Juhood: Vol 3 Issue 1

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Letter from the Editors

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cademic discourses regarding the Middle East and North Africa have become stagnant, constrained by a repetitive template that constantly produces similar representations and analyses of the region. This issue of Juhood, Duke University’s Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, hopes to broaden and challenge the imagined geopolitical and academic boundaries of the Middle East and North Africa.

The submissions that we have selected for this issue encapsulate a variety of approaches to the region—some quite unconventional and innovative. They are drawn from religious studies, queer theory, economics, history, and more.

We also aimed to expand the reach and audience of the journal by engaging institutional knowledges and resources beyond Durham. The issue features submissions from three transnational university campuses: Duke University, University of Pennsylvania, and Qatar University as a way of intersecting different academic discourses along with geographical boundaries of knowledge production.

Fernando Revelo La Rotta attempts to construct inclusive futurities for Queer Muslims subjects in the Middle East through an interdisciplinary approach that fragmentally synthesizes queer theory, cultural studies, and Islamic studies. Mario Parks traces the effects of US forces in post-war Iraq through an economic lens, focusing on their establishment of a “free market” capitalist economy and constitutional democracy. Leena El-Sadek explores the power of street art during the Arab Springs in creating a collective consciousness for imagining communities that transgress national boundaries.

Sharifa Saleh Al-Kindi from Qatar University brings a unique approach to Western academic discourse by incorporating feminist theory and religious studies together to analyze the misuse and misconceptualization of the Islamic concept of polygamy by the state of Saudi Arabia. University of Pennsylvania student Ellen Frierson creates a historical analysis of the hydropolitics of the Nile River Valley that delineates the political and alimentative importance of the Nile River to Egypt, Ethiopia, and North and South Sudan.

On behalf of the Editorial Board, we are proud to present you with the third edition of Juhood. We hope that it will queer the way the geographical region of the Middle East and North Africa is understood.

Fernando Revelo La Rotta, Co-Editor-in-Chief Sabrina Rubakovic, Co-Editor-in-Chief

Staff Co-Editors-in-Chief Copy

Advisory

Special Thanks

Cover Photo

Fernando Revelo La Rotta, '13 Sabrina Rubakovic, '13 Claire Coyne, '15 Erin Harrington, '13 Ezgi Ustundag, '16 Jamie Bergstrom, '15 Jonathan Hafferkamp, '14 Leena El-Sadek, '15 Sarah Elsheryie, '15 Sarah Haas, '16 Abdeslam Maghraoui

Associate Professor of the Practice and Director of Undergraduate Studies, Political Science

Bruce Lawrence

Nancy and Jeffrey Marcus Professor Emeritus, Religion

Kelly Jarrett

Associate Director of the Duke Islamic Studies Center and the Duke University Middle East Studies Center

Mbaye Lo

Assistant Professor of the Practice, Asian and Middle Eastern Studies

miriam cooke

Braxton Craven Professor of Arabic and Arab Cultures and Director of the Duke University Middle East Studies Center

The University Publications Board (UPB) John Spencer Bassett Fund Committee Duke Islamic Studies Center (DISC) Duke University Middle Eastern Studies Center (DUMESC) Dome of the Rock, Jerusalem, Palestine-Israel Taken by: Fernando Revelo La Rotta The information provided by our contributors is not independently verified by Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, referred to hereafter as Juhood. The materials presented represent the personal opinions of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Juhood or the Duke University community.

Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs Volume 3, Issue 1, Fall 2012 • Copyright Š 2012

Contents

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QUEER IJTIHAD: Queer Muslim Intersectionality and a Close Reading of Islamic Texts

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DOORS: A Cultural Kaleidoscope

16

BECOMING A CAPITALIST ECONOMY: Post-War Iraq and the Effects of US Forces

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STREET ART: The Unspoken Battleground of the Arab Springs

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POLYGAMY IN SAUDI ARABIA: Justifications, Implications, and Reformation

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"GIFT OF THE NILE": Egypt's Hydropolitical Dominance over the Nile Valley in the Modern Era

Fernando Revelo La Rotta Julijana Englander Mario Parks Leena El-Sadek Sharifa Saleh Al-Kindi Ellen Frierson

Queer Ijtihad: Queer Muslim Intersectionality and a Close Reading of Islamic Texts Fernando Revelo La Rotta

L

ocating itself in the areas and intersections of queer theory, cultural studies, and Islamic studies, this paper engages with Queer Theory’s methodology of a close interpretative reading and exploration of the construction, policing, understanding, and subversion of queer identities and spaces in the context of Islam.

The fabrication of Muslim identities is in constant discourse with the East-West binary that fixates Islam and “Eastern” cultures as static, antiquated, and traditional. Within this binary, Queer Muslims are portrayed as a category that is invisible due to their assumed non-existence. However, queer relationships have existed throughout ArabMuslim histories, but have been understood through different terms and subjectivities.

Queer Muslims are policed and construed as illegal citizens not only in the ArabMuslim world, but also in Western societies. They are seen as terrorists or dangers to the homonational and moral values of both the “East” and the “West.” This paper consists of two parts: the theorizing of Queer Muslims as intersectionality and a Queer Ijtihad (close reading and interpretation) of Islamic texts, the Qur’an and Hadith, with the goal of developing futurities that are inclusive of Queer Muslims.

QUEER AS A TACTIC Throughout this work, I use the “Western” term Queer because it captures the sexual fluidity and difficulty of naming and establishing universal identities, a factor that problematizes the conceptualization of queer sexualities in the “Middle East.”1 I invoke a hybrid meaning of queer in which it represents both its past and current uses as both an umbrella term for LGBT subjects and as a non-category or "the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excess of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone's gender or any one's sexuality aren't made (or can't be made) to signify monolithically."2 As a result, Queer also expounds the expansive geopolitical boundaries, both real and imagined, that give rise to the construction of a “Middle East,” while allowing for the deliberate blurring of these boundaries. As a result, the term queer also allows for the deconstruction of many binaries and dialectics, such as West/East and secular/religious, which bury Queer Muslims into invisibility.

One way that queer allows for this exploration of possibilities and wounds in history is the employment of close reading as a queer tactic. According to Elizabeth Freeman, “reading closely means fixating on that which resists any easy translation into presenttense terms… To close read is to linger, to dally, to take both pleasure in tarrying, and to hold out that these activities can allow us to look both hard and askance at the norm.”3 Employing a close reading in order to conceptualize a Queer Muslim intersectional subjectivity creates the possibility of translating into contemporary terms of a discourse that is grounded on an antiquated and perennial binary of East versus West and modernity versus tradition. Queer Theory, through the queer tactic of close reading, permits an exploration of “the possibilities of resistance through the transgression and subversion of dominant identity discourses.”4 These possibilities are embodied in the intersectionality of Queer Muslims, as their alleged impossibility or invisibility is their power of resistance. Queer Muslims challenge the construction of both categories, queer and Muslim, for they are understood as mutually exclusive. Queer Muslims’ power of resistance lies in their epistemological challenge of universalizing or minoritizing categories, as their intersectionality draws “attention to the ambiguous operations of power as a disciplinary force in the construction of identities,” as well as forces of inclusion and exclusion.5

Queer Ijtihad: Queer Muslim Intersectionality and a Close Reading of Islamic Texts

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1. As Jasbir Puar in Terrorists Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007) simultaneously warns us and encourages us to question. Is it possible to develop queer sexualities in the “Middle East” without colliding with neocolonialist assumptions that are accomplices of US missionary and savior discourse?

2. Sedgwick, Eve. Tendencies.

(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). 8. As a result of this hydridity I try to distinguish between its two meanings through the use of lowercase and upper-case queer. However, due to its refusal of definiton and boundaries, the distinction between both Queer and queer is blurred and convoluted.

3. Freeman, Elizabeth. Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories.

(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). xvi.

4. Rahman, Monin. “Queer as Intersectionality: Theorizing Gay Muslim Identities” Sociology: 44 (2010). 952.

5. Ibid., 952.

As a result of the interdisciplinary location of this work, I engage a multiplicity of theoretical paradigms and textual materials. Along with the tactics that Queer Theory and “close reading” provide, a theorization of Queer Muslims as intersectionality and the queer Ijtihad of Islamic texts require the use of Islamic theology and its tools. As a non-Muslim, I apply the Islamic theological tools and knowledge provided to me by studies, such as my knowledge of the Arabic language—the language of Islam. I attempt to stay true to the proper methodology of the Islamic tradition of Ijtihad and the interpretation of Islamic texts (Qur’an and Hadith), which are spiritual, historical and critical works that influence and inform the lives of millions of people around the world. The interpretation of these texts serves as the basis for Shari’ah or Islamic law in many countries and communities and is culpable for the oppression of queer subjects.

Therefore, a close reading of this archive of Islamic texts also serves as an opportunity, though quite limited, for Islamic scholars to develop a futurity that acknowledges the existence of Queer Muslims.

ASSEMBLING QUEER AND MUSLIM INTERSECTIONALITY

6. Rahman, "Queer as Intersectionality," 948.

The fabrication of Queer Muslim identities is in constant discourse with the isolating and dividing East-West binary that places and develops these two identities as mutually exclusive. This binary discourse assumes the category of gay as Western, and “Muslims as unable to accept gay public equality.”6 As suggested by Freeman, homosexual identity was simply the product of a historical moment in time. But sexual dissidents have also in many ways been produced by or at least emerged in tandem with, a sense of ‘modern’ temporality… thus gay men, lesbians, and other ‘perverts’ have also served as figures for history, for either civilization's decline or sublimely futuristic release from nature, or both.7

7. Freeman, Time Binds, 7.

Homosexual identities have been put to work on behalf of the East-West binary discourse that places the “West” as the site for moral exceptionalism and the East as a locale for moral degradation. The Islamic tradition, a product of the “East” in that it was a form of resistance to colonialist effects and neocolonialism, repulses and rejects any “Western” influence, while the “West” constructs its illusory static identity as an antithesis and moral superior to the “East.”

8. Habib, Samar. Introduction to Islam and Homosexuality. Ed Samar Habib Vol 1. (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010). xxvi.

9. Jama, Afdhere. Illegal Citizens: Queer Lives in the Muslim World.

(Oracle Releasing, 2008). iii.

10. Habib, "Introduction," xlvi..

The rejection of all Western influences in the East has led to the depiction of Muslim homosexuals as an impossibility, thereby banishing them into invisibility. This is aided by discourses such as Ahmedinejad’s infamous denial of homosexual existence in Iran.

In Muslim countries, “anyone not seeking to maintain the status quo is easily alienated as a saboteur, dismissed as an infiltrator or as Westernized, hence inauthentic Muslim.”8 Queer Muslims are considered “illegal citizens,” whose “love and sexuality is not only unrecognizable but also punishable.”9 This is a result of the strong religious opposition to homosexuality based on a limited and insufficient interpretation of Islamic texts.

“Homosexuality [in Islam] is an adulterous act for which Hadd [severe] punishment applies. There is also a consensus that this sin is punishable by death. Scholars only differ in the style of execution.”10 As a result, thousands of Queer Muslims are forced to leave their home countries to avoid political persecution, only to be confronted by the crude reality of the exclusionary processes of the East-West binary that labels them

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Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs

as the eternal illegal citizen and a threat to national values.

In the West, specifically in the United States, to be Muslim is to be “un-American,” especially after the September 11 attacks.11 Muslims have become a threat to the national narrative of the United States, and have been stereotyped as violent and sexually perverse due to a long history of colonialism and Orientalism. As a result, a social narrative of homonationalism or US national homosexuality developed as a strategy during a state of crisis, or an exceptional time. This new categorical construction of exceptionalism portrays the West/US as an “exceptional nation state” that is distinct from the Muslim other.12 Sexual exceptionalism is a product of this new state and it occurs through the “staging of US nationalism via a praxis of sexual othering, one that exceptionalizes the identities of US homosexualities vis-à-vis Orientalist constructions of ‘Muslim Sexuality.’13 Once again, homosexual identities are put to work, but this time to exclude and otherize a population, while exulting a specific type of homosexual subject—one that can be constructed and controlled within the portrayal of the American nationalist narrative. This glorification of a specific racialized and sexualized subject is what Puar, through the support of Rey Chow, names “the ascendancy of whiteness”—a technology of normalization “ensconced in (neo) liberal ideologies of difference” that keeps ethnic subjects in their respective place.14 Through this exceptionalist discourse, Muslim subjects have become racialized and constructed as terrorists, a threat to the “American national values,” and also as a threat to homosexuals, as “Muslim fundamentalists have deliberately and specifically targeted homosexuals.”15 The September 11 attacks alongside this state of exception have “facilitated the consolidation of a new identity that groups together persons who appear ‘Middle Eastern, Arab or Muslim. This consolidation reflects a racialization wherein members of this group are identified as terrorists, and are dis-identified as citizens.”16 The danger these subjects pose is the power of resistance and exposure evident within the Queer Muslim subjectivity, because they disrupt and challenge the hierarchy that sustains the “ascendancy of whiteness.” As a result, Muslim subjects have been linked to sexual deviancy and assimilated into the national narrative as a threat to “American cultural values” of freedom and liberty. They have become illegalized and alienated from the Western narrative of inclusion (citizenship) and from Western human rights.

They are considered sub-human, made subject to governmental policies such as the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011 that strip them of their humanity and violates their integrity.17 The process of US exceptionalism permits the de-humanization of queer and/or Muslim subjects by making them disenfranchised and marginalized through the production of the terrorist identity that excludes them from being legitimate inhabitants of “Westernness” and “Americanness.”

