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Policy Questions for AFRICOM’s Next Commander July 2016
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The Senegalese navy off-shore patrol vessel Kedougou pulls into port in Dakar, Senegal to refuel during the at-sea portion of exercise Obangame/Saharan Express 2016. Obangame/Saharan Express, one of three African regional express series exercises facilitated by US Naval Forces Europe-Africa/US 6th Fleet, seeks to increase regional cooperation, maritime domain awareness, information sharing practices and improve interoperability among participating forces in order to enhance maritime security and regional economic stability. US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Weston Jones
What’s Inside
News from Across Africa
African Defense news digest of significant, interesting and thought-provoking insights within the African military and security community.
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10 Policy Questions for the Next US AFRICOM Commander
US Marine Corps Lieutenant General Thomas Waldhauser faced a host of questions during his confirmation hearing.
12 South Africa’s Internal and External Deployments
On March 11, 2016, the South African Minister of Defence and Military Veterans briefed a parliamentary committee on South Africa’s internal and external deployments and ACIRC.
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16 Africa’s Active Militant Islamist Groups Map
A review of attacks by militant Islamist groups in Africa over the past year reveals considerable variation in the groups involved. Most are locally focused even if they have declared an allegiance to a global terrorist network. This map by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies looks at the trends.
18 Multinational Counter Piracy Operations
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The Gulf of Guinea forms a significant strategic component of the world’s maritime system—but how strategic? By Captain Pakiribo S. Anabraba
26 Internet/Facebook African Penetration
Charting the level of African Internet and Facebook users.
27 Building Partnerships and Relationships
African Defense recently sat down with Paramount executives John Craig, CEO Paramount Industrial Holdings and Ben Jansen, CEO of Innovation and Design to discuss the company’s latest partnerships, the company’s strategy and business philosophy.
30 Maximizing Effectiveness with Special Forces
African militaries are seizing the benefits of specialized forces.
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News from Across Africa
Central Accord Exercise Kicks-Off
On June 13, an audience of senior military leaders, multinational soldiers and guests of honor from across the world gathered for the Central Accord 2016 opening ceremony at the Gabon Air Force Base. An annual exercise, CA 2016 focused on command post and field training exercises held in the region to foster partnerships, increase interoperability and build the capacity of the participating African, US and European forces. “Regional exercises are one of the best ways to test and evaluate capabilities and procedures before a real world crisis,” said US Ambassador to Gabon, Cynthia H. Akuetteh. “The multi-national cooperation marking Central Accord 2016 in Libreville, Gabon, gives me great confidence that we will be better prepared and better equipped to face the future together.” As the first speaker, Gabon’s Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Gabonese Armed Forces Brigadier General Olame Ndong Ferdinand Gaspard gave an overview of the entire event calendar for CA 2016 through the tactical phases highlighting the airborne operations, education and a field training exercise. “What will be very interesting is that
we will have the 82nd Airborne Division coming from the United States and jumping straight onto the field at Pont Denis,” said Olame. Following the 82nd Airborne jump there will be a combined airborne operation between US, French and Gabonese paratroopers, followed by a multinational airborne wing-exchange presentation amongst the three nations. “Another special training is the Jungle Warfare School reserved especially for the US soldiers taught by French instructors,” said Olame. Along with logistics and medical support, CA 2016 aims to build partnerships and value between nations. As reported by Specialist L’Erin Winn
Angolan Defense Minister Visits Italy The strengthening of cooperation between the Ministries of Defense of Angola and Italy topped the Italy visit of Angola’s Minister of National Defence, João Lourenço, on June 15. According to the Ministry of National Defense, Lourenço headed a delegation comprised by members of his Ministry and of the Angolan Armed Forces. In November 2013 the two countries signed a defense and international security cooperation agreement which included capacity building and training for military operations, intelligence and collaboration in humanitarian operations and peace support, search and rescue, landmine clearance, and medical assistance. The parties also agreed to cooperate in the fields of military law, sport and culture, science and technology, and foundation of the defense industry.
Peace Operations Course & ECOWAS Combined Joint African Exercise The Peace Operations Course and the ECOWAS Combined Joint African Exercise (CJAX) 2016 officially ended on June 10 at the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC). The course, which ran for two weeks had 65 participants who were trained with the requisite capabilities to analyze and
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apply the theory underlying doctrine, principles and procedures involved in the planning and execution of combined operations, evaluate the nature of ECOWAS-led military operations and the capabilities that could be made available and demonstrate the skills required for effective group and team work. It also sought to expose the participants to an advanced and critical understanding of peace operations as a concept and a practice in an international system. In his key note address, the guest of honor, Major General Henry Kwami Anyidoho (ret.) shared that the changing landscape of armed conflict around the world has occasioned the shift towards integration of activities within peace support theaters with an increasing number of multi-dimensional tasks. These he noted included humanitarian relief, stabilization operations, security sector reforms, support to reconstruction and economic recovery, governance and democracy restructuring among others.
Gabon Acquires French Equipment The French defense company Nexter and the Gabonese Republic recently signed new contracts which continue their collaboration. Gabon, a current operator of Nexter’s Aravis 4x4 armored vehicle—with the ARX20 remote weapon station—will be acquiring the company’s FindSat locating system, the Nerva LG robot as well as the NX-100 Novadem drone. Euro-Shelter, a Nexter partner will also be supplying mobile care units to Gabon.
Botswana Looks at Gripen for Fighter Replacement Left with only a few months before he leaves the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), it’s commander Lieutenant General Gaolathe Galebotswe appeared before the country’s parliamentary Accounts Committee and spoke about the challenges, success and his dream for an ideal army. Having served the army for 33 years rising through the ranks to become the BDF’s fifth commander in 2012. Propounding and expanding on how he aimed at revitalizing, re-equipping and re-
African Defense/July 2016
idexuae.ae
THE INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE EXHIBITION AND CONFERENCE The Middle East and North Africa’s largest defence and security exhibition returns to Abu Dhabi in February 2017. Attracting more than 1,100 exhibitors and 80,000 local, regional and international trade visitors and officials from governments industry and armed forces. For detailed information about IDEX 2017, visit www.idexuae.ae To book an exhibition stand or outdoor space email: shahla.karim@adnec.ae
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News from Across Africa building the 39 year old army, Galebotswe, who once headed the ground forces command, revealed that this can be achieved by enhancing their capability in contested and uncontested space both in air and on the ground. To achieve that, he said, the BDF has to re-equip as most of its equipment was old and obsolete. Trained by the British Special Air Services in 1983, Galebotswe said in the past BDF used to buy old equipment; hence most of it is now obsolete. To enhance their capability to contest the air space, he said, they have to consider procuring new jet fighters as the current F-5s are unsustainable and costly to maintain. Recently there has been speculation that the BDF was interested in buying the Swedish Gripen. Although the BDF initially denied the stories, Galebotswe confirmed that they are considering the Gripen. On why they were considering the Gripen, Galebotswe said their operating costs are very low compared to the Russian Sukhoi Su-35 and American fighters. He said currently there is nothing concrete on procuring the Gripen fighter jets but didn’t rule out the possibility of purchasing them. Recently a 12-member team from Saab was in Botswana for meetings. After buying 26 Gripen fighter jets, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been forced to park 12 of them because they were too expensive to operate, sources have revealed. Brazil is also allegedly struggling with maintaining them due to the high cost involved. VUCA Currently the main threat to any country is not necessarily external but can be explained in the military acronym VUCA world, said Galebotswe. This, according to the BDF outgoing commander, is an envi-
ronment that is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. To address that, BDF must be prepared to “take on increasing challenges from asymmetrical opponents such as non-state militias and other loosely organized, sometimes almost “virtual” adversaries; to adapt rapidly to highly improvised weapons and tactics by those opponents; to respond quickly, effectively and efficiently,” said Galebotswe. To address that, he said, there is need to have a national defense strategy which should not necessarily be based on the defense force but all sectors of the economy. BDF Academy One of Galebotswe’s dreams was to see a cadets’ academy. The project was delayed by the disagreement between the BDF and consultants. He said that through the Economic Stimulus Programme (ESP) they are going to redevelop the Paje Military camp where cadets are trained to meet the modern challenges. Galebotswe revealed that one of the developments that they will do at the Paje camp is construction of an airstrip. Their 2015/16 cadets trainees are currently based at the Matsiloje military base near Francistown. “Our aim is to turn the Matsiloje camp into an academy that is well equipped,” he revealed. As reported by The Patriot
Class of Nigerian Air Force Intel Officers Graduate The Nigerian Air Force School of Air Intelligence, Makurdi, recently graduated 77 military intelligence personnel to aid the fight against aggression in any part of country. Addressing the joint graduands of the Young Intelligence Officers’ Course, Intelligence Supervisors’ Course and the Basic Intelligence Course, the commandant of the institution, Group Captain Raymond Nwankwo, said the training was aimed at boosting the capacity of the graduands.
Nigerian Colonel Excels at US Army War College Nigerian Colonel Charles Nengite, a colonel, was recently recognized for outstanding performance at the US Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., noting that his
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performance was the best by any foreigner in 38 years in the college. In one of several letters conveying his choice for the various awards, the commandant of the college, Major General William Rapp, described Nengite’s performance as “arguably one of the best in the international fellows programs at the USAWC.” He earned the Distinguished Graduate award reserved for the top five fellows in his class of 381 and also the Commandant’s Award for distinction in research. Nengite also received the USAWC recognition award for innovation in SHARP - Sexual Harassment and Response Program and articulated a seminal paper—I am your friend campaign—strategy under SHARP. SHARP is considered of significant importance to the US Army. He was recognized as the 2nd best speaker award in the speaking competition in the 2016 class made up of 302 Americans and 79 other nationals from 73 other countries.
Namibia Receives Russian Weapons Russia has supplied small arms and light weapons (SALW) to Namibia, according to a source in the Russian defense industry. “Namibia has ordered Kalashnikov AK-103 and AK-105 assault rifles, PP-1901 Vityaz sub-machine guns (SMG), SVD-S sniper rifles, PKP Pecheneg and RPK-74M machine guns, Kord heavy machine guns, AGS-30 automatic grenade launchers (AGL) and GP-34 under-barrel grenade launchers (UBGL). Russia has fulfilled Namibia`s order,” the source said, not specifying the quantity of the weapons supplied. He added that the delivered SALW would be issued to the Namibian naval infantry.
Nigeria Sends Pilots to UK and South Africa for COIN Training The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) has sent 20 officers to the United Kingdom and South Africa for special training on combat operations aimed at sustaining the capacity of the military to deploy aerial forces to troubled parts of the country. The flying officers, selected after the completion of their courses at the Nigerian
African Defense/July 2016
Defence Academy are expected on return to beef up the counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram and other militants. Ten officers are being sent to the UK for a six-month training course while the remaining 10 are headed to South Africa for one-year. As reported by Senator Iroegbu for ThisDay
RDF Junior Command and Staff Course Graduates On May 27, Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) Chief of Defence Staff, General Patrick Nyamvumba presided over the graduation ceremony of 39 Rwandan Defence Forces officers completing the Junior Command and Staff Course. In his remarks, Nyamvumba congratulated the graduating officers for successfully completing the course and urged them to remain focused on the role of RDF in the transformation and the development of Rwanda. He further expressed his belief in the fact that at their course completion, the officers are better equipped with required skills to effectively execute their future assignments. “I have no doubt that you now understand better the complexities and dynamics that characterize the current national and international security environment and how they impact on the military operations at all levels. It is your responsibility therefore that what you have learnt from this course and anywhere else be applied in your respective units.” The RDF Command and Staff College commandant, Major General Jean Bosco Kazura said that the officers have positively improved their character, enhanced their capacities and acquired more analytical power, knowledge, planning and communication skills to work more efficiently for their institution and for their nation than before. “The college feels proud once again for this significant milestone in our officers’ professional development,” the commandant said.
French Ambassador Meets with Angolan Defense Minister
Issues related to cooperation in the
African Defense/July 2016
political and military field between Angola and France topped the May 26 audience the Angolan Minister of National Defense, João Lourenço, granted to the French ambassador Jean-Claude Moyret. Asked about the existing cooperation ties between the two countries, Moyret stressed the importance that French companies play in the oil sector, when it comes to large investments and long-term partnerships. “Despite the crisis derived from the oil price fall in the international market, which perhaps will not last, I hope, that companies in the oil sector decide to invest again in Angola with projects to keep oil production in the country,” he said. As reported by AngolaPress
Burkina Faso to Leave Darfur Peacekeeping Mission Burkina Faso has become the second African Union country to announce its withdrawal from the joint UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). This follows a similar announcement by South Africa in early May. The Sudanese government has reiterated its commitment to the exit of UNAMID, and confirmed its “continued dialogue with the African Union” and “the support of its friends in the Security Council until the UN forces exit Darfur as they entered it.” “The Sudanese government made it increasingly difficult for us to provide logistic support to our troops, and impossible for our forces to protect the women and children of that country,” said South African Defence and Military Veterans Minister Nosiviwe Minister Mapisa-Nqakula.
