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Coping With Climate Change: Issues in Science, Policy, and Communication John P. Holdren Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy Executive Office of the President of the United States
A Compendium from Recent Presentations June 2015
Overarching questions About climate‐change science: •What do we know? •How (and with what confidence) do we know it? •What more do we most need to know? •How (and when) can we know it? About climate‐change policy: •What should we do and when should we do it? About communication: •How can we communicate about the science to better inform the answers that publics and policy‐makers embrace about what to do and when to do it?
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The science questions
Five myths about the science 1. The Earth stopped warming in the last decade. 2. If it is warming, humans aren’t the main cause. 3. A little warming isn’t harmful anyway. 4. If there is any danger, it’s far in the future. 5. Even if mainstream climate science is right and the need for action therefore is real, doing enough to make a difference is unaffordable.
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No longer warming? Here’s what thermometers say. Global Land-Ocean Temperature Anomaly
Based on the indicated central estimates, 2014 was warmest year, 2010 2nd, 2005 3rd.
Green bars show 95% confidence intervals. Baseline is 1951-80 average.
NASA/GISS (January 2015)
A recent NOAA re‐analysis shows no slowdown at all.
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Over 90% of the excess heat trapped by green‐ house gases goes into the ocean
Continued increase in ocean heat adds to confidence that warming has been proceeding apace.
Global warming is not globally uniform. 2012 Surface Temperature Anomaly (°C above 1951-80 average) Global- and annual-average anomaly for 2012 = 0.56°C
Hansen & Sato 1-13
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Other climate indicators are changing apace
NCDC, 2000
Most places getting wetter, some drier; Earth wetter overall.
Indicators: glaciers retreating
Rongbuk glacier in 1968 (top) and 2007. The largest glacier on Mount Everest’s northern slopes feeds the Rongbuk River. National Snow & Ice Data Center 2010
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The shrinking Arctic sea ice
Sept 2012 sea-ice minimum = 3.6 million km2
September 2005
September 2007
The magenta line is the average sea-ice extent at its September minimum from 1979 to 2000. The 2012 extent was by far the lowest since 1979, when satellite observations began. National Ice and Snow Data Center
September 2012
Arctic sea-ice thickness is shrinking, too. Extent and thickness at September minimum
World Bank / Potsdam Institute Nov 2012
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North America snow cover in June
Data from Rutgers University Global Snow Lab
Summer surface melt area on Greenland 2012
In the 2012 image, the darker pink represents confirmed melting and the lighter pink probable melting. The last time melting of close to this extent occurred was 1889, the result of a local warm spell, not a global one as now. World Bank / Potsdam Institute Nov 2012
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Greenland ice sheet mass balance Black = MBM Red = GRACE
Rignot et al., 2011 Geophys. Res. Lett. DOI: 10.1029/2011GL046583
Antarctic Ice Sheet Mass Balance
Black = MBM, Red = GRACE Rignot et al., 2011 Geophys. Res. Lett. DOI: 10.1029/2011GL046583
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Global mean sea level 1860-2010
World Bank / Potsdam Institute Nov 2012
Sea-level rise is not uniform (!)
The Earth is not a bathtub. It’s a rotating ball, non-uniformly heated (experiencing non-uniform thermal expansion), where winds and ocean currents pile up water against the barriers formed by continents.
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Atmospheric CO2 and ocean pH About 1/3 of CO2 added to atmosphere is quickly taken up by the surface layer of the oceans (top 80 meters).
The link is that dissolved CO2 forms weak carbonic acid (H2O + CO2 H2CO3), lowering the pH.
