Julia Teitelbaum Period 2, AP Comparative Government, 4/15/09 Democratization Term Paper
Former Vice President Dan Quayle garbled his lines when he said, “I believe we are on an irreversible trend toward more freedom and democracy -- but that could change”; however, his paradoxical statement stumbled upon truth. Democratization, the change from an authoritarian or nondemocratic form of government to a procedural democracy to a liberal democracy, is a continuum (Powell 2). The transition to a democratic regime may seem like an “irreversible trend”, but movement on the continuum changes in both directions. An authoritarian government based on coercion may become a procedural democracy with elections and some degree of political competition, and vice versa (“Important”). The key qualities of a liberal democracy are accountability, competition, political equality, and civil rights. Accountability means that policymakers are answerable to citizens and other branches of government through mechanisms like impeachment, checks and balances, elections, and judicial review. Fair, nonviolent elections with multiple parties that can campaign, raise money, and realistically win an electoral contest give a democracy competition (“The Last”). Political equality allows all adult citizens to elect representatives who have “a decisive vote on public policy”, engage in political discourse, and run for public office. Protection of civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion from arbitrary infringement or discrimination give citizens political freedom (Powell 17). Both China and Russia fall towards the center of the continuum of democratization, and both are moving on that spectrum. While China is currently less democratic than Russia in some areas, key elements of Russian democracy are eroding while elements of Chinese democracy slowly gain ground (Powell 27). Although this trend “could change”, the current situation indicates that China will be as democratic as or more democratic than Russia in ten years.
After centuries of dynastic rule and years of civil war between nationalist and communist revolutionaries, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong, created the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1921. At first, Mao encouraged freedom of expression in the Hundred Flowers Campaign, but when people overwhelmingly expressed criticism for the government, the campaign ended. Then the Cultural Revolution “purified” the country by persecuting dissenters (Hauss 275). All democratic movements in China since have failed. In 1978, the government-supported Democracy Wall calling for citizen input failed when, like the Hundred Flowers Campaign, it became too critical of the government. The 1989 Democracy Movement culminated in the infamous bloodshed as the PLA opened fire on protestors at Tiananmen Square (Powell 15). The CCP dominates the political system of dual rule with the state and supervises every level of government in China. The authoritarian CCP-run state has maintained its dominance by coercion; however, China’s social and economic development are “creating new pressures for democratization and greatly improving its prospects for survival if introduced” (Powell 27). Chinese officials are also more willing to discuss democracy; one senior official said, “The debate in China is no longer about whether to have democracy but about when and how” (Thornton 9). As in China, communists ended up in power after the fall of traditional authoritarian government in Russia. Communists took overthrew the remains of Russia’s tsarist government in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. The Bolsheviks were at war with other revolutionary factions from 1918-1921. They won the war and officially created the Soviet Union in 1921 (Hauss 231233). In 1924, Stalin took control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (Hauss 234-236). The CPSU was a model for and benefactor of the CCP until the Sino-Soviet split in 1956 when the Chinese declared that the CPSU was no longer ideologically pure (Hauss 274). Like the CCP in China, when the CPSU was in its heyday, “party officials were responsible for
overseeing the actions of every individual and institution” and party membership was “the only route to success” (Hauss 238). After Stalin’s death, the CPSU and the USSR began to decline. Gorbachev tried to reform the USSR politically and economically, but his reforms only hastened its unraveling (Hauss 239-241). Finally, in 1991, the USSR fell apart and the Russian Federation formed as a democratic republic (Hauss 243). However, its democratization was never consolidated and now Putin and his party, United Russia (UR) are shifting Russia back towards authoritarianism. Since China is an authoritarian state with unelected leaders, its accountability is weak; however, it is becoming stronger. Premier (Prime Minister) Wen Jiabao said democratization in China would mean “three key components: elections, judicial independence, and supervision based on checks and balances” (Thornton 3). Jiabao’s statement and others like it indicate that China’s leaders are moving toward democratic accountability. Although most Chinese elections are simply confirmations of CCP selected candidates, pilot projects in local competitive elections have planted the “first seed of a culture of checks and balances” with popularly elected township heads now daring to defy local party secretaries (Thornton 4). At the local level and above the CCP has introduced “open recommendation and selection polls” in which any adult resident can run, community leaders choose two finalist candidates, and the local People’s Congress chooses between those candidates (Thornton 3). The semi-competitive elections make officials less secure in their posts and more accountable for their performance. Judicial independence is strengthening even more than elections and shows promise as a check on government. Government interference in the judicial system is declining as the civil law system becomes more sophisticated, increasing judicial independence (“Thornton 6”). Citizens have also successfully sued the government. In the highly publicized “nail house” incident, a couple who demanded compensation for being forced to move to make way for development successfully
