2020-2021 Concordia Journal of Political Affairs by quinn bunke

Message from the Editor-in-Chief As the COVID-19 pandemic continued across the world, the 2020-2021 academic year proved to be a uniquely challenging experience for Concordia students and staff alike. As much as we miss seeing each other in person and partaking in the activities that are usually synonymous with our day-to-day lives and education, such as meeting in classrooms and studying at the library, we know that we must make personal sacrifices for the sake of public health. I will take this opportunity to note how grateful I am to have been able to pursue my studies in a remote and safe manner throughout this pandemic, and to put together this journal with a group of dedicated, talented and intelligent young writers. I truly believe that the world is a better place for having them in it, and I keenly await to see how they will leave their marks on society. As far as a theme for this year’s Journal of Political Affairs, you will notice that we decided on an upbeat and colourful design, in order to portray hope in a time when the world around us can make us feel hopeless. I truly believe that finding light in a dark place is our only way forward, and that as we continue to overcome the ongoing public health crisis, we must focus on what we have learnt throughout it, notably the socioeconomic inequalities that have been amplified, and the path forward that we now have the opportunity to take. It has never been more critical for individual citizens to fulfill their civic roles, engage themselves democratically, and hold governments to account for their decisions and actions. We must all do our part to fulfill these collective responsibilities. After a year that perpetuated longstanding political divisions, both domestically and globally, and saw horrific geopolitical conflicts continue to take devastating human tolls, we must come together, find our common humanity and cultivate a better path forward for all. This means rejecting bigotry, hatred, and violence in all of their forms, and relentlessly pushing ourselves and our leaders to do more to promote equity, inclusion, and justice. This can take shape in many ways, and we all have our own individual parts to play, but what is most important is that we maintain hope for a brighter future ahead and continue to push for societal advancement, in every form imaginable. -

Quinn Bunke, Editor-in-Chief, 2020-2021 Concordia Journal of Political Affairs

2020-2021 Concordia Journal of Political Affairs Editing Team Editor-in-Chief: Quinn Bunke Associate Editors: Brenagh Rapoport Hannah Rogers Manisha Kumar Stella Forbes Assistant Editors: Analisa Wong Gloria Manege Gregory Aderhold Hannah Kalin Ivan Gonzalo Rodao Julia Grimm Naumkin Lina Benredouane Martha Elizabeth Roussopoulos Skye Miechkota Designer: Matt Dunn

3 canadian & quebec politics

63 international politics

121 comparative politics

147 political Theory

172 Public policy & adminstration

Systemic Racism: Racial Inequality in Canada

Blake Enders

George Floyd’s murder was the last straw that sparked the underlaying issue of racism in the United States. On May 25, 2020, a convenience store employee called the police accusing George Floyd of using a counterfeit bill. Within 17 minutes, George Floyd was unconscious, showing no signs of life (Hill et al., 2020). Derek Chauvin, a now former Minneapolis police officer, arrived at the scene and detained George Floyd. Chauvin held Floyd on the ground by weighing him down with his body weight — placing his knee on the back of Floyd’s neck, and kept it there for approximately eight minutes. Despite George Floyd pleading to the officer about not being able to breathe, Chauvin remained steady, ultimately leading to the death of George Floyd on the spot. An outrage of black communities and people from around the world, including parts of Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and Australia, turned to protest the inconsiderate systemic failure in the 21st century. There is no doubt that the issue of racism has never been resolved, and hence, has always existed since decades. The death George Floyd is only an amplification for the systematic racism, which is still a heavily ongoing issue today. Systemic racism refers to a society that has constructed itself in a manner that allows racism to persist within its institutions, government, and its culture. Canada is no exception to this. Despite the recent progression to end racism, it is deeply embedded in all parts of Canadian society, that ultimately, causes and maintains the disparities between minorities and white people in Canada. Thereby, this essay will focus on analyzing the contributing factors to systematic racism in Canada and how these have been affecting society up until today.

Literature Review With the focus on the more recent publications of modern disparities, one of the largest contributing factors of systemic racism directly happens in the workforce. Organization culture refers to shared patterns of informal social behavior such as communication, decision-making, and interpersonal relationships. These social behaviors are key evidence of unconscious values, assumptions, and behavioral norms (Agocs & Jain, 2001, p. 3). The organizational culture is constructed by the dominant group, creating a monoculture in the workplace. The organizational culture reflects the values of that dominant group, which in Canada, is generally heterosexual white males, and able-bodied (p. 3). Even so, it can be translated differently between members of the workplace. For a minority or a woman, the culture set by white males generally do not reflect their values and it can create a negative environment to work in. In contrast, the white males — the ones responsible for creating the workplace culture, feel as though the workplace environment is a positive one (p. 4). The organizational culture differentiates between each workplace. However, it is often formed based on the beliefs of the dominant group, which is generally white males in the case of Canada. These culture norms in the workplace contribute to systemic racism that functions to serve the non-minorities, and ultimately damage the opportunities for minorities to succeed in the workplace. Another factor discussed by scholars is the feeling of not belonging in Canadian society. Over 70% of Canada’s population is white, and due to this, minorities feel drastically outnumbered (Dhara, 2020, p. 596). Many minorities in Canada share a similar feeling that they are different from the rest of society. The way these feelings are perceived by minority groups are through acts of what are called “microaggressions” or also known as “small and often unconscious forms of bias that are not a big deal individually but have substantial cumulative effects” (p. 597). Dhara

(2020) discusses her personal experiences as an Indian woman and describes them as dehumanizing. She (2020) is a native-born Canadian, but is constantly asked questions like where she was born, what her native language is, if she enjoys living in Canada, what her favorite Indian restaurants are, etc. Dhara (2020) discusses how she does not even know how to answer many of the questions because they actually are not relevant to her life, and although most likely of good intent, these questions are stereotypes. Due to these microaggressions, minorities get a sense that they are different subjects and are not seen as just Canadian citizens as they should be. Ultimately this feeling of not belonging can be translated into all sorts of different aspects of society. The feeling of not belonging in an educational institution or in a workforce constitutes for the negative environment for minorities, which makes it even more difficult for them to receive an education and join the workforce in a desired field. “Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary “'peaks of progress,” short- lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies. We must acknowledge it and move on to adopt policies based on what I call: “Racial Realism” (D’Angelo, 2006, p. 311). This quote originally from American lawyer, professor, and civil rights activist, Derrick Bell, expressed in 1992, within his works about “racial realism,” is still relevant today — 28 years after he wrote it. Derrick Bell was the first scholar to create and define the term racial realism, which refers to handling racism from a realistic viewpoint. Racial realism is based on accepting that racism exists in our society and systems, and we must use realistic policies in order to combat racism. One of the reasons that racism continues to exist in society today is because many people that are unaffected by racism

are unaware that it is even happening. Since racism has been ingrained into everyday culture of society, it appears as normal and natural (Gillborn, 2018, p. 67). Many of the advancements’ society has made to combat racism is counteracted by alt-right individuals in power, creating a never-ending struggle (p. 71). Gillborn (2018) illustrates an example of these counteractive moves by the alt-right to allow racism to continue existing, through a book written by Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein, titled “The Bell Curve”. The Bell Curve became a world-renowned book, selling over 400,000 copies in the first two months, appeared in the New York Times bestseller, and headlined on the cover of Newsweek (p. 72). It aimed to analyze intelligence levels between different races, and it highlights Caucasian as a superior race in intelligence. “[T]he averages white person tests higher than about 84% of the population of blacks … job hiring and promotion procedures that are truly fair and unbiased will produce the racial disparities that public policy tries to prevent” (Herrnstein & Murray, p. 269) Furthermore, The Bell Curve received a copious amount of scholarly criticism, yet it was still promoted through large businesses like Newsweek and the New York Times. However, despite the criticism from scholars, Murray’s book was successful at reaching the alt-right community and ultimately reenergized them (Gillborn, 2018, p. 72). This is an example of how systemic racism continues to exist, because despite all efforts made and battles won to combat racism, there is always continuous counteractive moves, which makes racism to persist and continue in society. The last scholarly opinion that will be analyzed in this paper is regarding the unwillingness of Canadian citizens to choose and change racism in society. Many people choose to believe they are not racist, and that the racist population lives in rural communities and appear as neo-Nazis. However, because of the unwillingness to admit there is a racial problem, it is the reason why it continues to exist. Many people claim they have a high education and are immune to racial

discrimination, or that they are an open-Obama supporter, or they have a relationship with a person of color, and they believe this proves they are not racist. However, continuing to exist in a society of systemic racism, without attempting to change the culture only makes systemic racism worse (Frie, 2020, p. 278). Further, many white Canadians were more concerned about Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, making an apology for wearing a blackface costume rather than looking at the systemic racism that exists in Canada (p. 279). Many Canadians choose to believe they are innocent when it comes to racism persisting in Canada, because it strikes a point of discomfort in conversation. This is exactly how systemic racism continues to exist, because society chooses to believe they are not the ones causing a racial disparity. Nevertheless, in doing this, it promotes systemic racism because if the majority race is unwilling to admit to any wrongdoings, then ultimately nothing will change in society. In order to make a change, it requires all citizens to accept their part in a society that systemic racism exists and choose to change policies and institutions to promote equality of all races (p. 279).

Historical Background Systemic racism is a term being used to describe the lasting effects of racism at the highest levels of a country’s operations. It refers to anything that has contributed to the disparities between one community and another, and in this case, between the Black citizens and non-Black citizens. It could be a policy put in place by government, businesses not hiring Black citizens, demolishing of housing, etc. Therefore, because of the unclear boundaries of what systemic racism is, it can be difficult to find the exact things that can be classified as systemic racism. However, many of the factors can be directly linked to modern day outcomes seen in Black communities. Systemic racism

that began over 200 years ago in Canada is directly linked to economic, educational, and geographical disparities. Nevertheless, the majority of these disparities differentiate between races, and the Black community is generally hit the hardest. This can likely be attributed to African individuals being one of the first non-white races in North America, other than Indigenous. Black communities have felt the most of systemic racism due to their longer roots in North America because of colonization of Africa, resulting in enslavement. Due to Africans being one of the first non-white races in North American society, they became subject to systemic racism. In crucial years of Canada’s early development, racism was inscribed into laws, norms, and the culture which has continued to affect Black citizens for hundreds of years. The first ever documented Black person in Canada arrived in 1608 as an interpreter of the Mi’kmaq language (Library and Archives Canada, 2021). Canada has seen a heavy stream of migration of Black people from Africa, Europe, the Caribbean, and the United States since the 17th century. Many Black people being brought over from Africa were being enforced into slavery. However, in 1793, the Upper Canada legislature passed an act to gradually abolish slavery and any slave arriving in the province was declared free. Therefore, during this time many Black people migrated to Canada from the United States hoping to free themselves of slavery, roughly 30,000 slaves came to Canada between 1793 and the end of the American Civil War in 1865 (2021). With that, more Black American slaves began to migrate to Canada in hopes of a better life, reaching all parts of Canada including the prairies — until 1910, when the government of Canada passed a new Immigration Act that aimed to prevent immigrants of undesired races access to Canada. During this time, very few Black people were able to enter Canada — until 1967, when the Government of Canada decided to remove the Immigration Act, which resulted in another

influx of Black people into Canada. The last stage has brought Canada into the current demographics, with Black people making up about 3.5% of the population or approximately 1.2 million Black citizens in Canada. Many different factors contribute to the disparities seen between the black community and non-visible minorities in Canada. Canada has avoided the label as a country with a racist history because of slavery and racism being stronger in the United States. However, Canada does have a notable and documented history of racism. It is essential that Canadians understand the history of racism in Canada as it is the only way to improve the current disparities in society. Canada has numerous examples from their history of systematic racism. Beginning in the late 1920s up until the Second World War, McGill University had created numerous anti-Semitic admission policies. Many eastern European immigrants were coming to Canada and began to study in the universities as it offered the best opportunity for social mobility. In 1913, 6.8% of McGill students were Jewish. In 1924, the number of Jewish students increased to then, 25%. Therefore, this triggered a policy by the McGill principal, Sir Arthur Currie, and the dean, Ira Allan Mackay, making the admission average for Jews 75% — whereas for non-Jews, the admission average was 60%. Along with the change to the admission average, a policy was put in place stating only 10% of the Medicine and Law faculties could be Jewish students (O’Neill, 2020). This is not an example of systematic Black racism, but it is systematic racism that has been put in place by powerful individuals to control a certain group. One of the most notable offences of racism in Canada occurred in Nova Scotia, in a town known as Africville. Africville was a primarily a Black community located on the outskirts of Halifax. The Black community had created a self-sufficient town that began to feel like a refreshing safe place for many of the enslaved individuals. However, they still were not safe from racism

entirely. Although they were taxpaying citizens, the city of Halifax refused to provide the citizens of Africville with clean drinking water, sewage, or garbage disposal. Instead of meeting the basic demands the citizens of Africville were asking for, the city of Halifax decided to relocate all residents of Africville (Cooper et al., 2014). The city of Halifax based their decision on the grounds of human rights, claiming the relocation would result in a better quality of life for the residents of Africville. However, almost no consultation with actual residents of Africville was made before the decision to relocate. Following the decision, the destruction of Africville took several years. For the residents that could prove they owned their houses, the city paid the estimated value, but for many that could not prove ownership, they would only receive a $500 payment (2014). The city of Halifax continued its efforts to relocate all residents of Africville, and ultimately succeeded, destroying the last home in Africville in January 1970 (McRae, n.d.). Many of the residents that lived in Africville had nowhere to go following the decision to relocate from Africville and the residents that only received a $500 payment for their properties did not have many options. As a struggling minority race, Africville was an accepting and vibrant community for them, something that was rare to find in North America at the time (McRae, n.d.). The story of Africville was a tragedy that shows how systemic racism has operated within Canada for centuries.

Statistical Evidence To further understand the impacts of systemic racism, one must analyze the modern-day statistics to analyze the disparities in outcomes. The Government of Canada realizes that, in order to even the disparities, they must first keep track where the disparities are occurring. Therefore, Statistics Canada has released detailed information based on race, age, and sex concerning

economic, educational, and social factors. One of the most disturbing statistics presented by Statistics Canada was statistics based on hate crimes committed, categorized by race (Moreau, 2020). Figure 1. Hate Crimes by Motivation Based on Race or Ethnicity in 2018 1

Furthermore, according to the Toronto Police Service (n.d.), a hate crime is defined as “[…] a criminal offence committed against a person or property that is based upon the victim's race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar factor.” Canadian police forces discovered Black people were by far the most likely to be victims of a hate crime. This statistic is significant because it is a clear example that racism still exists in the Canadian population. It exists so much so, that hate crimes on Black citizens is not uncommon. This statistic illustrates how much progress is still needed to be made amongst the Canadian population to create a more accepting culture towards other races. The next statistic worth highlighting is based on education. Education is an essential part of any society — it can be linked to a better functioning society, along with better prospects economically in the future. Education helps people become better citizens, as they can further understand the structure and system of the country they live in. It also helps to create more Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics, Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey. 1

employment opportunities, develop problem-solving skills, improves the economy, shapes modern society, and lastly, brings the entire world together with research, and it makes citizens more likely to give back to the community. Not being able to receive an education puts people at a disadvantage that ultimately creates unequal opportunities. As a result, it creates a trend where other races are able to make more money and live a higher quality of life, which will not change until the inequalities of education become more equal. The following graph illustrates Black youths who are keener to the idea of achieving a postsecondary education with 94% of Black people aged between 15-25 wanting to obtain a university degree. However, in reality, only 60% of the Black population believe they will be able to obtain one. Whereas, for the rest of the population, around 82% would like to obtain a university degree, and 79% of them believe that it is achievable for them. Figure 2. Expectations for Higher Education Among Populations in 20162

According to Statistics Canada (2015), an individual or family is determined and considered to have a low-income when the “low-income cut-off” (LICO), considering the family and community size, is compared to the income of the individual’s economic family. Thus, if the

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey (Canadians at work and home), 2016. Data for youth aged 15 to 25. 2

economic family income is below the cut-off, all individuals in that family are considered to be low-income. In essence, this means that everyday items are unaffordable to people deemed as lowincome status. In Canada, Black citizens are almost twice as likely as non-visible minorities to be considered low-income. It was estimated that almost 24% of the Black population is classified as low-income status, compared to the just over 12% of non-visible minorities. This is a concerning statistic that can, most likely, be related to the lack of opportunity to education along with generations of inequalities, resulting in the inability to generate multi-generational family wealth. Figure 3. Proportion of Low-Income Status Among Populations in 20163

Further, we investigate the unemployment rate between the Black population, non-visible minorities and other visible minorities. Yet again, the Black population is on the wrong end of this statistic with 12.5% of the population being unemployed compared to non-visible minorities being at 7.3% and other visible minorities at 5.7%. Yet again, this can likely be attributed to education opportunities. With a higher education comes more financial opportunities — without a postsecondary education, the opportunities to find work become much more difficult. Furthermore, this statistic could also be attributed to housing factors and transportation — the inability to live in a location where work is easy to access can be a major impediment in finding employment.

Source: Statistics Canada, 2016 Census of Population. Based on Income data for 2015.

Figure 4. Unemployment Rate Among Populations in 2016 4

The last statistic that this paper will analyze, displays the annual income between first, second, and third generations of non-visible minorities and the Black population. In all generations, the non-visible minorities earn a higher income and more so concerning, the annual income decreases between generations in the Black community. This can likely be attributed to stereotypes and a pressuring culture that Black people are less likely to succeed, resulting in second and third generations being less interested in receiving an education and finding employment. Figure 5. Average Total Income for Non-Visible Minorities and the Black Population in 2016 5

4 5

Source: Statistics Canada, 2016 Census of Population. Source: Statistics Canada, 2016 Census of Population.

Conclusion It is clear that systemic racism exists in Canada — it is deeply entwinned in the institutions, policies, and the political culture of Canada. It can strongly be seen how systemic racism exists in Canada through statistics gathered by Statistics Canada that showed that the Black community in Canada is falling behind the rest of Canadians in terms of economic and educational standards. Black people are the most likely people in Canada to experience a hate crime — they also had the highest ratio of unemployed citizens, and are most likely to be considered as low-income status. Many examples of ways in which racism existed and still exists are seen through the example of Africville and the treatment the Black residents received. Despite being taxpaying citizens, they were denied basic human rights such as clean drinking water, sewage, and garbage disposal. Furthermore, they were forcibly removed from their homes and forced to relocate leaving many of the residents in a difficult position. This was a collective accomplishment of government officials in the City of Halifax, who have recently apologized for the actions that took place in Africville, Nova Scotia during the 1960s — but ultimately an apology does not correct the disparities that the action caused. Even more, many scholars attribute the continual nature of systemic racism to the ignorance of Canadian citizens related to these ongoing issues. Many of the scholars believe that conversations or the topic about racism is seen as a discomfort for many people, in which many white people will not voluntarily talk about the subject or voice their opinions related to systemic racism. Additionally, the scholars also believe that the inaction of citizens is ultimately an action to continue the structure of systemic racism in Canada. However, that was not the only issue scholars pointed out — the alt-right where racism still exists in its strongest form, has fought to undo the progress of abolishing systemic racism.

With each progression to end racism, a counter move is made by the alt-right in order to maintain the current system keeping the whites in power of society. Gillborn (2018) discusses one of these counterproductive moves by the alt-right by giving an example of a book, The Bell Curve, in which it claimed that white people were more intelligent and that the disparities between the white and black communities was just a natural progression. Despite being criticized by numerous scholars, the book still made it into the New York Best Seller and featured on the cover of Newsweek, ensuring that it got its publicity. Through counter active measures like this, the altright is able to reach an audience and continue to undo progress made to eliminate systemic racism — one of the ways it continues to exist in modern society. However, scholars argue that it is the responsibility of citizens to not be okay with this and not allow these things to happen. But for most white Canadians, it can be an awkward conversation to have and because of this, many white Canadians are reluctant to stand up to racism, which ultimately promotes and allows systemic racism to continue existing in Canadian society today.

References Agocs, C., Jain, H. (2001). Systemic Racism in Employment in Canada: Diagnosing systemic racism in organizational culture. The Canadian Race Relations Foundation.1-37. Cooper, C., Ma, C., Tattrie, J. (2021). Africville. The Canadian Encyclopedia. Retrieved from https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/africville Crossman, E. (2020). Low-Income and Immigration: an overview and future directions for research. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/reportsstatistics/research/low-income-immigration-overview-future-directions-research.html D’Angelo, R. (2006). Taking Sides: clashing views in race and ethnicity. United Kingdom: McGraw-Hill Companies, Incorporated. Dhara, A. (2020). Our Complicit Role in Systemic Racism. Canadian Family Physician. 66(1). 596-597. Retrived from https://www.cfp.ca/content/cfp/66/8/596.full.pdf Do, D., Maheux, H. (2019). Diversity of the Black Population in Canada: an overview. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/catalogue/89-657-X2019002 Frie, R. (2020). Recognizing White Racism in Canada: extending the conversation with Bhatia and Sperry. Psychoanalysis, Self and Context. 15(3). 277-281. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/24720038.2020.1773469 Gillborn, D. (2018). Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: anti-Black racism as fluid, relentless, individual and systemic. Peabody Journal of Education, 93(1), 66-77. https://doi.org/10.1080/0161956X.2017.1403178 Government of Canada, Department of Justice. (2015). Disproportionate Harm: hate crime in Canada. Retrieved from https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/crime/wd95_11dt95_11/p2.html Herrnstein, R., & Murray, C. (1994). The Bell Curve. New York: Free Press, p. 70-270. Hill, E., Tiefenthäler, A., Triebert, C., Jordan, D., Willis, H., & Stein, R. (2020). How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html Library and Archives Canada. (2020). Black History in Canada. Retrieved from https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/immigration/history-ethniccultural/Pages/blacks.aspx McRae, M. (n.d.). The story of Africville. Canadian Museum for Human Rights. Retrieved from https://humanrights.ca/story/the-story-of-Africville

Moreau, G. (2020). Police-Reported Hate Crime in Canada, 2018. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2020001/article/00003-eng.htm O'Neill, M. (2020). Canada has a long, documented history of racism and racial discrimination, don't look away. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-has-a-long-documentedhistory-of-racism-and-racial/ Singh, M., & Slaughter, G. (2020). Five charts that show what systemic racism looks like in Canada. CTV News. Retrieved from https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/five-chartsthat-show-what-systemic-racism-looks-like-in-canada-1.4970352 Statistics Canada. (2015). Low Income Definitions. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/75f0011x/2012001/notes/low-faible-eng.htm Statistics Canada. (2020). Ethnicity, Language and Immigration Thematic Series: Canada's Black Population: education, labour and resilience. Retrieved from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/89-657-x/89-657-x2020002-eng.htm Toronto Police Service. (n.d.). Hate motivated crimes. Retrieved from http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/crimeprevention/hatecrime.php

The Aftermath of Extreme Mistakes: Evaluating the Significance of Canada’s Apologies Towards Japanese Canadians and Victims of Indian Residential Schools

by Guy Vertinsky

When a wrong is committed between two people, one person generally must apologize and admit their mistake for those concerned to move on. Some mistakes or wrongful actions are committed between large groups or between a state and a specific group. Mistakes can be done systematically based on certain beliefs, which can cause irreparable harm. In recent years, governments have been issuing apologies for significant wrongdoings done to groups of people around the world, such as Uganda or, in the case of the Holocaust, Germany (Barkan, 2006, 8). These apologies can take multiple forms such as direct apologies, truth and reconciliation or historical commissions (Corntassel & Holden, 2008, 466). The overall goal of such measures revolves around acknowledging historical crimes in an attempt to reconcile them. They are often followed by redress attempts in various forms of compensation such as financial or “restitution of cultural property” (Barkan, 2006, 8-9). Debates are extensive regarding the efficacy of the apologetic tactics in addressing historical wrongs. Canada is no stranger to issuing public government apologies or being involved in significant redress efforts with the goal of correcting past mistakes. Two major cases in Canada required apologies and redress efforts — the first being the case of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, people of Japanese ethnicity or descent, known as Nikkei, were seen as a potential threat in British Colombia — the case was the same for the Nikkei in the United States (Wood, 2014, 349). The result was the forceful displacement of the Nikkei from their homes and assignment into temperament camps from 1941 to 1949, while their property was sold off. These actions accounted for a violation of human rights (Prutschi & Weintraub, 2000, 20). In 1988, former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney formally apologized to the Japanese Canadian community for the harming and family separation of over 20,000 Nikkei and

settled with the National Association of Japanese Canadians on a $300 million redress agreement (CBC archives, 2018). The second case, which will be examined in this paper, involves the inhumane measures that occurred in Indian residential schools over a prolonged period. These establishments, where Indigenous children were sent between the 1800s to 1996, had the explicit goal of assimilating them. Subsequently, the children suffered physical, psychological, and sexual abuse in these schools (Bombay et al., 2013, 443). In 1996, The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) requested a public investigation of the violence that occurred in the Indian residential schools. However, the Canadian government did not respond to these allegations until 1998, and initially rejected a formal truth commission (Corntassel & Holden, 2008, 472-473). A formal extended apology was offered by former Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, in 2008, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created afterwards, with its work concluded in 2015 and 94 calls to action made (The Globe and Mail, 2015). Indigenous struggles regarding this affair are ongoing in Canada till today. Both cases account for miserable conditions of their victims and clear fault on the part of the Canadian government. In response, the government has issued the above stated apologies and settlements to acknowledge their past errors to repair them. On the other hand, the government has tried to dodge accountability, which can be seen in the length of time the Nikkei waited to receive an apology, and the initial lack of action that the Canadian government showed in regard to residential schools. Given the self-evident record of injustices and the actions of the Canadian government, one important question must be examined in regard to apologies, reconciliation and redress. Due to the severity of injustices and human rights violations suffered by the Nikkei in the Second World War and by those affected in Indian residential schools - are truth commissions,

apologies and redress settlements the proper way for Canada to right its wrongs and strive for better relations to avoid making similar mistakes in the future?

Thesis Statement This paper will show that apologies and acknowledgments are a necessary first step to correct historical wrongs by the state, but subsequent steps under redress such as compensations and cultural awareness efforts, are needed in order to move past simple acknowledgment and strive for better relations. Otherwise, a problem will be seen as solved as opposed to being acknowledged and prevented from reoccurring. Therefore, methods such as victim-led initiatives and education are necessary in ensuring mistakes are not repeated. This paper will break down the thesis into sections by analyzing the importance of the first step, the necessity of subsequent steps, and lastly, the idea that reconciliation does not necessarily correlate with trust and forgiveness but can possibly foster better relations. The cases of the Nikkei and survivors of Indian residential schools will be used to represent concrete examples as well as a comparison to support the thesis. After the analysis, a conclusion will present limitations of this work and future implications.

Literature Review Due to the fact that official apologies have been made extensively in Canada and in the rest of the world to address historical state mistakes, a vast amount of literature analyzes the different lenses of official apology and reconciliation methods. Elazar Barkan (2006) focuses on the importance that apologies and commissions hold in a human rights context. He stresses that redress towards correcting state wrongs as in Germany or Canada is essential. Redress in his work is presented as a right, and he subsequently contrasts various redress and reconciliation efforts to

determine their significance. Similar to Barkan’s work, Corntassel and Holder (2008) also look at various reconciliation efforts and methods as a goal of analyzing the overall effectiveness of formal apologies. They examine cases of abuse of Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala and Peru; however, for the purpose of this paper, their section on Canada and overall theory are essential. In this section, they evaluate the case of Indian residential schools through a series of timelines. Prutschi and Weintraub (2000) view the importance of memory when it comes to past grievances committed by states, largely focusing on the Holocaust. They describe Canadian issues as well, and theorize the significance of memory for victims of state-led abuse. Both Patricia E. Roy (2015) and Alexandra L. Wood (2014) use a comparative approach in analyzing the case of Japanese Canadians with that of Japanese Americans in order to determine the differences and similarities in each respective case. Roy concentrates her research on the treatment of the Nikkei before and during the Second World War (2015) while Wood focuses mainly on the redress agreement and apology as well as the steps it took to reach that stage (2014). Wood provides examples of how the Japanese Canadian community reacted to the settlement and how it developed since (2014). Audrey Kobayashi also analyzes the redress agreement of the Nikkei and its effectiveness (1992) — her examples and research like that of Wood, acknowledge the importance of this agreement. Bombay et al. (2013) focus on a political psychology lens by analyzing the levels of trust in survivors of Indian residential schools and their expectations after an apology. This article also looks at the dynamics of apologies and trust overall, through the concepts of inter-group and outer-group relations. Darren Bohle (2017) evaluates the concepts of closure, disclosure and foreclosure through examples of witnessing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. He also argues for the necessity of public space and dialogue when it comes to reconciliation.

Two news articles by The Globe and Mail (2015) and CBC archives (2018) present relevant data to this paper. The former describes previous Prime Minister, Stephen Harper’s inaction, after receiving the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2015, as well as a synthesis of the 2008 apology for Indian residential schools. The latter, which was produced in 1988 but updated in 2018, discusses the reaction of the Japanese community after the signature of the redress agreement and apology by former Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney. Lastly, Paulette Regan (2010) presents numerous ideas and perspectives on Indian residential schools and colonial narratives in general. Regan’s work is extensive and offers relevant information and examples to all the points discussed in this paper. In particular, she stresses the need to recompose colonial narratives if there is to ever be a chance of building a new narrative together.