Canines Employed for Anti-Poaching in Kruger National Park Tracker dogs trained by Denel of South Africa are having increasing success in curbing the smuggling of rhino horn and ivory in the Kruger National Park (KNP). Six tracker dog teams consisting of dogs and their handlers have been deployed in the KNP since September 2015 in terms of an agreement between Denel Mechem and South African National Parks. Ten more dogs will soon see action at gates and entrances to the Park to detect hidden firearms and
ammunition or smuggled contraband. Dr. Hannes Slabbert, senior manager canine business at Mechem said welltrained dog and handler teams remain among the most effective solutions to track and apprehend poachers in a vast terrain such as KNP. “Our success show that the number of rhinos killed for their horns in the iconic park would have been much higher if not for the actions of our canine units,” he said. Mechem has a global reputation for the quality of its sniffer dogs used to detect landmines and unexploded ordnance in conflict zones. Dog and handler teams have proven their value in landmine detection operations in countries such as South Sudan, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A team of 30 Mechem handlers and dogs are currently deployed in Turkey to support demining activities. Slabbert said the escalating global concerns about border security and aviation safety are contributing to a growth in demand for South African-trained dogs. Mechem is in the process of negotiating contracts to train dogs and handlers for custom services in Senegal and canines used by the Ivory Coast defence force.
4 South African Infantry Battalion Pre-Deployment Training The live simulation team consisting of Nico Nel and Talent Mkhondo under the leadership of Colonel Wouter Meiring from the South African Joint Operations Division deployed the Gamer Manpack system for a period of a month to Port St. John’s in the Eastern Cape. The aim was to train members from 4 South African Infantry Battalion to equip them with the necessary skills and knowledge in preparation for a peace support mission deployment to the Democratic Republic of Congo. During this live simulation training the military members were also fully trained in practical aspects such as river crossing, booby trap awareness, section drills and house clearance drills. The Port St. John’s training was the first phase of the training which was concluded by the members receiving the mission readiness training at the De Brug training area
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News from Across Africa near Bloemfontein. At the latter training the constructive simulation team lead deployed BattleTek and associated software systems to finally prepare military members for deployment. As reported by Nico Nel
Prisons, Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya Forest Service, National Youth Service, National Disaster Operations Centre and the National Counter Terrorism Centre. The Kenya Defence Forces was represented by 67 personnel.
New Commander for Namibian Anti-Poaching Operations
Elephant Fence to be Built Around British Training Area
On June 8, Armas Shivute, commander of Namibia’s Otjozondjupa regional police took command of the Yesa Ongava antipoaching operation in the Etosha National Park. He took over from the regional commander of Oshikoto, Anne-Marie Nainda, who headed the operation for three months. Nainda said the operations in the park are complex, but dealt with properly by a good team. “We developed a very concise operation plan, which helped us achieve our objective,” she said. She then thanked members of the public for informing the police about suspected poaching, which helped make the operation a success.
The UK MOD reported that on June 10, they began constructing the Laikipia Elephant Fence around the area used by the British Army Training Unit Kenya. The fence, which will stretch for 100 miles, will run around community land and ranches, and will cost almost £600,000. “The UK shares a longstanding and mutually beneficial defense relationship with Kenya, and we are delighted to help in this important matter. Protecting elephants from poachers is an important environmental goal.” The aim of the fence—which will link up with and improve existing elephant fences—is to sustain Army training areas, provide a separation zone between community farms and provide a migratory route for elephants.
Kenya’s First Multi-Agency Response Drill Kenyan Defence Cabinet Secretary Ambassador Raychelle Omamo presided over the first Multi-Agency Rapid Response Capability Exercise Maliza Magaidi on June 9, at the Humanitarian Peace Support School Embakasi, Nairobi. Exercise Maliza Magaidi ran between June 2-10 June through different phases including the clinic phase, the command post exercise phase, field training exercise and the action review. Spearheaded by the National Security Advisory Council, its objectives were to demonstrate Kenya’s preparedness and effectiveness in response to threats, to consolidate lessons from past experiences and improve interoperability between agencies, to improve on readiness and preparedness of all security agencies and enhance standard operating procedures on response to crisis on the multiagency platform. The exercise brought together 352 participants gathered from the Kenya Defence Forces, the Kenya Police Service, the National Intelligence Service, Kenya
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price foreign military sales contract for a base quantity of 172 eyesafe laser range finders for the Kingdom of Morocco, with an option for an additional 28 units. Estimated completion date is July 31, 2018.
Eastern Africa Standby Force Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff Meet The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff concluded an extraordinary meeting on June 17, 2016 in Nairobi, Kenya. The meeting, which was chaired by Somali Major General Mohamed Aden Ahmed, discussed new staffing for EASF structures in support of future deployment. In his opening remarks, Ahmed noted the importance of strengthening the key functions by appointing competent staff as a means to effectively operationalize EASF. General Mwathethe, Chief of Defence Staff for the host country, Kenya, urged the chiefs to ensure the discussions were conducted in a manner that would propel the organization forward into the next frontier of peace and security. A total of nine chiefs of defense and their representatives participated.
Madagascar Minister of National Defence Receives Russian Ambassador On June 8, Russian ambassdor Ahkmedov Stanislas Anvarovitch visited Madagascar Minister of Defense Rasolofonirina Beni Xavier. The Russian ambassador expressed an interest to boost cooperation with the Malagasy Armed Forces and Russia. The development of a draft framework agreement on the Russian-Malagasy military cooperation will provide a legal basis for the next series of agreements. Moreover, Russia has repeatedly shown its willingness to renew military ties during talks with previous Malagasy ministers of national defense, including hosting training in Russian in military schools and academies of the former USSR.
Eyesafe Laser Rangefinders for Morocco Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., has been awarded an $8.84 million firm-fixed-
Radios for Tanzania In late June, the US government announced it was seeking sources able to supply Soldier Dismounted Multiband Handheld Radios, C2 Transportable Operations Center, and Land Mobile Radios (LMR) with P25 Interface Application for Foreign Military Sales to Tanzania. Sources providing equipment must be fully, interoperable, interchangeable and compatible with Harris CommunicationsElectronics equipment and radios within East and West Africa utilizing Citadel encryption standards on the Backbone and individual radios
African Defense/July 2016
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE EXHIBITION
24-26 JANUARY 2017
ABIDJAN • CÔTE D’IVOIRE
Protect the development of Africa www.shieldafrica.com African Defense/July 2016
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Policy Questions for the Next US AFRICOM Commander US Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Thomas Waldhauser has been nominated to be the next commander of AFRICOM
Before and during his confirmation hearing to become the next commander of US Africa Command, US Marine Corps Lieutenant General Thomas Waldhauser faced many questions about his command style, his knowledge, his challenges and his solutions. Here is a broad selection of some of the key topics. Within AFRICOM AOR, what do you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities? Waldhauser: AFRICOM’s top counterterrorism priorities are neutralizing al-Shabaab and transitioning the campaign from the African Union Mission in Somalia to a Somaliled operation, degrading violent extremist organizations in the Sahel-Maghreb, such as IS-Libya, containing and degrading Boko Haram, and interdicting illicit trafficking that resources violent extremism. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al-Shabaab to the region, the United States, and broader western interests? Waldhauser: Despite losses of territory, influence, and conflict among their senior leaders, Al-Shabaab remains a threat to US persons and Western interests in East Africa, and retains the capability to effectively attack members of AMISOM, the Somali National Army and the Somali Federal government. Additionally, Al-Shabaab propaganda, which consistently singles out US and other Western targets, further demonstrates the group’s intent to target western interests throughout the region as evident in the Westgate Siege video of 2015 and the Path to Paradise video of 2013. In 2016 we expect activity to increase across the region during the Ramadan period. Al-Shabaab seeks to conduct high profile attacks similar to the one on Kenyan
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Defense Force’s base at El Adde. Al-Shahaab continues to pose a threat to aviation as demonstrated by attacks against Daalo airlines and the improvised explosive device attack at Beledweyne Airport. Modest and sustained US assistance has contributed to AMISOM’s increased effectiveness. AMISOM forces liberated large portions of southern Somalia. AMISOM’s gains against Al-Shabaab have increased opportunities for progress in governance and development. However, as demonstrated by recent Al-Shabaab offensives, AMISOM successes are fragile and will require continued U.S. and international assistance. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Boko Haram to Nigeria, the region, the US, and broader western interests? Waldhauser: Traditionally, Boko Haram has focused the vast majority of its operations on local national and host nation targets; however, the group is avowedly anti-Western. Boko Haram has issued public calls for attacks against Western/international targets, but has only conducted one mass-casualty anti-Western attack—the August 2011 suicide bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja, Nigeria. At this time, there are no indications Boko Haram has shifted its targeting strategies away from regional targets to Western interests. Boko Haram will likely focus on soft targets in the region, given the group would probably conclude security at hard targets like US/Western embassies would prevent a successful attack. Boko Haram is a recognized branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and calls itself the “Islamic State - West Africa.” This link provides Boko Haram greater legitimacy; the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has also provided guidance and support to propaganda efforts and has likely
helped enhance some Boko Haram tactical tradecraft. In the future, this could expand to limited provision of fighters and materiel. President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, appears to be fulfilling anti-corruption promises made during his campaign. Early indications are that appointees to senior military positions will be willing partners in US security force assistance activities and are attempting to improve the effectiveness and professionalism of the security forces. What is your assessment of the security situation in Libya? Waldhauser: Libya’s precarious political situation coupled with IS-Libya’s destabilizing influence could push the country toward civil war, threatening US interests in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. IS-Libya’s current estimated strength now in question after Libyan forces cordoned and advanced into Surt. We previously assessed IS-Libya had 4,500-6,500 fighters with a majority of the group being comprised of foreign fighters from Tunisia and the Sahel region. Before the Surt offensive, IS-Libya was considered the most proficient Islamic State branch outside of Iraq and Syria in terms of its ability to project force and govern territory. As conditions rapidly evolve, we believe IS-Libya will adapt a more asymmetric approach seeking to slow and disrupt further gains made by Libyan forces. We expect IS-Libya to use its enduring presence in the west near Sabratha to facilitate attacks in Tunisia as a way to export instability. What efforts would you undertake to prevent and/or counter the spread of AQIM
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operations, fundraising activities, and ideology in North and West Africa? Waldhauser: AFRICOM is and will continue to work to degrade violent extremist organizations across the Sahel-Maghreb. Crucially, AFRICOM supports Operation Barkhane, France’s 3,000 person effort to stabilize the region. In Mali, Niger and Chad, AFRICOM will continue to provide Security Force Assistance in concert with Department of State Security Sector Assistance. If confirmed, how would you seek to strengthen the impact of Operation Observant Compass while recognizing those competing national priorities of our partners in the counter-LRA fight? Waldhauser: Despite competing priorities, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Central African Republic remain committed to participating in the African Union Regional Task Force—though their force capabilities are limited. Uganda, the largest troop contributor to the African Union Regional Task Force, has announced its intention to withdraw its forces. AFRICOM has a longstanding relationship with the Ugandan People’s Defense Force, and if confirmed, AFRICOM would continue close coordination with the US country team to ensure our engagement with the Ugandan government and security forces is in support of regional stability. Regardless of force composition, AFRICOM remains committed to building the capability of the African Union Regional Task Force until a change in U.S. policy dictates otherwise. In addition to working with our African partners to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army directly, AFRICOM is also working with regional partners to counter illicit activities that support the Lord’s Resistance and other destabilizing influencers in the region. In your view, do China and the United States share common security objectives in the AFRICOM AOR? Waldhauser: China’s security interests are ensuring access to valuable resources and markets while enhancing its political influence. The United States and more closely aligned western nations have broader interests that include stability, humanitarian concerns, and improved governance. Nevertheless, China and the US should cooperate on issues of mutual interest such as counterterrorism, and on other projects that satisfy both countries objectives.
