Communal Management of Natural Resources by Juan Martín Merlo

Investigation and Analysis of Water Management in Communities of Pifo, Ecuador Authors: Franziska Bauer, Sarah Beyer, Daria Dubovitskaya, Katarzyna Malinowska, Juan Merlo, Jonathan Steinke, Vandreé Palacios, Marco Pringgosiswojo, Sarah Zügel Supervisors: Thomas Aenis, Susanne Hofmann-Souki, Cinthya Peñaherrera July 2014

Abstract The research paper analyses the status and condition of water resources in community-based water governance systems in the parroquia of Pifo, in the vicinity of Quito, Ecuador. In recent decades, Ecuador has followed a path of decentralisation in water governance, enabling community water management systems to develop in rural areas. Seven communities were analysed in a field trial according to the principles of Elinor Ostromâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s IAD framework, identifying inputs (physical aspects of water resources, attributes of the community, rules-inuse) to the water governance, the â&#x20AC;&#x153;action situationâ&#x20AC;? itself, outputs as results of the water governance as well as criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of the water governance. The findings indicate that shortages in irrigation water exist in almost all of the communities during the dry summers due to a lack of infrastructure of pipelines and reservoirs for water provision, combined with considerable problems of inefficient distribution of existing irrigation water between the different water users, resulting in unequal access. Household water provision, however, is of good quality, sufficient and equally accessible for all water users. Due to a lack of waste water collection and treatment facilities, pollution of local water resources is at a high level, while awareness of this phenomenon and its causes remains low. Failures in horizontal and vertical coordination among the various stakeholders in water governance exacerbate the existing problems. Solutions can mainly be found in improving the knowledge of the local population, increasing communication between communal water management and higher-level governing bodies as well as within/between communities e.g. through stakeholder platforms, as well as in introducing technical solutions, such as dry toilets. A number of key strengths common to all communities have been identified which should be built on to achieve better outcomes. The strength of community water management systems will be tested in the future as it will be forced to tackle the challenges of population growth as well as the intended re-centralisation of water governance if the new water law in Ecuador is to be accepted.

Acknowledgements

Special gratitude is expressed to the people from the communities of Pifo who have helped in providing information for this report, who were welcoming and friendly, and who provided a unique opportunity for the authors to spend time and experience life within their families. The authors especially want to thank Cinthya Pe単aherrera, the director of Red Ambiental, for her invaluable support throughout this study. Thank you to the employees of the governmental bodies, the NGOs and companies who have cooperated by providing suitable and reliable information in regard to water issues. Finally, thanks a lot to everyone who made the time spent in Ecuador more comfortable.

Table of Contents Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... I Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... II Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... III List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... VIII List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... VIII List of Boxes ......................................................................................................................... VIII List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ IX 1.

Introduction to the project .................................................................................................. 1 1.1

Background .................................................................................................................. 1

1.2

The Chiche River Sub-Watershed ............................................................................... 2

1.3

Problem Definition ...................................................................................................... 3

1.4

Purpose and Output of the Research Project ............................................................... 6

Context for analysing water management in Pifo .............................................................. 8 2.1

Geography of Pifo ....................................................................................................... 8

2.2

Water Rights and Water Law .................................................................................... 11

2.3

Land Tenure ............................................................................................................... 13

2.4

Governing Bodies ...................................................................................................... 15

2.5

Preliminary conclusions of context analysis ............................................................. 17

Theoretical Underpinning for the Analysis ...................................................................... 19 3.1

Water Quality ............................................................................................................ 19

3.1.1

Surface Water Pollution ..................................................................................... 21

3.1.2

Groundwater Pollution ....................................................................................... 22

3.2

Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) ................................ 23

3.2.1 3.3

Community-Based Water Laws ......................................................................... 26

Participation ............................................................................................................... 27 III

3.3.1

Evolution of participation theory ....................................................................... 27

3.3.2

Definition and Main Aspects.............................................................................. 27

3.3.3

Participation in water management .................................................................... 28

3.3.4

Advantages and Disadvantages .......................................................................... 29

3.4

Institutional Analysis and Development Framework ................................................ 31

3.4.1

Inputs .................................................................................................................. 32

3.4.1.1

Nature of the good/biophysical conditions ................................................. 32

3.4.1.2

Attributes of the community ....................................................................... 33

3.4.1.3

Rules-in-use ................................................................................................ 33

3.4.2

Action Situation.................................................................................................. 35

3.4.3

Outcomes ............................................................................................................ 36

3.4.4

Evaluative Criteria.............................................................................................. 36

3.4.5

External variables. .............................................................................................. 37

Methodology .................................................................................................................... 40

Institutional Analysis of Water Management in Pifo ....................................................... 44 5.1

Palugo ........................................................................................................................ 44

5.1.1

Inputs .................................................................................................................. 45

5.1.1.1

Nature of the good ...................................................................................... 45

5.1.1.2

Attributes of the community ....................................................................... 47

5.1.1.3

Rules-in-use ................................................................................................ 49

5.1.2

Action Situation.................................................................................................. 50

5.1.3

Outcomes ............................................................................................................ 52

5.1.4

Evaluation........................................................................................................... 53

5.1.5

Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 54

5.2

El Tabl贸n ................................................................................................................... 55

5.2.1

Inputs .................................................................................................................. 55

5.2.1.1

Nature of the Good...................................................................................... 55

5.2.1.2

Attributes of the community ....................................................................... 56 IV

5.2.1.3

Rules-in-use ................................................................................................ 57

5.2.2

Action situation .................................................................................................. 57

5.2.3

Outcomes ............................................................................................................ 60

5.2.4

Evaluation of the action...................................................................................... 61

5.2.5

Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 63

5.3

Cochauco, Mulauco, La Virginia .............................................................................. 64

5.3.1

Inputs .................................................................................................................. 64

5.3.1.1

Nature of the good ...................................................................................... 64

5.3.1.2

Attributes of the community ....................................................................... 65

5.3.1.3

Rules-in-use ................................................................................................ 67

5.3.2

Action Situation.................................................................................................. 68

5.3.3

Outcomes ............................................................................................................ 69

5.3.4

Evaluation of the action...................................................................................... 71

5.3.5

Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 73

5.4

Itulcachi and La Cocha .............................................................................................. 74

5.4.1

Inputs .................................................................................................................. 74

5.4.1.1

Nature of the good ...................................................................................... 74

5.4.1.2

Attributes of the community ....................................................................... 76

5.4.1.3

Rules-In-Use ............................................................................................... 79

5.4.2

Action Situation.................................................................................................. 79

5.4.3

Outcome ............................................................................................................. 83

5.4.4

Evaluation of the action...................................................................................... 85

5.4.5

Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 89

5.5

Governing Bodies and Ministries .............................................................................. 90

5.5.1

Household Water ................................................................................................ 91

5.5.2

Irrigation Water .................................................................................................. 93

5.5.3

Waste Water ....................................................................................................... 96

5.5.4

Institutional matters â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the consequences of decentralisation ............................. 97 V

5.5.5 5.6

Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano ................................................................. 100

5.6.2

La Red Ambiental ............................................................................................ 101

Companies ............................................................................................................... 103

5.7.1

Novopan ........................................................................................................... 103

5.7.2

Flower companies ............................................................................................ 104

5.7.3

Poultry Farms ................................................................................................... 105

5.7.4

Landfill “Relleno Sanitario del Inga”............................................................... 106

Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 109 6.1

Review of successes against expectations ............................................................... 109

6.2

Principal problems of water governance in the communities.................................. 111

6.2.1

Waste water and pollution................................................................................ 111

6.2.2

Unequal access to water ................................................................................... 111

6.2.3

Water insufficiency .......................................................................................... 112

6.3

NGOs ....................................................................................................................... 100

5.6.1

5.7

Laws ................................................................................................................... 99

Underlying drivers of unsatisfactory outcomes ....................................................... 112

6.3.1

Infrastructure .................................................................................................... 113

6.3.2

Knowledge gaps/ poor dissemination of information ...................................... 114

6.3.3

Failures of horizontal coordination .................................................................. 115

6.3.4

Failures of Vertical Coordination ..................................................................... 118

Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 122 7.1

Technical Solutions ................................................................................................. 122

7.2

Training, education and knowledge dissemination ................................................. 126

7.3

Stakeholder platforms for improved horizontal coordination ................................. 129

7.4

Building on the existing strengths within the communities .................................... 132

Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 134

References ...................................................................................................................... 137

Annex ..................................................................................................................................... 143 VI

Annex 1: List of Problems found the Chiche River Watershed by Parroquia ................... 143 Annex 2: Effective and Potential Preliminary Solutions for the Chiche River Watershed 144 Annex 3: Hidrography of Pifo (Diagram) .......................................................................... 145 Annex 4: List of Interviewees Across Stakeholder Groups ............................................... 145 Annex 5:Interview Guidelines ........................................................................................... 147 Annex 6: Dry Sanitation Systems窶的ntelligent and innovative solutions to save on nutrients, water, costs and energy. ..................................................................................................... 158

VII

List of Figures Figure 1: Map of the parroquias of the Chiche River Sub-Watershed ...................................... 3 Figure 2: Basic Components of the IAD Framework .............................................................. 32 Figure 3: The research process steps ........................................................................................ 40 Figure 4: Irrigation water channel in Palugo ............................................................................ 47 Figure 5: The new irrigation water reservoir ........................................................................... 56 Figure 6: Illegitimate water abstraction ................................................................................... 60 Figure 7: Collection tank for household water of Cochauco, Mulauco and La Virginia ......... 65

List of Tables Table 1: Problems, Description and Linkages ........................................................................... 4 Table 2: The life zones of Pifo ................................................................................................. 10 Table 3: Roles and responsibilities of the organisations involved in water governance in Ecuador (as relevant to Pifo) .................................................................................................... 16 Table 4: Principles for successful CBNRM ............................................................................. 24 Table 5: Research Questions .................................................................................................... 37 Table 6: The research process - schedule ................................................................................. 43

List of Boxes Box 1: Water rights .................................................................................................................. 11 Box 2: CBNRM definition ....................................................................................................... 23 Box 3: Mingas .......................................................................................................................... 29 Box 4: EPMAPS Operations and Upcoming Projects ............................................................. 91 Box 5: Projects and Initiatives of the Provincial Government of Pichincha ............................ 94 Box 6: SENAGUA and Conflict Resolution. ........................................................................... 95

VIII

List of Abbreviations

CBNRM

Community-based Water Resource Management

EPMAPS

Metropolitan District of Quito Metropolitan Public Enterprise for Potable Water and Sanitation (EPMAPS, previously known as EMAAP-Q)

FLACSO

Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales

FONAG

Fund for the Protection of Water

IAD

ElinorOstromâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Institutional Analysis and Development

INDA

National Institute of Agrarian Development

INRM

Integrated Natural Resource Management

IWRM

Integrated Water Resource Management

MAGAP

Sub-secretariat for Irrigation, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Aquaculture and Fisheries

MIDUVI

Sub-ministry of Potable Water and Sanitation, Ministry of Urban Development and Housing

NGO

Nongovernmental organisation

SERIDAR

Rural Society, Economy and Natural Resources â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Integrating Competence in Rural Development

SENAGUA

National Secretariat for Water

Introduction to the project

1.1 Background “For many people living in the rural areas of the Chiche water passes by their noses without them having decent access to the resource” (Peñaherrera et al., 2010: 6)

This research project was established following the increased interest in analysing local forms of organisation and their relationship to the management of natural resources in the subwatershed of the Chiche River, located in the Pichincha province in the vicinity of Quito, Ecuador. Communities in the sub-watershed area suffer from persistent problems regarding water governance, water availability and water contamination, as has been discussed in some detail in “The Social Diagnosis of the Sub-Watershed of the Chiche River Basin” (Peñaherrera et al., 2010), compiled following extensive fieldwork and socialisation activities carried out in recent years. Red Ambiental, an NGO based in Cumbayá, Quito, aims to promote wellbeing and development from an ecological perspective so that future generations do not see their time compromised by the current modes of living. In order to achieve this, the NGO promotes citizen participation with the goal of generating sustainable production-consumption patterns, conservation and frugality through recycling activities and the creation of spaces for consumers and producers to exchange products and services in line with their values (Red Ambiental, 2014).With respect to water management, Red Ambiental has expressed strong interest in working with the communities in the Chiche sub-watershed area in order to mitigate the existing problems if further knowledge on the current situation facing those communities were to be provided. This project was therefore initiated to support the NGO by carrying out relevant research on this topic. This initiative builds on the work of SERIDAR, an action project for development and cooperation sponsored by the European Commission whose aim is to articulate the relations between the European Union and Latin America through the creation of a Competence Centre where, among other issues, rural development and natural resources are studied and evaluated 1

(Eulalinks, 2014). The research process demanded close cooperation between FLACSOEcuador and Humboldt University, commissioned by Red Ambiental. The project entailed an experiential learning process. The researchers met regularly over the course of ten weeks to explore the issues of water management in the sub-watershed of the Chiche River and subsequently carried out a literature review to gather theoretical information that would support the analysis of the case. This was followed by a visit to the field in order to gather data and contrast it with the insights gained during the desk research phase. This report is an attempt to compile and systematise the most relevant knowledge gained in the course of the activities outlined above.

1.2 The Chiche River Sub-Watershed By way of an introduction to the study region, it is worthwhile briefly outlining the administrative and geographical context of the Chiche River sub-watershed. In terms of administrative and political structures, Ecuador is divided into 24 provinces. The Pichincha province consists of eight cantons, of which the Metropolitan District of Quito is one. The latter, in turn, is divided into eleven administrative zones, each comprising several parroquias, or parishes. The micro-watershed of the Chiche river belongs to the sub-watershed of the Guayllabamba river which in turn is part of the watershed of the Esmeraldas river of Pacific Ocean slope. It covers an area of 39884 hectares and is located entirely in the Metropolitan District of Quito, covering a part of the territory of the parroquias of Tumbaco, Puembo, Pifo, La Merced and Píntag, as outlined on the

map of the area in Figure 1. Peñaherrera et al. (2010) proposed a definition that goes beyond purely geographical factors for their analysis of the Chiche watershed, aiming to reflect the close interaction between the natural resource and the societies that rely on them. A social watershed is defined as “a unit of analysis for water management in watersheds, is defined by the headwaters of streams and upland areas that serve as the source, and extending to where the streams reach to naturally and to where the water reaches the structures established by societies”. This is the definition of watershed that is used throughout this report.

Figure 1: Map of the parroquias of the Chiche River Sub-Watershed

Source: PeĂąaherrera et al., 2010

1.3 Problem Definition In order to gain a better understanding of the problem and thus more precisely define the purpose and the intended output of this research, a preliminary literature review on the water management challenges facing the population in the sub-watershed area was carried out, as presented in Table 1 below. Unless indicated otherwise, the information was sourced from PeĂąaherrera et al. (2010) â&#x20AC;&#x201C; to date, the most comprehensive report on water governance challenges in the Chiche River sub-watershed. The sub-watershed is abundant in resources yet water is scarce and, moreover, polluted by the users; industry and households alike. These phenomena occur due to the interplay of a number of socio-economic and environmental factors. Water scarcity in the sub-watershed is attributed to (a) weather fluctuations and socio-economic activities, (b) conflict of interests which lead to (c) limited supply and reach of water provision and, above all, (d) lack of enforcement of existing policies and control from authorities. Below, each factor is explained along with the interconnection between them. Additionally, the sources and causes of pollution are briefly addressed. 3

Table 1: Problems, Description and Linkages

a. Weather fluctuations

During the warm season (July-August) many water streams dry up. This has a significant impact on the water supply (domestic consumption and irrigation alike) and, given that the majority of the people living in rural areas depend on agriculture, water shortages have a direct impact on livelihoods and can be disastrous. Drought is an event of low precipitation but it is also due to the impact of complex human activities on the environment (Lybbert et al., 2013). In fact, water flow has diminished significantly in the Ecuadorian mountain region as a whole (Flacso radio, 2013) due to a wide range of factors, not solely attributable to weather fluctuations.

Even though low availability of water in the sub-watershed of the Chiche River is

a-b link

due to weather cycles, a significant role is played by political inefficiencies such as the absence of coordination due to imminent conflicts of interest. At the moment there is no agreement on who should guarantee universal access to water of acceptable quality in a timely manner and at reasonable cost. What exists is a dual (communal and private-public) water management system which reveals a historical conflict of interest.

b. Conflicts of interest

The takeover of communal water management systems by private-public partnerships is justified by the state on the grounds of pure market logic. Due to their size and lack of specialisation, community water schemes can be inefficient, thus making their service unreliable â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a problem that could be solved with the entry of a large private-public player. This approach though completely disregards the role of the communities and the work that they have done for centuries. Most indigenous communities do not trust the government in undertaking such ventures; contemporary history has taught them that public institutions are inefficient. Furthermore, they are aware of the limits of operating water management systems as businesses â&#x20AC;&#x201C; above all the resulting focus on profit rather than the wellbeing of the customers. In response to the limitations of private-public service provision, 7000 water councils are supplying water to rural areas across the country.

The current situation constitutes a political deadlock which generates water b-c link

shortages. Communal water management systems cannot further develop due to the inability to plan ahead and public-private companies are not interested in expanding their network to more rural areas amidst uncertainty.

Limited

provision

water

The area faces a population overflow; the latest indications estimate that it has increased from 70,000 up to 300,000 in the last 20 years in some areas of the watershed (Jaramillo, 2010). This exerts enormous pressure on the currently available water management systems. The water management system network has therefore expanded and decentralised in recent years to serve more residents. However, what has been observed is a concentration instead of a democratisation of the resource: the exploding urban and peri-urban populations use up the water and do not consider the implications for the rural users who have not yet gained full access. Such a process is strongly correlated with social inequality; the fact that

sections of the population are randomly prioritised over others dates back to colonial times. Today, this is reflected in uneven distribution patterns, particularly apparent in water distribution, where the worst affected groups are the indigenous people who â&#x20AC;&#x153;coincidentallyâ&#x20AC;? live further away from the water sources. A new water law has been suggested for resolving, among various other things, the limitations of the current water provision systems and optimizing the use of resources that are not de facto scarce. Unfortunately, no decision has been taken due to the fact that interests do not coincide.

Water provision is limited for the rural population in the sub-watershed due to the c-d link

existence of a rural-urban geographical and social divide1 but mostly due to the absence of laws. An updated water law is just a part of a set of policies that are missing or badly implemented.

d. Lack of/ Poor policy enforcement

d-e link

In recent years the Ecuadorian government has drafted prominent policies that deal specifically with water management but that are not being implemented. The Ecuadorian Constitution praises water rights and defends citizen participation at the same time that the Ecuadorian Government violates those rights and discourages political participation that is not aligned with the ruling party. Collective civil rights have been overly praised in the constitution (Flacso radio, 2013). The new water law does not define what constitutes a collective and this poses serious difficulties for designing and implementing policies that could protect the work that the water councils carry out. Additionally, there is no regulation for groundwater or large agribusiness players which use up much water for their production processes (i.e. sugar factories, national level; floriculture, sub-watershed level).

The existing flaws in the formulation and/or enforcement of government policies are key causes of water scarcity in the region and also have an impact on water pollution.

e. Water Pollution

There are no water treatment systems in the region e they are very much needed because water is polluted by the households, by companies and by agricultural activities alike. However, water treatment systems are a costly enterprise and the investment cannot be undertaken by municipalities alone; it requires the financial support of the central government.

Source: PeĂąaherrera et al., 2010, unless otherwise specified

Social and geographical inequalities are evidenced by the fact that 80% of smallholder farmers have access to just 12% of water in the subwatershed. Overall, the urban population tends to be prioritised over the rural population (Red Ambiental, 2010).

1.4 Purpose and Output of the Research Project Though the report “Diagnóstico social del agua en la subcuenca del río Chiche” (Peñaherrera, 2010) presents a detailed overview of water management issues in the Chiche sub-watershed, current and more detailed information about water management in the area was insufficient to allow direct engagement of the local NGO Red Ambiental. On the basis of the preliminary problem definition and the selection of the parroquia of Pifo as the focus of the research the following statement of purpose and output could be derived: The general purpose of this project is to provide information about the state of water management practices in Pifo to the NGO Red Ambiental to enable the formulation of capacity building activities for the local communities, eventually leading to more satisfactory water management in Pifo and a reduction of negative outcomes. Specifically, in order to achieve the above purpose, the need to understand and comprehensively elaborate a range of issues was recognised, resulting in the following objectives: •

Water governance in Pifo will be described and characterised, including physical, social and institutional factors;

•

Actors and power divisions within water governance will be analysed;

•

Problems within water governance in Pifo will be identified, specifically with respect to unequal access to water and contamination, based on the perceptions of both stakeholders and experts;

•

Factors leading to problems in water governance will be identified;

•

Some recommendations for interventions to improve water governance in the parroquia of Pifo will be made.

Furthermore, it was determined that the output of this research project would consist of the following written report, a preliminary presentation on site in Pifo to partners and stakeholders, and a condensed version of the final report in Spanish, to be presented to Red Ambiental. The following main research questions were derived:

1. How do the physical attributes of the resource in the region influence water governance? 2. How do the attributes of the community influence water governance? 3. What rules-in-use influence water governance? 4. What does the current water governance look like? 5. What are the outcomes that result from the current water governance structures? 6. How can outcomes resulting from water governance be evaluated? The structure of this report is, therefore, as follows: Section 2 presents the physical, institutional and social context for water governance in Pifo; Section 3 outlines the theoretical basis for the analysis, focusing on Elinor Ostromâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s IAD Framework which was chosen as the theoretical tool to guide the analysis; Section 4 describes the methodology for the fieldwork phase of the project, including the procedure of selecting the parroquia for the study; Section 5 presents and discusses the results of the fieldwork, i.e. an institutional analysis of water management in Pifo; Section 6 summarises the key successes of water management in Pifo and discusses and analyses the key problems; Section 7 provides preliminary recommendations on the basis of the problem analysis carried out and Section 8 concludes.

2 Context for analysing water management in Pifo The issues surrounding water management in Pifo and the problems that arise cannot be examined or understood in isolation. Exogenous factors, within the community and beyond, are likely to have a considerable impact on how water is managed and distributed. Therefore, this section aims to outline the broader physical, institutional and social context which would enable a better understanding of the conditions within the parroquia. In particular, the geography of Pifo, the rights to water and land, Ecuador’s Water Law and the structure of the governing bodies within the sphere of water governance are investigated and characterised and some preliminary conclusions of potential significance for Pifo are derived on that basis.

2.1 Geography of Pifo The following section is intended to provide a general overview of the physical characteristics of Pifo which may have implications for water governance in the parroquia. As previously mentioned, the parroquia of Pifo (latitude 0º 13’ 60 S, longitude 78ª 19’ 60 W) belongs to the Metropolitan District of Quito, and is located on the northeast side of this district. It is bordered to the north by the parroquias Puembo, Tababela and Yuraquí, to the south by the parroquia of Pintag, to the east by the parroquias of Oyacachi and Papallacta, and to the west by the parish of Tumbaco (Mayorga, 2011). The average annual temperature in Pifo is around 12ºC, and it has an estimated precipitation of between 500 to 1,000 mm per year. The high point of Pifo has an altitude of 4,300 meters above sea level, according to Mayorga (2011). The highest altitudes are located on the northeastern and southeastern sides of the parroquia. Those mountains and highlands are the sources of water flows used by the households and other users. Some of the most representative mountains are: Cerro Carirrumi (4,241 m), Cerro Yanaurco Chico (4,230 m), Cerro Yanaurco Grande (4,300 m), and Ñuñurcu (3748 m), in the Southeast. Loma Pishanga de Los Andes (3,794 m), Loma Pishanga (4,000 m), and Loma Pucará (3,628 m) are in the Northeast. The settlements located in the highest-lying areas are Cochauco, El Tablón, and Mulauco. The lowest point has an altitude of 2,400 m and is located in the Northwest of the parroquia, where rivers and streams lead into the Chiche River. This is where the largest settlements are located, such as the head municipality of the parroquia, and the many villages surrounding it. The predominant landscape is the middle slopes, which comprise between 25 and 50 percent of the area (Mayorga, 2011). The complexity of the different types of landscapes in the Andean zone of Ecuador allows the climate to vary within a short distance. 8

Thus, temperatures may vary considerably between the highlands, the lowlands, and the middle slopes. In regard to the hydrology, lakes, rivers, wetlands, and streams are the water bodies to be found throughout the parroquia. The lakes are located in the East, with the two most important being Lake Boyeros and Lake Yoyos. Regarding rivers, the main river is the Chiche, which is fed by the Chapahuaycu River and the Alcantarilla River. Finally, the Guambi River is another important watercourse that passes through a part of the parroquia and comprises many tributaries, of which Chantag, Moya o Guaraígu, Cuscungo, and Paccha are the most relevant, with Paccha originating within the parroquia in the San Pedro area. The Milagro stream originates in the Pacaypamba area and leads into the Paridero stream, which is a tributary of the Ayahuaycu stream. The Ayahuaycu finally reaches the Chapahuaycu River in the Tola Loma region. The Huaranga Loma stream also begins in the Paridero area, and feeds into the Paridero stream. Chulihuaycu originates in the Patapungo area, and leads directly into the Ayahuaycu. Those three water sources (Milagro, Huaranga Loma, and Chulihuaycu) flow downhill, leading into another stream, and cross close to the El Belén, Itulcachi, and La Cocha communities. Another watercourse that approaches the Ayahuaycu is the Potrerillos stream. Caryhuaycu and Huarmyhuaycu are two of the largest streams that cross the parroquia. Many water sources from the Loma Guagil Mountain intersect with the Caryhuaycu, which is tributary of the Ayahuaycu, as it flows through the region. In regard to Huarmyhuaycu, this stream passes close to the Cochauco, Mulauco, and Palugo villages before becoming part of the Churoloma stream; the Huarmyhuaycu is fed by the Méndez stream. Churoloma finally leads into the Ayahuaycu stream in the Tola Loma region. Finally, the Condehuaycu stream originates in the El Inga area near the settlement, passing between the Itulcachi and El Belén villages, and finally leading into the Alcantarilla stream in the San Salvador region; this stream then becomes the Alcantarilla River.

Table 2: The life zones of Pifo

LIFE ZONES

Lower Montane Wet Forest Montane SuperHumid Forest Subalpine Rain Forest

Lower Montane Dry Forest

CHARACTERISTICS Average CROPS Temperature annual Altitude (m) (ºC) precipitation( mm) 2,000 1,000 to Zea maiz, Solanum 12 – 18 2,000 tuberosum, Vicia faba Poor harvest, and bad 2,800 to 3,000 6 – 12 1,400 quality grasses Important zone for 3,000 -6 – -3 1,000 natural resource protection Zea maiz, Solanum tuberosum, Vicia faba, Triticum aestivum, Hordeum vulgare, Phaseolus vulgaris, 2,000 to 3,000 500 to 1,000 Cyphomandra betacea, Phaseolus vulgaris, Solanum quitoense, Physalis peruviana, Passiflora ligularis Sources: Mayorga (2011), and Holdridge (1967)

Four major life zones can be identified in the parroquia: the Lower Montane Wet Forest, the Montane Super-humid Forest, the Subalpine Rain Forest, and the Lower Montane Dry Forest (see Table 2). The ground cover is predominantly natural formations (31.9%), protected areas (31.04%), and grasses (27.5%). Covering less territory are crops (4.9%), streams (3.2%), urban areas (1.4%), and forest (0.04%) (Mayorga, 2011). There are several preliminary findings that can be drawn from the above overview: •

The high variability of altitudes is likely to pose considerable technical challenges for the construction of water infrastructure, with the added complication of the extensive planning involved for government providers of water services;

•

The concentration of the population in the lower-lying areas suggests that the needs of those located at higher altitudes might be underrepresented when decisions for the entire parroquia are discussed;

•

The different climate conditions arising from different altitudes are likely to have 10

implications for the agricultural potential of the respective regions, and therefore for the demand for irrigation water; •

The polluting behaviour of communities located at higher altitudes may affect those located downslope due to runoff;

•

As would be expected, each water stream is used by more than one community, suggesting that there are considerable benefits to be gained from elaborating common solutions to common problems.

2.2 Water Rights and Water Law In order to analyse water governance at parroquia level it is essential to gain a better understanding of the national legal structure with respect to water rights and water management and the restrictions it may impose on achieving universally beneficial outcomes.

Box 1: Water rights Water rights were defined by Boelens and Hoogendam to be “authorised demands to use (part) of water, including certain privileges, restrictions, obligations, and sanctions accompanying this authorisation, among which a key element is the power to take part in collective decision-making about system management and direction.” (Beccar et al., 2002) Water rights especially in collective action system should be distinguished between operational and decision-making rights. Operational water rights include the right to use the infrastructure and part of the water flow and taking positions for management tasks. Decisionmaking rights give the individual the right to take decisions, allow changes and modify the system. However, the ability of an individual to take advantage of those rights may vary considerably between different social groups (Beccar et al., 2002). The relationship between water rights and water management is based on the fact that water rights can be seen as the basic structure shaping water management both in terms of its general structures and in the power relationships within water management by constituting, producing and reproducing the core of these relations (Beccar et al., 2002).

The Constitution of Ecuador (2008) recognises the fundamental right to water (a “national strategic asset for use by the public”) which is considered “inalienable, not subject to a statute of limitations, immune from seizure and essential for life” (Constitution of Ecuador, 2008). Acquisition of water rights by private actors is prohibited by the state, as are any transactions based on those rights. Article 318 attributes the exclusiveness of water management activities to either the public sector or communities and prioritises the use of water for human consumption and domestic purposes over all other uses (USAID, 2011).

After the Constitution, the Water Law of 1972 is the most important legal document concerning ownership and control of water. It states that the use of water resources is subject to the granting of a concession by SENAGUA (the National Water Secretariat), although concessions are not required for drinking water, livestock or bathing purposes. In 2004, the Water Law was amended by a bill that gave legitimacy and authority to the local Water councils (juntas de agua) and Irrigation Councils (juntas de riego) by allowing them to collect fees from users for the provision of water and maintenance of water management systems (USAID, 2011).

Replacing the outdated legislation by a New Water Law has been under discussion for many years. A pre-legislation draft was presented to the National Assembly in 2009 but it has not yet been approved. The New Law would address the problems caused by the currently fragmented water management structure in Ecuador; namely, the lack of equity in access and distribution of water, as well as the hegemony of the irrigation sector and the weak participation of the public sector (Aqua de los Andes, 2013). However, the law is highly controversial. It defines SENAGUA, an agency of the central government as the sole authority for planning, regulating and controlling water access while the Local Autonomous and Decentralized Governments are responsible for the provision of water for domestic consumption, sewage systems and water waste management (Secretaría del Agua, 2014). Such law, leaves other stakeholders involved – i.e. the communities in the Andes – out of the equation and makes communal water management systems illegal (Sindicatos por el Agua, 2013). In sum, the legitimacy and authority that Water and Irrigation Councils were granted a decade ago would be revoked. Contenders of the New Water Law sustain that this would enable privatisation of water resources (Kennemore& Weeks, 2011), despite it being unconstitutional.

An important legal distinction to consider is the difference between statutory and customary laws. According to the customary practices water is not a commodity; instead it is regarded as sacred and belonging to the communities (Andolina, 2012). Indigenous communities share water resources in a participatory manner, whereby everyone has a right to use water and irrigation infrastructure (USAID, 2011). In fact, internal statutes drafted by each community and the so-called Law for All Members form a customary legal regime which sets out water management rights and obligations of all members within an indigenous group (Ramazotti, 2008). However, these laws and practices are not recognised as official despite being respected and acknowledged by the government; water is a national (not a communal) good and it should be available for public use as indicated in the Constitution (2008). Customary rights are therefore directly in conflict with statutory rights and are in danger of being outlawed.

2.3 Land Tenure Land tenure is the relationship among individuals or groups with respect to land, and includes other natural resources, such as water and trees. Land tenure is a set of rules which define how property rights to land are to be allocated within societies (FAO 2002). In simple words, they determine who can use which resources for how long, and under what conditions. These rules may be legal, i.e. established by the state, or customary. Land tenure is multidimensional and it constitutes an important part of social, political and economic structures. Land tenure relationships should be clearly defined and enforceable in a formal court of law or through customary structures in a community. Tenure security refers to the assurance that the land one owns or holds for an agreed period of time or purpose is certain (Payne et al., 2013). Tenure security requires property rights that are clear in purpose and duration and accepted as legitimate and legal. Without clear definitions ambiguities within and between the customary and statutory systems may arise, leading to the following intersecting interests (FAO, 2001): - Overriding interests: when sovereign powers (for example, a community) have the power to allocate or reallocate land through expropriation; - Overlapping interests: when several parties are allocated different rights to the same parcel of land; 13

- Complementary interests: when different parties share the same interest in the same parcel of land (for example common rights for grazing lands); - Competing interests: when two parties contest the same interests in the same parcel.

The link between land tenure and water management can be explained in the words of Bossio et al., (2010): â&#x20AC;&#x153;key to effective water resources management is understanding that the water cycle and land management are inextricably linked: that every land use decision is a water use decisionâ&#x20AC;?. The Constitution of Ecuador states that land belonging to indigenous communities is not divisible, conveyable or subject to legal attachment. This has precedence in the general principles of private rural property established in 1994 by the Agrarian Development Act (USAID, 2011) and provides the legal authority to the communities to manage their land, and therefore the existing water resources as well.

However, there is high insecurity regarding land tenure in Ecuador because the process of securing property rights through titling presents significant challenges. The land market in Ecuador is largely informal and there is a dearth of data on land transactions. It is estimated that 60% of rural properties lack current record, and 12% lack titles (IDB, 2010).The titling and registration system is characterised by poor access to the system and high transaction costs of the process. To add to the bureaucratic complications, there are two organisations directly responsible for titling and neither of them has sufficient resources to fulfil its responsibilities. These offices are the National Institute of Agrarian Development (INDA) and the local representatives of the Notary Public and Municipal office (USAID, 2011).

