19 wessel toonen

Introduction

2

1. Theoretical Framework

5

1.1 Empire, Nations and Nationalism

5

1.2 Soviet Nationality Policy

7

2. The Armenian SSR

10

2.1.Armenian Identity and Karabakh

10

2.2.The Influence of Soviet Policies

13

3. The Azeri SSR

15

3.1.Azeri Identity and Karabakh

16

3.2.Soviet Policy Outcomes

17

Conclusion

20

Bibliography

22

“Do you want to know the truth?” he [Muradian] replied “I will tell you the truth. We weren’t interested in the fate of those people. Those people [the Azeris] were the instruments of power, instruments of violence over us for many decades, many centuries even. We weren’t interested in their fate and we’re not interested now.”1 Igor Muradian had been a leading figure in the latest Karabakh Armenian campaign before the regional conflict between

the

neighbouring

Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted in 1988. Muradian worked for Gorbachev’s Soviet Union as an economist in the state planning Armenian Yerevan.

agency

of

capital This

the city

important

position allowed him to make good connections among the cadres of the Communist Party in Moscow. He also was a hard-line Armenian nationalist and utterly uncompromising in his views of the Armenian claim to the region which the Soviets had formally baptised as the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan’.

Thomas de Waal is a British journalist and writer on the Caucasus. He makes a first attempt to juxtapose both Armenian and Azeri perspectives on the conflict. De Waal proposes that there is nothing uncommon about Muradian’s neglect of the position of Azerbaijan or the forty thousand Karabakh Azeris when he organized a referendum on the Armenian future of Nagorno-Karabakh. This lack of interest in the views of one’s neighbours was inherent to the rigidly vertical structure of the Soviet Union, where individual republics only communicated through Moscow and never spoke to each other directly.2 However, it is questionable whether the Soviet Union’s structure was still that vertical or top-down at

1 T. de Waal, Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York University Press, 2003) p. 21.

2 De Waal, Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, p. 21, see also: pp. 16-17, ix and xii.

2

this point. De Waal himself seems to contradict this assumption in an earlier stage of his analysis when he concludes that the resolution of 20 February 1988, by which the Karabakh Armenians called on Moscow to change the borders of the region, effectively constituted the first case of ‘making politics from below’ in the Soviet Union since the 1920s. The rigidity of the Soviet Union’s vertical structure with its republics can thus be disputed. We may then also doubt whether the fierce attitude of the Armenian nationalists towards the Azeri position and Karabakh Azeri population results from merely a lack of interest in their views. What caused the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in 1988? More specifically, how do we elucidate Muradian and his associates’ call upon history in fully denouncing the Azeri interests within the region?

In order to answer these questions, we must examine several different issues that emanate from nearly seventy years of Soviet involvement in the South Caucasus. Similarly, we need to consider the respective positions of Soviet Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan from the early 1920s until Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika. It is from here that we should depart from the profession of journalism and move towards the field of academic history.

A historical perspective enables us to analyse the different elements of the NagornoKarabakh Conflict in their own political, cultural, social or economic context. It also allows us to critically scrutinize the conventional assumptions which have also been fed by journalist discourse. Laitin and Suny, both university professors of political science, indeed point out that it is commonly held and reported by journalists that the hatred between the Armenians and Azeris is of ancient, tribal origin and therefore both antique and persistent by nature.3 In this essay, I aim to question the assumption that the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict of 1988 was just a revival of primordial hatred of the type described before.

Moreover, I will also question the assumption that the conflict was merely the outcome of Soviet nationality policy since the 1920s. This approach provides ample room to examine the concrete influence of seventy years of Soviet nationality policy to the conditions under which the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict erupted in 1988. In turn, this allows for a critical evaluation of the facets of the conflict that could be used as arguments for the former explanation of its origins.

3 David D. Laitin & Ronald G. Suny, ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh’, Middle East Policy Vol. 7 No. 1 (October 1999) p. 145.

3

Thankfully, there is an extensive body of scholarly literature on the many issues that pertain to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. This essay will juxtapose the insights of various authors in the field in order to produce a ‘Thick narrative’ – a comprehensive literary argument – to answer the question of why the conflict broke out in 1988. The first chapter reflects on the keystones of Soviet nationality policy to establish a theoretical framework of analysis.

Second, we will look at Soviet Armenia or the Armenian SSR and its relations with NagornoKarabakh. The third chapter will repeat these steps for Soviet Azerbaijan or the Azeri SSR. The main findings will then be summarized in a final conclusion.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict was a direct precursor to the revolutions in the Baltic states, which resulted in the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. For this reason, it is very interesting to explore the historical dynamics between Moscow and the Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is also imperative to reflect on the historical background of conflicts where particular identities are mobilised for particular causes. These insights are not only valuable on academic grounds, but might also prove indispensable for possible political solutions to the conflict.

4

This paper aims to clarify the extent to which the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict relates to seventy years of Soviet nationality policy in the South Caucasus. These findings will help determine to what extent the conflict did constitute a revival of primordial hatred. The key issues here arise from the nature of Armenian and Azeri national identities, their mutual perceptions and their respective treatment under Soviet leadership.

