John Wonderlich Philosophy 457 Dr. Jacquette May 4, 2000 An Analysis of Wittgenstein’s Potentially Reflexive Statements in On Certainty In On Certainty, collected notes of Ludwig Wittgenstein present a detailed application of the familiar canons of Wittgenstein’s later thought to epistemological problems of certainty and of knowing. Wittgenstein writes largely in response to G. E. Moore’s Essay, “A Defence of Common Sense,” where Moore provides a “list of truisms” pertaining mainly to Moore’s spatio-temporal existence as a human, which he uses to provide an epistemological foundation, and hence a “Defence of Common Sense” (Moore, 32). Wittgenstein confronts Moore’s claims, typifying them by the statement “here is one hand,” and broadly discusses the epistemological issues raised by the defense of assertions such as these (¶1). This discussion takes place largely through the conceptual framework of the Philosophical Investigations, frequently evoking the praxeological language game explanations from Wittgenstein’s earlier text. Although the numbered paragraphs of On Certainty are often lucid and revealing of Wittgenstein’s theory and methodology, the text presents many interpretive pitfalls and ambiguities. A detailed overview and explanation of Wittgenstein’s main argument in On Certainty suggests the examination of his central argument through the construal of a few particular statements as significantly reflexive. This construal will suggest a resolution to some interpretive difficulties in On Certainty, and reveal several key features of Wittgenstein’s discussion of certainty and language. This reflexive construal can be best understood when introduced through a general discussion of Wittgenstein’s project in On Certainty. Wittgenstein characterizes the start of his project in writing: 1. If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest. 2. From its seeming to me-or to everyone-to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so. 11. We just do not see how very specialized the use of “I know” is.
Wittgenstein addresses what seems to be the simplest of Moore’s statements, “here is one hand,” and explains the immediate consequence of granting absolute certainty to commonsense statements. Avoiding this unjustified certainty, Wittgenstein promptly evokes both a logical and a praxeological analysis of Moore’s assertions. His logical analysis states that: 21. Moore’s view really comes down to this: the concept ‘know’ is analogous to the concepts ‘believe’, ‘surmise’, ‘doubt’, ‘be convinced’ in that the statement “I know…” can’t be a mistake. An if that is so, then there can be an inference from such an utterance to the truth of an assertion…And anyone who is acquainted with the language game must realize this-an assurance from a reliable man that he knows cannot contribute anything.
Wittgenstein shows in ¶21 that a careful analysis of Moore’s claims shows that they are not in accord with regular language use, since the truth of a statement cannot be derived from the assertion of its certainty. The method Wittgenstein eventually relies on in this preliminary analysis of Moore’s claims is the praxeological language game analysis, as explained in detail in the Philosophical Investigations. A language game functions in an explication of language as a simplified social language context, evoked to carefully analyze the roles of social interaction, purposive context, doubt, language acquisition, or any number of other philosophically relevant features of language. Wittgenstein uses this type of praxeological analysis in On Certainty, and seems to characterize his use of language games when he writes: 189. At some point one has to pass from explanation to mere description.
Wittgenstein passes in just this manner frequently throughout On Certainty, as “explanation” is subjugated to the final word of simplified anthropological evaluation, through praxeological language game “description.” This praxeological analysis leads Wittgenstein to discuss the philosophical grammar of doubting: 341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, as it were like hinges on which those turn. 342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
354. Doubting and non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only if there is the second.
With this explanation of the grammar of the possibility for doubt, Wittgenstein can characterize the “specialized…use of ‘I know’.” Since “A meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it” (¶61), Wittgenstein suggests, “Suppose I replaced Moore’s ‘I know’ by ‘I am of the unshakeable conviction’” (¶86). In analyzing the practical consequences of Moore’s assertions, Wittgenstein translates Moore’s “I know” with statements that do not imply the necessity of the truth of the statement, since ¶21 appealed to a language game to assert that truth-values cannot be determined by assertions of certainty. Wittgenstein writes, “‘I know it’ I say to someone else; and here there is a justification. But there is none for my belief” (¶175), and that “What I know, I believe” (¶177). Since knowledge is belief, and there is no justification for belief, Wittgenstein needs an explanation for the existence of belief. This he provides in several passages: 141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.) 144. The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it. 225. What I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions. 344. My life consists in my being content to accept many things.
In these passages Wittgenstein explains beliefs as a body of gradually learned propositions or dispositions, whose individual stability depends on the connections between propositions. This connection could be one like a hinge, allowing doubt, or one which is “unshakeably fast”, since, for example, “We are satisfied that the earth is round” (¶299). This discussion of beliefs suggests that Wittgenstein understood belief to be a body of propositions, or dispositions to support those propositions, which function within the context of the individual language games of everyday life, allowing people to “act with complete certainty” (¶174).
