Terror Management Theory and Disgust Towards In Vitro Meat

Terror Management Theory and Disgust Towards In Vitro Meat by Jennifer B. Floyd

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Animal Behavior and Conservation) Hunter College The City University of New York

2011

Thesis Sponsor:

Date

Signature [Sheldon Solomon, PhD]

Date

Signature of Second Reader [Joseph Barber, PhD]

Date

Signature of Third Reader [Sheila Chase, PhD]

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

ii

Table of Contents ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. iii DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... v THE MEAT OF THE PROBLEM ...............................................................................................1 FOOD REJECTION ......................................................................................................................7 DISTASTE...........................................................................................................................8 DANGER .............................................................................................................................9 DISGUST...........................................................................................................................15 CORE DISGUST .........................................................................................................16 ANIMAL-REMINDER DISGUST .............................................................................18 SOCIO-MORAL DISGUST ........................................................................................19 THE BIG THREE ............................................................................................24 ETHICS OF DIVINITY ................................................................25 TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY (TMT) ....................................................................... 28 TMT AND NATURALNESS............................................................................................34 PRESENT RESEARCH ............................................................................................................. 38 METHOD ................................................................................................................................... 41 RESULTS ................................................................................................................................... 44 DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................. 49 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 57 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 59 APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................ 75

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

iii

Abstract In vitro meat, animal protein that is bioengineered from stem cells, offers an alternative solution to the unsustainable livestock practices currently in place. However, studies have found that individuals are physically and morally disgusted by the “unnaturalness” of biotechnological applications, especially those pertaining to food and animals. From the perspective of Terror Management Theory, disgust results from stimuli that make one’s animal nature and mortality salient. In the present study, participants (N = 80) were primed with an essay that either emphasized human-animal similarities or human uniqueness, followed by one of four possible food product primes; organic tomatoes, genetically modified tomatoes, organic meat, or in vitro meat. Subsequently, participants were administered a word-fragment completion task in order to assess death-thought accessibility. The primary prediction, that participants primed with bioengineered food products would have significantly more death-related word completions compared to participants primed with organic food products, was supported. As predicted, this effect was greater for participants who read the essay that emphasized human-animal similarities compared to participants who read the essay that emphasized human uniqueness, although this interaction did not reach statistical significance. Contrary to expectation, participants primed with animal-derived food products did not have significantly more death-related word completions compared to participants primed with non-animal food products; however, there was a trend in the predicted direction for participants who read the essay that emphasized human-animal similarities but not for participants who read the essay that emphasized human uniqueness. Implications for the future marketing of in vitro meat and other biotechnology are discussed.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

For Trixie Bear

iv

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to extend a giant thank you to Dr. Sheldon Solomon, Dr. Joseph Barber, and Dr. Sheila Chase for contributing their time and talent in order to make this thesis possible. I would further like to thank Dr. Jeff Greenberg and Dr. Tom Pyszczynski for their insightful feedback on an earlier pilot of this study. Last but not least, my sincere gratitude goes to my parents, Don, Xero, and Trixie for their unconditional love and support throughout my academic adventures.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

1

Terror Management Theory and Disgust Towards In Vitro Meat We have entered the Century of the Environment, in which the immediate future is usefully conceived as a bottleneck. Science and technology, combined with a lack of self-understanding and a Paleolithic obstinacy, brought us to where we are today. Now science and technology, combined with foresight and moral courage, must see us through the bottleneck and out. (Wilson, 2002, p. 23) The history of human evolution has long credited meat-eating and livestock domestication as being some of the most important catalysts to our fitness as a species (Smil, 2002); however, we have become so fit that the practices that once solely nurtured us are now implicated in a host of human, environmental, and animal welfare offenses.

Livestock production currently occupies 30% of the world’s ice-free terrestrial surface, and is considered to be the largest, most destructive, anthropogenic use of land (Steinfeld et al., 2006). With global meat consumption projected to increase 72% between 2000 and 2030 due to population growth and increasing affluence in developing countries (Fiala, 2008), a dietary intervention is warranted in order to mitigate further environmental degradation, but large-scale behavioral change is difficult at best. Studies on environmentally relevant behaviors, such as energy conservation, inform the literature that substitution behaviors are generally more agreeable and more effective than curtailment behaviors, which involve hedonistic sacrifice (see Stern, 2000). For example, substituting fluorescent bulbs for incandescent bulbs, or substituting an energy-efficient hybrid vehicle for a conventional vehicle, are behaviors that have the potential to be more effective and easier to adopt than turning off lights or cutting down on driving (Stern, 1981). Likewise, substitution of products such as in vitro meat for conventional meat may be more effective than making appeals to the public to give up or reduce meat consumption.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

2

In vitro meat is animal protein that is cultured in a laboratory from either embryonic myoblast or adult myosatellite stem cells. These cells are bathed in a growth medium, and placed inside a bioreactor to burgeon, fuse, and differentiate into myofibers, which can then be harvested and consumed (see Bhat & Bhat, 2011). Theoretically, a single cell could be prolific enough to satisfy the annual global demand for meat (Edelman, McFarland, Mironov, & Matheny, 2005). Although speculation of such a technology has been documented as early as the 1930’s (Ford, 2010), research on the biofabrication of meat did not take off for another 70 years when the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) took interest in the concept as a potential solution to sustenance requirements for astronauts manning long-term space missions (Benjaminson, Gilchriest, & Lorenz, 2002). Initial progress was promising; however, NASA quickly lost interest in the project, eschewing it in favor of other developments.

Although in vitro meat may not have made it onto the cosmic menu, the product may still have many important implications here on Earth. Current methods of intensive livestock production are environmentally unsustainable, playing a primary role in deforestation, soil erosion, sedimentation, eutrophication, water pollution, acid rain, transmission of diseases and invasive species, loss of biodiversity, and greenhouse gas emissions (Goodland & Anhang, 2009; Steinfeld et al., 2006). A recent study conducted

by Tuomisto and Teixeira de Mattos (2011), which compared the prospective environmental impact of in vitro meat with the current environmental impact of conventionally produced meat, concluded that in vitro meat would involve approximately 7-45% less energy use (only conventional poultry would use less energy), 78-96% less greenhouse gas emissions, 82-96% less water use, and 99% less land use. Although these

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

3

statistics alone are enough to merit attention, in addition to the environmental benefits, in vitro meat would also cater to other concerns such as human and animal welfare.

With an estimated 1 billion human beings already plagued by hunger (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2009), climate change threatens to bring increases in droughts, cyclones, and floods, aggravating the already dire circumstances of global food security (Mousseau, 2009). Aside from its part in the precipitation of this climate change, livestock production is notoriously prodigal in terms of vital resources.

Pimentel and Pimentel (1996) calculated that animal-based protein uses up to 100 times more water than plant-based protein, and Smil (2002) estimates that 80-96% of all plantbased protein fed to livestock, which altogether claims one-third of the world’s harvest, is not converted into edible animal protein. These figures have led many to speculate that a reduction of meat consumption in developed countries would free up cereal and legumes from livestock, and largely mitigate hunger in developing countries (Chiu & Lin, 2009); however, this is not a practical solution. Even if developed countries did manage to curtail their meat consumption to such a great extent, the predicted impact is sure to disappoint. Food projection models indicate only a nominal gain in available cereal and legumes; the likely scenario being that as there will be more livestock products available in the global market, the cost of meat will fall, and developing countries will make up the difference by incorporating the more-affordable meat into their diets (Rosegrant, Leach, & Gerpacio, 1999). This is another area where the adoption of in vitro meat is rendered a superior alternative, possessing the potential to radically change the forecast for world hunger.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

4

Although disappearing rainforests and starving children are unfortunate realities, a Paleolithic disposition makes it all too easy for individuals to shut out concerns that are distant in time or space; however, whether one realizes it or not, everyone is affected by livestock production. Cardiovascular disease, which is strongly correlated with the intake of saturated fatty acids in meat (Astrup et al., 2011), is now the leading cause of mortality in developed countries (World Health Organization, 2011). Animal products are also the number one source of food poisoning, contributing to the 76 million illnesses that occur annually in the United States alone (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005).

But perhaps the most ominous concerns stem from potential pandemics. Sixty percent of all known infectious agents are zoonotic, and risk from such diseases is predicted to rise due to increasing livestock production, and associated displacement of wildlife (Cutler, Fooks, & van der Poel, 2010). This situation is exacerbated by the liberal dispensing of antimicrobials to livestock for non-theraputic objectives such as growth promotion, which inadvertently selects for antibiotic-resistant pathogens, and has led epidemiologists to voice concern that we are entering the “post-antibiotic era” (see Gilchrist et al., 2007).

In contrast to current practices, in vitro meat would obviate the inhumane conventions that an estimated 56 billion land animals are subjected to each year (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2008), which would effectively eliminate 98% of all animal abuse (Wolfson & Sullivan, 2004, p.206), and greatly attenuate threats of infectious disease. Additionally, there is even speculation that the ratio of saturated to poly-unsaturated fatty acids in in vitro meat could be engineered, palliating worries of clogged arteries and prescription diets (Edelman et al., 2005).

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

5

With the potential to be a deus ex machina that will ameliorate many of the planet’s worst predicaments, one may anticipate that consumers would be salivating at the prospect of in vitro meat. On the contrary, due to its perceived “unnaturalness”, many would-be consumers regard in vitro meat as physically and/or morally unpalatable (Edelman, 2003; European Commission, 2005; Ficek, 2011). A survey of 25 European Union Member States conducted in 2005 found that 54% of individuals stated that they would “never” approve of in vitro meat usage, 12% stated that they would approve of it “only in exceptional circumstances”, 18% would approve of it “only if it is highly regulated and controlled”, 6% would approve of the product “in all circumstances”, and 9% “didn’t care”. This study found that individuals who responded that they would “never” approve of in vitro meat usage were more likely to show evidence of an ideational (deontological) moral decision-making process, which emphasized the duty to protect nature, in contrast to a utilitarian analysis (European Commission, 2005). An internet survey conducted by Ficek (2011) also attests to the incidental position of utilitarian concerns in attitudes towards in vitro meat, as analysis revealed that health, environmental, and animal welfare concerns were not significant predictors of intention to consume in vitro meat, although health and animal welfare concerns were significant predictors of intention to eat organic meat and vegetable-based meat analogs.

The strong objection to in vitro meat, and its largely ideational basis, is not a surprise. Studies regarding consumer attitudes towards biotechnology almost unanimously find ethical concerns stemming from the perceived unnaturalness of a product or process, as well as a general hierarchy in application acceptance.

Overwhelmingly, individuals are less accepting of biotechnological applications in food

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

6

as opposed to medicine (e.g., Christoph, Bruhn, & Roosen, 2008; Connor & Siegrist, 2010; Gaskell et al., 2000; Grunert et al., 2001; Magnusson, 2004; Rozin et al., 2004), and in animals, as opposed to plants (e.g., Frewer, Howard, & Shepherd, 1997; Grunert et al., 2001; Hallman, Hebden, Aquino, Cuite, & Lang, 2003; Hossain & Onyango, 2004; Magnusson, 2004; Onyango, Govindasamy, & Nayga, 2004; Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, 2003; Serin, 2011; Verhoog, 2003). Although utilitarian analyses are partially responsible for these emergent patterns, ideational concerns play as large, if not larger, a role (Concerted action of the European Commission, 1997; Connor & Siegrist, 2010; European Commission, 2005; Hallman et al., 2003; Macer & Ng, 2000; Magnusson, 2004; Moon & Balasubramanian, 2001; Pivetti, 2005; Rozin, 2005; Rozin et al., 2004; Saher, 2006; Tanaka, 2004; Verhoog, 2003).

In the not so distant past, studies on moral judgment treated the matter as a conscious, language-based, reasoning process (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969); however, dualprocess models that emphasize the role of conscious, cognitive reasoning (e.g., utilitarian) and unconscious, automatic, intuition/ affect (ideational) are revolutionizing the field (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Haidt, 2001; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). The social-intuitionist model proposed by Haidt (2001) goes so far as to relegate moral reasoning to the realm of posthoc justifications, subservient to one’s affect-laden intuition. Haidt (2001) presents the case that affect emerges before reasoning in phylogeny, emerges before reasoning in ontogeny, as a heuristic, it is the quicker, and least costly of the two processes, and it accounts well for the phenomenon of “moral dumbfounding” (Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000), which is when individuals hold steadfast moral judgments although they

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

7

cannot provide sound rationale. Although researchers are still in debate about the specific roles that affect and reason play in moral judgment (e.g., reactions, dilemmas), there is agreement that both are essential. As the two components are in many ways inseparable, this study will focus more on the ideational/affective aspect of moral judgment, as it is particularly problematic. Although utilitarian/cognitive-based concerns are somewhat amenable to the availability and presentation of information, ideational/affective objections are more impervious to these efforts, and may even act as a visceral veto (e.g., Connor & Siegrist, 2010; Costafont, 2005; Fairweather, 2007; Gaskell et al., 2000; Martins, Pelchat, & Pliner, 1997; Novoselov, 2007; Saher, 2006). This problem prominently affects the field of biotechnology, leading to scenarios where scientists try to promote a novel product or process with excellent benefits and minimal risk, but are nonetheless met with opposition that cannot be affected by logical argument. This opposition has and will continue to alter the trajectory of many innovations by impeding funding, availability, and adoption of such products and processes. Thus, there is a dire need to understand what is behind this ideational bias against “unnaturalness”, why it is especially fervent when pertaining to food and animals, and how to neutralize it.

Food Rejection and the Special Cases of Animal-Derived, and “Unnatural” Foods I would not like them here or there. I would not like them anywhere. I do not like green eggs and ham. I do not like them, Sam-I-am. (Geisel, 1960, p.16) Food neophobia is ubiquitous in omnivorous animals, including humans (Rozin, 1976). The omnivorous strategy has the advantage of dietary flexibility, but this is qualified by risks such as consuming toxins or eating a nutritionally unbalanced diet. This environmental gamble has selected for an emotionally charged ambivalence towards

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

8

novel foods (Rozin, 1976). Based on interviews and questionnaires, Rozin and Fallon (1987) have dissected this ambivalence, and concluded that when it comes down to bite or flight, there are three distinct motivations for rejection of food by humans; distaste, danger, and disgust. Although there is a dearth of studies concerning attitudes towards in vitro meat, the available literature regarding attitudes towards animal-derived food, and attitudes towards genetically engineered food, suggests that within the context of the food rejection taxonomy, there are three rather large strikes against in vitro meat which may impede a swift reception; namely its novelty, animal origin, and perceived unnaturalness.

Distaste Distaste refers to real or anticipated negative sensory-affective factors, including everything from the smell and taste of a food item, to its appearance and texture. The relative failure of meat analogs (e.g., soy burgers) to steal the market as substitution products has been largely attributed to their anticipated and decidedly unsatisfying lack of similarity to the reference products’ sensory-affective properties (Hoek, 2010). Although the sensory-affective properties of in vitro meat are anticipated to compare well with the referenced products, as it may potentially be engineered according to preference (Edelman, McFarland, Mironov, & Matheny, 2004), Pliner, Pelchat and Grabski (1993) found that individuals expect to dislike novel foods in comparison to familiar ones, and that expectation of disliking is a significant predicting factor in their willingness to taste them.

Individuals also believe that foods perceived as unnatural will compare unfavorably in sensory-affective characteristics to their more natural counterparts,

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

9

although blind taste tests do not substantiate these expectancies (Basker, 2009; Fillion & Arazi, 2002; Kouba, 2003; Napolitano et al., 2010), and some products are even genetically engineered for, and are proven to have, a more pleasing flavor (DavidovichRikanati et al., 2007). Unsurprisingly, in vitro meat is regarded by many potential consumers as highly unnatural (Edelman, 2003), much akin to genetically modified foods (Bredahl, 1999; Frewer, Howard, & Shepherd, 1996; Grunert et al., 2001); thus, the anticipation of negative sensory-affective factors may be an initial issue.

Danger Danger refers to negative consequences of ingestion, whether real or anticipated, social or biological, short-term or long-term. Although perhaps not as vital a trait today, vigilance upon encountering novel foods in the environment was an adaptive response to a precarious situation. Although there is much to be gained from adding new foods to one’s repertoire, there is much more to lose due to the ingestion of toxins, allergens, and microbes. Thus the findings that novel foods are perceived as more dangerous than familiar foods, and that willingness to eat novel foods decreases as belief that the food could be potentially harmful increases (Pliner, et al., 1993), is rather expected.

