Irving's victims of Groupthink (Paul 't Hart) Netherlands

Irving L. Janis' Victims of Groupthink Author(s): Paul't Hart Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jun., 1991), pp. 247-278 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791464 .

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Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1991

Classics in Political Psychology

Irving L. Janis' Victims of Groupthink Paul 't Hart1

INTRODUCTION Victimsof Groupthink:A Psychological Studyof Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes by Irving L. Janis was published for the first time in 1972. In an unprecedentedway, Janisappliedideas from small-groupanalysisto the explanation of policy fiascoes. He made plausible the hypothesis that each of these events can, to a considerableextent, be attributedto the occurrenceof a very specific and obviously detrimentalphenomenonwithin the groups of decisionmakers involved in their making. He called this phenomenon "Groupthink," cleverly picking this highly suggestive Orwellian mode of expression ("doublethink" in Orwell's novel 1984).

Accordingto Janis, groupthinkstandsfor an excessive form of concurrenceseeking among membersof high prestige, tightlyknit policy-makinggroups. It is excessive to the extent thatthe groupmembershave come to value the group(and their being partof it) higher than anythingelse. This causes them to strive for a quick and painless unanimityon the issues that the group has to confront. To preserve the clubby atmosphere, group members suppress personal doubts, silence dissenters, and follow the group leader's suggestions. They have a strong belief in the inherent morality of the group, combined with a decidedly evil pictureof the group's opponents. The results are devastating:a distortedview of reality, excessive optimism producinghasty and reckless policies, and a neglect of ethical issues. The combination of these deficiencies makes these groups particularlyvulnerable to initiate or sustain projects that turn out to be policy fiascoes.

Janis's study has had a major influence on students of group processes (Brown, 1989), decision-making,and management.Also, it has influencedinternational-relationsanalysts in their efforts to understandthe dynamics of the 'Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences ResearchFellow, Departmentof Public Administration,University of Leiden, PO Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, Netherlands.

247 0162-895X/91/0600-0247$06.50/1 ? 1991 InternationalSociety of Political Psychology

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occurrence and resolution of internationalcrises. Here, we shall review the theory in view of its place within the field of groupdynamics, the researchwork that followed Janis's original formulation, and the implications of groupthink researchfor the crucial questionon the conditionsthatfoster high- or low-quality decision-making.2

"VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK" AS A CLASSICAL STUDY Context: Psychological Approaches to Political Decision-Making Janis'swork on groupthinkis one of the best-knownattemptsto illuminate and explain political decision-makingprocesses using psychological concepts, theories and perspectives. As such it is partof one among several distinct paradigms in the study of politics and policy analysis.

Paradigms of Political Decision-Making Analysis of political decision-makinghas long been dominatedby rationalchoice perspectives. In the rational view, policy decisions can be understood empirically as calculatedproblem-solvingby key actors pursuingwell-specified interests(for example, power maximization,attainmentof formallystatedpolicy goals). Normatively,the rationalperspective has producedelaboratemultistage models of policy-making, formulatingspecific tasks including problem diagnosis, informationgathering,formulationof alternatives,assessmentof the consequences of alternatives, choice, implementationof chosen alternative, feedback, and learning.

The rationalperspective has been extensively criticized. Empiricalstudies of political decision-making,following the lead of Allison's (1971) study of the Cuban Missile crisis, have provided evidence casting doubt on the empirical validity of rationalactormodels and have begun to formulateand test alternative ones. Also, it has been argued that rationalistassumptionsof perfect information, well-orderedpreferencesand single-actordominanceare far removed from the reality of politics and policy. This would also obstructthe usefulness of the rationalperspectiveas a normativeguideline for achievinghigh-qualitydecision2This articlefocuses solely on Janis'swork in groupdynamics, in particularon groupthink.It should be remarked that Janis's contributionto psychology in general and to political psychology in particularextends way beyond this. Among his majorworks not discussed at length in this essay, but significantfor a more elaborateassessmentare Hovland, Janisand Kelley (1953) on communication and persuasion;Janis and Mann (1977) and Janis (1989) on decision-making;Wheeler and Janis (1980) and Janis (1982) on applying decision-makinganalysis to daily choice situations;and the broad collection of papers in Janis (1982c).

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making [see Dror (1964, 1968), Etzioni (1967), and Lindblom (1979) for classical statementsof alternativenormativemodels].

Alternativesto the rationalperspectivehave takenmany forms. One important set of alternativeapproacheshas stressed the political dimensions of decision-makingprocesses: many actors, diverse interests, interagencyconflict, and ad hoc coalitions. In political models of choice, decisions are not the productof calculatedchoices by a governmentor a company as a unitaryactor, but rather the outcome of a bargaining process among different players in a politicalbureaucraticarena. The model of bureaucraticpolitics postulatesthatconflicts of interest and power games between differentsections, departmentsand agencies within a governmentadministrationare the most powerfuldeterminantsof policy choices (Allison, 1971; Halperin, 1974; Rosenthal, 't Hart, & Kouzmin, 1991).

The model entailed a definite break with traditionalperspectives of rational decision-makingand a strictseparationbetween politics and administration.One of the most intriguingvariantsof the political model focuses on the empiricalfact that on many occasions, the outcome of the process is such that no decisions are taken at all (non-decision-making).The analysis should then seek to explain why some social issues receive attention from policy-makersand are finally acted upon, whereasothersdon't. This takes the analystto identify the social, political and bureaucraticforces and barriersthat shape decision agendas (Bachrachand Baratz, 1970; Cobb and Elder, 1975; Kingdon, 1985).

Otheralternativesto the rationalmodel have stressed the importanceof the organizational dynamics involved in political decision-making. Paradoxically, organizationalmodels of choice have emphasized the relative unimportanceof decisions (Marchand Shapira, 1982). Instead,they discuss the impactof routines and standardoperatingproceduresfor coping with problems(Steinbruner,1974).

Explainingthe contentand the dynamicsof these organizationalproblem-solving regimes, attentionis directed towardthe impact of differentorganizationstructuresand culturalfactorsas they affect choice-relatedproblemperceptions,information and communicationprocesses, and action propensities. In this view, a complex decision "is like a great river, drawing from its many tributariesthe innumerablecomponent premises of which it is constituted"(Simon, 1957, p.

XII). The organizationalperspectivehas found its most radicalformulationin the so-called "garbage-cantheory" of organizationalchoice (Cohen et al., 1972; March, 1988). In organizationsdepicted as "organized anarchies," decisionmakingdoes not conformto the rationalistsequenceof stages. On the contrary,at any time, there are decision opportunitiesthat bring together various kinds of problems and solutions "lumped"by various organizationalparticipants.Organizationalchoice is seen, at best, as a by-productof variousindependentstreams of participantsand activities that occasionally interactin such a manner as to match "solutions"and "problems"at a time when the opportunityfor choice is there.

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As studies by Allison (1971), Steinbruner(1974), Linstone (1984), and many others have shown, the differentparadigmsof political decision-making are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are complementary:Each alerts the analyst to differenttypes of actors ands processes involved in decision-making.

Explainingpolitical decision-makingrequires,in otherwords, a multitheoretical approach.The analyticalproblemis whetherit is possible to develop contingency rules specifying the relative explanatorypotential of various (elements of) paradigms in different types of problem settings, administrativesystems, and political arenas.

Psychological Perspectives In additionto the abovementionedparadigms,psychologists studyingpolitical decision-makinghave provided a differentline of criticisms of the rationalchoice perspective, and have startedto formulateyet differentanalyticalmodels.

