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13 EXCOMM 15 DEFENSIVE/OFFENSIVE 17 QUARANTINE APPROVED
FIDEL CASTRO IS A Cuban communist revolutionary and politician who led the movement which would go work towards removing the Cuban Dictator Fulgencio Batista as the President. The revolution began in July 1953 and eventually came to an end on the 1st of January 1959. The regime was replaced with Castro’s revolutionary regime. After over throwing Batista, Castro travelled to the United States to explain his revolution clearly, saying - ‘I know what the world thinks of us, we are Communists, and of course I have said very clearly that we are not Communists; very clearly’. At the time Castro had the support of U.S in the
way of them agreeing to the removal of Batista, but none could predict how tensions would rise during the crisis over Cuban missiles. Castro was an extremely influential figure in politics as he consistently used radio and the newly developed technology of the television to communicate with the Cuban people. He defined it as the ‘dialogue with the people’. He used these talks to make intentionally provocative statements which would later define him as one of the most powerful people in world order.
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DICTATOR FULGENCIO BATISTA 02
CUBA OPENLY ALIGNS ITSELF WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THEIR POLICIES AFTER FIDEL CAME INTO power in 1959, the world began to change with the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union starting in the 1960’s. Fidel had to make a choice. Castro had always supported the U.S government due to their undenying support for the removal of Batista’s regime in the Cuban Revolution. However he had also shared the ideological views of the Soviet Government. Castro had wanted to open a closer relationship with the Soviets, so met with the Soviet KGB agent in Havana and spoke of the possibility of opening up a relationship that would involve trading with the Soviet Union. Initially, after meeting with the First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, Castro had agreed to supply the USSR with sugar in return for oil, fertiliser and industrial goods. Tensions between the U.S and Cuba began to rise as the Cuban government ordered the country’s refineries, which were then controlled by U.S corporations Shell and Esso, to process Soviet Oil. The U.S government then intervened which ended with the companies refusing. Castro then responded by nationalizing the refineries under state control. The U.S responded by cancelling all imports of Cuban sugar which would provoke Castro to nationalise the majority of U.S owned assets on the Cuban Island, which includes banks and sugar mills. After heated debates with the U.S, Castro returned to Cuba on 28 September, fearing that the U.S would make an attempt to overthrow his government. In response he purchased tanks and other weaponry from the Soviet Union. He also created a People’s Militia in which he could arm supporters of his revolutionary cause with heavy weaponry. With assistance of the Soviet Union, Castro was able to create a social programme which included the construction of infrastructure. Within 6 months 600 miles of road had been built, $300 Million spent on water and sanitations and over 800 houses were built every month. With tensions rising between the U.S and the Soviet Union, Castro had aligned himself with an enemy of America. Making himself a questionable figure in the Cold War.
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AFTER WARNINGS FROM CASTRO to Kennedy to not invade Cuba, President Kennedy pledged to never intervene militarily to overthrow Castro. Although this was true. Kennedy had agreed to an underhand attempt to invade Cuba using exiled Cuban dissidents, organised by the CIA. The result of this plan would be the Bay of Pigs Invasion which occurred on April 17, 1962. The Brigade was made up of 1,400 Cuban dissidents, rather than using U.S soldiers which would have increased tensions between the nations. Prior to the invasion eight CIA supplied bombers attacked three Cuban miliary airfields, killing 7, injuring 52 and damaging fighter planes. The U.S government announced that the bombers had belonged to Cuba’s air force, in retaliation, Castro publicly denounced their claims on television, providing evidence against their story. As the night of invasion came, the fleet landed in Cuba in an area known as Bay of Pigs. The invaders were shot at and Castro ordered a heavy counter offensive including tanks and the air force to destroy their ships weaponry, food and medical supplies. After the attack, Kennedy was unwilling to have direct intervention from the U.S and so on 20 April , 1189 men of the planned invasion surrendered to the Cuban army. Castro ordered that the rebels would be interrogated on live television. All but 14 rebels were returned to the U.S in exchange for medicine and food valued at around $25 million. This victory was a powerful symbol for Castro’s supporters.