Perhaps less intuitive is the revelation that anticipated consequences are a stronger predicting factor of willingness to try animal-derived foods than non-animal foods (Martins & Pliner, 2005). Fessler (2003) notes that although both animal-derived and non-animal foods may harbor noxious substances, animal-derived foods pose unique threats. As the large array of toxins present in plant species were likely selected for their deterrent properties against potential competitors and predators, it seems logical that

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

10

evolution would favor highly perceptible (e.g., bitter, bright red) secondary metabolites (Hladik & Simmen, 1996). In contrast, the noxious pathogens domiciled in an animals’ tissue are much less conspicuous, evolution having favored crypsis for successful transmission to new hosts. This insight illuminates the results of human and non-human animal studies.

A meta-analysis of dietary taboos concluded that meat accounts for the majority of all human food aversions, and is the principal target of proscription across 78 cultures (Fessler, 2003). Further, experimental studies have found that individuals are less willing to try, and more likely to reject, novel foods of animal origin than those not of animal origin (Martins et al., 1997; Martins & Pliner, 2005; Pliner & Pelchat, 1991). Martins and Pliner (2005) found that the factors that best predicted willingness to try different foods were the familiarity of the food and its origin; participants were less willing to try novel foods compared to familiar foods, less willing to try animal-derived foods compared to non-animal foods, and least willing to try novel, animal-derived foods.

In addition to human studies are non-human animal studies involving manipulation of the amygdala. Aggleton and Passingham (1981) observed that amygdalectomies in rhesus macaques led to an increase in exploration, coprophagia, and meat-eating behaviors in the normally vegetarian species. They concluded that the incorporation of these new behaviors into their repertoires was most likely due to the attenuation of neophobia, as the subjects exhibited no difficulty in distinguishing edible (e.g., peanuts) from inedible (e.g., paper clips) stimuli. Conversely, another study found that amygdalic lesions in the domestic cat, an obligate carnivore, resulted in a strong aversion to meat, but an increase in other foods such as milk and cereal (Lewinska,

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

11

1980).

In comparison to the well-established threats presented by foods of animal origin, perceived unnaturalness is a relatively mysterious factor in terms of anticipated consequences. Although “unnatural” food technology has provided remiss from foes such as the toxins and microbes which nature engenders, a 2008 survey tallied that “natural” was the number one marketing claim in food and drink product launches worldwide (Mintel Global New Products Database, 2009). An evolutionary analysis for the bias against “unnatural” foods is not possible in terms of technology such as genetic engineering, as genetically engineered foods have only been around since the 1990’s (Cockburn, 2002). However, other forms of food technology such as cooking, which is estimated to have caught on around 250,000-1.9 million years ago (Wrangham & Conklin-Brittain, 2003), offers an interesting parallel by which to examine aversion to “unnatural” foods.

Due to the universality of cooking, and calculations which suggest that a diet of raw food would not have been able to supply sufficient calories for a hunter–gatherer lifestyle, Wrangham and Conklin-Brittain (2003) proposed that the cooking of food is likely obligatory for modern humans, and that the evolutionary consequences of cooking rival those of meat-eating, agriculture, and livestock domestication. In fact, Wrangham, Holland Jones, Laden, Pilbeam, and Conklin-Brittain (1999) suggest that cooking would have raised energy intake substantially more than the addition of meat to early hominids’ diet. Cooking increases the digestibility of starch and protein, reduces costs of digestion for meat, and reduces energetic costs of detoxification and defense against pathogens (Carmody & Wrangham, 2009). These advantages provided by cooking food do well to

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

12

illuminate animal studies that find that when given a choice, great apes (Wobber, Hare, & Wrangham, 2008), and other mammals (e.g., Ramirez, 1992; Bradshaw et al., 2000), prefer cooked food to raw food. In light of this information, and along with the results of a study by Koebnick, Strassner, Hoffmann, and Leitzmann (1999) which found that individuals adhering to a raw-food diet suffered from energy-deficits so appreciable as to manifest in weight loss and impaired reproductive performance (i.e., amenorrhea), it is particularly perplexing that human raw-food diets are rapidly gaining in popularity due to claims of increased health, energy, and naturalness (Hobbs, 2005). Serin (2011) makes the observation that from an evolutionary perspective, a predilection for raw, unprocessed, “natural” foods should have been strongly selected against. However, a plethora of other studies also report positive attitudes towards products perceived as natural in composition or process (e.g., organic products, raw foods), and negative attitudes towards products perceived as unnatural in composition or process (e.g., genetically modified products, processed foods) (e.g., Bredahl, 1999; Bukenya & Wright, 2004; Chern, Rickertsen, Tsuboi, & Fu, 2002; de Barcellos et al., 2010; Frewer et al., 1996; Grunert, Bredahl, & Scholderer, 2003; Hallman et al., 2003; Lusk, Jamal, Kurlander, Roucan, & Taulman, 2004; Magnusson, 2004; Novoselov, 2007; Onyango et al., 2004; Rozin, 2004; Saher, 2006). The most common reasons offered by consumers for this preference again appeal to matters of health (e.g., Grunert et al., 2001; Magnusson, 2004; Rozin, 2004). Natural foods are associated with increased health, and “unnatural” foods are associated with decreased health. This is particularly true of genetically modified foods even though they are subject to more rigorous safety testing than are conventional and organic products (Cockburn, 2002), and studies show no

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

13

consistent difference in health properties between organic, conventional, and genetically modified food foods (e.g., Dangour et al., 2010; Honikel, 1998; Hoogenboom et al., 2008; Magkos, Arvaniti, & Zampelas, 2003; Malmauret, Parent-Massin, Hardy, &Verger, 2002). Further, food may be engineered for outcomes such as reduced allergenicity (Herman, Helm, Jung, & Kinne, 2003), or biofortification of micronutrients (Gilani & Nasim, 2007). Empirical data simply does not corroborate the public’s sentiments.

A number of other studies have focused on cognitive biases (i.e., intuition/ heuristics) that may contribute to the augmented risk perception of “unnatural” foods.

One mechanism is the omission bias, which finds that individuals prefer harm caused by the omission of an action over equal harm caused by an action. In this sense, human actions such as genetic engineering are likely to be perceived as commissive, but naturally-occurring events are not. In accord with this, studies have demonstrated that individuals fear human-caused hazards more than natural disasters even if the outcomes are comparable (Brown, Peterson, Brodersen, Ford, & Bell, 2005; Walsh-Daneshmandi & MacLachlan, 2000). Other studies have found this to be the case even when the outcomes are not comparable. For example, Ritov and Baron (1990) found that the risk of acquiring a harmful disease is preferred to the risk of a potentially harmful vaccination, even if the probability of acquiring the harmful disease far outweighs the probability of being harmed by the vaccination. Similar studies have found the same results (e.g., Asch et al., 1994; Brown et al., 2010). Other mechanisms such as the availability heuristic, which finds that predictions of the frequency of an event is based on how easily an example can be brought to mind rather than on empirical data (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), and the framing bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), which is when the perception

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

14

of an issue is influenced by its context, may also contribute to the augmented perception of risk regarding “unnaturalness”. These biases undoubtedly influence public perception of biotechnology via selective media coverage. Marks, Kalaitzandonakes, Wilkins, and Zakharova (2007) compared media coverage of biotechnology over a 12-year period in the United States and the United Kingdom and found that in general medical applications of biotechnology were positively framed and agricultural applications of biotechnology were negatively framed. These cognitive biases are attributed to cognitive errors in pattern matching (Baron, 1995), but another set of biases that operate at the “gut level” (Rozin, Millman, & Nemerof, 1986), is also suspected to play a large part in attitudes towards naturalness/ unnaturalness.

Rozin et al. (2004) discovered that although consumers often stated that health was the motivation behind their preference for natural products, this explanation was post-hoc, as the preference persisted even when participants were asked to decide between natural and “unnatural” versions of food and medicine, which were specified to be chemically identical with matched healthfulness and effectiveness. The authors concluded that the preference for natural products is not wholly instrumental, but largely ideational, that participants perhaps perceive natural products as being intrinsically good.

While the study by Rozin et al. (2004) focused on the ideational preference for certain foods, other studies have focused on ideational rejection of certain foods- otherwise known as disgust.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

15

Disgust Disgust is a negative ideational factor that is not primarily elicited by the sensory properties or anticipated consequences of a product, but by factors such as what the product is or where it has been (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin (1872/1965) defined disgust as “something offensive to the taste… excited by anything unusual in the appearance, odour, or nature of our food” (p.256). He goes on to note “it is remarkable how readily and instantly retching or actual vomiting is induced in some persons by the mere idea of having partaken of any unusual food, as of an animal which is not commonly eaten; although there is nothing in such food to cause the stomach to reject it” (p.258). As insightful as ever, Darwin, through mere observation, recognized disgust as a distinct motivation for food rejection. Having evolved from distaste, which in turn evolved from primitive chemosensory mechanisms adapted to avoid toxins and pathogens (danger), disgust shares certain features in common with other food rejection motivations (e.g., distastedisgust facial expression); however, it is characterized by a distinct set of properties.

Disgust incorporates a behavioral component (distancing), physiological component (nausea), expressive component (facial motor activity- raised upper lip and wrinkled nose), and mental component (offense/ revulsion) (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993).

Additionally, disgusting items are subject to the laws of sympathetic magic; contagion and similarity (Rozin et al., 1986). Examples of contagion and similarity do well to illustrate the distinct, and ideational nature of disgust. Rozin et al. (1986) found that the acceptability of a drink diminished greatly after a sterilized cockroach had been dropped in it and removed. The temporary presence of the sterilized cockroach did not alter the

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

16

taste of the drink, nor did it present any additional health risks; the aversion was ideational, and the finding that the aversion persisted after removal of the sterilized cockroach demonstrated the ability of disgusting stimuli (cockroach) to contaminate otherwise non-disgusting stimuli. A second experiment found that the acceptability of chocolate fudge diminished greatly when it was presented in the shape of dog feces compared to when it was presented in the shape of a muffin. The physical form of the fudge did not alter the taste of the fudge, nor did it present any additional health risks; the aversion was again ideational, and demonstrated the ability of disgusting stimuli (feces) to transfer negative properties to otherwise non-disgusting stimuli through mere resemblance.

As it turns out, not all objects of disgust are food; this discovery led Rozin et al.

(1993) to formulate a taxonomic classification of disgust elicitors. Despite individual and cross-cultural variation, three main branches of stimuli have emerged; core disgust, animal-reminder disgust, and socio-moral disgust.

Core disgust Core disgust is essentially a behavioral immune system, an oral defense that evolved to aid in food selection and disease avoidance; this manifests as caution towards, or avoidance of foods and possible contaminators of foods such as animals and body products (e.g., feces) (Rozin et al., 1993). It is suggested that disgust may have conferred an advantage on individuals who were concerned about the essence or history of an object, as sensory properties are not a failsafe informant of risk, especially in regard to animals, which may host imperceptible pathogens (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada,

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

17

1997). Current literature supports this notion with results such that disgust, measured against sensory and consequence information, has been identified as the primary predictor of willingness to try novel foods, accounting for over 50% of the variance (Martins & Pliner, 2005); as disgust towards a product increases, willingness to try it decreases (Martins, 2001). Further, studies have determined that disgust is greater towards animal-derived foods than nonanimal foods (Martins & Pliner, 2005; Pliner & Pelchat, 1991; Townsend & Campbell, 2004), and almost all objects that elicit disgust are of animal origin (Angyl, 1941; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). In the specific case of meat, experiments have found that the more the meat’s animal origin is made salient, the more disgust it elicits (Kubberod, Dingstad, Ueland, & Risvik, 2008; Kubberod, Ueland, Risvik, & Henjesand, 2006; Shimp & Stuart, 2004). Angyal (1941) noted that meat is often disguised by cut, sauce, and name in its market and culinary presentation, obscuring its animal nature, which when made salient by blood, veins, or form, may give rise to disgust in the gourmand. This ideational stigma surrounding animal-derived products is such that although beneficial sensory information and positive consequence information provided about novel foods have been shown to increase willingness to try, and acceptance of, non-animal foods, this information fails to have an effect with regards to animal-derived foods (Martins et al., 1997). However, a few recent studies suggest that the disgust-food association is a bit more nuanced, and that reminders of “animalness” and “livingness” account for most of the variation in disgust, but non-animal foods are also capable of being reminders of “animalness” and “livingness” via slimy, mushy, “biological” textures (Martins & Pliner, 2006; Oum, Lieberman, & Aylward, 2011). This

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

18

finding, that a stimulus only need be an animal-reminder in order to elicit disgust, takes us on to the next branch of the taxonomy.

Animal-reminder disgust In past studies, when individuals were asked to list what disgusts them, stimuli that could not be explained by oral defense motivations were listed; sexual deviance (e.g., incest, homosexuality), body envelope violations (e.g., gore, deformity, obesity), poor hygiene, and corpses (Haidt et al., 1997). The heterogeneity of these stimuli has generated two lines of thought that are presented as rival theories in the literature. Haidt et al. (1997) proposed that disgust ought to be thought of as a prototypical category (Rosch & Mervis, 1975), with oral disgust elicitors (food, animals) as the core exemplars.

They go on to note that the common denomination of the non-oral stimuli is that they are all reminders of Homo sapiens’ animal nature. Their reasoning follows that disgust originated as a distancing response to threats against the body, and was exapted (Darwin, 1859/2009) as a distancing response to threats against the “soul”. According to this perspective, civility is the antithesis of disgust; norms that serve to separate humans from their biological/ animal trappings (e.g., silverware, clothing) are found in every culture, as is the disgust that ensues from violations of these norms (Haidt et al., 1997).

Alternatively, Tybur, Lieberman, and Griskevicius (2009) suggest that a more parsimonious taxonomy is that with the exception of sexual deviance, the rest of animalreminder disgust elicitors could be construed as additional members of core disgust, being agents of disease and contamination. Sexual disgust would serve the separate function of protecting one against sexual partners or acts that would impose reproductive costs. This explanation is quite cogent, and Tybur et al. (2009) have found support for

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

19

their theory with experiments revealing predicted domain sensitivity differentiation based on sex, perceived vulnerability to disease, psychopathic tendencies, and the Big Five personality traits. Yet curiously, disgust in its full form (with a sense of offense and contamination properties) is not innate, but rather it is socially transmitted, and requires a certain degree of self-awareness and understanding about the nature of objects; thus, it is absent in other animals (Haidt et al., 1997), feral humans (Malson, 1964, 1972 as cited in Haidt et al., 1997), and young children (e.g., Fallon, Rozin, & Pliner, 1984). This discriminant pattern of acquisition has raised questions regarding its primary role, and has left researchers in debate of whether its cultural function may be of more significance than its biological function (Haidt et al., 1997). Aside from which theory one sides with (although this author sees no conflict between the two, and rather perceives them akin to proximate and ultimate causation), both schools of thought agree that there is a third branch of disgust; socio-moral disgust.

Socio-moral disgust Socio-moral disgust is initiated by stimuli such as racism, violence, infidelity, stealing, and blasphemy, but unlike core and animal-reminder disgusts, is associated with a good deal of intercultural variability. According to Rozin et al. (1993), although the latent mechanism of animal-reminder disgust is the accentuation of human-animal physical similarities, the latent mechanism of socio-moral disgust is the accentuation of human-animal psychological similarities. Whenever an individual violates a social norm, they are renouncing civilization, and essentially “behaving like an animal”. Therefore, according to this theory, disgust again serves to distance humans from their animality, as well as protect the social order. Tybur et al. (2009) have another take on this branch of

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

20

disgust as well, and offer the idea that socio-moral disgust was selected for because individuals who distanced themselves from others who exhibited non-normative or antisocial behaviors would have been benefitted.

Yet, to complicate things further, akin to the debate surrounding “the pain of social rejection” (e.g., DeWall et al., 2010; MacDonald & Leary, 2005), not everyone agrees that socio-moral disgust is a true homolog, exapted from core disgust, but rather regard it as a metaphor. Nevertheless, research has established that the terminology is more than a quirk of the English lexicon, as most languages have a word with a compound semantic meaning which describes both corporeal and socio-moral trespasses, and is accompanied by feelings of nausea and revulsion (Haidt et al., 1997). Neurological studies also support the existence of socio-moral disgust, and have demonstrated that disgust elicitors in both the corporeal and socio-moral branches activate different but overlapping neural substrates (Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Moll et al., 2005). But perhaps the most intriguing studies are those concerning behavior.

Danovich and Bloom (2009) found that children associate the facial cues of disgust with moral violations, and label moral violations “disgusting” more often than non-disgusting physical acts or neutral social acts (but less often than physically disgusting acts).

Additionally, a study by Jones and Fitness (2008) made the observation that individuals who scored high on the Disgust Sensitivity Scale (Haidt et al., 1994), which is composed of core and animal-reminder items, tended to display characteristics of moral hypervigilance, judging moral transgressions more severely. Rozin, Markwith, and McCauley (1994) even found that socio-moral disgust adheres to the law of contagion, as ratings of aversion regarding indirect contact with a moral offender were correlated with

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

21

ratings of aversion regarding indirect contact with individuals with contagious diseases.