African Defense/July 2016
In your opinion, what effect has China’s engagement with African militaries had on those militaries and on US security interests? While China seeks influence, it has yet to yield significant impacts on African militaries and US interests. China’s engagement with African militaries will allow them to increasingly gain favor among African military elites to further arms sales and MilMil engagement opportunities. China does provide limited training for military leaders and has engaged in arms sales or military training with two thirds of all countries in Africa. China currently has approximately 2,600 troops and advisors involved in seven peace operations across Africa who are interacting and learning from militaries on the continent. However, China does not have as extensive of an advising and training program as many Western countries, to include the US. In regard to arms sales to Sub-Saharan African countries, China is a leading supplier of military equipment to include small arms and heavier weapons such as armor and artillery. China may be a preferred vendor by providing customer incentives such as lower pricing on equipment and weaponry or other types of assistance bundled with arms sales. Importantly, Chinese security cooperation programs and arms sales are untied to demands for political or social reforms. This fact has been very enticing to many African governments who often resent or are frustrated with US and other Western countries’ insistences on political and governmental reforms tied to receiving economic or security assistance. Many African leaders view this approach as a threat to sovereignty, which is contrasted with the Chinese polices that do not include social changes or restrictions on use as conditions. China’s activities on the African continent do not pose a direct threat or challenge to US National security interests. However, Chinese influence on the continent is increasing. This influence may exclude US economic and military influence and reduce US leverage over democratic changes on the continent. Support from African countries, which make up over a quarter of the voting bloc in the UN General Assembly, is important for China as they continue to pursue increased global influence. China’s construction of a naval logistics facility in Djibouti, its first overseas logistics facility, to resupply their ships supporting UN anti-piracy operations in the Horn
of Africa illustrates its desire to be seen as a global maritime power. This facility, although geographically located close to US facilities in the region poses minimal threat to our security interests. Chinese dedication to ongoing peace operations shows their willingness to seek influence among African and other peacekeeping nations to improve global perceptions and to support China’s global agenda. China endeavors to expand influence in Africa and strengthen influence in international organizations, the United States will increasingly have to compete for influence on the continent but this is a by-product of, not the main objective, of China’s policies on the continent. China’s focus will likely remain increasing its political influence and maintaining access to African markets and resources. Chinese activities on the continent are not a zero-sum game in regard to competition with the United States. China’s recent offer to provide a $60 million grant intended to improve the capability of the African Standby Force and their crisis response capacity highlights China’s willingness to increase its involvement in African security and engage African militaries. Maritime security has proven to be a significant issue on the coasts of West and East Africa. What is your assessment of AFRICOM’s maritime security initiatives? Waldhauser: AFRICOM has seen some success in its maritime security initiatives. The challenges have global implications and include piracy, trafficking in persons, narcotics, and weaponry, armed robbery and kidnapping, illegal migration, and illegal fishing. These transnational threats are best addressed with regional solutions. AFRICOM-sponsored maritime exercises, partner training events, and regional maritime operation coordination centers contribute to our partners’ abilities to perform maritime security for themselves. Through United States Naval Forces Africa, AFRICOM supports regional maritime security activities and complements civilian initiatives that address root causes of maritime crime by strengthening governance and promoting economic development. In the Gulf of Guinea, our cooperation with Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo has led to the regional enforcement of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, an information sharing and maritime security agreement that has increased our partners’ capacity to counter illicit trafficking and piracy.
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South Africa’s Internal and External Deployments
The South African Ministry of Defence recently briefed a South African parliamentary committee on the SANDF’s operations and the ACIRC.
On March 11, 2016, the South African Minister of Defence and Military Veterans briefed a parliamentary committee on South Africa’s internal and external deployments. The internal deployments are mostly to deal with issues of border safety on South Africa’s borders and the external missions abroad in countries like Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, are to ensure the safety of the African continent. These missions include peacekeeping missions and counter-piracy efforts. The second part of the presentation dealt with African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) and South Africa’s involvement. South Africa has recently stood in for Angola in her commitments to ACIRC and will do so until June 2016. The challenges relating to ACIRC and South Africa’s foreign deployment are numerous, yet it was emphasized that all countries experience problems with climate, terrain and a lack of infrastructure on these missions. Members expressed concern about the implications of deploying extra troops for Angola, as well as the lack of preparedness for the different climate and terrain in those
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deployment areas. Members highlighted the problems associated with poor border security and in some places, a lack of borders at all as a risk for South Africa, as well as the vast number of private airports which could be a conduit of bringing things into the country. The co-chairperson, Mr. E. Motimele, asked that the committee hear about the recent casualties in Sudan and how that situation was going. The delegation addressed the questions posed by the committee and explained the unfortunate death of a soldier in Sudan, whilst reassuring the Committee that the South African National Defence Force could handle her international commitments. The Department of Defence admitted it needed help from other departments in creating the borders and roads around the borders. Lieutenant General Dumisani Mdutyana, Chief Joint Operations: Ministry of Defence, indicated that the scope of the briefing would be about the external and internal deployments of the SANDF and on the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. The briefings would address the SANDF’s current deployments,
and the other missions undertaken. Briefing by Ministry of Defence Brigadier General Mlandeli Alfred Kula spoke on the issues of South Africa’s current deployment. Currently the military was involved with search and rescue missions, border safeguarding, human assistance and support to the South African Police Service (SAPS). The border safeguarding is a continuous action and there is an advanced team on the ground leading that operation, Operation Corona. Operation Chariot is conducted at a national level and is about giving assistance to veld fires. The borders in question are the borders with Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho. Internally, these deployments look to ensure the safety of the borders. The external deployments are Operation Copper, which is a counter-piracy operation in the Mozambique Channel that ensures the safety of the southern African waters. Operation Cordite is a peace support operation (PSO) in the Darfur region
African Defense/July 2016
of Sudan. South African forces have been deployed there since 2008 but this is now coming to a close. Other operations like Mistral and DIB are situated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and these are PSO-related in both cases. The problems encountered with these external deployments are climate, terrain, security, remoteness and urban area challenges. The conditions are very different to South Africa and General Kula stressed the difficulty of engaging with rebel groups in areas such as the Eastern DRC where rebels are often clothed as civilians. The tropical areas are also very difficult to navigate yet as military personnel they try to circumvent these problems. Other such challenges are trying to navigate through areas where infrastructure is poor and bridges and roads cannot withstand the weight of tankers and vehicles. General Kula concluded by saying that the SANDF attempts to fulfill the role of government with the resources they have. The next presentation addressed ACIRC: its scope and goals. General Kula said that ACIRC is a mechanism of the African Union (AU), which allows for intervention in response to a crisis in the form of robust military services and troop contribution. There are 12 African countries contributing to ACIRC who are involved in robust forms of peacekeeping and the role is twofold. The role of ACIRC is to a) act as an immediate controller of violence and b) facilitate inter-cultural dialogue to promote durable peace and stability. As of 2015, the deployment schedule included South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Chad, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Sudan and Angola. However, as of January 2016, South Africa is standing in for Angola with these commitments until June 2016. The planned activities include a grand-total contribution of 2,411 people, 380 of which are from the air force. The challenges associated with ACIRC are numerous. There are strategic movement challenges such as the fact that the force needs to be deployable in 14 days of the outbreak of conflict, roads and railways are problematic and issues of sealifts are very challenging for South Africa. South Africa has no medium or heavy air capacity, yet Kula stressed that the African Union has promised to aid in this capability. Moving forward, the SANDF will continue with its preparation and address the challenges and shortcomings whilst still ensuring the readiness for deployment on behalf of Angola. Lieutenant General Mdutyana asked
African Defense/July 2016
that the committee keep in mind that the support they need in terms of getting a comprehensive defense review and rejuvenating. Questions Mr. S. Esau (Democratic Alliance) questioned the challenges concerning terrain and climate in foreign deployments and asked if the other 12 nations also faced the same challenges and if there were nations who have the suitable equipment that South Africa does not have. He addressed the lack of sealift capability and asked if the SANDF would consider using the island off the coast of Durban again as a way of launching operations strategically like they used to in the past. He questioned whether or not South Africa is exploiting the opportunity for trade and investment externally through these operations. We are in economic hardship and perhaps creating revenue streams through alternative sources of revenue would help ease the economic burden. Esau next addressed the issue of border security. He suggested that the SANDF use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the border to monitor movements there more effectively. He expressed concern over the
use of Gripens and said that it is problematic that South African pilots are not getting enough training and the standards are slipping. He suggested that the SANDF look into ways of easing the burden of travel in poorly resourced areas through looking at partners to invest in road and rail to ensure proper conduits of transport. Lastly, Esau addressed an issue that came up in the last report and said that the Department of Defence indicated that in foreign deployments, South Africa has less than 50 percent of its available medical stock. This is concerning because he questioned how well taken care of the troops can be if there are not adequate or sufficient medical supplies. Ms. L. Dlamini welcomed the presentation and commented on the success of the SANDF’s military day in Port Elizabeth. She addressed the deployment along the borders. In a recent visit to the Lebombo border it was very busy yet there was no border demarcation at all and she suggested that perhaps other departments also get on board with creating roads and borders. She asked how the SANDF deals with the number of private airports along the border because virtually anything could come through any of these 200 private airports
ACIRC Deployment Schedule Framework Nation (Advance guard within 0-7 days)
Volunteering Nation (Follow-up force within 0-14 days
Period
Tanzania Uganda South Africa South Africa Angola Chad
South Africa & Chad Tanzania & Angola Uganda & Chad Uganda & Tanzania Chad & Rwanda South Africa & Angola
Jun-Dec 2014 Jan-Jun 2015 Jul-Jun 2015 Jan-Jun 2016 Jul-Dec 2016 Jan-Jun 2017
Algeria, Senegal, Niger, Burkina Faso, Egypt and Sudan will provide combat support and combat service support throughout
13
Force Levels and Contribution of Resources Force Level Main Personnel Equipment Strength 431 Joint Task Force HQ
8 x Ratel Command Vehicles
199
1x Motorized Infantry Battalion
103 x Casspir Armored Personnel Carriers
904
1 x Armored Car Squadron (-) 1 x ZT3A2 Troop 1 x Mechanized Infantry Platoon
8 x Rooikat Armored Cars 4 x Ratel Missile Vehicles 4 x Ratel 20s
155
1 x Artillery Battery
8 x 120mm Mortars
204
South African Army
and pose a security threat. She asked what the implications of standing in for Angola in their ACIRC commitments would be given that South Africa had not prepared for that. Mr. S. Marais (Democratic Alliance) questioned the strategic challenges faced by the SANDF. The lack of strategic lift capability could translate into serious lack of readiness and adherence to procedure as well as mobility challenges given the lack of ammunition, resources and commodities. He expressed concern about exposing troops to these conditions and given the strategic challenges, it creates a very dangerous situation for the troops. In terms of offering equipment, service or logistical support, a strategic balance would have to be made because South Africa would not be able to fulfil all of those roles. He was concerned about the disciplinary issues of South African troops in Africa and commented that a number of troops were suspended and sent back. He asked what had been done to deal with that and what preventative measures were in place to ensure it would not happen again. Co-chairperson Mlambo asked about the deployment in Sudan and said it had been reported that there had been some casualties there recently and asked to be informed of the on goings. Lieutenant General Mdutyana responded to Mlambo’s question. Two days before the meeting (9 March 2016), South African troops went to an exchange point in Sudan to collect meals and fuel, yet 10 kilometers from the exchange point, the troops were ambushed by rebels. In the exchange of fire, one soldier was left with a flesh wound but he is well and in a stable condition. The second soldier unfortunately died in battle when he took cover from gunfire and it is thought he fractured his skull. His corpse was in the United Nations (UN) morgue and the post-mortem will tell what happened. The soldiers fought back and brought in reinforcements, but remained at the ambush point and called on the Sudanese govern-
14
1 x Engineer Troop
49
1 x Signal Squadron (-)
107
Radios & Telecommunications
1 x Tactical Intelligence Troop
45
South African Air Force Air Assets Tactical Airfield Unit
2 x Rooivalk Combat Support Helicopters 2 x A109 Light Utility Helicopters 2 x Oryx Helicopters 2 x C-130s UAVs Air Ambulances (C-130 PC-12, Citation 550)
380
South African Navy
5 x Patrol Boats (inclusive of support)
138
South African Medical Health Service
Level 1 Medical Post 4 x Samil 20 Ambulances 30 x Mfezi Ambulances
181
DI
2 x Tacticals UAVs
10
Military Police
1 x Military Police Platoon 4 x Casspir/Mamba
39
South African Other
Total 2,411 ment to help, however, they were unwilling to do so. Lieutenant General Mdutyana then addressed the adaptability to the terrain, and said that other nations in ACIRC also experienced problems with the terrain, as it is tropical so it affects most nations. Wooden bridges cannot take the weight of the vehicles as a result of the infrastructure, particularly in the Congo. However, bridges are being built in these areas but still troops
get stopped in swampy areas and as such, troops have to disembark and do the job on foot, which compromises the security of the troops. The problem is that the rebels are well acquainted with the terrain so they can move quickly afoot, yet these problems affect all the countries and they need to mitigate these problems. On the issue of the island as a strategic launch pad, the SANDF is looking at it as an operational base but he stressed the military still needs
African Defense/July 2016
Strategic Movement and Maneuver Dilemma Force must be able to deploy within 14 days (within 7 days as framework nation) Road and rail movement – huge challenges (remains a partial solution) Sealift limitations (port[s] still long distances from area of operations) No medium/heavy air capability – will have to charter to get as close to deployment targets as possible. Gains through trade and investment are possible but in cases such as Burundi and the DRC, money went in and did not make it back to the government. Lieutenant General Mdutyana emphasized that it is important to secure South Africa’s national interests above all else. Using UAVs is an expensive endeavor but they will look into using them to protect borders. There definitely is an interest in increasing road and rail infrastructure in those areas as previously it cost the SANDF as much as R3 million to move a battalion to the DRC. Medical supplies are not yet a critical stage yet there is a need to get more funds into medical supplies so that everything is fully stocked up for the troops. Lieutenant General Mdutyana said that at
Lebombo, there is no border demarcation at all and the DOD does not have the capacity to put up a border. It should fall under the Department of Public Works and even the Department of Agriculture to ensure that there is a proper border there. The DOD does not have the capacity to build roads as the engineers employed by the DOD do not have that type of expertise so they need help in that respect. Lieutenant General Mdutyana said the 200 private airports are problematic but the air force is doing everything to monitor it yet, where are the gaps they need help from the South African Revenue Services, customs and SAPS. The financial implications of standing in for Angola are not great as the troops are on standby and they are only activated when they need to intervene.
