Political Economy and Decision Making

Political Economy and Decision Making: Influences on the the win-win-win Papakonstantinidis bargaining model STEPHEN I. TERNYIK

ABSTRACT:

The article examines different strategies, focusing on the win-win-win

Papakonstantinidis model, suggesting a strategy of a harmonic cooperation between stakeholders. Political Economy and Decision Making are the fields of developing a win-winwin Papakonstantinidis strategic bargaining profile.

KEYWORDS Strategies, marginal economics, the win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model, decision making.

JEL: P16, P13

INTRODUCTION Nowadays, globalization is a reality in the current business paradigm. This new global business model is based on the high degree of interaction between agents, accessibility and speed of information, the development of new channels and forms of communication, the improvements in logistics and transportation, and international competitiveness. This framework, together with the evolution and adaptation of technologies to this new social and cultural context, suggests that the development of innovation will be one of the most influential factors in the business environment in the coming decade 1s. resources that enterprises need to innovate. rationale for this work. On the other hand, large and small businesses do present differences in the allocation of resources for developing innovation activities (Rizzoni, 1991). It is generally accepted that small firms tend to have more limited resources, less influence on the market, and less formal communication mechanisms than large enterprises (Dickson et al., 1997). However, some studies show how the strengths of small businesses in innovation do not rely as much on the availability of resources (at least tangible ones), but on certain behavioral characteristics, more linked to the figure of the managers (Vossen , 1998; Kotey and Meredith, 1997; Peteraf and Shanley, 1997, p.167). As a result, there are certain differences in the adoption of innovation strategies between small and large firms (Yap and Souder, 1994). This article belongs to a new line of research studying 1

Manuel Platero- Sonia Benito- Antonio RodrĂ­guez-Duarte (2013) “Differences between innovative and noninnovative microenterprises: internal factorsâ€? 35th DRUID Celebration Conference 2013, Barcelona, Spain, June 17-19

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innovation in microenterprises, continuing along the lines of earlier works on this subject such as the study of factors that determine the innovative capacity of microenterprises). This area is even more important in the case of Spain, where this type of enterprise has a large presence in the business landscape2“. This exploratory study presents a comparison between two samples of microenterprises. One sample is formed by companies involved in product innovation during the current economic crisis and the other is formed by companies not involved in product innovation during the same period. The comparison analyzes which internal factors, supported by the literature as the influential factors of small business innovation, are significant when explaining the main differences between innovative microenterprise and non-innovative ones. The results suggest that the factors related to the organization and activity of the company are the factors which explain the differences between these two types of firms, rather than those factors related to micro-entrepreneur's own profile. Jelcodes: O31,L29 1 Differences between innovative and non-innovative microenterprises: internal factors Abstract This exploratory study presents a comparison between two samples of microenterprises. One sample is formed by companies involved in product innovation during the current economic crisis and the other is formed by companies not involved in product innovation during the same period. The comparison analyzes which internal factors, supported by the literature as the influential factors of small business innovation, are significant when explaining the main differences between innovative microenterprise and non-innovative ones. The results suggest that the factors related to the organization and activity of the company are the factors which explain the differences between these two types of firms, rather than those factors related to microentrepreneur's own profile. Keywords: microenterprise, innovation, comparative analysis, entrepreneur, age, education, gender, organizational factors. JEL: L26, O31, M21. 1 Goals vs Strategies Every business, in fact every individual, must have a goal in order to succeed. It involves having to set a certain standard or level that one must reach, and which would require the development of several strategies that would set the pace and serve as guide towards the achievement of the goal.

A goal is defined as the desired result that a person or system anticipates and plans to accomplish. It is also referred to as the objective of any business plan or personal undertaking.

The expected result acts as a guide for whatever action that the individual or company is taking towards the fulfillment of its goals.

It is also like a specific, realistic, and attainable aim which usually has a deadline. Goals can either be short term or long term and can be any of these types: Consumer goal which is concerned with supplying the demand of consumers for a certain product Product goal which is concerned with producing products that are of higher quality.

Operational goal which is concerned with the proper management of resources for the efficient operation of the business Secondary goal which is concerned with all other goals of the company that are not considered as priorities 2

BenitoHernandez, et al., 2012 Long-Term Impacts of Non-Sustainable Tourismand Urban Development in Small TropicalIslands Coastal Habitats in a Changing Climate:Lessons Learned from Puerto Rico

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It involves the proper utilization of resources to achieve the desired results. With these results in mind, strategies are developed in order to achieve what is desired.