The Importance of The First Step It is said that the first step is always the hardest. When it comes to reconciliation and apologies, it is no different: “The road to reconciliation begins with acknowledgment” (Barkan, 2006, 8). The important theory behind official apologies in the cases of wrongdoings is that it allows for the victims to be recognized as being victims (8-9). In recognizing this, it immediately acknowledges the presence of a perpetrator, because the concepts of victim and perpetrator derive themselves from each other. By relying on recognition and remembrance, significant state wrongdoings cannot be denied. Through memory, victims of state abuse are not forgotten. Remembrance, similarly, to apologies, allows for acknowledgement of victims and understanding of their suffering for future generations (Prutschi & Weintraub, 2000, 17-18). Apologies are one form of the truth and reconciliation methods and are an important first step. Due to recognition

7 and acknowledgement being an admittance of wrongdoing by the state, official apologies are not always easy to obtain. The cases of both the Japanese Canadians or Nikkei, and survivors of Indian residential schools, confirm the difficulty of obtaining apologies, and thus, also confirm the significance of the first steps laying down the groundwork for subsequent steps. The National Association of Japanese Canadians contemplated an apology and settlement for the wrongs committed against the community for numerous years. Organization methods were increased in 1977 and a written case was submitted to the government in 1984. Finally, an agreement was signed in 1988 (Kobayashi, 1992, 3). It was the first historical apology offered by Canada and required numerous years to obtain (Wood, 2014, 358). Without a network established by the National Association of Japanese Canadians which included the support of church groups, human rights organizations and more, a settlement agreement and apology would have been unlikely (Kobayashi, 1992, 4). In addition, it is argued that Prime Minister Mulroney’s government was partially influenced by an American redress agreement offered to Japanese Americans and that Ottawa wanted “to avoid embracement” (Wood, 2014, 352). The pressure and evidence that was required to have a settlement or an apology issued speaks to its value as a first step. When a victim is acknowledged, as it is explained by Barkan (2006), a new set of actions become available, allowing for the possibility of reconciliation while simultaneously cementing the wrongdoing as legitimately being wrong. The apology and redress agreement of 1988 was seen by many of the Japanese Canadian community as a “healing settlement” (CBC archives, 2018). It can therefore be argued that to be effective, the initial step must include the community, who can fight for a result that is accepted at large.

Indian residential schools in Canada also saw the difficulty of receiving a formal acknowledgment and admission of abuse or wrongdoing. After numerous allegations in regard to the various types of abuse that occurred in the schools, Canada offered a quasi-apology in 1998 along with various policy suggestions, but a truth commission was rejected originally (Corntassel & Holder, 2008, 473). Despite knowing what they suffered, Aboriginal peoples still wanted an apology as a form of acknowledgment; however, the meaningfulness of such an apology would have been questioned (Bombay et al., 2013, 447). This, a first step in the form of an apology, is necessary to allow for reconciliation, and speaks to the severity of the state’s wrongdoings. In 2008, former Prime Minister, Steven Harper, formally issued an apology for the abuse that occurred in the Indian residential schools in front of the entire House of Commons with survivors in attendance and watching on television (Regan, 2010, 2). The setting of such an apology is important because by occurring in the House of Commons, it spoke to the severity of the issue and the need for broad public recognition as opposed to a single document. On the other hand, it can be critiqued as being a political action as opposed to being sincere (Bombay et al., 2013, 455). This is the reason that the matter was bittersweet for some who heard the apology, while others from Aboriginal communities thought of it as “too little too late” (Regan, 2010, 2). Following the apology, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created to investigate the real extent of the abuse suffered by attendees of Indian residential schools as well as to strive for reconciliation (The Globe and Mail, 2015). Furthermore, Regan posited that apologies as a part of truth telling can allow for settlers to understand Indigenous struggles to a certain degree (2010, 177). Despite the fact that some of those affected by Indian residential schools did not view the apology as significant as Regan explained (2010), it does not take away from the progress that a first step can bring and the satisfaction for those who saw the apology as necessary.

Furthermore, Regan claims that apologies must be followed by actions (2010, 178). She urges the necessity of subsequent steps and these steps can help consolidate an apology and foster reconciliation.

The Importance of Subsequent Steps and Action After establishing that apologies can be defined as a necessary first step towards reconciliation of past wrongs, subsequent actions are needed in the hopes of avoiding similar mistakes and helping the victims of state abuses beyond acknowledging them as being victims. The idea of redress towards reconciliation looks past simple discussion such as truth telling — it also involves measures such as “cultural property restitution” (Barkan, 2006, 3-4). Nevertheless, truth telling is a vital part of restorative justice as it allows space for dialogue and understanding of issues with the goal of striding for better relations (Regan, 2010, 63-64). Barkan (2006, 8) also stresses that redress involves financial reparations that are judged to be at a meaningful level to the victims but not as significant in terms of resource use for the state. Thus, redress can take multiple avenues, which introduces the idea that choosing a satisfactory action is not simple. Corntassel and Holder (2008, 470), refer to Taiaiake Alfred’s work who posited that without massive restitution such as financial compensation and land rights, reconciliation has no value. The question then arises of how significant the wrongs committed were and what secondary actions are satisfactory to follow the first step. Furthermore, the actions can be judged as successful or unsatisfactory by the victims. The Nikkei faced racial discrimination before the Second World War as did other Asian groups in Canada due to “racial prejudice” based on a notion of “white superiority” (Roy, 2015, 45-46). However, the treatment became much more radical as was demonstrated earlier. In

addition to the confiscation and liquidation of their land along with confinement, programs of stripping Canadian citizenship and repatriation to Japan were intended under the government of Mackenzie King (Roy, 2015, 61). The Nikkei would otherwise be required to relocate east of the Rockies as western politicians did not wish to have them back on the coast — Eastern communities were also not welcoming towards the Nikkei. The repatriation program was cancelled due to public pressure as sympathy grew towards the community from 1946 to 1947 (Roy, 2015, 60-61). The challenge to repair the damages is therefore hard to measure. Land can be evaluated but numerous years of relocations, discrimination and uncertainty are less evident to address. The redress agreement negotiated by the Japanese Canadians saw the creation of the Japanese Canadian Redress Foundation that would function from 1988 to 2002 as well as personal financial compensation for survivors in the goal of reconciliation and better relations (Wood, 2014, 352). Additionally, the foundation received limited government involvement and a community fund of $12 million, from which $8 million were used to build senior homes directly helping survivors, and $4 million were used for educational purposes (Wood, 2015, 352-352). By directly helping survivors and educating future generations, these subsequent actions cover numerous bases and show significant progress. Furthermore, through community-led initiatives as opposed to prolonged government involvement, there is no projection of superiority, but rather a space for the community to determine its own needs. In addition, the redress agreement saw the creation of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, which would allow for continuous work in the goal of avoiding racial prejudice and conflict as was the case before and during the Second World War (Kobayashi, 1992, 6). Thus, through direct measures to help survivors, education and culture initiates to inform future

generations and a foundation to analyze correlating issues in the goal of avoiding them — the subsequent steps following the initial redress agreement and apology appear to be positive. The case of Indian residential schools is arguably more complex when it comes to secondary steps and continuing measures. Similar to the Japanese Canadians, the Indian residential schools saw numerous aspects of abuse and discrimination along with a long-lasting distrust of outsiders that arguably continues to this day (Bombay et al., 2013, 443-444). An estimated 6000 children died while attending the schools (The Globe and Mail, 2015). The settlement for survivors was approved on May 8, 2006, prior to the official apology (Corntassel & Holder, 2008, 474). The settlement mainly included $1.9 billion for survivors, the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission with funding of $60 million over five years, $125 million in funding to the Aboriginal Healing Foundation as well as other initiatives (Corntassel & Holder, 2008, 474). However, the loses that occurred in Indian residential schools were not only physical or psychological, but also cultural as the explicit goal of these schools was assimilation and “cultural genocide” (Bohle, 2017, 258). Therefore, the extent of the damage inevitably makes the wrongs harder to address following an acknowledgement. As described by multiple sources, Indian Residential Schools are not one event or chapter that can be fixed easily, but rather require continuous public space and learning where disclosure is key to understanding and subsequently acting (Bohle, 2017, 264). Regan argues that reconciliation goes beyond the actions between perpetrators and victims as it requires restructuring of cultural and material identities to deconstruct colonial narratives, and allow educational and ethical reconciliation practices (2010, 215-216). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded its work in 2015 and presented former Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, with 94 calls to action. Despite his public apology seven years earlier, little seriousness was given

to the demands (The Globe and Mail, 2015). Thus, as opposed to relatively immediate actions following the apology towards Japanese Canadians, survivors of residential schools and Aboriginal peoples are largely unsatisfied with the actions following their apology. Therefore, the cases diverge significantly when analyzing group relations following the apologies.

The Reality of Prosperous Relations The goal of an apology is essentially to be forgiven for committed acts. However, in some cases, the actions following an apology are not seen as significant, or in other cases, harms are simply irreparable. Barkan claims that efforts and actions such as commissions, open up the door to achieving future relationships between groups (2006, 10). The general idea behind reconciliation is that future relations will be shared, achieved together, and will last (Corntassel & Holder, 2008, p. 469). Thus, apologies are accompanied with expectations towards the future. However, it is the approach taken after the apology that will ultimately determine the possibility of reconciliation. In addition, trust is a vital factor concerning apologies as those being apologized to, will examine the possibility of oppressions reoccurring based on history, as well as evaluating whether the apology represents a genuine regret from the oppressive group as a whole (Bombay et al., 2013, 446). Examples in both case studies show the different reactions towards apology and settlement while reflecting the issues regarding the possibility of repeated actions and overall trust. The Japanese Canadian community arguably welcomed the redress agreement it received and benefited as a result of it. The former president of the National Association of Japanese Canadians art (NAJC), Miki, felt that the redress settlement “helped revitalize the Japanese Canadian Community,” specifically in regard to cultural centres, senior home, and museums

(Wood, 2014, 354). Such reactions speak to the success of the redress settlement, preservation of history, and culture as well as acknowledgement. It is significant that the Canadian government played a limited role after reaching the settlement (Wood, 2014, 352), because it allowed the community itself to determine its own needs. Evaluating the overall trust of the Japanese Canadian community towards the Canadian government and society is difficult. Nevertheless, redress funds were essential in helping the community reclaim its heritage (Wood, 2014, 355). For survivors of Indian residential schools, their families, and Indigenous peoples as a whole, trust is an issue based on deeply rooted historical wrongs which may contribute to an inability of forgiveness (Bombay et al., 2013, 446). It presents a complexity towards an acknowledgment of the wrong — belief that an acknowledgement is sincere, and hope that history will not be repeated. Deconstructing the history and legacy of Indian residential schools, means that people must consider the idea that First Nations and settler relations were never peaceful to begin with (Regan, 2010, 5). Therefore, the following question arises — how do you achieve future peaceful or adequate relations if this was never the case in the past? Due to multiple Canadians not acknowledging the abuse that happened in residential schools when it did or presently, it becomes apparent that without Canadian society’s true comprehension in regards of its role towards the schools, and what it bares as responsibility, oppressive policies may reoccur (Regan, 2010, 42). To take responsibility for what occurred in the residential schools, Canada must as whole acknowledge its responsibility to deconstruct colonial narratives before hoping for better relations (Regan, 2010, 42-43). Relations and views between Canada and Indigenous peoples, specifically in regards towards Indian residential schools, continue to struggle despite the apology, and mainly due to a lack of trust based on past wrongs (Bombay et al., 2013, 444). Recognition of

responsibility, deconstruction of colonial narratives and extensive actions are therefore essential in rebuilding trust in the hopes for better future relations that have not prospered since the apology.

Conclusion This paper evaluated the significance of apologies, truth reconciliations, redress and relations in regard to rights violations and wrongs committed towards specific groups in Canada. The claim was presented that apologies and acknowledgments are important first steps in correcting and assuming accountability of collective wrongs done by the state, but must be followed by secondary steps to truly reconcile. In addition, this paper evaluated the possibility of relations not prospering as past wrongs could have been too significant and resulted in lack of trust. These claims were examined by evaluating the different stages and outcomes of apology, redress, and reconciliation in the case of the Japanese Canadian community’s struggles during the Second World War, and in the case of Indian residential school survivors. The paper presented theoretical ideas towards the subjects, and then evaluated how these steps and ideas were manifested in each case study. When it came to the importance of the first step concerning the acknowledgment of the wrongdoing and establishing that abuses were committed towards a single group, both cases showed difficulty of getting acknowledged. The case of the Japanese Canadians showed that it took an estimated 40 years to reach a settlement and an apology from the government (CBC archives, 2018). Proper organization and pressure from various sources were the key for the Japanese Canadian community to reach a settlement. In the case of residential schools, after the last school closed in 1996, it took until 2008 to receive an official apology, while a redress settlement was reached in 2006 (Corntassel & Holder, 2008, 472-474). This case also required

legal pressure and advocacy to reach its settlement and establish a truth commission. Both cases confirmed the first part of the thesis because through the difficulty of achieving a first step, the foundation is laid for subsequent steps while, simultaneously, acknowledging the wrongdoing that occurred. Subsequent steps may be varied, but ultimately, this paper showed that redress is needed after acknowledgement or else, it is insignificant as there are no guarantees that anything will change. Also, reparation to harms done is essential in apologies and needs to be considered as adequate. In both cases, settlements were reached; however, the Japanese Canadian Community was satisfied at large with their settlement and with the apology. The redress settlement insured reparation to survivors and various ways to preserve the culture while also creating a Canadian foundation to avoid racial injustice in the future. In the case of the survivors of Indian residential schools, reactions to the apology were split. Numerous First Nations Peoples questioned what would follow the apology, and if secondary measures would ever be adequate to repair years of harm based on colonial narratives. In addition, the idea of continuous dialogue and education was deemed important in order to avoid such issues from happening again as opposed to getting over these issues and forgetting them. This was where the outcomes of the two apologies and settlements began to split. The goal of apologies and the steps that follow them was explained to be the desire for better relations in the future. In the case of Japanese Canadians, the community has regained its culture through the settlement measure. However, the Canadian government had a minimal role in that regard after the apology, which signified the importance of community-led initiatives. The apology for Indian residential schools saw the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While acknowledging the potential benefits of the truth commission, it was shown

that numerous members of Aboriginal communities and survivors of residential schools have little trust in settler-led initiatives. They also require a general understanding on the part of the Canadian population concerning what really occurred in residential schools and society’s role in ignorance. Thus, as opposed to the Japanese Canadians, relations have in the most part, not improved when it comes to Canada and survivors of Indian residential schools as well as their families and communities. As the paper’s thesis was largely proven to be true with varying results stemming from official apologies, numerous areas remain to be examined regarding the presented topics. Regarding lack of trust and rights violations of those who went to Indian residential schools, their case should be compared to other ongoing Indigenous struggles such as the disproportionate incarceration rate of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian prisons. Such comparative studies and analyses of various Indigenous groups or populations struggling can offer a picture of continued colonial oppression and lack of action or potential improvements. Due to the relative success of the Japanese Canadian settlement, the case can be used to see how other racial based injustices of a similar timeline can be addressed. That case is also essential for reviewing policies and actions taken by governments in emergency situations or during war, in regard to rights violations. The limitations of this paper include the disparity between the two groups, despite both groups having suffered grave injustices at the hands of the Canadian government — the Indian residential school case was not triggered by a single event. The abuse towards the Japanese Canadian community was heavily sparked by the perceived threat of Imperial Japan during the Second World War. The case of the Indian residential schools is based on colonial narratives and perceptions, which start long before the creation of the assimilating school system. As the Japanese community accepted the apology and the settlement that was negotiated, Canada has a

long way to go in improving its relations with survivors of Indian residential schools and the Aboriginal peoples in general who are the original occupants of this land.

References Barkan, Elazar. "Historical reconciliation: redress, rights and politics." Journal of International Affairs (2006): 1-15. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24358010 Bohle, Darren. "The public space of agonistic reconciliation: Witnessing and prefacing in the TRC of Canada." Constellations 24, no. 2 (2017): 257-266. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12275 Bombay, Amy, Kimberly Matheson, and Hymie Anisman. "Expectations Among Aboriginal Peoples in Canada Regarding the Potential Impacts of a Government Apology." Political Psychology 34, no. 3 (2013): 443-460. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12029 Corntassel, Jeff, and Cindy Holder. "Who’s sorry now? Government apologies, truth commissions, and Indigenous self-determination in Australia, Canada, Guatemala, and Peru." Human rights review 9, no. 4 (2008): 465-489. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142008-0065-3 Government apologizes to Japanese Canadians in 1988. (2018, September 22). CBC Archives. Retrieved from: https://www.cbc.ca/archives/government-apologizes-to-japanese-canadians-in1988-1.4680546 Kobayashi, Audrey. "The Japanese-Canadian redress settlement and its implications for" race relations"." Canadian Ethnic Studies 24, no. 1 (1992): 1-19 Retrieved from https://libezproxy.concordia.ca/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fscholarl y-journals%2Fjapanese-canadian-redress-settlementimplications%2Fdocview%2F215642188%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D10246 Prutschi, Manuel, and Mark Weintraub. "Accountability, justice, and the importance of memory in the “Era of War”." East Asia 18, no. 3 (2000): 17-26. Retrieved from https://doi-org.libezproxy.concordia.ca/10.1007/s12140-000-0009-2 Regan, Paulette. Unsettling the settler within: Indian residential schools, truth telling, and reconciliation in Canada. ubc Press, 2010. Roy, Patricia E. "Canadian and American Treatment of the Nikkei, 1890–1949: A Comparison." American Review of Canadian Studies 45, no. 1 (2015): 44-70. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/02722011.2015.1022309 Truth and Reconciliation (2): First apologize, then act. (2015, June 5). The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/truth-and-reconciliation2-first-apologize-then-act/article24827422/ Wood, Alexandra L. "Rebuild or reconcile: American and Canadian approaches to redress for World War II confinement." American Review of Canadian Studies 44, no. 3 (2014): 347-365. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/02722011.2014.943585

The Impact of Neoliberalism on Immigration to Canada for Disabled Persons: Constructing the ‘inadmissible other’

Kathryn Nicassio

Introduction In today’s age, Canada’s immigration policies are motivated first and foremost by the economic needs of the country. Although the desire to attract immigrants who would be economically profitable to the state is not a new phenomenon, since the 1990s, the Canadian government has adopted a neoliberal framework when assessing the value of those who wish to immigrate to Canada. As a result, only immigrants who fit the neoliberal ideal of self-sufficient, financially independent, and economically profitable to the state are granted citizenship. Indeed, the raison-d’etre of both the federal and provincial government immigration ministries is to attract the best educated and most skilled people, who are also believed to be the most productive. While this may seem perfectly fine in layman’s terms, this point of view creates an unfortunate human rights consequence by introducing a purely subjective methodology to classify potential immigrants in “preferred” or “non-preferred” categories. This long-standing notion of “fiscality first” has (and continues to) shape the characteristics and, more importantly, the diversity of the population who are selected to enter the country. The goal of this research paper is to explore the impact that neoliberalism and its influence on Canadian immigration policy has on disabled people 1 trying to enter Canada. Specifically, this essay will be honing in on Canada’s medical inadmissibility policy, with a focus on section 38(1)(c) which reads: 38(1) A foreign national is inadmissible on health grounds if their health condition … (c) might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services.

Note that this paper choses to use identity-first rather than person-first language.

This section of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) singles disabled people out and positions them as burdensome and a potential drain on the health system. This exemplifies the way neoliberalism leads to the exclusion of disabled immigrants, ultimately transforming them into the “inadmissible other” (El-Lahib 2016). The ableist assumption that disabled immigrants with physical or mental impairments have little to offer the country creates a systemic barrier for people with serious illnesses or disabilities from settling in Canada, and more generally results in their exclusion and marginalization in the immigration process (ElLahib and Wehbi 2011). Such exclusion and marginalization amounts to discrimination on the basis of disability and runs counter to Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as international human rights legislation. To articulate the ways in which neoliberalism negatively impacts disabled people wishing to immigrate to Canada, this essay will be separated into four sections. The first section will open with a three-part literature review on neoliberalism, immigration, and disability. The second section will compare the historical exclusion of disabled immigrants from Canada to other minority groups that have also been historically marginalized by the immigration process. The third section will discuss the IRPA in greater detail, and using the 2016 case of Felipe Montoya, will demonstrate the negative impact of the excessive demand provision on disabled immigrants. Finally, the fourth section will look at a policy brief submitted by the Council of Canadians with Disabilities (CCD) to the standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration in 2017, which argues for the repeal of the excessive demands provisions in the IRPA on the basis that it is discriminatory and runs counter to section 15 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and

to international human rights legislation such as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

Literature Review: Neoliberalism, Immigration & Disability What is Neoliberalism? According to Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005), we are currently living in what they refer to as “the age of neoliberalism”, in which neoliberalism is the dominant ideology shaping our world today (2005, 1). Harvey defines neoliberalism as: “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade” (2007). Expanding on Harvey’s definition, Thorsen (2010) asserts that neoliberalism also includes the belief that the virtuous person is one who is able to access the relevant markets, and functions as a competent actor in these markets. Using this definition, individuals are seen as being entirely responsible for the consequences of the choices they make (Thorsen 2010). For instance, in the neoliberal ideology, inequality and social injustice are viewed as morally acceptable so long as they are a result of freely made decisions. Thorsen explains that “If a person demands that the state should regulate the market or make reparations to the unfortunate who has been caught at the losing end of a freely initiated market transaction, this is viewed as an indication that the person in question is morally depraved” (15). In that respect, neoliberalism can largely be viewed as the opposite, or the antithesis of community, as it proposes a “survival of the fittest” doctrine in which a distinction is made between “hard-working citizens” and the “parasitic classes” (Cappuri 2018).

According to Capurri (2018), the latter are framed as undeserving and appropriators of resources that should be spent on the deserving majority, individuals who are deemed “economic contributors” (2). Although capitalist societies in the West have always given great importance to waged labour, Capurri cites MacGregor (2012) who asserts that neoliberalism has dramatically increased the connection between worthiness and employability. In other words, neoliberalism puts economic contribution above all else, and positions those who are not economically profitable to the state as parasites living off the majority (Capurri 2018). It is important to note that the practices of neoliberalism emerged no earlier than the 1970s, led by the Thatcher/Reagan revolutions in Britain and the United States (Harvey 2007; George 1999; Thorsen 2010), and was initially adopted in Canada in the 1990s, primarily in an effort to integrate the Canadian economy with that of the United States (Cappuri 2018). This is of importance for the purposes of this paper because the exclusion of certain immigrants (including those with disabilities) from Canada precedes the neoliberalist era, and in fact began with the passage of the first Immigration Act in 1869 (Capurri 2018). However, while the initial motivation for exclusion of disabled migrants was the threat of “degeneracy” and based largely on ideas relating to eugenics, the motivation today has become increasingly economic in nature, resting on the unproductiveness and economic burden such persons might have on the country (Capurri 2018; MacIntosh 2019). Neoliberalism & Immigration In terms of neoliberalism and immigration, Bauder (2008) asserts that immigration has long functioned as a mechanism for regulating the economies of industrialized countries and plays an important role in neoliberal restructuring. In Canada, the economic importance of

immigration is widely recognized by lawmakers who, due to the global competition for human capital, are motivated to attract highly skilled migrant labourers (Bauder 2008). Indeed, the Canadian government prioritizes economic migrants who are perceived as self-sufficient, selfreliant and embrace practices and expectations around personal responsibility (Root et al. 2014). As such, state policy establishes the category of the ‘good citizen’ who “embodies the neoliberal ideals of self-sufficiency, hard-work, and effective and efficient labour market participation” (Root et al. 2014, 5). On the other hand, the ‘bad’ or ‘failed’ citizen is the citizen who does not conform to the prescribed neoliberal values and behaviours (Root et al. 2014). What this means for potential immigrants is that ideals of self-sufficiency and self-reliance are what constructs the “ideal immigrant individual”, and those who do not fit into this construction are likely to be deemed inadmissible (Root et al. 2014, 4). In a similar vein, Arat Koc (1999) asserts that when it comes to immigration in countries like Canada, immediate economic benefit is the primary goal. In a study conducted by Wilton et al. in 2017, an interviewee summed it up well when they said: “The [Canadian government] is becoming more and more selective, focusing more and more on the economic benefit that the individual applicant can bring to Canada. Immigration has always brought economic benefit but what this government is looking for is immediate and direct. They need to see it. You come here. You do this job. You contribute so much” (398). Expanding on this, Shields (2004) asserts that the desire to generate immediate/short-term economic benefit has also led to the tightening of rules surrounding the sponsoring of immigrant family members who may consume public social benefits disproportionate to their (perceived) labour market and economic contribution. This framework, according to Shields, is said to

further marginalize minority groups such as people of colour and women who have faced limited access to education, labour market participation, and other credentials considered highly valuable in neoliberal immigration policy as a result of institutionalized misogyny and systemic racism (Shields 2014). Neoliberalism & Multiculturalism As multiculturalism is considered to be “a cornerstone of the Canadian immigration landscape”, it is important to briefly discuss the impact of neoliberalism on its policies (Root et al. 2014, 6). Although multiculturalism is usually thought of in the context of ethnic and cultural diversity, disabled people are also widely thought to form a cultural group of their own (O’Connor 1993; Gilson and Depoy 2000; Jakubowicz and Meekosha 2003). For example, the cultural model of disability defines disabled people as a “unique group which shares experiences, tacit rules, language, and discourse”, and whose experiences occur in the arena of political and social circumstance, characterized by marginalization and oppression (Gilson and Depoy 2000, 209). As such, for the purposes of this essay, multiculturalism will also encompass disability. According to Root et al. (2014), multiculturalism has been reshaped towards a more neoliberal orientation since the 1990s, fitting more closely with neoliberal immigration change. Root et al., contend that Canadian multiculturalism was shaped initially by social liberalism, which aimed to incorporate newcomers from a variety of backgrounds to Canada by granting them a civic voice, recognizing their legitimate claims for inclusion and respect, and paving the way for newcomers to achieve full democratic citizenship (2014). According to Kymlicka (2003), this form of multiculturalism requires that there be an activist state (versus a neoliberal state) to survive. In other words, full liberal democratic citizenship for immigrants under a multiculturalist

framework requires that the state actively invest in immigrant settlement services and cultural expression, ultimately giving a voice to underrepresented groups (Kymlicka 2003). Neoliberal multiculturalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the need for newcomers to adapt to Canadian society and its neoliberal value system (Root et al. 2014). The overarching goal has been to utilize multiculturalism for the purpose of economic gain, and to effectively police the kind of diversity that is acceptable in Canadian society based on characteristics that are consistent with core neoliberal values (Root et al. 2014). Making Connections: Neoliberalism, Immigration & Disability While much of the literature on neoliberalism and immigration focuses on the impact on racialized minorities and women, the impact on disabled persons is under-researched. What is clear from the literature that does exist is that “neoliberalism provides an ecosystem for the nourishment of ableism” (Goodley et al. 2014, 981). Put differently, neoliberalism and ableism are intrinsically linked. Ableism can be defined as the “compulsory preference for nondisability” and is used to describe the discrimination towards disabled people. It also refers to how certain ideals and attributes are valued or not valued in society (Friedman et al. 2017). As was established earlier, in a country like Canada where neoliberalism is the dominant ideology, the attributes that are most valued are self-sufficiency, economic productivity, and effective and efficient labour market participation. Those who are not deemed economically profitable to the state are viewed as ‘parasites’ living off of the majority. As such, disabled people, and especially those with intellectual disabilities, are considered as undeserving and disposable since they do not fit the neoliberal ideal of able-bodied, financially independent, and productive members of society (Capurri 2018). Capurri states “if the measuring stick is economic and financial

independence, then obviously everyone who is unable to achieve self-sustainment gets transformed into a citizen minus who is a burden rather than an asset” (2018). Therefore, disability is viewed as a tragedy that needs to be solved or managed, not only for the individual experiencing it but for the good of the entire society, since those who are not disabled are ‘burdened’ with the costs of having to support disabled people (Capurri 2018). The goal of the neoliberal state then becomes to reduce such persons in number, and while this cannot be achieved by removing disabled people who are already legally citizens of the country, it can be achieved by forbidding entry to foreign-born disabled persons (Capurri 2018). The result is that disabled people are largely excluded from citizenship.

Canadian Immigration and the Exclusion of Disabled People While the exclusion of disabled immigrants has been a reality since Canada’s inception, their continued exclusion is unique when compared to other minority groups. Based on the literature on neoliberalism, immigration, and disability examined above, it can be deduced that since there exists a fundamental incompatibility between the disabled body and the ideals of neoliberalism, disabled people have been singled out by the Canadian government, and disproportionately excluded and marginalized from the immigration process. Indeed, while the historical record shows that Canada’s immigration history is chalk-full of anti-semitism, sexism, homophobia and racism, over the years, reforms to immigration legislation have led to the removal of many of the barriers to individuals and groups who were once denied entry (Hanes

2008) 2. In 2001, for example, when the government of Canada amended the Immigration Act for the first time since 1976, enormous strides were made towards changing legislation which had historically discriminated against people on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity and sexual orientation (Hanes 2008). As a result of these reforms, Canada has become home to previously unwanted populations, including European Jews, gays and lesbians, people from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, South America and Central America (Hanes 2008). However, while the overtly discriminatory immigration policies have been removed for most populations, no similar legislative reforms have been made to accommodate disabled immigrants (Hanes 2008). On the contrary, the 2001 amendment is said to have increased rather than minimized restrictions on disabled people by introducing the ‘excessive demands' clause’, which speaks to concerns regarding the excessive use of Canadian health and social services by disabled immigrants (Hanes 2008). This provision, which adopts a neoliberal framework when assessing the value of disabled persons, has been consistently used by medical officers of health and other immigration officials to deny disabled people the opportunity to immigrate to Canada (Hanes 2008; Blower 2015; Capurri 2018). Thus, while discriminatory provisions in Canadian immigration policy have been removed for many of the historically marginalized individuals and groups, disabled people continue to be singled out, and specifically targeted by the state. The next section will discuss the 2001 IRPA and medical inadmissibility in greater detail in order to establish the impact it has had on disabled persons.

Not to say that other minority groups do not continue to be discriminated against in the immigration process—it is evident that they do—just that there are no overtly discriminatory provisions targeting specific racial, religious, gender or sexual minority groups comparable to the excessive demands clause and its targeting of disabled people.

Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act & Medical Inadmissibility As was briefly discussed in the above section, in 2001, Canada passed the Immigration and Refugees Protection Act (IRPA) (Wilton et al. 2017). Unlike previous Immigration Acts, the 2001 amendment did not overtly list disability as a prohibited ground for citizenship; instead, the Act refers only to the “excessive demand” some applicants might place on Canada’s health and social services (Wilton et al. 2017). The 2001 IRPA regulations defines excessive demand as follows: (1) a demand on health services or social services for which the anticipated costs would likely exceed average Canadian per capita health services and social services costs over a period of five consecutive years ... [or] (2) a demand on health services or social services that would add to existing waiting lists [producing] an inability to provide timely services to Canadian citizens or permanent residents. (Minister of Justice 2002, 1)

At the time of the amendment, the cost threshold was set at (approximately) $32,000 over a fiveyear period, or roughly $6,000 per year, and was based on the average per capita costs derived from annual reports from the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) (Wilton et al. 2017). What this meant for potential immigrants is that if it was found that they have a disability or medical condition that would require health or social services which ended up costing more than approximately $6,000 annually or $32,000 over the course of five years, that individual would be deemed inadmissible on health grounds. The Canadian government also considers the potential costs of home care, specialized residential services, special education services, social and vocational rehabilitation services, personal support services, and assistive devices (Wilton et al. 2017). A threshold of a little over $6000 a year is quite easy to exceed, especially since there

is no stratification of costs by disability, age or other factors (Wilton et al. 2017). In other words, the costs that are associated with social and health services for disabled or older applicants are not compared with the average costs of disabled or older Canadians (Wilton et al. 2017). In order for potential costs to be assessed, applicants are required to undergo a medical examination by a designated physician, either within or outside of Canada. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) provides medical examiners with detailed instructions, particularly regarding so-called “conditions of significance” relating to excessive demand (Wilton et al. 2017). These conditions include cancers and cardiac conditions, as well as cognitive impairment, childhood developmental delay, hearing impairment, and psychiatric conditions (Wilton et al. 2017). If the medical examiner discovers a disability or illness that they think will involve excessive demand, this finding is communicated to a visa officer who informs the applicant that they or their dependent may be medically inadmissible to Canada (Wilton et al. 2017). The applicant is then given 60 days to either challenge the medical finding or demonstrate that they have the resources in place to counterbalance the “excessive burden” (Wilton et al. 2017). Because the Canadian healthcare system is a public system, applicants cannot offer to privately fund the costs of anticipated inpatient care, but they can demonstrate that they will be able to pay privately for outpatient services, social services, and prescription medications (Wilton et al. 2017). They are also allowed to demonstrate that they have other non-financial sources of support, such as extended family in Canada that might offset the need for formal services, although the extent to which this kind of support is taken into consideration in the determining of eligibility is unclear (Wilton et al. 2017).

Unfortunately, because data on medical inadmissibility is not published, it is difficult to know the number of people that have been impacted by such provisions (Wilton et al. 2017). Wilton et al., based on partial data, found that there were 122 medical inadmissibility refusals in 2013, and 145 refusals in the first six months of 2014, all of which were linked to excessive demand (2017). Mackay’s data points to an even larger number of refusals based on excessive demand, with 619 refusals in 2014, 473 in 2015 and 337 in 2016 (2018). Regardless of the statistics (or lack thereof), the medical exam requirement alone is deeply problematic, and positions disabled people as social and economic burdens, reinforcing negative and false stereotypes about disability. Indeed, the Council of Canadians with Disabilities (CCD), a national advocacy organization, has argued that the existence of the excessive demand provision “devalues Canadians with disabilities and does nothing to recognize the contribution persons with disabilities and their families can and do make to Canadian society” (Wilton et al. 2017, 395). Moreover, according to Niles, the medical exam has been used as an instrument to screen, regulate, manage, classify and control the health of incoming immigrants with the purpose of achieving the material and economic goals of the Canadian nation state (2018). In line with the literature on neoliberalism, immigration, and disability, the medical exam effectively differentiates the worthy citizen from the unworthy immigrant, reinforcing the idea that disability is deviant, costly and something to be avoided and excluded from society (Niles 2018). Case Study: The 2016 Montoya Case In order to demonstrate the real-life impact of the 2001 IRPA, this section will look at the case of Felipe Montoya, whose application for permanent residence status was denied because his son Nicolas has Down Syndrome.

Felipe Montoya is a full-time Professor in the Department of Environmental Studies at York University (Capurri 2018). He is a native of Costa Rica who entered Canada as a temporary foreign worker, and in 2013, he applied for permanent residency together with his wife and two children. While the whole family had to undergo a medical exam as per the IRPA, Felipe’s 13year-old son Nicolas was singled out by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) to undergo further medical examination due to the fact that he has Down Syndrome (Capurri 2018). Nicolas was later deemed inadmissible given the potential cost the IRCC felt he would have on Canada’s health and social services (Capurri 2018). The letter the Montoya family received from CIC informing them that Nicolas had been deemed inadmissible estimated that special education support for Nicolas would cost between $20,000 and $25,000 annually (McQuigge 2016). However, at the time that the decision was rendered Nicolas was already in school in Ontario and had yet to access any additional resources. CIC spokesperson Nancy Caron sent an email to Professor Montoya advising him that his family needs an “individualized plan to demonstrate that no excessive demand will be imposed on Canada social services due to the medical inadmissibility” (Blower 2015, 38). Caron states “If an applicant is deemed inadmissible… he or she can provide a ‘credible plan’ to offset the costs to Canada’s health-care system” (Blower 2015, 38). As he and his wife had already been living and working in Ontario, Professor Montoya refused to agree to pay for the future costs of services that might exceed the 2014 government threshold of $6,400 per year, stating, “As Canadian taxpayers, we believe we are entitled to the services we’d been paying for” (McQuigge 2016). Professor Montoya responded to the letter of rejection by the IRCC by making the case that he and his family should be granted permanent residency for these reasons (Capurri 2018). The case ultimately went

public, and significant criticism was addressed to the Canadian government for rejecting the family’s application. In response to the public outcry, Minister of Immigration John McCall overturned the decision and ultimately granted the Montoya family permanent residency status on ‘humanitarian and compassionate grounds’ (Capurri 2018). The Montoya case allows us to see first-hand how harmful the excessive demand provision is for disabled persons hoping to immigrate to Canada, and more generally illustrates the ways in which Canada’s immigration policies inherently focus on human capital and class. While Professor Montoya is certainly correct in arguing that (a) Nicolas had yet to require the use of any additional resources, and as such is not posing an excessive demand on Canadian health and social services, and (b) that he and his wife are Canadian taxpayers who are entitled to public coverage for any expense incurred by their son, such arguments function to reinforce the idea that a person’s worth relies exclusively on the basis of economic potential and social status (Cappuri 2018). As Cappuri asks; what if the costs of supporting Nicolas were indeed above average? And what if the Montoya’s were not Canadian taxpayers? Would this change Nicolas’ value as a human being? Would it make him and his family any less worthy of acceptance into Canada (2018)? Although there was a happy ending to this case, it made clear that a disabled child’s value, at least according to Canadian immigration policy, is exclusively assessed based on the contribution of his able-bodied parents (Capurri 2018). This way of assessing potential immigrants ignores the potential cultural, social, and emotional contributions that a person might make to the community and validates the ableist argument that disabled people who are unable to play a ‘positive’ economic role are of no value to society (Capurri 2018).

CCD Recommendation to the Canadian Government In 2017 the Council of Canadians with Disabilities (CCD) submitted a policy brief to the standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, arguing for the repeal of the excessive demands provisions in the IRPA. The CCD is a national human rights organization of disabled people and have been advocating for a more open Canadian immigration policy since 1984 (Council of Canadians with Disabilities 2017). In their brief, the CCD asserts that the excessive demands' clause, or section 38(1)(c) of the IRPA has a disproportionately negative impact on the disabled community and is the basis of the ongoing and arbitrary exclusion of disabled people from immigrating to Canada. They also point to the fact that the excessive demands provision perpetuates an outdated view of disability known as the medical model of disability, in which one's medical condition is considered the source of one's limitations (Council of Canadians with Disabilities 2017). Although the CCD does not touch on it, neoliberalism and the medical model go hand in hand. As was addressed in the literature review, neoliberalism can be viewed as the antithesis of community, putting a strong emphasis on individualism (Gray and Lawrence 2001). Similarly, the medical model of disability purports that disability is an individual deficit that needs to be cured (Blower 2015). The excessive demand clause is based on the medical model and contributes to the discourse that disabled persons are a “problem” to be solved (Blower 2015). Within disability scholarship, the medical model has long been superseded by the ‘social model’ of disability, in which disability is viewed as a social phenomenon caused by social oppression and prejudices rather than by individual deficits in the person (Council of Canadians with Disabilities 2017). In other words, individuals are not disabled by their mental or physical

impairments but by societal barriers to equal and full participation in society. The CCD asserts that the excessive demands' clause functions as one of those barriers (2017). Moreover, the CCD points to the fact that the excessive demands' clause is discriminatory as it specifically targets those with disabilities, despite the fact that there exist various groups of people that can, and probably will, place future “excessive demand” on health and social services (2017). For instance, people who live unhealthy lifestyles, extreme sports enthusiasts, smokers, alcoholics, etc., are more likely to require Canada’s social and health services over the course of their lifetime when compared with the average Canadian, but these characteristics do not trigger excessive demands evaluations (Council of Canadians with Disabilities 2017). It is only those who occupy the category of “disabled” that face such a rigorous assessment (Council of Canadians with Disabilities 2017). This is discriminatory, as disabled people are being arbitrarily singled out by the state, and demonstrates the troubling and continuing normalization of positioning disabled people as ‘unwanted citizens’ (Mackintosh 2019). Finally, the CCD points to the fact that Canada has made commitments to the equality and human rights of disabled people in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, federal and provincial human rights legislation, and in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (2017). The IRPA states that the “Act is to be construed and applied in a manner consistent with the Canadian Charter and international human rights instruments that have been adopted and ratified by Canada” (Council of Canadians with Disabilities 2017). Thus, Canada’s immigration law is bound by the principles of equality and non-discrimination set out in section 15 of the Charter. This is reinforced by the CRPD, and specifically Article 1 which states:

“States Parties shall recognize the rights of persons with disabilities to liberty of movement, to freedom to choose their residence and to a nationality, on an equal basis with others, including by ensuring that persons with disabilities: a. Have the right to acquire and change a nationality and are not deprived of their nationality arbitrarily or on the basis of disability” (Council of Canadians with Disabilities 2017).

As such, the CCD asserts that the excessive demands' clause “is inconsistent with […] contemporary human rights protections and fails to adhere to the CRPD which Canada ratified in 2010” (Council of Canadians with Disabilities 2017). Ultimately, for the reasons listed above, the CCD recommended the complete removal of the excessive demands' clause stating: “Repeal of Section 38 (1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act is an important subject of Canadian public policy whose time has come” (2017, 11). The 2018 Amendment to the IRPA In 2018, in response to the Standing Committee's recommendations, the Canadian government amended the IRPA, introducing some significant changes (Macintosh 2019). For one, the 2018 IRPA raises the fiscal medical inadmissibility policy from roughly $6,000 to $19,812 a year (Macintosh 2019). It also narrows the list of social services that will be included when making the calculations (Macintosh 2019). More specifically, Canada now excludes the costs of providing a potential immigrant or their family member with publicly supported social and vocational rehabilitations, personal support services, and special education (Macintosh 2019). While this is a positive step forward, it falls short of the CCD’s expectations, and there is no doubt that the excessive demands provision will continue to exclude disabled persons from Canadian citizenship (Council of Canadians with Disabilities 2018). As MacInstosh puts it, “it is

not that Canada has stopped discriminating, it is that Canada is now discriminating against a smaller number of people with disabilities or health conditions” (2015, 147). Conclusion To conclude, since its emergence in the 1970s-1980s during the Thatcher/Raegan revolutions in Britain and the United States, neoliberalism has been the dominant ideology in the Western world, with Canada being no exception. Indeed, since the early 1990s neoliberalism has had a profound influence on all facets of Canadian life. This paper has been concerned with the impact of neoliberalism on Canada’s immigration policies, and specifically on how those policies impact disabled people wishing to immigrate to Canada. Because neoliberalism and ableism go hand in hand, in that the citizen who fits the neoliberal ideal will always be ablebodied (and thus self-sufficient and financially independent), neoliberalism automatically marginalizes the disabled body, marking it as unworthy of citizenship. This is exemplified in the IRPA, which deems immigrants who might “reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services” inadmissible to Canada on health grounds. Whereas discriminatory immigration policies targeting other minority groups such as racial, religious, gender and sexual minorities had been removed in 2001, the excessive demand clause continues to target disabled people, effectively constructing them as the ‘inadmissible other’. While the IRPA does not explicitly state that disabled people cannot immigrate to Canada, those who are affected by the excessive demand clause are almost always disabled people or chronic illnesses. One example is the case of Felipe Montoya, whose application for permanent residence status was denied because his son Nicolas has Down Syndrome and was expected to pose an ‘excessive demand’ on Canadian social services. Despite the CCD’s recommendation to remove the clause, the

Canadian government merely introduced a higher fiscal inadmissibility policy threshold, increasing it from $6,000 a year to $19,812 a year. While this is a step in the right direction, the excessive demands clause continues to discriminate against disabled people in the immigration process and runs counter to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Ultimately, the only way to rectify this injustice is for the Canadian government to move away from a neoliberal framework when assessing the value of disabled immigrants by amending the IRPA, completely removing the excessive demands provision. “Neoliberalism is not the natural human condition, it is not supernatural, it can be challenged and replaced because its own failures will require this. [...] Business and the market have their place, but this place cannot occupy the entire sphere of human existence” (Susan George 1999).

Bibliography Bauder, Harald. 2008. “Neoliberalism and the Economic Utility of Immigration: Media Perspectives of Germany's Immigration Law.” Antipode 40 (1): 55–78. Blower, Jenna. 2015. “How the Discourse of Ableism Functions in Canadian Immigration Policy: Undoing Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities.” Dissertation, Ryerson University. Capurri, Valentina. 2018. “The Montoya Case: How Neoliberalism Has Impacted Medical Inadmissibility in Canada and Transformed Individuals with Disabilities into ‘Citizens Minus.’” Disability Studies Quarterly 38 (1). Council of Canadians with Disabilities. 2017. Repeal of the Excessive Demands Provisions in Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Policy Brief presented to: Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration. Council of Canadians with Disabilities. 2018. “National Disability Organization Disappointed by Immigration Minister's Response on Excessive Demands Clause.” El-Lahib, Yahya, and Samantha Wehbi. 2011. “Immigration and Disability: Ableism in the Policies of the Canadian State.” International Social Work 55 (1): 95–108. Friedman, Cali. 2017. “Defining Disability: Understandings of and Attitudes Towards Ableism and Disability.” Disability Studies Quarterly 37. George, Susan. 2018. “A Short History of Neoliberalism.” Transnational Institute, April 11, 2018. Gilson, Stephen French, and Elizabeth Depoy. 2000. “Multiculturalism and Disability: A Critical Perspective.” Disability & Society 15 (2): 207–18. Goodley, Dan, Rebecca Lawthom, and Katherine Runswick-Cole. 2014. “Dis/Ability and Austerity: beyond Work and Slow Death.” Disability & Society 29, no. 6 (June): 980–84.

Gray, Ian, and Geoffrey Lawrence. 2001. “Neoliberalism, Individualism and Prospects for Regional Renewal.” Rural Society 11 (3): 283–98. Hanes, Roy. n.d. “None is Still Too Many: An Historical Exploration of Canadian Immigration Legislation as it Pertains to People with Disabilities.” Developmental Disabilities Bulletin 37. Harvey, David. 2007. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Johanneshov: MTM. Jakubowicz, Andrew, and Helen Meekosha. 2004. “Detecting Disability: Moving beyond Metaphor in the Crime Fiction of Jeffrey Deaver.” Disability Studies Quarterly 24 (2). Kymlicka, Will. 2013. “Neoliberal Multiculturalism?” Social Resilience in the Neo-Liberal Era: 99–126. Macintosh, Constance. 2019. “Medical Inadmissibility, and Physically and Mentally Disabled Would-Be Immigrants: Canada’s Story Continues.” Dalhousie Law Journal 42 (1). Mackay, Douglas. 2018. “Immigrant Selection, Health Requirements, and Disability Discrimination.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14, no. 1 (May). McQuigge, Michelle. 2016. “University Prof Denied Residency over Son with Down Syndrome Returning to Canada.” Toronto Star, August 10, 2016. Niles, Chavon A. 2018. “Who Gets in? The Price of Acceptance in Canada.” Journal of Critical Thought and Praxis 7 (1). Root, Jesse, Erika Gates-Gasse, John Shielfs, and Harald Bauder. 2014. “Discounting Immigrant Families: Neoliberalism and the Framing of Canadian Immigration Policy Change A Literature Review.” RCIS Working Paper. Saad-Filho, Alfredo, and Deborah Johnston. 2005. Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader. London: Pluto.

Shields, John. n.d. “No Safe Haven: Markets, Welfare and Migrants.” In Immigrants, Welfare Reform and the Poverty of Policy. Thorsen, Dag. 2010. “The Neoliberal Challenge. What is Neoliberalism?” Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice, no. 2.

international politics

Killer Robot or Foolproof Weapon: the Role of Competing Frames in Shaping Public Opinion of Armed Drones

Celia Philippe

I. Introduction The armed drones discussed in this essay are a type of unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAVs) that are used for targeted elimination of threats. The use of drones for military purposes has expanded both in scope and speed since the beginning of this century, with heightening recourse for warfare. While a significant part of these drones is used for surveillance and reconnaissance, the use of drones for “targeted killings” remains consequent and controversial. Since the first alleged drone strike in 2002 by the United States, state actors and most specifically the United States have routinized the use of UCAVs for threat elimination (Ceccoli 2019). Armed drones are at the forefront of the military strategy of counterterrorism and have been used to launch strikes against high-figure personalities overseas but also at people lower down in terrorist group hierarchies. The framing of drones as a military strategy can be compared to that of anti-personnel (AP) landmines that have long been the weapon of choice for military actors due to their relatively low financial cost and easy installation. In the 1990s, AP landmines and their users became the subject of a transnational campaign launched by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and backed by civil society. The campaign was backed on principles drawn from the laws of war and international humanitarian law and emphasized the civilian indiscrimination and unnecessary suffering that came with their use. As a result, this issue was framed as a humanitarian crisis and a transnational matter rather than a national security issue under state prerogative. This campaign consisted in the “naming and shaming” of states that used AP landmines and put emphasis on the civilian casualties that were a result of landmine misuse. By 1997, a comprehensive treaty was drafted and ratified by 122 countries, including actors from France to the Talibans in Pakistan and South Africa as a regional power not subject to pressure (Price 1999). This successful instance of framing from non-

state actors in their effort to ban AP landmines demonstrates that even the domain of security and war can be subjected and cave to the pressure of civil society. These armed drones have been under scrutiny from transnational advocacy networks that perceive their use as inhuman and indiscriminate, to which states and military officials have responded by stating the drones’ efficiency and precision. The framing theory is key to understanding the interaction between these competing frames of UCAVs. Each side frames their issue a certain way to advance their agenda and influence the opinion of civil society. Here, we will see how two competing frames interact with one another and how compelling they are perceived to be by transnational civil society. The goal is to evaluate why campaigners against the use of drones have been unable to lead a widespread opposition to armed drones. Despite multiple high-profile campaigns against the use of combat drones, they are still widely used to this day and are seen as providing promising technological advancements in the waging of war. We will see that the very occurrence of these competing frames –drones as preventing military casualties and drones as indiscriminate “killer robots”– is what prevents any concrete action from being taken to limit the use of drone technology as a military strategy. The strongest frame is that of the United States administration of drones as efficient and precise, coupled with a dehumanization narrative pushed by the administration and the absence of policy alternatives. While the competing frame of killer drones has been effective to some extent, the role appeal to the efficiency of drone strikes that the United States administration has gathered is stronger. In addition, the presence of an equivalence frame that both NGOs and the United States administration have used to put the focus on either successful strikes against terrorists or that of civilian casualties brings about uncertainty in the public opinion.

II. Literature Review The concern over the use of drones as a routinized weapon of war has been approached by several angles whether it is legal, ethical, strategic or psychological. The legal scholarship on the use of armed drones is extensive and addresses the concerns over the extraterritorial use of force in international law, the place of targeted killings outside the laws of war, and the violations of international human rights according to humanitarian law that drone strikes pose (Perez 2012; Benson 2014). Grimal and Sundaram (2018) offer a particularly novel take on the legalistic issue of drones and their technicality by assessing the status of drone “swarms,” otherwise known as the coordination of a group of drones acting as one “hive.” The strategic effectiveness of drones is also questioned with regards to its accuracy and cost-benefit analysis. The use of signature strikes to detect a suspicious pattern of behaviour, and eradicate potential threats is not foolproof, and there are concerns as to the rigour of criteria that define said suspicious behaviour (Benson 2014). This concern is reflected in the propaganda from terrorist groups and the ability to turn the use of drone strikes to kill their group members as an advantage, portraying them as martyrs and continuing their appointment of new leaders (Cronin 2013). From an ethical standpoint, the use of drones is criticized on its technological aspect as a weapon, and on the consequences of that technology in shaping the nature of conflicts. The ethical considerations are concerned with the “stand-off” nature of the weapon that is remotely controlled and the issue of establishing accountability measures for the strikes. Ultimately, the perception that the human is taken out of the equation is at the root of these concerns when discussing drones as weapons. While unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UACVs) are currently remotely controlled, there is a concern that in the future these weapons could become fully autonomous (Whetham 2013). The psychological considerations of drone strikes have been felt by both the local populations who have witnessed and were victims of these strikes, and by those drone operators. For the victims of drone strikes, 66

the trauma is immeasurable. Living under the constant fear of strikes has resulted in populations developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and severe anticipatory anxiety (Coyne and Hall 2018). For drone operators, the occurrence of PTSD symptoms can be as high as for soldiers in the battlefield and manifest through anxiety disorder, depression or suicidal thoughts (Chappelle et al. 2019). The justifications for the use of drones have also been studied under different paradigms. For instance, the narrative and use of language of the Obama Administration with regards to drone strikes in Yemen has been observed. In this case, Yemen was often defined as a failed state and the Yemenis as backwards in their tradition, a narrative that justified the need for a foreign intervention. The use of drones was thus deemed necessary as a counterterrorism strategy and preferred to other policy alternatives as strategically more accurate and less costly (both in financial and human resources) than human intervention (Ceccoli 2019). The constructivist theory has also been used extensively to explain normative change with regards to drone warfare and its status in international law. As a norm entrepreneur, the Obama administration deliberately worked to shift the current dialogue on drone warfare to justify its counterrorist policy (Birdsall 2018). Through the extensive use of armed drones and expanded notions of imminence that are derived from a perceived threat, a new meaning of the right to self-defense has appeared, one that requires preemptive action (Schmidt and Trenta 2018). While these approaches allow for a more in-depth understanding of the use of drones and their implications, they do not give insight as to why they are still being used. Indeed, the criticisms for the employment of drones as a military strategy are numerous and diverse, but yet they are still a common and growing recourse in the counterterrorist strategy of countries.

III. Framing Theory Robert M. Entman clarifies the concept of framing theory by demonstrating “exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a text, or how framing influences thinking” (Entman 1993, 51). He defines framing as involving the selection of a “perceived reality” and making it more salient, meaning frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies (Entman 1993, 52 emphasis in the original). Throughout the process of communicating information, various frames are presented by the communicators who decide on the framing of a given issue. The receivers of that frame may or may not be influenced by the frame communicated to them, and these frames may or may not be received positively depending on the culture in which these frames are presented. In their article Framing Theory, Chong and Druckman (2007b) describe the theory of framing and the influence of framing methods on public opinion. The framing theory considers that events can be observed through different angles and that they can be embedded with different meanings. Through the process of framing, individuals develop a particular opinion about an issue which constitutes their “frame in thought” (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 105). That is to say that individuals will tend to frame other issues through a particular belief, and thus shape their overall opinion. Because even minor changes in the portrayal of an issue can disproportionately affect people’s opinions, these “framing effects” can easily be employed to shape public opinion (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 109). Scholars have speculated about such an effect by mentioning that public opinion can be superficial and volatile and that the knowledge people do have is fragmented and conflicting which makes it harder to reconcile. Here, the authors evaluate the psychological mechanisms involved in framing effects, as well as the “moderators of framing” that shape the framing of an issue (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 111). An issue does not have to be wholly novel to be the subject of framing, and “traditional” issues can be transformed into “new” issues through

the process of reframing. Over time, individuals store considerations of various issues to retrieve when exposed to future frames and assess its applicability to the matter at hand. Interestingly, preexisting fundamental beliefs reduce the efficiency of framing as individuals tend to resist information that challenges their internalized beliefs. In campaigns, this means that either side must present supporters with frames that are consistent with their values and can attract opposition members to their cause only by using a frame that will appeal to their side. However, not everyone is receptive to framing from the opposition as those with strong ideologies tend to resist contradictory information and only accept them from specific sources. The authors also explore the difference in equivalency communication frames as quantitative, and emphasis frame as dealing with qualitatively different considerations, the latter being the focus of the article. Equivalencies in communication frames are present when phrases spelled out differently but logically equivalent, phrases cause individuals to change their preferences (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). That is to say that the same information is being conveyed in a positive or negative manner, highlighting the sensibility of frame effects in individuals as they respond to these equivalency effects. Thus, it is crucial to understand the impact of frames on individuals in a long-term setting in presence of competing frames. People are most sensitive to framing effects at the early stage of an issue when their opinions are still malleable. Their opinion is also reinforced with time and repeated exposure to these frames. The authors also speculate that when individuals demonstrate active involvement in an issue, they will be less susceptible to framing effects and that when presented with only one frame, individuals do not automatically challenge it and seek alternative considerations (Chong and Druckman 2007b). In a prior article on limits to framing effects, Druckman (2001) explores the conditions under which framing effects occur, with an emphasis on credibility of the frame’s source. He

demonstrates that “contrary to many portrayals, elites face systematic constraints to using frames to influence and manipulate public opinion” (1042). He suggests that in providing frames, elites are not aiming to manipulate public opinion, but they do so at the demand of people for guidance that they perceive as a credible source and can be trusted. Druckman here conducts two experiments. One presenting to individuals a policy aimed at poverty reduction and framed either as a government expenditure or humanitarianism, and the other with regards to tolerance of a Ku Klux Klan rally framed as a free speech issue or public safety concerns. Individuals were assigned with a credible or non credible source and evaluated as to their beliefs and overall opinion on the issue. The findings show that when in the presence of a credible source, the individuals’ importance of considerations can alter their overall opinion through the adherence to the frame presented. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) unveil the cognitive and psychological rationale behind the choices that individuals make when presented with a specific frame in a risky context. The particularity of these risky situations is that they are characterized by their uncertainty in the possible outcomes and their probability. They assert that “the acceptability of an option can depend on whether a negative outcome is evaluated as a cost or as an uncompensated loss” (Kahneman and Tversky 1984, 1). For example, individuals are told that an unexpected disease outbreak is expected to kill 600 people and are presented with two policy alternatives: either Program A is adopted and saves 200 people, or Program B is adopted with a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. In this scenario, 72% choose Program A and only 28% choose Program B, showing the tendency of individuals to lean towards risk-aversion. By speculating on the expected outcome of a risky situation, individuals

tend to make preventive decisions that might have no actual influence on the reality of the experience but correspond to the framing of the situation. In their article, Chong and Druckman (2007a) shift away from the past scholarship, focusing on framing in uncontested settings to observe framing in competitive environments. This approach to framing is particularly pertinent in an era of mass communication, where the communication of frames is multiple and instantaneous. In this exploratory article, the authors identify three hypotheses to be explored by future literature in the presence of multiple competing frames. Firstly, they speculate that framing effects will be more efficient on better informed individuals as the considerations are more accessible in terms of resources and comprehensibility. Secondly, strong prior attitudes on an issue are expected to attenuate the framing effects as individuals with set opinions will choose considerations accessible throughout time rather than temporarily. Thirdly, the “frequent exposure to a frame will increase the accessibility and availability of considerations highlighted by the frame” (Chong and Druckman 2007a, 111). In a political, competitive setting, individuals are exposed to multiple frames at varying frequencies and thus tend to favour that which aligns with their values. In evaluating the response of individuals to frames in a competitive environment, the literature suggests that the most present frame shapes public opinion regardless of its strength, while others suggest that the strongest frame will mark people’s opinions most efficiently. IV. Presenting the Advocates For and Against Drone Warfare The most prominent framing of advocates of a ban on UCAVs is through the comparison to killer robots. This campaign consists of emphasizing the dehumanization of the waging of war, claiming that such distance would create an incentive for the increased use of weapons and war. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is the prominent advocate for the ban of fully autonomous

weapons, which refer, for the most part, to armed drones. This campaign is led by a coalition of NGOs and is supported by twenty-eight countries and the European Parliament. This coalition includes key NGOs that aim to protect human rights such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. In addition, it regroups thousands of experts in artificial intelligence and Nobel Peace Prize laureates, and garners sixty-one percent of the public opinion (The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots 2018). However, the frame of killer robots is one that is not completely aligned with UCAVs. Indeed, the killer robots that the campaign is referring to are fully autonomous weapons, which armed drones are not at the moment but could be in the future. These fully autonomous weapons do not require any type of human involvement in the process. Effectively dehumanizing the targeted killing takes out the only moral imperative that has prevented this act of killing. The main advocate for the use of armed drones is the United States military itself and the government and are at the forefront of drone technology and innovation. Armed drones are a central strategy of the war against terrorism waged by the United States abroad and have become increasingly important. Indeed, under the Obama administration, 400 authorizations of drone strikes were approved in a four-year span. The argument that the Washington administration is simple: they work. Drones have allowed the tracking of suspected terrorists and terrorist activities, identified the threat, and proceeded to the elimination of said threat at a distance, without the need to endanger the life of soldiers (Byman 2013). This argument of armed drones as reducing United States military casualties is particularly efficient in a country where the military is put on a pedestal and with a contentious history of soldier casualty. In framing it as an alternative to traditional warfare, this narrative is easily integrated by the people (Ceccoli 2019).