I have chosen to treat both these identities separately and will refrain from addressing the Soviet involvement in the Transcaucasia region. This would require an examination of the Georgian SSR as well, which is irrelevant to the purpose of this essay. For similar reasons, some periods of the Soviet era will receive more emphasis than others. All of them will, however, be treated in terms of their relevance for the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.

1.1.

Empire, Nations and Nationalism

What was the necessity to formulate a central nationality policy for the new Soviet Union?

How did the rationales to pursue particular nationality policies take shape? These questions have intrigued a range of academics and led to a substantial body of literature. Suny (2001) proposes to classify both tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union as empires in order to analyse their collapse as a problem in the internal construction of states. He defines ‘empire’ as a composite state in which a metropolis dominates a periphery to the latter’s disadvantage.

Suny borrows his notion from imperial theorists such as Armstrong and Doyle. He stresses that the centre-periphery relationship involves the unequitable treatment of the latter’s inhabitants compared to its own citizens or subjects.4 Terry Martin, associate professor of History at Harvard University, subsequently refines Suny’s imperial thoughts by branding the Soviet Union an ‘affirmative action empire’. He moves away from conceiving the Soviet Union as an empire in the traditional sense as Suny does in his definitions. Instead, Martin views the Soviet Union as a single national entity with a dominant Russian majority and

4 R.G. Suny, ‘The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, “National” Identity, and Theories of Empire’, in: R.G. Suny and T. Martin (ed.), A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 23-66, there: pp. 24-25.

5

peripheral minorities of non-Russian peoples. The main difference with tsarist Russia or other empires is that the Soviet Union established affirmative action programs for national minorities. Affirmative action here, according to Martin, does not only refer to programs on behalf of members of a given non-Russian ethnic group. It particularly serves to connote the Soviet state support for the national territories, languages, elites and identities of these ethnic groups.5 It is important to keep in mind that these programs were justified by the dangers of nationalism for imperial integrity. Suny makes a crucial point in arguing how the shift within nationalism [through the nineteenth century] from state patriotism to identification with ethnic communities, which themselves are the products of long historical and cultural evolutions, means that the seeming longevity or antiquity of ethnicity provided an argument for the naturalness or primordiality of the nation. This connection between nations and ethnicity in turn means that any state would require to link itself to the nation in order to survive. Suny, indeed, explains the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 due to the fact that tsarism never acquired political legitimacy because it failed to create a multi-ethnic ‘Russian nation’ within the empire. Diverse administrative practices and the compactness of local ethnicities, as well as the effects of settlement policies, maintained and even intensified differences between the Russian core and the non-Russian peripheries.6 Despite the claims made for the real existence of ethnic nations, it is equally important to remember that nationalism is essentially a political ideology. Its central aim being the mobilization of imagined political communities – which are neither natural nor primordial, but result from hard constitutive work of elites and masses – for purposes of selfdetermination and the establishment of homeland territories.7 This brings up the questions to which extent particular communities have genuine historical and cultural roots and in how far these identities rest on conscious, modern political efforts. Interesting and important issues which are and should remain subject to continuous academic reflection. For our purposes, it is crucial to observe how the problems with non-Russian peoples made it imperative for the Bolsheviks to formulate a nationality policy.

5 T. Martin, ‘An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism’, in: R.G. Suny and T. Martin (ed.), A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 67-90, there: p. 78.

6 Suny, ‘The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, “National” Identity, and Theories of Empire’, pp. 34, 56.

7 Suny, ‘The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, “National” Identity, and Theories of Empire’, p. 28.

6

1.2.

Soviet Nationality Policy

The new Bolshevik leaders had been confronted by a range of nationalist movements that sprang up across the territories of the old Russian Empire. Lenin and Stalin, however, seemed to have learned their lessons from the tsarist failure to form a multi-ethnic state without a nation that also appealed to its non-Russian peoples. Although Lenin had always taken the nationalities question seriously, the unexpected strength of nationalism as a mobilising force during the October revolution of 1917 and the subsequent civil war nevertheless greatly surprised and disturbed him. This direct confrontation with nationalism compelled the Bolsheviks to formulate a coherent nationalities policy to nullify the dangerous and stability-undermining potential of non-Russian nationalisms. Hereby, the Bolsheviks used the slogan of ‘self-determination’ which they had already invoked to rally ethnic support for the revolution.8 However, the problem with the Bolshevik interpretation of this notion seems related to their lack of appreciation for ethnic nationalism as a persistent, rather than a short-lived force against the Communist ideology. Robert Conquest, a renowned historian of the Soviet Union, remarks that the theories of Marx and Engels expressed no sympathy with demands of the self-determination of small nations. Consequently, the Bolshevik support of or their opposition against separatist movements had to be determined in the light of whether these movements would facilitate or delay the advance of the proletariat. Conquest elaborates on this Bolshevik attitude by remarking how Lenin declared the right of nations to selfdetermination as only to be understood in political terms – i.e. the secession and the formation of independent states.9 This type of self-determination, however, remained subordinate

to

the

integration

of

these

states

within

the

Soviet

Union.