Strategies are the methods by which goals are expected to be achieved. It involves the direction to which the company is gearing, the scope of the market, how it can compete with other companies, the expectations of people who run and control the business, and other factors that can affect the achievement of the company’s goals.

There are three types of business strategy: corporate strategy which deals with how to meet the expectations of the stakeholders; business unit strategy which deals with how the business can compete in a certain market; and operational strategy which deals with the utilization of resources towards the achievement of a company’s goals.

A strategy, therefore, is the means by which the goal of the company is attained. Every business enterprise has a common goal, that is, to become profitable and earn enough income for its owners. To achieve these goals, it needs to be competitive and utilize its resources efficiently. The achievement of these goals will depend largely on the strategies developed by its management.

Summary: 1.A goal is defined as the result which an individual or company plans to accomplish while a strategy is defined as the method by which the goal is achieved.

2.Goals can be achieved in the long term or short term depending on the strategies that an individual or a company develops and uses.

3.Both are geared towards the success of an individual or a business; the goal serves as the specific aim which inspires individuals to work efficiently while the strategy serves as the pattern, system, or means by which the goal is reached or achieved

DEFINITIONS  STRATEGY A method or plan chosen to bring about a desired future, such as achievement of a goal or solution to a problem The art and science of planning and marshalling resources for their most efficient and effectively use the term is derived from the Greek word for generalship or leading an army 3.

Strategy "art of troop leader; office of general, command, generalship") is a high-level plan to achieve one or more goals under conditions of uncertainty. In the sense of the "art of the general", which included several subsets of skills including "tactics", siege craft, logistics etc., the term came into use in the 6th century C.E. in East Roman terminology and was translated into Western vernacular languages only in the 18th century. From then until the 20th century, the word "strategy" came to denote "a comprehensive way to try to pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills" in a military conflict, in which both adversaries interact. Strategy is important because the resources available to achieve these goals are usually limited. Strategy generally involves setting goals, determining actions to achieve the goals, and mobilizing resources to execute the actions. A strategy describes how the ends (goals) will be achieved by the means (resources). This is 3

Business Dictionary

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generally tasked with determining strategy. Strategy can be intended or can emerge as a pattern of activity as the organization adapts to its environment or competes. It involves activities such as strategic planning and strategic thinking Henry Mintzberg from McGill University defined strategy as a pattern in a stream of decisions to contrast with a view of strategy as planning, while Max McKeown (2011) argues that "strategy is about shaping the future" and is the human attempt to get to "desirable ends with available means". Dr. Vladimir Kvint defines strategy as "a system of finding, formulating, and developing a doctrine, methodolical tool that will ensure long-term success if followed faithfully The term strategy derives from the Greek strategos4., an elected general in ancient Athens.

The strategoi were mainly military leaders with combined political and military authority, which is the essence of strategy. 

MARGINAL ECONOMICS

Analyzing the twin goal-strategy, the game theory (especially, the BARGAINING PROBLEM” must be taken into consideration: During this game, it is rather obvious that goals are different from strategy: Following the capitalist strategy, we could arrive in a goal quite different from a “capitalist goal” Especially, if in the “Nash’s win-win Equilibrium” we could include a third part (in any bargain between 2), then a NEW Equilibrium (agreement) could be arisen” the “win-winwin Equilibrium Marginal Utility In economics, the marginal utility of a good or service is the gain from an increase, or loss from a decrease, in the consumption of that good or service. Economists sometimes speak of a law of diminishing marginal utility, meaning that the first unit of consumption of a good or service yields more utility than the second and subsequent units, with a continuing reduction for greater amounts. The marginal decision rule states that a good or service should be consumed at a quantity at which the marginal utility is equal to the marginal cost

Papakonstantinidis, 2002 VISBY GOTLAND SW

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   

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, on Perseus Freedman, Lawrence (2013). Strategy. Oxford University Press Mintzberg, Henry and, Quinn, James Brian (1996). The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, Cases.

Prentice Hall.

Henry Mintzberg (May 1978). "Patterns in Strategy Formation" (PDF). Management Science.