These studies are complementary to a host of priming studies which have found that making core disgust salient via pictures, videos, stories, smell, and hypnosis, subsequently increased the severity of moral judgments (e.g., Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). This phenomenon works in the opposite direction as well. For example, Jones and Fitness (2008) found that participants who read about moral violations were subsequently more likely to form words associated with pathogen disgust in a word-stem completion task relative to a control group.

Conversely, priming individuals with cleanliness has been found to decrease the severity of moral judgments, and asking participants to contemplate a personal transgression has been found to increase the desire for cleaning products and to engage in hand-washing behavior (e.g., Lee & Schwarz, 2010; Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 2010; Ritter & Preston, 2011; Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006).

Williams, Huang, and Bargh (2009) introduce “scaffolding”, a possible explanation for the peculiar cross-modal phenomena witnessed in priming studies such as those previously mentioned. Scaffolding is proposed to be a process operational in both ontogeny and phylogeny. In terms of ontogeny, scaffolding manifests as a process by which early sensorimotor experiences come to serve as the foundation for the later development of abstract concepts and goals (e.g., self-propulsion = agency), and in terms of phylogeny, scaffolding manifests as old goal structures (e.g., physical cleanliness) that come to serve as the foundation for new, more abstract goal structures (e.g., moral purity). They go on to explain that the way one goal is pursued should resemble the way

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

22

the other goal is pursued, and that achievement of the foundational goal (physical cleanliness) may satisfy the scaffolded goal (moral purity).

Still, others (e.g., Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011; Royzman & Kurzban, 2011; Royzman & Sabini, 2001) suspect that socio-moral disgust is simply core disgust obscured by social context, as many of the supporting studies are confounded by the employment of socio-moral violations that contain or elicit features of core disgust (e.g., Harris & Fiske, 2006; Moll et al., 2005; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Rozin et al., 1994). In support of this theory is the fact that in developing the Disgust Scale (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994), which measures disgust-sensitivity, “core-free” socio-moral violations such as genocide, drunk driving, hypocrisy, and stealing, did not reliably correlate with core and animal-reminder disgust elicitors, but socio-moral violations that dealt with sexuality did correlate reliably (e.g., incest, homosexuality, bestiality). Arguing against this theory is a study by Chapman, et al. (2009), which reported that the same facial motor activity (raised upper lip and wrinkled nose) evoked by photographs of core disgust objects was also elicited by unfair treatment of participants in an economic game.

Another theory suggests that socio-moral disgust is really a conflation of emotions dominated by anger (e.g., Lupei, 2011; Marzillier & Davey, 2004; Nabi, 2002; Simpson, Carter, Anthony, & Overton, 2006; Widen & Russell, 2010). Evidence for this theory is provided by studies that report that individuals often confuse the disgust facial expression with anger (e.g., Widen & Russell, 2010). Although no one denies that sociomoral disgust is often accompanied by anger, there is good reason to believe that they are separate emotions. To begin with, socio-moral disgust and anger have distinct facial cues

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

23

(Ekman & Friesen, 1971). Socio-moral disgust and anger also have distinct physiological responses. A study by Sherman, Haidt, and Coan (2010, as cited in Jones, 2007) found that participants watching immoral video footage (e.g., an American neo-Nazi meeting) reported being both angry and morally disgusted, and stronger disgust responses lead to a larger drop in heart rate, which is akin to the physiological response of visceral disgust, and unlike that of anger which increases heart rate (Levenson, 1992). Further, sociomoral disgust and anger have distinct behavioral responses. Disgust motivates withdrawal and avoidance behaviors, and anger motivates approach and aggressive behaviors (Harmon-Jones, 2003). Hutcherson and Gross (2011) found that as self-reported anger towards moral offenses increased, self-reported disgust towards them decreased. This is concordant with a study by Pond et al. (2011), which detected that sensitivity to sociomoral disgust was positively correlated with decreased aggression. Thus, although both anger and disgust appear to lead to punitive behaviors, disgust may sway the individual towards acts of exclusion rather than acts of aggression, which are potentially more costly. And last, socio-moral disgust and anger have distinct psychological properties.

Anger is responsive to the contextual variables of whether an act causes harm to others and whether an act is committed intentionally, but socio-moral disgust is not, and sociomoral disgust is responsive to whether an act violates a body/purity norm, but anger is not (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Horberg et al., 2009; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011b; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011c). Russell and GinerSorolla (2011c) also found that when asked to justify self-reported anger or disgust felt towards moral violations, participants explained their anger by appealing to variables such as harm and rights, but spouted tautological excuses when attempting to justify their

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

24

disgust; this tautological reaction is in essence what Haidt et al. (2000) coined moral dumbfounding.

The Big Three The idiosyncrasies of socio-moral disgust and other moral emotions have led to yet another taxonomy. An analysis of moral conduct violations in Bhubaneswar, Orissa, India, carried out by Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (1997), resulted in the specification of three moral domains; ethics of autonomy (fairness, freedom, and harm), ethics of community (social hierarchy, duty, respect, and loyalty), and ethics of divinity (purity, sanctity, and naturalness). Taking into account that emotions are adaptations to unique (usually social) challenges, Rozin et al. (1999) elaborated on this stratification with the CAD triad hypothesis. This hypothesis predicted that anger, contempt, and disgust, which compose the “hostility triad” (Izard, 1977), would each correspond to a moral domain; violations of autonomy would engender anger, violations of community would engender contempt, and violations of divinity would engender socio-moral disgust.

The hypothesis was supported; American and Japanese students paired anger, contempt, and socio-moral disgust to the three domains in the predicted manner, using both words and facial expressions. A study by Hutcherson and Gross (2011) also noted the same general pattern, with the exception that socio-moral disgust was uniformly high across all three domains, but the term “grossed out” was endorsed strongly only in divinity violations. And more recently, Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) differentiated these three domains into five; harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity, with their Moral Foundations Theory.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

25

Violations of Divinity Although both Rozin et al. (1993) and Tybur et al. (2009) account for socio-moral disgust as a distancing mechanism from costly social interaction (+/- reminders of animal nature), neither theory has adequately addressed the recent emphasis of socio-moral disgust’s role in violations of divinity. Violations of divinity include acts of defilement and disrespect towards all things sacred, natural, and pure, but the question begs as to what function divinity plays in maintaining the social order. Even if one appeals to the concept of religion, which is well documented in its effect to augment community bonding (e.g., Graham & Haidt, 2010), this fails to explain why divinity is linked to disgust (i.e., cleanliness is next to godliness), and not simply clustered with the domain of ingroup/loyalty. One possible explanation, derived from the musings of Charles Darwin, suggests the usual suspect. Spurred by his encounter with the godless savages of Tierra del Fuego, Darwin (1871) penned The belief in God has often been advanced as not only the greatest but the most complete of all the distinctions between man and the lower animals. It is, however, impossible to maintain that this belief is instinctive in man… The idea of a universal and beneficent creator does not seem to arise in the mind of man until he has been elevated by long, continued culture (p.394).

Similar to socio-moral disgust, religion is not innate, but rather a cultural device that co-opted previous mechanisms (Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 2006). Thus, if socio-moral disgust towards violations of divinity is illustrated by religion, it is difficult to distinguish between protection of the social order and protection from human-animal reminders, as motivation. Yet, what of other exemplars such as socio-moral disgust towards violations of naturalness?

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

26

A social explanation of disgust towards violations of naturalness is conceivable if such violations focus on aberrant behavior, but unprecedented stimuli such as biotechnology, especially animal-based biotechnology, also tend to elicit disgust. In studies regarding animal-based biotechnology, focus groups invariably produce a semantic cluster apart from utilitarian concerns, which manifests as curious sentiments such as “unnatural”, “disgusting”, “wrong”, “immoral”, “playing god”, and “violating the intrinsic value, integrity, dignity, or identity of nature, animals, or humans” (e.g., Edelman, 2003; Fairweather, 2007; Frewer et al., 1997; Gaskell et al., 2000; Hallman et al., 2003; Macer & Ng, 2000; Magnusson, 2004; Moon & Balasubramanian, 2001; Pivetti, 2005; Rozin, 2005; Saher, 2006; Tanaka, 2004; Verhoog, 2003). Perhaps the bestknown declaration of disgust towards “unnaturalness” is credited to Leon Kass (1997), the ex-chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics. In his testimony on human cloning, presented to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Kass famously remarked “repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate it” (p.17). But is socio-moral disgust really deep wisdom, or rather deep-seated denial? If one entertains the possibility that disgust serves as a distancing mechanism from animal-reminders for other exemplars, why should violations of naturalness stray? In order to explore this theory, we first need a definition of naturalness.

The concept of nature is always normative. Some individuals would claim that everything in existence is natural, that humans are animals, and thus computers and skyscrapers are nothing more than extended phenotypes (Dawkins, 1982); however, the majority of definitions encountered operate on the assumption that humans are distinct

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

27

from nature, and thus “natural” is equivalent to ‘free from human intervention’ (Vining, Merrick, & Price, 2008). That in turn would mean that human intervention equals unnaturalness, but even organic food involves a great deal of human intervention. Rozin (2005), in a study on perceptions of what constitutes a violation of naturalness, found that the process, specifically the level of intervention, was the critical focus. He found that genetically modified organisms with single allele replacements, almost identical in genotype and phenotype to the original organism, were rated as less natural than highly domesticated species, much further removed from their wild progenitors through selective breeding. This study is congruent with another study on violations of naturalness, which also find that process is more important than content (Rozin, 2006).

Thus it appears that it is not the degree or effects of human intervention that stipulates what is a violation of naturalness, but rather the level at which human intervention takes place. Rozin (2005, 2006) appeals to the concept of contagion to explain his results, that contact with an unnatural entity contaminates the natural entity and destroys its pureness; however, this does not adequately address the underlying motivation or the specific focus on the level of intervention- the genome. So why would human intervention at the level of the gene be so damaging to the perception of naturalness? Drawing from these studies, and studies that reveal that genetic engineering creates identity crises for individuals by blurring boundaries between species, and what is natural versus unnatural (e.g., Fairweather 2007), it seems reasonable to theorize that the reductionist nature of biotechnology is a salient animal-reminder. By operating at the level of the gene (or cell, or organ), science is in essence obscuring natural boundaries by reducing all living organisms into standardized units. This interpretation of “unnatural” biotechnology

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

28

serving as an animal-reminder due to its reductionist quality may also go a ways in explaining the language surrounding food and medicine that are perceived as natural; consumers often appeal to the concept of “wholesomeness” and “holism” when asked to explain their penchant for organic foods (e.g., Schifferstein & Oude Ophuis, 1998) and alternative medicine (e.g., Kaptchuk & Eisenberg, 1998). The word wholesomeness has come to represent not only that which is nutritious and physically healthy, but also that which is morally sound (“wholesome”, n.d.).

If disgust did in fact evolve along parallel tracks, operating as a distancing response to pathogens, costly sexual partners, and deviant social behavior, as well as a distancing response to animal-reminders, the question would beg as to why human animal-reminders would be so aversive anyway? Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) suggests that animal-reminders are greatly aversive as they in turn serve as reminders of one’s mortality.

Terror Management Theory Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986), based upon the musings of Becker (1973), posits that the animal instinct for selfpreservation, along with the uniquely human awareness of the unpredictable, uncontrollable, inevitability of death (a byproduct of evolved abilities for symbolization, future-oriented thought, and self-awareness), is an unsavory recipe for paralyzing anxiety. Equanimity is managed by immersion into a cultural worldview that acts as an anxiety buffer by providing one with structure, purpose, and distraction, as well as literal (e.g., afterlife) or symbolic (e.g., children, fame) immortality, and by maintenance of self-

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

29

esteem, defined as meeting or exceeding the standards of value as measured by one’s worldview. Because these psychological structures provide protection from such terror, individuals are motivated to maintain faith in their cultural worldviews and satisfy the standards of value associated with them. Consequently, anything that bolsters one’s worldview and self-esteem is received favorably, and anything that threatens one’s worldview and self-esteem is met with disapproval.

Empirical investigation into TMT is generally conducted by employing one of two paradigms; either mortality salience (MS), or death-thought accessibility (DTA). The MS paradigm operates on the assumption that if cultural worldviews and self-esteem serve to buffer death anxiety, then making mortality momentarily salient will result in heightened defense of worldview and self-esteem. Worldview defense typically manifests as a fondness for other individuals who uphold or share the participant’s beliefs, and a prejudice against other individuals who challenge or do not share the participant’s beliefs.

In a typical MS experiment, participants are presented with a packet of questionnaires under the pretense that they are to participate in a study concerning the relationship between personality attributes and interpersonal judgments. Embedded within the packet of questionnaires is either a mortality salience induction or a control measure. Although there have been many variations of this mortality prime including death anxiety scales (e.g., Florian & Kravetz, 1983), subliminal primes (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997), walking in front of a funeral home (Pyszczynski et al., 1996), and other media such as morbid pictures, videos, and puzzles (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1994), the most commonly encountered format is the Mortality Attitudes Personality Survey (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989), which is a prompt that

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

30

asks participants to write down (a) their emotions pertaining to their own eventual death, and (b) what they believe will happen to them physically as they die. Participants next complete some manner of exercise meant to provide a delay and distraction from thoughts of death. Subsequent to the delay, a dependent measure is administered which involves evaluation of target individuals that either support or violate the participant’s worldview. For example, in a study by Greenberg et al. (1990, Study 1), Christian participants were asked to evaluate a Christian individual and a Jewish individual by reviewing their responses to a questionnaire. Although the questionnaires had been fabricated so that the Christian and Jewish individuals differed only in their religious affiliations, the participants in the mortality salience condition reported more positive attitudes towards the Christian individual and more negative attitudes towards the Jewish individual. Participants in the control condition did not demonstrate these effects.

Although the control condition in the aforementioned study by Greenberg et al.

(1990, Study 1) was essentially an omission of the mortality salience induction, the majority of TMT experiments employ a control measure that consists of an alternative salience induction, which is typically aversive in nature (e.g., paralysis, exam anxiety, social exclusion). Studies confirm that the effects of MS are unique to reminders of death, and cannot be attributed to priming values, negative affect (Greenberg et al., 1995), or physiological arousal (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Furthermore, MS effects are specifically targeted to stimuli that threaten or bolster the participant’s worldview; Rosenblatt et al.

(1989, Study 2) demonstrated that in contrast to participants with relatively positive attitudes towards prostitution, participants with relatively negative attitudes towards

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

31

prostitution prescribed a higher bond for an alleged prostitute after a MS induction, but did not evaluate the experimenter more negatively.

Another characteristic of MS is that the effects of worldview and self-esteem defense only emerge after a short delay. Research in thought suppression has led to the revelation that while the suppression of thoughts eliminates such thoughts from consciousness, the thought then becomes hyper-accessible in the unconscious, and may influence cognition such as interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, or behavior, outside of awareness (Wegner, 1994; Wegner & Smart, 1997). Based on this research, Greenberg et al. (1994) reasoned that if conscious contemplation of death prompts the mechanism of suppression, thoughts of death should become highly accessible only after a delay, when such thoughts are no longer conscious. Studies have confirmed that the delay component of the MS hypothesis is indispensable to procedure, with omission of such delay resulting in a decrease or elimination of worldview and self-esteem defense (Greenberg et al., 1994).

In order to explicate these unique effects of MS, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (1999) proposed a proximal-distal dual process theory which contends that conscious thoughts of death are managed by proximal defenses such as rationalizing one’s death into the distant future, and suppressing such thoughts, but reminders of death in the unconscious are managed by the distal defenses of worldview and self-esteem defense.

The second paradigm, death-thought accessibility (DTA), was first adopted as an additional measure that could serve to more directly assess hypotheses derived from the

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

32

proximal-distal defense theory (Greenberg et al., 1994). The original design of DTA studies is similar to those conducted in the context of the MS paradigm, as it employs a typical mortality salience induction, the difference is that the dependent measure, based on the thought suppression literature, is an assessment of death-thought accessibility.

Previous studies have employed techniques such as responses to ambiguous images (e.g., Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006), or reaction times to Stroop tests (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2006), implicit association tests (e.g., Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009), and other lexical decision tasks (e.g., Schimel, Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig, 2007), but the original and most common measure of DTA is a word-fragment completion task (Greenberg et al., 1994). This task typically consists of four to eight word-fragments that may be completed in a death, or non-death related manner (e.g., SK _ _ L = skill or skull). In order to avoid demand characteristics, these fragments are embedded within a list of 20 other word fragments that can only be completed in a nondeath related manner. One can infer whether thoughts of death are more or less accessible based upon the number of word-fragments that each participant completes in a deathrelated manner.