Any attempts by non-Bolshevik nationalist bodies to achieve autonomous statuses ‘in bourgeois forms’ were put down by force.

Nevertheless, Conquest also stresses the importance of tactical considerations over Soviet formation rationales in providing ad-hoc support to non-Bolshevik forms of independence.10 Similar concerns are echoed by Khalid and Schafer, assistant professors of History at respectively Carleton College and Belmont University. Khalid demonstrates that 8 Martin, ‘An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism’, pp. 67-68.

9 R. Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (The Bodley Head, London, 1967) pp. 15-16.

10 Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, pp. 23-24.

7

Russian/native or Bolshevik/nationalist dichotomies oversimplify the complicated picture of Soviet politics. Schafer, moreover, demonstrates that Lenin and Stalin’s nationality policy did not exist in a vacuum. For instance, the preservation of the Soviet regime fostered different types of policies which could be served by making concessions to non-Russian nationalist movements. Tactical and strategic imperatives, e.g. to crush counterrevolutionary forces, had a way of compelling Moscow to recognize a particular nation and its right to self-determination. Even when this meant that the Communist party Politburo had to take sides in a territorial dispute between two nations, which happened almost entirely in response to local conflicts, initiatives and political developments.11 One could argue that these insights are circumstantial in the sense that they derived predominantly from a period in which the Bolsheviks were confronted with the imminent threats of civil war between the Red and White Armies. However, I see no reason why the dangers of nonRussian nationalism, which were the major reason to form a central nationality policy in the first place12, would have constituted less of a threat to the formation of the Soviet Union. In this respect, we should be sensitive to the various priorities that inform Soviet policy decisions and create the incentives to form particular alliances.

Here, Schafer’s emphasis on the importance of localities provides us with yet another reason to doubt the supposedly rigid, vertical structure of the Soviet Union. Lastly, he also reminds us to remain conscious of the extent to which ‘self-determination’ was used as a political tool to mitigate the threat of nationalism in the Bolshevik strategy of ‘divide and rule’.13 Finally, the Bolsheviks seem to have made a serious a priori mistake by underestimating the persistent character of ethnic nationalism. We have already noted how Marxist doctrine did not express sympathy for the self-determination of small nations.

Although both Lenin and Stalin insisted that nationality would persist even under socialism, they believed that above-class national alliances for statehood could be split by adopting nation-building programs. Class divisions would then emerge naturally, which would allow

11 A. Khalid, ‘Nationalizing the Revolution in Central Asia. The Transformation of Jadidism, 1917-1920’, in: R.G. Suny and T. Martin (ed.), A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 145-162, there: p. 146. ; D.E. Schafer, ‘Local Politics and the Birth of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 1919-1920’, in: R.G. Suny and T. Martin (ed.), A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 165-190, there: pp. 167-168, 183.

12 Martin, ‘An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism’, p. 68.

13 Schafer, ‘Local Politics and the Birth of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 1919-1920’, p. 171.

8

the Soviet regime to recruit proletariat and peasant support for socialist purposes instead.

For the Bolsheviks, nationalism was a counter-revolutionary above-class ideology which could be nullified by granting forms of nationhood. This would indulge nationalconsciousness, which was at most an inevitable but temporary historic phase on the way to internationalism.14 Theresa Rakowska-Harmstone, eminent professor of the Soviet Union, however already argues in her essay of 1977 that “ethnic self-assertion […] is as much an unexpected by-product of Soviet policies […] as it is the outcome of traditional ethnic hostilities.”15 How does this relate to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict?

14 Martin, ‘An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism’, pp. 69-70.

15 T. Rakowska-Harmstone, ‘Ethnicity in the Soviet Union’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 433, ‘Ethnic Conflicts in the World Today’ (1977) p. 78.

9

“What might have been a political, even class struggle, degenerated into an ethnic struggle.

The Azerbaijanis were, of course, very pro-Turkish, while the Christian Armenians favoured ties with Russia.”16 2.1.

Armenian Identity and Karabakh

In February and March 1918, the Ottoman Turks invaded Transcaucasia [Azerbaijan] with the aim to advance into the capital city of Baku. The city itself was ruled by a Bolshevikdominated Soviet that soon came to clash with local Azeris. The Armenians, consequently, backed the Soviet troops and helped beat down this Azeri uprising in quite a bloody way.17 The result was an ethnic struggle between both titular nationalities of these later Soviet republics in the South Caucasus. How did the Armenian identity relate to Armenian attitudes vis-à-vis the Azeris? In what ways did Soviet nationality policy contribute to the outbreak of the conflict?

To answer these questions, we must reflect on perceptions of the Armenian identity as an ancient or primordial legacy. Similarly, we need to consider the extent to which this identity had been forged or moulded by its Soviet experience. Here again, and thankfully, have these issues been subject to an ongoing process of study and reflection.