African Union promises a (very limited) capability Never done on this scale before Angola and Algeria will assist with the strategic lift capability to make South Africa’s job easier. He admitted there are challenges with pilots because the pilots trained within the SANDF are often bought out by commercial companies or they leave the country so there is a lack of skilled pilots. On the issue of disciplinary challenges, the SANDF has indeed recalled troops but reminded the committee that South Africa is the only country that sends out lawyers and judges to those countries to undertake disciplinary action where it happened.
Total Flights and Percentage of Total Weight
Strategic Airlift Aircraft Comparison 300
200
100
0
C-130
IL-76
A400
An-70
C-17
An-70
C-5
Aircraft Type Flights
African Defense/July 2016
In Manifest (Tonnage)
15
AFRICA’S ACTIVE MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS TUNISIA
LIBYA
• Okba ibn Nafaa Brigade • Mujahideen Tunisia Kairouan • Soldiers of the Caliphate (a.k.a. Jund al Khilafah)
• Ansar al Sharia Libya (ASL) – Benghazi • Ansar al Sharia Libya (ASL) – Derna • Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade (ASMB) • Ajdabiya Revolutionaries Shura Council (ARSC) • Wilayat Fezzan (a.k.a. Fezzan Province) • Wilayat Barqa (a.k.a. Cyrenaica Province; f.k.a. Majlis Shura Shabab al Islam) • Wilayat Tarabulus (a.k.a. Tripoli Province)
Morocco
EGYPT
• Ajnad Misr • Ansar Beit al Maqdis (ABM) (a.k.a. Wilayat Sinai)
ALGERIA
• Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Mauritania Niger
MALI
• AQIM (a.k.a. the Sahara Emirate) • Al Mourabitoun • Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) • Ansar Dine • Macina Liberation Front (FLM)
Chad
Burkina Faso Côte d’ Ghana Ivoire Cameroon
Eritrea
Sudan
South Sudan
SOMALIA
Ethiopia
• Al Shabaab • Jahba East Africa
Uganda
NIGERIA
• Boko Haram (a.k.a. Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyah)
KENYA Tanzania
10000
ATTACKS
FATALITIES IN AFRICA BY YEAR
AQIM and affiliates Al Qaeda-linked groups Sinai-focused groups Al Shabaab and affiliates Unidentified/unaffiliated groups Boko Haram ISIS
8000 6000 4000 2000 0 2010
2011
AQIM
2012
Al Shabaab
2013
ISIS
2014
• Al Hijra (f.k.a. Muslim Youth Center)
2015
Boko Haram
“a.k.a.” = also known as “f.k.a.” = formerly known as
Note: Compiled by the Africa Center, this graphic shows attacks over the 12-month period ending April 30, 2016. Group listings are intended for informational purposes only and should not be considered official designations. Due to the fluid nature of many groups, the listed affiliations may change. Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Daniel Byman; Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre; Thomas Joscelyn; SITE Intelligence Group; The Soufan Group; and Aaron Y. Zelin.
Recent high-profile attacks have drawn increased attention to the threat of terrorism in Africa. A review of attacks by militant Islamist groups in Africa over the past year reveals considerable variation in the groups involved. Most are locally focused even if they have declared an allegiance to a global terrorist network. Attacks have also been conducted in a relatively few, concentrated areas on the continent. Boko Haram is responsible for the vast majority of fatalities, a figure that has escalated dramatically in recent years. Although it garners much attention, ISIS has a limited presence in Africa, often working through pre-existing groups with their own agenda. This map details the trends.
Map courtesy of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. www.africacenter.org
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African Defense/July 2016
2nd Annual
Peacekeeping & Logistics Africa
-
-Enforcing conformity and collaboration as a joint forces initiative
Date: 30 & 31 August 2016
Venue: Gallagher Estate, Gallagher 3, Midrand
CONFIRMED SPEAKER FACULTY
Josef Reiterer Chief Civil-Military Coordination Section UN VIDEO Emergency Services Branch CONFERENCE UNITED NATIONS
Lieutenant General Derrick Mbuyisela Mgwebi Force Commander UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (MONUSCO)
His Excellency Mr. Philip Jada Natana Ambassador EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN IN SOUTH AFRICA
Brigadier General Robert Chichangi Kabage Chief of Systems KENYA DEFENCE FORCE
Irene Ogaja-Akidiva Conflict Analyst EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE SECRETARIAT
Dr. Walter Dorn Professor of Defense Studies ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA AND CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE
Antonia N’Gabala-Sodonon Ag. Head Post-Conflict Reconstruction Division and Programme Coordinator – Gender, Peace and Security Department AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION
Lieutenant Colonel Cobus van Rensburg SO1 Joint Exercises Landward JOINT OPERATIONS DIVISION DIRECTORATE JOINT FORCES PREPARATION AND TRAINING SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE
Major Wouter van der Berg Military Law Practitioner: Defence Counsel SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE SANDF
Patrick Tseko Mahlangu Chief Instructor PEACE MISSION TRAINING CENTRE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE
Lieutenant Colonel Wouter Meiring SO1 Mission Ready Training JOINT OPERATIONS DIVISION DIRECTORATE JOINT FORCES PREPARATION AND TRAINING SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE Dr. Malte Brosig Associate Professor DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNIVERSITY OF WITWATERSRAND SPECIAL OFFER Register 5 delegates and receive the 6th one free
• •
Re
se
• •
ar
ch
ed
VIDEO CONFERENCE
Dr. Norman Sempijja Post-Doctoral Research Fellow UNIVERSITY OF WITWATERSRAND
Who should attend? Not limited to: *Military Stakeholders * Joint Force Preparation Professionals *Military Law Practitioners *Academics *Peacekeepers *Conflict Analysts *Defence Attachés *Force Commanders *Diplomats *Military Advisors *Defence Training Instructors *Staff Officers *Pilots *Humanitarian Officers *Officers Commanding * Peacekeeping Missions *Information Systems & Logistics *Procurement *Supply Chain
KEY STRATEGIES TO BE DISCUSSED:
Differentiating between peace enforcement and peacekeeping The conversion from Chapter VI to VII of the UN Charter and the need for a hybrid framework Critical technological innovations in the defence sector Enforcing of scenario based training for protecting civilians especially children
&
De ve lo
• • • • •
Joint force preparation and mission specific training Moving towards successful strategic concepts for mission ready deployment Seeking solutions for peacekeepers in the evolving African battle space Effective training and skills development for armed forces UN-EU-AU Coordination in peace operations within Africa
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Multinational Counter-Piracy Operations
How strategically significant is the Gulf of Guinea to the major maritime powers? By Captain Pakiribo S. Anabraba Nigerian Navy
Nations engage in international trade to realize their full economic potential through globalization and global economic integration. Maritime trade constitutes a preponderance of international trade and is conducted through established international sea lanes of communication or maritime corridors. Piracy has existed since the beginning of seaborne trade, but the scope, scale and sophistication of modern piracy require international collaboration to combat it. Various factors such as interests, capacity, commitment and moral obligation have occasioned different degrees of collaboration among sovereign nations to combat piracy. As a maritime thoroughfare, the Gulf of Guinea holds no exception to piracy, and the states abutting it have not shown the requisite capacity to eradicate the piracy scourge. The lack of capacity suggests the possible need for material assistance from extra-regional maritime powers. But does the Gulf of Guinea possess the strategic significance to attract such intervention? Oceans, seas and littorals collectively form incontrovertible existential importance to humanity. These components of the world’s ecosystem are critical for food
18
security, sustainment of economic prosperity and well-being of people, both in the industrialized and developing worlds. About 71 percent of the earth’s surface is covered by water and over 90 percent of world trade by weight and volume is transported over the oceans. Equally important as the flow of goods is the flow of services, which in today’s computer-centric world travels electronically in digital bits and bytes through fiber optic cables laid across the world’s ocean floors. The fact that threequarters of the world’s megacities (those of 20 million inhabitants or more) are by the sea and about 80 percent of the world’s population lives within 60 miles of a coast further supports the view that the maritime environment is indispensable to human existence. The sea is also home to living and non-living resources such as fish and other marine organisms, important minerals and hydrocarbons. The foregoing underscores the strategic importance of the sea to the potentialities of littoral states. But to fully realize these potentialities, the oceans and seas must be safe for free movement of commerce. Like the continental environment, the world’s maritime system is also threatened by
irregular threats and illicit activities such as piracy; armed robbery of ships; maritime terrorism; human and narcotics trafficking; mass illegal migration; smuggling; small arms and light weapons proliferation; illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing; as well as activities that degrade the maritime environment such as pollution and unauthorized resources exploitation. The complexity and dynamics of these threats necessitates littoral states to cooperate in ensuring safety and stability in the world’s maritime system. The Gulf of Guinea forms a significant strategic component of the world’s maritime system. It is conceptualized geographically as the Atlantic coast stretching from Senegal to Angola, including the island countries of Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe. The region is rich in marine resources such as fish, shrimp, and other aquatic fauna and flora, as well as large quantities of solid minerals and hydrocarbon deposits, amongst other important strategic valuables. But the region contends with a mixed fortune of realities. As political instability, insurgency, militancy and terrorism assume a disturbing trend ashore, an increase in incidences of illicit maritime activities— as enumerated earlier—have exposed
African Defense/July 2016
Geostrategic maritime significance forms the core of the maritime powers’ interests to astutely encourage security in the Malacca Strait and, in the case of the Gulf of Aden, to the extent of physically micromanaging their security. By analytically comparing the geostrategic maritime significance of these two maritime assets to that of the Gulf of Guinea, it is proven that, because the Gulf of Guinea does not have the same kind of geographical salience as the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden, it is conceived as being not as strategically significant. Accordingly, there is no overwhelming interest or obligation for the formation and sustainment of a multinational counter–piracy initiative in the Gulf of Guinea that is directly and physically spearheaded and micromanaged by the major maritime powers as obtainable in the Malacca Strait and Gulf of Aden. Regional cooperative solutions must then be found. limitations in maritime regulatory capacity as well as poor regional cooperation on maritime security. zxxxx Geostrategic Maritime Importance Because the Malacca Strait and Gulf of Aden have profoundly significant geostrategic importance of global dimension, there exist multinational counter-piracy initiatives in these maritime spaces—one undertaken by regional maritime powers but supported by the United States and other extra-regional maritime powers, and the other, a coalition of several willing nations spearheaded and micromanaged by the United States. zxxxx Gulf of Guinea Apart from its huge economic potential, the Gulf of Guinea straddles a vital sea lane of communication for the world’s maritime trade and is devoid of any choke points. The region is one of the largest hydrocarbon provinces in the world, with over 42.9 million barrels of total proven oil reserves and is potentially the world’s largest reserve of offshore deep water oil. Furthermore, the Gulf of Guinea contributes about 70 percent of Africa’s net crude oil output, and with recent discoveries in Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d’ivoire and Liberia, these numbers are only going to rise. Additionally, the low sulphur contents of its crude greatly reduces the cost of refining, and the existence of an
African Defense/July 2016