World Bank / Potsdam Institute Nov 2012
What do we know about the causes? Human vs natural influences 1750-2011 (watts/m2) Human emissions leading to increases in… atmospheric carbon dioxide methane (and resulting constituents) halocarbons (incl. stratospheric O3↓) nitrous oxide short-lived gasses (CO,NMVOC,NOX) particles (net of reflective + absorptive) indirect (cloud forming) effect of particles Human land-use change increasing reflectivity Natural changes in sunlight reaching Earth
+ 1.7 + 0.97 + 0.18 +0.17 +0.18 - 0.27 - 0.55 - 0.15 + 0.05
The warming influence of anthropogenic GHG is ~60x the warming influence of the estimated change in input from the Sun. IPCC AR5, WG1 SPM, 2013
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What do we know about the causes? Human vs natural influences 1950-2010 (º C)
Human well‐mixed GHGs Net human influence Human particulates + short‐lived GHGs Solar variability + volcanoes
IPCC AR5, WG1 SPM, 2013
The key greenhouse-gas increases were caused by human activities. Compared to natural changes over the past 10,000 years, the spike in concentrations of CO2 & CH4 in the past 250 years is extraordinary. We know humans are responsible for the CO2 spike because fossil CO2 lacks carbon-14, and the drop in atmospheric C-14 from the fossil-CO2 additions is measurable. IPCC AR4, WG1 SPM, 2007
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The human‐caused GHG increases overcame long‐ term cooling from natural causes
°C depar‐ ture from 1960‐90 average
Blue band is one‐sigma uncertainty range (68% confidence interval). The data show how a long‐ term natural cooling trend has been suddenly reversed by anthropogenic warming over the last century. Marcott et al. SCIENCE vol 339, 2013
Human “fingerprint” on the last 130 years Top panel shows best estimates of human & natural forcings 1880-2005. Bottom panel shows that state-of-the-art climate model, when fed these forcings, reproduces almost perfectly the last 125 years of observed temperatures. Source: Hansen et al., Science 308, 1431, 2005.
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Geographic pattern is also as predicted for GHG-induced change: Observed ∆T matches modeled results on all continents.
IPCC AR4 WG1 SPM, 2007 Black lines are decadally averaged observations. Blue bands are computer models with natural forcings only. Pink bands are computer models with human + natural forcings.
Why worry? What harm can it do? Climate governs (so altering climate will affect) • availability of water • productivity of farms, forests, & fisheries • prevalence of oppressive heat & humidity • formation & dispersion of air pollutants • geography of disease • damages from storms, floods, droughts, wildfires • property losses from sea‐level rise • expenditures on engineered environments • distribution & abundance of species
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Are we seeing harm? Floods & droughts in China 30-year weakening of East-Asia monsoon – attributed to global climate change -- has meant less moisture flow South to North over China, producing increased flooding in South, drought in North, with serious impacts on agriculture.
Qi Ye, Tsinghua University, May 2006
Are we seeing harm? Hurricanes in the N Atlantic Source: Coumou & Rahmstorf, Nature Climate Change, vol 2, July 2012
Red line is power dissipation index for N Atlantic hurricanes. Blue line is sea‐surface temperature in main development region for these storms. Dotted line is evolution of Northern Hemisphere mean temperature. All data are 6‐year running averages.
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Are we seeing harm? Downpours in the USA Percentage increase, between 1958 and 2012, in the amount of precipitation falling in the heaviest 1% of precipitation events in each region.
Source: USGCRP, Assessment of Climate Change Impacts in the United States, May 2014
This is happening in many regions. Central Europe, May‐June 2013
Munich Re (2014)
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Yet some drought‐prone regions are getting drier.
The American West is a conspicuous example. Western N America Summer Precipitation 1900-2100: History & IPCC Models
Schwalm et al., Nature Geoscience, Aug 2012
How does warming influence drought? • Higher temperatures = bigger losses to evaporation. • More of the rain falling in extreme events = more loss to flood runoff, less moisture soaking into soil.
• Mountains get more rain, less snow, yielding more runoff in winter and leaving less for summer. • Earlier spring snowmelt also leaves less runoff for summer.
• Altered atmospheric circulation patterns can also play a role.
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“We demonstrate that while 3‐year periods of persistent below‐average soil moisture are not uncommon, the current event is the most severe drought in the last 1200 years.”
March 31, 2015
Are we seeing harm? Wildfires in the USA
Data source: National Interagency Fire Center
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Are we seeing harm? Unusually warm summers
Percentage of summers during 1995‐2024 when mean temperature exceeds the 95th percentile value during 1950‐1979. Duffy & Tebaldi Climatic Change 2012.
