat on d De an y ppl es Su bat De e hav . ent rnm Jou Ad de · s on velo , i · est Qu . me11ta1 y P· . . ,. · _ 1 o f ar 1ta p �n 1e1 tte an 1 _ pa ry si1 1t1 �r v. go e tl1 r ernment; de 11n e os i·p pti is tli ed for· , s g 11t s ce ue a1:1 t1t ns 1ev co , :p u _ t g ea n _ gr ki ta or y l l_ a 11_ i11 nt small, co e ar � rs be m aiid Me , r d He an sty y aJe M all s du 1v1 G 1nd . rs r ste �ve 1n1 M ere wh nme nt tlt, me rlia Pa to ate .y c�e an � to ne nt wa t t1tu t 1ns no do e W 1on which . ble 11ta o11 acc e ar y vel collectj t en iam s 1n arl t�1 P _ of e c rs pe b res em M of t, nor to s o11 cti fun e th de ro e wotild y es. e�d vid n alr tio pro itu nst Co Our proposal h itis Br the ich wh s die e replace rein e ll ers g1� sl1a mb Me of We r. the fur l stil Parlia ment s die me e r se tho lop e e v cl is to . , zen the �1t1 � t�c o p1· namely, the services to use can y e th ich wl1 nt ine ti·u ins a better of a Parliame11tary Comnlissio11er for Adffilmstrat.100. 5. Under our proposals, tl1e Parliame11tary Commissioner will be an independent officer wl1ose statt1s a11d powers will be confer1·ed by statute. He will be appoint ed by 't11e Crown; his salary and pension w.ill be a cl1arge on the Consolidated Fund; and he will b e sect1re f1·om dismissal, except b)' parliamentary motion. He will 1-eport to Parlia1ne11t each yea·r, and otherwise as occasion requires. 6. Tl1e Co1un1issione1· will act only at th e instance of a Member of the House of Commo11s, as the elected 1·e1J1·esentative body in Parlia1nent, and on a complaint of perso11al i11j11stjce s11:ffered by tl1e complai11ant. It ,vill be for the Me.mber to decide whetl1er the complai11t appears to be one appropriate for reference to the Com1nission. A com1Jlainant \Vill not be restricted to approaching the Member for l1is o,vn constitl1ency; Members will d.oubtless establish their own conve11tions for ens111�ing that the co11stituency M ember is kept in tau.ch when another· Member· tal<es tlp a case. Most complai11ts will come from private in dividuals, b11t companies 01· other corporate bodies - other than those under publicly elected or appointed authority - will not be excluded. The Com missioner will be at1tl1orjsed to conside1· any complaint sent to l1im by a Member of Parliament f1·01u a11yo11e lawfl1lly resident i11 G·1·eat Brjtain ...

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7. Exce1Jt f 01· sorne exclusions wl1icl1 are explained later in tl1is Paper, tl1e field fo: tl1e Co1nnlissio11e1· will be tl1e w _hole ra11ge of relationships between tl1e

pri vate perso11 a11d tl1e ce11tral Gove1·0111ent. 'v\Te propose to list i11 the statute tl� e bodies to be st1bject to it1,1estigatio11 by tl1e Com1nissioner in n1atte_rs within lus scope. The l)toposed list is as follows:Mirust1�y of Agrict1ltt1re , Fisl1eries and Food

Ministry of A v· iation . .. [�...11e_r� f?llows c:l list f _50 Mi!list1·.ies and otl1er pu bli ag c e 11cies, including manr � sucli Illstitut1ons as tl1e C1v1l Service Commission an d I11Iand Revenue.] _· _ The list will n�ed to be aine11ded from time to of � (} tur str uc the as tim e tlle go�ernm�nt maclli11ery itself is cl1anged, ......._._ by tl i is do to an d po we we sh se r al ek l subord111ate instrument. . - 8 · !11e e�cl�sions wl1icl1 we pr·opose to ? make from tl1e Commission· er �--4Ie1Ca("'__-_ · vestig�ti�n are those where there ar_e dom · � -=� �� na ... ef io ns inant considerat �� publ . c _ 111 ter est - 1 1�mely, -��e exercise of powers to preserve tht} .s -��tg�Q��2; � the St�te _, n1atters wh.i�l1 M1n1ster c -==: 6 !l 0 � WJ �� s er tif y as tio�s _ af re fe la ct in g . countries_, matters relating to the adm : �:; :;: � =!P -9 te rJ__ e S: � · te in rr is i tr at n io ia of n co l lo · 2 . . the exercise of powers in relat·ion to 1nve 'IT · st1ga · · . :.. .:._ ,nethe r,: · · t1ng crime. or determri:µng��.,".::�7_i:'�;,��:c:::;::-.:..� :;:'__,:''. �

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the court s. The Co mm to go ll . issio11er ,vill 110t 1 101. sha r tte a n a11 Jur t e the withi11 . e compete11ce a o·f tl1 e co11rts ·11e w111 ama IDtter.,\:! which· r · 11a, ve i � } ?i d 1 scret1on ' . · . . t d h at e . e me h t I y o? s en in the co11.rts �s not o11e th mk l1e if a c t wl 1ic to l1 tJ 1 e co111b b l on ex e y a pe s c� re ed a to d u se, b11� tl11s will 110 t affect aiiyoiie 's pla inant coul st1e 1 sst1cs already 'riglit of access to tl1e courts. ·He w1Il 11ot p11r < co,, e. · re d · b Y t . ri I oo e 111to h ·11 k I . w1 t 1e r �xerc 1se of t11c Prerogati,,e of Nlerc bu.na ls ... N� y or pe n_ a rs o a1 l �b of 1tl e 1o r1 rc ty o.f t11e S overeig11 j 1 1 co1 1ferriilg into th� �xe 1se 1 1 01 10urs �p p� nt o 111t 111en_ts by tl1e Cro'rv11 or by IVf i il isters . and privileges, or � I-Te ,vill �ga 1nv _ t st. .Jn � ac � tio fro n m s of D�p,1rt111e1�ts i 11 JJe be ex�luded rso1111eJ 1 11atters, _ including ?rders and d1 sc1pline 1!3- tl1e 1-\.r111ed 1:.. 01·ces. F111 ally, purely co111mercial rel a tio nsh• ips of Departme11ts ,v1tl1 ct1stomers or st1ppliers will 110t come witl1 j11 his purview. 9. We intend t_ l1e Con1miss}o11e.r's proceclL1re to be as i 11.forn1aJ as J)ossible st,bject to the requ1remen� tb�t if 11e takes UJ)_ a case .l1e 111L1st give to tJ1e 1Jerso11 against whom the co.n1pla1nt lies the opport11111ty to co111111e11 t 01 1 it. l-Ie will be e111power ed to decide whetl1er tl1e parties can be legally re1Jrese11ted, b L1 t legal reJJresenta tion will be the exception, not the 1·11Je. 1-Ie vvill l1 ,1ve IJov,cr to tak:e evide11ce on oatl1, although we wo11ld expect tl1is powe r to be 11sed i 11 freqt1e11 tly. I11 tl1 is connection tl1e sat1ction to be i11,,oked i11 tl1e eve11t of defia11 ce of tl1e Con1missione·r will be to refer tl1e matter to tl1 e I·ligl1 Court ...

10. The Commissioner will l1ave d.iscretion to refuse to JJltrsue a case w1 1ere l1 e thinks there are insufficient grounds for tl1e co1uplai11t or wl1ere l1 e does not regard it as witllin bis sco1Je. 11. The C ommissioner will be conce1·necl witl1 fa11 1ts in ad1ui 11 is1ratio11 . It ,vjll 11ot be for h im to criticise policy, or to exan1ine a decisio11 011 tl1e exercise of dis cretiona ry powers, unless it appears to l1im tl1 at tl1e dccisi.011 l1as bee11 affected by a fault in administration. If l1e finds not11ing ,vro11g, l1 e \vill i1 1forn1 tl1e Me111ber of Parliament wl10 l1as approacl1ed l1in1. If J1 e :fi11ds t_l1 a! tl�ere_ is jt1stifiab�e c�use for complai nt and the Departme11t 1·espo11 cls to l11_s �nv1tat!on to pt1t 1t r1gJ1t, 11e will inform t11e Member. So far as t11e Co11 11 111ss1oner 1s conce_rne�, this will be the end of the matter, save for a possible reference to tl1e case 1 11 �s a_nnual report to Parliament. If tl1e Department does not act_ to the C�inmis sioner's satisfa ction, it will be ope 11 to him to re1Jort liis co11clt1s1011 to Parliament ad hoc. 12· It will be for Parliamen to dec ide what arra11geme11ts to make to receive aud t act upon reports from the Commis sioner. 13· It will be for 11 e i s ° (if ee. iitt mn Co ] ect sel o f [a p m hel rlia tl1e Pa h ent wit · ' · · a�po inted), to consider what action should be taken on tl· 1 e iep · orts of tl1e Con1nu ssioner - whether the annual report or re p or ts acl l7oc. 14 · In fi0nnu . s. le . ' ip c in r JJ t 11 . a rt o JJ im O t w 1, at1ng our proposals we have paid regard to · . rce o u r existing p rst, that 1 ? fi? re and lop deve _ this to 1 u new instit tion sl ould serve · t · ly d · i1 o c e S l · 1 a ' 1 d 1 con·stit·u-t1onal d 1v n 1 1 e l ments for tl1e protection f t nge arra y r e v e t a lJ t o tl a t the scope s le b i pos � · ' of the scheme must be made as clear as bi · able ' be 11 1 w r e 11 . ody may know 10 s 1s 1n m o . . C e l 1 t case� wh�t be as ly plain may as . . s 1e 1r 11 q in _ l is tak J1 o t i io · e up and what their 1 relat 11 e b I 1 w s on ati lig ob right s a.nd 1 · tlle powers of t. he Coni_ 15. In d e · . . . � course, 1t may be desirable to cons1?er e x�e� dJDg . e ati inin istr v l ad mi&Slon er to e tl t deal with complaints of the JJr1vate citizen agains

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'" SOURCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONS flT'UTIONAL LAW nd e te w to seek exper ie in , st · fir , ut B . s. tie ri ho t au ic e bl nc l IJt r he . . of ot . of ns 10 act n t b ee t w h h. e c1 e t1zen and ce ns s 1.p 1o t a I re o f ld fie e th n i · ntral the Commissionei Government.

A Fi1rtl1e1· Note A great deal of attentio11 l1as been posed in the readi?gs �bove to Parliament,s possible role as an i11\'estigato1·, �ot only �f formal legislative P!oposals, but of governJnent opei·ations. Comparative mater1als b��e b�en used s1mp!y to s11ggest possible lines of development. Tl1e pro�lem of pol1c1ng �ncompeten.ce_, irregularities, inefficiencies and inattention to duty 111 governn1ent 1n a developing country is probably a ,,ery real 011e; it l1as bee? noted_iJ?- nume�ous s!udies of political ''moderru zatio11''. B11t whether Parlian1e11t, 1n a political society like contemporary Ethiopia, can - or sl1011ld - assume an aggressive role in endeavoring to ''police'' and ''prod'' the ''burea11cracy'' in obviously open to question. This has not been its traditional 1·ole. And, indeed, as has been noted, the cons titution presently assigns (tl1rot1gh Ai·ticles 27, 36, 66 and 68) major responsibilities and powers to the Emperor. F1t1·tl1ermo1·e, jf it is trt1e that tl1e upper echelons of the bureaucracy are staffed by tl1e political ''elites'' - the t1·aditional nobility and rulers plus the new, university edt1cated generation, and if Parliament is 1·egarded witl1 mistrust or ambivalent attitt1des by these ''elites'', and if its ''stat11s'' is ''downgraded.'', and if it lacks expert staff and otbe1· resou1·ces to l1elp it do its bt1siness - to tl1e extent these elements combine - it may well be l1nrealis tic to· expec t too much, too soon . Compare: Articles 67,68,69 of tl1e Constitution of Tanzania, p. 271.

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The Impeachment Power of Parliament Read: A.1:ticle 74, 75 of tl1e Revised Constih1tio11. Consult the Penal Code. Fron1 Keef e & Oful, op. cit., pp. 416, 417. Legi slative. concern witl1 tl1e cond11ct of executi,,e officials leads in extreme cases to questions of ren1oval. . .. . Tl1e mo�t P��en t legal power of_ 1·e1:1oval tl1at Congress possesses is that of 11111)eacbme11t. Art1�le I of tl1e Constittltion pro,,ides that the House ''shall have _l1e . sole P?Wer of 1 m1)eac li1nent,'' a11d tl1at the Se11ate ''sl1all l1ave the sole power � �o try a�l �n11)ea?l1�e_t 1ts:'' A two-tl1irds vote oJ· tl1ose senators present is required co 1 �t. S� bJect to �I�peachment, according , den t Pre si the � to are Article II, � ; i ce- ies1de11t, _and ,111 c1v1l officers of tl1e United States. Impeacl1ment proceedings _ �lclY b . e bro�!gllt ?ttly 011 charges of ''t1·easo11, b1 ·ibery, or other higl1 crimes and �s e eanors. _Tl11s powerfl1I tool l1a� been used only twelve times in American his-_ � toiy. · ' · TJie _ 1 I?peac111n�11t w�apon is sim1)ly too strong to use in tl1e everyda y pr� ��s��:. !egislative over�iglit; 1!8 regula1· use might be c � ato ng <;!r equated witl1 appi o erase tl1e da1ly t1·affic s11arls so cl1aracteristic of contem rary urban life. po h c n itut onal p w�r to impeach provides Congres with the legal us ! s j tifit cati� :o ; er ou : wrong: o1ng. ... T? be ac to nee d eff ect no ive t , Congress does directl Tlll1s, Senate resure o11 P es1dent e Ge n ey torn � Gr At an t led l1is him as to k : ral to ��si Con.gress1on�I _com°:11ttees h� . tio -i: str a du rin g Ad t he mi ni Eisenhower similar sue�·sses whe� their 1nvest1gat1_ ons 1g� res tl1 e: ced spo tlig for hte d tha evi t den ce _ nation of [severa l high] officials. .

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the Executive on in the 1\. d option Influence entary parliam of National Policy

Problems ica l the t Hy po I Some er en1ployed 011 tl1e ad1n�11istrati,1e staff of parli alawy a , are you that AssUllle a re referred to yol1 for advi ce. ms ble pro ing ow foll The 1 ment. l) Several leaders from Parliament tell yot1: ''We l1ave seen, i11formally, dra ft copies of the �ew Five Xear Pla� . We belieye n1a11y 1ne111bers, partic1:1Iarly fron1 rural areas, will be part1cltlarly interested 1n tl1 e Pl a11 'targ ets' relat1 1 1g to pro vincial prima ry school constrt1ction, provincial road constrt1ctio11 a nd tl1e deve lopment of local public health clinics. \¥e b elie,1e the vie\vs of Parlia111e11.t sl1ot1ld be s011ght and formally commt1nicated before any Plan is ofl1cially pro1nulgat ed. Is this procedure required? or possible ? Please advise us." i'

2) Several M.Ps from Addis Ab aba tell you: ''We have read witl1 i11terest tl1e r e commendations of a special Commissio11 appointed to study 'l1ou.si11g proble1ns in urban areas' which urge cr eation of a Ministry of I-lot1si11g. (See JJ. 465, supra). We wish to try to persuade the gov ernment to i11trodt1ce a lav, to imple ment these proposals. w·hat steps should we l111de rtake ?''

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3) Members of the Chamber of Deputie s from certai11 awrajas in Harar and Arl1ssi and Shoa provi11c es tell you: ''\Ve feel tl1at local citize ns vvho arc affected by !he activities of the Awasl1 Valley Autl1ority should be represe11t ed on its govern ing board. Can Parliament propose an amendment to th e law e stablisl1jng tl1e agency (see p. 460-62, supra) to require local repr esentation on the Autl1ority's board of directors?'' 4) Some Deputies representing rural areas tell yot1: ,,·vve feel 011r awrajas are _ being neglected when it comes to hjgl1way development projects. We wa11t to try a?d require the government (tl1e Imperial Higl1way Authority) to sp end a _ certain proportion of its money in eacl1 province-and in 011r awrajas in �arti cular. The budget of I. H. A. is now p ending before the Bt1dget Colllilllttee . Can we as k for amendments to it?'' Re-read: Ch pter IV, Sec tion 6, pp.427-35, supra. � Articles 33, 34, 71, 86-92 of tl1e Revised Constitution. Chapter V, Section 3, pp. 468-88, si1pra. The Work 0,rp J arliame11t Day by Day

rea i gs be o are tl 1e 1 � 58 ,vith ling de;a 11e11 Ze1 is Add r h N f e pap ews acts rom t e extr J w dn (E.c�;96 66 i ical seven day_ period sess t� a on , less of or re lia mo Par , ect refl nt. e me t Th firs and so�e t hin· � / g)of t�e way measures are deb ated. The last provides an overview of tl�e session. All of th em ance to both br:c�des to point up the importance of executive-legislative relations and tl1e _1m�,ort through p . of developing effective procedt1res for ''comn1unicat ion'' and "Sleering n1eaSlrres ar 1ament. 1 Fro

m, Adu,,is . Zemen , 5 Febru · ary 1966 . · TI1e Ch· amb· er ecia I s Y b d re pa pr on t p lt1 f so D re � e a � ti pu d es yesterday passe � _ C-OOlmitt requ ? estmg the Prime Minister to clarify the 1nvest1gatory acuv1t1es of the Poli:'.

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SOURCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

d tt al D�p11ties, and re ferred t i iv d in m o fr ls sa o p ro p e iv at sl gi hem · le d ai 11e so al It s n io at d . e es en 11 m T m p co ro re d p 11 a d os y . 11 st s r al fo s ee tt in i 11 11 11 co t n a ,, 1 e e 1e tJ to d icial activities, land tenu e, ju nu ve re 11d la x Ta � . lth · ea I I' re f o· t n e 1 n y , · a p 1e t l d e d clt1 . . a re u a y re e K d n a r 1 e · 1 · e y 1e tl n 1· and tl1e sca1·city of \Vater . 66 19 ry a u 11 J·a 9 2 z, er n e, z is d d A From d_ se ies us ut sc ep di e � am of dm r n · �e 1:11 1a Cl e th ent� , ay 1·d ste ye 11 o ssi se its . During 1 ts special committee on these of ns 1o 1n op e th d . an vs Ia, 11 o proposed to tlle p e11si of ies e on ut th l ep ua D id tem iv sys d in of s ew vi e t11 d se ' · o di· scus . · a111endme·i1ts. It als · p 1n 1 ster to clarify M e nm e h t on ll ca to d te vo en tl1 1· be am Ch market taxes. Tl1e both of these 111atte1·s. The H:0110111·able Ato Agide Neg11sse quoted an amendment of 1940 E.C. prol1ibiting tl1e taxatio11 of minor co1nmo dities in markets, and on all goods in comml1nity markets. . .. 1:.:re told tl1e C11amber that laws sl1ould be passed allowing the farmer to sell farm p1·odl1ce from Ia11d on which he pays the annua! tax f�e� of taxatio� in �e local m,trket. The Cl1amber tl1en ,,oted to call on the Prime M 1 ruster for clan.ficat1 on before a11y decision could be passed on the 1natter. The Cha1nber also clisc11ssed a proposal by the Honot1rable Ato Aschalaw Haile-Marya1n on 1·oad. bt1ildi1 1g, and forwar ded it to a committee for further st11dy. . ..

From Acldis Ze1ne11, 3 February 1966 TI1e Senate co1 1ti1111ed its disc11ssion of the draft la'1. 011 tl1 e formation of public business association s [coo1)eratives]. It ha.s so tar discussed 32 articles of tl1e draft. I11 yesterday's sessio11, it started witl1 Article 32 (2), and continued witl1 its formal disc11ssion of tl1e d1·aft ,1rticle by article. Tl1e session discussed inconsistencies be tween articles of tl1e draft la\v a11d tl1e Co11stitution, over tl1e taking of private pro pe1iy for tl1e use of p11blic busi11ess associations. T11e Minister of Community Dc·,·e lopment ,vas therefore called on fo 1· clarifica.tion, after which tl1e Chamber accepted the articles with certain a 1 nend 1 11ents. The disc11ssion adjourned at Article 43 (3). Tl1e Cl1amber of De1)11ties discussed t11e draft Charter of the Municipality ?f Addis �baba, and rec�mmendations on a new organization of munici_ �ali�es 10 the � rov1nc es. The Kant1 ba was pre sen t t o answer question on the Muruc t� ality s of Add'Js Ababa. TJ1ere was a proposal to call on tl1e Prune Minister for clar1 fica tion, s�nce the Kan!ib� represe 1ited 011ly the Addis Ababa Municipality, but this . was �eJe�ted ?Y 1naJor 1tr vote. Tl1e De1Juties we re especially concerned with the const1tut1onal1ty of tl1e 1ncre�se i11 taxation c ollected by the Municipality in 1957 E.C.,_ �11d .req11es the ted e�1 Jla nat 1on tha t fro m tl1e d Ka nti ba. cla ime Tll Ka e nti ba . Mun1c1pal1ty 1 s al1!hor1zed by Decree No. I of 1934 E.C. to collect municipal tax es at_ the ra!e determ.Ined by the M11nicipal Council. Tlle inconsistency of this Decree �1th Art1 cl�s 28,_ 109 and I 13 of the present Constitution in,,olved the Chamber 1n a long d 1 sct1ss1on . ... 1

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From Addis Zemen, 5 February 1966. . Durin g its s_ ession of Friday, 4 February, the Chamber of Deputies ordered . 1!s f:egal Commi!tee to st1tdy the draft ,bill on municipalitie s Con the to rela tion s in titution and earlier Proclamations, a11d to report to . da ys ten the Chamber within .

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the Mu that nici pali ty osed sl1o l1ld t4 pro be preventecl f·om . co11ect11 p a s w It .· 1g _ · decisi o11 l1ad bee11 reacl1ed on tli� draft s�1� dd·u·onal taxes until a • · 6·111,1 b lIt tI 11s was ' ; a. 1 ' let�· reJected because. the maJor1ty vo ted th at a 1aw sl1ot1ld be observed tinti'l ·1 ts amendd. a1me procl is t ; roen tip witl1 tl1e disc11ssio11_ of tl1e legality of tlle reveiJtie t�ken ��s n sessio y's Frida The E.C. �957 �or ty �ant 1ba exp1ai ii ed to tlle Clla i nber M�1n1c1pal1 t�e by cted colle . was acting �n accordan�e 'Y1tl1 tl�e �t1tl1 ority given it by Par c1pality Muru the that was nothing 11nconst1tt1t1onal 111 1ts collectio11 of truces for there that and ent, liam area tl1e t�1at of Addis Ababa i s 600 gasllas witli a Chan1ber_ the to�d e H E.C. !957 1 resident population of half a lUlll1011. Bt1t tl1e avera.ge yearly revent1e of t]1e MuiJi cipality for 1940-_195_7 E.C. was only �500,000. TJ1is a1nou11t was by 110 1nea 11s e11011gJ1 needs tl1e w1tl1 accordance of tl1e ti m e. TJ1e i 11crease in taxes 1n city the develop to 00 land and buildings was tl1erefore needed to give better services to tl1e public. further, the vc1ilue of land and bllildiog assets l1ad increased so 111ucl1 tl1at tl1e Mtini cipality needed greater reveo11e from tl1en1. It is tl1erefore i1nJJorta11t that tl1e taxes continue in effect 1111tjl tb.e present law js amended. He also a11svvered otl1er questions 1 on the same issue from in dividual Dept1ties. Tl1e Chamber felt the need for a thoro11gl1 st11 dy of the draft bill, a11cl its co11sistency with the Constitution, and the Proclan1atio11 s of 1934 a11d 1937 E.C., and the Municipality Cl1arter of 1946 E.C., and ordered its Legal Committee to stt1dy and report on the matter accordingly. ... From Address bJ' }I.E. Lt. Ge1zerc1! Abiye Abebe to 1-J.J.ivf. 01z tlze Occc1sio11 oj· tlze

Annual Adjo·ur11111et1t of t/1e Parlia1ne11t-Hamle 1st 1958 (as reported by ENA Addis Zemen, Hamle2, 1958: E.C.) (Law School Translation).

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Your Majesty, The members of the Senate and of tl1e Chamber of Deputies, upon completio!1 of �ork for the year 1958 E.C., are going for vac�ti?n and, p�1rs11ant to tl1e Const i tution, have come before Yot1r Majesty for 1)erm1ss1011 to adJoti rn. · · · [l]he total draft laws presented [by tl1e Gover11ment] to tl1e Parlia111ent [tl1 is year] was fourteen: ... 1. The regulations of labour standards and conditions. ld or W 1e tl om fr d ar o B n io at 2. The loan to the Ethiopian Telecommunic Bank with the Ethiopian government as a surety. . l a n o ti a . n r . te n I 1 e l t m o r f t 3· The development loan to th e Ethiopian governmen Development Agency. y n a p 1n o C r e p a P d 11 4· T�e loan of the Import and Export Bank to the ptiIp a [with the government as surety]. . e v e d s u io r a v f o n io t 11 5. The loan of the American government fior the. exec lopment projects. 6- An increase in th e health tax. e h t d n a t n e m n r e v o g · 7· The loan agreement made between the Ethi. opJan American government [for various other proJects].

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814

i rm of r e fo t th i en ns m pa ip ex f on e of qu se ha rc pu a e t]1 r fo . an lo Th 8 t en m d rn an ve go the America n n ia op hi Et e th n ee · proJects made betw vernment. e t to b a r m en su rn y et ve go r fo n ia op hi Et [a] loa n e th to 11 9_ Altthorizatio f H om C ote 1 pa ny d n rom t a n e the m p lo e v e D 1 e Impo rt l t y b d 1e i1 ta b to be O a11d Expo1·t Eank. . es iv at er p -o f co o n o ti za am g 1· 0 1e tl n Io. Tl1e law o n pia m ve hio Go l Et ria t pe en . m Im C. E. 59 budget. 19 1 e tl of al ov pr ap 11. The . x a T n o ti ca u . d E 1e tl in e as re 1c 12. A n i1 13. T l1e Salt Tax. 14. A Iav, on tl1e Postal Se1-vice. Of these proposals, eleven we1·e approved by both Hou.ses and, pursuant to the Constitl1tio11, sent to H.I.M. tlrrol1gl1 tl1e Prime Minister to be proclaimed and a1)plied as law. Bl1t tl1e draft [laws] on l1ealth tax, educational tax and salt tax were f Ollnd to be unnecessary, for the time being, by both Houses and were rejected� I11 tl1e same 1na1111e1·, tl1e following seven legislative proposals were introduced by the men1be1·s of tl1e Se11ate in accordance with Article 86 (b) of the Constitution: I. Tl1e regttl.ation of marriage procedl1res 2. The control of prostitutes 3. Tl1e abolitio11 of Afersata 4. Tl1e distrib1ttion of lands 5. The organizatio11 of a Ministry of' ··onomic De,,elopment 6. The appointment of jl1dges 7 · Tl1e amendment of tl1e Criminal P1·ocedure Code and siinilar matters V..'hile half of the above n1entio11ed legislati,1 e proposals are stjll unaer sttidy tl1e others were decided by tl1e Senate. ... 1 �ill not _pass witl1oltt expressing my gratitt1de to tl1e concerned ministers a·nd tlieir: deputies wl10 ... atte11ded tl1e Parlian1ent 1·egularly during the discussions and carried on other [coope1·ative] activities. ...

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The Budget

Read: Articles 114-118 of the Revised Const itution.

(I) Tl,e Significa11ce of the ·Budget

From Keefe & Ogul, op. cit. pp. · · · po · � A If the bl1dget is conceived OnIY as a mass · rt;;. m · 1 · s t i. e11 h t exercise ar1tl1met1c 1n ' . ance cannot be understood · · · The . ost m .· ti " �_. 1 ts u b d get represe 1s Uch It more. � · � ?J, � · _ e::: .. authoritative sing1e measure of wl1a o s . :lo :'.:fne is. t the utive's program actually· ·� · . . ·· hi ghIY generali.zed language of the ca exec · · :jJJS· · tax · · e ign, e.g., ''I favour an equ1�abl_ . _ -_ ��:·-;; "":�_.::J mpa · . re tem'' , ''I WI·11 bu 1-1d adequa' te h i gh p l"-nr · , b , · · wa ys, pr� v1 ct�s a less than pr�� 1s�_ �:s1� -·�� :.� - ;. :�:::� dieting the executive's program. The s , � �� ,� 111� , pr ol ge 1gn ne ral 1za t1o ca n of the mpa lated i t0 a hattl, cold budgetary � � @ � ex p th e ite · m of ro vi de m s ea 1 tl su re e re al attitud� -- ---..----�-- ·. .. � --- - - --- -•

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. Whe n the �xecutive] ... prepar�s a budget, [it is] ... a bltieprint for ptiblic po1icy . bl ac th k e th pr at in of t ize co lt1 111 11s rea l of sta tistics in tlle buclget clocument . r.ag•islators tes of po1·1cy. Accord1n · . g 1 y , t.11e executive budget occtt ts real ih e . . )ie s tll J e c eii tra1 all t11r nda 1sla of age leg es. the on n o ·u· are poSl by th e exec11tive provides not 011Jy th os ed · The bu dget pr· op e best sing · · I e s t ea t pr tr� og t10 ra ad � m m1 b rus _ t 1t us11ally tl1e only coiupreliei1sive roen t of the pla n fo r leg1sJat1ve before assemblies. action put (2) Parliame ntary Consideration of the Budget From Bulcha Demeksa, !he Et�iopia11. Bi,dget (.LLB Paper), Fact1lty of Law, I-I.S. J.U. (1967). (Later publ1shed 10 4 Joi1rt1al of Et!1iopia11 Lalv 369 (1967). In accordance with Article 115 of tl1e Revised Co11stit11tio11 , tl1e draft bt1dget is presented to the Emperor before Ma rch 24tl1, a11d with Hjs apJ)roval it is presented by the Prime Minister to Parliament. Article 114 specifies that ''none of tl1e p11blic reve1111es sl1al] be expended, except as authorized by law,'' and the articles v.1llicl1 follov;, i11 dicate fairly clearly that ''lavv'' should in this context be 11nderstood to mean ''Parliament-enactecl lav1''. This gene ral control over the budget given to Parliament is st1bject to t,vo 1egai limitations. First, under Article 116, Parliament cannot aJJprove total expendit11res greater tl1an provided in the draft budget submitted to it. This liinitatio11 does 11.ot bar Parliament from increasing the expenditures at1thorized for particular ite111s, bl1t a11y i11crease in one item must be balanced by reductions elsev.,l1ere in tl1e bttdget. The second limitation stems fron1 the combination of Articles Ii 7 a11d 88. The former article provides tl1at, if a budget is not e11acted by tl1e begin11ing of a new fiscal year, the budget of the previous year shall conti11l1e in force.,:, Tl1� latter a_rticle �equires tl1e approval of tbe Emperor before a 111easl1re JJasse� by Parliament (1nclud1 ng the annual bt1dget) becomes law. Taken togetl1e1·, tl1ey 111 tl1eory leave open the possibility tl1 at the government col1ld operate i11:definitely free of tl1 e budget ary control of Parliament; so long as tl1 e Emperor declined to approve tl1e budgets enacte d by Parliament. the last Parliament-enacted budget tl1 at was app_roved by H im would continue to provide a lawfl1l basis for government expenditures. I_n practice, however, the constantly increasing needs of tl1e governn1ent make 11118 second limitation of no real importance. t..

· al . ci ffi o e th f o ft ra d th The d raft p.resented to Parliament I _e Y on 1ncll1des not text and acco 1 1 subhead eac fo! 1ons a11at expl mpanying schedules but also detailed ex e es or, where there are Tl1 . ure dit 1 e1 exp ry ina of ord d bea h no ds eac hea for sub planatjo ns give: w o ll a e il . and wages, civi b I. For pers al . o m . to u a d ·1 · lt1ments (c1v1l salaries emo �� f o e g 11 a r , s st an o p f o ces, r : rrul1tary and police pay and allowances), tlle nun� al l a u r1 n a n a d 8 aries, n a k ran month ly total for eacl1 group of employees ail t s 1o n to s A t. c e p . es . r . p e This n • lllat · oVIsio may by in o n o ti si po 5 ' ent Pa i impli r rl1� rengt l1en n . e dent1 of Parliament ''in case s cat on st ters, the Emp en p in �t� er egtsl � or d to _ 117 l er has pow an ite rticle unlim A that of e e bl �gua is It . th · ·: g Sittin t D n a are r bers 1s)arise Cham g when Je at the cy r ry sbo: e _ ta e g ?, d tt b f o e s 10 the c.a e p dur ro� y •• to r enc e erg em th . takch _ xclude any o e tion' aod that Article 92 therefore does not apply 1_n tbIS area.

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IONAL LAW T U IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E SouRCEBOOK OF

io , ss f fe af ro st J p e na iv at a tr is d n . in m te ad ch s p ni u o gr cal e re th f o ch ea r total fo f; f a t s n ig e r o f d n a , ff s ta r to o le s lc (� re h u ve it s, d . en p e ex i y qu ar in p rd o t of en m s em it i1g ni ai m re e th r 2_ Fo r ed fo id ch ov ea pr nt ou cl bam su e th s as , s) ge ar of ch r l1e ot . id ai ' . . s ie pl lp Sl , and ' '' 'en t d an pm u1 up eq to 11n 1t1 w t ne ni es ss la -c n 1b ee st en ev el to p (tl re itu expend . ') s' e rg 1a cl 1· 1e tl o '' 1 i1 l1 it w 1 e e 1n ay th w sa in t en y as m an lia ar P he ot l1. 1g ro r th se ur co its s ke ta t af TJ1is dr g in nc_rease in govern i a_n lv vo in s al os op pr at tl1 es 1ir qt re 86 Ia,v, except that Article s. e 1e nc 11t Si ep of �h D r ea b be · m ha C et e g . th ud t t? s :fi1 d te en es pr be s 1re it1 nd iJe ex mental e e of io os th ev th an pr tl1 r us te ea , gr ar ye s re t11 d1 n pe ex l ta en n1 rn ve go r fo has provided r be of e am tl1 Ch to ie ut st r ep fi D d te s. en es pr e11 be e tic ac pr in s I1a et dg bu t af dr t11e The Cl1amber of De1)11ties has a stan ding Budget Committee for the purpose of exan1ining tl1e draft budget. TI1e Committee holds hearings at which representa ti\,es of tl1e execl1tive ca11 p1·ese11t tl1eir case. The present practice is for only the re1Jresentative of tl1e Mi11istry of Finance to attend these heari ngs, but it would be desirable for representatives of otl1er n1inistries and agencies also to attend, when necessary, to explain and defend their proposals. The B11dget Con1mittee presents its report to the Cbamher and voting takes place in accordance ,vith Article I 16, item b); item. The Minister of State in the Prin1e Minister's Office is prese11t at tl1e Proceedu1gs before the full Chamber to ·answer any questio11s concerning tl1e proposals of the Council of Ministers. The budget ml1st be ap1J1·oved by a vote of a majority of the members present, and no · vote can be taken witho11t a quorum, which is a majority of the members .

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After being passed by tl1e Cl1amber of Deputies, the budget is immediately forwarded tl1ro11gl1 tl1e President of tl1e Cl1amber to the Senate. The Senate's pro cedure for consideration of tl1e budget is s imilar to tl1at of tl1e Ch.a.mber of Deputies. !he Senate elects a B.11dget Committee, wllicl1 examines tl1e budget and presents its report to tl1e fi1II Senate. Voting then takes place i n tl1e same manner as in the Chamber of Deputies. From Girma Tadess e,. Some Aspects of· tl1e Ethiopian Pa,·liament (LL.B. Paper, Faculty of Law, I-I.S.U.) (1966). · A resu.me �f �n importat1t dis�t1ssion n1ade on Megabit 20, 1955 E.C. in t�e Cha�ber �f .Dep11t1es ,�1ll serve to 1ll11 strate most of the problems faced by Parli� ment · �llat tI1e bttdget 1s 11ot p1·esented i11 time a11d that it· is not presented in detatl. Tlle honourable Ato Byissa Jammo Cl1ainnan of tl1e Budget Committee s�d · g to the Hous '' th �re_ ts facm · been 110 need to explain have . ' they tl1e blen1s pro . · · ·bm1ss1011 of tl1e budg : e su co11cern111g t1.1 - � et',. H e furtl1er said: ''(_I) In l951 E.C. tl1e Ho11se refttsed to pass the budget since it was sub h .. · m1tted 27 days befiore tlle cIos1ng e _ t ved · day of the session · But' we appro . b11dget tl1ougl1 not in coni�or1n th · ......... E H. 1ty e w1tl 1 the beca · us Con stitu _ tion . · e� . . . --=Pri e M�nis�er l�i self came and explained ·the difficul We .. ties in detail � not% e� ht� that 1 n tl1e future every detail of tl1e budget should be subJllltted _ �-·-··"�-- . t0 US ID time. _: =:= · . = � · (2) In 1952 and 1953 E.C. the b d e W . ·r d . . . , etai -·- _ .. ·-· _ · ID t ge s d wa �e t en no es pr � 11owever, ..,d ;:-asse i t . an ted d gave a notice to the effect tha .-:;.1 pre sen . he 1t · t ... -_,... det81-1 1n the P futu re. -m=��R-- �..::;,:

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PARLIAMENT AND LEGJS.LATIVE INSTITUTIONS

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817

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ap e d �he bt1d�et for 1 9 55 E. . becatlse p ro w v e 19 5� , In ) (3 tl1e Executive � _ ha d1 ffi ve wo ct1 ul lty d 111 prese�t1ng tI1e btidget itl de 1t tl1 at ed stat ta il llrltil Age11cy Personnel was establ1sl1 ed. the Central (4) Now tl1e 195? E.C. bu_dget l1as bee11 se11t as t1st1al. TI1e CoiJunittee llas decided tl1at 1t be se11t back so tI1at tl1e Exectitive 111ay examined and , l)reJ)are · ,, it in detai1. osa l was s11pported and it ,vas sen t accordi11gly. T11 e btidget ,vas This prop · · · m1t e t d t · b s11 o ar 1 P d an .1am e1 1 t 111 agai n detail for tl1 e first time.* prepared

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From Addis z,emen Se11e 21, 1958 E.C. (Jt1ne 12, 1966) (Law Sc.l1ool Tra11 sJatioi1). In a joint session taken y esterday, tl1e Se11ate a11cl the Cl1an1ber of Dept1ties spent tbe day disct1ssing the draft law on tl1 e 1959 E.C. b11dget. Since the draft law on the 1959 E. C . b11dget incl11des Etl1. $32,0tl7,500, a s11m hoped to be obtained from foreign loa11s, ot1t of wl1icl1 [a Ioa11 for] Etl1. $17,100,000 bas not yet been presented to the parliament for approval, tllis ite111 v11as, by a n1ajo rity vote, stntck off from tl1e 1959 E.C. bt1dget. But it was decided that Et11. $14,947,500, ot1t of the an1ount expected to come from forejgn loans, be approved in tl1e plan of tl1e b11dget as it is, on the gro1111d that this item was previously approved by the I-louse. In addition, in the meeting of the san1e day, tl1e l{oL1se by a majority vote struck out Article 7 of the draft law on tl1e budget wl1icl1 empov,ers tl1e i\1i11ister of Finance to conclt1de [unspecified] loan agree1ne11ts 111) to Etl1. $15,000,000 a11 d to give guarantees [for these loans]; tl1e I-Iot1se concl11ded tI1at tl1is a11tl1orization would be inconsistent with the Constitution. The decisions on loans taken above were later reversed. See t11e Bt1dget Proclan,ation for 1_958_ E.C. _Suppose, as a legaf �dvisor to Pa�liament, you ,vere asked to give an opinion n th� c ns � � htutional issue raised in the last paragrapl, above: w11at are tl1e relevant argun1ents? \Vhat 15 }our conclusio n?

(3) The Ethiopian Bt1dget: an example From the Budget Proclamation, 195 8 E.C., No. 219 of 1965, Negarit Gazeta 24t11 Year No. 14. In accord ance with Articles 34 88 11 6 a11d 11 9 of Our Revised Consti:tio;, We approve the resolt1tions of Ot1r Se11�te and Chamber of Deputies and we ere Y Procl�im as follows: ,, . .· E. c 8 5 1· This Proc lamatio 19 , 011 at1 1 lan oc Pr 11 ma y be cited as tl1e ''Budget . s e u n e v e r c li b u p 2. Und er th.1s Proclam . e th in o fr · t ed ' . ation there are hereby approprJa of Our Empire and from other funds, for the fiscal year eu<lin·g .J,.,0 th sene, 1958 (7th July, 1966) the following amounts: ,120 4 4 ,5 1 7 3 A. For Ordin.ary $ . h t E Expenditure of the Governmer1t .$ 77,732,595 1 B. For Capital l t E Government tl1e Expenditure of 7,314 5 ,5 6 C. For Pensio 1 $ . 1 t E ns Expenditure of the Government 455,834,029 $ . b t E Total:

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hamber C of es iv (Arch . the .Proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies, G enbo t 15, 1955 ep·uties.) (Author's footnote).

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3. 4··

NAL LAW IO UT IT ST ON C · AN PI IO TH E OF K SoURCEBOO

be ed end exp ll sl1a n for the p urpose · atjo clam o p1l1is t by d e t· 1a . s The ftind � app ro_P; 1 to . e r e d u le S 1 c l1 e h tl 1e in l ·t 1 ::i.11d services set 1 o , ed uir d m req an �ro e ed tim ris tl1o au to time, y reb . 11e is . e nc 11a Fi of er OLtr Minist ious Governm enta f o var the s l1ead or sters Mini · the of der . r . o r o l t n upon the w.ar ra _ · 1 . d an ues reven -tl 1c o . . p11b 1er f tl1e of 1 unds of 1t o l)ay to d r c 01 ts depar tme t fort h in the Scb'.edule hereto, the se ices sei·v and � :� es � : rpos � 1:1 l 1 1 e O iL r Empir ? n dred hun four fifty e v fi m lars Dol an iopi 1 illio Etl of 1 · 111 �:d 11101 a nc; · ab ove ment 1o ' . . c1e year end1ng 30th l e, 1or t run nty �e t d an 1d 1 usa t ho 11r fo t y itlii ed r nd eiglit 11u . ) 66 19 , 1ly 1 J l1 (7t Sene, 1958

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5. Tratlsfers of btidg etary app 1·opriatio11s �r_om one Head, Subhead or Item shall be permitted 11pon tl1e following cond1 t1ons:

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( a) Tra11sfers fron1 one Item to anothe1· Item wi!hin the same Subhead, or H ead if there are no Su.bheads, sh a ll be subject to the appr?val of t?e Mi11i;ter of Fi11ance. The Minister of Fin ance may delegate this authority to pr·operly authorised p ersons witl1in the limits fixed by him. (b) Transfers fro1n 01 1e SL1bl1ead to a notl1er Subhe ad within the same He�d, and fron1 a H ead of the Ordinary Expenditure to a Head of the C�p1tal Exi:>e11diture, shall be s11bject to tl1e approval of the Council of Ministers .

(c) Transfe1· s from ''Allowance for unforeseen expenses'' and from allowance for ''Undistribut ed Eritrean exp en ses'' s11all be subject to tl1e approval of the Council of Ministers.

(d) No tr a11sfer, wluch wo11ld i11crease tl1e total runount appropriated in any H ead for ''Perso11 al en1ol11ment s' ', may be n1ade from any source except ''Allowance for unforesee11 expe11ses'' a11d allowance for ''Unclistrib·uted Eritrea11 ex1Je11ses' '.

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6. Tl1e Mj11ister of :Fi11a11ce i s l1 ereby a11tl1orised to pay for past commitments �f tl1e previo11s fiscal year 0 11t of tl1e ''Allowa11ce for u11foresee11 expenses'', if he 1s satisfiecl tl1at tl1ey were legally contracted within the liinits of the past year's 1 b11dg�ta�y �J)propriatio11s and tl.1at tl1 ey cannot be paid out of c111·rent budgetary 1 appropr at1ons 11nder t11e approp1·.i ate Heads and Subl1eads. 7. Subject to the ap1)ro,,al of tl1e Council of Minis Finance te of rs M th in e is te r .,' is hereby authorised to co11tract loans, pledges an disperse d g� to ar an an d te es , !l1e procee�s of s�cl1 loa11s, up !o tl1e total amount o E f thiopian Dollars 15, �,000 10 co11nect1on with the fi11anc1ng of social and economic development proJects, and to fix tl1e term s a nd conditio11s of such loan s, pledges and guarantees. 8. SubJect to the approval of tl1e Council of ion al M in a dd is te it rs , _ an th pr d at ov id ed o�dinary. revenues are, in hi s opinion, deem of st �r ed M in to i b e available, th e . Financ� 1s hereby autl1orised to pa y over ted pr ia an d ap ab pr ov o e am th ou e nt s according to Article 2 of tl1is Proclamation ry es sa ne su ch c am be o un w ou ts as ld �or Go0vernment purposes which coul � d ex ar ce is e in no ca t se ur s o bu f ge t nc y, ing IO� of the tot�l amount appropri g at ed fo r O rd E re in xp ry en a d it u a ooo�4in · to Article 2 of th.1s Proclamation . · �- ·

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Il- ..., pARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE INST ITUTIONS

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. Expenditure Schedu le [to the 1958 E.C. Budget proe1amat1on ] · ·· Ordinary Expenditure

... [the following is only an example] e f ic o y st u tr J is in M 2. 1 Head .. ,

Subh ead I. Head Office & Co11rts of Jt1stice i 1 1 Addis Ab,tba 1. Personal Emoluments 2. Equipment and Suppljes 3. Otl1er Charges

Ell1. $ 1,919,054 28,000 244,132

Subhead 2 . Provincial Courts of Justice 1. Personal Emolumen ts 2. Equipment and Supplies 3. Other Cl1arges

Head 12 -Total

4-,107,668 155,142 212,998

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4,475,808 6,666,994

(4) Parliament, the Budget and the Five Yea1· Plan .

From Assefa Bequele and Eshetu Chole, A Profile of tl,e Et/1ioJJian Ecor101ny (Mimeograph. H.S.U. Department of Economics) (1967) 54-55. ... [A]t present, use [of t]1 e b11dget] as an i11str111ne11 t for eco1 1on1ic (ievel o pment has been negligible, and there is very little relationsl1ip betwee11 tl1e five year plans and the annual budgets. However, the role of tl1e b11dget i11 an economy wluch l1as adopted some kind of plann.in g b as a wider scope tl1 an in planless econ o1nies. Tl1ere rore tl1e government must give second tl1oughts to its concept of tl1e budget and use it and the plans as complementary, not indepe11dent parts . Fro!ll _I.S. Fraser, The Ad111. inistrative F1·a111e1vork for Econotnic Developn7ent in Eth10P1a (Mimeograph, 1965 ). At present, annual implementation progra1nmes, like five year p la11s and 01! 1er long-term proje ns 1e furict� on TI ts. en m ctt do al leg t 1o 1 ctio are socio-eco1 1omic a1 1d in ov pr ap nd a g in � de si ia on arl _c of � �ent in relation to them consists, tl1erefore, !� c an fin be 1? tunates tn the annu e 1 ar 11 cl I w ts ec oJ pr al budgets for carrying out those 111 g process, 11� a d pl e th fro of rt m p� Government funds. Though a very important ;. . ure - it leaves ou � tts prese� ts only a very partial view of th e total planning pict o pr al nu an e th gr�s e pr� Jects finan t en es pr t ced from other sources and does no nune 1n the context of the longer-term plans. t is prop sed in the draf N ional Planning Administration Order tl1at · an1 1� a bl t at · 1t w un. PIIement · o Y l t rren conc · u t n iame 1 Par by ation d . . enact e prog ramm be es sl1ould 1 itI w the nua t c ta n o _ c to n i a� l budgets. This would bring Parliament more closel� s. proc es g mak in . . .on 111 Plann1ng as su polic ytlle · _ at c1p h �1 . pa � the abou t It Would h e an d ensur� its active form ed I 10 Y ' owever, be essential to keep Parliament cont 1nuoLlS

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820

SoURCEBOOK OF E-r·HIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

. . 1 re1at'ion t five year JJl ans an d long-term projections an d for this ptirp· ose · · tl11· nk10g .11 c . 1 ava e d a 1 bl ma be e to to d 11ee li Par uld wo · s istic ame stat d · nt 11 a n 10 t· a 1 . 11 1 10 1n repor ts . b rs e m e m s it to . d te ra o b l a e d 11 a and ca;ef L111y expl ai11ed

ze11-1er1, 24

February 1966. ll on project s of th.e bi e] at riv [p t af dr a d se tts sc di ies 11t ep D ber· of m 1a c1 le Tl . d r ate be leg am de €h the 1e Tl y. da es Tu e att . m on r 11 sio · ses its in n ' Pla ar· Ye e iv F-; . · . . S eco11d 11 ""h a er er b'll t ov y OL 1 s. r1 1o pr h it w 1t on . rt po re · d an . y id stt to , t t · ee 1 to a con1n1 le ab ur o e 1!o At th Ho by er b _ ss am de 1 Ta Cl a e tl1 to ed nt ese p1· s _ wa l l bi t f a· dr Tlle l lo. l{e to.Id the Ch� ber a ¥/ of ct tr1 d1s 11ta ela -D l da a 'N e tl1 r fo ty _ A'bagaz, Depti J s r ect pro we 37 e 1er ed T1 vid n. pro Pla ar Ye e Fiv � the _ of 1· yea trth fot e 1 tl is s thi t tha _ ts ich Jec e _wh pro hav t ou ab ed orm inf e11 be t no s ha lic )llb 1e l T 11• Pla tlie in l for .been ts Jec was pro of mat the t esti cos e Th rs. yea e l 1re t t las tl1e r ove ted ple com aiid started ed in tl1 e Pl an at $425,900,000, but tl1e l)Ublic has no t been told ho w much has been used to in1pleme11t any of tl1ese project�. The Deputy therefore requested that the P rime Miruster be called on to expl a1n. Tl1e CI1amber disc11ssed tlus report, and assigned a committee to �tudy i! �vith priority over all otl1er bil ls. The Deputy's proposal to call on the Prime M1n1ster \Vas not supportecl by tl1e necessary n11mber of votes....

From Addis

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Executive Pressure on Parlia.ment Introditcto1·y Note

In Etluopia, as elsewl1ere, the legislat11re not only exert.s pressure on th� e� ec11tive, b11t is press·ured i11 its tttrn. This is not onl}r inevitable, but also, w1tl11n limits, desirable - one l1as only to imagine a parl iament whicl1 co11ld do wl1atever it pleased, to see l1ow tl1is may be trt1e. Whe11 disag reement a rises between tl1e two branc]1es of government, pa1·liame11t n1ay clai1n to rep1·ese11t the people, but the execl1tive also I1as argL1me11ts 011 its side. It may represent natio11al interests, when tl1e legislat11re can speal< on ly for a coll ectio11 of l ocal ones; it may have g.reate r expe rtise at its dis1)osal tl1an tl1e Dept1ties can 111uster; its vie\i\·s ma y be wiser, more experie11ced less subject to e1notior1al distortio11. Al l tl1e limita tions on th_e comp e.. te11ce of a11 elected assen1bly wl1icl1 we considered i11 Cl1apter I can he.re take precise constitutional form. Relations betwe�11 . e�ec11tive a11d legisla t u re va1·y g·reatly from one cou ry �t _ . to anotl1e1�. 111 Grea t B1·1ta1n, Parliament ca11 dismiss tl1e m.inisters, but they m turn c? ntrol Pa1·liame11t tl1rot1gl� the pa1·ty systen1; in t.lie United States, there is more give-a11cl-take between Pres1de11t a11d Congress, eac11 of wllicl1 has a11 independe nt electoral b�se and independent powers; in so1ne African countries, presidentjal rule effectively oversl1adows the l egislatt1re. Again, son1e mea.ns of exect1t1v.e · control _ove · r t Pa rli am en su t, i su ch as t he ve to ma or y th e power of dissol tition, _ one pol1t1cal system but not anotl1er. Here, we sliall exam of the mea ns so me ine o� cont_ r?l!ing _Par!ia�e�t whi?h_the Revised Constitution gives to t11e Emperor�o<l · = _ _ his M1111sters 1n Etl11op1a. It. 1s important to remember Jio whe. reas tne th at we ,·e r Constitt1�io11 on its f�ce deal s with tl1.e legal powers of t11� = b le e pr t_ h , e � � br a� tw ch es o for working lawyers 1s to develop efficient procedures -·=-: ea oh. th a� so ns co nv an en d tio branch can perform� - - -- . •·

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PARLIA f.1ENT AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

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J shi J en1be r 1\f r ove foivers j

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R ead. Articles 101-107 of tl1e Re,,ised Constitt1tio11 . The Etltlopia� Senate is cert�i11 ly_ 1111ust1al i11 bei11g e11tire]y aJ)J)ointed by tJ 1c Head of State, subJect to tl1e qualJ ficat1ons and })Ossi ble restrictio11s 011 tJ1e ren1oval of Senators, laid d.own in tl1e Constitt1 tion. TJ1e exte11t to ,;i,,l1icl1 tl1e aJ)poi11 t1 ne11t of Senators actu ally serves as a mea ns of executive presst1rc on Parlia111ent, 11aturally depends on the way in wl1icl1 tl1e E111peror's po,vers ,tre used a11d tl1e traclitio11s whicl1 the Senate develops for itself, and yot1 sl1ot1ld refer J1ere to tl1e earlier reaclings 011 the composition of tl1e Senate. There is no similarly direct co111 1ectio11 betwee11 tl1e execl1ti,1e and tl1e selectior1 of Deputies, tl1ot1gl1 the executive is res1Jo11sible for tl1e :.:1d111inistratio11 of elections, and executive agencies may l1ave to take se111i-j11dicial decisions concerni11g tl1e qualifications and electio11 of members. Tl1ese powers are clerived from Article 5 of the Chamber of Deputies Electoral La\v Proclamation, No.152 of 1956, as ame11ded. See sz,pra p. 746. Ethiopia is unlike most cot111tries i11 tl1at executive officials, s11cl1 as ministers, do not take an active part in electio11s, or sta11d for electio11 tl1e111selves; one important aspect of this is tl1e absence of a party system, tl1rot1gl1 wl1icl1 mi11is ters may try to ensure the election of members of parlia1nent of tl1e sa111e political party as tl1emselves.

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Powers of Convening, Su.spending and Dissolvi11g Parlia111e11t

Read: Articles 33 and 76 of tl1e Revised Co11stitt1tio11. Chapter II, Part 1, pp. 146-152. Co111pare: tl1e po\vers of the Preside11t of Tanzania, p. 265 et seq. The most powerful weapon in tl1e go\ 1ernment's ar1 11oury, that of dissolution, has not so far been 11sed , tl1ougl1 tl1ere l1ave been 1111co11fir1ned claims tl1at tl1e tl1reat of d.issolution has been raised in one or t\VO cases. Tl1is tl1reat col1ld be a powerftil one , for Deputies would risk losing tl1eir seats i11 tl1e resulting election, a11d wgl,t hav e to raise money for tlieir election campaigrJs. 111 countries wt1ere tl1ere are P01! tical parties, which would he!p witl1 election expenses and provi�e greater se currt! of tenure for members of parlian1ent, tl1e possibility of 1_ssol11t1�11 wo� Jd ?e � �ess important. Si11 ce the exect1tive is 11ot responsible to Parl.iame11t In Etbiopi�, It would not be riski11 g its own existence i11 dissolving tl1e Chamber, thotigll ibis would involve a confrontatio between the executive a11d legislature. n Consider and embellish the following l1ypothetical arg11me11t : Ato A: The power of dissolution is 'u ndemocratic' becatise it perniits tlie Execu tive to threaten and bu lly tl1e legislators. ivlembers of Parliament sl1oul� be left free to make tlp their ow n inii1ds. 01 1ly after tl1ey l1ave macle tl1e1r decisions an d served tlleir term ma y tlie public jtrdge. Then they ca11 defend their actions. Without soine reasonable ten11re in. office tl1ere ca11 be no separation of powers, no i11dependent, stable Parliament.

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A A SoURCEBOOK OF E"fl1IOPI , N CONSTITUTIONL LAW

822

le ab a s lu i d va ve an ol ss di _ ''d to oc e iv �m ut ec Ex i rat e tl1 of c'.' r we Po ie Tl Ato B: � ag ss of pa at a lk 1sl ba leg to n en t1o at 1·e th , which rs to . a sl_ gi Je e th If r. powe e_ t. er , us th m ed be ed ne e m so ly nt ge 11r 1s w_ay for ks in th t en m n r· ,,e the go ?n u!1 e sol Th �1s of le. op I?e the rli to P� al pe ap ament to t en nm . ver go tlle 1c� . lit s1s a P? cn of n n �hi tio No lu so re g could r l� pu po at th t jlis permits . a us 1n o r1_ lop se ve de so be ing d ul co co 11g h1 pt N ,u.ntry . t1c a i· oc m de e or m be � ul ng co be l11 ot e N or e. m at lem sta nece8.. t e11 in lia ar -P ive ut ec Ex as aii ly 1ck ate qt1 d lem an sta a ch su decisively e olv res to e l1r ed oc pr a sary tl1an and democratically.

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e tiv cu xe E e th by t e11 m lia ar P to 11 tio ica Commun n. io ut tit ns ed Co vis Re e th of 91 d an 73 , , 72 33 les Read: Artic ber 2 nt, me vem rlia No Pa to 1964. e ,·on Th the om Fr li eec Sp I, ie ass Sel ile From Ha

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A number of important laws will be introduce d into Parliament during the coming session, which, togetl1er with proposals already before you., will go far to fill out an d complete the legislative f1·amework within which Ethiopia will grow and fiourisl1. In1portant proposals dealing with tl1e conservation of Ethiopia's forests l1 ave already been s11bmitted, and We l1ope that final and positive legis]ative action will s0011 be talcen on tl1em. Legislation concerning the development and exploitation of the natural resources of the Empire is now under study, and you may ex1Ject to receive a draft code dealing with this subject before this session has been long under way. A Code of Civil Procedure, prepared as a further step in the considerable eff01·ts at codification already completed and as an adjunct and com plement to tl1e Codes al1·eady pl1blished, will be laid before you. A basic revision of [sic] the laws gover11ing been drafted a11 d will be st1bm.itted soon. Legislation dealing with the establishment an d c?ntrol _of co-o�rative societies will be put before you for cons. ideration. This latter 1s pa:t1cularly Important in tl1at it pr·ovides a f t1rther means wl1ereby local grou�s, acting on tl1eir ow11 i11itiat.ive., may participate more actively and success fully In tl1e growth of their country, a development which should be supported a.nd encouraged.. •••

We llrge tl1_at yo11 giv� tl101·ol1gh a11d proper co11sideration to tl1ese and the otl1er meas11_res 111 tl1e c�11s1de1:able legislative progranlllle which has been outli�ed for tlie com �ng �ear. It 1s obv10�1s, f1·om tl1e variety an d extent of the subje cts_ m volved, tl1at tl� e1r e11act1ne11t will 1�equire time aiid deep and thoughtfu! review. _ Remember �l1a t la�s. proposed to yoll 11a,,e bee11 prepared by experts , reviewed by tl1e responsible M1n1ster an.d tl1e Cou11cil of Minist ve d o ap pr an d whole er s as a by U�- Only wl1en tl1�Y l1ave been fou11d to serve the nation are they tl1 int e er of es t slibniitte_ d !0. �011· Bi·i�g to rol11· co11sid�ra�ion of son rea of sp iri � th ese pr a op os als . e and obJect!vity, fre ?f pass1011 and preJud1ce. Study them solely in the l1gl1t of tbe. · · be . ne fi t w lu · ch th ey b1 · 1 ng to th e ors na 1· ion 1 , t". . d put ting an aside personal 1nterest . w ea[!"1ng emotion. •

From Tlze Rt,1,les of P1·ocedure of the Sena te, op. cit, Article 16 (a) _ . al. messages s�n! by tl1e Emperor shall be given top priority ·and shal l�:��:-. read o iwith at any s1 tt111g, regardle of u uo ss r of · wl 1et m he a r or is th no er t e q · ·e�� .· � ·gee:-:-�� --:-·= · members · Tl1e members sha11 stand durmg the reading of ·the Emperor�s m .-=- --.- �

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823

·, Message to the Cf1am I e ss ber of Depittie.s Co,zcern. Haile Sela i TA n report ed i Addis Zeme11 by ENA, Sei1e 14, 1958zJ .)e (c·��.1 ::i:dure Coae �As C L ) . 5chooI Trans1at1on ''We have receiv ed t he report 011 yot1r decision concern· ing tJ1e c 1·v·I1 procedtire . 0 f 1958 E· C. · ·· to tl1e effect tl1a o e 52 N e r c e D y b d e u ss t t111tj I prOIJosaI s .,_i:-or i e d C0 · . · 1 e 71 of Tl1e Co11stitt1tio11 a11d J legislation are introduce d pt 1rs t1��t to A rt1c assed I p esen t . C 1vil rocedt1re Code Decree shotild be b the Parlia�e�t, th � p r. disapproved. y Sjnce your dec1s1oi1 reJect1ng tl11s Decree ,vas 11ot aJJprove? by tlie Se11ate tJ1e di sagreeroent of the two �o�ses was reported t o us by yotir Pres1de11t as J)rovided by Article . n o t1 u 1t st n o C e th f o 1 9 We have learned from t.l1is repor t tl1at yot1r disagree111e11t was 11ot 011 tl1e substance of the Code, but ?n the groun� th_at the procedure taken to promulgate it ,vas not in accordance w1tl1 the Const1t t1t1011. Believing that modern and efficie11t lavvs will adva11ce t.l1e ci\1.i.lizatio11 of Etl1io pia ... We have employed educated men witl1 legal experience a11ci abiljty to pre pare [Codes of law] under Our st1pervision. . ..

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It is well known that, wl1en tl1e Civil Code was JJroclaimed vvitl1out a Civil Procedure Code, those who came to t1nderstand tl1e serio11sness of tl1.is cleficie11cy included not only judges, advocates and otl1er lawyers, but ctlso those vvl10 11appe11ed to bt involved in litigation.

It is shown in the report presented to Us tl1at tl1.e I-Iot1se realized too tl1at a Civil Procedure Code shottld be applied side by side wit11 tl1e Civil Code, a11d tl1e House itself reques ted the executive brancl1, from ti111e to ti111e, to J)repare a11cl present a d.raft Code to it . . ..

We too .. . gave the necessary orders and l1elp to Our co11cer11ed minister to complete the task of preparation of this Code a11d forward to you the res11lts as soon as possible.

Tlie report [of your President] J)resented to Us also notes that the Civil. Code 111ated rd coo 18 ve�y compr b� to de Co ure ced Pro il Civ ve nsi the · ehe law, and, fo1 . with It, a careful s tudy mt1st be made, and the law must be �rafted 10. a co�plete form; and the final draft, which took a long time in preparation, was 11?111ediately presented to the :House for approval a short ti1ne before your aontial adJournme ;�� ast year; and [at tha t t ime] i t was referred to a committee w11icl1 started to �xam n. tio ac it, but it was not en r fo y bl m se as ire t en e th th possible to fo rw ar d it to _Me mbers of tl1e Chamber of Deputies decided [at t he e11� of tlieir 1�st s��J 1 11 r they c is_ atise :� d uss the draft Code during t l1e following ye�� be� rs e b m e m 1� � 1 ; : ad ourn [becaus e any s were pending]. Realizing tl1at m tion J elec ·, · · d n a , s r e b m e Who. ·wou1d come to m w e yea: mi·.gh t· b� 11 following the the House in ive] t a l is g e l x in 1 ight of e l p n co ng ssi r cti [ dis in t t as en sp e e fle tim n rie · pe he t x ce re · c. ting p n 1a l t s s e l t o Proposals al n e . k a t readY forwarded, 1t was est1D?-ated . tl1at · · · i t . miglJt ] . . [Accordingly] . two Or thr�e . . Code s hi t ions on t re a mo er lib de s e ar et ye s pl [to m e co s u o H h t o th e exe�ntiv b f o e branch, in an o�inion fo�warded to the Pre�'d�� t�i ·of p l a as Code he t e De :iam.ent, exp�essed_ the view t�at it would be t1 sef �I o s era n by Par tio del cr and appl ib . r e ur f for ry ssa ce ne y 1t g d rin rio du e pe th liRn1 .

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824

1at tl at ts en d si re P e 1 tl y b d e ss re xp e . . . Accordl ·ng to tl1e views .. n . . uo 1r s p t 11 1 o d e rt o p p su rs e b 1e n 1e m tl y ll ra e 1 e 1 t 1a tl d 1e i i g certa

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u il d iv ce C ro a P f re o e nc od se C ab e e th y b . d e at e were cr s ie lt cu iffi . d t he Siiice a D as ecre e and app li ed su is b� d ul co w la e th . .. e ed becaus not insignifica11t ... and ts ld u ec be co ef s d s it een . ... We d an ] d e t ec rr co r e t af re e 1 tl nd [a e through exper·ienc ecr ee.... D a as ed su is e b to w la e th at1thorized. ed from trus opinion r ffe di ve ha , rt pa ur yo on u, yo at tl1 d e We are now inform b t ecause you disagree no n, tio ra e lib de r fo ee r ec D e tl1 up e k ta to and have 1·eft1sed th e pr oper procedure was not at tl1 d un ro e th on 1t bt w, la e th g \vitl1 tl1e s11bstance of e [original] draft presented to you tl1 s us sc di to ed re a e v l1a u yo le lli g followed. W ecre e.But exce pt _ for the fact J? ed in! pr e tl1 ss c11 dis to e d t1s ref ve ha [last year], you iter and that r e-w a on typ n e itt wr rs e us Ho e th to ted sen pre ft a tl1at tl1e [original] d1· e d as a book, there is no dif 1 lisl ub p d an d e nt p1·i is ee cr e D by ued iss n bee a 11 s \vhich law in the Decree, the t d an f dra l ina ori the in law 1e tl of 1·it spj g the en we ference bet a11d if yo11 tl1i1 1k that the [Dec1 ·ee] presented to you for study n eeds amendment none wjll 1)reve11 t you from imp1·oving t1pon it . ... We have decided that the law issued b)' Decree sl1ol1ld continue to be effective, and when your examination of this law is completed, tl1e necessary amend1nents can be made and approved and the law ca11 tl1en be isstte d as a p1·ocla1nation ; and w e request that you discuss the Decree a11.d tl1is 01·de1· is tra11smjt ted to yot1, pt1rst1 ant to Article 91 of the Constitution. ... '' . f " ' Legislatil;e Powers o tl1e Execittive Read:

Tl1e executive's p�wer� o ver legislation are e.xercised mostly at tl1e beginning and �-l1e end of tl1e le�1slat1 v� Rrocess.At the beg i11ning, the Emperor (wliicl1 may effectivel1 mean_ the P1 ·1me M1111ster) may initiate legislation. This is not an exclusive power, since p1·1 vate me111bers can also do so, but it does mean that the more im � orta11t JJr_oposals come_ f1·?m tl1e executive , and are at first cast in tl1e form which tl1e exec11t1 ,,e ':ants. Tl11 s 1s co1nI1;1on practice in at1y country with a parliamentary gover?ment. It �ay �lso be IJOss1 ble for tl1e executive, under tl1e Constitution or !he IJI o_cedtire of Parlia ment, to benefit from p1·oce dural devices stich as determin ing wl11cl1_ Ch an1ber pro posals sl1ould go to first, an d tlle order in which government business sl1ot1ld be conside1·ed.. . t the end of th e \egislative process, th e Emperor m ay refuse to approve the � a �, � ,6 Parliainent; tlii� a�ottt1ts t_o a11 executive power of veto, altho ugh :: :;1 :�t� �oes r�ot appe ar i n the Revised Constitution. The veto is a usua l . . w 1· l

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r cou1�t1·y to cot111try. Some African examples a fina l_;_-= is It . ar e be gi ve lo n w �a.;fns �� ep1 ng tl1e two brancl1es of the gove rn e ti isl a m e le nt on in 1 ar v mo l _ , · ny g :� · m at ter s , a may be necessary to p re vent comple te · · n . fte o _ · , d · _ ea dlock betwee n them. . its use reflects tlle ver di.ffie ent po.nts. _ =� of v �� J ew ts of the ac tiv ich ecu i wh ex e, r � tional level' and of � eg 1·sla ors w ho represe na nt local or provincial interest.s.. .- .- . · · · . . . . . In Ethiopia, we I1ave found nO ase O f . . pp ti I r e Em p e ro to r pu a re bl fu ic . sin ly @'V�� .� g a measure passed by Pa 1 � ' t �' ough there may have been instances <1-�(�� -� laws being quietly ''poc��ect · But the commonest ·use of the veto '"'.'pBw,et...·.·-=-�'

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. . ex ecutive to refe r ba ck to Parli ament the for be · · de to cis i . . o . 11s w111c11 it bel 1 eves seew,., .ins t11e na t·1ona 1 1nt er es t , 1n . t 1· 1e hop e tl1at Parlia111e 111 t ag a . · will , after be . r · . f t11 tl1e , sion sua per change its mi iid. and tion a ider �;ns

, of io11 eria itut Lib 1847. st Con the From Art.2. Sec.10. Every bill or resolution wl1icl1 sl1all l1ave passed botl1• braiiclies of tJ1e Leg1· s1at lire, · before 1t· bec�me� �.I aw, b e 1ai'd be1or .r:- e tl1_e Pres 1 de11 t �or J1 is appro,,al; shall, jf 11 e appro ves, he s11�11 sign 1t, 1f not, l1e shall retur11 1t_ to tl1e Leg'lslatt1 re \VitI 1 Jiis Objec tions. If the Leg1slatur� shall afterward pass tl1e bill or resolt1 tio 11 by a vote of two thirds in each branch, 1t shall b ecome a law. If tl1e Preside 11t sl1all neglect to retur11 such bill or resolution to _tl1e Legisl�ture, witl1 l1i� o bjectio11s, for five days after tJ1 e same �hall h.ave been so laid before � m by t�e L�g1s!att1re re1nai 11 iog i 11 session duri iig that time, such neglect shall be eqtuvale11t to 111 s s1 g 11ature.

From the Co11stitz1tion of Libya, 1951 .

Art.135. The King shall sanction tl1e laws passed by Parliame11t a11d sl1all pron1ul gate them within thirty days of tl1e date of tl1eir com1111111icatio11s to 11i 111 . Art.136. Within the period prescribed for tl1 e prom11lgt1tion of a law, ti1e Ki 11g may refer the law back to Pa1·liament for· reco11s.ideration, in wl1ich case Parliament must reconsider tl1e law. If the la,,, is passed agai11 by a two-ti1.irds majority of tl1e members composing e acl1 of th e two Cl1ambers tl1e Ki11g sl1all sa11ction and pro mulgate it w.ithin th e trurty days following tl1e com1nt1nication to l1i 1n of tl1e last decision. If the majority is less than two-tliirds tl1e bill sl1all not be reconsidered during that session. If Parliament i n a11other s ession passes st1cl1 a bill agai11 by a majority of all th e m embers composi11g eacl1 of tl1e two Cl1ambers the I(in� s_�all sanction and promulgate it within the thirty days following the com111un1cat1 on of the decision to h im.

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Po1vers of Appointing Parlian1e1·1tary Staff Fro m General Notic� No.330 of 1964, Negarit Gazeta, 23rd Year No. 24 · His Imperial Majesty ha s been pl ea . s ed t o make tl1e following appointments: A p ri l 11 , 1964 s ie ut ep D f o er b m a l1 C . Ato Abebe Seyum t o be Mikitl Akabie Gubae i11 the Wilh the rank of Dire ctor General. . . ter Ato Gas aw Zalake to b e Ak·abie Gub a e of th e Senate wit11 th e rank of MtruS b 0f ' State. . t.) ci From The p. (o s ie ut Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Dep s 1 I Iy b d e t n i o 8. A A p p a b 1 1 1 1 ibae G a k 1:>e Gubae and an A.ssistant Akabe t �balf be replaced by tl1e Imper� M e , ae ub G e ty es b a.J ka . In the absence of the A Assi·stant Akabe Gubae . . ed r o_ rec ? be 9. The . to bly sem As the A of a s 1on s1t po pro l-le sh·all · k be. Gubae shall ca use the minutes er oth see to it that the written matter, reports, draft 1aws and

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A N O I L LAW T U T I T S N O C N A I P O I TH E F O K O O B E C R U So

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su.peryise the a tte ndanee if t o hnn by these reguJa.. ,,

ll a h � e H t p e k ly r e e prop r a _. r e b m a h C e th to d e n ig s s a tra11smitted s e i t u d r e 1 t1 o e g r a l1 c is d o ls a II a I1 s e f members. H

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f e Deputies an d the th o s n o ti u l s� e r · e th o 1t i� t u p ll a h s e a b u G s Tlie Aka be ft a w e r la d t th tr t, n s � n d a s� re P it e m t� h ed it w , n g si ll a . sh e l It. n e te � th to orders of the Preside r n e o � . S e t s e 1m H M e a sh im r P e ll th h g u ·o 11 tl y st je 1 a M l a ri e p · Im o h is g H · to r ti u eitlle e u p t o e s th e D l1 l1 1c w s r e t tt a m ll a d a b e re to se 11 a c r o lf se m lu eitller read s re f u o e d th e D c ro p d n i a ut s ep le u r es e th t 1a tl t en d si re P e th liear. He sl1all remind l1ave to be o bserved. Tl1e President may req11est the Akabe Gubae to prepare the agenda and .. doct1IDe11ts to be presented _to tl1� sessi�11s o� the Dep�ties. �he Aka_be Gubae may I I in such cases speak to clarify points raised 1n connection with the d.ocuments pro ' dt1ced, eitl1er when requested or at his own request. e�ec t

Tl1e Akabe Gubae shall · be 1·esponsible to the President for the administrative dt1ties of the Dep11ties. I-Ie sl1all help the President by supplying services and by recr11iting cle1·l<s and special assistants for the work of the Chamber of Deputies. Questions and Problems "

Pa1·lia111.ent's I11fo1·n1ing and Investigato1·y Ft,nctions

1) Suppose that_ Parliame11t wishes to investig ate the activities -of a Minister, in 01·der to decide whether to press charges ag ainst lu.m under Article 75. b) Can �t compel tl1e attendance of the Minister concerned? c) Can �t compel tl1e atte11dance of other officials? d) Ca 11 it compel tl1 e attenda11ce of necessary private individuals? Pa1·lia1nenta1·J1 P1·essi11·e 011 t/1e Executive

2) Examine tl1e general provisions of tl1e 1958 E. C. Budget. . . a) I-low much co11t1·0I of . gov er�nlei. it spending does Pa.rliament retain under proe1amat1011? 5-8 of tlie Articles . . b) I-low mucl1 co11t1·0I of gover.11n1ent spending ouglzt Parliament to e xercise? 1-Iow mucl1 sho11ld it leave tO the executiv. e?. . . c) Do you s11pport or disa gree with �ach . of the delegations of power under Articles 5-8 ? . . · . . . 3) Do you favo111· tl1e proposal of l ie . draft t 1stra 1?� Adnun National Planning Order that an11t1al implementatio! progra · a arli P mmes should enacted by be ment concurre11tly with the annual q,udgets? 4) Does the Revised Constitut· t � ud B exclude the possibility of enacting the ?Y a Decree under Article �� · ·· ... 5) Can taxes be raised by a Decree . . ? · � .. . An . er sw tl1 w1 t1� . reference both to the Revised p r ac . :1 . : a actu Constitu to tion, and illus!rated by legislation. -.

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AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

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by e? ed a ris cre De tho au be ns_ loa 6) C.an . . _ to _bo ce the tl1 Revised Const1tut1011, ancl. to actltal practice Answer with refere_n · illustrated by legislat1011. respects do Etl1iopian proced11res for ''in1peact11uent'' differ ant import what 7) In from those in Great Britain and tl1e United States? S) In Great Britain, 11se of the weapon �f''iml?ea�hn1ent'' l1as entirely ceased. vVI1y? Do you favour such a developn1ent 1n Etl11op1a, or do yo11 believe tl1at t11e pro cedure is desirable?

Executive Pressure on Parlia,nent 9) What limitations does the Revised Constitutio11 i1npose 011 tl1e Emperor's power to appoint and remove Senators at \vill? 10) Should Senators be ''protected'' fron1 possible exec11ti, e press11res exerted through the appointment power? If so, wl1at safeguards woL1ld you sL1ggest? 11) During an election campaign for the Chamber of Deputies, n1a), tl1e Prime Minister and his appointees campaign on behalf of SJJecific canclidates? IV£ay other public servants do so? 12) If the Prime Minister is to be ''respo11sible to'' Parliame11t as \Vell a.s to tl1e Emperor, should he be insulated fron1 tl1e election process? Or sl1ould l1e be more directly involved in it? 13) Does the Emperor's po,ver to dissolve Parliame11t rest \vitl1in l1is absolute djscretion? 14) Is the threat of dissolution a desirable feature of tl1e Co11stitutio11? 15) What differences are there between tl1e veto provisions of tl1e Revised Co11sti tution, and those of the Constitutions of Liberia and Libya? 16) What changes, if any, would you suggest in the veto provisio11s of tl1e Revised C o nstitution? 17) Do:s the power to appoint the Ak:abe Gubae derive from Ai·ticle 27 or from Article 82 of t.he Revised Constitution? 18) �ould the Chamber of Deputies be acting unco�stituti�nally if it amended its Procedure so as to appoint the Akabe Gubae directly itself? 19) What ar9'-1ments would you pu t forward in favot1r of, an� against, th� vie,v tha� parliamentary staff should be appointed by the executive, and sub3ect to ordinary civil service procedures ? 1

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SECTION 5 THE FlTNCTioNs

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AND DEVELOPMENT OF PARLIA1'1ENT IN ETIDOPIA

g reading is an interpretation. You are invited to study it carefully and criticise it.

o F(·rOCm.Cif.C)la ph.am' ''The Functions and De velopment of Parliament in Et bi opia'' .

T�e Parliament of Ethiopia 1er otl of se tho m fro cts pe res nt rta po im differs in co.Untries, whether in Africa or outside. Though it has the usual two chambers, '

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A N W IO A L T L U IT T S N O C N JA P O HI SOURCEBOOK O F ET

i t is u n like m�st parli am d n a , n w � 1· C e th y b d t te en in o p p a s, y tl c e ir d is se 1e tl f o one d t r en an 1� m n n se er v go c _ ffi e o v ti u l c a i_ e ex 1e s tl t i� tl e ar ju l, al e rs u co f o t o n thougll e to h e I�st�tut1 ons ag t d en p ap n a as e r _ o m ts c a it , of er l1 rt 11 F . it to le b si 11 o no - t resp h e state; and 1t 1s perh s t f o s er w o p ic as b e th ap f o e rc u so a as n ,a tJ . . t governmen · s. rt 1e a 1 p a 1c 1 1t o p f o e c n se unique in tl1e complete ab i n t h e unique constit utio nal ht ug so be t us m le ro s t' Tlle basis for Parliamen n le ee ab b �o s_ l ha ve a de pi io th E op s, e i . r tu its en . c e th r ve O a pi lio tl E of n situatio ed at gr te ith w in y e el th os cl e ar cial h so c lu w s 1·m fo al ic lit po al on ti na distinctive 1 a11d which ar e centred on the pers on u, ea at pl n er th 1 structure of tl1e peoples of tl1e no · d by 1e uc e to th en up be sr ly di ce ar sc tiv s l ba e em st sy al on iti d a tr 1is Tl r. ro pe Em e of tl1 d lle ua nt eq te h un ex ew els an to . ur ere go vi ts i s in ta re d 1 a1 le, ru al ni lo co of effects e n th tru te; wi sta te sta on a t, en m the rn ve go l ba tri e er m a to in d ne cli de it Nor l1as r d ro an pe e th Em e r th vern fo go , elf its n tio na w ne e tl1 of sis ba e tl1 s rm fo contrary, it i ni stration of the Empire m ad l na tio i d tra e th m fro ly ect dir d e op vel de s l1a ment whicl1 hiop ia. Innovating customs and Et ay t-d sen pre of on ati 1nd fo1 ing ify t1n the d e vi pro institutions imported from western countries hav e th erefore bad to adapt themselves to this strong and well-establishe d local framework in order to make their influence felt. Parliament, in addition, l1as been affected by the absence of any analogous institt1tions in tl1e tradjtio11al administration by contrast with the political systems of many otl1er Africa11 peoples. Emperors from time to time consulted the major figures of the realm in formal disct1ssions, from wh ich th e present Crown Council h_as developed; and_ at tl1e other end of tl1e scale, Ethiopians h ave always had the nght to presen_t pet1ti?ns to the Emperor. Bttt the structure of th e government was nevert�1eless h1erarcluca� and autho�itarian, leaving no scope for representative �ou�1c1l�, and the lo11g J11story of Etl11opia has been remarkable for the lack of any 1nst1tut1on, otl1er tl1an tl1e Cl111rcl1, capable of limiting the powers of the Crown. �t wa� 011Iy witl1 tl1e Re�ised Constitution of 1955, and the first parliam entary elect1?ns 1n 1957, that �arl1am�nt gain�d � position from ,vhich any significant functions coul? be _ e xercis� d. Tl11s Const1tut1on, tinder wllic11 Parliament at present erate� provides interesting examples of �l1e dialectical process by which the need �i an eiect e � a1� d grea t�� developed Parliament was re co nc iled with the requirem�nts of Eth1op1an trad1t1ons and imper1· al powers. p · · d ab.ove raise arl1ament W3:8 the consultative level and tlle approval of botl1 Cl1ambers for legisla req uir ed wa s tion · but these legisl�tive · powers we1·e checked by the Em 's power of dissolupe ro r · e power of veto and by his co�t· tion, and .effiect1v ur� g · d aw · t I I�ue d c ena ability to the parliamentary recess b decr�es hi. ch remai dis· tly en qu n in e e rc bs fo ss su le un approved by botI1 c11amb?rs 0f par1� iament. Tl1e Chamber of Deputies was for the first time to be elected b u · e 1 du t su r te na S� , e ge by t bu it d nc as la w ba � nal still directly appointed 6y t�; �:_ !ror,l audff � ut1o onst1t in P the c absence any of provision on political parties tl1e n o party system continued · 2 ' · en t It is in the control of the executive, h a owev . er Parl t h , at on i ro the limita tions are �ost clearly seen. Since the exec n e ut1� e n po we r gov er and the control of m t appointments are vested in the Empero r, It 1s clearly impossible for ministers to be

1 : I am ind ebted to D r D N L in . 8 o ev · · .' ci e Wax & Gold (Chicago 196 5) i n this and other references t �hara s o et y . 2. Revised Constitution of 1955, Arti"cIes 33, 88, 92, 95, 10 1.

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ent , as tl1 e y ar e in Wes tminster-inspir am Pa rli to le ed systenls . b tlle s me nsib 0 res: the orga nisation of exect1t ive i11sti t t1tio11s is ren1oved fro111 tl1 ' j� y a '!1-�ntar to en nd t he responsibility solely of t l1e Empe ror is and t ile Cotin�if � �10 1 sters. ; a e h sp . . h existence of t wo inclepe11de11t soti.r ces of a t·ttllorit e t y wa ; y i h r 111° t e 1l ered 1 ·ary ' In 1 · · �a ' b r e e d t 1 o D f Cb c m e ep e · h i � e t t es, l�as 1nvo��ed a certai il degre _ Monar�hy and e o f dev �ts� a elo lf s, �11 1e11t from tl1e tr,1d 1 t1011aI systen1 ii separation of P?wer i wlt icli t 1o ther e was no �ere?t1� n o� fu nc t ions. A co1nplete separation is 11 evertlleless impos si ble to ma1ntrun 1n. pract1c�, and tl1ere �re several points, in additioii to its legislative powers, at wbicl1 �arl1an�en.t ma y 1nfluenc� tl1e exec 11ti ve go,,ernillent. The commonest means of doin g tl1 1 s 1s tl11·ot1gl1 Parl1a1nent's power to summo11 the Prime Minister and otl1er ministers, or tl1eir de1)1tties, to answer qtiestions . and though this power is most often. 11sed to gain furtl1 er i11formatio11 about legislative proposals before the Chambers, 1t �ru1 also b_e employed for e11 q11iries into ad 11unjs t rative matters. Another source of 111:fluence 1s tl1rougl1 parlian1e 11 tary a11tl1o risatio11 of taxation and government expe11diture, tl1ot1gl1 its effective11ess is red11ced by administrative problems of implementing tl1 e Budget. Furtl1er, tl1e first f ai11t begi11 nings are visible of a parliamentary power to investigate executive age11ci es, and i11 exceptional circumstan ces, Parliament may initiate proceedings for impeacl1ment. 3

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The functjons which the l egislat ure ca11, and to a large extent does, perform are rooted in thes e powers. In e ssence Parliamen t, and es1Jecially the Ch.an1ber of Deputies, serves as a source of indepe nden t press11 re on tl1e exec11tive. Sucl1 pressure is naturally exercised mostly over legislative matters, sin ce tl1 e gover11me11t n111st obtain parliamentary approval if the laws \vhich it favours are to be put into effect. Parliament is very ready to amend or eve n r ejec t gover11ment proposals, a fact of ' which do cumentary evidence is most clearly provided by a1nendment. or disapproval of executive decrees, since parliame11t ary action on tl1 ese is p:ubli�I1e� s�par. ately from the original legislat ion. 4 Mor e general inflt1ence o,1er leg1s]at1011 1s 111d1 cated by . effective parliamen tary opposition to the indisc rin1ate use of tl1� decree power, which has resulted in a sharp decrease in t l1e nt1mber of decrees 1n recent years. When it opposes the exe cutive Parliament is n at urally subject to the pressures which, in different forms, affe ct parliament s ever)'\vhere, b1;1t t.l1e exa�ples sllO\V that these have by no means r educed it t o impotence. Tl1 e Etl11op1an Parliame_nt a!so ive t iSla leg of m r �ese we po nt bl e nd s e epe ind · · · most other legislat ures in t ha t it has litt le · · n , the 0nly la w I t1o lll1 tiative ; despite in a is leg of als pos pro numerable motion s and originating in Parliamen t which I1as so fa.r r e acl1ed t he stat11te boolc 11�s bee ii t he Members of Parliament (Salaries) Proclamat ion of 1962. 5 At mos�, ParlJament be ab le by importunate questioning to induce t he exectitive to introdtice a r law of its own. it to vis · a d n a apon we . This ques tion ing power is Parliament's mo st fteared . 'd not hesit ate par1iamen� wh e titi p De en a minister is pre se nt will sh ow tI1 a t the ot ; 1 ave 1 power tiifs O e bee� ss him as ?ard as they are able. Th e scope and _fr�quenc� e li ffic ials k o oth er t de ev loped in recent y ars, t ers b 1n1s onl y not incl ude ID to e I Hig hal i mpe r the L or: d May tl1e or of Addis Ababa6 and t he General Manager 0f

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-of ::-.3- -R gation investi the for 119. 116, o 3, 7 ' 11 5, icles 73, Ar 1955, of 72, n 7 nstitutio C · e:vise� t 2 , roclama P nd 10, ar 4: See�iv� ageoci�s, see Ethiopian Herald, 5 Apr� 1963No. a , d Ye 0 22 oe Oti a Gazet of p Disap rrt Nega roval No.1 of 1963, tionx 179-_184 of 1961, Negarit Gazeta, 21st Year, No.3. 5: ProcJa t 11. No , Ye 215t o ar 6: Acid ml t n No. 187 of 1962, Negarit Gazeta, 13 Z�men� 26 Ter 1958 E.C.

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830

t e a th th e ci c ffi n e o l st a si in g re in w ro g ir · qu a ed n e e b s a h e r 1e tJ d n e . u n q ti se , 1· n pa o r way Authori·ty' a C . _ ty u Y e p iam d e . a 1g ' 11 ry d nta 11 e s f o d a e . t 1s 1 1 1, 1 o s r n d , w n P a should atte1 1d in pe ra t d a l a il b � u n r e v � n � m h w be d r in m in e rn o b e b to � � reactio n has now ta r � a :e p 11 y _ 1a n ry a _ .. n o st t1 ue a q tr us 1 r n � io d a s e th f o g in rk o w 1e tJ in ts of other poi·n s1 r1 t o � g n � �u e is nc is si th d n m a , e y iv a an n r o d e d n u fo lil l il and criticisms are st g � � ? 1s t1 es er u f ev q n o ss ce el th ro p e th s es t u b ; _ n o ti ca 11 ed le tt li d Deputies liave 1,a s m 1s 1c � f 1t n o a _ cr e g n la a p ch ex ex en p na o n a le ib ss o p es k a 1n it a valuable on e, since h s ic m h le w i b e ev r� th p in f o b e ta � ly so ce fa su e th to g n ri b r to tions whic11 is necessary e at th th 1n iti t ad tr �n rt o p al 1m on y rl la cu ti r a p is It y. tr 1 afflict a developi11g cot n s er d sw n , � s an n o be ti es u q d on ch �u r y fo el n n 1a cl 0 1 1 es . d vi 1·o Ethiopian syste1n p e to n th 1o 1t pe et m p E a r; f ro o r y e un l ac m le ab it su un en ft o the cumbersome and nd e hi ly th be on e es ad en m sc be , to s m is ic it cr r fo cy en nd te a en e b e ther e bas tl1erefor m or rf to tial pe lp sen he es us th ay m t en m lia r Pa . l ty a and to b e constrt1ed as disloy ch tio hi r di w fo tra , l ds na ar nw w do d an ds ar 1 pw t 1 l t bo , comn111nicativ e functions metl1ods are 110w inad eq11ate. s, d on sts an ini re op te in al l oc of n sio es pr ex e th in le ro r ila Parliame11t has a sim n tio tra is so nis mi e ad os wh try un co a n i ten ot r fo be e ll w ise rw e h t ot g whic]1 migh ich ce at wh pla ly on the is s tie pu De of r be am Ch e Th . pia l1io Et of t tha centralised as es mm gra pro and nt, me ern l gov a r t cen the in ted 1 se1 1)re e 1· ctly e dir e the provinces ar e tak y the ess unl n atio ent lem imp ive act of nce clia e l litt e hav aba devis ed in P.).ddis Ab acco11nt of tl1e reactions of local landl ords, priests and peasants. Equally, the Cham ber of Deputies l1as l1elped to co11nteract the centripetal tendencies of the adminis tration by insisti11g, for instanc e , that a greater proportion of public health revenues be spe1?-t in the provinces. The convers e of this process is the parochialism of many of tl1e 1 ss11es wbicl1 ar� �aised in �arliament, and tl1e attempts of Deputies to attract roads? schools and cl1rucs to tl1e1r hon1e areas to redeen1 tJ1eir extravagant election promJses. Th e ge11eral effect of provincial pressur es in Parlian1ent is very difficult to assess, and de pends larg ely on t�e attitude of tl1e administration; more particular effor�s are usually unsuccessful, since De pt1ties do not L1ave influence enough to p1·ov1d e governm ental ''spoils'' for their co1 1stitt1e 11cies. !vfuch of the e ffectiven ess of th e chann e ls of co1rununication which Parliament provide_s depe�d� on tl1 e exte�t to wl1icl1 peopl e outside Parljament take notice of happ�111ngs w1th1 n, and l1ere is pe1·l1aps tl1e greatest weakness of the prese nt-day os t10�· Exce pt for occasional spectacul ar debates and decisions there app ears f � 1 !e ge� eral a areness of parliamentary activ ities . The edu�ated society of lddfs ab� is mucr1 111or e �on?erned wjth tl1e doings of the Exe cutive go vern ment than with tl1ose of prov 1 11c1 al representatives' quite apart from the fact that cthe 1orm er are un doubtedly by far tl1e inore ·important; and provincial comm un11·+;.1es, . . m o d' t n f s interested i? the political activities of Parliament, ha�e so ;;r �!e: t t{I��e�iJ:� by a11y tangible results of the ir the on efforts Deput . ies, . behal·f · Publ I t st nevertl1eless ap_pears to be growi ts un o acc l fac tua ng , sh an or t d of the da ;� �:J� m appear fairly regularly in the Amharic press; items on Parliame!t j 11 the E�glfs� press are much rarer an d less informative. . . It is a t this point that the 1ack 0f a pa':'ty e h t f on system . , since f � is . most felt . essential functions of a pol't· . y is to ink the es v1t1 I ica_1 part acu with � peo ple who le a as in the government and - speci ll _ ns, s rea y n � less arl � ament. There neverthe � � are � � s �hich I believe to be val1 ' against 1nst1t1rt1ng a 1es nbt do which party system and _ ' l enced the government 1n exc infu the · lu from d · ing a · prov1s1on on political parties Constitution of 1955.

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ubt th �t we re parties allowecl do lit tle is re the t o forin of tl1.eir tly , Firs ow n alo reg ng ton so al or do pe wo rha uld ps . eve 11 rel igi the ou y s liil es rd 110 t 0 1 o acc thi 's been vjrtually the t111iversal experie11ce elsewJ . � Y ' ti 1ere j 11 Africa · b t , 1n ov 1 pr . . c1a has s�ro e �ges! � f t l1 e var1011s_ 111fo�111.al groupings witl been t h also e hav s sion lin divi the of DeJ.?ut�es. th.is 1s seen especially 1n the election of offi mb er Cha n th iopi a cers E beg1nrnng of t�e eacl1 a11n�al session._ 1 It would generally at mittees com and be conceded that the disadvantages of sucl1 parties' for nat1011.al unity far outweigll sing sely le , a ''11atio11al ' party would 11. ave t l1.e effect of _Con ver tage s. adva n any reducing the Parl1ament to cen�ral contro!, and �o vveaken or destroy tl1. e detacl1.ment of Parliament from the executive a11tl1or1ty wl11cl1 l1 as been suggested as one of its most valuable assets. In this way, the no-party system may actually help the Parliament to carry out its distinctive functions, though tl1ere are certainly tende11cies on tl1e other side of the balance. At the electoral le,,el, tl1e absence of any orga11isation mear1s tl1at each candidate must run and finance his can1paig11 from l1is ow11 reso11rces, a fact which favours the rich. The personal nature of tl1e co11test 11 as resltlted in a large proportion of members being unseated at eacl1 electio11 , and since they are tl1e11 in many cases forced back on government patronage, t his may 1nake tl1em more susceptible to pressure when in office. T11e absence of parties a]so 1nakes it , ery difficult to present in Parliament any consistent ancl co11ere11t policy, wl1icl1 011e would have thought essential for the development of tl1 e instit11t.io11 beyond a cer tain point. Outside, it slows down the mo·bilisation of tl1e populace for social and economic development, though a case can certainly be 1nade for tl1 e EtJ1iopian policy of proceeding slowly ,vith changes which are bound to be disruptive 11nless very carefully handled. On the side of gradualism, i t may f urtJ1er be claimed tl1at tl1e whole c?-?�ept of open and loyal criticism is still a new and rather strange 011e, and suc11 �r1t1c1sm may only be tolerable so Jong as it is voiced in a fairly infor1nal_ 1nanner. .�I11s le�ves room for a certain amount of manoeuvering space on botl1 sides, _avo1d111g direct confrontations from which Parliament wo uld be t he chief loser. Certainly, no m?�ern African government can be expected to tolerate an organised body of �ost�le opinion, aorl the devising of an acceptable framework witllin which to_ meet inevitable pres= sures and criticisms has been on e of the main problems facing tlie recently iode peode�t African countries. One advantage, indeed, of th� fairly _informal aod_ loosely s rea inc 1 al tur na a ts r!Ill sed pe 1t p at th itio os n of the Ethiopian Parliament i s ru ?10!la � wt gro the and parliamentary influence following the pla y of political forces, t op f the I dev n u:� : ble era sid con ali ?18 cl qu ficatio ns and ;xperience of its members. A ear since 1957 ' covering s u fields as th e right of questioning, th� consIde�a _ ion ch , n 0r the Bu d o · im p · o y m 1n t n e m a li r has bee get, and the position of decree leg1slat1o_n; and Pa n � ble to carry ou t its tasks th e better for being able to_ take t1�;m 0 0 radually. li It fi ic b w s � li par in this respect a marked contrast fro� ?ther Afr;can ii: : isations hav�� n een launched on their way wit11 sophisticated powers and wb·ich .ma ny of them have been unable to sustain. y a m ia p io h t It h some . E f o t n e m · a 1 r Pa the e t ti� ha t _ s been suggested, indeed, eve ntual , .10. wluch the executive � develop into th e basis of a ''Westm1nster model �' ire t e r Will be resYpo o t d ' an I ng E 10 nsible to it, and a future Emperor will be able, as

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Herald, 9 7: A. P�rt· 11 ia iop Etl1 Ja rly interesting case il u trating this point is reported in �� Novem l s · oor 1 962.

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SOURCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

gracefully from the political scene. But whil� I �ave n ? desire to ventu re o nto the dai1gerotis waters of propl1ecy, I feel that this view �stakes both. the position of Parliainent and a 11un1ber of more general themes. Firstly, tl1e Parliament has be . able to advance s?.far _under th� protection of an exceedingly sta?le �yst�m of gove;� ment. Sue� stabil! ty 1_s essential to t�e growth of rel?res�ntatlve mst1tutio ns; d an country which 1n a 1s yo11ng, ry still v unaccust 1s since Parliament omed to such .. � instit11tions, I believe tl1at 1t would ha:e to devel?P by the grace a.nd favou r of the executi,,e government �o� a very long time befor� 1t could st�nd fully on its own tw.o feet. Under these cond1t1ons, to make the executive responsible· to Parliament would _ be, in effect, to reduce Parliament to complete depende11ce on the executive. Further 1 both the traditio11s of Etlliopia and tl1e conditions of modern Africa point empba: tically to the need for strong executive leadership, to maintain national unity and to carry out tl1e essential tasks of development. This is a form of leadership which by its nature it is very difficlut for a parliament to maintain; and in such circums tances, the most profitable fields for parliam�ntary activity would seem to be the communicative ft1nction which tllis paper has outlined.

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DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

833

CHAPTER VIII THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS Sun1n1ary of Co11tents

Introduction: Probl_ �ms in establishing jt1dicial instihttions; proVISIODS

comparative constitutional

Section 1: Histori_ �al Perspe�tiv_e - Tra?iti �11al Conc �pt � of La,v, Courts a11d Adjudication; Trans1t1onal Inst1tt1tions: legislation establ1sl11og the court system prior to 1955.

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Section 2: Ongoing Problems of Interpretation and Development - "The judicial power'' and the "courts established by La,v"; the prerogative of tl1e Emperor to maintain justice and its relation to the exercise of jt1dicial po,ver by the courts· the selection tenure, promotion and discipline of judges: tl1e administration of the courts· th� legal profession.

Introdt1ction

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Trus chapter is concerned \Vith the development of the judicial arm of govern ment: the organization of a system of courts, the allocation of powers to them and their staffing and administration. Beyond these specific problems, tl1e chapter is j concerned with development of a judiciary, conceived as a distinct arm of government, wruch will be ''indepe11de11t in rendering j11dgment'' and yet s11bject to that degree of supervision, from some source, which is necessary to secure competence, 'I integrity, e:fficiency and p11blic confidence in tl1 e courts. These problems are often neglected or glossed over in the literature of political development. Perhaps the work of the courts seems less glamoro11s than the tasks of many other governmental organs. The primary f11nction of co11rts is the settle �ent_ o � disp�tes, through the application of law and/or c11stom; and in a trad!tional, I static, society it may be the sole function of the co11rts, formed by applying the r same law and the same methods of adjudication to the same kinds of disputes from ( ne deca�e to the next. �tit _i11 Ethjopia, as in other countries moving towards re �onu s de s1�ed to revolut1oruse society, the coi1rts must, perhaps, be se�n as _agents ( ment of change. I . Lawyers need no reminder that initial change within society is secured by pre � pa�ing new laws and administering them wisely. Consider the development of institions designed to �and promote agricultural productivity (e.g., �ew l�ws goveriling tenure, cooperatives cred1"t sales transactions ' commodity prices and com. ' ' me re a I transport ing 1· r cont laws a new , . (e.g. e rpris ente s) ation or ness to busi I r foste b ss organisatio ?te prom to or ent) !oym emp and n, s _ taxe ent, ts, investm contr�c p�t!�al de ocra e n orga k, spea � _to ens c1t1z of ts righ s the (e.g. ,_ new law defining grou s andm p �� 1c n�a dra less er s1� con ar er rth 1c Fu e pat t s). ces pro 1n al the itic pol 1 1l sec to�s refo a_ l �dmints p�n 1n , ?rm rl!,1 ref : ple but peo of of s sse rta ma po im to nce , tration'. tn fami from es ur1 1nJ for ly 1on sat pen com ati rel in or s hip ons ties d du an , ind 1 to or �d ign des ts jec pro o �ut ny ma _of . s i�e c�s a�c suc . nts ate e im Th ult ch a�;; �0 ndittons ,v1th1n society may depend s1gruficantly upon the capacity of . court s to inte ' e th gh ou thr d e an rpr tes pu t dis of d ds an kin w ply ne ap w. laws to ne use 0 f . new . ' t 011 a b t 1ng me k" 1n h' f t h o ys wa ods new s, of ure ced pro adJud1cat1on (new Probierns).

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nge� a nd_ � ew law cre a . ch en e _ b � a h w la e ch at u m ,_ d, e m ti is th t a , ia . p io h t In E t role 1n _pol1t 1cal developme n a c 1fi n g s1 a n e iv g e1� e � . nt � v a h to r ea p p a s ,·t bl um and the cou io n ct l a a � t d s m e re p rn � ,? v n go o a s n ? o � t1 a 1t m y, l1 s. se o 1p in n o ti u it st n o 1 f . nt Tl e C v e e m w r p la en su h w s a t le re l p d a p f _i an a t re rp e t in to ed ct e xp the courts are e d go�ernrnent . Fu:l?er, the a� en z t1 c1 , n e e _ w et � s t� 11 p is d f o 11 io at ic , d jli ad e to th ds of a?m�strative n ki s ou ri va ?� y t ) l1 na t1o 1tu 1st o1 ''legality'' (rather than ''c n. 1 l t h er o e d at n sl a g1 o e od C ( il e iv th C y . b c.f le ab ew vi r·e ly ss e pr ex e ad m action is n teJ?plates the ''rule co ly ab m su e r p s k o _ o � e n t� i w la 1 Sectiorl 6 of Chapter VI). The

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v e lopment is another matter. de al ic lit po in e l ro l ia ic d ju But· realization of the ' er w v po l ' e an e to m l hig ''h d e ff ifi sta al qu of e ag rt 1o sl e 11t ac an e b ill w d an There is nd so it is cumbe rsome a e, rg la is m e st sy t ur co e h T . r i t e r e the courts1-ei ven the upp y an d congestion ela d s; ou rm no e is n io at ig lit of e m lu vo as well as expensive. The eav y and frustrating. The h e ar s e dg j11 y n a m on s e r ssu e pr e t h ; of cases is common e profession alism rag ou nc e to ; lly fu e r ca s ge ju d ise rv pe su d; need to select, train an e tiv ices tra nis serv mi ad e ov pr im to d an m; ste sy e th n thi wi n tio rup cor and to check within the courts, poses very r eal and very difficult problems. con e to hav l wil e iv cut e ex e h t t tha e u arg inly rta e c y ma one n atio situ this In ern gov of ar1n l icia d ju e th ing elop dev in ity hor aut e l erab si d con e rcis tinue to exe ment . The separation and ''i11dependence'' of the jitdiciary may b e argued in the abstract; these terms may, indeed, express desirabl e goals of constitutional develop ment; but specific, concrete issues have to be exami.ned befor e one can apply-or adapt- these principles to the present situation.

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The Chapter starts by examini11g aspects of the pre-Con stitutional situation. ��r. example: What were some of the co nditions which confronted those who have 1n1t1at7d-or tried to initiate,-cha.nges over rece nt decades? Are there public expectat1ons :1nd d�ep-roote� traditions that ca11not be changed overnight and thus St Again iciary? a?not easily be ignored 1n creating a system of courts and a jud � this �ac��o11nd the ch�pter the11 revie\vs some of the steps taken to establish a new Jud1c1al system d11r111g tl1e period 1931-1955.

