FOREWORD The McGill Journal of Political Studies showcases undergraduate research in the Department of Political Science. It is a student initiative, organized and brought to fruition every year by the Political Science Students Association (PSSA). The current issue presents eight papers drawn from a wide range of courses in the department, from 300 level courses to honours seminars. As you will see, the papers cover a wide range of topics and they effectively highlight the range of student interests in the department as well as student research and writing skills. Enjoy this issue!
Hudson Meadwell Chair Department of Political Science
Words
from the Editor-in-Chief
The McGill Journal of Political Studies is an annual publication that seeks to provoke new thoughts, stimulate dicussions and entertain. With a long history behind its conception, it has published many exceptional undergraduate articles, the authors of whom have continued successful careers in academia. To extend this tradition of excellence, the 2014 MJPS editorial board hopes to delight our readers with the combination of exemplary articles and a refreshing journal design. In this issue, our readers will find a wide range of articles. Pan’s original research on Chinese politics showcases the quantitative aspects of Political Science. Caira’s research on Federalism poignantly illustrates the similarities and differences between Canadian and Italian state structure. Weber’s insight into Germany’s historical tension and foundation is both controversial and stimulating. Lajoie’s research on Feminism in South America provides a unique angle on a global social issue. Ooto-Stubbs’ characterization of the militarization of Japan is highly relevant to contemporary politics. Azhar’s focus on Civic Nationalism in Pakistan is unexpected and fascinating. Langer’s analysis of Roma issues sheds light on an issue often overshadowed within the larger European Union issues. Finally, Fainer’s article casts spotlight on a highly contemporary issue and provides a stimulating discussion that challenges our preconceived notions of Asian politics. Certainly, this journal would not be possible without the support of numerous wonderfully dedicated individuals, to whom I owe an enormous gratitude. To our editors and photographer, you have contributed time and energy far beyond my imagination, and your thoughtfulness, profesionnalism, and friendliness have sustained me in the most stressful times. To Matthew Eidinger and Lauren Konken, thank you for providing ongoing support on behalf of both PSSA and your personal dedication to this journal. To Nouran Sedaghat, thank you for returning from our co-editorship in the previous edition of MJPS. Your positive encourangement has been a wonderful addition in all our meeting. To Kyle Ng, Esther Lee and Chris Liu, your design input and numerous other contributions have been simply remarkable. This journal would not be possible without you all. For our readers, we thank you for reading our publication and hope that you will enjoy this year’s issue. Please continue supporting MJPS and our initiative to uncover excellent undergraduate research!
Jimmy Lou Editor-in-Chief
Table of
Contents 6 |
Sponsors
7 |
Credits
8 |
Editorial Board -
10 |
A Dichotomous Approach to Studying Anticorruption Practices by the Chinese Communist Party Yishi Pan
18 |
Political Institution and Regional Tensions: Lessons from a Comparative Study between Canadian Federalism and the Italian Unitary State Celine Caira
32 |
Immigration, Integration and the Threat to German Democratic Quality Valerie Weber
44 |
Los Madres de la Plaza de Mayo: Feminine or Feminists? ZoĂŠ Lajoie
52 |
The Militarization of Japan as a Postclassical Realist Strategy Karlene Ooto-Stubbs
62 |
The Failure of Civic Nationalism in Pakistan Zoha Azhar
78 |
The Effect of Accession to the European Union on the Social Inclusion of the Roma Alexander Langer
92 |
The Role of Strategic Choices in Shaping Regime Trajectory: Comparing the Cases of the Philippines and North Korea Lewis Fainer -
106 |
Contributors
SPONSORS Arts Undergraduate Society (AUS)
Political Science Student Association (PSSA)
CREDITS CREDITS
FROM LEFT | TOP ROW: Matthew Langdon, Mohy-Dean Tabbara, Jimmy Lou, Brett Harley BOTTOM ROW: Charlotte Cheong, Irina Cristescu, Joy Lizette Aguilar, Lauren Duvall, Nouran Sedaghat
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Jimmy Lou EDITORS Joy Lizette Aguilar Charlotte Cheong Irina Cristescu Mohy-Dean Tabbara Lauren Duvall Brett Harley Matthew Langdon PHOTOGRAPHER Ngoc Anh Khoa Doan GRAPHIC DESIGNER Jimmy Lou SPECIAL THANKS
Nouran Sedaghat (Former Editor-in-Chief) Lauren Konken (PSSA VP Academic) Matthew Eidinger (PSSA President) Esther Lee (MIR Editor-in-Chief) Chris Liu (MIR Managing Editor) Kyle Ng
JOY AGUILAR U2 Major in Political Science & Minor in Communications ** Joy currently serves as a Board of Director on the International Relations Students’ Association of McGill Inc., a non-profit organization with consultative status to the United Nations. Her main academic interest is the region of Southeast Asia. Her other interests include youth diplomacy and public relations. In her spare time, Joy enjoys eating pistachio-flavoured macarons and searching for green tea-flavoured food items across Montréal.
IRINA CRISTESCU U3 Joint Honors in Political Science and History & Minor in French Language and Literature *** Irina was born and raised in Romania and emigrated to Canada at the age of ten. Her background has shaped the direction of her undergraduate work, which has focused on Eastern European politics and history - a subject she hopes to explore further in future graduate work.
2014 D R A O B L A I EDITOR
CHARLOTTE CHEONG U3 Major in Political Science and Economics *** Charlotte’s broad research interests include transitional governance, Southeast Asia, clinical and infectious disease epidemiology, and transport policy, with comparative dimensions. Currently residing in Montréal, she is involved in work in the areas of anti-discrimination, labour and disability rights and that promotes access to justice for human rights claimants. When she’s not writing about herself in the third person, Charlotte enjoys photography, learning new languages, hockey and performing the piano, while coping with chronic wanderlust.
LAUREN DUVALL U3 Major in International Development Studies (States & Governance) & Double Minor in Political Science and French Language & Translation *** Lauren enjoys researching and writing about the Middle East and North African politics. Hailing from sunny Florida, USA, Lauren plans on remaining in the Great White North and becoming a Canadian citizen.
WILLIAM DOAN U2 Honours Political Science and International Development Studies student & Minor in East Asian Studies ** William was born in Ho Chi Minh city, Vietnam. He has chosen politician as his future job because he wants to make a difference for his country of origin. His greatest goal in life is to become a political representative. In spare time, his favorite habit is playing the violin, which helps him relax and forget all tiredness.
MEET YOUR EDITORS BRETT EDWARD HARTLEY U1 Major in Political Science & Minor in Economics * Brett’s research interests include EU Monetary Policy and UN Security Council Reform. During his time at McGill Brett has developed a passion for Model United Nations, participating in both of McGill’s annual conferences (McMUN, SSUNS 2014). In addition, Brett will serve as Co-President of the McGill Pre-Law Students’ Society for the 2014-2015 academic year. This is Brett’s first year as a member of the MJPS Editorial Board.
MATTHEW LANGDON U3 Major in Political Science & Minor in Political Economy *** Apart from a meticulous adherence to grammatical rules and proper syntax, Matthew’s academic interests include international affairs, trade, and urbanism. Outside of MJPS and his McGill course load, he is passionately involved in model UN and other international relations simulations, as well as he is an avid sailor, traveler, and follower of international football and tennis. JIMMY LOU U3 Honours in Political Science & Major in Economics *** Jimmy was born in Taiwan and raised in Vancouver. His research interests include international political economy and public policy. Passionate about editorial experiences, Jimmy also serves as an Editor for the McGill International Review and was previously the Editor-in-Chief for the 2013 edition of MJPS. Following graduation, he looks forward to further refining his academic skills and eventually pursuing a career in law. MOHY-DEAN TABBARA U3 Honours in Political Science & Minor in Economics *** Mohy hails from the city of Montreal, though he has lived in Cairo, Egypt for over 10 years. His interests include Middle Eastern politics, democratization & party system institutionalization, Far Right political movements and quantitative methods.
A Dichotomous Approach to Studying Anticorruption Practices by the Chinese Communist Party By Yishi Pan
Keywords: China, Corruption, Quantitative, CCP, Elite Rank
Abstract Recent decades of anticorruption practices by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have been studied monolithically by using aggregate data. This paper rejects such approaches and attempts to put forth a dichotomous approach. Using quantitative analysis, this paper demonstrates that there is a statistically significant correlation between the rank of allegedly corrupt officials and how the cases are handled by the CCP.
T
he Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been carrying out a high-profiled ‘war on corruption’ since it adopted market reform in 1978. The liberalization of economic activities have created large incentives for bureaucrats at all-levels to participate in corrupt activities. Existing literature largely focuses on the efficacy of the anticorruption practices by using aggregate data, treating all corrupt officials as a homogenous entity1. This project rejects such monolithic approach, and advocates for a dichotomous approach that differentiates high-ranking from lowranking officials, in the hope that it may shed light on the question of how the CCP carries out the ‘war on corruption.’ Using quantitative methods, the paper will show that how cases are handled by the Party, depending on whether they involve high-ranking or low-ranking officials, is significantly different. Since aggregate data fails to capture the nuances between the two groups, multiple linear regressions were run in R using original data collected specifically for this research project. The data set is constructed based on the principle of pairing each corrupt high-ranking official who was prosecuted between 2008 and 2013 with a low-ranking counterpart. Detailed explanation on the methodology will be outlined in the next section, followed by a presentation of results from the statistical tests (i.e. Ordinary Least Squares and Paired t-Test) and a conclusion.
Literature Review
Some examples are Andrew Wedeman’s Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China (2012) and Sun Yan’s Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (2004).
2
1
A pervasive lack of data is perhaps the most difficult issue in studying corruption in any country. Perfect data does not exist in the study of corruption and anticorruption, as the revealed corruption cases are not always representative of all corruption, and those who have knowledge of corruption tend of have high incentives to maintain secrecy. In the case of China, existing literature mostly focus on the ability of the government to curb corruption. As a result, most of these studies rely on aggregate data published by the Chinese government, state-commissioned research institutions and/or relevant anticorruption institutions (such as the Procuratorate and the Central Disciplinary Inspection
“A pervasive lack of data is perhaps the most difficult issue in studying corruption in any country.”
Commission). For example, Andrew Wedeman concludes that the CCP’s campaign-style anticorruption practices in the 1980s and early-1990s have been largely ineffective, and corruption has actually intensified throughout the period2. Many scholars argue that without fundamental restructuring of the political institutions, the CCP’s anticorruption practices will remain ineffective in diminishing bureaucrats’ incentives to engage in corruption3. Melanie Andrew Wedeman, “Anticorruption Campaigns and the Intensification of Corruption in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 14:42, 93-116., 2005. 3 Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth,
Anticorruption Practices by the Chinese Communist Party | Pan | 11
Manion, for instance, uses game theory to model the strategic calculation involved in committing bribery and argues that in order to completely move away from corrupt equilibria, significant institutional change is necessary4. Although some existing studies do note that high-level corruption (i.e. corruption committed by high-ranking officials) and low-level corruption (i.e. corruption committed by low-ranking officials) exist simultaneously in China5, none have actually established the distinction or explained how and why they are different. As aggregate data treats all corrupt officials and their cases the same way, existing literature tend to overlook heterogeneity and potentially important nuances within the group of corrupt officials. This paper will use original data comprising both high-ranking and low-ranking corrupt officials and examine whether the CCP does treat the two groups in a systematically different manner. Methodology Multiple linear regressions were run in R using original data collected specifically for this research project. The goal is to first examine whether there is a correlation between the interested explanatory variable, rank, and the dependent variable, duration of internal investigation, and to assess whether such correlation still exists when controlling for an increasingly larger number of other variables. Furthermore, I also performed a paired t-test in R to find out whether the two groups, high-rankings and low-rankings, are significantly different from each other Power and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Hon S. Chan & Jie Gao, “Old Wine in New Bottle: a county-level case study of anti-corruption reform in the People’s Republic of China: Crime, Law and Social Change, 2008. 4 Melanie Manion, “Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing,” The Journal of Law, Economics & Organizations, V12 N1, 1996. 5 For instance Chan & Gao (2008). However, the study focus solely on low-level corruption as it examines the efficacy of anticorruption reform at county-level. 12 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
in terms of how long they were processed during the internal investigation. The rest of this section will lay out explanations of the data collection, variable and the logic behind the data analysis. Data collection The data used in this project is original, constructed based on the principle of pairing every high-ranking corrupt official convicted between 2008 and 2013 with a low-ranking counterpart. In order to further control for heterogeneity within the low-ranking group, I chose county-level as the standard for the pairing6. The reason why countylevel corruption cases, instead of prefecturallevel ones, are chosen to represent low-level corruption is that the differences between provincial- and county-level bureaucrats are considerably larger and more noticeable in terms of distance to central power, size of informal network involved, and amount of vested interest, etc. The latest Supreme People’s Procuratorate report states that there have been 32 judicially handled (i.e. prosecution of ) high-level corruption cases between 2008 and 20137. However, the names of the 32 corrupt high-ranking officials were not revealed. Thus, the first task was to find out who they are. Through an extensive news search using the Chinese search engine, Baidu, I uncovered 30 out of the 32 highranking officials. After noting down each of their names and their last official position, I proceeded to the pairing operation. The method of pairing is twofold, depending on whether the high-ranking official held An exception was made for pairing case 18, Wang Yi, former Vice president of China Development Bank. Since no detailed information on corrupt officials from county-level banks were available, I instead found a low-ranking counterpart at the prefectural level (Zhang Ye, former president of Changsha City Commercial Bank). This is perhaps because, first, the media lacks vested interest in scrutinizing bank managers for corruption; and second, perhaps the kind of economic crime county bank managers tend to commit is something other than receiving bribes. 7 Xinhua News, October 22, 2013 6
a position that is region-specific (e.g. head of a province) or central (e.g. minister of a ministry). For every high-ranking official who held power in a specific province, I looked for a low-ranking official from the same province and from the same xitong8 who was also convicted of corruption between 2008 and 2013. Standard search keyword is “province + county-level position + corruption.” I read through the first 20 pages on Baidu to note down all usable results (i.e. within the 20082013 timeframe and with information on all variables). Among all the usable cases, I randomly select one to be included as the low-ranking case for the corresponding high-ranking official. A different approach is adopted to match a high-ranking official who held a position that is not region-specific, such as the CEO of a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) or the head of a ministry in Beijing. I pair the non region-specific official with a low-ranking counterpart who held power at a bureau of similar function at the county-level9. The result is 30 pairs of corrupt officials, composing a sample size of 6010. After I came up with the names and positions of these 30 high-ranking officials and the 30 corresponding low-ranking officials, I recorded the information and codified the values of the six variables listed below. It is acknowledged that there is certain degree of selection bias in the process of pairing, since only those low-ranking officials with information on all variables are included in the data11. In other words, there may be Xitong means system or branch of government. The concept is used as control variable, which will be more thoroughly discussed later in the paper. 9 Note that “bureau with similar function” in this case is more general than xitong and thus may transcend the boundary of xitong. The reason why I took the liberty to interpret function of a specific bureau and to pair these non-region specific officials with others of similar function is that, information on low-level non-region specific corruption cases has proven to be extremely unavailable. 10 The data set is available upon request. 11 There are three low-ranking officials, case 39, 53 8
implicit reasons why certain low-ranking officials received full news coverage while others did not. However, certain controls (especially of locality and xitong) and academic rigor persist throughout the data collection process. Furthermore, considering this is the first attempt to disaggregate national statistics and scrutinize who these corrupt officials are, I am confident that the imperfect data can nevertheless shed light on the question of how these cases are handled by the Party. Dependent Variables: Duration of Internal Investigation (t) The duration, t, is used to measure how the CCP handles suspected corrupt officials, because it captures observable characteristics of how the Party deals with high-level corruption vis-à-vis low-level corruption. t denotes the length of time that an official is under the internal investigation by the Disciplinary Inspection Commissions (DICs), which better reflects the interest of the Communist regime than the other anticorruption institution, the Procuratorate, because the DIC is strictly controlled by the Party whereas the Procuratorate is technically an independent judicial body. The process of investigation is considered to have begun when the central or regional DIC announces the suspension of an official for investigation purposes and is considered completed when the DIC announces how the official is to be administratively handled (e.g. removed from the Party and the former government position) and that the official has been transferred to the judicial institution for upcoming judicial investigation. t is measured in months.
and 54, whose information on age is not available. These cases were nevertheless included in the data, for there is simply no other usable data. Considering age as a variable is only incorporated in model 5 during the multiple linear regression test, the omission of information does not greatly impact on the validity of the test results.
Anticorruption Practices by the Chinese Communist Party | Pan | 13
Independent Variables (IV) IV1: Rank Rank is the interested explanatory variable. Rank of an official is classified as High when his or her position is at provincial level or above, including heads of ministries in Beijing and CEOs of major State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). On the other hand, rank is classified as Low when the position is below provincial level, which includes numerous bureaucracies at prefectural, county and township levels. The definition of high and low here conforms to the classification of high- and lowlevel corruption in the latest report by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate mentioned earlier. Rank is of particular interest in this project because it captures the nuances within the anticorruption practices, namely, the different political utilities of investigating and prosecuting high-level officials vis-à-vis their low-level counterparts.
affiliation with a particular xitong can affect how the Party handles the case in several ways. First and most straightforwardly, officials from some xitong (e.g. Financial and Trade xitong) may be more prone to the economic crimes than others (e.g. Education and Health xitong). Secondly, different xitong may have different weight in the power calculation, thus it may take the Party more time to conduct more thorough investigations of officials from certain xitong. Moreover, the people of China tend to associate some xitong (e.g. Party Affairs xitong) with the Party’s image and legitimacy more than others, which may result in variance of t. IV3: Money
Money refers to the disclosed amount of bribes the official receives, measured in yuan (unit of RMB). This information is normally found in the dossier at conviction. Usually, the larger the amount of money an official has received, the larger the stake is for the IV2: Xitong Party because the case may have involved a Xitong (or systems) are networks of larger network of interest groups and thus bureaucratic agencies with functions and merits longer investigation time. responsibilities in the same general area. IV4: Impact It was first formulated in the 1950s by the central leadership for the purpose of better Impact refers to whether or not an bureaucratic management. This project takes internal investigation is preceded by a major into account both Bachman’s (2006) and accident involving large human casualties, Lieberthal’s (1995) typologies and comes which reveals possibility of corrupt practices up with the ten categories of xitong12;13. by a government official. If the practice Note that only 7 out of the 10 xitong has of corruption has major negative impact, representatives in the data. An official’s it may affect how the Party handles the case, because the Party is aware that failure 12 For more detailed information on xitong, refer to to respond to the people’s demand for Kenneth Lieberthal ‘s Governing China: From Revoluaccountability in a speedy manner may lead tion Through Reform (1995) and David Bachman’s to undesired social backfire and threaten the Bureaucracy, Economy and Leadership in China (2006). 13 regime’s legitimacy. The ten different xitong are: Party Affairs (PA), Organization and Personnel (OP), Education and Health (EH), Political and Legal Affairs (PL), Military/ United Front / public security (M), Finance and Trade (FT), Industry (Heavy/light industry) (I), Energy Resources (E), Agriculture, Forestry, Hydraulic engineering (A), and Communications and transportation (CT). Note that only 7 out of the 10 xitong are represented in the data set, which are PA, EH, PL, I, FT, E and CT. 14 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
IV5: Age Age refers to the age of the official at the time of arrest for internal investigation. Age of an official could affect t. Considering that most bureaucrats in China start their political careers around the same time, the
Table 1. Results of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis to explain variation in duration of internal investigation, t Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
5.44 (3.6e-05)***
4.66 (6.7e-04)***
4.56 (5.1e-04)***
4.12 (1.7e-03)**
3.21 (0.04)*
Finance & Trade
0.72 (0.84)
0.74 (0.83)
2.02 (0.57)
3.05 (0.44)
Industry
-1.17 (0.82)
-1.22 (0.81)
-0.01 (0.99)
0.12 (0.98)
Transportation & Communication
6.10 (0.05)
3.90 (0.22)
4.78 (0.14)
4.61 (0.20)
Party Affairs
2.02 (0.43)
1.72 (0.48)
2.97 (0.27)
3.40 (0.28)
Education & Health
-0.11 (0.97)
-1.01 (0.71)
0.18 (0.95)
0.01 (0.99)
Political & Legal
2.17 (0.40)
1.91 (0.43)
3.01 (0.25)
4.11 (0.17)
5.57 (0.02)*
5.14 (0.02)*
8.27 (0.002)**
0.00 (0.23)
0.00 (0.31)
Rank
Model 4
Model 5
Xitong (Energy = 0)
Impact Money
0.06 (0.54)
Age
14
N
60
60
60
60
5714
R2
0.25
0.25
0.32
0.33
0.37
The decline of sample size, N, is precisely due to the omission of data mentioned above.
older they are at the time of the arrest, the longer they have been involved in the political system, meaning the longer time they have to establish extensive informal network (guanxi) with interest groups inside and outside of the political system. Logically, the more extensive the informal network an official has established, the longer it will take the DIC to untangle and find concrete evidence. Thus, age may impact on duration of internal investigation time. Data Analysis I performed Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) linear regression using the variables outlined above. P values and the R2 values were recorded for models including different combination of the five independent
variables. The goal is to assess whether rank is correlated with duration of internal investigation (t). If the answer is yes, the multiple linear regression further permits us to examine whether the correlation persists when controlling for other variables. Furthermore, given that we can calculate the difference of t for each high- and lowranking pair, I further performed a paired t-test to determine whether the two groups’ differ from each other in a significant way. After verifying that the paired differences are independent and identically normally distributed, a key assumption of the paired t-test, I performed the paired t-test in R. The p-value of the paired t-test denotes the chance that the actual mean difference between the two groups is equal to zero. In
Anticorruption Practices by the Chinese Communist Party | Pan | 15
other words, the smaller p-value is for the paired t-test, the more confident we can be to assert that the two groups, high-rankings and low-rankings, are not treated identically by the Party, which merits the dichotomous approach. Finding The most noticeable result of the multiple linear regressions, as seen in Table 1, is that rank remains statistically significant in all five models. Model 1 shows that rank alone explains 25% of the variation in t, and we can be highly confident (p<0.001) that the rank has statistically significant relationship with the duration of party-initiated corruption investigation. Model 2, 3 and 4 illustrate that the explanatory power of rank is consistently high while controlling for xitong, impact and money. Why, then, does the p-value of rank increase to p<0.05 in the full model, model 5? One explanation is that age captures some characteristics of rank, and the covariance between the two variables dilutes explanatory power of rank, and it subsequently strengthens that of impact. I ran a regression between age and rank and found that the two were indeed highly correlated (p<0.001). This finding is not surprising, for the mean age for the highrankings is 56.8, and it is 49.2 for the lowrankings in the data. Nevertheless, rank is still rather significantly correlated with t in the full mode when controlling for all the 16 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
other variables. This finding supports the argument that it is valid to examine the CCPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s anticorruption practices with the dichotomous approach that separates the high-level corruption from the low-level ones. In addition, the results of the Paired t-Test further validates the dichotomous approach by showing that the t for the two groups is significantly different. The p-value of the paired t-test is less than .001, strongly rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the duration of internal investigation (t) for the high-ranking group and the low-ranking group. Furthermore, it shows that we can be 95% confident that the differential of t for each pair is within the confidence interval of 3 to 7.75 (months). The mean difference of t between each pair is 5.37 (months). The results are graphically represented in the histogram below. Considering the time differential is calculated as t(high-ranking 1) minus t(low-ranking , the graph also captures the fact that the 1) differential is largely positive, meaning most high-ranking officials undergo longer internal investigation than their low-ranking counterparts. Having done the paired t-test, we can be highly confident that the two groups are not processed equally during the internal investigation by the Partycontrolled DIC. Therefore, it further justifies the dichotomous approach in studying the CCPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s anticorruption practices. The remaining question is how to explain
the residuals from the models. I think part of the residuals are the result of imperfect measurement and lack of transparent information. For instance, money is defined rather narrowly as the disclosed amount of bribe at the time of judicial conviction, which is likely to be considerably less than the amount suspected at the time of internal investigation. Furthermore, there are aspects of severity of the crime (i.e. corruption) not captured by money nor impact but nevertheless can impact t. This may include illicit non-monetary bribes and other negative impacts that are not related to casualties. One example is sex-scandals accompanying corruption allegation. These scandals often entice large societal disapproval and have a very negative impact on the Party’s image which, in theory may affect how the Party handles these cases. Another factor that may have influenced t yet not included in the model is factional affiliation of the corrupt official, especially at the higher level, because selective prosecution can be effectively used to curb the power of a disloyal faction. Unfortunately, factions manifest themselves in a very discreet manner in Chinese politics under the oneparty rule, making quantification difficult if not altogether impossible. Conclusion This paper advocates that, in order to answer the question how the Chinese Communist Party carries out its ‘war on corruption,’ one can benefit from adopting a dichotomous approach. Specifically the approach examines and distinguishes how the regime deals with high-level corruption—acts committed by highranking officials—from how it deals with lower-level corruption—acts committed by low-ranking officials. Such an approach is merited because the quantitative analysis based on original data in this paper has three major finding that serve as support for the approach. The multiple linear regressions show that, first, rank is highly correlated with
duration of internal investigation; second, rank remains significant in explaining variation in the duration even when controlling for other variables. And third, the Paired t-Test supports that the high-ranking and lowranking groups are significantly different from each other in terms of how they are dealt with by the Party-controlled DIC. For the purpose of establishing the dichotomy between how high-ranking officials are handled by the CCP and how their low-ranking counterparts are handled, this paper has achieved its objective as set out in the introduction. Further research is needed to untangle the question of why the Party treats two groups with significant differences. Potential explanations may involve intricate political calculations that contribute to the CCP’s authoritarian resilience. ___________________________________ References
Chan, Hon Gao Jie. 2008. “Old Wine in New Bottles: a County-Level Case Study of Anti-Corruption Reform in the People’s Republic of China.” Crime, Law and Social Change 49 (2):97-117. Johnston, Michael. Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Manion, Melanie. 1996. “Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12 (1):167-195. Sun, Yan. Corruption and Market in Contemporary China. Ithaca, N, Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004. Wedeman, Andrew. 2005. “Anticorruption Campaigns and the Intensification of Corruption in China.” Journal of Contemporary China 14 (42):93-116. Wedeman, Andrew. Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012.
Anticorruption Practices by the Chinese Communist Party | Pan | 17
Political Institutions and Regional Tensions: Lessons from a Comparative Study between Canadian Federalism and the Italian Unitary State By Celine Caira
Keywords: Federalism, Italian Risorgimento, Quebec Separatism, Regional Tension
Abstract Countries have often adopted federalist ideas as a solution for resolving collective-action problems and for addressing regional needs. Considering the benefits of federalism inherent to its design, why a unitary state such as Italy has been better able to accommodate regional tensions within its borders than a federal country, such as Canada, warrants explanation. Using a qualitative comparative approach, this paper examines the pre-institutional factors of common history and national language, as well as institutional factors of reform through regional devolution, to explain why Canadian federalism has strengthened Quebec nationalism while Italyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s unitary system has calmed its regional tensions.
I
n crafting or reforming constitutional and legal systems, countries often have turned to federalist ideas as a solution for resolving collective-action problems and for addressing regional needs. However, considering the benefits of federalism inherent to its design, why a unitary country such as Italy has been better able to accommodate regional tensions and conflicts than a federal country like Canada warrants explanation. More precisely, why has Canadian federalism strengthened Quebec nationalism, whereas Italyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s unitary system quelled regional tensions? This puzzle attests to the complexity inherent to political science and suggests that although institutions are not neutral political devices, they appear to be distinctly secondary matters when understanding why a country does or does not encounter strong sub-national secessionist movements. A qualitative comparative analysis between Italy and Canada demonstrates that preinstitutional factors, such as common history and differences of national languages, as well as institutional factors of reform through regional devolution, play a very significant role in the expression, or lack thereof, of regional sentiment and subnational secessionist movements. However, contemporary politics in Canada and Italy suggest that federalism is becoming successful in accommodating Quebec, while unitarism is failing in Italy, leading to a desire for federal reform in Italy. This study uses
a qualitative analytical approach to assess whether the concept of federal and unitary institutional design is a cause of, or a solution to, regional tensions and whether they calm or aggravate sub-national secessionist movements. By selecting active secessionist movements as the dependent variable, through a comparison between federal and unitary states, this study aims to reveal that institutional design is a distinctly secondary matter when it comes to understanding why a county encounters regional tensions, as many causal factors are in fact preinstitutional. Here, pre-institutional factors are defined as independent variables existing prior to the implementation of the Canadian federal institutional design during Canadian Confederation in 1867, and the Italian unitary institutional design during the Risorgimento in 1861. How the independent variables of common history and the degree of difference between official languages within the country affects the dependent variable of the prevalence of sub-national secessionist movements, the Quebec separatist movement in the Canadian case and the calming of regional tensions in the Italian case must be considered. The likelihood of sub-national secessionist movements emerging increases, regardless of whether a country has a federal or unitary institutional design, in countries with groups that have less common history and more substantial differences between official national languages. The independent Political Institutions and Regional Tensions | Caira | 19
variable of institutional reform through regional devolution can help explain Italy’s success in accommodating regional tensions, despite its unitary institutional design. However, Canadian and Italian politics since 2000 suggest that the power of institutions
“...why has Canadian federalism strengthened Quebec nationalism, whereas Italy’s unitary system quelled regional tensions?”
to shape political outcomes has prevailed over pre-institutional factors, culminating in a push for Italian federal reform. Regional Tensions in Italy and Canada In many ways, it is surprising that in Italy, a country united comparatively recently, political tensions based on regional conflict have not been stronger and that regional parties and movements have not played a bigger role in national politics1. With the exception of certain small areas on the periphery, there have been few powerful movements of regional defense, let alone parties promoting the break-up of the Italian state. However, the emergence of the few Italian separatist movements has often been linked to economic factors. Since unification, Italy has been divided economically, having a higher variation in socio-economic structures and living standards across its regions than in other major European states. In 1946, regional devolution was first introduced to address Sicily’s growing independence movement, Movimento per l’indipendenza siciliana, whose main claim was economic in nature, since the unitary Italian government was responsible for the state of poverty and “backwardness” of the region as compared to the more advanced and industrial North2. David Hine, Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective. (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1996) 109-110. 2 Simone Pajno, Regionalism in the Italian constitutional 1
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The central government’s redistribution of resources from the North to the South in the 1970s, satisfying Southern supporters at the expense of Northern taxpayers, worsened this tension3. In the boom of the late 1980s, North-South tensions largely disappeared because of economic prosperity. Once the boom turned to recession, however, tensions reemerged with the creation of the Lega Nord separatist movement in 1992. Growing support for such movements seems to be linked not to demands for ethnic or linguistic expression, but to frustration with the functioning of the Italian unitary state4. In Canada, federalism was adopted to accommodate linguistic duality and regional differences between the English and French. However, during the Quiet Revolution, Quebec nationalists largely rejected federalism and pushed to achieve an independent Quebec state, with the creation of the Parti Québécois (PQ) in 1968. In October 1995, they came within a few thousand votes of winning a referendum calling for secession, with continued “association” with the rest of the country5. Although the prospect of Quebec secession has considerably receded, the proposed PQ 2013 Quebec Charter of Values once again raises questions regarding the capacity of federalism to provide a framework for calming regional tensions. Paradox in 1860s Italian and Canadian Political Thought A comparative analysis between Italy and Canada presents an especially interesting case considering the apparent paradox in the prominent political thought during the years leading up to the 1861 Risorgimento in Italy, and the 1867 Confederation in System. (Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche, 2009) 627. 3 Hine, “Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective,” 112. 4 Anna Cento Bull. Ethnicity, Racism and the Northern League. (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1996) 171. 5 Éric Bélanger, Honours Seminar in Canadian Politics. (McGill University, 2013) 34-40.