V. Drone Warfare and Framing Strategies in a Competitive Setting

The advocates of The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots put an emphasis on the wide range of organizations and experts that back up their cause, thus creating an appeal to authority as a legitimate framing actor. This framing of drones as killer robots, while strongly amplified, is perceived as credible by the general public as its source is legitimate and it is a frame that is comprehensible for most individuals considering the overwhelming presence of this theme in the mainstream modern media. One of the central agencies put forward by the campaign are artificial intelligence experts including Stephen Hawking, as well as twenty-one Nobel Peace Laureates (The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots 2018). These actors are considered to have the primary scientific expertise to assess the danger that fully autonomous weapons represent, and thus their position to be followed. However, the same goes for the competing frame that the United States administration has offered, claiming that drone strikes are accurate and an efficient measure to counter-terrorist activities. As one, if not the most powerful government in the world, and the strongest military power among the international community, the United States is waging a war against terrorism on several fronts. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, several administrations of United States presidents have led the fight against terrorism and can thus easily be regarded as the reference in terms of counter-terrorist measures (Byman 2013). That is to say that the United States government also has such authority to dictate policy and as a national government is considered as a credible source by individuals. We can say that in this issue of armed drones, these competing frames presented by NGOs and the United States administration are considered to be of equal credibility by the public opinion even though their expertise comes from different fields. As Druckman (2001) noted in his study, individuals tend to adhere to a frame more easily if the source can be trusted, which can then alter their overall opinion on the issue. This duality in sources and equal credibility could explain why the public opinion is so divided in the issue of armed

drones, and why no concrete measure could be taken to change the current practices of drone warfare as elites have not been able to provide a frame that could challenge the beliefs of the opposition, and the dialogue between both thus remains inexistent. The frames of drones as killer robots and as foolproof weapons are not contradictory but are rather complementary. Indeed, this particular frame advanced by NGOs does not doubt the precision of drones, it fears it. Indeed, the guaranteed accuracy of the strike is necessary to eliminate a threat, but what is problematic is the sometimes-faulty decision-making process behind these drone strikes as well as the lack of accountability involved in the process (Whetham 2013). With the creation of fully autonomous weapons comes the “strategic robot problem,” whereby through learning mechanisms the machine gains knowledge and, in theory, the ability to assess each situation and decide on the measures to be taken without human intervention. But there are serious doubts that this would be possible in the near future (Roff 2014). This lack of humanity in the act of killing is the aspect that opponents to drone warfare have developed as per The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. However, the frame put forward by proponents of armed drones and the United States government is that these drone strikes prevent the danger that sending troops on the ground represents (Boyle 2013). As drones are operated from safe locations and not war zones, individuals operating them are not exposed to direct physical risks. Nevertheless, drone operators can be subject to rates of PTSD sometimes as high as soldiers on the ground and experience significant emotional distress (Chappelle et al. 2019). By taking human losses away from the equation, drones are portrayed as a favourable policy alternative to traditional warfare. This frame resonates well with public opinion, especially in the United States. For individuals that experience a feeling of anger and threat from terrorist activities, drone strikes, while controversial, are more acceptable as sending soldiers “would likely elicit a negative response from those made fearful

about the threat” (Fisk et al. 2019, 993). Thus, in this case, while the framing of drones by NGOs as killer robots is successful and influences public opinion, this potential and futuristic threat does not contend with the frame offered by the United States administration of the use of drones preventing the need for sending troops on the battlefield. While individuals do recognize the caveats that come with the use of armed drones and the danger of fully autonomous weapons, the portrayal of the imminent threat that terrorism represents and the lack of policy alternative presented by the government prevent any shift in the predominant frame and in restricting drone warfare. One of the strategic policy transmissions of the Obama administration with regards to drone warfare is to legitimize the act of killing through dehumanization rhetoric. This dehumanization strategy is not novel and has been used to justify going to war and killing what is portrayed as the “other” (Bachman and Holland 2019). In their article, Bachman and Holland (2019) engage in discourse analysis of six major speeches delivered by officials of the Obama administration in the 2010-2013 period during which legal argumentation was put forward to legitimize the use of combat drones as a counterterrorism strategy after criticism of their policy. Through the dehumanization process, the goal was to input legitimacy in the use of drones and justify their use from a legal standpoint. To make the case that “American actions are legal,” the Obama administration called upon notions of “lethal sterility,” “murder through the mundane” and “assassination enabled through the bureaucratically banal” (Bachman and Holland 2019, 1031). The killings and casualties involved in drone strikes have been framed as essential and as a means to an end that is the eradication of terrorist networks. The framing of the issue fit particularly for most Americans as consistent with the hatred of the “other.” For them, this frame has been internalized through the routinized discourse against terrorism from past administrations. In the

elimination of targets, officials also highlighted the surgical precision and accuracy of the strikes. When there are civilian casualties, the United States describes them as regrettable but as a necessary cost to pay to counterrosit efforts. However, unlike the threats eliminated by drone strikes, these civilian casualties remain nameless. To entice people to care about these civilian casualties, NGOs and media outlets have started to retrieve and display these victims’ names and independently keep track of civilian deaths by drone strikes. That is the work of the Naming the Dead project run by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, providing updated numbers and telling the individual stories of these civilian casualties in Pakistan and the testimonies of communities and families affected (Name the Dead 2019). In reminding that these civilians are humans who should be valued like so, this program attempts to get rid of this frame of “lethal sterility.” The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots also aims at closing the gap in the dissociation with drone casualties as implemented by the United States administration. As a matter of fact, the Campaign uses the word “victim” in contrast to what is referred to as “casualties” by the United States administration, if they are at all mentioned. The use of the word “victim,” as well as the narrative that “no one country would be safe” in the event of the use of fully autonomous weapons, calls to remind individuals that this issue concerns everyone and not only those currently affected (The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots 2018). As a result, the context of security policy is an important arena for policymakers to justify the use of drones by the transmission of particular narratives, and the manipulation of language in policy formulation is the principal means through which they do so. In addition, as the Kahneman and Tversky (1984) article assessed, the cognitive and psychological rationale behind the choices that individuals make when presented with a specific frame in a risky context is defined by the uncertainty of the outcome. In this case, the risky situation is the threat that terrorism poses, and

the acceptability of the current counterterrorism policy that consists of using drone strikes to combat terrorism depends on the fact that the negative outcomes that are civilian casualties are considered as an “uncompensated loss.” However, for the advocates against the use of armed drones, the issue is framed in such a way that these civilian casualties are considered to be a cost to the United States administration's policy. When faced with an imminent threat, individuals tend to favour the policy alternative that is risk-averse as a way to deal with the uncertainty variables, even though the expected outcome would be the same. By doing so, individuals tend to make preventive decisions that might have no actual influence on the reality of the experience but correspond to the framing of the situation. That provides an explanation as to why American citizens primarily support drone strikes as a policy to combat terrorism and are ready to accept the civilian casualties that such a program brings. As per framing theory, when a frame evolves in a similar pre-existing culture the efficiency of that frame is determinant and accompanied with a matching policy frame leads to one frame prevailing over another (Entman 1993; Kahneman and Tversky 1984). To this day, the United States administration has a hold on the framing of the use of armed drones at home and has the military might to support that frame. This means that perceived efficiency of drones as a military strategy prevails among the American public. However, public opinion abroad might be more sensitive to the civilian casualty frame as their culture differs and national administrations do not have a stronghold on that narrative. In the case of drone warfare, equivalencies in communication frames can be found in the transmission of the successful elimination of terrorist figures and the occurrence of civilian casualties as a repercussion of counterterrorist action. These equivalence frames are present when the same information is being conveyed but positively or negatively , highlighting the sensibility of individuals to frame effects as they respond to these equivalency effects differently (Chong and

Druckman 2007a). In this case, the primary goal of drone strikes being the elimination of terrorist threats is perceived by the United States administration and the American public as a good development while the death of civilians is seen as grievous. However, these two alternative descriptions reflect two sides of the same coin, as the targeted killing of terrorists can hardly be isolated from civilian casualties, as with any war (Boyle 2013). While the American administration has decided to focus on the positive outcomes of the use of armed drones and highlight their success and precision in a positive light, NGOs have been quick and consistent in calling out the negative effects of such a strategy with an emphasis on the killing of innocents. The United States government, in the form of press releases, informs the public of the occurrence of the elimination of targets, such events usually being highly mediatized (Schmitt and Walsh 2012). Under the Obama administration, drone strikes became the counterterrorism strategy par excellence, the White House claiming to have depleted the ranks of Al Qaeda across borders while minimizing the risk of sending soldiers on the battlefront (Ceccoli 2019). On the other hand, these statements from the United States administration forgo mentioning the casualties that these strikes that target terrorists come at a price of civilian casualties. This is the focus that critics of armed drones have taken, with NGOs like Amnesty International in formulating reports about the civilian casualties caused by United States drone strikes (Amnesty International USA 2013). Because the same information is being conveyed in a negative or positive frame by two different actors that both have the corresponding authority and credibility, it is hard for the public to have an opinion of their own on this issue. The confusion that these equivalencies in frame bring to individuals could also justify why neither of these competing frames is sticking and shaping the public opinion but rather provide a divide between two different sides.

The frame presented by the United States government in favour of drone warfare resonates particularly well domestically due to the culture of strong counterrorist sentiment in which it evolves. Indeed, the frames presented by either side have an objective to entice a reaction of the receivers of the frame. In this case, both communicators of the frame play on the feelings of fear and count on a reaction of anger to make their frame stronger. The United States administration builds on the perceived threat terrorists represent and capitalizes on the anger that terrorist actions provoke in the public. In their article, Fisk et al. (2019) demonstrate that the perception of threat from civil society plays a central to support the narrative presented by governments in favour of the use of drones against terrorists. The levels of support in the United States are similar regardless of party-affiliation and show that the majority of Americans are supportive of drone strikes in the counterterrorism agenda. However, this sentiment is not shared by citizens of other countries. French citizens display 63% opposition to these strikes, with the strongest opposition in a country coming from Greece with 90% of people against drone strikes (Drake 2013). This feeling of anger drives an aggressive response that is directed to the punishment of evil (Fisk et al. 2019). The role of antiterrorist sentiments embedded in American culture are emphasized by perceptions of imminent terrorist threats that strengthen the United State government framing of drones. These situations are defined by uncertainty and individuals attempt to speculate on the expected outcome of a risky situation to assess the best solution. But in doing so, they tend to make preventive decisions that might have no actual influence on the reality of the experience but correspond to the framing of the situation (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). As a result, the uncertainty of the situation and confusion of these competing frames do not help individuals make sense of their reality and critically assess the best policy option but rather merely respond to the frames presented to them. Because of this fuzzy context and lack of concrete knowledge about their options, individuals tend

to stick with the frame that they are either the most exposed to, makes a stronger appeal to them or fits best with their pre-existing values.

VI. Conclusion We can say the circumstances of these competing frames prevent any concrete action from being taken. The public opinion on the use of drones is polarized between those in favor and against, with no interaction and dialogue between the two groups. The primary frame that has been transmitted by the United States administration usually retains the upper hand as the administrator of this policy has the opportunity to frame the issue a certain way before anyone else. Individuals are most sensitive to framing effects at the early stage of an issue when their opinion is still malleable (Chong and Druckman 2007b). Despite the fact that the killer robot frame has had resonance in the media and to some instance civil society, it concerns fully autonomous weapons which drones are not and can thus be considered more so fiction than a real threat The Obama administration has used the framing of drone strikes as a means to the end of eradicating terrorist networks. It also made use of dehumanization strategies to provide a frame of “lethal sterility” that opponents to drone strikes have tried to counter by providing the names and testimonies of victims. To some extent, this attempt at giving exposure to civilian drone casualties was successful thanks to the wide media exposure, but the public opinion could still support drone strikes while recognizing the casualties in the absence of policy alternatives and the wish to avoid losses by sending troops on the ground. Moreover, the presence of equivalencies in communication frames with regards to deaths by drone strikes, whether they are of well-known terrorist or of civilian casualties, further creates a divide in public opinion as these two equivalent frames do not communicate with one another. Lastly, the role of feelings of threat and anger geared towards

punishment work in reinforcing the frame of the United States administration, particularly in attempting to make sense of the uncertainty of the situation. As of now, it seems that these two competing frames prevent the prevalence of either one, but we can wonder if some conditions would tilt the balance in favour of one of these frames. Through increasing availability of drone warfare by terrorist groups, the stakes for the use of combat drones would be higher and potentially negatively affect their perception in the public opinion. The lack of access to state resources prevented non-state violent actors from using drones, but the Hezbollah in Lebanon flew a military drone over Israeli space in 2004, a rare instance for this non-state actor. However, with the improvement of technology and in accessibility of “weaponized commercially available” drones this could soon change. While these home manufactured drones are nowhere near state capacity, the Hezbollah possess drones that were allegedly supplied by Iran (Sims 2018). If opponents to drone warfare adjusted the pre-existing frame of drones as killer robots but in the hands of terrorist groups who intend harm, then perhaps the argument against combat drones would gain more weight and shift the current public opinion.

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Islamisme et démocratie : entre principes religieux et idéologie politique

Nolwenn Bouillé

Introduction D’après Huntington, la démocratie s’est imposée en trois vagues. La première au début du 19e siècle, la deuxième à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et la troisième à partir des années 70.(Huntington 1993) Aujourd’hui, seuls deux états du Moyen-Orient sont considérés comme étant des régimes démocratiques. D’après l’indice démocratique de The Economist, seul Israël peut-être considéré comme une «démocratie pleine». La Tunisie est-elle seule dans la catégorie «démocratie imparfaite» ? Le reste des pays du Moyen-Orient se distribue entre des «régimes hybrides» comme pour le Liban ou la Turquie, et des régimes autoritaires comme pour la Syrie, qui arrive avant-dernière dans le classement, juste avant la Corée du Nord. (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2019) Le phénomène est particulièrement marquant lorsqu’il est sous forme de carte, la région semble en effet particulièrement résistante à une transition démocratique. (ANNEXE)Pour expliquer cette robustesse, les universitaires se sont intéressés à ce qui fait l’exception de la région. La question de la culture et, précisément de l’Islam, comme obstacle à la démocratie s’est donc posée. C’est une théorie particulièrement avancée dans les années 90, notamment par Huntington qui parle de «Conflit de civilisation». (Huntington 1993) Nous pourrions alors questionner notre choix de revenir sur cette question aujourd’hui. La raison principale est que nous sommes près de 10 ans après les Printemps arabes. La série de révolutions a fait tomber des régimes autoritaires, notamment en Tunisie ou en Égypte, et a ouvert la porte à de potentielles transitions démocratiques. Cependant, malgré les nombreux pays touchés, seule la Tunisie est aujourd’hui considérée comme étant une démocratie. Cet épisode a ainsi confirmé la robustesse de l’autoritarisme de la région et a engendré de nouvelles études sur son lien avec l’Islam. (Stein 2013) La question de la religion comme opposée à la démocratie s’était déjà posée pour le catholicisme et s’est avérée empiriquement fausse, au moment de la troisième vague de démocratisation. Pourrait-il en être de même pour le Moyen-Orient et donc l’Islam ?

Il est important de noter qu’une transition démocratique repose sur un nombre de facteurs trop importants pour envisager la particularité culturelle qu’est l’islam comme seul obstacle, mais cela n’écarte pas la possibilité d’une incompatibilité entre les deux entités. Il s’agit ainsi, dans un premier temps, de montrer en quoi l’Islam n’est pas fondamentalement opposé aux principes de la démocratie, ou du moins ne l’est pas plus que ne l’était le catholicisme. Cependant, au-delà de la spiritualité et de ses principes fondamentaux, l’Islam sous la forme de l’islamisme est également une idéologie politique, représentée par des partis, des leaders et des projets. Ainsi, dans une seconde partie, nous montrerons en quoi, si les principes fondamentaux ne peuvent être tenus responsables pour la résistance à la démocratie, l’idéologie politique qu’est l’islamisme tient bel et bien un rôle dans les changements politiques, mais celui d’un acteur politique comme les autres. Un acteur, qui peut se retrouver à renforcer l'autoritarisme de la région non pas de lui-même, mais par ce qui le différencie et l’oppose à d’autres idéologies, ou encore de par ce qu’on fait de lui. Il s’agit de montrer en quoi les séparations entre musulmans et minorités jouent un rôle majeur dans le maintien, et la robustesse des régimes autoritaires du Moyen-Orient. I.

L’islam n’est pas fondamentalement incompatible avec la démocratie A. Définir la démocratie Afin de définir si oui ou non, l’Islam présente des caractéristiques fondamentales

faisant obstacle aux principes de la démocratie, il convient de s’accorder sur une définition de ce qu’est la démocratie. Dans sa définition la plus nue, la démocratie est un « système politique, une forme de gouvernement, dans lequel la souveraineté émane du peuple.» Ce principe transparaît dans l’étymologie même, le mot démocratie étant composé des deux mots grecs «Demos », le peuple et «Kratos» le pouvoir. (Larousse 2019) Ce principe se traduit par la mise en place régulière d’élections durant lesquelles les citoyens choisissent leurs

représentants, ou dans le cas de référendums, sont consultés au sujet d’une loi ou d’un changement politique important. C’est par ailleurs ce critère que Huntington a utilisé pour déterminer les trois vagues de démocratisation. (Huntington 1993) Cependant, cette définition n’est pas satisfaisante. Des élections régulières ne suffisent pas à qualifier un état de démocratie efficace puisqu’elle ne garantit pas que le pouvoir réside dans les mains du peuple. On peut parler d'électoralisme, ou "the faith that merely holding elections will channel political action into peaceful contests among elites and accord public legitimacy to the winners" no matter how they are conducted or what else constraints those who win them." (Karl 1980-1985, as cited in Schmitter and Karl 1991) Il nous est donc plus intéressant de nous appuyer sur une définition plus large. Afin de déterminer les critères qui nous serviront à évaluer la compatibilité, nous nous sommes tout d’abord intéressés aux différentes méthodes et indices qui permettent de mesurer le niveau de démocratie des pays. Dans ce papier, nous nous appuyons donc sur l’indice démocratique The Economist, sur les théories de Dahl et sur ce qui fait une démocratie d’après Schmitter. En recoupant ces sources, nous obtenons une série de critères récurrents, communs aux différentes définitions de la démocratie. Ce sont ces critères que nous allons utiliser pour tester l’éventuelle incompatibilité entre l’Islam et le système démocratique. Il me paraît important de noter que, si les indices comme celui de The Economist sont en effet critiqués, c’est l’application des critères insuffisamment transparents qui est la cible, ce qui n’enlève rien à la pertinence des critères en tant que tels. Ainsi, les critères qui reviennent et qui ,donc, nous intéressent sont les suivants : 1. Des élections libres, justes et fréquentes ; 2. Une citoyenneté inclusive/suffrage universel ; 3. Libertés civiles incluant expression, média, organisation ;

Il s’agit à présent de déterminer si les principes de l’Islam sont compatibles avec les trois critères précédemment énoncés.

B. Des concepts similaires L’Islam présente des concepts et une rhétorique qui peuvent être considérés comme compatibles avec les trois critères précédemment énoncés. Les concepts souvent invoqués sont ceux de la «Shura» ; «Ijma»; «Ijtihad». (Arunachalam and Watson 2014) «Shura» exprime l’idée selon laquelle, la consultation du peuple, mais surtout la consultation entre les musulmans est un élément primordial dans le règlement des affaires. Cette idée est très proche du principe des élections qui sont la mise en place pratique de cette «consultation» (Mubarak 2016) . Le terme Ijma signifie quant à lui « consensus». Comme l’explique Zardar, il désigne le procédé de débat auquel le prophète Muhammad faisait appel lorsqu’il devait prendre une décision. La communauté était invitée à exprimer son avis sur la question, jusqu’à obtenir un consensus : "Thus a democratic spirit was central to communal and political life in early Islam" (Sardar 2002) une fois ,encore, un concept similaire à celui des élections, plus précisément des referendums, se trouve dans les fondamentaux de l’Islam. Enfin, le terme «Itjihad» qui signifie «dérivation», désigne l’idée selon laquelle, les textes fondateurs de l’Islam ne peuvent être considérés comme étant la loi elle-même, mais doivent être utilisés par les Hommes pour déterminer les règles de leur société. Ainsi, il est inclus dans l’Islam l’idée selon laquelle, ses principes peuvent et probablement doivent être adaptés à un système politique dans lequel les hommes peuvent évoluer. (Weiss 1978) Je tiens à noter que cet élément, bien que considéré comme pouvant soutenir une transition démocratique, ouvre également la porte aux interprétations variées, puisque les Hommes ont

la responsabilité de déterminer les lois, à partir du texte. Ces interprétations peuvent poser des difficultés, et nous les abordons dans la partie suivante. L’Islam ne semble pas s’opposer au principe des élections, au contraire, on trouve dans sa rhétorique, une symbolique similaire. Cependant, la question de la participation n’est pas celle qui oppose les universitaires, mais celles de la laïcité et de l’égalité des droits qui feraient obstacle. Nous discutons de ces deux éléments ci-dessous. C. Les problématiques de la laïcité et de l’égalité des droits La laïcité et l’égalité des droits sont aux nœuds du débat. Un des principaux arguments du côté des défenseurs du «Clash de civilisations» est l’absence de séparation entre l’État et la religion, autrement dit, l’impossibilité d’implémenter la laïcité. Lakoff le résume ainsi : " the belief that Islam must form the basis of the state will pose a major obstacle to democratization throughout the Muslim world"(Lakoff 2004) Cet argument pose tout d’abord problème puisqu’il ne se base pas sur l’Islam en tant que tel, mais sur l’application politique souhaitée par des groupes : " Those who claim to adhere to this early experience most scrupulously—including the Shi'ite mullahs of Iran and the Sunni Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the violent Wahabi radical Osama bin Laden and his followers—all insist that "the Koran is our constitution" and that the only legitimate form of government is what amounts to a revived caliphate, combining spiritual and temporal authority and relying on shari’a." (Lakoff 2004)

L’auteur s’appuie donc sur un islam politisé pour soutenir une contradiction qui ne concerne pas l’Islam en tant qu’ensemble de principes religieux. Or, pour être considéré laïque, un état doit remplir deux conditions : "1) their legal and judicial processes are out of institutional religious control, and 2) they establish neither an official religion nor atheism".

(Kuru 2007) Ainsi, il est possible, pour un état dans lequel une religion est majoritaire et très présente, de tout de même obtenir un système laïque. Dans son article, Kuru compare la laïcité en Turquie, en France et aux États-Unis et montre ainsi que différentes versions de celle-ci sont possibles. Le lien entre l'État et la religion aux États-Unis est beaucoup plus ambigu qu’il ne l’est en France par exemple. (Kuru 2007) Le second nœud majeur est celui de l’égalité des droits. Le débat s’intéresse surtout à la place de la femme dans la religion, et déplore ainsi une inégalité profonde, irréconciliable avec le principe d’égalité des droits, nécessaire à la démocratie. Cependant, une fois de plus, ce n’est pas l’Islam lui-même qui est responsable de ces divisions, mais son interprétation et sa mise en place concrète. "There is a significant gap between what the Qur’an says and the manner in which its teaching are practised (Ali 1993, as cited in Reconciling Islam and feminism) " dans "Reconciling Islam and Feminism", Hashim présente les droits que la femme possède d’après le Coran, tout en argumentant que les vers qui les exposent pourraient même permettre aux femmes d’accéder à une nouvelle place dans les sociétés musulmanes. Elle insiste ainsi sur l’idée que l’éducation islamique est particulièrement importante. (1999) Nous retrouvons ici l’idée selon laquelle, c’est bien ce qui est fait de l’Islam, et ainsi comment il est enseigné, qui est discuté, et non pas les principes fondamentaux qui le constituent. Dans le cas de la laïcité et de l’égalité, le problème vient de l’interprétation. Nous pouvons associer cette idée au concept précédemment évoqué du Itjihad. Quelques notions en plus : Le concept qui semble poser le moins de problèmes dans la rencontre entre l’Islam et la démocratie est celui de la place du pouvoir dans les mains du peuple. Or, ironiquement, c’est l’unique élément que Huntington utilise lorsqu’il détermine les trois vagues de démocratisation. Ainsi lorsque ce même auteur parle du clash des civilisations qui oppose

l’islam et la démocratie libérale, ce ne sont pas les thèmes plus problématiques que sont la laïcité et l’égalité qui sont pris en compte. Enfin, je tiens à ajouter qu’un système qui répond à toutes les aspirations que sont celles de la démocratie n’est observable nulle part, dans aucun état issu des trois vagues de démocratisation. Même des États, considérés comme des leaders du monde libre, comme les États-Unis, sont considérés comme des démocraties imparfaites. Ainsi, on ne peut demander aux pays du Moyen-Orient de proposer des bases en adéquations avec cet idéal alors qu’il n’est atteint nulle part. Nous ne pouvons donc pas les disqualifier.

Dans cette première partie, nous avons, à partir des trois critères principaux d’une démocratie, proposé un bilan du débat sur la question de l’opposition entre Islam et démocratie. L’Islam présente donc bel et bien des concepts allant dans le sens de la démocratie. Pour ce qui est de la laïcité et de l’égalité des droits, ces critiques sont effet observable, mais elles ne font pas référence aux principes fondamentaux de l’Islam, mais à ces interprétations et ces applications. Ainsi, nous concluons : l’Islam ne semble pas présenter d’éléments en contradiction avec le système démocratique. Si l’Islam n’y est pas fondamentalement opposé, quel rôle joue-t-il concrètement dans les changements politiques ? Dans cette seconde partie, nous nous intéressons à l’Islam, non pas en tant que religion et principes, mais en tant qu’idéologie et force politique : l’islamisme. Pour illustrer la compatibilité ou du moins l’absence d’incompatibilité entre les principes de l’Islam et la démocratie, nous nous appuierons sur une étude de cas de l’Égypte. L’Égypte nous paraît une étude particulièrement pertinente et intéressante pour plusieurs raisons. Premièrement, c’est en Égypte que le parti des Frères musulmans est né, en 1928. Deuxièmement, c’est en Égypte que les révolutions arabes de 2011 ont vu le jour; or cette

série de révolutions est probablement la tentative de démocratisation récente la plus globale, pour la région du Moyen-Orient.

II. L’Islam comme acteur politique et comme groupe pour comprendre sa relation à la démocratie et aux régimes autoritaires A. Instrumentaliser les divisions (les islamistes dans les élections) La religion est un vecteur de connexions sociales fortes, qui permettent la création de communautés, d’un réseau (Smith, 1996). Or comme le montre Rørbæk dans "Religion, Political power, and the "sectarian surge" : Middle Eastern Identity Politics in Comparative perspective" : "Middle East is the only region in the world where religious affiliation is the predominant identity marker" (2019). Ainsi, il convient à présent de s’intéresser à la manière dont «ce marqueur fort d'identité» a pu être instrumentalisé. 1. Légitimer le pouvoir sacré Premièrement, la religion peut permettre de légitimer le pouvoir. Nous avons argumenté dans notre première partie que la consultation du peuple, et la consultation au sein du peuple étaient des concepts présents dans les fondamentaux de l’Islam. Cependant, les fortes affiliations que suscitent les croyances religieuses peuvent être exploitées par le détenteur du pouvoir, qui, se présentant comme l’élu, ou une figure religieuse, justifie ses prises de décision. Ainsi, un dictateur en place, dont la légitimité est religieusement justifiée et généralement acceptée, aura moins de mal à se maintenir dans un contexte de fortes affiliations religieuses. Il ne s’agit donc pas de l’Islam en soi, mais de l’utilisation des connexions qu’il engendre. Lorsque Sadat est arrivé au pouvoir en Égypte en 1971, il prenait la suite de Nasser, dont l’influence se basait sur un nationalisme arabe laïque. Afin de développer sa propre

influence, il s’est appuyé sur l’Islam, profitant non seulement de la légitimité que cela lui offrait, mais également du soutien de son peuple. Ainsi, la religion et les symboles qu’elle englobe lui ont permis de créer son identité politique, en comparaison avec son prédécesseur. (Esposito and Voll 1996) Cependant, il est intéressant de noter que contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait penser, cela a également permis d’ouvrir l’espace politique à des partis islamistes modérés (notamment les Frères musulmans), prêts à se développer et à travailler au sein de la démocratie et non contre.(Esposito and Voll 1996) 2. Instrumentaliser la peur Deuxièmement, l’Islamisme, autrement dit l’application politique de l’Islam, a été instrumentalisé à de nombreuses reprises, que ce soit par des dictateurs, l’armée quand il s’agissait de tutelle, ou bien les élites, de manière plus générale. Cela a permis aux détenteurs du pouvoir de maintenir des régimes autoritaires. Dans un contexte où les affiliations religieuses sont fortes, les potentielles oppositions idéologiques peuvent être accentuées, le détenteur du pouvoir pouvant appliquer l'adage «diviser pour mieux régner». Dans le cas des dictateurs, nous pouvons prendre l’exemple de l’Égypte. Dans les années 90, Mubarak a mis en place de nouvelles lois restrictives qui ont fermé la porte du système politique. Ces règles furent justifiées par la montée de groupes islamistes souhaitant prendre une nouvelle place dans le paysage politique égyptien. (Swedler, clark)

Le même

phénomène est observable dans le cas d’un État soumis à une tutelle militaire. En Turquie, par exemple, "the military and its civilian backers utilised societal tensions, such as those regarding Kurdish rights or political Islam, to reproduce deference to military power" (Arslanalp, Pearlman 2017)

Plus généralement, comme l’explique Toft, les élites ont un intérêt dans le jeu des conflits, en leur insufflant un aspect religieux, afin de s’assurer de leur maintien au pouvoir. (2007) B. Les difficultés du consensus (La laïcité) Les divisions ont été instrumentalisées, mais elles n’en sont pas moins réelles et profondes. Elles existent et peuvent aussi, en tant que telles, être considérées comme un obstacle de plus à la démocratie. En effet, si la démocratie ne nécessite pas un consensus total, elle se base tout de même sur un accord concernant les règles de bases qui la régissent. (Schmitter and Karl 1991) Nous l’avons vu, la question de la laïcité ne semble pas être un problème pour l’Islam en tant que tel, mais cela ne signifie pas qu’elle ne l’est pas pour les islamistes. En effet, dans de nombreux pays du Moyen-Orient, un conflit oppose laïques et islamistes. Or il paraît difficile de trouver un compromis entre les deux visions opposées. En Égypte et en Tunisie, les idéologies laïques et islamistes peuvent difficilement être conçues comme réconciliables puisque la première demande une séparation totale entre l’état et la religion tandis que la seconde, propose un état dont le fonctionnement repose sur l’Islam. Contrairement à des problématiques ethniques, celles-ci sont difficilement réconciliables dans un seul et même régime. (Lust 2012) Le fait que ce conflit ne puisse potentiellement n’avoir qu’un gagnant, approfondis les clivages de la société, des clivages qui, nous l’avons vu, sont en plus dans l’intérêt des détenteurs du pouvoir. En Égypte, cette séparation peut être considérée comme catalysée par l’assassinat du Dr. Faraj Foda. D’après Najjar, connu comme étant laïque, critiquant la possibilité d’un état religieux, le docteur a été assassiné par deux membres de Islamic Jihad . Bien sûr, l’extrémisme de l’acte est loin d’avoir été soutenu unanimement, mais il témoigne d’une opposition profonde, difficilement réconciliable. (Najjar 1996)

Au-delà de ce qui sépare les groupes, des divisions sont également observables au sein des groupes politiques eux-mêmes. En effet, comme le souligne Lust, "Islamists at first seemed more unified, but, as Tunisia’s president Moncef Marzouki notes in a New York Times op-ed, their new-found ability to participate in politics rendered the divisions among Islamists more apparent than ever before.” (Lust 2012) Même si l’Islam avait été la seule et unique religion universelle de la région, cela ne signifie pas qu’un consensus aurait été atteint. Sans même parler des schismes religieux, les partis politiques islamistes ne sont euxmêmes pas homogènes et les débats que déclenche la compétition électorale nous montrent bien que l’Islam politique s’étend du plus radical au plus modéré. Des sujets tels que l’excision, par exemple, sont débattus et de manière plus générale, la façon dont l’Islam doit être politiquement appliqué peut différer. En Égypte, l’islam politique s’est exprimé différemment. Lorsque Sadat a accédé au pouvoir, de nouvelles formes d’expression politique islamistes plus extrémistes sont apparues, faisant de la concurrence aux partis islamistes considérés «modérés» qui jouaient le jeu de la démocratie (Esposito and Voll 1996). D’après Esposito et Voll, ces nouveaux groupes se sont notamment formés en réaction à l’emprisonnement d’islamistes, à présent convaincus que seule la violence leur permettra d’atteindre leurs objectifs (1996). Conclusion En conclusion, la question de la compatibilité entre l’Islam et le système démocratique est une question légitime puisque la religion musulmane fait partie de la spécificité culturelle de la région. Cependant, lorsque nous cherchons parmi ces principes fondamentaux, et que nous les comparons à ceux de la démocratie, il apparait que, dans un premier temps, l’Islam présente des principes similaires, et dans un second temps, les points critiqués s’appuient en réalité sur certaines visions de l’Islam et non sur les principes de bases. Ainsi, ces arguments sont valables, mais ne traitent pas du même sujet. Il s’agit donc

de différencier l’Islam en tant qu’ensemble de principes fondamentaux et l’Islam en tant que présence politique. La fatalité de l’argument du «Conflit de civilisation» ferme rapidement la porte à une future vague de démocratisation dans la région et ne permet pas de comprendre la relation qu’entretient l’Islam politique avec les régimes dans lesquels il évolue. Nous conclurons ainsi : " The future development of the islamic movement depends on how it is treated (or mistreated) by those in power and not on any inherent conflict between Islam and Freedom…"(Esposito and Voll 1996).

