Vol. 26 - Fall 2020

Colin Bushweller & Emily Bruggeman

Language as Representation: A Transnational Analysis of Language Policy in India and China Shashank Rao

Accessing Space, Memory, and Narrative in the "Contested City:" From Baghdad to Hebron to Nicosia Neelam Sakaria

Impact of High-Profile Police Use of Force Incidents on Violent Crime Rates Megan Galante

FALL2020 journal of politics

The Struggle Towards Westernization: Examining Collective Discourse 1 in Estonia's Post-Soviet Society

& international affairs

Volume XXVI

Fall 2020

Journal of Politics & International Affairs Fall 2020 • Volume XXVI New York University

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FALL 2020 • VOLUME XXVI Notes On The Contributors

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The Struggle Towards Westernization: Examining Collective Discourse in Estonia's Post-Soviet Society Colin Bushweller & Emily Bruggeman

Language as Representation: A Transnational Analysis of Language Policy in India and China Shashank Rao

Accessing Space, Memory, and Narrative in the "Contested City:" From Baghdad to Hebron to Nicosia Neelam Sakaria

Impact of High-Profile Police Use of Force Incidents on Violent Crime Rates Megan Galante

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This publication is published by New York University students. The university is not responsible for its contents.

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FALL 2020 • VOLUME XXVI

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE The Journal of Politics & International Affairs at New York University is a student-run publication that provides a forum for outstanding student work on relevant, thought-provoking topics in the domestic and international landscape, including research in political science, economics, history, and regional studies.

We believe that the student theses published biannually in the Journal—chosen and edited rigorously by our editorial staff—are legitimate and valuable examples of the intellectual growth of politically-minded students and writers at New York University.

NOTES Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted for libraries. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale. Message sponsored by the NYU Center for Student Life and the College of Arts and Sciences.

Articles published in the Journal of Politics & International Affairs do not represent an agreement of beliefs or methodology, and readers are not expected to concur with all the opinions and research expressed in these pages. Instead, we hope that these pieces are able to inform and inspire dialogue in the NYU community by addressing a wide variety of topics and opinions.

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Emmanuel Hidalgo-Wohlleben

PRINT MANAGING EDITORS Pragya Parthasarathy Roshni Rangwani

DIGITAL MANAGING EDITORS Dylan Liang Oluwatona Campbell

ASSOCIATE EDITORS Keerthana Manivasakan Rob Loeser Natasha Roy

EDITORS

Alan Sun Grace Buechler Fabiha Khan Emily Dai Ojas Kharabanda Rishi Dhir Pavel Shirley Imaan Hilaly Srishti Gupta Shri Iyengar Sarah Strohecker Anaya Galibdin

SPECIAL THANKS Center for Student Life

Archival volumes of the journal may be found online at

JPIANYU.ORG Fall 2020

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Want to Write for the Journal?

Our editorial staff accepts submissions for consideration throughout the year. To submit your work, or to inquire about being published on our website, email jpia.club@nyu.edu.

Pitch the Print Journal with your original long-form essay or thesis: Works that are published by the print Journal tend to be longer than 5,000 words or 20 pages, double spaced.

Submissions are vetted based on their originality, academic strength, and syntax. Works that are chosen are then polished by several staff editors. The Journal is published every December and May. Submissions from NYU students, as well as non-NYU students, are welcome.

Join JPIA's digital team: Our website publishes short blogs that are often around 500 words and feature unique, and creative insights into political issues, current events, and international affairs. We also welcome long-form, reported pieces that are typically 1,000-2,000 words, allowing writers to explore more complex topics with a heavier research component than the blogs. Please reach out to the Editor-in-Chief or the Digital Managing Editors for more information on applying to be a digital staff writer.

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Editor's Note Once a semester, the Journal of Politics & International Affairs publishes outstanding pieces of work from student writers across the nation, especially those from New York University. This past year has been like no other in recent history, and like everyone else, the Journal has had to make adjustments. As such, we were sadly unable to publish an edition last spring, but we hope that this superb fall edition will go some ways towards making up for this.

This semester, we are featuring a piece by University of Vermont graduates, Colin Bushweller and Emily Bruggeman, which showcases some of the dominant discursive themes that exist in modern day Estonian society, and in particular, the nation’s increasing integration with the West. In another piece, 2019 NYU graduate, Shashank Rao, investigates the experience of two states, Karnataka and Hong Kong, to see how language serves as a proxy for broader concerns about national development and identity. We are happy to showcase the work of NYU alumnus, Neelam Sakaria, who considers the role of space and place in the protracted power struggles over disputed territories, through a close examination of three hotly contested cities: Hebron, Baghdad, and Nicosia. Finally, we are also excited to present a work by University of New Haven alumnus, Megan Galante, which explores the theory of ‘de-policing,’ which posits that in cities where high profile cases of excessive police violence have occurred, there will be a corollary increase in violent crime.

We hope you enjoy reading these pieces as much as much as we have enjoyed selecting them. To keep up with the Journal or get involved, follow us on our website (jpianyu.org), Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. As always, we encourage you to send us your best research papers and theses, and we look forward to reading them.

Fall 2020

–– Emmanuel Hidalgo-Wohlleben, Editor-in-Chief

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS COLIN BUSHWELLER & EMILY BRUGGEMAN

Emily Bruggeman and Colin Bushweller are students from the University of Vermont, where they both study Russian Language and Political Science. A recent graduate of UVM, Bruggeman's research interests predominantly focus on Russian authoritarianism in domestic politics, and the behavioral patterns of illiberal democracies. Bushweller's area of research analyzes the Baltic region's post-Soviet society, and specifically the complications surrounding language use, citizenship, and social belonging for the region's ethnic Russian community.

SHASHANK RAO

Shashank Rao is a 2019 graduate from the Global Liberal Studies program, concentrating Politics, Rights and Development, and minoring in Chinese and Social and Public Policy. His thesis investigated the role of linguistic contestation in forming political constituencies in Karnataka and Hong Kong. He is currently a second-year graduate student in the Masters of International Affairs Program at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, where his studies focus on social policy and conflict resolution in the context of international development initiatives.

NEELAM SAKARIA

Neelam Sakaria is Chief of Staff at Civic Signals and New Public, intiatives dedicated to moving beyond the necessary critiques of our current online spaces and to encourage thinking like digital urban planners about the spaces we want to inhabit in the future. Prior to joining, she supported early-stage social entrepreneurs at Echoing Green, working on the challenges in racial equity, the climate crisis and working in support of a more inclusive entrepreneurial ecosystem.

Neelam is a 2015 graduate of NYU's Global Liberal Studies program, where she concentrated on politics, human rights and international development and double majored in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies within the College of Arts and Sciences. After a year spent in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, she wrote her undergraduate thesis to better understand the critical political and urban sociological processes that influenced the experience of physical space, specifically within cities at the center of territorial conflict.

MEGAN GALANTE

Megan Galante is a 2019 graduate of the Honors Program at the University of New Haven, studying Criminal Justice and Investigative Services. Her thesis, completed as part of the honors program at the University, analyzes high profile incidents of police brutality and how they impacted crime rates in their respective cities. She currently works as a paralegal and will be starting law school this fall.

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The Struggle Towards Westernization: Examining Collective Discourse in Estonia's Post-Soviet Society Colin Bushweller & Emily Bruggeman

This article seeks to showcase the dominant discursive themes that exist in modern day Estonian society as a means to demonstrate the social trajectory in which the nation is moving, specifically in relation to the nation’s further integration with the West and the isolative struggles that encompass its ethnic Russian community. To accomplish this, we have conducted a discourse analysis of 216 Estonian articles — published between August 1, 2018 and July 31, 2019 — from six national media outlets, which produce content representative of social discourse in the country. An equal divide is employed between Russian and Estonian language samples in order to obtain linguistic diversity in the study. The discourse analysis identified the largest points of contention and discussion in Estonia, both through a qualitative and quantitative framework. The results of the study serve as the foundation of four thematic categorizations that represent the largest struggles Estonian society currently faces. These struggles deal with 1) Narva, the country’s Russian enclave, and the barrier this city poses to country cohesiveness with its isolation; 2) The emergence and growing popularity of the Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) and its far-right ideology; 3) The debate over language use in Estonia, specifically with education; and lastly, 4) The social and economic implications that Estonia faces as it moves further into the global market. This article serves to advance scholarly understandings of the struggles post-Soviet nations encounter in contemporary times, especially those with large ethnic Russian populations, and how these nations, such as Estonia, handle and work their way through such challenges.

Introduction

From Soviet occupation to EU membership, Estonia has experienced significant changes in its governmental and societal structures over the past three decades since its initial independence movements. The nation, through peaceful protests, signaled to the USSR that the time for independence was imminent. In this transition, Estonian society drastically altered its political, economic, and social environments in ways that integrated it within the West, allowing the newly independent nation to access a market and society that spurred innovation and encouraged globalization. Despite this economic and social integration, Estonia maintained its nation-state structure and formulated policies over the years

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aimed at further constructing and promoting its national identity after five decades of brutal occupation under the USSR, which attempted to erase Estonian language, culture, and history from society.

As a result of its nation-state positionality and the policies that followed, Estonia developed a variety of internal problems, specifically with its ethnic Russian population, with whom the country has a tense, strained relationship owing to this community’s thematic connection back to the USSR. Divides emerged along ethnic and linguistic lines in Estonian society, allowing for intense social isolation to encompass the nation’s ethnic Russians, who found themselves lacking national belonging and struggling to establish social connections in a country in which they felt unwelcome. The Estonian government then found itself in a struggle, in which it had to balance the progression of its national identity with its attempts to integrate its ethnic Russian community, as well, in order to establish a cohesive level of social unity within its borders that aligned with EU values and principles. To this day, this struggle continues, and many factors exacerbate the ethnic Russian community’s isolation, enabling the continuation of an ethnic divide and its growth within the country. This then begs the question: Nearly three decades after independence, what are the dominant points of contention in Estonia’s modern day society?

To answer this question, we have conducted a discourse analysis of news articles from six Estonian media outlets that publish content representative of social discourse in the country. We used 36 articles from each outlet, totaling to 216 samples between all six, during the selected period of August 1, 2018 to July 31, 2019 for 1) Its position within the lead up and aftermath of the nation’s March 2019 parliamentary elections, and 2) Its unique position as three decades after the independence movements that spurred the end of Soviet occupation in the country. We also employed an equal divide between Estonian and Russian articles, so that there is linguistic variety among the samples in the study. To explore the results and paint a picture of contemporary Estonian society, this paper is broken into four main parts.

In the section to follow, we lay out the historical context that facilitated the beginnings of the ethnic conflict in Estonia, detailing the Soviet brutality that the nation endured under occupation. The second section explains in greater depth the study’s methodology and the purpose of the discourse analysis. The third section — and the longest within the paper — presents the study’s results, and then examines their deeper meaning. This portion of the paper is broken into four smaller sub-sections that investigate the study’s dominant themes and place them within four thematic categories. Lastly, the final conclusion of the paper will succinctly explore the path forward for Estonia in consideration of the results and lay out the study’s significance for Baltic-related social research.

Historical Context: Soviet Brutality in the 20th Century

Estonia has suffered from a history dominated by vacillating levels of independence and autonomy at the hands of authoritarian regimes. Most recently, the country struggled under Soviet occupation from 1940 to 1990, during which its people, language, and culture were oppressed in ways systematically aimed at eliminating Estonian society to make way for a single unit of Slavic culture throughout the USSR. In order to prevent ethnic mobilization and to instate an ethnic Russian majority in Estonia, the Soviet Union initiated mass deportations of Estonians — many of whom were women and children — throughout the 1940s to intense labor camps and uninhabitable parts of Russia. (Key, 2003; Koort, 2014; Mertelsmann & Rahi-Tamm, 2009). Families saw their loved ones stolen from them; friends found themselves coerced into turning on one another; progressive, free thinkers were forcefully silenced and removed from society.

The deportations in 1941 and 1949 remain salient in Estonian history because of the qualitative

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COLIN BUSHWELLER & EMILY BRUGGEMAN

and quantitative impact they left. The 1941 deportations constituted the first mass act of inhumanity perpetrated by the Soviet regime, manifesting fear into all of Estonian society for the oppression that was to follow, and the 1949 deportations resulted in a crippling blow to Estonia’s postwar guerrilla resistance, eliminating any hope and possibility of liberating itself from Soviet occupation (Raun, 2007). Since deportations and executions in smaller, more covert fashions took place outside of the large scale ones in 1941 and 1949, there exist only approximate estimates on the total number of Estonians who were deported and died from 1940 until the start of the 1956 de-Stalinization period, after which government-sanctioned deportations were discontinued. Nonetheless, nearly 100,000 Estonians — ranging from newborn babies to elderly Estonians — fell victim to this form of Soviet brutality (Strods & Kott, 2002; Mertelsmann & Rahi-Tamm).

To mitigate the population loss and ensure a Slavic dominance, Soviet authorities ushered in thousands of ethnic Russians into Estonia. Many settled in the Ida-Viru region, which is located in northeastern Estonia near the Russian border and also home to Narva, currently the country’s thirdlargest city. The Soviets bombed this region in the mid-1940s while struggling to regain control of it over the Nazi army; these bombings demolished the infrastructure and old-town baroque architecture of the region, and specifically in Narva. Instead of rebuilding it once back in control, the USSR chose to forbid Estonians from returning to the area, and then proceeded to demolish even the walls of the bombed-out houses. This was done to make room for Soviet-style apartments to house the region’s workers, since IdaViru — specifically Sillamäe — became home to a uranium factory and other industrial plants that fueled the USSR’s nuclear program (Lippmaa & Maremäe, 2003; Faure & Mensing, 2012). Sillamäe became a “closed town” run by the Soviet military, inhabited only by ethnic Russians, and did not even exist on maps nor have a postal address; careful monitoring was done to ensure state secrets remained in the region (Sillamäe, n.d.; Kattago, 2008; Maisel & Duval, 2016; Faure & Mensing). The Soviet Union’s lack of trust in ethnic Estonians prevented them from living or working in this region at large. Outside of Ida-Viru, other ethnic Russians were also resettled to the capital city of Tallinn to occupy high-ranking government jobs in Estonia. The phenomenon of “Russification” then officially took place in Estonia: the Soviet government sanctioned the removal of the Estonian language, holidays, cultural traditions, and history from nearly all social and educational spheres; Russian language, culture, and traditions replaced it all, consequently becoming the “superior” culture in occupied-Estonia.

In 1990, however, things began to change. After the success of the country’s singing revolution and the region-wide Baltic Way protest movement, Estonia publicly denounced the past five decades of Soviet occupation in Estonia and announced the commencement of a transitional period for the nation’s full independence. By August 1991, this goal had been achieved, as the Soviet Union itself recognized Estonian independence.

The ethnic Russian population around Narva did not support Estonia’s statehood and demanded autonomy for the region at the time (Faure & Mensing). Despite this, many ethnic Russians chose to remain in Estonia rather than move to the Russian Federation. These Russians understood that the economic situation in Russia was in ruins, and that though they have cultural and linguistic ties there, life itself in Russia would come with an array of challenges. For others, it was more personal; since their entire lives existed in Narva, to leave would mean to let go of everything they knew. Nonetheless, Narva’s region remained with Estonia. The newly-independent nation now found itself with a population that, for many, resembled the remnants of a dark, troubling past, away from which society wanted to break. And on

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the other end, Russians in Estonia now found themselves unwelcome and unwanted—sentiments that encouraged ethnic consolidation, causing the ethnic Russians to isolate themselves from the rest of Estonia in areas such as Ida-Viru.

The Estonian government passed policies that were rooted in Estonian language and culture in the 1990s, thereby rendering it a nation-state that wanted to promote its own identity after years of having it oppressed (Mole “State,” 2012). Paramount of these policies were those surrounding citizenship in post-Soviet Estonia, such as the restrictive citizenship laws passed in the 1990s that made it difficult for ethnic Russians to become citizens (Smith, 1996; Romanov, 2000; Barrington, 1995; Zabrodskaja, 2009). Instead of becoming a citizen of Estonia or moving back to Russia, many ethnic Russians received gray passports, which signified that they had no state to which they were attached (i.e. stateless citizens).

To this day, Estonia has approximately 75,000 stateless citizens and the vast majority of whom reside in Narva (“Number,” 2019). The Russian population then soon began to struggle with identity formation and national belonging. The years to come only augmented these struggles, too, since sentiments of inferiority and social displacement were instilled within the community’s mind, preventing progressive integration, and instead worsening Estonian society’s challenge with cultural isolation and alienation.

These policies also impacted Estonia’s pre-accession phase for EU membership. Estonia experienced difficulty in meeting the EU’s standards for the integration of minorities and the protection of their rights, since before accession, the government paid little to no attention to its Russian minority (van Elsuwege, 2004). Many Estonians at the time believed these requirements could jeopardize the very national identity they had just begun to reconstruct, and that forfeiting this liberty would regress Estonian society in significant ways (Mole “Identity,” 2012). Despite this, Estonia moved forward with its application and joined the EU in 2004. Estonia still faced integrational challenges along the way, as it was criticized by the European Council for its feeble efforts to protect the interests of ethnic Russians and integrate them into society. All necessary legislation had yet been implemented by 2004, as well, and the EU observed “important shortcomings” in the area of anti-discrimination legislation for Estonia (Council, 2002; Mole “Identity”).

The arguments and methods I advance here serve as a rudimentary attempt at addressing phenomeTo this day, the ethnic divide in Estonia still exists and is visible on social and economic levels, raising questions about the future of integration in Estonia, especially as nationalistic parties rise in popularity in the country’s political system and Estonia, as a whole, continues to try to shed its Soviet past.

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Methodology

Table One: Overview of Selected Media Outlets Which outlets were selected and why?

VIRU PROSPECKT

STENA

TEMA

Language of Articles

Russian

Russian

Russian

Reason for Selection

A Narva-based outlet that provides insights into society in the Ida-Viru region from a municipal perspective.

Number of Samples

36

36

36

Usaldushing ProspektMedia

Privately Owned

MTÜ TEMA

prospekt.ee

stena.ee

tema.ee

DELFI

POSTIMEES

ERR

Language of Articles

Estonian

Estonian

Estonian

Reason for Selection

As a regional outlet, DELFI's Estonian portal incorporates largerscale discussions in its reporting, while still focusing on Estonian society.

Number of Samples

36

36

36

Ekspress Grupp

Eesti Meedia Group

Estonian Government

delfi.ee

postimees.ee

err.ee

Ownership Website

Ownership Website

An Estonian-based outlet which primarily broadcasts to the country’s ethnic Russian population in Narva and Tallinn.

Considered the country’s oldest newspaper, it is one of Estonia’s most visited news portals and reports on all things related to Estonian society.

A Narva-centered outlet which predominantly covers local politics and cultural issues impacting Estonia’s ethinic Russian community.

Funded by the Estonian government, ERR offers a unique perspective on society from a governmental standpoint on what their possible priorities are.

To explore dominant themes in Estonian society, our research followed the discursive approach of framing-analysis to examine how the issues presented in news media reflect broader social anxieties and discussions. For the article selection processes we implemented a quantitative and qualitative structure.

Articles from six news sources (see table one) were selected from sections pertaining to culture, politics, economics, and societal issues. The articles were individually reviewed to ensure that the issues discussed

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were relevant and topical to the study. This step was included to make sure that the reporting would be related specifically to Estonian society, rather than just general reporting on unrelated events that did not affect Estonia. There was an equal divide between the language of the outlets; we selected three outlets from which to only draw Estonian articles, and then three outlets from which to draw only Russian articles.

Though almost each outlet has both Estonian and Russian sections, the reporting itself in these sections varies and is not always a duplicate of one another. Therefore, we chose outlets that are emblematic of society specifically through the dominant language in which they are presented.

The selection timeframe is from August 1, 2018 to July 31, 2019, encompassing a 12-month range.

We selected this time frame to capture a large sample of the news coverage leading up to the parliamentary elections on March 3, 2019. Elections are a reliable catalyst for bringing voter concerns to the forefront and stimulating broader discussions about their implications for citizens and society. Expanding the time frame to include pre- and post-election analyses added more nuanced contextualization to the data. This period is also especially revealing because it covers content thirty years after the nation’s independence movements that led to its official independence in 1991, and therefore is a representative time to evaluate the state of Estonian society.

For each outlet we selected three articles from every month to effectively track thematic evolutions and devolutions on a month-to-month basis. This added up to 36 articles per year for one outlet, equating to a total of 216 between all six outlets.1 Each article was reviewed three times in the coding process.

First, to read through and become familiar with all content; second, to code it according to the dominant themes presented; finally, to verify the coding. Each article was coded to at least one theme, and then three themes at most for articles that covered a wide thematic variety of reporting. Once the coding process was complete, statistics were drawn from the coded articles to quantitatively identify which themes were numerically dominant and most saliently presented throughout the samples. These results can be found in the next section.

The framing-analysis method was used to analyze the data collected through a discursive lens. The sociological concept of framing refers to how people consume and organize information into categories which can be easily identified and processed (Zhongdang & Kosicki, 2010; Goffman, 1974).

Frames can evolve to include complex sociological units which are grounded by social meaning or experience but expand to include the discourse which emerges from those baseline narratives. Through this process, frames become both internal and external methods of organization, since they allow individuals to categorize their perceptions of the world, which then becomes a tool for broader social organization and understanding (Zhongdang & Kosicki; Gamson, 1989). News media often picks up on these frames and uses them to organize its own content, which often mirrors representative topics within society. As a result, news media in the process then often reflects the pre-existing discursive frameworks in place.

For the purposes of this project, framing-analysis will serve as a tool for showcasing four thematic, overarching categorizations that explore Estonia’s contemporary discourse. These four categories derive from themes that were statistically significant in the data presented, and both their qualitative and quantitative features will be considered, as well, in the analysis. This will allow us to examine how broadly held conceptions of politics, economics, culture and citizenship are understood by people living in Estonia, and how the discourse emerging from these themes impacts general perceptions and attitudes towards 1 To see a full list of the articles used in the study, please see the appendices.

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Estonian identity.

This paper will serve as a contemporary explanation of Estonian society, framed by the data presented and analyses provided by the selected news outlets. This research specifically engages with the legacy of how — three decades later — the themes of Estonian independence and autonomy are functioning as Estonia joins the globalized world. Our methodology serves this goal by presenting samples of the most commonly discussed themes. This will set up a qualitative exploration of the frames mentioned above, and how they relate to the current trajectory of Estonian society.

Results: A Glimpse into Estonian Society

Table Two: Presentation of Results from Discourse Analysis Thematic Continuities and their Rates of Appearance in Estonian Media Outlets Russian Language Outlets VIRU PROSPEKT

STENA

TEMA

Narva Culture and Society

17%

Ethnic Politics

31%

Ethnic Politics

34%

Education: Language of Instruction

15%

Estonian Market

14%

Party Politics

14%

Local crime

13%

Elections

8%

Infrastructure

11%

Russophobia and Integration

12%

Foreign Policy

8%

Elections

9%

Corruption in Narva

11%

Crime

7%

Corruption

9%

Political Party Dysfunction

9%

Social Programs

7%

Labor Market

7%

EstonianRussian Border

9%

Infrastructure

5%

Migration

4%

Voting

4%

EU-Specific

5%

Social Programs

4%

Economic Situation in Ida-Viru

4%

Party Politics

5%

Language Policy

2%

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2%

Environmental Regulations

5%

Birth-rates

2%

Migration

2%

Corruption

3%

Crime

2%

Estonia-Russia Relations

2%

Local Governance

2%

Citizenship

2%

15

Estonian Language Outlets DELFI

POSTIMEES

ERR

EKRE Reporting

25%

The Market

18%

Integration

22%

Narva's Isolative Challenges

11%

Education Policy

13%

Education in the State Language

16%

Tensions with Russia

11%

Environmental Regulation

12%

Narva’s National Positionality

16%

EstonianRussian Border

10%

Political Reform

11%

EKRE Reporting

16%

Integration

7%

Cultural Policy

11%

Ethnic Russians’ Struggles

7%

National Pride

7%

Local Development

11%

Migration

5%

Far-Right Politics

7%

Foreign Policy

5%

Corruption

5%

Hate Speech & Freedom of Expression

6%

Healthcare

5%

Challenges of the Media

5%

Governmental Frustrations

6%

Migration

5%

Political Party Dysfunction

3%

EU-Specific

4%

Elections

3%

Crime

2%

NATO Reporting

4%

Crime

3%

Border

2%

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COLIN BUSHWELLER & EMILY BRUGGEMAN

Challenges of the Media

2%

Local Governance

3%

EU-Specific

1%

The results of this study indicate that, on the whole, there is an inherent interconnectedness that exists within all the themes obtained from the six outlets. The themes have a “spillover” framework, meaning that their social representations bleed into each other, highlighting their interconnectedness.

There is a clear linkage between the top three themes among each news portal, which are rooted in struggles encompassing nationalism, language use, social integration, and ethnically divided politics. The connection between the leading themes in this study not only reifies their importance in understanding controversial trends in Estonian society, but the connection also signals that, even between Estonian and Russian language outlets, there is a noticeable similarity among the outlets’ reporting that intertwines with all six. This highlights that, in terms of what is seen as a “problem” in Estonian society, there is not a large disagreement between the linguistic groups.

To examine and explore Estonian society through the lens of these discursive results, this section is broken up into four sub-sections, which will analyze the greater trends from the data, placing them into larger categories for contextualized analysis. Integrated within these four parts will be quantitative considerations of the data above, but primary focus will be given to the qualitative analysis of each section.

Because of the overwhelming number of samples, we have selected the following sections because they best represent the dominant points of contention and controversy in Estonia. As such, these sub-sections will tell the story of Estonia’s contemporary society, while also discussing the social trajectory in which the country is moving.

Estonia's Russian Enclave: Is Narva a Barrier to Country Cohesiveness?

Located in the Ida-Viru region of Northeastern Estonia, Narva — the nation’s Russian enclave — is a city of 60,000 whose residents live on the margins of Estonian society: culturally, linguistically, and socially (Kalikova & Kurbatova, 2002).2 Its most recent historical roots date back to the Soviet era, when it was entirely reconstructed and wiped of its Estonian past, after bombings from WW2, to fit needs of a Soviet city. Block apartment complexes were developed, ethnic Russians were resettled to the region, and a uranium factory was revamped, thereby creating its contemporary origins. After Estonian independence, which many residents at the time opposed, not much has changed — it shares more similarities with its Soviet past than it does with modern Estonian society (Fein, 2005; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015; Kirch, 1995). It is an isolated municipality, whose residents often lack national and social belonging, allowing for the augmentation of a geographical divide in the country. This isolation, however, is not felt on just social levels, but also economically, since the city possess the lowest income per capita in the country, being the only region with a gross income of less than 1,000 euros per month. The average gross monthly income in

Estonia is roughly 1,300 euros, and the highest is approximately 1,700 euros in Viimsi — a county outside of Tallinn (Hankewitz, 2019). And though unemployment has been decreasing in Estonia in recent years, this has not been the case for Narva, where unemployment continues to increase because of the lack of a 2 Approximately 95 percent of the city’s population speaks Russian as their native language, and many possess inadequate levels of Estonian language. Local media is entirely in Russian, and it is a rare occurrence to hear (and use) Estonian on the streets.

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growing, secure industry; Narva relies predominantly on blue-collar work, such as textile manufacturing, mining, and staffing at the local power plants. Unemployment in Narva’s region rests at approximately 12 percent, whereas the country average is five percent (“Why Narva,” 2019).

The results from the discourse analysis reified these truths, showcasing that — from a quantitative and qualitative standpoint — Narva remains a controversial enclave in Estonian society, in which political corruption, positive views of Soviet legacies, high rates of crime, and integrational obstacles exist: all issues that stem from its intense isolation. The city is a living remnant of the nation’s Soviet history, and because of this position it will forever hold an air of unease and solicitude for many ethnic Estonians. As a result, it continues to be a roadblock to cohesiveness for the nation, as Estonian government officials and citizens must reckon with the fact that their third-largest city operates in a different world and shares little to no commonality with Estonian society and culture. This subsection will identify and analyze some of those struggles that are at the core of Narva’s society.

From the study, crime rates in Narva appeared as a dominant theme in several articles, specifically in the Russian language ones from Viru Prospekt and Stena, where it accounted for 13 percent and seven percent respectively. Narva possesses the highest rate of crime per capita in Estonia, and this level is influenced largely by the fentanyl outbreak that has gripped the city over the past two decades, launching it into one of the epicenters of the opioid and HIV/AIDS epidemic for not only the country, but all of Europe itself (“Estonia 2019,” 2019; Armstrong, 2017; “European Drug Report,” 2017). The ethnic Russian community is the one who uses the most opioids in Estonia, as well, and this exacerbates their isolation and doubles the problem for Narva. The city must grapple with the struggles of identity formation and belonging coupled with high rates of opioid use, specifically with fentanyl, for the community, who then also suffer from layers of stigmatization because of this drug abuse (Allaste & Lagerspetz, 2005). This reality then helps promote crime within Narva and facilitates its ongoing presence, giving it the necessary capital and resources to flourish, especially within the city’s younger population.

That being said, juvenile delinquency among the city’s youth poses a significant and immediate challenge for Narva. There is a lack of social programs and activities to occupy their time, so they turn to alternative engagements outside of the law to fill their days. And for the vast majority of the city’s youth, life in Narva is influenced by several risk factors: high rates of unemployment, low incomes, and high rates of violence — all factors that feed into their high rates of drug use and crime (Kalikova & Kurbatova).

This layer of vulnerability poses a dilemma for municipal officials, who are struggling to generate ways to mitigate the situation, as evidenced by a September 2018 sample from Delfi, which reported that: Minister of Justice Urmas Reinsalu met with local representatives […] in Narva to gain an overview of the work and difficulties so far with regard to juvenile delinquency in Ida-Virumaa. The bottlenecks at the meeting were the lack of social programs for young people. Proposals at the meeting included improving access to social programs for young people who have not yet been convicted. "Young people need to be dealt with before the prosecution, court or other law enforcement agencies get involved. Preventative action needs to be given to young people in action and in showing them how to grow into a law-abiding citizen," Reinsalu explained. Local governments as well as state social welfare were seen to play an important role in prevention work. "Having youth workers and making attractive hobby circles available would prevent a situation where young people have nothing better

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to do," Reinsalu said.

These social programs are integral to the future of Narva’s residents, since in many cases those born in the city spend their entire lives within it. That is, if the youth is predisposed to crime at a young age now, then it is likely they will carry that into their adulthood later. In turn, this multiplies the crime rates in the city and establishes it as a breeding ground for trouble. Social programs that incorporate language learning and instill sentiments of belonging could help prevent the city’s youth from finding their way into crime and drug use, because they would give the participants a sense of identity that connects them to Estonia on a greater level and presents them with opportunities outside of Narva (i.e. through learning Estonian), or academic and professional opportunities within the city itself.

In Narva, the murder rate has increased recently, too, as suggested by an article titled “Police commented on surge in killings in Narva” from Viru Prospekt in June 2019 that discussed the nearly threefold increase in murder rates since 2017.3 Verbal threats of murder, the article reports, are increasing, as well, especially among family members and close relatives in Narva: a phenomenon for which police have yet to find an answer. Incident reports from the outlet reflected this, as they published reports about sons who had beaten their 80-year-old mothers, husbands who had seriously injured their wives, and individuals who had shot or murdered their own family members. Verbal threats were also included in these reports with notes about husbands threatening to kill wives, and then adult sons and daughters threatening to kill their parents. Other cases found in the incident reports dealt with the appearances of corpses around the city, parents abusing their young children, several hit-and-runs, armed robberies, and various stabbings.

This rate — and type — of crime is alarming for a city of roughly 60,000, and it is one of the many factors creating a cloud of anxiety for ethnic Estonians. Estonians hear about the reports and see the violence posted online about what takes place in Narva, thereby reinforcing their aversion to and apprehension of the city. On a national level, high crime rates in Narva get attached to the Russian community writ large, even for those outside of the Ida-Viru region. Consequently, this stereotype of Russian communities equating to crime and violence spreads throughout all regions of Estonia. To combat this reality, qualitative resources need to be devoted to the city, which could help tackle its high rate of crime and identify the roots of its ongoing growth so that preventative measures can be put in place; if not, Narva runs the risk of crime amplification and expansion in the years to come.

Similarly, corruption plagues this eastern city, where the political parties and local businesses are involved in a variety of scandals. The study indicates that Narva’s political system, in many ways, is entrenched in corruption at significantly higher levels when compared to the rest of the country. A sample from ERR in April 2019 discussed the “curse of Narva,” reporting that: Narva is run by a group of local bosses… if a boss is suddenly captured, it will seem as if things are moving for the better, and the rule of law in Narva will become more openly democratic…. The mistake is that [Narva] is run not by just one boss but by an organized group of local bosses, who are 3 From a structural level, much of the reporting on Viru Prospekt’s website is related to municipal crime, and they not only have a section entirely devoted to this form of reporting (titled “112”), but it is also the one that is most often updated and the most prolific with postings.

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not interested in dismantling the existing power system.

Narva’s “curse” of corruption most often appeared in the samples that discussed municipal politicians themselves, and the foundational corruption that defines their actions, reputations, and agendas.

These samples reported on, for example, the arrest of Alexei Voronov, a local businessman and politician, who violated public procurement requirements and received bribes of up to 60,000 euros; various investigations into corruption activities of members of the Narva city council and municipal officials, such as the detainment of Vladimir Mizhuy in March 2019;4 and the endemic political corruption within the Center party — the country’s populist, socially-liberal political party — in Narva. In fact, an article from Stena in March 2019 reported that nearly a hundred members of the Center party in Narva have voluntarily stepped down from their positions since the corruption allegations began in the summer of 2018. The first to leave were eight deputies of the Narva City Council, against whom the prosecutor's office in early August of 2018 presented their suspicions that they had violated the city’s anti-corruption laws in their political positions.

The effects of this corruption run deep. It leaves a lasting impact on the voters in the city, who view such political corruption as explicit indications of democratic backsliding in their city. Jana Toom, a growing political figure in Narva, leading member of the Center party, and an MEP for Estonia, cites corruption in Narva as a reason for low voter turnout in Ida-Virumaa, according to a sample from Stena in May 2019.5 This article also addressed the low electoral activity in Narva’s region in the recent EU elections, where there was only a 24 percent voter turnout, and in the country’s March 2019 parliamentary elections, where the Ida-Viru region had the lowest voter turnout rate in the entire country by over ten percent (“Voter,” 2019).6 These impacts stifle political participation and, in a cyclical way, render corruption and political misbehavior more likely, since individuals are not working on a voter-level to root out that which plagues their municipal political system. Since Narva operates within its own world, corruption spreads and can happen more easily because corruption that takes place in the city is often politically and socially confined to its municipal borders. That is, individuals can more easily take advantage of the city’s isolation and its lack of structural connection with the rest of the country.

Table Three: Social Layers of Integration in Estonia (Lauristin. et al., 2011; Koort, 2014) Thematic Continuities and their Rates of Appearance in Estonian Media Outlets Integrational Group

Percentage

Description

4 According to a March 2019 Tema article, Mizhuy claims the allegations of corruption are false, and that he was slandered and targeted by businessman Sergey Berezovsky.

5 Yana Toom has both Estonian and Russian heritage, and is therefore a member of both communities in Estonia.

6 The voter turnout for the 2019 parliamentary elections was 48.2 percent in Ida-Viru, whereas the national average was 63.7 percent. Harju county, located about 40 kilometers outside of Tallinn, had the highest voter turnout with 69.8 percent.

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1. Successfully Integrated

25%

Often comprised of the younger generation that was born and educated in the country, usually after the USSR collapsed.

This group often does fine economically, and does not experience similar hardships from the older generation.

And though possessing Russian heritage, this group often has citizenship, considers itself a part of the country, trusts the state and its authorities, and do not consume Russian media.

2. Russian-speaking Compatriots of Estonia

16%

Middle-aged individuals, who do not cope very well economically, and whose attitudes are rather pessimistic, owing to their socioeconomic status. Nonetheless, most of them possess citizenship and consider Estonia to be their home.

3. Integrated Linguistically, but Actively Critical

13%

The youngest and most active people who are economically secure, this group speaks the country’s language, but uses it infrequently. Their identity of citizenship is weak—some possess citizenship, but many view Russia as their homeland.

They follow Estonian media, but lack trust in it. They have little political involvement.

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4. Little Integrated

29%

This is the lowest-income group, consisting mainly of bluecollar workers, but also retirees and the unemployed. All age groups are represented here.

Their language skills are poor and their citizenship is mostly undefined, meaning they were unable or unwilling to pursue any Estonian citizenship after the collapse of the USSR. Members of this group attribute their lack of citizenship to inadequate learning ability that prevents them from learning the official state language. They are distinguished by their distrust toward state authorities, the lack of a sense of security, and pessimism. They are active consumers of both the local and Russian media.

5. Unintegrated Passive

22%

This group is made up predominantly of older people who do not speak the official language. They are distinguished by their inadequate level of education and low self-esteem.

Many of them have Russian citizenship and many consider Russia their only homeland.

They are socially passive, not interested in Estonian politics, and their main source of information is Russian television channels.

On an individual level, integration of the ethnic Russian community in Estonia has come with challenges. The levels of integration exist in a variety of layers, as identified in Marju Lauristin’s 2011 study on integration classification in Estonia (see table three). Reinforced by the results of the discourse

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analysis, identity continues to be one of the largest points of struggle for the residents of Narva because ethnic Russians have weak connections to the Estonian state, their relationship to Russia is largely just cultural and linguistic, and their sense of belonging — individually and to society — is significantly lacking. Their integration into society has been successful for some, such as the 21 percent who are part of the “successfully integrated” category, but Narva’s Russian community finds itself lacking in integrative progression, especially since many residents in Narva are “non-citizens.” That is, they have gray passports that indicate they have no state to which they are attached. These gray passports are a reflection of the restrictive citizenship laws passed in the 1990s that made it difficult for ethnic Russians to become citizens of Estonia, since the nation was apprehensive of naturalizing a base of individuals who supported their former oppressor.

Prospective candidates in the 1990s had to master the Estonian language, demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of its history and culture, and, in some cases, take an oath of allegiance to the Estonian state (Smith, 1996; Romanov, 2000; Barrington, 1995; Zabrodskaja, 2009). So, instead of becoming a citizen of Estonia or moving back to Russia, many ethnic Russians received the gray passports that signified their statelessness. Though non-citizens were permitted to reside in Estonia, they were not given certain rights, such as the right to vote, run for local government elections, serve in national and European parliaments, or participate in national referendums. They were also restricted from various work roles, specifically public service positions, consequently isolating them at a professional level (Semenov, 2017; Cianetti, 2014). As noted before, Estonia has approximately 75,000 stateless citizens and the vast majority of whom reside in Narva, where they can comfortably live using only Russian, since virtually all of them do not even speak basic Estonian (“Number,” 2019). These individuals are part of the “unintegrated passive” group.

As a result, many residents of Narva — such as those with gray passports and those born into families with parents who have them — suffer from an “alien’s syndrome.” That is, they feel like a generation on the margins of Estonian society, existing in a separate world and lacking a common language and cultural connection with the rest of the nation (Kalikova & Kurbatova). This has led to passive social engagement for those in Narva, who possess feelings of inferiority from the rest of Estonia. They see their social position as one that is significantly lower than their Estonian counterparts, since they lack the agency and capability to engage in Estonian society in meaningful, material ways. Confidence and life satisfaction levels are much lower within this population compared to the rest of the country (Kus-Harbord & Ward, 2015; Koort; Lebedeva & Tatarko, 2013). These feelings of second-class citizenship are often reinforced

by Estonia’s far-right politicians, such as Mart Helme, who was quoted in an October 2018 ERR sample, saying that Estonians only want one thing of the Russians in living in their country — to leave them alone. He continued by inviting those Russians who wish to stay in Estonia to assimilate, and for the rest to return to Russia. Other instances of alienation come at the hands of ordinary ethnic Estonians as well, according to Yana Toom, who was cited in an October 2018 Delfi sample as saying that “The problem is that Estonians are not willing to integrate with Russians,” adding that the barrier in language prevents the communities from integrating with each other.

Though the Estonian state has reached out in recent years by offering free Estonian language courses to the city’s population, many do not make use of this opportunity, and instead accept their disadvantage and detachment from the nation’s society. For some ethnic Russians, these sorts of efforts cause them to feel even more unwelcome, since they are interpreted as what some call the “Estonianization”

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of society: a phenomenon, they believe, that actively suppresses the Russian community’s culture in its attempt to restore and promote Estonian identity (Zaitoun, 2019). In response to this, the discussion of Narva’s future in Estonia comes into play, as indicated by a September 2018 sample from ERR, in which Jana Toom states that “cultural autonomy” ought to be considered for Narva: Yana Toom later stated to the ERR's Russian-language news portal that cultural autonomy is something that has been enshrined in the National Minority Cultural Autonomy Act of 1993.

"The law is there, but it doesn't work. It works not only for Russians but also for other minorities in Estonia. At the moment, there is a situation where it is worth discussing. Because no one is saying directly, in the current pre-election situation, that assimilation prevails in a democratic society, that the majority should not decide how a minority should live, so when preparing for a party's pre-election program, it is worth discussing how to provide minority access to education, information, and cultural development in their mother tongue," said Toom.

With an isolated population come many challenges for the state. Estonian officials have been doing what they can in recent years, especially since the country joined the EU, to better integrate the community into society in a cohesive manner aimed at constructing a nation with their needs in mind, rather than constructing one that ignores this community. The president, for example, moved her office to Narva in late 2018 with the intention of signaling that she is focused on the development of Narva, and would like to learn more about the city’s social environment. Estonia’s Integration Foundation continues to work to deconstruct the stigmas surrounding the Russian population in Narva, in an attempt to find ways to bring the nation’s people — from both ethnicities — together to establish a society without ethnic divide.

And in 2016, the nation passed a law mandating that children born on Estonian soil to stateless parents will automatically receive Estonian citizenship, reversing the law’s previous stance that made it, so children of stateless parents also received the label of statelessness at birth.

Nonetheless, the ethnic divide in the country remains salient, and policies aimed at erasing the division will take decades to fully reach an impact. As a result, Narva — and its isolated Russian community — will continue to represent a barrier to cohesiveness in Estonian society.

Estonia, EKRE, and the EU: A Pivot Towards Far-Right, Nationalistic Ideology

“United in Diversity”— or, in Estonian, “Ühinenud mitmekesisuses”— is one of the underlying principles of the EU and also its leading motto, under which it encourages member states to take pride in the diversity within their national borders and embrace a plurality of cultures. In Estonia, however, this motto does not find a particularly welcoming home, especially in light of its recent parliamentary elections in March 2019, in which the far-right Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) more than doubled its representation in the national parliament, launching it from a mere 8.1 percent to a 17.8 percent presence. EKRE had the largest gain of all the parties in these elections and it increased its number of seats by 12, so that it now has a total of 19 (“Voting,” 2019). EKRE’s political ideology is rooted in a far-right, populist framework, in which it aims to construct a strong, salient Estonian identity often at the expense of criticizing other cultural communities, such as Estonia’s Russian population; statements made by its leading politicians carry racist and xenophobic connotations, as well. On the whole, the party’s agenda is four-fold with its: 1) Anti-Russian stance, both for the country and the people themselves, such as

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those who live in the Baltic region; 2) Euro-skepticism; 3) A promotion of traditional and religious values, such as its staunch criticism of the LGBT community; and finally, 4) An anti-refugee and anti-immigrant discourse (Kasekamp et al., 2019; Petsinis, 2019).

A majority of the samples within this study — especially those in ERR and Delfi — dealt with EKRE and the effects that this party has recently had on society, specifically through the political divisions it attempts to intertwine within society. Several samples also covered larger trends in Estonian society that point to its gradual shift to a population further fixed in conservative beliefs that are at odds with EU values.7 This reality poses a two-fold problem for Estonia. On one end, it hampers social integration with the EU and puts the country at odds, politically and socially, with an entity that is crucial to its further economic development; and on another level, it makes it so, for a nation already entrenched in a struggle with majority-minority relations, the tension between ethnicities has the necessary political platform on which to grow, as an Us vs. Them mentality can be expanded to further foster ethnic divisions in the country.

To start, EKRE and its supporters were cited at a significant level as having a clearly divisive role in society, especially between the nation’s two leading ethnicities. These divisions appear to be purposeful, as the party likely finds it beneficial to distinguish itself as a political entity that wants to create an “Estonia for Estonians” (Petsinis, 2016). For example, a March 2019 article from Delfi reported on comments from Andrus Ansip, Estonia’s former prime minister, that EKRE purposefully and consciously divides society through its actions as a means to attract supporters and increase public visibility. In doing this, it garners a fiercely supportive base of followers, who identify with the party’s agenda and want to see Estonia further established as a nation-state. Supporters believe EKRE can further strengthen Estonian identity at a time when the country is finding itself further integrating with Western institutions and embracing globalization. On another level, these supporters view EKRE as a party that speaks truth to power about the Russian community rather than diluting the discussion since EKRE politicians have called for them to “assimilate” or leave the country. These politicians and supporters are extremely critical of ethnic Russians living in the country because they believe their presence prevents Estonia from becoming truly “Estonian.”

They also see this community as a barrier to a monolingual society, specifically with language use in schools, and that Russian schools should be replaced with Estonian language-only schools. In doing this, Estonian culture, history, literature, and language can be effectively taught to all residents in the country, according to the party’s platform, through what it calls a form of “patriotic education” that will preserve the uniqueness of Estonian nationality (Tiido, 2015; “EKRE Party”).

Articles also reported on the party’s ability to incite hatred that threatens the freedom of Estonia itself, and that the party’s actions have begun to dismantle the nation’s democracy, extensively regressing its national values and principles. An August 2018 article from Stena reported on EKRE “temporarily” reconstructing a previously deconstructed Nazi SS monument in the lead up to the parliamentary elections.