Canada. These events were a result of much dialogue and deliberation in the 19th century between political elites regarding what political system would best suit each country. In Canada, Confederation was not a sharp break with the history of British North America since the conquest of New France in 1762. Provincial delegations met in Quebec City and Charlottetown to discuss the terms of a union of British North America following the stalemate that endured regarding how to unify Upper and Lower Canada. Many elites suggested that the union of the two Canadas demanded the emergence of a federal concept. However, the first prime minister of Canada and father of Confederation, John A. Macdonald , was not a federal enthusiast and would have preferred a unitary state in which provinces were subordinate and acquired authority from the central government. According to Sabetti, without the Francophone community, the union would have proceeded along centralized lines since Macdonald favored, “one government and one parliament legislating for the whole of these peoples…the cheapest, the most vigorous, and the strongest system of government we could [have] adopt[ed]6.” However, the terms of the 1867 Canadian constitutional settlement were not solely unitary as Macdonald would have wished, but combined federal and unitary principles of organization to form a responsible party government with parliamentary omnicompetence and majoritarian rule at the federal and provincial levels of government. Similarly in the 1860s, Italian political actors struggled to reach a consensus regarding how to unify Italy. Considering the strong local foundations of regional self-governance that existed for centuries in Italy, federalism was suggested as an appropriate political system. Independent of one another, political theorists Carlo Cattaneo, Francesco Ferrarra, and Alexis Sabetti, Types of Federalism: Achieving Self-Governing Capabilities in Societies with Federal Potentials, 30. 6
de Tocqueville were attracted to the North American experience of federalism and were all large proponents of applying such a system to the Italian case7. Cattaneo insisted that federalism, as a constitutional and institutional framework for a selfgoverning society, would be successful in Italy because a self-governing society must start with the commune as the fundamental unit of political association, which existed in Italy as early as the 10th century8. According to Cattaneo, Italians should avoid, not emulate, the French political mistakes and weaknesses seen in their unitary system. However, he was mindful that communal self-government was not enough and that in order to succeed, the practice of self-governance must be linked to other larger self-governing institutions that extend to the nation as a whole. He saw federal constitutional law “as the intellectual mechanism for designing and operating a multi-constitutional political system with overlapping jurisdictions9.” Similarly, Ferarra believed that it was a common error “to attribute more cohesion to a state whose central government takes on tasks that subaltern bodies or individuals can do better10.” For various reasons however, including the American Civil War, the victory of centralized government in the making of a united Italy eclipsed the prospects of an Italian federal union11. The paradox between the Italian and Canadian political thought present in the years leading up to their national births reveals the puzzling conclusion of Canada adopting a federal system, when its major political actors would have preferred a unitary system, and Italy adopting a unitary one, when many of its political actors were advocating for federalism. Ibid., 53. Ibid., 43. 9 Sabetti, Types of Federalism: Achieving Self-Governing Capabilities in Societies with Federal Potentials, 44. 10 Ibid., 51. 11 Ibid., 52. 7 8
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Efficacy of Federalism in Addresssing Regional Needs A federal system is defined as one in which governmental powers and responsibilities are divided between a federal legislature and a number of provincial legislatures, wherein this division of power is constitutionally entrenched12. In contrast, a unitary system is governed as a single unit in which the central government is supreme and any subnational units exercise only powers that their central government chooses to delegate to them13. Even when some factors seem intractable, federalism is presumed to have greater capacity than unitarism to resolve collective-action problems and to address regional needs. According to Filippo Sabetti, the polycentric nature of federalized systems of government makes them less likely to be overloaded with problematic situations. Their institutional design allows for constant adjustment and reform towards new forms of federal association, expressions of self-governance, and constitutional choice. Contrary to unitary institutional arrangements, federalized systems offer greater advantages of diverse economies of scale with regards to the provision and production of public goods and services. Citizens also can more actively participate in the conduct of public affairs due to the existence of a greater number of institutional remedies to address grievances14. Federal structures allow for a larger set of actors and participants than a unitary system, which enhances political participation, protection of human rights, and a better alignment of human needs with available resources15. Federal design Garth Stevenson, Federalism. (Historica Canada, 2006) Web. 13 “constitutional law.” Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition. (Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2013) Web. 14 Sabetti, Types of Federalism: Achieving Self-Governing Capabilities in Societies with Federal Potentials, 29. 15 Michael A. Pagano, In the Eye of the Beholder: The Dynamics of Federalism in National and Supranational Political Systems. (New York: PALGRAVE MAC12
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is unique in that it uses constitutional and legal frameworks to advance the human condition, which requires institutions that accurately and realistically incorporate the various agencies and stakeholders existing within a country. Within the federal framework there is recognition of multiple and interactive opportunities allowing access to various “levers of power” within the state or federal sphere, or even at the level of local government16. This constitutional and legal framework extends beyond solely constitutional issues to include the broader governance structure of federal systems, which are dynamic and robust in providing a foundation for citizens and their governments to engage in and change their relationships with one another17. However, federalism contains a paradox wherein its very institutions meant to address and accommodate regional tensions end up aggravating them, culminating in strong sub-national identities and even secessionist movements. According to Celine Souza, this is because federal political design is a territorial division of power based on the apparent paradox of preserving diversity, through self-rule, as well as unity, through shared rules18. Although federal institutions are inherently designed with the goal of calming regional tensions and facilitating cooperation, it has fostered strong secession movements in the past. This could be because the structure of federalism, compared to a unitary system, gives subnational units political and financial resources that can be used in the service of a secessionist movement19. Of course, active utilization of these resources is dependent on other factors. According to David Cameron, although political institutions are not neutral devices and can MILLAN, 2007) 9. 16 Pagano, In the Eye of the Beholder, 9. 17 Pagano, In the Eye of the Beholder, 9. 18 Celine Souza, Overview and Introduction. (New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2007) 22. 19 David Cameron, The Paradox of Federalism: Some Practical Reflections. (Routledge, 2009) 310.
play a role in accommodating or aggravating regional tensions, “the institutional structure of federalism is a distinctly secondary matter when it comes to understanding why a country is or is not facing secession20.” That is to say, pre-institutional factors play a very significant role in the expression of regional sub-nationalist sentiment and secessionist movements. Pre-Institutional Variable 1: Common History Comparing the length of common history and the goals of Canadian and Italian unification helps explain why federal Canada experienced a strong Quebec nationalist movement and why unitary Italy experienced no serious regional threats to national unity. The Italian people’s long history on the peninsula helped create a sense of deep rooted nationalism and the goal behind the Risorgimento was to bring them together as one country. In contrast, Canadian history is shorter and tells a story of colonization with national unification as a compromise between two peoples. Although Italy was not formally a country until its unification in 1861, inhabitants of the Italian peninsula carried a sense of Italian nationalism and citizenship as far back as the 10th century. Following the fall of the Western Roman Empire, between the years 1050-1150, nowhere in Europe did cities flourish so abundantly as in Italy. Italy during this time was comprised of many polycentric self-governing units that later evolved into collections of advanced political and cultural civic centers. The Italian tradition of “civic humanism,” and this artistic, literary, and political sentiment is said to have laid the foundation for modern day Italian nationalism21. Thanks to their history, Italians have had an identity as a people for over twenty centuries as long “before the formation of a unified Italian Cameron, The Paradox of Federalism, 310. Peter Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition. (University of North Carolina Press, 1992) 188. 20 21
state, there has existed an Italian people22.” Unlike Italian history, Canadian history is a story of colonization, competition, and compromise between different peoples, which did not foster or contain a historically rooted sense of nationalism. The discovery of what would later be called Canada by English and French explorers in the late 15th century marked the beginning of a long period of colonization and competition. Prior to European arrival, First Nations Peoples inhabited the land living in small groups, which European colonists referred to as “tribes,” each with their own culture, religion, history, and language23. In 1608 the first permanent settlement and the capital of New France, what today is Quebec City, was founded but was later ceded to Great Britain after their victory in the Seven Years’ War. The Province of Lower Canada was later created by the Constitutional Act of 1791 separating the British colony into Lower (Quebec) Canada and Upper (Ontario) Canada24. Due to the composite nature of its founding tradition, Canada is seen as a dual-fragment society, having to accommodate two distinct fragments each with their own cultural traditions, values, and languages25. As a legacy of Canada’s colonial past, the two provinces did not share a common identity and faced seemingly irreconcilable differences of opinion with respect to political representation. This culminated in “dead-lock and impending anarchy,” which forced political elites to the conclusion that they “must either abandon the idea of Union altogether, or devise a system of union in which the separate provincial organizations would be in some degree preserved26.” Filippo Sabetti, The Search for Good Government: Understanding the Paradox of Italian Democracy. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000) 33. 23 Bélanger, 170. 24 Robert Christie, A History of the Late Province of Lower Canada. (Montreal: Worthington, 1848–1855) Web. 25 Bélanger, 128-129. 26 Ibid., 7. 22
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In contrast, the Italian Risorgimento held national unification as its intrinsic goal and was not a compromise or compact between two peoples. The label Risorgimento given to the movement for the liberation and political unification of Italy means, “to rise again” and represents the rebirth of the Italian people as a unified state27. The political division that existed on the peninsula for more than thirteen hundred years fostered a strong attachment to community and regional affairs as well as an extraordinary set of diverse social institutions, cultures, and languages, which did not exist in colonial Canada at that time28. The Napoleonic hegemony over the Italian peninsula between 1796 and 1814 helped to foster political nationalism and a sense that an Italian state ought to exist29. In addition, since the Austrian Empire ruled the northern states, a common desire existed amongst Italians for liberation from foreign rule. This culminated in the 1848 revolts in the North led by the state of Piedmont. However, by 1849, all the uprisings collapsed lending credence to Giuseppe Mazzini’s view that the struggle for Italian unification must take precedence over the issue of what framework of governance best suited Italy, for example whether to adopt a federal or unitary design. After 1849, the Kingdom of Sardinia was the only remaining parliamentary monarchy in Italy and as a result the political leaders of the House of Savoy in Piedmont were the only hope for Italian unification. Consequently, in 1861 the parliament proclaimed Victor Emmanuel II King of Italy making Rome its capital30. Since the majority of political leaders believed that federalism would weaken the fragile unity of the new Italian state and undermine its intrinsic purpose by being “inevitably slow …and only too ready
for disagreement,” federalism in Italy was eclipsed by a unitary system31. In contrast to the Risorgimento, negotiations among political leaders from the Province of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia were not regarding the rebirth of a people, but concerned the facilitation of cooperation. These negotiations resulted in the Imperial Parliament’s adoption of the British North America Act of 1867, which united those three colonies into a federal state. Unification in Canada was desired as a means of facilitating economic growth, territorial expansion, and military defense. However, the preservation of existing colonial governments and boundaries was desired by French Canadians, a majority only in Quebec, who were unwilling to place all power in the hands of a central government where they would be a minority32. Federalism therefore was a necessary compromise in which the creation of Quebec as a subnational unit in 1867 permitted the predominantly francophone society to develop as it pleased. Paradoxically, the federal system designed to accommodate the Quebec sub-nation gave rise to one of the most powerful secessionist movements in the modern world33. Since the rise of the Quebec sovereignty movement in the 1960s, political power in Canada has been flowing to the provincial governments due to demands of Quebec nationalists for greater autonomy.
Sabetti, The Search for Good Government: Understanding the Paradox of Italian Democracy, 85. 28 Ibid., 30-32. 29 Ibid., 33. 30 Ibid., 40.
31
27
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Pre-Institutional History 2: Language vs. Dialect Language has historically been the cause of dominant political divisions in Canada. The distinct difference between the English and French languages has shaped the federal institutional structure, just as the regional character of these cleavages charted the Sabetti, The Search for Good Government: Understanding the Paradox of Italian Democracy, 34. 32 Stevenson, Federalism. 33 Cameron, The Paradox of Federalism: Some Practical Reflections, 317.
success of Canadian federalism. However, Italy is more regionally fragmented than Canada and contains about 15 main linguistic groups clearly different from each other, which roughly correspond with regional subdivisions34. Considering Italy is a unitary state whose institutions are not designed to accommodate regional linguistic diversity, why then has the French-English linguistic cleavage caused more political tension within the Canadian federal state and the emergence of a secessionist movement? The answer lies in the difference between language, dialects, and linguistic minorities, and how language is a powerful variable that defines national identity. French and English are distinctly separate Romance and Germanic languages but they do share similarities due to the introduction of French at the time of the Norman invasion of Britain in the 11th century35. The French language descended from the spoken Latin language of the Roman Empire and is part of the Romance family, along with Italian and Spanish. The English language originated from the West Germanic language formed by the Anglo-Frisian dialects, which was brought to Britain by Germanic settlers. French and English are not dialects but separate languages that represent the official national languages in Canada, however, the French-speaking population of Canada are a linguistic minority. As early as 1838 when Britain sent Lord Durham to investigate conditions in the British North American colonies in 1838, he discovered “two nations warring in the bosom of a single state36.” Consequently, language was a major reason why Canadian federalism developed in a relatively decentralized way. According to Charles Taylor, “the singling out of linguistic nationality as the paradigm pole Miriam Voghera, et al., Linguistic Variety in Italy. (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1996), 73. 35 Paul Shoebottom, The differences between English and French. (Frankfurt International School) Web. 36 Bélanger, 35. 34
of self-identity is part of this modern drive to emancipation. It connects naturally with the demand for self-rule37.” For Quebec, the primary issue was the power to preserve its own culture and language in the face of an English-speaking majority at the national level as Taylor claims that humans “need language in the broadest sense in order to discover our humanity38.” However, the creation of new provinces within Canada reduced the overall weight of Quebec in the federation, eventually making it one province in ten with new western provincial governments harboring hostility to FrenchCanadian interests. For example, Ontario placed limits on French-language schools in the province. Differential treatment based on language reshaped Francophone identities, from the original Canadiens settlers to French-Canadians, defined primarily by language and religion, to the contemporary Québécois national identity, centered on the high concentration of French-speakers within the Quebec state39. The institutional autonomy given to Francophones to pursue self-government and preserve their language within Quebec also provided the space for other provinces to limit the use of the French language, which explains why the Canada-Quebec conflict has strong roots in the French-English linguistic cleavage. Constitutionally entrenched bilingualism in Canada demonstrates how federalism has attempted to facilitate cooperation between French and English speakers however; the creation of the PQ in 1968, the 1995 Quebec referendum, and the 2013 Pastagate scandal demonstrate how federalism has failed to accommodate two languages within one country. Pierre Trudeau’s multicultural immigration policies and the establishment of English as the language of global commerce have also made this issue more salient. Unlike the English-French dichotomy Ibid., 53. Ibid., 53. 39 Bélanger, 36. 37 38
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in Canada, Italian is Italy’s only national language. However, it operates beside about 15 main dialect groups roughly corresponding to regional subdivisions, whose high usage today is especially surprising considering the unitary design of the Italian state and mounting pressure from the national language. Italian originated as a written language from 14th century literary Florentine but was not widely used due to high illiteracy along the peninsula. Consequently, a plethora of local dialects continued to develop, and written Italian was confined to the more privileged40. These dialects are separate Romance languages and can differ from each other as much as French differs from Spanish. They are not varieties or adaptations of the national Italian language, but are all ‘sister’ languages derived from spoken Latin. Dialects such as Turinese, Milanese, Florentine, etc. differ from each other in phonology, grammar, and lexis, and can vary so much from each other as to be reciprocally unintelligible to their users. From a strictly linguistic viewpoint, there is no difference between a language and a dialect, and a dialect used officially by a state is called a language41. The question of Italian dialects is treated separately from that of linguistic minorities, which are enclaves of speakers of foreign languages42. Although Italian dialects are separate Romance languages originating from Latin, they share more common ground than English and French languages, which differ in their Germanic and Romance origins. In this respect, Frenchspeaking Canadians represent a linguistic minority within Canada, and thus the french language requires institutionalized protection within the framework of federal government. As a unitary system of government prevailed in Italy, between 1861 and 1918, Italian was considered to be the national language and dialects were
generally disregarded43. In the years of Fascist Italy, authorities tried to introduce forced assimilation of linguistic minorities, which included the Italianization of surnames. The unitary system of government provided no protection for linguistic minority rights or preservation of dialects, as regulations on education imposed the use of Italian even in schools for children who were German or Slovene-speaking44. Although Italy is historically more regionally and linguistically fragmented than Canada, the fact that Italian dialects stem from Latin and share similarity as Romance languages helps explain why no major regional secessionist movements emerged in Italy based on language rights. As well, French-speakers in Canada represent a distinct minority compared to Englishspeakers, whereas 15 main dialect groups in Italy have about the same population size. Unlike Canadian Confederation, the myth of the Italian “rebirth” during the Risorgimento helped create a sense of pride in having a unified national language, to the effect that speaking a local dialect would not harm their sense of Italian national identity. Although the use of dialects has fallen in the past twenty years, due to the prevalence of standardized education and the creation of state-owned media RAI (Radiotelevisione italiana) in 1939, less than half of the population in 1991 used standard Italian regularly with friends and colleagues45.
Voghera, et al., “Linguistic Variety in Italy,” 71. 41 Ibid., 69-72. 42 Ibid., 72.
44
40
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Explaining the Success of the Italian Unitary System In examining the failure of Canadian federalism to calm Quebec separatism, the success of the Italian unitary system in quelling regional tensions must be explained beyond pre-institutional variables because institutions are not neutral devices; their design and operation have Ibid, 76. Voghera, et al., “Linguistic Variety in Italy,” 76. 45 Carl Levy, Introduction: Italian Regionalism in Context. (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1996), 9. 43
profound effects on how language and regional tensions are played out in national politics46. The variable of institutional reform through regional devolution in Italy helps to clarify why paradoxically, a unitary state has not been subject to stronger centrifugal tensions. The constitutional order brought about by the Risorgimento imposed a highly centralized unitary state that was not sensitive to regional differences47. Until 1948 it permitted no decentralization to its regions, and very little to the municipal level of government. The explanation for the absence of a regional reaction to this centralization lies in the period from 1869
“Unlike the current Italian political structure, the Canadian federal system [provides] a foundation for citizens and governments to engage in and change their relationships with one another. “
to 1922, with the cultural dominance of the myth of national popular rebirth on which the Risorgimento was based. Only after 1945, with the fall of Fascism, was the question of territorial articulation through regional devolution able to come to light. As a result, substantial concessions to decentralization were made, although within the framework of a unitary state that did not give regions a valid claim to representation in the national legislature48. Certain regions were granted a degree of autonomy not only to account for their cultural differences and to protect dialects and linguistic minorities, but also so that the central government could control any demands for secession following the Souza, “Overview and Introduction,” 26. 47 Hine, “Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective,” 110. 48 Ibid., 110. 46
Second World War49. The first Italian experience of regional devolution can be found in 1946 when Sicily received special statutory treatment granting it considerable legislative powers and fiscal autonomy to help improve its economic “backwardness” and poverty, which was still prominent because of the failure of the central Italian state to address southern needs. The Italian Constitution was approved in 1947 and the regionalism provided for in the Charter was based on 14 “ordinary regions,” whose system was still disciplined in the Constitution itself, and five “special regions” of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardenga, Sicilia, Trentino Alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta. Although the recognition of these “Regione Speciale” is written in Article 116 of the Italian Constitution, the law regulating the relationship between the Italian state and these special regions was so broad that, in constitutional theory, the difference between ordinary regions and special regions was not great50. In 2001, the Italian Parliament approved the “legge costituzionale,” the most important constitutional reform since 1948, which further defined the relationship between the central State and autonomous territorial organizations based on the principle of subsidiarity51. Article 117 lays out the broad areas under which regions may legislate, which include: urban and rural police forces, public charities, health and hospital assistance, tourism and the hotel industry, inland fisheries, and artisanship52.
Ibid., 112. Hine, “Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective,” 111. 51 Pajno, “Regionalism in the Italian Constitutional System,” 626. 52 Hine, “Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective,” 114. 49 50
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Contemporary Politics: the Beginning of Canadian Federal Success and Italian Unitary Demise Although pre-institutional variables can determine whether a country will experience secessionist movements, institutions are not neutral and the design and operation of either a federal or unitary system will have profound effects on how language and regional divisions play out in national politics53. Consequently, Italy today is experiencing regional dissatisfaction imbedded in the context of overall political discontent. In contrast, years of negotiation and compromise at the Canadian federal and provincial levels have culminated in a degree of success in diffusing Quebec regional tensions. These more recent finding suggest that federalism, with time, can not only be successful in accommodating subnational groups but also provide the best institutional framework for the success of modern day democracies. Federal system is dynamic and robust providing a foundation for citizens and governments to engage in and change their relationships with one another. As a consequence, electorally, Quebec sovereignty aspirations have waned. In the 2008 Quebec election, the federalist Quebec Liberal Party captured its third consecutive mandate, at the expense of the PQ, who in the 2007 provincial election suffered its worst defeat in 34 years. Following this defeat, the PQ openly acknowledged its lack of appeal and has since rebranded its strategy and image, but to little success54. In 2006, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper tabled the parliamentary motion formally recognizing that “the Québécois form a nation within a united Canada55.” In 2009, polling data Bélanger, 35. Nadine Changfoot, Why is Quebec Separatism off the Agenda? Reducing National Unity Crisis in the Neoliberal Era. (Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2011) 769-770. 55 Official Report (Hansard). (House of Commons Debates, 2006) Web. 53 54
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by Angus Reid showed that support for Quebec separation was weak, based on an online survey that posed a question similar to that of the 1995 referendum. This data showed that 34 per cent of Quebecers would vote “yes,” 54 per cent would vote “no,” and that 13 per cent are undecided56. Although 79 per cent of Quebecers identify at least one area they believe their province should have more autonomy in, only 15 per cent believe it is very likely Quebec will one day separate from Canada57. According to Nadine Changfoot, the development of federalism in the context of the neoliberal era in the 2000s has “created conditions for just enough asymmetry in the relationship between the federal government and Quebec, something that Quebec has historically demanded, for separatism to remain off the agenda58.” In Italy, despite the enthusiasm for increased regional power, the region remains a relatively weak administrative unit compared to the municipalities and provinces of the central state apparatus59. It is clear that Italian regionalism is not federalism, as constitutional entrenchment of regional powers as well as their representation at the national level, as in the US Senate where each state is represented by two senators, is not present60. In Italy, while powers of the regions are theoretically constitutionally entrenched, in practice, they are very imprecise. The regions have few areas of exclusive legislative power and their financial autonomy from the center is extremely modest. The devolution of regional powers outlined in Article 117 is Separation from Canada Unlikely for a Majority of Quebecers. (Angus Reid Strategies, 2009) Web. 57 Ibid. 58 Changfoot, “Why is Quebec Separatism Off the Agenda? Reducing National Unity Crisis in the Neoliberal Era,” 771. 59 Hine, “Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective,”114. 60 Hine, “Federalism, Regionalism and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical Perspective,”113. 56
rather misleading, as they must legislate in these areas within the basic framework of legislation laid down by the national unitary state. Considering the failure of regional devolution to truly empower Italy’s territories and the enduring high degree of centralization within the state, it is surprising that more powerful movements for regional autonomy have not emerged throughout Italy’s history. However, things seem to be changing in contemporary Italian politics, begging the question of whether Italy is moving towards adopting a more federal system such as that of Canada. Is Italian Federalism Inevitable? Contrary to unitary institutional arrangements, federal structures allow for a wider array of political actors and participants, which enhances political participation and better aligns human needs with available resources61. The Italian North-South regional tension has become entwined with a more widespread frustration with the inefficiency of the Italian state as a whole. This growing political discontent is illustrated by the “mani pulite” investigation into political corruption in the 1990s, the continued rise in support for the Lega Nord, and the creation and election of the Five Star Movement in 2009. These events demonstrate that Italians are leaning towards federal reform not primarily to ensure protection for regional ethnic or linguistic minorities, as in Canada, but to ensure a better functioning of the state in general in the provision of public goods and services and the avoidance of corruption. Proof of the failure of the Italian unitary state can be seen in the growing support for the Lega Nord, who in 2010 experienced their largest electoral success since the party was founded62. In the most recent 2013 Italian parliamentary elections, the Five Sabetti, Types of Federalism: Achieving Self-Governing Capabilities in Societies with Federal Potentials, 27. 62 Bull, “Ethnicity, Racism and the Northern League,” 180. 61
Star Movement garnered 25.55 per cent of the overall vote representing the major opposition party to the Grand coalition government of Enrico Letta. Popular activist, comedian, and blogger Beppe Grillo, launched the movement in 2009 to voice growing political discontent. The emergence of this party is not surprising considering the years of sex scandals and allegations of corruptions brought about by Italy’s longest serving post-war prime minister, media magnate, and one of the country’s richest men, Silvio Berlusconi, who was ejected from his seat in Senate in November 2013 because of his recent tax fraud conviction63. The support for the Five Star Movement clearly reveals a level of political discontent felt by Italians as it is considered not to be a party but a populist, anti-corruption, and anti-government political reform movement. Conclusion Although pre-institutional factors, such as common history and language, play a very significant role in the expression of regional secessionist movements, institutions are not neutral and their design, whether unitary or federal, can accommodate or aggravate regionalism. However, federalism is at an advantage in that it introduces a communitarian dimension of justice often missing in unitary states64, an absence which is thrown into sharp relief with regard to the institutionalized corruption within the unitary Italian state. Although Italy’s unitary system appears to have been successful in controlling regional tensions through institutional devolution, contemporary politics suggest that Italy’s unitary state has fallen victim to corrupt political actors leading citizens to demand federalism as political reform. In Canada today, federalism seems to be succeeding in Profile: Silvio Berlusconi, Italian ex-prime minister. (BBC, 2013) Web. 64 Cameron, The Paradox of Federalism: Some Practical Reflections, 319. 63
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that it provides an open forum for dialogue Session=. and compromise between federal and provincial governments, and the decline in Christie, Robert. A History of the Late Province of Lower Canada. Quebec City: demand for Quebec secession is related to T. Cary/R. Montreal: Worthington, this success. It seems reasonable to conclude 1848–1855. Web. 11 Dec. 2013. that the likelihood of a secession movement emerging in a given polity, pre-institutional “constitutional law.” Encyclopaedia Britanvariables considered, depends more on how nica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encyclopædia Bripeople are treated than on whether or not tannica Inc., 2013. Web. 11 Dec. 2013. they are federally governed. Considering the http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ tendency for unitary states to be more easily topic/134322/constitutional-law corrupted, a federal design is seemingly the best organization for overcoming regional Hine, David. “Federalism, Regionalism tensions and upholding standards of and the Unitary State: Contemporary Regional Pressures in Historical democracy that exists today. Returning to Perspective.” Italian Regionalism: History, the institutional design that was eclipsed Identity and Politics. Oxford: Berg Puduring the Risorgimento, it is possible that blishers, 1996. 109-130. Web. 11 Dec. Italy can learn from the Canadian case, and 2013. http://site.ebrary.com.proxy2. one day become a federal state. library.mcgill.ca/lib/mcgill/docDetail. ___________________________________ action?docID=10006747. References Bélanger, Éric. Honours Seminar in Canadian Politics. Course pack. Montreal: McGill University, 2013. 1-207. Print.
Inglehart, Ronald. Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline. Institute for Social Research University of Michigan. Web. 13 Dec 2013. http://www. worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/ folder_published/publication_514/ files/5_Partapsa.pdf.
Bull, Anna Cento. “Ethnicity, Racism and the Northern League.” Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1996. 171-187. Jones, Jonathan. The Lost Battles: Leonardo, Michelangelo & the Artistic Duel That Web. 11 Dec. 2013. http://site.ebrary. Defined the Renaissance. London: Simon com.proxy2.library.mcgill.ca/lib/mcgill/ & Schuster UK Ltd, 2012. 90-95. Print. docDetail.action?docID=10006747. Cameron, David. The Paradox of Federalism: Some Practical Reflections. Routledge, 2009. 309-319. Web 11 Dec. 2013. http://dx.doi. org/10.1080/13597560902753644. Changfoot, Nadine. “Why is Quebec Separatism off the Agenda? Reducing National Unity Crisis in the Neoliberal Era.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. 44.04 (2011): 769-787. Web. 13 Dec. 2013. http://journals. cambridge.org.proxy1.library.mcgill. ca/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=8509187&jid=CJP&volumeId=44&issueId=04&aid=8509185&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOC30 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
Levy, Carl. “Introduction: Italian Regionalism in Context.” Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1996. 1-30. Web. 11 Dec. 2013. http://site.ebrary.com. proxy2.library.mcgill.ca/lib/mcgill/docDetail.action?docID=10006747. “Official Report (Hansard).” House of Commons Debates. (2006): Web. 12 Dec. 2013. http://www.parl.gc.ca/ HousePublications/Publication. aspx?DocId=2544166&File=0&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Pub=hansard&Ses=1. Pagano, Michael A.. “In the Eye of the Beholder: The Dynamics of Federalism
in National and Supranational Political Systems.” The Dynamics of Federalism in National and Supranational Political Systems. New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2007. 1-18. Print.
Shoebottom, Paul. “The differences between English and French.” Grammar. Frankfurt International School. Web. 11 Dec 2013. http://esl.fis.edu grammar/ langdiff/french.htm.
Pajno, Simone. “Regionalism in the Italian constitutional System.” Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche. 2009. 625-642. Web. 11 Dec. 2013. http://www.dirittoequestionipubbliche.org/page/2009_n9/05_studi-08_S_Pajno.pdf.