settled with the government. The state-sponsored newspapers further commented that the story was “encouraging for the future of citizens defending their rights according to the law” (Thornton 8). While Russia’s accountability is still more substantial than China’s, it is deteriorating. The judiciary is only independent on paper and does not check executive power, even when that power is being abused. For example, when the rich, powerful, and corrupt oligarch Khordokovsky was put on trial, political pressure made the court proceedings rigged. The New York Times headline about his conviction was “Guilty until Proven Guilty” (Hauss 228). Russia’s fall from 84th to 102nd in rankings by the World Economic Forum clarified that its judicial independence is ineffective (Edwards 16). “Recent restructuring of the judiciary has strengthened the subordination of Russia’s courts to executive power”, on the other hand, China’s recent reforms have strengthened its courts (Edwards 19). Russia’s 1993 Constitution made the parliament and the courts subordinate to executive power. For example, the lower house of parliament, the Duma, has little real policymaking power because the Constitution allows the president to rule by decree (Hauss 255). When Putin became president in 2000, he began changing and exploiting the political system to consolidate his own power. While the parliament’s power of impeachment would seem to protect against such a breakdown of checks and balances, the impeachment process is “extremely difficult” (Hauss 253). Besides, the parliament did not challenge Putin’s seizure of power, let alone impeach him for it. Since UR now dominates the parliament and Putin’s laws have undermined opposition parties, it is even less likely that impeachment will be an effective check on executive power. Unlike the trend among Chinese leaders to call for better checks and balances, even Russian politicians who oppose Putin show little concern for that element of accountability: in the last presidential election, “all the major candidates favored maintaining the personalization of power around a
strong presidency” (Hauss 255). As the Russian state becomes less accountable, it moves further toward authoritarian government with less to stop it. China’s political system is becoming more competitive both at its highest and lowest levels. Although elections in China usually just confirm for CCP appointed officials and are not truly competitive, the CCP has begun to permit trial runs of competitive election procedures. Skeptics say that pilot projects in transparency and competition in local elections are meant to appease citizens and are not true experiments with democracy. However, eleven counties (with an average population of 450.000 each) have begun to use “open recommendation and selection polls” that have introduced competition among CCP members and citizens “where absolutely none existed before” (Thornton 3). By sanctioning these larger scale experiments, the CCP has verified its commitment to exploring democratic competition. Moreover, the CCP’s traditional factionalism is developing into “intraparty democracy” at its topmost levels. The Politburo is the center of power in China, creating major initiatives and making the final decisions on policies and has significant internal debate that (“China”). Discussion of competing ideas has thrived under President Hu who, unlike his dictatorial predecessors, has called for debate and consensus based decision-making in he party (Thornton 4). China’s gradual establishment of competition from the top down and the bottom up will continue and eventually result in competition throughout the political system. Since Russia still has a multiparty system, it is more competitive than China. However, the system has grown less competitive with each election. Although Russia’s Constitution provides for a run-off vote in presidential elections if no candidate wins a majority, only the first election in the Russian Federation had a second ballot. Similarly, from 1996 to 2004, the number of presidential candidates halved and the gap between Putin and his runner up was 57%. The number of parties running in Duma elections has steadily declined too (Hauss 249). Even as