appreciable amount of natural gas deposits further increases the strategic significance of the Gulf of Guinea. As crises in the Middle East and North Africa continue unabated, and as the politics of Russian oil and gas supplies to Europe remain uncertain, the Gulf of Guinea will continue to remain a veritable alternative source of hydrocarbon resources. Tanker transit to refineries on the east and gulf coasts of the United States and to Europe is relatively short and has the added advantage of not passing through vulnerable choke points. However, lack of a chokepoint, which appears an advantage, is, in reality, a strategic disadvantage as far as international interest in providing multinational counter-piracy response is concerned. This is because the Gulf of Guinea could be accessed from all directions due to its expanse and does not canalize shipping as do the Malacca Strait and the Bab el Mandeb in the Gulf of Aden. Consequently, the Gulf of Guinea, when compared with the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait, portends far lesser risk as far as threat of interruption of global energy supply and other trades are concerned. Also, states and non-state actors cannot obstruct or threaten to obstruct the entire Gulf of Guinea (unless within harbors, and these are not part of the gulf) as a means to garner undue political concessions or to negotiate from a position of geographical advantage or strength. zxxxx Comparing Geostrategic Maritime Significance One could assess the geostrategic significance of maritime spaces by comparing the economic well-being of countries or regions they service or give access to. This is in view of the axiom or fact that over 90 percent of international trade is conducted through the sea. Therefore, it follows that maritime corridors must undoubtedly contribute similar measure to the economic progress of the countries or regions they serve or service. Since it is axiomatic that over 90 percent of international trade is conducted by sea, and since no nation can be great without meaningfully engaging in international trade, it follows that the maritime corridors that give access to these regions are reasonably instrumental to their economic well-being. Commonsensically, anything that contributes immensely to a
nation’s well-being should be strategically very significant to that nation. Each region comprises four representative countries. The West is represented by the United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Asia is represented by China, India, Japan and South Korea. The Persian Gulf comprises Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar and the UAE, while Africa is illustrated with Nigeria, Angola, Senegal and Ghana. The average GDP of the four countries representing each region is computed for five years (2010–2014) to indicate the steady disparity in economic well-being among the regions. Only real GDPs were computed, not gross national income, or compensated for purchasing power parity. The Gulf of Guinea bounds the coasts of littoral West and Central African countries and, hence, provides access to some of the world’s poorest countries. The Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait, on the other hand, provide cost-effective maritime access or links between three of the most important and technologically advanced regions of the world—the United States and Europe (West) and Asia. Additionally, these regions, especially Asia, accommodate a greater percentage of the world’s population. Coupled with their huge populations, the energy demand of the rapidly industrializing Asian economy is very high. Similarly, the industrialized and highly technologically advanced economies of the West also make very high energy demands. These energy demands, if sourced from the Persian Gulf countries, are serviced by the Malacca Strait for vessels going to the Far East, and the Gulf of Aden for vessels going to the West. This makes these maritime corridors profoundly strategically important, as they guarantee the energy security of most of the world’s population. Furthermore, the economic progress of the Far East Asian countries coupled with their rapidly rising population has correspondingly created a middle class with financial buoyancy and purchasing power. Combined with cheap cost of labor, the net result is a huge market for Western products and a cheap business environment that is mutually exploited by Western and Asian companies. Therefore, a strong nexus and mutualism exist between the Western economy and those of Far East countries. This makes the West very interested in the security of the Gulf of Aden and Malacca Strait because most of the trade is conducted through them and also
19
because they form the most cost-effective maritime link between the United States, European Union, and Asia. It is therefore not surprising that the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden command great security interests and, hence, are on the front burners of the security agenda of the United States, European Union, China, India, Japan and South Korea, as well as most East and Southeast Asian countries. The Gulf of Guinea does not have similar credentials or geographical characteristics as the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden and, therefore, should understandably not attract similar security interests from the major maritime powers. The Gulf of Guinea does not only give access to some of the countries with the lowest per capita income, GDP, and GNP in the world, but also to economies that are not manufacturing and so mostly dependent on the United States, the European Union and China for manufactured and finished products, including raw materials. The United States, the European Union and China all have suitable alternative markets for their products. This is evident from the fact that the Gulf of Guinea states rank very low in their list of trading partners and in the volume of activities in the Gulf of Guinea ports. Although some of the Gulf of Guinea states export crude oil, natural gas and raw materials, there are also ready and equally suitable (if not cheaper) alternative sources for these products. For example, routes are shorter and, hence, cheaper for China and the other fast growing economies of the Far East to buy their oil and gas from the Persian Gulf and Russia. The European Union imports its crude oil requirements from Norway, Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), and OPEC countries (mostly Saudi Arabia, Libya and Nigeria). The United States has seriously scaled down its oil imports from the Gulf of Guinea since the shale oil boom but continues to patronize the Persian Gulf states even though it might be cheaper to buy from the Gulf of Guinea because of the shorter distance and low sulphur contents of the crude. The foregoing examples are cited to show the multiplicity of alternative sources of crude oil at the disposal of the major maritime powers and the wide array of choices available to them. his is expected to negate the Gulf of Guinea from occupying any special place
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or extraordinary position in the maritime security agenda of the major maritime powers to the extent of physically partaking in the region’s maritime security. As crises in the Middle East and the associated political dynamics assumed a disturbing dimension that threatened global security, the need to search for alternative sources of energy became unavoidable for the United States and its strategic partners. Consequently, as part of efforts to prevent al Qaeda and its affiliates from using Africa as a safe haven within the overall global counterterrorism effort, the United States increased its engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa, including trade in oil and gas. However, the current reality indicates that the Middle East countries have continued to enjoy enough patronage in oil and gas trade from the United States and partner countries as one of the strategic options to diplomatically douse the situation and keep the region within its fold in order to protect and promote its interests in the Middle East. This has meant more maritime traffic through the Gulf of Aden and Malacca Strait. Also, in order to protect and promote their strategic economic interests, the European Union and United States are obligated to ensure that the Gulf of Aden, its surrounding maritime spaces, and the Malacca Strait are kept secure and open for free flow of commercial maritime activities. This includes ensuring that piracy and armed robbery against ships do not grind commercial maritime activities to a halt. The formation, strong encouragement (as in the Malacca Strait), and sustainment of multinational counter-piracy initiatives are some of the ways that are being used to ensure that maritime trade routes are open and secure to satisfy the strategic interests of the West and the rapidly developing economies of the Far East. Since the Gulf of Guinea does not share similar credentials, it is most unlikely that the United States, the European Union and the developing Asian economies would be willing to form a counter-piracy coalition that will physically combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Other indicators of strategic maritime significance of a maritime area are the trade volume and port activities it supports. Again, the volume of import and export trade of Europe, America and Asia regions over and above Africa is evidently clear. These high trade volumes are made possible by a sea lane of communication that connects these
regions. Since Gulf of Guinea states rank very low in the list of trading partners with these regions, and since they all rank very high among themselves as trading partners, one can justifiably conclude that the sea lanes of communication linking them are more strategically significant than the Gulf of Guinea. However, this hypothesis is in view of the truism that maritime trade contributes over 90 percent of international trade, and so the maritime corridor that gives access to a region contributes correspondingly to its economic viability. Statistics show that the world’s top 20 ports from 2004–2013 are in the United States, Europe and Asia. Out of the twenty, 15 are in Asia, and China has 10. Of the five ports outside Asia, two are U.S. ports; and one each is from Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. Also, within the same time frame, eight of the top twenty ports experienced over 200 percent growth, of which seven are Chinese ports. The exception is the Port of Dubai in the UAE. It is doubtful if any port in the Gulf of Guinea has ever made the Lloyd’s list of world top container ports. The forgoing shows the low level of maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea. Again, this indicates the poor strategic maritime significance of the Gulf of Guinea. If the Gulf of Guinea were as significant as the Malacca Strait or the Gulf of Aden, this would reflect just as bustling container activities in the numerous ports that straddle the length of the Gulf of Guinea coastline. zxxxx The Cost of Piracy Studies have shown that the severity of the costs of piratical activities to the international maritime community is different for each pirate hotspot. Case studies on the Strait of Malacca, Gulf of Aden, and Gulf of Guinea show that the costs of piracy are causal to the formation and sustainment of multinational counterpiracy initiatives. Rather than see the costs of piracy only through an economic prism, these case studies take a wide-spectrum perspective and recognize that there exists a multiplicity of human, psychological, social, and political costs of piracy. However, many organizations, authors and researchers have concentrated their studies on the economic cost of piracy, perhaps because of the impact of piracy on commercial profits. Studies on the costs of piracy have
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concentrated mainly on Gulf of Aden/ Somali pirates. Perhaps this is due to the sophistication and temerity of these pirates and the strategic significance of the theater in which they operate to international maritime commerce and global welfare. This lopsided attention by researchers and organizations to the economic costs of Somali pirates has created a paucity of literature and data on the subject matter with regards to other pirate hotpots. Nevertheless, efforts shall as much as possible be made to balance the studies on the three regions under review. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development categorizes the costs and trade-related implications of maritime piracy into first and second order costs. First order costs feature ransom, insurance costs, shipping networks and re-routing of fleets, security deterrence equipment and armed guards, fuel consumption, additional labor, naval forces, and piracy prosecutions, among others. Second order costs include fisheries, food security and food price inflation, tourism, and environmental pollution, among others. Peter Chalk, an analyst at the Rand Corporation, divided the economic costs of piracy into direct and indirect costs. He categorized the costs of piracy into real and virtual costs. The real costs are those that can be assigned numerical values, while the virtual costs are those that cannot be attributed numerical values or otherwise quantified. Calculating the global cost of piracy has been a difficult and elusive venture among researchers for certain reasons. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The global cost of piracy … remains uncertain, with existing assessments providing divergent estimates and conclusions. Existing studies tend to primarily focus on calculating first order costs such as the cost of ransoms, security deterrence equipment and naval forces deployment. The secondary costs of piracy, such as the effects on foreign investment in the affected and neighboring regions, or on commodity prices appear so far to have benefited from much less attention. Existing studies differ in terms of their methodology and approach and, therefore, are neither directly comparable, nor provide a definite authoritative assessment of piracy related costs.