The governmental organisations responsible for land administration are in a state of continuous change. The legal framework for land tenure and property rights in Ecuador, although well intentioned, is hindered by numerous gaps and contradictions, lack of implementation and poor intergovernmental coordination (USAID, 2011). The National Agrarian Development Administration, which reports directly to the Ministry of Agriculture (MAGAP), is in charge of implementing the Agrarian Development Law (Ley de Desarrollo Agrario) which addresses the legalisation of land rights and tenure and the further development of agriculture (USAID, 2011). Data on land rights and ownership for Ecuador is very limited, and rather than serving as a guide, current legal instruments have been a source of conflict and confusion (Dagnino et al., 2013). 14

2.4 Governing Bodies In Ecuador, there are many relevant government and community organizations linked to water management activities and water provision. As expressed by Hoogester (2012), the process of economic integration and neo-liberal restructuring, which started in the early 1980s, dramatically reconfigured the social and political landscape in Ecuador. Policies and regulations concerning water management shifted roles and responsibilities from national to local government and other intermediate-level bodies, while also changing the institutional setup. Within the context of rapid changes and inspired by new policies, direct state involvement in the domestic water use sector and irrigation sector was significantly reduced. Through various programs, rules and rights the state was to create the incentives for civil society, market forces and the private sector to play a more prominent role in various areas of water governance. While moving away from direct management and leaving more space for autonomous bodies, however, the state did not provide any political will or institutional capacity to generate a real space for local rule-making autonomy (Hoogesteger, 2012).

Additionally, Ecuador was experiencing a rapid succession of presidents within a short period of time, each with their own vision regarding water governance. However, the inauguration of Rafael Correa as president in 2007 marked the arrival of a more politically coherent period, and a true turning point for decentralisation of water governance. Therefore, the process of decentralisation has not yet been completed despite the sufficient political will to empower local jurisdictions and provide them with the necessary resources and capacity to carry out their responsibilities. Clashes between the government and the communities pose a significant hindrance to achieving full decentralisation. Nonetheless, the water governance sector today is perceived as being more stable than in previous years (Dagnino et al. 2013).

Water management is a shared responsibility among public institutions at the national, regional, provincial and local levels (Dagnino et al. 2013), namely the National Secretariat for Water, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, the Provincial Government of Pichincha, the Secretariat for the Environment of the Metropolitan District of Quito, and the Metropolitan Public Enterprise for Potable Water and Sanitation (IUCN, 2009). In addition, the local Water and Irrigation Councils are important stakeholders, as is FONAG (Fund for the Protection of Water). The roles and organisations of the abovementioned organisations are outlined in Table 3. 15

Table 3: Roles and responsibilities of the organisations involved in water governance in Ecuador (as relevant to Pifo)

Institution

Level

Official roles and responsibilities

SENAGUA (National

National

- Development of integrated water management with

Secretariat for Water)

an ecosystems-based, sustainable approach - Promoting

criteria

preservation,

conservation and sustainable use of water in sectoral policies - Promoting the protection of watersheds - Implementation of policies, strategies and norms to prevent and control contamination of water sources - Mitigation of water-related risks

MAGAP(Sub-secretariat

National

for Irrigation, Ministry of

- Tertiary irrigation canals, i.e. the linkage between the farms and the greater irrigation network - Planning, regulation and monitoring of the integrated

Agriculture, Livestock, Aquaculture and Fisheries)

management of irrigation and drainage systems - Providing

technical

assistance

and

specialized

information

MIDUVI(Sub-ministry of

National

- Establishment of sectoral policies - Development of technical standards for potable water,

Potable Water and Sanitation, Ministry of

sanitation and solid waste services in households

Urban Development and Housing)

Provincial Government of Provincial

- Planning, construction, operations and maintenance of the irrigation systems in the province of Pichincha

Pichincha

- Providing various informational books and leaflets for

school-age

children and

for

water

users

themselves - Organising trainings and information sessions

Secretariat for the

Municipal/

Environment,

cantonal

- Monitoring the quality of the environment in the municipality of Quito by means of environmental

Metropolitan District of

impact assessments and subsequent issue of permits

Quito

and certificates - Following government policy delineated in the Plan Metropolitano de Desarollo and approved by the Consejo Cantonal, i.e. the governing council for the municipality of Quito

EPMAPS(Metropolitan

Municipal/

Public Enterprise for

cantonal

- Provision of drinking water services to the population of the Metropolitan District of Quito

Potable Water and

- Provision of water treatment services

Sanitation (previously

- Planning,

known as EMAAP-Q)

design

and

implementation

new

infrastructure

FONAG(Fund for the

Municipal/

Protection of Water)

cantonal

- Trust fund aiming to protect and rehabilitate the environment,

particular

the

sub-watersheds

supplying water to the residents of the Metropolitan District of Quito - Knowledge dissemination, restoration of vegetation coverage, environmental education for school-age children, technical research on sub-watersheds, and control of protected areas.

Water councils

Parroquia

- Service provision, operation and maintenance of household water systems

Irrigation Councils

Parroquia

- Service provision, operation and maintenance of irrigation water systems

Source: Websites of the respective organisations (2014); Pe単aherrera et al. (2010).

2.5 Preliminary conclusions of context analysis The physical, institutional and social context for water management in Pifo, presented above, suggests some preliminary conclusions of relevance to this study. The physical idiosyncrasies of the terrain indicate that the technical and infrastructural requirements for sufficient and 17

equitable water distribution may be considerable. Inequalities in physical conditions may be related to social inequalities which may, in turn, induce opportunistic behaviour within disadvantaged groups, which is likely to be exacerbated by uncertainties relating to land tenure. These factors, as well as the legal framework, provide further justification for focusing on community-based water management structures as a time-tested approach to mitigating social problems related to water use, particularly since the current reforms may threaten the existence of such structures. Community-based management of water resources should be analysed and understood within the broader institutional framework, especially given the complex system of government bodies and the distribution of their spheres of competence that resulted from the decentralisation process of the recent decades.

3 Theoretical Underpinning for the Analysis

The analysis of water governance in Pifo carried out in the course of this project required a theoretical foundation which would help to understand the physical and institutional aspects of water governance and provided a conceptual framework for the field research. With respect to the physical aspects, a review of factors affecting water quality and of parameters for analysing it was carried out. On the institutional side, given the current prevalence of the discussion on the relative merits of community-run water management systems as compared to a more government-centric approach, it was considered worthwhile to outline the key characteristics and theoretical benefits associated with community-based natural resource management and the closely related topic of participatory management. Theoretical analysis of the latter is particularly relevant given the emphasis placed by Red Ambiental on community-level actions. Lastly, Elinor Ostrom’s IAD framework was selected to guide the analysis.

3.1 Water Quality Water quality is determined by the content of compounds which mix with the water along the water cycle. It tends to vary naturally over time and through space, depending both on the season and on the kinds of rocks and soil through which the water moves. The water source plays a significant role in determining the quality of water, and there are three main sources that are typically used to collect drinking water (CAWST, 2013): •

Groundwater: Water that is found beneath the earth’s surface and fills the fractures of rock formations and the soil pore spaces, creating an aquifer. Most of the drinking water in the world comes from below the ground. Aquifers enable natural purification of water by acting as a filter that traps sediment and other particles. Despite that, groundwater can contain a high concentration of some elements, depending on the type of rock and mineral that characterises the aquifer in question.

•

Surface water: Water that flows in a stream, river, lake, pond, spring or similar source. Due to its open feature which is highly susceptible to every contaminant, surface water is generally unsafe to drink without pre-treatment. Upstream water is usually of better quality than

downstream water and, wherever possible, should be sourced at a distance of more than 30m from a latrine. •

Rainwater: Precipitation water that is collected and stored using a receptacle such as a roof top or via a direct catchment like ground surface or rock. The quality of rainwater collected from a roof surface is usually better than that from a ground surface or rock catchment sincethe ground is more susceptible to contaminants.

According to the UNICEF (2010) Technical Bulletin No.6 there are three main parameters to establish water quality: 1. Microbiological parameters: bacteria, viruses, protozoa, and worms; 2. Physical parameters: turbidity, conductivity, colour, taste and odour; 3. Harmful chemicals: nitrate, iron, arsenic, fluoride, lead, cyanide, metals (aluminium, cadmium, chromium, copper, manganese, mercury), selenium, organics (including pesticides and disinfectant by-products), alkalinity and corrosivity.

Safe drinking water should be clear, free from pathogens, have a low concentration of toxic chemicals, and be odourless and tasteless. There are guidelines for drinking water quality created by the World Health Organization but those are merely recommended targets for countries to work towards and not mandatory parameters. Further to those guidelines, every country has developed their own national standards based on the consideration of the environmental, social, cultural, and economic circumstances particular to the country. In Ecuador, the established minimum permissible standard for potable water is stated in the Norma Técnica Ecuatoriana(NTE,2011). Water for irrigation is subject to less stringent quality standards, meaning water of lower quality is acceptable for agriculture, compared to domestic users. However, several factors should be taken into account regarding the possible long-term effects on soils and plant production, as well as possible health risks (Bauder et al., 2007): •

Type of the irrigated crops, distinguishing between i) those not intended for human consumption, ii) for cooked consumption, iii) for raw consumption and iv) aquaculture (Ayers et al., 1985). Indeed, more precautions should be taken for the quality of irrigation water for the production of crops that will be eaten raw, compared to crops not intended for consumption or those that have to be cooked. On the other hand, the type of the crop also determines its tolerance against the following factors.

•

Salinity hazard in water: total soluble salt content

•

Sodium hazard in water: relative proportion of sodium to calcium and magnesium ions

•

pH-value of water

•

Alkalinity in water: carbonate and bicarbonate

•

Specific ions or trace elements in water: chloride, sulfate, boron, and nitrate

•

Health criteria: Freedom from gross solids; significant removal of parasite eggs; significant removal of microbial pathogens (not more than 100 coliform organisms per 100 ml in 80% of samples); no chemicals that lead to undesirable residues in crops or fish; no chemicals that lead to irrigation of mucous membranes and skin (WHO, 1973).

The standards for irrigation water usage in Ecuador are stated in “Revisión y actualización de la norma de calidad ambiental y de descarga de efluentes: recurso agua” published by the Ministry of the Environment.

3.1.1

Surface Water Pollution

Before regulatory measures regarding pollution of the water bodies can be derived and implemented, the source of the pollution should be defined. In general, there are two main types of pollutant source: 1) Point Source Water pollution that comes from a single, identifiable source is known as “point source”. A detailed definition can be found in the U.S. Clean Water Act (EPA, 2012a). “The term "point source" means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.” Examples of sources in this category include discharges from a sewage system, a factory, a city storm drain, or dumping of garbage and livestock waste. This type of pollution is easier to analyse as its source is identifiable. 2) Non-Point Source Contrary to point-source, non-point source pollution does not originate directly from one source but rather indirectly from many diffuse sources, complicating identification and 21

analysis. This category covers the inputs and impacts that develop over a wide area, such as particular modalities of land use. The pollutants can be excess fertilisers, herbicides and insecticides from agricultural land; Oil, grease and toxic contaminants from urban runoff; Sediment from improperly covered rural land and eroding stream banks; Salt and nutrients from irrigation practices; Acid drainage from abandoned mines; Bacteria and nutrients from livestock and landfill. The pollutants are carried by the rainfall and runoff to the water bodies (EPA, 2012b). 3.1.2

Groundwater Pollution

Groundwater can become polluted if the pollutants are being carried by the water as it seeps through the soil to the ground water. The pollutants can originate from the soil or rock, and can occur in the form of liquid hazardous substances that soak down through the soil or rock into the groundwater. Some examples of such pollutants are excess nutrients, especially nitrogen from agricultural land that infiltrates the ground; nutrients, pathogenic microbials and toxic contaminants from landfills; heavy metals from rock minerals.

The above overview has a number of implications for the study of water governance in Pifo. Firstly, the importance of the source of the water should be noted â&#x20AC;&#x201C; polluting behaviour on the part of the rural residents, for instance, is likely to have much more serious and lasting consequences on human health if the population relies on surface water. In this case, enforceable sanctions would be particularly important. The nature of pollution â&#x20AC;&#x201C; whether it is point-source or non-point-source â&#x20AC;&#x201C; would also be significant for the ability of the water users and governing bodies to identify the key actors responsible, as well as for the possibility of holding them to account. Lastly, the list of parameters necessary to establish water quality, i.e. a pre-treatment process that is likely to be considerably beyond the capacity of the communal water systems, implies that the water users in the communities are either accepting significant risks when drinking water from the communal systems or that communal water is more likely to be used for irrigation.

3.2 Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) Integrated Natural Resource Management (INRM), including the specific case of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), was the paradigm that preceded CBNRM. IWRM sets as its objective the integration of environmental, economic, social and geographic (development of sub-watershed water management) issues into former water management mechanisms. Based on the Polluter Pays and User Pays principles, measures such as increased formalisation of water rights, cost recovery and water prices as well as new formations of institutions covering sub-watershed management were developed (Van Koppen et al., 2007). Later, to include community structures, laws, norms and institutions, the CBNRM approach was developed to make use of the benefits of the community structures and to incorporate them into the effective management of natural resources.

Box 2: CBNRM definition Community-based natural resource management was defined by Child and Lyman (2005) as â&#x20AC;&#x153;a process by which landholders gain access and use rights to, or ownership of, natural resources; collaboratively and transparently plan and participate in the management of resource use; and achieve financial and other benefits from stewardshipâ&#x20AC;?. CBNRM is an approach to managing natural resources on the basis of community participation in management and decision-making. The development of social capital in terms of networks, knowledge, institutions and trust determines the capability of a community to manage the natural resource in question (Gruber, 2010).

According to Renard (1991), CBNRM provides four main benefits: 1. Democratic and equity enhancement. Decision-making and management occurs at the local level and includes all stakeholders directly affected by the decisions being made. 2. Economic and technical efficiency. Local responsibility and local resources (human resources as well as land, knowledge, techniques, etc.) reduce the need for outside enforcement. 3. Responsiveness. CBNRM effectively adapts to change and participants of community become quickly aware of changing conditions. 4. Stability and commitment. It prevents top-down management and boosts participation.

The degree to which the benefits that CBNRM provides are realised depends on the fulfilment of 12 basic principles which have been identified by Gruber (2010) and which are summarised in Table 4 below. 23

Table 4: Principles for successful CBNRM

Participation further empowers citizens and is driven by local knowledge Public participation

which initiates in communal action. In planning CBNRM active participation

and mobilisation

should be a feature at all times: from planning and information gathering to objective setting and decision making.

Social capital and collaborative partnerships

Collaborative decisions lead to a stronger sense of commitment, which lasts longer the more social capital is fostered. Transparent and fair distribution of resources must exist for communal

Resources and equity

management not to result in the concentration of resources in the hands of the few.

Communication and

Flow of information and proactive communication between actors is

information

fundamental to the functioning of a group in a communal, cooperative

dissemination

manner.

Research and

Ongoing refinement and extension of the knowledge on the natural resource

information

in question enables the community to adapt and improve its management

development

practices.

Devolution and

Indigenous and scientific knowledge should be emphasised in order to

empowerment

empower the communities before authority is returned to them and the right to self-determination is established.

Public trust and legitimacy Monitoring, feedback, and accountability

Community leaders are crucial for achieving this precondition. It demands a close relationship between decision makers and community members. Systems that provide the means to rapidly adapt to changes and steer action are fundamental for the well-functioning of CBNMR.

Adaptive leadership

The high demand for coordination requires dynamic leaders for managing

and co-management

communal natural resources.

Participatory decision making

Decisions in a community must be democratic, inclusive and participatory in order to reveal the will and the needs of the group as a whole.

Clear resource borders, pre-defined community structures, willingness to Enabling

participate, a common goal and adequate2 external support are some of the

environment

aspects that must be present in an environment that enables CBNMR practices.

Conflict resolution and cooperation.

A community cannot function as such if conflicts are present and cooperation is weak. Conflict resolution mechanisms and strong cooperation among actors are thus two further preconditions for CBNMR.

Source: Gruber, 2010 Elinor Ostrom established eight principles how to set up a successful CBNRM in her book “Governing the Commons” (Ostrom, 1990). These can be seen as more practical guide comprising direct instructions on how a CBNRM can work successfully. 1. The CBRNM as well as individual boundaries have to be defined clearly. 2. Appropriation (quantity, time, place) and provision rules (labour, material, money) must match local needs and conditions. 3. The system must allow for the modification of operational rules for those affected by the rules. 4. External monitoring should be used and it should be ensured that appropriators can be held accountable. 5. Graduated sanctions for those violating the operational rules should be allowed. 6. The system needs to ensure that conflict-resolution areas can be assessed quickly, are low-cost and conflict-resolution mechanisms are in place. 7. The CBNRM and its authorities must be respected by external bodies. 8. The responsibility for all of the above functions must be distributed between “layers” of nested enterprises. (Ostrom, 1990). It should be noted that, once established, CBNRM should empower communities and strengthen community structures. Government organisations should only have a limited role in the direct functioning of CBNRM. However, they are expected to contribute indirectly and to create an enabling environment through policies related to conflict mediation; coordination,

Adequate support would not undermine the sovereignty of a community but rather genuinely assist in the fulfillment of its demands.

implementation and enforcement of regulations; incentives for collective action; the right to self-regulate; and technical assistance. All of these would contribute to the establishment of CBNRM and the transformation (devolution) of state-led management into management of resources by the community (Renard, 1991).

The Gruber principles are essential for understanding the theoretical underpinning of successful CBNRM and are closely related to the analysis stages of the IAD Framework which will be presented in Section 3.4.

3.2.1

Community-Based Water Laws

As CBNRM projects and structures usually result in and can easily be based on community law, it is important to consider how community law works, how it is enforced and what advantages it offers to the community, and hence CBNRM structures. Community-based water law is defined by Van Koppen et al. (2007) as a “set of mostly informal institutional, socio-economic and cultural arrangements that shape communities’ development, use, management, allocation, quality control and productivity of water resources”. These water laws may and often do exist only in oral form and are usually part of local governance structures and normative frameworks or clans, communities and other cultural groupings. Advantages of such types of community-based water laws are, for example, that they are robust and dynamic. Community water management is adapted to local ecological, social and economic conditions and will always be altered according to the community’s needs. The second advantage is that community-based laws are not necessarily bound by social borders, but are rather applied on a larger scale as well – in terms of water management this could be sub-watershed or watershed management. Thirdly, as for CBNRM, community laws are usually entrenched in member participation and responsibility, raising incentives to follow the local laws as these are understood well, or even are self-designed. Hierarchies in communities support the enforcement of water laws, as the authoritative body in a community is both feared and valued and hence may facilitate communication and implementation of water law (Van Koppen et al., 2007). As far as the negative aspects are concerned, community law may be able to adapt to small changes in external conditions but is usually insufficient in achieving higher living standards 26

when dealing with major obstacles such as urbanisation, migration, droughts, population growth, etc. As communities are heterogeneous and hierarchal, discrimination due to gender, ethnicity, class, and other parameters need to be addressed by public bodies (Van Koppen et al., 2007). Analogous advantages and disadvantages can be derived for CBNRM.

CBNRM theory and the principles of communal laws serve as a useful introduction to the topic of communal water management and provide some initial indications of what the successes and failures of a system could depend on. These Ostrom principles in particular are likely to be particularly useful for the evaluation of the key problems facing the communities in Pifo with respect to water governance and will be revisited in Section 6.

3.3 Participation 3.3.1

Evolution of participation theory

Participation as a concept has gained popularity in the 90s and is now present in almost all development projects. It represents a significant departure from the global, top-down strategies that were commonly used in early development initiatives in favour of more locally sensitive methodologies (Claridge, 2004). The popularity of participation has its roots in the recognition that in order to achieve sustainable results all stakeholders needs to be involved in development planning, decisions and implementation. In other words, new technical and normative designs should no longer be forced onto a system, but rather carefully adapted to individual users. 3.3.2

Definition and Main Aspects

Participation is a very broad concept that can be interpreted in different ways and has a multitude of accepted applications. The following definition is a good holistic starting point for explaining the concept: â&#x20AC;&#x153;a social process whereby specific groups with shared needs living in a defined geographic area actively pursue identification of their needs, take decisions and establish mechanisms to meet these needsâ&#x20AC;? (cited in Ndekhaet al.,2003). Within multiple attempts to define participation the role of community in the decision-making process is the most apparent commonality that should be highlighted (Claridge, 2004). Essential

components of participation are access to information, equality, common language, good atmosphere, transparency, interaction and incentives. Because of the multiple interpretations of participation, confusion is common regarding understanding the difference between participation and consultation. It is therefore very important to stress that participation indicates an active role for the community, leading to significant control over decisions, whereas consultation means sharing of information, and not necessarily power. Sharing of power is a fundamental aspect of participation: power depends on knowledge and the economic and social status, and therefore sharing that power ensures that the interests of the whole community and not only of selected individuals will be pursued (Boelens, 2002). Participation is very often limited to a simple sharing of information, labour input, payment of fees, contribution of materials and providing information on how to organise and use the technological system ‘responsibly’. Truly empowering participation, however, starts when the stakeholders are able to formulate future plans and take control over local decisions, sometimes also independently of external institutions. In many cases, participation is only seen as a tool that can be helpful in implementing a project and not as an end that could reverse the relationship of domination between rural populations and policy makers.

3.3.3

Participation in water management

Participation, together with access to information and transparency, is the criterion of good governance that helps to reinforce the rule of law and fight corruption. In case of water management, participation can help to create networks of water arrangements, bringing dynamism as well as publicity to the water sector. Such participation generates trust and empowerment among stakeholders, and secures respect and support for the decision-making process (IUCN, 2009). Additionally, participation can be seen as a farmer’s investment to protect his or her water rights. In the indigenous communities of the Andes these rights mostly refer to access to water, use of infrastructure and decision-making concerning system management. These rights can only be earned via organisation, design and construction of water systems. According to various studies, farmers do not recognise their rights by virtue of merely paying fees to the state. Many of them, for example farmers from Licto, Ecuador, follow a norm that states: “only those who work in mingas, who pay the dues that have been agreed upon 28

collectively and who take part in assemblies are entitled to water” (Boelens, 2002). This system not only helps to obtain the rights, but also assures material and intellectual input, strengthens collective enforcement of intra-communal water distribution agreements and assures infrastructure maintenance. The importance of mingas, i.e. the practical embodiment of the concept of participation, within the Ecuadorian context cannot be overstated. The social phenomenon is outlined in more detail in the Box below. Box 3: Mingas Minga comes from Quechua, an Andean indigenous language, and it means “collective work”. It is a term for describing collective practices that this widely used both orally and in practice by people living in poor areas of the Andes –indigenous and mestizo alike. For a long time, communal leaders in the Andes have identified minga as successful means to organize people and, in turn, labour. The use of minga dates back to colonial times, where people were organized work collectively in mines and the construction of public infrastructure. The aim, however, was not merely purposeful but also symbolic in the sense that minga revealed the absence of state action in indigenous territories and affirmed the effective response of communal work. Hence, minga goes against top-down, imposed plans directed by the state which are often considered to be in the best interest of all people; minga denotes independence and self-sufficiency. Source: (Pool, 2008)

3.3.4

Advantages and Disadvantages

The importance of community participation is well established in the literature and its benefits are visible in many development projects. Participation is a catalyst for further development and it encourages a sense of responsibility. Moreover, it ensures that “things are done the right way”, specific for individual users, and that services are provided cheaper (Claridge, 2004). Participation uses valuable indigenous knowledge, frees the stakeholders from dependence on the skills of others and makes them more conscious of the causes of their poverty and what they can do about it. In other words – it empowers all community members. Empowerment is one of the most widely recognised benefits of participation and the two terms are inseparably linked. Participation is therefore a process which enhances the capacity of individuals to improve their own lives and facilitates social change. Despite the importance and benefits listed above, participation has several limitations, mostly in relation to being context-specific. There are four main constraints to participation: 29

institutional, cultural, knowledge and financial. Moreover, there are limits to what participation can achieve in terms of equity and efficiency, given pre-existing socioeconomic inequalities and power relations. Participation may also simply not occur in practice due to the following barriers: economic, political and professional (Claridge, 2004). Economic barriers relate to simple cost-benefit calculations: benefits must be greater than the costs. Political barriers are put forward as a reason for non-participation because full participation might simply not be in the political interest of other actors in the project. Professional barriers arise from the fact that the professional training and culture of some specialists goes against the concept of full participation, emphasizing that “professionals know best”. More criticism comes from the fact that participatory discourses and methods very often rely on implicit assumptions that are in fact sociological illusions, which often leads to disappointing practices. These illusions are: the illusion of community, the illusion of transparent communication and the empiricist illusion (Delville et al., 2001). The term “community” often idealises the local society and underestimates its dynamics, differentiations and internal power struggles. All societies are divided according to status, gender, generation, income etc. Participation can also be relative when it only involves the most powerful, meaning that the weak and the poor are excluded. This leaves plenty of room for manipulation and could also strengthen the power of dominant groups. The problem with communication arises from the fact that it is usually marked by the context and unconscious reproduction of schema of domination: people might not necessarily say what they think, but rather what, in their opinion, should be said. Finally, the empiricist illusion means that understanding and correctly interpreting the problems of the communities is only possible when all aspects of their farming, production or irrigation systems are well known, and all information is easily available (Delville et al., 2001).

In terms of the implications for this study, participation theory raises some interesting points which deserve to be investigated. Firstly, the social phenomenon of mingas appears to be highly significant both for general coordination within rural communities and for providing vital infrastructure. Participation in mingas and the types of projects that are typically undertaken within the communities in Pifo should be explored. Secondly, the extent and nature of participation in water governance across all water users in the region, including possible power imbalances, would be of considerable interest for the study. Thirdly, the implications of the co-existence of two water systems (public and communal) from the point 30

of view of participation, for instance whether the public water systems involve the water users in any way, would be worth examining. Lastly, participation theory could provide some suggestions for how the existing water management systems could be improved, or how the local water users can take greater control over the outcomes. It would also be worthwhile to consider this concept when identifying possible intervention modalities for Red Ambiental.

3.4 Institutional Analysis and Development Framework Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework was considered to be ideally suited for the purposes of analysing water governance in a rural context since the tool was specifically developed to guide the analysis of community-based resource management systems. It encompasses the concepts of CBNRM and participation theory and serves to clearly outline the role those factors play in determining outcomes of water governance. The IAD Framework helps to identify the major types of structural variables that are present to some extent in all institutional arrangements and to understand the ways in which institutions operate and change over time (McGinnis, 2011; Ostrom, 2011). In the context of the Framework, institutions are defined as human-constructed constraints or opportunities within which individual choices take place and which shape the consequences of their choices. The analysis involves the decomposition of institutional contexts into their component parts as a prelude to understanding how these parts affect each other and how institutions shape outcomes. Development is interpreted broadly as referring to the processes of dynamic changes of institutions as well as changes in their effects over time (McGinnis, 2013). The IAD framework consists of four basic components: •

Inputs, which include the contextual factors (nature of the good/biophysical conditions, attributes of the community and rules-in-use) that encompass all aspects of the social, cultural, institutional, and physical environment that set the context for the action situation;

•

Action situation, which consists of interactions and represents the “black box” where policy and action choices are made;

•

Outcomes, that are shaped by both the outputs of the action situation and by external variables;

•

Evaluative criteria, against which actions and outcomes area appraised(McGinnis, 2013).

All relevant explanatory factors and variables are assigned to those four basic components which in turn are located within a foundational structure of logical relationships:

Figure 2: Basic Components of the IAD Framework

Source: Ostrom, 2011 3.4.1

Inputs

3.4.1.1 Nature of the good/biophysical conditions Physical and material conditions influence action situations and constrain institutional arrangements (Polski & Ostrom, 1999). Here they are defined as the physical resources related to providing and producing goods and services. Given the emphasis of the research on the analysis of water governance, the physical and material conditions of interest could be specified as follows: •

The physical resources that are required to provide and produce water-related goods and services, such as technology and infrastructure;

•

The scale and scope of water provision, as well as the availability of water resources in Pifo in terms of quality and quantity;

•

The impact of the regional economy on the biophysical status of the water resources, such as water usage in industry and agriculture, including water use practices of households;

•

The factors contributing to water pollution, since water pollution limits the availability of useable water resources.

3.4.1.2 Attributes of the community Attributes of the community are used to encompass all relevant aspects of the social and cultural context within which an action situation is located. Attributes of a community affect the action situation through the generally accepted norms, the degree of a common understanding potential participants share about certain activities in an area, and the extent to which the participants’ values, beliefs, and preferences about strategies and outcomes are homogeneous (Polski & Ostrom, 2011). The following community attributes are particularly relevant for analysing water management: •

The degree of trust in the community, which is the extent to which members of a community feel confident that other members will not take maximum advantage of vulnerabilities and/or will come to assistance when needed;

•

The existing reciprocity of behaviour, which encourages members of a group to cooperate with others who have cooperated with them in previous encounters;

•

The common understanding, which is the extent to which members of a community share the same core values or goals as other members of that community; and

•

The social capital, which is used in two senses: -

The resources that an individual can draw upon in terms of relying on others to provide support or assistance in times of need; and

The communities’ aggregate supply of potential assistance generated by stable networks of important interactions among members of that community. (McGinnis, 2013).

3.4.1.3 Rules-in-use Rules-in-use designate all relevant aspects of the institutional context within which an action situation is located. They can be divided into formal rules (or rules-on-paper) and informal rules, norms and strategies that tend to be used in real settings and on a regular basis by participants. Rules are frequently nested in other sets of rules that define how lower-level rules function (McGinnis, 2013). 33

Three levels of rules are distinguished that cumulatively affect the actions taken and outcomes obtained in any policy situation: â&#x20AC;˘

Rules on the constitutional choice level legitimise and constitute all relevant collective entities involved in collective or operational choice processes. They determine who is eligible to participate in crafting collective-choice rules and how these rules may be changed;

â&#x20AC;˘

Rules on the collective choice level determine who is eligible to participate in the relevant activities affecting the operating level and how operating rules may be changed. Institutions are constructed and decisions are made on the collective choice level by those actors authorised to participate in the collective decisions as a consequence of the rules on the constitutional choice level;

â&#x20AC;˘

Rules on the operational level are implementations of practical decisions by those individuals who have been authorised (or allowed) to take actions as a consequence of collective choice processes. Most individuals affected by rules on the operational level can participate in modifying the operational rules (Kiser & Ostrom, 2000).

Box 3: Distinction between Rights and Rules - Property Rights As stated in Schlager & Ostrom (1992) "rights" are the product of "rules" and thus not equivalent to rules. "Rights" refer to particular actions that are authorised and "Rules" refer to the prescriptions that create authorizations. A property right is the authority to undertake particular actions related to a specific domain (Commons, 1924 as cited in Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). For every right an individual holds, rules exist that authorise or require particular actions in exercising that property right (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Property rights determine which actors have been authorised to carry out which actions with respect to a specified good or service: - Access:

Right to enter a defined area and enjoy its benefits without removing any resources.

- Withdrawal: Right to obtain specified products from a resource system - Management: Right to participate in decisions making - Exclusion:

Right to determine who has right of access, withdrawal or management.

- Alienation: Right to sell, lease, bequeath, or otherwise transfer any of the preceding component rights. 34

Property rights can also be defined through property rights systems, which are systems of interrelated rights as defined by legal and institutional context. Types of Property Rights Systems are:

- Open Access:

No effective restrictions on use of resources.

- Private Property:

Bundles of rights held by and exchanged among individuals or legally recognized corporate entities; typically including full rights of alienation.

- Public Property:

Bundles of rights held by official agents of some unit of government.

- Common (or communal) Property: Bundles of rights held, defined, and exchanged by some communal entity as a whole.

Property rights are related to the nature of a good or service, as property rights are used to manage goods and services. The nature of a good or service can be determined by two attributes: 1) the extent to which access to consumption can be controlled (excludability) and 2) the extent to which one personâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s consumption reduces the supply available to others (subtractability) (Polski & Ostrom, 1999): Substractability low

Substractability high

Excludability low

Public Goods

Common Pool Resources

Excludability high

Toll Goods

Private Goods

3.4.2

Action Situation

The action arena is a conceptual space in which individuals (acting on their own or as agents of organisations) inform themselves, consider alternative courses of action, make decisions, take action, and experience the consequences of these actions (Polski & Ostrom, 1999). Here, ideas, patterns of association, material conditions and productive possibilities interrelate to form configurations of relationships where individuals in certain positions take actions, in light of the information they possess, the control they exercise, and the payoffs they face, to attempt to achieve certain outcomes and results (McGinnis, 2013). All those factors are 35

affected by the physical and material world, the community attributes and the rules-in-use (Polski & Ostrom, 1999). The following aspects of the Action Situation are relevant for water governance analysis: -

who the main participants in the water management are;

what positions the actors in the water management have;

the actions they take or plan;

the availability of information for the participants;

the level of control each participant has over certain situations or outcomes of actions;

the possible outcomes of the current and planned water management;

the (nonmonetary) costs and benefits of actions taken or not taken.

3.4.3

Outcomes

Outcomes are generated by the conjuncture of the outputs of a given action situation, other closely related action situations, and exogenous influences that may not always be subject to effective control of human intervention (McGinnis, 2013). Therefore, the outcomes of the decision made and actions taken in the water management in the Pifo area will be described.

3.4.4

Evaluative Criteria

Evaluative Criteria may be used by participants or external observers to determine which aspects of the observed outcomes and the processes of achieving outcomes are deemed satisfactory and which aspects are in need of improvement (McGinnis, 2013; Ostrom, 2011). The following evaluative criteria should be applied to water governance analysis (Polski & Ostrom, 1999): â&#x20AC;˘

Efficiency in the use of the water resources through factors such as cost effectiveness (producing a good or service at the lowest possible cost);

â&#x20AC;˘

Distributional equity, meaning that individuals should contribute towards the cost of goods and services based upon their ability to pay for them;

â&#x20AC;˘

Legitimacy, meaning the acceptance of the rules-in-use;

•

Participation, meaning the involvement of actors in decision making and actions taken;

•

Accountability, meaning 1) the extent to which the policy context facilitates low-cost information sharing or transparency, 2) the capacity and skill of participants to evaluate the actions of others in the situation, and 3) the extent to which participants have ready access to mechanisms that permit them to monitor and sanction one another;

•

Adaptability, Resilience, Robustness, or Sustainability, referring to a system’s capacity to suffer a disturbance and yet still continue to function, without losing its basic structural or functional integrity. Of these terms, robustness is the term most appropriate for use as a performance criterion for human designed systems.

3.4.5

External variables.

