JHU POLITIK
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OCTOBER 6, 2014
VOLUME XVI, ISSUE VI
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JHU POLITIK EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Eliza Schultz MANAGING EDITOR Christine Server
HEAD WRITER Julia Allen
ASSISTANT EDITORS Katie Botto Dylan Etzel Preston Ge Abigail Sia
POLICY DESK EDITOR Mira Haqqani
CREATIVE DIRECTOR Diana Lee
WEBMASTER Ben Lu
COPY EDITOR Florence Noorinejad FACULTY ADVISOR Steven R. David
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MARKETING & PUBLICITY Maria Garcia
STAFF WRITERS Olga Baranoff Arpan Ghosh Rosellen Grant Rebecca Grenham Christine Kumar Shannon Libaw Robert Locke Corey Payne Juliana Vigorito
• October 6, 2014 • Volume XVI, Issue VI
INSIDE THIS ISSUE
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The Week in Review: Electoral Politics Juliana Vigorito ’16 Up in Flames: France’s Anti-Smoking Plan and Johns Hopkins’ Lack Thereof
Rosellen Grant ’16
When We Talk About Campus Crime Eliza Schultz ’15 An Unspoken Alliance:
The Shifting Balance of Power in the Middle East
Mira Haqqani ’17
The Emergence of a New Relationship: Modi’s American Adventure
Arpan Ghosh ’17
Ebola Outbreak: Who Is to Blame?
Olga Baranoff ’16 Behind Saudi Arabia’s Participation in the ISIS Coalition
Julia Allen ’15
Why We Should Nationalize the Defense Industry
Alexander Grable ’15
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The Week in Review: Electoral Politics by Juliana Vigorito ’16, Staff Writer Early Voting Restrictions Upheld in Ohio For the past decade, legislative attempts to restrict voting have become a hallmark of election season. This year is no exception, with Ohio a central battleground in the polarizing issue. Early voting, a practice that encourages and improves voter turnout, took a hit last Monday when the Supreme Court chose to uphold a proposal from state Republicans. The accepted proposal reduces the early voting period in Ohio by a week, and in the process removes access to voting on the Sunday before Election Day, November 4th. This hit to early voting, which began in Ohio in 2006, may affect African American turnout the most. In a swing state where African American voter turnout is above the national average, reducing the early voting period could influence electoral outcomes for all sixteen of the state’s congressmen.
Behind the Umbrella Revolution, a Goal of Electoral Independence While recent international press coverage of Hong Kong has centered on the modes of protest employed by Umbrella Revolution participants and the aggressive response tactics of Chinese authorities, the issue at hand is really one of electoral freedom. Resistance to Chinese sovereignty has long stirred tensions in the officially autonomous region. This youth-led protest is only the latest challenge to the authority of the People’s Republic. The Umbrella movement stems from announcements by Chinese authorities over the summer that candidates for the Hong Kong’s highest political office would need to be approved by a special committee before allowing citizens to vote. This announcement contradicts a 1997 promise of eventual electoral independence from China, a freedom that Hong Kong residents have long awaited. The initially peaceful protests have escalated into skirmishes, and talks between the demonstrators and Beijing have yet to commence.
In Wisconsin, Voter ID Laws Limit Access to Polls Wisconsin voters may find it much harder than usual to exercise their right to suffrage this year. Act 23, passed by the Wisconsin state legislature in 2011, requires one of eight acceptable forms of state or federally issued photo identification to cast a vote. Since its passage, the Act has come into use only in a state primary election, but in attempting to apply it for the upcoming midterms, Wisconsin has come under fire from civil rights and citizens’ advocacy groups. While the ACLU fought the implementation of the law when it was first passed and was granted an injunction by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in April 2014, a stay of injunction resulted after the state appealed, paving the way for an escalated battle over voter ID restrictions. The ACLU continues its fight to the very last moment, as absentee voting has already opened in the state. As of this week, Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan has received an emergency filing from the ACLU to stop the Act’s enactment and prevent an estimated 300,000 Wisconsin voters from disenfranchisement. Her response has so far been to request a response from the state, due Tuesday, October 7th. ■
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• October 6, 2014 • Volume XVI, Issue VI
Up in Flames:
France’s Anti-Smoking Plan and Johns Hopkins’ Lack Thereof
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by Rosellen Grant ’16, Staff Writer
hen in France, pass by any grande école or wander through a public park in one of the arrondissements, and you’re sure to encounter a familiar hazy cloud as Parisians puff on cigarettes between hums of conversation. Smoking has long been an intimate part of French culture. Its use dates back to the sixteenth century, when diplomat Jean Nicot (from whom ‘nicotine’ takes its name) introduced the drug to the French court. Tobacco became a staple of the elite and the French government established a monopoly over the production of tobacco.
