Applied geography 2015

Applied Geography 51 (2014) 8e25

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Applied Geography journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/apgeog

Windy Ridge: A neighborhood built to fail Janni Sorensen a,1, Jose Gamez b, 2, Melissa Currie c, * a

The Charlotte Action Research Project (CHARP), University of North Carolina at Charlotte, McEniry 423, 9201 University City Blvd, Charlotte, NC 28223-0001, USA b DesignþSociety Research Center, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Center City Building 1003, 9201 University City Blvd, Charlotte, NC 28223-0001, USA c Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Colvard 1057 B, 9201 University City Blvd, Charlotte, NC 28223-0001, USA

a b s t r a c t Keywords: Charlotte Growth-machine Housing Foreclosure Planning Mixed-methods

This paper presents lessons learned from the development process of Windy Ridge, a subdivision in Charlotte, North Carolina, that drew national media attention as a community destined to be “The Next Slum” (Atlantic Monthly 2008). The development was aided by a city as growth machine environment that failed this and other neighborhoods through the lapse of proper planning oversight. Rather than laying the blame of high foreclosures at the feet of financial institutions that engaged in high-risk and predatory lending practices, or homeowners who bought more home than they could afford, this paper looks deeper to address both the social and physical decay of the neighborhood. Using a mixed-methods research approach, we uncovered a variety of contributing and enabling factors that led to high foreclosure rates, rapid neighborhood decline, and disparate impacts on low-income populations. We examine public policy, civic culture, development and land-use regulations, and homeownership patterns through Windy Ridge’s political, spatial and economic geography. Because homes in Windy Ridge were marketed to investors and in package deals, the neighborhood was highly vulnerable to financial collapse as the Great Recession of the 2000s set in. This case study provides important implications for planning and land development policy. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

surrounding environment. We also consider what various parties in the community have contributed to cause the situation that exists today. Further, by placing the development in the context of urban planning theory, we question some of the underlying values and assumptions that led to its problems. The work presented here is, in part, a way of reinforcing the roles of urban planners and designers as upholders of the public good, badly needed in a landscape where planning intervention in the free market is often loose, at best.

When a community experiences high rates of foreclosure and blame is assigned, fingers typically point in one of two directions: to the financial institutions that engaged in high-risk and predatory lending practices; or to the homeowners themselves who are blamed for buying more home than they could afford. In contrast, we contend that a broader context must be evaluated in order to understand what led to the foreclosure crisis impacting starter home communities e including public policy, civic culture, development and land-use regulations. In the following sections, we present the data and highlight emergent themes in our case study analysis. These themes include the political, economic, and spatial geographies of Windy Ridge as revealed through the subdivision approval process, the built environment and geography of

This paper explores the many factors surrounding the development of Windy Ridge, a single-family subdivision in Charlotte, North Carolina (see Fig. 1). Our examination revealed vulnerabilities that led us to conclude that it is a “neighborhood built to fail.”

Windy Ridge, built between the years 2002 and 2004, enjoyed an auspicious beginning. And yet it was described in a March 2008 Atlantic Monthly article as representative of “The Next Slum” (Leinberger, 2010). A year later, Fast Company described Windy Ridge as a soon-to-be ghost town, foreshadowing the potential “end of suburbia” (Cannell, 2009). How did a newly built community engender such foreboding descriptions? Using Windy Ridge as a case study, the process involved in land development is documented and we reflect on the resulting neighborhood and its

* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 704-687-2442.

E-mail addresses: jsorens2@uncc.edu (J. Sorensen), (J. Gamez), mcurrie3@uncc.edu (M. Currie).

1 Tel.: þ1 704 380 1838.

2 Tel.: þ1 704 687 0117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2014.03.005 0143-6228/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

jlgamez@uncc.edu

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Fig. 1. Windy Ridge Vicinity Map. The subdivision is located in Northwest Charlotte, within Mecklenburg County.

concentrated poverty in a suburban setting, the power and development culture in Charlotte, and a discussion of wicked planning problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) that arose as we attempted to assist Windy Ridge residents in addressing neighborhood challenges.

The city as growth machine: the political geography of Windy Ridge Charlotte is among those cities in the Southeast hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis and the Great Recession that began in the mid- to late-2000s. Prior to the downturn, a thriving economy and comfortable climate contributed to the city’s rapid growth and suburbanization. In 1980, Charlotte’s population was 315,470; by 2010, it had more than doubled to 756,912. Over the same time period, the metropolitan statistical area grew from a population of 855,538 to 1,759,531. This rapid growth propelled Charlotte to national prominence as a financial powerhouse while contributing to a physical landscape characterized by sprawling, single-family subdivisions on an increasingly wide suburban footprint. Charlotte’s population increases plus suburban expansion were seen as a formula for success, and local planning policies in the 1980s seemed to have framed all growth as positive. In her January 7th, 2011 editorial, Mary Newsom, then associate editor of The Charlotte Observer, described what seemed to be taken as a fundamental law of economics in Charlotte e growth as good e so much so, that zoning reviews for residential development were deemed unnecessary: The city’s growth policies don’t require most subdivisions to get rezonings, just to meet the subdivision ordinance. That die was cast 30 years back, in the 1980s, when all undeveloped land in Charlotte and unincorporated Mecklenburg County was zoned

for single-family subdivisions, no rezoning needed, growth on autopilot (Newsom 2011).

Newsom’s observation brings to light how the planning and development process in Charlotte had been situated in a cultural and political environment supportive of the private sector, and one that seemingly embraced growth at all costs. In this context, Charlotte can be viewed as a “growth machine” following Molotch’s (1976) classic description of the various powerful interests that shape municipalities. Molotch makes the connection between the desire to foster growth and the putting aside of political interests: “The desire for growth provides the key operative motivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilized elites, however split they may be on other issues, and that a common interest in growth is the overriding commonality among important people in a given locale,” (p. 310). Growth itself is not a bad thing; in fact, it is a sign of a healthy organism. Accommodating an increasing population is a basic issue in planning, determining the siting, size and shape of new urban development. Maturing communities often experience revitalization brought on by new populations, while in other areas population may decrease, thus leaving underused infrastructure behind.

In its coverage of Charlotte’s hosting of the 2012 Democratic National Convention, The Atlantic Cities chronicled the dramatic changes that had taken place in the city over the previous 20 years (Francis, 2012). The creation of Uptown Charlotte produced the Bank of America Stadium, new professional football and basketball teams, a new light rail system, gleaming new towers for Bank of America’s Corporate Center, Duke Energy Center, Wachovia Bank’s corporate headquarters, art museums, plus the expansion of the Charlotte Douglas International Airport including a new hub for US Airways; all were added within the previous two decades. Much of

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the flurry of redevelopment was due to the efforts of Hugh McColl, former president of Bank of America. The highly ambitious McColl was driven to build a banking empire in Charlotte, and he had the vision and the resources to make things happen. McColl understood the difficulties of attracting top banking talent from metropolitan cities like London, New York or San Francisco. In order to achieve his lofty goals, McColl set about recreating Charlotte as a modern city able to compete on the scale to which these executives were accustomed. The city reaped the benefits as well, and Charlotte flourished with new businesses, civic structures, improved infrastructure, and arts/entertainment venues. These improvements were accomplished through incentivized mortgages, significant infrastructure upgrades in Uptown by utility companies and the city, and favorable rezoning (Smith & Graves, 2003). The large-scale and coordinated revitalization was concentrated in the Uptown area and it’s new wealthy suburbs, with the outer suburbs largely left to the traditional homebuilding industry. Although Smith and Graves argue that by focusing growth in Uptown and nearby revitalized areas Charlotte did not follow Molotch’s growth machine model, the sprawl that proliferated throughout the ensuing housing bubble growth seems to contradict this position.

As early as 2000, the city as growth machine mentality had translated into Charlotte’s ranking as the 15th largest new home market in the nation (Lunan, 2003). Organizations positioned together to propel the city’s growth (and in particular new construction), spurred on by local actors that included investors, developers, and a consumerist public. Charlotte’s growth machine was aided by the full-speed-ahead zoning framework already in place, while overwhelmed planning departments tried to keep up with the constant flow of new development proposals. Newsom’s observation is also reflected in those of local civic officials at the time of this growth surge. John Belk, Charlotte’s former mayor, was known to boast, “Charlotte is a man-made town.” Tom Flynn, former Director of the City of Charlotte’s Economic Development Office, also declared, “the business of Charlotte is business,” (Bacot, 2008, p. 403) and this business culture pervaded local civic culture.