That is, party officials erected a monument in the town of Lihula with a picture of a soldier in a German uniform, an MP-40 machine gun in his hands, and with an emblem of the 20th Waffen Division of the

7 Reporting about EKRE from all media outlets came with a negative image, highlighting the possible idea that, outside of EKRE’s base, there is a general consensus that EKRE is damaging to the country’s democracy and society.

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SS.8 This is a copy of a monument dismantled by the government several years ago. Tactics, such as this, are employed to fabricate history as a means by which EKRE can reinvent the legacy of Nazi occupation — that is, establishing it as “liberation,” as opposed to occupation— using it to the party’s advantage to justify and support its intensely nationalistic rhetoric.9

Estonia’s current president, Kersti Kaljulaid, has long been a critic of EKRE’s rhetoric and actions, because of, what many label, its inherent connection to a malicious political ideology that separates rather than unites communities. Likewise, EKRE is not a fan of the current president, as evidenced by an ERR sample in which the party claimed that she should resign if she does not want to work an EKREinvolved government. The article quoted President Kaljulaid with saying “I hate [EKRE] for its behavior and I apologize for the impression it may have," and that "decent people do not behave like this. This is not a view we share in Estonia.” Kaljulaid is Estonia’s first female president, the youngest head of state, and she describes herself as a liberal conservative. She is also working to better integrate the nation’s Russian community, trying to find progressive, innovative ways to raise the community’s confidence levels and help them feel more welcome in Estonian society (Eylandt, 2016). As such, her agenda is oftentimes at odds with EKRE’s.

Table Four: Overview of Criminal Charges against EKRE Members Overview of Criminal Charges against EKRE Members Form of Crime

Percentage

Brief Description

1. Violence

41%

Beating wives and children, strangling security guards, murder, arson, possession and use of firearms, threats of violence

2. Drunk Driving

35%

Driving while intoxicated and the accidents that ensue, harming police officers, disorderly conduct

3. Theft & Fraud

13%

Insurance and computer fraud, armed robberies, document forging, tax evasion

8 Nazi Germany occupied Estonia from 1941-1944, during which Germans pillaged and murdered thousands and thousands of people, including ethnic Estonians.

9 Martin Helme’s father, Mart Helme, is the chairman of EKRE and the former Estonian ambassador to Russia.

Mart Helme also holds the racist and xenophobic views of his son, having once said publicly, according to a March 2019 Delfi article, that “Indigenous people are replaced by Negroes,” in the EU.

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4. Sexual Crimes

6%

Rape, sexual harassment, possession and dissemination of child pornogrpahy, sexual extortion

5. Drug-related

5%

Drug use, trafficking, and possession of large quantities of narcotics

The party also suffers from a membership base with a checkered legal background. An article from Delfi in January 2019 reported on the nearly 300 criminal charges that members of the EKRE party face. These charges, however, are not for petty crimes — they represent significant lapses with the law, as evidenced by the table above. The five categories are emblematic of only the overarching types of crimes listed; that is, they represent the majority of the criminal charges, but do not include everything.

Martin Helme — the current Minister of Finance, popular member of EKRE, and a politically controversial individual in Estonia — often acts, along with his father, Mart Helme, as one of the leading figures who promotes EKRE’s nationalistic rhetoric. He appeared in the majority of articles that discussed EKRE and acted as the public face of the party. His public position as the Minister of Finance has allowed him to promote EKRE’s ideology and narratives, resulting in its proliferation on a national level.

Although he continually makes comments in public that engender frustration and are rooted in racism, they nonetheless garner attention. Articles cited him as saying that priority ought to be given not to the economy of Estonia, but rather its own nationality and the further construction of its nation-state status.

Additionally, Helme stated that immigrants — both legal and illegal — degrade the reputation of state and increase crime, because of their acts of “rape and robbery.”10 He has been labeled as fundamentally xenophobic and racist. For instance, a March 2019 Delfi sample reported that he had said “if it’s black, then show it the door,” and that he claims, without evidence, that 80 percent of Estonians agree with such a statement.

Martin Helme and most members of EKRE hold contentious views of the EU, believing that it strips Estonia of the very sovereignty it only just received. A July 2019 article from ERR reported that, according to Helme, EKRE, like Marine Le Pen, would like to see Europe as a union of nation states, rather than a “European empire,” into which he believes the EU is evolving. And, a March 2019 sample reported that: "[Estonians] don't like the European Union at all," Helme said. “We are sovereigns. We oppose any attempt to deprive nation states of their power. ” According to Helme, the European Union is slipping towards Soviet-style oppression. "People who have not lived under Soviet rule may not recognize these trends, but these trends are unmistakably present," declared Helme. According to Helme, current anti-hate laws are repressive. "People have been put in prison ... for hate speech in 10 Helme once stated, without evidence, that the amount of rape incidents has increased by a thousand times in Sweden and Norway, claiming that this alleged increase was the result of immigrants.

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the European Union. ... It's the same as it was ... in the Soviet Union." For example, Helme said they wanted to imprison France's right-wing leader, Marine Le Pen , for saying wrong things to the public. Helme also defended his criticism of the UN and his father's [Mart Helme] fear of ‘world government.’ "I think the whole history of the UN shows you that they tend to take power," Helme said.

Additionally, in an ERR article, Helme’s views on the loss of Estonian sovereignty at the hands of the EU were explained further, as he wagered the idea that there is a fundamental connection between the EU and the Soviet Union: According to Helme, both the Kremlin and Brussels, while employing slightly different approaches, have the same ultimate goal—to see Estonia become a multicultural and multiethnic state. While the EU wants to achieve this goal by bringing in migrants from Africa and the Middle East, the Kremlin wants to bring in people from Slavic areas. "The substance remains the same, however: the local indigenous population must become a minority, its language and culture ethnographic relics, and its political rights delegated to geopolitical power centres," he described.

Helme’s beliefs have resonated with many in Estonia, and they are largely the reason why the party surged in popularity to such a great level in the recent elections. Throughout the campaign, EKRE, with party leaders like Helme, ensured its voice was heard and its image was seen all over Estonia. Because of this, the party connected with a large base of voters who share anxieties over the EU, ethnic Russians, and possess largely conservative principles. The success of the party in the recent parliamentary elections will likely normalize this form of far-right thought to a certain extent in Estonia. In doing so, individuals who identify with this political ideology will feel more comfortable coming out in public to showcase what they believe to be the necessary political future for Estonia — a future that closes its doors to immigrants and refugees, capitalizes on nationalism, isolates and ignores the country’s Russian community, promotes anti-Semitism, and so forth.

Ironically, however, there exists the possibility (and a paradox) for EKRE to connect not only with nationalistic ethnic Estonians, but also ethnic Russians, who despite not being ethnically Estonian hold very nationalistic viewpoints and religious values. That is, though EKRE will not reach out personally to Estonia’s ethnic Russian community for support, the party would not necessarily turn away ethnic Russian supporters — albeit, those loyal to the Estonian state — who come at their own volition (Wierenga, 2017). The reason: the ethnic Russian community often possesses largely socially conservative views, as does EKRE, so they are able to find a form of common ground. And for EKRE, having ethnic Russian supporters, even if only a few, can be tokenized, through which the party can claim it is not inherently anti-Russian, per se, since EKRE itself has ethnic Russian supporters. This political paradox can be viewed through a November 2019 ERR sample that covered a discussion with an ethnic Russian, Fedor Stomakhin, who is a member of the board of the EKRE youth movement and who emigrated to Estonia from Russia: [Stomakhin] disagrees with the arbitrary image of the EKRE that it is made up of homophobes, racists and Russophobes. "I do not take these accusations with phobias seriously, because such

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accusations are an ideological weapon against dissidents," he said. According to Stomakhin, EKRE has the potential to reach out to Russian voters, for example, from a family values perspective, and to solve integration issues. "Liberals impose upon us a degrading, oppressed minority status that puts local Russians in the same category as negroes and transgenders," Stomakhin noted. In his opinion, the depiction of local Russians as a minority must be stopped, but at the same time they must be demanded of loyalty to the Estonian state.

Estonian society, on the whole, has also been moving further to the right on the political spectrum, specifically on the social level. According to a sample from Delfi, starting from June 2019 the Estonian government no longer supports sexual minorities at public parades. Estonia’s Foreign Minister, Urmas Reinsalu, stated that: “Everyone has the right to participate in any desired referendum in the rule of law, but participation in sexual minority parades on behalf of the Estonian state is not justified.” These socially conservative decisions clash with the EU’s standing on similar matters, which places Estonia at odds with the EU’s structural institutions, such as its Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, which works to protect and improve the rights of the EU’s LGBT population, who suffer from discrimination in places like Estonia (“LGBTI”).

The above factors therefore render contemporary Estonian society in a peculiar position with the EU, and this could create problems in the years to come, especially if EKRE’s support base continues to grow at its current cadence — which many samples claimed it is projected to do, specifically over the next four years — and thereby retains or increases its presence in the national parliament. The long-term effects of this presence, let alone its increase, will be especially salient in modern-day Estonia, considering that it will join the other Euroskeptic countries, such as Poland and Hungary, whose reputations are increasingly losing soft power in the EU. And as a smaller nation, it is economically imperative that Estonia preserves it soft power, in order to influence and contribute to the union’s agenda, and also continue its ongoing integration. If not, however, then the nation runs the risk of suffering from economic isolation —a type of isolation that will affect everyone in the country, Estonian and Russian. Its voice will not be represented or given the necessary amount of consideration, if its own national politicians continue to place the EU in the same category as the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the rapid growth of EKRE and its emergence within the public threatens this, and it questions what Estonia’s political trajectory could look like in the years to come.

“Eesti Кeel or Русский Язык:” The Challenge with Language Use in Estonia

Language represents the fundamental tension between ethnic Russians, Estonians, and the Western, English speaking portion of the world. For ethnic Russians, Estonian remains the lingua franca.

Schools, businesses, and general day to day interactions are frequently conducted in Estonian, which relegates many monolingual Russians to ethnic enclaves where they can comfortably utilize Russian. This comes at the cost of integration and increased opportunity, as enclaves like Narva are closed off from the prosperity of mainstream Estonian society. This isolation also comes at a social cost. Ethnic Russians without Estonian proficiency are deemed to be second class and restricted from gaining full citizenship, which further deepens their economic and social disparity. Simultaneously, Estonians face their own language dilemma. As Estonia turns towards the West, English is becoming a more reliable language in which to gain proficiency for the sake of connectivity and convenience with Western institutions, particularly the

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EU. English proficiency helps signal that Estonia is further separating itself from its Eastern European ties and is eager to assimilate with the rest of the world. This may be a matter of survival for Estonia, since it is a means to gain protection from Russian aggression along the eastern border as well as secure financial and political stability. However, this may also come at the expense of Estonian identity. As such, language highlights one of the many frames under which modern Estonia must grapple with its desire to remain independent and purely Estonian, while also reconcile its interest and advantages in assimilating with the West. The main spheres in which this tension plays out is in Estonian education and language legislation.

According to a Postimees article from 2019, the Soviet era imprinted a linguistically differentiated school system upon Estonia where Russian language was incorporated in Estonian education. This was done to serve the children of Soviet Military officers and to promote Russian for the sake of establishing a unit of Slavic culture and to develop Union-wide businesses. The era of Soviet power is long over, and the benefits of access to Russian language learning solely exist as a cultural relic. The cultural importance of language is carefully guarded in ethnic enclaves, with many Russians pointing out that if Estonians are able to have Estonian-speaking schools to preserve cultural legacy, Russians should have access to the same.

Unfortunately, many Russian language schools are drastically underserved and cannot provide quality education. Some argue that Russian-Estonian integration is the only solution to this and that Russian schools should be district free -- liberating them from ethnic isolation -- and open to Estonian language instruction.

Conversely, Estonian language schools should be accessible to ethnic Russians, but with a legitimate goal of preserving Russian language and cultural learning. The article explains that two barriers currently stand in the way of this initiative. First, integration remains unsuccessful when the minority population (in this case, Russians) make up more than 30% of the school population. This could be overcome in a city like Tallinn, where over half of the residents are Estonian, but finding the same distribution of Estonians in an enclave like Ida-Viru would not be feasible. Related to this, the success of integrated learning relies heavily on qualified teachers who are willing to take up jobs in underserved schools. A report from Estonia’s National Audit Office in August 2019 found that Ida-Viru lacks significantly when it comes to qualified Estonian-language teachers, and therefore this shortage dramatically hinders the community’s ability to linguistically integrate with the rest of Estonia (Vahtla, 2019).

A 2018 article from Stena explained that one preschool in Narva admitted that switching to Estonian language instruction could be beneficial for students, but that successful language acquisition depended heavily on an environment of language immersion. Part of that environment includes having proficient native speakers who are willing to teach. Unfortunately, native speaking Estonian teachers are much less likely to travel to poor, isolated regions, which then means that the schools suffering there do not have easy access to improved resources. The only way around this would be investing in high pay and benefits. Furthermore, in a 2019 ERR article, the Minister of Education Yevgeny Ossinovski noted that natural immersion can never truly happen in enclaves like Narva, because the flow of native Estonian speakers is far too low. Part of the Minister’s plan is to ultimately create “artificial language immersion,” which, at its core, is moving Russian children out of Narva and resettling them among the Estonian population. This plan includes organizing long-term language camps for students, as well as granting admittance to institutions instructed in Estonian for them to study. These types of programs slowly build a bridge out of Narva and into Estonian main society, where ethnic Russians can make non-Russian acquaintances, gain proficiency in the language, and begin a life outside of their ethnic enclave.

A major catalyst for movement between Ida-Viru and the rest of Estonia has been the Integration

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Fund. In 2019, Tema found that a third of this fund’s work focuses exclusively on providing Estonian language courses and quality teachers to Russians in the Ida-Viru region, specifically to Narva. Part of the language teaching initiative is to also offer “life support” to those living in Narva with general tasks, which language proficiency is also seen to help remedy. This initiative constructed a language house in Narva to function as the central nervous system of language learning, social support, and integration efforts.

In 2018 Tema also found that the Integration Fund spurs informal language learning opportunities in Narva schools designed to give students practical Estonian language skills by taking them to museums and immersing them in Estonian daily life.

Integration proposals, however, attempt to have their cake and eat it too; they claim that Estonians and Russians can live harmoniously and mutually benefit from their respective languages and cultures.

In reality, the evidence points to the imbalance of power and resources between Russian and Estonian schools. Ethnic Russians do not have a clear path towards gaining equal footing with the reputation and success of Estonian schools, because Russian language and culture is not prioritized. In an August 2018 sample, ERR found that this speaks to a general fear of many Russian families, that learning Estonian may help their children become more prosperous, but it will turn them away from their heritage and erode their desire to learn and speak Russian.

It is reasonable, they believe, to conclude that integration could result in either the eradication of Russian language components, or lack of institutional improvement within Russian schools since it is easier to contain their failings to ethnic enclaves rather than sink the resources necessary to bring them to the level of mainstream Estonian institutions.

Language integration serves as an incendiary point which often triggers general “social racism” between ethnic Russians and Estonians. An October 2018 sample from Stena found that common tropes used against the Russians are that they are a Soviet people still, disinterested in actually integrating into Estonian culture, but rather seeking shelter from the brutality of Russian regimes. Russians who have not lived in cosmopolitan areas or are recently transplanted to Western Europe are considered to be “rednecks,” unworthy of engagement. This sparked a good deal of pushback from Russian journalist Artemy Troitsky, who argued that ethnic Russians deserve to be spoken to in Russian. He further argued that treating ethnic Russians like second-class citizens, with indifference and hostility, will not only work against healthy efforts to coexist, but will give fodder to the Kremlin’s narrative that there is no safe haven for Russians abroad; that their only home can be the motherland, despite the perceived open arms of the West. Some Russians push back against this argument for separation and claim that they would rather have a greater push towards integration. One Russian who moved to Estonia for permanent residence expressed her frustration at the lack of Russian integration and Estonian language learning in her daughter’s school, especially since her tax dollars are supposedly going towards that very objective. The overarching theme from these types of narratives seems to be that Russians want options. They do not want one decision to be the difference between a life of poverty and a life of comfort, as is the current reality for many ethnic Russians.

Informal Estonian education has begun to take place in Ida-Viru. In April 2019, Stena reported on a cafe owner in Sillamäe (located in Ida-Viru) who sensed a growing interest from ethnic Russians to learn Estonian. Her response was to start an Estonian language cafe, where native speaking Estonians visit and hold an informal conversation hour. Interestingly, unlike the integration schools, these conversation cafes to do not struggle to attract qualified and engaged Estonian “teachers.” Many who participate see

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this as an opportunity to push back against the dominant narrative in Ida-Viru that Estonian culture is the oppressor of Russian culture. The cafe owner profiled in this piece, Anna-Olga Luga, said: They say that the Russian-speaking people here are another tribe, living on their reservation, and perceive everything “Estonian” with hostility. This is such a lie! In the Estonian press, this assumption really hurts me. Don’t scare people with the Language Inspectorate! Help their interest in the Estonian language. Say, a person copes with paperwork in Estonian, but can get confused in conversation.

There is no permanent language practice in Narva, Sillamae, Kohtla-Järve, so we will meet in a cafe for interesting interlocutors and the possibility of discourse.

Estonian as the lingua franca puts many ethnic Russians in the difficult position of losing access to the amenities of Estonian culture and society. This in particular has meant limited employability for ethnic, monolingual Russians outside of Ida-Viru. Several 2019 articles from Stena also found that the Estonian government has worked to combat job insecurity by offering Estonian language courses in IdaViru through the Unemployment Insurance Fund. Narva leads in unemployment rates for the region, with women more likely to be out of work than men. The Unemployment Insurance Fund corroborates the observations of cafe owner Anna-Olga Luga, saying that general interest in learning Estonian is vastly growing in the region. This interest may stem from a sense of desperation, given that Russian language offers minimal mobility in Estonia. For many jobs, having a basic knowledge of Estonian is required — even for low level positions like fast food and massage parlors. The barrier to learning basic Estonian is relatively low, especially with courses like the ones offered through the Unemployment Insurance Fund, but the ethnic Russians who do not take this step to break their monolingualism suffer a noticeable disadvantage.

Although Estonians naturally have more capital in Estonia than ethnic Russians, many hold a deep fear that the loss of Estonian language will result in the demise of Estonian culture and the state. For Estonians, English language instruction poses an existential threat. English is increasingly necessary for higher education and professional success, both of which are highly impactful spheres for the direction of Estonian society. A February 2019 article for Postimees argued that without Estonian language, the culture ceases to exist. That the destruction of Estonian culture does not look like a Western invasion, but rather is an insidious creep from higher learning institutions and business, to entertainment, to Christmas songs, to the very mechanics of language slowly being changed and erased until several generations down the line, Estonian no longer resembles itself or exists at all. The article goes further to highlight the importance that language plays in giving Estonia its borders, since the natural territory is ambiguous and vulnerable to “rulers of the world for whom the Estonian language and culture is not important.” This speaks to the Estonian anxiety of being able to self-determine. Schools are the tool to protect against this English imperialism. Estonian language must be taught consistently, as it had been for previous generations, to demonstrate a loyalty to Estonian tradition and culture. This also goes to show that the likelihood of equal integration with Russians cannot realistically happen. To some, budging on the prioritization of Estonian language learning is the epitome of cultural betrayal.

The sway of higher education is highly decisive on the language taught throughout Estonia.

Until recently, Masters programs were taught entirely in Estonian. This trend has started to shift as Estonia

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turns towards the global market and seeks to attract Western businesses and students, as well as appeal to English-speaking lecturers. In a December 2018 article, Postimees reported that pressures exist from within dictating this decision as well: Estonia does not charge tuition fees to students who are enrolled full time in the Estonian language program but can apply fees to those who are in the English language program. Tuition rates then determine the funding of the institution and bolster the programs which can be offered. As a result, offering English language becomes a financial consideration.

Overall, language is the cornerstone of most social dynamics, as the relationship between Estonians and ethnic Russians clearly illustrates. Self and outwardly imposed segregation to the Ida-Viru region is heavily predicated on language ability. We clearly see that monolingual Russians face little chance of gaining employment, becoming enfranchised citizens, or integrating fully with Estonian society solely on the basis of language. For Russians who are perfectly happy living as a subsect of Estonian society, language is used as a method of discrimination and othering. Russian speakers are subjected to harmful tropes that they are uneducated, fleeing from a broken regime, and simply taking advantage of Estonian amenities. On the whole, there are rarely any proposals for Estonians to learn Russian or integrate fully into Ida-Viru (other than for the purpose of immersing Russians in Estonian language). As a result, language politics remains highly charge and emblematic of the deep social tension which remains prominent even decades after Soviet rule.

Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) find that localized economic shocks from trade competition, specifically Chinese import competition, cause members of the United States House of Representatives representing affected districts to vote in the more protectionist direction on roll-call votes on trade bills while leaving voting patterns on all other types of bills unchanged. Employing two separate quantitative techniques to prove the robustness of their findings, Feigenbaum and Hall argue that the effects of such localized shocks on political behavior affect incumbent behavior without a statistically significant observed corresponding “punishing” of incumbents in succeeding electoral contests after a shock. Incumbents employ the very public and highly symbolic ritual of the roll-call vote to not only cast their vote, but to signal to their constituents that they are actively responding to negative effects of a localized trade shock.

They also note the voters’ difficulty in assigning responsibility to individual legislators for economic shocks from trade, thus possibly illustrating the uniqueness of trade shocks, among the extensive list of other negative economic shocks, in that electoral wrath is not immediate or directed when constituents feel or perceive the negative effects of an international trade shock.

Dell et al. (forthcoming) apply the index for change in international competition per worker per municipality—as devised by Autor et al. (2013)—to construct a model for changes in manufacturing employment per municipality in Mexico. Dell et al. differs from Autor et al. in that the trade relationship of interest is not import competition, but rather export competition in a common foreign market, namely the export competition faced by Mexico generated by China in the common market of the United States.

Dell et al. finds that “trade-induced job loss” causes significant increases in violence, an effect that is particularly acute in municipalities with transnational criminal organizations, with the argument resting on the logic that (negative) changes in local labor markets that make drug trafficking more lucrative in a locality lowers the opportunity cost of criminal activity and spurs violent fighting between drug trafficking language learning is the epitome of cultural betrayal.

The sway of higher education is highly decisive on the language taught throughout Estonia.

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Until recently, Masters programs were taught entirely in Estonian. This trend has started to shift as Estonia turns towards the global market and seeks to attract Western businesses and students, as well as appeal to English-speaking lecturers. In a December 2018 article, Postimees reported that pressures exist from within dictating this decision as well: Estonia does not charge tuition fees to students who are enrolled full time in the Estonian language program but can apply fees to those who are in the English language program. Tuition rates then determine the funding of the institution and bolster the programs which can be offered. As a result, offering English language becomes a financial consideration.

Overall, language is the cornerstone of most social dynamics, as the relationship between Estonians and ethnic Russians clearly illustrates. Self and outwardly imposed segregation to the Ida-Viru region is heavily predicated on language ability. We clearly see that monolingual Russians face little chance of gaining employment, becoming enfranchised citizens, or integrating fully with Estonian society solely on the basis of language. For Russians who are perfectly happy living as a subsect of Estonian society, language is used as a method of discrimination and othering. Russian speakers are subjected to harmful tropes that they are uneducated, fleeing from a broken regime, and simply taking advantage of Estonian amenities. On the whole, there are rarely any proposals for Estonians to learn Russian or integrate fully into Ida-Viru (other than for the purpose of immersing Russians in Estonian language). As a result, language politics remains highly charge and emblematic of the deep social tension which remains prominent even decades after Soviet rule.

Estonia's Transition into the Global Market: Implications and Considerations

Ethnic Russians and Estonians alike struggle with how to increase their lot in life. For Estonians, their quandary stems from the advantages of plugging into the Western economy and reaping the benefits of globalization, versus the toll immersion takes on cultural preservation. Ethnic Russians cannot consider such lofty ambitions; for those living in Ida-Viru, the main goal is finding employment and raising an impoverished standard of living, where currently unemployment in Narva hovers at 12 percent, even though the national average is five percent (“Why Narva,� 2019). Just like Estonians, the trade-off to achieving greater economic opportunity often hinges on their cultural identity. To get ahead economically, acquiescing to the dominant culture seems like a prerequisite. The economic reality for Estonians and Russians incorporates this broader struggle for cultural survival but incorporates the hopes and anxieties of a burgeoning state, vying to join the global economic order.

For instance, joining the EU not only posed a number of cultural considerations, but it also forced Estonia to abide by international standards for social and environmental protection. A July 2019 Stena article found that environmental considerations included greater restrictions on manufacturing and waste production, specifically on limiting C02 emissions. The EU operates on a carbon credit system, and recently bumped the price of credits from seven euros to 24. This price increase hit the Ida-Viru region the hardest, since it is the main industrial sector of Estonia. It found specifically that as a consequence of the credit augmentation, the number of operational power plants in Narva will decrease from six to three, with the reduction of approximately 300 workers. More broadly, this shift holds greater implications for the general labor market in Ida-Viru; environmental restrictions pose a major threat to the majority of workers in Narva, who are employed either as miners or in the factories. These impacts are likely to ripple to the rest of Estonia, as energy security from Narva becomes less certain, but also as the threat of unemployment strains the already subpar conditions under which many Russians live in Ida-Viru. This

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means greater pressure on social services, and a significant loss in the human capital that helps power Estonia.

The cost of EU integration on the ethnically Russian enclaves speaks more broadly to the cost of globalizing. The economy of Ida-Viru is not one which can easily assimilate to the EU; it is not gig- or service-based, but rather dependent on trades which are slowly being regulated out or going obsolete.

Particularly in a union like the EU which prioritizes innovation and growth, regions which cannot keep up are more likely to be stifled. Given that ethnic Russians are already disadvantaged by lower rates of education, limited knowledge of Estonian and English, and burdened by poverty and an anemic job market, the rising tide of the EU market is unlikely to lift Russian boats. Taxi drivers are a good example of service workers who bear the brunt of new regulations. Estonia has tried to make cabs more accessible to the Estonian population by requiring all drivers to speak the country’s language at a B1 level, which by all accounts far surpasses the bare minimum language proficiency needed (“Taxi Drivers,” 2016). Drivers who were unable to comply within a few months of the change were at risk of losing their cab privileges.

Many workers felt frantic in the face of this bill, arguing that they did not have enough time to get their Estonian to a B1 level, while also pointing out that it was an unnecessary standard aimed at restricting ethnic, monolingual Russians from working.

In addition to the state, Russian taxi drivers also feel targeted by the EU through car standards and set price instituted by the Union. If Estonia is to be in accordance with EU standards, all cars must be manufactured within the last nine years and follow the EU emissions standard (known as EURO 5), according to a Stena article published December 2018. Cars in Narva frequently fall victim to the city’s rough roads and are much more than a decade old, which cause issues for maintenance and upkeep for the vehicle. Purchasing a newer vehicle is simply not in the budget, however, for a majority of taxi drivers in Narva, and more importantly, the new cars would still suffer from the rough roads, thereby forcing expensive repairs. Drivers also note that these standards would likely drive up the cost of fares as the vehicles become more costly, and fewer drivers are able to comply with the regulations. In the aforementioned article, Valery Fedyshun, a member of the board of one of the largest Narva taxi companies, Seti Takso OÜ, comments on the social impact this initiative will have: Having raised the price, taxi drivers may even be left without work. Consequently, after two or three years, there will be almost no cars in Narva that will meet the new requirements in the taxi business.

The price, accordingly will definitely rush ip. And what to do next? What are we going to do with the almost 500 Narva taxi drivers and their families who are artificially freed from work? How will our citizens move if the standard price of a taxi ride suddenly rises, for example, to 5 euros? For most citizens, this service will simply not be available! And the hardest blow will be inflicted on the most unprotected layer of the population, our pensioners, who (attention, gentlemen deputies!) traditionally give the largest number of votes in the elections!

Taxi drivers are the epitome of blue collar workers Narva who are left behind and legislated out of the greater Estonian economy. Fedyushi in particular notes that these types of policies illustrate a clear disconnect between those who make the policies, and those who are directly impacted (ibid). This feeds into the skepticism and distrust that ethnic Russians have of Estonia and of the EU, as forces which will gladly leave them behind for the sake of advancement and Westernization.

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In terms of EU support, a May 2019 article from Stena reported that during initial ascension to the EU, Narva was split almost evenly for those in favor (51 percent) and those against (49 percent). Since then, skepticism of the EU is rising. In this sample, Stena reported that if a referendum were held on the EU immediately, a majority of Russians would vote against it. Reasons for this vary, but many attribute low perceptions to a lack of education around the benefits of EU membership. Journalist Ago Gashkov says: For our neighboring country, the European Union is the evil one. I think that Russia has such influence here. But Estonians have become more skeptical of the European Union, because there are people who are unlucky in life. They lost, or think that they lost, something because of the European Union, not because of ourselves or because of our mistakes. It’s always good to blame someone else. And Brussels is the easiest to blame.

This statement highlights the power of scapegoating and other the West for problems inherent in the community. Given examples of greater economic disenfranchisement due to the EU, it is easy to see how many Russians would link their misfortune to Western integration. But further than that, this quote picks up on the deeply rooted ethnic tension which often dictates who is to “blame” for Russian disadvantages. Seen as already as Eastern European transplants into a Western country, ethnic Russians have always seen their struggles to be a product of the “other,” imperialistic West. The EU embodies these tropes even more heavily, and therefore comes across as a much greater threat to Russians. Already embroiled with a deep suspicion of EU activity and an agenda to disrupt Western institutions, the Russian government is well equipped to tap into diasporic Russians’ fear that they are in danger of the West erasing their livelihood. One outcome of this messaging is certain: Ethnic Russians do not feel as though they are a valued and welcome member of Estonian society and, therefore, are disposable.

In April 2019, Postimees reported in addition to the ideological“othering” which the EU poses, recent measures have also drawn distinct boundaries between member and non-member states. Through the coast guard agency Frontex, the EU has increased border security guidelines and expectations. The initiative, which is to be implemented in 2021, is a direct response to the migration crisis across Europe. It draws upon a mutual understanding of all member-states to control their external borders for the general security of the Union. Part of this involves greater coordination of police forces, setting up checkpoints, and preparing for rapid mobilization of guards in case of emergency. For Estonia, its natural non-member state neighbor is Russia. Increasing security along the border adds another layer of distance between the two countries, and strongly signals Estonia's departer from the Eastern sphere into the West.

Because of its economic unviability, Ida-Viru is often passed over for investment opportunities and development plans. On one account, a Saint Petersburg-based businessman Vladislav Bobrov stated he will not be pursuing real estate development or investments in Narva due to the lack of wealth, untenable political situation, and lack of people with whom to actually do business, according to a Stena sample from October 2018. Bobrov noted that there have been many plans to help develop the region, but they all fall through because there is no economic base to support their growth. What is more pernicious is that many residents in Narva are continuing to look to Russia as their economic beacon—particularly monolingual residents. Bobrov argues that the more astute citizens know that Tallinn is the only place for economic development and growth to occur, and therefore the only hope for those who are looking to escape their current financial situation. Unfortunately, this is often not a viable option for those living in Ida-Viru. Even

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if a language barrier did not exist, and even if they had the means to travel to Tallinn and resettle, there still exists a high degree of skepticism around the capital and Estonians overall. This constricts all potential for economic development, since Narva itself is not attractive for investors, and the Russians living there are limited in their outreach based on their societal disenfranchisement, and their possible perceptions that Russia is the savior and Estonia is deceitful.

Ida-Viru not only faces greater rates of unemployment and experiences higher rates of workplace injuries (due to the nature of mining power plant labor), many are also finding their pensions to be disappearing. A May 2019 article for Stena reported that by 2020, the ministry of social affairs is planning on stripping the ability to retire on long service pensions or on preferential plans for people who work in dangerous conditions. The Ministry points to a lack of resources as its main motivation behind slashing benefits, but also admits that preferential plans and early retirement would remove many critical, able-bodied people from the workforce well before they were needing to retire. Currently, preferential pensions exist for workers who have spent 10-12 years in conditions that are harmful to their health, or 20-25 years in jobs where they have developed “occupational diseases,” and as a result have a diminished working lifespan. Currently, that is approximately 33,100 people in Estonia. Proposers of the change in the law argue that these jobs are not as difficult as one would assume, and that people who do need to quit early can easily retrain into a different field. Some site the Unemployment Insurance Fund as an example of how resources to retain work have cropped up in Estonia, taking the pressure off of pension benefits.

What this initiative represents is a clear departure from the reality of hard labor occupied often by people in the Ida-Viru region, and the necessary reprieve that pension benefits afford them. Marina Lukyanova of the Independent Trade Union of Miners and Power Engineers explains the toll that hard labor takes:

The last time they came to us on April 1, 2016, they went down to the mine, and watched under what conditions people work underground. By the way, in a non-working mine. And now they want to deprive miners of privileges with one stroke of the pen? The mines sometimes go 60 meters down...the humidity, noise, vibration, gas contamination...and no matter how the company invests in ventilation and invests in improving working conditions, they are still far from the working conditions in the office. If officials want, we will bring them to the mine when everyone is working—let them see! People work in rubber suits for eight hours. They do not see daylight for six months. They come down in the morning when it’s dark in late autumn, winter and early spring, and rise in the evening when it’s already dark...this is very difficult, psychologically.

Lukyanova speaks to the general division that exists between the blue collar workers in Estonia, who are often minorities or underserved, and the legislators who are removed from the people and situations for which they are actually legislating. This may be framed as an economic consideration of efficient government spending and maximizing the workforce, but in reality it represents a deep divide in Estonian society on how critical labor is regarded, and more importantly, how the people in those sectors of the workforce are valued and perceived.

Pensions are a critical safety net for elderly workers who are beginning to phase out of the workforce. This is a particularly relevant topic in Estonian discourse, especially since the nation’s pensioners are among the poorest in OECD countries (OECD, 2019). The issue with income stability starts before retirement, however, with the general average income of Estonians during their working years. Postimees

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ran a 2019 article arguing that higher pensions were a tool to generate cheap money distribution, meaning that the workforce did not have enough disposable income to circulate in the consumer market, which meant pensioners were designed to pick up the slack. This sample points out that relying on pensioners is futile if their income was meager when they were working, and that the priority should be on ensuring that Estonians can retire comfortably and with dignity. To do this, the workforce itself needs to be revamped so that it can survive a career’s worth of time and not lose out on savings. This will become especially critical as the population ages, and greater pressure is placed on the pension system. Poor education and poor health are major impediments to the workforce achieving full productivity, as well, and will continue to cause problems down the line.

Several samples in the study highlighted that the underbelly of the Estonian economy includes thousands of migrant workers. Similar to the lives of the ethinic Russians living in Ida-Viru, they have very little mobility and depleted access to resources, but are critical to the daily function of many Estonians’ lives.

A November 2018 article from Postimees reported that Estonia has been flooded with migrant workers as legislation has opened up to permit them working. This saturation of labor has posed a reasonable concern for productivity in Estonia. Labor unions have advocated for a moderate labor shortage to help increase productivity levels as well as drive up wages, which lag severely behind the European average. To be on par with the rest of Europe, Estonia needs to increase its wages by six percent every year for the next twenty years, according to the sample. Estonia finds itself in a difficult position, since although it wants to be competitive with the working conditions of Western Europe, it also has to bear in mind competitiveness with Eastern Europe. Wages to the East are much lower, and working conditions not held to such a strict standard, which means that during a financial crisis, Estonia stands to hemorrhage firms which migrate to decrease costs. This signals once again the two worlds which Estonia straddles; the developed and established West which it is on the threshold of joining, and the developing East which clings to Estonia and prevents it from fully immersing.

Many of the economic concerns in Estonia stem from an overarching question on how a former Soviet state, which still carries its Eastern European identity and culture in certain ways, is able to fully integrate with the Western, globalized world. Cultural politics are often at odds with opportunities for economic advancement, and Estonians have to decide if they are willing to lose the authenticity and longevity that isolation affords for the sake of reaping globalized benefits. This question is even more prominent for ethnic Russians, who often cannot rely on the support of Estonians to protect their culture, and have little say in the actual economic policy implemented. The impact of this is drastic, and has threatened the careers of many blue collar workers in Ida-Viru. The loss of work is scary for all, but particularly ethnic Russians who face additional barriers to integrating into the workforce. Estonia’s move towards “the West” has explicitly othered the ethnic Russians living in Ida-Viru, even if unintentionally, and furthered the divide between the two cultures.

Conclusion

Three decades after the independence movements that spurred liberation from the USSR, Estonian society finds itself struggling to balance the interests of its nation-state structure with its continual process of growing increasingly more globalized. These struggles are felt socially, politically, and economically, demonstrating that they represent a society-wide phenomenon that is not isolated to just one level. The interconnectedness nature of the study’s results showcase that thematic points of contention

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in Estonian society hold inherent similarities with each other, and therefore make it so one affects the other and the other and so forth, creating a type of “spillover” effect in society. This spillover effect was represented, for example, in how samples discussing language policy immediately engendered debates along ethnic lines, and then these ethnic lines were then used by political parties, such as EKRE, to stoke fears and anxieties over nationality in the country: the discourse itself in Estonian society functions in a way where most to all social discussions and dialogues leave an effect on the others. This paper has shown that at the forefront of these internal problems are those surrounding Narva and its position as a barrier to country cohesiveness, owing to its ongoing isolation and the challenges the city faces with crime and corruption; the emergence and growing popularity of EKRE and its far-right ideology, which has further cemented political and ethnic divides in society; the debate over language use in spheres of society, specifically with education; and the implications of expanding Estonia towards the global market, including the European Union despite the ramifications this has had on Estonian and ethnic Russian identity.

These results indicate that moving forward, Estonia will need to reconcile the deep social fault lines which run through these broader policy issues or else face stymied growth. Almost three decades have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world is the most interconnected it has ever been, and Estonia is poised to reap the benefits of the greater economic and social contact with other nations.

But what our observations show is that the growth which has already been capitalized upon is severely undercut by the disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians, the rise of alt-right politics which advocate for an isolated Estonia, and deep seated fear over the loss of Estonian identity in the wake of increased globalization. If Estonia continues on its current trajectory, increased foreign investments, global attention, tourism, and resources will likely be injected into the country. But there is no indication that these benefits will be enjoyed by the ethnic Russians who have few clear tools to access them, and whose main jobs rely on dying industries. In our assessment, it would take a prolonged recovery period before the Russians in the Ida-Viru region would be integrated into the “westernized” aspects of Estonian culture. This is assuming that the efforts currently underway to teach Estonian and transplant Russian children out of Narva are successful. In the short term, this shift may bring more division between the ethnic Russians living in Narva and Estonia as a whole, particularly as the economic conditions for Russians deteriorate. It is likely that the Kremlin’s efforts to sow dissent and distrust among diasporic Russians will continue and consequently impede integration efforts, further sequestering Ida-Viru from Estonian prosperity.

For Estonians, if the trend towards globalization and Westernization continues, English could possibly encroach as the lingua franca. This would likely occur via a top down approach, where academics, university students and business people are the most likely to speak English proficiently, but will likely work its way through the rest of Estonian society as a prerequisite for mobility. It does not seem foreseeable that English will fully replace Estonian, but its role as the language of business and globalization changes the incentives of language learning. Estonians will have to actively work to keep their culture alive for the sake of heritage and identity, which may become harder to do as kids grow up and interact with English.

The impacts of these trends politically are much harder to predict, and hinge on the greater geopolitical trend of far right politics. The threat of culture loss may embolden parties like EKRE to hardline anti-globalization platforms and double down on their base. Best case scenario, this will continue to divide Estonia along party lines. More drastically, if parties like EKRE gain more political capital, we may see Estonia trend away from globalization and westernization. The EU would be a prime target

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under these conditions. What we can see from these potential paths forward is how Estonia reflects general tensions that many emerging nations are facing. Breaking out of the Eastern European sphere and into the western one poses complicated cultural and ethnic questions for Estonia, which are continuing to impact the prosperity and goals of the nation as a whole. These issues are not going to disappear but may slowly be overrun by stronger cultural and economic themes if Estonia continues on its current trajectory.

This paper advances understandings of what controversial trends exist in contemporary Estonian society through the discourse analysis of national media outlets, which provide a unique insight into that with which the nation's current struggles from the variety of news sources utilized. News media represents and conveys dominant national dialogues in its reporting. The outlets then use these societal discussions to organize and produce their own content, which often mirrors representative topics within society. As a result, this study’s results then reflect the pre-existing discursive frameworks of the nation itself, offering an exclusive understanding of Estonian society. The data also reflect very recent reporting, and therefore the results themselves represent what is at the core of discourse right now. What we ultimately see from this research is the complex interaction between ethnicity, cultural preservation and the economic imperative to open its borders to other countries. The growing pains presented in Estonia today are not going away anytime soon – but will strongly shape the country as it develops its culture and economy for a twenty-first century world.

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Appendices

Below is a list of the articles in reverse chronological order used as samples in this study: Delfi’s Samples 1.

“Prime Minister Jüri Ratas: The Importance of the Singing Revolution Cannot Be Questioned

by Any Minister. Such a Thing Must End!” Delfi, July 31, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/ eesti/peaminister-juri-ratas-ukski-minister-ei-tohi-laulva-revolutsiooni-tahtsust-kahtluse-alla-seada-sellineasi-peab-loppema?id=87003725.

2.

“Mart Helme interviewed by a pro-Kremlin propaganda channel.” Delfi, July 29, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/mart-helme-andis-intervjuu-kremli-meelselepropagandakanalile?id=86984615 3.

“Oudekki Loone on a salute organized in Moscow on the anniversary of the re-occupation of Tallinn: This is just a domestic policy move.” Delfi, July 10, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/ eesti/oudekki-loone-tallinna-taasokupeerimise-aastapaeval-moskvas-korraldatavast-saluudist-see-onsisepoliitiline-samm-reinsalu-reageerib-ule-ja-naeb-tonte?id=86792373 4.

“Mart Helme: Estonia should suspend its participation in the ENPA. We received confirmation on how Russia would react if the Baltic states were attacked.” Delfi, June 27, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/ news/paevauudised/eesti/mart-helme-eesti-peaks-peatama-oma-osaluse-enpa-s-saime-kinnitust-kuidasreageeritaks-kui-venemaa-rundab-balti-riike?id=86657581 5.

“Estonia no longer supports sexual minorities in parades.” Delfi, June 18, 2019. https://www. delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/eesti-ei-toeta-enam-paraadidel-seksuaalvahemusi?id=86569077 6.

“Keldo: Ratings show that people are not happy with the government.” Delfi, June 17, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/keldo-reitingud-naitavad-et-inimesed-pole-valitsusegarahul?id=86547035 7.

“Raimond Kaljulaid: Organizing incitement to hatred must be made a criminal offense.” Delfi, May 22, 2019.

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https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/raimond-kaljulaid-vaenu-ohutamise-organiseeriminetuleb-muuta-kriminaalkuriteoks?id=86283721 8.

“Reinsalu: We must not close our eyes to Russia's continuing aggression in Ukraine.” Delfi, May 16, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/reinsalu-me-ei-tohi-silma-kinni-pigistadavenemaa-jatkuvale-agressioonile-ukrainas?id=86221753 9.

“Narva banned the procession of the Soviet Victory Day.” Delfi, May 8, 2019. https://www.delfi. ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/narva-keelas-noukogude-voidupuha-tahistava-rongkaigu?id=86148653 10.

“Tomorrow the Spring Storm will begin, with over 9,000 people taking part in the three-week exercise.” Delfi, April 28, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/homme-algab-kevadtormkolmenadalasel-oppusel-osaleb-ule-9000-inimese?id=86044489 11.

“Lauri Hussar proposed that the President convene a Round Table to defend freedom of expression.” Delfi, April 27, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/lauri-hussar-tegipresidendile-ettepaneku-kutsuda-sonavabaduse-kaitseks-kokku-umarlaud?id=86038109 12.

“Helme: The economy is not a priority. Priority is given to nationality and nation-state.” Delfi, April 10, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/helme-majandus-ei-ole-prioriteetneprioriteetne-on-rahvus-ja-rahvusriik?id=85865683 13.

“Andrus Ansip calls the activities of EKRE a purposeful division of society.” Delfi, March 29, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/andrus-ansip-nimetab-ekre-tegevust-sihilikuksuhiskonna-lohestamiseks?id=85760563 14.

“Martin Helme on Deutsche Wellele: The European Union is moving towards Soviet-style oppression.” Delfi, March 14, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/martin-helmedeutsche-wellele-euroopa-liit-liigub-noukogude-stiilis-rohumise-suunas?id=85598485 15.

“Yana Toom: I hope the coalition has more human and liberal political forces than the EKRE.” Delfi, March 8, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/yana-toom-loodan-et-koalitsioonison-inimlikumad-ja-liberaalsemad-poliitilised-joud-kui-ekre?id=85553277 16.

“Indrek Tarand brought an action for damages against EKRE.” Delfi, February 20, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/indrek-tarand-esitas-ekre-vastu-kahju-huvitamisenoude?id=85376565 17.

“Estonian parties in Russian media image: EKRE and Center Party are the most buzzing parties.” Delfi, February 19, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/rk2019/uudised/graafik-eesti-erakonnadvenemaa-meediapildis-enim-komu-tekitavad-ekre-ning-keskerakond?id=85364973 18.

“PPA raises monitoring capacity on Narva River: three new radar towers erected near eastern border.” Delfi, February 8, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/ppa-tostabseirevoimekust-narva-joel-idapiiri-lahistele-pustitati-kolm-uut-radaritorni?id=85269187 19.

“Fatherland and EKRE: Don't be afraid of the Postimees election engine!” Delfi, January 23, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/rk2019/uudised/isamaa-ja-ekre-arge-kartke-postimehevalimismootorit?id=85111585 20.

“LIST Criminal members of EKRE.” Delfi, January 23, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/ paevauudised/eesti/nimekiri-ekre-kriminaalkorras-karistatud-liikmed?id=85095745 21.