Atlantic, it’s not without a certain ring of irony. An entire European government has mobilized to deter smoking, while Johns Hopkins, the world-renowned bastion of public health, has not. Dr. Raymond Pearl, a Hopkins biologist, was one of the first to demonstrate the negative impact of smoking on longevity, and yet students light up all over campus. According to a blog post by Hopkins Kicks Butts, an organization devoted to eliminating smoking on campus, “The State of Maryland specifies that people smoking should be 15 feet away from a building. However … there is little to no enforcement of this law on campus.”
This status quo continued until the mid 1900s, when debate in France slowly changed in response to emerging research proving the detriments of tobacco. In 1995, the French government began an uphill battle against the drug; by 2006, they had introduced a ban on smoking in public enclosed spaces. Despite these initiatives, France’s smoking rate remains one of the highest in the European Union for teenagers and adults, far surpassing that of the United States.
The issue of smoking, both in France and at Hopkins, prompts an interesting question regarding “libertarian paternalism,” the basic idea of which is “that private and public institutions might nudge people in directions that will make their lives go better, without eliminating freedom of choice.” Often, institutions will use this “nudge” when their audience has imperfect information (in this case, not being aware of the dangers of smoking). The plain-packaging plan is an example of libertarian paternalism at work: smokers are still free to buy the cigarettes, but the government has nudged them away from it, in a direction that would “make their lives go better.”
The French government has yet again decided to strengthen its strategy against smoking. Health Minister Marisol Touraine recently announced a multifaceted plan to abolish smoking in France within the next 40 years. The measures include bans on smoking in cars with children under twelve, and in play areas of public parks. One of the more controversial steps would outlaw unique cigarette packs and branding. This “plain-packaging” measure would require all packages to bear large health warnings and vivid photographs of diseases caused by smoking. Brands’ logos would be reduced dramatically. Tobacco companies have been quick to respond. Many claim that the plain-packing initiative will not reduce smoking (despite evidence of its success in Australia), but will instead push younger consumers to seek out cheaper cigarettes in the black market. Some companies are threatening to sue the French government if the plan passes, calling it an assault on their intellectual property. This confrontation will come to a head later this autumn, when the French parliament votes on the proposals. And, as the impending clash brews on the other side of the
But does the government, or the Hopkins administration, know what’s best for its citizens? Undoubtedly, smokers on our campus are aware of their habit’s detrimental effects. Does our administration have the right to dissuade us from smoking, or deprive us of the choice, when we are clearly educated enough to make this decision ourselves? Considering the results of the 2013 referendum supporting a smoking ban at Hopkins, and the lack of subsequent change, it appears our administration has elected complete free choice for its student body. But if Hopkins will protect a smoker’s decision, it follows that it must also protect the students who choose to abstain from smoking. Hopkins must enforce the laws established to defend the latter. We should not have to inhale the negative implications of someone else’s actions. And as the French government debates a nudge this fall, perhaps it’s time that Hopkins debates one, too. ■
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When We Talk About Campus Crime
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by Eliza Schultz ’15, Editor-in-Chief
n Wednesday, colleges and universities nationwide published their aggregated campus crime statistics from the past year, as required under the Jeanne Clery Act. That same day, the Campus Sexual Violence Elimination (SaVE) Act took effect. All colleges and universities participating in federal student aid programs released updated sexual assault policies in order to comply with the new law. Johns Hopkins was no exception. Under increased media scrutiny – not to mention a federal investigation for its failure to notify the campus of an alleged gang rape – it announced a revised policy on sexual assault and relationship violence. The University also released its 2013 Annual Security Report, which reported nine cases of sexual assault, as well as a staggering 14 cases listed in the footnotes. These 23 incidents marked a significant increase from the 2012 Annual Security Report, which had documented 16. As grim as a combined 39 cases of sexual assault over a two-year period sounds, these numbers actually indicate that Johns Hopkins has improved in terms of its adherence