In 2010, Phil Gamaghelyan – a PhD-student and co-director of the Image Center for Conflict Transformation18 – argued that the formation of present-day Armenian identity is an important contributing factor in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Moreover, the Armenians indeed do trace their ancestry back to ancient times, particularly to the sixth century B.C.19 What then, are the key aspects of this distinct and primordial Armenian identity? According to Suny (1993), the Armenians consolidated their identity as a “unique, identifiable, ethno-religious community” when they adopted an exclusive form of 16 R.G. Suny & J. Stork, ‘What Happened in Soviet Armenia?’, Middle East Report No. 153, ‘Islam and the State’ (Jul., Aug., 1988) p. 38.

17 Suny & Stork, ‘What Happened in Soviet Armenia?’, p. 38.

18 For general information see: http://imaginedialogue.com/.

19 P. Gamaghelyan, ‘Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, Scholarship’, International Negotiation Vol. 15 (2010) p. 37.

10

Monophysite Christianity and a common language in the fourth century A.D.20 A main difficulty with the scholarship of identity, however, is how one must differentiate between historically demonstrable ethno-religious or even linguistic group identities and the heavily politicized ethno-cultural or ethno-political group identities, meant to be mobilised for nationalist purposes. Different types of identity often overlap and thereby problematize scholarly attempts to treat them as analytically separable categories.

To complicate matters even further, it is necessary to point out that scholarship itself has often not been very helpful in de-politicizing matters of identity. Nineteenth century nationalism introduced new ways to use history as a political instrument and increasingly to legitimize the territorial demands of ethnic groups. This allows nationalist stakeholders in a territorial dispute to call on ancient times in support of their claim.

For example, a diplomat in Yerevan would quote the Greek geographer Strabo, who attests that by the second century B.C. the entire population of Greater Armenia (including today’s Karabakh) spoke Armenian.21 While this observation may be absolutely true, or cannot be proven false through inquiry, it still appears rather anachronistic to use it as an argument for the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia in the late 1980s. This is the crucial point where history moves from its academic purposes to the political ends of nationalism.

How should we deal with this difficulty? I suggest that we grant special attention to the modern historical context where group identities came into being. Consequently, it appears that De Waal was right to interpret Igor Muradian’s harsh words about the Azeris as a ‘lack of interest’22. It seems, however, that De Waal made a crucial mistake in believing that this lack of interest stemmed from the vertical structure of the Soviet Union. Such an explanation places too much emphasis on the Soviet Union as the facilitator of the NagornoKarabakh Conflict. Furthermore, it has too much appreciation for the effects of nationality policy as the decisive factor of the conflict’s start. On the other hand, this particular explanation completely ignores the contributing factor of identity to the conflict. It also does

20 Gamaghelyan, ‘Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, Scholarship’, International Negotiation Vol. 15 (2010) p. 37. ; For full reference see: Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Indiana University Press, 1993).

21 Laitin & Suny, ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh’, p. 146.

22 De Waal, Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, p. 21.

11

not retain much ground if we consider that Armenian-Azeri relations were overly calm during the Soviet period.23 Alternatively, I propose that this lack of interest results from a particular Armenian identity that arose no later than the early twentieth century and became mature under Soviet nationality policy. Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika then gave the final push on the slippery slope that ended in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict of 1988.

What would be the underpinnings of this latter, Armenian identity? Here, we need to remember that perceptions of ‘us’ can greatly rest on the images of ‘them’. According to Gamaghelyan, the Armenian popular narrative closely associates the Turkish-speaking Azeris with Turks. It were the Turkic tribes that invaded Armenia from the 10th to the 12th century and had been responsible for numerous massacres.

Ultimately, this culminated in the Armenian Genocide of 1915 in which the entire Armenian population of Anatolia was murdered. In the Armenian collective memory, consequently, the Turkish-speaking Azeris are considered part of the ‘genocidal’ Turkic nation and bear responsibility for massacres, ethnic cleansings and the overall destruction of Armenian culture. According to recent research and popular polls, most Armenians hold that the memory of the genocide contributes to Armenian national identity and, of course, Turkey’s continuing denial of the genocide does not help to improve the Armenian image of the Turkic nation.24 Furthermore, Laitin & Suny (1999) argued how this Armenian identity has been increasingly politicized for nationalist purposes. The drawing of sharp lines between ‘us’ and the ‘others’ – the Armenians and Turks/Azeris – wraps Armenian identity up in a narrative wherein they have continuously suffered at the hands of the others. One

de facto result of this policed mind-set is reflected in the practice of inter-marriage between Armenians and Azeris. The objections to intermarriage are not about religious proscription, since Armenians and Azeris are not particularly religious today due to the long Soviet experience. Conversely, to an Armenian nationalist, such intermarriage would be anathema and a betrayal of what it means to be Armenian.25 Moreover, the example of Armenian-Azeri intermarriage also refutes the assertion that the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict was a revival of primordial hatred. Given that the ancient Armenian identity greatly rested on its distinct Monophysite Christian religion, a revival of 23 Gamaghelyan, ‘Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, Scholarship’, p. 35.