INFORMS. 24 (9): 934–948. on 19 October 2013. Retrieved 31 August 2012

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MRS The marginal rate of substitution is the rate at which a consumer is ready to give up one good in exchange for another good while maintaining the same level of utility At equilibrium consumption levels (assuming no externalities), marginal rates of substitution are identical Under the standard assumption of neoclassical economics that goods and services are continuously divisible, the marginal rates of substitution will be the same regardless of the direction of exchange, and will correspond to the slope of an indifference curve (more precisely, to the slope multiplied by -1) passing through the consumption bundle in question, at that point: mathematically, it is the implicit derivative MRS of X for Y is the amount of Y for which a consumer is willing to exchange X locally. The MRS is different at each point along the indifference curve thus it is important to keep locally in the definition. Further on this assumption, or otherwise on the assumption that utility is quantified the marginal rate of substitution of good or service X for good or service Y (MRS

) is also equivalent to the

xy

marginal utility of X over the marginal utility of Y. Formally,

5

By taking the total differential of the utility function equation, we obtain the following results: , or substituting from above, , or, without loss of generality, the total derivative of the utility function with respect to good x, , that is,

.

Through any point on the indifference curve, dU/dx = 0, because U = c, where c is a constant.

It follows from the above equation that:

, or rearranging

The marginal rate of substitution is defined by minus the slope of the indifference curve at whichever commodity bundle quantities are of interest. That turns out to equal the ratio of the marginal utilities: .

When consumers maximize utility with respect to a budget constraint, the indifference curve is tangent to the budget line therefore, with m representing slope:

6

Therefore, when the consumer is choosing his utility maximized market basket on his budget line,

This important result tells us that utility is maximized when the consumer's budget is allocated so that the marginal utility per unit of money spent is equal for each good. If this equality did not hold, the consumer could increase his/her utility by cutting spending on the good with lower marginal utility per unit of money and increase spending on the other good.

To decrease the marginal rate of substitution, the consumer must buy more of the good for which he/she wishes the marginal utility to fall for (due to the law of diminishing marginal utility).

ELEMENTS OF GAME THEORY5 “Social welfare” is the end (the ideal end) of the agreement between 2 on that point profits for any “bargainer, including the Community- the “C” factor: addition quantity become less and more less toward ZERO See Papakonstantinidis LA “win-win-win” law of diminishing marginal returns (each, in his/her ordinal utility function 5

In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy.

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PL EASANT ..EXPERIENCE

u  individual....utils..( not ..meas p : probabilit ies , these.. pleasant

U AU B , U C when, UA  x UB  y U c  (100  x  y )

UTILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM Utility is a function of “personal satisfaction units (utile)ordering ranking, by its corresponding probability to succeed this result- see below Suppose, U A ,...U B ,...U C .. the Utility functions of A, B and the Community –C bargainers, who participate in a political game Also, suppose that COMMUNITY responds, “Human Values”, ethic, traditional life, the History Then all participants A, B, C start bargaining each-other Each of them expects to derive profit from the bargain Understood that, as the product of the satisfaction of A, B,C moves to max, then we say that social welfare is feasible and increasing by the utility product of A,B,C Let’s see U A  U B  U G  MAX ...or

U A * U B * U C  MAX .... from ...the...set ...theory 

If .....the. product ..of ... U A * B B * U C   0..( or..in..neiborhood ..of ..ZERO ) d (U A * U B * U C )  0..ther..is..not.. possibilit y..to..improve.. profits ..of ..any.. dx NEGOTIATOR without...worcen .. profits ...of ..any..other..in..the..negotiation..agreement xi  ..VARIABLE ..OF ..the....UTILITY ...FUNCTION ;.. ( xi )

then

In math expression: If ,...U A ....U B ...U C ..are...the..utility.. functions..of .. A  B  COMMUNITY ..negotiators,..then

U A  U B  U G  U A * U B * U C  MAX

for..this..must..be..U A * B B * U C  '  0..(or..in..neiborhood..of ..ZERO)

8

PAPAKONSTANTINIDIS 2002

The derivative of a function of a real variable measures the sensitivity to change of a quantity (a function value or dependent variable) which is determined by another quantity (the independent variable).

slope 

change...in..Y = 1ST DERIVATIVE OF U’=f(x)’,possible N.E change..in... X

Win-win-win Equilibrium From the two graphs above, and the “Pareto Efficiency” (even the “Week Pareto Efficiency”) CONDITION, the famous (since mid –1700’s6 he laws of diminishing marginal returns goes by a

6

The first recorded expression of diminishing returns came from Turgot sometime in the mid-1700s. Classical economists, such as Ricardo and Malthus, attribute successive diminishment of output to a decrease in quality of input

9

number of different names, including law of diminishing returns, principle of diminishing marginal productivity and law of variable proportions.