External variables are here defined as the actions taken by other stakeholders who are involved in water related issues in the Pifo area. Through their actions, these stakeholders may have an influence on the community-based natural resource management. Those stakeholders are companies, governmental or non-governmental organisations and are not subject to IAD analysis. The IAD Framework, and specifically its components outlined above in some detail, served as the basis for the derivation of the specific research questions which were to guide the fieldwork phase: Table 5: Research Questions 1. How do the physical attributes of the resource in the region influence water governance? General information on the area and its water sources such as topography, hydrology; climate; Size, location, boundaries, capacity and abundance of the resource; urbanisation of the region, hillside location

IAD Section What is the biophysical structure of the regional economy in terms of INPUTS: agriculture & irrigation? Biophysical What quality does the water have? Conditions What amounts of water are used by the different actors, and for which purposes? What are the factors contributing to pollution? What technologies are being used? What happens to water after use? 37

2. How do the attributes of the community influence water governance?

IAD Section INPUTS: Attributes of the community

How is the community built up? (social groups, professions, inhabitants, rural/urban area share, ethnicity, composure, organisational structure of the community) To what extent do people know each other/ engage with each other? Is there a sense of community? Do informal networks exist? How regularly are they used? How many people participate? Are actions in the community based on, or allow reciprocity? What organisational templates exist and are the users aware of these?

IAD Section INPUTS: Rules-inuse

3. What rules-in-use influence water governance? Which laws have relevance to the action situation and are in use? Which norms have relevance to the action situation and are in use? Who currently holds which property rights? 4. What does the current water governance look like? Who are the participants? What are their positions? Are there any conflicts w.r.t. water governance? Groups? Attempts to resolve the conflicts already made? What decisions are made by whom? What is being done currently? What information are decisions based on?

IAD Section Action Situation

What kind of experience with water pollution, etc., has the community had? What are the perceptions about the (i) driving forces of action and decisions (Industry, Energy, Agriculture, Aquaculture, Households, Tourism); (ii) Pressures on water (Physical intrusions, water abstraction, climate change, diffuse/point source pollution); (iii) State (water quality, quantity &, ecological status) of the water in their region? How much control does each actor have over the potential outcome? What changes in the outcomes do actors desire? What are the future expectations w.r.t water governance given population growth, etc.?

IAD Section Outcomes

5. What are the outcomes that result from the current water governance structures? What are the outcomes of water pollution in each community?

6. How can outcomes resulting from water governance be evaluated? Efficiency in the use of resources, especially capturing economies of scale:Are there major efficiency losses due to waste of resources? How does the efficiency of water use differ among different user groups? Equity in distributional outcomes and processes. Does everyone have equal access and enough water? IAD Section Evaluative Criteria

Legitimacy as seen by participants in decision processes. Do bodies of governance enjoy trust of the community so that decisions are perceived to be legitimate? Acceptance â&#x20AC;&#x201C; to what extent to the water users accept the rules in use? How many community members participate in water governance? How does participation affect the outcomes? How and to what extent are actors held accountable for their actions? Adaptability, Resilience, Robustness or Sustainability â&#x20AC;&#x201C; to what extent does the system have the capacity to sustain a shock, recover and cope with change? Have there been previous (physical) shocks to the system? If yes, how did the system recover?

The objectives of this study shall be achieved by answering the above research questions. For each factor identified within the IAD framework (such as Inputs, Action Situation, Outcomes and Evaluative Criteria) that contributes to the water governance, certain research questions were derived that shall enable an institutional analysis of the status quo of water governance in Pifo and related water problems, leading a profound problem analysis in the studied area and the achievement of the overall purpose as defined in Section 1.4.

. 39

4 Methodology The research has a dynamic, descriptive, and cross-sectional methodological design, and follows the research steps (Figure 3) proposed by Nagel (1993) & Friedrichs (1980), as cited by Aenis (2013). Exploration, stakeholder and problem analysis, theory, determination of contents, and choice of methods were carried out in the course of an in-house study, followed by the analysis of information collected during the field work phase, and the writing of the final report. Figure 3: The research process steps

Based on Aenis, 2013 Selection of the parroquia Due to technical, financial and time limitations, the work of this project had to focus on one parroquia within the sub-watershed area. Based on Pe単aherrera et al. (2010), a thorough analysis of the different problems found in each parroquia was carried out (see Annex 1), including whether they had already received assistance from an external body in order to identify the focus of this study.

Tumbaco and La Merced were discarded because Red Ambiental had sufficient knowledge about both parroquias. Puembo was not considered an option because research indicated that there were difficulties in organising any type of data collection or other activity in the area 40

due to strong conflicts of interest within the parroquia. Pintag was rejected for being the smallest of all within the watershed. Therefore, Pifo, the largest parroquia within the watershed3, was chosen for its relevance and the lack of existing data. This decision was approved by the head of Red Ambiental, who ratified the need to gather information on Pifo as the NGO had a strong interest in starting working with the communities in that area. Moreover, working in Pifo meant studying an area where both public and communal water management systems exist and, in many cases, the choice of system is open to the residents. This afforded a unique research opportunity to understand which system was better for dealing with pollution and water scarcity. Literature Review A literature review based on secondary sources of information (listed in full in the References section) formed the foundation of the preliminary phase of the research, encompassing Exploration, Stakeholder and Problem analysis. This was essential for determining the thematic focus of the study and for understanding the physical, institutional and social context for water governance in Pifo. A review of the theory relevant to various aspects of water governance helped to define the factors that could determine the success or failure of a given water management system, and to set up a framework for comparison and analysis of the findings. In that respect, as has been discussed in the previous Section, the IAD framework (Hess & Ostrom, 2005) was the most important theoretical tool adopted by the study. The framework served as a basis for deriving detailed research questions and for specifying the content areas to be covered in the interviews on-site which constituted the primary sources of information. Data Collection In terms of the interviewees, the research project focused on three different stakeholder groups: firstly, community leaders, local water councils and water users from the selected communities of Palugo, Cochauco, Mulauco, La Virginia, El Tabl贸n, Itulcachi, and La Cocha;

Important to note is that Pifo is the largest parroquia in terms of geographical extension despite the half of its city centre lying outside of the hydrographical area of the watershed; this leaves practically half of the population out of the analysis (CGGR, 2010)

secondly, with representatives of various levels of governing bodies; thirdly with local companies who shared water resources with the communities; and lastly with independent experts on water governance issues in two NGOs. Annex 4 contains the full list of interviewees. Red Ambiental provided valuable organisational support by establishing contact with the communities and some of the organisations prior to commencement of the fieldwork phase, although some of the interviews were arranged in the field. The research questions derived on the basis of the IAD framework determined the design of the interview guidelines for each of the stakeholder groups which were subsequently translated into Spanish. The semi-structured format of the interviews was chosen so as both to allow some flexibility and focus the conversation towards obtaining relevant information, taking care to not phrase the interview questions in a prescriptive or leading manner. While the selected format meant that analysis and comparison of open-ended questions was more difficult to analyse than, for instance, a structured questionnaire, making a generalisation of findings more difficult, it was still considered the most appropriate for the task at hand. Initial interviews sought to enable a broad understanding of the issue, with questions becoming more specific and more targeted towards the individual interviewee as specific points of interest began to emerge. Moreover, this allowed the space for unexpected perceptions and opinions to be voiced that could have been lost with a more structured approach. While the interviews were conducted in Spanish, detailed notes were taken in English and consolidated into interview transcripts. The information in these transcripts was supplemented by observations which enhanced the overview of the overall water management and water provision situation in the communities. Community leaders organised walks to the water collection tanks, reservoir tanks, and/or irrigation systems in Palugo, Cochauco, and El Tabl贸n. Analysis Analysis of the data collected was a continuous process, carried out at the end of every day of fieldwork and beyond the fieldwork phase of the study. The raw data, together with observations and perceptions formed as a result, was reviewed to extract the relevant material and organised in an Excel matrix based on the IAD framework research questions in order to identify the common patterns and key problems. The analysis sought to compare statements from a range of interviews to triangulate the information in order to support the preliminary 42

hypotheses, for instance by posing questions about water service provision both to the recipients in the communities and to the governing bodies responsible for the service. Inconsistencies and contradictory opinions were considered to be valuable information and were preserved and included in the presentation of findings. Outputs One of the intended outputs – a presentation of preliminary findings on-site – was delivered at the conclusion of the fieldwork phase. Stakeholders from the communities where interviews had been conducted were invited to attend a meeting held in the community house in Palugo in the course of which an overview of information gathered was presented, followed by a discussion of the findings and conclusions. Recommendations and feedback received in the course of that meeting, as well as during a review session with the head of Red Ambiental were taken into account for the final analysis and preparation of the final report. Table 6: The research process - schedule PHASE

TIME

Exploration

November 2013 – January 2014

Stakeholder and problem analysis

November 2013 – February 2014

Definition of objectives

December 2013 – January 2014

Theory

December 2013 – February 2014

Determination of contents

January 2014 – February 2014

Choice of methods

January 2014 – February 2014

Survey

March 2014

Analysis

April 2014 – May 2014

Presentation of results

Jun 2014

5 Institutional Analysis of Water Management in Pifo

The following Section presents the information obtained in the course of the fieldwork phase in Pifo, following the methodology outlined in the previous section, and the analysis of this information carried out using the IAD Framework. In order to present the information in a manner most convenient and useful for Red Ambiental, the following analysis is structured by community, followed by other stakeholders. Each community is presented, analysed and interpreted according to the IAD subsections. The information presented in the subsections of Inputs, namely Nature of the Good, Attributes of the Community and Rules-in-use relate to information obtained during interviews and observations made in the communities. Conclusions drawn from interviews and observations are distinguished linguistically, emphasising the assessment aspect. This is followed by the section containing the analysis and interpretation of results namely Action Situation, Outcomes and Evaluative Criteria. A conclusive section for each community with community-based recommendations by the authors will follow.

5.1 Palugo Two water supply systems exist in Palugo: the municipal EPMAPS system and the local community water supply system of the Palugo water council4. EPMAPS provides only drinking water, whereas the water council manages a drinking water system and an irrigation water system.

With the help of the residents of Palugo, EPMAPS installed the first household water supply system 25 years ago. Once the work had been completed, the Palugo residents were informed that the water would cost a certain amount of money instead of being free of charge, which

As the emphasis of this report is the community based water resource management, the water management of EPMAPS is

not analysed as extensively as the water management of the water council.

was the impression EPMAPS had originally given. Many families in Palugo were unhappy with the development, openly communicated this and refused to use the water supplied of EPMAPS, with only a few households deciding to install the system.

As a consequence, the community developed its own communal water system, covering both drinking water and irrigation water supply, constructed by the members of the community. The water council of Palugo has been the water management body for 24 years and is in charge of drinking and irrigation water provision to both Palugo and Amazonas (a neighbouring community), having grown from an initial service area of 130 households.

5.1.1

Inputs

5.1.1.1 Nature of the good Drinking water Today, about 450 households use the communal drinking water system, while in total 65-70 households use the EPMAPS system (or at least have it installed), and some families have both. Different respondents expressed preferences for different systems: the majority favours the communal water system either because it is cheaper or because the taste of the water seems to be better. Some prefer the water supplied by EPMAPS because of the frequent water quality controls carried out by the Ministry of Health, or because the EPMAPS system does not require participation in meetings and mingas. Having access to both systems was always considered as something positive as it allows the household to switch to another system whenever one doesnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t provide any water at that moment (e.g. during road construction work as a result of which pipes get damaged), i.e. contributing towards greater water security. Nonetheless, the water supply of both the EPMAPS system and the communal water system is regarded as sufficient by all residents. The water council deals with the expected increase in future water demand and plans to provide water to 1000 households in 20 years. Therefore, the drinking water supply system is being expanded. Old pipes with a radius of 3.8cmâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;5cm are being replaced with ones that have a diameter of 10cm which shall provide water for 1000 households with 15 l/s, compared 11.5 l/s. The system has been almost completely renewed. The water council expects to complete the project in November 2014.

Palugo residents described the water quality of both systems as good. Water is delivered from an underground spring in the highlands and is led through pipes to two tanks (each 90mÂł) at which point chlorine is added. From there it is transported via pipelines to the households. Most of the residents drink the water directly from the tap, only some boil it before drinking. The water quality of the communal water system is tested every year by the University Politechnica Nacional. This year it has not yet been tested because of the continuing construction of the new pipe system. The old test results indicated the water to be clean. The water canals and tanks are cleaned by mingas when sufficient water is available from another source (e.g. in the rainy season). About 25 mÂł of drinking water are used per household per month on average.

Irrigation water The irrigation water from the communal water management comes from the Ayaguico River and is provided through a pipe system, which ends in irrigation ditches. Irrigation water costs $5 per year. Most of the residents in Palugo are engaged in agriculture and require irrigation water, whereas production is usually for own consumption. In general, there is no irrigation water scarcity - only during the dry season can a lack of irrigation water sometimes occur. In these cases drinking water is used for irrigation which can result in large water bills. The water quality of the irrigation water is generally described as poor â&#x20AC;&#x201C; contaminated and dirty. This is why animals (guinea pigs, chickens, pigs) are usually given tap water. Some residents even refrain from using the irrigation water sometimes due to its bad quality. Concerning the reasons for the bad quality of the irrigation water, different opinions were stated. Most respondents could not think of any pollution source. One blamed the contamination on chemicals in waste water that are discharged directly into the irrigation canals by plantations. Another blamed the livestock farming in the upstream areas of the river that is used for irrigation water. Most of the interviewees use fertilisers, e.g. urine or manure from guinea pigs, which can also lead to pollution of the water in the irrigation canals.

Figure 4: Irrigation water channel in Palugo

Source: Own photo Waste water There is no centralised waste water treatment system in Palugo. Instead, many of the houses have septic tanks installed into which domestic waste is discharged. The waste water from the houses which do not have a septic tank, or where not all waste is discharged into the septic tank, is collected through a centralised pipe system. Eventually, the waste water is discharged without any treatment into the nearby rivers, the Warmyguaico and the Olaya, which flow into the Chiche river. Knowledge on contamination through waste water discharge seems to be missing, as some perceive the waste water collection system in its current form to already be an improvement in the water quality. 5.1.1.2 Attributes of the community

Almost all respondents expressed discontent with decision-making in the community, with recurring complaints including claims that decision makers take advantage of their position, and that the rapid turnover of decision makers leads to confusion. It is interesting to note that the decision-making process attracted criticism despite the fact that some interviewees did not know who was responsible for these decisions, suggesting that personal conflicts do not affect 47

the negativity of the response. General disapproval with the management of the water system was also palpable. Some very strong negative opinions were expressed, including allegations of misuse of the fees paid by the water users to build “a nice big house with three floors” for the president of the community, concluding that an integration of the community system into the EPMAPS system would be desirable. However, one interviewee (who knows the board of the Water council – a circumstance that may be a factor in the assessment) stated that the Water council does a very good job and that all the money that is charged is used for maintaining the water supply system. Even though most of the interviewed community members do not trust the decision makers, all use the communal water system and support it through usage, payments and participation in mingas. The majority of the community wants to have an independent water supply system and keep it that way. Here, most of the community members display a common understanding. The Palugo residents also share the same values in terms of willingness to offer help to each other and to reciprocate when help is offered to them, including on issues concerning drinking water. If there is an interruption in the water supply of one system, residents who have the other system installed always help the ones who lack drinking water. It is common practice as it is seen as a matter of solidarity and community. Nonetheless, some criticism on the social aspects of the community was offered by one interviewee, stating that poor organisation and interpersonal conflicts remain a problem – though this view does not appear to be representative of the community as a whole. Regarding outside support for strengthening social capital in water management, the water users interviewed stated that they have never received any training in water-related topics from governmental or non-governmental bodies. Social capital of the water council/community leaders Linkages between the Palugo water council and other water governing bodies are rather weak. Aside from the Junta Barrial de Agua de Pifo (the local water council in Pifo) which acts as a partner for the construction of a pipeline between Fatroda, el Tablón and Pifo, the Palugo Water council does not have any official connections with any other councils in the area. However, families that are involved in the water management of different communities may know each other. The Palugo community leader, for example, was aware of water-related problems in other communities, such as the haciendas in Itulcachi and La Cocha impacting the water supply. Conflicts, problems or difficulties with other community water councils do 48

not exist. The water council members made it clear that, in general, they are unwilling to cooperate with EPMAPS on water provision. Despite that, the relationship with EPMAPS is considered to be good, though communication is rare. While some connections to SENAGUA and MIDUVI exist, the Water council claims to receive minimal support from higher-level governing bodies. It also receives no support from non-governmental organisations.

5.1.1.3 Rules-in-use Constitutional level Water users in the community were poorly informed about the new constitution and the right to water. The water users generally had no knowledge of water laws, neither of the older ones nor of the pending one. SENAGUA has given a concession to the water council to extract water from the sources they use for both drinking water and irrigation water. The water council is therefore legal and can act autonomously to provide water. To match the growing demand for drinking water and to continue with the renewal of the pipes, the water council has asked for a new concession to provide 15 l/s which has been granted by SENAGUA. The water council members in general are not well informed about the pending water law but one water council member has been taking part in information events about the new water law with representatives from MIDUVI and SENAGUA. Collective-choice level The community holds meetings to make decisions on community issues. Meetings take place at least every two months for general discussion about topics related to the community. According to the president, everybody in the community is invited, every opinion is considered, and the decisions are made during the meeting. If somebody in the community feels that there is an additional need for meetings or mingas, one can contact the president of the community, who then initiates the meeting or minga. The water council consists of five persons: the president, the secretary, two accountants, the communication officer and two fieldworkers. They are selected every two years in the general assembly of the community by nomination and election. Decisions are made by the five members of the council, but the president could overrule if necessary. Community members can put forward ideas and suggestions. When important topics have to be discussed, it is done in the general assembly. 49

Operational level The main operational rule in terms of how actions are taken in the community is that work is carried out by mingas. Mingas take place whenever they are necessary, e.g. for the work on electricity related issues or for work on the communal house. Also the work on the communal water system, like the construction and the maintenance of the water supply system, is also carried out by mingas. It is a duty to participate in the mingas and failure to do so results in a fine of $20. For receiving water from the EPMAPS system, a flat rate price of $6 a month has to be paid. The price for the communal water system is at least $3 per month, depending on the amount of water used, which is measured through a water meter. The use of the community water system requires participation in mingas. The installation of a new water connection costs $240 for the community system and $60 for the EPMAPS system. Property rights The community Palugo is organised as a barrio, meaning the land is mainly private property, where every landowner has a title. Even though water is often classified as a toll good5, Palugo residents and the community leaders define water as a public good from which nobody can be excluded. Therefore no sanctioning mechanisms exist that could lead to exclusion from the water supply. As the water council has to ask for the management concession from SENAGUA and water users cannot be excluded from the service, the water council can be defined as a claimant.

5.1.2

Action Situation

The main participants in the water management in Palugo are the community president, the members of the water council and the water users. Other important participants are EPMAPS

Even though many people can use the water at once, there are production processes, control systems, and distribution systems that make it possible to physically control consumption access so that consumers contribute to the cost of provision and production (Polski & Ostrom, 1999).

and SENAGUA. They decide about which actions should be taken in the water management, but have different positions. EPMAPS provides a top-down managed water supply system in which the water users or the community leaders of Palugo have no say. EPMAPS manages the system outside of the community. The Water council of Palugo manages the communal irrigation and drinking water systems and is in charge of the related decision-making. These rights are given by SENAGUA through concessions. Water users can participate to some extent in the decisionmaking processes of the communal water management. The community president plays a minor role in water-related decision-making itself but plays a major role in the implementation of the decisions. This has implications for the control each actor has over potential outcomes. The Palugo residents have no control over the EPMAPS system itself and decisions or actions that are related to it while the water council and the water users have almost full control over the decision-making processes and actions relating to the communal water systems, for as long as the water council maintains its concession from SENAGUA. The water council has direct control over the drinking water quality (tests of water quality, addition of chlorine), but has little control over the quality of the irrigation water as it is extracted from a river, where many different stakeholders may have an impact on water quality (pre-treatment is excluded as an option due the lack of financial resources). The Water council also has limited control over water quantities that it can extract, as these are regulated by SENAGUA. The water users and the Water council of Palugo could control their water pollution. Since they donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t, they contribute to the pollution of the surrounding water bodies such as the Chiche River, as no decisions or actions were taken to reduce contamination. Recent implemented decisions of the community water council mainly deal with the maintenance and extension of the drinking water supply system. The drinking water system does therefore seem to be the current emphasis. This is not just reflected in the current actions, but also in planned future projects. Examples include plans to build a third drinking water tank or to expand the distribution of pipelines within Palugo to meet the needs of the growing community. No current actions or future plans that are related to the irrigation water system seem to be in place. The same applies to issues related to waste water and water pollution. Therefore potential outcomes of decisions are also only considered for the drinking water supply. Other related issues such as the possibility of increased water pollution or

increased demand for irrigation water do not seem to play a role in the current decisionmaking processes of the water management. This may be due to an information deficit, as the information water users and decision makers possess about the conditions of the water resources differs. Some residents demonstrated knowledge of water-related issues, e.g. causes of water contamination, while others (including community leaders) lacked general knowledge of water-related topics. The information water users and community leaders possess about the actions taken also differ. Information dissemination as well as information gathering is low on all levels. A lack of communication was identified on all levels in the decision-making processes and in actions taken. Regarding the costs and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes it can be stated that the costs of possible actions usually exceed the financial limits of the water council and the water users. Even if the benefits would exceed the costs of a certain action, the lack of financial resources would still hinder the implementation of the action decided upon. An example thereof is the current lack of money to build the planned third drinking water tank.

5.1.3

Outcomes

The current communal water management in Palugo results in a drinking water supply that is generally perceived as good in terms of quality and quantity. The same applies to the drinking water supply of EPMAPS. The communal irrigation water system provides sufficient amounts of irrigation water, available for all inhabitants of Palugo, although it is of low quality. Water insufficiency or unequal distribution as a common outcome in the parroquia of Pifo seem to not be an issue in Palugo, unlike pollution which results from the lack of waste water treatment facilities and the direct discharge of waste water into nearby water bodies. Knowledge and awareness about the impact of waste water discharge are lacking. The lack of communication on all scales leads to an unclear distribution of responsibilities. This may cause certain issues such as waste water treatment or pollution to be ignored. The community leaders and the water council of Palugo do not seem to see themselves responsible for waste water related issues. The way decisions are made and/or communicated within the community has resulted in distrust towards the leaders (both water council members and the community president). 52

5.1.4

Evaluation

The drinking water supply system in Palugo is not efficient since two drinking water supply systems are in operation where one reliable system would suffice. Therefore, cost effectiveness is also a cause for concern since households which have both systems installed pay double, i.e. considerably above the lowest possible cost of water provision. Water is distributed equally in the community and most of the water users seem to contribute to the cost of the water services through payments and work. However, the allegations concerning the misuse of public funds – the fees collected from water users – suggest that the water governance system is being exploited in favour of the decision-makers at the expense of the fee-paying residents. Benefits of the payments might therefore not be redistributed equally. The concessions that the water council receives from SENAGUA legitimise it on a constitutional level, while the active involvement of the water users through subscribing to the service, paying the fees, participating in decision-making at community meetings and in mingas legitimises the work of the water council on the community level. In terms of participating in decision-making processes, the main channel for doing so in Palugo are meetings and general assemblies, with residents appearing to use the opportunities provided for expressing their opinions. Concerning participation in the physical maintenance of the water system, mingas are the key tool, though feedback on their effectiveness has been mixed. Some claims have been made that participation in mingas is highly uneven (“below 50%”, “only 20-25 people work in mingas and the rest do nothing”) and depends on the urgency of the issue while other comments were considerably more positive. Typically, it is the men who take on most of the minga-related work due to the physical strength and effort required. EPMAPS is also legitimised on the constitutional level as well as through the water users that subscribe to the service and pay fees for it. EPMAPS does not allow for participation in decision-making processes, which reduces legitimacy. EPMAPS decision-making processes also do not facilitate transparency as they occur outside of the community. The decision-making processes in the community facilitate transparency, as at least the important topics are usually discussed in an open public debate and actions are usually implemented by the community itself. Nonetheless, some processes in the communal decision making remain opaque, e.g. the accounting. To evaluate the work of EPMAPS or the water council and the community leaders it has to be considered that water users may not have the skills to evaluate the outcomes of the decision making (or the bookkeeping). The 53

water council can, contrary to EPMAPS, be held accountable for their actions directly through the election processes. In addition, meetings and assemblies permit the water users to monitor the water council. The water management provision system, despite being inefficient, is very robust and resilient to shock. Whenever problems with one system occur, the other system can compensate. The decisions made by the water council are decisions made by members of the community who have information about local conditions readily available. The water council can adapt its planning and decision-making according to local conditions. For instance, the communal water management system shows its adaptability, as preventive measures are taken now for a growing population in the future by already commencing work to expand the water provision system. EPMAPS lacks this adaptability as it operates from outside the community. Last but not least, it can be stated that the overall water management is not sustainable in environmental terms due to the pollution it causes.

5.1.5

Conclusions

Palugo does not have a problem with the water supply, with both drinking water supply systems seeming to meet the needs of the water users. Even though the two drinking water supply systems may constitute an advantage for the Palugo residents, they are not efficient. Resources are wasted when households in Palugo have two systems installed while other households in Pifo actually lack any water connection. Palugo is the only community in which irrigation water is generally sufficient, including in the summer months. This may be due to the amount of irrigation water available (e.g. through the pipe system), but may be also due to the good maintenance of the irrigation water system (e.g. regularly cleaning of canals). Nonetheless, the irrigation water is of poor quality and the usefulness of the irrigation system therefore remains questionable. Despite the good water supply available, the communal water management practices can be criticised, in particular due to the water pollution caused by the community, the low level of trust of the community in the decision makers and the missing contact to other stakeholders. Water contamination caused by the community has a negative impact on the environment in the area as well as on the human health. The waste water that is discharged into the streams is returned to the fields through the irrigation system where toxic substances accumulate, or is even used as drinking water by residents who lack drinking water further down the stream. 54

Water pollution issues have to be taken into account in water management and solutions to lower water contamination need to be found by the community. The low level of trust in the decision makers may be the result of previous or even current mismanagement but seems especially to arise from miscommunication of decisions taken and/or a lack of participation in decision-making processes. Attempts should be made to increase participation in decision-making processes. Communication channels have to be improved and residents have to become better informed about the decision taken. The incomes and expenditures of the water council should be made public in order to increase information supply and to avoid misuse of public funds. Additionally, conflict resolution mechanisms should be installed as these seem to be absent in the community. The lack of exchange with other stakeholders leads to restrictions in water management as only community-related problems are considered. Water-related issues further up or down the streams are not taken into account. The water council needs to establish contact with other stakeholders to exchange water-related knowledge and information on actions taken and to find solutions for issues in the water sector e.g. for pollution control.

5.2 El Tabl贸n 5.2.1

Inputs

5.2.1.1 Nature of the Good The community of El Tabl贸n obtains their water from the Ramosacha spring in the highlands, of which only about 50% is extracted (0.8 L/s). The water is captured directly in a reservoir and then flows down to the community via a 7-km-long, and 2-inch-wide pipeline, where another reservoir right above the settlement is filled up. Below that, another three km of pipes enable water access for every household in El Tabl贸n. This whole system was installed approximately in 1989. The water quality was said to be excellent, and there is no pretreatment of the water before consumption. Water is not commonly boiled before drinking, and the inhabitants denied suffering from any water-related diseases. The water used to be chlorinated, but since animals watered with that same water got sick or died, the practice was abandoned.

Figure 5: The new irrigation water reservoir

Source: Own photo For irrigation, a long concrete irrigation canal was built in the course of almost two years, with construction work completed in 2006. The system catches the water flow of the Chimborazo stream in the highlands, directed to different users, with 5 L/s intended for El Tabl贸n. The water is transported down to the community and should fill a ~25 * 15 m reservoir (finished in 2013), for watering animals and irrigation usage. Because of an internal conflict (see below), the reservoir has not yet been filled up, and domestic irrigation is not yet available to the inhabitants of El Tabl贸n.

5.2.1.2 Attributes of the community El Tabl贸n is the second highest-lying community in Pifo and consists of about 120 households with an estimated average of seven members. It is a comuna, hence land property is collective. The standard of living is relatively low: most households are dependent on agriculture (e.g. fava beans, potato) and small-scale animal husbandry. The home gardens require irrigation, especially in the dry season, and the animals are supplied with drinking water throughout the year. Currently, drinking water is being used for these purposes, increasing supply pressure on the drinking water system.

Mingas have been said to be an essential part of community life and are held every Saturday. The nature of participation in mingas is unknown, different opinions regarding the matter were expressed. A conflict between members and non-members of the “association” exists and is described in detail under 5.2.2 Action Situation. The Asociación del Tablón Alto is a former property of MAGAP (the Ministry of Agriculture) that was given to a group of 27 El Tablón residents (with an equal gender split between men and women) in 2010. The group had received legal status in 2001, and members now cultivate the land together. While 2011 and 2012 were granted for free, from 2013 on, they are obliged to pay a yearly fee to the government, for ten years. The government, in exchange, supports the association with extension services, and SENAGUA asked them to establish their own water council. Of a total 309 ha, they now plant 30ha of potato, quinoa, barley and fava beans, and keep 200 heads of cattle, as well as 300 sheep.

5.2.1.3 Rules-in-use Although it was also stated that all households have a tap, there are only ~80 members of the water system (with ~120 families). Every member must pay $3 per month for an amount of 10m³ of drinking water. For every additional m³, 3¢ are charged by the water council, yet the consumption of almost all households exceeds the amount of 10m³. For instance, one household of two persons claimed to be using 20 – 30 m³ per month. Participation in mingas is mandatory, and absence is sanctioned by a fine of $10. The water council stated that, usually, 30-50 persons attend the mingas. The status of association members within the community appears to be unclear: both the water council and representatives of the association agreed that they participated well in mingas related to drinking water, but not in road construction mingas even though the association members are still considered regular comuna members and should participate in all mingas.

5.2.2

Action situation

Decisions about water governance are taken by the community water council. Elections take place every three years. Every two to three months, the water council holds an assembly to inform all members about current developments. The money collected from members via 57

monthly payments and fines sums up to $250-300 and is used for maintenance of the system. The water council receives no money from governing bodies for the maintenance of the water pipe system. Residents complained that when tubes branching from the main drinking water pipes to the individual households are broken families have to pay for the repair themselves even though a community water technician exists. Regarding the water governance and its challenges, distinction must be made between the drinking water, from the Ramosacha source, and irrigation/animal water, from the Chimburazo stream. The water council's goal is to run two parallel systems, with two taps per household. Drinking water The infrastructure for drinking water was built around 1989 for 100 families and is being expanded to ensure an adequate supply of the growing population. At the moment, the 2-inch pipes from the Ramosacha spring to the village are getting replaced by new and bigger pipes in mingas every Saturday to sustain the growing water demand in the village. The new pipes are paid for with money that the community earned two years ago when they transported 26 000 polilepsis trees to the P谩ramo for a reforestation project by the Ministry of the Environment. The community received $17 000, half of which was paid to the planting company. Yet, the money is not enough to broaden the tubes all the way. Irrigation and animal water For the use of 5 L/s for irrigation purpose, $17 per year are paid to SENAGUA by the water council. The irrigation system (the entire concrete canal) has been constructed by the inhabitants of El Tabl贸n in regular mingas and was finished in 2006. A tributary of the Chimburazo stream provides water to different stakeholders in predefined proportions. First, a part is abstracted towards the NOVOPAN factory. The remainder passes through the land belonging to the Hacienda Camilo Ponce, where another portion is abstracted for the use on the hacienda (crop irrigation and water needs related to cattle husbandry). At this point, 5 L/s are let through, supposed to reach the community irrigation reservoir of El Tabl贸n. While the water council asserted there is no conflict with the Hacienda, the water flow successively decreases after this, to the point where no water reaches the community's reservoir at all. The canal passes through the lower part of the association's land, but was present there already before the association came into being.

Illegitimate water abstraction Along the canal, water is being abstracted at numerous points. Adjacent farmers (on the canal's downhill side) block the water flow to create overflow to irrigate their field. Others drill holes into the concrete sides of the canal, creating a stream branching off. Apparently, both association members and non-members 'sabotage' the community system. Furthermore, within the association land, the canal is largely unmaintained since it is perceived as unjust by association members to have the water flow through their land while they have no right to use it. Therefore, maintenance is weak. As a consequence, the canal fills up with sediment, aquatic plants, and at one point, uncontrolled erosion and landslides have covered the canal to an extent that hindered any further flow. Conflict between the water council and the association The water council blames the association for not taking measures against erosion and clogging of the canal, but admits that non-members are also involved in forbidden water abstraction. Accordingly, the members of the association donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t feel responsible for maintaining the canal even though they use the water. The association members oppose the notion that the mud in the channel originates upstream, from the Hacienda Ponce. They perceive it as unfair that the canal flows through their land, but they have no right to use the water for irrigation, even though they had participated in its construction as members of the community. Association members made it clear they had little usage for the water canal anyway, since most of their agricultural area lies upslope of the canal. They expressed a desire to use their own water canal with 2.74 L/s which is currently being used for animal watering only. Due to the abovementioned difficulties, the water council plans to turn the irrigation canal into buried tubes by 2015, thereby piping the water directly from the Hacienda Ponce onwards to the community reservoir enabling household supply with irrigation and animal water. Association members expressed their openness to this project, including the installation of a water meter, so that extraction by the association can be regulated. Analogously, the water council confirmed they had no interest in excluding the association from the water, but rather simply needed to secure the supply for the community members. It is worth mentioning that the water council further expressed their fear of a decreasing water flow in the Chimborazo due to climate change. In all this conflict, SENAGUA has never intervened in favour of either side. 59

Figure 6: Illegitimate water abstraction

Source: Own photo Further pressures on the system include algae growth in the drinking water pipes from the spring down to the village. The water council members expressed their concerns about whether these algae are harmful and their interest in a cleansing option with no harmful effects on water quality. The community's waste water creates another challenge: there is no sewage system and no connection to the nearest sewage treatment plant. All households use septic tanks, possibly leading to contamination of groundwater.

5.2.3

Outcomes

The outcomes of water governance in El Tabl贸n are two-sided: there is substantial infrastructure and a potential for sufficient water supply both of drinking and irrigation water. 60

Mingas are well institutionalised to secure maintenance, and have been useful in building an impressive irrigation canal from the Hacienda Ponce down to the community. This is an example of the functioning of the community and reflects their ability to self-organise with little by way of financial resources. Additionally, there is a large new water reservoir that would help to safeguard irrigation water provision during the dry months. On the other hand, a conflict around water use rights and maintenance duties has led to a situation where the resource and the infrastructure benefit only few. The reservoir lies close by the settlement and is supposed to provide irrigation water to the homegardens below and drinking water to the domestic animals. It flows by or through a cropping and grazing area (private and association-owned) for most of its way, but is supposed to remain untouched until reaching the reservoir. Hence, farmers uphill from the community â&#x20AC;&#x201C; who would not benefit from a filled reservoir â&#x20AC;&#x201C; illicitly use the water for their field. Furthermore, association members (allegedly) let the canal fill up with eroded soil because they are denied access and/or have no interest in the water due to another water source being available. As a result, there are large quantities of water wasted or used unproductively (where the canal is clogged or blocked), resulting in unequal access to water.