24 Gamaghelyan, ‘Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, Scholarship’, pp. 37-38.

25 Laitin & Suny, ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh’, p. 147.

12

primordial hatred would have been a sectarian struggle between Christian Armenian and Muslim Azeri groups. Christianity, however, apparently was not among the Armenians’ concern and Islamic religious expressions had also been relatively unimportant in 1988.26 Moreover, Laitin & Suny pointed out how differences between ethnic communities were much less sharp in earlier centuries. Rather than being separate and discontinuous, these groups shared many cultural features of their neighbours. Thus, the edges were blurred, which made it quite a challenge for e.g. scholars, activists, statesmen and warriors to sharpen them over centuries.27 In any case, the Nagorno-Karabakh region played a major part as an Armenian identity-marker and it had also been part of Soviet policies in the South Caucasus.

The question is how the latter related to Armenian identity and the outbreak of the conflict.

2.2. The Influence of Soviet Policies

The Nagorno-Karabakh region has a particular importance for the Armenian collective memory. Gamaghelyan notes how according to some Armenian historians, the region has been the only place that remained autonomous and independent. While the rest of Armenia assimilated, the Karabakh Armenians retained their identity. This particular component of Armenian collective memory has become increasingly important since 1990.

Moreover, it has contributed to the view of Nagorno-Karabakh as “the last Armenian stronghold”. Surrendering the region would therefore not only constitute the loss of territory, but also a significant loss of identity.28 In addition, the nationalist discourse indeed comprises that Armenians who deny the fundamental historical role of Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenian national history are ipso facto held as traitors to the Armenian nation.29 Nagorno-Karabakh became an autonomous region in the Azeri SSR when Armenia was inaugurated into the Soviet Union by 1920. Artin H. Arslanian, a professor of History and International Relations at Marist College, points out that this decision contradicts the declarations of Stalin and the Soviet-Bolshevik government of Azerbaijan that the region would be ceded to Armenia. This status-quo, however, dissatisfied both the Armenians and the Azeris. They both wanted Nagorno-Karabakh as an integral part of their respective Soviet

26 27 28 29

Suny & Stork, ‘What Happened in Soviet Armenia?’, p. 40.

Laitin & Suny, ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh’, p. 147.

Gamaghelyan, ‘Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, Scholarship’, p. 38.

Laitin & Suny, ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh’, p. 147.

13

republics. In 1980, Arslanian suggested that the former promises had presumably been made to facilitate the sovietisation of Armenia.30 This is a very interesting point. Richard Pipes, a historian of the early Soviet Union, subsequently stated in 1997 that there are many indications that the Soviet entry in Armenia was motivated by a desire to forestall the collapse of the independent Armenian Republic.

The Bolsheviks wanted to enhance their power in the South Caucasus and it seems reasonable to assume that the Armenians, in turn, saw Russia as the lesser evil with the prospect of a Turkish occupation of Yerevan. This would explain the readiness by which the Armenian social-democratic Dashnak Party consented to form a joint Soviet-Dashnak government in the new Armenian SSR.31 In 2013, Jeremy Smith – who is concerned with the early Soviet policies of developing nations – then argued that many features of the modern nation-state emerged in the post-Stalin period. Similarly, he contends that the Bolsheviks at least held out the promise of an Armenian political formation surviving under Soviet rule.32 Thus, given the status of Nagorno-Karabakh for the Armenian collective memory, it seems most likely that Armenian political leaders expected this Soviet promise to mean that Moscow supported the territorial claim of Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. Conversely, the Bolsheviks baptised the region as the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan’. What motivated this decision? Laitin & Suny (1999) initially argued that the Soviet authorities preferred placing the region in the wealthier Azerbaijan rather than in the poor Republic of Armenia.33 This explanation, however, appears too simple. In 2012, Arsène Saparov – who teaches Caucasian history at the University of Michigan – instead argued that the Bolshevik Party used the issue of Karabakh to promote its agenda by supporting at times the claims of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. He carefully demonstrates that the Soviet decision to declare Nagorno-Karabakh an autonomous region within Azerbaijan had been the outcome of a vigorous political contestation between the two neighbours from 1918 to 1925. In the end, the decisive motivation was the relatively foolish fact that Azerbaijan had a better 30 A.H. Arslanian, ‘Britain and the Question of Mountainous Karabakh’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 16 No. 1 (1980) p.

101.

31 R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Harvard University Press, 1997) p. 232.

32 J. Smith, Red Nations: The Nationalities Experience in and after the USSR (Cambridge University Press, 2013) p. 45.

33 Laitin & Suny, ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh’, p. 151.

14

geographical access to the mountainous region. However convenient this answer to the problem might have been for the Soviets, it did not address the issue of the hostile Karabakh Armenian majority, to which the Azeris now had easy access.34 This was not the only part of Soviet policy that was unhelpful in resolving the territorial dispute when it occurred in 1918. Here, we observe how the Bolsheviks made use of ‘self-determination’ as a political instrument to manipulate Armenian territorial demands in order to serve their own needs.

The ad hoc, Bolshevik strategy of ‘divide and rule’, as pointed out in the theoretical framework, is similarly reflected in these attitudes towards the conflict. Although the outcome of this conflict did not provide a satisfactory solution to the neighbours, at least both of them had become sovietised.