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THE VIENNA SUMMIT J U N E 4, 1 9 6 1
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KENNEDY KHRUSHCHEV
AMERICA
RUSSIA “ I t’ s u p t o t h e U .S t o decide whether there w i l l b e w a r o r p e a c e”
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that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear l e g i t i m a t e d e f e n s e, h o w e v e r harsh and terrible the Solution would be J U L Y 2 7, 1 9 6 2 CASTRO MAKES AN announcement to his people that Cuba is taking measures that would make any direct U.S attack on Cuba the equivalent of a World War. He also claims that U.S.S.R has invested greatly in helping defend his country. Although he did not specify any exact details regarding his defensive measures, it was presumed by most that heavy weaponry would be the outcome. With the U.S and the Soviet Union already not seeing eye to eye, further reasoning for the Soviet Union to disagree with the U.S was growing rapidly. And after the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs, Cuba had it’s own reasons to not trust Kennedy and the U.S government. If Kennedy did order an invasion or attack on Cuba then it would have appeared that the Soviet Union would have intervened and with the U.S and U.S.S.R knowingly having access to nuclear weapons, the outcome would have been devastating. What wasn’t known completely at this time was the assumption that Castro and the Cuban government were in the stages of purchasing and building their own nuclear weapons to defend themselves. With so many countries having ownership of such devastating weaponry, one attack could change the entire course of the world and would have inevitable led to much more than a Cold War.
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CIA DIRECTOR JOHN Mccone sends a memo to kennedy expressing his belief that soviet missiles will be deployed in cuba 01
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ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE OF a military base build up on Cuba was increasing, no U-2 flights were made over Cuba until October 14. The first time it was delayed was due to poor weather and then due to the news that a Taiwanese operated U-2 had been shot down over China. The U.S officials were concerned that one of the Cuban or Soviet missiles may attempt to shoot down a CIA U-2 which would initiate an international crisis. Due to these problems, the Kennedy administration decided to use a satellite in an attempt to gain enough evidence to make the fly over worth while. By the end of September, the Navy reconnaissance aircraft had photographed Soviet Ships with very large crates on board, which were the size and shape of II - 28 light bombers. With this evidence from both the Corona satellite and the Navy aircraft, the administration made the decision that it was now worth risking a U-2 flight over Cuba. The administration was prepared for it to be shot down, so decided to move the U-2 to the Air Force rather than the CIA as this would be much easier to explain. The first piece of photographic evidence of the missiles came on October 14, when a U-2 flight, piloted by Major Richard Heyser, took 928 photographs The images showed, what turned out to be, an SS04 construction site in Western Cuba.
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ON OCTOBER 15 the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Centre (NPIC) reviewed the photographs and identified the objects as missiles. The CIA notified the Department of State but National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy decided to wait until morning to inform the President. On October 16, Bundy told Kennedy of the discovery and showed him the images. Kennedy immediately called a meeting of a group which would be named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) to discuss the possible responses. The US did not have a plan in place as U.S intelligence had been told that the Soviets would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba. The possible outcomes that came from the EXCOMM meeting were as follows Do nothing: American vulnerability to Soviet missiles was not new. Newly placed missiles in Cuba made little strategic difference. Diplomacy: Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles. Warning: Send a message to Castro to warn him of the grave danger he, and Cuba were in Blockade: Use the U.S Navy to block any missiles from arriving in Cuba Air Strike: Use the U.S Air Force to attack all known missiles sites. Invasion: Full force invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that a full scale attack and invasion was the only solution. They believed that the Soviets would not attempt to stop the U.S from conquering Cuba. Kennedy however disagreed, saying, ‘ They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can’t, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don’t take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin’.
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ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY disagreements, the EXCOMM agreed that the missiles obtained by Cuba would affect the political balance. Kennedy had previously promised the American people that ‘if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States...the United States would act’. The second problem was that the U.S credibility among their allies may be damaged, as well as the American People, if they allowed the Soviet Union to appear to redress the strategic balance by placing missiles in Cuba. Kennedy further explained the crisis by saying that ‘it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality’. Due to these complex issues arising, on October 18, President Kennedy met with the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko. Gromyko claimed that the weapons were for defensive purposes only, not offensive. The president, avoiding exposing what he already knew and to not avoid the American public, did not reveal that he was aware of the missile construction. Due to the positioning of the missiles and the rising tensions between the nations. Kennedy knew that there was the potential for an offensive against the U.S and that Gromyko was giving a deliberately impartial view.
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AFTER HIS MEETING WITH Gromyko, Kennedy met again with the members of EXCOMM and considered two last options. An immediate air strike against the Cuban missile bases or a naval blockade of Cuba. Kennedy had support from Robert McNamara for the idea of a naval blockade as a strong but limited military action that gave the control back to the U.S. One problem that occurred from this was the term ‘blockade’ which according to International Law, refers to an act of war, however the Kennedy administration did not thing that the U.S.S.R would be provoked by a blockade.
