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Ukraine is Just a Small Piece of a Global Power Struggle
By Shammai Siskind
For the current generation, a massive, multinational European ground war is a foreign concept.
When most people today think of armed conflict in that part of the world, it’s in the context of a good action movie. Or maybe a history textbook. Nothing to do with reality.
What the current tensions over Ukraine have reminded us (or should remind us) is that core-geopolitical interests never really go away. They’re determined by things like geography and deeply rooted cultural trends – phenomena that typically don’t change.
Indeed, the roots of what we’re now seeing on the news go back a long time.
The historical links between Russia and Ukraine date as far back as the 9th century, when a group of people called the Rus moved their capital to Kyiv — a historical vignette President Vladimir Putin often likes to invoke.
Ukraine was, for a long time, an important economic asset for Russia. During the decades it was controlled by Moscow, Ukraine was a strategic component of the Soviet Union, with a large agricultural industry and important ports on the Black Sea.
There are also security factors.
Positioned in the middle of warring empires for centuries, Russia’s national security has always been profoundly based on its strategic depth – the geographical buffer that separates it from hostile neighbors and also acts as a serious deterrent for potential invaders. (Napoleon and Hitler can both tell us a bit about that.)
During the Cold War era, Russia’s satellite states like Ukraine played an important role in forming that buffer. But for the past thirty years, with Western (and particularly American) influence permeating Central and Eastern Europe, Russia has had to come up with new methods to assure
its territorial security. This need has become especially pronounced in the face of a 70-year-old military pact in Europe designed from its outset to be an adversary to Russia – i.e., NATO.
At the crux of the NATO alliance is the commitment of all members to go to war if another member is attacked. While this provision was ironically never activated during the Cold War itself (that would have to wait for September 11th and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan), it still presents a massive military power factor in Europe today.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, fourteen countries have joined the NATO accords, most of them being former Soviet states. This has been a deeply troubling trend to Russian leaders and the reason why the country’s current president has taken a hyper-aggressive stance on Ukraine for the better part of a decade.
All of this context can help explain why the Kremlin has long demanded guarantees from NATO that Ukraine and Georgia — another former Soviet Republic that Russia briefly invaded in 2008 — will not join the alliance. The Biden administration and other NATO allies say Putin can’t deny Ukraine that right – even though no plans are currently in the works to grant the country membership.
Over the past several months, the world began to see these age-old interests of Russia once again come to a head.
In May, Western European leaders revealed that Russia was maintaining some 100,000 troops near its border with Ukraine. In November, Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky brought attention to the uptick in activity and maneuvers of Russian forces stationed to his country’s east, strongly indicating plans for an invasion.
Since then, things have only escalated.
On the 3rd of February, President Biden ordered the bolstering of U.S. troops in Eastern Europe. Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said 1,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in Germany would deploy to Romania, and another 2,000 in the United States would be sent to Germany and Poland. Shortly afterward, another 8,000 American servicemen and women were put on high alert.
Three days later, White House national security advisor Jack Sullivan publicly warned war with Russia could be imminent. “We are in the window,” Sullivan said during a weekend interview. “Any day now, Russia could take military action.”
So now the eyes of the world are on Ukraine. As they should be. A conout. Regardless of how this particular drama ends, Ukraine is just one piece of a much broader power struggle, extending from the Middle East, to Central Asia, all the way to the Pacific.
The Bear and the Dragon
The relationship between Russia and China over the past seventy years has been rocky.
When the Chinese communists came to power in 1949, they were already long-time allies of the Soviets, having maintained close ties for years and even fought together against Japan during World War II. The two countries’ totalitarian dictators, Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin, naturally found kindred spirits in each other. The Friendship Treaty of 1950 triggered fruitful years of collaboration on the industry, critical infrastructure, and maritime development fronts. But alas, the rapport was not to be long-lived. A series of ideological and leadership shifts after the death of Stalin became the catalyst for what is known today as the Sino-Soviet Split of the late ‘50s.
Through the latter half of the 20th century and the beginning of the current one, relations between the two nations have been, well, mixed. To be sure, there have been important cooperative ventures between Moscow and Beijing during that period – mostly in the commercial domain – and diplomatic ties continued even after Russia rejected communism in 1991. But as for a grand joint strategy against the West, it seemed that ship had sailed for the two Asian giants.
Over the last twenty years, however, the geopolitical groundwork has
slowly been laid for a big reconciliation.
There have been several milestones in this process, the most important having taken place just six months ago when the United States unilaterally withdrew from Afghanistan. The common thread in this trend: a receding West and war-weary United States leaving the global
flict between Moscow and Kyiv would be catastrophic for the region, trigger distribution on a global scale, and almost certainly drag Western powers into the fray.
However, while the outcome of the Ukraine standoff is certainly important in and of itself, it’s worth appreciating the much bigger context in which the conflict is playing field open for resurgent powers hungry for expansion.