It

is………………………………………………………….

d ( f ( x)) , or.. dx f ( x) ..is..its..MARGINAL...UTILITY ....FUNCTION

If ..u  f ( x)..is..a..utility.. function,..then..

Source: Papakonstantinidis (2002)

A s. . t h e .. t h e n , o n .

.. q u a n t i t I t.. i s... a s I f

....

U

A

,

r e s p o n d

t h e .. d e v e i d e a l

.. c a

'Pareto Efficiency' Pareto efficiency, also known as "Pareto optimality," is an economic state where resources are allocated in the most efficient manner, and it is obtained when a distribution strategy exists where one party's situation cannot be improved without making another party's situation worse. Pareto efficiency does not imply equality or fairness.

PARETO ...EFFICIECY MAX ...Utility...Function : ...MAX ..U ( x1 ,.. x 2 ,... x n )

px i

i

 M ,...xi  0,...xi  {1,..2,..n}

p  price,... xi  quantities..... pxi  sum..of ..all , , pxi M  FRONTIER...MAX ..sources.. for..allocation

10

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U AU B , U C when, UA  x UB  y U c  (100  x  y )

U A  U B  U G  U A * U B * U C  max

for..this..must..be..U A * BB * U C  '  0..(or..in..neiborhood..of ..ZERO)

11

xy (100  x  y ) n , , max  [ xy (100  x  y ) n ]'  0

But,

12

U A  U B  U c  U A *U B *U c  max  U A *U B * U c    0 ui  f i ( s ) xy(100  x  y ) n  max  [ xy(100  x  y ) n ]  0 [ xy (100  x  y ) n ]  xy (100  x  y ) n  xy(100  x  y ) n  xy[(100  x  y ) n ]  0 xy(100  x  y ) n ]  y (100  x  y ) n  x (100  x  y ) n  nxy(100  x  y ) n 1  0



 f ( x) * g ( x )   f ( x) * g ( x)  f ( x ) * g ( x)

[ xy (100  x  y ) n ]  y (100  x  y ) n 1 (100  x  y )  x(100  x  y ) n 1 (100  x  y )  nxy(100  x  y ) n 1  0 It...must : .....xy(100  x  y ) n  max  lim [ xy(100  x  y ) n ]  0 x 

sup ...that..(100  x  y )  0 y (100  x  y )  x(100  x  y )  nxy *1  0  x y x y ( x  y )(100  x  y )  nxy  0    xy  (100  x  y )  (1)n.....................by.. putting ,.... xy    0  

 (100  x  y )  (1) n  (100  x  y ) 

n



 (  n)

1



but ,.....(100  x  y )  %..Community.." share "..of ...o..budget ,..b  1.......EXPECTED.. payoff ... from.." b  1" %..Community...share  ( n)

1



(b).........the..(  n)...denotes, , the..reduction

result ...which..comes.. from..the..Community.." reaction"..in..any..BARGAIN ,..(by...its..3rd ...role ,....i.e as..an.. Agent..of ..the..CITIZEN .  .PRINCIPALr elation,.. Arbitrator , , , and ..as..the..

Indepented..3rd ..barty )..to..the..total..budget.." b"...of ..the..BARGAIN then,...the..i th .. player; s.best..mixed...strategy ( probabilit y  ..a..lottery..over.. a..trinomial ...distribution), is..the..best..strategies.. for..h.imself , as..well, as..the..best...strategies .. for..the..other.. players, aswell..as..the..best..strategy.. for..the..Community..(the..common...welfare )

13

notes : A, B.C...do, , , not...cooperate.. forward A, B, C..must ..collaborate..in..and ..during..the..b arg ain..( ins tan t ..reflection ..winning..stra " C"... exp resses ...not...only..the..rest ..( no..b arg ain.. participants ), , but...also..the..total..co cultural ...heritage, world ...cultivatio n...the.." human...being "..." Homo...Sapiens" From...this.. po int ..of ...view,...Community... participation..in..any..b arg ain...between ..TWO Also,..COMMUNITY  the.." c".. factor..MUST ... exp ress ..the.." Community..Fear".. from.