Are we seeing harm? Pest outbreaks in CO Pine bark beetles, with a longer breeding season courtesy of warming, devastate trees weakened by heat & drought in Colorado
USGCRP 2009
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Are we seeing harm? Melting permafrost
Norwegian Polar Institute, 2009
Are we seeing harm? coastal erosion
Courtesy Gary Braasch
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Current harm is widespread Around the world we’re seeing, variously, increases in • floods • wildfires • droughts • heat waves • pest outbreaks • coral bleaching events • power of typhoons & hurricanes • geographic range of tropical pathogens All plausibly linked to climate change by theory, models, observed “fingerprints”
T and impacts grow for decades under all scenarios. IPCC Scenarios
Last time T was 2ºC above 1900 level was 130,000 yr BP, with sea level 4-6 m higher than today. Last time T was 3ºC above 1900 level was ~30 million yr BP, with sea level 20-30 m higher than today.
EU target ∆T ≤ 2ºC
Note: Shaded bands denote 1 standard deviation from mean in ensembles of model runs
IPCC 2013
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Temperature scenarios to 2300 Global-average surface T from 1950 to 2300 according to Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios developed for the 5th IPCC Assessment. Yellow lines are medians and gray bands represent 66% probability that the true value, for the given concentration assumption, lies within. RCP8.5 is a no-mitigation scenario. RCP6 assumes modest mitigation policies.
World Bank / Potsdam Institute Nov 2012
What’s expected: Hotter summers
National Academies, Stabilization Targets, 2010
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Hotter summers (continued): Why a small increase in average T leads to a big increase in hot weather
Hotter summers (continued) Temperature anomaly (wrt 1961-90) °C
July-August T in Western Europe observations HadCM3 Medium-High (SRES A2)
The 2003 heatwave killed some 35,000 people in France, Spain, & Italy.
2060s
2040s
2003
Summers as hot as 2003 will likely be the norm by the 2040s and considered unusually cool by 2070.
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What’s expected: declining crop yields
These declines are without taking into account any increase in major droughts.
National Academies, Stabilization Targets, 2010
But droughts are expected to worsen Frequency of 4-6 month duration droughts (events per 30 years)
Drought defined as soil moisture below historical 10th percentile value for that calendar month.
1961‐1990
events per 30 years
Results shown are the mean of 8 global climate models
Source: Sheffield and Wood 2008 Climate Dynamics (2008) 31:79–105 DOI 10.1007/s00382‐007‐0340‐z
2070‐2099, IPCC A2 scenario
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What’s expected: sea-level rise
NOAA OAR CPO-1, December 2012
1870, 280 ppm
What‘s expected: continued fall in ocean pH Increased acidity lowers the availability of CaCO3 to organisms that use it for forming their shells & skeletons, including corals.
2003, 375 ppm
Adverse effects are already being observed. Coral reefs could be dead or in peril over most of their range by mid to late 21st century.
2065, 515 ppm
Steffen et al., 2004
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What’s expected: impact of acidification
NCA Highlights 2014
What more do we most need to know? • Improved understanding of climate “sensitivity” to human & natural forcings (including effects of particles, clouds) – Sensitivity means, in essence, how much average T increases under a doubling of atmospheric CO2 or its equivalent. – Improvements in this understanding will improve predictions. – Getting there will require continuing investments in paleoclimatology, basic climate physics, maintaining & improving our constellation of Earth-observation satellites, and running better climate models on faster computers.
• Better regional disaggregation of predicted changes in temperatures, precipitation, storm tracks, ice sheets; and better sense of where “tipping points” lurk – Requirements for getting there similar to those above
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What more we need to know? (continued) • Better understanding of ecological effects of regional climate changes – Including impacts on oceans, crops, domestic animals, wildlife, pests, pathogens – This is needed to shape adaptation strategies – Requires continuing investments in ecological sciences, major improvements in diversity & density of monitoring networks
• Better integrated assessments combining predictions, mitigation and adaptation options (character, capabilities, costs), social dimensions – Requires additional effort in integrated-assessment methods and practice as well as in specifics of mitigation & adaptation options
The policy questions
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What should we do? There are only three options: • Mitigation, meaning measures to reduce the pace & magnitude of the changes in global climate being caused by human activities. • Adaptation, meaning measures to reduce the adverse impacts on human well-being resulting from the changes in climate that do occur. • Suffering the adverse impacts and societal disruption that are not avoided by either mitigation or adaptation.