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further loo� �t the. 1 ud1c1al po•ver'' 1,ested in the courts by the Constitution aorl e h m h�r laws ,, , fro ste, p s take t 11 to create a structure of cour ts;-the ''system f tbiya �agna to H.I.M.'s Chi/at; the problems confronting those wh� mu st p re· pare ( _an_ �1:force) laws governing the selection training su ervision promotion d i�g of the .fudicif:ry; the regulation �n d devel�pm�nt of a iegal pro/es-· ' t ��d!� !n r-relat1onsh1p of n Dl p elo � e d the to deve lopm n ent profe of ssio v a g of the cou rt�' t�e problems of administration within de as th al!13 1 e courts' such g . : n1n with court congestion delay ·and i·neffici·en cy n a J d . an s 1 e n cas disp of osin g ' P . , d lop1n for the future ' th; rol� of the courts (and the pro f ession) in continuously eve i ·t' ! · 1 1 s r clarifying and ·e1,orllllng the law: T he M1n1s a d ·d 1 e · " try of Justice will be cons e r _ wers ' . . . presently exercises �rucial JU�Isd 10 . s y t �c! n in ' Min is all thes . e e P� wre .' r Th sect ors to control and· develo JudJ.ci y are considerable, and a r�Jy , �e on/ � character of judicial in�ti!:100 ; , a - S WI depend very. much on the polic1 e s an c el11. 1 of this particular ex ecut· agenc t y e .Bey to ond that n: what t J b. there . 1 quest io is the s }�� J should the Ja w of the , t · . a ur es. e nd se pa ra te a th e cou rts from the Ministry . . · ,,:, them as a more autonom.ou s, self-adm1n · · te r1ng · 1s · branch of government ?· .· . :

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the Revised Constitution . of VI ter Chap ad: Re--re o si al vi on ro ns 1ti P ti ti 1s o1 C e tiv ra Coinpa

Re--read: carefully: Article III and Article II (2) of the Constitution of tl1e u,1 ite(/ States (set forth supra, page 171); Chapter VI of the Co,,1stitutio1z of Japarz (set fortl1 sz,pra pages ' 118-89); Selected Articles Establislli11g Tl1e Supren1e Cot1rt of Dal1omey (set forth supra, pages 200-201).

From TJ1e Interim Co1zstitz1tio11 of Ta11za11ia (1965). CHAPTER V THE JUDICATURE OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC AND OF ZANZIBAR PART I The High Court of the United Republic 56. - (1) There shall be a High Court of the United Re1J11blic which sl1all l1ave

such jurisdiction and po\vers as may be conferred on it by tllis Co11stitution or any other law.

_(2) The judges of the High Court of tl1e United Republic shall be the Chief Justice of Tanzania and such n11mber of other j11dges, 11ot being less than eight (hereinafter referred to as ''the puisne judges'') as may be prescribed by Parliament: . Provided that the office of a puisne judge sl1all not be abolished while there 18 a substantive hold er thereof. �3) The High Court shall be a superior court of record and, save as otherwise provid ed by Act of Parliament, shall have all the powers of such a court. 57· - (I) The Chief Justice of Tanza11ia shall be appointed by the President. . (2) The puisne judges of the High Cot1rt of tl1e United Republic shall be ap pointed by the President after consultation witl1 the Chief Justice. (3 ) a Subject to the provisions of subsection (4), a person shall not be qualifi 1 () ed for appoi ntment as a judge of the High Court unless1 h� is, or ha s �een, a judge of a court having a limited_ j11risdiction in civil ) and�r1. m1nal , y out ntr cou a11y 111 or tte ma tl1, eal rs onw mm In Co e som tbe of t par s·de_ the Com monwealth that may be prescribed by Act of Parliament, or a court � ving jurisdiction in appeals from any such court; or (ii) he holds one of er oth or one d hel l1as and of ns atio lific the specified qua � tho e lifications for a total period of not less than five years. a s qu 1 In this subsection and i n subsections ( 4) and (6) ''the specified qu�lifications\�)mea ns nce ina Ord ates the voc Ad tl1e by fe pro d e cifi spe nal ssio ns atio lific qua· (or bY or u · nder · any law amending or replacing that Ord1na one of which must ) e n9_ be held b a y such 1aw) Y · n person before he may apply under tha t Ord1na11ce (or 11nder a11y to be admitted as an advocate in Tanganyika.

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N O I AW T AL U L IT T S N O C N A J P O I H 'r Sou·RcEBOOK OF E

s nce ta m l f ia o ec n sp so rc e ci u y t a r s � t d � e s � ti fi s� is t en d si re P i e d q ua. l1ficat1o n s 1s worthy, ca pable and suitabt (4) Where the if ec sp e . 1e tJ f o e n ] o l s ld o . l . . . . at h e h.as no t h th di a person w 10 n a t g n h s t v1 t\ o n rt u o _C i gh d H el 1e tl · f o _ e g 1d j1 a to be appointed f t d o o o r n e p ss l le ta to a th i � fo n s r n o t1 e a fiv � f i li a 11 q se o th f o er some one or oth o _ at such pers th ; n en l m � al 1r sh u �q r e v th ha h 1t � e se en p is d ay m t en d i c t i ons 10� a tot al _ pert�d of t years, the Presi no al1 f. a u q ss ed le fi i ec sp 1e tl f o 1 er tI o held some one or a id, a ppoint h im a judge of s re a fo n o ti a lt su n co 1 cl su · e1 ft a , a y m d 11 a , rs a e y ve than fi the High Co11rt. e ef ic h� st e C is Ju th if r r fo o t n a y an c v� is e ic st J� ef hi C e th of (5) If the office i l a person has been t un , en th , ce offi is h of s on i t 11c fu reason unable to perform the l e ti on th r rs un o pe ce l offi o h. t a th of s on ti i1c fu e th ed 1m s1 d as s a h appointed to a11d ase may be, those functio ns c e th s a , ns tio nc f11 e os .th ino that office has resumed as may be designated in that es dg ju ne 1is p1 e th of e on ch sl1�ll be perf armed by su behalf by the President. any such judge is app ointed if or nt a c a v is e dg jl1 ne 1is p1 ny a of ce (6) If the offi s on cti of his fun the rm rfo pe to le ab un n so rea y r an fo is or ce to act as Chief Justi t ss in ine bus he of te a st t the a th nt de esi Pr the es vis ad e stic Ju ief Ch the if office, or oint app for d lifie a ql1 son per a t oin pp a y ma ent sid Pre the es, uir req High Court so ments as a jt1dge of the High Co11rt to act as a ptlisne judge of _that Court; Provided that:-

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notwithsta11ding the p�·ovisi �fns of st1bsection (I) of section 58 of th is Cons· (a) _ 1 u110n, 110 person sh a b e d1squal1 ied for appointment u11der thi.s subsection by ,� t·t reason only of his age; 11 t j not (b). tl1e President n1�y dispense with the requ.iremer1ts that a person shal) be q11alified for an appo1ntme�1t ,1s a judge of tl1e High Court unless he has hel d i son1e one ?r �the1· of the spec1fie? qt1alifications f'or ,1 total period of not less �ban : five �ears_ 111 tl1 e case of a11 appo1nt1ne11t of a perso11 who has one of the sp ecifie d qualifi�at1ons to. act as a pt1_isne j t1dge of the High Court for the like reason s as he ·. may dispense withotit requ1ren1e11ts llnder the provisions of subsection (4). At . (?) Any pe�son appointed under s1;1bsection (6) of this section to act as a pu�ne 1 �udge s_hall co11��1111� to act _ for tl1e period of his appoiiitment or, if no such period -lt is spec1fi d, t111t1- l 111s a_ppo1ntn1ent IS revoked by th e President; J{I � Prov1ded that, _11otwithsta11ding the expiratio11· of the period of his app oint- :;.· a s ·he may ment or the revocation of llis ap1Joi· iti11ent, a t a c thereafter continue to i t ·udg· � o on n a m judg y be i uisne 1ny � � l me _ j r necessary_ deliver to e11 ble a to h m . ;th�� :� it� g ! o do relation to proceedings that were commenced before previously thereto. : _ � f. 58. - (I) Subject to the prov·I ion ce · s Of this sectio o ffi . t g n n, a person holdi he � · two _ -, a judge of the High COllrt 8ha� v acate that office on attaining the age- -of- si x-�Y.. -=:'.'::_lt years; - . · -ki:: --· =. . .-:�··: . . Provided that the President a � � �-�"":;;-� i y n permit conti ?1 r .: ll, U!L such to a pe son :: until he has attained th f · e a g e of sixty- ive y ea rs. _ _ ___ .. .. _ --..,. ·-:;;- _ � :· :;; � ti . • : . =(2) Notwithst anding th t h h as . . l l att�1.ned the age at w�ich he ·1��l° �a�� he provisions of this sectio� t e . O v�cate his office, a perso e g ! ho ldi n li · n �p_ J !,l�_ \;· t� � Judge of the High t · court may continue in offi t i tai n I ce for so gno after a� ng:-- �t ��=;��J

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r as may _be necessary t� enable him to deliver jt1dgi11e11t or _to do a11y otl1er tl1 ing I in relation to proceedings that were comn1e11ced before 11101 before Ile attai il ed \ that age. ( 3) A judge of tJ:te High <;ourt may be remov�� from office only for inability i h s of offi fun ce ctio ns (w? eth er the �r1s 11 1g fron1 i 11 fir111ity of body rm perf o to or :', ' - mind or from any other ca11se) or for n11sbehav1011 r and sl1all 11 0t be so removed ,' except in accordance with the provisions of subsection (5) of t11 is section.

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(4) Jf the President . consi?ers tl1at the ·q11estio11 of re111oving a j11dge under this section ought to be 1nvest1gated, then:-

(a) he shall appoint a trib11nal which shall co11 sist of a cl1airman and 11ot less than two other members, the chairman a11d at least 011e half of the otl1er n1en1bers bein g persons who hold or have held office as j11dges of a co11rt having unlin1ited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in son1 e part of the· Con1 mon\vealth, or in any country outside the Commonwealth tl1at n1ay be JJrescribed by Parliament, or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from a11y sucl1 court;

(b) the tribunal shall inquire into the matter a11d report on tl1e facts thereof to the President and advise the President whether tl1e j11dge ougl1t to be removed from office under this section for inability as aforesaid or for misbehaviour.

(5) Where a tribunal appointed under s11bsection (4·) advises the Presi�ent that a judge ought to be removed from office for inability as aforesaid or m1sbe ,, haviour, the President shall remove sucl1 jt1dge from office. (6) If the question of removing a jt1dge from office has bee11 referred �o a trib11n . al unde r subsection (4) of this section, the Preside11 t may suspe11d the JUdg � from . 1 perfo rming the functions of bis office, and any st1ch suspensio1 1 n1ay �t a11y t 1n1e be _ rev ked by the President and shall i n any case cease to have effect if tl1e tribur1al � \ , advises the President that the judge ought not to be removed from office. I '' • • (7) The provis ions of this sectio11 shall be withot1t prejudice to the provisions of subsection (7) of sec tion 57 of this Constitution. �9· - A judge of th e High Court shall no t enter upon the duties of his office unless cu exe _e has taken and e du e th for th oa ch su bscribed the oath of aliegia11ce a11 d su hon of his office as may be prescribed by Act of Parliame11t, '1 I>

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PART II Appointment of other Judicial Officers in Tanganyika • • and the Judicial Service Comm1ss1on lic Repub . . United �- (I) Tb e�e . . . . the c r · in tanga - shall be a Jud1c1al Service Comllllss1on 1n and 10 .nyika W'hich shall consist of:( a) the · n '· Ch'Ief Justi·ce of Tanzania wl1 0 shall be Cb ai· rma or may � (b) su c_h . as . bljc the time _ puisne Judge of the High Court of the 1! 111. ted Repu ultation with · the C being .he designated in that behalf by the President a fter cons hi ef Justice ; ,

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L A N IO T LAw U IT T S N O C N A I P IO I J·r E SoURCEBOOK OF '

t. n e id s e r P e th y b d te in o p (c) a n1ember a.p u er nd e d th te i!l po is ap ov pr be to io ed i� al qu �s be of t _ i;o l al _ sh on rs pe A (2) r be em of I m e he th If on ct � se ti ) is Na S th � of a on (1 l n tio ec bs su j of (c) h ap gr para y b t en r am e li fo th ar P p ur p ed b ri sc re p e os ce offi an of ] f o i de ol h · e th Assembly or this section. t, en e th am e li w ar po f P o r: ct A y an o� ns io is ov pr j e th ( to 61. - 1) Sub ect o i ct n a se ies is pl th ic� ,vh clu (in p to s ce g offi din ld ho to ns rso pe . 1 1t i po ap to (a) n ing or ti g ld ac ho ns rso in pe er ov such l ro nt co y ar lin cip dis ise erc ex (b) to f ns rom ce rso offi pe ch su e ov rem to d an nts , is vested me int po ap te na mi offices, to ter in the Jt1dicial Service Commission. (2) The offices to which this section applies are the offices of Registrar and Dept1ty Registrar of the High Court of the United Republic, Resident Magistrate and any other magist1·ate, and such other offices connected with any court (other than a court-martial) as, subject to the provisions of this Con.stitution., may be prescribed by Act of Parliament; Provided that this section shall ·not apply to any such office or magistrate of a court in Zanzibar. (3) The power of the President to abolish offices in the service of the United Re:publi9_ _shall not be exercised in respect of any office to which this sectio n applie.s \ w1:111� there is a s�1bstantive holder of that office, 11nless the Judicial Service Com- ; miss1on conct1rs In such abolition.

PART ID The Higlt Court of Zanziba.r

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62· - N?thing in this Chapter shall be construed as pre cluding the continuance ?r establ1shme11t _11nde1· and 111 accordance with the law of Zanzibar of a Hi gh Court In and for Za11z1bar or cou1·ts s11bordi 11ate thereto. . � 3· ' (l) Subjects to sections 36 and 64 of this Constitution the High Court of ; b y of a�zIbar shall �ave sue� jur isdiction as may b C u ' rt o h H ig co e nf 'a er re on d r un e any law 111 force in, incll1ding a law x : e te11ded to Zanzibar. � (2) Subject to this Co · of 1 nsf_1 tufIon and to an y expr ess provisi. on of an ActUa· p Parliament where jurisd.cf 1?- c<? ·1ar e t of a d re n er t � h C la ur 1 n S o _ h ig a. a H o i!( by _ ment of the United Re 1 ub0� I whichf �p�li an f a e� ar t i or orc e _ o m , T � ng a rb in law -" which is extended to Z anZI , J ,?:. 1 ar . f , � the � t 1:Ir1sd1 ct Cour �� on � of High the shall 'be concurrent wi' th a O f the High Court o f the United Republic . · · � -·

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. -� From Tl1e Constz'tutz·on 0if g i A'.lrr. I1an stan (1964). · _ _ . . . •· Art�cle 97 The Judicia · es : · · . _i � � � · , . !ndependent organ ?f t he State and disohflil'g: "-. " duties side by side wi � : an th h Leg1slati v e .and Executi O gan . ", . - ·. .�;,: ve r s. _

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839

consists of a St1pren1e Cot1rt and ia ry Ju d ic T h e 93 e other cotlrts, the 11LlffiAfticl . ber of which shall be detern11ned by la,v. It is within the j1;1risdictio� of the Ji1diciarJ' to adjt1dicate in all Iit ig at io i1 ?e ac fo co 1t re rd ht in broug g to �h e rt1les of la'rv, i 11 w11icI1 real or le _ gal persons, 111c!t1d1ng tl1e State, are 111volved eitl1er as plai1i tiff or de fe nd ant. ci Under no rcumstances shall a law exclude fro111 tl1e j11risclic tio11 of the Judjciary, as defined i11 this Title, a case or sphere, a11d assion it to other authorities . Th i� p�ov�si?n does 11ot preve11t tl1e establisl1111e�t of military courts; but the Jur1sd1ctlon of these cot1rts is co11fi11ed to ofef nces related to the armed forces of Afghanistan. Tl1e orgar1izatio11 a11d j11risdic tion of the military courts shall be detern1i11ed by law. Article 99 The jt1dges are appointed by the Ki11g 011 tl1e reco111111e11dation of tl1e Chief Justice. Whenever a j11dge con11nits an offence, the Supreme Court considers tl1e case of the judge, and after l1earii1g the defense of the jt1dge can recommend l1is disn1issal to the Ki11g. In case the re� commendation is approved by tl1e l(i11g, the judge is dis1nissed from office. Transfers, pron1otions, calli11g to ac cot111t, a11cl. reco111111e11datio11s for retjrement of the jt1dges are withi1 1 tl1.e con1pete11ce of the Supre1ne Court, in accordance ,vith the provisio11s of the la\v. Swtable salaries for the judges are fixed by la,v. Judges cannot engage i11 other occ11patio11s d11ri11g their tenure of office. Article 100 In the courts of Afgha11ista11 trials are 11eld ope11ly a.11cl everyone 111ay attend in accorda nce 'rVitJ1 tl1e 1Jrovisio11s of tl1e lc1w. T�1e Court n1ay in exceptional cases specified i n the la\v hold closed trials. However, the judgment shall always be openly proclaimed. The courts are bound to state in tl1eir judgn1ents tl1e reaso11s for their verdicts. Article 101 The enforcement of all final jt1dgments of tl1e cot1rts is obligatory e� c�1Jt in the case of a death sentence ,vhere tl1e exect1tio11 of the court decision is subject to the King's sig11ature. Article 102 The courts i 11 the cases under their co11sideration shall appl y the pro.. . . . o n er ev en h W . te ta S e th f O aws l v1s1on s of thls Const1tut1011 and t1 1e . • a case ui.lder conr fo s w Ja e · provision exists .in tl1e Const1tut1011 · or .th . e th f o s le p ci · 1 . a the siderati on, the courts sl1a11, by _follo\ving s n o ti a it m li e �b 1� h ft � � n Hanafi Jurisprudence of the Shar1aat of Islafi:1 � n io in p o ir e th n i t a th set forth in thls Constitl1tion, render a decision secures justice in the best possible way. c e with the an accord Article 103 Investigat in ted, ion of crimes shall be conduc the of part a is who l, provisions of the law, by the Attor11ey-Getiera Executive organ of the State. the · to ing 11 a re Art·icI e 104 Subje rt1les . n 1 · const·tutio ct to the provisions of this ning concer rs matte ' d organization an d the function of the courts, an judges shall be regulated by law. mity unifor of t en 1sw.u i......... establ . Th.e principal aim of these laws sh a11. b_e tJ1e l . . n, and procedures of· tie in judicial practice, organjzation, Jur1sdictio courts.

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SOURCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

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Article lOS The Supreme Court consists of nine Judge s ap pointed by the Kin g. Tlie King shall appoint the members of the Sup reme Court fr om amo persons who shall: ngs t I. Have completed 35 years. 2. Be eligible f or election to t�e Sh ur a (Parliament) in accordance with the provisions of Article 46. 3. Have sufficient knowledge of j urispru�ence, the �tional obje ctives, and tl1e laws and legal system m A fgharustan. The King appoints on e of the Judges of th e Sup reme_ Court! age is not less than 40 and not over 60 y w ho se J ears, as th e Chief Justice. The King can review the a ointment o f th e Chief Justice and the pp of the Su preme Cou r t aft Judges er the laps e o f ten years f r om the date of their appointment to the said offices. Su bject to th e p r ovision s of this and of A rticle 106, the Chief Justi A rt ic le c e and Judges of the Supreme Court sl1all not b e removed from their offices by any other m eans. Except in the case mentioned in A rticle 106, the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court shall, a f t e r their tenure in office, enjoy rest o f their lives all the :fi fo r the nancial privileges pertainin g to the term of thei1· services. The Chief Justice and Ju dges o f the Supreme C o u rt shall not, after the termination of their servic es, beco me Prime Minister the Government, men1be or members of rs of the Shura (Parlia officials. ment) or Government The Chief Justice and n1emb ers of the Sup reme cipate in political partie Court shalJ not parti s during or after their tenu re o f office. Article 106 Should more than one-third of the n1embers of the Wolesi of the People) dema Jirgah (House nd the impeach1nent more Judges of the of the Chief Ju stice or one or Supr eme Co urt on a from the perfo rma char oe of a crime stemming nc e _ of their duties, and th; Wolesi of the People) a . Jirgah (Ho�se pprove this dem and by a majo rity membe�·s, the accused of two-thirds of its is susp ended from office Loya. Jirga h (Great and a meeting of the C ouncil) is called to appoint a Enquiry. C ommission of If t h e .L?y a Jirg� h (Great Council), after st Commissi on: decid udying the re ort of the es by a tw?-thirds p the pro secution of majo rity of its members t�at tl1� accu sed is necessary, it menibers t? file a shall its a suit of o int one a d p p shall t as a tn? a � poin p t a un al. panel : to The of eight persons trib unal, presid ed ov eshr�no J rg ( er by the President of tbe o 1 use � � of the Elders), ance with th_e shal l tr cnn y d the unal o ac accused in c roce � p if proved gu!lt dur es of the y, shall b e dismi Supreme Court. The accuped; . Article 107 The ssed from office and supreme Court is. . punished. the highest judi cial authority in Afghanistan,' · �� upr ou_r� reguJ�tes <; � t anf ��e JUdi the organization the·� cia_I affairs of and of functions . visions o this Constitution and the State in accordance with th_e _p!�::_ ' ; :_ the law. - .,�-- .... •

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841

The •Suprem•e Co ur t adopts 11ecessary 111east1res to oi·gac 111· 2e th e ac1 111·111 1-· strative affa1rs of th e c ot1rts. The b11dget of the Jt1diciary is prepa re d by tl1e Cl1ief Jtistice i tl co11sulta tion with th e Gover11n1e11t a1 1d , after the approval of tl1e St1 nren1e Cotirt is presented by the Govern111ent to tl1e Sht1ra (Parlian1 e1;t) as a part of the State budget. ·The Supreme Co urt adn1inisters tl1e bt1dget of the J t1 diciary . The provisio ns of tl1e lavv relating to civil serva1 1ts a 1 1cl otl1er adn1i 11is trative employees of the Sta te are applicable to tl1e civil serva11ts a11d other a'dministrative employees of tl1 e Jt1diciary. I-Io"'vever, tl1eir appoint me11t, promotion, dismissal, retiren1e11t, a11d calli11g to account sl1all be \\1ith i11 the co1J1petence o f tl1e SuJ)ren1e Court, i 11 accorda11ce \Vit11 the la'rv·.

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SECTION I

HISTOlUCAL PERSPECTlVE Traditional Concepts of La\v, Courts and Adjudicatio1u Introduction . One's kno\.vledge 0£ the traditio11al legal syste1n 1nt1st.. of cour�e, be bt1il� 011 scrap? of evidence rather than any existing, con1prel1e11sive scie11tific a11alys�s; 011 various trad�t1ons passed down orally; and on pieces of evidence fot1nd i11 IJoolzs ,,,J11cl1 deal t1nsysteinat1�ally ?r sup�rfically with legal institutions, inclucli11g tl1e s0111eti111es dt1biot1s a�1d s01net11nes �teresttng insights of foreign observers; 011 work: s st1cl1 as tl1e Fetl1a Negas� vvl11ch n1ay some times portray the ideals of law ratl1er tl1a11 tl1e actual rules and workJ11g of tl1e sy5tem. �e _excerpts below are only representative. Our problem is to try to see s0111e of the context \VIthin which developers of tl1e lavv and jt1dicial system l1ad to ,;vork.

An overview of traditional judicial i11stiti1tio11s Fr?m Seyou,n Gebre Egziabher, T/1 e Develop1ner 1t of So111e I11stiti1tior1s _Co, 7cern�cl With L abour Relations in Ethiopia p. 2, ·Note 2 (1969, H.S.I.U. De1)artmei1t of P t iblic _ _ Admm1str ation). . ant concept was social The dom1n . harn1 ony, a11d under the basic social philo .1 th f o d tI llil sophy, no formalized o r � e _ lop e e v d ti onalized co 11rts we !e titu ins is xi � ; : f o th th century. y arcl ie l � pia develo ped was a11 informa h � E e _19 What thio r e th o .[ h . ug o r tra t1on and Ju h . t pass111g lders ' · ' . e . · . age -11 1c1al d VJ h wit arbit beg111111ng rs, e .e nized o r instiofli c1.als] to the 1lar , reg a of e 1 1 C/1i abs lot e1 E The f o o _ � r. the mp er Ie l�fate of tl1e law _ tu naliz� d elo 11de y e rela �las t1v s j f the o udges and lawyers, J 11 � �hat social har1nony an�� egal insti tutio ns until recently (1960) suppo rts the ded. t iction Was the oncept c that was institutionalized. , 9 4 1 , 7 4 1. Fro m erha 6 4 1 , 5 4 1 . . 4 4 1 3 4 1 P, P�m, (194 8) Th. e Governn1ent of Eth1op1 a 150

(toot notes omitte d). It es. r featu 1g asti1 r coi1t The sys o . tw te d we . �ho m, f or it well merits that na me , most that in Was at onc tic ocra dem was It e zed. very �li centr e?, Inde . democratic and highly it. E.thi ._.l in part us v a s cte , � who are deeply i �ere�ted in litigation, � ? ;;;:�t, while D'Abbad1e it w�i said i:t arou ite that to play at 11t1ga r favou a was t1on

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SOURCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONS"fITUTIONAL LAW

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d ti e Ethiopians wit h remarkable critical faculties and a _gr eat kno �} 1::, an� said t ha t they regarded injustice as he wo /i wJe dg rst of _enemies. It w � r � as also in t hat native s a nd stra n�ers had som e cho1� as Ii be a _to ;i: th eir . c'. o ur t '.111 d f ull rights ··,( of appeal. Thes e right� w�re, i ndeed excessiv s ince 1 t has b een e, estimated tha '. some parts of the e m p _ ii·e 1 t was possible to tak � _appeals t'?,ro g h t in fifteen courts . :; much weight was given t o whether or not the 1 1 tigant r and e ceive J a [:avou r able verd ic from a n1ajority of these co111·ts. t Litigation at its lowest s tages was a �o�unta r� a n d sp on tan eous fo rm of arbitra tion . Parties in civil and even min or cnm1nal d is p u t es would call up on a passe by to decide the iss11e between them 11nder r a tree. If the arbitration resulted i n a decisio n a c cept e d by the parties tha end of the m atter thou gh t her e was t w as the on ly t he pressure of public op inion t o en force the settlem ent. This must have been str o n g to m a k e the m ethod work at all. If there wa s no decision at this s t a ge, o r if o n e of th e litigants desired it, th parties, with the judge and witn e e s es, would g o t ? t h e lo s west official court. accounts are given of th is c ou Various · , r t for different p eno ds and ar eas. T he lowest judge would be the chiqa shu oflii:iaJ I m, who corresponds to th r e village head elsewhere Af ica, or, n1or e oft en i n t he ' in t o w n s , h e m ig ht be a special fu a 111an knowing t h nctionary, t he danya, e l aw. S u c h c ases wou ld ta ke p lac e w ith th who play a gr ea t part i n E e help of guaranto t h rs io p ia n , a s i n e a r l y Anglo S axon, procedure, went 'bail' for the partie s a nd who agreeing t o a c c e pt the pe nalt i e s i n case o Ass e ssors, whose function f their escape. appe ared t o corr espond s omewh were a lso used. The taking at with that of a jury, of oaths w as a v e ry imp or It was common, too, tant part of the pro for litigants to make in cedure. might be at issue a wage additio n to t he material stake which r, som e part of whic h might go to the judge. . !he next court, and th e or igi nal c ourt for n1ore importa cruruna_l cases, ,�as th nt and especiall y fo a t of the Malka r nya, or gove rnor's d According to an 1mportant eputy in the district. d ec r ee of 1931, these officials the governor. Th';'.Y n 1ust be 'honest n1en were to be appointed by ledge of the la w. fhey and sympath e tic to th e poor' w ere to take with kno w _c::ourt clerks and u the legal oath upon shers and to see t their appoi nt ment, to keep hat a ll cases w ere fhey must choose t w r ecorded in a c ourt r gister. o assessors e from those in the chose a uarantor. On cour t, while the li tigants each appe a l � the a l] conceined, t? case went, wit h the a copy gov e rn of the r ecord signed by o r, who the v.10111baJ-·s, c ould he ar the appeal him self or w1tl1 f011r assesso1 ·s. t o his judges, ' Appe�I fr om th e . govern or lay t o th 1n the capital rne e centra l n cour t at Add1·s k · nown a s rron 1,,/' . A . r 0f the provinces baba · • There ibar -Rase e we s Judg a11d to help es appoi11 ted to represe11t eac h . · in . ' the ser · d . ea 1· ing . · · W1th f ou as thei r appeals. This central court us d sors and t wo �uaran of tl1e �/;� � �l e tors . The ( Je �outh · g s next appeal was to the co�t of the King), T the help of Jlld he Afa Ne gus would ges irom tl1e cou take the case witb rt below. l t e wen t t t he time:'�� :fu�t � r1 Emperor himself � . This w as h is duty as it was at t h :: �;e evid n c e. e have ie s e a r l th f o r m e t e � W a d full picture of the Em o_r's co ur t he m iddle was a l ong tent r per t ages from Alvarez. of· s e In the moving capital there peror and his j �� ; h cl ose to the � mpe us ti ror' s tent, and from e c With man Em· in the mu respect to the s t . te11t dism . of JUst rc ount b efore pa · _ chref Jus e Were ssing between these tents. · tice in th e mid thirte. en· chairs · on each si· , SIX dle though the e th for de, e o and n_ .1..,. . _ Judges actually sat o n the ground bemde i=Dl·

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1d says as 11111cl1 as l1e pleases ,vitllotlt ailyo ile a action l1is t brings ntiff siJeal('The plai ans\-vers a11d say s as n111ch as lie IJleases.' After fti .rtller qt sed accu the d . i est·1011 .1ng an . . er repeats a11 tl. 1 at . d . en 1 � rec�r . h t · l1as bee11. sai_d ailcl gives ]Jis ee� bet\v w�r ans . and i dge, r 1s1ng 1n t1�r11,_ does the sa?1e, tl1e cl11ef J ti stice Jt Each dict. siJeaki il g er own v _ ,for br111g111g �ny proot_ tl1at 111ay be reqti ired. Fitlally dela)' a be then may re The . last s tent, speaki11g to 11 1111 tl1rot1gl1 tl1 e ctirtairls, and Empe ror th� to go es judg . the . . n 1o 1s c e is d h h it w return We have, unfortunately, 110 s11cl1 exc elle11t accou11ts of tl1e royal jti stice for subseql1en t perio�s. De <;a�tro, hovvever, gives 11s s0111e acco1111t of tlie SLipre111e court of 1\fenelik s day s1tt1ng to take aJJJJeals 011 Wed11esda)1s a11d Fridays. The flight of steps in front of t11e palace ,vas tt1rned i11to a11 ope11-fore11sic l1all; 111a11y coloured ea stern carpets \Vere spread ot1t; tl1e j11dges sat at tl1e to1) a11cl the cl1iefs, soldiers, and servants at the ,vings; tl1e f ourtl1 side was closed by tl1e ,1cct1sed, tl1e \vitnesses and the advocates. Behind these vvas tl1e thro11g of tl1e c11rious l)ttblic. Jn th.e a.bsence of the Emperor, the Aja Negits ,vould JJreside. Coming to Haile Selassie's day ,ve fi11d tl1at tl1e us11al procedt1re \,vas for tl1e Aja Negus to make a c oncise report of the case to the E1nperor. Accordi11g to the 1930 crirninal code the Emperor alone could sente11ce to death, tl1011gJ1 i11 Menelil( 's day some provincial governors still had ca1Jital powers a11d it is 1Jossible tl1at some of the more po,¥erful rases c ontinued to use then1 up to 1935. The prese11t E1111Jeror put aside two days a \Veek for his judicial d11tie$. Tl1 11s it was tr11e to say tl1at from the earliest times until 1935 an appeal lay fro1n the ht1mblest peasa11t to tl1e En1peror himself, and only the expense and the long dista11ces preventecl his legal duties be coming a n impossible burden. Traditio11 reqt1ired tl1at tl1e E1n1)eror sl1011ld be accessible to all. Even in the nineteen-thirties it was diffic11lt for the JJrese11t En1peror to clis regard public opinion on this matter and to delegate this exacti11g taslc e11tirely to a court of appeal over which he did not 11ormally reside i1 1 JJerson.

Local Cz,stomary Coi1rts a11d Local Govern,nent Cottrts From Knutsson, Authority and Cfzange (1967).

s o f ef by ed w llo fo a� w II The enormous expansion during th e re ig n of Menelik �e t on , 1 1r o av de n e_ to co o idate the new g s thi in e tiv mo reat Ethiopia. A leadi1.1g ns l f o e c n e d n e p e d p art Of th central n 'J e th uce d re to w1sh the b been t 11rnen as oover · · • e · 0 · nt t a A · n 1mpo1 1 te th e vario t � s . us parts of the Empir strong nationa .· a · e and to create m e t s y s e 1v . t a r t 1s 1n m mov · d . :r.orro ac: • • . e In this struggle has been the creat.1011 of a ULlu and ts dist ric s b t �p�n a division OVlll s11 -p s e o prov in c of the coun int try , ? � l� tl1e s11b-district suu;;_ t � n tri�t s. This division orga lega the ! to also s lie app �� : � l a11d ovii1cia sub-pr and 18 rt t level . as act . ! 1udg_es c the mselves governors the i ring the · · dt ded v 1 1 d pr o vi nc ial level were 011s t1 func l icia jud the administrative and 0 · P stw-ar per10d and sepa rate courts set 11p. · us to var e h t , ration ninist 1 · d a 0 l th , c lo offi ia the . al n . l of leve c tion a e bina ·d the p urely local com ffl o ll 1 tio og a lo i c r the e �: �, s�tem with rufferent P�P of � ! e atives represent �z � jur i:� 1 a a ur1 c i a J org col1t1 'po · typ estcof· fun �1zat1on has resulted in a ctionaries· n�r, gov�r t's The· �en . tral administration represented, ap �rt from h- e b -distric 1str1c t T . sub-d is he � 0 rce by the 1a t r ce po l i na tio na e e th ry ta of m re rs c 's d be s an em e t. · ·

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N O I T AL LAW U IT T S N O C N A I P O I H T SOURCEBOOK OF E

n io it f s e o o e p th h la . T a .. b .. ' b s ip ll s s tt tt a a b a , l a 'b l ra e v se to in d. e t, s n e e u is ftlrthei· divid h q w n e e o h t c rg la r = te f � p a rtj o d n l� f o n o ti u ib tr is -d e r e th y _ b d e n e th streng rn e e _ v o r th g ? f to o _ e l. b e ra e th sw n a s 1 b &U tt a b !a a sb di � . _ n i e tb to 1 e1 tv g . of laJld \\'e r. e e g in d h a u it s J a W ts a c a o l ls a b a d n ab � a re a atfs is h 1 11 h 1t w er rd o trict for peace and a ru le , are also her edita s a , se e h T . e g d Ju , o ,·r o k 1 . s t 01 e a le t a y ll a u s ti is re e . area th _ g 1;1 e n m th u a . e d n te e la m r p sa e th f o ie _ er ce � o Z e_ th in in g ri o r ei th e v positions and ha l adm 1n1stration , a form a tr n ce e h t f o e_ v t1 a 1 1t 1n e h t 11 0 , y tl e� ec R . ce 1 ei 1d ei ep d of in . r d y o te er � ea ev cr n ee b la s ba � h , 11z tt sa ba ed ll a -c so e th s, ve i t ta en es r of people's rep e t_ u 1t a st 1 1; ci �0 h ey un co T l i e. t m a th t wi � s ar ye e 1·e th 1· f 0 1 1 se 1o cl sl1 ip three sa11i are ei r area. Like wise in th h it w er rd o r fo le b si n o p s re r e a the balabatt as cl1air1na11. Tl1ey ti . c g ru to in st d in or s, cc on A x. ta ey th ay p to e 1r il1 a f d n a es im cr 1·t they have to repo al authority's repre t.r n ce e th ld u o h s n io at 1l pt po e h t f o are also to speak 0 11 behalf . es ti ri la gu 1·e ir of y lt 1i gl e b es tiv ta sen o ls. ns ve tw le ai nt co ne O us is th m te s sy l a g le d an e tiv ra t is in dm a al ci Tl1e offi l ca ri lo e f na os tio th of nc es ed s po u om c s i r e h ot e Th . es di bo l a ci offi ly made tip of p111·e e d th an ers o, mb rr me ko tt, ba la ba t, en 11m r ve go l ra nt ce 1 e tl by ed wl10 are recog11iz of the sa11i co11ncil. From Sl1aclc, ''On Gurage Jt1clicial Str11cture

Jour11al of Etfziopian Sti1dies (1967) pp. 89-91

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Afric .an Political Theory,"

. . In Gt1ragela11d, two ji,dicial syst�ms exist: traditio11al coi,rts, which apply tradi t1o?al, or _ci1st�n1a1·;; la\v as the basis of adjl1dication over disputes ranging from torts to crimes, �n_d Go1)e1·111�1.ent coz.trts, the lJ. ighest at the A,vra ja Gizat level, with thre� non-Gurage Jt1clges at the be11ch, 011e of vvhon1 , tl1e Governor of the Awraja, presides over the cot1rt. .. . . jurisdic legal point the om r F of no of �iew G· e1·°?1ent, v Go_ have s court rage u _ .. ,and AvvraJa G1zat cot11·ts 011ly are autl1orised to adjudicate tioi1 , ai1 cl Wor �da Gizat 1ega1 matters 1n Gt1rageland. A Gura.ge who seeks legal redress c,111 opt to brin 0o the issue either before Gurage . t s or G ove1·nn1.ent coi,rts Bttt as G llrage' cot1 r ts have ,110 governmental 1egal cour . · statt1s, the Awraj a court , f01. exa.mple, ca11not serve as an appeal court against dec1. sions handed d 1 1 11 c �1s t_ o111ary proceedings. 111 a legal sense, it is functionally · _ 1ot1s G·t1rage to pit one Jtl possibl;, say, fo�: � a, var1c r the · ; · · di. c1a o e h t · t ins aga tem 1 sys . . There are 110 legal or polit1· a1 s 11 �1. 11 with111 he corpus of Gurage law to restr� t or prevent t11e pri i lcipals i 1� :ra_�i ti_��nal cotirt pr�ceedings from later petiti�J1Jn g their case to a Govei· nnleilt co�i ��:f ei!her party .1 d1ssatisfie� \Vit? the �riginal Judg: . men�. This is legally possible . � ec� and prtnl ary satict1?ns of a k1nsh1p, social, 1 llOIIllc natt1re, a i,d tlie inore d"ffuse oral an d et E .=_ � · � !13 t_ ec ir d l to h a n d ic n io te ct s, 11 sa �n � � od Gurage away froin taki ii g su h a �gal course. Al\ %ela Gura . in g age livin Gur _ belong to a complex network of social and ut o e � con�m1c relationships which ar1s . of membership in the k i hIp sySten1. n l ridicu � � :--. Public of f opinion in orm th. e �e a formidable sanction �l1en t to a g l o 1 ld b use, upho 1 1: P , · co1npelling to individuals · t1ons of cla11 and tribal Cl t!Zenshlp . an . · l""'--'T1 age. . . . .;_ � ��l}_ u _ . d n o. p u b }" IC nt "d _ r1 i u c I a1 r rest. a pl e ces Wh0 m1gl 1t choose to act in th U�j:� ' � n � ha N o st cu . ar s ay a d w ve 1�y ppro � call: st�d for long outside th� ki� � . 11 s structure �� · .. �� the !'. . . ffi . " which village communal. re1a1-1011s a P net�ork which f. orms . ': , g re org . a n 12 d e A G urage depends.uJ?O_ !!.�S� -::·s;t:,. hours, \Vh o 1n every village are . . : "'"' "" � iie lP: also his k1nsme J.e · n, for the indispe � nsab - -·- -· -M • ... . .

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es�in�, borrowi_11� a11d_ lenc�i11g _11?011�y, harv and �n?n � l p goods arld ofte iJ rovide in e-bt�ld11�g. to ass1s� �t �he l1f�cr1 s1 s i:it Llal� hot1 � 1n Jorn to k, of birtll aiJd &vestoc his de· �t atl1. The tl�eat o� vv1tl1dravv111g J<!IlSlli J services mo ur11 to _ 11 d a ge, ia marr [ 1trant .re ma1ns alway�-. a pote11 t1al vvl1 1cl1, togetl1�r witl1 inoral and reca! c a from e inforce t he ove rall syste m of order a11d social c011trol, tll r ons, sanct i cal ereby ethi 11formity to the nor111s of expected b e ha,,io11r. co 11iving 0 . Gurage appear be fore Gover11 111e11t courts 111ainly beca11se of infractio118 of "Government law''; that is, del inquency in tax-pay111e11ts, occasio11 ally i11 suits of aggrava ted violenc e, f�r comn1itt i11g a n11isance i11 tl1e 1 11arl<et area, or i11 appea.1 cases over the re cl amation of Crown la11ds. !11 a 1 1arr0Yv sense, st1 cl1 cases fall \Vitl1 i 11. the sphere of Government ad.m inist ratio1 1 of G11ragela.11d. 011 tl1e otl1er ha11 d, G11 rage courts dea l principall y with disp11tes whicl1 arise 011 t of tl1e 11et�1orl( of ki11 sh.i.p, economic, and social rights, dt1 ties , a11d obligatio11 s existing an1ong G11rage, a11d which are incumbent upon all G11ra.ge vvho clai111 cit ize 11 sl1i 1), eve11 11.1igra11.ts ,vl10 reside abroad for long p eriods of t i1n e. Gurage co11rts decide 111)on iss11es vvl1icil1 } if allowed to go t1nsettle d thro11gh the custot11ary _ji1dicial }Jrocess, wo11ld eve11tually erupt in violence, thrusting lineages and cla11s i1 1to fe11di11g \Vith perso11al i11jt1r;,' and perhaps a loss of l ife occurring before l) eace is finally restored. 1-he G11rage judicia l systen1 app li es Gttrage la�, in t]1e regt1latio1 1 of social relatio11s a111011g Gurage; Gurage law defin es the c11ston1ary way i11 ,vl1icl1 bel1aviour ougl1t to be carried out. In the daily e xercising of the se rights a1 1d dt1t ies, i11fractio11s of G11rage law inevitably occur, but Gurage consider it tl1e duty of tl1eir traclitio11al courts, not Governnzent coi1rts, to r e align social relatio11s betwee11 dis1J11ta11ts. In terms of the structure of judicial processes, tl1e ft111ct io11al disti11ctio1 1 betvveen Goven11nent courts and Gt1rage courts can b e summar.ily stated t l1us:�over1_ 11nent courts decide. upon i ssue s where infractions of laws gover11i11g tl1e ad1111111�trat1o�1 of Gurag eland hav e occurre d; Gu1·age co11rts decide upo1 1 iss11es wl1ere 11uractions of Gurage Jaw and a11thority have occurr ed.

From Ministry of L.and R e form, Pilot tud;, of Agriculti,ral f:ancl DisJJlttes i,1. i2,i�';;� � Wereda and Yerer and Kereyu Awr adja Courts (Shoa Province) (1969) PP·

1 a 0 ·. t cul J-!·� \v � y Fa . tl1e . of ts 1 de1 stu .S dy 1t � d . This stu was prepa.red by gradt1ates and E.U a i as n; � t 19 ei:s Eld of il unc Co f g . 11in o , no f o io i nct t th bes cri e des nly u � � t 68 . � g i nsu�ntution, 0 hut shows the persistence of tl1is institution, today, despite ci ea 1011 f

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asi cally, local elders derive their authority to settle disptites fro!n tlie cits�0! 1'1 o Be ocalit 1te � .ar1 s1no t s1J d� e ttl se to ,·s de el of w_ y in which the y re side. The po er l � � . e o C d 1 1v . C , e 1 . . tl Within. Or w1·thout their 1d 1 a t c ' ca 1' ed h . commt1ruty 1s a long estab lis e disPute s ttl se ive r ecognition to it. It unlikely that the power of elders to\ is ::Ygco n me under a chal l enge. . . . 1 11g 1d c e d n i y l p p a rs e d Th k l e e ind of l egal or customar p1·i11.ciples wh ic11 the a Y_ 1 ring which 1 d c ses ho"."ever, d o ri e e l o _ h w . e not far from disp ute Ot1t of !h e ar the , e ref ere n c e d a m a i n � D t t\l a n erv1 ews l_asted, it was only once th at. a c�.r:ta1n. Atb1: � ed in his ac h e r he o s i i le c pa� enunetated_ in the Fetha Negest as 1nspmng;hi ti es t he l a . Y_ as rs. e T eld i � of Jci u a local Judge or as a m e mber �f an ad O • l, a ic p ty of th c e th o d e l tl 8 g 11 s en pre r ew s, e_ l de� rv s e wit int h wh had om we i � :� r�le o/r11le s e1nbodied il liter:�� in a r 'i� . h1�p1an �u�al popul ation, c�uld not potnt t e ey h t h g u o h lt a t, s e g e N � e tiVel y sophisticated legal treatiSe such as th e ·

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e _b a sed on st a 1:3 - ding custo, r a � n o i is ec � r e! th t a h r t na t c y fa rt 1e tl g 11 i ss re st : ly g 11 1·0 st ,vere . e th e a vowed a1 m of the elde c in S s. le 1p c . n ri p d an · rs 1 les . . . . 1-t fi,1 · l r ra 10 . \ 11 e m so . d . . 11 a � s e c .1 t c a p. r s n a s1 1 1t io o p 1s er to rm 1o c r re ei th to c es ti on ar p iL 1e �, t1 e e at st tl ei r to . . ch Jtl is no t· so n. n n d t o a n . e n ca r a d t o re d e . b n r� s 11 io i tr 1s � c _e d ly 1e ct tl , d 11 u .. ro g le � b ta i t1 eq 1e n so 11 tlleill 0 e e n upset by t�e dispu te, b e v a h t h ig ' m s a s n o t1 la 1·e e l b a c 1i n a legal. To i·estore such ro a p f o m re o co e m is e b m ld u a 1o th sl , el n fe rs de a el e 1 tl , 1.1 ve i g e b to 1 s . i io is ec d \l tile l r ar e de c·a e el lo th s, nc s rt u co co y n ar er in ' rd o ed e th e k i nl U . se n se l ga le g decisiotl in tl,e e mg th ri to ab �s ic f _r o a� le le ab p �a 11 la re io is ec d e bl ta p ce ac lly ·a 01 111 a ng I \\'itl1 reachi n r l e an 1s na _m 1o t 1t no ad tr li e th 1n d ite m es ut sp di 1g li1 tt Se s. ie rt pa e th n ee tionship bet,:v t t ec gh eff e at rru th th rs te sir at de m l al ed to so al 1t bt s 1n ai cl of 1 1g li1 tt se e th to n1erely e community..... m sa th e of rs e b m e . m n e ve t\ be ps lii 1s long-sta11di11g friendly relatio1 enforce thei r decisions. to ty ili ab in ls th of e ar aw es lv se m e th e ar The local elde,·s e elders except of ns h io t, cis de e th pt ce ac to n tio ga i l ob al leg The parti es are under 110 ed for refusal to abide by the ct e bj su e b t igh m y e th ch i wh to e ur ess for tl1e soci al p1· t effecti ve enough no is e r, v e \.v ho 1 e , r t ess pr l cia so cl1 su e11 Ev . s e,· eld decisio11s of tl1e . ity is un Th n mm the the co of ers mb me e1· oth by ess gn lin bic n-a no ure fut y an er to det '' 11t. me e s ttle te pu dis of e t m sys 1al io1 dit tra tl1e of acl< wb d1·a ef i s the chi Realizing tl1i s i11ability of theirs, all the elders \vith ,vhom we held interviews i11dicated that redt1ci 11g tl1e agreen1e11t of t he parti es to the decision i nto w riting n1igl1t compel the parties to stick to their words. They also informe d the team about their sti p11lati11g of sa11ctio11s to become effecti ve agains t the party who breaches his promise of t1plceeping an agreen1ent. Of co11rse, where one of the parties fails ] to ob_serve a decisio11 of the elde,·s, tl1i s signed agreement containing the stipulated · to court for adjudication sanct1011 ha� 110 exect1tory force of its own before it is ta ke11 011 t�1e 111er1ts of the case. I-Iowever, the signi ng of tl1e agreement has the effect of p1.1tt1ng some press Lire 011 tl1e J)arty i 11te 11ding t, o denot111ce it . .. .. -Th�re are_ no con1111011ly accep_ted rt1les �t procedure which a complainant h�s to follo� in cases wl1ere �1e decides to e11d a di spute v:,,ith another member of his commuiiity tl1rot1gl1, for 111sta.11ce, a1·bit1·ation bJ' local elders. The absence of ?�1 �h a procedtire _inay be d11e to the abse11ce of a sta11ding coimcil of elders which, 1 it :were a stand1ng body, n1i ght have nt e sett le m e formali ze d its pro th in e s ced tu · · of d1sputes. · . . . In the absence of ac: 11y stai ' ldt' 11g coi1r1c1.1 o if·· elders it 1s up to tl1e ·contesting parties to appr.oach so111e elcle,·r:; to }1e1 P se . ttle t11e d_1spt1te ¥.1 here tl1e parties prefer !? av ail. . themselves of the t 1: .·ional n etl od 0 of n Jo s1t po t m sp co T d1 t. e e en s he �t m le tt '. l i � �� i . the counc l is dete . �� a_ representative basis, I.e.' e ach party elects one or more. = elders equal to the 11t1111 be_r of e!de1··s ele =are ho cted by the othe 1· party. The elders w thus elected to the cot111c1l of elders .;.=... that · � · as ty ' i �y b e locali res1d en�s of the sa�e n of the .contestitlg arties O . . s '4lO ay .be reSid�nts of � d 1ffere11t locality. !he e/der chosen will then fi� a d.ate �: es cas which n tli e d. disp1 1te \V1ll b e heard a nd decide · I : - ,· where the process of dis te et leinent fallows this �atte r11, it ppe ars that the etd�!� _... :: � � do not have to inform t1� � e w o n bl� � or rw te he da ot e g is e in th rd ) ga re the elders have decided to te �; �� ;� ;,_ .

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_ ,. _ _ _ • w · , t e ween them b Y reierr1ng cer lat �2 � :� �:. it to local elders. In this . gory of cases, the pr ced . . . e. s-·�:. :�::: in b ur a e . is . qt 1 1t e d'ffi . I e �ent. A gro u of eld ers �hi�b:::__ �e ��c--�;1� aware of th d1�pt1te l? st1gge sts � to the par�es th e propnety o f en.&ng: tlie,]ts;\' thr0ugh arbitration. But . ';",c°'i: this is done only in the 11arrow g r·oup of c�ps�.w��:eJiA� . --

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL lNSTJTUTIONS

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1 1 parties /(II rs e'ie on some equitabl e bas 1s. I n the third and final category of cases, it is the ordit1ary courts which will encourage the parties to end the d_ispt1te by referring it to a coi1r1cil of elders. In stich cases either the court or the parties elect elders to l1ear tl1 e case. T11e kii1d of situations' which justify this approach on the part of tl1e courts is not clear, btit tl1 e courts do nonetheless transfer cases properly before tl1en1 to cot1ncils of elders. Th e traditional process of dispt1te settlen1ent is not based 011 tl1 e adversary system of dispute adjudication. For insta11c�, wl1ile it is possible to rebut a11y allega tions made, such rebuttal cannot be made 1n the f)rese11ce of the other party. Each contesting party is allowed, i n h1rn, to malce a11 oral allegatio11 to the council of elders which body \¥ill then comm11nicate the allegation to tl1e otl1er party. After considering the allegations of the parties, the council will then call 1111on wit11esses to hear their testimonies, if any, on the allegatio11s made b�,r each party. Ha.vi11g considered and weighed the evidence presented, tl1 e cot111cil ,vill proceed to l1 a11 d down a decision, often a compromise bet\veen the claims of botl1 parties rather than a decision strictly in favour of the party with a better cause. The compronuse is often reached by requesting each party to drop a part of l1is clai 111 . Decisions are �ven only by a unanimous vote of tl1e n1embers of the cou11 cil. 111 tl1is regard, a group of elders was asked as to what will happen if an elder who is a n1e1nber of a council dissents from the opinion of the other elders. I11 respo11 se, the gro11p i11for111 ed the team that an additional elder \Vot1ld be reqt1ired to sit with tl1e assenti11g :11 embcrs of the council, probably for influencing the dissenting member of the cot1nc1l. Decisions reached by elders are not recorded; and tllis i� 1111de:·sta�dable in the. absence of a standing council of elders. If such a body existed, it nught have �ain�ained a complete record of all cases settled over a give11 period of years. The high d�ter acy rate in this Awradja (94.1%) might also be said to l1av� prevented the s rec�rding of decisions of a case the all n r, eve i l1ow , ugh eno ly cot1ncil. Surprising d ecided the agreement of the parties to abide by the decisions reacl1ed are reduced to writing.....

. The following is ... [a summary of a] case involving a disp1:1te over bouodary ers wn clo lao ich . t en Jac ad aro O se t\V in een tvv je be ''E rsa'' Chikashum area. It arose : s� rk ch _ o f them comp ma ary un� bo the t pec ed that the other failed to res � � lain _su �r_at1ng their holdin gs. One of the m a ''Shenetcha' ' himself, dec1d�d to : 10 d l u c 1 1 _case to an 11 er l: mb me � e i 1 1 11 of ·s 11 d� e ad i11g sist hoc council of l 1 co 1rbta Dagna', 1 ent 0 tl en 1 . sett the to ess t · n · , w �1 1 o c1a h was fii o called an upon as y dispute · The boundar he t of dge knowle elde the1r rs of were s basi ed elect the on 1e to marks er t} I went 8 d he s ite anJv �he exact placemen� of whlch the dispute arose. T � ;�he disputants o r ct1�ed the boundary e e agr e e l y, uen t line..... Subseq over the � l �� r : failt1re to respect an g wr1 t the n w ectrfied b�undary line wa s _reduced to 1 _ � ; he defaulting party. . ... e boundary line was to result 1n a sanction aga1n:st t . s i $800 f roro � b [In a_ notber r o d an 1 of res hecta case] five ''B'' [had] bought the '' bro ther-in-l S'' . 8 . year f o r D numbe aw ' . a , d r an o _ · d h Ian ad the e by sinc been using n Se ller cl upo d agree d 1 the P� r kmed an additional sum of $700 as the _p_r1ce for the,,;� ed to in aten thre t valid.ate If B was not willing to pay this additional su:, s'' netch� ''She the f th. o al aske of the loc .s �s contract. At this point, ''S'' went an� ng ad �� persu i y b be · r a; tty if he could ei uld co settle the matter for him (this

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847

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N O I L LAW T A U T I T S N O C N A I P O TI-II B SOURCE.BOOK OF

848

t r1J r d e e n y a ll u b se e r th to th o b a · , c g in : g r1 ri om b y b r. r o , -Pro. s , , im · la c , 1 , ' ' 'S . � t : " ,, " n , ''B to pay V\'11a · n m s . o p a m ) U c e d 1 _ i t a h a w S d n a � th ss le , B y e n o m f o t . n ,I urt se e to n1ise on an amou W ca th 1 1s e k or 1 ta to da ed id ec d o C d n a m su � d al . n io it 1 refused to pay the ad � 1 . de el en1 · oif cz un to a co se l e ca th . to er f ed re re g a B fS, .s·, er d el 1 e tl y b · 1 1 0 ti r· i as I n · s .. e , B ll t u.po p • i1tl n f re n • t� u io d , t n e in te th . s r 11 � i se e 8 $ th 00 d te a c 11 11 he 1t 1n n . o c 1 1 . v 1 The elders chose11 tl1e is d h n � f la o rn t� 1f re B � 1n a d w n o sp s e rr co t e no th 11 Jo ll r e y ti b ie tl l 1 11 o fr received rs e er de p th t, el in e o p ad su is th t A d . 0 0 7 -$ th bo ( o m su ; al n , io it d ad e th ay p to 1 willing 11 : m 00 $ 2 ed �o ay ad p B u rs p e ey th _ _ s _ u , h e T or s. m ai cl r ei th � o , e m so P )J parties to give es ti �� e ar ed p th re ag n 1o 1t d n d co an is th e th n O t. 11 11 10 an is th ly n o 1d a1 m de to s and �� ch e hi th r \v to lle t se an su 1r p1 rth g 11 fu ti 1·i ¥1 er to ed 1c ao-ree.me11t was st1bseqt1ently red1 t en m rn o ve a h . it go al w ci ffi le sa e th 1g i1 �� er st gi re y b p hi rs 1e v1 o, er sf an tr aireed to C(O n ee e tw os e be ar th It . ea ar m 1 er own ht as ck lu C B ' o' iy '' i11 e os ar [Another] case 7ie nt te11ement. There was a customary r1 se a of at th d an rit of a do11iina11t tene,n,e l ur ca o lo a fl ll. g to mi in ad e le Th t en m ne te t an in n1 do e th of 1· ou av f 11 i right of -r.,vay t en t an em in ten m of do e th this of er vn o, e th d ive pr de t en e1n ten 11t vie ser e th of r ne ow nt na mi e ten do th nt of me r ne . o\v e Th . th pa e th ng 1ni ar e f by y ,va of t gl1 i 1· ry n1a custo ed the reda ch Wo e rea cas e th ter Af t. 11r Co da ore W the th wi e cas 1al 1 mi cri a d tl1en file n o ati cili h con oug thr te pu dis the end to s nes li11g wil ir the sed clo dis s ·tie pa1 Court the ri) h, whic rs elde of l nci cou a to j:ed 1nit st1b n the was t1te disp The rs. elde l _ ..I by the loca rn an equitable d cision. M� do"' d 1de ha1 ties par h bot of ms clai the , e after consideri11g T?e elders decided i11 favot1 r of tl1e ovvner of the s. ervient tenement for they allowed hln1 �o collee� an a11nual fee of $10 for the 11se of t .he path. The decision could also ci;� be said to be in favour of the owner of the domina nt tenement since it perm itted him ; to mal<e �1se of_ the way. (This is a t)'pical case where the elders assign more weight ; � a ed w reac to what 1s eqt11table tl1a11 what is legal). S·ubseq11entlv., ' the agreen1ent s ! �·i h · reduced to writing. . .. . Lastly, mentio11 n111st be made of the fact that the elders do also settle criminal cases of all degrees ranging fro1n petty offe11ces to first degree homicide. e'

Sedler, "Th_e Development of Legal Systen1s: The Ethiopian Experie nce," J1 5{ owa Law Revzelv 562

, 603 (1967), (foot11otes 0111itted).

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hi is p e a _ edo 1nin te : ant t ly Ch is rist ian ity cou Ch ntr h rist y ian sm wh ere ! � a reIig . ere_ 1s {1owever, a l,1.rge Mosle1n pop ' st l at ea .., to b , t ul , estim tion ated a e . ' · ird· a1 1d poss1bly 11 1ore and s ome ? f t·I th lelll, 8 0 M � antly , 1e provin ces predo D11n are e r Mosle,n religious coi,rts 'had ong e they we ' tion xiSted, Libera and following the given official recognition T�ese ase s ourts l1 ad jurisdiction in · two classes of � 5- ·-, , � � rr . · (I) qt1estions regardi·og 1arr1age divo r ino m f · tena_nce and guardiansh'1p o, .· -con- � rce.' m . · a1n · and fam1ly relatiotlsltips where tb e marriage to which the question related was ..rod � eluded in accordance with M0ha 5 l os . 111;� ed an law or the parties were all M ein , �Is ; 1 (2) questions regardin W kf or . n io (rel igio us cess endowment), gift, and suc provided that the endo�er � Ji �ied ono rt r or cou , ��ce ased M e was The s a s apPaJllY • ; osle m. Mohammedan religious l�w n : add1tion, u�der the Penal Code of 1930, bll\ te : ; I was an offense only if com . s a a 1 d te e was a Ch ?Y nst1an. To this extent there . , "�jlll law for the Moslem Popu � . - - - ._· • at1on in Ethiopia. . . . d ! : . afne Th e . : questi . on t . is whether th . is . e sepa rate law based o'n. r·el1'.g.ion w:i•ll· te�r . · . in the new system. Ill , : � "' " , .J -1 · li'flO"':., I . . . . ..,. • , · OSIem Countrie M " r ' . s. the 1 . . . · Q· a e attitude toward . trad1t1o . ..._ :·-- .-�-� .

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and sue� changes _are reflecte_d i� tl1e la\v. TI1e ngi ng, a ch is llll§OlIIldJl ess ractices an econom1� a11d _ s oci al standpo nt 1 s cle�r, ar1cl it 11 as m o fr amJ been se�f polyg and even abol1sl1ed 1n so1 11e ivio.slem cot ntr1es. Ir, tliose coti ed t ric rest ritries . . .. verely . 010 d der 1 zat1011 1s tak 1g place, btit it is one tll at an 1t1o n tra d en betw e nflic t o a M�slem _context. �Ioslen1s '"'ill_ be nakii,g tile :':ith in ved l reso be decisioi, �vi� onal practices. will be ret�1ne_d a 1d w l1 1 cl1 \vill be abolisl1ect. 1 tradit i which to 11 as Ethiopia, on the o�her band, \vlule tl1e. co11!11c� s t l1e sa n�, it n1ust be resolved j 11 the context of the rights of a 1v1oslen1 rn111or ty in a predon1 11a 11tly Christia1 1 society. Ethiopia's law dealing \\'ith family la\v and Sl1ccessio11, as reflected in tl1e Cocle, is based on Christian concepts, e.g., bigan1y i s forbidden. Tl1erefore, i11 Ethiopia the question necessarily is one of ,vhetl1er there sl10L1ld be separate lavv for a strong minority group in matters that are co11sidered l1y then1 to be religious in 11 atL1re.

I 11, n � \... t • ..

849

This question has not yet been resolved. Wltile tl1e Pe11al Cocle of 1957 prohibits bigamy, it also provides that bigamy shall not be an offense if tl1e civil lavv provides an exception. No such exception is contained i n tl1e Civil Code, wl1jcl1 voids biga mous m arriages. However, to the best of my k110\vlec!ge, tl1ere l1as 1 1ever bee11 a prosecution against a Mo slem for bigamy, and those persons that practice pl11ral marriage do so openly. It can also be argl1ed tl1at the Civil Code, \vl1ich co11tai11s applicable to Moslems, impliedly repealecl tl1e j11risdictio11 of tl1e o provisions n Mos lem court:,. Since the Civil Code repeals all otl1er la\v and tl1e la\v is to be 11niforJ11 throughout the Empire, the argument is that Mohammedan la\v is 1 10 longer re cognized and the jurisdiction of cot1rts to apply sucl1 law is repealed. TJ1e alter11ative argument is that since such courts \Vere i n existence and were applying Moha u 1 11edan law, the Civi l Code which makes no reference to courts ,v as not i11tended to abolisl1 their jurisdiction id cases assigned to them by existing'law. SL1bseque11t laws, how ever, dealing \-vith the courts and their jurisdiction have n1ade no reference to tl1e Moslem courts. . These courts contin11e to f 11 nctio11. It is reported that sl1ortly after the pro mulg� lton _ o f the Civil Code, t o s_ court the icted instrt lar circu by tl1e Minister of Justice . contin ue to exercise their jurisdiction llnder the 1944 Proclamatroi1, . �pplyJng Mohammed an law. Indeed isiotl of div a as sits now eal A1Jp of rt the Sl1aria Cou the Sup reme Im that tl1ese ia per l Court · On the other han d ' if the i 1te11tio11 \-vere courts remain · t0 th. a' t . effect · I at1011 · a permanent part of the jt1dicial system new legis Would have been a 11�s � uop Elr t a th s iou obv is It n. lg bee mu pro has e But ated non n ot come to grips with the q u�stion of separate law for tl1e Mosien:i- p o pt1lat10 n in th ese matt . g n · ti 1 t1 s e r . e h t e it p s e d d ers a11 t amb·igwt. y an The failure to do so appears to be del'i bera e d uncertainty, this w as desirable. . trong Separa te la\VS, eve 1 1 As wa 8 seen earlie r, the desire for a uniform law 1s s . in limit�d ed govern tters ' a m 1e cases, encourage divisiveness. On the other hand� tl by reli u t o b.ind effort l lat _ _ oslem po�� io � itto ngly resisted them b�� s �w are vitally i�portant to the M l unifo wou rm lues v a law tian ba s s ed 1n part on ''Chri and could ority n1 a.kes min ar cau s e a serious upheaval. Perhaps the fa�t tha t the� �:C th eir rel the St1dan igious l w a h s t cou a n more than � i them important to Where the 1e unwise to attempt f to imp y are in the majority. In a ·ny event, it wo11ld clear_ Y . Ose the uniform law on the Moslem population at this ti me. . . naI o . d1t1 a . . d ic tr The e.xperie t a th nce in a number of Moslem countri es in · ates Practice 8 thiopia E in tnie as P�lygamy are on the decline. This appea�s t� b e as Welt. as, and are n urba ;·ifYga h my 1s not very common a,mong Mosleros 10 e

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AL LAW N O I lT l T I T S N o C N IA P HIO T E F O K O O B E C R U So

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d n o c . a e se if e w k ta s to A ly n a o is e so y c n e d n ct te e t th y , d e c ti c ra p is it e � e h t, even w . � re � d p re n p o a a m 1e � �e o c e. b r we Y 1J?a g ly o p a f n o d, es � ta n a v . d a is d e th s, p o el dev o t1 za r1 n �a t _ a cu e th se th h e 1! in � e. g ta 1a vi �r a _ m l a y 1r bl lt p 1n e g a 1g e1 l il w fe\ver people o l t b e as stro ng, n il w s e ti s � u 1o � l1 re l a n 1o 1t d ra cl t an , ss re . g ro p ic m o ii o ec m o fr results t e s l o � a il n w l .i d a n �e ? t1 a 1z y n er d � o m f o pt st cce te �e tl v� vi 1r �t t o n n ca t a doctrii1es th , ed l1 p ly e ap �c rm s1 o 1f � u si re e b _ a n st ca w la e nce h t a, p1 1o th E 1n rs 11 . cc o ed When· this m de b� n _ a . 1n ca th s � o . e !1 ca fi w d1 la 1o 1: e 11! to so s ap h er P g. 11 ro st be er ng will no lo us w 1o do l1g en re ed 1t m t. l! en m �f � 10 at 1z e Th or th au e th , g. e. s, ed ne m reflect Mosle t� e Moslem courts will at th y el lik 1s 1t e 1r t1 fu e th in . . goal is one system of law, and d b It on n s 1t1 po ca e op t e ea gr te ea cr on ld ou w t en ·es p1 be abolisl1ed. To do so at , ng s o t s ro �h er hi w �g is lo o n ly � like ar s ce !i ac pr . al on iti ad tr e th to s tie e only when th t cu rn 1o ea cl c1s a ds de oi av w no ch hi w n tio lu so t en es pr e th e, or ef er to happe11. Th . le ib as fe is at th e on ly on e th ly al re is d an d is sot1n n s ow urt its co d ha which ch ur Ch ox od th Or 11 pia llio Et e th , lly Traditiona was abolished templated.

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From Sedler, op. cit., 568 (Footnotes omitted).

. �he final a11tl1ority was the E1111;e�or, who exercised the power to review the decisions of l?cal rt1lers. He was recogruzed as the ultin1ate source ofji1stice, and he ,vas not considered to be bou11d by strict rules of law i n rendering his decision. . 1:he _absence of binding effect to r11les of la.,,, is a common feature in many societies in the early stages of legal develop111e11t. In the sense that the peopl e look to the rt1.ler ratl1er than !o tl1e law, the ruler 1nay be said to be ''above the law." · c · 111 the adn1inis tration of justice would not But a rule r who was arb1 ti· a r·y· ' or 1111 1 a1r · . . . �n? e Joy 1 . .tlle confi�e�ce _of the people u11der his jurisd.ic tion. The people's sense � s J�l c imposes l�mrtations o11 11.is action n1o re so than rules of law. In th at �tag o} �evelo1Jment, law ca11not be separated fro m .l1e n1en administerin.g it. t al p· Re-read: Chapter III ' pa ges 'J9 in :- 3-9 4 (The role of the Monarchy as Arbiter of dispute and SUJJreme Jt1dge).

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From Perham, P- cit., p . 149. 1 j . . � ·e. 7 �j Before leaving the questioii of the 1 ott n �Y _ m ega� sy s tem and procedure we � : that, whatever hard things may have been n 1nflue _cl- � said 1t t Fe li abou N t , � agas the t a on the administration of just· w udge_!Je�-1::" mostly good I �pon � 'J . n tion he t se witnesses' it _ !�id _down a nu��er :; t t e a r most reg_ �3: excelle d o.�... nt x1ms with conduct of htJ.gatJ.on, the purity of the t ench and the pub!Jc1ty of proceedings. 4 From The Fet/1a Negast (Ab ij.;� _ -;:: · . · : l S a p . au /o s Tzadua Translation, Faculty .of Law I{ :·�-:- · ..'.__i... 1968) pp. 258-63. -.. And as provided b the Ia . when s the _both nts htiga !i.all�� _ e you, e com ore o t you at th� centeiof the �u b f �t. After yo u hear what they s- ay, ··�; �t:� between them with .ustice _ yoµ s.�ie�, . _ -: ..::u f . · and . · . J t -1g · upr . h . . · tness. you s hall not Juclge solely on. .

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It IS n?t right that . �ot1 ?ec 1de aga111 st one before botl1 appear to that said a dy alre aether, because if you g1ve yot1r dec1s1011 111 haste, 011 tl1e basis of ,v11at 011 ty 011e of �hem said when the other party \Vas not prese11t to defe11d l1i111self, yot1 ,vill deserve the sentence you passed; yo11 \:'\'ill be an acco111 plice i11 tl1e lie a11d suffer its co 11se quences before the Almighty... . When both parties come before the jt1dge, l1e sl1all say to tl1e1n: G'S peak ot1t''; h e shall keep silent until they speak.And if both apJ)ear as accusers, tl1 e 011 e who bro ught the charge first shall have priorit)', and when he l1as fi 11isl1 ed witl1 his charge, the charge brought by the other shall be l1eard.If 0 11 e i11sL1lts the 0th.er or says shame ful wor ds, the judge shall ct1t him short; if l1 e does tl1 is again, the judge shall re proach him, and if he persists in tl1is, the judge sl1all exco111 rn t1nicate I1 i 1u. And if the judge cannot understand the charge brought by one of them he sl1all say to hi111 : "Make the charge you brought clear.'' He shall not give l1 is decisio 11 u11til tl1e accuser describes the object and indicates its quality a 1 1d qua11 tity i11 t111eqt1ivocal la11guc1ge, for instance by saying, ''I gave him fifty Egyptia11 di11ars''; a11d tl1e words ''Egyptian dinars'' describe the quality, ''fifty'' the quantity. If the accuser brings a clear charge, which is u11 derstandable, tl1e jt1dge shall say to the other: ''What say you?'' If the accused adn1its t]1e charge tl1e jt1dge shall say to the accuser, ''Here, he admits [he is your debtor]''; if the acct1ser clai11;1s Ilis property, the judge shall decide in his favour and agai11st tl1e debtor. But 1f the accuse d denies the charge, the judge shall say to the acct1ser, ''I-lave you ,vitnesses ?'' If the accuser says ''No," he shall say in l1is turn to the acct1sed ''Will yot1 s�ear?'' If the accused is afraid to swear and turns back tl1e oath to his acct1ser, and if tl1 en the accuser takes the oath, the object shall be restored to I1im.· · · �<: judge shall write a special and separate book about his jt!dgments [for �wo subm,ssio�] to another of ny l�O teSt the r b�� l [superior] judge. This boo k sl1al r r ore rio pe [Su ] s thi d An ]. 1on c1s de ['s sse tne m e s dg i o jt1 wh testified in favour of the ?Ju_dge W shall examine the correctness of the j11dge's deeisio11 s.If he has accepted the Witnesses' te-stimony, he shall decide on the basis of those decisions. · · · ·· · s e s u ca 1e 01 h c_ Litig ation achieves no i h w. le . good in this world, fo r tl1e tr�ub to an th 1 o �· t a pt tem s hi of d an er vil de due to anything of this w orld is a deed of the A n d oa 1s h · f o e m o s s e s lo e b n ·r ma 1 .n s · eve h ou n, Id tio pta tem n . ste ha s t to thi fea de . belon in. s. 's il le n ll a e b to r ge ea be g g t cl an s 11r yo tte m be of r g at in th eth u yo so se lo is I brothers , s e i r . t s i n i M . e h t f o t Re..read.• Ch_apter III, n e b 1� l b �sta pages 321-323 (The ror e nota bI th e . p m . E ( 9 0 3 g e a P m , II) rk 11el t r Me rus Mi ry o 'Per Em of tice Jus , by the MeneIr 1k ,s proe 1 amat1. o n to assure respect for workers) · Pro111 · Sed i fer, op. cit., p. 569 (Footnot s omitt ed). e the y pl ap to A.s the o ed rc fo . ere lers r e . ocal o but . f laws r the w r Emperor i l , u reased, sake nc � f own their o u gated by P or iot i g bindin the him. These laws were bec aus· e·: : i on m pose Id u co e h ey represented the l icl wh , or will of th e Emper

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his adversary appears, bt1t ,vl1en botl1 litigants a befo re says them of ne bto r . . . pre.sen . d to 1t, v,,,hen yot1 s�t O\VI� t? J L dge 1, 1 ct the litigailts ar?tie 10g d or acc ge jud d n a. � � justice yot 1 shall n?t call tl1en1 �1otl1e1 s t111t 1 I tl1 ey are reconciled face, to face you before

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TION,AL LAW U IT T S N o C N IA P lO il T E · cEBOOK OF S o uR

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e f er th o w tr o n p ce e th al , II go c i/ el en r ve M f o n n ig re m e th . 1 g 1 ri t · D s. er ul i 1 · 1 rs as le w \ u �u d ca re lo e . d th ce f o er A w o p 11n l n1 ca ti li : o p e th d an , ed at d li o s n c� ;;: s e on of th s1 l c1 ca �e lo e r th d n er a. ul d, te ga ul o� pr s could e er w es re ec of Impei·ia] D s r se de e ca . un th ed 1d ec d o ha h e� w F , es d� Ju al eg ri f! pe Im _ to ast ed al pe ap ly ct re di be f s o e er th w p e po Im th d l �� ia s er ee cr de e es dg Ju th of 1t gl , i I 1 J1 . 1vv la y ar om st es or cu e d er un w s se bo ca by ng d1 w c1 la de e os th w la s which of le ,·u e the cotlcept of th e. g er em to an eg b d ar g re is d t o n they co11ld l tra e en �h c _ of r ve r go we po e �h nme nt \Vas r, ro pe Em t en es pr 111 the reign of tl1e g 1n t ec nd e eff b1 th of n, 1o at al d i_ leg ol ns co ch su rules ith w d an , ed at id ol ns co fully r E s re_ n law we d an ted �w a ac en l d, he . lis tab es re we ts ur co nt me rn ve Go increased. y erc g mm tin co al ula reg transactions s law i ted 1 lga m1 pro I sie las Se ile Ha in his reig11, d ns to an tio op ac vel ns de tra ch s11 a more in ity ur sec me so ide ov p1· to t or eff i11 an it orb the der of ht un ug the written bro s wa y ivit act re mo and 1·e Mo ny. 1101 eco modern law, a11d the judges were botmd by tl1at law. A major enactment at this time was the Pe11al Code of 1930, vvbich was considered essential i n order to create the condi . e prior practice the �o tions necessary fo1· the modernization of society. Under t h ver1101· of the a1·ea sentenced the accused; the judges merely decided whether the condt1ct was wrongful. The Code fL"'<ed the punishment for each crime and defined the offenses. 011ly specific crimes a11d a1 1alogous offenses could be punished; the.re :vas no danger. that a11 act co11ld be p11nished because a. j11d.g e or governor thou.ght 1t wrongft1l. With the enactment of the 1930 Code binding law was in effect in pen al cases. From Maine, Ea,·ly /-Jisto1·y of Institi1tions (1897), pp. 392-93.

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Si_r Henry Maine, jurist, hi_storian and philosopher, studied an d wrote at length on tho ] , 0 J�!��n f0fe;:�· The w ork �ed. above and his treatise. A11l·ie1it Law, are books \��ch ; o 1 ciaoge 8 h ou ld n ow. In the excerpt belo\\ 1• M ain e was of co urse gen eralizrng · f h" kn ow Ie dg e. of _legal hi�to�y of_ otl1e1· societies, bL1t )'OU 1uight c on si der the appli cabili ty · · � his 1es1s to E t 1uo1J1a, and its u111)l1cations. �'

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. ··· There are .·· · two types o·f �1·ganised political society. In the more ancient -. of l e, _tl1�. great. btilk of 111e! 1 der ive their 1·t1 les of' liie fro the custo1 eir J. 1� r1s m of th � . � vill g r t�, btit tl1ey occas1o11ally, thougl1 n1o st nds "' • m c the im ob pli ey cit i ly o ma of an a� so� ute. � 11ler �ho takes taxes f1�0111 tl1 the oth em In r e ;g bu isl t at ne es ve . l r, . · and the 011e witl1 wluch we a.i·e n ost f: mi·i· . · ly i t more ac tar, � , v� J the ever Sovere1g11 is . legislati11g 011 IJri iiciples O··f 111� _ovv.ti, while � · g stew � b loc a eve al custom a11d idea are r to decay. It see t h a �sa ge �rom one of these political sys te Jllw� � �nother, laws �i;i:c�,;:;:re ; t1ieir cha racter. The Force for exam ple , w �c; j; , 1s at the back of law ca 1 1 y � e c ng g �ll ed l th of e sa me g _by str ain me a i� re � � :;��.J CustomarJJ /aw ... is' 11�� i�e e d a� enacted law JS obeyed. When 1� ob_tains--o� :�: � sm all areas a11d in sn1all 11atJ S rou ps, th e penal sanctions on wh_Jch _ i t d:°Ost'""c I are p�rtly opinion, partly su e�:: it� t a w . h en ��::. o �s pr i m ve es uc mo . me the so of ? � � b . . 1es od ? T he actual const t en, e ow ev e er , th e ru les which have to be oJJ y _,_: �_11 . emanate from an author.11y 0 · -�: . --::c 1Jl e x m t g e r n . a l t o fi the ma11 natura l gro�p an d . a rt o f. i t, they wear a cha r QT_( h;_eyhliSf;iji :_ � acter wholly unl1k e that of customary rue. l . e assistance of super 1 ih . _-_ �\i, : ;: . : ·' -. , · '60:V" . w.n . st·t·1011 probably t ha t of op1 . impuIse. The f�rce at the � .: _ 111on, certainly that�of_s�o,�- -�fg�A, ' "'"" ' -� b�ck --:L�&; iv� of law eD . ....:CQ com es therefore to- be ,,nurelv_ to a degree q111te unk . nown -�<E. · ,t' -=--. ""' 111 -�� --::- .i.! . soc· ieti·es of the more primitiYe tYP-e· . -��!�� man. y comm un1tie s, this G�i -� � > "° >'=-• • < fOrce has to act at a ver-y = � , _:, -3 ;_. � : � '."' �� : o.DF _ , .,, great cfis. ta- noo . .. ..-�-"' .. · .. · � ·. -� -. --·

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i'> sons exposed to it, and tht1s tl1e Sovereig11 \Vl10 wielcls it has to deal \Vith th:ar:;asses of person s, rathe� than wit.11 iso �a ted acts a11d W!tl1 i11divi?llals. A111011g '� . . _ necess a�e 11;1�ny 1t� of tl1 e c�1a�ac tlus ter of 1 st1cs so111etin,es supposecl �e consequences 1; t o b e inseparable from laws, their 1nd1ffere11ce, tl1e1r 111exorable1 1ess, a11ct tlieir gei,e· ::/. . rali ty, �·1

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t\ l. Consider the validity of tl1e following, propositio11s, \vl1ich are clesigned to ::." describe salient features of the traditio11al legal and j11dicial syste1n i11 Ethiopia. If a ;; proposition seems essentially valid, \Vhat are its implications, if ,111y, \llith respect t to constituti o nal developme11t? • a. By and large Ethiopians were, a11d still are, ''litigous''; they resort to litiga tion frequently and depend upon it-or tend to rely 011 it-to s ettle all manner of quarrels; litigation has been a n1eans of mai11tai11i11g order. ! b. Various methods and forums l1ave bee11 developed i1 1 vario11s localities � 1 lo settle litigation: these have ranged from essentially i11forn1al arbitratio11-type rocedu! es, to more formal adj11dicatory procedures, to local gover11n1e 1 1t co11rts P_ 1 1, (i.e., adjudicat ion conducted by officials appoi11ted by tl1e e111peror's gover11ors or by the govern ors themselves). ''Local'' or ''tribal'' forums \Vere t1sed ,vl1ere it V:as assum ed that the dispute should be settled by local Cl1ston1 or in accordance ,v1th 1 i the cust om of one's ''tribe''· governme11t cot1rts ,,,ere llsed for disputes that, for one reason or another, could' 11ot be settl ed by local ct1stom. ; c. There was no established i1ni1or1n 1ierarcl1y oif coi,rts, no established p.r:o/ 1 ced ure tor hea ·ing ' � cases or disposing of appeals, no settled lavv governing many r k' mrls o f transactions. d. The empero r (and officials of his cot1rt) exercisecl judic�a! po��r �11� a�j dii, cated �tion . cases appealed from sdic Jtiri tliis 1ng rc1s e;<e other courts· procedures for aried; the empe ror in theory was a gu�ra11 tor of jt1stice · I1is power of revie\v \Vas �ee ' me d essential to the for matJY hardship a been have 1nay system t i prac�ice in but lit.igants t0 ' appeal to the emperor; his court was simply not that accesSI· ble. e. he tradit es li disp of s � kind _ e som le k sett l iona to '' tem ed ''sys T may have wor ' (e betw een la�downers, members of a family), bt1t it was 1 1o t com_pat1ble w1tl1 1,1 · o.f modermzation. 1 f. There . was no establis hed legal profession or JU s ,· governme11t · ice serv d I 1c1a · · · ou c rts and Ju dges were not ''independent'' agencies of governn1e11t. ) e g n cha iot did _ i t inis II ik e11el M p ry Em of J11stice created by the eror the t;�d·i;he M _ SLtpervJse anJ·ud lOJla l syste m, a lthough the Minister in theory was empowered to . ·gesaudpro bably was established to unify the law 1n some respec ts .

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L A W N A O I L T U IT T S N O C N IA IOP · H T E · F O K EBOO . -SoURC

a of al, t rm en fo m ish bl ta es u ni r fo m for d lle ca . 31 19 ,r 0 'J . n t zo u t • • nstz· o C e l1 T 11 o n d'd t b , · y b t ·t 1 1 e u 1ts I , es dg f, Ju · al ri make pe im . . hy of goverrimen t cou,·ts 1d a1 · hierarc any cha11ges. s n o ti tu ti s n I l a n io it s n a Tr

s li 42 b f 19 o ta es 1 . o in N h t n g o ti a m a e h. cl ro (P 2 35 ge a p , IV r te Re-read: c11ap

Nega,·it Gazeta); _ . . . . ng , ); J ry 1st c 1n of M ti us �th bi 1s e bl ta e� 43 19 � Ibicl, pages 354-55 (o,·der No. l of 1 s em st a of ng sh sy u l b co rt es i i 42 1 !� : . of ? 2 o. N o, at ,n cla ro (P 59 � 635 ! Ibid, pages _ 1

, e) ic st Ju f o n o t1 a tr 1s 1n m ad e th r fo · and other procedt11·es at ith g ns w in pe al m de co 42 ion 19 of l .. o N e re ec D of 7 t ar (P Ibid, pages 361-62 _ of local jt1dges a11d othe1· local officials); c ti g ias in les ish ol ecc ab al ;· 42 of 19 3 . No e re ec D of 10 cle rti (A 4 36 ge Ibid, pa jurisdiction); F1·om Sedle1·, op. cit., pp . 611-12 (Footnotes om itted).

1 i �. local of es gori cate and rs'' ''tie y n1an so ting crea Tl1e author is clisc11ssing reaso11.s for courts in the j11ridical system established by the Courts Proclai.-uation of 1942 (Proclamation � , No. 2, set Fourtl1 i11 cl1apter IV, page 356).

The primary consideration was to provide a cot1rt that people could reach and , he ard. The mean-s of transp orta be natt1re cot1ld minor relatively of a ,vhere dispt1tes tion existing at tl1at ti1ne \Vere poo1·, as it has always been difficult to travel great distances in Ethiopia. Tl1is consideration dictated tl1e establishment of a court in the loV11est administrative t1nit. The more importa11t the case, the further the parties could be expected. to travel-tht1s, tl1e concept ot' a tiered court system ba sed on f !l administrative t1nits. j Each court l�eard appeals fron1 the next lowest co1.1rt and there was to be only one appeal. In l)ractice, howeve1·, 111ultiple ,1ppeals were taken. The higher co urts '. woul� ofte11 hear the appeal, altl1ot1gb they l1 ad no j11risdictior1 to do so. _Wh7n J . court� :Vere_ fir_st estttbl1sl1�d, t�1ere_ a1)pare11tly was a tendency on the part of d1�satis· l fiecl _l1t1ga11ts to seek rev�e� 11� higher courts, and thu s it m.ay have been difficult -� for_ them to accept the l1m1t,:1t1on of a single ap pe a.l. The l1igher courts may h�ve believed th�t they _shotild not 1·efuse to hear tl1e a1)peal i 11 view of the prior practice or may not have trtisted the lowe1· cot1rts to arrive at a so un d decision. hate er W � l � l tria the reason, �h.e_ appeals ofte11 were heard Moreover, a ally usu wa s app � . eal an . le d� nova, with the appella �e court rehearing all the vid These fact�r�, c?np fi4 en ce e . with 11 �bse1:3-ce of effective procedure, resulte a iti ti_O�·ud J in d de la ys en in dl es s I � was a so P?Ssible fo_r a defendant to obtain _ : -C� H i� th e a to tr an ca sfer of hi s se s � n 1a upon post11�g security for costs. This en p ? i Et h _ ier ab led we alt h fo re ign an d er s u dg � to have their cases heard i·n the Hig , · · J " h Court, where there were some foref:gn · · : a � d he e t e mo:e �ompetent E hiopian h a g sin � po , t im t ju dg es i to ad sa dit t. In io n : rd n t e plaintiff who would often ha ve to travel to Addis Ababa to � �case h ba��6aa�i ear� J

_j Furthermore, there wa8 not � e _ . � . uuv . . . ec . a e� 8h arp d1st1nct1on between t�� , 3-5 the judiciary fwictions of W: . e a: _ · v. e ov ern me nt. ra.t 1 T� e governor of the adm1n�st ,�q ��SA.___·, the president of the court p n that area. This had a two-fold pn:rpese,.-- !!l�� >:_:��- _• -- r-- ------·......-.:-•

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ty. ot· ·sending additio11al j t1dicial perso11nel t o tllose a reas si nec es e th at , avoided many official � �ere r lt1cta11t to lea ve tl1e c�i)ital. Secoild , a,1d nlore � n wh e e tim � r s 111s1sted Ll1a t . tl1e y l1f1d to exe rcise j1,dicial JrJOlver as no go ver the well .nnportant, · order. Tl11s \Va s co11t· 111 ee p o · t · 111 11g tl1e p ast tradition of the k . er po w e uti v . exec adJ11d1�at1ng th e c,tses t hat arose tl 1ere ,vith a vie,v to,vard inaiil ?rY territ of �Ier ritory. The gover11ors also l1ad a good cleal to say abo u t \Vllo ter the_ 1n order tujn ing Jt1dges. l n n1ore rece11t years n1os� go�er11ors tist,ally did 11ot sit, as inted appo ,vere s tic 11 a � 1tt1,tt1011 te11de b s tr�ng. �ery 1 d . co11 � e nc d to JJreve ,i t tl,e � but their influe Ol\ts1d_ e ol tl1e C,1fllal. Tl1er� is 11ot lllltCl1 i11forma Jl� diczarJ: �ent i11clepe� an of growth t 1011 of.J u stice _ i n the prov 111ces. Bttt 1t ap1Jears tliat becatise adn11111stra the about tion of the positio11 of the �over11or a11d his rol_e i11 st1cl1 acl111i11istr ation, i t 1nay 1,ave been assumed that the JU�ges \Ve_r� s11bserv1e11t to l1i1n. Cas es l1ave bee,1 reportecl ,vhere the governor s set aside dec1s1ons of tl1e co11rts. Eve 11 tl10L1gl1. tl1ere n1ay liave been respect for j11dges i11 the provincial areas-tl1 e tracl itio11 of tl1e \vis e j11dge 111ay be deep-rooted, it appea rs likely th at tl1e co 11ce1Jt of a11 i11cle1Je11cle11t jztcliciar;, f ree from executive co11trol was not ft1ll y 11nderstood or acce1)tecl, a11d 111 ay 11ot be even

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At the sa1ne tune, however, th e co11r ts i 11 Addis Ab,1ba, 1)artic11};;1rly tl1e I-Iigl1 Court and the S11preme Imperial Co11rt, \Vere f1111ctio11i11g 111ore effecti,1ely. A 11L1n1ber of British judges came followi11g t l1e Liberatio11. a 11d togetl1er \vitl1 tl1e Chier J ustice, senior Ethiopian j11dges, and Ministry of J11s tice official s, 1111d ertool( to develo1J a modern system of ad�inistering j11stice. 111 1943 1 Jroced11ral rt1les follovvi11g the common-law model were pro111ul ga ted. \Vr itte11 j11dgme11ts \verc issued, tl1ougl1 they were 11ot reported. J11dges of tl1ese co1 1r ts bega11 to e11jo:y so111e prestige, t l 1011gl1 except for the Chief Justice it \Vas not comparable to tl1�tt e11jo�)'ecl by l1igl1 gover11men t officials. Litigation has always been a prou1ine11t feature of tl1e Etl1io1)i,t11 sce11e, as i t is in many developing societies. 011ce courts l1ad bee11 establisl1ecl, peoJ)le r esorted to them frequ ently, even with 111inor cases. T l1e bt1rcle11 ,vas excessive. To red L1ce this burden, in 1947 a system of Atbia Dag11as, or l ocal judges, was i11at1g L1rated . Traditionally, peopl e submitted tl 1eir disp11tes to loc,11 elders, a11d 1111der tl1e 1947 Proclamation an attempt was n1ade to i 11stit11tio11alize this process. A.11 Atbicz Dagt1a was appo : inted for each ''l ocal ity." From Procla111atio11 To Provide For Tl 1e Establish111e11t Of Local J 11dges, No. 90 of 1947, Negarit Gazeta 6 th Year No. 10.

WHEREAS We ha ve co11sidere d tl1a t tl1e 11u111be r of Courts establisl1ed by Our _Adn1inistratio11 of Justice Procla111atio11 of 1942 betwee11 \Vide �reas i11 � ur Em·p1r e have not met the d.iffi.culties of Ottr people caused by tl1e delay 111 tl1e set tling of their di sput es; a.nd W HEREAS in Article 23 of Proclamatio11 No. 2 of 1942 it is provided �liat ��':8 of small significance can be settled accord i!1g to tbe traditionally recog msed hiopi a11 Law or by the compro1nise of the JJart1es ; We proclaim as follows:_ l . This Pr oclamation m ay be cited as the Establisl1me11t of Local Jtidg es Procla mation, 1947. 2· There shall be establ ished in each locality one loca l judge.

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AL N IO AW T L fU I" T S N O C N IA P IO I-I T E F O K SoURCEBOO

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, y . b es as l t al e le tt se p om , le � ib m ss ro po � s a � i· a i f as u se 1 s e d J l a c l A 3. � � ? a i say is n thi at , wi th to . the m tio dic n; ris ju li his of l 1 its ts im of' tI1e parties, with. 1n tl�e . . . . . .d n a n o t1 1c sd r1 JU is b r e d n 11 e c la p e th of . . . · es not exceed 25 dollars; do ich wh of r tte a m t c e J b1 l Sl e a) 111 c1v1l c a ses th · · g in ; ed 15 rs ce la t ex ol no d e n fi a ith w le ab · sh ni pu es . . . b) 1n cr1D1111a I cl1arg · . d . k 'bl th JU e ge . e n 1 ss ca po 1m 1s a m ea ise om pr om c a r e e wh at provided th decision. a nd �h� assess ors ge jud e t c ase d in an � s or ess ass o tw th wi 4 · Tlie jtldge shall sit · t the 1on bu il opm a v · pre ll of the sha ·. ge 11d e J th of on 1 n i' op e tl 1 s are 110 t 11nan1mou assessors shall also be recorded. ... 10. The Miiiiste1· of Justice sh all s11bmit to and get �ec ision from the Council of Ministers with regard to the r.e1nu11eration of the local Judges. 11. Nothing in this Proclamation shall �e deemed to affect the tradition of the Cot1ntry in settli11g disputes by compromise. Tl1e above 1Jrocla111ation also provided for appeals from decisions of ''local judges" to the ''appropriate co111munal court."

From ivlinistry of Justice, Temporary Regula tions for Inspectors Being Se�t To Awradja Co11rts, 1939 E.C. (1946) Circ11la r 178/300 (as transl ated by AberraBa11tiwalu, Faculty of Law. Tl1e circular sets Fortl1 tl1e duties of inspectors.

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1. To a1)pear without war11ing at each Aw1·adja, Wored a, and district court and to investigate its performance, thereafter noting necess ary recommendations to present to the head office. To evaluate the a bility of judge�s; · 2. rfo find out wl1ether fili11g cler ks organize tl1eir files correctly. To determine l1ow long it takes to fi11ally resolve cases and to discover wheth er draw11 out cases ar_e t�e fault of fili11g cle.rks or the negligence of jt1dges . To ar range short conferences w1tJ1 J11dges a11d cot1rt en11?loyees to fin d ot1t who is at fa ; t1lt 3. To determine how many cases are finally dispos e d of in a court's d ay! in a n1011th, a11_d how 1nany of tl1ose c ases institute.cl du rin a g cert ain period of time are fi nally disposed of. These st tistics should be put into proper form; a . �- To discover tl1e 1111111be1·s of prisoners in a wradja s an d the reasons for their 1mpr1s011me11t s� tl1at � Higl1 Co11rt c irct1it es ju dg e c a n b e sent to hear their cas · . -To note the detain ed pnsoners already sen tenced have spent in jail; 5. To investigate the conditions of pr ri� di st is o ns in ja al aw l w ra o re d d a d a n �nd to report on the performance of -� �� "lll lll go ve m rn ai n m ent personn el responsible for mg them; . __ _ . :� To_ investigate t�e state of fi�anc�s in t th t e a w . ra o d ja d co u to rt f i s n . � th w � e h� erte-� �:�� . dg et o f th e J1:-11.n1stry of Justice 1s being proper ex . e5 1 o n ly . p en d ed T v · 1:1ga · •. improper use of M1rustry funds; .·. J an onestly and to repor t any irregularities; �;�- c�'-=\ 8- To find out whether woreda and �wradja clerks are dishonest; · ·. · :7�.":� II'

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

857

wor cot eda �rts are whe ther l1an dling cases ,vitl1 _i 1 1 tI1e jurisdictioi1 out find To 9. tl1at see to 1f there and are such cases tl1at tlley are serlt to courts ja awrad f the that appea ls see re To . ma?e easily and qt1ickly. To eval Liate court ja awrad � . �e . d tl1e ab1l1ty of Jt1dges. an ces offi 1ng J fi the of e stat the 10. To advis� district court jt1dges 011 110,v to vvo_rk diligentl)' a11d to J1elp tl1em interpret Ia,vs ,vbich they may not t11 1derstand, a_Il w1tl1 dt1e res1Ject. See tl1at tl,ere is no disagreement betwe�n cou!t person11el a11d 1 11s1Jectors. 1-\Il results of jnvestiga tjon should be presented 11nmed1ately to the head office. I11spectors sl1ot1ld 110t 111ake friends with court person11 el so that the Head Office ,vill have co11fide11ce i11 tJ1eir reports; 11. To find out whether advocates licensed to practjce i 1 1 tl1e variot1s courts know the law a1 1d to make investigatio11s of tl1ejr past lives a11d deter111inatio11s concerning their character. This should be reported to tl1e Mi11istr)' of J L1stice; 12. To see if some judges i11 tl1e courts sl1 ot1ld be placed in l1igl1er 1Jositio11s due to qualifications they may possess. 13. To find, by going through cot1rt files, if judges l1ave bee11 follo,ving orders from the Ministry of Justice and tl1e lavi1s fot111 d i11 tl1e Negarit Gazeta; 14. To discuss the problen1s fot1nd in the courts with gover11ors \vl1e11 it is 11ot possible to report these problems to the I-lead Office. 15. To see that jt1dges and filing clerks ,,,ho have IJerfor 1 11ed their dtrties faitl1 fully are brought to the attention of the Mi11istry of J11stice; I 6. · Each inspector of the Ministry of J t1stice sl1all be ordered to go to a specific area, make his investigation, and retur11 with his report to tl1e Ministry of J11stice in two months' ti.me.

But if the \Vork cannot be accomplisl1ed in t,vo 1110 1 1ths, tl1e i11spector n1 List so notify the Ministry of Justice and tl1e Ministry may gra11t an extension.

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From Public Prosecutors Procla111ation, No. 29 of 1942, Negctrit Gazeta 1st Year No. 2 (Supplement). I . This Proclamation may be cited as the Public Prosecutors Proclarnatio11, 1942. 2. A Public Prosecutor is an advocate for the prosecution of cases before the courts and his duty is to prosecute the cases wl1ich affect pt1blic security i 11 general. 3. There shall be appointed by Us i1 1 Ou.r En1pire a Pri11cipal P11b_lic _Prosect1t�r and D eputy Public Prosecutors who shall be subordi11ate to the Pr1 11c1pal Public P rosecuto r. ·Ju . �- A Pu�lic Prosecutor shall posses a sound know!edge of la,v or shall have dicial experience. No person shall be appointed a Public Prosect1tor otl1er than (a) advocates' (b) officials in the Governm ent service, (c) police officers of or above the rank of Assistant Inspector or Police. 11 ister i M r Ou of ic ubl s ion ect dir se l Pro era gen ors to the cut ll t sha iec be sub � 0 f JS. J ust1ce.

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858

IONAL LAW T U IT T S N O C N IA P IO H ·r E SoUilCE.BOOK OF

o ti cu l se al r? s p s, rt n � o C e th o al r ci in v ro P a th 1e tl d n. 111 , rt u o C h ig H e th In 6. r to t1 . c se c ro li P b u P a y b d te c 11 d 11 o c e b ll 1a s1 s i1 io it t c e , s · o r pr1vat·e p r _ t o u th � y l1 au it it w ef ad b _ le p r o d n a � r e� p y ap an ay m i· o 1t c1 se ro P 7 _ A Ptiblic er d 1s 1;1 y e u 1r rg u q 1a m cl s a , h e l h ia tr h ic h w or f o se ca al in in i · ci 1y a1 h ic cotirt iil wh te 111 an� such case the cu se ro p to te ca � v ad n a ts 1c r1 appeal, atld if an)' perso11 inst te so ct ca ru e vo st th in ad d ed an on t1 all 11 sh ec os pr 1e tl t 11c 11d co ay n1 · 1 o. tlt ec s Ptiblic Pro · nder l1is directio11s. act u

Tile ''Prii1cipal PLiblic Prosecutor': beca111e tl1e '' Advocate Ge11eral'' �s a result of Procla111 atio11 No. 118 of 1951 (Negar1t G� z�ta, 9th Year No. 11) amending the above_ proclan1ation: and by Article 3 of the Cr1n11nal Procedure Code of 1961, the Advocate Ge11eral'' is �lso referred to as tl1e '' Attor11ey General."

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From Tl1e Cou1·ts (Registratio11 o_f Advocates), Rules, Legal Notice No. 166 of 1952, Negarit Gazeta, 11th Year No. 11.

The follo\ving Rl1les of Co11rts are made by virtue of Article twenty of the Ad111inistratio11 of Justice P1·ocla111atio11, in respect of tb.e Supreme Imperial Court, of tl1e High Court and of all othe1· Col11·ts established by that Proclamation, for tl1e ad111issio11, co11duct and dis cipli11e of legal practitioners and for the fixing of fees. Registe,· to be 111ai11tained

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1. Tl1.e Minister of 1·t1 stice (hereinafter 1·eferred. to as ··The Minister'') shall ca11se to be prepa.red and 111aintai11ed a register (hereinafter reterred to as ''T/1e Registe1·' '). �n wl1ich shal� be reco1·ded tl1e 11ame and 11sual place ot' business of every pe1·s011 e11titled to b_e registered, togetl1er with particulars of a11y limitation imposed uncler these rl1les with 1· egard to tl1e Col1rts before w .luch such person may practise.

P1·0!1ibitio11 f,·0111 JJt·actice z111less 1·egiste1·ed

�- No pe.rso11, other tl1an a person l1oldi11g a11 office wherein he is bound to _ piact.1ce only foi· _ the Crow11, ?l:all _pr,tctice 11nless he is registered, and then ndt before s11ch Co111_t� �s are s1)ec111ed 111 the register as those before v;,hich he is pre cl11ded fro1n p1·act1s1r1g. Registrc1tio11. as of rigl1t i11 a JJl'OJJe,· case.

..3: Any J)erson_ sl!all, o11 a�)plicatio11 to the Minister, o1· to su ch person as the M.1 s L _sl1_a�l 11tl101·1se be �11t1_tled to be registe n rso p r su ch e re � d if M o � in th ist e er %r as e 1111ste1 shall a11thor1se is satisfied tl1at : (a) !!;1s the skill and knowledge necessary to enable him properly to practi se;

(b ) �: i� �f a character suitable for assisting in the proper administration of . ., j t e : P1·ovided that: -· ( a) If the Minis · ed that su ch person ha s th· e skill and k no��d e . ter is· no · t s_ atisfi -�-ged--. - 7 . necessary to e11able him properly t 0 Ji t Js '"'o · ' ___ · _ · "._ . · "™' 1s b u.t prac 1se t · 1n every Court, . that he has the sk..111 and knowle · �ct1s ; pra d g to e n e ce · m . hi' ss a ry t l . _ _ b . � e o ena · (1) otherwise t ha11 before the Supreme Imperia,l C ourt on tlw High Co�lP� · .. · - -- .. ...

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

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859

before the Sl1pren1e Imperial Col1rt, tl1e I-Iigli Cotirt than rwis e othe (ii) . rt u o t C a ez h G i la ek T a or As the case may ?e, St_tcl� pe_rso11 sl1all be e11 titled to be registered, but witl1 the approp1·1ate l1n11tat1011 as to tl1e Co11rts before ,vl1icJ1 }1e may practise; a11d register e� s?all 011 l1i� 0\1/11 ap1)lica�io11 �e e11tit�ed be to entitled on pers (b) a _ _ _ red subJec t to st1cl1 l1m1tat1011 as 1s referrecl to 1n tl11s proviso to be registe being a limitation not les� restrictive tha11. tl1e Mi11ister or st1c]1 perso11 as the Minister shall a11thor1se '\\'Ot1ld .l1ave 1n1posed 11po11 l1is tJractice hacl such an ap plication not be en made. Re,noval fro11'l register or si1bseq11er1t li111itatio11.