Thus, a pro-business governance model supported an environment that fostered growth with minimal regulation. In fact, this government-as-business ethos is/was, in part, responsible for local governmental cooperation with major corporate sectors, such as the local residential development and finance communities. Charlotte’s civic culture contributed to a “liberal growth” policy climate (Bacot, 2008, p. 403), and a “rational” decision-making, i.e. planning, environment in which publiceprivate partnerships were seen as essential to the public good (p. 405). Therefore, growth was seen as good for business and, by extension, good for Charlotteans. In line with its mantra, “Charlotte’s business is business” and corporate norms, a premium was placed on efficiency and effectiveness in Charlotte (Bacot, 2008). Within this civic and cultural value system, overt considerations of equity and sustainability were seemingly absent from the equation.

Many relating factors must be analyzed if one is to understand the broader context of planning and development. Technical expertise and efficiency, both hallmarks of rational planning models, often privilege professional culture and norms; and the pro-business ethos of the city enabled the values of the private marketplace to become embedded within the public sector. In many ways, this form of publiceprivate value system legitimized status-quo power structures, thus rendering a “value neutral” rational planning model as imbalanced. One result of this imbalance, as pointed out by Flyvbjerg (1991), is that “the greater the power, the less the rationality” (p. 2) e meaning that rationality gets left behind as those in power lose sight of the very ones they are meant to serve. Local government is typically concerned with the growth of its economy, and economic development often takes

priority over social development. Brooks (2002) writes, “.planning, as practiced in capitalist societies, is fundamentally an instrument for maintaining the stability of the system and the power of the state.Planners work to protect the system, to preserve the domination of capital over labor” (p. 40).

In Charlotte, each actor in the planning process has a specialized task and it is not clear that any one individual has the opportunity to survey the big picture. Municipal land use planners are separate from urban designers, who do not seem to have a role in the process. For example, in Charlotte separate planners coordinate the rezoning and subdivision processes (see http://charmeck.org/city/ charlotte/planning/) in entirely separate departments: the Planning Department and the Department of Neighborhood Services and Economic Development. These and other civic departments participated in the city as growth machine during the boom years by what appears to be the rubber-stamping of development plans.

Attention may have been paid to complying with ordinances, but the process lacked consideration for the quality of life of those who would live within hurriedly approved developments.

This situation can be a source of conflict for planners, however, governed by a duty to the “public interest, or good,” (Bollens, 2005; Brooks, 2002; Sandercock & Dovey, 2002). Indeed, the first overarching principle listed to which planners aspire is, “Our Overall Responsibility to the Public” (AICP Code, 2009). The Windy Ridge story illustrates what happens when planning is reduced to a simple checklist e held hostage to ordinances that produce sprawl and fuel the growth machine. Jane Jacobs’ distinction between development and growth e in which development involves differentiation, not just the act of getting bigger e is particularly relevant here (see Steigerwald, 2001). Growth is not always good for all citizens of a community in equal measure. This is clear in the case of Windy Ridge, but this neighborhood is not alone. Planning theorists tell us that an awareness of the values shaping our actions (our own and those of the political framework within which we plan) is critical for moving toward a planning model that is ethical and equitable (Brooks, 2002). Paul Davidoff, who introduced the concept of advocacy planning, asserts that the urban planner cannot be value-neutral. The planner’s values must be made explicit in the process and the course of action taken should affirm them. Accordingly, the planner is “an advocate for what is deemed proper” (Brooks, 2002, p. 109) and should approach land use decisions from the perspective of the public good.

Location and isolation e the spatial geography of Windy Ridge Prior to its development, the 38.5-acre site that is now Windy Ridge was a wooded property zoned for light- and generalindustrial uses (see Fig. 2). It was rezoned in 1999 to its current designation of R-5, or single family residential with a manufactured housing overlay.3 The original proposal for the neighborhood called for 157 single-family, manufactured homes, with ten percent of the site reserved for common open space as required by code. This included a basketball court, picnic/play area, five-foot wide walking trail, and two horseshoe pits. The planning staff’s initial review

3 In 1999, a rezoning petition (99-42) was filed by Community Investments, LLC to rezone approximately 38.5 acres of land located south of Rozzelles Ferry Road between Hovis Road and Melynda Road. Atlantic Land and Improvement Company and CSX TRANSPORTATION INC., a railway carrier, owned the land. Petition 99-42 requested the area be rezoned from I-1, light industrial, and I-2, general industrial, to a classification of R-5, single family residential, and MH-O, manufactured housing-overlay. The properties to the west of the land in question in the subdivision of Todd Park were zoned R-5 and occupied by single family residences, while properties to the southwest, south, east and north were zoned a combination of I-1 and I-2 and occupied by industrial interests. This was one of the few areas not zoned residential as described by The Charlotte Observer’s Mary Newsom.

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Fig. 2. The Windy Ridge area prior to its development. The industrial context dominates the area, and the residential neighborhood of Todd Park is visible west of the Windy Ridge site.

Image: Google Earth, dated Feb. 1993.

concluded the proposed development was consistent with strategic area plans in place at the time, and, therefore, was considered an appropriate use for the site.4 The only resistance to Windy Ridge’s development came from representatives of the nearby neighborhood Todd Park, who requested that the active recreation component be dropped from the common area. Residents expressed concern that basketball courts and other recreational amenities would attract illegal and unwanted activities. This was not a typical case of NIMBYism,5 though, as Todd Park was/is a predominantly low-income, minority neighborhood. It has been classified a “challenged” neighborhood by the City of Charlotte, defined as one suffering from economic decline (City of Charlotte Quality of Life Study, 2008).

Subsequent to the public hearing, the Planning Commission’s Zoning Committee approved the petition on May 24, 1999, with the following modifications: the number of lots was reduced from 157 to 151; the active recreation area was eliminated; and the common open space along the western property line was to remain undisturbed. Despite the green light given by planning staff, the Zoning Committee expressed concern that the type of development proposed in Windy Ridge would likely become home to a large number of children in need of active recreation. The committee, which serves in an advisory capacity only, was hopeful that City Council would not approve the petition without restoring this component of the plan. Additionally, one committee member recommended the incorporation of higher roof pitches so homes in the subdivision would not look like “trailers,” evidence of concern over the appearance of homes built for a low-income neighborhood. The rezoning was ultimately approved in 1999, and at this point, its fate was sealed. Construction in Windy Ridge began in 2002 and was completed by 2004, with 133 single-family homes built (see Figs. 3

4

The petition was reviewed by staff from the Charlotte Planning Department, the City Engineering Department, Charlotte Department of Transportation (CDOT), and CharlotteeMecklenburg Schools (CMS). After review, two recommendations were made. The first was that the proposed street connection to First Street must provide a minimum of 230 ft of intersection sight distance, to be reviewed during the subdivision process. Additionally, street connections would be necessary along the western side of the subject property, possibly with Second Street and/or Third Street.

5 NIMBY e an acronym for “Not In My Backyard.” This phrase is used when residents object to a proposed development that would negatively impact their neighborhood, such as a landfill, group home, or heavy industrial use. Although acknowledging that it is needed in the community, those in opposition want it placed somewhere else, and “not in my backyard.”

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Fig. 3. Windy Ridge as constructed. Heavy industrial development and railroad tracks enclose the neighborhood to the north, south, and east. The wooded stream buffer can be seen between Windy Ridge and the Todd Park pre-existing neighborhood to the west. Additional industrial development added since the 1993 aerial is highlighted.

(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

Google Earth aerial dated 11/20/2013.

and 4). The typical home was a 1033 square foot, pre-fabricated structure with three bedrooms, two bathrooms and a patio on a slab foundation with aluminum and vinyl exteriors. Most were onestory structures, with a few one-and-one-half stories.

Historically, development in Charlotte occurred in such a way as to concentrate minority populations and a significant amount of industrial development to the west of Center City. These areas were home to segregated African American communities in earlier eras, and have remained predominantly so to this day. This contrasts with the more affluent and historically white southeastern sections of the city (Bacot, 2008, p. 392). The legacy of segregation and development seen in the case of Windy Ridge combine to produce a fragmented landscape of limited access to institutions and services.

For example, there are virtually no amenities within a quartermile, or 5-min walk, of Windy Ridge. The few resources within a 10-min walk are limited to service stations, a bank, and two churches. Gas station ‘convenience marts’ represent the closest shopping options, as commercial areas to meet daily needs like grocery shopping are located approximately four miles away.

Windy Ridge is also poorly served by mass transit, with few bus stops nearby. The combination of a single entry point into the neighborhood (both for vehicles and pedestrians), the lack of commercial or other resources nearby, and limited transit all contribute to the neighborhood’s isolation from the city at large.

Suburban poverty and foreclosure e the economic geography of Windy Ridge The housing boom that made Charlotte such a hot destination also created a hotbed of housing woes. The rapid growth became an albatross for some communities, squeezed by the expansion and contraction of an unsustainable housing market. Charlotte, as the second largest financial center in the U.S. was considered by many to be insulated from the nation’s financial tribulations. But, it found itself at number 34 of the top 100 metropolitan areas in 2008 with the most foreclosures, up 113% from the previous year (Realtytrac. com). By 2011, it had moved up to among the top ten in the nation.