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For each of the maritime regions under review, this case study discusses the different costs of piracy as it affects that region. Since different pirates employ different modes of operation and business models, each region’s costs of piracy cannot be compared directly. Even when some of the costs of piracy are similar, the process or manner in which they are incurred is different. For example, ransom is common among Somali and Gulf of Guinea pirates, but not with Malacca Strait pirates. Even between Somali and Gulf of Guinea pirates, the former ransom everything—ships, cargoes, and crews—while the latter only kidnap crews for ransom, sell off part or all of the cargo, and are not really interested in ships—although there are a few cases of phantom ships or ghost ships. (Phantom or ghost ships is an operational model adopted by pirates where an entire ship is stolen, renamed, reregistered, and sold on the spot market—sometimes with its cargo, other times separately. This model is mostly adopted by Southeast Asian pirates and occasionally by Gulf of Guinea pirates. These ships are called “phantom” or “ghost” ships because when law enforcement agents set out in search of a missing ship, the ship could be seen but not found because it is under a different name, registration documents, and appearance (all or part of its external paintwork may have been altered to disguise it). For Somali pirates, everything—crews, cargoes, and ships—are all ransomed.) Similarly, while the cost of insurance is common to all three pirate hotspots under review, the parameters for arriving at their insurance premiums are not entirely the same, and these details are not usually completely divulged by insurance companies. Consequently, different insurance premiums are paid for different pirate hotspots and therefore cannot be used as a basis for comparison. In view of the foregoing considerations, certain indicators of the severity of the costs of piracy in the three regions under investigation are used as a basis for comparison and are measured by the number of attacks within the same time frame. This is because without pirate attacks, no costs—whether human, psychological, economic or social— would be incurred. Furthermore, the growth of pirate attacks in a region is another indicator of the costs of piracy. The larger a region’s share
of pirate attacks, the higher the costs of piracy for that region. The outcome of the comparisons show if the Gulf of Guinea pirates create as much cost as the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait pirates. zxxxx Human and Psychological Costs of Piracy Pirate attacks most times result in severe human costs such as death, torture, harassment, permanent injury, disfigurement, psychological and emotional trauma and hostage-taking. Generally, some of the costs such as fear, trauma, stress and the like are unquantifiable, but their impact is global. This is true because the global maritime commons are transited by ships of different nations and ownership, and bear crewmembers from a multiplicity of countries, nationalities, ethnicities, religions, races and colors. Hostage-taking and ransoming of crewmembers is common among the modes of operation of pirates of the three regions under review, albeit with different degrees and scope. While incarcerated, crewmembers could be subjected to different forms of psychological and physical maltreatment, as well as violence. Some seafarers who survive the initial violence and risk associated with the takeover of ships by pirates eventually die as hostages due to unhealthy conditions and torture inflicted by the pirates or their networks. Somali pirates have taken a total of 3,230 seafarers as hostages, while Malacca Strait and Gulf of Guinea pirates have recorded 238 and 718 hostage takings, respectively. Also, in their course of operation, Somali pirates have killed 26 seafarers between 2000 and 2014, dwarfing the records of Malacca and Gulf of Guinea pirates, who have killed 7 and 13 seafarers, respectively, within the same period. Apart from these human costs, there are other losses and sufferings, such as threats, intimidation, assault and missing seafarers, which are not included the data. zxxxx Economic Costs Of Piracy Piracy poses economic costs among stakeholders in the maritime industry as well as among governments within and around affected maritime spaces. Based on a study conducted by Oceans Beyond Piracy, piracy collectively costs national
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economies between $7 billion and $12 billion. This cost is grossly infinitesimal compared to $18.8 trillion, the dollar value of the world’s merchandise trade in 2013 (between 0.04 to 0.05 percent). With an average increase of 5.3 percent of the world’s merchandise trade between 1993 and 2013, it means that the economic cost of piracy had been a miniature fraction of the value of international merchandise trade. This perhaps is why the commercial world is slow in taking decisive and lasting action against piracy. However, while the global economic cost of piracy may appear very small when compared to the value of the world’s international trade, it does not negate the severity or significance of the piracy burden in the different piracy hotspots. Besides, piracy is increasingly becoming a potential threat to global energy security. Considering the fact that crude oil and gas are still the fundamental prime movers of most economies of the world, any sustained disruption in energy flow by pirates has the potential to cripple most economies of the world with multifarious ripples. zxxxx Economic Cost of Gulf of Guinea Piracy Crimes and other illicit activities in the Gulf of Guinea negatively impact the business activities of millions of people in the region and the safe transportation of millions of barrels of oil per day as well as other commercial maritime activities involving the oil industry. The business model in the Gulf of Guinea is focused on stealing petroleum products. Accordingly, oil tankers laden with finished or crude petroleum products are the main targets of Gulf of Guinea pirates and other criminal networks in that maritime environment. The overriding aim of their attacks is to hijack oil tankers, steal some or all of their cargoes and sell them to pre-arranged buyers or at spot markets. These attacks usually take place in territorial waters and anchorages, although there are occasions when Gulf of Guinea pirates have ventured far afield to capture victim vessels. Gulf of Guinea pirates also engage in armed robbery, kidnapping, and hostage-taking of ships’ crew, oil workers and expatriates, who are released after the payment of ransom. Furthermore, proliferation of piracy and armed robbery against ships as well as other illicit maritime crimes due to ungoverned maritime spaces in the Gulf of Guinea has
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caused states significant losses in revenue. Also adversely affected are berthing fees, custom duties, and other charges for port services and facilities, which sometimes collectively generate a very large proportion of annual budgetary needs. Despite efforts by the Gulf of Guinea states at improving port services and facilities, hikes in piratical activities within territorial waters, anchorages, roadsteads (calm areas of water near harbors where ships await their turn to enter into harbor), and other maritime spaces under states’ jurisdiction have correspondingly hiked insurance premiums, which has in turn reduced vessel traffic to ports in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, the activities of pirates have negatively impacted the number of vessel calls to Cotonou Port in the Gulf of Guinea. Despite upgrades, expansion of port facilities, and improvements in port services, Cotonou Port, which generates about half of the total annual Beninese government revenue, experienced a 70 percent drop in vessel port calls after piratical attacks surged in Beninese waters in 2011. Although actual economic losses in numerical terms are difficult to ascertain because of poor data collection and record keeping, Admiral Oshinowo, a maritime security expert estimated that the “annual cost of piracy to the Gulf of Guinea ranges from $565 million to $2 billion.” zxxxx Political Cost of Piracy Corruption among political leaders helps breed poverty in a society, which in turn encourages piracy and armed robbery against ships as sources of livelihood, especially among coastal dwellers. As pirates’ confidence increases and their skills get sharpened over time, their success rate also increases. With an increasing success rate, pirates are better empowered to give more financial inducements to power brokers for more space to perpetrate their nefarious acts. Financial inducements by pirates make politicians corrupt and lose the will to govern effectively. Chronic corruption helps breed pervasive poverty within a society and the attraction of more coastal dwellers and the rural poor to piracy. The foregoing suggests that the piratespoliticians relationship is a vicious or virtuous cycle, depending on which side one looks at it—either from the side of the well-meaning public or from the perspective of the criminals.
zxxxx Political Cost of Gulf of Guinea Piracy There is yet no concrete evidence that politicians in the Gulf of Guinea benefit from the proceeds of piracy, or are instrumental in perpetrating incidents of piracy as obtainable in Somalia. Perhaps the only traceable relationship between politicians and pirates in the Gulf of Guinea is that bad governance and corruption can contribute to the emergence and proliferation of piracy. It is also speculated that law enforcement agents in the Gulf of Guinea are complicit in the activities of pirates by accepting bribes and other financial inducements. While there is no documented evidence to prove these speculative allegations beyond reasonable doubt, the possibility of some law enforcement agents compromising their profession could exist, given the pervasiveness of poverty in the countries abutting the Gulf of Guinea. It is also speculated that the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND), an insurgent/militant group in southern Nigeria, which agitated for control of that nation’s oil and gas resources between the late 1990s and early 2000s, had carried out piracy as one of its means of generating revenue. MEND employed terrorist tactics in pursuit of its course throughout those years, and in some cases, their activities spread to neighboring countries. The close tie that existed between piracy and terrorism (tactics employed by the militants) suggests that there was a cost of political instability to the Gulf of Guinea region. zxxxx Comparing the Costs of Piracy The International Maritime Bureau data suggests that Somali piracy represented 4.7 percent of attacks reported in 2000. By 2005, its share of worldwide attacks had risen to 16.3 percent, which more than tripled its share of attacks in 2000. By 2011, it had climbed to 53.8 percent, which again more than tripled its share of attacks in 2005. But a thorough observation of the data reveals that until 2007, the Gulf of Guinea consistently recorded more piratical incidents—sometimes doubling or tripling that of the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space except in 2005. This implies that the Gulf of Guinea suffered more costs of piracy than the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space. In 2008, the number of
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attacks in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space surpassed that of the Gulf of Guinea. Interestingly, that same year, CTF 150 was established to check terrorism in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space, with implicit concurrent accreditation to conduct counter-piracy. Despite the evidence that acts of piracy were disproportionately greater in the Gulf of Guinea until 2007, counter-piracy task forces were instead set up in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space by the United States and later joined by a partnership of other maritime powers. While an attempt to take up the security of the Malacca Strait by the United States and other regional powers is understandable in view of the incessant piratical attacks prior to 2005, this does not explain their engagement in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space. The answer would seem to be that in view of its strategic significance, the Gulf of Aden/ Somali maritime space was assessed as imposing more costs due to piracy, despite having fewer piracy attacks. Although the frequency of Gulf of Guinea piracy was consistently higher than that of the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space until 2007, the relatively lower volume of trade transiting the Gulf of Guinea meant a much lower overall cost of piracy. Accordingly, interests of the major maritime powers were less affected by the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, as compared to the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space and the Malacca Strait. Those maritime hotspots incur much higher costs of piracy due to the much higher volume of trade transiting them. Accordingly, there is an absence of impetus for the major maritime powers to initiate and physically participate in counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. This means that for the major maritime powers, increase in the costs of piracy is a motivation for the establishment of counter-piracy initiatives. zxxxx Where are the Solutions? The Gulf of Guinea is indisputably one of the most important maritime arteries facilitating international trade and global welfare. As long as international shipping remains interdependent and the world increasingly depends on crude oil and gas, this fact will remain so. Like other maritime spaces where commercial activities flourish, the Gulf of Guinea is bedeviled by piracy
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‌the comparatively low maritime significance of the Gulf of Guinea does not negate the fact that piracy is serious within the region and its impact on regional stakeholders is enormous. and armed robbery, as well as other maritime crimes. The scale and scope of modern piratical activities have necessitated an international coalition of maritime powers to physically undertake and micromanage the security of some maritime corridors in the world. But such physical participation has never been attempted or muted for the Gulf of Guinea despite a higher share of global acts of piracy between 2001 and 2007, the same period some other counterpiracy operations were initiated by the major maritime powers. The reason for this was found in comparing the Gulf of Guinea with the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space using two parameters—strategic maritime significance and the costs of piracy. From the case studies, it was found that the Gulf of Guinea does not possess the kind of geostrategic maritime credentials possessed by the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space that motivated the United States to attempt taking over the physical security of the Malacca Strait or spearhead a multinational counter-piracy initiative in the Gulf of Guinea/Somali maritime space. It was also found that the Gulf of Guinea does not have the capacity to create the costly losses to pirates that could attract the material presence of the major maritime powers to participate in counter-piracy operations in the region. Consequently, there is no overwhelming incentive, interest, or obligation for the major maritime powers to attempt a counter-piracy coalition, or to physically micromanage counter-piracy initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea. However, the comparatively low maritime significance of the Gulf of Guinea does not negate the fact that piracy is serious within the region and its impact on
regional stakeholders is enormous. Also, as long as energy and its supply networks still form part of the major determinants of the global economy, the threat posed by piracy in the Gulf of Guinea will continue to remain a challenge to stakeholders outside the region. But since the possibility of attracting physical participation of the major maritime powers in counter-piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is unlikely, at best remote, it means the Gulf of Guinea states are on their own to manage their maritime affairs and the future of their maritime environment to a conclusive success. Therefore, regional actors and stakeholders must start to eschew the unrealistic hype that the Gulf of Guinea is overwhelmingly strategically significant. They must come to terms with the reality that it is not a major maritime trading route and, hence, does not portend as much strategic significance or create as much costs of piracy as the major maritime trading routes. This unrealistic hype has pervaded the region and has ingrained in the minds of regional actors a sense of complacency that if things really get worse, the major maritime powers would always come to the region’s rescue. Things might not necessarily always work out that way, and in the face of dwindling resources and other competing strategic obligations, the maritime security assistance currently received from the major maritime powers might dry up or reduce significantly. Accordingly, political masters in the Gulf of Guinea and regional maritime stakeholders must brace up to search for unique regional solutions to regional maritime security problems. It is strongly believed that the Gulf of Guinea states have the resources, or could provide the resources, to adequately sponsor the security of their maritime environment if the political masters could be more committed, honest and receptive to constructive ideas. Any proposed solution to the Gulf of Guinea piracy problem must include a strategy that can bring about significant improvements in maritime regime governance, security, safety and development. Such a result-oriented strategy would require mutually reinforcing actions at three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. Strategic Level The strategic level would involve governments and intergovernmental actions at the national and international levels.
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Actors at this level would be required to do everything possible to make piracy unattractive to perpetrators and potential perpetrators. Since socio-economic cum political factors have been identified as the root underlying causes of piracy, strategic level actors are to come up with proactive measures, plans and strategies that would create disincentives among pirates and would-be pirates. For the national governments of the Gulf of Guinea states, this entails good governance and grassrootsoriented socio-economic policies that would improve the lot of the masses and bridge the economic inequality between the rich and the poor. Job creation and infrastructural development that would accompany sound socio-economic policies would make coastal community dwellers detest piracy as an interesting occupational venture. Piracy and armed robbery against ships have exposed poor regulatory capacity as well as inadequate cooperation among the Gulf of Guinea states on maritime security. The ripple effect of these deficiencies has been the existence of weak, and in some cases, near-absent maritime law enforcement enablers such as maritime law enforcement institutions, tools, facilities, and resources. The absence of these enablers has created incentives for people to not only engage in piracy, but to also carry it out with naked impunity. Therefore, it behooves the political masters to project the right political will and resolve to curb maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea. Since most of the Gulf of Guinea states are economies that depend mainly on offshore crude oil mining as their major source of foreign exchange earnings, the economic implication of such piratical activities are enormous. In view of the economic strength the maritime environment provides, it is imperative for political masters of the countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea to balance their attention between continental issues and maritime security matters. Operational Level The operational level of strategy will be geared towards interdicting pirates— from planning to execution stages. This level of the strategy requires effective networking and intelligence gathering and sharing among the Gulf of Guinea states to interrupt and terminate piracy even before execution.