Wittgenstein’s discussion of belief and certainty, when understood solely on the basis of this “nest of propositions” theory, suggests that Wittgenstein does not see this explanation as conclusive or certain. He repeatedly expresses doubt and reservation as to the status of his explanation, and the availability of a better explanation: 305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory. 373. Why should it be possible to have grounds for believing anything if it isn’t possible to be certain? 449. Something must be taught us as a foundation. 508. What can I rely on?
In these statements, Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with the possibility of a better explanation for belief and certainty are clearly expressed. Wittgenstein seems to continue to search for the “bedrock” that repeatedly turns his spade, he is not “content to accept” his explanation if it is only based on this discussion of belief as based on a system of knowledge. Wittgenstein seems, however, to present another set of propositions which suggest another possible solution to this problem of epistemic certainty. He writes: 149. My judgments themselves characterize the way I judge, characterize the nature of judgment. 216. The proposition “It is written”. 318. ‘The question doesn’t arise at all.’ Its answer would characterize a method. But there is no sharp boundary between methodological propositions and propositions within a method. 507. “If this deceives me, what does ‘deceive’ mean any more?
These statements all subtlely suggest a reflexive analysis for problems of epistemology and linguistic analysis. Judging can characterize judging, written words can directly apply to themselves, propositions prescribing a method also use one, and sufficient doubt seems to deceive one as to the definition of ‘deceive.’ Whether or not Wittgenstein explicitly advocates
the use of some sort of reflexive analysis, these statements give clear evidence that Wittgenstein considered reflexive complications when he wrote the notes that became On Certainty. With the project of On Certainty now clarified, with a special emphasis on Wittgenstein’s apparent treatment of reflexive complications, an analysis of the reflexive construal of certain statements can begin. Wittgenstein writes: 28. What is ‘learning a rule’?-This. What is ‘making a mistake in applying it’?-This. And what is pointed to here is something indeterminate. 128. From a child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging. 129. This is how I learned to judge; this I got to know as judgment. 254. Any ‘reasonable’ person behaves like this.
In order to analyze the reflexive construal of these statements, an interpretive ambiguity must first be explained. For example, the term ‘this’ in ¶254 could be construed to refer to a general example of a person behaving in a reasonable way. ‘This’ could also refer to the statement itself, characterizing the statement: “Any ‘reasonable person behaves like this” as reasonable behavior. I would like to explain the second interpretation, but first some of the difficulties that might arise in utilizing this liberal interpretation should be examined. First, Wittgenstein could have certainly not meant these instances of the word ‘this’ to be construed as reflexive. Whether or not this construal was intended is not the point, there is sufficient evidence to show that Wittgenstein may have intended this interpretation. Second, in the case that there is some overlooked evidence that suggests that Wittgenstein did not intend the instances of “this” to be construed as reflexive, then the force of this inquiry is not diminished, since this inquiry attempts to suggest a method for gaining a specific understanding of one facet of Wittgenstein’s philosophy through a possible construal, even if the construal is inconsistent with Wittgenstein’s intentions. The suggestion that Wittgenstein would not have welcomed this reflexive construal can easily be allayed by looking to ¶309, where Wittgenstein writes: “Is it
that rule and empirical proposition merge into one another?” This analysis seeks to utilize the reflexive construal, which suggests one manner in which empirical proposition could merge with rule, in order to show how it elucidates other facets of Wittgenstein’s model as a whole, and could provide a way out of specific difficulties. These potentially reflexive statements achieve this clarifying status by setting up a specific relationship between the text and the reader. The implicit relationship between these reflexive statements and the reader takes this form: Insofar as you now understanding the text here written, and agree with the statement (the statement is reasonable, it is a learning of a rule, or it is in fact judging) then we (the text and the reader) have established an important similarity in our systems of knowledge, such that our opinions on certainty can be mindfully constructed, with these similarities in mind. This relationship can provide Wittgenstein’s theory of certainty a ground in the present actions and choices of the reader. This seems to be the focus and motivation of Wittgenstein’s entire project with language, since “Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings” (¶229). An example of the way this relationship between the reflexively construed statement and the reader would work will help to show the merits of grounding Wittgenstein’s statements in a dialectic between the reader and the text. For example, ¶129 states: “This is how I learned to judge; this I got to know as judgment.” When a reader who reflexively construes the term ‘this’ reads ‘this’, he or she is forced to acknowledge the situation of reading the text, and compares his or her concept of judgment with the evaluation made in the statement: “this I got to know as judgment,” wherein the statement is characterized “as judgment.” Furthermore, this statement reveals the pre-linguistic character of the reflexive connection between the reader and the text, since Wittgenstein emphasizes the term ‘as’. This emphasis shows Wittgenstein’s possible intent to walk a reader through an example of acquiring a label for a social experience: ‘this’ (that which we[the text and the reader] have just agreed on as judgment) “I got to know” (was trained in a language game to recognize and label) “as judgment.” In this way, ¶129 can be understood