Aside from corroborating the proximal-distal dual process theory, the DTA paradigm has also opened up other avenues of empirical inquiry (for a review see Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010). One avenue, which is very similar to the original DTA design, employs stimuli that are hypothesized to be directly (e.g., cancer, terrorism) or indirectly (e.g., wilderness, disgust) associated with death in lieu of an explicit mortality induction. By employing stimuli that are associated with death, rather than an explicit mortality induction, thoughts of death are assumed to never enter the

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

33

consciousness to begin with, so a delay before the dependent measure is not necessary (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997). In all other respects the procedure is identical to the original DTA method. To illustrate, MacDorman (2005) hypothesized that the reason humanlike androids sometimes elicit an uncanny, aversive feeling in individuals is because their human appearance coupled with subtle imperfections is an indirect, unconscious mortality reminder. In support of his predictions, it was found that participants exposed to an image of a lifelike android evaluated target individuals that supported their worldviews more positively than a control group, and had more death-related and uncanny-related (e.g., creepy, strange) word completions in a word-fragment completion task.

Another avenue made possible by the DTA method functions essentially as the inverse of the MS method, and hypothesizes that if death-thought accessibility augments the defense of one’s cultural worldview and self-esteem, then threatening or attenuating the potency of one’s cultural worldview or self-esteem should result in augmented deaththought accessibility. The procedure for this line of inquiry is again very similar to the other DTA studies except that instead of an explicit mortality induction, or a deathassociated induction, participants are presented with stimuli that threaten their cultural worldview or self-esteem. For example, Schimel et al. (2007) found that creationists exposed to an article that presented evolutionary evidence that contradicted creationism demonstrated higher death-thought accessibility compared to evolutionists who read the same article, or a second group of creationists who read a control article on social behavior.

The most recent avenue of inquiry spawned by the DTA paradigm operates under

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

34

the hypothesis that if unconscious death-thought accessibility is ultimately what triggers the distal defense mechanisms, then individual variation in baseline DTA levels of participants may predict the degree to which these defenses are enacted. High disposition to DTA appears to result from things such as tenuous worldviews, and other individual traits such as independent self-construal and insecure attachment styles. For instance, Friedman and Rholes (2009) found that interdependent self-construal was significantly associated with reduced DTA for participants who were low in religious fundamentalism, but not for participants who were high in religious fundamentalism. The authors concluded that the trait of high fundamentalism buffered individuals from death-anxiety, and that individuals low in religious fundamentalism required the additional anxiety buffer of interdependence.

Terror management theory has been the focus of hundreds of experiments, which have demonstrated the unconscious effects of subtle reminders of death on just about every attitude and behavior one can imagine (e.g., desire for fame, desire for children, faith-based medical refusal, legal decision-making, smoking, tanning, voting, gambling, shopping), but of particular interest to the present study is how TMT specifically relates to disgust, animal-reminders, and naturalness.

Terror Management Theory, Disgust, Animal-reminders, and Naturalness Given such awareness, humans could not function with equanimity if they believed that they were not inherently more significant than apes, lizards, and lima beans. (Solomon, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1991, p. 96) In an echo of Haidt et al. (1997), a terror management theory literature review by Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (2000) concluded that stimuli that

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

35

elicit disgust do so because they make Homo sapiens’ animal nature salient; however, going one step further, they proposed that the reason animal-reminders are so aversive is because they make Homo sapiens’ mortality salient. In support of this claim, Goldenberg et al. (2001) found that priming participants with reminders of death (vs. television viewing behavior) led to heightened disgust towards bodily products and animals (Study1). They also found that questioning participants about their mortality (vs. dental pain) led to a preference for an essay that described humans as unique and distinct from other animals, compared to an essay that emphasized human similarity to other animals (Study 2). Along the same lines, but using the DTA method, Cox, Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, and Weise (2007) found that exposure to extreme disgust-eliciting pictures (e.g., feces, vomit) led to higher DTA than neutral pictures (e.g., book, chair) for all participants (Study 1), but that milder disgust-eliciting verbal stimuli (e.g., “It would bother me to see a bowel movement left unflushed in a public toilet”) led to heightened DTA only in participants who had first been primed with an essay that emphasized human similarity to other animals, but not in participants who had first been primed with an essay that emphasized human uniqueness (Study 2). Although the first experiment in both the Goldenberg et al. (2001) and Cox et al. (2007) studies are interesting, they could also be readily interpreted in a disease-avoidance framework considering that the stimuli are members of core disgust; however, the addition of the second two experiments, which made use of the “creatureliness” essays, greatly adds to the weight of the animalreminder disgust interpretation. These “creatureliness” essays were also employed in a set of studies regarding disgust towards human sexuality.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

36

Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, McCoy, Greenberg, & Solomon, (1999) found that priming participants with reminders of death (vs. television viewing behavior) led to heightened disgust towards the physical aspect of sex in participants who scored high on a measure of neuroticism, but not in other participants (Study 1), and conversely, that priming the physical (vs. romantic) aspects of sex increased DTA in participants who scored high in neuroticism, but not in other participants (Study 2). To explain these findings, Goldenberg et al. (1999) reasoned that individuals high in neuroticism have difficulty remaining embedded within a meaningful cultural worldview, and thus are particularly susceptible to reminders of their animal nature. A third experiment (Study 3) tested this interpretation by replicating the procedure of the second experiment, with one additional task; participants were asked to contemplate romantic love (vs. a good meal) subsequent to the physical sex prime. This addition was concocted in order to imbue physical sex with cultural meaning by associating it with romantic love. As expected, the addition of the romantic love prime eliminated the increase in DTA for the neurotic participants. This too is a fascinating study, but is still left open to a disease-avoidance interpretation (although the two leading disgust theories assign sexual disgust elicitors to the own domain), as socio-sexuality and cultural institutions such as marriage systems, are correlated with geographic disease prevalence (Schaller & Murray, 2008). The results are also open to the costly sexual partner interpretation (Tybur et al., 2009), as favoring an emotional bond would play to matters of parental investment (e.g., Gonzaga, Turner, Keltner, Campos, & Altemus, 2006). However, in a follow-up study, Goldenberg, Cox, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (2002) made way in discriminating between these various interpretations by recruiting aid from the “creatureliness” essays. In the first

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

37

experiment (Study 1), Goldenberg et al. (2002) discovered that priming the physical (vs. romantic) aspects of sex increased DTA in all participants who had first been primed with an essay that emphasized human similarity to other animals, but not in participants who had first been primed with an essay that emphasized human uniqueness. Additionally (Study 2), priming participants with reminders of death (vs. failing an important exam) led to decreased attraction to the physical aspects of sex, but not the romantic aspects of sex, in participants who had first been primed with an essay that emphasized human similarity to other animals, but not in participants who had first been primed with an essay that emphasized human uniqueness. The discussion noted that having participants read about human–animal similarities prior to the physical sex prime served an analogous function to trait neurosis, and thus, DTA increased irrespective of levels of neuroticism.

Additional evidence regarding the link between sexual behavior and animalreminders is presented by Beatson and Halloran (2007), who conducted a study which predicted that priming participants with death reminders (vs. dental pain), and a video depicting the reproductive behavior of Bonobo chimpanzees, would lead to a decreased evaluation of other animals in participants who had been instructed to contemplate the similarities between human and non-human animal reproductive behavior while viewing the video, but not in participants who had been instructed to contemplate the differences between human and non-human animal reproductive behavior while viewing the video.

The results supported their prediction in participants with low self-esteem, but no effect was found for those with high self-esteem. These results were interpreted as further evidence of the self-esteem anxiety-buffering hypothesis of TMT. This study also introduces additional implications of TMT on such things as evaluations of nature.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

38

An expansion on this theme of TMT, and its effects on the evaluation of nature, was carried out in a study by Koole and Van den Berg (2005). They found (Study 1) that (despite mortality statistics) participants reported that they were more inclined to think about death while in the wilderness (e.g., rainforest) than either cultivated nature (e.g., grain field) or urban environments (e.g., city), and that (Study 2) priming participants with death reminders (vs. no prime) led to a decrease in the perceived beauty of wilderness, and an increase in the perceived beauty of cultivated landscapes (although an overall aesthetic preference for wilderness remained).

Present Research If one concludes from the disgust literature that unnaturalness (e.g., biotechnology) is disgusting because it is an unconscious animal-reminder, but also concludes from the terror management theory literature that naturalness is disgusting and aversive because it is an unconscious animal-reminder, then it may initially appear that something is amiss. However, these seemingly incongruent ideas may make perfect sense if one views biotechnology and “unnaturalness” not as falling somewhere between biology and technology, or natural and artifact, but instead as super-naturalness, a sort of supernormal stimulus that makes Homo sapiens’ animal nature and inevitable mortality salient.

Based on this reasoning, the main hypothesis of this study was that if “unnaturalness” is indirectly, unconsciously associated with death, then there should be a larger increase in death-thought accessibility when “unnatural” bioengineered stimuli are made salient, relative to when natural organic stimuli are made salient. The significance

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

39

of testing this hypothesis was that it represented one of the first attempts to move the phenomenon of disgust towards “unnaturalness” from the philosophical and observational domains to the experimental domain, where it can be empirically investigated. This advance is important as it may yield insight into possible methods of resolution regarding the conflict surrounding biotechnological innovations. The current study employed the DTA paradigm of terror management theory, and tested the following predictions: H1: If participants are primed with “unnatural” bioengineered food products, then they will demonstrate increased death-thought accessibility compared to participants who are primed with natural organic food products.

H2: If participants are primed with animal-derived food products, then they will demonstrate increased death-thought accessibility compared to participants who are primed with non-animal food products.

H3: If participants are primed with a food product that is both “unnatural” and animal-derived, then there will be an interaction that leads to a greater increase in deaththought accessibility.

Hypotheses H1-H3 were tested following the reading of an essay either in which human-animal similarity was primed, or in which human uniqueness was primed.

H4: If participants are primed with an essay that describes human-animal similarities, then this will interact with H1, the “unnatural” food product primes, to augment death-thought accessibility, in comparison to participants who are primed with an essay that describes human uniqueness.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

40

H5: If participants are primed with an essay that describes human-animal similarities, then this will interact with H2, the animal-derived food product primes, to augment death-thought accessibility, in comparison to participants who are primed with an essay that describes human uniqueness.

Method Participants Eighty students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Hunter College participated in the study as partial fulfillment of their research participation requirement.

Ages ranged from 18 to 46 years (M = 20.55 SD = 4.74), with 63 female participants (78.8%), and 17 male participants (21.3%).

Procedures Students signed up for the study under the pretense that its purpose was to investigate personality and its correlation with attitudes about nature. Experimental sessions were held in a small room on campus, and took place with 1 to 4 participants present. Upon arrival, participants were greeted by the experimenter and directed to read and sign a consent form if they wished to participate in the study. After obtaining consent, participants were randomly assigned to complete a packet containing one of the eight possible conditions that made up the 2 (Human-animal similarity essay vs. Human uniqueness essay) x 2 (Animal-derived food vs. Non-animal food) x 2 (Natural food vs.

Unnatural food) design, with the experimenter blind to the condition to which each participant was assigned. The experimenter instructed participants to work through the packet at their own pace, and to complete the items in the order they appeared.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

41

Participants were also informed that their responses to the questionnaires would be anonymous as well as confidential, and that they were free to skip any questions that caused discomfort, and that they could withdraw from the study completely without penalty or loss of benefits. Upon finishing the packet, participants were debriefed, given an opportunity to voice questions and concerns, and thanked before being dismissed.

Materials Filler Measures. In order to maintain the cover story concerning personality and attitude about life sciences, participants first completed the 10-item Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), and a 22-item Neuroticism Scale taken from the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1967).

Creatureliness Prime. After completing the filler measures, participants were asked to read an essay entitled “Human Nature” that they were told was authored by a senior honor-student at Hunter College High School. In actuality, there were two versions of this essay, identical to those used in previous TMT research (Goldenberg et al., 2001).

One essay emphasized human-animal similarities (see Appendix A), and one essay emphasized human uniqueness (see Appendix B). At the end of the essay, participants who received the human-animal similarity essay were asked to write down one similarity between humans and other animals, and participants who received the human uniqueness essay were asked to write down one difference between humans and other animals.

Food Origin x Naturalness Prime. Following the creatureliness prime, participants read one of four possible stories. The stories asked participants to imagine that they signed up for a class on modern agriculture as they heard that it would be easy

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

42

to achieve an “A” grade. In the stories, the student chooses to shadow a professional in the field, and write a report about his or her experience instead of the alternative option of taking an exam. While shadowing the individual, they are put in a situation where they feel obliged to try a certain food. The four stories were similar except that the type of food encountered in each of the four stories was different. The different stories employed organic tomatoes to represent a natural non-animal food (see Appendix C), genetically modified tomatoes to represent an unnatural non-animal food (see Appendix D), organic meat to represent a natural animal-derived food (see Appendix E), and in vitro meat to represent an unnatural animal-derived food (see Appendix F). The story was entitled “Easy A”, and students were told it was a personality measure. In order to maintain the cover story, at the end of the essay, participants were asked to answer on a 10-point scale, with a ‘0’ indicating ‘Not at all’ and a ‘9’ indicating ‘Yes, definitely’, ‘Do you regret choosing the field trip over the exam?’

Death-Thought Accessibility. Under the pretense that the experimenter was pretesting an instrument for future studies, participants were next presented with the dependent measure, a word-fragment completion task similar to those used in previous studies (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1994). This instrument consisted of 25 word fragments, 19 of which could only be completed with neutral words, and six of which could be completed with either neutral or death-related words (see Appendix G). Participants were directed to fill in the items as quickly as possible with the first word that came to mind.

The possible death completions were _ _ TAL (fatal vs. petal, metal), DE _ _ (dead vs. deer, deed, deep etc.), GRA _ _ (grave vs. grade, grape), KI _ _ ED (killed vs. kissed, kicked), SK _ _ L (skull vs. skill), and COFF _ _ (coffin vs. coffee). All words were

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

43

employed in previous studies except “fatal”. Scores were constructed from the total number of death-related completions.

Disgust Evaluation. After completing the dependent measure, participants encountered nine questions designed as explicit measures of disgust. The first question, pertaining to the “Easy A” story, served as an explicit manipulation check concerning the Food Origin x Naturalness salience induction, and asked ‘How disgusted did you feel when imagining yourself in the scenario?’ Although each participant was only exposed to one of the four possible Food Origin x Naturalness primes in the “Easy A” scenario, the remaining eight questions asked participants to explicitly report the disgust that they experience in response to each of the four food products that represented the four Food Origin x Naturalness primes. This measure was included to see if self-reported disgust towards each product adhered to the patterns of self-reported acceptance found in previous studies. It was also of interest to see whether or not physical and moral disgust reported towards the products correlated with each other. All questions were responded to on 9-point scales with a ‘1’ indicating mild disgust and a ‘9’ indicating extreme disgust.

Specifically, participants were asked, ‘How physically disgusting do you find organic vegetables?’ ‘How physically disgusting do you find organic meat?’ ‘How physically disgusting do you find genetically modified vegetables?’ ‘How physically disgusting do you find the concept of lab-grown meat?’ ‘How morally disgusting do you find organic vegetables?’ ‘How morally disgusting do you find organic meat?’ ‘How morally disgusting do you find genetically modified vegetables?’ and ‘How morally disgusting do you find the concept of lab-grown meat?’ (see Appendix H).

Creatureliness Prime Evaluation. Six additional questions were placed at the end

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

44

of the packet in order to explicitly measure participants’ reactions to the “Human Nature” essay and its author. This measure served as a manipulation check concerning whether or not participants explicitly reported a more positive perception of the human uniqueness essay in comparison to the human-animal similarity essay, as in previous studies (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 2001). Specifically, participants were asked, ‘How much do you think you would like this person?’ ‘How intelligent do you believe this person to be?’ ‘How knowledgeable do you believe this person to be?’ ‘Is this person’s opinion wellinformed?’ ‘How much do you agree with this person’s opinion?’ and ‘From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s opinion is of the topic they discussed?’

All items were responded to on 9-point scales with a ‘1’ indicating a negative evaluation and a ‘9’ indicating a positive evaluation (see Appendix H). Scores were constructed as a composite of means from the six questions.

Results Creatureliness Prime Evaluation. Contrary to previous studies, a two-tailed t test conducted on the explicit evaluations of the “Human Nature” essays failed to find a significantly more positive perception of the human uniqueness essay and its author compared to the human-animal similarity essay and its author, t(78) = 0.01, p = 0.99, M = 37.38 (SD = 8.25) and M = 37.40 (SD = 7.86) respectively.