For..this.." Community.. participation"..is..captured ..as...(100  x  y ) n , where ..n  the.. fe the.. A, B..utility.. functions...must ..be..linear

n   1,.x * %... %  100%  max(quite..unequality..and ..unjustice..in..distibution...of . A, B, and ..Com 1 n   2...x * %  %  50  50  0 2 n   3...x * %  %..  33,3333...IDEAL...SITUATION 3 x   4  ......x * %  . %  UNSTABLE .(THEOCHARIS  OSCILLATIO N )...of .. A, B, C.. exp ectati 4

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CONCLUSIONS Testifying Leonidas’ opinion I would say that Gamification, LMX ,Principal Agent and Mediation Theory are included in a dipolar "bargaining perception" from rational individuals, where, each of the 2-polar tries to maximizing his/her profit, by the minimum cost So we have a form of "bargaining Problem" (John Forbs Nash, 1950) According to its rules, the process of creating profit/costs positions may be lasted by agreement or disagreement In the case of agreement, a "win-win" situation is developed Now, if the profit for all the community (a system of common accepted human values) is sought, then a NEW equilibrium point is resulted, the "win-win-win equilibrium point" This point is feasible to be measured and estimated by the "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model As market segmentation is in the focus, especially in luxury hotels a "bargaining problem" is arising, which obeys in bargaining rational rules. According to market tends, and to Pareto Optimality, after some "movements" an equilibrium point is achieved. in that point an agreement is the result Now, if the "Community" (by the means of an aggregate ethical distinct entity, as a set of total human values) should participate at any bargain between 2, then a new equilibrium point could be defined: the "win-win-win papakonstantinidis equilibrium" coming from applying the "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" in market segmentation could be arisen What is the “win-win-win”? It is a tool for measuring the qualitative properties of an issue, taking into consideration that "COMMUNITY" (any community (ie a cultural community, an athletic community, a "value system" an "ethical system" etc must gain is own profit, from any bargain between 2 In real terms it is an expansion of the "win-win situation In this case the "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" is able to measure "internal branding in a retail organization" in terms of "deviations" from the "win-winwin equilibrium" (the max -ideal profit situation for all the involved parts of any (re-active strategies) bargain what a "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is? first of all it is a typical version of "Moral Aggregation“, taking into consideration the "Community as aggregator" The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” is a “tool of consent” useful in socioeconomic human (and not only) relations Using this tool, a decent answer can be given to Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Also it is a “tool” for conflict resolution Also it may be used in approaching the “Principal-Agent Problem” (PAP) In particularly, argumentation of the work is focused on “transferring’ the “voting perception (Arrow, 1951) from a single individual choice, in the ”bargaining multiple decision making, thus taking into consideration the “Community Profit” (The 3rd part os a “peer-pressure perception” Bargainers A-B and the Community as a whole (the “C” Factor) I tried to identify the "win-win-win" as a key tool for the approach to social welfare by clicking on the incompatibility of five basic theorems that define it - each one of its own side-either positive (justice theorem ) or negative (the impossibility theorem) The suggested "win15