“Hussar: EKRE has begun to dismantle the basic principles of Estonian democracy.” January 18, 2019. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/hussar-ekre-on-asunud-lohkuma-eestidemokraatia-aluspohimotteid?id=85057313

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22.

“Defense survey: Estonians believe cyber attacks and spread of false news to be the biggest threat to Estonia.” Delfi, December 17, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/kaitseuuringeestlaste-hinnangul-on-suurimaks-ohuks-eestile-kuberrunnakud-ning-valeuudiste-levik?id=84776543 23.

“Boundary upgrade phase ends: New warning labels help fight ‘selfie’ workers.” Delfi, December 17, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/piiri-uuendamise-uks-faas-jouab-lopule-uuedhoiatussildid-aitavad-muuhulgas-voidelda-piirpostiga-selfie-tajate-vastu?id=84771853 24.

“Jürgen Ligi: Center Party and EKRE, however, are two backcountryists with agendas over the Kremlin.” Delfi, December 5, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/ jurgen-ligi-keskerakond-ja-ekre-on-siiski-uhe-tagumiku-kaks-kannikat-kelle-paevakorrad-kattuvadkremliga?id=84670035 25.

“Kersti Kaljulaid criticizes EKRE: this is the last time the Interrinne rushed in front of Toompea Castle. This is unacceptable.” Delfi, November 27, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/ eesti/kersti-kaljulaid-kritiseerib-ekret-viimati-maratses-toompea-lossi-ees-niimoodi-interrinne-see-onvastuvoetamatu?id=84568645 26.

“Nearly EUR 35 million will be invested in the Estonian-Russian border area.” Delfi, November 20, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/eestivene-piirialale-investeeritakse-ligi-35miljonit-eurot?id=84493995 27.

“President Kaljulaid will be working in Narva next week.” Delfi, November 10, 2018. https://www. delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/president-kaljulaid-tootab-jargmisel-nadalal-narvas?id=84279329 28.

“Yana Toom for international publication: Estonians refuse to integrate with Russians.” Delfi, October 29, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/video-yana-toom-rahvusvaheliselevaljaandele-eestlased-ei-ole-venelastega-nous-integreeruma?id=84154239 29.

“Raimond Kaljulaid: Reform Party and EKRE are both xenophobic parties.” Delfi, October 11, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/raimond-kaljulaid-reformierakond-ja-ekre-onmolemad-uhtviisi-ksenofoobsed-erakonnad?id=83963114 30.

“The Center Party wants to restore the armed border guard: conscripts would be sent to the border.” Delfi, October 9, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/keskerakond-tahabtaastada-sojavaestatud-piirivalve-ajateenijad-saadetaks-piirile?id=83940269 31.

“Anvelt from the migration crisis: Estonia is also on the fence to protect its country.” Delfi, September 20, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/anvelt-migratsioonikriisist-omariigi-kaitsmiseks-on-ka-eesti-tarade-poolt?id=83734439 32.

“Martin Helme stops rising tide in EKRE: it may be due to lower support from Russians after Lihula pillar and Metsavas.” Delfi, September 20, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/ martin-helme-ekre-katkenud-tousutrendist-pohjuseks-voib-olla-venelaste-toetuse-vahenemine-lihulasamba-ja-metsavase-jarel?id=83728723 33.

“Reinsalu: To help young people, social programs must also be made available in Ida-Virumaa.”

Delfi, September 8, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/reinsalu-noorte-abistamisekspeab-tegema-sotsiaalprogrammid-ka-ida-virumaal-kattesaadavaks?id=83607389 34.

“Kristina Kallas, Director of Narva College: Only a marginal number of people support separate schools for students of Estonian and Russian descent.” Delfi, August 29, 2018. https://www.delfi. ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/narva-kolledzi-direktor-kristina-kallas-eesti-ja-vene-paritolu-opilaste-eraldikoole-toetab-vaid-marginaalne-hulk-inimesi?id=83506961

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35.

“Katri Raik from the new faction: the umbilical cord that united Narva's power with the Estonian central power broke off.” Delfi, August 16, 2018. https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/katriraik-uuest-fraktsioonist-nabanoor-mis-uhendas-narva-voimu-eesti-keskvoimuga-katkes?id=83375363 36.

“EKRE support has risen to new heights.” Delfi, August 2, 2018. https://epl.delfi.ee/eesti/ekretoetus-on-tousnud-uutesse-korgustesse?id=83227871 ERR’s Samples 1.

“Analysis: Russia uses rail business to influence Baltic states.” ERR, July 9, 2019. https://www. err.ee/959612/analuus-venemaa-kasutab-raudtee-ari-balti-riikide-mojutamiseks 2.

“Right at 11am: Mart Helme on changes in the way foreigners work for short periods.” ERR, July 17, 2019. https://www.err.ee/962089/otse-kell-11-mart-helme-muutustest-valismaalaste-luhiajalisetootamise-korras 3.

“President Kaljulaid: I hate the behavior of EKRE politicians.” ERR, July 19, 2019. https:// www.err.ee/963120/president-kaljulaid-ma-vihkan-ekre-poliitikute-kaitumist 4.

‘Alexei Voronov, Narva entrepreneur and politician accused of corruption crimes, goes to jail for real.” ERR, June 4, 2019. https://www.err.ee/948961/korruptsioonikuritegudes-suudistatav-narvaettevotja-ja-poliitik-aleksei-voronov-laheb-reaalselt-vangi 5.

“Detention of a minor dealer in Narva led to the liquidation of a narcotics group.” ERR, June 26, 2019. https://www.err.ee/955926/alaealise-diileri-kinnipidamine-viis-narvas-narkogrupi-likvideerimiseni 6.

“Estonian politicians deplore the ENPA's decision to restore Russia's voting rights.” ERR, June 25, 2019. https://www.err.ee/955613/eesti-poliitikud-taunivad-enpa-otsust-venemaa-haaleoigus-taastada 7.

“Helme: There is no consensus in the government to move forward with the Estonian-Russian border agreement.” ERR, May 15, 2019. https://www.err.ee/939713/helme-valitsuses-puudub-konsensuseesti-vene-piirileppega-edasi-minekuks 8.

“Helme: Le Pen's Russophile policy is unacceptable to us.” ERR, May 14, 2019. https://www.err. ee/939558/helme-le-peni-russofiilne-poliitika-on-meile-vastuvoetamatu 9. “‘From the situation in the country:’ The popularity of EKRE will increase even more in four years.” ERR, May 5, 2019. https://www.err.ee/936413/olukorrast-riigis-ekre-populaarsus-kasvab-neljaaastaga-veelgi 10.

“Jüri Nikolaev: The Curse of Narva and the Third City.” ERR, April 3, 2019. https://www.err. ee/926353/juri-nikolajev-narva-ja-kolmanda-linna-needus 11.

“Agur: Time is ripe for a break with Russian-speaking students.” ERR, April 17, 2019. https:// www.err.ee/931121/agur-aeg-on-kups-vene-emakeelega-opilastega-paikades-murrangu-tegemiseks 12.

“Anthropologists: Not all EKRE voters are angry, rebellious and backward.” ERR, April 24, 2019. https://www.err.ee/933007/antropoloogid-koik-ekre-valijad-ei-ole-vihased-massavad-ja-tagurlikud 13.

“An influential Narva politician is suspected of taking a bribe of € 60,000.” ERR, March 26, 2019. https://www.err.ee/923694/mojukat-narva-poliitikut-kahtlustatakse-60-000-euro-altkaemaksuvotmises 14.

“Raul Rebane: Society must respond clearly to Martin Helme's attack.” ERR, March 29, 2019. https://www.err.ee/925038/raul-rebane-uhiskond-peab-martin-helme-runnakule-selgelt-reageerima 15.

“Ansip: Why does EKRE have to divide society and harm Estonia?” ERR, March 29, 2019. https://www.err.ee/924377/ansip-miks-ekre-peab-uhiskonda-lohestama-ja-eestile-halba-tegema

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16.

“Ossinovski: With political impetus, Russian schools cannot be turned into Estonian.” ERR, February 6, 2019. https://www.err.ee/907852/ossinovski-poliitilise-hoogtooga-vene-koole-eestikeelseksmuuta-ei-saa 17.

“Estonian-Russian political consultations took place in Moscow.” ERR, February 17, 2019. https://www.err.ee/910859/moskvas-toimusid-eesti-vene-poliitilised-konsultatsioonid 18. “"Cleanse the mouth": politicians have mutually tarnished their reputation.” ERR, February 5, 2019. https://www.err.ee/907751/suud-puhtaks-poliitikud-on-vastastikku-oma-maine-ise-ara-maarinud 19.

“Concerns about Estonian-language education in Ida-Virumaa brought together parents.”

ERR, January 4, 2019. https://www.err.ee/892204/mure-eestikeelse-hariduse-parast-ida-virumaal-toilapsevanemad-kokku 20.

“The Integration Foundation estimates that we need a political agreement on education.” ERR, January 8, 2019. https://www.err.ee/896037/integratsiooni-sihtasutuse-hinnangul-vajame-poliitilistkokkulepet-hariduse-vallas 21. “‘From the Newsroom:’ What to Expect in 2019 in Estonia and the World?” ERR, January 2, 2019. https://www.err.ee/888986/otse-uudistemajast-mida-oodata-aastal-2019-eestis-ja-maailmas 22.

“Juhan Kivirähk: A new slump in Estonian political culture.” ERR, December 14, 2018. https:// www.err.ee/884807/juhan-kivirahk-eesti-poliitilise-kultuuri-uus-madalseis 23.

“The integration project brings young people from Ida-Virumaa closer to football.” ERR, December 12, 2018. https://sport.err.ee/882026/integratsiooniprojekt-toob-ida-virumaa-noorijalgpallile-lahemale 24.

“Narva City Council drastically cut the budget for preparing the Capital of Culture application.” ERR, December 20, 2018. https://kultuur.err.ee/886476/narva-volikogu-karpis-tugevaltkultuuripealinna-taotluse-koostamise-eelarvet 25.

“Reader Magazine: One does not have to lose Russian identity to become an Estonian.” ERR, November 19, 2018. https://www.err.ee/878234/lugejakiri-saamaks-eestlaseks-ei-pea-kaotama-veneidentiteeti 26.

“Kristina Kallas: Let's let Russians stay Russians.” ERR, November 2, 2019. https://www.err. ee/874009/kristina-kallas-lubame-venelastel-jaada-venelasteks 27.

“Young Russian from Russia: EKRE solves integration issues.” ERR, November 6, 2018. https:// www.err.ee/874885/venemaalt-parit-noorekrelane-ekre-lahendab-integratsiooni-kusimused 28.

“Ilmar Tomusk. From the transition to the Estonian language of instruction through language supervision.” ERR, October 20, 2018. https://kultuur.err.ee/870521/ilmar-tomusk-eesti-oppekeeleleuleminekust-keelejarelevalve-pilgu-labi 29.

“The Russian-speaking population of Estonia is increasingly watching the propaganda channel RTR Planeta.” ERR, October 25, 2018. https://www.err.ee/871836/eesti-venekeelne-elanikkond-vaatabaina-enam-propagandakanalit-rtr-planeta 30.

“Digest: Russian cultural autonomy on the other side of Narva River, says Helme.” ERR, October 2, 2018. https://news.err.ee/865922/digest-russian-cultural-autonomy-on-other-side-of-narvariver-says-helme 31.

“Kolvart: the Estonian-language education system does not exclude the existence of a Russian school.” ERR, September 13, 2018. https://www.err.ee/861200/kolvart-eestikeelne-haridussusteem-eivalista-vene-kooli-olemasolu

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32.

“Yana Toom: It is time to consider cultural autonomy.” ERR, September 27, 2018. https://www. err.ee/864655/yana-toom-aeg-on-kaaluda-kultuuriautonoomiat 33.

“Troitski: Estonia segregates like South Africa.” ERR, September 19, 2018. https://www.err. ee/862494/troitski-eestis-valitseb-segregatsioon-nagu-louna-aafrika-vabariigis 34.

“President Kersti Kaljulaid starting first work week in Narva on Tuesday.” ERR, August 28, 2018. https://news.err.ee/856785/president-kersti-kaljulaid-starting-first-work-week-in-narva-on-tuesday 35.

“Young people and adults live in different information spaces.” ERR, August 11, 2018. https:// www.err.ee/852294/noored-ja-taiskasvanud-elavad-erinevas-inforuumis 36.

“Käosaar: Intimidation with Estonian education does not create a common language.” ERR, August 10, 2018. https://novaator.err.ee/852975/kaosaar-eestikeelse-haridusega-hirmutamine-uhistkeeleruumi-ei-loo Viru Prospekt’s Samples 1.

“The centrist party agreed with the prosecutor on a conditional fine of 200,000 euros.” Viru Prospekt, July 12, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/13148-centristskaja-partijadogovorilas-s-prokuraturoj-ob-uslovnom-shtrafe-v-200-000-evro.html 2.

“Narva has completed the preparation of the final application for the title of European Capital of Culture 2024.” Viru Prospekt, July 31, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/society/13248-narva-zavershilapodgotovku-finalnoj-zajavki-na-titul-kulturnoj-stolicy-evropy-2024-goda.html 3.

“At the disposal of many reductions - about a year. Spend them right!” Viru Prospekt, July 29, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/society/13234-v-rasporjazhenii-mnogih-sokraschaemyh-okolo-goda-potratteih-pravilno.html 4.

“Police commented on surge in killings in Narva.” Viru Prospekt, June 26, 2019. https:// prospekt.ee/law-and-order/13057-policija-prokommentirovala-vsplesk-chisla-ugroz-ubijstvom-v-narve. html 5.

“The cultural capital will also give a general picture of the desires and preferences of the Narvites.” Viru Prospekt, June 19, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/society/13025-kulturnaja-stolica-dast-esche-iobschuju-kartinu-zhelanij-i-predpochtenij-narvitjan.html 6.

“Kersti Kaljulaid sees a new upsurge in Narva's self-confidence as an Estonian city.” Viru Prospekt, June 5, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/12929-kersti-kaljulajd-vidit-novyjpodem-uverennosti-narvy-v-sebe-kak-jestonskogo-goroda.html 7.

“In the fall, high school students will be able to take the internationally recognized Cambridge C1 Advanced test for free.” Viru Prospekt, May 8, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/society/12702-s-osenigimnazisty-smogut-sdat-besplatno-mezhdunarodno-priznannyj-test-cambridge-c1-advanced.html 8.

“The arrest of Alexei Voronov was extended for another two months.” Viru Prospekt, May 28, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/law-and-order/12843-arest-alekseja-voronova-prodlili-esche-na-dva-mesjaca. html 9.

“Criminals take advantage of careless people.” Viru Prospekt, May 14, 2019. https://prospekt. ee/law-and-order/12752-prestupniki-polzujutsja-nevnimatelnostju-ljudej.html 10.

“In the Kremlin, a meeting between Kersti Kaljulayd and Vladimir Putin.” Viru Prospekt, April 18, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/events/12590-v-kremle-prohodit-vstrecha-kersti-kalyulayd-i-vladimiraputina.html

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“The leader of social democracies on what to expect from the new government.” Viru Prospekt, April 25, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/12613-lider-socdemov-o-tom-chegozhdat-ot-novogo-pravitelstva.html 12.

“It's never too late to learn.” Viru Prospekt, April 23, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/society/12602uchitsya-nikogda-ne-pozdno.html 13.

“Centrists against a free newspaper: at least a smaller circulation.” Viru Prospekt, March 20, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/12450-centristy-protiv-besplatnoy-gazety-hotyaby-menshim-tirazhom.html 14.

“Our image in terms of attitudes towards Russians in Estonia is worse than it really is.” Viru Prospekt, March 14, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/12407-nash-imidzh-v-planeotnosheniya-k-russkim-v-estonii-huzhe-chem-vse-est-na-samom-dele.html 15.

“Suspicious item caused a commotion in the building of the Narva Police.” Viru Prospekt, March 28, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/law-and-order/12507-podozritelnyy-predmet-stal-prichinoy-perepolohav-zdanii-narvskoy-policii.html 16. “‘The tragedy of the Merikul Landing.’” Viru Prospekt, February 15, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/ society/12234-tragediya-merikyulskogo-desanta.html 17.

“There are fewer polling stations in Narva, like voters.” Viru Prospekt, February 14, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/events/12227-izbiratelnyh-uchastkov-v-narve-kak-i-izbirateley-stanovitsya-menshe. html 18.

“If not the Cultural Capital, then at least the Cultural Province? And now - the local troll factory.” Viru Prospekt, February 20, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/society/12270-kulturnaya-stolica-zashla-v-tupik.html 19.

“Pushkin is our everything!” Viru Prospekt, January 21, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/ society/12121-pushkin-eto-nashe-vse.html 20.

“Reformists: money will bring a change in the tax system and excise taxes.” Viru Prospekt, January 21, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/12129-galereya-reformisty-dengiprineset-izmenenie-nalogovoy-sistemy-i-razmerov-akcizov.html 21.

“Narva Orthodox school will be led by a ‘compromise figure.’” Viru Prospekt, January 16, 2019. https://prospekt.ee/narva_linn/12080-narvskuyu-pravoslavnuyu-shkolu-vozglavit-kompromissnayafigura.html 22.

“Alan Kaldoya thanked his grandmother at the opening of the ‘Free Stage.’” Viru Prospekt, December 5, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/society/11935-alan-kaldoya-poblagodaril-za-otkrytiesvobodnoy-sceny-svoyu-babushku.html 23.

“An emergency change of administration of the Narva Orthodox School shocked teachers and parents.” Viru Prospekt, December 5, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/society/11934-ekstrennaya-smenaadministracii-narvskoy-pravoslavnoy-shkoly-shokirovala-uchiteley-i-roditeley.html 24.

“Narva celebrates centenary with fireworks awards.” Viru Prospekt, December 5, 2018. https:// prospekt.ee/narva_linn/11933-stoletie-respubliki-narva-otmetila-feyerverkom-nagrad.html 25.

“In October, the registered unemployment rate increased, there is still a great interest in training.” Viru Prospekt, November 12, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/11778-voktyabre-pokazatel-zaregistrirovannoy-bezraboticy-vyros-po-prezhnemu-sohranyaetsya-bolshoy-interesk-obucheniyu.html

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26.

“List of the Center Party in Ida-Virumaa headed by Jan Toom.” Viru Prospekt, November 17, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/11833-spisok-centristskoy-partii-v-ida-virumaavozglavila-yana-toom.html 27.

“Free Party in the Riigikogu Votes Against the Migration Pact.” Viru Prospekt, November 20, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/11856-svobodnaya-partiya-v-riygikoguprogolosuet-protiv-migracionnogo-pakta.html 28.

“Petersburg-Tallinn bus threatened with bomb from Russia.” Viru Prospekt, October 5, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/law-and-order/11452-avtobusu-peterburg-tallinn-iz-rossii-ugrozhali-bomboy.html 29.

“Police report.” Viru Prospekt, October 25, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/law-and-order/11608policeyskaya-svodka.html 30.

“Alan Kaldoya about the new theater center: ‘Everything is in Russian here, everything is for the Narvites.’” Viru Prospekt, October 29, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/society/11632-alan-kaldoya-onovom-teatralnom-centre-zdes-vse-na-russkom-vse-dlya-narvityan.html 31.

“Narva is the last city in Europe before the Russian border.” Viru Prospekt, September 21, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/ljudi-i-zizn/11339-kersti-kalyulayd-narva-eto-posledniy-pered-rossiyskoy-graniceygorod-evropy.htm 32.

“Criminal Estonia. Recognition of the ‘suicide bomber:’ a tower is better than such a life.”

Viru Prospekt, September 15, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/ljudi-i-zizn/11360-priznanie-smertnika-luchshevyshka-chem-takaya-zhizn.html 33.

“A criminal case has been opened to investigate the activities of an opposition member in Narva.” Viru Prospekt, September 3, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/11173vozbuzhdeno-ugolovnoe-delo-dlya-rassledovaniya-deyatelnosti-chlena-oppozicii-v-narve.html 34.

“Yana Toom: 39 people left the Center Party in Narva.” Viru Prospekt, August 29, 2018. https:// prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/11132-yana-toom-iz-centristskoy-partii-v-narve-vyshli-39chelovek.html 35.

“Alexey Voronov announced the creation of a new faction in Narva instead of a faction of the Center Party.” Viru Prospekt, August 17, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/11049aleksey-voronov-obyavil-o-sozdanii-v-narve-novoy-frakcii-vmesto-frakcii-centristskoy-partii.html 36.

“Ratas urged corruption suspects to leave Narva City Council.” Viru Prospekt, August 13, 2018. https://prospekt.ee/the-country-and-the-world/11016-ratas-prizval-podozrevaemyh-v-korrupcii-uyti-iznarvskogo-gorsobraniya.html Postimees’s Samples 1.

“Helme congratulated the new British Prime Minister and offered his experience in restoring sovereignty.” Postimees, July 23, 2019. https://poliitika.postimees.ee/6736806/helme-onnitles-briti-uutpeaministrit-ja-pakkus-oma-kogemusi-suveraansuse-taastamisel 2.

“Employment Agency: Companies will hire a Ukrainian rather than a local.” Postimees, July 29, 2019. https://majandus24.postimees.ee/6740433/toojourendifirma-firmad-koondavad-pigem-kohalikukui-ukrainlase 3.

“Andres Viisemann: A peculiar, baseless theatrical company dismantles the pension pillar.”

Postimees, July 16, 2019. https://majandus24.postimees.ee/6731460/andres-viisemann-penisonisammastlammutab-kummaline-pohimoteteta-teatraalne-seltskond

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4.

“The Extra Money has not Shortened the Waiting List.” Postimees, June 22, 2019. https:// meieeesti.postimees.ee/6713853/lisaraha-ei-ole-luhendanud-ravijarjekordi 5.

“Mining is a Source of Strife for the Locals.” Postimees, June 21, 2019. https://meieeesti. postimees.ee/6712541/kaevandamine-ajab-kohalikud-riigiga-tulli 6.

“Headmaster: They Are All Our Children.” Postimees, June 10, 2019. https://meieeesti. postimees.ee/6703483/koolijuht-koik-nad-on-meie-lapsed 7.

“Aimar Altosaar: Family Doctors are Good for Us, but the System Needs General Organization.” Postimees, May 29, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6694257/aimar-altosaarperearstid-on-meil-head-kuid-susteem-vajab-uldist-korraldamist 8.

“Georg Männik: It is not Worthwhile to Raise Unnecessary Expectations When it Comes to Pensions.” Postimees, May 22, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6688910/georg-mannik-pensionidepuhul-ei-tasu-ules-kutta-asjatuid-ootusi 9.

“Jaak Aab: Government continues to implement state reform.” Postimees, May 19, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6683462/jaak-aab-valitsus-jatkab-riigireformi-elluviimist 10.

“Estonia is expected to make a greater contribution at EU borders.” Postimees, April 25, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6577133/eestilt-oodatakse-eli-piiridel-suuremat-panust 11.

“Ex-politician Jüri Adams is undisputedly skeptical about reforming the country.” Postimees, April 24, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6576184/ekspoliitik-juri-adams-on-riigi-reformimisesuhtes-varjamatult-skeptiline 12.

“Erkki Koort: ‘peacekeeping operation’ in Minsk.” Postimees, April 18, 2019. https://meieeesti. postimees.ee/6572160/erkki-koort-rahuvalveoperatsioon-minskis 13.

“Cultural differences between Estonian and Russian schools.” Postimees, March 19, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6548153/eesti-ja-vene-kooli-kultuurierinevustest 14.

“Intelligence Director Mikk Marran: Tension and dissatisfaction are growing across our borders.” Postimees, March 14, 2019. https://leht.postimees.ee/6544556/luurejuht-mikkmarran-pinge-ja-rahulolematus-meie-piiri-taga-kasvab?_ga=2.63842090.448809842.15679988831703352317.1564800499 15.

“Martin Ehala: Top-class Russian schools could stay in Estonia.” Postimees, March 12, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6542522/martin-ehala-eestisse-voiks-jaada-ka-tipptasemel-vene-koole 16.

“Aimar Altosaar: The idea of state reform is not dead yet.” Postimees, February 20, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6527162/aimar-altosaar-riigireformi-idee-ei-ole-surnud-veel 17.

“Can the Kremlin interfere in Estonian elections?” Postimees, February 14, 2019. https:// meieeesti.postimees.ee/6522561/kas-kreml-voib-sekkuda-eesti-valimistesse 18.

“The survival of the Estonian state without Estonian-language education would be hardly conceivable.” Postimees, February 5, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6515482/eesti-riigi-pusimineilma-eestikeelse-hariduseta-oleks-vaevalt-moeldav 19.

“Katri Raik: Time is ripe for a debate on whether we have gone too far with police cuts.”

Postimees, January 10, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6495215/katri-raik-aeg-on-kups-arutelukskas-oleme-politsei-karpimisega-lainud-liiale 20.

“Külli Taro: The basic principles of state reform were formulated.” Postimees, January 9, 2019. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6494557/kulli-taro-riigireformi-pohialused-said-sonastatud 21.

“Different fertility behavior of Estonians and Estonian Russians.” Postimees, January 7, 2019.

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https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6492843/eestlastel-ja-eestivenelastel-erinev-sundimuskaitumine 22.

“Protected areas are cut as in the Soviet state forest.” Postimees, December 14, 2018. https:// meieeesti.postimees.ee/6477003/kaitsealadel-raiutakse-nagu-noukogude-aja-riigimetsas 23.

“How Higher Education Becomes English.” Postimees, December 4, 2018. https://meieeesti. postimees.ee/6468692/kuidas-korgharidus-ingliskeelseks-muutub 24.

“Construction companies are not interested in restrictions.” Postimees, December 3, 2018. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6467820/ehitusettevotjad-pole-piirangutest-huvitatud 25.

“Aimar Altosaar: What's wrong with our democracy?” Postimees, November 21, 2018. https:// meieeesti.postimees.ee/6458256/aimar-altosaar-mis-on-lahti-meie-demokraatiaga 26.

“Rivo Noorkõiv: Our regional leadership is almost non-existent.” Postimees, November 14, 2018. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6452976/rivo-noorkoiv-meie-regionaalne-juhtimistasand-on-peaaeguolematu 27.

“Will migrant workers save the Estonian economy?” Postimees, November 12, 2018. https:// meieeesti.postimees.ee/6451025/kas-voortoojoud-paastab-eesti-majanduse 28.

“National Reform as a People's Initiative.” Postimees, October 24, 2018. https://meieeesti. postimees.ee/6436318/riigireform-kui-rahvaalgatus 29.

“It is good to grow up in a larger family.” Postimees, October 15, 2018. https://meieeesti. postimees.ee/6429119/suuremas-peres-on-hea-kasvada 30.

“Eesti Gaas is building the largest solar power plants in Estonia in Pärnu County.” Postimees, October 10, 2018. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6425942/eesti-gaas-ehitab-parnumaale-eestisuurimad-paikeseelektrijaamad 31.

“How many Estonians still support Rail Baltic?” Postimees, September 14, 2018. https:// meieeesti.postimees.ee/6404754/kui-palju-eestimaalasi-ikka-rail-balticut-toetab 32.

“Only members of forest cooperatives receive state forest inventory grants.” Postimees, September 9, 2018. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6385997/riiklikke-metsainventeerimise-toetusisaavad-ainult-metsauhistute-liikmed 33.

“Hunting tourists violated the requirements and morals of waterfowl hunting in Lääne County.” Postimees, September 8, 2018. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6399916/jahituristid-rikkusidlaanemaal-veelindude-kuttimise-noudeid-ja-moraali 34.

“Rail Baltic was sued.” Postimees, August 31, 2018. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6150798/ rail-baltic-kaevati-kohtusse 35.

“Rail Baltic First Day of Judgment: Are County Plans Legal?” Postimees, August 23, 2018. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6139952/rail-balticu-esimene-kohtupaev-kas-maakonnaplaneeringudvastavad-seadusele 36.

“Scientists are investigating why a conservative white man does not believe in climate change.” Postimees, August 22, 2018. https://meieeesti.postimees.ee/6138483/teadlased-uurivad-mikskonservatiivne-valge-mees-ei-usu-kliimamuutusesse Stena’s Samples 1.

“Prime Minister's visit to Ida-Virumaa left power engineers confused.” Stena, July 9, 2019. https://www.stena.ee/blog/vizit-premera-v-ida-virumaa-ostavil-energetikov-v-zameshatelstve 2.

“The Estonian Foreign Ministry called a salute a provocation in honor of the liberation

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of Tallinn from the Nazis.” Stena, July 9, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/v-mid-estonii-nazvaliprovokatsiej-salyut-v-chest-osvobozhdeniya-tallinna-ot-fashistov 3.

“The withdrawal of shale ash from the list of hazardous waste will revive the Estonian closedcycle economy.” Stena, July 8, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/vyvod-slantsevoj-zoly-iz-perechnyaopasnyh-othodov-ozhivit-estonskuyu-ekonomiku-zamknutogo-tsik 4.

“Police commented on surge in killings in Narva.” Stena, June 26, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/ blog/politsiya-prokommentirovala-vsplesk-chisla-ugroz-ubijstvom-v-narve 5.

“There will be no songs in Russian at the anniversary Song and Dance Festival. But RimskyKorsakov’s opera will sound.” Stena, June 26, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/pesni-na-russkom-nayubilejnom-prazdnike-pesni-i-tantsa-ne-budet-zato-prozvuchit-opera-rimskogo 6.

“Residents unhappy: British helicopters exercise in the skies of Estonia at night.” Stena, June 7, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/zhiteli-nedovolny-britanskie-vertolety-uprazhnyayutsya-v-nebe-estoniii-po-nocham 7.

“World media: the results of the elections to the European Parliament speak of a growing fragmentation of politics in Europe.” Stena, May 27, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/mirovye-smi-itogivyborov-v-evroparlament-govoryat-o-rastuschej-fragmentatsii-politiki-v-evrope 8.

“Jana Toom about low turnout in Ida-Virumaa: the main factors are EKRE, Kaljulaid and Voronov.” Stena, May 27, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/yana-toom-o-nizkoj-yavke-v-ida-virumaaosnovnye-faktory-eto-ekre-kalyulajd-i-voronov 9.

“Thousands of people may lose their right to a preferential pension: who will it affect?” Stena, May 14, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/tysyachi-chelovek-mogut-lishitsya-prava-na-lgotnuyu-pensiyukogo-eto-kosnetsya 10.

“Organizer of the language cafe in Sillamae: do not scare people with the Language Inspectorate.” Stena, April 25, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/organizator-yazykovogo-kafe-v-sillamyaene-nado-pugat-lyudej-yazykovoj-inspektsiej 11.

“Kaljulaid invited Putin to visit Estonia. The former commander of the Estonian Defense Forces was wary of the meeting in the Kremlin.” Stena, April 19, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/ kalyulajd-priglasila-putina-posetit-estoniyu-byvshij-komanduyuschij-silami-oborony-estonii-otny 12. “‘A repeat of the riots is possible’: Reva - about the press hut after the bronze night, life in Russia, as well as Putin and the medal for Crimea.” Stena, April 12, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/ blog/%E2%80%9Dpovtorenie-besporyadkov-vozmozhno%E2%80%9D-reva-%E2%80%94-o-presshate-posle-bronzovoj-nochi-zhizni-v-rossii-t 13.

“Tarmo Tammiste returned to Narva City Council and will cooperate with the opposition.”

Stena, March 19, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/tarmo-tammiste-vernulsya-v-narvskoe-gorsobranie-ibudet-sotrudnichat-s-oppozitsiej 14.

“The city of Narva is stormy: Georgy Ignatov resigned from his post as director of the Narva Department of Economics.” Stena, March 15, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/narvskuyu-gorupravushtormit-georgij-ignatov-podal-v-otstavku-s-posta-direktora-narvskogo-depar 15.

“The city law of Narva proposes to dissolve the commission ‘Narva - the cultural capital of 2024.’” Stena, March 14, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/goruprava-narvy-predlagaet-raspustitkomissiyu-narva-kulturnaya-stolitsa-2024 16.

“Grigoryan: All the candidates are angels, where do the bad deputies come from?” Stena,

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February 22, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/grigoryan-vse-kandidaty-%E2%80%93-angely-otkudazhe-berutsya-plohie-deputaty 17. “‘I was silent for a long time, but I feel that the time has come to speak out’: the chief architect of Narva about the cultural capital.” Stena, February 17, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/ya-dolgomolchal-no-chuvstvuyu-chto-prishlo-vremya-vygovoritsya-glavnyj-arhitektor-narvy-o-kult 18.

“How do we equip Narva?” Stena, February 10, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/kak-namobustroit-narvu 19.

“1,000 Estonian Ida-Viru County residents register for Estonian language courses from the Unemployment Insurance Fund.” Stena, January 29, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/na-kursyestonskogo-yazyka-ot-kassy-po-bezrabotitse-zapisalis-1000-zhitelej-ida-virumaa 20.

“Estonian journalist suggested sending missiles to St. Petersburg.” Stena, January 20, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/estonskij-zhurnalist-predlozhil-napravit-rakety-na-sankt-peterburg 21.

“Reader Delfi: the truth is that a person can live his whole life in Narva without ever meeting an Estonian.” Stena, January 14, 2019. http://www.stena.ee/blog/chitatel-delfi-pravda-zaklyuchaetsya-vtom-chto-chelovek-mozhet-vsyu-zhizn-prozhit-v-narve-ni-r 22.

“The Ministry supported the Chancellor of Law in her lawsuit against Narva.” Stena, December 19, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/ministerstvo-podderzhalo-kantslera-prava-v-ee-iskeprotiv-narvy 23.

“The owner of the Narva Taxi Company warns that changes in taxi requirements will lead to social disaster.” Stena, December 19, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/sobstvennik-narvskoj-taksofirmypreduprezhdaet-chto-izmeneniya-trebovanij-k-taksi-privedut-k-so 24.

“Ministry of Defense plans rearmament of army next year.” Stena, December 19, 2018. http:// www.stena.ee/blog/ministerstvo-oborony-planiruet-v-sleduyuschem-godu-perevooruzhenie-armii 25.

“Baltic states agree to increase defense spending above 2% of GDP.” Stena, November 24, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/strany-baltii-dogovorilis-uvelichit-oboronnye-rashody-vyshe-2-vvp 26.

“Shocking details of attack in southern Estonia revealed.” Stena, November 17, 2018. http:// www.stena.ee/blog/raskryty-shokiruyuschie-podrobnosti-napadeniya-na-yuge-estonii 27.

“Police: another traffic participant prevented a driver who shot down a child in Narva.” Stena, November 1, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/politsiya-sbivshemu-rebenka-v-narve-voditelyu-pomeshalskrytsya-drugoj-uchastnik-dvizheniya 28.

“Addicts in Tallinn and Ida-Virumaa will be able to change syringes in special buses.” Stena, October 31, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/narkomany-tallinna-i-ida-virumaa-smogut-menyatshpritsy-v-spetsialnyh-avtobusah 29.

“Social racism: “the best people of Russia” require special treatment from nationalists of the Baltic states.” Stena, October 23, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/sotsialnyj-rasizm-%C2%ABluchshielyudi-rossii%C2%BB-trebuyut-osobogo-otnosheniya-ot-natsionalistov-pribal 30.

“Russian businessman Vladislav Bobrov: only local princes work in Ida-Virumaa.” Stena, October 22, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/rossijskij-biznesmen-vladislav-bobrov-v-ida-virumaarabotayut-tolko-mestnye-knyazki 31.

“Election of the board of directors of the Narva district of the Central Committee failed: employers and former members of the same party threaten centrists.” Stena, September 27, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/vybory-pravleniya-narvskogo-okruga-tsp-provalilis-tsentristam-ugrozhayut-

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rabotodateli-i-byvshie 32.

“Alexander Openko: strong people have always lived in Narva.” Stena, September 20, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/aleksandr-openko-v-narve-vsegda-zhili-silnye-lyudi 33.

“Narva was skeptical of the idea of switching to the Estonian language of instruction in Russian schools.” Stena, September 14, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/v-narve-skepticheski-otneslis-kidee-o-perehode-na-estonskij-yazyk-obucheniya-v-russkih-shkolah 34.

“The leader of the ruling majority in the Narva City Council, Aleksey Voronov, told Delfi what the authorities expect from the president’s arrival.” Stena, August 28, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/ lider-pravyaschego-bolshinstva-v-narvskom-gorsobranii-aleksej-voronov-rasskazal-delfi-chego-vla 35.

“In Estonia, "temporarily" erect a monument to the SS men in the town of Lihula.” Stena, August 24, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/v-estonii-vremenno-ustanovyat-pamyatnik-esesovtsam-vmestechke-lihula 36.

“Conflict erupted between passenger and staff at Tallinn Airport over Russian language.”

Stena, August 24, 2018. http://www.stena.ee/blog/v-tallinnskom-aeroportu-mezhdu-passazhirom-ipersonalom-razgorelsya-konflikt-iz-za-russkogo-yaz Tema’s Samples 1.

“Narva has completed the preparation of the final application for the title of European Capital of Culture 2024.” Tema, July 30, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/07/30/narva-zavershila-podgotovkufinalnoj-zayavki-na-titul-kulturnoj-stoliczy-evropy-2024-goda/ 2.

“Narva will continue updating the park near the former recreation center ‘Gerasimova.’” Tema, July 26, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/07/26/narva-prodolzhit-obnovlenie-parka-vozle-byvshego-dkgerasimova/ 3.

“Government to discuss allocation of funds to Vaba Lava center in Narva next week.” Tema, July 27, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/06/27/pravitelstvo-obsudit-vydelenie-sredstv-czentru-vaba-lava-vnarve-na-sleduyushhej-nedele/ 4.

“Narva Alexander Church may collapse without emergency repairs.” Tema, July 22, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/07/22/narvskaya-aleksandrovskaya-czerkov-mozhet-razrushitsya-bez-avarijnogoremonta/ 5.

“Arrival of the fire of the singing festival in Narva and Simman Folk Festival.” Tema, June 14, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/06/14/pribytie-ognya-pevcheskogo-prazdnika-v-narvu-i-narodnyj-prazdniksimman/ 6.

“Narva-Jõesuu's national budget will go towards landscaping near the river.” Tema, June 11, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/06/11/narodnyj-byudzhet-narva-jyesuu-pojdet-na-blagoustrojstvo-territoriivozle-reki/ 7.

“Narva thanks cultural figures for their contribution to the development of the city.” Tema, May 27, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/05/27/narva-blagodarit-deyatelej-kultury-za-vklad-v-razvitie-goroda/ 8.

“Deputies of Narva will discuss the idea of revising the agreement with the Ministry on the construction of a state gymnasium.” Tema, May 24, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/05/24/deputaty-narvyobsudyat-ideyu-peresmotra-soglasheniya-s-ministerstvom-o-stroitelstve-gosgimnazii/

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9.

“The organized procession on the occasion of May 9 in Narva will not take place.” Tema, May 9, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/05/09/organizovannoe-shestvie-po-sluchayu-9-maya-v-narve-nesostoitsya/ 10.

“Narva Mayor and City Council Chairman Raise Wages by 33%.” Tema, April 26, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/04/26/meru-narvy-i-predsedatelyu-gorsobraniya-podnyali-zarabotnuyu-platuna-33/ 11.

“The new mayor of Narva was elected Alexey Evgrafov” Tema, April 8, 2019. http://tema. ee/2019/04/08/novym-merom-narvy-izbran-aleksej-evgrafov/ 12.

“The recruitment of schoolchildren for the summer labor squad continues in Narva.” Tema, April 8, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/04/08/v-narve-prodolzhaetsya-nabor-shkolnikov-v-letnij-trudovojotryad/ 13.

“Urban elections to be held urgently in Narva.” Tema, March 29, 2019. http://tema. ee/2019/03/29/v-narve-srochno-provedut-vyiboryi-mjera/ 14.

“Suspected of corruption Vladimir Mizhui: I was slandered.” Tema, March 29, 2019. http:// tema.ee/2019/03/29/zapodozrennyiy-v-korruptsii-vladimir-mizhuy-menya-oklevetali/ 15.

“Narva opposition proposes a vote of no confidence to Irina Yanovich.” Tema, March 21, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/03/21/narvskaya-oppozitsiya-predlagaet-vyirazit-votum-nedoveriya-irineyanovich/ 16.

“Border guard with Russian citizenship fired in Narva.” Tema, February 26, 2019. http://tema. ee/2019/02/26/v-narve-uvolili-pogranichnika-s-rossiyskim-grazhdanstvom/ 17.

“In Narva, a special commission will distribute money between national-cultural societies.”

Tema, February 11, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/02/11/v-narve-spetsialnaya-komissiya-raspredelit-dengimezhdu-natsionalno-kulturnyimi-obshhestvami/ 18.

“Narva opposition may try to initiate the resignation of Irina Yanovich.” Tema, February 11, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/02/11/narvskaya-oppozitsiya-mozhet-poprobovat-initsiirovat-otstavkuirinyi-yanovich/ 19.

“Activists from Narva collect signatures for the city to participate in the ‘Cultural Capital’ contest” Tema, January 22, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/01/22/aktivistyi-iz-narvyi-sobirayut-podpisichtobyi-gorod-uchastvoval-v-konkurse-kulturnaya-stolitsa/ 20.

“The prosecutor demands toughening the sentence to the director of the Narva kindergarten Tatyana Korelina” Tema, January 10, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/01/10/prokuror-trebuet-uzhestochitnakazanie-direktoru-narvskogo-detsada-tatyane-korelinoy/ 21.

“Integration Fund moved to Narva.” Tema, January 2, 2019. http://tema.ee/2019/01/02/ fond-integratsii-pereehal-v-narvu/ 22.

“Narva City Council adopts budget for 2019.” Tema, December 21, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/12/21/gorsobranie-narvyi-prinyalo-byudzhet-na-2019-god/ 23.

“Narva deputies will be provided with tablets, e-voting is also planned.” Tema, December 19, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/12/19/narvskih-deputatov-snabdyat-planshetami-planiruetsya-i-vvedenieje-golosovaniya/ 24.

“Come to the Narva Winter Fair with your whole family - it will be interesting!” Tema, December 11, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/12/11/prihodite-na-narvskuyu-zimnyuyu-yarmarku-vsey-

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semyoy-budet-interesno/ 25.

“Margarita Källo will head the Estonian language house in Narva.” Tema, November 23, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/11/23/dom-jestonskogo-yazyika-v-narve-vozglavit-margarita-kyallo/ 26.

“Discussion about the future of the city will take place in Narva.” Tema, November 22, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/11/22/v-narve-proydet-diskussiya-o-budushhem-goroda/ 27.

“Informal learning of Estonian.” Tema, November 9, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/11/09/ neformalnoe-izuchenie-jestonskogo-yazyika/ 28.

“Narva City Council voted to create a municipal newspaper called Narva.” Tema, October 25, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/10/25/narvskoe-gorsobranie-progolosovalo-za-sozdanie-munitsipalnoygazetyi-kotoraya-budet-nazyivatsya-narva/ 29.

“British Edition: Narva is cool, in the right sense of the word.” Tema, October 18, 2018. http:// tema.ee/2018/10/18/britanskoe-izdanie-narva-krutaya-v-pravilnom-smyisle-jetogo-slova/ 30.

“In Narva, decisions are not in accordance with the Constitution. Chancellor of law filed a complaint with the court.” Tema, October 18, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/10/18/v-narvepostanovleniya-ne-sootvetstvuyut-konstitutsii-kantsler-prava-podala-zhalobu-v-sud/ 31.

“Border for leased vehicles from Estonia is partially open” Tema, September 26, 2018. http:// tema.ee/2018/09/26/granitsa-dlya-lizingovyih-avtomobiley-iz-jestonii-chastichno-otkryita/ 32.

“Narva will not fight for the opening of a support center for victims of violence in the city” Tema, September 12, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/09/12/narva-ne-budet-borotsya-za-otkryitie-v-gorodeopornogo-tsentra-dlya-zhertv-nasiliya/ 33.

“The prosecutor's office opened a case on the basis of a statement by Alexei Voronov” Tema, September 3, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/09/03/prokuratura-vozbudila-delo-na-osnovanii-zayavleniyaalekseya-voronova/ 34.

“Prominent Narva centrists left the party - among them Voronov, Efimov and Olenin.” Tema, August 16, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/08/16/vidnyie-narvskie-tsentristyi-vyishli-iz-partii-sredi-nihvoronov-efimov-i-olenina/ 35.

“In Narva, did not choose the chairman of the city assembly.” Tema, August 3, 2018. http:// tema.ee/2018/08/03/v-narve-ne-vyibrali-predsedatelya-gorodskogo-sobraniya/ 36.

“Opposition chooses candidate for chairperson of Narva City Council, centrists - not yet” Tema, August 1, 2018. http://tema.ee/2018/08/01/oppozitsiya-vyibrala-kandidata-v-predsedateligorsobraniya-narvyi-tsentristyi-eshhe-net/

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Language as Representation: A Transnational Analysis of Language Policy in India and China Shashank Rao

This thesis examines historical developments in language policy in Karnataka, India, and Hong Kong, China from the 1990s to the present day and formulates a theory of language’s role in political spaces. This paper attempts a systematic evaluation and categorization of policies, beliefs, and practices in each policy arena through the disciplines of language planning as articulated by Joshua Fishman and public policy grounded in the work of Paul Sabatier. In doing so, the work aims to articulate an understanding of how language policy unfolds in post-colonial states in Asia. The broad conclusions of the research in this paper find that language is often a proxy for broader concerns about national development and identity. Language functions as a form of sociopolitical identification in Asian policy circles and is employed as a tool by otherwise silenced constituencies. Phenomena of globalization prompt state and non-state actors alike to consider the development of their languages and affiliated institution concerning the debates on the position of English in post-colonial states. At the end of this thesis, a set of policy recommendations are provided by with these conclusions.