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4. (I) The Minister or s11cl1 person ,1s tl1e iYii11ister sl1all a.t1tl1 orise 1nay at a11y time remove the 11ame of a11y advocate fron1 tl1e register or n1ay i11 a11 appropriate case enter i11 tl1e register witl1 regard to a11y 1Jerso11 st1cl1 ]j111ita tion as is referred to i11 the proviso to the last 1Jroceeding Rt1lc 011 bei11g so requested by s11ch person; or (2) On his ceasing to be satisfied as to the skill a11d l<11owledge of a11y advocate necessar)' to enable him properly to practise or vvl1en he considers that any advocate is not of a character suitable for tl1e adn1i11istratio11 of jt1stice the Minister or sL1ch person as the Minister shall at1tl1orise n1ay fortl1\vitl1 suspend such advocate from l)ractising provided al\\1ays tl1at tl1e cal1se for such suspension shall immediately be referred to the Arlvocates Disci plinary Co1n,11ittee w1der Article 8 of t/1is Ri1/e. 1'Jinister or s1.1cl1 perso11 as t/1e Mi11ister s/1all Clt1t/1orise

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Arti�Ie . 8 of t he above rules establisl1ed a n Advocate Disciplinary Con1inittee! app� i11ted b ster to "inquire into any cond uct ... of a n a ture as to s�g�est ". tha t tl1e_ . 1n�es�1,�ated a�;:aM11;1;1. te not of a char acter su itable for assist i 11g tl1e ad 1n1111strat1011 of 1ust 1c,e, t 11e !� co i.ttee r or s ''remove " the acI,,ocate 5 nanle may M who t r � p t " it s "findings" iniste o the rnm the rrom . . " reg1ster . "for sueh period as m a y to l11m seem proper. . . Th: term "practise" (of es plead111g in court an d 1d inclt to 14 cle Arti law) js by d e d efin "pre pa nng for anothe r any act or doct1ment in a leg al n1atter of 811Y kind·"

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e time is 1954 an 1ussion, preparing n11 Co � e th th wi ing rk . d u wo yo r e ye ar a law adrat of the Revised Co,nstitution. I. You are asked to summarize the present state of the law goveriiing: a) the orga nization of courts (the hierarchy and jurisdictio11 of courts);·

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i111JJO.s-e test.

5. For the purpose of satisfying himself as to tl1e sl<ill a11d k:110,vledge of a11y �erson necessary to enable him properly to practise, \\'hether vvitl1 or \Vit]1ot1t Ii111ita tion as to the courts ·before which such perso11 1nay practise, tl1e J\1inister or s11cl1 person as the Minister shall a11thorise may require a11y perso11 registered ?r wl10 _ ? has appl1ed for registration from time to tin1e 1111dergo st1ch test as the M1111ster or Such perso n as the Minister shall authorise shall thi11k fit: · Provid ed that no person shall be obliged to unclergo such a test wjthin a periocl of one year of his having so satisfied the Minister as a res11lt of such a test.

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N AL LAW O I T U IT T S N O C N IA P O II JSoURCEBOOK OF ET

li ip d c a n e r is n d fe f s o n a tr , g n d o ju t� o � , ro es p .t, n � �m in o p p a b) tlle selectioi1., , e ic v r e s l a 1 c .1 d t1 J a f o t n e m h s li b a t s e e th d an c) tlle admii1is trative st1pervision of t he courts; ?u.dgeting for salaries ai1d other costs of opei·ation s ; staffing of co11 rts (o ther th�n Judges); a nd �h� prom · otion and disciplii 1.e and st1 pervision of these employees; 1:1.a1ntenance of sta t1st1cs; transfer of jtldges as need be to assist in courts �here a h1g� volume of cases .accumulates a11 d where additional jt1dicial personnel 1s temporarily needed; plan ning of court . ( d.evelopment e.g., for ex1)ansio11, new facilities, etc in light of experience and anti cipated needs); d) the authority to make law governing civil a n d criminal procedure; the ex ect1tio1 1 of court jt1dgn1ents and related matters; e) the a11 thority to regulate q11alificatio1.1s, licen sing a nd conduct of advocates and other practitioners ; disciplining of advocates. 2. Y 011 are asked to prepare a memorandum: ''s et ting forth principal facts and con side1·atio11s whicl1 should be taken int o accoun t in dete-rn1ining po licies which are to underlie ft1tt1re laws, i ncluding ft1t11re cons ti tution al provisions, governing the topics set out in (I) above.'' 3. You are asked to comme11t on the following (paraphrased from Sedler, op. cit. p. 610): ' ':The developers of Ethiopia s co11 rt system mu s t give con.sider.ation to such qt1est1 ons as: �'a) �ho11ld there ·be one, integ1·ated sy sten1 of cot1rts? What should the law provide w1!h resp_ect _to various local, Cll stomary tribunals (Councils of Elders, etc.?) If �11e ffic1 al policy 1s to ''codify'' tl1e entire la\v of the country and apply uniform � legi�latior� as the sole sot1rce of la\v (except where legislation s pecifically incorporates c11sto1n), IS the answer· to the above questio11 predetermined? ''b) AsSuining a11 integrated cot1rt sy s tem, how many tiers of cot1rts and. bow many courts s l1ould there be? Ho\v 1nany appeals allowed? ''c) Shotild any ot_l1e1· local i11stitt1tions of a jt1dicia· l character' outside the cou. rt system, be establ i shed? ' 'What sl1ould be tl1e relationship, if any, of local courts to local g o' ! : vern ?

4. You are asked to comment on the followi11g:

· . · . . . · ''The responsibility for d. eve.Iopmetl t ?� effective ice serv 1al jud1c a and courts e m11st remain for the t · e b ng in the Mi nistry of Justice. Although indep � eis a required quali t it�� d��s, .that. term, or p rese i�o n mea nt purposes, should all . peridence i 11 gi,,fn �ud in n m fro z.e.) insulation of the adjudica tion process g g � _ not extraneous press urf s : r �in flue n�e, official or uld;- sho ce n independe otherwise; mean tenure in office '� �resent circumst�nces (e.g. �: ly__ high of , the almost total lack "'"-·- _ r trained manpower) require constant review of ete d to s J·udg e the pe of rform ance · mine their cont·i'nued fitness fo.r offi th-e · . 1n · . ce, - a nd that function should be lodged Ministry because, realistica11Y' it Is the only �. � · ' jo b.' ag e ncy fitted to do t.he · · ;;;, -ir ···· -_ ..:... · . · . · r ea 5· You are asked to comme t o 1o eati n the M inist.ry' s regulations cr ll l'!_ g �: t ur co inspectors (see sunra) ·s r • pec1ficall y : _ , � . : ·. . ,

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ONGOING PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION AND DEVELOPMENT The ''Judicial Power'' and the ''Courts Established by Law''

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SECTION 2

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861

. hat is the source in la.w of the Minister's authority to isst1e tliese rules? · · underIymg a). W em ?. th policy Wha t 1s the . . . . any, might 111specto�s improperly i11flt1enc� the coiiduct 1f ,vays, . what b) In pow�rs part1c11 given lar to 111spectors \vhicl1 sI1011Id be any there Are es? .d 0�J�r! regulat ions are to be 111ade ''permanent '' Jaw, these c If fi e d? lari or ? wn WI would yo u make? nts me end · · am tber what o Constit11tion provide for tl�e co11ti_1111atio11_ of a �11dicial R�v�sed the Sho�ld c) What are some alternative devices wl11cl1. M1n1stry? · m1gl1t be the · 1 n ate ector . . 1nsp . 1 t. e s m tu re e sa th e v ie h . ac established to

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

The Significance o_f ''Judicial Pol-ver''

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· Compare the usage of the term ''ji,dicial power'' i11 Article I 08 of the Revisecl Constitution of Ethiopia with Article III (Sections 1 and 2) of tl1e Co11stit11tio1z oj' ilie United States and Article 76 of the Co11stit11tion of Japan. Compare tl1e absence of the term in constitt1tio11al provisions set out supra th.is Chapte r. Re-read: pages 617-18 (si1pra, Chapter VI);

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tl1e j11ciiciar)'

Marbi,ry v. Madiso11 (silpra pages 173-176); Martin v. Hi,nter's Lessee (excerpt SUJJra, page 178); Liyanage v. The Qi,een (excerpt, SUJJra, page 179); Ministry of Finance v. A vedis Savadja11 sitJJra, page 405); Telvjik Sherif v. Public Security Depart111er1t (excerpt sitpra, page 406-7).

Re-read: pages 235-241 supra (limitations on the ''ji,clicial polver''). Problem

onsider the foll�wing propositions: do they represent valid staten1ent of the ?C law. 1· �e term ''judicial between governmental distinctio11 a power'' implies wers; like the term ''legislative power'' or ''exect1tive power,'' it denotes a category �� governmental power . s .2· The ''judici al power'' is basically the po we r to resolve disputes thro11gh the interpretati on and application of the relevant law or custom to the case at hand· 3 '!]le Ethio n al po1-ver'' an d vests it entirel7 ici pia ud ''j n Co s · ate n ar tio sep tu sti · th o rts rea st1Con the of ons visi pro g blin n ed c ena by by d the t a n utio u stit c � Con ��tio . ile other agencies of government, e.g., administrative tribunals, may, �b in en�;or ing c the laws, adjudicate disputes between individuals and the governinent,

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N IO T U L LAW A T I . T S N O C N A f P IO I IT E F SOURCEBOOK O

l of ia ic se ud ci ''j er ex e w e po at tim 11l ' r' e e th of ep xc ed iv pr t de be . ·t 0 11 )' . 1a 11 . · · · ts r · 11 o c · e th . . th t e c b . 1tu it st w on n 1o ity m or nf co th au 111 s lz w . or la d 1 e ' ar . 1 {:'. . r io tit t ' i · st on C e 1 . 1 1 s · a u 111s01 r y f ar o it 1t il e.1 m m sh ts li ur b co ta es 1e tl to s try ze ri o b 1t a1 11 o ti Li it st 1 01 5 · .T l1e c t en a tm of w ac la en e th ib str · es di jz or th au · ing ' · ut it ice rv se ry ta · 11 1 111 ve 1 . ' c t a · IJerso11s 111 · · e h t e h 1z t or au t lu no ec pr es do n t sio 1 ; ts ur co of s ou ri va e th n ee tw e b · 11 10 t' 1c · -d· Jt· 1r1s · · .. 1t S-U ng t Ill n h s · b e ay 1 W a ts ur ar co m on rs pe to a 1d a1 er tl1 ge to al '' e1· iv po ''jitcficiaf s nt ha w en la va be le re e th op pr y, rs ly ve er ro nt co 11 ve gi a 1 j1 , · e1 1 tI he deternljne w interp1·eted and ap1Jlied to l1im. '' in er l ow th c_ia di � ''j ise nc rc se xe ab e tno ld p ou � sh · 01 tno � ll wi ts ur co e Th 6. n of e 1o th h at d1 r1g J ad s to le 4 t1b ep sc st1 � � y rs � ve ro nt �nd co al leg a , . e i. . of a 'case''y is pl th to ap 1a ter e 1pl cn p nc lo ve pn de to ts 11r co e th to tip is it es; duties of the parti and detern1i11 e tl1e lin1 its of their powe1·. Pol-ve,·s Incide11tal to ''Ji1dicial Polve1·'' Re-read: Tewfilc Sl1e1·if· v. Pi1blic SecitritJJ Depa1·t1nent (cited szq;ra). a a Fro1n Assefa Dula 1). Pz,blic Security Depart,nent, High Court, Addis Ab b

(Civ.Case No. 322/58) (1 965 G.C.).

In tl1is habeas corpus case tl1e applica11t all�ged th.at he had been imprisoned for a prolonged period 011 tl1e order of a lJolice officer, contrary to the criminal procedure code and tl1e co11stitution. The respo11clerit's aclvocate, i11 response to an application for habeas corpus, simply statecl that I1e lcnew notl1ing about the case a11d in effect could do nothing to l1elp the court adjudicate it. The court said i11ter alia:

A11y person n1ay petitio11 to· this cot1rt 011 tl1e crrou11 d that he has been ra rested a11d im1)risoned illegallj1• [The cot1rt the11 cited Art�. 177-179 of the Ci11i/ Procedure C�de a11d �eclarecl :] eve1·yone has a f11ndan1ental co11 stitutional right not to be de prived of h1s libertJi witl1oi,t cli1e JJ1·ocess of .lavv . ... We have not been shown th ta Ato Assefa l1ad . been deJ)rivecl of l1is Iibe1·ty in accorda11ce with the law . .. . We [r11le] �hat l1e 11:11� t be 1·eleasecl tod,1y .... Any person or authority ,vho hinders rexectit1011 of tl11s Jt1dgn1e11t shall be lJt1nisl1ed for conten1pt of co11rt . ...

Fron1 Civil Proced,,re Code of Et/1 io_pi£1. Art. 48 I. - DisciJJ!i11a,·y _/JOJive,·s Atly presidei1t of a cot11·t 01· J)residi11g jttdge ma y take such action a s m ya be 1:1ecess�!� to enst11 ·e �1·d�1· i11 c�t1rt a11d th� adt]l��str_ · d. f acc o i e jus of t�c � � ti� n . ance with the prov1s1011s of tl11s Code and may e fin a with punish sum mar ily . the any party, pleader or othe1· person who is olti tn ct con du lty im pro of per 0 course of any p1·oceedi11gs. · . _ Art. 481. [sic] - Sun1.n1.arJJ punisl1ment . =c·= of certain ,offences . v1q · Any cot11·t may su mmari·1Y p11n·1sh n · · tio a l 1n flag ra1 1 t ed com offe nce mit t s , 0 f A rt; 442 ' 446 . ee . · n . e or t · sen 447 f 0 g h t � Penal pass1n Code in that provided ' ·· · c- st1c·h an offence ior · . _ __ . : . · · · . ceed (a) a Woreda Ghezat Cour t -� . · · . _ · ex may only 1mpose simple imprisonment no,t ·ing one year; and .. _ . ......� . (b) an Awradja Ghezat Court . . nut . t n · _ . me· . . on s y ma I 011 r1 p y _ impose 1m . . us o r r1go . · exceeding three years. - . ..� -'- .:...:_..:: - -- - - - - - '.

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a. Eth iopi of Cod e l Pena froro ice. st d ai Ju to al us ef R _ 2. 44 ,i\rt. (l) Whosoever, hav�ng been law_ft1lly s11n 1111oned to a1)pear in j11clicial or qtiasi judicial proceedings as a v,11tness or acc11sed person, i11te.rpreter, assessor or juror: (a) fails or refuses to appear without la,¥ft1l excuse; or (b) having appearet, refuses, con trary to tl1e law, to obey tl1e cot1rt or competent j11dicia1 trib11nal, is pt1nishable ,vitl1 fi11e 11ot exceedi11g five ht1ndred dollars, or in t�e event of persistent and. repeated ref11sal, vvith simple i n1prison ment not exceeding one month. (2 ) Where the offender pleads a false excuse, tl1e cot1rt shall pass se11te11ce of simple imprisonment within the limit laid dow11 above, a11d in1pose a fi11e. (3) Where st1ch perso n has fra11d11le11tly obtained exe1nptio11 from the obliga tion placed upon him, simple in1prisonment may be i11creased UJJ to tl1e general maximum prescribed by law, s11bject to tl1e ap1Jlicatio11 of more severe specific provisions un der v,1l1ich the fraud 111ay fall, especially those concerning the use of a false certificate of forgery. Art. 443. - Contempt of Coi1rt.

(I) Whosoever, in the course of a j11dicial in quiry, proceedi11g of heari11g,

i11

any manner insults, holds tip to ridic11le, tl1reatens or distL1rbs the court or any of its members in the clischarge of tl1eir d11ties, is pt1 n ishable with si111ple impriso11111e11t 11ot exceedi11g six montl1s, or with fine 11ot exceedi11g on e tho11sa11d dollars. In flagra11t cases, the court may deal with tl1e offe11ce st1111marily. (2) Where the offence is not corn111itted in ope n co11rt, the punisl1IDe11t, except in more serio11s cases, shall be fi n e not exceedi11g five h1111dred dollars. (3) In cases of distt1rbances or unseemly bel1avio11r i.11 court or d11ring jt1dicial proceedings, the relevant provisio11 (Art. 434) sl1all apply. Art. 434. - Viole11ce ancl Coercion. ( 1) Whosoever: (a) by use of threats, coercion or violence, pre ven ts a l)t1blic servant_ fron1 performin g an act whicli it is his duty to perform or forces l11n1 to perform such an act; or (b) strikes him or his assistan ts or us es violence or any other act of coercion against him, is p11n ishable with simple imprisonme11t 11ot exceeding six mo11tl1s or a fine not exceeding three hun dred dollars. (2) Simpl impri sonment and fine ma y be increased up to tl1e ge11eral 1naxi n1� n1 � prescr1b�d by law, according to the grayity of the case a11d the fun c ;1on _ by k uc str or !he ed erc co Yic , ed ten ea hr t m, en be ere wh s ba � h the latter eans of instruments or weapons.

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of er the O� e ? �h c ct e f ourt to increas af · all sh J le tic A s thi e the 1 1 � (3) N·othii1g j l s lt ry l a Ju su c . 1n re si y h p r o 1 n . r a h y il d o b . penalty w.1ere . ty r a P a y b s t. 11 e 1n te ta S Art. 446. _ False (l) Any party to p1·oceedings bef ore a j�dicial �Jr quasi-judicial tribunal who is required to ·speak th� truth know1n?lY g1ves a fa�se statemen t· relating to facts 1naterial to tl1e 1ss11e t o be dec1d.ed by th.e tribunal, is ptinishable, even w�ere the result s011ght is not achieved, with simple impriso11111ent not exceeding �n� year or, w_here the false state�ent has bee11 made in the course of crirrunal proceedings and may cause injustice with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding three years. (2) Where the party has been sworn or affirmed to speak t.he truth, the punish ment is rigoro11s imprisonment which, according to the circumstances, and partic11larly where the result sought has been in wh ole or in part achiev ed, shall not exceed five years. (3) Mere inaccurate allegations by a party in defence of his interests are not subject t o these provision�. . Art. 447. - False Testin1011y, Opinion or Translation. (1) Whosoever being a witness in judicial o r quasi-judicial proceedings know ingly 1 nal<es 01· gives a false statement whether to the advantage or the prejl1dice of a11y party thereto, is punishable even where the result sought is not achieved, with simple imprisonment or in the more serious cases with rig orous imprisonment not exceeding five years. (2) Wher: a :VVitness �as been svvorn or affirmed to speak the truth the punish men� IS r1goro11s Imprisonment which, according to the circumstance� and partic11larly -vvhere tl1e res11lt s011ght ha.s been in whole or in part achieved, shall not exceed te11 years. Where, l�o\\rever, in a crimj11al case, the convicted person has been · e?ce equ cons wrongly �onv1cted or l1as inct11·red a more severe pw1ishment in of the w�tness's act, the witness n1ay hin1self be sentenced to the purush·" ment wl11ch he has ca11sed to be wrongfully inflicted. � . (3) �11Y trans�ato1· or i1 1te1·preter wl10 falsely translates or interpr ets anythin� �= 1? connection with sucl1 proceedings and the translation or the interpreta-· tion _relates to facts material to the issue t o be decided by the tribunal, shall be liable to the same p11nishme11ts. �-='i e (4) �here �he false e�i ence, translation p inca i n or interpretatio � iio_[ �� t� � . �nflu�ncmg the dec1s1? � � tn on of the tribunal the punishment shall be s! � 1D1pr1sonment not exceeding two years. . . ·.:--�'""� '----..... ·--. --�--'-;��- - :.�-:.. �::. �, . . � . -'='· --,._ ,,_.,._= problem . -� ',t. ·,� ·. . � .;;: i. p. .ero ''If the codes did n o . 'c -: " . t n 0 t pr�v1'd authonty to punish certain actt�� -:. _ -;;;; , · t��::: -� � of court' the cour -_ _ !! � · g . · ts should still enJoy that p o er e li t � _ : w ' 1n any eviVpnt, by. ,,...,.t u_c:MJ:t . .. �!11' ��.. ----::- � . of '1"u.d,·c,·a1 power, Ill · 5 : ::A : . r . � t. zc �.:::--� l e e:: ;; · 108 $ . of e�le the Constitution. a-certain To 'contemPt' pow ers of � '.be . . -..:.t-- """"-rn_,-. - -a , _ .-:. an a court- i.e., its powers to preserve oroer �-��:: �:�±fi;::� . - , - --- · '

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. ne e to its decisions - m11st �e �egarded as _ an 'inherent' pa_rt of 'ji,dicial p�»,er., ,, di � thes of l1m1 e powers? If Parliament enacts laws de ts the are hat W e? agre D. You limits of the contempt powers of co11rts ancl tl1e procedtlres for tlleir . l . .firUng. the • ' t an supp any I h ' 10 erent ation powers wl1icl1 tile leg1s this - cotlrt 011· ooht does e e-xerc1s , enjoy? '' lv a L y � ed sh li ab st E s t ur The "Co

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ria� Coi,rt i_ s e_st a_bli_�shed by the Co11stitutio11 jtself, but legis mp eme Supr ! � The I. · Jurisd 1c t1�� ml1s_t be enacted d an size its g by the Emperor a11ct lation governin Parliament. Con1pare analogo11s prov1s1ons 1n other constitutio11s. Why does the Constitution create a ''supre,ne court'' and yet leave it to ordj11ary legislation to determine its jurisdiction and size? Wl1y 1ne11tion tl1e si11Jre1ne coi1rt at all? If its size and jurisdiction can be subject to legislative cl1ange at a11y time?

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2. Other Cot1rts Establisl1ed by Lali l

From Civil Procedi,re Code of Etl1iopia Art. 12. - Principle (I) Every suit shall be tried by the court con1petent to try it 1111der tl1e provisio11s of this Chapter and shall, unless otherwise provided, be i11stih1ted i11 the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. (2) Every appe.al shall be tried by the court competent to try it under the pro visions of Art. 321.

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Art. 13. - Jurisdiction of Woreda Gl1ezat Coi1rts

Without prejudice to the provisions of Art. 15 (2) a11d (3) a11d Art. 18, Woreda Ghezat C ourts shall have jurisdiction to tr)': (a) all suits not regarding immovable property ,vhere --tl1e a1no11nt involved does not exceed E.$500; and (b) all suits regarding immovable property where the amount involved does not exceed B.$1,000. Art. 14. - J11risdiction of Al,vradja Ghezat Courts Without prejudice to the provisions of Art . 15 (2) and (3) a11d Art. 18, Awradja Ghezat Courts shall have jurisdiction to try: {a) all suits not regarding immovable property \Vhere the amount involved does not exceed E.$5,000, and (b) all suits regarding immovable property where tl1e a1nount involved does not exceed E.$10,000. Art. 15· - Jurisdiction of High Court {l) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to try: (a) all suits not regarding immovable property where the am . ount involved exceeds E.$5,000; and (b) all suits regarding immovable. _property where the amo11nt involved exceeds E. $10,000.

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s i it y rd su tr to ga n re o ti g: n ic d is 1r jt e iv i,s cl ex e v a h (2) It sha.11 of on ati s 1id 1 liq_ d die an bo n rp tio co l11 so dis orate; , o11 ati m i· fo (a) the e m d iti an · cy ar pt ; m w ru la nk ba , 1ts e1 11m tr s i1J e bl tia (b) nego ( c) ins11ra11ce policies; t; h ig yr p co d an s 1t e1 at JJ s, rk 1a en ad tr d) ( ; ty n of er tio op ta pr oi pl ex e· iv ct lle co 1d a1 11 io at i 1· op pr ex (e) · in e the ge don s har act disc for o ts van f ser lic pt1b official (. f ) the liability of duties, witl1011t prej11dice to the provisions of Art. 75 of the Constitution; (g) nationality; (h) filiation; (i) l1abeas co,pus. (3) It sl1all decide applicatio11s for the enforcement of foreign judgments an� arbitr·al awards.

Ai·t. 31 - Change of veni1e

(I) Whe11ever it is made to appear to the .High Cou.rt, at any time before judg ment, by applicatio11 of either party that: (a) a fair and impartial t .rial cannot be held in any court subordin ate thereto; (b) tl1at some qt1estion of law of 11n11sual difficulty is likely to arise; or (c) that an order t111cle1· this Article will tend to the general convenience of the_ pa1·ties or vt1itnesses or is expedient for the pu.rposes of justic�, the I-I1gl1 Cot1rt n1ay n1ake an order f ron1 which no appeal shall lie to the effect that a11y st1it: (i) be_ tried by any co11rt 11ot empower·ed under the provisions of tl11s Cl1apte1· to try it bt1t havir1g n1aterial jurisdiction to try the same; or (ii) be tra11sferred f"or trial by itself. (2) :\'he11ever ·it is made ·to appear to the Supreme Court at any time_ before· -� JUdg�ent by_ afplicatio11 of either party that there are good reasons: �hr_ _ - -:=: -" a suit pei1d tn�- _1 � · any division of the High Court on circuit should J,e -f:!'.��--by ai1ot�er div_1s1011 of tl1e Higl1 Co�rt, the Supreme Court ·may a.rder �hat --= - such suit b� tried by such division of the �ct. dir sha ll it as Hi gh Court ___ - -� . � �--�· -· � ... .±::-c;;;,;;::;: � .. .. .: ... .:.. ,::.:._� --. Art. 320- - When appeal lies ( l) Unless _ ot�erwise expressly 1:�·::� : r ot b� provided for by this Coqe or. any _uilS. · · . . the pla1n· t1ff in · or the deien ·wn o d 4'." d la1 . d ant may, co11d1t on .I o ns the _::: ... __ . Chap · ter, appeal again �:fl::, � 7� st any final judgment of a civil co.uri. = =-:-=2f · ·. rlii <�· , -, -Si (2) Where an a peal e n u d _ y l es d _p from i r eme _ a judgm but t:�'" ent R. {�, f { or ord. e r : Code 1s ava1.la . §l!. l! � .a7"de:..:::-z "it.�"'��:: . :._ r� . '�JUtlg - ent� · ble Ill · the court Whic .� , Jiih gave SUCll orde r, no appeal may b I d . ·. =oe � ; �, lll 1 iJ1 rr='e: c:a.,1iRS c:...,;f_ .. Ch r.emt,u:f . SU. e e 0 ge.d UllI ess . " . - ,7.:'c,::<:j_..�::s_::,,"'-�.,,�� . :

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(3) No appeal shall lie fr�� any decision or o_rcler of a11y cot1rt on interloctitory matters, �u�h . �s a dec�s1011 �r �r?�r o. n adJour111ne11ts, preli111inary objection the adn11ss1b1lity or 111adm1ss1b1l1ty of oral or doct1111e11tary evide11ce or permission to sue as a pat1per, bt1t any s�cl1 decisio11 or order 111ay be raised as a ground of appeal when a11 appeal 1s 111acie agai11st tl1e fi.11al judgmer1t. (4) Nothing _i� sub-art_. (3) shal � pr?l1ibit ar1 appeal fron1 any order tinder any prov1s1on o·f this Cod e drrect1ng the arrest or dete11tio11 o1' a11y person, th.e transfer of property fron1 the l1a11ds of 011e 1Jarty ii1to l1ands of the other or reft1sing to gra11t an ap·plicatio11 for l1abec1s corpi,s.

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Art. 321. - Courts l1aving appellate j11risclictio11

(I) An appeal shall lie from a jt1dgn1e11t of: (a) a Woreda Ghezat Cot1rt it1 its origi11al jurisdictio11 to tl1e Awradja G1'1ezat Court in whose area of jt1risdiction sucl1 Woreda Gl1ezat Cot1rt lies� (b ) an Awradja Gl1ezat Court i11 its origi11al jurisdictio11 to the I-Iigl1 Court; (c) the High Court in its original j11risdictio11 to tl1e St1pre1ne In11Jerial Court. (2) Where on appeal an Awradja Gl1ezat Cot1rt or tl1e High Cot1rt varies the judgment appealed from, a second appeal sl1all lie: (a) from an Awradja Ghezat Court to tl1e Higl1 Co11rt; (b) from the High Court to the Supren1e I111perial Co11rt.

Art. 322. - His Imperial Majesty's C/1ilot Nothing in Art. 321 shall preven t an appellant who l1as exhausted l1is r �g_hts of appeal from making a petition to His Imperial Majesty's C/1ilot for a rev1s1011 of the case under Art. 361-370.

Th.e Civil Procedure Code was preceded by tJ1e Courts (A111e11dment) Proc�a!nation of 1962 (No. 195, Negarit Gazeta 111erged tl1e local Mel<itil Woreda ,vhicl1 7) No. Year 22nd courts, aboUshed the TekJay 11t1n1ber of Aw�adja judges _required �o tl1e Ghezat court, reduced �ear a c�se and authorized the Higl1 Court to sit in divisio11s 1n the provinces. This la mation was suspended (by 16) c No. ear :' .. d 2211 ta e Gaz arit Neg , 1963 of lan a 203 tio11 1 Proc at�he request of the arrangeinents (firSl) be made tl1at nm gover sary neces ent \.Vas se "it becau before full effect could be given" to tl1 e reform. See Secller, op. cit. at page filS. Oi1e may eculate that considerable opposite or 1nisundersta11ding cleveloped in Parliain:n.t over some �� the chan C0 (as ges. No further reform was initiatecl t11 1til the pron1tilgatio11 of tl1e Civil Procedure a Decree) in 1965. In its debates on ratificatio11 of tl1e Procedur� Code Decree, par ia�ent has not urged, despite Gover11ment }1as and d accepte le princip the ' appeal' "one opposition th at this li mitation be removed .

3· Th Atbia e Dagna and oth er Qi1asi-Ojficial Jnstiti1tio11s . t/1e Lol,ver coi,rts 0,r From G ag t 1 111 1s len ob er Pr eop s h and e A ude P e, tic rac , l ttit y, P Ethio . pp . s te no ot (fo ), 69 19 . U I. 1, S. -8 . 77 H w, La on (M ograph, Faculty of omitie�. u� t_he Ci�l P rocedu s. haviiig � crs 7 g, da ia � atb on nti me re Co de of I 965 did no t any iv1I Jur_ . 1sd1ct1on. The Ministry of Justice, however, has taken the pos1t1011 tl1at

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e re ies rt ag to pa it e bm th su e er wh eir th n io ca ct di 1is J·11 ses il t civ · 0 e cis er ex y a · m . y · e th e b' d ar g s 1n 1n na d d ag · an b ia n y b ca at s se ca be h 1c e s1 1n cu xe ed er t.. nd e i· s 1 .1 io is ec D . them . t r 11 o c a d e r 'o " l a c lo e th ed by s] �t w de la stu �l . sti u· . r e .se .s H _ y [b m d we i� to rv te in hear as gn da a bi at e th t Bu 00 . 5 $2 e f e ut w o r sp th te di a 1s t lo ec be b su � e � th j 1f y rt pa 1e 01 by d te ia lit i i s se ca civil l d al ns an an sm 1o lo at s c1 se so ca as . ub ek of 1t 01 g in is ar es 11t sp Eth. such as di . is. is n. ve io Th gi ct n di to ris ju l na i _ em th im cr l cia by offi ve ha ll sti as gri cla Atbia , cle at e rti th th to A nt bia ua at rs Pu . de gna Co da re 's du ce o · P1 al in ·im C, e 1 t/ of 3 22 le Artic o n tio m l oc Pr es l dg e . ca a Ju th in Lo d ne a tli ou at th f as function is basically the sa1ne t es bu rti ere e pa th wh een tw he fails be ion iat cil on rec a k see to is ty d11 1947. His fi1·st s na h. bia Et At dag are 5.00 of $1 also e n fi a se po im y ma he ise rom n1p co a ect to eff . ar ey he s th se ca e th of s rd co re ep ke to 3 22 le tic Ar req11ired by . ints pla n . itte com by wr While ted tia ini are nas dag ia atb e 01· bef s ing P1·oceed n, the isio te of nda dec es ma rul for es cod the to d ere ref y the d sai 11as dag ia atb e som t in cien s suffi seem Code ure ced al Pro min C1·i , of the 223 icle Art by them given itself as a basis for 1·eaching decision witho11t resort to other Iaws-atbia dagnas are to t1·y to reco11cile the parties where ap etty offence has been committed. If that is not possible and g11ilt is established the atbia da.nia is authorized to impose a fine of $15.00 Etl1. by Article 223. The atbia clagnas interviewed said they heard anywhere from three to twelve cases per month. Most atbia dag11as said that the bulk of the cases they used to hear . especially tl1e civil cases - are now heard by the wor·ed.a courts. There is even a tendency, no\v they said, to take petty criminal cases to court, by-passing the atbia dagna. Most ?f !h� a�bia clagna's official time is spent executing orders given by courts who l1a�e JUr1sd1ct1on over his ''atbia''. Thus he is respo11sible for serving summons on . parties who are required to appear in court or ·\\titnesses needed to testify, �e est1ID�tes the val11� of land for exec11tion purposes, establi.s.hes boundaries, and_ is son1:etimes r�spo11s1ble for apprel1e11ding and bringir1g a crimin.al to the local .P�lice st�tr�n. I-le 1s also an agent.of othe1· administrative agencies such as the Mmistry of F111ance for wl1om he collects taxes. !he purpose o·f appointi11g ''local judges'' was to provide official sanc�io� for th sett�en1e11t of petty disputes co11ve11ient for the many people in Etbi op�� wh� o_ther ise w.0�1ld have to travel for two or three days to reach a court. Aud !he � albza dagna s decis1011 was to be effective because of his stature in his owa commum tf-- -0 d itl nst t 'Y l ? e Ile\v c?des, l1owever, that direction seems to be reversed. I ea { s 1 rng disI?t1tes_ hi�_self, the atbia dagna finds himself more and more the t?o :� �h� ce � j �ee.,El and tra lize d Judicial system. hus he is its agent for executing orders � _ rs e th· at parties appear before the courT ts far otb . away. Now he exercises the power of "' � � \g ttlit . In E�hiopian society there are a : o. f � nsed mea . 11um ber insti of tutio naliz . :.=- -== serious disputes out of court - · - ��·- =· -�� he m os :� t � i? 1p or J>e ta nt i,eci@ of re th s es e . in T stitutions is the ''sha·mag les"' � · · e M.: oS� l·n the comm · unity' wh 0.are chosen by the parties to the dispu·te (usually, ·tw �, ijlj:: ".'·-.-- '.'L �- i;: by each party an d a chairman ect � ag e a ree d to up on be , s ) tw pa een rti t. h e ff � �� t;;:::: e : : u:f�� -eri ,, -=·�� . --·Though s h amageles . ""� � 2:� F-' . . are most often resorted to when family t1r---mar1� ,-:01� . . , arise theY are active in all kinds of cases from petty insult, t@ land dis- �s,_!��-== �·· · '· ' "· · .... -· .,_

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869

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the d�c of isi� s/1a�11ag eles Vi' s binding, ai!d even � a day s, o�d the today ill . dis �. In 0 position of a d1spl1t� c�r1 1es great weight. Se the ir r sid e, I, y unt ttleillents ' . th_e co were respected as law and obl1gat1ons asst1n1ecl ptirsuant to tliose the m by d eftecte ·,. dom avo1·d:d . N. ow, especia sel · 11 y in · · s, tl1eir effectiveness · the c1t1e were ts men .rtle se I with dis putes freque11tly resort to tlien1 peo · p le tho ugl 1 sed crea e bas d . Most of the liti¥ants interviewed in lar�e cities, l10-vi1ever, felt tl1at tl1 e s/1a111ag el es ' pas the t. No of w thin li e g a11yo11e else, tl1ey saicl, s/1an1c1g e!es are a k \Vas s fulne s .se \• , � te rested in earning a living, are li.kely to wor k ft1ll tin1e for wages a11 d \va11t 111011ey ' Ill / or en f� dec.·ct· ev 1 1ng d"1spt1tes. do ey th er ev at '' wh for \ Furthe r, there is a general i111pressio11 tl1at their decisions are 11ot biiiding upon the parties in t�at the exect1t1011 powers of a court n1ay 11ot be invoked to ' enforce them. For this reaso11, people prefer to go to court 1 e11 wl tl1ey feel that someone needs to be compelled to do or 11ot to clo a ccrtai11 act.

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The Volu1r1e of Litigation· From Central Statistical Office, Tl1e StatisticcL! Abstract 1966 (1968)

Civil Cases Lodged a11d Decided i11 Variot1s Co11r_ts for the Year 1957 E.C., 1964/65 (Illustrative Figl1res 011ly) Cases lodged

Cases decided

criminal

civil

cri,nina/

5,190 8,351 4,804 7,143 46,677 11,485

3,0 21 8,855 8,407 8,470 43,732 8,078

4.332 , 8,384 5,070 7,701 50,689 8,471

Court

'' \

civil 3,014 9,262 8,202 7,873 41,848 8,011

High Cotirt-Addis Ababa All co11rts, Eritrea All cot1rts, Goja111 All courts, Kaffa All cot1rts, Shoa All courts Wollega

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Cases Appealed and Judged i n the Supren1e In1perial Court and High Court of Addis Ababa 1957 E.C., 1964/65

-----=--

Appeals lodged

1,032 225 1,964. 1 ,57 2

criminal ' civil criminal, civil

Coi1rt Cases j1Jc!ged on appeal ___:�- --------St1preme Court 900 crimi11al, 368 civil High Court 1,756 criminal, 72 3 civil

The abo ve figure s are supplied by the lvlinister of Justice: '�l1e�r acc�tr�cy of c?urse may be e t ln n o_pven o some question since the k ee ping of accurate stat1st1cs JS a d1ff1cult bus1ness cas� y g! en Year, of course, the number of cases i11itiated 111ay not equa! t�e. numb�r 0 f 111es s ci _of c I ssu i Judi e voluin d tl1e of the n es timat ti st�ti above m A bd es e as d. what 0 le s cs g ; ;;e need s t o stem · sy m cour hey the of t suggest with respect to the strttcture for 1·u% •ial d c manpower a t· various levels?

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I T U AL IT N T O S W N A O L C N .fA P IO H T E F O SOURCEBOOK

. (1 C t, o 4 ) b 5 . 9 en E 1 u . f 2 o 1 2 96 11 o G si o es S N , te 52 1a e1 S e th of s g i, 1 d 154 c ro P ee From ) 11 io t la s 11 a "r (Law School 1

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of �t1s�i c:e, was p�esent to answ er questions r ste i11i , e. ssi lla Se e br Ge c1e v ,., ze � H.B. Dedjazi11acll n and tenure. In response io ct al le c1 se d1 1u on w la a 1t m 1b st to t en n1 rn ve go relative to tl1 e failtire of tl1e : d te o n r te is in M 1e tl , n o ti es u to one q

es tri e g un lik co rin ou a hb ny ig Ke ne r d an ou ke ta the r fa g i11 go 1t 01 tJ1 \ivi Let us try � r un th is be co m th nu In . of ia op hi Et as dge Ju g bi as s ice tw t os lm a is 1 1 d� Sti 1• Suda, es 10 the Woreda and dg Ju an th 26 re mo 110 e ar ere th ile wh t, ur Co ah Hi e 1 tl is 14 in 0 , pia as big hio as Et ly s ha ab ob ly pr on is 6 ich wh da an Ug rly ila Sim el. lev a dj a r Aw , , try ver un we the co ho r ou er In mb d. nu ate l1c ed hly hig re. a es dg Ju ese th t B11 Judges. s t ha ges ugh of Jud bro er mb about nu s ou rm eno is Th . 000 14, all in ll a is of Judges selection]. a delay in tl1e ,vo1·k [of preparing a law on jl1dicial Fron1 Geragl1ty,

OJJ.

cit., pp. 93, 94-95, 113-114, 126, 127, 129, 131, 134.

Files i11 a.11 Addis Ababa woreda co11rt and i·n the Menagesha Awradja of Addis Ababa ,vere a1 1alysed by tea1ns of l aw stude11ts. !11 the woreda court (hereinafter for the year 1968 was put case tieth twen every ') t' Co11r reda ''Wo the as refe1·red to into digest forn1 . In the Menagesha Awradj a , digests were made of every tenth case for tl1e same year. Estimations of perce11tages as to types of cases heard are thus based 011 a 1·andom selection a11d sl1011ld be deemed approximations.

Approxin1ately thirty-nine percent of the Civil Cases heard in the Woreda Court involved debts arisi11g 011t of lo a1 1s betwee1 1 private individuals and failure to pay bills, . tlli1·teen perce11 t involved no11-payme11t of rent, twelve percent were concerned with en1ployer-em1)loyee disp11tes mainly arising out of non-payment of severence pay, eleven l)ercent v\ e1·e claims for 11on-payn1e11t of taxes. The other twenty-perce11t of th. e cases were divided ratl1 er eve11lv between disputes over ekub payme?t.s,. obligations of g11ara11 to1·s, c1 1 ild s11.pport p�),ments a11d marital dispute s ?vei· div1.s�o11 of l)t·oper·ty, a11d certific,1.tio11 of contracts by t .he court. Also inclu ded 111 �he residue twe11ty-five pe1·cent \1/e .re cases i11 volving non-delivery of good s and claims for property da111age. Most debts arose out of s111all loa11s between individuals. For the n1ost part, he loa11 was eitl1 r a_cln1 it�ed by tl1e defe1 1? a11t, proved by a. \Vritten c?11tra�t o�loa�, � r the d�fenclant� failed _ _his in h1m to a 1)pea r and J11dgn1 e11t was entered against absence. In otl1e�· cases tl1e dis1)ute 11st1ally revolved around the amount of maney. !hat ll a� been J)aid back l)t1rs11ant to the loa11 agreement, the two parties each alle g�-� ing a d1tTere11t amou11 t. n Sltcll situations t�e cent1·a.l i�sue _in the case was one of fact to b� pro�e� -� b i{, w1 i�:;ses or ass111:1-ptio�s. Very little 1nterpretatio11 of the law �as requii:etL��s:�---; is c fronl a review_ of the cases_ �1at not much was engaged_1n by _the_ scri�- � � who te out the pleadings, by the l�tigants, o r by the judges. Since th·e b asic� �, u�k,:::�� tions�� re . � was there a loan?, and 1f so, did the defendant pay th�_m�ne ba y� ! ,·-- ---� rd �� w�! ;��:��s- �f the agreement?, not much legal interpreqttion o-��y. ��,,: � . ...,.. ,,, . -..,..,. - � ---· - .. . 1

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brou ght to Cocl the Cot1rt pt1rstiant to Article 29 of t!ze e Pena l the of 630 1ft1l use of tl1e _ . ticle unla \\ and Code , re Property of arlotber (Article 644 cedu Pro nal i,ni g Penal Code) . c�ses the i11vo!ved i1�terfere11ce wit11 tl1e physical \Vell ?f perce nt teen Nine by v1:tue . of e1tl1er a�1 111uned1ate t11reat to catise 11arm or acttial er� on p a of ng bei v1olat.Ions of Articles 539 and 544 of tl1 e Pe, 1at Cocle . inJury of tion inflic The remaining types of criminal cases heard i11 tl1e Woreda CoLirt were abotit evenly divided between disorderly co_ndt1:t (Article _782 Pe11al Cocle), violatioi1s of curfew hours for bars and hotels . selling l1qt1or (Article 775 Pe11c1! Coc!e), violatioiJs of traffi c regulations and otl1er cnroes st1ch as ga111bli11g, co11ten1j)t of cotirt, perjtiry and seduction. . The procedt1re most _con1n1011ly used - especially in cases i11itiate d by private conJplaint-- is for the pol1ce to su111mo11 tl1e acc11sed to tl1e l)olice statio11 a11d tl1ere, jf they deem it necessary, require the defe11dant to ft1r11isl1 boncl. If tl1e acctised is unable to furnish bond the police will detai11 l1in1 ttntil trial . ''SL1r11111011i11g'' a defend ant to the police station may it1 practice 1nea11 brii1ging l1in1 by force.

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The Menagesba Awradja court i11 Addis Ababa l1as jt1risdictio11 over a11 area extending fifty kilometers beyo11d tl1e city's li111its i11 all directio11s, bt1t 11ot jt1risdictio11 within the city itself. Tht1s people livi11g witl1i11 tl1is fifty l(ilo111eter racli11s \vl10 l1,1ve cases whose subject matter i11vokes an awraclja cot1rt's jurisclictio11 1nt1st co1ne to Add·is Ababa to have their cases heard. Similarly, ap1)eals fro111 \vore d a cot1rts within this area are heard by the Me11agesl1a A\vradja.

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There is another awradja court i11 Addis Ababa \Vl1icl1 has j t1risdictio11 over Addis Ababa proper. The Menagesha Awradja ,vas cl1osen for file j11vestigatio11 because the litigati.on that takes IJlace tl1ere gives s01ne i11dicatio11 of tl1e l<i11ds of disputes which arise on tl1e woreda and awradja co11rt level in a rL1ral area adjacet1t �o a large metropolitan city. This, it was felt, \-Votild give tl1e st1rvey good bala11ce inasmuch as the Woreda Court discussed above, l1ad a11 e11tirely i11-city. foc11s.

D·ue to the fact that the Menaoesha Awradja has j11risdiction over rt1ral areas, !and is the subject matter of sevent�-five perce11t of tl1e first insta11ce civi_I litig�t�o11 It hears. Almost t\vo-thirds of these cases i11volved tl1e rigl1t to succession arisii1g ?ut of various contexts. Most freq_uently, a succ� ssio11 case merel_y . i11volve d th� lSSuance of a ''certificate of heir'' pursuant to Article 896 of t/1e Czvzl Code. MoSr of these cases were unconte sted. . The other most freqt1ent kind of land case brotight to the :tvfenagesha A V:radja invol�ed disputes arising out buy and sell land. These cases c00st1t11ted to of co11tracts one-SLXth of the land litig ation. The remaining civil ''land dispu.tes'' i11volved disagreen1ents as to owi1ership aotl the right to possession arising out of a variety of co11texts. yer 1)lo e1n , lts fau cle � e loa Th ed olv i11v er oth ce tan civil cases heard on :first ins _emp perty, pro le vab mo iin loye e disputes' petitions for reg l sel to s act 11tr co of ion . rat ist · · and en.�orcement of the obli gations of sureties. Civil a�peals cases heard by th e Me11agesl1a Awradja originated a� wor� d� of court cases in st mo t th� , ore ref the ed, ect exp be . entially rural areas. It is to ess these cases invol eal a1)p 1l c1v the of t cen per y sixt ve land in som .e way and almost

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872

I�IUTIONAL LAW . T S N O N C IA P IO H T E F O SoURCEBOOK

. ln d. lly 8 di ica s g Ba_ ri1 es th du e a 6 19 1 d s ra di . Aw j a · a sh ge p 1a e1 \a"'-8 · . M . e · th . n 1 d · · . . cases 11ear t vo g ac I . n 1n tr v1 n d 1 co an a h d 1t w an o d d to J.st ur bg 1 1 v1 ha s it su _ s se as cl were of t\\,0 a11ce of possession. Approxin1ately one-fourth of the decisions give11 on review modified in some vvay tI1e decisi on of the lowe: court. Most �ppeal cases we�e sent back to the co urt of' first itlsta11ce ,vith instructions to hear w1t1�esses or consider documents that had, f01· some rea.son, been igi1 01·ed at the first trial. Othei· cases i11volved theft of ho11sehold goods and agricultural products and only a fe\\' cases arose out of the. ft of cash.

Fifteen perce11t of the Menagesba Awrad ja 's first instance criminal load was composed of violatio11s of A,·ticle 558 of the Pe11a/ Code·- ''Grave willful injury.'' The otl1er eighteen pe1·cent of the criminal cases heard on first instance at the 11enagesha Awrad ja we1·e dist1·ibuted fairly eq11ally between damage to property (A. rticle 653 of t/1e Pe11al Cocle), violation of transport rules concerning loading of trt1cks and bt1ses, a11d cases bro11ght bef01·e the court to satisfy the requirements of Article 29 of the Crin1i11al Procedu,·e Code (bringing a suspect to court within forty eigbt l1ours afte1· h is arrest).

In 1na11y first .u1stance c1·in1inal cases the court's remoteness from the sce11e of the crin1e cot11)led with diffic11lties of t1·ansportation and communication create a great ma11y proble1ns. Poli ce are not al'\vays likely to be statione d in most areas whe1·e the crime is committed. Th11s tl1ey have to rely upon the reports of atbia clag,1as a11cl cl1iqira sl1un1s brot1ght to then1 where tl1ey are stationed in larger tow·ns. ,_fhen tl1e re1)01·t has to be bro11gl1t to Addis Ababa f'or consideration by the prosec utor at the Menagesl1 a Aw1·ad ja.. D11ring tl1e ti1ne requi red for all this th . e suspect is often held in police c 11stody whi le the investigation and ·trial run their course. Re-read: Cl1apter VII, page 598; B11 dget ot' the Mi 11 istry of" Justice for the year 1958 E.C. (1965/66). Problem

'"fraditional li11es of �tctio11 i1.1 ''col1rt reform'' la\VS entail the fallowing: l. redticing the nt-i 111· ber o f difle1·e11t cot1rts (e.g., abolishing the Mekitil Woreda _ Co11rt); 2· increasing tl1e mi11im11m ju1·isdictional limits of the first instance court; . ·.·ng abili· ·ty . to 3 · 1·imiti -=- - transfer a case fron1 one tribunal to another· · 4· 1·�dticing the ntimber of appeals wi th a single ent pet com direct appeal to � - - -higller level appellate t1·ibunal · ' -:-:--= 5. encouragi11 g settlement of cases o·u t o co . f u rt ' -: · · .. 6· enaeting other measures to reduc � � d!S . "-be wi ll _- � _. e wh de lay ich an co d ng est ion _ cussed infra. ..,,." ----------·-=��:- From the standpoint of efficiency _ : ....... S= ie 1 · · · )l! o · �� · _ � · �5: -r � a � · c an _ jud1 wise d of alloca tion . =-"· these stePs all may n1a � · obv1o _ ke 0-E •be · t · t1s ro se nf nse. h W co L- �i.-- ·:;�::i�� n:, bl t a i:ract1ca ems 1 pro . . vernme . · 11t . . 1n1t . , of Ethiop1a Ill ,.. ..... _ -� , , _ ll tIO da � · . 1a . . t1 ng the first 11 • tfi"-- "';;��-..:d-,. · soI":. "our 11St.ed re.1"orm - -.,..... s supra.? c·con 0f ex1st1ng courts) Wh at ur f th er data would be seful to a pe s@n. ch�-��iJ�� . task of studying the valu � � � _ _ _;�;� e of further consol1dat1on of Ethiopia �s-co· ur. ts:?·. · ��:;��}::;;:;:�. � .-

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873

OF TlIE EMPEROR TO l\1AINTAIN JUSTICE A'l'IVE OG PRER T}IE D ITS RELATION TO TflE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY TI-l.E AN COURTS a/ Prerogatil'e Polvers of t/1e E1111Jeror to .S'eci,re Ji,stice Tra11sition a,zcl tional Tradi for His People

Re-read: Chapter III, pages 291-294, 301-302, 305, st1pra (Traditio11al po\�lers of Emperor to hear petitions from the courts a11d otl1er sources); Chapter III, pages 326-335 (Tr eatn1e11t of this I)Ovver i11 tl1e Co11stitutio11 of 1931 and the Unp11blisb ed Com111e11tary; fi11d the releva11t articles); Chapter IV, pages 354-355 (Assig11n1e11t of respo nsibility to Mi11ister of Justice to ''sub n 1it petitions'' a11d 1nake ''recon1 n1et1datio11s'');

From EtJ1iopian Herald, 1v1arch 10, 1964 (Excer1)t fro111 1-f.I.lv/. 's ''Seven Point Declaration to Peop l e of Bale'').

7. Those pe o ple who, for fail11re to }Jay their la n d taxes dttri11g tl1e period 1951-1961 bad lost their la11d, are to be give11 back tl1eir la11cl JJrovidecl tl1at the land in question bas n ot been take11 by the Governn1ent or give11 to individuals.

From Hambro, ''The Rebellion Trials i11 Ethiopia," 12 Bi1l!eti11 of lt1tert1c1tio11c1I Co1n1nission of Jurists, page 29, (1961).

It is_ a thought dear to most Ethiopians tl1at they can obtai11 j11stice fro1n His In11Jerial MaJesty even if the courts have failed them.

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Re-read: Chapter III, page 312, ( Af,-1·1011d a11d Cole111c1n: ".ivlodernization'' of a political system

calls for "differentiation, explicitness and functional distinctiveness of political and governmental

structures .',

The Proble,n: The Present Jurisdiction of t/1 e Prerogative to Jvfaintai1z Justice Tl1rougl1 the Courts.

The traditional powers of the emperor (and the rights of. people to presen t �11. mann:r of petitions to him) suggested by tl1e a.bove readings were 11 ot of�en differentiated''; rather they tended to be blended into a single, comprehensive conc ept of the emperor as a ce of j11stice, a11d lo\v-giver and head of government, sour church and society . l aw,_ it the ith � an, ent rnm e the gov the der mo , on 11ti n · isation of the constit .W 0bvio usly becomes more important to ''differentiate'' and ''delegate p e o gative � � p w ers The t i gra to r l we po the , rts o11 c e the pow j by r to review a case ad udicated c temenc. y, the power to review some alleged abt1se in public adnuniStration, the As er to grant an peria ys. wa r ula rtic pa in w ied dif mo be im �� o l favour are each to . ese th of cl1 e � ow k� e ly tiv o c e tin ins nd and C l man suggest- and as lawyers rn:y hav e to be conceived of as a differen t gover11mental fu11ctio11, a different legal pro cedure. ng pi lo ve de v h of s e a m le ob pr e ev th pr V iously considered (Chapter I) go verW� n1ng traditional t. men ern gov of nt eme nag ma the r powers exercised ove

874

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SoURCEBOOK OF ETlIIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(

it ic pl n of s ex tio er w �a le po de to e th e , th w la C e ic rv se ouncil l vi ci a of n tio tic iiltrod _ , m' me b lop e th ve 11t de s, of cie law en ag a r est he ot d. an lish es tri tis • ters, the u1i i • lS · ' •� l/1 g · ' Oif 1,.,I' ' ' t� f hd w� ? . .og on at1 �re c! en h e ag t es ts, ac e lik ive rat 1ist 1 n1i ad the of ,;ew 1 ,.e al ;udici d 1 ct1on over p u b�1c officials r1s l Ju na pe ith (w l ra g ne ey 1·11 to at e }, t11 ld at � �aitdito,·-ge, 1 eral r e ro th d J?e an of Em q re rs u 1re a rede fi we po e'' tiv _ cu xe ''e l, na tio di tra efef ct vai ·iotls us iv of r1o at a v· og s'' er es pr itn lic : xp es ''e th e pr e w 11e a d an ' 11' tio tia ' e11 fer f di Ilition ' u s governmental 1:ersonnel to anrio va ss mi dis d a11 r sfe ·an t , int po ap 1 rogati�e to . ab ses or t s u f ou ure ab a1l of nts la1 n1p co vario us ar he to y; lic po 1d 1 a ,vs a ce 110t1n I officials.

Similarly, tl1e establish111ent of a system of courts, the ''separation'' of these co11rts from other agencies of government plus the development of comprehensive legislation as the written source of a// law, may force changes in the way in which traditional prerogative power to sec11re justice is exercised.

The Co11stitution (A,·ticle 35) and other laws now establish explicit procedure by whicl1 to exe1·cise the po\\1er to grant clemency to persons sentenced for com· n1ission of c1·i111es. This power is not only traditional within Ethiopia, it is a dis· cretio11ary power cornn1only vested in heads of govern�ent throughout the world; it is exercised by monarchs i11 constitt1tional mona rchies· (tho u gh some may act solely on the advice of the appropriate n1inister), by presidents or premiers in other constitt1tio11al systems. Altho11gl1 a clemency power is argu ably broader than a jt1dicial power, it 111t1 st be exe1·cised. ca11tiou sly to ens u re against any encroachmen t· u pon the power and i11depe 1 1ce of the cou,·ts to interpret and apply the law. (For further discu ssio 11, see Fis/1e,�, Ethiopia11 c,�f,ninal Procedure (1969).)

''the has Article en1peror of 35 the Revised the Constit that declares also tion u . right and duty to 111ai1.1tain j11stice thro11gh the cou rts.'' I11 liol1t of tradition and, perhap�, �he Constitt1tio11. ( Cf Articles 63 and 59) and othere la,vs (e.g., the Ci1�il a71d Crzmznal P1·ocedz,11·e Cocles ), a11d in lioht of co11tinuing practice it is often said that Article 35 preserves tl1e e111pe1·or's po�er to adj11dica te in Cfzilo; as an ''ultimate court." Btlt tl1at assertio1 1 111ay be inacc u1·ate. Tl1e ''judicial power'' is vested in the ''courts establisl1ed by law," c1nd J.4.rticle I 09 certainly implies tl1at these ''courts'' are_ to �e the St1pre1ne Co11rt, and other inferio1· cou rts established by parliamentary le_gz�lat , 11• A nu mbe1· of _arg11�1e11ts sug very is 109 Art ges icle t thi 1ter s pre i 1 tat ion : °. siin 1la� t� an alogo _ 11s art1cles 1n otl1er co11stitt1tions (e.g., Article Ill of the U.S. Co,istzti,t,o,i ; ons t zcle rea _ s 76 of' · t/1e us _Ja1 Jar1 ese obv io Co ,zst itut r e ion the ); re a. �� _ _ _ w - const1 t11t�o1 �tself establis�1es �l1e �igl1est d � . �p r �nc � ? l . d ici a u co the j 11rt in ;; � � - 1 to _ establish 1 P_ : es f �r legislat1�1 1nfer1or courts wit h subordi11ate Jur1sdictio �. ote also t�e A �aric t�sag� ''fird 'biet'' to denote the courts to be establisb ed by r � w Th s t : ti Em11�10_1 , s G_liilot 1s su rely _1 1ot an ''Article 109 court,'' and t.hus n.ot an rticl� lOB cou, t since the co11rts mention 6- �� --' � � cou : the ed in Article 108 are presumably a � �zv J�hed by or p11rs u ant to Article 109. (On this point see also, Sedler, EthiQP�aJ!.. � . z rocedure, pages 12-13 (1968). ·

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urt pow::0�:af �e� n �te that Article 35 (English version? speaks of the f'at nta in � 1-" u stic � e tlir . . oi1g : thi h s of " tlze _ cou . rts sco .'' pe W ha , t the the :_::, n } 1s · ""-� r· 35) �rero gat1ve? Is It the source . . . rtled dec �=-�·'- �� ses _:: =. ca of a e t 1.ca power uu to rev d ew i a d d n a. the by 0r · courts ?· If. 110t, does the Constitution otl1erwise clearly ''in1ply'' s 1ie Jra R�� != �� · · · � is the exercise Of cr,z · . al'' , ,residu n e� " .. ... · , " . · · .:; �� ,_ � :t1 e. 1. ot � . a pow£ r o nai powe r - a traditi . becaus.e not expressly altered b y the Constitution? .. . . . - .._'.:::·��::::,-·��-;�� . -� :,fi

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Articles 4, 26, 27, 3 1, 35, 36, 59, 63 a11d Chapter VI of the carefttlly: ider Cons io n. sti tu t Co n ise d Rev 92 of �h�pte r IV, sitJJra (E1111) ero1's ad clre ss )roinulgating tlle 3 g pa l � Re-r ead: , ReVIsed Co11 s t1tut1on, r en1arks on tl 1e En1pe1or s d11ty to assure obse rva11 ce of the Consti tt1 tion by all branche s of gov<:r11111 e11 t); pa.ges 442:445 of Chapt er 17, si,pra �d isc:1ssion of /-.irticle 36 as a11 ind e pendent source of pow er or as a clar1ficat1on of otl1er explicit }Jr erogative s in Chapt er II). Other Legal Sources on the ScoJJe of tl1e Prerogative to Maintain Ji,stice Tl1roug/1 the Courts. From Crirninal Proceditre Code of Etl1iopia. Art. 183. - Application to Ilis J111perial A1ajesty's 1-:,;/1ilot. (1) Nothing in Art. 182 shall pre v e nt a11 aprel la11t ,vl10 l1as exl1at1stecl l1is right s of appeal und e r Art. 182 from applyi11g to J-Jis J11-11Jerial 1vfajesty's Chilot for a review of th e cas e. (2) The application to His Impe rial Majesty's Chilot sl1all be acco1npa.11ied by: (a) a copy of the jt1dgme 11t or judgme11ts with which the applica11t is dissatisfied ; and (b) a rea soned memorandt1m se tti11g forth ctearly a.11d concisely tl1e reasons on which the appl icant b ase s his req11 e st for a revie\v.

From Civil Procedure Code of Etf1iopia. Art. 322. - His Imperial 1'1ajesty's C/1ilot. Nothing in Art. 321 shall preve nt an appell a11: wl10 has exbat1sted his rights of appea l from making a petition to His J111perial. Majesty's Cl1i/ot for a re visio11 of the case und er Art. 361-370. Art. 36 l · - Petition for revisiorz. (I) A petition to His Imperial Majesty's C/1ilot for the r evisio11 o� a case sl1all be mad e within one month of the prono1111ceme11t of the Jt1dgment or d.ecision follow ing which the petitione r's rights of app eal or r eco11rse to any court ar e exhausted and sha ll be accompanie d by: (a) a copy of the judgment or jud gments with which the p etitioner is di ssatisfi ed; and (b) a writte n memoran dum setting forth clearly and c�11?isel y tl1e r easons on which the petitioner b ases his pe ti tion for a r ev1s1011. (2) Upon receipt of the e e serv ed on b to ce i t 11o ect i l l sha 1 t ilo � C/ p ti tion the � . d. t a gr e the opposite party to show cause why the pet1t1on sl1011l d not b �� (3) The provisions of e11 a l)e t1t1011 wh ogy l ana y b · y l app l l sha Arts. 324-326 _ app eals under this Article is ma de out of tim e . [These articles d eal \Vtth ''out of time''.] Art. 36 2· - S ecur1ty for costs: e t l1 an (I) \Yhere the petitio r 1no t no hin it w all sh er ion tit n is granted, the pe sixty days:

' ,

876

STi fUTIONAf;, LAW N o C N IA P IO I IT E F O SOUJtCEBOOK

I ,. ('

t n e d n d ; o n e a sp th re f o s st o c e th r fo (a ) ftlfJJish sect1rity . o ay t. ed fr ir u de q_ e re th be e a� 1n en as xp t. un se of 11o a1 ch su t si po de (b) t re �n 1 _ n m? e· 1s nv co , er ev ch hi _w the g, record in py co or r, fo g din sen e th ich 1on wh t1t to pe nt me dg Jtt relates was e th 1 icl wh of• the c,1se in given. r ne io l e al tit th sh �e be e, ad m en nd be fu re s ha e , 1y a1 d if , iJY co cli su re he W ) (2 r d de te a un si bpo su de rt. nt ou (1) (b). am e th of y, an if e, nc la ba with the . . n io it et p of ng ti r1 ra G 3 36 . Art e 2, th 36 rt. e A ad t m llo sit Ch po de shall: d n a ed ish n 1· ft1 en be s ha y rit ct1 Where se (a) declare tl1e petitio11 ad1nitted; d ; an nt de on sp re e th to of e e1· tl1 e tic no ve gi (b) y of the an of s pie co papers ed cat nti the at1 re mo or e on 1·ty pa er eith (c) giv e in the suit 011 his applying therefor and paying the reasonable expenses incurred i n 1)repa1·ing them.

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Art. 367. - Orders pe11cling hearing of petition. (I) Notwithsta11ding the grant of a petition for revision, the decree t.o which the· petitio11. relates shall be UI1conditionally executed, unles·s the Chilot othe1·\vise directs. (2) Tl1e Chilot may, for good cause, of its own motion or on the application of any party to the st1.i't: (a) impot1nd any n1ovable property i11 dispute or any part thereof; (b) allow tl1e execution of the decree to which the petition relates taking such secl1rity from tl1e respo11dent as it thinks fit for the due perform an ce of any order which it may make on the petition; (c) stay the execution of tl1e decree to which the petition relates, talcing st1ch sect1rity f1·0111 t11e petitioner as it tl1inks fit for the due performance of tb.e said clecree 01· of a11y decree or order '\\'hich it may make on · the petitio11; or (d) place ai1y party seeking its assistance u11der such conditions or�give �ticl1 . other· directio11 1�especting the subject-matter of the petition, as it tl11nks fit, by the appoi ntme11t of a receiver or oth.erwise. Art. 369. - 0JJeration of decree or order. . !1 nless t�e· Chilot otherwise directs, no dec1·�e or order of the Chilot shall be.........,...,.,...,... e fh �o noperative on · t�e grot111d tl1at 110 11otice .has been served on or given : ; . . = t_egal representative of any �eceased opposite party or deceased res�onden In a cas�, �here such opposite party or respondent did not appear eif4e� _ .aL- = · e heari ng In the court whose decree was complaine of or at· any proceeding d !� bseqtie s · · · c -fo nt t� t �e decree of that court, but such order shall have the same r e · ; an<l effect as if It had been made bef - -� · ore the death took p lace. Art. 370. - Execution. -_- �- � :__-�:--.-3(I) Whoever desires to obtain execu �lot eli: � th; _ �f · .--',_l ·-�-�---- ---:�?,,. er tion of any decree or ord · � � · ll make sha · 1 h �.'...-:5:=��· an app 1cat1on, accompanied by a certlfieo copy of: s.u��.;-� · �';_}=� .

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execl1te the decree or order as tho11gl1 it I1 ad bee 11 passed sh�ll court (Z) Such or made by itself. (3) The _orders made by th_e co11rt \-Vhicl1 exe cl1tes tl�e decree or order of tl1e relating to such execut1011, sha ll be appealable 111 tl1e sa111e 111an11er a11d stibject to the same fllles as the orde rs of s11cl1 co11rt relating to the exect1 tio11 of its own decrees .

Art. 371. - Principle. (1) A decree may be execu�ed in accor?a11ce with tl1e 1)rovisio11s of this Cl1apter either by the court ,vhicl1 passed 1t or by th e court to which it is se11t for execution. (2) Nothin_g in this C h apt e r shall affect the provisions of tl1e Mariti111e Code regarding the arrest, dete ntion and sale of sl1i1)s. Note: Arts. 364, 365, 366, 368 deal with for1nalities regarding the furnishing of sect1rity for costs. Note that the Procedtue Codes do not provide for an ''appeal'' as of rigl1t to H.!.lvf. 's Chilo!. Rather the procedure is a "petition'' for "revie\v'' or ''revision'' of the case. Js this distinction in terminology made equally explicit in the Amharic version of tl1e releva11t articles? Is tl1is term ("revision" or "revie\v'') significant? Cf Art. 370 of tl1e Civil Procedure Code, SIIJJra.

Froni Ministers (Definition of Powers) (An1endn1ent) Order No. 46 of 1966, l\7egarit Gazeta 25th Year No. 23. 32. . .. The Minister of J11stice, in accorda11ce vvitl1 tl1e Ia,v, sl1all: •

• •

(b) make all arrangements for tl1e establishn1e11t and adnli11istration of a1)pro priate co11rts throughout the nation; (c) ensure and supervise the impartial ad111it1istration of justice; • • •

(i) submit to Us the record of each case i11 ,v hicl1 sente11ce of deatl1 has been passed together with h i s re con1me11datio11s; (j) submit to Us petitions concerning pardons, toge the r witl1 l1is recommendat1ons. . .. Th ese seem to be the most relevant legislative sources establishing proced�re for tl1e exercise of the E�peror's Chilot. Compare Order No. 46 of 1966, (Article 32, s11I?ra) with Order No. 1 of 1943 (Arti:le 59 and 60, set out pages 354-55, supra). Note that an earlier 1raft of Order No. 4_6 �repa!ed ID 1964, before promulgation of the Civil Procedure Code, �or the , Conm11_ ttee 0? Admi �r�tive Reform'' contained the following: ''The Minister of Jt1st1ce shal�: ·· .(h) SUbIDit to Us petrtions for the exercise of Our prerogative, together with his recommeotlation."

Observations on the Institu tiorz of C /1i/ot - Theory a11d Practice. �ro� Se�ler, ''Th e Chilot Jurisdiction of t he Emperor of Ethiopia: A Legal Analysis Hist00cal and Comparative Perspective," 8 Journal of African Law, page 59, -73. (l964) (footnotes om itted). .t �here are tw o possible ways of loo kin g at chi/ot. o11e is that chilot represe11ts \e highest court in th e judicial system (by the jt1dicial systen1 we mean �he structt1re ) 9 o rts 2 4 1 i .( twn !ama stab u Proc Jus ce n ti of t in Adm d istr lishe o e under the �dc� a the 1on 1at la1 exp e s thi r cle 1:1n r sup . ak h e spe ''' em to m ''Supre e Col1rt so E. eIs t anner as do me a s ou e t ro tn d er ju � t pow be ial 1;11 dic l exercising in chilo th�Pcou r W rts. The other explanation, which seems preferable, 1s tl1at chilot represetJts

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878

SOURCEBOOK o:F ETI-IIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

d ice st an �u s h� to ?o as its e iv at ?g er so pr 's ce ur g? i _ e 1· ve so t e he tll of _ . e cis er ex e th e ig tl1 re 1n ve ns so ai m n re tw no , ed 1tt st m ith 1b s1 an 1s 1t d at i·n tI1 e ic st J·11 of l IIl tit ct · . ot n o 1il ts ti c/ is 1a e� a1 pl t ex ar s 1i ap t1 er o d fr 11 U m s. t 1· �1 co th! of 11t 11e 11 . s1 li b ta es �� u e s u _ t� d se s1_ es re ss o p_ m 11 of 1 !e ve sti so ju e th ce e us ca d �� an in Ste S)' t ur � co r lla gt re _. h i s dec1s1on supers edes tha , ne ?o is_ ce sti Ju at th e se to ty t the tlltimate responsib.1l1 ed en l!y pp na in t1 h� �1 tra i op t hi 1a Et wl a _is lis Tl d, . an se ca n ve gi � a ,i11 ts tir co e th of n , t1o nd 1n tu gla st1 En 1n e s th low fol of on ris pa m from co r ou n1 o f1· 1 1 e as \\'e 11ave se e ct at e th fa th e ur th sc ob o t tw 11o es do is th institu-. 1t B1 e. tiv ga ro e · 1)1 e tl1 of tl1e 11attire g vin ch ct a ha ea tin tl1 dis wi e sid , by ugh e tho sid ist ex t, ilo c/1 1d. ·a1 ts t1r co e tl1 , ns tio related, role to play in the admi11istration of just.ice. m ter the ng ' usi urt are ''co ,ve ' in the '', urt ''co a t 11o is lot chi t tha say e \V en Wh legal ratl1er tha11 tl1e pop11lar sense, that is, the sense in which the word is used in the Constit11tio11 a11d laws defini11g judicial power. We a,re attemptjng to draw a dist i11ctio11 bet,vee11 the fu11ctio11s and powers of the cot1rts referred to in th,e Consti t11tion a11d Ia,vs, and the functions and powers of the Emperor in chilot. It is sub1nitted that an a11alysis of the provisions of the Co11stitution and laws will reveal that the legal basis of cl1ilot is the p rerogative of the sovereign to do justice and that witl1 sovereign prerogative as its basis the po\i\ ers and functions of the Em.peror i11 c/1ilot differ from the powers and f1 1nctio11s of a court, as we have defined it. Si11ce the Co11stitution doe s 11ot provide for cl1ilot in Chapter VI, which defines the judicial power an. d at1thorizes tl1e es tablishn1ent of coitrts, the source of jurisdiction in cl1ilot m11st be f ot1nd elsewl1ere than i11 the text of tha.t Chapter. The source, it is s11b1nitted, lies in tl1e sovereign p1·erogative of the Emperor to do justice. This pre rogative_ gives hi111 t11e power to 1·evievv co11rt j11dgments and, as we have seen, set them aside for �e aso11s vvl1icl1 1nay be difle1·e11t they (may also be the same) from the reasons f 01· 'A:l11cl1 a11 ap1)ellate co11rt reverses a judgment of a subordinate cour!· Tl1e pre1·oga�1ve o� the sovereign to do jt1stice has long existed in Ethiopia and 1s firmly established 111 the Ethiopia11 legal t1�aditio11. By the Constitution the Emper or has delega�ed_ �ome o� l1i� p�we�s a11d prerogati,,es to other agencies of govern m�nt. Bt�t. s_ overei�ruty re1na1�1s 111 l111n 1n acco1�dance \\iith the pro,,isio11s of the Constitut1.07i. [Citi�g A,·trcle 26]. Tl11s n1ea,11s tl1at tl1e po»;ers arid pre1·ogati11es he always possess�d remain 111�less t�ey are �JJecifically a.bolished by the Constitution or their exerc1se wotild be 111co11s1ste11t \V1tl1 the othe r· provisions of the Constitution. Cliilot jt1 ��sd!ctio11 is ft1lly consistent \\'it11 the other provisions and has struc ture , ition. Unde1· _ Constitt of th� C/1aJJte1· v1· the ji.1dicial po,ver is vested in the courts es_t bl hed by law; the judicial power is the power to decide cases in accoidance _ � � �w�t l t� . e law. The Einperor co11tin11es to perfor had = �ys alw has he fun n1 ctio the n . x . with respect to the ad1n1111strat1ot1 a�u, rts cou · · . · of Justice, the · of to judgments review 1·1 1 t1le broad sense, to Se rcJ ex. e see thatji,stice is done when the courts fail. In chilo-t he c.... a- - � .,.. · 1 sth· at power · Th,e fac·t that Ius --- -�=� 0. _ t :cour · d ec1s1on · · 111 the of · chilot that supersedes · e cas does 110 ea1 that the i nt · siste �_-=-: --w exercise of chilot jurisdiction is. incon . !� 1 f�: � x �IS Cia! pow�r by the_ courts. In the first place, where the E1P?�'o/�� ! . does n g�.a��. ��eiew in '=:-::::: chilot, the Judgments of the courts are fin·al and""C?ro . -� =� But more s1gn1ficantly the powe . BS de e· t1v 0f the Emperor to exer�ise his preroga _· � 1E.,:�,� : . � . not directly interfere wi e ��i� if _ e ' t : r�t �� e r ty we h ili po ab :" e e o t e ts r t c1s u. er e to co h f �� h �d !O t em un er the Constitution. Th � m e ourts a r� free t� Judge the case�_b.e-f��eif i::::c �f the Emperor himself r an executive official sat 1n the court and -pr �n �lJ�� :�� ? � Judgment _i·nst .ead of the � ---:::: � C,.: .: d n u -::l: n ! � -t' o .ge · Jud s , th e courts could not p. erform tlie1,:r,�-:1cllllb.Q - -��lj"':';r�f · the Constittitron, . · and the action of the Emperor or the ex:��e oflicj;al �gtil ��: 1

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL ]NSTITUTIONS

879

the of Co nst itt1 VI tio11. Nor does the fact tl1 at the r Cha pte . with e ·,( 1ncons t decision ·sten . . 1 . . . sub��ct t o �ev1�� 111 cI11 �ot, a11� he11ce 11 0 t fitlal, meatl y 11 potent1a is court of the

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the �erfo rm1ng Jt1d1c 1�l ft1;nc�1)1� �ss1gned to thein tinder tlie not_ are s court the that t:ure of c/11/ot �ur1�cl1ct1011 we fii1d tl1a t na t_ h e_ exam. 1 ?1-°g In on. there are tituti Cons ( t O characteristics which d1stingu1sh t11e exercise of st1 cl1 jurisdiction fron1 t he l I e;ercise of judicial power by t�e courts. �irst tl1 e exercise of jurisdictio11 i 11 c!zilot n ( is discretionary. The Emperor 1� not reqt1!red t o hea: a particular case or exercise 1,' t, chi/ot jurisdicti?n at �11. As _po1nt�d . ot1t. 1n _tl1e_ pre\1ous sectio11, the Co11 s titution does not mention chzlot. This on11ss1on 1s s1gn1ficant. U11der tl1e Co11 stitt1tion the Emperor is not given the cli1ty to _exe:c�se j�1ris?ictio11 in chilot as he is given certain such as that of ma1nta1n111g Justice tl1rot1gl1 the co11rts. Persons have duties, other I present petitio.ns to Hin1, wllicl1 ,vot1ld incl11de, of course, JJetitio11s seeki11g to right a l ·J' of his prerogative to do justice. Bt1t 110·.vl1ere are they given tl1e right exercise the ! to have their case heard on the merits in c/1ilot. In otl1er words, tl1ere is a rigl1t to ask for r eview of the case, bttt whether to hear. the ca;e or, as we have saicl, whet her I to exercise chilot jurisdjction at all, rests in tl1e discretio,1 of tl1e E111peror. The absence of a d uty to exercise chilo t jt1risdiction is in accordance witl1 the principle of sovereign prerogative. Secondly, in c/1ilot the Emperor is not to1111d by tl1e provisio11 s of tl1e I II strict la\v, but many mitiga te the rigours of the law i11 the particular case. Courts do not possess this power. Under article 108 tl1e coz11ts m11st exercise jztclicial power �. in accordance with the law, i.e. the Cons tit ution, stat1 1 tes and codes. U11der ar ticle 110 the judges are required to give jt1dgn1ent in acccrdance wi tl1 tl1e la\v a11d must sub mit to no authority other than tl1e law. This does not n1ea11 tl1at sometimes the code provisions may not be sufficiently :flexible so that the jt1dges can interpret I them to meet the needs of the individt1al case. Bt1t other ti111es they are 11ot a11d be. This may become code ap1Jlication �annot especially true in the earlier periods of I in �evelopi.ng legal system. In c/1ilot the Emperor possesses the power to relieve against the effect of the strict law. { t• . As we saw in our earlier disct1ssion, the prerogative of the sovereign is to ''do Justice'' ra t her than to decide cases, limited by the provisions of the law. It is not nece�s a1{' to get into a me taphysical discussion abot1t the differences be t\veen ' 'law'' and Justice.'' Suffice it to say that while the applic�tion of the formal law .111 th_e ¥reat run of cases may be sound and just, there may be individual cases wh�r� it �s not. We have earlier used the example of a cont1oversy between persons living I �n _a remote part of the nation where all affairs have been governed by custom tliat • inco nsisten_t with the w�itten Jaw. One of tI1e hi�torical reasons for the maintenance � f the sove_re1gn I co�rt s tructu_re, l f�rma a of ati t prerog 1sl1men establ ve the long after . w saw in ou.r stt1cly of the instit11tio1 1 in England_, is to provide � de�i-�e by which :: e � rigours �f the la\v may be mitigated i11 a par ticular �ase. This IDJtigation and ' ·ving of re_lief where l none was available under the law 1s exactly _ what was done � the English }(jog in the Curia Regis and later by :he cl1ancellor _ i n t_he, �h�ncery ,; urt on behalf of the King. The pow er of the Emperor to ''�o Jt1st_1ce . without be�ng bouotl by the formal law has historically been �ecog11ized In Ethiopia a� \1/ell, a we have sa!d, trine � f c do . the of. ce 1 a1 ten 11 i �a the is r fo e on ns so of rea the � reign prerog�tive uct ure. 1�1 this str_ rt co11 al :orm the r of afte ent the hm blis esta I res e t he e ercise of e rcis exe the n1 fro y_ �pl sha t st ch mo of . power in ilo differs x ! jurfu � t1on ide dec to d un by bo t no IS ot the hzl ui r c c ror pe Em e Th t ts. the t fac tha �·u acco:� g to e Th . so do t o se o o_ cl1 the t no !n .. y ic v str ma e t h law tha t an es do me ot n · so gn may exer cise d an r ne 1an 1 he _ t 11 1 ne do is ce s1i �� ju � his prerogative to see that for rea sons that he dee.ms fit. Thus, he ma y set aside a judgment In clzilot because �

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SOURCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

lle belie,,es that the cou rt 1nisapplied the law, or because �he proceedings were Unf co the co�rt r �ec_ t ly believ e s J1e applied although the law, the applica air or becatlse, tio case unjust. was It 1s 1n the latter respect that the p n f the Ja,v iii the partict1Iar owe r 8 from in chilot differ En1pero r that of the courts. �nd f11nctions of the

At this j11nctt1re \1/e TI?-ay consider the role o� tl1e F!�d. M_irmera �nd the Sebr e , Se,11i. Altho11gh th ese bodies are Ioo e ly termed �ourts , It 1s subrrutted that � are not courts in the se11se that the tribunals established under the 1942 proc!a they ,nat io n are or i11 tl1e sense that the t erm is used in. CJzapter VI of the Constitution. They do not possess the jitdicial power, as they cannot render a jud�_ent. Both m_ a ke con1n1e11dations to the E1npe ro1·; he alone makes the final dec1s1on. The. main re fun c tion of the Fird lv.li1·n1e1·a is to screen pe titions for review in chilot and decide wh eth er they have any 1nerit. It makes recomn1endations to the Emperor as to wh eth er the case sho11ld be 1·eviewed in clzilot an d ma y make recommendations as to the disposition. Wl1en the Fi1·d Mirr,1e1·a decides that the petition for review lac ks me rit, it has authority from the Emperor to di sm iss it. The function of th e Sebre Semi is to give an opinion on q11estions of law when such questions arise in cl iilot and when the Emperor 1·efers the case to it When the Emperor has th e re co . m me ndations, l1e hears the case. He may p er mit the parties to ar gue be fo re hi m an d ma y seek the advice of others. He may also establish a special co m m is si on to he ar the case and make 1·ecommendatio11s to him. The final decision is of , co ur se , his. It should be noted that there is no absol11tely rigid proce du re for re vi ew in chilot. Petitions made directly to the Empero1· or· to the Mjn is tr y of J1 1stice or other government agen·cy will no . t b e ig11or ed if tl1e Emperor feels the case mer its review. · The Fi,·d Mi1·n1e1·a possesses anoth e r f11nction: it m a y recommend that another appellate co11rt l1ea1· a case, though ,� , , it h o u t such direction that appellate court would have no j11risdiction. From Be rekete Ab llabte Se/l a ss ie , '' C o nstit11tiona1 Development in .Et hiopia," IO Joi11·nal of Afi·ican Lai,,, p . 87 (1966). ��ere is a ne,� ring abo11t th e p rovision regarding the Judiciary, which makes a positive de. clarat1on that ''ji td 1er ic ia l p o J i , sl1all b e vested in the courts established by law and shall be exerc ised b y th e c ourt s in acc o rdance � ·ith the law .... " (art. 108) �he courts are _ "a Supreme Im p erial Court an d su c h other c ou r ts a s may be au!h0• nsed or estab _ hshed by la w...." In actu al fact the Empe ror's Chilot s till functiollll and th�re . exist two k11ow11 c o 11 11 11 it te es (the F ird Mirmera Comn,ittee and the Sebre Co mmit�eet wh?se f ncti?� is s a\d t o be ad v is ? ory b u t is not de f ined by any la �, An � thetr adviso ry , ?.p1n1on s given at the c ongeste d ''b ench" of the Emper or 5 Chilot can unmake dec1 s1 o ns car efully ar _ rived a t by the Sup rem e C o urt. ' Th e c�nstitutional bas is of the E1nperor's Chilot i t self wo ti n � m up ?n. The JS�ue e n c o m r is th s may be juxta pose d in te r m s of th e expr ess prov n o f t he con� ti· tion regarding isio the �� urts a nd the tradit � io na l j u dicial p o w er o f the w c h a b e ar8iu�d o n a r M '. � [c it cb i �g Sedler] w as : � n on o t _ expres sly abolished by the co ns titllh AI .. e provision which declares sovere1gn1ty to b e v = --:h & S sometimes been put o r p er E e m th s te in e d . · (:' . lO rw · 3: . . . · d a� u r,o ; .+ an ,. o th er fu in of th n b a sis to Justify the contmued - n"'� � · e C hzlot. The b etter v1ew 1s -u that the wording of arti·cle 108 1·s e as 1t vests ,,. d.c ·a · e n x e p ss r -=I o: g µ , � We r J� ge i n erally in specified cour by article 35 w c pi r P? " d ba c ts is vi . ew Th is k� _ . =.·'-=--' o v i d e _ s t h a t � th e Emperor h a s th just ice th;oug I�e � m a:J!l e n to g d _ h u a th t ty n e d � co u rt s. I n t h e a b se nce of a la w w h ic h cle Chiiot as one of r er o E m p . th e e s a in u rl d c y l the court s and de.�unes -:. . . c. .J . · e -t s _- .· . 1·1s f unction and Ju.:r1 s0 :: 1ction, h·_.er - · ·ee - m. s.;_

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ction. A n d r�fer�11ces made to !t i11 some Ia,:vs 011 proce?ti al jurisdi fo_ r s basi � _ _ .to be n o n obJect 1o n sa . 1e TJ1e proctical proble.n1s 111volved 10 its the to ct sub1e are J s . roaster . . . . ' o t f th or age h E e n e s 1pe t or h s to_ i111e a nd tl1� 1nti�tii)l city of � � � administr ation, due . escript1on. Rece�t. atte1:1pts to strea111l111e a11cl rat1onal1ze 1t �ave defy � eals, a e�ery litigant if be co11ld wo11ld go to the t?l), TJ1e view, Nearly avail. no of b��n _ t the Jt ldges wo11ld do a worse �ob bt1t for the t1lt1mate possibi tha voiced, es metim i througl1 the al wrath /ot, ca1111ot be t�l<en seriously. /; imper _ and C } e expos of t:1; the ,vork of the co11.� ts � ompared with that of the of analysts 1st1cal t t a s simple A 1 ork of the En 1per?r to 'rV �1cl 1s a?ded a o n of � amoui1t e-l1our daily s � stupendou session at the Chi/at \vo11ld be enough to dispose ol tl11s claim. Tl1e sys ten1 can not therefor e be reasonably expected to promote better admi11istratio11 of justice, evei1 granting that a few individual wron�s migl1t. be redress�d - fro1:1 ti111e to ti_me. I_ts political advantage for the Emperor 1s unde111able, an d 1t 1s this factor vvh1ch ,v1II determine its immediate future.

Identify and carefu.lly consider the problems reflected in the following case. Are the:y resolved by the Civil Procedure Code? j•fg' _r: \

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From Tekle Mikael Abdi v. Estate of Be!ayerzes/1 Azbete, (S11pre111e I1nperial Co11rt, 1964), 3 Joitma/ of Etlziopian Lav., 25 (1966) .

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Ato Tekle· sued (in ari Awraja court) Wo. Belayenesl1 in her capacity as adn1inistrator of her husband's estate, contesting the validity of the decedent's '-lill and clain1ing the right to ren1ain in possession of immovable property bequeathed by tl1e vvill 10 tl1e defendent. A.to Tel<le's petition was dismissed by the Awraja Court.· His appeal to tl1e Tekfay Ghizat Court \.Vas dismissed. He then petitioned the Fird Mirrnera which advised the Chilo! t,J ren1ancl tl1e case to tl1e 1-Iigh Court on the theory that if Tek.le now held possession. of tl1e land it \.Vas incumbent on tl1e administrator (Belayen.esh) to in itiate a special.action to regain possession. Tl1e Clzilot ren1ancled tl1e case in ac cordanre with this advice. The Higl1 Cot1rt l1eard argume11t and dismissed Telcle's petition. TekJe then petitioned the Fird Mirmera again, wl1ich advised:

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· This case bas come to us on a previous occasion ai1d 11pon 011r finding that there had been a miscarriage of justice, we recon1mended tl1at it be tried a11e'rv by the Hig? Court and it was dt1ly tran sferred tl1ere. :-Io\vever, the 1:igh Co11! t failed to con sider the reasons t1pon \vhich we based our recon1men dat101 , hurried_. ver � � th e matter, and found agai nst the appellant, \vhom ve had su.1�ported 1� our opinI? 11· Therefore, we reqt1est that Your Majesty s11bmit a copy of this Comm1!tee's finding of facts _and opinion to the 111per al Cl1ilot and to :lie Supreme Imperial Court for J i further investigation an d revie\1 /.

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T h e Supreme Court h.eld:

This Court finds_ · that· the argume11t put forwc.rd [by the Fird Mirinera] does _ n?t �ave any legal basis ... it affir ms. the decisions given by tl1ree co11rts ... and d1sm 1sses .this appeal. . . . .

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Problems th �n I. Consider carefull fo put s eri t eni sta � i11g � ow f0J y-and critically-the 1n a hypothetical study of Article 35 and the Em p.eror's Prerogative to Maiota _ J ustice. (a) The Emperors have traditionally exercised fi11al j u�icia� atilbority. The public has expected th em to per:orm that f u_nct1on 1� order _to preserv e the integrity of the ordinary co11rts. Without an Imperial Chilot there would be loss of confidence in the court.

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_ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ :88:_ 2 ____ ______ in e ia, tim iop s t�i Eth at re the tice jus are of 11 tio tra inis certain m ad the In (b) s al tem leg sys 1n ere wh 1t ��1 h pre bot s Jes the law t1ch m are ich wl1 s risk d lve ve evo l1� �lly d� gra ry 1c1a Jud over many l na sio fe� pro hl� }1ig and a d se �y ea 1l1 cr e ab in th o? of pr e that a �ase us �a be . ist ex s sk 1 1· 1e TI s ar ye . l na of sio fes pro se au bec incompetence ted 1ca Jud ad ly per pro m i \vill be se of cau be tio d; rup oo rst cor de un n or fo; t no are s de co tl1e ise cat be some similar reason. Again there may be rare cases where the applic a tion of new legislation causes a partict1lar, seve:e· hardship,_ not simp1y a hardship reasonably to be foreseen by the legislature. It 1s necessary to recog11ize that these risks are more likely to occur in Ethiopia, at this time, in any give11 case, tha n in other countries where the law is better kno\vn (through cases, doctrinal writing, etc.) to those who administer it and where the jt1dges and lawyers are more highly trained and enjoy more social status, independence and professional esprit. Accordi11gly, at this point, it is desirable for the Em_peror to continue to exercise bis traditional prerogative, as a protection against these contemporary risks, but the procedure for exercising the prerogative fran1ed for these particular categories of cases. should be precisely . (c) Since it is the En1peror's dt1ty to maintain 'justice,' he is not obliged, when acting through Cl1ilot, to foilow the law; if the relevant law pro dt1ces a particularly 11njt1st result (see ('b) above) he may disregard the relevant law in disposing of a petition· and 'revising' a judg ment. (d) Apart fron1 the particular circumstanc.es noted in (b). Revie\v of a case in Chilot sho11.ld not be a review of all the evidence or t.he applicable la�, it is a review to assure that the courts h.ave measured up to appro priate standards of professionalism and integrity. (�) T�e framers of the Revised Co11stitt1tion l1ave in effect left complete discretion to the �n1peror to reft1se to review particular cases in Chilot, or gradually so _rest1·1ct that oper·ation as to achieve abolition in effect. 2· O� th_e assi,,t7ptio1z that any of tl1e above statem ents do reflect a desired obJect1ve:

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(a) does tl1e Constiti,tion 1 1eed ame11dment? (b) do the JJroceclure codes 11eed an1endm ent? (c) does Order No. 46 need an1e11d1nent '? 3· 3� the constitutional �o�rce for the !aw (Article 32(c) of O �e r cle r 0�.1� · ) · w�ich empowers. the M1n1ster of Justice to ''ensure and supervise__ the �mpartial. adm�nistration of justic s wer po ria l mi e? nis '' te W spe ha t cif i 9 are included 111 th1s general delega ". � tion of power?

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THE SELECTION, TENURE � ES G ;Jlff} PROMOTION AND DISCJPLINE OF Re-read: Articles 11 o and . _ _ _ ==., ::--'-_� l l l f the Revised Constitution; . - --=-_-·: .--:::;-�---=� re1evant. comparable art1·cle · " -,, . . .. ., set �es · nt u o· s i c n th er C ons o th · 1 t �--:-t:0 ut t f o . ions · . . forth, supra at the beg in � n in =�;;·-;;.:;: g -. · o f t i h s C h a te r · pag es 7 27 appo e � � � p1! i me �n co int � a, i J1: .ZO nt "T'tim 1·" s· of · ' J· . h . ufi h co ig . u .n d · f g e "'· :i o the 2C3h1�ef4Ju( st1·ce). __...:.::_- =�:.=:-= -_ • _ _ ----- ..

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Art 111 icle of on men tati Imp le of ProbleDI S f or a pro!e ssion�l judiciarJ' of tl1e ''l1igl1e st in tegrity," re ta irls cal�s 111 le Artic of Jud ges 1 11 the E 111peror, bt1t n1a1 1da tes enactmeilt of tn1ent appo1n of power h e �, pecial law '' to lay down the procedt1re, no t 011\y for jud icial selection bt1t for as ·'' 1 d 11 r n1 a r: t' e1 e re re s 1t. 1 an tr 1 , a v o rem "prom otion, tat e \Vl1at policies \\1ill be f oll0\\1ed by tl1e ''s Jecial law," t s no s doe 111 1 Article though obviously th e ''independence'' of t/1e ji1diciarJ1, as set fortl1 in Article 11 O, must be preserved and t�e �rnper�r' s prerogative to asst1re jt1stice (11rtic!e 35) res pected. Presum ably too, 1t 1s poss1 �le to reacl1 co11c11rrence 011 tl1e qt1alities desired of judges: in term s of age, experience, k11owled ge, te1 11perame11t , fortitude and integrity. Within these broad confines those who n1t1st draft a11d enact a ''s1Jecial l aw'' on the judiciary are, in th eory, coi1fr o11ted ,,,ith a nl1111ber of choices . The judiciary, in th eory, migh t be d e veloped as a con1pletely auto1101nous, self-governing bra nch of government. The ranki11g jud ges n1ight be vested witl1 powers to nomina te candi d ates for j udici al vaca11ci es, pron1ote or discipline judges and administer the courts in all otl1er way s. Tl1e Emperor' s appoi11t1nent of jt1dges might be trea ted, de facto, as a formalit y confir1ning the selectio11 decision of other senior judges. Thus the ji,diciarJ' it self \Vo11ld be res po11sible for i ts O\Vi1 recrt1itme11t, for policying itself and f or the efficiency of tl1e co11 rts. Or, the law co uld reflect policies of exte 11 si ve executive su1Jervi sio11. Broa d powers could be delega ted to the Minis ter of Justice to 11omi11ate, pro111ote ai1d discipline judges, to assign judges to p artict1la r d i vi sio11 s to s11pervise tl1eir professio11al conduct for other p urpose s (to ass ess their con1pete11ce, to investigate cas es of corruption or other viola tions of judici al sta11clards of co11d t1ct). �he law could contempl a te a c areer judicial service (a11alogous to a career tea�hjng service) whereby members of tl1is c areer ser vice work tl1eir way 11p from positions on inferior courts to higher cot1rts . Or t l1 e l aw co11ld provi de that members of the judiciary would be recruited for various le vel s of app ointment fron1 the ranks of the bar and from go ver1 1ment service. Or so111e amalgam of both approaches could be attempted. The comparative constitutional provi sio11s citecl at the outset of thi s chap ter �ls� �ugg est various approaches. But thos e who develop a ''special l aw '' ?n the . ud,cia�y for Ethiopia mus t obvio usly rela te tl1at law to c?ntempor a y cond! ions_ � � {n cluding, , wh i ch e sySfetn to some extent ' trad ition a11d p opular e xpect at1011 Th s. . · · · the I a� creates -the co o!-11°t ing pr i ng, ai n tr ng, i lect se for machi11ery urt s a nd the and disciplining jud ay b e g iv en to m tio11 a er d s i 11 o c s Thu ges-m ble. a ust be work such problems as : 1 Tlz e si e of th. e judicial ariotis k�i1d ? _ of v of ion lict :isc ji11 , �h e m e11 establish z cu · t e of Jud1�1al and 1m yol1 t l1e t th e ges, d Ju f type o es i k of r o w teg or of vario us ca r� aoppo int o be req uired t se erti exp ents nal to o ess i f o be pr of e mad and the degre e tor thesm e appointment s . 2. T�e sources of nzanpower available to staff the varioi1s levels of coi,rts. �ow u versity gradu m ates will be available over a given period as _a pool of "h igh anpower ? Wha t is a ppo� d es ire d b efore a _ui�iversit y g�aduat experience be will inted ? What are the best sources of manpower for appo111t1ng 0ther Judges �·

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SOURCEBOOK OE . B·rtIIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

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) l? ne on rs y t tr pe s j. ha in i M in tra an 'Y rs ng ra st op gi R s? te ca vo � . d a d � e i1c e (Experi d w an ho sill si w t r ba e la es gu e 1 be a 1 01 � la re s d ge l Jt d to te ed er off be ill w s e iti un t por s ce ur er w so 1st re po ex to provi d.e an m t ha (W ? nt e m e 11c va d a r fo s e to opporttliiiti ? ed p o el e ev b d t es b e 1 y tl n ca vv o H s? ie it trainit1g· oppo1·t11n n a pla ll nt wi ce me ne ple im o rily ssa le ab ail av � be s 1·ce ou 1·es l cia 1 a, jin e 3. Tli _ e don7 at any gtven time . n b ca t ha w t ic str re se ur co of ill w ct fa s limited , and .t hi d ing an n pla 1. ful are e th cin an fin y, bl tta g e r reg of t, tha � 1 ait ag � ted no e b (It might _ _ with econonuc planners; the _ �ty Je ior pr sub low a ct s e rat n e oft ion t tra nis mi d a al ici jud is not cove1·ed i11 the Th ird Five Year Plan). 4. Tl1e Proble111s of ad111.inistratio1i a11d supervision. Although the .idea of ''super vising'' a jt1dge in his wo1·k seems to contradict the concept of'' independence,'' it may also be 11111·ealistic to tl1ink of a totally self-policying, self-administering judiciary particularly when one talces factual acco11nt of who the judges may be a,nd how they may vvork: thei1· backg1·ound, ed11cation, salaries, incentives a.nd professional esprit. Tl1e clesired conditions obviously ca.nnot be created b)' legisla tion. To the extent t l1at ther·e a1·e abnormal inc entives f 01· corri,ption (low pay, low social status in compariso11 to the scope of a judge's juris d iction the system must provide checks against wa)'S of detecti11g and d eali11g with corriptio11.. If the syste m has co11sider able inher ent 1·islcs that a n11n1ber of judges will demonstrate, in other ways, their unfi tness f01· office, then it m11st provide Vlays of lessening those risks. Again, a goal of the syste m may be to 11t ilize j11dicial ma11power \.Vith max:im.11m efficiency by shifting judges f1·01n one a1·ea to another, depending .on the vol11me of business in the variol1s cou1·ts. Tl1is p1·oble m, too, ca11 only be solved if authority is clearly . allocated somewhe1·e to deal witl1 it a11d if the judges are ma d� accountable to that authority. 5. The p1·oble11i offi11di11g tlie 111ost competent ai,thority to adniinister the ''special law.': If there are tho11sands of jt1dges, the ad ministrati,,e iasks of" selecting a suitable ca�didat � f01·_ each vaca11cy a11d evalt1ating tl1e ,vo1·k ot' each judge, and the task of 1nvest1gat111g ea�l1 �er!ot1s_ charge ot· incompe te11ce or wrongdoing and ''hearing'' each case \Vhere d1sc11Jl1ne 1s reqL1ired will · be burdensome. Such work cannot be a e ''Comn1ission'' without consid ering tl1e difficulties wl:ich }Jart-ti1n upo° thrust : _ the work will .11npose, tl1 ea e l d ersl1ip, staff and othe r resources needed for the Job. P_,·oposals for I111JJ/en1entation of.· Article 111 Frain Proceeclings of tl,e Senate, Gt1enbot 22. 1954 E.C. (op. cit., supra). 1e Presiclent read. th e letter sub Tl Sub [the n d an mit te d to Min the iste Pri r me . 1?1tted �l1e followi11g q11estions to tl1e Minister of Justice]: (a) �hy ·the draft law has not been prepared and presented to the House; _(b) tf a law has been prepared; (c) .when the· Government can submit to' the House the draft law pertaining _ to tl11s matter.

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- · Answer of H.E. Dej. Zelvde Gebre Selassie. · s dges �e d ou� no\v, in accordan9e with Ju � the n, -t Art it. .must e icle 111 of the Const utio s�led 111 .the law. In view of this, the scholars wh drafted the·Cil il -Gude:, --- -"· o commerczal Code -l·gw . . . · ' Pena. I C0de and Marztzlne Code were requested to prepare_ ·a '1Q-�--r . ges on the appointment <;>f Jud t and .it had been drafted accordingly. But sin� _1 . 1

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

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the problems in Ethiopia] it vvas proposed lllat M' itl istry [to tion h rela bad no.t 01��ould make a [ furtl1er] study which it did i11 detail taki11 g tl1e sclJ olars, of Ju stic e sbasis. The decision taken by .t he Con11 11issio11 i11 tl1 e n1o11 tt1 of Au o 0ust ' a s a draft submitted to the Prime Minister's Office. was issue his t 00 1953 ( E ·C ·) • . . Ma r 1al y I�p Jes ord llis e er�d a JJr�per str,cl!' of tile establisllk t , w, u _ n all ? _ yo As t1n my ?�r Cl1a1r111 a11sl11p a 1 1cl s111ce Meskere111 4, at.1 Orgaruz ctal . Judi �� the men t of r 1c1ar;, f�r t 1 e W 01�eda a11d 1\ \Vraja Cotirts was stritcture 01 .1uCi the of study _ 1 1 954 the 1�e t part_ A to d une�pec!ed 1 11 er1ca for so111e t1�ge11 t btisi iJess, my to dtie � but �der ,vay la\V .w?1cl1 IS on. Jud1c1al Procedt 1 re' vvas sub1 111tted to }Jarlia dr�ft the of part onl has It and 1 presented to H.I.M. for clecision. bee1 Min1sters of council the meit by

In the course of later discussion the Min ister also noted:

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1ich sl1all l1ave the res1Jo11sibility of selecti11g ,vl established be shall e ommitte A . .. c '!'he co111 1nittee n1 ay select fron1 an1 011gst �, Judges for appoi11tr11e11t by tl1� E?-,�peror. the present men1bers of the Ji1cl1c1c1rJ1 as it sees fit. As a 111atter of fact, tl1ere arc ... persons in our cou.ntry. who are know11 for their ability j11 tl1e acl1ninistratio11 of justice and there might be others wl10 are not k110\v11. I11 ,t11 y eve11t, the co1 11111ittee .,·, est ablished for this pt1rpose ,:vill take the respo11sibility and presen.t the111 for ,1ppoint � · ment. The Minister further added tl1 at it ,vas proposecl tl1at tl1e J t1dges i11 tl1e 350 '\ \Voredas should be mobile 011 acco11nt of the fac.t that the JJt1blic \Vas f�1ci11g difficul ties in respect to transportation and food bttt Parlia1ne11t rejected it ...

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Other remarks of the Minister indicated son1e of tl1e diffict1lties tl1en confro nti11g the Conunission 1) opposition to further consolidation of the cot1rls; 2) opposition to limiting the nu.mbers of appeals; 3) opposition to single judge (as opposed to three judge divisio11s); 4) opposition to improving judicial salaries to n1ake judicial appoint1ne11t n1ore atlraciive; 5) the shortage of qualified manpower. •

The Commission described above prepared several draft la1,vs. 011e was tl1e Cou�ts Procla1natiorz of 1962, enacted by Parliame11t a11d l,1ter si1s1Je11c!ed. (See dis cussion supra). Another \Vas a proposecl ''Decree'' (p11rst1 ant to Article 92). Excerpts from a n early draft version ·of this decree are set 011t belo,;1,1 • Co11sider ca.reft1lly some of the proble ms which the draftsme11 tried to answer; co11sider critically some of the technic al defects i n this partic11lar draft, \vll icl1 was later a111ended in minor respects by the Commis sion. 1 · This Decree may be cited as the Jitdiciary Decree 1961. 2· In this Decree, unless the co 1 1text otherwise req11ires, "Co nunjssion'' shall mean the Judicicll Com111issio11 established under Art. 13 of this Decree·' ''j�dge'' shall include the Afenegus, a Vice Afe11egus, tl1e President ?f the High Court, the Preside nt of the Federal High Cot1rt and all other Jtidges except Woreda judges; "Minister shall mean the Minister of Justice. 3· (I) All judg l al sh e re ec D 1 is tl of e rc fo es appointed after tl1e comi11g into be appointed under the provisions of this Decree. <2) This Decree shall come into force on the 1st Meskerem 1954·

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s. U y b d te in o p p a e b ll a sh es g 1d j1 4 . (I) All ess be of he the unl Us est high by ch.ara cter t�d oin app be ll sha _ son per (2) N O . w la e th 1n d le il sk d an d ce n ie er a11d is exp ed be to it fill e 11 � uir �h. be the duty req �ry ici jud the in. es 1ci ca1 va ere (3) Wh the h oug thr Us M.m1ster names of to 1t bm su to on issi mm Co of tl1e . es dg ju as d te in po �p be to ed ifi al qu 1s o1 rs pe us neg Afe and judges with ce a _Vi us, neg Afe the n tha er oth , ges jud (4) All a University degree in law, shall be appointed for two years on probation. (5) All j11dges who have been appointed on probation and such other j11dges as the Minister shall direct sha ll undergo such courses in law a11d procedure as shall be prescribed. (6) No person shall be confirmed in his appointment as a judge by Us 11nless the Commission confirms that he has proved himself t· o be both . e judg ent effici and t peten com of the highest character and a

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5. (1) No perso11 shall act as a j11dge while holding any post in the govern ment or while he is a member of the Senate or Chamber of De_puties. (2) No person shall be appointed a j11dge who has been convicted of an intentional offence the penalty for whic. h is not less than six months simple imprisonment.