Psychological research on political decision-making builds upon the work of pioneers as Lasswell, Leites, George, Simon, and March. It stresses the importance that individualcapabilitiesand personalcharacteristicsand propensitiesof individual actors can have on the course and outcomes of political decisionmaking processes. Psychological studies brought "man back in": In contrastto organizational and political paradigms that emphasize meso- and macrolevel processes, psychological studies focus on the micro-level (individual decisionmakersalone and in interaction).Janis'swork, not only on groupthinkbut also in his well-known study with Mann (1977), is partof this emerging psychological contributionto the field of political decision-making [see Holsti (1977), M. Hermann(1978), Kinder and Weiss (1978), Falkowski (1979), Hopple (1980), Jervis, (1980), Ungson and Braunstein(Ed.) (1982), Barber (1988) for overviews and discussion]. Psychologicalstudies of political decision-makingreflect different orientations and research traditions within psychology. They have focused on, among others: Beliefs and cognitions held by decision-makers,shaping their views of the world, key actorsand theirimportance,the natureand scope of policy problems, and the possibilities for resolution (for example: Lau and Sears, 1986; Cottam, 1986); Information-processingcapabilities and dynamics, specifying different ways in which individualscope with limitationsin cognitive abilities (for example, Axelrod (Ed.), 1977; Nutt, 1988); Emotions and motivationsconsciously and unconsciously affecting the attitudesand behavioralpredispositionsof decision-makers,includingmany works on the effects of psychological stress and individualcoping strategies(for example, Cottam, 1977; Etheredge, 1985; see also Janis and Mann, 1977), as well psychobiographicalaccounts of socialization and development of the person-

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alities of key politicians and bureaucrats(for example, the classic George and George, 1956); Leadershipand interpersonalstyle of prominentpolitical leaders and bureaucraticentrepreneurs,specifying how key actors interactwith others in their social and professional environments [for example: Lewis (1980), Doig and Hargrove(1987); elements of this approachcan be found in Janis(1989)]; Group processes, focusing on the formation and dynamics of small groups as muchneglected fora of political and bureaucraticdecision-making (Golembiewski, 1978).

Janis'swork on groupthinkfits into the latter category. In fact, it has been one of the pioneering studies in this area. At the time of its publication, it was rare in its broad interdisciplinary(social psychology, political science, history) approachand its extensive use of comparablecase studiesoutliningthe argument and developing and illustratingthe theory. This methodology, as well as Janis's lucid style, made it appeal to an unusually broad audience, including many political scientists and international-relationsanalysis who were otherwise not inclined to consult psychological studies employing strictly experimentalmethods. Lateron, the book was also adoptedby studentsof organizationalbehavior and managerialdecision-making(for example:DuBrin, 1984; Swap, 1984; Leavitt and Bahrami, 1985; Pennings et al., 1985).

In this sense, Janis's study on groupthinkhas stimulatedinterdisciplinary efforts. At the same time, these very qualitieshave made this work vulnerableto various discipline-boundcriticisms. Historiansare boundto criticize the focused and potentially superficialcase accounts and interpretations(Welch, 1989), and experimentally inclined psychologists will point to empirical ambiguities and difficulties in pinpointing causality due to the post hoc nature of case study research(Longley and Pruitt, 1980).

Research Tradition: Cohesiveness and Group Performance Having placed groupthinkwithin its broaderinterdisciplinarycontext, it is time to zoom in and presentin greaterdetail the theoreticaland empiricalroots of groupthinkanalysis. These are to be found in social psychology. Groupthinkcan be considered an anomalous branch on the broad tree of research on group cohesiveness and group performance that constitutes a substantive body of knowledge within groupdynamics. The cohesiveness of decision-makinggroups is the crucial linchpin in Janis'sown depictionof the dynamicsof groupthink.In fact, it is the sole group-levelfactorthathe singles out as a substantive,independent cause of groupthink.

Cohesiveness, viewed by Janis and most other small-grouptheorists as the extent of "sticking togetherness"of members of a group, is one of the crucial

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factors in group functioning. It is also one of the most intensely researched variablesin the social psychology of small groups. Perhapspartlybecause of its very pervasiveness, it is also one of the most elusive and multifacetedaspects of (decision) groups:there are several competingnotions of cohesiveness; there are differenttechniquesof measuringcohesiveness which do not always yield consistent results; Cohesiveness affects group behavior in numerousways. It pervades both group structureand process, and cohesiveness factors may act as either independent,intermediate,or dependentvariable.Essentially,many of the unresolvedproblemsin the analysis of groupcohesiveness reportedtwenty years ago by Cartwright,still exist today: How do various sources of attractioncombine in a composite measureof cohesiveness, what is the importanceof different sourcesof attractionon groupcohesiveness and its subsequenteffects upon group behavior,and what is the natureof causal linkages involving groupcohesiveness and other aspects of group structureand process (Cartwright, 1968; see also Golembiewski, 1962; Verba;1962; Golembiewski et al., 1968; Hare, 1976)?

Cohesiveness and Group Members Just after WorldWarII, cohesiveness researchmoved swiftly throughthe systemic efforts of Festinger,Schachter,Back, and their associates. Much of the research programon informal social communicationby Festinger and his colleagues was devoted to studying group effects on individual members. The investigators, soon to be followed by a vast numberof others, found that cohesive groups exert certain pressures toward uniformity upon their members.

More generally, as Shaw observed, "[Groups] characterizedby friendliness, cooperation, interpersonal attraction, and similar indications of group cohesiveness exert strong influence upon members to behave in accordancewith group expectations. Members of cohesive groups are motivated to respond positively to others in the group, and their behavior should reflect this motivation" (Shaw, 1981, p.218). In cohesive groups, the explicit or implicit norms and standardsthat underliethe functioningof any collectivity, gain importance.

It is held thatthe more cohesive the group,the more its memberstend to abide by its norms of conduct.

There appearsto be a compelling logic in this proposition:The more cohesive the group, the greaterthe members' satisfaction with it and the greater their willingness to remainpart of it, hence the greatertheir incentives to think and act as the group does. Yet, this final step is taken too hastily. Whether a groupmemberfeels compelled to go along with the group,dependsentirelyupon the contentof the group'snorms. Groupnormsmay very well encouragecritical discussion and dissent by minoritiesor individualmembers. It should be added that this is not very often the case. Usually group norms tend to stress the

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importanceof consensus andjoint action, hence the tendencytowarduniformity.

The key point to remember,however, is thatcohesiveness increasesthe power of group norms, and these may or may not favor uniformity.

In practice, the tendency for conformityin cohesive groups is widespread.

Researchby Festingeret al. and many of theirstudentshas illustratedthis in both laboratoryand field settings (Asch, 1952; Hare, 1976; McGrath,1984). The very cohesiveness of the group promotesthis: Because group membersemphatically want to remainin the group as respectedparticipants,the groupenjoys considerable sanctioning power. It has at its disposal a wide range of techniques for changing the opinions and behaviors of a deviant member: from occasional remarksor jokes that alertthe deviantto the groupnorm, to (threatsof) rejection and expulsion. The group memberwho is able to withstandsuch pressurehas to be a formidableindividual. Yet, as the literatureon deviance and psychological reactancehas shown, undercertainconditions, deviantsmay persist and serve as catalysts for groupchanges (Schachter,1951; see overviews in Diener, 1980 and Dickenbergerand Gniech, 1982).

Cohesiveness and Group Problem Solving At a very general level, field studies have shown that cohesive groups are more effective in accomplishinggroupgoals than non-cohesive groups. Similarly, studies of group problem-solving show that cohesive groups perform well (Shaw and Shaw, 1962; Maier, 1970). In the literaturecontrastingindividualand group performance,the benefits of groupcohesion have been stressed again and again. The advantages of groups are said to lie mainly in the sphere of the quantityand quality of informationstorageand retrieval.Also, groups are more successful than individuals in generating a wide range of alternatives. At the same time, group decision-making has some costs: It takes more time and it requires a sometimes difficult give-and-take between group members. In this context, the value of cohesiveness is stressedas promotinga congenial and taskoriented atmosphere, which allegedly facilitates group discussion (see, for instance, Miesing and Preble, 1985).