5.2.4

Evaluation of the action

Efficiency The governance has a high level of efficiency: the water council leader, maintains regular contact with the parroquia council (junta parroquial), enabling quick information exchange. The drinking water provision and its current infrastructural improvement are working efficiently as a supervisor and coordinator handles the matters concerning mingas and material acquisition. One efficiency deficit lies in the old and deteriorating pipes, causing breakage and resource loss. Yet the irrigation system features massive efficiency shortcomings, as described above, mainly rooted in deficient communication between stakeholders and unclear property rights, as well as the lack of a system to ensure that those rights are respected.

Equity Community members are individually financially responsible for the pipes leading from the main system to their household. This can be characterised as a deficit in equity, more so since outside observation of houses in El Tablón allows the assumption of strongly diverging incomes and living standards. Also, given the current situation, whereby only 10m³ are considered the base drinking water quantity per household, irrigation of home gardens and watering livestock with an additional quantity is a production input for which the residents must pay. Even though 3¢/m³ is a very low price, the system favours the better-off. Thus, the water council is aiming for a parallel irrigation system with a base price, comparable to the drinking water system. Unequal access to irrigation water can be considered the most prominent equity problem in El Tablón. 5 L/s from the Chimborazo stream are supposed to reach the reservoir without previous extractions. While the canal was said to have been constructed by the entire community in mingas, uphill farmers may rightfully question the project's equity, if there is no option for them to use the water for irrigation. Legitimacy The water council is elected by the community, and community members are informed about its activities in regular meetings. No information was obtained about the possibility of participatory decision-making which would increase the system's legitimacy. As long as the yearly fee to SENAGUA is paid, the governance is legitimate for external governing bodies. Acceptance Acceptance of the water council's activities is low: there has been prolonged opposition of certain community members (the association) against the water council's plans and decisions, and active opposition to current structures was observed (i.e. inhabitants stealing water). The state of conflict with a certain share of the population and the contrasting positions among community members obviously decrease the water council's authority, and show the low degree of acceptance of its decisions and the current water governance. Participation Currently, mingas are organised every Saturday for the extension of drinking water infrastructure. With only 30-50 participants, participation may seem low, but in regular, weekly intervals, overall participation may still be high. Of greater concern is the lack of 62

information about collective decision-making. If the water users' roles are restricted to receiving information and working in mingas, but no influence can be exercised on the elected water council, participation must be characterised as low. Accountability There is an absolute lack of any accountability for stakeholders causing conflict. Currently, various stakeholders disobey the water governance rules, but no consequences are imposed by the water council. With unclear water use rights (e.g. people 'stealing' irrigation water where they are supposed to let it pass) and responsibilities / duties (e.g. the association does not feel responsible for maintaining the canal or preventing erosion), accountability of actors is not yet possible. However, accountability would be a necessary component of stable water governance, once the rules of governance are accepted by a majority of participants. Robustness At the moment, El Tabl贸n water governance shows intermediate adaptability or flexibility when faced with challenges: with the help of a technician whose job it is solely to stay alert and work on maintenance of the system, shocks can be confronted efficiently. With the decision to broaden the drinking water pipes, the water council has already proved capable of reacting to challenges proactively. Moreover, population growth or a diminishing water flow can be dampened, since the community is merely using half of its available water resource. However, since activities of different participants are not well coordinated and the inhabitants may have little influence on decision-making, changes in governance may be slow and not no everybody's satisfaction.

5.2.5

Conclusions

The community of El Tabl贸n has constructed and maintained an excellent system for drinking water, providing every inhabitant with sufficient and high-quality water despite limited financial resources. In questions of irrigation, great efforts have been made by the community, but the continuing dispute about usage and maintenance of the irrigation water canal has hardened the fronts: it seems there is little to no communication between the water council and members of the association. Both sides react very sensitively to accusations by the opposite side, so discussions easily result in loud confrontations. However, it seems both sides see the need for further discussions, because they want the conflict to be resolved. Stakeholders appeared open towards interventions and help from a third party, and mediation 63

may be a welcome first step to an effective community water management. Once people 'agree to agree' and cooperation between the Water council and the association becomes possible, the water governance can be adapted in a way that satisfies all parties in an equitable sharing of benefits and duties. Putting the irrigation canal into buried tubes will be a necessary and useful step to promote discussion among those currently benefitting from water abstractions.

5.3 Cochauco, Mulauco, La Virginia 5.3.1

Inputs

5.3.1.1 Nature of the good The Andean Mountains provide drinking water as well as irrigation water to the inhabitants throughout the region. This is the case of Cochauco, Mulauco, and La Virginia, obtaining the largest quantity of drinking water from the Pishanga mountain, located on the eastern side of the parroquia of Pifo. The Yactaquiringuay water spring is located on the lower part of the Pishanga. The water is collected into a tank and then flows downhill to three different tanks to be used by the communities. Finally, the water flows from these tanks to the three settlements. However, the amount is not sufficient to supply the three communities, and Cochauco and Mulauco each use another water source to provide for the whole population. In Cochauco, a few families located below the other houses in the village use a second water source, also originating from the Pishanga Mountain. In Mulauco, the actual main source supplying most of the population is located near the Carihuaicu River, on the lower part of the Guanguil mountain. Researchers from Universidad Central de Quito have tested the water quality in the recent years on an annual basis. According to the interviewed population, these assessments prove that the water quality is high in the three villages. The current community system provides clean water because it is treated with chlorine before being distributed via pipelines. For example, in Cochauco, eleven ounces of chlorine are added per week in a special plastic tank located at the water collection site, in other words, at the start of the system. Some households boil the water before drinking, as an extra precaution; other residents drink directly from the tap. Due to the geography of the region, the system uses a break pressure tank to supply the

population living at high altitudes. Each village has its own break pressure tank for water distribution. Figure 7: Collection tank for household water of Cochauco, Mulauco and La Virginia

Source: Own photo La Virginia and Cochauco do not have a system for irrigation water. The families in Cochauco have the option to use the overflowing surplus from the drinking water system. At the tanks, where the system begins, surplus water flows downhill as a stream. This stream passes by the settlement, and its water can be used for irrigation. The quality of this water is very high because it belongs to the drinking water system. In Mulauco, there is a canal providing irrigation water for the community from a second source, but the quantity as well as the system's reach is insufficient to cover the whole population.

5.3.1.2 Attributes of the community The largest of the three communities is Mulauco with 485 families. Cochauco has about 1000 inhabitants, the smallest community is La Virginia with 117 families and about 850 inhabitants. Populations have been growing rapidly: according to the water council, La Virginia consisted of approximately 20 households about 24 years ago. The general level of incomes is described as low, as residents of Cochauco and the water council of La Virginia 65

confirmed. Most households in all three communities maintain a home garden, but the absence of an irrigation system in Cochauco and La Virginia prevents a production sufficient to feed the family. Hence, in Cochauco (the only community where interviews with residents were possible), most inhabitants work in construction and agriculture /animal husbandry, both for domestic consumption and for sales. Similarly, in La Virginia, men mostly work in construction, and many women are housekeepers in Pifo. People in Cochauco appeared well connected and seemed to know each other well. Many of the inhabitants are interrelated and have family connections in the community. Correspondingly, the water council of La Virginia certified the community “maintained a united spirit”. All three communities are not official barrios of Pifo, or at least parts of the communities are not legal. At least in Cochauco, the legalisation process with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MIES) is underway. Minga work is organised regularly to maintain and fix the water system; every community participates in mingas in order to deal with the water issues and problems. Mingas have been an important community tool which has helped the communities compensate for the lack of governmental assistance. Beyond the teamwork aspect, the minga is a social relationship network between community members that strengthens the cultural values. These values are mirrored at the family level, where families call their neighbours asking for support for fixing houses or building new ones. In La Virginia, participation in mingas was estimated to be very high (>95%), whereas it was said to be lower in Cochauco (~80%) and Mulauco (~60%). Other specificities of communal social organisation relate to participatory decision-making. All three communities hold general assemblies where all members of the community are supposed to participate for information exchange and decision-making. Each community member has the right to call for a meeting and the duty to participate in them. Whenever a family has an issue to deal with, the community’s president is obliged to support their needs, as well as to gather the people for a meeting. In regard to water issues and problems, the water council must support the community. Both mingas and general assemblies are community organisation pathways which are the roots of the people’s strength in governance of the water resource. In Cochauco, the community council holds a meeting every three months, and the water council twice a year. Although participation in mingas is relatively low, attendance at the assemblies is higher (~80%). In Mulauco, assemblies are even held monthly, together with 66

necessary mingas. No precise information concerning the extent to which residents have decision-making power in these meetings was available. In Cochauco, the water council and the community itself have initiated different voluntary training sessions and seminars for the community members, with the aim of increasing awareness and knowledge on topics such as water pollution. For example, the water council has started awareness seminars on waste and water management to decrease the influence of waste on the nearby water resources. 5.3.1.3 Rules-in-use The system of rules and norms of the community referring to water governance is simple, but efficient. The most important ones are those related to mingas. There is a fine of about $20 for non-participation, ensuring minimum participation required to carry out the relevant tasks. In Mulauco, when families cannot participate in a minga, they may double the number of family members participating at the next one in order to compensate. To formalise the water governance, in all three communities households organise water councils (five members: president, vice-president, treasurer, two communication officers). Every household with a water meter and access to the system counts as one system member, represented by the head of household. Water councils are responsible for all decisions and activities concerning water supply and, in theory, issues of waste water. These governing bodies are formed by members of the community and elected democratically (biannually, in La Virginia) by the water system members. In Cochauco, the task has been fulfilled by one person since 1988, proving a high level of trust within the community. In all three communities, each family has the right to use 15 m3 per month with a basic fixed payment, differing from $1-3 depending on the community. The water from the communal system is supposed to serve as household water (cooking, bathing, drinking), and it is not designated for irrigation usage. Therefore, in Cochauco and La Virginia, where rainfed agriculture is practised, few households ever use more than that (in La Virginia, the base price for <15 mÂł is US$ 1, and for every additional mÂł another Â˘15 are paid). However, in Mulauco, the residents are accustomed to irrigating their crops with water from the irrigation canals. When these periodically dry out in the dry season, residents use drinking water for irrigation. This practice is forbidden by the water council, but the Mulauco residents see no alternative in order to maintain their cropping. The same practice and conflict was mentioned in Cochauco. 67

5.3.2

Action Situation

The three communities of Cochauco, Mulauco and La Virginia share water extracted from the same source: before 1988 (earliest account the interview partners could give), SENAGUA gave concession to use the Yactaqiringuay source, with at least 3.5 L/s diverted towards Mulauco, 1.6 L/s to Cochauco, and 1.1 L/s to La Virginia. The money which is collected by the water council is used for the materials necessary for maintenance or repairs, as well as for refreshments at the mingas. Whenever maintenance work, repairs or new water-related constructions are necessary, the councils call for mingas, which are generally viewed as highly important elements of water management, as well as of the community life. Whenever some measure requires more money than the council controls, in La Virginia, contributions of $10-20 are demanded from each member. Households facing difficulties in providing the full amount may also pay off the sum by three monthly instalments. The water councils hold an information meeting twice a year, within their own community. The water bills are paid to the treasurer of the water council once a month within a defined time frame, e.g. in La Virginia, on a Sunday afternoon. This is another instance of informal information flow between the council and water users. While the communication within communities is institutionalised, so far there is no functioning communication channel between the three water councils: for instance, the newly elected water council of La Virginia had been trying to get in contact with the one from Mulauco since January, but there has still been no answer by the time of interview in March 2014. Although all three councils had precise information about their own extraction quantities, information about the others tended to be vague and contradictory. The water council of Cochauco claimed that communication and cooperation between the three water councils is unproblematic, yet limited to a minimum: only when it concerns the source, where infrastructure is actually shared, are â&#x20AC;&#x153;intercommunity mingasâ&#x20AC;? organised, with every community obliged to send five people to help. In all three communities, where representatives of the water council were interviewed, a certain degree of opposition against giving up responsibilities in favour of government bodies was expressed. Explicitly, the interview partners in La Virginia stated that EPMAPS had repeatedly tried to take over the administration of the community's water system. This was strongly opposed, since there is great disapproval of handing over issues of such vital importance as the water supply to 'outsiders'. The council members expressed their objections 68

to losing control and having to appeal to EPMAPS for construction and changes, instead of organising it themselves. In Mulauco, the council claimed that the yearly fee paid to SENAGUA not only covers the permission to extract water, but also the right to self-manage the water system. In all three communities, claims were made for financial support by EPMAPS / junta parroquial to the community water system, e.g. for the construction of a sewage system (Cochauco, La Virginia), an irrigation system (Mulauco) or renewing the freshwater pipes (La Virginia). In all cases, the community representatives hold the opinion that the government organisations should provide financial support to the water council's projects, even though their active interference is not welcome.

5.3.3

Outcomes

Household water When the current system had been installed and the respective extraction quantities (M: 3,5 L/s, C: 1.6 L/s, LV: 1.1 L/s) for the three communities were defined, inhabitant numbers were much smaller. Now, the population size is much larger, still being provided with water from the same source. While household water scarcity is not yet an issue in any of the communities, there is fear that the available water quantity may become insufficient in the future. The water council of La Virginia expressed their desire for negotiations with representatives of Mulauco in order to redefine the water flow shares to adjust for the rapid population growth and secure future supply. Conflict was also mentioned by the council members from Mulauco, accusing La Virginia residents of diverting water from a Mulauco water pipeline passing through or near their land. In consequence, as expressed by the water council of La Virginia, it seems all three water councils strive to split the shared system and govern individual water systems, thereby abolishing the causes of conflict. The Mulauco water council is also considering using a third new water source higher up in the mountains, just like the Cochauco water council, but will need support from governing bodies in order to implement that project. As a consequence of the absence of EPMAPS in the region, the water councils have relatively small funds at their disposal, and necessary infrastructure projects remain impossible. As an example, in La Virginia, freshwater pipes are deteriorating and are buried in shallow ground, and thus break 69

easily, regularly putting at risk the inhabitantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; water supply. According to the water council, replacing the pipes by new ones is long overdue, and given the location's extremely hard and rocky subsoil, lowering them in order to be better protected against surface activities requires heavy machinery. Both projects exceed the water council's financial capacities, leading to the appeal for governing bodies to support the communities' efforts with funds. Irrigation water At the moment, there is no system providing irrigation water to the inhabitants of La Virginia and Cochauco that would enable the inhabitants to increase their crop production and improve their livelihoods. In Mulauco, there is an additional system of irrigation canals supplying stream water to parts of the community. Nonetheless, not all households benefit from this system, and it regularly dries out in the summer season, causing the residents to use household freshwater for irrigation. The lack of a satisfying irrigation system was mentioned by all three communities as an urgent problem they would like to solve (or get solved), but there was also broad agreement that the construction of the necessary infrastructure (reservoir, pipes, canals) would require support by external actors. All three water councils stated they have contacted the provincial government or the government of the parroquia for assistance in building / expanding their irrigation service, but so far, no support has been provided. In the case of Cochauco, for instance, it was mentioned there is a water stream near to the settlement that could be used for irrigation, but the water council lacks the funds necessary to build an irrigation canal system reaching the community and people's gardens. The water council chairman in La Virginia explained that a project for building an irrigation reservoir was halted and then given up because the community lacked the appropriate machinery to dig into the rocky subsoil. Waste water Since none of the communities are provided with a sewage system, household waste water commonly ends up in septic tanks. While the interviewees in Mulauco stated that their septic tanks had never filled up, leaching of contaminated water into lower ground layers and thus pollution of groundwater and the Huarmihuaycu watershed can be assumed. In Cochauco, the water council was aware that leaching from the septic tanks causes contamination of the Huarmihuaycu, as well as the Carihuaicu river. Lastly, in La Virginia, regular excavations of the households' septic tanks seem to be common practice due to the impermeable mother rock, inhibiting the leaching of residues to lower layers: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Every six to eight months, I put on 70

those large glovesâ&#x20AC;?, as a resident told us. The slag is then commonly disposed of via the Huarmihuaycu river, leading to downstream contamination. Facing the unsolved environmental problem of waste water discharge, awareness was high among those responsible in all three communities that a sewage system was necessary, putting an end to the practice of septic tanks. Also, all three councils expressed their wish for a water treatment station (since a sewage system alone would still result in the waste water polluting the environment). According to the water council leader of Cochauco, there have been talks with EPMAPS leading to the plan to build a waste water treatment plant in / near Mulauco, but work has not yet commenced.

5.3.4

Evaluation of the action

Efficiency Due to old and inadequate infrastructure, there are a number of causes of efficiency losses. The old and deteriorating pipes frequently lead to loss of water, and their maintenance consumes time, energy and potentially more expenditure in the long term than new pipes would require. The water councils are aware of this dilemma but lack finances in order to change the situation. In Mulauco, the system of open irrigation canals, exposing the resource to direct sunlight, causes losses through evaporation â&#x20AC;&#x201C; protecting at least parts of the canals by covering them might increase the quantity available for irrigation. Furthermore, while water is scarce in the dry period, there is no system of water treatment that would enable, for example, re-use of treated household effluent for irrigation. A major efficiency deficit is reflected in the failure of the three communities to coordinate and then pool their efforts in issues of common interest. All three water councils have contacted governing bodies independently, demanding financial support for the implementation/ extension of an irrigation system, so far in vain. Besides, facing the need for a sewage collection and treatment system, a centralised plant receiving effluents from all three communities seems an intuitive and the most cost-efficient solution. The necessity is acknowledged by all three water councils, yet only the council of Mulauco has been in touch with EPMAPS to discuss this issue. An efficient way to progress with the sewage project could be the formation of a responsible committee, with an equal number of members from each community. 71

Equity The main element of water governance in focus – the provision of household water from the Yactaqiringuay source – is, in principle, equitable: every household in Cochauco, Mulauco and La Virginia has the right to 15 m³ per month. However, taking a closer look, some issues of equity have already come up: above all, not everyone has access to irrigation - in fact, only some of the Mulauco residents do. This is an issue which falls within the responsibility of the water councils. As long as the councils do not take the appropriate steps in order to make irrigation available for all inhabitants of their communities, inequitable conditions between the water system members will persist. Beyond that, the equity of the extraction shares at the Yactaqiringuay source has been questioned by the water council of La Virginia. It can only be assumed that the highly diverging extraction quantities between the three communities were defined according to the original population numbers. Nowadays, approximately 485 inhabitants in Mulauco receive 3.5 L/s, and about 850 inhabitants in La Virginia live with 1.1 L/s. (485 is the estimated population number given by the president of the community in Mulauco. In the course of the interview with the water council of La Virginia, it was stated that Mulauco consisted of “more than 200 families”, while La Virginia was 117 families. While the large gap is confusing, the numbers support La Virginia's demand for an adjusted, more equitable distribution of the resource.) If technically feasible, the extraction right at the source must correspond to the respective numbers of households to be equitable. Accusations of theft from the pipelines leading to Mulauco levied against La Virginia residents would, if proven true, only sharpen the feeling of injustice among La Virginia residents. Legitimacy Decisions taken by the water council are legitimised by biannual elections. Little information was collected on the legitimacy as perceived by the water users. The water council chairman of Cochauco has been reelected again and again since 1998, enjoying a high level of trust within his community. Acceptance There is no information on whether the water users oppose the rules-in-use of the water governance. Yet, as stated above, the water councils do not fully accept the current, dichotomous system - in which water management is either handed over to EPMAPS, or practised autonomously by the water councils, without any support from governing bodies. 72

They now demand financial support for their own projects, yet without EPMAPS interfering in water governance. This can be interpreted as a partial rejection of the current legal structure of water governance. Participation Participation in mingas was acknowledged as a vital part of water management by all interviewees. Without mingas, there would probably be no infrastructure at all. Information meetings are institutionalised and held twice to three times a year, and the participants of the meetings have certain power in decision-making. The water council is obliged to take into account all opinions and suggestions from the community members, and finally the community has the last say. The level of participation can be characterised as high. Accountability Apart from council members not being reelected, hardly any actors of the water governance are held accountable for their actions. Free-riding in terms of non-participation in mingas is sanctioned via fines. Since every household has a water meter, excessive, wasteful usage must be paid for. In Mulauco, where residents are reported to periodically use household water for irrigation, no penalty is intended. Robustness Due to the possibility of convening assemblies and communal decision-making, water governance has a high degree of flexibility and adaptability. The water council members are themselves water users who live within the community and can thus receive a lot of informal information to adapt their planning and decision-making. According to the water council of Cochauco, problems of high pollution in earlier times were reduced via information dissemination about the sources of pollution (fertilisers, animal slurry, construction wastes). The combination of a grassroots element (assemblies) with a representative element (elected water council, gathering information and taking responsibility for problem-solving) is efficient in confronting challenges and physical shocks.

5.3.5

Conclusions

At the moment, water governance appears to largely satisfy its participants. Despite the lack of governmental support for the communities, people have managed their water resources through community self-organisation. The cultural heritage from ancient indigenous 73

communities is still a part of the people's lifestyle, and is expressed through their customs, particularly in mingas. Nonetheless, there are aspirations in terms of improving living conditions and environmental standards, as well as conflicts, that all deserve attention. The inhabitants as well as the elected responsible persons in all three communities share a lot of expectations and wishes as well as challenges and constraints. The lack of irrigation and the absence of any sewage system are urgent challenges for the water councils in Mulauco, Cochauco, and La Virginia. An exchange of experiences between the communities, potentially leading to united efforts, could be beneficial for all communities. The inefficiency in engaging with the governing bodies, like EPMAPS or the junta parroquial could also be reduced if all three communities were to identify their common difficulties and goals and cooperate, e.g. via a joint committee in charge of 'outside affairs'. Once trust is built up, even financial cooperation for construction of infrastructure could be a possibility. In principle, simple economies of scale can be considered by the three communities: if measures, such as a waste water treatment plant, are necessary and beneficial to the inhabitants of all three communities, it would be sensible to pursue these aims as a team.

5.4 Itulcachi and La Cocha 5.4.1

Inputs

5.4.1.1 Nature of the good Household water Itulcachi and La Cocha have a shared communal water system that is managed by a common water council that provides household water distribution for 3 barrios including El BelĂŠn. The water is collected from the watershed El Yakpito and is sand filtered and treated with chlorine (0.3 ounces for 70mÂł continuously) before being distributed to the community. The water quality is tested by the Escuela PolitĂŠcnica Nacional every 6 months both before the treatment in the collection tank and after the treatment. The corresponding test in 2012 showed that the treatment improves the water quality. This is proven by the absence of coliform bacteria compared to the amount of total and faecal coliform before treatment with 400 UFC/100ml and 20 UFC/ml respectively. The quality of the distributed water is overall acceptable, however the amount of dissolved solids was exceeding the permissible limit (75 mg/l) and the

amount of organic compounds in water is not recommendable. Measures for those exceeding physical-chemical parameters should be considered. Based on the interviews and observation by the interviewers, most of the households in Itulcachi and La Cocha drink the water directly from the tap, although some households pretreat the drinking water by cooking. However, no diseases or parasites related to unsafe drinking water could be observed in the course of the fieldwork. The president of the water council stated that in the three communities (including El Belén) there are approximately 400 water connections for 900 – 1000 families with app. 50-100 families who do not have a connection yet, because the water distribution pipe system has not been renewed since the first installation in 1987. The recently built houses could not be connected to the household water system due to the low water supply from the current tank. The current collection tank has a volume of 70m³ with a flow rate of 2 L/s and the connecting pipes to the households have a diameter of 3 inches (76 mm). The average consumption of the households in Itulcachi and La Cocha is 8-10 L/month. There are companies and industries that are located near or within the communities which also use the communal water system of the three communities for consumption and processing but not for irrigation. The three flower companies that are located in La Cocha each use more or less 300 m³/ month. Two poultry farms located in La Cocha use each on average 500 m³/month. Based on information by the water council, Novopan, a big plant located nearby, receives communal water at an average of 80 m³/month, mainly for bathrooms and the cafeteria in the main factory building. Any other water necessary for the wood plantation is provided by independent water sources. Most of the large companies, including Novopan, the flower companies and other industries have their own water and waste water systems. The waste water from the households in both communities is collected in a sewage water system, which was built by EPMAPS in 2008 for the three communities. The waste water is then discharged to the lower branches of Chiche River. Irrigation water The irrigation water system for Itulcachi and La Cocha is a different system than the previously described community household water system. It originates from the Paramo de Guamani, derived from acequia de Casanto (Gobierno de Pichincha, 2013), then branches into El Inga river which is utilised by three other communities: El Inga Alto, El Inga Bajo and El Belén, while the other branch flows towards Itulcachi river / El Chacpito, where a tank 75

about 1 km away from Itulcachi collects the water and distributes the water to the “canales de tierra” to four main users: Hacienda La Cocha; Hacienda Ponce; Itulcachi and La Cocha. The irrigation water channels are open canals. Concessions by SENAGUA exist for each user to withdraw a certain amount of water (Itulcachi 29 l/s, La Cocha 17 l/s, the limits for both Haciendas are unknown). Based on the information of the irrigation water council in Itulcachi, the amount of irrigation water according to the concession for Itulcachi should be sufficient for the community. Irrigation canals run through both communities providing irrigation water for the households. However, the topography and the distance of properties to irrigation water canals differs. Particularly in Itulcachi, where the terrain is hilly, many households do not have access to irrigation water. In summer, the pressure on the water supply increases due to higher evaporation losses from the open canals, consequently exacerbating the scarcity of irrigation water. Open canals are also affected by waste and other contaminants. 5.4.1.2 Attributes of the community The second input factor to be analysed in terms of the IAD framework are the attributes of the community. Certain elements such as reciprocity, common understanding and social capital influence the structure and activity of the community, shaping the action situation of decisionmaking in water governance and its outcomes. First, information on both communities and a short overview on certain historical developments will be given. Itulcachi and La Cocha lie very close to each other and are in the influence area of the landfill “Relleno Sanitario del Inga”. With 1200 inhabitants, Itulcachi is the largest community of the three and is located in the centre. La Cocha is the second largest community, with 323 inhabitants and lies west of Itulcachi. El Belén is the third and smallest community with 170 inhabitants and lies the closest to the landfill. The three communities are historically connected as the “Hacienda Itulcachi” used to own almost all the land in the three communities. During the agrarian land reform of 1964 each worker was given 1 ha of land from the Hacienda within the current boundaries and surroundings of the three communities. The workers that were given land during the agrarian land reform are called “huasipungos”. The Hacienda Itulcachi still exists today but only employs between 2 and 8 persons depending on the season, in comparison to 300-400 employees in former times. The Hacienda focuses on animal husbandry, milk production and agriculture.

All three communities are non-legalised barrios, or communities. This results from the distribution of the land during the land reform to 70 employees: each family in the past 50 years built houses for themselves, their relatives and new family members without any form of legal authority to do so, leading to the current state of non-legalised barrios. All three communities individually strive for and, to an extent, work towards the legalisation process. Particular difficulties arise due to the fact that every owner of buildings or land has to fulfil specific bureaucratic steps. According to the community council of Itulcachi, El Belén is already in the last stages of the legalisation process while Itulcachi and La Cocha are both in the process of or starting the legalisation process. The organisational structure of both communities is dominated by an elected community council of a specific amount of inhabitants that are in charge of community matters. However, any larger community decision is communicated and taken during meetings of all members of the community. A community council usually consists of a president, a vice president, a secretary, an accountant and one or several “vocals” that are in charge of the communication of matters discussed. La Cocha is led by a president and, largely, the vice president, as the president himself is only present for about half of the month. The presidents of both communities are in charge of organising and managing meetings and mingas, the administration of the community and communication within the community, as well as dealing with urgent issues and projects in the community. The community members are mainly focused on agriculture (primarily subsistence) and animal husbandry, and many are employed as hired labour (i.e. many persons met or interviewed work at nearby companies such as Novopan, recycling companies, construction or at the landfill). The communities themselves seem to lack financial options to take care of certain improvements, especially those concerning water management. In contrast to La Cocha, Itulcachi receives financial compensation from the landfill due to the small distance to the plant and the correspondingly greater impact, such as the smell. The amount of compensation depends on the amount of waste delivered to the landfill. The daily amounts of waste transported to the landfill are 190 tons. A compensation of 10 ct/t of waste is paid to the communities El Belén, Inga Bajo, Inga Alto and Itulcachi. Hence an amount of $190 is paid into the compensation fund each day. The share that Itulcachi receives is unknown.

The two communities are located in a mainly rural area but are surrounded by a number of companies and a modernised highway. More detailed information on the companies mentioned can be found in Section 5.7. The community area of La Cocha is largely influenced by the two poultry farms and the two flower companies situated inside the community land. The social capital of a community can be assessed by analysing the following factors: engagement of inhabitants, communication and interrelations, reciprocity, informal networks and organisational templates. Many groups were founded in Itulcachi, such as the irrigation water council, a group for organic farming, a group of organic husbandry, of guinea-pig breeders, a church group. Up to 60 people take part in the groups depending on the aim of the group. In total, seven individual organisations were founded in Itulcachi that sometimes receive support and seminars from the Ministry of Agriculture and the provincial government. Itulcachi generally seemed to be an active and well-connected community. Lots of engagement on the part of the inhabitants could be observed, for instance through participation in the voluntary tasks of water councils, community councils or other organisations. Most interviewees knew their neighbours and other inhabitants well. This also seemed to be the case for the interrelation between the three communities, El BelĂŠn, La Cocha and Itulcachi. In contrast to Itulcachi no information was found or gathered about any organisations in La Cocha. This may be a result of fewer inhabitants in La Cocha and the lack of an active elite which could initiate such groups. The inhabitants also seemed to be more reserved and less interested in community affairs. La Cocha also seems to be the least progressive of the three communities: no effort has been made to improve the situation with respect to water governance, such as lack of irrigation water, and only little effort has been put into the legalisation process. Informal networks exist in Itulcachi and La Cocha. Both communities base the work of the community councils on decisions taken in community meetings. These meetings take place whenever necessary and desired. On average it was mentioned that they take place approximately every one to two months. Mingas are the dominant tool used by the communities to handle any matters, for example cleaning canals, building canals, and other communal actions.

5.4.1.3 Rules-In-Use The last input factor influencing the action situation and the outcomes of water governance in accordance with the IAD framework are the rules-in-use, namely the relevant laws, norms and property rights. Regarding drinking water, every water user has to pay to the water council according to their water consumption. The basic tariff is $2 for 10 m³. Any additional consumption costs $0.20/m³. Companies are charged with a higher price of around $0.25/m³. Each community has to provide one representative for the water council. The council holds obligatory meetings twice a year for all members of the drinking water system. Mingas are important basic instruments in community matters, as well as any matters concerning water. Even though the communal drinking water system employs one worker for the daily tasks of connection installation and small reparation works, any larger tasks are generally carried out by mingas. Approximately 70-80% of the inhabitants of Itulcachi take part in mingas, otherwise a penalty of $10 has to be paid. In La Cocha, another penalty system exists: if as individual does not attend the minga, he or she has to bring more “manpower” next time. Community meetings are generally used to solve any issues between neighbours or inhabitants. In general, it seemed that most families in both communities handle water carefully, as it seems to be acknowledged that water is a scarce resource at specific times of the year and that higher consumption is expensive. However, drinking water appeared to not be used for irrigation during shortages in summer months. Concerning norms in irrigation water governance, the most important norm seems to be that each user of the irrigation water is responsible for their irrigation water system individually. From the point of distribution towards the four users (two farms and both communities) onwards, there are no regulations for internal distribution.