6. (1) Judges shall hold office d.uring good behaviour. (2) N·o person shall be removed. by Us from the office of judge unless the C�mn1ission sl1all l1ave fot1nd after .inquiry that he has been proved guilty of corri1ptior1 or otl1er in1proper behaviour or by reason of age or infir1nity has become incapable of exercising judicial functions. (3) Notl�ing i11 tl1�s Decree s11all preVient any judge fro·m resigning his office of 111s own will or on his transfer to ar1other appointment under the Crown. (4) 011 reachi1�g the age of 60 )'ea1·s a jt1dge shall retire unless the Minist�r ; . f 01·. except1on�l 1·easo11s, witl1 tl1e agreement of the judge, extends his period of service.

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7. [Oath of allegiance - omitted] . 8. [Se11iority - omitted]

9· No jtldge shal.l �eek or be given instructions or orders b y the Minister_ or _,, an� 0ther adIDin1s!rative authority regarding arrest, release on bail or general- J ly in regard to any proceedings before a court. 1 - '1 ,, · IO. (l) Where the Afeneg_ us, the Pr�sident o� the e d i s e r P � � H!gh Court o! the of the Federal High Court, 1s not satisfied with the quality of the_yvor · ?r th�. behaviour of any judge of his court he shall inform. th e�judg� � - · in writin� of the _matters· complained of and shall require him to imptqy�--� the quality of h1s work or improve hi s beh.avio,r .

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

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l n � end h �s ways, af�er having received a warning o s t f: · ai e ju?g the re Whe i cle, the A ie11egi1s, the Preside11t ) l Ar h f t . is t o e l ( t1c subar r of tl1e unde High Court or th� President of the . Federal Higl1 Co11rt, as the case may be, may, having called_ 11po n h11:11 to f11 r11ish an expla11ation ai1d having found such expla�a�on 11 11sat1sfactory, ad1no11isl1 tl1 e judge or . o ss1 m1 n e m th Co to him t repor Where the President of an Awradja Co11 rt is 11 ot satisfied witl1 tlle quality o_f the work .or th� b eh��ior of any j11dge st1borclinate to lii111 , he shall inform the Jttdge 1 n wr1t 1ng of the n1atters com1)lai 11 ed of and shall require him to improv e the quality of his vvorl< or i 1nprove his behavior. Where the judge fails to mend his ways, after l1 avi11 g received a war11 i11g under subarticle (I) of this Article, tl1e President of tl1 e Awradja Co11rt sha.11 forward a full r eport to tl1e M.inister, \.Vho shall refer tl1e 1natter to the Commission. Where a judge is charged with a serio11s cri11 1i11 al offence i 11 a co11rt of competent jurisdiction the Advocate Ge11 eral sl1all ca11se tl1e investiga tion file to be sent to a sub-committee of tl1 e Con1n1 issio11 co1 1sisti1Jg of the Vice-Minister of J11stice as chairnJa11 vvitl1 the Afenegt1s and the President of the Higl1 Co11rt as 1 11e1nbers. The sub-committee sl1all examine the file, make s11 ch further inquiries as it dee1ns 11 ecessary a11d advise the Minister as to whether tl1e judge who 11as bee11 charged shall be interilicted from the ex ercise of his j11dicial functio11s 11ntil the case has been decided. Where the sub-committee advises that the j11 dge should be i 11 terdicted the judge shall be informed by the Mi11ister i11 vvriting that l1 e is i11ter dicted from his duties until further notice. During the period of his interdictio11 the judge sl1all receive such portio11 of his salary not exceeding half as the Mi 11ister shall decide. No salary or portion thereof shall be made after the expiry of three mo11tl1s from the date of interdiction 11nless the Mi1 1ister otl1er\vise orders. When the case has bee11 decided a copy of the jt1 dgment shall be sent to the Commission. There is hereby established a Judicial Co111n1issio11 \Vhich shall consist of the following members Ex-officio members.

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n; io iss m m Co e th of an rm ai ch Minister who shall be the Afenegus; ' President of the High Court; . Adv·ocate General; President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Nominated members (a) a person trained in the law a n d of th e highest char�cter an<l re�:S�� l uc i P s. � ie ut ep D of r e tion elected annually by th e Chamb may be a deputy o r not an d . shall b e eligible for re-election.

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ITUTIONAL LAW T S N O C N IA P IO I IT E F O SouRCEBOOK

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st the he of hig d an c ara ch law e ter t i11 ed and il sk � n rso . pe � e on . (b) 0 c1 er ... b ffi x e o E em th s. m y b y tl in Jo ed 1t 11 o p ap n o rep11tati t gs om y fr on ar et am cr e th se a t f in af po st ap l of al sh n io ss 11i l11 ol C he T (2) the Ministry of J11stic�. 14. The dt1ties of the Commission shall be (a) to submit to Us the names of persons qu.alified on grounds of char acter and skill in the law to be appointed as judges; y, or cit ct pa du ca on in to isc m r fo d ld ho rte po re en be s ha e dg j11 a e er (b) wh er ist its in e lu M th nc co h ug ro sions. th Us to 1·t po re to d an , iry qu an ii1 e er by tic ist in no M in e g th itin wr by ed en nv co be all sh 1i sio 11is 1111 Co e Th 15. (1) served on the 1nembers not less tba11 seven days before the meeting to be held. (2) Fot11· membe1·s of the Co111111issio1i shall form a quorum. (3) Tl1e deliberatio11s of the Commission sha.11 be in camera and all matters to be decided shall be decided by a simple n1ajority vote. (4) Th.e proceedings of the Comn1ission shall be secret and nothing shall be discussed. by the n1embers of the Con1r11issiori except as required by la,v. I 6. Where tl1e Commission has 1·ecommended a person for appointment as a judge the Minister may pen.di11g his appoi11tment u11der Art. 4 appoint such perso11 to act as a jt1dge. 17. A copy of this Decree a11cl all reg11latio11s made thereunder shall be given to a j11dge on ap1Jointment. 18. The Minister may 1nake 1·egulations reg1tlatin.g (a) the proceedi11gs o·f the Con1.1nission, ar1d. (b) the d11ties a11d co11duct ot.. t.l1e judicia,·y and the members ot' the court staff.

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e edur proc with Draft_ retrtt{ations to in1ple1nent tl1is cleci:ee were also prepared. These dealt primarily t tmen appoi � for discipline c �ses an? for �orwarding tl1e Co111111ission 's nominations. For judicial to the Ern1Jeroi. Tl1 e regt1lat1ons also set fortl1 these ''duties'' and standards of ''conduct.'

3. 111 1·espect of (a) the S11p1·eme Imperial Court

(b) (c) (d) (e)

tl1e th.e the the the

A .fe11egus · President Preside11t President President

the High Court the Federal High Co11rt an Awradja Court a W oreda Court -"' sllall be respo11sible for· t; · . . . cour . (i) the distribution 0f work. � t he . . � ::: · _ · · f o 011S amongst the various d1v1s1 . � .. -· ·: · -· fY; � IDSf (11) the. expeditious . _ rec � rt cou · an � �d : . he t · th smoo and ing work of t r the cou. ... -·" . � . . tra n t . ·· · · [iol1 . · .. (u1) the proinpt dea1111g _, . · · _1n1s with complaints concern1·n� adm · the · . · ·.· .Justi c · -·--.·= 1 �--. ce 1n th · e courts u11der his c _ontrol; '

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ornmission of jL1dges or to the i\1i�ister of ()ro the to G_ ng porti re ( iv) the n11scon�u cte� themselve s or sl1ows ii1cap.tcity in have who tors secu r ; ei es th 1t1 of dt e rg ha sc di er op pr the of t�e codes a11d laws ancl stationer)' t� e11able copies of ions provis the (v) the courts properly to fut1ct1on ; (vi) informing t�e Minister where there is a shortage of jL1dges or pra,ectitors owing to sickness or other caus e. be sl1all staff u11?er court .tl1e . direct co11tro. of tl1e the and ar registr 4_ ·The President of every court and shall carry ot1t his d1rect1011s a11d i11st1uctio11s. 5. (1) No judge sh.all (a) unnecessarily delay the co11clt1sion ·or a case; (b) absent himself from attendance at l1is �ot1rt witl1ot1t goot cat1se; (c) fail to give effect to the laws of Etl1io_pia.; (d) do anything which will interfere \vitl1 tl1e J)roper adn1i11istntion of j ustice; (e) pay any regard to instrt1ctio11s give11 by a11 aclr11inistrative CL1t/1oritJ' in relation to tl1e trial or conduct of a11y case; (f) fail to be cot1rteous to advocates, \Vitnesses and JJarties. (2) Where a judge wishes to absent hin1self for a reaso11 otl1er than nedically certified serious illness, he shall first obtai11 the per111issio11 of tle Presi dent of the court.

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The Con1n1ission further recommended that Woreda jt1dges be elected locally. TI1e Co11n1ission declared: ''judicial power should be exercised i n Woredas by jt1dges \vho l1ave tl1e contdence of the I � population and ... this [objective] can best be acl1ieved by providing for tl1e eection_ of such Judges." It was further recommended that the Minister of Justice be given power to leter1111nc the number of judges needed in each Woreda and thereafter to reqt1est the A\vradja go;ernor to conduct elections through the Woreda Shum. Qualifications were establisl1ed (age, literacy,residency and oprior c?nvicti on of serious offenses) and tl1e Woreda Sht1n1 \\ as author�zed t_o_"��ect'' any � te cand!d a lacking the qualifications. The term of office was for tl1ree years w1tl1 el1g1btlry for re election. 1

Present Law a,zd Practice on the Selection of Judges From Order No. 46 (op. cit. sup ra). 32· ··· The Minister of J ustice, in accordance with tl1e law, shall: {a) insure that the nomination, appointment, pron1otion, trans�er, :en1oval and retirem ent of judges are accomplished in accordance with ·h . e law.

mpare t�e analogous � language in Article 61 (a) of Ore/er 1 of 1943 (siiP_ ra page �4). Why were � articular �rovisions of Order No. 1 amended? Compare also: Articles 5 Gill 6 of the Adnrinis�:,ron of Justice Proc/amati.on (sc,pra page 357).

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e lisl i rr q, l plb i a (U ia, ioJJ Eth in ant J ry Tli cia ucli u i P / iwa e The of , os B tion Ab� S enior Resea.rch, HSIU, Faculty of Law, 1966). th proced ure followed to appoint· lower Co urt judges has di5tin� t : teps. It stans � . e giv� to an appl icatio a 1uclg n which the person who wa11ts to Direct::�� e : ;: : eral of the Personnel Department in the !v11n1strr of Just.ce. applicant � Will then be forwa rded to a comm.ission which considers whelher the

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TI U T TI S N AL LAW N O O N C A PI O -II TI E F O K O O EB RC U SO

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d r te an t ac ta ar pu s ch re hi . n. io to t he ec T sp 1·e h it w p ap d l e i if i'c,ant. al . qti . 8 , 1· . . 11t a 1c . 1 pp . a . · t wi 1s er 1n s h w M h e t . y ic h b s ' if 11 ve .. g ] he n s 1 pa ? at1 ll 1 [ 11 am e ex , 1 a1 r fo 1 . sit 1 the ll wi . e g d u J s a a d e 1t 11 o p p a e b to make him qttalified �e st sta is e fir t in Th po s. t _ al? en tm i11 po nt ap me of as pro s ge sta o tw e ai· e er Th ry na io e at ob Th es Pr e. dg ic Ju st Ju ve ?f ha er st i1� M got all e th by es dg jti ry ila batio ey t th a . d pt th ul ce x co e. s be ha e re dg Ju ry na di moved on or e th ich wh es leg the privi 11otice. t e lis 14-h e of Th probationary jud. ges al. fin is nt n1e int po ap of ge a st TI1e second to or. the per ted Em sen If the Eniperor pre is s o11 ati c lifi q11a d 1 a1 ds oun l<gr bac with tl1eir 1 _i11 the li�t s�ould be dis1:11,issed, _for wh.atever so1 per tain cer a t tha io11 pin o the of is s his m t fro sed oin m1s app d1s and t 11st men a the of out a n cke re asons, he will be stri probatio11a1·y judge. T·he writer has �ot come across �11ch a case; usually, the Empero r jt1st p11ts his signature. Afte1· the 11st has been ratified by the Emperor the proba tionary judges vvill continue i11 tl1eir offices as ordinary judges. TI1e proced11re which has been l aid dow n is not a hard and fast rule. There are ma11y judges who have been appointed to the office without satisfying the above req11irements. When a vaca11cy is declared i11 one of the Awradja Cot1rts, the minister decides whether that vaca11cy sho11ld be filled by promotio11s from the Woreda Courts or to man it f1·0111 applica11ts w]10 do 11ot have previous judicial experience. In most c ases the mi11ister ,vo11ld be forced to give pro1notions for the Wored,a judges when he fu1ds that the period of recruitment ha.s elapsed. It is more convenient to allow the W 01·eda jt1dges who have shown ability in their work to have promotion. It will also give i11centives to the Wored a j11dges. . _Whe11 th� period fo r appoi11t111e11ts to the Hig/1 Cou,·t is due, the Mini�ter of Jt1st1ce establishes a Ji,c/icial Co111111ission which consists of tl1e n1inister himself, the �ice-minister, �he Afe11egt1s, the Presiden·t of tl1e High Court and the Vice Presidei1t of the H1gl1 Co11rt. The Ji,clicial Co111111issio11 111ay include other members as well. It ,vas even thot1ght of i11cl11ding t\\'O n1embers fron1 the Parliament but this has 11ever been do 11e. es judg The period of ap1)oi11tme11ts is d11e \\1l1enever the Hiol1 of short is Court 0 1tle to t�e _retir ine1;t_ of the jt1dges or any other cause. The Co,nm.issio� consid�rs � he ap1)0111�ments ol t11e perso11s \vhose 11a111es have been forwarded to it. The list o f nan1 es forw a i·ded to tl1e Con1111ission 11sually consists of judges from the lower courts �ho have bee11 fot1nd to be l1 ardworki 11g and have a clean characte r aod e rep� tatio � r�e ord. 1""'here niight also be 11ames of qua tb in ng wo rki lawyers lifi ed . � var1011s n11n1str1es or advoc ates wl10 have appl ied for the post. tel o sol i s i m,?i a e �n _ has s· u b nd fa e11 I fou ced !'� b with k was y many t ; setba c s. diffic t get any informat�1on on the background of the persons. · th ·- zon ·e The Co mmzss · . th en presents the names of the persons selected, that is, . . C ·t J·udge·s names of these persons which It· . . our High cons idere d are bein wort . g . hy of . through the minister, who .is or er Enip usually the chairman of the Commission, to the From Geraghty, op. cit supra, pp. 52 , 53, 55-56, 57-58. . The average age of the . d . . m . ea ns h s i T . Ju ges 1nterv1ewed was around forty-fi.v·e. · that ·they were 0f sch001 · age · during the 1930's . . . . ' •

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OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS . THE DEVELOPMENT

891

ed11c any �tio n b_ e yond ha� had prin 1ary es Chtlrcl1 Scllool judg the . of fe,v �rrte An1�a:1 c a1 1d, 1f they progressed f t1rtllll", Geez. a�d read to ned \vh ere theY lear 1 on of rel1g1011s texts con11Jose the CI1t1rcI1 S cl z rec1ta t and n atio l ool ori em R ot� � whose basic course lasts three years. Al1 11ost all lower co11r: j11dges h i urc Ch 1 catio 1 1 . 1 ba s ed thi ly on had a e itr � �:�� fEr . . � 1111�1es f �_r f or al �d11 cat101� a11d n1a11y !·es_)Oilsible oppor t1 few �re ther� � Wh ere . be filled, practical exper1e11ce ga1 11ecl 111 service for the to ons positi ent o ern g v, :e nt agency must take the place of formal ed11catio1 1. Witl1 tl1eir aJility to v :;� nd write, these futur� j11dges were able to get \vork ,vith tl1e Jvli11istry 0� J11 stice o ce as or ,vorkers for gover11�11ent agencitS . �fter scribes! as � courts, in rks e cl . as '. decided to ta �e . tl 1e exan1 g!ve11 by tl:e 11 1111 �try either they serV1ce, of period Jong of Justice or merely were recom_mended to the Jvl1 1 11stry_ of Justice by tl1e1 r s1periors and were appointed on the basis of that recon1mendat 1 on alo 11e. Long service for go,,ernment agencies aside fron1 the Mi11is try of JL1sice \Vas also fairly common among woreda j11 dges. Us11ally tl1ese j11dges l1ad bee1 clerks

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or awradja governors. A w oreda court judge's salary in the provi11ces is $80.00 Etl1. 1Jer 1 1101 1tl1. I11 Addis Ababa, because of the higher cost of living, he n1ay receive as n111ch as$120.00 Eth. Alth ough this is considerably above tl1e a1111ual incon1e of the average Et1iopian, it is le ss than the income say, of a primary school teacher, of a garage 1n�cha1 1ic, bank clerk, even in some cases of a factory \Yorker.

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Though a ji1dge's job would seem to be a more im1Jorta11t a11d res)o11sible po sition than any of those mentioned above, the salaries offered to j11dges disoL1rage people \vho desire to maximize their earning Ci:tpacity fron1 looki11g to tl1e j11dicial system as a career.

Attitudes of the population to,vards j11dges are ,veil knov,11 1 by the j11dg<s then1�elve s. They know that they have reputatio1 1s for bei11g corri,pt a11d poorl: versed in �he law: And naturally enough those judges wl10 are dishonest blamed it 011. a socie ty which places so little importance on their jobs tl1at it forces them to tndergo the unpleasant process of earning part of their living by taking bribes fro111 ltiga11ts. · People know now that a j11dge's power does. not exte11d out of tl1e co1ttroon1. Further, he is no longer a· local landowner. He is 11 sually transferred from o1e place another a d de. velops few l oes in Addis Ababa, for example, � e11eral Jud ocal ties. n Y_do not liv e in the locality Furthern1ore, comnunities located. in is which c�urt their \Vtlb strong cohesi tl1en. having j11dge, The ve centers. forces urban in do develop not no local ties Is . · no different from any other governme11t o-ffic1al.

The Ins?Jee1to · n Department: Supervision of Abuses in Jitdicial Acl,riiriistraiorz From Aberra Ba.ntz.wa li,, op. cit. supra. e n ts, gge5 e nam t �.1 the e I As r E ror. mpe eral Gen o the is c_ sp ed appoint by his � Tlle duty is to inspect the i,ls. offi rt ot er oth n � a11d � ges � jud work of the llea :� flice . ab Ab dis of Ad in the t1ce Jt1s of to !nspec r-Ge11eral is within the Ministry � fie has got 8 of th J • �bordmate Inspectors wh o go fro m place to place and cl1eck th� works e ud1c1Qry .

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892

SouRCEBOOK 01• ETI-IIOPIAN CO'NSTITUTIO NAL LAW

n wi b� ed vie er ter th !n g� g s ha the r ite wr e tl1 spe In n io at ctor., rm fo in e tll l on Fr g 1n r1t rs w by _ tt� ? _Ie t!o to ac e th s ke ta s se esi ca Pr t os n1 in den ts ter iis i i nl e th Getleral, n . _of t1o ce :a st� 1st Ju In J11 m ad e th e th e ov s ca pr im e of to ts 11r co llS r·io va e of tll ns eir tio g th nc in fu do e o� ?f pr e _ bl pa ca ly . r in be to (either d 1n 01 f i�e ,ve o 1 w1 tlie jl i dges res ey at su th !h en e ai: te� i ther tra ns e n1s n11 e t� , 1pt rr1 co or ess rel ca by bei ilg lazy, e ov to pr d eir an im th im r w p ork. re a n ve gi or es 1ti dl e iv l1t ec ex r lie ot ferred to A F1,11·t/1er Note

011.

tl1e J11sJJection Function

Many cases (mostly fron1 Woreda and Awradja courts) are brought to the Jns pectio11 Depa1·tn1ent upon petitio°: by disappointed, usually very_ poo r,. litigants. Their petitions present such allegations as: (1) the court o.rdered an illegal unprison ment; (2) the petitioner vvas prevented from filing a timely appeal (he was not advised of the tin1e reql1irements; the case file-or part of it-wa.s lost or unavailable; the col1rt passed jt1dgment without proper notice); (3) there \\1ere defects in the court's ju1·isdiction; (4) there were abl1ses in the execution of a judgment; (5) bias on the pa1·t of a judge; ( 6) defects of proced·ure (only two judges hea.rd the case; his advocate was not allowed to appear; a third party was not properly impleaded); (7) an applica tion to proceed in forn1a paupe1·is was improperly, denied. Many of these cases are found to be grot1ndless afte1· investigation� Other allegations are very difficult to investigate for obviol1s reaso11s. Of course there are some cases which bring Gharges of seriot1 s misc onduct. Asst1ming Sl1ch allegatio11s, 110\v shol1ld each be disposed? What jurisdictiqn does the law vest i·n the J11spection Departtr1ent? Does the Constitution limit its . jurisdiction? In what ways? Ft1rther p1·oblen1s a11d obstacles to investigation are presented by the failure of local jitclges to respond to reqt1ests for the file of a ca. se reviewed by the Depart me11t, by variatio11s in procedl1res for 1naintaining files and by the chaotic conditions of some files. The juclges sometin1es object a11d cooperate only reluctantly with I11spectors.

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From: ''A I-Iy1)othetical Men1ora11dl1111 to Tl1e Mi�1ister of Justice." Comment on tl1e followi11g:

1- I beli�ve i t cat1 be sh?wn tl1at the Inspection D�partment has no jurisdiction _ s, to review the to. revi se case merits of particular judgments or to remedy the grie�ances of every petitioner who co1nes before it; the Constitu.tion would · fo rbid st1ch actio11. · . 2· · Ho:ve�e:, tli�i·e is a necessary task of reviewing. serious allegations of abu se of Jlldicial P0:-Yer (as a deterre11t to 1nisbehavior) and reviewing co�ditions �nd problems which commonly recur in judicial · administration. The Inspection . Department should have two basic functions: . (a) inv �stigating serious charges of misconduc of court personnel ud.g s t U : e, reg�strar, executi on officers) which would appear to warrant disciplinafY action·' (b) � : in � courts by performin� st1;1dies of problems (e.g., causes of C?ugestio� : !:y)' by providing a11thor1tat1ve gttidance on settled 'interpretation of � o c _du e odes r�es of evidence and other settled rules of j udicial a dnlln . Is� ; � � r. a ion, Y runrung formal training . etc ; tics programs; by keeping S"ta.tis

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL lNSTITlJTIONS

893

(a) poi 2 nt abo ve, wit h it is recomme11ded tl1at tL1 e Ministry of n nect io con In 3. • • Jusnce. (a) set forth all _ the la\V gover11�t1 g proper j11 dicial co11duct, u1cludii1 g: a code of ethi�s s�11t�b�e for 011 r c1.rc11111sta1�ces; r11les from tl1e I)rocedtire cocles goverrung Jt 1d1c1al �ond11c� 1n tl!e trial of cases a11d otl1 er releva11 t rules regardin g the working dutles of Jttdges, respo11sibility for tl1e files i 11 cases forms for submitting judgments, etc.; (b) establish a fixed proced1 1re wl1ereby complai11ts allegi11g violations of tl1ese inv estigated a.11 d disposed of systematically-"',itl1011t 1111d 11 e be may ules r hindrance of judicial inde_pende11 ce. 4. The constitutional lim.itatio11s on tl1e Mi11istry's J)O\ver to carry out tl1e f 1111ctions stated in 2 (a) and 2 (b) need to be caref11lly st1 1died. 0 11 tl1e assu1n1Jtio11 tl1at H.I.M. has, by Order No. 46 delegated his po\vers 11nder Article 35 of t/1e Co11sti tution, the M.i1ristry may exercise the f11nctions itself. B11t if a ''special (ji1diciarJ}) law'' is to be enacted purs11a 11t to Article 111 and if a ''Jitdicial Co1n111issio11'' is to be created with po\:vers over selected and tenure of juclges, tl1e11 I recom mend consolidation of tl1e Inspection Divisio11 into tl1 at t1nit of gover111n.e11t with an enlarged, legally defined j11risdiction to work towards tl1e in1proveme11t of the ad.n1iojstration of justice. The Disciplining of Jz1dges From Aberra Ba11tiwalu, op. cit. The author is discussing the Judicial Discipli11ary Co1111t1ittees establisl1ed in Addis Ababa and each Teklay Ghezat.

· The Discipli11ary Comn1ittee in Addis Ababa is tl1e head of tl1 e otl1er bra 1 1ches found in every Tek.lay-Ghezat. There are also some Awradja Disci1)li11e Con1n1 ittees. The Discipli11ary Committee in the Teklay Ghezat is composed of tl1e Governor General as the President, and a Vice-President is selected fron1 the Ministry of Justice as a permanent member for that Teklay-Ghezat. The otl1er members of the T�klay Ghezat Disciplinary Committee are temporary at1d 11s1 1ally consist of the Presidents of the Awradja and Teklay-G hezat Courts. . The duty of the Teklay-Ghezat Disciplinary Co11111zittee is to co1:sider cases br?�g�t against judges or court officials in the Teklay Ghezat, AwradJa, VIoreda, M1.k 1 !11 Woreda _and the Atbia Dagncts. The ust1 al cases �re !hat of corritptzo,z sLich �s bri�e. ry o_r a case rela d bloo to dtie ed c ticli_ preJ be to re said whe is t the men judg _ tionship which the judge has with one of the parties to the s1:1t. There �ie also c�ses such as neglect of 1 g s11 ffic1e11 t v11 a l1_ o11t w1th elf hims s 11ts dutie abse e e wher the judg reas ons or_ causi ng delay of cases by adjour1unent. Cases of corri,p_tzon are br�u�ht }� the Drsc ipli�zary Committee by interested par_ties or by anyone Judge wh.o is 1� 1 ed _ about It. The e t t r abo � � o�t tl 1 � _ d fi1 who e Judg the ed � interest persons or c o rnupti ion t �ic� o� a�p r r atl n i g n ti_ wr1 uld sho by e tt 1mi Con ort rep to the Disciplinary fo n s e_ . pl ary sc at e zn z ng Th pz . tion rup cor the 1 d sai ne wit the on sses who could testify Cn ! the n . 1ng r _ hea � the for ll sha e dat � a es con r side the application and ee sJ;mztt date, the Disci plinarJ ses nes wit 1ng a he by � cas the r de nsi co , Co,nmittee, will � If the abov on h charge 1sed Jt1dge �.as. and 1 acc o the als ich wh g rin e hea enc the def � cas! �1s b o ce on g Jud � the � ght e, itte 111m Co in ry a n. the pli sci Di y kla Te t eza Gh could appr u ;�� e ion eal to the Disciplinary Committee in Addis Ababa. The decis

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894

UTIONAL LAW IT T S N O N C IA P IO H T E F O K SoURCEBOO

t ec bj al su to fin be e l th al sh pr ap ba ba A al . .p1.1nary ov s di Ad of in th e ee itt m m Co . . · D1sc1 h 1s1· on of t.he Com e d th ec ge an c to y it or th au . e th s a ee . itt 11 m I1o w e, ic st 1 1 J· of Minister he lly as , . ua on us si c! , de es e do th es e ov th pr ap e i� st judge Ju of r te is in M If the y ed m ly re ld on ou w is H be d. de to ar aw tit nt pe ne l11 1s 111 p1 ion e tl1 to ed ct je lb Sl ,vill be tl1e E111peror ...

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ic e . bl Pu ice (th law rv Se ice erv s il , der civ Or e th No. 23 of s on isi ov pr t an ev rel e tI1 _ ConJpare: _ _ s, supra page 601 et. s f!q,). Note ion lat gu Re ic rv Se ic bl e_ Pu e tl1 d an ., seq et. 5 59 of 1961, si.1pra page ould the procedure for discipli ning Sh . law is th of g ra ve co 1n fro ted cep ex � sly res exp tllat judges are _ ? ts an rv se l v1 c1 r he ot r fo an th al rm fo s les or e or jt1dges be n1

T/1e ''l11depende11ce'' a11d Professionalis,n of Judges Re-read: page 407, StlJ)ra ( Graz. Woube Wolde Se/lassie v. Dedjaz. Kefelew). Re-read: Article 5 of the ''Draft Regulations Governing the Judiciary." Do these lay down the necessary standards to secure the ''independe nce'' called for by A1·tic!e 110?

The language of 44rticle 110 has many similar counterparts in other constitutions; it is a familiar clause. Note that this Article is, presumably, speaking of ''i,zdependence'' with respect to ''cond.uct ing trials and giving judgments," not, necessarily, independence from a general supervision from some other autl1ority. The problems of corrl1ptio11, incompetence and inefficiency are, apparently, real enough today that perhaps one simply cannot ins11late the jt1dge from a degree of supervision. Th.e problem is how to define and confme tl1at s11pervision so that the judge is not influenced by fear or desire for favour in any particular case-and partic11Iarly in sensitive cases.

Re-read: Chapter II, pages 118-119 st1pra, (The struggle for judi cial independ ence; pages 133 -134 (problen1s). Fro,n P.T_. Georges ''Tl1e Co11rts i11 the Ta11za11ia 011e-Party State'' (Paper presented to a Seminar on ''Law a11d. Social Change in East Africa'' at Dar Es Salaam, 1966).

Tanzat7ian he author has been the C11ief of Justice of Tanzan relation ia. � He ship is disct1ss tl1e ing . . 1ud1cLary to TANU.

. · · ·. The _cl1allen�e is to fit the ideals of a11 independent judiciary into a pattern which is basically· d1ffere11t from tl1at witl1 wl1ich it is traditionally associa ted. he es 11lt was ,1 growing concern over what tl1e term ''independence of the ! ,; . . ·es11lt of sucl1 i11dependence would be in a s_ociety dici ar mea 11t a11d wha . t the 1 � 1:here the par��- [TANU] w_as s_o powerf t1l. If [tl1e judge] stands aloof seem1ng to play ilie a-political role which 1s supposed to be his, hi s motives will doubtlessly be suspected. A new way m11st be found. In searching for it, it must be realised that the fact of politic al commitme t n to has never _ been consi�ered a bar to judicial ap d s be y po i n tm en t th·ough it ma ai. a�e b da a g to the 1m_age of judicial es judg y ma n imp artia Am lity. eric a I n r e:ct :· f:�Y are llOilllnated by political e t b partie l camp ns waged OJ;} s aig and e y beha�f· Their term� of office are not for t _ e offic b of ten life ure and . the dur ir ing l must dia � � main t�in y ientl_ � � relat ionsh ip suffi ith the c is party whic h � y to ens��;r:!� no nat on � i J?d , I� the d an H . of i: el m � re. ead n In nd . 1o gla �ct En the i � the Lord Ch 1 lo r, �n whose h_a��s lies the power of appo ntment to all J��c!S;Y i _ l offices to i�� rtance, 18 both a i polit1c1a� �nd judge, and ther. e i s no .doubt t�at J�dtc office is 80 i- es m the reward for political loyalty. . · · · . -_ · • . ,

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL ]NSTITUTIONS

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895

Problem Assume that high govern!Ile11t o_ffici�ls an? newspapers call for a ''crackdown'' the pub lic service 1nclud111g ''severe ,p11nisl1n1ent to make an in n'' upti o "cor r on · 1g. '' Assume furtl1er tl1at X is charged mple of those f011n d gu1·1ty of wrong d011 ::er relevant article� of the Pe11a/ Code of act� of corri1P_tio11 and is found guilty. and the cot1rt has co11s1derable d1scretio11• pending now is nce Sente Would it be _a violation of Art. l I_O_for tl1e Minister of Justice to urge the judges to exercise severity? Suppose the M1n1ster n1 ade a speech, urging ''severity in all cases of corruption'' but without mentioni11g tl1e si:ecific pendi11g cases. When if ever should the judges be consciously influenced by the government's avowed views on an issue pending before the courts?

THE ADMINISTRATION OF TEE COURTS The Prob/er,zs of Ji1dicial Adn1i11istratio11-Son1e llli,strative Materials

From Geraglzty, op. cit., pp. 107, 108, 109, 110.

The a uthor is analysing delay in the Woreda court s .

Almost twenty-five percent of the civil cases re,ie,ved were dismissed because of the plaintiff's failure to press the case.

Cases involving small claims are often discontinued-especially cases involving contracts of loan or rent defa11lt cases involvi11g $5C.OO or less. . . piough the fact plaintiffs often fail to come to 1�ourt may be a sign of recon ctli�t1on always preferable to· court imposed resolution of the dispute, tl1e fact re mains that such cases are often carried on a court's docket for as long as five n1onths. Even where the plaintiff does not appear at the first Leari11g, the court may call the case twice within two months time before dismissing the case. Co11sidering the v�lume of such cases it is certainly a colossal waste of a court's time to have to deal with cases that are discontinued . Cases take an average of three months to be decided from the time of the fir5t court appearance. The average of hearings for each case ,vas a little over number three. The longest case review appoint three twentyand nths o m. -nine twenty took m ents to decide. ases that extended beyond one year were rare ·Jut those lasting between five C . m0 ths and a_ year were fairly common. Usually ther� were !"r0� five to seven ' a :. PP intm ents 1n such cases. [The following sumn1ary :s illustrative]· pie plain_t� claimed trees which b�Ionged joi!ltly s lypt1 euca that n the dow t ndan cut defe th lamt1ff and ve rece he ce pr1 tl1e �r of re sha his a iff end int def pla nt the but failed to give � f t�m. \ ia e cas the t er nine months and nine appointments, the ·�ourt found tha al dy �Aft th: for s son rea n e !h . urt co id dec ja rad aw ed an in the by s r defe.ndant' favou ni�:a ap e summ? ns ' (2) the pefom tments were as follows: (1) the defendant had not received tl1n en t as g1": nda \V d�fe nda the (3) _ nt nce; defe was s hi n e give are de more time to prep mo t1m. tb me w1 co to t �1re fad l1i� p pre r _fo o d fine are s wa his defence; (4) the defendant his:�a ent ae he t 1on, f (6) dec1s its are def o prep _ · c ence to (5) time :fm the no t f ourt wanted i�1.� e;'� _o es pa e rt1 a h bot u (7) in ; ded nee i s wa by d _ _ me the court and so more t a. Y )x m e 1on m f�v�' }8 the court had not prepared its decision; (9) the co��t rendered i�s J.ec1:a. o the defendant saying that the awradja court's :lec1s1on was ·res-Ju ica

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TIONAL LAW TU TI S N O N C JA P O II TI E F O K O BO SOURCE

896

ed e tir re th qt re or se ca a re mo er ev ei: \Vh po ap at tl1 le intments rti a be to d me see It s. th n o m x si r e v o r fo cl e st la to be resolved, .it du an or ( e'' em cre De by y ia � dic Sir J11 aft Dr Charles ie T] � � on es ot ''N . 1 Fron d e ic he st lis Ju ub of np (U er 1st 1n ) M e th to (1961). r . iso dv A l cia di Ju Mat/1ev.,s, ng d, bei es aye cas del of s nce cha whereas with s les are re tl1e ge J11d e With on ce of a g sen jud e ab th on to ing ow account of ed lay de be . � y. ma e cas a ges jud three gh urt th� Hi Co 1n m fro es· dg Ju of Andis Ababa ce sen ab e Tl1 .... ise erw oth sickness or n h t isio eac tha div say . to of n i rat the High gge exa po is It . e. enc 11rr ? occ ily da is a . 1sm ee nt se to �b g in ow ar ye a rk wo 's 1th o1 m e on Court loses

Note: Sir C/1arles' estimate n1ay be wl1olly inaccurate to·day; we are con.cem.ed with the problem he alludes to and jt1risdiction to resolve it.

Fron1 Geragl1ty, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Judges should be given more power to control the personnel in their courts. The Minist1·y of Justice co11ld n1ake it clear to them that they are p.rimarily in charge of what goes on in their co11rts and· also primarily responsible for the efficient adn1i11istration of them. Improvement co11ld .also be made in the organization and ju.risdiction of the courts. In rural a1·eas, for i11stance, awradja courts are often located far from people they serve. Some, at least, of their j11risdiction of first instance could be given to the woreda courts or perl1aps some awradja co11rt· judges could ride· tjie circuit · of the woreda courts witl1in their jurisdiction. W?en three awradja court j11dges sit on one case, as prescribed by law, man power 1s �asted when j11dges elsewhere are ha1·d-pressed ·10 keep up with their work loads v;,h1le operating· individ11ally. On tl1e other hand, d.isorderly proceedings· often res11It ,vhen three awradja j11dges in the san1e room hear three different cases simul taneously, as happe11s in some aw1·adja co111·ts. Tl1ese judges should either be separat ed to h�ar cases individually or, wl1ere tl1ere is t1ot enough business for that, some of the Judges sho11ld be alloted to woreda col1rts to relieve the heavy work loads that exist there.

w· In acldi�ion to t_he problems notecl above, consider the needs for manpower plan ning an d the e _allocation of lligh I v�l n1anpower resot1rces i11 tl1e ad1ni11 istration of justice; the need for . tbe 7 l1cs on k�!pmg of � cctrrate stat1s ca�es con1i11g into the courts; the. need.to review the .� orki�gs 0f the· law 10 tl�e C?tirts, l? detern11ne whetl1er partict1lar legislative provisions need cl�i�catt?0 . h � ameo<l�lent .10 light of Jttdicial ex corut s bt >erience in applying the1u; tl1e need to provide _ f _ �!r wei t�e nd g t1ons .piofession publtca clari fying decis ions the law; tl1e cour need to-pu t a blish t0- iul e ,gi:en to l)t1bli_ sl1ed precedents.

The Law Establis/1ing Responsibility for Court Administratio n ·Re-r��d: Chapter V of the Co�stitutio n. From Or�er.. No. 46 (supra) 32 · · · · The MiniSter of Justic e, iI1 accordance with the Law, shall: •• • .

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m�k� all ·arrange�ents for the ·establishment and ad,ninistration of apPro· · · · ., }?r1ate courts throughout the' na tion. . . '

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897

(h) provide ... for app:opriate a�1d_ systematic p11blicati011 of the decisioris of the courts, including the op1n1011s of tl1e jt1dges.

Re-read: Article 20_ of the Administr�tioi:i of J11stice Proc/an1ation of· 1942, set forth supra t of tl1at leg1slat1on l1a� never been explicitly repealed. Tlie Cou age 359. Note that: this par rts ded) suspe repea lecl (late t1cles 1 tl1rougl1 18 of tlle 1942 Proc/o,nation �: r:i � �roclan,ation of 1962 10 effect. Th C1v1/ Proce� ure Cocle cloes not Artic 2? le left sly expres � deal explicitly with thus and Article 20 of the 1942 Proclamat1on, but contains the follo\v1ng. )

From Tlze . Civil Proced1.1re Code

Art. 482. - Regi1lations

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The Minister of Justice shall make regt1latio11s concerni11g any matter which under this Code may or shall be prescribed.

Art. 483. - Power of Minister to 1nake Rules

(1) The J\.1inister of Justice may, from time to tin1e, n1ake R11les to add to, or to amend, the provisions of this Code: Provided that no rules shall be 1nade inconsiste11t witl1 tl1e provisions of this Code dealing with tl1e ma terial jt1risdiction (Arts. 12 to 18) a11d appellate jurisdiction (Arts. 321 to 322) of tl1e Courts.

(2) Rules made under this Article and under Article 482 shall be pt1blisl1ed in the Negarit Gazeta.

The excerpts below are intended, in part, to recapitulate many of the issues raised in this chapter. The first excerpt by Vanderbilt reflects the view of an A1nerican judge (and Ia,v professor) wl10 dev_ o!ed Years to c.n1sading for judicial reform. Vanderbilt argued strongly for an autonomous JudiCJary, selected by a non- partisan con1mission given broad. autl1ority to maintain tl1e integrity and effi.cieacy of the courts and a mandate to w�rk for refom1s in tl1e law and its adn1inistration. The second excerpt is by a former Minister of Justice in Uganda, \Vl10 argues for a strong Ministry of !us !ice with broad powers to assure the integrity of tl1e cot1rts, law reform and tl1e protect�on of md,vidual rights. To what extent are the two views inconsistent? Unrealistic for Ethiopia?

From Vanderbilt, Materials on Ji,dicial Administratiori (1952) �ere has never been any considered effort in modern times to relate _the j11di?ial fu.nction organic ally wi th the vital process of i 1nproving the law. From time to time }: PU?lic is �ade aware of legal inadequacies by_ the ?bi�e� dicta of judges: and m tune. to tm1e their opinion bas beei1 sotight, either I?? 1vi�11ally or c?llectively, uPon part1c 11lar proble ms. In Englaiid there is even prov1s1on 1n the Jucl1cature Act 873 or a council of the judges with suggestions for legal i1npro�emen� as one !Its aims .f ; but it is said that the council has not met h�lf a dozen times_ since the sta te as b s1� w passed and has not on any of these occasions transac�e? 1111por�ant O� noess. Work of trus kind ought to be an inherent par� of the jud�c1al f11nct1�n. t�e many difficulties that law reform co11fronts is the tecl1n1cal cl1aracter f � s f its ubJect matter, of which the resu.lt is a serious limita tion of the part tl1at tl1e � a can p a in i t n co a been _ �ys alw bas bt dou T . no s yer i law r rove e imp h � t � men se atrve force in society and the stability he largely prote�t� has its ow1� s�e�1al social valt. 1e. ry zc1a Jttd the from But ng a1n1 obt this of ility s irab doe des not rule out the in eg l r 11s tl1e1 a m the and and : u law the of cohe ate t s rent the way their view of Woa !rd t�ka enc� o e, especially in urgent aspects, for its improven1ent. T? allow their exper1f its o·peration to go unutilized is surely a waste of a n important source of

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NA L LAW IO T U IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E SoURCEBOOK OF

on �i p ce of n n� l _ se co ga r� le p r u i o st in es ar p m ti �u co ho s w on e on ily A e. dg le ow kn so.cial t1o 1tu l s st na hi on C e . 1n od C am th en B ill w by t ou • t d se fin ' · e . pl am . . ex . . . r o J:" 1' . ' I a e d I e with th f g 1n o d l d er 1a JU n 1c d re e si er c1 . e m e th s on . at t? , 11 10 no tis cl 1 1 co e th . st si re to ilt ct ffi it di t es t no do , us ne ha e ex do e b th ay m i 1t rv se ch hi w l1 it ces w 11 io ct in st di matter what the tl1e judge can perform. . .. e , t w th ns _la e_ courts and th ai ag ve ha le op pe e th ch hi w s nt ai pl Tile various com d ch th an 1n ea ng an le st e in m so ce at d re se us sc di en be ve ha n tio ra ist in m their ad ed at tu it is fec be ef to ss e ce ar ne s ie ed ary m re e es th If d. te es gg sti en be ,,e ha e s i med e. os l ra rp at ve pu th Se r fo s 11p ing t th se ly er op pr be t en n1 ish bl ta es l cia di jti e that th are esse11tial. (1) Rule-Making Power e r u. d ced st an e pro mu tic ac pr of les ru ke ma to r we po the st e mo for d an st Fir be vested in the highest court in each state ... (2) Ji,dicial Conjerences a11d Councils If the courts are to make the maximum use of their rule-making power, it is essential that they hav� the. advice and counsel of a representative cross-section of the be11ch, the bar and the p11blic .. .

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(3) An Administrative Head

A judicial systen1 is a large statewide business and has all of the problems that are present i11 the operation of any large business enterprise .. Like a. business it cannot function efficiently witho11t proper admi11istrative control. Ju.st as every business has a president in whom the final a.dministrative authority re.sts to carry out the poli_cies of its board of directors, so every j11dicial system must have a single admi�s trat1ve head_ who ha? the power and responsibility for 1uaking the judicial establish me?t function effi�1ently. The ad1ninistrative power sl1ould most naturally ��d logi�al_ly be_ vested 1n the chief justice ... It is clearly a cardinal principle of j�dicial admznzstrat1on that tl1ere be a chief j11stice witl1 a substantial term of office with the power and the dt1ty t? assign judges, to s11pervise the work of all the courts, �nd to call conferences of Judges and. others to discuss the work of the judicial establish me11t. (4) Administrative Office and Director It �h?uld _be quite obvious tl1at a chief justice charged with the respo?si? ilitY of admi�1stration cannot p ersonally attend to the multitude of problems incident to ru?n1n� a statewide business in every county and in every community in �he · 0 sta�e if he is to pe rform his normal udicial duties as ll Competent administrati ve we · J · ce · l. There must be an adeq ass1sta nee 18 esse11tia · O ffi · ive administrat uate ly man ned headed : by. an . adm·1n1stra · abilit · dir ·y · ector .who must not only have execut ive · t1ve and. �e skilled-in th� dispatch of business and y�r Iaw go od , bu a wh t o be mu als st o a d1P 9mat versed in the ways of r cto ire d . jud g es. The duties of an administrative and his staff . suppIi'e and . · are. nu. merous .· they· inclu · rar1e de s, the purc hase l1b of law s d· : e ui an s· ni the JU?�es; roo · th e e o urt : �tarb�shrneot c· of and e : maintenanc : c6a!::��' ;- supervis ion. and d1rect1a. n of court clerks and their o. ffices; the:prepa�

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899

budg judic ets; ial the of s.1per ation vision of inistr stenographic readm d o an .t1 n · · · t t s arm a s, const rgean s es bl a11d officers, _ ot�er � � _c?tirt _perso1111el; orters, prob �t1on P _agruos t t he oper�t1), 11 of tl1e Jttdt�ial_ �ystem;_ tlle a1n�s 1 �omp of ion stigat the inve _ stat1st data 1cal co 1 1cer1111 1g of tl1e is statt1s analys of Judici al business and tJ·on . ec . II co a· 1 c repo rts b ase d th ereo11... . 0 per1 f o n atio ic publ the and

of Administration Jt1stice i 11 Uganda'' - Bi1lletirz of J,zter ''The ngor, Obwa From national Com111ission of Ji1rists - (No. 26) (1964) p. 25 et seq. [The Minister] is in t�e Govern13:1ent to _take cl1arge of tl1e ac �111inistratio11 of justice, and the way he discharges this duty 1s ...of fu11da111ental 1n1porta11ce ... to the development of a country. What, then, do�s the administratio11 of justice involve? It involves, to my way of thinking, seven major factors. Fi rst, the creatio 11 of a courts systen1 adapted to the circumstances of our country. Seco1 1d, enst1ri 1 1g d1at j1.1stice is available to every person in Uganda, however hun1ble. Third, the 111ainte1 1a11ce of a proper relation ship bet ween the courts and the services on ,vhich they de1Je11d - the JJolice, tl1e prisons, the probation services. Fo11rth, ensuri11g that tl1e law remains a dy11amic and flexible instrument, in accord \Vitl1 the de,1eloprne11t of tl1e co11ntry. Law, con trary to much popular opinion, is 11ot a fossil: it is a living thi11g which must adapt itself to the circumstances in whicl1 it operates.Fifth, �he establishment of an efficient and contented judicial service, from Judge to Clerical Officer. Tl1e exercise of the law involves great concentration, contint1ed study, cDnsiderable intellectual detach ment; everything must be weighed dispassionately and impartially. Bt1t if this is to be so, the judiciary must be as free as possible fro1n worries over 1 natters of detail, from personal cares, and external distractions. I11 a pl1rase, tl1e jz1diciary must be b�cked by a flawless administration. Sixtl1, the exercise of tl1e prerogative of mercy. Ctr�u�stances of which the law cannot take cogni2ance n1ay so1netimes justify a renuss1on of sentence. The Minister of J11stice is empowered 11nder the Constitutio,z to advise the President in such cases: this entails the most careful consideration of every petition he receives from convicted perso11s, their frie11ds or their relatives. But the general prerogative of mercy goes further tha11 this. Many people f�el they have s_ufef red personal or many of these compl�1nts �re injustices: administrative not suitable matters for Minister of Justice has to review with judicial The remedy. ca.re every complaint he 11g such action as he thinks proper. taki ves e recei befor He must be accessibl e to everyone: people who are conft1sed, who a!e frighten:d, who have suffered any turn to I11m for advice may they that e injustic know must nd rem � ne edy. And, fina. lly, and perhaps most impor'.ant of all_, t�ough hardest to offi acc_urately, is his responsibility as gl1ardia11 of the Constitution and the Rule of otit be t no he aps Jerh _ phra ld '' wou se tion og stitu l tchd Con ''wa T . of the IaLaw. e and as such he and s rt1e l1be 's ple peo the of n sio ero st any mu guard against , freecdoms , whether by legislation or by administrati\'e decree. TIIE LEGAL PROFESSION

e Revised Cons ; titi1tion appa,rently assumes the existence of private advoc�te and �e a/ � profession (comp J recogni�e their iste long has_ law tl1e and 2 are Articles 5 and 47), n ce. (See, e.g., Article 20 of the A dministration of Justice Proclan:at1on of 19:;, pa ge 359, supra; Article 6I(f) of Order No. 1 of 1943, page 355 supra, page

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Sou·RCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

900

the judic of ial chara cter system will be influenced futur e · the ly s · ou vi b O ra ) 360 silJJ ' d. of ' a le gal pro.. ch�racter of the legal_ profe�sio7:- and vk·z�edveifsa. W ha.t kIn by the. . sho b at. 1n o. a syst_em can 1n 1a W ? p1a h1o 1 n Et C . c. t be deveed lop ve de be tlld · fessio,i_ loped 111 the mor� 1·n1111ediate future. The read111gs below only suggest a few of the dimensio11s . of this difficult proble1n. Re-read: The Courts (Registration of Advocates) Rules, Legal Notice No. 166 of 1952, sup,·a.

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From Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstract 1966. . . Statistics on Numbers· of Advocates, By Type of Court and Provmce. High Cot1rt

Sub-Province Courts

District Courts

Total

Province

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38 13

4 16

153

37 1 8

7 310

102 39 7 3 9 14 40 12 43 211 91 7 50 77 705

61 25 6 16 15 38 5 17 393 90 4

143 81 894

192 68 13 41 25 29 91 21 76 757 218 12 201 165 1,909

Arussi Bale Beghemder Eritrea Gemu Goffa Gojam Hararghe Illubabor Kefa. Shoa Sidarno Tigre ·wollega Wollo TOTAL

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From Gerag/1ty, sitpra, pp. 47-49.

The author is disct1ssing the background of advocates licensed to practice in the lower courts AU b11t two of the adJ1ocates i11tet read

vi ew in Addis Ababa and Harar could · and write. Approxi111ately fifty per ce 11 ao t o d f th em ti o l1 n ad ed A uc a m b a as h ar ic ic approxim ately thirty-tw o percent had a c'ombination of Churc h School and foi:m� e?ucat ion ranging fro m the se cond to the eighth grade. Other had more �ducation, s eighteen per cent of the Addis Ababa advocates intervie �a d or in g at . te w w n er d ed e att,ende? th7 Univers ity law certificate course. Most cl m at te n s dv oc at of th e a e the University co11rse had , li tt le o o ed t1catio11 beyond basic Amharic Church Sch bef?re a tten�ing the law sc h u o o l. O ed n e a d al v o c a te fo , rm w h o o f h y a ea d si rs x cation, was 1n tl1e law sch ool's evening LL.B. course. In Asmara only one of the io n ei gh ca t t a d vo ca te ed s u in te a l rv ie fo w rm ed beyond Church School b had n o u t he_ had progressed q uite fa r in Amharic and Geez. Th :i�: o f th_ e a�vocates t�ere h ad I t ah an law degr ees and o n e h a d a Jaw degree fr?m L as de Umversity extension pro gram. Others had a t least been thro • gr a si xt h ugh the It is a rather stri ng . act tha t no advocate ki f interviewed in Addis Ababa practic UIS m the lower courts fin ished government high school.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

901

partict1lar respect as a · rest1lt of tl1eir edtica110 con1mand ca11 then · Ad rocates · ' I . or fro111 1 ·1t1ga11ts. Tl1ey are 111e11 pe1son11e t cotrr rom . ements either f u onal a;:1�: th.iiik they have, a special talent for l1a11dli11g otl?er people's affairs; �vho ha �atu.rally s11rewd and for the n1ost part sel�-scl1??le? 111 cot1rt procecl tt �e. 1hey 81: e utine nature of the cases they hanclle for tl1e1r clients cloes not reqt1ire Th e fa r1 Y :� { of substa ntive law. In additio11, tl1e jt1dges before \Vl101n they appear dge much abot1t tl1e sa1ne or have less and i111pressive eclt1catio11al la\. V more much ::w ot o d ; o unds. The only factor �hich sets jt1dges apart fro111 advoca�es as far as _ forn1er that the ge11erally l1ave 1s JJrev1ot1s lengthly co11cerned 1s 11 o ati . a1ific · ba legalgrqu . ce 11 1e er p e ex v ti a tr is in m · · ad government Advocates live by their \vits. and J?OSt ear11 tl1eir livi11gs vvitl1 110 edt1cational stamp of approval. The ma�ner in_ 'r�l11cl1 tl1ey e11tere? tl1e _legal JJrofessio,1 as �ell 1 111depe11de11t, a I1v1ng reflect a earning relat1vel) of \¥ay l011e exist present their as ence. Approximately t\.ve11ty-five perce11t of tl1e advocates i11terv.iewed said tl1at they were induced to becon1e advocates after bei11g i11volvecl as parties to Iitigatio11 themselves. In many i11stances this litigation involved a fainily dis1 )ute over st1cces sion to land after the death of their fatl1er or otl1er 11ear relative. So111e forty percent of the advocate s were employed in occupatio11s before tl1ey become aclvocates ,vhich naturally produced some litigatio11 ex1)erience. Ma11y of tl1ese acll'ocates, for example, had worked as scribes before tl1ey decided to becon1e 111ore active profe ssional legal representatives. T,vo of the advocates i11tervie,ved hacl been woreda court judge s and decided later to become advocates. 011e advocate bad bee11 a police prose cutor and others had bee11 legal represe11tatives for gover11111ent \Vith courts before they became professio11al legal practitioners vvere t,vo former ek11b "judges'' who came to court often to enforce the payn1e11t of dt1es 011 behalf of their association. From Paul, "First Annual Report from The Dean'', 1 Jo11r11al of Etlziopia Law, pp. 335, 336 (1964).

B_ ut co��Iex, _written law, to be effective, reqt1ires cap�b!e l1un1a11 resources fo r Jts adm1nrstrat1on. The more ''moder11'' a11d thllS soph1st1cated la\vs become ao d the more complex a society becomes, the n1ore t1rgent the 11eed for these ht1man esources. To make her modern legal i11stitittior1s 1,,vorlc, Ethiopia n1ust produce a ;ar greater number of broadly educated, ,vell-trained lawyers. he effective ad1ninistratio11 ofjustice is not a Iuxt1ry ,vl1ich ca11 ,vait upon otl1er T a e _ts of de�e!o elc�i_ve admzn pment; it is as importa11t as hospitals, roads, a11d schools. I believe ,zstration ofjustice is important for three basic reasons: fu·st, because it·18 nght · · · a societ · t1t 1t in th e a bstract; second because w1tho d · , e ern11n d l111 be can y third be�ause it of 80',cial 1nst" · is an indispen;able tool for the develop111e11t and im1Jrovement the ad . . 1 t�tions. All societies, I believe, are only i11 the process of devel opi· ng tl1e hardest concept ly b,1b pro j is ce ly usti simp to defi.n?zn use ice beca ji1st �I tion ,Slra e �dmiruster in t�s world and because tl1at tas � i_s erfore� utterly ?e J)ende: o··�� kin I? d of huma.n 1ntegrity wisdom and mental d1sc1pl111e wl11cl1 111a11 k.ind so ofte 1 · ' · · ice, bu t n acks All soci· eties Just o f e1ns syst have' in a sense' under-developed · · must · l· belie·ve, it · a ble and be a matter of deep concern whe11 the gap between a s1ze 1lllpress· . b t�e ody of law 1yers lal1 ed trc1i11 to help on nally essio IJrof the of ly s supp book and tile implement it is wide.

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SoURCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

902

Notes and Problems

The training of /awyer.r �s � pu1?1ic invest�ent, �nd the size of this investment ultimately depends on the pr1or1ty g1�en to this particular sector and the estimated value of the ''return'' on the expenditure. If the numbers of 11nive�sity trained lawyers. are to re�ain small in the future then consideration must be given to a number of important issues e.g: I. To what extent is gover11ment going to regulate the flow of qualified univer sity graduates into the private practice of law? I� th.e fi?ancial rewards of private practice are high compared to government salanes, this problem becomes more serious. 2. To ·what extent- and by what techniques-might the legal profession be ''socialized''- regt1lated by the government (Ministry of Justice) to accomplish certain ends? For example, if there are increasing needs to make competent legal services n1ore available to the poor, can these needs best be .met by greater regulation of the professio,i?

3. Is the legal profession to be developed as a tr·uly ''independent'' group? What are tl1e values of ''independence?'' How can independence be developed if n1ost good lawyers are ''conscripted'' by the gover·nment?

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CHAPTER IX

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HUMAN RIGHTS - AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Summary of Co11te11ts The Developing "Com�1on" La,v _of Hun1an Rigl1ts_ in a ,vorld of Diverse CultLI_ Seetion I: . The UN Declarat1on of Universal HL1man Rights; Tl1e European Conven �:� for the Protection of HL11nan Rights; Tl1e UN Cove11ai1ts on Huinan Rights.

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Chapter Ill of The Revised Costitution - �n Overvie,v: So urces of Cl1apter I� l; : _ section 2: The Constitution of 1931; The UN Declaration; Federal I�egislat100; Other Legis lation· Implementation of Constitutional Rights Throt1gh The Codes; "In Accor da nce' ,vith The La\v" - And Article 65; Observations on Interpreting Cb apter III . Secrion 3:

)

Freedom of Speech and Publication and Problems of Lin1itatio11 of Tl1ose Rigl1ts; The rationale of these Freedon1s; Tl1e problem of censorship; standards a11d due process.

Section 4: Freedom of Speech: Collective Advocacy: The rigl1t to organise for purposes of advocacy; Ethio_pian legislation on formation of associatio11s; Tl1e rigl1t to assemble and "demonstrate". Section 5: Freedom of Speech - Sedition: Etl1iopia11 legislation; Sedition a11d tl1e Consti tution, some comparative approaches to the forn1ulation of tests and sta11dards. Section 6: Equal Protection of the Laws: The nature of the right; tl1e problem of classifi cation; d enial of equal protection in tl1e administration of la\¥S vvl1ich arc non. discrin1inatory on tl1eir face; Section 7: Preventive Detention: Ethiopian legislation; the pre·ventive detention orders (Nos 56 and 62) and parliament; constitutional guarantees to persons acct1sed of crime; due process and preventive detention; Article 65 as a constitutional atitho rization for preventive detention; judicial review of tl1e exercise of _prerogative powers; Indian experience; alternatives to preventive cletention.

Introduction

This c�apter deals \.Vith selected problems of defi11ing a11d e11forcing gt1ara11tees of human liberty in Ethiopia. It focuses 011 Chapter III of tl1e Revised Co11stitt1tio11, ao<l prima rily on those articles which pt1rport to g11arantee rigl1ts to freedo1n of . . speech, pu bl"1s h1ng, collective advocacy and p11blic asse111bly . . The su bject matter of h11.man rights compasses far n1ore tl1an that. It is assumed 1 � ;:; cours es th� t you will �t11dy crimi1�al pr�cedure i11 detail and th11s t�e Arti�les e r Ill which deal with tl1at topic . It 1s assun1e� that later studies_ de�l1ng i� ,vith P pe_.rty, natural oc11s f . will ent developm resources c economi and and law Your attention In · deta1·1 on Article 44 - certai11ly one of tl1e n1ore s1gt11 · Ies · · fica11t art.1c of the Cons titutio n. · · There is· a grow mg body of literat11re - notably comparative stt1 d"1es - on prob}em . s f secu ·The rnater1�·al h ring freedom through law ' and notably the law of Constitutions. ere can be used more profitably if you make reference to some o f this l't1 erat ure. . . Re.read. (1) Chapte r I, especially pages 54 - 63 (theor1es_ a bout ''h tt�an rights'' a nd · . problems of defining them, ''limiting'' their exercise and e11forc111g thern).

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' law s of e lim le ru g . ( itin 61 gov ' ' ' ern 8 ? 61 m nt (2) Chapter VI, pages . ) ts r t1 o e c th 1n le b a e c r .. power throt1gh law enfo e of t th o en 1t1 pm nd lo c? ve �e ns e th of at th hu d re cla de man en be . n te of s ha It n� 1 _ e r1d !h o er ov ed ed at ne 1n rd to bo s11 p b� im t us m ro � es tri ve un co or po in ty er lib ' en ty v� m ru g1 t 1g n 'd ' wo 1e ' d o1 an al 1ts gl i r1 nd ''i of ll bi vi A s, on iti i1d co ic econom ch e ee �r� sp d _ n an ea m cy ra oc m tle lit de at th d rte where se as tly e11 qu fre is duality.,, It y c . ra d 1te an 1s 1ll w e er slo th e er wh o on ec , l1s ac 1n sto mic y pt em t11 wi en m e ar there te l, ea gfu cr to e in an tim me �y _m it ly �n effective, rta Ce . 1e tr1 is is growth. Perhaps th . a. p1 1o th E 1n ty er lib 1 a1 m l1u of es te an ar gu l lega s ces of political change p�o th� ! o[ a par ely sur is law s thi of e11t pm But tl1e deve]o ns can t1o e t1tu erg 1ns em tic if atten cra mo de w ho . see to rd l1a is It o11 ati nis and moder ir of , s the hts ou rig sci con ple peo encourag g kin ma of n1 ble o p1· the to d pai t 11o is 11 tio ing tl1eir exercise and dete1·mining the limits of government's coerave role. In this chapte1· \:\1e \Vill start with a review of attempts - initiated since the origin of the U11ited Natio11s - to develop world-wide ''common'' law of human rights. This n1aterial reflects a gro\\1ing consciousness of the importance of h·uman rights in a cha11ging, shrinking \�1orld. Thls movement has surely affected Ethiopia. Tl1e mate1·ial then exa1111nes so1ne of the sources of Chapter III of the Revised Cons titution - how son1e a1·ticles, s11cl1 as 65, may have come to be written as they are.· The co11cluding sections foc11s mainly on the problem of interpreting Articles 41 and 45 - and 65: we examine such topics as censorshlp, sedition, the right to organize �ssociations for political advocacy and cond11ct p11b1ic demonstrations. These topics were selected beca11se of thei1� obvious relevance to future political develop�ent an_d beca11se tl1e mak.i11g of la"'' in this area n1ay be n1ore difficult. A concluding sect1011 deals \Vith ''preve11tive detention.''

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SECTION 1 TI-IE DEVELOPING ''COMMON'' LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSE CULTURES

Since �orlc� War II, a nti111ber of steps l1ave been t aken on a n inte level to persuade rnat iona l · · an d commit nations to recog:r1 ize ,L, comn1?n . core of hun1at1 rigl1ts witl1in their legal system�- Two notable ex a 1 e . e • t.1 e n � n 0. ven�1 _Con ecla at on pean 8) Euro of (194 t� Righ 1 tl1e and r . U.� , . � Human Ri f:t� � 9�r Botb of tl1ese doct11nents 11ave 1nflt1enced tl1e drafting of Bills o.f Right s in African co�stit�tioi;:

The United Nations Declaration of Universal Hu,man Rights · · . . Re-read: Chapter I V ' pages 364-6 on 1 ect t Pro ded pan el1 Ex wd (G s ne the for � of Human Rights _ The U.N. D eclaration of Human Rights of 1948). From Jenks, Law in the World Comm unity (1967), pages 120-126. The author is deputy-d'•rector of the International Labor O. rganization.

sci us as i men lie have re f: �::. h ' n -0ur _ S never futu been our before �i that � � own t i p rspec

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-,-::;: tive, respect for human rights has become a tes! 0 he __ _ : . moral viabilit Of societ er and ne of Y the y, as lega l and it , b polit ical v ��- :..-- - ·-� order ·as before. =- - _l In the Charter of the ". . : . . . U . e t d ru N at1ons the peoples of -the United �;a:tLD�--tb�_.-� pressed their deteri--1 . · n na · 1·ion 'to reaffi-· · · · nhts, 1n e " · h 1n rm 1a1t · fundamental human Pc" · -- · - - . ,,

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perso n, in tl1e eqt1 al rigl1ts of n1en and \von1e11 and huma n the of orth 1v v and • di.gnl·tyt.I' large and small'. Tl1ree years later the Ge11eral Assen1bty adopted the ons · l1 ts as 'a co1n111011 standard of na · of Human R1g . sal Declaration of acI1ieveinent . , . Un1ver . . \ fo r all people s and �ll- nat. 1ons : .The pr�occtipat1 011 \Vtlh tl1 e r1gl1ts of 111an wliicJ1 \ I t po 1 ca 1 p !l 1 osop ' ' 1 f 1 li 1 o 1y d o_ r 1g1ns 1a a� last fot111d expressioii in a the to o back ' es ' �. ' . :ecogoised international standard defin1 11g. tl1e l1t1 1na11 r1gl1ts and ft111 dame11tal free ' doms which man may reasonably expect . tl1 e_ state to respect and preserve and tlle to promote and protect It 1s not surprisi11g i11 these circun1staiices unity con1m world ;{ that the degree in which a state accepts a11 d i n1 plements tl1 e U11iversal Declaratio11 • Huma n Rights should be a signi.fica11 t factor i11 its i11flt1ence, JJrestige and reputa of 'l � I tion in the world community or that, witl1i11 tl1 e 111ore inti1nate con1mu11ity of Western Europe, ratification of tl1e European Co11ve11tio11 for tl1e Protectio11 of Ht1 man I Rights and Ft1ndamental Freedoms sl1ould have beco1ne virtt1all)' a reqtrired qtrali fication for the admission of 11e\v me111bers to the Council of Etirope. It m3.y be ) anticipated that accepta11ce of tl1e United Natio11s Cove11ants of I-Iu111an Rigl1ts, ad opted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1966, V11ill, \•1hen they I1ave secured the initial thirty-five ratificat.io11s necessary to bri11g tl1em into force, come •• to be rega· rded in the same light. f Though the precise legal 11ature and validity of tl1e Declaration \Vere left some I what indeterminate at the time, and have bee11 1nt1cl1 disct1ssed b)' legal \Vriters , 1 tl 1 at 1noral and political tl1e 1 witl grown ave 1 I ority its no there can be doubt that years. Among the new members of tl1 e U11ited Nations 110 fe\ver tl1a11 twe.nty-tl1 ree African states have inclt1 ded in tl1eir constitutio11s refere11ces to the ·u11iversal Decla ration or provisions inspired thereby, a11d tl1e Cl1arter of tl1e Orga11ization of African ' Unity like\vise endorses the Declaration. As was said by Po1Je Jol1n XXIII in the Encyclical Pace111 i11 Terris the Declaration 'represe11 ts a11 i1nportant step 011 tl1 e ath towards the juridical-political organization of tl1e vvorld com1nt111ity' for i_1 1 it, �in most solem.n form, the dignity of a person is ackno\vledged to all hun1 an beings, aod as a c?nsequence there is proclain1ed, as a ft1ndan1e11tal rigl1 t, the rigl1 t _of �ree movement 1n the search for truth and in the attai11n1e11t of n1oral good a11d of Jt1st1ce, aod also the right to a dignified life.' Tl1e U11iversal Declaration n1ay still repres�nt a goal rather than an achievement but we l1 ave at least reached the stage at wl11cl1 even t�ose_ who_ show little respect for its provisions in practice rarely qt1 estion its authority Ill. principle. . The equality of man is the keynote of tl1e U1 1iversal Declaration .. Tl1 � J?ecl�ra tion affir ms the principle · insists tllat it is applicable \.vithot1t any d1scr1n11nat1on; d am li!ies the obligati�n of respect for hu111a11 dig11ity wl1ich flov�s fr?m. it. All ��m p an beings, the Declaration free a11d equal In digi1 ity ai1d n bor are , ims cla pro ri ts. ey are 1 01 s ard t?w a�t uld sho a11d �e, cien wed s _ con ndo with reason and _� � a;�therT? . free d s Ill a sp1r1 t of brotherhood. Everyone 1s entitled to all t�e rights ai1d set forth in the Declar 1nd, SlIC� as �a�e, k Y _ 1 a1 of ion i11ct dist ation, witl1out cii:ur, sex,_ g1 lan 1age, religion, political or other o1Jj11io11,. r1 �t1on�l or social or1g�11 , ro perty, birth 1 d se�urity ai y ert lib , life to or l1t r1g b er the oth E as . tus ne sta veryo �f rson. ted Jec sub be ll sha o p e on No one . ude vit ser ll sha or be y ver held i 11 sla t oe ture orN . al eqt are All 1 ent. 1 n 1 to isl pun or l crue � inhuman o degrading treatment bo !io re of the n tio tec pro law l tia eq , to 11 d tio an na mi �re entitled without an y discri t�e �aw. e di nity and oso i ph g l lyin der u11 the s ent res rep rth n wo rso pe of the human � phy !! which the whole of the Declaration is based.

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e of th s on io isi rat ov cla pr De e th n of rt at ea rel l1 e l t ing 1. s i Jaw of ess c r . u D p , ll of them fund·amental. es a pl ci in pr n ve se . in h 1·t 0 f t se is t 011c ep c' e Th . s e 1 t� r e 1 b � l. ·i 1 v t c o t n i e by c h t y om e te em p.e r nt ve cti e t na ? e . 1 1 o a ff to a. l ht 1·ig ie l t l . Everyone 11as e an d s h ht gr 1 g. 1m ri 1 b t a y n 1e 11 h t a e con sd un f e th 11 g i at ol vi c ts a 1· 0 f s l la tli trib · titt1tion or the law. [A1·ticle 8]. e st, detention o r exile. [Art. 9]. r ar y ar tr bi ar to ecl ct e bj s11 be ll 2. No 011 e sha

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lic h� ar i g by an inde nd b r pu fai a � to ity l 11a eq l ful i11 d le tit e11 3 . Everyo11 e is !1 f n o bts t1o his r1g �na rm d d ete an the ob in l i l 1 na b1 t1·i l a 1·ti 1pa 1 i1 d 1 1 a t pe11den . gatio11s a11 d of any cri1ni11al charge against hi m . [Art. 10]. 4. Eve1·yone charged with a penal offence has the right to be pres umed in noce11t t11 1til proved guilty according to law in a public tria] at \\1hich he has had all tl1e gt1ara11tees 11ecess ary for his defence. [Art.11(1)].

.5. No 011e sl1ail be charged g11ilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 0111iss io11 wl1ich clid 11ot constit11te a penal offence under national or i11 ter11 atio11al law at the tirne whe11 it was committe d. Nor s·hal] a heavier p e11alty be i111posed tha11 the one that was appl ica·ble at the time the penal offe11ce was co1nmitted. [A1 ·t. 11(2)]. 6. N·o 011e shall be Sll bjecte d to arbitrary i11 te1·f ere 1 1ce witl1 his priva,cy, family, hon1e or corresponde11ce . [A1·t. 12]. 7. Ever�>7one is e11titled to freedo1 11 of move111ent, inc.l 11di11g the right to travel abroad, tl1e 1·igl1 t to rett1r11 l 1on1 e, and the right to seek asyl11n1 elsewhere. [Arts. 13, 14].

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Freedon1 h,1s its roots i11 tl1e f 1·eedon1 of tl1 e 1 ni11 d. O r 1l y where the n1i11d is free and ca1 1 express itself freely ca.11 fr·e edom th1·ive a1 1d .flot1 risl1 . Evervone, the Declara tion p1·oclaims , l 1as tl1e rigl1t to freedo111 ot� t .houol1t co11science · a11d reli 0ion; this right inclt1des �r�edo111 to cl 1ange l 1is re ligio1 1 0 1· belief. Everyor 1e l1as th; right to fr�ed om . of OJJ1111011 a11d e xp ressio1 1. Tl1is rigl1t i 11clt 1des freedon1 to hold opinions WlthoLit 1_nterfe 1·e 11ce a11d to seek, 1·eceive and i111part .i 11 for111ation and ideas throl1gh any media a11d regarcl less of f1:011 tie1:s. [A 1·ts. 18, 19].

M�11 i s a s�cial a11i111al. Neitl1er J)e.rso11al 'freedon1 11 01· freedo111 of thought and expr�ss1 �11 ca1 1 give hi1 1 1 a f11ll life ti11less l1e ca11 sl 1are these freedorns with l 1is fellows. I-Ierei� lies the sigi1ifi�a11ce of' tl.1e tr·e edon1 ot� peacetul assernbly a11d association procla1n1ed by the U11 1 ve1·sal Declc1.ra.tio11. ! . Tl1e Declaration e11visages s t1cl1 f1·eedo m in political, economic, religiot1s, edu· rlal ai1d Clilttira.l s he cati� res. It states the p 1·jnciple i11 st1cl1 genera l terms as to cover · p 1 :hes_e . sp ll�res btlt, except �11 respect of' the political s here, also reformulates · -tj= p s ely in te rns approp ate t o ��· f t to pec res h eac � _ of e in th se It s e is ph . s e n . � e con�:f� an<l so_c.1al s J t l xp e her e t t l1 at the D e cl arat1 011 de als ,v1 th the ma.tter mos � p · citi y. E__veryone: 1� affii:ins, l 1as the right to for m and to joi n trade 11-nions for the ote ctioii ? f 1s 1 1 1 �eres Its, and everyo11e bas t.be r ight to own property alone as well �; . 111 a ssoc1at1on with othe1·s . [Arts . 23(4); 17]. J · · · '-� . The specific references tO free nal io i - ·' · .. u a e · a om of s , asso ciat ion reli i11 giou th e �: a11d ctiltu al fi � -1 leId s a�e more general in character :_ JV0�4 qu , une · s e s · :rtbel e but e n v The Decl:rat10 · 11 specifies tli ·· _ . on · c . , at tl1e right of everyone to freed.om of thougp.t . ... l

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. e and religion ioclt1des the right 'alo11e or i11 co111mt111ity witl1 otl1ers a11d i,1 scienc · ...... v,rorsI 11· 1) a11d observa,1ce'. ;i:b'1s re1·1g1011 · and b e1·1ef 1n manuest to te priva r 1 _P� � t;:iaration 'affi� ms t_he ri�ht of pare� �ts 'to cl1oose tl1e , l<i11cl of ed11c �ti_o11 tl1 �t T ll be given to their children and tl1e 11gl1t of everyo11e freely to participate 1n s:a ultural life of the com1nu11ity'. Tl1ese are 11ot freedon1s ,vl1icl1 tl1e i11divicl11al alo11e; tl1ey pres11p Jose himself freedo1n of 1)eaceft1l asse111bly 1 by or for e �xercis ; �a ]. 7 I) 2 ( , , 6 2 18 s. rt [A . n io at ci so as and The Universal Declaratio11 does 11ot lin1it itself to tl1ese classical freedo111s; it embraces freedom fron1 ,;,,,a11t no less tha11 freedom fro111 fe,1r a11d proclaims tl1e right to share �n the frt�its of eco_11on1ic a11d social p �ogress by e111111ciati11g tl1� right to s ocial security, tl1e right to vvork a11d to free cl101ce of en11)loy111ent, tl1e r1gl1t to just and fav?urable conditions of vvork a11d �-e!11u11eratio11, t�1e rigl1t to re�t a11d J e.isure, the right to an ,1deq11ate sta11dard of l1v111g, a11d tl1e r1gl1t to edt1cat1011. It accepts the proposition for111ulated i11 tl1e Decla.ratio11 of Pl1iladel1)!1ia of 1 944 restat ing the aims and pt1rposes of the Ii1ter11atio11al Labour Organis[ttio11, whicl1 I1as since been e11Jbodied in the Constit11tion of ILO, tl1at eco110111ic sec11rity a11d eqL1al opportunity are essential elements in the freedon1 a11d dig11ity of 111a11. [i\.rts. 22, 25,29].

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The European Con,1ention for Protectio11 of I-Iuman Rig!1ts The European Convention for the Protection of I-lun1an Rigl1ts a11d Funcla1nental 1:-reeclon1s, prepared in 1950, has been ratified by fifteen \,Vestern Europea11 nations in 1950 (including Great Britaia). Recently Greece has ,vithdrawn fron1 tl1e Council of Europe tinder tl1rea.t of expulsion for violation of the Convention.

From Robertson, ''The Et1ropean Co11rt of flt1n1a11 Rights'', 9 A111erica11 Jo11r na/ of Con1parative La�v, page I (1960).

. �Y the terms of the C.011vention, the Co11tracti11g Parties guara11tee to all J Jerso11s within their jurisdjction a . number of rigl1ts a11d freedo111s.... Tl1ese rigl1ts a11d free doms \.Ver e taken from the Universal Declaratio11 of Hi1111a11 Rig/1ts· adoptecl by tl1e General Asse1nbly of tl1e United Natio11s 011 ] Otl1 December, 1948, tl10L1gl1 they are de�ned in m11ch greater detail. Moreover, tl1ey form in tl1e Et1ropea11 Co11ventio11 the. 0bJect of precise legal obligations, by co11trast witl1 tl1e Universal Declarati_on, which was a solemn statement of intentio11s-of co11siderable 111oral valt1e b11t \.V1th out legal effect.... In order to ens11re respect for the provis.io11s of tl1e Co11ventio11, it was decided to set up machinery for its enforceme11t, before ,vl1icl1 the Parties cot1lcl be called � 0rder if they failed to ftilfil th.eir obligations. First of all, there vvas created tl1e u;��an Co11·1,r_1ission oj· Hz man R ghts, con .istirig of a 11�rnber of n1en1bers eq 11al � � _ C011ve11 tio , to of the High Contractitng 24 of the _ icle � Art er tind , 1cl1 \Vh to , ttes Par _ y. Thi _ an p rty ay art 1e1 � otl a11 er ref by � 1on e11t n 11v Co : ged tl1e alle of � h c· bre � � is ihe as ic � ? type of inter-State act1011, �hereby 011e g?vern13:e11t_ n1ay br1n�.a co111_ � plain . t ga,nst a11other government for fa1l interna er tind 1s t101 1ga obl ts i il ft1lf to t1re ' t10 na1Jaw1 · ·. n actd1t I io11. ··l,1.,at JJe t·1· ,.r·1 ··io11 to this, however, the re is also a r1g 1nc.iv1e · f1t oj u �d;�:rttcle 25, t�e Comm n ay receive petitio_ns fron1 ''a11Y pei�s°.� 11on issio m ' of a go e . ental _ 1 n v1ct tl1e _ be to ! orga g 1n1n cla1 ti niza t1als on ivid i11d or up of gro viola by n 1 Ill tl11� �on� rtl !o t s l1t rig e the of rti , s Pa t in rac e nt Co g gh _Hi � ? t � -10 11s. Venti��- � Thi�s J� 1d1t co1 ur1_sd1ct10� of the Cornmissio!1 1 s however s11bJect t°. tw� _ th at the _ Party against which the complaint rs macle has declared that it recogruzes

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r es he at ot ve St e t fi av as le e ad at m at th si d � an ila n m io tit pe r al du vi di in of ht rig tlle e cil th of un rs of Co be em p M ro Eu en te e fif of t ve ha ou ne ni ct fa . In , · ' · 8 1 · · 01 . 1 ta ar I ec d d d 1 ive 1v1 10 ce re to ua · 1o · t1t n · 1o pe 1ss m 1n , ns Co e th d an of ce · ten pe m co e th · ed 1z gn reco · . ns ea A n op co ur d' on E 1 ili on m 1t1 O 9 t of ou ab its to e bl la ai av w no is y ed · tills rern . · d" y "d 1n 1 an 1 1v m d ; ua e 1es 1:1 ica pl re ap l �a lo of ns tio o? sti au 1 l ex us io ev pr e th is e cis er ex . le ru is th h it w e 1c a1 li 1p n co n o n r fo 11ave bee11 rejected

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ts an gh um Ri of d H n an tio ec ot aPr nd e Fu th r fo n tio en nv Co an pe iro Et 1 on Fr mental Freedoms. . on of �y ers p _ e uri No on sec d an y shall e:t lib to ht rig _ the s ha 1 e on ., ery Ev Article 5. ( ) ce an 1n ord h d wit acc a an es pro cas ing low fol the in e sav y ert lib l1is of ed riv dep be cedure 1)resc1·ibed by law: (a) the lawft1l detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) tl1e lavvful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawft1l order of a court or i11 order to secure the ft1.l:filment of any obligation pres ,, cribed by law; I (c) the lawft1l arrest or dete11tion of a person effected for the _purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having com n1itted an offe11ce or wl1en it is reasonably considered- necessary to prevent his com mitti11g an offence of fleei11g after having done so; (d) the dete11tion of a 111inor by lavvful order for the purpose of educational ' supervisio11 or his lawft1l detention for the purpose of bringing him before the com , pete11t legal at1thority; (e) the lawful detentio11 of perso11s for the prevention of the ·spreading of in fectious diseases, of persons of u11sou11d mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f)_ tl1e lawf�l arrest 01· detention of a person to prevent ltls effecting an un a�thoriz:d entry into tl1e country or of a person agai 11 st \Vl1om action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition; ' II (2) Everyone who is arrested. sl1all be i11formed promptly, in a language which he t1nderstands, of the reasons for ltls arrest and of a11y charge against him. f 'r (3) Everyon� arre�ted or detained in accordance with the provision of p·ara graph ! (c) of this Article sl1all be brot1ght promptly before a judge or other o�cer authorized �y law to exercise jt1dicial 1:>ower and shall be e1 1titled to trial withi n a , reasonable time or to 1·elease pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees � to appear for trial. -� -'-= (4) Everyone wh? is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be_ en- · - ·1 .titled _to take proceedings by which the Iawf ulness of his detention shall be dec ided: speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detentio is not lawful. n 5) Eve_r�one who ?as b�en the victim of arrest or detention in contraven��n- :_ -� of 1� · e provisions of this Article shall have an enforceab right to compensauon.._ -_ le _ -� :f �· :v · . Articl e 6 (1) I n the determ1nat1 J a or on of his civil rights and obligations . of - � - - _:_i .cr1m1n . . al · · .:- ·tfii'O�� charg� against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hear m g_:Wl · � -�· : �� r : � u�:ion�bl� ::�e by an independent and imparti al tribunal �Stahlishe��m'�1;J • �k� -=·=·=1: en s a e pronounced publically ; ;:_ u� e�c ! but the press a . nd, publi.c may be ... •

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RIGHTS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UMAN H

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909

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trial in the interests of morals, pt1blic order or nati·onal the of art ,1' I' P Or , all se , ct1r1 . ·ty . o m fr · . l ere th h e in · t w ere . , sts soc1e_ty of Jt1ven1.!es or tl1e J)rot ectio11 of "' i). atic ocr . dem tl1e .in_a re qu or so to ire s '. th , e parti e ex te nt strictly 11ecessary in th the of 11 e li'" e e t Op 1·n1on . •• · nva • . !\\I P t anc c1rc es um h \V s ere pt1bl'1c1t 1 a spe c1 . y Wo in t1ld rt prejt1dice the i 11terests cou the of .:1 of justice. Every one ch�rged with a criminal 0£fe11ce s11all be prest1med ini1ocent until (2) � I g to law. in rd o cc a ty il gu d ve pro (3) Everyone charged with a crjminal offence l1a s tl1e following miniint1111 r i ghts:

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(a) to be i11formed promptly, in a language w11ich .l1e 1111d erstands, a11d i 11 detail. of the nature and cause of the acct1satioi1 agai11st him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for tl1e preparatio11 of his defence;

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(c) to defend bim_self in person or througl1 legal assistance of l1is own choosi 11 g or, if he has not sl1ffic1ent means t o pay for legal assista1 1ce, to be give11 it free wl1e11 the interests of jt1stice so require; (d) to examine or have examined vvit11esses agai11st hi111 ancl to obtain the attendance and examination of- vviti1esses 011 his behalf u11der tl1e san1e condit i o11s as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistap.ce of a11 interpreter if he cannot 1.111dersta11d or s1Jcak the language t1sed in court.

Article 7. (I) No one shall be held guilty of a11y cri1ni11al offcr1ce 011 accou11t of any act or omission which did not co11stitute a crimi11al ofle11ce 1111der 11ational or international law at the time vvben it ,vas con1n1it ted. Nor s11all a heavierf penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable a.t the ti 111e tl1e criminal of ence was commi tted. (2) This Art i cle shall not prejudice the trial a11d punish111ent of �11� p erson for �n y act or omission which, at the time when it \Vas co1111nitted, ,,,as crm11nal accord mg to the general principles of law recognized bJ' civilized nations. Article 8. (I) Everyone has the rigl1t to respect for his IJrivate and fan1ily life, 11is h ome and his correspondence. . (2) There shall be no interference by a pt1blic at1tl1ority ,vith the_ exercise of th�s ng�t except such as is in accordance with the Jaw a11d is 11ecessary 1n a_ democr�tic ociety in the interests of national security, pub lic �afety or the econo�ic vvellbeing �f the country, for the prevention of disorder or cr1n1e, for the prot ection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. �- i Ie �I) �ver li _re d an e nc cie ns co !, gh ot1 th ?f ne yo �n,� has the right to freedoID; er th i rigl1t includes t i e m, ed �l _ fre � an� ief bel or 011 1g1 rel freedom to change his �one ?r � on igi rel s thi in community with oth est nif ma to e, vat pri c or bli pu in ers · d an or elief b ' 10 · Wors h'1p, teaching, practice and observance. 2 Free m t 011�Y to _ st � c _ j sub do be all sh to fs lie be Iitnit�t1o manifest one's religion or �� ns _ as are prescribed by law and are necessary ID a den1ocrat1c society 10

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. SoU.RCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN _CONSTITU ' TIONAL LAW

910

r, ic de bl or th pu al he of n or tio ec ot pr a or m e h t· r fo ls, or , ty fe sa ic bl pu of ts interes s. er th f o s o m o d ee fr 1d a1 ts gh i 1: 1e tl f o for tl1e pr·otection . es ion o pr ex om s �d fre to ht ht rig rig � e tl1 � s l1a � shall 1e o1 ery Ev (1) . 10 le tic Ar i mpart 1nfo� m.at1on 11d . ideas d an e eiv rec to d an s o11 i11i op old h · to � _ include f i·eedon1 . s �rs of les nt1 ard fro reg is d Th an y r1t tho at1 c bli Article pt1 by 1ce re1 rfe 1te 1 j tit tho \\,i g, tin cas of ad ng bro nsi lice io vis the tele ing t1ir 1·eq n or 1 ron f tes sta t ven pre t shall 110 • ci11ema e11terpr1ses. (2) Tl1e exercise of these f1·eedot?-�, since it _ �arries wit� j� duties and r�sponsibi lities, n1ay be subject to s11ch for1nal1t_1es, cond1t1on�, rest�1ct10?-s or I?enalt1es as are prescribed b)' la\v a11d are 11eces_sary 1n a democrat1c soc1ety, rn the _ rnterests. of na _ tio11al sect1rity, territorial i11tegr1ty or publi c safety, for the prevent1on of disorder, or crin1e, for the I)rotection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation the disclosure of information received in confi or 1·igl1ts of others, for preventing · dence, or for maintai11ing the a11thority and impartiality of the judiciary.

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Article 11. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedon1 of association with otl1ers, inclt1ding the right to form and to join trade unio11s for the protection of his interests. (2) No 1·estrictio11s sl1all be placed 011 the exercise of· these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are 11ecessar).1 in a den1ocratic so-ciety in the in terests of 11atio11al sect1rity or p11blic safety, for the prevention of disorder or crin1e, f 01· tl1e protection of l1ealtl1 or 111orals or for tl1e-protection of t .he rights and freedoms of otl1ers. Tl1is Article sl1all not preve11t the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rig11ts by me1nbe1·s of the arn1ed forces of the police or of the administration of tl1e State. Notes and Qi1estions

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the Above.

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l ._ Tl1e clrafti1�g o( th.e El11·opea11 Co11ventio11 is obviously more detailed th an the U.N. Declaration. Why? Which doct1rne11t \vould have provided the best mod.el for the farrners of the Revised Constit11tion? · 2·. A _ co11ve11tion s�111ilar to E11ropes l1as been ra.tified by member states of the _ Or�anization of Amencan states, and there has sometime been discussion of a s regional conventio11 for Af1·ica. St1ppose tl1e European Conv ention were prop o. s e_d as a model for mem?�r states of tl1e O.A. U., and supp ose you were asked to prep are a memorandum adv1s1ng the Ethiopian gover11ment of the implications of this step:

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ould the convention be enforceable law in the cour ts? � iii) What new major _restrictions would : on t��"'�go-,-----·=�.J-= su ch a convention impo se ver11ment?• , - ---- = --I ·� . ---

Why?

i geria,

Ke11ya a.nd other former Br1t1sh colonies as a .

See also·. U11ited Niations Covenants on Human rights.

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SECTION 2 CHAPTER III OF THE REVISED CONSTITU�fION Some Notes on Sources of Chapter ID of Tl1e Revised Constitution Re-read: P age 392 (Em_peror's remarks on Cl1a1) ter III of Tl 1e Revised Consti tution).

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Unpublished docu.me�ts _indicate tl1�t tl1e clraftsn1en o� tl1e Revised Constilulion consulted many of the world's const1tut1ons _as possible sources for var1o �s articles in the 1955 revision. Cer tain articles are patterned on foreign models: for example, Article 52 bears close con,parison vvilh Article VI of the U. S. "Bill of Rights'', and tl1e "due process'' and "eqt1al JJrolection'' clauses (Articles 37 and _43) are appar �ntly based on . A111erica� counterparts. But it is clear that tl1ere \vere Ethiopian materials more read1ly at hand \vl11cl1 n1ost 111fluenced tl1e content of botl1 Chapter III and other constitutional provisions related to its enforce111ent as ''\vorl,ing la'.:v'' (e.g. A.rt. 122). The immediate "Ethiopian'' sources of Cl1apter III \vould a1Jpear to include:

l. The Constitution of 1931;

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2. The U.N. Declaration of Rigl1ts;

3. Legislation establishing Eritrea and its Federation witl1 Etl1ioJ)ia; 4. Other legislation enacted prior to 1955, dealing witl1 fundan1ental institt1tions of govern ment and fu.ndarneotal rigl1ts. . Presumably the jurists who developed the 1955 Constitution \.VOrkecl ,vith tl1ese n1aterials asL �g them as bases for revised or new articles. Obviously, too, tl1ey \vorked within a context of Ethiopian tradition and the political ot1tlook of the times.

J. TJ,e Constiti1tio11 of· 1931.

Re-read: Pages 327-28: Chapter III of tl1e Coi1stitution of 1931. Chapter III of the Constitt1tion of I 931 was obviot1sly iuodel ed L1po11 tl1e Ivleiji Const!tut�on, which i11 tLtr11 was patterned ttpon tl1e ninetee11tl1 centttry Prt1ssia11 00stitut1on, developed by Bismarck. The fra111ers of tl:e Meiji Co11stitutio11 l 1a_d ace_d proble ms somewhat analogous to those confronti11g tl 1e Ernperor and his visors in 1931. Befor e th� �feiji era !apan ,vas, i11 _ma11y vvays, a fe��d�l socie �y �� · gely contr olled by a heridttary officialdom, an ol1garcl1y \V11ose 1)11v1legecl status .was fixed ore by birth or connecti·on neither a ''moder11'' l1ad 1 . 1·apa1 111erit m tl1ai1 . . . . centra r1 ed gover nment nor a systen1 of comprehensive \Vr1tte11 la\v. Ter111s like "C onst1t� . ut1011'' and ''political party'' and ''civil rights'' were i1ot part of the vocab ulary. Ther e were few er11 gov iri io11 pat tici par zet1 citi g blin l ena lega s ion itut inst . ment ' or express1o . n of public wants. p an l c ed . the a a k L1nderlying concept of citize11ship by which tl1e i11dividua_ l is ·v enJ �f u more of a corporate interest in sl1api11g his society - n.o t 011ly thi·otigll rigllts rage nd freedo111 of l: l we as ts _ rigli r f othe of J ion gr1it reco 1 ug ch � l1ro spee but t m0s f q ality lt)' Lll� r po op re 1no , _of t 1en yn Jlo r �o op em cl an ;: ty 1 ni on tu � ati fo; educ to k: � le ctJve action, more opportt111ity to challei1ge abL1s.es of JJetty officials �J . and quest10n the legality of o ficial acts tl1roL1gh established procedttres. f �he lead ers of ent, erim exp Je son a11d dy sttr the cl1 mu iji Me r afte nt , me gover11 consc1o usly adopted the Germa11 model for their constitt1tion. Tl1ey \Vere cleter-

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NAL LAW O TI U IT T S N O C N A PI IO f I:· T E F O K O SoURCEBO

s, s� as ey ge j1: th an ch re l ga we le d ter an de l a ic. lit po n mi sic ba ed · t ou b a g i1 i br to miiled d re te 1s 1n be m om fr ad to as e w ov ab e 1g a1 ch . t bu Th , ny ey o1 on ec e tl1 e liz ia tr tis d ix1 to . gh s ou d _ th e an er m th de s as m re or we 11, t10 lu vo some re tl1 wi ed 11t ro rif co t no were ate uc -ed ern d by est W led r de _ s lea up 1·o g _ s. But m fro e g _ an cl1 l ica lit po f 01presstires ire ct th e chara��r and pace of chan ge. d to 1ty or 1th a1 �n ta I-� to s wa the govermnent . n, s 1 pa r e1J Ja ro M pe the Em e th 1n monar ch so , 31 19 In )1a 1io Etl of 1 e cas As in the ed ter to. be nis re mi we ad s on rm fo a Re le. step op pe the to 11 1tio tih ns Co the e'' ''gav t. en m rn ve go ed en ht lig en 1 a1 by sis ba ic at m ag pr by step, ed lect hts ref s rig il thi civ th wi policy. g lin dea s ion vis pro 1al io1 tut 1sti co1 e Th ''Rights'', i11 the Meiji Constitutio11, as i11 Ethiopia's of 1931 , were declared to exist t ion van slat rele h legi \�1it to be e anc ord acc in , i.e. '' law the h wit e anc ord acc ''in enacted over a pe1·iod of tin1e. Tl1e Constitution did 11ot itself establish civil and political 1·ights as wor·king law; its provisions, in this sector, were not self executing; they were pron1ises to be implemented thro11gh future legislation - notably through codes a11d specific la'v\'S to deal with s11ch matters as criminal proced11re, trade unions, political associatio11s, 1J11blic employ1nent, the press, and the like. The codes and other legislatio11 (which were in fact imported laws based on foreign models) were to be pro1nulgated over a period of time. Thus the elitist leaders of government hoped to gl1ide a11d control the lJrocesses of fundamental political change. (For further refere11ce, see Beckma11, T/1e Nfaking of the Meiji Co1istitL1tion (1957); Von Mehren (ed.) Law i11 JaJJa11 (1963); Ward and Rustow (eds.) Political Modem.ization i11. Japan and Turlcey (1964-)).

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Prest11nablJ' a s01newhat similar theory underlay Chapter III of the Constitution of 1?3�. Of cot1rse, �iewed from today's context, one may dismiss its importance. Bt1t it 1s well to cons1de1� tl1.e doc11ment i11 its own historic.al context. The Constitu tio11 of 1931 did 1nark a brea.k with tradition. It ,:vas the first law to deal \Vith citizen s' rights, in a systen1atic way. It decla1·ed the existe11ce of a 11umber. of basic rights, and later legisl�tion establishing tl1e Federation witli Eri·trea (see below) did in fact mal<e tl1ese article� self exect1ting. The rigl1ts and dt1ties d.eclared by the Constitution of 1931 were Obv1ously 011e poi11t of departure for the '' revisors'' who drafted the 1955 Constitution.

2. The Universal Declaratio11 of· Htlma,1. Rights of 1948. ' Re-read: pages 364-366 sitpra (Tl1e Declaration)· pages 379-380 (The fede ral ' ' Act, Parag1·apl1 7) . -. · n Wh ile s not par t n_w of � tl1e inte rna atio l � la,;v of De cla Eth iop ia, U.N . the . r � _ set ob:1011s source for _the it dra :fts111e11 of the Revised Constitution. Not only did ou� Pllrported ''11n1versal'' sta11dards - to which Eth ·a officially subscribed, __ } iop 1 e but the Dec1 arati· on 'Yas obvi·?usly a source for th · . · f aph par agr provisions of 7 · Fede " ral .Act, (the Urut�d Nations resolution establishing the basis for F-edera =� � .. -� . wrth E�r1trea) The UN D ec1arat101 1 · · s :1. · . · . · ' -o -:.. t · _ f1$.u f 1 o was ''bill also a · s011rce the for . _ the Const1tu�-tI011 of E· ri:ti·ea. ... . .....-.! � . t-:.J T l7i ;:i � · �to . . T:� Thus ' if the fram·ers o·f Ethi·opta .� : � .: e · . .· \I J.� OlJ Y 11 , S C Iega onst1tu t1on not c¥ were . . i11corporate the U N Deelarat . l . . :! :::: ul h ��d � 9 �": · d · · · co Ion . i nto ..; . they the Rev i sed . Constitution' . . · · · nore its pr1nc1p ig . · � :;;, � ---:�fS�...; e les · A ?d Ill = a · f;act its influence - and the us.e af 1ts. �lan@. g �"' a;.:"';;,"�-r;., clear. compare e.g. Articles 37 . . . 1ev cennte:f �::.;:-·�:-: , 38, 5 3, 54, 5 5, 56, 57, 6 I with - -. -"='.:· '--�:"�::· then: re_-_..- -aµ_t�· "��.:. ·- --=--·,;;::::,, '-""" =·====;

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- POLITICAL AND ECON01\1IC DEVELOPMENT S RIGHT UMAN H

913

in Paragrapl1 7 of tl1e Federal Act wl1icl1 i 11 turn and ration Decla arts . the �' . Declaration the }. > p bas on '. ,vas llled I\ partict1lar rigl1 ts, tvvo otl1er provisio11 s of the u. N. va. r ious the to tion addi , ;� In -� ., note. of worthy are Decla ration ', �.., I '-( ! Article 8 declares the oblig�tio11 of_· natio11s to provide ''a11 effective remedy'' 1 nat1o?al. ti. �11i1al'' for ''acts violati11 g ft1ndamental petent ''co , some h throug �by th e constitution . ri!!h ... ts" guara nteed Articles 29 and 30 lay down standards for ''li111itatio11s'' 011 I111111an rights. � Indeed the scheme of the U.N. Declaratio11 is to declare rigl1ts i 11 tl1e for111 of broad, � · almost absol te propositions (e.g. ''Everyo11e bas tl1e rigl1 t to freeclo11 1 of peaceft1l u ; : assembly and association''); b11t the Declaration recog11izes tl1at tl1 e task: of tra11slat[, ing such broad declarations into working law req11ires tl1 e effort of detern1i 11 i11g 1 the permissible limits of any partict1lar right. I 1 1stead of defi11 i11 g particular co11di tions and rules delimiti11g each partic11lar rigl1t (as ,vas don.e i11 tl1e E11ro1Jean Co11\• vention), the Declaration adopts tl1e strategy of setti11g f ortl1 a ge11eral pri11 ciple may 1Jrotect at the expe11se of restricti11g f expressing the interests which the state the exercise of any of particular gt1 ara11teed hun1an rigl1 t. Tht1s , 1\rticlcs 29 a11d I 30 of the U.N. Declaration declare: i

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Article 29 (I) ·Everyone has duties to the co1nmt111ity in vvhicl1 alone the free

and full development of his perso11ality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freeclorns, everyone shall be subject only to such limitatio11s as are deter111i11ed by la,,11 solely for the purpose of securing d11e recog11ition and respect for the rigl1ts and freedoms of others a11 d of meeti11g the jt1st req11ireme11ts of morality, public order and the ge11eral welfare i11 a democratic society.

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(3) These rights and freedoms may in 110 case be exercised co11trary

to the purposes and principles of the United 1�ations.

Article 30 Nothing in this Declaration may be i11terpreted as i1n1Jlyi11g for •

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any S tate, group or person any right to e11gage in a11y activi�y or to perform any act aimed at tl1e destrt1ctio11 of any of the rights a.nd freedoms set fort h herein. Article 29(2), supra, became the source for tl1 e conclt1ding provisions of the f: us paragraph and a) si,pr IV? pter Cha 0,_ 9-38 ( A l 37 7 of es_ pag the see _ era ct Fed t�:�ource for was , turn in , uage la11g This cle Arti rea. 34 Erit of of the 1tion st.itl Con adopted as Ar ticle 65 of the Revised Constitution. . e fact that Article 65 2) 29( e ticl Ar m fro ,vn d:a is 1 C o1 11ti stit on of the Revised of tJh t No e . 1 � r1Jo . d 1 a1 P� 1ng ean a . ecl 11 1 its 1 ion rat d tan helps us to 1nders N D l!-le � tha t �rt1c no is it ion: rat cla De 2) 29( . � N. U. is tl1e by g on am red cla de the ht.r; rig sim I ·a bro . a� 9ualification of the other rights e1 111m�ra!ed. by the De�la:at1_? 0 , rat6ei It _is a 1 11_ct o t d1s e Th ts. r1gh t l1m1 1� l1m to n atio er pow on the government's � � may be impo e1111t be t1ld sl1o 65 rta le t1c r A. nt ich wh ce sin in it suggests the spirit Pret d (See . . " f tirther discuss.ton below 1or e · of this · ·) · · po1n.t

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SOURCEBOOK OF ETI-IIOPIAN CONSTITU.TIONAL LAW

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n tio e tu th sti s d In a,i o,f n r de tio ra Fe de Fe al e th g Goverti� in s/ bli ta es n tio sla gi Le 3_ 11'1ent. 4. 8 -3 6 es 36 ag p , V r te I ap h C f o Re-read: Sectio11 2 Note ca1·efi1!/J1 tl1e p ro visions of: 1

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1) Paragraph 7 of tl1e Federal Act set out at pages 379-80, supra. 2) Ai·ticles 6, 7 a11d 8 of 01·der No. 6 of 1952 (Federal Incorporation etc.) set out at page 375, sup1·a. 3) Articles 3(a), 3(b), 3(r) a11d 3{s) of the Federal Courts Proclamation· No. 130A of 1953, set ot1t at pages 382-384, SLIJJra.