Concerning the three options… • We’re already doing some of each. • What’s up for grabs is the future mix. • Minimizing the amount of suffering in that mix can only be achieved by doing a lot of mitigation and a lot of adaptation. – Mitigation alone won’t work because climate change is already occurring & can’t be stopped quickly. – Adaptation alone won’t work because adaptation gets costlier & less effective as climate change grows. – We need enough mitigation to avoid the unmanageable, enough adaptation to manage the unavoidable.
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Adaptation possibilities include… • Changing cropping patterns • Developing heat-, drought-, and salt-resistant crop varieties • Strengthening public-health & environmentalengineering defenses against tropical diseases • Building new water projects for flood control & drought management • Building dikes and storm-surge barriers against sea-level rise • Avoiding further development on flood plains & near sea level Many are “win-win”: They’d make sense in any case.
Mitigation possibilities include… (CERTAINLY) • Reduce emissions of greenhouse gases & soot from the energy sector • Reduce deforestation; increase reforestation & afforestation • Modify agricultural practices to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases & build up soil carbon (CONCEIVABLY) • “Scrub” greenhouse gases from the atmosphere technologically • “Geo-engineering” to create cooling effects offsetting greenhouse heating
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Key mitigation realities • Human CO2 emissions are the biggest piece of the problem (50% and growing) – About 85% comes from burning coal, oil, & natural gas (which provide >80% of world energy) – Most of the rest comes from deforestation & burning in the tropics
• Developing countries now exceed industrialized ones in total CO2 emissions (but not per capita). • Global energy system can’t be changed quickly: ~$20T is invested in it; normal turnover is ~40 yrs. • Deforestation also isn’t easy to change: forces driving it are deeply embedded in the economics of food, fuel, timber, trade, & development.
How much mitigation, how soon? • Limiting ∆Tavg to ≤2ºC is now considered by many the most prudent target that still may be attainable. – EU embraced this target in 2002, G-8 & G-20 in 2009
• To have a >50% chance of staying below 2ºC: – atmospheric concentration of heat-trapping substances must stabilize at around 450 ppm CO2 equivalent (CO2e); – to get there, developed-country emissions must peak no later than 2015 and decline rapidly thereafter, and – developing-country emissions must peak no later than 2025 and decline rapidly thereafter.
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Mitigation supply curve for 2030: aiming for 450 ppm CO2e
Height of bars indicates cost of measure; width indicates annual avoided CO2e emissions by 2030.
Policies needed if 450 ppm CO2e is the global goal Need RD&D to lower this fruit into reach
Need to remove barriers to picking this low-hanging fruit
Need price on C to motivate reaching higher into the tree
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Is this much mitigation affordable? • Rough calculations – Paying an average of $100/tC to avoid half of current world CO2 emissions would cost $0.5 trillion/yr, under 1% of current GWP (much of it a transfer, not a “loss”). – Using McKinsey cost curve for what we’d need to be doing in 2030 to be on 450 ppmv stabilization trajectory shows net cost of only about $0.1 trillion/yr.
• Current econ models say mitigation to stabilize at 450 ppmv CO2e probably means 2-3% GWP loss in 2030, 2100 (range 1-5%). • World now spends 2.5% of GWP on defense; USA spends 5% on defense, 2% on env protection
The communications questions
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Q: How can the answers about the science better inform the answers that publics and policy‐makers embrace about what to do and when to do it? A: Through more effective communication and education.
What are the ingredients of more effective communication & education? • Start with the basics • Be clear about terminology • Explain how we know what we know • Link it to what can be observed • Link it to listeners’ regions and communities • Focus on how science works, sources of authority & credibility in scientific findings • Avoid conveying a paralyzing pessimism by pointing to progress being made on solutions
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Starting with the basics • Without energy there is no economy • Without climate there is no environment • Without economy and environment there is no material well-being, no civil society, no personal or national security The problem is that the world is getting most of the energy its economies need in ways that are imperiling the climate its environment needs.