5.4.2

Action Situation

Household Water A common water council for drinking water for Itulcachi, La Cocha and El Belén is responsible for any drinking water related issues and independent from the community councils. The water council consists of six persons, with at least one representative from each 79

community. The secretary and one vocal are from Itulcachi. The accountant and one vocal are the representatives from Belen. La Cocha provides one vocal. In terms of irrigation water, the irrigation water council has just recently started its work, meeting once a week. No information about regular community assemblies could be obtained. The community council of La Cocha is responsible for the management of irrigation water and does not hold any specific meetings to discuss matters of irrigation. Other participants in the water governance in Itulcachi and La Cocha are the three communities (the villagers) and their community councils, water users, haciendas and companies. Regarding the rankings in the water governance, it could be observed that the water council has the highest position in terms of control, as it has decisive powers over all three communities. Next, the three community councils are important in terms of community interaction, but decisions in terms of water governance are mainly taken by the common water council with participation of the villagers as water users. The latter also contribute in mingas to maintain the infrastructure. The companies, such as flower companies and poultry farms, also act as water users that use larger amounts of water but are important in the community as supporting pillars, providing jobs and participating in the community by helping out on different occasions (i.e. money contribution for street construction, providing food and drinks during mingas, etc.). Finally, the last group of water users are the two haciendas mentioned above that are supposed to participate in community meetings. All decisions taken by the water council are based on the information from studies, close cooperation with EPMAPS and engineers, after community meetings and others also participating in the decision making. The information flows between the participants of the water governance by meetings and word of mouth and usually originates in the water or community council. Conflicts that could influence household water governance were not identified. The water council as the body managing the water distribution between three communities seems to be trusted and has built a good relationship with the other participants in water governance as well as with different groups of water users. The perception of the most inhabitants in Itulcachi and La Cocha are that the major driving forces of action and decisions regarding household water are the demand of households and industries (flower companies, poultry farms, Novopan, etc.). The population growth with the accompanying construction of new houses and new water connections is seen as a factor that 80

will put pressure on water by over-limiting the water extraction. Regarding the state of water the inhabitants of the communities are satisfied with household water quality and quantity. Every participant in the water governance has the same level of control over pollution in terms of waste water discharge except for the community council who could enforce the building of a waste water treatment plant. The community council also has the power to enforce/create norms and rules to reduce pollution, while the water councils can inform water users about pollution and enforce norms on handling water. On a national level, state agencies can provide information meetings and training on water quality awareness. The control of the household water governance lies in the hands of the water council. As the water council lacks financial resources, the enlargement of the water provision system depends on the cooperation of EPMAPS. Itulcachi and La Cocha have a common plan designed by the communal water council to build new water connections to all households, bigger pipes to reduce water insufficiency and a new water tank. However, the residents from both communities are quite content with the current communal water system and management. Irrigation Water The irrigation water governance in Itulcachi and La Cocha is more complex than the household water governance. No common organisation or body exists to manage the irrigation system for both communities. In contrast to La Cocha, where irrigation is managed by the community council, Itulcachi has just recently established an irrigation water council. The relevant participants of the water governance in Itulcachi and La Cocha are the irrigation water council or community council respectively, the water users, two haciendas and three flower companies. As has been mentioned previously, the highest power regarding irrigation governance in Itulcachi is held by the newly founded irrigation water council as it can act quite independently, although influence from residents and community council of Itulcachi can be expected. The irrigation water council acts as representative of the community in terms of all matters of irrigation but these also have to be discussed and decided within the community. The irrigation water is shared between the two haciendas, la Cocha and Itulcachi, while each one has a specific concession by SENAGUA regarding the allowed extractable amounts. The flower companies and other industry claim to have their own water systems. Lastly, the inhabitants in both communities as water users determine how much water is

extracted from the open canals. No rule exists within the community regulating the extraction of irrigation water by the single households. All decisions regarding irrigation are taken by the community council of the community during meetings while in Itulcachi some decisions may also be taken only by the newly founded irrigation council. The information for the decisions of the irrigation council in Itulcachi are based on work with an engineer supporting the project and from information of the inhabitants via word of mouth and information gatherings. In La Cocha the information flows are questionable, but not much information could be obtained about this. The president of the community does not live in La Cocha and most of his functions are represented by the vice president of the community. The information is distributed between the inhabitants mostly by word of mouth or meetings. Both communities have received and will receive support from the provincial government which also acts as a source of information for both of the communities. Some friction between Itulcachi and La Cocha may exist as a result of the unequal compensation payments due to the existence of the landfill, whereby La Cocha does not receive any financial compensation. Major driving forces of action and decision perceived by the communities regarding irrigation water are the demand for gardening or subsistence, aquaculture, agriculture and husbandry, as well as for industry. The landfill is perceived to be the major pollution source to air and water resources. Other factors contributing to pressure on water due to pollution are agriculture, livestock, pollution from companies and household waste water discharge. Over-extraction of water resources is not perceived to be a pressure. The state of the water is believed to be unsatisfactory as some people dump waste into water bodies. The quantity of the irrigation water is especially perceived to be problematic because of the unequal distribution. The landfill seems to have a large potential to pollute at the same time as the waste water discharge to rivers. The landfill is located directly beside the river El Inga, nevertheless the risk that liquids from the water collection pools might leak due to overload is difficult to assess. It could however be observed that the security pumps to avoid any overflowing seem to be inadequately small, leading to the conclusion that a risk of pollution from polluted water from the landfill to the rivers exists. A risk of infiltration of liquid waste to the groundwater may also exist if water overflows or holes in the impermeable layers of the water pools exist. The flower companies were suspected to have a large pollution potential, but are regulated by 82

the state on pollution limits. No information about pollution could be obtained by the flower companies themselves. Inhabitants of the communities though do not believe that there exists any pollution by the flower companies. Large agricultural farms (the Haciendas) have a big potential to pollute because of their production systems which need high amounts of fertiliser and pesticides. The communities Itulcachi and La Cocha generally have the same desire to build a new reservoir and new pipelines instead of open canals for equal and adequate access of irrigation water especially in summer. 5.4.3

Outcome

Pollution Water pollution has to be distinguished according to drinking water, irrigation water and stream and groundwater resources. As the input Section on Itulcachi and La Cocha reveals, the drinking water in general has quite a good quality and only has to be sand-filtered and disinfected with chlorine. The irrigation water sources both in Itulcachi and La Cocha seem to be regularly polluted by waste dumping into the irrigation water channels because of its open feature and the lack of formal rules prohibiting the discharge of waste into water. No information was retrievable about diffuse sources of fertiliser pollution. The irrigation water runs in open channels and is extracted at a certain point further away from the villages. Pollution by agriculture, by chemicals, by air, by precipitation and other water users further upstream may be possible. Information was only available about one pollution event, whereby the river water was polluted to such an extent (for unidentified reasons) that high amounts of chlorine were necessary to eliminate any damage from the pollution. Pollution of local water resources is not perceived as a problem by the inhabitants of both Itulcachi and La Cocha. However, some inhabitants of La Cocha are aware of local pollution of irrigation water channels by waste dumping. The largest pollution sources for water resources in these two villages are the discharge of the collected waste water streams into nearby rivers and the pollution of rivers through the nearby landfill. Unequal access The second outcome to be assessed is unequal access to water resources. In Itulcachi and La Cocha most people have access to drinking water resources. 30 houses in Itulcachi and 10 in 83

La Cocha respectively have no connection to drinking water. This is mainly due to the fact that these houses have only recently been built and that the capacity of the current water system cannot provide sufficient water for the current and the additional houses. According to the water council, at high demand times of drinking water, the amount of water extractable in each house can already be at a minimal level, precluding the installation of additional connections without enlarging the tank and diameter of the pipes first. The reasons for the lack of water connections due to lacking capacity of the water provision in terms of pipe width and tank size are the nonrenewal of the water governance system since its installation in 1964 and the “unplanned” or unexpected large population growth in the past 50 years. This is valid both for Itulcachi and La Cocha, as well as for El Belén. Therefore, a plan to expand the water system is in place and shall be enforced with the help of EPMAPS this year. A plan exists, partly financed by EPMAPS (with a budget of $400.000), to improve the system while maintaining the independent function and management of the water resources by the community water council. The project consists of two phases. The first phase will be implemented in cooperation with EPMAPS which will provide the technical knowledge and financial support of about $150 000 (signed in March 2014) to build a new reservoir tank of 100 m³ and 150 new connections. The second phase, with a budget of $280 000, plans to change the distribution pipe system and widen the connecting pipes to households from 3 to 6 inches. A large problem perceived by the inhabitants is the unequal access to irrigation water. In Itulcachi, 50-80% of the residents have no or only little access to irrigation water. Additionally, those higher up on the canals are perceived to withdraw a disproportionate amount of irrigation water leading to unequal distribution. In La Cocha, almost everyone has access to irrigation water but the distribution seems to be unequal as inhabitants higher up on the canals can take as much irrigation water quantity as they desire due to a lack of regulation concerning how much any of the inhabitants shall/can receive. No formal rules exist to avoid these distribution inequalities. Usually these kind of issues are resolved in meetings (between all users of irrigation water). To find a long-term solution for this problem, Itulcachi took the initiative to found a new water council for irrigation water that shall manage the irrigation system and shall, with the support of the provincial government, install a new reservoir and new closed pipelines instead of open canals to ensure equal distribution. The new reservoir shall adequately irrigate 78 ha. The costs will be spilt 50-50 between the community and the consejo provincial (the 84

Provincial Government). Within the community each user shall pay about $1 per year. La Cocha was inspired by the irrigation water council of Itulcachi and their plans and wishes to act similarily. However, no measures in La Cocha have yet been taken. The lack of financial possibilities seems to be the largest setback. Water insufficiency The third outcome is insufficient water. As in the rest of the parroquia of Pifo, shortages in water resources are a major problem in the summer months. In terms of drinking water, the water provision is almost sufficient, only a few houses have no connection to the household water system. However, the water provision is already under pressure due to a growing population and is expected to rise in the future. Plans are already made to enlarge the water provision as described above. Irrigation water is especially lacking in summer both in La Cocha and Itulcachi. Itulcachi in particular makes an effort to increase the irrigation water provision. In contrast to Itulcachi, La Cocha does not actively work to improve the provision of irrigation water. This may be due to the fact, that irrigation water lacks in summer but as distribution inequalities are not as dominant as in Itulcachi, the incentive to change is lower. 5.4.4

Evaluation of the action

To evaluate why the current water governance leads to the previously described outcomes of water resource pollution, unequal access to water and water insufficiency, the action situation must be analysed according to the following criteria: efficiency, equity, legitimacy, acceptance, participation, accountability and adaptability, robustness, resilience and sustainability. Starting with the criteria of efficiency, the main questions were if there are major efficiency losses and if water use efficiency differs among various user groups. Considering that both Itulcachi and La Cocha have the same water council in charge of any issues related to drinking water, all efficiency matters can be considered equal for both communities. No major water efficiency losses in the system of drinking water provision by the community could be observed. The water council employs one technician, referred to as â&#x20AC;&#x153;the operatorâ&#x20AC;?, who is responsible for any kind of work that is necessary for the provision of water (pipelines, tank, connections, etc.). To the extent permitted by the technical capacity of the current installations, the water system provides sufficient water for all connected users. However, higher efficiency of the water source use could be achieved by increasing the amount of water 85

extracted. A plan to be financed by EPMAPS is already in place though it will exacerbate this problem, allowing the communities to extract more water from the spring due to a new tank and larger pipe diameters. Considerable inefficiencies are evidenced by the lack of water treatment or water reuse. As waste water is not treated, it cannot be reused and is discharged into the rivers downstream. No differences in efficiency between user groups could be identified. Considering irrigation water, higher inefficiencies exist, especially as irrigation water is carried through open canals where the water resources are open to evaporation and contamination by air, soil or other infiltrating substances such as waste. The distribution of the water canals in Itulcachi also represents high inefficiencies, as the canals only pass by a few properties within the community, leading to considerable irrigation water shortages in Itulcachi. The layout of irrigation water canals in La Cocha is slightly more efficient, as almost every property is reached by the canals and receives irrigation water. However, inefficiency in both communities is largely due to a lack of storage facilities such as tanks or reservoirs to collect water in times of high water supply. Differences in efficiency of irrigation water use could be assumed to vary between different users depending on agricultural practice (i.e. organic farming), availability of irrigation water, location of the water user within the community, and location of the irrigation water channel. For example, a downstream water user could be expected to act highly efficiently with his/her water supply, as only little irrigation water may reach him during dry seasons. Any water user higher up in the community, who is reached first by the irrigation water canals, may not need to act as efficiently with water supplies. This topic leads directly to the second evaluative criteria: equity. The main criteria used to determine equity in distributional outcomes and processes was whether everyone has equal access to sufficient water resources. Regarding drinking water, it was stated by the water council that, in total, 40 connections to the water sources are currently lacking in Itulcachi and La Cocha but plans exist to improve the water provision to allow the building of new water connections as described in 4.4.3.2. Equity between the two communities is questionable. At the moment, the water council consists of three volunteers from Itulcachi and only one volunteer from La Cocha. This could either be a mere reflection of the fact that Itulcachi is a community four times as big and more active, or evidence that people in La Cocha do not feel they need to participate in water governance â&#x20AC;&#x201C; either because there is less of a need to

participate in water governance or because there is less interest in the work of common water governance bodies. Equity in the access to irrigation water and in the sufficiency of irrigation water for all water users is a highly discussed issue in both communities, as has been described. According to the perceptions of most inhabitants of Itulcachi, considerable distribution inequality exists in the community. The inequality results, firstly, from a total lack of provision of irrigation water to 50-80% of all households in Itulcachi, and secondly, from inequalities in how much irrigation water is provided to whom. According to the inhabitants, some water users extract shares of irrigation water that are perceived to be unfair, too high and inequitable. It seems that the largest problem in Itulcachi lies in the insufficiency of irrigation water provision caused by a lack of canals. Rules to determine how much water each user can extract and transparency regarding the amounts extracted by companies and water users may help to reduce inequity. Equity in La Cocha seems to be a problem resulting less from a lack of a canal system than from inequitable extractions by different users. Similar to Itulcachi, no rules to regulate the extraction of users exist which could ensure more equity in access to irrigation water. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants mentioned the distance to irrigation water canals as an issue. The next evaluative criteria determines whether bodies of governance enjoy the trust of the community so that decisions are perceived to be legitimate. Governing bodies of interest in Itulcachi and La Cocha are the water council for drinking water, the irrigation water council of Itulcachi, the community councils of each community and the Ministry of Agriculture as well as the Provincial Government. According to any person interviewed in both communities, the drinking water council is perceived to act independently and effectively, and therefore seems to be accepted as legitimate by the communities. Knowledge on the legitimacy of irrigation water council of Itulcachi could not be obtained as it has been founded only recently. Currently, the community council of Itulcachi seems to enjoy legitimacy as no opposing opinions or objections have been noted. Nonetheless, some tension could be observed since, in the past, problems had occurred between a former president of the community council and the community council itself where re-elections had to take place. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Provincial Government do not take any decisions but rather inform, support and help 87

out in developing various projects. Their support and work is perceived to be positive and helpful by the inhabitants of Itulcachi. In La Cocha, no irrigation water council exists, the community council being in charge of these matters instead. The community council seems to be trusted, especially the vice president who is in charge 50% of the time. Cooperation with the Provincial Government is aimed for, allowing the assumption that general consent and trust holds. The degree of acceptance of the rules-in-use could determine whether rule or law enforcement may be a suitable solution for unsatisfactory outcomes. Within the scope of the field research, no information could be gathered on whether the laws and rules-in-use are complied with or accepted. In general, though, only minor rules, laws and norms exist that regulate water governance, handling, quality, disposal, treatment, etc. For many other aspects further rules or norms would be helpful, e.g. regarding extractable amounts of irrigation water, pollution of canals, etc. However, non-compliance is not currently a problem in either Itulcachi or La Cocha. The extent of participation in water governance could determine whether it could be a tool to increase legitimacy, effectiveness or any other criteria. Three of the 1200 inhabitants of Itulcachi participate in the six-person water council of the three communities. One volunteer from the 323 inhabitants of La Cocha participates in the drinking water council. Attendance at meetings of all water users with the water council is high at 300-350 out of 400 water users. The Itulcachi water council consists of six inhabitants who work for it on a voluntarily basis, any further volunteers are unknown or non-existent at the moment. In La Cocha if the members of the community council do participate in water governance matters, they do so only when it concerns decisions on irrigation water. Participation by all members of the community exists largely in the form of mingas, the attendance for which is about 70-80%. The participation of volunteers for the water councils and community councils is especially important as the councils are the mechanical tool to deal with any water or community related issues. Only due to the existence of mingas was it possible to establish such a communal water management system. All canals, tanks and the reservoir, as well as all large projects that have been completed affect the outcomes of water distribution, pollution and scarcity to a large extent. Accountability is a major tool to limit and influence decision-takers and participation in a governance system. In Itulcachi and La Cocha the governing bodies who take decisions such as the water councils or community councils can be held accountable for their actions via the 88

re-election processes and by direct consultation in community gatherings. Water users can generally not be held accountable for their water use, neither in terms of amounts, purpose or pollution. Water users can only be held accountable for non-attendance of mingas. To finally determine the state and stability of a governance system, its adaptability, resilience, robustness or sustainability has to be determined, establishing whether the system has the capacity to sustain a shock, recover and cope with change. Therefore, previous shocks and solutions have to be presented. No knowledge about previous instances whereby resilience of the drinking water council could be judged could be collected. However, the water council seems to be adaptable to changes in population growth as plans are currently being made to expand the system to provide drinking water for growing number of inhabitants. Irrigation water governance in Itulcachi was established as a measure to cope with the distribution inequalities and insufficiencies of irrigation water, representing Itulcachiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to cope with change and adapt. Concerning community resilience and adaptability, Itulcachi went through a period of time where unpopular decisions on prolonging contracts with the landfill were taken by the community council without any consultation with the population, leading to serious struggles between the community council and the community, finally resulting in re-election processes. However, the community seems to have regained trust in its community council and has thereby demonstrated its adaptability and sustainability, being able to sustain shocks and recover from them. La Cocha had to deal with the financial and social shock of being the only community not to receive financial compensation from the landfill, despite the fact that La Cocha is closely interlinked with Itulcachi and El BelĂŠn. This leads to jealousy and misunderstandings between the communities. However, up till now La Cocha has proven its robustness, adaptability and sustainability to recover from this shock by reinforcing a reliable system of water governance and a strong relationship with Itulcachi.

5.4.5

Conclusions

The greatest problem for Itulcachi and La Cocha lies in the lack of irrigation water and unequal distribution of it. The main difference between the communities seems to be the ability of the community to improve the situation: Itulcachi, possibly as a result of a more significant lack of irrigation water, has gathered active inhabitants to form an irrigation water 89

council which will try to solve the inequalities and insufficiencies in irrigation water, with the help of the Provincial Government. This seems to be a positive step to improve the community’s situation. Itulcachi, in comparison to La Cocha, seems to feature quite an active elite of inhabitants who take up responsibility in the community. Cooperation with La Cocha in matters concerning irrigation water would be advisable to increase the linkages and communication between the communities, improving irrigation efficiency through joint effort. If cooperation is not wanted by the communities, the irrigation water council in Itulcachi could serve as an example solution to solving a problem within water governance. Plans to improve household water provision with the help of EPMAPS are in place for common water management of the three communities. Cooperation with EPMAPS and the Provincial Government should be enhanced further. Seminars and training sessions by the Ministry of Agriculture allow inhabitants to gain knowledge on how to improve water governance, and raise awareness on problems such as water pollution. The impact of the landfill and the surrounding industries (including those that will be constructed in the future) should be investigated further. In particular, the pollution of water resources in the region by industries and potentially higher demands on water sources by new industries may increase the general pressure on clean water systems in the region. Closer cooperation between the companies and the communities would be desirable. The communities themselves should encourage cooperation with the Provincial Government to demand the construction of a waste water treatment plant to reduce the negative impact of the community on the surrounding water resources.

5.5 Governing Bodies and Ministries A series of interviews carried out with stakeholders from government agencies at the national, municipal, provincial and parroquia levels, as well as the public utility company EPMAPS, provided an insight into the operational issues, priorities and key problems relating to water provision and quality from the point of view of “service providers” – as opposed to the “service consumers” in the communities. As could perhaps be expected, the key issues identified by the interviewees with respect to irrigation water, household water, waste water and institutions are somewhat different to those highlighted by the beneficiaries.

5.5.1

Household Water

a) Operation and administration According to the EPMAPS interviewee, the key feature of water provision in Pifo is that it is the only parroquia within the municipality of Quito to operate two service systems for household water – EPMAPS and communal water management. In order to connect to the EPMAPS system a household has to fill out an application form and pay for a meter (the cost of which is approximately US$70-80), after which an EPMAPS engineer connects the household to the network within 15 days. On average, the cost of the EPMAPS service is US$15-20 per family per month, compared to the US$1-2 paid for communal water services. The minimum flat rate still has to be paid if the customer goes on holiday, for instance. If water users do not pay for the service, EPMAPS has the right to take them to court. In principle, the service should be cut off, as would be the case with an electricity provider. However, in practice, this is not always feasible and is not always the case. In some instances, EPMAPS has waited for a year or even two for a water user to pay their bills. Here, the major obstacle relates to legislation issues – cutting off the water supply would contravene the constitution and public company law dictates that EPMAPS has no right to deprive anyone of water. One of the possible solutions being investigated by the company is to severely reduce the amount of water supplied, down to a trickle, until the money is paid. It should also be noted that the only role played by the local population in the development of the EPMAPS system is to put in requests to be connected to it. There is no participation in the design of the new infrastructure projects, and there is no cooperation between EPMAPS and mingas. More information on EPMAPS current development plans can be found in Box 4. Box 4: EPMAPS Operations and Upcoming Projects Currently, EPMAPS is responsible for 99% coverage with respect to drinking water provision in the municipality Quito, and for a slightly lower percentage in the peri-urban area, including the Pifoparroquia. The planning of future projects is based on the population index (census data) and the requests put in by water users. EMAAP has construction plans up to 2050. EPMAPS has experienced difficulties in water provision in someareas due to the difficult terrain – in those cases, communal water management was the only option. However, one of the projects currently being designed isintended to extend water provision to those mountainous areas. A preliminary scoping study was carried out in 2014, atconsiderable cost. The cost of the total project is estimated to be $8-10 million.

b) Water Quality The EPMAPS interviewee sought to emphasise the high quality of water provided by EPMAPS. According to him, problems with contamination arise due to poor infrastructure at household level – while EPMAPS provides good-quality water to the central network, e.g. a pipe running down a street, the pipes connecting individual households to the central network are sometimes very old and in need of repair. Water travelling down those pipes can therefore become contaminated with the oxidised residue. Nonetheless, the interviewee noted that EPMAPS have had problems with the high arsenic content of the “raw” water in the past and have set up a separate department within the organisation responsible for monitoring water quality. Unfortunately, the attempts to contact this department to request more detailed information about water quality monitoring were unsuccessful. However, the perceived quality of water supplied by EPMAPS (indeed, “the best in South America”, according to the interviewee), as well as its state monopoly status, gives it considerable advantage over community water providers. This partly why, in some cases, EPMAPS water is used for household consumption whereas the “communal” water is used for irrigation. c) Water Treatment To maintain the above-mentioned high quality of water, EPMAPS relies on a number of (preuse) water treatment plants. The most recent project was the construction of a major plant in Paluga (known as the Paluguillo), meant to serve a large surrounding area. However, the water treatment plant in Mulauco has experienced technical difficulties due to a landslide and is no longer in operation. EPMAPS did not appear to consider the failure of the plant to be a significant problem. Instead it was used as an example to highlight the advantages of the dual system implemented by EPMAPS whereby each region is connected to two water sources. Should problems occur at one end, the other plant can be relied on to provide water – albeit a lower quantity. As the interviewee explained, Pifo is linked to Palugillo from the western side and to the Quito plant from the East.

5.5.2

Irrigation Water

a) Operations The canal of interest for the study of water governance in Pifo is the 60-kilometer-long Pisque canal, covering the eastern part of the parroquia. In terms of the organisation, the canal is a fairly large system, comprising 28 “moduls”. The Irrigation Water council appoints the head technical officer in charge of the entire system, and a “canal manager” for every secondary canal who is responsible for cleaning, maintenance, etc. While smaller irrigation projects are sponsored by the Council, larger ones are undertaken in cooperation with the Provincial Government of Pichincha who provide technical knowledge, materials, etc. In terms of the payment system, the Council had preserved the tariff system, inherited from INERHI (Ecuador Institute for Water Resources, responsible for irrigation services since 1972). On average, the cost of the irrigation water service is $20 per year for smallholder farmers, while a higher tariff applies to the flower and export companies. There is enough water for the users in Pifo, even considering that it is the “last stop on the line”, according to local government officials, though summer months can sometimes present a challenge. One of the roles of the canal manager is to regulate the water supply by means of a system of gates to ensure the provision of irrigation for 2-3 days per week (which is more than the average farming requirement of 1-2 days per week). The Council also cooperates with mingas for maintenance and cleaning work, particularly since the canal can’t be shut off for more than 4 days. However, there appears to be a gap in the allocation of responsibilities as it remains unclear who is in charge of dealing with physical shocks, as noted by the interviewee from the Provincial Government of Pichincha. For example, excessive rainfall can cause the irrigation canal to overflow, and there are no organisational or legal structures in place for minimising the risk or managing the aftermath, suggesting that little thought is given to the resilience and sustainability of the irrigation system in its current form.

b) Social Issues The interviewee from the Provincial Government of Pichincha sought to highlight the role of the social and institutional aspects in the development of irrigation systems. Before 2011, when responsibility for irrigation was devolved to the Provincial Government, the focus of 93

irrigation policy was on infrastructure, paying very little attention to the institutional aspects. The limited effectiveness of the policy has led to the population losing trust in the institutions responsible for irrigation. However, the interviewee claimed that, as a result of their concerted efforts (see Box 5 for an overview of the projects and initiatives provided in the course of the interview), the Provincial Government has gained back a lot of trust.6 Box 5: Projects and Initiatives of the Provincial Government of Pichincha The work and the aims of the GPP are multifaceted, encompassing supporting the livelihoods of communities in remote mountainous areas, promoting value-added agriculture, promoting climate-sensitive production methods (especially with respect to water use) and institutional development (helping communities achieve legal status as defined by SENAGUA). In terms of dealing with problems of water use and water contamination, the main instrument at the disposal of the GPP is education and training initiatives. For instance, the interviewees provided a selection of brochures aimed at school children, with the intention of raising awareness of these issues from an early age. The GPP works closely with mingas and with irrigation water councils.

However, in terms of local community engagement in irrigation projects, participation is still limited. According to the representative of the Provincial Government of Pichincha, the construction and operation of an irrigation canal comprises the following four elements: 1) Infrastructure work â&#x20AC;&#x201C; plans, design, and operations and management; 2) Economic analysis to ensure the project is economically viable; 3) Environmental impact studies; 4) Social projects to support local institutions to enable them to play an active role in operation and maintenance. According to the interviewee, it is usually possible to secure the support and cooperation of the local population and the Irrigation Water councils to implement the first stage, but not for any of the others.

It is perhaps worth noting that the officials from the Provincial Government of Pichincha were exceptionally helpful, offering to set up and provide transportation to the meeting with the Irrigation Water council. Overall, the impression

In terms of the relationship between the various water users, the official of the Provincial Government of Pichincha claimed that no problems arise due to potential competition for water resources between smallholder farmers and flower companies. The latter do not use the water provided by the irrigation canal to any significant extent because they have the money and the technology to install their own back-up capacity and to drill their own wells, thus making them independent from the state system. It is, however, interesting to note that those wells are not subject to any regulation, despite the possible impact on groundwater reserves. Box 6: SENAGUA and Conflict Resolution. SENAGUA is responsible for conflict resolution and handling the complaints about water provision. The procedure is as follows: a written complaint is sent in, both parties are invited to a consultation with the aim of getting both sides heard. The SENAGUA moderator attempts to enable a solution to be reached by way of discussion and debate. If a solution cannot be found, the moderator carries out on-site examinations to verify both accounts. If one of the parties is found to be guilty, the existing laws concerning water use etc. apply. In general, anyone can complain but many people arenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t aware of their right to complain, or of the complaint procedures.

The flower companiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; access to wells partly serves to explain why, despite numerous attempts to bring the various local water users together to discuss problems concerning water access and contamination and to derive a joint solution, the companies have repeatedly refused to participate in the roundtables organised by the Provincial Government of Pichincha, claiming that the problems surrounding water governance do not apply to them. Should conflicts between water users arise, SENAGUA is the government body officially tasked with arbitration, analysis and resolution (see Box 6). Whether the water users in Pifo are aware of the official structures and are prepared to use them is, however, a different matter. c) Water Quality Water contamination has been a persistent problem for the Pisque canal since its construction. When asked to identify the stakeholders who bear the greatest responsibility for pollution, the interviewee from the Provincial Government named the flower companies and their use of chemical fertilizer and pesticides, presenting the greatest threat to human health. This was not the opinion of the FONAG interviewee who claimed that the livestock farms contribute to the 95

problem to a considerably greater extent. However, households and smallholder farmers also make a significant contribution to water contamination. On the household level, the canal is used for washing clothes, thus becoming a receptacle for chemical detergents as well as waste water, and as a general rubbish depository (owing perhaps to the lack of appropriate communal waste disposal services). Farming practices contribute to deterioration of water quality through the persistent use of chemical fertilizer by the farmers who are hesitant to deviate from the tried-and-tested “this is how my grandfather did it” methods. A further recurring problem arises from the fact that the canals are open, not buried underground, leading to farm animals falling in and dying there. Moreover, the canal is used as a source of drinking water by the animals. In terms of the legal framework, while municipal sanctions for polluting the water, e.g. washing clothes in the canal, do exist, experience shows that transgressions are extremely difficult to monitor. The Irrigation Water council has adopted an approach to resolving the above problems focused on education and information dissemination, with initiatives including: i.

Connecting the local population with the commissar responsible for information dissemination;

ii.

Issuing a magazine which includes advice sections on efficient water use and avoiding water contamination;

iii.

Implementing the “Water Guardians” programme aimed at school-age children.

The interviewee’s reasoning regarding the “Water Guardians programme” was that the interfamilial transfer of knowledge has changed direction in recent years – for example, parents are often in awe of their children’s computer skills. Therefore, there is considerable potential to disseminate the knowledge throughout the community by educating the children.

5.5.3

Waste Water

Without exception, every government representative interviewed in the course of this project highlighted the lack of waste water treatment facilities as a key problem with respect to water contamination in Pifo. The interviewee from SENAGUA went even further to claim that the municipalities, whose responsibility it is to provide waste water treatment services, contribute more to deteriorating water quality by “failing to do their job” than any other stakeholder, 96

including flower companies. The major obstacle, according to the representative of the Irrigation Water council, is the perceived excessive cost of the treatment plants, as well as the lack of the physical space required to construct them – despite the impact that failing to do so continues to have on human health. In fact, insufficient information and lack of awareness about the implications of preserving the status quo seem to be a major factor not only for the decision-makers in the municipal government but also for agricultural producers and consumers. The former are prepared to use waste water for irrigation, while the latter have rather lax standards when it comes to contaminated water and the goods produced with it. At the time of the interviews, SENAGUA was taking the initial steps towards developing waste water treatment projects, with EPMAPS being consulted. It remains to be seen whether the nascent initiative will be successful. 5.5.4

Institutional matters – the consequences of decentralisation

As has been briefly outlined before, the system of water governance in Ecuador has been undergoing a process of decentralisation, with greater responsibility for planning, administration and management devolved to the local governing bodies – e.g. the transfer of authority over irrigation issues to the Provincial Government of Pichincha in 2011. There appears to be a general consensus regarding the advantages brought by decentralisation – namely that developing cooperation with the local communities whereby ever greater responsibility is taken on by the latter means that the local population takes more pride in the respective projects, which are therefore more likely to be sustainable over the long term. The needs of the local water users can be taken into account to a greater extent, and the local water councils do not have to keep appealing to the ministries for assistance, since the former now have their own budgets – in addition to support from the central government. According to the MAGAP interviewee, irrigation projects for the total value of $130 000 000, designed with the needs of the water users in mind, were created in 2012, and a similar figure is expected for 2013. Nonetheless, the decentralisation process has hardly been faultless. It appears that the institutional problems that persist in the water sector are largely due to general confusion about and contradictions in the new arrangement of responsibilities, examples of which abounded in every interview carried out: 97

It is sometimes difficult for the Provincial Government to persuade the local population to play an active part in resolving issues around water management since years of centralised government control have made them accustomed to the government representatives taking on responsibility for all matters.

Local farmers still refer to the ministry for help with matters concerning irrigation, even though the responsibility had been transferred to the local bodies.

Due to a change of competencies, some infrastructure projects had to be abandoned by one body with the intention that another body will take over the process. In some instances, this has led to considerable delays in service provision for the water users.

The Irrigation Water council has made attempts to contact SENAGUA for closer cooperation on issues such as education and training in order to sensitise the population to the problems of water contamination but, according to the interviewee, no response has been received so far.

Lastly, the dual system for the provision of water for household use in Pifo is a further example of such institutional incongruities – while EPMAPS is under legal obligation to provide water to the population, according to public company law, there are provisions in the constitution stipulating the right of community organisations to manage their own water systems.

Another complication of the decentralisation process was noted by the MAGAP interviewee, who drew attention to the discrepancies between the allocation of responsibilities and the allocation of resources. Some local government bodies, such as the Provincial Government of Pichincha, have sufficient technical, organisational and financial capacity to carry out their work and are therefore capable of achieving tangible results. Other provinces, however, lack budgets, technical staff and managerial capacity – a complication that had not been taken into account. Moreover, the “brain drain” phenomenon presents an additional obstacle, as provincial bodies have difficulties attracting educated and experienced staff who can earn higher wages in Quito. The MAGAP interviewee readily admitted that the institutional structure for water governance is still chaotic, and that it will take a while to bring some order into it. The government did not prepare for this process very well, and the transition has not been well organised or orderly. Part of the problem might have been that only one institution

(ConsejoNacional de Competencias/ National Council of Competences) responsible for the process in all 23 provinces. 5.5.5

Laws

The water law introduced in 2008, which is currently being developed, is expected to address a wide range of issues concerning water governance. Those mentioned specifically by the government interviewees included the following, with the caveat that it was still too early to talk about the details in concrete terms: -

Tariffs (commercialisation of water provision);

The possible creation of water councils for the watersheds (juntas de cuenca) which would manage and control all the smaller institutional actors;

Coordinated information exchange on water quality, etc. â&#x20AC;&#x201C; there is little information available to begin with, and what is available is collected and recorded based on the individual needs and perspectives of the relevant organisation, according to the SENAGUA interviewee;

The obligation to redistribute the quantity and quality of water, due to the implications for food security and the current inequalities in access to water (e.g. flower companies or export companies versus smallholder farmers).

Regarding the last point, the interviewee from the Provincial Government of Pichincha summarised the problem as follows: there are two ways to achieve redistribution of water â&#x20AC;&#x201C; either through greater efficiency of water use by means of technological change (which is expensive), or by physically taking the water from those who have too much. Given the extreme political sensitivity of the second approach and the power dynamics related to water governance, it can be expected that the obstacles will be numerous and the process will be far from straightforward.

5.6 NGOs 5.6.1

Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano

Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano (FFLA) was founded in 1994 and seeks to encourage sustainable development in South America. It works through two main approaches: the first one focuses on viewing the problems as opportunities, and the second one on working towards building a culture of peace. FFLA is working in Ecuador through six programs, with “water governance” being one of them. FFLA is aware that water management is a process for meeting the needs of the water users in the Guayllabamba basin, as well as for protecting natural resources. This process should be handled by all stakeholders. The water governance should take place through a participatory decision-making process. To achieve this process, it is necessary to set up a stakeholders’ dialogue platform, taking into account the different geographical scales and institutional levels. The platforms are dialogue spaces where such actors have the chance to solve their problems and fulfill their needs regarding water issues. Hence, FFLA has facilitated the creation of those platforms – for example, between 2007 and 2012 they developed a project in the Guayllabamba basin, in order to achieve participative water management. That project was carried out together with FONAG. The project dealt with six main issues, which were included in the conceptual framework of the project, and also are part of the results of the work done in the Guayllabamba watershed. The issues include: integrated water resources management, water governance, participatory management, participation and dialogue, multi-actor platform, and the social watershed. Water supply and water demand data are some outcomes from the FFLA’s work as a whole throughout recent years, as well as water governance diagnostic in the local communities. An overview of the problematic situation is quite clear for FFLA. The organisation emphasises the fact that the new water law has not been approved yet, thus the basin councils do not have a normative framework confirmed by SENAGUA. Furthermore, the law is facing considerable resistance: “…Water is a thing that moves people. For example, they don’t agree with the fee. Indigenous communities protest against the water law; they don’t agree with the new water law and don’t want it to be approved…” Thus, FFLA highlights that people from the communities want to participate in the decisions regarding water law, but they can only participate in low levels of decision making. However, that’s not the only problem. There is a 100

conflict between urban and rural water users, because the population in the capital city is constantly growing, thus demanding water that is supplied from the rural areas, which are in the worst position regarding water distribution. EPMAPS has taken the resource that originates and passes through the rural areas to supply Quito. In the countryside, EPMAPS has shown interest in providing water to the communities - however, according to FFLA, not to provide communities with water, but to take water from there to the city. Pollution of the water sources is a complex issue in the Guyllabamba basin, with residents in lower areas affected by the lack of awareness about the bad waste practices of residents in the higher areas. Communities further downstream consume the already polluted water and continue with the contamination themselves. The pollutants are mainly agrochemicals and human waste. Otherwise, in regard to the relevant problems in the Chiche river basin, FFLA highlights the threat of future water scarcity since the highlands are being affected by human intervention. Numerous problems can be identified in relation to the water councils. According to FFLA, most of them do not work well, mainly due to the lack of knowledge. For example, they do not know how to do the administration of accounting. They receive the money from the water users and do not know how to administrate it properly. The water councils are also often poorly organized. Some water users refuse to pay the fees and fines; they do not want to pay because they believe water should be free. However, they do not understand that they pay for the service, i.e. the provision. In addition, there is no social organisation to address the water issues, and there is a lack of information about where water comes from and where water goes to. Finally, there is a lack of better agricultural practices.