Rather than showing the presence of Queer Muslims in both poles of the East-West binary, Monin Rahman suggests that it is more beneficial to explore the “intersectional social location” Queer Muslims occupy “between political and social cultures.”18 Understanding Queer Muslims as intersectional effectuates the power of resistance that Queer as a close reading tactic provides. It allows for the disarmament of the EastWest binary that binds Islam and the East to tradition and immobility, and challenges the dominant normalizing discourse as well as “the ascendancy of whiteness”—the accomplice of homonationalism and multiculturalism. It disrupts the proliferation of an asymmetrical power relation and hierarchy simply by exposing it and its technologies of exclusion. In addition, it demonstrates that “cultures are plural and overlap rather

Queer Ijtihad: Queer Muslim Intersectionality and a Close Reading of Islamic Texts 9

11. Rahman, "Queer as Intersectionality," 945.

12. Puar, Jasbir. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times.

(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 3.

13. Ibid., 4.

14. Ibid., 26.

15. Ibid., 32.

16. Ibid., 38.

17. For examples, look at the atrocious human rights violations that occurred at thr Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Puar describes the way in which sexuality was used to constitute and develop punishments.

Another example is the abuse of prisoners and defamation of Islam that occurs in Guantanamo.

18. Rahman, "Queer as Intersectionality," 945.

19. Rahman, "Queer as Intersectionality," 948.

20. Ibid., 945.

than being monolithic and mutually exclusive,”19 and illustrates how Queer Muslims inhabit the “nexus of oppression, caught between cultural and political Islamophobia and homophobia.”20 Though it may not be a comfortable location to inhabit, this conceptualization allows for the de-stabilization of the East-West binary that erases Queer Muslims.

QUEER IJTIHAD 21. Hendricks, Muhsin. “Islamic Texts: A Source for Acceptance of Queer Individuals into Mainstream Muslim Society.” The Equal Rights Review 5 (2010): 35.

22. Kugle, Scott Siraj al-Haqq.

Homosexuality in Islam: Critical Reflections on Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Muslims. (Oxford: Oneworld Books, 2010). 42.

23. Hendricks, "Islamic Texts," 35.

24. Habib, "Introduction," xli.

25. Kugle, Homosexuality in Islam, 40-41.

26. Ibid., 40.

27. Music, Rusmir. “Queer Visions of Islam.” (Thesis, New York University, 2003). 7.

28. Ayat or signs also mean verses.

29. Unal, Ali. The Qur’an with Annotated Interpretation in Modern English. (Somerset: Tughra, 2008).

136. This translation of the Qur’an is by Turkish scholar Ali Unal, and it employs a progressive translation and interpretation methodology.

Before a close reading, or Queer Ijtihad, of Islamic texts, it is necessary to discuss the principles and tools of interpretation. During the time of the Prophet Muhammad until the tenth century, the ability of Ijtihad, or the interpretation of these texts, through personal effort was a prized possession “and a key process in achieving a workable society.”21 Ijtihad is derived from the Arabic root J-H-D )‫د‬-‫ه‬-‫ (ج‬, the same root of jihad or to struggle. Thus, Ijtihad is a “struggle to commit all of one’s resources—spiritual, intellectual, literary and political—to understand a matter of faith.”22 This practice has been lost to religious control and political agenda because religious scholars believed that it led to “human error and excess.”23 These scholars, or ‘ulama, declared the doors of Ijtihad to be closed.24 Now the interpretation of texts is reserved for an elite few educated in Islamic theology and extremely proficient in classical Arabic.25 These theological scholars tend to be associated with specific schools of thought, and are dependent on the practice of taqlid—imitation of religious authority without critically re-examining the scriptural basis or the interpretation process.26 As a result of this institutionalization of Islamic interpretation, it is now forbidden for any “common Muslim” to engage in interpretation at all.

Islamic Law is rooted in four sources: “1) the Qur’an, Islam’s sacred text, 2) the Hadith, saying and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad as reported by his contemporaries, 3) qiyas, analogy to similar cases, and 4) ijma or consensus of the Muslim community.”27 None of the latter three can contradict the message of the Qur’an—it is paramount, considered to be the word of God and the basis of the religion. It is composed of 114 surah, or chapters, and is written entirely in Arabic. Its revelation served as a catalyst for the development of the Arabic language, and it is considered to hold the essence of the language. An Arabic sentence structure is extremely ambiguous; as a result sentences can be created in multiple variations, and a sentence can have numerous meanings.

Thus, the inherent ambiguity of the language, coupled with the Quran’s poetic form of expression, liberates the Qur’an to numerous interpretations.

The Qur’an is known for its obscurity of message, hence why it is referred to as the Book of Signs.28 There are two types of verses in the Qur’an: muhkamat (clear) and mutashabihat (ambiguous). The former are defined as “firm and valid; any verses of the Qur’an that are explicit in meaning,” while the latter are the “allegorical, and multifaceted [verses of the Qur’an], which have more than one meaning, containing relative truths.”29 Both types are referred to in the third surah of the Qur’an, al-Imran: It is He Who has sent down on you this Book, in which there are verses explicit in meaning and content and decisive [muhkamat]; these are the core of the Book, other being allegorical [mutashabihat]. Those in whose hearts is swerving pursue what is allegorical in it, seeking (to cause) dissention, and seeking to make it open to arbitrary interpretation, although none knows its interpretation save God.30

30. Ibid., Qur'an 3:7.

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This verse delineates the existence of temporal relative truths within the Qur’an. It creates room for alternative interpretations, but is also wary of them for they might be used to cause dissention. The methodology of Qur’anic interpretation for extremist religious groups is the same as that of progressive interpretations—they both employ a close reading and seek an interpretation suitable to them. The message gathered from the Qur’an is relative to each person, for the Qur’an “does not speak by itself. It needs proper interpreters, and the interpreters are human beings” that are produced by a specific historical context—in this case a seventh century patriarchal society.31 Thus, the manner in which the Qur’an is interpreted reflects the societal context and biases of the interpreter.

The second textual and last source that is used to understand God’s intentions is the Prophet’s Hadith. Similar to the differences in interpretations of the Qur’an, the Hadith “incorporates a spectrum of attitudes and opinions on many specific subjects.”32 Hadith are considered important and reliable tools for understanding the Qur’an and establishing Sharia law by Islamic Schools of Jurisprudence. Hadith were passed down orally for years until they were transcribed during Caliph ‘Umar’s reign to dispel myths and gossip regarding the Prophet Muhammad.33 Similar to the subjectivity that is inherent in the Qur’an’s interpretation, Hadith “represent the triumph of both selectivity and the pen as arbiter of communal Islamic truths.”34 The effects of this problematic nature are discussed in D.A. Spellberg’s Politics, Gender and the Islamic Past, a work that attempts to restore and recuperate the role of ‘Aisha Bint Abi Bakr, the Prophet Muhammad’s youngest wife. Despite ‘Aisha being one of the key sources of Hadith, due to her close relationship with the Prophet, her history has been erased throughout the transmission process of Hadith. Spellberg claims this is due to the fact that “the final stage of written preservation [of Hadith] features only male authorities as compilers.”35 As a result, Western scholars criticize Hadith as “repositories” of unauthentic fictions despite the many safeguards that Muslims have established to weed out forgeries and false chains of transmission.36 Regarding homosexuality, the Qur’an has no direct reference. In fact, there are no words for homosexuality or gender in Qur’anic Arabic.37 The Hadith does contain references to homosexuality, but the different sources tend to have contradicting views or narrations of the same anecdote. Therefore, the Qur’an is the main source of authority regarding this topic, and since it has no explicit mentions, the only tool available is the interpretation of the mutashabihat or ambiguous verses of the Qur’an through Ijtihad, or a close personal reading. The main passage used to condemn homosexuality is the parable of the Prophet Lot and his tribe—the story of the fall of Sodom and Gomorrah.

These two cities were destroyed by God because they consciously transgressed against the bounds of God. “Some classical interpreters who were jurists read into the scriptural text the conclusion that Lot was sent primarily to forbid anal sex between men,” for they believed that male-to-male anal penetration was the principal act of Lot’s Tribe that constituted their infidelity.38 These scholars developed the legal term, liwat, as a shorthand for the “act of the people of Lot” similar to the English term sodomy.39 Therefore, contemporary Islamic Scholars and common Muslims “take for granted that Sodom was punished exclusively for same-gender sex,” and do not critically analyze the interpretation of this parable in alternate manners.40 They fail at translating this social construction and belief into the present-tense. However, a number of scholars have recently begun to produce these alternate interpretations of the Qur’an, such as

Queer Ijtihad: Queer Muslim Intersectionality and a Close Reading of Islamic Texts 11

31. .Kugle, Homosexuality in Islam, 39;The revelation of Islam brought along with it rights to women. It was the first religion in the Middle East to provide women the right to divorce and of inheritance. At the time, Islam was an extremely radical religion that began as a protest against a system of oppression.

32. Music, "Queer Visions of Islam," 9.

33. Spellberg, D.A. Politics, Gender and the Islamic Past: The Legacy of ‘Aisha Bint Abi Bakr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

11.

34. Ibid., 12.

35. Ibid., 11.

36. Ibid., 13.

37. Even in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) there are no words for both of those concepts. For gender MSA uses an arabicization of the English word Gender, and homosexuality is translated as “sexual anomaly."

Homosexuality has also been translated literally as a derivative of sameness such as ‫املثلية‬.

38. Kugle, Homosexuality in Islam, 53.

39. Ibid.

40. Habib, "Introduction," xlvi.

41. Homosexuality is thought to be a Western import into the "Middle East." Joseph Massad argues in his work Desiring Arabs that homosexuality as a construct was brought to the Middle East through NGOs advocating for rights of gay subjects. This group of NGOs and individuals is what he terms the "Gay International." See more at: Massad, Joseph. Desiring Arabs.

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle and Mohsin Kendricks. As a result of the mutually exclusive discourses that bind Queer Muslims and the construct of homosexuality as the “white man’s disease,”41 this envisioning of alternate conceptualizations and understanding of homosexuality is seen as a consequence of the infiltration of Western thought.

42. Music, "Queer Visions of Islam," 18.

The new interpretations of the Qur’an embody the spirit of Queer Ijtihad in that they utilize the tools provided by Islamic tradition to interpret the ambiguous verses of the Qur’an and extract their relative truths. With the re-opening of the Ijtihad door, scholars have been able to resist the normative and orthodox interpretations of the Qur’an and specifically the story of Lot. For example, Amereen Jamal situates the narration of Lot in a textual context of other messengers whose “people rejected their call towards Islam and consequently paid the price, not for same-gender sex, but for their ignorance of God.”42 Andalusian philosopher and jurist Ibn Hazm argues that the reason Sodom and Gomorrah were punished was

43. Kugle, Homosexuality in Islam, 52.

rejecting their Prophet [Lot] and the ethical guidance he brought.

They were rejecting him in a variety of ways, and their sexual assault of guests was only one expression of their inner intention to deny Lot the dignity of being a Prophet and drive him from their cities.43 These are only two of the alternative interpretations and they emerged in the eleventh century, 300 years after the death of the Prophet. They both show that the role of male-to-male anal sex is only marginal and not central to the destruction of Lot’s Tribe.

44. Music, "Queer Visions of Islam," 53.

45. Kugle, Homosexuality in Islam, 53

46. Ibid., 64.

47. Sharma, Parvez, Sandi Simcha Dubowski, Sussan Deyhim, and Richard Horowitz. A Jihad for Love.

(New York, NY: First Run Features, 2007).

There are no references to homosexuality in any of the Qur’anic verses referring to the parable of Lot; the main connection between them occurs through the Hadith, and even then the link is not entirely reliable.44 Most of the interpretations that condemn homosexuality have been established by substituting the word al-fashisha or immorality with male-to-male anal sex. Ibn Hazm points out that “it is impossible that Lot’s tribe was destroyed solely or primarily because of male-to-male sex, because Lot’s wife was also destroyed among with all the women and children of their tribe” for God only punishes those who are guilty and deserving of punishment.45 Most of the subversive scholarship regarding homosexuality is located within the parable of Lot. The story of Lot does not address sexual acts between women. In fact, there are no verses in the Qur’an that clearly and unambiguously address sex acts between women, which is known in contemporary Arabic sources as sihaq or rubbing—a term that is not used by the Qur’an.46 Female sexual perversion is not attentively addressed because sexual intercourse is defined by penile penetration. This privileging of the penis is an indicator of a phallogocentric society—one that is based on a system of binaries privileging the penis. Since lesbianism does not involve the feminization or emasculation of men, it is not seen as a threat to Islamic masculinities. In the documentary A Jihad for Love directed by Parvez Sharma, a lesbian couple research what the Islamic archive states regarding the punishment for Al-Sihaq or Lesbianism, and found that it is clearly forbidden according to these documents (though no sources are cited), but that it is not punishable because it does not include any form of penetration.47 As a result, female Queer Muslims are made invisible in that their sexual practices are not even worthy of punishment.