to the Clery Act. Historically, its compliance has been abysmal. For four consecutive years between 2007 and 2010, the University reported zero cases, a rather dubious statistic given that one in five women will be sexually assaulted over the course of her college career. The 2011 Annual Security Report disclosed only a single incident. Failure to publicly disclose information about the alleged gang rape was also in violation of the Clery Act. Also on Wednesday, President Ronald Daniels issued a public statement in which he admitted that the decision not to inform the campus of it was “unacceptable.” Around the same time that the University apparently chose not to notify the campus of the alleged gang rape, Campus Security reported what must have been every reported incident of petty crime that it received. On at least a weekly basis in 2013, University affiliates received constant updates about unattended cell phones and laptops that had been stolen from the library. When news of the alleged gang rape broke in May, this practice prompted a student at the Transparency Protest to hold a sign that asked, “Is laptop
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theft worse than sexual assault?” Recently, Johns Hopkins has mostly ceased to notify the campus about petty theft. Perhaps to compensate for its past failures, Campus Security has instead circulated information about reported cases of sexual assault, as well as other more serious crimes. In the last week of August alone, the University notified the campus via email about a total of three such cases, a testament to the fact that Campus Security takes these allegations at least more seriously than it has in the past. I recently noticed, however, that Campus Security did not issue an email about an incident of sexual assault that occurred in late September, despite its close resemblance to those reported in August. The incident was listed online on the Homewood Campus Crime Blotter, but never made it into our inboxes. The only difference between this and the three August cases was that it was perpetrated by a Johns Hopkins freshman. It appears that while the University issues email blasts about cases of sexual assault perpetrated by non-affiliates, it continues not to circulate statements about incidents carried out by Johns Hopkins students, as was the case with the alleged gang rape. This practice perpetuates the misconception that students are more likely to be victims of sexual assault in the streets of Baltimore than we are at a campus party. I will also add that one of the emails sent by Campus Security in late August described the assaulter, who was not affiliated with the University, as black. The assailant, however, had been taken into custody, and so there was no need for students to identify him. Whether or not it was the intention of Campus Security, that email also reinforced a harmful stereotype about who perpetrates sexual assault. Over the past few months, Johns Hopkins has taken some genuine action against sexual assault, and has publicly admitted to one of its own failures. It is now time that the University take full responsibility for the fact that its students have perpetrated sexual assault. It may do some damage to its reputation, but our community will be safer for it. ■
• October 6, 2014 • Volume XVI, Issue VI
An Unspoken Alliance:
The Shifting Balance of Power in the Middle East by Mira Haqqani ’17, Policy Desk Editor
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he rise of the Islamic State, commonly known as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria has thrown the Middle East into frenzy. It has resulted in unusual alliances; as Saudi Arabia warms up to Iran and the United States coordinates security protocols with the Assad regime in Syria, regional opposites have been drawn closer in efforts to dismantle the militant group. Amidst this crisis, the relationship between the U.S. and Iran is one to look out for. Both countries benefit from the defeat of ISIS and from each other’s support in the upcoming battle, but it will be important to see whether years of hostility and tension can be thawed now. As the U.S. carries out air strikes against ISIS, backing from Tehran, however unlikely, could be a game changer and might just be the need of the hour. Recently, both Iran and the U.S. have dismissed the Islamic State for its fundamentalism and extremist ways of violence against Muslims and other religious groups. They have voiced the urgent need for curbing the threat ISIS poses to the region and beyond. In this respect, the U.S. and Iran are on the same page; they share common interests in the defeat of ISIS and could mutually benefit from an alliance. The Iranians possess the intelligence, knowhow, and people on the ground – all from which a joint operation against ISIS could benefit. Simultaneously, Iranian backing against ISIS would further legitimize the American cause in the Middle East, thereby preventing a sticky situation similar to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. With nuclear talks underway and a moderate president in Iran, an alliance should be easy to strike. But it is not. Despite common security interests, a U.S.-Iran alliance against ISIS seems unlikely. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has publicly condemned U.S. airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, criticizing them on grounds of breached sovereignty. He has refused to become a part of this plan because the “U.S. itself has been involved in creating and spreading terrorism”. Within Iran, there exists a general distrust of the U.S., especially because of the Americans’ closeness with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has been one