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The above legislatio11 111ade p1·ofound changes which plainly affected the legal co11text withi11 ,vbjcl1 tl1e d1·afters of the Revised Constitution worked. The 1952 Co11stitt1tio11 of Eritrea became part of the working law within a part of Etl1iopia. This Co11stitution closely followed the U. N. Declaration and established its bill of r. ights as ''s11p1·e1ne law'', enforceable in the courts. j' By virt11e of Etl1iopia's legislation creati11g the Federation (Order No. 6, supra a11d the Federal Co11rts Procla111atio11 si1p1·a), Paragraph 7 of t.he Federal Act became part of tl1e law of the En1p_ ire of Etl1iopia, as \Vell as Eritrea. Indeed it became ''sup reme law'', e11forceable i11 tl1e Courts. Tl1e Federal Act proclaimed rigl1ts to ''equality before the lavv'', ''sect1rity of tl1e pe1·son'', ''freedom of opinion and exrpression'', ''peaceft1l assen1bly a. 11cl associatior1'' and to ''dt1e process of law'' and a ''fair and eqt1itable trial''. These rights were, of course, state,d in absolt1 te terms, but \Vere s11bje_ct to ''limitatio11s'' to sect1re �'public orde1·' ', the '· ge11eral weltare'' and the ''rights of oth.ers' '. Th11s tl1e Federal Act followed tl1e pattern t�or formulatin.g l111ma.11 rigl1ts laid dow11 i11 the U.N. Decla1·atio11. Tl1e Co11stit11tio11 of 1931, 11otably the provisions of Cl1apter III, also appears . �o l1ave bee11_ 1nade ''st1pren1e la.w' ', e11fo.rc.eable by tl1e cot1rts. Tht1s the status of I!s Cl1apter I�l ·w�s dramatica.lly cha11ged - t'ro111 an esse11tiall)' programatic affirma t1011 of certa111 r1gl1ts, to self'-executi11g law. Tl1e Federal courts were given power to e1 1force paragraph 7 of tl1e Fede1·al Act as well. tituCons The Feclera l Act was R evised tl1eref ore law at the tl1e 111on1e 11t \Vhen . . tio�1 was pro1ntilgated. It cot1ld not be repealed \.\'itl1out amending the basis for ·Fede- J ratio11, and that task. W,ls not atte111 pted t111til 1962. Wl1etber Para.graph 7 ?f the 1 . Feder:al Act survives, as law, after tl1e 1962 dissolution of the Federation is a difficult J · qtiest1011 - thotlgh _perl1aps of more acadei11ic importance today. But it is imp?rtant .ih,_e_ � to see tl1at tl1e Rev.1sed Cor stitution in fact picked up the rights forrnulated rn � �-� � _ Federal Act, a11d the latter 1s clearly the basis for many articles of the fonneL__··- _:; ., ............ 4 . 0 t/1er 'Legislation. _�-.�-_ ·--� ��·:��'. t1 0 p Re-re�d: �ge 359, supra: Articles 21 and 24 of the Administr·ation . { J� - �:-r;1 Proclamatio11, No. 2 of 1942: prohibit.ion o· f laws ffend.i against nat o 11g '' u'raij;us�i-:;_��;fj ,, -@i �O .n O . · :::::. · = -: The terms ''natura1 J11st1c · 0 · s e · _ e h and Engli s '·hum anity '' ,, r l �:-.: ::;:ry:�-:;::: ::, ; � the (in . u . · J ma uo :n 1942 Courts ProcIam au· on) �� -r " a . r this wer e pro bab ly use deli d ber atel y; -=1-cc ��""� ."'��""'i+-;,; . . was uu<loubte ly drafted, = in iti � al ly , � by B . ri ti rs sh le o ga ad l vis · s-erving·, � �:� :'tPI�, ': "if: ment at that time, a d � �; . . · -� , . na. " . : : : . . . . = te n these Jurists were surely fam1l1�r wrth �he_ tm_°' ·:��i�

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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1-IUMAN RIGI-ITS -

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in E11 glish law to refer to a basic staiiclard of short l1a11d legal of form ) J.U�u.ce,, as a reason ableness - a11alogo11s to the concept of ''dtte process'' (see · l·rurness and _pron1t1l ��ted 11· 1 B r1t1sl1 l t1?� eg1s_a · · · L tJ1 rotigJ1 otit · VI). colo11 1es r h apte C 638, '3 e recog1 Jttcl1c1al 1 1t1011 or e11forcen1 e 1 1t of a11 y local or forbade oi1ly comm Id p,g '',0:ry the law wllicb infringed this standard (see Allot, EssaJJS i11 African La ,,v 1 en of t h� 1942 Courts Procla111atio11 _had tl ese draftsn the ibly oss p e t ui q � _ they pre1Jare_d _Articles 2 1 and 24. Perlia.JJS tl1 e 1n1 111 ed1ate \�}�en n11nd in ons rovisi ( Pur ose of these prov1s1ons was to pr ohibit e11force11 1ent of ct1sto111ary laws wl1 ich \Vere p t �o, _tl1 e re_fere11 c� to ''\oreigners'' was designed perhaps, hars�; und11ly ed 1 �een to protect Italian �es1de11 ts of Etb1o_p1a dt1r111g this \Vart1�1 e_ �Jeriod.. Nevertl1ele_ss, lanouage of t he articles goes ft1rtl1er - as a11 absolt1te prol11b1t1on aga111st re1Jress1ve leiri�lation which offe11ds a basic stanclard of fair11ess a11 d good conscie 1 1ce. I t is left to jurists - jt1dges and t he gover11me11t's legal advisors to fix a11d apply tl1 e standard in any give11 case.

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\Vhile the Courts Proclamatio11 of 1942 is 111ostly now of l1istorical i11terest it is \vorthy of 11ote that the abortive Cotirts Procla111atior1 of 1962, \\1l1icl1 IJL1rported · to arnencl and repeal most of the l942 Proclamation, ex Jressly left Articles 2 l and 1 1f 24 in effect. (See Art. 24 of the Cot1rts Procla111 atio11 of 1962, No. 195, flegarit Gaze/a, 22nd Year, No. 7). Pres1 1111ably these }Jrovisio1 1s are still in effect toclay, though the Consultative Com111 ittee 0 11 Legislatio11 l1as 1011 g si11ce ceasecl to ft111ctio 11 . The standard of ''natural justice'' laid dow11 i11 tl1 ese provisio 11s is, ,1rgL1ably, er11bodied in the standards of due process and eqt1al protectio11 of tl1 e Revised Co11s1:i tution.

)

Re-read: pages 380-382: The PL1blic Rights Procla111 ation of .1953. The public Rjghts Proclamatio11 is IJOorly drafted, diffic11lt to follovv.

Nevertheless it is a signjficant milestone.

It reiterates the ''self executory'' statt1 s of tl1e Federal Ac� as ''sup�em� law''

and accord s the same status to all future treaties a1 1d i 11ter11at1011al obl1gat1 ons.

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t decla r�s that all Ethiopia11s have tl1e rigl1t to ''d11e process of lavv'' �rid ''the I . equa! Pr?t ect1o n of the laws'', and. prolJibits any infri 11 gen1e11t of these r1gl1t_s by any P\1h11c official. Tl111s the concepts of ';dt1e 1Jrocess of lavv'' and ''eqt1 al protect1? 0'' ere \Cv �mp_orted into Ethiopia11 Ia,¥ well before tl1e 1Jromt1lgatio11 of tlie Revised onst1tut1on.

lt_ pr_ohibits any the y b ' teed 1 ra1 gt1a ts righ tl1e of y 1 a1 official infringement of C 00s t•tution or by the Federal Act. I_t �stablishes . ts 1 rigl . hes t of o11 lati vio _ �al � cri1ninal liability for any intentio _ Nor 8 It an_y 1 at he was tl 01 rs de or en def r r1o pe se / s11 for the official to plead simP car Y rying out the provisions of some other law. The immediate ide pr?v o was , ably 1 11� pres ti 11, inten atio lam � on of ·the Proc a coDUnon 111 r if? un re su co as to us n, rp tio ra de Fe of rights for all citize11s of the res t these right� by 11 t l offici� in J eri go all on � s on � cti � :� a11 g imposin duties and ? _ _ w-6i�� t�: Pro clamation was partjcularly des1gned to prevent d1scr11n1natory tr

916

TIONAL LAW U IT T S N O C N IA P O I . H T E F O SOURCEBOOK

Er itr ean res s idi a. n ng d a in e r it oth r er E in 1g i1 id s � r par s ts 11 ia p o 1i t� E � s in a g a t n 1e 11 * . d a o r b JS e p o c s s it , e · 11 p of tl1e Em . e of ce th an fic la ni oc �ig Pr e th o , ati es m os rp -�u n lies t e11 es pr r fo t, eii ev 111 any ed ish bl by e ta s th es l1t r1g e th ti t a· ns tl1 Co 11 10 io s1t tut po o · p1 n e th of n tio ra ite e i· ·u its e bl w ea la rc d 1fo an e1 ', in e' m re llp its ''s 1·e a we est ct A l ra de Fe e th d an 31 �f 19 e am of e . nd e tb fu al on nt as ' w' a la ar of gu s es oc ntee s IJr l1e ·'d to ht rig e tI1 of blishinent e e s os ak ht th m to rig pt m te rc at fo en its . in le cl eab an ia op hi Et in n oi ed fre 1an in ht 0f in the co11rts. d w ha t La n ora pia orp hio inc Et ed 55 19 the By 11s. tio ·1,a se1 Ob e1· 1 rt/ Fi1 So,ne t ral ?e Ac d e Fe an th the Public , 31 1? of ion ut tit 11s Co l1e t by d e 1· cla de g11arantees d me by the l�r oc p� UN hts rig ra e cla th De of ny ma , ory tl1e I11 . ion 1at an l c Pro ts Righ n; tee a t1o ran 1sla of ''due gua leg le eab orc enf as t1e, vag ver we l1o 1, orn f tio11 f011nd process'' l1ad been added; a system of constitutional judicial review had been esta on rati cla h.ad been adopted De N. U. he t of 2) 29( icle Art of o11s visi pro the d, blisb.e as sta11dards by ,vliicl1 to j11dge pe1·1nissible limitations on these rights; government officials could be l1eld liable - botl1 in civil and criminal proceedings-for viola tions of these rigl1ts.

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B11t tlus accL11nt1latio11 of law was certainly not in very tidy condjtion. The Federal Act - which was, perhaps, original ly intended more as a political commit ment tl1a11 operative legislation, ,vas not an easy document to interpret and apply t o co11crete cases. The Co11stitt1tion of 1931 \.Vas anaclrronistic. The Public Rights P1·oclamation \Vas a c11rnberso111e, and almost chaotic, piece of legislation. And of co11rse t here were other realities. It is well to recall the economic, social a11d political conditio11s of the early 50's. Tradition still held swa.y. There were still few schools. Mt1cl1 of the macl1i11ery of 111oder11 !-l'o\rernn1ent was not yet created: there \vas no civil service. TI1ere \\:as 110 developn�e11t plan; 11atio11a l budgeti ng for develo1Jn1enta_l ]Jt1rposes was still a p1·i111iti,,e art; the tax ·system \Vas similarly un developecl. V1t�l gover11111er1t ente1· .prises i11 ba11king, agriculture, health, govern mei1t co11str·tLct 1 o11 a11ci ma11y other secto1·s still were unformed. Tl1ere was no legal base on wl1icl1 a 111oder11 co11stit11tio11 could 1·est; critica J parts of the legal syste m vier� 1�0� et . asse1:1blecl; 11011e ot· tl1e codes b.ad bee11 prepared; there we.re alm?st � no Ju_r1sts tra1_11ed In the context of 1node1·n laws and n1odern methods of analyzing . ai1d I te:pi·eting law. There \.\1as little experience wit h elections. There were 0.0 � labor �1�11ons - 01· otl1e1· collect ive associations oriented to,vards modern econonuc p�litrcal g?a1�: A,�011stitt1tio11 of co111·se, cannot c1·eate these and other conditi��s �ir modernisat1011 · It can at best· create a realistic elastic f1·an1ework for thetr f11ture d e velopn1e11t. '

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. , . * Consider the case of n u tY [Fe ed (F r be 1Iaga G _:j-: d eral] Ad Hadgu . ocate Genera : l Fitawr v . a. r i v � ict s I:Iigl1 Cotirt, Crim. Case � 8 79 istr ••D e z47, Un1·eported 1955 G.C.). Tl1e acc11sed, an. Entr an ·1 · . �-. as w Officer'' was c h � tll vi olatto.n of the Ptt?lic Rights Proc· 1an1 at!on. His _allege�,-offe�� _ _ �i �1 § !;! �su1nn1 ary con:fi sc . d 0 goat s from tl1e possession of t t -.. ePw1 mpla nts ' w1tho u u two :1-.or-e '. h e ina co · -"" · · · 1of law''· Tlie accused assertect · . . 1 ng ai] . con1pl1aoce . tl a pr b e I_ l t a?te� 1n a custom wrth ary J w tl1e ev .1 Rfgnts� -� --:}-= the act took place Tl I h C�ui·t d1s!111ssed the cl1arge on tl1e groun.d that_ !h e �b1. -� 1tucJ. a Procl 1nation was �otle i ab .11 h le· even if the a�cus ed abt1sed his legal au�hor1fy, is OU!:erpret:,� ,.::1.;.: should n_ot be treated � ederal . offen se. Wl11l e ur tl1e m�de 1ous n� Co effa��t�-; ii.c-w:>�� .;:-?�*'; t se the Publ1? RigI1ts Procla � mati o ;:; : ' { ;: �;L _ , . " � _ d ro m _ tel� e s rn i . l n cu s so e dxffi tl1 of e 1e t nd ts a � it -pplication to mistakes ;f �� a ��f:;:. - - · ·�� -

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HUMAN RIGI-ITS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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Presu mably� t?o, the dr �_fte_rs or the Revised _ Co11stitt1tio11 were u11cter a mandate Con st1t11t10 11_ 1t1 a pr�g111at1c w�y, �1ot _stlJ)J)lant it. The Cllapter x1st 1ng the rm � refo to s.1st to be con ent .w1tl1 otl1er 111st1tut1011 s of govern111e11t and l1ad Rig hts an Hu m . . on , I J ,vith a philosophy of . a co11st1t11t1011 ,v 11c 1 preserved tl1e J)ositio11 of the Emperor _ arlian1e11t, 1uinisterial gover 11_ but provid ed the bas1s for ft1rther deve��J)Inent of_ P roent and greater scope of pop11lar l)Olit.1cal part1c1pation over a period of time. Agaiii it is obvio11s that th� new �onstit11tio11 ,vas desig11ed to e11d L1re be)'Oild possible dissolution of the Federation. !t 1�, of co11rse, not a Federal co11stitL1tio11; but whe11 framed it was in fact the const1tt1tI011 for a governn1e11t wl1ich exercised both federal and regional powers. These considerations, too, n111st l1ave surely inflt1e11ced the ap proach to Chapter III and the decision to establisl1 tl1e s11premacy of tl1e Co11 sti tution as ''s11preme'' enforceable law. Implementation of Constitutional Rights TI1rougl1 The Codes In many ways various provjsions of Cl1apter III of tl1e Constitution J1ave been given added content by the codes and other legislation. Tl1e following are a fev,r significant, illustrative examples.

From Civil Code of Ethiopia:

Art. 8 - Effect of perso11a/ity. (1) Every physical person shall enjoy tl1 e rig11ts of perso11ality a11ci ll1e liberties guaranteed by the Ethiopian Constitt1tio11. (2) I11 this respect, no regard sl1all be l1ad to tl1e r,:1ce, colot1r, religio11 c,r sex of persons.

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Art. 9 - Li1nitatio11s to these effects. (1) The rights of personality a11d tl1e liberties g11ara11teed by tl1e Co11stitt1tio11 are extra cornmerciun1. (2) Any volt1ntary limitation im1)osed on the exercise of s_11�l1 rig�ts and liberties shall be of no effect u11Iess it is justified by a leg1t1n1 ate interest. Art. 10 - Cessation of unla•,vfi1l 1110/estatio11s. Any unlawful molestation to tl1e perso11ality sl1all g�ve to th� p_erso11 who suffers it the right to demand tl1at it be stopped, w1thot1t preJt1d1ce to the liability of the author of such n1olestatio11. Art. 11 - Restriction on freedo,n a11d searcl1es. No person may have his freedom restricted, or be s11bjected to a search, except in the cases provided by lavv. Art. 12 - Freedom of residence. (I) Every person is free to establish his residence wherever it is suitable for him and to cha11ge tl1e place of st1ch reside11ce. (2) The undertaking of a of be ll sha ce pla lar ticu par a in icle res to person no effect under civil law . (3) The undertaking of a person no t to resicle i n or 11ot to go to a pa�tictilar _ _ te _ place s.hall be of no effect unless it is jtistified by a leg1t11ua 111terest

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NA L LAW IO T U IT T S N O N C IA P IO I-I T E F O SOURCEBOOK

. e il ic m o d f o Jl it il b la o 1,i 11 [ Art. 1 3 . le b la io v is in n o rs e p l ca si y h p (1) Tlie ct0111 icile of a t ns e ai ll t� ag wi h of ot r � . an f h o _ . c su le ici 111 do · r� pe e th 1• on, te 11 e ay 111 e 011 o N (2) pt e ce 1n , th ex ein er ses th ca ted o fec pr ef be vided cl1 ar se a y ina er ith 11e b)' law. Art. 14 - F1·eeclo111 of t/1oi1ght. s. ea s s id bi es pr ex to d an k .in th to e e f1· is 1 o1 rs pe y · (1) Eve1 (2) TI1e 01 1Iy 1·estrictions which this !iberty admits of are !hose which are , ity ers ral oth mo of and the law. hts rig tl1e for t pec res tl1e by cl ose i 111p

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Art. 15 - Religio11. Tl1ere shall be no i11terference with tl1e exercise, i n a.ccordance with the law,. of tl1e rites of a11y religion or creed by residents of the Empire, provided that st1ch rites be 11ot lltilised for political purnoses or be not preju dicial to pt1blic order 01· morality.

Art. 16 - F,·eer/0111 of actio11.

(1) Eve1·y perso11 is free to exercise any activity which be deems proper in that \Vllicl1 co11ce1·11s his calli11g and his leis11re. (2) The only restrictions v,,l1ich s11cl1 freedom admits of are those which are imposed by the respect for tlie 1·ights of others, morality and the law. (3) The act by wl1jcl1 a 1Jerso11 bi11ds hi111self to exercise a given activity or bi11 ds 11i1nself not to exe1·cise s11cl1 activity shall be O'f no effect unless it is jt1stified by a legiti111ate inter. est.

Fron1 Penal Code of· EtlziOJJia:

Art. 2 - P1·i11ciJJle of Legality. ' (1) Cri.111i11al lavv specifies tl1e vario11s offe11ces which are liable to punis hn1e11t a11cl the penalties a11d n1easures applicable to oftenders. ·1 Tl1� c otir _ t 1n�y 1�ot treat as a breacl1 of tl1e law a11d p11nish any act _or es o1.niss1011 \vl11cl1 1s not P1�o alti pen e l1ibi imp teci . os b)' law. It 111ay 11ot . j . or 1neast11·es otl1er tl1a11 tl1ose prescribe d by law. J1 Tl1e co11rt 1nay not crea.te offe11ces by a11alogy. _ , (2) Nothi11g i11 tl1is Article shall prevent i 11terpre ; tation of the la�. - . ·. �11 cases of do11 1?t the col1rt sl1all interpret the law accordin g to its sp!rit, :i e rev 1n acco�dai1 c� with t�e ach to 11:ea11ing intended by the legislature so as _ _th e p11rpose 1t has 11 1 view. - -· 9 (3) Nobody shall b e punished tw ..c��-�ff-�.-� ice for the same act. - _ From C1·imi11al Procedure C -_ ode of Ethiopia: . �--� - _ _...;_ A rt . 3 2 Sea,·ches and seizi,res. - - · ·- - -� · � . ·- � - -�� Any � nvesti¥ati11g police � cb ai�e ke offi a ce r m y or a · m . em Ii. be . . r m o ce · . f e th po or se1zl1res in aceordan . _ . . � -,�:·...::�: "" 4 � ·. ce with t,he prov1s1ons which fo1low: . 2,-.i: . ...... . -

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HUMA N RIGHTS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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(I) No arrested person shall b� searched except_ ,vl1ere �t is reaso11ably sus pecte? that �e has about his perso11 a�y art1�les wl1�ch 1nay be material as evidence 1n respect of the o.ffe11ce w1tl1 Vi1h1ch he 1s accused or is sus pected to have committed. A search shall be n1ade by a person of the same sex as the arrested person.

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(2) No premises may be searcl1ed t111less tl1e police officer or member of tl1e police is in possessio11 of a search warrant in tl1e forn1 prescribed in tl1e Third Schedule to thls Code except \Vhere:

(a) an offender is followed it1 hot purs11it a11d enters premises or disposes of articles the subject n1atter of an offence i n premises;

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(b) information is given to an i11vestigati11g police officer or 111ember of the police that there is reasonable cause for s11specting tl1at articles which may be material as evide11ce i11 respect of an offeL1ce in respect of which an accusation or con1plaint has beer, made L111c!er Art. 14 of this Code and the offence is punisl1able witl1 more tl1a11 tl1ree years imprisonment, are concealed or lodged in a11y place and he 11as good. grounds for believing that by reason of tl1e delay i11 obtai11i11g a search warrant sucl1 articles are lilcely to be ren1oved. Re-read: Pages 90-91; 128-129: implementatio11 of the right to l1abe,1s corpL1s through the Civil Procedure Code. ''In Accordance \-Vith The La,v'' - and Article 65. . Re-read: pages 60-63 of Chapter I: tl1e problem of stating li111itations 011 l1uman · rights.

Some of the Articles in Chapter III are stated in absolt1te and selfexect1ti11g terms. Consider e.g. Articles 37, 49, 53, 57, 59 a11d 63. Otl1ers, follo\ving the 1931 Constitution (and other foreign models) declare tl1at tl1e JJa.rticular �ight exi�ts ''in ac�ordance with the law''. E.g. Articles 41, 45, 46 a11d 47. Otl1er ar!1cles, \vh1Ie not us1�g the phrase ''in accordai1ce with the la\v'', presuppose the ex1ste11c� of_ s01ne basic �ody of legal principles as a fra1nework for interpret�tion a�d �pplrcation of �e article. Consider e.g. Articles 43, 44, 61 a11d 62. I11deed 1f const1tut1_onal declara tio�s of human rights are to be used as worki11g propositions of law, rf they ar� to be 1nterp�eted and applied by government officials and cot1rts,. tho_se respo1:s1?le for applyi ng the c011stitution will have to draw 11pon son1e con1b1nat1on of ex1st111g law, tradition, philosop and practical politics to define tl1e sco�e ne hy, doctri c juristi of the ri�ht;' the corresponding limit of governmental power. As w_e_ l1ave see11, tl11s problem 1s inher ent in e and reg11late the conditions o� freed�m defin any to pt attem through the force of 0� in specifi s, term lute abso in d state are ca!ly qualified terms law. Whether rights n1 ble pro ic bas e sam the '', law e ''th to or made generally subject eXIsts . . But by declaring rs me fra the '', law tl1e � \Vit e a11c ord acc that some rights exist ''in obviously inten ded to give greater discretion to the ]aw-1nak1ng organs of gov�r11ment to ?etermin e the scope of the particular ri_ght_. Pr�s11mably they exerc1_sed ome choice, and therefore some care i n deciding wl11ch rights we�e !0 be SU?Ject : further, unde fined rig �t t can i sign fi s� mo _ the eed Ind fi . ion cat ? gled legislative clari � sin wit e anc ord out for this treatment (i.e. declaring the rigl1t to exist ''1n acc

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A N IO W T L A U L IT T S N O C N IA P IO I 1-1E F O K SOURCEBOO

1, cl a : ee ic ty sp bl vi ti pu ac n, al tio ic lit po m pa ith w al de J1 1ic wl e os th · e ar '') · · the 1a,v s ( m A rt 1e e . c f bl· d 1 cI es 41, 45 ss n a a s n o t1 a r 1 t· o em d , y it v _ _ �� pllleteering, collective acti Y he d se rig e ht s ss ma a y p m o c ? r e sug s � ges 1e 1t v t1 c a t e 1 tl f � o 1 1· e tt a 11 ry e v 1e l T ). and 47 . n o t1 u 1t st e n th co 1n d te la 11 rm o f e er reasons for tl1e way the)' w e ve m gi h d so ic ad wh ed conteiit ed gu ar be ay n1 s le cip in pr 11 i i·ta Neverthel ess ce t is enc e of rights ''in accordex e th e ar cl de ch hi w 11 tio itu st on to those articles �f the C ance with the law''. t he rig/it does not depen d 011 n; io z1t tit ns Co e t!1 of rce fo by 1. Tlie rig/1 t exists '' t a 1e e; nc '' ste ex y its ma r fo ! ( it ) nlim tio � sla gi le � ry ta e11 am rli Pa e. (i. 11 ,s fa _ _ o the,· 1 a id tations which y !tm all t ion ti1 sti on t ( o /y 011 ct � bje sit s ist ex � lit ,·ig e i th b ,t tli e rig/it; s n. y 1o op s1t ma pr e ve es th h� le en hl be W e. tim to ? i1n t z on fr se po ini y ,na � o11 ati isl feg _ ay. lid tod va der ely nsi sur Co are y , for the , 1on tt1i 1 nst Co 1 193 the r de un e arguabl us eo on - indeed quite m err see uld wo It n. tio itt1 nst Co e th of 41 e l tic exainple, Ar unrealistic - to asst1me tl1at the ''1·ight'' of freedom of speech did not exist upon ht of the rig nce was to be ste exi ry e v the t . tha or n, 1tio L it· nst Co e th of 1 tio1 lga promu . ot dependant depe11dant upo11 later legislatio11, or that tl1e right cou ld be granted or n on tl1e will of Parlian1e11t and tl1e gover11ment. Rights of freedom of expression, and associatio11 and asse111bly, based on the U.N. Declaration were recognized through the Federal Act (Paragraph 7) and its incorporation into Ethiopian law (via Order No. 6 and tl1e Pt1blic Rigl1ts ;proclamation). Presumably the Constit11tion followed the Federal A..ct (which ren1ained part of the Ia,:v of the land after promulga tio11 of the Constit11tion); thus, the Co11st.it·t1tio11 recognized the right but provided for ''limitations'' in the form of legislati .01 1 vvhich would deal v'lith such subjects as sedition, censo1·sl1ip, defamation, obsce11e ptiblications and other forms of speec h threate11ing harm. And tl1at is ,vhat has happened. ''The law'' which regulates fr ee d?� of speech is to be fot111d, not in a single IJiece of legislatio'Il, but in those pro v1s1 ons o_f th� Pe11al Code, Civil Code and otl1er legislatior1 ,vhich i111pose liability f �r cer1�1 n k11:ds of speech 01· \Vriti11g. Bt1t speec11 or pt1blication which is not for bidde11 1 s obv1 ot1sly l)ermitt ed. (Cf. Articles 43 a11d 54 of the Revised Constitution; Article 14 of tl1e Civil Code).

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2. ''Tl1e law'' 1-vhic/1 regulates tl1e rigfzts· g1·a1·1 ted b)' the Cor1stitutio11 must be _ _pro mulgatecl 11� acco,·da nce �vitlz JJrocedi11·es Jo,· la11,-111a!ci11g es tablislzed by t!1e Consti _ t�tzon . Thus, tl1e sotirce for a11y regt1 la,tio11 or officia.l act restr·1itli 1 10 exercise of the rig�t must, ?rd�narily, be legislatio11 e11acted pu1·s11a11t to A1:ticle; 86 throug h 92 e Constittltion. �part !rom e1 n e1·gen st m law cy e d th c � e 92 ees ), � (t � nd · t 1 icl 1 A e e1· � � . _ pro vec l by �a 1 I1a n�e 11t , and· dec1�ees, n111 st 1n a11y eve11t be submitted to Parlia � m e t. An exceptio11 to t!1e above is a11 order prom es tim in 29 Ar tie 1ti .le ga teli under ; aces wh�re � national emerge 11cy is decla1·ed. A possi us du bio bu t ble � i g u le ex�eption is ai� Ordei· pron1ttlgated unde ady alr e � ns rea so r fo Ar 1· tic bu 36 le t ; : g su d 1 se ed te d oub groun l a q tha n d be of a ws" thi t � �u "� ca cha s tU r cter 1 ��f �::: � c on 6 the authority of Parliament cou·ld be so easily circumvent ed. ' . (See d1s ' cuss1on of Ar·ticle 36 ' pages 443 n a d · 56 . s 4 No 45; of Orders discussion of 70 infra Section 6_

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3. Any lin·zitations 01 ti1 e nt t · · e o e ,·czse x of any co1istitutio11a/ right mi,st be c ns-IS . with. the standards t b � rt,·� p ter a Ch � � e 65 ?f the Co11stitutio'!· Placed at e e d of III,_ Article 65 refe:: �oyall �� i in � the of ghts g11aranteed 1n the forego1n.g (1.e. p �e�ed g . 1� articles'' of the cha�te ·Tt � � c , us Arti l e 65 stands as a 9ua�fi cation on th e kind� . ·, �· laws which may "li .(: :_ : t' .. r g . · rtie ts guar A a f . nteed by the Const1tut1on.. The· so,urc� o . -.rl · .,

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of the U.N. Declaration, and tl1e purpose of Article 29(2) Article is oted, n e · 6:,� ,ve hav · or t 1011 �t1spe11s roga 1 1 o f rig 10 a b · hts, but rather to restrict e · authoriz to not vas (' ? ) 2 9 - .� governments cot1ld 11npose on tl1e exercise of rights declared which n s itatio t h e 1I • • by the Const1tut1on. t/1 e power to e1iforce t/1e Constitution c,s 4_ Since the courts, presi1111ab!J', have l 1 e ?0111er to i11terpret a11 d apply Article 65 i,1 ore/er e hav coi1rts th law'', � � "supr eme _ lzl'11 1tat1011. Tl1t1s, whe11 relevari_t to any co11stitutional 1e t of validity � tlie judge 10 issue, the courts may rev1e� the cl1�lle11ged law to determine Vl'l1etl1er it complies with the requirements of Article 65, 1.e. \\lbether the cl1alle11ged governmental actior1 is necessary to preserve the i11terests protected by Article 65. 5. If Article 65 is to be interpretecl a11d a1;plied cor 1 siste11t!J' lvit/1 tl1e spirit ct11 d purpose ofits ancestor, Article 29(2) of tl1e U.N. Declaration, tl1e courts s/1ozt!d require a sho1ving of 11ecessitrv to ji1stify t/1e li11 1itatio1 1 of tl1e exercise of a11y rigf1 t. \Ve l1ave noted before that Article 29(2) was not a ''carte blanche'' gra 11t of 1 111restricted power to governments to curtail rights recogrlized by tl1e Declaration. Rather, the Declaration recognizes broad categories of i11terests wl1icl1 govern111cnt may protect by restricting the exercise of i11di,1idual rigl1ts. B11t the restrictio11s must be necessary to preserve an over-riding public interest. Consider t]1e follov1i11g, by Rene Marcie, Professor of Jurisprudence a11d Rector of the U11iversit:y of SalzlJ11rg.

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From Marcie, ''Duties and Linlitation Upon Rigl1ts'', Joi1r11al of J1-zter1,atio11al Con11nissio,z of Jurists, Vol. 9, pages 61, 64-65, 70 (1968).

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There h ave been many legal studies on the possibility of dra,vi 11g tip a code �f permissible limitations to human rigl1ts a 11d duties. Si11ce a duty e11tails a limita tion upo n a rig h t, it is an important field of researcl1. It is l1ovvever, difficult to lay ?own hard and fast rules gover1ling Iin1itatio11s. In practice, tl1ese are made by the Ju?ge or other authority called upon to ad111inister the lavv. Tl1ey do not normally arise from theoretical reflection-altho11gl1 it mt1st 11 ot be forgotte11 that tl1ey are essentially based upon logic: wl1en ht1man rigl1ts are de.fined and 'determined', a tern1 is put to them. '

. Article 29 (2) of the Universal Declaratio11 provides for the possibility and neces :�ty of lin1itatio1 s upon the rigI1ts and freedoTI_1S. !t does 1 10� pe1:mit their abrogati?n � _ _ 1the r temp�rar1ly or permanently. I\J'o co11st1tt1t1on o� legislation n1�y 111 an_ y c_ ir cumstances invalidate the set ot1t 111 the Declaration. This is a ms freedo rights and remarkable break-through, which is not self-evide nt. . Article 29 and 30 of the Declaration contain a1 1 absolute Iin1itation 111Jo1 1 tl1r kio<ls of permissible limitations to rights a11d freedoms. 1. As has bee11 l1t ri¥ an h11m a of e11t ext the i11g min exa ntio me ned above when r fr_eed om i n th e context of duti;s a11d limitatio11s, one must begin by accordiiig � rim�ry p by ed t it_ bt :e be ly on ay u m res n io pt � tio t1m es mp pr n of freedom. This _ of un mb1g� o u_ s t gl1 r1_ 1n? n po �es or c _ tl1e _pr m � f fro oo ng of isi (ar a ing ty ict du confl ano he 1n i at10 1m1t °: b? I 1al] 1t101 st1tt Con 1du [ m i.e. al) or ate v cl r � iti by f a proo of leg law uly pro 1l1m a or ty du a rts se as o a wh m ulg hi . � on ted up The burden of proof is tat· n. In s at th er ov ce en ed ec pr thi s ke ta l ua ne on vid di in on cti th e freedom of th e � of �� e com munity. ·

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TIONAL LAW U IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E F O K Sou·RcEBOO

y ty an at du or th t m ita d? ee lim fr of n io ?io pt tha 11m es t is )1 e th · 111 fro v;,s lo 1 ol f 2_ · It . 11 0 t1 ta re rp te 1n e v ti c ri st asserted n111st receive a re y ac � IJ? e an it'i t th le� �e 1g t ti1 ali ua al leg ev y r fo of 11 rio ite c1· a nt ·ta oi lp in t os nl A 3_ e n 1s e th t1o pl c1 r� la 1n ec p� D e of th of ) op (2 pr 29 le ic or rt A n o1 fr d ve ri de n linlitatio n tio or tly op �c e at pr str be to e ld th o� �h n ti? ita need lim 1y a1 of 11t te ex e th tioi1ality: r e g. fo If, pl tin am ec ex ot , pr as 1s a n t1o ta ul n1 res li1 e t t]1 ich wl1 t ·es te1 i11 ei· oh hi e of tli e in ag , t : a ict or str s� g di in us ho the e ut ac an local is ere th e ph tro tas ca l of a natira : n _ e se th t1o les r �1a op as pr 1?e ex to · t ure or res of y tel dia me im t no ld ou sh y rit tl1o ati n n _of t1o tio �a or s1t op e pr th at y t� alit all be re ay n1 s ise em pr of g tin let y compulsor e n th th o� t1o _wi ed ec n fre co . 1_n e of an n� rta po i1n al vit of is e ipl inc pr � quires. This l ca l or ysi nta s ph me al du ity 1v1 egr 1nd int the of t en gem 1·in inf no n: rso pe d accuse d. use e is he acc Th ich h of German w. me cri the of ess 1s11 io1 ser the eed should exc Federal Constitutio11al Co11rt ha s developed a consistent and instructive practice in tlus field.

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4. Tl1e p1·inciples i11 the tl11·ee preceding paragraphs have been outlined because . owever made of they are not stated expressly in Articles 29 a11d 30. Mention is h the principle of t11e Rule of La\v, which can be found in the two phrases (in my itaUcs) of Article 29 (2): '111 tl1e exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are deter111ined by lal4'' (i.e. legal limitaiions) 'solely for tl1e purpose of meeti11g.... tl1e jitst reqi1i1·en1e1:zts' (i.e. the legitimate interests ) 'of morality etc.'

The power to impose limitations may be looked at from another angle, which presents two J?Ossibilities. Tl1e fi1·st is that the legislature is given general, unrestricted power to li1nit rights and freedon1s: tl1ey are simply mad · e. subject to the la\.VS. Such a formula deprives the rights a11d freedoms of any higher safeguard, and renders them val11eless.

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The second possibility is that the legislatt1re is en1powered to limit the rights and freed?n1s 011ly for c�1·ta!11 clea1·ly defi11ed purposes: t.hey are made subject t? · �he la;1s !n ce1·t�111 �p�c1fi�d respects 0111)'. The unive rsal Declaratio11 uses this formuia;. it })erm1ts l1m1t�t1ons 011 1·igl1ts a11.d f1·eedon1s for the protection of four con1n1u111ty 1nte1·ests: (a1·t1cle 29 (2)). Tl1ese inte1·ests are:

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I. Due recognition a11d 1·espect for the rights a11d freedoms of others. 2. Meeti11g tl1e jt1st 1·eqtiii·ements ot' (a) morality

(b ) public order and . ' (c ) the general welfare in a d emocra t1c · soc1e · ty. .. - �. · not a p li ed T · . 1t Article 29 (2) is complete1 Y depr1ve p 1s � · d 1f of any value however · i ' ' with due respect for the Rule J_, . crac mo e · · d · 1 0f L aw. . a T o h const1tut1 n 1s _ -: l&. -of- . involves a . . in which the p rin �iples of legality and legitima.cy are respected. By t.he princip :8·•• · i.. ". ' ' legality th·e execut1ve an d · Ud · · legl . h t _ of ici��Y J . Acts are bou11 d the t� give to effect lature: by the p rinciple _of � �_e-o rni s� 0 her --' ., g _l lu git · · e : s ma · by _ c y, th · . e i leg isl bo . atu � un l d re is which are enfo d b a l r Jud_ 1 ciary J?, ese with CO S t i p �= t itu_ onal powers. Both � are valid in all �=Ids 0 Yf publ1c order, especially 1n that of public security. _:_ ..__��,_.,�, -... ---�"'-

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on w �rds fou.nd i n Article 29(2) \Vl1ich are on1itted f roin Article reliance some places ·c of public order etc: Note a!so tl1e terms: ''i11 a c/e111ocratic society''. ements'' requir "just '" i m ission of these words change tl1e essential 1nean1ng and purpose of Article 65? Arguably 65, ·11,�� i � voes;� emphasis to declare tl!at Article 65 requires "jt1st'' and ''den1ocratic'' some add may it 1 00�· those terms hardly relieves tl1e governn1ent of tl1e essential burden of of n omissio the legis_1afon ! ' r obts only as necessary to secure other parru11ot1nt interests. Recall that the exact '.vor ds t ng i \v_ere first intro?t1ced into E�l1iopian la'.v by tl1e Federal Actfofl!lulate� tly n prese. 65°as e �f��i�l w1tl11n the U.N. itself before 1t \Vas acceptecl by Ethiopia. It is ratified and prepared was b'ch apply 11ot to i_ts O\Vn territory (Eritre�) the sa111e _ s tand_ards \vould U.N. he t _ that argue to ;fficult which it called upon its mem�er states to �pply un1ve�sally. A_s sug�est�d 1n the reading, either Article 65 introd�ces. a n�rmat1ve tes� e�abl1n� courts, 1� any g!ven, Just1ficab]e case �o determine the necessity and JUstificat1on for restr1ct1ve_ action, or Article 65 ts to be treatecl as a v irtual autho rization to the government �o retract the r1gl1ts else\vbere "gt1aranteed'' ii1 CI1apter III. Tl1e latter view see ms unlikely - particularly \vhen one recalls tl1e context in which t l1e Constitution \Vas promulgated: the co �ts were given expres� po\ver to. e�force r aragrapl1 7 of lhe Federa� Act, and thus power to detenrune whether any particular restrictive action goes beyo11d the"rec1u1ren1e11ts'' of the interest ,vhich the state seeks to protect.

The Interpretation and Application of the Provisions of Cl1apter m: Some General Observations. The interpretation and application of legally e11forceable guara.11tees of I1l1111a11 rights to concr ete cases is one of the n1os t diffic11lt a11d interesti11g..., tasl<:s of constitutional la1vv - particularly in cot1ntries 11 1 1dergoing cha11ge, li l<e Etl1iopia.

We deal, here, with a11 area of la\v characterized by marl<ed 1111certai11tj1; tl1e guid elines of the constitl1tion are far more general tha11 the rules laicl clo\v11 i11 111ost oth_er �iec es of legislatiot1. \Ve deal \Vith problems of inter_pretation \Vl1ich are 11eces saril� 1nfl�enced by a blending of pl1ilosophical 011tloolc a11d J)rac t ical political cons1der at1o ns; \.\1e deal with iss11es whicl1 call for rigoro11s i11tellectual a11alysis if they are to be accorded scientific treatn1e11t at all. 011e ca1111o t resolve disp11ted iss11es meaningfully by sol emnly repeating the generalities of tl1e co11stit t1tion or by pomp ? usly statin g the propositions of some appeali 11g political pbilosopl1y, or by asst1n1ing that "rights'' exist only at the co11venie11ce of tl1e governn1e11t. 1\11alysis int1st go further.

The assertion of a ''right'', we have noted, n1ay be seen as a clai111 against go�e�nme11t - e.g., the mant ma y insist tl1at he is en titled t o engage i 11 some clai actiy ity (su.ch_ as speec . -making) withot1t interfere11ce, or tl1at he ha� already been h bJe�ted to interference which is not permissible (e.g. an illegal �e1zure and co11��cati on of prope r ty) or that he is entitled to some treatment which has not been roperly acco rded by government officials (e.g. a hearing 011 an applica tion for a f. e, or more type aw l _ l t ur� i1a le Whi y). t er prop pe com ed t a ion opri 11sat for expr _ ��fd erat 1o s o s11cl1 1ng gruz reco for on reas . f · j one be ality mor n I and ustice may s, ther e are also, r ed. 1 sec be t �o s re�t inte al so�i , ing pell com ably _presum other Th�� When we recognize a right of freedom of speech 111 a c?�1st1t11�1on, �e do �o be ca' se e will iety soc ons 1n co 1 d1t co11 n cl i11g t exis ude of that u w n discussion ope d ce ben e ts, despite also may ch whi o s nism ago a11t 1d 1 1 a s fear the resentn · ents' f:suInt from fi · thi : s rreedo m. When we recognize a right to ''due pr?cess '', we do so ,, on 80 due the by deliberate set of assu e uir req s t1re ce? _pro the t � · mptio11s tha P�oce!'� ara se ca a of n 1o at l11 _ a ev te 1a 1 0 e s1 nte as sp 1 � .. e d fi ar a re necessar y to assu be re edom n shme t fre . �.g y, vac pri of l1ts rig is 1 ize ogn rec icte infl n d. Whe1 we P� i fro� olic tis is give�. e searcl1es , we agairi act on a policy: society will be be_tter 1f eacl1 of n1 fro clear ass11ranc e that ure sec be l wil s t c effe 1al so1 per our homes and our

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n o f ti _ o 1a s ge tt n si e ra : n fi t de es w d ro ar n y e b th in w la ly n o ve sa _ 1 oi si va in external �d t rd gh y ri co by er ac ev e th s. h� T 1. s o1 on ti C �c ot pr ti al ci di ju e os cl to t ec bj su and s t ill fi at w !t ne th su be re on s1 c1 de fro e m at er lib de re a on s st re ly ab um es ttitiotl pr e gh lu ou va t d en ea a� gr po of im � ar a rt s fit ne be e nc e es th at th , 1t gl ri 1e tI of on cogniti , l lts fu su ch re hi rm w ha e ot es pr im et m o so cti d n an e, 11c ie en nv co in e th gh to outwei of the rigl1t ma.y ca11se. io l at er fu id re s n. ca n co y, lic of po a on that s st re ly ab 11m es pr ht rig y er Since ev ay e, c lp � a. st he pl fir us � th in ter �t de ig r _ e t� 11g 1ti a1 gr r fo s on as re e th ., i.e policy, t, ch In us ea e , m se W ca 1t. on n ke t1o ma 1ta m 1 l ed 1g 1 le al ch e m so of ity lid va e th 1e 1 mi n ts tio cu to ita in e lim th d ge ry len ve al ch e th ich \Vh to t ten ex e th of n io t 1a. al1 a11 ev core of interests protected by the right. s d ich an film wh ws ws ne allo s, ok bo of ip rsh so cen of tem sys a le, n1p For exa g y ,,er ttin cu deeply into of ble pa ca ly us vio ob is sor cen tl1e to n complete discretio ng u rizi sec ho A pro law aut n. sio res exp e fre of l1t rig lies der u11 ch wlu licy po e the cor tion of those who sell ''obscene'' n1agazines to adolescents imposes some deterrents 011 tl1e exercise of a free press, but its effect on the fundamental policy underlying press freedom is obviously less drastic than the sweeping censorship law. . Thus tl1e effect of the repressive activity on the very existence of the right is one point of analysis.

A second is a careful identification of the harm which government seeks to prevent and the lil<elihood of the occurrence of that harn1 as a result of the exercise of the alleged right. Jt1stice I-Iolmes' classic illt1s·tra,tion was the man who shouts ''fire�' in a crowded tl1eatre. The th1·eatened l1arm is ''clear'' and the danger of its occurrence is ''present'' as a res11 lt of that particl1lar ''speech''. Conversely, the less �1early a l1arm _is defined an� the less in1mi1 1ent an)' ''danger'', the less persuasive 1 s the case for interference with the exercise o.f tl1e right.

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Evaluation of the 11ecessity to protect i11dividua.ls or society from some clearly d_efined I1arm a�1d eval�atio_n of tl1e i 1 111)act of the limitation 011 the existence of the right are two lines of 1nqt111·y. A tl1ird is co 11sideration of wl1ether the means used i, by government are the only practicable \Vay to prevent the har m feared - or w�e: ther there are other less rep1·essive, alterna.tive wa)'S of }Jt�otecti 11g tl1e intere st which 1 gov�_rnm�nt seeks �o pr·ote�t. (Marcie, sup,·a refers to this as the principle ?f pro: portio�ality.)· Co11 s1der again. the example of a broad discretionary censorsl11p law· � ne � sce one �ight argtie tl1at tl1e law 1s a necessary protection against publication of ob · � . ;i tl · en materials · But 0bvioti� that · IY there are otl1er less repressive means to achieve only caii t�e pi·ecise l1a1· m be better identified (i.e., wha t is an ''obscene'' book� - -, e t ang ers sib ! if pos any , , doe s an "obscene" boo k create?) but it may be � ! l:o -� � : :reve t the harm without eve11 �eJ l resorting to the strateogy of censorsh ip at all; a . �rafted penal law may suffice. 1

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lPl � � The task ?f _tailoring laws to precise objectives � id avo to ing att em pt and · ·1 · necessary restr1ct1ons o n enJoyment . constan· ttvco:n- .. . . � _ -e , which of human 1 rights one is h J " fronts law ers. It of confronts the draftsman of a statute� It of-ten G@nfr�� . ;�-�-:. legal advi!or in a g �:�rnment tf e n, agen whe cy. It r conf ront pros ecut '.11.� the o �--, �a . d ' whether orv?-?1 a particular body W J so if nd of evidence warrants pro ; :fll,r., .�� - svc· uti'on, ._ a - ,;_,.; -. nti e,1.-�;:::-Zl whi'ch pro 1s1on of the cod to e 1 1 ed . conf ront s oblig cour y ts are ' when ..:--t__:��"' ::;:-lf�=� the · _j _? . legislation wb en they are obliged to determine whether a partic,utar�i11:�-ei:p�e�� ' 0

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legislation wo11 ld constit11te an t1nconstitt1tio11a1 aJ)IJlication of of e articl of an . the la w Rem ember, too, that the t1�ual _isst1_e �o b � dete1:111i11 ed i 1 1 co11stittitional cases . not ,..vhether the challenged leg1slat1on 1s 1 nva]1d 011 its face, b11 t \Vl1ether tile legisto tl�e case applied at ha11? is i11valid: tl1e interpretation arid ted interpre as ;:tion and enforcement of the la\v to a particular set of c1rct1111sta11ces is the })roblein _ not the validity of the law tinder a11y and al! ?ircun1sta11ces. Tl1is 1 1arrowi 11g of the issue is a crucial importa11ce. It helps the dec1s1011-maker focL1s 011 the most relevant factors; it enco11rages precision of j11dg1ner1t, and it tends to co11fi 11 e tl1e scope of judgments and thus avoid tl1e s11�sta11tial ri�ks produc�d by swee1)i11g decisions wl1icl1 attempt to la)' down unnecessarily broad 1nter1)retat1011 s of the co 11stitt1tio11. Re-read: Pages 231-235: judicial restraint vs. jt1dicial activism;

Pages 235-236: limitations on the exercise of judicial l)OWer; the reqt1 ire ments of ''standing'' and other ca11tionary rules for con fronting constitt1tio11al cases;

Pages 417-418 : stare decisis; I

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Pages 418-419: a problem case - factors which 111igl1 t i11flt1e11ce j11dgment in applying l1un1a11 rights gt1ara11tees to co11crete problems. SECTION 3

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PUBLICATION AND PRO.BLEMS OF LIMITING THE EXERCISE OF THOSE RIGH·Ts Introduction: What is the Rationale for Allo\ving ''Freedom''? A_ response to the above question was penned a l1undred years ago by Jol1n Stuart Mill. His _ lbesis is often quoted and widely argued today. Consider tl1e following:

From Mill.

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Liberty (McCallu� eel. 1946) pages 14-47.

If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, a11d only one person were of the cont rary opinion, mankind Vlotild be no more jtistified in silencing that one P:�so �, th�n he, _if he_ had the po,1/er, wot1ld be j?s_tifie_d i11 sil�n�ing m�nkind.... Tl1e P uliar evil of s1lenc1no t11 e expression of an op1n1oi1 1s, that 1t 1s robbing tl1e 11_i.11:1a1 1 0 race p · · ' osterity as well as the existing generation; tl1ose vvho d1·ssent fro1n the opinion, . . .till mor e_ than those who hold it. If the opi 11io11 is right, tl1ey are dep_r1ved of tl1e � feportunity of exchanging error for trtlth; i� w�o11�, they �ose, wl1at _1s alrnost as t a e_ ced du pro 1 th, tr1 of n s1o res mp t, 1 er the el1 i l1v r cleare percept on an d fY �,t s h n�fi colJ 1 s1on with error.... We_ have now recognized the necessity to tbe mental well-being of mankj11d (�n Wh1cl1 all 1 1? and free�om nio opi of dom ir free the of er s) oth well-being depe11d o th: expressio fly brie 110w will ,ve ch whi s; n t1nd gro of t inc n opinio ' on fou r dist recapitula te. {irst: if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion �ay, 0.r. atight we can erta1nl y kno w, be true. To deny this is to assume our own 1nfall1b1lity.

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Seco,idly, tt1011gh the sile11ced opinio? be an error, it may, an� yery c monly �� does, contain a portio11 of truth; and since t�e _ g eneral or preva1��g opinion o n atlY stibject is rarely or 11ever the whole truth, 1t 1s only by th� coll1s10� of adverse opirriorls that the ren1ai 1 1der of the truth has any chance of being supplied. e , t th ue bu tr le ly ho w on ot n h; _ ut tr be n_ io in op ed v i ce e 1· e th if 1 e1 ev ', TJ1ird!J n d earnestly c_ontested, it a ly us ro g? v1 1s, ly al t11 ac d 1 a1 unless it is s11:ffered to be, a r of c ne di an e eJu m th p� e, with 10 ld he e b _ it, e v i ce re ho w will, by n1ost of tl1ose is, � ly th no on nd r A ou s. t.f nd bu ou g� th l na t1? ra its o� g in el fe or 11 little comprehensio g st, in or lo be e of l�d er eb ng fe n da , 1n be ll wi · elf its 11e tri oc d e tl1 of ng ni ea !JJ, the m a e t; gm �h uc ng do nd mi co co d be an r te ac ar ch e th 1 01 ct e eff l ta vi its and depi·ived of ing the ground, and r be m cu t. , b� od go r fo us cio ca effi in n , io a mere forn1al profess v1ct1on, from reason or personal n co lt tfe ar he d an al e r y an of th ow gr e th 11 preventi g experienc e.''

Notes and P1·oblen1s on t/1e Above.

I. Mill re1Jeatedl)' use s tl1e term ''truth'' as the goal of free speech. How would Mill define ''trt1th''?

2. I11 the passage quoted above Mill arg11es the ''necessity'' of ''the mental well-being of mankind. (011 whjch other well-being depends)." As noted below, M.ill co11ceded tl1at at1thorita1·ian 1·egimes or authoritarian measures m-ay well be necessary to pro1note son1e essential cond itions necessary to ''well-be ing'' - such as ''order'', ''unity'', ''educatio11'' and ''economic growth''. But he insisted that ''mental well-being'' was the 11ltimate value towards \Vhich Constitutional systems shot1l d aim. How wot1l d I\tlill define ''n1 ental well-being''?

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J. While Mill arg11es the great val11e to socie ty of freedom to criticise or question the status qito, lie also declared: ''No one prete11ds that actio,i should be as free as opi11io11.s. [�mpbasis added ]. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity 1 �he� tl1� c1r_ct1msta11ces it1 whicl1 they are expressed a.re such as to constitute a posi tive 1nst1gat1on to some mischievous act. Acts....which, without justifiable cause, �o h_arn1 to oth ers, may be.... controlled....". See Mill, op. cit. page 49. Is the dis I tinction between ''action'' and ''opi11ion'' meaningful for legal purposes? 4. Mill's a_rgument fa vori11g a policy of open discussio11 and freedom of dissent assumes,.does rt not, that people will listen to eac h othe r and reason together and lace a_ high valtle �n �'truth'' reached thro11gh the processes of debate. To a var �ing •.. �x�en t . in communities throughot1t the world, that is a rather ''utopian'' assumption, . is 11 not; Men �re not always so tolerant of dissent an rs are dissento no cri r d tic ism · always 'non v1ole11t''? · ' 5 � ot�er e�says, Mill recognized that his arg 111u D1 i ma xi of fav or um I ent i n s . · f d or �dividtlals to express opinions were not necessari applicable to all i . ly . � ti�� ;�� socie ies at all times. Thus, he wrote: (See M -1 ill, op. cit., page 112): . de s _ e . [i. un ed e uca t e ben d] ' t p eo �� ple , though in some degree alive to the fi _ : · of ci z�� society, m�y be f . ed d t: ad ] · un ab le s is to f pra ha cti rbe se ara the nc [em e p o which 1·1 demands: t he ir passio � oo 1 e d · pr1 s t may b · per�onal e too . � violent, or their . r 1 exacting, to roregO rivate co -� ; nflict, and leave to the laws the aven.gtng of their ea .. . . _·.4,; , or supposed wrongPs. ,, . - ...- � ..... ' - I

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- POLITICAL AND ECONOIYIIC DEVELOPMENT TS RIGH AN fIUM

927

following: the also · ae· r Const is made by Mill i� l1is essa� o,,z Liber�y: 'Liberty, as excl�sio� ther ano ."Still state tl1111gs a11y of to a11ter1or to tl1e time vvl1en manat1on appl1c no has . le · · · a pnncip ' · · d c;1og 1pr?�e n 1_ . b f · Y b"' 1ee o and f eqt1al _capable d1sct1ss1011 U11til ome . c e b_ have kind for them but 11npl1c1t �bed1�11ce to a11 Al<bar 0� a Ch�rle nothing s 1 there then, �s to find one . Tl11s passage reflects T\Jil_l's frt1�tft1I fort�n�te so are they if rnagoe, 1s � corollary expression of self-gover1111?e1!t, bt1t 1t 1s put 111 a of freedom that idea of tt1t�lage or prolongat10� }Jat�r11a�1st1� ce11sorsh.i 1J. Mill's a to lead ight that m way antago nist, Sir James Stepl1en, was quick to seize tl1e open111g, 1n I11s Liberty, Eqi,a!ity, fraterni ty:' Why, then n1ay not edt1cated n1e11 coerce tl1e ignora11t? \Vl1at is tl1ere in the character of a very comn1011place ig11ora11t [E11glisl1] 1Jeasa11t or petty sl101J . ;l� i keeper in these days which makes liin1 a less fit st1bject for coercio11 011 tY1 r Mill's I principle than the Hindoo nobles and princes who were coerced by Alebar?' '' 1 (Freund, "Standards for Civil Liberties'', an essay repri11ted i11 l1is T/1e ,Si1pre111e Court of the United States, pag es 85 (1961).

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Re-read: pages 218-227: Constrtiing constitutional protections of freedon1 of speecl1; Ternzi �, 1 niello v. Chicago and the "clear and present danger'' test, its rationale, and Jackson J. 's criticism r of that test. d

Pages 230-231: the "inescapable'' problem of developing constittttional standards in Ethiopia, I in order to interpret legislation restricting speech and press activity. :�

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The Problem of Censorship

: II

The following materials examine:

. (I) the problems inherent in those systen1s of administrative ce11sorship wl1icl1 i�pose "prior restraints'' on commt1nicatio11; (2) Etbiopia11 legislatio11 creati11g pri.0! restr�iat� on publications, cinema and drama; (3) selectecl cases a11cl doctrinal \V�Itmg which illustrate possjb}e constitutional approacl1es to the problem of ce11sor. s�p. .

, The Nature of ''Prior Restrai11ts'' From Em erson, ''The Doctrine of Prior Restraint'', 20 Lai,v arzd Conte111J)Orar;1 Proble,ns, page 648 (1955). The clearest form of prior. restraint arises in those sit11ations where the govern. . n, express ment rim itatio . 1111dertakes to prev1se, other\ or ed tion in e regula statut ' ' ve · . nt. fu. ture publ'1cat1o nce approva 1 O·f an adva out witl1 n or o11 icati r mun othe com �xec tu i�e official. prosect1tion l crimina by Such d eilforce ons lim.itati ly normal are · •0r hav1n g bli h d ase b g e1n b · on uti sec s JJro ed the al, t rov hou app ed wit r t1.i the req . P� u ere failure to obtain content tl1e i11g cern con e issu f a11y o11 not al : rov and app : o ner of the publication. · Br eadth·· A system of · of e mp co e · t h 1 x n hi t · wi s 111g br ly 1al rn 11o ior int pr restra gover ent of em syst m ma a than hine tjon nica c 1mt1 con ry a far gr of t1nt r eate amo subs eqnuent · p · // _ex. u n 1shment. It subjects to government scrt1t1ny an d approvaI _a·· pression m tbe area controlled-the innocent and borderline as well as the offe11sive, tbe r .u · , s �n cti pe ins l rsa ll iv� �e un to as are �e t?e is ry usu iiJe un ch al. Th� ma not t� !��tfn � e w1s 1er otl y or in int pla com ti of par t Jec sub ar cul the es are cas which come to the attention of prosecuting officials. The pall of gover11ment control is, •

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of communjcation, and more e� ar e th r ve o y �l iv as rv pe thus, lik. ely to 11a 11 g more . i n ss o re p e ex e fr st 1 11 a g a ed lv so ,{ issties a1 ·e likely to be 1·e t, en � e sh !h ni nt ue pu . m eq co bs su f o ic un m em st sy aa r de 1 1 U ;1: !a de ici at g y;111;11 � · 1o t s n; 1t_ a� ke us ta t th en m rn ke ve ta g o s e t� its re tion J1as alreacly bee11 n1ade befo I �,i s. ea of e r id e . ac pl nd t U a ke ar m te e sys _th n 1 m , t? or � pla.ce, for wl1ateve1· it ma .y be .,,,, � he e � ac th re ve t �e 11e ar , . m ed 1n 1 ac pl e a t1 01 1, _if ba c 111 11u 111 1 co e th ' t, in ra st re . r io pr of ·� its se of ue lea iss e re th 1s til un y ld all he fin th wi be ay at all. Or tlie co1 1un1111icatio11 n1 o�table. Such a delay pr or �n e l�t so ob e 1n co be a ve h y 1a n it e tim ich settled, at ,,,h ! : _ e wh sn o re ti tu o m re pic 1n as ge I lar cl1 s11 sa e ar ' is particularly serious in certain { I. . . ed lv vo i11 be ay 111 investments ' ,I:�, int a tr· is ior so pr res of tem con sys A : o11 isi dec ·se ve1 ad an ·d va1 , toi, ity Properis ,,. I r ula y rtic an in pa t case the tha , ely lik re mo e nc he d a11 , ier eas it ke str11cted as to 111a ,,..t on m ati ade is a nic mu A com n. sio res exp e fre to y sel ver ad e r11l l t wil 1 i me I ern gov fait acco111pli, and tl1e publisher has all the practical advantages of that position. A gover111ne11.t official thinks longer a1 1d harder before deciding to undertake the ff''• serious task of subsequent 1J11nishme1 1t-the expenditure of time, fu.nds, energy, and ' . perso1111el tl1at will be 11ecessary. Under a system of prio r restraint, he can reach �! l initia of n . e burd the , case one n i s, the result by a simple stroke of the pen. Thu actio11 f,tlls 11po11 the go,1 er11ment; in the other, on the citizen. Again, once a com munication has been. made, the government official may give consideration to the stign1a a11d the troubles a crinJinal prosect1tion forces upon the citizen. Before the commt1nication l1as bee11 issued, however, st1ch factors would n ot enter the picture. l Fo1· _these and simila1· reaso11s, a decision to st1ppress in advance is usually more readily reached, on the same facts, tha11 a decision to punish after the event.

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. f!roceclure: Under a systen1 of prio1· 1·estraint, the issue of whether a communicat1�11 i_ s to be s11ppressed 01· not is determi11ed b), an ad_ministrative rather than a cr�m�nal procedu�e. This means th.at the procedural protections built around the cr�m.1 11al prosec�t101 1-m�ny of wl1icl1 are co nstit11tio n . al guarantees-are not �p1 plicable to a J)rior 1·estra111t. Tl1e prest1n1 ptio11 of i 1111ocence, the heavier burden of P.roof borr1e by tl1e _gover111ue11t, the stricter 1·l1les o f evidence, the stronger objec tion to vagtiei1ess, t�e 1m111eas11rably tigl1te1· a.11d 111ore technical procedure-all these · are not on tl1e s1cle of free expressior1 wl1e11 its fate is decid.ed. Fi11;a�l�, t�e n�t ef!ect ?f 11sing _tl1e ad 1ninistrative p1·ocess is to place prim�ry . sp?11s1b1 11ty fo1_ Jt1dg1 1g re 1 tl1e [legality of] the communication upon an executive . . . . are deci·· aed 0 ffi 1c1al rat11er tl1a11 th e COll rts. . Th tis, . sens1t1 ve 1ss11es of free expression . · · largely by a. 1.n1 ? 0r· ?ureaticrat rathe1· tha11 througl1 an i1 1stitution designed to secure a somewhat more independent, ob jective, and liberal ju dg m en t.

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Opportu�ityfor pi,blic appr�isal a11d criticism: A system of prior restraint u�ually �:� _ 0 per es behind _a screen o_f SIY io� ser �� informality and partial concealment that �1 o ta o p rtunity f�r. public apprai�al and na i dis . increases the chances of c� � o n 1-- �� t �er� � at_ a use . ty1: � 0 ec1s 1 1on s are l1c les f s likely to be made in the glare o ·pub . . aceompan.1es a subsequent puru· sh men . · · � rog _:-� . . ens ,lic t. The. pol1c1 es and act1ons· -of the � �-* · ess . offici'a l do 11ot as often co�e tO publ' · l e ar p. , aet1o ic notice; the his for reason s ? -��-: likely to b� known or publicly deb J � . · r� .:a · IIl " ._ . ""'I ·- tu.r at ed m at er ia l a· d or · _ tu s a d f . ea . 1 ly . ava 1lable; and tl1e whole apparatu·s of publi � . �� scrutiny Y .ta1_s � i"J ctn Q- : p ;;;,Iay· --rlie�rll�: _: �i�; · 1t normally does under a sys "- :-�::_� · . tem of subsequent purushment. . -- - -- �- ---· ::a:: .:i �---. ,�. �-z.::� .· � __ -� . -

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restrain�: P �rh_aps tl1e 111ost significan! feat11re of systems prior of mics dyna The they conta111 w1thi11 the111selves forces wl11ch clrive irresistibly that is . aint restr · of prior · d a d 11;11n1stration. zea I011s, �n d t1sua II·y a bsur · · · ove gent, Q11e factor � nintelli u toward of tl1e l1ce11ser or ce11sor. As M1lto11 Io11g ago observed. personality and ability is the ehoves hin ?, there cannot be a 111ore tediot1s a11d unpleasing journey, as th wo � such of � be he If . k a greater loss of tlille levied upon 111s l1ead, thar1 to be n1ade the perpetual reader of unchosen ! :i�k; and pamp�Jets :" ,ve may ea�ily foresee ,vl1at kin� of Jicensers ,ve are to expect hereafter,

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Certai11ty and risk: It is freq11ently arg11ed that a system of l )rior restraii1t affords individual citizens greater certai11ty i11 tl1e law witl1 less risl( of serio11s co11seq11e11ces. Under such a system, it is said, au individ11al can fi11d 011t wl1at is pern1itted a11d what is forbidden without incurring tl1e da11ger of crimi11al or si1nilar sa11ctio11s in the event his interpretation of the law is erro11eous. For tl1is reaso11, son1e p11bli shers prefer licensing systems to syste1ns based on st1bseq11ent l)L1nish1ne11t. At1cl this bas been a factor in tl1e establishn1e11t of private systen1s of censorship, sLrcl1 as exist in the motion pictt1re ind11stry and nov1 i11 tl1e co111ic booJc i11cll1stry. Fro1n the point of view of some individuals, there is n1ucl1 to be said for these co11sidera tions. But from a public or social poi11t of view-the i11terest of society as a \\ l1ole in free expression-the argume11t is, in tl1e 1011g r1111, d11bio11s. For it n1eans, t1ncler most circumstances, l es· s rather tl1an more com11111nicatio11 of iclcas; it leaves ot1t of account those bolder individ11als vvho n1ay wisl1 to express their opi11io11s a11d are willing to take some risk; and i t i1nplies a pl1ilosopl1y of willi11gness to co11form to official opinion and a sl11ggishness or timidity i11 asserting ri,gl1ts tl1at bocles ill for a spirited and healthy expressioi1 of t111ortl1odox a11d u11acce1Jted opinion. 1

Notes to tl1e Above: I. In the 18th centt1ry, Blackstone in his Co111111e11taries 011 t/ze Constit11tior1 c,ncl l.A"':s of Et1gl ancl (vol. 4, page 15 1) asserted that: ''Liberty of the press co11sists i11 laymg _ n ? previot1s restraint 11pon JJt1blicatio11s, ai1cl 11ot i11 freedo111 fro!n ce11sLtre for cr1m1nal matter when published. Every free man l1as an 1111do11bted r1gl1t to lay what sentiment he pleases before the public; to forbid tl1is is to dest�oy freed�n1 of the press.'' The constitutions of many countries express!>' forbid prior restrai11t t�pe censorship of printed matter. See also Article 10(1) of the E11ro�ean Conve11tion, si,pr a, which limits ''licensing'' to broadcasting, televisio11 a11d cinem�. It has been argued in the U.N. that justifiable restrictio11s 011 freedom of expression gua rantee _ � by Article 19 of the Dec]aratioi1 of I-lu1nai1 Rigl1ts ''shall 11ot be dee.med to J_u8_ tify t�e impositio ews, co:11 ments �.11 f o ip censorsl1 prior 1;1 n of by State any _ p_olit1cal opini.ons, to c11t1and may not be used as gro1111ds for restr1ct1ng tl1e r1ght _ c1ze t�e government.,, r Matte tlze zn atiorz 11zi1 Discri 1 of See United Nations, Stitcly . of Po!1t1cal Rights (Santa Cruz ed.) (U.N./E/CN.4/Sub.2/213/Rev. 1) (1962). 2· However, the laws of other cou11tries authorize vario11s kii1ds of possible ''1Jrior _ restraints'' on th e press. Consider th e fo ll owing: (a) A law recently enacted in Tanzania (Newspaper Ordi11ance (A111e11dme11t) Act of 1968) declares: . ·'�ere the President is of th e opinion that it is ii1 the pu�Iic interest or I� the interes t of pea ce and good order to do so, he may, by orde� 111 _the Gazette, direct that the 1u fro as tion lica pub se cea ll sl1a er ord newspaper nam ed in the the date.··· specifie d in the order.''

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i s sh es or P� ns he Ce (T , ct) a � nd ga U i of ov �r ws La e th des of 6 30 � r e t ap (b) Ch er¥e ncy or 1n t� e inte rest m 1 bl p� y an of ce en ur cc o �h � s ''o �, � that the President may �, . g e to m th n br ct io A at m la to in oc pr a o e su is ra pe 1ty 11l qt an tr or e ty f sa ic bl pu of e: r la ec d to n o es o g ct A e h T tion''. ,, s. The Preside11t may by statutory order establish a press censorship and n1ay at a·ny time revoke such order.

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e nt of a press c�nsorsbip the Pre si hm lis ab est e th of ion rat cla de e th 6. (1) 011 t ink fi y th e ma to be a press h as ns rso e p or n rso e p cl1 su int po dent may ap censor or press censors. (2) N·o 11ewspape1·, n1agazine, pamphlet, book or other publication shall be published u11less and until the contents of such newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, book or other publication have b een passed by a press censor.''

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(c) A 1�1�1 in Pakistan (The Press (Emerg ency Powers) Act of 1931, retained in force after independence) provides that the gove rnment may, under a declared ''hemergency'', require a11y l)ublisher to deposit a sum of m.on e)1 as ''security'' for ''his future operations. If tl1ereafter the publisher prints any material offending certain broad standards - e.g. '·promoting f eelings o·f enmity or hatred be·tween different classes'' or '�to excite disaffection to\vard.s the Government'', the security may be declared forfeit by the official charged with enforcement of the Act. An illustra tion of enforceme1it of tl1is Act is reported in Goodnow, Palistan: A Case Stiuly in Bureai1c1·acy (1960) pages 101-102:

''The Chief Commissioner of Kar·achi (C.S.P.) ordered the newspaper Morning News to make a security deposit of 3,000 rupees (st1bject to forfeit) as a gt1arantee that there w�t1ld b� _11? further news a1·ticles similar to the one appearing on April 14, 1968, which cr1t1c1zed the ar1·angements made for the Jd-ul-Fitr prayers at the "' Polo Grounds. l he a1�ticle had charged that the facilities showed discrimination bet�een promi11�nt persons a11d the con1mon. M uslin1 public a11d that such discrim� nation was fore1gn to tl1e spirit ot.. Isla1n. The Chief Commissioner held that this was an attempt to bring the Gover·nn1e11t into hatred and contempt''.

this ( a d) Exam ples infr of I11dian e ar l e gislati o11 app dealin g rs with newspape . · section.

(e) A great many _countries have enacted laws requiring the licensing of film s � to be showr1. for publ1� ex�1ibitio_n. An exhaustive description (highly criti�l)� of film censorship a� practiced 1n various states i 11 the U.S.A . set forth in the opinion is f Warren C.J. 1n !in1.es 1!illr! Co. v. Chicago, 355 U 55 (1962). .S. � j e Argu1?ent� seekin� to Jt1st1fy some of thes e ''prior restra no ay aw s int '' l m t - .� -h�d t? Imagine. It 18 worth noting tha power in Afric!_- t Bri tai n, lon ial as co a . and Asia, enacted (despite Blackstone's : � � ws ia sh in ju nc tio n) pr m an ess ce nsor ip y tbe type noted above a wer J po n d t th o · de.pend ence governments which succeeded. . - _- . __ 1 e Ill . . frequently retained, 'Indeed. sometimes � _: & � . Se e ws. la. ex pa nd ed ns , or th sh es ip e e c M" u r , Freedoni of the Press in India (1961) pa ge 26. Nevertheless, onet:-:-a._11}�� --� -Ji en . �1. , r1. t ten� " .. -..:-i able guarantee of freedom 0f . a· speec h h an 1o_ r t 1n . : ;-. : : !::! ?;'" :_��. d h t e 1s set press constitution 'J· llfIS · tS. must confront -�1 =�� =:�==: �c 4t.. �"' 1,e,.,o�V . . 1· h 1 : � -� �' · _ th l·1n1.is,- L,..ml e b o pr l t a�m f d o w et e ng 1111 rm constitution impOses o n enfio . A-J.. :n.£_1S;RU l..1 � _____ s · -..¥ :�� :; � � r c �� e m · e a:vL.1 n t o f p . rior est ra1 nt I aws. presum r confronts lawYers · and J.u . . ·· dges 1 n Eth1op1a - cS; ·��;;� .

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Eritrean Su preme �?� rt's. decision, as reported by s111ith, inter ra: su 40� , e P_ pag d: Re-rea g law a_nd holding tl�at . l1cens1ng, as a means of controlling tl1e press'' I1cen s1n ss pre ean Eritr .g retin p,vas unconstitutional under the Er1trean Const1tut1on.

m le b o r P l a ic et th o yp H A M is a newly appointed Min�ster of I11forn1ation a11d yo11 are assigned as t1is legal ad�is or: M tells_ y_ou t�at he 1s concerned abo11t tl1e state of the law regarding censorship (1.e. adn11n1strat1ve controls over tl1e co11tent) of bool<s, 11ewspapers, periodicals and films. He asks for a careful report setti11g forth: 1) the present laws 011 censorship; 2) problems of interpretation and e11forcement of these la\vs; 3) constjtutional problems - if any; 4) policy issues regarding repeal or reform of these laws; 5) your proposals - if any - for new legislation i11 tl1is field.

Ethiopian Legislatio11 Regarding Ce11sorship of Publicatio11s, Fil,ns, T/1 eatre a11c/ Entertain,r1ents.

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From The Printing (Control) Proclamation, No. 28 of 1942, Negarit Gazeta 2nd Year No. 2.

931

This early Procla.mation contains no preamble and does not specifically recile passage by Parliament.

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I. This Proclama tion may be cited as the ''Printing (Co11trol) Procl,1matio11, 1942."

2. (i) Every person who is the proprietor, n1a11ager, lessee or occt1pier of a printing press shall dec]are the same to Our Minister of Pen \Vithin 15 da)1s of the coming into force of this Proclamatio11. (ii) Su. c h· declaration shall contai11 the following i11formation: (a) the address of the place at which tl1e press is situated; (b) the type of press or presses therei11 i11stalled; (c) the name and address of tl1e proprietor, n1anager, lessee or occupier, and (d) whether the press is being used or i11te11ded to be used. . 3. No person shall establish a printing press after the co��ng into force of th18 Proclamation without first obtaining a pern1it from Our M1n1ster of Pen. 4. Al� printed matter produced at a press i11 Our Empire shall have clearly .stated on It the name of the printing press from \Vhich the matter emanated; Prov ided that the provisions of this Article shall not apply to vi�iting cards, men us, announcements ter mat ted prin r othe and es, riag mar and of births ' deaths of a su· n·11ar nature. 5 · Any person of ilty gu is on ati lam oc Pr s thi of contravening the provisions a.n offence and shall on convictio11 ·be liable to punishm ent.··· ro a zet Ga e it gar Ne 3, 194 of 37 . rt No nte me n ain tio ma cla Pro nts ip E Censorsh d m Th n Year No. 8. In accordance th 11 tio olu res e 1 t ve pro ap � W � n tio wi Article 34 of Our Constitu � of Our Sen s. ow foll as m clai ate and the Chamber of Deputies and We accordingly pro ·

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SoURCEBOOK OF ETI-IIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I. This Proclamation may be cited as the E11tertainments Censorship Proc la n1ation, 1943. 2. r11 this Proclan1atio11, ''entertainments censor'' means an official appointed to be e11tertain1nents censor by 011r Minister of the Pen. 3. Oui· Mii 1ister of tl1e Pen may appoint_ by Notice in th� Negarit Gazeta ente r tainments ce11sors i11 such towns of Our Empire as l1e may think ne-cessary. ce of for o this Proclamation, int ing com tl1e. of e dat the e1· aft s day 4. Fiftee11 ted ll_ be sen sha pre nt me ain . for public ert e11t r 1ila sin er oth or t1e 1·ev y, lJla 110 filn1, exhibitio11 t111less and u 11til it has been passed by an enterta1nments censor for public exl1ibitio11. 5. Tl1e1·e shall be payable in respect of every film, play, revue or other similar enterta .i111ne11t ,vhicl1 is st1bmitted for the approval · of an entertainments censor a fee of Maria Theresa dollars 5. 6. (i) A fil1n sl1all be st1bmitted to an entertainments censor for approval by deliveri11g to him l)articulars in writi11g of the title, nature and description of the fi1111, togethe1· ,vith tl1e 11ame of the theatre in which and the days on which it is to be prese11ted fo1· pl1blic exhibition. Should the entertainments censor so require, the owner or ma11ager of the theatre in which a film is to be presented for public exhibi tion sl1all exhibit tl1e film to the entertainments censor on suc,h da)' and at such hot1rs as 11e n1ay require. (ii) A play, revt1e or other e11tertainment shall be submitted to the enter tai11n1ents ce11sor by deliveri11g to him a copy of the script as it is to be presented to the p11blic, togetl1er witl1 partict1lars of the tl1eat.re in v-1ltlch and the days on wlu.ch it is to be 1)rese11.ted to tl1e pt1blic. 7. An e11tertai11n1e11ts ce11sor i11 deciding \¥hetl1er or not a film, play, revue or other_ sin1il�r e11tert,1inn:ent shall be passed for p11 blic exhibition, s.hall be guided by co11s1derat1011s of pt1bl1c sect11·ity a11d dece11cy. An entertainments censor may !)ass a fiI111,_ play, revt1e �r similar e11tertai11n1e11t fo1· public exhibition to all class es of the pt1bl1c 01· to certain classes 011ly. 8. TJ1e owner a11d 1 nanage1· of any ci11e111a or tl1eatre i 11 which a film , play, revt�e or other sim.ilar c11te1·tai11ment is JJt·ese11ted for p11blic exhibition without : having bee11 passed by a11 entertain1nents ce 11sor are gu ilty of an offence. 9. _Tl�e manage1· and p1·odt1cer of, and the participants i11, any play, revu e. or . other siintlar ei1terta111111e11_t wl1ich is prese11ted for public exhibition ,vitho ut having been. passed by an e11terta1n111ents ce11sor, ar e gtlilty of an offence . l� liab be IO. _A�y perso11 guilty of a11 offe11ce against this Proclamation shall t en ison 11 coilvt�tion to a fine i:ot e�ceedi11g Maria Theresa dollars 500 or to impr m . t . en onm or a period not exceeding six mo11.ths or to both such fine and impris

Fron1 Penal Code of Ethiopia. Art. 767 · - Protectio11 in Regard __, to tl1e P,·ess and Pi,blications. .en-ts, .... Whosoever contravenes the r . ...Jo · c_.um_.. 'O&'='-:_;�� d . I es u. . · or regu . I p. r a m. t ions t e co11ce __ rn1ng u . . ad ver publishin· g, pu . .tisem . ents . · .blic and posters, a,s we ll ,as the d@claratlo:13:,- ·

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l d n ro a. nt of p.ri11ted doct 1n1ents or p n co tio bu tri dis e sal ' pOSl·t , osters of a11y natu re whatsoever, e t. or es fin r · ith ar w e bl ha nis pu is

;

_ Supervisio11 of Theatrical .Pe1for111ances a, 1c/ Entertain,ne,·,ts. 6 . 77 Art. The owner, organiser, _director, � a1 1ager or agent ,vI10 coiitravenes tlle r Ltles or regulations co�cern1 n¥ thea�r1cal perfor1nances a11d e1 1tertai iin1e11ts of any \' kind whatso-ever, 1n particular 1n rega rd to: , (a) the permission to orga11ize or offer them to the l)Ublic or the cor1c(itions /' of their manageme1 1t a11d safegl1 ard s relati11g thereto otl1 er than tll ose specified in Art. 781 [i.e., rules governi11g safety of b L1 ildi 11 gs]; or I' (b) cens ?rship and the prior r �ql1irer1 1:ents i1nposed in tl1e i 11 terests of decency, public order or the protection of 1 1 1fants a 1 1d you 1 1g perso11s; or

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(c) opening and closing times or aL1tl1orized ti1ne of perfor111a11ce, or ail)' other police regulation or n1easure of st 1 pervisio11 apJ)lyi11g to J)laces or establishments used for p11blic or private tl1eatrical perforn1a11ces or e11ter tainments,

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is punishable with fine or arrest. From Ministers (Definition of Powers) (Ame11 cln1e11t I'\Jo. 2) Orel er 1,1 o. t�6 of 1966 f' Negarit Gazeta 25th Year No. 23.

I Art 20. The Mitlister of Information and Totrrism is tl1e l1ead of 011e of tl1e .Depart

ments transacting State affairs, 11a111ely, tl1e Mi 1 1istry of l 1 1forn1atior1 and Tourism. Tl1e Minister of Informatio 11 a11d To11ris111, i11 accorcla11ce 'Nith the la\v, shall:

(a) be principally respo11sible for, and, i11 co-operatio11 witl1 otl1er Mi11is tries and Public At1tl1orities co1 1cer11ed, prepare, J)ri11t arid pt 1 blisl1 information concerning Ethiopia a11d l1er people both ,vitl1in a11d witl1out the nation; (b) be principally responsible for e11suring tl1at tl1e public is informed . _ _ concerning the plans, program111es, inte11tions a11d actrv1t1es of tl1e Gover11ment; (c) be principally responsible, i 11 co-01)eration with other Ministries a 11d Public Authorities conceri,ed, for all Govern111ent anno1111ce111e11ts and publications both witl1 i11 a11d withot 1t tl1e natio11; (d ) own, manage and operate 11ewspapers a11 d 1nagazines; (e) issl1e licenses for the private o\ 1nersllip, n1a11age1nent and operatior1 of newspapers and magazines; (f) own, manage and operate Goven1n1e11t-ow11ed radio and television stations·, · . · g ) ( ISSUe licen · ses for the private ow11ership, maL1age1nen� and operatio11 of radio an d television stations, except i11 sofar as specrfic _power tl1:�e: for has been legally delegated to aI,1other Mi11istry or Ptiblic Atitbority' 1

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TIONAL LAW U IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E F O SOU.RCEBOOK

934 (h) (i) (j)

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n lic ai ub rt p _ r te he e� e m ot d nt pre sent an es vu re s, ay pl s, m fil at th enstlre ity al ic or bl or m pu da en d en off t er ng 11o do ia the op hi Et i i i th wi ed ; n o ti a n 1e tl f o ty ri u c se r d te rte at .po � nto or print i d im te in pr at th g n ri su en r fo be responsible ity al ic or or bl m ng pu da nd en fe of t no er es do the ia op 11i Et 1 1 i th wi ed security of the 11ation. �s pe p� _of ws s ne ive t�t en res , periodicals, rep d an s list r11a jou all . register 1n p1a th h1o a w1 Et s n d render cie en ag ws ne d an es 11s l10 ing ptlblish 1 necessary assistance to them; a n d foster and 1)romote tourism.

e d r th lem an ste ob ini Pr e M er Th of Int in sts Ve it ,·s we Po e t/1 , 6 4. No 1· ·de 01 011 Noies preting Proclan11ation No. 28. o ati of ter n was, orm nis Inf Mi the ra si,p 66, 9 1 of 46 . No der Or by t tha 1. Note n the Pe der un of rint ter ''P nis Mi the in ted ves y usl vio pre s 1· we po e11 giv ly, ab sum pre . ory e ra) hist Th d sup an 37, 28 s. s n (no tio ma cla Pro '' 11ts me ain t 1� 11te ''E d ing'' an of this transfer of autl1ority may be traced: (a) By Order No. 14 of 1954 (Negarit Gazeta 14th Year No. 2, the powers of the Ministry of Pen to ''co11dt1ct and co11trol the propaganda, information and press services'' were transferred to the Ministry of Information. (b) By Order No. 33 of 1964 these powers were transferred from the Minister of Fina11ce to the Ministry of I11for1natio11. See pages 455-456, supra (Chapter V). (c) By Order No. 46, si,pra, the powers of the Minister of Information were restated and set forth as show11 above. 2. Re-reacl ca1·efl1lly: pages 451-452 of Cl1a. pter V, supra. Note that the preamb�e of Order No. 46, si1p1·a, cites Revised Constitution, Article 27 as its source. This �rder deal_s with j11risdictio11 of tl1e several 1nit1istries. The Minister o·f Information 1s to exercise the powers besto\¥ed ·by tl1e Order '' i,1 acco1·dm1ce with t/ie lalv'', (See amended a1·ticle 20? si1p1·a; en1pl1asis added). Prestimably ''powers'' vested in ministers llnder Orders 1ss11ed pt1 rsuant to Article 27 of the Constitution are powers to enforce ot/1er laws. We l1ave elsewl1e1·e dealt with the constitution al limits of ''law1naking'' t1nder Article 27 (see pages 451 -452 of Chapter v supra); and the v�ew h_as been suggested that '' Article 27 only co11fers authority ov;r the intern al organzzatzon of tl1e g?ve�?111e11t, a11d tl1e distribi,tion of powers between different g�vernmental agei1c1e�. Orders do 11ot create legal duties and rights except within the gove:nment - i.e., as b�tween government officials. Accordingly, Order 27 does for n ot ztself ve�t a cens?rsh1p pow er in the en to Minister; it onl y vests authority ce other laws, i.e. pa1·l1ame11tary legislation, creating su ch authority. 3· One issue, then, is whether the Proclamations reproduced above (which �pve: r t b_e the only releva�t parliamentary legislation) ves t censorship p owers in 1: �i01ster. exaD;P The_ Entertainments Proclamation supra is certainly las sic a · c ' ' of a censorship law ., 1· t requrre · s approval by the ''entertainments ensor ,, be1.ore0 c tr films , plays_ etc. may be ''presen ted for pu on ( g xhibition'' · The .;'Printin . · C o bli c e Proe1 amat1on'' poses a more d1·fficu e apth uire 1t problem. It does 11ot expressly req � --re s proval f n °fficia . l bef?re a pu?lication can be t reci�; .. ed. I circulat or printed es only th�t P�rsons operatttlg pr1nt1n g presses ''obtain a permit'� to do so. The q

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.t1on, presum. ably, is whether the officials wh o enforce .tllis Proclamat·10n may, .1n · e approva 1 � f the content of material to be r_ e quir n, retio printed as a condi. their disc 1t to operate a pr1n_ting pre ss. Consider the Proclama pe_r m y an tioil careftilly: tion of . eted to authorize such interpr a ce11sorsh1p povver? Or to allti1or1ze be it uld . sh o . . author•ity of t he pro c1am t10� to · exe rcis e rcin an;, g ot/1 er kinds of ad,11i11is� the enfo co�t ent of pu�licat1ons? Or is the plirpose of tlle Proclaina �he over ls contr o trative 1.e. a_ reqt1_1rement that printers register a11ct ideiltify tile tion one of no!ificat1on press which printed ��y �ater!al d_es1gn_ed ,�or general circulation? \,'fllat would be not1fi cat1on-l1�ens1�g law - as opposed to a ''regulatory a of tives objec the licensing'' law? What are th� essential d1ffere11ces between these two possible inter pretatio ns of the Proclamation? 4. Whatever the proper interpretation of Proclamatio11 28, tl1e 1\1inistry of Infor mation has in fact required - or ,1dvised - printers to obtain approval of n1 aterial submitted for prii1ting vvithi11 the �mpire, and printers ha•v1e jn ttiri1 either passed this burden over to authors or publ1sl1ers, or l1ave tl1emselves submitted tl1e material to the appropriate Ministry officials for approval. There aJJpear to be no publisl1ed regulations governing administration of censorsl1ip, t11ot1gl1 ar1 official i 11 tl1e 1\,1 ir1is try has published an unofficial expla11atio11 of tl1e111. See, Amare \.Vorkt1, ''Freedom of Speech and Press'', (A.mharic) Addis Ababa, 1969. rfl1e proccciures for censor ship are informal, and standards are developed through _practice a11d p<Jlicy directio11s from the Minister. Problems of Constitutional Limitations on Censorship: Some Sr.sggestiYc Comp21r11tive, Materials: ''Standards'', ''Due Process'' and Limiting Censorsli1ia> to a P�rticuI�r Time, Place and Set of Circumstances. From Burstyn v. Wilsor1 343 U.S. 595 (1952). A New York statute required films shown for pt1blic exhibitio11 to be lice11ses, by t11e state's ''Board of Regents''. The Board revol<ed the Iice11se for tl1e fil1n "The Miracle'', on the ground-that it was ''sacrilegiol1s'' - vvhicl1 ,vas 01�e ,of t�e grounds of censorship authorized by the statute. The film had bee11 ex�1b1ted 1n. other cities in Europe and North America, but tl1ere were some Catl1ol1c leaders who asserted that it ''defamed'' or ''mocked'' sacred teachings of tl1e Cht1rcl1. Burstyn and other distributors of the filn 1 stied for a declaratory judgn1ei1t; their claim was that the New York statute as interpretecl a11d appliecl, violated co11stitu tional gt1arantees of ''freedom of spe;ch'' and ''dt1e P:oces� of law''. The � tipreme , ote tl1e Court, reversing the New York courts, sustai11ed this cla1111. Clark, J. \:Ii Court's judgment, declaring: It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a sig11ificant n�edi�m for _the communication of ideas. They ma y affect public attitt1des �nd behayior in a variety of w�ys, rangin g from direct pousal of a political or soc1�l doctr111� to th� strbtle es sha�ing of thought which aracterizes all artistic expression. The importailce of ch Y th t tlla m oti on_ pictures as t fac the b ed �e°: les t no � � an organ of public opinion is ,k Yo lv Ne v. are designed to entert rs ,ite Wz 1n d sai s wa ain as well as to inform. As 333 . . 0 51 (1948): U S 5 7, 0 e th r fo e v si t1 el o to · · is · Th · g 111n 1 e '' . 1ine between the in.forming an d the enterta . . . . . s c tan 111s pr otection of at tl1 w1 r 1l1a fam is � th basic right [a· free press]. Everyone s r he ot an o f r pag anda s he ac te t, en em t1s am through fiction. W ha t is on e man's d octp r1?ne.''

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936

To llold that liberty of expression by mea11s of _motion pictures is guaranteed b th First atid Fourtee1 1th Amendments, however, 1s not the end of our problem. Iido!s 110t follow tl1 at the Con stit11�ion requires absolute freedom t� ex�ibit every nlotion picttire of every kind at all t1�es and all places. That 1:1-uch 1s ev1den_t from the series of decisio ns of th is. Co11rt . with . respect to other m_ed1a o� commumcation of id.eas. Nor does it follow tl1at motion p1ct11res are nece�sar1ly subJect t.o the precise rules goveri1ing any otl1er pa1·ticular method of _ expr�ss�on. Each method tends to presei1t its ov,,n peciilia� problems. But , the basic pr1 11c1ples of freedom o� s�eech and tI1e press, like the First A1nend1nent s co�mand, do not vary. Those pr1nc1ples, as they have freq11ently been en1111ciate� by this Court,_ make freedo� of expression the r11 Ie. There is no j11stifica·tio·11 i11 tl11s case for mak1 ng an exception to that rule. The stat11 te involved I1ere does not seek to punish, as a past o.ffen.se, speech or writing falling withi11 th e permissible . sc_op� of subsequ�nt p�nishment. On the contrary, New Y01·k 1·eq11ires that perm.1ss1011 to commu111cate ideas be obtained i11 adva11ce f1·om state officials \vho judge the content of the words and pictures sought to be comn1un icated. This Court recog n ized many years ago th.at such a IJ1·evious 1·estraint is a form of infringeme11t 11pon freedom of expr,ession to be es pecially condemned. N·e\7\' York's h ighest court says the1·e is ''nothing mysterious'' about the statu tory provisio11 ap1Jliecl in tl1is case: ''It is simply this: that no religion, as th.at ,vord is understood by the ordi11ary, reasonable person, shall be treated \Vith contempt, mockery, scorn a11d ridicule .... '' Tllis is far from the kind of narrow except ion to freedom of expressio11 which a state may carve out to s.atisfy th.e adverse demands of other interests of society. 111 seeld n g to apply the broad and all-inclusive defini tion of ''sacrilegious'' given by the New York co11rts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea anud a n1y1·iad of conflicting c11r1·e n ts of religious views, witl1 110 charts bt1t those provided by the most v ocal a11d powerful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such u11li 1 nited rest1·aining co11trol o,,er motio1 1 pictures in a censor. vague so was defined, as ''sacrilege'', standard tl1e tl1at Frankfurter J., conct1rr!ng,. agreed _ _ as to be capable of n1any d1.ffer1ng 111terpretatio11s; tl1is defect violated two basic requirements of ''d11e process of law'':

�r_ol1ibition tl11 ·ough wo1·ds that fail to convey what is pern1 itted and what is prol11 bited f?r w�nt of a1Jpropriate objective sta11dards, offends D11e Process in two \vays. F1rst, It does 11ot st1fii.cie11tl)1 ,lpprise tl1ose be11t 011 obedience of law of wh at may reaso11,tbly be foresee11 to be fot1nd illicit by the law-enforci 11g authority, �hetlier co11 �t 01· jtiry _01· ad 1 11i11is_tr�tive age11cy. Seco11dly, where licensin g is reste�, _ �n t �e �rst 111sta11�e, 111 a1� adm1n1st1·ative agency, the available judicial review �s 10 ��ect ren�er�d- 1 1101Je1·at1ve. 011 tl1e basis of st1cl1 a portmanteau word as ·'s�c:1, , I egi?us t�e Judic_iary l1as 110 sta1 1dards with wl1ich to judge the validity of adm1nis _tr�ttv� action wh icli 11ecessa.1·ily involves, at least in large measure subjective 4eter.. n11 11at1011s. Tl1us, the admi11ist1·ative first step beco111es the last st;p.... Notes to the above:

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I) The Burst;,n case suggests th . . . ese proposition� fo r our consideration: . · ·. · (a) Films are an import �nt . ,, · h '' ec t spe orm · f O ide a of exp . res sio par n t are an.d as that term· 18 · used 1n constituti.ons. ·

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(b) The scope of _censorsh�p must b e �imited by standards \Vhich cotlfine tile par evi ticu l !o be avo1ded; that evil 0111st be defi il ed lar a ard s tow r nso s0 that ce · · 1· ·ted as far as poss Ibl e ,· ''b · roacI''' ''u1111ecessar1·ly 1nclt1sive'' sta1 . discretion is. 1m1 . 1d ar d s . d al1 v e r 1n a 1p h s r o s en c of Would you agree with the ab· ove. l)ropositions? Would yot1 agree \Vith til e Court's 1 '' ar d sac eg1o r1 = d us''?. Coul d tl1at ter111 be give11 nlore precise stan the analysis of . _ meaning? Compa�e Eth1op1an Pena ! C�de Art. 771. Co11sider also tJ1e following from the East African Sta11dard (Na1rob1) Jan. 28, 1967 - \vhich reflects, perhaps the absence of standards in Kenya film censorsl1ip . ''Kenya's film censors hav e reversed tl1eir decisio11 to ba11 the ·film Fail Safe, which deals with tl1e possible da11 ger of a 11t1clear war bei11 g started by error.

A statement by the chairma11 of the Film Ce11 sorsl1ip Board, P..ld. J.TvI. Kasyoka, disclosed that the Board has approved tl1 e screeni 11g of tl1 e film for exhibition to perso11s of or over the age of ten. P... 1neeling of tl1 e ft1 il Board had been convened to co11sider an appeal by T\!letro-Gold\vyn Mayer (East Africa) Inc. against the ban imposed 011 tl1e fil111 in Noven1ber. A panel of the Board had rejected the film the11 as it co11sidered certain parts were ''likely to prejudice I(enya's declared }Jolie)' of no11alignment''. Yesterday's statement said tl1e approval of tl1e full Board \'la.s subject to the excision of the parts objected to earlier.

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"The original ban led to protests a11d controversy over tl1e S)1sle1n of film censorship in Kenya. T\.vo weeks ago it ¥.ras :111110L111ced tl1al a11otl1er film ,vhich had been banned - Cast a Gia11t S/1ac!o}v, ,vhicl1 deals ,vith the Arab-Israeli conflict - has bee11 released for ge11eral s110\ving. Tl1e Censorsl1ip Board rejected the filtn after representations agai11sl it by the United Arab Republic Embassy i11 Nairobi.'' 2) What standards, if any, are provided i11 the Printing (Control) Proclamation, _ No. 28, and the Entertainments Proclamation No. 37, sttJJra? Note tl1 at tl1e Pe11al Code contains provisions deali11g ,vith prol1ibited speech and publicatio11s. So111e relevant provisions are as f ol101vvs: From Penal Code of Ethiopia Art. 609. - Obscene or Indecent Publications. (1) Whosoever: (a ) makes, imports or exports, transports, receives, posses_ �es, �isplays in public, offers for sale or hire, distributes or circulates wr1t111 gs_, 1111age�, , nt ce de in y sl os gr or 1e e1 sc ob e ar e st po rs, films or other objects which or in any other wa y trafficks or trades i11 the111; or (b) advertises indicates or makes know11, by a11y 1nea11s, l1 ow or from �h?m su�h objects n1ay b e procured or circt1lated, either directly or 1nd1rectly, . . . e ic tid eJ pr it ot ith w e fin r t is punishable with simple imprisonn1e � � : ? . to the forfeiture and destruction of tl1e 1ncr1roinat1ng material.

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938

SouRCEBOOK 01� ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

n tha e s on les , t nth no mo for and be ll sha the fine, nt me son pri im ple Sim (2) accor·ding to the circumstances, shall not exceed ten thousan. d dollars, \Vhere the offender : (a) habitually engages in or carries on such traffic; or (b) ktlO\vingly exhibits, bands �ver �r delivers such objects to an infant or young person for a cons1derat1on. Art. 610. - Obscene or Indecent Performance_s. . . . The p11nishn1ents s1)ecified i°: the 1:r�ced1ng Art1cle are apJ?licable to anyo�e ,vho organizes or gives pt1bl1c aud1t1ons o: performances, 1n � theatre or 1n a cinema, by projectio11 or by broadcast, or 1n any other way, which are obscene 01· grossly indecent. Art. 611. - Law/it! Wo,�/cs. Works or objects purely artistic, literary or scientific in character which are not calculated to i1Ifla111e erotic feelings or lust, are not held to be obscene or indecent. Ca11 it be arg11.ed that the standards provided in the Penal Code a.re the only pe1·missible standarcls for a ''censor'' to follow? Should censorship standards be broader·, more inclt1sive than penal standards?

Note that ter111s st1ch as �'seditio11s'' and ''obscene'' are hard to define accurate ly. For e)�a1nple it is agreed · by many jt1rists that the term ''obscene'' has no very clear n1ea11ing. See 1v1inattt11·, Freeclo,n of tlze Press in India (1961) who qu.otes va.rious s11ggested detinitio11s. See also Roth v. U11itecl States 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and Paul and Scl1viartz, Federal Censo1·sJ1ip (1961). F1·on1 Freedma,1 v. MarJ,fancl 380

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51 (1965).

One issue in this case was whetl1er the state censorship statute was unconstitutional because the proced11res it established for censorsl1ip violated constitutional gua·rantees of ''d.ue process of law''. T �e stat:1t �, i t was argt1ed, did not cleru·ly lJrovide for pron1pt, full judicial review of adverse censorship dec1s1ons. The court (per Bre1111an J.) upl1eld this claim:

Althot1gh the Court has saicl that motion pic -tures are not ''necessarily subject to the precise r11les. gover11i11g a11y otl1er partic11lar m ethod of expression,'' Joseph · Burstyn: l11c·. v. Wil.�011, 343 U.S. 495, 503, it is as t1·ue her e as of other forms of expr�ss1on tl1at ''[a.]11y syste111 of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a l1eavy prest11nption against its co11stitutional validity." Bantani Books, Inc. v. Si,llivan, st11)1·a, at 70. Tlie ad i11istra:tio1� of a censorship systen1 fo r motion pi �a r pe cu pr es en ts ct ur es � const1t dangers to t1t1�11ally protected speech. Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, . a censorship proceed111gp 11ts, the initial burd e11 on tl1e exhibitor or distributor. Because the censor'� bt1si11ess is to censor, tl1er e inheres the danger that he· may be less respons1�e �!1an a court - pa!t of an r v g of . h in d b� ep an en c � de nt . :: t to the co ? � �_ 11stitut1onally protected interests 1n free expression. And if �t 15 ade 1111d�lly oner�us,. by reason of de : iew re v al la y or ot ju di he ci rw ise, to seek � t · e censor s determ1nat1on may in p ractice b e final. . pplyi g the sett�ed rule ?f _ our cases, w e hold that a noncriminal pr?cess · v.,b· ict requ�ires the prior subm 1ss1on of a film to a censor avoids constitutio nal

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place llnder procedural safegt1arcls desigiied to ob tak es it jf onl y vi·ate . 1nfifll]I·ty system. p·irst' the b11rden of provi11g tl1at tl1e film Ip h cens ors a of oers is tbe dan must rest on the censor. n ssio expre �ted te unpro Second, while the State may requir� adva11ce submissio11 of all filn,s, i11 order t� bar all show1�gs of 11 nprotected films, tI1e reqtiirement vely ct eff j ceed � pro to nnot be adm1n1stered 10 a man11 er which ¥lould le11d a11 effect of fi i1 ality to tJ1e �!nsor's determination whetl1er a filn1 constitt1� s protected ex1)ressio11 _ To this end, the exhibitor �t1st b_e �sst1red, b_y statute or at1thoritative jt1 dicial c onstruction, that the censor ,:v1ll, \.v1thin a specified brief period, eitl1er isstie a license or go to court to restrain showing the fil1n. Any restrai11t in1posecl in advan.ce of a .final judicial determination on the n1erits n1 ust si111 ilarly be li111ited to preserva tion of the stah1s quo for the shortest fixed period compatible witl1 sot1nd jL1dicial .

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·Therefore, the procedure must also assure a prompt final jt1dicial decisio11, to minimize the deterrent effect of a11 interim a11d possibly erro11eous de11ial of' a license. Without these safeguards, it may prove too bt1rde 11some tc, scel( revie1iv of the censor's determination. It is readily apparent tJ1at the Maryland scheme does not satisfy tl1 ese criteria.

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Notes to the above. Re-read carefully pages 635 et seq. of Chapter VI: "due process and the admi nistrative process". Assuming that Article 43 of tl1e Constitution ap1Jlies to the adn1inistratio11 of censorship in Ethiopia, there remains tl1e question: l101v does it apply? 1�11e J7!·eedo111 case, supra

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obviously does not state the law for Ethiopia, bt1t it n1ay be useful as a model. Consider carefully the reasons why it may be important to require ''notice'', "l1earing'' an "in1partial tribunal'' ::ind "opportunity for judicial review'' jo censorship cases. Ii1 any dispt1ted case, what n1ay be issues 10 be resolved? What kind of "evidence'' is necessary to resolve tl1ese issues? Wl10 is con1petent lo niake the necessary decisions? Does careful review of tl1e proposed censorship help to protect and ?�ure _ t he policy objectives for allowing free speech? Consider tl1e app!i�atio°: of the draft a�m1strattve procedure code (set forth Chapter V page 652, supra) to tl1e ad1run1strat1on of censor ship.

From Virendr a v. State of Punjab, All I11dia Reports 1957 Supreme Court 896.

Thjs case arose at a time of considerable tension in the s tate of Punjab:. t!1e issue \vhich divided P!e m�o _poten!ially hostile camps was_ whetl1er the state sl1ould be par�1t�oned on a co�1n1una� :O · � ling wst1c basis. The law conta1n1ng the following pro cy rgen e1ne state an e ted latur enac legis v1s1o ns, among others:

''Section 2- The State Government or any authority so authorised_ i n this be��lf if s�ti�fi�d that such �ction is necessary _or combating any a�tivity preJudic�al g entin prev of for ose the purp to tbe_ mamtenance may, Y r, orde ic ptibl ct e aff to likely or of cting e aff unal harmony 0rder m Writing addresscomm ed to a printer, pt1blisher or editor, any (a) prohibit the printing or ts �en docu of class any or . t men docu or publication in any lar ticu �atter relating to a par 10 or iod per d cifie spe a for s ject s of sub clas issue or issues o particular subJiect or • • f a newspaper or per1od1cal; . that no such order shall re m ai n i n force for more th an two montl1s from tlie making

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ten days in Provide d rLI:1her that the h it w ay m e d ma een b ias 1 person against whon1 the order of th as�in may on llich w t en nm ver Go p g te Sta of his order ma ke a representation to the con,81-� eration thereof modify, confirm or rescind the order;'' se tion 2(1) authorised the State Government or the delegated authority to i ��s� ;�::�s�l shf.1p, c

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h ed by ris aut it in_ this behalf, if satis ty i r· tbo au y an or � ent nm ver Go te Sta e Th ). "'Section 3(1 g ng or t1n e at1 ev b pr m. co of y e an os rp pu tl1e i tiy ac r fo � ty pre y · sa1 ces ne is n tio ac _ ch su fied tl1at g tm or ely ffec lik to y ect on aff rm h pu l un blic m com f � � nc ena � int 01 1 e tl ? to _ l � judicia � _ ng1ng 1nto PunJab of any newspaper, periodi_ , order, cal br1 the 1t leaflet h1b pro , ion cat i tif no by y, ma or otl1er publication.'' , al in a in im d ng cr ge di len . al ocee pr ch s wa s on isi ov pr e es th of y lit na io ut tit ns co 1 e TI g h fundamental rights), lin ( wit dea ia Ind of n tio itu nst Co the of 19 e ticl Ar lly efu car Re-read . a. pr su ) II er pt ha (C 7 19 619 s ge pa in set forth ra sup id, was val 2 tion tion Sec Sec t 3 invalid. tha d hel .) C.J s Da r (pe rt cou the of ent gn, jud Tlle Excerpts follow.