References Arunachalam, Raj, and Sarah Watson. 2014. "Does Islam Promote Authoritarianism ?". https://polisci.osu.edu/sites/polisci.osu.edu/files/IslamandAuthoritarianism.pdf. Arslanalp, Mert, and Wendy Pearlman. 2017. "Mobilization In Military-Controlled Transitions: Lessons From Turkey, Brazil, And Egypt". Comparative Sociology 16 (3): 311-339. doi:10.1163/15691330-12341426. Arslanalp, Mert, and Wendy Pearlman. 2017. "Mobilization In Military-Controlled Transitions: Lessons From Turkey, Brazil, And Egypt". Comparative Sociology 16 (3): 311-339. doi:10.1163/15691330-12341426. Dahl, Robert A. 1963. A Preface To Democratic Theory. Hashim, Iman. 1999. "Reconciling Islam And Feminism". Gender & Development 7 (1): 714. doi:10.1080/741922938. Esposito, John L, and John Obert Voll. 1996. Islam And Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. The Third Wave. University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The Clash Of Civilizations?". Foreign Affairs 72 (3): 22. doi:10.2307/20045621. Karl, Terry. 1980-1985 " Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in E1 Salvador". Elections and Democratization in Latin America. 9-36. Lakoff, Sanford A. 2004. "The Reality Of Muslim Exceptionalism". Journal Of Democracy 15 (4): 133-139. doi:10.1353/jod.2004.0065. Larousse, Éditions. 2019. "Définitions : Démocratie - Dictionnaire De Français Larousse". Larousse.Fr. https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/démocratie/23429?q=democratie#2331 3.

Lust, Ellen. 2012. "After The Arab Spring: Islamism, Secularism, And Democracy". Current History 111 (749). Mubarak, Abdulkadir. 2016. "Democracy From Islamic Law Perspective". Kom : Casopis Za Religijske Nauke 5 (3): 1-18. doi:10.5937/kom1603001m. Sardar, Ziauddin. 2002. "Rethinking Islam". Journal Of Futures Studies. https://jfsdigital.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/064-A06.pdf Moustafa, Tamir. 2000. "CONFLICT AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE STATE AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY EGYPT". International Journal Of Middle East Studies 32 (1): 3-22. doi:10.1017/s0020743800021024. Najjar, Fauzi M. 1996. "The Debate On Islam And Secularism In Egypt". Arab Studies Quarterly 18 (2). Stein, Ewan. 2013. "Studying Islamism After The Arab Spring". Mediterranean Politics 19 (1): 149-152. doi:10.1080/13629395.2013.856183. Schmitter, Philippe C, and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. "What Democracy Is. . . And Is Not". Journal Of Democracy 2 (3): 75-88. doi:10.1353/jod.1991.0033. The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2019. "Democracy Index 2018: Me Too?". http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2018.p df&mode=wp&campaignid=Democracy2018. Toft, Monica n. 2007. "Getting Religion ?". International Security. Weiss, Bernard. 1978. "Interpretation In Islamic Law: The Theory Of Ijtihad". The American Journal Of Comparative Law 26 (2): 199. doi:10.2307/839668.

The Role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT’s) in Human Rights Monitoring: Tools for Democratizing an Otherwise Elitist Practice or Facilitators of State Impunity?

Niya Stoyanova

Introduction The rise of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) has enabled people to document events, share information, communicate ideas and connect with each other like never before. The rapid advancements offered by such technology have had an important impact on all facets of our society, including the field of human rights monitoring. But how have modern ICT tools influenced human rights monitoring? This paper argues that ICTs mitigate some of the practical and ethical problems prevalent within the traditional practice of human rights fact-finding and monitoring. However, ICT tools also present human rights monitors with new and critical challenges. On one hand, ICT tools allow human rights monitors to collect data from remote or otherwise inaccessible locations, connect with sources of information, track events in real time, and anticipate events. Such technologies also serve to decentralize human rights monitoring by allowing civilians, affected by human rights violations, to participate in the process of collecting data. Despite these benefits, ICT tools also present important challenges for human rights monitoring because they can become a tool for state control over information that reveals human rights abuses, the mass quantities of data collected are difficult to process, and the data collected may be inaccurate or, may be inaccurately interpreted by researchers. Research on the impact of ICTs on human rights monitoring is important because human rights organizations must recognize the benefits that ICT tools present or they will miss out on the opportunities they provide. Understanding the potential of such technology, particularly the use of Citizen-Generated Media (CGM), has the potential to democratise human rights monitoring. As

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well, such research sheds light on the practical challenges human rights monitors face in using ICT tools, which is an essential step if human rights organisations are to overcome such challenges.

1. Defining Human Rights Monitoring Human rights monitoring can be described as the ongoing observation of the state of human rights in a given context (Puttick 2017, 6). It involves the continuous and long-term analysis of trends in order to detect patterns of violations and identify areas for intervention and improvement (Ibid., 6). Human rights monitoring reveals whether there are gaps between universally accepted human rights standards and those set through domestic legislation or between domestic standards and how they are applied or met in reality (Guzman & Verstappen 2013, 12). In situations of acute conflict or escalating abuse, one of the main ways, in which the international community learns information about violations of human rights law, is through the creation of fact-finding missions (Puttick 2017, 7). Fact-finding involves the collection of information that either proves or disproves that human rights abuses have occurred (Ibid., 8). Human rights monitoring is accomplished primarily through the dynamic interplay of three kinds of actors: inter-governmental, governmental, and non-governmental organizations. The work that a type of organization does complements or provides a balance to the work of others (Guzman & Verstappen 2013, 16).

2. Practical Challenges of Traditional Forms of Human Rights Monitoring Human rights monitoring by the United Nations (U.N) is undertaken by treaty-based committees, Special Rapporteurs and other bodies under the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, as well as some specialized agencies such as the International Labour Organization (Guzman &

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Verstappen 2013, 17). The treaty bodies are made up of independent experts who monitor the implementation of human rights treaties, primarily through the periodic review of reports submitted by state parties (Rodley 2013, 626). A major weakness of this system is that most reports submitted by states tend to be self-congratulatory and often provide little information on how the rights are enjoyed in practice (Ibid., 627). Treaty-based committees thus have to rely on information provided by non-governmental organizations (NGO) (Ibid., 628). NGOs conduct human rights monitoring through documentation and investigations, particularly through factfinding missions (Puttick 2017, 7). However, several challenges have often impeded such missions’ abilities to effectively carry out their work and produce the intended results. The first and foremost of these challenges is the difficulty factfinders face in accessing the territories in question (Ibid., 9). Traditionally, the gold standard of fact-finding has been the faceto-face interview between civilian witnesses and human rights practitioners (McPherson 2018, 192). This required investigators to be physically present on the territory of alleged human rights violations. However, access to the affected country has often been obstructed. Security concerns and on-going conflict preclude the possibility of fact-finding delegations physically visiting territories where violations are allegedly taking place (Ibid). Governments may also prohibit the entry of international human rights investigators and Special Rapporteurs into their countries, especially if such governments are the ones carrying out the human rights abuses (Montgomery 2004, 28). As well, witnesses and victims may refuse to testify and provide information out of fear of retaliation by government security forces or armed groups (Ibid., 28). Another important limitation of such missions is that they are resource intensive: they are extremely costly and time-consuming (Puttick 2017, 9). Fact-finding missions require international travel for mission staff to attend orientation and conduct in-country visits. When

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necessary, interpreters are used during the course of fact-finding missions. The careful selection of independent and professional interpreters that are experts in the required languages and relevant technical concepts is thus another time-consuming process (Ibid). In addition, the NGO must ensure the security, health, and safety of the mission staff – the appropriate emergency procedures must be in place and the delegation must be fully briefed on recognizing and managing stress and psychosocial trauma to prepare them for the upcoming mission (Wallenberg 2013, 6). The safety and protection of potential interviewees in the state where the mission takes place is another central responsibility of the NGO. If the government of the state where the mission takes place, or any other party, finds out that there are concerns for the safety of an interviewee, then the NGO may cancel the interview or abandon the mission (Wallenberg 2013, 7). In addition, the NGO should seek a guarantee from the government that the interviewees will not be persecuted, victimised or be put in a harmful position for willing to cooperate with the delegation (Wallenberg 2013, 7). The same principle applies if the interviewee is threatened as a result of being identified by other people (Ibid). Moreover, fact-finding missions operate painfully slowly, with months or even years passing between the establishment of the mandate and the publication of a final report (Ibid). Factfinding missions are thus a slow and generally ineffective way of collecting information about crisis situations, in which reliable information is needed quickly.

ICT Tools Technology can help mitigate the aforementioned issues related to human rights monitoring. First, ICT tools allow researchers to monitor human rights in a given state remotely. Satellite imagery, in particular, allows researchers to gain access to restricted and remote locations.

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Satellites provide otherwise unattainable, contemporaneous information about events occurring in non-permissible environments (Raymond et al. 2013, 186). Orbiting hundreds of miles above the Earth, their sensors collect unique data about certain observable objects (tanks, planes, burned buildings, etc.) from places that are not easily accessible from the ground (Ibid). This aspect also allows researchers to investigate events across large expanses of land and also track a series of events that took place over a long period of time. Drones are another form of ICT that enhance human rights monitoring because drones carry photographic equipment and are equipped with infrared technology that can detect hidden troops, track movements of armed militias, and document atrocities (Karlsrud & Rosen 2013, 2). These ICTs provide large amounts of reliable information quickly, remotely, and effectively. However, cost is a major obstacle to the widespread use of such ICTs. The retail price for priority tasking DigitalGlobe’s QuickBird satellite can average as much as US$40 per square kilometer (Wang et al. 2013, 5). Moreover, there is also the risk of researchers interpreting an image incorrectly or miscalculating the direction of an impending attack: “NGO analysts could be motivated to deliberately distort image data in order to produce findings consistent with their conjectures” (Ibid., 7). They may also lack the necessary training to make accurate interpretations of overhead images or they may tend to over extrapolate what can be shown through analysis of satellite-derived data (Ibid., 8).

3. Ethical Challenges with Traditional Forms of Human Rights Fact-Finding by NGOs A closer examination of the fact-finding practice of NGOs reveals a system which is utilitarian in nature, elitist, and largely non-collaborative.

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I. A Utilitarian Practice The first main issue with the practice of human rights fact-finding is that it is utilitarian in nature (Montgomery 2004, 27). Through fact-finding, NGOs aim to identify and stigmatize those responsible for human rights abuses and to compel change toward greater respect for human rights (Ibid., 27). Fact-finding methods are strictly designed to achieve specific outcomes, such as securing the physical integrity of individuals and advancing democratic societies. Such utilitarianism, being a form of consequentialism, holds that choices and actions are to be morally assessed solely by the state of affairs they bring about (i.e. they aim to maximize the public good) (Larry & Moore 2016). Consequences thus justify any kind of act, for it does not matter how harmful it is to some as long as it is more beneficial to others. The formal regulation and standardization of procedures pertaining to human rights monitoring often have the effect of bureaucratizing and depersonalizing the human rights field work (O’Flaherty & Ulrich 2010, 8). Focusing on ‘delivering results’ could render human rights monitoring to a job like any other and a source of comparatively lucrative employment that stands in stark contrast to the plight of the local communities suffering violations of their human rights (Ibid., 8). This utilitarian aspect of traditional human rights monitoring means that fact-finders occupy a position of authority in relation to the subjects who find themselves subordinated. Such power asymmetry is further reinforced when human rights fact-finders conduct interviews with refugees, survivors, émigrés or when they conduct on-site visits in less developed states. This tends to foster and reproduce a binary dichotomy that ruptures the globe into two conceptual communities; the one “heavenly” and the other “hellish”– a dichotomy that draws fairly neat lines between “the good West” and “the flawed developing world” (Okafor 2015, 52).

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This division is harmful to human rights discourses because it fosters alienation that impedes cultural legitimacy: developing nations are portrayed as inherently uncivilized and in need of the “good” Western states. Fact-finding is a practice in which the West undertakes with the seemingly sole purpose of protecting human rights, however this has the effect of demonizing less developed nations all while presenting the West as the ultimate saviour of human rights. Moreover, the utilitarian nature of fact-finding means that NGOs fact-finding missions are disproportionately concentrated in developing states, while focusing little attention on the Western and developed states that may be human rights violators. This leads to the “one-way traffic paradigm” which assumes that human rights scrutiny and knowledge only need to flow largely in one predetermined direction, that is, from Western societies to non-Western ones (Okafor 2015, 54). This is problematic because it produces a racialized hierarchy in which developing countries emerge as a near-absolute human rights hell and where citizens are not agents of human rights knowledge production and dissemination. This is the point where the heaven/hell binary takes firm root.

II. An Elitist Practice As it is practiced by the world’s biggest international human rights NGOs (INGOs), factfinding is an elite activity carried out, for the most part, by a class of increasingly professionalized ‘experts’ (Sharp 2015, 1). Organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are heavily staffed by lawyers from Ivy League schools where students are taught to think like global power insiders (Ibid., 4–5). Although such professionalization ensures that fact-finders possess the necessary expertise and experience to adequately perform the task at hand, such elite composition

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of INGOs means that fact-finding will inevitably be imbued with bias that reflects the Western perception of international human rights law. The dominance of lawyers as professional factfinders at many global human rights NGOs results in the penchant of these organizations to see human rights through a legalistic lens (Ibid). This reflects a technocratic approach to human rights problems where the aim is towards retributivism rather than towards dismantling the deeply embedded power structures that contribute to human rights violations in the first place. Moreover, the elite composition of INGOs has proven harmful to the types of problems fact-finders have tended to devote most of their attention to. Although progress has been significant, factfinders continue to dedicate the bulk of their attention toward the documentation of civil and political rights violations, rather than on economic and social rights (Sharp 2015, 6– 7). This practice of focusing on civil and political rights violations stems primarily from the idea, as articulated by Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth, that for an organization relying on the mobilization of shame as a principal advocacy strategy, fact-finding must result in the identification of a clear violation, violator, and remedy; a task which is exceptionally complex when focusing on economic and social rights (Roth 2004, 69). Yet such focus on civil and political rights violations is problematic because it perpetuates historical hierarchies of rights while also reinforcing the perception that elite INGO factfinders are part of a larger mission civilisatrice (Sharp 2015, 7).

III. A Non-Collaborative Practice This professionalization of the human rights fact-finding domain profoundly impacts the way in which actors are positioned vis-à-vis one another, as well as the relations that pertain between the professional and the beneficiaries of his or her work (O’Flaherty & Ulrich 2010, 7).

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In relation to the first aspect, relations between INGOs, there is a strong competition among the principal INGOs. Particularly, it is a competition for brand-name recognition that pushes such organizations to have a strong interest in being able to claim ‘credit’ for their monitoring and reporting (Alston & Gillespie 2012, 1108). Such competition, although healthy to an extent, has negative implications for the approaches INGOs adopt, the coalitions and partnerships they are able to build, and for the policies they adopt for information-sharing (Ibid., 1108). Collaborative undertakings and consultation with other organizations are much less likely to take place since INGOs will often wish to assert ownership over their own findings, not only because they compete for influence and authoritativeness but also because they compete for funding. But such competition also affects the quality and reliability of the collected data (Ibid). Competition often prompts INGOs to conduct investigations rapidly without much care to details; “their missions often reach important conclusions and make weighty allegations against a developing state with either no visit at all to the state, or (as is now more typical), with too short a visit” (Okafor 2015, 57). The aim of such competition is that the INGO is able to deliver a ‘final product’ which distinguishes itself from other INGOs; an objective which does not involve ‘sharing’ or becoming part of a broader enterprise (Alston & Gillespie 2012, 1109). In relation to the second aspect, relations between professionals and beneficiaries, professionalizing the domain of human right monitoring has the effect of disqualifying and excluding some groups of practitioners that may have something valuable to offer. Human rights fact-finding tends to take place in the contexts of relative isolation and marginalization from the mainstream international community (O’Flaherty & Ulrich 2010, 8). As such, professionalization limits capacity. Only a few people with experience and expertise are allowed to contribute to human rights monitoring, which means that those who participate may have less detailed or

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intimate knowledge of the context in question than if human resources were unlimited (Land 2009, 1120). But such professionalization narrows the diversity of perspectives; if a wider range of people were able to contribute to the organization, then it would widen the diversity of perspectives (Ibid). Professionalization must be framed in an inclusive manner to address the situation and needs of practitioners who come into the field through non-conventional channels, that is, from civil society.

ICTs and Civilian-Led Monitoring Modern technologies can help mitigate the problems which the utilitarian, elitist, and noncollaborative nature of fact-finding engenders. New social media, social networking sites, usergenerated content sites or platforms, and a range of other ICTs enable any person with access to the necessary technology to collect and report information relating to human rights violations in real-time – e.g., through Facebook, Twitter, or crowdsourcing technologies (Alston & Gillespie 2012, 1112). Jeff Howe coined the term “crowdsourcing” in 2006, defining it as “the act of taking a job traditionally performed by a designated agent and outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of people in the form of an open call” (Howe 2009). Applying this concept to human rights monitoring means that anyone who has access to the necessary technology will be able to submit information, whether it be in the form of video-footage, photographs, the time and location of the human rights abuse, by text message, smart phone application, or the web to all other users of such platforms. The content thus produced by private citizens who are not professional journalists is also known as Citizen-Generated Media (CGM). The latter is an alternative form of media to the traditional, mainstream type of media that typically represents institutionalized, capitalized, routinized and ‘professionalized’ methods of

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storytelling that privilege the powerful elite at the expense of ordinary citizens. Some scholars have variously defined CGM as ‘participatory journalism’, ‘citizen journalism’, ‘we media’, ‘grassroots media’ or ‘self-service media’ to emphasize the notions of inclusion and participatory communication that are often embedded in alternative media outlets (Moyo 2011, 4). Citizengenerated media, or alternative media, must also be construed as being more than the mere dissemination of news and images by ordinary people because it embodies a philosophy of journalism that seeks to emancipate the citizen from the state and corporate propaganda (Moyo 2011, 5). Citizen journalism is not simply journalism, but journalism with an attitude of seeing and interpreting reality from the point of view of those whom the mainstream constructs as the incomprehensible and irrational ‘other’ (Ibid). It seeks to move the centre from the mediated grand narratives of the national elite to the self-articulated and self-published small narratives of the ordinary people in conflict-ridden states (Ibid). The concept of citizen-generated media is also known as the Fifth Estate (Moyo 2011, 10). The Fifth Estate is often used in opposition to mainstream media which is known as the Fourth Estate after the judiciary, legislature, and executive (Ibid). The Fourth Estate comprises both corporate and public media that see themselves as performing a watchdog role in society, but which essentially serve the interests of the business and political elite, thus protecting corporate and state power. The Fifth Estate, the citizen-generated media (CGM), has developed partly in response to the said limitations of the Fourth Estate. In contrast to the Fifth Estate, the Fourth Estate refers to the internet and other digital media that are the property of the people and which promotes bottomup communication, freedom of information, and participation (Moyo 2011, 11). Social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are increasingly accessible to citizens in conflict-ridden areas of the world which means that they open up opportunities for local groups

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to assert greater control over the process of fact-finding. This in turn means that citizens in such countries become less reliant upon intermediaries that traditionally bring their own interests when monitoring human rights violations. “Individuals benefit because they can engage much more deeply and meaningfully in the project at hand without the mediation of professionals” (Land 2009, 1116). As such, technologies allow local groups to collect facts pertaining to such violations in ways that express their point of view rather than that of Western fact-finders. This also mitigates the issue of “good versus flawed” states as it enables citizens from conflictridden countries to participate in human rights monitoring practices, thus emerging as agents of human rights fact-finding and dissemination. Individuals from affected communities have the most detailed and intimate knowledge of the nature and extent of their needs and as such are best suited to set the agenda for human rights activism and participate in the monitoring of events. An example is the Ushahidi platform which was originally developed by Kenyans during their country’s 2007– 2008 post-election violence, which allowed users to submit reports of human rights abuses via platforms such as SMS (text message) and the web (Alston & Gillespie 2012, 1112). As such, modern information and communication technologies enable those communities most affected by human rights abuses to actively produce news and initiate news flows among themselves, and between themselves and the outside world. ICTs are thus a powerful tool that gives a voice to the voiceless.

4. Challenges of Using ICTs in Human Rights Monitoring Two important issues arise with increased amateur participation in the process of human rights monitoring: the risk of state surveillance and the absence of control over the accuracy of collected data.

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I. State Control over ICTs First, as argued by Balkin, “the very forces that have democratized and decentralized the production and transmission of information in the digital era have also led to new techniques and tools of speech regulation and surveillance that use the same infrastructure” (Balkin 2014, 2297). States that violate the human rights of their population will seek to have control over the information and communication technologies used by civilians. Instead of, or in addition to, targeting speakers (civilians), states will aim at intermediaries and owners of auxiliary services to stifle citizen-generated content. To do so, states use two techniques: collateral censorship and public/private cooperation and co-optation (Balkin, 2014). Collateral censorship involves either states owning internet intermediaries or exerting control over privately held intermediaries – such as Facebook or Twitter (Ibid., 2310). For example, states might want intermediaries to flag and delete suspicious content, finance effective filtering technologies, or shut down accounts (Balkin 2014, 2311). To ensure compliance, states will often threaten intermediaries while also making promises of immunity in exchange for cooperation (Ibid). Collateral censorship occurs when the state holds one private party A liable for the speech of another private party B, and A has the power to block, censor, or otherwise control access to B's speech (Balkin 2014, 2309). This will lead A to block B's speech or withdraw infrastructural support from B since party A errs on the side of caution to avoid any chance of liability (Ibid). Virtually every aspect of the digital infrastructure of free expression can be a potential target of collateral censorship (Balkin 2014, 2310). Public/private cooperation and co-optation involves both access to data and the use of soft power by states. At government request (or compulsion), private companies can build special access facilities or “backdoors” that enable government penetration of their communications and data storage systems (Balkin, 2325). Or, the state may choose to encourage information regulation

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informally, that is, using the soft power of public statements as was the case with WikiLeaks where the U.S. government attempted to shut it down without giving any direct orders or making any direct threats to private companies (Ibid., 2327). These techniques point to the irony of the democratizing effect of modern technology on the collection of information pertaining to human rights violations: digital networks allow for greater civilian participation in the process of human rights monitoring but at the same time also enable the very governments that violate such rights to enjoy impunity through control of such networks.

II. The Issue of Inaccuracy A second major issue that arises with increasingly higher volumes of data collected by civilians is that the data may often be unreliable and inaccurate. This reflects what is known as the “lemon problem”: as investigations by both intergovernmental and non-governmental human rights monitoring groups increasingly rely on video or photographic evidence, the spread of misinformation increases (the term lemon in the case of human rights monitoring refers to inaccurate information) (Koettl 2017, 38). As stated by Land “Accuracy is important because states accused of human rights violations often attack the credibility of the information at issue” (Land 2009, 1119). Given that crowd-sourced reporting platforms allow members of the public to freely contribute with few barriers to participation, there would seem to be nothing preventing users from submitting false, exaggerated, or otherwise unreliable information (Puttick 2017, 26). Some victims may lie about their experiences out of fear for their security, others may misremember particular details about an abuse, whereas some activists may exaggerate information in order to advance their cause (Ibid).

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15 Such circulation of incorrect information not only throws civilian-led monitoring into disrepute, but it also has the potential to threaten lives by igniting tensions in already fragile settings, provoking retaliatory violence, or causing mass displacement (Ibid, 27). One solution is to focus on authentication; in the context of human rights monitoring, authentication includes the processes to ensure that any recorded information is genuine and has not been altered (Poblet & Kolieb 2018, 270). The EyeWitness to Atrocities Project launched by the International Bar Association is an example of an authentication app which allows the capture, storage, and verified transfer of raw footage (Ibid).

Conclusion ICTs help mitigate the practical challenges of traditional forms of human rights monitoring; ICTs collect reliable information from otherwise inaccessible regions, track events over a long period of time and over large expanses of land. ICTs also help mitigate the ethical challenges of human rights monitoring by increasing civilian participation and dissemination of information and thus contributing to decentralizing a practice that has traditionally been the domain of Western, highly elitist organisations. Despite technology’s advantages, there have also been new challenges with the advent of ICTs because they enable state control over digital networks while also resulting in massive quantities of data that may not always be reliable and accurate. The current focus on ICTs is potentially problematic for the human rights discourse as itt diverts attention from what is fundamentally a political struggle. New technologies do indeed facilitate the collection of previously inaccessible information, but the primary obstacle to seeking accountability for human rights violations is not, in most instances, a lack of information (Land & Aronson 2008, 12). The main obstacle to such accountability for human rights violations is the lack of political will of those who have the ability to exert pressure on human rights violators

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16 (Ibid). This is not to say that ICT’s must be discarded altogether, rather, they must be used in ways that can pressure powerful actors toward action.

Bibliography Alston, Philip and Colin Gillespie. “Global Human Rights Monitoring, New Technologies, and the Politics of Information”. The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 23 No. 4 (2012): 1089–1123.

Balkin, Jack M. “Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation”. Harvard Law Review, Forthcoming; Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 491 (2014): 2296–2342.

Guberek, Tamy and Romesh Silva. “Human Rights and Technology: Mapping the Landscape to Support Grantmaking”. A Report by Partners for Human Rights Information, Methodology and Analysis, (2014): 1–57.

Guzman, Manuel and Bert Verstappen. “What is Monitoring?”. Human Rights Information and Documentation Systems, International- Huridocs (2003): 3–44.

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Karlsrud, John and Frederik Rosén. “In the Eye of the Beholder? The UN and the Use of Drones to Protect Civilians”. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2013): 1–10.

Koettl, Christoph. “Sensors Everywhere: Using Satellites and Mobile Phones to Reduce Information Uncertainty in Human Rights Crisis Research”. Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal, Vol. 11, Iss.1 (2017): 36–54.

Land, Molly K. and Jay D. Aronson, “The Promise and Peril of Human Rights Technology”, in Molly K. Land and Jay D. Aronson, New Technologies for Human Rights Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2018: 1–20.

Land, Molly. “Peer Producing Human Rights”. Alberta Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2009): 1115–1140.

Marcinkute, Lina. “The Role of Human Rights NGOs: Human Rights Defenders or State Sovereignty Destroyers?”. Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, Vol 4 No.2 (2011): 52–77.

Moyo, Last. “Blogging Down a Dictatorship: Human Rights, Citizen Journalists and the Right to Communicate in Zimbabwe”. Sage Publications, (2011): 1 – 16.

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Montgomery, Bruce P. “Fact-Finding by Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations: Challenges, Strategies, and the Shaping of Archival Evidence”. Archivaria; The Journal of the Association of Canadian Archivists, Vol 58 (2004): 21–50.

Okafor, Obiora C. “International Human Rights Fact-Finding Praxis: A TWAIL Perspective”, Chapter 3 in Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey; The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding, (2015): 49–67.

O’Flaherty, Michael and George Ulrich. “The Professionalization of Human Rights Field Work”. Journal of Human Rights Practice, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2010): 1–27.

Poblet, Marta and Jonathan Kolieb. “Responding to Human Rights Abuses in the Digital Era: New Tools, Old Challenges”. Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 54, No. 2 (2018): 259–283.

Puttick, Miriam. Eyes on the Ground: Realizing the Potential of Civilian-led Monitoring in Armed Conflict. Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights, Report by Minority Rights Group International, London (2017): 4–47.

Raymond, Nathaniel, Benjamin Davies et al. “While We Watched: Assessing the Impact of the Satellite Sentinel Project”. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 14, No. 2 (2013): 185–191.

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Rodley, Nigel S. "The Role and Impact of Treaty Bodies." The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (2013): 621–648.

Roth, Kenneth. “Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by International Human Rights Organization”. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.26 (2004): 63 –73.

Sharp, Dustin N. “Human Rights Fact-Finding and the Reproduction of Hierarchies”. Chapter 4 in Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey: The Transformation of Human Rights FactFinding, 2015: 69–87. “Guidelines on International Human Rights Fact-Finding Visits and Reports”. Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 2013: 3–12.