These are all familiararguments.And it was precisely this line of thinking that Janis was contendingwith. He surmisedthat, at a certainpoint, high cohesion becomes detrimentalto the quality of decision-making.This idea was most impressive in its counterintuitivepower:the realizationthat, dependingupon the content of group norms, harmonious, cooperative, teamlike entities may be a liability ratherthan an asset in producinghigh-qualitydecisions.

This is not what one would expect. At face value, it seems perfectlysensible that a tightly knit group,where memberslike each otherand cooperatesmoothly, is likely to produce better decisions at lower costs than groups where members

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cooperate less, groups where there is little common groundbetween members, and groups characterizedby internalconflicts. The basic thesis of groupthinkis, of course, exactly the reverse:The very cohesiveness of the groupmay become a value in itself for each of the members, and to such an extent that they may be reluctantto say or do anythingthat might disturbit, such as voicing criticisms againstthe ideas and opinions of othermembersor the group'smajority.Furthermore, it may even affect (delimit) their capacity to think critically.

This lack of franknessis detrimentalto the making of consequentialdecisions, where discussion and a certain amount of dissent are indispensible in arrivingat well-groundedchoices.

The characteristicsof groupthinkare, in fact, geared to the preservationof group cohesion and high spiritsthroughthe quick attainmentand preservationof consensus on the issue the groupconfronts.Ultimately,this can produceunsound decisions leading to the kind of policy fiascoes analyzed by Janis.

However, in the experimentalliteratureon group decision-makingand task performance,little supportfor this contentioncould be found, Janis'scase rested more on the above-discussedfindings on pressurestowarduniformityand on his studies of combat units (to be described below). At the same time, studies of U.S. foreign policy decision-makingprovidemostly anecdotalsupportfor Janis's ideas. For example, in his detailed analysis of the decision-makingprocess of PresidentTrumanand his advisorsat the time of the Koreaninvasion, De Rivera signals that, at times, the high cohesion of Truman'sgroup(despitebitterpersonal rivalriesbetween key advisors) seemed to cause distortionsof the advisement process: the witholding of informationthat might shatterthe consensus of the group (De Rivera, 1968). After the publication of Janis's study, many other analysts signalled such distortionsof informationprocessing and choice-making beyond the domain of foreign policy (for example, George, 1974; Gero, 1984; Hirokawaet al., 1988; Hirokawaand Scheerhorn,1986; Tjosvold, 1984; Smart and Vertinsky,1977).

Intellectual Backgrounds: Coping with Stress In crisis circumstances (high stress), group cohesiveness generally increases: Taskgroups may actuallybecome "primarygroups"underthe pressure of outside events. This thesis has been extensively documentedin field settings.

The most strikingexamplesof primarygroupties can be found in militarygroups in combat situations. Loyalty to the small combat unit was what kept many soldiers going during World War Two (in terms of combat effectiveness and resistance to enemy propaganda),both in the German and the U.S. armies.

Similar findings were obtainedin other theatresof war (Chodoff, 1983; George, 1968; Grinker and Spiegel, 1945; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Stouffer et al.,

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1949). Otherfield studies can be found in the disasterliterature,for instance in Lucas' study of two groupsof minerstrappedundergroundfor many days following a major accident (Lucas, 1970). A third example concerns Mulder et al.'s research among Dutch associations of shopkeepersthreatenedby supermarket take-overs (Mulder and Stemerding, 1963; also Mulder et al., 1971).

Janis-as co-researcherin the American Soldier Project-obtained in this period most of his initial data and insights on groupcohesion understress (Janis, 1945; Janis 1949a-c). Throughouthis career, he remained interested in the problem of human responses to stress, in particularthe ways in which people make decisions underconditions of externalthreat. This interesthas taken him from work on the effects of air war (Janis, 1951) and disasterwarnings(1962), to the plight of patients deciding whether to undergo surgery (1958, 1971), and onwardsto Lewineanareaslike dieting and decisions to stop smoking (Janisand Mann, 1977; Wheeler and Janis, 1980). Fromthese wide-rangingfields of empirical study, he developed a comprehensivetheory about individualand collective modes of choice under stress (Janis, 1971; Janis and Mann, 1977; Janis, 1989). Focusing on small-group performanceunder stress, Janis was heavily influenced by psychodynamictheory, stressingthe role of individualand collective defense mechanismsin coping with anxiety.Among these was the illusion of invulnerability: A variety of less overt personaldefenses against anxiety is likely to develop. Complete denial of the impending danger, implicit trust in the protectiveness of the authorities, reversion to an infantilebelief in personalomnipotence-these and other unconscious or partiallyconscious defense mechanismshave been describedas typical modes of adjustment during a period of impending air attack. Irrespectiveof the particularmodes of defense a person employs, however, the net effect may be an illusion of personalinvulnerability. (Janis, 1971)

In his early work on coping with stress, the roots of Janis'scounterconventional view of the effects of high cohesion on group performancecan be found. This basically psychoanaliticview suggests that, even if a group fails to achieve its formal goals or stated official objectives, its cohesiveness may remain unchecked. It may, indeed, even grow, as the membersview one anotherand the group as a whole as a sourceof emotionalconsolation, quite independentlyfrom task- and goal-related considerations. Lott and Lott have signalled that when failures are perceived by the group members to be arbitrarily"imposed" by sources outside the group's control, there is a good chance that attractionto the group increases (Lott and Lott, 1965; see also Mulder and Stemerding, 1965; Rabbie and Wilkens, 1971). This is even more so when group memberslack an exit option: They cannot dissociate themselves, so they decide to make the most of it ('t Hart, 1990).

However, laboratoryresearchhas made it clear that there is no simple and clear-cut linkage between external stress and increased group cohesiveness.

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Hamblin hypothesized that group integrationactually decreases when members either feel that they can do betterby a timely retreatfrom the group, or perceive that there is no solution to the crisis available at all. In these situations, group membersmay display more self-orientedbehaviorand indulge in imposing negative sanctions upon their colleagues (Hamblin, 1958, 1960). In his researchon stress in task groups, Payne emphasizedthat for groups under stress to become more integrated, it is necessary that the members have interpersonalskills (Payne, 1981).

In conclusion, one could arguethat althoughqualificationsare needed, the groupthinkconcept effectively turns aroundsome of the traditionalideas about the effects of "cohesiveness" on group performance.To a great extent, Janis's contributionlies in developing and pursuinga counterintuitiveline of thinking.

Moreover,he has appliedit to historiccases of political decision-making.Let us now turn to the main thrustof his analysis.

JANIS ON GROUPTHINK Whatis groupthink?How does it come about?What are its specific antecedents and effects?

The most systematic treatmentof these issues can be found in the second edition of Janis's book, which extends and above all systematizes the earlier formulation [Janis, (1982a); see also the early re-working in Janis and Mann (1977), and the more appliedinterpretationsin Janis(1982b, 1986)]. In his recent study Crucial Decisions, he has presentedthe groupthinkphenomenonwithin a broadercontext of decision heuristics and shortcutsto rationality,while at the same time respondingto some of the criticalcommentsraised in response to the two editions of the groupthinkstudy, however, without changing the theory as such (Janis, 1989).

Definition Originally,Janis defined groupthinkas follows: "A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group,when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternativecourses of action" (1982a, p.9). As Longley and Pruitthave pointed out, this definition is confusing as it incorporatesnot only the process itself (a certainmode of collective thinking),but also some of its antecedents(a cohesive in-group,personalinvolvementin it by individualmembers),as well as some of its effects (a reducedcapacityto realisticallyappraisealternativecourses

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of action). In his later formulations,Janis has not, as Longley and Pruittimply, changed his definition (Longley and Pruitt, 1980). Rather he has provided an operationalformulationof it; the causal connections between antecedents, indicators and effects are made explicit in a flow chart (see Fig. 1).

Thus, it turns out that groupthinkstands for concurrence-seeking,that is, the tendency for group memberstowardconvergingopinions aboutthe adoption of a certain course of action in a given decision situation.

ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS

OBSERVABLE CONSEQUENCES

Decisionmakers Constitute a Cohesive Group ?

B-1 StructuralFaults of the Organization 1. Insulationof the Group 2. Lack of Traditionof Impartial Leadership 3. Lack of Norms Requiring Methodical Procedures 4. Homogeneity of Members' Social Backgroundand Ideology Etc.

"" Concurrence-Seeking (Groupthink)Tendency

C Symptomsof Groupthink Type I. Overestimationof the Group 1. Illusion of Invulnerability 2. Belief in InherentMorality of the Group Type II. Closed-Mindedness 3. Collective Rationalizations 4. Stereotypes of Out-Groups Type III. Pressures Toward Uniformity 5. Self-Censorship 6. Illusion of Unanimity 7. Direct Pressureon Dissenters 8. Self-Appointed Mindguards

I +

B-2 Provocative Situational Context 1. High Stress from External Threats with Low Hope of a Better Solution Than the Leader's 2. Low Self-Esteem Temporarily Induced by a. Recent Failures That Make Members' Inadequacies Salient b. Excessive Difficulties on CurrentDecisionmaking Tasks That Lower Each Member's Sense of SelfEfficacy c. Moral Dilemmas: Apparent Lack of Feasible Alternatives Except Ones that Violate Ethical Standards Etc.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

D Symptomsof Defective Decisionmaking Gross Omissions in Survey of Objectives Gross Omissions in Survey of Alternatives Poor InformationSearch Selective Bias in Processing Informationat Hand Failure to Reconsider Originally Rejected Alternatives Failure to Examine Some Major Costs and Risks of Preferred Choice Failure to Work Out Detailed Implementation, Monitoring, and Contingency Plans

E Low Probability of Successful Outcome

Fig. 1 Groupthinktheory:A model. Source:Janis, J. L. (1982). Groupthink:Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

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Antecedent Conditions Consider the flow chart. It shows three types of "causes": 1. High cohesiveness of the decision-making group. Take President Truman'sgroup which dealt with the conduct of the Korean war. Janis quotes Glen Paige: Truman'sgroup of advisors developed a high degree of solidarity.Glen Paige ... calls attentionto the "intra-groupsolidarity"at all the crisis meetings. He concludes that "one of the most striking aspects . . . is the high degree of satisfaction and sense of moral rightness shared by the decision makers". . . The members of the group continued to display esprit de corps and mutualadmirationthroughoutthe many months they worked together.It was a groupof men who sharedthe same basic values and dominantbeliefs of the power elite of American society, particularlyabout the necessity for containing the expansionof "worldcommunism"in orderto protectthe "free world." (1982a, p.49; see also De Rivera, 1968)

2. Specific structuralcharacteristics("faults") of the organizationalcontext in which the groupoperates.One of the structuralaspectsmentionedby Janisis a lack of impartialleadership.Considerthe following passage on the way President Kennedypresided over the meetings of the Cuban-invasionplanninggroup during the Bay of Pigs episode: [At] each meeting, insteadof opening up the agendato permita full airingof the opposing considerations,he allowed the CIA representativesto dominatethe entirediscussion. The presidentpermittedthem to refute immediatelyeach tentativedoubt thatone of the others might express, instead of asking whether anyone else had the same doubt or wanted to pursue the implicationsof the new worrisome issue that had been raised. (1982a, p.42)

3. Stressfulinternaland externalcharacteristicsof the situation.Groupthink does not easily occur in routinesituationsinvolving equivocal decisions. Rather, the chances of groupthinkmarkedlyincrease when decision-makersare under stress, dealing with a crisis situation. In these circumstances,decision-makers may perceive threatsto their self-esteem because of the tremendousburdenof having to decide about impenetrable,morally complex issues. Then, the group may become a key source of consolation. See Janis'sremarkson the Watergate cover-up by Nixon and his associates: [During] this stressful period they spent much more time talking about what to do, but their ramblingconversationsinvariablyended up reaffirmingand extending the cover-up policy. These long conversationscould be characterizedas displayingcollective uncritical thinking. ... Apparentlyunderconditionsof high stressthe membershad become highly dependenton the group for social support,to maintaintheir morale as well as to protect them from criminalliability throughtheir affiliationwith the presidency.(1982a, pp.252253)

These are not equally importantfor the occurrenceof groupthink,according to Janis: "The explanatoryhypothesis about why groupthinkoccurs gives preeminence to the provocativesituationalfactors . . . (box B-2)" (1982a, p.259). And then: "[the] explanatoryhypothesis implicitly assigns a secondary role to the

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structuralfaults of the organization(box B-l). . . Those structuralfeatures can be regardedas moderatingvariablesinvolving the presence or absence of organizational constraints that could counteract the concurrence-seekingtendency" (Janis, 1982a, p.301).

Characteristics Janis mentions three types of characteristicsof groupthink: 1. Those producing an overestimation of the group (illusion of invulnerability;belief in inherentmorality).

2. Those producingclosed-mindedness(collective rationalizations;stereotyped images of out-groups).

3. Those producingpressurestowarduniformity(self-censorship;illusion of unanimity;direct pressureson dissenters;self-appointedmindguards).

From these characteristics,one cannot doubt the negative evaluation of groupthinkthat pervadesJanis'swritingson the subject. All characteristicsseem malicious: while the pressurestowarduniformitycan be viewed as indicatorof excessive concurrence-seekingas such, the other two types of characteristics (overestimation,closed-mindedness)assure that this concurrence-seekingtakes place in the context of "bad" policies.

According to Janis, concurrence-seekingas such is a necessary element within each collective decision process (especially when unanimityis called for).

At a certainpoint in the deliberativeprocess, discussions need to be concluded and actions taken. In this respect, there is not so much differencefrom processes of individual decision-making, where decision-makersstart "bolstering" their preferredalternatives(Soelberg, 1967; Janisand Mann, 1977). However, concurrence-seeking becomes excessive when it takes place too early and in too restrictivea way. This need still not be fatal, if the groupis embarkingon, more or less accidentally, a sound alternative. It is the other set of characteristicsof groupthinkthatare likely to preventthis from happening:Closed-minded,stereotyped, overconfidentand morallyexempt decision-makersare highly unlikely to strike the right, or at least a satisfactory,key.

GROUFI'HINK AS A FIELD OF RESEARCH I have already noted the paradox between the instant popularity of groupthinkand the relative numericalpaucityof subsequentresearchefforts. It is time to illustrate this. At the one end, there is the mass of textbooks either reprintingJanis'swork or paraphrasingit, couched in sternand definite warnings about the dangers of "too much cohesiveness" (for instance, Forsyth, 1983;

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DuBrin, 1983; Swap 1984; Luttrinand Settle, 1985; Roberts, 1988). But what actualresearchwork has been done since 1972? What are its results?Apartfrom Janis's own follow-up writings on the subject, some critical reviews have appeared, three studies discussing problemsof conceptualizationand theoryformation, as well as a numberof laboratoryand "real world" replicationsof Janis's empirical research.

Real-World Replications Only a few analysts have produced articles or monographsapplying, like Janis, groupthinkanalysis to governmentand public policy-making.In 1974, the Watergatescandal dominatedthe Americanpolitical and scholarly community.