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d gne · u the of imp �ct are ultra 3 a�d _2 Ss. h bot t tha nd e t con s ner itio pet The ge the fundamental r1g.hts of the 1 1i,·es the State L egislature, because the y 1nfr1n ion itut the of nst (g) Co and are l) _ l�( and (a) 1) 19� t. Ar by teed ran gua s petitioner · (2) (6). or t.19 t.19 1n Ar ied Ar od mb e s 1on v1s 11ot saved by the protecti11g pro Tl1ere is and ca11 be no disp11te tl1at the right to freedom of speech, and expres sio11 carries with it tl1e 1 ·ight to propagate and circulate one's views and opinions s11bject to reasonable restrictio11s.... The test of 1·easo11ableness has been laid down by this Court in .The State of Mad,·as v. V. G. Ro1rv, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 196 in the following words:

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''It is i1nportant in this context to be ar in mind that the test of reasonable ness, wherever prescr·ibed, sho11ld b e applied to each individual statute im1Jugned, and no abst1·act standard or general pattern, of reasonableness ca11 be laid down as ap1Jlicable to all cas es, The nature of the right alleged to l1ave been i11fringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and 11rgency of the evil sought to be ren1edied there by, the dis proportio11 of tl1e impositio11, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all e11ter into the jud.icial verdict."

This dict11m has been adopted a11d applied by this Cou.rt is several subsequent cases. Tl1e s�1rrou11di11g circmt1stances i11 which the in1pugned law came to be enacted, of the u11derlying p11rpose of the exte11t a11d the urgency the e vil sought to be re. medied have alreacly bee11 adverted to.

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It is conceded that a serio11s tension l1ad arisen between the Hindu.s and the Ak�lis over the qt1estio11 of the partitio11 ot' the Stat e on linguistic and communal basis .... It was f�r preserving the safety of tl1e State for maintaining the public orde r that the Legislature enacted this i111pugned Statt1te....

···.The Stat� Govern111ent was cl1arged with the pr eservation of law and order . in the �tate; �s it �lone was i11 possession of all mater ial facts it would be the best atit�or�ty to �nvestigate the circumstanc�s and asse n tio sit ua the of ss ur th ge e nc y tha� nught arise atld to make up its mind wheth ry to ipa an tic er wh an at y an d if so acti on must be taken fo r the prevention of ea ch · b r ate d th e th 'an re tic ;t ip ene d or of the peace.

A_ power the exercise of which is conditioned of ent rem req ui by po the sit ive · · f actio the existence of t h� sat1s . · n of the · . e · h . t ing ma au k th or ity as fo r to ne ce th ssi e ty order fo · · r· the specific purposes m�ntioncd in the section [2( 1)(a)] and the effect of

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HUMA N RIGHTS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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ope rem rat in ai11 io11 for to a is lim itec l whi · ch period 011Iy and of . is .liab se le l . . . exerc . . . the a repr t ese11 t1pon at1011 b e111g 111ade ca1111ot, 111 otir OIJillion d e d resc1 n or ed odi.fi ' to b e ro t a11ce c1rct1 s, be cI 1aracter1se 111s _ m g d · · atte11 d as · u11re as011 able ai1ct otitthe of view . given by Art. 19(2) or Art. 19(6). n ctio te pro the �fde ·vations .... ca11not, ho,vever, appl_y to �l1e IJrovisio11s of s. 3. Al obse� se] [The po\vers tinder S. 3(1� Is st1bJect to tl1e same c011dition the of exe_ r c1se the h thoug as the satisfa� tion of the State_ Go�er�n1ent or its del�gates as is n1e11tio11ed j 11 s. 2(l)(a), !here 1s, _however, no t1n1 � �1m1t for tl1 e operat1011 of an _order :11ade tinder this section nor 1s there any prov1s1on 1nade for a11y re1Jresentat1011 be111 g made to the State Government. The absence of these safeguards i11 S. 3 clearly n1akes its provisio11s t111reason able. Note carefitlly: The essential test applied by the court was wl1etl1er tl1e provisio11s of the em ergency act were ''reasonable'', but the cot1rt l1ad to appl_v so111e eXJ)licit criteria to make that judgment. What were tl1e criteria? With respect to co11stitt1tional gua rantees of freedom of speech, is it possible to argt1e that the Indian cons titution contains essentially the same st1bstantive gt1arante as Et11iopia's? If so, should Ethiopian cot1rts apply analogous criteria to resolve a11alogot1s constitutio11al issues?

SECTION 4

FREEDOM OF SPEECH: COLLECTIVE ADVOCACY

The Right to Organize for Purposes of Advocacy

941

The Basis of the Right Re-read: Revised Constitution: Articles 41, 45, 47. U.N. Uniyersal Declaration of l-It1n1a11 Rigl1ts: Articles 20, 23.

From Natio nal Association for Adva11cen1e11t of Colored People v. Patterson,

357 U.S. 449 (1958). Effec t�ve advocacy of both p11 blic and private points _ o f_ vie\v, pa�ticularly ontr � overs1al ones, is unde�iably e11l1ance� by gro11p assoc1at1011, as this Court as more tha11 once recogniz e t een betw � s nexti close J the o11 u1 g 1 ed by r �mark11 freed?m_s of speech in ge ei1ga to om freed that te deba association for the and assembly. It 1s be)'011d · of.· aspect inseparable · a11 is ideas fre edom of speech advancement of beliefs and .... Of co�rse it i s immaterial whether tl1e beliefs sotight to be advanced by associa , tter m l ura cult � or � ious relig tion pertain to political, eco11omic, state action which may have the effect of ct1rtailing the freedom to associate is � ct to the closes t scrutiny.

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Fro m United llts g Ri l ica lit Po of ter at M e Nations , Stz1dy of Discri11iination irz th (Santa Cruz ed.) (U .N./E/CN.4/S11b. 2/ 213/Rev.1) (1962) Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Ht1n1a11 Rights reads: n. io at ci so as "( I) Everyone s <l an y bl m se as ha tl1e right to freedom of peaceful · ' · ( · N ' " 2) 0 one may be , ion iat oc ass an to g lon be lle to pe d com

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e of assem bl y or as�o�iation to which p t� e th y . cif e sp ot n s e do As th e n tio ed or cia en v so n s as co e s e i rm bl fo , m e s d as at th for e d n1 su as e b ay m it s ·t refer es and ass�ciatio ns, in this i bl m s� l'' ftt e ac e ''P . ed d ' clu n i e ar �� olitical purposes , t an ar rb ou ro th stu up wi di e c d , e ct du or n co e os the tl1 as d e n fi e d en be ve ha coiltext y r ar tu nt na e which assoc ia lu e vo th s e ss e str le tic ar e tl1 of 2 h ap gr ra Pa ''. tise of �rms essu re upon i_ndivi� uals pr of n e tio r _ e e x t� ts ibi oh pr d a11 , ve ha ld ou 1 tions 11ormally s1 · pu1·pose of which, m1 gh t be contrary to their political to join any association the views or in terests.

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In State of Madras v. V. G. Row (1952 All India Reports 196) the Supreme Court of India declared 11nco11stitutional a statute a11thorizing the Madras government to declare ''unlawful'' any oroanization wl1icl1 constituted ''a danger to public peace''. Once declared ''unlawful'' th.e organiza tio� \\'as in effect required to cease all activities. The legislation provided for a bearing before a government ''Advisory Board'', on petition of � ny proscrib�d _organization; the Board'� decision \Va.s final. Tl1e S11preme Co11rt noted that tl1e nght of association was protected by Article 19 (c) of India's constitution (set out pages 196-197 supra, Chapter ID; and all government restrictions on tl1e exercise of tl1is right 1nust be ''reasonable''. The Madras law was ''unreasonable'' because it failed, an1ong otl1er tilings, to allow for judicial review of the grounds for the government's order ''both in their fact11al �.nd legal aspects'' (emphasis added). The Court stressed the importance and valt1e in Indian political, social, economic and religious life of the right of association.

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tl1e Rig/1t to Organize

The lavvs on this subject will obviously vary gre atly from country to country

for obvious 1·easons

Regt1latioi1 of exercise of the right to form and maintain organizations for ad,1ocacy pt1rposes n1ay take many forms. Governments may seek to prohibit forma tion of organiza.tions which overtly pursue certain obje ctiv es - or which are found to do so after investigation (e.g. overthrow of the gov ernm ent by force). '·Political'' organizations, crea.ted to elect candidates to offic e will be prohibited totally in those states which deliberately and constitutionally adopt a ''one party'' - or a ''no j party ' - political systen1. Governme11ts n1ay seek to regulate organizational activity 1n o�her w�y_s: specific kinds of organizations may be prohibit ed from engaging in ?pec!fic act1v1ty (e.g. labour t1nio11s and employ er groups may be ba,rred from engag 1�g In '' politi�al act�vities '', (see below); the expe11djtu.re of f. unds of any organiza pt1r1)oses ( �.1qp! 1f��·i tJpc��?!1�er1n� may elling disclosure e.g. comp be r e gulated by . · .PfJ?JUJ�-<�ne9p1n&,,.R�. In:iposing lin1its on the total an1ount sp�nt or by prohibiting s��tq�n ! �JU,PiS f9f:;nPS�w� ure - SllCh as direct co11tributio11s of money to particular E�n:,q�9.c . ½;s)..1, qR�tf�.1?1e1�!,�;.11nay seek to regt1late t.he financial dealings of the officers :rr9 e. ,s� . �9�a;y,\9p1 ;!9, ...1 eR,s%� ;·\l1eir_ fis�al ''honesty''; governments may regu.Iate the P.l08��\1:�1-!?r, [�!lp��g 9X1 a1�11?i��B91zat.Jon to conduct its business, e .g. to en.sure that

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i!B, �Y:�rf\¥11� �) f,;ljlffS._�\9��i?t. i f?.�\�1dual member's views. Sp ecial limitations may � Imposed �� t1 1e organ1zat1onal rights of civil servants - on the theory that som e

krn?s �f activity e.g. electioneering or trade union activity is inconsistent with the �\Rljg a.t .\�ps A :of<�1,a-,nu �se an\1t. \,\. �\,'.' .\\. 1"/, . .....,, 1p .1111,., 'f;1 .b''1lic '111,:1�rv'l\ � These, o f course,, �B� of'l�J!,ue��ti e f :rJ 11 If an enf�rp��Rl� ,;£�:Pi��i��tiRnaJ ·1rlght: to organize associations exists at all, · :. ·- ·y· p articular then1 o. nce ag 1 - th I�g li f 0 sis analy tlig. �-itt i6 ,,t R'' ,:,,j�-i�; �'1}� ..-�f-�� _ m l1m1tat1on will tu on u1ar int:rest "Wliicn· cl'.-pitJttibulat"·:gove rnmental restricti se eks ·10 protect on and.t'the ,, proporti'onaii - c-1tJt11. · L e me?S 1 · ,}i-h,' ..3 1'·;0: lit_Sed to se cure th at inte rest. - -· --.- -... -· . -__ 1

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for Org Purposes of Aclvocacy irz arz Ai,t/1 a11iz e to Rigl zt The · ·son ( co,npari ��·_i ''One Party'' State .

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esidential Decree No. 11 of 1965. Pr r · ba nzi Za From cited tl1e as be Afro-Shirazi Party Decree, 1965 . may e Decre This I. red to be the_ so]e political party ar1d 2. The Afro-Sh�az� Party i� 11ereby �ecla the supr eme a�thor1ty 1n Zan�1b�r. It \\1111 re1)rese11t tl1e 111terests of all w orl(ing people in Zanzibar. The Const1tt1tio_11 and R_t1les of the Party �11d a�y ame11dme11ts that might be made tl1ereto from time to t1n1e shall be J)t1bl1sl1ed 111 the Gazette . ,., 3. (1) There will be the foll owing Departn1ents of tl1e Party:':,' (a) The Army Department. (b) T h e Police Department. (c) The Se curity Department. (d) The Youths' Department. (e) The Workers' Department. (f) The Women's Departme11t. I (g) The Peasants' Department.

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Heads of Departments mentioned in st1bsection (I) s11,111 l)e appoi11ted by the President after consultation with the Revolt1tionary Cot111cil. (2)

4. Any person who manages or assists in the ma11ageme11t of an u11lav.1 ft1l party is guilty of a felony and is liable on convictio11 to i1npriso11n1e11t for a ter111 of seven yea.rs.

5. Any person who (a) is a member of an unlawful party; or (b) knowingly allows a meeting of a11 unlawful J)arty or of members of a11 unlaw�ul party to be held in any house, building or place belongi11g to, �r �ccup1ed by him or over which h e has control is gt1ilty of a felo11y and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of three years. 6· (I_) The Union of tbe First Sched s mentioned in Part I and the Societies mentioned in Part II commencement ule shall be dissolved within a period of one month from the of this Decree. ( ) Upon dissol or Society shall be ion n U11 utio led edu the sch ds ry fun eve of � to the gene Paid in ral funds of t h e Party. (3) :1f any scheduled n c� \Vith rda acco i11 d olve diss be Union or Society fails to this ct1o n as g actin the n perso _ unio every n ffi and , or of society every o cer there an o:�er , on ther tin� the eof aud e offe11c or an rpo u p· of guilty rting so to act shall be or 80 ety and ding excee not each fine a o t � such n ictio conv person shall b e 'liable on five undred sb.illings. the :i"ui!� ! resi?ent may a! any time app ve the establishment of any society �� n 0bJects of which are non-polit1cal.

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AL ON TI U I'f LAW ST ON C AN PI IO TH E OF K SOURCEBOO

8. 111 this Decree r 11 de io ed ct un ov se pr ap ty 7; cie so 1 1y a ''Party'' 1s a1 111 '' ty cie so d ve ''ap_pro � . 111ea.11s the Afro-Sh11·az1 Party; d s an tie cie ion so un o nti tl1e me s an 1ne ned in y'' iet soc or 1 io1 lltl cl tlle ed l ''scl the First Sc.l1edt1le; n tio iza an or org or rty pa al y iet liti soc p y a11 in s a11 1ne '' i·ty pa � tll wf � ''tlnla _ za11zibai· otl1er tha11 the Afro-Sh1raz1 Party or an approved society. are eby le her du che repealed and on Sec the in � � ed on 11ti n1e es ci·e De 9. The ed eal e es rep cre t of De 1s 101 v1s ( p1·o the er oth ?, der 11n red iste 1·eg iety soc 01ion 1111 a11y . . . th wi rth fo d lve so dis are ty) cie so or ion 1111 led 11 ecl tha11 a sch FIRST SCHEDULE PART I I. The Federatio11 of Revol11tio11ary Trade U11ions. 2. The Zanzibar a11d Pemba Central, Municipal and Local Government Wo1·ke1·s Union. 3. The Commercial Transpo1·t and Allied Workers Union. 4. The Resta11rant, Hot1sehold and Allied Workers Union. 5. Tl1e Seafare1·s, Port and Allied Workers Union. PART II 1. Tl1e Afro-Shirazi Yot1th Leag11e. 2. The Afro-Shirazi W01nen's Organiza·tion. SECOND SCHEDULE

The Trade Unio11s Decree (Cap. 176). The Societies Decree, 1963 (No. 20 of 1963)

The Zanzibar revolutiona ry governn1e11t abolisl1ed Zanzibar's written constitution upon seizure of power in 1964. What ha. ppened to the rigl1t to organize associations for the purpose of advocacy t111der tl1e above Decree?

Ethiopia11 Legislation: The Rigl1t to Organize Labour Unions . . From The Labou1· Relatio11s P1·oclan1atio11 No. 210 of 1963, Negarit Gazeta 23rd Yr. No. 3.

Th�s legis� ation allows en11)loyee� to orgaruze ''labour t1nions'' (in and y-w ide com pan clu din g _ t�ade-'Y1de 11n1ons a1:1d nation al co11federations of tmions). Procedt1res are established fqr the r e gistration �f each un1011 an� for tl1e conduct of collective employers an d ba rga 1m ini ion ng bet s we en _ and f?r tl1 e regulat1011 of this activity by the Minister � ou r La b the of Community Development an d _ Relations Board. Union s and employers L1ave a duty to bargain and to abstain from various defined _ ''unfair labo11r I? ractic _ es' '. Pr_ �visions dealing with th.e right to organize unions an d the .scop e_ of · ,. allowable organ1zat1onal act1v1ty are set fort h below: · ·�

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Article 210. - Rights of Association , (a) ETI?ployers TI?-ay create and join employ : e� oy � e:m pl an er d s' as so cia tio . ns . m�y establish and JOI labour 11 nions. th : by er Sa ed id � or ga re ni gi za st tio w ns he , n Minister, may engage In all lawful a _ · . �"'---=-�i ctivities. ..?

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1!-lay belong to 1nor� tl1a11 011e (1) employers' employee or_ r ploye e (b) No m . t' n or labou r 1101011, respectively, at the san1e t1n1e. assoc1a 10 may be created in an e�1terprise en11)!oyi11g Ies_s _tI1 an fifty union � Iabo u No (c) ed, h?wever, the employees o� st1�l1 �11terpr1ses may Jo111 ge,1eral provid s; erson (SO) 1orkers e11gaged 111 t1n1011 of \.\ a [e.g. s. s11111lar trades]. union Iaboir (d) The Minister may, in exceptional circt1111sta11ces, ,vaive tl1e provjsio115 of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Article 20. Article 21. - Registratio11

(a) Every employers' association a11d labot1r t111io11 sl1all, pro111ptly tipon its creation, file with the Ministry tl1e followi11g, all dt1ly certified by a se11ior official of the organization: [various procedt1ral details omitted].... (d) If the Minister ref11ses to register tl1e organiza.tio11, 11e shall 11otify tl1e organization of this fact and shall give his reaso11s theref or. (e) If the Minister i�ails to take a11y actio11 witl1 respect to any app.licatio11 for regjstration \Vithin thirty (30) days followi11g the date of tl1e sL1bmissio11 of tl1e doc11ments set forth in paragraph (a) of tl1is Article 21, said orga11izatio11 sl1ail be deemed registered. Article 22. - Scope of Activity of Organizatio11

(a) Employers' associations and labour· t1nio11s shall l1ave as their pt1rpose the regulation of labour conditions and activities covered l1ereby, as vvell as tl1e stticl)', protection and development of the eco1101nic, social a11d 111oral i11terests of their members. (b) Su�h organizations shall, in particular, 11egotiate freely a11d volt111tarily 00 �atters 1n the field of labour conditio11s \.Vitl1 a view to achieving i11creased eco nomic and social progress. (c) Employers' associations and labo11r t111io11s shall 11ot p11rs11e political aims or engage in any political activity whatsoever. (d mployers ' associations and labo11r u11io11s shall be required to settle � 1abour)disp utes by peacef11l means ,vbenever possible. Said orga11izations shall _be o ra_ged to collect�ve ?f !?art l nt�� esse �e enga a11 in as 1 tio1 ry cilia 1nta con vol1 ��g�·rung, and to 1ncl11de a requireinent of voluntary co11c1l1at1on 111 collective agreements· to whi ch th ey are parties. e Employe s t mi s11b to ht rig the ve l1a ll sha a s oci tions and labour union an y atour _ r ' ass dispute or any case of unfair labour practice to the Board. From Fas·11 N · · · · · · (LLB '' ia a iop h Eth um 111 11 t10 ree Ac ·'F eech and Political Sp . · Se nior Paper, unpubl . ished, P..rchives, H.S.I.U. Faculty of La.w, 196?)·

The author 15 ·. co.mm entmg on Article 22(c) above.

· on s a B y its very n t re t i Jat oc ass · ) · rs' ye plo em an a a u as ( ll r we ou lab un io n as Politic I orga et tll ge to ne bi 1 � � co ho � n. rs io at ke � or w It is created b y a grot1p of for th! prot ection of their various interests and for imJ)rov1ng tl1e1r standard of

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living. If the law allows them as an _ orga�d !p"?UP to work for the upkeep of their interests, it is allowi11g them to voice their op 1°:1ons and act upon them to achieve their goals. Needless to say, they must act w1th1n the law. ity is tiv al a ac ic re lit ffe po di ir tb nt of nt te ex d an d an re tu na � e th g 1 1in i m er et D l, e ca th m lo te t on en y xt ar e or n ai rt ce a n to co s nd pe de at th m le � ob pr ilt ct . ffi di ry ve o th e h au , ks ay m m n th t1o , am cl iti P e leg Th � y. et ci so � e � th in �� g lin ai _ ev _ pr ditions es w 1t1 1ch t1v d ch ac su an m an a al 1c l1t po or � e th to it lim � a t ! se to pt m te at ely at m e y ag 1 en to an t no 1s c 1t iti ol at ''p th y sa al to t Bu � � . in ge ga en ld ou sh n tio ganiza ic _ c1 l om so a on d e ec th c lo liti ve po de d al an ? t ec ot pr t ye d an � p er ev so at wh ! '' ity tiv ac es in t1v e Jec ma Th ob . ry of cto di ra nt the co be to s em se s er mb n1e its of interests e ov pr d e to im an th ts es ter in working s' er mb me e th rd ua feg sa to e ar labour unio11 es tiv n jec ca be ob ese Th ed es. iev liv ach eir th of ns itio nd co ral 11e ge tl1e d a11 ns conditio . nt me ge d na an ma r ou lab n ee tw be ns tio tia go ne t ec dir by only in part 1v1embers of a labot1r union 1nay want the opportunity to learn some skill, T en. ir ldr the i and ch es elv ms hese the for ies ilit fac al ion cat edu a11d 1ing 1 i tra better are not matters for t11e employer only bt1t for the Government as well. Members want medical treatment available to them when they are ill, reason.able housing accomodations a11d transport facilities from hom e to work; are these the employer. 's or the Government's respo11sibility? These fe\V examples indicate that in atte1npting to improve the conditions of its men1be1·s' lives; th.at is, in protecting and improving the economic, social and moral interests of its 1nembers a u11ion will inevitably engage in political activity. The labou1· t1nio11 move111e11t does not exist simply to bargain collectivelly, !o collect sufficient d.ues and. to strike when necessary. The labour movement today 1s a sophist!c�ted i11s!itt1tion Vt itl1. a defi11ite n1ission to educate every member to . a ft1ll a11� ,11v1d consc1ous11ess of his rights as a human being in every sphere of life. _ ,, The ult1ma!e �deal of l1t1man concern, [the] welfare a11d the recognition of the statt1s a11d d1gn1ty of Man'' can be said ·to be t11e aim the labour 11nion movement has set f�r �ts _achievement. It does therefore not only implement democracy, so to say, w� th111 the worJ(shop and tb1·o·t1gl1 collective bargaining but also b)1 means of _e�tens1ve ed11cational activities it seeks to free the worker' fron1 the shackles from f illiteracy, poor education and social vision. It far lack of broad may not be � the_ trtlth to s�y that the lab ?ur n1oveme11t is perhaps, apart from the free school system, o11e of tl1e greatest 1nstrt1n1e11ts for tl1e edt1cation. of the mass of people known to the modern world.

In vie':¥ :r t}ie above _how 111�gl1t Article 22(c) be amended? Sh.ould employe r groups enjoy 111e same rig ts to engage 1n ''political ltctivities'' as unions?

Elhi0Pian Legislation: The Right to Organize Associations "or Social and Political _ J• Purposes .

From Civil Code of Ethiopia

. r · · The Civil Code (Title III' Ch apt er 2) . . ' · two of ? . deals in a systematic way with assoc1a t1ons � · . more persons, formed ''wi· t� a view . to obta1nmg fits pro of g a sha resu rin lt oth er than· the · securing or · ·1ous association (Art · 404) · R elig · t with l s' trade unions, tr�de or business cooperative s are to be dea . .- ent 0f . �Y other laws. The Code r d�� or he forn1�t1on of� �ssoci� tion tru:ough th:e ag� �, its �ounders .in a ' 'memoian�� 0_ . � , hts g r sta '11.1 t t u i �ut1es of the ''associa tes'' ''d .re·�ors�� ,, ene es of _ass''oc1at1on; 1t prescr1b_ es various e a s�ta ,_ - - -� s , .� ral meet�g , and the rights and duties of th eta t1on as a legal entity. The fo·ll� � tio. n � wm g asso pro visi ons are particularly relevant to the control of b y the governmen t. ., --:

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Art. 462. - 4. Administrative decision. · sha be ll dis sol nved by the offi ce of ass oci (I) An. associatio · a t· 1 101 s w 11ere its . .. object or activities are unlawful or contrary to morality. (2) An appe al from . such decision ma y .be . made to tl1 e Mitlistry of I nter1or by any of th. e d1rec tors o f the as. so. c1at1on witl1i 11 011e m011tli af·L·e r I·t h as been made k11own to the assoc1at1on. (3) The court_ �ay, pendi�g the decisi?n 011 the appeal, st,1y the execLition of the dec1s1on d1ssolv1ng the association. Art. 468. - Office of associatio11s. (I) �n office �f ass�ciations shall be establisl1ed in tl1 e capital of etlcl1 provi11ce 1n connection wrth the gover11 orate of sucl1 province. (2) The office shall exercise supervisio11 over all associations ,1cti11 g vvithiri the province. •

Art. 469. - Deposit of stati1tes. The office of associations shall call upon the founders or tl1e perso1 1s 111 anagi11 g associations, where appropriate, to draw up a11d to de1Josit statt1tes for the association. Art. 470. - Register of declared associatio11s. {I) The office of associatio11s shall keep i11 alpl1abetical orcler a register of the associations established in the provi11ce a11d ,vhich l1ave been cleclared to it. (2) The directors of an association n1ay appeal to the court agcli11st a. ref11sal of registration which is made to tl1em by the office of associations.

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Art. 472. - File of tf1e associatio11. The file of each associatfon entered in the register shall co11tai11: {a) the name of the association togetl1er \Vith its progressive nu111 ber; and {b) the statutes of the association, and the amendments made to st1ch statutes, together with the date of such statt1tes or amendments; a11d {c) the name of the directors of tl1e association, or of tl1e persons en1 1Jo,vered to represent it; and {d) an indication of the secondary residences wl1ich the associatio11 may have; and (e) the decision taken to dissolve the association and the names of the liquid ators, where appropriate. Art. 473. - General meetings. - J. Convocatio11. (I) The office of associations shall be informed in due tin1e whe11 ever a gei1eral meeting of an associatio·n is held. . {l) It may be represented by an observer at such general meeting. . . (3) It may prescribe any measure it thinks fit to ensure tl1e good ftiiic_tioning of the general meeting as regards in particular the 1nanner and _ times of convocation, the order of the day an d the holding of tl1e n1eeting.

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A1·t. 474. - 2. Decisions. The office of associatio1 1s shall be i 1 1forme�. withi11 the moo.th foll�wi.ng the J1olding of the ge1 1e1·al meeting of all th� �ec1s1 ons taken by such meeting which are to be entered in the file of the assoc1at1on kept by the office.

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Art. 478. - Balance s/1.eet. ce o the offi of ar ye ery associations ev ate nic nu m1 co ! ll sl1a 1 io1 iat (I) The assoc . g tin ee l m ra ne ge e th by d ve ro Jp a t its balance sl1ee 1 (2) The Mi1 1istry of I 11terior may prescribe such rules as it thinks fit with a s e . uln f h o_ thf suc the tru d an balance ion tat sen pre od go a ng t1ri e11s to ,v vie sheet.

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Excerpts fron1 Associations Registration Regulations, Legal Notice No. 321 of 1966, Negarit Gazeta, 26th Year No. I

(5) Applicatio11 f01· Registratio11. applicatio11 f 01· tl1e registration of an association shall be submitted to the Office i11 five (5) copies.... accompanied by five (5) copies of a l\.1emo ra11dt1m of Association a11d by the fee specified.... (2) St1ch application shall bear the names of not fewer than. five (5) founding members of the associatio11.... (3) S11ch a1Jplicatio11 shall co11tain or be accompanied by the following: (a.) the 11a111es, 11ationalities, addresses and occt1pations of the founders; (b) two (2) pass1Jort size head a11d shoulder photograpb.s of ea,ch of the fou11ders; (c) a brief biography of each of the founders indicating his place of birth, place of 1·eside1 1ce, a11d partict1lars as to his education and previous en1ployn1e11t; ai1d (d) t�e 11a1nes, aclclresses and 1 1atio11 aJities of an), ad visors, age11ts or adrni11 1 strators to be e111ployed. b)' tl1e association. .

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, contain shall m A M ora ndt1n1 o. f Association and shall be p 1 · e pared in Amh. a ric � . _ .1 'Vl 1tl1 ot1t l11n1tat1011, the followi 11 g: . (1) the 11a1 ne of tl1.e associatio11 · (2) tl1e location of tl1e l1ead office and a .11y b 1 ·a11cl1 offices of the association; (3) the pt1rpose of the associatio11; 1 (4) tl1e qt1.alificatio11 s :for 1nembe1·ship i11 tl1e asso ciation including an·y fees ' and dt1es payable b y n1e111bers; (5) a desci·i�tio1 1 of the uniforms, badges, insigni .. tifi a or other means of iden _ ! catioi�s,. if any, to be carried or wor11 by the � member. s of the offi an ce d rs ass�c1 a�1011; , _ . � ( 6) the 1111tial capital of tl1e association, if any, and the manner of its acquisition; . ·1 (7) the manner ?f lection or appoin : , nt s ag e tm � en an t d of th offi e _ ce di _ rs re _ ·. ct o. r s ' of the assoc1at1on · -..-=..:.:1� '

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be s to app oin d�e _ t �d ctor to of t11e board o_f ma11agerneil t, tlle ber num the duration of appointment a11d the pa1t1ct1lar powers ass1g11ed to tJ 1e board of managen1ent; the period for which the associatio11 is to be establ isl1ed; the at1ditors of the �ssociatio1 1 or specificatio11s as to tl 1e 1na1111 er of appoint ment of such auditors; and the manner i11 \Vl 1ich tl1e association sl1 all prepare a11cl : publish its reJJorts .

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�?: : (8) Grants of Appl ication. (1) The Office may deny a11 y application where it deter1ni1 1es followi 11g a1Jpro priate investigatio11 that: articulars conta.ined in tl1e applicatio11 or i 11 tl1e acco111pa11yi 11 g p the a) ( Nlen1orandt1m of Associatio11 are false or 111isl ea.di11 g i11 a11y 111aterial 1 I aspect; (b) the pt1rpose of the i11tended associatio11 are t1nla\,1ft11 or i111n1oral; or :il..',' (c) the purpose of the intended associatio11 are agai11st 11atio11al l111ity or ,. interest; provided however, tl1at any Sl1cl1 cle11ial sl1all lJe made i11 writing a.nd shall specifically state the reasons for st1cl1 de11ial a11d r ., -. a ny facts reveal ed in the col1rse of a1 1y st1 cl 1 i1 1vestigatio11 \-Vl1icl1 are relevant to such de11 jal . .... (14) Supervision of Management of Associatio11s. '' (2) The Office may, 11pon req11 est by a1 1y te11 (I 0) 1 11e111bers or s11 cl1 s11 1aller number as is eq11al to not less than te11 per ce11t (I 0%) of tI1e n1e111bers of tl1e association conduct a11 i11vestigatio11 into tl1e n1a11agen1e11t of the affairs of any association. Upon com1Jletion of s11 cl1 i11vestigatio1 1, tl1e Office 1 11ay r upo n finding of fact that any of the officers, directors, a dmi11istrators or a� visors of such associatio1 1 bas fail ed properly to carry 011t his oblig�ti? 11s \VItb respect thereto as stated by Jaw or in the Men1orand11m of Assoc1at1011 or Statutes of the associatio11 order the ren1 oval fron1 office of a1 1y of Slich persons [or] .... the s11 spe11sio;1 of any of st1ch persons f ro111 offi�e pe11diug tbe completion of any crimi11 al prosec11tio11 wl1ich n1 ay be 11_ 1st!t11ted as a result o� such investigation or to whicl1 sl1ch _perso1 1 may be s11bJect for ail)' reason 1n connection witl1 l1is activities i 11 Sl1ch office. (l5) Dissol o · ut1'· ·n of Ass oc1·at1ons. · to :� association shall be s11bject to dissolt1tio1 1 by order of tl1e Office JJUrs� air� ticle 462 of the Code in the event of tl1e occ11rence of a1 1y of the follo,ving · (J) the asso �iation wilf11l ly undertakes activities l111reiated to and 11ot in fu: tl �er ance of the purpo Oil iatI soc As of m 1du ra1 mo Me or the Statu tes ses tl1ereof as set fortl1 i11 the of the association; ( 2) h e ass I ?ciation fails to comply with any requirement of the law _or of theie e� lat1ons e to ed u1r req n atio orm inf tin rela g to notices, reports or . . to o vicied by associations or with Iawft1l orders of tl1e Office relating : e cooduct of the activities of the associatio11; or

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be en organized or is s ha n tio cia so as e th at th e c bei ng · · . (3) 1·t a PPears to the Offi · e s th e or os rp oc s _ pu as l · a t1o or 1a m 1m n or or any l fu aw nl u _ r fo on d carrie e b een ?onv1�ted by a co v ?a e of re th rs be m e. � e tl1 of n mpesubstarltial portio e ct1on with the acti nn co 1n or of t ou ng 1s1 ar e m cri vities y an tent colirt of of tl1e association; provided liowever, that any such order for the dissolution of an association shall be n1ade in writi11g and shall state the facts found by the Offic.e and reasons based 011 st1ch facts 011 whlcl1 such orde r is bas e d. Art. 479. - Ministry of Interior. (1) The Ivlinistry of I11terior may prescribe, within the framework of the exist i 11g Ia,vs, a11y other measure it thinks fit with a vie w to placing the offices of associations in a position to exercise an efficient control on the associa tio11s. (2) Such measures n1ay differ according to the object, the importance and the du1·atio11 of the association. (3) Partic11lar meast1res may also be prescribed for the associations which l1ave tl1eir head otlice in a foreign country, or which carry on an activity i11 a foreign countr)' of the �ajority of whose m embers ar e foreigners, or ,,,hich l1ave a bofl..rd of n1anagement in which on e or more members are foreigners. Art. 480. - C1·in1inal sanctio12s. - I. Dec/aratio,is to tl1e office.

The pu11ishments laid do,vn in the Penal Code shall apply where: (a) the founders of an association have not deposited the statutes thereof at the office of associations within the period provided by the law; or (b) the di1·ecto1·s of a11 association ha.ve contravened the provisions of this Chapter relati11g to tl1e declarations to be made to or documents to be deposited in the office of a.ssociatio11s.

Art. 482. - 3. A...'>sociation declarec:l illegal. (I) The _directors of an associatio11 dissolved by the office of associations who co11�1 nue to ca1·:y on a11 �ctivity in their said capacity shall be lia ble to tbe pt111.1sl1n1e11ts laid dow11 111 th e Pe 11al Code . (2) TI1� !�en1.be��s of an association who have continued to take part iD: its activities_ being aware of its illegal character shall be liable to the purush ments laid dow11 in the Penal Code. Fro� Pe11al Code of Ethiopia .ise and control Art. 746. - Vi0 Iat101 · 1 oif regulations regarding orga nization, exerc of trades and professions. . .ode, .con- · (1) Whosoever, apart from the cases punishable under the Penal C 00 tra�enes the rules or regulatio a l ns egarding the licensing, q,u a ifi c 1l:r . regi stration, exercis e or cont rol o f commercial and industrial u nder taking'

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Art. 758. - Failure to 1\1ake Co111pi1/sorJJ Official State111 e, 1 ts or E,ztries. (I) w·hosoever, a �art fro �1 . tpe cas �s punis�1 able u11der tl1_e Penal Code (Art. 428) or_ a special prov1s1on, 0 �1ts or fails to make, w1tl1 in the time limits prescribed by la,:v or. reg11la �1 ons, an official stateme 1 1t or entry of a1 1y nature whatsoever ,vh1ch l1e 1s bot1nd to 111ake, is punishable \Vith fine or arrest not exceeding fifteen days . (2) Nothing in this A:ticle sl1all affect the special JJrovisions deali 11 g with compulsory professional declaratio11s i1 1 l1 ea]tl1 matters (Art. 790).

HUMAN R.J .GHTS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVEL OPMENT

9Sl

porary or sea'sonal emp1oy1ne11 ts artisans· , professional persons, tem · · o r · ' ions a assoc I an · t d na soc1et1es of any kind, profess1o _ ! is punishable with fine or arrest. g in tl1is Article shall aft�ect tl1e special pro (2) Nothin · visions 1·mpos1· 11g part1c · ·· . u ar 1 · on th e exercise of profess1011s st1cl1 as the ban ons cond1t1 , k 1· 11 g, commerc1a · · · 1 · ' mar1 t1me or mea·1ca I pro fess1ons.

A Note on Orga11izatio11s Desig11ecl to Take Part

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I. Obviously political parties are a partict1lar ki 1 1d o.f '' organizatio11' ', a11d their existe11ce - if they are to exist - poses a 11 t 1mber of special, very diflict1 lt problems. The theory, nah1re and operatio11 of ''parties'' in a competiti,;e, multi party political system a11d the problems of importing the co11ce1Jts of co1npetitive parties as developed in Britain, western Et1ro1Je or tl1e U.S.A. are disct1ssed in Chapt er VII, pages 512-514; 518-522; 606-611. See also Chapter I, pages 50-52; Chapter IV, pages 427-435. The tl1eory of the ''011e-party1 system'', as it has been developed in Tanza11ia under the leadership of Preside 1 1t Nyerere, is set OLit 011 pages 254-255, 257-258. See also pages 275-278. Con1pare the Za11zibar ''one-party'' approach, set out si1pra this sectio11. Tl1e above material i11dicates tl1at many very significant issues relative to a theory and co11stitutio11 al n1odel of political develop ment may have to be resolved before one can 11ndertake systematic analysis of constitutional development of the rigl1t to organize l)olitical parties as instruments for prom oting popular control over the elected organs of government. 2. Assim1ing a multi-party system, identify activities of parties wllich m _ay ha�e to be regulated, and consider what for m the regt1lation should ta�e. Assi,n1 zng a single party, is there a need to place the party 1111 der la,v? what topics should be covered in the 1aw? 3_ _. Consider the present state of the Jaw in Ethiopia �ith_ respect to the right of c1t12en� to organize groups designed to i11flue1 1ce the thi�l<1ng of the electorate _ and_ candidates for Parliament and those who \Vin tl1e elections. \Yhat are t�e 1;111ped1ments in existing law to the organization of a .nationwide or reg1ona� assoc1at1on ( as that term vern go 1s 1ot var te is defined in the Civil Code ) whicJ1 would advoca _ ment al meas ures and seek to ''educate'' the public on the 1;1ecess1ty of these measures, ders of lea aD d thereby influen the and nt me rlia Pa of s ion act ce elections and the and :a government? (Cf. th.e sup 3, n tio Sec in sed cus dis p shi sor ms of cen ble pro im�ose the P�oblems of y ma s law ; se tl1e � ow bel se c11s dis g holdin public assemblies right restrain ts on org tl1e on s use foc ve abo n stio que the tio but a..niza ivit act nal y · ' to form the assoc1at1. 00 . 1n the first place ) .

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SOURCEBOOK OF E·rmoPJAN ·CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The Right to Assemble and Demonstrate - The Problems of Mass Protest Fron1 Martin L11the r King, ''Le tte r from Birmingham Jail'' (in King, Why We Can't rflait (1964) pages 77-100). My Dear Fellow Cle1·gyme11 : While co11fined here in tl1e Birmingham city jail, · I_ came across your recent staten1e1 1t calli1 1g my present activitie s '' u1 1wise and untimely." ....I am in Bi1·n1ingham beca11se injustice is he re._ Just as the_ prophets of the eighth centu1·y B.C. left their village s a11d carrie d _ their ''thus saith the Lord'' far beyond the bo1111daries of their home tow1 1s, and Just . as the Apostle Paul left his village of Tarsu s and car1·ied the gospel o f Jesus Chr1st to the far corners of the Greco-Roman world, so a1n I comp elled to carry the gosp el o f freedo m beyond n1y ow11 l101ne tow11. Like Paul, I must constantly r e spond to the Macedonian call for aid. Y011 deplo1·e the demonstrations talcing place in Bir1ningham. But your state n1e11t, I a1n sorry to say, fails to e xpress a sin1 ila1· concern for the conditions t hat brought abo11t tl1e den1onstratio11s. I am sure that n one of you w ould want to rest co11tent with the superficial l<ind of social analysis that de als merely with effects and does not grapple with 1111derlyi11g cat1se s. There ca1 1 be 110 ga.i11sayi11g the fact that ra cial injustic e engulfs this conununity. Birmingl1a1n is p1�obably the most thorot1gh1y segre g ate d city in the United States. Its ugly reco1·d of brutality is widely k 11ow11 ....... Y 011 may well aslc: ''Wl1y direct actio11? Why sit-ins, march es and so fortl1? Isn't 11egotiatio11 a better l)ath?'' Yot1 are q11ite right in calling f or negotiation. In deed, tl1is is the v ery p11r1)ose of direct action. No11violent direct action seek.s to create st1ch a c1·isis and foster s11ch a tensio11 that a con1mu1 1.ity which has cons tantly refused to negotiate is fo1·ced to co11fro11t the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can 110 lo1 1ger be ignored. MJ, citi11g the creatio11 o f tension as pan of tl1e wo1·k of the_ nonviole11t-1·esiste1· n1ay sot111d rather shocki11g. B u t I must con.fess that I a1n ?ot afraid of the w o1·d ''te.11sio11''. I hav e earnestly opp osed violent tension , b11t there 1s a type of c.011. str11ctiv e, 11011violent t.e11sion ,vhich is necessary for growth. ! us� � s Socrates fe!t that it was 11ecessa1 ·y to create a tension in tl1e mind so that 1nd1v 1d11als co11ld 1·1 se f1·0111 the bo11dage of n1ytl1s a11d 11alf-truths to the un.fettered r:a1in of cre�tive analysis a11cl o·bjective apprais al, so n1 ust we see tl1e need for non violent gadflies to creat� tl �e kind of tension in society that \vill help men tise fr?m the dark depths of preJud1ce and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherl1ood. The Pt1rpos� of 0 111· direct-actio11 progran1 is to cre ate a situation so crisis pack�d that It will i11ev ita?l ope11 the door to negotiation. I therefore concur with Y_ Y011 1n. your call_ for 11egot1at1011. Too long has 011r b eloved So 11thland bee n bogg ed down in a tragic effort to live in 1nonologue rather than dialog ue.

�artin Lu�her Ki?g's l e t ter is in re ply to th ose who d eplored his attempts, in 1963, to organize conti us vanous land s of d_emonstratio�s ("parades ", "sit-ins", "picketing") in the city � Birm;� t t d e p r vat ons e r 1g ht_s of Negroes in t hat city. King's critics were cler� tl1 <_)f i i � f:J tf g � me n w o p 0 g e unr est. and violence w h1c this J{jn ce. p�o d . _ s l1 tra did u teg y threatened and pioneered, in 1963' � deve l_ o prng th e st · ra t egy of n on-viol e nt m a ss prot est and thus 1n1ti.ated a n�w . ' era .of organized ' m a.ss action o n th e part of Ame rican N eg ro es.

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953

L_iberty a11cl Represe11tative Gover111ne,1 t (tvfcCal On M ill , s. J. lunl ed. 1946), from pages 120-1 21 . acc eptation Order 111ea11s Obediet1ce. A govern ow est nar r its In Jne11t 1s · · sa 1 ·d · if·_it _sl1cceeds In gett111g ·itself ?beyecl. Bt1t tl1ere are difef re11t ord er e serv pre deg to ree s not eve�y �e�ree th�t 1s con1111e11clable. o, 1Iy a11 tlrli 1s 1t and , ienc e obe? nitigated of . despo tism demands . that the_ 1nd1v1d11al c1t1ze11 sh�Il_ obey 1111coilditioilally every mandate of persons In au�l1or1ty._ We m11st_ at least l1rn1t the defii1ition to stich man dates as are ge11eral and 1ss11ed _111 !he deliberate for n1 of laws. Order, tllus tinder ses, dol1bt!ess, �n 111d1spe11sable attribt1te of governme11t. Those \Vli o expr es stood , �� oiJ'� are unable to ma�� their _or�1nances obey�d, ca11not be said to govern. But tllotigJ1 /�,< a neces sary cond1t1on, this 1s not the obJect of gover111ne11t. TI1 at it sli otild make ·i; 1;; itself o beyed is requisit:, in _order that it rnay accomplish some other ptrriJose. We still to seek ,vhat 1s this otl1er purpose. are ½-i In a sense somewhat more enlarged, Order n1ea11s the preservatio11 of peace by the cessation of private violence. Order is said to exist \vhere the people of tl1e a ceased general rule, as to prosecute tl1 eir quarrels by private force, have, country I":'; '·� the habit of referring the decision of their dis1Jutes and tl1e redress and acquired I j't of their injuries to the public autl1orities. Bt1t in this larger use of the tern1, as \Veil as in the former narrow one, Order expresses rather one of tl1e co11ditio11s of go,1er11ment, tha.n either its purpose or tl1e criterio11 of its excellence. For tl1e r1abit 111ay be well established of submitting to the gover11me11t, a11d referri11g all dis 1Juted matters to its authority, and yet the mat111er i11 wl1ich tl1e gover11ment cJeals vvith those disputed matters, a11d with the otl1er thi11gs abo11t ,vhicl1 it co11cer11s itself, may differ by the whole interval which divides the best fron1 tl1e Vi1orst IJossible. ! '.1

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Fr om Bayley, ·'The Pedagogy of De1nocraC)': Coercive Ptiblic Protest in Inclia'' American Political Scie11ce Review, Vol. 56, IJages 663-673 ( 1963). Throughout the 11istory of India11 politics i11 tl1 e 20tl1 Ce11tt1ry r\111s a ct1rious and disturbing thread. Both before and after tl1e acl1ieven1e11t of 1ndepende11ce in 1947, large segments of the Jndia11 pop·ulace felt that the ins.titL1tional i_neans of redress for grievances, f rt1stratio11s a11d wro11gs-actual or fanc1ed-\vere 111ade quate. The Congress Government ha s bee11 treated to a11 allnost co11st�nt tattoo of dema nds supported by the sam e techiliques popularized dt1ri11g the �11depe11 de11ce , est arr �trugg!e, suc h as hungerof g rtin cou the ns, tio tra 11s mo de g strikes, black-fla impeding of public business, and violent riots. For the statesmen of contemporary Ii1dia the co11tinuatio11 of public protests a.atl agitations co nstitutes a unique pr ob lem . :··· Coercive public protest has three attributes: (l) it is �ggregative; (2) it_ is 1t 11 ra st n . . co Public ' as opp . a s se o p im it ) (3 d an · e, . osed to consp1rator1al o r cland est1n upon governm ent by its presence and actions. at interests and co11cer11s ar e aff ected by these ma11ifestations? �h �Jll�� h � Wern � a ov I p 11n l ? fe · cy � cra n1o de me of nt nc co erned with the strengthening u lerta e . e d u t 1 n a 111 1s � th of t es prot n co lic 1b pt ai str ve ci er ng co ni n d tio ar ac w to k l A� east six . and t y 1e x 11 a l ta n · e m 1 r1 . e v o g · r c o c1• l oselY connected reasons may be given action:

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First: coercive public protest i�poses an e�onot:?�c burden upo� the natio n. This cost is a conseqt1e11 ce of the phys1ca� de�t�uct1on v1s1te? upo� public an� private property, the loss of life and health to 1nd1v1duals, the d1s�upt1on of s�rv1ces, and the diversion of resotirces, time an� en�r�y from constructive economic programs to tlie essentially 11 eutral task of ma1nta1n1ng law an.d order.

e rnm en t is the preserva v o g y n a f o es ti u d l ta n e am d n fu Secoild: 011e of the n1ost ent, whatever its political m rn e v o g o N . er rd o d an w la f o s n io it d 11 co al im in m f o tioi1 e ed. If the gov er n n is th _ ee m t to y it il b a s it to e g n e ll form, can 011tlive a successful cha e its rules and regulat ions ' rc fo en d an e st t ro p c li b . u p t n ment is unable to contain viole eg it im ac y. l to im a cl s it , ce n te is ex r it may lose its j11stification fo ct in je ct of e f ob af s it g in s e d th e ce c su h c hi w st e ot pr lic 1b p1 T'hird: coercive l e.... Usually, y ru it or aj m om fr on ti ga ro e d a 1ts e1 es pr re decisions of government , ch s . su A it ity or es in m rik st d ve ie gr ag an of ol to e th 1 e1 e b s ha t coe1·cive public protes e majority of th ill e w th at th , e ly m na t, en m rn e v go tic c ra o at the basic premise of dem v ereig :n. If so is es tiv ta en es e pr r d te lec e h ug ro th 1d a1 ns tio lec e as expressed in free esentativ e integrity and efficacy pr e r e th d, ee c c su to en se is est ot pr lic . b coercive pu t. los be ll wi nt me rn ve go tic cra n1o de 1ile ,Nl rst e the of

Fot1rth: coercive public protest represents not only the introduction of a supplementary means for the s11 asion of governm ent, but a fu.ndamental threat to the rule of law. If laws can be disregarded, slo11ghed aside arbitrarily, the prospect of equality and impartiality befor e the law is destroyed, and the effica cy of consti tuted means of represe11tation and adjudication is impaired.

Fifth: as a result of the destn1ction oi- the rule of law and of the rule of the m�jority, � sort of Gresl1am's Law begins ·to affec t the na.ture of political responses. D1rec_t action and reco11rse to social violence:-either threatened or a.ctual-begin to dr1ve 011t tl1e orderly, constitutional responses de111anded in a democratic state. Eve1?' s��cess for di1·e?t actio� sets a preced e11t for its utilization by other groups a�d 1n�1v��11als. Coercive pt1bl1c protest, if allowed to go unrestrained, will be more widely IID1tated an? become an even greate1· rival to · t he. p1·ocesses of peaceful change through democratic gover11ment. er ord in e disciplin Sixth: democracy dema:nds a con e sid measure rable ial c of so _ o al _ r illeg are SllCCess�ully. C�erc1ve pllbl�c pr·?test ir1_volving forms· which . 0 en� re?rese�!s a brea�do:"11 of d1sc1pl1ne. It 1s bas ed upon. the destructive pr1 n ·· . tion solu · c1p 1e that certain ends JlIStify recou1·se to 1111democratic m ea11s of re . Democratic political tlieo1·y has always recognized tha t coercion and e ven • • v101 ence are sometimes vern ,f:' . J· 11 stifiai bl. e m eans ior go of e r s1st1ng the encroachments . me n t n th reser e of h�man rights. There are boundaries which no auth ority ca n b:��o � �o tra � �ce without p1·ovoking, justly, r pa the t on a vio e nt response � l of its o ;:se 0 0 te? ts. The cruc ial question � n and ted, deba j sly dles � � �� only by litic t e ' I� wh ere. are these �oundar1es to be drawn? Ar.e 11:1erd any principles which can guide policy -makers 1n the permissible use of organize social power? . . ce . In preserving law an d Order, _ he · an I ba a Gov t ernm en t of India is determining . ·. · between the ina1ien · able prerogati rn · � n e. c ves of the individual an d the legitim ate of the State· Th· ese are the stakes. · · . .•-�r

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a repressive policy is the heightenirig of the feeling of Jt res le probab � st The fir frl�strat1on a1:1ong the people. Underlying tliis stipposition is and cy oten of imp t s ?c1al protest acts like a safety-valve for tlie social h _ t thes1s o p hy_ � miliar the fa d1ss1pat1on of acct1 mulated disconterit. the ting permit m, syste The safety-valve hyp?thesis -: in eitl1er of its f ormt1lations - poiilts to the important fact that co �rc1ve public protest �ay l1ave social litility. Overt mass responses of anger �r d1saffect1on �ay be _ ft111ct1onal to tl1 e social system. Eliininate this mode of expression and tl1� society n11gl1t crack apart in otl1er even n1ore seriotrs ,vays. In the words of one Ind1an o�server: ''I11 India, agitation is 11 0t always bad; in fact, in _ a cot1 �try [st1ch] �s ot1rs 1� n1_ a y be da11gerous to limit popular urges in inter-election per1od[s] to strict const1tt1t1onal metl1ods of petition.''

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Another effect of strict co11trol of organized, illegal pt1blic protest is a deteriora tion of consensus. Democracy thrives on the feeling amo11g its people of joi 11 t parti cipation in the affairs of governn1ent; the feeli11g that gover11ment is a creature of the people; the f eeling that it is amenable to cha11 ge as a result of popt1lar, or mass, pressures. The Indian people, new to self-government, have habitt1ally tl1 ought of government as ''They." One of the tasks of tl1e Nel1rL1 Gover11n1 e11t has been, and ,vill continue to be, to convert the image of gover11111 e11t as son1etl1ing wl1icl1 happens to people into one of govern1ne11t as s0111 etliing in ,vliic11 IJeople can parti cipate. Every time, however, tl1at the Government restricts the area in vvl1 icl1 people may maneuver and determine actions for tl1emselves, it drives wedges of alie11atio11 between itself and the people. If the gover11 ment is to wi11 the trt1st of its people, it must appear to be sympathetic to tl1eir pleas.

A fourth possible result is the political advantage which may accrue to agita tional parties and groups vis-a-vis the governme11t. In a cou11try where tl1e n1eani11g of democracy is as yet largely 11nfixed in the p11blic mind and l1as not bee11 hallowed by years of reflexive experience, a policy of the gover11n1e1 1t desigi1ed t? establish rules, particularly rules for the expression of p11blic opi1uo11, can be too easily labelled as anti-democratic by the opposition.

. The fifth and most immediately serious conseqt1e11c� of a restric_tive policy 1s the damage which it inflicts t1pon the position and prestige of tl1e police and the l� w courts. The Indian police establishment must take the va11 in any a t�emp� to _ discipline the masses, hence it becomes the prin1ary target for abuse and v1l1ficat1on. opposition by tly sta on _ c d ne fan e is � e me a lic fl. po of ism the °: on tag ard an tow . pol��c! ans, both in and ou t of legislative bodies. There 1s a11 ax10� among these politicians �hat if violence occurs, it is the fault of police provocation. The police of India have become the chief wliipping boys for all ?isord7rs. They �an expect little cooperation from the people, and often �ot even a f �ir hearing of their case. The Indian i tate before .1� embarks hes to se cal1 ple am has ent nm Gover upon any policy wh ich might y. t1lit hos of den bur le iab rec app tlus nt me aug The �ttitude of the stibject equally s system jt1dicial mass the � of toward Indians to · deteriorati . on arly particu as Indians, a Many result repression. J of government in ru�al area s, continue to exhibit what Sir Percival Spears has called a , slot machine'' attitud e toward the c o u rt system. ry ma pri the Courts are not thought of as or tice jus l tia par im as the arbiters of lin e of defense y the r, the Ra nt. me ern gov against the encroachments of predatory

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L A N IO T LAW U IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E F O SOURCEBOOK

n l o d o n ti tr a a n it co lo p ex d f n o a sk ta th e th ey in t en m n er v o g h it w rs o t are coll abora . ts s o c l l a t a d e id o v a sl 1ot1ld be "' . lice force are corner� d o e � st u tr d an l ib t up rr � �o in An impartial co111·t system a11d lat.1on b y consent! which u g e r r o , n o ti la gu e r l a 1 c. so stoiies of the system of volunta1·y eo ple from police and e p th of t en m e g n ra st e e h T · . is tlle 11a1In1ark of democracy of re od tu m fu e e rn India. th r fo t n te r o p s ou in om an t en es jlldicial syste1118 w o ul d repr It should by now be clear that in desi¥n�ng p ol icies �or the regulation of coercive social protest, ,:vbether exacting or perm1ss1ve, the Ind1a1;1 G��er1?-ment m�st steer betvveen Scylla and Cl 1arybdis. There are grave dangers 1mpl1c1t 1n a too ngorous adl1erence to the let ter of the democratic blueprint, an. d also grave da.ngers in disregarding portio11s of it. EthioJJian Legislation Regi1lati11g the Rig/1t of Assembly

Fron1 Peacef11l Public Demonstratio11s Proclamation No. 243 of 1967, Negarit Gazeta 25th Year No. 6. 2. Definitio11s In this Proclamation, unless the context otherwise require: s: (I) ''Minister·'' and ''Minist1·y'' shall mean, r espectively, the Minister and Nlinistry -of Interior; (2) ''pe1·son'' shall mea11, as appropriate, any natural or juridical person; (3) ''r�g:Ulate'' shall. mean the implementation of this Proclamation by the M1n1ste1· by the 1ss11a11ce of regulations or otherwise ; (4-) ''1)eac�ful p11blic demo11_stration'' shall mean any assemblage, procession, gathering_ or other ma111festation of opinion condticted on, in or through _ ut shall excl11de traditio11al gatheri.ngs, religiou.s and a11y public place , b marriage ceremonies, f 11ner�l _ processio11s, official mee tings, gatherings held purs11ant to law, and s11n1la1· e,,ents: (5) ·'p11 �lic place'' shall mea11 any higl 1�1ay, public park, garden, bridge, road or oth.e� pla �e, are� or way freely accessible to the public, whet.her generally or for tl1e t ime being, wl1etl 1er on paynient of a fee or otherwise; and (6) ''St!pervisi11g A11thority'' sl 1all mean such autl1ority as the Minister may designate.

3 · Permit Reqtiired for the ·Holding of Peaceful Public Demonstrations d efltl p t· 1b!i� demonstratio� shal f be ?on du a� p o a in an d cted only un der � � g � h ·ance w�t tile conditions set forth 1n a Permit .therefor issue by the ·supervism d Auth or1ty. pursl1a11 t to Article 5 here of.

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. . Auth ori·t y in Application for a Perm·1t sh· a11 b e submitted · to Superv1s1ng the · · two (2) copie s, 1n such formsas mar be pre or · s a d ( y scr 1 'b ven d, not e s l tha 7) n ss � re . i � such shorter period as the upe 1 . O e , r� s1n� Aut allo h r1ty w b • may 1n· any case � the convocation of the d · emonstra,t1on 1n question. Such applicatic;>n shall set forth· .

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(I) the time, date and place of assen1bly for the demoilstration .' (Z) a brief descriptio11 of the natt1re a11 d p11rpose of tlle cI emo 11strati.on an d whi ch in it will man ner be conductecl; the (3) the route, �f any, t� be follovved by the clet11 0 11stratio11 and the expected periocl of its dt1rat1011: (4) tl1e nt1mber of persons expected to particiJJ ate; (5) a descripti�n of any sig11s and placards to be carriecl or displayed at the den1onstrat1on; (6) the n�m�s and addresses of all . persons, groups, associatio11s or other organ1zat1ons under ,:vhose at1sp 1 ces or by ,vl1icl1 the den1011stratio11 is orga11ized or cond11cted, and tl1 e signature of a11 autl1 orized perso 11 on behalf of each s11ch person, grot1p, associatio11 or other organization; 3 1 1d (7) the name and address of a person who 1nay be co11tacted to J)rovide f t1rtl1er information in respect of the derno 11stration ,v11ere tl1 e sa111e is reqt1 ired and to whom all commt1nications fro1n sucl1 . .L\11tl 1ority i11 respect of stich demonstration, including the Pern1it, sl1 a.ll be se1 1t. 5. Issuance of Permit

(I) (a) The Supervising A11thority shall i:tct on eacl1 a1Jplicatioi1 ror

Per111it

within five (5) days after receipt of ap1Jiication tl1erefor. (b) w·here the Supervising Authority fails to act on an ap1Jlicatio11 for a Permit ,vithin five (5) days after receipt of application tl1 erefor, th.e Permit shall be deemed to have bee 1 1 issued. (c) \Vhere the Supervising Authority deter1ni11es that the carryi 1 1g 011 of a peaceful ptiblic den1011stratio11 wot1ld regardless of s tich co11clitions as might be imposed u11 der paragrapl1 (2) of this Article 5, enda11ger the maintenance of p11blic healtl1 or JJtlblic order, or be contrary t? law or morality or to the pt1rposes or objectives of a� 1y �roup or associ ation involved or participating tl1erein, it 1nay, "".1tl1111 fiv� (5) days after receipt of applicatio11 for a Per1nit, isst1e a written de�1al of such application setting fortl1 i11 detail the gro11nds of s11ch denial. (2) A Permit may ·be isst1ed s11bject to st1ch conditio 11s as the Stipervising At1thority may impose with respect to: (a) the prevention and avoidance of interference with the activities of any Ministry, Agency or Public Authority of the Governn1e11t; (b) the restriction or prohibition of tl1e carrying of inappropriate signs, placards and dangerous articles; (c) the observance of traffic reg11lations and the maintenance of normal circulation of traffic; . (d) the eos11rance of the orderly a11d proper cond11ct of the demo11 stration; (e) the maintenance of qt1iet at night; and . 1 o n as may t a tr s 11 0 1 en. d (f) such changes in the route, place or �1me e t h · of . be necessary to av oi d danger to public l1ealth or pttblic 0rder· ·

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SOURCEBOOK O F

CONSTITUTIONL LAW _· -------- ··----------

ETHIOPIAN

6· Penal · · ·· tes 1c1pa part or of 1n a uct cond pea t11e e in s k a t e ceful d n u o h w n so er p Y T} A ) (1 � and in a ccordance with th Permit a nt to u a s e e y l e publi�. asse1;1b 1J � se and sha ll upon off�n an of y guilt e b shall fcf,� e t s� o · 1p 1n cond!11? 11S le Artic in 478 of ded provi the ties JJenal Pe nal the O t t c b �e su be n 1o ct conv1 Code. . ent on ernm duty Gov the and who of ial offic n a t no rs o wh o� r s e (2) Any r:i e nt at a ny p ea ceful public demonstrapres hile �as with lum p t a Peffi:U in forth restricting or e t s s ition :ond t�: :: ��1: o t1on,. o_r_ wh all be guilty of an offense sh s, rticle a ous nger a g d of in rry . . • c� e th ng 1 t ib1 proh . to the penalties provided in Article J and sJ1all, tlpon co11v1ct·1 01·1 , be subiect 478 of the Penal Code. 7. Implementation . . . The Minister shall ha,,e atlthority to regt1late the 1mplementat1on of th1.s P�o clamatio11. Problem

As a gover11n1ent Iaw),er yot1 a1·e asked to submit a memorandum on the above la\v dealing with the following: (I) Discuss constitt1tional limitations on government's power to regulate ''public assemblies''. (2) Is the present law, as written, constitutional? (3) Asst1ming tl1e law as w1·itten is constitutional, �scu�s the �angers that 1t may be enforced in t1 11constitutional \Vays - give illustrations. (4) In light of tl1e above, submit a drat't of ne,,, legislati-on on this subject.

Son1e Comparative Material

From the opi 11ion of Frankfu1·ter J. i 1 1 Nie111otko l'. Mar;,fand 340 U. S. 268. Adjustment of tl1e inevitable co1 1flict bet,veen free speech and other interests is a problem as persi stent as it is perplexing. It is important to bear in mi�d �at thls Court can only hope to set li 11tlts and poi11t the Wa)'. It f alls to the lot of leg1slat1ve bodies and administrative officials to fi 1 1d practical solutions within the frame of our decisions. The pioneer ca se concerning speaking in p a M rk as: s a n v. d D st av re is et is s sachusetts, 167 U.S . 43. The Boston or d in an ce w h ic h w as u h el d required a pernut p from the mayor for any perso'n to " m ak e an y public address, disch n n ca n o n y a a rg e or firearm, expose for sale any goo d s, .. .. '' d o n ec te p u b li c re g sp ro u C n T d o h s. u is rt ,the..finding that the �rdinance w a s n o t d irected ag ain st free s p eech but was intended as a proper regt1lat1on of th e use of public grounds.'' 162 Mass at 512, 39 N. E. . at 113. . A n attempt_ to derive from dicta in the Davis case the right of a city to exerci se any power over its parks , } however arbitrary o r discrimin atory was rejected in Hagup · ! C.l.O. _307 U.S. 496: The i ordinance presented in t h e Hagu ;e e'case required a p � .. s on public ground, �he � :f i: e i rm it 0 Y _t o b e re in fu g se s d offic ,,_ ·· · Jl 1 b?' the licen he Purpose of prevent:J. �,1 ng nots, disturbances o r di sorde assemblage· rly · . · ] .

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t . the case , of ho,v 502 ever T , facts left he no do ibt . e that the li ens1ng pO\Ver 11d•• , at . ,,.instrument of ar b"t 1 rary st1ppression of free express· an ade m been to.n f views b ad a 516 Th e h ra t o . ff: · Id"It1g of the Hague case \Va 11ot tl '' . .i, ., airs a onal nati . 1 at a city s on _ t he u e of its _streets and parks t? reas011able regulatiotl. Tile hold � could not subJec ! officials could no t be g1ve11 power arbitrarily to l1ce ns1 ng the tha was � stippress ing under matter what cover of law they ptirported to act. no ssion, expre free Cox v. Nev.1 Hampslzire, 31� _D. S. 569, n1 ade i t clear tl1at tl1e United States Constitution _does .not deny lo_cal1t1_es the p_owe: to dev.ise a Iicensi11g system if the exercise of discre_tion by _ the l1cens1ng officials 1s ap1)ropriately confi tlecl. A statute reqtiiring a pern11t �nd license fee for parades l1ad bee11 narro\vly constrtted by tile State c ourts. The license could be reft�sed 011ly _ for ''considerations of time, place and manner so as to conserve the pttblic conve111e11ce," a11d tl1e license fee ,vas ''to meet the expense incident to the ad1ninistratio11 of the Act a11d to tl1e mair1te11ance of public order in the matter licensed''. Id., at 575-576, 577. Tl1e lice11si1 1g system was sustained even thot1gh the tax, ranging fron1 a nomi11al amou11t to $300 was ' determined by the licensing officials on the facts of each case.

From Edwards v. Soi1tlz Caroli11a 372 U.S. 229.

Mr. Justice Ste\vart delivered the opi11ion of the Col1rt.

The petitioners, 187 in nt1mber, \Vere con,,icted in a magistrate's col1rt in Colt1n1bia, South Carolina, of the common-la\v crin1e of breach of the pe,tce. TI1eir con victions were ultiipately affirmed by the South Carolina St1pre1ne Court, 239 S.C. 339, 123 S.E.2d 247. We gra 11ted certiorari, 369 U.S. 870, to co11sider the claim that these co11victions can11ot be sqt1ared with tl1e Fourtee11 tl1 Ame11dment of the United States Constitution. There was no st1bstantial conflict in the trial evide11 ce. Late in tl1e mor11ing of March 2, 1961, the petitioners, higl1 school and college stude11ts of the Negro race, met at the Zion Baptist Cht1rch in Colt1mbia. From tl1ere, at abot1t noon, they walked in separate groups of about 15 to tl1e Soutl1 Caroli11 a State House grounds, an area of two city blocks open to the general pt1blic. Their p urpose was "to submit a protest to the citizens of South Carolina, alo11g with the Legislative Bodi� of South Carolina, our feelings and our dissatisfactio11 ,vith the present cond1t1on of discriminatory actions against Negroes, i11 general, an� to let _t�em know that we were dissatisfied and that we wot1ld like for tl1e Ia,vs wh1cl1 prohibited Negro privileges in th.is State to be removed.'' Already on the State Hot1se grounds wl1en the petitioners arrived wer� _30 or more law enforcement officers who had advance knowledge that the petitioners were co�ing. Each group of petitioners e11tered the grou ds through a drive\vay � , they ao<l parking area known in the d, ere e� y the As . � oe esh ors ''h the as ord rec go to ere , zen citi a told as t, righ by a had the law enforcement officials that ''th�� e wer hrough �he St te House y the s a g lon , has _ zen �� s, as any other c1t1 und gro � , e m sa peaceful · During the e til 10 , rs 11e 10 t1t pe e th , es xt half ho ur or 45 minut ne small gro ups, walked � un� gro the gh roti 1 tl way erly ord an in ' le t sing eas e abr l fi two or each group carrying gro Ne a be to tid pro am ''I as and " own . · placards bearing such messages with segregation''. D uri g this time a crowd of some 200 to 3 00 011lookers had collected in the D h0rseshoen area and on the adjacent sidewalks ....

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SouRCEBOOK OF ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

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e ok th lo e ?f m on so ed s, iz er gn co re he ho w at th d e m ifi st e t r e g 1a a1 M y it C e Th equent t.esti m o ny bs s su hi t bu '' s, er ak 1n e bl 1 o1 tr e bl _ si 11e did 110t ide11tify, as ''p os ed or e us at ca re ly th al tu d ac ne d ow r c e th y an ng no a1 y od ob 11 at 1 t1 r a e cl made tro11bled.... , e ed th rib e e d sc lic us po th s e c au an st um rc o ci th .. e tl1 · e1 1d 111 d an 11 tio 11a sit e th 111 e sted if they _did not disperse r e �r b _ ld ou w y e th at th s r 11e rities advised the petit.io ers engage d 1n what the City n 1o t1t e p e th g, in s er sp di of ad e 1 st I1 s. ,vithi 11 15 min11te ' t, y t' uc bo nd lam �o f ''_ d a� ic ', wh d' ou ''! h, ', s' ou ter s oi ''b �� a s d e rib sc . e d er ag a11 M eligious harangue' r a to ng ni te lis of d e ist ns co , ar cle e ad m ' as his later· testi1nony ed Ba�ner'' �nd othe r gl an Sp ar �t e h ''T 1g gi1 sin l7 11d lo d 11 a s , r e d lea by one of their . ing pp d th eir hands. cla �n et f e e ir th ing mp �ta ile wh s, ng so 1s io1 lig e r d n a. patriotic . d an ers ed ch ion r . tit p e ma e th ted es r them ar e lic po e tl1 d, e s s pa d ha s e t After 15 min11 off to jail. Upon this evidence the s tate trial court convicted the p etitioners of b reach of tl1e peace, a11d imposed se11te11ces ranging from a $10 fine or five days in jail, to a $100 fine or 30 day s in jail. 111 affrrming the judgments, the Supreme Court of South Carolina said that 1111de1· the law of that State t he offense of breach of the peace ''is not su sceptible of exact definitio11," but that the ''g eneral definition of the offense'' is as follows : ''In general terms, a br each of tl1e p eace is a violation of public order, a disturbance of the pl1blic tra11quility, by a11y act or conduct inciting to violence.... It 111ay co11 sist of an act of violence or an act likely to produce violence.... Nor is actt1a1 pers onal violence an essential element in the offense.... '' Tl1e state courts ha,,e held that the petitio11ers' conduct constituted breach of the peace tinde r state law, a11d ,v e 1nay accept their decisi,on as binding upon us to t11at extent.

It has long bee11 establisl1ed that tl1 ese First Amend.ment freedoms are protected I by the Fot1rtee11th An1encl1ner1t fron1 it1vasion by tlie s·tates. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652.... . T�e cir�11mstai 1ces i11 tl1is case 1·eflect an exe rcise of these basic, constitutional riglits in th�1r m_ost pri s_ti11e a11 d class ic f01·.n1.• The petitio .ner·s felt aggrieved by laws of South Carolina wl11ch alleged!y ''1?rol1ibited Negro p r ivilege s in this S tate ''. Tl1ey peac�abl_ � a�sembled t�e s1t_e of the State Governme 11t and there peacea�ly �� , exl?ressed !l1e1 r griev 11ces t? th c1�_ .1ze11 s f South Carolina, along with the Legis- , � � � _ lative Bo�ie? of sotith C�rol111a. No t t111t 1l they were to ld by police officials that they must d1 spe1·se 011 pa111 of ar1·est did they do mor_e.... · · The Fourte�11th Amendme11t does not perm it a St e th na l 1 cri mi e m ak at e to , e eful. expressio11 of_ t1np?p1�lar �iews, ''[A] r o r un de function of free speech �� u ve e rn m en t i_ o s to in vi te di sp ut e. It m ay gh � in h de ed its 1 be se rv st �� e i purp s . Jhen�t . · ngin c e . 18 0 · en cha and provocativ e may strike a t . ·udi es and pre . c t e , s eff c on e s on pti ng ttli d an e v e s ha un r nd p ou � of as it presses fo�� ce Of an dea. Tha t is why freedom of spee ch,... is ·· pr�; . � tected agai11st cen��s�fp 0 pu � · l :· ishm ent, � c � ce unle ss prod u show n a ea: like to ly r.� � and present danger of a serio · · · � n · co . u s sub8tant1ve evil in li · that rise s far above pub c � venjence annoyance or r · :1. ' unrest · · · There is no room under 011r Constitution· iOI ' '1 'I"

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the For alte rnat ive view . e . wot1 ld rictiv lead to stan rest ' dai·cti·zat·1011 of 1'deas Ore · . . Ill a es, cour ts, or dom1 nant po l1 t1cal or commtinity grotips· ,, slat ur legi by r T er n11ei'the · · ' · 4 . . . S i U I 5 n As 337 the Ter111 1111�llo case, tl1e courts of South .. niello v. Cb'icago, cr1 m1nal offense so as to pern11t coi,viction of the pe a defin ed h ave lina Caro t't· 1 1oners · · ,, 1e t o a11g�r, 1· 11v1tecl pt1blic disi)ute or brotlght peo� . d st1r re h pee c thei . abotit if � � _ , 1ct1o n rest 111g 011 any of those grotinds con v A unre st. of tion may not stand...,, cond i a

..,_ ''

For these reasons we conclt1de tha t these cri111i1 1al convictions cannot stand. Reversed.

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Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting ...

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The priceless character of First An1endn:1 ent freedon1s can.11 ot be gain-said, but it dqes not follow that they are absolt1tes imn1t111e fron1 necessary state action reason ably designed for the protection of societ)' . . .

It was only after the large crowd had gatl1ered, a111ong \vl1ich the C.ity Manager

and Chief of Police recognized pote11tial troublernal(ers, a11d \vl1ich togetl1 er vvith the students had become massed on and arot1nd the ''horsesl1oe'' so closely tl1at vehicular and pedestrian traffic was n1aterially in11)eded, tl1at a11y action against the petitioners was taken.... Even at this juncture no orders vvere issued by tl1e Cit)' Ma11ager for tl1e police to break up the crowd, now abo11t 500 perso11s, and 110 arrests \Vere 111ade. I11stead, he approached the recognized leader of the I)etitioners and reqt1estecl l1im to tell the various groups of petitioners to disperse witl1it1 15 n1 i11l1tes, fail.i11g 'vVl1ich they \Vould be arrested. Even thot1gl1 the City Ma11 ager 111igl1t hc1ve beer1 l1011estl)1 111istc1l<e11 as to the immjnence of danger tl1.is \Vas certai11ly a reaso11able reqt1est by the city�s t?p executive officer in an effort to avoi d a J)t1bljc brawl. But tl1e regpo11se. o� peti tioners and their leader was defia11ce ratl1 er than co-01)eratio11. Tl1e leader 11111ne dia�ely moved from group to gro11p a111ong the stt1dents, deliveri11g a ''l1.ara11gt1e'' �hich, accordin g to testimony i 11 the record, ''aroused [then1] to a fever pitch caus ing this boisterousness, this singing and stamping'' .... . It is my belief that anyone conversant wi th tl1e almost spontaneo�s combusti0,11 in som e Southern communities in such a sitt1ation will agree that tl1e City Manager s act'Ion may 1vvell have averted a major catastrOJ)l1e. The gravity of the danger he re surely 11eeds 110 further ex_plication.· · · �ut to say that the police may no t intervene un til th e riot l1as occtirred i � !ike e. rin ct do keep 1.ng ou t the a ch sti to e ib cr bs su ot doctor until the patient dies. I cann

s 11 o ti a tr s Prom Judgtnent 11 o m e D '' o y On The TOk . rt Cou of ane e Jap rem Sup se · 0 d;ina ce'' 011d Cons 1 zt i,r Co t, ak M 1 1 i (Ha nreishu 14, No. 9, 1243, as translated ? tu�.ion zn Japan (1964) pages 84-116).

s it n o l a n o ti u it st n The Tok n· c n u o as o I e b d e w no w 1stnct ance Court . the .o:din pro declar e � l v titutio t f�c�. The PuJ n na l � s co an e e r d ? Prosecutor appealed this dec1s1on. Tl1e ordinance an v1s1ons are IC as follows: 44 . o N e c . . n a in cl r Ordinance C O o y k o . , and De1r1onstrations (T er 01 onc g nln or1s ss1 e bli oce . Assem s, Pr 1950).

962

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s n ? a o s or in other PUblit n ro io ss e c ro p r o s e li b m e ss a t c u d n o c to g in d n te in c ty li e b fe u th f _ sa p o t n co se n o c e m th mi ssio·n Article l. When r, e v e o ts a h w e c la p y n a in s n o ti ra : st g n m 10 11 w e o d ll fo e r o th o t s ly lace p p a t o n ll a h s s 1i tl t a th d e id �ust be received; prov t; r o s d n a , g in in a tr l a ic s � y l1 p , ts n _ e d . . tu s y b l e v a tr d n a s n io s r ti c x , rel1g1on, etc. th (i) e a , e e d g ia rr a m , e g a f o g in m o c itl1 w d te c e n n o c s ie n io n re e c (ii) tile norn1aI e er e d b ll n a d te sh in � . in w ip o tr ll fo e te th ca li g i� n i_ ta °: o '? t n se n co r fo n , y ce b e k la e p ta th l il v t w Article 2. Tlle applicatio di en in ev u e h id t _ n o al !1 1c sd r1 Ju f o � re a _ se o l1 w tllrough the police station in organ1zat1on sponsoring it, a t le a st se ve nty-two hours before the or the representative of tl1e stration is to tak : e c la p e . assembly, procession, or demon r; so n o sp 1e tl f o ss re d ad d an 1e (i) nan e the event is to take er h w e g_ lla vi or n, w to , ty ci . .. d ar w e th e id ts ou · es liv r so on sp e th re he w e; (ii) er le b th si n o sp re d n a ed rn ce n co n so er place, tl1e name and address of a p n; io at tr ns o m de r o , on si es oc pr y, bl (iii) the time of the assem ch et a ; sk d ap , m an on ti ra st on m de or , on si es oc pr y, bl m (iv) the rot1te or place of the asse s se es dr d of persons es ad an m na e th d an e at ip ic rt pa to nd te in at th ns tio (v) the name of the organiza representing them; e; at cip rti pa to ng di ten in ns rso pe of r be n1 nu e th ) (vi n. io at str on m de or n, sio es oc pr , bly sem as e th of (vii) tl1e object and name d ibe scr ion in pre cat the pli ap e th es eiv rec it 1en wl , ion iss mm co ety saf c bli pu e Th 3. le tic Ar ng ryi t out of the car tha d ize ogn rec y arl cle is it re wl1 t cep e t sen con its e giv t mu , � preceding article :e � . l dir lic ce· f o pea pub ce nan inte ma the · er ' ang end ly ect wil ion trat ons dem or on, essi roc , b)y ssem the � p provided tl1at 1t may attach necessary conditions with respect to the following: (i) the prevention of interference \Vith the business of public offices; (ii) restricti!lg the carrying '?±: firearms, offensi,,e weapons, and other dangerou.s articles and the prevention of danger ar1s1ng therefrom; (iii) preserving the flow of traffic·' (i,r) maintai �ing the orderlines of the assembly, procession, or demonstration; (v) tl1e maintenance of quiet at night; (vi) cl1anges in the route' place' or t·lille wI len unavo1'dable for the preservation of public order or public health. · · as well The Co1zstiti1tion of Japan Article 21 stat·e� ·· I· Freedom o[-.. assembl)' and assoc1at 1on as speech, press' and all otller 'rornls of expression are guaranteed. 2· No censorship shall b· e 111aintai ' ned' nor 8ha11 the secrecy of any means of commu nication be violated.

Judgment of The Cot1rt (Excerpts 011ly): . Collective activities (with the e x�e ption ?f school tours� and and excursions so forth, and ceremonies coniie te d witli c?ming ls, � st1 , f a of ag e , marriage, d eath e and the like) ge 11erally itlvolve �li e expr ss1on s l f i or of thoug hts, �g conte ee nsion s, e r garding politics eco11omics Iabor, an 1 so fort h, or e 's basic p�o con cern on ing so�hy, in order to' appeal to the general i ec e t popu lace. coll In cours this e v resp of e ct ' ' act1vity conta ins essent1·a1 eIements th a e a t as f re ' edo� of expression, should � � ranteed by !he Constitution. As a m s t1 es? 1 1v a f ac ex ss t re e iv 1 ct g , 1n ts e l gh co ou th � . � however, differ from mere s peech � 1 J e fact · r writ by ing· they th. zed . are characteri that they are supported by th l e h e t of a ass d ·_ 1 �arge ; ::: mb number actually of people tog ether in _a body, a type 0 e nt n phy r s Sical force. i by Such a u t force latent t an can be set 1n motion very e pl -1 4 whe Y, th e e r in ceiv . . acc ord anc e pre con or unexpectedly as a r esult with a ] _ . IIl o3;1incitement or excitement either fro m within or fro

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i s clear fron1 the Jaws of crowd psych·ology and much o S • from actua1 exw1'thout 011g A h t rt1c · h eve le 21, paraora n re, here fo T · e 0 •pl1 2 , of tile Const't . . ·enc . 1 ut·1 01 1 pro. . per1 prev1 �11s _ restraint - of p111?licat101 1 that ca11 be called ''exp sors hi� 1 cei s reshibit s ense, 1t 1s , after all, ':navo1 dable that local aut tric t s t?e in llorities, in dtie sion'' and gene�al �1 rc11n1stances, aclopt prior to the fact loca l both of tion idera cons the minimum m�asu�es 11ecessary to ma1 nta1n law and order and to guard agaiil st unforesee n situations by me�ns of what are tern1ed ''public safety ordirlances''' 1 by n1eans of collective action. express101 to respect in only but When w� c_ome_ to exa1;11ine tl1e ordi11 a!1ce, w� �e� tl1e f)e�missio1 1 of the public safety comm1ss1on 1_ s reqwred for_ c?llect1ve act1v1t1 es (Article I). However, the , s11ch 1 s pern1 on s1 give except must ''\.vhere it ssion is clearly recoor1ized , commi that the carrying 011 t of the collective activity ''will directly endanger tl1 e �ainte nance of public pe�ce'' (�rti�le 3). TI1at is to say, it has a d11ty to give permissior1; the circu.mstances 1n wh1ch 1 t can ref1 1 se are strictly lin1ited. Thus, althotigh the ordinance, so far as the \.\'ordi 11g of its provisions is concer11ed, adopts a Iicensi11g system, this system in essentials no\vhere differs from 011e of notification. Tl1e pre requisites for collective activities, wl1etl1er license or notificatio11, are immaterial so long as freedom of expressio11 is not tl1ereby i111 properly restricted. Naturally, ",vhere it is clearly recognized that the maintena11ce of public l)eace will be directly enda.ngere d '' licence will not be give11. This, hov\1ever, is u1 1avoidable i11 vie,v of t1 1 e fact that local authorities have a responsibility to tl1e i1 1l1abita11 ts to mai11 tai 11 lavv and order. That it is \Vithin the discretion of the p11blic safety comn1 issio11 to decide, when granting or refusing permissio11, whetl1 er s11ch a situatio1 1 exists, follo,vs naturally from the fact that these are matters of s11cl1 a 11ature tl1at they shoL1ld be ·decided by concrete study and consideration of tl1 e vario11s factors operati11 g in the particular sit11ation. We cannot] straighta\vay find tl1 e ord.ina11ce 1111 co1 1stitu tional and void merely because \Ve ca11 visualize sit11atio11s \Vhere a decision 1 1ot to grant permission \vould be improper; nor ca11 we do so 01 1 the grot111 d tl1at tl1e applicant is provided with no mea1 1s of redress \Vl1en the a1)pointed day arrives and the d ecision is still d eferred. It goes without saying that a p11blic safety con1n1issio11 i11 a1)plyi11g the ordinance must use the utmost care to e11 sur e that it does not ab11se its po\vers and, ·under the guise of maintaining the peace, repress peaceful a11d orderly collec�ive activities. !Jowe ver, it is improper to l1old the ordinance 11nco11 stitutional by saying tl1at there is the possibility of abuse. From Dissenting Opinion of Justice F1 1 jita Hachiro. . The majority opinion states th at '' ....it cannot be said that the or�inance is entir ely free from the danger that it ma y be used in s11cl1 a way as to VI?late_ th,� gua rantee of freedom of e pression provided in Article 21 of the Consti_ttiti_on. x Nevert_heless, it continues , ,, .... it is improper to hol d the or_dii1ance unconst1t11t101�al s � leg t no by _say�ng that there is the �r er eth wh 1 101 cis de ity of ab use.'' The bil ssi po i leg the a�o n !8 10 are re the er eth wh st con itu_ti?nal, however, largely d7pends on ] :; 0 a? P nce 111a atio itself prov1s1ons suffi ord the s � ofa I11s se. 1 ab1 n cient to prevent its � d ne a sy Ste tio e? em or af e th 1g 1 1 1d of ov pr m previous res traint it cannot be said that in abso 15 _ It ao rd the e. us a� g tin en ev pr to aximum cons ideration h as been given : � f� elct� nd ta s s y im ossi le to eat s is of tlu ba e th on , se ca is th in tr tl1e licensing sys te m p ? a r� ' as essent ially no different from a notificatio11 s ystem.

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964

NAL LAW IO T U IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T SOURCEBOOK OF E

SECTION 5 N O I T I D E : S H C E E P S F O FREEDOM

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h e rang: of c ond l_Jy fu re � er ca sid on C . cy ca vo ad uct '!"� turn now tOPena. l restrainl ests on v� 1n 1nterpret1ng some of ha y ma ts ur co h 1ic wl s lem ob pr e th 1n g_ Artic w o ll ? f � th by ed 1t 1b ases h o Th r p ti eta on pr ter ve m ha ld on ou c sh e n io . ut tit ns co e l1 ny' wl1ich t . a 1 f , ce en u . 10 fl 1e l t d an the1. n d 1· t10 f · o n se es t · �p t . o J s. w w a . ng y1 1 · p ap • d . an tho g (1) in . et pr er se nt i of s em l b n o ct1 f low 1 o c h c si b e e ch su . all 1ty s In t1v l ca ac a s th tic l po a i e tiv l ec l co at - t l1ose aiJned l fatl pu b_l?1catt�o ns,_PI(�) \� a1n11ed ty · · · na I liabili e p Y f 1 t' S · JU to · d re t11 q re ce n e id issue is concerned with tl1e ev politica l

Ethiopian Legislation

f Etl1iOJJia o le oc C l na Pe From Art. 249. - Outrages against the Dynasty. k ea br �r to mo or r ro pe dify the Em the ow hr ert ov to pts em att Whosoe,,er rra ts, nsp . ea y co c thr ce, or other len vio by e, ron Th the to 11 sio ces 11c of s · order t1nlawf11l 1neans, . . , or 1n cases is p1111ishable with rigo1·011s imprisonment from five years to life of exce11tio11al gravity, with death. Art. 250. - Oitt1·ages agai11st the Constitution or the Constitutional Authorities. Wl1osoever, by viole11ce, threats, co11spiracy or any other unlawful means: (a) overtl1ro,vs, 01· attempts to overtl1row, s11spend or modify the Constitution of the En1pire; 01· (b) overth1·0\1\1s, 01· attempts to overtl11·ovv, change or destroy the Government or a11y co11stitt1ted p11blic, legislative, executive or j11dicial authority, is pu11ishable with rigorot1s in1prisonment from three years to life or, in cases of exceptional gravity, witl1 deatl1. Art. 251. - Obstructio11. of' the exe,·cise of Co11stitutior1al Powers. Whosoever, by violence, th1·eats or a11y other unlawful means, prevents , or attem1)ts t� pre�e11t or r·estrain a11y legislative, executive or judicial authority fr�m exe_rc1s1ng its constitt1tional powers, or to force a decision, 1s pt1n1sl1able witl1 rigorot1s imprisonment not exceedii1 g fifteen years. • Art. 252. - Armed Risir1g ancl Civil War. ,. (I) Whosoever· 1·aises, or attetn[Jts to 1·aise:

0!· .tl1c co11stit11tio11a l at1tl1orities; or (b) �tvil war, by ar111�ng citize11s or it1habitants or by inciting them to ta½e 11P arn1 s ag�1nst 011e anothe , 1·, . . . • is pt1nis�able w�tl1 1·igorot1s imp1·is or, , lif e to on m en ye t ar s fiv fr e om 1n . cases of exceptional gravity, with death. J _ , . ho oever: o f his 0"'.'n fn�e ( 2). W will takes part i n s u c h a moveme nt f s punishable with . rigorous imprisonment 11ot exceedingfi fte e n yea rs. Art. 253. - Attacks on t h ·· e pO ztzc · al or Territorial /11tegrity of the State. _ . � I W.hosoever comnuts . . r o an act designed· t? destroy . . l the unity of the peop �tioll1 , - 1 · to sever part of the terri . t o ry or pop�latio n from t.he Empire o r the Fe dera · _ � by violence or by any other unconst1tut1_ onal means ' �: : � � -� . · = . . ·-:•.. = "'.-� .,.-'- �· :.--. . ..-ec.':-;t, _:c1;

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·s1 punishable with· rigorous impriso11men t from five years to lI·i:-1 1e, or, 111 cases 1 death. vity, w 'th ra g al i1 o i pt ce ex of ry to t/1e Emperor or tl1e Co11stitutio11al Autlzorities. Inj u _ 256 . :\ Art.

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HUMAN RIGHTS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

e r ins11l�s, abuses, defan1e s ?r sla11ders tl1e E1 11 )er ev Whoso or or the I ln_ 1 perial Cro w n Prince _ ishable wi� rigoro11s in11)risonn1e11t not exceedi11g five years, or in is pun Jess ser1ot1s case s with a fi11e 11ot less tl1a11 five l1t1I1dred dollars. Where t�e of!en ce is di�ected �gai_11�t tl1e Go�e! ·I1 1 11eI1t or 0 1 1e of tl1e consti !uted_ legislat1ve, exe ct1t1ve, or Jt1d1c1al author1ties, tl1e pt111isl1ment is si inple Impr1sonn1ent fron1 t11 ree mo11ths to five years, or fine. The concepts of i n sult, abu se , defan1atio11 or slander are defi 1 1ed i 11 tl1e provisions relating to attacks o n ho11r (Art. 580 and. 583).

Art 269. - Provoca1iorz and preparatio11. Whosoever, \Vith the object of con1mitting, permitti 1 1g or Slli)portir1g a11y of the acts provided for i n the preceding sectio11 of t11is cl1a pter: (a) publicl y provokes then1 by ,vord of mot1tl1, ir11ages or \vriti.ngs; or (b) conspires towards, pl ans or t1r ges the for111atio11 of, or hirnself forn1s Li band or group \Vith other persons, ,vl1etl1er \Vitl1i11 or 011tside the col111try; or (c) joins such band or grot1p, adheres to its scl1emes or obeys its instrL1ctio11s; or {d) enters into relatio ns or est ablishes secret co111111L111ication \Vith a foreig11 government, political p arty, or ganization or age 1 1ts; or (e) launch es or disseminates, systematically and vvitl1 premeditatio11, by ,vord of mouth, in1ag es or \VritiI1gs, inacct1rate, l1ateful or st1 bversive i11forn1atio11 or insinuatio11s calculated to den1oralize the pt1blic a11d to u1 1dermi 11e its confide nc e or its will to resist, is punishable witl1 simple im_prison111e 11t fro1n one mo11th t? :five years or, w�ere the foreseable conseq11 e11ces o f his activities are part1ct1larly grave, with rigor ot1s imprison1 11e nt not exceeding te11 years. Art. 451 · - Te11de 11tious Publicatio11s · intended to pervert tl1e Course of liLSlice.

Whos�ever, i11 any m ann er ·v,1hatsoever, publisl1es or sr)reads news, a 11ote, a prec1s, a criticis m, a or known to report or a p a1nphlet which is i11acct1rate, be teoctentious, or whi ch distorts the facts, and whicl1 has ?ee11 drawr1 tip _for the p-urpose of t r ied, be to or 11g be1 e_ cas _ a influencing a j11 di cial decision in . il whether by informing upo ilg ct i a by or s e c 1pl1 n o the a ccused per son or 11is ac c the feelings of eneg t ir cot tlie of s r ce offi the cou·r t ' J·urors ' witnesses ' experts or rally, . is _punishable with a fine not exceedi11 g fiv e hundred dollars or with sin1ple Imprisonment not exc eeding three m o n ths. Art. 472 (l) Who . r eparp of e · i:rpos soe · p_ u h e ver consp ires with one or more persons 1 ?r t . aIth ' tl1e Ing or com e h r rity secu � in mitt g s e rious offe11ces ag ainst pt1b lic p erson or property, or per suades a11other to joi11 s11cl1 conspiracy,

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966 •

NAL LAW IO T U IT T S N O C N JA P IO I-f T E SouRCEBOOK OF

es lis ia er , at h cy m it ra w pi ns si co e th pl m at th e iJn. d de vi o pr le ab sh ni pu is . e d n a s th n 1o :t1; e r th 1;1 a �? !'; prisonment for not le�s th e s ar s ce ce en en off off s ou ri se ic wh , _ le 1c �t A h are is th of e os irp pt For the rs r ea o ve y fi re r o m fo . t . en m n so ri p 1m s u ro go ri h it w punisliable ey e th re ed a� he m w �r or or s, ou e� m s nu po e ar sess rs to ra pi ns co e th re he W ) (Z 1o ss D11 �e m t . n r c� fo of re an tu na o r ei th by d ffence, te fit ns ea m or its ei m iiistru , �s po a _ ng we �i or rr ca ch be su to d un fo e instru ar rs to ra pi 11s co e tli e er wh or n e iso pl pr s1D1 im t be en m l al sh for six t en m sb ni . 1 p1 e th , ns ea m n1e11ts or t. as le at rs lla do nd sa ou th e on of e n1onths or a fin en s be ha cy on ira dem nsp co the strated of e t11r na us ero ng da the re l1e W (3) st er ain e eth a� li� wh or , �e en off so s per iou ser n, a of ion iss mm co by the . p11blic safety or property, by the comm1ss1on of a se�1es of cr1me. s, whether or not of the same kind, or by acts, such as traffic 1n arms, narcotic su.b stances or persons, the Co11rt shall pronou.nce the maximum sentence provided by la\v, taking into consideration the provisions relating to concurrence (Art. 62 and 63).

•

Art. 474. - Pitblic Provocation to or Defence of a Crime.

Whosoever publicly, by word of mouth, writing, image, gesture or otherwise: (a) provokes others to commit acts of violence or gr.ave offences against the communit)', i11dividt1als or property; or (b) defends or praises s11ch offence or its perpetrator; or (c) launches a11 appeal or starts a collection for 'the payment of pecuniary punishments pronounced by d11e process of la·w, with the intention of making co�mo°: ca11se with the convicted person or of upholding his deed ?r of sho\Vl?� ?1sapproval of the autl1orities, or who knowingly takes part In such act1v1t1es, is punishable with simple imprisonn1ent or fine. Art. 476. - Forbidde,i Societies a11d Meetings.

Whosoever: (a) �ot1n_ds, org�nizes 01· con1mands a society, band, meetings or assemblies, forbidden, either ge11erally or f1·on1 tin1e ·to tin1e by law, by the Government or by the compete11t autl1ority; or (b) knowi11gly takes part i11 st1cl1 activities; or (c) kno":'ingly places pren1i�es or land at the ieS, ciet so n disposal of for bidde m�etings. or demo�1strat1011s, whether f01· considerat ei arg ch of or free io n , IS �tinishable with a fine no ers , d gle a t exceeding fiv e hundred dollars. Rin ot organ i�ers �r commanders are punishable 1 n t oe ll so nr im pr wi i th sim pl e exceedIng SIX months. Art. 478. - Forbidden Assemblies. 1 (l) 0 o so ev �r y fo rm s, � a organ_izes or _ commands, o n the public hig h :� , S b c li tak � pla ce, as wi sem ll bli es fo rbidden by law, or of his own free U J? ,,, ·' Par. t In t.hem' , rs IS purushable with a t } d a e fin e not ex. ceed. in 1 g n ru g o : n rs e lla · � d s_ u d o n a t? organizers or comm not . _j; . ..

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a ssembly is . ar1 11 ecl, sin11)le wf 11l un ]a th e re W _ iinpriso1101ent sllall b e he (2 ) ee mo11tl1s, anc l 1 11ay be 1 1 1cre ased lll) to til e thr leas t at or ge11 era1 n1ax1n1um · f · · . gl eaders, orga111zers a11 cl co1 n1 11a11ders ailcl tlJose \Vllo in the ca�e o f rin have carried weapo11 s or kne,,, tl1at weapo1 1s were bei1 1g carried. Art. 479, - Alar111ir1g t!1e Pitblic. (I) \Vhosoever spr e ads alarm an1ong tl1 e pt1blic: (a) by �hr�a_t of danger t? tl1e co1 11n1t1�1ity, ?r to tl1e life, l1ealth or property of 1 nd1v1dt1als , especially tl1at of 1 11vas1on, assassi1 1atioi1 ' fire ' devastatio11 or pillage; or (b) by deliberat�ly s_pr eadi11g f�lse �t1111ot1rs co1 1cer11i11g st1cl1 ha1)pe11i1 1gs or general d1stt1rba11ces, or 1 n1111111 e11t catastroph e or cala111ity' is pt11ushable ,:vith si111ple i 1 npriso1 1111 e11t or fine.

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967

Art. 480. - False Rur11oi1rs a11cl J11cite111e11t to Breacl1es o.f t!1e Peace. Whosoever, apart fro1 11 offe11ce s agai11st tl1 e secL1rity of tl1e State (Art. 252, 269 (e) a 1 1d 273(a) ): (a) starts or spreads false rt1 mot1 rs, st1SJ?iciot1s or false cl1arg es agai11st the Government or the J)ltblic at1tl1orities or tl1eir activities tl1er eby distt1rbing or inflaming pt1blic opi11 io11, or creati11g a da11ger of pt1blic clistt1rba 1 1ces; or (b) by ,vhatever acct1sation or any other 1nean s fo1n e1 1ts disse1 1sio11, arot1 ses hatred, or stu·s tip acts of viole11ce or lJolitical, racial or religiot1s clisturbances, is punishable \.Vith sin1ple i1n1Jriso11n1ent or fi11e. Art. 48 1. - Seditious De111onstratio11s. Whosoever: (a) mak es, utters, distributes or cries ot1t seditiot1 s or tl1reate�i11g re1nark_s, or displays in1ages or drawi11gs of a seditiot1s or tl1reate11111g nattire 1n any public place or m e eting; or (b) pt1blicly incites or provokes others to disobey orders 1sst1�d by a lawful central or local at1thority or to disobey Ia,:vs or regL1lat1o11s dtlly _promulgated, i itl ,:v or , s r lla do e d dr 1n ht e is punishable witl1 a fi1 1e not exc eeding fiv simple impriso11me11 t not exc eeding six 1nontl1s.

Sedition and The Constitution: Some Comparative Approaches to the Formul ation of ''Tests'' and ''Standards''. er '' test). g 1 da1 e11t Re�read ·. pages 2"'-/6-228 l)res e ar. a11d 1 c ,, · 1 1e t : ( I e r · r ?t a aJ pr h C su . CoL1r t ne e 1 (SLIJ)r From' n·i�ector · . 187 R epor ts . · · ria ge Ni l Al 61 tio 19 ci1 i of v. ose Ob Pr 11s 0f N1ger1a). 1 stice Jt e f Chi e tl1 by Ad emo1a, C.J.F. :- Thi h" � s C otirt t t� ferred r e was s matter 1 1joins e . whic h Bigh ou t ·a 1on_ of 1 t 1 r of_L Co nst ago the s IO� of tind er � ectio1 1 1 _! _ st1b that a y a es � inv olv question as to the 11 1terpretat10 11 of the Co11stittition

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968

N. AL LAW O I T U IT 'f S N o C N IA P O I H T SoURCEBOOK OF E

d eral S upre� Cou_r�. The de e F e th t? d e r r e f e r d be l 11 o h s w la f � o tl io st s statltial que o � g It se a f � d 1t1on under L o rt u o C h 1� H e th re o f e b · d e rg a h c s a w se a c e th l fendailt in a e 11 u f th rr o r1 ) e C d (I o 1 C 5 n o ti a c re e S . e ds d o C l 1a iI m ri C 1e tJ f Sectioil 5 1 (1) (c) o as f ollows:-

51. (l) Any perso n wl10es ir h sp it y r n w o an co , o rs d pe to n n o io at ar to ep p _y an s �e 1a 11 : ? o d o : t (a) does or attem�ts , n o t1 n te 1n s t1 1o 1t d se a h it do , any act w (b) utters an y se ditious w ord s; ditious public ation; y se es an uc od pr re or s te bu ri st di , le sa (c) prints, publisl1es, sells, offers for t it � is ditious; se on to belieye tha as re no s ha �e �s le un n, o i (d) imports any seditious publicat 1s onment for two to pr ce 1m en off st :fir a_ r �o n t1o 1c nv co on e bl sliall be guilty of an offence and lia nd fine and for a _subsequent ::i t �n nm so r1 np _u: ch su th bo to or s d t1n po years or to a fine of onel1tmdred d be l f 1te n al fe 1o sh o Her or t at 1c bl pu us t1o d1 se y an d an s; ar ye e re tlr offence to in1prisonment f or Majesty.

Section 50 (2) of the Criminal Code defi11es sed itious intention thus:-

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50. (2) A ''seditious intention'' is an intention-

(a) to bri11g into l1atred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the person o f Her Majesty, l1er l1eirs or st1ccessors, or tl1e person of the Governor-General or the Governor o f a Region, or tl1e Government or Constitt1tion of the United Kingdom, or of Nigeria,, or of any Region tl1ereof, as by law established or against the administration of justice in Nigeria; or (b) to excite Her ivfajesty's subjects or inl1abitants of Nigeria to attempt ·to procure the altera tion, otl1erwise tl1an by Ia,vful means, o f any other matter in Nigeria as by law established; or (c) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst Her Majesty's subjects or inhabitants of Nigeria; or (d) to. pr�n1ote feelings of ill-,vill and l1 ostility between different classes o f the population of N1ger1a.

