866
ADAMS V. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 10 Cal.4th 866; 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 606; 897 P.2d 544 [July 1995]
[No. S042149. July 20, 1995.] G. DENNIS ADAMS, a Judge of the Superior Court, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, Respondent.
SUMMARY
On the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Performance, the Supreme Court ordered that a superior court judge be removed from office. Preliminarily, the court held that the commission's combined roles as investigator, prosecutor, and adjudicator, as well as litigation adversary in proceedings by the judge challenging the commission's decision to hold open hearings, did not create an unacceptable risk of actual bias on the part of the commission so as to deny the judge his right to due process. Neither did the commission's vigorous opposition to the judge's attempt to vacate the open-hearing order, using as legal counsel the same attorneys who were prosecuting the charges, inevitably prejudice the commission against him with respect to the merits of the charges, so as to create a strong probability of bias against him. The court held that removal from office was the appropriate discipline for the judge, who engaged in successive extrajudicial transactions with a litigant who had obtained a substantial damage award in a court trial presided over by the judge, and attorneys who appeared before him over a significant period of time, creating an appearance of serious impropriety and thereby tending to diminish the public esteem of the judiciary—a consequence the judge either deliberately ignored or was unable to appreciate. The court held that clear and convincing evidence supported the charge that the judge engaged in seven separate instances of prejudicial conduct in his transactions with the litigant, a car dealer, four of which transactions involved the attorney representing the litigant, which attorney frequently appeared before the judge. Such conduct could be construed, from the viewpoint of an objective observer, as improperly using the judicial office to advance the judge's personal interest and permitting the appearance of special influence. Clear and convincing evidence also supported two charges that the judge engaged in prejudicial conduct in accepting gifts or financial benefits from attorneys or their law firms whose interests had come and were likely to come before the judge, and that in four separate instances the judge assisted or otherwise communicated with members of a law firm regarding matters pending before the court. Finally, the court held that the
ADAMS V. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 10 CaUth 866; 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 606; 897 P.2d 544 [July 1995]
913
the bench in dealings with litigants, attorneys, witnesses, and other persons, or while otherwise performing his or her judicial functions, and an abuse of his or her judicial powers and authority. In Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 49 Cal.3d 826, for example, the judge had engaged in persistent rude, abusive, hostile, and irrational behavior in dealings with litigants, attorneys, witnesses, and court personnel, often humiliating or demeaning them in the courtroom setting, and regularly abrogated the rights of criminal defendants, accepting guilty pleas from and sentencing defendants in the absence of defense counsel, and arbitrarily adjudging criminal defendants in contempt. In McCullough v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 49 Cal.3d 186, the judge previously had been censured publicly for failing to decide a case that had been pending before him for six years, and the judge thereafter engaged in misconduct by directing a jury to find a defendant guilty in a criminal proceeding, and conducting the trial of two other defendants in the absence of their attorneys, among other derelictions on the bench. In Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 13 Cal.3d 778, the judge was found to have conducted his court in a bizarre and unjudicial manner, engaging in a pervasive course of acting vindictively toward attorneys who sought to have the judge disqualified or who appealed from his decisions, and to have permitted his business relationships and social friendships improperly to influence his judicial rulings (e.g., according preferential treatment to his longtime friends and political supporters). (See also Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1975) 14 Cal.3d 678 [122 Cal.Rptr. 778, 537 P.2d 898] [the judge committed 21 acts of wilful misconduct and 8 other acts of prejudicial conduct, including an egregious abuse of the contempt power, often arbitrarily ordering the incarceration of public defenders and thereby depriving their clients of effective assistance of counsel].) (20) To summarize our conclusions regarding the misconduct committed by petitioner: With respect to count 1, we conclude clear and convincing evidence supports the charges that petitioner engaged in seven separate instances of prejudicial conduct in his transactions with Williams (four of which involved Frega), in petitioner's attendance at the celebratory dinner, and in his acceptance of the sweater. As we have indicated, however, the record does not support the allegations that petitioner received any special financial benefit in the Mercedes purchase transaction, or that he initiated any of these transactions with the expectation of receiving favorable treatment. We also conclude the record fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner solicited or had any knowledge of Frega's financial contributions
A judge failed to disclose a longtime friendship with an attorney appearing before the judge in a family law matter, even after the issue of a possible undisclosed conflict was raised. (Ann. Rept. (2005), Advisory Letter 11, p. 27.) A judge presided over a hearing on a motion and issued a ruling before disclosing a conflict of interest. The judge then recused from further proceedings. (Ann. Rept. (2002), Advisory Letter 8, p. 23.)