5.6.2

La Red Ambiental

„If we do not change our way of interacting with nature, we will be the next dinosaurs“, as the founder of La Red Ambiental (RA), Lic. Cinthya Peñaherrera López, put it. The NGO's principal aim is changing decision-makers' as well as regular citizens' approaches to the environment. This choice is driven by the convictions that, firstly, the current interaction with nature is depleting the natural resources that the society is relies on, and secondly, the living conditions of many people are not acceptable. Thus, the goal that the organisation focuses on is sustainable development for the most marginalised population. RA is trying to align its activities along the three axes of sustainability: economic, social, and environmental; meaning 101

that all actions must reach monetary self-sufficiency (eventually be independent from outside inputs), promote social equality, and decrease the depletion of natural resources. Given the current contamination of the Chiche river and the number of resource-poor communities in the area, it was decided to cover communities within the Chiche river basin. The goal of sustainable development and poverty alleviation shall be reached by community outreach via 'field schools' (escuelas de campo), where Sra. Peñaherrera builds positive relations with an estimated five percent of interested pioneers in the communities, and assists in the development and establishment of technologies for development. This way, for example, in La Merced, rainwater-harvesting technologies were introduced to just a few families in 2007. By now, these technologies are a vital part of practically every household, improving overall living conditions through a reliable water supply throughout the year. Such developments are organised by community self-help groups, which are eligible to credit by RA. One project RA is planning to include in the next field school is the construction and support of dry toilets (letrinas secas): this method, completely new to the area, has proved successes in other locations worldwide where similar difficulties prevail. In conditions of water scarcity, no water is 'wasted' for flushing of toilets and dilution of excretions. The provision of nutrient-rich fertiliser further decreases the need for fertiliser and potential consequential contamination of water flows. Dry toilets require a process of two years to turn human faeces into composted fertiliser. After one year, the mixture of faeces and carbon-rich additives like sawdust or paper is already converted into soil by microorganisms and edaphic fauna such as earthworms, but another year of patience can eliminate the risk of bringing out human-borne diseases to the arable fields. So far, project-specific community self-help groups, e.g. for the experimental construction of water harvesting systems, have usually dissolved after the termination of projects. With cooperation between communities and credit by RA, permanent „groups of endogenous development“ may arise, connected within a network, determined for instance by the Chiche river basin. Lic. Peñaherrera would like to facilitate a stakeholder platform for all relevant actors of the regional and local water governance, most of all the water councils. In this platform, collective action for development in issues of, for example, water supply or waste water discharge can be planned and turned into a reality.

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RA strongly backs the idea of self-mobilisation, with the background of deep disappointment, dissatisfaction and confusion in questions of support by governmental bodies for communities. In Lic. Peñaherrera's perception, with the new constitution and the envisaged water law, the central government is assuming responsibilities and committing to duties that used to lie at lower levels of governance: budgets are retained and responsibilities are concentrated among central actors, like SENAGUA, yet at the local level, in the communities, there is no evidence the government is actually keeping its promises. Starting from this deception, RA favours the communities' self-management wherever possible – a 'decentralization from below'.

5.7 Companies Numerous companies and industries are located near and within the communities in Pifo. It can be assumed that their existence influences the water management of the community and may influence issues of water pollution, scarcity and availability. This section will review the features of the companies, their water usage and management, their impact on neighbouring communities as well as the potential risk of pollution and the rules that regulate them. 5.7.1

Novopan

Novopan is a wood processing company located near the three communities of Itulcachi, La Cocha, and El Belén. The company has 260 employees at this production site and a second unit in Guayaquil – with 350 employees in total. On a daily basis, 900 m³ of planks in the size of 2.5 x 2.5 m are produced. In addition to the processing of wood, Novopan produces their wood sources in a wood plantation with an area of 8000 ha, situated about 5 km further east. The plantation has a small tree nursery for young trees. According to Novopan, only the trees in the nursery are irrigated. The amount of irrigation, however, is gradually reduced over time to accommodate the trees to local water conditions, as water scarcity largely exists in summer. 40% of the wood used in processing comes from this plantation. The other 60% is used or rest wood from other companies. The wood used is mainly pine tree and eucalyptus because these species grow fast (only 10-12 years) and are easy to process. Organic colours are used. In 2004 Novopan received an ISO 14001 environmental certificate. Regarding water management, Novopan utilises the communal potable water system of the three neighbouring communities. However, this only concerns the water demand of the 103

cafeteria and the bathrooms in the buildings as well as a backup water supply. The average consumption of the communal water varies between 80-200 m³/month. Technically, Novopan does not have a high demand for water in the processing of wood, as the main task is drying wood. Water demand is higher only for the tree nursery of the plantation. This water is extracted from a canal near El Tablón, which also withdraws water from this spring. However, Novopan withdraws the water further downstream than El Tablón. Novopan has a septic tank and its own waste water collection system. Novopan stated that their other waste is collected and separated into cardboard/paper, plastics and organic waste, whereby only the organic waste is landfilled (in the Relleno Sanitario – see below), the plastic is picked up by recycling companies and the cardboard and paper is sold. Novopan seems to have built a good relationship with the neighbouring communities and functions as an employer. About 25 people from the three communities work at Novopan, as estimated by the president of water council of Itulcachi, El Belén and La Cocha, who works there. No conflict could be observed with El Tablón regarding the plantation and the management of the spring.

5.7.2

Flower companies

Within La Cocha there are two flower companies, Flower Village and San Enrique, and directly opposite of Itulcachi and El Belén lies the third flower company Agroplantas. Unlike the other two companies, Agroplantas Rosen Tantau is not intended to produce roses, but to experiment with roses. The plantation has an area of 7 ha. Agroplantas evaluates gene codes of roses that are manufactured in Hamburg by planting them, growing them, evaluating and choosing which product could be sold best on the market. The stems of the chosen plants are sold to the producing flower companies ($5 for 5 interims) – 90% are sold to the local flower companies who grow and produce the flowers on a large scale, such as Flower Village and San Enrique, while Agroplantas keeps the property rights of the gene code. An interview could only be carried out with Agroplantas. Flower Village has a greenhouse plantation with an area of 17 ha in La Cocha, the plantation size of San Enrique is unknown. One interesting point is that the founder and the owner of Agroplantas and Flower Village is Victor Ponce, who is also the son of Camilo Ponce, the former owner of large Hacienda Itulcachi (1000 ha). San Enrique is presumably also owned by Victor Ponce.

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Regarding irrigation water systems, Agroplantas stated that they have their own irrigation water system, differing from the communities Itulcachi and La Cocha. They said that the water originates from the mountains (paramo). No further information about the irrigation system of the other two flower companies could be obtained. Agroplantas and Flower Village have certifications of organic farming (VeriFlora certification) and sustainability standards (Norma Tecnica Ecuatoriana certification). This means that both companies use a minimum amount of chemicals, green fertilisers, natural predators such as the mite spider as pesticides, and that the waste is used as a fertiliser. The waste water is discharged into the lower branch of the Chiche River. The companies, however, are aware of the regulation Norma Tecnica Ecuador that limits the amount of pollutants that can be discharged to the rivers (see Annex). Like Novopan, the flower companies seem to have built a good relationship and function as supporting pillars of the communities, providing jobs and participating in community life by helping out in different occasions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; for example, providing refreshment for the people during mingas. 5.7.3

Poultry Farms

The farm Pollo Favorito Pofusa is the biggest poultry farm of the two in La Cocha. Only the farm Pollo Favorito Pofusa was interviewed. It has 140 000 chickens with only 4 cockerels, while the rest are hens. The chickens are kept in a cage with an area of 120m x 12m, with 15 hens on each mÂ˛. After reaching between 37-45 days of age the chicken are sold to the slaughtering houses. Pollo Favorito Pofusa uses the communal water system of the three communities, for feeding the chickens as well as for cleaning and processing. Chlorine is added to the water to increase the amount of chlorine to 3 ppm in order to decrease the chance of diseases of the chicken. The water usage is around 400-600 mÂł per month. The farm only produces chicken meat. In terms of growing and maintaining the chickens, antibiotics are given whenever a disease could occur. Disinfectants are also used preventatively: these are added every 2 months, 20L for the whole farm bed. The characteristics of these disinfectants are unknown. The floor bed of the chicken cage consists of lime and disinfectants. The manure that is collected on the floor bed is sold to agricultural farms. The impact or amount of disinfectants in the manure sold is unknown. Further research 105

on the amounts of disinfectants, antibiotics and other pollutants in the manure material should be done to enable an assessment of the impact on soil and water conditions of the buying farms. The poultry farm has only little impact on the communities. None of three employees come from the communities. Obligatory water user meetings are attended but not willingly. However, the relationship with the communities seemed to be good. They also had contributed money for the street construction in the community. 5.7.4

Landfill â&#x20AC;&#x153;Relleno Sanitario del Ingaâ&#x20AC;?

The landfill is located west from Itulcachi and La Cocha and directly at the El Inga. It exists since 2003 and was operated by a private company, Fundacion Natura, until 10/2012, when the landfill was taken over by the municipality of Quito. In total, 60 employees work for the landfill, including 50 local workers from the surrounding communities. Under the operation of Fundacion Natura the landfill had no system for liquid waste treatment and produced 80 000 m3 of leakage. Now it is one of the two landfills for Quito and the surroundingsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; thrashes. There is an input of 1900 tons waste per day to the landfill (1780t from Quito, 120t from the surrounding Parroquias (such as Pifo, Tumbaco, etc)). The waste consists of very roughly estimated (never measured) 60% organic and 40% non-organic waste and is weighed and then directly deposited without any separation into basins. There are currently seven basins, six of which are already full. One basin can be used for 1.5 years, as a rough estimation. The landfill consists in total of nine basins with a total area of 62 ha and depth of approximately 6 m. 1m3 can be filled by 1.3 t waste. The 7th basin has been used since November 2012, soon the 8th basin will be opened. All of the area of the landfill will be full by approximately 2020. Afterwards, this landfill will be shut down and a new space for a landfill will have to be found. After the closure of the whole landfill all the basins will be evened out (to make one whole one) and then be covered with 50 cm lime and 50 cm of sand. Vegetation will be planted on top. The old closed basins that do not have pipes for liquid outflow have to be pumped out. The wall of every basin is layered by a geomembrane (made of polyethylene). The ground is then filled with stones and parallel pipes for the outflow of the liquid waste. The stones shall absorb the liquid to reduce the produced leakage. The waste is deposited on top of the pipes and stones, potassium permanganate is added as an antiseptic due to its strong oxidising 106

characteristics and the waste is buried with sand. The outflow of the liquid waste is collected in several ponds. In total 15 ponds exist, all secured by geomembranes and all of different size. The principal pond is 30.000 m³ and the largest of all ponds. The liquid waste is treated in different processes: aeration using floating aerators, homogenization and sedimentation of sludge, MBR (Membrane Bio Reactor), purification by Wetlands aquatic plants and Reverse Osmosis in which the solids, bacteria, organic and inorganic material are removed (EMGIRS, 2014). They stated that the approximate outflow of the treated water is 350m3/day, while the inflow is >400m3/day. Afterwards the treated water is discharged to the river El Inga. About 80% of the water can be obtained as clear. The remaining material that is not filtered in the treatment (20%) is transferred back to the waste liquid collection pond. The treated water is tested by Grüntec and the quality is ecologically acceptable (see Annex) The active basin like the 6th basin has small pipes that lead the gas that develops within to the gas treatment, where the methane is burned into CO2. For the fresh landfill basins like the 7th basin the gas pipes are left open to the air, because it is predicted that not many gases develop. Each day 600 m³ / day of CH4 are produced on the landfill. The municipality of Quito is striving to repair the landfill system of the former landfill company that damages the environment by the leakage. Nevertheless, the inflow of the waste onto the landfill overwhelms the purification capacity of the treatment system. The open pond for liquid treatment is almost full and this reservoir is potentially threatened by overflowing if it is raining. The overflow will directly flow to the river EL Inga. It has a safety pump to buffer high water loads, but the capability of the pump was observed to be critical. In addition, no (empty) security pond could be observed at the time of the visit. On the other hand, the geomembrane base of the landfill is observed potentially to be torn, creating a risk of liquid waste leakage to the ground water. The relationship with the neighbouring communities such as Itulcachi, La Cocha, and El Belén seems to be difficult, since the inhabitants of the communities are disturbed by the smell and mosquitos that come from the landfill. However, a compensation of 10 cent/ton of incoming waste is paid to the surrounding communities (4-5), equaling about $190/day. A hospital was supposed to be built for the three communities (Itulcachi, La Cocha, and El Belén) by the municipality. Unfortunately this was cancelled as the communities insisted on having their own hospital or clinic in each of the communities and would not accept a compromise. 107

Other large companies, such as Bateria de Ecuador and a gas production company, are located near the communities of Itulcachi and La Cocha. At the time of the interview, no problems could be observed in terms of water sufficiency. With the construction of the industrial park (Itaco) of 37 ha for 15 industries, the pressure on the water sources in the surrounding area might rise. Most of the companies have their own water system that differs from the surrounding communities’ water system, therefore no conflict about water usage between the companies and the corresponding communities could be observed. Nevertheless, water scarcity might be a potential issue in the future considering the growing number of the industries in this area. Water reuse technologies are strongly advisable to avoid potential damages of over-extraction on the water bodies. The companies around the communities have an impact by shaping the economy and the lifestyle of the inhabitants of the surrounding communities as they provide jobs and financial contribution for the communities. Some also have adverse environmental effects like the bad scent from the Landfill “Relleno Sanitario del Inga” that is perturbing the surrounding communities. Interference from the governmental bodies is advisable to support and protect the livelihood of those communities. Since there is a regulation about pollutant limit in the water discharge (Norma Técnica Ecuador), the environmental adverse effect on water by the companies could be minimised, but the enforcement and the application of the norm is questionable.

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6 Discussion The analysed parroquia Pifo is part of the Chiche river sub-watershed, whereby any activities within Pifo influence the water sources within the Chiche river sub-watershed. As analysed by Peñaherrera et al. (2010), problems of water scarcity, water pollution and unequal distribution of water sources are widespread. Within this research project, interviews were carried out in the parroquia of Pifo with representatives from seven different communities, as well as from several companies and other relevant actors in water governance at different levels of action. Although the observed and stated realities in relation to water provision and water management, as well as the actors' perceptions and aspirations differ strongly between communities, it is worth emphasising some repetitive patterns. Drawing from experiences and observations our interview partners shared with us in La Cocha, Cochauco, Itulcachi, Mulauco, Palugo, El Tablón, and La Virginia, certain generalizations about the region's water governance can be made, but the relevance of some findings for the whole parroquia of Pifo is inevitably limited.

6.1 Review of successes against expectations As was expected following the preliminary analysis of the physical, institutional and social context for water management in Pifo (see Section2.5), the technical and infrastructural requirements for sufficient and equitable water distribution in the communities turned out to be not inconsiderable. Nonetheless, numerous examples have been observed of communities organising themselves successfully through mingas in order to install new water provision systems or improve existing ones, namely: •

El Tablón has successfully constructed an irrigation reservoir and irrigation canals, despite the considerable amount of physical labour required due to the hilly terrain;

•

Palugo has constructed the infrastructure for its own communal system when it was discovered that the EPMAPS system, previously constructed by mingas, would incur costs and has drawn up a plan to expand the drinking water system;

•

Itulcachi and La Cocha have constructed irrigation and drinking water infrastructure and have drawn up plans to further expand their common drinking water system;

•

Mulauco, Cochauco and La Virginia have all contributed to the construction of a common drinking water system.

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Furthermore, the expectation that community-based management structures, i.e. social systems with a long history in Ecuador, would provide evidence of successful water management, was met, to an extent. Specifically, •

Mingas have proven to be indispensable for the infrastructure projects outlined above;

•

In La Virginia, the community decided that fees to cover the additional costs for repair and maintenance works could be paid by installments, should some community members struggle to pay the lump sum, reflecting the flexibility and adaptability of the community system;

•

The Itulcachi community has taken active steps towards resolving the existing problems related to irrigation water by setting up an irrigation water council;

•

Without exception, all communities hold informational sessions to ensure that every member is aware of the status quo relating to water governance, what is being done to resolve problems and what may be required from the members themselves to do so;

•

Relating to the previous point, efforts are made to develop the knowledge on water governance matters by either holding training sessions within the communities (Cochauco) or by inviting external actors, e.g. from MAGAP, to do so (Itulcachi);

•

Community and water councils are democratically elected with every community member holding the right to stand for election. Furthermore, decisions affecting the entire community are taken by the entire community.

Nonetheless, a range of problems of water governance was observed – some matching the preliminary expectations (e.g. the notion that inequalities in physical conditions may lead to social inequalities in water distribution), some arising from factors not previously considered and relating to physical, social and institutional idiosyncrasies. These problems and the analysis of the underlying factors within the seven communities are outlined in the following sections. These cannot be seen as being representative for the whole parroquia of Pifo, but may provide an insight into possible problems and root causes within the parroquia.

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6.2 Principal problems of water governance in the communities 6.2.1

Waste water and pollution

In none of the communities, household waste waters undergo treatment before discharge to the environment. Where a pipe system for household effluents and a collection tank exist at all (like in Palugo or Itulcachi), this waste water enters the respective water flows (e.g. the Huarmihuaycu) below the settlement. In other communities, like in El Tabl贸n or Cochauco, residents use septic tanks, potentially leading to leaching of contaminants into the groundwater. In both cases, downslope communities are affected by lower and potentially harmful quality of water used for irrigation and animal watering, confirming the earlier hypothesis concerning the impact of the physical characteristics of the landscape regarding pollution. Thus, further complications arise from the fact that Pifo suffers from both nonpoint-source and groundwater pollution. The problem of environmental pollution and degradation of downstream water quality was also stressed by FFLA, and was acknowledged by some water councils / community leaders, and there are efforts to connect communities to waste water treatment services, notably by representatives of Mulauco. The problem of concentrated release of waste waters into natural water courses may affect various communities, and, with careful planning, the necessary infrastructure (e.g., a treatment plant) can serve numerous communities simultaneously.

6.2.2

Unequal access to water

As it appears, the current governance does not ubiquitously ensure equal access to drinking water: In several communities, not all households are connected to the communal water system. The inhabitants of those most recently built houses, e.g. in Itulcachi, must ask their neighbours or family members for water. In some cases, newly arrived residents or grown-up children of the community have to pay an initial sum in order to get connected to the communal system, which may prolong the exclusion of some members of the community from access to drinking water. In general though, access to drinking water is perceived as far less unequal and problematic than access to irrigation water. While Cochauco and La Virginia have no irrigation available to residents at all, in those communities who do have some irrigation system, complaints about inequitable sharing and deficient access are widespread. In Mulauco, Itulcachi and La 111

Cocha, not all households are connected to the system, that is, not all houses, fields and homegardens are supplied with irrigation canals. Additionally, in La Cocha, Itulcachi and El Tablón, not only infrastructure is insufficient in order to make irrigation available to everyone, but also institutions: In these three communities, upstream users extract disproportional shares from the irrigation canals, to the disadvantage of downstream residents. Here, regulations about permitted extraction amounts are absent or inefficient, causing a situation of very unequal access to irrigation water.

6.2.3

Water insufficiency

Most of the communities have been in place for decades now. In many cases, the system has been constructed to provide for a number of inhabitants smaller than the current one. In El Tablón, for example, the drinking water system is currently being extended in order to keep up with the increasing water demand of a growing population. There, usage of the water source can still be expanded further. In La Virginia, though, population growth cannot persist indefinitely, since the available amount of water determines a maximum of people it can provide for. It has been stated that ongoing population increase will put at risk everyone's adequate supply, especially if human interventions in the highland persist and affect watershed refill capacity, as FFLA has warned. As for irrigation water, generally, there is not enough for everybody's optimum requirements, and especially in the dry season, supply falls short even where infrastructure allows provision throughout the rest of the year.

6.3 Underlying drivers of unsatisfactory outcomes The root causes of the key problems listed above can be traced back to several closely interlinked factors. While, firstly, inadequate or insufficient infrastructure is the most obvious and, perhaps, the most immediate cause of inequitable access to water resources and problems of contamination, the situation is in turn exacerbated, secondly, by considerable knowledge gaps concerning both the sources of pollution and the structure of water governance in general. Lastly, poor coordination among water users (“horizontal”) and between different levels in the governance structure (“vertical”) leads to conflict and considerable inefficiencies 112

in water use. The following section is therefore meant to provide a more detailed overview of these four main drivers, bringing together evidence from all interviews, from the water users to the Ministry of Agriculture.

6.3.1

Infrastructure

Of the three key problems that can be generalized over the seven communities in question, at least two are largely problems of infrastructure: The lack of waste water collection or treatment, and the insufficient or unequal access to irrigation water. In Palugo, La Cocha, and Itulcachi, household waste waters are collected by a sewage system, whereas residents in the other communities use individual septic tanks. Although this represents a gradient in the degree of infrastructural development, both situations lead to environmental pollution. Unquestionably, the lack of waste water treatment before release to the natural water courses is, at least at the surface, a problem of infrastructure. There are plans to connect Cochauco, Mulauco and La Virginia to a waste water treatment plant, but this is still to be planned and built. Although there is a strong institutional and organizational component leading to suboptimal outcomes in terms of inequality in drinking and irrigation water supply (see the case of El TablĂłn), the most basic, direct reason is the lack of pipes, canals, pumps etc. ensuring provision of those people currently at disadvantage. It is beyond question that the respective water sources would not be sufficient in any community for everybody's full irrigation needs throughout the entire year. Yet, an equitable sharing of the available resource is prevented by the lack of infrastructure â&#x20AC;&#x201C; there is only one community where every household has access to irrigation canals (Palugo), and numerous households throughout all communities are not individually connected to the drinking water system. Not only the inequal distribution, but also the overall insufficiency is, in some cases, due to the lack of adequate infrastructure. Hence, for example in Itulcachi, the extension of the pipe system is planned. In Cochauco and Mulauco, the construction of new irrigation canals is desired, accessing previously unused sources of water and increasing the total quantity of water available for irrigation. In La Virginia, where no inhabitants have access to irrigation although the water council has a water source available, the difficulty in constructing a reservoir, canals and pipes is preventing completely the creation of an irrigation system. Besides, in various communities, evaporation from uncovered irrigation canals and reservoirs 113

may be further driving insufficiency. Deficient or simply inexistent infrastructure is causing losses of both drinking and irrigation water at numerous sites in the communities. Lastly, poor infrastructure can sometimes impact the quality of the water that is available, with EPMAPS claiming that rusty pipes connecting individual households to the EPMAPS system (that are therefore the responsibility of those households) lead to the good-quality water that reaches the central network in the respective communities being contaminated by oxidised residue, considerably reducing the quality of water that eventually comes out of the tap.

6.3.2

Knowledge gaps/ poor dissemination of information

When analysing water and sanitation systems, perhaps the most immediate and frequently arising concern relating to knowledge gaps is that lack of education on safe household water consumption might lead to poor health outcomes among the target population. This does not seem to be the predominant issue for the communities in Pifo where household water obtained from the communal system appears to be of sufficiently good quality and does not have an adverse impact on the health of the local residents, at least in their perception. Rather, the main problems arise from the lack of understanding of the consequences that the actions of water users impose on the environment. A prominent example thereof is harmful waste water disposal, such as direct discharge into the water streams or groundwater contamination resulting from the use of septic tanks. While the water councils and community leaders have conceded that the pollution of water sources is troubling, the behaviour of the local residents suggests that other considerations â&#x20AC;&#x201C; convenience, lack of additional cost or effort required, among others â&#x20AC;&#x201C; are ranked more highly than the dangers of pollution for human and animal health. As has been discussed in detail by the interviewees from government bodies, this is evidenced not only by waste water disposal practices but also by the contamination of irrigation water with chemical fertilisers and laundry detergents, as well as the use of the irrigation canals as general waste depositories. When contaminated water is used for irrigation, and consumers lack the awareness and knowledge to oppose such production methods, the vicious circle is completed (particularly since as preliminary context analysis indicated that irrigation water quality is not monitored). A similar misalignment of priorities occurs on the municipal level, where arguments of cost and inconvenience outweigh sanitary concerns in the discussion on the construction of waste water treatment plants. 114

It could be argued that lack of detailed and accessible information about the interdependence of the various parts of the water system and the health implications of using polluted water is one of the factors contributing to this environmentally damaging behaviour. This is certainly the viewpoint of the local governing bodies (including the Provincial Government of Pichincha, the Irrigation Water council and the Water council of Cochauco), as reflected by the amount of effort on their part dedicated to local education initiatives, as well as SENAGUA whose representative highlighted the lack of coordinated information exchange between institutions. It is this lack of detailed knowledge on issues of water contamination that considerably limits the ability of both individuals and government bodies to make informed decisions and that is therefore partly responsible for the lack of adequate infrastructure in the Pifo communities.

6.3.3

Failures of horizontal coordination

It cannot be denied that the communities in Pifo provide ample examples of successful horizontal coordination – defined here as the relationship between various water users leading to mutually beneficial outcomes. This is largely due to the widespread acceptance and effectiveness of mingas, universally described as democratic, legitimate and respected, which enabled, for instance, the construction of the irrigation canal in El Tablón. Nonetheless, water users in Pifo are not limited to minga participants, and the lack of cooperation both within and between groups of water users has shown to lead to conflict and inefficiencies in water use. In terms of factors impeding horizontal coordination, inadequately allocated and poorly enforced property rights emerge as a major obstacle. This has been the source of the conflict over the irrigation canal between members of the Asociación del Tablón Alto and other residents of El Tablón – as a textbook example of the Tragedy of the Commons, the Asociación is accused of failure to carry out the appropriate maintenance work for the section of the canal on its territory to which they are nonetheless denied access. Moreover, failure to extend the property rights for the irrigation water reservoir to all parties concerned, thus alienating the farmers further uphill, and the lack of appropriate mechanisms to enforce the property rights regime has led to those farmers withdrawing the irrigation water illegitimately (a common occurrence in many of the communities). Confirming a hypothesis put forward during the preliminary review, the needs of the stakeholders located at higher altitudes are not being adequately taken into account by the majority population of the community in question. 115

Similarly, the friction between Itulcachi and La Cocha arises from disparities in compensation payments made by the landfill plant – i.e. the inadequate allocation of the “ownership” of clean air, the deterioration of which the landfill plant has to pay for, in adherence with the “Polluter Pays” principle. Most of the above complications with respect to property rights can be related to the lack of certain tools and measures in the community-based water management as described by Ostrom (1990), see Section3.2. In this respect, at least four principles can be determined as “not fulfilled” that have led to the described problems: Provision and appropriation rules (Principle 2) on water extraction are not defined for the single users, leading to unequal and uncoordinated water irrigation water extractions. A lack of clear boundaries (Principle 1) exists to determine the property rights of each water user, his/her rights and obligations. Sanctions on water pollution actions, illegitimate water extraction or non-compliance with existing rules have not been established in any of the community water management system except in terms of minga participation (Principle 5) sanctions.As especially has been seen in El Tablón, the lack of conflict resolution mechanisms, externally or internally (Ostrom’s Principle 6), has led to increasing failures of horizontal coordination. Insufficient communication appears to be a further factor contributing to poor horizontal coordination. The problems range from lack of information exchange among communities potentially facing similar challenges (or perhaps even those who have derived suitable solutions to some of those challenges) to communication between the water council and the Asociación in El Tablón dissolving into loud confrontations. It could be argued that the lack of an appropriate communication channel between the water councils of Mulauco, Cochauco and La Virginia, as illustrated by the imprecise information about the other communities’ water extraction quantities, is at least partly responsible for the resulting conflict and accusations of diverting water from other communities’ pipelines. Lastly, the extent of communication problems was made evident by the fact that it proved impossible to conduct interviews in La Virginia and Mulauco except with the water council members, despite the emphasis placed on the neutrality of both the interviewers and of the entire research project. Though generalisations regarding coordination and cooperation between the communities and the local businesses would be ill-advised, given the wide diversity of companies that operate in Pifo and have access to the local water resources, it appears that there is sufficient goodwill between those two groups of water users (with the exception of the landfill facility). Company interviewees sought to emphasise that, while using considerable amounts of water, the 116

businesses maintain good relationships with the nearby communities, providing employment opportunities and even contributing funds to community projects, such as road construction. Principle 7 of Ostrom’s tools to a successful CBNRM emphasises the necessity of the recognition and respect of external bodies towards the CBNRM bodies ensuring good cooperation and communication, as in place between most companies surrounding the communities Itulcachi and La Cocha. However, despite no apparent issues relating to unequal access to water resources (particularly given that flower companies tend to dig their own wells), pollution remains a key factor in horizontal coordination difficulties. While the representatives of local government repeatedly named flower companies as one of the top polluters in the region, most of the interviews in the communities did not perceive this to be a major problem and no precise data on the true extent of the pollution could be obtained. Naturally, the precise identification of the actors responsible is made more complicated by the non-point-source nature of pollution, as was initially suggested in Section 3.1. Together with the apparent absence of conflict over scarce water resources, this allows the companies to consider themselves to be “outside” actors, rather than water users on a par with the communities, and serves to explain why company representatives have repeatedly refused to participate in the stakeholder roundtables organised by the Provincial Government of Pichincha. Using the terminology of participation theory, the above represents a political barrier to full participation – since the only outcome that flower companies appear to expect from their involvement in such roundtables is restrictions placed on their business practices or a similar inconvenience, the political costbenefit calculation argues against participation. While it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions regarding the direct impact of the behaviour of the companies on water governance in Pifo, poor communication, inadequate property rights structures and a lack of accountability have the clear tendency to lead to the breakdown of collective action – crucial for the implementation of infrastructure projects – in favour of narrow (in some cases, vindictive) self-interest. It is important to note that poor horizontal coordination leads not only to problems for water-related infrastructure (e.g. the considerable delay and other complications surrounding the construction of the irrigation canal in El Tablón and the persistent problems of illegitimate resource use) but also for more basic, social infrastructure, as evidenced by the failure to construct a hospital in the Itulcachi-La Cocha-El Belén area due to petty squabbling between the communities. It is interesting to consider the above disputes over property rights in the context of the discussion on statutory (“official”) 117

laws and customary laws, whereby water is considered a sacred property of the communities. The conflicts that arise despite the endurance of customary laws may theoretically be considered sufficient justification to extend the reach or strengthen the dominance of statutory laws in rural communities. Given the apparent resistance to state involvement in local affairs, it is likely that alternative â&#x20AC;&#x153;softâ&#x20AC;? solutions would be preferable.

6.3.4

Failures of Vertical Coordination

Ostromâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s principles are also relevant for problems of vertical coordination. Principle 7 states that CBNRM bodies should be respected and recognised by external bodies. The lack or fulfilment of this principle will be discussed in this Section. As has been already discussed at length, the decentralisation process within water governance in Ecuador, while enabling the local governing bodies to take on a more important role and arguably take into account the needs of the local population to a greater extent, has been fraught with difficulties. Considerable institutional knowledge gaps, contradictions in the constitution, incomplete allocation of responsibilities, and inadequate allocation of resources all lead to poor cooperation between the actors at varying levels of governance, hereafter referred to as vertical coordination. Perhaps the most immediately apparent problem is the fact that the water users, the intended end beneficiaries of the decentralisation process, lack knowledge about the roles of the various governing bodies and therefore neglect to make full use of the services and support available. For example, the numerous instances of conflict around access to water resources arising between different groups within the communities are taking considerable time and effort to resolve, if resolution is reached at all. Meanwhile, one of the official responsibilities of SENAGUA is to act as an arbiter in conflict resolution, following the procedure outlined in Box 6. However, as the SENAGUA representative himself admitted, most water users are simply not aware of the structures in place. There is no guarantee, of course, that the SENAGUA conflict resolution process would be more efficient or more effective than internal discussions and arrangements within the community, but it is worth noting that there is an evident mismatch between the services offered by the governing body and the extent to which those services are used. Similarly, interviewees in Itulcachi and La Cocha dealing with legalisation issues did not seem to be aware that the Provincial Government of Pichincha can 118

allegedly offer support with securing comuna status (i.e. addressing the land tenure/ property rights aspect which could be a crucial factor in securing water rights and improving water governance, as previously discussed), while La Cocha seemed unsure of where to obtain financing for the construction of an irrigation reservoir. As has been noted in the theory discussion, the central government has an important role to play in creating the enabling environment for successful Community-Based Natural Resource Management, for which the services and support modalities outlined above would be of considerable importance. It is therefore imperative that obstacles to the creation of the enabling environment are overcome. It is unclear whether these knowledge gaps are due to poor communication on the part of the respective governing bodies or to the general unwillingness of the local residents to approach government officials due to the entrenched views of their perceived ineffectiveness (as noted by the interviewee from the Provincial Government of Pichincha). However, given the apparent persistence of some farmers in exclusively approaching the ministries for help in water-related matters, it is also possible that it is the role of the lower-level governing bodies in particular that has not been made clear. In addition, interviewees both from FFLA and RA stated that governing bodies, though the new water law not yet been ratified, have already started acting and assuming responsibilities according to the presumable future legal context, thereby further increasing confusion and insecurity on the side of Water councils. Related to the lack of knowledge about the responsibilities of the respective governing bodies and the perception of the remote central government as the only institution with influence is the reluctance of some local populations to take an active part in resolving water governance issues, as they expect the government, inefficient though it may be, to intervene7. Thus, it is the lack of knowledge about their own responsibilities that might lead to sub-optimal outcomes for residents of the communities. However, it is not only the link between the end users and the governing bodies that seems to be weak â&#x20AC;&#x201C; numerous examples of cooperation failures between various levels of governing

This statement was taken from the interview with the representative of the Provincial Government of Pichincha who was referring to problems occurring in the entire province. Though interviews with the limited number of communities carried out in the course of this project indicated that the local residents in those communities are more than willing to self-organise to work on water-related issues, the same is not necessarily true for the parroquia of Pifo as a whole.