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CONCLUSIONS: ISLAMIC FUTURITIES, QUEER ISLAM It can be concluded that another face of Islam is possible—one that escapes and deconstructs the binary that binds it. As suggested by Sharma, in the foreword of the first volume of Islam and Homosexuality, we are at the point of Islamic reformation. The ideas proposed by these alternate interpretations or Queer close readings provide an opportunity for the establishment of new Islamic futurities. Queer Muslims have begun to struggle, or perform jihad, through the tools provided to them by the Islamic tradition of Ijtihad. Their struggles are evident through the hardships they face. For example, Mohsin Hendricks, an imam in South Africa, lost everything when he declared himself publicly as gay. On the other hand, his struggle has opened up opportunities for dialogue within the Muslim community in South Africa. He founded The Inner Circle, which is the “longest standing, largest, and most influential human rights organization in the world that deals with Islam, gender and sexual diversity from an Islamic theological perspective.” Due to subjects such as Mohsin Hendricks, the interpretations developed by Kugle and Jamal have proliferated throughout the academic and religious world.

But one question still lingers: will this theological debate for inclusion of Queer Muslims fully engage common Muslim subjects and Islamic scholars around the world, or will it be dismissed as a Western neo-colonialist project? And furthermore, is this inclusion of Queer subjects into the Islamic tradition desirable? The inclusion of Queer Muslim subjects within an institutionalized tradition has a likeness to Puar’s homonationalism—a technology of inclusion with the goal of excluding others. Thus, should Islam be reformed and revisioned, or is Islam inherently flawed? And is it necessary to embrace the tolerant and positives aspects of the tradition and grapple with its heterosexism and sexism? Islam is a product of a very specific cultural context after all. Queer Ijtihad shows us the many alternatives and futurities that can be established through a Queer close reading and interpretation of Islamic texts, but does not direct us to a solution. The full implementation and praxis of these semi-utopian futurities lingers in the etymological definition of the unattainable and distant utopia—no place. This note of pessimism should serves as caution to the blind infatuation with theoretical futurities, while at the same time encourage the full embrace of a complete and self-destructive struggle or Ijtihad for alternative futurities. As suggested by the interpretability of the Islamic textual archive, there is not just one conclusion—there are many.

Queer Ijtihad: Queer Muslim Intersectionality and a Close Reading of Islamic Texts 13

Doors: A Cultural Kaleidoscope Julijana Englander

I

n Alif Baa, the introductory Arabic language book, one of the first words a novice Arabic student learns is door-—al-baab.

Throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and in Morocco particularly, doors are distinguished by their beautiful shape and simplicity. They are a gateway into the homes and private lives of families, and geometric patterns of Moorish and Jewish design evoke a sense of history and time travel. During my summer in Morocco, the beauty and distinctive design of the doors became the subject of many of my pictures. This photo essay is a compilation of doors of different shapes, sizes, designs, and compositions throughout the cities of Fes, Asilah, Chefchaueon, and Meknes.

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Becoming a Capitalist Economy: Post-War Iraq and the Effects of US Forces Mario Parks

C

ontrol of the Iraqi economy has switched hands four times over the past decade. The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 marked the end of a three-decade Ba’athist regime, and was followed by the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority as a transitional government by the United States. The Transitional Administrative Law and the subsequent ratification of a new constitution in late 2005 signified a full shift of power back to the Iraqi people. This paper will examine the practical effects of the combined Iraqi, UN, and US efforts to transform Iraq into a capitalist constitutional democracy that began in 2003. Fostering growth in a post-conflict nation in a transitional stage presents a number of complex issues, and evaluating how and why success is achieved has proven quite difficult.

Reconstruction required the establishment of a free market capitalist economy, a supportive form of government conducive to the success of that economy, and intimate participation by the Iraqi people on all levels. In general, the standards by which the stated mission of the constitution is being accomplished are traditional macroeconomic indicators such as unemployment and gross domestic product (GDP), but there are several additional ad hoc indicators that will be utilized as well (implementation of shared oil revenues, for example). As is the nature of the current economy, a significant amount of attention will be paid to the role of oil, but the expansion of other sectors of the economy like finance and agriculture will also be examined. To what extent has a market-based capitalist system been established? What kind of infrastructures have been instituted to support the newly formed economy? What change has been effected by the constitution? These questions will guide the paper towards a conclusion about the current state of the Iraqi economy, at both the macro and micro levels.

The Iraqi economy reached its peak in 1979 when per capita income reached $7,500 and Iraqis enjoyed benefits such as subsidized healthcare and free education.1 Prior to the war with Iran (1980-1988), there was relatively high participation by women in the economy in a respectable technical capacity. By all account Iraq was a solid middle-income economy.2 However, the Iran-Iraq war marked the tipping point toward increasingly rapid economic decline. Iraq’s subsequent invasion of Kuwait in 1990, motivated by conflict over oil revenues was the nail in the coffin. The invasion and occupation of Kuwait led to direct military intervention by a US-led coalition, as well as condemnation and harsh economic sanctions from the international community, debilitating Iraq’s already declining economy. A UN embargo on Iraq caused oil production to decline from 3.3 million barrels per day (bpd) to only .5, and a significant amount of infrastructure was destroyed during the conflict further exacerbating the problem.3 In the years leading up to the 2003 US invasion, Hussein’s Ba’athist regime decimated the economy. Understanding the economic measures taken by Hussein during his reign is necessary to understand the economic situation inherited by the Iraqi people in 2003, although this information is difficult to glean because economic statistics were treated as veritable state secrets.4 What is clear, however, is that his regime seriously harmed oil fields through mismanagement and overproduction. The regime was corrupt, embezzled funds, and diverted an unreasonably high proportion of GDP (about one third) to the military.5 The economy in 2003 lacked many of the institutional organizations necessary for a free-market capitalist economy, such as an active financial sector with independent banking.

The overthrow of Hussein by the United States in 2003 seemed to be an opportunity to immediately reverse the negative economic trends affecting the nation. The economic sanctions were lifted with UN resolution 1483, and a US-led interim ruling body replaced the long-standing dictatorship. Ideally, “reconstruction is about establishing from the get-go a market-based capitalist economy system, twinned with a political regime that is willing to promote and defend free market capitalism,” so immediate economic reform was necessary

Becoming a Capitalist Economy: Post-War Iraq and the Effects of U.S. Forces 19

1. Sassoon, Joseph. "Economic Policy in Iraq 2003-2009." Post-Saddam Iraq: New Realities, Old Identities, Changing Patterns. (London: Sussex Academic, 2011).

2. Ozlu, Onur. "Iraqi Economic Reconstruction and Development."

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 21 Apr. 2006.

Web. 16.

3. Ibid., 18.

4. Sassoon, "Economic Policy in Iraq 2003-2009."

5. Ibid.

6. Guttal, Shalmali. "The Politics of Post-war/post-Conflict Reconstruction." Society for International Development, 2005.

Web. 48.

7. Sassoon, "Economic Policy in Iraq 2003-2009."

8. Guttal, "The Politics of Post-war/ post-Conflict Reconstruction," 79.

9. Ozlu, "Iraqi Economic Reconstruction and Development," 22.

10. Ibid., 23.

11. Ibid.

12. Khan, Javed Ahmad. Iraq Reconstruction: the Arab's Response to an Imperial Design. (Delhi: Manak Publications, 2008): 10.

13. Whyte, D. "The Crimes of Neo-Liberal Rule in Occupied Iraq." British Journal of Criminology 47.2 (2006) 177-95. 30 Sept. 2006. <http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/ content/47/2/177.full.pdf+html>. .

to effect change.6 The window of opportunity to put a country back on course in terms of economic reconstruction is small, and the Pentagon’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which took over post-hostility operations, failed to seize this opportunity. Infighting between the Pentagon and the State Department meant that none of the planning done before the war was utilized, and there was no institution to fill the gap left by the fleeing Ba’athists.7 The end of hostilities does not automatically mean the beginning of development, and mismanagement during this precarious time can be just as destructive as open warfare. The United States had several contingency plans regarding refugees and oil field repair, but neither of these problems materialized and the United States was ill-prepared to manage the country and its economy.

The Coalition Provisional Authority soon replaced the ORHA, and L. Paul Bremer replaced Jay Garner as the Administrator of the CPA. However, the change in management did not mark a reversal in trends. Bremer almost immediately issued his infamous de-Ba’athification decree, ousting some of the only experts on the Iraqi economy from their management positions. Approximately 500,000 state workers, including soldiers, lost their jobs.8 And, the subsequent creation of a large force of young, armed, and alienated men is attributed to Bremer, who has been blamed for significantly increasing the amount of insurrection forces. The severe lack of competent managers meant that Americans attempted to impose unrealistic goals on the Iraqi economy, and furthermore instituted ill-advised reforms. The CPA reforms were characterized by what is known as “shock therapy,” a postSoviet era type of radical reconstruction of previously socialist economies to free-market capitalist economies.9 The most glaring example is CPA Order 39, which for the first time opened businesses in Iraq to complete foreign ownership. It was an effort to make Iraq attractive to foreign investors, a hallmark of the US’s plan for the country, yet it effectively pushed many small business owners out of competition, debilitating an already struggling middle class. Although the order specifically excludes oil, banking, and insurance from its jurisdiction, the sentiment that the United States was “selling out the Iraqi economy” became prevalent among Iraqis.10 However, several operations stand out as examples of successful implementation--namely the creation of the Iraqi Central Bank and currency reform. The creation of an independent central bank and the education of Iraq’s Finance Ministry advisors by the US Treasury were positive steps toward a market based economy. In addition, the introduction of a new Iraqi dinar showed early signs of success as it appreciated against the US dollar until the summer of 2005.11 Yet the successes were overshadowed by misappropriation of funds. The US Congress appropriated $18.4 billion in October 2003 for the short-term rejuvenation of the Iraqi economy, but disputes over the choice of contractors caused only $333 million to be spent by mid-2004. Furthermore, Iraq’s oil revenues during the time were reportedly directed toward reconstruction projects contracted to US companies, despite the ability of Iraqis to carry out this reconstruction on their own.12 The large amounts of money pouring into US companies and the impressive Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) point to continued corruption in the CPA--records indicate approximately $12 billion in funds with unaccounted sources.13 In general, the goals set by the United States during the CPA period were overzealous, and many macroeconomic indicators detail how the economy contracted during these few years, including a decline in GDP, an increase in prices, and unemployment.

The CPA handed over control of the country to the Iraqi people in June 2004, but the institutions and laws created by the interim government were rife with politicization and partial to US interests. From June 2004 to May 2006, the country was under the rule of

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the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), at the end of which the country adopted the recently-ratified Constitution of Iraq. The general ethos is well-stated in the preamble: “We the people of Iraq who have just risen from our stumble, and who are looking with confidence to the future through a republican, federal, democratic, pluralistic system."14 Yet, despite the powerful rhetoric, the constitution was not the jumping-off point it could have been. There were several opportunities to right the wrongs of the CPA and the TAL, such as the so-called “Bremer laws.” However, rather than repealing the harmful mandates, the new constitution reinforced their implementation. For example, there is a specific article stating that “the Saddamist Ba’ath in Iraq and its symbols, under any name whatsoever, shall be prohibited,” preventing many able political servants from aiding their country.15 Also, the extremely liberal policy of foreign ownership of businesses was codified in the new constitution. Disturbingly, the fact that these obviously harmful interim laws were solidified in the constitution may not be the fault of the Iraqis. It is quite apparent that the constitution desired by the people of Iraq was not the one they ratified, as it was heavily influenced

by US agenda rather than truly restoring power to the Iraqi people.

When comparing the first draft of the constitution to the finalized draft submitted for ratification, the true sentiment of the Iraqi people becomes juxtaposed with the wishes of the exogenous groups to which they were forced to submit. From the first draft of the constitution, it appears the Iraqis first favored a centrally-controlled government, almost an antithesis to federalism, and much more similar to European-style government than that of the United States. The original draft included provisions for welfare systems, such as government guarantees of employment and constitutionally guaranteed-aid to agriculture. According to one report, “69 [percent] of Iraqis from across the country want the constitution to establish ‘a strong central government’ and only 22 [percent] want it to give ‘significant powers to regional governments.’”16 The practice of federalism is US-imposed; disagreements between the regional and the central governments create major limitations to economic progress, especially with respect to oil. While the constitution states that “[t] he federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country,” it does not provide more specific information.17 Oil has always been the backbone of the Iraqi economy, and oil revenues will continue to play a major role in the country’s economic reconstruction and the eventual achievement of its full economic potential. It is the commodity that can provide Iraq with the necessary capital to achieve its economic goals, provided that its extraction and exportation is managed responsibly. Currently, oil industry estimates indicate that Iraq’s proven and probable oil reserves amount to about 116 billion barrels, with a potential additional 100 billion barrels in mostly unexplored western regions.18 Iraq’s proven oil resources are second only to Saudi Arabia, and their economic potential is increased by the extremely low costs of exploring, developing, and producing oil in Iraq. Crude oil accounts for about 90 percent of domestic energy consumption, and exporting oil accounts for 90 percent of government revenue.19 The prospects for oil-revenue sharing are central to Iraq’s economic development, and will continue to finance reconstruction efforts for the foreseeable future. However, the production of oil has only recently begun to reach antebellum levels, in large part due to the increase in the price of oil to compensate for the less production. Before the war, Iraq was producing 2.5 million bpd, compared to 1.96 million in 2009.20 In order to fully realize the potential of its current reserves, as well as the untapped oil

Becoming a Capitalist Economy: Post-War Iraq and the Effects of U.S. Forces 21

14. Iraq. United Nations. United Nations Assistant Mission in Iraq.

Iraqi Constitution. <http://www. uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_ constitution.pdf>.