Terminology: “global warming” is a misnomer That term implies something… • uniform across the planet, • mainly about temperature, • gradual, • quite possibly benign. What’s actually happening is… • highly nonuniform, • not just about temperature, • rapid compared to capacities for adjustment • harmful for most places and times A more descriptive term is “global climate disruption”.
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Terminology (cont): Weather, climate, disruption Climate = weather patterns, meaning averages, extremes, timing, spatial distribution of… • hot & cold • cloudy & clear • humid & dry • drizzles & downpours • snowfall, snowpack, & snowmelt • breezes, blizzards, tornadoes, & typhoons Climate change means disruption of the patterns. Global average temperature is just an index of the state of the global climate as expressed in these patterns. Small changes in the index big changes in the patterns.
Observables: Powerful storms (USA, Oct 2010)
This super-storm – the strongest US non-coastal storm on record -- spawned 67 tornadoes over a 4-day period.
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Observables: Floods (Australia, 2010‐2011)
Photo: NASA
Record warm sea temperatures contributed to the wettest spring ever in Australia and flooding in Queensland that was the costliest natural disaster in Australia’s history.
Observables: Coral bleaching (Carribean, 2010)
2010 brought the worst coral bleaching since 1998. Courtesy www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/
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Link to the local: increased heatwaves
Link to the local: wildfire predictions Percentage increases in median annual area burned for a 1°C increase in global average temperature
National Academies, Stabilization Targets, 2010
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Link to the local: Sea level could rise 1-2 meters by 2100, 3-12 m in the next few hundred years, up to 70 m eventually.
What would 1-70 m of sealevel rise do to your region?
Courtesy Jeffrey Bielicki, Kennedy School of Government
Talk about how science works CUMULATIVE CHARACTER AND PEER REVIEW • Science is cumulative. New evidence and analysis that survive peer review become part of the accumulated, accepted body of scientific knowledge. Contributions that do not survive the scrutiny of peers do not become part of that accepted corpus, and those who cite such contributions as authoritative or worthy of equal consideration with the accepted corpus are either uninformed or duplicitous. • Our confidence in conclusions drawn from science grows with the magnitude, diversity, and coherence of the lines of peerreviewed evidence that have been brought to bear. In the case of climate change, those lines of evidence are large and diverse and coherent indeed. And because of their importance to society, they have been subjected to even more peer review than scientific findings typically receive.
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Talk about how science works (continued) UNCERTAINTIES ARE TWO-SIDED • Yes, it could be that the climate changes occurring under a continuation of “business as usual” would be less disruptive, and the adverse impacts on human well-being less severe, than the scientific-mainstream best estimates contained in the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), and other authoritative bodies. • But it could also turn out that the climate changes under business as usual would be more disruptive, and the impacts on human well-being more severe, than the “consensus” estimates suggest. (Recent evidence and analysis suggest this is more likely than the reverse.)
How science works (continued) BURDEN OF PROOF • Deniers routinely brandish some single contrary piece of evidence or analysis—often a newly reported one that has not yet been subjected to the scrutiny of the scientific community— and declare that it invalidates the mainstream view. • That’s not how science works. Contrary results appear regularly in all scientific fields. But when a strong preponderance of evidence points the other way (as in the case of climate-change science), isolated apparent contradictions are given due scrutiny but not, initially, very much weight. • That’s because it’s far more likely that the “contradiction” will turn out to be explainable as a mistake, or otherwise consistent with the preponderance of evidence, than that the preponderance of evidence will turn out to have been wrong.
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How science works (concluded) BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRUDENCE • All science is contingent. It's always possible that persuasive new evidence and analysis will change the mainstream view. But the greater the size and consistency of the existing body of evidence and analysis, the lower the likelihood that the principal conclusions derived from it will be overturned. • Given the size, diversity, and coherence of the lines of peerreviewed science underpinning the mainstream view of the reality, causes, and consequences of climate change, the burden of proof is on the “contrarians” who dispute it. They have not come close to meeting that burden. • Policy-makers, on whose decisions the preservation and expansion of the public’s well-being depends, are gambling against very long odds if they bet that the contrarians are right and the mainstream position is wrong. That is not prudent.