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bodies have surfaced in the course of the interviews. Most notably, a frequent focal point for the work of the local government is education programmes, designed to inform the population on the dangers of contaminated water and altering behaviour can reduce pollution. Given the potential benefits of a coordinated effort, attempts have been made to contact potential partners (e.g. the Irrigation Water council seeking to establish contact with SENAGUA or with a local town council) that have nonetheless failed to yield results. Furthermore, coordination problems go beyond difficulties in implementation of joint projects â&#x20AC;&#x201C; as noted by the MAGAP interviewee, the various governing bodies persistently fail to organise a system of information exchange, leading to gaps in knowledge on water quality, extent of pollution, etc. Aside from the already mentioned probable causes of such coordination failure â&#x20AC;&#x201C; poor communication on respective spheres of influence and responsibilities, deeply entrenched expectations concerning the role of the central government â&#x20AC;&#x201C; far from the least important is the sheer complexity of the decentralisation and the resulting system of water governance. It is a telling indicator that, when asked to explain the decentralisation process, an interviewee from the irrigation department of the Ministry of Agriculture struggled to do so in a clear and concise manner. It should therefore hardly come as a surprise that problems with understanding the system persist at lower levels of governance and among water users. In addition to problems of communication and perceived allocation of responsibilities, the water governance system in itself contains a number of omissions and contradictions. For instance, the legal obligation of EPMAPS to provide drinking water to every household of the Quito municipality, set out in the public company legislation and based on the inalienable right to water outlined in the constitution, contradicts the right of the communities to manage their own water resources as defined by the 2004 amendment to the Water Law, as well as making it impossible for EPMAPS to make credible threats of cutting off the water supply as punishment for failing to pay for the service. A further incongruence is the failure to match the newly allocated responsibilities with appropriate budgets and technical capacity for the provincial governments and local water councils (though this is not the case for the Provincial Government of Pichincha, the governing body most relevant for water governance in Pifo). Lastly, the lack of waste water treatment systems in Ecuador seems to indicate that no governing body has been made responsible for construction of the infrastructure or provision of the service, despite the apparent widespread belief that it falls under the purview of the municipal government.

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On a practical level, the abovementioned failures in vertical coordination, with widespread lack of understanding of the water governance system in its current form, lead to inadequate provision of infrastructure, be it through lack of information on funding sources or lack of clarity on respective responsibilities. As spheres of competence change, infrastructure projects become delayed or abandoned altogether, and insufficient cooperation on public projects means losses of potential economies of scale and inefficient use of the financial and technical resources available.

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7 Recommendations As the previous chapter has outlined, unsatisfactory outcomes for water governance in the parroquia of Pifo are brought about by a range of problems, both physical and institutional. While deriving workable solutions to some of these, such as the poor management of the decentralisation process, is considerably beyond the scope of this project, a few practical recommendations for local-level initiatives could be identified. A three-pronged approach focusing on i) technical solutions, ii) training and education, and iii) stakeholder platforms would be most effective in addressing not only the immediate problems of pollution, unequal access to water and water insufficiency, but also some of their underlying drivers. These three types of solutions can, largely, not be implemented individually, but shall be understood in a strongly intertwined way, complementing each other in order to reach a sustainable and effective outcome.

7.1 Technical Solutions The technical or infrastructure-based approach is crucial for addressing the physical problems arising within water governance. In the case of Pifo, the two major problems of this type are water contamination and insufficient availability of irrigation water (in turn exacerbated by inequalities in water access). As has been discussed in the previous chapter, inadequate waste water collection and treatment systems are one of the main contributing factors to pollution of water sources in the parroquia of Pifo. Arguably, the biggest positive impact on the reduction of water pollution would be achieved if the Metropolitan District of Quito were to construct and operate a waste water treatment plant and to extend the service to cover the parroquia. The ability to induce change on this scale through grassroots-level initiatives is, however, rather limited, though some initial thoughts will be discussed in later sections on the role of education and stakeholder platforms in this respect. However, several technical solutions for implementation at household level could be suggested, each serving the dual purpose of reducing water contamination and improving the efficiency of water use, thus relieving the pressure on the overburdened communal irrigation systems.

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Dry Sanitation Systems

Installation of dry toilet systems offers numerous advantages, including preserving nutrients for improved soil fertility, reducing water waste, and achieving savings in terms of cost and energy. A comprehensive review of dry sanitation systems is available in the Annex. The construction and broad introduction of dry sanitation systems may, at the moment, be hindered by the local people's ignorance of the concept. Long-term flagship implementations with local opinion leaders may require long-term commitment by either outside agents or highly engaged community members, but may eventually demonstrate the concept's functionality. Nevertheless: dry sanitation systems require investments, but most benefit downstream water users, hence some obvious incentive for the construction is necessary. While the incentive of producing fertilizer free of charge might not be sufficient for people with access to animal manure, governing bodies, and, to a lesser extent, Water councils may have the power to create financial incentives. Most promising in this respect, a stakeholder platform including all communities in the river Chiche watershed could pool financial resources and successively fund the construction of dry sanitation systems in the involved communities. Downstream communities have an increased interest in making dry sanitation systems possible in upstream communities. Other incentives, such as those based on a widespread acceptance of the benefits of introducing a new technology, could also be appropriate.

ii)

Greywater

A further idea could be to establish a collection system for reusing the waste water from washing and bathing, i.e. greywater, which could subsequently be used for irrigation. This way, some of the organic waste could be absorbed by the plants, leaving less to pollute the main water sources. It is important to note that this system should be separate from the toilet waste system, since human excreta bear the risk of pathogenic contamination of produce (Finley & Barrington, 2008). At the same time, reusing greywater could also help to resolve water insufficiency problems in summer by contributing to decreased withdrawal of water from natural sources and reservoirs. However, in order to utilise this method, there are very important issues to keep in mind (Lindstorm, 2000) (Greywater Action, n.d.) (San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, 2012): 123

1. Greywater treatment before use is highly recommended. This could be carried out with the aid of a grease trap septic tank (a 3-stages septic tank) or a sand filter combined with slow sand filter. 2. Soap and detergents used for washing should be biodegradable, non-toxic, and free of antibacterial chemicals as well as salt (sodium) and boron (borax) since those are hazardous to the plants. Chlorine bleach should not be used or poured into the greywater system for analogous reasons. As an alternative, hydrogen peroxide bleaches are less harmful and would be recommended. 3. Water used to wash diapers or similarly soiled garments or other prohibited contents outlined above should not go into the greywater system since it would become contaminated by faecal coliforms. 4. Greywater should be used in sub-soil irrigation, rather than spray irrigation, in order to maximize water efficiency, avoid air-borne contamination of produce and reduce potential bad odour. 5. Greywater should not be allowed to pond or runoff and should not be discharged directly into any surface body of water. In particular, greywater must not mix with the potable water system. (http://sfwater.org/) 6. Greywater should not be used to irrigate root crops or edible parts of food crops that touch the soil. 7. Untreated greywater must not be stored as the nutrient content can facilitate the growth of pathological microorganism and cause bad odour. Some studies have analysed the environmental impact and health risks associated with greywater irrigation and strongly advise to treat the greywater before using it for irrigation (Gross et al., 2005) (Finley, 2008) (Maimon et al., 2010). Environmental impact mostly occurs due to a significant increase in soil pH and salt (Sodium), but it can be mitigated by employing an alternating usage pattern between irrigation water and greywater (Pinto et al., 2008). The potential effect of surfactants (compounds present in detergents) on plants and soil is still undergoing research. In order to reduce health risks, direct human contact with greywater should be avoided or minimised, except the interaction required to maintain the system (San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, 2012). Greywater usage for irrigation promises obvious and immediate advantages, especially to those members of community currently in complete lack of irrigation. Yet, since the issue remains a matter of ongoing research (cf. e.g. Finley et al., 2009) and requires 124

experimentation under local conditions, substantial investment, as well as behavioural changes in a lot of parts of daily life (separation of waste water flows, change of soap etc.), implementation can only be considered realistic if large efforts within the communities of the parroquia are made. Also, the system is quite vulnerable and bears risks of health repercussions (e.g. in case of forgetting to wash diapers separately) or crop failure (e.g. using regular soap when biodegradable soap is not available, Bubenheim et al., 1997). Thus, strong social control is required in the case of shared systems. Despite the potential difficulties in implementation, we believe that greywater usage in agriculture has a chance in those very communities lacking any system of irrigation, e.g., La Virginia or Cochauco. Even though the implementation of greywater usage for irrigation requires overcoming various obstacles, its potential of increasing production and thereby people's income and food security may be an incentive strong enough to motivate local leaders, Water councils, industrious individuals or even outside agents like NGOs to start pilot projects at individual household level, to be scaled up to community level later on.

iii)

Water-saving agriculture

In terms of the problem of water insufficiency, mainly arising during the summer months, the dependency of farmers on precipitation water would be an interesting starting point to reduce grave issues. Practices on reducing evaporation losses include utilization of mulches and wind breaks and weed control (agritech.tnau.ac.in). Mulches can be a layer of crop residue, straw or even plastic material such as polyethylene or polyvinyl chloride that is applied to the surface of an area of soil. Reflective antitranspirants have a longer effectiveness than the metabolic types (Gawish, 1992) and a study by Javan et al. in 2012 showed a significant increase in yield on soybean with kaolin compared to plants without any transpirant. Wind breaks have a purpose of obstructing the wind flow and speed, thus lowering the evaporation losses by the wind. Shelter belts are one form of wind breaks that consists of one or more rows of trees or shrubs planted in sheltering manner for the crops. Weed control will eliminate the competition of weed with the crops for water in the soil. It should be accompanied by mulching the soil, since the removal of weeds leaves space for uncontrolled evaporation. Introduction of other plant species that are drought stress tolerant or even resistant for crop rotation could also be helpful. Example for that are winter wheat, multipurpose grain legumes, or alfalfa for pasture. Such crops can also be beneficial by providing mulch from their residues.

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These relatively simple and easily applicable agronomic measures require low inputs and have the potential to increase yields in periods of supressed plant growth due to low rainfall. To our knowledge, there is little to no experience of agricultural extension in the communities of the Pifo parroquia. Experimental plots proving the measures' effectiveness may convince a critical mass of farmers, eventually changing the ways of production sustainably. The collaboration of local leaders or opinion-leaders and the assistance by an experienced extensionist would be prerequisites for the setting up of well visible trial plots, where local farmers may observe a fellow try out the 'new' methods. This process might best be facilitated by an outside actor.

7.2 Training, education and knowledge dissemination There is a close and, indeed, obvious link between technical solutions and training and education: the causes of the original problems, the benefits of using the relevant technology and the practical applications of it must be explained in detail to ensure uptake of the technical solutions among the population. In the context of Pifo, however, training and education takes on a broader and more important role, given that knowledge gaps can be derived as one of the main drivers of the problems arising with respect to water governance. Specifically, the following issues can be addressed:

Vertical integration Lack in infrastructure of water governance is partly caused by budget constraints in relation with lack of cooperation and knowledge with governing bodies. Training for local leaders and community Water councils on water rights, laws and institutions, specifically on the responsibilities of each institution, the possibilities and the chances to apply for financial and technical support, could improve the cooperation between governing and community bodies, as well as providing larger budgets and shared knowledge. As noted during the fieldwork certain information that could improve cooperation between communities and with outside stakeholders (companies, etc.), would be helpful. One example is the possibility of filing complaints to SENAGUA in case of overexploitation of water resources outside from the permitted fraction according to concessions. If knowledge on this tool were available and it were used to a greater extent, conflicts could be resolved and inequalities in water extraction could subsequently be reduced. 126

Pollution As became apparent in the course of the research work, some of the problems concerning pollution and the resulting deterioration in water quality are behavioural rather than technical, providing justification for the importance of knowledge disseminaton programs. Training programs in general can raise awareness within the communities of environmental and waterrelated issues and what can be done to avoid exacerbating the situation. As community based water management relies largely on the voluntary participation and engagement of people, strengthening the capabilities of the community and its leaders in terms of skills and knowledge is key for increasing the effectiveness of community bodies. An “active elite” in a community can, if active, informed and present, start by leadign the way towards changing harmful behavioural patterns. A good example of this approach were the training sessions for inhabitants on water pollution organised in Cochauco. Generally, training approaches build on the conviction that, with awareness, comes behavioural change (Sayers 2006), i.e., if knowledge about water flows, interconnectedness of water resources within the watershed, the negative effects of pollution and options for alternative action is widespread, people will develop the wish to apply this knowledge and pursue a lifestyle that protects the water resources better. Yet, behavioural change requires incentives (Lilley 2009), and if these are not derived from the increased awareness about every stakeholder's responsibility towards the water, Water councils might need to step in and begin to sanction wasteful or excessively polluting behaviour. In order to ensure social acceptance and, consequently, implementation of such 'policies', it is important that a critical mass of residents follows the new norm, say, a ban on throwing waste into water streams, deliberately. This may be reached by awareness raising via adult education workshops, Sunday schools, etc. Workshops should always include some hands-on element, given that adults learn most effectively by own observation and by experience (Lieb 1991): A 'pollution experiment' could be carried out, water-saving agronomic techniques may be tried out together on a communal experimental plot. In general, observable results are an important element of the training system. Details like session frequency, length, duty of attendance but also contents should be decided upon democratically by the community. In time, reputational incentives – i.e. the desire to follow the methods set by the entire community to avoid gaining the reputation of a “polluter” – could gain significance.

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Mathiza and Le Roux (2009) provide a useful overview of the practical factors to be taken into account when adopting the education approach for improvement of water governance. In essence, education should address three key dimensions: a) knowledge, b) skills, and c) attitudes. Educational sessions on knowledge should ensure that the participants in water management (including all water users), gain insights on: •

The water cycle, including own water source and water discharge;

•

Water pollution and potential causes of pollution;

•

The local water management (as far as it reaches), including costs, responsibilities and power/status/hierarchy within the region;

•

Implications

actions/water

flows

for

the

basin/downstream/neighbouring

community; •

The availability/scarcity of the resource & the needs to sustainably use water;

•

Principles of sustainable water use;

•

Water demand of communities and households to offer insights on possible water saving options.

b) Skills that can be taught and improved should focus on water saving actions and may contain the following: •

Water saving actions in the household, such as showering instead of bathing

•

Water reuse, e.g. of showering water to flush toilets

•

The installation of water saving devices, e.g. dry toilets, water saving technical devices

•

Maintenance of water system, such as pipes to avoid water losses

•

The collection of rainwater for irrigation purposes and the recycling of water for irrigation purposes, if suitable from the households

•

Water-saving agronomic techniques such as mulching or drip irrigation

•

Reducing the need for irrigation water by selecting less water demanding and droughtresistant plants/crops, while increasing weed control

128

To ensure that any of this knowledge and of these skills taught, actually may be considered and used, it is of large significance that c) certain attitudes are communicated to the participants of the water governance. The attitudes to be communicated should be, that â&#x20AC;˘

Water is a scarce resource, vital for survival and therefore needs to be handled carefully, efficiently and should be conserved;

â&#x20AC;˘

Any human being should feel responsible for their own water consumption, discharge and general handling of water resources;

â&#x20AC;˘

Active players in water saving or conservation should feel pride of their status.

A hindering factor of educational trainings can be a lack of incentives of stakeholders to attend trainings. To avoid this, the trainings should be planned together with the community, its members and other relevant stakeholders. Relevant issues and concerns for the specific community should be determined to encourage engagement of community members (ensured through participation and relevance of the training) and a sense of responsibility (due to participation and awareness raising). Participatory learning approaches, while developing critical thinking skills, should be part of the training to ensure effectiveness of the educational solutions. This report, we hope, among other sources of information, may assist in pointing out important knowledge gaps among community and Water council members. Since many of the problems described in this work had been identified by community members, Water councils have the responsibility to communicate the role of the training workshops in alleviation of those very problems. A joyful, welcoming, and never judgemental atmosphere will be crucial for carrying out sessions.

7.3 Stakeholder platforms for improved horizontal coordination As has been outlined in the Discussion section, failures of horizontal coordination have a substantial impact on poor outcomes of water governance. In particular, communication between communities, within communities, and with external stakeholders has been shown to be severely lacking. Communication and joint effort enabled by the creation of stakeholder platforms could facilitate active resolution of existing problems. This is directly linked to the theory of participation, as discussed at length in Section 3.3. In particular, stakeholder platforms can take the following steps to improve outcomes: 1. Putting pressure on the relevant authority for a waste water treatment plant to be constructed, by all neighbouring communities in a close radius; 129

2. Creation of joint irrigation pipelines in neighbouring communities and neighbouring companies; 3. Communication between communities to reduce misunderstanding and information gaps, resolve conflicts and improve joint systems. 4. Clarification of rules and responsibilities, for instance by establishing a rota of irrigation water extraction between a certain number of water users, or by regulating the use of water meters that measure the amounts extracted. Penalties for non-compliance should at the same time be implemented to ensure the adherence of all users to these rules.

Facilitation might be a vital and highly critical issue in the establishment of a stakeholder platform (cf. Warner 2006). Ownership-mentality and the perception that involved primary stakeholders decide on the agenda and come together to solve the problems directly concerning themselves are crucial for a platform's success and long-term sustainability. Thus, 'outsider' interference may be considered dominating quickly, and participants may lose interest, possibly irreversibly. At the same time, neutral outside-party mediation and moderation can be a vital requisite for reaching balanced results that will be accepted by all stakeholders. Cautious facilitation by an outside actor can be the key to sustainable results, ensuring that necessary information is available to all stakeholders, results are understood/interpreted in the same way, and acting as an arbitrator, when necessary. Verweji & Wandera (2010) identify another five issues of importance when planning multistakeholder platforms: participation, representation, results-orientation, leadership and funding. Identifying all relevant participants for stakeholder platforms depends on the range of the purpose set for the platform. It is important to formulate the goal in such a way that all relevant stakeholders feel the need to participate (the topic relates to them) but is broad enough to also reach out to external participants (Verweji & Wandera, 2010). In the case of Pifo, consideration should be placed on the participation of companies and governing bodies. A topic focused solely on a communal water management system of one or more communities might not trigger the interest/need of external companies, the management of neighboruing streams which are also used by the companies though may. Nonetheless, the strength and the enduring successes of mingas, i.e. the practical embodiment of the participation concept outlined in the earlier discussion on theory, suggest that, to a large 130

extent, the institutional structures necessary for the fulfillment of this requirement are already in place. The second task is to ensure adequate representation of the stakeholders involved. Hereby the quantity of the participation of each stakeholder group and the totality of the stakeholder participation need to be considered. A high quantity of participants could ensure adequate representation of a group, but only as long as the representatives can on the one hand raise issues and concerns of their respective group, and on the other hand, report information and decisions taken back to their group, to discuss opinions and ideas. Especially considering water management stakeholder platforms, the participation and representation of women may be essential and should be encouraged. The lack of social organizations for certain stakeholder groups (such as women) may complicate the participation process of these groups (Verweji & Wandera, 2010). As noticed in most of the communities in Pifo, in a large amount of households, the wives stay at home and are responsible for agriculture, hence special focus should be put on integrating this stakeholder group into teaching and stakeholder sessions. Stakeholder platforms should be result-oriented. To motivate and encourage engagement of all participants, the platform should create a common goal with certain milestones to keep motivations high (Verweji & Wandera, 2010). Especially in terms of companies and governing bodies, certain intermediate reports on improvements would help to keep stakeholders focused. Milestones could be celebrated in the communities to draw attention to the actions and benefits gained from the platforms. Already established leaderships within a community need to be valued and if possible, encouraged to take part in the stakeholder platforms. Accepted local leaders may facilitate participation in the community or encourage resistance towards the platform, if they do not participate themselves. Depending on the issue and size of the problem to be discussed in the platform, it may be wise to include low-level governmental leaders to discourage conflicts on policy or legal level and guarantee success (Verweji & Wandera, 2010). Considering the unstable legal situation on water laws in Ecuador, the involvement of governmental bodies into water management discussion would provide larger insights into probable future developments as well as facilitation lacking communication between governing bodies and their programmes and local initiatives like the communal water councils.

Funding of a stakeholder platform has to be provided by any of the organizing or participating bodies. Support could be asked for from certain governmental institutions, such 131

as provincial government of Pichincha or FONAG as well as from companies with an interest in communication with the communities. The crucial role of horizontal coordination, communication and information exchange in defining common rules and enabling collective action in resource management has been also stressed both by FFLA and RA: Both organizations favour the creation of stakeholder platforms for a more effective and participatory water governance.

7.4 Building on the existing strengths within the communities While the previous sections outline the possible range of solutions to match the existing problems of water governance in Pifo, the limitations and conditions that accompany each solution make it clear that the options open to Pifoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s communities in particular should be examined and analysed with the local context firmly in mind. Though the weaknesses of various institutional structures have been discussed at length, it is worth emphasising that a number of highly visible and significant strengths could also be identified across all communities. These strengths should be built upon and can increase the effectiveness of the presented recommendations. Specifically, the following key factors could prove to be decisive: 1) The first important strength presented in all seven communities is mingas. Mingas are an important and efficient communal tool that can provide, construct, maintain and develop infrastructure with little financial resources. At the same time, it has proven to be a widely recognised and respected social institution that demonstrates the social strength of these communities to cope with changing external conditions by showing a consistent commitment to participation in joint projects. High attendance at mingas could be used as a way to increase participation in training sessions and stakeholder platforms, if it were to be communicated that participation in the latter two is as evident for the communal cause as participation in mingas. 2) Some communities such as Itulcachi and Cochauco can rely on a high share of active and engaged share community leaders, water council members and other individuals within the community that encourage communal work, progress and can serve as role models and leaders in accepting innovative technological solutions. High levels of trust and legitimacy with respect to this â&#x20AC;&#x153;active eliteâ&#x20AC;? could be used to enforce innovation and development through encouraging participation in stakeholder platforms and training sessions. 132

3) Cooperation with governing bodies, such as EPMAPS, has led to a joint plan on how to meet future household water demands in Itulcachi, La Cocha and El Belen. Moreover, a positive relationship and communication with MAGAP for training sessions should be enhanced and pursued further. These connections should be built on in order to improve vertical coordination.

4) While hesitant to engage with issues surrounding water governance per se, the companies located close to the communities within Pifo have demonstrated good will towards the local residents, maintaining good relationships by providing employment opportunities and occasionally contributing to community projects. Given this initial level of engagement in community life, it could perhaps be possible to further strengthen the relationship between the communities and the companies to induce them to pay attention to water issues in particular â&#x20AC;&#x201C; for instance, by participating in a stakeholder platform.

5) Examples abound of communities coming together to construct joint projects, as well as establishing common management systems for common resources, recognising the value of joint action. This willingness to cooperate should be built on. In general, the existence of and dependence on common resources provide clear incentives for communities to cooperate and pool resources to reduce pollution and install water systems that provide sufficient water to all. Existing successes and achievements in this area could be used to rally support for the establishment of a stakeholder platform.

While the detailed analysis of the adaptability of technical, knowledge-orientated and coordination solutions to the local context in Pifo is beyond the scope of this study, it is hoped that the considerable potential for innovation and cooperation within the communities shall be recognised and employed actively in order to improve the quality of life for water users in Pifo by securing the water supply, reducing pollution and ensuring sufficient water for all.

133

8 Conclusion The aim of the concluding section is to revisit the purpose and the objectives of this study, evaluate the extent to which said purpose and objectives were achieved, and identify the limitations that may have hindered a more thorough analysis of water governance in Pifo, as well as providing suggestions for further research topics. The first objective of the study was to describe and characterise water governance in Pifo, including physical, social and institutional factors. This was achieved in the course of the fieldwork phase in Ecuador, using Elinor Ostromâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s IAD framework as the theoretical basis for deriving research questions and specific interview guidelines, with the findings outlined in Section 5. It is worth noting that the description and characterisation of water governance in Pifo could not be exhaustive since time and resource constraints had meant that interviews could only be carried out in 7 communities residing in the parroquia. The second objective was to analyse actors and power divisions within water governance. The analysis covered a range of stakeholders, including smallholder farmers, representatives of local, provincial, municipal and national governing bodies, local companies, and NGOs. However, difficulties in arranging interviews with some key stakeholders, for instance haciendas accused of polluting the local water sources, precluded more thorough analysis of the power divisions. The third objective was to identify problems within water governance in Pifo, specifically with respect to unequal access to water and contamination, based on the perceptions of both stakeholders and experts. Such problems were discussed in Sections V and VI, leading to the identification of lack of waste water treatment, pollution, unequal access to water and water insufficiency as the main challenges. The NGOs were consulted as experts on water governance, though interviews with a wider range of authorities on the technical and social aspects of water governance in Pifo would have been desirable. The fourth objective was to identify factors leading to problems in water governance in Pifo. This was carried out in Section VI on the basis of the problems identified in the course of the fieldwork phase, with poor infrastructure, knowledge gaps and failures of both horizontal and vertical coordination identified as the main drivers of the abovementioned problems. Lastly, the fifth objective was to make some recommendations for interventions to improve water governance in the parroquia of Pifo. This was the focus of Section VII, with the 134

proposed possible solutions relating to i) technologies, ii) training, education and knowledge dissemination, and iii) stakeholder platforms for improved horizontal coordination. The achievement of the above objectives was expected to lead to the achievement of the overall goal, defined as follows: The general purpose of this project is to provide information about the state of water management practices in Pifo to the NGO Red Ambiental to enable the formulation of capacity building activities for the local communities, eventually leading to more satisfactory water management in Pifo and a reduction of negative outcomes. The above purpose will be achieved in full once the Spanish translation of this report is passed on to the NGO. However, it is worth noting that Red Ambiental has already been provided with preliminary findings in the course of the presentation made in Pifo at the conclusion of the fieldwork phase. Moreover, the presentation was attended by representatives of the communities where interviews had been carried out. A lively discussion took place at the end of the presentation and the meeting concluded with arrangements being made to set up a regular meeting of neighbouring communities, with Red Ambiental assuming the role of facilitator. The evidence so far therefore indicates that there is considerable potential for the information provided in this report to contribute to the formulation of capacity-building activities for the local communities, given the apparent interest and commitment on their part. The methodology selected for this study consisted of a literature review encompassing preliminary problem analysis, exploration of the physical, institutional and social context for water governance in Pifo, and the theoretical basis for carrying out the research. Elinor Ostromâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s IAD framework was adopted to guide the analysis. The fieldwork phase consisted of semi-structured interviews a range of stakeholders, both in Pifo and in Quito. The findings from the fieldwork phase were subsequently consolidated, analysed and presented in this report. While the above methodology has enabled the achievement, to a satisfactory extent, of the objectives and the overall purpose, some key limitations of the approach of this study could be identified: â&#x20AC;˘

Within the communities, convenience and availability were often the key factors determining who was interviewed and how information was obtained. This may have had implications for the unbiasedness and completeness of the findings. 135

•

In other instances, external factors, such as the general mistrust of questions relating to water governance led to the exclusion of key stakeholders (e.g. some haciendas accused of polluting the local water sources) and possible bias (e.g. only being offered the opportunity to interview the community leaders and not the local residents).

•

A lack of quantitative information on water quality, which perhaps could have been obtained from scientific institutions, meant that triangulation was difficult and subjective statements on water quality in the communities had to be accepted as fact.

•

The solutions proposed in Section 7, while seeking to respond to the key problems analysed in the previous Section, were not specifically related to the context in Pifo in terms of technical feasibility, affordability or indeed desirability from the point of view of the community residents.

•

The timing of the study could be considered unfortunate since the new Water Law, which would have significant implications for water governance throughout the country, was ratified by the Ecuadorean Parliament shortly after the conclusion of the fieldwork phase.

•

Lastly, since the interviews were conducted in Spanish and not recorded or transcribed verbatim, it is possible that some information may have been lost or misunderstood.

In conclusion, the above limitations could provide a basis for deriving suggestions for further research on water governance in Pifo. A more detailed analysis of pollutants and the individual origins, with a particular emphasis on objectively verifiable, quantitative data, would provide a clearer picture of the patterns of pollution and the extent to which various actors are responsible. Further research on the feasibility of the proposed solutions for the communities in Pifo, including for instance a cost-benefit analysis of the possible technological innovations, would be highly desirable. The implications and consequences of the new water law should also be investigated. Lastly, looking to the future, it would be worthwhile exploring the long-term threats and opportunities for water governance associated with population growth and industrial development in the region.

136

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Annex Annex 1: List of Problems found the Chiche River Watershed by Parroquia PROBLEMS Social Phenomena

TUMBACO Population increase leads to a decrease in water availability in various areas.

Infrastructure

PIFO

LA MERCED Population exceeds the capacity of the water distribution channels available.

Poor maintenance of WMS facilities; no water treatment facilities; limited supply provided by the communal WMSwater for domestic consumption is only available 3-4 days a week2.

WMS is old and requires and overhaul – it has 3 served 5 communities for 20 years.

Lack of infrastructure means buying water 5 from trucks every week .

Lack of Coordination / Public Support

No governmental support for running the communal WMS; lack of community engagement –very much needed for running a communal WMS.

No organizational scheme for irrigation, many stakeholders have rights over the water results in conflict, especially during the summer.

Pollution

Greywater discharge8; a poultry farm in the area dumps industrial waste into the water; presence of arsenic pollution; other Industrial residuals dumped into the water have affected water used for irrigation.

Mining activities –people are afraid about the water quality; untreated industrial waste is being disposed into the river.

Mining activities – people are worried that the material used for explosion has leaked to the water source; inhabitants believe Chaucaco River dried out partially due to mining activity.

Companies and farms use 9 up most of the water

Preference given to residents of Quito over rural communities by EMAAP-Q10; the water source is drying –water is found deeper

Health Issues

PUEMBO Social discontent due to explicit rural-urban differential treatment –in terms of water 1 provision .

PINTAG Social resentment due to the feeling that water is being taken to Quito; limited supply forces communities to share leading to clash between communities.

Limited Water Supply despite functioning communal WMSs4.

No institutional 6 response ; information gaps –the municipality has offered a solution but nothing has happened; no water access despite being 7 legally accessible ; time taking legalization of some neighborhoods – community weakening and less overall engagement.

People who do not have access to water use it directly from the (polluted) river.

Uneven Distribution / Scarcity

People feel their water is taken for others in Quito and that no effort is being made to supply them as well. In the Soral and Acauco. El Belén, La Gloria Itulcachi, La Cocha y El Carmen. 4 Chantag does not have access to water at all. 5 In Huangal and Guantugloma. 6 The communities are constantly working towards legalizing their neighborhood status in order to have access to the service. 7 In Santa Anita. 8 Near Melo, from domestic use and car washing activities. 9 Uneven share between El Tablón and a company (Novopan) and a single individual (Victor Ponce) results in 5% of total water stream is available for the community; only 35% have access to water. 2 3

Anocher reason said to have been the cause for Chacuaco River to dry out.

143

Annex 2: Effective8 and Potential Preliminary Solutions for the Chiche River Watershed Effective

Potential

TUMBACO Population increase leads

Red Ambiental has worked together with various communities with the intention of strengthening cooperation between 1 them ; after 2010 there was more interaction between the communities and the Agency for Water for Quito which resulted in the mediation and attempts to solve various types of conflicts. Some communal leaders that work closely with the town administration say it would be better if EMAAP would manage the entire system themselves; on the other hands, the presidents of the Water Councils say that they should solve the problem and agree that such process would require external guidance4.

PUEMBO Social discontent due to

PIFO

Changing the Pipelines that feed 5 5 communities would improve the quality of the service for those directly linked to such WMS.

Setting up a WMS under concession and/or establish property rights for each party for better coordination; the Itulacachi community needs support to organize an irrigation council.

LA MERCED Population exceeds the

PINTAG Social resentment

The communities that do not have access to water must legalize their neighborhood status in order to have access to services similar to urban areas; dialogue between civil society and Municipal authorities is needed for coordinating existing efforts to improve the situation, coordination between the Junta of the Parroquia and the Munifipality Administration is needed6; building a sub-water channel from the main one that crosses Santa Anita so that the residents can have access to water for irrigation.

Piping the water would be a solution for the people living in San Alfonzo; there are blueprints for this project already.

Red Ambiental works together with some of the families in the area in harvesting rain 2 water ; in the case of Santa Anita, the people make use of pipes from EMAAPQ that have leakage; small groups of families in the area harvest water for 3 irrigation purposes only.

Cooperation: in terms of fencing and reforestation activities with the purpose of preserving the water source. Water harvesting is only available “for those families who are willing to take action in favor of the ecosystem and the people in their communities”. 3 Drip irrigation only. 2

This second group does not think that EMAAP-Q wants to take care of their communities and believes that the water costs would increase (from 1.5 to 3USD p/month) 5 El Belén, La Gloria Itulcachi, La Cocha y El Carmen. 6 In 2010, Red Ambiental said they would not work in La Merced until this is done.

As found in Peñaherrera et.al (2010).

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Annex 3: Hidrography of Pifo (Diagram)

Annex 4: List of Interviewees Across Stakeholder Groups Stakeholder Group

Stakeholders SENAGUA EPMAPS Provincial Government of Pichincha Governmental organisation or institution

Secretariat for the Environment, Metropolitan District of Quito Ministry of Agriculture, Subsecretariat for Irrigation and Drainage

Governmental and nongovernmental institutions

FONAG Red Ambiental Fundaci贸n FuturoLatinoamericano

Non-governmental organisation

Irrigation Water council (Pisque Canal) President of the community Communities

Palugo Water council

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Community members

President of the community and Water council

Cochauco Community members

Mulauco

President of the Water council

La Virginia

Community Council Water council

El Tabl贸n

Community member Community members association President of the community Water council Irrigation Water council

Itulcachi Community members Water user Water council La Cocha Community members Hacienda Itulcachi Agribusiness PolloFavoritoPofusa (poultry farm) Companies

Timber company Floricultural company

Novopan research

Landfill

Agroplantas Relleno Sanitario del Inga

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Annex 5:Interview Guidelines Companies - Interview Guideline 1.

What quality does the water have? Do you test the water quality in any location in Pifo?

Physical

Locations and why that location was chosen?