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THIS GOVERNMENT, AS PROMISED, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 A.M., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.
THESE NEW WEAPONS ARE not in your interest. They contribute nothing to your peace and well-being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny your freedom. Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be truly free -- free from foreign domination, free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, free to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the society of free nations and to the associations of this hemisphere. My fellow citizens, let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead -- months in which both our patience and our will will be tested, months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing. The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are; but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high, but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission. Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right; not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.
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ON OCTOBER 24, Soviet ships en route to Cuba slowed down. This action forced the United States to raise the readiness level of SAC forces to DEFCON 2. This was the only time in U.S history that the level had been raised to DEFCON 2, the highest ever. The B-52 bombers were sent to a variety of locations and were ready to take off, fully armed and equipped within 15 minutes notice. One eighth of SAC’s 1,436 bombers were on airborne alert and 145 intercontinental ballistic missiles stood on alert. At the same time the Air Defence Command had redeployed 161 nuclear armed interceptors to 16 dispersal fields. Twenty three nuclear armed B-52 were sent to orbit points within striking distance of the Soviet Union. This was the closest that the world came to a nuclear war. On October 25, Kennedy responded to a telegram by Khrushchev stating that the United States was being forced into action after receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba, and that when these assurances proved to be false, the deployment ‘required the responses I have announced...I hope that your government will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation’.
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IMAGINE, MR. PRESIDENT, what if we were to present to you such an ultimatum as you have presented to us by your actions. How would you react to it? I think you would be outraged at such a move on our part. And this we would understand. Having presented these conditions to us, Mr. President, you have thrown down the gauntlet. Who asked you to do this? By what right have you done this? Our ties with the Republic of Cuba, as well as our relations with other nations, regardless of their political system, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And, if it were a matter of quarantine as mentioned in your letter, then, as is customary in international practice, it can be established only by states agreeing between themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural goods and products. However, in this case we are not talking about quarantines, but rather about much more serious matters, and you yourself understand this. His Excellency Mr. John F. Kennedy President of the United States of America Washington. You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather issuing an ultimatum, and you are threatening that if we do not obey your orders, you will then use force. Think about what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What does it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean for us to conduct our relations with other countries not by reason, but by yielding to tyranny. You are not appealing to reason; you want to intimidate us. No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that deep inside, you will admit that I am right. I am convinced that if you were in my place you would do the same. This Organization [of American States] has no authority or grounds whatsoever to pass resolutions like those of which you speak in your letter. Therefore, we do not accept these resolutions. International law exists, generally accepted standards of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of international law and strictly observe the standards regulating navigation on the open sea, in international waters. We observe these standards and enjoy the rights recognized by all nations. You want to force us to renounce the rights enjoyed by every sovereign state; you are attempting to legislate questions of international law; you are violating the generally accepted standards of this law. All this is due not only to hatred for the Cuban people and their government, but also for reasons having to do with the election campaign in the USA. What morals, what laws can justify such an approach by the American government to international affairs? Such morals and laws are not to be found, because the actions of the USA in relation to Cuba are outright piracy. This, if you will, is the madness of a degenerating imperialism. Unfortunately, people of all nations, and not least the American people themselves, could suffer heavily from madness such as this, since with the appearance of modern types of weapons, the USA has completely lost its former inaccessibility. Therefore, Mr. President, if you weigh the present situation with a cool head without giving way to passion, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot afford not to decline the despotic demands of the USA. When you lay conditions such as these before us, try to put yourself in our situation and consider how the USA would react to such conditions. I have no doubt that if anyone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you -- the USA, you would reject such an attempt. And we likewise say -- no.
O C T O B E R 2 7, 1 9 6 2 The Soviet government considers the violation of the freedom of navigation in international waters and air space to constitute an act of aggression propelling humankind into the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet government cannot instruct captains of Soviet ships bound for Cuba to observe orders of American naval forces blockading this island. Our instructions to Soviet sailors are to observe strictly the generally accepted standards of navigation in international waters and not retreat one step from them. And, if the American side violates these rights, it must be aware of the responsibility it will bear for this act. To be sure, we will not remain mere observers of pirate actions by American ships in the open sea. We will then be forced on our part to take those measures we deem necessary and sufficient to defend our rights. To this end we have all that is necessary.
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