Several analysts have tried to interpretthis domestic-policyfiasco by suggesting that groupthink was operating within the group of President Nixon and his advisors. Green and Connolly have directly linked groupthinkto the Watergate cover-up (Green and Connolly, 1974). Raven has made a very detailed effort to use groupthinkin explaining the Watergatecover-up (Raven, 1974; see also Raven and Rubin 1975). He found many conditions and symptomspresent, but he also concluded that some very crucial conditions, such as high group cohesiveness, were lacking. Nixon's "big team" and his "young team" were analyzed using sociometric techniques. It appearedthat there were highly competitive and conflict-laden relationshipswithin the Nixon group, which made groupthinkquite unlikely. "On the other hand," Raven notes, the Nixon groupcould still be considereda highly cohesive groupin some sense-despite their personalantagonisms,all of them wanted with all theirheartsand souls to be in that group and to be central to that group. . . . Dependence upon and admirationfor their leader was the glue which held the Nixon group together. (Raven, 1974, p.311)

Raven, not entirely satisfied with the groupthinkhypothesisas an explanationof what happened, also suggests other theoreticalperspectivesfrom group dynamics that may be useful in this respect (Raven, 1974, pp. 313-318). WongMcCarthyhas presentedthe results of a detailed content analysis of the White House tape transcripts, which also points to many symptoms of groupthink (Wong-McCarthy,1976). In the second edition of his book, Janisalso examines the Watergateaffair,and reintroducesthe groupthinkexplanationby focusing on a much smaller in-group:Nixon, Haldeman,Ehrlichmanand (until his "defection") Dean.

Tetlock has made content analyses of speeches by decision-makersassociated with groupthinkand non-groupthinkdecisions, as they were outlined in Janis'sbook. Using a techniquecalled integrativecomplexity coding, he found that

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relative to nongroupthink,decision makers were more simplistic in their perceptionsof policy issues and made more positive referencesto the United States and its allies (own group). Inconsistentwith Janis'theory, groupthinkdecision makersdid not make significant more negative referencesto CommunistStates and their allies (opponents).(Tetlock, 1979, p.1314; see also Suedfield and Tetlock, 1977)

In assessing the contributionsof this specific technique, Tetlock stretches its heuristicvalue: detectingprobablecases for groupthinkanalysis. His methodhas not since been pursuedin groupthinkanalysis.

Gero used a questionnaireto examinefurtherthe effects of a consensus style of group decision-makingon expectationsof intra-groupconflict among group members. She found thattheremay be a stronginclinationtowardamiabilityand agreement in consensus climates. The potentially adverse effects on decision quality are discussed (Gero, 1985).

Finally, attempts have been made to add more cases to the groupthink catalogue. Following a magazine article by Janis, Smith has attemptedto document the suggestion that groupthinkdominatedthe Carterdecision-makingprocess with respectto the hostage rescue mission to Iran. Heller, in an articlein the Guardian, linked groupthinkto the conduct of the FalklandIslands war by the Thatchercabinet (Janis, 1980; Smith, 1984; and Gabriel, 1985; Heller, 1983).

These latter examples cannot always be consideredsuccesful. They are all very casual and lacking in psychological proficiency to make them serious contributions. On the contrary, such quick-and-easy characterizationsmay create an illusion that groupthinkis an all-purpose,little-effortlabel explainingjust about any case of policy failure. This is deplorable,and Janishas gone to greatlengths in calling for caution in linking groupthinkto policy outcomes, as well as in providing a sound framework of all relevant factors to be actually used in groupthinkanalysis.

A more substantiveeffortwas undertakenby Rosenthal.In a comprehensive analysis of several cases of crisis decision-makingin the Netherlands(disasters, riots, terrorism),he systematicallychecked the evidence of groupthink.In some cases, positive indicationswere found, in othersnot (Rosenthal, 1984). Similarly inconclusive or even negative aboutthe role of groupthinkwere both Etheredge and Polsby in their studiesof the evolutionof the United StatesCentralAmerican policy and several cases of policy innovation, respectively (Polsby, 1984; Etheredge, 1985). Hensley and Griffinperformeda full-fledged groupthinkanalysis on the case of a protractedconflict about the location of additionalsports facilities at the campusof Kent State University.The authorsfound clear-cutevidence for the presence of groupthinkin the university'sboardof trustees. In the course of the article, some useful methodological and theoretical observations were made [Hensley and Griffin(1986), in particular,pp.501, 502]). Some follow-up studies have provided criticism of Janis's interpretationsof the case studies

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presented in his book. For example, Barretthas re-examinedthe U.S. decision process concerning the escalation of the Vietnam War and has argued that, contraryto Janis'sfindings, groupthinkdid not play a role at all (Barrett, 1988; see Janis's response in Janis, 1989) Similarly, Etheredge(1985) was skeptical aboutthe groupthinkanalysis of the Bay of Pigs decisions by PresidentKennedy and his advisors (also met by a rejoinderfrom Janis in his 1989 book; these discussions, as well as Janiset al. 's polemic with Welchabouttheirinterpretation of the Cuban missile crisis illustratesmy earlierpoint that Janis'stheory-driven case studies are likely to be vulnerableto in-depth scrutinyby historians).

Using Cases to Adapt the Theory McCauley used the original case studies by Janis to substantiatehis theoretical claim that groupthink comes about not only through "amiabilityinduced" internalizationof group norms and opinions, but also through mere compliance (public agreement on the part of individual group members not accompaniedby private acceptance of the prevailingperspective). McCauley's analysis rightly calls attention to the status and power dimensions of group decision-making (McCauley, 1990).

In my dissertation,I have furtherelaboratedon this line of thinking, arguing that, on the basis of findings on changingpatternsof hierarchyand leadershipin small groups under stress, "anticipatorycompliance" of group membersto senior membersor leaderfiguresconstitutesan alternativepathtowardsgroupthink (e.g., excessive concurrence-seeking).In other words, strong affective ties between group members are not a necessary variable in producing groupthink.

Given a basic amountof groupcohesion seen as interdependencebetween members, groupthinkmay also arise because low-statusmembersanticipatethoughts, wishes or commands from leader figures, and adapt their own thinking and action accordingly ('t Hart, 1990).

Similarly, Whyte has made an attempt at comparingthe groupthinkconstruct with related approaches of high-risk group decision-making based on framingand prospecttheory,and examinesthe relativemeritsof these alternative approachesin explaining empiricalcases of decisional fiascoes, mentioningthe Challengerdisasterand the Iran-Contrascandalas potentialcases (Whyte, 1989).

Additional Case Work The Challenger case was subject to a more quantitativelyoriented test of Janis's groupthinkmodel performedby Esser and Lindoerfer,who found clear signs of positive antecedentsto groupthinkin the critical decisions concerning the launch of the shuttle(Esser and Lindoerfer,1989). In testing my own revised

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model of groupthink,I found strongindicationsof groupthinkin a study of U.S. decision-making with regardto the arms-for-hostagesdeals with Iran in 19851986, while these were conspicuously absent in what could be called the Dutch equivalent to Pearl Harbor (e.g., the prelude to the German invasion of the Netherlandsof May 1940) ('t Hart, 1990).

Laboratory Replications In addition to the case approach, interestingattemptshave been made to investigate whether groupthink(unconventionalto many experimentalpsychologists because of its real-worldempiricalbasis), can also be observedin decision groups working under laboratoryconditions.

Flowers conductedan experimentwith problem-solvinggroups in which he systematically varied leadership style (closed; open) and group cohesiveness (high; low). He hypothesized that decision processes of the high cohesiveness/closed leadershipvariantwould most likely be characterizedby groupthink.

Using a somewhat debatableresearchdesign, his findings stress the importance of the leadershipvariable, while no evidence could be obtained with respect to cohesiveness, implicitly supportingthe view that there is an alternativepathway to groupthinkindependentfrom group cohesiveness, stressing the role of compliance instead (Flowers, 1977).

A more sophisticateddesign was presentedby Courtright.He also focused upon group cohesiveness and (non-)directiveleadership,but he devised much more credible experimentalproceduresto attain them. Also, he put forward a convincing measure of the dependentvariable, that is, the quality of decisionmaking. His major findings suggest (a) the feasibility of the groupthinkphenomenonas such (in particulartypes of decision groups); (b) that the absence of disagreementin directive leader/high cohesiveness groups is one of the majorfactors contributingto the-alleged-low quality of decision-makingin these groups. As such, Courtrightseems to have come across a plausible operational measure of concurrence-seeking[Courtright(1976), a comparabledesign and similar results were later reportedby Callaway et al., (1985)].