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Also, the strategy should be aimed at finding out pirates’ safe havens in coastal communities in order to root them out and subsequently establish government presence in the ungoverned spaces where pirates hide. In this regard, the strategy requires the establishment and operationalization of an overarching regional maritime security organization that will conduct counter-piracy operations as one of its main mandates. Such an organization will focus on collaboration among the maritime security agencies of the Gulf of Guinea states to work together across their geographical and sub-regional boundaries. In order to succeed, the organization must have the capacity to properly coordinate effective use of intelligence, personnel, and materiel to deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. It is perhaps in pursuit of this kind of counter-piracy strategy that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) developed the ongoing collaborative maritime security strategy to address the diverse maritime threats across the Gulf of Guinea region. In the ongoing arrangement, the Gulf of Guinea states are grouped into zones headed by a commander from one of the countries in each zone. Each zone is to formulate and operationalize strategies for the security of its maritime space, with provision for liaison with adjacent zones. Although this initiative appears to be a welcome development, it might not be the panacea to the Gulf of Guinea piracy predicament. This is because rather than encourage joint and combined patrols, it encourages only coordinated patrol arrangements among the zones where, for example, Zone A’s patrol units cannot cross into Zone B and have to coordinate their patrols through communication with liaison arrangements ashore. What the Gulf of Guinea needs is a more robust but fluid structure under a single overall command with a combined patrols arrangement within and among participating units. Regional actors of the Malacca Strait Security Patrol (MSSP), which the current Gulf of Guinea maritime security architecture is modeled after, accepts that inability to transition fully from a coordinated to a combined patrols arrangement is one of its major albatrosses. It is important to state that successful
implementation of the proposed arrangement would greatly depend on deliverables such as effective organizational structure, integrated logistics, the right number and mix of platforms, repair/ maintenance facilities and bases, training and doctrinal integration, sufficient maritime domain awareness infrastructures, equipment interoperability and compatibility, an effective motivation and reward system for law enforcement personnel, adequate funding and, above all, commitment and mutual trust among the political leaders in the region. Additionally, the success of such an arrangement requires effective prosecution of pirates with penalties capable of deterring would-be pirates. Since some of the Gulf of Guinea states might not have provisions for piracy in their penal codes, and since there might be marked differences in the penal codes of those that do have them, it would be necessary to develop, streamline and operationalize a common judicial code within the international legal framework for resolving piracy cases. Ancillary to a common Gulf of Guinea counter-piracy judicial system is the need for the development of regional antipiracy agreements that would create and foster a common understanding among the Gulf of Guinea states. While paying particular attention to regional peculiarities, such antipiracy agreements would be focused on promoting existing international antipiracy agreements within the region. Also, since the possibility of adequately and effectively dispensing justice without a prison system does not exist, there is the need to build in the proposed arrangement prisons with common conditions, rules, and regulations in at least four evenly dispersed countries within the Gulf of Guinea where pirates could serve jail terms and be rehabilitated. The proposed arrangement would require the Gulf of Guinea states to integrate and coordinate the security of their maritime space against illicit activities through a centralized headquarters. This collective maritime security arrangement will place the entire expanse of the Gulf of Guinea maritime environment under a common security umbrella, which could be termed the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command (GGMGC) as part of a restructured, expanded, and strengthened Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) that is truly committed and empowered to achieve its set objectives.
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The operations of the GGMGC shall be directed by a commander, who shall be a naval or coast guard officer from any of the member states with requisite seniority, experience, knowledge, and capacity. He shall be administratively assisted by a staff comprising all ranks of maritime law enforcement representatives from member states, and operationally by a deputy and two strategic regional commanders (one each for ECCAS and ECOWAS states). The appointment of commander GGMGC shall be tenured and rotated regularly among member states after an agreed duration. The commander GGMGC shall retain operational control, while the strategic regional commanders shall retain tactical command of their respective regions. Operational command shall be retained by a Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Committee (GGMSC), which shall be established and shall comprise chiefs of defense staff of member countries. They are to meet frequently to consult, make decisions on various maritime security issues, and give collective policy and strategic directives/guidance to the commander GGMGC. Overall command shall lie with the heads of state forum through the chairman of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. The Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command is not to be a military alliance. It is to be run strictly as an intergovernmental maritime security alliance against illicit maritime activities, particularly piracy and armed robbery against ships. Apart from the strategic regional commands, the arrangement shall also include a Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Training Command and a Research and Development (R&D) Command. The Training Command would provide education and training of staff in order to facilitate interoperability and common understanding among the international staff at all levels. The R&D structure will provide innovative and cost-effective ways the Guard Command could go about achieving its set objectives in line with global best practices. Funding the Guard Command can be achieved in two ways: a compulsory common funding and a voluntary asset contribution. The Guard Command could start initial operations with assets volunteered by states. Within the compulsory common funding, the share of each member state’s contribution is
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to be based on a predetermined burdensharing formula, which represents a small percentage of each member’s gross national income. All maritime stakeholders—private or public—in each member state are to contribute to the compulsory common funding. Excesses, if any, from the monies accrued from the common funding after taking care of recurrent expenditure could be saved until they have reached a reasonable amount for the purchase of maritime security assets, including vessels. The idea is to make the Guard Command completely independent of member states’ maritime security assets as time goes on. Since funding could pose a serious problem for the survival and sustainment of the Guard Command to run its operations and programs and the necessary capabilities to meet its operational mandates, it would be part of the R&D’s mandate to work out modalities for cooperating with and receiving assistance from extra-regional powers. But primarily, these resources and capabilities will have to be provided by the Gulf of Guinea states even though some are poor and most, if not all, hardly have enough assets to monitor their respective maritime environments. Regional commanders are to ensure that they take full control of their operational domain through the arrangements of their forces. Efforts should be directed at establishing outposts at all river towns located near the mouths of inlets to the Atlantic Ocean. Although the logistics for achieving this is beyond the regional commanders, this order of battle should fundamentally be their focus if the logistics are provided. With such outposts put in place, lower tactical commanders would be able to monitor traffic in and out of the mouths of inlets. Tactical Level Tactical deployment of forces is the prerogative of the tactical commander. For effective deployment, a tactical commander takes several factors into consideration, such as terrain, the adversary’s known and likely movements, and the adversary’s strength and disposition, among several others. In line with mission command philosophy, this section of the thesis is not intended to tell tactical commanders how and where to deploy their forces, but to highlight certain factors a tactical commander of maritime forces in the Gulf of Guinea must take into
cognizance. More than 2,500 nautical miles in length, about 500,000 square nautical miles, the sea area of the Gulf of Guinea is enormous and therefore requires that tactical deployments be made consistent with the principle of economy of force. This means that forces are to be deployed effectively in a manner that achieves maximum results at decisive points and times despite the enormous expanse of the Gulf of Guinea. The coast of the Gulf of Guinea is characterized by inlets to several interconnected rivers, tributaries, and creeks that give access to several coastal towns and villages. These inlets are either close to one another or are far apart. Since pirates must come out to sea through these inlets and return to their bases through the same inlets after carrying out their nefarious acts, deployments could be made in a style that takes maximum advantage of the knowledge of pirates’ movements, the nature of the coastline bordering the Gulf of Guinea, and the morphology of the topographic features along the coast and inlets. Instead of burning fuel and other logistical wastage incurred while conducting random patrols at sea in search of pirates or armed robbers, patrol units could be deployed to conduct fixed station patrols in or around river/creek inlets. All speedboats going out to sea or entering the creeks should be subjected to a thorough search before they are allowed to proceed. Any speedboat that flouts this rule should be decisively dealt with in line with the extant rules of engagement to deter others who might want to do the same. This patrol arrangement should form the foundation from which other complex arrangements could emerge. Although the foregoing recommendations are not by any means exhaustive, they are respectfully offered with a view to achieving a safe, secure, and economically viable Gulf of Guinea maritime space. It is believed that organizing the security structure of the Gulf of Guinea maritime space along these recommendations should serve as a good starting point towards achieving a panacea to the region’s maritime security predicament. This is an edited version of a longer article by Captain Pakiribo S. Anabraba. If you would like to receive a PDF copy of the original, please send an email to jeffm@ defense-house.com
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Internet/Facebook African Penetration Population (2015 est.) Angola 19,625,353 Benin 10,448,647 Botswana 2,182,719 Burkina Faso 18,931,686 Burundi 10,742,276 Cabo Verde 545,993 Cameroon 23,739,218 Central African Rep. 5,391,539 Chad 11,631,456 Comoros 780,971 Congo 4,755,097 Congo, Dem. Rep. 79,375,136 Cote d’Ivoire 23,295,302 Djibouti 828,324 Egypt 88,487,396 Equatorial Guinea 740,743 Eritrea 6,527,689 Ethiopia 99,465,819 Gabon 1,705,336 Gambia 1,967,709 Ghana 26,327,649 Guinea 11,780,162 Guinea-Bissau 1,726,170 Kenya 45,925,301 Lesotho 1,947,701 Liberia 4,195,666 Libya 6,411,776 Madagascar 23,812,681 Malawi 17,715,075 Mali 16,955,536 Mauritania 3,596,702 Mauritius 1,339,827 Mayotte (FR) 220,300 Morocco 33,322,699 Mozambique 25,303,113 Namibia 2,212,307 Niger 18,045,729 Nigeria 181,562,056 Reunion (FR) 867,687 Rwanda 12,661,733 Sao Tome & Principe 194,006 Senegal 13,975,834 Seychelles 92,430 Sierra Leone 5,879,098 Somalia 10,616,380 South Africa 54,777,809 South Sudan 12,042,910 Sudan 36,108,853 Swaziland 1,435,613 Tanzania 51,045,882 Togo 7,552,318 Tunisia 11,037,225 Uganda 37,101,745 Western Sahara 554,795 Zambia 15,066,266 Zimbabwe 14,229,541
Internet Users Dec. 2000 30,000 15,000 15,000 10,000 3,000 8,000 20,000 1,500 1,000 1,500 500 500 40,000 1,400 450,000 500 5,000 10,000 15,000 4,000 30,000 8,000 1,500 200,000 4,000 500 10,000 30,000 15,000 18,800 5,000 87,000 n/a 100,000 30,000 30,000 5,000 200,000 130,000 5,000 6,500 40,000 6,000 5,000 200 2,400,000 n/a 30,000 10,000 115,000 100,000 100,000 40,000 n/a 20,000 50,000
Internet Users Nov. 2015 5,102,592 1,232,940 620,000 1,779,578 526,372 219,817 2,611,314 217,279 317,197 54,512 338,087 2,381,254 5,230,000 100,000 48,300,000 139,704 67,000 3,700,000 670,197 373,865 5,171,993 770,000 70,000 31,985,048 250,000 348,240 2,400,000 1,100,000 1,080,620 1,186,888 455,553 803,896 107,940 20,207,154 1,503,005 470,000 351,892 92,699,924 380,000 3,216,080 48,806 7,260,000 50,220 260,000 500,000 26,841,126 1,914,823 9,307,189 389,051 7,590,794 430,482 5,408,240 11,924,927 27,000 2,711,928 6,759,032
Penetration Internet Facebook (% of (% of Nov. 2015 population) Africa) 26.00% 1.50% 3,300,000 11.80% 0.40% 570,000 28.40% 0.20% 620,000 9.40% 0.50% 490,000 4.90% 0.20% 340,000 40.30% 0.10% 190,000 11.00% 0.80% 1,400,000 4.00% 0.10% 61,000 2.70% 0.10% 200,000 7.00% 0.00% 50,000 7.10% 0.10% 300,000 3.00% 0.70% 1,900,000 22.50% 1.60% 1,800,000 12.10% 0.00% 100,000 54.60% 14.60% 27,000,000 18.90% 0.00% 52,000 1.00% 0.00% 67,000 3.70% 1.10% 3,700,000 39.30% 0.20% 360,000 19.00% 0.10% 180,000 19.60% 1.60% 2,900,000 6.50% 0.20% 770,000 4.10% 0.00% 70,000 69.60% 9.70% 5,000,000 12.80% 0.10% 250,000 8.30% 0.10% 260,000 37.40% 0.70% 2,400,000 4.60% 0.30% 1,100,000 6.10% 0.30% 700,000 7.00% 0.40% 770,000 12.70% 0.10% 250,000 60.00% 0.20% 580,000 49.00% 0.00% 49,000 60.60% 6.10% 10,000,000 5.90% 0.50% 1,200,000 21.20% 0.10% 470,000 2.00% 0.10% 230,000 51.10% 28.00% 15,000,000 43.80% 0.10% 380,000 25.40% 1.00% 510,000 25.20% 0.00% 32,000 51.90% 2.20% 1,700,000 54.30% 0.00% 39,000 4.40% 0.10% 260,000 4.70% 0.20% 500,000 49.00% 8.10% 13,000,000 15.90% 0.60% 150,000 25.80% 2.80% n/a 27.10% 0.10% 160,000 14.90% 2.30% 2,700,000 5.70% 0.10% 280,000 49.00% 1.60% 5,200,000 32.10% 3.60% 1,800,000 4.90% 0.00% 27,000 18.00% 0.80% 1,300,000 47.50% 2.00% 850,000
Data from Miniwatts Marketing Group. www.internetworldstats.com
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African Defense/July 2016
Building Partnerships and Relationships
South Africa’s Paramount is a globally successful defense industrial powerhouse. African Defense recently sat down with Paramount executives John Craig, CEO Paramount Industrial Holdings and Ben Jansen, CEO of Innovation and Design to discuss the company’s latest partnerships, the company’s strategy and business philosophy.