Introduction

Language is often discussed in public policy as a given parameter of a policy environment, and treated as if it has no dynamic properties of its own. It is given little attention as the object of policymaking, though there are numerous areas where it is frequently the subject of much debate. This is especially true in several countries with histories of colonial rule in Asia, including but not limited to India, Pakistan, China, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia. The diversity of spoken languages within Asian countries is a major dimension of social policies, including education and access to government services. As such, language is a focal point in policy circles in these countries, a fact which this thesis examines in detail in the context of India and China.

India is home to a vast number of ethnic groups and languages that compete for power and recognition. After independence in 1947, Indian states were organized on the broad basis of linguistic majorities through the State Reorganization Act of 1956. This created states such as Karnataka (Kannada), Tamil Nadu (Tamil), the original state of Andhra Pradesh (Telugu), and West Bengal (Bengali), among others. The intersection of language and social policy is a salient theme of Indian politics and society in

Journal of Politics & International Affairs

58 general, and deserves special attention. China too has a thorny relationship with language in politics and policy, particularly in regard to the governance of Hong Kong. Since the 1990 agreement to reintegrate Hong Kong into China, the question of the use of English and Cantonese in education and public life has become the subject of fierce debate. The exact position that language occupies in both policy systems is unclear, and for that reason this thesis investigates the role of language in the public policy systems of these countries, focusing on examples in education and governance. Is it truly language that motivates policy, or is it something else?

In Karnataka, one of the cases examined in this thesis, there are at least six different competing linguistic groups: Kannada, Tulu, Konkani, Kodagu, Hindi, and English. Of these, Kannada is spoken by the vast majority and is asserted as the main language of the state by the government. Tulu, Konkani, and Kodagu are spoken by significant minority groups and Hindi is a de facto national language across most of North India, but is resisted by many people in South India. Particularly in Karnataka, there is a persistent feeling among Kannada speakers that Hindi speakers come to places like Bangalore and refuse to learn Kannada.1 Meanwhile, Hong Kong schools and policymakers are embroiled in a long-standing battle as to the place of English, Cantonese, and Mandarin. The Mainland government emphasizes the importance of Mandarin, but vacillates between "collaborative" or "coercive" policies in schools.2

English is a clear residue of British rule in India, and there is a complex set of issues surrounding the role of English in Karnataka. English is perceived as both the language of the colonizer and as a tool for socioeconomic mobility. The latter sentiment is prevalent in urban areas like Bangalore and carries strong connotations of class mobility and social status.3 This issue is pervasive in other countries formerly ruled by the British, such as Hong Kong. Like Karnataka, Hong Kong was a former British possession and endured many of the same issues regarding language and self-determination. In Hong Kong, English proficiency served as an important bridge to better job prospects, and perhaps most significantly, “an essential condition for [Chinese residents of Hong Kong]’s progressive integration within the political machine”.4 As such, Hong Kong and Karnataka have more similarities than differences and the comparative study of both countries yield useful insights about the effects of language on policymaking in post-colonial contexts.5

Overview of Karnataka

Before we proceed, it is important to understand the historical reasons that these different languages are grouped in Karnataka. This first section of my thesis opens with the history of Karnataka’s formation and the present. The historical movement of (Karnāṭakatva 1 K.S. Dakshinamurthy. 2017. How Hindi Got Caught in Karnataka's Linguistic Crossfire. August 8. Accessed March 14, 2019. www.thequint.com/campaigns/bol/hindi-caught-in-karnataka-language-battle.

2 Bob Adamson and Paul Morris. 2010. "Language Policy and the Medium of Instruction." In Curriculum, Schooling and Society in Hong Kong, by Paul Morris and Bob Adamson, 147-162. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 158.

3 Sazana Jayadeva. 2018. "‘Below English Line’: An Ethnographic Exploration of Class and the English Language in Post-Liberalization India." Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge University Press) 52 (2), 581.

4 Raphaël Jacquet. 1998. "Language Policy in Hong Kong: One Country, Two Systems—but Which Language?"

China Perspectives (French Centre for Research on Contemporary China) (19), 53.

5 I use “post-colonial” in exclusively the temporal sense, acknowledging the term’s use is debated.

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Kannada nationalism) led by Aluru Venkata Rao, a prominent historian, independence activist, and writer in British India, was instrumental in rallying Kannada-speaking communities to vie for statehood.

His ideology sought to unite the Kannada-speaking regions of India into a separate state, capitalizing on the momentum of movements in other parts of India for linguistic states. In 1916, he along with other like-minded activists, formed the (Karnāṭaka Sabha – The Karnataka Assembly), an organization dedicated to advocating for the unity of Kannada-speaking districts in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies.6

Venkata Rao wrote a variety of literature in Kannada to promote a sense of shared identity across groups in Karnataka, and was a prominent voice during the discussions of state organization post-independence. His book, (Karnāṭaka Gatavaibhava - The Lost Glory of Karnataka), went into great detail on the Kannadaspeaking dynasties of the medieval empire of Vijayanagara and a bygone era in which Kannada language and culture thrived. The work served as an inspiration to Kannada-speaking intellectuals and activists, and was further supported by Venkata Rao’s continuing contributions in pro-India journalism and Kannada literature. Venkata Rao’s objective was to reanimate the Kannada community after witnessing what he felt to be a dearth of cultural feeling among Kannadigas and the oppression of Kannada under the rule of the Maratha Empire (most of which is now present-day Maharashtra).

Areas that historically spoke Kannada (or the other languages of Karnataka) had been broken up into several different administrative regions. Among these were the Kingdom of Mysore, Bombay Presidency, Madras Presidency, Coorg, and the Nizamate of Hyderabad (see map to the upper left7). The British utilized this divisive policy to split up linguistic and ethnic groups and discouraged coalitions from forming across state and administrative lines.

Campaigning for the unification of Kannada-speaking regions, Venkata Rao’s movement posited that the area known today as Karnataka was the perennial homeland of Kannada speakers. Without a province or political entity to itself, his movement argued that Karnataka’s people could not flourish politically, economically, or culturally.8 His knowledge of democratic ideas through his education in British schools in India motivated him to solidify bonds across Kannada-speaking communities and thereby posit

6 A.M. Rajasekhariah, P.S. Jayaramu, and Hemalata Jayraj. 1987. "Karnataka: Ideology and Politics." The Indian Journal of Political Science (Indian Political Science Association ) 48 (4), 576.

7 AreJay. 2010. Karnataka 1956 Reorg. Digital image. Wikipedia, November 20.

8 Rajasekhariah, Jayaramu and Jayraj 1987, Karnataka: Ideology and Politics, 581.

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the formation of a state by majority consensus.9 On November 1, 1956, Venkata Rao’s objective was achieved: Karnataka was declared a separate state (although still called Mysore at the time). Even today, his ideology serves as an important intellectual foundation and cultural value of Karnataka’s modern government, as he is always remembered during Karnataka Rajyotsava.10 Yet, despite the realization of Venkata Rao's goal, the legacy of British rule haunts Karnataka's politics today. Schools that attempt to teach the state language, Hindi, and English are still bitterly contested topics in South Indian politics.

Meanwhile, many of the minority ethnic groups in Karnataka continue to vie for political recognition and the ability to teach their languages in public schools. This conflicts with the national government’s efforts to promote Hindi as the language of the union and is in tension with the reality that English presents a great opportunity for socioeconomic mobility. This is only one way in which language manifests as a highly politicized subject.

Over the last ten or so years, protests and various social movements have arisen on the behalf of various local minorities in areas such as education and political representation. The Tulu Nadu movement was founded to promote the sociopolitical interests of the Tulu people, with some parts of the movement seeking to form a separate state. Various groups representing Kodavas (speakers of the Kodava language) have formed to gain political power in an arena dominated by Kannada speakers. Similarly, there has been ongoing conversation on the position of Konkani speakers in Karnataka, though they are considerably more allied with the Kannada establishment. These movements for separate states point to a larger issue: Venkata Rao’s vision of a unified Karnataka may have never been so united as he envisioned, and is based on a political imagination of boundaries.11 Venkata Rao’s theory of a unified Karnataka included groups both from Dharwad, where Marathi speakers dominated Kannada speakers in all spheres, as well as the Kingdom of Mysore where Kannada speakers were the majority. While discontent among Kannada speakers in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies was a significant motivation for forming Karnataka, the same enthusiasm was not present among Kannadigas in what is now southern Karnataka.12 These differences indicate existing sociocultural fault-lines even within the the Kannada-speaking community.

Tulu, Kodagu, and Konkani-speaking groups are divided by state lines, and exist in multiple states due to Kannada majorities essentially dragging them into Karnataka during unification. In an article from the Economic and Political Weekly, Mahesh Gavaskar describes the formation of Karnataka as "politically one of the most excruciating processes in the reorganization [sic] of states along linguistic lines."13 It may very well be because of these various minorities being forced into union not of their own choosing that we see so much tension among ethnic groups who wish to be officially recognized. This conflict between the rather optimistic ideology of Venkata Rao and the reality of other groups within Karnataka illustrates the sociocultural backdrop of Karnataka policy systems.

9 Mahesh Gavaskar. 2003. "Land, Language and Politics: Apropos 70th Kannada Sahitya Sammelan." Economic & Political Weekly (Sameeksha Trust) 38 (12/13, 1114.

10 The yearly celebration of the founding of Karnataka State.

11 K. Raghavendra Rao. 2007. "The Emergence of Modern Karnataka: History, Myth, and Ideology." In Karnataka Government and Politics, by Harish Ramaswamy, S.S. Patangudi and S.H. Patil, 30-42. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co, 33.

12 Ibid., 34.

13 Gavaskar, “Land, Language and Politics,” 1113.

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Overview of Hong Kong

Hong Kong, an island off the southern coast of China, has been the subject of much political struggle since the early 1800s. The Convention of Chuenpi in 1841 was the first time that Hong Kong was used as a bargaining chip in international relations. The Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 formally ceded Hong Kong to the United Kingdom; this was followed by the annexation of various areas including Kowloon and the New Territories. For much of its colonial history, Hong Kong served as a vital trading post with access into Mainland China. However, it is during this century- and-a-half long control of Hong Kong that many policies related to the schooling of local Hong Kongers arose and generated conflict, particularly in regards to the language of instruction.

The British colonial government of Hong Kong had many dilemmas with teaching in the local vernacular versus English, such as whether it was important for Hong Kongers to retain their identity or not. The government eventually chose to focus on educating a small, wealthy cadre of Chinese people to speak English and be the intermediaries for the colonial government. “...the emergence of a class of Chinese people who were perfectly fluent in English and familiar with Western culture was an essential condition for their progressive integration within the political machine.”14

Even before the Mainland re-acquired control of Hong Kong 1997, English and language in general was politicized. Cantoneses's place within Hong Kong education and society has long been the subject of much debate, while remaining the prevailing language of daily life. For example, Cantonese was once heavily restricted for its use within the triad societies, which were associated with political unrest, protest, and resistance to the colonial government.15 From 1931 to the end of the 20th century, the status of Mandarin (or Putonghua) in Hong Kong schools burgeoned and the implementation of Mandarinmedium schools in Hong Kong became an issue of national identity.16 When the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1984, however, surveys indicated that young people in Hong Kong considered English a part of their identity, though mostly for its use to separate the identity of Hong Kong from that of the Mainland.17 Thus, the rising prominence of Mandarin has become a hot issue in Hong Kong politics, as some see it as cultural and political encroachment from the Mainland.

The use of Cantonese and English is tied not only to a sense of identity unique to Hong Kong, but it is also linked to sovereignty. The debate on the power of choice of language as a means of expressing power or autonomy is evident in studies of Hong Kong, and reinforce how language can be the medium

14 Jacquet, “Language Policy in Hong Kong,” 53.

15 Kingsley Bolton and Christopher Hutton. 1995. "Bad and Banned Language: Triad Secret Societies, the Censorship of the Cantonese Vernacular, and Colonial Language Policy in Hong Kong." Language in Society (Cambridge University Press) 24 (2), 165.

16 Adamson, Bob, and Winnie Auyeung Lai. 1997. "Language and the Curriculum in Hong Kong: Dilemmas of Triglossia." Comparative Education (Taylor & Francis) 33 (2), 240.

17 Jacquet, “Language Policy in Hong Kong,” 53.

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of policy.18 To be able to choose one's language is to say that the Mainland government has no right to infringe on the politics or culture of Hong Kong. This is extremely similar to Venkata Rao's ideas in promoting the concept of (Karnāṭakatva - “Karnataka-ness”), championing the Kannada language in order to unify and assert the political power of the Kannada-speaking people. Just as Hong Kong struggles to negotiate the positions of languages in schools and government, Karnataka seems to face a similar issue as the many ethnic groups vie for recognition on the state level.

Outline of the Following Chapters

The second chapter of this thesis includes the theoretical framework used to analyze each case's recent and present issues related to language. The chapter's model draws on theories of language planning, which seeks to understand public policy interactions with language. Conventional public policy frameworks also help support the analysis by showing the flow of policy actions and decisions and their effects on various parts of society. This framework serves as the foundation for the study and understanding of Karnataka and Hong Kong’s language policy environments. Synthesizing sources from different disciplines allows for a more balanced view of public policy mechanisms in Asian policy environments. At first glance, the topic of this thesis may seem more closely linked to sociolinguistics than public policy. Unlike the former, a policy- oriented analysis of language is less interested in the changes that language undergoes and more in the mechanism thereof. This may seem a specious distinction, but the non-political focus of sociolinguistics tends to resolve various political institutions related to language into a broad set of meta-conditions, rather than as dynamic factors of policymaking.19 The theories of language planning are useful for parsing the conditions of public policy decision-making, and giving a clearer picture of a policy environment.

The third chapter takes the theoretical framework outlined in the second and gathers events including policy programs, protests, and other important factors that shape language to describe the policy environments of both Karnataka and Hong Kong. The use of Sabatier’s theoretical model and Fishman’s tools of analysis help to place Karnataka’s policy issues in dialogue with those in Hong Kong.

Divisions within and between linguistic groups call into question the integrity of Karnataka’s founding principle of (Karṇātakatva) and as Janaki Nair observes, the unity of Karnataka on the basis of language may have exacerbated tension rather than promote communal harmony.20 If the state's validity of a Kannada-speaking state is already proven, why does language continue to motivate political action in Karnataka? Similarly, this chapter examines the ways in which Hong Kong as a distinct political actor is understood and asserted through the politics of Cantonese and English vis à vis Mandarin. What functional uses does linguistic affiliation have in a state where “Chinese” is not a differentiated linguistic category? Overall, the chapter interrogates language as the object of public policy as well as its medium, and thereby enables us to visualize the two policy arenas more clearly, preparing for a synthesis of the two 18 Evans, Stephen, Rodney Jones, Ruru S. Rusmin, and Cheung Oi Ling. 1998. "Three Languages: One Future."

In Language in Hong Kong at Century's End, by Martha C. Pennington, 391-416. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 394.

19 Zaidi, Abbas. 2013. "Language Planning: An Overview." Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies (University of North Texas) 5 (3).

20 Janaki Nair. 2011. "The 'Composite' State and Its 'Nation': Karnataka's Reunification Revisited." Economic and Political Weekly (Economic and Political Weekly) 46 (47), 54.

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analyses in the next chapter.

The fourth chapter takes the conversation into a comparative discussion of the two chosen postcolonial states. Perspectives developed in the previous chapter are compared with those on Hong Kong to examine the nature of language in these Asian public policy arenas. Language has played a significant role in Hong Kong politics and governance throughout its history, as well as that of Karnataka. This chapter seeks to establish not only the similarity of these two societies but also to provide evidence for policy recommendations offered in the concluding chapter. Differences between the two policy arenas are acknowledged and discussed in order to illustrate the key factors of language policy in each arena.

The final chapter of the work offers several policy recommendations and analysis based on the comparisons in chapter four. The consequences of state actors’ actions are discussed at length, and how they impact the future of Karnataka and Hong Kong individually. While these recommendations are theoretical, and to some extent ideological, they are based on empirical observations of both policy arenas and offer important insights on transnational policy studies.

Framing Analysis and Methodology

Karnataka in particular stands out as a worthy subject of analysis, since it is one of the few states with multiple regional languages, some of which are not recognized in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, a fact which features prominently in this analysis. In addition, compared to other states in the Indian union, Karnataka has comparatively less language policy literature associated with it, with most other studies conducted predominantly on North India, with the exception of Tamil Nadu. Contributions to the literature on Indian language policy seem to focus on and extrapolate from the issues associated with Hindi and other North Indian languages, such as Marathi or Bengali, focusing on the issues related to implementing a national language and ongoing tensions with English’s status in India.21 These are important perspectives, but it is necessary to have a more granular understanding of states in India, which have significantly varied policy environments and actors. Additional study on South Indian language policy environments is necessary. Due to Karnataka’s multilingual social landscape, it can serve as a kind of microcosm from which Indian policymakers can draw important lessons.

The same idea holds true for Hong Kong relative to the provinces of Mainland China, as the hyper-visibility of Hong Kong internationally can serve as a way for the Beijing government to modulate 21 Jyotirindra Das Gupta. 2013. "Language Associations in India." In Language Planning and Processes, by Joan Rubin, Björn H Jernudd, Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Joshua A. Fishman and Charles A Ferguson, 181–192. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.

A. R. Kamat. 1980. "Educational Policy in India: Critical Issues." Sociological Bulletn (Indian Sociological Society) 29 (2): 187-205.

Samita Sen. 2015. "Abolishing English in Schools: Implications for Higher Education in West Bengal." Inter-Asia Cultural Studies (Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Society) 16 (2).

Lachman Khubchandani. 1991. "Evaluating Language Planning in the Indian Context." Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute (Vice Chancellor, Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute (Deemed University)) 51/52: 303-312.

David D. Laitin. 1989. "Language Policy and Political Strategy in India." Policy Sciences (Kluwer Academic Publishers) 22 (3/4): 415-436.

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its policies in the Mainland. Compared to Karnataka, there is an extensive corpus of research on Hong Kong’s linguistic landscape, providing rich foundation for this thesis and foil for Karnataka’s language policy literature. Rather than simply comparing two Indian states (which are often dissimilar in sociopolitical profile and policy practice), an international and transnational frame of analysis yields important insights on the impacts of colonization and governing strategies of multilingual polities. Here the legacies of colonial rule, a need for multilingual policy management, and complex dynamics with higher national powers are the control variables. These characteristics supply the contextual basis for this comparison, as Arend Lijphart notes that a comparative analysis of two regional polities is legitimate because it includes "the combination of intranation and internation comparisons."22 Through this mode of comparison, the lessons gleaned from Hong Kong's policy experiences can be used to critique and analyze public policy in Karnataka.

The public policy focus of this thesis comes from the fact that much of the literature in the West on India is grounded in sociology, anthropology, and the overall study of antiquity. This thesis aims to make India’s contemporary issues more accessible and place them in a global context alongside Hong Kong, rather than simply the province of South Asian regional studies. Drawing on Kuan-Hsing Chen’s idea of “Asia as method,” “whereby Asians study Asia and Asians, from Asian locations, and within an Asian context that foregrounds the relations between Asians and Asian countries,” the comparative study of two Asian polities enables a re-conceptualization of Asia that is grounded in an Asian understanding of policy.23 Restricting policy analyses for Karnataka or Hong Kong to their respective national policy arenas forgoes the possibility for transnational policy learning and parochializes the study of Asian countries. Asian politics do not exist as multiple vacuums next to one another, and the connection of British colonization as well as similar sociolinguistic profiles both emphasize the potential for a holistic, local understanding of the region.

That said, it must be recognized that this thesis is written with American concepts of policy analysis, and does not entail quite as deep a shift in perspective as “Asia as method” perhaps hopes to achieve. Nevertheless, I hope that this is a step in the right direction. The practical function of a policyoriented analysis is to improve the professional practice as well as expand the range of academic inquiry.

This is especially relevant for the understanding of public policy in Asia, which is often not discussed in public policy classrooms in the West. Contextualizing Asian policy programs in a broader global framework shifts the frame of policy study to one that is transnational and thus may facilitate useful innovations in foreign policy.

Chapter 1: Applying Language Planning to Public Policy Frameworks

To discuss language in public policy, and in the context of post-colonial history, I have constructed an analytical framework that draws on the theories of Joshua Fishman’s discussions of language planning and Paul Sabatier’s model of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Mapping out the links between policy events allows a clearer visualization of the relationship between the actions of institutions and social 22 Arend Lijphart. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." American Political Science Review (Cambridge University Press) 65 (3), 689.

23 Janet Hoskins, and Viet Thanh Nguyen. 2014. Transpacific Studies: Framing an Emerging Field. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press. Kindle Location 527.

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movements. I then use this model to supplement a comparative analysis between the policy systems of Karnataka and Hong Kong, illustrating the similarities and differences. In this chapter, I discuss the components of my analytical method.

Fishman and Language Planning

Language planning is a sociolinguistic discipline that deals with the relationship between language and state policymaking, with the aim of understanding effects of policy on language itself. Authors such as Heinz Kloss and Einar Haugen contributed to the field considerably, but Fishman’s work in particular24 provides a useful set of definitions and framework with which to examine language development in nations that were formerly colonial possessions. His work focuses on the strategies focuses on the agenda-making strategies of language planning that enable states and languages to become prominent. He refers to multiple linguistic conflicts across the world, making it more broadly applicable.

There are two forms of language planning: corpus and status planning. Corpus planning broadly refers to the internal regulation of and expressed values regarding the language itself. This include policies related to concerns such as what kind of vocabulary should be used, or seemingly pragmatic ones such as the grammar or orthography of the written language. Status planning refers to a language’s external values and positioning in society, particularly relative to other languages. This may involve the legislation or institution of the language in certain spaces, to legitimize or de-legitimize it. Figure 1.1 provides a useful set of distinctions between corpus and status planning, but it should be noted that it is not exhaustive.

Figure 1.1: Corpus planning versus Status planning

24 Joshua A. Fishman. Do Not Leave Your Language Alone: the Hidden Status Agendas within Corpus Planning. Lawrence Erlbaum Publishers, 2006.

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This distinction may seem clear, but as one examines real-world examples, the lines begin to blur. For example, in Karnataka, the state government established the Kannada and Tulu Sahitya Academies25, institutions dedicated to promote their respective languages through literary patronage and academic study. While the goal of the Academies is ostensibly one associated with corpus planning (promotion of usage, literary development), their establishment and authority are rooted in status planning.

They are overtly concerned with the status of Kannada and Tulu among the public, whether as a preferred medium of instruction, entertainment, or artistic endeavors. Fishman anticipates the limitations of a supposed binary between corpus and status planning, and Throughout his book, he hints that status planning’s objectives to elevate languages or subordinate them, to some extent, inhere in corpus planning and vice versa. Fishman discusses the possibility of the "simultaneity" of corpus and status planning, and writes that "language planning en toto and each of its subparts... are too dictated by history to be independently or jointly predicted with any comforting degree of accuracy."26 For that reason, the complex interaction between corpus and status planning can broadly be termed "legitimation," as it helps to characterize the process by which languages attain official or national status or become "admitted" as languages (as opposed to a dialect).

Legitimation is an important quality of language planning and language policies in general, as helps to illustrate one of the ways in which languages compete with one another. Pragmatic concerns such as standard orthographies or curricula may be a guise for status concerns; additions and coinages of terms to official dictionaries may be justified in the name of elevation or sophistication. This thesis interrogates the process of legitimation through public policy frameworks, so as to situate it in policymaking context.

Fishman provides a useful model in his book in the form of a wheel of policy dimensions, which helps us analyze this process more clearly (reproduced in Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2: Fishman's wheel of dimensions27

25 Sahitya Academies (occasionally spelled “Akademi� for faithfulness to Indian language usage) are literary authorities in India that are dedicated to promote the study, development, and proliferation of literature in Indian languages.

26 Fishman, Do Not Leave Your Language Alone, 17.

27 Ibid., 110. Changes including use of color and full dimension names instead of abbreviations are mine.

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This wheel of linguistic policy dimensions gives greater clarity to the discussion of the variety of policy options that exist. Each pole represents one of four axes along which language planning and policy may be categorized. This chart describes language planning and policies by direction, intent, and quality. Each dimension is on a pole, with one end highlighted in red, and the other in blue. Fishman constructs this diagram as a radar chart, where points are plotted along the axes according to the magnitude of the dimension in question. This chart can be used to broadly assess a language policy environment and present data visually. The following sections of this chapter discuss the differences and similarities between each dimension. The wheel allows us to see the different modes of policy implementation, but the underlying agendas (i.e. whether it is corpus or status planning) can only be determined through analysis. Some of these terms can intersect in their intent or mode, and are noted in the discussion of each.

Ausbau-Einbau ("Building out" and "Building in")

Ausbau and einbau indicate the degree to which language planning attempts to establish a language’s difference or non-difference from those around it. A common example of an ausbau policy is where languages are designated dialects of another. Fishman recognizes this as subordinating the nonstandard dialect of the prestige variety.28 Even in common parlance, the label of dialect is self-evidently inferior to being a full language. This act itself, as well as historical relations between two groups, may be a factor of enmity and distrust. Einbau, on the other hand, denotes a policy or act that attempts to separate and distinguish a language from others, and may be an institutional response to ausbau. A useful example in this thesis is the question of whether Cantonese is a dialect of Mandarin; they are not very mutually intelligible but use the same written medium. The issue is obscured by the requirement to teach “Chinese,” a broad term that is often used to imply Mandarin rather than any Chinese language. It is important to note here that these labels have little to do with the objective qualities of a language (i.e. whether in fact two languages are too similar to be separate). Ausbau and Einbau policies are concerned with the status of languages in a given state or policy arena, and attempt to force unity or difference between groups through the legal establishment thereof.

Uniqueness and Westernization

The second dimension of language policy is the dilemma of whether languages should attempt to construct their identity and currency through Westernization or through coining new terms from the language’s existing lexicon. This dimension has applications in post-colonial studies, exploring an issue that many formerly colonized nations grapple with. On the one hand, Westernization allows for a variety of material benefits, including some level of familiarity by proximity to English and other Western languages.29 However, it can also be a question of status; in both Karnataka and Hong Kong, rather than the Westernization of the languages themselves, it is possible that the society is so Westernized and therefore conditioned to prefer English for the sciences and higher education in general. This struggle is contextualized by the desire to be rid of colonial influence while being accorded the respect of Western society. The opposite of Westernization, according to Fishman, is “uniqueness”; a state may choose to legislate certain vocabularies and linguistic registers that suit its criteria. In doing so, the language’s 28 Ibid., 90.

29 Ibid., 51.

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inherent worth and sophistication is asserted. This objective may be manifest in developing literature, popular media, and curricula, with the end of establishing the distinct character of a language relative to others, as in the case of Cantonese in Hong Kong.

Purity and Vernacularity

The dimension of purity refers to how a policy may discourage the use of certain vocabulary or expressions, particularly with the attempt to “cleanse” a language of its perceived taint by foreign languages. This arises particularly prominently in Karnataka, where the use of hyper-Sanskritized30 Kannada is touted as pure. This stands in contrast with vernacular Kannada, which is interspersed with not only English borrowings but also those from languages in geographic proximity. Because Karnataka’s constituent regions are surrounded by various languages on all sides (such as Tamil or Telugu), in addition to the languages spoken within (Tulu, Kodagu, etc.), the use of “pure” Kannada is a controversial point.

This aspect of language planning also seems to intersect with “uniqueness,” since it focuses on expelling foreignisms. Fishman remarks that the difference is that purist approaches expel only certain sources of vocabulary or phrases that are deemed objectionable, whereas the pursuit of uniqueness is expelling all and any foreign borrowings regardless of origin31. It is worth noting that this axis of comparison can also be used to understand the meta-status of languages in a multilingual polity. To what extent does the state argue for the purity of language, or homogeneity, within its confines? Does it allow for vernacular diversity and the presence of other languages? This illuminates the status-related aspects of attempting to purify or vernacularize a corpus agenda. The definition used in this thesis understands purity as a policy objective for all the languages of a polity, rather than simply one language.

Classicization versus Panification

Policy events that characterize classicization include the example of Kannada previously discussed. By using a liturgical language such as Sanskrit, planners and activists hope to elevate Kannada’s vocabulary and let it stand on its own. Like uniqueness, classicization often intersects with purity, particularly in the case of Kannada. Classicization aids in reforming or supplementing the existing vocabulary of Kannada through Sanskrit loans, while expelling undesirable English ones, so as to preserve its Indian character. On the other hand, panification, as Fishman defines it, is the act of asserting a historical bond or link between various languages spoken by different polities to unite their interests.32 There appears to be no clear example of this in either Karnataka in Hong Kong, as the competing languages in each case are not asserted to be related and in fact one language. However, the common Dravidian ancestry that most of the languages of Karnataka share may serve as a basis for linguistic camaraderie, though a similar strategy may not be practicable for Hong Kong even though Cantonese and Mandarin are both Sino-Tibetan languages.

Integrating Language with Sabatier's Model of Advocacy Coalition Framework 30 Sanskritization is the phenomenon in which Indian languages adopt the use of words derived from Sanskrit, particularly for technical use. It may also extend to other parts of everyday speech.

31 Fishman, Do Not Leave Your Language Alone, 27.

32 Ibid., 74.

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In this section, I develop a theory of policy analysis that organizes the ideas of language planning above. In his paper, Paul Sabatier develops a theory of policy change over time, called the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). It is designed specifically to describe the relationship between political elites and their policy environments.33 Sabatier's model describes a policy environment as a system of coalitions that function under various macro- and micro- socioeconomic conditions, competing for power and resources. Conditions that do not change or fluctuate over several decades are referred to as stable parameters, and external system events are the means through which policy changes are forced from the outside. By situating Fishman’s ideas of language planning in Sabatier’s conceptualization of policy environments, this section attempts to construct a policy-oriented framework for the study of language policy arenas.

This section provides a brief overview of Sabatier’s model, as it is applicable to language policy. Within the policy subsystem (the main object of study in this thesis), there are coalitions within the decision-making bodies, which compete and broker deals that result in specific policy programs. My model includes both governmental and non-governmental actors, since we must account for the institutional pressures from inside and outside the government, and place them in a dynamic relationship. As applied to language, this model maps out the network of effects that phenomena such as linguistic nationalism has on different institutions. Language policy and its relationship to communities and institutions is understood as a dynamic system, rather than a static object of sociopolitical whim. Because language is spoken, ideated, and felt by its speakers, the status and content of a language is very much dependent on the behavior of its speakers. This helps to ascertain the active role that language plays in these policy arenas, rather than a presumed, passive norm.

On the following page, Figure 1.3 provides a visual conceptualization of the flow of policy and its effects on each constituent part or other systems. This model characterizes the policy subsystem in Karnataka and Hong Kong as a dialogic interaction between governmental and non- governmental forces.

The policy program that results from this, after having been acted upon by the stable parameters and external system events, may not be a neatly defined, single program.34 For example, the influx of migrants from other parts of India may slowly alter the composition of communities in Karnataka, which results in a change in stable parameters and constraints. That influx could very well be analyzed as its own system chart, which feeds into the larger policy ecosystem, which may affect still others.

33 Paul Sabatier. 1988. "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein." Policy Sciences (Springer) 21 (2/3), 130.

34 Ibid., 133.

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SHASHANK RAO Figure 1.3: Sabatier's ACF framework modified to fit language policy35

35 Ibid., 132.

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Locating the source of different policy effects is crucial to understanding the directions in which language policy proceeds. For example, an application of this would be grouping literary promotion institutions (i.e. the Kannada Sahitya Academy) and other government institutions (i.e. the Karnataka Department of Public Instruction) separately. Distinguishing groups by their interests rather than their formal establishment helps to see motivations more clearly. This prevents the conflation of literary and governmental interests, as they can very well be different, even if the underlying mechanism by which both exist (the laws or statutes) is the same. Governmental agencies and legislatures need not necessarily be allies, and in fact may oppose one another.

External policy forces are described by Sabatier as “one of the principal dynamic elements affecting specific sub-systems.”36 This aspect of the ACF also notes that these external factors are not necessarily one-off events such as protests, but may consist of other institutions, social movements, or other policy systems altogether. For example, the Tulu Nadu movement has allowed various Tulu-speaking politicians to be elected to office, resulting in a new factor which may disrupt existing government coalitions to arise. Sabatier notes that public opinion and governing coalitions can fluctuate much more than things such as political boundaries of the state.37 As such, I consider coalitions such as the Tulu Nadu movement a kind of dynamic parameter. They fluctuate in effect, quality, and composition, but do not disappear within a short period (such as less than a decade). They also not purely governmental or non-governmental, as many coalitions depend on a combination of governmental presence and social activism to make their concerns known. To categorize the Tulu Nadu movement as a stable parameter would underestimate this kind of active participation in the state legislature and society. These “dynamic system events,” according to Sabatier “present a continuous challenge to subsystem actors to learn how to anticipate and to respond to them in a manner consistent with their basic beliefs and interests.”38 However, if they occur consistently over many years, it is worth considering them to be dynamic actors rather than passive stable conditions of the environment.

For something as public as language, the public, most of whom are not politicians or elected officials, should be included in the system in some way. For this reason, the model I present in this thesis includes non-governmental institutions and movements as part the policy sub-system, rather than solely considering the government aspects of it. Cynthia Groff, a researcher in multilingualism in society, writes that language policy must be investigated as a “practice of power” operating across multiple levels of government and society, which implies that the policy subsystem is not purely formal institutions like the Sahitya Academies or legislature.39 That means when describing the policy subsystem, actors would be classified by their linguistic affinity. The Tulu Sahitya Academy, Tulu politicians, and organizers of Tulu language protests would be broadly considered the “Tulu lobby” or “Tulu movement,” which could be refined per their strategies or specific goals. Hong Kong similarly would have institutions grouped together as such, since not all those who advocate for Hong Kong’s autonomous identity believe that the identity is characterized purely by English or Cantonese usage. The hybrid nature of English medium schools in 36 Ibid., 137.

37 Ibid., 133.

38 Ibid., 136.

39 Cynthia Groff. 2016. "Language and Language-in-Education Planning in Multilingual India: a Minoritized Language Perspective." Language Policy (Springer Netherlands) 16 (2), 138.

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Hong Kong promotes a syncretic identity that includes Cantonese in the classroom.

Sabatier's own theory affirms the need for an inclusive analysis of policy systems that include journalists, researchers, and other parts of society that analyze and process policy.40 With these facts in mind, my analysis draws on this understanding that language planning and policy are characterized by a web of interconnected sub-systems and actors who exist at and across varying bureaucratic levels.

Chapter 2: Policy Environments in Karnataka and Hong Kong

Karnataka: Corpus Planning as Status Consolidation

Karnataka, as discussed in the historical overview, is a multiethnic and multilingual state with strong underpinnings of ethno-nationalism from Venkata Rao’s ideology. As might be expected, there is a complex web of group contestation in Karnataka state politics, which itself is acted upon by exogenous variables. These include the struggle of Kannada-medium41 schools to remain relevant as providers of formative education, in competition with English-medium and Hindi-medium schools. The former Chief Minister K. Siddaramaiah, before his defeat by H.D. Kumaraswamy in the 2018 elections, had announced that Kannada coursework would become compulsory for all schools in Karnataka (including ICSE and CBSE) and that 5% of state civil service positions would be reserved for students from Kannada-medium schools. It is possible that this was a bid for Siddaramaiah to retain power among different social groups in Karnataka, particularly across caste and religious lines. By issuing a call to all Kannadigas to recognize the need (and social imperative) for Kannada language education, Siddaramaiah hoped to combat campaigns from supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), who argue that Hindi is the shared linguistic heritage of India, and therefore should be its national language (and hence compulsory in all schools).

The struggle between regional languages and Hindi is perennial, but adding to the issues is the presence of English. English, as a language of colonial origin, is simultaneously exalted and reviled in India. While a de facto lingua franca and symbol of upward social mobility, especially in the private sector, English also often bears the mark of upper class pretension. As shown in the Sazana Jayadeva’s study of attitudes toward English in Bangalore, English, in addition to its practical uses in many profesisons, is often used to express upper class identity and mobility, often with the implication that Kannada speakers are of a lower class.42 It is no wonder then, that when the current Chief Minister H.D. Kumaraswamy announced a proposal to merge Kannada-medium schools with low admission rates and convert them to 1,000 Englishmedium schools, there was a great deal of outcry from Kannada academics and activists, claiming that

40 Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," 138.

41 A “Kannada-medium” school refers to an educational institution which conducts all instruction of core subjects in Kannada, except for languages such as Hindi or English. Similar designations exist for other languages; “Hindi- medium,” “English-medium,” etc.

42 Jayadeva, “‘Below English Line,’” 588-589.

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it was an assault on the reputation of Kannada.43 Other opponents of the move included the Kannada Development Authority, a government agency responsible for the promotion of status of Kannada, as opposed to the Kannada Sahitya Academy (KanSA), which is markedly less political in its public role.

The historic struggle between regional languages, Hindi and English has been characterized by the central government’s desire to exert control over the state governments by unifying (even if by force) people through a pseudo-cultural shared identity through Hindi. The assertion of regional language rights is understood as a threat to the center’s “ability to act forcefully and coherently.”44 This provides important context for the dynamic between Karnataka and the central government in New Delhi. Furthermore, the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India is a crucial focal point of language policy in India. This is because the Eighth Schedule lists all languages considered official languages of the Union, which allows them to have special representatives on the national level as per Article 344.45 David Laitin, a scholar on language in politics, writes that regional language coalitions have played a major role in disrupting the proHindi policies of the national government.46 Because pro-Hindi groups such as the BJP and some parts of Congress have difficulty appealing to South Indian and other non-Hindi-speaking groups, the local coalitions that promote Kannada in Karnataka can maintain power by frequently accusing the opposition of cultural imperialism.

Amidst this debate of Kannada versus English versus Hindi, the cries for recognition from local linguistic minorities such as Kodagu, Tulu, and Konkani often go ignored. Kannada has a difficult time with asserting itself even in government offices, even though officials have attempted to promote its use.47 This administrative problem permeates other parts of public policy as well, including education. Because Kannada occupies such a central position in policymaking, there is little opportunity for other languages to obtain representation in schools. Figure 2.1 on the following page shows the statewide breakdown of schools by language medium, which includes not even one of these languages. The issue of entry and presence in policymaking spaces in Karnataka is an obstacle to these languages, as policy decisions on their behalf cannot be made until they are considered a part of the state policy discourse. It is thus relevant that the Karnataka state government has historically oscillated between emphasis placed on English and Kannada, without making room for other languages.

43 Firstpost Press. 2018. Karnataka Academicians Oppose HD Kumaraswamy's Move to Introduce English-Medium Teaching in Govt Schools. July 8. Accessed February 20, 2019. www.firstpost.com/india/hd-kumaraswamys-move- tointroduce-english-medium-teaching-in-govt-schools-faces-opposition-from-karnataka-academicians4692311.html.

44 Laitin, “Language Policy and Political Strategy in India,” 419.

45 Indian Constituent Assembly. 2014. "India's Constitution of 1949 with Amendments through 2014." India's Constitution of 1949 with Amendments through 2014. New Delhi: Constitute Project, 168-169.

46 Laitin, “Language Policy and Political Strategy in India,” 424.

47 Patil, R. L. M. 2007. "Karnataka's Political Culture: Reflections on a Soft State". In Karnataka Government and Politics,

by Harish Ramaswamy, S.S. Patangudi and S.H. Patil, edited by Harish Ramaswamy. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co, 47.

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SHASHANK RAO Figure 2.1: Schools in Karnataka by language medium48

To analyze this issue, we must separate out the various variables that affect the state of language policy. Using the model depicted in Figure 1.3, policy events are sorted into a diagram that describes the environment of language policy. The subsequent paragraphs present the analysis that is summarized in Figure 2.2, presented on the following page.

48 Karnataka Department of Public Instruction. 2017-2018. Schools [Medium Wise]. School Data, Department of Public Instruction, Government of Karnataka, Bangalore: District Information System for Education (DISE).

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Figure 2.2: Model of Karnataka based on Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework

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Gaining Access to the Policy Agenda: the Cases of Tulu and Kodava

Two groups stand out as proponents of Tulu culture and language: the Tulu Sahitya Academy (TulSA), which promotes the development and dissemination of the Tulu language and its literature; and the Tulunadu Rakshana Vedike (TRV), a separatist movement, which has placed pressure on the government to grant Tulu-speaking areas full statehood and formal recognition in the meantime.49 The TulSA has been particularly succesful, running campaigns to promote the adoption of Tulu language in school curricula and publishing syllabi for Tulu literature, history, and language (including the formal establishment of a script for Tulu). Since 2009, several schools in Dakshina Kannada adopted Tulu as an optional third language in 2016, and a small group of students have taken Tulu as a part of their coursework.50 Literary institutions like the TulSA have sway because education has been an ever-present policy item in Karnataka due to the programs of Siddaramaiah and Kumaraswamy, providing significant momentum to get the Tulu language integrated into school systems. While the TRV is politically more outspoken than the TulSA, the TulSA has had more political and social clout than the former due to its status as a government agency and resources to implement policy decisions at its discretion.

Despite these efforts, Tulu has yet to be declared an official language of Karnataka, or added to the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. This aspect of Tulu’s struggle (as well as those of other minority languages) is a crucial factor in gaining legitimacy, because Eighth Schedule status gives Tulu and other linguistic minorities formal protections under the Constitution. The difficulty that Tulu and other regional languages of Karnataka encounter is that while education broadly speaking is a persistent topic in policy circles, the government rarely makes concessions for the regional languages or even considers that they might want to be included. Cynthia Groff, writes that acknowledging that a language exists allows its speakers to exist as a distinct legal category, and therefore is a status goal.51 Likewise, minimizing a language's legitimacy is also a status goal, because it assists in maintaining the power of Kannada-speaking groups by excluding others through non-recognition, even if it is not outright suppression. Admitting Tulu and other minority languages as official languages of India or of Karnataka would grant legitimacy to Tulu coalitions, and could seriously alter the balance of power in Karnataka state politics. Sabatier concurs with this analysis, writing that “significantly altering the political support of various advocacy coalitions” can

49 The Hindu. 2016. Tulunadu Rakshana Vedike Demands Statehood. December 2. Accessed January 17, 2019. www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/Tulunadu-Rakshana-Vedike-demands-statehood/ article16087168.ece.

50 Deepthi Sanjiv. 2016. 626 Students from 16 Dakshina Kannada Schools Opt for Tulu. July 14. Accessed February 19, 2019. bangaloremirror.indiatimes.com/news/state/626-students-from-16-dakshina-kannada-schools-opt-fortulu/articleshow/53217026.cms.

J.A. Naina. 2015. Seven Schools to Have Tulu as Optional Language from June. May 15. Accessed February 5, 2019. www. deccanherald.com/content/477801/seven-schools-have-tulu-optional.html.

Raviprasad, Kamila. 2009. Tulu Introduced in Four Private High Schools. The Hindu. July 24. Accessed January 18, 2019. www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-karnataka/Tulu-introduced-in-four-private-highschools/article16561377.ece.

51 Groff, “Language and Language-in-Education Planning in Multilingual India,” 144.

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have substantial effects on the subsystem.52

From 2017 to the present, there have been several campaigns for Tulu to be added to the Eighth Schedule, partly as a reaction to inaction on the part of local leaders and the Karnataka state government.53 Members of Parliament B.K. Hariprasad in the Rajya Sabha and Shobha Karandlaje in the Lok Sabha, have both appealed to the central government to add Tulu to the Eighth Schedule.54 These are noteworthy, because they completely bypass the Karnataka state government, utilizing the potential of the national government to override state structures. It is also noteworthy that these two politicians are from two rival parties: the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This may indicate that language status concerns may transcend party lines for Tulu speakers, something remarkable in India where polarization between the INC and BJP is a major factor in politics. On the local level, the TRV has repeatedly staged dharaṇes55, demanding that Tulu be given Eighth Schedule and classical language status.56 This series of public protests shows that even if the government is not outright hostile to minority groups, ignoring their needs or interests has a strong effect on public opinion and policy reactions from advocacy groups.

Let us turn to the example of Kodava57, a significantly more marginalized language in Karnataka. The Kodava people, located in the southern district of Kodagu, have vied for recognition on the state level for decades. In 2018, the Karnataka Textbook Society petitioned both the state board and Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) to add the Kodava language to the list of optional 52 Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," 136.

53 Daijiworld. 2019. Mangaluru: Inclusion of Tulu in Eighth Schedule of Constitution Demanded. Daijiworld. January 5.

Accessed January 14, 2019. www.daijiworld.com/news/newsDisplay.aspx?newsID=550977.

Deccan Herald. 2017. MPs from State Demand Inclusion of Kodava, Tulu in 8th Schedule. April 7. Accessed February 24, 2019. www.deccanherald.com/content/605296/mps-state-demand-inclusion-kodava.html.

—. 2018. 'Will Work for Inclusion of Tulu in Eighth Schedule'. July 23. Accessed March 12, 2019. www.deccanherald.com/ will-work-inclusion-tulu-683139.html.

J.A. Naina 2019. MP Appeals to Include Tulu in 8th Schedule. January 14. Accessed February 15, 2019. www.deccanherald. com/mp-appeals-include-tulu-eighth-711580.html.

54 Mangalore Today. 2017. Constitutional Recognition to Tulu Can Result Only with Pressure on Centre: B K Hariprasad.

September 3. Accessed January 23, 2019. www.mangaloretoday.com/main/Constitutional-recognition- toTulu-can-result-only-with-pressure-on-centre-B-K-Hariprasad.html.

J.A. Naina 2019. MP Appeals to Include Tulu in 8th Schedule. January 14. Accessed February 15, 2019. www.deccanherald. com/mp-appeals-include-tulu-eighth-711580.html.

55

(dharaṇe): A non-violent, public demonstration, also known as a धरना (dharna) in Hindi.

56 Deccan Herald. 2016. Classical Language Status Sought for Tulu. Deccan Herald. April 2016. Accessed March

12, 2019. www.deccanherald.com/content/541499/classical-language-status-sought-tulu.html.