Further,Fodorand Smith also studiedthe leadershipand cohesiveness variables in an experimentalgroup problem-solvingdesign. They, however, did not manipulatethe style of leadershipby instructions.Rather,they sought out group leaders high and respectively low in n-Power, that is, in power motive action.

Strikingly,the low n-Powerleaderspresidedover the groupsthatproducedbetter decisions that those headed by high n-Power leaders. Like Flowers, Fodor and Smith could also not find significanteffects of group cohesiveness. Again, as in

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the Flowers study, this lack of results may be due to the rathersimplistic experimental manipulationof the cohesiveness variable, yet it may also point toward the abovementioned multipath explanation of groupthink [Fodor and Smith (1985); similar results were reportedby Leana (1985)].

Moorhead has developed a clear model of what would be needed to adequately test for groupthinkin decision-making groups (Moorhead, 1982). His attempts to use the model in an empirical analysis of teams of management students engaged in a 3-month intergroupcompetition provided material for additional doubts concerning the overarching(negative) impact of high group cohesiveness (Moorheadand Montaneri, 1986). t' Hartet al. (1989) have developed a decision-simulationdesign testing the effects of differentmodes of accountabilityfor decisions among group members upon the quality of decision-making. The decisional context was designed to incorporatemany of the theoreticalantecedentsto groupthink.It was found that decision-making groups that do not have to account for their judgments and choices displayed more tendencies toward groupthink-likepatterns of group decision-makingthangroupswhose members,eithercollectively or individually, did have to renderaccount.

Groupthinkand Choice Shift As Whyte (1989) has rightly noted, Janis does not elaborately discuss a long-standing research tradition within group dynamics, namely research on group polarizationand choice shifts. AlthoughJanishypothesizesthat the group process induces group membersto adopt courses of action that seem to involve high risks of failure, he has not developed his argumentwith sufficientreference to the results of experimentaland field studies and criticismsof the "risky shift" (i.e., group interaction favors more risky solutions than individual members would have adopted without group discussion), the cautious shift (the reverse phenomenon) and other work on group polarization(Moscovici, 1976; Lamm and Meyers, 1978; Meertens, 1980). This gap has partiallybeen filled by followup research.

Minix has used groupthinkto explain choice shifts in the context of crisis decision-making(Minix, 1982). The key question was whetherdecision groups, confronted with various feasible scenarios of internationalcrisis events, would reach different(more or less risky decisions) than individuals.To enhance external relevance, Minix's subjects included military officers, the closest he could come to runningthe experimentwith officials who actuallymake these decisions in real-life situations (other groups were cadets and university students). In his theoreticaldiscussion, Minix discussed at length the crisis literaturein order to illustratethe validity of a small-groupapproachto the analysis of crisis decision-

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making. He stressed that maintainingdecision quality under stress was a vital problem in crisis decision-making. Further,he elaboratedupon groupthinkas a syndromethat was not only likely to appearin crisis decision-makingby small groups, but also detrimentalto the quality of decision making. In this respect, excessive risk-takingwas regardedas a pivotal factor.

In the analysis of his results-which showed a ratherdifferentiatedpattern of risk propensitiesin his three populations-Minix hinted at elements from the antecedents and symptoms of groupthinkbeing operative in the dynamics of choice shifts. These included, first and foremost, the operationand differentiated content of group norms and standardsamong the three populations, but also phenomenasuch as collective psychological rigidity, defective informationprocessing (for instance, uncriticalrelianceupon historicalanalogies), and the steering role of group leaders. The selection of subjects-college students, naval cadets, and navy officers-reflects Minix's emphasis on the importanceof normative orientationsas an explanatoryfactor. Minix's work indicates that there may be connections between groupthinkand risk-takingin crisis situations. In that respect, his work can be viewed as lending supportto earlier assertionsby De Rivera, who examined the risk-takingprocess in the Korean decision-an episode which Janislater explainedas a groupthinkdecision (De Rivera, 1968).

Why, then, do groupthinkgroups tend to play down uncertaintiesand neglect the risk dimension of their preferredpolicies? The fact that they do so should be quite clear from some of the symptomsof groupthink.The overestimation of the group through the illusion of invulnerabilityand the belief in the inherentmoralityof the groupsets the stage for overoptimism.It is reinforcedby closed-mindedness (rationalizationsand stereotypes), while cautionary forces within the group are preventedfrom gaining leverage by the the operation of uniformity pressures.

Whyte (1989) has arguedthat excessive risk-takingin the group decisions leading to policy fiascoes is due to group polarizationeffects occurring when groupmembersperceive the choice situationas being one of choosing between a sure loss and an alternativewhich entails the possibility of a greaterloss. These perceptionsmay be the result of biased decision "frames"adoptedby the members of the group. The effect of groupinteractionwill be to amplify the dominant individualpreferencefor risk that characterizesindividualgroup members confronted with these perceived "no-win" situations. This thesis remains to be explored by systematic empirical research.

On the basis of a more elaboratereview of the polarizationliterature,I have argued for another interpretation('t Hart, 1990). In my view, there exists a paradoxicalrelationshipbetween groupthinkand risk-taking:It is precisely because the risk dimension of their actions becomes less relevant to members of decision groups caught up in the groupthinksyndrome,that they will not refrain from supportingalternativesthat are highly risky. In reconsideringthe psycho-

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logical processes underlying groupthink, there are some remarkableresemblances with other group research. For instance, the characteristicsand consequences of deindividuationcontain forces which provoke a negligence of risks.

For deindividuatedgroups, the futureas such loses relevance. They become less concerned about the longer-termconsequences of their actions; they are insensitive to the thought that they are taking any "risks" at all.

While this may seem an extremeform of risk negligence, there are striking correspondences between this psychological syndrome and the complacent groups of AdmiralKimmel and PresidentNixon examinedby Janis. In both the PearlHarborand Watergatecases, therewere markedinstanceswhere the groups failed to take into considerationfutureconsequencesand risks of what they were advocating.Likewise, groups acting undergreat stress such as Truman'sKorean group and, at times, Johnson's Vietnam Tuesday Luncheon group seemed to suffer from a collapsed time-perspective, a cognitive patternthat is frequently found as a (defensive) response to overload and stress (Holsti, 1979; Holsti and George, 1975). With only the very short-termconsequencesof decisions deemed relevant, the concept of risk faded into the background.Consequently,reckless decisions were taken.

Second, excessive risk-taking can occur in what have been termed groupthink-type2 situations ('t Hart, 1990): groups not acting under crisisinduced stress, but ratherdriven by perceptionsof opportunity.The desire to maximize success by determinedaction in an opportunitysituation(cf. political and bureaucraticentrepreneurship) can easily lead to adventurismand collective overconfidence. Supportfor this lattercontentionhas been found in my examination of the Poindexter-McFarlane-North nucleus directingthe arms-for-hostages exchanges with Iran ('t Hart, 1990, pp. 305-309).

Additional Research Required In reviewing the various findings of replication studies, it should be remarkedthat their numberis modest, their quality mixed and their findings only partially conclusive (see, however, Janis, 1989). Real-world replications often lack in analyticalrigor, while laboratoryreplicationsare plaguedby the seeming impossibility of incorporatingmore thanonly a very limited numberof variables in their designs. In particular,experimentalstudies of groupthinkhave rarely succeeded in creatingthe kind of decisional stress thatis a crucial element of the preconditionsfor groupthinkoutlinedin the Janismodel. All in all, this examination of empirical replicationsleads one to sympathize with Rosenthal's assessment that "[it] has proved to be extremely difficult to produce indisputable informationabout groupthink"[Rosenthal (1986, p.120); see the excellent re-

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view of methodological aspects of groupthink research by Won-Woo Park, 1991)].

THE GREAT DEBATE: GROUTI'HINK AND DECISION QUALITY As can be observedfrom the presentationof follow-up studies, the empirical validity of groupthinkis a matterto be settled by furtherresearchusing a variety of methods, ultimatelyproducinga more specified, contingentperspectiveon the occurrence of groupthink, i.e., a better demarcationof the contextual factors conducive to groupthink.