Disgust Evaluation. Significant correlations were found between the explicit measures of self-reported physical disgust and self-reported moral disgust for organic vegetables, organic meat, genetically modified vegetables, and in vitro meat, all r(78) ≥ .61, p < .001). See Table 1. Mean physical disgust ratings ranged from 2.10 to 6.49, with

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

45

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

46

organic vegetables being rated the least physically disgusting (M = 2.10, SD = 1.63), followed by organic meat (M = 3.05, SD = 2.43), then genetically modified vegetables (M = 4.81, SD = 2.53), with in vitro meat rated as the most physically disgusting (M = 6.49, SD = 2.44). Mean moral disgust ratings ranged from 2.01 to 6.38, with organic vegetables being rated the least morally disgusting (M = 2.01, SD = 1.59), followed by organic meat (M = 2.97, SD = 2.40), then genetically modified vegetables (M = 5.05, SD = 2.66), with in vitro meat rated as the most morally disgusting (M = 6.38, SD = 2.72). See Figure 1.

Disgust Ra*ngs of Food Products 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Natural Non-­‐animal

Natural Animal-­‐ derived Physical

Unnatural Non-­‐ animal

Unnatural Animal-­‐ derived

Moral

Figure 1. Self-reported ratings of physical and moral disgust felt towards the four food products.

These ratings of self-reported physical disgust and moral disgust towards the four products were significantly correlated with the self-reported disgust experienced during the “Easy A” scenario in terms of both the Naturalness dimension of the product encountered, r(78) = .24, p = 0.03, as well as the Food Origin dimension of the product

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

47

encountered, r(78) = .34, p = 0.002. Just as participants reported more physical and moral disgust towards unnatural products and animal-derived products, participants that encountered these unnatural products and animal-derived products in their version of the “Easy A” scenario reported experiencing more disgust during the “Easy A” scenario than participants that encountered the natural products and the non-animal products. However, self-reported disgust experienced during the “Easy A” scenario was not significantly correlated with death-thought accessibility, r(78) = .03, p = 0.78.

Death-Thought Accessibility. A 2 (Creatureliness: Human-animal similarity essay vs. Human uniqueness essay) x 2 (Food Origin: Animal-derived food vs. Non-animal food) x 2 (Naturalness: Natural food vs. Unnatural food) ANOVA was performed on death-thought accessibility scores. As expected, the analysis revealed a significant main effect of Naturalness, F(1, 72) = 6.97, p = 0.01; participants primed with unnatural bioengineered products had significantly more death-related word completions (M = 1.60, SD = 0.95) than participants primed with natural organic products (M = 1.07, SD = 0.83).

However, contrary to expectation, there was no significant main effect of Food Origin, F(1, 72) = 0.14, p = 0.71, and no significant interaction between Naturalness and Food Origin, F(1, 72) = 0.14, p = 0.71. Additionally, the interaction between Creatureliness and Naturalness was nonsignificant, F(1, 72) = 1.91, p = 0.17, although results were trending in the predicted direction; participants who were primed with the human-animal similarity essay and an unnatural product had more death-related words completions (M = 1.90, SD = 0.97) compared to participants who were primed with the human uniqueness essay and an unnatural product (M = 1.30, SD = 0.86). See Figure 2. The interaction between Creatureliness and Food Origin was also nonsignificant, F(1, 72) = 0.14, p =

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

48

0.71, but again results were trending in the predicted direction; participants who were primed with the human-animal similarity essay and an animal-derived product had more death-related words completions (M = 1.50, SD = 1.05) compared to participants who were primed with the human uniqueness essay and an animal-derived product (M = 1.10, SD = 0.79). See Figure 3.

Figure 2. Nonsignificant interaction between Creatureliness and Naturalness on deaththought accessibility.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

49

Figure 3. Nonsignificant interaction between Creatureliness and Food Origin on deaththought accessibility.

Discussion The results of this experiment support the primary hypothesis; participants who were primed with “unnatural” products (genetically modified tomatoes or in vitro meat) demonstrated increased death-thought accessibility compared to participants who were primed with natural products (organic tomatoes or organic meat). This supports the theory that the “unnaturalness” of biotechnology may be a salient animal-reminder, and hence, the reason that individuals react to biotechnology with disgust. Of interest is that

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

50

participants who were primed with animal-derived products did not demonstrate increased death-thought accessibility compared to participants who were primed with non-animal products. This finding is incongruent with the explicit measure of selfreported disgust felt towards the four products, as participants rated animal-derived products higher in disgust than non-animal products. This discrepancy between the explicit and implicit measures of disgust regarding the animal origin of the four products may be due to the differing motivations behind core disgust, animal-reminder disgust, and socio-moral disgust. As core disgust is presumed to be an oral defense motivated solely by risk of disease, and not by a denial of human-animal similarities and mortality, it would make sense that there are no suppressed thoughts of death to access. However, the results also do not support the third hypothesis; participants who were primed with a product that is both “unnatural” and animal-derived, did not show evidence of an interaction leading to a greater increase in death-thought accessibility. This finding is surprising as it too contradicts the explicit measures of disgust felt towards the four products. Although this discrepancy may as well be attributed to the differing and purely oral motivations of core disgust, one would suspect that animal-based biotechnology would be a more potent animal-reminder than plant-based biotechnology due to phylogenetic relatedness. In regards to the creatureliness primes, the results do not support the fourth and fifth hypotheses; participants who were primed with “unnatural” products, and participants who were primed with animal-derived products, did not demonstrate significantly augmented death-thought accessibility after being previously primed with an essay that described human-animal similarity as compared to participants who were primed with an essay that described human uniqueness. However, for both the

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

51

fourth and fifth hypotheses, the results were trending in the predicted direction. These last two findings are more difficult to interpret as the creatureliness prime failed to produce similar effects to previous studies as assessed by the explicit evaluations of the “Human Nature” essays. Although past studies have found that participants explicitly evaluate the human-animal similarity essay more negatively than the human uniqueness essay (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 2001), participants in the current sample evaluated both essays to be of almost exactly equal valance. In this sense the creatureliness manipulation failed.

Therefore, the result of the explicit measure regarding the creatureliness prime was unexpected, but the implicit measure of death-thought accessibility is a logical outcome given that no significant difference in the explicit measure was found.

The main finding that “unnatural” primes led to greater death-thought accessibility than natural primes is in accord with both the disgust and TMT literature if “unnaturalness” is interpreted as super-naturalness, a supernormal animal-reminder.

Therefore, the disgust literature, which indicates that unnaturalness may be disgusting because it is an unconscious animal-reminder, and the TMT literature, which suggests that naturalness is disgusting/aversive because it is an unconscious animal-reminder, are not in conflict.

One limitation of this study is that the creatureliness prime failed to produce similar effects to previous studies as assessed by the explicit evaluations of the “Human Nature” essays. It is possible that this finding may be a consequence of the self-selected nature of the study sample, as students autonomously select the studies that they wish to participate in. The “personality and attitudes towards nature” title of the study may have unintentionally created a bias by disproportionately attracting students who perceive

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

52

humans as closely connected to nature, and similar to other animals. This result may in turn account for the non-significant interactions between Creatureliness and Naturalness, and Creatureliness and Food Origin, on death-thought accessibility. This possibility may have important consequences. Although both of these interactions were non-significant, they were both trending in the predicted direction. It may prove fruitful to run this experimental design with a different sample to see if the results regarding explicit evaluations of the creatureliness prime could be reproduced. This achievement may lead to different results concerning the Creatureliness interactions. The significance of this effort is that if human-animal similarity primes interact with “unnatural” primes and animal-derived primes to augment death-thought accessibility, or alternatively if human uniqueness primes interact with “unnatural” primes and animal-derived primes to attenuate death-thought accessibility, then priming consumers with human uniqueness may decrease disgust and increase acceptance of biotechnology, especially when it pertains to animals and animal-derived foods.

Additional directions for future studies which seek to explore ways to attenuate disgust may be derived from Rozin’s (2008) work which notes that individuals encounter a great deal of potential disgust elicitors on a daily basis (e.g., public bathrooms), and employ a number of tactics, specifically denial (i.e., suppression of disgusting thoughts), adaptation (i.e., ceasing to think of disgust elicitors as disgusting), and reframing (i.e., thinking of disgust elicitors in another way), in order to manage what would otherwise become debilitating disgust.

The use of tactics such as denial, adaptation, and reframing in order to combat disgust fits well with the literature on dual-process models (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Studies

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

53

show that affective/intuitive processes do not respond well to cognitive means of persuasion, but that cognitive processes and affective/intuitive processes both respond to affective means of persuasion (e.g., Edwards, 1990). Edwards illustrates the stubborn nature of affective/intuitive processes by citing the example of phobias. Although an individual may readily acknowledge that their incapacitating phobia of clowns is irrational, they cannot reason away the affective reaction. Likewise, an individual may readily acknowledge that their disgust towards a stimulus is irrational, as it poses no health risks, but this reasoning does not eliminate the reaction (e.g., Rozin et al., 1986).

Whether physical or moral, disgust felt towards “unnatural” biotechnologies, including in vitro meat, will persist despite cognitively-based persuasion tactics that focus on variables such as health, environmental, and animal welfare benefits (e.g., Ficek, 2011).

The best hope of attenuating disgust comes from affect-based remedies such as triggering competing intuitions (see Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Hersh, 2001), and one method by which to trigger a competing intuition is to reframe a situation (Hadit, 2007).

Analogous to the current conflict of humanity’s psychological drive to avoid animal-reminders, and in vitro meat’s potency as an animal-reminder, is humanity’s psychological drive to avoid animal-reminders, and evolutionary theory’s potency as an animal-reminder. Although the theory of evolution is met with hostile obstinacy by creationists that aver life’s “irreducible complexity” (Behe, 1996), a number of creationists have managed to solve this cultural conflict by reframing evolution to fit within their beliefs. Proponents of this “theistic evolution” theory do not perceive evolution as being in conflict with the existence of their god or creationism, instead they perceive evolution as being a process that was designed by their god, and is part of

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

54

creationism. This solution allowed creationists to accept the existence of evolution (albeit a teleological version), and their animal origins, but still maintain their unique status above other animals (via their teleological perfection), and their belief in literal immortality. Although this particular example has not been examined in an experimental context, very similar studies have been carried out. Tracey, Hart, and Martins (2011) found that priming participants with mortality salience (vs. dental pain) led to both a greater acceptance of intelligent design theory as well as a greater rejection of evolutionary theory, regardless of participants’ religion, religiosity, educational background, or preexisting attitude toward evolution (Study 1). However, the authors were able to completely reverse the effects with the addition of an essay that explained how naturalism could be a source of existential meaning (Study 4).

In light of the relative success that reframing has had in the evolution/creationism culture war, it is possible that a solution similar to “theistic evolution” would be effective in the marketing of in vitro meat. This study found support for the theory that what was initially perceived as a discrepancy between the disgust literature and the TMT literature (i.e., disgust literature seemed to indicate that unnaturalness was disgusting because it is an unconscious animal-reminder, but TMT suggested that naturalness was disgusting because it is an unconscious animal-reminder) was really only a matter of framing; the two canons operate on different dichotomies. The disgust literature operates on a natural versus unnatural dichotomy, while the TMT literature operates on a natural versus civilized dichotomy, but unnaturalness is not the same construct as civility, as it is more akin to super-naturalness. However, this mismatch of dichotomies presents a possible framing solution; if “unnaturalness” is disgusting because it is a potent animal-reminder,

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

55

then instead of leaving consumers defenseless to the existential implications of an “unnatural” product, marketers must reframe in vitro meat so that it is not perceived as an unnatural animal-reminder in a natural/unnatural dichotomy, but as a civilized invention of humanity in a natural/civilized dichotomy. Essentially the solution may be to try to equate “unnaturalness” with civility.

If carried out successfully, this reframing opportunity will trigger a competing intuition and attenuate disgust towards in vitro meat. Haidt and Hersh (2001) found that intuitions based in the ethics of community and the ethics of divinity could be somewhat countered by a competing intuition based in the ethics of autonomy; conservative participants who judged homosexuality to be socially deviant and impious (community, divinity) were also able to concede that homosexuality was a private right (ethics of autonomy). Countering disgust towards in vitro meat, an intuition based in the ethics of divinity, with intuitions based in the domains of autonomy and community may prove useful in regard to problems such as legal moratoriums, but in order to get individuals not only to allow the existence of such a product, but actually consume it, it may be more effective to work within the ethics of divinity and fight fire with fire, or rather fight disgust with disgust.

Even with all of the commonly touted utilitarian variables set aside (e.g., health, environmental, and animal welfare benefits), in vitro meat still has a benefit that has been relatively neglected; cleanliness. Due to the “holistic” nature of livestock processing, fecal contamination is inevitable. In 2001, the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine petitioned the United States Department of Agriculture to declare feces as a meat adulterant after a study they commissioned found that 84% of Americans did not

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

56

know that feces are the originating source of salmonella, campylobacter, E. coli, and other foodborne pathogens, and thus that meat is often contaminated with feces (Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine, 2001). In contrast to current practices, in vitro meat will be produced in a sterile environment. Considering that feces are an intense and universal disgust elicitor (Rozin & Fallon, 1987), and that cleanliness counteracts disgust (Lee & Schwarz, 2010; Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 2010; Ritter & Preston, 2011; Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), contrasting conventional meat with in vitro meat while making this variable salient may be exactly the type of approach needed to move perceptions of in vitro meat from the natural/unnatural dichotomy to the natural/civilized dichotomy. This would be an interesting case to follow up that could lead to potential marketing moves such as branding in vitro meat “clean meat”. Using the variable of cleanliness to move perceptions of in vitro meat from unnatural to civilized may be a preferable alternative to employing the more obvious variable of animal slaughter. Although it would be possible to frame in vitro meat as civilized in comparison to conventional meat by depicting animal slaughter as an inhumane, animalistic convention, this route could potentially backfire. It is true that making animal slaughter salient is likely to make mortality salient and produce a disgust reaction towards conventional meat, but dominion over “lower” animals is often expressed as a uniquely human right. In the Book of Genesis, the God figure explicitly gives humankind dominion over all other animals, and suggests that other animals merely exist to serve humankind’s needs (Preece, 2000). To argue against animal slaughter may be taken as an attack on cultural worldviews.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

57

Future studies should focus on three general areas. The first focus should be on supplementing the present study. The current experimental design should be executed with an alternate sample in order to see if the effects found in previous studies regarding the creatureliness prime can be recreated, and if so, how this affects the results. Studies are also needed to see if the effects found in the present study can be corroborated using the MS paradigm of terror management theory. It would further be of interest to see if such effects generalize to different biotechnological stimuli. The second focus should be on studies that investigate methods by which to trigger competing intuitions. This effort may prove useful in attempts to attenuate disgust towards in vitro meat and other biotechnological stimuli. The third focus should be on studies that assess the weight that different cultures put on each of the three moral domains, as cultures that place less emphasis on the ethics of divinity may be more receptive to in vitro meat and other novel biotechnological products and processes in general.

Conclusion As part of a species that partitions the world into a list of dichotomies; human versus animal, natural versus unnatural, moral versus immoral, and as part of a generation that has watched human technology exploit the natural environment almost to the point of no return, it is not surprising that the thought of more technology is difficult to swallow.

But dichotomies are nothing more than a cognitive construction, another human heuristic that often helps, but sometimes hurts us in our endeavors (Berlin, 1990). In reality, everything including both nature and technology is a continuum, graded and evolving.

The present study suggests that the natural versus unnatural dichotomy may be the manifestation of a latent anxiety of our biological limitations. According to this

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

58

perspective, biotechnology is not threatening because it reduces everything into discrete units, but rather because it reduces everything into the same units. This essentially erases our constructed boundaries, challenges our dichotomies, and presents all of life as a single contiguous, holistic, living system. This theory has the capacity to explain the affective rejection of novel biotechnologies with wining utilitarian profiles. Every biotechnological triumph, even ones that we consciously recognize have the potential to remedy our ills and extend our lifespans, is accompanied by an unconscious, anxietyprovoking concession of our biological nature. In coming years, with technology and the human population predicted to grow at an exponential rate, the challenge will be to introduce biotechnological innovations to consumers while keeping anxiolytic dichotomies intact. Possible methods that ought to be explored include priming human uniqueness, and reframing these biotechnological innovations as agents of civilization.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

59

References Aggleton, J. P., & Passingham, R. E. (1981). Syndrome produced by lesions of the amygdala in monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Journal of Comparative & Physiological Psychology 95(6), 961-977.

Angyal, A. (1941). Disgust and related aversions. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 36, 393-412.

Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1997). Subliminal exposure to death-related stimuli increases defense of the cultural worldview. Psychological Science, 8, 379-385.

Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Simon, L. (1997). Suppression, accessibility of death-related thoughts, and cultural worldview defense: Exploring the psychodynamics of terror management. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 5-18.