of the largest sponsors of Islamist terrorists groups in the Middle East. Iran has always had a difficult relationship with Saudi Arabia, a geopolitical rival as well as one in terms of Shia-Sunni politics. In addition, for many Iranians like Khamenei, sentiments behind the 1979 Islamic revolution still resonate loudly; for many older Iranians, an alliance with Washington would be a U-turn on Iran’s revolutionary credibility. After years of antagonism, expecting Iran and the U.S. to suddenly become allies is nothing short of idealistic. Just as the Iranians are unwilling to trust the U.S., Americans are similarly unsure about Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Assad regime. However, what might be preventing an alliance may actually neither be Iran nor the U.S.; America’s allies in the Middle East, namely Israel and Saudi Arabia, would prefer to keep Iran at odds with the U.S. For the Saudis and Israelis, a U.S.-Iran alliance would come at the cost of their own security and regional power. There is a faint possibility that Washington and Tehran have engaged in talks behind the scenes and Khamenei’s rejection of American airstrikes is part of a scripted show being run by Iran and the U.S. Closed-door diplomacy in this situation would ensure that the U.S. did not lose its allies in the Middle East while Iran seemed unwilling to cooperate with the West, keeping its status quo. Regardless, Iran was the first country to provide Kurds in northern Iraq with weapons and ground forces to fight ISIS. Therefore, while an official alliance with Iran seems unlikely, both Iran and the U.S. seem to be collaborating inadvertently. As far as destroying ISIS goes, there seem to be two analogous operations occurring in Syria and Iraq, a U.S.led one and the other by Iran. The question that arises is whether these operations can be united to create a strong alliance against a common enemy, one that could potentially dismantle the Islamic State. ■
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The Emergence of a New Relationship:
Modi’s American Adventure
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by Arpan Ghosh ’17, Staff Writer
bout a week and a half ago, hundreds of foreign dignitaries gathered in New York City for the 69th session of the United Nations general assembly. Although this event has always proven to be a great feat of a collaborative international system, the role that most nations play in the U.N. remains limited and overpowered by the great hegemonies of Europe and the United States. For India, international participation continues to be minimal and ornamental at best. The last time an Indian prime minister set foot on U.S. soil was 2009, and it wasn’t very special. For Indians, it didn’t signal a major change or revision in diplomatic ties, and for even the most politically astute Americans, it served to illuminate the status quo. However, last week newly-elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi rejuvenated Indian interest in the U.S., and the relationship seems to have taken a turn from subtle courtship to blunt fascination. For many foreign officials, the U.N. was the only thing on their mind, but Modi’s interests clearly went beyond the assembly. Throughout his visit, he attended a total of 35 meetings with mayors, governors, representatives, former U.S. officials, and businessmen. He began by meeting with New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio, followed by Michael Bloomberg, and paid a visit to the 9/11 memorial. And after the U.N. assembly, Narendra Modi demonstrated, quite possibly, one of the strangest forms of international courtship: opening the Global Citizen Festival at Madison Square Garden with Hugh Jackman. Toward the end of his visit, Modi called for more bilateral involvement in areas such as defense and foreign policy in meetings with President Barack Obama, Representatives John Boehner and Nikki Haley, and Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley. Modi also emphasized greater economic involvement from American companies and businesses. He spoke with Eric Schmidt of Google, Indra Nooyi of Pepsi, Ajaypal Banga of Mastercard and nine other chief executives during a breakfast meeting. Later, Modi held one-on-one conferences with the chairman of Boeing and Goldman Sachs, and the CEOs of IBM, General Electric and BlackRock.
