Ethiopian Constitutional Development; A Sourcebook Vol. I by James C. N. Paul (1967) [Part 2 of 2] by jahrastafari89

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Further Reading The ide al sources for the study of Ethiopian constitutional development are undoubted} an documents; unfortunately, there are few of tl1ese, but the following histori� Eth iop i orar y emp ront of documents should be consulted: ns collectio nd a s text

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FaJha Nagdst; a translation of this ancient Ethiopian legal code is at present being prepared by the Facult y of Law, Haile Sellassie J University. Kabra Nilgast, published in Budge, The Qi,een of S/1eba 0,1d /1er 011/y so,, MenJ,elek, London 1922. Chronicles of the Emperors of Ethiopia; many of these have been p11blisl1ed in a variety of languages. oarnese Waldamenu'el, Constitution and Parlia,ne11t of Et/1iopia, Addis Ababa 1958. Mahtama-Selassie Walda-Masqal, Zekrd Nagdr, Addis Ababa 1950. . Other contemporary records include accounts of Etltiopia written by foreign vjsitors to the ,country; the following collections provide an introduction to their writings, but the works of Alvares, Bruce and others are worth reading in greater detail: Beckingham & Huntingford, Son1e Records of Et/1iopia, 1593-1646, London 1954. Pankhurst, Travellers in Ethiopia, London 1965. The largest category of books reflecting Ethiopian constitutional development consists of the

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studies written by various foreign writers; the following are especially recomrr1ended:

Levine, Wax & Gold, Chicago 1965. Perham, The Gov�rnment of Ethiopia, London 1948.

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As a selection of further useful works, we suggest: Budge, A History of Ethiopia, London 1928. Greenfield, Ethiopia, a New Political History, London 1965. Lipsky, Ethiopia, New Haven 1962. .Luther, Ethiopia Today, Stanford 1958. Mathew, Ethiopia, the Study of a Polity, London 1947. Mosley, Haile Se/lassie, the Conquering Lion, London 1964. Pankhurst, A.n Introduction to the Economic History of Ethiopia, London 1961.

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�nsult also; Mengesha Gessesse ''Report on an interview o� the 1_ 931 Ethiopi�n _Constitu�on With Fitawrari Teele Hawariat'' (N. D. Unpublished Paper 1n Institute of Eth1op1an Studies). Finally, for a systematic bibliography of Ethiopian legal history and research, we recommend: Vande rlinden, ·'An Introduction to the Sources of Ethiopian Law'', 3- Journal of Ethiopian Law, No.1, 1966.

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CHAPTER IV

: 5 5 N 19 F O O I T U IT T S N O C THE REVISED D U N T A U F E S R IN IG R O EVOLUTION E T IA D E M IM S IT F O AN OVERVIEW Sun1111ary of Co11tents Introduction Section 1

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Steps Leading to Constitutional Revision - Parliament and legislation cast in a modern forn1; tl1 e Executive; the legal system; the provinces and the church; guide lines for the expanded protection of l1un1an rights.

Scctio11 2 :

The Federation of EthioJJia and Eritrea - steps leading to the federation; t he federal act and the JegaJ stn1cture of the federation; the federation and expanded guaran tees of civil rights; the federal courts and judicial review;· steps towards the ending of federation.

Section 3

Drafting and Pro111ulgation of tf1e Revised Constitution - the Revised Constitutioo .

in_ historical perspective;· drafting of tl1e Constitution;· promul.gation of the Con· stitution.

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Section 4

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The Conceptual Fran1ework of· the Constitution - tho structure of the Con5iitu· tion: a conceptual outline; significant developments since 1955.

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ue5lions of Future �onstit utional Developme reme nt: . The Constitut K>n as Sup 9 . ; Law - problen1 s in the applica:tion of iopia Eth in tl1e theory· of judicial rev�w on: re� roactive appli�ation of tl1 e Constitu lati 5 legi o�a l tion of· 1955 t o pre-eonstituti the crucia� role of tl1e lawyer ·a nd other problems. _

Section 6

Question of Futt1re Constit Y thC utional Deve Iopment: The Role of the Mona rcb··' Executive and Parliament i!itY; . . . sib 0 · - t rans1ttonal -steps towards ministerial resPo alternative patterns of deve 1opment: m o d el s and problems.

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Introduction to the Chapter

This chapter, . pi�king up fr?m the las!, starts_ (_in Sections I through 3), by s1gn1:fica�t de�elopments 1n publ_1c law wl1ich occurred dtir som e_ g inin m exa ing �he ber L1 �t1on (1941) a11 d dur1ng tl1e forinative stages of the w1� g foll o rs yea the and E�1trea .(!�52-55). �l!e p·urpose is to illustrate how tllese Eth 1op 1a of on erat i fed alon g w1tl1 pme nts, pol1t1cal tr�d1t1011 an�l tl1e Constitution of 1931,. devel o l lega and conten t form of tl1e Revised Co11st1tt1tion of 1955. the d ence influ Section 4 is a brief examination of tl1e sche: me of tl1e Revised Constitution _ and a set of questions desig?,ed to foct1s on tl1e ways in wl1icl1 it separates powers, combines powers and establishes ''checks'' a11d bala11ces'' - or creates ambiguities. in this respect. The remaining sec.tions focus on some specific sets of proble1ns of furtl1er constj tut.ion al development. Section 5 is concerned witl1 tl1e status of tl1e constitution as ''supr<;me law''. We revisit the doctrines of judicial review a11d examine tl1e power of Ethiopia's. Courts to enforce the Constitution as ''law'' controlling Parliament and Public administration. We also note some of tl1 e problems of developi11g legal resources manpower, conventions and institutions - i11 Etl1iopia to i1nplen1ent tl1is objective. Section 6 examines tl1 e evolution of executive gover11ment - a second crucial problem for the immediate future. It starts witl1 Order No.4-4 of 1966, vvhich c1.ppears to proceed on a theory of gradual divorce of tl1e inonarch t·rom tl1e day to clay con" duct of executive government and tl1e substitutio11 of tl1e Pr.i111e Mi11ister as tl1e l1ead of the Council of Ministers and tl1us tl1e l1ead of executi\1e go,,1ern1ne11t. Tl1e interest� ing problem is: if Order No.44 is a transitional step where ,,,ill tl1is evolution lead in the future? Towards a ''Westminster style'' co11stitutio11 witl1 i11creasing, direct accountability of the cabinet to Parliament? Or sin11)ly towards exectitive govern ment l1eaded by the higher echelons of the senior civil service - a sort of oli garchy - with no direct legal accountability to Parliament or tl1e electorate but rather an indirect accountability thro11gh tl1e bl1dget and tl1e 11ecessity of getting ·government programs enacted. Or towards some other cou1·se of evolution? Ethio �ia is not the only developing country wl1ere tl1 e monarcl1y is a deeprooted insti�u t1on, important to the maintenance of unity in tl1e country: Morocco, Persia, Afghanistan and Thailand are also examples; Japan was. lt is fasl1 ion�ble in _some quarters to deride monarchies as anacl1ronistic institutions, today. But, 1ncreas.1ngly, recent Afric an history underscores the need for strong, s�cure exec�tive government and a leader who commands an underlying loyalty by virtue of his of1:ice - and a frame work with.in whic11 poljtical debates and disagree�ent can be _d1sc11ss�d �n� 1a 1op s Eth ettle t!ng ron onf c _ ces l101 e Tl1 s. ou �or with ta dic t or se ps our t o cou rec � s � con st1 �utional developers of the fut ure are J1 ard and 1nt�re�t1ng. Sectio n 6 sketcl1es these issues and otl1 er, related problems which may be sig111ficant.

SECTION I STEPS LEAD ING TO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, Introduction

1941 - 1955

llow the g f r du nd � , 4l l9 ay M in n, tio pa cu oc t� f in fiElbiopi a was liber ated after the sh or t Italian s te l reor co as t t w e he ears Y ega l r st govern f l m the r�ctu n °:1p � � e o ri: ;�t:�al: :e�:w � a�e o nt· Sleps l t s. were taken to create modem government.a l 10st1 u tion

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ts. The y reflect, in part, the context withi 1en n elop dev n W hich Of t·hese e m so 1 te ra st lu il are C\ e to idenc they d s, te of the /ram otl,er word been selec in _ d re a e p was r p o itt1tion ater designed · to operate. Fu rt here\l.\ hork 0! l t ?55 1 f was Cons ution the Constit , t oueb · d e is v e R e th l1 11 c I ' V. 10 ' ·b n at some time over tb.e last twent ritte rew govern111e11t w it or d nde ame fi"'ve ts have b � e m ct � n e st se �re 1e of �uct tl l lega f opi o �thi many an sent- day pre gove the for rny. e�� cu o � 1, c si a b l il �t re str:n ve on slat h le t ich wh la er 1 g1 they 1 ugl years, tl1ey a hro t a ly ' or � ct dire r l e 1 ng1y i e d e i u g to e u n ti n co y 1e tl h ic l, w influenced.

dem form o a M in st a C n o ti la is eg L d n a Parliament

a et z a G t ri a eg N 1e t/ of on ti a re C e h T n, io I of 1942� Negarit at o. am N cl ro P a et az G it ar eg N e th of t en From the Establisl1m Gazeta 1st Year No.I.

· all ich be sl1 wh led tte cal ze Ga l cia ffi Negarit e tl1 d he s> lis tab s e y reb 11e ; . · · · ii�ere is Gazeta in which sl1all be published: s, on ati s, gul der Re , Or 1les R1 , ws Notices La s, ree c De ns, tio ma cla Pro l a) Al _ and subsidiary leg11slat1on. ...... 5. A Col1rt sl1all take judicial notice of: a) All Proclamatio11s, Decrees, Laws, Rules, Regulations, Orders, Notices · and subsidiary Jegislation publisl1ed in the Negarit Gazeta.......

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Revised 1-:>rocedi,re for Election From Perl1a1n, op.cit., pages 97-98. In l1is speecl1 [tt tl1e re-opening of Parliament: tl1e Emperor told th_e depu�ies tl1at '\.vl1en Ot1r PeoJ)le' have obtai11ed s ufficient experience the time will be npe for tl1em to cl1oose tl1eir own representatives. In the 111eantime, since Article 32 of tl1e Constitt1tion is very brief, a Proclan1ation to define tl1e system was issued _ on tl1e 9tl1 of l'v1arcl1 1941. It laid down what was, i n e.ffect, a form of indirect elect 1 ?0· Eacl1 of tl1e 12 provinces was divided into 20 electoral districts. All persons paying land-tax and all notables l1ad tl1e rigl1t to vote. Tl1e 20 electors were to come together to th� c�pital o� tl1e province a11d tl1ere, in tl1e presence of tl1e gover nor a� . ecc]�s1asl1cal dign i tary, a re1)rese11tative of tl1e Ministry of the Interior a.nd a S\V�r. official recorder, tl1ey \Vere to elect by secret bal lot 5 of tl1eir number to be �epuu�� : TI1 ose_ elect�d mt1st be over 21 years of age, n1u st be 111e11 versed in the public _a��: of their regions and ,1cce1Jtable to tl1e }Jeople, and of know loyalty an d patriotJ n

Note. There is son,e _niy�tery _attacl1ed to tl1is not ve ha We 194 1. Pro cla n of 9th March ': a�lc to find a copy of it, s ince 1� ,vas not p t1blisl1ed i n1atio 11 the Negari! Gazeta; f urthe rmo re, the �IJlJouJd v.as at tllat date busy conduct111g guerilla opera it , a tio o ns i ag ainst the Ita · lia·ns n· G jj m aD<otl yel e\tll be most strange for h ini · tO b e ·1sst11· 11g a proclan1a t ion on sucl1 matter v. hen dn ha he i· a nst o l1.bcrated 1. c 11 · s country or re-establ'15 l1e · d l11· s governn1e 11t . Parlian1ent does appear to ba,,e betm .lut.ed as . unt. Perl,ani describes, btit tl1ere n1ay be some 1 11istake, perhaps of date, in her aceo 1

A,z A_ppraisal of t/1e 1942-1957 P ar/ia1ne11t ! ia · p F:-ron� ClaJJham, ''Tl1e Ftinctio11s o thi E in an en d t Developme11t of Parliam , c1t. oc. : • r t,e . eIIl Parliament was intei.rtipted ov N 1· n h b d Y ene tl1e rt reconv Occupation, . and w . 1942 · It s 0 e!s wer.e tl1e san 1 1 . 51 1e as be for e ve wa ( s an me d its mb ers ry l1ip � �ostlY ' a0 overw 1e Dling preponde rance of noblemen, tl1ose of · 11 igher ran k being · ,i

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the 19 1 Sin Co e nst itu tio n ate . pro � vid ed for Sen no � parliamentary term, e h t in dis so lve 1n d 19 57 wa , tho s ug h it ma ny of its members died retired 0 unt il sat ·t other posts; others remaine� for th� full fifteen y�ars. Ther: to oin ted app . �ere , eac fro of m the ut1 tw es elv pro v1n � De es, r1tr ea being added in 1952, fi v e � � � e � wer _ Sen w1 ato tho rs t1t ter r1t thi or1 rty al qua�ificat1011s, thol1g11 Eritrean repre ou t ab d an Senators was agreed three at the t11ne of Federation. of n atio sent The only meetings public!� reported were ceren1onial occasions of little import ance, including tl1e State Opening eacl1 year, a11d tl1e l111animot1s ratification of the United Nations Charter and the Eritrea.ii Co11stitt1tion, tl1ough these have some constitutional inter�st in �hat the 1931 Co11stitutjo11 gives the Emperor tl1e exclusive right to make treaties, without reference to Parliament, wl1ile tl1e Eritrean Consti tution. provides the only reported case before 1957 of JJarliamentary approval of decree legislation passed by the Emperor dt1ring the recess. There is also evidence that Parliament took its legislative dt1ties seriously; a few cases of parliamentary opposition to the executive l1ave been reported from tl1e nineteen-forties, and in the nineteen-fiftj�s it made frequent, thot1gl1 ust1ally minor, amendments to legisla tion. Its best known amendment to government legislation is the introduction of flogging as a punishment into the Penal Code of 1957, [l considerable change in attitude being shown -by the ,rigour witl1 wl1ich, in 1962, tl1e Cl1amber of Deputies opposed a decree extending the use of :floggjng. A readiness to x·eject lav1s is indicated by the Federal Tax (Amend ment) Proclamation of 1955, tl1e preamble of which refers to imperial approval of the resolution of the Senate alone, implying tl1at the Chamber of Deputies passed a different resolution v,,1bicl1 vvas rejected by the executive. These cases help to refute the assumption that Parliame11t in this period \'</as simply a �'rubber stamp'' for e�ecutive desire�. But nevertl1eless, it can have made such changes as these to draft laws only because tl1e governme�t � ,as prepared. to accept them; and these amendments, and the occasional questioning of executive officials, indicate a rather peripheral influence.

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The Executive

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The Establishment of Ministries and Government Agencies

ore� as the o rganic la � f in d ne ai e m r e d, nd e n am e t The M.· · te ·a1 o d e. f 1943 though of 1 e ex cu ive ove the of e s tri nis mi s ou ari t i; 1�� ase3 on %� creat ing ancf:ist�bu�g ;o�e rs b�twee n he v a .· 1966, whe n it was re laced b a ne w Order which was, however, ve� SlrOng Y blic pu of nt de tu t as bu , er rd O is th of re t e na Only selected excefits are gi�en below, to illustrate th _ ? law should make himself very familiar w ith it, and with its many amendments.

a et az G it ar eg N , 43 19 f o 1 . o N From the Ministe rs (Definition of Powers) Order, 2nd Year No. S. Miscellaneous , r e d ) r s O r e w o f P o n io it n fi e (D · order ma y be ci·ted a s the Ministers I · th1s 1943_ ir e t th u o y rr a c l il . w . t n e m rn 2 All Departments and Ministers o f Our Gove du,ti. es· u._nder Our orders.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OPIAN ETHI SoUR CEBOOK OF

Council of Ministe rs

r te is s f in h o ic M h il w c n _ u o sh C all comPr"1 � a d e sh !i b � st e y b re e h . . y c n r n , e u I o 3_ There is id s s e b r a r P , u c n O e r e d e n u a ,v11n1Ster s r te 1s 1n -M e ic V d n a . e. a1.1 Our Ministers d pres1 1 all sl Us nominated by rs of Stat e. e n tt o a s U m e is v d a ll 1a sl rs te is in M f o il c n u o C e h T 4. en y s ta in k n n a io o is C c e d n r u fo l ci rn le b si . n . o sp re eettng y tl in . jo re a rs te 5 • Minis . meet on days t? be fixed and on such . . rs will e te oth 1s 1� M r of �l nc ou C he T 6. t en e f d o th u si o re C P 1e tl . il y b nc d e m a n e b e m ti to days as may from time it to bm l s al su U sh e th r te is in nutes of· M mi g in id es Pr e th e nc se ab 7. In Our the Council business. r l be de al sh un rs e te th is in M t of rec di il io nc ou C n e tl1 of t ia ar et cr Se e Th 8. . n e P e th f o r te is in M r u O and supervision of

e ll s tak sha ter an oath of nis W.J all nt, me int po ap ir the tip g ci11 tal 9. Before allegiance to be tendered by Us. 10. Ministers will only sit in tl1e Chamber of Deputies or the Senate when sa� propo tiv isla Leg or icy Pol the on s ent tem sta ke ma to e Us by ted rt1c inst are they of Our Government.

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[Tl1e Order goes on to create: The M�n�stry o! �omral:1nications and .Public \Vorks Tl1e Mm1stry 01 Edt1cat1on a11d Fine Arts The l\1 �rt�stry of Commerce and Industry The r,,11n1stry of Interior Tl1e Ministry of Agriculture The Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Ministry of Finance The !v1inistry of War The Ministry of the Pen The Ministry of Jt1stice Tl1e Ministry of Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs].

Ministry of Justice

· ting ac 59. Tl1e Mi11ister of· Jtist·ice is · t l1e I-lead of one of the Departn1 ents trans ction . d're 1 h Stat e Aftai· rs, namely tl1 e Ministr Of Just1ce, t or e f responsible is and . and exec11tio11 of ti'1e ,o . : r 11ow111gY matters . ' ois dini · 60. He will prepare a11 d . SUbmit er p pro · . draft laws necessary for tl1e a · ffe , l tratio11 of 11is Miilistr H : w ll make regulations t e wit � h a:rthl. ) ance accord in will give such orders m � e neces_sar� to ensure the proper carr ying out · ;\ work of his Ministry and wYt.ll Superv1se .. · �-, its execution. . . 61 · The Min 'd \ ister of JUStic · e in · accordance with the law:\. ; all g . e5 d . . U (a) shall propose to U8 suitable J £ as ment persons for appoint .. judicial officials.' � · h : g u o r h t (b ) shall ·make all _arrangeme rt of ', nts for tl1e establishment Cou s . - 1 out Our Emp1re;

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(c) shall organize and supervise the administration of justice but shall not sit as a judge; (d) shall submit to Us the record of all cases where sentence of deatl1 bas been pas�ed and requires confirmation by Us, together witli his recommendation; (e) shall submit !o U� all petiti�ns a?dressed to Us for the exercise of Our prerogative, together w1tl1 his reco1nme11dation · (f) shall issue to suitable per�ons licences to practice ;s advocates; (g) he shall prepare and st1bm1t draft laws relating to criminal and civil matters. The Establislzment of a Prinze J\1inistry

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From the Ministers (Definition of Powers) (Ame11dn1ent) Order, No.2 of 1943, Negarit Gazeta 3rd Year No.I. 2. Paragraph 2 of the principal Order is repealed and replaced as follows:''2. All Departments and 1'1inistries of Our Government will carry out tl1eir duties under the direction of Our Pri1ne I\1inister wl10 is subordinate to Our orders''.... 8. The principal Order is hereby amended by tl1e insertio11 of the follo\ving after paragraph 21 thereof:''21A. The powers and duties of Our Prime Minister are:(a) Our Prime Minister is next to Us in authority and sha,11 be the I{ead of all Our Ministers, and be responsible for tl1e good adm.inistration of the work in tl1e Ministries. (b) He will supervise the execution of the laws, proclamations and reg11la tions of Our Imperial Government. (c) He will transmit Our Orders to Our Ministers and obtain their execution. (d) He .will ensure that the activities of the various Ministries do not conflict. ( e) He is responsible for the execution by the vai·ious departments of the general and political business of Our _Government. (f) He will supervise the Court to be establ1sl1ed under Article 54 of Our Constitution. (g) He will supervise the Commission which audits the -accounts of Our Imperial Government.'' The Establishme nt of other new Agencies of Governmen t

, .�e 1941-1955 period was one of activity in establishing governn1ental agencies other tb� n �tnes. Many of these agencies enjoy a considerable degree of au�onorn:y. _All a_re conce�ed with . d�ve lopment . w telo 11st . �on 1he trat 1n1s adm a iopi Eth in role st ant Mo ific sign '' e a tinu to play ill t ti g impo con f o _ tent con the e n1�Ii a e:x_ t1ld sho u yo_ and s, ncie age h t suc rtan legislation creating !someusofra n �ese laws, making notes on the similarities and differences in tl�e organ1sat1on ofthe �genc1es rs, cto e r_ D1 ?f ard Bo the of htp ers i:nt l me and rs ing v,e po u com the ing par isons concern mc d e th ich 1n wh y wa the , �?' en at ag the 1n d ste y ve . rs we po l act' t1�I f or '' powers (if any) and financia to the ncy age t]1e of lity i tab oun acc the nt, the v me c eloi: n . age cy may aff ect economi de 1 es , o E�vJ'.)Cror the Council of Ministers Parliament - and the courts. · �ofthe State Bank Year No.3. 3rd a zet Ga rit ga Ne 3, 194 of 18 . No e tic No ral ne . ofEth'1op1·'a , Ge .. fbe A &rlc . ltu u ral Bank Proclamation, No.75 of 1945, Negartt Gazeta 4th Year No.S.

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STITU TIONAL LAW N · o C IAN P IO H T E F O K O O SoURCEB

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. p . n Air Lines General Notice No.59 of 1945, Negarit Gazet 5 1 1 -.......... Charter �f �he Etu? �oard Procl�mation, No.113 of 1950, Negarit Gazeta 9t h; th YearN�t , ear No9 . The Eth1o p1an Gra1n .,.,,egar1t Gazeta 10th .. iy 195 ' 1 f o 5 1 No .1 , atio n Yea·r\.r14,0 5.. · . I1way Au thority Proclam The H1g hiop1a · proeIamat1o n, No.116 of Et of k an B t en m op el ev D 1951,.. Th e Establishment of the Neg fJ!y · o. N . 7 Yea r . Gazeta 10th . .a 1ons of 1cat mun com iopi · Tele Eth of rd Boa l Proc l eria Imp amar10n, No 111e of t men h 1s l' b Est a Tl1e · ·tn11 5 · No · ear y h 12t . of 1952, Negarit Gazeta , No. 172 of 1954, Negarit ce t No eral Gen i ba Aba · ' is Add Gazeta u� Charter of tl1e C1ty of .. -; l . No .10. Year ral Notice No. 185 of 1954, Neg ne Ge a, ab Ab . dis Ad of ge lle Co ty rsi arit Ga?t'.J. Charter of the Unive · � 13th Year No. 13. , ii

The Legal System

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Tfze Judiciary a t/ze opi s: i . tem Eth Sys n Experience. (1�. gal Le of ent opm vel De The ler, Sed m Fro .) w .U .S La H (1965). of lty cu Fa of s ive cl1 Ar in y sa es ed ish publ Follov1ing the Libe�ation, the �st _ s�eps toward raising the status of judrn 1 1 and creati11g str1Jctured 111dependent JUd1c1ary were undertaken. The office oi Afr J'.�egus \Vas constit11ted as tl1e President of the Supreme Imperial Court. Judgei ' l \Vere a1Jpointed. to the I-Iigh Court, and these judicial positions enjoyed official� statl1s a11d title. Sc·me of tl1ese judges were appointed to the Supreme Imperial Coun . to l-1 ear partictilar 1:ascs, and tl1e later practice was to appoint High Court judge to tl1e St1preme I1uperial (·:ourt for indefinite periods. Other persons were appointtd as 'lice-Afe �Jegus, a nevv position. ;-\s a result of these actions judges of the Hij �.=ourt arid Supreme Imperial Court began to enjoy some prestige, though ii W'Ai , not comparable, except for tl1e Afe Negus, to that enjoyed by high officials in !rt. ; IVlinistry of Justice. The salaries paid to the judges were relatively low. The judge ; were appointed by tl1e Emperor on the advice of the Minister of Justice, and cou!o be removed at any time. Establishment of a Formal Court Systen1 From the Administration of Justice Proclamation No.2 of 1942• ' Negarit Gazeta 1st Year No.l.

This law is still the fo�ndation for the court system, a lthough the structure and jurisdiction of� i c ourts have been modified by the Civil Procedure Code and the ''Provincial'' (TeldaY GI¢ court has been abolished.

Part I Preliminary

. 1· This Proclamation may be cited as th Admin 5ti of J io n e ist · rat u ce procla· mat10n. � �I h 2 Th fi 11owin · d g Co ur ts s_ h ir al l be es tablished in Our Emp � an h s p0¢! constituted �n �h anne_r here1nafte� described a nd shall exe:c1�e . t e conferred on the�1 Y this Procl ia · am th at io io p n in s ov E er pe al rs l on (a) The S�preme Imperial C ourt. (b) The High Court. (c) The Provincial Courts (d) Regiona ' l and Comm11�al C OU .rtS.

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Part II The Supreme Imperial Court .

Im pe C ria e l ur shal l comprise the Af a �egus as Pr Su t pre e Th � l? 3. esident, _ !WO Judges of th e High Cot1rt, who shall be nominated by the Presi together With _ ou the for rt hear1?g of any a �I?eal from the H igh C ourt. No Hig h <=: the of dent om�nated by _th� Presiden t of tl1e High Cour� t hear any n be shall ge appeal in ? jud _ any case upon which h e adJud 1cated as a me�ber of tl1e High Court. When in any matter the me°:1be_ rs of the Supr�me Imperial Cot1rt are not unanjmous, the 1ty shal l prevail. Jor ma the of nion i op

Part III The High Court

4. The High Court of Ethiopia sh all comprise such 'number of jLdges as We may from time to time think nece ssary, of who1n one sh all be designated the Presi dent. The High Court shall contain s uch nt11nber of judges of British Nationality We shall consider to be desirable.

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5. No person shall be a ppointed by Us to the office of· J11dge of 011r I-Iigh Court unless he is a regularly qualified legal practitione1· or is certjfied to lJs by Our Mjnister of Ju stice to be qualified for such office b�l rea.sort of l ong j11(iicial ex-· perience or soun d knowledge of law.

Part IV Provincial Courts •12· In each of the Provinces o f Our Empire there s ha! l �e e� tablished a _Pro y- nCia] t�d in o pp a s ge d Ju al ci n i ov pr C _ of r � ourt, which shall comprise s uch numbe _Us as We may fro m time to time think necessary. One judge of e ach Prov1nc1al Jourt sh all be designated the Presid ent.

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6. We may also appoint from time to time fit persons as additio11al jud.ges of the High Court for the tria l of p articular cases or fo1· a specified period or v1hile holding any specified office. 7. The High Cou.rt shall have full criminal a11d civil jt1risdictio11 in Ethiopia according to law. 8. The High Court s hall be d eemed to be fully constituted for the bearing of any matter when it comprises t hree judges , and where_ i n. any m atter th� members of the Court are not unanimous , the opin ion of the m aJor1ty shall prevrul. 9. The High Court ma y sit at a ny place withln Our Empire as may be conv enient for the despatch of busi ness. de�ision of y an m fro t ur Co l ria pe Im e em pr Su An appeal shall l ie to th e _ _ I?. la id dow n er nn a m h t e e 1n , ce tan ins . igh r fi t s of h t t ur !10 H Co when acting as a cour Rules of Court. 11. No sentence of death s hall be carried into execution u11 less coofir1ned by Us.

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STITUTIONAL LAW N O C N IA P IO H T E F O K SoURCEBOO -w

. fi� time person� to time as additional We ma. also appoint from r � c ed spe a J i �V!ncj fo iod P per w or ifi or es cas r r . YI la t, ticu hile 3� par I llOld1ng Judge s 1or t11e tr1a of � specified office. · , ly to be ful co�stituted f ed em de be all _sh urt Co l or theh..n� 14. A Provincia d ea re an rs he be w em m 1n g re e re tl1 ard s ise pr m co to a matttr of any ro att r wl1en it �y i m e e th on s, ini ou op of im a un t th 11 no o e ar a Ity sh th e member� of the Court �! prevailc . . · , hi ,1w1t ace I p n an at the �rovmce for � 15. A Provincial Court may �1t Whiciich at sp e de of th r fo s1n bu nt converue ess. 1·t is constituted as may be rt in its original jurisdiction Cou al inci Prov a of on dicti juris Tllc (l) 16_ sll'J b e limited: (a) ln criminal 1�aatters to (i) imprisonment not exceedin¥ � years; (ii) fine not exceeding 2,000 Maria !heresa Dollars; (iii) corporal punisl1ment not exceeding 25 lashes; ;nd shall extend to any combination of the above punishments. :i

(b) In civil matters, to cases, the subject matter of which does not exceed 2!00) l\iiaria 1'11eresa Dollars. (2) fa,. Pro\ ir1civ.l Court shall have sucl1 jurisdiction to hear appea ls fr om Courti est�_blisl1e(l ur1dcr /-1. rticle 18 of this Proclamation as may be prescribed by thewarrao! · of any st1cl1 Court a11d any decision of a Provincial Court on appea l shall befinru. , 17. Ar1 appeal shall lie from any Provincial Court as a court of first instm to the J.-Iigl1 Court in ti1e ma11ner laid down by Rules of Court and a ny decisio: , of tl1e High Court or1 such appeal sl1all be final. 1

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Regional and Communal Courts

18-. Notwitl1standing the jurisdiction of tl1e Higl1 Court and the Provinci� ' Cou�t . s ! 1 sl1all be _ l�V.:fL1� fo_r Us to establish by warrant under Our h a nd o�hercou� of criminal and civil JUr1sd1ction whicl1 shall su .ou l i r e P ov ncia � :1 tl1 to bo be rd ina te Such warran _ t s�al� d�fi!1 e tl1e constitt1tion of the court, the area withi� w hich\ 0u_ rt �xercises Junsd�ctJ?n e os a� ll w d the la to be administered , and sha unp � '. mitat ns upo_n the JUnsd1ct1on and powers of the court as m ay app earn� l ppea;os sllall li� fro�n courts established u11der tl1is Artic to sucl 1 court or co le as may b e specified 1n th . . . e warrant establ1sh1ng a cot1rt.

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Assessors

, � ; i w tt 19· Any Court const·itu s . · � t s see fi . �e d 1t un der 1f t�1!s Proclamation mav, tl nti two or inore suitable e � 3 er�ons in tl1e c3:pac1ty of Assessors. Assess_ ors. sh�ebcase sh � to put any relevant Je . giv_e _their opinions Jn ;�� to a_ny _ witness and, at the conclus1on of tound by ll' · op1111ons of tl:1·e A · acts in 1sst1e, but the Court sl1all no t be ssessors.

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Part VII Rules of Court

20. Rules o f �ou rt may be made, with the approval of Our Minister of Justic e _ re 1n sp N ec of eg t us th e A Supreme Imperial Court and b th p . by the fe ' d re Co of the High urt i� spect of any other Courts established by thi� Pr�c1;:�1 ror the purposes of tio n of tl1e Court ' an·d tl1e 1·nsti· (a) Regulatin·g the administra tut1·on. con duct · . and hearing of proceedings therein. (b) Regulat�n g the admi�sion, condu?t and discipljne of legal practitioners. (c) Regulatin g th e selection and duties of assessors. (d) Regulating the committal of crin1inal cases from lower courts to hi her g �s. (e) Regul�tin g the imposition and recovery of fines, tl1e award of 5mprison ment 1n default of payment, and the procedure relating to ex, cution and attachment. (f) Prescribin g forms. (g) Fixin g fees. (h) Regulatin g the general ad ministration of justice.

Part VIII General

21. For the better examin ation of laws submitted to Us for enactment there is hereby established a Consultative Committee for legislation, which shall comprise Our Judicial Adviser, the Presid en t of the I-Iigh Court, and three persons having recognised legal qualificatjon s or bein g qualified by reaso11 of long judicial ex perience and soun d knowledge of law to be especially appointed by Us. The duty of su.ch Committee shall be to draft laws upon 011r directions or to review the draft of any proposed law. No law shall be submitted to Us for en actment unless it is accompanied by a certificate signed by a majority of t11e members of the said Com mittee certifying that the law to which the certificate relates 1s not repugnant to natural justice an d humanity an d is a fit and proper Jaw to be applied withot1t dis crimin ation to Ethiopians and foreigners alike. 22. When any law has been enacted by Us it shall be published in the O�cial Gazette of Ethjopia in the Amharic and English languages, and shall -co�e into force from the date of publication in the Gazette or from any otl1er date which may be specified in the law. 23. Nothing con tained in thjs Proclamatio shall prevent tl1e hearin nd _ lem � � �. . sett �nt of minor d isputes in any manner trad1� 1onally recognize� by E�l�?P1�n law until such time ca n be established for t� e l1ear1n g � (� uvn dis as regular courts � ut� s by judges duly appointed by Us on the recommendation of Our .1\1.1n1�ter of Justice . 24-. It is hereby declared that no court �hall give effect to any e.xiStin g 1� :hl�h is c�ntrary to natural justice or h maruty, or w?.1ch makes any harsh or in� � quJtable diffe rentiation between Our subJects and foreJgners.

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360

NSTITUTION AL LAW AN Co PI IO TH E F O K SoURCEBOO �' . ? h u y r is f Co ts . h governed by the c · and ie�arc ction jurisdi the . Pr� Today, of course '· . IVil o (a) es : fo ex te l amp te, r N e . r 1;10g e 5 of tlte abo ve ar m e

Code . ��t ma r pri;��! Court (b) the ''rule making'' powers (Article 20) (c) tt� se��n-: r e 1 ,: of sUSe ent m om a t nc W compos1t1o_n ° he I fu eir th n? io t is h ha W A t c '? rs' so ss� ''A e ar ·� at ) 1 do · · '' · ( A I r t' 2 e 1 tc ) sors''. (Artie1e 19 ··) W ''Consultativ its ittee · members hip and r.. ��u a b ' Comm e . ? tl1e ( d ' on this s�! 100 ial iew dic rev ''ju ' for limited plish ab est y the n :� Do T'n,_,. _ 24 le c ti' Ar � f • o s n 1o 1s ? ion. i1 v o pr The 1

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ti a la t d u ie n eg h on R is bl of a st E a e th to g n Legal ti a el R � � ProfeJJi� aw L of t n ,ze pn o el ev D . za p zo th f o E s w a L e h T f o k o o b d n From Marein, J-Ia it gar a Ne zet Ga the in ed dat ed lish pub e April 29,l�t; wer les Ru ate Advoc 44 19 f o 49 o N ce ti o N al eg L er d un . . t kep by is �tes the v?c Ad of l Rol Minister of JusL� a es, Rul said the er Und ary ess nec 1on �or a person to pra� 1ss adm of ms ter and ns atio c i alif qu The only , les :v1z id Ru e sa th of 4 le Ru in t ou set are . te, ca vo Ad an as Any person who: (a) satisfies tb.e Iviinister of Justice or any person authorized by him in !hi! bel18,lf tha.t he l1as sufficient qualifications and is of good character, 800 ('b) pays t!1e prescribed fees. Tl1e s:1icl l=<.11les sc�t 11p an Advocates Disciplinary Court which can suggell' to the ]\1lin.iste.r of J·ustice to suspend an advocate from practising as an adv�� if in its opinion sucl1 ad\'ocate is guilty of ''unprofessional conduct or of such otoo 1 cond.11ct as v1ould prevent a person from being admitted as an advocate " . In my [:f\1Iarein 's] opinion, it will indeed be difficult for a disciplinary� to define sucl1 conduct. There is no appeal from the decision of the Minis'1t1 o_f Jus_tic� So f�r, to the best of my knowledge, the Disciplinary Court h� noim-:i . since its 1ncept1on, and no disciplinary action has been brought before 1t . The Rules described an ''Advocate'' to be: A pers�n entitled to practice as sucl1 in the Supreme Imperial Court or Olll!li subordinate thereto under the provisions of these Rules. The following fees are payable: I

On admissio11

. E $ 50 • • • • ••• 2 Annual fees: . . (a) in all Courts 200 (b) in the Provincial Region f al, a11d ...... ........ . Communal Courts 100 (c) in the Regional and C ommunal . ..... .... ..... Co,1rts 50 · · · ··· · · · · · · · · · d ( ) in tl1e Communal Courts 30 . , . ff 5 . . . . . . . ot2 . . dv Rule 8 of the said R . . . . a as t . without reward t0 comp Y uI�s, expressly exempts relatives who ac 1 with tl1e provisions of these Rules a.o · !C e b Advocate's tar'fl: are . es t o 1:1ot s�t out any where. I believ e that a dv ;� fee is ePf 10% of the value 0/ t�e sub�ect matter as their fee. In many case s sue gerated · Champerty seems to be a common practice ., . •

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The Provinces and the Church

fhe Development of Provincial and Local Government F OJ1l Decree Approving Administrative Regulations for Provincial Government ,. Jo. 1 of 1942, Negarit Gazeta 1st Year No. 6. Pa.rt 1

The Emperor will appoint on the. recon1mendation of tl1e Mi11istry of the In terior, one Governor- General responsible for the administration of each Province.. Part 2

The Governor-General is tl1e Gover11me11t represe11tative for tl1e Province· in which he is appointed. Governors shall exercise general supervision over all officials appointed in their Province by tl1e Ministry of the I11terior and otl1er Iviinis- tries. But they are responsible to tl1e Ministers of Fi11ance, J11stice, Agriculture and other Ministers according to the nature of the business. On matters directly a_ffecting·. a particular Minister, Governors shall commt1nicate dire ctly with that Minister. On matters of direct concern to a particular Minister but also affecting general admi nistrative policy they will consult with the Minister of the Interior. They will pass . copies of all correspondence witl1 other Ministers to tl1e Mi11ister of the Interior ..

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Part 3

Governor-Generals shall reside in the a1)1)ointed capital of the Pro'1ince. i

Part 4

The Governor-General is empowered to give orders in accordance vvitl1 tl1e regulations issued to him by the Ministr·y of the Interior, to the Director, Governors,.. mislenies and town officials and to give orders in accordance witl1 regt1lations isst1ed by other Ministries, to their departmental officials appointed in his Province. Part 5

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The Governor-General shall transact all the public business of his Province through the intermediary of the Director, of the Head of the Principal Secretariat,. of the Governor and Mislenies. Part 6 y e p du e h t. of o11 isi The erv sup tl1e for � e ver ibl ns Go po res en r-G be no all eral sh _ ment into the Government Treasury all taxes and dues legally fixed by tl1e Imperial Government. As it is the by d fixe y all leg t no es du d an es tax t lec col bidden to for Govern ment all such pro · be ll sha s yee plo em ent nm ver Go and ls cia offi , ers end off seou ted before the Criminal Courts. Part 7

n a ccordance l':lir.eItor , with the n ew administratiy e regul�tions, Governor-Gener�ls , c s Governors, Judges, Mislenies , Soldiers, police officers nd the pohce an. d all o � . ther Government employees are paid monthly salaries according to the rates. .

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UT IONAL LAW · IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E SoURCEBOOK OF

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e y a r e forbidden to receive any h T o l · e r1a e p m e 1 t h b ed by th th e e m Govern � y fro� m b -fix � y en fixed for m n e as b t t what .. .. er han h t o e l op e p he t

Governmen t

Part 11

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t� in po , ents an_d h on ap le� tit s w ra �d t i w d an ours As the Emperor grants t d ire ctly a�po1_ �t or dismiss o n n ca m hi er d n u s al ci or r;li� Governor-Gen era l or offi e be an 1ndiv1dual in th er th ld ou sh t bu p ne yo an .intt � ' r e e f rov ns · · tra or ty t from du ' su h b · t e y shall , th � e m · _ s, r _ ou on atter in Writin' h �r °:t me t in po ap . or s e itl t of deserving es 1c s rv al se du d v1 an d1 in e of th pr g 1n fy i c1 ess e i sp on ' d, ne er g nc co y tr is in and M to the .. .. rs u o n o h r o t i 1 en tm n o p p a r o e tl ti d te es .the sugg Part 16 e Imperial Governme�t the neces sary th m r� f e eiv rec all sh ral ' A Governor-G�11e d th law e security of the public an e t� of n t1o ecu �x ? an c� p� res 1ng sur en police force to es, unless authorized to os e rp lic pu po for als du 1v1 1nd t rui rec f sel but s11all not l1im , .do so by the Ministry of tl1e Interior..• .. '

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Part 19

�A. G·overnor-(je11eral is strictly forbidden to receive ''Metin, Metara: 1 1v.Ieste1.1guidr.."J, ljn1ensl1a '' a11d siwJlar kinds of gifts which may be brought to him l 11 in the col1rse of his tour.... i

Part 36 : Tl1e Emperor ,,1ill ap1)oint 011 tl1e recommendation of the Ministry of llie 1 • Interior Governors whose duty sl1a1.1 be t o administer the ''Weredas'' under a Gover11or�General....

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Part 47 _A Council �l1e [Wereda] Governor shall be constituted in every governorshlp : to discu_ss and aav1se on matters relating to the welfare of the in.habit ants and the prosperity of the territory. The Cou11cil sl1all meet three times a year....

Part 49 : T�e Coun�il of the Governor sl1all consist of th e Governor as Chairman, !h e Counc1llors being the Principal Secretary of th e ''Wereda'' the ''Worober" of tht , . and the Officia� . . . . ''Wereda'' the officer 0f tt11e tow11 m11n1c1p al1t y, the M1slen1es, � ·1 . . . no ude o f ti1e var1ous M1111str1es wl10 may be sta tione ' incl l · shal and d i11 the town .more than two local elders....

Part 57 .·, In· the . . f The Emperor will ap 010 . . O · t �11 tl�e recommendation of the M1n1stry Jll3fi ·te rior one Mislenie �� r �aP� 11 Misle�te district in a ''Wereda''. A G overnor J · 0 however reco en o h r er v d o _ ii ° d1 uals 1d suita ble e e �� n the ho f -Ge ; Go mi to r v ip s sl ni w m y sub sue1 recommendations to the Ministry of the In te n or..,. ,... . Other provisions established . ected . co� , . m unicipal government for ''towns'' ' includmg el �i.noe ]e\relS� · · ·w1th, apparently advi·sory Pow . u .. , u 1 ii ers P( arts 71 -77) · Other sectio e tb . c1. al gove ' � at o urts .prov1n ns set up c rnment with th red t o President of the court which e O overnor-�eneral, Go vernor and Mislenie e roP0�-S3) operates at their respective jurisdictio al lev els. (Part:S 7 n .

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Tfie Church h e Ad inistration of the Church, No t. g Con cer nin e ecre .3 of 1942, Negarit D 1?1 From 3. No. Year 2nd eta, Gaz

excerpts are illustrative produced below. few a only Note :

WHEREAS We have in mind Article XI of Our Constitutio11• the approved and noted have proposals wl1ich the Eccle We AS WHERE AND and put considered forward co11cerning the administration has Council tical sias of the Church. We hereby promulgate the attached Regulations concerni11 g the administration of the Church. Article 1 Schedule of the Landed Properties of tl1e Church

There are many kinds of landed properties and fiefs of tl1e cl1urch. There is landed property called ''Rim'' or ''Qulad'' which was give11 to the clergy for the service of the Church. There is landed property known as ''Gabar'' ''.Melkenyinat'' or''Qalad'', which was given as fiefs to the ''Alaqas'' a.rid ''Gabazes'', there are landed properties wl1ich belonged to officials, ladies and other people ,,;vhich .have been transferred with the approval of tl1e Government a11d become the landed pro perty of the Church. These and sucl1 like properties are grouped togetl1er a11d are called the landed properties and fiefs of the Cl1 urch: accordingly as prescribed in Article 2, the tax which is payable on them sl1all be used for the maintenance of· the church.

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Article 2 The Tax to be paid on the Landed Properties of the Church

. TlJose who own landed properties, whether ''Rist'', fief or ''Melkenyinat'', in the capacity of ''Alaqa'', ''Gabaz'' Priest ''Deacon'', ''Debtera'' or holder of any other different office of this nature by which the Church is served, are to pay money to the Church while the land and fiefs are in tl1 eir possession, according to the rate of tax assessed by the government....