Asch, D. A., Baron, J., Hershey, J. C, Kunreuther, H., Meszaros, J. R., Ritov, I., Spranca, M. (1994). Omission bias and pertussis vaccination. Medical Decision Making, 14, 118-24.

Astrup, A., Dyerberg, J., Elwood, P., Hermansen, K., Hu, F. B., Jakobsen, M. U., Kok, F. J., Krauss, R. M., Lecerf, J. M., Legrand, P., Nestel, P., Riserus, U., Sanders, T., Sinclair, A., Tender, S., Tholstrup, T., Willett, W. (2011). The role of reducing intakes of saturated fat in the prevention of cardiovascular disease: Where does the evidence stand in 2010? American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 93, 684-686.

Baron, J. (1995). A psychological view of moral intuition. Harvard Review of Philosophy, 5, 36-40.

Basker, D. (2009). Comparison of taste quality between organically and conventionally grown fruits and vegetables American Journal of Alternative Agriculture, 7(3), 129. DOI: 10.1017/S0889189300004641 Beatson, R. M., & Halloran, M. J. (2007). Humans rule! The effects of creatureliness reminders, mortality salience and self-esteem on attitudes towards animals.

British Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 619- 632.

Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York, NY: Free Press.

Behe, M.J. (1996). Darwin’s black box. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Benjaminson, M., Gilchriest, J., & Lorenz, M. (2002). In vitro edible muscle protein production system (MPPS): Stage 1, fish. Acta Astronaut, 51(12), 879–89.

Berlin, S.B. (1990). Dichotomous and complex thinking. Social Service Review, 64(1), 46-59.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

60

Bhat, Z. F., & Bhat, H. (2011). Animal-free meat biofabrication. American Journal of Food Technology, 6, 441-459.

Borg, J. S., Lieberman, D., & Kiehl, K. A. (2008). Infection, incest, and iniquity: Investigating the neural correlates of disgust and morality. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(9), 1529-1546.

Bradshaw, J., Healey, L., Thorne, C., MacDonald, D., Arden-Clark, C. (2000).

Differences in food preferences between individuals and populations of domestic cats Felis silvestris catus. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 68, 257–268. doi:10.1016/S0168-1591(00)00102-7 Bredahl, L. (1999). Consumers’ cognitions with regard to genetically modified foods.

Results from a qualitative study in four countries. Appetite, 33, 343-360.

Brown, K. F., Kroll, J., Hudson, M. J., Ramsay, M., Green, J., Vincent, C. A., & ...

Sevdalis, N. (2010). Omission bias and vaccine rejection by parents of healthy children: Implications for the influenza A/H1N1 vaccination programme. Vaccine, 28(25), 4181-4185. doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2010.04.012 Brown, T. C., Peterson, G. L., Brodersen, R., Ford, V., & Bell, P. A. (2005). The judged seriousness of an environmental loss is a matter of what caused it. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 25(1), 13-21.

Bukenya, J. O., & Wright, N.R. (2004). Determinants of consumer attitudes and purchase intentions with regard to GM foods. Alabama A&M University, Normal, AL. Carmody, R. N., & Wrangham, R. W. (2009). The energetic significance of cooking. Journal of Human Evolution, 57(4), 379-391. doi:10.1016/j.jhevol.2009.02.011 Center for Disease Control and Prevention. (2005). Foodborne illness [Data file].

Retrieved from http:// www.cdc.gov/ ncidod/ dbmd/ diseaseinfo/ files/ foodborne_illness_FAQ.pdf Chapman, H. A., Kim, D. A., Susskind, J. M., & Anderson, A. K. (2009). In bad taste: Evidence for the oral origins of moral disgust. Science, 323, 1222–1226.

Chern, W. S., Rickertsen, K., Tsuboi, N., Fu, T. T. (2002). Consumers acceptance and willingness to pay for genetically modified vegetable oil and salmon: a multiplecountry assessment. AgBioForum, 5(3), 105–112.

Chiu, T. H. T., & Lin, C. L. (2009). Ethical management of food systems: Plant based diet as a holistic approach. Asia Pacific Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 18(4), 647653.

Christoph, I. B., Bruhn, M., & Roosen, J. (2008) Knowledge, attitudes towards and acceptability of genetic modification in Germany. Appetite, 51, 58-68. doi:10.1016/j.appet.2007.12.001

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

61

Cockburn, A. (2002). Assuring the safety of genetically modified (GM) foods: The importance of an holistic, integrative approach. Journal of Biotechnology, 98, 79106.

Concerted action of the European Commission. (1997). Europe ambivalent on biotechnology. Nature, 387, 845-847.

Connor, M., & Siegrist, M. (2010). Factors influencing people’s acceptance of gene technology: The role of knowledge, health expectations, naturalness and social trust. Science Communication, 32(4), 514-538. DOI: 10.1177/1075547009358919 Costa-Font, J., & Mossialos, E. (2005). ‘Ambivalent’ individual preferences towards biotechnology in the European Union: Products or processes? Journal of Risk Research, 8(4), 341–354.

Cox, C. R., Goldenberg, J. L., Pyszczynski, T., & Weise, D. (2007). Disgust, creatureliness and the accessibility of death-related thoughts. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 494–507.

Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006). The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1082-1089. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x Cutler, S. J., Fooks, A. R., & van der Poel, W. H. M. (2010). Public health threat of new, reemerging, and neglected zoonoses in the industrialized world. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 16(1), 1-7.

Dangour, A.D., Lock, K., Hayter, A., Aikenhead, A., Allen, E., & Uauy, R. (2010).

Nutritional-related health effects of organic foods: A systematic review. American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 90, 680–685.

Danovitch, J., & Bloom, P. (2009). Children's extension of disgust to physical and moral events. Emotion, 9(1), 107-112.

Darwin, C. (2009). The origin of species (1859). In B. F. Gentile, B. O. Miller (Eds.), Foundations of psychological thought: A history of psychology (pp. 320336). Thousand Oaks, CA US: Sage Publications, Inc. Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex. London, England: John Murray.

Darwin, C. (1965). The expression of the emotions in man and animals (1872). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Das, E., Bushman, B. J., Bezemer, M. D., Kerkhof, P., & Vermeulen, I. E. (2009). How terrorism news reports increase prejudice against outgroups: A terror management account. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 453-459.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

62

Davidovich-Rikanati, R., Sitrit, Y., Tadmor, Y., Iijima, Y., Bilenko, N., Bar, E., & ...

Lewinsohn, E. (2007). Enrichment of tomato flavor by diversion of the early plastidial terpenoid pathway. Nature Biotechnology, 25(8), 899-901.

Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dawkins, R. (2006). The God delusion. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company. de Barcellos, M. D., Kügler, J. O., Grunert, K. G., van Wezemael, L., Pérez-Cueto, F. J. A., Ueland, Ø. And Verbeke, W. (2010). European consumers’ acceptance of beef processing Technologies: A Focus Group study. Innovative Food Science & Emerging Technologies, 11(4), 721-732.

Dennett, D. C. (2006). Breaking the spell: Religion as a natural phenomenon. New York: Viking.

DeWall, C. C., MacDonald, G., Webster, G. D., Masten, C. L., Baumeister, R. F., Powell, C., & ... Eisenberger, N. I. (2010). Acetaminophen reduces social pain: Behavioral and neural evidence. Psychological Science, 21(7), 931-937.

Edelman, P. D. (2003). In vitro meat production. Retrieved from http://www.newharvest.org/img/files/Edelman.pdf Edelman, P. D., McFarland, D. C., Mironov, V. A., & Matheny, J. G. (2004). In vitro cultured meat production. Retrieved from http://www.newharvest.org/img/files/Invitro.pdf Edelman, P. D., McFarland, D. C., Mironov, V. A., & Matheny, J. G. (2005).

Commentary: In vitro cultured meat production. Tissue Engineering, 11(5-6), 659–662.

Edwards, K. (1990). The interplay of affect and cognition in attitude formation and change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 202–216.

Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1971). Constants across cultures in the face and emotion.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17, 124-129.

Eskine, K. J., Kacinik, N. A., & Prinz, J. J. (2011). A bad taste in the mouth: Gustatory disgust influences moral judgment. Psychological Science, 22(3), 295- 299.

European Commission. (2005). Special Eurobarometer 225: Social Values, Science and Technology. Retrieved from http:// ec.europa.eu/ public_opinion/ archives/ ebs/ ebs_225_report_en.pdf Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S .B. G. (1967). Personality structure and measurement.

London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Fairweather, J., Campbell, H., Hunt, L., & Cook, A. (2007). Why do some of the public reject novel scientific technologies? A synthesis of results from the fate of biotechnology research programme. Lincoln University, New Zealand.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

63

Fallon, A. E., Rozin, P., & Pliner, P. (1984). The child's conception of food: the development of food rejections with special reference to disgust and contamination sensitivity. Child Development, 55(2), 566. doi:10.1111/14678624.ep7304562 Fessler, D. M. T., & Navarrete, C. D. (2003). Meat is good to taboo: Dietary proscriptions as a product of the interaction of psychological mechanisms and social processes. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 3(1), 1-40.

Fiala, N. (2008). Meeting the demand: An estimation of potential future greenhouse gas emissions from meat production. Ecological Economics, 67, 412–419.

Ficek, J. (2011). Values, beliefs, and ambivalence as predictors of health and ethically motivated patterns of meat consumption. (Unpublished manuscript). Hunter College, New York, NY. Fillion, L., & Arazi, S. (2002) "Does organic food taste better? A claim substantiation approach". Nutrition and Food Science, 32(2), 153-157.

Florian, V., & Kravetz, S. (1983). Fear of personal death: Attribution, structure, and relation to religious belief. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 600-607.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2008). FAOSTAT [Data file].

Retrieved from http://faostat.fao.org/ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2009). The state of food insecurity in the world: Economic crises- impacts and lessons learned. Retrieved from www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1683e/i1683e.pdf Ford, B. J. (2010). Culturing meat for the future: Anti-death versus anti-life. In C. Tandy (Ed.), Death and Anti-Death, Volume 7 (pp. 1-26). Palo Alto: Ria University Press.

Frewer, L. J., Howard, C. & Shepherd, R. (1996). The influence of realistic product exposure towards genetic engineering of food. Food Quality and Preference, 7, 61-67.

Frewer, L. J., Howard, C. & Shepherd, R. (1997). Public concerns in the United Kingdom about general and specific applications of genetic engineering: Risk, benefit, and ethics. Science, Technology, and Human Values, 22(1), 98-124.

Friedman, M., & Rholes, W. S. (2009). Religious fundamentalism and terror management: Differences by interdependent and independent self- construal. Self and Identity, 8, 24 – 44.

Gailliot, M. T., Schmeichel, B. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2006). Self- regulatory processes defend against the threat of death: Effects of self-control depletion and trait selfcontrol on thoughts and fears of dying. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 49 – 62.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

64

Gaskell, G., Allum, N., Bauer, M., Durant, J., Allansdottir, A., Bonfadelli, H., & ...

Rusanen, T. (2000). Biotechnology and the European public. Nature Biotechnology, 18(9), 935.

Geisel, T. S. (1960). Green eggs and ham. New York, NY: Random House, Inc. Gilani, G., & Nasim, A. (2007). Impact of foods nutritionally enhanced through biotechnology in alleviating malnutrition in developing countries. Journal of AOAC International, 90(5), 1440-1444.

Gilchrist, M. J., Greko, C., Wallinga, D. B., Beran, G. W., Riley, D. G., & Thorne, P. S. (2007). The potential role of concentrated animal feeding operations in infectious disease epidemics and antibiotic resistance. Environmental Health Perspectives, 115(2), 313-316.

Goldenberg, J. L., Cox, C. R., Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (2002).

Understanding human ambivalence about sex: The effects of stripping sex of meaning. Journal of Sex Research, 39(4), 310- 320.

Goldenberg, J. L., Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (2000). Fleeing the body: A terror management perspective on the problem of human corporeality. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 200– 218.

Goldenberg, J. L., Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Kluck, B., & Cornwell, R. (2001). I am not an animal: Mortality salience, disgust, and the denial of human creatureliness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130, 427435.

Goldenberg, J. L., Pyszczynski, T., McCoy, S. K., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1999).

Death, sex, love, and neuroticism: Why is sex such a problem? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1173–1187.

Gonzaga, G. C., Turner, R. A., Keltner, D., Campos, B., & Altemus, M. (2006).

Romantic love and sexual desire in close relationships. Emotion, 6, 163–179.

Goodland, R., & Anhang, J. (2009). Livestock and climate change: What if the key actors in climate change were pigs, chickens and cows? Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute.

Graham, J., & Haidt, J. (2010). Beyond beliefs: Religions bind individuals into moral communities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 140–150.

Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 1029–1046.

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1986). The causes and consequences of a need for self-esteem: A terror management theory. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), Public self and private self (pp. 189–212). New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

65

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S., & Lyon, D. (1990). Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology, 58(2), 308-318. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.58.2.308 Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Simon, L., & Breus, M. (1994). Role of consciousness and accessibility of death-related thoughts in mortality salience effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 627–637. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.627 Greenberg, J., Simon, L., Harmon-Jones, E., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Chatel, D. (1995). Testing alternative explanations for mortality effects: Terror management, value accessibility, or worrisome thoughts? European Journal of Social Psychology, 12, 417–433.

Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008).

Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment.

Cognition, 107(3), 1144-1154. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 Grunert, K. G., Bredahl, L., & Scholderer, J. (2003). Four questions on European consumers’ attitudes toward the use of genetic modification in food production.

Innovative Food Science and Emerging Technologies, 4, 435–445.

Grunert, K. G., Lähteenmäki, L., Nielsen, N. A., Poulsen, J. B., Ueland, O. & Åström, A. (2001). Consumer perceptions of foods products involving genetic modification – results from a qualitative study in four Nordic countries. Food Quality and Preference, 12, 527-542.

Gutierrez, R., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2007). Anger, disgust, and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors. Emotion, 7, 853–868.

Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814–834.

Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 316, 998-1002.

Haidt, J., Bjorklund, F., & Murphy, S. (2000). Moral dumbfounding: When intuition finds no reason. (Unpublished manuscript). University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA. Haidt, J., & Hersh, M. A. (2001). Sexual morality: The cultures and emotions of conservatives and liberals. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31(1), 191-221.

Haidt, J., McCauley, C., & Rozin, P. (1994). Individual differences in sensitivity to disgust: A scale sampling seven domains of disgust elicitors. Personality and Individual Differences, 16, 701–713.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

66

Haidt, J., Rozin, P., McCauley, C., & Imada, S. (1997). Body, psych, and culture: The relationship between disgust and morality. Psychology and Developing Societies, 9, 107-131.

Hallman, W. K., Hebden, W. C., Aquino, H. L., Cutie, C. L., Lang, J. T. (2003). Public perceptions of genetically modified foods: A national study of American knowledge and opinion. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University.

Harmon-Jones, E. (2003). Anger and the behavioral approach system. Personality and Individual Differences, 35, 995–1005. doi:10.1016/ S0191-8869(02)00313-6 Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2006). Dehumanizing the lowest of the low: Neuro-imaging responses to extreme outgroups. Psychological Science, 17, 847–853.

Hayes, J., Schimel, J., Arndt, J. & Faucher, E.H. (2010). A theoretical and empirical review of the death-thought accessibility concept in terror management research.

Psychological Bulletin, 136(5), 699-739.

Herman, E. M., Helm, R. M., Jung, R., & Kinney, A. J. (2003). Genetic modification removes an immunodominant allergen from soybean. Plant Physiology, 132, 3643.

Hladik, C. M., & Simmen, B. (1996). Taste perception and feeding behavior in nonhuman primates and human populations. Evolutionary Anthropology 5(2), 5871.

Hobbs, S. H. (2005). Attitudes, practices, and beliefs of individuals consuming a raw foods diet. Explore, 1(4), 272-277. doi:10.1016/j.explore.2005.04.015 Hoek, A. C. (2010). Will Novel Protein Foods beat meat? Consumer acceptance of meat substitutes - a multidisciplinary research approach. (Unpublished doctoral disseration). Wageningen University, The Netherlands.

Honikel, K. O. (1998). Quality of ecologically produced foods of animal origin. Deutsche Tierarztliche Wochenschrift,105, 327–329.

Hoogenboom, L. A. P., Bokhorst, J. G., Northolt, M. D., Vijver, L .P. L., van de Broex, N. J. G., & Mevius, D .J. (2008). Food Additives and Contaminants, 25(10), 1195–1207.

Horberg, E. J., Oveis, C., Keltner, D., & Cohen, A. B. (2009). Disgust and the moralization of purity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 963– 976.