But an act, speech or pt1blication is not seditio11s by reason only that it intend,s(i) to show that I-Ier Majesty l1as been n1isle d or mistaken in any of Her measures; or (ii) to P.0int out e�rors or defects in !l1e Goveri1n1ent or Constitution o f Nigeria, or of any . 1ereof,_ as by law establ1sl1e d or in tl1e legislation or in tl1e administration of !1e�on t! Jtlstice w1tl1 a view to tl1e ren1edying of st1ct1 er1·ors or detects·' or (iii) :� persuade IIer - Majest�'s st1?jects or i11l1abitants of Nigeria to atten1pt to procure by awful n1eans tl1e alterat1011 of a11y 111atter in Nigeria as by law established ; or · or have a · (iv) to point o t1t ' witl1 a· v1ew · t0 tl�eir · 1·_e 1 11ova · I , any 111atters \\1l11ch are producing . tende ncy t? p�odtice feeI111gs of 1ll-w1ll a11d en111ity between different classes of the popola· t.1on of N1ger1a.

be defenda_nt Cbike Obi was prosecuted on the charge that he "durin g the mon� Of AugllSl 1960 at Lagos, dist1·ibt1ted a pamphlet call s Fact e: Peo pl e d ''The · · th : · that you must know'' co11 t ain1?g · · a se d1t1ous · publication to wit: '·Down with e enemies of the eo le the :x plo1ters of the weak an e Th . ... ! -- . poor d oppre ssors of the days of those who �a . ;e _enr�cl1e d themsel ves at tl1e expense of the poor are numbered. --· The comm011 man In Nige ria can t d ay · · ti n elec o - --" no lo11ger be foole d by sweet talk at . d a_ild treated � time only to b p1OI;� _ red sha been like dirt has after the office booty of �--=_ among the pol�t �� ans wh 1ch appear on pages 3 an d 5 of the copy of the pamphlet.· · 1 1c1 · - ·- -' .. t The charge was fo un d ro ved n s ue . j . tJ.o b q e . c ut Th no on b n ed t!o vic d s ha r _ een reco . r eferred to this Co urt b th . . . s e l earn ed -:-·-� a Y Chie f J of 1ce h Hi r ust Cou go rt L of a.re --..· t e gh _ _ the efore:-- - -,-

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- POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HUMAN RIGHT S

n s of the Cri n1inal Code r elating to seditio provis io the her n as con t ne 1 . n sect Whet io ns (l) n al Cod e l1ave bee n i11validated by tile Crim i 51 the of · n o f �1ect�1oIn 1 and 24 prov·tsio 50 and · · n of N'1ger1a · as set ot1t ·10 tl1e Second ScJ1edule of the Nsi· . f the Const1tut1o geria (Const1tu d an , ; cil 60 un 19 tion) Order i n Co er to (1) is in the negative, \vl1etl1er tl1ose provisio ns of tl1e Crim' na1 Code 11av answ the If ) (2 been m ifi ed by section 24 of the Constitt tion of e Nigeria, a nd, . od 1 1·f so, toi w11at extent ?.

we feel. qt1estions t] 1e q11es tio 11 p tit to tis tinder (1) two these id�rin� In cons the purposes o� tl� 1s refere 1 1ce , a 11d vve ti111it ours elves for sc�pe 1n wide too is ro tich 1 ?11 �O (2) (a)_ of th� Cr1 111 1 11 al Code 011ly i 11 s o far as it relates sect to ent judgm in this I n doing tl1_1s we l1ave in mi11d tl1at it is not imposs ible N1�er1a. of ernment_ Gov the to that different cons1derat1ons may apply 1 n res pect of otl1 er provisio1 1s covered by the section. Now, the provisions of sections 1 and 24 of tl1e Constitt1tion of the Fede ratio11 of Nigeria referred to i 11 the references are as follows:-

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Section 1. 1. This Constitution shall have the force of Jaw througl1ot1t Nigeria and, subject to tl1c pro visions of section 4 of this Constitution, if any otl1er lav,r (i ncludi ng tl1e Co nstitutio n of a Region) is inconsistent \vitl1 this Co nstitutio n , tl1is Constitution sl1all prevail and th e other lav; shall, to th e ex tent of the inconsistency, be void. Section 24. 24. (1) Every perso n shall be e n titl ed to freedom of expression, i ncluding freedon1 to hold opinions and to receive a nd impart ideas an d informatio n witl1out interference;

(2) Nothing in this sectio n shall invalidate any law tl1at is reasonably justifiable in a den1ocralic society-

(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, pt1blic mo r ality or public l1eallh; (b) for the purpose of protecti ng the rigl1ts, reputations a nd freedo n1 of other l)ersons, p�-e veating the disclosure of i nfor n1atio n received i n co11fidence , n 1aintaining the authority and indepe nde nce of the Courts or regulating telepl1ony, \Vireless broadcasting, televisio n or the exhibition of cinematograph films; or (c) imposing restrictio n s upon perso n s l1oldin g offic e tinder the Crown , n 1embers of the armed forces of the Cro\vn or members of a police force.

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The submissions made to tis by Chief Rotimi Willia111s on bel1alf of the de fenda nt were to the effect tl1at sections 50 a.nd 51 of tl1e Crimi11al Code so far as tl:iey relate to the Government of Nigeria a re i11consistent \vit� the provisions i11 section 2� of the Constitt1tion whicl1 are provisions guara11tee1 11g Ft1ndan1ental � tin1a11 �g�ts. At the end of bis arguments co11nsel s11m1ned up the grotinds for his Slib' · m1ss tons in the following words :-

n1ent into Go vern . a ··ag s ri b I Any l 1 · 11c aw 1 w · _ t d's e .t o wh'1ch punishes a person for making a statemen etl1 _er tl1 � �t � t : wl of ! tive spec irre t n ff r ridicule or creates inst tl1e Governn1e

disa ectio n aga � � ?r no is ty uri sec or e er tru ord c bli or pu se on fal icht�18 reasonably and irrespective of any repercussions justifiable in a democratic society.

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s imil r prot d ar oun ? reg _ e hav sel further submitted tha t the Court shotild ; ··C v1s1o otl1er o s t1on ns_ relati11g to Fundam 1 st1tt Con the Rights i11 an Hum al ent countries . • s, rie . . co1 111t oth er It is un dou�te 1 11 · e n1ad dly e a t similar pro v1 s1on_s. wis k to loo tak en be d but it is e a l sho t1l e ca and co _q u l � important that jo considering st1ch pr�v1s1ons, �.111gs of sucl1 pro 0s1deration should be given to any difference 111 tl1e wor vision s and ours.

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L A N IO T U IT T S N O C N IA P SOURCEBOOK OF ETiiIO

a di d of In an e d ic C rt o pa al a en P ul e t� y _ rl 1 01 s se e ca th an di In f o r be m 11u . A ed ect aff are by de co the tl1e of pro s v 1 011 t sec 181006 se the · ' as · far . 80 1 1 1 . ·. . 11 1 0 · 1 r ·· e . · La"' w Of S d · e �di I. a o er 'T' f w n b o ught to o ur o st � o C e th in ts h ig R �� 11 � 11a ; 111 H l ta 1 e1 am 1d 111 r , F s t o .- n; .pa.1·u·ctila' r·l.y th e cases of Romashz T,,a1par v . .1 r1e tate o1 1.-fadras (195Q) atte11t1o 1. ( 1950) A.I.R. ,I ' D lh e te 01 ta S e h T . v . r o n a . 129 d n c1 ri 1a sl lt ll B ji ,�i B d n a , 4 I.A.R. 12 i is on. s relating to sedjtio n ov e pr th er th l1e w as \V n io t s 1e q1 .. . In t]1ese two cases, the · · h d b 11 s ee a b s , v1 pr � ogated or a 1.0 r1 � ge 1 N e th to ar � 1il in ss di t . o n e � irl Itldia, wllich ar o nst1 ut1 on. A rt1cle 19 (1) C 11 1a n d 1 e th of ) (a 1) ( 19 le ic 1·t A had become ir1valid by s: w o ll fa as ad 1·e ly al n gi 1·i 0 (a) and (2) 19. (1) All citizens shall J1ave tl1e rigl1t(a) to freedon1 of s_peecl1 a11d expressions;.... y existing law � so f on e an ati op the ect aff ll sh (1) use ? ! cla of (a) se au � -cl sub in ng thi (2) No g t o li?el, slander, atm rel law def y an amat� on, km ma m fro te Sta the ts ven � Jre or to, tes rela it � 1 far as _ offends agamst decency or mora.lity or which undermmes conternpt of cot1rt, or any 111atter wl11cl1 tl1e sect1rity of, or tends to overtl1row tl1e State.

111 th e two cases 1ne11tioned above, the S111 Jreme Co urt of India held in 1950 that tl1 e p1·ovisio11s 1·elati11g to s e ditio11 in the Indian Penal Code w e. r e void, as being inco11sist e 11t witl1 Article 19 (2) of the Constit11tion. This Articl e 19 (2) was however in 1951 repealed and replaced by a new Article 19 (2), which reads as follo,vs :Nothing in sub-clat1se (a) of clause (1) sl1al1 affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any Jaw, in so far as st1ch law in1poses reasonable restrictions O'Il the exercise of tl1e rigl1t conferred by tl1e said st1b-clat1se in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations witl1 foreign states, pt1blic order, decency or morality, or in relation to co.ntempt of court, defan1ation or incite1nent to an offence.

T·he lear11ed Attorn e y-G e ne1·al 1·eplying to the s11b111issio ns made by Counsel for th e defe11dant a1·g11 e d that the provisio11s in the Nigerian Criminal Code relating to_ th e offe11ce of seditio11 a1·e not inco 11siste1 1t vvith t11e Nigerian C onstitution, and said that 1·ega1·d mt1st be had to the text o f the Nigeriar1 Constitu ion rat,l1er than t t� e Indian Co11stit11tio11, as i11 l1is s11b11iission, the p�ovisions o f the two Constitu tions are far f1 ·om bei11g sin1ila1·. T11e I11 di,1n Penal Code. he subn1itted is different n�t on.ly in orie11tation b11t also i11 specific context to th� Nioerian Cr�nal Code. G 1ve11 tl1e t e xt of tl1e I1 1clia11 Pe11al Co de a11d tl1e I11 dia1 1 C�nstitution and given the t ext of the Nig e rian C1 ·i111i11al Co de a11d tl1 e Ni cre1·ia11 Co11stit11tion 'the lear. ned Attori,ey-General 811·bmitted, the Co111·t v,1 011ld 110 d;t1bt reach differe11t conclusions from tho�� f th e . I11dia�1 Su 1:en1 e Court on the eff on tut i Co nst i ect ria n of e Ni g e th 1? on the C11n 11 11al Law of Sed1t101 1. 1 will 110w exa11li11 e section 50 (2) of th e Criminal Co de in so far as it relates· .�o Gov e rn� e11t, to se e how f"ar it goes. It see1ns to m e that the effect of the section is to ��ke It an offe n ce to us e word s e xpr e ssive of an int e ntio n to e ffect the p urp ose 0.f _excrtIIlg a stat e of ill f eeli11g ag pr e ng ai ns t sa vi the Go vernm·e11t ' st1 biJ ect to the v1 s1 011s already refe1·red t0 at th t 1· th a · e 1a a end o f ter the subsectio n. It provides in a statemeiit is 11ot s e d1._t1.ous by t. s feE e _ d 1·e as o1 1 or on ly that it te11ds to poin t out errors in th e G v e t 1th a view t res is o e r t med In , _ :: r h ·� in� � of fects. such :! � de er -� ors or pect it i Y_ · 0 poin� out that an essa nec a tnCi not te men t is t o : � � e nc viol e ingredient of th e �e ce . T s h� s !ii : _ �-A. 56 at pag e 6°0' nd th s d _b e e n laid down in R. v. Wallace Johnson 5ed'Y\i; 1 e cision h a s be e n followe i s of t s e d in all ou r cas Ill Nigeria. i .::�•':cc�4--

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esse11tial matters i11 sectio11 50 (2) of tha t . . me to ears app It tl 1 C e r 11111nal Code . . en11 tt t ) to reach a dec1s1oIJ 111 ay be 111ad .(' e an a e1or . b ned defi be e ' t w1. tJ a · t muS · IS mea11t · . ''G overnmen t d s as wor b y la\v established''?· WI1a t IS n1e i ng w follo e 1 t1 a1 1t by bY · ' � f-r' ? . . t· i �e� lSdl on d or . d a11 t emp to \V l1at exte11t ca1 1 tr11tl1 be IJleaded hatred, or _cont as 1 10 f 1t 1 o d ge ? se ar ch a defence 1 n a In se_ction 50 of the Criminal Code of Nigeria it a1Jpears tlie \Vord ''Govern ment'' will 11:ean more. t�a11 mere syste111 of Gover11111e11t, and one mtist ttiril to titution of N1ger1a to get the effect of tl1e v'.'ords ,. Go,,erniJi eiJt as b 1 aw the Cons · Y '' e ca 1tt . l ou e n d b· · · · ere t b 1 · t11 at Th tl11011 gl1 ot1t tlie Co11stittitioii ''Gove _ established. ' ment �s by law :stablished'' n_1ea11s the ?ody of perso11s \\'ho for tlie tiine befr�g collectively exercise the exec11t1ve a�1tl1or1ty of tl1e Govern111 e11t of tlJe Federtioii of Nigeria, co1:1sidered as a collective bod y a11d iI1depende11tly of tlie persons it consists of. This body of persons ma)' cl1aI1ge bt1t it ren1ai11s tl1e ce11tre of gravity as the body administeri11g tl1e Governrne11t.

In section 50 (2) (a) tl1e words 11sed are ''tl1e Gover11111e11t or Co11stitution'' '· plainly ''the Government'' has a concrete se11se, whilst ''Co1 1stit11tion'' has tl1e abstract sense of ''form or kind of polity''; ''tl1e Gover11me11t'' n1ea11s ''tl1e body of persons charged \vith the d11ty of gover1li11g''; or ''tl1e 1Jri11cipal officers of a state''.

I now consider tl1e words Hatrecl a11d Co11te111pt: Tl1ese are stro11g \vords: they are akin to disaffection. I would defi11e the111 as Dixo11, J. defi11ed disaffection in Bur11s v. Ra11sley ( 1959) Commo11 \vealtl1 La\v Re1Jorts 101 a.t page 109, a11cl bor rowi11g his words, I \.\iOtlld defi11e ''hatred a11d conten11)t'' as ''11ot 1nercly tl1e abse1 1ce of affection and regard, b11t disloyalty, e11mity, l1ostility." The worcl ''Disaffectio11'' to my mind \Vas aptly defined by Ricl1, J. i11 Bi1r11s v. Ra11s!eJ1 (s11pra) at page 1 12 as follows:-

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lity to cons . Disaffection connotes enmity and hostility, estranged allegiance, disloyalty, l1osti tituted authority or to a particular form of political Governn1ent. '

The effect of this definition i11 co11sidering tl1e section, to 1ny 1nind, is that a person has a right to disc11ss any grieva11ce or criticise, canvass and ce11s11 re tl1e a_cts of Government and their public policy. He may eve11 do this ,vitl1 a vie\V to effect1ti g a change in the party in po\ver or to call atte11tio11 to tl1e \veal<ness of a G:0 v_ er11n1ent, so long as he kee ps within the lin1its of fai r criticism. It is clearly 1eg1t11 11ate aiid constit�tional by means of fair arg1.1111e11t to criticise th_e Gover1:111ent of tlie day. as e 11n m� r 11t 11a l1g n1a ha a 1n 11t 1ne 1 W � JS not permitted is to criticise the Gover11 · ce. described above, for such attacks, by their nature te11d to affect tlie public pea

I now have to consider whether tr11th can be a defence in a charge of sedition UD<ler the Criminal Code? Where tl1e seditio11s i 11 te11tio11 \Vas clear au<l patetlt trutb c�nnot be a defence . it may l1owever in certai11 circumsta11ces, be· a relevant con n o · rs e · p e . .' th f sider au· 0� for ' ' 1 _1on . e 111t I . the purpose of ascerta10111g or to show the rea °: l na inu Cr e th of harg e n considering the x ) (u (2) e ceptions provided in section 50 cCode. d I

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e d o C l . 1a i1 . im r C 1e tl · f ) th·18· connection the tr11e .mearung of· sectio n 50 (3 require·s cons1 · ' 'deration. The section reads:.In

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A N O I W L 'f A U L IT T S N O C N IA P O I I IT SoURCEBOOK OF E

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y act was done, any words were . 1n · g w·hetl1er the intention with which an · . 0 11 n r te d e n y I er on shall be dee med s, rs ev ou pe d 1t1 se (3) t no s wa or s wa ed ish bl t was pu d t uc nd at the time and Under s Co hi om fr w llo fo y ll ra tu na ' ld ou w e s which :: �: �� _ on r a; 11 o� d � �� :� lf. e s im h d te c u d n o c o s e h l1 ic the circumstances in wl1

_ le e to ab th _ en p is ] ra c �tp se [s ro n io ct io se ut b su n of e os i·p pu e h t ew vi In my t g u in o ll h y it ca w an lf se it ex t t rinsic n 1e !1 cu o d e th r o s rd o w to rely on tJ1 e ac t or th e t _ b e co n strued so as to d�prive o n � ca n 1? ct se b �u e l1 t 1t t evidence to prove the intent, b e f os o e t th n se o t 1s ou on t1 t en 1� the 1n ly n o _ is h at th ow sh o t t a person of his rigl1 t rut h m ay be a relevant cons1dere os rp pu s hi t r fo 1d a1 ) except ions to sect ion 50 (2 atio11 . n io ct on se 24 ) ed (2 ac f pl [o be e to th n io ct ru t ns co t ec rr co e th is Now what e th ts prohibited ac lid if va ly on is w la a t a th 1ed gt ar as w t I Constitutions] above? e t ha t this is taking m to s em se It . er rd so di to ly t c re di d lea o t ely lik are i11 every case, o cra tic society m a in de e bl fia sti ju be t us m t i r fo , on isi ov pr e too' narro\'\' a view of th t his may involve the d an r, de or c bli pt1 rve e es pr t o s 1t ion cat e 1J1· to t ake 1·easonable d t t o disorder, lea gh mi d, ine tra res un d an d ke c he nc 1 t if , ich wh s act of n prohibitio t ly. This Court must be e ve11 thougl1 tl1ose acts wo11ld n. ot themselves do so direc the arbiter of wl1etl1 er or not any partic11lar law is reasonably justifiable. t l1is

I am satisfied tl1at in Nigeria the except ions to sec t ion 50 (2) of the Criminal Code (which I J1ave already referred t o in this judgment) form enough protection to a c harge of sedition and they offer enough freed om of expression to anybody i11 our democr·atic so ciety. Tl1e section does not in my view prevent fair criticism of the Gover11n1e11t a11d only prohibits pt1 blicat ions made with the intention of ex�iting hatred a11d co11temp t, or disaffec t ion against, i11ter alia, the Government. It rs the duty of tl1e Co11rt to decide the real int ention of persons ch.arged on the facts of eacl1 par�ic�la1· case . I t is however for a person charged to show that his defence comes w1th 1n the exception .

. I wo11 Id ��m 11p by sayi 11 g. that tl1 e position to-day in Nigeria, in my view, is that _the prov1s1�11 of_ tl1e Co11st1tu t io11 relating to Fundan1ental Human Righ ts has not In an� �ay 1nval1dated t l1 e Law of Sedi tio11 as co11tai11ed in sections 50 and 51 of th� Cr� min �I Code i 11 so far as these sections relate to the matters under consi derati on 111 tl11s reference. r�t:, F.�. :-I agre e t liat t l1� qt1es tio11 referred to us sl1ould be answered as the �.11e 11�stice proposes, a nd with tl1e reasons l1e gives but the mat ter is one of h p�rta11ce tl1�t I sl1ot1ld like to add a few words �f my own. If the courts � f s �!c 111 con�tr�iin _g t e r�f�rences to '' tl1e Government '', t o ''hatred and c n ? � � tern �t . 111 the_ way indicated o d1sa �ection thin I , Justice � Chief by the � t � the c ts w c tl�e . �ect�011 makes ptinishable inevitably endanger the basis of pub�c order to a s11 ffi c1ent exte 11 t to inake t tic ra mo c de he a sec in tio n rea jus son tifi ab abl ly e society.

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. There is one fact . to which our h i h c w but atten tion was not drawn by counsel I do not feel abl_ e t ignore. of k tas The the Constitut ion entrusts t he courts with deciding conclus 1 whet e t p Cha er s or vene not any contra legisla tive measu � re III of the Con st�;�trI � g sug n , �n 1 �o not wish might to say any hing which that the c ourts are e� ad � .� t at th ing t their responsibilities. Nevertheless it is righ courts should rem b_ er 1 tha t their �unct i�n is t o decide whether a restri�tion reasonably justifia�:11 ; 0 ws e in a democratic society, not to vie own their impose

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o be. In c o11sidering th e co rrec t jt1clicial appr t t 01 1g h la\ \/ oac_ ll tlle Supreme b t th e in State of Madras v. Row (1952) S.C.R. 597: _'. said, India of � �0

�lusive fac�o�s �nd (orming tl1eir own conception of wllat is suc l1 atin g eval u reasonable in all In 1t 1s 1nev1t case, able gtven tl1at tl1e social pl1itosopl1y and tlle seaIe of. a . . s tance cums · r : o f va1ues d · ci . . the ec1 tl 1e s1o s 1 1ou n 1� ld at1 �g a� 1 an 1n1porta�t part and the limit to 1c1p � o.f the judges p artleg1sl their Judg emen ca11 t only be at1ve dtcta ted by tl1eir sense of respons'b' nce \Vtlh 1' · 1 1 l't · · 1 Y and . 1 errere 10 · · · fl 10n re tl t ec 1a t 1e tl er1ng b C o . so st1tu h t1on e · 1s n1eant not only for people of tlleir estraint �d t_ � self-r,u of thii11dng but for all, and tl1at tl1e n1aJor1ty of tl1e elected representatives ay n . . . of tlle peop1e . o,v " .. tl . 1. t.ton o f 1e restr1ct1ons, considered then1 to be reasonable. have, in author1s1ng t he 1n1pos

In s.in:ular vein �oln1e�, J., _delivering tl1e judge1ne11t of tl1e St1preine Co ti rt of the Uruted States 1n Af!1ssoi1r1, Kan� as _a,zcl Texas Railroacl v. May (1904) 194 U.S. 267, a case concerning th e co11st1tt1t1onal gt1ara11tee of the equal protection of the la'ivs said:-

It must be remembered that legislatt1res are ultimate guardians of tl1e liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the Cot1rts.

Unsworth, F.J. :- I agree with tl1e views that have already bee11 expressed. The la\V relating to sediti on in a de1nocratic society is desig11 ed. to sect1re tl1e safety of the State and pt1blic order, a11d I do 11ot tl1i11k tha t tl1e l a \v i11 Nige ria, i11 so far as it relates to the m atters t111der co11sideratio11 i11 this r ef ere11ce, go es f t1rther than is reasonably justifiable for this pt1rpose. 111 tlus r es1J ect tl1er e is 11otl1ing I can 11 sefully add to what has al.ready b een said .

Tl1e exten t to which prosec t1tio11s for sedition are brot1gl1t is a matter for tl1e Director of Pt1bli c Prosect1tion, witl1ot1t wl1os e co11 se11t t111der st1bsec tion (2) of section 52 of the Crimina l Code 110 prosect1tion for s editio11 car1 lJe institt1ted. Tl1e tenure of office of this official is sec t1red by sectio11 145 of the Co11 stitutio11 of the Federatio n of Nigeria, and subsection (6) of sectio11 97 of tl1a t Co11stitt1tion p_rovi?es that in the exercis e of his powers the Director sl1all 11ot be subject to tl1e cl1r ect1on or control of any other person or autl1ority. Notes and questions on t/1e above case.

1. What evidence did the Prose cuto r introdt1ce i11 tl1e Obi case ? 2. C�mpare the appr oach of lioln1es, J. i11 Git!O'rV v. NelV rorl� 268 ·u·?· 652 (1925). Gitlow wa s indicted for publisl1ing a pa1npl1let adv ocat111g ,revolutionary '.,ocial_ism", "revoIutio nary mass action", "mass strikes", th� " 0v�rthrow ". �� the P�r��me ntary state" and t he establishment of "pr oletan�n dictator ship · t! maJority of the C ot1rt upheld the c onstitt1t ionality of G1tlow s con�iction sion of P1111 th�ory that the pamphlet res exp e ''th t no ', 11t' wa s a ''direct inciten1e ��; _ h d a� e forc phical abstraction'' adv by ent 1 . n er11 gov of row rth ove ocating tl1e . ent1ng ' d1s . s me s Ho l Prese ' . nted a suffi-. e ic t· tis cient danger'' to justi fy pun1shn1 ent. J e 226 -228 ' g (wilh Brandeis, J.), a p (see teSt'' argued the '' cle a r and pr esent da11ger Supra) and not ed: · · a111·rest tl1at · ere was 110 preth ' If what I think the correc t t est is appl1ed , it is m e th of art th ce sent ?anger of an attempt to ove rthrow tl1e governmen; by_fo; �f : �'tJ1 at this s i s 1 8 � e adm�ttedly sn1all .vi s t . 11 a fet1.d minority wl10 shared tl1� d e an is ide a ry e Ev �t �a�festo was m ore than a theory, tha t �t \Va� a.n 11? ci�eme ess so me tii1 l on d 1 citement. act s it d e beli ev ff _ if It and o beli ers ef itself for i \ement at its birth. � o 0 her b el ief outweighs it or som e failt1r e o f ene rgy st 1fles the m

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N IO T fU A L LAW ir T S N o C N IA P IO H T E OF _ _ EB OOK _ _ · _ -o UR __ �S::��:,C:::=�- -

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. of tllis document ha d been laid as an attmept to induce a 1 101 t ca. . bl1 p�1 n u f · . de te i in ni e m e If the so tim at fi u n ot t e 1 th . d an 1 ce · on · · . at ' . t re 1 e1 1 1 n . gover1 · · gainst · l h ou w ct Je d ob e av t1pr1s1ng a l1e T en be . 1 o 1 t10 1es q1 ne nt re e th ff wi di a cl t e e1 pr� it ":ould l1 ave ! : ea l' s11bJiect to. the doubt· whether there was an.y danger that t>h t d 1 1 · 11 vV a l e 1 tl which or h s, e w er w th d th o er 1n 1t or t, 1 , s wa 1 st re 1y a1 t no e · IC dl o · pi d ul o the_ P11 blic. a t1011• c e m e h t ct t. di Bu in . t es nt 11c 1e leg al eq ns co es t le ib he · ss po · 111 ro · f te o m e futile and too 1 ' ' . e r 1o n 1g i1 1 l t 1 o 1 d n a 1 1 publicatio u d te y p b y o e tl d a th en u f q se ll b su c ourt e er w s ei d 11 ra B d 11 a es Tile views of Holm ). 0 2 2 e g a _p a r· p it s t t1 o t se , o (see Te1·111i11iello 1,. Cl1icag rd da !o in n a. rm st te al e d. tio e u ti� ns the c? _a p lo ve de . J. C. a ol in � de A 3. Does t , at ha so th 1s w da If an . s st 1c 1t cr ? s rd it 1 l 1 1 1s pu to er w po _ s t' en !i,nits of governn1 rt in e e ou th th C to i d re Ob se er f ca re n tio es u q· l na io 11t tit 11s co e th at th 4 Note s e on y of t� cti li� Se na 1 5_ io d 11t an tit n� co e tl1 on le ru rt 1 1 Co e 1 tl id D was a�biguous. ase? What lar c cu rti s pa i Ob to ied pl ap as · 01 t? ac str ab e th 11 i de Co 50(2) of tl1e difference does it make? From De1111is et al.

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U11itecl States 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

This was a prosecution initiated in 1950 of 11 leaders of the Communist Party under sections 2 and 3 of tl1e Sn1jth Act, 18 U.S.C. par. 2385, wluch make it unlawful, inter alia, ''to organize or l1elp to organize any society, grouJ>, or assen1bly or persons who teach, advocate, or encourage tl1e overthrow or destn1ctio11 of any governn1ent in tl1e United States by force or ,riolence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any st1ch society, group, or assembly of perso.ns, know ing the purposes thereof.''

From the Opinion of Vi11son C.J.

B11� the C ou1·t of Appeals held that the record supports the following br o ad con_c�us1011s: B� v�rt11e of ��eir co11trol over the political apparatus of the Comm unist Poli_tica_l As_soc1at1on, pef:lt1one1·s [tl1 e defe11 dan·ts] "''ere able 'to tra nsform that or garuzation 1 11to the C omn111nist Party; tl1at the policies ot.. the Associatio n were cha!1�ed from peacef11l co-ope1·atio11 witl1 t11e Ur1ited States and its econo mic and po�tical str11ctt1 re to a l)Olicy wl1icl1 had ex.isted. be,fore tl1e United States and Soviet Union were fig11ting a con1mo11 e11en1 y, 11a111ely a policy which worked for the over t�row 0� t�e _Governn1ent by force a11 d viole;1 ce that the Comm11nist Party is a ; 11 glll� disciplinecl orga11izatio11 , adept at infi.lt1·ation i t1to strategic positions, use } o aliases? autl c�o11ble111ea11 i11g la11gt1age tha t the Party i rigidl controlled; that · y s · · C 01nmun1st 11nl1ke otl1er l)o1·1t·ical a1·t e' · · ic 1 o p y the fr�m s, tolerate d1sse11s no 1?n _ . . _ laid down b, the gt l tng for�e_ , bttt,, � � _ ed ow foil y � that t slavish , l 1 e l � approv ed 1s progra m � _ by the meilbei·s _of the Party, that _ t n e stat m r the 1· · the l1te atu e of the Party and e s an·d act.1v1t·1es of its leaders p�titi · · th f o one goal , rs here, e gener al a11 advo cate, d the _ Party was during . �th e period _in question, to acl1 ieve a succes e th of ow ov ert hr sfu l existin g 0;der bY 1 orce and v1ole11ce . . _.. . --=The obvious purpo se Of t·h . �t �=o -n , me11t e statute 1s to protect existing Govern from change b · a e ble y � a violence, rev ol t i �� , l �f til a�d c<?n�titu�ional means, but from chang b _ -:-�; e�s.:� -��-:..;: rro rism r n o . _g Th � at C . � 1t �he p 1s wit hin the o�ver _of pr�tect the Government . :. . · � ttJ s _ t po e _ Un prp ited · States frorp armed rebellion 1s a \Vhich requires little a· -, · -� . _ · the 1scuss1on · Wha"'e +. ver th . eoretical merit , there may be to · . ---..--..---__-- - � .

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HUMAN RIGHTS - POLITICAL A D ECON OMIC DEVELOPM � ENT

975

> ere i s a "right" to rebell i o th th a t t en � � n against dictat .n � a orial gov r11 e 1 ts . the e whe istin re g h uro lle�� wt�g strl1 forc ctl e x 1 r e t of m r 1s t ou tl1e governmeiJt ' ; · . . provides i.or peace 111 . ), l'.nnc1�1 e r c e e h e. 1e � n t c g _ W a n rl y o rd e f _of governmental and � �, h e r i¥ li �, e v fo o t1 l1 r o 1t n p 1o a ra n w , h ic p r h e of p r 11 e 1c1p] e , carried to it lplessness i n th e fac s lo g ic al cotlcltlsion, . y h rc a n a to d a le st u :gtit n1 . In this ca�� we are_sqi1arely p �ese11ted witl1 the a1)plic a ti o n of tlle ''clear aiJ te a n s! n m d g , 1 er _ st l d a _ e d c id nt e w pr d ese h a t t�1a t ?hrase i 11:p� �II:\· rts. We first note tlJ at · many o f the cases 1 n ,:vhich this Co11r t has 1ev_e1sed co1 1v1ctions by use o f tlJis or similar tests have be� n based o_n the fact !l1at tl1e interest Vi'l1icl1 tl 1e S ta te was attempt \V it ct a se pr s to lf ot o 1n e s1 to ng 1b st a n i t 1 a l to \v arra1 1t restrictio11 of spee (i . °' " •• J cJ1.... <.:�: O verthrow of tl1e Governn1ent b y force a11d vio le11ce is certainly a stibst · . eno ug h interest for the Gover11me1 1t to a11tial li111it SJ)eech. Indeed, tl1is W•1�� is tl1e 11Itimate value of any society, for if a society can11 ot protect its v e ry str11ct11re fro n 1 armed attack, it rn t1 st follo,:v th a t n o subo in te rn al rd /!1�C i11ate vall1e ca11 be protected . If, the11, , thls interest may be protected, the literal JJroblem 1 \, I1 icl1 is prese11ted is \Vl1a t has m be en eant by the lise of the phrase ''clear a11d IJre sent da11 ger'' of tl1 e 11tterances bringing about the evil \vithin the po ,,1er of Congr ess to p1111 ish. Obviously, the words cannot n1 ea n that ·be fo re tl1 e Gover11 n1e11 t 111 ay act, it m ust wait 11ntil tl1e pi1tsclz is about to be ex ecu t� te d, the pla11 s l1ave been laid a11d � the signal is awaited. ...,, .. ,. Chief Judge Learned Ha11 d, \Vriting for the 111ajorit)' below, interi)reted the ph ra se as follows: ''In each case [co11 rts] �"; m 11st asl< w l1etl1 er tl1 e gra·vity of tJ1 e 'evil', discounted by its improbability, justifi es s1 1c l 1 invasio11 of free s1Jeecl1 as is nece ssary to a void the danger." 183 F . 2d at 212. W e adopt this staten1 e1 1t of the r11le.... ·, I Likewise , we are in accord with tl1e co11rt beloVi', wl1ic l1 affirmed tl1e trial cot1rt's nd ing that the requisite danger existed.Tl fi :l 1e n1ere fact tl1at fro111 tl1e JJeriod 1945 lo 1948 petitioners' ac ;i tivities did not r es11 lt i11 an atte1n1 )t to overthrow tl1 e Gover 11ment by force and violence is of course 110 a11swer to th e fact tl1 at tl1ere \Vas a gro11 p that �as ready to make tl1e attempt. The for1nation by petitio11 ers of such a l 1igh ly orga.nized conspiracy, \vitl 1 rigi dly discipli11ed n1e111bers subject to call wb�11 tl1e lea de rs, these pe titioners, f elt that t . he tim e ha d come for action, coupled wrth t he inflammable natur e of world co11 dition s, similar uprisi11gs i 11 otl1 er c�11 11 tr1es ,vith h?m pe�ti ?ners wer� i� the very. lea � st idealogic�lly a ttur!ed,_ convrnce us tha� hell ' co n vic tio I: tenti ns we re JUS!Jfied on this score. An th analy dis es the co pos of _ n d is sis on that a conspir acy to advocate, as disti11 ished fron1 the advocacy it�elf, gu t be constit I � is the existe utionally r estrained, because i t comprises only the p�epara t wn. nce of the conspiracy which create . f s the da 11 ger. · · · If tlle ingredients the ea ction are present' we cannot bin the ; 1?s r d Go vernment to ,vait 1111til the catalySt add ed....

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From the .. d'1ssen . t1.ng op1n 1 on of Douglas, J. f this e e a � rnentl Wer w r case where those who claimed protection u11der tile FirSt Ai�l eo<l e teaching t · · the filchi he t echniques of sab ota ge, the assas s1na tron f the Pres1 dent ng o do 11/arf are nd f �um ents from public fil es, the plan ting of bombs, tl!e ar 0f street � the tea�h the like, I would have no doubts. The freedom to speak 1�:o abs�lute � o ing f methods of terror and othe seditio11 co11duct shoti be be ond r s

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I T ' U f I� T ONAL L A W S N o C N IA P IO H T E F O SoURCEBOOK

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se s ca hl as T w . gu ity ar al or m im ed as d an if ity 1 i e th sc ob ith w 1g 1 o a 1 the p a1e s ous t diti e s duc con ch e o mu c into ted the Jor r ne 11 t im1 e 1 rg11 T · a 0 rd. l1e . · s. t · c · . a f e h t were t t n C f t es o 1 v1 t1 u m ac e om th s r st p fo n1 , i al pe ar ap l lo ing pu po as 1 l it 1d a 1 sy That is ea edg e. But the f�ct l ow �n on m m co e ar ld or w ee is fr e th st irl that a ag . g in nl e and sch T e 1s [another] statute w hi ch er l 1 l. ia _tr � tl1 t a d ce I11 make s no stlch evidence "'as inti�oc ers , ho w ever, w ere not �barged with on t1 1 et P l. f11 w 1la 111 a a seditio11s co1 1spir acy ere charged with a cons p w y he T t. �n m rn e ov G e th iracy "conspiracy to overthrow" p e ople �ho t each �n d advocate the of s e_ 1 bl m e s as d 11 a ps o11 gr to form a party a11d e an d wi th a conspiracy to advocate c len vio or e rc fo by t en m rn ve Go overthrow of 011r we l l be that indoctrin a tio n y ma . It e c len vio d an ce for by w hro and te ach its overt ern me nt ":ould be_ indictable under v Go e th _ oy s�r e d to r ·ro ter of 1es iqt in t11e techn ed h e re 1 s of a different character. n em nd co 1s 1ch wl1 ng chi tea the t Bu e. tut a either st How it can be s aid tl1at there is a cl ear and pre sent danger that this advocacy \vill succeed is, therefore, a mystery. Some nations le ss resilient than the United St ates, ,vhe1·e i llitera.cy is hig·h and where democratic traditions are only bu.dding, migl1t have to tal<e d1· astic steps and j ail t hes e men for merely speaking theircreed. But in Ame1 ·ica they a1·e mise1·able merchants of u 1 1\¥anted ideas; their wares rema in unsold. The fact that tl1ei1· ideas a1·e abhorrent do es not m ake them powerful.

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The political i1 npote11ce of the Communists in th.is count[)' does not, ofcourse, dispose of the p 1 ·oblen1. Their nt1mbers; their positions in industry and government; the exte11t to vvl1icl1 tl1ey ]1ave in f act infiltrated the police, the armed services, tra ns port ation, stevedoring, power plants, 1nunitions works, and other critical pl aces these facts all bea.r on the likelihood that their advocacy of the Soviet theo ry of J revolt1tio11 \:vill e1 1da11ge1· tl1e Republic. B11t t· 1 1e record . is silent on these facts.... ' Notes a11d Co111111ents to tl1e Abo1,e.

I . The De11�is c ase deals with the problem of'' orga1uzing'' and using aco�esi_ve gro1_ 1P to advo�ate overth1·�vv of tl1e goveri11ne1 1t by unlawful means. The maJo rity bel 1eve� tl1e evidence establ1sl1ed a ''clear and preser1 t d:111ge r'' - a.s that test should l be appli�� to st1ch c ases. D011glas, J. felt tl1 at certai 1 1 critical evidence was lacking. . Wl1at ev1clence? 2· The Court's judg1nei:it in.Dennis was criticised by a number of com?1enta- ;' tors, an<l s11bseq�1e11tly mod1fied b)' t]1e Cot SUb · in ed ra is 1 rt itself. A critical issue sequent prose_c11t1011 s r·ela ted to tl1e reqt1is ers lea d pa rtly ite pr ''in e nt'' or oo t of f to act on tl1e11· advoc 'cy In t en a · _ 1·.11.t· e11 t to e11ga ge 1.11 over thro rnro 1 e · gov the of w . . N,oto v. Unzted StateJ' 367 U.S. 290, the Court said: e reiter ate now, that the mere abstract teaching of Communi5l fheo yv . rY, a. inc1 u� 111g the teachi11g of the o f _ y ess it mo r a l propriety or even moral nec r f i t · resort to f01·ce a. 11ct v 10 • t Ien v10 c · ·1ence, 1s 11ot. tl1e san1e r 1 p gro u . a pa rin pr as g e � . · t : j ac tio_n a11d stee_l rng e� 1r � it to st1ch actio11. There must b e some substantial f is . or circumstanti al evidence h c whi Of a ca.11 to vio lence no w or in the future . er· bo· tll sufl�I :· tb · O fi eJlt1Y strong and sufficiently e th to r co lo p len e rv d as iv to e wise an1b1guous t heoretic al material ,, . " ni 3. After the Supreme . ote ''i Of c our of t · pro add ed th qui red e . ele me s t. o.-�--\ nt of re . to act 011 their adv t ca c , the ? government withdrew or abandoned all atteJPP. _ � i y prosecute Commun1st p . ..., . , . · -Ji arty leaders • .· i t J

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977

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SECTION 6 EQUAL PROTECTION OF TI-IE LAWS

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Introduction

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Wbat values a nd policies underlie Articles 37 and 38 of the Constitution?

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from Barker, Principles of Social a11cl Political Tf1eory (1951) pages 150-153 .

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Jus t as each person, because he is a perso11, is a free legal age11t i11 the scheme :•· of the State, so also each person, becat1se be is a person and as 111t1cl1 a perso11 as all other persons, has an eq11al sta11ding, a11d co11nts eqt1ally as a legal .factor, t1nder that Scheme. This is not to say that eacl1 1noral personality is eqt1al to every other, in terms of total capacity and t he po'rver of developi11g st1cl1 capacity; it is only �- to say that each legal perso11ality is eqt1al to every other i11 tern1s of legal capacity. I

The principle of Eq11ality accordi11gly 111eans tl1at ,vhatever co11ditio11s are guaran teed t o me, in t he form of rights, sl1all also, a11d i11 tl1e san1e n1east1re, be ·1 guaranteed to others, and t hat vvbatever rights are give11 to otl1ers sl1all also be given to me. Act ing on that principle of dis tributio11 t l1e Jaw gives to all - of whatever class and whichever sex, as soon as the a.ge of discretio11 is reacl1ed a11cl the legal t ., pers�n has fully emerged - an eq11al rigl1t of o\v11i11g J)roper t y. This is 11ot to say that it gives an equal right to owning an eq11al amou11t , \Vhicl1 is a11 e11tirely different I, pr oposition; it is simply t o say that it recog11izes an eq11al capacity for owning. 1.:

A cardinal question which confro11ts us today is how far tl1e State and its la_ \v should go in promoting equality of culture and eco1101nic equality; how_ far, in a wor?, the Sta t e should add social to legal eqt1alit y, or, n1ore exactly (s111ce t l1e �t�te Is a legal associat ion, and since any eq11ality \vl1icl1 i t promotes m t1st also be _ . 10 its nature legal), how far it sho11ld extend its pri11ciple of legal equalit y into t l1e field_ of culture and t he field JJossible to stop short at a bare conit Is of s. economic \ cep �ion °f_ legal equality, or must that co11ception be extended and e11riche? by 1 the inclusion in it of the idea of an increasi11gly eqt1al distribt1t io11 botl1 of edt i cational op·portuni· tie · s and of econom facu ic lties? 1 I

38 e a 3 sid er, c arefully, the e tent Articl by n � �� nteed guara _ to which the essential rights x I of th Re is� tion, e.g stitu Con !11� by stitu Coo teed ran gua tioo ts righ ? are embodied in other the r�t �0 due proces s of Jaw'', the rights to freedom of speecl1 and religion. '. . the h it w l i Suppose t0 example, that legislation is enacted which deals spe_ci·fi� ly le so d n a 11 a · Y � : r ghts of uni.'versity t Public uc d con d _an ons publicati students to organize associations ' n1aintain assem·bl'1es' and su ppose the law were challenged vvitl1 the argun1ents tl1at 1 t ·· (a) viol�ted rights guaranteed under Articles 41 and 45 of the Constitution (as modified by t1cle 65); Ar {b) vi olate d Procedu ral rights guaranteed by Article 43; (c) violated 1· · Jes 37 and 38 of t11e � ghts to equal treatment under law guaranteed. by Artic Con· st'1tut1on. , . derations si n o 1 beln What respe t does each c d n a t s er 1n do Weighed in �h ? To \vhat axtent argument focus attention on diff erent ! �� e co �rse of ma.king a proper constitutional determ1n � 10�1t� ro the dec isio (a) issues of e o n 0 00 the issue (b)? raised by contention (c), supra, depend on t e

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SOUl{CEBOOK OF E·rHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

978

The Problem of ''Classification'' e ' s' th f n. aw o io L , ct 37 te ro if P al C al 11 q E n e or 1 .l ''T ia , ek ro B n te ld t a. l at in ss ti T From Lal1' Rel7ieM' 341 (1949). d a ot be an nn m c� de n th ti? ec ot pr �t l_ la ua eq r fo ws d an m de e th at th . It is clear t l, at ac al t to 1s us t 1. m 1f 1 e, ur at p sl m gi le e �s h� T . 1s o1 rs pe l al to lly sa er iv 11n _ y pl ap ps l ou s or ia se gr ec as cl sp to s fit of ne be in l ia ec sp t an gr or on up s en rd bu special dividuals. y lit ua n r eq ro fo nf d co an · m ts de e th the h ic wh at t in po e th at e riv ar lis th e W e e th ng es ra of in rm �e rso h de pe ic wh ns n tio ca ifi ss cla e th is it r Fo '· right to classifJ t y no pl es ap to do l ich 'al wh w r la pe a of t fi ne be or e11 rd bu ial ec sp e th by affected er ew in ce Br sti 8, Ju 189 r. M 'that id sa ,' on ati c fi ssi cla of ce e11 ess e th sons.' 'It is of on g 1:1p tin the r�s l se era tho gen m fr� n! ere di� ns rde bu . t... cas are ss cla the 11po11 , . . . ... ty public .... I11deed, the very. idea of classrficat1on 1s that of mequali . Here, then is a paradox: The equal protection of the laws is a 'pledge of the protection of equal la,vs.' B11t laws may classify. And 'the very idea of classification is tl1 at of i 11 eqt1ality.' In tackling this paradox the Court has neither abandoned tl1e den1 a11d for equality nor denied the legislative right to classify. It has taken a n1iddle co11rse. It has resolved the contrad.ictory demands of legislative specialization and constitutio11al generality by a doctrine of reasonable classification. I

The essence of that doctrine can be stated witl1 decep·tive simplicity. The Consti tution does not require tl1at t hings different in fact be treated in law as thoug.h they were the sa1ne. B11t it does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are similarly sit11ated be sin1ila1·Iy t1·eated. The meas11re of the reasonableness of a classi fication is the degree of its s11ccess in treating similarly those similarly situated....

Presumably classifications wl1 icl1 provide for difterent ·treatment of persons because of 1·ace _or 1·eligion wol1ld be immedia.tely suspe.ct under the Constitution, be_ca:use.they strike at the heart of. some of the values secured. by these guarantees. D1st1nct1ons based _ upo11 sex 01· age pose different, and sometimes difficult questio�s. �her_e are, ofte1�, �mp?rta11t, desi1·a· b1e i11terests to be secu1·ed by making such dis l tinctions. Bt1t d1st111ct1ons a11d classificatio11s based 011 the above g1·ounds are �nly a small segme11t of the possible p1·oble1ns vvhich ca11 arise u.nder Articles 37 and 38. T�ere �re ma11y otl1er kincls o� distit1ctio11s vvbicl1 1·esult f'rom legislation dire c�ed at partictilar _1Jroble111s a�1d 1)a.1·t1cl1la.r gro11ps of people. With a 1noment's refle cti�n : '. you c�n beg1 11 t? compile a list of 1·easo1Jable - perhaps highly desirable - dif- ! . fe�e1:tiat 1 011s wl11cl1 legislatio11 1night ma ke. Th e different classifications include� · � l w1th1 11 ta� laws, for exarnple, are a classic illustration; so are laws regulating partI· 1: cular businesses 01· occupations. f� I

From the opii1ion of Frankfurter, J. in Morey

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HUlrfAN RIGHTS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

979

tion i s inhe ren t i n legislatio . Clas sific a ind. he m n the E i 1 prot ctio 11 t of 1. es d mo _ _ ; To ni � qt recog l it. e11 ; d c ze d ed forbi mark liff t a no re11 e s es h tl at · c: ex1s t 111 i:act 1 s .isregard pract1c Clause · 1 }'A' a c 111ere11ces and co11ce11trate d to c: ]a\V. on son1e abstrac t , . . .' ' liv1n�. " 1ess. logic . , J t1e is s ue 'den I u CODSl.der

tion declares : "The stat e shall not deny to any perso11 equality before tl1e law or the equal J)rotection of ,, the laws ·

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now the following two Indiar1 cases. Note tl1at Article 14 of tile 1n d'tan Consl1t ..u-

v. Ar1i-var A.Ii 1952 All I11dia Reporter 75 (Stlpreme Court Bengal West of State From of India).

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The accused and forty-nine otl1er persons were t_ ri��l tinder an en1ergency "Special Courts Act". This Act ,vas promulgated a s a result of the act1v1t1es of large gangs of "dacoits'' _ sin1ilar lo bandit "s.hiftas'' in Etlliopia. The dacoits L1ad raided to\vns and factories, robbing and killing. . 1ent to establisl1 a "Special Court'' to "try such The Act, (Section 5), enabled tl1e State Goveron offenses... or classes of cases, as tl1e state govero111ent n1ay by general or special order direct''. Certain modifications were made in the procedure to be follov, ed in trials before the SJJecial Couri; it ,vas assumed however, tl1at none of the JJrocedural changes violated fundan1ental rights, but they were, concededly, less advantageot1s to the accused tha11 tl1e procedures followed under the regular Criminal Procedure Act. The apparent pur1Jose of the Special Courts Act ,vas to enable a more rapid, efficient disposition of cases invol ving a large nun1ber of defendants wl10 had acted in concert. The accused alleged that the Special Courts Act violated rights guaranteed by f\.rticle 14 of the Costitution, s1rpra. The Supren1e Court agreed.

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I now come to the other head of arg11111e11ts pt1t for\vard....a11ci tl1e pri11 cipal p oint for our consideration is \Vhetl1er the ap1)are11t d iscrin1inations tl1at· l1ave been made in the Act can be j11stified on the basis of a reaso11able classificatio11 . It vests an unrestricte d d iscretio11 i11 tl1e State Govern1ne11t to direct a11y cases 0� class es of cases to be tried by the Speci al Cot1rt i11 accordance \vitl1 tl1e proceclt1re laid down in the Act. It is not s tated tl1at i t is onl)' \Vl1en speedier trial is 11 ecessary that the discretion should be exercised . . In th� second place, assuming that the preamble tl1ro\VS a11y. ligl1t 11pon t!1e i.at_ e�retat.1on of the sec tion, I am definitely of opinio11 that the 11ecess1ty of� speed ier t�ial 18 too vague, uncertain 0r the s basi nal ratio a or111 f to rion . and elt1sive a crite the clis�riminations made. The h \vhic ct obje tl1e be 1nay trial dier ssi ty for spee nece legislat ure had in view t. · · · l tmei enac the ing 111al< for sion or it may be tl1e occa t t e question is: how is th.is necessity of speedier t rial to be d et eriiiiii e_d ? u Not Bby b reference to the nature of the of fe11ces or the circun1sta11ces u11d er. wl_1��l1 s or the area 1e 1t r a l1 u c e · wb1ch p y ' tl1ey are con1m1. tted , no r eve11 by re1e 11 a · O t �e · In re11 i:o r a eced e nts o u ab tbe to le�t _ 1s ion ect f the offenders themselves, bu t the sel !� :� and �nfett e . red discretion of the executive government with nothmg i n the 1 I b llUid e or co � trol ar i ai t i bt l al at its ac tion. This is no t a reaso11able classificatio11 tra sele ry ction. e h t A line is dra f . . o e d i s e 11 0 11 0 . . · n a . t 1fic1ally between t\-VO classes o f cases. w r n e the h are . ou d to . g ass to ses J cJ o 1 t e11 s tho e r ve Go ses .i ca w ate St t ch he b p� r °. Governm ��· t does cia Spe l ourt , ?-ill on the other side stand th e rest wl11ch tl1e State

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980

SOURCEBOOK OF ETI-:IIOPJAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

a y m s i se ed ca rv by se ob e th en be . S s ba � � It re h. up 11c to to me er op pr ld i a. fit not think n 1o at c i s 1f ha ss la of en rt be so e 1n te s0 at at th � pt ct m fa e tl1 ed at th a ic er n1 A of Cotli·t . se u ty li la c a u q e e th f o h c a re e th will no·t relieve a statute from s n ha io en at be fic si m as e cl ad a at th t bu 1ly 01 t no at t1 1 ar pe ap t _ tis ''It in nd e ou m gr so e ff bl d1 1a o1 as e r nc re e m so on up � d se � ba is it . also tl1at ed pt c i m e s1f te th as at cl to n' 1o n at tio ': la re er op pr d an st ju a s ar he ,vI1icJ1 " . 0. .S 5 15 U 16 7) 89 (1 s, lli E v. o. C c. et lo ac or ol 1,ide, Gi,lf C From Kat/J i Ra,1 irig v. State of· Sauras/1tra 1952 All India Reporter 123 (Supreme Court of I11dia).

Mi,llherjea, J. : As has bee11 stated already, S. 11 of Saurashtra Ordinance is worded in exactly the same n1anner as S.5(1), West Bengal Special Courts Act; and tl1at pa1·t of it, with which we are here concerned, authorises the State Gover111nent to direct a11y classes of offences or cases to be tried by the special trib1111al. The State Governmen. t , therefore, has got to make a classi·ficatio11 of cases 01· offences before it issues its direction.s to the Special Cot1rt. The qt1estion is, on what basis is the classification to be mad.e? It is to be noted that the integration of several States in Kathiawar which 110w form tl1e State of Sa111·ashtra, was completed some time in Febr11ary, 1948. It appea1·s fro1n tl1e affidavit of an officer of the Home Govermne11t of tl1e Sat11·ashtra State tl1at soon after the integration took place an alarn1i11g state of lawlessness prevailed in son1e of the districts v1ithi11 the State. There were ga11gs of dacoits operating at different places and thei1· 11t1n1ber began to i11crease grad11 ally. 111 view of this t1gly sitt1atio11 i11 the State, this Ordinance provides i11ter alia for establis11n1e11t of Special Co11rts whicl1 are to try offen.ders 1111der a s:pecial p1�oced11re. Acti11 g 11nder S. 11 of the Ordinance, the Government issued a !1otifi_cation on 9/11-2-1950 which constituted a Special Court for areas specified 111 the scl1ed11le, a11d l1ere agai11 the affidavit shows that all the �e areas are i11cl11ded in tl1e districts of Gohilwad Madhya Saurashtra a11d .Sorath, wl1ere tl1e tribes of 11ara 11 ders p1·i11cipally flourished....If �pec��l Courts wer� co11side1·ed 11ecessary to cope with an abnormal situa be said tl1,1t tl1e vesting of authority i11 the State Government �1011 it ca1111ot f to select of e11ces f01· t1·i,1l by s11ch Co111·ts is i 11 any way unreasonable.

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Does Muklierjea, J. 111a.ke a JJerst1asive disti11 ra ash t Sau r the ctio11 b et\vee11 tl1e West Bengal and case? Does lie make a IJersL1asive sl1owi11g d � ''an urts eo ecia l to jt1s tify tl1e constitutionality of ''Sp · . . spec1a1 procedt1res fo·r cri·mes growing · : . . . · ot1t of orga111zed ''sl11fta'' (daco1t) act1v1ty?

Denial of '' Equal Protection'' in the Administration of Laws Which are Non-Discriminatory on Their Face.

From Yick Wo

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Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

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·� � A local city law requi·re_d en lic ure se� op er_ a tor s to of l�undries in ''wooden b uildings'' fro1n a local official. ted _-Qstl_(_--,,:� e 1bl t is was a fire prevention measure). Yick Wo wa s co�VI·chfu e �0 vi?lating the ordinanc�?l.� f� ):1 � C aliens resident in tlle Ci us trial 1� was proved �hat h e and many other perso� Vt'.ho wlti ai:fJiJi�� . _*, tY were denied laundry licences when they made appl1cat10°�. ··_ -_ ·.· �:-· � . � -

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981

Chinese applican�s ha d_ be en gra nte c1. Yick Wo alleged tha t non by u11der the c1·r.cu ms. • filed criminal prosecution against h 1m \Vas a violation of llis rigllt uons to "equ . a1 l)rotect1o n of tances 1h�. Excerpts fro111 the Court's decision follow: the la\VS,

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HUMAN RIGHTS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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rteenth. Ame1 1dme 1 1t to the Constitt1tio11 is 110t cotlfi u The Fo 11e d . t o . . the prot�ct1on of c1t1zens. It s��s. 'Nor sl1all a 1 1y State deJJrive ai1 y JJerson w 1 tho11t d 11e process ?f Ia,v; ty ro_ p e 1 ?r er!Y, � � _ 1 f e , f � li 110r dei1y to any o pers on w1th1 n its J_ ur 1sd1 c_t1011 t�1e equ�I I_Jrotect1011 of tI1e la\vs., Tllese provisi?ns. a�e �1n!ve rsal_ 1n their appl1cat1011,_ to all persoi,s vvithii1 tlie territorial_ JU r1s_d1 ction, ,v1thout regard to.a11y d1ffere11ces ?f race, of coloLtr, or of nationality; a11d the eq1 1al protect1011 of tl1 e laws 1s a J)leclge of the protection of eqt1al Ia,vs....

\Vhen w e consider tl1e nature a11d tl1e tl1eor.)1 of our institt1tio11s of government, the principles 11_po1 1 \Vl1ich tl1ey are st1PlJOsed to rest, a11 ct revie\V tl1e history of their development, \Ve are co11strained to conclude t11at they do not n1ean to leave room for tl1e IJlay a11d actio11 of JJltrely personal and arbitrary po\ver. It is indeed, qt1ite trt1e, tl1at tl1ere must al\vays be lodged somewhere, a 1 1d i 1 1 some JJerso11 or body, tl1e at1thority of final decision; and, in ma11y cases of 111ere ad111i11istr�ttio11 the res1)011si bility is purely political, no appeal lyi11g exce1Jt to tl1e t1lti111 ate trib t1 nal of the public judgment, exercised either i11 tl1e JJresst1re of OJJi11io11 or b�>' means of the suffrage. I11 the present cases, ,ve are 11ot obliged to reaso11 fro1T1 tl1c probable to the actual a11d pass t1pon tl1e validity of tl1e o rdi11a11ces co111J)lai 11 ecl of, as tried merely by the opportt111ities vvl1icl1 tl1eir ter.n1s afford, of t111eqL1al and unjust djscrimination in tl1eir admi11istratio11 . For the cases present the ordinances in actual operation, a 11d the facts sl1ovv11 establisl1 a11 adn1i nistration directed so exclusively agai1 1st a JJartict1lar class o.f perso11s as to \¥arrant and reqt1ire the co1 1c]11 sio11 that \\ihatever 1nay l1ave bee11 tl1 e i?�ent of the ordinances as adopted, tl1ey are apJJlied by tl1e pt1blic at1t]10r1t1es charged with their administration and tht1s represe1 1t111g tl1e State itse�f, with a mind so ·uneqt1al a11d opp r�ssive as to amot1nt _to � pr,1ctical den1al b y the State of that eqt1al p rotectio11 of the la\vs vvl11cl1 �s sect1re? t? the petitio ners, as to all other persons, by tl1e broad a11d be111g11_ pr?vi sions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitt1tio11 of tl1e United States. Thougl1 the law itself be fair on its face a11d in1partial ii1 appea� ance, yet if it is applied and administered b y JJt1blic a11tl1ority \Vitl1 a_i1 evil e�e � n� an unequal hand, so as practically to n1ake t1njt1st a11d !!legal dis�r111?1 natio ns between to rial 1?�te . s, ance 1mst cir�t r la persons i 11 simi . the1 r rights, the denial the of equal justice is still with11 1 tl1e prohrbit1011 of Constitution. o t r 1ist i e � ji adm c blj disc 1 ri p1 tl1e i . Tb � ?ation is therefore illegal, an� � w· hich enfo rces 1t 1s a denial of the eqt1al protect101 1 of the laws an? a v_iola tion of the Fourteenth Amendme1 1t of the Constitt1tion. Th e .1111prisotl ment of the petit rge d . . lla sc di be t us m ey th ione rs is therefore illegal, a 1 1d

u o y ld u o w Is the doctr·ine Of the r fa \V o 1 J ,, . "Yes, Yic� Wo case des irable� Jf your aos:ver IS ca� it . What being is \v la y r a 1 t Or eg � t or proof IS necessary to SUSta1n a �ont�ntJOO that a r ll 0 applied disc riminato rdy used as a cloak for discrim1nat1on?

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982

SECTION 7

PREVENTIVE DETENTION. Introduction

o tw on lem s ob cu pr fo to s: d ne sig de (I) consti- 1 e ar n io ct se is th in ls ia Tlle inater d de r by en de am s Or (a . of 69 No 19 o. 56 N 60 of rs de Or by d ise ra s ue tutioilal iss e ti� en of ev tio 11 pr tio ten ra de ide ns n co as an (2) ), 70 19 of 70 . No r ·de Oi d at1 1969 g n_ us1 foc me ?Y : n.t lop on ve de \a ) 1al 1 _ tio itu nst In�ian co ure ft1� of m ongoi11g pi·oble . n t1o �, t1v �en en de � e, of pr 1�h �h u, li� 1n , ght res Illl s11 a _ n1e ve ati ern alt (b ce, experie11 ) , be used to protect tl1e interests of ''security an d order with less 1nfr1ngement on ''liberty." Preve11tive dete11tion laws 11sually operate to per1nit imprisonment, or special restrai11ts 011 tl1e freedo1n of persons sitspected of either crimes or alleged ''seditious'' activities 11ot otherwise made crimjnal. P1·eventive detentjon laws usually authorize deprivation of liberity witho11t reco111·se to the established pro.cedures for arrest, bail, a11d proof of guilt i 11 ope11 court before ne11tral judges. Indeed, preventive detention ·f laws 1nt1st be see11 as deliberate effort to legitjmize imprisonment ,vithout the neces sity of obeying the ordinary law of crimes and criminal proce:dure and the penal code - and, in ma11y countries, without obedie.nce to solemn commands of the constitution. Si11ce IJreventive detention laws often vest. great discretionary power in police and other officials, tl1ey may impose significant deterrents on dissent and on any political activity which may be deemed subversive by t.hose ch.arged with preserving ''sect1rity.''

''emergencies;'' b11t 1nany p1·eventive detention laws while :fir·st enacted during times of crisis, or alleged c1·isis, have been retained i11 'force year after year, despite the abs�nce of onJsoi11g evide11ce of ai1y t111us11al continuing emergency. Thus many preventive det�nt1on laws, while originally based on some special circumstance

\vh1c� may prevail 111 the co11ntry, a11d of·te11 m�1.y be expected to prevail for an 1n defi111te f11t111·e. Obv�o11sly, if tl1e ''develo1Jers'' of a f't111da111e.ntally new political system c hoos e to _o�gaiii�e ?0ver11 111e11t 1111cle1· a writte11 co11stitt1tio11 l1aving the force of law, t�ey u�t det�i n1111e _wl1etl1e1· a11y J?r�ve11tive detention is to be leg alized, a11d if so, the JU_s �ifying circuinsta11ces a11?: 1n!n1n1al procedu1·al safegt1ards to be fallowed. And, in · ; any event, ma�y c�111�tr.1es, irrespective of their constit tem Ys 8 an ideology d uti on , must reckon with s1.1n1lar isst1es on t.he legislat ive level. 4,l � t�e law (reflecting existi11g values of a society a11 d its stated ideals) is to eros phasize the need for human liberty, th en <l bu f en it will deliberately impose heavy go ernment's power to deprive people tea e chr t en exp . eri of Pe lib rha ert c ps y �:at w; ere th e law ai1d law enforcement are insensitive to the value of liberty, o 6 p� · P. i 1n become so too· and socie . · fe · tY may then become more brutal and the quality Of l _ ut. [ . · · society · s t·h- IIl y lf � wil ! lpaired. If these premises are t J?en on irnp ris acc ept the ed n trial an� 1�:out scrupulo s O l me c proof j fi � � c of commi defined o ssion aJ Jl}e T of well a i be ust b o e special reason whic� t a .. f _ c that j . fy st usti mu t exis to . � : l : emergenc w er is clear that the ordinary penal processes - notably t · wv

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HUMAN RIGHTS - :PoLITf CAL AND ECONOMIC DEV ELOPMENT

an d att ac en1pt - are i11 adeqtiate to ies on sp ir . c on s i t dl · de'al \VI·th of se . ' · t1 1e tl1reat .· . pr ev 1 t1v e1 e a d 1or ete e 11t 1 101 1 1 la the ,v d c1r ct1 n1 ve11ts tlle t.raci·t An nd a . h . 1 ·1 011a1 procesat · est 1s abl" 11ec1 co11 st1tt1t10 11al gt1ara11tees of a11d t he la\ v al Pe n of 1· 11 c1-1v"d ses 1 t1 a1 l'b . . I erty th at eac l 0\.\ e 1 11 b , s b d e mu Jartt1re 1s Jttsti fiab st 1 · le to sec·tire son1e c1ear' , the Ill ore it. . . ' h 1 c11 a 1ess ar b"1trar)' la\v ca11 not sectire. ,1v st intere ding overri There �ave been fe,;v c�r�ful stt1dies of preve1 1tiv_e dete11tio11 ii1 actiotl _ li ttle bard . a nalysis of the need for these Ia,vs ,:vl1 ere tl1ey exist' ar1 d tJ1e erre i11 cts of ' a11d ·tt i e cala mities avo1"ded by, t h e .1r �n f'orce1 11 e11t. TJ1e_ reaso11s for tl1is deartl1 of evidence _ as opposed_ to loose assert1?11s 111ay be obv1ot1s. Bt1t tl1e situatio11 i s 1 1ardly one \Vhich can satisfy truly professional Ia,vyers. Pre,'entive Detention Legislation

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R'artbne Meas11res From Public Security Proclamatio11 , No. 4 of I 942, 1'legarit Gazera 1 st Year, No. I. 2. Tl1e Com1nissioner of Police may order tl1e arrest ,vitl1ot1t 1,,varra11 t and detenti on of any person who in l1is opi11io11 ,voL1ld, by reaso11 of tl1e n1atters set 0L1t in the Schedt1le to this Proc]amatio11, be a da11ger to Pt1blic Sect1rity if he re111ait1ed at large. 3. Any person so arrested shall ,vithot1t a11y delay be brot1gl1t before the Higl1 Court. 4. If the Higl1 Court is of tl1e opini o11 that tl1e Con11nissio11er of Police vvas justified in arresting and detai11i11g a11 y perso11 t 1 11der tl1e 1 )r0\1.isio11s of tl1 is Procla n1ation, the order for dete11tio11 shall re111a i 11 in force for tl1ree 111ontl1s ,111d 1nay be rene\ved for ft1rther periods 11ot exceeding tl1ree 111011tl1s eacl1 011 a1Jplicatio11 bei 11_g made to the High Court by tl1e Com1u i ssio11er of Police or by son1e perso11 011 111s behalf. 5. The Comntissioner of Police 111ay at a11y tirne, vvitl1 the per111issio11 of the High Court, order the release of any perso11 so ordered to be cletai11ed. . SCHEDU LE

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983

. . �olitical activities, Espionage, Propaga11da, Stibv_e�·sive Act�vities, Acts l )re Judi_c1a! to the i11 terests a11d safety of t]1e Ethio1Jia11, �r1t1sl1 or Allied Foi_ces or the Ethiop1a.n Govern ment a 1 1d Acts prejt1dicial to Pt1blic Safety. From Public Security (Amendment) Proclan1atio11, No. 54 of 1944, J.legarit Gazeta 3rd Year, No. 7 . 2· The Principal Proclamatio11 is hereby an1ended by tl1e additio11 of tlJe follow· g as Article in 6 after Article 5 :-· 1 ister · 1v1i1 · · t]1e of ·der 01 ,,6· The ComID1ss1oner of Po lic e may, 011 tl1 e .. . e i tl f � ler iuS of the Int erior order Mi the as subJiect to st1cl1 conditio11s ' ' e b se ther\v1 o I Interio · r may consider c I :VOll · O h . necessary, that a perso n \V 1 a fixed 11 ide arr ested and detained reS 1 1 0 at1 r Article 2 of tl1is Proclam de un th"is er d un pla� e. The High e ad n, r de or ery Court shall be i 1 1formed of ev '' Arti cle and of tl1e . conditions relat i11g thereto

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984

de or an of � e ad ns m io is ov de pr un e th r, this s 11e ve ra nt co ho w il so er 3 A g in ed ce o t e _n ex ia n fi ar � a o t le e h ab T li e b s re n io t a � vi n o c n . o ll a sh . 1 � � a Procl�m g t in o ed n d ce io er ex p o a r tw fo t en m ar n ye so ri p s. im to r o d JJ sa ti io tl dollars one

L A N IO W T A U L IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E SOUilCEBOOK OF

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l n� pe �e and the Criminal e_ _�h Co of nt e _ tm ac en by . ly ab gu ar ed al pe re The abo,,e 111easlll·es were d te es 10 lis e 1t1 th t1v ac g in la rn oc ce Pr on c es ns e f tio of ma n ed n fi de e od C l 11a Pe e 1 Tl . e d C o . co de I�1·d down ru Ies £or arrest anct deten· · 1e·Proced ure procedu1·e · tl d n _a , 1t 1 e1 n b i1 . and Provided for their pti is . as ly o w nt � N re pa n ap 1o at 1:11 ate la oc tre Pr t d 11c 11d by co al 11n 1n cr of ty iil gt d ve lie be ns so er ·t o f r n P n m of tio rn ra ve go sto t re en ve cti fe ef d an he t n the io at er lib e til er alt d , ale pe re , as t 11 t he gover11111e end of tl1e war. s ga wa ul law om pe pr ty ted, not as ntio ten de e tiv en !ev w ne a , 69 19 P ril Ap in In any event er. rd O l 1a er 1p In an as t bu n io at sl gi le y ar nt 1e an rli pa

Rece,1t Measi,,·es: Orcle,· No. 56 of 1969, as revived by Order No. 62 of 1970

Fro1n The P11blic Safety and Welfare Order N·o. 62 of 1969, Negarit Gazeta, 28th Year, No. 13. WHEREAS, p11blic orde1·, safety and welfare of persons in some parts of the Empire are th1·eate11ed by secret conspiracies [''by certain evilly disposed persons'' in Orde1· 56], and WHEREAS, it is 11ecessary that appropriate temporary measures be taken to st1ppress s11ch activities; NOW, THEREFORE, in acco1·dance vvith Articles 36 and 65 of Our Revised Constitt1tion and 011 the advice of Our Co1111cil of Ministers, We hereby Order as follows: I. This Order n1ay be cited as the'' P11blic Safety and Welfare Order, 1969''. . 2. The PL1blic safety and welfare (a1ne11dment No. I) Order, 1969 (Order No. 60 of 1969) is he1·eby repealed. t 3. (a) If Ou1· Minister· of I11te1·ior shall have reasonable ground to believe that a 1Je1 ·son is a tl11·eat to p11blic 01·der a t. 1d safety, he may b)' order �11der his hand req11i1·e s11ch a perso 1 1 to enter i 1 1to a bond with sureties in a s11m 11ot exceedi11g ·the period dttring ,:vhich . this Order re1nains in force. (b) A11y p_e1·s011 who, l1c1vi11g bee11 req11 i1 ·ed by 011 r Mi11ister of Interior to ./ enter 111to s11cl1 a bo11d, 1·eft1ses 01· neglects to d.o so shall be detaine d by ord�r of Ot1� Mi11iste1· of I11·te1·ior t"or a period not exceeding 3 mont�s or 11 11til Sllch t1n1e as s11cl1 pe1·so11 e11ters into the bond whichever 18 ' sooner. j 4· (a) �itl1011t fii·st 1·eql1i1·i11g any pe1·so 1 1 to enter nce i 11to a boi1d i 11 accorda with pa�·agra.JJh (�) of A 1 ·ticle 2 Ot1r Minister of Interior may by order _ 1111der 11 1 s hai?cl d11:ect the Cl1ief Con1missioner of Polic that a11y person e • ' II b the eta 111e ? 111 in s11c h ied � JJla c of detentio11 as ma y be specif 1 �� der, � � � for a p�riod 11ot exceeding 3 mo11ths if he shall have reasonabl� . grotlu<ls_ to believe tl1at the n1aintena11ce re fa we l or sa fety of pu or bl de ic r so regt11re. -,-,---�,.,,..,. . (b) !f �t the eod of the 3 mont · � of ter h s perio d of detention Our Minis ; C:,��; ��} :easonable �ro�nds to be�ieve that the maintenance of pu�: . · � "" ' e y or welfare still so require any s uch person may be deta1nl . : ed f ther P�riods of 3 mon to t shall in t , � he� •· · � ths ea h bu case no ii� o/ er detentio n exceed the period during r reroa11i-s_ Or de i thi s ch wh fn fore�. -- --

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:HUMA N RIGI-l TS - POLITICAL AND Ec0Norvr1c DEVELOPM.ENT

985

the Chief Co ?1111i�sio11er of Police ha s reaso11able grotlllds to belie If (a) ve 5_ that a11y plac e_ 1s be111g 11sed f or pt1�poses of a11 associatio11 wllicll etlcotirage� o: _aids p er s?ns to co1111 111t acts of viole11ce j11ti111idatioil or acts �r�Jud1c1al _t o the_ 111terest s or sa . fety of tl1e__public, 11e 111ay by order in w�1t1ng published 1 11 st1ch n1a 1111er . a� l1e tl1111l<s best adai)ted .for iilforn11ng the perso11s c o11cer11ed, prol 11b1t tl1e t1se of st1cl1 l)lace for sucl1 pt1rposes.

(b) Any person wl10 dis obeys or 11eglects to co1n1)ly \vi.tl1 st1c11 a11 order may be detained by orcler o f Ot1r Mi11ister of l11terior i11 tl1e n1a1 1ner prescribed in Article 3 l1ereof.

6. 1-\ny power conferred trnder tl1is Order sl1all be i11 a.clditio11 to a11d 11ot i11 lieu of any other po\.v er c o11ferr ed by other la\V .

7. (a) Any perso11 arrest ed or detai11ed 111ay a1)ply to tl1e I-Iigl1 Cot1rt for

revie\V of a11y order pt1rporti11g t o l1ave bee11 111ade t111der this Order . (b) For purpose of s11ch review tb.e provisio11s of Article s 177 (2) a11d (3), 178 and 179 of the Civil Procedt1r e Code Decree 1965 sl1all apply by analogy.

8. (a) Any pers o11 arre sted or detai11ed t11 1der this Order sl 1all not l1ave t he right of applying to tl1e Higl1 Cot1rt t1 11der Ar ticle 177 (1 ) of tl1e Civil Procedure Code D ecree 1965.

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(b) Wl1ere the High Cot1rt is satisfie d t l1a t tl1e order of arrest or dete11tion, as the case 111ay be is 11.ot 111ade in s trict con11 Jlia11ce \vitl1 tl1e provisi�11s of this Order it sl1all order tl1e i1 11111ediate release of tl1e 1 Jerso11 restrain ed and t he ;erson 11nder vvl1ose ct1stody the 1)erso11 restrai11ed is lcept, shall not'vvit hstanding a 11y ot l1er orde rs or i11strt1ct io11s t o the co11trary by any otl1er l )erso11 or at1thor ity, for tl1witl1 r elease tl1a t perso11. 9. This Order shall enter into f orce on tl1e day' of its pttblication in the Negari t Gazeta and shall conti11ue to be applied t1ntil December 31, 1970.

Notes on Order No. 56 . arid its Successor, Order No. 62.

(l) Order No. 60 of 1969 (pron1t1lgated 011 Nove n1ber 28, 1969 -:- a[ter Order N �. 56 l1ad lapsed) amended Article 8 of Order No. 56 by exte11d111g its enforce . ability until November 30, 1970. S ee Negarit Gazeta 29 th Year No. 1· reand 60 . (2) Order No. 62, · o N . der r o d e promulgated 1 n Jat1t1ary 1970, rep ea 1 promulgated the exact text of Orde r N o. 56 - �xcep t that the preainbl f s:cr �t by d e tJ ate the Order declared e hr t e ar , , t e pa rts of the En1p1re tha m · · ''so ssary . , 11ece , . '' ere w ·. czes , and Conspz,a ·es, aSllI e n1 rary mpo t that ''approJJriate e (3) D 0 0rders N o. 56 and 62 a1nend: (a) The Penal Code? (b) The Crim inal P rocedure Code? ( c) The Civil Code ?. If so ' in · what respects?

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AL LAW N IO T U IT T S N O C N IA P IO I-I T SOURCEBOOK OF E

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n rs o e ti d n rd n a te O e e D v ti n e v re P e h T s: Constitutional Problem s w e a h L e T v ro p p A o T n o ti Parliament's Jurisdic

The pr·eve11tive detentio11 o rder is, of cou rse, 1!ot parliamentary legislation. It is an Jn1perial Orde1· p1�on1t1lgate� pu rs11ant to A rticle 36 o_f �he Constit11tion. We have previo11sly stt1died the qt1_est1011 of w�etber _there_ are limits on the law-making po\ve1· confer1·ed by the Im1Je r1_al Pre rogative � r t1cles 1n Chapter II of the Revised Co11stit11tio11. Yot1 shot1ld review tl1 at material carefully .

Re-read: Cl1apter V, pages 441-445 (''Sovereignty'' and the Powers Bestowed by Article 36). Ibid, pages 451-452 (Constitutional limits on the ''O r der Power'' under Article 27). Ibid, pages 469-470 (The meaning of ''law'' as the t.erm is used in the Revised Co11stitution - notably in Ar ts. 34, 86 and 92).

Alternatives To Preventive Detention

E111e1·ge11cy Actio11- U11der A1·ticle 29 of The Co11stiti1tion.

Re-read: Article 29 of the Revised Constit11tion; Chapter V, pages 499 - 504 (E1nerge11cy Order a11d Reg11lations i11 regions bordering Somalia in 1964). What is the difference betwee11 an Order prom11lgated t1nde r Article 29 and Orders No. 56 and 62 supra? The Use of the Penal Code Provisions on Sedition

Re-read: Se�ti?� 5 (this chapter) si1p1·a page 62-65 :selected ar·ticles on seditious �ctivities. Note also the application of tl1e lav., of' ''attempt'' as set out 1nfi·a. From Penal Code of Et/1iopia.

Art. 26. - Preparator;, Acts.

Acts w. hich are merely des1g.11e .. · d to . .p1·epare or n1ake poss1 ble an . offence' by . . Proc11r111g t·he inea11s or· creac t.111g th · e cor1d.1t1011s for its comn11ss1on are not . p11nisl1able llnless: · (a) i11 tl1emselves tli ey coiis-ti·.ttite . a11 offe11ce defined by law·' or (b) they are ex. p1·essly co . ·11stitt1·ted a spec1a · l offe11ce by law by reason of therr· gravity O•r tlle general danger tl1ey e11tail.

Art. 27. - Atte,npt. (l) Whoever i11tentionall b . e u, urs p · �gin� t? co1�1� an offence and does not or is unable to pursfe l. s c pursues !us , n1:1unal u who activity or to its end criminal activity tO . s end the for ry without necessa achieving the result � completion of the• 0 eiice sh · all b e guilty of a n attempt. · Iy r er.a e e is deem I c . T he 011enc · ed t 0 be begun when the act performed aims, by way of dir · ect consequence, a t it s commission.

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}JUMAN R.JGIITS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

987

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offence is al\-vays pu1 1ishable save as is ot mp ted att e An her,vise provided (2)

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by law. to i11stigate or participate i 11 a' 11 0ri1.r1e11 pt A n1 ere attem . ce. does not con1e . . within the prov1s1ons_ of t be Iaw t111less it is expressly l)rovided to the contrary. (3) In the _case of an attempted o_ffe11 ce tl1e ofie11cler is liable to the IJtltlishmetJt attaching to the o.ffe11ce he 1 11te11decl to con11nit: P _ rovided _th�t if ci�c�n1sta11c �s so jt1stify tl1 e cot1rt 1 11ay reduce tlle pt1n1srunent within the l1m1 ts provided by la,v. (Art. 184).

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Art. 267. - Indirect Aid a11cl E11coi1rage111e11t.

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(1) Whosoever, bei11g a,vare that an offe 11ce is being pre1Jared or has been comn_iitt�d against the Em_peror, tl1e Empress or the Cro,v11 Pri11ce, agai11st const1t11t 1onal order of nat1 011al defence, or agai11st the i11ternal or external sect1rity of the State, fails to i1ifor1n tl1e at1thorities thereof, or does not to the best of his ability try to pre,,e11t the 01Te11ce fron1 bei11g carried out and to bring the offender to jt1stice, save i11 cases of force majet1re or n1a11ifest im possibility is p11nishable with rigorot1s im1Jriso11n1e11t not exceedi11g five years

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(2) Official or professional secrecy cannot be i11volced to evade tl1e obligation to in.form the at1thorities .

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(3) When the offence is comn1itted in time of inter11al or exter11al e1nerger1cy, the punishment shall be rigorous impriso11n1e11t 11ot exceedi11g te11 years. (4) Kinship or close ties of affectio11 \-vith the per1Jetrator or perpetrators of the offence, w hether projected or carried ot1t, can11ot be i11voked as an excuse in the above mentio11ed cases. (Art. 80).

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If tl1e Minister of Interior has ''reaso11able gro1111ds'' to ''believe tl1at a person is a threat to public order and safety'' (see Article 2a of Order No. 56), \-vhy \Vould he not order prosecution of the individual t111der 01 1e or a11otl1er of tl1� a�o_ve penal la\vs? What is the need for ordering detentio11 \-\1itl1out trial of tl1e 1ndivtdtial?

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Use of Cri,ninal Proceditre Code Procecl11res For Dete11tio1z Pef1di,7 g InveSligation. From Crimi11al Procedure Code of Etfziopia.

Art. 59. - Detention.

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e id c e d ll . a h s ) 9 2 t · r · (A · 1t (1) The court before which the arrested perso11 1s · brougl .leased on bail re whether such person shall be kept in ct1stody or be e lic P g i at ig St ve in � e th (2) Where the police investigation i s no t completed �_ig as ve in e th le b a en to officer ma y apply for a re m a n d fo r a st1fficient time tion to be completed. · more for ted 1 · gra1 be (3) A remand may be granted in writing. No ren1and 8 Iia11 than fourteen days on each occasion,

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A N IO L LAW T U IT ·r s N o C N IA P JO H f SOUI{CBBOOK Of E r

. t c u d n o C d o o G f o s e Requiring Guarante . ia p io h t E f o e d o C From Perra! . le ip c in 1· P ; t c u d n o c d o o g f o e te 11 a r a u G . 39 1 t. r A (1) Wheil a coi1victed perso11 indicates his i11tention to commit a further offence or wJ1 en it is likely that he will commit a ft1rtb_er o�ence as in a case of declared J1ostility or tl1.reat, the C?t1rt may _requ1r� him to enter into a re cognizance to be of good bel1av1ou1� together w1th a surety or sureties. (2) The recogniza11ce sl1all be for a period of ·from one to five y ears. The surety shall be i11 the f01·111 of a personal or monetary gt1arantee. (3) The Cot11·t shall deter1nine the duration of the recognizance and the value of the ot1ara11tee according to the nature and gravity of the threat, a.nd hav ing re;ard to the personal a11d material circumstances of the offender or his g11arantors. The recogniza11ce of the gua1·antee shall be recorded in the judgment.

Art. 145. - Co111n1011 Provision: General Preventive Application. (I) A perso11 ,¥110 has 11ot been prosecuted may be required to enter into a r·ecognizance to be of good b ehaviour ,vhere s11ch person behaves or is likely to behave in a ma11ne1· which threatens peace or security of the public or a men1ber thereof. An order f 01· the seiZl1re of a1·ticles 11nder Art. 144 may also be made. (2) !he a11thority competent for prescribing such a measure is d.esignated 111 the law on proced11re.

Compare the above articles witl1 Article 2(a) of Order No. 56. What is the difference between the two procedures?

Injunctions Against Threatened I-Iarm Under The Civil Code

From Civil Code of EthioJJia. Art. 2121. - Injunctions. . . (1) The co11rt 1nay grc.ant an 111J1111 · · · . ct1on restra1n111g the defendant from· acom· • . • · · · ... m1tt1ng ' from cont1·11111·11g t· o con1n11t I · 1c1a · · 1·on1 rest1m1ng an act preJU or f . . . e l)la1n .to th t1ff. (2) A11 inj1111ction· shac ll• b• e gra1.1t ed 011 Y believe 1 to where there reasons are good . . Jtlclicia.l to the that tl e act :pie re wh e and pla int iff ou is t lik : ely car to rie . be d the 111Jury wi th wl1icl1 he is tl1 reatened be redressed is s11 ca ch n. n th ot at it by a11 award of damages. Does the above Article su ggest . . dings e aily f proce 11rther . civil leg1slat1on authorizing aimed at. restraitlin.g threatened h See I ? . s a r m · fu ua l t · ·t 'd ac 1v1 · 1nd1v1 1es · · f o of group a aIs·o Art· icles 154-159 0 f the c·ivil. Procedure Code. Detentio11. Lin1ited To Surv . -------�� . :t -= .:_ 11?en�) Procl_am_at1 on No. 54 of I 944_, supr a. ea sider carefullY the constitu tional s1gn1ficance of the clifferen9C be.twee� --.. · 1 -,

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989

,vl1icl1 a court �night i11�pose i11 a�c�rda11ce witli tl1e above s iction restr the 1 l11ch tl1e M1111ster v\ ''detent1011'' the a11d ca11 i11 1r)ose tinder Proclamation 62. No. and 56 No. rs Orde Preventive De tention and Constitutional Gt1arantees Accorded to Persons Acct1sed of Crime from Unite d Nations Universal Declaration of Hl1n1a11 Rigl1ts. Article 3. Everyone has the rigl1t to life, liberty and security of l)erson. Article 8. Everyone has the rigl1t to an effective ren1edy by the co111pete11t national tribl1nals for acts violating tl1e ft1nda111e11tal rights granted him by the constitt1tion or law. Article 9. No one shall be sl1bjected to arbitrary arrest, d.etention or exile . Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full eql1ality to a fair ancl l)llblic hearing by an independent a11d impartial tribl111al, i11 tl1e determination of his rights and obligations a11d of a11y cri111i11al cl1arge against hi1n. Article 11. (I) Everyone charged with a penal offe11ce bas tl1e right to be presumed innocent u11til proved gl1ilty accordi11g to law in a public trial at which he bas had tl1e gl1ara.11tees necessary for bis defence. (2) No one shall be held guilty of a11y penal offe11ce 011 account of any act or on1ission whicl1 did 11ot co11stit11te a penal offence, under national or i11ternatio11al Ja,:v at the ti1ne when it \Vas committed, nor shall a heavier pe11alty be imposed than tl1e one tl1at \\1 as applicable at tl1e time the l)enal offe11ce ,vas com mitted. Re-read: Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Et1ropea11 Co11,,e11tio11 for the Protectio11 of H uman Rights, supra, Section 1 of this chapter. Read carefully: Revised Constitution Articles 37, 38, 43, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, Consider also Articles 108, 110. It is to be noted Consti� tl1e of III that Chapter all the From of above articles tut'ion are stated in self executing terms, and son1e are stated in absoltite terms. ll in g guidelines of in shed ab� t es_ _ ard� stand _ 11 U. and o arati the mos t�� w N. Decl 1 g systems (Compare the El1ropean Conve11t1011) tl1e Co11st1tt1t1on imposes rnan.y Well-kno · pr1·son ·· · t1· ons on governments' pow er to arrest, conv1c wn linuta · t· and 1m . · · I) the po 1ice · powers · , d ite 1 1 1n are · of arrest and searches \Vtthout ,varra11t 2 ) �- person arrested is enti�led to a pron11)t preli1ninary l1eari11 g - and to ·is relea�e if that hearing doe s not disclose evide11ce warrantii1 g his formal Prosec ution. ' 3) the cri r nde u · ,, '' rne charged me cr a be i rse co11 of st mtt mu st. be specified and . · Jn exist w. g la 4) if co itted · ' for ge ar h c e th of e tic no ll fu trial the accused is e-ntitled to and �•

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A U N T I O L LAW I T T S N O C N A I P : IO I f T E SouRCEBOOK OF

990

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; ' ' l a i r t y d e e p s '' a . el; 1s cot11 to the right ; n o 1 t . a t n o r f n o c f o tlle rigllt. . _; l a i · 1 t c li b t1 . a p _ e c 1 1 e c o n 1 11 f o 1 1 10 the pres11111pt . li � r� s hed in accorda !a u c es ? l �i ci a 1 i1: d ie tr e b to e nc ed tl ti en is d se ct S) The ac l l 1a e 1c d th g u te n J ys ti s a ; e r m c s w la e th d n a 11 o ti with tl1 e co11stit11 secution; o r p e th n o is e g ta s y er v e t 6) the btii·dei� of proof a d in te im ea cr l p a . r g re ar fo ch is as b . es 1e tl e d a 1 1. 1 be t o 1 1 n ca t ac 7) the same ly a� um e e� ar on pr nd 1ti ou it1 gr st on C ed e th on in s · 1 he ot e lik ', s' ht i·ig Th' ese ,, ts er gh � 11:1ri es ot f th o al t eg en s m m o te el ys ev d e ! s th r fo s n o as re c ri t� s i h e � h T y. ic ol P, la w and natural JU.Stice , , the p of ed ne s es oc to pr 11e ''d e 11r ec s to e sir de e i tl include: � sa e� s rd ce of bu ne e �n -fo th ill d an t d un en 1? ss ra ha om fr s 1 o1 rs 1Je t en oc 1 1 in t ec ot pr g tin an me rr sh wa ni ilt pu gu nt of t en hm must lis ab est at th f lie be e 1 tl ; on uti ec ed pros u to co en as so age y . r d nt an tai cer in 11m ma xim ma d a11 re ca t os 11tm the th wi ne do be ds , tho the me tem of the police sys al ici jud the of ss rne fai the in e c en d fi con . tain public s, ual l ivid l spe a. ind t irre tha ief bel the ; e11t e1n orc enf Ia,v c tive of ses ces pro the and of tl1eir guilt 11nder ma11 -made laws, are entitled to humane an,d just treatment, the belief tl1at tl1e dig11ity of free men livi11g i11 a ''civilized'' as opposed to a '·brutalized'' comm11nity requires tl1ese p1·ocedu1·es. As the U.N. Declaration's preamble suggests, we are concer11 ed l1 e1·e witl1 ''standards of achievement'' which governments have in1posed 011 themselves for very good reasons. While pra, ctice ma.)' fall below the norm, as it does, to son1 e extent at some times, in all communities, the standard ?ho11ld still remain tl1 e law, and government m11st a.ss11me a heavy obligation if it 1s to enforce the law.

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Preventive Detent-ion and The Right To Due Process of Law. Re-read carefully: From C11aptei· II: j na ag M . e I) pages 87-89: tl1e sot1rce of tl1e co11cept of ''due process of law'' in th Carta; 2) pages 89-90: the evol11tio11 of tl1e p1�i 11ciples. ot.. d11e process of law (see also_ pages 123-124, Tl1e Cot11··t of Star Cl1an1ber and d11e process of law); 3) page 9o: the introcltictio ·11 of tl1 ese ; tion titu Con s principl · es i11to the Ethiopian 4) pages 90-92 · tl1e to · ht rig · IJ··.g1.l t· to e , b abea s corpt1s as an integral part of th due process of law· 5) pages 125-129 · the scop e ar1d nature of habeas corpus. Re-read Chap ter VI p a · . sti ges _ e 6 17 th 618: due Ill law b Cow , proce of s a s a s ource s ' tu tion givi cotl ts h a cial � � � pow c� w ti�n : er offi to of revi ew lega the lity · . depri;e a p�s on 1nd1vidually of his liberty without a fair deternnn a · --_._ _ --. of guilt. I

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a broad ''foundation'' principle - wh ich . u�·tufi.atl-_:jf th�r particular right Arti cles 51, 52, 53 s s h as many of. t�ose guaranteed in Revised _const leJiti011�}�7'.�:F and �i�ewhere ven e t en iv .E .d:eti :· -· _',>· ::fprev ,t if be conceded that •

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HUMAN RIGI -ITS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMEN T

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table asst1111ption the '' . a "no n crim.inal proceedi11g'' (a very d eba dtie J)rocess'' · 1s . e e ·t 110 Th t? 1 ss e nt1a1 co mrna11d of " . ,, iesl does l app '' ntee d ti e p ro . . cess 1s 1or a . . tion ·guara · . · sa11 ct10 re 11s are 111f11cte d," a i1d this dete be "l o. ,, ,, na rmi dete • rn111. 1at·1011 must · ,,&'.1a1r . ,, ''h ear111g . . . ,, co n f r o 11tat1011 ' a11 ''11111)artia ' ce no ti l tribt111a' l'' wt·t· l1 tl1e " de ' elu · .10 '' ' 11 t ' 1e o t · t d e l pros e ct1t1ng party. TI1ese coi nrrl oca a f oo r p of den a11ds may be bur . some flex1'b'li . 1 �� - de pe nd'111g n tl1e �rav1ty of the sa11ction \vl1i w1t l1 d ppl ie _ a � ch 111f t l1c an d the e�1e1�e11cy c1rct1111sta11 ces a t llatld. Bu t tile government proposes to . wl1e 11e app ver tl1e 111d1v1dual's ''liberty'' ly s rem ent reqti i is at stake . TllUS "'basic . e th. er or no t t 11e proceed 111g be labeled a ''crimi tl al'' "due proc ess '' ap-1? }'1es wh trial . der for exa1uple th e follo \vi11 g c ase. or a civil proceeding. Cons1_

( ) . 3 7 48 . .S 33 r 25 19 U ive Ol Re In om Fr Black, J.: In obedience t o a st1b1)oe na tl1e pe titio11 er [Oliver] appeared as a ,vitness before a Michigan circt1it jt1dg� ,vl�? _,vas tJ1e11_ co1:dt1cting i11 accorda11ce \Vitl1 Michiga11 Ia,v, a ' , one-roa11 gra11d Jt11·y 111vest1gat1011 into alleged gambli11g and official cor ru ption... . Tv.10 o tl1er circ11it jt1dg e s ,vere pre sent i11 a11 a dvisory capacity A prose . cutor may have been present . A stenographer vv as most likely tl1ere. Tl1e record does not sl1ovv ,vhat o ther members, if a11y, of tl1e jt1dge's i11vestigatorial staff parti cipated in the proceed.ings. It is c ertai11, l1owe v er, tl1at tl1e public \Vas exclt1cled the questioning ,vas secret i n acco rda11c e \Vith the trad itional grand j L1ry metl1od.* After petitioner ha d given certain testimo11y, tl1e judge-gra11cl jt1ry, still i11 secret sessio n, told petitioner tl1at nei tl1er l1e nor l1is advisors ·believecl petitioner's story - tha t i t did not ''jell." Based on its beliefs tht1s for111ed - tl1at p etitio11er's story did not ''jell'' - the jt1 dge-gran d jt1ry in11nedi ately cl1arged l1in1 \Vitl1 co11tei11pt [of court because of his alleged. false and evasive testimo11y], i inn1ediately convicted him, a.nd immed iately sentenc ed l1im to sixt y days i11 jail. ... . * * Three days l ater a la\vyer, filed 011 peti tio11er's bel1alf in tl1e Michiga11 St1.pre111e Court the petitio n for habeas corpus novv u11der co nsideratio11. It alleged _amo!1g other things that t he petitioner's attorney had not b e e11 allo ,ved to c onfer w1tl1 hi� ��d that, to the best of the attorne y's kno wledge, tl1e petitio11er \Vas not _l1eld 111 Jatl under any judgment, decree or executio11, and was ''i1ot co11fi11e d by v1rtt1e of any· legal commitment directed to the sheriff as r e quired by Ia,v." [I� respo11se to �e �i�h igan Supreme Courts inquiry] an order was tl1e11 entere�, s1gne� by tl1e cir�u 1t Judge that he ha d wliile ''sitting as a ? e-Ma11 Gra11� Jt1r co1;1vict:,d the � . � pet iti�ner of con tempt of cot1rt becat1se p et1 t1oner l1ad te st�:fied , eva 5 ively. . aild � ad give i1 ''contradict ory a11swers' ' to questio ns. The order directed th�t p etitio.ner be confined in the county jail ... . for a period of sixty days · · · · or until SllC� ti e � m o as he t Y hi . ···· shall app ear and answer th e qt1estions l1eretofore propou_nd�d re me Sup ail this Court.... ''. [The p e hig c Mi e th by d tition for ha beas corpus was denie

· s se ) ca ' w ie v re · es ri ,, ju d n ra G an u · ,, d Jury *A" tr1aI ' J Grand juries of alle ;r ron . is an "investi�ative'' (as oppo�ed_ to a 1ar . initiated be ii ou h s e tra diti�na1r gdo1ng and _deternun� wb�ther a cr1;: 11nal c] g . function ,vas solely t tl1eir 1 t l a · : : m� ·.Y co nducted their proee<l1 ngs 1 n ''secret . Ren1emb n see ca you to deci s , erha ,, ,, nt � tn why ": whe!�er there ,vas sufficient evidence to warran_t �n 1nd1c } f eaf-1y N�rma n Englisl1 recy was thou�ht to be a "protection.'' Gran� J�r1� �re a re ic O w la and have been abolished in many common Jav, 3ur1sd1ct1ons. · Consult y. dictiona r *• Ed M . w I a a 10 · h for "conten1pt.'' 7 the Code orte �at is "conten 1pt'' of court? Look up this concept punis Civll Procedure. Would a Court in Ethiopia have power to

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ll y imprisoned. The peti·tio fu law s wa r ne . : io tit e p r ne t tha · t' a 1111 . h e · n . t he gro ' 1 Cou· rt 011 · h r h t . 1n1p 1s a t e sonm . ging u le nt al 1 . . 1rt, was Cot w Stl . 1e . . f pren nla the 1 u 1 e 1 l so11ght ]. n io t . u it t s n o C e h t f o n io t · la io v �n beca11seI1�t: w,a, "f.ls 1· a n io u� it l p st e n th co e ow er of Michi g �� ll a ch e er � t 0 1� es �o . n ga The petitiotler . � le ? a ng to si er ow e, p _ dg Ju ry Ju an d f an gr r l th r1� to s1 re 111 q 111 o . l na tio e di . to gra11t tra ng s lo be ha e� r� cogru zed in It n. t.to es qu at th t� w� s e v l e s 1101 this we do not concern d an r e b e gr � s 1 m rie Ju o t 23 2 ay m l 1a 01 1t1 ad a tr ex e tl1 mine at tJ1 er . ev ,v bo y tr cotln ly r1 k en both by the me m na ta d1 e or ar y ec cr se o� l1s at O . ns io ss se t witnesses itl seci·e . y an em re th M ns fo so be rea s s� es tn w1 ve ha by d an s e been ri ju d a11 gr ch su of bers �s e so os th rea v 1t h� B1 . e �ever bee n . . . . cy cre e s_ ry j11 nd gra t oi· pp su ad,,aiJced to ar? e d v.:1th v1olat1o n of la w ?. c_h use acc �f an _ l tria e th in y rec sec thotlght to j11stify estigate, and the usual inv ies d Jur an Gr l. Jai to t 1 se1 01· l 1ec 1 fi be y ma he ich \vh foi· e., t o re port no basis for [i. '' l -bil ''no a t, por e r a e r eith is 1 io1 gat esti inv end of their a formal criminal charge] 01· an indictment. Tl1ey do not try and they do not convict. They re11der 110 judgn1e11t. Wl1en their work is finish ed by the return of an in.dict . ct on indi . Nor may he be e d pers the nst agai ence evid as 11sed be ot cann ment, it fined or sentenced to jail 1111til he has been tried and convicted after having been afforded the proced11ral safeguards 1·equired by due process of law. Even when \Vit11esses before gra11d ju1·ies 1·ef11se to answer proper que stions, the grand juries do not adj11dge the witnesses g11ilty of contempt of court in secret or in public or at all. Witnesses who ref11se to testify before grand j1rries are tried on c.ontempt charges before j11dges sitting i11 01 )en co11rt. And tho11gh the powers of a judge even '· ,vhen acti11g as a one-man g1·and j11ry may be, as Micrngan holds, judicial in their nature, the due process cla11se [of the 14th Amendment] may apply ,,,jth one effect ?n the judge_'s gi·and j11ry investigation, b11t \Vith q11ite a different effect �,hen the ' Judge-grand Jury suddenly n1alces a witness before it a defendant in a contempt case. j We f11r!be1· bold �hat fail11re to afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the cha1·ge of false and evasive swearing was a denial of due pi·ocess of la_w. A p erson's right to reasonable notice of a charg·e aga in.st him, and. a1: opport11n1ty to be l1eard in his defense - a right to his day in court - are b_asic 111 our _system o� jurisp1"11dence; an d these rigl1 ts include, as a minimum, a right to exami�e t�e w1t11esses agai11st hi111, to offer testimony, and to be represented by coui1sel. Michiga11, n.ot denyi11g the existe11ce of s cas e a l cri mi n. in rig e hts tl1e s gener�lly, appare11tl y co11cedes tl1at th e s11n1m n bee e ha v wo uld ar he e co y r nv 11 ict o i J � den.Ia! of pi·oced11 ral dt1e J)1·ocess bt1t f01· tl1e natt11·e of the charge' namely,.a con· ten1pt of c·o111·t, con1111I · 'tt-ed, tI 1e State tirges, 1. n the co urt's a.ctual presence. . . · It is true tl1at courts hav · i-1.a in· ce--+ · e ' h I pun1s ong to exercise d . a · power s11mmar1ly · · . . · d11ct comn 1 tt d · n o e 1 co11 . ; I 1J r co111·t w1tl1ot1t notice, testimony or bearing. Ex part� Terry 128 U 2 9, was such shal mar a the cas e. Th ere Terry committed assault on , · who ;, t ·1 0 onlent removing a hec e viol �: " kler from the courtr�om. The and mi��o:d��.� b th . e t e j · . -· urr occ � hec o · r kle d a11 nt th e marshal's assaila � · ? the ''perso11al . terru d . view of the Jltd . . nte . , =::-. � fl"�� ·. 1n · ge, � ,, ll u11_ d er actua ms own ey e,'-' and . the trial of a cause t s en u der wa y. T cum } .. _ � c� � h suc !� urt r Co lus he t und tha ;11 : � judge has power 1 punisli __ :� h ou: . an w1t� off ender at once, witho ut notice and . 1ng, altho·ugh ·hIS· cond .. .. ---. . . tr: . uct may als 0 be punis h able as a cr1IlllnaI 01.1.ence. · ··· _ - -:;::_ � ,:� That the hold.ing in th . r " � . � 6!1 b : :ta · · . t e te Terry case 1s not t o be considered as an unliro. � donment of th b · : \ _ . � c d-ue p oce � ss proce�ural sa.feguards, even in c�J!tem �t was spelled ou: w�� emph atic la11guag 1 e n C oo ke v. United S,tat�s,- 2oJ_t!� ��- =-·�2! I

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HUMAN R.lGI-lTS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

993

dis fed tric t cot1rt. Tl1ere it vvas era l a in aris ing cas e poi11ted otit tl1at 1or t r t . P . . . con e.Dl a 111a rao t � ct· ry 'b ll t 11a1r_o\v1y l11111ted power to ptIIl ish be ex t rcis e exe to t t t 1ate no ice �nd opportt1_�1t� to b e _ l1 eard, tl1 e ade q1 hoti t t wi cotirt-disturbi�� t �o��:!p occur 1n tl1e .cot1rt � 1n1 111ed1�te preseilce, but tllat only not mtist ct u the miscond kno\vledge of 1t acquired by l11s ow11 observatioil of the perso nal have st u m � judge ..... cond11ct ous mptu conte . ' Except for a narrowly li1nite? category of contempts, d11e process of law as e cas� req1�1 res tl1at 011e cl1arged ,vitl1 co11te111 pt of cotirt Cook he t in ined be expla dvised of the cl1arges agamst l11n1, l1 ave a reaso11able OJJport11nity to meet them �y way of defense o� explanatio11 , hav� tl1e rig�t t? be repre�e11ted by co1111sel, ar1 d have a chance to testify a11d call otl1e_r w1t11esses 1 11 l1 1s bel1alf, e1tl1er by vvay of defe11se or explanation. Tl1e narro\v exception to tl1ese due JJrocess req11ire111 ents incltides only charges of misconduct, i11 open co11rt, i11 tl1 e prese11ce of tl1e j11dge, vvl1icl1 dis turbs tbe court's b11siness, ,vhere all of the esse11tial elements of the 111isco11 d11ct are under tl1e eye of tl1e court, are act ually observed by the co11rt, and l 1ere in1 n1ediate punishment is essential to prevent ''de111 oralizatio11 of tl1e court's a11tl1ority. ... before the pt1blic." If some esse11tial elen1 ents of tl1e offe11ce are not personally ob served by the judge, so that l1e mt1st de1Je1 1d 11po11 staten1 e11ts made by others for his knowledge about these esse11tial eleme11ts, dt1e 1Jrocess reqt1ires, accordi11g to the Cooke case, that tl1e acc11sed be accord ed 11otice a11 d a fair hearing as above set out. I I

The facts shown by th.is record p11t this case 011tside tl1e narrovv category of cases that can be pt1n.ished as contempt witho11t 11otice, heari11g a11d co1111sel..... It is "the law of the la11d'' that no man's life, liberty or JJroperty be forfeited as a punjsbment until there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried i11 a JJUblic tribunal. See Cl1an1hers v. Florie/a, 309 U.S. 227, 236, 237. The petitio11er vvas con victed without that kind of trial.

