Introduction

Introduction

Introduction

Belfast, as the second largest city in Ireland, barely needs an introduction to its particular historical complexities. Partition, which made it the largest city in the north-eastern region of Ireland left under unionist control in 1921, merely amplified many of its existing anxieties and lengthy history of violent conflict. By the middle of 1922, around 25% of all fatalities in the violent conflict around Irish independence since 1919 had occurred within the city. Today we are no further removed, in time, from that steep intensification of violent conflict in the late 1960s, than those who were involved in the late 1960s were from 1920- 22. In that light, there is a puzzling absence of detailed studies of the organisations and trends that spanned the period from the 1920s to 1960s. With some notable exceptions, we are largely bereft of detailed studies of the non-state republican and unionist organisations in the intervening period (please note, throughout the text, I have tried to consistently use ‘Unionist’ to specifically designate actions by the Unionist Party’s northern government and elsewhere ‘unionist’ where it is other members of that same political community). Similarly, historians have yet to capture a real sense of who participated in the violence of 1920-22 in Belfast on the unionist side, the depth of official knowledge and direction and what legacy that carried across into post-1922 politics. Arguably this gap in our knowledge compromises the idea that we fully appreciate the background to the intensification of violence in the late 1960s. We are better served with histories of the republican side up to the early 1920s, in recent excellent contributions from the likes of Jim McDermott (Northern Divisions) and Kieron Glennon (From Pogrom to Civil War) and an increasing availability of archival materials that permit exploration of the individual republicans involved, their motivations and interactions. And it should be noted that neither were the I.R.A. the only players on the Irish nationalist side. This book, essentially, provides a chronology of the activities of the Belfast I.R.A. from 1 st November 1922 to the 22 nd September 1969. That is, from when contact was broken between the I.R.A.’s Dublin-based G.H.Q. and what was then the 1 st (Belfast) Brigade of the I.R.A.’s 3 rd Northern Division (in 1922) and when the Belfast Battalion of the I.R.A. broke with G.H.Q. in Dublin in 1969. Largely the evidence used to construct this chronology is contemporary news reporting and other official records, such as court reports. In this respect, it is very much a subaltern

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Belfast Battalion

history, relying on the narrative generated through descriptions offered in court cases, officialdom’s inferences of motive and blame and the partial view that provides. More significantly, though, it does secure a more robust chronological framework than the frailties of both oral history and the canonical studies of the I.R.A. over the relevant period, such as Bowyer Bell’s Secret Army and Tim Pat Coogan’s The I.R.A. (both essential reading as background). While indispensable both have minor chronological errors with regard to Belfast. More recently, Matt Treacy has shown the value of thematic treatment when writing about the period from 1956 to 1969 (in The I.R.A., 1956-69). To concentrate on developing an appropriately detailed timeline, I have largely avoided thematic exploration except where unavoidable. Unfortunately, for most of this period, we lack a clear picture of who was involved on the Unionist side and who directed their activities. Almost immune from arrest or imprisonment, even subsequent academic histories have largely ignored the role of violence in unionist politics and so, to some extent, the history of the Belfast I.R.A. is stripped of some of it’s significant context. I’ve broken the history of the Belfast I.R.A. down into several phases for this book. The first follows immediately on from the intense violence of 1920-22 when the I.R.A. was paralysed by the vortex of a civil war in the south and coming to terms with its own traumatic experiences of the previous three years. The reburial of Joe McKelvey in 1924 then became a reference point for the re-organisation of the I.R.A. in the city. The fragmentation of the republican position that had begun with the civil war continued with the de Valera split of 1926 which ushered in the next phase. This was a confusing era wherein Fianna Fáil and I.R.A. fortunes still appeared to be interdependent. Ironically, the natural partner for Fianna Fáil in the north, though, was the Nationalist Party, complicating the dynamics between the Belfast I.R.A. and G.H.Q. in Dublin. This appears to provide a more nuanced context, ultimately, to the Belfast I.R.A.’s reaction to the I.R.A. leadership returning to individuals like Sean Russell and Stephen Hayes who, to some extent, sought to at least not work against Fianna Fáil, if not actually work with them. Around Russell and Hayes the I.R.A. hemorrhaged senior personnel. The southern Minister for Justice, Gerry Boland, in the 1940s referred to what happened over the period from 1938 to 1946 as the ‘second civil war’. In 1941 the Belfast I.R.A. firstly ousted the remnants of Russell’s leadership, in his deputy Hayes, and then relocated G.H.Q. to Belfast. All the while, Boland and de Valera, sought to crush the I.R.A. for good in the south and assist the Unionists to do the same in the north. The outworking of this saw the eclipse of an I.R.A. G.H.Q. to provide overall strategic direction but failed to eradicate local republican structures and, more significantly, sentiment for the organisation as enough survived for the I.R.A. to rebuild in the late 1940s. By that time Fianna Fáil too had succumbed to electoral defeat for its handling of the I.R.A. (at least in part). The formal declaration of a twenty-six county republic provided the impetus for the I.R.A. to finally focus on a northern campaign. Paradoxically, after lobbying for a militant anti-partition push for decades the Belfast I.R.A. was to take a subordinate role. However, Belfast was mainly to supply internees to Crumlin Road jail. As with the end

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Introduction

of the 1940s, the Belfast I.R.A. had to be rebuilt from scratch after the 1956-62 campaign. Given the directions the I.R.A. took from 1969 onwards, much energy has been expended on narrating a particular view of what transpired over the period from about 1962-69. The events that led up to the split appear less dramatic in hindsight than later histories have required them to be.

ACKNOWLEGDEMENTS This book had started as background research for a biography of Jimmy Steele (which I do intend to publish in the future) before becoming a necessary pre-requisite. Thanks are due to all those who assisted in the research, answering queries, and helping and encouraging in various ways including Claire Breen, Fearghal Caughey, Tim Pat Coogan, Danny Donnelly, Martin Flynn, Anthony Fox, Kieron Glennon, Brian Hanley, Kathleen Hayes, Roddy Hegarty, Roy Johnston, Brian Keane, Ciaran MacAirt, Dónal McAnallen, Mary McConville, Jim McDermot, Tim McGarry, Máire McGinley, Billy McKee, Chris McLoughlin, Sean McNally, Danny Morrison, Niall Murphy, National Library of Ireland, Féilim Ó hAdhmaill, Stan Ó Cairbre, Gerry O’Hare, Niall Ó Murchú, Geraldine O’Neill (who read the whole book in draft), John O’Neill, Tómas Ó Néill, Eamonn Phoenix, P.R.O.N.I., Republican History Museum in Conway Mill (particularly Susan and Johnny), Ciaran Steele, Liam Steele, Seamus Steele, Siobhan Steele and Danny Turley. Apologies if I’ve overlooked anyone.

i ndíl gcuimhne Niall Largey, 1972-2004

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