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COMPARATIVE POLITICS

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Lojain Azzam

The Falling of a Democracy Comparative politics scholars have developed numerous theories to understand the timing and success of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. In recent years, however, there has been a reverse trend of democratic backsliding. This is usually when democracies witness a shift to authoritarianism. In some countries, populist leaders have gained power and undermined the norms of liberal democracy that were long taken for granted. In other countries, democracies have given way to hybrid regimes that combine features of authoritarian rule with elements of democracy. What accounts for these authoritarian reversals? Are some regimes more vulnerable to democratic backsliding than others? This paper examines these questions by comparing Turkey and Hungary. I will argue that populism of the twenty-first century not only transformed the meaning of populism into a negative term, but it also caused democratic backsliding mainly due to the chronological preplanned actions of the executives’ parties. Literature Review Many scholars have researched and written pieces on how a democratic state shifts back into an authoritarian one. As many scholars share different opinions, some scholars agree that the reasons for such a change usually comes from factors outside of the democratic regime. Nancy states that the reason for democratic backsliding is usually explained by questions starting with why. However, she addresses the occurrence of democratic backsliding with questions of how it

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happened rather than why (2016, 5). The paper focuses on the role that political parties play in shifting a democracy back to authoritarianism. It argues that through their decisions and actions that are aimed at appealing to the common citizen, they are able to cause this shift to authoritarianism. The hidden goals of populist parties are the fuel of what is driving executives to change the regime to achieve their goals. Most of the time, populist parties aim to gain more power by changing a constitution and forming allied government institutes. Nothing stops executives’ parties who possess similar goals, even if the consolidation of institutions and constitutions is very strong. This is a first step most populist actors do to secure their positions. This contradicts Nancy's statement that what causes democratic backsliding lies in the weak consolidation of institutions or laws (Bermio 2016, 6). On the other hand, I agree with Nancy that if the hindered or manipulated regulations are unchanged for long periods of time, the harder it will be to re-establish them or fix them (Bermio 2016, 6). Other scholars like Moffit have a different view of such a situation. Moffit states that any failure of the government can be used by populists to create a crisis which in turn opens a way for the populist party to change the regime into an authoritarian one (Moffit 2014, 198-199). Victor Orban, the first president of the Hungarian Civic Alliance party (Fidesz) as well as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of Turkey’s Justice and Development party (AKP), showcased the failure of previously democratic institutions by placing the blame on these institutions when a crisis happens to convey the dire need of changing them. These claims were made for the “democratization” of Hungary and Turkey. Furthermore, the actions made by executives through a process called executive aggrandizement is commonly used by Hungary and Turkey's political parties (Fidesz and AKP), to control the government and force new laws, which in return gave them more authority domestically and internationally. Both Bermeo and Zerofsky illustrated that through executive

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aggrandizement techniques, executives can easily revert a democratic regime into an authoritarian one (Bermeo 2016; Zerofsky 2019). Notwithstanding, for the Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) and Justice and Development Party (AKP) to achieve their desired outcome, they had to overcome the economic crises in Turkey and Hungary which emphasizes their emergence was only applicable due to the feeling of chaos in the community. Moffit argues that populist parties create a sense of crisis that they later use to achieve their objectives (2014, 195). Viktor Orban was able to eliminate the economic issues in Hungary which shows how such a crisis had a pre-planned “problem solver”.

First Steps of Reversing Democratization Process In Turkey and Hungary Turkey and Hungary are two countries of the twenty-first century that had a well constituted democracy and later experienced a backward shift to an authoritarian regime. While many factors may play a role in such a change, mainly the actions of political parties have the most direct effect on the change. Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance party) was initially a liberal party which transformed into a populist authoritarian party once the elections were won in Hungary by Viktor Orban. Similarly, AKP (Justice and Development party) had its own radical transformation once Recep Tayyip Erdogan became the chief executive of Turkey. However, there has been a shift in the idea of populism between the past and the present. Previously, a populist approach was associated with the welfare of the people. Recently, this same approach has a negative connotation as executives use it to accumulate authority. AKP began its journey to centralized power by, first, winning the trust of the Turkish people. This required action and solutions to the crises happening at the time. Erdogan’s campaigns were filled with promises of transforming the political and economic institutions to allow further democratization in Turkey (Toktamis 2018, 4). Such promises are

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a way for populist candidates to address current problems and offer a set of solutions. This helps the candidates build a connection with their audiences, which persuades the electorates to elect the hopeful ideologies without giving attention to the hidden motives of the candidate. Certainly, these techniques differentiate populists from others. Hungary had the same experience when Fidesz’s candidate Viktor Orban gave many speeches emphasizing the need for repair and upgrade of certain conditions in Hungary. For example, Orban divided the people within Hungary when pointing out that some government institutions are in the way of democratization and in the way of what Hungarians needed (Bugaric 2019, 604). The unseen power of populists comes from their ability to influence human emotions as they are prepared to go into the deepest struggle of citizens to showcase themselves as one of the true candidates who are working for what is best for their people. Ultimately, this feature made both Orban and Erdogan the chief executives of Hungary and Turkey. To centralize the power within Hungary, Orban dissolved the parliament, re-electing candidates from his party to ensure consolidation of power. Filling the parliamentary seats with members from the Fidesz party allowed them to pass new constitutional amendments. By doing that, their attempts to produce laws that enforces their rule in the state, was unchallenged. Similarly, Erdogan changed the constitution using the populist technique of appealing to the citizens' feelings. He claimed that changing the constitution is primarily for the citizens’ wellbeing (Tansel 2018, 204). In the same fashion, AKP took over the majority of governmental institutions which made it hard for any democratic party to challenge their rule. Both Hungary (Fidesz) and Turkey (AKP) became dominant party systems, which further implies the consolidation of their existence in the executive, constitution and legislation branches. Competition lessened as these populist

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parties used many methods to dominate the political and public spheres. As a result, this left no room for a fair competition.

The Unstable Rates of Populism And The Violation of Liberty And Human Rights Many questions might strike any person watching the de-democratization of two previously democratic countries.Questions vary from how it first began, to how these populist parties are still maintaining their authoritarian rule over the free population who demand democratization. Answers to this question can be certainly unlimited when qualitatively observing the historical conjunctions, the economy’s situation, the cultural environment, the adaptability, and the willingness of the people to either accept or reject the transition. Results make us wonder whether the democratic breakdown happened due to various coincidences or due to planned and executed actions. According to Elci, Turkey’s democratic backsliding started taking shape after 2008’s economic crisis, in which Erdogan relied on a populist approach to resolve problems during his term (2019, 388). Elci added that Erdogan’s populism reached its peak in 2015 when the Gezi protests occurred, and his alliance with the Gulen Organization broke off (2019, 395). Populists usually show their real intentions when they are dealing with serious issues that might hinder their power. For example, after the failed coup d’etat in July 2016, Erdogan used his populist expertise to become the “Executive President” which gave him absolute power in the government (Ellyatt 2018). Adding to that, Erdogan distributed government jobs to his allies to ensure the stability of his rule. The economy was dominated by pro-APK businessmen who were very supportive of Erdogan’s extreme ideologies because of mutual benefits. If Erdogan stays in power, they ensure the stability of their benefits. Along with the economy’s domination, Erdogan made sure to not allow any freedom of speech of the people

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and of the news (Toktamis 2018, 5). Turkey’s media outlets were controlled by both the AKP and AKP allies, which gave Erdogan the ability to control the information circulated in the community. Erdogan did not stop at controlling the economy and freedom of speech, he also used violence to repress opposing citizens. An illustration of AKP’s violent approaches can be seen through the imprisonment and torture of Gulenists after their attempt to overthrow Erdogan (Toktamis 2018, 5). The party did not tolerate peaceful protests, in fact tear gas was thrown at peaceful protestors. Correspondingly, Orban made an equal effort to solidify his legitimacy in Hungary. Populist executives tend to implement the most harmful authoritarian actions on the same individuals with whom they “empathize.” While further explaining the actions of populists in regime change, one stops to contemplate the similarity of events each head of state had to make to facilitate an authoritarian regime. The Fidesz party slowly and gradually shifted the citizens' focus on cultural differences between Hungary and the European Union. In fact, Orban wanted to raise the sense of nationalism in the Hungarians to divide people and create divisions within the country. Fidesz’s idea of nationalism is to make people view his party as the true representatives of Hungarians, which paints the opposition parties as inauthentic Hungarians (Bugaric 2019, 598). The populism rates of Fidesz increased throughout the years, especially when history was falsely reconstructed to help them maintain authoritarian rule. Toomey stated that Fidesz had focused on two events of the past which consolidated the feeling of nationalism in Hungarians (Toomey 2018, 93-94). The altered story of Hungary’s previous head of state, Miklos Horthy, portrayed him as a brave leader. However, real history shows him as responsible for the Hungarian Jewish Holocaust. In addition, Toomey argues that the Treaty of Trianon was also told differently to support the nationalistic feature they wanted to re-ignite.

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Just like Erdogan, Orban distributed top business and government jobs to allies and family members. Populism’s strength comes from the strong network made during its first stages in power. The willingness of people to agree with Fidesz is mainly because of the control it has on the state's economy and the fear of consequences. As for the economy, the populist leader of Hungary seemed to follow the same footsteps of Erdogan’s accomplishment to ensure validity in the political arena. Orban received national and international recognition when he repaired the fallen economy of Hungary. By doing so, he was able to control the public. Once he had controlled and scattered his allies to dominate the economy, he was able to be one step ahead of any social movements that were being organized in the community. Not only did Fidesz monitor the social life of citizens, but it also made people subordinate to the government. Bugaric declared that Hungarians tolerated the new authoritarian regime in exchange for their rights and their safety (2019, 615). Turkey’s citizens also had a similar reason for tolerating their authoritarian regime, which emphasizes the depth of violence in these authoritarian governments. Hungarians do not have many choices as the opposition forces are being weakened in the campaigning process and the elections. Since Fidesz controls most of the media outlets, it is particularly difficult for the democratic parties running against them to be heard. According to Ghitis (2018), even if a democratic party wins the elections, it will be very hard to undo what Orban did as it would require a supermajority in parliament. Such calculated movements remind us how populism focuses on spreading its wings over the branches of the country before showing its true intentions of transitioning democratic regimes. This demonstrates how the repetitive actions of the AKP and Fidesz allowed them to accomplish the transition from a democratic to an authoritarian state. With that said, it is clear why the first terms of both executives were “peaceful” and progressive. As a matter of fact, we

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now know that democratic backsliding occurs, not when we elect populist leaders, but when we let populists perform these radical modifications.

Conclusion The arguments presented explain how populists are the reasons why backsliding happened in Turkey and Hungary. The resemblance of the Fidesz party in Hungary and the AKP party in Turkey’s action demonstrates how de-democratization is now a game perfected by populists. Most importantly, the evidence to this argument provides an explanation to how populist parties manage the backsliding of democracy and how citizens are manipulated until they reach a point of helplessness. Undoubtedly, the executives' slow and gradual manipulation of laws facilitated the consolidation of their rule, and in turn, authoritarianism. By this, they were also able to control the citizens' social life and cultural ideologies.

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References Bugarič, Bojan. 2019. “Central Europe’s Descent into Autocracy: A Constitutional Analysis of Authoritarian Populism.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 17 (2): 597–616. doi:10.1093/icon/moz032. Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy 27 (1): 5-19.

Elçi, Ezgi. 2019. “The Rise of Populism in Turkey: A Content Analysis.” Journal of Southeast

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doi:10.1080/14683857.2019.1656875. Ellyatt, Holly. 2018. “Turkey lifts state of emergency but nothing much has changed, analysts warn”. CNBC. July. Doi: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/19/turkey-lifts-state-of- emergency-butnothing-much-has-changed-analysts.html Ghitis, Frida. 2018. “Another Orban Victory Will Entrench Authoritarian Drift, in Hungary and Beyond.” World Politics Review (Selective Content), April. 1–4. http://0search.ebscohost.com.mercury.concordia.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h& AN=12891 3677&site=eds-live. Moffitt, Benjamin. 2015. “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism.” Government and Opposition 50 (2): 189-217. Toktamış, Kumru F., and Isabel David. 2018. “Introduction: Democratization Betrayed – Erdogan’s New Turkey.” Mediterranean Quarterly 29 (3): 3–10. doi:10.1215/104745527003132.

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Tansel, Cemal Burak. 2018. “Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: Beyond the Narratives of Progress.” South European Society and Politics 23 (2): 197–217. doi:10.1080/13608746.2018.1479945. Toomey, Michael. 2018. “History, Nationalism and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán’s ‘Illiberal Hungary.’” New Perspectives: Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics & International Relations 26 (1): 87–108. http://0search.ebscohost.com.mercury.concordia.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh& AN=1315 37526&site=eds-live. Zerofsky, Elizabeth. 2019. “Viktor Orban’s Far Right Vision for Europe.” The New Yorker, January 14.

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Creating a New Empire: How the Creation of a Russian National Identity Under Nicholas I Influenced Russian StateBuilding Post-1991

Victoria Bolanos Roberts

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Introduction The 1989 fall of the Iron Curtain across Europe and Eurasia meant that many new states emerged all with the question of how to rebuild themselves towards democracy. States were faced with a decision that would decide to return to traditionalism or embrace modernity. The case of the Russia Federation after the fall of the Soviet Union is remarkable in their methods of statebuilding with a focus on traditionalist Russian nationality as created by Tsar Nicholas I. This essay will argue that the creation of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality” under Nicholas I directly impacted Russian state-building after the fall of the Soviet Union. This is seen in the re-emergence of religious doctrine in domestic policy (orthodoxy). Furthermore, the structure of governance in Russia under Putin demonstrates the idea that Russia needs a staunch ruler in order to be successful (autocracy). Finally, nationality has been used to explain extensive military campaigns both in the east of Ukraine and in Chechnya (nationality). The framework of research for this essay is based on an irredentism approach. Irredentism is a theory for ethno-territorial conflict between two states. It follows a trajectory where a “kin state” seeks to annex territory inhabited by its ethnic kin outside its borders. This paper will focus on Russia’s advantages as a “winner-takes-all” system, where conditions are perfect for political elites to pursue irredentism (Siroky and Hale 2017, 118). Russia’s history with pan-Slavism 1 at the forefront of its military endeavours primes it to be successful. During the Soviet Union, the Communist bloc was made up of satellite states where primarily ethnic Slavs lived. The Soviets positioned themselves as a saviour of Slavs against the Western world in case of war (Guins 1950, 439-441). Prior to the Soviet Union, pan-Slavism was at the forefront of foreign policy: protect the Balkans at all costs against the Ottomans. Alexander I pushed an irredentist agenda to attempt 1

The political ideology concerned with the unity of the Slavic peoples, used by the Soviet government to isolate Slav countries from the Western world (Guins 1950, 441).

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to gain access to the Straits of Constantinople as an effort to halt Ottoman domination over the Slavs (Kucherov 1949, 205). It would also symbolically represent the source of religion and culture of Russian peoples if captured. The seeds of irredentism planted in Russian history enabled the actions that took place post-1991 to rebuild the state. Traditionally, the literature has focused on state-building in Russia being a result of a power vacuum. This power vacuum led to the monopoly on government, ultimately giving rise to an authoritarian regime under President Vladimir Putin. This argument is often used by Western authors as a way of explaining why Russia did not democratize as many anticipated it to. Zimmerman (2003) argues that the system was inherently flawed once President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) started to groom his successor. He also states that voter fraud and intimidation was a method used, even if Yeltsin was supposed to represent the new age of Russia (Zimmerman 2003, 299). Other authors, like Evans and Northmore-Ball (2012), argue that Russia’s foundations for a moral conservative state are a paradigm shift from the suppressive regime throughout the Soviet Union. This offers an explanation as to why Russia is an exception to Western secularization. The theories used to describe state-building focus on the theory of circular flow of power. This concept, coined by Robert V. Daniels, was an original model that describes the system as a “participatory bureaucracy”. This system was guided by a circular flow of power, which was a behind-the-scenes mechanism that allowed the party to decide the outcomes of policy changes (Hoffman 2011, 158). This paper will argue that while the statements of these authors hold truth, they reject the blueprints of Russian identity as coined by Tsar Nicholas I. Its role in explaining how the Russian Federation works is extremely important. It is a pattern that shows how Vladimir Putin has been able to consolidate power and remain the Head of State, and it is how he has adapted in explaining his

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policy choices. From the struggle for control in Chechnya to the advances in Crimea, Russia has been able to twist what it means to be ethnically Russian in order to favour Putin’s position.

Russian Nationalism under Nicholas I The year 1833 marked a turning point for Russian nationality. Tsar Nicholas I believed staunchly in a Russia that would embrace the doctrine of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality” as their guiding force (Bilington 2004, 9). The education policy reforms of that year implemented by Sergei Uvarov brought the monarchy to the forefront of everyday civilian lives (Riasanovsky 1960, 38). By implementing traditionalist orthodoxy in educational settings, the government was directly involved in overseeing all school activity to ensure they were abiding by the new guidelines. The Tsar saw the need to have the visibility of his role as “Father of the Nation” (Bilington 2004, 9). The creation of a Russian nationality came at an important time in Tsarist rule. Russia had to decide whether or not they were going to abolish serfdom, what they were going to do with the Polish question, and most importantly their ongoing battle against Turkey in the Sevastopol area (9, 17). The Tsarist regime saw an opening to cement them in geopolitics. Society questioned whether they were going to join modern Europe (westernizers) or whether they were going to return to traditionalism (slavophiles) (12-14). Westernizers saw the importance of socioeconomic and industrial reforms as a method to parallel Russia to its European neighbours (13). On the opposing field, Slavophiles saw Russia as a unique civilization: orthodox faith, Slavic ethnicity, and communal instincts that were a result of peasant culture (12). While the national policy of Nicholas I reflected a more slavophile approach, his way of implementing Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality was much more militaristic than either camp anticipated. Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union faced a similar question: what would the rebuilding process look like?

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Would it be one of democratization as seen in the Western hemisphere, or would it go back to traditionalist values erased by the communist regime?

Orthodoxy The fall of the Soviet Union enabled orthodoxy to take center stage in the cultural and political life of Russians. The religious revival was a clear indicator that Russia was not going to follow the path of the West. Unlike in the West, where secularism and modernization had a negative consequence on religion, Russia saw a religious boom. People who identified as nonreligious during the oppressive Communist era turned to Orthodoxy as a method to express their beliefs. As a consequence, Russia was equipped to provide similar moral conservatism as once was seen in the Tsarist regime (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012, 797-798). As the government was now allowed the use of censorship to uphold morality, the orthodox laws were able to be embraced in domestic politics. The ultra-nationalist wing of the clergy has allowed for Russia to go forward with a modern rendition of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality (Della Cava 1997, 388). The church has become a spokesperson for Russia’s domestic and foreign policy goals. Their defense of Russian state control over Belarus and Ukraine demonstrates how pan-Slavism is an inherited characteristic of Russian culture (388). There is a revival of orthodoxy in public classrooms, as well as the revival of sympathy for public officials (396). More importantly, the Church begins to encompass goals concerning the military and law enforcement in the Russian Federation (397). In 1995, the Orthodoxy was granted a department meant for communication with armed forces and law enforcement agencies, making it possible for the spiritual mission of the Church to seep into security affairs (397). Russia’s military campaigns now have a symbolic divinity. During the military campaign in Chechnya, where Russia was fighting against Chechen

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Muslims, the Church was called on to restore morality in the troops (397). The Russian Federation used religion as a driving force during times of war, calling on draftees to “protect and defend [the Motherland] from external and internal enemies as true orthodox warriors” (398). Orthodoxy has been at the forefront of Russian foreign policy where Russia has appealed to its role as the Messianic figure for those abroad. In ecclesiastical orthodox law, there is a suggestion over a jurisdictional monopoly over a geographical space (398). When Chechnya invaded Dagestan in 1999, they did so with an agenda to carry out a holy war against the Russian People (Womack 1999). This move by insurgents was a direct attack on Russia’s orthodoxy, and was reminiscent of the history of religious war between the Ottomans (Riasanovsky 1960, 41). Nicholas I wanted Russia to expand their Messianic destiny, and demanded that the future of Russia follow an aggressive foreign policy to do so. After the fall of the Byzantine to the Ottomans, Russians viewed this as a sign of punishment against the Greeks for straying away from true orthodoxy. Due to this and the fall of second Rome (Constantinople), it was believed that Moscow would be the inheritor of the spiritual Christian world (Geifman 2016). During the 2008 economic crisis and 2011 public protests against electoral fraud in Russia, President Vladimir Putin needed to adopt a different approach to gaining public support. Since this point, Putin has been criticizing the West for leaving their Christian roots behind. He further gained support for his crusade in Syria, where after a month of air raids Putin's approval ratings reached an all-time high (Geifman 2016). This campaign in Syria has been regarded as a part of the pattern for Russian political culture and a method to eradicate a threat to orthodoxy.

Autocracy

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Vladimir Putin parallels the Tsarist regime by diminishing political freedom in Russia while maintaining a “Father of the Nation” image. Media censorship is key in maintaining the power that Putin has in Russia. After the 2014 Crimean expansion, Putin reorganized the news and radio to be headed by Dmitry Kiselev, a prominent propagandist (European Council on Foreign Relations 2015). This created leverage for the President against opposition, allowing him to block news sites and replace editors. He also removed anonymity online and limited foreign ownership of media assets. One of the biggest acts Putin has done to “protect” Russia is modifying the laws on foreign agents, granting the Ministry of Justice authorisation to declare organisations as “foreign agents” (26). This is important because it allows the government to fine and imprison those who oppose their rule. There have been many conspiracies concerning Putin’s involvement in the murders of Anna Politkovskaya and Boris Nemstov, staunch critics of the regime. Many in the West who covered the story noted the similarities with their assassinations: Politkovskaya was about to publish a document on the human rights violations in Chechnya, and Nemstov was about to host a demonstration against the government before their deaths (McLaughlin 2020, 54). Despite these claims, Putin is still able to win elections due to the political system put in place post-Soviet Union. The Russian Federation has a political system that is based on one dominant group of the ruling bureaucracy that is in charge of all appointments. This allows for the group to have a monopoly of control, preventing any concentration of political resources to its opposition (Yavlinsky 2019, 65). The ruling group, as previously mentioned, decides what political information gets transmitted to the population. They have also demonstrated their reach for supervision through their new financial overview laws. They have increased their supervision of regional bodies, blocking any attempts to organize or fund political projects that have not gained consent from the government (68). This allows the ruling circle to gain control over any political

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threat within the elite or the population (71). The actions of Nicholas I during his time of consolidating power were eerily similar. Nicholas I had a secret committee, entirely loyal to him, which became his secret police. They were in charge of all orders and announcements regarding security, information gathering, surveillance, and censorship. They were the bridge that allowed Nicholas to exercise political dominance over the empire (Wortman 2006, 133). Putin’s revival of the ‘eye of the sovereign’ allows him to consolidate his power and brand himself as “Father of the Nation”. Putin’s public support leans on his irredentist causes for war. The Crimean expansion is a perfect example of this cause. In 2014, after military intervention in the region, Russia signed a treaty with the representatives from Crimea to make it a part of the Russian Federation. Originally, only 39% of Russians supported Putin’s cause of Crimean annexation (Al Jazeera 2019). However, the government was able to convince its population with the argument that they needed to liberate the ethnic Russians in Crimea from assimilation. Putin also used Russia’s political history of panSlavism to push the agenda that NATO expansion along the Russian border meant Russians were at threat of a Western invasion (Triesman 2016). Because his campaign was so successful and resulted in the “protection” of ethnic Russians, his approval ratings soared in the capital. A poll from the Levada center, as cited in The Guardian, demonstrates the surge of his approval before and after Crimean Annexation (Nardelli, Rankin, and Arnett 2015).

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By completing Russia’s long-standing goal in the Sevastopol area, Putin successfully branded himself as the Father of the Nation, a title used during Tsarist Regimes after successful military campaigns. Putin was able to use the failure of the Ukrainian revolution as a message of what would happen to the population if they were to engage in revolutionary acts (Ragozin 2019). Putin does not shy away from his country’s imperial past, but rather embraces it in his domestic and foreign policy.

Nationality Russia used its campaign in Chechnya and later in Crimea to reunite a common Russian nationality. Yeltsin’s 1994 attempt to enter a short and successful war in Chechnya was seen as a way to appeal to nationalists in Russia as hostilities between Chechnya and Russia grew. The defeat of Russia in the first Russian-Chechen war of 1996 meant that the history of Russian prestige was at risk. The growing rise of Islamic militants posed a direct threat to the Russian way of life (Putin 1999). From 1991 to 1994, Russians and Ukrainians who lived in the area were forced to

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leave when reports of violence and discrimination against non-Chechen people came out (Smith 1998, 143). As a way to consolidate his role as a unifier of Russian people, Vladimir Putin released an op-ed in the New York Times. He became the spokesperson for the nation, putting down the Islamic Republic as an idea that does fit in with the Russian identity (Putin 1999). In his op-ed, he persists with the image of a Russia at threat, and the need for safety for Russians and rationalminded Chechens in the region. The Chechen Wars saw an appeal to civic Russian nationalism. Similarly, during the Tsarist regime, there was an appeal to civic nationalism as a way to bring together the different fractions of ethnicities in Russia. Peter the Great did this through his Table of Ranks (Hughes 2002, 166) and Catherine the Great pushed forward by integrating diverse nationalities (Wortman 2013, 261). Under Nicholas I, the trend of civic nationalism was replaced by ethnic nationalism. This trend is the same that happened in Russia during their conquest of Crimea. Putin’s rhetoric changed, and in a state address he used the term “People of Russia” to signify ethnic Russians wherever they might live. He specifically used the term russkii narod, a pre-revolution term that is used in the ethnic sense to address Russian people (Kolsto 2016, 18). In this newfound Russian State, a motivator for territorial expansion is ethnic commonality among the Eastern Slavs, that of Ukraine and Belarus (23). Similarly during the Tsarist regime, the state and population accepted the new Russian order (Riasanovsky 1960, 43). The fall of the Soviet Union saw the reawakening of an ethnic Russia that was not taken for granted by the population (Kolsto 2016, 27). In 2006, Russia ordered the expulsion of Georgian nationals, regardless of their rights to be in the country. Russia based their decision on statutory provisions in compliance with the requirements of its international obligations (Arp 2015, 168). This demonstrated the feeling of otherness in Russia. The rounding up of the Other, and poor human rights conditions (169) showed the lack of compassion for those who were not ethnically Russian. During Putin’s second

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presidential term, ethnonationalism increasingly became important (Kolsto 2016, 34). The documents he signed refer to the Russian people as the historically system forming core, a symbolic step away from civic nationalism (38). This language and actions taken by the government of Putin parallels that of Nicholas I. Nicholas I implemented practices known as “Russification” (Riasanovsky 1960). These measures were put in place to assimilate populations into the Russian way of life, that of Orthodoxy and Autocracy. This similarly reflects the consequences in Chechnya. Putin placed a leader to rule over Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov. This was Putin’s way of ensuring that Chechnya was following the rule of Putin, and not of Islamic revolutionary leaders. It was through Kadyrov that Putin was able to crush Chechnya and be seen as a saviour of sorts (Bullough 2015). In the Crimea, his campaign was seen as a success for Russian nationals. Russia has always been seen as the natural leader of Slavs (Riasanovsky 1960, 44). Putin embodies this by ensuring that Slavs and Russians understand that he embodies what it means to be a Russian (Hill and Gaddy 2012, 31). By securing Crimea, he has solidified his role in protecting the nation and its nationals against threats. He consolidated his power by using the Russian narrative in Ukraine, one that was against and fearful of the revolution happening in Ukraine (Ragozin 2019). This aggressive foreign policy plan to save Russians abroad found its way into the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. Russia signed a new treaty with the leader of South Ossetia which would enable a nearly full integration of the region to Russian control (Berry 2015). Ossetia represents the Orthodox values of Russia (World Heritage Encyclopedia, n.d.), and Putin was able to be viewed as a savior of orthodoxy and Russian territory by saving it from Georgia. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy on the basis of nationality has been a catalyst for the revival of nationalist sentiment across the country.

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Conclusion This essay demonstrated how conventional wisdom concerning state-building in Russia post-1991 was a product of blueprints left by Nicholas I. Russian nationalism was created by Nicholas I, but Vladimir Putin has been able to revive it during his time as president of Russia. This is seen in the revival of orthodoxy in Russia. The appeal to the Messianic role of Russia has influenced where orthodoxy is placed in its domestic politics and has been used to explain Russia’s military campaigns since its transition out of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Russia has seen a new wave of Autocracy as a forefront of what it means to be part of the Russian Federation. This was done by securing Vladimir Putin’s role as Father of the Nation. The revival of Nicholas I in Vladimir Putin is seen in his surveillance mechanics in his government as well as securing loyalty to remain in power. This essay also demonstrated how Russia used its military campaigns to boost popularity in the Father of the Nation and secure the ongoing Russian legacy of successful military campaigns. Finally, Vladimir Putin revived Nationality from a linear approach to ethnic nationalism. This was successful against Ukraine, Georgia and Chechnya where Putin used these wars as a steppingstone to recreate a Russian identity. As Russia has seen Tsars dominate its political landscape for 300 years, Vladimir Putin is ensuring his legacy and lineage as the rebuilder of Russia. With the new constitutional changes underway, the world should prepare itself for the same power transition that occurred between Yeltsin and Putin. The new wave of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality” will only continue in Russia, for Putin stamped its importance in Russia’s geopolitical standing.

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Works Cited Al Jazeera. 2019. “Russia marks five years since the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea.” Al Jazeera, 18 March 2019. Arp, Bjorn. 2015. “Georgia v Russia (I).” The American Journal of International Law 109, no. 1 (Jan 2015). Berry, Lynn. 2015.“Putin signs treaty integrating South Ossetia into Russia.” Alternative Press, 18 Mar 2015. Bilington, James H. 2004. Russia in Search of Itself. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Bullough, Oliver. 2015. “Putin’s closest ally and biggest liability.” The Guardian, 23 Sep 2015. Della Cava, Ralph. 1997. “Orthodoxy in Russia. An overview of the Factions in the Russian Orhodox in the Spring of 1996.” Cahiers du Monde Russe 38, no. 3 (Summer). World Heritage Encyclopedia. n.d. “Demographics of South Ossetia.” European Council on Foreign Relations. 2015. “European Foreign Policy Scorecard: Russia.” Evans, Geoffrey and Ksenia Northmore-Ball. 2012. “The Limits of Secularization? The Resurgence of Orthodoxy in Post-Soviet Russia.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 51, no. 4 (Dec). Geifman, Anna. 2016. “Putin’s ‘Sacred Mission’ in Syria”. Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (2016). Guins, George C. 1950. “The Prospects of ‘Pan-slavism’.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 9, no. 3 (July). Hill, Fiona and Clifford Gaddy. 2012.“Putin and the Uses of History.” The Center For National Interest, 177 (Jan-Feb). Hoffmann, Erik P. 2011. “Robert V. Daniels.” PS: Political Science and Politics 44, no. 1 (Jan). Hughes, Lindsey. 2002. Peter the Great: A Bibliography. Yale University Press: New Haven. Kolsto, Pal. 2016. The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism. Edinburg University Press: Edinburg.