15. Ibid.

16. Doceena, Herbert. "Iraq's Neoliberal Constitution." Foreign Policy In Focus | International Affairs, Peace, Justice, and Environment. 2 Sept.

2005. <http://www.fpif.org/>.

17. Iraq. Iraqi Constitution.

18. Blanchard, Christopher M. "Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue Sharing, and U.S. Policy."

Congressional Research Service, 3 Nov. 2009.

19.Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Blanchard, "Iraq: Oil and Gas Legilation, Revenue Sharing,and U.S. Policy."

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Hafidh, Hassan. "UPDATE: Iraq Parliament Panel Wants Hydrocarbon Law Ahead Of New Deals - WSJ.com." Business News & Financial News - The Wall Street Journal - Wsj.com. Wall Street Journal, 4 July 2011. <http://online.wsj.com/ article/BT-CO-20110704-704026. html>.

25. Blanchard, "Iraq: Oil and Gas Legilation, Revenue Sharing,and U.S. Policy."

26. Cox, Kevin S. "Planting Peace: Agriculture and Post-war Reconstruction in Iraq." Drake Journal of Agricultural Law, (Des Moines: Drake University Law School, 2005).

27. Sassoon, "Economic Policy in Iraq 2003-2009."

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

reserves in unexplored regions, Iraq needs an influx of technology and investment in the oil sector.21 In 2009, Iraq began auctioning off six known oil fields, but only accepted one bid from a joint venture by British Petroleum plc. and China National Petroleum Corporation.

However, infighting between the central government in Baghdad and the regional governments, particularly that of Kurdistan, has prevented the realization of these contracts.

Kurdistan is drafting its own contracts with foreign companies, but the central government refuses to allow them to export the full amounts without its approval.22 Furthermore, the cabinet in Baghdad cannot approve any contracts made by the central government without finalizing hydrocarbon framework laws, seriously impeding economic expansion. But this has not stopped the central government from signing some thirteen contracts without parliamentary approval.23 Only since 2012 has the parliament’s oil and energy committee taken steps to facilitate the drafting of the framework law, calling for a ban on all further oil contracts until talks are resumed. Disagreement primarily exists about the appropriate roles and authorities of federal and regional bodies, and the extent of foreign participation--these issues have yet to be resolved.24 Revenue sharing is less contentious, as most parties agree to a population-based system. The Ministry of Oil remains optimistic in the face of these obstacles, and has announced plans to double oil production by 2013. However, these projections seem just as unrealistic as the goals set by the United States, and are hampered by the continued use of single-year budgeting over multi-year long-range budgeting that would be more conducive for that goal.25 The overwhelming dependence on oil revenues is troubling, and an effort to boost the agricultural sector to lessen oil dependence is one of the priorities of the administration.

According to Kevin Cox, “revitalizing a war-torn agricultural sector is essential to establishing a landscape in which peace may flourish… [and] the significance of agriculture in postwar reconstruction elevates vis-à-vis that sectors role in the nation antebellum."26 Although the agricultural sector employs the largest segment of the workforce, it generates the smallest percentage of GDP. So while the above discussion of oil shows that the country as a whole has never largely depended on agriculture, many individual Iraqis do. Iraq has about nine million hectares of arable land, of which more than half is used only for seasonal grazing purposes. The arable land, much like the oil fields, was damaged during Hussein’s reign due to mismanagement. Strengthening the financial sector is another approach to decrease the dependence on oil. Iraq’s international financial obligations were largely waived by the Paris Club of creditors (and South Korea), totaling 80 billion dollars.27 Yet one cannot help but wonder what kind of double-edged sword this may be for a country already overwhelmed with foreign influence. The creation of the first independent Iraqi Central Bank was a positive domestic achievement, as was dinar reform, but in reality there was not enough funding (only 30 million dollars). This lack of funds, combined with unrealistic expectations, has made progress unsustainable. Given the importance of banking to Iraqi finance, development of technology, training strategies, operational framework, and support for the banking institutions is imperative for the development of a modern financial sector.

Security problems exacerbate economic problems on all fronts; however, oil, given its central role in the Iraqi economy, has naturally been the target of a majority of the attacks.

From 2003 to 2008, there were 469 attacks on not only oil pipelines and installations, but also on the homes of oil and gas executives.28 Security problems extend beyond outright attacks, and include smuggling, stealing, and black market operations. The root of this criminal economic activity is traceable to a lack of upkeep in oil transportation. Under CPA rule, administrators were proactive in fixing broken valves and pipelines, but failed to repair the meters signifying that oil was in fact being siphoned off, and in what quantity.29 The

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Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs

reason for the administrationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s failure to implement these repairs remains unknown, but the problem persisted under Iraqi government control. One estimate claims that between four and four and a half billion dollars annually in crude oil was smuggled directly from the pipelines, until the government began talks to overhaul metering systems in 2006.30 The attempt to rebuild the Iraqi economy following the war was based on a neoliberal ideology that was applied without a real understanding of the region it was supposed to revive. There was little regard for the consequences of three decades of conflict, internal mismanagement, and external economic sanctions on the country. The degree of difficulty the country faces with regard to overcoming obstacles to economic development is staggering. The country is currently enduring the effects of a damaged infrastructure, the blunders of the CPA, the continued damage from insurrection, and the ongoing tension between the central government and the regional governments. The creation of a new constitution did little to fix these problems, and in fact in exacerbated them. The largest obstacle to economic growth is the ambiguity of the constitution in regard to the boundaries of power of the central and regional governments. The poorly defined relationship between the two has impeded oil exportation, and subsequently prevented the accumulation of an enormous amount of revenue. Furthermore, it increases the tension between the different ethnic groups in Iraq, as regions often have a majority of one major ethnic (Shiites, Sunnis, or Kurds), impacting political representation. In order to achieve cooperation and a sense of a cohesive economic strategy, power must be defined and security must be established.

Only then can a return to repairing civil infrastructure become a priority; paving the way for diversification of the economy and the realization of oilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s full potential.

Becoming a Capitalist Economy: Post-War Iraq and the Effects of U.S. Forces 23

30. Sassoon, "Economic Policy in Iraq 2003-2009."

Street Art: The Unspoken Battle Ground for the Arab Springs Leena El-Sadek

T

he protestors scream, but their voices are merely whispers in comparison to the reverberations of tanks, firearms, and gas bombs the government has released on its people. But these people do not give up easily. The entire world has witnessed this since the first protests of the Arab Spring Revolutions countries across the Middle East and North Africa, which began in 2010 and have extended into the present day. Street art is the voice and battlefield of these long-silenced people, and ink their ammunition.

This form of expression is a new concept to the region; prior to the uprisings, all genres of art were scrutinized and anything expressing dissent was abolished. miriam cooke explains in Dissident Syria that “artists and writers secretly complained that they could scarcely breathe” because of the government’s tight control on the cultural scene.1 In Dissident Syria, playwright Sa’adallah Wannus claims freedom “may look harmless on paper, but it sounds dangerous when articulated in a particular tone of voice."2 To avoid this “danger,” dissidents seek freedom through anonymously created street art. International fame is not a priority for creative dissidents; they have a greater goal in mind.

1. cooke, miriam. Dissident Syria.

(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 20.

2. Ibid., 78.

Street art is used as a form of creative expression to comfort protestors—to remind them freedom is forthcoming. Despite fear of persecution and imprisonment, artists unwaveringly and courageously work to restore hope in their countries. cooke states that “[filmmaker Muhammad Malas] could still hope because he knew he was getting through to viewers.”3 This essay will explore the effects of street art on three significant countries in the Arab Spring: Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria.

3. Ibid., 110.

TUNISIA: COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS OUSTING BEN ALI Known as the birthplace of the Arab Spring, Tunisia was the catalyst of the movement’s domino effect. The street art used in Tunisia is an unusual, but equally powerful form of art that unified a country. Prior to the protests, Tunisian streets were flooded with posters of Ben Ali and his authoritative dictatorship. After the ousting of Ben Ali, Tunisians decided that it was time to remove the daunting images. Many Tunisians joined 2011 TED Prize winner JR, an anonymous Parisian artist known for his graffiti murals. In an episode of the countrywide campaign, Inside Out Project, we travel within the thoughts of many Tunisians post the Ben Ali regime.4 “We are in a country that for more than fifty years we had a single portrait in the street—the portrait of the ruler,” recalled a Tunisian citizen.5 Another Tunisian man helping with the project said that it would “replace the faces [of the streets] with faces of Tunisians. [The Tunisians] are always seeing pictures of president and all the dictators. Now the message is not that anymore. It’s people. It’s Tunisians. It’s us.”6 The project focuses on the streets of Tunisia where Ben Ali was represented the most, such as the Big Ben Ali wall. It replaced all of the old regime’s pictures with portraits of the common people, including every class and age group. A bystander stated that after viewing the portraits, “we can feel life.”7 One teenager felt the pictures generated a collective consciousness among Tunisians. “To see hundreds and thousands of people that aren’t famous. They aren’t stars. They aren’t journalists. They are people like us. True, we don’t have the same face or the same character. Catholics, Muslims, Jews, we are all human beings. It’s not the same face but it’s the same people.”8 The portraits were large, black and white images placed next to each other to show unity.

Street Art: The Unspoken Battleground of the Arab Springs

25

4. “Inside Out Episode 1.” Inside Out Project, 2012 <http://www. youtube.com/watch?feature=player_ embedded&v=_BQIpdJg5Bs>.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. “Collective Consciousness.”

University of Chicago Theories of Media Keywords Glossary Piepmeyer, Anna.

01 May 2012 <http://csmt.uchicago. edu/glossary2004/collectiveconsciou sness.htm>.

10. cooke, Dissident Syria, 78.

11. Galliot, Lorena. “Graffiti Artists Show Their Support for the Tunisian Revolution." France 24: The Observers. June, 2011. <http://observers.france24.com/ content/20110606-graffiti-artistsshow-support-tunisian>.

12. Ibid.

13. Eyeswoon. “Street art by the Zoo Project in Tunisia.” Made in Slant.

2011. <http://www.madeinslant. com/2011/04/street-art-by-the-zooproject-in-tunisia/>.

They did not discriminate against age, religion, or class. A recurrent slogan was also found in the episode of Inside Out Project and in many posters of the Tunisian Revolution: Dégage! Meaning “get out,” this slogan took over the streets of Tunisia, becoming a familiar utterance. The slogans and chants were matched with hand movements that propagated like a wave across a crowd. As one protestor paraded the streets with a “dégage” poster, in a scene of the episode, many joined in with “dégage” chants. Shortly after, the chants were matched with hand gestures motioning for the regime “to leave.” This is analogous to cooke’s description of collective consciousness in a theater. The phenomenon of collective consciousness is defined by French sociologist Emile Durkheim as “the shared beliefs and moral attitudes which operate as a unifying force within society.”9 cooke says that this is achieved by people simply “being together . . . they do not have to do anything . . . they do not have to say anything to anyone to be bonded to those others in that hall who have understood what they understood.”10 This collective consciousness surfaces with the protests as well. Viewers of and contributors to the mural do not have to say or do anything to create a bond. One look at the powerful dégage posters and they are reassured that they are fighting the same battle, unified in their beliefs and the ideas reflected in the image. French journalist Lorena Galliot states that “Tunisian street artists are reclaiming public spaces that were once tightly controlled by police and street services . . . art groups are using their newfound freedom to paint their hopes, fears, political views for everyone to see.”11 An example of a Tunisian art group is Ahl El Kahf, meaning “cave people.”

Elyes Mejri, a member of the group, stated, “we were frustrated by the absence of the ‘underground’ art forms in our country.”12 Working with paint and stencils, Ahl El Kahf ventured to the Tunisian streets to find a well-known building that held political power.

Ahl El Kahf members painted martyrs of the Revolution on the walls of the building, such as the street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi, who set himself on fire after the police publicly humiliated him in December 2010. Although their work is consistently censored, the members of Ahl El Kahf continue to paint and urge Tunisians to keep fighting, reminding their fellow citizens that people have died for their freedom.

In addition to the murals on the Tunisian walls, the Zoo Project was started to honor over two hundred brave people who risked their lives to ensure freedom for Tunisia.

The anonymous artist placed hundreds of figures of life-size martyrs on Tunisian streets.

The black and white figures display solemn looks, and each reveals a unique flaw. From wrinkles to scars, the figures are representative of current Tunisians. This shows Tunisians that the martyrs are among them, and they do not have to look far to find the strength to continue. Situated across the country, the figures “serve as a remembrance of the people’s sacrifice as well as an inspiration for people to stand up for their rights and revolt against tyranny.”13

EGYPT: IMAGINING COMMUNITIES Egypt was the next country to overthrow its regime after the fall of Ben Ali in January 2011. There were two main types of street art that became prevalent in Egypt: graffiti and posters. One of the most well-known graffiti walls in Egypt is “Biker vs. Tanker,” underneath the Cairo's 6 October Bridge. The elaborate mural was painted to depict the oppression of Egyptians. A life-size tank with a soldier peering from above confronted a biker carrying a breadbasket on his head. The Egyptian Arabic word for bread is “aish,”

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Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs

JR, Inside Out Project. 2011. PhotoGraffiti. Tunisia. Source: Michael Cuffe. Flikr. Date Accessed 25 Mar 2012. <www.farm6.staticflickr. com/5310/5633116308_a403c81f74. jpg>.

Zoo Project. 2011. Figurines.

Tunisia. Source: Eyeswoon.

Madeinslate. Date Accessed 25 Mar 2012. <www.madeinslant. com/2011/04/street-art-by-the-zooproject-in-tunisia/>.