Souza, Celine. “Overview and Introduction.” The Dynamics of Federalism in National and Supranational Political Systems. New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2007. 19-26. Print.
Pirlet, Sebastian. “Berlusconi keeps Italy guessing over 2013 plans.” Reuters. Friday Jul 2013: Web. 12 Dec. 2013. http:// www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/13/ oukwd-uk-italy-berlusconi-idAFBRE86C0YU20120713. “Profile: Silvio Berlusconi, Italian exprime minister.” News Europe. BBC, 27 Nov 2013. Web. 13 Dec 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11981754.
Stevenson, Garth. “Federalism.” Historica Canada. 2006. Web 11 Dec. 2013. http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/ en/article/federalism/. Voghera, Miriam, et al. “Linguistic Variety in Italy.” Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1996. 69-80. Web. 11 Dec. 2013. http://site.ebrary.com.proxy2. library.mcgill.ca/lib/mcgill/docDetail. action?docID=10006747.
Riesenberg, Peter. Citizenship in the Western Tradition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. 188. Print. Sabetti, Filippo. “Local Roots of Constitutionalism.” Perspectives on Political Science. Heldref Publications, 2004. Print. Sabetti, Filippo. The Search for Good Government: Understanding the Paradox of Italian Democracy. Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2000. Print. Sabetti, Filippo. “Types of Federalism: Achieving Self-Governing Capabilities in Societies with Federal Potentials.” The Dynamics of Federalism in National and Supranational Political Systems. New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2007. 27-54. Print. “Separation from Canada Unlikely for a Majority of Quebecers.” Quebec Sovereignty. Angus Reid Strategies: 2009. Web. 12 Dec 2013. http://www.docstoc.com/ docs/32029410/Separation-from-Canada-Unlikely-for-a-Majority-of-Quebecers. Political Institutions and Regional Tensions | Caira | 31
Immigration, Integration and the Threat to German Democratic Quality By Valerie Weber
Keywords: Immigration, Germany, Integration, Democracy, Culture Identity, Netherland
Abstract Despite having the consistently highest levels of immigration, Germany only acknowledged its status as an Einwanderungsland, or ‘immigration nation,’ in 2000. In maintaining that recruited guest-workers were merely temporary long after it was clear they had come to stay permanently, Germany failed to implement a comprehensive framework that could integrate immigrants not only economically but also socially and politically. By comparing the paths of immigrant-integration of Germany and the Netherlands, this paper seeks to address how the insufficiencies of the German immigrant integration framework have missed opportunities for positive integration, and stand to threaten the country’s democratic quality as immigration levels continue to rise.
G
ermany is an immigration nation. In 2010, the number of foreigners in the country was close to ten million, or around twelve per cent of the total population1. Having experienced a sizeable increase in immigration starting in the 1960s due to its guest worker program, Germany has consistently held the highest proportion of foreigners in Europe throughout the post-WWII period2. Without foreigners, nothing would work. There would be a serious workforce shortage, and whole industries would crash. There would be fifty billion dollars less in tax income, and GDP would drop eight per cent. Without foreigners, Frankfurt would lose every fourth resident, and Berlin’s population would drop by fourteen percent. One million four hundred thousand Germans would lose their spouses. Millions of people would lose good friends. The auto industry would lose one in ten workers. Almost half of the German premiere soccer league would be gone3. Germany without Marianne Hasse and Jan C. Jug, “Migration Im Europäischen Vergleich - Zahlen, Daten, Fakten?,” [Comparison of European Migration - Figures Data, Facts?], Bundeszentrale Für Politische Bildung (August 2008), http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/ dossier-migration/56589 migrationsdaten. 2 Rainer Klingholz, “Migration and Integration Policies in Germany – Demographic Change and Migration in Germany,” Migration and Integration: Japan in Comparative Perspective, (Munich: Iudicium, 2011): 115. 3 Pitt von Bebenburg and Matthias Thiem, “Deutschland Ohne Ausländer? Das Wäre Grauenhaft!” [Ger1
foreigners would not be Germany. Being so dependent on foreign workers, one would think Germany would have an incredible immigrant integration framework. If not for the fact that the country needs foreign workers, but because it is one of the strongest European democracies and secures the integrity of each person in its first and most significant national law. One would think. Remarkably, given how reliant the country is on foreign workers, and to what extent it has benefitted from their presence, German provisions for integration are shockingly insufficient - and even more shockingly, they are only a very recent addition to German policy. At the root of this paradox is the effective denial of the country’s status as an Einwanderungsland, or immigration state, until the late 1990s, after facts had shown for several decades that those whom the government had deemed ‘temporary immigrant residents’ were here to stay4. The delayed realization and acceptance of this reality has robbed the country of important chances to integrate foreigners and has made it more difficult for installed integration policies to be effective. Foundational in hindering integration efforts were the country’s until-recently highly restrictive naturalization policies, as many Not for Foreigners? That Would Be Ridiculous], Die Welt ( June 2012), http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/. 4 Peter Lang and Marianne Takle, German Policy on Immigration--from Ethnos to Demos?, (Frankfurt DE: Lang, 2007): 227.
Immigration, Integration and the Threat to German Democratic Quality | Weber | 33
no effort was made to make them more inclusive until the early 2000s. Despite the changes, Germany still remains one of the most closed systems in Europe. In early 2013, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found the German immigration system was “perceived both internally and externally to be highly restrictive and difficult to access5.” While detrimental to the labour market, this has also had severe consequences in the social and political realms. Since foreigners were not integrated politically, there has been no framework upon which to demand inclusion in other social or cultural realms. Even after having lived in Germany for most of their lives, many immigrants still feel isolated and do not have the right to take part in political decision-making - one of the most fundamental democratic civil liberties. Germany’s insufficient integration efforts stand at odds with the present demographic of its society. Most fundamentally, naturalization policies are poorly matched with the needs of German society as well as second and third generation immigrants who may identify as ‘German’ but remain excluded from the polity. who belongs – and who does not belong – in the polity, and the rights it guarantees are fundamental to the preservation of democratic values. The disjuncture between the prevalence of immigration in Germany and the lack of concern for integration puts the country’s liberal integrity at risk as immigration continues to be important in the coming decades. I will begin by focusing on Germany’s history of immigration and integration to show how the country has overslept its status as an immigration nation, and has missed the opportunity to effectively integrate immigrants into society, most Axel Springer, “OECD Kritisiert Deutschen ‘Anwerbestop,’” [OECD Criticizes German “Anwerbestop”], Die Welt. (February 2013), http://www.welt.de/kultur/ literarischewelt/. 5
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significantly because of restrictive citizenship laws. Subsequently, I will offer a comparison of the German and Dutch cases of immigration to demonstrate how similar contexts result in different integration strategies based on the inclusiveness of naturalization policies. My purpose is to highlight Germany’s insufficient integration policies, to demonstrate the profound effect of citizenship policies on domestic
”Citizenship fundamentally delineates who belongs – and who does not belong – in the polity, and the rights it guarantees are fundamental to the preservation of democratic values” integration, and to assert that the integrity of Germany’s democratic quality is at risk given trending immigration. Historical Perspective
For over three decades, the German government effectively denied the country’s status as an immigration nation. Although the issues of integration had been needed for decades prior, they were not seriously considered until the late 1990s6. Leading up to the 1960s, Germany was entering a phase of rapid economic growth, and a guest worker program was initiated to recruit foreign workers – most prominently from Turkey. The offer was lucrative, as Germany was at that time providing some of the best working standards and wages in Europe at the time7. In 1961, when the program was initiated, six thousand eight hundred Turks Valentin Rauer, “Migration and Integration Policies in Germany - Turkish Migrants’ Associations And Their Impact on Policy Reform,” in Migration and Integration: Japan in Comparative Perspective, Glenda S. Roberts and Gabriele Vogt eds., (Munich DE: Iudicium, 2011):128. 7 Douglas B. Klusmeyer and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Negotiating Membership and Remaking the Nation, (Oxford GB: Berghahn Books, 2009): 92. 6
came to Germany for temporary work. They were housed in tenement complexes, and were expected to leave once their labour was no longer needed8. This meant there existed a stark disconnect between economic and social policies of integration – while Turks were imbedded into the country’s labour force, were able to form workers’ unions, and received substantive training, the government did not include further social or cultural integrative provisions. With the economic downturn in 1973, Turks were suddenly seen as a financial burden, and Germany halted guest worker recruitment9. The government tried to push workers to return to their home countries, but few left. Fearing imminent anti-immigration laws, workers instead arranged for their families to join them in Germany, and thereby caused an increase of immigration to the country. Rather than attempting to integrate them, the policies sparked by the influx of immigrants were designed solely to get them back out. In the early 1980s, Germany placed restrictions on relatives coming to join family members, and, in 1983, offered workers a stipend of ten thousand five hundred DM to return home10. Few took advantage of it, however, and by the late 1980s there were over one million seven hundred thousand Turks in Germany11. Despite this, and despite the fact that the total number of immigrants in the nation had by then risen to six million and eight hundred thousand, a stunning eight Gérard Bökenkamp, “Migration: Wie Wurde Deutschland Ein Einwanderungsland?”[Migration: How Is Germany a Country of Immigration], Eigentümlich Frei: Politische Analyse ( June 2008), http:// ef-magazin.de. 9 Matthias Bartsch, Andrea Brandt and Daniel Steinvorth, “Turkish Immigration to Germany: A Sorry History of Self-Deception and Wasted Opportunities,” Spiegel Online (September 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/. 10 Jürn Gottschlich, Bernd Knopf and Cem Özdemir, Currywurst Und Döner: Integration in Deutschland. [Currywurst and Doner: Integration in Germany], (Bergisch Gladbach DE: Bastei Lübbe, 1999): 78. 11 Bartsch, Brandt and Steinvorth. 8
percent of the population and highest level of any country in Europe, Germany refused to acknowledge its status as an immigration nation12. The naturalization guideline of the time maintained, “The BRD is not an immigrant nation. It does not strive to raise the number of German citizens through naturalization,” and politicians widely echoed this view13. A 1979 Infas poll shows the German population widely opposed to possible integration attempts, finding, “Any of the political parties in Bonn would have risked conflict with many of their followers if they had aimed to integrate a significant portion of the guest workers into German society14.” Even with a substantial number of real – or permanent - immigrants present in German society, they were not accepted as such. Following the federal elections three years later, the new coalition noted, “The Federal Republic of Germany is not an immigration country. It is therefore justifiable to undertake all humanitarianly reasonable measures to prevent the influx of foreigners,” and CDU chief Alfred Dregger in the state of Hessen further remarked, “The foreigners’ return to their native countries must be the rule and not the exception. It’s not immoral to demand that what is left of Germany be reserved mainly for the Germans15.” This suggests the ambivalence may partially have been due to a larger cost burden. An article in the business newspaper ‘Handelsblatt’ in 1971 stated the non-integrated barely-subsisting immigrant caused a relatively low cost of thirty thousand DM to the German welfare system, while the necessary infrastructure Klingholz, “Migration and Integration Policies ,” 115. 13 Gottschlich, Knopf and Özdemir, Currywurst Und Döner, 178. 14 Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte Der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge, [History of Foreign Policy in Germany: Seasonal Workers, Forced Laborers, Migrant Workers, Fugitives], (Munich DE: Beck, 2003), 249. 15 Bartsch, Brandt and Steinvorth. 12
Immigration, Integration and the Threat to German Democratic Quality | Weber | 35
to integrate immigrants would cost one hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand DM16. Klaus Bade, a migration expert and former chairman of the German Foundation for Integration and Migration, adds that, next to higher costs, the German defensive and self-proclaimed status as a nonImmigrant nation was also rooted in strong fears of social burdens and cultural ‘overalienation17.’ This supports the view that guest workers “were tolerated, as long as they were of use to the economy and caused no costs…it was most important that they left again when they were no longer needed18.” While this highlights the fact that a certain level of labour integration had been attained, social and cultural integration had been completely ignored. The main feature of the German mode of integration was to open ‘core institutions,’ such as the labour market, training systems, and housing, and to include them in the general welfare state. The effects of welfare state inclusion on overall integration were counteracted by a lack of legal integration, however, since the naturalization law remained restrictive19. Echoing this, Borkert et al. from the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions find that, “Welfare state integration without citizenship gave integration policy in Germany an ambivalence that resulted in a lack of integration of migrants20.” Following the fall of the Berlin Wall Rauer,”Migration and Integration Policies in Germany,” 126. 17 Klaus Bade, “Klaus J. Bade: Integrationspolitik Muss Als Gesellschaftspolitik Für Alle Verstanden Werden,” [Integration Policy a Necessary Social Policy for All to be Understood], Interview in Deutsch Türkische Nachrichten, (March 2013), http:// www.deutsch-tuerkische-nachrichten.de. 18 Gottschlich, Knopf and Özdemir, Currywurst Und Döner, 33. 19 Lang and Takle, German Policy on Immigration, 227. 20 Maren Borkert, Wolfgang Bosswick, Friedrich Heckmann, and Doris Lüken- Klaßen, “Local Integration Policies for Migrants in Europe,” European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2007), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu. 16
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in 1989, politicians across party lines sustained that the inflow of immigrants was ‘temporary,’ and integration policies were not a responsibility of the state21. The government therein maintained the denial of its status as an immigrant nation long after facts showed otherwise, and continued to put off the crucial task of reforming naturalization policies. Not until the late 1990s did integration become a formally recognized issue, and new efforts arose seeking to complement economic integration with social and cultural provisions. Due to the absence of an institutional framework, however, the delayed realization impeded the efficacy with which positive integration could be attained. This led to serious gaps in German integration policy – most fundamentally with respect to naturalization inclusivity, the extremely restrictive policies of which were not amended until late 1999. Assessing the Role of Citizenship In his essay on citizenship and the social class, T.H. Marshall argues that inclusion and social solidarity are fostered through the extension of civil, political, and social rights within the framework of citizenship22. With this, he highlights the importance of citizenship provisions in upholding the democratic value of liberal states. While the case of immigrants was not directly addressed in his work, Wright and Bloemraad note, “from [Marshall’s] perspective, the failure to accord equal citizenship to immigrants should impinge on their sense of identification with the adoptive nation” – and many analyses support this allegation23. Klopp establishes that citizens have more access to political Lang and Takle, German Policy on Immigration, 236. Irene Bloemraad and Matthew Wright, “Is There a Trade-off between Multiculturalism and Socio-Political Integration? Policy Regimes and Immigrant Incorporation in Comparative Perspective,” Perspectives on Politics 10 no. 1 (2012), 79. 23 Bloemraad and Wright, “Is There a Trade-off,” 79. 21 22
and certain economic rights than noncitizens do. These rights are essential to democracies, “because it is those with the right to vote and to be voted for who may make, amend, and repeal the laws, including those concerning citizenship and naturalization criteria24.” Klusmeyer comes to a similar conclusion, alleging, “Ethnonationalist thinking and the jus sanguinis tradition [have] severely retarded the general course of development, leading to a quite belated acceptance of social reality on the levels of programmatic and legal declarations25.” Citizenship is furthermore an essential component in establishing not only a legal but also social framework for positive integration. Wright and Bloemraad find that immigrants – regardless of citizenship status – “feel more welcomed in countries with inclusive citizenship laws, [because] law and policy on citizenship may provide symbolic legitimacy and a general sense of membership26.” To support this ecological view of citizenship further, their empirical analysis shows that immigrants perceive “less discrimination in countries with more liberal citizenship policies and the least discrimination in countries that offer both liberal citizenship and political multiculturalism27.” Open and inclusive citizenship rights are crucial to upholding democracy both because it provides a legal framework for immigrants to become formal members of the polity and because it instils in society a more accepting and culturally accommodating attitude. Citizenship and Integration in Comparative Perspective The
critical
role
of
citizenship
Brett Klopp, German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship, (Westport CT: Praeger, 2002): 14. 25 Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, Immigration Policy, iiv. 26 Bloemraad and Wright, “Is There a Trade-off,” 80. 27 Ibid, 83. 24
becomes additionally clear when drawing comparisons with the Netherlands, a nation with a similar guest worker program and comparably large population of foreigners, but more open citizenship laws28. The greater success of Dutch integration highlights that naturalization laws are a fundamental components of integration policy. The Dutch government recognized much earlier that foreign guest workers were becoming a permanent component of the country’s demographic, and accordingly introduced comprehensive integration policies in the early 1980s29. These resulted with more foreign pupils in higher education, better integration into the workforce, and less overall social discrimination30. Several studies outline the cases of German and Dutch integration, as the two countries follow a similar historic path of immigration. Like Germany, the Netherlands experienced a period of strong economic growth in the late 1950s, and wrestled with a shortage of workers31. Three years after Germany started its guest worker program with Turkey in 1961, the Netherlands entered into a recruitment agreement with the Mediterranean nation as well32. While the Netherlands never followed an active demigration policy as Germany did in the early 1980s, it did make similar efforts to push Turks to return Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider, “Children of Turkish Immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands: The Impact of Differences in Vocational and Academic Tracking Systems,” Teachers College Record 111 no. 6 (2009), http://www.tcrecord.org/library, 1510. 29 Han Entzinger, “Changing the Rules While the Game Is On; From Multiculturalism to Assimilation in the Netherlands,” In Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos: Incorporation Regimes in Germany, Western Europe and North America, Y. Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul eds., (New York NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 129. 30 Entzinger, “Changing the Rules,” 129. 31 Crul and Schneider, “Children of Turkish Immigrants,” 1510. 32 M.J.M. Maussen, “Constructing Mosques: The Governance of Islam in France and the Netherlands,” Dissertation at University of Amsterdam (2009): 122. 28
Immigration, Integration and the Threat to German Democratic Quality | Weber | 37
to their home countries during times of economic decline in the 1970s. These measures were just as unsuccessful in the Netherlands as they were in Germany, and the immigrant population rose. While Germany continued to see the presence of foreign guest workers as ‘temporary,’ the Dutch government changed its views during the early 1980s33. This led to a shift in integration policy that made naturalization easier34. While the German naturalization policy at the time was based around the principle of descent (jus sanguinis), and made it impossible to obtain citizenship, Dutch policies were fairly open, and only required a residency period of three to five ears. Second-generation immigrants could furthermore opt for Dutch citizenship upon reaching maturity. In Germany, immigrants had to have a residency period of eight years and prove economic self-reliance in order to obtain permanent residency35. Despite similar immigration inflows, these differences distinguish the integration paths of the two nations. The differences in Dutch and German naturalization policies highlight German integration shortfalls since the Netherlands was able to more successfully integrate immigrants given its more inclusive citizenship policies. This is important, because it demonstrates the importance of citizenship for both social and political inclusion. Below, I will briefly compare the success of established integration policies in both nations by looking at education, integration into the labour market, and domestic cultural pushback.
Jaco Dagevos, Rob Euwals, Mérove Gijsberts, and Hans Roodenburg, “The Labour Market Position of Turkish Immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands: Reason for Migration, Naturalisation and Language Proficiency,” Central Planning Bureau Netherlands for Economic Policy Analysis: Discussion Paper 79 (March 2007), http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/, 19. 34 Dagevos et al., “The Labor Market Position,” 20-21. 35 Ibid., 20. 33
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Education In their study on children of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands, Crul and Schneider examine the integrative education policies in the two countries and measure their effects on the academic success of foreign pupils. They highlight that the children of Turkish immigrants are from a similar socioeconomic strata in both countries, as their parents had been recruited mostly as low-skilled labour36. This means differing levels of success of the pupils can be attributed mainly to the characteristics of the education system of their host country.37 They find that children in the Netherlands begin school earlier, and therefore have two more years of formal education “in a crucial phase of their development and socialization, especially with regard to learning the majority language38.” The Dutch system also allowed for the teaching of foreign cultural practices, so that children of immigrants could maintain their culture. Crul and Schneider suggest more inclusive integration measures outside of school can contribute to more inclusive socialization and better performance of foreign pupils as they are less segregated. In the German system, in which no such practices were offered, higher social stratification occurred from an earlier age. Results show that, while the children of immigrants perform worse than native children in both countries, those in Germany performed comparatively worse in higher education measures39. In the 1998 EFFNATIS survey, only nine percent of the second-generation Turks in Germany attended university, representing less than half of the percentage of successful students in the Netherlands40. While Germany offers more alternate tracks and vocational schools, Crul and Schneider, “Children of Turkish Immigrants,” 1510. 37 Ibid., 1511. 38 Ibid., 1512. 39 Ibid., 1517. 40 Ibid., 1512 . 36
this in a sense serves to strengthen the view that immigrants belong to a lower social stratum, since the majority of them pursue these education tracks41. Since the attained level of education has implications for subsequent labour market integration, this suggests this divide is upheld throughout a person’s lifespan.
lowest-skilled jobs suggests that there exist few channels for immigrants to escape this categorical isolation through means of education or labour force mobilization. Therefore, both education and labour policy effectively increases the stratification of foreigners in Germany, and fosters a greater
“The way in which Germany has maintained foreigners in the Labour Market Integration lowest-skilled jobs suggests Euwals et al. affirm the importance of that there exist few channels education policies in securing a better labour market position for Turkish immigrants42. for immigrants to escape this Like with educational policies, immigrants categorical isolation through in the Netherlands and Germany are in means of education or labour less favourable labour positions compared force mobilization” to natives, and the unemployment rate of immigrants is higher than that of natives. Nevertheless, disparities of immigrant’s labour market integration between the two countries are substantial. The study confirms that German integration policies addressed labour market allocation, showing that there are comparatively few immigrants unemployed in Germany than in the Netherlands43. However, the study also highlights that the jobs of immigrants in Germany are less ‘prestigious,’ low-skilled jobs. On this measure, the Netherlands score much better. The jobs immigrants hold have a substantially higher ‘prestige’ in the Netherlands, suggesting that the return on education is no different between immigrants who achieve high levels of education than their native pupils44. Placing large emphasis on the educational component in determining labour market position, Euwals et al. argue that the lower levels of unemployment among immigrants in Germany may be more due to the structure of the labour market and type of jobs they hold rather than a result of integration efforts. The way in which Germany has maintained foreigners in the Ibid. Dagevos et al., “The Labor Market Position,” 7. 43 Ibid., 29. 44 Ibid., 37. 41 42
sense of alienation than in the Netherlands, where foreigners hold broader chances for upward mobility. Cultural pushback As immigration increased in the midto late 1900s, the Dutch took pride in the fact that many people came to their country because of its relative tolerance towards other cultures and religions45. Guest workers were encouraged to maintain their own culture, even after it became clear they would stay in the Netherlands permanently. Ersanilli highlights that “access to citizenship was easy, and the pressure to assimilate was low,” which contributed to a higher level of cultural tolerance and a shared identity amidst growing diversity46. This social inclusion occurred organically in response to the ease with which immigrants were politically integrated47. Since integration policies had been in place from early on, the children of Immigrants have been better able to learn the language and grow up in a Evelyn Ersanilli, “Historical Trends in Immigration and Emigration,” Focus-Migration: The Netherlands, (November 2007), http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/ migration/laenderprofile/58491/historical-trends. 46 Ibid. 47 Crul and Schneider, “Children of Turkish Immigrants,” 1512. 45
Immigration, Integration and the Threat to German Democratic Quality | Weber | 39
way such that they felt ‘Dutch.’ This was also made possible by the political framework that gave them the legal status to legitimize these sentiments. While xenophobic and right-wing extremism are not completely absent, it is hard to ground them in any legitimate basis due to political provisions that stem from the more inclusive legal framework. German discrimination against Turkish immigrants have been a serious reality since the early years of the guest worker program, but increased dramatically following reunification in the 1990s. This so-called neo-Nazism often targeted Turkish immigrants, since they, as author Greg Nees stated, “Are both darker-skinned and Muslim48.” One of the earlier violent acts was the 1992 targeted firebombing in Mölln, which killed three Turkish residents. While obviously illegal and strongly and actively discouraged by the state, these xenophobic opinions were corroborated by the sentiments that Turks in Germany were still ‘temporary’ guest workers who occupied low-skilled jobs Germans themselves did not want. A big problem was the country’s restrictive naturalization laws, which robbed Turks of the legal basis upon which to form an inclusive identity49. A bigger problem was that, when a legal basis was finally installed, it may already have been too late. Ex-Post Facto Integration By the early 1990s, the number of Germans with “personal contact” to nonGermans was rising, and by 1995 reached fifty percent of the population50. This increase was accompanied by a political shift towards a new consciousness of immigration, and it became clear that Germany without foreigners was not an option. Throughout the 1990s, conservative political parties Greg Ness, Germany: Unraveling an Enigma, (Yarmouth, ME.: Intercultural, 2000): 155. 49 Bade,”Klaus J. Bade.” 50 Rauer,”Migration and Integration Policies in Germany,” 128. 48
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lost their majority in parliament, and, in 1998, they were elected out of office after sixteen years in power. One of the first issues the new Social Democratic and Green Party coalition addressed once they took over was the comparatively low level of naturalization rates in Germany51. Arguably the most significant step in working towards integration has been the amendment of the German citizenship law in 1999. The revised law adapted the earlier principle of descent (jus sanguinis), by the acquisition of nationality by birth. This meant all children born in Germany after the law took effect in 2000 could opt into German citizenship at maturity52. The new law also reduced the period of time that immigrants had to reside in the country before being eligible to apply for naturalization53. The “othering” process that had caused a divide between immigrants and natives was no longer legally sustained, and becoming a citizen was easier. However, Germany had not before established the necessary institutional framework, society was highly fragmented, and right-wing extremists became increasingly frustrated with this new development. Important integrative measures had been installed too late, and failing social integration could not be simply undone by the instalment of legal provisions. This caused what Bade calls an “integration paradox54.” While growing up amidst cultural diversity was a normal reality for children in Germany at the time, the instalment of formal political integration policies left cultural pessimists “feeling like losers” and caused a backlash and strengthening of anti-Islamic sentiments55. Following substantial changes to integration policy in 2003, far-right parties experienced a surge in membership, and tried to stop political integration56. Ibid, 129. Ibid. 53 Dagevos et al., “The Labor Market Position,” 11. 54 Bade,”Klaus J. Bade.” 55 Ibid. 56 Rauer,”Migration and Integration Policies in Ger51 52
When efforts were made in the late 1990s to integrate foreigners legally, rightwing extremism in some ways became more “intellectual57.” Anti-immigrant sentiments claimed to be based not solely on the unfounded hatred of foreigners, but they were furthermore aimed at justifying their antagonistic beliefs by stating how immigrants were eroding German values and using up tax dollars through unemployment programs58. This is most infamously argued in German economist Thilo Sarrazin’s 2010 book Deutschland Schafft Sich Ab, which alleges that ‘Germany is running itself into the ground’ by trying to provide social services to Immigrants that contribute little to the country’s economic growth59. While it is certainly democratic to provide the open space in which to profess such allegations, it seems confoundedly undemocratic to wish for the removal of a substantial part of the demos. This obviates the real problem: sentiments that immigrants are not part of the demos continue to exist. These attitudes originated from Germany’s restrictive naturalization policies, which kept immigrants legally – and socially – excluded. Now that they have become included, it is more difficult to reverse engrained perceptions.
higher education, the opportunities to evolve out of this cycle are not available. While, in the Netherlands, there are higher levels of unemployment, there are more pupils in higher education, and the disparities in the labour market are not as extreme. While ‘immigrants’ are effectively an isolated group in Germany, this is the case only to a much lesser extent in the Netherlands. Since political integration policies were installed earlier, and naturalization policies were more open and inclusive, Dutch immigrants felt more welcomed and Dutch natives less hostile. In Germany, the ambivalence towards integration–with economic policies present but social and political policies largely absent until much later–there ensured an unfortunate divide between immigrants and the native population. While many children in Germany
Drawing Conclusions
have grown up surrounded by much cultural and ethnic diversity, it will take additional time for the engrained ‘positions’ within society to be corrected by the growing inclusiveness of political integration policies. Fortunately, there are promising steps being made. The recently formed Grand Coalition between Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party has included additional amendments to the naturalization law, and has eliminated the provision that children of immigrants born in Germany must choose a citizenship upon maturity. Instead, they will be dual-citizens. Germany cannot do – and should not do – without immigrants, especially because many of them feel just as
While immigrants in Germany have higher levels of employment and seem therefore to be integrated into the labour force, it is hardly a shining example of democratic values that the large majority of jobs held by immigrants are low-skilled and low-pay jobs. Since the job attainment is so heavily based on education attainment, and few children of immigrants enter into many,” 137. 57 Bade,”Klaus J. Bade.” 58 Alexander Neubacher and Andreas von Macho, “Bücher Review: Deutschland Schafft Sich Ab,” [Book Review: Germany Abolishes Itself ], Spiegel Online, (May 2012), http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/. 59 Neubacher and von Macho, “Bücher Review.”
“... European Union is extremely reluctant to be directly involved in the internal governance of its member states. Most areas concerning social inclusion, such as social welfare, housing, healthcare and education fall under this principle.”