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Kucherov, Samuel. 1949. “The Problem of Constantinople and the Straits.” The Russian Review, 8, no. 2 (July). McLaughlin, Greg. 2020. Russia and the Media: Makings of a New Cold War. Pluto Press: London. Nardelli, Alberto, Jennifer Rankin, and George Arnett. 2015. “Vladimir Putin’s approval rating at record levels.” The Guardian, 23 July 2015. Putin, Vladimir. 1999. “Why we must act.” The New York Times, 14 Nov. 1999. Ragozin, Leonid. 2019. “Annexation of Crimea: A Masterclass in Political Manipulation.” Al Jazeera, 16 March 2019. Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. 1960. “‘Nationality’ in the State Ideology during the Reign of Nicholas I.” The Russian Review 19, no. 1. (Jan): 38. Siroky, David S. and Christopher W. Hale. 2017.“Inside Irredentism: A global Empirical Analysis”. American Journal of Political Science 61, no. 1 (January). Smith, Sebastian. 1998. Allah’s Mountains: Politics and war in Russian Caucasus. I.B. Tauris: New York. Triesman, Daniel. 2016. “Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin.” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016. Womack, Helen. 1999. “Dagestan moves to state of holy war.” Independent, 10 August 1999. Wortman, Richard. 2013. Russian Monarchy: Representation and Rule. Academic Studies Press: Boston. Wortman, Richard S. 2006. The Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian monarchy from Peter the Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II. Princeton University Press: Princeton NJ. Yavlinsky, Grigory. 2019. The Putin System: An Opposing View. Columbia University Press: New York. Zimmerman, William. 2003. Ruling Russia: Authoritarianism from the Revolution to Putin. Princeton University Press: Princeton NJ.

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POLITICS AND THE GRAPHIC NOVEL Prisoners’ Experiences of Rehabilitation in the U.S. and The Real Cost of Prisons Comix

Leila July

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Prisons are a highly controversial and sensitive topic. The concept was thought to protect society from “free-riders” whose actions represented a threat to the social balance while punishing criminal behaviors. Still, throughout history and particularly with the development of human rights, certain collectives have organized to rethink penitentiaries, focusing on the system’s consequences on imprisoned individuals and society. Through the graphic novel The Real Cost of Prisons Comix, edited by Lois Ahrens and publicized via the Real Cost of Prisons Project (RCPP), this paper will discuss the efficiency of the American criminal justice system’s ability to rehabilitate convicts. The RCPP is a citizens and professionals’ organization formed to expand the knowledge on the criminal justice system in the United States. Their main activity consists of seminars meant to confront individuals with the reality of penitentiaries. The chosen graphic novel for this study embodies the RCPP’s report on the matter and translates its aim at abolishing prisons. This paper will focus on the rehabilitation process, treated as “cycles of exile” (Figure 1). The leading argument is that the United States’ penitentiary crisis is partly due to the community’s misconceptions of prisons, directly resulting from a disregard for the human status of formerly incarcerated people. First, an overview of society’s judgmental approach and its functioning will enlighten the reader on the nature of the penitentiary crisis. Second, the study will deepen the understanding of the issues preventing social reinsertion. Finally, the paper will discuss the impediments to effective reinsertion programs and attempt to formulate alternatives. Prisoners are associated with hazard. Their social status is solely defined by one or more actions that are deemed illegal and require a form of punishment that is to be carried out in isolation from the rest of the community. However, this idea of punishment does not end at the same time as the sentence itself. Society holds pre-determined conceptions of its prisoner population, in which the assessment always tends to be negative. Once released, formerly incarcerated people must therefore face the challenge of overcoming those hostile stereotypes

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that are mainly based on personal ideas and not factual behaviors. It becomes paradoxical, as the purpose of prison is originally for individuals to redeem themselves and repair their wrongs, yet they continue to be punished once they return to society. Limits are placed upon employment, education, and accommodation, which are the main requirements needed to grow into an autonomous and respected citizen (Kelly 2015, 64). As the main instruments for the dissemination of information, media holds an essential role in transmitting biased knowledge. According to media scholar Marshall McLuhan, media is designated by its rapidity and becomes “the main factor in social arrangements” (McLuhan 1964, 94). McLuhan introduces the various forms media can take and how as “extensions of ourselves” (McLuhan 1964, 60), media shapes our perceptions. In relation to the prison topic, the growth of media increased the ease with which ideas, values, and judgements can be transmitted and assimilated. In certain places, it is a quarter of the adult population that will be incarcerated (Jones, Miller-Mack, and Ahrens 2008, 64), and almost half of them will eventually be imprisoned more than once (Kelly 2015, 61). In the comic, the “cycles of exile” illustrate this succession of complications from the moment rehabilitation starts (Jones, Miller-Mack, and Ahrens 2008, 64). The material was formulated to be easily comprehended; arrows symbolize the effects and consequences, and simplified drawings represent the institutions encountered in the process of resocialization, and that most confront former prisoners to the burden of their past (Figure 1). The fallout is society’s division. From refused employment to sometimes withholding of identity proof, few groups are committed to change prison prejudices, resulting in minor improvements, while 2.3 million individuals are still incarcerated in the U.S. and meant to meet the same obstacles once released (Gilmore and Gilmore 2008, 17). It is those prejudices that actively participate in the constant reprimanding of the actions of formerly incarcerated people and their social dehumanization. How does civilization work for formerly incarcerated people from the moment they exit prison? Are there social or public arrangements taken for them, such as shelters? How are they

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financially independent? As seen previously, rehabilitation often leaves formerly incarcerated people with few choices; only certain employment opportunities are available to them, impacting their financial autonomy and jeopardizing opportunities for education and habitation. In the RCPP Comix, the cycle points at long-term consequences such as seclusion and defection (Jones, Miller-Mack and Ahrens 2008, 64). With no chances at evolution – such as stable employment – and low levels of education, formerly incarcerated people continue to live in reclusiveness and others commit additional reprehended actions, progressively increasing their sentences (Jones, Miller-Mack and Ahrens 2008, 64). The fact that this phenomenon maintains itself emanates from the removal of prisoners’ legal status. From within the prison walls to the outside world, they are being dehumanized and stripped down of their rights. The biggest indicator of this lies in the loss of their right to vote (Jones, Miller-Mack and Ahrens 2008, 63). In his comic about concentration camps and the second World War, Spiegelman expresses his father’s need to be recognized as a “human being” while being retained as a war prisoner (Spiegelman 1980, 54). The author’s idea to symbolize the power relation during the Holocaust is an attempt at humanizing the characters. He depicts cats as Nazis and mice as Jewish people dressed as individuals (Figure 2) to facilitate the attempted projection in occupied Poland (Spiegelman 1980). It is also illustrated in the RCPP Comix’s “road to freedom” (Figure 3), meant to illustrate the subjective path starting at liberation: at the beginning of their incarceration, prisoners are being dispossessed of their piece of identification, which is not immediately returned upon release (Jones, Miller-Mack and Ahrens 2008, 62). Their legal status has been taken away, implying that their bare existence is not recognized anymore. If not treated as human beings anymore, what are they? And why release them in a system that will lead to either poverty or recidivism? Overall, the community holds corrective expectations on prisons, supposed to correct the wrongs committed by some, yet prisoners’ deprivation of legal status and human consideration hinders the possibilities at reinserting them correctly and

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durably. Individuals are more focused on protecting themselves from formerly incarcerated people, rather than ensuring the efficiency of the system itself. To properly make assumptions out of this study, the controversies must not be omitted from the discussion. Rehabilitation is not without its challenges. If society is not adapted to reinsert formerly incarcerated people, past experiences have also been detrimental. Prisoners are categorized for having violent features, and history has proven that rehabilitation is, to a certain extent, a risk (Jones, Miller-Mack and Ahrens 2008, 65). Unfortunately, the issue remains a social problem. Due to the fear that exists within communities, society maintains its rejection of former prisoners. Additionally, the various attempts at modifying the system have proven to fail in reducing recidivism figures (Kelly 2015, 61). Yet the question persists; how to reinsert them? What would encourage their installation back in society while discouraging recidivism? Looking closely at the cycle, several factors appear as determinant: the inability to preserve strong ties to relatives, the constraint to accept mediocre jobs implying small salaries, and overall the fact that those individuals encounter more obstacles than support (Jones, MillerMack and Ahrens 2008, 64). In that sense, conceivable solutions could involve fewer hiring restrictions, more available accommodations, and avoiding divisions within the family. Moreover, illicit endeavors would decrease if society was to use education to prevent children and young adults from reproducing their relatives’ social patterns. Improving the school system and promoting higher levels of education could benefit not only the less fortunate through decreased potential to commit punishable offences, but the community as well, profiting from more secure and skilled neighborhoods. In Understanding Comics, McCloud refers to graphic novels not only as promoting minority’s interests (McCloud 1994, 197), but further as echoing to less knowledgeable individuals (McCloud 1994, 201). Through graphic novels, the authors have the opportunity to simplify the understanding of their arguments. As theorized by McCloud, cartoonists can decide on the equilibrium between icons and words plus emphasize

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the realistic aspects of some elements, allowing a broader perception of the topic while picturing oneself in the character’s place (McCloud 1994, 43). First described by McLuhan as a “cold” medium – where participation from readers is required (McLuhan 1994, 165), it is then supported by McCloud as he presents the symbolic scope offered in comics (McCloud 1994, 45). Thus, using a comic book as support to engage in prisoners’ rehabilitation is a valuable initiative. Knowledge is easily acquired and rapidly assimilated. Educating through less common mediums will ultimately improve what McLuhan refers to as a continuation of ourselves and hopefully slow down the cycles that society has been maintaining (Jones, MillerMack and Ahrens 2008, 64). The U.S. penitentiary crisis has amplified over the years, directly impacting the issue of the social reinsertion of formerly incarcerated people. The community’s norms and values on the topic are not adapted to reinsertion. From judgments to predetermined assumptions on their disposition to violence, it has been recognized that the vast majority are not willing to support them. However, the system requires improvement. Social stability requires unlawful undertakings to be condemned in one way or another and complete prison abolition is, at least for now, unrealistic. But as shown by Kelly (2015), the actual system is not functioning either. Prisoners are losing their dignity, rights, and voices to the system, hindering them from possible reinsertion. Shifting the community’s apprehension constitutes a complex initiative but focuses on issues such as education and literacy are reasonable alternatives. In the meantime, The Real Cost of Prisons Project, alongside other activist groups, offers significant benefit through their graphic novels, ultimately sent to activists and incarcerated people to promote awareness of the issues in the current American penitentiary system.

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Bibliography Gilmore, Ruth Wilson and Gilmore, Craig. 2008. “Introduction.” In The Real Cost of Prisons Comix, edited by Lois Ahrens, 17-22. PM Press. Jones, Sabrina., Miller-Mack, Ellen., and Ahrens Lois. 2008. “Prisoners of the War on Drugs.” In The Real Cost of Prisons Comix, edited by Lois Ahrens, 49-68. PM Press. Kelly, William R. 2015. Criminal Justice at the Crossroads: Transforming Crime and Punishment. New York: Columbia University Press. McCloud, Scott. 1994. Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art. HarperCollins Publishers. McLuhan, Marshall. 1964. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Spiegelman, Art. 1980. Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. Pantheon Books.

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Criticism by Weapons: Metaconflict of the Cultural Revolution in Li Kunwu’s Une Vie Chinoise

Oliver Smith-Jones

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Introduction What was the Cultural Revolution fought over? Was it literary criticism that came to blows? A Byzantine power struggle? These are all suggested, usually woven together in various, unsatisfying degrees, to elude a clear consensus. Ethnic and ideological divisions simplify armed conflicts even Congo, Syria, ex-Yugoslavia, Lebanon, or Myanmar can be broken down. A civil war between identical sides prompts facile explanations out of exasperation, if not partiality. The ubiquitous term “red guards” is as specific as the term “paramilitary” in writing around the Northern Irish Troubles. It does not refer to a discrete entity but to factions which fought between and within themselves, as well as against the military. Proposing “rebel” and “conservative” lines is no more than consolation.1 The exact casus belli remains as much of a mystery as precise casualty figures of the period. Accounts which depict the scene in vivid detail seldom give much inclination as to why Chinese cities became warzones. In the dispute about this dispute, or metaconflict, one must nonetheless infer from them. In one account, Li Kunwu’s Une Vie Chinoise stands out. It is suited to a certain French vogue for Maoism, but rejected in the Anglo world for being apologetic towards, not only the former Red Guards and the Communist Party, but the country itself.2 Furthermore, it does not serve the purpose of the Anglo market for Cultural Revolution memoirs (as anti-Communist ‘dissident literature’) by crediting the Chinese government with bringing order, stability, and development.3 Historical Background As in much of the literature, there is a refusal, or inability to take the participants at their word. It takes for granted that “cow demons and snake spirits” and “five black categories” have no fixed meaning. The focus on dated or exotic pejoratives obscures any real cleavages within Chinese Society which may have existed. On the other hand, The Cultural Revolution as a case of persecution by the socialist state is an expedient gloss that overlooks the initial violence against and within the Communist Party itself.4 This fact would lead us to wonder why the West did not laud this violence, as it had during the Hungarian Uprising a decade earlier. The use of Mao Zedong as a masthead by all sides, as well as the aforementioned jargon, made it difficult for them to detect a faction which could be amenable to their interests. Even intelligence documents show bewilderment.5 The prior commitments they had to the Kuomintang in Taiwan also discouraged this. The West’s inability to make sense of the Cultural Revolution would prove costly. In the end, the Army and later the Communist Party would come out on top and solidify their place. There has not been a comparable window of opportunity since. The rapprochement with China, as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union, lasted only until the fall of the Soviet Union. In turn, China would build its economy and become the West's rival. Suppose the Cultural Revolution was a baseless episode of hysteria grounded in guilt by association. For all the suggestions of espionage, there was a failure of Western intelligence during the Cultural Revolution; pointing to a reliance on second hand documents.6 This gives some credence to these allegations of “paranoia”. Yet, the local reaction; bourgeoisie, landlords and Kuomingtang, were not supposed to have existed in mainland China post-1949 and Une Vie Chinoise contradicts this.7 The Red Guards unveil ledgers and Kuomingtang paraphernalia. Furthermore, dazibaos decry speculation and speak of school principals impregnating their cleaning ladies. Though Li Kunwu dismisses his youthful folly, his account reveals a remarkable substance to the suspicions, corroborated by the noted appearance of posters with nationalist slogans around Peking University during the time the Kuomintang was still carrying out an insurgency across Southeast Asia as well as within China itself.8 158

It is tempting to consider the intrigue of a fifth column, but for sharper focus the scope must be widened. Worsening relations between the People’s Republic and the Soviet Union, the massive escalation of American aggression against Vietnam, and the wholesale annihilation of the Communist Party of Indonesia beset the People’s Republic on all sides. Last but not least, it would also have to contend with age-old internal struggles. During the Great Leap Forward, Li Kunwu shows how the famine sparked a mass exodus towards the cities.9 A familiar pattern during old China’s perennial famines.10 Urban centres, as indicated by the rest of the first chapter, were far less affected. In this chapter an important, and often neglected aspect, is the Soviet Union’s withdrawal of aid.11 The global division of labour in relation to the underdevelopment of the Chinese economy is usually overlooked during the Great Leap Forward. As it may be but a fig leaf for incompetent local officials to save their own skin, this fissure in the unity of the socialist bloc would have consequences for those among them who had staked so much in the strength of the Soviet economy. This, more than anything else, suggested to the Chinese peasantry that their unflagging support for the communist party was misplaced. Unlike the explanation of natural disaster, there was a clear culpability. These factors, in the Great Leap Forward, shed light on the discrepancy between how urban and rural China were affected by the Cultural Revolution. As cities were being riveted by violence, during the Cultural Revolution, education and medicine were pushed to the periphery for the first time.12 As the domestic situation in China descended into civil war, many villages were finally coming to see benefits to their loyalty. Public servants, being put under intense scrutiny, became replaceable and subject to the will of the population.13 Administration of state power by the people themselves is jarring to Western sensibilities about democracy, which is defined by the maintenance of past norms and institutions. They are quick to forget the upheavals which precipitated their establishment. Indeed, Une Vie Chinoise’s depiction of the discontents in the post-Mao era hardly reflect rural nostalgia for the Cultural Revolution. Anxieties about job security and housing would not be out of place in the capitalist West.14 These are guarantees, not novelties. Accounts of the development of rural China during the post-Mao period note the destruction of gains explicitly identified with the Cultural Revolution. For the peasants who had sustained the Communist Party during the civil war only to be left behind in the years following land reform and then betrayed during the Great Leap Forward, such a settling of accounts was long overdue.15 Untenable as it is to characterize the Cultural Revolution as a conscious revenge against urbanites and officials, Mao’s own concept of the contradiction between the town and the countryside figures into the debates of the period. The famous "red" categories, made up the bulk of the population of China itself by way of the peasant. The "black" ones concentrated within the country’s urban areas. Less recognized campaigns leading up to the Cultural Revolution singled out Shanghai in particular for wantonness.16 The onset of hostilities within high profile universities is no coincidence. As rural China rose in status, so did those from a peasant background begin to demand their place among its universities. Those of lower class backgrounds had attained positions of power in the Great Purge in the USSR, the same was true of the reforms of the Cultural Revolution.17 This is contrary to the ideologically motivated tendency to characterize socialist governments as a “new class” or “bureaucracy” to conceal the outside drivers of conflict within these.18 Access to higher learning and the content of that learning itself is a battleground. As long as the ranks of the educated middle class remained exclusive, it would be out of sync with the ambition of 159

masses advancing in literacy. The Cultural Revolution would put on a collision course. The full and official title, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, is often left by the wayside. More than just grandiosity, it indicates the metamorphosis of the peasant in word and deed, as tens of millions of them would join the urban working class. With two thirds of the population under 30, along with education and employment problems, the Cultural Revolution can be situated at the forefront of a global wave of youth led rebellions in the late 60s. The responsibility is placed on the shoulders of Mao and his entourage, not of the vein of resentment that existed within Chinese youth which they tapped. As education was the point of mobilization for Red Guards; and their battleground as well. Before the Cultural Revolution, education was, for the Soviet’s, based on party loyalty and immaculate grades.19 The Cultural Revolution did away with the entrance examination, and twinned education with labour.20 The class backgrounds of applicants was also taken into consideration. Because of this, “bloodline theory” became a popular scapegoat to condemn the education system. Critics alleged that attacking people based on their family background in the “black categories” was a variation of this, as it was believed this referred to their ‘biological’ lineage, not social background. How “black categories” made up a tiny minority within which access to education was already limited is often left unsaid. “Red” categories were the vast majority of people in China. Measures of aptitude that claimed to be impartial, in China and in the West, were still grounded within the culture of ruling classes. As American whites and Indian brahmins see affirmative action and reservation as a threat, certain Pekingologists like Joel Andreas have portrayed it as an attack against family backgrounds and meritocracy itself. 21 Stripped of historical context, it can simply moralize a case of envy against social betters. Confucian philosophy, like Western philosophy, holds a contempt for those who toiled with their hands. Proscribing them to be subjects of the educated, as women were by men, and children by their parents.22 However, the educational reforms of the Cultural Revolution challenged this and opened up the field of education to those who would have never been able to access it otherwise. The middle class did not take this usurpation laying down. With parallels hitting a little too close to home; Western historiography accepted the official version of Communist Party of China out of a certain mutual elitism. To avoid addressing the social impetus of the movement; the degrees to which scholars will go through to prove Mao’s complicity are impressive for sheer effort and imagination.23 His powers rival those of yahweh. In explaining his role as a master manipulator, the use of his alleged intellect to demonize him is likewise enough to deify him. These tales usually extend Mao’s almost hypnotic powers of suggestion backwards in time through the whole of the Chinese Revolution. To say Chinese peasants were successfully manipulated into rising up against landlords would in effect paint the same idyllic picture of Chinese feudalism which Disney has painted of European feudalism. This great man theory, or history on horseback, would have one believe no grievances even exist, and that there is really nothing good or bad had thinking not made it so. As long as it absolves them, it pleases Mao’s successors to blame the problems of the Cultural Revolution on his missteps and those around him while Westerners point to Communist ideology or the racial character of the Chinese themselves. Neither address the prospect of conflict, in Chinese society or their own. As the Cultural Revolution mobilized the resentment towards the education system, the rational extension of this was a resentment against its Soviet prototype. In spite of claims to egalitarianism and meritocracy, it was still exclusive, and that placed it out of step with the needs of a transforming 160

society.24 In spite of political attacks against the growth of a bureaucracy, it was necessary to handle the increasing complexity of an industrializing country. The Soviet economy’s own answer to this had been a series of reforms. First, it would replace the piece rate system with a wage.25 Later, it would sell the machine-tractor stations to local administrations, opening the door for speculation.26 The socialist economy in the USSR had begun to unravel. In the debates around import trade substitution, this important precedent is usually forgotten. The Great Leap Forward would prefigure a focus on the reliance on underdeveloped economies for primary sector goods by industrial powers. To suggest the Soviet as a cause of such suffering, implies also that the Chinese were still not yet masters of their own destiny. The reconfiguration of the Soviet economy would compliment its place in the international system. As the United States occupied Taiwan, South Vietnam, and South Korea, the Soviet Union maintained a policy of peaceful coexistence which, while making the Cold War “cold”, rankled the Chinese. The predatory lending and importation of grain from China during the Great Leap Forward was the final straw. Despite having cancelled a debt to countries in Eastern Europe some years before, it refused to do so with China. Despite the overthrow of the Soviet Union itself, it's previous influence upon China was not called into question but rather accepted, as it represented a bulwark against the influences of the global market to which China had become integrated. It is even possible to argue to some extent that China’s current economic policy parallels the 1921 New Economic Policy of the USSR. This, nonetheless, can only promote the prophecy made by Mao and the Gang of Four in the minds of their devotees about the danger of the capitalist roaders. Global significance today In the interim, what has emerged is a remarkable nostalgia for the period, with its most acute political expression in the Bo Xilai affair.27 For all the violence and chaos, the Cultural Revolution was a time noted for its newfound freedom, power, and above all, novelty for Chinese youth, especially in rural areas. Had it not occurred, time may very well have passed them by, leaving them to live lives almost identical to that of their parents and their parents before. Nowhere was this more true than in the case of women, recognized and feared as an important force during the Cultural Revolution. The great villain of the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing, was subject to this treatment, part of the wider reversal to send women back within the confines of the home.28 Gender, it seems, may have also been a driver of conflict and reprisals larger than usually believed. This is nonetheless bound up with wider cultural teachings about subordination which follow in line with others. The rhetoric of the later Cultural Revolution combined Marxism with this understanding of Chinese history29. Confucians initially represented the slave system while Legalists represented feudalism. This telling of Chinese history synthesized by the left at the end of the Cultural Revolution made it clear that it would try again in socialism, clawing back the gains of the revolution. The reversals of the ‘80s gave credibility to these accusations. It should be emphasized that this process is anything but particular to Chinese culture. Some Pekingologists, with their obligations against Marxism, see it as a procrustean bed, others draw on fashionable academic trends in postmodernism, such as that of Derrida's “trace”, to make stereotypes out of certain aspects within Chinese cultural history, without regard for the struggle contained within.30 As long as they do this without regard for their own it may be enough to reassure them that the events of the Cultural Revolution were in fact unique to Chinese history. The role of Confucianism only mirrors the attitudes of Western conservatives and reactionaries towards capitalism. Their optimism reveals more about the observer than the observed. Contempt for manual labour as well as filial piety 161

are well stated values within both traditions, only in China’s break with feudalism did they grasp this. The western Liberal tradition inherited more from its feudal past than it would care to admit.31 As such, in the Western Liberal tradition, the family as an institution has never been widely challenged or even questioned, and neither has the low position of manual labourers.32 Turning away from Europe, with the lessons extracted from Chinese history, the wave of uprisings across Asia pointed the Cultural Revolution towards a broader significance. The People’s Daily proclamation of “Spring Thunder over India” greeted the uprising in Naxalbari.33 In response, Indian revolutionaries proclaimed China’s chairman as theirs.34 The Red culture of the era would serve as the basis for the armed struggle in Philippines, Nepal as well as other regions as far as Turkey and Peru. Even the Red Guard generation, who dismissed their past, perhaps underestimated the wider impact of the era. A world which relies upon China for its global supply chain, has forgotten its promise to unmake it. At the crest of the revolutionary apogee, the seeds were being sown for China’s manufacturing takeoff. Perhaps the Cultural Revolution is not forgotten, but it is part of the air we breathe. Taking its cues from revolutionaries who had called into question the status quo of rural, the Cultural Revolution challenged the everyday and expected.35 These behaviours being the product of millennia of class struggle, it was likewise expected to reproduce them. It was necessary to join the most basic of items with revolutionary imagery. This was in the form of every possible household good, produced for the first time in China, as it was necessary to remind the consumer.36 During the war, the Chinese relied upon articles produced by their Japanese foes.37 Beyond just a coat of red paint, McLuhan's maxim is turned on its head; China broadcast self-reliance through mass production. The place of political slogans where, by custom, logos and advertising should be is a reminder of the era when politics was in command of everything, even commodity production, challenging the image of the period as an entirely austere, ascetic one. The apparition of print throughout China caused no less upheaval than it had in Europe. The Red Guards cannot be responsible for one without the other.38 Amazingly, ‘60s nostalgia as a phenomenon cuts across the pacific. As China had to have its own youth subculture, the Red book and Mao badge would be its starter kit.39 Youth subcultures, almost by necessity, have their rivals. Fashion that imitated that of the West came under attack.38 High heeled shoes and makeup, representing a culture that expected women to suffer in order to please men sexually, were also targeted by Red Guards.40 These were puritanical outrages to Western eyes, who forgot how only a generation ago the Chinese people had suffered the curse of opium dependency and foot binding. It is now the West which cannot ignore its own opiate crisis nor its culture of misogyny and sexual violence. As such, the iconoclasm against Chinese religious artifacts, seen as a senseless destruction of its past, had a creative purpose and meaning of its own. While there is an important counter argument based around the discovery of many of China’s most well known historical artifacts during this period, certain items were destroyed because of their cultural heritage, rather than in spite of it. These had a meaning, as the monuments to slavers in the United States and elsewhere still do. Icons of Confucius and Buddha, whose words had sanctioned their suffering for millennia, were an eyesore to the Chinese peasant. Thus, the occult and subjective household gods were replaced by a wider secular national culture. As this mass culture remains an important category of cultural experience, Une Vie Chinoise points the Western reader towards the period’s often overlooked comic art.41 The bulk of Chinese comics are completely neglected by even the most renowned scholars of the medium, such as Scott McCloud, a Western authority who neglected them from his authoritative work Understanding Comics in spite of their representational quality and unique format.42 Imitation being the sincerest form of 162

flattery, the didactic use of the medium has been adapted by American evangelicals. In McCloud’s defense, lianhanhua, the main form of graphic literature, if not Chinese literature, have never been widely translated and, largely ephemeral, were out of print. In addition to this, the output has been so broad that only a cursory overview of the medium is even possible. A noteworthy example, however, is worth mentioning for the purposes of example. Within it, a young Red Guard informs the state about her grandfather for the crime of espionage.43 This clear subversion of “filial piety” that made the rounds on the Chinese language net enough to filter through to Western audiences. This comparison is important for the purpose of extrapolating the reception of the Cultural Revolution within the wider comics culture of the region, and the world, where it has taken precedence as part of the hegemonic culture of US imperialism. Within Japanese manga, the consistent thread which runs throughout depictions of the Cultural Revolution is one of the futility of any sort of rebellion against a natural order. Exemplified by the play on words in an editorial cartoon, where “it is right to rebel” becomes “it is impossible to rebel” after the rebels have taken power.45 The notion expressed is that in the end the strong will always rule the weak. In rightwing manga, this takes on a clear racial dimension, with the Chinese being presented as a rebellious people loath to accept royal authority in contrast to Japan’s orderly succession.46 This depiction of China is one which, remarkably, meshed with the Cultural Revolution’s interpretation of Chinese history as struggle, noting how the duration of political institutions, says nothing of their justice or legitimacy. The Chinese peasant is one who has the resolve to overthrow unjust tyrants, while Western and Japanese peasants suffered their abuses in silence and futility, accepting submission by their rulers, a value observed and lamented within China as well. As with Western China watchers, the observation often reveals more about the observer than the observed. Conclusion When Chou En Lai delivered his quip about the significance of the French Revolution being “too early to tell” everyone assumed that he was speaking about the French Revolution of 1789 when he was referring to the events of ‘68 in Paris.47 Likewise, Napoleon never made his pronouncement about China being a sleeping giant.48 He did, however know the difference between the sublime and the ridiculous. Napoleon himself would assure that it will never be certain when the French Revolution ended, and likewise, China’s role in the global economy today ensures that it is still all too early to say the significance of the Cultural Revolution. What it was fought over will be fully decided only when the battle is won. As the United States attempts to overthrow the People’s Republic without success, China must contend with its own past and a movement which has galvanized peasant insurgencies across the world. Philippine and India guerrillas now strike at the multinationals as they invoke the words of the Great Helmsman. No social transformation is without resistance, be it violent or otherwise. China has closed the gap between the urban and rural divide and in its development from an agrarian to an industrial and consumer society. It has also put the bellicose realities of peasant life behind itself, trading them for the problems of its industrial rivals. This cannot be said for much of the world, wherein these antagonisms remain an everyday reality. As there is still a place for these neocolonial or feudalistic relations in the agricultural base of the global economy, the spectre of the Cultural Revolution will be part of the wider problem of agrarian violence that continues to pour fuel upon the fires of global conflict.