A Warm Reunion
Earlier this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted Vladimir Putin for the opening of the Winter Olympics. At a meeting during the Games’ commencement, the two leaders took the opportunity to announce their new and aspiring Strategic Partnership. “Friendship between the two States has no limits; there are no forbidden areas of cooperation,” read a joint statement.
The text of the Partnership stated that their relationship “was superior to any Cold War-era alliance” and that the People’s Republic and the Russian Federation would begin broad level collaboration in a variety of domains immediately.
While the interests and ambitions of Russia and China are certainly distinct, they are in many ways strikingly similar – similar enough for the two countries to agree on a strategic collaboration not seen in six decades.
To make this a bit more concrete its worth briefly examining what the ambitions of China and Russia are at the global level:
The Middle East
Russia has been heavily invested in the Middle East for some seven years.
At the surface level, Russia’s activities have been focused on its military intervention in the Syrian civil war. In truth, however, Russia’s long-term goals are much bigger than propping up its failing ally Bashar Assad
Putin’s general objective in the Middle East is to establish Russia’s status and role as a major outside power in one of the world’s most volatile regions.
By the time of President Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria in 2019, Moscow had already acquired enough political capital and used its hard power leverage to become a key intermediary with all stakeholders in Syria, including Turkey and Iran. This made Russia, in the words of one journalist, a “partner to everyone and friend to nobody.”
Russia’s specific goals include containing and diminishing Islamist extremism and radicalism that might otherwise expand into Russia and its immediate neighborhood of former Soviet states. In recent years, Russia has learned firsthand the danger of
Islam-fueled terror. In tandem with the rise in Muslim populations in the region and inside Russia itself, radical ideology has spread across the country. Since the 1990s, terrorism is a constant threat, particularly in major cities.
Russia also wants to expand its presence in the region’s arms, nuclear, oil and gas, food, and other markets. This vision has already come about to a great extent. For nearly seven years, the Middle East and North Africa have accounted for close to 40 percent of Russia’s arms exports, a business that is only growing. The Russian nuclear industry, represented by the state-owned Rosatom, has built reactors at Bushehr in Iran and is looking for new contracts there.
China, while not engaged in any military activity in the Middle East, has similar concerns in the region.
The first noteworthy fact is that China is a major exporter to Iran. And not just for little things like sneakers and cars. Over the years, PRC heavily invested in Tehran’s subway systems, dams, fishery, and cement factories. Last March, a desperate Iranian leadership, reeling from international sanctions, signed a deal with China to trade oil for infrastructural investment. The roads, railways, and other major projects will form a major component of China’s notorious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a project designed to transform commerce on the Asian continent and bring economic systems under Chinese influence and patronage.
Looking further west, China, like Russia, is very concerned about rising Islamic extremism. For decades, China has been engaged in a war of attrition with its Muslim Uyghur population concentrated in the Xinjiang autonomous zone. This conflict has produced more than a few Uyghur militant groups that have been a scourge to central leadership in Beijing. One group in particular, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), has made a name for itself as a highly effective military force and has fought alongside ISIS-affiliated factions in places like Syria for years. And this brings us to the next important region of joint Sino-Russian interest. er vacuum produced by the West’s total pullout from Afghanistan last August.
The vast mountainous country immediately became a battleground for warring factions seeking to control territory. While the Taliban occupies the seats of power in Kabul, there is a slew of jihadist organizations (about fourteen, according to the CIA’s estimation) with strong footholds across the country. The Taliban is also engaged in an active struggle with secular armed opposition movements based primarily in northern regions. Add to this mix the fact that billions of Afghan assets remain frozen by U.S. authorities, and one can understand why the Taliban is in desperate need of outside help.
This has given the benevolent Chinese the opportunity to swoop in.
Roads, factories, mines – all across Afghanistan Chinese projects are visible in every possible sector. Of course, these substantial Chinese investments aren’t coming for free. In return, Beijing is demanding exclusive rights to Afghanistan’s highly valuable rare-earth mineral deposits and territorial concessions on which to build BRI infrastructure.
And then there’s China’s security concerns.
The lawlessness of post-NATO Afghanistan allowed jihadist groups, both local and foreign, to develop bases of operations. Today, hundreds of Uyghur ETIM fighters train and
conduct missions side by side with the Afghan branch of the Islamic State known as ISIS Khorasan. China doesn’t just want stability in Afghanistan for economic reasons. It also wants to ensure the country won’t continue functioning as a breeding ground for Uyghur militantism. Keep in mind that Afghanistan does share a small section of border with China in its northeast and that cross-line contact is still maintained between ETIM in Afghanistan and Uyghur leaders in China.