Unknown. Portrait of vegetable vendor.

2011. Graffiti. Tunisia. Source: Another Africa observers.france.24.

Date Accessed 1 Apr 2012. <www. anotherafrica.net/art-culture/no-fearthe-rabble-writing-on-the-walls>.

Street Art: The Unspoken Battleground of the Arab Springs

27

14. “Mad Graffiti Weekend: Results.” Blog. Ganzeer. July 2011. < http://ganzeer.blogspot. com/2011_07_01_archive.html>.

15. Abdelmagid, Yakein. “Egypt’s Underground Cultural Scene.” Arab Springs: Revolution and Repression. (lecture given at the Duke’s Asian and Middle Eastern Department, Durham, North Carolina, February 16-18, 2009).

16. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. (New York: Verso, 1991).

17. Khalil, Karima. Messages from Tahrir: Signs from Egypt's Revolution.

(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2011).

18. Famy, Mohamed and Samy Al Togby. Egyptian Freedom Story: 25th of January Revolution: a Photo Documentary. (Cairo: Mediworx.

2011).

19. Jerad, Nabiha. “Words as Weapons: A linguistic revolution Tunisia.” Arab Springs: Revolution and Repression. (lecture given at the Duke’s Asian and Middle Eastern Department, Durham, North Carolina, February 16-18, 2009).

and this translates to “life.” The soldier holds a gun pointed directly at the biker’s head.

A solemn black and white panda, a symbol of sorrow, trails behind the biker. “Biker vs.

Tanker” was painted right before the elections to warn the protestors that the army will turn against the people. After the violent clashes in Tahrir Square, bloody protestors were painted underneath the tank to represent the gruesome deaths of many Egyptians.

Shortly after, several passionate Egyptian protestors were painted near the biker with the statement “ana mowgood,” or “I am here,” above them. Once this mural was recognized throughout Cairo, pro-government supporters painted over it, covering everything except the tank with Egyptian flags. The protestors returned and painted over the damage with a frightening, green Tantawi, the Egyptian army general, eating a female protestor. This bloodless yet powerful battle continued between the protestors and government supporters until the mural was completely distorted.14 Cultural anthropologist Yakein Abdelmagid stresses that this was not the work of a single person.15 Different artists painted the panda, protestors, army general, and the biker and tank, which is apparent in the unique artistic styles in the mural. The collective experience united many Egyptian protestors by creating an imagined community. Coined

by Benedict Anderson, an imagined community is a socially constructed community imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group.16 This imagined community was created by a shared connection inspired by the mural. Although the contributors and viewers of the mural will never meet each other, they are reminded that they are not alone in the fight. As long as the art lives, so will the battle. Like the Tunisian “dégage” posters and chants, this mural highlights cooke’s description of a collective consciousness in a theater.

Karima Khalil’s Messages from Tahrir: Signs from Egypt’s Revolution illustrates graffiti in the form of text rather than images.17 Elaborately written on a weathering, miniature shop is the slogan “We are all Egyptians, wake up.” The colors used in the writing suggest an interesting connection to American liberal ideals. The shop is a faded white and half of the slogan is in blue, while the other half is in red. Reminiscent of America’s freedom colors, this shows Egyptians that they too can achieve sovereignty. Several pictures of martyrs are also painted on walls to honor them and remind protestors that people have died for their freedom. Khaled Saeed, a 28-year old Egyptian man, was beaten to death by Egyptian police for possessing suspicious material. The allegations proved to be incorrect, but the police only served four days in jail before returning to work. As a result of this ill-conceived murder, Saeed’s picture became a mobilizing symbol throughout Egypt, as shown in Mohamed Fahmy and Samy’s Egyptian Freedom Story.18 People who never met Saeed immediately felt close to him and his struggle.

Apart from the graffiti, posters and slogans created during the protests had an equally unifying effect. Weaponless, thousands of protestors carried only these images and the messages used to fight for them. Sociolinguist Nabiha Jerad commented, “This Revolution is all about words and images . . . This is not a Revolution for bread.”19 The concise and clever “words and images” that were mobilized during the Revolution resulted in a countrywide domino effect, showing protestors that they are fighting for more than economic reform. Egyptian Freedom Story shows many slogans that circulated among the Egyptian people. Many of these slogans shared a common message, such as the ousting of Mubarak. A few Mubarak-related slogans are: “my address is Tahrir Square until HE goes,” “Mubaraks, get out of our Egypt,” “the people want to bring YOU down,” “I’m not afraid of dying Mr. President,” and many others. The diversity of the anti-Mubarak

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Mohammed Fahmy. Tank versus Biker. 2011. Graffiti. 6 October Bridge. Facebook. Date Accessed 25 Mar 2012. <https://sphotos-b. xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ash3/3972 63_336362849721479_74874615 1_n.jpg>.

Unknown. 2011. Raise your head high you’re Egyptian. Graffiti. Source: Hannah Cooper. Date Accessed 20 Mar 2012. <http://globalcomment. com/cairos-art-of-resistance-the-streetart-of-the-january-25th-protests/>.

posters depicts how a common message can adopt numerous different forms and interpretations through the creativity of individuals. Thus, when the anti-Mubarak posters gather in a common public place, like Tahrir Square, they unify protestors under their shared ideas.20 In addition to the anti-Mubarak posters, many slogans emphasizing the concepts of freedom and hope circulated around Egypt. Some slogans included: “Egyptian come demand your rights,” “Ahrar (free)”, “I used to be afraid...I became Egyptian,” and “We’re not tired, we’re not tired, freedom isn’t free.”21 The simultaneous uniformity and personal variation of each slogan illustrates how a community as a whole, despite social or personal differences can come together to express their hope for freedom.

These slogans and posters bounced from adults to teenagers, from Muslims to Copts.

Amazingly, Egyptians proved to the army and Mubarak supporters that they could put aside their differences and fight alongside one another for freedom. Many posters showed images of the Islamic star and crescent next to the Coptic cross. In addition, a famous slogan that circulated throughout Egypt was “Muslim + Christian = Egypt.” As these posters proliferated, so did the desire for unity. In the middle of Tahrir Square, several Egyptian Copts circled Egyptian Muslims while they prayed.22 With a history of constant conflict, this act of kindness, sparked by the dissemination of a simple slogan, helped unify an entire country.

In contrast to the protestors’ posters and slogans, the pro-Mubarak slogans contained

Street Art: The Unspoken Battleground of the Arab Springs

29

20. Famy, Egyptian Freedom Story.

21. Ibid.

22. Samir, Khalil. “Egyptian Revolution: Muslims and Christians United.” Asiannews.com. 2011. <http://www.asianews.it/index. php?l=en&dos=144>.

23. Famy, Egyptian Freedom Story.

little creativity. Egyptian Freedom Story contains examples of such slogans, and their imagery was limited to pictures of Mubarak. They were simply replicas of his headshot. In a pool of posters by the protestors, the uninspiring, repetitive government-supported posters were quickly defeated. The original fonts, colors, pictures, and messages flooded the streets while the government’s posters slowly disappeared. In this unspoken battle, it did not take weapons or violence. The message of freedom was triumphant.23

SYRIA: CROSSING NATIONAL BOUNDARIES Syria represents an ongoing battle between the protestors and the government. Inspired by the effect of street art in Tunisia and Egypt, Syrians took to the streets in March 2011 and their struggle is still being waged. Blogger Rima Marrouch says that the Syrian struggle exists beyond the bloody streets.

24. “Rima Marrouch: ‘Graffiti War in Syria.” The Arab World in Revolution(s). Mar 2011. <http:// monde-arabe.arte.tv/en/ rima-marrouch-graffiti-war-in-syria/>.

25. Walt, Vivienne. “Escape from Syria.” Time Magazine. <http:// www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,2108573,00.html>.

“Outside of the violence there’s another war: a graffiti battle to control images and slogans. Walls are the battlefields of influence between anti-government and pro-government supporters. The alleys of Midan in central Damascus–once famous for its restaurants–now are filled with black paint covering anti-regime graffiti.”24 Time Magazine writer Vivienne Walt chronicles the event of a man’s dangerous escape from Syria. Walt notes, “[a] year ago, on March 6, a group of teenagers in the Syrian town of Dara’a scribbled graffiti on a wall: The People Want The Regime to Fall—a verbatim echo of the chant that had recently shaken Tunisia and Egypt and led to the demise of ingrown tyrannies.”25 All 15 teenagers were thrown in jail by the local authority for disputing with the regime. Unfortunately, this was a familiar result of graffiti. With Al-Assad still in power, artists, professional and amateur, remained muffled. However, that did not prevent the message of hope from disseminating.

26. “The Stream: A Syrian graffiti battle that has spread to the U.S.” Al-Jazeera English. Aug. 2011. <http://www.dailymotion.com/ video/xszjux_the-stream-a-syriangraffiti-battle-that-has-spread-to-theu-s_tv#.UKqAgoVQc08>.

Despite Al-Assad’s iron grip on protestors in Syria, the slogans have crossed borders. In an interview with Syrian-American hip-hop artist Omar Offendum about Syrian graffiti, Al Jazeera host Derrick Ashong calls it the “war of the walls.”26 He notices that the Syrian graffiti has spread to the Syrian community in America “where angry pro- and antigovernment messages have been painted on buildings.”27 Ashong states that the Syrian graffiti is “a form of expressing dissent.”

27. Ibid.

In cooke’s Dissident Syria, we see this “dissent” in the ideas of writer Colette al-Khuri.

“Writing is a way of screaming with my fingers. I have always written for everyone, because I want as large a readership as possible.”28 Similarly, we can see why street artists, from Syria to America, create such powerful art. Like al-Khuri, street artists are silenced by the regime, but their work speaks volumes. With every passerby, the message of the painting is reiterated. Soon, the message would propagate through the area, eventually making its way to the media. Offendum adds, “Graffiti has always had an element of resistance…it was in itself a political act … [to reclaim] the space around them.”29 Some recurrent graffiti themes include the message “Free Syria,” which has spread across America and London, despite the threat of hurting those living in Syria. Offendum states that “Internet police” can never restrict slogans from disseminating, indicating that Syrians will eventually witness the shared connection they have with those in America and London.

A transnational imagined community, although rare, crosses borders to unite different spheres of the world. This is similar to the imagined communities found in Egypt and Tunisia. Like the Egyptians and Tunisians, the Syrians will never meet all those protesting

28. cooke, Dissident Syria, 62.

29. "The Stream: A Syrian graffiti battle that has spread to the U.S."

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Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs

against Al-Assad’s regime. However, knowing that hope exists across the world encourages them to become resilient in the face of oppression.

Like al-Khuri, many protestors wrote to express their rage without exhibiting violence.

With the help of the Internet and internal communication, the slogans and posters spread across the country, like in Egypt and Tunisia, and eventually across the world, as with Syria, becoming the face of the protests. The unspoken battle between protestors and government supporters through street art is a remarkable representation of a country’s pursuit of freedom through creativity. The lack of dialogue reveals how an imagined community and collective consciousness can unite a population without physical contact.

In a wordless battle of slogans and posters, the lifeless, pro-government posters are no competition for the inspiring, attractive slogans created by the protestors.

Filmmaker Muhammad Malas states, “Every day I wonder whether it’s worth continuing to make films under such circumstances. Yet I go on because there is always hope.”30 Similarly, the protestors in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria have an ocean of paint with which to tell their stories, each symbol reminding them that they are closer to freedom.

30. cooke, Dissident Syria, 110.

Unknown. 2011. Graffiti. Source: Nicholas Mirzoeff. Date Accessed 25 Mar 2012. <http://www. nicholasmirzoeff.com/O2012/ wp-content/uploads/2012/08/ graffiti-syria.jpeg>.

Unknown. Free Syria. 2011. Graffiti.

London. Flikr. Source: Duncan.

Date Accessed 20 Mar 2012. <http://www.flickr.com/photos/ duncan/6507876499/lightbox/>.

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31

Polygamy in Saudi Arabia: Justifications, Implications, and Reformation Sharifa Saleh Al-Kindi

P

olygamy is defined as the practice of having more than one spouse in a marriage.

It can be broken down into two types—polyandry, when a woman marries more than one man, and polygyny, when a man marries more than one woman. Both types are usually referred to as polygamy. This phenomenon has persisted since the preIslamic era until contemporary times, and is practiced in societies across the globe by both Muslims and non-Muslims. Many Muslims believe that polygamy is encouraged in Islam due to their literal interpretation of a specific Qur'anic verse known as the polygamy verse. Feminists are currently challenging this viewpoint as one that is dependent on social constructions and misinterpertation of the divine Islamic text: the Qur'an. The practice and promotion of polygamy in Saudi Arabia are seen as un-Islamic by the Islamic feminist school of thought, as its justifications are directly in conflict with true Islamic teachings; thus, they argue that polygamy should be restricted or outlawed.

Saudi Arabia promotes polygamy vigorously and it is justified based on two central arguments—there are more females than males in the world, and the need to fight against spinsterhood.1 The latter is considered vital since Saudi Arabia’s extreme “patriarchal guardianship system” requires that a woman be represented by a male member.2 Thus, an unmarried woman is looked upon with shame by her society. Other popular justifications include increasing the Saudi population to have a larger workforce, fighting widowhood, protecting against fornication and sexually transmitted diseases, providing for women economically, satisfying men’s sexual desires, and being able to have children if the current wife is barren.3 Muslim men from various backgrounds collectively argue that polygamy is a God-given male gift because it is part of the Sunnah, which denotes the practices and sayings of Prophet Mohammed. Since Sunnah cannot not be easily challenged, Muslim societies accept polygamy as long as the husband can provide necessities for all of his wives.