There is more to the influence of Soviet nationality policies. Crucially, Armenian nationalists such as Igor Muradian did not arise in a vacuum. It seems that a paradoxal development had taken place in the Armenian SSR throughout the 1920s. As early as 1962, Mary K. Matossian already argued that the Bolsheviks had to compete against the Armenian nationalist intelligentsia from the start. Matossian used written Soviet sources in her attempt to discern and evaluate the effects of Communist policies. She contended that although poorly organized, the intelligentsia managed to keep nationalist sentiments alive among Armenian youth, which hindered the propagation of Communist ideology. Moscow responded by implementing the nationality policy of korennizatsiia.

This meant staffing the government with Armenians, the use of the Armenian language in administration and schools and the adaptation of political methods to local conditions.35 Moreover, it is also probable that the korennizatsiia of government were popular policies among the people of Armenia.36 However, this seems to have had the paradoxal effect of enforcing a conscious, Armenian identity rather than creating a new Soviet identity with loyalties to the Soviet Union. This is also apparent from the fact that Armenians were the most eloquent defenders of their native language when Moscow gave the impression that it wanted to remove the requirement for Armenians to learn Armenian in school.37 34 A. Saparov, ‘Why Autonomy? The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region 1918-1925’, Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 64 No. 2 (2012) p. 321.

35 M.K. Matossian, The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia (Leiden: Brill, 1962) p. 37.

36 Matossian, The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia, p. 47 37 Y. Bilinsky, ‘The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-9 and Soviet Nationality Policy’, Soviet Studies Vol. 14 No. 2 (1962) p. 141.

15

“However, the project of writing national histories and the emphasis on ancient and prehistoric times raised the question of the ethno genesis of the Azeri people”38 3.1.

Azeri Identity and Karabakh

There are two sides to every coin. For our purposes, this means that we also need to reflect briefly on the issues surrounding the Azeri identity. In this case, we are now facing three important observations. First, the Azeri identity had been just as policed in creating an ‘enemy image’ of the Armenians. Second, the Azeris often combined these perceptions with clear threats of the Karabakh Armenians. Third, Soviet nationality policy had actually been aimed at creating a new Azeri identity in the 1930s.

Ceylan Tokluoğlu (2011) conducted personal interviews with leading members of the Azeri political society to examine how they (re)constructed their ideas about Armenian identity and community. She points out that, interestingly, Azeri political discourse defines the Armenians instead of the Azeris as a ‘unique community’.

This context is where the stereotyping of Armenians begins. They are believed to have a ‘special mission’ of occupying the lands of other nations where they once lived.

Furthermore, the Armenians would never cease to make territorial claims, for this is the historical legacy of Greater Armenia. Armenians would have a duty to defend Christianity against the Muslim threat in the region. Nationalist Azeri discourses also attribute a ‘unique destiny’ to the Armenians: a destiny to be deported from all countries they once lived in.39 In addition, Gayane Novikova (2012) focuses upon the role and impact of the ethnicity factor and the ways in which it has been exploited and manipulated in the NagornoKarabakh Conflict. She suggests that the Soviet idea of the ‘Friendship between Peoples’ which had been imposed and cultivated over seventy years had effectively helped to reduce the negative mutual perceptions between Azeris and Armenians. According to Novikova, it

38 H. Yilmaz, ‘The Soviet Union and the Construction of Azeri National Identity in the 1930s’, Iranian Studies Vol. 46 No. 4 (2013) p. 530.

39 C. Tokluoğlu, ‘The Political Discourse of the Azeri Elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict’, Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 63 No. 7 (2011) p. 1225.

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would be possible to state that the ‘enemy images’ among the people of the Azeri and Armenian SSRs subsided into the historical memory. It might certainly be true that Soviet policies, designed to unify all non-Russian peoples under the banner of Communism, had a soothing effect. However, we should not overestimate the extent to which these have been effective. Crucially, it does not appear very logical that Soviet policies – which answer to completely different criteria – would have a substantial effect on internalized ‘enemy images’.

Moreover, Novikova points out that ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azeris continued until the mid-1930s, when harsh measures were implemented to halt them.40 It is noteworthy to remark that until the Great Terror of 1937-38 there was no consensus on the ethno genesis of the Turkic-speaking majority of Azerbaijan.41 The fact that the Soviet Union consequently had to step in to create an Azeri national identity does not leave the Azeris with much primordial legitimacy to the region. As a possible consequence, they policed themselves in their hatred for Armenians – who were everything they were not, in their view.

Moreover, the ‘Friendship between Peoples’ policy never solved the Armeno-Azeri distrust and rivalry. Conversely, the removal of all the grounds for national distrust and discontent had formally been a key component of the principle of ‘self-determination’.42 Between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this had thus never been achieved. To this end, Artin Arslanian points out how Armenians in the 1970s actually used ‘the spirit of Lenin’s policy on nationalities to make claims against Azeri occupation of territories.43 3.2. Soviet Policy Outcomes

Principles such as ‘self-determination’ or ‘local autonomy’ were cornerstones of Soviet nationality policy. These were supposed to remove distrust and discontent among nonRussian peoples, in order to pave the way for international proletarianism.44 In the South Caucasus, however, this concept seemed essentially too flawed to remove the distrust 40 G. Novikova, ‘The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict through the Prism of the Image of the Enemy’, Transition Studies Review Vol. 18 No. 3 (2012) pp. 552-553.