Immigration, Integration and the Threat to German Democratic Quality | Weber | 41
much or more ‘German’ than any other Dagevos, Jaco, Rob Euwals, Mérove nationality. The perception of what it means to be German must become more inclusive Gijsberts, and Hans Roodenburg. “The Labour Market Position of Turkiand more colourful. Only then can the full sh Immigrants in Germany and the potential of Germany’s democratic integrity Netherlands: Reason for Migration, Nabe realized. turalisation and Language Proficiency.” ___________________________________ Central Planning Bureau Netherlands for Economic Policy Analysis: Discussion Paper References 79 (March 2007). http://www.cpb.nl/en/ publication/. Bade, Klaus. “Klaus J. Bade: Integrationspolitik Muss Als Gesellschaftspolitik Für Alle Verstanden Werden.” [Inte- Entzinger, Han. “Changing the Rules While the Game Is On; From Multiculgration Policy a Necessary Social Policy turalism to Assimilation in the Netherfor All to be Understood]. Interview in lands.” In Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos: Deutsch Türkische Nachrichten. (March Incorporation Regimes in Germany, Wes2013). http://www.deutsch-tuertern Europe and North America, edited kische-nachrichten.de. by Y. Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul. New York NY: Palgrave MacBartsch, Matthias, Andrea Brandt and Damillan, 2006: 121-44. niel Steinvorth. “Turkish Immigration to Germany: A Sorry History of Self-DeErsanilli, Evelyn. “Historical Trends in Imception and Wasted Opportunities.” migration and Emigration.” Focus-MiSpiegel Online. (September 2010). http:// gration: The Netherlands. (November www.spiegel.de/international/germany/. 2007). http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/ migration/laenderprofile/58491/historiBloemraad, Irene and Matthew Wright. “Is cal-trends. There a Trade-off between Multiculturalism and Socio-Political Integration? Haase, Marianne and Jan C. Jugl. “MiPolicy Regimes and Immigrant Incorgration Im Europäischen Vergleich poration in Comparative Perspective.” Zahlen, Daten, Fakten?” [Comparison Perspectives on Politics 10 no. 1 (2012): of European Migration - Figures Data, 77-95. Facts?]. Bundeszentrale Für Politische Bildung (August 2008). http://www.bpb. Bökenkamp, Gérard. “Migration: Wie de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-miWurde Deutschland Ein Einwangration/56589/migrationsdaten. derungsland?” [Migration: How Is Germany a Country of Immigration]. Herbert, Ulrich. Geschichte Der AusländerEigentümlich Frei: Politische Analyse politik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, ( June 2008). http://ef-magazin.de. Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge. [History of Foreign Policy in Germany: Borkert, Maren, Wolfgang Bosswick, Seasonal Workers, Forced Laborers, Friedrich Heckmann, and Doris LükenMigrant Workers, Fugitives]. Munich Klaßen. “Local Integration Policies for DE: Beck, 2003. Migrants in Europe.” European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2007). http://www. Gottschlich, Jürgen, Bernd Knopf and Cem Özdemir. Currywurst Und Döner: eurofound.europa.eu. Integration in Deutschland. [Currywurst and Doner: Integration in Germany]. Crul, Maurice, and Jens Schneider. “ChildBergisch Gladbach DE: Bastei Lübbe, ren of Turkish Immigrants in Germany 1999. Klingholz, Rainer. “Migration and the Netherlands: The Impact of and Integration Policies in Germany – Differences in Vocational and AcadeDemographic Change and Migration in mic Tracking Systems.” Teachers College Germany.” In Migration and Integration: Record 111 no. 6 (2009): 1508-1527. Japan in Comparative Perspective, edited http://www.tcrecord.org/library. 42 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
by Glenda S. Roberts and Gabriele Vogt. Munich DE: Iudicium, 2011: 111-124. Klopp, Brett. German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship. Westport CT: Praeger, 2002. Klusmeyer, Douglas B., and Demetrios G. Papademetriou. Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Negotiating Membership and Remaking the Nation. Oxford GB: Berghahn Books, 2009. Lang, Peter and Marianne Takle. German Policy on Immigration--from Ethnos to Demos? Frankfurt DE: Lang, 2007. Maussen, M.J.M. “Constructing Mosques: The Governance of Islam in France and the Netherlands.” Dissertation at University of Amsterdam, 2009. Nees, Greg. Germany: Unraveling an Enigma. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural, 2000. Neubacher, Alexander and Andreas von Macho. “Bücher Review: Deutschland Schafft Sich Ab.” [Book Review: Germany Abolishes Itself ]. Spiegel Online. (May 2012). http://www.spiegel.de/ spiegel/print/. Rauer, Valentin. “Migration and Integration Policies in Germany - Turkish Migrants’ Associations And Their Impact on Policy Reform.” In Migration and Integration: Japan in Comparative Perspective, edited by Glenda S. Roberts and Gabriele Vogt. Munich DE: Iudicium, 2011: 124-144. Springer, Axel. “OECD Kritisiert Deutschen “Anwerbestop”” [OECD Criticizes German “Anwerbestop”]. Die Welt. (February 2013). http://www.welt. de/kultur/literarischewelt/. von Bebenburg, Pitt, and Matthias Thieme. “Deutschland Ohne Ausländer? Das Wäre Grauenhaft!” [Germany Not for Foreigners? That Would Be Ridiculous]. Die Welt. ( June 2012). http://www.welt. de/wirtschaft/.
Immigration, Integration and the Threat to German Democratic Quality | Weber | 43
Los Madres de la Plaza de Mayo: Feminine or Feminists? By ZoĂŠ Lajoie
Keywords: Artgentinean Politics, Social Movement, Feminism, Political Activism
Abstract Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo is part of an ongoing debate in the literature regarding feminine movements and whether they can be considered feminist. While the movement has been criticized by feminists for advancing its cause through motherhood, the Mothers succeeded in carving a space in politics for Argentinean women by challenging the entrenched gender norms. Additionally, the examination of the movement must take capacities into account as the use of feminine values was a direct consequence of the Mothers’ background, in contrast to the middle-class feminists who have criticized them.
G
ender equality has become a major issue for human rights organizations in recent decades. Indeed, many organizations have been formed, and are still formed, all around the world to promote equality between men and women. While many of them are ‘feminist’ organizations, there also exist some that are considered ‘feminine,’ especially in developing countries. Indeed, feminist organizations focus on equal opportunity between genders, while feminine organization promote values usually associated with women, such as motherhood, love, caring, etc. However, the distinction is not as clear as it looks since these two types of organizations can sometimes share common goals1. Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo is representative of these blurred distinctions since there has been an ongoing debate regarding whether it is a feminist or a feminine movement. This question remains important because of the long-term consequences this movement had on women activism in Argentina, but also more generally in Latin America. In this paper I will argue that the movement of Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo constituted a feminist movement because it challenged traditional gender roles as dictated by the Argentinean government and Church. It created a space for women in Argentinean politics even though it was based on the value of motherhood. First I will discuss how the movement challenged Nikki Craske, Women and Politics in Latin America (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 165. 1
deeply entrenched gender roles and norms in Latin America. Then, I will demonstrate how the Mothers contributed to the opening of a political space for women in Argentina. Finally, I will go over some of the most important feminist critiques toward the movement and the Mothers’ responses. Historical Context On March 24, 1976, the government led by Isabel Peron was overthrown by the military, making it the sixth coup d’état in Argentina since 1930. However, this military coup was different from the previous ones, as it would initiate the darkest period in the history of Argentina, one characterized by atrocities committed by the government. Shortly after the coup, the statute for the process of national reorganization, also known as the Proceso, replaced the constitution and gave the military full judicial, legislative and executive powers2. The military regime was based on the Doctrine of National Security: the enemies ostensibly came from within Argentina, not abroad, and were seen as “[threatening] the fundamental Western and Christian values of Argentine society3.” This threat led to the “dirty war,” or the war against subversion, which had two main components: direct Rita Arditti, Searching for Life: The Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Disappeared Children of Argentina (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 7-8. 3 Arditti, Searching for Life, 12. 2
Los Madres de la Plaza de Mayo | Lajoie | 45
confrontation with guerilla forces and “a long clandestine campaign carried out by special task forces,” whose aim was to abduct individuals seen as seditious.4 Furthermore, since the government believed in a definition of subversion that was quite broad, tens of thousands of people were taken. However, the junta did not acknowledge that those activities were perpetrated under their orders. After being arrested, the individuals were brought to concentration camps or clandestine detention centers. Those who were detained, the detenidos, were living in inhumane conditions and subjected to repeated torture; those who were abducted but not formally arrested were called desaparecidos, as many of them were never heard from again. The special task force did not make any distinctions when accusing individuals of subversion; men, women, children, adults, elders and even pregnant women were all possible subjects to abduction5. Once the abductions started, the victims’ relatives reported the arrests, disappearances, and kidnappings and tried to gain information about their possible locations, but the judicial branch denied them the right to undertake legal procedures. Those who continued to pressure the authorities for help did so at the risk of their lives as they received threats and became victims of abduction themselves. Through powerful state terrorism, the junta instigated fear throughout the population with the intention of prompting compliance, but also created profound divisions between the state and civil society6. The movement of Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, which emerged in April 1977, was one movement that arose as a consequence of the conditions produced Marysa Navarro, “The Personal is Political: Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo,” in Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, ed. Susan Eckstein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 244 5 Ibid., 244-6. 6 Ibid, 247-8. 4
46 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
by the Proceso. Compared to other human rights organizations, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo only comprised women, most of whom lost their children as a result of the “dirty war.” Moreover, none of them had been involved in politics before joining the movement as their societal roles had primarily been as housewives. Their main act of political defiance was to walk silently around the pyramid in the Plaza de Mayo, which, though a seemingly useless activity, was something that no other human rights group or political organization had ever attempted before during this particular military regime. These Thursday marches became a ritual and subsequently gathered additional members as other organizations such as Las Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo, a group of women looking for their lost grandchildren, began to participate7. The government’s first response was to ignore the Mothers or ridicule them, calling them Las Locas de la Plaza de Mayo because they, “did not recognize the political nature of the Madre’s actions and, [so, they] did not attempt to suppress the group8.” This gave rise to the opportunity for the movement to “strengthen their resolve, contact other mothers, establish an informal organization and engage in other activities9.” When the junta finally recognized the Mothers’ political potential, they began using force and many of the women were abducted as part of these forceful tactics. As a result, the Mothers decided to seek the help of other human rights organizations in Europe and the United states for support and international attention. When the military’s hold on the government started to show weaknesses, the Mothers were an active part of the struggle to end the Proceso. Additionally, when the electoral campaign began, the issue of the desaparecidos had become a central focal point for political Ibid, 249-51. Ibid, 251. 9 Ibid, 252. 7 8
parties as a consequence of their efforts10. Challenging Gender Roles The women who formed and participated in the movement of Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo had more in common than simply the disappearance of their children. Indeed, they all came from the working class, where their primary role was to take care of the children and their husbands11. By creating this movement, the Mothers “subverted the concept of motherhood as merely biological and stepped out of their roles as passive and private persons,” defying the values promoted by the Catholic Church, which
“They misjudged the devotion of the Mothers to their cause, believing the use of force would drive them home and away from political activism.”
supported the existing political system12. For example, due to the financial hardship experienced by Argentina during the Proceso, it was crucial for women to have a source of income so as to complement their husbands.’ This new responsibility was condemned by the Church and the military because it was the first step toward a shift from the private to the public sphere.13 Surely, the movement, by encouraging women to move beyond the private sphere, directly challenged the gender roles and functions perpetrated by the Catholic Church and the state through the cultural ideas of machismo and marianismo. When the Mothers began engaging in political activism against the junta, they “[refused] to be co-opted into the prevailing values and power structure” promoted by Ibid, 252-5. Jo Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 32. 12 Marguerite Guzman Bouvard, Revolutionizing Motherhood: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1994), 184. 13 Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared, 55.
the Church and the military14. Indeed, their actions illustrated their rejection of two important and self-reinforcing concepts in Argentina: machismo and marianismo, which were sustained by the Church and the military15. In Latin America, machismo is “the cult of virility,” which glorifies men’s violent tendencies and authority over women. It is a reflection of the cultural norms and expectations toward women in Argentina. Because the role of men in supporting their family is predominant in this culture, ‘good women’ are confined to their home to take care of their children16. Moreover, marianismo reinforces machismo in its contrast to men, as women are expected to act in the image of the Virgin Mary. As a result, a woman must be humble and prepared to sacrifice herself, which makes her morality greater than that of a man, while remaining submissive to him17. It is quite evident that the actions taken by the Mothers to retrieve their children did not fit the description of what a decent woman was obligated to do in Argentina. Indeed, they “proclaimed principles totally at variance with the political system and [...] did so openly18.” For this reason, when the military could no longer pretend to be indifferent to their actions, “it fell victim to the misconceptions of its own machismo” and took forceful measures against the movement19. They misjudged the devotion of the Mothers to their cause, believing the use of force would drive them home and away from political activism. Indeed, now that they had crossed the line between the private and the public, “which [had] served to constrain their political participation,” they were not ready to give up what they had acquired20. By involving themselves outside of their homes and challenging the Bouvard, Revolutionizing Motherhood, 184. Ibid, 184. 16 Craske, Women and Politics in Latin America, 11. 17 Bouvard, Revolutionizing Motherhood, 184. 18 Ibid, 98. 19 Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared, 60. 20 Craske, Women and Politics in Latin America, 25.
10
14
11
15
Los Madres de la Plaza de Mayo | Lajoie | 47
government like no other organization or movement had done before, Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo defied the assigned gender roles defined by the concepts of machismo and marianismo, introducing themselves into a public sphere traditionally reserved for men, and confronted the Church and the military’s ideas regarding the place of women in society. Creation of a Political Space for Women As a result of the cult of machismo and marianismo, the Mothers, like the majority of women from the working class, had never engaged in anything remotely political before Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo.21
“As they continued to confront the government the Mothers realized the extent to which the military was ready to lie in order to hide its activities and protect itself.” However, the movement would have important consequences on the political opportunities of women in Argentina. The introduction of the Mothers into political activism began when they accepted the challenge to continue the fight of their children. Indeed, most of their children were abducted for having acted against the regime or for having expressed dissent toward the military. As they continued to confront the government the Mothers realized the extent to which the military was ready to lie in order to hide its activities and protect itself22. As a result, the Mothers decided to pursue the work of their children by confronting the government and demanding justice in a process called “inverted generational transmission” because it was the Mothers who “learned from the example set by their offspring23.” Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared, 52. Bouvard, Revolutionizing Motherhood, 175-7. 23 Graciela Di Marco, “Women’s Movements in 21 22
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From this point on, Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo started practicing “social motherhood,” which implied that, instead of women striving to protect their own missing children, they saw themselves as the mothers of all those oppressed within Argentinean society and therefore, saw it as their mission to protect all of these individuals from the government’s actions. For example, even after the junta left power, they took care of the political prisoners that were arrested and jailed under the military government and pushed for their cause to be heard.24 The consequence of the Mothers’ practice of “social motherhood” was the very politicization of motherhood, making “it no longer a private exercise in the privacy of the home subjected to male authority” but rather a basis for political activism25. Even after the Supreme Court’s decision to declare the amnesty laws unconstitutional and void in 2005, the Mothers continued to engage in political activism and collaborated with other human rights organizations and movements, guaranteeing their persistent relevance in Argentina26. The empowerment of women in Argentina was directly linked to social motherhood. According to Craske, empowerment is a “process by which oppressed persons gain some control over their lives by taking part with others in development of activities and structures that allow people increased involvement in matters which affect them directly27.” Through social motherhood, women that were once confined to their homes found a cause for which to fight, giving them their first opportunity to involve themselves in politics. Therefore Argentina: Tensions and Articulations,” in Women’s Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Engendering Social Justice, Democratizing Citizenship, ed. Elizabeth Maier and Nathalie Lebon (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 161. 24 Bouvard, Revolutionizing Motherhood, 185. 25 Di Marco, “Women’s Movements in Argentina,” 161. 26 Ibid. 27 Craske, Women and Politics in Latin America, 23.
the empowerment of women becomes implicit within the movement of the Mothers, challenging traditional notions of public and private spheres by demanding the right to find missing and abducted children28. Furthermore, the empowerment of women during this violent period in Argentina contributed to the expansion of the place of women in politics. Women in Argentina, and Latin America more generally, have increasingly held legislative and executive positions in political parties and the government at large29. Additionally most women’s organizations in Argentina were created following the movement of Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo. By politicizing the idea of maternity through social motherhood, the Mothers created a political space and opportunities for women in Argentina who came mostly from the working class and whose primary role was being a mother. This, in turn, empowered many women and led to the introduction of women in formal politics and to the creation of many women’s organizations. However, the concept of motherhood is still central to the many political activities in which women engage in Argentina30. Feminist Critiques Even though many see Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo as one of the most important women’s movements, it is still heavily criticized, particularly by feminist scholars within political science who have condemned the Mothers for emphasizing the role of “motherhood” in their cause. Indeed, they thought “it [locked] women into a traditional, marginalized and passive role [...] and [reinforced] the sexual division of labor” instead of promoting new gender roles31. As explained previously, Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo did not challenge their Ibid, 25. Di Marco, “Women’s Movements in Argentina,” 162. 30 Craske, Women and Politics in Latin America, 25. 31 Bouvard, Revolutionizing Motherhood, 184. 28 29
role as mothers; rather they based their whole campaign on the concept of motherhood. Many feminists believe that the Mothers should have found an alternative means to challenge the government and its violent activities in a way that directly defied the traditional place of women in society or, in other words, in a way that was more radical to ensure drastic change. Other middle class feminist groups in Argentina resembled their counterparts within the West. They sought to leave the private sphere altogether and strived to have the same rights and possibilities as men, such as accessibility to certain jobs and inclusion in formal politics. They believed that in glorifying motherhood and the private sphere, the Mothers actually perpetuated the cult of machismo and marianismo. Indeed, through its portrayal of mothers as the saviors of the oppressed ones, the movement reinforced the image of the Virgin Mary and moral superiority over men. This in turn highlighted the distinctions between men’s and women’s roles in society32. As a response to those critiques, many Mothers said that they were “uncomfortable with some of the feminist organizations in Argentina because they see them as representing privileged circles33.” The Mothers from the working class were not living in the same conditions as the feminists from the middle class. Therefore, the possibilities for them to enter the political sphere to defy assigned gender roles were quite limited compared to the radical feminists who “enjoyed more freedom and have been able to penetrate previously allmale professions34.” As a result, Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo elaborated modes of political action proper to their social class which ultimately gave them more power as the government did not expect their resistance35. Ibid, 189-90. Ibid, 189-91. 34 Ibid, 184. 35 Ibid, 184. 32 33
Los Madres de la Plaza de Mayo | Lajoie | 49
Finally, feminists who have criticised the Mothers did not acknowledge the importance of the concept of “motherhood” in the success of the movement. The goal of the Mothers was not to eliminate gender roles linked to maternity but to “[create] a political role for the values of love and the caring work associated with maternity36.” As Bouvard argues, “humanizing political behaviour is an important thread in the changes [the Mothers] seek to bring about37.” Indeed, the centrality of love and caring was used in contrast to the violence of the government. While radicalism would have attracted direct reprisal from the military, the Mothers’ strategy based on motherhood made them initially appear more insignificant38. Furthermore, social motherhood also brought compassion from other groups in society as well as international attention and support39. Therefore, the Mothers’ strategy was to act against the militaristic thinking of the government and, as a consequence, weakened its support40. Thus, the critics who claim that Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo did not constitute a feminist movement did not take into consideration that the Mothers came from a less privileged background. The Mothers saw this strategy as representative of their situation and as an effective way to counter the violence perpetrated by the junta. Conclusion After the military coup of 1976, the government and the Church had been working together to ensure compliance to the regime. One way that both institutions did so was through the emphasis of the concepts of machismo and marianismo, which guaranteed that women would not engage in political activities and remain in the Ibid, 187. Ibid, 185. 38 Ibid, 185. 39 Navarro, “The Personal is Political,” 253. 40 Bouvard, Revolutionizing Motherhood, 188. 36 37
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private sphere under the authority of men. However, when the Mothers went to the streets to demand information concerning the whereabouts of their children, they crossed that boundary and became active members in the public sphere through political activism, and were seen as a threat to both the regime and to the Church. Furthermore, when the Mothers decided to openly contest the government like their children before them by basing their action on social motherhood, it empowered women in Argentina in an unprecedented way, allowing for the introduction of more women in formal politics and other organizations. Nevertheless, the Mothers were still criticized for having openly used maternity as the symbol of their movement. Their actions were seen as reinforcing the traditional roles of women and the sexual division of labour. Indeed, some argued that a more radical version of feminism would have been as effective against the government and would have had a stronger impact on expected gender roles in society. Problematically, these feminist critiques did not take into consideration the modest background from which the Mothers came; one that provided them less freedom and fewer opportunities than radical middle class feminists. Despite this, the promotion of values linked to motherhood, such as love and caring, was an effective strategy to use in contrast to the violence perpetrated by the military. This helped the movement garner support from the international community that was able to relate to their cause. Additional work should contrast Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo with a more radical women’s movement during another military regime. Indeed, such a study would provide information regarding which political strategy is the most effective when facing a repressive and violent government. It would additionally give scholars the opportunity to see if more a radical feminist movement would trigger more changes in gender roles and expectations in the
long run. However, comparable women’s movements from this historical period are heavily under-researched, which highlights the importance of Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo as an important case study within Latin American feminist politics. ___________________________________ References
Arditti, Rita. Searching for Life: The Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Disappeared Children of Argentina. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Bouvard, Marguerite Guzman. Revolutionizing Motherhood: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1994. Craske, Nikki. Women and Politics in Latin America. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999. Di Marco, Graciela. “Women’s Movements in Argentina: Tensions and Articulations.” In Women’s Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Engendering Social Justice, Democratizing Citizenship, edited by Elizabeth Maier and Nathalie Lebon, 159-174. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010. Fisher, Jo. Mothers of the Disappeared. Boston: South End Press, 1989. Navarro, Marysa. “The Personal is Political: Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo.” In Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, edited by Susan Eckstein, 241-258. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
Los Madres de la Plaza de Mayo | Lajoie | 51
The Militarization of Japan as a Postclassical Realist Strategy By Karlene Ooto-Stubbs
Keywords: Japan, Foreign Policy, Post-Classical Realism, Article 9, Rearmament
Abstract Japan’s post-WWII constitution contains a clause titled Article 9, which renounces the use of war to solve international disputes. However, current rhetoric expressed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe articulates attitudes favouring the rearmament of Japan’s security forces. This paper contends that the militarist movement in Japan is the result of its decades-long stagnant economy, security issues with neighbouring China and North Korea, its military and economic ties with the United States, and various formative periods of military governance. By employing the framework of postclassical realism, these factors can help explain Japan’s rearmament behavior.
T
he formation of Japanese foreign policy has changed profoundly over the course of the past century, resulting in unique patterns of its interstate interactions. The early decades of the twentieth century coincided with the prosecution of an extraordinarily aggressive foreign policy by successive governments in Japan; ones that are associated with a series of terrible wars and infamous occupations across East and Southeast Asia. This pattern of bellicosely revisionist foreign policy culminated in Japan’s defeat at the end of the Second World War, after which the government and political sphere was expunged of all militaristic tendencies and the island nation entered into a long and uninterrupted peace which persists to this day. Recently, however, rearmament has become a salient issue in Japan’s domestic political discourse, and its foreign policy appears increasingly to shy away from defensive approaches to perceived foreign threats, instead favoring more active responses—even if they carry the risk of confrontation with regional competitors1. Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan famously renounces the right of its government to wage war—a legal measure operationalized through limitations imposed on the size of military forces and the virtual elimination of offensive capabilities2. Stephen G Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 446. 2 Wada Shuichi, “Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and Security Policy: Realism Versus Idealism in 1
However, the current rhetoric articulated by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expresses determination to dramatically alter the postwar institutionalization of Japan’s pacifist foreign policy. This resurgent militarism and the rearmament dialogue are the result of Japan’s chronic economic stagnation, latent security concerns emanating from China and North Korea, shifting military and economic ties with the United States (US), and the reanimation of prior formative periods of military governance within public consciousness. This paper contends that the aforementioned factors, as they account for contemporary shifts in Japan’s foreign policymaking, are best understood within the framework of postclassical realism3. Recent Japanese foreign policy has placed heavy emphasis on economic performance and technological prowess4. Indicative of this was Japan’s attainment of the position of second largest economy in the world during the 1980’s5. Observing this phenomenon, scholar Tsuyoshi Kawasaki comments that, “unlike defensive realism, postclassical realism explicitly incorporates the question of economic power in addition to that of the security dilemma6.” Cognizant Japan since the Second World War” (paper presented at the Japan Forum, 2010), 408. 3 Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” 445-46. 4 Unless indicated otherwise, “Japanese foreign policy” will heretofore refer to its general manifestation and patterns in the postwar era. 5 Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” CJST 28, no. 1 (2008): 5. 6 Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and The Militarization of Japan | Ooto-Stubbs | 53
of this, it is clear that Japan’s postwar strategic culture highly values the rationality of conflict-avoidance, as demonstrated by its strong economic ties with the US and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Consensus
“unlike defensive realism, post classical realism explicitly incorporates the question of economic power in addition to that of the security dilemma.”
within Japan’s foreign policy community has traditionally maintained that the sheer breadth of exchange and economic activity generated by these ties inherently confers a minimum guarantee of security to the nation and allows for the accumulation of power without the need to expend resources on the maintenance of a sizeable military. The Yoshida doctrine, named after Shigeru Yoshida who served as prime minister of Japan between 1948 and 1954, prioritized economic growth in postwar Japan and stipulated that international disputes be avoided wherever possible and defense expenditures be kept to a minimum, relative to those of contemporary liberal democracies.7 Yet, by 1963, Yoshida’s stance had changed, notably embodied where he insisted that “Japan should spend more money for its defense as an advanced independent state,” as reflected by Abe’s view for Japan’s becoming a normalized state8. Japan’s arrival as an “advanced independent state”—to borrow from the words of Yoshida—is widely attributed to innovations such as the just-in-time production system, as well as technological advances made by Japanese Security Policy,” The Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (2001): 224. 7 Shuichi, “Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and Security Policy: Realism Versus Idealism in Japan since the Second World War,” 409. 8 Ibid.; I use the term “normalized state” to reference a state’s ability to possess its own offensive security forces, in contrast with Japan’s unique security situation. 54 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
large Japanese corporations9. As Takashi Inoguchi states on the rise of Japan’s income level, “[it] went up so steadily that Japan became the target of envy and then of enmity10.” The apparent success of Japan’s foreign policy in fostering impressive economic performance, however, overshadows dangerous domestic structural developments. By the 1980s, Japan’s economy had developed a precarious bubble, the bursting of which it has yet to recover from11. Consequently, Japan has amassed massive public debts while its economic performance remains stagnant and uninspiring. Some observers contend that the remedy for the current economic circumstance may be found along the path to rearmament which, in the postwar period, is considered by some as a chance to boost growth and restore a sense of national spirit to Japanese society12. From a theoretical perspective, the postclassical realist framework maintains that if a given defense plan is too expensive to be sustained by a nation’s economy, the state will choose a more cost-effective defense plan that preserves some previously-established level of minimum security13.This is congruent with the contemporary trend of Japan’s moderate rearmament. However, owing to Japan’s flagging economy, policymakers might conceivably wait until more robust economic performance is in place to fully undertake rearmament. Jennifer Miller corroborates this where she writes that, “in July 1953, Masao Nakamura, “Changing Japanese Business, Economy and Society: Globalization of Post-Bubble Japan,” Asian Business & Management 5(2006): 115. 10 Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” 5. 11 Alizera Dehesh and Cedric Pugh, “The Internationalization of Post‐1980 Property Cycles and the Japanese ‘Bubble’economy, 1986–96,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23, no. 1 (1999): 148-49. 12 Jennifer M Miller, “The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in Us-Japanese Relations,” Journal of Contemporary History 46, no. 1 (2011): 83. 13 Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” 228. 9
Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo reasserted that ‘the development of Japan’s defensive capabilities is to be predicated on her economic stability and development since it is recognized that defensive strength must build on a stable economic base14.’” Japan is, no doubt, attempting to reclaim its once-premier position as Asia’s top economy, and its policymakers understand that, “global competition [makes] it clear that [the economy must] reform itself to regain competitiveness15.” Increasing competition with China (and, to a lesser extent, other regional competitors such as South Korea) ultimately leave Japan’s foreign policy—heretofore based on a robust domestic economy—contending with creeping insecurities. Apart from accounting for the economic factors contributing to the rise of rearmament discourse in Japan, the nation’s history as the sole colonial power native to Asia has not been forgotten within the public consciousness of its neighbors. The colonial experiences of peoples spanning from northern China, through Southeast Asia, and into islands such as the Philippines and Indonesia, has created a latent distrust of Japan among these nowmodern nations, as they remain cognizant of its imperial aggression during the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. This colonial legacy is frequently cited by politicians in East Asian countries as reason to fear Japanese rearmament. Yet, contemporary circumstances differ substantially from the past in that several nations in the region—notably China and South Korea—possess well-equipped militaries and economies that are now advanced and robust16. In this sense, Japan’s approach to security is explained well by Miller, “The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in Us-Japanese Relations,” 97. 15 Nakamura, “Changing Japanese Business, Economy and Society: Globalization of Post-Bubble Japan,” 222. 16 David C Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 77. 14
the postclassical realist framework, which construes states as actors who are, “highly sensitive to the economic costs of defense,” thus, “[maximize] their security without threatening others in a situation of the security dilemma17.” Despite what current rhetoric may suggest, Japan is reluctant to aggressively rearm because of the possible reactions from other nations in the region. Thus, as opposed to any dramatic surges in military acquisitions and mobilization, Japan has steadily been building its military in recent decades18. Postclassical realist scholarship also hypothesizes that rational states respond to probable, not possible, conflicts.19 The probability of conflicts among states varies according to factors such as technology, geography, and international economic pressure, even if military capabilities remain relatively constant20. Consequently, unpredictability created by challengers to the status quo—particularly South Korea and China—lead Japanese policymakers to increasingly consider substantive and strategic rearmament. To varying extents, both North and South Korea would consider Japan’s rearmament to be particularly threatening to their own security. Such is owing to the two states’ experience under the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula, which began of the 20th century and did not end until the conclusion of the Second World War. Recent issues in this sense have involved official visits by Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine, which both Korean governments consider crassly offensive as it memorializes Japanese war criminals21. Conversely, North Korean missile tests have worsened relations Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” 223. 18 Shuichi, “Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and Security Policy: Realism Versus Idealism in Japan since the Second World War,” 423. 19 Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” 447. 20 Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” 228. 21 Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” 6. 17
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further, and threaten a security dilemma within the region. Regularly launching threats against the Japanese islands, North Korea’s totalitarian government harbors animosity towards Japan largely as a result of its role in the Korean War, wherein Japan served as the central mobilization point for the US military and benefited enormously in terms of American procurement contracts and other externalities22. Further exacerbating tensions between Japan and North Korea, the former’s Maritime Safety Agency forcefully engaged a North Korean vessel (unidentified at the time) as it resisted a procedural boarding by the Japanese ship23. Japanese foreign policy undoubtedly makes real considerations of the threat posed by North Korea, as the rogue state possesses nuclear weapons and harbors longstanding resentment towards the Japan. So, an important factor in Japan’s steady rearmament can be derived from political instability in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, the extent to which Japanese foreign policymakers fear a North Korean attack is consistent with the postclassical realist view that states will act in preparation of probable conflicts. Similar to the case of North Korea, atrocities committed by the Japanese army during its occupation of China contribute to latent animosity there. Contrasting with North Korea, however, China’s threat against Japan is more economically-based than militarily. Furthermore, Japan’s role as the largest economy in Asia is quickly being upset by China’s rise, thus creating instability in that Japanese policy calculations based on the regional economic primacy appear increasingly challenged. Japanese foreign policy has conceived of peace and security as being a function of trade, but students of postclassical realism would likely argue that Japan Miller, “The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in Us-Japanese Relations,” 87. 23 Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” 8. 22
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may militarize if Chinese firms continue to undercut their domestic counterparts, eventually supplanting its trade with the US. Postclassical realism regards rational states as those which ultimately “[seek] to increase the economic resources under their control . . . subject to the constraint of providing for short-term military security24.” Recent developments in Japanese foreign policy display that it has not only been more active in terms of attaining greater security independence, but has also moved to disassociate itself from any potential conflict over Taiwan25. Such has had the effect of straining its relations with the US, as this lack of commitment to Taiwan can be perceived as an appeasement to China26. Surprisingly, however, China has indicated that Japan’s alliance with the United States is more preferable than an independent Japan with much more powerful military capabilities27. Ultimately, and in accordance with the theoretical work of Kenneth Waltz, Japan might reasonably be expected to expand its military capabilities under the guise of mitigating uncertainties stemming from the anarchic nature of the international system28. Like the potential flashpoint that Japan faces in the case of Taiwan, its territorial dispute with China and the Philippines over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Sea further threatens regional security29. As China’s economic clout increasingly grows, Japanese policymakers Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” 228. 25 Ibid. 26 Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” 228.; To be sure, Japan would prefer the avoidance of any conflict altogether. Taiwan, however, constitutes an important strategic consideration, particularly for the US, and the expectation is that Japan would contribute to its defense in the event of conflict. 27 Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” 7. 28 Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” 226. 29 ““Japan Will Stand up to China, Says Pm Shinzo Abe,” BBC News, October 26 2013. 24
undoubtedly harbor apprehensions that such territorial disputes may be used as a pretext for war. This perception generates a sense of insecurity about Japan’s own status in the global order of powerful states, and permits militarism and rearmament to be increasingly considered as viable measures to counteract China’s rise. Following the end of the Second World War, the US has proven to be Japan’s most important ally, both militarily and economically. Not only do the two nations profit enormously from trade and commerce among themselves, but Japan has relied on the American security umbrella for its defense since the end of the Second World War. Recently, however, Japanese policymakers “show signs of not only being more active on the security front, but also of being more independent of the United States30.” After decades of American military presence and a changing balance of power, the importance of the US military to Japan is arguably dwindling. The reduction of military expenditures brought about by the end of the Cold War, coupled with recent American military occupations and engagements in the Middle East have created an environment in which Japanese policymakers have begun to doubt the tenability of US security commitments to them. If the US were allies to Japan, or even if the Japanese perceived such a possibility, the latter’s subdued military capabilities would create a regional power vacuum and likely invite harassment—at the very least—from other powers within the region. The withdrawal of American military protection of Japan would dramatically alter the regional balance of power, wherein the postclassical realist framework contends that Japan itself would militarize to ensure its own minimum-acceptable level of security. Present day Japanese foreign policy assumes a continued leadership role for the US and emphasizes the capitalization Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” 78. 30
of market conditions, which are most conducive with its economic performance and power-projection31. This is consistent with Kawasaki’s conception of Japan as exhibiting tendencies of expected state behavior within the postclassical realist
“If the US were allies to Japan, or even if the Japanese perceived such a possibility, the latter’s subdued military capabilities would create a regional power vacuum and likely invite harassment—at the very least—from other powers within the region.”