A judge failed to recuse or to adequately disclose the judge’s prior association in practice with an attorney appearing before the judge. On occasions when the conflict was waived, the judge failed to obtain written waivers of disqualification as required by law. The judge also was verbally abusive toward court staff. (Ann. Rept. (2002), Advisory Letter 16, p. 24.) [Demeanor/decorum; disqualification/disclosure/post-disqualification conduct.]
Stanford's State of Mind I.
Did Judge Stanford know his conduct was wrong at the time he acted?
Judge Stanford testified that when he was adjudicating the tickets of friends and family it did not occur to him that his actions were improper, that he simply "missed" the conflicts and appearance issues, and had a "blind spot" which prevented him from thinking about the impropriety of his actions. Consciousness of wrongdoing is not charged in the Notice and is not an element of willful misconduct in the context of this case. Nevertheless, the judge urged the masters to fmd that he did not realize his actions were unethical until he was confronted by the presiding judge. While recognizing "[t]hat a seasoned judge would miss the issue does seem implausible," the masters were "not persuaded that he [Judge Stanford] could not have failed to recognize the conflict of interest and the appearance of impropriety it created. Many who have known Judge Stanford for years have testified that, yes, he could have - and did - miss the issue. We cannot simply disregard this mass of evidence as 'wishful thinking' and conclude it was 12
2002 In one civil matter, the judge ordered a party’s spouse, over whom the judge did not have authority, to appear to defend the party’s excuse for being absent. The judge also displayed prejudgment through flattering and solicitous comments to a witness who was testifying in the proceedings. In another case, the judge failed to follow the statutory requirements for due process in conservatorship proceedings, engaged in ex parte communication, displayed bias against an attorney, and made an appointment of counsel despite the counsel’s obvious conflict of interest. In a third matter, the judge made remarks evidencing prejudgment and imposed sanctions without affording notice, a hearing, or a statement of reasons. (Ann. Rept. (2002), Private Admonishment 1, p. 22.) 10
FLETCHER V. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 19 Cal.4th 865; 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 58; 968 P.2d 958 [Dec. 1998]
896
recall petitioner's saying anything about the Pearsons or whether he had a problem with them. Consistent with his practice in similar cases, the district attorney asked that the matter be continued until, and dismissed when, the Pearsons cleaned up their property. At the district attorney's request, petitioner continued the matter two or three times. Petitioner did not believe that the conflict created by his ex parte contacts and his knowledge of the zoning violation prevented him from ordering a continuance. However, petitioner also believed that the district attorney gave Pearson too much time to clean up the property and should have forced Pearson to act more quickly. Petitioner remembered that Pearson's earlier brandishing offense involved a neighbor who was angry about junk in Pearson's yard. (10)
On this record, we agree with the Commission's unanimous finding
that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct in continuing to preside over the zoning case despite his personal knowledge of the relevant circum stances and his ongoing personal relationship with Pearson through the fellowship meetings. Because of the conflict that these contacts created, petitioner exercised no substantive judgment in considering the district attorney's continuance requests. By his own admission, petitioner thought the district attorney was giving Pearson too much time to clean up his property, creating a potential for another confrontation with his neighbor. But for his decision not to make substantive rulings in this case, petitioner might not have acceded to all of the continuance requests. Rather than participating in the case under these circumstances, he should have recused himself. (See former Cal. Code Jud. Conduct, canon 3A(4), as adopted eff. Jan. 1, 1975, see now Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(7); Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 170.1, subd. (a)(6).) In failing to do so, he committed prejudicial
misconduct.
CJP Supp. 342
INQUIRY CoNCERNING HYDE 48 Cal.4th CJP Supp. 329 [Sept. 2003]
called Ms. Hyde and left a message that her court date would need to be rescheduled. The next day, Judge Hyde approached Ms. Mateo and told her to keep Ms. Hyde's case on the January 23 calendar.16 Around midafternoon on January 23, 2001, a clerk reminded Judge Hyde that he was scheduled to preside in night court that evening and that his daughter's case was on the calendar. Judge Hyde testified before the masters that he had forgotten that he was scheduled to preside that evening. Judge Hyde then called longtime pro tern, John Harding, and asked him to cover the January 23 night court because he had an unspecified confict. Judge Hyde contacted Mr. Harding because he lived nearby, was well liked and respected by the court clerks and had a reputation for honesty and integrity. Judge Hyde had been acquainted with Mr. Harding since he was a child. He knew Mr. Harding as an adult through their mutual service as directors in the local Rotary Club. Mr. Harding agreed to handle the January 23 night court calendar. When he saw the Suzanne Hyde case file that night, he realized that the confict involved a family member of the judge's, and disclosed to the defendant that he knew Judge Hyde. The defendant waived the confict, and both parties and Ms. Hyde's sister testified. Mr. Harding rendered judgment in Ms. Hyde's favor, but he awarded her less than the full amount of damages she sought.