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Article 6 The Administration of the Clergy

The Clergy who serve the Ch urc h shall be selected as l1aving good chara�ter :0n� abilit�; they shall be appointed in fixed numb�rs to each Churcl1 according its requirement and shall be assigned work of which they are capable and shall be prov1·ded with pay.... Article 9

All the money which is received under Article 1, �' 3 a11d 4, above sl1all be e _ �t me ern ov t�e by d l1e l1s ab est � d ry asu t tre as o , a it in is collected in fu ll p si e , esllec d. ra Uy for tl1e Chtrrch. Tl1e officials shall be proposed by tl1e Eccles1ast1cal Cot1nc1l and apP . ointed with tl1e approval of the Emperor.

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Article 10 over the congregation unde n tio dic ris ju te va pri . Tl1e Cl?u ch 1ias � f a and essio n f inflic t on . � pena W�ch lti i1 o c y w by es ; bers e o e t can deal w1t h m f 1 hai It its o s rs kee be , ho o use ho m me ld re a o wh t l y erg . . the � c p I'll½._( Power. of or d er over . 1 · ) ( f r ,rvlll po the on tem 1 1 t c1v a dic o ris Ju tte r i · a m e th t in · Bu ' JUdg · ns o . · ti 1 on · by sp1r1tua1 m e d nt d es. · s1 ci' or ai l Ecc ma e er. Th an d ar gu n i . all sh t en !1 1caJ . ted by tl1e Governm · �t appoin · ·1 I) · (t ra o po l n, em f b ict e s 1 JUn c1v pa ca · d e ar i o wh n me o but Council may propose r. ro e p m E 1e tl y b d te in o tl1ey shall b e app n io an ct of te um H ro P d de Rights an xp E e th r fo es in L s Guide n pia t in hio en Et law of Formal guran� pm vel de the to ted bu tri con ? ve ha rs, cto Fa of ber num A e t t ed ten enc con 1nfi of the Revised CollSI� ve ha to ar � ?pe a ich � wh o Tw , l hts rig cal liti po and il of civ ssed , 1scu gb n R ma Hu o on rati � cla � De � ! s tion Na ted uni 1 . below; the law gro'win£ tution are: tl e ed 1n the next section. • uss 1s ich disc wh 2, 195 1n a tre Eri and ia 1iop Etl of tion era Fed out of tl1e

Tl1 e U.N·. Declaratiorz of Hu1na1z Rights of 1948

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According to the U.N. Cl1arter (preamble) tl1e member states ''reaffirm'' their ''faith" in , •·fundamen�--il l1ur11an rigl1ts'' and (in Articles 55, 56) ''pledge themselves'' to take "jointandseparaie [i.e. collective and national] action ... for the acllievement'' of that goal. Tl1e lJ.l'l. Declaration of Rjghts, adopted in 1948, after two years deliberation, wasastepto- ': \Vards tl1at end. The Declaration admittedly does not l1ave the force of law; it is not an intemationtl obligation; b11t it is a guideline - a statement o f standards (,vhich was at least accepted as sum 1 by tl1e overwhelming rr1ajority \Vhicl1 voted for it); it therefore expresses a moral commitment to establisl1 la'A'S and a j11dicial system wl1ich, minin1ally, secures the political and civil rights set for�0 : , in the Declaration. Wl1ile tl1e Declaration sets forth a nun1ber of ''social'' and ''economic" "righfi e.g. tl1e right to education, tl1ese obviously cannot be f11lly secured simply by relying on written �w · and tl1e J �d �es. B11t rig;1� to eq11a1ity of treatment, freedom of thought, speech, writing, publishing. and assoc1at1on for pol1t1cal, social and economjc advocacy and freedom from illegal arres� conn· . nement and unfair adj11diciation - these rights can be pr�tected by the Courts. � hu� , to a certain extent, tl1e U.N. Declaration offered guidelines and standards for fu� con �t1t11t1onal and legal development. Indeed, the influence of the Declaration became more J!Ii· portant, wl1cn (as we shall see) it was 11sed as a source for the drafting of the legal strUctureoflh! _ _ _ _ Federatio n of Etl11o p1a and Eritr ea in 1952. ��ad t �1e followin� illustrative articles of tl1e U.N. Declaration. See if you can fio<l counte.rpa � prov1s1ons 1n tl1e Revised Con.-:;titutio n.

lY· b F onl Th e U· nt· ve,.sa! Declarat1.011 rn Asse ral Gene of 1a11 Hz,n the _ by Rig/ ts 1 pted (Ado o;

tl1e U111ted Nations, 10 December 1948) .

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROC AIMS L . �:. J]]Jll THIS ·uNryE.RSAL DECL co a as S A T R A T IO R IG N H O H 1 • F U M · A N standard of acl1ievem rY eve · ent for a11 peoples an d all nations, to the end th at ind, ; w dividtial· and e e o 1 · rgan of society, keeping this Declaration constan tly . d fret � ry ? shal l s 1 e by teacl1111� an . hts · d . · rig i ed t1c at io n e 11 th es to f u pr om ote respect or dams a � � b ir . : r ive r h':C ve sal a11d e �fv! ;:� og �.eaSltres, natio11al and international, to secuesrd rJelll�'- ; n1 t1on and observance, bot among the pe_ op! .sd S tates themselves an d h ict1oll·. · · l Uf among tl1 e peoples o.f territories under their J . .. '

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Article 1

eings are born free and equ al in dignity and b an m bu . All ri'ghts. Tl1 ey are endow. . · con e nce and shoul d act towards one sci d an . son rea anotl1er 1n a sp1r1t of ed With d. brotl1erhoo Article 2 Ever�o�e i� entitle d to �ll tl1e rights and fre edorns set fortli in tllis Declaration · · any n d f ki o st1c . h , nct1o as n rac e , ' colo ur d1st1 · sex ut laiig . tlage rel i Wl tho ' g1 ' 0 ' n, , 1 JJO 11 1ca 1 · · · · 1on t or a I soc · na 1a · I 1on, or1g111, property, birth or otller status. op1n r othe or e, no distinction sl1alJ be made on the basis of· til e or Furtherm pol1·t·1caI, Ju · ris· . · nat1o na] status of the country or terri tory to ,vliich a person be1 ongs, dictio nal.or 1nter . dependent, trus t, non . -self-governing or u11der any otlier limitation whether 1t_ be 1n of sovere ignty.

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Article 3

Everyone has the right to life, liberty a11d sec11rity of person. Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to c1·11el, inl1uman ment or punishment.

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Article 7

All are equal before the law an·d are entitled ,Nithout any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal p1·otection against any discri mination in violation of this Declaration and against a11y incitement to s11ch discri mination. Article 8

. Everyone has the right to an effective r emedy by t�e competent n�tio?al tribunals for acts violating the fundamenta l rights granted him by tl1e const1tut1on or by law.

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_ li�-- he aring by . an . Everyone is entitled in full equality to a �air . and . pub I�dependent and impartial tribunal, in the determ1nat1on of h1s rights aud obligations and of any criminal charge against l1im. Article 11

ed i n e Su r p � b 1 to t l g r� e . t� as h e 1c e: f I f o :as ha d al en p yo er a h e n ed it g w ar ch . � E ) ( nocent unt il proved ilty according to la w 1n a public trial at which he gu all the guarante es necessary for his defence . cc 0 0 e n e f f o l a en � �� p y �� n :e a � � ¥ f � No o ty e il t n u ll g d a e el sh b h ; ) n ? a � r ( 0 · 10 0 e Ol!li8810n which did n ot constitute a pe o.al offence, un r � sed p b e 1 � ty a 1 at t n e p r 1e av e J1 a l al sh r ; o N � n . d e e tt 1i ti m e o c m en h as it w w e . t�wan, th h i m m o c s a w e c n e ff o l a e one that was applicabl e a t the time tl1e pen

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Article 13 t en d em an v o f o residen ce witl tin m m o d ee fr to t l1 g ri (I) E,eryone ]1as the the borde1s of each state. g in ud cl y, in tr s hj un co ow y n a n, e av le d to an t gh ri to e . th s 11a e on ry \e E ) (2 return to 1is country. Article 17 ll e as we on as al in ty er c so op as pr n ow iation to ht rig e til s 11a (I) E'eryone with otl1e1S. . ty er p ro p is h f o ed v ri ep d y il ar tr bi (2) N) 011e shall b e ar Article 20 (1) E· eryone has the right to freedom of pea cef ul �s�embly and association . n. t1o c1a so an as to ng lo be to ed ell 111p co be ay m e (2) N) on 1

Article 21 (1) E�eryo11e has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or tl1roug1 freely cl1ose11 represe11tatives. (2) E1eryone has tl1e right of equal access to public service in his country. Article 29 ·1

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(1) E·,eryone l1as duties to tl1e co1nmunity in which alone the free and full developm(nt of his personality is possible. (2) Ir tl1e exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to sucl1 li 1?-i �ations as are determined by law solely for the purposes of secu�ng due_ recog11�1011 and respect _ for the rigl1ts and freedoms of others and of meetI�g the }ust re1u1re1nents of morality, public order and the general welfare in a dem ocratic society (3) T1ese_ri�hts and freedoms ma y in no cas e be exercised contrary to the pur· poses anc pr1nc1ples of the United Nations.

SECTION 2 THE FEDERATION OF ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA l \

Introduction

.· Eritrea w a s tarY It 1 · roili olo h y from Br1t1S 189 0 until 1941, when it came under adrninistraton p:di11: it�! � r � er Itafian: of ea e and, subsequently, the disposal of the fo� tioJIS colonies by .11e' U nited Nations ea Y e P c , ited rNa be e nd ignty'' th of �.n the 0 9 mbly Asse eral Gen 1 5 , 2 � f� p voted that �ritrea be federated O� e w�t 1 t iopia �s an '·autonomous unit' under the. Sov e ed of the EthiqJian En, er . nit u tu ion f r Eri t rea was then <? a � drafted under the direct10D otf a bY fb C i �� r�i�':: � �ions CQnrnissio e N n with the people of the territory, and w� ad � fedeJS· n1ted Natons, the Eritrean Asse 1 {! �1 and volv the . • E�peror of Ethiopia. The ste ps m �ion were complicated and d Y of an � 1 internal co,stitution for Eri iffic u �� p� ep3:Tat1on and ratification by popular a�m:Jop�). Govern.men and the Er·t trea t�·e istr1but1on of powers between the ''fe dera l ( Erl� ment, both_ th�f re<Je� the of ratificati? Co!lstit_utiol and t he ·'F��:�� G _ _ rn by Emperor ��. n the A creating the federation and promulgat ion by hUll v.e�1 leg1slat1on Creating a ''Fe for Eritrea to carry ouder 1 Govl ernment'' in Eritrea, i.e. � branch of the Ethio pian Go. t ;edera responsibi itl ies.

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the readings below, which then examine some of the in re.fl ect e_ d are . ste ps ese Th ''le gal ma te rta 1 s '" will note that the You result of on. this legal engineering was: derati fe the f 0 popularly elected assembly in Eritrea; a of tion crea the _of a s?'st�m of ''federal'' courts; hroe�t ) establ�s the �) s1on w1th1n � th1op�an _law, as enforcea�le Ia�, of _ various new civil rights having incl u the 3) it 1-c on st1 a tut qu 1on r, sta al tus , an app d 1nc ea l11d 1ng rig � hts developed in tl,e U.N. De�la would ration of Human Rights; of the ''Federal Act'' and the Constitution of 1931 as ''stipren,e law'' nt ishm esta bl : the 4) tl,rough e; out the Empir con stit utional judicial review to secure t]1e stipren,acy of this of hm ent esta blis the S) ''supreme la\v''. Finally, it is most i�p?rtant to recall tl1at the Federation a11d tl1e above legislation existed as part of the Jaw of Eth1op1a. The mat�rials �hi �h foll_ow are not_ designed to go into detail on all aspects of ''federalism'' as it existed m Eth1op1a . �ur1ng the per�od _ 1952-1962. The purpose here is to sl1ow the influence which this a �pe�t of pol1t1cal and cons�1tut1c_,.nal development in Ethiopia11 l,istory may have had on the Const1tut1on of 1955. Bt1t you ,1w11ll quickly see some of tl1e proble1ns inl1erent in establishing a "Federal'' system of government. Very little scholarly legal comn1entary bas been published on the Federation. Tre best basic source material for the period up to consun1ation of tl1e Federation are u·.N. Docu nents · some are cited in �h� article below ._ See also Trevaskis, Eritrea (1960) a sl1ort book written by a former British admm1strator In Entrea. The reading belo\v is a by a distinguished legal scl1olar, A. l\rthur Scl1iller, now Professor of Law at Columbia University. He was a legal advisor to the U.N. Coinmissioner in Eritrea during 1951-1952.

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Steps Leading To The Fed,eratiolill .

From Schiller, Eritrea: Constitution a11d Federation with Etlziopia 2 An1erican Jot1rnal of Comparative Law. p.375 (1953). (Footnotes re11.urnbered). At the conclusion of World W ar II, It aly, by its Tre aty of Peace, renounced all right and title to its territorial possessions in Afric a, i.e. Libya, Italian Somaliland, and Eritre a. The Tre aty of Peace came into effect on September 15, 1947, at which time the Four Powers, Gre at Britain, Soviet Russi a, France, and the United States, were charged with deter1nining in the course of the next ye ar, a fin al dispos al of the Italian possessions. Disposition of these possessions was to be made in light of the wishes and welf are of the inhabit ants of the territories, in th.e interests of pe ace and security, and account w as to b e take_n of views of other governments which for vario us reasons h ad interests in these are as. If, after 011e year, the Four Powers had not agreed on a solution, the m atter w as to be referred to tl1e United Nations General Assembly, a nd its recommend ations the Four Powers agreed to accept. . The Four Power Commission of Investigation started its study in Eritrea l ate in the fall of 1947. Inh bit nts of Eritre a w er e consulted, interested governmen�s a a ;ere co�erre u Co n�1� the to k bac ed ort rep s wa n atio orm inf th, a of y nd the bod � � _ f Foreig n· Ministers of the Powers. Th e four governments came out with four d1f �nt solu tions on none of which could they reach common agreement, so the matter . t urn ed over to the Genera l Assembly. . In_ Nov ember 1949, the General Assembly set up a Unit�d Nations Commission foi Eritrea. a�e G a, rm Bu of s 1ve t tasen e r rep � of e Th up de � Commission w as ma _ ::; Norway, Pakista n, and th e Union of So�th Afric�, _assisted by a�. adm_i nis e Secretari_ at of ea itr Er 1t v1s to s. wa ion iss mm Co is Th . ns rso some twenty pe

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TITUTIONA L LAW S N O N C IA P IO H T E F O SoURCEBOOK

, , d an es w sh e . wi e re th lfa : o ta ra f . e the inh ab·H e desid m sa e l ' tl · e 1 11 rn1 e t . . a · n and.there to d e � . f ·h d e ai an h s ! t rig a · f r1c d A an st t m cl . , E n . � y t I r1 ct1 s o Eth tl! e inter� st� of eace and se io. s ecause of h1s tor1cal b e l ro t n ca nifi sig a tie d JJlaye . , g eo gra i· _ P y l ar , s es ec . n · 1a p o 1 1 1 t E pia. · , · · d r en te 1c ep in d m c no en co . e . e m 1d a1 o 1 Fr 1p l s ' n tio b Fe · . r ua n, ph1ca1 prox1n11·ty, ethni·c rela .' . · 1 n ta ·· · d t h i e se as ws n vie ca o f y . l1l tl v ug a ro l1o e t 1 inh. b . . . . to J unp,...,,. 1950 ' tl1e Comnuss 101 ts I .. e r1n0 . ut o A t l 1 n.1s nu d ty A or1 . tl1e m tl1 w1 tr Eri s on ati rel ea -a· . se rlo ,., . d · e 1n a t in a m d n · a B 1 · t1s 1 fill·1·i�ary o�cup 1 d r1 t 1e d e e ce 1c st d l1a n io at tr ation of s British E ri trea Admini e nts of the United Kingd o m r11 ve go e l1 t d te ul ns co m and 1941 _ The Commi ssio11 c e and_ Italy. I t so� an Fr t, yp Eg of s nt e 1n r11 ,,e �0 ght wide e til as Ethiopia, as we ll e d. Tl1ree d1�erent solutions rsu pu e b to e urs co ble ssi po Were advice as to tlle best e d th � an 10 a Un :� �u ?f of e iv t ta S?uth en s e pr r� e tI1 ) (I Arri� _ d: se o op pr ly al n fi t erm s compat1ble with the seff. on . p1a 11o Etl and a e tr Eri of n tio era fed a ired des 1 es;'', (2} N�rwa� looked for reunio n�r cou l� t �o_ of y nom al1�o ti� s � n dom and ect resp e rn Province - the lowla nds est \\ tl1e hat t l1ty 1 s1b pos tl1e 1 vv11tl a, 1op1 Eth to of Eritrea adjoining tl1e St1da11 - would provisionally r e main_ under the British Administra tion; (3) Gt1ater11ala and Pakistan believed that Errtre a should be placed under a United Nations trt1steesl1ip for a n1aximt1m of t en y ears, after which it should be· come completely i11depe11dent. * Tl1e report of tl1e Con1mission was considered at the Fifth Session of the Uniied Nations. A draft resolution largely embodying tl1e proposal of Burma and the Union of South Africa was approved by t l1e Political Com.mittee, and on Decem ber 2, 1950, the General Assembly adoptecl tl1 e Resolution tl1 at was to result in the disposi· tion of Eritrea not later tba11 S epte1n ber 15, I 952. * * Tl1e vot e was 46 to 10, \vith 4 abstentions. 1�he United Nations Resolution was a multifeatur ed instrument. It provided for the appointment of a Conunissioner ,:vho ,:vas to be aided by an administrative staff and by additional expert s, if I1e so desired. A constitution for Eritre a based on princip�e s. of dem ocratic governn1ent was to be drafted I n preparing the draft the Co�1 ss1oner was to co11sult with tl1e Britisl1 Administ. ratio n, the Government of Etl1ropia, an� tl1e inl1abitant s of Eritrea. Tl1e draft was finally to be submi�ted to an elected Eritrean Assembly. Tl1e Eritrea11 Assembly was to study and co?sider the d raft . and to make cl1a11ges, st1pplements or omissions as i t deem ed desi rable, er If t�e Eritre a� �ssembly adopted the constitution, �ow the in 1 wit l it ,va t o be s [or 0� tile _Cofil:missioner t o appro,, e it and subnlit it to tl1e Em pe ror of Ethiopi a 111 s ratific�tion. Furtl 1er, tl1 e Re soll1tion provided that th e British Adroini 5rra tion w�1e1:1 �l1e 11_1?-e came,_ was to co _nsult wi tl1 the Commissioner in organizing a� Eritre� 1 �; ��r;tion and in co nvo k111g tl1 e Er it rean Assembly. Important to o, 15 tbe f�e 1 rst sev_en paragrapl1s of t l1e Res term�� ,�1 wa ol u w ha io em t s t n bo di ed l s F"'ed eral A Federal ' A c t· T u e � 1 ry ct mi gl1t ratI1 er be designated a en t · a fragm c onstitution · If tl! e E i .peror of the d t an i, n Etl 1io pia . fi al A fi Fe na der lly the rat ed i c E ;1 t o t 1 t l i t ranse th l ica h ff e s wi p t-u ect � . e � uld P? wo into go :� � J�� i �� ; � � ;�� I 0 , r . t illln1strat1on to tl1e ''appropriate authoritie s. 1

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• The activities and the · "Report · solu. tio. ns ropo�d by th e of the United Nations Com Commission are fully pres�nted fficial P.&. cords: Fifth Session , Supple: 0 or Eritrea," General Assembly, United Nat:Io ns! g :!� �0• �' (A/1285), Lake Suc cess, New York, 1950:, ... , 0�'rJJ . •• Tl1e resolutio n was res t �9, 1950, General Asse�bl;n �eport of _the Ad Hoc Political Com mi ttee · 0�·;1teso!Q' Ann �ations, O�c1al Records: Fifth Session, A/1951, -. · .tion, 390 A (V), is published ��i�!d . as ex I to the Final Report citea infra note 6. ' '

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The Resolution made it imperative th at the �o°:missioner and hi s staff perform be Sep te 15, 1952. All o ?l1gat1ons V:e re dtily discharged, and befo re s ill: : task ese th _h Co mm 1ss 1on er ft1r the the r ad vis , ed the the se Br 1t1s Administration with beyond f pow er an ers, tran s the � ? �e undertook to draft organic laws supple to � t ec resp co n nst f 1tu su r t1o bm 1ss1on to the Iegis_la�ive organ of Eritrea. All the t� � tal men _ ma ter1 al1z eve ed, nts nd the able Comm1ss1oner, Mr. Eduardo Anze e abo v � the of Matienzo, reported on scheduled _time tl1� st1ccessful conclt1sion of the mission to the General Assembly of the United Nat.tons at its Seventl1 Session in December 1952. * The report was accepted by a vote of 52 to O witl1 5 abstentions. It is not proposed to disct1ss tl1e political aspects of tl1e federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia.** Nor is it necessary to cot1sider tl1e n1a11y ad111i11istrative and economic problems which arose.*** It is _ of �oment l1ere to dwell on s01ne of the tasks faced by the legal _consultants. It was_ 1n this respect tl1at tl1e nlission proved to be a practical demonstrat100 of th·e co-working, as colleagt1es or as adversaries, of lawyers trained in the American, �nglish, F�encb, S, _ �ss: Italia11, Dutch,_ or Etl1iopian legal systems. It was truly a meeting of varied tra1n1ng 1n tl1e law, of diverse legal traditions, and of . differences in working techniqt1es. The early formal consultations with tl1e British Administration in the spring of 1951 dealt with the organization of the administration of Eritrea and revealed no major differences in opinion. Conferences later with the Ethiopian Go,1ern1nent, however, soon indicated that on some fundamental questions the Resolution was susceptible to t,vo contrasting interpretations. The Commissioner spok.e for the United Nations interpretation and had as l1is lega.l officer a French j11rist with a background of activity in the League of Nations as v,ell as in the United Nations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs represented Etl1iopia ,vitl1 a :Harvard-trained lawyer in advisory capacity. Differences in view were clear cut. The Ethiopian Minister stressed that the truly essential powers rested witl1 tl1e Ethiopian Government, while the Commissioner was of the opinion tl1at Eritrea was to become an ''auto nomous unit'' with its own legislative, exect1tive, and jt1dicial powers. Ethiopia saw a close tie between the Emperor and tl1e executive of Eritrea, perhaps eve11 ap pointm ent. of the executive by the Emperor. In contrast, tl1e Commissioner insisted t� at the Resolution perr11itted neither appointment nor control by t�e Emp� ror, since there was to be no limitation on Eritrea's autonomy. The Fore1gn M1n1ster maintained that a confederated state could not employ foreigners in its civil service, since that was a matter for the federal government; the Commissioner offered that this relation was a inatter of private Jaw within tl1e internal jt1risdiction of the state • �epo rt of the proceedin gs in General Assembly, UJ?ited Nations, 0%cial Record s: Seventh �ton, 40th and 41st Meetin g, Ad Hoc Political Committee, on December 11 and 12, 1952. . • The official version of all the activities of the mission from January 1951 to September 1952 IS� be foun d in l Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea,'' General Assembly ina ''F Uni.� Nations, Official 19�2 k, �o� New ), 2�88 A/ ( No. !5 t n e plem Sup ion, Sess nth . Recor ds: Seve Act1v r 1n ne s1o 11s mn 1t1es of the flrst year are give ns Co tio Na d ite Un e . th of rt . : po Re ss gre ro n m '·P . s, O�cia . s·ixt . . Enttca dun.ng · n, Se �s1� , h . ds . cor Re l the Year 1951, , General Assembly, United Nat1?n . �/1959, Cf. also, R.Pinto ''Une experience constituante d es Nations Un 1es. La Federation EthiopiePolitique Etr�ngere, 17e annee, No.5, pp. 349-60. . . . nd � 1n i� r eat B_ Gr of m o_ ngd K1 t d ite Un d the in of Tr ent rnm l e ful in the '·Report of the Gove ea N·ort�ern n t1o tr� 01s m1 A? the ing rn ce co n ns tio Na la Ire ed nit U nd to the General Assembly of th e of for the Pe riod December 195o-September 1952,'' General Assembly, United Nations, urnent A/2233.

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ITUTIONAL LAW T S N O C N IA P IO H T E SOURCEBOOK OF

rs. Th ese and other co ntr ai aff n ig e r fo er d n u · ad d se as cl . icto e b to n., t · o n . d n a d , e n · ·1 1 v1 con. ce. r a c1 aw r o t in an po 1c er m of -A o gl n A e vi · n w a t 1a tl ') e W t a ·c 1 d as n i' t o n o d s n 1o 1n p o a 1 er e f th G e� A. o m _sse bly . Polit i n 1o ut 1 · o es R e th of on ti cal involved in the interpreta li e p d p their respectiv e P ants. su lt s n co � l a g e l e th d an rin interests were paramount, e w it � the word � an� the spiri l b !1 a p m co e er w h cipals with constructions whic osen to acl11ev e particular, and 10 this case, t of. ch ver di ly ri a ss ce e n t u b n o ti lu so e R e th . gent political aims. __ a l consultati� ns with the rm fo e th , sk t� ed ir qu . e r in Proceeding to the n ext a utumn. A deta iled ex amination l I t1 d ue in nt co d an , . habit ants began in July 1951 rcu la ted . throug?out Eritre a to try ci n e be d ha n io ut ol es R . . of the General Ass embly ent at ive out.line of the proposed t d� e n ai nt co l ia t er a m s hi T to prepare ptiblic opinion. ch hi on e w th up ns tio ws of the es vie qu of r be m nu d ite lim a d ise ra d an n io constitut r tw o as semblies? What term of o e on e b e er tl1 ld ou Sh . ed inl1abitants were desir ? it be to ed s ect sel wa w Ho ? ist Should ns co ive 11t ec ex e th ld ou sl1 1at office? Of wl at de gree? Should uni wh to d an , in e er th d e t en res rep be ia iop Eth the Emperor of versal st1ffrage be establisl1ed? What ty1Je of direct a nd indirect election? lesser b e tl1e official language? What ld ou sl1 1at V/J ed: lud inc s ion est qu g stin ere i11t t bu e d to be suggestive only, they end int e er 1 v, ns stio que se tl1e gl1 l1ou Alt g? a fl of e typ pro'v'ed to tJe comprehensive to tl1e Erit rean public. The repres entatives of the in habitants ha.d been briefed on tl1ese matters a nd w ere unwilling to discuss anything 011 which they had not beer1 instrLtcted by the peopl e. Consultations \Ver e first l1eld in the capita l, Asm ara. Repres entatives of the n omic eco nd a ies, minorit fo ign e th 1 co re ies, s religiou rununit political parties, the . Later, cultural, and professional organizations came for ext end ed discussions �embers of t_he mission m ade extended trips througl1out the country, at which time consultat1�ns_ were l1eld witl1 tl1e popula.tion groups. Hund.reds of people gather· ed . at c�ntres w1th1n the area of tl1e settled habitants of th e plateau-land and at key p�1nts 111 tl1e coastal and western lowlands. Freqti ently nomadic tribal and se� tr1bal groups travelled from_ fifty to one I1undred miles in order to partici pate 1n these meetings, to h ear tl1e1r spokesmen and tl1e Commissioner. T?,is �Jeriod was _one of real educatio11. Tl1e political and religious leaders, the IDino�ity aud spe�ial . grotips, ge11erally came w ell-primed with material to urge s rest the adoption of const1tt1t1011al provisio11s favo ring personal or small group inte : �requently tlle documents tl1ey sub1nitted ha d been prepared by Italian la,vre r� in Af� a�a. It was tl1e conce�11 of the Commissione r to illust rate that a constitution proc aim.I ng . to be de1nocrat1c must l1ave a s its prima ry a·im the well-being of �e . n · . auo . whOle of "E'r1trea . At tl1·e sa1ne 1ime, ti·1 e inc Ia ec · 1us1on r d of prov 1s1ons of the · . of hu a • h. epresentat1ve assembly, and full participation of all in the st�· ture � ti: ir��;e:� o ernmen_t would s af ro e gua rd the rights of the special g :5� The legal advisor w: ; o r es ently ca ll ed up o resi· ag nt a v ad e e d to th ib e sc r ? . advantages of a unic�e::(� r a bicame ral legislature , to explain the nature :�pyjng . dential or parliamentary governJ.?-en�, a O e . or to set forth the possible valu a represent ative of tlle E r mpero 1n E ritre a. . in llS . The Commissioner was mew tio h at disappointed during the cons�1ta r t li the field b ecause tile opinions �ff ear e ed W�re too often refle ctions of the_ views e th presented by th e various oliti f at a parties at Asma ra. Ne verthe�e�s , 1 t w_as b �e scores of these meetings lield t� J 1 r o ugho ut pat _ the country and part1c1 � ? ner, Jll_ p�ople th3:t the autonomy of E tr_ ea �a s truly ach ieved. Th e Co �5510 tte!S his presentation o f problems � · an in hi s response to questions, clarified nia .

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. ..tiµlle d in this illiterate population totally unversed in the wa ys ., o f . . n th e i m d o . d e m . n a -g ov ern se If m f en o t t · at h ce It pt 1s ho pe d wi co n ll no t soon be Iost. Through a Jd , · . · wor pa in ki sta ng as hi · f: 1n on , th an e d m ea m ng· s of ter th e secret ballot' th. e res rpr . e . . .inte e o s, e ffi h Id th d' 1r ceec f t1 o o n of Internal affairs, and the constitu o l � es ln i b _ tional ponsi · by which democrat1c government could be achieved these we ' re the concepts d e\flces· · . · b e e to t 'd h d un ers sai tan d1n gs be wh ich ca ay me through the offices of the · m ch hi . w ne wa ce ssa s ry t o exp1ain It ns . . to th e pagan Baria and Moslem Beniati o N d . te Vni W the est ern Province that. two asseinblies were 1n ent u Ba r at Arn er • . not requ1·red . fUU' · tat f o d · ton es.1 re pre In se 1 eg1 sla t1 �ee e bo � � ara n �y. !t was essential that Kadi � � gu o t me mb wi ers of h1 s tribe was s0Jot1rn1ng 10 tl1e liighlands of Sena th wh o , Al i n Osma fe fro tre ann m th� stretches borderi11g tl1e Red Sea, be convinced k ual the ing follow rep a resent�t1ve of tl1e En1peror i11 Asmara would not mean of nce pre se the that bec uld ome su�J�ct to the will of tl1e monarc11. ,..fhese and scores w trib e � his that we re exc1t1ng and co1;1vincing and ma ces exp ene n r sim i�a of .. de an unforgettable impression on all wh_o atten?ed � es� gatherings and who ear11estly followed the discussions, whether 1n English, T1gr1nya, or Arabic. The field trips concluded in the auttlllln of 1951. Taking into account the views expres sed at the many meetings, an outline was made of suggested content of the constitution for Eritrea. The scene now shifted to Geneva wl1ere a panel of experts in international law was presented witl1 a series of questions. Among many matters, the panel undertook . to determine the significance of tl1e ''sovereignty'' mentioned in the Resolution. It was also de·cided that tl1e creation of a federation betvveen Eritrea and Ethiopia would not constitute a new legal entity at the internatio11al level. Further, the panel maintained tha t tl1e concern of the United Nations, \Vith possible intervention in Eritrean affairs, would continue after tl1e establishment of the federation. It is interesting to note tl1e part played l1ere by tl1e '1,1rious legal backgrounds of panel members, Swiss, British, and Dutch.�� Ex.perience in inter national law was reflected in the discussion of treaties, inter11ational agreements, and decisions of international tribunals. The British legal influence was at vvorlc when federations within the British Commonwealth ¥1ere referred to in explaining the nature of the ''autonomous unit'' of Eritrea. 2. 195 ly ear in d rte t sta on uti stit con ft dra l ua act the ork ion of on he preparat W The panel of legal co nsultants was made up of tl1e �egular staff legal officer, another versed in constitutional law, and a third in international law. _The document framed by this panel augured well fo r th e establishment of _a ?em�crat1c forin of �overnment ce fer ter 1n m fro e fre n, 1o �� at str n ad le ab cap of efficiently carrying on its internal � � from the other party to the union. On their exam1nat1on of the draft, �oth the B�1�1sh Administration and th e Ethiopian Government had c omments.to -�ake. The Br�ti_ sh, l it IC pl ex be y ar CJ dI JU e til of ce s en a a might b e expected insisted that the independ set forth to prevent dontrol by ot,her arms of government. They fur1b_e� suggeSte that a prov1·s1o · nal body whose acts wo uId be b'1nd'lllg upon th. e defin1t1ve governd e . h 1s l' . b ta es as . w e te it m om C 1 ve t· me xecu nt, be set up during the . ' inter1m per1od.. A n E Jn July as a result of this suggestion. **

ber-20 m ve o N 2 a, a ev en G t 2 d el h n ti ee g (M • General Rep ort ts � sulta Con a l Leg .1 by the Panel of /R . C /S 4 4 · 1 . C /A A t en 1'....... Docum ...,� ions •• .bor 1951), ,, General AssemblY, u_01·ted Nat . . ' d . . after September 15, 1952; atio n tr . is a g oi ng rru� The for budget a !I... · executive Committee laid the basis for a drafted a rtment dep ' ....uong oth e . serv1.-ce, set . up an excis . , � ' . r r t' o p e R , '' y ll ra e n e e g se ; s n the follo e matters 1t organized a c1v1·1 io it e pos v ti u c e ex in k or w to supra) [ o t Year, and employed Britishers Nwtnge ••• p 369[. .

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. ed 1_.1s ore critical com me nt through the Minister of Fo . · 1 la onal nati gn re inter rt Ethiop ia subm1tt w expe w s of ro l pane ere the ch . . of a lleng ings fi . " d n the of " a-a1rs. Many 1on. t1tut cons The representat' · drart i-u1 the of parts o t ve en · k 1 ta of s a w O : 0 i h h e t t an r rog he pre rat . ed. Except ly ativ on , es rs we po t o l ma for whi e h o r Empe did s not h noriti ave to be Specia}� � ; ;:� tY��e :; the rights of foreign mi the le b to s1 th Crow; . a n e o �h s� op re pe t o , n le as w o r "ev� . n e iv ut ec ex n ea tr ri � E sa eguar ed . the.,, ' d. c l d un ry Co 1so a dv ; i dy bo an r A esi fo ed ne n e 10 00 s wa ' g re • he L , n ig · e r e 1 p�ogress of the cou to the sov 1a d soc an uc non eco the for ntry * . ns pla ary ess nec the draw up o t a n E sio en eh at pr th e ap th an ed ct e re rit re fl ns io ct ie o · · These and other similar obJ · 1 t th a b"I" 1ty e � 1 t f o ns t ai h _ ag e te 1ta de 1 Fe m l1t ig o i m rat n tic a r oc m de d an s ou m no to au r ne 1o 1ss d m e se ro th fu re Co , rt o depart pa t t os m e tl1 r · Fo a . pi io 1 l Et . and indeed of . bl E . e es1 t 1or d cra �1tr e� ea m rn ve whi ch go ic at cr o had em d e th f o on ti p ce n co from the * � p. u o gr e th f o g in k in th ed ol po e th grown out of r a in April, 1952. ma ed in' As ar ep pr s vva n tio titu ns co the of ft dra al fin The n isio erv the of h sup wit ted the rus ent eleciioD n bee l1ad tion ra ist min Ad h itis r B e Th n of atio this Assembly, voc the con and bly sem s _ fa n trea Eri the of s r be mem the of 1 )' mbl ted the that final Asse elec this to was It . 1950 er emb Dec of n lutio Reso by the draft constitution v1as ·submitted on May 3, 1952. In the following two and one half montl1s, the Assembly considered this dra.ft constitution, and the chief task of the Commissioner and l1is staff \Vas to advise and assist. Two legal advis o rs were continuously pres·ent. Discussions were time-consuming, often exasperating, al\\1ays stimulating. Most of the disc11ssioi1 s fell within one of two categories, labeled i n the Final Report of the Commissione1·: (1) ''questions not dealt with, or merely touched upon during the cons11ltations but which oave rise t o important discussion i? the Assembly'' and (2) ''controversial q11estion; common to both the consulta· tions and the_ proc�edi11gs of tl1e Assembly.'' It is not necessary to dwell at !en� upon thes� discussions or to attempt to evaluate the nature of the constitution Ill the form it was eventually adopted *** Constant stimulation came from th e facl . ers t�at the �embers o:� the Assembly wl1e her<l came l '. tl1er rust ic peasants, nom adic . village _chiefs� Copti? pr1es_ts or Mosle1n kadis, urban politicians, no matter boli uch _t!1ey differed in acl11eving tl1e er1 d, all he� at a itre r E of ha d the welf are � litically j c! un tutored group, it did not take lon g to fashion itself into a typ; . P? P ar 11ament·ary body · Amendmer1ts to the draf t were repeatedly prop osed ' 01te, n more rad1c · ain· · . a 1 than tl1e p roposer v1sua barg in · l1zed, and concessions were made ·lug T hat no pr of on n . . occurred o 1 onged fi1lI'bt1ster · m1n� · deter . the to was due largely t n all to ft1lfi-ll tl1e mandate tl1at e n · . lisb.l tab tl e e _peop h e . I l of E tl1em, r itre given t � 1 a ad l s ulatioD, of self-gov·ernmeilt i n Erit . rea \V1tl1 respect f 01· tl1e rights of the ept1re pop eD b The Cornmissio11er a d w ks oc dl 0 dea sta ff , e were ca.lied upo11 to mediat e. � · these arose. Tll ou h . s t s perienced no diffi.c�lty�lerican and F1·e11cl1 trained, the two legal con ult� sions i 0 in a r�eing upon tl1e formulation of the stat� t0I"Y.P[ ,iern· that expressed the v· 0 f g tia · s li ment decided upon ;�;� � the a�sembled delegates. The semi-pres1 �en ar p n d r1tr � e a ial_ e , br� dged the gap between the president h t mentary forms of g In ' . ar overnment with which t I111l respectively they were fa ! ' * The Advis rect° . ory. counc1I. had froJJ l �)' ........ng · experienc 0f his come from the Co fioyy ions, nativ e Bolivia. mmissioner's suggest � In One mstance at least wher ** . tbe � .· . later a e e th C "'•,.

m otled the articl e to rea � omnussio�er had accepted the Ethiopian View, the Commissioner's earlier opinion. See Cl1apter IV and VI 0f the ''Final Report,'' supra, [cited in Not e** P· 3691·

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thei comm r leas t, on trad ition eased the task of outlining the organs at field law blic u p d functions of government. Ouce the Assembly delegates l1ad reacl1ed substantial �ey wanted . �nd in a num�er of i11stances t11is was distinctly t �at w on ent em ::re t?e const1tut1on - the article co11ld be drafted by the 1n s10° : incl u of hy legal wort n t1o e of th fac . t1s bly sa sem As the to ors is adv The duties connected with the consideration of the draft constitution by the Asse mbly were �Y. no mea1:1s . all t�e tasks un�ertake11 by the staff during the summer of 1952. The Br1t1sh Adm1n1strat1on sougl1t tl1e advice of the Conunissioner in the allocation of the powers of government to t11e p1·oper autl1ority. Eritrean or federal. This entailed study of the few texts available, Willougl1by for one advisor and Rous seau or Duverger for the other. Tl1e concl11sions were strikingly similar and so re ported to the Commissioner by his legal advisors for submissio11 to' the British Administration.* It was the wisl1 of all that the constitution be brief; co11sequently, s,;veral im portant suplemental organic laws were st1bmitted to tl1.e Eritrean gover :1ment for its action. The medley of courts which l1ad grown up under tl1e Bri tisl1 Jl..dministra tion needed integration; the judiciary had to be recognized .as an i_ndependent organ guardian of the constitution and protector of federal citizens or foreign nationals; the system of law to be applied in a given case had to be specified1 whether indi genous customary law, Islamic law, Italian Civil Code, or statt1tory enactment. The American legal consultant for the United Nations mission and a Britisl1 jurist, ex-justice of the Sudan Supreme Court, for the British Administration, each prepared a version of a comprehensive organic act to deal with these matters. Conferences were called with representatives of the acting Italian judges, the British Adrnini stration, and the Ethiopian Government. Eventually, an Administration of J11stice Proclamation was promulgated just five days before the formal establishment of the new government. Six additional organic laws were drafted by the United Nations staff. These were considered and revised by the staff of the British Administration, and later submitted to the Executive Committee. One only, the Functions of Government Act, was adopted .by that body. The others awaited action by the duly constituted Eritrean legislature. The drafting of these laws brougl1t into play the divergent ap proache s of lawyers, economists, and political scientists of various nat�onalities. Remarkable again was the unanimity of opinion prevailing at the completion. !hus c?mpara tive law, or rather comparative social science, had worked towards a single aim: efficient democratic self government. i nst co the ted op ad sly ou im an un On bly y sem Jul As n 10, ea , itr 52 19 Er the . tut1on. The Commissioner formally gav e his approval oi:e mo�th later. Sh�rtly ther eafter the Emperor of Ethiopia, at a formal ceremony 1n Addis Ababa, ratified the constitution. The next legal act, the ratification of the Federal Act, occurred on September 11. • �req uently s Con1n io Na ed nit U he ''T e: ! p am ex r fo � n, tio tra nis . adopted by the British Admi �s1oner, however, made a specific reservation to the effect that h1s a�reement to the l!st of what loy t1 mp ol per pro the of ip rsh ne ow he t of � � e ion es be F deral services had no relation to the qu t u dsuc ! for h services. The tra.nsfer of the properties was theref�re made on the express cond1t1fn t�at they were vm g ea ly, er on us <l aTI ] ro nt co of t h rig e th n ha th wi ded over to the Federal authorities �e 1· 371 p. ote ••• lN question of ownership ra, sup '', t r epo ''R ' er.' t to be finally de t ermined l a

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r f e re o d tu e c F n u o tr ti a S l a eg L e th d n a t c The Federal A

. s a wa U N. Resolution of Decem on ati der Fe the . of is bas the s wa h ber . i The legal mstrument whic . r See Orde trea. No 6 Er and of 19S2 Ni .1 pia Ethio b e � :i blis pu s I l t." 1950 w]uch was lat at�fi �:s era i Ac eci � th ''F t d lle is ca n io ut �esol �; ' r be em .m pt Co N. U ' Gazet�, Se rt' po of l Re ma the e . th ''F in d an ) 59 · 0r Ethio ia (19 of o k o db an H , t en lem , o. 15 {A/218 8)m;: pp on N Su ssi �arem Se h nt ve Se s: rd efo R l cia �ffi yL e l T.b'h s1oner, General Assem York (1952).

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From The Federal Act (op.cit). era it t ed with Ethiopia fed un s ou �m on tn au an e ut tit ns co all 1 l. Eritrea st . n w C ro n ia op under the sovereignty of the Ethi tive, executive and judicial a isl leg ss sse po ll sha ent 11m ver Go an tre Eri 2. The . s air aff ic est m povvers in the field of do 3. The jt1risdiction of the Federal Government shall extend to the following n1atters: defence, foreign affairs, currency and finance, foreign and interest ate commerce and externa.1 and interstate communications including pons. 1'he Federal Governme11t sl1all have power to maintain the integrity of tl1e Federation.

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The san1e Federal Act states that Ethiopia and Eritrea shall constitute a single customs area; that a single nationality shall prevail throughout the federation; that Eritrea11 citizens shall participate in the executive and judicial branch es, and shall be represented in the legislative branch of the Federal government ''in accord· ance wi�h law and in the proportion that the population of Eritrea bears to the population of the Federation''; that an Imperial Federal Council, compo sed �f equal numbers of Ethiopians and Eritreans sl1all meet at least once a year to ''advise'' upon the common affairs of tl1e federation; and that the Federal gov�rn ment, as well as the Eritrean governn1ent shall ens ure to residents in Eritrea wit� out distin�tion of natio�ality, race, sex, Ian�uage, or religion the enjoyment of certain fundamental human rights and liberties. The Creation of t/1e Federatio11 by Etliiopia tbt The _Federal I�co�poration and Inclusion of 1hi0 wi rea Erit Te of th e rri tor y Empire of Etliiopia Order, No.6 of 1952, Negarit Gazeta 12th Year No.I,

Conquering Lion o f the Tribe o f Judah ·: Haile Selassie I Elect of God, Emperor o f Ethiopia .:: ; , ' eS d fi · WHEREAS th F d. raI A ?t o r 1 ra tifi 2 _ e d er, _ b y U s Se on 11 p� th em b 95 13ib io� 8,l l ; for the· federation ;,r1;rea w i th �t�op1a un?er the sover�1_ nty of �e . atiiu1 g al . . Crown wrulst res ectin th · · · rn mt C�n st1tu e t ion,_ 1n�t1tut1ons, traditions and · status and identiiy of fh , · e �mpu-e of Eth1op1a; a n d , , r 1 e J\ l WHEREAS on 11th September, 1952 , W e ha ve ratified said Fe de ra . . NOW THEREFORE, We order as follows:

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cit �e ed ma y as t�e Federal_ In�orporation and Inclusion of Or de � Th is I) . w1t h1n the En Em tre pir a e of Eth of 1op 1a Order and shall be deemed y rito r Ter the 11th on ber, tem e Sep 1952. forc into me co to 2) The territo ry of. Er�trea, incl':ding the _islands, is that ter:ritory defined Co nst1tut10�1 �or Eritrea. and 10 Article 23, paragraph I of the �he of 2 icle Art in Peace Treaty �1th Italy, and 1t 1s hereby 1ncorp�rated and included within Our Real m as an integral part of Our federated Empire. 3) Th� name and st�le of the_ Empir� of Et�iopia internationally and otherfed�r of at1on Er1tr �a w1tl1 Eth1op1a wl1ich name shall apply to the Wing follo wise 1 all such fed�rat�d territory shall cont1nu� to be the Empire of Ethiopia, and the Imperial Et�1op1an Government shall _cont1nl1e as_the_s�le_designation internationally and otherw1se of the Government having federal JUrs1d1ct1on over the entire federated territory. 4) The Imperial Ethiopian Flag sl1all continue internationally and otherwise as the flag of the federated Empire. :i 5) The international treaties, conventions, and all international obligations 1 of Our Empire presently in force are hereby extended witI1 their full force and effect to the said territory, excepting treaties, co11ventions and agreements vvith Ethiopia concerning Eritre.a, which are hereby declared null and void. 6) The Federal Act is hereby declared to apply in all its details a.nd provisions r' throughout all the territories of Our federated Empire. 7) The Constitution of Ethiopia given by Us as Sovereign and Cro,:vn of ' Ethiopia on 16th July, 1931, is hereby extended a11d is made a.pplicable throughout l Our Empire as henceforth constituted; all rights and a.ll privileges set fortl1 therein as hencefortl1 constitutecl andt o devolve thereby upon all nationals of Our Empire 'I the extent so proyided, upon all inhabitants tl1ereof. It is further ordered that, pursuant to the rights established by Our Constitution and to the present Order, ' all Eritrean citizens shall enjoy throughout Our Empire all those rights, privileges j of any other part of Our of citize11s and immunities of all Our other subjects and ' Empire, nor shall there be denied to any person anywhere within Our Empire the ' equal protection of the laws; nor shall the privileges and immunities of any of Our subjects be abridged anywhere within our Empire. 8) The Federal Act and Our Constitution of 1931 and all federal legislation made pursuant thereto as well as all international treaties, conventions and obliga tions of Our Empire as extended to the territory of Eritrea by the present Order shall be the supreme law throughout the territories of 011r federated Empire. . 9) All inhabitants of the territory of Eritrea excep� persons P? Ss :ssing �oreign nat1 ?nality are hereby declared to be subjects of Our Emp�re and Eth1op1a°: na!1onals. All inhabitants born in the terr itor y of Eritrea and having at least o�e 1nd1genous _ parent or gra.ndpare·nt are also declared to be subJects ?f Our Empire; however, if such p rson is in possession of foreign nationality, h� 1s hereby perlllltted to r� � _ nounc e within six months of the date hereof the nation ality granted above and retain sue� foreign nationality but if h e does no t so renounce he shall thereupon lose suc h foreign nationality. Given at Addis Ababa, this I Ith day of September, 1952. ,.

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ution it Const an The Eritre tative Assem y n se re e p e th R y b d te p o d (A bl a e tr ri E of f o n o ti tu ti s n o C From the 1952) July 10 on Eritrea re. e l1 n e iv g e r a ts p e c x e Note: Only

GENERAL. Article 1.

s, ve ti reby adopt and ta n he se re p re r ei th h ug ro th , le op pe l. The Eritrean e al th y er b en 50 G 19 r, be mb sse em A ec D ly n 2 o ed ov pr ap ct A al er ed ratify the F of the United Nations. e ns of th io d is sai t. ov Ac pr e th lly 1fu itl fa e rv se ob to e 2. They undertak Chapter I. Status of Eritrea. Article 2.

The territory of Eritrea, including the islands, is that of the former Italian colony of Eritrea. Article 3.

Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown. ./

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Article 4.

The Government of Eritrea shall exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers with respect to matters within its jurisdiction. Article 5.

.1· Th_e jurisdiction of the Government of Eritrea shall extend to all matters not vested in the Federal Government by th e Federal Act.

2. This jurisdiction sl1all include:.); etc (a) the various branches of law ( . . w 1 a ' 1 · rc1a comme cr1mtnal law law civil . ' . ' (b) th e organ1zat1 . on 0f the publi· c services· , . _(c) in te rnal police ' · (d) health; (e) education; (f) public assistance an .' d social security; (g) protection of labour; JJl· co . ation of (h) exploit al nat ra1 reso�rces a n d regula ti o n of industry, .intern . merce, trades anJ profess1ons; (1) agricult ure . ..,.1 U) internal c�mm uru·cations· · 1 -(k) the publi. c utilit s · . erv ed ' es i (1) tl1e Eritrean budge1 � which are peculiar to Eritrea; axes d esign an the establishment and collection of t to meet the expenses , · s. of E n-1 rean public functions a.nd ser vice

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Article 7.

1. The Eritrean re:pre�entatives i� the Imperial Federal Council, compo se d Et rs of hi nu op m ia be ns an d ua Er 1treans shall be appointed by the Chief of eq l Ex ap pr th ov of e al th w e Assembly. They shall be formally invested ecutive ith in office· ro r. Em pe by the 2. Eritreans shall participate in the executive and judicial branches and shall be repr esente� in th e legisla!ive branch of the Federal Government, in accordance with law and 1n the proportion that tl1e population of Eritrea bears to the population of the Federation . Article 8.

Persons who have acquired Federal nationality in Eritrea under the Federa1 Act (Section A, paragraph 6 of the General Assembly Resolution 390 (V) A) and have been granted Eritrean citizensl1ip in accordance with the laws of Eritrea shall be citizens of Eritrea. Article 9.

1. On the basis of reciprocity, Federal nationals who are not Eritrean citizens. shall enjoy the same rights as Eritreans. 2. Federal nationals shall enjoy political rigl1ts in accordance with the Eritrean, ,•• Constitution and laws on the basis of reciprocity .

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Representation of the Emperor in Eritrea. Article 10.

There shall be a representative in Eritrea of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia, Sovereign of the Federation.

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Article 11 .

The representative of the Emperor shall, on all occasions, have the place or· precedence at official ceremonies in Eritrea. Article 12.

Je ,. tjc ce 68 th an Ar wi The ch·1ef Execu1·1ve, eI ected by the Assembly in acco· rd · . icIe 72 The shall take the oat h of office in accordance with the provis�on& 0 f Art' rep resentative of the Emperor, having noted �hat_ the Ch�ef Executive has · bee�. elected by the Assembly, shall formally invest h1m 1n office 1n the name of the Em · Peror, Sovereign of the Federation. Article 13.

· · . ive tat en res e th rep , bly sem As e th f A t ions sess the opening and closing of . f � 0 t e h wit l l dea wil he ich wh in ne ro . th e t m f Emperor may deliver the speech r� ? affair s of co a. tre Eri to d an on ati der Fe the mmon interest to

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Article 14.

ly b m ? e , the Chief Execu tive ss e A th Y d te o v n e e b s a h 1. When draft le gislatio· n eror. p e m f th E o e v ti ta n e s e r p e ' r e th I 0 1 ly te ia d e m im will transmit it � t a r� f� legislatio n ted d th s er si � o c r ? er p m E Vo e th f o e v . ti ta n se re p ' re e th 2. If t a 1t r th lv n, o . o o v ti m 1c es sd r1 e JU � th l a er inter. e F n o p u es ch a o cr en ly b by the Assem t t 1 . es a u sm q n to re a tr y the Chief a m e h , n o ti a er ed F e th f o -l ti ·national responsibility er � y s bl r fo on em ss rec id e a th on by e v? e t . . th r te af ys da ty en tw in h it w ve Executi s n r doing so. so fo a is re h g n t1 a 1c d 1n , ly b em ss A e th -0f the draft legislation by I

Article 15.

a sl in n gi e te le tio th ga er ul ann om m pr ill w r ro pe Em e th of e The representativ laid down in Article 58.

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faJticle 19.

1. The orgat1s of government and public officials shall have no further powers tl1an tl1ose conferred on thern by tl1e Constitution and by the laws and regula tions ' ....,vti.ich gi"1e effect thereto. . .. Article 22.

The follo\ving provisions of paragraph 7 of the Federal Act shall be an inte gral part of the Constitution. of Eritrea:- [I ncorporates paragraph 7 of the Federal Act; ·see belov1 for text of this part of the Federal Act].

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A,rticle 23.

o f ction distin q All _ persons are born free and are e ual before the law without . d shall be an rights ·nati_onality, race, sex or religion civil and, as such, shall enj�y _ sub Ject to duties and obligations. •

Article 24.

t trea i No one �h all be subjected to torture or to cruel , inhuman or degard ng · ment or purus h ment.

Article 25. e Everyone resid th . o d t ent in Eritr. ea h_as the r1�ht to freedom of movem ent. an -,A choice of place of residence in Er1trea subJec t to the provisions of Article )'f•

Article 26. f evetf' . · . . T h e right to freedom of co n�cien � and religion .shall include the rig h t �est -one, either alone or in comm ity w th , to v p e at ri c s er th r li ? o b u a in d p �n i n is i o h gi li r n o re f ie el b ac n te · ng, practice, worship a nd obser vance . . ·

Article 27. �I . . . No economic, a � , f in ncial or poIit�c . � measure of a disoriminatotY na' · · . ·. ;be taken to th e detriment 0 f any religion practised in Eritrea. . .

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Article 30.

Everyone resident in Eritrea shall have the right to express his opinion through (pre spee ss, ch, r etc. wha and ) teve to learn the opinions expressed by dium roe any others. Article 32.

1. Everyone resident in Eritrea shall have tl1e right to form associations or companies for lawful purposes. 2. Companies or associations shall enjoy funda1nental freedoms i11 so far as their nature permits. 3. Such compa.nies or associations shall be regarded as persons before the Jaw.

Article 34.

1. The provisions in the last sub-paragrapl1 of paragrapl1 7 ot· the Federal Act apply to the whole 'of Chapter IV of Part I of the Constittition. This s11b-para graph reads as follows:I[

''The respect for the rights and freedoms of others and tl1e require ments of public order and the general welfare alone vYill jt1stify any limitations to the above rights." 2. In applying the aforementioned provisions the .enjoyment of l1uman rights and fundamental freedoms may be regulated by law provided that sucl1 regulation does not impede their no1mal enjoyment. Article 39.

I. Legislative power shall be exercised by an Assembly representing the Eritrean people. 2. Members of the Assembly shall represent the Eritrean people as a whole, and not only the constituency in which they are elected.

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Article 67.

The Executive shall consist of a Chief Executive .assisted by Secretaries of executive departments. Article 68.

1. T he Chief Executive shall be elected by the Assembly by secret ballot.... The Federation and Expanded Guarantees of Civil Rights Fro m the Federal

Act, foe.cit., Paragraph 7.

The � e�era� Gove.rnment, as well as Eritrea, shall ensure t? �esidents in_Eritrea. · wt.tho ut d1s�nction of nationality, r ce, ex, langu�ge or rel1g1on? the enJoyment � _ _ � of· hum an nghts and fundamental l1bert1es, 1nclud1ng the following·

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i m o ri � �c . di w la ti na � th on �e o f �e sh y it al all be lll qu e to t h The. rig E ritrea enga ged 1n ce en ade st i x e 1n es is pr . in er nt e n · d aga inst D re 1g al or ion cat slria11 . u i � v , 1 cha edu ct l ritab e . a n, tisa r a ] · al ' ? . r tu . 1 . 1t es com. merc1al, agricu · n om pa n ie s operati c e nc ra su in d an ns ng tio in .Ert,.tre. 0;a aga inst b anking institu . . . . of p erson' t y · 1 r u c e s d n a ty r e b Tl1e rigl1t to life, li . one shall be o ty N er op pr _ of e os sp di de prived 01. d an n The r ight to ow t ou th e wi d� s, �t r1g oc pr l ess t1a ct ra nt co of law and ng di cJu i1 i , ty er prop ective c om l? ensat1on ; f ef . � a� st ju f o t n e in ay p t witl1oti ress1on and the right of p �x d _ar: on ni i o p of m adopting Tl1e right to freedo ' n 1o g l1 re r o d e re � y n a g and practisin . . The rigl1t to edt1cat1on; embly and as so c1�t�o ; s as t1I ef ac pe f � . m o d e� �r to T·he rigI1t � d i an e nce l mic do nd e, po res subJect to the Tlle rigI1t to 1nv1 0Iab1lrty of cor . . requirements of the law; TI1e right to exercise any profession subJect. to th� re qwrements of the law: No one shall be subject to arrest or detention w1t�out �n o�der of a com: petent authority, exce1Jt in case of :flagrant and serious v1olat1on of the law · ·in force. No one sl1 all be de ported e xc ept in acco rda nce with the law· Tl1e rigl1t to a fair and equitable trial, the right of p�tition to the Empero; and tl1e right of appeal to tl1e Emp eror for comm utat1on of death sentences; Retroacti,1ity of penal law shall be excluded;

Tl1e respect for the rigl1ts and free doms of othe r and the re quirements of public order and tl1e ge11eral welfare alone will jt1 stify any .limitations to the above rights. From the Public Right s Proclamation, No. 139 of 1953, Negarit Gazeta 13th Year No. 3 .

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WHEREAS, by Article 6 of Our Order No.6 of 1952 We provided that the Fed eral �c� for tl1e federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, sl1all apply in all its details and prov1s1ons throt1ghout all the territories of Our fe derated Empire; and WHEREAS, by Our ratification of said Federal Act under date of llili s.eptember, 1952, and by Article 8 of the afo re said Order We provided that said Fed�ral_ Act a s well as ?ur Constitution, sl1a11 be the supreme law throughout the terr1tones of Our Empire; and WHEREAS, paragrapl� 7 of the said F eder al Act requires that the f ederal �overn men t as we ll as �r1tr�a s?all ensure the enjoy nt in Eritrea of h�man e m d an nghts and fundame n tal l i berties, including those ph , gr set forth in said para a W_H?REAS, by AJ:ticle 7 of the afor e said Orde rights all that ovide d r We pr our aod rrivile ge s se t fort� 10 ?ur Constitution of nal s natio sh all all de vd up lve on E�p1re and upon all inhabitants tl1ereof h s i i n an d. ' further ' that all Eritr. ean c t ze s i1l�I · eilJoy th rougl1 ou t Our E�pir e a· II th ose rights, privileges a nd 1mmun1ties · of re · Our otller sub'�ects and cit1zer1 s of e th ll r an y no a ot he r e Em pa t pi of r O r ur ' . sh (tht be derue d to any p erson anywhere · h' o io c wit n prot e t in ?u r equ al Em the pire . . laws; no r sl1al1 tl1e p rivileg7s aod d sed bri a be ts Immun1t1e s of any of Our subJec a nywl1ere witI1 in Our Emp1re; and .. ll e WHEREAS, it is expedien i as ' t and necessary tha t Ou r Eritrean c1t1z e�s rtie5 as .l as all residents in Eritre a b e ass . �re; those enjoyed by Our sub�ec1 ured the s3:me rig hts and fundam ent. al t� s and by th e inhabitants in the rest o f Our ·

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be assu red_ �rit the re� enjoyment of human rights and fundamental of ents esid r that 1tre as a req mre by d E paragr�ph 7 _of the Federal Act; but also 1n onl y � not s rtie libe e, and tha t there be u� fornuty and equality throughout Em p1 ur � � ut gho th rou nt of _the hu_man r�gl1ts and fundamental liberties in enJ O the 1n re � t: mp i E our . 1nd1cated 1n particular 1n said paragraph 7 of tI1e Federal thos e_ as wel� as eral en In the ral. d ude gene incl g bein as let NOW THEREFORE, in accordance with Article 9 of Ot1r Constitutioii, We Proclaim as follows:1. In add ition to existing �reaties, .internat_i�nal co11ventions and obligations extended throughout the federation by tl1e prov1s1ons of Article 5 of Our Federal Incorporation and Inclusion of the Territory of EI·itrea w.itl1in t]1e E:mpire of Ethio pia Order No. 6 of 1952, all treaties, inter11ational conventions and obligations and executive agreement� he?ceforth conclt1ded and/or 1·atified shall be the supreme law throughout the terr1tor1es of Our federated Empire, sl1all be incl1 ,ded as an integral part of federal legislation and shall tl1rougl1out tl1e Empire be self -executory. In the present Proclamation, all reference to· federal la\vs or legislation, shall be held to include the treaties, international conventio11s and obligatio11s and executive agreements referred to in the present Article. 2. Full faith and credit shall be given in and by every governn1e11t in the federation to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other govern ment in the federation provided, however, that in case of judiciai proceedings, the same shall have been l1ad with full jurisdiction as to tl1e person and subject matter involved and shall be in courts on record. 3. No government or part of the federation shall make or enforce any lav, which shall abridge· the privileges or immunities of nationals of tl1e federation or deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of tl1e laws. Tl1e fact that a person serving in any governmental office, function or capacity whetl1er federal or otherwise shall, in acting in violation of the provisions of the present Article, have, in fact, exceeded his authority, or contrariwise, shall l1ave been acting purs11ant to legislative or administrative authority granted to him by any government, federal or otherwise, shall not preclude the application or diminisl1 the scope of application of the provisions of the present Article. 4. No person serving within the Empire of Ethiopia in any gove171mental ?ffice, function or capacity of any government, whether �ede�al o� oth_e1:11�e, shall In any way utilize his office, function or capacity to rest�1ct, 1mpa1r, d111:11n1�b, s�s P�n� or threaten to restrict, impair, diminish, suspend or In fact, to restrict, 1mpa1r, s son per of s clas ni or up gro any h, or son per en susp any _ s d ard or reg as troy des � ?lilll 1nclud1ng juridical persons anywhere within Our Empire the �t1man rights and funda me ntal liberties as prescribed in Our Constitution, or in Art�cle 7 of Our Or?er No. 6 ?f 1952 known as the Federal Incorporation and Inclusion of the Te�r1tory_ of �ntre a within the Empire of Ethlopia Order or in any _of (?ur Federal laws, Including e, ffic tal n _ me er1:3g?v any esen 10 g vin ser ? son per cla a pro T t mation. he fact tha _ r!enct1P� n .t _ o or capacity whether federal or otl1erwise shall, In a�t1ng in �1olat1on of � he pr?vif>i )ns of the present Article, ha ve, in f�ct, �xceeded hi_s ��th�rity, or c�n .rarrw1se ,, shall ity l1or aut t1ve tra 1n1s adm or e tiv isla leg to e ant hav rsu pu been acting an ed to h_ m the de clu pre t l no sh , ise �� erw oth r al , l ' by any government fede� ? r 1� _ t sen pre the at of s 1on v1s pro the n of P c n tio o ica f o sc r diminish the op e o appl 1 � A:P · rttcle.

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.·' i op of hi · Et re pi a m E in · e th y an in ith w g v o go l rv .ern,n,�.. e S person · ny A 5 n . ta e ra l or othe rw1se, who shall co d fe 1 r e th e wh · y cit pa ns ca · or office, f unction i e r shall be a person se rving in oth � PU'e W ll i such not o an r · e · · · th e · wh Y g ov . · or or der ano ther . em s d d 1 r pa n h m �s 1 °;1 or ct ri st � e i sp r i_ su to , e , ty ci n . a re mental office, function or capa 1ng l lud 1ca 1nc r1d Ju ns p rso e p o · ers of ss cla ns or hin up wi gro t y an . . · r o n o rs &ard& e p y an . O · ur · es e w1 y av 1 c-. 11 u d h i s an 1on 1ss J om n f or ts ac act ' r · tncted E mp1re,'or who shall by his ! s d ga r r y an d a e e � oy rso str e d � � n r o_ or ed n� _ e any group impaired, diminish�d sus� o in h E ur t wi r p1 e! the h_u s m on �s pe l ic� r1d Ju ng d1 cl� 1n . man righ� s . on rs pe or class of on uti tit ns or Co r <?� in In d ibe scr e pr Article 7 of the as ies ert lib al nt me da fun and f a of e d eral_ offence and 1l£y gu be ll s�1a 2, 195 of 6 . shal lupoo aforecited Order No e to a fine no t e xceeding_ Eth._ $5 00 or bl lia e b t ur co al er fed a to im conviction by prisonment ·not exceeding one _ ye �r. or t? bot� suc h fine and 1�pr1sonment except e th e maxunum penalti cas ich wh 1n rv, 1nJu ily bod ve gra or th es may dea of e in cas · · be a fine not to exceed Eth. $5,000 or 1mpr1sonment no t to e ��e d ten years or both such fine and imprisonment. It sl1�l l be no defence to a conv1ct1on under thepresent Article of tl1e present Proclamat1on that the accused, as . a person serving within the Empire of Etl1iopia in any governmental office, f u1:1ct1�n or capacit y, whether federal or otherwise, sl1all have been empowered by legislation or grant of admini strative authority to violate tl1e said human rights and fundamental liberties referred to in tl1e present Article. Tl1e fact that a person serving in any governmental office. function or capacity, shall in acting in violation of the provisions of the preseni Article, have, in fact, exceeded l1is authority, shall not preclude the application or dimi11isl1 the scope of ap·plication of tl1e provisions of the present Article ... 1'.he Federal Courts and Judicial Review From tlie Co11stitution of Eritrea, Article 90. The Supreme Court sl1all have jurisdiction in the following matters:(3) J?ispu!es concerning tl1e constitutionality of laws and orders. If the constitutronality of a law �r order is challenged before a Court, proceedin gs shall be 5us�ended and the issue shall be presented to the Supre me Court, which shall i decide v1hetl1er sucl1 act is constitutional. From the Federal Courts Proclamatio .. th 13 a et az G n N o · t r, 13 o:a 0A 0f 1953, 1Arv,e·b ' ,t Year No. l . · 3 Our Federal courts shall h av · · ' . our e Jurisd 1ct1on exclusive of all oth er courts in · c · . . Emp1r· e In · th e iollow1n g matters: (a) arising under Our c · . or � : 0 00 st1 tution, un der the Treaties of Our EmP "' b) u �d� r Our laws of F e deral application; ( ar1s1ng under Internation a l L ( aw' · · d · ze51 c) of a m1ral1ty and marit . . . . pn d me an i _ J ur! · ure sd1 ct1o n, e inc iz s lud ing � defence and matters within O u . te�ritor1�l waters, maritime domain or areas, or on board Et � iopian ships, vessels o r aircraft. . (d) for or on behaIf of 1" . . ve . o · 0 Our Crown, or 1nvoIv1ng 1 an p the Imperial O' . Ethi o ment as defined · 0ur o t r:ri952; e d ral n corp?rati e th Te of on and I nclusion of Eritrea withi�n th F � l _ e Empire of Ethiopia Order of 11 September, 1 I'll·

CoNSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF ETHIOPIA

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(e) between a.ny Government within Our Empire and any foreign Governmen t; 0 ( concerning crimes an d o ffen ces cognizable under the authority of Our Crown and defined b y laws o f Federal application, including any such crime or offence;

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(A) the sovereignty of or the integrity of the Federation; (B) the Federal Government; (C) the defence or national security of Our Empire; (D) the maintenance of friendly relations between the Empire of Ethiopia and foreign states; (E) a Federal official, employee or person performing a Federal function or with intent thereby to interfere witl1 the performance of federal function or with kno,vledge that the perpetration of such crime or offence would, in fact, so interfere;

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(g) by aliens asserting violation of International Lavi or the treaties of 01.1r Empire; (h) involving the application of Our Immigration laws; ... (j) under Our revenue or tax laws �f Federal application; (k) involving Our postal, telegraph or telephone lav1s; ( ) involving foreign or interstate commerce or external or interstate com 1 munications and all laws concerning the same; (m) involving or concerning ports; (n) involving any restraint of foreign or interstate trade or commerce or_ any . . . . · t of such trade or commerce, con.sp1racy or comb1nat1on 1n restrain (o) involving Our patent or copyright laws; (p) involving Our currency, banking or foreign exchange la s; � (q) the enforcement of any penalty, pun1s . hment or forfeiture incurred under Ou.r laws of Federal a pplication; . . t en es pr e th g in 11d cl in w la l ra de (r) the interpretation of the prov1s1ons Fe Of any . al r de Fe e th g in ud cl in 10 1 c Ii l Proclamation, and any l aw �f Fed�r Act for the Federation of Entrea _wit� t 1OPfa �� Constitution and all treaties and inter·n ational conventions, agree n'ts and obligations, except ·thin this or any other that, in the case of the said Federal A t, n ot� t re rp te in to ea tr ri E fn � tsw �: 0 c a law shall exclude the right of no?-Fe e; 1 of s ld fie e th d ne er nc co re a s a r i a the said Federal Act, within and tn so

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e Government the C th to ct A l a er ed F id sa e th y b o ed rv ns. se re ion t· ic ' d . s J�ri . m ed h fro the Fede;al GoVe . is u g n ti is d as , ea tr ri E f o . s w la rn e . th . d n a · . n 10 t tu t1 , a e r E r1t n 1 e c r o f 10 s w la d n a ment, Constitution on d ti u an _ it y st an on C t r e� u t� � f o_ ies y it il te ab in lic p ap r e th ng ni er nc co ,(s) g _ .1n n t?� r e c n r � validi � ? c s n o ty t1 a g l1 b o of d n a any s n o ti n e v n o c l a n natio _ ve or al t1 �1 ra d1 st JU der, decr ee, n1 or m.1 ad e, iv ut ec . ex y an of legislation or y w1th1n Ou_r Empire it or th au Y_ a� of t ac ?r ng �i fin , . judgment, sentence ur ?f �s tit _O !o ns 1s Co ov pr ion ut e th 1 1tl or w of 1ty 1n or nf co its of s in term n t1o of 1c e th sd r1 e JU th e r itr fo Er t ec an sp re Go g in ud cl in ct A l ra de Fe e th r w he la y ot a� or all is sh th in h u cl it_ w pre g in de th no at th pt ce ex t; en m vern g on y in n up a. ss pa om io fr est qu re n first pi Em r Ou of t ur Co l ra de a non-Fe g e tin th ec il sp cab t re pli ur ap co ity or ch su re fo be s ng di ee oc pr raised i n on of ati t, l isl ra Ac leg de , Fe e th orders th wi ty roi or nf co of ms ter in ity valid ly ive lus s, exc act or non-Feder al gs din fin , ces ten sen s, ent gm jud decrees, i n character, subject to the rights as reserved to Our Federal Courts by any provision of tl1e present Proclamation. A fin al deterr11ination by a Federal court tl1at any legislation or administrative, executive, or judicial order ... is invalid in terms of conforroity with Our Constitution or the Federal Act, sl1all have as consequence that such legislation, order, decree, judg ment . . . sl1all be held tl1roughout Our Empire as null and void and unen· forceable and inapplicable by any officials or courts in Our Empire ...... ; or nt me Govern pian Ethio rial en Impe r ing the betwe matte a involv (I) 1( t) any part thereof, including any ministry, department, service, office, agency ... , or, in any matter concerning an act of feasance, non· feasance ... ; (II) involving a matter between two Governments within the framework of t�e Federation or any parts t.hereof, including any ministry ..., or, in any matter concerning an act of feasance, non-feasance... Steps Towards the Ending of Federation

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rnal te · . . 22 Mar 1955 Statement by tlie. E niperor, s m· o are n ''there Representative in Eritrea that tIVC nta 0r external affairs as far rese Rep as the office of His MaJ·esty's . . Imp eria l · rn nce co 1s concerned <and th ere will be none affairs of Entrea in The the future. ' Ethiop1a · as a whole and the Emperor.,, , . ·cat .,Qrtie:s 1956 Second elections to th E . .-e ritrean Assembly, in which there were no politI and u..� Dec 1958 The Eritrean Assem . . blY voted unanunously to abolish the Er1trean flag, only the Eth·1op1an · flag. code Sep 1959 The Eritre an . l o p a Assembl't voted 1:1Da�imously to accept the Ethiopia n e in place of existing E ri tr ean legislation. . May 1960 The Eritrean t!°0 _ . trea0 G·aIo"1,1° ,·.t.ri . AssemblY v�t�d un�1m ously to change the name ment'' to ''Eritr n Ad 0 e t of h nistrat1on' .1ii Irnr.prit¢! ' rru , to adopt the insignia for administrat·1,:a p u o es and to change th e Eritrean seal to rea Administration uender il � , aile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia''. .o0. . . u 14 Nov 1962 The S ef d : � Eritrean Assembl f . . . e e � th · Y voted unanunously for the abolition of 15 Nov 1962 Eurlin g of the Federation · , by Imperial Order.

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t?e Federa� _Statu_s of Eritrea a�d the Application to of on ninati Terr e th 111 fr? of the System of Unitary Adm1n1strat1on of the Empire of Ethiopia Order a :�� of 1962, Negarit Gazeta 22nd Year No.3. . ..

WHEREAS, the Eritrean Assembly, b� resolt1tion unanimously adopted express h�s e� the will of 1?�2, the p_ e er, ople of Eritrea that the ovemb N 14th 00 ter�nated and ?e. admm1strat1on tl1at �r1trea be wl1olly integrated of m syste l era fed of adm.In1strat1on of the E111p1re of Ethiopia; system unitary the into

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NOW, THEREFORE, in recogJ.?-ition of the desires of the people of Eritrea, economic and of social pace deyelop1nent the of the Empire of that nced . convi Ethiopia has been adve:sely_ affected by the appl1ca�1on of tl1e federal system of 1 accot into ing tl1e t n . ta resolt1t1on and unanimously adopted by k ation, dministr a the Parliament of the Empire of Ethiopia on 15th November, 1962 giving full sup port to the resolution if the Eritrean Assembly, We hereby order as follows: ...

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2. The federal status of Eritrea with Etl1iopia is hereby terminated, and Eritrea, which continues to constitute an integral part of the Empire of Ethiopia, is hereby ,vholly iniegrated into the unitary system of administration of Our Empire.... 5. All rights, powers, duties and obligations of tl1e former Administration of Eritrea become, by virtue of this Order, the rights, powers, duties and obligations of the Imperial Ethiopian Government. 6. All enactments, laws and regulations or parts thereof which are presently in force within Eritrea or which are denominated to be of federal application, to the extent that the application thereof is necessary to the continued operation of existing administration shall, until such time- as the same shall be expressly replaced and repealed by ·subsequently enacted legislation, remain in full force and effect, and existing administration shall continue to implement and adminis ter the same under the authority of the Imperial Ethiopian Government.

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Read the Constitution of 1955 with reference to the existence, at that time, of the Federation.

Questions

I) Does the Constitution refer explicitly to an y aspect of the Federation? If not, why not? l) Do�s t�e Constitution specifically apply to Eritrea, as well as to the rest of Eth1op1a? 3) In w?�t ways may some of the federal Jaw of the Federation have influenced Prov1s1ons of the Constitution, (a) W�th regard to civil rights? (b) W�th regard to judicial review? ( � W�th regard to the setting up of an elected Chamber of Deputies? ( ) With regard to other matters?

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386

IONAL LAW T U IT T S N O C N IA P IO H T E SOURCEBOOK OF

. . n d es the Constitution make for the powers of the Fed era ! 4) What provisio ent nm ver ean Go r it Er ' the 1s v -a 1s v t n e m n r e v o (Ethiopian) G ? s r e w o p l ia c n a n fi o t d r a g e (a) w.ith r ?. s e rc u so l re ra tu a n f o l o tr il o c le tl t o d r a g e r h (b) wit ? s er tt a m er th . o (c) with regard to . ex legal proble ms, and some pl m co y an m es ais r . n tio ra de Fe e th The disso1ut·ion .of r eflected in th e questions below e ar s ue iss al ion ut t ti· ns of the more b as1c c0· at e is th , wh 62 al status, 19 of leg 27 o. N r de Or of n tio ga ul om pr e th S) With (a) of the Federal Courts? (b) of the Federal Act? ? 53 19 of n t1o na la1 ·o� �1 ts gl1 Ri ic bl Pu e th of (c) (d) of the Eritrean Const1tut10.n? ., (e) of legislation previo11sly p1�o�ulgated by_ the Enrrean Governmen�?. (f) ot� legislation st1ch as the C1v1l Cod e preVIously promulgated by Ethiop1a1

SECTION 3 :J

DRAFflNG AtJD PRO!vlULGATION OF THE REVISED CONSTITUTION

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Th.e Revised Constitution in Historical Perspective ,,

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From Haile Selassie I, Speecl1 of 14 April 1961, in Etl1 iopia Observer, Vol.V No.2, 1961. It is axiomatic that development in any country must proceed simultaneously ess in all areas of its life. As a country advances economically, equivalent P!o� 5uut· 1� al politic must be made in the creation of more highly developed social and tions as well. Any attempt to retard advancement in any single area will ine VImbly aU ov�r the in ns retard the development of the wl1ole, and will create serious distortio o� acti Our in fa bric of tl1e nation. This principle We have always recognised. and in n catio edu We have been guided by it. The empl1asis which We have given to to d an Our country has stemmed fro1n Our determination to eliminate ignorance d rn prepare Our people for the changes wl1icl1 Etl1iopia's emergence into the mo e world would bring upon them. . .. It . is also_ axiomatic that cl1ange begets change, that each step for w ard 1� l�g1cally and inexorabl� to the next, and the next, O n ce unleashed, the fo�h histo-:Y cannot be containe�, or restrain lll s sa who y ' , ed , an d d h in e n d ai is ee ve far will I go and no fartl1er This ed . W fo l.lo principle, too, W e h av e recognised and . E hiopia,_ for long centuries, re n t fa s n ta m ained isolated in h er moun i � � r m t t; outs ide 01 rld. Emerging from 0010 the . � ·� W? the this of isol atio heig n ht at the in :Pen ence and in overcoming lll fro n th o e ns di iti fficulties posed by the tra ancient to the modern have been multiplied maw·rioId. ... How, then, has Ethiopia travell ed the long path ... ? In 1930, recognizing that th sed isa . en11 e progra mme of development which We �1 for Ethiopia required ra d. to ces an 1 d �� ou ar r tu re · of fro m . t?e political system We gave to Our peop�e E: fil13 · will, opia s first Constitution, of Our own free ·- . ·

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. t the strenuous objection of many who were close to Us and who did not oppo sing this step. For ill: the first time, Ethiopia's governblood shed to :te :� tall1zed and defined form. As has been stated by Us crys a d uire when . . . . . t acq 111en ?nst! tut1o t ha t '' the E th1op1an :peop Ie must share tI1e n, C -�rst t�e burden e We gav 10 �h� past was bor�e by the.1r mo11arcl1s," by this act We which y s1b1l1t on . of resp respo and nsibi autho lity rity amon g Our people ' tl1at ·tI1 ey migllt rse dispe to t Ugh . so · h O�rseIf, 1n . securing t11e advance1nent a11d the unity of wit e: togeth it, e cis exer . Nation. In t111s manner We s_ougl1t to lay_ tl1e gro11 11 d work for tile . the Ethiopian of growt those po_l1t1cal and soc1�l institutions whicI1 h natur al and rly are orde essential to the development of a dynamic yet stable society. . .. · Our plans were abruptly l1alted by the invasion of 1935, b11t, following Ethio pia's liber�tion, We resumed Our �ork and carried it y_ e t ft1rtl1er. In 1943, We caused to be published Order No. 1, wl11ch defined tl1e duties and responsibilities of the Ministers of Our Government and vested tl1em witl1 all powers requisite to disc11 arg ing them. At tl1is same time, We promulgated a law whicl1 provided for tl1e creation of an organized system of courts wl1ere Our st1bjects might go to seek redress for wrongs done to them and enforce the rights wl1icl1 tl1e la.\vs and tl1e Constitution guaranteed to them. These steps, again, We took voluntarily - not in response to any demand or pressure. . .. As our Empire grew and flourished, it became appare11t that tl1 e Constitution of 1930 no longer responded adequately to the needs of 01ir people. 1-\ccordingly, in 1955, again in the face of objections a11d oppositio11, \Ve pron1111gateci tl1e Revised Constitution with wltich you are all familiar. In it, provision v1as .n1.ad.e tor Our people to enjoy direc·t representation and partici_patio11 in tl1e business c,f goverrt ment. The division of power among Us, Our Ministers acting collectively and indi'�1i� dually, and Our Parliament, was solidified and acquired permanent institutional form.

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Drafting of the Constitution

From: Clapham, unpublished D.Phil. thesis, op.cit. Inadequacies in the 1931 Constitution became apparent with the changing P�litical climate of the early nineteen-fifties, and especia�ly with the_ F�deration with Eritrea in 1952. I t contrasted unfavourably with the liberal Const1tut1on best ow�� on Eritrea by the United Nations, and there wer e _ also doubts abou_t its ai;:,pli cability to Eritrea, and hopes that a new constitution might be used to bring Eritrea more clos ely under the control of the central government in Addis Ababa. Supporters 0f r�for m further urged that Ethiopia was being cri�icised for the illiberality of �he ei_xsting Constitution both abroad and by the growing number of educat�d Eth10P1ans, and that it would be wisest to anticipate demand for cl1ange before 1t became inst the Co �iou of n_ isio rev s e Th re. tha ssu pre t o t the in ing nt giv � governme wa s :tion thus followed closely fro m the political developmen.t of the time. This Revised Constit ution was a Io�g time in p!eparation: the Empero� �as sai th t the on 1s1 e rev th at th 52 !9 ly Ju 1n ted no s wa rt c pro x ess took si years, and wd a Unde� way. The lengthy procedure i tself marks a considerable development ft� the o inf rmal drafting of 1931. Tl1 e first fo rm�I step appears to �ave b�e1;1 the sett�tng up of a committee of ministers under the chairmanship of the Prime M1n1ster,

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ITUTIONA L LAW ST ON C N lA OP -II TI E SoUR CEBOOK OF

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d te es gg e te su it a m om C m . . u n· s l1i T be r of ch n . ew 1 c1 a lk a d n E en 8. 1twadad_ �ako�� stitt.1tion , i 11cludi 1 1g provisions on tl1 e status of the famil, a ges n. on. � to tl1e e_xi_sting nd , bl a m se h as ec � pe y s of ; on om ed the habiJi1 fre d an . t1on , leg 1sla of , retreoct1,.. 1ty . . r 1 t pa a 1· en on 1t1 1am dd' a ry a on re s· nt va ' er s pre s e il civ n . 1 } nd a . ers aho t m1n 1s n o law at em b s m er f h' o 1 a 1p w ne e re ev ry three . . and on a Sei1ate witl1 part1a1 Years. of 1arge a· .t1· es , a se for th e wo rk of tl1e Constit b a s a ed rv �e 11 r tu utio nal suggestions in e Tl1ei . . wor·Ked 1· n a 11011se 1n th e P al ace grounds, beneath the close supervi'.s1o n . . Comll11S9.0n w as do ne bf three Amer ican rk v.:o led tai de its le gal of of the :Emperor. Most , y 1rs e _ el tl1 rg ey la th s w a rk _ o w 1 1p l ed n� a ftm a beneath dr e 1 tl . 1 gl ou tl1 al . t bu advisors, .. 1o 1ss m n started intensive om C e Th . l s a ci offi n ia op l1i Et wort tlle close supervision of t as d ated 2 F�br uary ,954; af � dr ed �t pl m co st fir its d an , 53 19 in the Slmmer of by t�e ric ha l ria Am pe to Im in ted a l ns Chroniclei tra s \Va d a n , sl1 gli En j 11 n it was writte a ps e be!we� n �his dr aft a� d the final el to r� �e ths on 1 n e_ n o tyen Tw Dep artrr.ent. tes the leisurely pace ich 1ca wh 1nd t fac a n, 1t1o t1tL ns �o ed vis Re tl1e of 1 1 tio ilgi mt pro nt me t ern the tl1a gov o was under no als d an t, ou ried car s wa n isio rev 1 e : at wl1icl tl r ,c urgent )ressure 1 or re1 orm. Thedr8.ft was tl1en s11b1nitted for revision and review to tl1e Emperor, the leaders : of the Ch11rcl1 and tl1e nobility, and import a nt officials ; five amended versions v/ere pr)ducecl bet\veen 1::-ebruary 1954 and June 1955, adapting the original to · tl1eir st1�gestions. f.\.s in 1931, t.l1e agreement of the major figures of the countrf · was nee,led to sec11re general acceptance of tl1e new Constitution, and in particular, co11servrlive nobles �t11d cr1urchme11 had t o be persu aded to accept its more liber� aspects. ·r 11is process v1as carried 011t more institutionally than in 1931, througo tl1e Cro�11 Council, 'Nl1ose l<ey figure \Vas tl1e E mperor's cousi11 Ras Kasa. He was one of 1l1e great lords \Vho l1 ad considered t l1e Constitution of 1931, and so greai was the respect in v1l1ich l1e \V as l1eld by tl1e CI1urch a nd tl1e older noble men that this suwort vvas essential for a gener a l co11sensus.... Thougl1 tl1e final text of tl1e Constitt1tion broadly agreed \Vitl1 the Commission's first dr,ft, tl1ere a re eno11gl1 import ant cl1a 1 1oes t o sl1ow tl1at tl1is reviev, stage Wai mor� tlan � formality. Several of tl1ese cha�ges prevented the Em peror from �y p assing_Parlian1e11t .or the ConstitL1tio11 itself. Tl1e a.rticles 011 regency and successio� to _!he �1rone, prev1�usly detacl1ed as an orga11ic law, were brougl1t into the Cons!�; tut�on (nd tl1us subJected to tl1e ordinary processes of amendment; the £11:per�r -: residtia; _and �n:erge11cy J)O\vers were n1ade st1bject to tl1e rest of the Co nsiltur�o�; ro difi a prov1;ioi1 gi�Itlg tl1e Em1)eror complete cont mo ro fo of l re n affairs wa s ig t� e to �eq t�re parl1a 1 ne11t:1ry a1)pro\'al of certain del e . wer ty Jes of tre a nd articles aty 1 ' , lla ar w l11cl1 ,1lowed tl1e p · E rn pero1. t0 1 egis O f · �iate . by decree wl1e11 the two chamber s ate II e� t d.sagreed on an itlll)Ortant Inatter wl1icl1 allow d Pa rlia me . nt to deleg ounaCJ:l , r e ' eg1slat.ve power to tl1e En1p. e1·o1. 11. 1 . . c e 1 11ergenc1es, a11d wl11ch allowed tl1e ut� · o b of M in ·t st er . s to r a.ise 1oans of tip to fifteen percen et· WJ dg ' . bu s r a · t of the ye ,�c par11arre. ntary approval Other 1 o p s ' o r e _c iat · lge s, E1 �o w_e�er, i n creased the 3:1 p � atifict4' . of appointment to tlle' 1eg1.slatt11 u l tori e a and tl1e f terr i Jt1d1c1ary·' a suggested h t 1 · tion fo·· tl1 e S enat e was remov o s 1 · a t o e q · 1·1ned. n ' speC!a . · c1p fust drtft, by a standiilg J·ud. . d·, and _J· udges were to be d1s a t o 1c1 a ect 1 j co m m su itt b ee , or . bu V I� t Em by pe th r e e law' o1e of several occas1011 d a . s a s o sed n w Oi , ll ic h u an was · imp o 1 ement1ng aw 1 n to posbone decision� 0 c. a . 5 e 11 controv_ers1 a: matters. T he r cha1 g se th e fo r on ea s s be andysed witl1ou; o � s of[� , i de 10 a u led [ll :e gro i p r al nfo t n tio c ma liti po ed on the [ t ime, bough it is cle: � co at t le y nall Emp� r or i_nust perso l1ave been amend nents wl1ich dea lt s o much witl1 his ow p n owers. 1

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CoNSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF ETHIOPIA

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. The Constitution wa s also approved by Parliament before its p om 1g tio • ment of that time wa s m os t un lik ely i.we pa rlia to ha ve done m ore rt · h anu gi�ve it_ns, t ut b • ct Wi· th '!'h ic o a proJe t · h . ng th . e Emperor was so closely co i ss ble al n fon ncerned. Promulgation of the Constitution

Sp eec I, h Sel fro ass m ie the Throne, 4 November 1955 ' as publ"Is e Ha il m Fro h e d in . o be 5 N ld, m ra ve He r (1955). the Ethiopian The gro�h in size and responsibilities_ of _ tl1e Gover11me 11t has necessitated the stren gthening of the processes o.f central1sat 100. Al l regions of tJ1 e Empire a now closely knit t�gether under a sing!� llnifie� dir ect�o11 capable of guiding tile: all along parallel lines of progress and 1ntegrat1ng all 111to a comm011 national endeavour. In addit_ion, all vestiges of fe udali�tic and o!l1er class ?r personal privileges have been wiped out, so that all O t 1 r belov ed subJects may live togetl1e1 as equals and brothers in the same family.