41 Yilmaz, ‘The Soviet Union and the Construction of Azerbaijani National Identity in the 1930s’, p. 525.

42 Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, p. 19.

43 Arslanian, ‘Britain and the Question of Mountainous Karabakh’, p. 101.

44 Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, p. 19.

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between the Armenians and Azeris. Lenin, however, only meant the purpose of this principle to remove the historic distrust of nationalism vis-à-vis Great Russia.

He stated that “the working masses of other nations are full of distrust toward Great Russia, as a kulak and oppressor nation.”45 It is likely that the possibility of fundamental distrust between two non-Russian peoples (Armenia sided with Russia because it was the ‘lesser evil’ over Turkey) did not concern Bolshevik policy-makers. Furthermore, Marx and Engels did not express their sympathy with demands for self-determination of small nations.46 We have observed how this relates to the subsequent Bolshevik attitude of using ‘self-determination’ as a political instrument to serve their own strategic or tactical needs.

Similarly, we have been able to identify that paradoxically, the policies aimed at transforming societies and the building of socialism have only served to stimulate ethnic polarization. Theresa Rawkowska-Harmstone therefore calls the increasing amount of ethnic assertions throughout the Soviet Union as much an unexpected by-product of Soviet policies as it is the outcome of traditional, ethnic hostilities.47 In the particular case of the NagornoKarabakh Conflict of 1988, I tend to agree only partially with Rawkowska-Harmstone. This essay has tried to show that the Armenian and Azeri identities that underpinned the mutual distrust of the neighbours rest greatly on modern and politicised inventions. In turn, these nationalist identities seem to have been reinforced by the policies of korennizatsiia, which had the effect of enhancing the native identities that were already in place. Soviet nationality policies had the actual effect of consolidating non-Russians in territorialized political units and they fostered national consciousness through e.g. educational programs.48 Thus, the Bolsheviks have also been responsible in that they facilitated and stimulated the development of nationalist Armenian elites.

Second, Rakowska-Harmstone is absolutely right to point out that the dual framework of the Soviet state – “National in form, Socialist in content” – has stimulated the forces of ethnicity in the Soviet Union.49 It seems reasonable to assume that people like Igor Muradian could rise to great heights within the Soviet system, despite their profound nationalist feelings, if they had prior knowledge of what kinds of attitude would be approved by the

45 46 47 48 49

Martin, ‘An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism’, p. 68.

Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, p. 15.

Rakowska-Harmstone, ‘Ethnicity in the Soviet Union’, p. 78.

Laitin & Suny, ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh’, p. 148.

Rakowska-Harmstone, ‘Ethnicity in the Soviet Union’, pp. 86-87.

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Communist Party Politburo. Armenian nationalists, as well as Azeri antagonists, might have recognized a ‘window of opportunity’ to act under the political freedoms granted to them

by Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika. The Armenians started their campaign for Karabakh and the Azeris followed suit.

Ultimately, this put Gorbachev in an utterly difficult situation. He could not possibly grant Armenian demands. To him, this would have constituted a response or even a surrender to popular demands and demonstrations. Starting to adjust territorial borders, moreover, at a point where the Soviet Union was already granting various freedoms to the SSRs would only incite more territorial claims from more ethnic groups.50 Conversely, Gorbachev seems to rather have opted for ‘damage control’ through e.g. diplomatic means.

While this may have been tactical from his point of view, history has taught us that it certainly was not enough to prevent the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict from breaking out in 1988.

50 Suny & Stork, ‘What Happened in Soviet Armenia?’, p. 40.

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Did the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict of 1988 constitute a revival of primordial hatred between the Armenians and the Azeris? I have attempted to demonstrate that the answer is a clear ‘No’. There are no historical sources that provide substantial evidence in support of this claim. Furthermore, we have defined this so-called ‘primordiality’ as a kind of tribal or sectarian violence between two ancient and distinct ethno-religious identities. Given the fact that religious motivations did not play a significant role in the outbreak of the conflict, this explanation of the conflict loses a great deal of its value. Moreover, Armenian and Azeri national identities were by far not as distinct in ancient times as they became in modern history.

Academic prudence should remind us of the possibility that certain components of Armenian and Azeri identity, or what they perceive to be their identity, might indeed have an ancient background. However, this would be very difficult to demonstrate through scholarly research. On the other hand, we can safely conclude that the particular identities that clashed in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict were predominantly a modern attainment.

They were based on some components of national history which, in turn, became increasingly politicized for nationalist purposes. Both the Armenians and the Azeris created an ‘enemy image’ of the other in their collective memories. These opposing narratives had only one thing in common: a central role for Nagorno-Karabakh as a distinguished part of their identity.

Was the conflict an outcome of Soviet nationality policy since the 1920s?

I have attempted to demonstrate that the answer here is already much less ‘No’, but still not a full-fledged ‘Yes’. Territorial disputes over Nagorno-Karabakh showed their face earlier in history. The Bolsheviks actually had to find a solution to the Karabakh question before the Soviet Union was even consolidated. This means that the Soviet experience in itself did not provide the most important impetus for the eruption of the conflict in 1988. However, the seventy years of Soviet nationality policy in the South Caucasus did play a notable role in creating the framework wherein the issue could receive an impetus again. This is because the policy aims here failed or had paradoxal effects in at least the following respects:

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1) The principle of ‘self-determination’ served only half of its purpose; while it indeed did provide a political instrument to the Bolsheviks to persuade or manipulate e.g. the Armenians, it failed to remove the mutual distrust with the Azeris. This distrust, in turn, became increasingly fed by both ‘enemy images’, as well as e.g. violent rhetoric from Azerbaijan with respect to the Karabakh Armenians.

2) Soviet nationality policies, particular those associated with korennizatsiia, had the paradox of creating conscious, ethnic communities while trying to eradicate ethnic nationalism. This was part of the Bolshevik ideological miscalculation to see this type of nationalism as only a temporary stage in history on the way to ‘international proletarianism’.

3) The Soviet framework of ‘National in form, Socialist in content’ created a highly ethnic government apparatus. This rendered Moscow extra prone to lobbying from Armenian nationalists such as Igor Muradian. These campaigns and lobbies had been essential for the start of the conflict.

4) Finally, Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika directly provided the right setting for a slippery slope to emerge. Armenian nationalists seized the ‘window of opportunity’ granted to them by these new, political freedoms to organize the Karabakh movement. Moscow could not respond more decisively to halt the events which had already been set in motion. Any change of territorial borders at this point would only lead to subsequent claims and, consequently, threaten the entire internal stability of the Soviet Union.

History shows that Gorbachev’s attempts at ‘damage control’ could not do much to stop the conflict. Subsequently, these attempts proved also insufficient to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union. What role should the scholarship of identity play in finally resolving the ‘frozen conflict’ of Nagorno-Karabakh? This question provides ample space for further discussion.

21

Arslanian, A.H., ‘Britain and the Question of Mountainous Karabakh’, Middle Eastern

Studies Vol. 16 No. 1 (1980) p. 101.

Bilinsky, Y., ‘The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-9 and Soviet Nationality Policy’, Soviet

Studies Vol. 14 No. 2 (1962) p. 141.

Conquest, R., Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (The Bodley Head, London, 1967) pp. 15-16, 19, 23-24.

Gamaghelyan, P., ‘Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, Scholarship’, International Negotiation Vol. 15 (2010) pp. 35, 37-38.

Khalid, A., ‘Nationalizing the Revolution in Central Asia. The Transformation of Jadidism, 1917-1920’, in: R.G. Suny and T. Martin (ed.), A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-

Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford University

Press 2001) pp. 145-162,

there: p. 146.

Laitin, David D. & Ronald G. Suny, ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh’, Middle East Policy Vol. 7 No. 1 (October 1999) pp. 145-148, 151.

Martin, T., ‘An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism’, in: R.G. Suny and T. Martin (ed.), A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-

Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 67-90, there: pp.

67-70, 78.

Matossian, M.K., The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia (Leiden: Brill, 1962) pp. 37, 47 Novikova, G., ‘The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict through the Prism of the Image of the Enemy’, Transition Studies Review Vol. 18 No. 3 (2012) pp. 552-553.

22

Pipes, R., The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Harvard University Press, 1997) p. 232.

Rakowska-Harmstone, T., ‘Ethnicity in the Soviet Union’, Annals of the American Academy

of Political and Social Science Vol. 433, ‘Ethnic Conflicts in the World Today’ (1977) pp.

78, 86-87.

Saparov, A., ‘Why Autonomy? The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region 1918-1925’, Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 64 No. 2 (2012) p. 321.

Smith, J., Red Nations: The Nationalities Experience in and after the USSR (Cambridge University Press, 2013) p. 45.

Schafer, D.E., ‘Local Politics and the Birth of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 1919-1920’, in: R.G. Suny and T. Martin (ed.), A State of Nations:

Empire and Nation-Making in the

Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 165-190, there: pp. 167-168, 171, 183.

Suny, R.G. & J. Stork, ‘What Happened in Soviet Armenia?’, Middle East Report No. 153, ‘Islam and the State’ (Jul., - Aug., 1988) pp. 38, 40.

Suny, R.G., Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Indiana University Press, 1993).

Suny, R.G., ‘The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, “National” Identity, and Theories of Empire’, in: R.G. Suny and T. Martin (ed.), A State of Nations: Empire and

Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 23-66, there: pp. 24-25, 28, 34, 56.

Tokluoğlu, C., ‘The Political Discourse of the Azeri Elite on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict’,

Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 63 No. 7 (2011) p. 1225.

23

Waal, Thomas de, Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York University Press, 2003) pp. 16-17, 21, ix, xii.

Yilmaz, H., ‘The Soviet Union and the Construction of Azeri National Identity in the 1930s’,

Iranian Studies Vol. 46 No. 4 (2013) pp. 525, 530.

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