Focus on solutions: the Climate Action Plan Georgetown University, June 2013
• Cutting carbon pollution in America (mitigation) • Preparing the United States for the impacts of climate change (adaptation) • Leading international efforts to address climate change http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf
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U.S. emission target for 2025
Progress: Climate-Change Mitigation • Reducing carbon pollution from power plants – standards for cutting CO2 from new power plants (Sept 2013) – and from existing power plants (June 2014)
• Reducing other greenhouse gases – interagency strategy to reduce methane emissions (March 2014) – EPA proposal on hydrofluorocarbons (July 2014) – 2025 target to reduce methane emissions form the oil and gas sector by 40-45% from 2012 levels along with various actions to reduce methane emissions going forward, including EPA regulation (January 2015)
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Progress: Preparing for the Impacts of Climate Change • Directing agencies to support climate preparedness/resilience – All agencies required to develop & implement plans for integrating climate preparedness/resilience into their missions, policies, programs, investments, and grants. – Agency plans were released in 10-14. • Establishing internal & external task forces on resilience – Interagency Council on Climate-Change Preparedness & Resilience (~30 Federal agencies) and Working Groups established (11-13) – State, Local, & Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness & Resilience, comprising 26 elected officials from across the country; delivered recommendations to the Administration (11-14)
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Progress: Preparing for the Impacts (continued) • Managing flood, drought, & wildfire risks – National Drought Resilience Partnership (11-13) – 7 USDA Regional Agricultural Hubs for ClimateChange Mitigation & Adaptation (02-14) – USDA/ DOI National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy (04-14) – HUD $1B National Disaster Resilience Competition (06-14) – Federal Flood Risk Management Standard (01-15)
Progress: Preparing for the Impacts of Climate Change
Mobilizing science and data for climate resilience • Climate Data Initiative (03-14) • 3rd U.S. National Climate Assessment (05-14) • U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit (11-14)
toolkit.climate.gov
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Progress: International efforts ENHANCING BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT
• U.S.‐China Joint Announcement in Nov. 2014:
Also in announcement: Carbon storage demo, new Clean Energy Research Center track on energy‐water nexus, new initiative on cities.
• India, Mexico, Brazil Targets announced or pending
Progress: International efforts (continued) • Enhancing multilateral engagement G‐20: Agreement to phase out fossil‐fuel subsidies and to develop a methodology for a voluntary peer‐review process (09‐13). UN: Extensive engagement w/ UNFCCC process toward a new global agreement in Paris in December 2015; President Obama speech at UN Climate Summit launched major new U.S. commitments on international assistance for preparedness/resilience (09‐14).
• Mobilizing clean‐energy and preparedness finance USA: $3 billion pledge to the Green Climate Fund at G20 (11‐14). USA/UK/Germany: Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance ‐ public‐private platform to advance next generation of climate finance instruments (06‐14).
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Taking action globally can make a huge difference. Aggressive global emissions reductions versus “business as usual” emissions
Change in average surface air temperature between 1970‐1999 and 2070‐2099 USGCRP, 3rd National Climate Assessment, May 2014
The path forward • Defend the requests for clean‐energy RD3 and for Earth observation in the President’s FY16 Budget. • Finalize EPA’s Power Plant Rules. • Improve the coverage, usability, and user base of the Climate Data Initiative and Climate Resilience Toolkit • Build the public‐private‐global partnership for boosting resilience in developing countries announced at the 09‐14 UN Climate Summit. • Continue to push toward a comprehensive, equitable, forward‐leaning climate agreement in Paris. • Implement the President’s Climate Education and Literacy Initiative to ensure continuing public support for all of the above.
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Some key references • The White House, President Obama’s Climate Action Plan: Progress Report, June 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cap_progress_repo rt_update_062514_final.pdf • U.S. Global Change Research Program, Third U.S. National Climate Assessment, Climate Change Impacts in the United States, May 2014, http://nca2014.globalchange.gov • Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation: Summary for Policy Makers, April 2014, http://www.ipcc.ch/ • Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Summary for Policy Makers, March 2014, http://www.ipcc.ch/ • Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Science 2013: The Physical Science Basis: Summary for Policy Makers, September 2013, http://www.ipcc.ch/
http://www.ostp.gov
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