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International Horizons Expanded

On the other hand, under our reign, Etl1iopia's interna.tional horizons have been enormously e xpanded. Twenty-five y ears ago Ethiopia was still a little known corner of the dark contin ent of Africa. Through h er courageous resistance against aggression and through Our appeal to the world founded on respect for international morality and collective security, Ethiopia l1as achiev ed imperishable fame. The world has come to recognize the moral stature and greatness of the Ethiopian people. In consequence, We have b�en able to rectify certain of ihe cryi11g injl1stices perpet rated against Our beloved country during the iniqt1itous period of imperialism against which Ethiopia, unde r Our leadership, l1ad to fight alone. No longer is Ethio pia a land-locked country. Two ports on tl1 e Re d S ea ar e being developed to handle the rapidly expanding foreign trade of Ethiopia to whicl1 We have just referred. With the rectification of sixty y e ars of injustice, and with the return of Our devoted Eri�rean Subjects, Ethiopia has known, once again, that 11ational unity and coherence which she has enjoyed since before the time of Christ. �owever, her e again, the increase in population, territory and �ati�nal res ponsibili ties, has called for a broader concept of governmental organ1zat1on� For example, probl ems ent of ports, m lop e dev the r, ntie fro me riti ma a h ted wit nec con of naval forces and of a merchant marin e, did not exist ltntil r:ce11tly. T?day,.the Government must be remodelled to take t11ese developments into c�ns1derat1on. ed, as olv g inv are er ord l1 r hig nee of ing i n isio erv . skills and . administrative sup En r1 �e M� well as the establishment d .an my e ad Ac ard Gu ast Co a ademy, Ac l va Na of a a nd Fisher· ies 1op1a l1 Et 1 1cl wh s res og pr of e c pa d e ri r nis trations. In st1m, th e hu mi Ad �as �nown durin llS for our most of l al 11:1 ro f lls ca ly e g Ou r Reign no w imperativ on up d we sto be telligent efforts to s �1a !tY ugl n Al e tJ1 ich wh �s. profit by tho se favours e orts . e e th It is Our hope to in s ie tr un co ly nd ie fr have the assistance of � � . In oth er words the st 25 ye ar s have bee11 cl1aracterised by mater1al, 1nclt 1 d1ng pa coltlrner · . f ' · l ra u l t cu o ve r cu g in d n e c a 1 ep y st n.ct a . �1 �I , gr es s o pr in du st l fin , ri al an , ci an a d a p li � an� i1ational territory, and on t t ula i pop al x ded pan · el dev 1c o e o ent an pm , eVer.w·1 e t a 1 d . I' so n co st u m e c an d · i gu cteni· n g natio nal h o rizo ns. Ethiopi a, under our

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van ce ye t fL1rtl1er. To assure the ad st nu o re m d t h tl1is J?rogr�ss. e. of re can be no jt;�: lif al l1e go T le so ur O is e pl o Pe d ve gres�1ve �elfa ! ;f i-;;�� befo at th of pt ce su ex en , r1n fo g rin its be and er ev 1at wl pro , nt me n er v o . g y 11 a r 1o n o t1 fica Sll bJects. s it f o re a lf e w 1e tl g n1otin

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Revised Const1tut1on

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t f gr us o w in size and in el m its t en nm er ov G e tl1 f o ire t t Lic str Obviotlsly, Llle ?a se of al � l three_ �f the tra e h t 11 1e t! 11g re st d 1 a1 en td of br t tis m e W o s power. To do ve and ud 1 1 1 a v e, L eg1s at 1c1 1 t1t ec Ex ry. The e tl1 t, en 1 n rn ve g o of 1 es ct an br l na ditio o day reflects these pre occupati ons t ted lga 1nu o pr ,,e l1a e 'N l1 1ic wl 1 r tio itLi 11st Revised c0 and enlarges r1nd co11solidates tl1c Government. In this Revised Co11stitt1tio11, \Ve l1ave not 011 y1 sougl1t to pr ovide the essential conditions for effective w orl( by 1ni11isters and Gov ernme11t officials, but We have, at tl1e san1 e time, provided tl1at Our 1ninisters sl1all b e responsible to Us and to the State for tl1e proper fL1lf1l1ne11t of t!1eir _ l1igl1ly respo 1 1sible functi ons. Close coll,1bort1tion betwee11 tl1e exect1tive and legislati, 1e branches of all modern go, er11 ments l1as bcco111e cLil ineluctable r1 ecessity as regards tl1e legislative _process. In order to work i11telligently i11 the dr,:1fti11g of laws, Parliament must be acquainted with proble1ns as viewed by tl1e Executive. Cor1sequently, We l1ave provided that n1inisters, 011 tl1eir ovv11 i11itiative or at tl1e request 0f Parlian1ent, may appear before it to explai11 tl1cse n1atters. It is 0Lir l1ope tl1at this pr ocedure ,vill serve as a precious tool for tl1e _coordir1ation of tJ1e exect1tive and legislative processes, and that, with tl1e explanations \1/J1icl1 Ot1r 1ninisters n1ay, fron1 time to time furnisl1 to Parliament, tl1is Ia_tter body will_ be able, 111 ore i11telligently and in a ftille; knowledge of the facts and c1rc11msta11 ces 111v ol,1ed, to devise legislation m ore resp onsive to the exigencies of the presen� l1ot1r ancl t o tl1e needs of tl1 e ft1ture. We l1av� menti_oned tl1e rapid expa11sio11 o f legislation in social and economi c . lds New 1ndustr 1es, tJ1 e accum fie t1lation of wealtl1 tl1 e acquisition of a maritime _. frontier aod �f p orts: tl1e �xiste11ce of 11ew fields of y, fina ll an d, ur , o s0 en cia de l a, pr_oblems of inter i1at1011al import i11clt1di11g ational coin· tre int at ern ies a1 ot . 1d l1e r m1tments, l1ave al l served to b roadei1· th e . call o t · and re 1 ·1es of par11ament fIo · i:n t 1 1e n�e�nbers tl1ereof f or greater s oci -sp o ns1b·'1 i·t r· int e ed , :11 in , de ec o1 d 1o niic . ' national a11 ' nat Ional vis1011. o 1d to t 1ese J)roblen1s, We l1av tl1 e en st i g to e so ug ht ,i 11 tw o ways r n� tl1 e egi;f:ii�� B_. a ci1 f t�e e e G· o ver ro 111n e fi 1 1t, im p rst na , by organizatio l vm and seco11dly by c: � roa� eiltng of tlie Parliamentary . ft1nctions. •.

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We have provided for a . . r· pa f SU bstant i al in O crease i 1 1 siz e of both House s liament. What is ho eve er b h of Deputies, we' l ia,:e r �vJ?�rhaps even more important, is that, for the C a�out t h e Empire upon the. ba�i � ed. for direct electio1 1s, by secret ballot, throug _pro · o uni ersal suffrage. M o1·eover, in order that these ared visions for electio : � ns sllou d be PI omptly_ · rep . p e tra11slated into reality, We l1av for co11sideratio11 and a pproval by Parl1a1nent a . Jaw al na ele . tio ct or 11a . l Th· e Const1tutton contai . . ElllPi.Jt n s p� ov th is_ i on s of e to tl1e en d that all parts shall receive th eir due re s· i d j Presentation 1n Parliament, a1 1d tl1a t there shall be nO � '

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CoNSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF ETHIOPIA

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amo ngst raci oeve al or religious groups. Furthertnore as We r wha ts tion ·na . ind� to cat� shor in tly de�ail, W.� have provided that th�re shall sio� �a 0 ve . fha : Et!11op1 amo_ n an g subJects :¥1th m1nat1? respect 1:1 _t? the enjoyment of n disc 0 be 0 It _is c1t1zens Our h1p. steadfa st �m that all c1t1zens of the Empire or s right l civi all ers 1n e oth ge on br lar y. as llll fal er eth tog e liv l shal mem ber every of Parliament shall feel himself free to carry out that order In �ati on, the_ ''with to out fe r or �ilitie s favo� r," W� _I1ave provided in ponsi res � bis greater detail for the �ra�t1onal system of Pa�l1a�entary 1mn1un1t1es as consecrated by the origin al Const1tut1on and by tl1e pra�t1ce 1n otJ1er countries of the world. Finally, by detailed provisions, We l1ave establisl1ed means for resolving differences of opinion between t11e two I-louses of Parliament. In tl1is matter, We have followed time-honoured precedent3 from the Parljamentary systems of other countries using bicameral legislatures. It is essential that tl1e two Houses work to gether in ha.rmony for the nationa l interest. They should not constitu1 e warring or antagonistic elements. Those elected by tl1e peo1)le must also benefit r y the sage advice of those to whom long years of experience in government administration and positions of responsibility have given wisdom and i1 1sight. Such. are, then, the concepts which We have adopted in respect of the reorganiza tion of Parliament. There is, however, as We have just mentioned, yet anotl1er as_pect of this problem of strengthening the bases and enhancing tl1e importance of Parlin;-� ment. By that We refer to the role which Parliament itself, as so reorganized, .,,Nil! be called upon to play in the legislative process. We have envisaged and, in conse quence, provided for, a broadened role of parliament in respect of the law�malcing functions. We have ca.rried on the well-established precedent that no law may go into effect without the approval of both Houses of Parliament. In addition, We have maintained the principle that every decree promulgated, for reasons of great emer gency, in the absence of Parliament, must, in every case be promptly submitted to Parliament for its consideration.

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We ha,,e broadened the fields of legislative activity. For example, by �et�ed provisions in the Revised have provided for further leg1slat1ve We Constitution responsibilities in respect of finances. Furthermore, We have p�qvided that every o rr posal of law involving an increase in governmental expenditure or a new or ncreas ed tax, shall first come before the Chamber of Deputies. . W e have mentione d the international responsibilities of Parliame�t in the at, th � 1de t i ov sla pr is it , ve ion ut tit ns Co oc ed pr ess. For example, in th e Revis � . ore ente ing t en �m rl1 Pa of s use Ho th bo of l va pro ap o e nc int va ad ce for the r �h all be req a g yin la t� en _ m ee gr l D;a tio na te� i1;1 d an ed uir in respC::t of al l treaties � , �r ce en ist ex I� n 1o at sl g1 le on g 1n r 1fy od m p rU dJ�n Ethio ian subjects personally, or iod a m or , ie� o� �p �n m or e s �n lo p g in lv vo t in di en or s, es ur nd e fu of at St x g � fieq cation of the y an er ov n 1o ct d1 r1s Ju or y nt ig re ve so of it or rr te re pi y Em e or th of ' . · ·Part of· SUch territory, and in respect of all treat.1es of peace.

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Human Rights ed -?rovisions 00 Hum in ta n o � y d a e lr a n o ti u it st n o C l a in g ri o 1e tl 1 g Alth l�e R ev1sed Constitution t in r e t ap h C is th c r ties, o:� e ib L al nt e m da n �u Ri_gl1ts a;� es of the world for tlle ri un co d e t nc va ad .. t os . m · e i ro tI1 i i P d e pt do a s n ta1ns provisio . ts h ig R n a m u H f o n o ti c te ced en t, eit h er in Ethiopian t�ad iti o ns, e pr a s l1a r e pt h� C Each provision i n tl1 is . ss an le � th . N 29 articles have ad ro ab t n e d e c e pr l na ·n \Veil-established constitutio e pr ot ec tio n of th e essentia l liberties l1 t r_ fo e id ov pr to on �:;n inserted in tl 1e Constit11ti n o �ne _sh� ll �e denied the '' at th ed id ov pr e v 11a e W s, hu T . le and rights of tI1e peop cr!m1nat1on amon gst �s d _ no be l al sl1 e r h: ''t at th ''; ws la equal protection of tl1e ent of al l 91v1l rights''; that "there ym Jo en e th to t ec sp re tl1 wi Etlliopian subjects e la w of th e rites of tl1 th w1 ce an rd co ac n i ise rc e ex e th 1 l t \Vi e c sl1 all be no interferen re edo� of spee ch and of ''f at th ; ' '_ ire 1p En e th of s 11t ide res by ed cre any religion or ce an with the law''; that rd co ac 1n e r , 1p1 En e th t ou 1 gl ou tl1r ed nte ara gu is ess pr the exc ept i n tim e of declared national ip, rsh e c nso 110 e to ct j sub be 1 all sl r1ce e nd spo ·•corre e1nergency''. \Ve l1 ave, further, co11f1rmed our practice tha t every person accused of a crime shall b e presl1med innocent unt il proved guilty, and that no one shall be in1prisoned for debt, except in case of lega l ly proved fraud. ·unlike many cot1ntries of the world, We l1 ave provided the right to any resident of the Ernpire to bring suit against the Go,,ernment or any min ist r y, department, age11c.y or instrumentality thereof for wrongful acts resulting i11 substantial damage. Lil(ewise, everyone in tl1e Empire sl1all l1 ave tl1e rigl1t to present petitions to Us. So imp?rta1:t have w_e considered tl1ese guaranties of Human Rights and Fun· damental L1bert1es t�at, 1n _the Revised Constitution, We have stipulated that not only tl1e courts. but, 111 part1ct1lar, Ot1rselves, sl1all, at all tin1es, assure and protect the�e Human R1gl1 ts. They constitt1te principles \Vl1ich no bran cl1 of the Government, be it the Exect1tive, Legislative or Jt1diciary, can transgress, and which, in con· sequence, must ?e placed t111der the partict1lar protection o.f tl1e Sovereign Himself. We Ourselves will always be rea?y to act positively to insure respect for these ri�hts by all bra�cl1 es and every official of tl1e Government Thus tl1e lowlie st subjec t ays f tlle Empire, tl1e poorest as :vell as tl1e ricl1est, eve11 al� has , pris on tl1e �onvict in �t le assur ance tllat hts ig r his tl�e S�vereign is at all times vi 0 of oilan t i n t l1 e protection and f u11damental l1bert1es. Judiciary

ons Similar consideratio11s have b een . . isi . . v r th e p o b up or11e 1n draw mind ing 1n concerning tI1e tllird b ra· ilc1 1 0f tl1e Gover11ment, tl1e Judiciary. Tl1u s th e welfare of Ou r be1 . erati which . ov ed �eople 1s tl1e supreme consid ,.on ·ved · . has dictated the del b atio · °:s out of ,vh1cl1 the Revised Constitution wa s concetand r and elaborated. w : 1� ve given 10?g a n ? searcl1ing t l 1ought to this pr? ble I11� ort f the fruit of Our refl ec;.10 t lld del ib eration dur ing tl1e pas t six yea rs 15 be:ntbS no superficial acll ieve en� � � t rep res · ents solid a11d patient studies for roanY ft was, . by Ourselves witll t: a nce of spe�ialists and n1any comm i_ ssipns. � al Jll [ thereafter, s�bmitted to ;�;� r u 0 lam vin ent g for its approval before recei sed vi autl1o�isa!ion. Thus it is e R is tllat th , toda e y, lgat We have prom u been able to Co11st1tut1on. ...

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SECTION 4: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF 'fHE CONSTITUTION Below is a most summary synopsis of the Constitution, or2anized along tradjtional lines of analysis - alloca !ion .or power ?et��n reople and go vei:nment, allocations of and limitations on . , , ''executive'', ''legislative_ �nd JUd�c1al , powers. Read 1t and: 1) see if you can annotate it by citing appropriate. const1tut1o�al article � to st1pport each statement; 2) see if you can intelligently qualifY or amplify some of its assertions.

The Str1,cture of the Constitution: A Conceptual Outline

The Reyised C�nstitutio1;1 o_f 1 �55, like an� other constitt1tio11, is basically concerned with defin1ng and d1str1b11t1ng powers, r1gl1ts and duties within the Ethio pian Empire. a11d n_otably betw.een five ma�or . e_lements in its government: the Emp e ror, the executive the parliament, the Judiciary, and tl1e people. Of these, only the Emperor and the people are, under tl1e Constitution, ''self-sufficient'' sources of political power. The establishment of tl1e other elements and institutions of the state is ultimately dependant upon one or other, or both, of them. As ''Sovereign'' and ''Head of State," the Emperor receives a pre-eminent place in the Constitution. He stands apart from other agencies of government esta blished by the Constitution, though he is connected with all of them. He has powers. and functions whJch are ''executive'', ''legislative'', and ''judicial'' in nature. The Emperor is most closely connected with the executive branch, and essentiaJ executive powers are vested directly in him. Among these are the pov-,er to appoint and dismiss not only ministers , but all ''officials'' - and thus to constitute the civjl service, (a task which in fact has been delegated to a civil service agency); the power to determine the organisation and jurisdiction of government departments, to esta blish and command the armed forces and appoint the officer corps. He has wide discretion concerning foreign policy-to conduct relations witl1 other nations, negotiate . treaties (which must usually be submitted to Parliament), and appoint ambassadors There is therefore no clear , stated distinction between the Emperor and tl1e executive branch of government·' but there are nevertheless aspects of the Constitution which . . indica_te that they are not merged - tl1at the Emperor stands apart from �n execu�1ve establishment, though its critical powers must, in a legal �ense, �e _exercised �y _ him. There are clear references in the Constitution to the Prime M1n1ster, to m1n1sters and to a Council of Ministers· the ministers collectively and individually are sup pos ed to provide an executive �tructure subordinate to, and to some exte11t distinct f�o m, the Emperor; they enjoy certain limited constitutional ·powers in their own ri�ht as well as many powers now delegated by the Emperor and by laws. enacted , Wtth �arliamentary approval. They, not the Emperor, mu�t respo°:d to Parl1a.ment s. . questions conc erning the conduct of government or the_ 1mpl1cat1ons of leg1slat1ve Proposals; they stand between the Emperor and Parliament. The legislative branch is bi-cameral: Senators are directly appointed, for 6Year terms, by the al�y equ from ted elec ctly dire are ies put De ile wh or, per Em Populated consti cies for 4-year terms. Tl1e Emperor could, �reSum�bly, in tuen ue� �0 ce elections� not only by virtue of his pres�ige, but by th� exercise of his power d_issolve Parliament d t rs. Bu ato sen w ne in� po ap d an s on cti ele w ne for l an cal p l a nt of om ed fre of hts r1� l na tio itu �st co en m nt de joys, institutionally, indepen t ,� d:� ate immunities from arrest and control over its membership aorl procedures.

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s to o er ti w es o p qu s n 11 t o 1n o he n . to au · Pr 1 t ii b . ed it m 1j1nplicit powers to del iber me Parl1ame11t tlso en� o_ys . I and, tl1ro11gl1 tl1ese and its ate . , s 1e r t s 1 1 11 M e h t n c d co 11c ue fl 1n uct of l y b M inister and a e um es pr cu xe . ay tiv 111 ' . it e ' t . ge id bt . 1 e tl . e v o r pp c d m1n1ster ior crimes arising o r i policy an t1ons u prosec itiate 1 i1 also � may e11t P�rliam s , e p removal on othe r functio11 1n o to c r e w o JJ a g /e 0 11 s a h it t 11 b s, ie it v ti c a l a ci fi o i� from tl1e gro unds. ce n a _ e in rt o th p w le im la b a er d i sj 11 ak co -m t 1 g e1 1n ia rl a P n J1 it w s re 1a s1 r o er Tile Em:> 1 ament for approval if rl � P o to g st u 1n ed at ti o eg n process. Treities wI1icl1 11e J1as en l rd u ca _ on Et hiopia. b is F a te a e cr r o w la al 1 1 cr 1t i1 of ct e f tlley are to 1 ave tl1e ef t en m ia rl by Pa ed o� m�st receive pr aI? ts en 1n nd ne a1 l na io 11t tit ns co Proclamatio is ai1d s, ce d with certain an an st um rc ci n ai rt ce r e _ �d U e. 11t ol s ab is . his approva; his veto s te ee cr g� de ul om h n pr hic ca w can J1e , ng tt1 s1 t no is t 1en an rli Pa en 1 -.vl s, 1 1 io pt exce ns pas sed by Parlia io at m la oc pr as e op sc e 1n sa e 1 tl d an w la of e I1 ave th e sane forc annulled - or, be er lat ay m d an t en am rli Pa o t 11t se be t t1s 1n ment; bt1t tJ-ese d.ecrees er to do so. t eth ac tog t en am rli Pa of rs 1be an cl1 tl1 bo if d de e11 a1n , 1)resun1ably nt, me on certain rlia to e Pa 11c ere ref t1t ho wit ly, ect dir te isla leg o als y n1a The En11)cra· subjects; tl1ts, tl1 e organisatio11 and jurisdiction of g o vernment agencies and officials al sense, tl1e Emperor alon e ct leg stri a n i ere, spl1 tl1is in er; ord l eria imp )Y ed slat legi is can make ti� law. And, agai11 by i111peria] o rder, l1e n1ay, in time and places of mili tary emergcrcy tl1reate11 ing tl1e secL1rity of tl1e natio11, declare martial la,v and exe rcise en1erge11cy aw-making powers. Tl1e exact bou11daries between tl1ese three main forn1s of le1islatio11 - procla1nations, decrees and o rders - 11eed t o be examined v1itl1 car�. tut, pr_est1r�a·b1y, basic laws whicl1 in1posed, generally legal duties o n or create legal riol1ts people \V1tl1n the En1p1re and privileoes b b ' must be ca st in the . f orrr1 of prcclamat1ons or decrees a11 d n1t1st first be e11acted by Parliament, or, if s11cl1_ la\VS. ,re promt1lgated els decrees, they must be referred to Parliament for possible . d1s.1 pr oval �r. revisio 11. �l1e budget and otl1er apJ)ropriations of public � reven11e. m t_ be expl_1c1_tly aut_l1 o_r1zed by Parlian1ent, tllougl1 its legal po,vers of � bud�et rev1, 10 n ,tre � 1m1ted; s1n11larly, tax Ia,vs 1nust be l aid before Parliament. An in_deJ)_errl nt auditor a!1d t_l1e outli11es of an at1dit l a\V are establisl1ed by the � ConSritutioi, and tl1e Auditor 1s n1ade directly respo 11sible to Parliament as well as e mpercr. Tl1 .ese fiscal ;powers _are, prest�n1ably, Parli ament's principal ful�r um �} 1;verage )Ver tl1e exect1t1ve part1c11larly \\'1th res )ect to t l1e formation of nati ona l . 1 poI icy.

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. slat1· ve T l1 e ex,cutive,· in Ethio pi·.a as e1 se\vl.1ere, . of legi 1s of source course a cl1ief . proposa Is - e.g., th e var1ot1s cod"es Of �\V ve f 1 cu e ex I were under first prepared su · pervi sion ancl til e execut1·::c11:ay s.o mctii11es n�ed_ to es 0; ssur pr� bring indirec� Parlia m e11t to pass wllat it e � o be essen�1�l 1n tl1e ':a� of l�g 1slat10�, tax%: and budg�t:1ry atitl,orizatiJns. ;s �� en_ e a Parl1 from m _ 1 c w1tl1 pol1t1 l a barg a n1ng tl1e execut1\e I1as Jegal J)owers a t 1:ts �.I;; 5 i r e o e isposal: It may persuade tl1e Emper or t .x c t' I1is pow er · of par11·a·rneI. 1 . s of vet o' or to speak fr on 1 tl1e tl1rone, or to extend a sess101 1 or - 1f tl1e deadlock ren1a1n · s unreso on, ssi se lved - to convene a special, new . n t. . . solve eitlier Cllambe ·Or to dis b th ' and tl1us convene a wholly 11ew Parliarn; th In practice it would appe ar ;1 the. executi�e an d Parliament � :1le Emper�r increasingly stands apa�t frorn de� d or_ s icts a_ �otent1 confl al mediat o r of sucl1 locks_ rathe· t han a more dir oJl ti u it ect p�rt1c1pant; and in the Const t o f certainly ptrmits this role o ,, sense a legal c du f on arb itra to c r'' rather tha n ''party'' in the ·executive-l�islative relati ons.

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oin ted by the Em eror, subiect to a speci'al l a p The judiciary is. app · w on JU · d' 1c1 J . · a1 · al an d prom otion (wh1cl1 has y et to 1sm1s s d . e, tenur n, a ctio ppe a r) Tl1e courts . sele . . · go h o ve.rnment, 1_ n tl1eory d1s�1nct from tlie executive (t f . b �anc e_ eparat � a m ll ou g11 for no. w exercised by tl1 e Ministry of 1ustic ·n practICy adm1n1stra't1?n of tl1e courts 1s · e ). . ' 1s, bY tl1e Const1tut1on, explicitly ''vested'' in tl 1e S tipr. pow er I • • I c1a jud1 e ''Th eme ,, · Court a11d o ther cot1rts est abl'1sl1 e_d by law'� - tl1 at is to say, by parliaJmperial ment and the Emp�ror tl1rot1gl1 proclamat1011 ; and Jttdges are bound to sub · t ut_ hor_1ty'' but ''the l aw'' (and tl1e. term ''law'' J1ere, presumably a oth er ''no to cludes the const1tu_t1on). But The E1nperor retains certai11 residual judicial func _ 111ai11tai11 jtistice t11rougl1 tile courts'' tions - an otherwise undefined power t o " w,hich b as bee_n construed to provide autl1 or1ty to continue tl1e traditional iil stitution of the_ Imperial Chelot wl1ere the Emperor exercises a discretionary jtirisdiction to revie w and remand c�ses br?ugl1t from tl1 e regtilar courts. On tl1is theory tl1e . role ?f the Empero_r, _as JUd�e� 1s I.argely witl1i11 l1is discretion a11d I1e may sharply curtail or abandon 1t 10 tl1e f utt1re if l1e cl1 ooses. In any event tl1e Emperor as judge stands outside the cotirts establisl1 ed by l a\v, and, presu1nably, tl1 ese courts are to act independently of him i n the exercise of their jt1dicial power.

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The power of the people is entren ched n ot 011ly in tl1eir rigl1 t of election of Deputies, but also in their enjoyment of certain ft1ndame11tal rigl1ts and liberties; these rights are an integral part of tl1e Constitt1 tion and prest1mably are to be inter preted a.nd enforced by tl1e courts i n tl1e same way other provisio11s of la\v are enforced. Many of these rights, e.g. rights of political advocacy are qualified; by their own terms they may be regulat ed by other laws, e.g. the pe11al code or SJ)ecial legislation, provided always that the limitation can be jt1stified in order to sec11re respect for the rights of others and the req11irements of public order and the general welfare. This l ast qualification r aises interesting problems concerning the role of courts in interpreting the scope of constitutional rigl1ts guaranteed in tl1is fonn.

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Other provisions of the Constitution , no t directly related to tl1e distribution _ e, of powers, rights and duties, govern such matters as the succession to _ the thron the royal f amily and the national flag. An i nteresting provision deals with con�cts of intere st of government officials. And Article 130, which ves�s p_roperty r1gh_ts over ''natural resources', in th e government, is of great _ potential 11:1port ance_ 1n r�spe ct to economic development, though i n some respects 1t may require at1tl1 or1t ative interpretation i n the near future. g io od bi is It a. pi !o t? E of re pi � _ E 1e tl of '' The Constitution js th e ''supreme law on the whole area ''under the Sovereignty of the Eth10I?1an Crow 11 and on _ all people an<l org anisations within that area . As supreme law, it governs �very �fficial a_ nd _ al l oflicial activity within the Empire . an d all go ve rnment acts - incl�d1ng leg1slat10 � ta en � n rn ve g d li v a l al of any sort - inconsistent with it' ''are n u ll and void''' a1;1d � t en ist ns co an om fr ed iv er d P�w e� - valid in a leg al sense - must therefore be with its provisi ons. 5 5 9 1 f o n o ti i, it t s n o C The ''Separation of Powers'' in the

; J n o ti c e y ll ia c e p � e , 2 . · r te p a s h . ly Section 5, and Par t JI C R.e.view again . . Chapter 1, especial ow el s b n o ti es u q e th r e sw n a com p to y r 'T 1 t u t'1 on t· s on C e th e o th t te e e � th t w e ea s r ding s carefully i h 1!: _ by rc:� erring to specific articles of the constitution . .. . . ..-. �

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stitution assume and make between . . c1-10ns, if any, does the 'C.on,, ,,· d1c 1a1 fiunct·ions.? . What distin U J d n a '' e v ti la is g ''executive'', ''le d e te t ar ea en cr m n er by v o g e f th o s n o �i u on it C st 1 i1 d an s n io at is an rg What o ? . s n o ti c n u f stitution to perform these e t of th ar iv p ut s ec rm ex e fo or er a p br m E 1e tl h nc at th · id sa be it n ca s ay . ? In What w e . v t1 u c e x � f ie ,. ch s a t n e m n er v o , , of g , te . om ra fr pa e th se 1s r ec ex ro pe Em ve uti e th at tl1 id sa be it n ca ys wa In what brancl1? e s perform iv cie ut r en ec he ag ex ot d an r ro pe Em e th do y, an if In what ways, . . legislative fu11ctions? c en e iv ag es ut r ec form he ex per ot i or r ro pe Em e th do y, an if , ys In \vl1at wa j11dicial fu11ctio11s? cti e o ns? fun tiv ecu ex rm rfo pe re atu isl leg the es do y, an if ys, wa 1at In \Vl o ns? cti n l fu. icia jud rm rfo pe e tur isla leg tl1e es do , a11y if ys, 11 1 what wa In wl1a.t ways, if any, does tl1e jt1diciary perform execut ive functions? In wl1at ways, if any, does tl1e j1Jdiciary perform legislative functions?

I. 2_ 3.

What influence, if any, do the Emperor and the executive branch have over

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the recruitment, selectio·n, or removal of members of the legislature? What influence, if a11y, do the Emperor or executive brancl1 have over the recr11itment, selection, or removal of members of the judiciary? Wl1at influence, if any, does the legislature l1ave over tl1e recruitment, selection, or removal of members of the exect1tive? What influence, if any, does tl1e legislature have over tl1e recruitment, selectio n, or ren:1oval of 1:1e1nbers of tl1e jt1diciary? What influence, 1f any, does tl1e jtidiciary l1ave over tl1e recruitment, selection! or removal of men1bers of the executive? What influence, if any, does tl1e jt1diciary l1ave over tl1e recruitment, selection, or removal of members of the legislature? In ,vl1a� wa.ys, if any, may tl1e En1peror or executive brancl1 co11trol or influ ence the actions of tl1e legislature? 1 wl1a! ways, if a�y, ��y the Emperor or executive brancl1 coi1trol or influence ��e actions of tl1e Judiciary'? of ns 111 wl1at way t' . s if· an O ' y, may. tl 1e 1 eg1slatt1re · · the ac I co11trol or i11flt1ence ' tl1e exec11t1ve? of . . . s n In wl1· at w,iys ' if 'any, inay t.1 1e 1eg1slatur t· influenc e the ac IO e . control or ' the JUd1c1ary? the . . of I11 wl1at ways if any Olay tl1e JU · s on d.ic1ary control or inflt1ence the acti ' ' exectit·1ve ? the f In what w. ays if any ' may t1 1e . . . o ons . acti . the Jtidic1ary control or influence legislature? ·' 111 e n To ,vl1at extent a11d in wh a ni r Y o g t of resp ects es do ff bra nch tl1e di eren t �ranch? carry out tl1eir ft1nct·1011s .Ind ependently, witl1out reporting to another ,.. . r o . g gr oups I.n wl1at ways, if any, d . . . es win tl 1e : . Con t follo � st1tu t1on n the perm it e sources o f power or In� zn uetlce to secure representation in the go vern _ ,� a) t11e Emperor? b ) the Nobility? --�,�·• c) t11e Churcl1 ? · • •

CoNSTl"!"O'I'IONAL DBVELOPMENr OF ETHIOPIA

9 · l 0. I I. 12. 13.

397

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elite''? (Assuming the existence of cated such a group.) ''edu the d) e) the milita r y? f) the ''people''? ? y rt a p l a c ti li o p a ) g of governn1e11t represent In what ways, if any, ma y the di_fferent branches _ different sources of power o� the 1_nfluence of different groups in Ethiopian society? e.g. !n what branch 1s the _influence of a yot1nger 11niversity educated group most likely to be felt? Tl1e influence of tl1e Cl1urcl1? Of peasants? In what ways do qualifications for admission to the different branches of government v �ry?_ Are membe:s o_f any socio-econon1ic group preclLided by law from serving 10 any capacity 1n a11y bra11ch of government? What provision, if any, does the Constitution make for federal or local government? To what extent does tl1e Constitution permit the existence or development of federal or local governments with considerable autonomous rower? Taking account of your answers to all of tl1e prevjous questions� to v1J1at extent are there significant ''separations'' of ''power'' u11der the Constitution of 1955?

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Some Notes on Significant Constitutional Developments since 1955

The Constitution of 1955 has, of course, never been amended. A Commission was established in 1961 to study possible revisions, and it subn1itted a report to the Prime Minister i n May 1963. (See the Etl1iopia11 He1·a!d for 19 August 1961, 29 October 1961, 4 November 1961 and 7 May 1963). Tl1is report has not been made public. Nevertheless constitutions change and evolve even witl1out amendments to their text. For conventions, practices and otl1er laws can profoundly affect the nature of the political system, the implementation of specific constitutional provi sions and the framework within. which the constitt1tio11 n1t1st operate. Significant steps have been taken during the period 1955-1966 to create formal laws, govern mental institution and practices whicl1 will profou11dly sl1ape future co11stit11tional development. Some of these are noted below. . 1. l'Iew Ministries have been created to undertake new governmental func tions (e.g. the Ministry of National Comm.unity Development by Order N_o.15 of 1957, Negarit Gazeta, 16th Year No.5), or to take over tasks formerly committed to some other governmental agency (e.g. the Ministry of Infor�ation which took ov�r responsibilities previotisly committed to the Ministry of the· Pen and the . Ministry of Finance by Order No.33 of 1964, Negarit Gazeta, 23rd Year No.10). In 1966 t o more, ministries w�re create?: Land Re�orm t fican signi ly ntial pote � aod Planning over functions prev1ouslr committed and took EacJ1 ent. lopm Deve to agencies which had not enjoyed Ministry s!a_tus? at tl1e san1e t1n1e, ?Y tl1e ::e Order, t�e powers and duties ?f a �I the 1:11n1str1es were red�fined. This was, efo re an important sl1ould be studied caref11lly. See 1cl1 wh n tio isla leg ce of pie , 0rder No.46 of 1966, Negarit Gazeta 25th Year, No.23. 2 E r· The Prime Ministry and the Council of Ministers. In March 1966, tl1e to lllJ>e ?r delivere d an historic address to the nation and promulg�ted (pursuant les �Ic 27 and 66 of the Constitution) Order No. 44 (see Negar1t Gazet � 5th Ye · � _ to tl1e _ 'No.10). This Prime M1n1ster Order allocated new powers a11d duties

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398

s 1i tl p ter, and probl· o f l1a C 6 1 o1 ti ec S 1 ir . t ou t se is . · it . em �. nc11 of. · M1·1 11·sters ' �t11d t11 e C a.I an . d 10 . Ch . a re 1e r t I te d p e V w 1e v re I e ar . . ' s 11 o ti ca li p 1· 1 . 1 1· cl 0f 11 · 1ter1Jre ,at 1011 ,111 ublic agencies l1ave bee n cre p s ou o� on ut i-a m se ated 3_ _!\. ntimber of important 1 1 ent - functions p1 lo ve de l 1a o1 t� na to d t� la re s ic 1 \Vh 1 tio nc fu h l ia ec J SJ t o1 y rr ca to ill: ent -a�d o�her_ spe ciali op el d ev _ l ta J)1 �a , 1� 01 1 t ra Je zed may e11 tail co1nplex business o1 s s 1 e Un1,1ers1ty, its Impe _ lla Se le ai H g 11n 1sl bl ta es rial task 5· O1.1eillustratior1 is tl1e law · . N , f o 961 ega, 1 4 1_1· Gazeta 20th ?8 .N O e_ · 1c t o N l ra 1e e1 Q as ed at CI,arter, WlS proint1lg 1 n operation s o·f ge ga _en to ed 1z or tl1 at1 cy e11 consiag ic Year No.8 A,1 ot] 1 er pt1bl l as e 1 Va�ley Autority, til Aw 1s t en pm lo ve de al 11r t t1l ric ag to c derable. iirporta11c of tt 2, gar 196 !'_e 9 .29 �o ce Gazet a 21si ot1 I 1\ ral 11e Ge by or, per 1 En tlie b� created, t of tl1e Livestock and �1eat e11 l1m l1s ab est e h t is ion rat 1st 1 ill r tl1e fur A Year No.�. Board crmted i 1 1 1964 to pron1ote growtl1 a11d gover11ment regulation of the pro . ent pm al elo ion dev nat See Order of nue ave l ica crit a ely sur t 1ea 1 1 o· 1 tio� dt1c No.34- of 964, Negarit G'a::.eta 23rcl Year No.13. A ll of the agencies created above , are so1ne�l1at at1tonon1ous - they e11joy powers i ndepen dently from any ministry, 111ay be enpowered to receive separate bu d getary appropriations from parliament a11ci exercise a11 exclt1sive jurisdiction o,,er respo nsibilities committed to them. i. Eacl1 \vas created by In11 Jerial legislation issued \.Vithout reference to Parliament. Tl1e co11sttutio11al bases for tl1is legislation - and tl1e constitutional limits of the power - ire disct1ssed i11 Cl1apter V. The Orders cited above sl1ould be consulted and studi td, a11d a11 attempt should be n1ade to identify le gal differences between a_11 agenc� lilce AV A and a Mi11istry and to identify some of the advantages (and risks) \\ l1cl1 accrt1e fro1n establisl1i11g ad /1oc aoencies ratl1er tl1an committing the res1Jonsiblities to a regt1lar govern111ent minist;y. 4. 111� Judiciarr. At tl1is writing (June 967) draft legislative proposal s are �efore Pa:l1an1e11t to implement Article 11 1 of t11 1e Co 11 stitut ion. Tl1ese are discu ssed �n Cl1aptcr VIII. 1TI1e develop111ent of jt1dicial revie \\, is discussed further, below, 1n Sect1or 5 of tl11s Cl1apter. S. local Government. Sig11ificant n1e ast1res l1ave bee11 under taken to establish � 11 ew fra11ewo�k �or local govern1ne11t i11 Ethiopia. Se e the Local Self Adroini5lra· o.4l tl n O(de- (again ISSued pu(suant to A(ticle 27 of ]'l ( 0( de the Constitution) , f 0 1966, tve[farit Ga�eta 25tl1 y-ear No.9 (a). Tl1is or d er establisl 1es a sySl ero of elected raJ a c�ti cils to exer�ise j11risdiction op· e� de v in g over l ocal affairs. includ � ;� I?-ent o � ) a1 pr11n,1�y scl1ools in eacl1 awraja. . Tl1e Orde r and i�plemen tin g leg1sla · tion are discussed 111 Cl1apter IX. 6. 1he Civil Ser, ice 1 1 as b een esta n1 . . . . ua 5 ur p bl'1sl1_ed by in1per1al leg1slat1011 ( to Article 2 7 of' tl1e Constitutio see J96L also A(ttcle 66) th(ough 0(der No.23 °� �j C(eating he Cenkal Perno e1 /4 s c to ger1 cy ar1d vesting it witl1 broad powers . 1 jobs, recruit govern 85 1 16 , iilent ��1c1a � and establisl ta aze � rit 1 Ne ga pa y sc Se ale e s. 1 · Year No3. Tl1e CPA l1as �la (c sed these powern by promulgating detailed aril tions go,eniing public ei:;foynt le ;� , · nt; se e Legal Notice No.26 19 62 of 9 Gazeta 2!nd Year, No.6. · o 7. �he Codes not onl bi . t f fl Z rnI ect a e dr e amatic step to unify and mod n pia's l�w bt1t in many res � e gth 0 c ; : . prov1s1orB of the Constitu� '{ f cou:se: t1 1e Codes may implement or stre unPle · 0 1le Criminal 10 le a r ex , o verri ro� fo edure , s Proc ment those Articles i tl ci1a t · Code �nd limit tl1e law enforcem r III of the Constit�tion (id.eotify them) w_h1 �h f cases rn� powers of the po 108 r f c � court5 m the co1rts. Tl1e Civil Pr lic tri e als th an o e d ocedure Code, replacin �r arl i e th e g provisions of 1

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CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF ETHIOPIA

399

this of 1 Section (See resta hapter) 94 es the of 1 law n � iired by (reqt ! matio � cla pro _ t e of s � cour· 1 wh1cl1 the ''judicial power'' tl1rol1gl Empire the tabl1sl11ng es � 108) le _ Artic _ sed. he C1v1l Code governing w creat l s the liability of public exerci � ser � � be to is the of 62 also and Const1tut10 Article sets ) fortl1 e law governing a (com � � s � vant by land of government age11c1es (Compare Article 44 of tI1 e Consti on opr1at1 expr the tution). The Penal Code r egulates and places li1nitations on pri 11ted materials and _ the organization and conduct of associatio11s (compare Articles 41, 45 and 47 of the Constitution) by prohibiti.og, e.g. seditio11s SJ)eecl1es a11ci propaganda distribti of 65 Article (Compare 1e Co11stitutio 11.) The Civil Pro materials. tl obscene of ion t cedure Code establishes., as we l1ave already noted, a procedure for I1abeas coi·pLIS _ which, presumably, is guara 11teed t11 rougl1 Article 43 of tl1e Co11 stitL1tion. Tli ese, of course, are only a fe¾1 illustrative examples of the interaction of the codes and the Co.nstitution. The codes deal comprel1e11sively witl1 broad fields of law; tl1ey were prepared . by exper!s and reflect months, indeed years , of painstaki11 g stt1dy and con sultation of various models and sol1rces of la,v fro 1 n abroad. I r1 several instances. e.g. the Civil Code, the proposed legislation was studied a1 1d reviseci in r Jaces by � special Commission, appoint�d as part of t]1e codification process by tl1 e Emperor. The codes, as· every law student quickly lear11 s, are tl1e .source of a great cleal of the law of Ethiopia; but despite their awesome characte1· it is important to remember that, in a constit·utional sense, they are no different tl1an any other legislation: they were enacted by Parliament and prom11lgated by t h e Emperor, p11rsuant to Article 88 of the Constit·ution; they can be amended - or i11deed reJJealed - by the same process, and are subject to the s11premacy of tl1e Co11stitution (Article 122) in the same sense as any other legislatio n. Tl1us each of tl1e Codes is a Procla mation or Decree. Official citations are as follo\vs:

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Proclamation No.158 of 1957, .1Vegarit Gazeta 16th Year Extraordinary Issue No.l. Maritime Code

Proclamation No.164 of 1960, Negarit Gazeta 19th Year Extraordinary Issue l\lo.l.