win-win papakonstantinidis model”[1]is built up on these incompatibilities, in particular as regards the pairs" Pareto efficiency – Impossibility Theorem” "paradox liberty (Amartya Sen) - Pareto Efficiency” , “Theorem of Justice –Pareto Efficiency” and (the most important) “the Theorem of incompleteness-the Impossibility Theorem” The winwin-win papakonstantinidis model is a methodological tool for conflict resolution, especially in the case of decision making, or in forming "instant reflection winning strategies" in the BARGAIN (which is the frame) The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” concerns the strategic decision making in a number of fields and domains (biology, psychology, management, marketing, history- especially in interpretation of historic events-logography, ethnology, anthropogeography, philosophy, economy, sociology, pure math, communication, public speech, diplomacy, and go on The reason so many regards thinking and research Special regard is given to regional and local development field both as a regional and social sciences. It proves that building social capital at local level mainly depends on social trust links among local people: Social cohesion based on social capital may be measured by the diversification Rate (R *) from strict globalization rules: From this point of view, local people’s intervention should be useful, so as to diversify these "rules" at local level adjusting them to local identity, including communication code, customs, ethics, culture. The Win-win-win methodology [Papakonstantinidis Model] should facilitate local people to "readjust" bargaining globalization rules locally, through a sensitization process: Community is defined as a discrete spatial / cultural entity, as their people’s sensitization process' is going to its limit The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” (2002, August, SW) may, thus, transform individual winning –instant reflection –strategies (the win-win Nash Theory) in a NEW –three poles-equilibrium point, including the COMMUNITY (Environmental Protection, Value Systems, Ethic etc), which is the “absolute cooperation” limit point in the bargain between TWO Since the game theory (exactly: the “non cooperative game theory”) saved the New-classical School of Thought in Economics letting it to make a restart, focusing on the “bargaining equilibrium” (Nash Equilibrium) and the equi-marginal principle (consumer choice) it seems that the bargaining behavior is in the centre of our research Papakonstantinidis L.A(2002-August 14) “The win-win-win model” Euracademy Guide The Visby University-Gotland-SW7 It could be possible to approach this, by the game theory, especially, the bargaining problem, as any human activity has the re-action dimension in this problem, the agreement-ie the Equilibrium point resulted from rational decisions coming from “players, ie from two payers (A-B) IPR in emerging markets follow the Rule of “re-action” in Emerging Countries For example, if “Biotechnology” is the domain, then all the involvement will take care of this re-action, by the scope to arrive in agreement, or “win-win situation” (Nash Equilibrium) If the World Community (the total of Human Values, the Culture etc) –in an ideal casecould participate, then we could have a NEW equilibrium point, the “win-win-win Equilibrium” could be a feasible situation, thus interpreting the scope of IPR in emerging markets For this, the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” has been introduced since 2002.

··· 7

Papakonstantinidis L.A (2002) The “win-win-win model” Visby University, Gotland SW, EURACADEMY Guide

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REFFERENCES   

 



   



     



Nash, J.F., Jr. 1953. Two-person cooperative games Econometrica 21, 128–40.

Nash, J.F., Jr. 1995. Autobiography Les Prix Nobel The Nobel Prizes 1994, ed. T. Frangsmyr Stockholm: Nobel Foundation. Online Neumann, J. von 1928. Zur theories der gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen 100, 295–320. English translation by S. Bergmann in Contributions to the Theory of 8 Nash, John Forbes (born 1928) Games IV, ed. R.D. Luce and A.W. Tucker. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

Neumann, J. von and Morgenstern, O. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior Princeton: Princeton University Press (2nd edn 1947).

Papakonstantinidis LA (2013) The Intermediate Community: A Behavioral / Bargaining Approach For Conflict Resolution At The Local Level/ Bayesian Analysis EUROMED World Conference- Proceedings.................. P. 1443 Papakonstantinidis LA (2012) The 'Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model' as a Bargaining Solution Analysis for Local Government Decision from TerritoryCommunity to 'Behavioral' Community: The Case of Greece Papakonstantinidis LA (2016) Volume II titled “The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” VOLUME II: COLLECTION social choice, social welfare: theoretical background 2016 RESEARCH GATE Papakonstantinidis LA (project2016-2020) Social Welfare: Collection of bibliographic references and the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model- Project Papakonstantinidis LA “Involving communities in rural tourism: Α "win-winwin papakonstantinidis model" methodological approach and the examination of two Women Rural Tourism Cooperatives’ Case Studies IJRCM , VOL No 2, 2012/1,issue no 1 Papakonstantinidis LA (2017) The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model: the Community’s key-role in bargaining problem: Political Game as a function of “Bargaining” ”Principal-Agent” and “Ultimatum” game : The “rainbow concept” in the Political Bargain under publication Papakonstantinidis LA: the “S.H.I.E.L.D model” Presentation Book of Proceedings “World Conference “Tourismo Verde”, Rome, 1997 Pareto Vilfredo (1906) Manual of Political Economy. 1906 25. Pareto Vilfredo (1896) Cours d' Économie Politique Professé a l' Université de Lausanne. Vol. I, 1896,Vol. II, 1897.

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