China moves away from elections where the result is a given, Russia is moving toward such artificial competition. Furthermore, increased state control of the media has made competition unfair (Edwards 21). Opposition parties cannot use broadcast media as a platform for public exposure and cannot compete with the powerful UR, which uses the media to promote itself and its leader- Putin. As president, he reshaped the party system “so that it can be more easily manipulated, if not outright controlled” (Hauss 248). For example, the Duma used to be half proportional representation and half FPTP/SMD representation, but since small opposition parties won more FPTP/SMD seats, Putin pushed though a change to make Duma representation completely proportional. He also raised the percent threshold for parties to win a proportion of seats from 5% to 7% (“Russia”). Yabloko, the “anti-Putin” party, fell below the 5% barrier in 2003, so by changing the threshold, Putin eliminated his most determined opponents (Hauss 250). While China has allowed more competition at the local level, Putin changed Russia’s federal system to be more authoritarian; regional governors used to be elected, the president appoints them (Edwards 19). Putin’s changes predict an ominous future for competition in Russia. China’s system of dual rule weakens its political equality, but Chinese citizens persistent participation continues to pressure the party to handle participation more equally. While both the CCP and the state are experimenting with democratic elections, only CCP members can vote in internal elections. Still, the qualifications for membership in the CCP are becoming much looser; starting in 2001, the Chinese Communist Party began allowing capitalists to join it (Hauss 286). Almost all candidates for public office in China are members of the CCP. However, the number of them running has exploded from 100 in 2003 to 40,000 in 2006 even though independent candidates rarely win elections (Thornton 4). Chinese citizens are more likely than Westerners to participate in the political system, albeit that participation is mostly carrying out orders, not
contributing to political discourse (Hauss 281). Political equality is also weaker because the party treats various groups differently when they speak out against the party. For example, Tibetan protestors are abused and imprisoned while mainland Chinese protestors usually are not severely punished (“China”). Still, “the party is getting better at handling unrest”, and recently most protestors have been placated rather than persecuted (“A great” 34). While China may not surpass Russia in political equality in a decade, politically engaged citizens still challenge the ingrained system to change. The situation of political equality in Russia is nearly reversed. Participating in the Russian political system is still easier than participating in the Chinese system for the average citizen. Any citizen can run for public office, campaign for candidates, protest, vote for the president and Duma representatives, and engage in political discourse with relatively few obstacles (“Russia”). However, public surveys show that Russian citizens place little value on democratic procedures and the role of citizens in government (Hauss 247). Without citizen pressure to allow participation, Russia is beginning to act more authoritarian in its treatment of political equality. The government has made it harder for interest groups to organize and exert influence on the political process by requiring difficult registration procedures (Hauss 247). In addition, under the pretext of fighting terrorism, Russia has not respected the political equality of the citizens of the unstable region of Chechnya (Hauss 256). Just as China makes exceptions for Tibet, Russia treats Chechnya differently because of ethnic conflict in the region. Because citizen participation does not threaten the regime, Russia’s political equality will probably not change significantly in the next ten years. Civil rights in China continue to improve, slowly. The improvement of the civil law system is helping civil rights in China. The government has passed statutes to protect citizens from government wrongdoing, and people have successfully sued the government (“China”). Despite
government censorship, the commercialization of the Chinese press has led to an increase in the number of publications, which has made restrictions on the press harder to maintain. Commercialization’s incentives for investigative journalism have led to more reports on civil rights abuses and more attention for the abuses. For example, public uproar over an article on poor working conditions of taxi drivers obliged the government to address the issue. Eight days after the article’s publication, Wen Jiabao issued an official statement supporting taxi drivers and ordered a report on the situation (Thornton 8). In ten years, the economic and social changes in China will likely have driven the party to show much more respect for civil rights. Civil rights in Russia will remain in their current state or worsen. Although respect for civil rights improved in the early days of the Russian Federation, like the rest of its democratization, respect for civil rights has since declined. Russia’s average score on civil rights and political freedom from Freedom House from 1991-2005 has been same as the average score that the USSR had (Powell 23). Putin’s control of broadcast media has weakened the freedom of the press. Moreover, as in China, the freedom of the press has been abused by violent persecution of reporters. Twenty-one reporters have been assassinated since 2007 in Russia (“Russia”). In addition, basic civil rights and liberties are “by no means guaranteed, especially outside the major cities” (Hauss 256). In other words, civil rights are not consistently respected. However, except for the treatment of the press, civil rights in Russia are neither worsening nor improving. The key elements of a liberal democracy are all gradually developing in China, while they stagnate or erode in Russia. China’s accountability is improving while Russia’s is disappearing. China is becoming more competitive while changes in Russia have eliminated much real competition. China’s political equality and civil rights, though growing quite slowly, is not stagnating like Russia’s political equality and civil rights. In ten years, China will be equally as democratic as Russia, if not more.
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