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t en m op el ev D l na io ut it st on C Some Questions About Further . _Con sider and criticis e the following stater:nents which, you should assume � h� ve each been nst1tut1on of 1955.

made at some point prior to 1966 by hypothetical commentators on the Co

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PIAN ETHIO SoURCEBOOK OF

· s· e t n , se re s rm p it fo in is n th , o ti u it st 11 p o 1t 100 ''A poss1"ble weakness of tl1e Co . . . e 110 base . of sup av e� h d II Th 1) . y. d a u 1 v -i 1n . d an vely ti r ec po ll co t , rs te is 11 i 1n 1e tl r of o at s etic Innov g d er �n en e b a to d i m m 1e tl st g ni n l1 b 1a e1 ra. er w o p l a g le le and litt to h o ld office, any � v a l1 ey h _t st 1u 11 r o n e v a r pa 1 , liaI ly ri sa es ec 11 t o n o d y le tl : tors r a te l 1e 1r st1 bord1nates, no t f o or mw ce k en fid 1 · su 1 co e 1 tJ r 110 , . P· t or " pp su y a.r t� · men p M e r m �e 1 ri 1e us t 1r , o f ey 1g 11 �h ss le e e ar 1 tl r pri 11o , rs te is in m r � he ot om fr rt po t an � factors which 1n�u�nce it. r l?o lp St s r ro pe n1 E nlarily dependant 011 tl1e 111 pr ac ti ce, m ay deter exhibition of p lo ve de o t ed w lo al Suell a conditio11, if ly ar ul se ic ci rt er pa ex �r w of p owers po e iv t1t ec ex of se ci er ex . t1s ro go vi initiative, t m ay deter candor and oui I y lic po ; or m ra og pr l relati11 o to a controversia to d re on �n cu iti se nd co o is vig tl1 t en ur ev at pr To . rs te 1is 1 i m 1e l t by s es spoke1�1 t be devised - perhaps grafted us m n1 ste sy a , 1 ch a1 br e 1 tiv t ec ex 1e l t tl1 e top in y vel d cti ire lle qu co re d e an ar i s ind er ist ir1 m e tl1 e 1er wl 1 o1 t1ti tit i1s co e l1 t on 1 icl1 wi ll satisfy the Emperor, wl t en em ev l1i ac of rd co re 1 a ce t od pr to vjdt1a1ly nts e me of society. lat ele icu ar t er oth d 1 ai t en am rli Pa in 11t me ele a substantial end to i i the am cons se, sen al leg a in , ary ess 1ec 1 t no is it ive ect obj t tha t1re sec To ele e nsiv exte an of ult res ed bi11 com tl1e by ed 1iev acl be ld cou d ei1d l 1e t tL1tion; gatio11 of powers fron1 tl1e Ernperor to tl1e Prime Minister, cot1pled with the esta blisl1 111ent of practices wl1icl1 enable tl1e Pri me Minister to command the govern · me11t tl1rougl1 tl 1e Council of Ministers a11d to inflt1ence parliame11t sufficienily to get tl1e budget, taxes and otl1er esse11tial legislation enacted - or, if he can'i, to resig11 gracefL1lly and let tl1 e En1peror seek som eone else wl10 can . To establish this systen1 it is 11oi 11ecessary to change tl1e cons tit11tion, nor is it even advisable ; tl1e l�gal cl1a_nges :equired can be secur ed by In1perial Order, or by establishing 1)ract1ces wl11cl 1 will become precedents and, later, conventions."

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olitical p a of . ' 2) ' Tl1e Co11�titutio11, a� presently written, permits development system wl�1cl1 W?�ld 111c l t1de tl1ese elen1 ents: i) creation of responsib le, mass 1nen1_�e-� sl1 1p_ pol1t1cal par�ies wl1icl1 will advocate action proposal s for g��e�n· ! ; in· Ill) s; ment_, 11) using sucl1 parti es as a vel1icle to sect1re election of Deputie cre�s,ng t11e role 0� P�rli,1n1ent in i11flue11cing selection of the 1n inis �ers (aorl i tlleir removal), ai1d its 111flt1ence over tl1e Cou11cil ot� Ministers in suc h vital a r eas as tlie . coi�tent of tl1e b_t1?get, allocation of priorities in public expen�it�re, determination of tax pol1c1es; iv)increasing \iigot1r by Parlia ment in revie,vi og . . ' Jaws . g . 10 performa1. 1ce by Minist t men ri· es and ot.11er agencies cl1arged w1tl1 1mple . g b,vaY i ail d proJ�cts '1Vllicl1 Parliame11t h as deen1s. crucia progress (sucl1 l to ' t a rY en constrL1ct1on J)rogr-1� 1 11s)'. v) t·I ltts creat1 11g tl1e founda iaro 1· tion for a p�r · v e e o d democrac Y ·T l:ere is 110 })rese1 1t constitutional impe line tl1is to fr rol.e , diment . ate lop gre far a . _m ent ' P. ,1rl ia111:ent l1 as e11ot1gl1 legal exert po1tv ers now to · u ec x . · e 1n 11 1 fl L1enc111g policy cJ 1oices _of nat 1 0 f t 1 1al development and the conduc o xreni � . e tive governn1ent T l e I�ped1 e b to ent, t of the ! nts to_ developm this t�eory of : they exist, are f;t111� e n f _ c��ors u al c onto : king5 1 w l 1 1 cl: l ex_ 1 st 1e t eg l outs ide or constitution: mistrust �/ f itical _ 0r�a n1:at1011s; _civic ign orance of the_ portan t j O o f tl1is sort o f a politi C j me so · sySlem, n of ?ISLl betwee n 1ty Of d1s�r�st !l B z gro�ps jn society · and �t m ; �er 11 andicaps to organizing broad -based ·· dea- � . i gan1zations in Etl op1a di d s� ls ; l '' fficulty l i sa 1 1 an a; roup propo deve oping action g ogy wl1ich. wouI� � n_d strong support fr m diverse elements a ook LO � J in society; a politic�f i;;� e ? r p o . ition pur�11ant to wh1cl1 tl1e mass ?� pe aders \\'ho J .tl1 e Emperor for leadersh1P atid guidance 1 l politic a � acceP.1 ! � �j ratl1 er than to lack tl1e traditional attrt . butes o f prestige a n d i 11 fluence. If the tbe orY 15 - i 1

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ems of crea �ing a political system formulat ed 011 i t m u st focus on non obl r p the , stand which as t obstacles na e o implementation. , legal phenom ut �on as p rese nt ly written permits t.he est blishment stit Con he of a strong, J) ''T � . _ g ove rnm u ve t ent , and �xe c a st r ong exe u c tive 1s the critical need. The vigo rous � execu!ive 1n Etl1! op1a now has all the legal powers neede� in a developing country to guide and direct ch�n�es, e:g. the power to organize and reorganize units of government and the c1v1I se rvice, and t o sh11ffle tl1 e leadership of key agencies . to prom11lgate development plans and require adl1erence to tl1 em · to establish a vigorot1s propaga11da_ progra.m t o pu �licise tl1e n�eds and ideology of develop ment; t? co_ntrol Parl�ament so tl1at _ _1t ,vo rks w1tl1 and for tl1 e government , not against 1t - by 11s1ng tl1 e appo1nt1ve power to tl1e Senate or, the threat of dissolution in the e�ent P,trliame�t balks and t.he prestige of the Emperor and his government to 1nflue�ce elections. Legal changes are not required, indeed not advisable, to establ1sl1 sucl1 a governn1ent: needed is the indispensable support of the Emperor gi,,en to ,1 strong, sn1all disciplined group of leaders who know what they want to do and are determined to work in concert, self lessly, unde r discipline, to put their program in action." 4) ''The Constitution as presently ,vritten, accords to the Courts all the power they nee d to secure observance of t l1e law, inclt1ding constitt1tionally guaranteed rigl1ts a.nd to resist executi,,e dominatio11. The problem of strengtl1ening the role of courts and tl1e ''rule of law'' is n ot one of a.mending the constitution but of securing adequate legal manpo,ver resources and framing a feasible plan for selecting judges - giving t hem te11ure in office, but providing close supervision to weed out incompetency. It is ·pointless to talk abstractly about such measures until the trained manpower to implement them is available.'' 5) ''Statements (1), (2), (3) and (4) above are i11consiste11t witl1 each other. !�ey could not all have been wri t ten by the same commentator unless l1e was w1ll1ng to contradict himself.''

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QUESTIONS OF FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION AS SUPREME LAW '

lntroductio11

as, ts ur co _ e th in e bl ea �c fo en � The concept of the C onstituti on as law _ e� Section we have seen, introdu ce d into Ethiopi a during t he peri od of _federation (s 2 of this Chapte r) and, apparently, confirmed by the Revise� C o�st�tugf 0· Th� r p 1a _ 1 n (i e e . w vi re y e ad r al � ve ha concept derives from foreign ex perience, and we e inst1tu th g n p1 l ve de of s em bl ro p � _ �nd II) much o f the u nderlying the ory ; and the ed at lengtl1 ss cu 1s d en be e av h ew n vi 1o re � s and legal procedures to imple me nt ju d ic ia l in Part 2 of Chapter II. · aII tb1·s material carefully. O ur . task » nefore proceeding further you must review .· . ·. now is to build on this backgr ou nd a n d revi ew what l1ttle Eth1op1an exper1erce e re o s, m le ob r p e m so there ha s been, so r, fy � enti d i d an �} � � ew vj re l ia ic d u j h it fa w t _ p s a 1s th f o t n e m p lo e v e d Peculiar e . wh"1ch 1·1e 1·n t he path o f futur to Eth" . 1op1a, the, C.ons· titutio n.

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TIONAL LAW CONS TITU PIAN ETHI O SOURC EBOOK OF

s e e u th ss f I o e m o S s u c o F to A Problem Case e, re t forth in Negarit ec se D s] tie al en P [ e od C al en P ile (T Decre No 4 S of 91 61 de t pr tha urt C tl1e t vi de Co gh Hi l ? na Pe � o e tl1 ds en am . • ', • Gazeta,20Ll�1 Y�ar No. 15) t 1 t11 t io n f 0 th er penalties b s su 1n ng gi og ''fl of nre t en n1 sl1 ni pu e 1 tl se ro im ''may'' d te ic ly nv du co a s rso ha pe t ur co n of ariy e tl1 re l1e w e, od C e tl1 by ed id av pr violisly 80 d 481 of the 51 �� 9, , 5 , 47 4 4, 6 47 _, 4 2 les tic 4� Ar � by d 1ce of the offe,.ces denou1 e l� 1c fa n l1t of po t1o la al cu c1r r g in ow rs kn o� 1 um itl � al de s se en off e llfS (T . Code es that �e flogging id r ov �e pr rt fu �5 �. N e re ec D . ) t1s t1o d1 se ed em de and other a::tivity ce an rd co th the pro d ac wi 1n re ste n1 nu ad be l al 1 sl d 1 a1 es ok str 3 0 d ee ecc shall not s h ibe hic scr (w de pre Co a medical l na Pe the of _ 0A 1 2 e ticl r ,A,.. by ed 1 sl cedure estd:>li ent e hm th n nis of tio pu .) tra nis mi icle ad Art to ior pr n. sio rvi pe su d an 1 tio na mi exa y d ber ate rob rav s, wa agg for apparent ent !1m nis pt1 a as g 11 ggi fio ing ish a�l est , 0A 12 and r ent afte liam Par of considerable ve iati jnit tl1e on e Cod al Pe11 tl1e edin sert 1 ly, i1 debate O\'e· tl1e ge11eral n1erits of both tl1 e policy of corporal punisl1ment and the crJnstitt1tiotal iss11e -- wl1etl1er tl·1is sa11ction is inconsistent with Articles57 of the (:011stj tt1tio1. (Sec :R.edden, Etl1iOJ}ia1i Legal For,nbook, pp. 35-36 [1966], and for t�urtl1er iJ a(1(gr,Ju11d, J�o\ve11stei11� ''Tl1e Penal System of Ethiopia'',2 Journal OJ E'tfz iopicztz la}v, pJJ. 308-89, [1966].) '"fl1 us, Parliament has (in1957) approved corporal IJl111isl1n1e11: as a sa11ction for s01ne offenses, and tl1e Emperor, in a critical period follo,vi11g ,n attempted cot1p d'etat, l1as exte11ded tl1e punishment, by l1is personal decree issued pt1rsuant to Article92 of tl1e Constitution, to certain political offenses. Decree N·c. 45 has also been laid before Parliament (cf. Constitution, Article 92) and has b,en disct1ssed in botl1 hot1ses a11d, apparently, rejected by the Deputies but appro,ed by tl1e Senate. (See Tlze Et/1ioJJia11 H·era!d for November21, 1962.) Nott, 1.ssu111e tl1at today D l1 as been proper!')' convicted in tl1 e Higl1 Co urt of tl1 e off�nse,denounced _by Article256 of the Penal Code and duly sentenced by_the Court (1n a:;corda11ce w1tl1 Decree No . 45 and Penal Code Article I20[A]) to flogg1 ngi 10 strokes D l1 a� n?w filed a motion in tl1 e �igl1 Court, asking tl1e Court to vacate its c�rporal. p-1n1sl1ment order a11d otl1erwise 111odify tlle punisl1ment on the gro unds (inter al1c.) tl1at: ''fl1e sentence 0_f floggi11g i1nposed by tl1e Higl1 Co ed oriz aut l1 1 alt ho ugl urt' · · t b· the_. D.ecree , 1s inc0 11s1s · t·ent w1tl1 tl1e reqt1irements of Article 57 °f the Const1tt1t1011 a11d tl1 erefore Illtll and void.,, e ·You nay ft1rtl1 eri:- assu•n1e• that Th e. bl 1 proce " durally pern11s s ' , D' · is s motion , . k prosecutor now as s 1or disn1issal of D's . . · , arg . 1not1on uing z nter al,a: ''f/1e Court l 1as 110 /JO ,er t g · ;11 $ og o re e t}z ff e J' of vz e lit na i ut tit 11s o co !lz w " . · Dec. ree. 11:ovisio11s of t/1e ons • tent t I con must nal reJec t D's constitutio wthout ev e n 1 g .into tl1e1r o"" � p of merits. On k . this ground alone lac � t(l entertai11. ti� �issue - tl1e Cot1rt should reject D's constitutional arg nent."

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Legal BastS for Judicial Re ie . · �v i, 1 v Et/1Lop1a Re-read: 1) Part2 of Cl1 a ter II cially page s e 7 l 9 � 1 59�162,167 1 , 3 t;r , 2) Articles 122, 108 1 3) Section2 of Cl1 a'p 10 '62·,26, 36, 35 of the Constitution ter IV.

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Some Experience and Precedent

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Sect i on 2 o.f CI1 apter IV, particL1larly Article 8 of The Federal I11corporation Order (No. 6 of 1952) and Article 3(s) of The Federal Co11rts Proclan1at i on (No. 130A of 1953).

1 .Rights j 11 Eri trea'', 18 A1 ocler,1 La1- v Revieliv 484 ·( 1955). Huma1 '' Smith, m: Fro

The autl1or served as attorney general and as a jt1dge i11 Eritrea. Tl1e article revie\vs the developn1ent of jt1dicial review unclcr tl10 Erilrean Co 11stitution during the period 1952-1954.

The idea of t �e citizen J1a,,ing a11y rigl1ts agai11st tl1c authorities being a startli11g innovation i11 Er1 tre�1, resort to tl1e SL1pre111e Cot1 rt i n defe11ce of constitt1tional ri vl1ts l1as been rare, bLtt five cases l1ave ,1risen in tl1e first t\vo a11 d I1alf years of self g;vernment. The earliest case, decided i11 Augt1st, 1953, co11cerned tl1 e ''rigl1 t to freedom of op i ni on a11d expression,'' a newspaper l1aving bee11 st1ppressed by tl1 e withdrawal of its l icence to prjnt jt1st before tl1e persons co11 cerned had bee11 acquitted of a criminal c11arge of seditiotis libel. Under a.11 Italia11 lctw 110 one could pri 11 t without a licence, and tl1e court l1eld tl1at tl1i s provisio11 ,vas constitutio11 al as a means of raising revent1e and of' keeping tl1e at1tl1oritics i11formed of tl1e existe11 ce and locality of pr i nting presses; but tl1 at it was u11 constitutio11al as a 1neans of con trolling tl1 e press� and tl1 at the wit11 drawal of t11e licence for tl1i s purpose vvas there fore unlawful. Smith revic\vs other cases and concludes that tl1e i11trocluctio11 of constit1.1tional judicial review in Eritrea ''l1as prO\'ed in the h,tnds of an indepe11dent judiciary to be not a t1seless \vea1Jon in tl1e defense of liberty.'·

From Federal ProsecL1lo1· v. Li.'ici Sofia, Federal SL1pre1ne CoL1rt. Criminal Appe,tl 7/7 (I959).

[Article 8(e) of tl1e Regulat i ons prohibited importation of ct1rrency in excess of E $J 50 ]. The Federal H i gl1 Court i n Asmara acquitted tl1� respo11de11 t on tl1e grou�d tl1at artic]e 8(e) of the Currency Amendment Regt1lat1ons, 1949, was 11ot a valid !aw in that it was enacted by the Minister of Finance beyo11d the powers vested in him by law. M i 11ister tl1e by e act 1 e1 re we 9, 194 � he s, R ion lat egu ncy rre Cu 11t Amcndme ! _ . _ of Finance in virtue of the powers conferred on him by Article 3 (111 ) of tl1e Curr�11cy Pro clamation, 1942 (Proc. No. 3 1) as amended by tl1 e Curre11 cy A1�endn1e11t Pr� c�mation of J 947 (Proc. No. 99). It ma y be usefL1l to set out here br1�fly tl1e p _rov1�10ns of tl1ese two Proclamations. Article I is the title of tl1e Proclamat1 ?n�; article 2 13 _th e defi tl1e of n sio mis per t 1e th i w ept exc � , t . tl1a o es niti vid pro n clause; article 3 _ Ministry of Finance no person except an authorised dealer, 1s allowed to b·uy or bor row, or lend or ised l1or aut an not s i o wh . son per any to ncy irre 1 c n , s�ll any forei�

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<; f n y mon ey, coi ir o p � m E e th f o t u o , n r e sf n a tr a b e nk th ; s it ib h ro p · 4 le ic rt a _ r le le dea ' negotiab 1nstrL1ments or fore1· , fts d1a ls, bil es qLi che y ar1 gn . · or ' · s e t 0 11 y c n e rr tt c r o · s except tin der licence·'su notes 1e 1t 1r c1 se r o s t 11 ra ar w ar be . . • b c er s ·e , 1 I 1a s s, d n o b r o ' � tI1111gs ma;Y, tn a ny manner, bl a I u va o n ·CL1rrency t 1a tl s e id v ro p 4 le ic rt a id sa 1e tl f o i) (i le artic e s ti r 1e n o o ar rs of the Empire fr d n t1 o b s m to 1s cL 1e l t ss ro ac · h · sub-ar 1·ICI e c···) be t ransported Or transfered . . are co1np1·ied wit t�t of the , m sa es e t1 l1 1a n r fo s 1n o st cu 11 ai t t1n l ess cer l �t1ons, b noti e g� ak re m to er w o p e th ce n a n ce i F y f o r te is in M ; 1e tl s ve gi e cl <trti 1 to �� n1 ad st er the �roclary s� es ec 11 e b a� m as a et az G � t publislied in t l ie Negari t l1at valuable thi ng " as es 1d ov �c 1Jr 4, e cl ti ar e 1n sa . 1e tl of ) (iv le mations ' stib-artic s od y go an 1d or a1 e a lu ch va er m of le tic ise nd ar y an '.� es L1d cl in . ) (ii le tic ar bused in su 1 eJ 1, cl1eqt1es, b ill s, drafts , negotiable 'c. 01 111 e tid cl in d] cle ad btit does ,iot [e1111 )!iasis ts or s ecurities. t:J er at1 rr ar be wa , es ar sl1 s, 11d bo y a11 r ) . 11< y, 11c rre cL1 1 ig1 re j 11strumenls or fo .Article 5 is a pe11al ty c l ause. �--r• ,,. ng 1 thi ai1 11o , to 11t s co t n hibi tio pro 1na cla ro P . d s�1i tl1e at l1 t ar It is abL11.1da11tl y cle ' r; jec ole ob t of the Pro wh e Th ). tes (11o ey n n1o of )ire n 1 E tl1e 1 l1i1 J ,vit il tl1e importatio .l cl,1matio11s is to 1 Jrol1ibit Ll1e exJJort of tl1c money, notes, etc. tl1erei11 mentioned and to enstire tl1at ,1ny f<.)reig11 ct1 rrer1cy acqLiired by tl1e export of valuable things is given ... up to tl1c ,1L1tl1orised dea.ler. If it is a.greed tl1at tl1e words ''trar1sported or trans ferred ..\ ' ' ' as used in article 4 (ii) apply ire Emp tl1e of s darie 1 boL11 ,li1d s sto1n . -1 1 c. tl1e ss acro to transportatio11. ,111d tr,111s[cr jr1 and ot1t of tl1e Empire tl1en it is to be noted that • ·-. (iv) 4 article to ing accord ,vhicl1 ble 1ings'' l t ''va.lt1a to ' onl ap1)lies tl1e provision ) ,,., does not incl t1 clc n1011ey. cl1eq11es, bills etc . FL1rtl1er1nore it is to be noted that fr om tl1e context of article 4 (ii) tl1ere ca11 be doub t that '' transported or transferred across ,. of export '' tl1 e ct1st om�, bou 11daries or frontiers of tl1e En1pire ' apply only to tl1e ,,alt1�ble tl11 11gs: tl,c wl1ole 1Jrovisio11 is i11t ended to ensure tl1at any foreign currency ,.. rised ' autho tl1e acqt11red throt1gl1 tl1e tr,t11s1Jort or transfer is to be paid or assioned to 0 ,, dealer. d� red '' consi being Tliat tl1e posi�io , _ 1 be t111der l t 1e o Procla n t point 1 1 atio1 11ext s tl1e . is tlie P 0 :Ver of_ �,1� iv.1111_1ster _ of _Fi11a11ce to 111ake regt1l,1tio11s. Tl1is power g iven . uo<ler artrcl� 4 (111) JS l11n1tecl '·to 1sst1e.... st1cl1 regL1lations a11d designations as he • ina1 deter1n111e �o be 11ecessa_ry to aclr11i,1i�r;t er tl1e Ct1rre11cy Proclamatio11 ''. Tl1is pow�r l to issue regt�lations a11cl des,g11ations to acl111 i11ist er tl1e ·Proclamation may be exe rcis· I• ·n ed for a var1etY 0.f J)ltrpo_ses b tit· Slicl1 pt1r1Joses 1nL1st be lin1ited to tl1e adn11· 111·stratio s r.ce 0f � 11 e proclaination. Tl iis power does 11ot include ·t po otre v: 11e l1e wer to create ond 1c 1 i are i1ot contem!Jlated in the Proclan1ation. bey s ooe po we r exe suc to h rci se �1 n power o d �1e . the f a 1111111strati,1g tli e proe1 amat1on.' Tl1e power to make 1a,vs by is · � . . . ;tv; Constit ution vestecl 111 tiie 1 eg1sI at1 ,,e orga . on th u 11 , a11d 110 perso11 or offi cer_ or a do l1as tl1e JJower to 111a l<.e ai1y 1e�1s 0 t s o . la! 1. 011 unless l1e js expressly autl 1or1s ed _ a by tl1e la\v s enacted bY ·tl1e 1eg1s lat1ve to ven . . . h�n sue� is. gi DJti s o e. rg an po . ' an d w 1 \v � person, a11tl 1ority or officer sucl p U th . o ,ver 1n11st 1 w1th � be exercised _strictly n e otice conferred. In tl1e case of tlie C uir �y Ame�1dment Regulation s, 1949, (Le_ gal : pr<J· No. 127 of 1949) th e Mi11- ter O t� . "'lilance 111 ma kin g provisions regardingd t � illl l1ibition of i inportitlg ino;� cti h O , �r�11cy etc. exceeded t l 1e powers co11fe rre Y he by the Proclamation. sucl d t provisioi1s cre�te new offences wl1ich are b e yo; ocJa· powers of issui,1g regulati� s . r e t� aod ster e�ig11a_t10 .ns necessary to adr11ini a· �ation. Sucl1 are the provis: ol � g e . id R 115 co�t a 111ed 10 � s tl1e of a!t1cle 8( d) and. 8(e) e.Gl1 t1011s; they a r e , tlierefore 1 lf e 11 vires n � v?1d, bei11g void, they are ot 0 t1 11ave no legis lative coerci�n �;: oi ef r � � th n, �r� ca tlot f b1 o n d.111g 011 tl1e subject: tl1er e b e 110 offence ·under· tliese y pro,,,s ioi,s. Tl1e responde11t ca11no ·t be fouo<l g ui·Jt 1• •

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405

offence in that she imported. E$1,060 i11 excess of wl1at is alleged to be allowed an offence can be created only by tl1e legislative organ.... ' Sucl 1 0. E$1 5 is t:at The judgme�t �f t�e Federal Court of Asmara must therefore be confirmed d. se 1s m 1s 1s l d a e p p a 1e t1 a.od

Make sure _ you hav e read this judgn1ent and th?ught abo11t it as a lawyer. It was a criminal case . What precisely was the charge? Wl1at was tl1e evidence? was tl1ere any disptite abotit the facts? was the gro11nd for defen�e? . I-low ( bJ' lvl,at procedure) did Lisci Sofia,� ly, prec is � what , not If Jawye r interJ?ose tlus defe �ce? what was the precise 1sst1e raised in tl1e trial cotirt? 1-Iow did the c u i spose of that 1ss11e - and the case? Wl10 bro11gl1t the aJJJJcal to tile Supren1e Court? d rt o i al tr What did the appe llant ask the S_upren1e Court to clo? WJ1a_t \Vere tl1e relevant sources of law? what was the S�p�eme Cour!s. dec1s1on? \Vhat _v,1a� ll1e reasoning to SUJJJJort tllat decision. Does the L!sct _Sofra ?ec!s�on rest _ on co11stitut1onal grot1nds? Is it a precedent for tile establis]J ment of const1tut1onal JUd1c1al rev1e\v? The Cotirt says: ''The. po,ve.r to n1ake la,vs is by Const_ itt1�ion vested in tl1e legislative organ, and no person or ... authority has tl1e p_owe_r to n1akc an, � leg1slat�on unless he is expressly authorised 50 to do by the laws exacted by the leg1slat1ve orga11 . . . rlovv cl1d tl1e cot1rt know tJ1at this was the law of Ethiopia? what are the relevant articles of tl1e Constitution? Again does the case set a coostitutio11al precedent?

From Ministry of Finance v. Avedis Savadjia,1, S11preme Imperial Col1rt, Civil Appeal No. 720/50 (1958 G.C.) The. Ministry's Inland Revenue Department assessed respondent's tax liability, under the Transaction Tax (Decree No.I I of 1956). Respondent appealed to the Tax Appeal Committee of the Ministry, which determined that respondent owed E $24,150. Respondent then appealed to the High Court asking for relief in tl1e nature of a ''declaratory judgment'' to the effect tl1at under the Decree there was no tax liability. The Ministry n1oved to dismiss respondent's staten1ent of claim on the ground, inter alia, that the Higl1 Court had 110 jt1riscliction. TI1e High Court l1eard the case on the merits and gave judgn1ent for respondent. The Mi11istry ap1Jealed to the Supreme Court again contending, inter alia, that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the case on its merits. The Ministry argued that the Transaction Tax Decree (supra), which provided for a tax on goods manufactured locally, did not authorise any appeal from the Ministry's determination of tax liability to the courts, that no appeal could lie to the courts where tl1e law provided for none. It was agreed that ''no provision [was] made eitl1er in the Decree or in tl1e [Minister's] Regula tions for an appeal or a review from the finding of the· [Ministry's Tax Appeal Committee.]'' It was agreed that 011e issue in the case was: ''whetl1er t11e [High Court) had jurisdiction to [revie\v] ... the assessment [of the Tax Appeal Committee] ...'' On tl1is isszte the Court's judgment reads, in part, as fo]lows:

There is no question tl1at the Courts h ave no power to make laws; that is the functio n of the legislature. The duty of the Cot1rts is to apply the la\vs of t h e land, th.is duty implies t h e pov1er to interpret existing laws. The principle tl1at the Courts �re _bound to follow th e law togetl1er with the p1·i11cipl� of tl1e �n_de�endence of the _ runs Judiciary is clearly laid down in article 110 of the Revised Co11st1tut1on wh1cl1 as follow s: ''The judges shall be independent in conducting tria�s. and _giving iudgments in accordance wi th the law. 111 tl1e adm.1n1strat1on of Justice,.they submjt to no other autl1ority tl1an that of tl1e law." . In the present case tI1e High Court did not correc� or add ?r s� btract anytlling 1n th� existing law. T h e High Court on examining tl1� ex1st1_ ng leg1slat1on of the matter relating to Transaction Tax found t h at in t h e macl1111ery for tl1e a�s�ssment an� levy _ � tr1b11nal of this c se, the law made no provision for a 11 appeal to an adm1n1strat1v � . as ther. e is in the case of legislation. of income tax. Tl�at being so, tJ1e ��gh Court held �nd rightly so, tl1at tl1e subject who feels aggrieved by a�y dec1s1on of an � admm1strative officer must h ave a remedy before the law because 1n default of such

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vised Constitt1tion (wl1ic11· pro . Re tl1e . . of 43 v1 d e cl arti es of · . s n 1o 1 s v ro c . p . 1e l t J'b y d e . e rem 1 erty or prope rty ith , 11 f 1 o ed iv r p e d e b w y a 1 n ou1 · e ir IJ m E e th · 0 11 l 't 1 w e 11 0 e d llere ! l1at the t l1at no dd b a e Y II ·u f e s u y a m It _ . . p ry to ga u ro . 11 ,. , e b ld u o w ) w la f o du e process f p o roperty . a s bet n o ti a v ri ep d to ly n o \ve t o 11 en ly 1J p a 3 . 4 le ic rt a 1i s tl f o n visio s ver n me nt, M1n1st ry Dep o d n a Si ct Je b su 1 1 art s b etw ee a _ so al t t1 b ct je 1b st d st1bject an _ e essary � uch con firmat io n 15 0 t1 ?r1 � fi n co ?, � 1 a1 n If . � ty r1 1o tl au lic 11b p r l1e ot r o t en m 1 ch �rov1des tl1 at any l1 n t1 u 1t st n o C � ? ed is ev si re R 1e tl _ of 62 e cl ti ar in d n u fo e b is to a su1 � aga111st the Gove rn q, IJi th O E [ _o ts 1r o1 C ! 1e t1 dent of the Empire may br i11g, i11 v1s �d Constit utio n are � e th _R 10 ns 1o 1s ov pr l1 1c St c. et ment, Mii1istry, Depart111e 11t ver nm e1 1t as d1st111g u 1shed from a totali o G of m te ys s tic ra the J1all-marl<: of a den1oc t 11 t n he indiscrimina ai ag tio ec ot pr no or � tle _ lit s l1a . ct e bj _ tariar1 system wl1er e tl1e su . W1tl1 su ch provisions es 1t1 or tl1 au ic bl pu of rt pa e tl1 on r we po tions or abuses of re tl1 e protectors of tl1e freedo m a e tic s Ju of rts u Co e tl1 n io t1t i11 tl1e Revised Constit e in th its th lim wi al ibed du scr ivi pre i11d e tl1 of y ert op pr of om ed fre d of perso11 an e s of Justice whe n urt th Co of ty du th e is it d om e e fr l1 st1c of r1 tio by law. I11. protec established proc edu r. e to see that h wit ce an ord acc i11 n1 tl1e to lies app 1 so1 1Jer a11y utl1ority are lic er a pub oth or nt me art Dep y, istr Min ai1y to l,1w b)' n give ver JJO\ ar1y not abused and ti1at st1cl1 lVIinistry·, Department or other public au thority acts within tl1e lirnjts of tl1e JJC)\Vers give11 by law. Tl1is principle of the control of the Courts applies 11ot 0111} to individt1al JJll blic officers but extend s also to bodie s established b� la\v _ st1cl1 as > vi1l1at are often referred to as admi11istrative tribunals, e.g. tl1e Appeal Con1n11ttee of tl1e l11co1ne ,_fax Depart1nent if s11 cl1 tribunals act outsi.de the limits of tl1e po\v ers given b� iaw, � l1e individ11al aggrjeved by tl1e decision given may apply t� tl1e Cou�t� of Jt1st1ce wl11cl1 sl1all l1av e tl1e power to inves tigate into tl1e legality or the dec1s1011. 1

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�or tl1e �bove reaso11s, tl1erefore, the l-Iigl1 Court had full juris diction to take cogn1san�e or tl1e responde 11ts' I?rayer for a declaratory judgment as to \Vl1ether _ Transaction Tax was or not lev1able 111 tl1eir case.

· · L • 198,.?00 · 2 Jour11a/ of Eth1op1an See also: lvfinistry of Fi11a11ce v Nicola sat.ris · reported 1n �� ,. r�ads as follo,vs: [The advocate for the Mm 1stry bas (1964). Part of tl1e l-ligll cour·t's_ Jll · ·dgn11:;nt argued tl1at] tl1e w rd ' t o1 at1ca�ly executive' llSed in Article 13 of the Proclamation [No. 107 of 1949 the lncom� T!x�rocran1 t on] ea tl1at any de ci sio n taken by the collector or the 1Ta x � �1ster mof 1� e · b oft Appeal]' Con11nission ·.. or tl 1e M 1r1 tin · F1n:.1nee_ ·is not subJect scr u y. d to t l1e control or . courts of la,v. Tl1is is a misconceJJt �. o 1 1 tlle la,v gives various offi authoritie s menuone and cers ' in said Proclamation various O e s t11 la� i.. the po th wi ce ers r t tis 111 n d be da ise v co in erc ac ex , it is the rigl1t of tl1e stibject ti a; � 't o ��e courts of la\.v, and it is tl1e duty of the courts of law. 1� le enst1re tl1at the law is coinplied t 1 and tl1at tl thoflh) or 1 e officer powers au public vested any in e are no. t ab. used · · ·'' Tile Cotirt dt'd 1101 ci.te any I ; Is · e b ov so Ice d Const1tut1on tl1e sot1rce of the ''rigllt''?· Vll'lat. .ar u . of 1a w f,or tl1e ''r1gl1t'' state a e tlie relevant articles? . s, Compare: M r Justice B1.a11de1 s co11curring ate St in St. Joseplz Stock l'ards Co. v. United 298 U.S. 38 (1936): de Tl1e su1Jren1acy of Jaw de111ands tl1at i tl- �ere sl1all be opportunity to have some cou rt sdecre wl1etl1er a.n erroneous rtile of la'\V \\'as · ,ve · ac a f: p p h l1 d e · t whic , and wl1ether tl1e proceeding in s ad'JU d'IC<'lted was conducted regtll'irly T it , o h t at a extent, right, w � _ � a tever sci· tl1e a person sserting so�rce, �l1ould be entitled to tl1e i;de l col of d ion n ent P quest Jt1dgn1ent of a. ultin1ate court on the tut1 onal1 ty. L

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h From Tewfik Slzerif v Pitblzc· Seci . ' fl 8 ,rrty Depart,nent. (Or d er File No. 22/5 Jg Cou rt, Add is Ababa (196S) (Law S c h o ol Translation). . This was a _pro�eding in tl1e . J1B� n a tes tu re �e (Tewfik) �as in1pnsoned incommun. of_ ha�eas _corpus: petitioner Tewfik's advo� d P6ti· d � in v _1olat1on of Article 51 of the Constitut1on_an o� t1oned for his release. Respon (��! dent CC ecurity Department) appeared through a poli

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s objections to the petition. The cot1rt then ordered that the vari ou ed b...-.it · prisoner b e prot · · who su l.J.J.-1 rt and cont·1nued the case �� " r a furth er hearing. Respondent failed to comp! d in cou with · Y entered then add1t1onal orders Court a.nd observed: �;; order. The

m st ur c a of r � ord e � ? _u�der no c�nditio� be violated since according to e Th ns Jll t1t d1c ut1 1al power 1s exercised by the cot1rts i n accordance on C the of � J08 . art with the law and 1n the name of tl1e Emperor... ... [A]ny government department ca�1 be stied as individt1als are sued; it is a lega l duty that tl1ey resp�nd ... a1�d act 1n accorda11ce_ witl1 tl1e judgme11 t and the [court's] order ... Other�1se the existence of the Cot1r� !s of 110 effect ... [The Court has the po,ver] to exam.Ine whetl1er the relevant J)rov1s1011s of tl1e Co11stitution and the Criminal Procedure Code J1ave been observed.... I

A Note on Grazmatclz Woube Wolde Selassie v. Dejaz,natch Kefelew Wolde T.sadilc

•

The full judgment of this case, \Yl1ich recites a rather con1plicatecl history, is set out in 2 Journal ofEthiopian La�v 54 (1965). For our purposes the Jo1,r11als' editorial l1eadnote accurate!) sun1 marizes both the facts and tb.e judgment of the Court - \Vl1icl1 states bt1t does not elaborate any further on the three propositions stated belo\v. Tl1e 11eadnote reads:

Respondent in his capacity as Governor isst1ed an order to tl1e President of an Awradja Court directing l1im to t11r11 over land to a party with wl1om petitioner was engaged in litigation as to the questio11 of ow11ersh.ip. T11e land was conveyed to that party pursuant to the order and petitio11er filed tl1e present suit in tl1e High Court against the Governor to have l1is above order declared 11t1ll ai1d void. Held: Relief gran,ted. Order of Governor declared null and 'loid. l. Art. 110 Rev. Const. guarantees the independence of tl1e Judiciary. 2. Any action of tl1e executive or admi11istrative autl1orities v1l1icl1 interferes with tl1e independence of t11e Jt1diciary will be declared null a11d void. 3. Judges should disregard unconstitt1tio11al interference with tl1eir co11stitu tional prerogatives and adjudjcate dis1)t1tes solely in accordance witJ1 tl1e law. A Furtl1er Note on Experie11ce 'rvith, Juclicial Enforc·en1ent of Tlze Co11stitution The above, of course, are not tl1e only cases wl1ere tl1e courts l1ave been called upon, by some litigant, to enforce provisions of tl1e Cons�itt1tio11.. Si11�e,_ apart_ from �he Journ al of· Ethiopian La'rv, there exists no court reporting service, it 1s obviously impossible to make any accurate statements abotit t11e nt1mber of cases where con stitutional issues have been raised or about tl1eir disposition. The case of Lij. Araya Abebe, set fortl1 below, present�d a clear_ cut challenge to the constitutionality of a Procla,nation, but the �ourt avoided tl1at 1s� ue. In other _ _ _ unreported cases known to the editors the coi1st1t11t1onal challe11ge was a1n1ed aga1!1st an administrative order; and it appears, for exarnple, tl1at in seve�al cases tl1e H1�I1 _ Court has invalidated expropriation actions of t�1e !mper1al l-I1gl1way At1tl1or1ty for non -compliance with Article 44 of tl,e Ct)nst1t·ut1on, J1,1s ordered governme�t agencies to make restittition of mo,,ey to private citize11s on _ gro1111ds of 11on-c�n1pl1anc e witl1 Articles 43 and 44 has ordered tl1e release of pr1so11ers confi11ed �1tho11 _ t . charge on grounds, 1on 11t t1t 11s e Co tl1 of 43 e icl t _ r A. th wi _ e nc lia inter alia,' of non-comp ls? appears that tlie former ·Federal Stipreme and High Cotirts _l1a_ve entertained t I ast con itu tional issues. [See e.g. the judgment j 11 tlie unreported Cr1m111al Case No. .

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n i_ m n se o r ti is � d fo f o n ? ti ic a v n o ? d se : )] ra a _ o iti sm (A ui rt u o C h ig }I l ra e d e t l1 at conv1c t1on would v· · 189/50, F a lz a r te in · s 101ate n o ti c . ie b o te l sp e J ' d · n i a st e n E tr o n C pamp111et up I1eld ti • .h tu t � o _ m · ro n f . d n an w a r d ch e e e th sp f o 1n o d e e fr f o s e he court does not t y e guarante b su is l a n o t1 u 1t st n co e se 1e tl f o m n o ti si o p is d le ti ; ct A l ra e d Fe . . very clear. 1s e h a� th e courts � a � m � b n a _c l1 1c �1 w n v o ti ha a z_ li e . a r ne ge st fe sa le ti Perhaps v s al1 d at1ng various adrnj. n 1n 1o 1s ec d n 1 s le ic rt a l a n o t1 t1 from time to time cited consti� h a ve, on a numbe r of _ ts ur o t _c l1 t _ rs a pe � a s� oc al 1t � ; ns o ti ac ce li po d an nistrative le at . ast a power to a_I review c1 �1 JU l na 1o ut 1t t ns co casions, assu,ned a power of sl at1on); bu t 1n no case has there g1 le to d se po op s (a ts review admi 11istrative ac houg h tl1e c ases set forth above t , so do to er w po e th of been a full dress analysis ts ur en in vo ed fa ec pr of judicia l of r te us cl m fir ty et pr a 1 isl bl ta es , ly ab may, argu review. a wa re of otl1er rele vant unreun be ay n1 rs ito ed e tl1 1) d: de ad be ist mt To this ty s tl1e cul of nt Fa de stu of La\v by 1 rcl ea res d ue tin 1 1 co t tLb do no s; ported decision in the arcl1ieves of the courts will yield n1ore; 2) there are, as noted before, some h deserve clos e analysis ic wh ent ce� pre n1 fro rt ap� olly 1 wl -· ms ble pro er 1 tl fur before 011e mal<es final co11clus1ons on tl1e subJect of constit utional judicial review., and tl1ese are treated belo\v.

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Is Judicial Review of the Constitutionality of Legislation

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From Krzeczunowicz, ''Hierarcl1y of La ws in Etl1 jopia'' 1 Journal of Ethiopian Law III (1964). In Etl1iopia,_ the Constitution a 11d inte rnat iona l treaties '' · · · shall be the sup· re· me · Iat 1· on, decrees orders judgments dec1s1ons 1aw of the Empi. re' and all fut ure 1egis . and acts 1ncon s1stent tl1ere\-vitl1, sl1all be 11utl atld ,,o id,, (Ar't · l2?) - · ·'Leg, islat ion.." h ere apparently mea tl parI·iarne t ry sta te-lav-1 (Arts. 8�-�0). ·: decrees ; _ �� ;� s, tl1e emergency legislatf� 11 u�der_ ��t. 92 : orders rule , tl1e r gene al adm1n1strat1ve _ ''decisions'', tl1e particular d�llllIS trati�e I , acts. 1erefore follows that any und t tl constitutional enacttllents 0: \V late er k111 d tl1ey be, sl1 ll be null. But wl10 sl1all fin them to be sucl1 and make tl m O ; 1:.? effect , a�d 110a e don ? Where be tl1is w sl1all �� 5l an e11act1nent's nullity de e s on Its uiiconst fir be must 1 tutiona lity, the latter stated to exist, wllicll inv�lves Sltbtle or (as s e ss oce con tro ver sial ation pr inte rpr et sl1ow n by tl1e Uiiited Stat s Sta;; or ou r 0 w11 ''f� er a l'' c ases) affectin g t�e � , and being of ten beyond tll: ;::::ge 1ed_ h olis co J ab rt s 110w u·n _ca der our 1J a b1l1ty. federal syste1n, st1c11 cases of llilco _ � l e e r Slitut ionah ty a the F d were by �!, dealt with Court and the Federal Supreme ; urt P�rSltant to Procla mation No. 135 of 195 3, n ? I It seems th at only cases concern s. urt 111g Eritrea wer e bro ugl1t before t hose co I * The sovereig11 orders or d O!l tio eCt. Sions . ·tu jc:d· l1ow t e er t Cons prerogat · es (A ta 's en eror Emp uant k purs 3 to the . rts.26- 6), e.g., under �-t 36 o v , �� e r ly non s y and at in_a �" the • a distinct th in nat category t� Ofciin�ry legisla _ ; se tio� (sO: 11 r : This in1portant ved for discus;ion �� w1� e only reser is gory cate incidentally ment·ion e � ll1 tl1e present pa.per. • •see . .0r der No .. 27, of 1962: sin the . . _ al du �.ol�°;��gl �nalys1s is u1da�1on ?f Federal institutions and cases is gra , � : �:tq _ open to te p q ua 1 I 1ca r, t1ons. 11c 1 ts no\v 11npliedlYabrogated, if ver e o 5 togetl1 er _wil order abolishin g tl1e Federal · . . h other federal proclan1ations by a . Ill, syste1n (af"e t r tinanimo us parliamentary votes to tl1i; end).