paradigm, evidence where he writes that, “the combined concerns for the regional security dilemma (primary concern) and economic resources (secondary concern) form the theoretical core of Japan’s basic defense posture since the mid-1970s32.” President Obama’s recently-announced pivot of American security commitments to the Pacific, away from traditional theaters in Europe, dispels some of the aforementioned notions and undermines aspects of Abe’s dialogue—specifically those regarding the need for Japan to provide for its own defense. Ultimately, Japan’s foreign policy has been based on its alliance with the US since 1945, but it is important to make note of the “waning and waxing of the United States’ hegemony” when considering Japan’s rearmament33. Assuming a decrease in American hegemony, Japan will be in a position to take greater military control of its region and, ostensibly, be conceived of less as a free-rider in terms of its reliance on the US for security34. Perspectives Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” 6. 32 Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” 224. 33 Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” 9. 34 Ibid., 3. 31
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emphasizing the import of the American security umbrella frequently consider the primacy of realist frameworks and contend that, if the US retreated from its security commitments, Japan would compensate by pursuing rearmament. Those states expressing concern over the Japanese rearmament cite evidence of several of its political developments, including increased defense spending, the pursuit of nuclear deterrence strategies, and nationalistic discourse from politicians35. In fact, the US has been instrumental in the postwar reconstruction of Japan’s military, particularly under the 1952 Mutual Security Agreement which “[has] allowed the United States to supply military equipment and training to the growing Japanese military through the Mutual Security Program36.” Miller notes further that, “Since the end of the US occupation of Japan in 1952, the United States had sought to incorporate Japan into [the Mutual Security Program], rebuilding a Japanese military that only seven years before it had sought to destroy completely37.” Recently, the transformation of American defense policy under the Bush administration required Japan, as party to the Mutual Security Treaty, to take a more active role in regional security38. This development supports Kang’s claims that Japan has had various reasons to doubt American commitment to its defense and further contributes to the viability of its militarization strategy39. One percent of Japan’s Gross National Product (GNP) is spent on the military40. In accordance with the postclassical realist framework, Japanese foreign policymaking Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” 75. 36 Ibid., 77. 37 Miller, “The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in Us-Japanese Relations,” 83. 38 Shuichi, “Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and Security Policy: Realism Versus Idealism in Japan since the Second World War,” 425. 39 Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” 77. 40 Ibid., 78. 35
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is sensitive to the economic costs of defense and will seek to maximize its security without incurring a security dilemma. Japan—the world’s third largest economy—currently spends around one percent of its GNP on defense, amounting to $24.04 billion41. This spending is considerably smaller than comparable figures from similar countries, such as Germany and France, which invest 1.3 and 2.3, respectively, in the most recent data42. Thus, militarization is still possible at the acceptable rate of one percent of its GNP avoiding a regional security dilemma while still maintaining concern over its economic resources like an archetypal within the postclassical realist framework. Japanese discourse surrounding militarization has strong historical ties, spanning several centuries. This history of militarism pervaded Japanese culture and was clearly evident in the the system of military governance that was forcibly dismantled at the end of WWII43. The legacies of Japan’s militant history suggest that it may be more prone to aggressive rearmament, though doing so with knowledge gained from its experience in the Second World War. The reconstruction of forces intended solely for defensive security mirrors the pre-Meiji era samurai military-mandate and an isolationist foreign policy. To analyze Japan’s foreign policy from a constructivist framework, one must emphasize the legacy of WWII and how it has served as important experiential learning for Japanese policymakers, ultimately reinforcing their avoidance of subsequent World Bank Group, World Development Indicators 2013(World Bank Publications, 2013), 69.; Minstry of Defense, “Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of Fy2014 Budget,” in Defense Programs and Budget of Japan(Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2014), 56. 42 Group, World Development Indicators 2013, 8286.; Kang, 75. 43 Nakamura, “Changing Japanese Business, Economy and Society: Globalization of Post-Bubble Japan,” 222.; By the fourteenth century, the samurai-led Japanese military government system resembled European feudalism, departing from East Asian socialist norms. 41
military aggression. The Japanese people have not forgotten that militarism was a “dominant force in their society, their politics and their government… and [that] it was militarism that launched Japan on the aggression that made the Japanese a hated people throughout Asia… [and] eventually brought death and devastation to Japan itself44.” Recently, however, attitudes towards rearmament have changed, as reflected by recent proposals in the revision of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution45. Many Japanese consider the revision of Article 9 to be necessary: according to a survey in 1952, “47.5 percent of the interviewees responded that Japan should revise the Constitution to allow rearmament, while 39 percent answered that it should not46,” suggesting that pro-militarization sentiments have grown in the postwar era. Anti-militarist norms and identity in Japanese society are vital to understanding “irrational Japanese security policy47.” In addition, Kawasaki highlights that “contemporary Japanese security policy constitutes a compelling case vindicating constructivism as a viable or even superior alternative to realism48.” Recent developments in Japanese militarism, then, can be accounted for by a combination of both postclassical realist and constructivist frameworks, particularly in terms of the phenomenon’s historical significance to the nation. Arguably, Japanese policymakers have internalized the lessons from the nation’s historical experiences with militarism, but this does not sufficiently guarantee that Japan will not continue to steadily rearm in John M Maki, “Japan’s Rearmament: Progress and Problems,” Political Research Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1955): 546. 45 “Abe Says It Is Time to Revise Pacifist Constitution,” Japantoday, Jan. 01 2014. 46 Shuichi, “Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and Security Policy: Realism Versus Idealism in Japan since the Second World War,” 411. 47 Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” 223. 48 Ibid. 44
the face of new global threats. In fact, Japan is becoming a conventional armed state in a number of ways. For example, Inoguchi states that the use of force is becoming more accepted in Japan, referencing the fact that the Self Defense Forces have been allowed to use force in the event that they are attacked or detect a possible enemy attack. They have used force in their peacekeeping operations in Iraq, and the main governing Liberal Democratic Party drafted a revised constitution in 2005 advocating for “solid defenses, patriotism, small government, [and] excellence in science and technology and competitiveness49.” Furthermore, in May 2007, a law regarding the procedures for constitutional revision passed in the National Diet, establishing political mechanisms for the revision of Article 950. The defensive tilt assumed by postclassical realist coincides with Japan’s recent strategies. Comparatively, under the competing neorealist paradigm, aggressive states’ actions could cause reprisals from neighbors or even trigger an arms race, which Japanese foreign policy resolutely seeks to avoid51. Related literature’s discussion of Japan as a “virtual, potential, or nascent power,” should be considered as, “simply an admission that Japan does not function as a typical realist nation-state52.” Instead, Japanese foreign policy is best accounted for by the postclassical realist framework in conjunction with elements of constructivism. Whether or not Japan will refit to adopt the capabilities of a normal power remains to be seen, but its path towards rearmament and militarization can be explained by its defensive policies and liberal economic cooperation with other states. Japan continues to arm modestly and defensively Inoguchi, “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase,” 8. 50 Ibid. 51 Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” 228. 52 Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” 75. 49
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under the American security umbrella, devoting only one percent of its GNP towards security expenditures. Current domestic economic stagnation threatens to dislodge Japan from its position as a regional hegemon, thus reinforcing rearmament as a preferred foreign policy. Furthermore, direct security threats from North Korea and underlying insecurities about China’s accession to power bolster the discourse within Japanese policymaking circles which call for increased security independence. Japan’s relationship with the US has been mutually beneficial, but its terms appear to be shifting. Ultimately, Japan’s incorporation of economic power as a central component of its security policy and in accordance with theoretical projections outlined by the postclassical realist framework account for its behavior as an increasingly militarized state. Japan’s transition from wartime devastation to economic affluence in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been a remarkable narrative. In this sense, much is owed to policymakers’ concentration on domestic development and the projection of a peaceful foreign policy. Militarist rhetoric from Prime Minister Abe and the rearmament and recalibration of Japanese defense forces threaten to disrupt this trajectory of Japan’s postwar peace. One must hope, ultimately, that the lessons gleaned from Japan’s previous experiment with hyper-militarization have not entirely faded only a handful of generations later. __________________________________
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References
“Abe Says It Is Time to Revise Pacifist Constitution.” Japantoday, Jan. 01 2014. Brooks, Stephen G. “Dueling Realisms.” International Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 445-77.
Business & Management 5 (2006): 303-06. Shuichi, Wada. “Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution and Security Policy: Realism Versus Idealism in Japan since the Second World War.” Paper presented at the Japan Forum, 2010.
Defense, Minstry of. “Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of Fy2014 Budget.” In Defense Programs and Budget of Japan. Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2014. Dehesh, Alizera, and Cedric Pugh. “The Internationalization of Post‐1980 Property Cycles and the Japanese ‘Bubble’economy, 1986–96.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23, no. 1 (1999): 147-64. Group, World Bank. World Development Indicators 2013. World Bank Publications, 2013. Inoguchi, Takashi. “Japan as a Global Ordinary Power: Its Current Phase.” CJST 28, no. 1 (2008): 3-13. ““Japan Will Stand up to China, Says Pm Shinzo Abe,” BBC News, October 26 2013. Kang, David C. “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks.” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 57-85. Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi. “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy.” The Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (2001): 221-40. Maki, John M. “Japan’s Rearmament: Progress and Problems.” Political Research Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1955): 545-68. Miller, Jennifer M. “The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in Us-Japanese Relations.” Journal of Contemporary History 46, no. 1 (2011): 82-108. Nakamura, Masao. “Changing Japanese Business, Economy and Society: Globalization of Post-Bubble Japan.” Asian The Militarization of Japan | Ooto-Stubbs | 61
The Failure of Civic Nationalism in Pakistan By Zoha Azhar
Keywords: Pakistan, Ethnic Conflict, Sectarianism
Abstract Sixty-six years after it’s independence from India, Pakistan stands today a divided nation, rife with internal conflict. Strong sectarian and ethnic identities have emerged in the nation-state, those which Islam has not been able to unify. A examination of the country’s history and the demographic balance of its peoples sheds light on possible reasons and ramifications of this phenomenon.
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hough not originally founded on an ideological premise, the creation of the state of Pakistan was originally fuelled by religious notions of identity. The ‘Two-Nation Theory’ that justified the formation of Pakistan and its secession from the British Indian Empire, was based on the notion of a separate homeland for the Muslim population of the subcontinent. Religion has played a major role in both the domestic and international spheres of Pakistani politics, and political Islam was, and still is, propelled into cultivating a civic nationalism which would adhere to pan-Islamic identity that would cut across the different ethno-linguistic cleavages in the country. The failure of the state to develop and maintain this civic nationalism, coupled with the way in which religion has been promoted by the state has led to the fragmentation of Pakistani society, mainly along lines of religious sect and ethnicity. This paper will explore possible explanations as to why religious identity could not unify the peoples of Pakistan in the post-partition era, and examine the implications of such for the country in recent years. A distinction between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism is vital to the subsequent discussion. A nation, as defined by civic nationalists, is “an association of people with equal and shared political rights, and an allegiance to similar political procedures. The nation is a political entity, inclusive and liberal. Anyone can, so to speak, join through becoming a citizen1.” Henry Srebrnik, “Civic and Ethnic Nationalism,” December, 2011, Accessed at http://www.journalpioneer.com/Opinion/Columns/2011-12-28/arti1
Civic Nationalism does not have ethnicity as its prime determinant, but rather tries to subdue the ethnic identities and propagate allegiance to the “Country.” By contrast, ethnic nationalists define the nation in terms of a shared heritage, which usually includes “a common language, faith, and ancestry. They base membership on descent or heredity. It is clearly a more restrictive form of nationalism2.” In Pakistan, statepromoted religious nationalism was intended to act as civic nationalism and displace other nationalisms rooted in ethnicity or language. Historical Background Borne out of the quest for a Muslim homeland, Pakistan and its relationship with Islam is a strong determinant of how domestic politics unfolds in the country. As stated by Ahmed, “the social and political crisis in Pakistan history has created rifts and insecurity in Pakistan society which have, in turn, stimulated the will to survive and succeed, which crosscuts through and affects all ethnic groups3.” Centuries of Muslim Mughal rule in India was dislodged by the arrival of British colonialists in 1857. Authoritarian Mughal rule in the region had kept the Hindus and the Muslims alienated from one another along sensitive religious boundaries. British colonization in the region “was a great blow to the Muslims, not only in terms of any future cle-2849291/Civic-and-ethnic-nationalism/1. 2 Ibid. 3 Jochen Hippler, “Problems of Culture, Democracy and Nation-Building in Pakistan,” Silk Road- A Journal of West Asian Studies, vol. 1, no. 4 (April, 1998): 22. The Failure of Civic Nationalism in Pakistan | Azhar | 63
hopes of regaining their past ruler status but also of their national identity, as their linkages with the political center were severed4.” The establishment of British rule and the subsequent rise of Hindu power in the Indian subcontinent in the late 1800s made Indian Muslims increasingly aware of their status as a numerical minority, and also of Islam’s declining political and cultural power in the region5.” This sentiment then provoked a sense of nationalism among Indian Muslims: “In their view, Hindus and Muslims were not merely followers of different religions but members of two different communities or nations. This belief formed the crux of the so-called ‘two-nation theory,’” in which an independent Muslim homeland was needed to separate the Muslims from ‘Hindu India6.’ The Pakistan movement “was aided by the acceptance of the demand of the Muslims as a religious minority7.” Muslim nationalism began to grow in parts of the colonial subcontinent where Muslims made up the minority and faced social, economic and political marginalization. The All-India Muslim League was created in 1906 to safeguard Muslim interests8, and was the political party that was ultimately responsible for the creation of Pakistan. It comprised of an “elitist group of the aristocratic Muslim families predominantly from Muslim minority provinces of India (Uttar Pradesh and Bombay),” and was headed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah9. The Pakistan movement did not gain momentum Assaf Hussain, “Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan,” Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 10 (October, 1976): 22. 5 Aparna Pande, “Islam in the National Story of Pakistan,” Current Trends in Islamic Ideology, vol. 12 (October, 2011): 37. 6 Ibid., 38. 7 Rasul Rais, “Identity Politics and Minorities in Pakistan,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, vol. 30, no. 1 (April, 2007): 113. 8 Pande, “Islam in the National Story,” 32. 9 Adeel Khan, “Ethnicity, Islam and National Identity in Pakistan.,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, vol. 22, no. 1 (1999): 69. 4
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until 1946, just a year before independence, which is when it started gaining support from the Muslims in Muslim majority provinces such as Punjab, the North West Frontier Province, Sindh, Balochistan and Bengal, all of which would later come together to form the country of Pakistan. It is also important to note that the demand for Pakistan was based on a secular ideology. As Khan notes, the demand grew out of an economic threat from the Hindu majority, rather than one based on religious differences10. Moreover, “the Pakistan movement was not a movement of Islam but of Muslims11.” Even before the formation of Pakistan, the use and manipulation of religious symbolism was a handy tool in mobilizing the Muslim masses, and is a practice that is still present today. Due to the enormous cultural, ethnic, and linguistic differences among the Muslim populations living in the various provinces of British India, the Muslim League’s campaign strategy to win support emphasized the idea of the Two-Nation Theory: the separateness of the Muslim and Hindu nations. After poor performance in prior elections, the League began using Islamic slogans and symbols to mobilize electoral support for the 1946 elections12 and raise consciousness of a common religious identity that would replace ethnic identity. Following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, “the political elites of Pakistan believed that Islam had saved Muslims from Hindu domination and given them a national identity13.” As a result, Pakistan consisted of a wide variety of ethnic and linguistic groups and subgroups which had very little in common apart from a shared Ibid., 168. Hamza Alavi, “Ethnicity, Muslim Society and the Pakistan Ideology,” In Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State, ed. Anita M. Weiss (Syracuse University Press, 1986), 22. 12 Pande, “Islam in the National Story,” 39-40. 13 Hussain, “Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism,” 923. 10 11
Muslim identity14. Once Pakistan came into being, identity based on faith lost its rallying power because Muslims were not being relegated due to their faith in the new homeland. In a Muslim majority country characterized by various ethnicities and languages, the commonality of religion was not enough to unite distinct ethno-linguistic identities post-independence. The political leadership tried to integrate these groups into a national community by supplementing Islam with coercive tactics whenever the issue of ethnicity arose. The creation of the Pakistani nation did not develop from below from the societal roots or nationalist movements, but rather was developed from above; the State was created first, which then generated the nation it desired15. The political leaders expected too much of Islam when they used it as the only integrative determinant of national identity, and their failure to properly integrate multi-ethnic identities through a civic nationalism distinct from religious nationalism has led to a deeply splintered society today. A Look at Demographics in Pakistan The population count in Pakistan reveals that there are 185 million people living in the country16. The peoples are perceived as being part of one of five main ethnic groups, each identified with a specific region in the country: the Punjabis in the north-east, the Pashtuns in the north-west, the Balochis in the south-west, the Sindhis in the southeast and the Mohajirs who immigrated to the province of Sindh in Pakistan after the 1947 partition and claim to have a homeland there17. The state religion is Islam, and the majority of the population follow the teachings of Sunni Islam while Shiite Hippler, “Problems of Culture,” 7. Ibid., 8. 16 Government of Pakistan, “Census.” (November, 2013). 17 Christopher Hurst, “Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 19, no. 2 (1996): 190-191. 14 15
Muslims make up the religious minority. The two official languages in the country are Urdu and English, while important regional languages such as Punjabi, Pashto, Sindhi, Balochi, Seraiki and Bengali are widely recognized18. Provincial boundaries are drawn along ethnic and linguistic lines, but a strong centralization of state does not give much autonomy to the provincial governments. The ethnic groups that claim these regions as their own have faced mutually hostile periods throughout Pakistan’s history, and have also been in conflict with the national government. The Punjabis make up the largest ethnic group at roughly 50% of the country’s population and have maintained political dominance since independence19. The reason for their stronghold of the national government is partly due to their inheritance of power from the British at the time of independence. The British favoured the Punjabis as the main successors because the Punjabis constituted a large part of the British armed forces. This is the reason why Punjabis exert more control over the country’s military institutions more than any other ethnicity in Pakistan20. Control of the military led to a formation of an elite Punjabi upper class, which had greater opportunity and access to better education, and that consequently paved the way for induction into positions of influential bureaucratic control and dominance of the Punjabis. The powerful presence of the Punjabis in seats of substantial power has made them a target of the other ethnicities in Pakistan who are shadowed in comparison. The dominance of the Punjabis was also the main reason for the separation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from Pakistan in 1971. “Today, with the watchful eye of and the strong hand of a Punjabi-dominated military, the Punjabi’s clearly maintain the balance Hippler, “Problems of Culture,” 7. Hurst, “Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide,” 181. 20 Ibid.,182. 18 19
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of power in their favour21” by commonly entering into alliances with other ethnic groups. The Balochis are a tribal community and the smallest ethnic group in Pakistan, constituting less than 5% of the national population. Balochi historians claim the group to be ethnically linked to the Kurdish peoples found in Syria. They are culturally and socially distinct from the rest of Pakistan, and have kept their language, customs and traditions intact. They are a fiercely tightknit group of peoples who have resisted the idea of the inclusion of the Baloch peoples in Pakistan, instead of the creation of a separate Balochistan22. Ever since independence, the national government and Baloch guerrillas have engaged in several armed insurgencies, and a strong separatist fervour fuels Baloch nationalism. The defeat of a Baloch insurgency in 1973 by the Pakistani armed forces transformed the Balochi demand from one of regional autonomy to a stronger demand of complete secession from Pakistan. Continued repression and discrimination of the Balochi peoples as an attempt to dismantle separatist sentiment in the province of Balochistan has led to a stronger cohesion of the Balochi people, the emergence of a more robust Balochi nationalism and the ignition of a secessionist movement in the region, similar to that which led to the formation of Bangladesh in 197123. The Pashtuns are also a tribal community and make up around 15% of the population24. They have had a similar experience to that of the Balochis, though the Pashtuns have enjoyed a better standing in Pakistani society. This is one of the reasons why Pashtun nationalism did not manifest itself through violence. The North West Frontier Province where the Pashtuns are settled is more easily geographically accessible and
so “the economic benefits of Islamabad’s programs have managed to reach the Pashtuns far more than the Baloch25.” While this has made the Pashtuns more dependent economically on the capital, it has also helped mitigate separatist attitudes among the peoples. Like all the other ethnic groups of Pakistan, the Pashtuns also have their own language and traditions. Pashtun nationalism was moulded from their treatment under the British Empire and “even at the time of the Partition, though they eventually conceded, the Pashtun leadership was wary of the imposition of the Pakistani state, realising that the coming government would more likely than not be dominated by the Punjabis and Mohajirs26.” Also unlike the Balochis, the Pashtuns do hold prominent leadership positions in the country given their past induction in the British armies.27
21
Ibid., 183. Ibid. 23 Hurst, “Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide,” 185. 24 Ibid., 186.
25
22
26
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“The proliferation of various ethnic group identities and the chafing that occurred between them in the Pakistani state demonstrates that religion was not a strong enough unifying factor to prevent these issues. “
Sindhis in Pakistan are somewhat difficult to account for because they are so successfully assimilated with the Mohajir immigrants in the province of Sindh. Ethnic and ‘original’ Sindhis account for around 13% of the total population28. Like the Balochis and the Pashtuns, the Sindhis have also managed to retain Sindhi as their native language. Sindhi nationalism arose when the incoming Mohajir population displaced the Sindhi majority and gained significant control over the region’s cities. Furthermore, the Punjabi-dominated Ibid., 187. Ibid., 186. 27 Ibid., 187. 28 Ibid., 188.
national government entered into alliances with the Mohajir middle classes for mutual political support. This gave the Mohajirs preferential treatment, side-lining the native Sindhis and curtailing their power over what they saw as their homeland. Sindh is also home to the Bhutto family, and the Pakistan People’s Party. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto revived Sindhi nationalism in the 1970s when he came to power by implementing certain legislations that would benefit the Sindhi nation. He was later overthrown and executed by General Zia ul-Haq, who was a Mohajir. The execution, combined with General Zia’s Mohajir ethnic background “sent the Sindhi cause into a higher degree of militancy29.” The Sindhis have been involved in violent conflict with the Mohajirs, causing death tolls to rise with increasing ethnic clashes. As mentioned earlier, the Mohajirs were immigrants who came from India after the separation and who started settling in the province of Sindh. They are the second dominant ethnic group in Pakistan, after the Punjabis. They identify as Urdu-speakers, which sets them apart from the native Sindhi speakers in the region. They came to Pakistan in such vast numbers that they ultimately outnumbered the native Sindhis and, because of their urban concentrations, were able to dominate the cities in Sindh30. Their main political party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) is based in the city of Karachi and is very often engaged with political clashes with other ethnic parties, especially with the Sindhis who live in the same region. The proliferation of various ethnic group identities and the chafing that occurred between them in the Pakistani state demonstrates that religion was not a strong enough unifying factor to prevent these issues. All other ethnic nationalisms and ethnic identities in Pakistan have arisen out of a fear of being a minority. Collectively, 29 30
Ibid., 189. Ibid., 191.
the Balochis, the Sindhis, the Pashtuns and the Mohajirs have become aware of their distinct cultures and traditions because they are reacting to a threat, a threat posed by a Punjabi majority with power stronghold in the national government. Religion ceased to remain the unifying factor after the creation of Pakistan because there was no threat from a Hindu majority. Instead, the threat was now posed by a Punjabi majority and other competing ethnicities. In a land where the majority of the population was Muslim, the Muslim identity began to wane; there was simply no need for a religious identity because there was no threat to it. The disintegration of a common religious nationalism can be seen in two phases: pre1971, where ethnic tensions lead to the secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan, and post 1971, where Islam became codified in the constitution and created sectarian identities. 1947-1971: Centralization Leads to the Creation of Bangladesh Founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s untimely death so soon after independence left the fledgling country in a haze of uncertainty and a loss of clear direction. As Islamic identity was the one factor common to all ethnic and linguistic groups in the country, the political leadership sought to emphasize it and fuse it with national identity. Unity was stressed as a national goal and was utilized as a tool of governance that allowed political elites to control and repress different ethnicities at the centre as well as in the provinces31. The right to autonomy was snatched from the provinces as the Punjabi-Mohajir majority held all of the power in the capital, not entirely for the sake of national stability, but rather more for the consolidation of their hegemony. As Hippler stipulates, “national integration and unity were perceived in bureaucratic rather than political terms. It meant placing the provinces under the control of the central 31
Hippler, “Problems of Culture,” 7.
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government and repressing demands for a federal system or provincial self-rule32.” It was thought that because Islam was such a strong unifying factor preindependence, that it could maintain its unifying factor post-independence that would cut across ethnic lines. The first problem with this approach manifested itself into the centralisation of the state. This centralisation infringed upon ethnic identity and was discriminatory against some ethnic groups, as in the case of (former) East Pakistan. “This desire to create ‘one nation, one language, one religion’ (a common slogan in Pakistani political life) has manifested itself in an effort to suppress local, ethnolinguistic identities by the state,” claims Pande, “and a related effort to replace these identities with a national identity rooted in Islam33.” After a civil war in 1971, Pakistan lost its east wing, which is now independent Bangladesh. The Bengalis in East Pakistan made up the majority of the population at the time, but because of their distance from the capital, they were largely discounted in terms of political and military power34. The Punjabi elite in Islamabad excluded the East Pakistanis from the power structure. The Bengalis were also economically exploited by the West Pakistani elites. The Bengali language was not recognized as an official language even though Bengalis at that time constituted a major part of Pakistan. Such ethnic and socio-economic discrimination against the Bengali people aggravated tensions, and agitations arose in East Pakistan over sectional bias, neglect, insufficient allocation of resources, and national wealth. The final straw occurred in 1971, when the Awami Muslim League of East Pakistan won outright parliamentary majority but faced strong resistance by the West Pakistani central government to their right to form a government. This sowed the
seeds that ignited Bengali nationalism and ploughed the way for the emergence of a strong secessionist movement, which, with the help of Indian intervention, saw the creation of an independent Bangladesh after a civil war in 1971. The example of the separation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) is illustrative of how the problem of multiple ethnicities, heterogeneous society, and provincial autonomy was handled in Pakistan.Moreover, “while officially the political centre strongly de-emphasized ethnic identity as a political factor, in reality its policies strengthened it35.” While the bureaucratic and military centre was established in West Pakistan, the majority of the (then) Pakistani population was living in East Pakistan. The ‘One-Unit’ ideology would integrate the provinces in West Pakistan into one political unit which was hoped to balance the demographic strength of East Pakistan. This had two results: the attempt to form a coalition of all the non-Bengalis against the Bengalis and the elimination of the possibility of provincial autonomy or federalism in West Pakistan36. It demonstrated the dominance of the Punjabi elite which was unwilling to give up their power, even when a mass civil war broke out. From Dhaka, the war was clearly seen through ethnic lenses, as a war between a Punjabi army and Bengali population. For the Balochis, Sindhis and Pashtuns in West Pakistan, the secession and subsequent independence of Bangladesh had two implications. On one hand, it proved that it was possible for a successful ethno-nationalist movement to take place. This further intensified their own beliefs and identities and strengthened their identities. On the other hand, the loss of the Bengal region weakened their political strength against the central government37. For the political elites in West Pakistan, the
32
Ibid. Pande, “Islam in the National Story,” 42. 34 Khan, “Ethnicity, Islam and National Identity,” 170.