During Charlotte’s housing boom, home values in higher income neighborhoods were rising, while those in lower-income neighborhoods were flat or decreasing (Appelbaum & Crouch, 2006). This

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Fig. 4. Plat of the Windy Ridge subdivision as built.

discrepancy increased the ability of higher-income citizens to escape financial problems by selling or refinancing their houses; whereas lower-income citizens were forced to remain in their homes with higher rates, often resulting in default or foreclosure (Chandler & Hopkins, 2007). Within Mecklenburg County, foreclosures quadrupled between 1999 and 2005 (Appelbaum & Crouch, 2006, p. 3B), and a 2006 analysis by The Charlotte Observer found that 80 percent of the region’s foreclosures from 2003 to 2005 involved houses priced at $150,000 or less (Mellnik, Hammersly, Appelbaum, & Pitzer, 2006). Many high foreclosure neighborhoods were those new developments that proliferated during the city’s growth boom, characterized by mass-produced, nearly identical houses that ran riot throughout Charlotte’s periphery e a model well suited to a growth-machine framework.

Despite the swelling ranks of foreclosures, new construction pressed on (see Crouch, 2005a). One neighborhood group in northwest Mecklenburg County protested the continued proliferation of new subdivisions with signs that read, “American Dream or Foreclosure Nightmare?” and “When is enough, enough?” (quoted in Crouch, 2005b, p. 1).

The problems in neighborhoods like Windy Ridge are indicative of the suburbanization of North American poverty (Madden, 2003).

For decades, a substantial amount of literature documented the causes and effects of concentrated poverty in America’s urban core (see Teitz & Chapple, 2007; Wilson, 1996), characterized by aging and depleted housing stock, failing schools, high crime rates, and a lack of employment opportunities. A growing body of recent literature documenting the rising rate of poverty in inner-ring suburbs

shows outcomes of concentrated suburban poverty similar to those of their low-income, central-city counterparts (Jargowsky, 2003; Kneebone & Berube, 2013; Murphy, 2007). In addition, suburban contexts present significant barriers that exacerbate the challenges faced by the suburban poor, such as: limited social services, job training centers and family resources; spatial isolation often due to a combination of low connectivity plus a lack of access to adequate transportation; and a dearth of fundamental establishments, like grocery and healthcare providers oriented to the needs of poor populations (Murphy, 2007).

The most visible impacts within foreclosure-riddled neighborhoods are blight and increased crime. In a Chicago-based study, Immergluck and Smith (2006) report that when the foreclosure rate increases by one percentage point, neighborhood violent crime rises 2.33 percent (p. 862). The study further demonstrated that foreclosures in low-income neighborhoods harm the community through extended vacancies, crime and abandoned or blighted buildings. The combination of physical and social disorder contributes to increased criminal activity, discourages the formation of social capital, and leads to further disinvestment and neighborhood decay (Immergluck & Smith, 2006, pp. 854e855).

The negative effects of foreclosure also lead to declining property values for non-foreclosure homes. In a review of federal homeownership programs, Bradford (1979) found that foreclosure rates negatively impacted neighborhood stability, particularly in lower income areas. A 2008 study by NeighborWorks America cited seven primary ways that foreclosures impact communities: increased crime; financial distress for individuals and municipalities alike;

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youth experience stress and instability; displaced residents struggle to find shelter; neighborhoods are blighted by neglect; and poor and minority communities are impacted disproportionately (Vidmar, 2008). The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL, 2008) ranked North Carolina fourteenth in the nation with the highest impacts from foreclosure spillover, with price declines valued at $851 million (or $920 million in 2014 dollars). Several studies document the negative impacts that foreclosures have on neighboring property values, especially when clustered (see Agpar & Duda, 2005; Bianco, 2008; CRL, 2008; Crump et al., 2008; Immergluck, 2009). All of these impacts are manifest in Windy Ridge, where the compounded effects of clustered foreclosures and the recession had caused home values to drop by approximately 45 percent in early 2011 (Portillo & Hammersly, 2011).

The spillover effects from foreclosure reach beyond the immediate neighborhood and other foreclosure hotspots. Municipalities e whether cities, counties, or school districts e lose tax revenue from abandoned homes and declining property values. Other nongovernmental agencies often invest considerable time and money into failing neighborhoods, as Habitat for Humanity did in Windy Ridge.6 In an examination of Federal Housing Administration foreclosures, Moreno (1995) estimated average city costs of $27,000 and neighborhood costs of $10,000 for each foreclosure. These costs equate to over $41,400 and $15,300 (respectively) in 2014 dollars, and are associated with things such as the demolition of abandoned or vandalized properties, and the increased costs for fire and police services (King, 2009). Cities have also employed a variety of expensive legal approaches to address foreclosure fallout (McKinney, 2010).

Most solutions proposed for the foreclosure crisis have been straightforward: tighten federal lending regulations and end the practice of subprime mortgage lending. The case study we present suggests that the answer may not be so simple. Studies indicate the single-family home in the suburbs may quickly become a relic of a previous era of lifestyle and household choice framed by the Baby Boom generation. Household family size has been on the decline in the North American population, including married couples under age 45: the demographic most often associated with home buying.

This is compounded by the fact that the post-foreclosure crisis housing market will soon be dominated by Baby Boomers entering retirement e those sellers aged 65 and older e who compete to attract a smaller and diminishing pool of younger replacement buyers (Lucy, 2010; Myers & Ryu, 2008). When weighed against the many alternatives in a buyer’s market, neighborhoods like Windy Ridge will not fair well and revised lending regulations will not address this problem.

This raises the question of who will buy properties in Windy Ridge and similar subdivisions? Many of Windy Ridge’s challenges are rooted in the neighborhood’s inability to attract long-term investment, i.e. owner occupancy. Unfortunately, this points to one aspect of the neighborhood’s location that traditional urban theory has yet to addressddevelopment wedged between a historically African American, low-income neighborhood and an industrial site.

Smith, Caris, and Wyly (2001) suggest that the flight of the middle class leaves behind the lower class, and increasingly so in urban and suburban areas. They also point to other urban changes such as neighborhood deterioration, the ‘graying’ of many suburban populations, and the NIMBY-isms aimed at rental markets, affordable housing, and immigrant groups (pp. 523e524). In the case of Windy Ridge, there is no previous population whose exodus can

account for its current dilemmas. By contrast, the homebuyers attracted to the neighborhood represent a troublesome trend of absentee owners who exhibit little or no concern for the quality of life of their tenants e primarily those of the lowest income brackets. Many of the neighborhood’s renters are former public housing residents relocated via Section 8 vouchers. In fact, we argue that Windy Ridge functions as de-facto public housing, but without any of the social services or support that would typically accompany it. The convoluted interplay of circumstances at work in Windy Ridge made/make it unattractive to middle class homebuyers, illustrating the complex roles that class, capital and race play in the long-term stabilization of metropolitan areas.

Windy Ridge’s residents have been unwitting participants in what may be the collapse of not only the residential marketplace, but also, by some measures, the suburban development model itself. William H. Lucy (2010) studied home-buying trends over the 1990s and concluded that the neighborhoods with the strongest signs of market resilience indicated a “quest for the newly built and the older full of character, and a flight away from those in the middle” (p. 61). He noted that many neighborhoods built between the1950s and 1970s performed poorly in the marketplace, while pre-1940s areas showed signs of improvement. Windy Ridge contradicts Lucy’s findings, however, and presents similar characteristics of the 1950se1970s auto-oriented subdivision. This is despite the fact that it was built a half-century later, and further contributes to the neighborhood’s lack of contemporary appeal. “A majority of house-only suburbs will struggle to attract new buyers,” wrote Lucy (p. 113). Although Lucy’s work more directly addresses middle- and upper-middle income residential markets, those seeking affordable housing alternatives have similar needs and desires. Safe places to walk, easily accessed commercial resources, safe and reliable school districts, and housing stock of quality: each of these factors is amplified for those with limited economic means. Windy Ridge falls short when checked against such a list.

Many mid-century neighborhoods and commercial centers are aging poorly, especially those predominantly constructed along auto-oriented corridors at the outer edges of suburban enclaves.

The patchwork development pattern in these fringe areas allowed other uses (such as industrial or heavy commercial, airports or distribution points), to emerge from the city fabric, further contributing to their isolation. The result has been a mixture of neighborhood-islands strung together by auto-centric corridors, surrounded by commercial or industrial development and interspersed with pockets of undeveloped land. It is in these remaining pockets where, as in the case of Windy Ridge, new affordable housing is often proposed.