as a foundational agreement between reader and text, grounding speculation on certainty in agreement over predication. The other examples listed (¶28,128,129,254) could all be construed in much the same manner, with the possible exception of ¶28. This passage could be read, however, as a signal to the reader to use the ‘learning of the rule’ mentioned as a learning of the process of this reflexive analysis. Wittgenstein’s following statement, “And what is pointed to here is something indeterminate” could be his admission of the difficulties in explaining this reflexive analysis. This admission of the difficulties in characterizing the reflexive statements is mirrored in the text by ¶471: “It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back.” The difficulty inherent in trying not to “go further back” is similar to the indeterminacy of Wittgenstein’s first mention of the reflexive ‘this’ The fact that this statement comes first in the text, as compared to the other reflexively construable statements, further supports the hypothesis that ¶28 is Wittgenstein’s explanation as to how the reader should approach the other relevant instances of ‘this’, namely, as self-referential statements which force the reader to acknowledge the predication of ‘this’ at the same time as the text provides that predication. Irrespective of the status of the interpretation of ¶28, the other statements can clearly be construed to be constructively reflexive, providing a ground for a discussion of certainty in the tacit agreement between the text and the reader over the use of certain predications which follow the term ‘this’. This textual foundation maps very cleanly onto the main tenets of Wittgenstein’s project, since language and definitions are defined in terms of social action and community standards, and this foundation is constructed through action (the reader’s tacit consent), and social standards (the reader’s and the text’s agreement on the predication immediately following the term ‘this’). With an explanation of the reflexive construal of certain cases of Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘this’, the remainder of Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty is clarified by the hypothetically grounded perspective afforded by the reflexive construal. This perspective can clarify because it
takes into account the potentially grounded nature of Wittgenstein’s discussion of certainty. The episode between the text and the reader provides an appreciation for the relevant similarities between the reader’s and Wittgenstein’s systems of knowledge that determine the use of the predicates agreed upon. This appreciation for the reflexive singularity of perspective achieved between the reader and the text allows the reader to analyze the other parts of the text in terms of their inability to provide a stable foundation for the discussion of certainty. For example, after Moore’s assertion of certainty is shown to be contrary to anthropological evidence (assertion does not determine truth-value), Wittgenstein repeatedly speculates as to the possibility of the creation of a context where similar assertions could be admitted: 22. It would surely be remarkable if we had to believe the reliable person who says “I can’t be wrong”; or who says “I am not wrong”. 32. It’s not a matter of Moore’s knowing that there’s a hand there, but rather we should not understand him if he were to say “Of course I may be wrong about this”. We should ask “What is it like to make such a mistake as that?”-e.g. what’s it like to discover that was a mistake? 86. Suppose I replaced Moore’s “I know” by “I am of the unshakeable conviction?” 350. “I know that’s a tree” is something a philosopher might say to demonstrate to himself or to someone else that he knows something that is not a mathematical or logical truth…(But here I have already sketched a background, a surrounding, for this remark, that is to say given it a context.)…
Especially relevant is the parenthetical statement in ¶350, because Wittgenstein recognizes that he is creating contexts in order to make points about the possibility of certain stances (i.e. “Can one say, ‘I might be wrong about knowing this’”). This speculation is not satisfactory for Wittgenstein’s explanations because it appeals to no specific standards in judging the possibility of these admissions of these statements. The reflexive foundation offered by some statements in On Certainty suggests a different structure for hypothetical language game construction. Since a foundational agreement has been made through the reflexive moment about the similarity of specific predications, the hypothetical language game construction could be performed under the auspices of this agreement. A sort of dialectic between the text and the reader could then be
constructed which would speculate about the constraints on possible language games, and do so under the constraints of the language game of reflexive agreement that Wittgenstein has introduced in ¶28. This analysis of hypothetical language game construction done from the perspective of the reflexive construal of some instances of ‘this’ in On Certainty exemplifies the way that the application of the reflexive foundation can prove to be fruitful in interpreting philosophical theory. Regardless of what Wittgenstein’s own view would be on the subject, some merit is apparent in advocating a reflexive analysis of On Certainty. This is not a surprise, since a theory that suggests that personal action and social standards define language use will occasionally involve both personal action and social standards. Construing this co-incidence of structure and content, and method and prescription, as constructive might have even been condoned by Wittgenstein, since it was he who first questioned, “Is it that rule and empirical proposition merge into one another?” (¶309).
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