Much more difficult to resolve are issues concerning the effects of groupthinkon decision outputs, and hence the evaluation of groupthinkas a mode of policy-making.Does groupthinkindeedproducebad decisions all of the time? Why should this be the case? And to whatextent can the decisional outputs of groupthinkbe characterizedin more theoreticalterms?

Theoretical Considerations The quality of high-level policy-makingis a key issue not only with regard to government action but also in major corporations,whose decisions equally affect large segments of society. Decision-makersneed to anticipateand circumvent the complexities of decision-makingin the multi-actor,multi-interestenvironment that characterizesmost issues that require top-level consideration.

Government authorities need to deal with cognitive and value complexities.

While these topics are central to the normative theories of political decisionmaking developed in the organizationaland political paradigmsmentioned in section 2, few of the psychological contributionsdeal with this topic in an elaborate way.

Groupthinktheory is a markedexception. In fact, groupthinkhas explicitly been developed as a theory of explainingdecisional failuresand policy fiascoes.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Longley and Pruitt note that "a negative evaluationof groupthinkpervadesall of Janis'writingsaboutthe topic" (Longley and Pruitt, 1980, p.77). They signal that even in the revised conception of groupthinkas concurrence-seeking,the flow chart directly links concurrenceseeking and groupthinkcharacteristicsto symptoms of defective decision-making, which are presentedas a recipe for policy failure.

However, in his 1982 edition, Janisis not entirelyas deterministicaboutthe alleged adverse effects of groupthinkas Longley and Pruittsuspect. In the final analysis, according to Janis, groupthink is not a necessary, nor a sufficient

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condition for policy failure (Janis, 1982a, pp. 11, 196-197, 259). He does suggest that groupthinkincreasesthe likelihood of defective decision processes, which, in turn, increase the likelihood of disastrouspolicy outcomes. Still it is quite clear that, in Janis'smind, groupthinkis a certainroadto failure. In fact, in his researchstrategy,he departedfrom this premise:He chose cases of (alleged) policy failure first, and then applied groupthinkanalysis to see whether the decision process was affectedby it. If so, groupthinkwas implied to be one of the causes of failure. This methodologyplaces a high premiumon the objectivityof the analyst to withstand(unconscious)biases towardsselective interpretationof the case study material. Also, this reconstructive-analyticaland evaluative approach is open to accusations of producingcircular statements:Groupthinkis inferred from policy failure and failure is explained in terms of groupthink.3 The link between concurrence-seekingand defective decision-making is evident from the specification of the eight symptoms of groupthink:From a proceduralpoint of view, they appearto be all bad (see boxes C and D in flow chart). However, to understandthe implied link between defective decision processes and decisional failures, one must first take a look at Janis'sbroaderviews on the issue of decision quality, as formulatedin his classic study of decisionmaking, written with Leon Mann (Janisand Mann, 1977).

Janisadheresto the paradigmprevalentin decision theorythat "good" (i.e., systematic, vigilant) proceduresproduce "good" results(goal maximization).In his view, decision quality is contingent upon the quality of the deliberations preceding the actual choice. Good proceduresvirtuallyensure good results (defined as optimaloutcomes with the limits of the situation).Therefore,the authors have adopteda model of decision qualitythatis entirelyprocedural.It comprises seven "critical tasks" for high-qualitydecision making: (a) canvassing a wide range of availablecourses of action; (b) surveying the full range of objectives to be fulfilled and the values implicated by the choice; (c) careful weighing of risks, costs, and benefits of each alternative; (d) intensive search for new informationrelevant to furtherevaluation of each alternative; (e) assimilating and seriously consideringnew informationor expertjudgment, even if it is critical of the initially preferredcourse of action; (f) re-examining positive and negative consequences of all known alternatives before final choice; (g) making detailed provisions for implementationof chosen option, making contingencyplans to be used if variousknown risks were to materialize.The symptoms of groupthink,the authorshold, are squarelyopposed to an adequate fulfilment of these tasks. Hence, defective deliberationsabout decisions, and 3I am indebted to one of the journal's anonymous referees for drawing my attentionto this point.

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hence (logically deduced from the authors'premises), the near-certaintyof failing policy outcomes. This line of reasoning is not entirely unproblematic.

Symptomsof GroupthinkReassessed?

Longley and Pruitt contend the linkage between the symptoms of groupthink(box C) and defective decision-making(box D) is one-sided. They contend that "symptoms of groupthinkas self-censorship, urging dissenters to curtailtheirremarks,avoidingthe influx of outside opinions, and even collective rationalizationsare eventually necessary in many decision making sequences" (Longley and Pruitt, 1980, p.77). In other words, they maintainthat these features can also be detected in decision-makingprocesses that would qualify as high quality. Mechanisms for consensus-buildingare necessary to come to a decision at all. If no limits were to be put upon the duration,scope, and likely outcomes of their deliberations, decision groups would never come around to anything. According to Longley and Pruitt,the crucial factors involved in determining whether the above characteristicsof groupthinkreally obstructa sound process of deliberationabout choice are: (a) their timing. If one curtails discussion too early one falls into the trap envisaged by Janis; but if one, for instance, uses these mechanisms to shortcircuit repetitive and low-utility discussions, they might actually enhance the quality of deliberation; (b) the type of decision task that the group faces. Longley and Pruittcite Katz and Kahn (1978), who differentiatebetween dilemma-likeissues requiring innovative solutions-which, in turn, demand very elaborateand wide-ranging discussions with a minimumof closure and focusing duringthe key deliberations on the one hand-and normalproblemsthat are less complex and can be solved more easily, thus, not necessitatingtoo elaboratediscussion.

It follows that the above-mentionedgroupthinksymptoms will probably hurtthe quality of decision-makingabout "dilemmas,"while they may be neutral or even functionalin "regularproblemsolving." It is interestingto see thatin his recent book, Janis (1989) has paid ample attentionto specifying the conditions under which his newly developed "constraints"model of decision-making is applicable. Specifically, he asserts that the problematic nature of distorted decision procedures is most clearly felt when decision makers are faced with importantdecisions, necessitating consequential choices-as opposed to more simple routine choices. The heuristics, biases, and other cognitive and motivational barriersto strictly rational-synopticor, in Janis'smore realistic terms, "vigilant" decision-making, are problematic only when decision-makers are faced with difficult problems for which there are no standardsolutions. This suggests that, as far as groupthinkis concerned, it is not really interestingto perform groupthinkanalyses of regularproblem-solvinggroups at some lower-

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level of managementor policy-making. Instead, and compatibleto Longley and Pruitt's assertion, one should concentrateon high-level decision groups at the pinnacle of the organizationor governmentwhere the stakes are high, standard solutions are lacking, and "bad" procedures for deliberation and choice are likely to be self-defeating.

Effects of GroupthinkRe-assessed?

As far as this linkage between proceduresand failing outcomes is concerned, it could be suggested on theoreticalgroundsthatthe linkage between the symptomsof defective decision-makingas producedby groupthinkand the incidence of policy failure is truly one of probability,and not of necessity. In other words, "bad" proceduresneed not always producebad results;decision-makers may get lucky. Similarly, well-conceived decisions may result in fiascoes, because of failing implementation,unforeseen adversities, and so on. The pervasiveness of uncertaintieshas led Dror (1986) to characterizepolicy-makingas a process of "fuzzy gambling."Janisis obviously awareof this need for qualification. However, in groupthinkanalysis, the de facto line of reasoninghas been that groupthinkproduces defective decision-makingprocedureswhich, in turn, produce policy fiascoes.