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Endnotes 1. Alexander Walder. “Factional Conflict at Beijing University, 1966–1968”. The China Quarterly, no. 188 (2006): 1023-047. Accessed December 2, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192703. 2. Ryan Holmberg. “Li Kunwu: A Chinese Life” Yishu: Journal of Contemporary Chinese Art, 54 (JanFeb 2013), 95-105. 3. Li Kunwu, and P. Ôtié. Une Vie Chinoise Tome I. (Brussels: Kana, 2009), 199. 4. Alexander Walder. "Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966–1971." Social Science History 38, no. 3-4 (2014): 513-39. Accessed December 5, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/90017046. 514 -539. 5. Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence “The Cultural Revolution and The New Political System in China.” (1970). 6. Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence “Intelligence Report: Mao’s “Cultural Revolution” in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power.” (1968). 7. Li Kunwu Une Vie Chinoise. Tome I. 142, 166, 186. 8. Victor Nee and Don Layman. The Cultural Revolution at Peking University. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971) 19. 9. Ibid., 89-90. 10. Dongping Han. The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008). 3. 11. Li Kunwu Une vie chinoise. Tome I. 91. 12. Mobo Gao. The Battle For China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution. (London: Pluto Press. 2008) 19. 13. Dongping Han. The Unknown Cultural Revolution. 49-71 14. Li Kunwu, and P. Ôtié. Une Vie Chinoise Tome III. (Brussels: Kana, 2011). 44, 171. 15. Dongping Han. The Unknown Cultural Revolution. 7-17 16. Yomi Braester. ""A Big Dying Vat": The Vilifying of Shanghai during the Good Eighth Company Campaign." Modern China 31, no. 4 (2005): 434. Accessed December 10, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20062620. 17. Sheila Fitzpatrick. Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934, (Cambridge University Press, 1979) 164

18. The foremost example of this sort is Yiching Wu. See Yiching Wu. 2014. The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis.(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 19.Victor Nee and Don Layman. 1971. The Cultural Revolution at Peking University. 37 20. Nirmal Kumar Chandra. "Education in China: From the Cultural Revolution to Four Modernisations." Economic and Political Weekly 22, no. 19/21 (1987): AN121-N136. Accessed December 10, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4377015. 21. Joel Andreas. "Battling over Political and Cultural Power during the Chinese Cultural Revolution." Theory and Society 31, no. 4 (2002): 463-519. Accessed December 10, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3108513. 22. Victor Nee and Don Layman. The Cultural Revolution at Peking University. 27. 23. Ji Fengyuan essentially accuses Mao of inventing the entire Chinese language to further his own agenda. See Ji Fengyuan. Linguistic Engineering: Language and Politics in Mao's China. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004). 24. Victor Nee and Don Layman. The Cultural Revolution at Peking University. 13. 25. Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence. “Soviet Economic Policy: December 1956 - May 1957” (1957). 26. Roy D Laird. "The Demise of the Machine Tractor Station." American Slavic and East European Review 17, no. 4 (1958): 418-25. Accessed December 14, 2020. doi:10.2307/3001127. 27. Willy Lam, “The Maoist Revival and the Conservative Turn in Chinese Politics” China Perspectives, no. 2012/2 (2012): 5-15. 28. Zhong Xueping. ""Long Live Youth" and the Ironies of Youth and Gender in Chinese Films of the 1950s and 1960s." Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 11, no. 2 (1999): 177. Accessed December 10, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41490808. 29. Liang Hsiao: “Study the Historical Experience of the Struggle Between the Confucian and Legalist Schools”, Peking Review, #2, (January 10, 1975): 8-12. 30. Siraj Postmodernism Today (Utrecht: Foreign Languages Press, 2018) 71. 31. Ishay Landa. The Apprentice's Sorcerer: Liberal Tradition and Fascism. (Leiden: Brill, 2010) 21113. 32. Domenico Losurdo, and Gregory Elliott.. Liberalism: a Counter-History. (London:Verso, 2014) 67-69. 33. People’s Daily “Spring Thunder Over India” (July 5, 1967). 165

34. Charu Mazumdar. “China’s Chairman is our Chairman: China’s Path is Our Path” Liberation Vol. III, No. 1 (1969). 35. Jennifer Purtle, Stephen Qiao, and Elizabeth Ridolfo. Reading Revolution: Art and Literacy during China's Cultural Revolution. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016) 17-27. 36. Karl Gerth. Unending Capitalism: How Consumerism Negated China's Communist Revolution. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2020). 178. 37. Edgar Snow. Red Star Over China (New York City: Garden City Publishing Company, 1939) 239. 38. Jennifer Purtle, Stephen Qiao, and Elizabeth Ridolfo. 2016. Reading Revolution 6-7 39. Li Kunwu Une vie chinoise. Tome I. 112, 153. 40. Karl Gerth. Unending Capitalism. 181. 41. Li Kunwu Une Vie Chinoise. Tome I. 69. 42. Scott McCloud. 1994. Understanding Comics. (New York: HarperCollins, 1994) 54. 43. Joe. “Red Guard Betrays Family in 1976 Cultural Revolution Comic.” chinaSmack (2014, January 15). Retrieved December 10, 2020, from https://www.chinasmack.com/red-guard-betrays-family-in1976-cultural-revolution-comic 44. Erik Esselstrom. "Red Guards and Salarymen: The Chinese Cultural Revolution and Comic Satire in 1960s Japan." The Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 4 (2015): 953-76. Accessed December 10, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24738566. 45. James Shields. “Revisioning a Japanese Spiritual Recovery through Manga: Yasukuni and the Aesthetics and Ideology of Kobayashi Yoshinori's "Gomanism"”. The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus 11 Issue 47. No.7 (2013) Retrieved December 10, 2020, from https://apjjf.org/2013/11/47/James-Shields/4031/article.html 46. Jonathan Fenby “Statement Fitted So Neatly with French Revolution.” (August 29, 2017). Financial Times. Retrieved December 10, 2020, from https://www.ft.com/content/a245c796-899211e7-bf50-e1c239b45787 47. Peter Hicks “"Sleeping China" and Napoleon”. Napoleon.org Retrieved December 17, 2020, from https://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the-two-empires/articles/ava-gardner-china-and-napoleon/

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Bibliography Althusser, Louis. On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. (London: Verso. 2014) Amin, Samir. The Future of Maoism. (Ahmedabad: Rainbow Publishers, 1998) Andreas, Joel. "Battling over Political and Cultural Power during the Chinese Cultural Revolution." Theory and Society 31, no. 4 (2002): 463-519. Accessed December 10, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3108513. Braester, Yomi. ""A Big Dying Vat": The Vilifying of Shanghai during the Good Eighth Company Campaign." Modern China 31, no. 4 (2005): 434. Accessed December 10, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20062620. Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence “The Cultural Revolution and The New Political System in China.” (1970). Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence “Intelligence Report: Mao’s “Cultural Revolution” in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power.” (1968). Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence. “Soviet Economic Policy: December 1956 May 1957” (1957). Davis, Mike. Planet of Slums. (London: Verso, 2006) Day, Alexander. “Interpreting the Cultural Revolution Politically.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 7, no. 4 (2006): 705–12. doi:10.1080/14649370600983345. Fenby, Jonathan. “Statement Fitted So Neatly with French Revolution.” (August 29, 2017). Financial Times. Retrieved December 10, 2020, from https://www.ft.com/content/a245c796-8992-11e7-bf50e1c239b45787 Fengyuan, Ji. Linguistic Engineering: Language and Politics in Mao's China. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004). Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934. (Cambridge University Press, 1979) Esselstrom, Erik. "Red Guards and Salarymen: The Chinese Cultural Revolution and Comic Satire in 1960s Japan." The Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 4 (2015): 953-76. Accessed December 10, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24738566. Gao, Mobo. The Battle For China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution. (London: Pluto Press. 2008).

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Gerth, Karl. Unending Capitalism: How Consumerism Negated China's Communist Revolution. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2020). 178. Han, Dongping. The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008). Hicks, Peter. “"Sleeping China" and Napoleon”. Napoleon.org Retrieved December 17, 2020, from https://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the-two-empires/articles/ava-gardner-china-and-napoleon/ Hoeffding, Oleg. "Sino-Soviet Economic Relations, 1959-1962." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 349 (1963): 94-105. Accessed December 14, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1035700. Holmberg, Ryan. “Li Kunwu: A Chinese Life” Yishu: Journal of Contemporary Chinese Art, 54 (JanFeb 2013), 95-105. Honig, Emily. "Socialist Sex: The Cultural Revolution Revisited." Modern China 29, no. 2 (2003): 143-75. Accessed December 14, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3181306. Hsiao, Liang: “Study the Historical Experience of the Struggle Between the Confucian and Legalist Schools”, Peking Review, #2, (January 10, 1975): 8-12. Joe. “Red Guard Betrays Family in 1976 Cultural Revolution Comic.” chinaSmack (2014, January 15). Retrieved December 10, 2020, from https://www.chinasmack.com/red-guard-betrays-family-in-1976cultural-revolution-comic Kang, Liu. "Popular Culture and the Culture of the Masses in Contemporary China." Boundary 2 24, no. 3 (1997): 99-122. Accessed December 14, 2020. doi:10.2307/303708. Kumar Chandra, Nirmal. "Education in China: From the Cultural Revolution to Four Modernisations." Economic and Political Weekly 22, no. 19/21 (1987): AN121-N136. Accessed December 10, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4377015. Kunwu, Li and P. Ôtié. Une Vie Chinoise Tome I. (Brussels: Kana, 2009). Kunwu, Li and P. Ôtié. Une Vie Chinoise Tome II. (Brussels: Kana, 2009). Kunwu, Li, and P. Ôtié. Une Vie Chinoise Tome III. (Brussels: Kana, 2011). Laird, Roy. D. "The Demise of the Machine Tractor Station." American Slavic and East European Review 17, no. 4 (1958): 418-25. Accessed December 14, 2020. doi:10.2307/3001127. Lam, Willy. “The Maoist Revival and the Conservative Turn in Chinese Politics” China Perspectives, no. 2012/2 (2012).. Landa, Ishay. The Apprentice's Sorcerer: Liberal Tradition and Fascism. (Leiden: Brill, 2010) 21-113.

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Losurdo, Domenico and Gregory Elliott. Liberalism: a Counter-History. (London:Verso, 2014) 67-69. Mazumdar, Charu. “China’s Chairman is our Chairman: China’s Path is Our Path” Liberation Vol. III, No. 1 (1969). McCloud, Scott. 1994. Understanding Comics. (New York: HarperCollins, 1994) 54. Moufawad-Paul, J. Continuity and Rupture Philosophy in the Maoist Terrain. (London: Zero Books, 2016) Nee, Victor and Don Layman. The Cultural Revolution at Peking University. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971). People’s Daily “Spring Thunder Over India” (July 5, 1967). Purtle, Jennifer, Stephen Qiao, and Elizabeth Ridolfo. Reading Revolution: Art and Literacy during China's Cultural Revolution. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016) 17-27. Shields, James. “Revisioning a Japanese Spiritual Recovery through Manga: Yasukuni and the Aesthetics and Ideology of Kobayashi Yoshinori's "Gomanism"”. The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus 11 Issue 47. No.7 (2013) Retrieved December 10, 2020, from https://apjjf.org/2013/11/47/James-Shields/4031/article.html Siraj Postmodernism Today (Utrecht: Foreign Languages Press, 2018) 71. Snow, Edgar. Red Star Over China (New York City: Garden City Publishing Company, 1939). Walder, Andrew G. "Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966–1971." Social Science History 38, no. 34 (2014): 513-39. Accessed December 17, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/90017046. Walder, Alexander. “Factional Conflict at Beijing University, 1966–1968”. The China Quarterly, no. 188 (2006): 1023-047. Accessed December 2, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192703. Wu, Yicheng. The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). Xueping, Zhong. ""Long Live Youth" and the Ironies of Youth and Gender in Chinese Films of the 1950s and 1960s." Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 11, no. 2 (1999): 177. Accessed December 10, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41490808.

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Do Canadian Public Schools Actually Accommodate Deaf Students?

Morgan Symington

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Introduction Deaf students in Canada have been subject to a variety of different educational approaches in the public system, ranging from the oralist methods of teaching deaf students how to speak (MacDougall 1971, 535), to the Total Communication system that arose in the 1960s that mixes learning through both auditory sounds and sign language (Smith and Campbell 1997, 441-42). This paper asks, do Canadian public schools accommodate the needs of deaf students? I argue that public schools do not provide the necessary accommodations for deaf students due to inadequacies within provincial education policies that limit the resources and program support for deaf students. Following this introduction, a brief explanation will be given that highlights what deafness entails for the individual that has such an impairment. A literature review will then explore the many different arguments of scholars surrounding inclusive education policy in Canada and the arguments surrounding the different approaches to deaf education more specifically. The provinces of British Columbia and Ontario will be used as case studies to provide insight into the current policy approaches taken to support deaf students in Canada. The case studies will serve to highlight the ability or inability of each province in accommodating the needs of deaf students. Finally, I will discuss the implications of such findings and future focus areas for the provincial ministries when crafting education policies. Deafness and the Student Deafness refers to the inability of an individual to hear audible sounds (Padden 2000, 57). The level of hearing loss can vary between individuals, as some individuals may only experience mild hearing loss while others cannot hear at all (Padden 2000, 57). The term “deaf” is generally applied to individuals that have complete hearing loss and communicate primarily through visual methods, while “hard of hearing” is used to describe those that have hearing loss but can still

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hear and communicate through audible sound (Jamieson 2010, 379). In Canada, there are approximately 357,000 deaf Canadians and approximately 3 million hard of hearing Canadians, however due to the lack of a census conducted on this group in Canada these numbers are only an estimate (Canadian Association of the Deaf 2015). Despite the disabling nature of deafness, some issues arise due to its relative infrequency in the Canadian population. In Canada, there is a shortage of professional sign language interpreters (Gordon and Hardy 2009, 6). This is especially true in British Columbia, where it is estimated that 371 interpreters are needed to assist deaf residents in all aspects of their lives, such as government, medical, and educational services (Gordon and Hardy 2009, 7). The access to these limited accommodations is also subject to whether the deaf individual resides in an urban or rural area. Generally, most services to support deaf individuals and students are only available in urban areas, thus increasing the barriers for deaf individuals to receive services in rural regions (Erlich 2012, 6). This is also an issue that will be discussed later in the paper, as the cases of British Columbia and Ontario display how rural deaf students are disadvantaged in their ability to access Provincial programs and schools. Literature Review Deaf adults and advocates of Deaf culture in Canada desire the use of special education schools for deaf students, as they believe that it fosters a more inclusive and healthier social environment (MacDougall 2004, 18). However, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) proposes that disabled students have the best opportunity to learn in an inclusive public educational environment as it would mitigate discrimination while also attending to the child’s specific learning needs (UNESCO 1994, 10). Education policy in Canada differs from most other countries. In Canada, it is the responsibility of the provincial

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government to design and implement education policy rather than the federal government (Levin and Read 2013, 348). The varieties in provincial education policies can pose challenges for students with disabilities. Provincial education policies can be delivered by more than one service provider in each respective province, making it difficult for the disabled child to receive services due to limited and uncoordinated information from each provider (Pivik, McComas, and Laflamme 2002, 98). Each provincial education body also determines and regulates the credentials required for teachers. McCrimmon (2015, 35) argues that the current postsecondary and certification bodies within Canada do not provide the necessary courses for future and current teachers on how to effectively deliver educational services to disabled students in an inclusive setting. Bibby (1994, 179-80) similarly argues that the lack of resources and educator training in Canada does not provide deaf students with the same quality of education in inclusive classrooms that are provided in deaf education schools. Inclusive education is a policy framework that promotes the inclusion of students that require additional assistance in the classroom, and it is prevalent across provincial education policies (Brackenreed 2008, 132). Beginning in the 1970s, the Ontario government made inclusive education mandatory in special education policies, citing that school districts must accommodate disabled students into regular classrooms and offer special education programs and services (Brackenreed 2008, 132). However, this concept of inclusivity was not seen as working or ideal for disabled students. Brackenreed (2008, 132) highlights the frustrations experienced by teachers following the mandatory inclusive education policies in Ontario, with many new teachers leaving within the first five years of starting due to lack of support in the classroom. Tensions between the Ontario Ministry of Education and the school districts exist due to the challenges and complexity of implementing such policies at the district level (Segeren and

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Kutsyuruba 2012, 2). In British Columbia, no legislation requires students to be fully integrated in all situations, however the Ministry of Education still expects each school district to integrate students unless their needs require otherwise (Naylor 2005, 7). According to Siegal and Ladyman (2000, 12), there are many different interpretations of the policies set out by the Ministry of Education across the school districts in British Columbia. It was also found that the inclusive education policy in British Columbia is problematic because many schools attempt to integrate disabled students by immersing them in the typical classroom at all times rather than using other forms of learning, such as resource rooms or self-contained classes (Siegal and Ladyman 2000, 12). The same scholars also noted that the inclusive framework in British Columbia has led to other troubling actions by the school districts in implementing the special education policies. In some cases, disabled students were only provided with partial day programs rather than the full-day programs they required, and other disabled students have been excluded from schools so the school district can avoid responsibility (Siegal and Ladyman 2000, 13-14). Oralism is a method that is used for deaf students in some education policies, in which deaf students attempt to learn how to understand spoken language and eventually be able to speak it themselves (MacDougall 1971, 535). Although oralism is not as prevalent as it once was in the twentieth century, it still can be found in policies and programs today (MacDougall 2004, 16). Total Communication is currently the most prevalent method used in modern education policy in North America, and its focus is on combining aspects of both English and American Sign Language (ASL) through the use of sign language in conjunction with written and spoken English (Smith and Campbell 1997, 441-42). Approaches as such are desired by hearing parents of deaf students, as it is believed they will have more adequate communication in both languages

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(Priestley, Enns, and Arbuckle 2018, 83). However, the deaf community argues that the above methods completely ignore the desires and needs of the deaf students. For example, Ontario has created an oralist policy in which students that receive cochlear implants are not allowed to learn or be provided assistance in sign language, as it is deemed that it will interfere with their comprehension and learning capabilities (Cummins 2014, 7). Scholars argue that these policies are disastrous for deaf students, as the students will be sub-adequate at understanding both English and ASL following their educational journey (Gibson, Small, and Mason 1997, 232-33). The Total Communication approach to learning provides similar inadequacies for the deaf student, as the confusing delivery of both English and ASL contributes to the lack of literacy and development in deaf students (Smith and Campbell 1997, 442). The deaf community would rather use a bilingual-bicultural model in the educating of deaf students, as the use of ASL has been seen to promote higher levels of social and academic performance (Smith and Campbell 1997, 444). Desires to use the bilingual-bicultural model to foster greater development should also not be viewed as anecdotal claims. Case studies done by Priestley, Enns, and Arbuckle (2018, 91-92) display that students in such programs make substantial cognitive capabilities in both English and ASL as well as improved self-esteem. Education Policy in British Columbia The government of British Columbia made significant changes to the provincial education policy in 2002, particularly in the realm of funding. The government altered the funding formulas to a system that increases the base amount of funding per student instead of providing school districts additional grants (Grimmett and D’Amico 2008, 7). As a result of the changes to the funding formulas, school districts received less funding overall due to the decline of student enrollment throughout the province, which resulted in the cutting of programs and

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services to maintain costs (Grimmett and D’Amico 2008, 7-8). This approach to the funding of education is still used currently, and no amendments have been made in the funding areas since this alteration in 2002. In addition to the reduced education funding, British Columbia suffers from a lack of professional interpreters, and thus deaf students often do not have access to an interpreter while attending a public school (Gordon and Hardy 2009, 7). This may not be a devastating inadequacy for some deaf students, but those who may not need an interpreter will still suffer from the limited ability of school districts to provide learning support on reduced funds. Without additional funding for programs and access to interpreters, there are not adequate resources to support deaf students properly in the classroom. The special education policy created by the Ministry of Education indicates that students who are deaf or hard of hearing will receive instruction in language development, auditory management, speech development, and speech reading (British Columbia Ministry of Education 2016, 80). It also mentions that sign language and deaf culture may be used when deemed appropriate (British Columbia Ministry of Education 2016, 80). The special education policy and its application to deaf students is troubling. This policy incorporates a mixture of the ideas that are present in both oralist and Total Communication methods of deaf education. Both methods create undesirable results for the deaf student, as the mixture of English and ASL in such a manner is confusing and results in lower levels of literacy and development among deaf students (Smith and Campbell 1997, 442). The policy language itself emphasizes the use of auditory and spoken methods of education and marginalizes the use of sign language and Deaf culture by indicating they are not a priority in programs for deaf students. The special education policy outlined by the Ministry of Education also mentions that the school districts are in charge of creating policies that assess the effectiveness of local programs and evaluate the progress of deaf

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students that are provided with a specialist teacher (British Columbia Ministry of Education 2016, 81). Following these remarks, the special education policy also indicates that deaf students will be subjected to the same evaluations and reporting procedures of the school district they are enrolled in (British Columbia Ministry of Education 2016, 82). Comparing these two sequential statements can display how deaf students in British Columbia will not be accommodated in the classroom. Deaf students are expected to perform similar evaluations that their hearing counterparts take, which could create difficulties in assessing the effectiveness of such local programs considering the deaf students are at a disadvantage when compared to their hearing peers. In smaller school districts, the assessments of effectiveness may serve little use considering smaller schools with less funding will have limited program capacity to improve the environment for deaf students if necessary. By leaving such policies to the school districts, the British Columbia Ministry of Education takes a very hands-off approach in creating accommodating educational environments for deaf students. In British Columbia, there is only one Provincial School for the Deaf and two secondary school programs to support deaf students (British Columbia Ministry of Education 2016, 93). By only having three program choices, deaf students in British Columbia are severely limited in their options of receiving an education outside of the traditional classroom. This is provided that the students can attend such programs. To be admitted to the Provincial School of the Deaf, the student must have either profound hearing loss or a learning difficulty due to hearing loss (Burnaby School District 2019). Applications to the Provincial School of the Deaf are assessed by the BC Deaf Education Committee (BCDEC) (Burnaby School District 2019). The application criteria for admission is unclear, as no publicly available document indicates how the BCDEC evaluates prospective students into the program. The Provincial School and one of the

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secondary school programs are in Burnaby, while the other secondary school program is in Langley (British Columbia Ministry of Education 2016, 93). All three of these programs are in the urban center of British Columbia. The lack of deaf education programs in regions outside of the urban center means that deaf students located in rural areas will have to move to the urban locations or rely on the limited services that their school district can provide. Rural students are also subject to less funding for programs and services as their school districts generally have fewer students enrolled, which under the revised funding formula will result in a significantly lower amount of funding (Grimmett and D’Amico 2008, 7-8). Without the ability to access the Provincial School and programs, rural deaf students in British Columbia are left without schooling resources and programs such as teachers of the deaf and other forms of ASL support to facilitate learning. Education Policy in Ontario The education policy in Ontario lacks the recognition of deaf students and fails to provide any substantial explanations of how such students will be provided accommodations. As of 2016, the education policy for students in K-12 limits the explanations to stating that deaf students may be provided instruction in ASL and that there are Provincial Schools available for such students (Ontario Ministry of Education 2016b, 34-45). The special education policy in Ontario also lacks accommodation procedures for deaf students. The only mention of deaf students is in the section that discusses Provincial Schools (Ontario Ministry of Education 2017, F9). Additionally, the special education policy mentions there are requirements needed for teaching students who are deaf or hard of hearing (Ontario Ministry of Education 2017, F12). Rather than identify the actual qualifications that are needed, the policy manual provides a link to the Ontario College of Teachers website which also fails to indicate what requirements are needed (Ontario Ministry of

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Education 2017, F12). However, this is not to say that these policies do not provide any information. In the special education policy, a step by step guideline details the process in which the Identification, Placement, and Review Committee (IPRC) determines if the child is deemed exceptional and determines program placement (Ontario Ministry of Education 2017, D34-43). The issue with these policies is that there is little indication of the potential accommodations for deaf students and vague descriptions of resources that may be used in any case of exceptionality (Ontario Ministry of Education 2017, E39). Understandably, there is flexibility required to deal with the needs of different students, but this is not grounds to avoid providing a framework to guide parents, teachers, and school districts on potential educational options for deaf students. Despite the vast size of the list of accommodations presented by the Ontario Ministry of Education, it still does not mention any form of ASL accommodations or interpreter assistance. In Ontario, there are Provincial Schools for students who are deaf, blind, or deafblind (Ontario Ministry of Education 2017, B12). These options are generally only to be considered if the current inclusive classroom structure does not provide an adequate learning environment for the deaf student, however one must apply to such schools and there is no guarantee of admission (Ontario Ministry of Education 2017, D10). Such schools are limited in number in Ontario, and only service certain regions of the province. For example, the Robarts School for the Deaf is a Provincial School located in London and is one of the three schools that are currently available for students looking to attend a school that is only for those who are deaf (Ontario Ministry of Education 2016a). However, applications to the Robarts School for the Deaf are limited to students living in Essex, Lambton, Kent, Elgin, Brant, Oxford, Haldimand, Norfolk, Grey, Bruce, Perth, Huron, and Middlesex (Ontario Ministry of Education 2016a). The other two Provincial Schools for the Deaf are the Sir James Whitney School for the Deaf and the Ernest C.

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Drury School for the Deaf in Belleville and Milton respectively (Ontario Ministry of Education 2016a). The locations of the three Provincial Schools can be problematic for students living in rural Ontario since all three operate in the urban areas of the province. In some circumstances, deaf students that live outside of the counties allotted for each school may be allowed to attend a residential program from Monday to Friday (Ontario Ministry of Education 2017, D42). Despite the accommodation that this appears to provide deaf students, there are flaws in this approach. Some deaf students may not feel comfortable living at an institution away from home during the week, especially those who are in their elementary years of schooling. There is also no mention of whether parents or guardians are responsible for paying for the residential program should the deaf student be admitted, as the policy only indicates that transportation to the Provincial School will be provided by either the school district or the Provincial School itself (Ontario Ministry of Education 2017, F8). The Robarts School for the Deaf uses a bilingual-bicultural model to teach students, however it is stated that only a limited number of individuals have the capability of using this model successfully (Ontario Ministry of Education 2016a). The statements made by the Ontario Ministry of Education are contradictory in several ways and show the flaws that are inherently present in the province’s education policy. The first issue stems from the encouragement to apply to such schools if the inclusive classroom structure does not meet the deaf student's needs (Ontario Ministry of Education 2017, D10). As mentioned in the literature review, proponents of Deaf culture and deaf adults would prefer if deaf students went to school in an environment that uses the bilingual-bicultural model (Smith and Campbell 1997, 444). Therefore, if the student and parents deem that it is in the student’s best interest to learn in the bilingual-bicultural environment provided at the Robarts School for the Deaf, they should apply. However, it is

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mentioned in the admissions criteria that the students must both need the specialized program and show that they can benefit from attending the programs offered at Provincial Schools (Ontario Ministry of Education 2016a). Issues could arise from the subjectivity of what can be classified as a need for the specialized program, as the Ministry of Education may argue that the deaf student wishing to enter the school to benefit from the bilingual-bicultural model does not require the program. The vague definition of qualifications for such programs is both discouraging and unaccommodating, as there may be cases in which deaf students could have received an educational program that matched their learning preferences but were rejected due to an opposing view by the Ministry of Education. Other issues can be seen in the admissions criteria which states that “students must demonstrate the potential to benefit from instruction in programs offered in the Provincial School for the Deaf” (Ontario Ministry of Education 2016a). The Ministry of Education indicates that only a select number of students possess the skills for the bilingual-bicultural approach (Ontario Ministry of Education 2016a). If deaf students are coming from inclusive classrooms in which they may have not developed appropriate skills, how does one demonstrate the ability to benefit and or possess such skills in the bilingual-bicultural program? Without a clearly defined measurement of how deaf students are assessed, it creates much uncertainty for the student and leaves the power of enrollment solely at the hands of the Ministry of Education. The specific entrance requirements and vague assessment criteria involved in the admissions for Provincial Schools in Ontario display the inadequacies in the education policy by creating unnecessary red tape and failing to ensure that deaf students are given access to the learning environments that they require. Discussion

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This paper aims to highlight the lack of accommodation that is present for deaf students in the public education system in Canada. In both British Columbia and Ontario, there is a lack of substantial resources to accommodate deaf students outside of attending a Provincial School for the Deaf or one of the few deaf programs that are present at secondary schools. Without proper accommodations and resources, deaf students are forced to go to special deaf education schools to have their needs met, but this opportunity is becoming increasingly out of reach as many of such schools are closing (MacDougall 2004, 18). Additionally, the application process in both British Columbia and Ontario is administratively complex and is unclear regarding who will be admitted into such programs. Whether the deaf student attends the traditional classroom setting or Provincial School, the student is at an evident disadvantage in receiving a similar standard of learning that is presently given to non-disabled students enrolled in the public education system. With these realities in mind, the public education systems of each province should focus on the disadvantage that is created not only by a lack of accessibility and resources for deaf students in traditional classrooms but also through the lack of programs and Provincial Schools that are capable of accommodating them in a different setting. Conclusion The public school system in Canada has thrown many different approaches to learning at deaf students. This paper explored whether Canadian public schools accommodate the needs of deaf students. I argued that public schools in Canada have been unable to accommodate the needs of deaf students because of inadequacies in provincial inclusive education policies. This paper began by introducing what deafness entails for the student with such impairment. A literature review then highlighted the arguments proposed by scholars regarding inclusive education policy in Canada and some of the arguments surrounding deaf education specifically.

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The provinces of British Columbia and Ontario were used as case studies to highlight the current policy approaches taken to support deaf students in Canada. The case of British Columbia displayed the inadequacies present in the provincial education policy through the lack of funding present for school programs, the accommodation policies that focus on oralist and Total Communication methods of learning, and the lack of programs present for deaf students outside of the traditional classroom setting. In the case of Ontario, it was found that both the education and special education policies lack recognition of deaf students and potential accommodations, while the admissions to the Provincial Schools require applicants to meet a very specific criteria but do not indicate how the student is evaluated on such requirements. The Provincial Schools in Ontario also pose issues for deaf students that live in rural areas, as the only schools that are present are in urban areas and have restricted enrollment for those counties unless circumstances allow admission into the residential program (Ontario Ministry of Education 2016a). Both cases show that deaf students are subject to unclear and unsupportive education policies. Improvements should be made in both the recognition of deaf students in education policy and their placement in programs outside of traditional classrooms. Until a change is made, deaf students in Canada will continue to be ignored by the current education policy frameworks and thus be at a disadvantage during their time in the public education system.

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