Team Udayavani. 2019. TRV: Include Tulu Language in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Udayavani

January 5. Accessed March 19, 2019. www.udayavani.com/english/news/karavali/350558/ trv-include-tulu-language-eighth-schedule-indian-constitution.

57 Note that “Kodava” is used to refer to both the ethnicity as well as the language spoken by said ethnicity. “Kodagu” refers to the district and historical homeland of the Kodavas.

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third languages for Standards I to X.58 The addition of Kodava to the state syllabus as well as CBSE, the nationally most widely preferred syllabus, would give Kodava significant recognition and promote cultural pride in the language. In doing so, it may promote the political power of Kodava groups in Karnataka and allow them to exert more pressure on the state government to meet their demands. However, the status of Kodava among its native speakers is not particularly high; most Kodava speakers prefer to send their children to English-medium schools because of the socioeconomic mobility it confers.59 An ethnographic study of English-medium schools and educational institutions in Bangalore observed that English is a marker of middle class status and socioeconomic ascension; merely possessing English proficiency is a sign of power and class.60 This attitude, when amplified through the voices of a significant electoral group such as the Kodavas, propels English rather than Kodava.

Consider that schools available from primary through secondary school61 in Kodagu are mostly Kannada-medium and state government-run, whereas English-medium schools are fewer and mostly privately run.62 The high premium placed on private education (especially in English) may account for why Kodava speakers would not want Kodava taught in state and CBSE syllabi since it would turn them away from going to the more prestigious English-medium schools. In addition, it also appears that institutional support for Kodava is weak and not popularly supported. In 2007, there was significant controversy over the actions of the Kodava Sahitya Academy (KodSA), which was accused of mishandling funds, political nepotism, and exclusion of certain Kodava-speaking groups from membership in the Academy.63

The importance of the issues surrounding the KodSA are more apparent when we compare the case of Kodava with the case of Tulu. The role of Sahitya Academies in promoting languages’ status is dependent on public trust of those institutions, which may be attributed to their being government agencies. However, the historic nation-building value of the Sahitya is also salient; the initial premise of the Kannada Sahitya Parishat (the former name of the current KanSA) in 1915 was that literary and cultural development was connected to advancing the cause of statehood.64 Today, this belief seems evident in 58 Star of Mysore. 2018. Move to Include Kodava as Third Language in State, CBSE Syllabus. 28 June. Accessed January 20, 2019. starofmysore.com/move-to-include-kodava-as-third-language-in-state-cbse-syllabus.

59 Ibid.

60 Jayadeva, “‘Below English Line,’” 580-581.

61 This refers to elementary through high school in U.S. terms.

62 Karnataka Department of Public Instruction. 2017-2018. Schools [Medium Wise].

63 Jeevan Chinnappa. 2007. Controversies Mar Proposed 'Vishwa Kodava Mela'. The Hindu. December 2007. Accessed March 19, 2019. www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-karnataka/Controversies-marproposed- lsquoVishwa-Kodava-Melarsquo/article14891681.ece.

The Hindu. 2007. 'Dissolve Kodava Sahitya Academy'. November 24. Accessed January 16, 2019. www.thehindu.com/ todays-paper/tp-national/tp-karnataka/lsquoDissolve-Kodava-Sahitya- Academyrsquo/article14881467. ece.

—. 2007. Okkuta Refutes Academy Chief's Statements. September 17. Accessed February 20, 2019. www.thehindu.com/ todays-paper/tp-national/tp-karnataka/Okkuta-refutes-academy-chiefrsquos- statements/article14778943. ece.

64 Janaki Nair. 1996. "'Memories of Underdevelopment' Language and Its Identities in Contemporary Karnataka."

Economic and Political Weekly (Economic and Political Weekly) 31 (41/42), 2809.

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other Sahitya Academies: Tulu speakers appear to value and support the TulSA's work in promoting Tulu in schools and creating learning materials, which may have paved the way for figures like Hariprasad and Karandlaje to make the case for Tulu’s addition to the Eighth Schedule. However, the Kodava people’s accusations against the KodSA evince a distrust of the institution, which stymies changes in the status of Kodava on an institutional level because the literary institution tasked with the cultural and literary development of Kodava does not have the backing of its own community. That said, the fact that protests have even taken place over the KodSA indicates there is at least some value for the literary institutions.

Fishman’s assertion about literary institutions rings true: corpus functions do not exclusively serve to build a “cultural portfolio,” so to speak, and do in fact seek to address status concerns. In Karnataka’s case, the Sahitya Academies are intimately linked with various linguistic minorities’ aspirations for statehood, identity, and agency. However, corpus changes such as the development of vocabulary to write literature on historical figures in the Tulu and Kodava communities serve little purpose if people do not accept them.

In the end, it also raises an important question about whether institutions are self-serving or in coalition with the community.

Konkani: Language Planning as a Gesture of Cooperation

An interesting development arises in the case of Konkani, particularly in the politics surrounding its writing system. Konkani has historically been written a variety of scripts: Nagari, Roman script, Kannada, Malayalam, and even Perso-Arabic.65 Different groups argue for varying merits of what script the language should be written in, particularly because the language was added to the Eighth Schedule in 1992 by the seventy-first amendment.66 As Valerian Rodrigues, an eminent Indian political scientist, points out, there is significant power underlying the choice of choosing Nagari specifically, because it is used to write a majority of Indo-Aryan languages, including Hindi, Marathi, Nepali, and others not listed in the Eighth Schedule. Rodrigues notes that the “social connectivity” afforded by Nagari may improve Konkani’s survivability.67 Meanwhile, others shun it because of its association with Marathi, since many battles were fought to be separate from it, and earn autonomous status and a place in the Constitution. Constitutional legitimacy allows Konkani a great deal of policymaking power, not only in its own state (Goa), but also in Karnataka, because 45% of the population lives there.68 In Karnataka, Konkani is written in the Kannada script, which Rodrigues suggests allows them access to Kannada as a dominant language and policymaking power. This sentiment is supported by the fact that a survey of communities in Karnataka, conducted by the news outlet Outlook India in 2005, found that a majority of Konkani speakers supported the use of Kannada as the medium of instruction in Konkani classes. From these facts, we can determine that there is some affinity between Kannada and Konkani speakers. Building coalitions with the majority is a way to help further policy goals for Konkani, such as providing for Konkani language education in schools, first implemented in 2005 after significant pressures from the Konkani Sahitya Academy (KonSA). The 65 Valerian Rodrigues. 2013. "Konkani: The Script Controversy." Economic and Political Weekly (Economic and Political Weekly) 48 (31).

66 Indian Constituent Assembly, "India's Constitution of 1949 with Amendments through 2014,” Seventy-First Amendment, 244.

67 Rodrigues, “Konkani: The Script Controversy”. Economic and Political Weekly.

68 Ibid.

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KonSA appears to work with the KanSA to develop the language using the Kannada script, citing that it will help students learn Kannada more easily and integrate with Kannadigas.69 It is also significant that the Karnataka KonSA (as opposed to the Goa KonSA) lobbied against a High Court order that Konkani documents use the Nagari script, with the president saying that the act of preferring Nagari indirectly marginalized other languages associated with other scripts used to write Konkani (such as Kannada and Malayalam).70 This observation is an interesting one because it does suggest that different languages can support one another in a non-opportunistic manner, and could pave the way for a hybrid understanding of linguistic community relations in Karnataka.

Another important observation about the case of Konkani (especially when compared with Tulu and Kodava), is the fluidity of constitutional norms. Sabatier writes that “basic legal norms are quite resistant to change” and changes are often long-lasting.71 This may not be the case in India, seeing as 102 amendments have been added since the Constitution was adopted in 1950 and Konkani’s Eighth Schedule status was declared in the seventy-first. However, this does not imply that the structures of legal and constitutional power of India have significantly changed; in fact, adding languages to the Eighth Schedule fits constitutional precedent. From this, we can conclude that a legal norm of the language policy subsystem in Karnataka is that languages may acquire legal legitimacy through means that bypass the state government, and that the state is obligated to respect that. This dichotomy indicates that there is a clear insider-outsider dynamic between groups inside and outside the government. Where Tulu and Kodava do not have recognition, Konkani can negotiate its position and demand resources much more easily. Those who possess government backing, whether in the form of the Sahitya Academies or being included in the Eighth Schedule, are clearly empowered to represent a linguistic community and thereby participate in the policymaking process. Meanwhile, those who operate outside the government are disadvantaged and may be pressured to form coalitions with others to acquire policymaking power, though this necessarily dilutes their causes.

Hong Kong: Bilingual Identity and Assimilatory Politics

Hong Kong, much like Karnataka, contends with the issue of balancing the exigencies of English and national language education. While English has been a part of Hong Kong education since 1862, the reintegration of Hong Kong with China has raised a number of issues as to the place of Mandarin (and Chinese languages in general) in Hong Kong’s education system and in public life.72 The resistance of Hong 69 The Hindu. 2006. 'Kannada Script Must Be Used to Teach Konkani'. March 14. Accessed March 10, 2019. www. thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-karnataka/kannada-script-must-be-used-to-teach- konkani/ article3164231.ece.

— 2007. Teaching of Konkani Begins in Schools. July 15. Accessed February 13, 2019. www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/ tp-national/tp-karnataka/Teaching-of-Konkani-begins-in- schools/article14794827.ece.

70 Prasad, Shyam, and Deepthi Sanjiv. 2016. HC Gives Hope for Konkani in Kannada Script. May 1. Accessed February 16, 2019. bangaloremirror.indiatimes.com/bangalore/others/hc-gives-hope-for-konkani-in-kannada- script/ articleshow/52067743.cms.

71 Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," 136.

72 Jacquet, “Language Policy in Hong Kong,” 53-54.

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Kong to submit to Mainland authority is prominent in many areas, particularly in the media of instruction for education and the mode of governance in Hong Kong as a Special Autonomous Region (SAR). The reason that these issues are politicized is due to the friction between Xi Jinping’s idea of a unified China, a core principle of Xi Jinping Thought (Mandarin: 习近平新闻思想), and the existing “one state, two systems” status quo (Straits Times 2017). Paul Morris and Bob Adamson, prominent scholars in education and language policy in Hong Kong, remark that “the languages that are taught in schools can influence the way that citizens see themselves,” illustrating that language is indeed a highly politicized policy subject in Hong Kong.73 Championing Cantonese, English, or both is cast as resisting unification and being a divisive force in China.

Hong Kong’s linguistic landscape seems relatively simple compared to the six-language quandary in Karnataka, but other identity issues are salient in Hong Kong. Cantonese is the vernacular in which many media is produced, ranging from soap operas to popular music, as well as the medium of day-today affairs. Meanwhile, English is the standard for professional advancement and is a required subject in Hong Kong schools, alongside Mandarin. Raphaël Jacquet distinguishes using and learning English in Hong Kong, remarking that the latter is more central to Hong Kong identity.74 Mandarin, on the other hand, occupies a politically-fraught space in Hong Kong, as it is often seen as a symbol of increasing encroachment by the Beijing government. Activists claim that Beijing has an active agenda to suppress the use of Cantonese in Hong Kong.75 Hong Kong's system of tensions between languages appears to essentially be between Mandarin and Cantonese and Mandarin and English, but not necessarily between English and Cantonese. This is evidenced by the fact that English and Cantonese have co-existed in Hong Kong for years prior to the handoff in 1997. In addition, the standard of biliteracy and trilingualism announced in 1999 by then-Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa set the tone for the conversation around language in Hong Kong schools and society.76 Under this policy, Hong Kong schools were to ensure that students received adequate education in all three languages, but with the implicit understanding that literacy in Mandarin and Cantonese are fundamentally similar. However, over the last twenty years, the reality appears to privilege English and marginalize Cantonese. See Figure 2.5 for a summary of the policy arena in Hong Kong, followed by analysis to support it.

73 Adamson and Morris, “Language and the Curriculum in Hong Kong,” 147.

74 Jacquet, “Language Policy in Hong Kong,” 53.

75 Nithin Coca. 2018. Hong Kong Is Fighting Back Against a Mandarin Language Invasion. OZY. July 2. Accessed April 7, 2019. www.ozy.com/fast-forward/hong-kong-is-fighting-back-against-a-mandarin-languageinvasion/87198.

76 Adamson and Morris, “Language and the Curriculum in Hong Kong,” 152.

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SHASHANK RAO Figure 2.5: Model of Hong Kong based on Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework

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English: The International Face of Hong Kong

English has competed with Mandarin since 1997 for the position as the preferred medium of instruction in Hong Kong schools. English was and still is widely considered the language of international trade and communication, and necessary for Hong Kong’s ascent to “world-class status.”77 The colonial era (approximately from 1860 to 1997) was broadly characterized by officials privileging English medium schools, while simultaneously denying it to as many local Chinese people as much as possible. The British sought to cultivate a small, English-speaking Chinese upper class that could serve as an intermediary between the British and the people of Hong Kong.78 Thus, only the wealthy and powerful could send their children to English medium schools, further linking English with status and power and causing Cantonese to be devalued as a medium of instruction among the wealthy. In the early 1900s, the influx of refugees from the Mainland during the upheaval of the war between the Kuomintang and the Communists caused a brief increase in the demand for Chinese medium education (whether in Mandarin or Cantonese).79

However, the colonial government also began cracking down on the triad societies, groups of Cantonese-speaking Hong Kongers that resisted British rule, and enacted what is now known as the Societies Ordinance in 1964. The ordinance made it an offense to claim affiliation with, participate in the rituals of, or use the linguistic code of triads, which is entirely in Cantonese.80 This targeting of Cantonese as the mode of expression of Hong Kong identity is one part of the institutional marginalization of Cantonese in Hong Kong. Because the triad societies were a major source of political resistance and organized crime in Hong Kong, and were heavily associated with the secretive use of Cantonese, the two became linked. The use of the Societies Ordinance effectively criminalized resistance to British rule and further denigrated the status of Cantonese, though this allowed it to become a symbol of Hong Kong’s rebel identity in the present. In its place, English became one of the only acceptable modes of expression in British Hong Kong as well as among activists and intellectuals in modern Hong Kong.

From the 1970s onward, the Hong Kong government appointed several different committees to conduct research and offer policy recommendations on education, particularly regarding language. For example, the Official Languages Ordinance of 1974 established that Chinese and English would enjoy equal status in Hong Kong, and various amendments have extended the statute’s scope to other areas, such as the courts.81 The phrasing of "Chinese" in Hong Kong legislation seems operatively vague, as it formerly referred to Cantonese under British administration, but has become more ambiguous today with the introduction of Mandarin. This, too contributes to a preference for English in institutions like universities and government offices.

In 1984, the Education Commission Report No.1 (ECR No.1), continuing the trend of 77 Adamson and Morris, “Language and the Curriculum in Hong Kong,” 152.

78 Amy B.M. Tsui. 2004. "Medium of Instruction in Hong Kong: One Country, Two Systems, Whose Language?" In Medium of Instruction Policies: Which Agenda? Whose Agenda?, by James W. Tollefson and Amy B.M. Tsui, 97116. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc, 105.

79 Adamson and Morris, “Language and the Curriculum in Hong Kong,” 151.

80 Bolton and Hutton, “Bad and Banned Language,” 166-167.

81 Kingsley Bolton. 2011. "Language policy and planning in Hong Kong: Colonial and post-colonial perspectives."

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previous recommendations, suggested a flexible choice of medium of instruction and gave Chinese medium schools additional support for English coursework.82 By 1998, ECR No.4 stressed that “mother tongue instruction” (that is, in Cantonese) was best for pupils, despite previous government guidance favoring flexible medium instruction. The report was roundly criticized as a renewal of British policy to restrict opportunities for English medium instruction to the elite, though it seemed to be based on pragmatic assessment of educational development. In addition, schools themselves were reluctant to switch to purely Chinese medium instruction, because parents widely believed that English medium education was good for their children.83 The handoff of Hong Kong in 1997 to the Mainland government saw a significant decline in English medium schools, as the government only allowed approximately 100 schools to remain English medium and enforced punitive measures against those that disobeyed this directive.84 Hong Kong regulations and laws have changed little since the colonial and immediate post-colonial period.85

Underlying the push for Mandarin to take a greater place in Hong Kong education is a very clear political agenda. Qing Shao at the University of Hong Kong writes that public dissatisfaction with Mandarin is centered around preserving Hong Kong’s democratic society, and the public appears to believe that interference from the Beijing government threatens it.86 The official policy of Hong Kong’s government, to promote “trilingualism [in Mandarin, English, and Cantonese] and biliteracy [in Chinese and English]” is another important aspect of contemporary Hong Kong language policy and planning.

Bolton cites factors such as “the desire of the business community to maintain Hong Kong’s competitiveness as a centre for international commerce and finance, the pragmatic need to prepare students for a university education” as reasons for the maintenance of English in Hong Kong curricula and life in general.87 This indicates that English has a largely non-cultural and mostly instrumental or functional value as far as the identity of Hong Kong is concerned. Since the handoff, English’s international functionality has been more determinative of demand for English medium education than its use in Hong Kong, as Cantonese continues to prevail as the medium of everyday life.88 Rather than a crisis of socioeconomic opportunity for the public, it appears that the international character of Hong Kong is at stake vis à vis English.

However, simply stating that Hong Kong’s desire to appear international is the basis for its support of English education seems to be a weak analysis of actors’ motivations. In a 2005 study of Hong Kong students’ attitudes toward Cantonese, English, and Mandarin, it was found that Hong Kong students broadly thought positively of Cantonese, neutrally of English, and relatively negatively of Mandarin.89 Mee-Ling Lai at the Hong Kong Institute of Education distinguishes orientations toward the three languages with two labels: “integrative,” which Lai defines as “an interest in a language” and “an open 82 Tsui, “Medium of Instruction in Hong Kong,” 106.

83 Evans, Stephen, Rodney Jones, Ruru S. Rusmin, and Cheung Oi Ling; "Three Languages: One Future,” 392.

84 Bolton, "Language policy and planning in Hong Kong,” 4.

85 Ibid., 5.

86 Qing Shao. 2016. "Keeping the Policy Window Closed: Framing Putonghua as a Medium of Instruction in Hong Kong." The Asia-Pacific Education Researcher (Springer Science & Business Media) 25 (5-6), 772.

87 Bolton, "Language policy and planning in Hong Kong,” 9.

88 Adamson and Lai, “Language and the Curriculum in Hong Kong,” 236-237.

89 Lai, Mee-Ling. 2005. "Language Attitudes of the First Postcolonial Generation in Hong Kong Secondary School."

Language in Society (Cambridge University Press) 34 (3,: 371-372 Tables 1, 2, and 3.

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attitude toward another cultural group;” and “instrumental,” which refers to the pragmatic or functional valuation of a language or the group that speaks it.90 English, unto itself, is not held as a status marker or particularly disliked.91 Lai also finds that English is valued more for functionality than it is for personal or cultural reasons. Comparing English’s values with the higher values of Cantonese and the lower values of Mandarin, the survey shows that there is a clear resistance to Mandarin individually, rather than relative to other languages.92 People were reluctant to identify with Mandarin or the Mainland, but didn’t necessarily dislike Mandarin outright. The contextual valuation of Mandarin shows that while Hong Kong is not hostile to Mandarin in and of itself, the added baggage of Mainland imposition and strong-arming the local government appears to be the primary reason for aversion to Mandarin in public institutions.

Cantonese: The Chinese Face of Hong Kong

In contrast to public discussion of English, Hong Kong’s policy discourse on Cantonese revolves mostly around the nature of Chinese identity of Hong Kong and how that impacts its relationship with the Mainland. According to a study of media sources by Qing Shao at the University of Hong Kong, the major issues surrounding Cantonese in Hong Kong are framed as the following: politics of language choice, the legal status of the language, the preservation of Hong Kong’s identity, and the choice of language in schools.93 Shao’s study establishes that identity and status are key parts of language planning policies in Hong Kong, at least from the perspective of the general public, delineating four frames in which Hong Kong’s media discuss Cantonese. All four are related to the perceived denigration of Cantonese, its protection under the law, and generally its position in society. This indicates that a core belief among the people Hong Kong is that Cantonese is under attack, informing the way policy is conducted.

According to Kwai Sang Lee and Wai Mun Leung at the Hong Kong Institute of Education, 89.2% of Hong Kong’s popualtion speaks Cantonese as its mother tongue but curriculum materials do not reflect this reality.94 This issue of "mother tongues" in China is deeply complicated by a vague and potentially exclusionary definition of the term, especially as it is used in Chinese languages. The word 母語 (“mother language” or “mother tongue”) is not interpreted as the language used with one’s parents day to day, or even as the one that one’s mother speaks. Song regards this as a colloquial definition unsuitable for directing policy. In a set of teaching materials sent out by the Hong Kong Education Bureau, intended to support the teaching of Mandarin, an article written by Xinqiao Song defined 母語 as the following: From the individual’s point of view, “mother tongue” [母語] is indeed something that is identified by individuals. However, this definition of “mother tongue” is relative to outsider tongues (外族語) and

90 Ibid., 368.

91 Ibid., 371-372 Table 2.

92 Ibid., 371-372 Table 3.

93 Shao, “Keeping the Policy Window Closed,” 774.

94 Lee, Kwai Sang, and Wai Mun Leung. 2012. "The status of Cantonese in the education policy of Hong Kong."

Multilingual Education (Springer Berlin Heidelberg) 2 (2), 3.

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foreign languages (外國語), indicating that it refers to one’s ethnic group’s language (民族語言).95

This definition of “mother tongue” is clearly one of ausbau, essentially implying that Cantonese cannot be a mother tongue, and therefore a separate language, because Mandarin is ostensibly the standard form of a single language, of which Cantonese is but a dialect. Song goes on to state that 94.9% of Hong Kong speaks the “Han language (漢語),” and that included in that statistic are various dialects (方言 – “local speech”) such as Cantonese, Hokkien, and others.96 It is worth noting that 普通話 (Mandarin or Putonghua) is not considered 方言, because it is asserted to be the national language and main form of an allegedly cohesive language. The name of Mandarin in Chinese languages is strategic; while 漢語 (“the Han language”) indicates its ethnic affiliation, 普 通話 (“standard” or “universal speech”) implies that it is the standard for all communication in China. The ausbau qualities of this discourse establish that Mandarin competes for the status of “language” with Cantonese in Hong Kong. While no one denies that Mandarin is indeed a language unto itself, Cantonese’s status is unsettled, and recognizing it could create a competitor in Hong Kong sociopolitical spaces.

The relegation of Cantonese to dialect status is made clear in the paragraph following the one stated above: “Cantonese (粵語) is a part of the Han language (漢語), but as a rule we are not able to use Cantonese, a local dialect, as representative of the language of the Han ethnicity (漢民 族)”.97 However, despite this very clear subordination of Cantonese in official education materials, Hong Kong officials including Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor and Secretary of Education Kevin Yeung Yunhung both unequivocally denied that Mandarin would be displacing Cantonese as a medium of instruction, and also that Cantonese was at all under attack.98 What this reveals about the policy arena of Hong Kong is that while public feels encroachment from the Mainland government and their allies, the Hong Kong government itself is quick dismiss allegations of Mandarin taking over. The central component of this quandary is the situation of power in particular linguistic or cultural communities and political institutions.

Language is the means by which this is accomplished. Song’s stance has serious implications for when and if Hong Kong is fully integrated with the Mainland government. The Chinese Constitution states that a general principle of the People’s Republic is that “The State assists areas inhabited by minority nationalities in accelerating their economic and cultural development according to the characteristics and needs of the various minority nationalities.”99 What this demonstrates is that Cantonese and the people who speak it are subsumed under the label of 漢族, literally meaning “the Han ethnicity,” which is incredibly vague.

Whether the government is honoring the spirit or the letter of Chapter 1, Article 4 is the crux of the issue, 95 Xinqiao Song. 2013. 淺論香港普通話教育的性質與發展. Instructional resource, Hong Kong Education Bureau, Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region Government, Hong Kong Education Bureau.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Sun, Xinqi, and Lok-kei Sum. 2018. Hong Kong Says No to Replacing Cantonese with Mandarin. June 25. Accessed March 12, 2019. www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2144578/should-mandarin-replace- cantonesehong-kong-says-no.

99 The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. 2004. "Constitution of the People's Republic of China." Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Beijing: The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, March 2004, Chapter I Article 4.

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and as of now, it seems that it is the latter, where Mandarin competes for the status of “language” with Cantonese in Hong Kong.

This interpretation of Cantonese’s linguistic identity effectively absolves the government of a responsibility to defend or allow the promotion of Cantonese, because it is not considered a separate language. If dialects are not able to be considered mother tongues, they cannot receive government support, making it difficult for Cantonese to assert itself. Admitting that Cantonese is a language would threaten the power of the Mainland over Hong Kong. Interestingly enough, this continues a trend from British rule: “a fear of the vernacular, of loss of control, and a sense that there are powerful forces in society which, if left unchecked, will overthrow the forces of law and order.”100 The fear of Cantonese manifesting a public identity of protest and separatism seems to underlie the government’s actions. The active suppression of Cantonese in schools in Hong Kong is recognition of Cantonese’s power to mobilize the people. Students at Hong Kong Baptist University protested against a Mandarin language requirement for graduation, and were suspended and later forced to apologize for their conduct.101 This is also further supported by the fact Hong Kong's government recently banned the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, using the Societies Ordinance.102 The use of the Societies Ordinance is significant, because it was used by the British to control the Cantonese-identified triads that resisted colonial rule, and it is now being used again to suppress the Hong Kong identity again. Clearly, there is a strong distaste for Mandarin and its apparent encroachment on Hong Kong’s cultural sovereignty, and that displeasure is being increasingly manifested through pro-Cantonese and pro-English movements.

Chapter 3: Insight and Synthesis: A Policy Theory of Language in Society

The comparison between Karnataka and Hong Kong highlight three basic insights into the role of language in public policy. The first is that language is fundamentally a proxy for cultures, communities, and ethnic identity as political groups. Language serves to mobilize, identify, and represent people through a medium with which all parts of society are intimately familiar. It is a unifying idea through which a variety of groups across class, religion, gender and other categories can interpret their environments and advocate for policies they believe benefit and support them.

The second insight is that recognition is a key aspect of language planning. The struggle to establish a clear sense of political self within policymaking contexts is a prerequisite for negotiation of policy. Without it, groups and entities are unable to articulate appropriate solutions to their concerns because they cannot identify needs that are distinct from other groups. The primary response to this problem is development of literary and cultural identities located in specific content created by and for the community. This is especially relevant to understanding Asian policymaking contexts, where identities organized around language serve as vehicles for previously unrecognized groups to access circles that 100 Bolton and Hutton, “Bad and Banned Language,” 178.

101 Chiu, Peace. 2018. Baptist University Agrees to Review Suspensions over Mandarin Protest. January 31. Accessed February 27, 2019. www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/article/2131446/hong-kong-baptist- universityrelents-agrees-review.

102 Huang, Claire. 2018. Pro-Independence National Party Banned in Hong Kong, Stoking Fears of Clampdown on Freedom.

September 24. Accessed March 12, 2019. www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/hong-kong-governmentbans-pro-independence-national-party-citing-security-risks.

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generate policy agendas.

The third insight of these case studies relates to the role of globalization and international pressures on domestic policymaking. Comparing outcomes and impacts of policy programs in Karnataka and Hong Kong reveals policies intended to homogenize the linguistic landscape and simplify the policy arena. This suppresses conflict in the short-term and prolongs existing deficiencies in policy programs, fomenting public resentment and outcry.

Language as a Proxy for Ethnicity and Cultural Groups

In both Karnataka and Hong Kong, language is seen as a symbol of identity, distinction, and self-sufficiency. The previous chapter illustrated that there is an active acknowledgement of language as a serious issue in Karnataka, though not necessarily in productive ways. The legislature routinely considers bills related to the institution of languages in schools and funding of resources for institutions that support them. In addition, Eighth Schedule status in the Indian Constitution essentially serves as sociopolitical proof of identity. With the recognition of distinct languages, groups like Tulu, Kodava, and Konkani are able to demand resources from the government and can expose the state if they do not, since they are officially recognized in public records. Through this, we can see that on the formal level, linguistic distinction makes policy agenda access possible. Being a separate, recognized language demands the attention of the government. The Karnataka state government is aware of various languages that exist other than Kannada, English, and Hindi, but until they are recognized in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, there is little ostensible need for members of the legislative assembly to actively address these communities.

In Hong Kong, language is similarly seen as a form of identity. The culture of Hong Kong is repeatedly expressed as one informed by the history of colonial possession and the resulting coexistence of Cantonese and English. The historical advocacy for English and Cantonese being allowed in schools by the public of Hong Kong is evidence of this dual identity. It distinguishes Hong Kong’s cultural differences from the Mainland, and qualifies the need for a separate mode of government. The use of language as a form of identity is broadly similar to the Karnataka case, as groups in both places employ the pragmatic and relatively non-controversial matter of language as a way to construct a political identity that cannot be ignored. This is further demonstrated by the Mainland government, from which there is a reluctant, silent acknowledgement of Hong Kong’s Cantonese identity having power because there is a narrative that attempts to actively deny the legitimacy of Cantonese as a separate language. The government would not need to deny Cantonese recognition unless it were an active threat to the stability of power in the Mainland. The creation and development of a Cantonese identity that can mobilize the Hong Kong public is viewed as a threat to the hegemony of Mainland China.

Sabatier remarks in his work that “political power in most countries tends to be rather highly correlated with income, social class, and large organizations.”103 This can be extrapolated to the politics of language, in which political power is wielded through language, as it functions as an organizational tool. Whether it is literary organizations, expatriate linguistic associations, or even simple gatherings of people to speak in a language, language can accumulate power or take away from it. This is evident in both 103 Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," 135.

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Hong Kong and Karnataka, as distinctions of language can be used to target or support a specific group.

Karnataka purposefully ignores languages not included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution to avoid allocating resources to groups that request them, and insists on the primacy of Kannada in the state, clearly expressing a preference for linguistic purity over vernacularity. Karnataka is by and for Kannadigas, following from Venkata Rao’s Karnatakatva ideology. Regional languages are implicitly not welcome in that vision. Various linguistic groups are then prompted to lobby against such an agenda by calling for resources to be allocated through the Sahitya Academies.

Meanwhile in Hong Kong, pro-Mandarin and Mainland forces push a narrative that attempts to join Cantonese to Mandarin through an argument of dialectical relation, or einbau. This is related to Xi Jinping’s ideological agenda of One China, and a conscious attempt to integrate Hong Kong, encapsulated in his outline to the 19th Party Congress.104 In resistance, the Cantonese public seeks to meaningfully distinguish the language from Mandarin and Hong Kong from the Mainland through cultural content production and opportunities for Cantonese-cum-English education, which would be categorized as ausbau.

In addition, Hong Kong news sources portray government institutions’ stances on the legal status Cantonese and Mandarin as indicative of political agendas of the Hong Kong and Mainland respectively.105 In both policy arenas, the political character of language is highly visible, as it indicates group affiliation and political orientations. In this way, language identity serves as proxy for political identity.

Since language is highly politicized in both Hong Kong and Karnataka, it follows that targeting languages through suppression or singling out is a purposeful act on the part of governing elites. This form of targeting is used to exclude from or limit the participation of certain parts of the public without outright disenfranchising them. Kodava people prefer English instruction in their schools because of the socioeconomic mobility it promises.106 Kodava groups have repeatedly expressed disinterest in Kannada, or even being a part of Karnataka.107 Kannada or Kodava language initiatives in schools often make little room for English instruction, and make it difficult for Kodava advocates to lobby for different policy solutions, prolonging the delays in other policy programs that alleviate poverty and lack of education in Kodagu. Similarly, the Cantonese speaking public in Hong Kong continues to lobby for English medium schools, because English is a source of economic opportunity for Hong Kong, especially in a global context.

The government’s pushing of Mandarin, restrictions on the number of English medium schools, and implication in official materials that Cantonese is not a language similarly pushes Cantonese out of the

104 Noh, Goh Sui. 2017. 19th Party Congress: Xi Jinping Outlines New Thought on Socialism with Chinese Traits. October 17.

Accessed March 2, 2019. www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/19th-party-congress-xi-jinping-outlinesnew-thought-on-socialism-with-chinese-traits.

105 Shao, “Keeping the Policy Window Closed,” 774.

106 Star of Mysore. 2018. Move to Include Kodava as Third Language in State, CBSE Syllabus. 28 June. Accessed January 20, 2019. starofmysore.com/move-to-include-kodava-as-third-language-in-state-cbse-syllabus.

107 Siasat Daily. 2018. Kodavas don’t want to be part of Karnataka: Nachappa. Siasat Daily. March 28. Accessed April 6, 2019. https://www.siasat.com/news/kodavas-dont-want-be-part-karnataka-nachappa-1333087/.

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policy arena.108 This restricts opportunities to organize through Cantonese, and forces Hong Kongers to use English as a policy program spearhead in order to command the government’s attention. In addition, the use of einbau policies as expressed by Xinqiao Song suppresses political organizing through Cantonese, because if people are not able to speak it freely or are discouraged from doing so they cannot coalesce an identity through it. Speaking a language with others naturally creates a bond between people, especially when used preferentially over others, because it distinguishes actors’ preferences and beliefs within a policy system. These cases further affirm that language in Hong Kong and Karnataka is strategically used to support groups as well as suppress them, identifying groups through their languages.

In Karnataka (as well as India), language is one of the few sociopolitical categories that can bring different groups together, especially those that might not ordinarily form coalitions. Sabatier refers to this as “delimiting subsystem boundaries”; systems seeking to include a larger variety of interests in a particular coalition.109 For example, Kodavas are frequently glossed as Hindus, lack strong political representation, and possess few characteristics to distinguish themselves from others. This leads to lower visibility as a group with distinct needs, and the presentation of language as ethnic representation allows for the Kodava people to be recognized because language is understood as something ostensibly pragmatic and non-partisan. It is then noteworthy that the BJP has allied itself with the Kodagu separatist cause, as it normally would not defend the interests of an ethnic minority, especially one that clamors for English language instruction.110 Kodavas appear to capitalize on dissatisfaction with Congress as well as the ascendancy of the BJP in Karnataka to advance their own interests by using the BJP’s significant differences with the existing governing coalition to avoid being ignored or overlooked. The situation indicates that the Kodava language itself is immaterial, and rather that its political value is important. The BJP is clearly using the Kodava cause to further their political ambitions in the state of Karnataka, especially in the wake of a close election that split the state nearly in half between the BJP and the JDS-INC coalition. The political value of Kodava here is further established by the fact that the senior party leader Subramanian Swamy openly supported the secession of Kodagu and linguistic reservation for Kodava in the Eighth Schedule (Siasat Daily).

Similarly, Hong Kong’s use of English and Cantonese to distinguish its cultural and linguistic heritage and its policy needs may be entirely strategic. English cannot provide the same kind of identification as Cantonese does, but has the advantage of having practical value that is difficult for the Mainland government to publicly deny without seeming anti-globalization. However, there are diverse “sub-publics” within the larger population of Hong Kong: the working class, middle class, educators, the business sector, intellectuals, etc. These groups have varying reasons for supporting Hong Kong 108 Bolton, "Language policy and planning in Hong Kong,” 11.

Kris Cheng. 2018. Cantonese a Dialect, Not a Mother Tongue, Says Hong Kong Education Bureau Supporting Material on Mandarin.

Hong Kong Free Press. May 2. Accessed March 14, 2019. www.hongkongfp.com/2018/05/02/cantonesedialect-not-mother-tongue-says-hong-kong-education-bureau- supporting-material-mandarin/.

109 Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," 138.

110 Indresh Coovercolly. 2018. Why The Angry Kodava Voter Turned Against The Congress. Swarajya. May 30, 2018.

Accessed January 20, 2019. swarajyamag.com/politics/why-the-angry-kodava-voter-turned-against-thecongress.

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independence or not, and by extension support Cantonese and English in Hong Kong. Every partner in the coalition enters into alliances with one another for their own reasons. The business sector prefers to uphold English as the language of trade and higher education because of its potential to support Hong Kong’s economic advancement.111 Meanwhile, intellectuals and educators, through participation in the Education Commissions have championed Cantonese for its qualities as the mother tongue of Hong Kong, citing the fact that education in the mother tongue is demonstrably more effective.112 In addition, English medium schools have had teachers that employ code-switching between English and Cantonese to assist students in comprehension since the 1990s, and the “fine-tuning” policy since 2007 has given schools some freedom over the medium of instruction for certain subjects.113

The Cantonese public lobbies openly for English instruction, because while Cantonese is used as the de facto language of instruction, English medium schools are the only policy option available that is not associated with Mandarin. English medium schools have become a safe space for Cantonese speakers to learn both languages without being targeted by the government, and the Cantonese public doesn’t lose the opportunity to organize through Cantonese. In addition, multiple groups of Hong Kongers can identify with the pragmatic need for English as a medium of international communication, while also supporting Cantonese’s survival. Even if one doesn’t prefer Cantonese as their day to day language of communication, one still may sympathize with the Hong Kong independence movement. Coalition members with varying interests can understand the strategic value of Cantonese as a marker of Chinese Hong Kong identity that stands against Mainland Mandarin hegemonic forces. Coalitions can consist of seemingly contradictory members, but according to Sabatier, these members can make temporary compromises and adopt each others’ strategies to advance individual interests.114 This shows that language is used operatively as not only a sign of political identity and affiliation, but also a strategy for coalitionbuilding. As a result, the hybrid identity of Hong Kong as one defined by Cantonese and English together arises, making it difficult to push Cantonese from public use entirely.

Recognition and Identity Development

Knowing that language identifies policy communities and interest groups, how do language affinity groups attain prominence? The role that language plays in public policy arenas is broadly related to the status of the community that speaks a given language, and contributes to the sociopolitical profile of the policy subsystem. While this is not a surprising fact, it is an important one to emphasize. In this context, reinterpreting Fishman’s dimension of purity and vernacularity as the composition of languages within the state (as opposed to the internal composition of a single language) is useful. He writes that for purity to be attainable, there must be an ostensible opposite: vernacularity (or alternatively, impurity); it rests on the assumption that non-standard varieties of a language are easily identified.115 This makes recognition an essential part of language policy systems, and can in fact represent distinct goals between groups. Purity 111 Bolton, "Language policy and planning in Hong Kong,” 11.

112 Lee and Leung, "The status of Cantonese in the education policy of Hong Kong." 4.

113 Adamson and Morris, “Language and the Curriculum in Hong Kong,” 152-154.

114 Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein," 148.

115 Fishman, Do Not Leave Your Language Alone, 25.

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as linguistic homogeneity may be the goal of higher institutions (such as Karnataka’s state government or the Mainland government), whereas vernacularity may be the goal of lower institutions (the proponents of Tulu or Cantonese). Vernacularity benefits the latter by granting them institutional recognition and acknowledges their presence in policymaking decisions. In this respect, corpus planning may be independent of status per se, given that language institutions’ development of curricula and literature may not be overtly related to contextual status (that is, vis à vis other languages), but rather generates awareness of a distinct, policymaking community.

Take Tulu for example; a proposal for Tigalari, the script traditionally used to write in Tulu (also known as Tulu Grantha and Arya Ezhuttu), was recently submitted to the Unicode Consortium in order to facilitate its use on the Internet (Murthy & Rajan). While not a formal endorsement of the language in a political or legal sense, this would enable the mobilization of Tulu speakers not only within Karnataka but also the community’s expatriates living elsewhere. It would also be helpful for the dissemination of Tulu language materials on the Internet and prevents the language from being lost due to the decay of physical materials. The TulSA’s support of this endeavor is evident through their publishing of the Tulu script on their website, and is proof that the TulSA’s contribution to a diverse and more vibrant Karnataka (Karnataka Tulu Sahithya Academy). This also shows a concerted effort to develop Tulu as a language for public use and instruction, further evidenced by the language’s recent introduction as a subject of study in Dakshina Kannada and Mangalore schools, making it more public and visible to non-Tulu speakers. This recognition on the state level makes Tulu’s case much stronger and indispensable to the development of the state. Educational attainment, even if in another language, is indisputable as a measure of economic development and would be of great benefit to the state also as a form of communal harmony since nonTulu speakers can learn more about Tulu communities in a public space. In addition, the development of Tulu’s written tradition strengthens its claims for classical and Eighth Schedule status, making it difficult to ignore in Karnataka. This is not necessarily related to Tulu’s status in a hierarchy relative to other languages in Karnataka, but is still rooted in creating a visible identity that Fishman speaks of.

Tulu, Kodava, and Konkani are all good examples of how in order to be considered a “language,” and by extension a full member of the policy community, one must demonstrate proof of identity through an easily identified culture and sociopolitical organization. The more that languages develop their literatures, their cultural content, and other forms of presence in policymaking and society, the more difficult it is to suppress the identity or deny its legitimacy. This is the challenge for Cantonese in Hong Kong as well, as activists, volunteers, and various media content creators scramble to compile Cantonese dictionaries, generate Cantonese-language content (music, TV shows, etc.), and promote its use in schools (OZY). The development of cultural content allows for the coalescence of a distinct identity, even if it is only one formed in opposition to another. The difficulty is making it safe for Cantonese to be visible in public as a force for community organization. Despite the setbacks of the Mainland promoting Mandarin and discouraging Cantonese usage, there is evidence that pro-Cantonese efforts are working, given the protests and activism in support of Cantonese in Hong Kong from Guangdong Province, another Cantonese-majority area in China. This is especially relevant given the 2010 protests in response to a proposal to increase Mandarin television programming in the province, making it clear that there is a significant minority that supports the Cantonese cause (Asia News). Regardless of the risks involved in such activism, advocating for Cantonese is not simply calling for equality with Mandarin (recognizing their distinctions in the process), but also calling attention to an unmistakably separate identity.

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The creation of cultural identity makes it challenging for the Chinese government to deny that it is suppressing an ethnic minority, especially in the context of global pressures regarding China’s record on human rights. Fishman calls this struggle for an identity “autonomy motivated distancing” within the dimension of ausbau, and can create a basis for power but broad policy changing.116 Sabatier notes that coalitions consisting of majority and minority groups can learn from one another, though they may not necessarily alter key attributes of either (Sabatier 149). This means that minorities can play a valuable role in gauging the government’s policies regarding language and cultural diversity. For this reason, the logic of language as political identity can also be used by the group in question to draw attention to suppression or for the government to acknowledge deficiencies in their policy programs. This policy learning process is an important medium through which coalitions, policy systems, and institutions can acquire more information about one another, which may cause varying degrees of shift in policy.

One such example is protest literature, a valuable tool of minorities and subcontinental resistance in general. In an interview, Addanda Cariappa, a celebrated Kodava journalist, playwright, and writer, discussed the role of resistance theater in the Kodava community against the British through plays written

by Haradas Appacha, another notable Kodava playwright. (Sahapedia). Appacha’s work criticized the Kodava cooperation with the British and called attention to deficiencies within the Kodava community.

The works of Aluru Venkata Rao, such as his Karnataka Gatavaibhava and Karnatakatva Vikasa, also fall into this category through his calls to the Kannada community to address its dearth of cultural pride.

Protest literature, in fact, forms the basis for the Sahitya Academies, which were originally fora for writers and intellectuals to gather and build a native, Indian language intellectual culture. Venkata Rao founded the Kannada Sahitya Parishat in 1915, which was the precursor to the highly influential Kannada Sahitya Academy, which itself gave rise to the prominence of Sahitya Academies as agents of language promotion and planning This makes a strong case for the role of literature promotion and its institutions of language policy in Karnataka. Cantonese, too, is a tool of political protest in literature and cultural pursuits. The Umbrella Movement’s development through social media, music, and poetry is well documented. As Tim Rühlig, writing on music as a form of participation in the Umbrella Movement, poetically states: “Songs are more than intellectually stimulating texts; they help to create emotions stimulating an atmosphere of community and solidarity that very often draws on the power of utopia and stimulates people to dream” (Rühlig 60; emphasis original)

Given Rühlig’s argument that music is a form of social identification, it is especially relevant then that protest literatures are written in specific languages. Poets like Waitong Liu express their affiliations through poetry and other content in English, Mandarin, or Cantonese (Nogues). This specification, especially in the context of Chinese languages, is political because it makes clear delineations between certain groups in the presence of a policy elite that contends otherwise. These kinds of cultural challenges to the political status quo are an important dimension of analysis, which Sabatier affirms as a way in which policy actors can learn more about their environments. The identity of the state is revealed through this process of policy discourse, and formal and informal recognitions allow for the government to acquire a deeper understanding of itself. As E. Annamalai eloquently puts it, 116 Fishman, Do Not Leave Your Language Alone, 91.

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“The most important of the shared things is the idea of a nation defined by a set of values, institutions and symbols. Language plays a role in defining the nation as a value, as an institution and as a symbol.”117

The plurality of languages plays a role in defining the nation, and without the recognition processes that go on in Karnataka and Hong Kong, the nation risks fragmentation and policy paralysis.

Further evidence that recognition is a significant component of both Karnataka and Hong Kong’s policy arenas are the public institutional barriers languages face. Because leaders such as Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor and Secretary of Education Kevin Yeung Yun-hung insist that there is no threat to Cantonese, it is difficult for the pro-Cantonese public to advocate for and develop Cantonese as a linguistic competitor. In addition, the assertion in articles proliferated by the Hong Kong Education Bureau that Cantonese is only 方言 (local dialect) delegitimizes their claims. This is further evidenced by “[The] fact that Chinese dialects are officially regarded as dialects of a single Chinese language means that there will not be any “multilingual” language education policy for the Han Chinese population,” resulting in an official stance that precludes the possibility of a multilingual society.118 Even though Chapter 1, Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution stipulates that ethnic minorities must be assisted in their development of culture and language, it is easy for the Mainland government to excuse itself from that responsibility because they do not recognize Cantonese as a separate language or identity.119 As a consequence, the overall cultural and linguistic identity of China (and by extension Hong Kong) is re-asserted as Mandarin-only. However, there is a kind of via negativa proof of Cantonese identity in the active non-recognition of Cantonese in Mainland-sponsored media. In these outlets, dialects and other non-standard languages like Cantonese are framed as “identity markers, individuals’ cultural heritage and tools to resist cultural invasion from the outside,” making it obvious that the Mainland government has identified Cantonese as a viable threat to its hegemonic governance.120

The back-and-forth of Cantonese and Mandarin reveals much about the Mainland's agenda for how China should be perceived. For this reason, recognition of Cantonese (or the lack of thereof) is a kind of policy canary in the mine that signals the degradation of personal freedoms in China. This echoes the actions of Karnataka politicians who do not actively support the interests of regional languages due to their lack of Eighth Schedule status, resulting in government inaction. Konkani, by contrast, has the ability to freely develop its literature and advocate for Konkani curricula, enhanced by its Eighth Schedule status. The fact that both Tulu and Kodava institutions are advocating for recognition of their respective languages again highlights the importance of recognition in language policy. Konkani’s particular power in determining its legal position is strengthened by the fact that its legal battles with the Kendra Sahitya 117 E. Annamalai. 2003. "Reflections on a Language Policy for Multilingualism." Language Policy (Springer Netherlands) 2 (2), 115.