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be to now seem in liqt1idation? as are other Federal institutions. latte r tf1e nt, ve to appear . h ave no courts spec�ally en1powered to deal with s e E!11pir ed u nifi e Is there fore probl ems. every Etl11o p1an court nal1ty com p · etent , in every · utio tJ · t . . · . . cons. e 1ca e h d 1· te t que on t10!1 s of co11st1tut10.nal1ty? On tile face of pas s to , case � t van rele _ to tem tak pte 1 e d be tl 1s vie w. Bu tl1e t m.a y de ,1rt � of stgnifica11t cases Aft. 122, on� content of Art. _ 62. (see be�o�) seem to go aga1nst sl1cl1 a sweeping 1ct1v restr : the and _ oll w1n the g ana t1ve l s1 � � � � 1s offered regarding unco11 stitutional approac�. ! ent� ly, Leg 1sla t1ve ( c) , J (b) ud1 c1al acts, a11cl (d) tl1e E1nperor's special rat1 ve, 1nist Adm. (a) position: resi to den sue the Admi11istratio11 (tl1e ''Gover11ment'' in its ts allo ws 62 Art. a) Executive sense, together witl1 its st1bdivisio11s: Mi11istry, Departnient, Agency, etc.) in the ordinary cot1rts for acts ''wrongft1l'', wl1icl1 ter1n obviously includes the unconstitt1ti�nal_ orde�s or _decisions contemJ)lated by Art. 122. * Tl1e q11es tions of unconst1tt1t1?nal1ty w_1ll l1ere be settled solely i11 relation to the partict1lar litigants involved, w1tl1 no wider effects (rel ativity of jt1dgme11ts), so that parti cular awards under Art. 62 will not carry an11t1lme11t of a general enactment, though they may indirectly induce its revocation.

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b) The language of Art. 62 is perhaps open to interpretatio11 as to whetl1er the same remedy \\1ill apply regarding unconstitutional legislation initiated by way of Parliament. Conceivably 11ot, tl1ough only future cases, if any, co11ld enlighten us on this point. Incide1Jtally, si11ce the differe11ce between the Legislative power and the Constituent power lies 011Iy in the voting majorities required (Arts. 87 and 131), unconstitutional legislation will probably occur - if at all - only rarely.

c) As to unconstitutional judgments, who is to imple1ne11t Art. 122 on their nullity, since it is precisely the judges who, by virtue of Art. 62, pass on tl1e wrongs of unconstitutionality? Final judgments are presumed correct both as to fact, an� as to law inter partes, be it Constitutio11al or other. And wl1ere appeal or review is still open, it can in any event be brougl1t on any relevant ground, be it of unconstjtutionaljty or other. It follows tl1 at Art. 122 adds notl1ing to tl1e law regarding judgments. It is gratuitous and meaningless in tl1is respect. d) By virtue of Art. 36 the Emperor is Himself the supreme Sovereign guardian of the people's constitutional rigl1ts and liberties as set out in Arts. 37-63. In these and other matters everyone has the traditional ''rigl1t to present petitions. to the Emperor' ' (Art. 63), Who also holds the supreme power of judicial �eview _ pursuant to the spirit of Art. 35 as implemented by Ar�. 183 of tl1e Cr1ID111al Procedure Code and the (suspended) Courts Proclamation of 1962 _(A�t. 9). As seems implied by Art. 26 ff, tl1e Emperor, hav_ing _s11p�en1e autl1or1ty 1n all fields, is alone judge of the con stitutionality of His own Jt1dgn1ents (cf. supra) or legislative approvals (Art. 88) or sovereign acts (Arts. 26-36; cf. note. 6), from wl1ich, it submitted, there s11ould lie no aJ)peal to perso11s otl1er tl1an H1?1self in the capacity appropriate to tl1e occasion. T11is view, supporte? by prac_t1ce _ (no cases contra), is in the logic of our system where, 111 accordance �1t_l1 a sens1b�e tradition, there is no real ''separation of powers'' at_ tl1e top (1nc1dentally, 1t may ?e inapproprjate even to suggest th,1t a �eparat10� of st1pre1ne po\vers . doctrine-completely alien to th e national trad1t1on-be imported from abroad). • &,e also Civil . ties uni imm on 8 213 . Art lly, nta ide inc , and (2), 3 203 0, Code Arts. zo35, 2126, 214

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iew of AdministTat ev � l i� ic ud J to ht ig R al i ve n io ,, ut tit ns Co aw n L 1a 5 01; 1 . 17 tl1 E . 6) Fro111 Mea11s, Tl1e 96 of (1 al 11 . ur Jo · 3 , , ' s ion t ties . . Proceedings: Tl1resl1old Q t to distingu ec 1s sp tl1 re 1n y ar ss ce ne is jt s te 110 ish ic ow z � e As Professor K.�z �� void fro� t11e power to override legislation on cons�i 011 is g e � r d r to r e e ,v os e cl th . re fo ot ib n tl1e_ po ss po s oe d ty ili 11e d an tha � t se ca ·ticLilar a 1� s 11 11 r? g use c ing B eep s sw tut10n � les we po , a ter r. lat e tl, e ise erc ;x � :� � Je r ly � pr ,t J 5 ur co 1 1 t�e E t i op1a a col1rt to void legislation _ of . 1 power the much so not 11 1estio t ° q 1n ll s ca t en m · t1 his arg en th ve op · . 1s I ea n l ca dd IDJ 1e J e , er w o th p pa a l1 1c 51 g n si ci er ex , s l t · f O .a s tI1e pru de1 1ce witl1out logical inconsistency. on ti e L1 tl1 it e st pr on su C e m ed is ev law R e th of on ti uc tr · · ns co al ci 1 d' I · · Is, the1.1, J·u . . · · t 1 p 1c _in ex s u 1s e A at 1cl · st rt � l 11 . t I� as l1 lf �e 1t on t1 tu ti 1s o1 C 1 e tl t of tlle En1pire? TI1a ne ru e d �1 ld th t� ou s11 no w nst i Co to as 1g 1 11 tl no s ay � s f el its 2 12 le ic rt A And thougl1 y l1t b1 e s1 on th on sp s: at re urt th co m e ac pl to e se ld ou w 0 11 le ic rt A , ng tution's rnea11i ing d i �:iv als ai: en�s !ri gm g jud in 1�t 1 _ nd co in nt de en ep ind be all sl1 s e ''Tl,e jt1dg y ce, the St1 of JU submit n t1o tra n1s ID1 ad e th In . law tl1e tl1 wi e i 11 accordanc to 110 otl1er autl1ority tl1an tl1at of tl1e law." ted ispu und the and IO 1 le tic Ar of ge gua lan the 11t poi g rtin sta a as Talcing ::1ncestry of Article 122, tr1e cor1clusion that judicial construction should be follow to see ld wou tice prac in m but ry of tl1eo er 1 11att as a only not eme supr as tl1e n1ost straightfor\vard kind of st2�tt1tory interpretation were it not for tl1e argu ment from tl1e uniq11e positio11 of the En1peror. Tl1is conclusion would, moreover, be supported by tl1e l1is torical context in whicl1 tl1e Revised Constitution was drafted. Tl1e Federal Act, estab lisl1ing conditions for t11e federation of Ethiopia and Eritr�a, * a11d the 1931 Co11stitution tl1en stood at the supreme Jaw of the Federat�d E�p1re, �nd the federal courts l1ad expressly bee11 granted tl1e power to render legis lat1011 vo!� on tl1e gr ?ur.id tl1at it was inconsistent witl1 tl1e provisions of either.� tl1e prov1 s1ons establ1sl11ng these two princi1Jles are taken together, they sugge.sl a �odel for Article �22 _\vl1ich was closer at Iiand tllan the sup;emacy clause of the Un1tecl States Const1tut1on: ''Tl1e Federal Act and OL1r Constitution of 1931 and all federa l l egislation made p�irs�ant tl,ereto as well as all international t�eaties, conventions and obligations of otir E n1pire as exte11ded t o the territory of E ritrea shall be tile SU}Jreme la\v throt1gl1 tl1e territories of Our Federated Em ire p .''tt or '' .....: � fiil�l detern on lati 1 i�a tion legi s by a Federal Court tl1at any . . ce, dn�1n1strat1ve, �xe_cL1t1ve or jt1dicial orde de te� ·sen r, cree, judgment, �1nd�ng, n o u�r or act is i11valid in tern1s of confor stit our Con wit h mit y on, or tl1e Federal . Act ' slla11 l1 ave u Ja is · leg as a co11sequence that st1ch o ut order , de . · �ree, Jt1dg1nent, se11tence fi i h u tl1ro g. , l1e l nd be or ng d ha ll act s 0ur E "'ffiJJ1re as 11ull and anY by v e bl ·ct 01 1d· u11enforceable and inappl 1ca a1 · . official s or courts 111 Our E 1 n pire. ······'' * * * ----ct • �- Marein, The Ethiopia•1 En1 A . ral d ir e p , 011 011 ::ide: a1:d Luws (1955 ). AppeJ. n �he dix Fe �01t,er -consisted o f tl1e first seven articles �f the f 0 nit d t Nat1on_ resolu 1�n � .d · 356. � mbly General Asse 10, 1950, rela

ting to the tlien proposed e s . P . , zbt d erat � , ion · Ln of ap ia Eritrea with Ethiopia. N. Mare • • Federation Incorporatio _ _ n and 1n lus on of the . Territory of Eri trea within the Empire of EUU Order., 1952, Art. 8 , Ord er. No. 6 c 1 , N eg. Gaz. year I? N • •• Federal Judic . 1a . ry Pro -, o. 1 · . ' . ; · Ga . ,,:.-, _..,¢ cl aniat·ion of Ethio . N eg pi a, 1953, Art 3(s), Proc. No. 130 A, 13, No. I. .,

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411 .

un fai r, t�erefore, to repl�rase the q��stion as to jttdic.ial supre . see r not s doe � It _ term in s. Do es ollo a w doc trin e o. f Jud the 1c1a l � st11?remacy so conflict in � y mac . Em the per of or tl1at wl1at �ould be tl1e ordinary interpretation on pos 1t1 . the witll regarded as merely suggest111g a course for fttttire evolution.* be must 122 cle Arti of It must be emph� sized tl1at _ tl1� po:Ver of� tl1e E1n1Jefor to act as til e Lrltimate Rev ised Con st1t11t1on 1s no� at isst1e. Wl1etl1er supreinacy be given the of te rpre inte � 1 e courts, tl1e rest1lt 111 ter1ns of tl1e power tl to or ure t leg1s la the of tl1 e Emperor _ to _ _ tl1 b asse he s on al! leg1slat1on a11d can review a11 y judicial deci sinc e sam e, � � the is sion . Rather, the question is \vl1etl1er 1 t \Vot1ld be poi11tless for a cotirt to override legislation on constit11tio�al �rounds in view of tl1e fact tl1at t]1e Einperor had pre viously approvecl tl1e leg1slat1on and wot1ld st1bseque11tly l1ave tl1e opportunity to pass on the decision of tl1e court. It is suggested tl1at for t\vo reaso11s tJ1e a11swer to tl1 is qt1estion is no. First, the declaration that a statute is unconstitutio11al a11d tl1erefore void is 11 ot tl 1e only occasion on whicl1 a cot1rt migl1t substitute tl1e reqt1ire111ents of the ConstitL1tion for the judgment of the legislatu.re, nor vvould it likely be eve11 tl1e most common one. If the experience of the United States is i11 a11 y respect i11dicative, tl1e far n1ore common use of tl1e cot1rt's povver wot1ld be to hold tl1at a statute can11ot be applied in a particular circum.stance or that it n1ay not be interpreted in a particL1lar way.*�: A statutory requiren1ent tl1at parties pay a fee on l1lir1g a11 appeal j11 the High Court,*** for example, \Vould in tl1e general run of cases be entirely u11objectio.nable. But if the requirement prevented an indigent crimi11al defendant fron1 appe::Lling l1is conviction, it is arguab1e that its application wot1ld i11 tl1at case an1ot111t to a der1ial of the equal protection of the laws.**** If the I-Iigl1 �0urt toole tl1is view a11d 11eld the requirement inapplicable to indigents on cri111ir1al a1)1)eals, tl1e statL1te vvould by no 1neans have been declared void. It wot1ld only have been 111odified to bring it into line with the court's jnterpretation of Article 37. And, it is sL1ggested, the Emperor might consistently approve both tl1e statute and tl1e jt1dg1nent modifying it, for the two operate at different levels of ge11erality. Second, although all legislation must be approved by the Emperor, the same is true of judicial decisions only in the limited sense tl1at if tl1ere is a petition to

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• See Krzeczunowicz, cited above at note 2, p. 116 (Articl e 122 described as ''largel y programmatic''). •• Cf . Advocate of the Mtn:stry of Finat1ce v. Sarris (H.Ct.1959), J. Etl1. L., V_ol .1, p.198, 200, construing th.e phrase ''automaticall y ... executive'' as used in the Perso11al and Business Tax Procl a mation, 1949, Art.13. Proc. No.107, 1Veg. Gaz. year 8, No. 12. ••• . The statute supposed is only hypothetical. At p resent a five d_oll ar fee is, charged for the filing of rimin al appeals in the High Co urt , but thi s is pLirsLiant to tl1e H1gl1 Court s own �tiles. See C:o_urt c e ure Rul es, 1943, Rul e 83, L. Not. No.33, Neg. Gc,z., Year 3, no.2. Tl1ere 1s no_ p rov1s1?n �rocd in these rules for in forma pauperis proceedings, but it is L1nd�rs�ood by tl 1e at1_t!1or _tl1 at in pra�� e � ol1 the Jl1 of 1 t on ica �1f n10 � Paupers are permitted to appeal witllout payment of tt1e fee. fh1s ad 110 Court's own rule s of course does not raise any issue as to tl,e pro per rel at1011sl11p bet,veen tl,e courts aoct the legislature. . '' · •* s .. aw *• Revised Constitution Articl e 37: ''No one shall be denie(I tl1e eq�a l . protcct_io� 0 f the 1 . l defenclants a 1n 1m cr The Unitd 11t ge d1 1n at th ld tie s se ca e State Supr me' Court 1 s in umber of may not be pla . l i11 g tl1eir co11viction than· they a pe a to t ec s; re p th � wi �t ec � in a fess f avoura ��e p�s1 10 n 1 . Doi1c.r/as v. C' ./ifo1·11ia (SLIJJ. Ct., U.S., 19 63 ), would be in i·r the y g 0 were l e to pay a ll Ices . , S ee , e · ·, a b s · se e ca 1 1·on 1· n the_, " s f c1 ce U S· ·Rep.Vol 372 or nd ou gr e Th 1. 81 p. La wy rs E 1 . 2d Vol . 9 p 353 1c St 1preme Cot1rt, appears td be the , . tl See n. io ut tit ns Co · s te Sta 'the United e l at 1sce or _ l pro't ect1on c · 1 · cqt1a 196,- Term, H arvard L. Rev., Vol. 77 (1963), p. 62, 107-108.

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n e ces�aril y must either e H t ? o il h c s r' o a gr r e _ p m nt E t h � b d re e d si n o � ortant in !he case of a stat p h ave a case c im e b y a m n o t1 e c ut n t1 1s d s in T _ • · !1 o r. A ld e f u if o d u c s or deny the petiti n s_ e m e _ m le b a n o at th s a re in h ic h w f o ty h a n o t1 u 1t st d e d t 1t was const1. lu 1a c tl n as to the c on o e c H , 1s t 1a tl , te tu a st . 1e tl d e v ro p p a r ro I e p m E se n d o n suc.ll a ca c s1 a _ 11 u 1 o c la ry a ec d 11tr o c red the . a d . :e cl a re rt u o c . tutional. Subseqtiently, a dered by the E _ si e n s a o c c 1e tl e v a l1 to s 11 0 t1 t1 e p w o n y rt a p g n si lo e l1 T . id o v statute or's ear_li� r approval �f , er p m E e th m o fr _ w o Jl fo y peror's ch ilot. Does it necessaril 1 e 1s e th ec d rs ? e 11 v 0 re d 11 O r migh a n 1o 1t et p 1e tl t n ra g ld t1 1o the statute tl1at He sl n be better serve d if � r� g n lo e th in ld u ? w n . He determine that the Constitutio e ti ili ib 1s r o1 s ei sp th as t re u o g ter in in k or w 1n on t1 re sc d1 e m so courts were allo\ved d? t se l1a fu e T re b e e th or ef er ter th lat d ul 1o sl 1 o1 ti ti pe e th t 1a preters of tl1e law a11d tl t es ce no oi do en ch e,, �e _tl t bu ist ex 11, ai rt ce t no se t1r co of is n se . 1o cl cot1rse whould be. y gl in err f n. y em se co l1t b1 d s1 on on sp re e e tl1 pt ce ac e ac pl st fir e tl1 u11less tl1e courts 1n tl1em by Articles 110 a11d 122. •

The Problem of Judicial Review of Pre-Constitution Legislation . m H.E. Lij Araya Abebe v. The Imperial Board of Teleco1nmunications of Ethiopia Fro (Hig11 Court, 1964) as reported i11 2 Jour11al of Et/1iopial'1 Law 3 03 (1965). · •

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In this case the plaintiff is cla·im�· ng tl1e SUm of· E. $5, 000 as compensation for � da11t aut1 1or1ty. trees felled by tlle de1en . . . . . of Tl1e defence pleaded by tlle deDenda?t is that 1t acted 1n pursuance ArUck 6 of the Maintenance of Te 1 11 11 e ervic�s Pr o�la111ation, Pr o c . No. 114 of 1950, S � :P J and that no com J ensation i P yable . Tl11s Article provides as follows: ''Wl1ere in the OJ)inion of tl1e M'inIStry of �osts, Telegraph and Telephones .. ce nou any trees are doing harm to tl by shall, telepho_ne services, the Ministry to be delivered to th e Wored a C�u req u ! re the own er t o rem ove such trees. If the person so notified fails to com)! , ti�� M niStry o Posts, Telegraphs and Telep hone! f i ) f a . shall have authority to h ve h en. own personnel fell or lay down the trees." . It 1s not co11tested by tlle p1 in . t.·iff. that a notice under Article 18 was rece1�ed by him; in fact he replied t o u t I ouce stating lhn! [e e h t at tha t if it is decid ed t� � nce of the t rees is helpful for the P� ilic t hty, his rda cco a ngh t sho uld be reserved 1n � of _ S with A�t1cle 44 of the Revised Const1tut1on I47 le Artic of under Ethiopi a and _ n tion the C1v1l Code and th at co111p ria . ensatio op be paid. Article 44 deals with expr

• The distinction is more. clear if th f pill e Empero ' � 11 I · of court nal 10 _fi · rega rded n ot_ as_ a �. IS but as part of th gn prerogative. See i{ Je ler• The Ch11 ot J unsd!cuon of th e 8 fi,.sl Ethiopia", Journ-�/iJ'.';/J'nc�� L,' w, V regarded er 111'1 _66 is et_ court O f ap peaI however, It ,s _a cou al. 8 ( 1964) t . i .seq f i en Ev 9 � r t w it h u n li .;. ,ft P ·5 case, and a dis�retion n a s to whether it will eo••1t,e th' dec1s1on not lo con id � d1scre1to s er .': Ju dgm ent. o f a lower court nee d nod· '.(1l' equi�alent of a decis�� pro g the lower c t .. r wo ore "f . l, k Passtve Virtues" ' Har,. c .B , A u S t. s i en m dg ee e J l.1rJpL. Rvm ; eview. Vol. 75 (l�� ) - p.40.

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plaintiff wanted to refer to Article 43 of the Constitution which the bab ly pro and vides that no one is to be de�rived of property wjthout due process of law. Article deals 1th the Code in f P Sses�ion of imm�v �ble property Civil � ! the ? of ;:v � � � f��S _ , ad1ng of E�propr1at1on , this article of the Civil Code is not h ral gen e � the der un circumstances the the 10 c present to case. able li apP The plaintiff referred to Article 122 of tl1e Revised Co11stitution and stated that ontra y law ry tl1e to a Co�stitt1tio11 is 11ull and avoid; }1e argues Artic le this � � er u.nd doe 1ch s w lam not at1o _ P rovi n, de for co1npe11sation, is contrary to � Proc the at th . Article 43 of the Const1tut10�. �hat �rt1cle 1_22 provides is tl1at any future legisla tion decree, order, etc. tl1at 1s 111cons1stent w1tl1 tl1e provisio11s of tl1e Constitution affect a11y legislation, order etc. that was is n�ll and void; that Articles does 11ot 1as promulgated. Tl1e Const tl1e itutio n time the \.\ at Co11stitt1tio11 was pro in force rotiJgated in 1955 and Proc. No. 114 ,,,as enacted i11 1950. For the above reasons, tl1is Cot1.rt holds tl1at 110 compe11sation is p:1yable ..... . .From Means, Zoe. cit., Sl,lpra. If Article 122 is taken to be the sole basis of tl1e power of the Ethiopian coL1rts to override the acts of other branches of tl1e governn,ent on constitutional grounds,* it is only acts done subsequent to November 4, 1955 wl1icl1 sl1ould be vulnerable to the courts' p0Vr1er. ** So much is clear even to a partisan of judicial review. Wl1at is not clea.r, ho\-vever, (at least to such a partisan) is tl1e proper application of this limitation where two governmental acts, tl1e 011e done before and the other after pro mulgation of the Constitution, must be considered together. Take tl1e follo1Ning hypothetical cases: Case No. 1: As provided by the terms of a statute enacted in 1950, a government department in 1965 orders P's land taken witl1ottt payment of any compe11sation. P argues that the taking is unconstitutional under Articles 43 and 44. *Ji:* Case No. 2: The Municipal Council of Addis Ababa i11 1965 affirms an assess ment of municipal fees against P. At no stage in tl1e proceedings before the Council or earlier was P given an opportunity to present evidence or argument with respect to his assessment. He asserts that tl1is amot1nts to a deprivation of l1is property without due process of law. By the terms of a 1950 statute, decisions of the Municipal council are final arid not subject to judicial review. * * * * • It _ might be argued from the United States analogy that it is_ not. �ee �ote 4 s upra. Ho�ever, eve� if the Ethiopian courts would l1ave l1ad tl1e p o\ver to overrid e l�g1slat 1ve _e nactments �1t �out Article 122, it seems the better v iew that, Article J 22 11av ing been included 1n the Const1tu t1on, the courts' power in this respect is limited by its tern1s. •• See Lij Ar.1y{t Abebe v. The /inperial Board of Teleco111111u11ici.1tio11s (I-I. C t. 1964), J · Etl,. L., vol. 2, p. 303. *.*• This hypothetical case is based on Lij Araya Abebe v. Tlie J111perial Bo arcl of Telecon1111un1ca�� s*of Ethiopia, cited ab o ve a t note *. Addis Ababa Mt1nicipal Water, Rate, Licences and Fees Ord e�, .1947, Art. 5 L. Not. No. 112 Neg. Gaz. year 7, t. l l, Pr o�. N o. 4 5, A 94 I � ,at , lan _i�n oc Pr ies 7a no. 5 issued pursuant to Municipalit ab 1s Ab � f Ad N�g. Gaz., year 4 no. 7, pur orts to make decisions of tl1e ��1n1c1pal Cot1nc1l ? t lfJ ;;) ;;/ f e r s ic 1th con e� _b; l1as res n 1s1� v pro 7 pect to the assessment pof municipal fees final. This vi i ase 1: (C Dep rd Guc e ar1c Fin l a ipa r1ic , . a M1 bah . ·. /is . Ad e v. h 1 Sh A cases wo a /1t} p 1c1 Ct. 196 1) (tak e 11n s jt1risdic tion ove r appeal); Societe Hoteliere d11 To11r1sll1e S�art; c;o .. l. M r appeal) of Addis Aba ha (C" . e Jur1sd1c t1o n ove k ta to es lin ec (d ) 64 19 t C . ) (H ,v,1 A ppeaI No. ?) S6 S/ . (sen,hle).

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ed d f 1 is en 5 o 19 am in n o ti a m a cl 6S to"iorro 19 P x . a T ne . i co In e lJ T C ase No. 3 . e m s s b ts e n s s y s t' a n e n eithe t1 r a p r e D e the 11 11 e v e T R d 11 la In ax e 1 tl f h o w ie v l close re ts p l to a em e c tt ng _a y le t n u� s q hi se b su in p . ts co _ r u �o 1e me tl r o n o si is m n1 o C al pe Ap . . e o 2 s n a c d 1n e is a r e s o th o t r a ll lll . . t�assessment on grounds si h at 1s n ot 1n � o l_lbt._ Whatever w te ca dj in to bi am ly on d de lu lc i i 3 is o. N e as C t1 ta e lli th y �1l b on � te of ea cr ot cl n rti A e ar e y 1e tl 122 , se ca t 1a tl n i be ' a) nl e guities ther ibl y at issue - the amendm en t ss po ts ac 1e !l of th o B . ts ac to future governniental e ur t ed en oc m pr ss se as er ere w op pr im y done dl ge le al e th d an 11 of tlle Pro clamatio . n o ti 11 it st n o C e 1 tl of n io at 1lg 11 on pr to st1bsequent v cti d oa a11 etr 2 12 ''R e'' cle ·ti At ca pli i11 Ap ' . e' z,r itt ''F d or W e 1 t/ 011 t 1en n11 1 Co er A Furt/1 11. io at s! gi Le 11 io ut tit ns Co ePr to ,z io ut tit ns tion of t!ze Co The L(i AraJ1a judg111e11t and Mr. Means' article, sup,·a, indicate that the courts n1ay be confronted ,vitl1 son1e troublesome questions in applying the Revised Consti tution to 1Jre-Co1 1stit11 tion legislation tl1ro11gl1 tl1e process of judicial review. 011e of tl 1e l 1ypot l1etical cases posed by Mr. Means suggests that the court s 111ay, in n1a11y instances, be able to avoid the problen1 of jurisdiction to review a pre-ConstitL1tio11 la\:v by followi11g well known canons of statut ory interpretation and req11iri11g wl 1ercver possible an i11terpretatio11 of pre-Constitution legislation wl1icl 1 wil l pL1t enforcen1 e11t of tl1e la,v in conformity \1/itl1 tl1e Constitution. Note t l1at Articl e 122 says t l1at all ''orders'', ''decisions'' and '·ac ts'' of government 1:1ust be consiste11t witl1 tl1� Constitutio11._ I11terpretation and enforcement of legisla t1011 by gover11ment officials arc prest11nably post-C onstit11tion ''decisions'' and ''acts'' covered by article 122 , no matter w l1at tl1e date of enactme11t of tl1e legislation. T_I,�s, argtiably, ,vl,�re ! l1 ere js a11y plat1sible ground tor an i11terpre1ario11 of a pro v1s1o � of prc-C_o11st1tt1t1on legislation wh.icl1 \vill avo id constitutional issues, then tli at_ 111terp retat10 11 1r1i1st be fo llo\ved. Consider, fo r exa1nple, Mr. 11e an s' hypo· t�1eti cal c�se no. � - co11]d a co11rt, confro11ted witl1 t l1 at case, avoid a res u lt incon· s1stent w1tl1 A rti cle 43? But Mr. Mea,i s' ''c,ise No. l '' �a11d tl 1e Li_j AraJ;a case?) pose tl1e 1nore difficult _ · ma � roblem.WI1at sl,oi,l rl tl1e ocla Co t1 Pr rts do if a ·particular provision of a pre-I 955 _ ti nl s t� req�ti re. a� ti11 co11sti�t1tio11al rest 1lt? i.e., if tl1e legislat ion do� 00 c s ue..! �;��; a,iy discretion 111 111ter1)retat1011 wl1icl1 \VOttld avo id tl 1e constitutiona l ,ss P t a1 1 l is a s s i t o_ f t!1i � pro y b l e111 sl1ot1 l cl sta rt wi t l1. the questio11 : \vha _ � � : h, \ �i � n e i ten i , . tur r A ti cle l -2 111 tl11s reg·t' rcl?W/1)' d'd "fu d wor 1 1 I t 1e t 1e f insert ra111ers · of jnto tl1e Constittit· D'd 11 11 �e ::111 to foreclose any constituti or1al challe_n�: on pre-Co11stitLttion 1;;;:·,,lti� � 1 i t 5 � .· di d tlie _111ean o nl � to say tl1�t the �on Lt � c· co L1ld 11ot b e ii ,voked to �1 s 1 11 o � h t l1e_ leg,1l1ty o f offi c i al transacti ons wh ich a n t ? st i· curred befo re its })ron1t1] oi , 1 re-Co 1cl p i d of 1I 1e ng ac· l t 1 1e ity tn legal of tl1e en L i ; � tt1tion Iegislat iot l btit 110�.. 1l.; s eniorcer11e11t after November 4 1955 '? . ' ve Ev1de11ce of official ''le 1· 1 . . ti . a ·sl l l e� - � � ti , e 1r1 t 11t'' on suc t1 1 a_ ffic o 1 qt i ns o est i �n I1istory reflecti iig tl,e J)recis� :�i ew, o � 1 t t n t i u f t li ose \v k l 10 wor ed on tl1e Co s ,,-n,-usl:: _ of cot1rse, Iackiiig; b ti t· it a re J)pea rs t fu rec � u t ' s o1 1abl rd y · . o w clear t l 1at tl1e l1ave been deliberatelY i · cla pro d (Con, �are A rtrcl nserte rts . e 3(s) of t l 1e Federa 1 C ou · f mer5. .;. mat,. 011 (set forth sz,pra S- .· · 10 2) w 11cl1 omits tl1e word). Pr esL1n1ably �h� �- 1,e-� _ of tl 1e Revise d Co , J ; �i� 1stitu,t . �_ � b w.· wl 1ole body of pre-C011 st1t . ere v., orr1ed and co 11cernc d Jest t l1e validt�Y · a -� I is t1t1o · · n · law · an . d r11,1ny transactions based 011 th caIIed .into questio11_

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_ oactive �pplication of a Constitution is, of course, not a The problem of retr 1en an pe ce; d 1t e leg al in e � � !-11ay freqttently be encountered itl political situa o n ne w an l onst1tt1t1onal ge s to be_ expected and partictt larly w11ere a new· e wher ! � ! ns � tio , , constitution 1s far more liberal than its predecessor. Mr. Means, _in the article quoted above, writes: ''Tl1e evide 11t pLtrpose of tile limitation of Article [122] to future g �vernme�tal .acts ... is to avoid the difficulties \vhic h would be ��usea1 by retroactive appl1cat1011 of constit11tio11 al limitations. [Emphasis. added]. This may be a good starting point of analysis. Tl1e q L1estio11 tl1 en is: wJ1 at were· may I1ave 1 ed to ''avoicl' '. Si 11 ce tl1 ere is no r ramers the wisl wllich · culties'' ''diffi e th official d?c��enta�ion_ to tell u?, w� n1�1st spe?t1late. <?rcli11 arily . tl1e �iffictilty witl1 ''retr oactive application of leg1slat1011 1s tl1at 1 t 1nay d 1stt1rb or 111 val i date transac 1l1 icl1 were carried 0L1t in good tions w�ich are now con1plete, o, and \\ esser1tially or ? _ faith reliance on tl1 e prev1ot1s law: tl1 at \Vl11cl.1 has bee11 done sl1ot1ld 11 c t n.ow be undone simply because tl1e la,v has Il0\1/ bee11 cha11ged; to re-open set11ed trans actions might ·greatly en1barrass and t1nreasonably burcle11 tl1 e partie� to tl 1ose transactions; and where government officials have a]ready acted 011 tl1e basis of existing law, it may be t1nreasonable and bt1rde11 some to review cl1ose tra11sactions now. Furthermore, we may speculate, tl1 ere was 110 tin1 e to review, revjse and re enact all pre-Constitution legislation ,vl1e11 tl1e new Co1 1stitutio11 was promulgated in 1955, and the framers may l1a\1e vvisl1ed to i 1 1dicate that pre-Co11stitL1tio11 legislc:ttion was not to be challenged si1np!y becat1se, e.g. i t was 11ot enacted by Parlia11 1er1t in conformity with Article 88 or because, on its face, it 1nigl1t appear to be inconsiste11t with provisions of the Revised Constitution. But this does not necessa,·ilJJ mean tl1 at all pre-Co11stitutioi1 legislation is auto matically immune from judicial review if its JJresent e11 forceme11 t vvot1ld violate Constitutional Commands Suppose, for example, a pre-Co11stitution law clearly authorized expropriation of real property witl1out co1npensation - an activ.ity which is now clearly condemned by the 1955 Co11stitt1tion; a11d suppose officials decided to enforce that law today. Are tl1ere co1npelling reasons to argue that the confiscatory rules of this law should still be enforced today'? Wot1Id the gover11 ment be embarrassed or unfairly burdened if, nol-v, a court were to l10Id that the ''ac!'' of enforcing the confiscatory provisio11s of tl1e old law c?t1ld be cl1 al_lenged? Article 44 of the 1955 Constitution clearly reqt1ires compensat1011 to be paJd \Vhen property is expropriated. Is there any clear policy supporting tl1e view tl1 at Article 44 should be ignored, today, when the government seeks to enforce tl1e old law? . On its face Article 122 might appear to immt11 1ize tl1_e old law from any jt1dicial �e�iew. But it may be difficult framers Jntend� d t�at res Lil� beca� se the that to believe It is difficult to believe reasons for wanting 1t. If tl1 e 111sert1011 that strong they had any of the word ''futur e'' into Article 122 was to avoid ''difficulties'' (i.e. u11� eason3: ble burdens on the pplying Artic not e for policy the governmen and reason � t) then the � : 44 of the Con stitution _ J 1ypotl1 et1cal (pre-Consti of otir to enforcement present day tution) statu te is lacking. o summarize: we ·d ''future'' int of the "vo . T insertion tl1e may tl1at agree � ? A�1cle 122 was . . , 1 e const1to of tl ap�l1cat1011 retroactive avoid by , caused ''difficulties tut1011 to the e bt1rdens were tl avoided be existing ' to ' difficulties' J . The ' body of aw � on govern ment , pleted transa which might result from disturbing co1npleted or essentially com ctions . But wl1ere those difficulties are not present and where the courts.

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at t emp t to enforce pre-Constit ive ec t JJros p , ra r utio 1tem 1 0 y o c a 1 wi tl d e t fro 11 1 o1 � � Jl learly are c . en rig ta e fu ts nd e1n now establishe n l vio la h t · a :way w I,1c · c I · W l1 d · 1 legislation 11� re no e 1 b i tha t et ar 1 e to ru 1s t p inter uld s1,o l il i rt cot r e t in g s p 1 a _ l er JJ , n 1o t l1 1t st n o C e by th 1t of the command enforceme1 icial d jti lit n er of JJ .11 1 W 1 the l c i li w y a w _a in 2 Article· 12· 1at tl1e legislation , no matter wh l t t insis all c. c t r u o c e 1 at · · nstitution, 1.e. perl1aps t1 o C J n 1o ut 1t . st e c h on t h it w . ly nt te is s n its·1 i· tteraI contei1t ' be enforced co ctive retroa of application of the enis probl 1 ese tl t a t 1 e t no y a n: Fi11ally w e n ificant - jf indeed they have sig less , and less e ' om ec b · to e 1 u r·10� ar. e li k ly Const·t · t1 c pre titu ng ons . on I aws, and, laci rep lly dua gra re a s law e w n 1t, a1 i fic ever bee11 s1gn be pret ably inter prob d can ws a in J a way ion t·tut e 5 1 1 0 C pr st o , 11o te al re ad y _ as d m _ ;�t coi, stitutiona ] _ a nd if tl1is possibility exists, e wl1icl1 \v1ll n1 ake t 1 1e1r en1orcem it should always be seized.

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.Sonze Fi1rtl1er Pro?I Ie111s.. W.I1at cozirt - or coi.trts - sl1ould !1ear cor1stitutional cases? Is a system o.t· ''Stare Decisis'' necessary? Re-re ad: (a) pp. 198-199: provisions _of _ tl1e Kenyan Con�titution. o�. dis tribtttion of judicial jurisd1c t1on to 1:e_ar and d ec� de const1tut1onal issues a11 d the procedure for ra1s1ng sucl1 i ssues. Comp are Articles 177-179 of the Civil Proc edL1re Code set out pp. 128-129, supra. (b) pp. 182-184; judicial review and tl1e problem of star e_ d�cisis and securin g ''u11iforn1ity'' ar1d ''co11siste11cy'' in constitut ional decisions. 1. What court - or courts? In Chapter VIII we will analyze in more d�tai,1 -the stru cture of tl1e judicial system in Etl1iopia. But from yot1r study of otl1er su?Je cts_ you will l(11ow already tl1at Etl1iopia l1as opte d for a ''broad based'' pyra.mid or J1ieracl1y, of courts. Tl1us, tl1ere are l1undreds of ·woreda and Awraja courts, t ho u sands of minor jt1dicial officers spread tl1rougl1out tl1e en1pire in e\1ery local gov r� ·ment center. Tl1e reason s for tl1is systen1 of ''grass roots'' cot1rts are not har ; 1•� discern, an d tl1e s ystern reflects tradition , a policy adopted i 11 tl1e I 942 Court pr clan1ation and confirn1ed again, i11 1965, i11 tl1 e Civil Procedure Code. ut, 5�oufd B er all �l1ese local courts e_xer?ise jt1risdictio11 to hear co11s ou ld 1 S_I titutio11al issues_? e to 1nterpre_t tl1e const1tt1_t1011 be vest�d i� all cot1r �? ��':h ll t Or sho uld Etl11op1a fo o _ ) pattern set by Ke11ya (111 tl1e const1t11t1onal 199 8 19 pr · o,,1s 1 ons q11oted supra PP· · .. n ?· and require co1 1st1tt 1t1·onaI is · sues to be tr,111 sferred to a I1igl1er c ourt /::or resoluuo 1 · IS Note tl1at (by virtue of _Civil Procedt1re 0 Code Articles 177 et seq.) habeas : ');d I ·Cases 111.ust be bro11g!1t_ 111 tl1e J:fjgl1 Cot1rt. WJ1 at factors, do_ you sti ppo s ot j the drafters of tl1e C1v1l Procedt1re Code to decide t l1at tI1e H1gl1 Court �and n . an 00• ' ja court) was tl1e apJ)r c . Awr" 1la r opriate tribu11al for sucl1 cases? Would siJJ1 · · l c i SIderatio11s ca11 1o 0 s i:- r ::1 si m ilar alloca t c oo · j ior1 of J L1risdiction to d ecide cases rai• 5in • g o .� t t. utIo · na1 i·ssues ?· Or are t I1ere con t::i . ur co :::: 11 )e ll w i1 er 1g re ::1 lo so n p s er g fo m r it ti n d 1nterpret an d enforce tl l u 1e Constitt1tio11 wl1e 11ever sucl t 11 a W ? d ra 1 is is e a su . r s�?ori· e es b e �he �ole 0 _f t_he upreme C u t? r r � N t � te C o u th a t m in K � e n S y u th a p e re � _gin �l � urisdictio n - and � fo h��'final'' Jurisdiction - o ver con stitutional 155 j jll Ethwpia t he Sup re�e Co urt w rt c h o; � s _ a p p e th ll a e t e ju ri th s d u ic s n ti ly o o ; n only h ea _r co nst1tu1to�al is erY ev a, (111 sues if they are brought u p o appe a l, and n n consti tu �ional ISSlle w1ll eve j re n e g e t before the Supreme Co11rt. Presumab ly on :1 for tl1e Kenya . prev i· si·on · · 1c�IY · u 1� th� d esire to d q gIe · . ·de � ec . i d g e t c s o st n itutional issue and aulliontatively, but 1s . J sro a 1t wise to have only a sin gle tribunal (and only � --

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tha of cot1 rt n ?) con si�e divi r con�titutional issues? Or, considering sio � or _ _ nel _ pa 1tut1 onal 1sst es, cons wou t ld 1t be wiser to of pr � ide re for at least two _ natu ?� the . derat1ons o� the issue, first by a cot1rt of or1g1nal jurisdiction and separate cons! filed 1s appea l by the Supre if a 1ne Cot1rt (a11d perhaps an extra . fter °: erea th the mom (Fo ent 1t ?) we_ may p�1t �side tl1e matter of further review of pane l � nary ordi b y H.J.�.'s C?elot). Jt1st1ce Frankft1rter 1s one Jt1r1st who l1as argued strongly that constitutional 1sst1es should only co1ne to the st1pre1ne (and final) co11 rt in the posture of an appeal. Long ago, wl1en he was a lav,, prof. essor, Frankfurter wrote: ''The court's position and f11nction as a11 appellate tribt111al'' forces it to ''sift', various arguments and ''data'' wl1icl1 l1ave already been explored by a lower court. decisio11-maki11g. ��Adjudica This, he claims, � s ,� n advant�ge, fo1· it _ prodt1ces wi ser _ tion'', l1e argt1es 1s a p1·ocess· (emphasis added). It IS, perl1aps, a p1·ocess of carefully unravelling all the relevant ''evide11ce'' and ''facts'' and tl1e relevant ''law'' -and also the argun1ents which bear 011 proper inter_pretation of tl1e law and its application to the facts at hand. Tl1us: ''the deliberations of successive tribunals serve to illt1. . '' See Frankfurter, ''A Note 011 Advisory Opi11ions'', 37 Har .. judgme nt final mine vard Law Reviei--v 1002 (1924). Tliis ,,ie,v is wortl1 careful reflection, but consider carefully whether it is realistic for Ethiopia, a11d co11sider the occasional need to get constitutional issues quickly resolved witl1out recourse to a time const1ming process of appeals. 2. The problem of ''stare decisis'' and securing uniformity of judgments. If the courts are to ha,1e the power of interpreting and enforcing tl1e constitution as ''supreme'' law, and if their judgments are to be binding upon government, there will be a need for ''certainty'' and ''finality'' in the deternlination of constitutional issues. Suppose for example the St1preme Court rules autl1oritatively tl1at a particular provision of law is 11nconstitutional. Should the government be able to ignore the ruling in a later case and argue, e.g. before a Higl1 Cou1·t, that tl1e Supreme Court's judgment sl1ould be ignored. Or should the Supreme Cot1rt itself be encouraged, in a later case, to overrule or ignore an earlier decision wllich autl1oritatively disposed of a partict1lar constitutional issue? What should be the force of ''precedents'' in deciding a consti tutional issue? Tbjs problem is in theory an OJJen one beca11se a doctrine of stare decisis - or adherence to precedents - is not yet autl1oritatively developed in Ethiopia, and it is complicated by the fact that tl1e existence of detailed codes (e.g. the Civil Co�e) and the philosophy and. metl1ods of code interpretation may negate the need for developing a doctrine of stare decisis in many fields of law. But t_l1e �eed for a coherent doctrine relating to the use of precedent In the field of constztutz�nal l�w � ay be very important if judicial review is to be _developed properly. A const1!u t1o_ n 1s not like a code: many of its provisions are s1n1ply broad st�tements ?f pr1n c1ple which must be systematically interpreted if they are to be applied meaningfu �ly a_nd rationally to concrete cases. Consider the readings below, t1.1e first two by dis tingu ished philosophers, the last by a great judge. From Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush, pp. 64-66 (1951). . In the large precedent consists in a.n official doing over again under similar circumstances substantially what has been don.e by him or his predec�ssor 1?efore. at ty ocie 1n The foun dation, t wl1a or ogue anal � _ ial oflic the is � edent , prec then of large, we know we al du 1v1 e ind th in , 1a wJ of d an , ! s, ion ut tit ins as as folkways, or _ are se know as habit. sen d oa br s thi 1 nt de ece pr r fo ke ma 1;1 d the things which An the same whic lve so t to or eff d an e tim s e . tak It 1s. io1 t1t tit ins r h make for habit an d fo

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e it seem s fo ol ish to reopen it. Indeed you on d e lv so . . ce yo u · · . problems. O11 are · g B in t en I e t h op r f • _o o n in o ti o n 1a e:1 1e tl ith a w nt nd con . tie JJa im e it qu e b to . y likel ou ha ve al�ead y build' for �nco rpo y t l1a w on � l1e rt fu g in ratin venience speak for build t, to ur operatmg �hniq� in ou yo d ke or w ce on tw fu so e th e, ad . � the decision once m ur ng hi yo ac io o re lut znt so nt n. 11,e It e,· IS further rl ea at wh of 11 tio ina am ! ex re t ou witl1 o rds the ba ck gro un d range of t�e pract c re en itt wr of n o ti tu sti in e ice clear that witl1 th d. _For wl1ereas the c_ourts might e nd e t ex y bl era id ns c o be make of officers is likely to o tl1e�; or m ight _pa y desul t n t1� ten at all sm y pa t �e t bu tory , ern tb ep records and ke t 1en en nv record if they should co 1n an ct gle ne y tel era lib de en ev t gh mi r o n; attentio of case, the law yer se arche� the records e !YP t �l1a ut o ab s d n mi ir the later cl1ange c o urt wh�t 1t has already � h on t_ s up sse e pr , 11:t po 111s rt o p sup to es cas for convenie11t n t1o et1 by g, rep din ard n fi tow ive dr by making n ma hu 1e tl es liz ita cap , e or bef e don explicit, by urging, tl1e prior cases. At tl1is po int there enters into the picture a11 ethical element, the arg ument that courts (and other officials) not only do, but sl1ould continue what they have been doing. V/ha.t one l1as bee11 doing becomes the ''right'' thing to do; not only the ex pected tl1i 11 g but the thing wl1ose happening will be welcomed and whose failure to l1appen will be resented. Tl1ere are, particularly in tl1e case of officials, and most particularly in the cru;e of judges, reaso11s of lJolicy to buttress this etl1ical element. To continue pa.st practices is to provide a new oft1cial i11 his inexperience with the accumulated experience of l1is predecessors. If be is ig11orant, l1e can learn from them and profit by the knowldge of those ,vl10 l1ave gone before l1im . If he is idte he can have their action brought to liis attention and profit by tl1eir i11 dt1stry. If he is foolish he can profit by their wisdom. If l1e is biased or corrupt tl1 e existenc e of past practices to compare his �ction_ with gives � public check upo n l1is biases and his corruption, limits the frame 1n which he can indulge them unchallenged. Finally, even though his prede cessors �ay themselves, as tl1ey set tip the practice, l1 a\1e been idle, ignorant, foolish an� biased, y�t tl1e knowledge that l1e ·will co11tinue ,vl1at they l1ave done gi ves a basis from wl11ch me11 may predict tl1e actio11 of tl1e co urts · a basis to which they can adjust their expectatioi1s a11d their affairs in advance.' To know the law is help ful, even wl1en tl1e law is bad.