The judgeme11t of the Supreme Court of Micl1iga11 is reversed.

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What does the above judgement say about the requisites of due process.?

Preventive Detention and Article 65

�he preamble to Orders No. 56 and 62 bo th cite Article 65, apparently as a constitutional authority for preventive detention legislation. l e gency en of t s i _ 1 :e a1 1 iss1 e btf iz dou hor at1t ul to if Article 65 ,vas intended � .I 1 egisla t on. 1_ ch cle�rly do:� vvl1 �on 1t t 1 sti 1 p 1 R om Co are Article 29 of the evised C _i . aUlb oriz e governmental actions in contradiction t o tl1e Co11st1ttitro11 1 11 �ert�111 defi 11. casi:s . Article tioil . N?te , a gisl e l_ h s11c for ag a 1n tha t the 65 makes 110 mention of a1 1 iss11ing povver ted Nat1011s D eclarat1o11 , i Un r sou tl1e of ce 2) 29( of e le icl tic t Ar Ar s i 65 and that the tl1e n e ed t0 e t a d o n 11 on_ acc inter e a ld purpose \Vas to provide a general gu1·de to in� blic ll t 6: � O�� JIDJ r othe teresf; ; u� balance constitutional gt1arantees S? t!1at applied _ 1 1 to laws : ? be �ccommodat_ed. Th?s Article ?5 1s �1111ply a sta ;; of Chapter III. _hich might otherwise be 111 derogat1011 o� th� commail 1 sti coi Indeed it s urely of sion 1 1 1 �rguable that, far fro1n a1 1 a11thor1za!10n [or ;� tution at r� � es Ar ticl oth er e g in Cha t ts, �r�1cle 65 is 111ore i n the nature of a r1g l1t itse1 · of sotirce a tl lan per III it 1s a limit ation on governmental power ratl1er

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r, it a te is i. deline for i'nt g ap h u C at th · in le ic rt A . . 1 al . 1 e fi r 1e t1 .. as n io ct a e iv t a affi ' .' le ic t r g A in o g e r o f '' e th ��ng a11d a' pplying eac·h of prew ' c li er b :1 rd p o " ay ' f_ m o ' if s' st 1t e1 ju m re y ui eq im 1 ''l '' e th i .. . at th · es at st 65 le ic rt A . n es It o o I t d t1 o u n 1t st o n o th C au e th ri y b ze ed te e 1 th 1 a ' r . 1a g1 t ts . l1 ig . ,, i . r le . tl o ,, n o · ,, 18 . t -01 ta, �1g h 1m an !s 1�1 d ng 1 n ''� e usp e en di tw e b e � n ng' e ' 1· e . 1ff d . e th e il h W '' . n ''si,spei?sio . n 1o ct 1n al st ci or d1 u F cr 1f a y el ic 1r rt st A le 1t 1s , ee 65 gr de of 1• e tt a 111 a be a y m then1 us d abrogate constitu.. th an d en sp su _ ay m t n_ ne 11 1·1 ve go t is intei·preted to 111ea 11 tl1a s t ke ay ec ta eff aw l 1n al le ic at rt th A i is th t s 1a tl ex e ud cl 1 1 co t us m e \V , its tional 1-igl tio e itu th of st I o� II C n. er I?t ha e C Th ?f n � co on isi ov pr r he ot e th by 11 ve gi pressly ex e ce d th en an 65 ist of le ic rt a A g t1n c c1 bli pu by at th w llo fo 1 e1 1 tl ht ig m n io clus ed te s an ht ar rig at gu lly eir na th io ut tit ns co dis e rid er ov n ca rs ke a m wa need, the l cretion. e ur st n as tio be mu me ten de ze e aly tiv an en ev d pr y an 65 le tic Ar of 1g di1 a re s On thi , ed nd re pe s . we t su bu on uti her tit rat ns Co the of hts rig l nta me a d f11n the if s a 11ot as if tl1e f11ndame11tal g11arantees - including Article 65 - remain in f orce to be interpreted and applied as in a11y other case.

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Re-read pages 919-923 of Section 2 of this chapter (''In Accordance with the Law'' and Article 65). Judicial Review of Legislation Enacted Under the Emperor's Prerogative.

Re-read pages 408-412, sitp1·a. Consider whether the Fact that Orders No. 56 and 62 �e�e pro1nulgated as ''prerogative'' legislation prevents a Court from rev1ew1ng tl1eir constit11tionality. Re-read: pages 617-618, sitpra. Preventive Detention: Comparative Experience

Re-read: Chapter VI, page 635.

t �e <?onstitutio�s of most countries grant extraordinary powers of arrest and � de _en 10 111n extraorcliii ary emerge11cies. B11t there is variation on a number of crucial · points. on1e allow exercise ofsye erge11cy po,ver only in · ar or in��rrecti'.on · time w of and onl8y when tl1e ordinary 8�en1 o f· law e11f orce111ent and. judicial adm1mstratI on '· b ak,,8 dow11· Others all. ow c rge em exe e ct1 tiv e of dis ' c1·e '' tio for n n a rat de ion cl s'' ' y'' . �� a h s11spe11s1on'' of' co11st· it11t·1011a1 rig ou� h t , d e · h ts "'h e11 c1v1l threaten · · · d1s01·der is . . not yet a fact. The Co�.st1tt1t1· ons of son1e tain co Kenya, n cot111t1 i es, e.g. India and · detailed rovi sio s la 0 s ec . o w c t a lly . 1J ifi authorizing e11actment of preventive deten i n . In· other�oui1tries e g Tanza11ia, ence h b s � e t Gh i me) ana (d · g g r h ur1n the uma Nkr . . ' � . of an enforceable bill. of.' . to 1s1o ts appears 111 part to reflect a dehberate d� f · remove constit utionaI roa . ocks a w n ntio dete t<;> j th� preventive enactment of . on a continuing ha 1 rd1nary legislation. Many countries in Afri ca have r�sor� to IJreventive dete� g uri aws. na 111 a ( n e som.e e.g. South Africa and Gh d Nkrumah period) the power s I vely has clearly ) . n . i�e extensi been used (a11d abused (� g. Tanzania) the we But has_ , . apparently ringly , been used very spa e!cy little detailed factuaff;� u fre : e m ation th to laws, q · u. ·os · · 1 evaluate the the i 11pact of of their abuse tllei·r r\f as me · cr1 t· · 1ca 1 1c 1 rel ras a tio d n o t ' · and whether less rity secu mi· ght have suffi ced · t 0 prevent whatev . . e ten a e l d thr er . rea h arm was really . The var1at·ion in prev . in S· d · · ea r · wins t· en ive d etention laws is suggested in the f ollo .. -

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HU?v[AN RIGI-ITS - POLITICAL 1\ND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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Tl, e Rigl,t of Ever;,011e to be Free Jro,n of i,d; St , on s, Na ti d nite Jlrbitrciry _ Froro U 8 9 (E/CN.4/ 26/Rev Exile 1) (1 and 64) pages 191-1 94. tio,1 Dete,, Arrest, tra! Af ric a11 Rep11blic] tl1e la\v provides [Ce 11 y coi 1ntr one In tlJat tlJe Presi 722. s ta te of _e111�1:ge_11cy (etc1t cl'ttrge,1 ce) wlJeiJeve p roclaim n1ay blic F:epu the of r � dent threats to tl1e 111st1tt1t10_11s _of t11e ReJ)ttblic or to prese1!t and 11� serio are be there �. tak�11�s �11d tl1e 11?rn1al ft111ct101�111g of J)tlblic powers esta 11�de 1ts of otit ing carry _ _ 1 11 t err11p 1s ted. 1on _ Befor u t t e 1)rocla1m111g a state of einergeiJcy blish ed by the Co11st1 vv1tl1 the pres1de� ts of tl1e Natio11al Asse111bly a,1cl of co11s1!l t must dent Presi the the Constitutional C:0�111c1l a11d tl1e �rocla111at1011 n111st be decreed after delibera tion by the Cot1ncil of_ M1111sters. The National Asse111b.ly 111t1st be i1� sessio11 a11d it cannot be dissolved dt1r1ng the state of en1erge11cy. Ail)' J)rolo11gat1011 of tl1e en1erge11cy beyond fifteen days can be ordered _011ly by a la\v ad?pted b)' tl1e AssembI1,. I11stead of the state of e1nergency tl1e Pres1de11t 111ay procla1n1 /'etat cl'a!erte, 1111der wl1icl1 measures less restrictive of h11ma11 rigl1ts tha11 t111der a state of emerge11cy are per mitted. L'etat d'alerte may be J)roclain1ed \Vl1e11 seriot1s pres11n1ptio11s exist tl1at public order may be th reatened, or if eve11ts occur vvhicl1, i11 vie\v of tl1eir 11att1re and gravit)', may be considered as IJUblic cala1ni tes. L'etat {/'alerte is proclaimed by order of the President 11pon the advice of tl1e Co1111cil of 1v1i11isters. Its dt1ratio11 cannot exceed three mo11tl1s. U11der tl1e state of e111erge r 1c1, or l'etc1t cl'a!erte ad111i11is trative authorities designated by the 11i11ister of tl1e I11terior 1nay take i11to c11stod)1 (garcle a vite) persons who are co11sidered as bei11g da11gero11s to l)lI blic sect1 rity. The Administrative CoL1rts have son1e co11 trol over tl1e l. egali ty of tl1e exercise of this po,ver of c ustody, and jt1dicial co11rts 1nay be seized of con1plai11ts against official acts which are alleged to constit ute a gross violatio11 of b11n1a11 rights (voies c/e fait ). 780. Under the Preve11tive Detention Ac t of 011e cot111try [Ghana] tl1e Head of the State is empovver ed to order the dete11tion of a citize11 for up to Jive years without trial or jt1dicial review 11nder certain co11di tio11s. Tl1e Ac t \Vas passed 011 18 July 1958 for five years a11d i t may be exte11ded for a ft1 rtl1er J)eriod of tl1ree years by a resoluti?n of the assembly. Arrest a11d dete11tio11 111ay be ordered, it tl1� l1ead of th. e State 1s satisfied that i t is 11ecessary to preve11t a perso11 fro111 act111g in a_ny manner prejudicial to the defence of tl1e cou11try, tl1e relatio11s of tl1e cou11try ":'1111 0ther co�ntries. or for the security of the State. Witl1i11 five days after de�ent1011, the deta1ned person must be informed of the gro1111ds of dete11tio11 and given an opportunity to make representations i n writi11g to tl1e head of tl1e State. A:ttempt o eva_d: arrest may entail in ifie� �pec that s a� long as e twic dete11tion .for a period � he orig1nal order. The Head of the Stat e 111ay s11spe11d tl1e order of d�tentio_ 11 ag�inst a person and req11ir e him instead to notify llis moven1e11ts a11d ftirnisl1 11; failiir� }0 comp�y with these require er 0rd al grr1 ori the er 1111d 1 io1 e11t det ments ma y lea d to or a period 11ot . te ta s ie tl f o d a e H e th f o e exceeding five years or d 11ring tl1e IJleas11r rltr 1 c� 782· In one country t he law al ici d _ jtt �o ct bje s11 n is 1tio te1 de e tiv en ev pr on � [Burm a]. he law 1 e sid Pre the � _ ich wh ' der 1 1111 · 1se it 194 cla s wa a 8 s d ha cte ena in _T b Y a not fi · ' a o r er offic ce 1 1 po a ation a\ 1 rat ion. Under. tl1e V Sp ec1'fied .1 c k , ca11 terminate its ope . · ran or an officer specially ernpowered for the l)llrpose nJay a'r. rest \Vtt. h011t . ·c Warrant "any . · b 1 1 p b .1 1 t1r d1st . I . t O d . n nJay tranqtu·ti·1ty person wl10 purst1es a co11rse of· acti on ca, 1 ct_ l atearrested perso -' · o e r 1 fl n a manner prejudicial to p11bl1c safety. , , J ·} p b e detai tile tlt of ·de re d up to teen ys. e J t to ted or eJJ r be 1st m1 t res da ar e Th o � c untr y� d :� President e d : 0rde dete� t1on beyo11d the fifteen days ca� only be o r by s�m� 1gs roceedii � p }}ie . e a re subje :uthor1t_y to whom his powers are spec1fi.cally delegat 1 tio1 lica app · an 011 ct O scrutiny by the irt High Co urt or the S111Jren1e Cot

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IO T U ' IT NAL T S N O N C IA P IO H T E F O SoURCEBOOK _

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_ _ _ _ 99 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ �6 � as . of be us ha ,p re co tt1 na e Th . e th u i.11 co 11. rts io ct re di' h r fo .a . v y t t· pa , . e . d e v e i r . g g a e by th 1 o1 1 , 1n t, h rs d e pe e 11 e a1 dg et d Ju e th e m of nt of tt.. e as 1e e · 1 e th . tte ct . re . i d. . . . .11ot h.es1-1a·ted to . . t s d n d n e a r t te r . e a n Y ·r 1o t1 s u J o t l 1a r 11ate 1 t 11 1e fic f 11 s t 0 1 1 s a \v cotlrt, there e� y ct el je io at re us er cl ib in el d n o on ti a �u f ti :s o1 C u ''d s ' . ia 1d J1 e of s · ei nl ar f The,, g r in fo on do as so re e as on w d a an r n pu 1o 1t 1t1 st 1 s o1 po C es a' di In · i 11 e is at cl s s e c o · r p . . . . s. on aw ee I s t1 en g. d et e. ve t1 te us e� A ev pr n, of t 1 e e1 Th n1 ct 1a e1 w lo al to 1 o1 si ci de ful e th 50 In 19 r G ve . o 6) 96 n me nt intro · (� n zo at a of N_ ne to 1·s ·ne o1 C Indian co,1stitutio,1: t. en m 1a r1 a P 1 11 e · 11 s1 ea m 11 io 1t dtlced a preve11tive dete1 The n,aterials ,vhicl1 fallow focus on the I11dian exp�rience with preventive detention. Pei·haps in 110 co1111try has t�ere been more ��nt1nued open debate con cei·ni11g t.11e 11eed for p1·eventive detention and the leg1t1macy of Sl1ch laws in an avo\ved democratic state.

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Fr o m Ba)rley, P1·e11enti11e Detentio11 i11 l11dia (1962), pages 2-4, 6, 7-9, (footnotes omit ted).

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The Preventive Dete11tion Act of 1950 occupies a place in Indian law provided for it by tl1e Constit11tion of India. It can only be understood within that context. Freedom of the pe1·so11, the si11e qita 11011 of a democratic liberal society, is pre served for citizen s of I11dia i11 Articles 20, 21 and 22. Article 20 gu.arantees that no person shall be (I) co11victed of a11y offence except t1nder a law in force at the time, 11or be subject to pe11alty for an offe11ce; (2) prosecu ted or p11nished. for the same offence more than 011ce, (3) a11d fo1·ced to bear witness against himself. P·rotection fr o m the actions of ex JJost facto lavvs, d.011ble jeopardy, and seli"'-incrimination are th11s aff?rded. A�tic!e 21, disa1�mi11gly short and simple, states that ''no person shall be deprived of l11s life ?r personal liberty except according to _procedure established by law''. In tl1e a11tl1or1tative decision t1po11 the 111eaning of Article 21, the Gopalan case, tlie St1pr�1ne Cottrt rt1led that ''procedt1re established by law'' allowed the courts_ to _qtiest1on 011Iy wl1etl1e1· a la\v vvas con1patible \.Vitl1 other provisions of the Constittition. Tl1e cot1 1·t 1·ejected tl1e conte11tion that Article 21 could be interp reted �o as 1? accon1��date _tl1e dei1 otatiot1 ''dtte p1·ocess of· .law." It would be open to the legislattl�e, _if it desired, to pass a law \Vllicl1 aifected great cha11ges in the pro cedui·e of c1·1�111 �l trials, eve11 to the exte11 t, f..01· instance, of abolishing the right of cr oss-exan,inatio11. The cot1rts cotild 11ot qt1estio11 tl1e propriety of such an en actment.

· Artie!� 22, tl1e last 1ne1nbe1· of tl1is gro up of Articles specifies that in the eve nt · . ' th· at tl1ere 1s occa.sio11 f or th e arrest hall s on pers of a pe1·s011 acco1·ding to law that . . the not be deta111e· d 1n ctist0 d w1t· ·I ' ' f , · 0 e b , Y .1011t be111g 1nfo1·11 1ed ''as soon as may �r�:�ds for _ s� ch arres t_ and he shall h ave the righ t to consult and be defended byd a _ g r�c t oner of his choice." Y sto l cu in ed deta in Fu r thern1ore, h e may not be � � { 1 for a p r1o a m t n ger tl1 �n 24 hot1rs before being produce befo1·e the ''neares Sd · " ? � · te'', exclu d1ng tl1e t11ne te tra sta ng · av i r th� jo_urney to the magi?tr�te. H n�cessary 1or ,, . ir these comme ndable . guara the .· t. o · n te�s the const1tut1on proceeds, as 1s its won t, t immediate mod'fi at l u h e ght to be inf or me d of the gro un ds o� a rrest to T _ O:, � , n hl : � � � with legal cou s J} e n to be produce� befo re th e 1_1-earest magistrate wit" rr st· day shall no t ap e a 1 'to / b e w v l10 3: r � o e1t er ene a!1e or w� my ns r �� :mainqe ed or detained �Jde � : . r j h p T rov d 1 11 1ng 1or dete prev nt10 entiv e � of the Article sets or . . · · . . · . rf tego . ca £ th th e rights to which a al tion person in the excep

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As 011e disgrt111tled member of t11e Lok Sabl clai n1. may nt1 dete · ve la . , con , . . of prevenb tl Artic 1. . c. . , 22 c?111ers 01� ev�ry I 11 dt a11. c1 t1ze 11 'tl1e rig11 t, tile ftlil clatllC iltal le y , rl itte i �ented tr 1t al. ot th w1 ed 11 tai de being ght, 0f ri ,, d tinder a la ,v of 1)reve1 1tive detention, wJ10 are de ste r� ar 11s rso pe i'' se tho For to be prodt1ced before a 11 1agistrate \.Vitl1i11 24 llotirs righ t tl1e ng 1-,..'. cJajr oi from b ed by l�gal cot111 sel, tl1 e Co11stitt1tio11 IJrovides a SJ)ccial defe nded be to '' right the '• :%om s for tl1e1r safety a11d ,vell-bei11g. ''WI1e11 a1 1y JJerso,1 is guara ntee um 1 minin \ of �et order n1ade of t1 an 11 der a1 1y la,v !)rovidi1 1g for preverl 1anc� pt1rst in ed tive tain . de 1ty making �l1e orcler sl1all, as soo11 as 111ay be, co111 111t,riicate at1thor the n, tentio ,,. de ' \�l 11cl1 tl1e order l1 �s bee11 _ 111ade a11d sl1 all afford llii on g1� o und the person n such to • , 1 1ty of mak 1 11 g a representat1011 aga1 11st tl1e order.'' Except for opportt11 t earlies '• the ' 1er, tJ1is provisio11 is const1lt a to right la,v) the of n very n1 t1 cl1 lil(e tl1 at omissio the afforded a person not arrested t111der a prever1tive dete11tion Ia,v, 11 a111ely, tl1at I1e must be informed, ''as soo11 as 1 nay be,'' of tl1 e grou1 1ds for st1 cl1 arrest. Tl1e n1ajor point of difference bet,veen tl:e s�a�t1s of the pt111 itively a11d tl1e JJreve11 tiveJy cletai11 ed is that in the former case tl1 e 1nd1v1 d11al n1t1st be prodt1ced before a 111agistrate \ViLl1 i11 24 hours, while in the latter case-tl1at of tl1e dete11t1-l1e 11 eed 1 1eve.r be a11d car1 only claim the slin1 gt1arantee of n1aki11 g a ''represe1 1tatio1 1'' against tl1e order. Third party intervention i11 cases of preventive dete11 tio11 is allovved n1ore or less as an aside. 111 discussi11g the 111 aximt11n ti11 1e for dete11 tio11 tl1e Co11 stitt1tio1 1 states that no 011e may be held for longer tl1 a1 1 tl1ree 1no11 tl1s t11 1less a1.1 Adviosry Board, c onsisting of persons of J)rese1 1t, forn1er, or 1Jote11tial l-Iigl1 Cot1 rt ra11l<, "has reported before the ex1Jiratio11 of the said period.... tl1at tl1ere is i11 its 0 1Jin.io11 sufficient cause for such detentio11 .'' Referral to st1cL1 a Boa rel is 11ot n1a11 datory; Parliament may prescribe those classes of dete11t1s v\1110 are 11 ot to be giver1 ti1e be11efit of ex parte judgement. Furthermore, the 1)roced11re \vl1icl1 the Advisory Board is to use in its inquiry into those cases it n1 ay be allo,"'ed is also st1bject to tl1e regt1latio11 of Parlian1ent. There are no provisions for power of cross-exan1 i11atio11, exan1i11atio11 of the detenu in person, subpoena po,ver for vvit11 esses, and so fortl1. Un_der the Co11stitution the safegt1ards ,vhich a dete1 1t1 l1as are tl1e1 1 (1) h e 111t1st be detained under a Jaw sanctioni 1 1g preve11 tive deteutio11, (2) l1 e mt1 st be a�lowed to rn�ke a represe11 tation against the order, (3) I1e 111ay be JJern1 itted to l1ave his case examined by an Advisory Board if l1 e is to be kept i11 dete11tio11 lo11ger tl1 a11 tliree monlhs and if the Parliame1 ;er 1 its it . 1t n . The Preventive Dete11 tion Act of 1950, as it has bee11 a111 e11ded tip to _date, pro vides that if the al Gover111 ne1 1t or a State Gover11 111e11t is ''satisfied ,;vitl1 respect Centr !0 ��Y perso n that with a view to preve11 ti11 g hi1n from acting in a11y 111 a1111er pre Ici a.l 1? (1) the 1 JJowers, �r r eig for h \Vit lia I11c of enc s 11 ?ef {�� e of I11 dia, the relatio . bli, � ec rity of nd1 � or (2) of ance 1 � te1 1a1n 1 1 _ � tl1e or u te St I u tl1e sec rity of tl1e � � o rders or \'. 1 ltir n:n (3) the ma1 ntenat1 ce of s11 pplies a11d services esse11t1al to the co ' t hese gove rnme11ts may make an order directi11g that s11c!1 person .b . d�tattle�I ._ ! � ict Mag i trat . Pow e ay b e e str Di ercised by District Magistrates by Add1t1011al x esp c�ia_r t he t Y ly_ arid , alf beh p em s tl1i e ow 1 i1 red by the State Gover11 me1;t to act Co� 0118s1011 ers of Police for Bombay, Calctrtta, Nfadras or flyderabad. officer . ?rder by t·11� app ropriate . Within 12 days after tl1 the Stat� G e making of a detent10�1 beconie� order L1e vern 1ot, 1 , s _doe �t me1 it If t er. rn11s ord the rove apJ) oid ' Jer ''forth\vitl1 to V . It i s �ere or re port th.e fact f�re 1nct1mbent t1po11 tl1e officer 1naldng tl1e bee11 made,· aild stich of 1sst1 ance, the grotrnds on which the order has

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t he matter'' to the State G ov�rn n o 1g i1 r . ea b a e v a h .. n io in p o js J1 in '' as r s partict�la the S tate Governm of ent l · va pro ap has the r e aft been ' be' 'A y ma as t. l e e11 tra en nm r e ov e t ov ra G n Ce rn e · th to n s me r te t t 1a 1 · . 1 d te a , l re . d . 11 a , s d . 1 11 o-rot

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e m th by de tain�11g authority hi t o ed �t 1ic 111 m 1n co ) ve l1a t us n1 ed i11 ta de 11 so Tlle per r o�nds upon_ wh1. c g e th h n . 1o e 11t th t� de of te de da or e th r 111 0 f1· ys da e fiv 1 a1 th i· te la t 110 rtun1ty of �aking a representa.. po o_p st . lie r ea e th ed 1·cl o f af e ''b ,v as n1ade ar1d he sl1all im at n om rb f� �e ve ta 1s rti ct A A � �h cle of 11 , io 22 ct se is Th '' . 1· de r o e th t . s in a a g tioii t required to fu rnish no 1s ity or th au g 111 1n ta de 1e Tl 11. io ut it t ns clatise 5 of the Co terest to disclose . in ic bl e pu th t 1s 1 ai ag be d 11l ,vo 11 io in op its f acts which i 11 The Act goes consider ably beyond the per�issive requirements of _the_ Consti tution in its provisio11 for 1·eference to an Advisory Board. The Const1tut1on only 1·eqt1ired that the1·e be 1·efer1·al to an Advisory Boar d f o.r those persons who wer e to · be kept in dete11tion lo11ger than three n1onths. The Preventive Detention Act, as it now sta11ds, n1akes it mandatory 11pon the appr opriate Go\1ernment to place before a11 Advisory Boa1·d any order which has been made, t.he representation, if any, made by the detent1, and the repo r t of the offi c er making the or de r. Tms must be done ,vithin 30 days after the date of detention. The Adviso ry Board is not bound in its consideration to the mate1·ial given to it by the Government. It may call for ''such ft1 rthe1· information as it may deem ne c essary from the appropriate Govern ment or from any pe1·son. c alled for the pt1rpose.... or from the person c on cerned''. · e Advisory Board will gra11t leave to hear the detenu i n person if the detenu desire s Th or the Bq ard conside1·s it esse11tial. Ho\vever, the Act expressly provides that nothing in the Act sl1all be c onstrued as giving the detenu the right of being defended by :'a11� legal practitio11er' '. A dete11t1 is thus on bis o\vn; he may n o· t have legal counsel • • 1n his approacl1 to an Advisory Boar d. After· the Board has .made its cons.ideration, it mu�t st1b�it a repo1·t to the appropriate Gove r n111e11t stati11g whether it thinks there 1s s_uffic1e1�t �a11se for the detention ot' the i11dividt1 al affec ted. This report must be submitted w1tlun te11 weeks from ·the date of detention. Putting the time r equire-: ments to_getl1er, we find that the Advisory Boa r d 111ust be a.pprised of a detention l aud be give11 the 11ec essa 1·y facts witlii11 a month of the date of detention and it must Ji have made its decision as to the st1fficie11cy of' the g1·ou·nds within approximately three mo. nths fron1 tl1e sa111e date. .i An Advisory Board is composed of three persons all of whom must either v e bee r1, � are , o r rt. ai· � q11a lifie Co u ? a to ' b e, Hig j d h ppo i11t a ed as ges of u �t T� . � air:°-1a11 of the Board mt1st e1tl1er be or have bee11 a High Court Judge' potential 1 '; 1 rank 1s not e11011gl1· · Dec1s1 · · · 1 · · 0 1 1s of. t·I1e Boa1·d a1·e taken by maJor1ty vote.

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pe son, e a�propi·iate gover nn1en rde n n tio t e· de t is obl iged to revoke the ° � r t i 1, an use, ease t e prisoi1er ''for thwith''. If ca i; ient c suffi it con.eludes that there is the beovernment may do as . e . Tb . r de r o it the · wish es confi rm revo . ke mod ify or ' . ' . ' Adv1sory Board is thus given :j � tJ1e power of negative v eto . ·.' - . . . : � � f , . ce · · n The maximum p · d tor Si e ·'. . . e one r. a . y on is a e d ine t e de b an c a every order of dete ntfflO wlu h p rso11 c . _ 1 01 must b�. referred to a11 Adv1�ory Board a11d s�nc� no p- · j· . r c�n be held without the coi1 r ma . a i t , with n t t fi io11 of repor u pP the be Board st which n1· x1mately thre · e month8 of the making n : · ca · · · _ e o . no n · . ·•.tl-; P of the orde;, the result is that .

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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HUMAN RIGl-lTS -

999

witl1otrt a positive jt 1 dge111 e11 t of an ex n1o nth s e thre n tha er pa t b dy. 1 1 g · lon d he! Act Dete ntion he P. reventive ren1oved tl1e pern1 issive11e;s or' t� � ! t e ns t Y th1� w� ,provisions detentio11 longer tha11 three n1011 tl1s and 1.11,ade a for · � i, 11 A 1 c s v1 so ry n rut.to . ry to a d n a m n io at Boar d'6 con·f·ri m i11 I11dia (1962) pages 22-23. Detentior1 e Preventiv ey, From Bayl "Of all the argu1ne11 ts in favour of preventive dete11tio11 _ptit forvvarcl by spokesover tl1e years, perha_p� tl1 e 1 11os_t coge11t a11 ct vvell-expressed rnn 1en t Gov e e th for men Data:, Deputy M1n1 ster of fiome Affairs, iil DecenJber Mr. by ced advan that \\'as e for . its do,¥n-to-eart_l1. qt�ality. I-le did not dabble ,vitli rem ark abl \�as It 1954 , . of the generalities a_bot1t the dt1t1es a11d respon�1b 1 l1 t1es of gover11 1ne11t-,,,bicli are not untrue for bemg ge11 eral-bt1t treated tl1e 1111 1Jorta11 ce of preve11tive dete11 tioii \Vithin the special circumstances of n1 oder11 I11dia. First, l1e raised t11e ''infant clemo cracy'' argument. l1 1 l11dia democratic habits of 1 11 i1 1d a 11 d procedt1res have 1 10t been widely Iearn�d n?r. deeply t 111�erstoo�. �emocracy i11 I11 dia is a tender pla 11t, whose roots are still 1 n1111sct 1Ie. Studied cult1vat1011 of la,,,1ess11 ess i11 st1cl1 a11 e 11viro11ment s ets an example which may choke out tl1 e slovvly cleveloping democracy. De mocracy in India needs to be gt1 arded more closely tl1 a11 its 1 nore J1 earty variety i11 the West. A corollary to this is that becat 1 se den1ocracy is frail tl1 e time i11 \\ hicl1 government may have to n1ove in its defence is correspo11 di11gly short. Tl1 e gover11 ment must be forearn1 ed. 'We cannot dig a well \\1l1 e11 tl1e hot1se is 011 fire.' Seco11d, tbe Preventive Dete11tion Act has a deterrent effect lIJ)011 pote11 tial 111alefactors. Even if it is not used to detain vast numbers of people, it is there i11 reserve a11 cl provocateurs, blackmarketeers, decoits, and so fortl1 are a,vare of it. Tl1ird, I11dia's problem is pecu.liar in that working from ,vitl1i11 is at least 011 e political part)' de dicated and committed to the overthrow of democr:1tic governn1e11 t. A force is poised for the seiz11re of power, by fair mea1 1s or fot 1 I . At any partict1lar ti1ne tl1is force may not be massed in a terribly aweson1e a11d belligere11t way; bt1t it is there nonetheless and India disregards it at her peril. Lastly, I11 dia's society lacks tl1e homogeneity that permits the calm i11 teraction so 11ecessary for de111 ocr,1tic gover11ment. Democracy demands consenst1s; the society of I11 dia is rive11 a 11d strai11ed �y hundreds of irritating and antagonistic loyalties. Social i11stability provides_ the tI�der for provocateurs and in tl1 e rest 1ltant co11flagratio11 de1nocracy n1 ay be rrre tr1evably lost.,,

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From Bayley , 0.rn. cz·t., page 80 , • ince a close �xamination of the conditions of society are �ritical to �he _jus _S � fie ation of prev i entive detentio11 and' in tt 1 rn· ' to tl1 e man·ner of its autliorizatioi \Vhetber cont· · 1 e-o1_ 1 e wot1ld 1n 1 f o s period , gently , d e i specif permanently or for have ·expectedm the Government to dwell at som e le1 1gth t 1 po11 the precise 11 ature and magn·1·t ua� . t1 r . h e N . r · M . . t · n_ me 111 v� o go f the threat fac111g Ind1 a11 society a 11 d . ._ hi s elf as ci of t_ y lit t� t? e 1 sa id: '' .. .. we have to consider this fact, whether 11 1 tl _ h s 11 cu!st nce . this 10 th ar like 1 re ia asu Ind me today, it is desirable to hav e some {;I ou y � the � s t e _ ma r eve 1 r; 1 as 1 te l Sta t en 's laws?' ' C 11 riot 1sly enot1gh tl1 e Governm cas ed e Ile tiv en ev pr of v Go y lic JJO m ern ent's argument i11 justifidation for tl1 e te n�:100 tna y be reduced to syllogistic form as follow: 0� so :: tie r re ise er lib the ct tri p ers��18 P m : Preventive detention, which does res � t p ' ive e th ' �ecessa y when law an d order are in st1ch jeopardy that y r J)ert ' aua libe rty of the vast majority are enda1 1gered.

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· e s i_ t, ec en pr om is m th in at s , h is uc r de . or o je d an p · aw a L r d : se lli ei : ' Y M'inor Pr y e 1t g n ar u an d 1m n en · co e . i th ed er f o es ti r:. er b l _ d an , y t i· e · p ro p . tl1at the lives, en s t be en h� e or i:m m er ov ? o e �l th e qu , ly 11t ca �fi nt and ::, gn si lt bt y, l al Par. adoxic e n ns a n th e r re th Jo p a e m th m!nor f o e . c 11 fe e d Deb 1n h at� t g n . le r te a r·e g t a d te a ti ex a i c f te o an ge ac xe ar e _ e ch s th � si d a li i n e or po ef � er ,_ th , t ve ha n io al nt te de ve � ti en ev pr � 0 ,� all n_ n. � n al ia ci e so nd n th co of e o qu I 1ti t1 r1 ed n o_ I � as re a �f an th er tll ra t :( p i lciple en l be s a e ta ba er to th ilu f� 50 19 e re nc 1 s_ to n 1o 11t te de o pr - . i: ve 1t1 e1 ev pr 1 . 01 s te ba tlle de r fo ed t1 e ne en Th �v i e. pr :�s ve en pr te or de 111 m e t� nt e at lid on va to dtice einpii·ical data . u n m en at e re g er th s w d on an 1t1 nd o c_ t ot 1a tl n 1i 10 po 1·t se as an on 11p d se ba l ei be s ha f . g 1n n te a 1·e th e er w ey th t a th i o, ti ·a t, 1s a demo, \i n' ial itio oc nd ''s co ' 's dia uld I11 wo of '' 11e tend f tiq cri d 11e so ea ''r of d kin What s? ' w n' la io nt te de e iv nt ve re ''p r fo ed ne e ��f, th to ''demo11strate'' t r ' the ino te' ''m da ali ''v e' to mis ed pre ed ne '? is ' ta' da cal i What kind of ''en1pi1· .,.

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Fron1 ''l11roads I11to Fundamental Rights in India'', Bulletin of International Com111issio11 of Ji11·ists No. 29 (1967) pages 24-25.

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· t or a State n e ernm Gov tral Cen the les e11ab Act n ntio Dete e e11tiv Prev The Gover11ment to place 1111der detention any person, if it is satisfied that .it is necessary to do so in 01·der to prevent s11ch person from acting in any manner prejudicial to: (i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or (ii) the security of the State or the maintenance ot.. public order, or (iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. . In �he case of a_ fore�g11er, the Government may place him under dete n� on with a view to regt1�ati11g his co11ti11t1ed presence in I11dia, or with a view to making arrangen1ents for his expt1lsion fro111 India. Se?t�on 7 <;>f the Act requires the detaining authority to inform the detenu, 11nl_ess 1_t 18 co11s1�ered to be agai11st the p11blic interest to do so, of the groun ds upon which the �ete11t1o11 01·d.e1· \Vas n1ade. rfhe section also enables the detenu to make representat1011s agai11st the order to the Gover11ment. !he �ct provides for tl1e establish1nent of Advisory Boa.rds consisting of per�ons

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1th111 3o days of tl1e 1naking of a detention order to place before the AdVISO!'Y Boa�d the grounds 011 \Vl1ich the 01·der wa.s made to�ether with any representa tions '1� 0 t • l . he · . :� receive. d from g · 0 · the detenLt. Th e Advisory Board 1s required, after cons1deri t · � '1 e� de m.aterial placed before it and calling for s11ch fu ay m it as ion in fo rm rth at er t u ece ssa ry s an � d after· hearing the deten11 in perso to , hea rd ' be to if de n sir · es he b� opt 1ts report to the Goverument · If . · s · i there 1s in . t - ti.o · th e t tha . ory vis ts Ad ard or Bo rep ni _ t cause for the detention the Government ma y· confirm the dete� n lI 0 on suffic1e n re1s rder But 1f the Advi·sory Board ' t e Governm . n with. - -+� _ the report s contra to ry, the quired to revoke the detent on o f d l ease re i order and cause the detenu to be � ·,·_.-· ! : � 1 : -i � t The maximl1m p eri·od Of s . . n G�ove ·afte:r.��- -i� the �ete nt1 1� but on mon twe lve ths, _ entitled to make ·a fresh d se ar etent i . have on order n · · :..:-:-; . if fresh facts which i expiry of the or1g1n . . . , --�� al order warrant sueh a course. . · · . - -� � · -,

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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT }{UMAN RIGI-ITS -

1001

1 1 Act ,vas_ origi!1ally � 11acted for a J)eriocl of oile Detent i 0 e entiv year . . _ . The Prev exte1 1 s1ons, 1t cont11111es to be 011 t11e stattite c per1o d1 of t resul a book as t u b . only , 1111der tl1e detaine Act d l1as perso11s variecl fron1 1 o 962 i ii l 9SO �.:,11 of ber num Th l� f 1963 T 1 risdic�io1 � of t �e Courts ��as beei1 l1eld 1111cler tl;e Act to be jt he . . 200 n to :f�:: confined sol_ely to the exa1 11 1nat1 ?n of th� q11 est1011 of_ \vl1etl1er _a detei111 11as bee_ n i�r; furnished with the gro111;1ds of bif d��n 1;to11 to a11 extent s1rffic 1 e11t to e 1 1able 111111 ry 1e Boar d . so to t v1 ns tio ta en res rep his ke ma :�J to �,._

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1011e To Be Free Fro11 1 Ever; Of Rig/1t The Of dy Sti Nations, Arbitrary United � From �ti ,, /Re /826 N.4 1) le 4) Exi (E/C (196 es })ag . And 7-8 1 ntio1 Dete t, Arres ,, '.

. This stud y was prepared by a Committee establisl1ed by tl1e U.N. Con1mission on Human / Rights. The Committee attempted a global study of laws relating to "arrest" and ''detention" � and it made suggestions as to minin1um gt1aranteees \·vl1ich sl1ould prevail in all countries� In the excerpts below tl1e Committee atternpts to define tl1e term ''arbitrary" as it is used in Article 9 of the U.N. Universe!, Declaration of Hun1an Rights. (See supra).

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27. In the light of the travat,x preparatoires on article 9 of tl1e Universal Decla ration and [in light of other material] .... tl1e Co1nn1ittee bas con1e to the opi11io11 that "arbitrary'' is not synonyn1011 s with ''illegal'' a1 1d that the for111er signifies more than the latter. It seen1s clear that, ,vl1ile an illegal arrest or detention is almost always arbitrary, an arrest or detention which is i11 accorda 1 1ce ,vitl1 law n1ay nevertheless be arbitrary. The Committee, therefore... . l1as adopted tl1e follo\ving defini tion: an arrest or detention is arbitra.ry if it is (a) 011 grot111ds or in accorda11ce ,vitl1 proce dures other than those established by law, or (b) t111der the provisions of a la\\' the purpose of which is iI1compatible with respect for tl1e right to liberty a11d security of person .

28. This definition, in the view of the Con1mittee, is corroborated by article 29 (2) of th e Universal Declaration.

Und.er this paragrapl1, the right to liberty and security of person, j11st as otl1er human nghts, is ''subject only to st1ch lin1itations as are deternuned by law.'' "!?ur . ��ermore, the Jaw its�lf shall be ''solely for the p11rpose of secu�ing dt1e_ recogn1t�o11 d respec t for tl1e rights and freedoms of others a 1 1d of 111eet1 ng the Jtist reqtiire· '' · · ments ' Of morality, p11blic order i n a de1nocrat1c so�iety. re welfa ral ge11e the and A of arrest or dete1 1tion which is contrary to this p11rpose m�st be considere? I�w :Y 0 �ectionab le from the poi11t of view of article 29 (2) as \\1ell as article 9 of the Univers al Declaratio . n

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· he· Comm1'ttee · · a si A in t n ta T is ex aws I v n etent1o d review e ed many differe11t preventi ' and AI c e\ ntt�d tiv 1 ven � pre 1 t wan i � to b 1e u tint con that e ld som co ntries wou Ass�m ng , laws th ow 0 � s antee Dllni d guar 1 ttee and iples recom d princ mended that the following if a� · when t h e extr aordinary power of dete11tion without trial was to be exercise · .!

Article 34

been · When an emergen . · bas d an t s s exi the nation cy wh of life ich the ens eat · thr ·I,, ofiiciall roclaim f o . po,vers special . P Y r · • ) arrest and d ·· ed and 1t becomes necessary to prov1·de f O the f 1 du t he tentio n, such powers shall be granted 011Iy _ for _ emergenc y � �! �f � tl . tio tt a d o es to 1 1genc the e tl1 ex e !en t by e req ui str red ict ly ?'con t these po\.vers Th ditio �s under . c hi w rnay be ex which and the procedures accord.1 ng to ercis ed must be clearly defined by law.

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1002

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Article 35 . e rs shall tak e place only up w o p cy n e rg e em . er d 11 u . 11 o o· ti < n _ . · e t e . n d . . ld at t s e rr A 1. 1 r th e s g n n e o t1 a as 1c d r fo 1n ty r1 e 1o th tl t1 a t n te d or e p m co er e th -� l n o fr r e rd o n e writt e re of. � l1 t t r o p p 11 s in ts c fa atld tJ1e e�son at the time of th l.s arre p � th to 11 v� gi be l al sh r st -� e 2_ A copy of t:he ord e a r epres enta tion to t ak gh m r1 s hi f . o e m ti e m sa e th at and he shall be informed , l. se n u o c l a g le e v a h to d n a r against the orde ''

Article 36

e nty�four hours of the tw in th wi ed itt bm su e b l al sh n tio ten 1. The ordei· of de w east half of whos e l at la by ed ish bl sta e dy bo r e h ot or t 11r co arrest to a competent eciding whether or not d of e os rp pu e th r fo ry cia di ju e th n1 o f1· members are draw11 ity all or sh th ng au ar wi he e vi re the e Th . ion e t nt e d e th r fo e 11s ca 11t e there is suffici on h ati suc th orm d wi by inf he nis fur e b all sh It . sel 11n co his d an n rso e p detained the detaining a11tho1·ities or other p ersons as it may require. 2. If the reviewing authority decides that there is sufficie nt cause for the deten..

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3. If the re viewing a11thority decides that the de tention is not justified, the order shall be 1·evoked a11d the detained perso11 released forthwith. 4. The revie\ving a11tl1ority shall i11form the detained person of all his rights · and shall inq11ire into the treatment accorded to him in custody. Comment

Tl1is article reqi,ires tl1e order of detentio11. to be reviev.,ed by an independent body. Tl1e i111porta�ce of t�is s�feguard 11,as stressed at 1 arious U':ited Nat�ons sem_in�rs. At the Bagi110 Sem111ar zt 1vas agreed that ''close corifor,1 1 zt;1 to ordinary cr1mi11al proced�re li1as desirable as a safegi,ard to libe,·t)l a11d tl1 at a citizen detained s/1ould be �11titled to /(11ow tl1e grounds for his dete,1tio11, to be heard a11d to liave his case re1,zel-ve_d from ti1ne to time''. At tl,e T¥e/lingto11 Ser11i11ar there was general agreement trial, ut 7 hat a ''if witho co :ntrJ founcl it dete11tion tely , abso/z. to to resort necessarJJ � 7 zt was �ssentzal to establisl1. son1e t1·ib·u11al (111it}1 at feast 011e senior jitdicial officer °-: .zn,.. 0�e 01 its n1e b7 J·) cl1 arged wit/1 the dt1ty of exa111i11i11g every case, in order to m m_ � . mzze t/1e posszbzlzty of_ grave inji,stice',.

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Article 37

_ Any· person who has been detained u11de r spe cial powers shall have the rig�t · even after the terminatio1 · 1 of tl1e e mergency to obtain compensation from pu blic n f nd8 fior any mate�ial or moral damages whic t a ou on cc d e r y e suff h h e ma have � · r 0 any abuse of th�ir p owers by the s es o ex of any c or aut hor iti es de taining him . . unreasonable exer�1se . t hereof. Article 38

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RIGHTS - POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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1003

bef ore a jud dia icial authority in order to challenge tely imm e gs edi n . e th e 1 eg li a ty proc n d t· o h' ht a1n ion 1 ete d is re n e se �vithout delay if it is t1t1lawful or � st � arre . bis or of ' Jury or in e ned enforc threate his the rights. nt preve to 2. The proceedings . before st1cl� �utl1ority sl1all be si 111ple, exi)editious and aggrieved party, _if _1 1 1 ct1 stody, 1nt1 st be prodttced witllotit Th e e. cha r of � e fre delay _ by the official or o� er person deta1n1ng 11 1 1n before the jtidicial atitllority before ,vhich the reco u.� se 1s taken: The 01111s s11 �11 be upon tl1e detaini11g official or other person to establish affirmatively the legal1ty of his act. 3. The proceeding s may be instituted by a ny person i 1 1 tl1e i 11terest of the aggrieved party . Con1n1ent This article enu11ciates t/1e rig/1t of a11yo11e 1vl10 is arrestee! or detained to /1 ave an in1n1ediate recoi,rse before a judicial a11tl1orit;1 to c!1a!!e11ge tlze lal·vfi1lness of /1 is arrest or detetztion. T/1e Co1nn1ittee 11otes tl1at iri r11a1zy coi111tries tlze lalv JJrovides SJJecial procedt1res for a prompt deter1ninatio11 of tl1e lawfl1lr1ess of clete11tio11, e.g., l1abeas cor1Jt1s, a1nparo, con1plaint, etc. The Co111111ittee has tried to i11dicc1te in t/1e above article certai11 features lvhich suc/1 procedi,res sl1oz1lcl !1ave i,z ore/er tl1at t/1e rig/it }vou!cl be 111ore effectively realized. Firstly, tlze recoz1rse 111i1st be available i111111ediately 11ot 011/J' to a JJerson under detention bi1t also to a11y perso11 lV/10 is in i111111i11e11t c!a11ger of bei11g detai,zed and to a11yo11e irz cz1stod;1 lv/10 /1as bee,i de11ied a,zy of tl1e rig/1ts a11d gitarantees e11i111ciat ed in the foregoi11g articles, suclz as, for exa111ple, t/1e rig/1t to legal coio1sel, t/1e rigl1t to be broi1gl1t before a jitdicial or ot!1er con1pete11.t ai1tl1ority JJro111ptly, etc. It slzall not be necessary for tl1e aggrievecl JJarty to ex/1ai1st other re111edies before resorti,zg to the re111edy available z1nder tl1is article. Seco11dly, tl1 e recoitrse sl1ot 1!d be before a judicial ai1tl1ority. Thlrdly, tl1e JJroceedi11gs s/1oi1/cl be cl1aracterizecl bJ' si1nplicitJ1 and expeditioi1s11ess ancl sl1oit!d be free of cl1arge. No jor111a!ities s/1oz1/c! be reqitirecl; proce edings n1ay be i11itiated orally or irz 1-vriti11g, by letter, te!egra111, etc. Fot1 rtl1ly, the aggrieved party, if in ci1stody, 111i1st be prodz1cecl before tlze ai,tlzority l1ec1ri11g t!1e applicatio11, arid it shoi1ld be i11ci.1111be11t itpo11 the ai1t/1orities co11cernecl to e7 tc1bli�li affirma tively the legality of their actio11, i.e., tl1at tl1ey acted i11 strict co1if�r111zty 1v1th the law. Finally, it s/1ould be possible for a11y perso11 to i11itiate t/1e proceedi17 gs for tlie benefit of the aggrieved party.

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INDEX

A TZADV OS pAUL A.BA JWALV ABERRA BANT ABER RA JEMBERE

)

I ( I

ABUN A NIATEW OS ABUiVA PETROS ABU1VAS ABUSE OF POWER. See Corruptio n. ACCOUNTABILITY. OF GOVER1V1\1ENT TO EJvlPEROR AND t PARLIA1\JENT ACCUSED Rights of

ADAMS CL11RKE & CAPPELLE111 MAVRO ADDIS ABABA Charter of the city

293-294,315-317, 319-321,850-852. 856-857,889-890, 891-892,893-894. 442-443,446-447, 451-456. 284. 318. 299-301,318.

513-514. 12,906,909-910, 989-990. 182-184. 579-582.

ADMI,VJSTRATIVE ACTIONS Judicial revie,v of 403-420,615-686. A DliJINJST RATIVE AGENCI E S Pov,ier of Emperor to create 442-443. ADN!INJSTJvtTIVE PROCEDURE CODE Development of, in Ethiopia 652-660. ADlvfJNISTRATJVE TRIBUNALS 132-133 ADVOCATE GENERAL. See Public Pros ecutors. ADVOCATES. See l.ega/ Profession. AFA NEGUS 302,323,8 .3,890. ALD RFER, HARA LD f 542-545. ALLOT, ANTON y N 915. ALMOND, GABRIEL . ABRAHAM 30,312,873. AME RICAN DECLAR TION OF l1VED A PNE DENCE 164. ANA RCHISTS 30. AR BIT RAT ION By local elders 842,845-848.

1005

In traclit ion aI Judicial acln1inistration of justice in Ethiopia. 840. ;11RJSTOTLE 26-29,50-52,418,734. AR!-.1ED FORCES Control of 498-499. AR REST, See also flabeas Corpus. Freedon1 fron1 arbitrary Lin1ited 12,776,907,989. ARVSfIA DECLARATION 261,706. ASSEFA BEQVELE & ESHETU CHOL£ 783. ASSEMBLY AND DEMONSTR;11TION, KIGHT OF 941-942,952-963 . ASSOCl/'1TIONS For social and polit ical purposes Free dom to form, guaranteed 11,947-949. ATRIA DANIAS 845,847,855-856, 867-896,872,893. ATTORNEY GENERr1L. See P11blic Pros ecutors. AUDITING. See also 707-712. Auditor General. AUDITOR GENERAJJ Appointment and 23,710-713,874. duties 635,996. AUSTIN, GRA1YVILLE 440. AUSTIN, Jolin 699-702. A WOLO J-VO OBAFEMI AWRAJA LOCAL ADMINJSTRATION Established BANISI-I/11ENT Forbidden

BARKE.R, E. BASU, DVRG,-1 DAS BATHER L. & f!ARVEY J.

BAYLEY, DAVID H.

BEARDSL£}/, RICHARD K . BECKER, CARL L O T U S BECKJ\1 ANN, GEORGE A1. BELOFF, AlAX BE REKATE AB J'./ABTE SELASSIE

563-573.

11 977. 194-196,202, 236,635,793. 30.

953-956,996997,999. 339-340. 80-81.11 0-113. 912. 756-757. 470-471,880-881.

. . . ...

'' t. '"

1006

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BERMAN, HAROl�D JO ' SEPH BICKEL, .4. BIENEN, H'ENRY , S T H IG BILL OF R . AMERICAN BILL OJ-; RTG . . HTS, ENGLISH BISHOP, J. W. BLACKSTONE, SIR 111/LLJAM

BODI!\', JEAN BOURGEOISIE BOU1EN, CATHERINE (DRINKER) BRANDEIS RULES On litniting tl1e ex ercise of power of judicial review BROEK JACOBUS T. & TUSSMAN JOSEPH BRO WJ\T N. L. & GARNER J.P. BRUCE, JA1\1ES

I ••

. INDEX

695-696. 412 264. 6 3,233,760,911. 113-115,149,165. 764-765. 91, 96, 116, 155157, 929, 930. 30, 162. 65-66. 105-106.

235-236. 978. 622-624,644, 678-679. 285,287,288, 290,293,300.

BUDGET ExamJ)le of Etl1iopia11 817-819. Parliar11entary con sideration and approval of 22,815-817. Significance of 814-815. BULCHA DENIEKSA 815,816, BURKE, EDMUND 27,36-38,61,116, 282,732-733,736. BYSE CLARK & GELHORN WALTER 672. CABINET GOVERN MENT Development of 141-144,152-153. CAPITALISM 64-65,67-69. CAPPELLETTI MAVRO & ADAMS CLARKE 182-184. CAQUOT, ANDRE 291. CARDOZA BENJAMIN N. 805-806. CENSORSHIP 931-941. CENTRAL G O V E R N MENT ''Ad Ho c'' Agencies o f 521-526. Delegation o f policy and law-making power to 531-537. Ministries of 5 1 8-521. CENTR AL. PERSONNEL AGENCY 489-490,595-600

CHAMBER OF DEP UTIES. See also Senate. . As judge of elections Candidates' qualifications Committees of Composition of Constituencies, established Electoral Law LegisJators, influence on & activities of Meetings, quorun1 and voting Members' qualifica tions, judgment of President and Vice Presidents of Rationale of an eJected R11les o.f procedure of Terms of office of Deputies Vacancies in Voters' qu.alit ications CHARTERS. See lrnper ial Ch.arters. CH/LOT, 1NfPERl�4L CHI QA-SHUM . CHURCH, ORTH. ODOX CICERO

C�LAPH AA1·, CHRISTOPHER

., l -·

; . ·�

753. 19,748. 770,772. 754-756.

19. 746-749.

�

736-738.

772-773.

;

20.

20,769-770.

731-733. 825-826.

20. 20. 19, 747-748.

' '

395,412,417, 442.,445,834, 840,867,874-882. 545·-546,552, 842,872.

I l

2.3-24,284-287, 299-301,318-319, 363-364. 57, 162.

•

.lj

CIVIL R . IG H 'TS. See Rights. CIVIL SERVICE. See also P11b/ic Service LatP.

' •

45,49,258,260, 398, 432-433,436, . 448,450,4 89· 490,584-594.

....

295,322-323,340341,344-345,352353,387-389,740742,827-832.

CLASS AND STATUS 308-309. In traditional Ethiopia CLASSLESS SOCIETY. 66-6 7. See also Communism. CLERGY. See also Chz1rch, 0 RTH318-319,363�364. 0DOX 398-399,823-824� CODES ..

I' •

'' ..!•,

. .'

•

�

! . {• ..,

. .

�

+:=.!

..?..•••

�,1-"-

. .-=-c-1...c....

INDEX EDT¥r1RD SIR coKE, JAMES N, EJ\1A oL c sMOOT coii1M ON LA �v Gro\v th of

..V .'

I. .

I '• .

-·'.

... ! '

coMhtfUNI SAlf Theory of CON/M UN/ST MA1VJFEST0. See also Co1111nu11isn1. COMPACT THEORY OF GOVER1V/vlENT CO1VF£DER1ITION, ARTICLES OF CONSENT lo Loc.ke In the Levellers CONSEJL D'ETAT CONSTITUTION, AFGH1INISTAN CONSTITUTION, .,t,\1ERICAN Excerpts of Historical orf'gins of Interpretation and enforcement of

CONSTITUTION' BURUNDI CONSTI TUTION' CEnON CONSTITUTION DAHO J.i!EY' CONSTITUTJo N ENGLISH Abolition of Star Chambe r Equal Franch ise Act Habeas Corpus Act Magn a Carta

•

' ' t

,,. .,a,,.r •

•.

•

I•

!).I

.• _, .

Petitio n of Right _ The Bill of Rights The Reform Acts e coJsh n Toleration Act TUTJON ERITREAN CO NSTJTU TJON f HI �PlAN' 1931 PPraisaJ of

86,88-89,96, 103-105,107-108, 118-120,128,155156,163-164.

Co111111entary on, t1npt1blisl1ed Co111parison ,vitl1 Japanese Constit tttion of 1889 .Decree pro1ntllgating I>o\ver ancl fJrerog atives of the Emperor

30,312,873. 84-85, l 04,128, 131-J 32l l54,l 57. 65-69. 65-66. •

164-166. 39-40. 39. 205-207,543. 623-624,641-644, 678-679,

f I

838-841. l 69-172,473,4,75, 763,788,810,874. 162-167. 173-178,209215,219-228, 959-961. 489. 592-593. 199-201. 123-4. 140. 112-113. 76,82,86-91, 103,105,107-109, 113,123,149. 107-109,149. 113-115,149,165. 139-140,146-152. I J 3. 353,368-373,376379,382,403, 408,440. 340-341

1007

I I

331-336. 336-338. 325-326.

Arts.6-17. pp. 326-327,446. Art. l 7.p.327.

Rege11t Rigl1ts a11cl duties of tl1e Nation Arts.18-29.pp.327-328, 91 l-913,916,919-921. The budget Art.55.p.330. The Deliberative Chan1bers of the E111pire Arts.30-47.pp. 328-330. Tbe Ethio1Jian En1pire ancl the succes sion to tl1e Tl1rone 1\.rts. l-5.p.326. Tl1e Judiciary f\.rts.50-54. p.330. The ivlinisters .A.rts.48-49.p.330. CONSTJ·TUTION, ETI1IOPIAN, REVISED Art.131.p.24. An1eod1nent of At1ditor General, a1Jpointn1ent a11d Arts.120-121.p.23. dt1ties Arts.115-118.p.22. Bt1dget Capital, declara Art.123.p.23. tion of Cl1a111ber of DeJJ Arts.93-100.pp. ttties 19-20. Coronatio11, 1 Jrovid Arts.7, 18.pp.4,6. ed for Cot1ncil of Guard Art.12.p.5. iansliip Arts.69, 71-72, Council of l.vlinisters 115,118,120.pp. 14-15,22-23. Arts.8-11,13-15, Council of Regency 20.pp.4-7. Arts.8,10-11,13, Crown Cot1ncil 17,22,24,70.pp. 4-8,14. Arts.9,11-12, Cro,v11 Prince 22-23. pp.4-5,7. Art.19.p.6. Cro\vn Property pp.387-389. Drafting of Art.64.JJ.31. Duty to obey Arts.4, 18,21, En1peror 26-36,59,62,66, 70,72,86,1 l l, 115-116,118,120121,126-127.pp. 3,6-10,13-15, 17,21-24

, ,··,· ;.I

•' '·!.z.

1008 Enforce1nent of as supreme l� w Ethiopian ctt ize11ship Ethiopian Ortl1odox C11urcl1 Expropriation of property . Flag prescribed Heir Prestm1ptive

' 1 •

I ' '

•�I

INDEX pp.401-4'1 R. At·t.39. p. 10. Arts.126-127.pp. 23-24. Art.44.p.l l. Art.124.p.23. Arts.9,11,13, 22-23,pp.4-5,7. .

Historical prespp.386-387. pective of Arls.15-17.p_p.5-6. In1perial Fa111ily . pp.405-408 • Jt1dicial enforc e111e11t of Arts.l 08-112-P·2 1 · Judicial Power Arts.34,72,86, Legislative process 88-92.p.19. Arts.66-68,73Ministers 75,84.pp.14-15,17. Art.129.p.24. Mt1nicipal Cot111cils Art.125.p.23. Official la11guage Arts.25, 76-107. Parliament PlJ.8,16,115-120. 23. Arts.66,71-72, Prime Iviir1ister 75,78.pp.14-16. Pron1ulgation of pp.389-392. Regency, provided for Arts.8-9,11.p.4. Retroactive application to !)re-consti tution legislative J)p.412-416. Rigl1ts and dt1ties of the people Arts.37-65.pp. 10-13. Senate Arts.101-107.pp. 20-21. State DomaiI1 Art.130.p.24. Strt1cture of PlJ.393-395. Succession to the Th1·one Arts.3 ,5-6, 13.pp.3,5. St1preme Imperial Court Art.109.p.21. Supreme law Art.122.JJ.23. Taxation a11d expe11diture of pt1blic revent1e Arts.113-114.p.22. CONSTITUTION, FRENCii Fifth Repttblic 207-208,774. CONSTITUTION, GI/ANA/AN 475. CONSTITUTION, INDIAN 194-197,218, 635,776. CONST ITUTION' JAPANESE (1946). See also Co11stitutior1 ' . .. l,,. JYleJj1, l 85-190,215-218, 239-242,874, 962-963.

. .' i

CONSTJ'TUTJON, KENYAN CO NSTITVTI ON·, LIBER.JAN CONSTITUTION, LIBYAN CONSTITUTION, MALAYAN CONSTITUTION, MAROCCON CO!./ STITU11.0N, 1vfEIJI (1889) CONSTITUTION, NIGERIAN C'ONSTITUTION, PAKISTAN CONSTITUTION, SIERRA LEONE CONSTITUTION, SO.MALIAN CONSTITUTION, TANZ.41VIAN CONSTITUTION, UNITED STATES. See Constit11tio11,

198� 199•

825 •

473-475,489,762� 763,825,

638-641. ;,

512,

•

l I

l ·I 'l

186-187, 190, 336-340, 446. 700-702.

' .

594. .

591-592.

699.

•

2.61,265-271,835. ·

An1erica,z.

CO NSTITUTIO_,v, - U.S.S.R. CO NSTITUTI O _1\/..4-L COf'.lJ/ENTlONS CO!\'STITUT/01\'AL COU1VCIL�' FRENCH CO NSTITUTJ'ON . AL DEVELOPMENT OF ETHJ'OPIA. See

704-705. 152-155. l •

207-208.

also Co,1stit11tio11,

Er/1iopian

111e 1raditio11a/ Go ver,,,11ent

Rigl1ts and dt1ties ot� • • c1t1ze11s Tl1e Cl1urch Tl1e Monarcl1y The Nobility Traditional officials Tl1e T,·a1zsitio11al Pe,·iod (1855-1955) Consolidation of Imperial Power Increased f tmctions of G ovemment Tl1e Constitution of · 1931 The decline of the Church The decline of tradj tional mobility

1 .

305-308. 299-301. 283-29 5. 296-29 9. 301-302.

' •

310-345. 315- 317, 319..120. 323-336.

31&-319--

r •

INDEX

lllii

.. ,,

. ,,.

' i �L!' \ J�···� ., ..1 i ·\�

..�l

�,'

' '•

opian Ethi first The 341-345. 5) (1931nt ame Parli . n of The foundat1o _ s 320-323. strie �lini Consti ed Revis The 3-24,386-395. 1955 of n tutio Questions of future 401-437. developn1ent Significant changes 397-399. since 1955 y co1VSTJTUTJONALJT OF L11 J¥S. See Judicial Rerie111. coNSTI1·ur1O.NS (GEiVERAL). See also Countries b.v narne. rlistoricaI origins of An1erican Supren1acy 162-167. clause In American 167,171,174-178. Constitution In Ethiopian 159-160. Constitution ln Japanese 189. Constistitution CORONATI01V 4,6. CORRUPTION rvlachinery to enforce penal la\\ S dealing with 703. Problem and control of 698-707,704-706, 884,886,891. 893-895 COUNCIL OF GU,,IR DIANSHJP 5. COUNCIL OF MI NISTERS 14-15,22-23,397398,421,424, 427,448,508509,51l-512, 531-532,534,874. COU1VCJL OF REGEN CY 4-7,509. COURTS. See also *:[a�y, Ethiopia n !D!stratio n of 895-899,901. Adrrn n1strative 132-133. Chil� t's relatio n With 878-88 J. Conseil d'Etat 205-207. DeveI� pment 83-85. Establishment of of in . Ethiopia 356-359. Executive 114-115,121-124. Federal 382-384. Bi�r�rchy and JUr1� diction of i n Ethi opia 854-855' 864-869' lns�ion 883. of legislative 856-857,891-893. 124-125. 1

t •

•

)

,, .•

"• !

• '

1009

Local custo111ary and I�ocaI G overn111cnt 843-845. f\.'loslen1 religiot1s 848-850. Role of ciders in setlling disputes 845-848,868-869. J{olc of in Ethiopia 833-83,L Staffing, financing and SUJJervision of 883-884. CR,,tNSTON, lv!AURTC.E 5·1,60. CR01'VN C'OU1VC!L 4-8,14,388,509, 828. Ci?OWN PRINCE 4-5,7. Cl?OWN PROIJEJ�1''r' 6 CUSTOMJ1 RY L;.1 f,V 844-846,854. DARJ,VJN, C.flARI�ES ROBE.RT 33. DAJ7/D, RENE 673-674. D,4VJS, J:ENNET!-I CULP 668-669. DECLJ1R,-1TION OF fl U/vf1-l 1\l RIGflT.S. See U11iversc1I Declaration of H11111an Rights. DECREE P01¥E.R Co.nsideration 01,. Decrees by Parlia478-481,920. ment Parli an1entary actio11 481-483. on Parlian1entary opposi lion to indiscri minate t1se of 829. 475-477,829-830. Rationale of DEMMJSSIE 1'VOLDE AJ\IIA 1VUEL DEJ\lfOCR.4.C' Y 111 Aristotle In Mill In Plate Iii the single pttrly state "Pure'', Rousseau's social contract tl1eory Relation of to JJolit ical Parties Theories of �fl1e Westn1inister n1odel Failure of in Africa DE SMITfl, S.11 . DETENTION. See Preve11ti•1e Detent ion. DEVELOPAiIENT' Administrative framework of econonuc

331-336,343-344. 26-27. 45-46. 44.

249-252. 42-43,778. 743. 38-46. 427-433,436. 740-7,i2. 762.

819-820

•

r l I

. .' .

1010 Constitutional implications of . 1n e l1 t d n a c u n o n o Ec dt1strial resolt1tion Ju1·isdiction over pt1blic investn1e11t for N),erere's tl1eories of Politic,il de,1elo1Jn1ent of tl1e new states Political tl1eory of econon1ic devel opn1ent Tl1e political systen1s of developing areas Tl1ird Five Year plan D'ETiflES.- SIA10NS DICEY, /lLBERT VElv.M

DISCRIMINATION Forbidden DIVINE 1?.IGJ-IT OF KINGS

I I

·\

INDEX 71-73. 64-65.

s21..s2s.

24 7- 261.

313-315. 69-71. 312. 693-697. 97-99. 120-121 ,125126,132-133 , 155158,194,663664,669. 10 35D36,7 7 ,88, 96,113.

DUE PROCESS OF LA1¥ As legal base for judicial review 617-619. Co111parative approachs to 637-644. Tl1e develop1nent of ''General Princi ples of Law'' by tl1e Frencl1 Conseil d'Etat 641-644. 1-1,e pri11ci1Jle of ''Natural Justice'' in Eng]isl1 and Co111monwealtl1 La w 638-6'41, ,915. Constitutional guarantee in U.S.A. 89-91,172,210211,593-594,797798,935-936 '938 ' 980,981,990-993 . Developing a law of administrative procedttre 652-660. Development of :principle a n d abol .1sl1ment of Sta·r Chamber 120-124. General reqt1iren1ents of 636-637. Hyt?othetical cases, d1scu.ssed 644-651. TII1:1strative decisions· mterpreting the ap�lication of in yar1ou s admin istrative proce edings 651-652.

In Federal Act and Public Rights Pro clamation In Japanese Con stitution In the Revised Con stitution of Ethiopia In Universal De claration of Human Rights Magna Carta as sot1rce of Transferability of foreign doctrine of to Ethiopia Void for vagueness doctrine DUGUIT, L. ECONOMIC DEVE LOPA,fENT. See Deve lopment. ELDERS, LOCAL. See Arbitratio,z.

. ,,

'i ::,

915,916-917.

•

187 '

1 1,90, 40 6-407 4 13 -4 14,862: 916,923,977.

•.

906.

�

86-90, 107.

635 - 636. 1

702-703. 203,205.

l '

ELECTIONS Chamber· of Deputies 746-749,753. Electoral Law 749-752. Practical problen1S of Right to free, in Etrropean Conven tion for protection 752. of Ht1man Rights ELITES 45,71-7 2,312 -3 15, Moder11 43 0,433,734,810 . 71-72,296- 302, Traditional 3 10-312,435436,734 ,765,810. ELl�JOT WILLl.14M & .MCDONALD 39-40, NEIL 927-929. EMERSON, THOMAS 1 EMPEROR ETHIOP IAN. See also Mon

arc}iy.

8 74-875. Cl1ilot jurisdiction of Consolidation of 31 '5-3 17·,851-852. Imperial Pow er Constitt1tional posi . -41 2 408 tion of Coronation of prov . , · 4 . 6 ide d for 95. 0-2 29 Ft1nctions of Powers a.nd prerogatives of ' tinder tl1e Revised 17 15 13 6-10, - , , Constitution 21-24, 393-39i 43 9-505., 8 7 875,88 0-8 81�9 46· ·.

, '

: •, ' . ''

•

.A'' -�= ", . ....;,. -�- ... .' . . , ,I

....

INDEX er pow ent ntm Appoi of

• II 1�( ,. .'

�-•

-�

"1.... .

. ..,..,» ,,

1 1 l· · ' l)"",�. "' :

,.'.,' '

:y'

\ 1I l, .r"\ �>'

'' ·

•I

,·'.. �

., l•

•t

As sovereign Charter grantmg po\'rer of Conduct of fore ign affairs and treaty po,v er of pecree power of Grant of honours by Judici al powers and dutles of

489-490,873-874, 889-890,959-961. 439-445. 456-461. 491-496. 475-477. 505. 505,842-843, 850,853,874-875, 880-881.

11ilitary and emer 498-504. gency powers 505. Minting power of Parliamentary and legislative powers 505,824-825. of Power to create Agencies of Go vernment and assign their jurisdic445-456,461-469. tion Power to suspend and dissolve Parliament 821,828. Promulgation and 472-473,824-825, veto of Jaws 828. Role in resolving disagreements between the two Houses of Parlian1ent 470-472. Powers of in th eo ry and practice 287-290. The religjous-dynas tic roundat io n s of Imperial Authority 283-287. �MPI RE So vereignty o f, vested _ 1n Emperor 8,440. EMPLOYERS' AS SOCIATIONS Rights and scope of activities of 945,946. ENAC TMENTS Po � and pub lica tion of 454-456. E Ls, FRIED G RICH 65. !ZGLI SH CON STITU TIONAL HIS In t�e Nor TORY man l)erto d In the 75-76. Middle Ages and Magna Carta · 76,82,86-91, Moder n

103,105,107-109, 113,123,149,165. 77-79,139-158 .

The revolt1tioos and the ''Bill of Rigl1ts'' Under the Stuarts Under tl1e Tuclors EQUAL PROTECTION OF TIIE LAWS Guaranteed ESIIETU CI10LE & ASSEF11 BEQUELE ETHIOPl.11N ORTfl ODOX CI1URCH. See Churc/z Ort/zodo."<. EUROPEAN COA1Ml SSION OF HUMAN RIGJ-JTS EUROPEAN CONVEN TION FO.R TliE PROTECTJ01V OF HUMAN RIGiiTS

1011 77,110-116. 77. 77. 10,411,744,906, 915,917,973, 977-979,980-981. 819.

907. 904-906,907910,913,929,989.

E/YECUTIVE Control of over org anization and n1an ageme11t of Go vernmental Age11cies Fiscal controls ancl auditing of 01}era tions of Legislative l}O\:Vers of Need to control op erations of Parlian1entary i11fluence 011 Power of appointing 1,arlia111entary staff Power to convene, suspend and dis solve Parlian1ent Pressure of on Parlia ment Privilege of to refuse disclosure of infor roation Role of the plan ni.t1g process in tl1e in1proveme11t of organization and · management of Supervision and control of in Tanzania EjYECUTWE AGENCI�S Delegation of policy and law-making powers to EXECUTIVE COURTS Court of• High • Comnuss1on Star Chamber

691-692. 707-712. 824-825. 687-691.

811-814.

825.

821-822.

820-824. 798-802.

692-693. 714-717. 531-537.

114-115. 121-124.

•

INDEX

1012 E C R O F . N E JIE J T EXECU MENT Of Constitutional decisio1. 1s U T 1 1 S IN E IV T U C E X E Tl ONS. See Coi1r1ci/ of '/vli11isters, E111peror Etl1iopia, E.tec11tiv e· Ager1cieJ·, Afi11istries Etl1ioJJic1r1; Prir11e Mi11ister. EXPROPRIATlON. See Property

EXTRADITJ01V FASIL 1\TAHUM FECADU GEDAA/fU FEDERAL ACT FEDERALIS!i1 FEDERA.LIST PAPE RS FEDERATI01V. ERITREAfl Public Rigl1ts Proclaroa tion Steps leading to Tern1ination of Tl1e Federal Act and Creation of FETHA NEGAST

FREEDOM OF ASSEAfBLY AND AS SOCIATION l�E DO M OF COJ< RESPONDENCE FREEDO M OF REL.fG10N I

F REEDOM OF SPEEC H AND PRESS. See also Censorship '

•

11. 945-946. 738-739. 374-380.408. 410,44,0,912-917, 920, 922-923. 52-53. 167-169.

FILMER, ,<;JR ROBE.RT FINER HERBERT FINER, HERlv/AN FISCAL CONTROLS. See A.11diti11g FISfIER, STANLEY z. FOREIGN AF FAIRS Condt1ct of FRANCiflSE. See Si(/Jrage. FRASER IAN S.

seditio,,.

227-228.

. I' '

I I

380-382. 367-373. 384-385. 374-375. 379-380. 35,293-294, 322,840,845, 850-852. 36. 803-804. 543. 874. 491-493. 442,527,531, 819-820. 11,910,914 920 94 1 -942,986�987: 11,905,908,910. 10,111,113,172, 904-906,910, 92 5, 97 7.

I I l

11,55,59,97 . 99,103,105�113:

' ,,,

. ..; j

172,218-4 27 774 905, 908,910:91 2' 914-95,920,913' 927-928,930,916: 937, 938,941-9 44 958-959,960- 961' 9,62--963,9.67-968 1 972,975,977� FREEDOM OF TRA!/EL 11,906. FREUND, PAUL A. 927. FRIEDMANN, WOLFGANG GA,STON 663. GA RN ER J.P. & BROWN N.1�. 622-624,644. 678-679: GELHORN WALTER & BYSE CLARK 672. GENERAL WILL In F .. ousse�1t1 42-43. 273-274,874. GEORGES P.T. GERAGHTY, THOMAS 867-872,890-892, 895-896,900-901. GETTELL, RAYJvfO;.VD 36. GARFIELD GHAI Y.P. & MCAUSLAN 273,278,711-717. J.P. W.B. GI1VZBERG EL.I & 612. SMITH HERBERT 751-753,8 1 6-817. GIRMA TADESSE GO ODNOW, HENRY 930. FRANK GO VERNJvfE1VT.4.L L.JABILJTJ7 13,129-132,399 , Liability at la\v of 406-407,409,621, 660-675, GOTIERNA1ENTS, FORMS OF 141-144,152-155 . Cabinet 138-144. Modern parlia1nentary 34-36,75,144-146. Monarchial 42-4 6. Popttlar 38-42,953. Representative 427-433,436. West:minste1· 111odel HABEAS CORPUS 128-129,399,4 06111 Etl1iopian law 407,416,675,862 , 866-867. Origi.11 in Magna Carta and develop t. n.ent in Anglo American 109 , 10 102 � 7 , 101 jurisprudence .112-11 j,l 24, 126, 9 17 , 128 0 . :� . HACKER, ANDREW HAGEN, EVERETT . . JJ0--312. EINAR ......-

. ..

i•

l•

I l

I •

•

. .

.•

y 1·

INDEX I SSIE SELLA HAI LE

� '(,

.. I• , I �

•

• '•• ,

. ·,

. ., . I

' ./

I .

)

& HALL, JOHN r¥. BEARDSLEY R. fl,,1i\-JBR0, EDVARD ISAK HAJ\1MILTON, ALEXANDER HARBISON WINFRED . & KELLY ALFRED HARVEY J., & BATHER L. HAZARD JOHN & SHAPIRO ISAAC HEIR PRESUlv.fPTIVE HOBBES, THO/viAS

HOUSE OF LORDS

Decline and reform of

HOW1tRD, W.E.H. HU1\1AN RIGHTS. See Rights. .HUNTINGFORD, G.W.B. HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. IMPEACH1'JEN T Power of

l�fPERJAL CHARTERS Constitutional basis of the Charter Power Creation of institu tions by Status of chartered institutions

IMPERIAL FAMIL y IMRU HA.ILE-SEL LASSIE RAS INDUSTRIA L REVOLU TION INTE GRATION OF POW ERS IN TERNATIO NAL AGREEMEN TS. See Treaties. INTERN ATIO NAL LABOUR ORG ANI ZATION

Charter of

286-287,29 l ,323326,343-344, 386-387,389-392, 421-422,426, 509-510,514,573, 583,600-601,731, 822-824,842-843, 851-852,873. 339-340 . 873. 167-169. 162-167,210-211. 30. 704-705. 4-5,7. 28,31-34,39-41, 61-62,95-96,440, 769.

1013

J A F F E , LOUIS L. J,;.1IN, 1vfAll1tB!R PRASiiAD t JANDJV ITS, lvfORR!S JEFFERSON, TI10li1AS JENKS, CLARENCE J,VILFRED JE1\'NINGS, S I R Jr/JLLI1f/11 IVOR JUDGES. Sec Courts, JucliciarJ', Ethiopian, Jucliciar;, Generc1/. JUDIC!.4L COivfi\11SSION JUDICIAL DIS� CIPL.I!'-JA Ry· CO!YI/viITTEES JUDICIAL I1VDEPE1'I DENCE

138,146-152. 321.

289-290.

JUDICIAL PO �f/ER Concept or

514-515. 810,829.

Lin1itations on Po\vers incidental to

Vested in Courts 459-460. 456-459. 460-461. 5-6. 298-299. 64-65. 50-51.

773-778. 436. 39-40, 164, l 95, 234.

904-907. 152-155,429,761.

I 887-888,889,890.

893-894 1 lS-119,168, J 90-191.201, 259,272,405, 407,410,427428,833-834, 338,854-855, 860-861,882883,884,889, 893-895,910.

160,168-169,

178-179,188189,235,6176 l 8,861-862, 922. 231-246,430-

I 1'

r I

431,676.

862-865. 2 I ,406-407, 834,874,877-879, 880-881,889,940.

JUDICIAL REV/EJ,J? By Federal Courts 1n Ethiopia Coke on

382-384. 119-120.

India Development in the Anglo-An1erican

194-J 97.

Develop111en t 1n

system In Dahomey In Etl1iopia

Jo Kenya In Roman law world Introduction . aocl o peration 1n Japan 907.

617-618,677-678, 680.

48,162-179. 199-201. 403-420,834, 873-874,916, 920-921,922-923 198-199.

182-184. 161,186-193, 215-218.

lr.;: l ' \

•j.,

' ;�

INDEX

1014

. � '

In Ethiopia,

tl1e

Lin1itations 011 676-6 8 6· , 6 4 2 t 3 2 exercise of Of adn1i11istrative 615-686. actions ' l il f, o n o ti ra e Op . 1 3 -2 9 0 2 es as c e tistrativ Operation of in t l1e 7 8. 172-1 . U.S.A 167-169. 1g i1 ly er 1d t1L ry o 1e tl l ca Politi Rejection of i11 201-205. France Relation of \\1itl1 201. rt1le of la\\,

'' • '

JUDICIAL SELF RESTRAINT JUDICIARY, ETHIOP IAN. See also Coz1rts.

JUDICIARY, GENERAL JUSTICIABILITY Concept of KEBRA NAGAST KEEFE WILLIAM J. & OGUL lvlORRIS S.

I, '

Il i

•

In Japan LEGISLATION Enactment procedure, extra parlia.mentar·y En,lct.ment proced ure, parlia.menta.I)' Initiation by Emperor Initiation. by members of Parlja.ment Prim.ary and delegated LEGISLATIVE CHAM BERS. See Chamber of Deputies, Pa1·l ia1nent Ethiopian, Se11ate.

233-234. 356-359, 392, 395, 398, 834, 854-856,860-861, 870, 880-881, 882-894.

LEGI.<:lLATIVE POWER Delegation of Of the E,xecutive LEGISLATORS Influence on activities of

839-840, 870, 894, 899.

LEGITIMACY LENIN, VLADIMIR IL'ICH LEVINE, DONALD NATHAN

237-241,680-683. 35, 283, 289. 732-733, 810, 814-815.

KEIR, SIR DAVID LI1'lDSAY 94-95,146-148. KELLY ALFRED H. & HAP..BISO!v WINFRED 162-167,210-215. KING, MARTIN LUTHER 952-953. KINGSHIP AND TRADITION 34-38. KNAPPEN, MARSI-JALL MA/JON 144-145. KNUTSSON, KARL ERIC 843. KRZECZUNOWICZ, GEORGE 408-411, 620. LABOUR UNIONS Rigl1ts• • a• .nd scope of act1v1t1es of · 947-949. LAISSEZ FAIRE Doctrine of , 33, 64-65, 67 , 2 1 0 , 213. LAW REVISION COM MISSION Establishment of the English and Scottish 806-807. Idea of a permanent 805-806. LEGAL PROFESSION Development of 85.

360,832,853..854 858-859,8,99-902'. 185. 10, 19. 18,470 -473. 10,17. 17. 531-537.

531-537, 824-826. 736-738. . 30.34.45.616. , , ,

68. 28,8-289,291292,,294-298, 301,304-308, 317-319,828. 742.

LEWIS, ARTHUR W. LIBERTY. See Righ1s 2 86-287, 301. LIJ IYASU LIPSKJ', GEORGE 301. ARTHUR LITIGATION -869-872. Volt1n1e and types of KARL LLEWELLYN, 417-418. NICKERSON LOCAL GOVERNMENT Administrative Regulations for . Provincial Go 36J-362,546-551, vernment Cl1arter of the City 579-58 2. of Addis Ababa · 542-545. ·· Comparative systems Control of Munici • palities and Town53. 552-5 ships Developing a system . 563 554. of modern Distribution of powers between central and local 53, 52-: Government 578.. 575 Finance of -,

I I

-� .,,.._,__,,,

--..::;. . . '

INDEX

dmi Local Self-AOrde 451,563-573. 398, r ation nistr _ nical Repo rt �f Tech the Comn11ttee on 555-562. establishment of 545-546. Traditional institutions 26-27,38-42,56, N JOH , LOCKE 62,163-165. 374. W. T ERNES HER, LUT 769. MACHIAVELLI 167. A!ADJS ON, JAMES 76,82,86-91 i\!AGNA CARTA 103,105,107109,113,123, 149,165. 1\fAHTAJvfA-SE LA S S IE

1·VALDA-MASQUAL

hfAl1VE, HENRY SIR �fAITLAND, FREDERIC WILLIAM

•

1,•,1;m..-" I,

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i�!A.KEDA MAK,I JOHN

1',f.

36,284,287288,292,295, 301-302,309, 321,323. 852. 80-81,83-85, 95-96,103-104, 1 l 8-119,141142.145-146. . 283. 190-193,239242,961-962.

MARCHA!vf, FREDERICK GEORGE 142-144. lvfARCIC, RE1VE 921-923. MARCIDIS R O Y C. & WARD ROBERT E. 190-191. MAREIN, 1VATHAN 360,374,410. MARTIAL LAW Definition of 500. MARXISM. See Cotnmunism. MARX, KARL 27,50,65-68. MATHEW, DAVID 303. i\fATHEW, SIR CHARLES 895-896. McAU SLAN J.P.W.B. 257,279-280. McAUSLAN J.P.W.B . & GHAI Y.P. 273,278,713-717. McDONA LD NEIL A ' � ELLJO TWILL/AM . 39-40. MEANS, ROBE RT 410-415,594. 1',fE/JI CON STITU TION' See �... ...Cousflt11t1on . lYJel jl.

MENEL[K I MENEL [K II

283. 284,291,309, 316-317,320322,508,518, 842-844,851852,853-854.

1015

1'1ICHELS, ROBERT A11L. ITARY Role of, in llllder developed coun tries A/ILL, JOJ�lN STU/t RT 1vf/LLS, CI-fARLES r¥RIGI1T 1\/ILTON, JOJJ1V AJINATTUR, JOSEPJi j\JJ1VISTERIAL GOVERNf.1E1VT. See 1'\fi11lsters MINISTERS. See also Co1u1cil of Ministers. Appointn1e11t, duties 1

and rigl1ts l111der tl1e Revised Con stitution Constitl1tional status

of under tl1e Revis ed Constitution

Definition of po\vcrs

J\.1inister of Pen, l1istory and role of Rec.ruit1nent of

MI1VISTRIES, ETlf.lOP IAN. See also Min isters.

735,743.

313-315,435-437. 27-28,45-46, 59,429,730-731. 925-927,953. 67. 929. 930,938.

14-15, 17. 508,510. 353-355'Li21424,452,455456,489,492-4-93, 510-511,518-521. 562-563,621.

397,450. 320-323.

Representation of

744-746.

508.

731. MOFFAT, ABBOT Loiv r .MONARCiiJ . See also Divine Rights of Kings, E111peror Ethiopia11. Advantages a,nd 34-36. disadvantages of 75,145. Constitutional 144,146. Decli11e of 283-295. Ethiopian 514. of le ro g in ng l1a C Consolidation of In1315-317,851-852. perial Power . 5 9 -2 0 29 of ns tio Func 431-432. Ft1ture of Relations of with 284-287. Orthodox Cl1urch

Powers of ·political n1oderniza tion of traditio11al

••

508. 432-433.

Creation of 11e\v Fo11ndation of tvlinistry of Pen, l1istory and ro]e of

MINORITY GROUPS

287-290.

514-515.

• '

INDEX

1016

' '

�fONTESQUIEU, BARON DE !Y!ORGAJ\T, GLENN G. M O S L E Y , .LEONARD OSWALD MU NJCIP/1. L J·TJES AND TO flf'NSHJPS l'lATHANSON, 1VATifANIEL L. Nr1TURAL JUSTICE. See also Nati1ral · La1r. .Nr1TURAL J..,A �T-1 As basis for rigl1ts l'·lEGARIT GAZETA NOBILITY

Traditional a11d decline of

1VYERERE, JULIUS Political pl1ilos opl1y of OBfJ1ANGOR, C.J. OFFICIAi� LA1VGUAGE OG UL 1vl ORRISS & KEEFE WILLIAM J. OA1BUDSA1AN, PARL IAME!vTARY ORDER P01¥ER Constitutional li.n1its

In action Origin and rationale of Proble111s of J1111Jcrial Cl1arters Uses of ORGANIZATION O.F AFR.IC/'lrl UNJ'I'Y (OAU)

Cl1a.rter of

I I \

•

"·

ORTHODOX CI-JURCii See Cl1i,rcli, Ort/1 odox. PANKHURST, RICHARD .PARLIAMENT, ETHIO P IAN. See also CHAivfBER of Deputies, Senate. Appointment of Parliamentary staff

28,46-50,165, 168,778. 716.

•

App1·aisal of 19421957 Parliament 352-353. Argtiments for and against vesting, investigatory power 10 795. 793� Consideration of Decress by 478-48 1. Election of first 341-3 43. Emperor's role in resolving dis agreements bet ween the tv10 Houses 470-472. Executive pressure on 820-824. Functions and developrnen t of 827-832. Houses of 16 Joint m.eetings of 16,18. Legislative proced17-19,920-921. ure of Members of Action against 17. Immunity from crim 17. inal charges Oath of loyalj ty to 8,17. Emperor by 17. Salaries paid to Parliamentary action 481-483. on Decrees Parliame·ntary con sideration and approval of the 22.815-817. budget Parliamentary in fluence on the Ex ecutive in adoption 811-814. of national polic}' Parlia111entary priv 773-778. i. leges Power of to ques tion Ministers 7 7 9 -786,829-830. 16-17 Quorwn required Ratification of 494-496. treaties by Regt1lar sessions and 16. 111eetings of Relatio11 of to five 819-820. year pla11s Jlole and evolution 425-426, 433in future 435, 728-730, 751-752, Role of in the Revised 53,446-4 393-394 Constitution The pre-war develop . 345 343ment in Ethiopia

•

?86-287. 24,551,553, 560-561. 215-218.

! 638-641,702-703. 915-917. 56-58,162-164. 11,19,352,508. 296-298,317-318. 43,247-261, 589-590, 706707. 899. 23. 732-733,810, 814-815. 807-810. 451-453. 461-469. .

446-450. 456-461. 450-451.

905.

283,289-290, 292-294,299, 302,308-309,320.

825.

I i

1 J

PARLIAMENT, GENERAL. See also Par/iame11t Ethiopian.

Critique of Legisla tive ''Investigatory'' Committees

792-793,

. ·� '

�

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-"-, .

(

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•

f J I

•

f' ,

, •

INDEX 0eve lop1nent ?f nmode rn parhan1e 138-1.:14. ment govern taIY Failure of "W ��t-. n1inster Style in 740-742. Africa Growth of under 94-96. the Tudors House of Lords, . 138,146-152. decline of Impeachment po,ver 810,829. of Information gather ing through Royal Comn1issions. The 802-804. British method Limitations on [nves tigatory Con1n1ittees and the questioning 795-798. power Origins under Norm an Kings 80-83. Parliamentary inves tigations by Committees: U.S. precedents 786-792. Parliamentary "Om budsman'' 807-810. Role of in one party state 279-280. Sovereignity of 155-158. The Bill of Rights 113-115. The dispute over Parliamentary Privilege 97-103. The dispute over the King's ''Prerogative'' 103-108. The Petition of Right I 08-109. PARTIES, POLITICAL Gro . wth of modern, 10 England 140-142, 144. Lack of, in Ethiopia 828,830-831. P as t experience of in Africa 740-742. Relation o f to democ racy 343. Th� role of in the smgle party state 249-251,275-278. The two party system 249-251,739-740. PATERNALISM 36. PAUL, JAMES C.N. 901-902. PAUL, JAMES C N SClfW ARTZ . . & MURRAY L. 938. PERHAM, ,\1ARGER y 283,284,288, 290,294,299-304, 323,352,509, 545-546,551-552, 842-843,850-851.

1017

PERlvfA!'1E1\'T LA 111 REVISION C0/11M!S SJO 1V. See LalvRev ision Co111111ission. PERR}', RICH/IJ�D L.

•

Jl£TJTJ01V OF R/Gf!T PETITI01YS Rigl1t of individual to Et1ropean Con, n1ission or I·Iurnan Rights Right to present to E1nperor and procedure of deal ing witl1 PICKLES, WILLIA ,\I PLATO

POL!TlCA.L DEVEIJ OP1\.fENT. See Der<'f()1>-

) I

86-88, l 06- l 09 . l 13-115,121-124: 107-109,149.

907.

13,409,713. 208. 27,44,61, J 62, 734.

111e11t.

• I

POLLOCI<, SIR FREDER!Cf{ POPE JOH1V X)(JTT POSITIVE L/t 117 POU1VD RESCOE POJ1l£RS Exercised by l)Oiiticai parties and press ure groups Exercised by state:; Integration of Separation of PRECEDENT�'. See Stare Decisis. PRE-CO1VSTITUTI O ,V LEGISL/lTIO N Judicial review of PRESS. See Freedo111 of Speec/1 ancl Press.

157. 905. 56-58,61. )6.82.83.119.

733-740. 29-31. 50-5 I 46-50,52-53.

Selection of

•

I. j

•

4! 7-416. '

I 'I

PRESSURE GROUPS 736-738. Operation of PREVENTIVE DETEN T/0 N 986-987. Alternatives lo 993-994. J11dian Ex1Jerience Legislation in Ethiopia 982-986,993-994. Relation of to due 990-993. process of la\v 989�990. Rights o f accused PRIME MINISTER Po\vers and respon sibilities of in Ethiopia

1�

( I

I I

14-16,397,420, 422-424,427, 448,450,509-514. 432-433,4 89.

. •�

.·t· '

1018

. /"1INT RESTR PRIOR . See aJso Censor�r;l11p. Doctrine of PRIVACY, RlGflT TO PRIVY COUNCIL PROCURATOR-GEN ERAL IN U.S.S. R. PROLETARIAT PROPERTY Expropriation of

INDEX

927-929,930, 936-937,938939,962. 55,129-131, 306,906,908, 909-910,923-924. 106,119-121, 124,14-1,152,156, 178-179. 704-706,716. 66-67. 407,412-413,415, 451,618-619.

Pri,,ate ownersl1ip of 11.908-909. gl1aranteed PROVINCIAL GO VERNlvfENT. See Local Gover11111e11t. PUBLIC DE1,10NSTRA 952-963. TIONS PUBLIC FINANCE Parlia1nent's control of 453. PUBLIC P R0.5ECUTORS 857-858,873-874. PUBLIC PROTESTS. See Public De,11011strations.

PUBLIC RIGHTS PRO CLAMATION PUBLIC SERVANTS. See also Civil Serv-

•

I .

. I

vzce.

Corrt1pliot1 and abuse of powers by Tort liability of P,UBLIC SERVICE LA T1I 111 Ceylon In Et11iopia In Ghana 111 Malaysia In Pakistan In · Sierra Leo11e PURITANS REDDEN, KENNETJi' �

REGENCY RELIGION, F.RE:EDOM OF See Freedom o f

380-382,673, 915-917,920.

702-704. 663-673. 592-593. 595-609. 611. 61 I. 611-612. 591-592. 110-111. 472-473,553, 713,769,773. 4.

_Re/igio11.

•

REPRESENTATION Apportioning of

743-747

·,

;

.REVISED CONSTJTU TION. See Constitu tion; Ethiopian, Revised. RIGHT OF DEMON STRATION. A1nerican cases on Etl1iopian legisla tion regulating 1·apanese legislation and cases on Problems of mass protest RIG HTS. See also Due Process of Law, Eqtlal Protection of the Laws, Freedom of Assembly and Associa tio11, Freedom of Correspondence, F,-eedom of Religion, Freedo,n of Speech and Press, Freedo,r1 of Travel, Habeas Corpi,s, P,-ivacy Right to. Ac<;used of

.I \

958-961. 956-958. 961-963. 952-956.

12,906,909-910 989-990.

Assembly and den.10941�942.952-963. nstra tion , Development of legal protection t·rom unlawful impris 102,125-129. onment 63. Enforce111ent of E11ropean Conuui 908. ssion of H11man Et1ropean Conven tion for protection 904-905,908of hun1an. 910,913. Granted to the people 929,989. by the Revised 10-13. Constit.t1tion. . Gt1araoteed by the 378-380,913. Federal Act I111ple111entation of, 923-925.. tl1rough legislation Interpretation and 919-923,60-63, application of 912-915,923,925. L . imitation of 94-,_944 '993-996 . 55 Moral and legal Natural law as basis 56-58,162-164r for , Organizations for purposes of ad 44, 941-9 vocacy Associations for so cial and political · 946-949, purposes

••

• •

INDEX

b ••

'•

,.f,.. .,••�...?

�,

.., .J>

s and Lab our Uoi.onAs Em ployers' sociations organizations despart igned to take in the Electoral Proc ess penal restrai nts on Public Rigl1ts Pro clamation U11ited Nations Co venants o f l-It1n1an Universal Declara tion of Hun1an

944-946.

950-951. 964-967.

SCI-JILLER, A.RTHUR rl. SCf/�VARTZ' BERNARD SCI1W.r1RTZ Jv/URR/-1 y L. & PAUL JAMES C.1V. SEDI,ER, ROBERT .4.LLEN

380-382,673, 915-917,920. 904-905. 54-55, 364-366, 419,615,903-907, 911,912-914,915916,919-923,929, 941-942,989-990, 993-994.

Unlawful se.arcl1es and seizures, exen1ption 13,129-132,172. from 58-60. Utilitarian approach. to RIGHT TO ORGANISE Associations for so cial and political 945-949. purposes 941-942. Basis of Labour Unions and Employers· As 944-946. sociations Limitations on 942-944. Organizations designed to take part in the Electoral Process 950. Penal restraints on 964-969. ROBERTSON, A.H. 907. ROSTOW , WALT WHITMAN . 69. ROUSS EAU, JEAN JACQUES 26-27,42-4.3,60, 732, 743. RULE ? J: LAW. See also Jud,ctal Review . De�elopment of principle J 17-133,615, 921-923. Dicey on 125-128,132-133. 10 Ethiopia 834,851-852. In India 953. In Japa n 190-191,193. . In Tan.zanta 258-259. I n the mode 201. I n Uganda rn age · 899. �Us11wo RTF ] J 125. Rusrow. . , DANK ' . · WART A ., & WAR . .ROBERT D E. 912.

SE"DITlON SE1VA1"'.E. See also Parlia111e11t, Ethiopia,,. 1\ppoi11tn1e11t and qualifications of Senators Conu11ittees of Composition of Control of 1nen1bership of, by En1peror Fu11ctions of a 11on r e1)rese11tative· Cl1a111ber Future of Internal Regulations of Meetings, Quorurn and \1oting. President and Vicc ·Presiden ts of Rationale of Bican1eralis111 Rationale of, in Etl1iopia Reappointn1ent of Senators .Rules of Procedure of 1�er111s of Vacancies SEJJ,.1RATJON OF POWERS

SEr'OUNI GABREG ZIABliER SflACK, WILLIA!vl 11. Sff,11J\1AGELES (Elders). See also ,1lrbitratio11.

1019 367-373. 202,669-670,802. 938.

356, 459-461, 848-850,851-852, 853-855,859-86 l, 867,874,877-880. 964-976.

20,763-765. 770-772. 20,767-769. 821.. 76l-762. 435. 779-780.

,, i

772-773.

21,770. 759-761.

765-767.

21. 822. 20. ·-, I . 46-50,52-53, 163,165,168, 202-203,208, 240, 404-407, 409,447,475476,617-618, 676,778,829. 45,509,840. 844-845. 845-848,868-869.

SJ/,11PIRO ISAAC & I J -!AZARD JOf N

704-705.

Slfll�S, EDWARD ALBEJ�T S'J-JIMELIS 1v!ETAFERIA S O . L0j\10NIC LEGEND

313-315. 491-496. 283-284.

I l

.�

I '

�:''

l �

INDEX

102.0

; • •

.\! '

SOJi,EREIGN. See £111peror, Etl1io/Jia11. SOv'ER.EIGNJTY 32-34,436,440. 1n Hobbes 29-3 L,440-441,445. Nleanings of 64-65. SlvlITff A .D.,41,1 403. SA1ITH, CLARE1\TCE J.A. 1 S1, IlTil' HE'RBER1� & 612. GINZBE.RG Ell l SOCIALJS1v 4-3,252-253. African

SPEECH, FREED01\1f OF. See Freedo111 of' Speec/1. SPENCE]�, 1-IEJ�BERT ST.4LJN, 10S!F STAR CHA!t1BER Metl1ocls and aboli sl1i11g of STARE DECISIS

ST.,1TE Definition of Welfare STATE DOJ\1AIN. s·T4 . TE OF EMER GENCY Declaratio·n of, in region bordering Somalia. STATE OF SIEGE STATUTE LAW STEPHEN, SIR JAA1ES ST. PAUL STR.EET, J-l,-1 RR},, SUCC'ESSION TO TIJE TfIRONE . SUFFRAGE Univers�1l adt1lt, c1evelopme11t of SUPREME IMPE.Rlr1L C'OURT '

I•

SUPREME LA�V Consti{t1tio11 ,ts

•I '

I, 'I r '

•

Federal Act

[ls

SUSENYOS TAFAR!, RAS. See also . Flaz/e Se/lassie J

TAKAAKJ HATTORI TAKAYANAGI, KENzo

33. 68. 121-124. 157,183-184, 214-215,416-418.

500-504. 499-500. 82. 927. 35. 799-800� 3,5,96,i. 139-14.1.. 21,395,41641. 7,864-865. 23,159-161. 165-167,171: 174-176,189, 227-228,395, 399,408,410411 ,417,419, 916-917,920. 913,915-916. 285.

185. 186-187.

I I

•

29-30. 68-69. 24.

286-287,301,

TAKJ_,A H;4.JA1ANOT 300.301 TANGANYIKAN AF"RICAN NA TIONAL UN/Q jy (TANUJ. See Tanzania. TANZANIA. See also Nyere,·e, Julius. ArL1sha Declaration of TANU . 2-61,706. Bi1J of P.Jghts, desir ability of, in 271 -272. Cor1stit11tional deve) oprr1ents of in 247-261. Democra.cy and tJ1e single party state 249-252. Education. for sel.f reliance 254-256. Excerpts from In terim. Constitu '" tion ?6 -?71 .. Independence of Judiciary in .259,272-273,8 94. Measures for state 272, 274-275. security in Newspaper Ord in.ance Act of 929. Per1nanen t Comn1.i ssion of Enquiry 717-721. Act Annual report of for 721-725. 1966-196'7 Place o·f the Constitu 261. tion in Pro·posaJs for control and st1per\1isio11 ot' 714-717 • -\dr11i11ist1"'3tion in Role of Civil Serv 258-260. ants in Role of Judiciar}' a11d 259,27 3-274. la\vye1·s i11 279-280 Role of Parlia.n1ent in 275-280. I-lole of party in 58. 257-2 llole ot' President in 252-254. Socialisrn ir1 TANU·, role, ideology <111d organiza . 5-27 9 261,27 tion of 274· ., ,272258-259 1 J1e rt1le of law in 300· , 291,298 T'E'WODOROS 301 ,303,315317, 320. THE KING'S PR.EROG.1l TWE 11' 308, 1 03-1 Dispute over 115, 119. THE PETITION OF I 08-109. RIGHT 3 6-38· ; Constitutional limita tions on substance

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49 -3.- -�

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INDEX Constitutional stal�s of Parliamen!'s role 1n ratification of TRE1lTY-NiAKING POWER rREVASKlS, G. 7 AN, GEORGE J L E V E TR J\1ACAULAY . r u s s M A N JOSEPJI & BROEK JACOBUS T . UGAND.4 Administration of justice in ULTRA VIRES

Doctrine of UNITED NATI01VS CO VENA1VTS OF H U1\t!A N RIGHTS U.N. DECLARATION OF J-JU,VJAN RIGHTS. See Unil'ers a/ Declarario,1 of Hu1na11 Rights. UNWERSAL DECLAR.;1TION OF HUlvfrlN RIGHTS

UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

493-494. 494-496. 491-496. 367. 82-83,85,116. 978.

899. 622-633. 906.

54-55,364--366, 419,615,904907,912,912915,915-916, 919-923,929, 941-942,989-990, 993-994. 13,129-131,172.

1021

VTII.,JTARIANISM In Mill, John Stuart 59. VrtNDERBJLT, r1 RTEJUR 1·. 897-899. VEDEL, G. 620. VON "fv!EJ-IRE1V ' ARTflUR 1A YLOR 185-187,203-205, 642-644. VOTE. Sec Sujji·age. ivA.LINE, M. 202. J:VARD .ROBERT E. & 1\1ACRJDJS 1�0 }/ C. 190-191. iVARD ROBERT E. & 1?.USTO J,V DA1VKf,VART A. 912. JVEBER, /11A .,Y 50. 1-VEBSTER, DANIEL 90. 1J?£LFARE STATE Gro\vtl1 of 68-69. ivESTA111V.S'Tl:.-I< Jv!ODEL ,127-433,436, 740-742,829, 831-832. iv!-I£,,t 1-w, t(J:Jv,vET11 SIR 736-740,759-761. 792. 1111r.s·o,v, ,,v·o o DR o 111 "l()J 31YO I-IANNES I� 802. YOUNG, RON,�ll. !) -?8�). J;USTOS 8 ) ). ZA-DE1VGEL Z,-J1VZIBAJ� 91-3-944,951. Afro-Shirazi J)arly in 301,323. ZA T,J? D/TU, E_i\,fPRE.�,.S' I

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