African Defense: Let’s start with the joint venture in Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan Paramount Engineering—KPE. How did this venture come about? Craig: As you know, and for anyone following the Paramount story, we already have an active engagement in Azerbaijan so it was logical for us to look regionally for other opportunities. The government of Kazakhstan had the vision and desire to build a defense capacity for their own benefit and they were looking for international partners who could bring the technologies—and that was us. Our partnership with KPE is split 50-50 with Paramount and KPE. Jansen: Kazakhstan Engineering was an ongoing government entity with various business arrangements and joint ventures.
branded as the Arlan. Within about 12 months after breaking ground for the factory, we completed the first production deliveries. This was quite an astonishing feat in such a short period of time to get the technology transferred and the people trained. The work being done there is not just simple assembly either. They can fabricate sophisticated armored steel structures, handle raw materials, plating, cut and welding, and more. African Defense: From a sales and marketing perspective, what is KPE’s territory? Craig: It’s logical that this would become the hub for us to tackle regional markets, for example the CIS countries. However, it is really more than just geography. While we have a state-of-the-art facility in South Africa we view the KPE facility as part of our global production capability. We envision placing production in Kazakhstan not just for regional consumption but as an integrated part of our global manufacturing strength. The speed at which they have [KPE] increased their production rates is a
great achievement and we now consider them fully a part of our global capacity. African Defense: Even the casual observer can pick up on the trend of Paramount to look for joint ventures to grow its business. Craig: You are absolutely right. We do see joint ventures as our route to markets. We have our innovation centers in South Africa which is a great place to be. We have fantastic facilities and bright engineers to develop products, but production has to happen where the market wants it to happen. On larger programs most countries these days want to see value-added, they want to see continuity of supply, and they want assurances that they are not dependent on critical factors outside their control. It’s absolutely part of the business plan to form joint venture business arrangements, put production in the right places and train people to do the job. African Defense: With your various production facilities, can you talk about your order backlog?
Craig: That’s right. Kazakhstan Engineering is the centerpiece of the government’s strategy to form joint ventures in different domains. They have, for example partnerships with Eurocopter and Aselean. Our protected vehicle partnership is obviously bearing fruit, however, we are offering much more than that. In fact, it stretches into all of our areas such as land, air and sea advanced technologies. African Defense: And you are producing vehicles in Kazakhstan today? Jansen: We started with the locally produced version of our Marauder locally
African Defense/July 2016
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Jansen: We are reluctant to talk about specific orders until the client themselves have released the news, but perhaps we can share some information in terms of bulk capacity. In terms of vehicle capacity, our South Africa facility can handle between 45-50 vehicles per month and current needs are on the increase. We are therefore, looking at further capacity expansion. By having production capacity elsewhere, we have more flexibility in dealing with increased demand. African Defense: Paramount is not just in the ground vehicle business—aviation and maritime also have their place. Craig: Although the exact ratios change over time, turnover for the current year shows that ground vehicles is our biggest business, with the aviation cluster not far behind. Between land, air and sea, we have a wellbalanced portfolio. In fact, our interest in aerospace goes back even before we went into making and developing our own armored vehicles. Early on we held a strategic equity stake in aerospace companies, in particular Aerosud, which was established in the 1980s by some of the lead designers on the Rooivalk attack helicopter. They created their own company and diversified, becoming a Tier 1 supplier to Boeing and Airbus, making components for commercial aircraft as well as Typhoon and other military aircraft. They had divisions with the ability to sustain military aircraft, manage upgrades and do life extensions on aircraft like the Mirage supersonic fighter. When the South African Air Force retired their fleet of F-1 Mirages, we had the opportunity to acquire the entire fleet of aircraft, the strategic stocks, all the test benches and, most important the human capital including qualified supersonic fighter pilots. Through our work, we were able to find new homes in Gabon and the Congo who are very successfully flying squadrons of F-1s today. We offer a wide range of aviation services, up to almost an air force-in-abox including runways, air traffic control, ground support, and language and pilot training. We operate a flight school in northern South Africa from an airport that was completely modernized for the World Cup but is now very under-utilized. We have established a world-class flight school there.
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Great flying conditions and an international class facility. There are quite a few flying schools out there but they are not going after the military type of pilot and lack the discipline necessary for military aviation. African Defense: Tell me about AHRLAC. Craig: Our chairman, who loves aviation, is always looking for projects that can find and nurture young talent. In about 2010 a group of young aviation engineers at our Innovation Center were given the task to come up with a new aircraft as a project. The entire process was about teaming up young and older experienced engineers to stimulate innovative approaches and creativity. However, these engineers didn’t stop there, they actually developed a business plan, identified a gap in the market and made the case for developing and building the aircraft—the AHRLAC (Advanced High Performance Reconnaissance Light Aircraft). It was a very brave decision to move forward with a new aircraft program without government backing and no home market guarantees. But the interest has been phenomenal. We are now flying the pre-production aircraft which has done very well with no issues to speak of. We are in advanced stages of producing aircraft number 2. That in and of itself is interesting. Instead of basically making the test aircraft by hand, we are working off production tooling, meaning that when the flight test program is complete and we are finished with mission system integration, we push the button and are ready to begin production right away. A few months ago we announced that we had financing in place for the
production facility located at Wonderboom Airport. AHRLAC will be perfectly suited for our business. Few, if any, of our clients will buy ‘green” aircraft that they customize with their own systems. This is where our advanced technologies division (Paramount Advanced Technologies) comes in. We can deliver complete system to the clients in a turn-key solution. African Defense: And maritime? Craig: We have long harbored an ambition to meet clients requirements for naval systems and the opportunity presented itself around the end of 2012 with a fairly new player called Nautic Africa. At the time they were focused on oil, gas and commercial markets and were looking to enter defence markets. Since then we have seen them almost double in size every year. The next acquisition was Veecraft Marine, with some similarities to Nautica and also a very innovative business. Southern Power Products which supplies engines and power products came next. The South African Navy’s Biro program is also very important to us. This is a big budget program for inshore and offshore patrol vessels and we have submitted a proposal for the program. African Defense: Tell me about Paramount’s approach to aftermarket support and sustainment. Craig: We do embed support programs into our initial sale. It’s sometimes a hard sell but we support the product no matter what. In this business it is name and reputation. We have had instances where clients have not initially had the budget but we support them
African Defense/July 2016
anyway until they can arrange the funding. In some cases this is where the technology transfer helps with the larger programs. Creating that local, indigenous capability is the bedrock of being able to support the product. If the people are there that did the manufacturing they are in a far better position to support and maintain it. We do everything we can to empower our clients to be as least dependent on us as possible. There is a need to build capacity in those countries and that’s a big part of our model to build that capacity. To many it may sound counterintuitive from a business perspective to wean them off of your support, but it’s not. We find this pays off because you get repeat business and from repeat customers in other areas. They may be a customer of our ground systems, but they come back to us about a maritime requirement because they know we can deliver.
Creating that local,
indigenous capability is the bedrock of being able to support the product. If the people are there that did the manufacturing they are in a far better position to support and maintain it. I think the other important thing is that a lot of the developing world business we do is on the back of finance schemes that we create together with the client. We do a lot of the supply or credit arrangements so we take the clients requirements for large capital programs which they can’t handle in one budget cycle and we create the finance scheme that they can afford. Almost a buy now, pay later arrangement. I think this makes us very unique in working through the customer’s issues to find solutions that work for everyone. I’m not aware of too many companies that take on some of the financial risk and work with their customers so closely on the financial arrangements. African Defense: What is Paramount’s vision of marketing its products and services to African countries? Craig: Without being falsely modest about Africa, we have succeeded in reaching the African customer. In Paramount’s first
African Defense/July 2016
10 to 15 years, Africa became our natural home market in large part because of the political connectivity but also because of the suitability of South African battle-proven products. In the early 1990s heading into 1994, we had a steady stream of interested customers who knew we had excellent equipment and wanted it for their own forces. In those early years, South Africa really didn’t have the infrastructure to export its military products. The only defense-related government agency was ARMSCOR and by mandate they were focused inward. So Paramount stepped in to help fill that need of putting together programs for exports clients. Jansen: Africa is the one area where we have sold all of our services—land, air and maritime. We have had some countries come to us for entire packages of services and equipment for their militaries, and in some cases their national police forces as well. Craig: Probably within 50 kilometers of our South African headquarters there are probably 10 places that make light armored vehicles. I think there is a place for that kind of a vehicle but with Mbombe, for example, we’ve managed to put differentiation into the marketspace and to my mind climb the complexity scale which requires knowhow and investments—and also access to markets. It’s no good making the beast if you can’t sell them. Remember, we’re not trying to own everything we provide to our clients. We have, beyond our own platform capabilities, a very active and open partner program that helps deliver solutions. We focus on the client’s requirement, listen to what they want and find the best and most affordable solution. Something else I’d like to point out is that there are a number of big international players that have approached us about partnerships. Our business model and methods have attracted attention. Boeing is a great example. They approached us about a partnership with no particular program or project in mind but saw value that a BoeingParamount partnership could represent and we recently announced collaboration with Boeing on our light aerial platform.
been able to maintain its position and growth? Craig: Number one is relationships, this is a relationship business. For all of its hightech commodity aspects of the business, it comes down to relationships. I think the risks Paramount has taken over the years would have been impossible had it not been for the strength of the relationships we had in place. The fact that we work so closely with customers on financing their acquisitions in a way that meets both their materiel needs and their financial obligations is unique. Jansen: It also comes from understanding the customer’s requirements. Listening to what they need and providing a solution that truly is in their best interest makes a difference. We also willing go to places that other people will not to get the job done and do what it takes to fulfill our obligations. Craig: That’s right. What makes a company stand out today is its service and how it is viewed and respected by its customers and its employees. As Paramount has grown over the years, we have worked hard not to lose sight of those core values that have propelled our growth. As the company has grown and mushroomed we have worked to keep the essence of who we were and are. Between Paramount and the companies we have an interest in there are about 3,000 employees in South Africa. Perhaps not a huge number by some standards, but in South Africa it’s a big deal that we take very seriously.
African Defense: In a world of struggling defense companies, how has Paramount
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Maximizing Effectiveness with Special Forces
African militaries are seizing the benefits of specialized forces Even with small militaries, and in most cases, even smaller defense budgets, many defense ministries are finding ways to increase their combat effectiveness is by investing in special operations forces or at the least training specific units for special operations mission skill sets. In late 2014, a Kenyan F-5 Tiger II with an engine problem crashed in Al-Shabaab controlled territory in Somalia. Lacking a combat search and rescue capability, Kenyan forces were unable to reach the crash site for some time. By the time they did, the pilot was missing. Responding to that incident, the Kenya Air Force announced in June the establishment of a combat rescue force to be based at Nanyuki Air Base. Kenyan Defense Cabinet Secretary Raychelle Omamo explained the unit’s mission is “to safely recover own or friendly forces who have either been captured, downed from an airplane or selfejected from a fighter aircraft or inadvertently lost in enemy territory.” Kenya already have elite special forces and Rangers units as well as the 20 Para Battalion. Next door, Ugandan President Museveni disclosed the establishment and subsequent deployment of a special mountain warfare force. Trained by French Alpine soldiers, the unit’s mission is to operate in the challenging mountainous environments of Uganda, some of which have been areas of operation of the Lord’s Resistance Army. With continuing French assistance, Uganda expects to build its first mountain warfare training institute. Earlier in 2016, Nigeria decided to up its special ops game when it announced plans to establish an Air Force Special Operations Command. The announcement came from the Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Sadique Abubakar during a lecture at the Nigerian National Defence College. Offering few details, he described the increase in Air Force commands from four to five with the addition of the Air Force Special Opera-
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tions Command. During the recent Central Accord 2016 exercise in Gabon, Gabonese airborne troops jumped alongside paras from the US and France. Jungle warfare training was also shared by soldiers from all three armies at the Jungle Warfare School in Gabon under the guidance of French instructors. In March it was announced that the Sudan was increasing the size of its special forces battalion to that of a brigade. The announcement came as the unit was wrapping up its participation in the Saudi Arabiansponsored North Thunder military exercises and it had been announced that the unit had been awarded the Order of Accomplishment by the President of Sudan, Field Marshal Omer Al-Bashir. Namibia’s Defence Minister Penda ya Ndakolo, after observing a military exercise said, “I am very proud of what I saw. As we in the ministry and in the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) constantly advocate for mobility and agility of the defense force, we should recognize that the role of our special forces will be crucial in nearly all operations of the NDF. In a vast and semi-desert country like this, role of special forces needs to be given prominence and considered central in the defense force design and deployment procedures.” He said the special forces are a forcemultiplier which can be deployed in small teams to serve as commando units in the Parachute Regiment, Special Air Service and special boat groups in support of the navy. The units can also be deployed on counterterrorism operations which include urban, desert, mountain and forest warfare. Ya Ndakolo implored the acting NDF Chief of Staff Vice-Marshal Martin Pinehas to recruit only the ‘best and brightest soldiers’ to form future elite units of the special forces and challenged the graduates to be exemplary. “They should be trained at a higher intensity to prepare them properly for their missions as a rapid deployment force.”
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African Defense/July 2016
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African Defense/July 2016