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From Brandeis J. in Bur11et v. Coro11ado O il and Gas Co. 285 U.S. 393 (1932). Stare . decisis is t1sually tl1e wise po e en e T lic y his c omm o nly tr ue v wh ;.· is the error 1s a matter of serious co_nc · · ·. can or] err e rn,_ e h provided co rrection [of t n o ti l1ad by legislatio n. B:� t . c ses e e or c ere I� � invo wh lvin g . n . the . Constitutio . rroCCSS throug h le islative diffic�lt because o f tl1e difficult tim�-con su �10J� sions. [ of am endi�g the C��i�utio I� n ] ' this �ourt ha s often overruled its earlier_ i .. .. Tl1e Court bows to lessons of . . mg experience a d the force o f better reason n A Further Note o n the Proble Case m / ·cb wbJ The pro blem case O es tti cu 402 iffi d �ug�est� a number of importa nt may confront courts g ranppPi· , ing w1tl1 Judicial review in Ethiopia. •

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aske d to _ i court s nt1llify r disrega rd the a law promulgated by the case this ? In _ penal policy wl1 1ch l1 as previously been deb�ted and approved by a and r ero Emp 120A of_ tl1e penal cod�). Son1e 11 1ay dispute tJ1e wisdom of rt. A (�f. ent iam Parl _ e th 1sdo w of apply111g tl1�t sa1�ct1on to JJolitical offenses. nt-�r _ _ m pun1sh � ral � rpo co 1s obviously never tf1e zssi e 1n cleter,1,zining it.c; constiti, 1s/at1on le o_f wisdo ? the � m_ But _ 1 ether tl1 e law-making agencies 11 ave violatecl a standard w1 1s 1sst1e The ality. tion aw. That standar suprem d, �'crttel'' ancl ''inl1t1111 an'' JJttnisll ment e the ! in n dow laid d1ffic t1lt but locat to e. Tl1e assun1ptio11, 11owever is t11 at cotirts state to easy b e may ' te 11lti1na jt1dges the 1 e n1atter. tl of be shot1ld and can Assuming. tl1e court is to go to tl1e 111e1·it,� of tl1e constitt1tio11 al isstie raised by the defendant 111 tl1 e problen1 case p. 402, 110\.v sl1 ot1lcl tl1e cotirt treat witl1 tli e follow ing arguments : 1) Flogging is a traditional pu11isl1n1e11t fo1� seriot1s offenses i 11 Etl1 iopia; of course it is very painftll and very l1t11niliati11g-very l1 arsl1; tl1at is precisely its ratio11 ale; it is t1sed !�or botl1 retr.ib11tive and detterent ends; wl1ile harsh, tl1 e punisl1 ment .is a11 approved \.vay of co11de1nni11g crimes wl1ich are strongly condemned, and tl1e average citizen docs 11ot djsapprove of flogging in that context. 2) Corporal punisl1ment has been used i11 otl1 er cot1ntries; in fact it l1as recently been institt1ted in Tanzania by a progressive gover111nent e.g. for serious thefts. 3) The courts sl1ould, in tl1is case, defer to tl1e discretion of Parlian1e11t and the En1peror; collectively they l1 ave a better capacity to 1nake tl1e judgment which Article 57 of tl1 e Co11stitt1tion requires; if t]1ey 11ave considered tl1at issue carefully then the court sl1 ould not, in tl1is case, s11bstitt1te its jt1 dg1nent. 4) If it can be shown tl1 at ''enligl1 tened'' citizens-tI1 ose witl1 education \ivho occupy responsibl� positions-condem11 floggi11 g as crt1el and inl1 t1m2n, then the court should follow and accept tl1 is view as tl1 e relevant constitu tional standard. 5) I.f courts declare: flogging violates Article 57, tl1e11 tl1ey may go on and condemn banging-on the same kind of reasoning; tl1 e precedent of declar ing flogging unconstitutional will involve judges in a da11gerous area of ajudication. 6) If it can be s·hown tl1 at flogging does great psycl1ic injury-as well as inflict physical pain-it should be declared unconstitt1tional. 7) Article 57 is apparently derived fro1n the UN Declaration of Rigl1ts. If it can be shown tl1 at th e framers of this declaration meant to promote abolition of such punishment, then it sl1ould be deem�d unconstitutional in Ethiopia. 8) The penal laws of other cotintries must be considered; tl1e judgments interpreting analogous constitutional provisions should be treated as pre suasive arguments. 9) The penal laws and court decisions of other countries should not be con sid.ered; this is an Ethiopian problem. 10) Flogging may be a constitutional punishD?,ent in some_ circumstances and not so in others; it depends on the gravity of the cr1me and the moral culpability of the criminal.

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s on si lu nc to co ic wh ad le d h ul wo 0) wou.ld be (1 r1 j ve bo a t 11 1 1 1 u g 1e , 1 o ti 11) u it st 1. 11 1 o tl C f o c 8 3 d ri a 7 3 s 1c c 1· rt A · t · ) � 1 wi 1� t 11 e 1 st ! s1 11 o 1nc l f a o e u n eq o '' is te 1 ro n p le b ro io p ct l a ci u ;' cr n , e th it , ry a tr 1 1 co e 1 tl n 12) O cannot be avoided. t no -Je ab e cj tl1 ti us j ot nd 11 ki is e of su i� 1e tl iss e, ue ov ab le ti l al of ,t gl Ii 13) 111 . e id c e d l lc L1 10 sJ r o 11 a c s wl1icl1 cotirt e l1 '' ec su is pe or S e re 1 "equal F a1 '' 1 ,1s le ab ci ti 1s jt as t is jt .is , 14) Tile isst. ie , , . _prote ctIOJl ISSLJe. r we po rces an ou l es lw e Pe R L lz ig }J d c1n iv ie ev .R l ia ic 1cl .li e: A Fi,1 c1/ Not m d its an i on tio iti ca os pli op pr ns. e or n1 1e 01 lly fu re ca er icl ns co Finally ms e ble th d l?ro an v ie\ inherent in rev al ici L1d j of 11 1tio titt i11s tl1e of ' Our stud) loping legal manpower ve de of e r1c rta po im e tl1 te ica i11d t1ld s!1o 11t 111e oJJ vel de its resources cap:1ble of n1aki11g t l1e i11stitt1tion ,vork. TJ1is 111ea11s: r1ot si1111Jly wise judges, b11t a cadre of well educated, tl1inking lavvyers a11d officials in go\1ern111ent, i11 practice and in otI,er counseling positions wl 10 l1ave a11 u11dersta11dir1g of and a ''feel'' for tl1e constitution and an appreciation of tl1e ,net!,od of lawyers i11 a11alyzi11g a11d argt1ing co11stitutional issues.

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SECTION 6

QUES1'IONS Ol<' FUTURE CONSTITUTIONr\L DEVELOPMENT: 1'I-IE ROLE OF �fI-IE lvIONAf{CHY, TI-IE EXECUTI\7E AND PARLIAMENT. l11trodi1ctio11

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T11e _Revised Constitt1tio11 of 1955, like any sticl, docu111ent in a de,1eloping country, 15 11ot a fi�1al a11d per111a11ent solt1tio11 to political problen1s. It represents , rather, a lo11_g step 111 a 1011g IJrocess of J)rofound transition. ''It is ... axion1atic that · · cl1ange begets cl1a11ge , tl1at e·acl1 step i:-1 or,var t·he to · y 1 d l ea s 111exor d ab lo g1cally and _ e next. , ,, a ' ' . xt, a11d th ne � tl1e En1peror Haile Selassie llas pu t it. 1�. P11 ° e 01f 11118 Section is to i11dicate some possible directions of further c � 11 s J LI ro na 'eve o1J111e11t fro1n 1955, and to rai h i s que stio se n ,vh c s01 of ne the .{. cecl as ft11 · w1l l l 1ave to be 1a 1da111enta ' l c 1 1anges b eco1ne 1Jecessary Tl1e answers to t] 1e..�e quest·1ons can by 11 o m ea11 s _be t_,1l<e�1 _for f rsel ! you w gra 11te d, an allo d no you t sho �ld · . to be m 1 sled by tl1e a1r of 111e,11t 1b 1l t · k'ng 1. , · I t · r/ Y_ wl 11c · I 1 creep� � 11n into events over t pa tl1at tl1e fL1t11re is eqtially decideci'· ,e ver) ve proble deser s \ vl11cl1 here are _ raised m se.rious reflectio11. We rettirJl to inarly of tl1e111 1n la te r cl1 apters. Transitional SteJJS' to1,vards Minr�v . terz.al ResponsibilitJJ . l1 Tl1ot1g tl1e Revised. Constittiti 1 . _. . d e 0 e · s s stil � i l, 1n 1967, unamended, and h a_ nJ her a far longer life tl1an tile great � ma· 0_rity of s11ch do�uments in Africa,_ ce: ta1n furt a devel?pments have affected tile s { s _ er rit P lett aud _ tl 1 e its work ing while of it eve n remained 11nchanged· Tb1s ' h " process 1s illust rat �c whJ :ed b y tl1e follo wing read.1ngs .l11e ar� �oncer11ed witl1 tl1 e devolu Prt t· 100 of authority tl1e to from M1n1ster. the Emperor

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Speech of 14 April 1961, in Et/1iotJia I, Observer, Selassie Vol. v No.2 aile H m fro (1961). In all that We did, We believed tl1at We were taking tl1ose measures essential to Ethiopia's development._ A � prograffif!1es became n1ore 11t1111erous a1 1d teclinically more complex? as . the nat1 011 _ s bt1d get 111c!·eased fron1 Etl1. $11 111illion iii 1942 to Eth. $279 million 1n 1960, 1t becan1e essential that tl1e decisio11-mcll<it1g ftinctio118 be increasingly dispersed �ong tl1e res1Jonsible officials of tl1e Gover1101ent. w110, today, can be an expert 10 all �elds? �110, tod ay, can si11gle-l1a11dedly take all the _ decisions necessary to the adm1111stra.t1on of a Gover11n1e11t 's programines? These _ questions require no answer. B11t ·we know tl1at man's desires rarely attai11 ft1ll acl1ieve1nent or perfection. And so it was here. \Vhat n1ore :vas req11i�·ed �o �reate a syste1n of trt1ly responsible government? What was yet lacking? Tl1e 1nst1tt.1t1onal fra111ework existed.. A modern Constitution guaranteed to eacl1 elen1e11t in tl1is str11ctt1re its proper dt1t.i.;s and tl1e autl1ority and the r.igl1t to ft11fil its tasks. Ot1r Mi11isters \Vere vested witl1 ; .ttribt1tions 00 less st1bstanti3:l that those given to Ministers in a11y 11atio11 of t11e world, irrespecti ve of political colouration or orientation. Our Parlia111e11t ¥1as given powers to legis late comparable to t.hose granted i11 a11y parlia111e11ta.ry syste1n of government. Tl1e legaI framework governing tl1e dealings of tl1e Etl1io1)ia11 people \vith eacl1 other and with the State ha d been fully articulated . You all realise that it is necessary to l1ave a sufficient 11umber of men who wot1ld courageously and honestly accept responsibility a11d act t1nder it, and, not counti11g. the cost, discharge th. eir dt1ties to the Ethiopian 11ation. We ha,,e always held Our self at the disposal of Our people and Our Ministers. And so 011r Mi11isters came to Us with their problems and questions. Always \Ve said: '' But tl1e power has been given to you to do this yourself." Frequently, Ot1r words went unheeded. Respo11si bility was shirked . Decisions were avoided and thrust back upon Us. As a result, some programmes remained unimplemented, an d other questions of major importance were left unanswered. Tl1e Govern1nent l1as been overwhelmed and benumbe d by details. Among tl1ose who stand before Us, many have devoted years of service to the Imperial Ethiopia11 Govern1ne11t. YOll know tl1e trutl1 of what We say. Respo11sibility to People

Today, ·we say unto you no longer shall it be thus. No longer shall you s!1irk your duties. No longer shall 'we accept your responsibilities, when We have given the p�wer to you. T11is power sha ll not be abuse� for selfisl1 and for persona_! e� ds when 1t has been given as a sacred trust to be exercised for the benefit of tl1e Eth1op1an people and nation. and ad n1in_ist� r Henc eforth, you shall work in your Ministries a!-1d De1Jartments _ _ Your programmes tlJere. Eac11 year, in accordance with tl1e Const1tut1on, and w1th111 pre the broad framework of ll sl1a t1 yo , ted oJJ ad n bee s ha ich wh Year Plan ve Fi tl1e pare you r progr en be s ha me a1n r g pr e tl1 n l1e \V . l1s nt mo � _ ammes for th e co mi ng 12 �Pl)roved by Our Council of Ministers an d by Us, you shall work 111 accordance with f el s ur yo e ov pr t, u If yo If d. te la u t11 yo ra ng co plan and execute it well, yot1 shall be ; _ Jor ma ncapable or in.co If . 1er otl an by ed lac rep d a11 d e mpetent: yo u shall be remov

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e 1 1s a t1 u q e; 0 P . 1n ; Mi11ister to aid y oL1. His primary function is to c'o- o:d1D. at�ee apJ)Otnte d Our r1 ecut!·on _of Govern m� 11t pro grammes e x e t 1 1 tl1�Lt e �e and 1 s 1istrie Mi e t h amoog t work d d e to b r ing the m to Us e c ir is , oo t , 1 e l , e s 1 � a y c li o p . is facilitat�d. If qt1estions of iven t o yo u are requi red , g en b e v e a l1 l1 1c l1 \V e th on s s� ti u ib tr at 1e tl 1 1 i ts en dn en am If shall b e fortl1comi11g. 1 of tl1em will be s�bj�ct to free � o t� t a _ n ne le 1p in �r o Your progran1ines a11 d y o tl1e p eo ple of Eth1op1a th at you t 1s 1t e, ns se e at 1n t1 ul e l1 t and open �omments. ''1 1 1 er for you� stewa rdsh ip_,, sw an t us 1n u. yo at th em 1 tl o are respolsible, and it is t P to me d. lia an ar s o t U e . During bl nt si on sp e r lly 11a io ut tit 11s co e ar u yo T11at is w1y ve felt, before Alnlighty God, l1a e W t ha w 11 e do ly ng ili fa O ur Iifetine, We have un t tl1 e cost to Ou self. ha r w te at m no 11, tio r1a t1r O d an r t o be Ot1rdt1ty to Ot1r people YOLl mt1s1 do likewise.

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ETHI OPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL

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Tl1 ro.tgl1out tl1e lo11g years of Ot1r ceaseless efforts to achieve tl1e a dvancement be d woul stage tl1e d that e t cipa anti ys v e alwa l1a W e o11, 11ati Otir of g -)ein a11d well cation edu by d e train l1ave \V e 1n wl10 ials, offic and s ister min Our l1 reacl1ed a wl1ic g their once , could tion, nistra admi 1ne11t i11 overn ice v ser and tl1rolgl1 1 011g years of ?uties anl tasks are defined, asst1me by tl1en1selves full responsibility and dischar�e �ec1• 1� properly, tl1us permitti11g Us to devote n1ore of Our time to major political s1ons and matters of utmost importance to tl1e future of Etl1iopia wl1icl1 ne cessitate Ot1r atteitio11.

We tre pe�suaded tl1at tl1is stage l1as no\\' bee1 1 reached, a11d you must realise Y h ,vort . e b mar tl1a_t th� tust g1ve11 to you e�tails a sacrifice on yot1r part, tl1at you of it. Y_ 01 sl1ot1l� be ever m1 11df11l tl1at tl1e supren1e test of your wortl11nes s of tlus trt1st wil�be _ n1a111 ef ste� 11o t o_nly by tl1e confide11ce We l1ave reposed in you, �u t al:0 �y yo11r tCl11even1ents rn tl1e_ 1n1plementation of tlle programn1es We I1ave laid do\\O for tl1e velfare of tl1e Etl11op1an people. • !JeeD . . ve h Yo ·. uoffi . ce sl 11 ia ors b e J w 1ere y ot1 belong. Tecl1111cal experts and advis . afu ncu o . provided ! 0 _ai d Y0�1 111 yottr work. Yottr Depart1nents and Ministries can � n n�} i_f the c_hoice 0_f your staff is dictated, not by ties of friendship and pers� !r � �t p 1 by ev1 ence of competence and ability. You shall w ork o�� -:'e � in yottr uc own re!�� s��tit 1 1 w o your ow�1 � , k�you � 1n 1 s t kes acl1ieving ' s . We sl1alireserve ior ��11 of yott a certa1� sl1al. a cultie5 period eacl1 week when We to repor1 o11 tl1e progress you llave made 10 iffi [Js e d t o h 1 n a11d y es our progran1n 1 · 11 1 : �c�u1g 1tered. But tin1e shall not be used to ask or ob tain fro[ll ;e��i 0�::�:�� r l1t tf ill Y yours to make. cti� ra p The Emperor's speech o f 14th . d n A t . e •.1 of �ovenme�t officials, rather h pril �961 wa_s concerned witl1 the atu ud s Jment t.o � 90: an t 1 n ame no the t and l ir lega ers pow with . us t . � g Revi sed Constitu io· n or m· ex1st1ng 1eg AU 1.n · ' · t · I uP tion i� a was therefore 11ecessary. Bu in t the Em�ror announced th t · se ld �ether n a m w e itte o� on ion C evis � l iona titut . o1Js i R C ?r<ler, as w a s later said, "to stu� y � e l9 1ne ' ·dered JllO d 1 d tern 55 Revised · and Constitution 1s 1?e�d t� an1end it in order th t e a the syStem of nlitJisterial government maY be ren !TIjttet b' eff1c1ent and effective" · In Ma y l963, the Prime Minist r stated that the colll e

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report.* T�is report _has not_ _been made its submitted and work its coropleted the �a �ges of March 1966, by �h1ch the Pnme �1n1ster gained _ appears. that e denved from its recom1nendations. we However, mtn1sters, ! fellow his .tutional amendn1ent, but by the following selec.t co!lsti Order _ were rnade not by Article 27 of the Constitution.

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nisters (De finition of Powers) (Amendmen t) Order, No.44 of 1966, Mi from Negarit Gazeta 25th Year No.JO. the

WHEREAS, in 1943 We pro mulga te d Order No . 1 u11der Article 11 of Our Constitution of 1930; an d WHEREAS, the pro mulgatio11 by U s in 1955 of Ot1r Revisecl Constitution provided tl1e necessary basi s for tl1e expa.nsio n and simplification of th e powers and duties of Our Ministers and tl1e ft1rtl1er develo pme11t of a s ystem of responsible Ministerial gover·n ment ; a11d WHEREAS, it h as accordingly bec o me necessary to an1en d Order No . 1 of 1943; NOW THEREFORE, i n accordai1ce ,vitl1 Articles 27 and 66 of Our Revised Constitution, We hereby or der as f ollows: •

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GENERAL I. This Order may be cited as th e ''Ministers (Definition of Po\¥ers) (Amendrnent) Order, 1966' '. 2. Articles 1 through 21A of Order No. 1 of 1943, as ame 11ded, are hereby repealed and replaced by Articles 1 through 14 of tl1is Orde.r.

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3. Our Prime Minister i s t he }1ead of all Our Mj 11isters a11d shall be directly res ponsible to Us and th e State for e nsuri ng tl1e exect1tioi1 of the duties, the pro grammes and the laws concer11ing tl1e Minis tries . Our Prin1e Minister shall have all powers and autl1ority necessary th ereto. 4. (a) Our Prime Minister shal l b e appointed and dismissed by Us . (b) All oth er Mi ni ster s shall be pro pos ed for appointment t o Us by Our Prim e Minister and th er eafter duly appoi nted by Us. (c) All otl1er Gov er n ment o fficials abov e th e rank, of Assistant Minist er sh_all, after consultation with tl1e appropria te Minister s , be proposed.for appoint m ent to Us by Ou r Pr ime Mi nister a nd thereafter duly appointed b� Us. 5. Before taking up t heir appointment, all officials above_ the rank of Assis�ant Minister sl1all take the oath of fide lity se t f ortl1 in Article 66 o f Our R evis ed Constitution. 6· Ministers may transact State business and may enter_ i1;1to _contra_ c�s or agr� e-1?-ents an� i ncur financia l lia bility i n r espect of their M1n1stnes w1th1n t� e luruts �: the!-f budgets a nd s ubj ect to th e require me nts of the Jaw and Our Revi sed Const1 tut1on. • Ful ler refe 61, 19 er tob Oc 29 61, 19 st g11 Au 19 for d ral He n c pia ren hio 4 N_ ovem ber es n1ay be found in The Et 1961, and 7 May 1963.

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ur r r te y tl ec ir d d e an b . ll 1a sl r te is in M ch a E : ) of (a i n of the dut es b 1o 7. ut e ec 1e t1 x r fo e at St 1e tl . 1s . y s n abo,,e 1.1.u•1n, to Us and M a h 11 r1 ce s g n n t co l 1e t t w f a o i l i u ti o n t ec ex 1e r. tl 1g i i d tl cl in Miilistry, il o nc u _ o <? f ur to ist C? t in M b s su i er :11 d an aft dr e ar ep pr ll 1a sl r te is in M h (b) E ac y t� �s n� ln r 1s 11 fo f n o e o th i t a er p e o op � pr r er p ro � p 1e tl r fo ry sa es ec laws n i s JUr1sd1ct1on. to h ed n fi n co s er tt 1a n carrying out o f a11y otl1er rdance with the laws con co ac in s n o ti la gu re e (c) Eacl1 Minister sl1all 1nak . y it il b si n o sp re is l1 to e r w o fiding sucl1 p t en ist tl1 ns t wi co no in the ns s tio law la gu re e iv at tr 1is 1 i 1n ad e ak m ay 111 s er st ni 8. Mi rie s. t is i11 M r ei th i11 11 io at ic pl ap r re fo pi m E of Our g lin the l i ies of ulf f m dut fro e us ca y an by ted en ev pr is ter nis Mi a r ve ne l1e 9. W u r Council of Minis O at g tin vo d an e 11c da en att ing lud i11c s, tie du d sai , cel1is offi ding y the hol istr d Min sai n i l cia offi r 1io 1 se xt ne tl1e by ed fill ft1l ters, sl1all be rank of Vice I\ifinister or above.

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

be shall and ers Minist cil Coun of form Ot1r tively 1 collec all sl ters l\1inis 10. Our responsible for all decisio11s tak:en by tl1em in Council. 11. Our Ministers shall, after disct 1ssion i n Council, make decisions concerning all m�tters broL1gl1t.befor� !l1em. All decisions 0 11 matters of policy shall be submitted by Our Pr1n1e M1111ster to Us. 12. Our Prin�e Minister sl1all be tl1e Cl1airn1a11 of Our Council of Ministe rs aod sl1all preside at all n1eeti11gs of tl1e Council. for Us 13· Our Council sl1 all draw tip its rt1les of procedt1re a11d to tl1em submit ' approval. 14· 0 r Coun il 0 MiniSlers shall have its own Secretariat. The Secretary General f. � ; o . tile S e�r�tai tat shall be a1)pointed by Us upo11 tl1e reco1nmendation of Qur P rime M1111ster. oarit N Tl1is Order sl1all enter ·111t0 force 011 tl1 e:, e date of its publication i11 the Gazeta. Done at Addis Al1,tba- ' ti . -?3 rd da y · 118 of Marcl1, 1966. LD \1/0 E TSAl-lAFE TAEZAZ AKLILU HABT Prime Mi11ister and Minister of Pen. •

Pr<,blc,,,i.i. 0,1,. l11 terpretation of Orcfer ,Vo. 44 1t' 1in l e . A . ss 11 me tl1 a t yoLt ,1re ::1 lclw ' . � . . t th . 11 . ,· e ! ab 0 1s sl1ortly 1�rior to Marcl1 23_ 1 )er 111 �1 1� Pr1111e M1111 ster's ofl1_ce_ a d rha 11 rt � 9 f 66· 0-� dr(.1ft of Order No. 44 (as 1t 1s set 1iu l1as been c1rct1lated ,111d 1 1. n cu. o e c se l o-· 111 tl1 c Cot111cil of Mi 11isters. Tl1e obJ r s c is t �,, be. en , p e�r, 11! sed i 1 t11 e CoL 1Cl 1 t ll'c.lt. ·• (• OS th · r,ti 1 . . i ti le d r�1ft Order is i11consistent \Vil· . " visions ot' t11e Cor1.. t1.: • n1s stit ti 1 ll)n . · J\11. m P r o wl11cl1 f vest ent 1e c) ti power appo111tn1 c.1f � tl1 e E rn1:-1eror a,1 ? rcqtiire e,tc � . :E. _ ll .,rur . and wl11cl1 require tl1c C ot111c1. ·1 1vli.t 11ster to be J)erson�1lly resJJons1blc to the r, o <.)f M1111s · · 1 ers tt) be resp<.)nsible to the E�ni·p er . . ,,.I So111e

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cha l nge s men are t to be ade i11 tl1e position and role of tile fund a � � i� ore rro . the M1n1sters and the Council, st1cJ1 cl1a11ges sl1ot1ld, as a matter the iste r, Min me Pri not law, be made by Constitt1tio11al an1e11dn1ent." if policy ise w of The Prime Minister ':1-Sks for comment and advice on tl1e qt1estio11s raised above. 2. Assume that yot1 are a lawyer ir1 tl1e Pri111e Mjnister's office a11d tl1at t11e time is after Marcl1 23, 1966. The Cot111cil of Mi11isters l1as begt111 clisct1ssions of tl) . next five-Year Pla11 a11d .ftitu�e. budget a11d ta:x policy. A clivisio11 of O}Ji11 j 011 iias developed: 011e grot1p of M1n1sters fa.vo11rs greater ex1Jc11ditt1res 011 ecltication particularly primary eclucati�11, co11pled vvitl1 a11 i11cre,1sc i11 inco111e a11d la11d taxes; another grot1p fav? L11� s t �x increases and 11:ore SjJe11di11g 011 rt1ral road bt1ildi11g, arguing for first pr1or1ty 111 tl1at sector; a tl1 1rd grot1J J favot1 rs ge11eral adl1erence to the prioritie s of tl1e past bt1dget and 110 11e,v taxes. Tl1 e Pri111e Mi11ister J1as deter mined l1is own position; l1e asks l1is l,1wyers wl1etl1er, legally, I1e is free to require tl1 e Council to acce1)t l1is view a11d ,vl1etl1er l1e ca11 i11sist tl1at Ministers S LIJ)l)ort l1is policies or resig11. \Vl1at ,vot1ld be yot1r advice? 3. Assume tl1at you are a la\vyer worki11g i11 tl1e Mi11istry of X. The Cot111cil of Ministers has approved fo1· st1bmission to Parliame11t, draft legislatio11, affecting your ministry. Your Minister l1as co11siste11tly favot1red amendments to tl1is draft legislation, bt1t l1is pro1Josals ¥/ere rejected by a n1ajority i11 tl1e Cou11cil. Your minister still feels strongly tl1at these an1endn1e11ts are 11ecessary. l-Ie asks yot1r advice: legally, can he report tl1e issue, l1is disagree1ne11t witl1 the Cot1ncil and his arguments directly to tl1e Em1Jeror? Ca11 l1e do so over tl1e oppositio11 of tl1e Prime Minister? Can l1e bring tl1e dispute to Parlia1ne11t? Or is l1e now leg,1lly bot111cl by the decision of the Council? 4. If you argue that Order No. 44 is an1bigt1ous witl1 respect to some of tl1e questions suggested above, \Vould yo11 favottr amendi11g it to resolve tl1e a1nbiguity? If so, w.hat amendments would yot1 co11sider? Would s01ne kinds of a1nendn1e11ts raise constitutional questions? Consider again tl1e co11cept of co11stitt1 tio11al con ventions - and tl1e discussion of tl1ese in Part 1 of ChaJJter II. Is it better to develop conventions \Vitl1 respect to the proble1ns st1ggested above - or to ,1tte111pt to resolve them bv a written ''law''? 5. Note and consider the significa11ce of Articles 2, 6, 7c and 8 of tl1e Order. Review Order No. J of 1943, notably tl1e articles wl1icl1 are a1ne11ded by Order No. 44. Order· No. 44 and t/1e Role of Pc,1·/ian1ent �nothe r respect in wl1icl, Order No. 44 may be ope11 to furtl1 er clevelopn1ent or i11terpreta �ion is _ tn the relations between the government and Pttrliamcn l. In his speecl1 011 tl1e � ro111ulgat1on. ol the Order, the En1peror said: ''the ·rrime Mii,ister a11ct tl1e :tv1ini stcrs sl1a�l be collec �1ve. ly respons1b}� lo Us and to Parliame n t l1 c l�e�1sc�I Const1tt1t 10� of 1955 t of s n io vis pro tl,c w th i e anc ord in acc T �e Chamber of 1 1 a voice 11 1 tl1e selcct1on of the 1 tl1e i,1g giv as s i tli ted Deputies in terpre Prim e Minister, as tl1e following reading in dicates.

From Voice oj· Et/1 i<JJJia, 26 M,trcl1 1966. �l1e two Ji ui,dred-ftfty elected ·oeJJ Ltties ()f tl1e Etl1 iopir111 P,1rli;.L111e11t_ yesterd,ty Lt l-labtc l 11 unanimously e,,dorsed Ak az ez Ta fc l1,1 . ,:i Ts E. ? 1-1. of t en tin n the appoi . �old as tl1 e first ini e inister of this ,l11cjc11t rnc.111arcl1y t<) wl1on1 1111pcr1,1l ,1t1tl1()Pr M rity w,:1s deleg ated to select 11 1c111bcrs of 11 is Cal1 i11ct.

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te a to ld en o f S h o a s� t1 o i H jo r nt b e m 5ee m 12 · e_ g th tin g � i it v in � 1 1 o ti _ lu � sc re a , In . e, d re [e ec . te D l no ia er e p th Im reference s ay d es u . T id sa s ie ut ep D on t l11 s 1 n attcr , tl.le ' p 0 11 · n gover �ment, I� tl e E th f o re u ct ru st _ 1e .is the tl g n zi 1i a1 rg o re 4] 4 . o :� er is to Ord h e ic er h d th w n u t ru P en m � ne Minister er v o g e v ti ta n se re p re re o m a right step tovards e p e m E ror and Parli ame th o t le ib ns o sp re ly ve ti ec nt. ll co e b ld ou w et 1 t bi ca ai,d llis e n1atter. of th ew vi nt r� e f if d a k o to , er ev w T he I>rinit Minister's Office, l1o

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's O e� ist 1n e � im e sterday � Pr ffi 1 e tl by d ue iss s y wa t en m te sta ng wi . T11 e folo , l sty ile ria aJe Ha pe M Im e is assi H Sel by ted ga 1ul on pr r de Or 1 e tl th wi n tic ec nn i11 co 1 e Emperor into tl1e structure l t by d ce du ro int 1 1 tio va 1no 1 i e th ing rn 1ce 1 ,0 I last weel<: o.f tl1e Etl1iopia11 Govern111ent :In His l 1istoric speecl1 of Tuesday, Ma rcl 1 22nd, 1-lis I111perial Ma jesty Haile and ister me Min Pri of t11e y ilit 1sib po1 res 1e l t of s, term l 1cra ge1 in l o <:e, s I ie Selass 1 ,vith ance ord ac in ent liam Par to and r c ero mp E e 1 tl to inet cab l1is of bers 1 the 1ne11 tl1e provisio1s of tl1e revised Co11stit11tion. T l1e order promulgated by His Imperial M.ajesty i1 11)leme11ting the i11novatio11s introduced by Him into the structure of Etl1iopia's Gover1 1men t cloes 11ot, 110\-vever, specifically mention Parlia.ment by nan1e, bt1t Jatl1er states that tl1e Prime Mi11ister is 1·esponsible to tl1e E mperor and tl1e State, a1d that eacl1 Mi11ister is i11 turn, responsible to the Prime Minister and, above l1im, to tl1e En1peror and tl1e State, for the perfor111ance of his duties. Tl1ere £ no i11consistency or co11tradictio11 in this. Tl1e Order itself must comply a11d. be cori;istent wit l 1 tl1 e princi1Jles established by tl1e Revised Constitu tion, and tl1� langt1a�e 11se� i11 �l1e Order is precisely tl1at llsed itl the Revjsed C onstit utio� .H1s I1nper11l MaJe_sty · s pron_o�11:1cen1e11t 1nade tl1 js amply clear, for He stated, in one �lace, tl1at tl11s_ respons1 b1 l1ty to Parliaiuent is liinited by tile rigl1ts _grant�d to tl11s boJy - \Vh1cl1 can 011ly flow from tl1e Revised Constitution - aod' � n anotl1er _paragra1Jl1,_ tl1 �t tl1is respo1 1sibility to Parlia 111ent was tl1at envisione d in tl1e Rev1sel Co11st 1 tt1t1on.

. Tl1e Slate, i 1 1 _tl1e se11se tl1,tt tl1is ter11 1 is l1sed i11 tl1e Revised Cons titution �o 11� tl1e 0 rdcr D e�111ng tl1e Powers of tl1e Mi11isters e11co1npa�ses the people of Eih 1 o· ' b e T . . 1 n p1a b ot 1 a� p 1I ys1cal persons a 11 ct_, 111 · t'o 1. n a · tl1e 1arger se11se,as tl1e sp1r1t of the . . · · .�1·11 f ·h ,n tio is expressed 1n various ways: throug His Imperial MaJ e5IY,; h e � �_ _ ao <l, 1e lea. a t 1e late ar1d tl1e repository of th e sove ; on rei 11t of tl1e nati entau ves .tl1e E tl1_1 op a 11 JJeople tl1e1nselves, acti1 1g tl1 ro11gl1 tl1 eir � l1(y elected repres sea1ed 111 .� arl 1ame11t. · the t Tl1e levised Co11stittltio · connectio11 , provides spe ci. fic�.11·y t11awJJe1l . _n, 1· 1 1 t 111s · Prime Mirister a1 1d tl1e MiniSters inust t .D1e n Par l1a pr ese to nt tl1 em . sel ve s called to .,,1 1swer q11 est1 ons presented to them. in e l o . ent,5 r Further, i 11herent in tlle very_ 11atu . re and s and . : character of Parliam al Etl1iopia's Governme, 1t · t S pr t ·, . e dge, b ew o a ve ati i�] o leg i of l pr va ap nd : · r:i v U �� ; of tl1e OVd"a}l progr ai�ml O Jl: Go n th� a verninent n s i ts dt1tY x 1n �ed as pres e In tl1eir scrtitiny aiid approva1 d ' r � es f ha se sc he d1 t ac i en nent a1 , ts men . Parl .: � to tl1e Stae and e xercises tl 1 �uIi r ro_g . . · p � mea sur e e th of ove con r tro l ,. , . activities of the Goveriime11t 10 D • 0 .'1 accordance witl1 the Revised Const1tu0· . .. .. . .. �

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1-\lternative Patterns of De·velopn1ent: Models and Problems In some count.�ies political insti�ution� s�en1 now S? well establisl1ecl tl1at the choices open l_ development are l1m1ted; n1? st 1f not all basic principles are reasonably, tut1ona sti con ture _ cer t 1nly not trt1e of many de elop1 g countri_ es, _ for fu _ 1s an l 111 Etl1iopia, despite strong, � _� � � settl ed. But _t !1,is ns, the prospe� t o_f basic social and econc)1n1c cl1anges opens tip a \vide ancient political trad1t1? . range of importai:t ,choices 1n the const1t_t1t1on�l field . We �l1all theref �re explore very IJriefly some open, startin \Vtth �l�e Engl1sl1 ''Vleslm1nster'' model wJ1ich, so far, may e w�1 cn � es cho � ic the . of appears to have !nflt1enced ideas of Eth1op1an pol1t1cal developn1e11t, a11_cl going 011 to disct 1 ss some reacltngs on political tlieory (in possible alternatives. It may b � helpft1l here to �efer back to tl1� Chapter 1) and on the alternatives to the Westn11nster system v.1I11cl1 I1ave bee11 formt1lated in Tanzania (see Part 3 of Chapter 2).

T/1e '' Westminster klode/'' r·be so-called ''West1ni11ster model'' is a tl1eory and a fra1ne\vork of constitu tional development derived from the Co11stitl1tior1 of E11gland. It may, arguably, be presented as a model whicl1 tl1e Etl1iopian. cons titutio11-1nakers l1ave bee11 follow ing in the past decade and shot1ld in tl1e fl1t11re. Tl1 e basic ele1ne11.ts of tl1is model, as applied to Ethiopia, \Vo11ld be: tl1e contint1ed devolution of tl1e power to formulate governmental policy from the monarch to Parlia1ne11t and political leaders appointed as heads of ministries and departme11ts, tl1e de\1elopn1ent of tlle role of Prime Minister as the head of tl1is governme11t, the gro\vtl1 of parliame11tary instit1tt.io11s and a more vigoro11s 11se of parliament's basic IJO\Vers coupled witl1 tl1e growth of electoral institutions such as parties - so tl1at tl1e Pri1ne l\1i11ister a11d l1i s ''cabinet'' are made increasingly responsible to Parliament \Vl1 ich i11 tt1rn is 1nade i11creasingly responsible to the people - to pop11lar will, eXJJressed 11 ot only for1na.lly througl1 Parliament bu t through otl1er agencies of i11terest articulatio11 as \veil. Tl1ese steps may also be accompanied by the developme11t of a stro11g and independent jL1diciary, and an expa.nsion of tl1e scope of r.ights of political ex1Jre ssior1 a11d as.sociatio11. In theory this model can probably ser\ e eitl1er a socialist a11d pla1111ed eco1101ny, or a free enterprise econ om)' - or a ''mixed'' system wl1icl1 combi11 es elen1ents of both economic systems. 1

Evidence of such development 1nay be found in Etl1 io1Jia. Tl1e power of the monarchy has been consolidated; a parliament has bee11 establisl1ed, first as a creat11re of t�e royal government to promote tl1e autl1ority of its laws, later on an i11de�endent basis - with the lower ho·u se accot1ntable to its electorate tl1rough establ1sl11ne11t of a broad-based suffrage. Separate ministries have bee11 created. Parlian1e11t l1as been given power over tl1e budget and taxes - tl1e crL1cial leverage to develop otl1er powers over government, and i t has power to question. Tl1e latest stage l1as been Order No. 44 of MarcI1 1966 which gives to the �rin1e Mi11ister tl1e power to select , other ministers and whicl1 strengthens tl1e role of tl1 e Cot1nc;l of Mi11isters. If a �'Westminster model'' is to be followed, tl1ese two lines o·f de\1elop1ne11t - tl1e cabi�et and the parliament_ ·wotild be combi11ed by n1aki11 g tl1e 11:i11isters ''res _ po� s1ble'', collectively as well as individt1ally, to Parlia�e11 t - tl1 at 1s, by 1nak1n g_ theu ten ure of office dependent 011 expressio11s of p,1rl1a1!1entary c?�fide11ce. �111s further development cal g�·� up1ngs cl (whi 1 might well prodt1ce tl1e format1011 of_JJol1t1 or emb , ryonic JJarties in parliament) ma y be foresl1aclo\ved by those p1·ov1 s1011 s of the Re ised Cons easingly tt s ed, wl1icl1 reqt1ire 111i11isters to co111e incr , tion � titu 110w to Parliame11t for questi.onirlg and by the increasi11g t1se of the po\vers to co11trol the budget and the government' s basLc · gram. · Ieg1· sl ,1t·1ve JJ1o ,

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y l _ al g� n r1 aranteed by the C !o is }1 ic 11 w , _ ry ia i� id ons ti Tl1e i11c e1Jende11ce of tl1e jt leg 1 slat1011 �or tl 1e ap po int n g t 1n e m le p n 11 e iv ct fe e m ef es r t1i nt, eq 1 r ll i st 5, 95 f o tt1tion f a trained leg�l professio o t en pm l? v� �e 1e tl 1d 1 a es n . ter1ure a11d �e111oval of judg ce est fir _ on ly b m l1sl1ed y, ar i 1c 1d Jt J1e T _ . e v ti ec and � eff s to n1ake · stel1 i11stitL1tion enfor ce t� e civil liberties alre to l� ab be s, un r _ y ady r eo accepted -would, so tl1e tli at 1on would enabl e uc ed of on 1 ns e t e x e tl1 e l _ r 1 h l1 suc \V 1, o iti itt st on C e l ti by d te an gr and ge ne �all� re�pect ed even by d se u ly e iv ct e eff � od to _ rs liberties to )e JJroiJerly t1r1de erly 1ng a ll tl 1e.s e 1nst1tutio ns, of course nd U . ed l1 JJ ap e ar y e tI1 those agai11;t \vI10111 r �en:1e11t o n tl1 e essential Iegiti'. ag n a � an y. 1it 1 11 of e ns se d wotild b e a ne\vly deve lop e 1 01 1al pr1nc1ples, and a willingne ss to L1t t1t 11s co sic ba e es tl1 of 1 nacy a11d cesirability abide by tle rL1 ]es of tl1e game. l�L1t of cot1rse tl1e fe.. 1sibilitya11d tl1e desirability of tl1e ''Westminster model" ed. We have examined one ion est qu be y 1na pia 1i<) Etl e lik y 1 11tr coL )i 1 1g elo dev i11 a exan11)le of its rejectio11 in Africa - Ta11za11ia - vv l1ere t11e model was discarded. 11ot tl1rougl. re\1olL1tio11, b t1t throL 1 g\1 a deliberate , p l an11ed dep arture towards a quite different ca1stitL1tio11al system. Of coL1rse Etl.1iopia i s a very different countr y, and tl1e ex.iste 11r,e of stro11g n1011c1rcl1ia l i11stitutions here mak es it i1nportant to study tl1 e West1nnster model, wl1icl1, as \Ve saw in Cl1apter II, g rew out of establishment of a strong111011arcl1y followed by a long, slop proce ss of devolution of power from tl1 e 111onard1 to tl1e parlian1e11t. W11etl1er a similar process could-or sl1ot1ld unfold l1ere - 1111..Bt at l east be closely examined.