35
33
36
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Hippler, “Problems of Culture,” 9. Ibid., 10. 37 Ibid.
secession in Bangladesh further solidified Punjabi dominance, as the Bengali counterweight was no longer in the picture. They also became less tolerant of the calls for autonomy from the other ethnic groups and starting “responding with stronger and swifter repression of secessionist sentiment38.” The central government learnt no lesson from the Bengali partition. Instead of realising that the true essence of the issue lay in the question of autonomy along ethnic lines and the balancing of economic shares in the country, the political leadership assumed that the rest of West Pakistan could be kept intact through continued centralisation and cultivation of an identity based on the fusion of Islam and Pakistani nationalism. It was assumed that Islam would somehow “replace” or at least relegate the ethnic identities. If anything, the loss of East Pakistan showed that Islam was not able to overcome ethnic animosities, and that religion was not enough of a reason to prevent Bangladesh from leaving Pakistan. It was that defeat which actually spurred serious government efforts towards strategic use of political Islam. 1971-Present: Islamization and Rise of Sectarianism It was not until the War of 1971 of East Pakistan, and the consequent secession which formed Bangladesh, that the nature of Pakistani national identity came into question: what element could keep the country and its people together? Ayub Khan’s mostly secular regime39 was thought to be the cause for the separation, so the state felt it only natural to fly the flag of Islam higher, which would encompass the masses under its faith system. The political leadership in its eventual aim of keeping the country ‘intact’ started to aggressively Hurst, “Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide,” 194. Katherine Ewing, “The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan,” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 42, no. 2 (February 1983): 258-259. 38 39
cultivate an Islamic brand of Pakistani nationalism. There is absolutely no doubt that the 1973 constitution was a giant stride towards fusion of religion to matters of state40. More than anything else, it also set the future constitutional direction of the country. The East Pakistan debacle also raised the question that had haunted Pakistan from the very beginning: If Islam is to be the basis of the state, whose Islam will be followed and how? Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) took over in 1971. He offered a modernist and egalitarian view of a socialist Islam as a response to the identity crisis post-1971. This outlook was rivaled by that of the religious Jamat-e-Islami party, which called for the integration of the Sharia, specific Islamic practices, in state law and administrative affairs. They believed that the reason East Pakistan was lost was because the leaders had betrayed the cause of Islam. Thus, the war of 1971 became a rallying point for many Pakistani citizens to look to their Islamic roots for an ideological cure, which is something that General Zia ul-Haq later takes advantage of. The loss of East Pakistan made the central government keener to promote an Islamic identity in hopes that it would hold the country together. It was also the start of escalating sectarian tension in the country. Under the pressure of the Islamic political parties in Pakistan in the 1971 election, Zulfiqar Bhutto went on to declare the minority Ahmeddiyah community as nonMuslim, and thus second-class citizens. This declaration was significant in two aspects: first, it marked the beginning of sectarianism in Pakistan41, and second, this Islamist victory set up the grounds for General Zia’s military coup which took down Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s “un-Islamic” regime. General Zia ul-Haq displaced Bhutto in a military Kalim Bahadur, Democracy in Pakistan: Crises and Conflicts (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1998), 315-316. 41 Rais, “Identity Politics and Minorities,” 118. 40
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coup in 1977 and acquired the title Chief of Martial Law Administrator. He was a practicing Muslim who wanted to bring the legal, social, economic, educational and political institutions of the country in conformity with Islamic principles, values and traditions in the light of Quran and Sunnah, in order to enable the people of Pakistan to lead their lives in accordance with Islam. Zia ul-Haq’s own interpretation of Islam was deeply conservative and his legacy includes heightened sectarian identities which gave rise to militant organizations, the enforcement of the Sharia in accordance to state law, and the question of which interpretation of Islam should be the basis for government policy. One of the biggest ramifications of Zia’s imposition of Islamic law in accordance with Sunni teachings was the public dissent of the minority Shiite population of Pakistan. The Shiites were already feeling threatened as a minority in the nation because they had witnessed the Ahmeddiyah minority branded as non-Muslim; they discovered a sectarian identity by perceiving an existence of threat42 and felt that they would be prosecuted on the basis of their religious identity. This caused a stir amongst the Shiite community which led to the beginning of Shiite political mobilization in Pakistan. They saw their beliefs being marginalized and Sunni teachings as being forced upon them. This led to the emergence of religious organizations for both sects: the Sunni establishment of Sipah-i Sahabi founded by Haqq Nawaz Jhangawi in 1985, and the Shiite establishment of Tahrik-i Jaffariya Pakistan founded by Mufti Jafar Husayn in 198043. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 further dampened the sectarian situation in Pakistan, whereby the Sunnis felt threatened by a possible Shiite uprising, which resulted in more clashes between the two Qasim Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi’i and Sunni Identities,” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 32 (1998): 693. 43 Ibid., 697. 42
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sects. Hashmi’s theory of the relationship between threat and mobilisation reflects the situation that occurred during this time in Pakistan: “The common thread that weaves violent political movements together is fear. This is true in the case of violent religious movements. The fear of being deprived of something drives one to act aggressively, while the fear of being left out drive movements against prevalent forces44.” There was violence from both sides; shops were burnt, religious institutions were destroyed, leading figures from both religious parties were assassinated and there were mass protests and demonstrations, which go on to this very day45. Sectarian violence continues to cause hundreds of deaths in the country each year. The Shiites are not the only minority in Pakistan who were affected by the Islamization in the country. The other religious minorities that make up less than five percent of the population were concerned about their safety and their recognition as Pakistani nationals even though they were not followers of the Muslim faith. With the implementation of the blasphemy laws (prosecution on the grounds of blasphemy against the Quran or the Sunnah) by Zia ul-Haq in the late 1970s, hundreds of Christians, Sikhs, and other religious minorities have experienced persecution and discrimination the grounds of religion; such laws, on the one hand, “discriminate against religious minorities and, on the other hand, further deepen religious intolerance and fanaticism in Pakistani society.” Even “repealing the law is currently an out-of-question option for the president or the parliament given the expanded influence of militant Islam in today’s Pakistan46.” Saleem Hashmi, “Pakistan: Politics, Religion and Extremism,” (May, 2009): 7. 45 Rais, “Identity Politics and Minorities,” 122. 46 Siraj Akbar, “Who Benefits from Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law?” The Huffington Post, August 23, 2012. Accessed at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-akbar/pakistans-blasphemy-law-c_b_1820601.html. 44
Instead of the unity that religion was supposed to foster, the political use of Islam has instead propagated extremism and sectarian violence. One has to understand that religion is not homogeneously interpreted and once unification is attempted through religion, this fact becomes a chief obstacle to deciding which interpretation of the religion in question is the most appropriate. In the case of Pakistan, multiple interpretations of Islam were being put forth simultaneously, resulting in sectarian rift. Moreover, the issue has further intensified religious bigotry against minorities. In the recent past, there have been attacks against Sufi shrines, as well as against Shiites, Ahmeddiyahs and Christians. Moreover, draconian laws continue to be in place, the repealing of which would lead to an increase of violence due to resistance on behalf of the religious clergy, a group that has become extremely powerful through their active promotion by the state in past years. However, a forced Islamic identity poses a deeper problem. It is impossible to agree on what it precisely means to be Muslim, let alone how to implement the mechanics of an Islamic state in modern times. Sadly, that has not stopped successive Pakistani leaders from mobilising Islam as the signal marker of citizenship time and again. The strategic use of political Islam to tackle ethnicity and also to gain other advantages continued into the 1990s, leading to the creation of the Taliban. Apart from creating so-called strategic depth, another rationale for the promotion of the Taliban was to tackle the issue of Pashtun nationalism. It was assumed that a radical Islamic force with its presence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan would stifle Pashtun nationalism as well. Needless to say, the country is paying a heavy price for that blunder today.
Explaining the Pakistani Civic Identity and Ethnic Conflict Given the basic multi-ethnic structures in place in Pakistan, there was a need
“One has to understand that religion is not homogeneously interpreted and once unification is attempted through religion, this fact becomes a chief obstacle to deciding which interpretation of the religion in question is the most appropriate.” to actively nurture a positive national identity, especially since it could not be taken for granted that such an identity would emerge from a shared religious identity. As Khan indicates, “ideological engineering is one of the main concerns of the nation-state, because it has to justify its individuality, its separateness and its nation-ness47.” The failure of secularism and federalism in Pakistan polity was the direct consequence of this oversight and precluded the emergence of a positive, consensual ‘Pakistani’ nationhood48. The Two-Nation Theory failed Pakistan after its creation; it did not maintain the ‘Muslim’ unification that it had pre-independence. The rise of ethnic consciousness and the formation of ethnic identity can be explained by an instrumentalist approach, and theories of ethnicity, nation-building and ethnic conflict. Of the various definitions of the word ‘nation,’ the following two suit the purpose of this discussion. Benedict Anderson thought of a Nation in somewhat neutral terms, calling it “an imagined community.” Khan, Ethnic Nationalism and the State, 68. Singh, Ashok, “Nationalism in Pakistan: Dimensions of Failure,” Written for the Observer Research Foundation 21, 2011, Accessed at http://orfonline. org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/occasionalpaper/ attachments/occ-21_1308124372844.pdf
47
48
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The implication here is that a ‘nation’ is not necessarily predicated upon socio-economic or cultural factors and could simply be “imagined into existence49.” Following this thought, we can see that the Pakistan Movement represents a gradual process of ‘imagining’ the nation into existence. Elements in the subcontinent’s Muslim population (who formed the Muslim League) began to visualise their community living separately from the Hindu majority who they feared would marginalise them after the British left. The second definition refers to a nation as “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture50.” When we look at Pakistan’s current situation through the lens of its history, it becomes apparent that it was lacking all the prerequisites listed in Stalin’s definition of a nation as it emerged into independent existence. Pertaining to the discussion of ethnicity, “a common history does not distinguish ethnic groups but is a product of some process by which ethnic groups are mobilized51.” The ethnic groups in question, the Pashtuns, the Balochis, the Sindhis and the Punjabis were mobilized toward a formation of a separate Pakistan given a shared common existence as a Muslim minority in British India. So strong was this shared common history, that “Pakistan, amalgam in a single name of several ethnic provinces, nevertheless drew its mobilising power from the collective sentiments of the Muslim masses in India52.” This would not have been possible without Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1982), 15-16. 50 Joseph Stalin, “Marxism and the National Question,” First published in 1913, Accessed at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/ works/1913/03.htm. 51 Kanchan Chandra, “What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter?” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 9 ( June, 2006): 420. 52 Anthony Smith, “The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?” Millennium- Journal of International Studies, vol. 20, no. 3 (March, 1991): 357. 49
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historical memories of the Mughal Empire, or without ethno-religious ties with other Muslim populations. Next, ethnic violence is motivated by emotions such as fear, hatred, or resentment53. Ethnic-conflict in Pakistan can be explained by this phenomenon. All the ethnic nationalist movements have arisen out of a fear of being marginalised or discriminated against. The Bengals movement resented the fact that they were not included in the structures of bureaucracy or military, the idea that they were suffering economically, and that the Bengali language was not an official language. This fostered animosity toward the West Pakistanis, and resentment increased until they finally mass mobilized and led a successful secessionist movement after the 1970 elections. The other ethnicities were fearful of the majority Punjabi group and that their cultures and traditions would come under threat under Punjabi rule. An instrumentalist views nation building as a tactic used by elites for the manipulation of identity towards their own interests. We see this in both pre- and post-independence times in Pakistan. Pre-independence, the use of religious symbols and the call to Islam by the elite groups was a basis for support and mobilization for the Pakistan movement. In post-independence times, religious nationalism was promoted to quell ethnic tensions in the country. Punjabi domination was also possible due to the pitting of some ethnic groups against each other to create factionalism and division between them that would ensure their own stronghold. Another approach views democracies as being destabilized by the permanent exclusion of some minority groups from power54. This view stipulates that ethnic divisions are fixed. Elections based on ethnic Roger Peterson, Understanding Ethnic Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3. 54 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 291295. 53
divisions, therefore, produce permanent winners and permanent losers based on ethnic demography. Consequently, the politicization of ethnic divisions threatens democratic stability55. A look at domestic politics in Pakistan today reveals deep factions in society and constantly warring ethnic groups and members of different religious sects. The centralization of state could also be an aspect that could be explained by this theory. Democratic institutions are very frail, and there is an ever-present threat to sitting governments, be it from religious extremists or ethnic violence or separatists movements in the country. Tying It All Together: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation The theory of nationalism as boundary maintenance and creation suggests that “although nations are a modern phenomenon, they rely on a pre-existing texture of myths, memories, values, and, finally, symbols56.” This applies to the context of the creation of Pakistan, where the Muslims relied on pre-existing stories, memories, values and symbols of the Muslim past of the subcontinent; they remembered the glorious past of the Mughal reign, where Islam was the centre of political power and princely states were ruled by religion. These memories and experiences helped shape the Muslim identity, as they were all connected by a common past which in turn, gave them a common identity. According to the theory, the intelligentsia play an important role in promoting the idea put forth by an intellectual; “the intellectuals are the creators, inventors, producers and analysts of ideas which the intelligentsia may then spread57.” In the Pakistani case, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was Chandra, “What Is Ethnic Identity?” 419. Daniele Conversi, “Reassessing current theories of nationalism: Nationalism as boundary maintenance and creation,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 1, no. 1 (December, 2007): 74. 57 Ibid.
the intellectual that came up with the idea of an autonomous Muslim region, and then later, a separate Pakistan. The elites formed the Muslim League act as the intelligentsia; they were the ones who tried to gain support of the masses by promoting this idea. Jinnah produced the idea of the Two-Nation Theory that set the foundation for the Pakistan movement. “Anti-state reactive movements can, for example, be pursued for religious reasons58;” in this particular example, it was the Muslim movement against a Hindu majority in the British Raj. Nationalism “must be seen as both an attempt to seize control of the state as well as a reaction against state interference and expansion59.” Political elites promoted a religious nationalist identity to control the state, and to subdue ethnic divide in the nation after independence. The ethnic nationalists, on the other hand, felt threatened by the Punjabi elite and reacted against the interference in provincial matters and the expansion of their hegemonic control. “The advent of both modernization and centralized state power has had destructive effects60.” This goes hand in hand with the situation in a newly independent Pakistan where over-centralization by the state and the lack of provincial autonomy brought out ethnic and sectarian identity to the forefront. Conversi also focuses on homeostatic approaches which “focus precisely on the process of reaction against state intrusion; an excess of over zealous centralism often engendered a homeostatic reaction which, in turn, gave rise to powerful peripheral nationalisms61;” the Pashtun, the Sindhi, the Baloch nationalisms arose because of centralization. According to Conversi, this theory is different as it introduces “a cause-effect model, which explains ethnonationalist
55 56
Ibid., 76. Conversi, “Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism,” 75. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., 76. 58 59
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insurgencies as a direct response to state repression. This model is often used to explain nationalist violence against a defence mobilization against the state62.” The state repressed the Bengalis economically, did not significantly induct them into the bureaucracy or military, and it actively resisted their right to form a parliamentary government in 1970. Another example pertaining to the Pakistani case is the rise of sectarian identity because of the imposition of Sunni law over all Muslims, and the enactment of the blasphemy laws that repress members of other faiths in Pakistan. Ethnic conflict has emerged as a defense mechanism directed at a threat posed by the state. A focus is placed on the ‘spontaneous’ construction of ethnic identities as a result of group interaction. “All forms of interaction need norms and regulations, and borders represent the core of such regulations. Borders indicate a limit which must not be trespassed. All processes of identity construction are simultaneously border-generating and border-deriving63.” The Muslim identity in colonial India generated a border; there arose a division between the Muslims and the rest of India. The formation of a religious Islamic identity in the subcontinent created a border, which separated Pakistan from India. In this case, the theory effectively explains the formation of Pakistan because of the creation of a Muslim identity; identity was thus in fact, border-generating. Ethnic nationalism explains internal border generation postindependence. Nationalism, in this context, “simultaneously strives at the reinforcement of external borders and the elimination of internal borders” which creates “a homogenizing pressure of nationalism64.” After independence, the Pakistani state was more concerned with the protection of its Ibid. Ibid., 77. 64 Ibid., 78. 62 63
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external borders with India and so tried to eliminate the ‘internal ethnic borders’ by propagating a common dislike toward India, and the re-emergence of an Islamic identity. An all-unifying Islamic identity did not sit well with the entire population and sectarianism arose. The effort to band everyone under one ideology created different identities in Pakistan. Another example of this can also be seen in the resistance to give official status to some ethnic languages (like Bengali) in hopes that Urdu would be adopted by everyone. The result of this homogenizing pressure “is the rise of separatist nationalism and the universalization of ethnic consciousness65.” The Bengalis separated, and there is an active separatist sentiment among Balochi, Pashtun and Mohajir groups. On the subject of ethnic identity, “groups tend to define themselves, not by reference to their own characteristics, but by exclusion66.” The Bengalis created their independent identity when they were excluded from state affairs and the economic gains of the country from a few West Pakistani elites. Imposition of Sunni law in Pakistan made other religious groups feel excluded from the state and its laws. The officiating of Urdu as an official national language made other ethnic groups feel excluded. Power and a stronghold of the bureaucracy by the Punjabis made the other ethnic groups feel excluded. Ethnic identities arose because existing civic identities were exclusionary. The theory of nationalism as boundary creation and maintenance explains all important aspects of nation building in Pakistan from pre- independence times to post-independence times. It explains the creation of Muslim identity in colonial India, it explains nation building in independent Pakistan and it explains ethnic conflict in the nation. Identities create borders, and this is what happened in the making of Pakistan, and still continues. 65 66
Ibid. Ibid., 79-80.
Conclusion No expression of political aspiration has been more severely repressed by Pakistan’s security forces than ethnic nationalism. For Balochi, Pashtun and Sindhi separatists, the consequences have been dire: there have been rampant disappearances and assassinations of activists, relatives, and perceived sympathisers for decades. Separatists, too, have been guilty of reprisal attacks, kidnappings and killings. Going as it does against the very grain of Pakistan’s claim to be a home for the subcontinent’s Muslims, ethnic nationalism has been condemned by both Islamists and the elite as a mischievous attempt to destabilise the nation. In reality, it has always been a direct consequence of marginalisation. That is why Bengalis, incensed by systematic discrimination from Pakistan’s Punjab dominated institutions, fought to create Bangladesh in 1971, as well as why members of the minority religious sects have mobilized with the presence of rife sectarian conflict. Marginalisation is the reason why identities come into consciousness in the first place. Religion could not unify the nation after independence because of three main factors that are illustrated in the examples given above: the removal of the threat to the Muslim identity, over-centralization of the national government and the resistance to hand over provincial autonomy, and different ideologies of Islam where the imposition of one over the other led to sectarian violence. The political elites of the country still pursued the idea of an Islamic Pakistani identity, and tried to culture civic nationalism that pertained to religion in order to subdue rising ethnic nationalisms in the country. This did not work either because the imposition of a strict Islamic code of law infringed on the rights and beliefs of other Islamic sects, as well as other minority groups belonging to different religions. Things might have been different if
Jinnah’s secular vision had survived, or if a system of federalism or consociationalism was implemented, as it would have given the minorities a greater say in public affairs. Alas, what unites the people of Pakistan is not a single Islamic identity, but a hope for a better future where ethnic identity is allowed to prosper and coexist with a shared civic identity. ___________________________________
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References Ahmed, Akbar. “The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan Society.” Asian Affairs 21, no. 1 (August, 2007): 20-35. doi: 10.1080/03068379008730366. Akbar, Siraj. “Who Benefits from Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law?” The Huffington Post, August 23, 2012. Accessed at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ malik-siraj-akbar/pakistans-blasphemy-law-c_b_1820601.html. Alavi, Hamza. “Ethnicity, Muslim Society and the Pakistan Ideology.” In Anita M. Weiss (ed.), Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State (Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 22. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1982. Bahadur, Kalim. “Democracy in Pakistan.” (1998). Print. Har-Anand Publications. Chandra, Kanchan. “What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter?” Annual Review of Political Science 9 ( June, 2006):397-424. doi: 10.1146/annurev. polisci.9.062404.170715. Conversi, Daniele. “Reassessing current theories of nationalism: Nationalism as boundary maintenance and creation.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1, no. 1 (December, 2007): 73-85. doi: 10.1080/13537119508428421.
Hippler, Jochen. “Problems of Culture, Democracy and Nation-Building in Pakistan.” Silk Road- A Journal of West Asian Studies 1, no. 4 (April, 1998): 6-15. Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985. Print. Hurst, Christopher. “Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 19, no. 2 (1996): 179-198. doi: 10.1080/10576109608436002. Hussain, Asaf. “Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan.” Asian Survey 16, no. 10 (October, 1976): 918-930. doi: 10.2307/2643533. Khan, Adeel. “Ethnicity, Islam and National Identity in Pakistan.” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 22, no. 1 (1999): 167-182, doi: 10.1080/00856408708723380. Khan, Adeel Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan. New Dehli: Sage Publications, 2005. Print. Pande, Aparna. “Islam in the National Story of Pakistan.” Current Trends in Islamic Ideology 12 (October, 2011). Accessed at http://www.currenttrends. org/research/detail/islam-in-the-national-story-of-pakistan. Petersen, Roger. Understanding Ethnic Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Print.
Ewing, Katherine. “The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan.” The Journal of Asian Studies 42, no. 2 (February 1983): 251-268. doi:http:// dx.doi.org/10.2307/2055113
Rais, Rasul. “Identity Politics and Minorities in Pakistan.” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (April, 2007): 111-125. doi: 10.1080/00856400701264050.
Government of Pakistan. “Census.” (November, 2013). Accessed at http://www. census.gov.pk/Hashmi, Saleem. “Pakistan: Politics,
Singh, Ashok. “Nationalism in Pakistan: Dimensions of Failure.” Written for the Observer Research Foundation 21 (2011). Accessed at http://orfonline. org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/ occasionalpaper/attachments/occ21_1308124372844.pdf
Religion and Extremism.” (May, 2009): 1-26. Accessed at http://www.ipcs.org/ pdf_file/issue/RP20-Arshi-Pakistan.pdf. 76 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
Smith, Anthony. “The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?” Millennium- Journal of International Studies 20, no. 3 (March, 1991): 353-368. doi: 10.1177/03058298910200031001. Srebrnik, Henry. “Civic and Ethnic Nationalism.” (December, 2011). Accessed at http://www.journalpioneer.com/ Opinion/Columns/2011-12-28/article-2849291/Civic-and-ethnic-nationalism/1.Stalin, Joseph. “Marxism and the National Question.” First published in 1913. Accessed at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm. Zaman, Qasim. “Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi’i and Sunni Identities.” Modern Asian Studies 32 (1998): 689-716.
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The Effect of Accession to the European Union on the Social Inclusion of the Roma
By Alexander Langer
Keywords: Roma, Social Inclusion, European Union, Subsidiarity, Conditionality
Abstract The Roma minority, particularly since the fall of Communism, has seen economic deprivation and intense social exclusion due to institutional racism. Since their accession to the European Union, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have, at the behest of their European partners, implemented Roma inclusion policies. Based on a review of the literature and analysis of two relevant variables, this paper theorizes that Roma inclusion policies have been broadly ineffective. This is related to problems in the use of conditionality in the accession process, the European principle of subsidiarity, and the models of Eastern European welfare states.
A
s recognized by the European Commission’s (EC) 2010 report on the social inclusion of Roma in the member-states of the European Union (EU), a significant percentage of the 10 to 12 million Roma in the European Union are socially excluded and live in poor socioeconomic conditions. This phenomenon is not new; Romani peoples have been discriminated against, persecuted to varying degrees and even targeted for extermination during their centuries-long presence in the European continent. To this day the majority of Roma lives at the margins of society, with few prospects for secure housing and social services, equitable treatment by the state or opportunities for socioeconomic advancement or integration. These problems are most severe in the postCommunist countries of East and Central Europe, where the majority of Roma lives and where Roma make up a demographically significant part of the population1. The EU has attempted to address these problems. In 2000, the Race Equality Directive was implemented by the EC focusing on ending discrimination in employment, housing and other social demands for all racial minorities, although with a particular concentration on ending discrimination towards Roma (Council Directive 2000/43/EC)2. In 2005, the UNDP (2003) Avoiding the Dependency Trap. [report] Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme. 2 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 im1
“decade of Roma Inclusion” was declared among nine Eastern European states with large Roma minorities, ostensibly making Roma inclusion a political priority3. This paper seeks to answer the question: how, if at all, has the state of Roma inclusion changed in Eastern Europe since accession to the EU? What mechanisms have caused change in measures of Roma inclusion? This question is highly relevant in the study of the European Union today. As the end of the Decade of Roma Inclusion approaches, the study of the outcomes of its policies is important. In addition, as countries in Southeastern Europe with large Roma minority populations, such as Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, continue in their push to gain official candidacy status for joining the EU4, understanding the effects of EU accession on policy towards Roma will be vital in predicting outcomes. This paper will first examine the literature on Roma inclusion, both discussing the available analysis and data, as well as defining the theoretical frameworks used. A statement of the paper’s hypothesis will follow this, along with an explanation plementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L295/1 3 The Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005) Declaration of the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015. [press release] February 2, 2005. 4 BBC News (2013) EU Enlargement: The Next Eight. [online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-europe-11283616 [Accessed: 10 Apr 2013].
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and justification of the variables used. An analysis of collected data, comparing the two case studies from pre-accession and postaccession, will determine potential responses to the stated research question. Then, the aforementioned theoretical frameworks will be evaluated for their explanatory potential in accounting for the results of this analysis. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the results of the data and conclude as to whether or not the paper’s hypothesis is supported by the available data. Literature Review This paper will divide the available data into two categories: pre-accession and postaccession. For pre-accession information on the Roma, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) collected a large amount of data on the status of Roma inclusion in 2003, compiled in its report entitled Avoiding the Dependency Trap5. This provides a baseline for any discussion of post-accession changes in their status. For post-accession data, reports from the EC, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EU-FRA), and NGOs such as the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) are important sources. However, the wide variety of metrics used, small sample sizes, and the inherent problems in studying the Roma make most data not entirely reliable. Many Roma do not publicly identify themselves as such, states make few efforts to reach out, and many Roma distrust outsiders due to their history of persecution and refuse to participate in data collection. Reports also often lack methodological consistency across time, space and organization, making it difficult to measure all areas of Roma life in relation to social inclusion. The body of literature relating to the treatment of Roma in policy is also important. This can further be divided UNDP (2003) Avoiding the Dependency Trap. [report] Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme. 5
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into literature addressing both the Roma specifically and the Roma as part of the broader discourse on human rights and non-discrimination. This literature includes current law at the EU-level. In current legislation, like the acquis communautaire -the common body of law for the EU- the Roma are not specifically addressed; instead, they fall under standard anti-discrimination law as citizens or residents of the countries they reside in. The most important legal institution covering the Roma in terms of European law is the European Convention on Human Rights (1961). Along with the Racial Equality Directive (2000), this has been used by the Roma, with the doctrine of direct effect, to fight for equal treatment at the European level. Marc Willers and Siobhan Lloyd wrote a two-part paper discussing potential paths for Roma to use such EU legal institutions to expand their rights advocating fighting through the courts rather than through the legislative process6. This paper will also investigate the national laws relating to treatment of minorities, such as a number of National Action Plans issued at the start of the “Decade of Roma Inclusion,” plotting out countries’ official plans for addressing issues of Roma inclusion. In order to answer how and why European policy towards Roma has changed, this paper will use a few relevant theories as tools of analysis and explore the quantitative data behind the research question’s test variables. The theoretical framework of conditionality, defined as “a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions” will be used7. Marc Willers, and Siobhán Lloyd, “Using EU law to tackle anti-Roma discrimination – Part 1,” Legal Action (November 2011): 21-6; Marc Willers, and Siobhán Lloyd, “Using EU law to tackle anti-Roma discrimination – Part w,” Legal Action (December 2011): 33-7 7 Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004) Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the 6
As conditionality is one of the two primary theories explaining why candidate states choose to expend political capital in order to change domestic law to match EU law, it will be an important tool of analysis. Specifically, Tobias Böhmelt’s work will be used to examine the effect of conditionality in European accession in terms of policies of Roma inclusion. Böhmelt concludes that while making accession conditional on the implementation of particular policy and legal changes gives the EU substantial leverage, conditionality’s power fades as accession occurs or appears as a foregone conclusion. This will help explain the success or failure of the EU in guaranteeing Roma social inclusion and pushing for beneficial policy8. In addition, the potential effects of the European principle of subsidiarity in the area of social policy will be used as a comparative tool. Subsidiarity is a central part of the European Union’s decision-making process and core identity. As defined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union: Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. This means that the European Union is extremely reluctant to be directly involved in the internal governance of its member states. Most areas concerning social inclusion, such as social welfare, housing, healthcare and education fall under this principle. The result of this is that the EU is only indirectly involved in social welfare, mostly providing recommendations, guidelines, facilitation candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (4), p.670. 8 Böhmelt, T. (2012) The temporal dimension of the credibility of EU conditionality and candidate states’ compliance with the acquis communautaire, 1998–2009. European Union Politics, 13 (3), p.1-23.
of policy convergence through the Open Method of Co-Ordination, and some funds through programs like the European Social Fund (ESF) or Phare. This, combined with national-level governmental structures, may have a significant impact on the success of Roma inclusion. This will be analyzed through a framework provided by Iain Begg and Josh Berghman’s 2002 publication9. Furthermore, theories of the European social model will be used. While most scholars agree that there is not necessarily a single European social model and that welfare states are far from integration at the European level, the emerging welfare state models of the states of Eastern Europe are a useful tool in analyzing Roma inclusion. Cristina Neesham and Ileana Tache’s work (2010) on emerging Eastern European social models will be key in this analysis10. In their preferred typology of welfare states, four models are very distinct. The Anglo-Saxon model or liberal model is a minimal welfare state, acting as a “safety net” for those who the market has failed to provide employment11. The Continental or corporatist model, on the other hand, is a more comprehensive welfare state, relying on payment to workers through employment insurance systems, state-facilitated labour relations, subsidized pensions and public investment. It is meant to provide work and protect workers and their families from hardship. Neesham and Tache conclude that Eastern European countries, after significantly reforming their state structures following the fall of communism, have generally adopted either an Anglo-Saxon or a Continental model. As well, countries that have adopted a more Continental model have generally seen Begg, I. and Berghman, J. (2002) Introduction: EU social (exclusion) policy revisited?. Journal of European Social Policy, 12 (3), p.179-194. 10 Neesham, C. and Tache, . (2010) The Emerging Eastern European Social Model: A Comparative Perspective. Transition Issues II, p.1-15. Available at: http://www.stat.unipg.it/aissec2009/Documents/ papers/149_Tache_Neesham.pdf 11 Ibid. 9
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better results in terms of quality of life and hostility towards Roma, to resurge. This reduction in inequalities than countries caused a waning, halting or even reversal of using an Anglo-Saxon model12. measures encouraging Roma inclusion. This argument is drawn from Böhmelt’s theory Hypothesis on conditionality13. This paper hypothesizes that during Second, the principle of subsidiarityand in the years immediately following -keeping the EU out of direct, detailed the accession process, substantial legal and policy-making in areas related to Roma policy reform in the area of Roma rights inclusion--pushes the burden of this policywere implemented. However, following making onto member-states, and their accession, the implementation of reform regional or local governments. Thus, with slowed or halted. This is because incentives political energy for reform originating to reform declined while obstacles to further at the EU level, well-intentioned reform reform grew. Because of the difficulty of efforts are derailed or diluted by the several gathering sufficiently consistent and clear layers of political resistance and bureaucracy data on many areas of European integration, that they must overcome, limiting the those variables that have consistent effectiveness of these efforts in creating measurement and available data, while still better policy outcomes. acting as reasonable measurements of social Third, as models of social welfare inclusion, will be used as one measurement develop in the Czech Republic, Hungary of success. The case studies used in this and Romania, they tended to embrace paper as representative of the level of either the Anglo-Saxon liberal model or social inclusion will be the level of school the Continental corporatist model. These segregation for Roma children in each models exclude the already underemployed country and the Roma unemployment rate, Roma from access to a “leg-up,” keeping contrasted with the general unemployment them locked in poverty and the social rate at the time period measured. These exclusion that comes with this; This is factors are excellent representations of social extrapolated from Neesham and Tache’s inclusion due to their importance to Roma work on emerging European social models, living standards. Additionally, due to the itself drawn from Esping-Andersen’s limited data available and different accession typology of welfare states14. periods for Romania and Bulgaria, the three Case Study 1: Segregation in Pre-School and countries examined in this paper will be the Primary School Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. As these three countries all acceded to the EU Schools are important areas of social at the same time, they provide a reasonable contact within and between communities. temporal benchmark for analysis on progress Thus, segregation of Roma children in in terms of Roma integration. the school system is a clear sign of social First, while the accession process gave exclusion. In 2003, one year before the the EU political leverage over candidate accession of the Czech Republic, Slovakia states, allowing it to demand that antidiscrimination laws and other Roma 13 Böhmelt, T. (2012) The temporal dimension of inclusion mechanisms be implemented, this the credibility of EU conditionality and candidate compliance with the acquis communautaire, leverage declines following accession. This states’ 1998–2009. European Union Politics, 13 (3), p.1-23. decline allows the same domestic political 14 Neesham, C. and Tache, . (2010) The Emerging factors that blocked Roma inclusion Eastern European Social Model: A Comparative before accession, such as deeply ingrained Perspective. Transition Issues II, p.1-15. Available 12
Ibid.