118 Sihua Liang. 2015. "The Politics and Sociolinguistics of Chinese Dialects." In Language Attitudes and Identities in Multilingual China: A Linguistic Ethnography, by Sihua Liang, 11-33. New York: Springer International Publishing.

119 The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. "Constitution of the People's Republic of China (2018 Amendment)." Chapter I, Article 4.

120 Shao, “Keeping the Policy Window Closed,” 773.

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Academy, which tried to force the KonSA to adopt the Nagari script.121 The fact that the High Court of Karnataka and Kendra Sahitya Academy have interacted with and issued orders to the KonSA give it a great deal of institutional power and recognition. President Ronald Castelino’s declaration that it would embrace the diversity of scripts used to write Konkani appears strategic in this regard. By at least saying that the Kannada script is a legitimate medium for writing Konkani, Castelino sends a message to proKannada coalitions that the KonSA is amicable and perhaps open to alliance. In doing so, the KonSA builds a reputation for itself that protects it from being disestablished, defunded, or otherwise have its authority mitigated.

Within the policy-oriented purity-vernacularity model mentioned earlier, there is a limited range of acceptable heterogeneity, as Fishman notes that it is rare to consider all outsider groups equally objectionable (Fishman 27). From this analysis, we can determine that recognition is an important dimension to the development of language planning and policies, especially as it pertains to the identity of the state.

The acceptance of various linguistic identities in the state is contingent on how much those identities support the dominant one and its ideology. This bleeds into a broader issue of why the state recognizes or does not recognize linguistic communities, which is strongly affected by the forces of globalization. If regional languages are not useful to broader policy objectives of the hegemonic language community, the former will be disregarded. However, the presence of regional language resistance reveals the multifaceted reality of the communities within the state, and function as signposts for other obstacles. Regional language recognition is helpful then, as it provides a clarity to political environments, especially as states in India and the whole of China are contend with essentialist notions of the state based on singular national identities.

This reveals that a “turn to essentializing notions of culture on the part of some advocates for rising Asian nation-states obscures the heterogeneity of Asian societies” is indeed taking place in Karnataka and Hong Kong, though in distinct ways, and has pertinent consequences for policymakers.122

Globalization and Pressure to Homogenize

As one considers Karnataka and Hong Kong’s policy discourses, a theme begins to emerge.

There is a deeply rooted anxiety about the identity of the nation state and how the languages therein exist in relation to it; that anxiety is connected to the relationship that these nation states and policy systems have to the international community. The blur between international and domestic contexts becomes increasingly relevant in this regard, and are pertinent influences on Asian policy actors’ beliefs, strategies, and coalitions. Karnataka is continually confronted with the reality of pro-Hindi forces such as the BJP that threaten Kannada in order to establish a culturally homogenous India that is resistant to outside influences.

In a perverse way, this prompts pro- Kannada politicians to downplay local minorities like Tulu, Kodava, and Konkani and participate in the same strategies of homogeny that the BJP does. Local non-state actors representing minorities like the Sahitya Academis similarly mobilize to defend the interests of groups who are caught in the crossfire. English presents the opportunity for international trade and socioeconomic mobility in Karnataka, but is also a symbol of Western soft power, just as in Hong Kong. While the study done by Mee Ling Lai and protests about English medium schools reveal that Hong Kong does accept English, this is problematized by Mainland narratives that project Hong Kong as anti-government and 121 Shyam Prasad and Deepthi Sanjiv. HC Gives Hope for Konkani in Kannada Script. Bangalore Mirror.

122 Hoskins and Nguyen, Transpacific Studies, Kindle Location 196.

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resistant to the unity propounded by Xi Jinping Thought.123

To understand why globalization generates such anxiety and conflict in Karnataka and Hong Kong, one must examine the political contexts in which these issues emerge. Many minority groups in Asian countries are pathologized by governments as threats to national security and integrity, especially those that express separatist sentiments.124 This theme of security and integrity of the nation state is relevant to the discussion of how language policy unfolds, because it serves as the backdrop of the process. This fear of rebellion and national disintegration is very clearly visible in Karnataka and Hong Kong’s policy contexts.

In India, Karnataka itself presents the possibility of separatism as a South Indian state characterized by Kannada nationalism, but even within the Karnataka state government’s treatment of linguistic minorities varies by the degree to which these groups acquiesce to the nation state envisaged by Aluru Venkata Rao. Groups like the Kodavas, who express interest in seceding from Karnataka, are less likely to be supported because their secession would directly result in less power in Parliament due to decreased representation.125 The splintering of communities threatens the balance of power not only on the national level, but the state level as well.

Hong Kong’s pro-Cantonese and pro-independence politics are similarly situated in China; the prospect of Hong Kong’s identity coalescing as one distinctly defined by Cantonese and peripherally by English is a threat to the national integrity of China. Furthermore, the rallying of Guangdong protesters and the Mainland government’s decision to curtail Cantonese television further evidences the fact that national integrity and security are concerns of the government. The emergence of a Cantonese identity contradicts Xi Jinping’s ideology and program to unify China, and threatens to consolidate power in an indisputably visible ethno-linguistic group. This threat to China’s global ambitions of to extend Chinese soft power is particularly relevant in the context of programs like One Belt One Road and the Confucius Institutes.126 As such, globalization has a very clear influence on language policies in both Hong Kong and Karnataka.

Evidently, the response of both state governments is to homogenize (phrased as “unity” in rhetoric) and control identity formation. Homogenization as a policy agenda essentially seeks to simplify the actors and policy needs of the state. The question to ask is: why? What interest does the state have in requiring a single language to be spoken and others to be suppressed? Language, as previously discussed, forms an indisputable difference that denotes various cultural and political identities, which is an obstacle to hegemony in Karnataka and Hong Kong. By ignoring these identities, it becomes ostensibly easier to negotiate and control the identity of the state through a single language as its proxy. To do otherwise, such as acknowledging cultural or linguistic diversity is seemingly a daunting task. This necessitates resources put toward the management of heterogenous polities, making it difficult to do much else. However, this is dependent on the beliefs inherent in homogenization, namely that it is necessary to make policy agendas function smoothly and more efficient. Aluru Venkata Rao’s ideology allowed incipient policymakers and leaders to assume the homogeneity of Karnataka as purely defined by Kannada speakers. This assumption 123 Lai, "Language Attitudes of the First Postcolonial Generation in Hong Kong Secondary School."

124 Wil Kymlicka and Baogang He. 2005. Multiculturalism in Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 44..

125 Siasat Daily, Kodavas don’t want to be part of Karnataka: Nachappa, Siasat Daily.

126 Educational institutions hosted by the Chinese government in other countries that promote Chinese language and culture education, as well as facilitating employment and study abroad.

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continues to guide policies that aim to support and protect Kannada, without looking at the needs of local languages. The mere presence of Tulu, Kodava, and Konkani Sahitya Academies does not imply the government’s commitment to their prosperity or worth as partners in governance.

Similarly, the Chinese government has repeatedly made it clear that cultural and linguistic homogeneity are important to its image. The constitutional imperatives that require the Chinese government to uphold minority rights to language and culture by participating in their development do not necessarily serve as guarantees of the government’s beliefs. The contradiction between Chapter 1, Article 4 and China’s policy realities, and Karnataka’s apparent multicultural legacy being ignored both strengthen the point that globalization provokes a certain discomfort within policy systems.127 Fishman writes that these oscillations in policy programs are due to ambivalence about the outside world, and that globalization prompts reflection on the part of policymakers.128 This results in a set of core beliefs in the policy system that respect the cultural diversity of Karnataka and China, but only insofar as it supports other policy goals.

The important fact behind these policy beliefs is that globalization is a pertinent pressure on the state to homogenize and for minorities to mobilize. The illusion of a monolithic China or Karnataka allows it to conveniently move to other interests such as trade and the environment, but these inevitably lead back to the linguistic minorities. It is both time-consuming and resource- intensive to attend to the needs of these minorities, but ultimately may be rewarding for long-term coalition building as it forces the state to turn attention to minorities. Language is a kind representation of people in a non-tangible, non-capitalist form which is difficult to erase, serving as a kind of non-partisan spearhead for minorities to break into otherwise closed-off policy arenas. Indeed, linguistic diversity becomes a prominent issue through global interactions.

Conclusion: Policy Recommendations for the Future

To address the politics and ongoing policy programs in both Karnataka and Hong Kong, this section enumerates three key policy recommendations that draw on understandings from both arenas. It must be said that some of these recommendations are long-term, and will require significant investment of time and resources from state actors and others involved in policy systems. Above all, they require the cooperation of the state with minority groups. In Will Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights, groupdifferentiated rights include assurance of the right to self-governance, polyethnic rights, and special representation in large-scale political institutions (Kymlicka 37-38).129 A respect for minority groups is central to the survival and long-term health of the state.

Recommendation 1: Multicultural Citizenship as a Model for Political Participation

Firstly, a major shift in beliefs must be initiated in order to pave the way for long-lasting changes in policy programs. In accordance with Sabatier’s model of dynamic beliefs that alter with knowledge 127 The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. "Constitution of the People's Republic of China (2018 Amendment)." Chapter I, Article 4.

128 Fishman, Do Not Leave Your Language Alone, 17.

129 Will Kymlicka. 1996. Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 37-38.

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of policy realities, both Karnataka and Hong Kong must embrace ideological stances that promote multicultural citizenship. This model of political participation entails a conscious inclusion of multiple ethnic and linguistic groups, without privileging one over the other, while also responding to communityspecific needs.130 The felt need for dialogue with minorities to assess their policy needs does not necessarily require a deep restructuring of social and political institutions, but requires close attention to the minorities in question. Regional languages must be recognized as equal constituents in both states, because of “If the nationhood is redefined in terms of language network rather than a single language, there will be no validity in defining language relationship in terms of majority and minority in their acquired meanings.”131 The tension between majority and minority groups must be resolved through an inclusive model of participation.

The challenge of such policy innovations is dependent on a “more complex, subtle knowledge of the world that is multicentered rather than bipolar in perspective.”132 Language policies that balance Fishman’s dimensions einbau, vernacularity, and panification are useful for maintaining solidarity and diversity.

In Karnataka, the consequences of such a different model of the state will require that that the state government must not only make efforts to support the existing Sahitya Academies, but also actively recruit their expertise in schools and the reformation of state curricula. Institutional support for minorities disrupts essentialist agendas that make governing coalitions susceptible to collapse. The consolidation of these specific ethnic groups as a multicultural bloc is important, because it cements Karnataka’s political integrity in an inclusive and productive manner. This policy would support vernacularity in Karnataka, because it upholds linguistic diversity in a way that does not diminish opportunities to create crosscommunal coalitions. Rather than Aluru Venkata Rao’s notion of Karnataka that is based on a community of Kannadigas, the state and society should attempt to encourage a respect for different languages and cultures, emphasizing their contributions to the cultural diversity of the state. The identities of regional minorities should not be treated as mutually exclusive of their membership in Karnataka as a state, because the fact that they occupy multiple identity spaces strengthens the cross cleavages of policy coalitions. A dynamic understanding of these minorities as migrants within their state is called for, as “mobile persons neither have a single (and unfavorable) identity, nor do they bear a fundamental difference from other migrants when it boils down to their motivations and behaviors,” setting a standard for the equal treatment of the citizenship of different ethno-linguistic groups.133 This would cause a radical shift in long-term beliefs, and perhaps core beliefs, especially in the context of the Indian union, where language-based states are still the norm. This theory of a multicultural and multilingual state still references the language-cum-culture complex as a central component, but does not make the state the exclusive property of a single language.

If Karnataka fails to adapt its policymaking models to one that acknowledges its sociocultural hybridity, it will be increasingly easy for opposition parties like the BJP to snatch votes and subsequently dismantle institutions that protect Kannada and Karnataka itself, as is already occurring with the dissatisfaction of Kodava voters.134

In Hong Kong, there is an existing multicultural model of citizenship and participation in policy 130 Kymlicka and He, Multiculturalism in Asia, 9-11.

131 Annamalai, "Reflections on a Language Policy for Multilingualism,” 115.

132 Hoskins and Nguyen, Transpacific Studies, Kindle Location 590.

133 Hoskins and Nguyen, Transpacific Studies, Kindle Location 1200.

134 Coovercolly, Why The Angry Kodava Voter Turned Against The Congress, Swarajya.

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making based on the “trilingual and biliterate” policy. However, in the broader context of integration with China, the Hong Kong government must be firm and advocate for its multiculturalism, especially in a way that recognizes Cantonese as a language distinct from Mandarin. There is already a foundation for this kind of hybrid identity, as a 2010 study of Hong Konger’s identities found that nearly half (46.7%) of Hong Kongers identify as both Chinese and Hong Kongers.135 The distinct recognition of Cantonese and Hong Kong culture need not diminish the place of Mandarin or of Mainlanders in Hong Kong, but local people should have the choice as to whether to speak Mandarin or Cantonese as their Chinese language of choice. Just as in Karnataka between Konkani and Kannada, fluid choices of language and identification will create more opportunities for both pro-Cantonese and pro-Mandarin groups to build rapport with one another and support the sociopolitical standing of one another. Cantonese-speaking people must be explicitly made welcome in all parts of Hong Kong society, and people should not be penalized for their lack of knowledge of Mandarin. Cantonese is an equal part of the linguistic and cultural heritage of Hong Kong and China. The Mainland government should refrain from suppressing this cultural expression, and rather encourage it to gain public trust.

Recommendation 2: Regional Language Curricula

As a step toward the first recommendation, regional languages in Karnataka and Hong Kong will require active and committed support from their respective governments. This proposal seeks to uphold the quality of einbau as a policy goal in both arenas because the distinction of linguistic identity helps to protect the interests of certain cultural groups and clearly designate policy objectives that are related to them. For example, in Hong Kong, Cantonese will require specific curricula and textbooks published to teach Cantonese to non-natives as well as create an institutional foundation for Cantonese advocacy in the future. Without the distinction of being a language formally enshrined in the law, Cantonese will not be able to promote its interests. In addition, Mandarin should not be pushed as requirement for graduation from universities, and rather than remove Mandarin from courses of study entirely, it may be introduced as a third language in primary education, much as Hindi is in state-run schools in Karnataka. It is important to note that this goal of emphasizing the unique qualities of Cantonese such that it is a separate language do not diminish the worth or qualities of Mandarin.

In government services, Mandarin should not be considered an absolute requirement, because the government too must be hybrid in its outlook and functionalities. Mandarin can still co-exist with Cantonese as a way for Hong Kong to build cultural connections with the Mainland in a way that does not compromise Hong Kong’s own cultural and political autonomy. Overall, Cantonese should serve as the primary medium of Chinese language education alongside English as a lingua franca that will make Hong Kong globally competitive. The goals of cultural preservation and socioeconomic mobility need not be mutually exclusive. Just as Karnataka’s schools present multiple options for educational attainment, Hong Kong education must be equally flexible. Accommodating cultural and ethnic diversity can and does contribute to the stability of democracy and the state itself.136 135 Center for Communication Research. 2010. The Identity and National Identification of Hong Kong People: Survey Results.

Survey data, School of Journalism and Communication, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, CN: The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

136 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 19.

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In Karnataka, a similar change must take place in the institutions and policies of education.

All four regional languages should administered as courses of studies in communities and districts where there are majorities of the respective ethnicities. This necessarily means that Kannada cannot be the exclusive language of Karnataka. Teaching all of the regional languages in schools alongside English can help promote sociocultural cohesion as well as the political integrity of Karnataka. This is because such changes in curriculum can be made more easily in state-run schools because they fall under the purview of the Karnataka state government. Programs that increase the popularity of state-run schools (as opposed to the nationally run Kendra Vidyalaya institutions) can be utilized not only to improve educational attainment and socioeconomic development in Karnataka, but also build coalitions within the multifarious community of Kannadigas, Tuluvas137, Konkanis, and Kodavas. The protection of these various ethnolinguistic groups through institutional learning and establishment makes it possible for policy actors to pursue multiple policy programs without eschewing others. This naturally facilitates the creation of a state identity that is multiethnic and inclusive.

Recommendation 3: English as a Tool for Global Development

Another issue that must be addressed for long-term stability in Karnataka and Hong Kong is the problematization of English as a force of Western intrusion. Especially as former British colonies, both states can utilize their familiarity with English as a tool for linking with the international community and advocate for the validity and value of their regional cultures. English need not be the exclusive language of education in either state for it to have a place in schools. Panification, in this regard, can be used as a mode of promoting linguistic-cultural solidarity, and present a new mode of education and policy that does not imply that English comes at the expense of other languages.

In Karnataka, this is especially relevant as English is seen as a tool for socioeconomic ascension, as it yields better job opportunities. This can be coupled with the promotion of regional languages as modes of participation in local cultural institutions rather than making them the only way to obtain government jobs. Speaking English in of itself is not a threat to political or cultural sovereignty, as demonstrated by the pragmatic attitudes of Hong Kong toward English. By presenting English as a universally accessible language that has no ethnic affiliations alongside the equally valuable regional languages, people in Karnataka can take advantage of the opportunities afforded by English proficiency while also feeling included in the activities of their communities and state. Ascribing purely economic values to language proficiency inevitably devalues regional languages because they are spoken nowhere else. But if they are conceptualized as intrinsically valuable and contributing to the multicultural character of the state in a nonmaterial way, they can be presented as a way of participating in the policy process without being extremely well-versed in political machinations.

Hong Kong’s need for English as a mechanism for development is less apparent, but English has an important function of bringing economic opportunity to China. By learning English without being at the expense of Cantonese or Mandarin, Hong Kongers can similarly participate in their local cultural institutions without feeling they are losing out on the opportunity to move up the socioeconomic ladder.

By requiring English in schools alongside Cantonese and Mandarin, policy actors can resolve the ongoing issues of hegemony by Mandarin and Mainland groups by creating a complex and dynamic sociopolitical 137 The demonym for Tulu speakers or members of the Tulu ethnic group.

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identity. Indeed, this identity is important because “multination states cannot survive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to the larger political community they cohabit.”138 The ideology of Karṇātakatva as articulated by Venkata Rao precludes non-Kannadigas or requires “Kannadiga-zation” for membership, and so in a multiethnic society like Karnataka, it is utterly incompatible with liberal norms of community rights and so will not be able to build a lasting multicultural and indeed multi-political coalition against right-wing forces like the BJP. Similarly, Xi Jinping Thought also inherently refutes the possibility of a multiethnic society, to the point that it will deny difference where possible, such as grouping Cantonese speakers under the label of 漢族 (the Han ethnicity). Unless this is revised to acknowledge minorities and diversity in meaningful ways, political fragmentation will become an increasingly large concern. The allegiance of groups within Hong Kong and Karnataka cannot be to an illusory identity or a singular conception thereof, but rather one that is radically multiple in nature and acknowledges the validity of different languages and the peoples they represent.

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Cheng, Kris. 2018. Cantonese a Dialect, Not a Mother Tongue, Says Hong Kong Education Bureau

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138 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 19.

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Accessing Space, Memory, and Narrative in the "Contested City" From Baghdad to Hebron to Nicosia Neelam Sakaria

This thesis will set out to explore the role of space/place in the presence of protracted power struggles, which are generally at the center of territorial conflicts. This will expressly be done through a comparative analysis of three “contested cities�—Hebron, Baghdad and Nicosia. Through these examples, I will engage an understanding of space and power and also, highlight critical spatial practices, which are manifest of political ideology and can be read as attempts to inform spatial disciplines (mapping, architecture, city planning) as well as the subjective experience of individuals. However, I will also explore the diffusive expressions of power by a pursuing understanding of resistance in this context of space. This thesis will predominantly explore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at length, focusing on Hebron and examples from other Israeli cities, but also highlight the crucial sociological processes linked to the production of space such as the establishment of national narrative, collective memory and group identity, considering parallels in the cities of Baghdad and Nicosia.

Introduction

The nature of our increasingly globalized world today has many implications for the notions of the nation, identity and migration. Migration and displacement are experiences that blur the traditional boundaries and borders of the conventional world and offer an insight into hybrid spaces and identities.

Our understandings of space are often too restricted and simplified to acknowledge and accommodate the complexities of human reality and adequately capture the intricacies of the human experience. The totalizing narratives, most often founded in modernist constructions, should be challenged to provide a more authentic understanding. My experiences in the last four years have shown me more than often that there is always more than one voice, more than one understanding and more than one solution. During my year in Tel Aviv, I found myself often losing sight of that. This thesis, in large part, is an academic exploration behind that experience.

Conflict became a significant factor in my research, but more so, the attachment to territory and land became more significant. The idea that developed as consequence became centered on the power

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108 relations embroiled in conflict and their subsequent manifestations in space. This thesis explores this phenomenon in depth by focusing on urban examples, which are fertile for analysis as microcosms of the larger contexts I wish to address, particularly in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle.

Part I, Understanding Space, is the foundational section of this thesis as it attempts to define what space is and how power interacts with it. In this sense, I also focus on defining power, borrowing heavily from Foucault. The section then weaves these two ideas together by following the tripartite categorization of space by Henri Lefebvre. This section is largely abstract and theoretical and so many of these ideas are supported with examples drawn from the cities of Hebron and Jerusalem, as well as other sites of contested space from the Israeli-Palestinian context.

Part Two, Socio-­�Spatial Differentiation: Fragmentations In Space, further delves into the processes of socio-spatial differentiation that become integral to maintaining distinction and by extent, the security of those in power. To explore this further, this section includes two urban case studies, which showcase the larger struggles for space and the fragmentation of it in the cities of Nicosia and Baghdad during 2003-2011 during the U.S. invasion. Additionally, this is also examined within the context of the West bank territory and Jerusalem. The section moves forward in examining spatial mechanisms that restrict movement and mobility, reinforcing divides in space as well as encroachments on land and territory, which reveal relations in power. However, this second part concludes by distinguishing spaces of resistance, which subvert any hegemonic display of power.

Part Three, Commemorative Imaginings of Space: The Role of Power in Historical Narratives and Collective Memories, will investigate the formation of identities in conflict through the dichotomous imaginings of narrative and recollections in memory that are associated with particular spaces. As the powers at be form, construct and infuse meaning within space, they do so with the intention of installing a narrative and foundation for collective memory that will legitimize their continued empowerment. Primarily, this section navigates this complex process by examining how narrative is mediated into memory through space and how these constructions converge in the context of nationalist projects. Legitimation is discussed as well, by highlighting spatial practices that have established a long-standing narrative and altered and manipulated remembrance. A significant aspect of this (re) imagining is associated with sites of antiquity, introducing temporal and historical elements in the discussion. This section ends by examining the convergence of divergent narratives, the implications of establishing dominance in memory and narrative as well as peripheralized and marginalized narratives in the larger context. This section again draws on various examples from Nicosia and Baghdad, but focuses heavily on the primary case study in Israel and Palestine.

Part I: Understanding Space

1.1 Spatial Politics: Mediations Between Space and Power

Power, hegemony, and authority are all concepts which merit discussion in the context of conflict,

but with the additional presence of territory a relationship that this thesis will look at closely will be the interactions between space and power.

Power and space are simultaneously constructed as results of overlapping and divergent processes.

In a sense, they are both social constructions as power, in its most simple terms refers to “relations among social units such that the behaviors of one or more units depend in some circumstances on the behavior of

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other units.”1 Power, then, stems as a result of interactions, or “force relations” between individuals, groups or entities. As Foucault writes, “…Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them…whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.”2 The resulting product of these interactions is the core interest of my exploration as they are internalized and legitimized officially by state structures and unofficially, by the societal hierarchies of the people they are also manifest in the realms of space.

Foucault allows a degree of flexibility as he recognizes this ordering in relations of power is not static. Rather, the production of power is seen diffuse and circulating, but consequently, makes resistance just as nebulous a concept as well. These dynamic shifts in power and authority as well as resistance are recognizable in abstraction, but are interesting to explore further in the spatial politics of physical and representational construction in the Israeli and Palestinian context, especially Hebron, but Baghdad and Nicosia as well.

Conceptions of space are diverse and complex as Henri Lefebvre elaborates in his seminal work The Production of Space. Space is a place of interaction and engagement. It essentially is a “resource for power, and the spaces of power are complex and qualitatively distinctive.”3 The semiotic nature of space allows power relations to infiltrate and create places of authority and control. Symbols are how power relations manifest to a space into place, which hold meaning. They communicate certain ideologies and attitudes based in power relations, creating a place of power that is “by definition a symbolic place, which is a vehicle for power in the spatial order and for space in the order of power.” Symbolic mediations “are produced and then interpreted only in the context in which they emerge. A place can be considered ‘symbolic’ whenever it means something to a group of individuals, in such a way that it contributes to giving an identity to the group.”4 For example, the city of Hebron, located around twenty kilometers south of Jerusalem, hold immense significance for both Muslims and Jews. The biblical figure of Abraham settled the city and for Jews, it is the place of the Tomb of the Patriarchs and Matriarchs. Muslims regard Abraham as an important prophet as well and believe the mosque in Hebron to mark the place of his burial. The sacred symbolism relates to the religious authority of each group and their belief in this meaning socially identifies them as Jewish or Muslim.

1.2 Spatial Practice: The Physical and Built Environment 1 Steven Lukes, Power (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 40.

2 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 92-93.

3 Paul Q. Hirst, Space and Power: Politics, War, and Architecture (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 3.

4 Jérôme. Monnet, "The Symbolism of Place: A Geography of Relationships between Space, Power and Identity."

Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography, Politique, Culture, Representations, Document 562, 2011. Accessed February 12, 2015. doi:10.4000/cybergeo.24747.

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For Henri Lefebvre, space is understood through a tripartite model of spatial practice, representations of space, and spaces of representation. Spatial practice can be understood as the physical perception of space, the built environment, and the material reality of a place. It is a “sensory experience.”5 This element of spatial practice is visualized directly as it is reflected in the immediate architecture or physical structures of an area.

A very physical example of this can be seen in divisive mechanisms employed in many contested sites. The West bank territory serves as a prime example. As a result of the Oslo II Accord, the West bank territory was divided into three administrative areas: Area A, Area B and Area C and consequently, Palestinian movement became increasingly restricted following the early 1990s. Initially, Palestinian entry to East Jerusalem and Israel were limited generally, but following the second intifada, Israel sanctioned checkpoints and the construction of physical obstructions, such as trenches, mounds and concrete blocks, as well as the wall itself. “The wall,” Wendy Brown writes in Walled States, Waning Sovereignty “is simultaneously an architectural instrument of separation, of occupation and of territorial expansion mandated by the turning of state-sponsored and outlaw extensions of settler colonialism.”6 The wall in spatial practice informs the material reality for Israeli and Palestinians as the physical manifestation of their separation and limited accessibility to space due to the restriction of movement. The wall also presents an element of encroachment in spatial practice as waivers off the 1967 Green Line to encircle settlements deep in the West Bank territory and includes a series of “depth barriers” and “sterile security zones” that impinge on Palestinian lands. “These are among the features that make it not a mere border wall or security fence, but a technology of separation and domination in a complex context of settler colonialism and occupation.”7 The divisive spatial practice reads as an architectural form influenced by the political ideology of the conflict and the power relations between groups in this context.

In 2012, B’Tselem: The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, took a survey to find: 16 military post in the area of Hebron, 41 outposts serving as the last checkpoint before entry into Israel (mostly concentrated east of the Green Line or outside Jerusalem) and 4 points restricting Palestinian access to the Jordan Valley. Additionally, the UN OCHA surveyed in May 2012 to find 450 unmanned physical barriers that closed or circumnavigated Palestinian traffic. Furthermore, 256 temporary checkpoints were erected in the West Bank for a few hours at a time during the same month, without any permanent structure at those locations.8

1.3 Representations of Space: Symbolic Mediations

Representations of space, however, are the display and portrayal of spaces. The dimensions of space are widened in this sense and offer another facet of consideration in respect to power. Individuals or groups often conceive certain representation with an intention to propagate ideologies or influence other.

Representations of space can be manipulated, politicized and often, altered. Maps of places and locations, 5 Edward W. Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 66.

6 Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 29.

7 Ibid. 30-32.

8 "Restriction on Movement," B'Tselem - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, July 15, 2012, accessed March 3, 2015, http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement.

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for example, serve as a representation of space, and given the nature of this spatial representation it can distort the spatial reality of an environment.

The Israeli settlement and urban planning policies rooted in Zionist ideologies contributed to the establishment of “unrecognized villages.” After declaring statehood in 1948, the Israeli state took legal measures to secure territory from the Palestinians. With this end, it manipulated the 1943 Land Ordinance of the mandate era, which aided confiscation and promised little to no compensation, as well the 1951 Complementary Law of State’s Property, which transferred property of the mandatory state to the state of Israel. In 1965, the Buildings and Construction Law allowed the districting of the entire state.9 The official district maps that emerged from this process, however, identified 123 existing and developed Arab towns within the state of Israel, conveniently leaving out rural Arab neighborhoods; instead, these lands were classified as agricultural and therefore, made illegal to build upon as well as receive services i.e. water, electricity.10

The 1965 Buildings and Construction Law only laid the foundations for Israeli justification.

The appointment of the Markowitz Commission put the law in action in 1986. Although the government and institutions, like the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund, made efforts earlier, the Markowitz Commission developed and implemented strategies more precisely to identify unlicensed Arab hamlets, even in the more remote rural areas. The commission referred “unrecognized villages” under the 1965 law, and targeted them for demolition and confiscation, while also attempting to maintain low costs for the government. “Markowitz referred to the villages as “gray areas” and referring, to Article157A of the 1965 law, explicitly called for the continued denial of any services to them. The idea apparently was that this kind of malign neglect eventually would cause residents to leave with minimum cost to the government.”11 Although no official reports are kept on the number of unrecognized villages, most often exhibit the worst conditions in the country. Palestinians, however have remained and the state has developed strategies to deal with unrecognized villages, like the village of ‘Ayn Hawd al-Jadida.12

The original ‘Ayn Hawd was occupied and its Palestinian residents expelled. While many ended up in refugee camps outside of Israel’s borders, others remained in the country and under the leadership of Abu Himli, who built a small settlement outside of ‘Ayn Hawd. ‘Ayn Hawd al-Jadida, under Israeli law, was categorized as an unrecognized village, and as such, denied basic utilities such as water, electricity, access roads and sewage. The settlement has also had countless demolition orders over its head. A forest fire exposed the Palestinian village to public interest in October 1998, leading to the arrest of a resident for arson. The forest not only provided some degree of isolation, but also provided considerable protection, 9 Joseph Schechla, "The Invisible People Come to Light: Israel's "Internally Displaced" and the "Unrecognized Villages"" Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001): 23, doi:10.1525/jps.2001.31.1.20.

10 Muhammad Abu Al-Hayja' and Rachel Leah Jones, "'Ayn Hawd and the "Unrecognized Villages""

Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 1 (2001): 44, accessed May 07, 2013, doi:10.1525/jps.2001.31.1.39.

11 Schechla, "The Invisible People Come to Light: Israel's "Internally Displaced" and the "Unrecognized Villages"" Journal of Palestine Studies: 24 12 The name of ‘Ayn Hawd translates roughly to ‘Eye of Basin,’ but the additional adjective of al-Jadida, meaning new, allows for the name of the old village here to be memorialized and remembered in the new ‘Ayn Hawd settlement. This serves as an interesting example of recollection captured through the use of language and naming.

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enablings ‘Ayn Hawd al-Jadida to continue their “illegal” building. The exposure led to the settlement to be cited as an “environmental problem” by neighboring Israeli towns, with its lack of sewage and garbage services, calling government attention to its illegality.13 In response, the Israeli state developed a program to address pre-existing Palestinian settlements during the 1948 war and after. Not only would they occupy and remove Palestinians by any means necessary, they would create their own structures from the ruins of the preceding ones The political motivations of the Israeli state to erase and reconstruct manifested into a struggle for national space, evident in the laws, policies and/or strategies that they chose to implement and exercise.

The example of ‘Ayn Hawd serves as one of many villages unjustly treated and also, shows the distinct lack of a complete picture in the representation of space. For Lefebvre, representations convey dominance in society and serve as a “storehouse of epistemological power” and portray “dominating spaces of regulatory and ruly discourse, these mental spaces, are thus representations of power and ideology, of control and surveillance.”14 The case of the “unrecognized villages” shows not only the vulnerabilities of representation, but also, the working of dominant powers to oppress other actors in space.

The symbolic mediations of space are then crucial to the discussion of power as is often used as an instrument to exercise it. The individual or institution with the position to influence the symbolism used in spaces can “manipulate processes of identification, and this have influence over the constitution of the group that legitimises the exercise of power.” The creation of nation-states gave rise to state authorities who “defined the symbols that were to define the nation” and encourage the burgeoning tides of nationalism in various regions, such as the Middle East. Essentially, space is distinguished by its representational qualities and by that extent so is power. However, the symbolic interpretation leads to an “interpretation grid of culturally grounded categories.”15 These categories include collective identity and memory, which are grounded in the context of culture and establish distinct impressions of temporality and spatiality.

Through their individual framework one can see for example, the development of a narrative, which contributes to the organization of spaces. However, it is important to note, “changes in scale or temporality should be apprehended as changes in symbolic efficacy. A symbolic place does not have the same meaning seen from nearby or represented at a distance, by a small group or by a large community, from inside or from outside, but ‘us’ or by ‘others’, and through time.”16 This threat to symbolic efficacy then only stresses the need for those in power to maintain stable symbolic structures reinforced by narrative, essentially attempting to counter and resist all change. If the authority in power succeeds in achieving this sort of permanence, then the identities also manage to remain clearly defined and rooted in the ideas translated and represented by symbolic places. Although with a degree of exaggeration, it could then be said that the type of power that is dominant in the process of elaborating symbolic places contributes to the identification of the society, either as a community of believers, or as a nation of citizens, or as a consumer 13 Abu Al-Hayja' and Jones, "'Ayn Hawd and the "Unrecognized Villages"" Journal of Palestine Studies: 39-41 14 Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places, 65-69.

15 Monnet, "The Symbolism of Place: A Geography of Relationships between Space, Power and Identity."

Cybergeo:European Journal of Geography, Politique, Culture, Représentations.

16 Ibid.

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market or a labour pool.”17

In Jerusalem, the contested nature of the city show the presence of pervasive symbolisms in both the old and new city, while also reinforcing a common narrative. As a city that is central to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the city serves as a place reflecting both the political and religious aspirations of both Israelis and Palestinians.18 At the center of dispute, lie the spiritual claims on the city, which are centered at the Temple Mount. Arguably, the Temple Mount is the most contested space in Jerusalem and is the subject of vying claims of ownership and access. Underneath the Temple Mount complex is a flattened summit top filled with debris and sediment. Jewish faith believes the complex to stand above the ruins of the ancient temple compound as described in the Old Testament. The Western Wall, a retaining wall supporting the Temple Mount, is considered to be the exterior wall of the second temple of ancient times. The top of the Temple Mount complex is the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock. With the intensity of political events in the area, the Temple Mount is often an additional arena for competing interests.19

As Durkheim suggests, the symbolic dimension is a pervasive facet of human existence, by providing meaning to one’s surroundings and render the environment intelligible.20 In this sense, symbolization cannot be undermined; rather, it becomes necessary to explore further to examine individual and collective understanding of realities historically, spatially and temporally. The cyclical reinforcement of space and power is filtered through a legitimation in narrative and strengthened by a recollection of it through memory. Again, symbols strengthen this through subtle and not so subtle representation in everyday life.21

1.4 Spaces of Representation: The Lived Experience

Lefebvre’s “spaces of representation” become relevant in understanding this example as spaces of representation describe lived spaces or rather the experience of individuals, groups and societies in spaces. Spaces of representation are a product of daily routine and everyday life.22 They show how space within a city is experienced, how the dominant understanding of memory and narrative is transmitted to the individual travelling through space. It is also here that aspects of spatial practice and representations of spaces converge as they affect the experience of an individual. In the contested city, this convergence manifests at the place of the checkpoint. Checkpoints are numerous and pervasive in the H2 area of Hebron. Shuhada checkpoint, the only clear passage between the H2 (Israeli-controlled) neighborhood of Tel Rumeida and the H1 (Palestinian Authority-administered) neighborhood of Bab Al-Zawiye, is one of the larger and more heavily manned checkpoints and obstructs the route many Palestinians must travel regularly in the course of their work and daily routines. The fragmentation of space is a product of the 17 Ibid.

18 "Jerusalem," Conflict in Cities and the Contested State, 2007, accessed April 03, 2015, http://www.conflictincities. org/Jerusalem.html.

19 Eyal Weizmann, "Jerusalem," OpenDemocracy, April 29, 2002, Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, accessed December 3, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ecology-politicsverticality/article_808.jsp.

20 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1995), 3-4.

21 Monnet, "The Symbolism of Place: A Geography of Relationships between Space, Power and Identity."

Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography, Politique, Culture, Représentations.

22 Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places, 71.

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daily obstructions traversed in the experience of Palestinians.23 The subjectivity of experience alone points to the indisputable presence of multiple understandings of space in the city.

In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau shares an interesting perspective from a vantage point high above New York City on the 110th floor of the World Trade Center. Like Lefebvre, de Certeau recognizes how certain perspectives distort truths and one totalizing perspective from high above although panoptic, is incomplete similar to a city map or secondary account. It does not offer a true understanding of the city inhabitants or the day-to-day truths. However, the act of walking in the city is quite different.24 By contrast, there is an element, which requires one to exercise agency in viewing the city, rather than a passive acceptance. de Certeau’s writing here touches on a very significant aspect that holds true in many context— experience is subjective and our understanding of space, no matter other factors, hold a certain level of subjectivity. New York City, for example, can be understood as a strategic grid of streets and avenues, clear and concise, or it can be experienced as a series of side streets and alleys that would confuse most, but are habitually used by the city resident. The act of walking can help realize the presence of alternative spaces with perhaps, marginalized narratives and histories. As a destination of tourism, areas such as Times Square and Central Park are often advertised as premier locations in the city. These areas show a conscious effort to portray New York in a contrived manner as destinations for large crowds and traffic. However, walking the city offers one the option to go beyond these constructions and explore the city in its entirety, traversing not only the premier locations, but also the peripheries of the island, such as the East River waterfront or Tompkins Square Park.

1.4.1 Counterspaces: Locating the Sub-Altern

In essence, what Lefebvre’ s spaces of representation and de Certeau highlight are the presence of “counterspaces, ”25 which resist the dominant order created by their positioning on the periphery. Often, they subvert the prevailing spatial practices and are oppressed in numerous ways. These counterspaces play into the development of a center-periphery dynamic, which understandably promotes an unjust, asymmetry within space. This asymmetrical development in the urban environment is often rooted in the individual historical context of each example. For example, Hebron has been divided asymmetrically into two sectors H1 and H2 since 1997. While a majority of the city falls under PNA jurisdiction in H1, tens of thousands of Palestinians live in H2, under Israeli authority and in direct proximity to the Israeli settlers.

Due to the violent history of the city, the dominant security paradigm upheld is one based on the “principle of segregation.” The settlers and Palestinians areas border each other, but effectively maintain no contact.

The implementation of severe restrictions on Palestinian movement facilitates this policy of segregation by prohibiting Palestinian vehicles on certain roads, closing many Palestinian shops by military order and even, pedestrian routes, restricting many individuals’ ability to access their homes.26 In Hebron, Palestinian enclaves in H2 are examples of such counterspaces as they resist daily the imposition of martial law around 23 ISM Khalil Team, "No Donkeys Allowed," International Solidarity Movement, December 17, 2014, accessed January 11, 2015, http://palsolidarity.org/2014/12/video-no-donkeys-allowed/.

24 Michel De Certeau and Steven Rendall, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1984), 93-100.

25 Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places, 66.

26 Breaking the Silence: Soldiers' Testimonies from Hebron, 2008-2010 (Jerusalem: Breaking the Silence, 2011), 3-5.

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them as well as harassment of the majority population in the H2, the settlers. The intensive separation between the two sides of the city has also contributed to the development of yet another counterspace.

With checkpoints as the sole passage through the city, Palestinians often circumnavigate these points by moving around them through “rabbit runs.” Locals often know these paths, which lead through families’ yards, over barriers and through rubble.27 In November 2014, the Shuhada checkpoint was burnt down, forcing it to be closed down by Israeli forces and making Palestianians adapt. Although “rabbit runs” subvert the control of movement and separation of the city as counterspaces, they by no means make the experience easier. Unpaved on uneven terrain, these paths are unsuitable for the elderly and sick as well as those who need to move through the city with their animals and heavy goods.28

Although subjective by definition, spaces of representation do fall into dominant or subordinate narrative paradigms. However, the presence of counterspaces supports the diffusive nature of power as described by Foucault. Spaces of representation show dynamic of push and pull, challenging dominant understandings in an attempt to disrupt established inequities.

Part II: Socio-Spatial Differentiation: Fragmentations in Space

2.1 Socio-Spatial Divisions: The Dialectic of the Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony

Power, of course, can be measured and multiple scales from the hegemonic force of institution to the micro-scale of a group or individual interaction. In the case of territorial conflict, power is manifest in spaces is best seen by Antonio Gramsci’s articulation that the establishment of hegemony is meant to reinforce the goals of the nation-state. Design and the built environment shapes and is reciprocally shaped by power relationships. The period of colonialism and imperialism showcase instances where dominant nations controlled and influenced indigenous groups and left legacies of power, which are still interpreted in the spaces of former colonies today.29 Foucault’s work on power is complicated in that the network and dynamic system of power set with multiple nodes of power in his model is challenged with hegemony. Edward Soja distinguishes in Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real- andImagined Places, how hegemonic power introduces a central node in the network that is absolute that does not only “manipulate naively given differences between individuals and social groups, it actively produces and reproduces difference as a key strategy” to create socio-spatial differentiation as a strategy to ensure continued authority and control. He describes how the distinct process of othering develops as 27 With the aid of the Dean’s Global Research grant, I travelled back to Tel Aviv January 2015, spending a considerable length of my time in Bir Zeit, a town located outside of Ramallah in the West Bank.

Through the duration of my stay, I had the opportunity to travel near Hebron and also, meet members of the International Solidarity Movement (ISM). Due to a series of unfortunate circumstances, my direct experience in Hebron was limited, but my knowledge of life in the city has been greatly informed by conversations with ISM volunteers who so selflessly spent their time between Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron.

28 ISM Khalil Team, "No Donkeys Allowed," International Solidarity Movement.

29 "Introduction to Section 4: Power, Subjectivity, and Space," in The People, Place, and Space Reader, ed. Jen Jack.

Gieseking and William Mangold (Routledge, 2014), 107-108.

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a tool to maintain power and then, how the “separation of ‘We’ and ‘they’ are dichotomously spatialized and enclosed in an imposed territoriality of apartheids, ghettos, barrios, reservations, colonies, fortresses, metropoles, citadels, and other trappings that emanate from the center-periphery relation.”30 The lack of continuity in space and increased fragmentation presents the situational context, where social distinctions are prevalent and highly stratified.

The increased stratification and measure of socio-spatial struggles are “cumulatively concretized and conceptualized in spatial practices, in representations of space, and in spaces of representation, for all three are always being profoundly shaped by the workings of power.” Essentially, this trope of separation presents itself through the spatial tensions between continuous and fragmented spaces. This tension becomes prevalent repeatedly, in a number of ways, but strengthens the divisive politics of the conflict ethos.

2.1.1 Spatial Stratification in Nicosia and Baghdad during 2003-2011

In Cyprus, tensions between Turkish and Greek Cypriots have not always been completely exacerbated simply by authorities in power. Historically, the city has been divided into a Turkish north, and a Greek south. This division has been upheld mostly, with the exceptions of Turkish enclave to the south, and one Greek enclave in the north as well as Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, and mixed villages were scattered throughout the rest of the island, both in the north and south. Turkish settlers originally arrived in the north from the Turkish mainland, while Greek Cypriots were concentrated in the south, near the Archbishop of the Orthodox Church was built. The riverbed of the Pedieos River reinforced the divide between these two communities and these riverbed streets formed the east-west route from Paphos Gate to Famagusta Gate, connecting the city. In this sense, natural geography as well as communal ties served as factors for socio-spatial differentiation. However, the riverbed streetscape offered space for Cypriots from both sides of the city to come together until exacerbation of ethnic tensions by the British colonial presence transformed these “spaces of cooperation to lines of division.” Today, the riverbed streets offer a different function as the route of the buffer zone and effectively partition the city.31

In 1958, the first divisions of Nicosia were instituted by a wire fence and became permanent with the Turkish invasion when separation became permanent. During the 16th century Venetian period, the initial planning of the capital as a walled city based the master plan based on an ideal form, however, the division distorted its natural geometries and the city center developed into two peripheries, which fractured further. Suburbanization became popular as the conflict and division displaced more residents from the old city and new neighborhoods gained momentum in development. Despite the rehabilitation of the old city, opinions are still widely split, however, Nicosia has developed a distinct migrant population with 80% Turks in the north and 55% migrant population mainly from countries in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe,32 challenging the binary in Greek and Turkish Cypriot spaces as well as the island’s historical narrative and memory of these two parties alone.

In Baghdad, a similar practice of physical separation was present, as walls became a fixture 30 Soja, Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places, 87.

31 "Nicosia," Conflict in Cities and the Contested State, 2007, accessed April 01, 2015, http://www.conflictincities. org/Nicosia.html.

32 Ibid 31.

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of the landscape after the U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003. These security walls often stretched miles in length and developed into a series of “green zones.”33 The goal to build these isolated enclaves within the city was to corral ethnic groups and prevent sectarian violence and while, volatility did seem to settle in many neighborhoods, these concrete walls “spread all over the streets, blocking alleys, removing corridors, amputating thoroughfares, choking public space.”34 Neighborhoods like Adhamiyah, a Sunni enclave, and Abu Nawas were surrounded with mile long walls, isolated from the remainder of the city and patrolled by U.S. funded private security firms. While the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign provided an air of calm in the war- torn city, it also introduced levels of segregation previously unknown.

Various neighborhoods within the city such as Adel, Ameriyah, Ghazaliya, and Jamiaa, which were considered a hotbed of activity for Sunni insurgents and Al Qaeda-linked fighters, were ringed with concrete walls at least 12-feet high, resembling other neighborhoods in the west and south of the city.

Northeast Baghdad and down the Canal Street expressway, miles of 6-foot- high walls ring neighborhoods like Jamila, Jazayer, and Ur on the edge of the predominantly Shiite slum of Sadr City. The idea of protective zones is spreading to the city center. Large segments of the main market, Shorja, were surrounded by blast walls and guarded entry points. However, the divides across the city enforce not only separation of neighborhoods as well as the fragmentation of the urban fabric, they result from the impositions of a foreign authority and mimic almost colonial interactions.35 In fact, many of the blast walls were built without local consult or approval and in some cases, in complete objection to the opinions of the Iraqi PM.36 In essence, “Actions like these make it more and more apparent how the military is capable of engineering spaces of conflict; their walls and checkpoints not only produce conflict zones, but exacerbate them once they already exist.”37 Spaces shaped by power often do not understand the intricacies of those within them and therefore, create tensions for the collective, rather than assisting them.

2.1.2 Socio-Spatial Divisions in the West Bank and Jerusalem

Perhaps, the most salient example of socio-spatial divisions can be understood through the delineation between Israel and the occupied territories within the context of the conflict, specifically the distinctions not only between the two spaces, but also within them such Areas A, B, C of the West Bank.

Area A comprises about 18% of all West Bank territory and falls under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Area B includes approximately 22% of the total territory and consists of mostly rural lands. Although the PA maintains transferred control of civil matters in the area, Israel retains security control of the area. Finally, Area C is the large administrative zone, consisting of 60% of all West Bank territory. In Area C, Israel maintains almost complete control with authority on security, civil, land-related matters, which include land allocations, planning and construction and infrastructure building. Although 33 Bryan Finoki, "Subtopia: A New Multiplicitous Wall Regime," Subtopia, December 11, 2007, accessed February 24, 2015, http://subtopia.blogspot.ae/2007/12/new-multiplicitous-wall-regime.html.

34 Ibid.

35 Sam Dagher, "Baghdad Safer, but It's a Life behind Walls," The Christian Science Monitor, December 10, 2007, accessed March 15, 2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1210/p01s04-wome.html.

36 Bryan Finoki, "Subtopia: Border to Border, Wall to Wall, Fence to Fence," Subtopia, April 24, 2007, accessed February 23, 2015, http://subtopia.blogspot.ae/2007/04/border-to-border-wall-to-wall-fence37 Ibid.

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the Palestinian Authority remains responsible for providing services to populations in this area, such as healthcare and education, Israeli authorities control and maintain the construction of any mechanisms necessary to deliver these services. Other civil matters also fall under Israeli jurisdiction, specifically the Civil Administration put in place.38

Area C is also the location of all 125 Israeli settlements, many of which began as illegal settlement outposts in the mid-1990s, but were later established and legitimized with the encouragement and assistance of state authorities in Area C. The exact demographic composition of Area C is unknown, but by the end of 2011, there were at least 325,00 settlers living in Area C settlements and according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), about 300,000 Palestinian residents. The Israeli restrictions have a forced a state of arrested development on Palestinians as policies limiting settlement and construction force many to live in substandard conditions. Many are faced with the constant threat of demolition of “illegal” structures as there serves no legal avenue to build homes and consequently, develop a communal Palestinian space.39

Similarly, other urban areas caught between the conflicting Israeli/Palestinian divide and are developed displaying patterns of segregation and ethnic fragmentation by the national classification, but also within it. Oren Yiftachel describes these settings as “urban ethnocracies,” where “tensions characterize the interaction between a city’s economic, planning and ethno- territorial logics, producing sites of conflict and instability and essentializing the boundaries of group identities and the zero sum nature of ethnic geographies.”40

Jerusalem, or Al-Quds, supports this notion of urban ethnocracy, as much of the urban planning and strategy of the city has aimed to navigate the various religious and political claims made by various groups. Under the mandatory period of British rule, Arab- Jewish clashes were frequent within the city and further exacerbated by the any religious interests in the city. The 1947 British forfeiture of its mandate Palestine eventually led to UN intervention and the subsequent development of a partition plan drawn up by the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The plan followed a two-state solution and designated international sovereignty in Jerusalem.41 Between infighting among residents of the city quarters and the looming expiration of British authority, the plan for partition was not enacted. Instead, the state of Israel was established the following year, spurring the 1948 War between Israel and the Arab coalition. The end of the war left Jerusalem divided, with Jordanian authority in the east and Israeli rule in the west, contributing to a pattern of uneven development across the city. The boundaries of Jerusalem were not remapped again until 1967 during the Six Day War. Israeli forces captured East Jerusalem and removed all previous walls and fences dividing the city. The post-war city emerged as a “unified” Jerusalem under the 38 "Area C," B'Tselem - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, May 18, 2014, accessed March 3, 2015, http://www.btselem.org/area_c/what_is_area_c.

39 Ibid.

40 Oren Yiftachel and Haim Yacobi, "Barriers, Walls, and Urban Ethnocracy in Jerusalem," in City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism, by Philipp Misselwitz and Tim Rieniets (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2006), 172.

41 Reyner, Anthony S., and Jane Philips. "Jerusalem: A Factual Background." JSTOR. (Spring 1975), p.

329-330. Accessed 10 December 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671587.

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rule of the Israeli state and has continued to grow under its authority until today.42

This self-described unification has been enforced by the large Israeli military capacity, as well as its relative economic power to negotiate boundaries and shift populations within the city to suit the state’s purposes. Yiftachel supports this by identifying two complementary Israeli strategies that have allowed Jewish residency to flourish in Jerusalem and Palestinian development to be confined. In East Jerusalem, there has been a massive amount of construction for the creation of an “outer ring of Jewish settlements or neighborhoods,” which currently houses over half of the city’s Jewish residents. However, Palestinian neighborhoods lack consistent access to basic utilities or infrastructure and development is frequently challenged with the denial of municipal building permits, demolitions, and restricted mobility. Beyond physical structures, urban spatial practices such as the location of residential areas and certain access roads are carried out strategically, so as to form mechanisms for segregation and separation. The Palestinian city is then characterized by a sense of stagnation and a distinct lack of growth, leaving many with no space for progress or innovation.43

The role of the wall in Jerusalem intensifies the effects of separation by concretizing the isolation of the population and exacerbating boundaries along ethnic groups. Not only does the wall include the illegally annexed areas from 1967, but also “neighborhoods” constructed outside municipal boundaries and settlements such as Maa’ale Addumim. However, the strategic planning and construction of the wall excludes Palestinian-dominant areas, such as the Shufat refugee camp or the villages of Anata and Kufr Aqab. This spatial practice will in fact manipulate the demographics of the city to significantly reduce the Palestinian population under the jurisdiction of the city municipality.44

Abu Dis, a suburb of East Jerusalem, served as a primary target of the “creeping apartheid” the Israeli state promulgates with the construction of the wall. In 2003, Israel began building from the southeast of Jerusalem, in the village of Der Salah, up into Abu Dis and east into the village of Azeriya. In Abu Dis, walls partition the center of town and afford the majority of its residents a higher degree of access with Israeli IDs, but also separate families from their homes and relatives. This has effectively pushed for the demolitions of homes in its route. The urban fabric of the city has disintegrated significantly as well, with attendance at Al-Quds University in Abu Dis falling, businesses closing, and unemployment on the rise.45

Jerusalem’s spaces are not only influenced at its borders and boundaries. Rather, the portrayal of its urban fabric and streetscape has been long disputed since the time of the British mandate. The Israeli presence in Jerusalem is not only limited by the expansion and delineation of the new city, but also the contentious space within the old city walls as well.

2.2 Freedom of Movement

The restriction of movement can additionally affect the complete accessibility of space and further fragment the landscape. Often, within urban environments the freedom of movement is focused on as walkability, engaging the concepts of proximity, accessibility, and connectivity. Within the socio42 Ibid 330-31.

43 Yiftachel and Yacobi, "Barriers, Walls, and Urban Ethnocracy in Jerusalem," in City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism, 172.

44 Ibid 173.

45 Ibid 175.

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economic and cultural context of spatiality, human movement can be approached as mobility; ultimately, showing everyday human movement is a result of social production.46

2.2.1 Checkpoints and Enclaves: Restrictions of Mobility in Nicosia and 2003-2011 Baghdad

In 1882, the British connected the new city of Nicosia to the old through the construction of Eleftheria (Freedom) Square. Subsequently, Ledra Street, a commercial thoroughfare, developed off the square running north to south. Today, midway down Ledra Street is the Lokmaci Checkpoint, which open in the Spring 2008 and is the only checkpoint in the old city. The opening of Lokmaci made a significant impact by shrinking the de facto Buffer Zone, as it integrated and linked commercial areas in the north and the south on Ledra Street. However, the checkpoint itself is a disruptive mechanism: a single shopping trip up and down Ledra will require an individual not only to travel with official documents, passport and ID, but also encounter the boundary several times in a day. Althoughmovement and mobility are not restricted for residents and visitors, it is monitored and policed at Lokmaci checkpoint, creating implications for the interactions of the city-dweller with the space around them and, ultimately, questioning their ability to access it.47

Similar implications can be explored in the context of military urbanism in 2003-2011 Baghdad, where the U.S. constructed blast walls simulated an identical disruptive influence for Baghdadis. Walls not only restrict definitions of space, but the people in and outside of them. As many neighborhoods transformed into walled enclaves, residents were forced to re-organize their daily lives and, in resignation of these permanent fixtures, make semblances to carry on despite them.

The disruption of daily lives is only one facet of the fortification of Baghdad’s neighborhoods.

Patrolled by Humvees and US-funded private security companies, the examples of Baghdad display a distinct element of surveillance and policing in civilian life, simulating imprisonment and oppression. The incarceration of spaces was reinforced daily by both Iraqi army soldiers and U.S. troops conducting searches of vehicles or monitoring shops, residents and visitors.48 This biopolitical component of checkpoints, which acts as the state’s political determination of physical bodies through space, parallels examples in various contexts. Once again, they complicate understandings of space for the individual by limiting availability and accessibility.

2.2.2 Checkpoints and Barriers: Restricting Movement in Israel-Palestine

In Israel, international human rights law requires the state to respect the right of residents of the Occupied Territories to move freely. This right is recognized in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Freedom of movement is also a prerequisite for the exercise of other rights outlined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, such as the right to work (Article 6), the right to an adequate 46 Aga Skorupka, "Wayfinding, Movement, and Mobility," The People Place and Space Reader, 2014, accessed January 28, 2015, http://peopleplacespace.org/frr/wayfinding-movement-and-mobility/.

47 "Nicosia," Conflict in Cities and the Contested State, http://www.conflictincities.org/Nicosia.html.

48 Sam Dagher, "Baghdad Safer, but It's a Life behind Walls," The Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor. com/2007/1210/p01s04-wome.html.

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standard of living (Article 11), the right to health (Article 12), the right to education (Article 13), and the right to protection of family life (Article 10).49 Instead, closures, checkpoints, and biometric cards control this right. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has restricted movement since 1967 and although a prevalent policy during the First Intifada, it became a fixture of the territory in the 1990s.50

Although in 2009, Israel made official reductions of their official checkpoints, the numbers are still significant and tend to fluctuate relative to the day and hour. As B’tselem reports, “These restrictions reflect Israel’s approach over the years that freedom of movement is not a right, but a privilege that Israel may grant or deny as it sees fit.”51

While settlers are able to travel unrestricted, Palestinians are often forced to circumnavigate certain routes and use alternative roads with the denial of access to main highways in the territory such as portions of Route 60 and Route 443. The fragmented Palestinian access allows Israel to retain control in areas with vested interests, such as East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley areas west of the wall, and settlements in Hebron. Everyday life for Palestinians is mostly characterized by a constant state of uncertainty as the restrictions on mobility make activities, such as going to work or school and visiting family, difficult.

Additionally, Palestinians’ travel between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is also restricted.52

Certain spatial practices such as the construction of the wall has further limited mobility and movement. The wall disconnects thousands of individuals from their livelihoods by cutting access to their agricultural property, adversely affecting a major sector of the economy. Villages are often isolated by restricted access to advanced medical treatment and higher education as well.53 Checkpoints are, in their frequency and function, a staple characteristic of the fractured landscape. Most checkpoints were established after the peace process of the 1990s, using the security rhetoric as justification.54 However, they have changed over time and what might have appeared overnight as a temporary roadblock often transforms into a passage lined with concrete blocks and CCTV surveillance. In 2000, the Qalandia checkpoint sprung up between the central road between Jerusalem and Ramallah. Rapidly, it evolved from a small earth mound, to a watchtower and fence, until it became a central crossing point between Israel and the West Bank. However, not all checkpoints evolved into such fixtures in the landscape and often, the materiality of the barriers is varied in placement and function. At times, they simply manifest as “flying checkpoints,” where Israeli soldiers check IDs atop a moving tank or control towers, metal turnstiles or cement blocks on traffic roads.55 49 “Restriction on Movement," B'Tselem - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement.

50 Helga Tawil-Souri, "Qalandia Checkpoint as Space and Nonplace," Space and Culture 14, no. 1 (2011): 8-9, accessed March 2, 2015, doi:10.1177/1206331210389260.

51 “Restriction on Movement," B'Tselem - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement.

52 Ibid.

53 "Separation Barrier," B'Tselem - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, January 1, 2011, accessed March 3, 2015, http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier.

54 Helga Tawil-Souri, "Qalandia Checkpoint as Space and Nonplace," Space and Culture 14, no. 1 (2011):

6, accessed March 2, 2015, doi:10.1177/1206331210389260.

55 Ibid 8-9.

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The interstitial formation of these sites of restriction reflects many aspects of Palestinian life through isolation on the individual and collective scale. Qalandia resembles many other mechanisms of spatial stratification that “immobilize (subaltern) populations” such as the border zones and checkpoints in Cyprus, Iraq as well as the U.S.-Mexico border, but also less politicized forms such as gated communities, ghettoes and reservations.56 However, Qalandia and Palestinian checkpoints are unique in one sense in that they are not only instruments of spatial manipulation, but also create a sense of temporal nonsequentiality.

This makes any sort of mapping exercise obsolete because what may be one day may be different another, continually reinforcing “the transience of the Palestinian experience, its individual and collective vulnerability and dislocation.”57

In addition to restricting movement, checkpoints contribute to the fragmentation of the West Bank space and act as apparatuses to implement the spatial politics at play in conflict. They act as the mechanisms of Israeli occupation and are the “extension of the Judaization and militarization of Palestinian land.” They contribute to the neo-colonial endeavor of the Zionist expansionary project and manifest in tandem with the wall, restricted access roads, closure policies, and bureaucratic controls such as travel permits and IDs as well as land confiscation, as tools of oppression. As Helga Tawil-Soury describes in her scholarship on the West Bank territory and the Qalandia checkpoint, “The colonialist advantages of the pass and closure system were elaborated with time as it transformed from an ad hoc military-bureaucratic measure into a fully conscious Israeli strategy with a clear political goal: “separation between the two peoples with an appearance of political separation, but with only one government—Israel—having any effective power to shape the destinies of both.”58 The hegemony of the Israeli state is continuously exerted over the Palestinian geography and attempts to physically remind the Palestinian nation of their subjugated position through the ability to isolate lands and segregate and fragment.

2.3 Encroaching on Space and Expressions of Dominance

The erection of the wall within the West Bank territory and the annexation of Jewish neighborhoods outside of Jerusalem has allowed more than half a million Israelis to live over the Green Line. The settlement and outposts together control approximately 42 percent of the total territory— and they have been enabled to do so through state legitimation. A distorted interpretation of Ottoman Land Laws and the concept of “state land” have allowed the allocation of various tracts of land to be used for settlement, primarily through seizures of property through 1979- 1992 as well as the recognized private property of Palestinians. Israel also extended certain economic benefits and incentives to settlements and settlers to encourage their growth and development. Most West Bank settlements hold a National Priority Area A status, which enables them to qualify for benefits: in housing, through the sale of inexpensive units with subsidized mortgages; in education, which include free tuition, extended school days, free school transport, and higher salaries for teachers; in industry and agriculture, provided by grants and subsidies; 56 Ibid at 13-16.

57 Ibid 19.

58 Ibid 6.

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and in taxation, through taxes significantly lower than in communities inside the Green Line, and aid to cover deficits. The settlement project not only violates Palestinian human rights, but also infringes on the spatial integrity of the Palestinian territory. It pilfers Palestinian lands, prevents the urban development of Palestinian communities, denies a contiguous Palestinian territory through the establishment of enclaves, and limits the mobility within the space, fracturing the landscape and establishing tangible and intangible divisions.59

The creation of enclaves strategically cuts off entire swaths of land and people from the collective and, in effect, leads to the creation of an incarcerated space. Foucault’s writings on power portray relations not simply as a single force used by a sovereign actor upon subjects who are submissive to it. For Foucault, power is diffusive in a series of complex and diverse networks. Power in this context is not simply seen in repressive forms associated with a sovereign state power, but also present in other sites within the social body. This form of power, based on the notion of surveillance, is present in various instances in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Jeremy Bentham’s model of the panoptic prison incorporates Foucault’s ideas of scrutiny and examination.

Bentham’s Panopticon was designed to always be able to watch inmate behavior, specifically to allow “it possible for the observer in the tower to see without being seen” (Hirst 169). The panoptic arrangement present in the prison supports the idea of surveillance and control Foucault describes as part of disciplinary power, but both align to Weizmann’s politics of verticality as both concentrate on this theme of surveillance. Paul Hirst writes, “At the most fundamental level, basic geographical distinctions like land and sea or steppe and sown do have effects on institutions and social practices…”60 The mountainous topography of the West Bank puts this idea into practice as one can see the presence of many Israeli settlements that are built on advantageous and strategic locations on the hilltops of the area. Eyal Weizmann compares their construction to the Crusader fortifications of the Latin Kingdom and elaborates to say, “…the form of the mountain settlements is constructed according to a geometric system that unites the effectiveness of sight with spatial order, producing ‘panoptic fortresses’, generating gazes to many different ends. Control – in the overlooking of Arab town and villages; strategy – in the overlooking of main traffic arteries; self-defence – in the overlooking of the immediate surroundings and approach roads. Settlements could be seen as urban optical devices for surveillance and the exercise of power.”61

Weizmann accurately summarizes the politicized spatial ordering of the West Bank in relation to the settlements and Palestinian enclaves as well as the specific military objectives to control and be surveillant of the population, once again segregating the Palestinians from Israelis under the rhetoric of security. The built structures very much reflect the political and ideological structures of the region as seen in the setting of Hebron.

2.4 Spaces of Resistance 59 Eyal Hareuveni, By Hook and By Crook: Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank, publication (B'Tselem - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 2010), 5.

60 Hirst, Space and Power: Politics, War, and Architecture, 3.

61 Eyal Weizmann, "Optical Urbanism," OpenDemocracy, April 26, 2002, accessed November 28, 2014, https:// www.opendemocracy.net/ecology-politicsverticality/article_804.jsp.

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Resistance is often considered a threat to hegemony and in the Foucauldian model, the diffusive nature of power allows for a nebulous expression of resistance to oppose it. With little economic sustainability or financial capital, Palestinian investment into constructing spaces is minimal. Largely, spaces of resistance are concentrated in the form of places of commemoration, which showcase the marginalized Palestinian narrative and collective memory. They oppose the “institutional forms of architecture, construction, and remembrance” in Israel and in this way, Palestinian space is further limited as it is not generated and informed freely, but rather by the forces that oppose and oppress it.

In Kafr Qasim, a Palestinian center within the boundaries of Israel, the presence of memorials, museums, and commemorative holidays makes the recollection of the Palestinian narrative prominent.

It seeks to capture the Palestinian national experience to remember for the collective nation, but also, to embody in materiality as inheritance for successive generations.62

However, spaces of resistance are not limited to Palestinian actors in Israel. Today, various populations in Israel are much more diversified and prominent against the traditional European Jewish appearance of the country with Indian and Ethiopian Jewry, Filipino migrants, and African asylum seekers and refugees.63 Initially, migrant labor was introduced when security concerns due to the first and second intifadas prevented Palestinians from entering Israel. By 2011, there were nearly 35,000 non-Jewish African migrants living in Israel, the majority Eritrean and Sudanese (92% of 54,000 asylum seekers in Israel today come from Eritrea and Sudan as well.)64

Both these populations are affected by the 1954 Prevention of Infiltration Law, which was written to address security and other concerns about Arabs trying to cross the border into Israel. In January 2012, the Israeli Knesset amended the law and legalized imposing penalties on those who illegally enter, which include economic migrants, but also refugees seeking protection from persecution. The penalties included a 3-year imprisonment, now revised to 1-year mandatory detention, while also including indefinite detention of those who cannot be refouled.65

The Israeli High Court of Justice has recently put an end to old legislation concerning detention and imprisonment of asylees, demanding the release of thousands. The state has taken considerable time in releasing individuals, but also has quickly turned around to prepare new legislation announcing an “open facility.” However, the facility effectively serves as a de facto prison, as it will be managed by the Israel Prisons Authority and follow regulations employed in the penal system as well. According to the bill, detainees will be required to check in three times daily and leaving the facility for more than 48 hours will 62 Waleed Khleif and Susan Slyomovics, "Palestinian Remembrance Days and Plans: Kafr Qasim, Fact and Echo," ed. Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi, in Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 186-189.

63 My experience with these populations was primarily introduced through my experiential learning placement with Physicians for Human Right-Israel in the Migrants and Refugees Department. Through this position, I conducted research on the ongoing legal proceedings surrounding the imprisonment of asylum seekers and refugees, progressing my knowledge on the region beyond the immediate conflict.

64 Rebecca Furst-Nichols, Reports and Information Sheets African Migration to Israel: Debt, Employment and Remittances, report (Tel Aviv: Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, 2011).

65 Reuven Ziegler, The New Amendment to the 'Prevention of Infiltration' Act: Defining Asylum-Seekers as Criminals, issue brief (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute., 2012).

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require a special permit. The facility’s location also leaves it isolated in the Negev, close to only the closed detention facility, “Saharonim,” where asylees are currently held.66

A Human Rights Watch publication writes, “In several sweeps during late February and early March 2008, immigration police in Tel Aviv and Arad arrested and detained over 300 asylum seekers and migrants, even entering three privately operated shelters without warrants.”67 These intense practices reinforce state politics to reinforce the divide between its citizen population and the “infiltrators,” but the most decisive measure underpinning this motive is the construction of the “security fence” along the IsraelEgypt border.

Regardless, these populations carry on in their distinctive neighborhoods, for example, in South Tel Aviv. The neighborhood of Shapira, surrounding the New Central Bus Station, presents a complete anomaly in the Tel Aviv urban fabric as it is occupied by asylum seekers, refugees and migrants from every demographic. The area itself is a spatial void on the periphery of the city, transitioning to more industrial areas and characterized by a lower socio-economic class. However, it is also a reclaimed space as the newly constructed Central Bus Station, which the city invested millions of shekels in, went bankrupt.

After the failure of this project, Shapira no longer holds appeal for investment and development, but for these marginalized populations it is a vibrant center of cultural diffusion and exchange, marked with spaces for impromptu Hebrew classes, butcher shops with pork products, and restaurants with authentic Ethiopian cuisine.68

Part III: Commemorative Imaginings in Space: The Role of Power in Historical Narratives and Collective Memories

3.1 Intersections in Space: Memory, Narrative, and Identity

As space is infused with meaning to become a place, the conception of identity is also present.

Place and identity interweave and once again, there is a simultaneously production of both as individuals and groups shape their surroundings and their surroundings shape them. Narratives form memories of those spaces (places) and the relationship between place and identity is inextricable from the process of identity formation itself as it influences social formations, cultural practices and political actions. Environmental and social psychologists, Harold M. Proshansky, Abbe K. Fabian and Robert Kaminoff, have argued for a similar concept termed, place identity, which functions as the “sub-structure of a person’s self- identity, and consists of knowledge and feelings developed through everyday experiences of physical spaces.”69 Place 66 Reuven Ziegler, The Prevention of Infiltration (Amendment No. 4) Bill: A Malevolent Response to the Israeli Supreme Court Judgment, issue brief (Interest Group on Migration and Refugee Law. European Society for International Law, 2013).

67 Bill Van Esveld, Sinai Perils: Risks to Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers in Egypt and Israel, report (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2008), 85.

68 Based on the observations and informal research during my own study away experience in Tel Aviv during my junior year.

69 Harold H. Proshansky, Abbe K. Fabian, and Robert Kaminoff, "Place-Identity: Physical Socialization of the Self" (2014), in The People, Place, and Space Reader, ed. Jen Jack. Gieseking and William Mangold (Routledge, 2014), 73.

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identity develops as spaces provide a sense of belonging, foster attachments, and convey meaning. Place identity as well as other theories of human- environment relations such Irwin Altman and Setha Low’s concept of place attachment, which theorizes on the connections people make to various places and the consequential effects of these connections on identity, place making, and perception.70

3.1 Hebron: Separate Spaces and Divergences in Memory

The history of the Hebron, for example, is marked with violence and bloodshed. In August 1929, 67 Jews were massacred, and British authorities evacuated the remaining Jewish population during the 1936 Arab Revolt. Following the War of 1948, Hebron became part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Israeli authorities then later annexed the city when they came to control the West Bank after the Six Day War of 1967.

The Israeli government was pressured to allow Jewish individuals to return but refused. However, in 1968, a group of Israelis made their way to the city to celebrate the Passover festival. After negotiations with the Israeli army, they left the city with a compromise to camp on the hills on the outskirts. In 1971, this camp soon grew and was established as one of the most significant Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Kiryat Arba, and the city of Hebron remained free of a Jewish presence at this time. In 1979, another group of women and children travelled back into the city and established themselves in Beit Hadassah building.

This led to more negotiations between settlers and the Israeli government, which ended soon after a group of Yeshiva students visiting the women were ambushed on Shabbat. With six young men killed, the Israeli government allowed the construction of settlement within the city of Hebron. In 1994, Baruch Goldstein, a Kiryat Arba settler killed 29 Muslim worshippers in the Ibrahimi Mosque, further exacerbating tensions in the city. The 1993 Oslo Accord and the Hebron Agreement of 1997 leaves 80% of the city (H1) under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and the remaining 20% (H2) guarded by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).71

This “principle of separation” has held an insurmountable effect on the character of the city as well as the presence of an unwanted military rule. It becomes necessary to deter any challenge to the existing order and to impose a sense of authority and control over the population, which does not distinguish between individuals who intend to do harm and the innocent. This manifests in a series of privacy breaches for Palestinians who live in H2, and again upholds the sense of control necessary to maintain authority.72

The divide of the city has informed the character of the city to include multiple narratives.

Although identity is fiercely prescribed by the divide, boundaries cut across areas, creating a complex space that is ambiguous and changing, but also, perceived in a variety of ways. In Hebron, the narratives of the settler and Palestinian inhabits the same space and time, but the city highlights them differently.73 “The

70 Ibid 72-74.

71 Richard Clarke, "Self-presentation in a Contested City: Palestinian and Israeli Political Tourism in Hebron," Anthropology Today 16, no. 5 (2000): 13-15, doi:10.1111/1467-8322.t01-1-00024.

72 Breaking the Silence: Soldiers' Testimonies from Hebron, 2008-2010, 3-5.

73 Clarke, "Self-presentation in a Contested City: Palestinian and Israeli Political Tourism in Hebron,"

Anthropology Today, 14.

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principle of separation”74 has in effect, also separated space and time that change view and perspective.

The marketplace of Hebron is illustrative of this fact. The Israeli settlers take in the view of the Palestinians in the market below, while Palestinians glance to see the settlers and soldiers above. The architecture of the city informs the politics of the Hebron as much as the politics of the Hebron has informed the architecture of the city.75

3.1.2 Conflicting Narratives in Nicosia

Similarly, the city of Nicosia has a long history as a capital of the island Cyprus, serving as the central node for the imperial authority for the Lusignans, Venetians, Ottomans, and the British. Today, the city is caught between two as the capital city of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) in the south as well as the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC). In 1925, Cyprus officially became a Crown colony after the decline of the Ottoman Empire, and remained one until its independence in 1960. Under British administration, the two ethnic groups were educated in separate systems of education, perpetuating ethnic differences over generations. The Greek Cypriot system stressed Hellenism, following the Greek nationalist discourse of Enosis, or union with Greece. In the context of the island’s colonial history, Archbishop Makarios at the head of the EOKA movement, the National Organization of Cypriot fighters, and its military force, pursued Enosis as “an anti-colonial movement” from 1955-59. Conversely, the Turkish minority, which was 18% of the island’s population, favored taksim which is partition of the island to align with national narratives in Turkey.76

After independence, negotiations between the two groups were nearly impossible and tensions culminated eventually to violence in Kanlı Noel, or the 1963 Bloody Christmas, and the subsequent separation of the two communities. From 1963 to 1974, violence and insecurity forced Turkish Cypriots into isolated enclaves in northern Nicosia, or Lefkoşa in Turkish.

The division of Nicosia became permanent with the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 as a Greek right wing military junta government staged a coup in Cyprus, overthrowing Archbishop Makarios to install a pro-Enosis puppet regime. Turkey occupied 37% of the island, establishing the Green Line, which divides the walled city of Nicosia in half. The TRNC was declared a sovereign republic in 1983 but has never been recognized by any other country than Turkey.77 The socio-spatial differentiation not only creates a dichotomized understanding of space, but also allows for spaces for historical narrative and recollection to diverge. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot strongholds are effective enclaves within the city, promoting a binary in the island’s historical trajectory. However, displacement of Cypriots from both sides informs the resident’s conception of island geography and while the line may delineate where they cannot go, it does not affect what they can remember. Displaced families from the seaside town of Famagusta have commemorated the event in the form of a museum adjacent to the town, behind barbed wire and try to keep this history of Greek Cypriots from the north of the island alive.

74 Breaking the Silence: Soldiers' Testimonies from Hebron, 2008-2010, 3-5.

75 Clarke, "Self-presentation in a Contested City: Palestinian and Israeli Political Tourism in Hebron,"

Anthropology Today, 16.

76 "Nicosia," Conflict in Cities and the Contested State, http://www.conflictincities.org/Nicosia.html.

77 Ibid.

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Spaces of representation are also revisited as the nature of the city itself forces residents from both sides to travel across the Green Line and UN Buffer Zone several times a day to visit work and school. While in many ways, the boundary enforces the divide and the simplistic fracture of the city, it also complicates the reality of the people who live here, by creating an ambiguity similar to that of Hebron.

3.2 Transmissions in Space: Mediating Historical Narrative into Collective

The symbolic characteristics of space allow what Pierre Nora labeled ‘lieu de memoire’ as they incorporate temporality to locales by “their ability to embody the past and stimulate remembering in fixed locales.”78 The relationship of place formation of identity is informed largely by memory as it the source of mediation between the attachment and connections made in space. Memory functions as a “spatialisation of the past to construct identity and shape interpretation.”79 As Eviatar Zerubavel demonstrates in Time Maps, there are considerable structural qualities to the construction of collective memory. He identifies how the past is organized in our minds and elaborate how “one of the most remarkable features of human memory is our ability to mentally transform essentially unstructured series of events into seemingly coherent historical narrative.”80 Constructing these links between seemingly discontinuous links to form a story then allows from a “strictly formal narratological perspective” to approach memory by examining the “structure of collective narration of the past as we examine the structure of any fictional story.”81 However, these sorts of narratives of the past are found in the recollections commonly shared by a group as acquiring a group’s memories and identifying with their collective past is the process of acquiring a social identity. As an Israeli author, Zerubavel roots his identity in experience through his personal subscription to the Zionist narrative, which is founded in recollecting the European Jewish history often in the terms of persecution and victimhood.82 Individual memory, then, is unreliable as it cannot transmit any knowledge of time in the past, making historical narrative only transmissible to the collective.

It is this quality that allows the politicization of recollection as often it is political organizations that impose narratives in memory to control and set the standards of society. In this sense, those who have the capacity to control the meaning of space and create place, yield power and authority and maintain it through the transmission of a historical narrative in collective memory.83

Often those in power employ cognitive mechanisms, which will support narrative, through the various understandings of space as categorized by Lefebvre. A few examples include the use of a geographical place as setting for a singular event within the narrative as seen by the Israeli commemoration at the site of Masada, or the representation of objects such as souvenirs, photos, relics and other memorabilia.

78 Sara McDowell and Máire Braniff, "Landscapes of Commemoration: The Relationship between Memory, Place, and Space," in Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes (Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 14.

79 Ibid 14.

80 Eviatar Zerubavel, Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 13.

81 Ibid 13.

82 Ibid 3.

83 McDowell and Braniff, "Landscapes of Commemoration: The Relationship between Memory, Place, and Space," in Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes, 14.

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These items are often catalogued and curated in the two major museums of Jerusalem, Yad Vashem, the Holocaust memorial, and the Israel Museum, the national institute of history, art and the state. Imitation and replication also become relevant in connecting space and time as they draw on production of the past to reproduce and represent a new meaning in the present such as the use of a great architectural style.

Symbols may be infused and re-infused with new meaning, but they can also be seen as seen as transhistorical as they retain significance through time.84

Tangible and intangible representations create “material landscapes of memorialization,” which are meant to enhance collective identity and solidarity, but can also reinforce the division and territoriality present in conflict.85 Systems of socio-spatial exclusion include spatial practices that establish physical structures that create enclosures with policed entry and exit, employ surveillance strategies, and property seizures that strategically fragment the continuity of landscape, while also incorporating symbols which realistically cannot appeal to everyone. By fact, these systems are exclusionary and are exacerbated in conflict as they reference the underlying structural racism, sexism and classism that permeate contemporary society. They also portray the territorial conflict ethos, defined by the protracted political struggle for space and sovereignty.86 Essentially the making of place, the writing of its historical narrative, and the recollection of it in memory show an intricate struggle over what story is privileged and to what ends. To understand this further, power relations become essential, as does the individual setting to contextualize these ideas.

3.3 Convergence of Space, Memory, and Narrative in Collective National Identity

The creative ideologies underlying these processes are central to nationalist projects by governments or external powers as Benedict Anderson demonstrates in Imagined Communities. “ ‘Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.' The drawback to this formulation, however, is that Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'. In this way he implies that 'true' communities exist which can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations. In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”87

Anderson’s distinction between fabrication and creation of nations in conjunction with the work of Gellner becomes relevant in the imagination of Iraq. The formation of Iraq under the auspices of British colonialism was the creation of “a new entity on the world stage.”88 Its construction was done without thought to the various ethnic groups, tribal factions, diverse urban and rural communities spanning various economic 84 Zerubavel, Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past, 40-45.

85 McDowell and Braniff, “Introduction,” in Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes, 5-6.

86 Setha Low, "Spatializing Culture" (2014), in The People, Place, and Space Reader, ed. Jen Jack. Gieseking and William Mangold (Routledge, 2014), 73.

87 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 49.

88 Magnus T. Bernhardsson, "Visions of Iraq: Modernizing the Past in 1950s Baghdad," in Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century, ed. Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 81.

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statuses and participating in different historical accounts and memories. In a sense, the nationalist challenge at the state’s inception was significant, as it would serve as the effective glue to adhere these groups into one entity and foster a sense of belonging. To protect their interests, the puppet regime, backed by British officials, completed for the loyalties of the people to maintain authority and power in the new nation.

However, “Iraqi national identity has always been fluid, based on many competing even contradictory visions of what modern Iraq should be…Iraqis have defined their national identity by appealing to a broad spectrum of images, memories, dynasties, and histories.”89 The 1950s served as a period when one totalizing narrative was imposed on the state, manifesting especially in the capital of Baghdad. “Unlike nationalisms based on language or race, paradigmatic nationalism, inherently tied to the ideology of the government and changing with political winds, is more prone to vacillation and political manipulation.”90 The use of paradigmatic nationalism, or cultural nationalism allowed authorities to appeal to ethnic groups across Iraq, but also created the opportunity to highlight nationalist sentiment, belonging and loyalty differently among the population.91 The fluidity of this notion underlies a significant reality in Iraqi national identitythe instability and fluctuation, characteristics which also manifest in modern Iraqi architecture.”92

Oil revenues flooded into Iraq in the 1950s when the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) renegotiated its contract with the country. The Iraqi Development Board (IDB) became responsible for managing the new revenue for development purposes and allocated much of it on Baghdad to address the growing urban concerns as the population grew exponentially. Many British architects and foreign consultants submitted master plans for the city, including Walter Gropius, Alvar Aalto, and Frank Lloyd Wright. Wright’s plans for the city matched most closely with the nationalists at the time and drew inspiration for a modern Baghdad from Iraqi history. As opposed to other submissions, Wright plans were more Orientalist rather than International Style advocated for other Baghdad projects.93 However, all plans under IDB consideration were halted after the 1958 military coup under General Abd-al-Karim Qasem. Under Qasem, plans for the city diverted completely from those of the Hashemite monarchy as the regime developed other conceptions of the Iraqi nation and definitions of modernity. Other architects, such as Gropius and Le Corbusier, continued their Baghdad projects, but at this time Iraqi architecture was also developing and defining itself from within the country. Foreign influence and the agendas to encourage support of new authorities manifested once again with the U.S. invasion in 2003 and although the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign marked the landscape of Baghdad, leaving a legacy of segregative spatial practice, Baghdad will “once again be subject to ambitious reconstruction plans and extensive rebuilding” and “undergo a period of modernization and new urban design to bolster the powers of the

89 Ibid 82.

90 Ibid 83.

91 Magnus T. Bernhardsson, "The Sense of Belonging The Politics of Archaeology in Modern Iraq," in

Selective Remembrances: Archaeology in the Construction, Commemoration, and Consecration of National Pasts, by Philip L. Kohl, Mara Kozelsky, and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 191.

92 Bernhardsson, "Visions of Iraq: Modernizing the Past in 1950s Baghdad," in Modernism and the

Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century, 83.

93 Ibid 88-89.

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new government.”94

3.4 Archaeology and Ancient Spaces

The inventive and creative qualities referenced in the previous section also lead to the discussion of their legitimation. With conflicting historical accounts not only in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, but general incidents in world history the portrayal of narrative requires support beyond simple recollection.

It is often reinforced in the spatial realm by the establishment and distinction of certain places such as the excavation and development of ancient sites that signify a certain time-honored space. The archaeological element and return to the ancient introduces a temporal and historical component to spaces that allow them to retain foundational roles in the narrative and contribute to the collective memory of the people.

With the advent of modern forms, Baghdad did not lag behind and the city began forming in the style of nationalistic modern architecture, which drew upon for inspiration from the Iraqi past. The Islamic and pre-Islamic past was modernized and ancient forms and motifs put to use for the contemporary Iraqi nation” as “creative paradigms drawn from Iraq’s near and distant history. Reflecting the local environment and local traditions, this architecture was intended to convey a distinctly nationalist political and cultural spirit, while also embracing universal elements influenced by foreign techniques and trends.”95 With the fluid practice of paradigmatic nationalism, themes and images were drawn from the vague and changing notions of culture. Archaeology became the scientific basis for constructing the linear historical narrative and an important signifier in the inculcation of Iraqi identity.96

Using paradigmatic nationalism, Iraq sought to highlight how its ethnically diverse population was tied to the various peoples and periods of the country's recent and distant past. Archaeology provided the tools and justification for this claim, offering the government with a sense of legitimacy for its authority and policies. In essence, archaeology developed as a mechanism for unity and fostered a sense of belonging; however, the current state of the Iraqi landscape will require, once again, the need to reconstruct the nation and perhaps, will draw upon archaeological foundations as earlier governments. Administrations in power, such as those between 1936 and 1941 and between 1963 and 1968, emphasized archaeology and the historical narrative to link them to Iraq’s pan-Arab and pan-Islamic ties, expressly its prominence as the seat of the Abbassid Caliphate in the 9th century. Under Qasem and Saddam Hussein, archaeology supported Iraq’s unique particularity based on its specific pre-Islamic history as the site of the Babylonian, Akkadian, and Sumerian civilizations. While all these connections are valid, those in power highlighted them when it was relevant to their administration, totalizing restrictions on the definitions, identity, and history of Iraq.

However, a macro history of Iraq shows how governments have pursued different paradigms from history to define what it means to be Iraqi.97

Similarly, as the first waves of European Jewry flooded into Palestine, they arrived without the understanding that the land there was in use by others. Rather, this journey was seen as a return to something 94 Ibid 90-93.

95 Ibid 82-83.

96 Ibid 83.

97 Bernhardsson, "The Sense of Belonging The Politics of Archaeology in Modern Iraq," in Selective Remembrances: Archaeology in the Construction, Commemoration, and Consecration of National Pasts, 193-195.

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that has always been theirs—almost as if they had finally claimed a collective inheritance.98 The Zionist enterprise contributed to this ideological perspective and forged forward to cultivate a vision of a new home for the Jewish people. Religious texts created an image of this land, but the process of yediat ha’aretz, or “knowing the land” enhanced the personal experience of the land further for the new immigrants. The use of Hebrew played a significant role to assert authority and control through naming and identification of various parts of the country with the “biblical nomenclature, and designated settlements and streets with the names of events and personalities derived from ancient Hebrew and modern Jewish history.”99 The field of archaeology developed largely to contribute to the repossession of the land and “reshaping European Jews into authentic natives in a land they had known only in their imagination prior to emigration.”100 The Israeli Exploration Society (IES) became the prominent organization through which archaeology developed to enable the newly formed immigrant society. The IES held annual meetings around the country in major cities like Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, but also “frontier” communities on the periphery, drawing audiences peaking in the thousands. The Ministry of Education funded these events for many reasons, primarily serving as another means of yediat ha’aretz and to foster a sense of belonging and connection that was so sought after. Immigrants were able to learn more of the ancient history of the land, but more so “invited to see themselves as legitimate successors” to the county and its offerings.101

A significant site developed during the period of archaeological expansion under the auspices of the Israeli state is Masada. Historically, it is the last site of resistance for the Jewish zealots against the mighty Roman Empire, but as Said describes Masada, took on to mean more within the Israeli nation-building endeavor. “In time the actual place was the site of Israeli army ceremonies, a commemoration of Jewish heroism, as well as a commitment to present and future military skill. Thus was a dim, relatively unknown incident in the past reformulated consciously as a major episode in the nationalist program of a modern state; Masada became a potent symbol of the Israeli national narrative of struggle and survival.”102 The space of the ancient site aligned with the image an identity valued by the Zionist enterprise in the early years of state-building and even today, attracts many to participate in the constructed ancient and contemporary narrative as a popular national site.103 The archaeological endeavor was a strategic spatial practice as it uncovered spaces that could fit firmly into a historical narrative, and in the case of the Israeli endeavor and Zionist project, it reinforced a narrative leading from ancient times to the present. The immigration and

98 Michael Feige, "Identity, Ritual and Pilgrimage: The Meetings of the Israeli Exploration Society," in

Divergent Jewish Cultures: Israel and America, ed. Deborah Dash Moore and S. Ilan Troen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 9.

99 Deborah Dash Moore, "Introduction," ed. Deborah Dash Moore and S. Ilan Troen, introduction to

Divergent Jewish Cultures: Israel and America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001),10.

100 Ibid 10.

101 Ibid 10.

102 Edward W. Said, "Invention, Memory and Place," Critical Inquiry 26, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 186, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344120.

103 Deborah Dash Moore, "Introduction," ed. Deborah Dash Moore and S. Ilan Troen, introduction to

Divergent Jewish Cultures: Israel and America,10.

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settlement of Palestine were presented as a “culmination and logical outcome of history.”104

Today, archaeological excavations to establish similar connections between ancient spaces and the Israeli narrative are still present. The claims on the city of Jerusalem are consistently disputed, but Israel has maintained Jerusalem as its national capital since 1950 when the Knesset moved to the city.105 The Israeli presence in Jerusalem is not only limited to the new city but has managed to infiltrate the old city walls as well. The Temple Mount is the most contested space in Jerusalem and is the subject of vying claims of ownership and access. Underneath the Temple Mount complex is a flattened summit top filled with debris and sediment. Jewish faith believes the complex to stand above the ruins of the ancient temple compound as described in the Old Testament. The Western Wall, a retaining wall supporting the Temple Mount, is considered to be the exterior wall of the second temple of ancient times. At the top of the Temple Mount complex is the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock. With the intensity of political events in the area, the Temple Mount is often an additional arena for competing interests, and it reinforces the divide between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs.106

In 1996, PM Netanyahu commissioned archaeological excavation underneath the Temple Mount, spurring a backlash from Muslim groups who believed this to be an attempt to undermine the foundation of al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock. A similar incident occurred in 1991 when an excavated tunnel caused the collapse of the ground floor of the Atman en –Afan mosque. Archaeological excavations have been conducted in Jerusalem since the 19th century with individuals such as Charles Warren of the British Royal Engineers leading the first exploration of Jerusalem’s subterranean levels, but now, they are appropriated as tools to establish legitimacy and hegemony in the face of oppositional narratives, which resists the complete power the Israeli state wishes to exert.107

3.5 Dominant and Subversive Paradigms for Recollection in the Israeli State

The widespread persecution and anti-Semitism, culminating in the events of 20th century Europe, were foundational defenses for the establishment of the Jewish state. In many ways Israel was a final hope—a sanctuary for the victimized, persecuted, and traumatized.

The early construction of the state of Israel laid numerous foundations for policy in the country.

The saliency of the Holocaust sustained the Zionist goal for a Jewish state “for reasons of safety as well as for the sake of spiritual renewal and Jewish cultural renaissance.”108 However, the ideologies of early Zionism were debated and reconstructed with new objectives in mind. Labor interests became vocal within 104 Feige, "Identity, Ritual and Pilgrimage: The Meetings of the Israeli Exploration Society," in Divergent Jewish Cultures: Israel and America, 93.

105 Reyner, Anthony S., and Jane Philips. "Jerusalem: A Factual Background." p. 331. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/20671587.

106 Weizmann, Eyal. "Jerusalem," OpenDemocracy, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ecology politicsverticality/article_808.jsp.

107 Weizmann, Eyal. "Jerusalem," OpenDemocracy, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ecology- politicsverticality/ article_808.jsp.

108 Richard Falk, "Israel and Jewish Identity," JSTOR. October 1983, p 88, accessed May 4, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/29790093.

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the Zionist project and with it, came a form of activism dedicated to build and create anew. “Redeeming the soil and building the land were means for engineering a new society for the New Jew, the ultimate creative task of Labour Zionism.”109 The Zionist endeavor had embedded within it an intention to create and arguably, re-create a new collective narrative and identity for the Jewish people. The previous Jewish identity projected a vulnerable image of the Diasporic Jew and a stereotyped minority in Europe, but the identity of the Israeli Jew intended to promise much more.

However, narrative was never absolute; rather, it is a subjective undertaking on reality. In the presence of conflict, narrative cannot be singular, but instead, it develops as a polyphonic composition due to the diversity of actors and their agendas. Even within the Jewish Israeli narratives differ in memory as seen with the early example of ma’abarot or transit towns, which became prominent in Israel during the period of mass immigration to deal with the large inflow of populations. Moreover, the system of transit camps that were developed at this time fit into the larger plan of national development and planning under the patronage of the prime minister and the administration by the Planning Department. Many architects and planners in the department were preoccupied with the notion of ideal distribution between the urban centers and rural areas of the country and among other reasons, sought a policy of decentralization “to create, ex nihilo, a settlement pattern that would appear to have been shaped by centuries of evolution, in order to naturalize the artificiality of the Zionist nation-state.”110 The transit camps were instrumental in the creation of this dispersal plan of newly immigrated populations in empty regions, but also areas previously inhabited by Palestinians. The settlement plan modeled on the British New Town would establish 28 new cities and populate them with individuals from the ma’abarot, which essentially functioned in this capacity as “human reservoirs.” Ma’abarot represented the “spatio-temporal voids” in the Israeli landscape and perhaps, one of the few remaining representations of the transitioning and resettlement processes in historic Palestine by the Zionist enterprise.111 As Kozlovsky writes, “Such a conception allowed the Zionist movement to envision a mode of action that circumvented political process since it refused to acknowledge conflicting desires and interests, or to allow their political negotiation through compromise or struggle.”112 Consequently, this belief in maintaining a system of large immigrant upheavals and the long extent of a transitioning phase would not result in negative consequences did exactly so. Ma'abarot became emblematic of separation and inequality among ethnic lines within Jewish Israeli society and created an “enduring correspondence between class and ethnicity in Israeli society, and its origin in the ma’abara, led to the emergence of a counter-narrative in which memory of the ma’abara was made into a signifier of social and political inequality.”113 Ironically, the Zionist enterprise “reproduced the very conditions it attempted to negate— dispersion, exile, and disempowerment…the concept of the transitory allowed Zionism to maintain its utopian vision of territorial and social harmony, while also enabling it to act and to 109 Alona Nitzan-Shiftan, "Contested Zionism -- Alternative Modernism: Erich Mendelsohn and the Tel Aviv Chug in Mandate Palestine." JSTOR. 1996, p.152, accessed May 11, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1568611.

110 Roy Kozlovsky, "Temporal States of Architecture: Mass Immigration and Provisional Housing in Israel," in Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century, ed. Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 148.

111 Ibid 148-149.

112 Ibid 154-155.

113 Ibid 157.

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exercise power, both in relation to the Jewish subjects who would inhabit those voids, and the Palestinians, whose prior presence and displacement would remain as a void in the nation’s collective memory. And it is precisely here that the violence of this mechanism brings a local subjectivity into being. In a dialectical manner, the local is that which resisted its negation and silencing by a modernist discourse that assigned it a transitory, empty space.”114

3.6 Spatial Palimpsest: The Implications of Constructing Narrative and Memory

The installment of a particular narrative becomes politicized as it adopts an ideological slant, finding a religious, historical—mythical or factual—legitimacy. Competing narratives drive their narrators to claim the throne for legitimacy and in this power play, a particular narrative asserts dominance as is done in space. The intention of the Israeli state under Zionist authorities to recreate and build anew was clear.

However, these new attitudes held consequences for the indigenous people of Palestine. The Palestinian built environment was seen as inadequate and unfit for the newly envisioned Israel. With the state’s active stance on re-creation, it forced the erasure of Palestinians from the new Jewish homeland—the source of the Jewish’s new identity. This created not only a new narrative territorialized in the biblical lands of the Jewish homeland, but also, outlined the beginning of imposing a new memory of the land.115

The desire for this re-creation also fortified the desire to reinforce the distinction between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, specifically recasting Jews as superior to Palestinians. Not only did the new Jewish revival in Palestine choose to repudiate its former identity as the frail Diasporic Jew, but also, the Orientalism of the Arab world.116 The socio-spatial differentiation as seen with the ma’abara towns supports this ideology as the Zionist influenced state planning placed the newly arrived Arab Jews on the frontier and periphery of the state. These dual aspirations were the foundations of the colonizing mentality behind the Israeli state and soon, took responsibility for shaping national perspectives until they infiltrated the social, political, and cultural structures of Israeli society. The formation of a new national identity being primarily a socially constructed process involved many practices, but the approach to the Israeli built environment specifically expresses the imposition of a historical narrative, enforcing dominant subordinate power relations between Israelis and Palestinians to secure the various social remakings at the time.117

National narratives, in particular, become significant in their politicization, once endorsed by a population and state, and in 1948, the official establishment of the Israeli state also nationalized the Zionist narrative to the territory within the state’s demarcated boundaries. It fostered support for certain ideologies in the erasure of historical Palestine and in a sense, provided sources for legitimacy for practices of othering. The Zionist narrative became a source for knowledge production and intermingled with collective memories of the Israeli population, informing values and attitudes. As seen by Zerubavel, the Zionist recollection offers an incomplete and partial recollection of truth by only narrating the European 114 Ibid 158.

115 Haim Yacobi, "Architecture, Orientalism, and Identity: The Politics of the Israeli-Built Environment," JSTOR, Spring 2008, p. 104, accessed May 02, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30245821.

116 Nitzan-Shiftan"Contested Zionism -- Alternative Modernism: Erich Mendelsohn and the Tel Aviv Chug in Mandate Palestine." p. 156. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1568611.

117 Yacobi, "Architecture, Orientalism, and Identity: The Politics of the Israeli-Built Environment," p. 94, http:// www.jstor.org/stable/30245821.

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Jewish history and then further obscures it by limiting its discussion to the notions of persecution and victimization.118

As crucial as the national narrative becomes, the need to support and justify it is greater. Spaces are consequentially used to enforce the recollection of a chosen narrative and thus the interplay between narrative, space, and memory is introduced. Essentially, the Zionist enterprise formed a palimpsest.

Originally used to describe the recycled use of a manuscript, palimpsest indicates the process of use, erasure, and transformative re-use in the history of written tradition.

In a spatial context, it captures “condition where the layers of complex meaning are involved within an entity and where the layers keep rediscovered and reinterpreted.”119 The Israeli palimpsest replaces the presence of a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious reality. This totalizing imposition is present in Tel Aviv, where even street names commemorate the historical narrative of the establishment of the state. Streets such as Herzl recall the father of modern political Zionism and the essential founder of the State of Israel. Streets named after Herzl are found not only in Tel Aviv but also in Haifa, Beer Sheva, Ashdod, and Jerusalem. Another common street name remembers Chaim Nachman Bialik, a pioneer of modern Hebrew poetry and Israel's national poet. Street and intersections celebrating his memory span multiple cities as well from Tel Aviv, Haifa to Jerusalem.

3.7 Selective Memories and Constructed Identities: The Imposition of Modernity

In the attempt to find and create a new identity, the Bauhaus International Style became the architectural foundation for the Israeli state. During the 1930s a number of influential architects such as Ariel Sharon, Erich Mendelsohn, Samuel Mistshkin, and Shlomo Bernstein came to Tel Aviv from Europe after studying architecture or immigrated to escape the Nazis. With them they brought the Bauhaus International style, later leading the Bauhaus style to become representative of the new Jewish society that was “modern, cosmopolitan, and strikingly successful in urban professions.”120 The Tel Aviv architectural circle institutionalized modern architecture in Tel Aviv and established the basis of architectural philosophy for the new Israeli state. However, approaches to the Bauhaus in the Chug, or Israeli architectural circle, conflicted. Erich Mendelsohn proved to be a rebel among the Chug as he introduced Oriental influences in his designs, something that could not be tolerated as it fragmented the vision the Jewish state held in mind for its grand re-creation.121

The introduction of modern forms in Israel as earlier seen in Baghdad takes on a interesting role in collective memory and historical narrative. Modernity, in these contexts, repudiate often the so-called Orientalist influences and makes implications for the hierarchy of representation. In The Colonial Present, Derek Gregory identifies this approach as “colonial modernity,” and demonstrates the neat dichotomy it 118 Zerubavel, Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past, 3.

119 Young Min Koo, An Analogy of Palimpsest as a Strategy for Transforming Urban Structure into Architectural Discourse-Focused on Dominique Perrault’s Architecture of Strata, working paper (Incheon, Korea: School of Architecture, Inha University, 2009), 830-831.

120 Anat Geva, "Rediscovering Sustainable Design through Preservation: Bauhaus Apartments in Tel Aviv," JSTOR, 2008, 44, accessed May 05, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25433937.

121 Nitzan-Shiftan, "Contested Zionism -- Alternative Modernism: Erich Mendelsohn and the Tel Aviv

Chug in Mandate Palestine," Architectural History, 150.

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creates by likening the idea to a double-sided coin. He writes, “If we remain within the usual transactions of French philosophy then one side of that coin will display the face of modernity as (for example) an optical, geometric, and phallocentric space; a partitioned, hierarchical, and disciplined space; or a measured, standardized, and striated space.

And the reverse side will exhibit modernity’s other as (for example) primitive, wild, and corporeal; mysterious, capricious, and excessive; or as irregular, multiple, and labyrinthine. Although the coin is double-sided, however, both its faces milled by the machinations of colonial modernity, the two are not of equal value. For this is an economy of representation in which the modern is prized over--and placed over--the non-modern.”122

Colonial modernity produces its other and complement, and in this way is problematic as the definition is produced ex negativo. Modern then comes to mean something absolute and all-encompassing, which served the project of the Zionist enterprise well but leaves no room for alternatives histories.

Walter Gropius, founder of the Bauhaus school, repeated often that the Bauhaus style meant, “starting from zero.”123 This idea suited post-war Germany as the nation struggled to rebuild itself after the injuries of the Great War. The Bauhaus International style fit the Jewish cause as the state wished to build anew while erasing all previous traces of Jewish identity. The Bauhaus style also embraced a nonbourgeois element as socialism emerged on the scene and the new architecture aimed to create perfect worker housing.124 Again, this aspect made Bauhaus extremely compatible with the standards of the Jewish state as it wished to do just the same by denying the bourgeois culture that was associated with the European society that subordinated Jewish life.

The Zionist state adopted the Bauhaus style as an extension of its re-created identity. The 1994 “Bauhaus in Tel Aviv” celebrations reemphasized the same use of the Bauhaus to promote a greater, collective Jewish identity—one that included the same hegemonic ideology, but not necessarily in the same Zionist spirit. Moreover, the celebrations also reassured a growing Israeli population, who by this time began to diversify not only with the more prominent presence of Arab Jews and Palestinians but also, migrants and refugees from the Philippines and Africa. “After six years of Palestinian uprising and growing internal conflict between secular and religious factions, the 1994 International Style celebrations provided the secular bourgeoisie with a reassuring architectural heritage.”125 Earlier, the separation between Palestinians and Israeli Jews was the most prominent distinction, but more complexities arise with the growth of the Israeli population.

3.8 Palestine on the Periphery: Recollection and Collective Identity for Palestinians

In the face of such dominant expressions in narrative and recollection, the Israeli state aggressively reasserts itself over the national space, leaving Palestinians to struggle. This expression of resistance supports Foucault’s nuance of reciprocity within power networks. Hegemony is not absolute 122 Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004), 3-4.

123 Tom Wolfe, From Bauhaus to Our House (New York: Bantam, 1999), 9.

124 Ibid 11.

125 Nitzan-Shiftan, "Contested Zionism -- Alternative Modernism: Erich Mendelsohn and the Tel Aviv Chug in Mandate Palestine," Architectural History,148.

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and even the marginalized resist the repressive apparatus of the state. Often, the aggressive state policies respond to this pervasive tenacity of Palestinian resistance in memory and narrative. The struggle between creation and destruction in the Israeli and Palestinian example of spatial palimpsest supports a socio-spatial differentiation between dominant and subordinate identities. Bhabha breaks down traditionally orientalist approaches to post-colonial frameworks further to build off of a distributive power dynamic. Bhabha speculates that colonial discourse is valid with its distinctions of power—the installation of a difference so that one can dominate another. However, he imposes a psychoanalytic element, where colonizers unconsciously realize the illusory quality of the difference installed between them and those they choose to colonize. Despite its recognition, this difference is refused and eventually, leads to anxiety to concretely establish a solid difference between the colonizer and the colonized—a distinct “us” and “other.”126

Largely, the Zionist movement entered as a colonizing force subjugating the Palestinians to unjust policies in their attempt to gain power and establish a new, individual Jewish identity. This re-created identity stemmed from the past tragedies of the Jewish past and though justified, called for denial of certain elements from the prior image of the Jew. This new re-creation precluded orientalism completely, a prominent aspect in the territory of Palestine, therefore spelling trouble for its people from the beginning.127 However, Palestinians did not passively accept these attitudes passively. As waves of immigration and the land purchases of the Jewish National Fund raised the Jewish population, acts of rebellion grew frequent.128

Disorganization and internal issues did not enable greater efforts of resistance in the past for the Palestinians, but now, civil society groups exhibit constructive efforts to take back what Palestinians once called their own. The Association of the Forty initially was established in ‘Ayn Hawd in 1988 and continues to fight for recognition of unrecognized villages and their memory, while also trying to improve their living conditions and obtain equal rights for Palestinians throughout the Israeli state. The Association provides legal aid and supports village initiatives for utilities and services and also lobbies the Knesset for plans to achieve their goals. Many community-based efforts mobilize and intervene to cause change, supporting the idea of Palestinians exercising their agency by empowering themselves. Full Arab political participation has been frequent since the 1980s, especially with the demand to change municipal lines and using any political leverage to affect the cause. “ Arabs in Israel have also started to mount a more assertive and effective challenge against land and planning policies. The commemoration ‘Land Day,’ recalls the demonstrations against land expropriation in March of 1976 and annually resists against the policy of spatial encroachment in Israel.129

Palestinian persistence to continue shows tenacity and willingness to fight for space that they believe belongs to them. Despite numerous demolitions, like in ‘Ayn Hawd al-Jadida, the inhabitants choose to remain and rebuild from the rubble. A continued denial of services has not deterred them either and 126 David Huddart, Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 2005), 3-4.

127 Nitzan-Shiftan, "Contested Zionism -- Alternative Modernism: Erich Mendelsohn and the Tel Aviv Chug in Mandate Palestine," Architectural History, 148.

128 James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,

2005), 206.

129 Eran Razin and Anna Hazan, "Municipal Boundary Conflicts Between Jewish and Arab Local Authorities in Israel: Geography of Administration or Geopolitics?," Geografiska Annaler, Series B: Human Geography 86, no. 2 (2004), accessed May 6, 2013, doi:10.1111/j.0435-3684.2004.00155.x.

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anything short of forced removals, like the war tactics of 1948, might not either.

Conclusion

This thesis set out to explore the role of space/place in the presence of protracted power struggles, which are generally at the center of territorial conflicts. To that end, I have tried to outline the various conceptions of “space,� in its most abstract and physical forms and connect its multiple definitions to more diffusive understandings of power, focusing on the dialectic between actors in the context of Hebron, Baghdad, and Nicosia throughout various points in their history as sites of contestation.

The conflicting nature characterizes these cities to their core and outlines them as prime examples. In the presence of conflict, instability, and insecurity push a frenzy for the absolute, the totalizing, but the attitudes of conflict mask often the social complexities of the people and their stories, their experiences are lost in the politicization of space and memory.

By applying the multiplicities of space in these cities and highlighting how certain narratives are perpetuated not only consciously in the space around them, but subconsciously through collective memory, it is clear how space ultimately transmits narrative and memory, but also, how they inform the production of space.

The complexity of this process is what I explore critically at various points in the context of cities, which act as microcosms for that larger state. However, in times of conflict, insecurity, and oppression, this process is hijacked and manipulated. Simplistic reductions are made in the transmission of space, memory, and narrative and what remains to be revealed and accessed is the histories, experiences of those marginalized on the periphery.

These formulations may not hold any particular immediate consequence, but what they establish is a gradual process of exclusion and peripheralization for those involved, diminishing the potential space (in all sense of the word) available to them. In terms of memory, we ask who has the right to remember? And who has the right to be remembered? And once again, we see restrictions for some groups to express their collective memory. At the nexus of this discussion are questions of identity, as a continued denial of space and memory and a place within narrative raises many concerns for identity.

This uncertainty is the driving force behind this thesis and the promotion of what I hope to see as alternative imaginings in the urban environment, as well as other scales of space.

The value of an urban environment is often measured by the extent of its diversity—not only in demographics, but also in languages, religions, foods, histories, and cultures. Spaces of heterogeneity offer a multi-faceted approach in reality and celebrate the dynamic, changing nature of the world today especially.

Ultimately, this serves as a movement to a more authentic, more complete understandings of present realities on the ground not only accommodating the endless cognitive interpretations and analyses of space, memory, and narrative, but also the people who experience them.

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The theory of de-policing states that extensive media coverage of incidents of police’s use of force cause police to engage in less active policing. Based on the theory of de-policing, it is hypothesized that there will be an increase in the rate of violent crime in cities where high profile incidents of police use of force have occurred. This increase in the rate of crime has been called the Ferguson Effect. My study examined whether or not there had been a statistically significant increase in violent crime following police use of force incidents. I hypothesized that the instances of police excessive use of force would result in higher levels of violent crime.

This research study examined the relationship between high-profile local incidents of police use of force and local violent crime rates. It is important to analyze the impact that police use of force has on the respective community in regard to crime rates. This study analyzed three incidents of police use of force that received extensive media coverage in order to determine if there was an increase in the rate of violent crime in that city. The theory of de-policing suggests that in the aftermath of a high-profile incident of police brutality, local police departments change their behaviors in response to the incident. The theory explains that police officers will retreat from their work in an attempt to avoid being a part of a controversial situation regarding police misconduct.

This theory further attributes that changes in behavior by police officers are in part due to the high levels of scrutiny that the media places on police officers following controversial incidents. Based on this theory, this research study looked to examine whether or not the change in policing behaviors following high-profile incidents impacts the rates of violent crime in the specific area where the incident occurred. The results of this study indicate that there was no statistically significant increase in the violent crime rates for the cities during the three-year span.

Introduction

Undoubtedly, the number of police use of force incidents in the media in recent years has raised concerns regarding the potential impact these events have on police behavior and crime rates. Some researchers have state that policy changes are needed to prevent police from abusing their power (White, 2016). White discusses the need for a national police deadly force database to keep detailed records of

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144 these incidents and to observe trends. White advocates for a national database because fully understanding the connection between citizen violence against the police and police violence against citizens can lead to a reduction in both. Therefore, research regarding police use of force incidents is important because it highlights trends and violence that should be monitored.

The Ferguson Effect

Since the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, there have been similar incidents reported in the media across the U.S. Rosenfeld (2015) conducted a study to test for what is known as the “Ferguson Effect” on crime rates in major cities in the United States. The Ferguson Effect suggests that the publicity surrounding the shooting of Michael Brown led to a rise in violent crime in several U.S cities. One theory suggests that the events in Ferguson lead to increased crime rates due to the influence of social media has on today’s society. Rosenfeld’s study sought to determine whether or not the events in Ferguson had an effect on crime in St. Louis, Missouri by examining the crime rates in the city in the months immediately preceding and following the shooting of Michael Brown. He found that violent crime in St. Louis increased by 5.3% in 2014, with the homicide rate, in particular, increasing by 32.5%. Many have attributed this change to the shooting of Michael Brown and the Ferguson Effect. However, through close examination of the homicide rate in St. Louis in 2014, Rosenfeld determined that the homicide rate increased in the months prior to the shooting of Michael Brown, and showed no significant changes in the months after the shooting, thus showing no support for the Ferguson Effect. When examining violent crime rates overall, there were observable increases in the data for the months after the Ferguson shooting.

In conclusion, Rosenfeld states that the increases in violent crime in St. Louis post-Ferguson should not be discounted as random fluctuations. While this is not sufficient support for a Ferguson Effect, Rosenfeld notes that it is important to keep track of these trends for future study.

Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe, and Shjarback (2016) sought to determine whether or not there was a Ferguson Effect on crime, as well. Pyrooz et al. state that high-profile incidents like Ferguson may convey to society that justice is not being administered fairly. They state that one response to the belief that the law is not being administered fairly is increased participation in crime, thus leading to a rise in national crime rates. Pyrooz et al. examined official crime data from police departments in 81 of the 105 United States’ cities with populations exceeding 200,000 persons in the year 2010. They focused on the rates of violent crime and property crime in the 12 months before and after the Ferguson shooting. Pyrooz et al. found that crime rates declined in the year prior to Ferguson, which is consistent with a long-term decline of crime rates in the United States. This research questioned whether or not there was a systematic change in crime trends and if their results were statistically insignificant. Thus, Pyrooz et al. found no evidence to suggest that there is a Ferguson Effect on crime rates in large U.S. cities.

Effects of Negative Police Publicity

Researchers Shjarback, Pyrooz, Wolfe and Decker (2017) conducted another study in which they analyzed the changes in quantity and quality of policing among Missouri police departments following the Ferguson shooting of Michael Brown in 2014. Their research sought to investigate the speculation that police officers are “de-policing,” or retreating from their work as a response to the animosity towards police departments across the United States. The de-policing theory suggests that police officers are changing their behaviors in an attempt to avoid controversies regarding police misconduct. The Ferguson Effect

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suggests that as a result of de-policing efforts, violent crime will rise.

Shjarback et al. (2017) assessed the extent to which de-policing occurred among 118 police departments in Missouri. They examined the changes in quantity, meaning the standardized rates of traffic/ vehicle stops, searches and arrests, and the quality, meaning the rates at which contraband was found by police from 2014 to 2015. Additionally, they examined whether jurisdictions with larger percentages of African American residents are more prone to de-policing. Lastly, the researchers looked at whether or not any de-policing behavior was associated with changes in the crime rate across the police departments in Missouri. They hypothesized that de-policing behavior would lead to increases in crime rates. The data used in this study were pulled from agency-specific vehicle/traffic stop reports from the state of Missouri for 2014 and 2015, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports for 2014 and 2015, and 2014 estimates from the United States Census Bureau's American Community Survey.

As a result of their research, Shjarback et al. (2017) observed a reduction in the number of stops performed by Missouri police departments, which was nearly 67,000 fewer stops among the agencies in 2015 than in 2014. However, Shjarback et al. note that the reduction in the number of stops did not correspond with a reduction in searches or arrests among the same agencies. Furthermore, they found that violent crime increased by 0.12 standard deviations between 2014 and 2015, while overall crime and property crime remained unchanged. Their results suggest mixed evidence of the de-policing effect.

Shjarback et al. also observed increases in hit rates, showing that officers were more successful at finding contraband during their stops. Overall, the results showed that among the police departments in Missouri, departments made fewer vehicle stops, searches and arrests in 2015 than in 2014 in jurisdictions with a larger African American population. Ultimately, this study yielded no relationship between de-policing and crime rates in the observed years.

Shane, Lawton, and Swenson (2017) examined fatal police shootings by United States police through 2015-2016 as a response to the Black Lives Matter movement. They examined reports of police fatalities in the United States offered by databases, such as Killed by Police and Fatal Encounters, from January 2, 2015 to December 29, 2016. Shane et al. examined which United States cities presented the greatest risk of a police shooting fatality, how the mean rate of police shooting fatalities varies across the country, and if the rate varies by race when looking at state racial composition.

Shane et al. (2017) found that per 100,000 people, New Mexico had the highest mean rate of police shooting fatalities at 1.97, while Connecticut (0.17), New York (0.18) and Rhode Island (0.19) had the lowest mean rates. The national mean fatality rate, comprising all 50 states and Washington, D.C. is 0.686.

Overall, they found that at the city level, major U.S. cities presented the greatest risk of a police shooting fatality. These results show that the rates of police shootings are greater in cities with higher populations, meaning that increases in crime rates for these cities may not be due to a Ferguson Effect, but rather changes in population.

Shane et al. (2017) conclude that their findings suggest that the public has a misconception regarding police use of fatal force. According to their research, there is not an increasing trend in fatal police shootings. Although their results show that there are higher rates for Blacks in fatal encounters, Shane et al. state that the findings fail to account for characteristics of the incident. Ultimately, they found that the data do not support the message that the public conveys through the media that there is an increasing number of fatal police shootings disproportionately targeting Blacks.

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Implications of Prior Literature

Overall, the literature reviewed provides limited support for the Ferguson Effect. Researchers generally found that their results were not statistically significant when analyzed, even though the data collected may have appeared to support the Ferguson Effect. Similar conclusions were drawn regarding the de-policing effect. It is important to note that the media does in fact influence officers’ perceptions, if not their behaviors directly (Blake & Lafond, 2017). Therefore, more research on the topic is needed to understand police behavior and the full implications of high-profile incidents of police use of force. This study examined whether there is a statistically significant increase in violent crime following police use of force incidents. It is hypothesized that the instances of police excessive use of force will result in significantly higher levels of violent crime in the three cities that were examined.

Method

This study used an interrupted time series analysis to examine the rates of violent crime across several different U.S. cities in the year after and the year prior to a high-profile incident of police use of force. For the purposes of this study, police use of force refers to an incident where a police officer utilized deadly or excessive force on an individual while on active duty. The incidents that were examined also received national media coverage, making them “high profile” events. This study used open source data of violent crime rates in the selected cities where these incidents occurred in order to determine whether or not there is a positive relationship between the violent crime rates and the high-profile incidents of police use of force. The cases that were studied are as follows: • Laquan McDonald from Chicago, Illinois in October 2014 • Tamir Rice from Cleveland, Ohio in November 2014 • Freddie Gray from Baltimore, Maryland in April 2015

This study examined the hypothesis that violent crime rates would have increased in Chicago, Cleveland, and Baltimore after each police use of force incident. For the cities of Chicago and Baltimore, the cities’ open data portals were used. These data portals contain information about all crimes reported in the city. For the city of Cleveland, state and federal crime records were examined. The crime rates for the year(s) before and after each incident were visually represented through time series plots. In cases where there is a wide variety, the data was analyzed by a multiple month range. Several statistical tests were used to determine if there were statistically significant changes in the rates of violent crime. Additionally, nonviolent crimes were examined as well in order to compare changes in the overall crime rates.

Data

For the purposes of this study, the crime rates in each respective city are separated into two categories: violent and non-violent. Violent crimes are those criminal acts which involve inflicting bodily harm onto another human being or acts that are committed with the intention of inflicting harm upon another human being. Non-violent crimes are those criminal acts in which the victim is not human, and no bodily harm is inflicted upon a human. The crime rates below are separated by each city: Chicago, Cleveland, and Baltimore, as well as separated by year, depending on when the high-profile incident of police brutality occurred. For Chicago and Cleveland, the incidents involving Laquan McDonald and Tamir Rice both occurred in 2014, therefore the years 2013 through 2015 were examined for those two cities. The Chicago data was taken from the city of Chicago’s open data portals (City of Chicago: Data

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Portal, 2019). The crime data from Cleveland were taken from the Uniform Crime Report statistics (U.S. Department of Justice, 2019). For Baltimore, the years 2014 through 2016 were examined because the incident involving Freddie Gray occurred in 2015. The data from Baltimore was taken from the city of Baltimore’s open data portal (Baltimore: Open Data, 2019).

Additionally, it is important to note the fluctuation of the overall crime rate in the United States during these years. In 2013, the overall violent crime rate in the United States was 369.1 per 100,000 people. In 2013, the number of property or non-violent crimes in the United States was 8,650,761 making the total rate, 2,733.3 per 100,000 people. In 2014, the violent crime rate decreased slightly to 361.6 100,000 people. In 2014, the total rate of property/non-violent crimes was 2574.1 per 100,000 people. In 2015, the number of violent crimes increased slightly to 373.7 per 100,000 people, while the non-violent crime rates decreased slightly to 2500.5 per 100,000 people. In 2016, the number of violent crimes also increased to a rate of 397.5 per 100,000 people. In 2016, the estimated total property crimes in the United States decreased slightly to 2451.6 per 100,000 people (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019).

Chicago

The violent crime rates observed in Chicago were assault, robbery, and homicide (see Table 1).

The non-violent crime rates that were examined were burglary, motor vehicle theft, and theft (see Table 2).

Starting with the violent crime rates, there is an observed decrease in assault and robbery from 2013 to 2014 (see Figure 1). There is an observed increase in homicide from 2013 to 2014 as well. From 2014 to 2015, there is an observed decrease in robbery, while there is an observed increase in assault and homicide.

Regarding the non-violent crime rates, there is an observed decrease in burglary, motor vehicle theft, and theft from 2013 to 2014 (see Figure 2). From 2014 to 2015, there was a decrease in burglary and theft. There was an observed increase in motor vehicle theft from 2014 to 2015, as well. Overall, the violent crime rates do not appear to show any major changes from the years 2013 to 2015. On the other hand, the non-violent crime rates show somewhat of a decrease in the majority of the crimes listed throughout the span of the three years.

Cleveland

In Cleveland, the violent crime rates observed are aggravated assault, robbery and homicide (see Table 3). The non-violent crime rates that were observed are burglary, motor vehicle theft and larceny (see Table 4). There is an observed decrease in violent crime rates, specifically for robbery and aggravated assault from 2013 to 2014 (see Figure 3). There is an observed increase in homicide from 2013 to 2014 as well. From the year 2014 to 2015, there is an observed decrease in robbery and aggravated assault. There is an observed increase in homicide from 2014 to 2015. Looking at the non-violent crime rates, there is an observed decrease in each crime, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft from 2013 through 2015 (see Figure 4). There are no observed increases in non-violent crime rates. Overall, the non-violent crime rates appear to show a steady decrease from the years 2013 to 2015. On the other hand, the violent crime rates do not appear to show any major changes throughout the span of the three years.

Baltimore

The violent crime rates that were observed in Baltimore are aggravated assault, robbery, and homicide (see Table 5). The non-violent crime rates observed are burglary, auto theft, and larceny (see Table

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6). There is an observed increase from 2014 through 2015 in homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault in regard to the violent crime rates (see Figure 5). The number of homicide incidents decreased from the year 2015 to 2016. Furthermore, there is an observed increase in robbery and assault from 2015 to 2016. In regard to the non-violent crime rates, there is an observed decrease in larceny from the year 2014 to 2015 (see Figure 6). Furthermore, there was an observed increase in auto theft, burglary, and larceny from auto from 2014 to 2015. There was an observed decrease in larceny, burglary, and larceny from auto from 2015 to 2016. In the same time span, there was an observed increase in auto theft. Overall, the violent crime rates show some steady increases from 2014 to 2016. Additionally, the non-violent crime rates do not appear to show any major changes in the majority of the crimes listed throughout the span of the three years.

Comparing All Three Cities

Figures 7, 8 and 9 depict the violent crime rates for all three cities in this study. The figures are labeled with -1, 0 and 1, to represent the years before, during and after each incident of police use of force.

In regard to homicide rates, there appears to be an overall increase in rates from the year prior to the high profile police use of force incident to the year after the incident (see Figure 7). As for the robbery rates, there is a steady increase observed in Baltimore, while there is a steady decrease observed in Cleveland during the time period (see Figure 8). There is a slight decrease as well in the rates from Chicago during this span of three years. Additionally, the assault rates in Cleveland during the three year span decreased (see Figure 9).

There is a slight increase in the assault rates from Baltimore and Chicago, as well. Overall, the three cities show conflicting data for the assault rates and the robbery rates, while all three share a similar increase in homicide rates.

Results

In order to further compare the data, a paired T-test was conducted for the crime rates before and after each high-profile incident of police use of force in each city. A paired T-test is a test of statistical significance used to determine if there is statistical evidence that the mean difference between paired observations on a particular outcome is significantly different. The paired T-test is appropriate for this study because it allows for a comparison between the mean crime rates for all three cities in the different years. The test of statistical significance indicates if the crime rates had a significant change over the three year span (Maxfield & Babbie, 2015).

In this study, the mean crime rates in all three cities for the year before the high-profile incident and the mean crime rates for the year after the incident are examined for each type of violent crime (see Tables 7 through 12). The statistical significance of the relationship is tested at the p=.05 level. For the paired T-test examining the homicide rates for all three cities, the p value was 0.2026, indicating that there is not a statistically significant relationship between the homicide rates before and after the high profile incident of police use of force for each of the cities. For this paired T-test examining the robbery rates for all three cities, the p value was 0.9134. Thus, there is not a statistically significant relationship between the robbery rates before and after the high profile incident of police use of force for each of the cities. For the paired T-test examining the assault rates for all three cities, the p value was 0.5454. There is not a statistically significant relationship between the assault rates before and after the high profile incident of police use of force for each of the cities.

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Discussion

In conclusion, this study looked to determine if the rates of violent crime in three cities increased prior to a high-profile incident of police use of force in those cities. The theory of de-policing suggests that following a high-profile incident in which the conduct of the police comes under scrutiny, police officers will retreat from their work (Shjarback, Pyrooz, Wolfe and Decker, 2017). The theory holds that officers taking a step back from proactive policing would lead to an increased rate of crime, known as the Ferguson Effect (Rosenfeld, 2015). The violent crime rates in the three cities of Chicago, Cleveland and Baltimore, for the years before, during and after a high-profile incident of police use of force were examined in this study. The paired T-tests of the data showed that there was no statistically significant change in the crime rates over the three year span. There was not a significant relationship in the change in crime rates for homicide, assault and robbery between the year before each high-profile incident of police use of force and the year after the incident. The hypothesis that the crime rates would increase in Chicago, Baltimore and Cleveland due to de-policing is not supported by the data.

Similar to prior research, this study shows no support for the de-policing aspect of the Ferguson Effect for the three cities examined. Both Rosenfeld (2015) and Pyrooz et al (2016) also failed to find a statistically significant relationship in the change in crime rates which would suggest a Ferguson Effect.

Although this study failed to support the Ferguson Effect, research such as Nix & Pickett (2017) shows that police officers believe in the Ferguson Effect, whether it is real or not. This belief may lead officers to adapt their policing behaviors regardless of what studies have shown. Therefore, officers should be educated about these types of studies so that the media and other high profile incidents do not negatively impact the field of policing too drastically.

Although this study shows no support for de-policing or the Ferguson Effect, high profile incidents of police use of force still impact the communities in which they occur. Communities have protested against the police in response to these incidents. Rather than focusing on de-policing, there should be a larger focus on community policing. Community policing aims at restoring the relationship between the police and the citizens. Therefore, this study, as well as similar studies, are important for police to take into consideration.

Limitations

There are several limitations to this study that are important to discuss. To start, this study uses a relative small sample size. Only the three cities of Chicago, Baltimore and Cleveland in which three high profile incidents of police use of force have occurred were examined. There are numerous other incidents and cities across the country that can be examined to provide additional data regarding the change in crime rates. Looking at a larger sample size and comparing more cities may lead to more accurate results.

Additionally, looking at cities with varying populations would also allow for a wider range of results.

Furthermore, the study was also limited in the fact that only the crimes of homicide, assault and robbery were analyzed with the paired T-test. Although the other crime rates were taken into consideration, the tests were focused on the violent crime rates for each of the three cities. Conducting similar tests focusing more on other types of crime may lead to additional results. In addition, this study only examined the crime rates during a three-year span: before, during and after the high-profile incident. This limited time period does not account for changes in crime rates that could have occurred during a longer period of time after the high profile incident of police use of force. Further studies can examine the crime rates during a longer time period to determine whether there would be a prolonged change in the crime rates

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resulting from the high profile incidents.

Recommendations for Future Research

Further studies can be done examining different high profile incidents of police use of force in other cities across the country. Studies looking at other incidents and the crime rates in those cities may yield different results. Cities with varying populations may also provide different results as well. As stated earlier, examining the change in crime rates over a longer period of time could yield different results than observed in the three year time span.

Additionally, this study focused mainly on the violent crime rates for each city. Further studies can seek to examine the non-violent crime rates for the cities in which high profile incidents of police brutality have occurred. Other studies can examine more specific areas of crime, by looking at crimes such as resisting arrest or interference with police, for example. These types of crimes could indicate changed attitudes towards the police following a high profile incident of police use of force.

It is important to conduct further research on this topic in order to determine exactly how high profile incidents of police use of force impact police officers and their surrounding communities. Due to these high profile incidents in the media, the police have come under strict scrutiny. Police officers are now required to wear body cameras so that if their actions are called into question, there is video proof of what actually occurred. With the help of future studies, it can be determined the true implications of these high profile incidents involving police use of force.

Works Cited

Ajilore, O., & Shirey, S. (2017). Do #AllLivesMatter? An Evaluation of Race and Excessive Use of Force by Police. Atlantic Economic Journal, 45(2), 201. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11293-017-9538-6 Baltimore: Open Data: Open Baltimore: City of Baltimore Open Data Catalog. (2019). Retrieved from https://data.baltimorecity.gov/.

Blake, D. M., & Lafond, B. (2017). De-Policing in America: The effects of media and leadership on officers’

discretionary enforcement. Law Enforcement Executive Forum, 17(1), 31–43.

City of Chicago: Data Portal: City of Chicago: Data Portal. (2019). Retrieved from https://data. cityofchicago.org/.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2019). Crime Data Explorer. Retrieved from https://crime-data-explorer.f

r.cloud.gov/explorer/national/united-states/crime Maxfield, M. G. & Babbie, E. R. (2015). Research Methods For Criminal Justice and Criminology: Seventh Edition. Cengage Learning.

Nix, J. & Pickett, J. T. (2017). Third-person perceptions, hostile media effects, and policing: Developing a

theoretical framework for assessing the Ferguson effect. Journal of Criminal Justice, 51, 24–33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2017.05.016 Nix, J., Wolfe, S. E. & Campbell, B. A. (2017). Command-level Police Officers’ Perceptions of the “War on

Cops” and De-policing. Justice Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2017.1338743 Pyrooz, D. C., Decker, S. H., Wolfe, S. E., Shjarback, J. A. (2016). Was there a Ferguson Effect on

crime rates in large U.S. cities? Journal of Criminal Justice, 46, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. jcrimjus.2016.01.001 Rosenfeld, R. (2015). Was there a “Ferguson Effect” on crime in St. Louis? Washington, DC: The Sentencing

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Project. Retrieved from http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Ferguson_Effect. pdf.

Shane, J. M., Lawton, B., & Swenson, Z. (2017). The prevalence of fatal police shootings by U.S. police,

2015–2016: Patterns and answers from a new data set. Journal of Criminal Justice, 52, 101–111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2017.05.001 Shjarback, J. A., Pyrooz, D. C., Wolfe, S. E., & Decker, S. H. (2017). De-policing and crime in the wake of

Ferguson: Racialized changes in the quantity and quality of policing among Missouri police departments. Journal of Criminal Justice, 50, 42-52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. jcrimjus.2017.04.003 U.S. Department of Justice. (2019). Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics. Retrieved from https://www. ucrdatatool.gov/.

White, M. D. (2016). Transactional encounters, crisis-driven reform, and the potential for a national police

deadly force database. Criminology & Public Policy, 15(1), 223–235. https://doi. org/10.1111/1745-9133.12180 Wolfe, S. E., & Nix, J. (2016). The alleged “Ferguson Effect” and police willingness to engage in community partnership. Law and Human Behavior, 40(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000164

Appendix

Table 1: Violent Crime Rates in Chicago, IL (2013-2015) per 100,000 people Type of Crime

2013

2014

2015

Assault

659.09

619.46

625.23

Homicide

15.48

15.61

18.41

Robbery

33.48

359.13

353.53

Table 2: Non-Violent Crime Rates in Chicago, IL (2013-2015) per 100,000 people Type of Crime

2013

2014

2015

Burglary

656.23

533.95

483.56

Motor Vehicle Theft

461.42

363.27

369.30

Theft

2623.25

2256.31

2103.21

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Table 3: Violent Crime Rates in Cleveland, OH (2013-2015) per 100,000 people Type of Crime

2013

2014

2015

Homicide

14.80

16.12

20.04

Robbery

892.39

765.51

631.47

Aggravated Assault

4900.97

4701.03

4279.79

Table 4: Non-Violent Crime Rates in Cleveland, OH (2013-2015) per 100,000 people Type of Crime

2013

2014

2015

Burglary

2113.29

1781.50

1162.49

Larceny

2770.33

2661.63

2122.29

Motor Vehicle Theft

1055.49

985.03

706.74

Table 5: Violent Crime Rates in Baltimore, MA (2014-2016) per 100,000 people Type of Crime

2014

2015

2016

Homicide

33.86

54.97

51.64

Robbery

627.92

762.19

909.96

Aggravated Assault

684.25

765.73

835.27

Table 6: Non-Violent Crime Rates in Baltimore, MA (2014-2016) per 100,000 people Type of Crime

2014

2015

2016

Auto Theft

586.04

733.75

748.39

Larceny

2904.20

2849.31

2755.54

Burglary

1103.56

1262.72

1200.13

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Table 7: Comparing Change in Homicide Rates for all three cities City

Year Before Incident (t = -1)

Year After Incident (t = 1)

Change

Chicago

14.8

20.04

5.24

Baltimore

33.86

51.64

17.78

Cleveland

15.48

18.41

2.93

Table 8: Paired T-Test Comparing Change in Homicide Rates Year

Mean

Standard Deviation

Before Incident

21.38

10.81

After Incident

30.03

18.73

Change

8.65

7.99

Table 9: Comparing Change in Robbery Rates for all three cities City

Year Before Incident (t = -1)

Year After Incident (t = 1)

Change

Chicago

433.48

353.53

-79.95

Baltimore

627.92

909.96

282.04

Cleveland

892.39

631.47

-260.92

Table 10: Paired T-Test Comparing Change in Robbery Rates Year

Mean

Standard Deviation

Before Incident

651.26

230.34

After Incident

631.65

278.22

Change

-19.61

276.46

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Table 11: Comparing Change in Assault Rates for all three cities City

Year Before Incident (t = -1)

Year After Incident (t = 1)

Change

Chicago

659.09

625.23

-33.86

Baltimore

684.25

835.27

151.02

Cleveland

4900.97

4279.79

-621.18

Table 12: Paired T-Test Comparing Change in Assault Rates Year

Mean

Standard Deviation

Before Incident

2081.44

2441.82

After Incident

1913.43

2052.02

Change

-168.01

403.20

Figure 1: Violent Crime Rates in Chicago, IL (2013-2015)

Note. This figure illustrates the Chicago crime rates for assault, homicide and robbery per 100,000 people during the three year span.

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Figure 2: Non-Violent Crime Rates in Chicago, IL (2013-2015)

Note. This figure illustrates the Chicago crime rates for burglary, motor vehicle theft and theft per 100,000 people during the three year span.   Figure 3: Violent Crime Rates in Cleveland, OH (2013-2015)

Note. This figure illustrates the Cleveland crime rates for aggravated assault, homicide and robbery per 100,000 people during the three year span.

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Figure 4: Non-Violent Crime Rates in Cleveland, OH (2013-2015)

Note. This figure illustrates the Cleveland crime rates for burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft per 100,000 people during the three year span.

Figure 5: Violent Crime Rates in Baltimore, MA (2014-2016)

Note. This figure illustrates the Baltimore crime rates for homicide, robbery and aggravated assault per 100,000 people during the three year span.

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Figure 6: Non-Violent Crime Rates in Baltimore, MA (2014-2016)

Note. This figure illustrates the Baltimore crime rates for auto theft, larceny and burglary per 100,000 people during the three year span.

Figure 7: Homicide Rates for All Three Cities

Note. This figure illustrates the homicide rates per 100,000 people in the three cities. -1 represents the year before the high profile incident of police use of force, 0 represents the year during and 1 represents the year after.

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Figure 8: Robbery Rates for All Three Cities

Note. This figure illustrates the robbery rates per 100,000 people in the cities. -1 represents the year before the high profile incident, 0 represents the year during and 1 represents the year after.

Figure 9: Assault Rates for All Three Cities

Note. This figure illustrates the assault rates per 100,000 people in the cities. -1 represents the year before the high profile incident, 0 represents the year during and 1 represents the year after.

Fall 2020