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TI,� de\1elOJ)n1e11t of a system of gover111nent based 011 free and fr e quent elec· t 101:5., vigo�oLis btit efficiently working re presen tative parliam e11ts a11d compe titive polit i cs, a )yste111 \vl1e.1�e parties and ideologies a11d go\rer 11 01e11tal action proposals n1ay be ad,aiice� b!' diverse, so1netimes a11tago11istic i11 te rest groups wl1icl1 compel� ?l)� 11ly -:-- )llt w1 tl1111 bot111d s se t bJ' law - tor e lectoral st1p1Jort, is 110 ea sy task ��,j !�cieti wher_e many people, by dint of tradition and upbringing, may hold vdaesilu_es· r 1 �t tces wl11 �1� n1ay be 111co 11 s1ste11t e e ofth s � e ,vitl1 som tl1e of establisl1111e nt " ct e" J)O1 1 t1ca co11drl1011s. · 5uch a Wl1ile tl1e 111ain focLIS of Ol 11. st·Ltd 1s · 011 pr ovisions of /ai11 t111d erly1ng Y 1 0 . ce tl1eory of L Over111·11e11t. ,v. e l1ave trie tan or mp ci (e.g._ 111 1 e · Cl lclpte r 1) to stre ss tl1 · . 11011-legal )r · oblems _: tlle 0 b Sl.acle · s - ly 111g 11 1 tl1is 1Jatl1 of development. 0 t te . A cleei)ly e11tre11cl1ed co 1 cept f ·j . . . ·1011al u 1ty is ob,,1ot1sly a prereq u1s he ? i�a_ t d � t JJrofou n c l )olitical cl1a11 e. S� too en IS CIVIC edu at1011: Jeopl'e mu st con 1p reb nd I � esse11ti.al i:ri11ciples 1111ct!r1Yi11g l e a t p ad o J ric· to syste m seeks l1 th 1 c l 1 e � y cot11 1t r � i value tl1esc ])riJlCiJ)les. tile . i e s ec 1 � d an be ent a1n rli a ide l of s, e p o11 e l cti � 1 � ? Y �t ;l� � t � . �; al debate :1. nd w, iilt to n1 . 1ese _1ns�1tt1t1011s work - s01net1mes more t gro\l' wa 11t to atl1ieve tl1eir o 0 s l 1 o 11 c o aio e b p� l l ca A ca iti iti l r, e s. po l nd s l?O r � � n 1ore co1nJlex so tlie 1 1e;l fi��ivic Ag 1 fficu educatio n grows 1nore urgent and d1 , rid inl there mus: b e developed 1 li y to co 1npr o111i�e- (whicl1 inclL1d es a_ n_ ove� J ieil! t i psycl 1ologcal willi i1 gness ti �1 �� lV et1t d eeply-held a com� eJcula!ll pos1t1ons ); for system n1ay not last long if th e /f) _ a p :vi nii ers ity r r tak ino e al o . y' c · l m a11 os ( d tl1 ing e l ·· i 1f 1t 1s ,l st:ong oiie) is left as a11 ol p . ' d'fy o 1 t1 s, t c a" st , p �wer1 ess to influence and mo n o i 1·f · ct·1v er se and. 11umeri un cal '! e l d . n tra· hance ia ll bu t .g . ar ti (e cu � p la te gr i1 1te st ou e r st t1dents, ·raditio i 1a · · · c ' ·l ''el. i·tes , or '-J'o· ung d e . h t· . lites'') are not g1ven · e ucated '·e .

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to 11ence sometim in action, es eve11 tl1ot1 gl1 1 ese gro11 ps, for one tl � and rd hea be . to lack tl1e capac1ty to elect 111any of tl1e1r O\V11 spokes111e11 to tl,e er, anotl1 or son rea . w als system t1ld see1n Tl1e to require deve mbly. op 11e11t s of � s ! o ? rgai,iza _ � pular � � o p . . . wl11ch l1as e11Joyed �11tl1or1tar1a11 lrad 1 t1011s and new to a soc1ety often es _ abil1t1 al tion role s wl11ch tt1rn 011 status derived f1·on1 JJositi o 11, lineage and pow er of pts once c or the like. son1e de1nocratic s o cieties, bLtt certai111y tl1 eir in Aristocracies, c�11 exist i11 . fluence canno� be d1spr�port1onate, a11d tl1ere 1 �1t1st be a11 t111derlyi11g agreeinent . equalrty, statt1s, "'' o rtl1 a11d ''r1gl1ts'' .of eac!1 i11divid11al, ancl tl1e pol1t1cal the about . fr?n1 and be represe11tative o f all 111aj or gr ouJJS in political system mt1st recru1t society. A system of representative gove1·11111ent based 011 free electio11s wot1ld also seem to require a considerable :flovv of i11forn1atio11 - co1111n11nicatio n j11 two direc tions, not simply down\vard to ''the people'' bt1t ll}Jward as well. Con11nL1nication must be free, bt1t partictilarly i11 a society wl1ere literacy is low a11d tl1e �xperier1ce of competiti\ e politics is 11e\v, the li111.its of freedo111 1n11st be rectsonably , veil tinder stood and reasonably vvell obser\1ed; for Mill's dictt1m tl1at '·ti1� tr1Jtl: .. \Vl {l even. tt1al . ly prevail gives n o asstir,tnce (as Mill l1i1nsel'f o bserved) tl1at t111fettered rabble rousing may 11ot ·ttndermine, i11deed preclude, establisl1n1e11t o f tl1e IJreconditions for this dictum t o operate. In otl1er \Vays a11 ''i11 frastructure'' of com111u11icatio11s n1ust be established - by road and air, by printing presses a11d raclio statio11s, by e<lLlca tion and langt1age comprel1ension, by co11fere11ces a11d forums - so tl1at com. munities may ·be tied more closely to eacl1 otl1er and develop a11d recognize tl1eir interdependence and overcome regio11al fears ar1d prejt1dices. The Westminster model of parliame.11tary den1ocracy - s0111e l1c1ve argt1ed :i: woLtld require and depend on tl1e existe11ce of co1npeti11g parties so tl1at a strong opposition wo11ld constantly scrL1tinize tl1e activities of go'1ern1nent a11d co111pete for p11bljc supp ort by propoundi11g alternative lJ olicies. !3L1t experience obvioL1sly cautions against untl1inking i1nportation o f IJarties patterned after tl1ose in wester11 democracies - esse11tially privately co11trolled, privately fi11a11ced citizen orga11iza tions which seek political p o,ver througl1 elections. Tl1e da11ger tl1at 1Jarties 1nay assume a tribal or a J)erso11al or a regional base, tl1at tl1ey will pro vide orga11ized mechanisms for conspiracies aimed at brib�ry or i11timidatio11 or otl1er perversions of the electoral process, t11 at they n1ay co 11fuse ratl1er tl1a11 elL1cidate t 1 1e electorate, t�at neither the majority nor the mi11ority may <?bserve co11ve11tio11s and rL1les wl1icl1 �1rcumscribe co1npetitive JJO]itics elsewl1ere - tl1ese and o tl1er da11gers are reflected in the experience of coL1ntries suc]1 as t�igeria a11d Pakistan wl1icl1 J1ave atten1pted �stablishment of West.1ninster 1nodels. A11d we J,ave notecl Preside11t Neyere's warn . ing. against deliberate cievelopmcnt of i11stitL1ti o 11s wl1icl1 .111ay acce11tt1ate ec o11on1ic or 1deologica1 divisio ns rat 11 er than institL1tio11s wl1icl1 \V111 acce11tL1ate tl1e 11eecl for cons ensus on the funda1nentals of natio11al JJ olicy. 1

Tl1e above, of co urse o ·nly sketc11es so1ne di1ne11 sio11s of so111e pro ble111s of creating an infrastrLtctLire �1,ereby clectio 11s a11 d con11Jeti tive ]JOlitics a11d tl1e deve lopment of parlia1nent as the cei,tral orga11 o f gover111ne11t may work. 1tssi1111i11g (a�d of course the assuinptio,1 is debt1table! tl1at tl1is is _a_11 t1lti111at� g�� l, wl1at steJJS might be take,, to Inove towards it? The 1de,t of ''pol1t1c,tl JJlct1111111g -a11ttlogoL1s *

!ennings, De111ocracyi,i Africri (1963) t)P, 34-35: '' ... it is a11 ,1busc of lar1gL1agc �o clcscribe as a den1ocracy · any systcn, of gover11111cnl in wliicl1 there arc 11<Jt al Ic·.1sl two 11ar11cs ... "

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1 ic n o n o ec '' d y et little cl? se at � to � s u 1o v o o m se l c 1l te t _ o w ion nt s n o t1 tu ' ti s � in c ti a cr o 11 e1 c tt1re'' for l 1e 1Jol1t1cs of develop1n g soc� e t 1 1 0 re tu ra te i l e l1 t· t f o ie.s_ li tc ll Jl 11 i t 1· to t ·c , ]Jtl · I ,er ae\ielop ment 1 1� I1as bee11 . . . I .1 ,e t e d 1 c LI 1n · e of 1r tt 1c . rt st ra i 1f ,1 civ c s 11 l t f o ts en 1 _ en el ) l ab 11 11 st Pre 1 al co it v ne a. as po n nt d 1� a of 11 at h sc y tr 11 u co l oo 1e tJ of cs vi ci ,e tl _ il io educat L1 d al ce 1c s ct ro re p ra JJ ,. 1t d e1 an �1 . effi f o st in t n u t 1e i 11 p o l e ev d 1 e tI , 11 io ai,d adtilt cdttcat � respect fo r the out an n1 1n J !I co w l1 1c 1h v _ n io l1 1s f, a i11 tioi,s to ca·ry otit electioi1s p ic r on ti d p u e an rr t co a 11s a1 i co ag s 11 10 ct n sa t 0 ve coi,1e tl,e ievel OJ')n1 e11 t of effecti e y, rl th s rit ea io ap pr rh pe , y ic bl o pu vfl de e th ; to e ic rv se a as ed us be to !r w po i; bl pu l t ca r 1a lo ve tl go so t en t m nen rn ru ve go l can ca lo i11 s on 1ti itt st in ic at cr 11o de1 of n1e11t nt, the developJ?-e l. r? 11� ve io go at n of t L1c 11d co e _ tl1 r fo ry ssa ce ne ntirture ex1erie11ce , ns uo te e 1r th ila op nt ve to opvel ss de ce ac as 11 1c bl l J)l e tl1 l1 1ic wl to s es pr 111er1t of a. l tte of democratic institutions, the va e tl1 s se es str .I1 1ic \vl da a11 ag o1J JJr 1ne11t of oficial s da itie a11 ti\i ag ac of op pr ups d gro cln al o11 ati 11iz g,1 or g, 1 ci1 a11 fin e 1 tl of 11 tio i. l 1 L close reg th nt me at , rlia \Vay n i the pa r we po k see 1d 1 a s on cti ele in es lat clic can r wl1icl1 s1Jorso developn1e1t of ]aw a11d legal ad1 ninistratio11 ,vl1icl 1 will n1aintain other ground rules gover11i11g tl1e 01)eratio11 of tl1e systen1. It see11 s to 11 ;1\ie bee11 asst1111ec,l in some of tl1e constitutio11-making in Africa i 1 1 tl1e clecaJe br,1cl(eti1 1g 1955-1965 that tl1e inst itL1tio11s of representative government a�1d d�n1ocracy cot1ld at1tornatically be brot1gl1t into existence, perhaps with a litUe d1rect1011 �io111 tl1e_. t op, by tl1e 1)ro1nL1lg::1tion of tl1e requisite constitution. Experience now caL1!1Q11s �1g: 1111 st. sL1cl1 a11 OJ)ti1nistic vie\v. JL tst as econoniic gro\vtl1 entails a l1ard. 1Jer1o=l of _1Jla1111111g a 1 1d sacrifice, so wit l 1 a political development predicat ed 011 tl1e \\est1111nster n1odel. "!

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. it inar be argtied tl1at i 1 1 deve lopi11g cot1ntries tl1e Westminster model is un· · t rnme� sat1sfactor' becat1se there 1·s ca11 overwl1e 1n1111g gove exect1t1ve · need for stro11g · • . 1 xec�t.•1ve ,lec.,1_dersl111J, tl1e argt1n ent goes, i s tlle 011 1y soL i rce of effecti\'e leadersh!P � r b � �g fcii� al cl,a�1ges ai1c� JJrogress; exect1tive leadersl1ip alo11e ca11 main tai n .1 e ol te11 �g 1 le f_a br1c of i1,1t1011al L11 1ity; i t 1l as to gt1ide tl1e propagation of a new ; in· d l 1l w1 ll e11cot1rao 1 eo ogy \\ 11c a ces e pc o n f O •· PIe t·o d o 11e\v job�, cast o ft' old prejudi· l1ibitj11g tiadjtioi1s _ to c f ce es5 oc pr e th d n a e ap th : v sh d t1 s n u te 1o a a n . i g : � i1 ur� developmmt. Th e execu ti sec as to i11an ge tl1e national econon1y ar1d ' � rit fastest lJos;ible rate of rowtl b_y hannehng Ji n p _reso u_ rce� to °ir sc�rce and capital areas of irvestmcnt an l effor� _ 1 � as to 1a� �o ��; has 1t ; deter 1111ne pr1or 1t1es_ l tl,_ e se ' d1 sside11ce ,t 11cl tl,e discoi,te ilt 0 / t.;1 0�e wl1o ol1ci_es , '. ps p its OIJpose or its order u to ward of JJlots ,1,,cl re\rolt g . 5 arat, ! �� _ its sep ' own lSl , from authority often 00 5 . which thnaten the existenc� : t t� e 11at1on. 111 order to carry ot1t tl 1ese_ fun an ol , n tl1e argt111e11t co11ti11t1es t1l e e _ _ _ 1 l 11 wl c c_ 1,i _ · x�cutive 1 ,rcr oowers govcr11111e 11t 1eeds easily by li11 1itecl by a c'0l1S t1tL1t101 111 cs 111 vil 1 especia ' . I l y 011e JJatterned on a · " ci 1nodel''. 111e exectttive it 11 ove be arg ol d, contr u need s comp r �\11ei lete : servi_ ces, tie armed for�es, :� � utl . · b to ot� cr ei C. ' 11eeds va 1 1ts of t11e state; 1t � � Jici 1nst1tt1t1on, 111to disci ])liiled ei,e 1 n getic e ' to : lite ; it grot1 ,tble ps 11eed s be to _ aIkcPf, and e11for,e laws accord· 1g to e uo · ts p -� 11ation, arg ".� hjcn of tl1e tl1e of needs cl,ecked b{ Iegisl;tive 0�s trt1ct1o erce1Jtio11 n or by t ri. ba I or regi. onal ce11tres of 1Jow er l'-� ro . , may de Ia) a1d b : 1 coi,fLise a Iarge_ 1 . . rate JJOJJulace · it n1ust tl,erefo re be an rne11[: ·· � illite st1bordi 1 1a e Parlia111ent a 1d ver o reg oi \t l g ; Lo tl,e ce11tra 'je c . \ it may alsc, l1ave to SLtbor (.'111.t1 atc , ,al ad111inis tratio1 r r O . t 1 rs tl1e role 0f t I1e JUcl1c1ary, . redt1ci11g Jts po\\ C .

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stitutiona l grounds, or it co n o n o n at i s powers to review 1 egt·sJ . . · th e · I li ega · · ty . o f or to b. ear ca se s w·1th po1 it1caI im adm1r ac ts u · se . tiv · p l1 · c at . tra 1o ·· n s , an d l t may Ir nece ·nu·t the n. ghts o f t},�e p eo pI e tlirough s t1ch ssary m e a sures a s prevent1ve . l1· · · · · d etent1o o t , ee d d s ecu re u11 derstand1ng n I n p. or 11 t s or cens · and s upport _ as well as t O pr · e v t e sen n i s e a· th t f g o o v n e r n m ratio e n t w · il ene l n e e d not only its own, vigoro g · u s prone m w e d s 1a ' m d ac an h 1 ' a ne . b ga nd tit its own party. a p o� the other hand, it can certainly be argued that the granti n g o f su c h strong rs m p a a o t y b w es e t ve n o cu n 1ore tl1a 11 _ paper over t11 e cti. ffi exe ti ct ,lt i es. ''Strong'' d n o o er e_ P_ t, s m s en e t n1ea�. eco11on11� progress. Tl1e govern d an g er s to in t ernal n at u io n it n. an a� y d m ay ri t1 t� lt 1mateJy be .111cre�sed if tlie gover 11 secu m en t pr events �e th el of 1n e o gs f n t1 1e es p eo p le _or .1g1101·es tl1e 111terests of tl1 e di expr sio ff er ent regional and tribal . groupings. T l1e re m ay . be 111crease d da�1ger of corruption _ not simpl y ho b1 1t n� al st di s s� y th ci e al k1r1d of 1Jsycl1olo?1cal �orrtIJJtion wl1icl1 un finan qt tes tio n �r tl in 1e c g; an re _will be a_ da11ger of a regt111e, lilce Dr. Nkrt1mal1's ed power in Gl1ana, gradually losing -popt1lar.1t)' as 1�s leaders_ beco111e 1nore �L1tocratic, as _they I_ose touch with the people, as tl1 e reg1n1e lo ses 1111petL1s to get tl11ngs do11e, uo ,1l forcible· overtl1row occurs - and is gr eeted by ge11eral rejoici1 1g. An ideology im po sed fro m above, \Vl1ich i s 11ot ge11uinely rooted in mass support, may be more sham �11an st1bsta11ce , and it �a� l1lti�ately cause more divi sion tl1an u .nity unless the d.iffe1·e11t and often co11flict1ng views of tl1e people are invited heard and accommodated in its making; and certainly tl1e subo1·dination of the judiciary and denial of civil liberties can be as effective in causing sedition as they are intende d to be i n preventing it. Those are some of the arguments.

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The Problem of the Futu,·e of Monarcl1y The future position of the mon arcl1y is natura_lly of !l1e grea.test importa�ce of c �1!rse to ar�ue ible poss is for the constit·utional development · of Ethiopia. It . eor1es. t h a · tent \T.'1th ''modern'' po 1t1c , that monarchies are obsolete or 1ncons1s . 1 1 � q tio ues t e h · an? ng, stro ly lar ticu par are pia lio Etl n i chy na r for mo the um nts e arg But · , er M odel t ns 1m est e ''W Th e l ro l na io ut 1·t 1 s co� � rai:ig o long pened here is its ultimate, .' rch as head of state na mo would call fo r th e growth of a d1st1nct1o n b. et;;� 11� 1 � '' i "� on th st e in ex is ts no w ct io n is T . t_ n _ e �nm e v go and the monarch a s hea d of �om and other European cou11tr1es. In ., tutional monarchj es'' of th e Umted King s of er ,v po g in s i rc e xe of e bl pa ca e n o l 'I · w be a la . in . y , a m h some f h h em narc t e mo o t . 'p e s; ti ea tr g t1n t1a .'' go e n s w la ng ti g the executive, e.g. appointing officials, r�u 1 � r s te is in m of ' e' ic dv ''a ; th to ant ,, but, these powers ar� alm os t entirely_ exerci �: ie�r! emo d by · sel ect ed lar ge ly e ar is . nd who operate collectively un der a Pnme y a h m rc a n o m e h T . n w ro C e . � . cratic processes working independently O �I 1e WI11 of th l a n o ti a n f o t en im d o b em e s th a e po lic sym b retain gr eat status, but he ha� only � : ��untries, particularl� wl1en and I �nity - a _function of gr ea t importanc e e d a n a h it w t n e 11 1 n r e v o g 1f the parliamenta ry system prod_uces de��l��:S and no quate base of support to ge t things done. � lo e v e d n r e d o m a f o r e d a le p o t e h t d ue r 1 e d a On the other hand, it ha s be en �rg le t a h t e r e h w ly r la u ic t r a p s r � : � p ar ul tit an th c e r or t nt 'eople simply will not 11nder�tan m us ou m y ve ha · ing . p . . er, d ! ea d d th e trad1t1o gru · ze e t in o p 11 e e b O e t na l or popular 1 y reco f o er It 11as pow tual the concept �f a head of state who has ��:� t gre � enjoyed :�� nly �� not � opia out t .hat u11t1l recently, t11e Emperors . 0 h i They, e. peopl the of minds the but. were identified as the government 10 ,y

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e u esti on . may be th q d a n e , g n a l1 c ts en k g as a ed ry a n 1 i Jr 1e tl 1 e n e b 1 d l 1a\e l1e m o11arcl1 ca n rule 111 fact and t ss le 11 t1 t_ is x e n t ca PU t n e 1 11 11 r ve go e v ti � ff e �l�� t1,;r v e r11ment . O n go of ds n 1a n m co e 1 tl d in h e b y · thi l ct ·e 8 · di i r e · e i t cs pr · 1 s � 1 1 . . . o t1 1e f·o rce o t e o h ave 11t · I I va t as ue t 11 ca 11fi e 1 ev g 1 s 1 n 11 o as a s e b r e li t i' . e t tis . m 1 1 c a1 11 ) . m ti e 1 · v1e\\' · p eople and be le e a de r o f l11s 1 e 1 tl be st u 1n ab e li e s el r o ty ,i , tii l na l·o c at . r.. f syn1boI o . 1 e1 m · n t a e er � , in, 1t ag t ov ·h f · o rs e w ar be, o JJ m e 1 v t cc ff e 1e tl r \'e O e k ta to l, i :io irl liis discre r ff w e e u l h po rf 1s ug 1 l no w t ch 0 ar on 1n di e or a o f 11 o1 ro 10 J 1 e b ld ou i sl ·e ,e t d ar atie e tl1 e po�e r to resolve t?e difference. av 1 l t_ 11o s oe h d o w \V i�l, tl;e Prirlle Mi t iister, btit e �f c?nflicts between Prime M inis_ters nc e r1 e J e x1 e tl1 om fr rt Tliis \'ievv ir.ay gain SUJJpo e w , thot1g l1 th� Emperor might v1 1s tl1 1 01 d a� · , 1a 1 a w ts B o ai,d Kiiigs 11 u ga,ida a11d ers pu rs ua1 1t to advice, he must still th o e is rc e ex 1cl 1 a rs we po de. leoate sone of li is e fin a l arbiter of governto b , ti e on r sc di s l1i in e bl isa rc e x e . 1 tl1e egal J)ower, reta0 n1e11t JJolicy.

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ion ect of Sel s arid t ister 1e11 A1in it11 crz-1, Re tlze for · ods 1 et/ M . 11g visi De of 11 ble Pro T/1e a11cl PolicJJ-lJ?af<,irzg Civil Servc111ts. Tl1 c 1T1=ll1od of sele cti 11g a Pri111e Minister is o f gre at import�nce, since it may deter111i 11e ·I1e basis of l1 is power, a11d tl 1e kind of at1tl1orit)' wl1 icl1 lie may be able to exercise over tl1e gover111ne11t committe d to llis re sponsibi lity. Again, the meth od of selecti11g �1 Pri1 ne 1.Vlinister a11d l1is cabine t n1ay re flect a syste m of political recuit· me11t - tl11t is it 111ay create i1 1stit11tions for se l e cti11g tl1e top political leadership of tl1 e cou1try �l1icl1 \vill de ter111i11e wl1at gro u1)s and wl1at backgrou11ds are likely to be JJrevtle 1 1t in tl1e ma.lce-111J of tl1e leadersl1 ip of a1 1y particular government. 011e r-ossibility, follo\ving tl1e ''Westminster n1o del''. is that the choice of a Prin1e Mirister \Vot1ld l1ave to be a1J1Jrove d by Parlian1� 11t be fore he could take office, a11d tl1 at Parlia11 1ent \Vot1ld be able to disn1iss a Pri me Minister by passin g � v te reflecting 110 co11fi�ence in l1in1 or l1is policies. Arno 11g t11e risks of this solution � 1 s �l1_e <larger tl1at Parl1a�e11� 111.igl1t 11ot be sufficie11 tly expe rie.nced, unified_ or pol1t1call:,1 !natt1re_ to exe_r�1 �e rts IJOWers wisely, and tllat s ucl1. a procedure nu ght aggravate_ J1e re�1 01 1,ll d1\'JS1011s "''11ic 1 are so ofte1 1 prese nt in a popularly elec�ed body. Tl11-c s�l11t1011 \v_ottld_ also clear!)'t affect tl1e positio11 of tl1 e E mperor in re!a�ion !0 �lie executive . Aga111 tli1s syste1 11 11 1igl1t wel l lead to ministers who are poliacians 11 1 tl1 �e11 :e t�1,1t tl1�,Y int1st deJJe1 1d on co 11siderable popularity and pub lic support �tai arban1 t en� s confidence. Thus 1ninisters wo uld be recruited less frolll tbe � n�s o_� tl e professi ra onal c1v1! servants (since they pr esun1ably would no t take p� �n elect1 ree r111g a11d co 1u1Jetitive politics) an 1 ; d 1 ore front a �olitical group wtuc f � c el�pe c l i11_ E thiopia. A11d a f11rtl1er r� st1l t o f making selectio n � ��1: ;��:� ·��1 11.s��r resp ll e w o 11 s 1 b l e ight to · cand d e p end ent upo n p ar11am . ent m · in to te1111Jt )r coii1.JJel tlle ·over nient . h u to lf, t11ro g y---P itse co11t he rol nt t arlia me fluence or electioris ai,d 1�roce� rt a p ent L rt �s or tl1� organizatio n of a governm or all tl1e� measures or soiiie subtle con1b1nation. . . teJ1l . s If Pail1 a1ne11tary stippor t ·s not y 5 a ld be pre�r co1� �q u isite, e ernat i,, an al ts t wl1ereby t Pri i ne Miilister a� a r ae n n· tl1er i;n.1 n1sters are largely cl1osen from th _ ? over . of se11ior ,;ivil servants and t a 111011a l leaders an d otl1er l1igh officials. r� e and � ment - i 1 tl1e ory a t least 1 ess \vo ld 1 be pro ma f � x age d nce e toOthrou� d e by per i · the JJrinci�al JJatl1 to top o81 t· e_ arid io b s ?f 11Id ex e c� wo t 1v e pol rsh itic ip al e ad l e tl1e civil service , ratller tl,�n s �ro n 1 c parlian1e1tary activity A 0�� ihnent in the competitive politics of el� 1!5�er (aod· . t 0 . · artin i u s ob t cle l1er v M P ime h h r e is t at suc a l1is cabinet) 1night liave n � eIBect�ive � � pol1t1cal base - no committed su pport 111 p

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public endorsement secured througl1 direct electoral s11pport; and the ine::t that neither . Parliament nor �ther minis�er� no;r tl1e top civil service be t migh res 1Iarly obliged to follow his leadership 1n trmes of controversy; partic1 feel Id ou w ually such a Prime Minister - and l1js cabi11et - co11ld be cut off from the feel �q of the people whom he js supposed to be governing if l1e fails to develop institu ��;�s to _establish close relations with Parliament - or close relatio11s directly with the electorate. Of course there is room for compromise between tl1ese two 1nethods of selection - developmen� of a syste1n wh:icl1 s�.1?t_ly con1bi11es recruit1ne11t fr�1n both the ranks of Parliame11t a11d popt1lar pol1t1c1a11s as well as fro1n tl1e senior civil service - and perhaps from otl1er gro11ps too (sucl1 as tl1e cl1urcl1). Tl1e system 1 ide so111e regional represe11 tation in the also be manip11lated to pro, may . selection of make-up of any given cabinet. Wl1atever tl1e 111etl1od, arguably tl1e 1nost critical factor, in a developing count1·y, is tl1e need to secure a governn1e11t with the capacity and energy to formt1late programs and press them: tl1e need for a cabinet wl1ich will develop teamwork, inter11aI discipli11e a11d sl1are cc1n1n1on objectives. Obviously, the more responsibility for day to day plan11ing and managing of government be comes separated from the Emperor, the greater tl1ese needs 1nay be felt. A related problem concerns the crucial lower ecl1elons of the civil service the professional and specialized, and today largely younger eleme11ts: Assistant Minjsters, Directors General and related personnel. Even tl1e n1ost vigorous cabinet may accomplish little if th� bureaucracy i_n the 1nin.istries does not respond to com mands and calls for action, if it lacks commitment. S01ne co1nn1entators on p11blic administration i n developing countries l1ave expressed concern that tl1e public service may tend to develop as a distinct ''elite'' group in society, increasingly cut off from tl1e mass of people. Tl1e contention is that a system wl1icl1 sin1ply recruits young men from the universities, provides them quickly witl1 relatively well paying jobs, tenure, isolation and immunity from competitive politics, pensions and assured albeit gradual promotion and incon1e increments, may prod11ce a self-perpetuating group of relatively priviledge elites wl10 live (in comparative terms) far more com fortably than the populace, become detacl1ed from the people tl1ey are supposed to serve and (as a group) too indjfferent to goals of development, perso11al sacrifice �nd the politics of developme11t. Of course tl1ere are obviot1s interests to be secured in the development of a professional civil service class, with recruitme11t based on education, and promotion based on ability and experience and with tenure to provide prote ction agai11st jmproper pressures, favoritism and nepotism. But it n1ay be eq�ally important to provide legal means fo1· vigorous housecleani11gs of agencies whicl1 do not produce desired results. A crucjal probelm, tl1en, is tl1e constitutional _ ?asis for the organization of tl1e public service: Who is to h . ave tl1e power to n1anage tt? To what extent is tl1e cl1ief exect1tive to be given powers to reorga11ize it, to appoin!, dismiss or transfer at his pleasure in order to secure loyal, energetic, subord1nates in positions of critical importance. Once again, perl1aps, tl1e answer cannot_ be fot1nd tl1rot1gl1 blind imitation of systems prevalent in otl1er developed co untries. 00

The Prob/enz of· Pc1r/iame11t: Its Role a11d Evo/1,tion . •

c rfl1�. difficulties witl1 tl1e im1ned iate developme11t of a Westmi 11ster n1odel a11d s�mpet,tive party politics, coupled witl1 tl1e need for strong executive leadersl1ip ggest tll,l t conside r,1tion mt1st be given to defini11g careft1lly tl1e role of parliarnent,

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l y a el c ur ti i l_ o , f _ o th s ei e g a st e, l a n o ti si n p a tr g rh u d st , at e ' m l at l ea p to ? pe _ al!y endowed lc e �h f o e ic vo c :� ti en th u a . e th as t en m la ar p lt xa e to. er stamp'' bodv. a b t as b 1 ru S JS .m 1s d to o d 1t l l i w · · l e, 110r ru . to t ll g ri 1re . d 1v a 1 wit 1 t n 1 rea1 P?�er .or atte;: a n r r a a w o d t e p 1p u _ q e l il o to d n a te a st f o rs e tt a f n o t n ra o n ig l ia m en t s acti.vities in r a P ! o ry o t . is h e l1 e T rec nt em st sy l a ic it l o p le tl in ll it w t· e es sy 1 th ea tl neralizations. bo ge ie el b n o ti si po n i: co s it of ;�:rs and ctreful studies l e. p m si so t o 11 ly re sL1 is ) em l ro and the p the e�e�t th a t Pa�l�ame nt is ill t� d ge ur be n ca 1ts e1 No dotbt strong argum e at a p_ ol1t1cal p hiloso 1n 1g f l ?r se it by ot 11n ca it y; lic po l 11a tio equipped to develop na t canno t its�lf prepare the 1 s; l an p a: ye � e ar ep pr ot phy of devdopme11t; it cann e ta1led cod es or a: ?e ep _ pr ot nn ca I! y; 1� l 1Jo of t 1en un n str in budget - t l at crucial 1a as op e h1 her n 1 Et ew , els ed de , in it ; se rti pe ex i led l sk r fo 1g 1 lli ca s \re as 1ne r l1e ot tor na t igi as en or of iam l r h muc Pa of e eiv nc co to te ra cL1 ac in y ive l 1r na see l \Vo11lc in1portant .egisl ation. and utive p an exec slli der lea ive cut exe for d nee al tic cri a i ng L1m ass 11 evt t Bu a has ent liam t Par tha ue arg ly tain cer y n1a 011e l , ver pov ; l)] er,1 sid e11do\ved \\ tl1 con crL1cial role to play in political cie, e l opment. Firstly it can review and reac t to the 1neast1res lad before it. Tl1is task of sifting and ratifying or modifying legislation proposed b r governr11ent may be of great in1porta11ce. For, wl1iJe it may be highly11 inaccurate 1o cl1aracterize Parliament as an aL1tomatic reflector of ''public opinion (and public opinio11 is a very amorpl1ous co11cept), the process of ratification does provide an :lement of general co11sent to tl1e l a\VS and tl1us endows tl1em with a legi· timacy wl1i�l1 becomes increasingly importa11t as pol itical consciousness grows. Furtl1�, P�rliame11t may ,vell be an essential l ink to provide a two \Vay flow of commur1cat1on betwee11 governme11t and people. Tl1is communication role m ay ?e. of great in1porta11ce. We l�ave st1ggested before tl1at tl1e process of devel_opm ets�i, is in part a process of edt1cat1ng and 1nobilizing people to 111ake new comrrutme� to express 1ew wants a_nd den1a:1ds, tl1rot1gl1 01Jen, legal cl1annels i;\nd to appreci��e inore ftilly the l1ardsl11ps or disloca tions wl1icl1 tl1e devel opment process en tails: to c�eate a gr�ater sen_se of t111ity. Con1mL111icatio11 is of tl1e essence. J>arliamentaD' ele_ ctions (cespit� the risks of appeals to parocl1ial or tribal type loyal ties) may p�od· . · · v1de som · e )f tl"'IS COlllmLinication. Bt1t since electio11s occur only once over a per10 o.f _years Hher avenues may have to be explored These might include fre quenl vin ce! o 1s1ts nd :eports to their constituencies by M. P 's· r p regular visits to the � ar� a Y _I J i �e11tary co111mittees ,;vit l1 o1Je11 l1eari11gs ·o� matters of concern to the a�e� ) ntl u v1s1ted a1111. open forma. · l he rttlg t . s 011 pe�ding o ll op p r up , , f witl 1 io11 legi t sla � · s given to tle ptibli ' a .ttc 1at�ly rep S( r� mte d res en tat e ct ive s e aff of of ou va s r i to present views � � � na�ly more y a cu r ia· : u ar � , e e ad . g e ra at u e v s co as ia q_ m ed m l r 1 a these auxilary a�tiv�t ies of P s · For these and s1m1lar (often neglecte d ) functi on , . c h· men t may be ju t an� as the long, SOmeti1nes tiresome, debates, S��itO' a: rpOr( � making alt! act;al o s ma� 1¢1 · ' 11 sk e ta th ; lls se ha e of th e rs th be am ch . mize conc·e te devices !�e;�iY 0an essentia et 1s need l com munication rn , in part. rroi i e Again Parliament ma h a vi r . e JatiO� ve a l ay . p sig n�fi ca n o t e t l i�v es ig� ro tor t y �he �ond_t1�t of tlle execLiiive is 1e d 1 cte , th e en e g pa� · _ ffic1e11cy . with which already a is being inplemented ti1e e 0 s nt en tto ns t o of e tl1e governme11t with resp c to tllused ! , ct1lar unsclved probl� � e vel p ed lly can et11e&'! .· b er pow this ry ato stig inve , fu pry out fa:ts showing �iha: ? r e rc . gy, fo t� s inco �pe u s tence or corruption and tl1u measL1res. Some sucl1 f ll o C · he tinction seems impl ied b y A .l rticles 72 -and 73 of t 1

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articles . and in Chapter VII we will· concern ourselves with the scope of these ' t1on 1 ,, ' · · na 10 herent powers to 1t1o dd' a any ent has liam er Par eth wh ns stio que nd 'the � e and information about activities affecting the conduct of government. Of course p arliament's power to investigate and question is a sensitive power, readily sustible to abuse; there may be dangers if Parliament po.kes too freely and indis c;fminately into executive affairs; such activity may run counter to tradition; and otl1er eacl1 py may unl1ap an with be war nt at ve consta executi d �n ment parlia _ � political condition . Assumin g that the reviewing, comn1t111ication -a11d i11vestigatory roles of parlia ment are worth developing, a further problem of uniqt1e i11terest .i11 Ethiopia is the question of bi-cameralism and tl1e ft1ture of t11e Se11ate. Its earlier rationale, as a council of traditional elites and a sort of mentor to guide develop1nent of a Chamber of Deputies may be easy to appreciate. But today some may argt1e that the Senate is as anachronistic as the Englisl1 House of Lords is alleged (by some) to be. If one sticks rigidly to a theory that parliament should simply be co1nposed of popular elected representatives of the constituencies of the nation, that parliament simply represents the majorities tf the people of fixed, eqt1ally populated units of the consti tuencies of the nation. then the Senate would see1n anacl1ronistic..But the fact is that many parliaments, scattered all over tl1e world, are 11ot structured solely on this theory, and the theory may be inadequate to get us a par-liame11t wl1ich will best perform the roles we want to assign to it: review of legislatio11, more commu11i cation to the groups which make up society, and intelligent investigatio11 of executive administration. One may argue, for example, tl1at a11 appointive se11ate affords opportunity to secure more talented, educated and politically experienced persons in parliament, that it provides a way to give representation to important groups in society who might not otherwise be represented well or at all in the otl1er l1ouse e.g. univ·ersity graduates (and students?), the military, civil servants, traditional leaders from the several provinces, the church and so on. -Finally, any realistic assessment of tl1e developme11t of parliament n1ust foct1s �n many practical problems, sometin1es slighted in tl1e tl1eoretical literature of poli tical development: it is important to analyze the laws (and the JJol.icies tl1ey reflect) which govern elections and electioneering - for the operatio11 of these may affect the_ c�nfidence which parliament enjoys, the leadership to be produced within it. It 1� important to consider questions of the rules governing the organization of p arlia�ent, the procedures it follows, for these may well affect its efficiency and its ability to carry out the tasks of review, communication and investigation which were discussed above. The Problem of the Role of tl1e Military.

Mjlitary esta�lishments are .incre�singly expensive; and exp�11ditures for armies, _ ai r fior ces and navies, must compete with expenditures for educat1011, roads and other ee � dfd development projects. So the question may well be asked: why strive to eve op a military sector of government at all? Despite some earlier pronouncements, it appears that every country in Africa, ne w or old, has a military establishment of some size. The justification for their exi te nc � !31ay be grounded· on a number of considerations: international relations an� p ol c ies tl\e i ; require a (especi large ments in country ally of ) interna l security ; res t P ige a nd tra,tlition,

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t ary un its create s an ele ili m d ze ni . a g or l l e • w m ' ed m ar · l ent el rv ,�, • , • f • o enc e t ex1 : The ut t1t s ns 1onal dev el m . co on ti a n e th 1n le · o r d op n a e er w nt . po , se o ll w t t11 m n r ve o . of g. o go s 200. �an army proved c apa n ve T . is E en ft o ble cannot be o�rlooked, tl 1ot1gl1 it t . �1l1ta!-)' co ups and milit en m rn ve o g_ d 1e sl li �b y t ar ly es . i1t re pa ap n a g in l p op t of 1cal c1rcumstances they m t h po e m so n 1 d an , le see ib ss po government, are obviously to become tigl1ly probable. t ili ary, often associated with m e th of e l ro l na o i ut t sti n co e tl1 f A ''clas;ic'' view o d ho]rl th at the armed ul wo t , en pm lo ve de l na o i ut t i t ns co of el od m tl1e Westmirster tic s; they ruust support the li po m ro f ' d' te la 1 st '' in d an '' l ra f orces must be ''net1t l1 e �� of state; th ey a�e sworn to e th y be o d an nt me r n ve go d he lis . ''legally'' es:ab t not take po s1t 1 on on current political issues, 1s 1nt y tl1e t bu n, tio itu 1st co1 l1e t d en def p no ar ticular ideolo�cal ve ha uld sho y tl1e l; cia cru e t i qt1 be y n1a cl1 vl1i se even t11o commitme11· witl1 respect t o the issues of develo pment a nd po litical change; their leadersl1i1) i; essei1tially silen t and tl1eir ou tside activities are cere monial, except i11 time of i,var or i11st1 rrection. Whetl1�r desirable or not, this theory may , as experience suggests, be in· con1patible ;vith realities. '' A modern'' n1ilitary f orce m ay possess the physical means to dislodge vvitl1 COiTIJJarative ease, any go\'ernm e nt a nd its leaders may be ab l e to take over sovereig11ity in the Hobbe.sian sense - at least temporarily, but long enougl1 to iisrupt, if 11ot alter, the p olitical processes. A ''modern'' military esia· blishn1ent nay increasingly req11ire a higl1ly educated young office r corps - men v1l10 canno· sin1ply disassocjate tl 1emselves f ro m tl1e problems of developme nt and change _witlin th�ir c.ount ry. Disengagement fr om po li tics may mean in effect supporting the regime 1n po\ver wl1atever i t s merit a11d if tl1at reo-ime is unacceptab le to significait _ele_ments of so ciety, however ''legal'; i t may be in ;stric t constit utional sense, t l1e ?�1n�1ple �� ''neutrality'' n1ay ,vork i n fac t to '' engage'' the milita r�'-: �nd engage_ 1t 1n �ol1t1_c�l objectives wl1icl 1 are not sup po rte d by some or 11:1ucn °1 its leadersl1p Or :f rn1l1tary leaders r� slighted, dow ngraded, isolated and 1gn�!ed1 � by_ a gover1men! 111 power, tl1 e poss1b1l1.t y of resentme11ts pro ducing plots to saus f) �1evances or thirsts for recognition and p owe r inay be increased. Since :hes� pr oble�s n1�� well exist i n ex1).erience as well as theory, P��aP,5 �hey ca�no, b� ignored 1n pol1t1cal planni11g. Anotl1er vie,v of tl1e role of the mih_t�I'), ng ivi str increas1ngl1 d1��t1ssed, starts from the l)reroise tl1 at is on 11at i pin g l o e if dev · a al . th n towards a pol1t1cal systen1 tot1nded on pr1.nc1p · the .t. ed les of demo cratic cons ent, ,, t cons�nt nt1st also encompass tl1e m ilitary c . . · · · e th ili · t a,ry ne eds t o be o.IIl� . la r · m " · to bas1c 10·1nat of [tl1e] political syst·em . s1011 n t' t uca o d e_ . . 1 t m�st l 1 a v· e a po litical the · f o to tha t of · he citizen a large :·: [and a] COIIllill ues va g m em erg t ment t o the ) 19641 society." Gee Janow:iz � Military In Th e D ev elopment of The N ew Na;,w�iioJiBI . p 100 et .!eq.). T· h-us likehtfle well-edu t the r ca o t ed untr you y, th ra ·.1 per· of tl1e co . ' elites'' orttlle 11 er_ v ce, or tlle y, to� , :(ll�I; ilit rel ar igi a ou ' s m le the de rsh ��: ip } � ceived as sou 0 n e e a _ akiJI J d �J o r rn ers mb nu n its gh we ou th en n ev r, l p a and, the a1gume nt go:s i� c o t o a de gr ee - be dra wn into tl1e dec1s�f v e S � process, a1d, perhaps inton;,�:t ac iti ual conduct of various govern ment ac . ·ctJY • 1 tr s m I ple:nentat1on of thi t h or a r ''legal'', c)nstitutiona l- vie! � Y_ may pose many hard questio11s. f o�be consu·9 oi t ,. It must be decided ho w and t o whorD ( : wP ) n tution wil allocate power r e powers tot11e Head of St . ?o bUild and c?ntrol tl1e military. F or e xaOlJtbebe3 0 the execuhve establishment (as o ppos�ti!rY bud� of State)? What powers · p a rliamen� exercise - e.g. over the� f 0_fijce�· over JJay s:ales ' over the pro cesses of recruitment, training and promotio n ° ·· •

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leaders, su�l1 as Chiefs of St��? To what e�tent w�l! tl1e Consti top of c tion sele er O�1.·00 contemplate and authorize the use of ID1l1tary officers 111 pos1t1ons usually tuo mitted to the ''civil'' service? On a broader front: is the military to be used in c �on-buildin g tasks other than maintaining sect1rity - such as building roads na Is military service to be see11 as a form of national facilities? nity commu other 0 :rvi ce? Jf so, should there be conscription? Should tl1ere be a civilian reserve officer �orps and mobility in and out of tl1e military? Will officers be trai11ed, i11 part, in and universities? officers be ap1Joi11ted Will to parliament (if schools r ;gula r the to men1ber )? W.ill tl1ey allow appointive assigned to b � � parlia ment i � �o structured _ _ work for civ1l1an agencies? Will the career patter11 be d1 ffere11t - and 1f so, attrac tive_ to talented, broadly ed11cated members of society? And 110w will this resource of talent and discipline be used? There are, of course, dangers to tl1e view suggested by tl1ese questio11s. 011e may argue that essentially tl1e military establisl1 1 11e1 1t is a 111acl1ine of brute f,Jrce to be kept at bay from civilian government, that tl1e very conditio11s wl1icl1 r 1ake for a oood army: iron discipline and loyalt)', constant drill, a SJJecial esprit, dt;rived from ; special experience, are incon1patible witl1 political ro}es - except in times of emer gency or unusual circ11mstances. Bringing tl1e military i11to gover11ment may be like mounting a tiger - it is difficult to dismot1nt and dangerous to antagonize once you have climbed aboard.

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