The practice of “infilling” such spaces raises significant concerns.

Undeveloped pockets of real estate are highly vulnerable to impacts from surrounding land uses, and when developed for residential purposes, issues of environmental and social justice are brought to bear. This is especially true in Windy Ridge, where the newly built subdivision was placed adjacent to many known environmental hazards and LULUs (Locally Unwanted Land Uses) that pre-existed the neighborhood. The intensive industrial uses and heavy rail surrounding the neighborhood puts residents at risk for exposure to numerous environmental hazards (see Fig. 5).

At Windy Ridge, there are four former superfund, or hazardous waste disposal sites in close proximity, two of which are within one-half mile.7 Interestingly, the formerly wooded area now home to Windy Ridge once provided a buffer from surrounding industrial

6 Habitat for Humanity bought 10 homes in Windy Ridge in early 2009 using federal grant money for neighborhood stabilization. These homes were rehabilitated and later matched with qualified homebuyers.

7 Windy Ridge’s other neighbors include Chemway Industrial Park and several other heavy industrial sites. The property is bounded on the north, south and partially the east by active heavy rail lines.

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Fig. 5. Environmental threats to Windy Ridge residents. The location of documented environmental hazards and hazardous sites surrounding Windy Ridge are shown within onehalf and one-mile radii.

Data Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2014).

uses for Todd Park, the preexisting neighborhood to the west. With this buffer gone, the Union Carbide Battery superfund site now sits within 1000 ft of residential uses, and adjacent to Windy Ridge. By comparing the 1993 and 2013 aerial images (Figs. 2 and 3), it is evident that large-scale industrial uses existed before Windy Ridge was built, and continued to expand during and after its development. Refer to Appendix C for an aerial time series of the development.

Case study e methodology and analysis Beginning in the fall of 2009, student and faculty researchers from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte partnered with Windy Ridge residents who repeatedly asked: “Why is one house after another foreclosing? Why is there no space for our kids to play?” and, “What can we do to stop the rapid decline of our infrastructure and housing?” In an attempt to answer resident’s questions and to understand the severe conditions that led to the negative media coverage, we approached the research process using a mix of interdisciplinary methods and data collection techniques that evolved as new data raised additional questions.

Research methodologies included archival and document analysis, public records analysis, mapping, visual surveys, participant observation, interviews, and the use of focus groups. These methods and the resulting data collected are discussed in Sections 2 and 3.

Archival and document analysis Our document analysis began with a survey of press coverage focused on Windy Ridge in established news outlets such as newspapers, journals and magazines that feature original reporting (see Appendix A). Blogs or news outlets carrying re-printings were

not included. The extensive coverage and publicity of the neighborhood’s dilemmas contributed greatly to the area’s poor public image, as it was frequently held up as an example of the foreclosure crisis’ worst consequences. Of the local media coverage analyzed, 17 newspaper articles and three online outlets were identified as relevant to the case. Additionally, five national articles made significant reference to the neighborhood, with an Associated Press article being run on multiple news outlets. The articles provided insight into the broader context of Charlotte’s growth and development, the subsequent housing crash, and the extent of the problem (both locally and nationally).

Given Windy Ridge’s “next slum” moniker (Leinberger, 2010), press coverage often included telling insights and quotes from local leaders as well as residents. In one instance, Charlotte planning director Debra Campbell noted, “within five years we’re reaching the need for revitalization strategies that used to take a neighborhood 25 years to reach” (quoted in Chandler, Mellnik, & Hopkins, 2007, p. 1A). Stanley Watkins, then director of the department of neighborhood development, was also quoted in the Associated Press article thus: “To get out in suburbia and to start seeing the same kinds of things you normally see in an inner city neighborhood, it was something totally unexpected” (quoted in Geller, 2011). Campbell’s and Watkins’ comments are an example of the foreclosure spillover effects (discussed in Section Suburban poverty and foreclosure) that impact individuals, neighborhoods, and municipalities. In one analysis, it was reported that 81 of Windy Ridge’s 133 homes were in foreclosure by 2007 (Leinberger, 2010).

Between the years 2007 and 2010, The Charlotte Observer often reported on the area’s foreclosure crisis, and one such in-depth analysis identified: .at least 35 starter-home developments in the county where 20 percent or more of the homes have foreclosed. That is more

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than six times the national foreclosure rate. The troubled neighborhoods are concentrated west, north and east of downtown Charlotte, a crescent of deteriorating development that is putting pressure on surrounding communities.

(Applebaum, Munn, & Mellnik, 2009).

Fast Company journalist Michael Cannell also wrote, “Communities like Elk Grove, (California) and Windy Ridge, (North Carolina) are slowly turning into ghost towns with overgrown lawns, vacant strip malls and squatters camping in empty homes” (Cannell, 2009, p. 1).

A search of Charlotte’s public records for material documenting Windy Ridge’s development process included the original development proposal, planning documents, and minutes from public meetings. These documents traced the neighborhood’s history and the process by which it was first proposed, and finally approved.

The analysis, as discussed in Section Location and isolation, revealed the development context and how the process itself may have contributed to its circumstances.

Survey, focus group and interviews While the process of data collection yielded valuable insights, many new questions arose that could only be addressed through a qualitative assessment aimed at capturing the experiences of residents living in Windy Ridge. A brief summation of the qualitative data collection methods follows.

Date

Data collection method

Participants

March 2010 July 2010 JuneeAug 2010 Aug 2010 Aug 2010 2009e2011

Windshield surveys Door-to-door survey Mapping Studies Focus Group Focus Group Informal interviews

Student observations of neighborhood 102 participants, 7 declined, 27 vacant 6 graduate researchers 3 homeowners, 3 tenants, 1 landlord 3 homeowners, 3 tenants, 1 landlord Residents and HOA members

Graduate researchers attended monthly neighborhood meetings beginning with the project’s inception in August 2009 through the summer of 2012. These monthly meetings provided a venue to observe and interact with key stakeholders (such as residents, city officials, police, etc.). The Windy Ridge Community Survey was administered in July 2010 by UNCC graduate researchers, where residents responded verbally while the survey administer noted each response (see Appendix B for survey instrument and summary of responses).

Findings from the survey helped illuminate the challenges related to the formation of social capital and neighborhood capacity building. When asked about their tenure in the neighborhood, most respondents had lived in the community only a few months, and of all households, more than half reported having lived in Windy Ridge for less than 20 months. Two-thirds of respondents were renters, many using HUD Section 8 vouchers. Evictions and vacancies were commonplace as banks repossessed properties, forcing tenants out. Residents frequently expressed a desire to move out of the neighborhood as quickly as possible, viewing it as a temporary location until somewhere ‘better’ became available.

When asked about friendships within the neighborhood, most responded they had very few and 40 percent stated that they had no friends at all. The need for social relationships within the community is evident, but efforts to secure its future have been challenging due to high turnover and short tenure rates in the neighborhood.

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Some residents expressed dissatisfaction with the public bus service, stating that it was unreliable and its stops too far away.

Concern for personal safety was raised when walking to and from the stop at night. One respondent, who rides the bus 16 or more times per month with her daughter and siblings, commented, “I am late for school or work because the train blocks traffic,” and the bus stops have “unsafe drop off and pick up points” (see Fig. 6).

Following the neighborhood survey, a focus group was held in August 2010 to better understand the lived experience of residents.

Some of the major themes to emerge from the focus group were: disillusionment and dissatisfaction with life in the community; isolation, burglaries and break-ins; and concern about disengaged youth. As one focus group participant put it, “I have seen Windy Ridge go from beautiful to disaster” (Angela, 8-19-2010). And in the words of Windy Ridge resident, Andre, I look out for the kids that live in the neighborhood. They need somewhere to go. something to do. I notice that they just run around messing (in) somebody’s yard. you look at them running up and down the streets. They’d be much better off, and we wouldn’t have to worry about the burglaries [if there were somewhere for them to play]. Because, what are we looking at for them to be, when they’ve got nothing to do? (8-19-2010).

Residents also recalled witnessing the domino effect of foreclosures in their neighborhood beginning as early as 2005.

Speaking in a focus group setting, Wigena recounted her experience with neighborhood foreclosures: . when I first came, that was 2005. there was a couple people, but only a few of us on the street and I noticed how it slowly progressed. And, then, a year or so later, the neighbors are getting foreclosed on, and the other neighbors, and I’m like. “what is this?!?” And then., bam! Back to back to back–and I’m like, “what’s going on?” And then I got foreclosed on! (8-19-2010).

The neighborhood survey also addressed Windy Ridge’s built environment and these concerns are discussed in the following section.

Fig. 6. The isolation of Windy Ridge. Heavy industrial and train traffic block the sole entrance to Windy Ridge often. Homes in the neighborhood can be seen in the background, located in the center of the photo, and the entry road is obscured by the tractoretrailer.