Beyond these superficial rationalizations of polygamy, there exist behind-the-scene reasons and justifications. For example, misyar marriages (temporary travel marriages) are encouraged because they bring back Saudi capital that is invested abroad by increasing domestic tourism. These have been legitimized in large part because of a fatwa or legal pronouncement by Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjami following the revolution—he employed Saudi scholars to make the misyar marriages legal in Iran, and Saudi Arabia subsequently followed. Another potential reason is that marrying women in Saudi Arabia disguises the number of unemployed females, since married women are not included in the national unemployment statistics.4 To promote polygamy on a national scale, women were asked to accept polygamy in order to truly accept the religion of Islam.5 These facts show that polygamy in Saudi Arabia occupies its own realm that is detached from Islamic tenets; rather, it is marketed as its own sacred, national commodity. The promotion of polygamy in Saudi Arabia has also driven content monogamous married men to pursue polygamy through polygamous matchmakers in mosques and social networks such as Facebook.6

POLYGAMY AS PART OF THE SUNNAH The most prominent justification of polygamy is its association to the Sunnah, and specifically the way the Prophet Muhammad dealt with his marriages. His first marriage was to a widow and independent merchant, Khadija.7 It was monogamous, and lasted

Polygamy In Saudi Arabia: Justifications, Implications, and Reformation

33

1. Ghassan Ascha, Al-zawaj Wa-altalaq Wa-ta'addummad Al-zawjat fi al-islam : Al-ahkam Al-fiqhiyah wa-Tabrirat Al-kuttab Al-muslimin Al-mua'sirin. (Bayrut: Dar al-Saqi, 2001), 103.; Ajwaad al-Fassi, Hatoon, .‫ مع الزمن‬,”‫ ما املشكلة؟‬،‫“العنوسة زواج أو ال زواج‬ Al-Riyadh. Oct 17 2010, accessed May 25, 2012, <http://www.alriyadh. com/2010/10/10/article566558. html>.

2. Walt, Benjamin J. “Saudi Men Push for More Wives”, The Jerusalem Post. July 13, 2010. Accessed May 25, 2012., <http://www.jpost.com/ MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=18130>.

3. Yamani, Maha A.Z., Polygamy and Law in Contemporary Saudi Arabia.

(Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2008).

50-51.

4. Ibid., 47-50.

5. Ibid., 52.

6. Walt, "Saudi Men Push for More Wives."

7. Aftab-ud Din Ahmad, Maulana.

"The Holy Prophet Muhammad's Marriages [Polygamy]." The Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement for the Propagation of Islam (Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at-e-Islam Lahore).

Accessed April 15, 2012. <http:// aaiil.org/text/acus/islam/ holyprophetmuhammadmarriages polygamywives.shtml>.

8. El-Hadad, Ahmad K. "The Prophet Dealing Justly with his Wives." Rasoul Allah. Accessed April 16, 2012. http://rasoulallah.net/ index.php/en/articles/article/245

9. Shamoun, Sam. "Muhammad's Inconsistency: Prohibiting a Lawful Marriage." Answering Islam. Acessed April 16, 2012. <http://www. answering-islam.org/Muhammad/ Inconsistent/ali_marriage.htm>.

10. al-Fassi, ‫ ما‬،‫“العنوسة زواج أو ال زواج‬ ".‫; املشكلة؟‬The World Factbook, "World Demographics Profile 2012." Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed May 25, 2012.

11. al-Fassi, ‫ ما‬،‫“العنوسة زواج أو ال زواج‬ ".‫املشكلة؟‬

12. Yamani, Polygamy and Law in Contemporary Saudi Arabia, 47.

for 25 years. His society was highly patriarchal, and having many wives was considered a normal practice. However, it wasn’t until the age of fifty that he began to practice polygamy and most of them served political purposes. The Prophet dealt justly with his wives; he visited each one of them every day and divided his nights fairly between them.

During his travels, he would draw straws to choose which wife would accompany him.8 Social and economic justice was valued over mere sexual desire.

Acceptance of polygamy largely rests on ignoring the first part of the Prophet’s marriage history—that is, that he was monogamous for twenty-five years. And while it is noble to strive for justice and equality in marriages by emulating the Prophet, it is unrealistic.

The Prophet was the chosen individual who had an unbelievably high level of taqwa, the criterion that allows God to differentiate between humans. Men in polygamous marriages can simply never be as just as the Prophet and truly follow his Sunnah, because he was much more capable of managing his wives rationally and fairly. It is also important to note that the Prophet sometimes received divine revelation, or a command from God (al-Wahi) to marry a certain woman. In addition, the Prophet himself prohibited Ali ibn Abi Talib, his daughter’s husband, to marry the daughter of Abu Jahl. It is believed that he did not want his daughter to be hurt because of satanic feelings of jealousy. He also found it difficult to imagine that the daughter of the apostle of God and the daughter of the enemy of the apostle could have the same husband. 9 The unique context of the Prophet’s marriages must be considered more carefully—the Prophet empowered women by marrying them. He allowed them to get closer to God by letting them get close to him, since he is the apostle of God. These observations show that before getting into a polygamous marriage, one must critically assess its context, impact on all participants, and overall purpose.

IRRATIONALITY OF THE PUBLIC JUSTIFICATIONS The two central justifications for polygamy in Saudi Arabia are just as irrational as the logic behind the Sunnah justification. First, that there are more women than men in Saudi Arabia and the world. The current census proves that women constitute 49.1%, and there are more men than women on a global level.10 The second reason—fighting spinsterhood—is also weak, as this is essentially a male problem. There are 31,712 unmarried men in Saudi Arabia, but only 23,103 unmarried women.11 Hence, both justifications are based on wrong statistics. Or rather, misleading assumptions.

The publicly-known justifications are also easily undermined. Creating a larger population and subsequently larger workforce, for example, would much more easily be achieved by including women in unemployment figures or allowing them to be more involved in the public sphere.12 Fighting against widowhood is a weak justification too, as men tend to marry young girls, who are usually virgins. If one wants to commit fornication, they can do so even if they are part of an official marriage. It is an individual choice, not part of a marriage contract. Polygamy could actually be conducive to fornication, if a woman feels like a secondary undesired wife.

The justification of providing for women economically suggests that women cannot be independent and must rely on men for financial support. In reality, the current social structure of the world allows for women to both produce and reproduce. Thus, polygamy reinforces a discriminatory attitude towards women, which is bolstered by denial of rights. For example, women in Saudi Arabia cannot work in sales, forcing many to

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Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs

roam around public roads either selling products or asking for donations from strangers. The next justification, based on the issue of infertility, is problematic since this is a natural part of life and many orphaned children exist. Lastly, it is obvious that the sex drive justification of polygamy is controversial, because it views women as objects for the satisfaction of men’s sexual desires.13 This distorts the Prophet’s intentions of a polygamous marriage. The Qur’an itself mentions that both men and female have a sexual desire and God allowed for it in a legal manner for the sake of both procreation and pleasure. Also, the Qur’an encourages modesty and self-restraint for both male and female, without discrimination, since both are the Khalifas (vicegerents) of the Earth.

13. Johnson, Heather. "There are Worse Things than Being Alone: Polygamy in Islam, Past, Present, and Future," Women and the Law. 11:3 (2005). 569-573.

IRRATIONALITY OF THE HIDDEN JUSTIFICATIONS The hidden reasons for polygamous marriages are also directly in conflict with true Islamic teachings. They pervert ideals of chastity and justice, and are representative of a much broader effort to control and repress women. The legitimization of Misyar marriages in Saudi Arabia constitutes fabrication of religious teachings to satisfy political and state needs. Using polygamy for tourism and economic purposes is obviously unIslamic since it uses women as objects, and "marriage" as a temporary contract (rather than eternal according to Islam) to make the country richer. The country should instead focus on fairer options, such as developing human intellect to become more innovative in entrepreneurship, and allowing local women to work and replace the massive amount of foreign workers.

Forbidding married women from being part of the workforce in order to disguise national statistics can be perceived as an act of sadd al-dhara’I’ (prohibiting some of what is allowed for in Islam in order to avoid what is prohibited in Islam i.e. prohibiting what is halal in order to avoid haram). This behavior is directly in conflict with true Islamic teachings because it is mentioned in the Qur’an that us humans should not forbid what God permitted for us, and should not allow what is forbidden.14 Sadd al-dhara’I’ is generally used on women (i.e. prohibition from driving), and is clearly oppressive in nature. Women should be allowed to work, but are instead subject to male laws and control that exclude them from the public sphere. The resulting gender hierarchy can be perceived as a route to shirk polytheism, since both men and women are in the same level and have the same capacity, and only God is above them.

14. Qur'an 5:87

NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF POLYGAMY The impact of polygamy, as well as its justifications, is drastically opposed to the moral teachings of Islam. It is stated that most children suffer economically unless the polygamous family is wealthy, and regardless most children also suffer emotionally. Violence usually spreads within the family, often leading to physical fights. Resulting feelings of hatred and loneliness cause many of them to neglect their studies and work in order to be independent from the family.15 Children belonging to a polygamous family usually do not perform as well in school.16 All of these factors contribute to the chance of divorce, but are not always resolved even after the divorce.

My grandmother is a victim of such bitter truth. Now 72 years old, she was beaten severely by my grandfather’s second wife (and the wife’s children). A case was opened after she was hospitalized, which ultimately led to her divorce. Jealousy and unfair

Polygamy In Saudi Arabia: Justifications, Implications, and Reformation

35

15. Numila. Nina. Woman, Islam, and Everyday Life: Renegotiating Polygamy in Indonesia. (New York: Routledge, 2009). 138-140.

16. Mobaraki. A.E.H.. "Gender Inequity in Saudi Arabia and its Role in Public Health." Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal. 16:1 (2010).

17. Rukhaya M.K. "The Diary of a Woman in a Polygamous Relationship." Yahoo Voices. October 21, 210. Accessed April 17, 2012

treatment are inherent in polygamous marriages due to our imperfect nature, fostering an environment of bitterness and depression that is passed on to the children. This can exacerbate the development of a non-participatory society, which is not encouraged in Islam. In her diary, Rukhaya describes the first wife in a polygamous marriage as a “handicapped individual”, both “spiritually and physically.”17 Divorcees also go through psychological bitterness due to feelings of being unwanted and uncared for, and easily replaced. Islam encourages eternal marriages that continue with love and mercy, elements built on peace rather than violence. Hence, the implications of polygamy prove that it is not desirable, especially in regard to Islamic values.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE POLYGAMY VERSE “And if you fear that you will not deal justly with the orphan girls, then marry those that please you of [other] women, two or three or four. But if you fear that you will not be just, then [marry only] one or those your right hand possesses. That is more suitable that you may not incline [to injustice]."18

Qur'an, Surah 4, Ayah 3

18. Qur'an 4:3.

19. Warren, Charles. "Polygyny."

Oxford Islamic Studies Dictionary.

20. Ibid.

21. Qur'an 4:129; 33:4.

22. Ali, Abdullah Y. The Holy Quran: Text, Transalation and Commentary. (Delhi: Goodwork Books, 2008). 826.

In order to understand how the current practices of polygamy in Saudi Arabia refute Islamic beliefs, one must understand the interpretation of the famous polygamy verse (Surah 4 Al-Nisa, Ayah 3)—the root of all justifications for polygamy. The Oxford Islamic Studies Dictionary illustrates the context of how the polygamy verse in the Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad to improve the current conditions of women in the seventh century.19 At that time they had no legal rights and could not own or inherit property. The revelation was situated against a context of many previous revelations restricting past unlimited polygamy, incestuous marriages, and slavery of women.

It was meant to comparatively empower them, by giving them the right to inherit and own property, and become equal partners of a marriage rather than subjects of a marriage contract. In addition, this verse was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad just after the death of many men in the Battle of Uhud, leaving behind many widows and orphans that needed to be part of a ‘complete’ family if they were to survive the economic and political struggles of the patriarchal society of the time.20 The general trend was that women were not viewed as full human beings in the society, and, in order to have some of their legal rights, they needed a male guardian that could support them. Polygamy was used as a symbol that society is based on the family, not the tribe. Ultimately, the verse must be interpreted with regard to its broader meaning— it cannot be taken at face value, but is rather as a product of its unique historical and political context. The verse at heart means justice and increased rights for women; this is the message that should be garnered from it. Applying it indiscriminately to satisfy political, economic, and cultural needs and desires, is wrong and a form of manipulation. Some Qur'anic verses are explicitly against polygamy: “and you will never be able to be equal [in feeling] between wives, even if you strive to do so," and “Allah has not made for any man two hearts in his one body.”21 This means that no man can simultaneously love more than one woman equally. He can only be just in a financial manner, proving that monogamy is the ideal form of marriage in Islam, while polygamy was reserved for very special and specific circumstances.22 Early and modern exegesis on this verse by Ibn Katheer and Sayyid Qutb arrive at very similar understanding polygamy as the current state of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Katheer

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Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs

claims that other than marrying orphans this verse allows a man to marry as many women as they like.23 His interpretation is a direct translation of the verse and offers no further explanation and completely ignores its context. On the other hand, Qutb claims that polygamy is allowed in Islam as a solution to societal problems; similar to the justifications used by Saudi Arabia.24 For example, he mentions that polygamy is used to solve the problem of spinsterhood with women.25 These interpretations are originally patriarchal, as these scholars did not live at the time of the Prophet. They do not offer a new perspective on solving such societal problems, even though the problem of spinsterhood is in reality a male problem in Saudi Arabia.