Attributes of the

Is data available? If yes, could you please give us the data about the water quality at

Water

those point locations? Can you summarize your findings? What pollutants are the most concern at those point locations? Where do you think those pollutants come from? What do you think about the water quality at every point location? Is there a notable tendency in improvement or deterioration of the water quality over the years? Please name reasons. What amounts of water are used by the different actors, and for which purposes? Do you have the data about water demand of different areas in Pifo for different usage: -potable? -household? -irrigation? -industry? Could you please give us the data? If not, what’s your perceptions? Any ideas? What happens to water after use? (actual condition about possible pollution factors) Do areas in Pifo you supply have waste water treatment system? If so, where? How big is the catchment area? Which percentage of the accumulating waste water is treated? How is waste water treated? What happens to the residues? Do you see an improvement potential? What are the factors contributing to pollution? (perception about water pollution) Do you think there is a problem with the water quality? If yes, can you specify? What do you think about the source of the pollutants? From where do you think? Where exactly improvement measures have to be positioned? What technologies are being used – sanitation, hygienic standards, etc. What technologies do exist – quality testing, disposal..? How is the coverage? Can you please explain about your water cleaning system for the water supply for the people? How about the maintenance? How oft it is being maintained?

Which laws have relevance for the action situation and are in use? (Everyone) What changes would you like to see in legislation relating to water use/rights?

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Rules in Use

Do you ever receive complaints about water provision? If yes, how do you deal with them? Which laws are the most relevant for you?

Who currently holds which property rights? Who owns/ controls the water source? Who do you think should own/control the water source? Why? 3.

Are there any conflicts w.r.t. water governance? Groups? Attempts to resolve the conflicts already made?

Current

Are you aware of any conflicts in water governance now or in the past? What were the

Governance

main issues regarding this conflict?

Situation

What measures would be normally taken to resolve a conflict? Who participates in a conflict resolution? Are there any laws/procedures used to resolve conflicts? How successful were the past conflict resolution cases? What are the most common reasons for conflicts? List 3 according to importance. Are any groups disadvantageous in conflicts and why? In your opinion, what can be done to improve it? Who is responsible for decisions regarding: a) drinking water b) household use c) irrigation water d) water for commercial use e) new infrastructure/planning f) infrastructure maintenance Do decision-makers have the authority in this community? Are they respected? To what extent community members/average users participate in decision-making? What are the on-going changes being now implemented? Who is responsible? What information are decisions based on? Information deficit? How is the information collected and who is responsible for it? In your opinion, is there enough information available to reach beneficial decisions? Information on what in particular is the most difficult to gather and why? (cost demanding, other barriers etc.) How can the information collection be improved? When making a decision, is it important (for you) that all the views from different social groups are taken into account? Yes/No why? What are the most common incentives when making a decision? a) profits b) environment c) community welfare d) other Is the corruption present, if yes, to what extent it affects the decision-making?

4. Criteria

Evaluative

Acceptance â&#x20AC;&#x201C; to what extent to the water users accept the rules in use? What are the obligations of water user towards you? What do you expect? Have you had any difficulties with compliance? Adaptability, Resilience, Robustness or Sustainability â&#x20AC;&#x201C; to what extent does the system have the capacity to sustain a shock, recover and cope with change?

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Have there been previous (physical) shocks to the system? If yes, how did the system recover? What happens if there is/were a sudden increase in water? I.e.new company plus employees? Do you have any projections for how this water systems will and has to develop in the future? What do you think are the major threats to the survival of the system?

Indigenous Organizations â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Interview Guideline 1.

Who did this test? Do you have access to that information? If yes, can you summarize the results?

Nature

the

Good

Have you worked or are working in any project regarding cleaning water or sanitation for the community? If yes, could you please explain to us what kind of project is that? How many Households benefit from your program?

3. Attributes of the community

What organizations, NGOs, civil groups are you aware of, that are relevant for the water management? (Other indigenous organizations?) Do you know if the community uses the minga yet? How was the mingain the past? Hos is now? How many people participate in the minga? How often the community does mingas? Do your organization make mingas? How manyâ&#x20AC;Ś Are there any other kind of community cooperation organizations? Where do community members have the chance to participate in public questions? Where can they get support for solving problems? Are there regular meetings for the community? Which laws concerning water are you aware of? If the water supply is cut off, what are the complaint procedures? Does the

Rules in Use

community have rights? Does the community receive compensation? Who does the community talk to? How does it get resolved? If water comes out of the tap and itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s brown/disgusting, can the community complain? And if yes, to whom? How effective is law enforcement for water issues? Do you ever receive complaints from your community about water? Have you tried to achieve law change? If yes, have you been successful? Do you think the existing problems with water use are due to lack of laws, lack of knowledge about the laws or insufficient enforcement of laws? Do you know who in the household/community takes care of problems with water provision? Do the norms and habits of indigenous communities w.r.t. water usage differ from those of the dominant ethnic groups?

Who are the main actors and what is their background? Do members usually come from the same background or are more diversified?

Action Situation

Are all social groups equally represented? If not, what groups are usually

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represented, and which are missing? Who are the most active/influential participants? Are you aware of any conflicts in water governance now or in the past? What were the main issues regarding this conflict? What measures would be normally taken to resolve a conflict? Who participates in a conflict resolution? What are the most common reasons for conflicts? List 3 according to importance. Who is responsible for decisions regarding: a) drinking water b) household use c) irrigation water d) water for commercial use e) new infrastructure/planning f) infrastructure maintenance Do decision-makers have the authority in this community? Are they respected? What are the on-going changes being now implemented? Who is responsible? What do you think about the role that (see the below option) plays in relation to the water pollution and uneven water distribution in the parish of Pifo? Options: Industry, Energy, Agriculture, Aquaculture, Households, and Tourism What do you think about the relationship between (see the below options) and the water pollution, as well as the uneven water distribution in the parish of Pifo? Options: Physical intrusions, water abstraction, climate change, diffuse/point source pollution What do you think about the current state of water consumption quality in the parish of Pifo? Do you think that the quantity of water for consumption is enough to supply all actors in the parish of Pifo? How do you think the current situation in the highlands (pรกramo) is affecting the parish of Pifo as a whole? The participants in the water issue in the parish of Pifo are: (noun the actors), Which ones have more access to the water source? Which ones are polluting in a high level the water source? Who do you think should manage the water source? How do you think would the best way to manage the water source? Do you think that EMAAP-Q must manage the water source? Do you think that the water councils must manage the water source? 5.

In your experiences are people willing to participate in community water governance? If yes, would you say it leads to better outcomes?

Outcome

and

Have there been previous (physical) shocks to the system? If yes, how did the

Evaluative

system recover?

Criteria

Do you have any projections for how these water systems will and has to develop in the future? What do you think are the major threats to the survival of the system?

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Community Leaders â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Interview Guideline Part I What is your position in the community? What organizations, NGOs, civil groups are you aware of, that are relevant for the water management? (Indigenous organizations?) Which organization do you consider most important / has most influence in water mgmt. issues? At what occasions and how often do people from your neighbourhood come together? Who participates in these activities? Is anybody excluded? To what extent do you think members of the community help each other? Where especially / where not? What shared problems have been addressed lately by people in the community? Which? If yes, was there success? If not, why? Which organizations, social groups, generally enjoy high trust? In your perception, do community members generally trust you? What platforms for exchange (of opinions, of help), for problem solving exist in your community? How many people participate and who? Do you use any networks based on un-written rules, on traditions? In your opinion, is 'giving' and 'receiving' in the community balanced? Common examples of reciprocity? (Minga?) Do community members exchange feedback on each otherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s' actions? Where do community members have the chance to participate in public questions? Where can they get support for solving problems? Are there regular meetings for the community? What kind of relation do you have with other social organizations, e.g. NGO, water council? How would you characterize your organization's relationship with other community organizations? Part II How effective is law enforcement for water issues? Do you ever receive complaints from your community about water? Have you tried to achieve law change? If yes, have you been successful? Which laws concerning water are you aware of?

Part III Do you play a role in settling disputes within the community? Do you participate in a community activity/group/water council? If yes, tell us about your experiences. Would you like to participate in such a group? What stops you? In your experiences are people willing to participate in community water governance? If yes, would you say it leads to better outcomes? Does any of the following apply to water use habits in your community: EXAMPLES TO BE IDENTIFIED What do you use water for? Can anyone complain about water access/ quality? Or are there any social restrictions? Who in the household/community takes care of problems with water provision? Are there seasonal restrictions on how much water you can use? Who owns/ controls the water source?

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Who do you think should own/control the water source? Why? Do you know if anyone in your community broke any water law and got punished for it? Can you complain at the water council in case of problems? Does anything get done if you do? Have there been previous (physical) shocks to the system? If yes, how did the system recover?

NGOs â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Interview Guideline Part I. Do you have any data on water quality? (Could we get it please?) What do you think about the water quality in Pifo? (Drinking water, water for household use, irrigation water) What are sources of pollution? Part II What do you think about the role that the following actors play in relation to the water pollution in the parish of Pifo? Flower industry, other large fincas (haciendas? What's the term in Ecuador?), small scale agriculture, animal husbandry (ganaderĂa), households, local economy Part II What improvement measures should be taken, and where? Have you worked or are you working on any project regarding cleaning water or sanitation for the community? Are the technologies still in use or the practices still going on in the community? How many households benefit from your program? What other sanitation or water cleaning technologies are in use in households in Pifo? Part III Do you think that the quantity of water for consumption is enough to supply all actors in the parish of Pifo? - The participants in the water issue in the parish of Pifo are: (noun the actors), From all the participants, which ones have most access to the water source? Which ones are polluting in a high level the water source? What do you think about the role that the following acors play in relation to uneven water distribution in the parish of Pifo? Flower industry, other large fincas (haciendas? What's the term in Ecuador?), small scale agriculture, animal husbandry (ganaderĂa), households, local economy Part IV

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What organizations, NGOs, civil groups are relevant for the water management? How would you characterize your own organization's relatonship with other community organizations? Are you aware of any conflicts between different actors in water governance now or in the past? What were the main issues regarding this conflict? What are the most common reasons for conflicts? List 3 according to importance. Part V Do you consider the current legal situation with regards to water effective? In how far are the existing water laws actually enforced? Do you think any problems for water users are due to lack of laws, lack of knowledge about the laws or insufficient enforcement of laws? Part VI In your organization, what are members' backgrounds? Are all social groups represented? How does your organization engage in water management? Who is currently responsible for decisions on infrastructure, on water quality and on water extractions? Are there any on-going changes currently being implemented? Who is responsible? Who do you think should be responsible for decisions on infrastructure, water quality and water extractions? What do you think would the best way to take decisions? Do you think that EMAAP-Q should manage the water? Do you think that the water councils should manage the water? Part VII In your experiences, are people willing to participate in community water governance? In what way? In what way does it affect the outcome?

Water councils â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Interview Guidelines

Could you first provide us with some general information about 1.

the water council? How was the water council founded and established? What are the main purposes of the water council?

General, Rights, Rules

For whom does the water council provide water? How is the water council organized (e.g. How are decisions made in the water council? How often does it hold meetings?) and which internal rules do exist in the water council (e.g. in terms of water distribution, irrigation schedules, participation;

153

Which rights (access, operational, control) does the water council have? Does the water council get concessions from the state? Are all water sources in the area state owned? If yes, do you think the ownership should be transferred to the water council? 2.

Do you have links with other organizations/stakeholders inside or outside of Pifo?

Linkages & Conflicts

Could you especially describe your relationship with the other water councils? Why are there 12 different water councils in Pifo? Could you especially describe your relationship with EPMAPS? Could you especially describe your relationship with the local and national government?

Has the water council ever

received outside advice/ funding/ support from the government or from nongovernment sources? Would you like to get (more) support? If yes, from whom (Local water users, Government, NGOs)? E.g. has the water council been invited to participate in any governmental planning processes regarding the water management/governance? Do you feel sufficiently informed about government programs and activities regarding water related issues? What are your sources of information? In general, how do you assess your organizationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s actual influence on local/national government decision making? Are you trying to influence local/national water related legislations e.g. through some groups? If yes, have you been successful? Let us talk more about the conflicts in the region in terms of water governance. What general conflicts in the local water governance exist now (or existed in the past)? What were the main issues and the most common reasons for conflicts? Are there conflicts in the water council, among water councils, NGOs, governmental organisations on the local and national level? Where do conflicts with EMAAPQ arise? -> We could show the conflict map to update it or make our own! Is there general any platform despite the water council where stakeholders can discuss water related issues or solve conflicts? 3.

What water sources do you use? Groundwater/Surfacewater? How is the water supplied? How

Physical Attributes

big is the catchment area? Do you have any water pre-treatment system or waste water treatment system (Collective infrastructure or household

154

treatment system)? If yes, which technologies do you use? How are the systems maintained? How much water is treated? If the water is not treated, how and to where is the waste water discharged? Do you have any water quality standards, especially for tab/drinking water? If yes which ones? Do you test the water quality in your area? Locations and why that location was chosen? Frequency (difference in frequency/location? And reasons for that?) If not, is any other data about the water quality in the area available? From whom?

How is the water quality in this area? What are the main pollutants and which areas are most polluted?? Could you please give us the data about the water quality?

Do you also have any data about the water demand in Pifo for different

usage?

If yes, could you please give us that data? If not, what are your perceptions? Any ideas? Is there a notable tendency in improvement or deterioration of the water quality/supply over the last years? How could the water supply/quality be improved? Anything where you see a lot of potential right now? What resources would you need? 4.

Can you tell us more about the people involved in the water council? How many are involved? Are all water users (not just

Participation & Information

households, but also local businesses and the flower companies) member of the water council? If not, why are some not involved? Why do people join or are willing to serve in the water council? What kinds of requests/demands do the members make? How would you characterize the quality of participation in the water council, in terms of:

... participation in decision making within the organization? ... collection and dissemination and of relevant information prior to the decision? ...

informal

opportunities

discuss

the

decision?

â&#x20AC;Ś consultation processes with the community? Are the views

155

from all social groups taken into account? … broad debate, including opposition positions, and honesty? … dissemination of the results of the decision making process?

Water Users – Interview Guidelines (intro) Name, what do you do, how long have you been living here for? 1. Where do you get your water from? (council/EPMAPS/Self-harvesting) Why? Could you estimate how much water you use per day for both drinking and household Water use use? (for example in litter or any other measure used) Is it enough? Please specify. What do you think about the role that the following actors play in relation to the unequal access in the parish of Pifo? Flower industry, other large fincas (haciendas? What's the term in Ecuador?), small scale agriculture, animal husbandry (ganadería), households, local economy, hydroplants; mining

2. Water quality pollution:

Do you try to control your water consumption or save water? Do you reuse the waste water in any way? How and where is your waste water discharged? (behind the house/directly into the river/piping system? If piping system, do you know where the discharge point is?) *Mapping water sources/extraction/discharge * Do the same questions for households regarding irrigation/drainage system From where do you get water to irrigate your field? How much water do you use for irrigation and how often? Is it enough? Please specify Where does your drainage system of your field go to? What do you think about the quality of the water you are using? Is there any problem or unsatisfaction? Have you ever been sick because of it? Please specify Do you drink tap water? Do you pre-treat it? How? Do you check the water quality of your tap water? How and how often? How about your water storage? What do you think about the role that the following actors play in relation to the water pollution in the parish of Pifo? Flower industry, other large fincas (haciendas? What's the term in Ecuador?), small scale agriculture, animal husbandry (ganadería), households, local economy; hydroplants; mining

3. Social capital

At what occasions and how often do you meet other people from your neighbourhood? Do many people participate in these activities? If you have problems, have you ever received help from other people in your neighbourhood? Have you asked them to help you? Do they expect something from you in exchange? Are you aware of your neighbours’ or neighbourhoods problems? Are you willing to help? Or have you ever participate solving them together? Why? (Unspoken: do you expect anything) What do you think about fairness in the community? Do you think you are getting as much as you give? –from the questions above we should get this info already Do you normally borrow or lend things from or to your neighbours? What do you feel about it? –if their answer about helping each other is already clear so this question is

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4. Laws

5. Property rights & management:

6. Conflict resolution

already answered How is the problem solving process in your neighbourhood? Are there any “platforms of exchange”? Or un-written rules or traditions? (like minga) Do you respect and trust your community leader? Why? Which social organization do you trust most? Which one least? Why? Which laws concerning water are you aware of? Are there any that you think are unreasonable? Is it prohibited to release household waste into the water stream? What is the penalty and how? Do you know anyone who got punished for doing so? If the water supply is interrupted or inadequate, how are the complaint procedures and resolution? Has it ever happen to you/your neighbours? What did you do to survive? Who owns/controls the water source that you use? Who do you think should own/control the water source? Why? Do you participate in a community activity/group/water council? If yes, tell us about your experiences. If not, would you like to? What do you think about the participation after the decision? Do people follow the decision or rules afterwards? Do you? If you thought of a way to improve water management in the area, would you talk to the community leader/water council? Do you have an access to information regarding public decisions? Were you or your neighbor involved in any conflict regarding water now or in the past? What were the main issues regarding this conflict? How was the conflict resolved? Were you happy with such resolution? Are any groups in a particularly weak position when it comes to conflicts? In your opinion, what can be done to improve it?

Companies – Interview Guidelines (Intro)

Tell us about your company – what do you produce, what do you need water for, etc.

Water use

Where do you get your water from? Which river? Can you give us an estimate of how much water you need each month? Does your demand for water depend on the season? Are there differences in timing? Where does your drainage system of your field go to? Do you have a waste water management system? Would you say that you have enough water to cover your needs? Do you think any of the water that you use is wasted? (FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS IN THE “OPTIONAL” SECTION)

Water Pollution

quality/

Do you think there is a problem with the water quality in the region? If yes, can you specify? Where do you think the pollutants come from? In general, which of the following contribute to pollution the most? Options: Industry, Energy, Agriculture, Aquaculture, Households, and Tourism. Do you think the following factors have an impact on water quality? Physical intrusions, water abstraction, climate change, diffuse/point source pollution.

Laws

Which laws concerning water are you aware of? If the water supply is cut off or is inadequate, what are the complaint procedures? Do

157

you complain to the water council? Do you receive compensation? How does it get resolved? Is there a legally defined limit on the amount of waste you can discharge into the water stream? Any limitations on the disposal of chemicals/fertilisers? Do you know if anyone in your industry broke any water law and got punished for it? Property rights and

Who owns/ controls the water source that you depend on?

Management

Who do you think should own/control and manage the water source? Why? Do you participate in local water governance? If yes, tell us about your experiences. If not, would you like to? Do you usually do what the community leaders/water councils ask you to? If you had suggestions for improving water management in the area, would you talk to the community leader/water council?

Conflict resolution

Are you aware of any conflicts in water governance now or in the past? What were the main issues regarding this conflict? How were the conflicts resolved? Which laws are relevant for conflict resolution? Were you happy with the past conflict resolution cases?

(optional) What are the most common reasons for conflicts? List 3 according to importance. Are any groups in a particularly weak position when it comes to conflicts? In your opinion, what can be done to improve it? General context

Do you think that the quantity of water for consumption is enough to supply all actors in the parish of Pifo? Is there anyone who enjoys greater access to the water source? Do you think there are other groups who have access to less water? If yes, who?

Efficiency of water

Do you reuse any of the water you use in your operations?

use

Does any of the water go to waste? If yes, why and have you thought about ways to reduce the waste? Have you set yourself any standards for efficiency of water use? Is there anyone in your company who is responsible for making sure water is used efficiently?

Annex 6: Dry Sanitation Systems窶的ntelligent and innovative solutions to save on nutrients, water, costs and energy. The necessity of a change from a disposal oriented to a resource oriented approach in sanitation concepts is inter alia derived from the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The MDG sanitation target aims to reduce the world proportion of the population without access to improved sanitation from 51% in 1990 to 25% in 2015 (WHO, 2014). Despite 158

significant progress on sanitation, in 2012, 2.5 billion people did not have access to an improved sanitation facility, which is only a decrease of 7% compared to 1990 (WHO, 2014). Even though Ecuador stands out in Latin America for their improvements, there are still Ecuadorians who suffer under insufficient sanitation (WHO, 2014). Unsafe drinking water, inadequate availability of water for hygiene, and lack of access to sanitation together contribute to deaths from diarrheal diseases, especially in children. In informal settlements were suburban growth takes place and in rural areas coverage is the lowest. The widely used “drop and store” system in which feces and urine are deposited in holes in the soil is unsustainable because valuable nutrients remain unused and groundwater pollution can take place by leachate with an additional contamination of water sources.

Figure A: Sanitation with the “end of pipe” strategy

Source: Esrey, 1998

As unsustainable the “drop and store” system is the more is the “end of pipe” strategy. In industrial countries each person flushes away 400-500 liters urine and 50 liters of faeces with 15.000 liters of pure water each year (Esrey et al., 1998). Via a pipe system greywater is added (fecal free low polluted water from household) which is another 15.000-30.000 liters per person and year (Esrey et al., 1998). Additionally rainwater from the streets and rooftops and heavily polluted water from industries enter the pipes. The problem is obvious. A small amount of problematic substances contaminates a large amount of fresh water. If there is no centralized sewage treatment plant at the end of the canalization system streams and ground water are polluted. An existing major disadvantage is that huge amounts of resources have to be spent to eliminate nutrients and other substances contained in waste water. Also, the

159

method of diluting and mixing applied at present has proven to be unsustainable but is needed to maintain the flow in the pipe system. Additionally water disposal techniques are not applicable to all regions of the world because they are technically complex, cost and maintenance intensive and are in need for a perfect infrastructure. The resource economic comparison shows that a worldwide coverage with conventional disposal technology with flushing toilets and sewer would lead to hundreds of billions of expenditure and the loss of valuable resources with a market value of several ten billion per year. To find alternatives to the prevalent sanitation strategies protect water resources and the closing of natural cycles promote soil fertility and can help to overcome economic dependence and social problems.

1. Human faeces and urine are fertilizer Feces and urine contain valuable nutrients. Especially for countries that are dependent on the import of essential resources like phosphor can gain independence in integration human nutrition in natural cycles. Phosphorous is an elemental nutrient in agriculture but phosphate rock reserves are limited. Global consumption of phosphate in form of synthetic phosphate fertilizer has risen significantly in the last decades and will continue to increase. Most of the best phosphorus reserves are gone and the remaining ones are situated in just a handful of countries (YALE, 2011). When the â&#x20AC;&#x153;peak phosphorusâ&#x20AC;? is hit is not certain but there are scientists who predict that to happen in around the next 15 years (YALE, 2011). Another essential nutrient in agriculture that can be gained from feces and urine is nitrogen. In contrast to phosphorous nitrogen is gained from the air. The Haber process converts nitrogen under high pressure is converted to ammonia. To run this process a lot of energy is needed. Would the nitrogen obtained from the air be substituted by nitrogen from feces and urine (average nutrient content of about 3 kg N / person) 40 kWh / E â&#x20AC;˘ a primary energy could be saved (Patyk & Reinhard, 1997). The production and application of synthetic mineral fertilizers that cause harm to human health and the environment can be replaced by the direct fertilization for plants with faeces and urine.

160

2. Hygienization of urine and faeces 2.1 Urine With about 500 liters per year urine accounts for around 90% of the volume of human waste (Vinneras, 2002). Fresh urine doesn’t smell. The conversion of urea to volatile ammonia/ammoniac causes the typical smell after several hours. Urine is a good fertilizer because 80% of all minerals a human excretes are in found in urine (Vinneras, 2002). In most cases urine is considered to be medically harmless and can be worked without prior treatment into the soil after a short storage period (conversion of urea to ammonia) (Baumeyer, 2002/2003). To prevent a local over fertilization and eutrophication urine could be used in dilute solution During the conversion of urea to ammonia the pH value of undiluted urine rises to 9 within 48h (Joenssen et al., 2004). Most organisms have a pH tolerance range they are adapted to. Higher or lower ph values inactivate the organisms. At a temperature of 20°C pure urine is considered to be hygienically harmless after one month of storage time (Joenssen et al., 2004). Higher temperatures accelerate this process and bacteria as well as viruses can be eliminated successfully. In general, urinal-orally transmitted diseases compared to feces-orally transmitted diseases can be neglected (Joenssen et al., 2004). By a separation of urine from feces the risk of disease transmission can be prevented.

2.2 Feces Each human produces about 50 liters of feces per year, which comprises depending of nutrition of 25-50 kg of dry mass (Langergraber & Muellegger, 2004). From a medical point of view the danger of infection is much higher than from urine. Next to bacteria, worm eggs are considered as a risk (Langergraber & Muellegger, 2004). To ensure the killing of parasites temperatures of 50°C over several hours have to be ensured (Schirm, 2005). Temperatures of over 80°C ensure the elimination of e.g. roundworms after less than one hour (Schirm, 2005). A recent publication indicates that faecal indicator bacteria are reduced by over 99% in the two step procedure of lacto-fermentation and vermicomposting (Factura et al., 2010). 3. Novel sanitation systems The term novel sanitation systems aim to utilize sewage ingredients (nutrients, organic substances etc.) without the complex and expensive transport of sewage in pipes. The basic 161

principle of resource oriented sanitation systems is the separate collection of partial flows as greywater (fecal free low polluted waste water from household), blackwater (feces and urine), yellowwater (fluid blackwater) and brown water (fecal solids) (BMZ, 1995). The main argument for the separation of urine and feces is the back extraction of nutrients. Human excretions are no longer seen as waster but a valuable source of nutrients. 3.1 Composting toilets Aberloo and Fossa represent simple composting toilets; the third figure shows a simple urine diverting toilet. In aerobic composting systems carbonaceous material has to be added to ensure an optimal C/N ratio of about 25/1 (Guenther, 2007). Ash and lime help to raise the pH which eliminates pathogens. To avoid unwanted anaerobic digestive processes adequate ventilation is important. The composting material shouldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t be too wet or to dry (dry matter content should lie between 50-60%) (Guenther, 2007). Compost toilets operate water free, the addition of water should be prevented because water promotes pathogen development and leads to anaerobic conditions that stop degradation processes.

3.1.1 Aborloo The simple Aborloo toilet consists of a one meter deep pit in the ground with a simple toilet on top. After each usage of the toilet soil, ash and leaves are added. After 6-12 month when the pit is full a tree will be planted on top and a new pit has to be opened in another place. Fig. B: EcoSan toilet Aborloo

Soure: EcoSan Res., 2008 3.1.2 Fossa Alterna The Fossa Alterna toilet consists of two 1.5 meter deep pits (Morgan, 2007). After each usage of the toilet soil, ash and leaves are added. One pit fills over a period of 12-24 month. Pits are 162

used sequentially. The substrate of the full pit degrades to fertile humus rich earth which can be used in agriculture while the second is filling. To prevent ground water pollution in flood prone areas and where the groundwater table is high the pits could be built above the ground (Morgan, 2007).

Fig. C: EcoSan toilet Fossa Alterna

Soure: EcoSan Res., 2008

3.1.3 Urine Dividing Dry Toilet UDDT A urine diverting dry toilet UDDT, collects separately urine and feces. Urine has to be stored separately for at least a month to ensure pathogen die-off (Schirm, 2005). In a 20 liter collection tank feaces are collected. After each usage of the toilet soil, ash and leaves are added. After 2 to 6 month the collection tank has to be emptied to external compost where further composting takes place (Morgan, 2007).

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Fig. D: Urine Dividing Toilet UDDT

Soure: EcoSan Res., 2008

Fig. E: Urine Dividing Toilet UDDT

Source: www.naturbaufhof.de

3.2 Terra Preta Toilet Was generated by pre-Columbian native populations in the Amazon area and is called black earth because of its dark color (Factura et al., 2010). The earth was produced as a byproduct from human activity with nutrient rich material. They added human and animal manure (rich in P and N), mammal and fish bones (rich in Ca, Mg, K, P and charcoal) and plant biomass (kitchen wastes, compost, algae etc.) in closed pottery which they deposited in the always wet 164

tropical soil (Factura et al.,2010). In those containers lacto-fermentation could start. Black carbon is microbiologically stable and persists in the environment over centuries (Factura et al., 2010). It has a large potential as a long-term carbon sink. Over time it gets partially oxidized â&#x20AC;&#x201C; it becomes a trap for nutrients and cracks in charcoal. Lactic fermentation plays a large role it prevents that organic matter is decomposed fast but builds up in continuous humus. Studies show that the total organic matter content in the produced Terra Preta is much higher than in the always wet tropical soil, called Ferrasol (fig. F). Additionally it shows high soil fertility, a high biological activity and has high water retention potential (Glaser et al., 2001)

Fig. F: Soil organic matter content in Terra Pretavs, Ferrasol

Source: Glaser, 2007

Urine diversion TPT are dry toilet systems based on a three step process of collection: urine diversion, lacto-fermentation with the addition of charcoal and vermicomposting. The result is lasting and highly fertile soil with properties similar to the Terra Preta soils. Terra Prea is produced in an anaerobic process in which no gas and no odor is produced which makes it interesting for large scale and indoor use. There is no need for a special ventilation of the collections chamber. Urine collection The urine can be collected in any container which is air and liquid tight. Half a liter of lactofermenting bacteria and bacillus subtilis should be added to a 20 L urine tank prior to the collection (Gensch, 2010 b). The microbes prevent the bacterial urease process that 165

hydrolyses urea into ammonia NH3 and carbon dioxide CO2. In that way no odor is produced and the loss of nitrogen into the air is reduced which results in higher nitrogen content in the urine (Reckin, 2010). The pretreated urine can be used as a fertilizer or can be added to the vermicompost (than the adding of wood, wood chips, leaves, coal etc. is important to maintain a good C/N ratio). Urine can also be composted on its own by adding the microbial mix an 80% of sliced wood (Gensch, 2010 a), ground charcoal 10% and existing soil 10%. The urine vermicompost should be covered with leaves and must be regularly watered (Gensch, 2010 a).

Faeces collection The collection chamber again is airtight to make sure the anaerobic conditions for lactofermentation. After each usage of the fecal bucket Â˝ cup of mixture of ground charcoal, dolomite lime, stone dust and sliced wood is added. Charcoal prevents the development of gases and odor and promotes the formation of stable organic matter (Otterpohl, 2009). Slicedcut wood raised the C/N ratio to prepare the substrate for vermicompostation (Factura et al., 2010). To start the lacto fermentation process microorganisms can be either added after each usage of the toilet (than it is important to keep the toilet seat sealed) or can be added to the full bucket (than buckets must be replaced every two to three weeks) (Factura et al., 2010). The microorganisms suppress the development of gases and help to store the feces for longer times. For an optimal conversion the lacto-fermentation has to take place for 4 weeks for both urine and feces before vermicomposting (Otterpohl, 2009).

Vermicompostation This process is aerobic, takes place with oxygen, so that aerobic microorganisms and earthworms can start their work. Nothing has to be added additionally. Urine and feces can be vermicomposted together. After one month humus like fertile material with no significant N, P, K loss is created.

Fig. G: Urine collection 166

Source: www.ecovita.net

Fig. H: Faeces collection

Source: www.ecovita.net

Fig. I: Modern Terra PretaToilet

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Source: www.homechunk.com

3.5 Literature

Baumeyer, A. (2002/ 2003): New Toilets for Indian Slums Nutrients Mass Balance of a CoComposting Plant in Bangalore, India. Technical report, Hochschule Waedenswil. Zuericher Fachhochschule. EcoSan Res. (2008): An Ecological Approach to Sanitation in Africa: A Compilation of Experiences.Factsheet13. Technical report, Environment Institute, Stockholm. BMZ (1995): Überlebensfrage Wasser – eine Ressource wird knapp. Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, Bonn. Esrey, S. (1998): Ecological Sanitation. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SIDA. Stockholm, Sweden. Factura, H.; Bettendorf, T.; Buizie, C.; Pieplow, H.; Reckin, J.; Otterpohl R.; (2010): Terra Preta Sanitation – rediscovered from an ancient Amazonien civilization – integrating sanitation, biowaste management and agriculture. Water Science and Technology. Gensch (2010) a: Terra Preta Sanitation Workshop, April 5-8. 2010. Cagayan de Oro City: SustainableSanitation Center, Xavier University. Gensch (2010) b: Terra Preta SanitationOverview, Cagayan de Oro: SustainableSanitation Center, Xavier University. Glaser, B.; Haumaier, L.; Guggenberger, G.; Zech, W. (2001): The Terra Preta phenomenon: a model for sustainable agriculture in the humid tropics. Naturwissenschaften 88, 37-41. 168

Glaser, B. (2007): Prehistorically modified soils of central Amazonia â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a model for sustainable agriculture in the twenty-first century. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 8: Biological Sciences 362, 187-196. Guenther, F. (2007): Carbon sequestration for everybody: decrease atmospheric carbon dioxide, earn money and improve the soil. Energy and Environment. Joensson, H. et al. (2004): Guidelines on the Use of Urine and Faeces. Crop Production.Technical report, Environment Institute, Stockholm. Langengraber, G., Muellegger, E. (2004): Ecological Sanitation: a way to solve global sanitation problems? Technical report, Institute of Sanitary Engineering and Water Pollution Control, BOKU University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, Vienna, Austria. Morgan, P. (2007): Toilets that make compost. Eco San Resources. Environmental Institute. Stockholm, Sweden. Otterpohl, R. (2009): Terra Preta Sanitation, providing new options in ecosan systems. Institute of wastewater management and protection gww. Techical University Hamburg TUHH. Hamburg. Patyk, A.; Reinhard, G. (1997): DĂźngemittel- Energie- und Stoffstrombilanzen. Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn Publishers. Braunschweig/Wiesbaden, Germany. Reckin, J. (2010): New insights in matters of plant nutrition, soil microbes and their role in recycling of human excreta and regeneration soil fertility. Schirm, V. (2005): Entwicklung einer sicheren Methode zur Bioabfallhygienisierung mit Kalk. Technical report. Institut fuer Umwelt- und Tierhygiene sowie Tiermedizin mit Tierklinik der Universitaet Hohenheim. UNICEF, (2014): Progress on drinking water and sanitation, update 2014. World Health Organization and UNICEF. Geneva, Switzerland Vinneras, B. (2002): Possibilities for sustainable nutrient recycling by faecal separation combined with urine diversion. Technical report, Department of agricultural engeneering. Doctoral thesis 2002. Uppsala. WHO (2014): Progress on drinking water and sanitation: Joint Monitoring Programme update 2014. World Health Organization Press. Geneva, Switzerland.

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YALE (2011): Phosphate: A Critical Resource Misused and Now Running Low. 7 Jul 2011 Report. Environment 360: Opinion, Analysis, Reporting and Debate. Yale University, New Haven, United States of America.

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