Image: Courtesy of UNCC-CHARP, Sept. 2013.

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Inventory of existing conditions The existing conditions of the neighborhood were initially documented in March 2010 by UNCC graduate researchers using “windshield surveys.” The assessment was conducted on a lot-bylot basis for evidence of decline, community safety, and proximity to amenities and/or undesirable conditions such as shopping, recreation, or industrial land uses (see Table 2 for a summary of these findings). Home and lot conditions were rated as good, poor, or acceptable using the criteria shown in Table 1. Visual observations of the neighborhood revealed a lack of diversity in housing, vacant homes, flooding after rain events, extensive erosion throughout, and poor quality construction evident in the homes and infrastructure (see Fig. 7). Dozens of homes were found vacant, with windows smashed, doors kicked in, and copper wiring ripped from walls.

The occupancy status of homes in Windy Ridge was also assessed by general observation. A house was considered “vacant” if found to be empty as observed through windows, if mail was built up in and around mailboxes, or if advertisements were taped to mailboxes or doors and absent from nearby residences. An “occupied” status was determined by observing individuals in and around the housing structure, the presence of furniture and toys in and around the house, and vehicles in apparent working condition on the premises. If the occupancy status was unclear, the unit was not classified and thus excluded from the occupancy count. Other general characteristics of the houses in Windy Ridge included noting the presence of real estate signage and/or locks in and around the house, protective bars on windows or doors, and “no trespassing” signs.

One of Windy Ridge’s most serious safety concerns involved the neighborhood’s streetlights. During the approval process, the developer proposed to install non-standard streetlights. The City of Charlotte disapproved the proposed lights because they did not meet their criteria, and as such, would not accept them into the City system. Rather than insist an approved streetlight system be installed, the City allowed the developer to make the streetlights the responsibility of the homeowners association. This proved extremely problematic as multiple homes went into foreclosure and homeowner dues were unpaid. The lack of available HOA funds meant that the power bill for street lighting could not be paid, and Windy Ridge residents were left in the dark for two years. Without street lighting, crime and vandalism increased and neighborhood deterioration intensified. This lack of basic public service only added to the turnover in the neighborhood. Eventually, the City Table 1 Windshield survey guidelines. Category assessment matrix used to determine home and lot conditions, as observed in March 2010 windshield survey.

Good

Acceptable

Poor

Condition of homes No major physical blemishes on the housing structure or components, including roof, shutters, windows and front door.

Some damage and wear of the housing structure and components easily repaired, replaced or painted to improve the overall condition.

Severe cosmetic and/or physical damage that would necessitate a prolonged rehabilitation effort.

Minor erosion, incomplete landscaping, and lawns with some damage due to weather effects and general negligence of upkeep.

Severe erosion and/or a lack of observable lawn or landscaping on the property.

Condition of lots No major grading or erosion issues, and intact lawns and landscaping.

Table 2 Windy Ridge Windshield Survey Summary. Survey results for home and lot condition and occupancy status. Performed March 2010.

Observations

Number of houses

Domicile condition score Good Acceptable Poor

66 49 18

Lot condition score Good Acceptable Poor

69 52 12

Occupancy/vacancy Occupied Vacant Undefined

86 37 10

Presence of signage With for sale/foreclosure sign Without for sale/foreclosure sign

19 114

agreed to take responsibility for the neighborhood’s streetlights (as it does throughout Charlotte), but by that time, much damage had been done.

A series of mapping exercises was also performed to analyze surrounding land uses, zoning, proximity and access to resources and/or hazards, foreclosure data (gathered periodically from Realtytrac.com), and ownership patterns gathered from Mecklenburg County GIS. Public records of sales in Windy Ridge revealed that lienholders and homeowners were scattered across the country, difficult to locate or identify, and that some homes had been sold repeatedly. An updated analysis of public sales data as of November 2013 is included in Section Analysis of public sales records.

In the survey and focus group, residents’ comments included the presence of “sinkholes,” the lack of grass growing, and one resident who wrote, “my home is sinking, and my foundation is shot.”

Another respondent said they were “trying to move” to another neighborhood because of “the dirt.” Other responses included the need for increased neighborhood safety (especially for children), the lack of a suitable playground, and the deteriorated condition of the neighborhood.

The loss of active recreation spaces from the proposed site plan has proven that the planning commission’s initial concerns about open space and the appeal of the inexpensive homes were legitimate. Windy Ridge is home to many families with young children whose only common play areas are now neighborhood streets, and children were often observed walking on the railroad tracks that form three of the site’s boundaries. Open space along an existing creek on the site’s westerly boundary was preserved as originally proposed; but as a wooded, undisturbed buffer required for stormwater protection, it is not an appropriate play area for children.

With support from the community, efforts were made by the UNCC team and its partners to establish new open space within the neighborhood. Several potential locations were pursued, but unfortunately, subdivision ordinances prevented it. Had the original recreational spaces and active uses been retained, the issue of children’s safety might have been prevented and the neighborhood would have greater economic appeal.

Analysis of public sales records The City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County (charmeck.org) operate jointly to provide many services, including the Planning,

J. Sorensen et al. / Applied Geography 51 (2014) 8e25

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Fig. 7. Windshield surveys: the observed conditions of homes in Windy Ridge. Home conditions in the neighborhood varied, with some scored as poor, acceptable, and good (clockwise in the photos). Site conditions as observed showed extensive erosion throughout the neighborhood, both in yards and around streets.

Photos: courtesy of UNCC-CHARP, updated Sept. 2013.

GIS, and Engineering Departments. Using its websites Virtual Charlotte and the Property Ownership and Land Records Information System (POLARIS 3G), public records and sales information were obtained for Windy Ridge in November 2013. The analysis of this data provided great insight into the history and workings of Windy Ridge. A general breakdown of these findings follows.

Average home size Median year built Initial median sales price Current median sales price Original owners Owner occupied Owner occupied Total owner occupied Non-owner occupied Non-owner occupied Vacant Vacant Total non-owner occupied

1033 square ft 2004 $108,000 (Builder to original owner) $40,000 (as of Nov. 2013) 10 (including 4 still owner-occupied) 23 (sole owner, including 4 original-owner) 10 (co-owned with Habitat for Humanity) 33 (25% of all homes) 37 (corporate owned) 54 (individual owned) 5 (bank owned) 4 (Fannie Mae/HUD owned) 100 (75% of all homes)

The data show that in roughly ten years, homes in Windy Ridge lost an average of 63 percent of their original value. The number of vacant homes will vary at any given time, but with this analysis it is assumed that the nine homes bank- or federally-owned are vacant.

Roughly half of the homes currently owner-occupied were bought between 2005 and 2008, and since the easing of the recession in 2011, thirty-nine homes have been purchased in Windy Ridge.

However, just three of these are owner-occupied as the trend of home flipping and absentee landlords continues. Fig. 8 shows the spatial distribution of all 33 owner-occupied properties (differentiating the 10 co-owned by Habitat for Humanity and the 4 still owned by the original owner). The majority are located along Windy Valley Drive, with a distinct pattern of rental or bank-owned

homes being those located adjacent to the pre-existing rail lines and industrial development. Oddly, this includes the neighborhood’s five cul-de-sacs, typically the most desirable locations in suburban settings. Not so in Windy Ridge, however, where only a handful of owner-occupied homes are located there.

Despite the neighborhood’s relative affordability, it has struggled to attract and keep homeowners. The largest volume of home sales in Windy Ridge occurred in 2006, when 107 properties sold.

This does not translate into the ‘hottest’ point in the market, however, as home prices had already dropped by 22 percent since their peak in 2006 (see Figs. 10 and 11). The large numbers of homes being sold and resold seems to reflect a sinking ship response that continued throughout the recession years and beyond. Home “flipping” has been a common occurrence, as the figures below indicate.

Number of ownership changes since construction: One to four Five to eight Nine or more

63 homes 63 homes 7 homes

In fact, more than 600 transactions8 have occurred in this single neighborhood since its first homes were sold in the spring of 2002 up through November 2013. Some of these transactions reflect the banking and lending industry process of selling a mortgage once a sale closes, or the bundling and selling of mortgages as investment products. These were common practices during the years leading up to and throughout the Recession. The transactions also include

8 Corrective deeds and transfers where grantee and grantor have the same name are not included in the count of transactions.

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J. Sorensen et al. / Applied Geography 51 (2014) 8e25

Fig. 8. (Left): The spatial distribution of owner-occupied homes within Windy Ridge as of November 2013. Blue circles represent the 19 solely owner-occupied homes, green circles are the 4 original owner-occupied, and red diamonds represent the 10 coowned by Habitat for Humanity. The map highlights the sizeable lack of owneroccupied homes. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

Source: Virtual Charlotte, customized by Melissa Currie.

over 150 foreclosures, counted here when ownership was deeded from an individual to a bank or federal agency such as HUD or Fannie Mae. As seen in Fig. 9, all but 29 homes had been through at least one foreclosure or short sale, and no spatial relationship is discernable.

Rather, the entirety of Windy Ridge represents a singular foreclosure cluster.

In his March 2011 Associated Press article, journalist Adam Geller reported on Windy Ridge’s troubles, and quotes the subdivision’s developer as saying: “Volume was good, so if somebody wanted to buy more than one we were more than willing to sell it to them,” says W. Freeman Barber Jr., who sold the building company about 6 years ago. “Of course, we had no idea of the implications.”

Barber said he offered volume discounts to investors who bought multiple homes, but delegated marketing to real estate agents working on commission (Geller, 2011).

The consequences of Barber’s marketing strategy reached far and wide, but as he alluded to, it did not prevent him from turning a good profit.

The data confirm that homes in Windy Ridge were indeed targeted to investors in “package deals.” Our examination of the original owners found that 96 of the 133 homes were sold as part of a multiple set (72 percent), and the remaining 37 homes (28 percent) sold to a unique buyer. This is a conservative estimate, as it

Fig. 9. (Right): The spatial distribution of foreclosures within Windy Ridge as of November 2013. Yellow circles represent the 97 homes with 1 or 2 foreclosures, red circles are the 7 homes with 3 or more foreclosures, and those homes with no foreclosures are left unmarked. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

Source: Virtual Charlotte, customized by Melissa Currie.

is possible that investor groups may have deeded homes in separate names. A total of seventeen different individuals or corporations currently own multiple properties in the neighborhood.

Another trend that has persisted in Windy Ridge is that of non-local owners. The addresses of current property owners indicate that more than a third are from outside the Charlotte area, representing 12 different states including such far-away places as Hawaii, New York and Texas.

But, is it such a big deal for a neighborhood to be marketed to investors, and not as owner-occupied homes? We extracted the sales records documenting the tenure patterns of the original owners to answer this question, after first eliminating the ten properties still owned by the original purchaser. What we discovered was eye-opening. Only 20 original owners sold their homes for a profit, averaging $11,100 (a 12 percent gain). An overwhelming majority of homes (103 of 123) when sold by the original owners were for a loss that averaged $42,126drepresenting a 40 percent drop in value. These losses happened quickly, as the average time between when the homes were originally bought from the builder to the first resale was only 2 years and 9 months. But, when considering that 85.4 percent of these resales were tied to foreclosure or distressed sales9 the short duration of ownership is explained. What is peculiar, though, is that even while those homes among the first built were going into foreclosure some two years later in 2004 and 2005, new homes continued selling for the initial offering price of $108,000e$109,000 (see scatter plot in Fig. 12). It

9

Distressed sales are defined here as a loss of more than 25 percent.

J. Sorensen et al. / Applied Geography 51 (2014) 8e25

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Fig. 10. The average number of homes sold in Windy Ridge. Sales doubled from 2005 to 2006, and then began a steady descent through 2011, where the sales have held steady. Data is as November 2013, with the last sale recorded in Aug 2013.

Fig. 11. The average sales price of homes in Windy Ridge. Prices peaked in 2003 at over $107,000, reaching their lowest values in 2010 and 2011. Sales had yet to rise above $50,000

by Nov 2013.

was not uncommon for adjacent homes to sell within days of each other e one through foreclosure and one at full price. This shows that Windy Ridge was crashing in the midst of the housing boom period, well before national markets.

The analysis also revealed some substantial differences between the two original buyer groups (see Table 3). Unique individual buyers fared better than investorepurchasers when reselling. Homes purchased in multiples were resold for a mean loss in value of $38,186 (a 35 percent loss), while homes sold to unique original owners were resold for a mean loss in value of $18,190 (a 20 percent loss). This is reflected in the higher sales prices that unique homeowners were able to obtain as compared to the investorepurchasers.

Differences in the two buyer groups indicate that those sold to investors in multiples were more likely to be sold for a loss, as a foreclosure or distress sale, and via non-warranty deed transactions (see Tables 4 and 5). Properties with non-warranty deeds can be more difficult to sell or to obtain financing on because no guarantee is given that there is a clear title with no unresolved liens on the property. Most banks or finance companies consider such properties too risky to finance, and options left to potential buyers are a cash purchase plus the assumption of all risks associated with the property. In every category examined, the original owners that bought a single home in Windy Ridge fared better when reselling than those who bought multiple properties.

Fig. 12. Scatter plot of all home sales in Windy Ridge from the first homes sold in 2002 up through August 2013. The graph illustrates the high volume of sales and resales, as well as the wide fluctuation of sales prices, often occurring at the same time.

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J. Sorensen et al. / Applied Geography 51 (2014) 8e25

Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the two buyer groups in Windy Ridge: unique buyers (n ¼ 37) and multiple purchase buyers (n ¼ 96). Ten homes are still owned by the original owners and are therefore not included. Note: date format is year/month/ day.

Descriptive statistics

N

Minimum

Single sales to unique owner (n ¼ 37) Sale_1_price 37 $1000 (first owner) Sale_1_date 37 1/11/27 Sale_2_price 29 $0 (2nd owner) Sale_2_date 29 4/1/12 Time_owned (in years) 29 0.50 Difference (sale 1 to 29 ($106,000) sale 2) Percent_change (%) 29 100.00

Maximum Mean

Std. deviation

$109,000

$93,905.41

$25,974.30

7/3/19 $118,000

4/2/08 $79,241.38

N/A $34,630.09

12/12/11 7.36 $22,000

6/6/29 N/A 2.40 1.85 ($18,189.66) $34,278.64

25.58

19.97

Sales as part of multiple purchases (n ¼ 96) Sale_1_price 96 $86,000 $140,000 (first owner) Sale_1_date 96 2/3/01 5/12/06 Sale_2_price 94 $0 $118,000 (2nd owner) Sale_2_date 94 4/3/18 12/1/19 Time_owned (in years) 94 0.81 8.88 Difference (sale 1 to 94 ($140,000) $22,000 sale 2) Percent_change (%) 94 100 25.58

37.69

$107,890.63 $4209.14 3/11/13 $69,696.81

N/A $29,673.06

6/10/16 N/A 2.90 1.47 ($38,186.17) $30,812.21 35.1155

28.14722

To further understand the data, an independent samples t-test was conducted (using SPSS version 21) to examine whether there was a significant difference between those original owners whose sales were to foreclosure or distressed sale, and those with nonforeclosures. The test revealed a statistically significant difference between the unique and multiple buyer groups (t ¼ 3.43, df ¼ 38.5, p < .05), the initial sales price (t ¼ 2.9, df ¼ 31.4, p < .05), the sales price of the second sale (t ¼ 10.4, df ¼ 78, p < .001), the price difference between the two sales (t ¼ 11.6, df ¼ 56.8, p < .001), and the length of time owned (t ¼ 2.7, df ¼ 121, p < .05). See the group statistics in Table 6.

The data also indicate that homes sold by original owners that led to foreclosure or distressed sale were initially bought at a higher mean price than those non-foreclosure resales. Homes in which the first resale was by foreclosure or distressed sale were also owned for approximately one year longer than those resales that did not lead to foreclosures, and were sold for an average loss of $41,000. The longer time owned is likely due to the lengthy process typical of a foreclosure or short-sale. The high frequency of foreclosures in Windy Ridge was also known to have created problems due to confusion as to who actually owned a

Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the types of sales made by the original owner to the second, within the two buyer groups in Windy Ridge: Unique buyers (n ¼ 37) and multiple purchase buyers (n ¼ 96). Ten homes are still owned by the original owners and are therefore not included.

Non_warranty deed Sold for gain Sold for loss Non_foreclosure Sold as foreclosure Distressed sale Original owner

Single sales (n ¼ 37)

Multiple sales (n ¼ 96)

Frequency

Percent

Frequency

Percent

20 9 20 16 19 2 8

54.1 24.3 54.1 43.2 51.4 5.4 21.6

71 11 83 13 69 14 2

74.0 11.5 86.5 13.5 71.9 14.6 2.1

Table 5 Cross tabulation for the types of sales made by the original owner to the second, within the two buyer groups in Windy Ridge: Unique buyers (n ¼ 37) and multiple purchase buyers (n ¼ 96). Ten homes are still owned by the original owners and are therefore not included.

Foreclosure multiple_sale cross tabulation

Foreclosure

No foreclosure Foreclosure Distressed sale

Total

Individual owner

Multiple owner

16 19 2

13 69 14

Total 29 88 16

37

96

133

particular property. Homeowners may have abandoned, or been forced out of, homes long before deeds were recorded. And because so many homes were sold in multiples, when an owner faced financial difficulties as the Recession set in, it would affect several homes in Windy Ridge, a situation repeated throughout the neighborhood in a domino effect that left home after home vacant.