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at: http://www.stat.unipg.it/aissec2009/Documents/ papers/149_Tache_Neesham.pdf
and Hungary, Avoiding the Dependency Trap declared that across Eastern Europe, only roughly half (51%) of Roma children seemed to be attending schools wherein the majority of students were members of the majority population. The number of children in majority-Roma schools ranged widely, with 12% of students in the Czech Republic, 24% in Slovakia, and 17% in Hungary attending these schools. However, in all countries surveyed, a significant numbers of respondents either did not answer or did not know the ethnic composition of their child’s school. As these parents are most likely to be uninvolved in their child’s education, this increases the probable number of segregated Roma students attending “Roma schools” to 28% in the Czech Republic, 40% in Slovakia, and 28% in Hungary15. Roma schools themselves fall into a number of categories. Some, especially in rural areas inhabited mostly by Roma, are “normal” schools with a predominantly Roma student body based on regional demography. However, in demographically mixed areas, Roma children are streamed into special segregated schools, or segregated classes within mixed schools. These schools, usually called some variation of “schools for children from disadvantaged families,” maintain a special curriculum and neartotal separation for Roma children from non-Roma. This segregation was often implemented on the grounds that Roma students often are not fully fluent in the language of their country, instead speaking a Roma language. A third type of school segregation is to stream Roma students into schools for mentally handicapped children, often with no grounds to do so16. All three types of Roma schools tend to be heavily under-resourced and provide a sub-standard education, while also reinforcing social boundaries between UNDP (2003) Avoiding the Dependency Trap. [report] Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme, p. 55. 16 Ibid. 15
Roma and non-Roma. These problems were increased by the economic crises and major reforms implemented by Eastern European states during the transition from communism. As government budgets were cut, education costs were downloaded onto local governments. Meanwhile, state-owned firms, which often funded primary schools for their workers’ children, were privatized, causing these schools to close. Thus, education systems everywhere underwent significant cuts. Roma, who were already marginalized, were affected most heavily by these cuts. In addition, the issue of school flight is important. As the entrance of Roma children into majority-population schools effects demographic change-- due to either relocation to new neighborhoods or as a result of government integration policies-majority-population parents will often withdraw their children, turning previously non-Roma-dominated schools into defacto segregated schools. In addition, many Roma parents express a preference for segregated schools, which they perceive as both academically easier and less likely to assimilate their child into the majority culture17, 18, 19. In 2002, the Council of Europe, a nonEU international organization joined by Hungary in 1990 and the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, called on all members to end the practice of segregation of Roma children in schools. The EU addressed this issue as well, with a 1996 report on the status of “Gypsy and Traveller Children.” The EU, however, waited until 8 April 2005, after the 2004 round of accession including the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, to issue a direct call to end this practice with UNDP (2003) Avoiding the Dependency Trap. [report] Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme, p. 53-7. 18 Greenberg, J. (2010) Report on Roma Education Today: From Slavery to Segregation and Beyond. Columbia Law Review, 110 (4), p.933-6. 19 European Roma Rights Centre (2004) Stigmata: Segregated Schooling of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. [report] Budapest: ERRC, p. 67-80. 17
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a European Parliament resolution calling on states to desegregate their education systems. In addressing school segregation around the time of accession in 2004, each state examined in this paper had different responses. The Czech Republic’s Education Act (2004) moved away from policies of segregated schools for “socially disadvantaged” children, but established in Section 16(8) of the law a system under which individual schools have the discretion to establish special classes or departments for children with disability of any type, including social disadvantage. Furthermore, the law declared that schools were to provide disabled or disadvantaged children with additional resources, such as Braille for blind children or textbooks for those who cannot afford their own. Finally, the law allowed for teaching assistants, who are hired at the discretion of the school to support disabled or disadvantaged children in the classroom. Teaching assistants were especially important in helping Roma children, who often struggled in a majority-culture environment, navigate the classroom20. Slovakia implemented some of the same practices as the Czech Republic, such as instituting paid teaching assistants in 2002 along with a “zero-year” of pre-school for students who would struggle in a primary school classes for developmental, linguistic or socioeconomic reasons. Other basic reforms such as recalibrating standardized testing that disproportionately directs Roma children to schools for the mentally handicapped were also implemented in 2005. These programs, along with others, were implemented as part of the PHARE fund of the EU, which was established in 1989 and subsequently expanded to help countries across Eastern Europe handle the Czech Republic (2004). On Pre-school, Basic, Secondary, Tertiary Professional and Other Education (the Education Act) 2004. Chapter 16. Prague 20
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costs of transitioning into the EU21. Hungary’s Roma were generally better integrated than in the Czech Republic or Slovakia. 62% of Roma children attended majority-population schools in 2003, and the vast majority of Hungarian Roma speak Magyar as their primary language. Still, policies to remedy school segregation began strongly before accession, with major revisions of the Public Education Act in 1999, 2002 and 2003. Along with the institution of paid teaching assistants and funds to subsidize school supplies, the Hungarian government earmarked money to reward schools that proactively integrate and foster a “favourable environment for Roma children22.” Despite the beginning of the “Decade of Roma Inclusion” in 2005, with each country submitting an official action plan and making political statements in favour of Roma inclusion, the situation on the ground has barely improved. Today, the statistics on the segregation of Roma in schools have not seen substantial improvement from the UNDP’s 2003 report; segregation in pre-school and primary schools had scarcely improved or even worsened since 2003. A report found that “while more than 75% of all children aged 3-6 are in preschool in each of these countries, the large majority of Roma children are not23.” In Hungary, possibly due to increasing social polarization, school segregation has increased substantially since the 1990s. In Slovakia, 36% of primary school students attend classes with all or mostly Roma peers, only 4% less than in 2003 before any new policies were implemented. In the Czech Carey, D. (2007), “Improving Education Outcomes in the Slovak Republic,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 578, OECD Publishing, p. 17-8. 22 Lannert, J. “Strategies for reform and innovation in Hungarian public education.” (2004), p. 5-7. 23 World Bank (2012) Toward an Equal Start: Closing the Early Learning Gap for Roma Children in Eastern Europe. [report] World Bank/European Commission, p. 7. 21
Republic, while Roma make up between 1.4 and 2.8% of the population, 32% of all students in primary schools for the mentally disabled or “practical elementary schools” were Roma24. Even since the landmark decision of D.H. v. Czech Republic (2007), where the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the Czech government had violated the European Convention on Human Rights by segregating Roma children into special schools, no concrete action has been taken25. The same is true for cases against Slovakia26 and Hungary27 at both the European and national levels. Numerous commissions have been implemented to “study” the problem. These commissions, often created on the back of European political pressure or EU judicial mandate, dutifully produce reports calling for policy changes, which rarely occur. This is a common theme across all three countries examined in this paper. Case Study 2: Unemployment Employment, according to the Roma themselves, is the single most important measure of social inclusion in every country measured, and, in the 2003 UNDP report Avoiding the Dependency Trap, it is also clearly the most pressing concern for most Roma families. During the Communist era, Roma, along with most other members of society, were guaranteed employment by the state. With the collapse of communism, Roma lost their jobs in inefficient state-owned firms en masse, causing Roma unemployment rates to soar to levels that appear almost unimaginably high. Unemployment rates vary widely, Ibid. D.H. and others v. Czech Republic (Case C-57325/00) [2007] ECtHR (2006) 26 Amnesty International (2012a) Slovak court rules segregation of Roma in schools unlawful | Amnesty International. [online] 27 Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary (Case C-11146/11) [2013] ECtHR (2013) 24 25
with perceived unemployment, measured through surveys of Roma families, at 46% in the Czech Republic, 58% in Hungary and 85% in Slovakia. This perceived unemployment rate does not include work in the informal sector of the economy. Taking this into account, the International Labour Organization (ILO)’s “broad unemployment
“Today, the statistics on the segregation of Roma in schools have not seen substantial improvement from the UNDP’s 2003 report; segregation in pre-school and primary schools had scarcely improved or even worsened since 2003.”
rate” for Roma, with the broadest possible definition of employment, was lower. Roma have an unemployment rate of 34% in the Czech Republic, 26% in Hungary and 64% in Slovakia. This means that even with the broadest definition of labour, including unregulated, insecure and poorly paid informal work, Roma unemployment rates are four times higher than the general population in the Czech Republic and Hungary and three and a half times higher in Slovakia. This is clearly related to the low average education level of Roma; among more educated Roma with secondary or higher education, unemployment rates are substantially lower28. This unemployment was not just related to the generally lower level of education in Roma communities; racial discrimination had a powerful effect. As stated by the European Commission’s 2004 report, The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union, many employers attempted to submit jobs listings explicitly discouraging Roma from applying, which often went unaddressed by local authorities29. In 2003, UNDP (2003) Avoiding the Dependency Trap. [report] Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme, p. 31-7. 29 European Roma Rights Centre (2004) Stigmata: 28
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almost 50% of Czech Roma and well over 60% of Hungarian and Slovakian Roma perceived their unemployed status as related directly to their ethnicity30. In addition, while uneducated or poorly educated Roma were more likely to be unemployed than better-educated Roma, unemployment among better-educated Roma was still much higher than among their non-Roma neighbours31. The response of the EU and related organizations to this crisis was similar in form to the response towards segregation in education. The European Union pushed for greater guarantees of non-discrimination in employment, for example with the issuance of the Equal Employment Directive of the Council of the EU in November, 2000. Starting before and continuing after accession, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia cautiously implemented active labour market policies (ALMPs) such as job retraining and aid to small businesses through government-supplied credit. From 2005 to 2007, National Action Plans for the Decade of Roma Inclusion, to be financed from both the European Social Fund and national budgets, were composed by the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. These plans included ALMPs, along with increased funding for data-gathering surveys, monitoring of best practices, and stronger anti-discrimination enforcement. Still, much of the improvement was expected to rely on a growing economy in each country, caused by European integration. In addition, since accession, anti-discrimination policies existing in the acquis communautaire, such as the Racial Equality Directive (2000), have been incorporated into national law, with efforts to establish institutions for Segregated Schooling of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. [report] Budapest: ERRC, p. 24. 30 UNDP (2003) Avoiding the Dependency Trap. [report] Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme, p. 34. 31 Niall O, and Andrey Ivanov, “Education and Employment Opportunities for the Roma,” Comparative Economic Studies, 48, no. 1 (2006): 12-3 86 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
Roma to appeal to in the event of racial discrimination. However, the effectiveness of these policies was unclear even in 2003, as more than 65% of Roma surveyed in each country found ALMPs either minimally helpful or not helpful at all in finding employment32. Since then, policies implemented have proven only partially successful in either providing substantially more employment or closing the employment gap between the general population and Roma. Total unemployment rates for adults (15-64) have not substantially improved: according to a 2011 EU-FRA regional survey, Czech Roma have a self-declared unemployment rate of 38%, Slovakian Roma has a rate of 35%, and Hungarian Roma have a rate of 36%. This contrasts to non-Roma unemployment rates of 9%, 8% and 21%, respectively. All three countries have thus improved substantially in employment of Roma33. However, huge gaps remain in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the narrowing of the gap in Hungary has more to do with rising Hungarian unemployment than with a sharp decline in Roma unemployment. In addition, these countries have benefited both from high economic growth rates since joining the EU and open borders. Since joining the EU, tens of thousands of Eastern European Roma have emigrated to other European states, shifting unemployment to other countries34. The remaining high unemployment is related both to low rates of education and the continued presence of racial animus towards Roma. In terms of education, Roma remain UNDP (2003) Avoiding the Dependency Trap. [report] Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme, p. 35. 33 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EU-FRA). 2012. The Situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States: Survey Results at a Glance. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 34 Kropp, M. and Striethorst, A. (2012) The Migrations of Roma in the European Union – an Ethnic Minority as the Sport of European Politics. Transform! European Network for Alternative Thinking and Political Dialogue, (10), 32
broadly poorly educated. In the Czech Republic, just under 30% of working-age Roma adults had completed a vocational secondary education, while in Slovakia and Hungary, the commensurate figure was closer to 20%. This compares to over 60% of non-Roma Hungarians and over 80% of Czechs and Slovakians. As poorly educated people encounter more difficulty in securing stable employment, this implicitly means that Roma are much more likely to be unemployed35. The 2009 EU-MIDIS survey--largely corroborated by the 2011 EU-FRA report--found that in terms of discrimination, 32% of Czech and Hungarian Roma and 23% of Slovakian Roma reported that they were discriminated against while looking for work or in the workplace. As well, over 80% of Roma in these three countries reported that they considered discrimination in employment based on racial or national origin to be very widespread. This is despite changes in national law to ban racial discrimination in employment. The lack of improvement may have to do with lack of awareness or distrust of the law36. Just over 50% of Czech Roma and fewer than 50% of Slovakian and Hungarian Roma knew about a law forbidding racial discrimination when applying for a job37. In addition, 66% of Czech Roma, 80% of Slovakian Roma and 82% of Hungarian Roma failed to report discrimination, mostly because they believed that nothing would be done or did not know that such an opportunity existed. Most European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EU-FRA). 2012. The Situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States: Survey Results at a Glance. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 15. 36 European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS). 2009. Data in Focus Report 1: The Roma. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 5. 37 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EU-FRA). 2012. The Situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States: Survey Results at a Glance. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 27. 35
alarmingly, a high number of Roma in all countries refused to report discrimination for fear of retribution38. Empirical Analysis With so much apparent political energy behind the project of Roma inclusion, especially since 2005 with the declaration of the Decade of Roma Inclusion, why then have outcomes not substantially improved? The three analytical frameworks provided by conditionality, subsidiarity and emerging Eastern European social models provide some important explanation for this. Using Tobias Böhmelt’s analysis of the efficacy of conditionality can shed light on the failure of EU states to implement concrete policy changes. Böhmelt’s theory contends that, states lose the incentive to implement potentially difficult or politically unpopular policies after they have been admitted to the EU39. While Böhmelt uses economic and political liberalization as his variables, policy on Roma social inclusion can be interpreted using the same framework. Roma inclusion has proven to be quite difficult to implement, meaning that some external force is necessary to incentivize action. For example, desegregating schools or establishing effective and expedient anti-discrimination appeal systems requires constructing new institutions and changing established patterns of behavior. This is a difficult process, requiring substantial political energy. Conditionality was one way to build political energy, but this tool was lost following accession. The lack of political will is evident in cases like the addition of the Racial Equality Directive into Czech law in 2009. The directive was temporarily blocked by the conservative European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS). 2009. Data in Focus Report 1: The Roma. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union p. 6. 39 Böhmelt, T. (2012) The temporal dimension of the credibility of EU conditionality and candidate states’ compliance with the acquis communautaire, 1998–2009. European Union Politics, 13 (3), p.1-23. 38
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Czech president’s veto and only barely passed with a parliamentary override40. The requirement of political energy, without the pressure provided by conditionality after accession, may prevent reforms of culturally entrenched systems, even assuming the existence of pro-European political elites. If, for example, the EU had used conditionality to force school desegregation or strong antidiscrimination laws before accession, some of the current problems of Roma social exclusion may not exist. In addition, policies of social inclusion for Roma can be unpopular among the rest of the population. Roma are generally viewed negatively across Eastern Europe41. Longstanding issues like school flight from desegregating schools is only a micro-level example of the deep prejudice that exists against Roma on the societal level42,43. This makes governments afraid to implement social inclusion policies, instead “dragging their feet” against external pressure. When this pressure is lifted by accession, they have even less incentive to force unpopular changes through and risk a potential backlash. Thus, even when EU pressure exists, demanded policies are often not implemented. For example, in the case of D.H. vs. Czech Republic, the Czech government followed the European Court of Human Right’s declaration that they were in violation of treaty obligations over continued school segregation with the commission of a number of studies44. These Ceetrust.org: Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe (2009) Czech Republic becomes last EU state to adopt anti-discrimination law. 41 European Commission (2012) Special Eurobarometer 393: Discrimination in the EU in 2012 . [report] Brussels: European Commission/Directorate-General for Justice, p. 114. 42 European Roma Rights Centre (2004) Stigmata: Segregated Schooling of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. [report] Budapest: ERRC, p. 68-75. 43 Greenberg, J. (2010) Report on Roma Education Today: From Slavery to Segregation and Beyond. Columbia Law Review, 110 (4), p. 936. 44 Amnesty International (2012b) Czech government still failing to address discrimination against Romani children in schools | Amnesty International. 40
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studies’ recommendations have yet to be implemented. Without the effective tool of conditionality, there is insufficient domestic or European pressure to convince them to do so, and no easy alternative tools to use to force compliance anyway. Subsidiarity is a useful tool for examining the lack of success in Roma inclusion as well. Due to the European Union’s reluctance to become involved in policy areas it sees as better dealt with on a national or local level, the responsibility for pushing reform in these areas falls to member-states. These governments in turn often push responsibility to the regional or local level. Both areas discussed in this paper’s case studies--education and social welfare--fall into the realm of member-state competencies45. This allows pre-established systems, such as school segregation or rampant racial discrimination in employment to continue to exist absent concerted effort for reform. It is clear that political energy for reform in the area of Roma inclusion since accession has come from the European level, often with NGOs pushing the EU to implement stronger policies. These top-down efforts for reform are directed towards national governments where some efforts for change, such as national Action Plans for the Decade of Roma Inclusion, occur. However, efforts are diluted, due to difficulty in implementation or fears of popular backlash. Pushing reforms to the regional level causes even more diffusion of political pressure. For example, in the highly decentralized school systems of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, European ideas or orders of reform are diluted into increased incentives or directives for desegregation at the national level. Then at the level of an individual school district or town, where popular anger over integration is a serious concern, these incentives lead Begg, I. and Berghman, J. (2002) Introduction: EU social (exclusion) policy revisited?. Journal of European Social Policy, 12 (3), p.185. 45
to little or no reform actually occurring on the ground46. In contrast, as with many of the more successful Roma inclusion pilot projects, energy for reform has emerged from the local level, where motivated individuals and communities can overcome these obstacles47. Thus, when efforts come from the top down, outcomes often do not change despite the best efforts of European and national governments. The fact that service delivery must occur and be administered at the regional level undermines the efficacy of top-down reforms due to the diffusion of political pressure at each level. Emerging Eastern European social models provide a third useful framework of analysis, especially relating to unemployment. According to Neesham and Tache, Eastern European countries are split into two groups. One group, Group A, has adopted an Anglo-Saxon or liberal model, while the other, Group B, has adopted a Continental or corporatist model. Slovakia falls into Group A, while the Czech Republic and Hungary fall into Group B. Broadly, Neesham and Tache found that countries that adopted a Continental model have generally seen better results than countries with an Anglo-Saxon model. However, examining the welfare systems helps to explain the only partial success of reducing high Roma unemployment, in that neither of these models is particularly helpful to Roma in their search for employment or better quality of life48. In the Anglo-Saxon model, the welfare state exists as a “safety net” to help individuals when the market has failed to provide them with a means of sustaining Greenberg, J. (2010) Report on Roma Education Today: From Slavery to Segregation and Beyond. Columbia Law Review, 110 (4), p. 946-59. 47 European Commission (2010) Improving the tools for the social inclusion and non-discrimination of Roma in the EU. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, p. 21-4. 48 Neesham, C. and Tache, . (2010) The Emerging Eastern European Social Model: A Comparative Perspective. Transition Issues II, p. 8-12. 46
themselves. It is relatively minimal, and does not strongly correct for economic inequalities. As well, this model mostly relies on workers being employable in the first place, with unemployment or other social distress considered to be a temporary fact that will correct itself in the long run as the economy improves. This fundamentally excludes the Roma in that the unregulated market does not provide employment to the highly uneducated majority of the Roma workforce, especially in conjunction with racial discrimination in employment. This is evidenced by the extremely high unemployment rate for uneducated Roma in all three countries surveyed. Thus, in a state following this model, many Roma are not be able to find stable employment and are forced to subsist on the meager offerings of a welfare state meant to act only as a temporary safety net, marginalizing and excluding them further. This leads to a vicious cycle of social exclusion, poverty and unemployment. Likewise, the Continental model does not provide substantial benefits for the Roma either. In this model, the welfare state emphasizes the role of labour law and collective bargaining, relying on “insurancebased, non-employment benefits,” old-age pensions and representation of workers by powerful unions. This model fails the Roma in two ways. First, due to the low-skilled, non-unionized and informal nature of many Roma workers’ employment, Roma would be unable to benefit from the gains negotiated by labour unions. Also, even broad workplace standards negotiated by unions would not apply to the substantial segment of Roma working in the unregulated informal economy. Furthermore, social stigma often prevents Roma from accessing these types of institutions. Second, the model fails the Roma in that benefits are acquired through working as part of insurance systems. Without initial employment, Roma cannot access significant parts of the welfare state, marginalizing and excluding them. This
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is evidenced as well by the extremely low employment rate for Roma in the formal economy, along with their reported lack of access to state services. Conclusion This paper proposes that in the area of Roma social inclusion, policy changes were attempted and new laws made in the accession and immediate post-accession periods. However, the implementation of these policies was broadly unsuccessful. Attempted reforms and new programs stalled or proved powerless in ending the problems that they were meant to solve. Using three case studies over two variables, school segregation and unemployment in, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, this paper demonstrated the veracity of these arguments. The three theoretical tools used, conditionality, subsidiarity and an analysis of changing social models, all provided insight. Through the evidence provided by these case studies and empirical analysis given, it is clear that reforms in the area of Roma inclusion have been weakened and stalled by structural factors explained by these theories. As the problems of Roma social inclusion continue to trouble Europe, taking a closer look at the structural problems behind efforts to address exclusion is a necessary step on the path to a more inclusive Europe. ___________________________________ References
Amnesty International (2012a) Slovak court rules segregation of Roma in schools unlawful | Amnesty International. [online] Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/ slovak-court-rules-segregation-roma-schools-unlawful-2012-10-31 [Accessed: 12 Apr 2013]. Amnesty International (2012b) Czech government still failing to address discrimination against Romani children in schools | Amnesty International. [online] Available at: http://www. 90 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
amnesty.org/en/news/czech-government-still-failing-address-discrimination-against-romani-children-schools-2012-11-0 [Accessed: 12 Apr 2013]. BBC News (2013) EU Enlargement: The Next Eight. [online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11283616 [Accessed: 10 Apr 2013]. Begg, I. and Berghman, J. (2002) Introduction: EU social (exclusion) policy revisited?. Journal of European Social Policy, 12 (3), p.179-194. Böhmelt, T. (2012) The temporal dimension of the credibility of EU conditionality and candidate states’ compliance with the acquis communautaire, 1998–2009. European Union Politics, 13 (3), p.1-23. Carey, D. (2007), “Improving Education Outcomes in the Slovak Republic,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 578, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi. org/10.1787/084038325004 Ceetrust.org: Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe (2009) Czech Republic becomes last EU state to adopt anti-discrimination law. [online] Available at: http://www. ceetrust.org/article/306/ [Accessed: 13 Apr 2013]. Commission of the European Communities (1996) School Provision for Gypsy and Traveller Children. [report] Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. Czech Republic (2004). On Pre-school, Basic, Secondary, Tertiary Professional and Other Education (the Education Act) 2004. Chapter 16. Prague D.H. and others v. Czech Republic (Case C-57325/00) [2007] ECtHR (2006) European Commission (2010) Improving the tools for the social inclusion and non-discrimination of Roma in the EU.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010 European Commission (2012) Special Eurobarometer 393: Discrimination in the EU in 2012 . [report] Brussels: European Commission/Directorate-General for Justice. European Parliament (2005) Roma in the European Union: European Parliament resolution on the situation of the Roma in the European Union. [press release] 8 April 2005. European Roma Rights Centre (2004) Stigmata: Segregated Schooling of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. [report] Budapest: ERRC. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EU-FRA). 2012. The Situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States: Survey Results at a Glance. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS). 2009. Data in Focus Report 1: The Roma. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union
Neesham, C. and Tache, . (2010) The Emerging Eastern European Social Model: A Comparative Perspective. Transition Issues II, p.1-15. Available at: http://www.stat.unipg.it/ aissec2009/Documents/papers/149_ Tache_Neesham.pdf [Accessed: March 28 2013]. O’Higgins, N., and Ivanov. “Education and Employment Opportunities for the Roma.” Comparative Economic Studies. no. 1 (2006): 6-19. Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004) Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (4), p.669–687. The Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005) Declaration of the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015. [press release] February 2, 2005. UNDP (2003) Avoiding the Dependency Trap. [report] Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme.
Marc Willers, and Siobhán Lloyd, “Using EU law to tackle anti-Roma discrimination – Part 1,” Legal Action (November 2011): 21-6 Greenberg, J. (2010) Report on Roma Education Today: From Slavery to Segregation and Beyond.Columbia Law Review, Marc Willers, and Siobhán Lloyd, “Using 110 (4), p.919-1001. EU law to tackle anti-Roma discrimination – Part w,” Legal Action (December 2011): 33-7 World Bank (2012) Toward Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary (Case an Equal Start: Closing the Early LearC-11146/11) [2013] ECtHR (2013) ning Gap for Roma Children in Eastern Europe. [report] World Bank/European Kropp, M. and Striethorst, A. (2012) The Commission. Migrations of Roma in the European Union – an Ethnic Minority as the Sport of European Politics. Transform! European Network for Alternative Thinking and Political Dialogue, (10), [Accessed: http://transform-network. net/journal/issue-102012/news/detail/ Journal/the-migrations-of-roma-in-theeuropean-union-an-ethnic-minority-asthe-sport-of-european-politic.html]. Lannert, J. “Strategies for reform and innovation in Hungarian public education.” (2004). The Effect of Accession to the European Union | Langer | 91
The Role of Strategic Choices in Shaping Regime Trajectory: Comparing the Cases of the Philippines and North Korea By Lewis Fainer
Keywords: Philippines, North Korea, Democratization, Dictatorship, Comparative Politics
Abstract Elites’ strategic choices play a significant, and too often neglected, role in explaining regime trajectory. Beginning in 1972, this study compares the political calculations of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and Kim Il-Sung in North Korea. This essay first explains why the two countries are suitable for comparative analysis. Next, it examines alternative interpretations and argues that these explanations can be supplemented through an elite-centric approach. After outlining the theoretical framework used for comparative analysis, this essay shows how the leaders’ differing strategic decisions influenced the trajectory of their regimes.