Hossain, F., Onyango, B. (2004). Product attributes and consumer acceptance of nutritionally enhanced genetically modified foods. International Journal of Consumer Studies 28(3), 255–267.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

67

Hutcherson, C. A., & Gross, J .J. (2011). The moral emotions: A social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and comtempt. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(4), 719-737.

Izard, C. E. (1977). Human emotions. New York: Plenum Press.

Jones, A. (2007). The depths of disgust. Nature, 44, 768-771.

Jones, A., & Fitness, J. (2008). Moral hypervigilance: The influence of disgust sensitivity in the moral domain. Emotion, 8, 613– 627.

Kaptchuk, T. J., & Eisenberg, D. M. (1998). The persuasive appeal of alternative medicine. Annals Of Internal Medicine, 129(12), 1061.

Kass, L. (1997). “The Wisdom of Repugnance.” New Republic, 216 (22), 17-26.

Koebnick, C., Strassner, C., Hoffmann, I., Leitzmann, C. (1999). Consequences of a long-term raw food diet on body weight and menstruation: Results of a questionnaire survey. Annals of Nutrition and Metabolism, 43, 69–79.

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research. (pp. 347-480). Chicago: Rand McNally.

Koole, S. L., & Van den Berg, A.E. (2005). Lost in the wilderness: Terror management, action orientation, and nature evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88(6), 1014-1028.

Kourba, M. (2002). Quality of organic animal products. Livestock Production Science, 80, 33-40.

Kubberød, E., Ueland, Ø., Dingstad, G. I., Risvik, E., & Henjesand, I. J. (2008). The effect of animality in the consumption experience - A potential for disgust.

Journal of Food Products Marketing, 14(3), 103-124.

Kubberød, E., Ueland, Ø., Risvik, E., & Henjesand, I. J. (2006). A study on the mediating role of disgust with meat in the prediction of red meat consumption among young females. Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 5, 281-291.

Lee, S. W. S., & Schwarz, N. (2010). Dirty hands and dirty mouths: Embodiment of the moral-purity metaphor is specific to the motor modality involved in moral transgression. Psychological Science, 21, 1423-1425.

Levenson, R. W. (1992). Autonomic nervous system differences among emotions.

Psychological Science, 3, 23–27.

Lewinska, M. K. (1980). Differential effect of ventro-medial amygdalar lesions on the ingestion of different foods. Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis, 40, 933-944.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

68

Liljenquist, K., Zhong, C. -B., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). The smell of virtue: Clean scents promote reciprocity and charity. Psychological Science, 21, 381–383.

Lupei, M. C. (2011). Two kinds of disgust: Physical disgust is to fear as moral disgust is to anger. (Unpublished manuscript). University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. Lusk, J. L., Jamal, M., Kurlander, L., Roucan, M., & Taulman, L. (2004). A meta analysis of genetically modified food valuation studies. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN. MacDonald, G., & Leary, M. R. (2005). Why Does Social Exclusion Hurt? The Relationship Between Social and Physical Pain. Psychological Bulletin, 131(2), 202-223. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.131.2.202 MacDorman, K. F. (2005, December). Mortality salience and the uncanny valley.

Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE-RAS International Conference on Humanoid Robots, 5, 399–405. doi:10.1109/ICHR.2005.1573600 Macer, D. R. J., & Chen Ng, M. A. (2000). Changing attitudes to biotechnology in Japan.

Nature Biotechnology 18, 945- 947.

Magkos F, Arvaniti F, & Zampelas A. (2006). Organic food: Buying more safety or just peace of mind? A critical review of the literature. Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition, 46, 23–56.

Magnusson, M. (2004). Consumer perception of organic and genetically modified foods: Health and environmental considerations. (Unpublished manuscript). Uppsala University, Sweden.

Malmauret, L., Parent-Massin, D., Hardy, J. -L., &Verger, P. (2002). Contaminants in organic and conventional foodstuffs in France. Food Additives and Contaminants, 19(6), 524-532.

Martins, Y. (2001). Food neophobia: An examination of food rejections with special reference to disgust. (Unpublished manuscript). Univerity of Toronto, Canada.

Martins, Y., Pelchat, M. L., & Pliner, P. (1997). “Try it; it’s good and it’s good for you”: Effects of taste and nutrition information on willingness to try novel foods.

Appetite, 28, 89–102.

Martins, Y., & Pliner, P. (2005). Human food choices: An examination of the factors underlying acceptance/rejection of novel and familiar animal and nonanimal foods. Appetite, 45, 214-224.

Marks, L. A., Kalaitzandonakes, N., Wilkins, L., & Zakharova, L. (2007). Mass media framing of biotechnology news. Public Understanding of Science, 16(2), 183-203.

Marzillier, S. L., & Davey, G. C. L. (2004). The emotional profiling of disgust-eliciting stimuli: Evidence for primary and complex disgusts. Cognition & Emotion, 18, 313–336.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

69

McFarlane, T., & Pliner, P. (1997). Increasing willingness to taste novel foods: Effects of nutrition and taste information. Appetite, 28, 227–238.

Mintel Global New Products Database. (2009). Global Consumer, Product and Market Research. Retrieved from http://www.mintel.com/press-centre/pressreleases/311/natural-claims-ranked-first-on-new-food-and-drink-launches-in2008-finds-mintel Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Moll, F. T., Ignacio, F. A., Bramati, I. E., CaparelliDaquer, E. M., et al. (2005). The moral affiliations of disgust. Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, 18, 68–78.

Moon, W., & Balasubramanian, S. K. (2001). A multi-attribute model of public acceptance of genetically modified organisms. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University.

Moretti, L., & di Pellegrino, G. (2010). Disgust selectively modulates reciprocal fairness in economic interactions. Emotion, 10(2), 169–180.

Mousseau, F. (2009). Toward a future without want. World Policy Journal 26(2), 73-81.

Nabi, R. L. (2002). The theoretical versus the lay meaning of disgust: Implications for emotion research. Cognition & Emotion, 16, 695–703.

Napolitano, F., Braghieri, A., Piasentier, E., Favotto, S., Naspetti, S., & Zanoli, R. (2010). Effect of information about organic production on beef liking and consumer willingness to pay. Food Quality and Preference, 21, 207-212.

Novoselov, T. A. (2007). Analysis of adoption of genetic modification in pork production chains. (Unpublished manuscript). Wageningen University, The Netherlands.

Oaten, M., Stevenson, R. J., & Case, T. I. (2009). Disgust as a disease-avoidance mechanism. Psychological Bulletin, 135(2), 303-321.DOI: 10.1037/a0014823 Onyango, B., Govindasamy, R., & Nayga, R. M. Jr. (2004). Measuring U.S. consumer preferences for genetically modified foods using choice modelling experiments: The role of price, product benefits and technology. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University.

Oum, R. E., Lieberman, D., & Aylward, A. (2011). A feel for disgust: Tactile cues to pathogen presence. Cognition and Emotion, 25(4), 717-725.

Pelchat, M. L., & Pliner, P. (1995). Try it. You’ll like it. Effects of information on willingness to try novel foods. Appetite, 24, 153–166.

Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology. (2003). Public Sentiment About Genetically Modified Food. Retrieved from http:// pewagbiotech.org/ research/ gmfood/ survey3-01.pdf

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

70

Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine. (2001, August 29). Citizen petition requesting administrative action to prevent and warn consumers about fecal contamination of meat and poulty. Retrieved from http://www.dfwnetmall.com/ veg/ pcrmpetition.htm Pimentel, D., & Pimentel, M. (1996). Food, energy and society. Niwot, CO: Colorado University Press.

Pivetti, M. (2005). Natural and Unnatural: Animal welfare and rights activists’ representations of animals and animal biotechnology in Italy. (Unpublished manuscript). University of Helsinki, Finland.

Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2003). The intelligence of the moral intuitions: A reply to Haidt (2001). Psychological Review, 110, 193–196.

Pizarro, D. A., Inbar, Y., & Helion, C. (2011). On disgust and moral judgment. Emotion Review, 3(3), 267-268. DOI: 10.1177/1754073911402394 Pliner, P., & Pelchat, M. (1991). Neophobia in humans and the special status of foods of animal origin. Appetite, 16, 205-218.

Pliner, P., Pelchat, M., & Grabski, M. (1993). Reduction of neophobia in humans by exposure to novel foods. Appetite, 20, 111-123.

Pond, R. R., DeWall, C., Lambert, N. M., Deckman, T., Bonser, I. M., & Fincham, F. D. (2011). Repulsed by violence: Disgust sensitivity buffers trait, behavioral, and daily aggression. Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology, doi:10.1037/a0024296 Preece, R., & Fraser, D. (2000). The status of animals in biblical and Christian thought: A study in colliding values. Society and Animals, 8(3), 245-263.

Ramirez, I. (1992). Is starch flavor unitary? Evidence from studies of cooked starch.

Physiology and Behavior, 52, 535–540.

Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1990). Reluctance to vaccinate: Omission bias and ambiguity. Journal Of Behavioral Decision Making, 3(4), 263-277.

Ritter, R. S., & Preston, J. L. (2011). Gross gods and icky atheism: Disgust responses to rejected religious beliefs. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.05.006 Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology, 7(4), 573-605. doi:10.1016/00100285(75)90024-9 Rosenblatt, A., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Lyon, D. (1989).

Evidence for terror management theory: I. The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who violate or uphold cultural values. Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology, 57(4), 681-690. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.4.681

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

71

Rosegrant, M. W., Leach, N., & Gerpacio, R. V. (1999). Alternative futures for world cereal and meat consumption. Proceedings for the Nutrition Society, 58(2), 219234.

Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rosenblatt, A., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Lyon, D. (1989).

Evidence for terror management theory: I. The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who violate or uphold cultural values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 681-690.

Royzman, E. B., & Kurban, R. (2011). Minding the metaphor: The elusive character of moral disgust. Emotion Review, 3(3), 269-271.

Royzman, E. B., & Sabini, J. (2001). Something it takes to be an emotion: The interesting case of disgust. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 31, 29–59.

Rozin, P. (1976). The selection of foods by rats, humans, and other animals. In D. Lehrman, R. A. Hinde, & E. Shaw (Eds.), Advances in the study of behaviour (pp. 21-76). New York: Academic Press.

Rozin, P. (2005). The meaning of “natural”: Process more important than content.

Psychological Science, 16, 652‐658.

Rozin, P. (2006). Naturalness judgments by lay Americans: Process dominates content in judgments of food or water acceptability and naturalness. Judgment and Decision Making, 1(2), 91‐97.

Rozin, P. (2008). Hedonic “adaptation”: Specific habituation to disgust/death elicitors s a result of dissecting a cadaver. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(2), 191-194.

Rozin, P., & Fallon, A. (1987). A perspective on disgust. Psychological Review, 94, 2341.

Rozin, P., Haidt, J., & McCauley, C. (1993). Disgust. In M. Lewis & J. Haviland (Eds.), The Handbook of Emotions. New York: Guilford Publications.

Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 574–586.

Rozin, P., Markwith, M, & McCauley, C. (1994). Sensitivity to indirect contacts with other persons: AIDS aversion as a composite of aversion to strangers, infection, moral taint, and misfortune. Journal Of Abnormal Psychology, 103(3), 495.

Rozin, P., Millman, L., & Nemeroff, C. (1986). Operation of the laws of sympathetic magic in disgust and other domains. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 703-712.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

72

Rozin, P., Spranca, M., Krieger, Z., Neuhaus, R., Surillo, D., Swerdlin, A., & Wood, K. (2004). Preference for natural: Instrumental and ideational/moral motivations, and the contrast between foods and medicines. Appetite, 43, 147-154.

Russell, P., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2011a). Moral anger is more flexible than moral disgust. Social Psychological And Personality Science, 2(4), 360-364. doi:10.1177/1948550610391678 Russell, P., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2011b). Social justifications for moral emotions: When reasons for disgust are less elaborated than for anger. Emotion, 11(3), 637-646. doi:10.1037/a0022600 Russell, P., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2011c). Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality. Emotion, 11(2), 233-240. doi:10.1037/a0022598 Saher, M., Lindeman, M., & Hursti, U. -K. K. (2006). Attitudes toward genetically modified and organic foods. Appetite, 46, 324–331.

Schaller, M., & Murray, D. R. (2008). Pathogens, personality, and culture: Disease prevalence predicts worldwide variability in sociosexuality, extraversion, and openness to experience. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 95(1), 212221.

Schimel, J., Hayes, J., Williams, T., & Jahrig, J. (2007). Is death really the worm at the core? Converging evidence that worldview threat increases death-thought accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 789–803. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.789 Schnall, S., Benton, J., & Harvey, S. (2008). With a clean conscience: Cleanliness reduces the severity of moral judgments. Psychological Science, 19, 1219-1222.

Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as embodied moral judgment. Society for Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(8), 10961109.

Schifferstein, H. N. J., & Oude Ophuis, P. A. M. (1998). Health-related determinants of organic food consumption in the Netherlands. Food Quality and Preference, 9(3), 119–133.

Serin, J. (2011). Cross-cultural perceptions of natural food. (Unpublished manuscript).

California State University, Sacramento, CA. Shimp, T. A., & Stuart, E. W. (2004). The role of disgust as an emotional mediator of advertising effects. Journal of Advertising, 33(1), 43-53.

Shweder, R. A., Much, N. C., Mahapatra, M., & Park, L. (1997). The “Big Three” of morality (autonomy, community, and divinity) and the “Big Three” explanations of suffering. In A. Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), Morality and health (pp. 119 –169).

New York, NY: Routledge.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

73

Simpson, J., Carter, S., Anthony, S. H., & Overton, P. G. (2006). Is disgust a homogenous emotion? Motivation and Emotion, 30, 31–41.

Smil, V. (2002). Eating meat: Evolution, patterns and consequences. Population & Development Review, 28(4), 599-639.

Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991). A terror management theory of social behavior: The psychological functions of self-esteem and cultural worldviews. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (pp. 93-159) New York: Academic Press.

Steinfeld, H., Gerber, P., Wassenaar, T., Castel, V., Rosales, M., de Haan, C. (2006).

Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options. Rome: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.

Stern, P.C. (2000). Psychology and the science of human-environment interactions.

American Psychologist, 55(5), 523-530.

Stern, P.C., & Gardner, G.T. (1981). Psychological research and energy policy. American Psychologist, 36(4), 329-342.

Tanaka, Y. (2004). Major psychological factors affecting acceptance of generecombination technology. Risk Analysis, 24(6), 1575-1583.

Townsend, E., & Campbell, S. (2004). Psychological determinants of willingness to taste and purchase genetically modified food. Risk Analysis 24, 1385-1393.

Tracy, J. L., Hart, J., & Martens, J. P. (2011). Death and science: The existential underpinnings of belief in intelligent design and discomfort with evolution. PLoS ONE, 6(3), e17349. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017349.

Tuomisto, H. L., & Teixeira de Mattos, M. J. (2011). Environmental impacts of cultured meat production. Environmental Science & Technology, 45(14), 6117-6123.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207-232.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211(4481), 453–458. doi:10.1126/science.7455683 Tybur, J. M., Lieberman, D., & Griskevicius, V. (2009). Microbes, Mating, and mortality: Individual differences in three functional domains of disgust. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(1), 103–122.

Verhoog, H. (2003). Naturalness and the genetic modification of animals. Trends in Biotechnology, 21(7), 294-297.

Vining, J., Merrick, M. S., & Price, E. A. (2008). The distinction between humans and nature: Human perceptions of connectedness to nature and elements of the natural and unnatural. Human Ecology Review, 15(1), 1-11.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

74

Walsh-Daneshmandi, A., & MacLachlan, M. (2000). Environmental risk to the Self: Factor analysis and development of subscales for the Environmental Appraisal Inventory (EAI) with an Irish sample. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 20(2), 141-149.

Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101, 34–52.

Wegner, D. M., & Smart, L. (1997). Deep cognitive activation: A new approach to the unconscious. Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology, 65, 984–995.

Wheatley, T., & Haidt, J. (2005). Hypnotically induced disgust makes moral judgments more severe. Psychological Science, 16, 780–784. wholesome. (n.d.). Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition.

Retrieved November 12, 2011, from Dictionary.com website:http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/wholesome Widen, S. C., & Russell, J. A. (2010). The “disgust face” conveys anger to children.

Emotion, 10 (4), 455-466.