23. Ibn Kathir, Alama Imad ud Din. Tafsir Ibn Katheer: Quran Tafsir.

(Riyadh: Dar as-Salaam, 1999). 24-4.

24. Qutb, Sayyid. Sayyid Qutb: In the Shade of the Qur'an. (The Islamic Foundation, 2003). 25-26.

25. Ibid. 27-28.

CONCLUSION: POLYGAMY AND REFORMATION The act of polygamy is not prohibited or commanded by the Shari’a, and hence it is open for interpretation. People can claim that polygamy can only be practiced with the condition of just treatment of the multiple spouses, but since justice can never be achieved, there should be a law that bans polygamy.26 Nadine Bedair suggests that polygamy should only be legal if both men and women are allowed to have multiple spouses.27 Many women’s rights activists are trying to influence the United Nations to outlaw the practice of polygamy.28 The United Nations can create a treaty that bans polygamy with only a few exceptions, such as cases that include the consent of the first wife, and then monitor states on their progressive implementation of this law.

However, nations would naturally be very resistant to such a measure.

Perhaps as a start to reformation women scholars can challenge the interpretation of the polygamy verse and provide a new interpretation that restricts it or even bans it, since Islamic Jurisprudence (fiqh) is a social construct. These women can focus on the second clause of the famous polygamy verse: “but if you fear that you will not be just, then [marry only] one or those your right hand possesss.”29 This commonly ignored clause can challenge the patriarchal interpretation of polygamy as a God-given male gift or right. It instead show that polygamy is an exceptional responsibility, which can occur under very limited circumstances since no human can be just.30 Therefore, monogamy is the ideal form of marriage in Islam. God, through the Qur'an, is in fact helping men by declaring that a monogamous marriage is what one should seek for, because such a marriage does not require a man to overwork himself trying to be just.In order to encourage reinterpretations, one must remember that polygamy is not part of a divine law, but a human construct rooted in the interpretation of divine texts(the Qur’an).

Reinterpretations should focus on this human aspect, analyzing Islamic, constitutional, and human rights through the lens of the current context.31 In ending this paper, two areas call for extensive research.32 The first area is comprehensive position of the Qur’an with regard to polygamy. As a result, Muslim interpreters can find an alternative interpretation that deals with polygamy in ethical and modern literature. The second area involves examining the nature of this interpretation process and its influence on social justice and legal determinations. The results of this research will encourage reformation, especially when the hidden justifications and assumptions behind polygamy in Saudi Arabia, which influence Islamic doctrines are revealed. Once this is achieved, one can construct a consciousness that discourages the "easy come easy go" multi-marriages justified by the concept of polygamy as is done in Saudi Arabia.

Polygamy In Saudi Arabia: Justifications, Implications, and Reformation

37

26. Sa'id, Mansurizade. "The Muslim Woman: Polygamy can be Prohibited in Islam." Oxford Islamic Studies Online. (2010).

27. Sandels, Alexandra. "Saudi Arabia : 'Polygamy for Women' Article Sparks Public Row in Egypt, Muslim World." Los Angeles Times.

January 5, 2010. Accessed April 16, 2010.

28. Zeitzen, Miriam Koktvedgaard.

Polygamy: A Cross-Cultural Analysis.

(New York: Berg, 2008). 181-183.

29. Qur'an 4:3.

30. Qur'an 4:129.

31. Anwar, Zainah. "Muslim Women Speak: The Experience of Sisters in Islam of Malaysia." Qatar University.

May 30, 2012.

32. Souaiaia, Ahmed E. Contesting Justice: Women, Islam, Law and Society.

(New York: State University of New York, 2008). 56-57.

â&#x20AC;&#x153;Gift of the Nile":

Egypt's Hydropolitical Dominance over the Nile Valley in the Modern Era Ellen Frierson

T

he ancient Greek historian Herodotus once said, “Egypt is the gift of the Nile.”1 He could not have been more accurate in this simple statement: all of Egypt’s water consumption—for irrigation, hydroelectricity, and daily human use—has and still derives from the Nile River. 86 percent of Egypt’s land is considered to be very arid, and the other 14 percent is considered arid. The only exceptions to this trend are areas in the Nile Valley and on the Mediterranean coast—thus, 96 percent of the population is compelled to “live astride the Nile River, upon which the entire life of Egypt depends.”2 What Herodotus failed to mention in this statement is that Egypt is not the only nation that depends on the Nile for sustenance. Ten African countries depend on the Nile or its tributaries as an important water source, but Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia are most dependent on the Nile for their agricultural success.3 In the modern era, Egypt has been forced to reexamine its relations with these nations as well as its reliance on the Nile, and to craft its hydropolitical agenda accordingly. Egypt’s focus on hydropolitics and its commitment to total authority over this regional arena reflects the nation’s greater attitude of superiority over the other nations of Northeast Africa.

1. Kendie, Daniel. “Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of the Blue Nile River.” Northeast African Studies, vol.

6, no. 1-2. (1999) (New Series): 141.

2. Ibid., 142.

3. Swain, Ashok. “The Nile River Basin Initiative: Too Many Cooks, Too Little Broth.” SAIS Review 22 (2002): 298.

DOMESTIC CONCERNS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Before the Nile reaches Egypt, it is divided into two branches: the Blue Nile River originates from Lake Tana in Ethiopia, while the White Nile stems from Lake Victoria in Uganda.4 The two rivers merge in Khartoum, after which the Nile flows into Egypt.

Although the Blue Nile is the shorter of the two branches of the river (only 1,529 kilometers long, compared to the 5,584 kilometer-long White Nile), it is estimated that 86 percent of Egypt’s water originates directly from it. In the flood season, this percentage can increase to as much as 95 percent.5 Egypt has asserted that its primary concerns are about water quality and quantity, which Egyptians point out is threatened by the fact that Egypt is the most downstream and that “those downstream get what is left after everyone else extracts what they want.”6 Egypt has other good reasons to seek control over the Nile and to worry about its population’s access to water. The nation’s population is growing at an alarming rate—increasing by almost three percent annually (equal to about one million more people per year). This increasing population not only puts stress on the water resources of Egypt, but on its food sources as well.7 Egypt’s interest in controlling the Nile is not purely based on economics—it is also a matter of national security. Egypt must be conscientious in pursuing water-sharing agreements with other nations; any one of the upstream Nilotic countries could shut off Egypt’s water supply at any time. In the past, Egypt has implemented its policies through threats. As late as the 1970s, former president Anwar Sadat warned that “any action that would endanger the waters of the Blue Nile will be faced with a firm reaction on the part of Egypt, even if that action should lead to war.”8 Clearly Egypt has never been afraid to demonstrate the power of its military to maintain its jurisdiction over the Nile.

One of the countries that Egypt is primarily concerned with is Ethiopia. Before the 1960s, Egypt did not pursue any formal legislation with Ethiopia to regulate the sharing of the Nile’s waters. Thus, in the past, Egypt placed itself in a “position either to dominate Ethiopia, or to neutralize whatever unfriendly regime might emerge there.”9 It has been suggested that water struggles between the two nations could stem from other underlying differences, including religion. Ethiopia has a vested interest in the

"Gift of the Nile:" Egypt's Hydropolitical Dominance over the Nile Valley in the Modern Era 39

4. Kendie, “Egypt and the HydroPolitics of the Blue Nile River,” 141.

5. Ibid., 142.

6. Hefny, Magdy and Amer, Salah El-Din. “Egypt and the Nile Basin.”

Aquatic Sciences 67 (2005): 42.

7. Kendie,“Egypt and the HydroPolitics of the Blue Nile River,” 144.

8. Ibid., 141.

9. Ibid.

10. Kendie, "Egypt and the HydroPolitics of the Blue Nile River,” 145.

11. Ibid., 146.

12. Swain, “The Nile River Basin Initiative,” 298.

13. Collins, Robert O. The Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and the Jonglei Canal, 1900-1988. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 273.

protection of the Coptic Christian minority within Egypt. This conflict had specifically been addressed in the Middle Ages; in the 14th century, the Mamluk Sultan al-Nasir initiated a crusade of persecution against the Coptic Christians by the Muslim majority. The Ethiopian king Zion threatened to divert the Nile River away from Egypt and thereby starve the nation unless the persecution ceased.10 It was an effective threat, solidifying Ethiopia’s hand in influencing Egypt via the Nile. In the nineteenth century, Khedive Ismail of Egypt attempted to take over Ethiopia, partially to gain control over a larger part of the Nilotic system. Once again, the Ethiopians repelled the Egyptians.11 These relations were once more strained when Egypt helped prevent the African Development Bank from giving loans to Ethiopia for hydrological development in the early 1990s, and as a result relations between the two nations fell into utter disrepair.12 Egypt has also faced concerns about water sharing with regards to Sudan. Robert O. Collins characterizes the relationship between these two nations as a constant cycle of “polemical bickering which…made nonsense of their protestations of eternal brotherhood.”13 Egypt had always considered Sudan to be an inferior region, almost a colony of Egypt. This ideology was reinforced with the arrival of the British. Egypt and Sudan were lumped together under British domination, and eventually a combined AngloEgyptian government administered Sudan. The social differences between Sudan and Egypt are not similar to the differences between Egypt and Ethiopia; there are many Arabic-speaking Muslims in North Sudan and this group has typically taken charge of the nation’s government, somewhat easing negotiations between the Egyptians and the Sudanese. Yet, after the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war, Egyptian interests in Sudan took a back seat as the government tried to cope with this widespread domestic dissent.

However, Sudan remains to be the one country with which Egypt has had meaningful water-sharing discussions.

THE FIRST AGREEMENTS 14. Carroll, Christina M. “Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin.” Geological International Environmental Legal Review (19992000): 269.

15. Ibid., 277.

16. Ibid., 276.

Before European colonization in Africa, there were no formal agreements in place to limit the amount of water each nation could derive from the Nile. In 1891, the governments of Great Britain and Italy agreed upon specific spheres of influence for each nation in East Africa, with Italy promising “not to construct…any irrigation of other works which might effectively modify its flow into the Nile.” In 1902, the two European powers, along with Ethiopia, delineated a set of treaties defining the borders between Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. This forced Ethiopia to forfeit rights to begin any hydrological projects without British approval.14 In 1925, Italy recognized the “prior hydraulic rights” of both Egypt and Sudan, thereby agreeing not to impede the flow of the river to those nations’ detriment.15 By 1929, Britain and Egypt had begun the infamous “Exchange of Notes Regarding the Use of the Waters of the Nile for Irrigation,” in which Egypt asserted its “natural and historical rights in the waters of the Nile.”16 Although this agreement added concessions to allow for increased water for development in the Sudan, it required screening of Sudanese projects with the Egyptian government before construction could commence, and granted Egypt primary authority over hydrological studies of the Nile. This single statement clearly communicated Egypt’s impression of itself as the single most important Nilotic nation in Africa. In fact, Egypt was uncertain of the permanence of

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this agreement, as the political sovereignty of Sudan had not yet been guaranteed, thus, suggesting a potential reabsorption of the Sudan as an Egyptian colony.17 The provisions established in the 1929 exchange of notes remained valid throughout the 20th century. From 1949 to 1953, Egypt convinced Britain to allow Egyptian engineers to monitor the completion of the Owen Falls Dam in Uganda. An Egyptian engineer was permitted to supervise the amount of water flowing out of the dam in order to maintain adequate water flow to Egypt.18 Once more, African nations began to gain independence in the 1950s and 1960s; however, the validity of such colonial agreements was challenged. The Tanzanian government created the Nyerere Doctrine, which invalidated British colonial agreements after former colonies became independent, and Uganda and Kenya decided to support this policy.19 Sudan invalidated the 1929 agreement, stating that “economic and technical development since 1929 had rendered these provisions obsolescent.”20 Ethiopia had its own qualms about the colonial water agreements, and refused to recognize them due to the fact that they were unnecessarily binding and did not assist Ethiopia’s development in any way. Egypt, however, was reluctant to forfeit its rights under the 1929 agreement, and thus ruled it valid “pending further agreement.”21

17. Carroll, "Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin," 277.

18. Ibid., 278.

19. Ibid., 279.

20. Ibid., 280.

21. Ibid., 279.

1959 AGREEMENT AND THE ASWAN HIGH DAM Although Sudan had denounced the 1929 agreement after its independence, it referenced this agreement when Sudan and Egypt developed the Agreement on the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters in 1959.22 This legislation clearly split the waters of the Nile between Sudan and Egypt, although not at all evenly. Sudan gained rights to four billion cubic meters of water for every 48 billion granted to Egypt. After the completion of the Aswan High Dam (AHD), Sudan would receive 18.5 billion cubic meters to every 55.5 billion that Egypt would receive.23 Through this agreement, Sudan would also receive reparations for any flooding caused by the building of the AHD, although much negotiation took place before a final sum of 15 million British pounds was agreed to by Sudan and granted by Egyptian President Gamal abd al-Nasser.24 Sudan also gained Egypt’s cooperation in “preventing losses of Nile Basin waters from Sudanese swamps,” and in “presenting a unified view in any other negotiations concerning the Nile waters.”25 However, the Sudanese ultimately agreed to a raw deal in comparison to their Egyptian neighbors: the funds that Egypt had allotted for Nubian relocation due to flooding was not enough to pay for the damages caused by the ensuing bloody revolts of the Nubian minority, thus straining the Sudanese treasury.26 Additionally, Egypt received more than twice the amount of water as Sudan, even though Sudan’s population is swelling rapidly both in the North and the South, especially, as predicted, since the end of the civil war in 2005.27 However, the 1959 agreement did provide mutual benefits for both nations. Sudan received World Bank financial aid to build the Roseires Dam, which ultimately increased irrigation in the Gezira region, and also provided hydroelectricity to Sudan’s major cities, including Khartoum. Egypt was granted the Aswan High Dam (AHD), which is not only Egypt’s largest reservoir, but is also key for Egypt’s hydroelectric success—taken alone, the AHD provides 22 percent of the nation’s electricity.28 Most importantly, it “[freed] Egypt from being the hostage of upstream riparian states by providing for century storage within the boundaries of Egypt.”29

"Gift of the Nile:" Egypt's Hydropolitical Dominance over the Nile Valley in the Modern Era 41

22. Ibid., 280.

23. Collins, The Waters of the Nile, 272.

24. Ibid.

25. Carroll, “Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin,” 280.

26. Collins, The Waters of the Nile, 273.

27. Carroll, "Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin," 282.

28. Kendie, "Egypt and the HydroPolitics of the Blue Nile River," 144.

29. Collins, The Waters of the Nile, 249.

POST-1959 NEGOTIATIONS AND THE JONGLEI CANAL

30. Eshman, Robert O. "The Jonglei Canal: A Ditch Too Big?."

Environment (1983): 20.