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These visits were more than a formality and, for many, indicated that the Prime Minister seemed genuinely interested in starting an era of new U.S.-Indian ties. By lobbying for increases in American investments to India, not just from politicians but also from executives of esteemed American businesses, Modi demonstrated his acceptance of American involvement in his country, as well as his seriousness in changing how Indians live. With about a quarter of the population living in poverty, Modi signaled to his electorate back home that his promises about creating a better India were serious; and to U.S. politicians, he signaled that he was ready to unilaterally establish business ties with corporations, regardless of U.S.-Indian diplomatic relations. On top of building economic ties, India’s meeting with Laurence D. Fink of Boeing signaled Modi’s desire for renewed defense initiatives. The U.S., which is already the largest exporter of arms to India and the nation that conducts the most joint military drills with India, have found each other to be reliable allies. With the constant ongoing threat of border infringements from both Pakistan and China, India’s military presence in South Asia, primarily in drone technologies, would be further strengthened through increased involvement of the U.S. Narendra Modi’s extravagant visit to the United States has certainly demonstrated that India is serious in wanting to create a stronger and more reliable relationship. As India, the world’s second most populous country, and the third largest in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), looks to the U.S. for economic revivalism, defense, and foreign policy, it further intensifies the hegemony of the U.S. and its influence over third-world countries. It’s a win-win situation for both nations: India gets what it wants economically, and the U.S. has found a better friend and a more serious business partner in Modi, whose actions over the past week have catalyzed what seems to be a very positive tone for future bilateral endeavors. ■
• October 6, 2014 • Volume XVI, Issue VI
Ebola Outbreak: Who Is to Blame?
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by Olga Baranoff ’16, Staff Writer
hile the West African Ebola outbreak is the largest of its kind on record, equally record-breaking is the lack of response to curb the epidemic. Who is to blame for the exponentially growing epidemic? Are westerners, with their unwavering faith in science and order, out of touch with the realities of life in West Africa? Or should West African governments be more transparent about Ebola? Cases of Ebola were first reported in Guinea in December 2013, but as the government and international medical agencies began to respond, residents reported fewer and fewer cases, until medical professionals believed the virus to be gone. The virus, however, spread throughout communities quickly and relatively unmonitored, until it became clear that the outbreak was beyond control of health care workers. For those in developed nations, until the recently reported case in Texas, Ebola seemed worlds away. Up to this point, the epidemic has more or less been contained within Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nigeria. CDC officials predicted best and worst case scenarios: up to 27,000 people facing the disease by January 2015 in the best case, and as many as 1.4 million in a worst-case scenario. What makes Ebola so deadly is that it is transmitted via close contact or fluids of an infected individual to a non-infected individual, and its fatality rate in outbreaks is between 50 and 90 percent. There is no known cure for the virus, although ZMapp, a biopharmaceutical drug being developed in the U.S., is being touted as a potential treatment to Ebola. However, trials have yet to conclusively prove its safety or efficacy. In the U.S., the majority of the population has some access to health care and to doctors, nurses, and medical facilities that are assumed to have people’s best interests at heart. Citizens of the West African countries where Ebola has struck, however, have very different attitudes toward outside medical practices. The nature of the virus makes it extremely mysterious and frightening to any community. For many, Ebola was not a known killer until foreign health workers appeared, dressed in strange, head-to-toe protective gear. Health care workers have been blamed for the outbreak and spread of the disease and have even been attacked in some parts of West Africa.