Discussion The usual argument for the cause of the foreclosure crisis points to larger, exogenous economic conditions. However, this case study has uncovered a variety of other contributing factors that led to high rates of foreclosure, rapid neighborhood decline, and disparate impacts on low-income populations. Recent trends in urban residential markets signal that neighborhoods like Windy Ridge face an increasingly troubled future. Lucy (2010), drawing upon the work of Robert Fishman (2005), states that, As residents sort themselves increasingly by the attraction of convenience, accessible mixed use districts will induce more affluent residents to choose residences in central cities and some suburbs, especially suburbs with transit connections to employment and entertainment (Lucy, 2010, p. 113).

What Lucy points to are the “favored quarters” that Christopher Leinberger (1995) described as urban areas that have

Table 6 Group statistics of the first resales made by the original owner to the second (0 ¼ non-foreclosure, 1 ¼ foreclosure or distressed sale) in Windy Ridge. Ten homes are still owned by the original owners and are therefore not included. Distressed sales are those with a loss of 25% or greater.

Group statistics

Recode_ foreclosure

N

Mean

Std. deviation

Std. error mean

Sale_1_price

0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1

29 104 19 104 19 104 19 104 19 104 19 104 29 104 29 104

$93,913.79 $106,812.50 $105,394.74 $65,836.54 696.11 1072.94 $7605.26 ($40,975.96) 0.84 0.04 8.7542 38.91 0.45 0.8 0.34 0

$23,414.00 $10,825.89 $10,620.45 $29,611.35 474.81 574.956 $13,263.96 $29,390.85 0.375 0.193 14.59 27.56 0.506 0.403 0.484 0

$4347.87 $1061.57 $2436.50 $2903.63 108.929 56.379 $3042.96 $2882.01 0.086 0.019 3.35 2.70232 0.094 0.04 0.09 0

Sale_2_price Time_owned (days) Sale_difference Gain Percent_change % Multiple_sale Orig_owner

Recode_Foreclosure: 0 ¼ non foreclosure; 1 ¼ foreclosure or distressed sale (25% loss or greater)

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remained attractive for middle and upper income demographic groups. Areas that lack the desired attributes also tend to lack significant residential reinvestment. In the case of Windy Ridge, none of these ‘favored quarter’ criteria exist, and its now blighted landscape will simply fail to appeal to a broad demographic without significant infrastructural and neighborhood design interventions. Community organizing, or grassroots planning, has the potential for fostering change (Hudson, 1979), and can help begin the difficult process of repairing the neighborhood. It is, however, problematic to suggest that residents of neighborhoods like Windy Ridge, often characterized by transience and resource deficiencies, should organize in order to demand changes, including better access to public transportation, amenities, or the mitigation of existing environmental hazards. The “tyranny of easy development decisions” (Lucy, 2010, p. 86) contributed to a metropolitan climate in Charlotte that made developments like Windy Ridge possible. As a result, the city is now faced with an increasingly difficult array of challenges as the neighborhood attempts to climb out of the abyss of foreclosure and general neighborhood decline.10 When discussing the public interest, we typically consider the different stakeholders that in one way or another experience the impacts of a development decision. In the end, few winners emerged through the establishment of Windy Ridge. The original landowner was able to sell property many would deem undevelopable for other than industrial uses; the developer sold homes for a profit; and a few investors made a profitable, albeit questionable, investment. Those in the “losers” category are many and varied. The already marginalized were disproportionally impacted, including residents of the adjacent Todd Park neighborhood who now must contend with Windy Ridge’s legacy; the City is now responsible for a neighborhood with declining tax value and increasing costs; the police must spend a disproportionate amount of time in the neighborhood in an effort to stem criminal activities; the department of Neighborhood Services and Economic Development grapples with a neighborhood that must be continually supported if stability is to be achieved; and the federal government has invested in the future of Windy Ridge through neighborhood stabilization grants.

Conclusion and recommendations There are two important issues that must be considered as a result of this case study: the long-term viability of Windy Ridge and similar subdivisions, and the long-term viability of new neighborhoods that have yet to be developed. This case study provides a detailed analysis and empirical evidence of the consequences of poor land use decisions within a growth machine environment. Windy Ridge is a clear case of environmental (in)justice, in which a property surrounded by heavy industrial uses and Superfund sites was allowed to be rezoned for residential development targeted to lower income minorities. We cannot know the outcome had the original proposal for rezoning this property been for a middle- to upper-middle income neighborhood, but it is likely to have been denied.

The lessons learned through this case study are relevant to communities everywhere as we grapple with an ever-expanding

10 The City of Charlotte has adopted a Sustainability Index and Smart Growth principles for use in evaluating land development projects that have requested City participation in transit corridor, business district, and neighborhood infill areas.

Parameters of this index include the project’s potential to support healthy neighborhoods, expand transit choices, promote design for livability, and safeguard the environment (see Bacot, 2008). The application of these principles to the private development process could have a significant effect on the quality and sustainability of new neighborhoods in Charlotte.

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population and decreasing resources. In Windy Ridge, high vacancy and absentee landlord rates yielded low community participation and an ineffective homeowners association. Through a partnership with the Charlotte School of Law, efforts were made to dissolve the neighborhood’s HOA in order to give the small band of active residents more authority to make decisions and affect change in the neighborhood. This approach was unsuccessful due to several legal obstacles that could not be overcome. Therefore, efforts were shifted to building a strong neighborhood association rather than supporting a dysfunctional HOA. Based on the experiences at Windy Ridge, we suggest that provisions be made to allow for HOAs to be disbanded under extenuating circumstances; and that municipalities require sufficient escrow be established by developers to help ensure that communities have the resources needed to carry out important neighborhood functions and maintenance after build-out. Other policy implications from this study are possible limits on the percentage of homes sold as non-primary residences in HOA-governed neighborhoods or those used for subsidized housing.

We recognize the challenges involved in assuming a position of advocacy from within the culture of the growth machine. Thus, we see the role of our research as an important way to support planners in their efforts to move toward more sustainable models of development. Therefore, we are calling for a public planning not unlike Michael Burawoy’s “public sociology” (2004).

We have spent a century building professional knowledge, translating common sense into science, so that now, we are more than ready to embark on a systematic back-translation, taking knowledge back to those from whom it came, making public issues out of private troubles, and thus regenerating sociology’s moral fiber. Herein lies the promise and challenge of public sociology, the complement and not the negation of professional sociology (Burawoy 2005, p. 5).

While Burawoy’s aim is to re-focus a sociological ethos upon that discipline’s multiple publics more equitably, the disciplines of planning and urban design would do well to heed a similar call.

Accordingly, the “back-translation” of a public planning would become part of a larger division of labor that includes both the academic and professional arenas of urban planning, urban design, public policy, community planning, and geography. Public planning, like public sociology, could become the complement to a planning environment where information rarely travels in more than one direction. Implementing newer zoning ordinances such as Form-Based and Smart Growth Codes is an important way that planners and town councils can mitigate the negative effects of growth-machine political environments. These codes base development approvals on the pre-determined and desired form of the built environment a given locale is to take; thus giving planning boards and departments more leverage in saying ‘no’ to bad development models that do not conform.

Community organizing can, at best, only ‘shore up’ Windy Ridge, and our experience indicates that it is unlikely to cause systemic change. The overwhelming number of foreclosures revealed a complex set of contributing and enabling factors that led to its current state of decline. Our critique of the planning and development process found that active planning did not occur in the case of Windy Ridge and perhaps other declining neighborhoods. Through Charlotte’s culture of growth, the regulatory capacity of the planning department had all but been given over to the marketplace. Ultimately, the market failed this neighborhood in many ways e from real estate and lending practices to the geography of housing that concentrated and isolated poverty.

Windy Ridge was doomed from the start e surrounded by

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industrial and hazardous land uses, isolated from transportation and support services, poorly designed with few amenities to maintain property values or to support healthy lifestyle choices, the municipal agencies responsible for oversight asleep at the wheel (or overpowered by lack of political support), and homes largely purchased by absentee landlords. This, it seems, was a neighborhood built to fail.

Acknowledgment The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation in the undertaking of this research. We also thank those residents who took the time to speak with the research team about their homes and neighborhood, and the guidance provided by the anonymous reviewers of this article.

Appendix A. News and media articles with major references to Windy Ridge.

Newspaper

Title

Author(s)

Date

The Charlotte Observer

Charlotte City Staff to Gather Foreclosure Data Request Follows Observer Report on Surge Since 1999 Starter homes, sad endings: Part 2 of ‘Sold a Nightmare.’

Appelbaum, B., and Crouch, M

Jan. 26, 2006

Applebaum, B., L. Hammersly Munn & T. Mellnik Barbour, C.

June 9, 2009 April 28, 2008

Carlock, C. and Kelly, F. Chandler, L. and Hopkins, S.

July 14, 2008 Dec. 12, 2007

Chandler, L., Mellnik, T., and Hopkins, S.

Dec. 9, 2007

Crouch, M.

Jan. 19, 2005

Crouch, M.

Jan. 19, 2005

Hopkins, S., Mellnik, T., Klemmer, S., Wygand, M., Onge, P., and Chandler, L. Lunan, C.

Dec. 16, 2007

Foreclosure Aid Plan Outlined-Charlotte Wants to Educate Homeowners, Team with Nonprofit to Help Peachtree Hills Funding will Likely be Diverted from Other Sources, Official Says.

Landlords Defaulting, and Renters Suffer.

Suburban Decay Stuns City Leaders Council, Police Seek to Crack Down on Those who let Homes Decline.

New Suburban in Fast Decay-Foreclosures in Starter Neighborhoods Lead to Vacancies and Crime EasyCredit Loans Meant Overextended Homebuyers, Concentration Problems.

Council OKs Homes Over Neighbors’ Fuss e Residents Say Already Foreclosures Hurt Area.

Starter Homes Face New Scrutiny-Neighbors Complain Low-Cost Houses Drive Property Values Down.

Construction Rolls on in Foreclosures Zones-Bunching of Starter Homes Fuels Concern Over Growth Policies.

Job Growth Sags, But New-Home Growth SoarsBuilding Permits Up 6% Over 2000 Pace as Interest Rates Lure Buyers.

Foreclosures-Mapping Mecklenburg’s Mortgage Failures.

Growth May not Always Mean Prosperity An Idea to Help Residents “Hang On” e Nonprofit Wants to Buy Homes, Offer Them as Lease-Purchases.

Agents: Tax Value’s Role in House Sale is Subtle.

Habitat Finds Buying is Cheaper-Instead of Building Homes, Charlotte’s Agency is One of the First In the U.S. to Buy Vacant Foreclosed Houses and Fix Them.

American Dream’s Flip Side: Big Bills-More Charlotte Blacks Buying Homes, But 1 in 8 Struggling Growing Numbers Paying More Than Half of Income on Housing, New Report Says.

Donovan: More ‘UD’ in HUD.

Oct. 11, 2003

Mellnik, T., Hammersly, L., Appelbaum, B., and Pitzer, W. Newsom, Mary Oliver, J., Wygand, M., and Mellnik, T.

Jan. 15, 2006 Jan. 7, 2011 April 6, 2008

Portillo, E. and Hammersly, L. Price, M.

Feb. 21, 2011 July 5, 2009

Rubin, R.

June 24, 2004

Stodghill, R.

April 4, 2010

Associated Press UNC Charlotte magazine

Neighborhood hit by mortgage crisis battles back.

Foreclosure Fallout

Geller, A. Patterson, L.A.

March 26, 2011 Quarter 1 2011

Online publications

Title

Author(s)

Date

Building Resilient Regions

The (Foreclosure) Tale of Two Developments: A Sense of Community Makes One More Resilient Habitat for Humanity Tests a New Model for Rebuilding after Foreclosures in Charlotte The Next Slum?

Suburbia R.I.P. Does the downturn spell the beginning of the end for suburbia? Some Experts say yesterday’s culde-sac is tomorrow’s ghost town.

Celebrating student ties to communities.

Can Windy Ridge Finally Find Stability?

Institute of Governmental Studies The University of California Berkley Institute of Governmental Studies The University of California Berkley Leinberger, C. Cannell, M.

May 22, 2012

Mar-08 March 11, 2009

Krewson, A. McCann, J.

April 27, 2012 Aug. 30, 2012

Atlantic Monthly Fast Company

Plan Charlotte Plan Charlotte

May 15, 2012

J. Sorensen et al. / Applied Geography 51 (2014) 8e25

Appendix B. Windy Ridge neighborhood survey instrument.

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. The goal of this survey is to provide each resident of Windy Ridge the chance to offer an opinion about life in the community. A research team at UNC Charlotte plans to use the results of the anonymous survey to customize neighborhood organization efforts throughout the next year.

The survey should take between 5 and 10 min. At the conclusion of the survey, you will be offered the opportunity to participate in a focus group to discuss neighborhood issues in more detail. If you choose to participate in the focus group, we will ask for your phone number and email address to contact you with potential dates.

1. In what month and year did you move to Windy Ridge?

2. Where did you live before moving to Windy Ridge?

3. Why did you choose to move to Windy Ridge? Were there other neighborhoods you considered?

4. How satisfied are you with policing services in Windy Ridge and why?

5. What method of transportation do you most commonly use to get around?

6. Where do you do most of your grocery shopping?

7. Do you ride the CATS bus? If so, how often? Are you satisfied with its service?

8. How many “friends” would you say you have in Windy Ridge?

9. Do you know that Windy Ridge has a neighborhood association?

10. Are you interested in becoming more involved with the neighborhood association?

11. Do you have any special talents or skills that you would be willing to use to benefit the community?

12. How safe do you feel in Windy Ridge?

13. What factors contribute to or detract from your sense of safety in the community?

14. Do you think that having a public gathering space, such as a park, playground, gazebo, or community garden would be beneficial to the community? Why or why not?

Windy Ridge Neighborhood Survey e with resident responses 1. In what month and year did you move to Windy Ridge?

Most respondents had lived in the community only a few months.

In fact, 53% of households reported living in Windy Ridge for less than 20 months.

2. Where did you live before moving to Windy Ridge?

23

5. What method of transportation do you most commonly use to get around?

Most residents we interviewed (81%) used a personal vehicle as their primary mode of transport.

6. Where do you do most of your grocery shopping?

60% of residents reported shopping at WalMart, Food Lion, or Harris Teeter, all of which are on Mount HollyeHuntersville Road, approximately a 10-min drive from the community.

7. Do you ride the CATS bus? If so, how often? Are you satisfied with its service?

67% of respondents reported that they do not ride the CATS bus on a regular basis. Of the 33% who stated that they did ride the bus, most (72%) reported being either very or somewhat satisfied with its services.

8. How many “friends” would you say you have in Windy Ridge?

Respondents did not report having many friends in the community. 40% stated that they had no friends at all in the neighborhood, while 50% could name less than 5 friends.

9. Do you know that Windy Ridge has a neighborhood association?

90% of respondents association.

were

aware

of

the neighborhood

10. Are you interested in becoming more involved with the neighborhood association?

Residents were split on their willingness to become involved with the association. While 38% stated that they were, another 34% stated that they were not, and 28% were unsure.

11. Do you have any special talents or skills that you would be willing to use to benefit the community?

Residents reported a variety of skills and talents, most notably: clerical skills, childcare, cooking, and outdoor work.

12. How safe do you feel in Windy Ridge?

Residents reported feeling very safe in Windy Ridge, with 86% reporting feeling either “very safe” or “somewhat safe.”

An overwhelming majority of respondents (88%) had lived in the greater Charlotte area before moving to Windy Ridge.

13. What factors contribute to or detract from your sense of safety in the community?

3. Why did you choose to move to Windy Ridge? Were there other neighborhoods you considered?

A variety of factors contributed to residents’ personal sense of safety, including their personal reputations, watchful neighbors, police presence, and overall low crime in the community. Interestingly, many of the same factors contributed to residents’ perceptions of being unsafe, including lack of police presence, suspicious neighbors, and high levels of crime. This issue should be investigated further.

40% of respondents reported moving to Windy Ridge because of its location near major highways. Other common reasons for choosing the neighborhood were the size and structure of homes, as well as the inexpensive rents.

4. How satisfied are you with policing services in Windy Ridge and why?

14. Do you think that having a public gathering space, such as a park, playground, gazebo or community garden would be beneficial to the community? Why or why not?

Overall, residents were satisfied with policing services. 48% reported being “very satisfied,” while 34% were “somewhat satisfied.”

Most residents (84%) support a public gathering spot. 98% of those stated that a park or playground for children would be ideal.

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J. Sorensen et al. / Applied Geography 51 (2014) 8e25

Appendix C. Windy Ridge development time series.

Map C-1. Historical development of the Windy Ridge site. The aerial images show the neighborhood taking shape from 1993 to 2013. In the 2002 image, the complete clear cutting of the site is visible, along with the eradication of a wetland area visible in the 1993 image. In all four images, active train traffic can be seen, despite the random nature of the satellite images. Extensive erosion is visible in the 2010 and 2013 images, resulting from improper grading and the loss of the site’s topsoil during construction without sufficient replacement.

Source: Google Earth.

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