P
hilippines and North Korea differed in many ways in 1972. Each state has a unique history and is home to a population with a distinct culture. However, these countries possessed a number of similarities, which make them appropriate for comparative analysis. Using 1972 as a starting point, this essay will compare Ferdinand Marcos’ authoritarian regime in the Philippines to Kim Il Sung’s authoritarian regime in North Korea. Perhaps, the initial point of historically salient convergence between the Philippines and North Korea was their colonial experience: both were controlled by colonial powers for approximately equivalent time periods. Following the Philippine-American War in 1899, the United States took control of the Philippines. While over the years American control underwent several changes, Filipinos were not given their full independence until 19461. Similarly, the Korean peninsula fell under Japanese rule with the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876. Korea was officially annexed by Japan in 1910 and remained a colony of the imperial power until the end the Second World War in 19452. Both countries suffered from stagnation in the development of democratic institutions Walter L. Williams, “United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism,” Journal of American History 66.4 (1980): 811. 2 Hong Kal, “Modeling the West, Returning to Asia: Shifting Politics of Representation in Japanese Colonial Expositions in Korea,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 47.3 (2005): 509. 1
during their colonial history. It is important to recognize that there were some differences between the colonial administrations in the two states. Principally, over time the United States gradually allowed for the establishment of civilian administration in the Philippines. Comparatively, the Japanese did not allow the Korean people to establish any form of self-government whatsoever. Despite the difference in colonial policy, following the conclusion of World War Two, the Philippines and North Korea exhibited a comparable level of stagnation in the development of their democratic institutions. The democratic development that occurred in the Philippines while the country was under American rule was not substantive: During each phase of governance, the United States maintained veto power over all legislation passed by the Filipino government. More importantly, the colonizing force heavily influenced elections and the legislative agenda in the Philippines3. This display of democracy did little to develop legitimate democratic institutions. Further, although Koreans were banned from building any form of autonomous government during Japanese rule, they were still able to develop some ‘democratic’ institutions. For instance, after significant protest in 19194, the Japanese David Brody, Visualizing American Empire: Orientalism and Imperialism in the Philippines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 124. 4 Frank Baldwin, “Participatory Anti-Imperialism: 3
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granted considerable latitude to Koreans. The ensuing intellectual and social ferment of the 1920s resulted in the organization of political groups and labour unions5. Although the both countries shared a similar historical experience prior to 1972, this essay will contend that strategic choices made respectively by the Ferdinand Marcos government in the Philippines and the Kim Il Sung government in North Korea led to divergent regime trajectories. Democracy was restored in the Philippines in 1986, while North Korea remains one of the most closed societies on the planet today. Ultimately, this essay will argue that the difference in key strategic choices of elites made democratization more likely in the Philippines and authoritarian consolidation more likely in North Korea. The essay will be divided into four sections. First, I will argue that the Philippines and North Korea were in similar positions in 1972 and are therefore appropriate for comparative analysis. Second, I will address alternative explanations for the countries’ differing outcomes. Third, I will outline the theoretical framework used in this essay. Finally, I will analyze how the leaders’ strategic decisions influenced the trajectory of their regimes. It should be noted that this essay’s argument is somewhat limited. As will be discussed in the second section, there are additional factors that help to explain the divergent outcomes in the countries under study. Nevertheless, the strategic choices of elites play an important, and often overlooked role, in explaining regime trajectory.
of future democratic success. While the comparison is imperfect, it is clear that at the conclusion of their experiences with colonialism, the Philippines and North Korea suffered from stagnation in the development of democratic institutions. This commonality meant that the two states were in a similar situation when authoritarianism transpired in 1972.
“Although the both countries shared a similar historical experience prior to 1972, this essay will contend that strategic choices made respectively by the Ferdinand Marcos government in the Philippines and the Kim Il Sung government in North Korea led to divergent regime trajectories.”
First, although both states saw increased productivity, their respective colonial rulers centered most of the economic development on the exploitation of resources. In the Philippines, improvements were focused on mining and agriculture. Over the course of American rule, industrial growth became increasingly neglected. In turn, the Filipino economy became progressively more dependent upon the United States economy6. The economic development that occurred in Korea during Japanese rule brought similarly little benefit to the native population. Japan’s initial economic policy was to increase agricultural production in Korea. The occupying force aimed to use Korean agriculture to help meet Japan’s growing need for rice. Like the Philippines, The Philippines and North Korea in 1972 the Korean economy grew increasingly reliant on the economy of its occupier. It is extremely difficult to assess the The Philippines and North Korea relative value of different democratic appear to have undergone extremely similar institutions in determining the likelihood economic development during their colonial The 1919 Independence Movement,” The Journal of Korean Studies 1 (1979): 127. 5 Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1985), 6. 94 | McGill Journal of Political Studies 2014
Jose S. Reyes, Legislative History of America’s Economic Policy Towards the Philippines (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1923), 192. 6
experiences; yet, there was one difference that merits consideration. During the 1930s, Japan began to develop a significant industrial sector in Korea, as part of its preparation for the Second World War7. In the Philippines however, industrial growth remained essentially nonexistent, largely because of significant agrarian unrest8. Yet, the Japanese had not developed the emerging industrial sector equally across the Korean Peninsula. Thus, when Korea was divided following the Second World War, the North was left with limited industrial infrastructure9. Further, the specific makeup of each country’s economic production is less important than their common dependence on a foreign nation’s economy. This shared dependence meant that in 1972, Marcos and Kim were in a similar position when they made strategic choices regarding their states’ respective economies. Second, there is a temporal justification for comparative analysis. Marcos and Kim both seized control of their respective countries in 1972. That year, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Proclamation No. 1081, extending his rule and ushering in a period of martial law in the Philippines10. Across the East China Sea, Kim and the Workers Party of Korea passed a new constitution installing Kim as President indefinitely and officially declaring that the state would prescribe to a socialist ideology11. Marcos had been President of the Philippines since 1965 and Kim had Stephan Haggard, David Kang and Chung-In Moon, “Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development: A Critique,” World Development 25.6 (1997): 875. 8 John A. Larkin, “Philippine History Reconsidered: A Socioeconomic Perspective,” The American Historical Review 87.3 (1982): 614. 9 Shannon McCune, “The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea,” World Politics 1.2 (1949): 227. 10 Albert F. Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 1-2. 11 Chin Kim and Timothy G. Kearley, “The 1972 Socialist Constitution of North Korea,” Texas International Law Journal 11 (1976): 113. 7
been Prime Minister of North Korea since 1948. Yet, until 1972, Marcos’ legitimacy stemmed from popular election and Kim’s stemmed from the Supreme People’s Assembly. Since both despots seized power and began consolidating their rule in 1972, it makes sense to compare the implications of their strategic choices. Finally, the Filipino and North Korean authoritarian leaders both depended on a similar regime type. Both dictators relied heavily on their state’s military apparatus to support their rule. In the Philippines, Marcos’ declaration of martial law meant that his regime explicitly relied on the support of the military12. North Korea’s 1972 constitution acknowledged the Supreme People’s Assembly, but also emphasized the importance of a military-first philosophy. In practice, the North Korean military became personalized serving Kim, not the state13. Furthermore, each supreme commander developed a cult of personality in his respective nation and incorporated personalistic rule into his leadership14. The similarities between the regimes structure in each state further support the case for comparative analysis. Alternative Explanations for Regime Trajectory There are two alternative paradigms that may be used to explain the divergent regime trajectories in the Philippines and North Korea. First, one could attempt to explain the outcome through a structural explanation. Amado Mendoza Jr., “People Power in the Philippines, 1983-1986,” in Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action From Ghandi to the Present, ed. Adams Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 181. 13 Dongsung Kong, “North Korea,” in The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), 335. 14 Mark R. Thompson and David Wurfel, “The AntiMarcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines,” Pacific Affairs 69.2 (1996): 291. 12
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Using this line of reasoning, one would attempt to identify structural conditions in the Philippines that are absent in North Korea and argue that these conditions played a role in Filipino democratization. Second, one could attempt to explain the outcome through an explanation of norm diffusion. Using this line of reasoning, one would argue that the Philippines and North Korea adopted a number of the norms and practices held by their colonial administrations. In turn, one would argue, these diffused norms would have affected the trajectory of their regimes. Neither explanation would be entirely incorrect. Yet, both paradigms can be incorporated into an analysis of elite strategy to provide a more thorough explanation of the divergent regime outcomes. In their work, Capitalist Development and Democracy, Rueschemeyer et al. suggest that democratization results from a “struggle between the dominant and subordinate classes over the right to rule15.” The problem with this structural formula is that the relative power between social classes is not determined in a vacuum. That was certainly not the case in the Philippines and North Korea. Rather, the struggle between social classes was a product of the strategic decisions of Ferdinand Marcos and Kim Il Sung. Therefore, the first argument in this essay will explore the economic policies advanced by each leader. It will argue that each leader’s strategic choices regarding economic reform altered the balance of power between social classes, which had important ramifications on regime trajectory. On a similar note, the second argument will address how the leaders’ strategic choices affected the relative influence of different social groups. This section will assess the attempts by Marcos and Kim to prevent divisions from emerging among the economic and military elite Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 47. 15
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within their states. In both the Philippines and North Korea, colonial powers focused their ideological indoctrination on societal elites. When Marcos and Kim seized power in 1972, the leaders made strategic calculations based on their own interpretation and experience with a colonial past. The best way to understand how the diffusion of norms affected the regime trajectory of the Philippines and North Korea is to view it through the lens of the leaders’ strategic choices. This essay’s final argument will explain how Marcos and Kim adopted differing levels of repression, as a result of their colonial involvement. Again, the difference in the strategic decisions made by each regime contributed to democratization in the Philippines and the consolidation of authoritarianism in North Korea. The Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Elites’ Strategic Decisions In its discussion of Ferdinand Marcos and Kim Il Sung, this essay will employ Ronald Wintrobe’s rational choice approach. The paradigm, introduced by Wintrobe in his work, “Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches,” suggests that dictators behave rationally. More specifically, under the rational choice approach, “whatever [a dictator’s] goals, which we take as given, they choose the best means possible to implement them consistent with available information16.” Using the aforementioned approach, this essay will examine three key strategic decisions made by Marcos and Kim. First, it will assess each leader’s economic policy. Second, it will discuss the leaders’ attempts to prevent divisions from developing among the elites in their countries. Third, it will compare the level of repression that Ronald Wintrobe, “Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Carles Boix and Susan Strokes. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 363. 16
each commander used on his respective population. In analyzing each strategic decision, this essay will further borrow from Wintrobe. The author argues that, “dictatorships use two instruments—repression and loyalty— to stay in power17.” Should the regime obtain more resources than required to maintain its rule, Wintrobe contends that the dictator may choose to spend these assets on personal consumption, rather than repression or loyalty18. Wintrobe suggests that four types of dictatorships can be distinguished: tinpots, tyrants, totalitarians, and timocrats. Depending on a dictatorship’s classification, differing levels of repression, loyalty, and personal consumption can be observed. The evidence presented in this essay will suggest that Ferdinand Marcos was somewhat of a tinpot. As such, Marcos sacrificed spending on repression and loyalty, in order to increase his personal consumption. Comparatively, the evidence presented in this essay will suggest that Kim Il Sung was a totalitarian. By sacrificing the maximization of his personal consumption, Kim was able to combine high repression with a capacity to generate loyalty. It is important to note that during his time in power, Marcos used high levels of repression on the Filipino population and commanded a significant degree of loyalty. Rather than a strict categorization, it is useful to conceive of a tinpot regime and a totalitarian regime falling on opposite ends of a scale. As a dictator opts to use more resources on personal consumption, he sacrifices his ability to repress dissidence and garner loyalty from his citizenry, making himself less of a totalitarian and more of a tinpot. In reality, the Marcos and Kim regimes both fell on the totalitarian end of the scale. Yet, the difference in each dictator’s level of personal consumption helps explain their divergent policy calculations. Next, it will be argued that each strategic 17 18
Ibid., 367. Ibid., 368.
decision affected the dynamic between hardliners and soft-liners in the authoritarian regimes. This essay will adopt the framework advanced by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philipe C. Schmitter in their work, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. The authors suggest that, “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence— direct or indirect—of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners19.” Marcos and Kim’s strategic decisions had important effects on the balance of power between these competing factions in their respective regimes. Finally, for every strategic choice, this essay will discuss how that decision can be incorporated into an alternative explanation for regime trajectory. It will attempt to reconcile differences in the approaches and explain why the emphasis on strategic decision-making used in this essay is important in explaining regime trajectory. Regime Trajectory Through the Lens of Strategic Policy Choices Shortly after establishing martial law in the Philippines, Marcos promised to implement economic reform. The leader guaranteed that through industrialization and the introduction of chemical farming, he would help impoverished farmers make a living. Instead, Marcos’ agricultural reforms significantly increased economic disparity between the rich and the very poor, the latter compromising a majority of the state’s population20. In contrast, the North Korean regime engaged in a significant degree of social engineering. Communism stripped the possessing class of ownership of the Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 19. 20 Kathleen M. Nadeau, Liberation Theology in the Philippines: Faith in a Revolution (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 41. 19
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factors of production and largely eliminated the clergy as a social group in the country21. In passing his agricultural reforms, Marcos surely knew that a significant number of Filipino farmers would become unemployed. The introduction of chemical farming eliminated the need for thousands of workers. Even if industrial jobs were becoming rapidly available, which they were not22, the laid off farmers would have required significant training in order to transfer industries. Marcos could have developed an assistance program or provided state subsidized employment retraining for the jobless farmers in order to maintain a high level of loyalty from the very poor. Alternatively, when the agrarian subordinate class increasingly turned to protest, he could have dedicated more resources to repressing dissidence. He did neither, instead choosing to maintain a high level of personal consumption. Comparatively, Kim’s economic policies prevented the development of a bourgeoisie, a group that typically provides important leadership during revolution. Kim used the resources he seized from the possessing class to his political advantage. By redistributing these resources among the his supporters23, the North Korean leader was able to consolidate the support and loyalty of the political elite. By maintaining an extremely high level of repression, Kim ensured that there were no significant protests launched by the groups he had marginalized. Instead of maximizing his personal consumption, Kim kept his supporters loyal and preserved a consistent level of repression. As a result of Marcos’ economic policies, the agrarian subordinate class in the Philippines was no longer willing to Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,” International Security 35.1 (2010): 49. 22 Benedict J. Kerkvliet, “Land Reform in the Philippines since the Marcos Coup,” Public Affairs 47.3 (1974): 290. 23 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, “North Korea: The Hardest Nut,” Foreign Policy 139 (2003): 46. 21
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acquiesce. Since Marcos had lost their loyalty and he did not significantly increase his level of repression, the group increasingly engaged in protest24. This in turn, caused soft-liners within the Marcos regime to begin doubting that the perpetuation of authoritarian rule was viable. The intensity and frequency of protest activity caused this group to believe that the regime would inevitably fall. In order to protect their political standing, this important faction began supporting calls for liberalization and became more
“While both leaders attempted to solidify their rule through personalization of the military, Marcos was far less successful than Kim.”
open to creating pacts with the subordinate class. Marcos’ economic policy increased the likelihood that democratization could take hold in the country. In North Korea, Kim’s economic policy did the exact opposite. By redistributing wealth to political elites, Kim was able to consolidate his authoritarian rule in three ways. First, he reinforced hard-liners’ belief that the continuation of the regime was feasible. Second, he was able to convert some soft-liners into hard-liners. Third, he was able to appease soft-liners that believed some form of democratization was the necessary outcome of authoritarianism. Kim’s effectiveness in minimizing protest activity gave soft-liners reason to believe that liberalization was unnecessary at that current juncture. Unlike his Filipino counterpart, Kim’s strategic choices regarding economic policy helped to consolidate his rule. Alternative theories explaining regime trajectory suggest that prospects for democratization are shaped by the relative power balance between different classes. As evidenced by the aforementioned discussion Benedict J. Kerkvliet, “Land Reform in the Philippines since the Marcos Coup,” Public Affairs 47.3 (1974): 293. 24
of economic policy however, the relative balance of power between classes can be explained as a product of elite decisionmaking. In the Philippines, Marcos further marginalized the very poor. In North Korea, Kim bolstered the political elite, at the expense of the possessing class and the clergy. The relative balance between different classes and the effect that has on regime consolidation, can best be understood by looking at strategic choices made by elites. Marcos and Kim both attempted to prevent divisions from emerging within the elite in their states. The Marcos regime was unable to prevent a number of divisions among elites from developing by the early 1980s. There were two significant elite divisions in the Philippines. First, a division emerged between “crony” and “non-crony” segments of the business class. The “cronies,” were the new economic elite who were relatives and close friends of the Marcoses. This group prospered through access to government credit and contracts, as well as an inside track in landing joint ventures with foreign investors25. Second, elite divisions within the armed forces emerged in response to Marcos’ personalization of the military and corruption within the troops26. The Kim regime was able to foster unity among elites through the establishment of an elite selectorate. Under this strategy, the regime bribed military leaders, party officials and bureaucrats. Members of the “core” class received the safest and most desirable jobs, more plentiful and better food, residency in Pyongyang, as well as a host of lavish gifts27. There is further evidence that the Kim regime was able to co-opt the military by bestowing on it policy influence and prestige, along with a large share of the Kurt Schock, “People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma,” Social Problems 46.3 (1999): 363. 26 Ibid., 364. 27 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,” International Security 35.1 (2010): 61. 25
national budget28. Wintrobe explains that in any dictatorship, “the easiest way to obtain support, is to overpay supporters29.” In providing preferential treatment to only his close friends and relatives, Marcos minimized the amount of economic elites who were overpaid in the Philippines. In doing so, the leader forfeited a certain level of support and loyalty, in exchange for an increase in his level of private consumption. The “non-crony” segment of the economic elite did not take Marcos’ actions lightly. In response to being marginalized by the Marcos regime, many of these businesspeople became prominent leaders in the People Power Revolution30, which was eventually successful in restoring democracy to the Philippines. Rather than attempting to dampen the flourishing protest movement with increased military and police mobilization, Marcos maintained a consistent level of repression31. Again, the dictator chose to sacrifice a higher level of repression to increase his personal consumption. While both leaders attempted to solidify their rule through personalization of the military, Marcos was far less successful than Kim. Marcos mobilized the Armed Forces of the Philippines to complement civilian agencies in infrastructure construction, economic planning and program execution, regional and industrial site planning, and community development32. In doing so, Ibid., 62. Ronald Wintrobe, “Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Carles Boix and Susan Strokes. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 367. 30 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election Movements to People Power in the Philippines (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 100. 31 Jim Zwick, Military and Repression in the Philippines (Montreal: McGill University Developing Area Studies, 1982), 41. 32 William H. Overholt, “The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos,” Asian Survey 26.11 (1986): 1148. 28 29
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Marcos vested extraordinary power in the hands of a few individuals. The military personnel who were appointed to fill these positions all had ties to Marcos and his inner circle.33 The strong evidence suggesting nepotism was at play resulted in some highranking military officers calling Marcos’ leadership into question. This sentiment, in combination with a strong legacy of military independence in the Philippines34, led to backlash against Marcos’ personalization of the military. Marcos’ military strategy further indicates the leader’s willingness to sacrifice loyalty to increase his level of personal consumption. Although military defections became increasingly common, Marcos made the strategic calculation to preference personal consumption over heightened repression. Unlike Marcos, Kim sacrificed his personal consumption to cast a wider net when overpaying economic elites. Members of the “core” class included descendants of anti-Japanese guerrillas, heroes of the Korean War, and party bureaucrats35. By bribing a greater number and a more diverse selection of elites, Kim was able to ensure a high level of loyalty in North Korea. In the Filipino context, individuals felt marginalized because they were excluded from economic advantages as a result of the Marcos’ nepotistic policies. Comparatively, excluded individuals in North Korea were better able to reconcile their omission from the “core” class because Kim had given preference to national heroes. This meant that individuals in the “wavering” and “hostile36” classes were less likely to demonstrate in opposition to the regime. Ibid., 45. Albert F. Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 82. 35 Marcus Noland, “Transition from the Bottom-Up: Institutional Change in North Korea,” Comparative Economic Studies 48 (2006): 195. 36 Changyong Choi, “‘Everyday Politics’ in North Korea,” The Journal of Asian Studies 72.3 (2013): 664. 33 34
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Kim Il Sung made public dissidence further improbable by continuing to sacrifice his personal consumption to maintain a high level of repression. The North Korean dictator was also quite successful at cultivating unification among military elites. Instead of focusing on integrating military and civilian elites like Marcos, Kim directed his attention toward bestowing prestige upon the military. Kim developed an active arms industry, created a national holiday honouring the military, and regularly praised the troops in his public addresses37. The elite appreciated their newfound prominence and rewarded Kim by being amenable to his personalization of the military. In order to allocate such considerable resources to the armed forces, Kim had to sacrifice personal consumption. The result was a unified military elite with a strong allegiance to the dictator. Given the military’s expanding size and vast responsibilities, it was necessary that Kim forgo a degree of private consumption to preserve a high level of repression. Had he not done so, an opportunity may have presented itself for the bourgeoning military class to seize power. Marcos’ strategic policies relating to economic and military elites were unsuccessful in preventing significant divisions from emerging. His nepotistic approach antagonized soft-liners and caused them to align with the resistance movement. Soft-liners from the “noncrony” class played an important leadership role in the People Power Revolution. During the movement, they coordinated strikes and the mass boycott of businesses owned by Marcos’ “cronies38.” Soft-liners in the military were also instrumental to the success of the rebellion. Disillusioned junior officers defected and created three Homer T. Hodge, “North Korea’s Military Strategy,” Parameters 33.1 (2003): 77. 38 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election Movements to People Power in the Philippines (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 101. 37
opposition groups: Reform the Armed Forces Movement, Soldier of the Filipino People, and Young Officers Union39. The Filipino dictator’s inability to prevent softliners from turning against his regime made democratization more likely in the Philippines. In comparison, Kim was able to keep soft-liners in North Korea committed to preserving his regime. From a quantitative perspective, Kim afforded benefits to a far greater number of elites than his Filipino counterpart. From a qualitative perspective, the two dictators were both particularly gracious to hard-liners in their regimes. Yet, only Kim Il Sung gave significant advantages to soft-liners. Fringe members of the “core” class and low-level officers in the North Korean military were treated extremely well. The same cannot be said for “non-cronies” and junior officers in the Philippines. Kim’s policies created such a high standard of living for soft-liners, that this group would necessarily incur significant losses in a democratic system. By doing so, Kim made the potential cost of liberalization too high for this group to turn against the regime and consolidated his authoritarian rule. Other theoretical frameworks would argue that divisions between elites are less important than their impending consequences on a society’s class structure. The key to determining the prospects for democratization, according to these theories, is unlocked by understanding the relative balance between different social classes. Yet, an approach that focuses on the strategic choices made by elites, allows for a greater understanding of each class’ actions. For instance, a subordinate military class emerged in both the Philippines and North Korea. Only through an elite-centric paradigm that focuses on strategic decisionmaking, is it possible to understand why these groups each took such divergent Mark R. Thompson, “Off the Endangered List: Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 28.2 (1996): 183. 39
action. Both an understanding of the balance between different classes, as well as an understanding of these groups’ motivations, can help explain regime trajectory. Each leader made strategic calculations and determined the level of resources he would commit to repress dissidence within his borders. Marcos regularly used the police and military to enforce prohibitions against organized political opposition, and to imprison, torture and assassinate real and perceived opponents. Rather than reduce popular mobilization, Marcos’ repression seemed to increase it40. In comparison, Kim used significantly harsher punishments than his Filipino counterpart. Many North Koreans were sent to prison camps for suspected disloyalty and it was typical for an individual’s entire family to be punished for his or her actions41. As the People Power Revolution gained momentum, Marcos instructed the military and the police to increase their level of repression. Yet, the Filipino dictator always called for a marginal increase. The police and the military were never instructed to change their tactics and protestors were never surprised or intimidated by the level of repression they faced when they took to the streets42. In short, Marcos was unable to develop a credible threat to protest. By choosing to maintain a high level of personal consumption, rather than significantly increasing his repression, Marcos was unsuccessful in quelling the revolution that sought to overthrow him. Given the protest’s relentlessness and Marcos’ inability to stop it, Filipinos began to sense that it might only be a matter of time before Kurt Schock, “People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma,” Social Problems 46.3 (1999): 360. 41 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,” International Security 35.1 (2010): 57. 42 Jim Zwick, Military and Repression in the Philippines (Montreal: McGill University Developing Area Studies, 1982), 41. 40
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a regime transition. Not wanting to fall on the losing side of a revolution, many individuals contemplated abandoning their endorsement of the regime. Consequently, in order to maintain his support, Marcos
“Differences in the leaders’ respective decisions resulted in Marcos being removed from power and exiled to Hawaii; whereas Kim stayed in power for the remainder of his life and is memorialized in North Korea today by over 500 statues”
had to spend more resources on winning and consolidating loyalty. He chose not to do so, instead opting to maintain a high level of personal consumption. From the outset of his rule, Kim Il Sung established a precedent of using an extremely high level of repression. The regime’s political opponents were summarily deported to prison camps43. Further, if the regime had any reason whatsoever, legitimate or otherwise, to suspect that an individual was disloyal, the military would not hesitate to take action. Typically, they would immediately detain the individual’s entire family. They would then torture the family in front of the suspect. The torture would continue until the suspect admitted their guilt. At this point, the suspect would be killed and the family deported to a prison camp44. Kim did not just sacrifice the maximization of his personal consumption in order to maintain a high level of repression. He was able to convince the North Korean people that there was no upper limit on the level of repression he was willing to use. As Wintrobe explains, “as the regime becomes more extreme and the John Larkin, “Exposed--Kim’s Slave Camps,” Far Eastern Economic Review 165.49 (2002): 15. 44 Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 42. 43
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level of repression increases, genuine loyalty to the regime begins to dry up, as people become increasingly worried that they will not be repaid for their loyalty but become a victim of the regime’s repression instead45.” Given this high level of repression, Kim was forced to make a strategic decision. The North Korean dictator chose to sacrifice his level of personal consumption, in order to maintain a consistent level of loyalty. In the Philippines, soft-liners found themselves facing an uncertain future. They feared that if they maintained their loyalty toward the regime and a coup occurred, their vital interests would not be protected by the incoming regime. As a result, they began defecting and attempting to make agreements with revolutionaries. Softliners hoped that by forming pacts, they would be able to, “define rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interests of those entering into [them]46.” The People Power Revolution incorporated a wide variety of notable elites including Cardinal Jaime Sin, the Archbishop of Manila, and Juan Ponce Enrile, the Defense Minister from the Marcos government. This is evidence that as the movement progressed, softliners increasingly defected and attempted to secure their interests in a future regime by forming pacts with protestors. Marcos’ strategic choices ultimately contributed to democratization efforts in the Philippines. Soft-liners living under the Kim regime never experienced a potential opening, in which they might have considered defection. The military was so repressive that civil society was not given an opportunity to manifest public opposition to authoritarian Ronald Wintrobe, “Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Carles Boix and Susan Strokes. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 370. 46 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 37. 45
rule. Artists and intellectuals are usually among the first to express resistance to dictatorship through oblique metaphors47. In Kim Il Sung’s North Korea however, the level of repression consistently remained so high, that few North Koreans dared speak out against the regime. In turn, soft-liners were never forced to question if the regime had accomplished what it set out to achieve. Kim was able to create an atmosphere in North Korea, where soft-liners never considered that the authoritarian regime was dispensable. The North Korean dictator’s strategic choices helped consolidate his authoritarian rule. Regime trajectory can also be explained through an analysis focusing on norm diffusion. Theories using this framework would suggest that the dictators used different levels of repression because of their respective colonial experiences. For instance, during its occupation of the Philippines, America established a judicial system, including a supreme court and a unique legal code48. Rather than creating institutions aimed at developing the rule of law in Korea, the Japanese unilaterally passed a series of laws aimed at oppressing the native population. A theory of norm diffusion would suggest that Marcos and Kim internalized norms based on the behaviour of their colonial masters. In turn, it would be argued that America was less repressive than Japan, which resulted in Marcos being less repressive than Kim. This approach provides a strong basis for understanding an important factor that contributed to the dictators’ convictions. However, Marcos and Kim did not operate in a static environment. Integrating this paradigm with the elite-centric decision-making model, allows for a better understanding of how the authoritarian leaders’ convictions Ibid., 49. 48 Walter L. Williams, “United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism,” Journal of American History 66.4 (1980): 813. 47
and approaches changed as the situations in their respective countries developed. Conclusion While the comparison between the Philippines and North Korea is imperfect, it doesn’t lack fruitfulness. Rather, there are several important insights that can be drawn by comparing the strategic choices of Ferdinand Marcos and Kim Il Sung. First, a small difference in strategic decisions can lead to massively divergent outcomes. Marcos and Kim were both ruthless totalitarian dictators. Yet, by choosing to dedicate a greater level of resources to his personal consumption, Marcos facilitated his own downfall. Differences in the leaders’ respective decisions resulted in Marcos being removed from power and exiled to Hawaii49; whereas Kim stayed in power for the remainder of his life and is memorialized in North Korea today by over 500 statues50. Second, there are many ways to explain the same phenomenon. This essay has explored numerous different theories that address regime trajectory. The main argument in this essay combined Ronald Wintrobe’s theory on dictators’ incentives with Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter’s theory on democratic transitions. In doing so, it aimed to build a model that could explain the divergent regime trajectories in the Philippines and North Korea. Further, this essay attempted to illustrate and incorporate alternative explanations for regime trajectory. By studying and learning from differing interpretations, it is possible to build a more thorough understanding of political phenomena. Finally, a comparison between Marcos and Kim provides pertinent inferences Albert F. Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 126. 50 Soyoung Kwon, “State Building in North Korea: From a Self-Reliant to a Military-First State,” Asian Affairs 34.3 (2010): 291. 49
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about the way dictators could function. In its analysis, this essay made simplifying assumptions regarding the goals and motives of authoritarian leaders. Therefore, by comparing these former leaders’ strategic decisions, it is possible to shed light on today’s dictatorships. Nevertheless, it must be noted that this essay does not purport to have predictive power. While it may never be possible to perfectly understand the mindset of a dictator, each investigation into the way they have acted in the past increases our understanding of authoritarian regimes and the tyrants who rule them. ___________________________________ References
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Contributors
___________________________________________________ Yishi Pan Celine Caira Valerie Weber Zoé Lajoie Karlene Ooto-Stubbs Zoha Azhar Alexander Langer Lewis Fainer
yishi.pan@mail.mcgill.ca U3 Honours in Political Science Minor in Economics Interest: Chinese Domestic Politics, Authoritarian Governance, Rule of Law celine.caira@mail.mcgill.ca U3 Honours in Political Science Minor in Economics and French Interest: Federalism, Canadian Studies, Public Policy valerie.weber@mail.mcgill.ca U3 Honours in Political Science and Minor in Economics Interest: International Relations, National Identity, Immigration zoe.lajoie@mail.mcgill.ca U2 Honours in Political Science Minors in Women’s Studies and Hispanic Interest: Women’s Rights, Social Movements karlene.stubbs@mail.mcgill.ca U2 Major in Political Science and Urban System Interest: Asian Foreign Policy, International Urban Systems and Architecture zoha.azhar@mail.mcgill.ca U3 Major in Political Science and Economics Interest: Politics of South Asia, Ethnic Conflict alexander.langer@mail.mcgill.ca U2 Joint-Honours in Political Science and History Interest: Ethnic Conflict, Civil War and Population Movements lewis.fainer@mail.mcgill.ca U3 Honours in Political Science Interest: Democratization, Comparative Politics
___________________________________________________ Special Thanks Professor Maria Popova | Independent Research Professor Juan Wang | Independent Research Professor Manuel Balan | POLI 522 Seminar on Developing Areas Professor Éric Bélanger | POLI 521 Canadian Politics and Government Professor Laurie Beaudonnet | POLI 451 The Politics of the European Union Professor Narendra Subramanian | POLI 423 Politics of Ethno-Nationalism Professor TV Paul | POLI 349 Foreign Policy: Asia Professor Philip Oxhorn | POLI 319 Politics of Latin America