Traditional West African beliefs and superstitions have complicated efforts to contain and treat the disease. Public health responses at the beginning of the outbreak were slow, since many medical professionals did not even know the disease was spreading. More cases were reported as the disease spread, and then, around May 2014, there was a sharp drop in the number of cases reported. Many health workers assumed the spread of the disease had been curbed. In reality, West Africans ceased to report cases, choosing instead to hide relatives from health workers, thereby inadvertently contributing to the spread of disease. The mystery surrounding the disease and its treatment – masked outsiders, far-off isolation centers with patients never to be seen again, no knowledge of Ebola until health care officials introduced the term – has been exacerbated by inadequate education on Ebola and a lack of trust in the government and outside health care officials. International doctors and local government officials have pointed to a lack of transparency and communication from local communities, while locals have cited fear of doctors and treatment as the reason for the growing outbreak. The public health infrastructure in West African countries is wanting, due in part to somewhat unstable governments. Nonetheless, the presence of the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and the U.N., along with smaller health care agencies in these countries, suggests that medical workers should have done more from the onset. With that being said, local communities were not educated about the virus and its transmission, and have directly undermined the work of health care agencies by hiding infected relatives, preventing medical workers from entering into towns, and generally being superstitious towards those who are trying to curb the spread of Ebola. As President Obama has said, the outbreak is more than just a public health crisis – it has the potential to uproot political, social, and economic stability in West Africa – and thus necessitates a strong, concerted response from western countries and from within West Africa. ■
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Behind Saudi Arabia’s Participation in the ISIS Coalition by Julia Allen ’15, Head Writer
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he world’s eyes are on the coalition that the United States is cobbling together to combat ISIS, and the processes have brought plenty of unsavory options to the table as U.S. policy makers consider potential partners – the most realistic and contested of which is Saudi Arabia. There are many questions surrounding the motivation behind the Saudis’ support of the coalition, which has been celebrated as a legitimizing Sunni force to be leveraged against ISIS. However, this policy that appears to be reinvigorating the troubled U.S.-Saudi security relationship has also been met with a strong backlash.
The competition between the Middle East’s most prominent Shia and Sunni powers should not be disregarded, and it certainly influences Saudi Arabia’s response to ISIS (especially in the Syria campaign) in potentially disruptive ways. However, the Al-Saud family is facing such a complex series of challenges that operating with tunnel vision is incredibly risky and unrealistic. Aside from its high-profile stand-off with Iran, Saudi Arabia must also keep an eye on aspiring Sunni powers, like Qatar, that are vying for regional standing and would benefit from taking a leading role in the coalition if the Saudis do not step up to the plate.
Skeptics have pushed an alternative reading of Saudi intentions, arguing that the kingdom’s main goal is to manipulate the coalition into a position where it supports Saudi Arabia’s efforts to destroy Bashar al-Assad’s regime and weaken Iranian (i.e. Shia) standing in the region. Although Saudi Arabia might be a Sunni power fighting an extremist Sunni would be-caliphate, critics argue that this is only a temporary effort limited to protecting its borders, after which Saudi Arabia will go back to business as usual: supporting internationally-operating Sunni terrorist organizations and undermining regional stability to strike at the Shias.
There is more to Saudi Arabia’s participation in the U.S.led coalition than just upholding its image as the region’s Sunni heavyweight. Although critics argue that the Saudis’ recent willingness to fight – rather than support – Wahhabi extremists is a new turn of events prompted by ulterior motives, there are concrete examples from the recent past which highlight the incompatibility between groups like alQaeda or ISIS and the al-Saud royal family. Within the family, the Sudairi line is known to be the most conservative and well connected to Wahhabi extremists. For a limited time in the early 2000s, key players like Minister of the Interior Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud granted radicalized clerics and al-Qaeda room to operate. But even when the Sudairi interest in undermining Crown Prince Abdullah’s more liberal programs overlapped with al-Qaeda’s, this coexistence and partnership came to an end after the 2003 suicide bombings in Riyadh. Nayef cracked down on alQaeda and other, more extreme voices in an effort to assert the stability of the royal family’s reign.
This line of thinking leads us to the conclusion that Saudi Arabia is a manipulative short-term ally whose strategic interests are incompatible with those of the United States. These concerns are well founded – there are plenty of reasons to approach this relationship with a sense of caution. However, the tendency to see everything through “Shia v. Sunni” or “Saudi Arabia v. Iran” lenses has caused observers to gloss over some critical details that indicate a more positive forecast for potential U.S.-Saudi cooperation in the fight against ISIS – and beyond.
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• October 6, 2014 • Volume XVI, Issue VI
Critics point to the large number of Saudi citizens traveling to Iraq and Syria to fight for ISIS as evidence of Saudi illintent, but it is also a sign of growing domestic resentment for the ruling Al-Saud family. Saudi foreign fighters leave their country to fight for groups that have stated their intention of overthrowing the Saudi regime, which has been accused of accommodating the West and has been blamed for the most recent coalition airstrikes in Syria and Iraq. On top of it all, the second generation of rulers – King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud’s sons – is reaching its end, and questions surrounding the line of succession are exacerbating preexisting internal divisions. King Abdullah has appointed his two successors – Crown Prince Salman, to be followed by Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz – effectively blocking the Sudairi line from power once again. While those who feel betrayed by the new trajectory of succession might attempt to support extremism to undermine the regime’s legitimacy, those in positions of power, particularly the third generation of rulers competing to be Crown Prince after Muqrin, have a vested interest in combating extremist Sunni elements. They might look to start developing a more serious security relationship with their on-again, off-again partner: the United States.
“This line of thinking leads us to the conclusion that Saudi Arabia is a manipulative shortterm ally whose strategic interests are incompatible with those of the United States.”
There are plenty of reasons why a revitalized relationship with Saudi Arabia might, yet again, fall short of success. The risks Saudi Arabia would take on by working with the Americans cannot be understated either – destabilizing the security partnership has certainly not been a one-way street in any direction. However, there are concrete reasons behind why Saudi Arabia would have an incentive to be a productive partner in the fight against ISIS and, considering the promising line up of potential third-generation kings, potentially beyond that. ■
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Why We Should Nationalize the Defense Industry
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by Alexander Grable ’15, Contributing Writer
ost overruns on shoddy products characterize much of the defense industry. The aircraft F-35 is a good example of this: it is $160 billion over budget, and many years late into service. Another good example is the M-16 rifle, which was far likelier to jam and needed to be cleaned more often than its various cheaper, better-crafted Soviet counterparts. However, this criticism of private inefficiency cannot be made without pointing to the helpmates of this waste in the public sector. In fiscal year 2013, despite bemoaning ostensibly horrific cuts in defense spending, Congress mandated that the military purchase 200 tanks it did not want and keep the Global Hawk drone in service, buying three new ones and replacement parts for those in service. The total cost of this legislated waste was $3 billion in FY 2013. This case, however, is hardly the most egregious example of wastefulness. In the 1990s, in response to postCold War defense cuts, many federal government functions were privatized, with bipartisan approval, to protect defense companies from suffering losses. There is a direct connection between this and the privatization of formerly exclusive public functions such as the transport and escort of supplies in a combat zone like Afghanistan. The result has been a very expensive (up to $1 million per mercenary) boondoggle. While in the current political environment nationalization of the defense industry remains impossible, it does not change the fact that it is what should be done. The process would be very simple: the government would simply purchase, via appropriated money or perhaps through the Federal Reserve, majority shares in all current defense contractors. It could then begin the process of turning these contractors into government sponsored enterprises. Turning the defense industry into an entirely government affair would not be radical. Defense contractors such as Booz Allen Hamilton receive up to 99 percent of their revenue from government contracts. These companies are wards of the state. In effect, defense contracts end up being a wealth transfer to companies that would not exist without the state. There is no reason that the benefit should be private, and the burden, public.
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Let us highlight the benefits of nationalization, since the burdens that exist are built into the status quo. Any profits in a government-sponsored enterprise are funded directly into the U.S. Treasury, raising receipts and lowering the deficit. Should there be any waste, almost all of the wasted money would be refunded directly to the Treasury instead of disappearing into a tax inversion scheme or a Cayman bank account. Losses to taxpayers would be minimized. Better still, direct government control of the defense industry would allow the government to dictate, as it did in both World Wars, what would be produced, how it would be produced, and at what prices. In addition to doing away with executives that are paid twice as much or more as a cabinet secretary, this would help the government control costs. With certain missiles being fired by the Air Force in Syria at about $1.6 million per unit, cost control is urgent. With lower costs, the defense budget would buy more with less. With the money saved we could expand the army, the force best suited to wage counterinsurgency. We could also use that money to improve decaying infrastructure. Finally, it must be noted that many defense contractors, being private companies, are foreign, as is the case with BAE Systems, the British multinational defense company. If not, substantial shares are often owned by foreigners. Private interests do not reflect the needs of American national security. National defense must remain national and not be subject to any private or foreign interests. A country in control of its defense policy can more effectively and rationally exercise its foreign policy. The international system will punish those countries, including the United States, who are not able to act as rational state actors due to undue influence upon the state. The defense industry is a large part of that undue influence. In sum, nationalizing the defense Industry will solve many problems in one stroke. Even if it cannot be done at the moment, it is what should be done. ■
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