Williams, L. E., Huang, J. Y., & Bargh, J. A. (2009). The scaffolded mind: Higher mental processes are grounded in early experience of the physical world. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 1257-1267. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.665 Wilson, E. O. (2002). The future of life. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Wobber, V., Hare, B., & Wrangham, R. (2008). Great apes prefer cooked food. Journal of Human Evolution, 55(2), 340-348. doi:10.1016/j.jhevol.2008.03.003 Wolfson, D. J., & Sullivan, M. (2004). Foxes in the hen house—animals, agribusiness, and the law: A modern American fable. In: C. R. Sunstein, and M. C. Nussbaum (Eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (pp. 206-207). New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

World Health Organization. (2011). The top 10 causes of death. [Data file] Retrieved from http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310/en/index.html Wrangham, R., & Conklin-Brittain, N. (2003). ‘Cooking as a biological trait’. Comparative Biochemistry & Physiology Part A: Molecular & Integrative Physiology, 136(1), 35. doi:10.1016/S1095-6433(03)00020-5 Wrangham, R. W., Jones, J., Laden, G., Pilbeam, D., & Conklin-Brittain, N. (1999). The Raw and the Stolen. Current Anthropology, 40(5), 567-577.

Zhong, C., & Liljenquist, K. (2006). Washing away your sins: Threatened morality and physical cleansing. Science, 313, 1451–1452.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

75

Appendix A Creatureliness Prime, Human-animal Similarity

‘Human Nature’

“The boundary between humans and animals is not as great as most people think.

Although we like to think that we are special and unique, our bodies work in pretty much the same way as the bodies of all other animals. Whether you're talking about lizards, cows, horses, insects, or humans, we're all made up of the same basic biological products.

We're all made up of skin, blood, organs, and bones. We're all driven by needs for food, water, sex, and comfort. Although some people like to claim that we humans are vastly more intelligent than other animals, this doesn't really seem to be true. What appears to be the results of complex thought and free will is really just the result of our biological programming and simple learning experiences, just like all other animals. Research shows that chimps have the capacity for language, even pigeons are able to solve pretty complex problems, and all animals show caring for and attachment to their offspring.

Human beings are just another species of animals, maybe a little more intelligent than others, but not different in any really important or meaningful way. Seeing ourselves as special or different from the cows we eat for lunch or the insects we wash off our windshields is just another example of human vanity and self-delusion.”

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

76

Appendix B Creatureliness Prime, Human Uniqueness

‘Human Nature’

“The one thing that my education has made clear to me is that, although we humans have some things in common with other animals, human beings are truly unique. Although our bodies may be pretty similar to simpler species, the potential of the human mind and spirit go far beyond anything remotely similar to what is found in simple animals. First there are the obvious things: Humans have language and culture. We create works of art, music, and literature that enable us to live in an abstract world of the imagination -something no other animal is capable of. Although simple animals may communicate with grunts and groans, and chimps can be taught basic sign language by humans, this is a far cry from the complex and inspiring works of human culture: Shakespeare, Beethoven, and Picasso, to name just a few. Unlike animals, humans live in a world of ideas and concepts, morals and values. We can even come to understand ourselves, as in the works of the great philosophers and psychologists. More importantly, humans have the capacity for love, generosity, and kindness ---- putting the welfare of others above themselves. We are not simple selfish creatures driven by hunger and lust, but complex individuals with a will of our own, capable of making choices, and creating our own destinies. Although we certainly have some things in common with simple animals, we humans are truly special and unique.”

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

77

Appendix C Food Origin/ Naturalness Prime, Natural Non-animal Food

‘Easy A’

As part of your undergraduate natural science requirement, you consider enrolling in a class on modern agricultural methods. You’re not particularly interested in the topic, but a friend of yours had taken the class last semester, and assured you that it is an easy A. The requirements for the class are weekly readings, a class-related field trip, and a follow up report. There are no quizzes, no mid- term, and no final exam; you sign up immediately. The class is as your friend promised; with two weeks left of the course, you’ve attended lecture twice, neglected all assigned readings, and still have an A in the course. The second to last week, you attend a mini conference with your professor who is setting up meetings in order to assign students their final project, the field trip. It turns out that the field trip is not a class field trip, but rather each student is assigned to shadow a professional in the agriculture business for a few hours, and write up a short report about their experience and what they learned. Although unconventional, your professor tells you that he will not be grading the report, but that it is instead to be graded by the individual that you shadow, as they know the subject matter the best. The idea of a field trip doesn’t sound so bad, but you voice your concern about having a random stranger being in charge of your grade. The professor understands your concern, and tells you that there is an alternative option of taking an exam for students who do not wish to, or cannot, attend their field trip. Seeing as you haven’t done any of the readings for the course, and you’d rather study for your other exams than make up all of the neglected readings, you decide to take your chances with the field trip.

The individual that you have been assigned to shadow is an organic farmer an hour upstate. You arrive at the farm on Friday morning at 9 am, and are greeted by Farmer Sam. He proceeds to give you a tour of the farm, explaining what each person is responsible for, and what all of the equipment does. You don’t find it terribly interesting, or understand everything he says, but you nod and mumble ‘uh huh” every few minutes to feign engagement and avoid elaborated explanations. You’re nearing the end of the tour, and besides being a bit bored, you’re still confused as to what you’re going to write in your report. Then you and Farmer Sam reach the tomato fields. You take a seat on nearby tractor, pull out your notebook, and Farmer Sam begins to lecture on his organic tomatoes:

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

78

“Organic farming promotes working in harmony with nature, relying on techniques such as crop rotation, compost, natural fertilizer, and natural pest control in order to maintain soil productivity and minimize artificial input. The result is fresh, crisp tomatoes without unnecessary additives. Recent research suggests that organic agriculture results in the conservation of water and energy, causes less leaching of nutrients, less soil erosion, and higher carbon storage. It also protects farm workers and wildlife from potentially harmful chemicals.

Hopefully within a decade or two, organic vegetables will have replaced conventional vegetables on supermarket shelves”.

You write down almost word for word his lecture, and then ask Farmer Sam if organic tomatoes will look, smell, and taste exactly like conventional tomatoes. Farmer Sam nods in the affirmative, walks over to a tomato plant and picks one off for you to try. You’re not hungry, but aware that this man is in charge of your final grade, and not wanting to offend him, you place it in your mouth. He watches you as you slowly chew it a few times and swallow it. He asks you what you think, and you just politely smile, while trying to tongue out a piece that’s gotten stuck between your teeth.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

79

Appendix D Food Origin/ Naturalness Prime, Unnatural Non-animal Food

‘Easy A’

As part of your undergraduate natural science requirement, you consider enrolling in a class on modern agricultural methods. You’re not particularly interested in the topic, but a friend of yours had taken the class last semester, and assured you that it is an easy A. The requirements for the class are weekly readings, a class-related field trip, and a follow up report. There are no quizzes, no mid- term, and no final exam; you sign up immediately. The class is as your friend promised; with two weeks left of the course, you’ve attended lecture twice, neglected all assigned readings, and still have an A in the course. The second to last week, you attend a mini conference with your professor who is setting up meetings in order to assign students their final project, the field trip. It turns out that the field trip is not a class field trip, but rather each student is assigned to shadow a professional in the agriculture business for a few hours, and write up a short report about their experience and what they learned. Although unconventional, your professor tells you that he will not be grading the report, but that it is instead to be graded by the individual that you shadow, as they know the subject matter the best. The idea of a field trip doesn’t sound so bad, but you voice your concern about having a random stranger being in charge of your grade. The professor understands your concern, and tells you that there is an alternative option of taking an exam for students who do not wish to, or cannot, attend their field trip. Seeing as you haven’t done any of the readings for the course, and you’d rather study for your other exams than make up all of the neglected readings, you decide to take your chances with the field trip.

The individual that you have been assigned to shadow is a farmer an hour upstate that grows genetically modified crops. You arrive at the farm on Friday morning at 9 am, and are greeted by Farmer Sam. He proceeds to give you a tour of the farm, explaining what each person is responsible for, and what all of the equipment does. You don’t find it terribly interesting, or understand everything he says, but you nod and mumble ‘uh huh” every few minutes to feign engagement and avoid elaborated explanations. You’re nearing the end of the tour, and besides being a bit bored, you’re still confused as to what you’re going to write in your report. Then you and Farmer Sam reach the tomato fields.

You take a seat on nearby tractor, pull out your notebook, and Farmer Sam begins to lecture on his genetically modified tomatoes:

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

80

“Humans have genetically modified plants and animals for thousands of years through selective breeding, but recent advances have made it possible for humans to genetically modify organisms directly by removing, adding, and transferring individual genes. The result is fresh, crisp tomatoes that can grow in harsher conditions, and have a longer shelf life. Currently, around 90 percent of corn, cotton, and soybeans planted in the US today are genetically engineered. Studies have found no difference between genetically modified vegetables and conventional vegetables when it comes to the environment. Hopefully within a decade or two, genetically modified vegetables will have replaced conventional vegetables on supermarket shelves”.

You write down almost word for word his lecture, and then ask Farmer Sam if genetically modified tomatoes will look, smell, and taste exactly like conventional tomatoes. Farmer Sam nods in the affirmative, walks over to a tomato plant and picks one off for you to try.

You’re not hungry, but aware that this man is in charge of your final grade, and not wanting to offend him, you place it in your mouth. He watches you as you slowly chew it a few times and swallow it. He asks you what you think, and you just politely smile, while trying to tongue out a piece that’s gotten stuck between your teeth.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

81

Appendix E Food Origin/ Naturalness Prime, Natural Animal-derived Food

‘Easy A’

As part of your undergraduate natural science requirement, you consider enrolling in a class on modern agricultural methods. You’re not particularly interested in the topic, but a friend of yours had taken the class last semester, and assured you that it is an easy A. The requirements for the class are weekly readings, a class-related field trip, and a follow up report. There are no quizzes, no mid- term, and no final exam; you sign up immediately. The class is as your friend promised; with two weeks left of the course, you’ve attended lecture twice, neglected all assigned readings, and still have an A in the course. The second to last week, you attend a mini conference with your professor who is setting up meetings in order to assign students their final project, the field trip. It turns out that the field trip is not a class field trip, but rather each student is assigned to shadow a professional in the agriculture business for a few hours, and write up a short report about their experience and what they learned. Although unconventional, your professor tells you that he will not be grading the report, but that it is instead to be graded by the individual that you shadow, as they know the subject matter the best. The idea of a field trip doesn’t sound so bad, but you voice your concern about having a random stranger being in charge of your grade. The professor understands your concern, and tells you that there is an alternative option of taking an exam for students who do not wish to, or cannot, attend their field trip. Seeing as you haven’t done any of the readings for the course, and you’d rather study for your other exams than make up all of the neglected readings, you decide to take your chances with the field trip.

The individual that you have been assigned to shadow is an organic livestock farmer an hour upstate. You arrive at the farm on Friday morning at 9 am, and are greeted

by Farmer Sam. He proceeds to give you a tour of the farm, explaining what each person is responsible for, and what all of the equipment does. You don’t find it terribly interesting, or understand everything he says, but you nod and mumble ‘uh huh” every few minutes to feign engagement and avoid elaborated explanations. You’re nearing the end of the tour, and besides being a bit bored, you’re still confused as to what you’re going to write in your report. Then you and Farmer Sam reach the cow pen. You spend a few minutes petting some of the cows, then take a seat on a bale of hay, pull out your notebook, and Farmer Sam begins to lecture on what his work entails:

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

82

“Livestock at our farm are fed wholesome, organic feed, and are not pumped full of antibiotics and hormones. In contrast to conventional farming, organic farms recognize the importance of letting animals express their natural behaviors with free-range to roam, fresh air to breathe, and fresh water to drink. Central to organic philosophy is that happy animals will result in higher quality eggs, dairy, and meat. Although sale of organic meat has increased 150% since 2002, it still only represents 1% of all meat consumed. Hopefully within a decade or two, organic meat will have replaced conventional meat on supermarket shelves”.

You write down almost word for word his lecture, and then ask Farmer Sam if it looks, smells, and tastes exactly the same as conventional meat. He nods in the affirmative, and steps out for a minute. He returns with some fresh steaks and tosses them on a nearby grill. He hands you a dish, and invites you to try some. You’re not hungry, and you could swear that the cows are staring at you, but aware that this man is in charge of your final grade, and not wanting to offend him, you stab a piece with your fork and place it in your mouth. He watches you as you slowly chew it a few times and swallow it. He asks you what you think, and you just politely smile, while trying to tongue out a piece that’s gotten stuck between your teeth.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

83

Appendix F Food Origin/ Naturalness Prime, Unatural Animal-derived Food

‘Easy A’

As part of your undergraduate natural science requirement, you consider enrolling in a class on modern agricultural methods. You’re not particularly interested in the topic, but a friend of yours had taken the class last semester, and assured you that it is an easy A. The requirements for the class are weekly readings, a class-related field trip, and a follow up report. There are no quizzes, no mid- term, and no final exam; you sign up immediately. The class is as your friend promised; with two weeks left of the course, you’ve attended lecture twice, neglected all assigned readings, and still have an A in the course. The second to last week, you attend a mini conference with your professor who is setting up meetings in order to assign students their final project, the field trip. It turns out that the field trip is not a class field trip, but rather each student is assigned to shadow a professional in the agriculture business for a few hours, and write up a short report about their experience and what they learned. Although unconventional, your professor tells you that he will not be grading the report, but that it is instead to be graded by the individual that you shadow, as they know the subject matter the best. The idea of a field trip doesn’t sound so bad, but you voice your concern about having a random stranger being in charge of your grade. The professor understands your concern, and tells you that there is an alternative option of taking an exam for students who do not wish to, or cannot, attend their field trip. Seeing as you haven’t done any of the readings for the course, and you’d rather study for your other exams than make up all of the neglected readings, you decide to take your chances with the field trip.

The individual that you have been assigned to shadow is a tissue engineer at Columbia University. You arrive at Columbia on Friday morning at 9 am, and are greeted

by Dr. Samiam. He proceeds to give you a tour of the laboratory, explaining what each person is working on, and what all of the equipment does. You don’t find it terribly interesting, or understand everything he says, but you nod and mumble ‘uh huh” every few minutes to feign engagement and avoid elaborated explanations. You’re nearing the end of the tour, and besides being a bit bored, you’re still confused as to what you’re going to write in your report. Then you and Dr. Samiam reach his station. You take a seat on a nearby chair, pull out your notebook, and Dr. Samiam begins to lecture on what his work entails:

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

84

“I am working on creating in-vitro meat. Essentially, we start with a biopsy of embryonic cells, attach them to a scaffold, bathe them in growth serum derived from cyanobacteria, place everything inside a bioreactor, and wait for the cells to multiply into edible muscle tissue. The result is meat, without growing the whole cow, pig, or chicken. Theoretically, a single cell could be prolific enough to satisfy the current annual global demand for meat, ameliorating many of the current environmental problems. Hopefully within a decade or two, in vitro meat will have replaced conventional meat on supermarket shelves”.

You write down almost word for word his lecture, and then ask Dr. Samiam if it will look, smell, and taste like regular meat. He nods in the affirmative, and walks over to a giant vat. He spoons out some in vitro meat onto a metal plate, and lightly cooks it over a Bunsen burner. He brings it over to you with a plastic fork, and invites you to try some.

You aren’t hungry, but aware that this man is in charge of your final grade, and not wanting to offend him, you stab a piece with your fork and place it in your mouth. He watches you as you slowly chew it a few times and swallow it. He asks you what you think, and you just politely smile, while trying to tongue out a piece that’s gotten stuck between your teeth.

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY Appendix G Word-fragment Completion Task

1. _ _ TAL

14. CHA _ _

2. PLA _ _

15. KI _ _ ED

3. _ _ OK

16. CL _ _ K

4. WAT _ _

17. TAB _ _

5. DE _ _

18. W _ _ DOW

6. MU _ _

19. SK _ _ L

7. _ _ NG

20. TR _ _

8. B _ T _ LE

21. P _ P _ R

9. M_ J _ R

22. COFF _ _

10. P _ _ TURE

23. _ O _ SE

11. FL _ W _ R

24. POST _ _

12. GRA _ _

25. R _ DI _

13. K _ _GS

85

Running head: TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

86

Appendix H Disgust Evaluation/ Creatureliness Prime Evaluation Human Nature

(1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Very)

‘How much do you think you would like this person?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

‘How intelligent do you believe this person to be?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

‘How knowledgeable do you believe this person to be?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

‘Is this person’s opinion well-informed?’

1 2 3 4 5 6

9

7

8

‘How much do you agree with this person’s opinion?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

‘From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s opinion is of the topic they discussed?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Easy A

(1 = Not at all, 5 = Somewhat, 9 = Very)

‘How physically disgusted did you feel when imagining yourself in the scenario?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ‘How physically disgusting do you find organic vegetables?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ‘How morally disgusting do you find organic vegetables?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ‘How physically disgusting do you find organic meat?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ‘How morally disgusting do you find organic meat?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ‘How physically disgusting do you find genetically modified vegetables?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ‘How morally disgusting do you find genetically modified vegetables?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ‘How physically disgusting do you find lab-grown meat?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ‘How morally disgusting do you find lab-grown meat?’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9