Russia, in a somewhat similar pattern to its activities in Syria, has also begun asserting itself in Afghan affairs. Russia has already sent millions in aid to the Taliban government and has led the lobby to release Afghan money locked in the global financial system. Furthermore, as it did in Syria, Russia has positioned itself as a broker between leaders from Kabul and the international community. Moscow has since hosted several meetings of Taliban leaders along with diplomats from China and Pakistan, the governments that have collectively become known as the “extended troika” of Afghanistan. Commemorating the Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1950
The Pacific
Tensions over China’s sovereign claims in the Pacific have become well-known in recent years. The con-
flict known as the South China Sea Dispute has seen several flashpoints involving Chinese, Philippine, Vietnamese, and Malaysian maritime vessels. By far, the most important aspect of China’s territorial assertions in this part of the world is Taiwan, the island nation considered by Beijing a “rogue province” of the PRC.
Over the decades, Chinese leaders have made several outright threats to invade Taiwan and “reunite” the country with the mainland. Security guarantees made by the United States to Taiwanese leaders have been a staple of Washington’s Pacific policy for a very long time. China, however, has made it clear it has no intention to back down from its claims and has been gearing up to assert all its territorial claims by force.
Last year, the Chinese government passed an unprecedented bill, the “Coast Guard Law,” granting its Coast Guard (CCG) forces authority to engage in “military” operations. Since the passing of this law, neighboring countries and even far-flung nations like Argentina have reported a surge in Chinese vessels sailing in close proximity to their territorial waters. There have already been several instances in which CCG ships have clashed with unarmed commercial vessels. Piling on to this trend of aggression are the renewed calls by Beijing claiming sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands, the archipelago that forms the southwestern edge of Japan’s territory. It is no surprise that Tokyo has begun to report more and more on Chinese warships approaching its coasts.
Regarding this regional conflict, the Russians may not have a direct interest, but they’re certainly making money off of it. Indeed, it is the cutting-edge Russian weaponry acquired by China (the fourth-generation Su-30 fighter jet being one notable example) that has given Beijing the military advantage necessary to assert itself confidently in the Pacific.
The Pushback
Nearly every aspect of the international goals shared by Russia and China can be seen in the strategic partnership penned earlier this month.
Highlights of the deal included
Russian support for China’s stance that Taiwan is an “inalienable part of China” and Moscow’s opposition to any form of independence for the Island. China also joined Russia in calling for an end to “NATO enlargement” and supported its demand for security guarantees from the West, specifically citing Ukraine.
Does Russia have specific interests in Ukraine relating to territorial security and national sovereignty? Sure. But the 100,000 Russian soldiers on the Ukrainian border are not there because of those interests alone. Ukraine is just the most recent move by Russia in a much larger global plan.
The bigger context in which the Ukraine crisis is nested has certainly not been lost on Western leaders.
France’s Emmanuel Macron recently took upon himself the role of shuttle-diplomat in an effort to stave off a Ukrainian war. The French leader was being very honest when he told reporters on February 7 th that the standoff had little to do with Ukraine per se. “The geopolitical objective of Russia today is clearly not Ukraine, but to clarify the rules of how Moscow lives with NATO and Europe.” Spot on Emmanuel.
Whether or not the Ukraine situation turns into a hot war, the longterm question is this: what will the European/American response be to this troublesome Sino-Russian reconciliation?
Based on what we know now, we can expect to see some specific developments over the next several months.
First is an increase in Western military cooperation in the Pacific. Last year, the AUKUS trilateral security pact involving Australia, the U.S., and Britain, was initiated by Australian leaders. While there was some feuding among Western powers about the details of the pact (France and New Zealand, for instance, made a fuss over not being included), AUKUS is a natural extension of Western Europe, America, and their allies taking a more assertive stance in the region. Last year, Britain, Germany, and France sent naval patrols through contested waters in the South China Sea, and all have committed to conduct more operations in the region. At this moment, Washington and Japan are planning military exercises in the Ryukyu Islands area while Tokyo remains in the midst of its largest naval expansion project since World War II. Other U.S.-allied countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia are also bolstering their naval forces.
Second: Russian and Chinese collaboration in Central Asia will most likely require some re-engagement on the part of the U.S. Over the past month, several outlets have reported on overtures being made by the State Department to Taliban leaders. According to some, U.S. diplomats have gone so far as to offer their former enemies intelligence support to help defeat Afghan-based jihadists. While these reports remain unconfirmed, in light of current geopolitical reality, they should certainly not be dismissed out of hand.
In addition to the military front, there will be a substantial increase in infrastructure investment to counter China’s expansion in Asia. Two goals currently being tackled by the U.S. and Japan are the international commercial routes known as the NorthSouth Transit Corridor (NSTC) and the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR), the latter being recognized as a direct competitor to China’s BRI.
Is Ukraine simply a diversion to draw away the West’s attention and resources?
Whatever it is, the crisis is only marking the beginning of some highly impactful trends that will shape international affairs for the foreseeable future.
Russia and China’s Strategic Partnership unites them against the West