Recently, Herek et al. (1987) have presentedsome empiricalevidence suggesting that the implied direct connection between processes and outcomes of decision-making is indeed highly relevant. They examined 19 cases of U.S. presidential decision-making during internationalcrises, using a selection of high-qualityacademic studies. Subsequently,they rated the quality of the decision-makingprocess using operationaldefinitionsof the seven proceduralcriteria mentionedabove. Then, they had two experts(from opposite ends of the conservative-liberal continuum in their personal views of the cold war-in order to controlfor ideology effects) make ratingsof the outcomes of each of the crisesusing two criteria: advancement of U.S. national interests and reduction of internationaltensions in the post-crisis period. This design enabled them to investigate their hypothesis that high-qualitydecision-makingproceduresduring crises are associated with better crisis outcomes than are defective decisionmaking procedures.

There proved to be "sizable" correlationsbetween process and outcome scores. Higher scores on symptoms of defective decision-makingwere related both to more unfavorableimmediate outcomes for U.S. vital interests and to more unfavorableimmediateoutcomes for internationalconflict. Correlationsdo not allow statementsabout causality.Therefore, several alternative,third-factor and methodologicalexplanationswere probed-and discounted. In the end, the authors conclude that

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The findings of the presentstudy thus bear out the surmisesof those social scientists who have concluded that poor-qualityproceduresused in arriving at a decision give rise to avoidable errors that increase the likelihood of obtaining an unsatisfactoryoutcome.

(Herek, Janis & Huth, 1987)

While this piece of researchdoes not explicitly deal with the effects of groupthink on policy outcomes, the gist of its argumentis quite pertinentin this respect. The assertionsby organizationallyandpolitically orientedanalystsappearto be incorrect: Decision process does matterin determiningpolicy outcomes; groupthink, therefore, is a real danger to effective decision-making.

One might object to this conclusion by criticizing the highly imaginative, in yet many respects debatable, researchdesign. Take the operationalizationof outcome quality. What are vital U.S. interests in any given crisis? Is it not conventionalwisdom thatnationalinterestsare, at best, an ambiguousmeasuring rod for success and failure of policies-for instance, if one takes seriously the perspective on policy-makingas an outcome of political processes between different agencies all defending their own institutionally shaped views of what actions the national interest seems to requirein any given case (see, however, George, 1980)? How relevant a criterionis the short-termreductionof international tensions from a broad, strategicgeopoliticalperspective?Yet, on the other hand, Janis and others rightly assert that their interpretationof process-outcome linkages is, at least, not contradictedor disconfirmed by empirical evidence.

Othersremaincritical. In fact, the articlewas followed by a rathersharppolemic with Welch who attackedthe article's methodology and main assertions about decision quality, using the Cuban missile crisis case as an example [Welch (1989), Herek, et al. (1989), Janis's Cuba 1962 interpretationhas also been discussed by Lebow (1981) and McCauley (1990)].

Part of the problem in the discussion on groupthinkand decision quality comes from the choice of criteriafor assessing decision quality. While Welch's critique focused primarilyon Herek et al.'s assessment of the decision-making process in view of the Janis and Mann criteria, I suspect that many political scientists may challenge the criteria themselves. This takes us to the very limits of interdisciplinarytheorizing. Janis is a psychologist analyzing and evaluating political decision processes. His analytical instruments,however, are derived largely from psychological studies of decision-making. The seven criteriapresented by Janis and Mann do seem to be based on an essentially rationalist, "problem-solving"view of the natureof decision processes. However, in the "organizational"and "political" paradigms of political decision-making discussed earlier,othertypes of rationalityaretakeninto account. These pertain,for instance, to the symbolic natureof many problem-solving activities (Feldman and March, 1981), the primacyof "domestic"consensus and legitimacy (Lebow, 1981) and the defense of organizationallydefined interestsand definitions of the common cause (Rosenthal et al., 1991). Adheringto this limited functionalist

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perspective on rationalityand decision quality, Janis and his associates run the risks of propagatinga one-sided view of success and failureof policy decisions.

As Jervis (1989, p.442) has observed, ". . . psychologists . . . often neglect the possibility that what appear to be errors on the part of politicians are really devious strategiesfor seeking less than admirablegoals. Thus, a statesmanwho seems inconsistentor confused may be seeking the supportof opposed factions."

George (1980) has already indicated that high-level decision-makersare constantly tradingoff competing requirements:analytically-soundproblem-solving, engenderingand maintainingsupportand legitimacy, and managingscarce decision resourcessuch as time and expertise. Fromthis perspective,one could go on to point to recent studies that have indicated that it may be very effective for political decision-makersto adopt seemingly "irrational"stances and policies (Brunsson, 1985; Dror, 1971; Mandel, 1984). Finally, Wildavsky's (1988) fascinating study of the managementof risks has made it clear that "the secret of safety lies in danger,"in other words, what some would consider irresponsible and reckless policies regarding the stimulation of high-risk technologies and experiments will be regarded by others-taking a different time perspective, adopting a different ideological viewpoint-as manifestationsof wise statesmanship.

This brings us to the heart of the matter. The debate on the quality of processes and outcomes of decision-makingis, ultimately,a political one. It is loaded with complex issues of value judgment. For example, Wildavsky'sbook can easily be read as much a political manifesto as a moder-day defense of liberal capitalism and the entrepreneurialspirit. It is highly critical of many social interventionsmitigatingthe developmentof hazardoustechnologies, as the latterare viewed as the key to long-termeconomic and social progress:"richeris safer versus poorer is sicker". Likewise, one might speculate to which extent Janis'sstudy on groupthinkreflects its author'sconviction aboutmany American foreign policy initiatives involving the use of militaryforce in foreign countries.

It is perhaps no coincidence that the two cases of policy success-where groupthinkwas avoided-were also instanceswhere policy-makingwas directed toward prevention of large-scale military force (Marshall plan, Cuba 1962).

Many political psychologists studying internationalrelations have shared these concerns, and have taken more explicitly "dovish" positions (see White, 1986; Jervis 1989).

Concluding Remarks The fact that, at present, we can only speculateaboutsuch issues alertsus to an importantdevelopmentrequiredin psychological studies of political decisionmaking, namely the introductionof greaterpolitical sophistication.Janis'scon-

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tributionto the evaluationof the quality of policymaking is undoubted,if only for his unusually clear distinction between quality of process and quality of outcomes. Yet it is necessary to go beyond his work and try to integrateother types of rationality and policy evaluation into our analytical frameworks(see Farnham, 1990).

The debate on groupthinkand decision quality will continue. Meanwhile groupthinktheory has made a main contributionby taking it from ratherabstract into very concretejudgment on quality of decision process and outcomes in the context of importantevents, for example in major internationalcrises.

Equallyimportant,by its intricateblend of small-groupdynamicsand political decision-making, Janis's work on groupthink has inspired many interdisciplinaryefforts. It stands out as a clear, if still developing, example of the need for analysis of policy and politics to probe multilevel explanationsrather thancontinuingto maintainrationalisticassumptionsaboutindividualand collective policy choices. Also, groupthinkand otherpsychological concepts provide a very useful counterweightto the strong meso-level bias of organizationaland political paradigms. A task ahead is to furthertry to integrate these various approaches, levels of analyses and research methodologies. Such a move to incorporate(individualand) small-grouplevels of analysis into more comprehensive researchdesigns should, however, always be based on a clear understanding of the inherentlimitationsof (social-)psychologicalapproaches.In this respect, it is ironic to note that despite Janis'sown exemplarycaution in outliningeach step in the analytical sequence of a case analysis (in particularin his Watergatecase study), the very popularityof groupthinkmay, in fact, act as an impedimentto careful interdisciplinaryintegration. This emerges clearly from the uncritical adoptionof sections on "the dangersof groupthink"in many policy analysis and management handbooks.

In the meantime, it is worthwhile to establish with greater precision the antecedents and dynamics of groupthink, and arrive at better-groundeddiagnostics of when, how, and why groupthinkoccurs. Fromthereon, we can follow Janis'slead in tryingto preventor mitigategroupthink,as well as furtherexplore its potential positive functions in specific types of decision situations. This should be done by social scientists from different disciplines using different methodologies.

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