31. Carroll, "Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin," 281.

32. Eshman, "The Jonglei Canal," 16; Swain, "The Nile River Basin Initiative," 297.

33. Howell, P.P. "The Impact of the Jonglei Canal." The Geographical Journal 149 (1983): 299.

34. Ibid., 292.

35. Swain, "The Nile River Basin Initiative," 297.

36. Eshman, "The Jonglei Canal," 18.

37. Collins, The Waters of the Nile, 376.

38.Eshman, "The Jonglei Canal," 18.

39. Ibid., 20.

40. Sugiyama, Tadashi. “Opinion divided in South Sudan over plan for world’s largest canal.” The Adahi Shimbun. 28 October 2012. Accessed 13 November 2012. <http://ajw. asahi.com/article/globe/feature/ nile/AJ201210280033>.

An old Sudanese saying states, “all the Egyptians want from Sudan is water and doormen,” which seems to accurately reflect Egyptian-Sudanese relations in the 20th century.30 Since the completion of the AHD, Sudan has supported Egypt in international relations to maintain their mutual hydropolitical goals. After cooperation between Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and the United Nations to commission a hydrological survey of three East African Lakes in 1967, Sudan supported Egypt in its attempt to bring these nations together once again to create a Nile Basin Commission.

This proposition was rejected by the other three nations, who refused to collaborate on anything other than Nile data gathering. In 1983, Egypt was successful in forming the Undugu Group with Sudan, the Central African Republic, and other White Nile states in order to trade economic development information; yet, once again, no progress was made on water issues and Egypt did not gain an enormous hydropolitical advantage over these states.31 The largest project on which Egypt and Sudan cooperated was the Jonglei Canal project that commenced in 1975. The original plans aimed to reduce the amount of annual evaporation from the Sudd wetlands by constructing a canal 276 miles long, with an average depth of 13 feet.32 From the outset, Egypt and Sudan planned to evenly share the $300 million cost of the canal, as it would reduce the inhibitory effect of the Sudd swamp on the Nile’s flow, thereby increasing available water supplies to both nations for agricultural projects. The canal would also provide a navigable waterway that could improve communication, transportation, trade, and education in South Sudan in the long run.33 Although it would “be a barrier to east-west movement of people and livestock,” Egypt and Sudan planned to build bridges and purchase motorized ferries to overcome these difficulties.34 Critics of the project have pointed out that it seemed to unfairly benefit Egypt and the northern part of Sudan, and would force undue harm on South Sudan.35 The draining of the Sudd would ruin the cultural life of pastoralist South Sudanese tribes, who have traveled to the swamp for centuries to graze their cattle.36 Collins also mentions the reduction of fish in the Sudd swamp, which would have adverse effects on the diet of the South Sudanese population.37 Many critics argue that the many adverse effects on the South Sudanese (a mostly Christian and non-Arab population) outweigh the agricultural benefits that Egypt would gain from this project—including an allotment of half of the water that flows through the canal.38 Ecologists also are concerned because the Sudd, while an obstacle to the Nile’s flow, is also a filter by which salts and soils are stored and released, maintaining the ecological balance necessary for agriculture.39 Sudan continued to work with Egypt on hydrological projects up until 1983, when civil war broke out in South Sudan. Since South Sudan's independence in 2011, there have been increased calls to resume construction of the canal. Many recognize that the canal could have positive impacts on transportation and trade in South Sudan.40 However, the South Sudanese government is approaching the problem with prudence, recognizing that downstream countries—including Egypt—would be the primary agricultural beneficiaries of the canal.41

41. Ibid.

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Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs

CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR EQUALITY In 1997, the United Nations General Assembly approved the Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, laying out guidelines by which member nations are encouraged to align with their neighbors on any future and existing water-sharing agreements.42 Its goal was to give representation to every nation sharing any water source with other nations when negotiating regional agreements. Despite these efforts, the Convention has had trouble gaining traction in Nilotic countries for several reasons. Firstly, the Convention will not change the norms established by earlier agreements (including the 1959 agreement) unless all Nilotic parties agree to develop entirely new legislation in accordance with the Convention.43 Secondly, Kenya and Sudan were the only East African nations to support the convention, with all other states abstaining from the vote (or in the case of Burundi, voting against it).

Ethiopia, disagreeing with multiple provisions, pointed out the most problems with the Convention, including those dealing with “obligation not to cause significant harm,” “equitable utilization,” and “notification concerning planned measures.”44 Another major obstacle is the difference in interpretation of “equitable” division of Nile waters, especially between Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt has emphasized that the availability of other water sources should be considered when determining equity, which was partially absorbed into the language of the Convention. This is an understandable concern for Egypt, as the Nile is the single source of fresh water for the entire nation. However, Egypt must consider that both Ethiopia and Sudan are in similarly difficult states: the Blue Nile is the only major source of fresh water in Ethiopia, while in Sudan (despite the intersection of the two rivers in Khartoum), evaporation rates are extremely high, and freshwater sources are located completely on the eastern edge of the country. Asserting that Egypt is the only nation fully dependent on the Nile for freshwater is simply false. Egypt has also claimed its increased rights to the Nile based on “existing or potential use”—in short, its historical use of the Nile as a source of irrigation.45 While this fact is undisputed, history alone cannot justify Egypt’s monopolization of the Nile, especially as desperation for water increases throughout Africa in concert with recent population increases. If history is to be taken into account, then Egypt’s manipulation of Sudan and exclusion of Ethiopia in forming the 1959 agreements must be considered, and thereafter discredited.

Ethiopia has different standards for determining equality. On one hand, the Ethiopian piece of the Blue Nile constitutes over 80 percent of the flow of the Nile.46 Additionally, Ethiopia, along with all of the other Nile states, has a much lower GDP than Egypt; reducing the amount of water granted to these countries based on historical rights will force these countries only deeper into poverty.

There are other weaknesses within the Convention and its interpretation. The concept of causing “harm” to downstream nations is not clearly explained, and is not related in any terms to the concept of “equitable use.” There are even miscommunications on these points: Ethiopia has stated that the “no harm” principle should only be invoked when a state has surpassed its allotment of water, while Egypt holds that each country has control over the part of the river that runs through its territory, and that “harm” will be caused by any object impeding the river’s flow.47 Egypt has taken advantage of the disorganization of its Nilotic neighbors and has maintained its grip over the Nile.48 Most of these countries lack mechanisms by which to gather and analyze data about the Nile, and lack a single government entity that is responsible for legislation pertaining to

"Gift of the Nile:" Egypt's Hydropolitical Dominance over the Nile Valley in the Modern Era 43

42. Carroll, "Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin," 283.

43. Ibid., 286.

44. Ibid., 287.

45. Ibid., 288.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., 290.

48. Ibid., 292.

49. Carroll, "Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin," 290.

50. Ibid., 292.

51. Carroll, "Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin," 301.

52. Ibid., 303.

the river.49 Egypt has also maintained its threat of military force and economic domination to prevent these nations from asserting their full rights to the Nile.50 Legal scholar Christina Carroll has suggested a potential method to equalize the watersharing agreements between Egypt and the other riparian states. Her plan relies considerably on the participation of the World Bank as a neutral party in negotiations, and the assumption that all Nile states will agree to discuss and commit to new legislation.

She asserts that the three areas that these nations must focus on to arrive at a comprehensive agreement are data collection and analysis, water storage, and environmental maintenance. However, there are major flaws in Carroll’s argument. Her heavy emphasis on the importance of the World Bank as a neutral facilitating party is potentially problematic—if any bias can be perceived in the World Bank during negotiations, these countries will question the credibility of international institutions, causing further destabilization in this region. Furthermore, she suggests moving the large reservoirs for long-term storage away from the Aswan High Dam and to a location closer to the Blue Nile. While this makes sense based on her argument that the site at the Aswan High Dam has a higher evaporation rate, thereby making it inefficient, it is in conflict with Egypt’s pervasive concerns about national security and unilateral control over its water resources.51 Her statement that “water could be seen as one of many goods that could be allocated and traded under this system, and thus…could lead to regional cooperation on a wider range of subjects” is incredibly far-fetched when one considers the entire range of conflicts that these countries have had in the past.52 Carroll’s assertion that these nations must have cohesive mechanisms in place to deal with management of Nile waters is very reasonable. It is also true that no new legislation can be considered valid until all major riparian countries sign on to the same compromise. An ultimate agreement between these nations in regards to water sharing can only occur when Egypt is ready to make major concessions, as Ashok Swain points out:

53. Swain, "The Nile River Basin Initiative," 303.

54. Ibid., 297.

Though Egypt is talking about basinwide cooperation, it continues to develop massive new water projects unilaterally within its borders. Furthermore, there has been no recent reduction of its dependence on the Nile water. On the contrary, Egypt’s demand for water is increasing considerably.53 Swain goes on to add that such changes must be focused on the sub-basin level, with particular emphasis on the needs of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt.54 Such changes can only come to fruition after the other Nilotic nations are ready to challenge Egypt’s authority over the Nile, which has only very recently become possible due to the end of the Sudanese Civil War and the independence of South Sudan. Whether or not a hot war is necessary to challenge Egypt’s dominance is debatable, but the other Nilotic nations must be able to show strength and solidarity if they hope to push Egypt away from their internal hydrological affairs and take their share of the Nile’s resources.

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Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs

Juhood Fernando Revelo La Rotta will graduate in 2013 with a double major in Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Arabic concentration) and Cultural Anthropology, and a minor in Women's Studies from Duke University. He is currently working on an undergraduate thesis exploring queer Arab male identities in modern Cairo and virtual worlds.

Julijana Englander is in her final year at Duke University and is studying International Comparative Studies with a concentration on the Middle East and North Africa as well as Psychology. A native of the Boston area, Julijana is a member of Duke Women's Rowing, the Undergraduate Conduct Board and Delta Gamma.

Mario Parks graduated from Duke University in 2012 with a major in International Comparative Studies (concentration in East Asia) and minors in Economics and Japanese Language. He is currently working in Tokyo as a consultant for the online industry in Japan.

His hobbies include ukulele, cycling, and running.

Leena El-Sadek is in her second year of study at Duke University.

She plans to major in Global Health and Biology with a minor in Cultural Anthropology. Her current research combines global health and anthropology to empower Middle Eastern women, children and refugees.

Sharifa Saleh Al-Kindi is an undergraduate student at Qatar University currently majoring in Accounting and minoring in Finance. She is an IB diploma graduate keen on being an accounting professional, and she is also interested in psychology and religious studies.

Ellen Frierson is in her third year of study at the University of Pennsylvania and a candidate for a Bachelor of Arts in History with a minor in Modern Middle East Studies. Her current research focuses on the modern Arab world specifically North Africa and the Levant, with an emphasis on these areas' relationship with neighboring and regional non-Arab states.

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Call for Submissions

• Please submit contributions to juhoodjournal@gmail.com.

• Essays may be print or photo, and should include a title, subtitle, author and his/her year of study.

• Papers should be between 1,200 and 5,000 words.

• Papers should be formatted by Chicago-Style Citation guidelines, with footnotes. Do not include in-text citations or a bibliography.

• Photo essays should feature five to eight pictures.

• Photo essays should include an abstract that situates your photo within a narrative.

• Submissions can concern any number of disciplines, and are not limited to the Islamo-Christian tradition or a discourse on Arabs. Issues of popular culture, the arts, human rights and Mizrahim presence are just a few viable topics.

• The papers should be well-researched and reflect a significant amount of academic rigor.

For an electronic version of the journal, please visit www.issuu.com/juhood/docs/juhood3

Juhood, The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, is a scholarly publication that aims to encourage discussion on the MENA region at Duke University. It tries to provide a diverse array of opinions on the cultures, histories and religions that constitute the region. It strives to be a space in which students can publish research on the Middle East and North Africa. It endeavors to place objectivity and erudition at the center of each contribution.

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Juhood: The Journal of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs