The Olympic Truce - The impact of Olympic peace in international relations

The Olympic Truce The impact of a norm of Olympic peace in international relations

Paul Steens S0226084 MA Thesis First readers: Dhr. Drs. R.N.F.M. ’t Hart Mw. Dr. T.E. Aalberts Second reader:Mw. Prof.dr. J.V. Outshoorn Master Political Science Leiden University

Content Preface...........................................................................................................................3 Introduction...................................................................................................................4 Research goal......................................................................................................................5 Cases....................................................................................................................................6 Chapters..............................................................................................................................6

Chapter 1 International relations theory....................................................................8 1.1 Constructivism..............................................................................................................8 1.2 Neo-realist criticism....................................................................................................13 1.3 Hypotheses...................................................................................................................16

Chapter 2 The origins of the Olympic truce...............................................................18 2.1 Ancient Greece............................................................................................................18 2.2 Olympism....................................................................................................................19 2.3 Political time frame.....................................................................................................21 2.4 Non-political nature....................................................................................................23 2.5 Presentation of the truce............................................................................................24 2.6 Critiques......................................................................................................................25 2.7 Conclusion...................................................................................................................27

Chapter3 Initial stages...............................................................................................28 3.1 Barcelona 1992 (25 July-09 August)..........................................................................29 3.2 Lillehammer 1994 (12 February-27 February).........................................................34 3.3 Atlanta 1996 (19 July- 4 August)..............................................................................38 3.4 Nagano 1998 (07 February-22 February).................................................................40 3.4 Conclusion...................................................................................................................43

Chapter 4 Olympic truce in the 21st Century............................................................46 4.1 IOTF and IOTC..........................................................................................................46 4.2 Sydney 2000 (15 September-1 October)...................................................................48 4.3 Salt Lake City 2002 (08 February-24 February).....................................................49 4.4 Recent developments..................................................................................................53 4.6 Conclusion...................................................................................................................56

Conclusion...................................................................................................................58 Working of the truce........................................................................................................58 Formation of state behaviour...........................................................................................59 Summing-up......................................................................................................................61

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Preface In the run-up to the Olympic Games in Beijing increasingly voices have been raised calling for actions surrounding the Olympics. These actions intend to call on the Chinese government to improve the human rights and to change their policy on Tibet.

It seems that sport and politics have become entwined.

Yet, this combination of sports and politics is not new. In fact, as will be shown in this thesis, the Olympic Games have been related to politics from their origin. Therefore the position of the IOC, claiming that the Olympics should not be used for acquiring political goals, is rather remarkable. In 1990 the Olympic movement has itself started a project aiming for bringing conflicts to a halt during the Olympics: the Olympic truce. Hereby it actively interfered in international politics.

Despite its prominence, the Olympic movement and the Olympic truce in particular are subjects which have been studied remarkably little by political scientists. Most of what has been published on the truce was requested by the Olympic movement. However, recent developments may increase the general interest in the topic. This thesis may prove to be a first step in expanding knowledge on the truce.

Tanja Aalbers has been very helpful and inspiring in the initial stages of the writing process. Many thanks also to my buddies of the FSW thesis lab. Furthermore I would like to thank the Pim Mulier Instituut for offering the possibility to employ my knowledge of sports and politics in organizing the Sportfilm- and documentary festival 2008.

Leiden, 13 April 2008.

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Introduction The Olympic truce is a remarkably unknown topic. Even though it is an ambitious project and despite some noteworthy achievements, the general public remains rather unaware of its existence. The same applies for academic research: political scientists and historians have hardly paid any attention to the concept. This unfamiliarity to public and science stands in contrast to the amount of attention the truce has obtained from actors in international politics. Both individuals and states have been keen to identify themselves with the ideal and international organizations have not hesitated to include it in their objectives.

For ages the truce was seen as a dated principle from ancient Greece. The ‘ekecheiria’ belonged to the history of the classical Olympic Games. Nonetheless the Olympic truce was resuscitated in 1990. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) became willing to engage actively in peace building. The objective of the truce was as clear as it was ambitious: from one week previous to the Olympics until a week after the closing ceremony there should be an Olympic peace. Three years after the initial idea, the truce was adopted in a resolution by the United Nations. Different international political actors have attached their name and support to the ideal. States (Japan and Greece) have been pressing for the observance of the truce. The support for the truce was large and during the 1990s some notable successes were attained.

The Olympic movement is proud of its achievements in establishing peace initiatives between conflicting parties in Yugoslavia and the Korea’s. In 2000 the Olympic truce was included in the UN Millennium Declaration.

However, in 2001 the initial optimism began to sway. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks the United States did no longer comply with the signing of the truce resolution as it was drafted by the IOC and UN. Therefore the content of the resolution was altered. The Olympic truce did not press for a complete truce in the weeks before, during and after the Olympic Games. Instead, the text of the new resolution called for a safe passage of athletes to and from the Games.

What is peculiar about this case is that a non-governmental organization which is primarily concerned with sports was able to become a notable factor in international peace promotion during the 1990s. Furthermore, it occurred in a rather short period of time with some clear observable effects on state behaviour.

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Research goal As the Olympic truce is calling for a particular kind of behaviour by states, it can be identified as promoting an international norm. That is the norm of peace for the duration of the Olympic Games. The initiative aims at setting a standard of appropriate behaviour. The norm embodies a sense of “oughtness� and moral assessment (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). The aim of the truce is the regulation of state behaviour. States are expected to live up to the demand of peace during the Olympics. Although it has no means to punish non-compliance, the Olympic truce directly aims at influencing state behaviour. As the truce is an initiative of the Olympic movement, it will be argued here that this organization is a so-called norm entrepreneur.

The role of norms and the influence of non-state actors on state behaviour are reviewed rather differently by scholars of international relations. Neo-realists believe that states are the single most important actors in international relations. The interests of states are exogenous and can therefore not be altered by norms. Constructivists however, argue that non-governmental organizations are able to exert influence on the actions of states. They are in the position to promote norms and hereby change state behaviour. Constructivism and its normative accounts will be the main focus of this thesis. Yet, neo-realism shall be reviewed as well. This theory can clarify the shortcomings of constructivism and can moreover explain the reasons why the initial support for the Olympic truce disappeared in 2002.

The IOC is content with the results it has attained in promoting the Olympic truce. The ideal is believed to have contributed to a temporary halt in conflicts at a number of occasions. It is argued that states have been willing to cooperate and observe the truce and state leaders have proclaimed their support to the initiative. The goal of this study is to explain the behaviour of states regarding the Olympic truce.

Two hypotheses may be formed. H1 is the constructivist answer of the central question, H2 is the realist response.

H1: States will adhere to the Olympic truce for reasons of appropriateness.

H2: States will adhere to the Olympic truce only at times when it is not in disagreement with their vital national interest.

In this thesis it is reviewed which of two hypotheses poses the most satisfactory explanation for state behaviour. Therefore a comprehensive analysis will be made of

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the occasions during which the IOC tried to observe the truce. However, it should be noted that the scope of this thesis is limited. As a result different questions remain for further research.

Cases Since midst 1992 the IOC is actively engaged in promoting the Olympic truce.

However, not at every Olympics it has aimed at stopping or averting violence among hostile parties. This has been attempted in only a number of cases i.e. Barcelona in 1992, Atlanta in 1996 and Nagano in 1998. At other occasions it aimed at easing tensions between hostile factions.

From the reviewed cases it is possible to discern whether the truce was reflected in the actions and rhetoric of states. The cases in the 1990s are described in three stages. First, the background will be described. An overview is given of the international conflict which dominated the Olympic agenda. Then attention will be paid to the application of the Truce. The actions taken by the IOC to promote the observance of the truce and state reactions are examined. Finally, other factors which may explain the adherence to the truce during the Olympics are looked at.

In Sydney 2000 and Salt Lake City 2002, the Olympic movement did not actively strive for a cease-fire. In 2000 it aimed at bringing together North Korea and South Korea at the opening ceremony of the Games. This outcome was presented as an observance of the Olympic truce. The truce initiative of 2002 is particularly interesting as the substance of the truce changed thoroughly at that occasion.

An account of the truce creation and observation is given by mentioning speeches and statements by Olympic officials, the Olympic Charter and other publications by the Olympic movement. Furthermore Erica Terpstra, member of the International Olympic Truce Foundation, was interviewed for this study. These data have provided insight in the ambitions, methods and accomplishments of the Olympic movement regarding the truce. To obtain an impression of the support for the truce initiative, statements made by politicians and UN resolutions on the Olympic truce are used.

Chapters As was outlined above, constructivist theory will be at the centre of this thesis.

Constructivism is particularly interested in the role played by norms in international

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politics and it is therefore well equipped to explain the functioning of the Olympic truce. In the first chapter constructivist theory will be explained at length, neo-realism will be used to criticize some of the basic constructivist assumptions. Additionally two hypothesis related to the Olympic truce are formed, reflecting the visions of both perspectives.

The truce is promoting an international norm of peace during the Olympic Games. Consideration of the internal situation of the IOC is required to obtain full understanding of where the norm comes from and why it succeeds or fails in socializing states (Finnemore, 1996: 24). Therefore the focus is on the role of the Olympic movement in promoting the truce. In chapter 2, the emergence of the norm of Olympic peace within the IOC and its motivations for starting the truce project are examined.

The IOC claims that the Olympic truce had some notable success in the 1990s.

In its publications the Olympic movement frequently points to the favourable effects of the truce in creating cease-fires among hostile factions. The accomplishments and failures of the truce initiative in this period are reviewed in chapter 3.

In 2001 the content of the UN resolution on the truce differed remarkably from previous occasions. This change has occurred rather silently although it had a significant impact on the working of the truce. In chapter 4 the causes of this change and its consequences are considered.

Politics and sports are closely connected but attention by academics for this relationship has been limited. In this thesis I have made an attempt to close this gap.

The Olympic movement is a compelling example of an organization which is highly active in international politics. However, many other topics related to sports remain to be explored by scholars of international relations. It is my ambition to point out that sports can be highly political. Hopefully research concerning sports and politics will be furthered.

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Chapter 1

International relations theory

In this chapter, two of the main theories in international relations are discussed. First, constructivism is reviewed. This relatively new theory has obtained many followers since the 1990s. Constructivism sees international politics as a field wherein different actors operate and wherein all these actors are able to influence one another (Finnemore, 1996: 2). By interaction identities, interests and eventually behaviour are formed. An important role in the construction of interests is attributed to norms. Both states and non-state actors are able to construct norms. As constructivist theory aims at explaining the role of more actors than only states, it seems most useful in clarifying the role of the IOC in international politics. However, the assumptions made by constructivist scholars have not been shared by all theorists. Harsh critique on its ideas comes from neo-realism. These structural realists believe that the state is the single most important actor. As states are operating in a world which is characterized by anarchy, their main objective is survival. As a result the influence of norms on state actions is limited.

1.1 Constructivism Constructivist theory focuses on the impact of ideas and norms on actors in international relations. Constructivism forms a collective name for a broad range of thoughts. However, the essence of constructivist theory can be summarised by mentioning three basic aspects. First, human interaction is believed to be shaped by ideational factors, not simply material ones. Second, the most important ideational factors are shared beliefs. Third, these shared beliefs together form the identities and interests of actors (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 392-393). These three features will be reviewed shortly in the following. The next section draws on the research carried out by Martha Finnemore. This scholar highly values the role of norms in the construction of state interests.

Interest formation According to constructivism states are socialized by the environment in which they operate (Finnemore, 1996: 2). This is reflected in the constructivist notion of identity formation. Wendt (1994: 389) points out how interaction can alter the identities and

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interests of states and how this contributes to a collective identity. Identities can be defined as “relatively, role-specific understandings and expectations of the self” (Wendt, 1992: 397). Constructivist scholars stress that identities are endogenous and based on social factors. What follows is that state identities stem from interactions with other actors within international society. In other words, identities and interests are not the independent variable as it is claimed by neo-realist scholars, but the dependent variable (Wendt, 1992: 394). Wendt refers to “intersubjective systemic structures” as opposed to material structures as the essence of identity formation. He defines the intersubjective system as a collection of “shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge embedded in international institutions and threat complexes” (Wendt, 1994: 389). By interaction states form ideas, based on how they perceive each other.

Constructivists understand the world as a social domain which exists only because the actors within it perceive it to be there. Finnemore (1996: 2) describes the position of states as embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that world.

The meaning that objects and events have for a state differs among these actors. The possession of nuclear weaponry by an enemy state will be interpreted differently by states than the nuclear arsenal of a friendly country. The distribution of power affects the calculations made by states. How it does, depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations. Actors define their own interests in the process of defining situations (Wendt, 1992: 396).

Constructivism sees the international system as a social construction as it consists of a combination of thoughts and ideas. As these elements change, the system will change accordingly. Anarchy for example is not caused by structure, as neorealists claim, but the result of process (Wendt, 1992: 394-395). However, intersubjective understanding does not mean that states instantly become allies or friends. It only offers a possible interpretation of events. This intersubjective base can be either cooperative or conflictual.

As has been pointed out above, constructivism is concerned with explaining how state interests are constructed. These theorists focus on the impact of culture, shared norms and social values on political life (Finnemore, 1996: 15). In the next section the constructivist perspective on the impact of norms will be examined.

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Position of norms An important role in the formation of state interests is attributed to norms. Norms are said to be at the centre of the constructivist research programme (Kacowicz, 2005: 26). Katzenstein (1996: 5) has described norms as “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”. Finnemore (1996: 22) refers to norms as “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour by a community of actors”. In both definitions norms encompass a great sense of appropriateness.

Constructivists believe that norms create a standard of proper behaviour. When a norm is in place, actors are automatically living up to certain expectations. These actions are not stimulated by incentives or punishments but they are the result of what is seen as good and appropriate. Norms prescribe certain behaviour above other behaviour and may form the justification for actions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 892).

Constructivists explain norm driven behaviour by making use of the “logic of appropriateness” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 912). The logic of appropriateness claims that states internalize roles and rules because this behaviour is seen as appropriate. The actions of states are defined by the social relationships in which these states operate, because they have become socialized to adhere to certain rules, values and roles. Actors assume that it is appropriate to behave in a certain fashion (Risse, 2000: 4-5).

However, constructivists assert that norms do not merely regulate behaviour.

They can also constitute and influence the interests of actors (Checkel, 1998: 326327). According to constructivism, norms shape both the interests of states and the means employed by states to obtain their objectives (Kacowicz, 2005: 25).

International norms are believed to constrain and influence the mass public and decision makers. Thus interests will change as the normative context changes (Burchill, 2005: 198).

Constructivists believe that norms are not fixed, rather they are subject to change over time. Hardly any norm is completely new, as new norms stem from old ones (Kacowicz, 2005: 29). Sovereignty for example, one of the most prominent norms of our time, has been altered unmistakably over the years (Risse, 2000: 5).

Constructivists observe an evolution of norms as there is a change in the notion of what behaviour is appropriate. Florini has created an evolutionary analogy between

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norms and genes. She argues that there is a natural selection among both genes and norms. First, for a norm to become accepted by a population it needs to gain prominence. Second, the norm has to be compatible with existing norms. The third requirement is that the norm needs favourable external conditions. This entails political shocks and technological developments which create a possibility for the emergence of norms (Florini, 1996: 381-385).

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have described how international norms emerge. Norms do not become accepted by societies at once. They are believed to follow a trajectory which has been described in a simplified way by constructivist scholars. This trajectory entails a three step process which evolves from norm emergence, to norm acceptance and finally norm internalization.

Norm emergence is the first phase of the so-called “Norm Life Cycle”. In this stage norms come into being and are introduced to states. Supporters of the norm attempt to persuade states to embrace the new norm. When this is achieved the goal becomes acceptation of the norm by states. Ideally states are socialized to adhere to a norm. Hereby it is crucial that influential states persuade other states to live up to the norm. In this stage adherence to norms mainly comes from the belief that this behaviour is legitimate. It is believed that “state leaders conform to a norm in order to avoid the disapproval aroused by norm violation” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 903-904). The third and final stage of the trajectory is norm internalization. When this occurs, norms are taken for granted. States conform to the norm automatically.

Adherence to a specific norm has become a habit and is no longer a point of debate.

Norm internalization does, however not, mean that norms are universally accepted. It is possible for a norm to be internalized by some states while other states do not conform to it (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904-905).

Norm entrepreneurs An important role in this process of norm evolution is believed to be in the hands of so-called norm entrepreneurs. These actors may put an issue on the international agenda. Norm entrepreneurs can be individuals, organizations or states. Sometimes organizations are formed specifically with the objective to promote norms. Amnesty International is an example of an organization set up specifically to promote the humane treatment of individuals. On other occasions norms emerge from organizations which are already existent; the Olympic peace norm within the IOC is

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an illustration of the latter. Constructivists believe that the prescribed norms are not always in the interests of norm entrepreneurs themselves (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895-905).

Once a norm is in place it does not automatically remain in position forever.

Rather, norms are in continuing competition. Existing norms may be contested and disappear, while new norms gain prominence (Finnemore, 1996: 135). One of the factors that explain the success of new norms is the position of norm entrepreneurs.

This encompasses the expertise of the individual or the organization, its contacts with media and the image of the actor. What also affects the success of norms is the extent to which they are in line with already existing norms (Florini, 1996: 376-377). Norms which are in complete contrast to current norms will have greater difficulties in gaining access to the larger public than norms which are close to present ideas.

Another important factor is formed by the support of state actors for norms. More precisely the success of norms is largely dependent on which states adopt the norm.

Some states are an example to other countries. If norms are accepted by these actors, they will more easily gain access to other states (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896898).

Among constructivists there is debate on the role of non-governmental organizations. Wendt applies a state-centric focus, which means that he asserts that states are at the centre of the international system. He does not deny that NGOs might constrain states but “states are still the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channelled into the world system�

(1999: 9). However, Finnemore criticizes this notion by demanding why states should be privileged. She points to the fact that states cannot control everything. Rather, they are believed to be embedded in a social context. As a result states are subject to changes on both local and transnational level. There is a variety of actors which is able to exert influence on international relations (1996: 144-145). International organizations are capable to socialize states. They make an important contribution to the formation of interests of states and can affect the norms and values to which states adhere (Finnemore, 1996: 5).

States are increasingly embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations. These involve governmental contacts with other countries within the UN or regional bodies, international agreements on trade, pollution and human rights issues. Furthermore international non-governmental 12

organizations seek to influence policies. In the previous section reference was made to the role of norm entrepreneurs in constructing and promoting norms. This task is often carried out by NGOs. Constructivists have paid significant attention to the role of non-state actors in internationals relations. As states operate within an international environment they cannot fully close themselves off from external influences. By engaging themselves in this international field they open their interests to outside pressures. Contrary to neo-realists for example, constructivists claim that more actors play an important role in the formation of the identities and interests of states. States are less dominant than neo-realists assume. Transnational actors like multinational corporations, epistemic communities, activist groups and NGOs can create changes in state behaviour. An increasing number of actors is playing a proactive role in policymaking (Levermore and Budd, 2004: 93-97).

Constructivists have pointed out that norms did succeed to undermine strong state interests at different occasions. As even strong states are supposed to be vulnerable for outside influences, scholars perceive non-state actors as potential international powers. The effects that international organizations have on states are believed to be far reaching. These can regulate actors, influence identities and interests and they play a crucial role in the existence of states (Risse-Kappen, 1995).

Whereas diplomacy was initially dominated by states, increasingly non-state actors play an important role. Outside actors bring new norms and ideas and discourses into the political debate. NGOs introduce new ideas, provide information, and lobby for policy changes (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

1.2 Neo-realist criticism Many of the assumptions made by constructivism are doubted by other theories in international relations. Particularly fierce criticism has come from neo-realist scholars.

The neo-realist critique of constructivism focuses on four issues. First, the constructivist attention to the interest formation of states is questioned. Secondly, the constructivist use of the logic of appropriateness is rejected. Thirdly, the prominence of the non-state actors is criticized and finally the extensive attention for the position of norms is brought in question.

Whereas constructivism is interested in the construction of state identity and state interests, neo-realism sees the interest of states as exogenous. Neo-realists believe that the main goal of states is survival. This search for a strong position is a 13

logical consequence of the anarchy which neo-realists observe. Anarchy in this sense refers to the structure of the international system. It implies the absence of a central order in international society as a common government is lacking at the inter-state level (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 226). Neo-realism claims that as a result of the anarchical situation, the international realm is characterized by conflict, suspicion and competition between states (Burchill, 2005: 32). Neo-realists believe that this anarchic structure is given and cannot be altered by states. States just have to adapt to this situation, the international structure constrains them from taking certain actions while forcing them towards others (Waltz, 1990: 29). Because of the lack of an international government, states perceive the international system as threatening. The main objectives of states in this hostile environment are security and survival. In a self-help system, domination by other states needs to be avoided (Waltz, 1979). Hence, neorealists assume that interests are the direct result of the international structure.

Processes and institutions can in some cases change behaviour but they cannot influence the interests of states, as it is claimed by constructivists. Rather, the preferences of states are presumed to be stable over time (Hasenclever et al., 1996: 184).

Whereas constructivists make use of a logic of appropriateness, neo-realist scholars explain state behaviour by a logic of consequence. According to this logic, actions are based on material and rational purposes (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 912). Neo-realists claim that the anarchic structure of international life causes states to act in a rational manner. States are continually behaving in a way that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation (Simon, 1985: 294). Hereby they strive for a maximization of their interests. These interests are defined in material terms. They encompass the maximizing of power and the maximizing of economic wellbeing. States will choose the option which yields them the highest utility (Simon, 1985: 296). According to Waltz (1979: 92) states will always see survival as their main interest. All other interests are trivial in relation to this objective.

A third strand of critique on constructivists thought is related to the position of the state. Neo-realist scholar Krasner (1995: 258) notes that the “state is the strongest actor; all other actors must conform to its structure�. Sovereign states are assumed to be the ontological building blocks of the international system (Krasner, 2001: 230).

This view on international relations has serious consequences for the perception of the position of non-governmental organizations. Unsurprisingly they are believed to play 14

a minor role in the international realm. It is not denied that NGOs are present and trying to exert influence, on some occasions these actors might even be able to exercise some pressure. But it is the state that regulates and decides the terms wherein this influence occurs. Decisions on peace and conflict are made by states which act in their national interest, herein there is no place for non-governmental actors and their norms. Hence, the state may not be the only actor but it is certainly the most important one to neo-realism.

Neo-realists see non-state actors as agents of the state. It is believed that states may use the influence of these organizations strategically, as dominant states can control non-state actors (Tarrow, 2001: 3). Thus, despite globalization the state remains the central actor in international relations. Krasner (2001) sees no evidence of undermined state control. He admits that, under pressure of non-state actors, states have adopted policies they would rather not have adopted. Yet, the authority of the state remains uncontested.

A final disagreement among neo-realism and constructivism entails the position of norms in international politics. As their main focus is on material factors, neo-realists have hardly paid any attention to the impact of norms in international relations. Yet, neo-realist scholars have not completely surpassed the topic. Krasner (1982: 186) characterizes norms as “standards of appropriate behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations�. From this perspective norms act as rules of international relations. They are believed to form expectations on behaviour. Norms, principles and rules together make up regimes. Krasner assumes that regimes are stable conceptions of behaviour which reflect state interests and may affect state behaviour (1982: 186-188). Axelrod (1986: 1097) defines norms as existing in a given social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way. This implies that the extent to which a given type of action is a norm depends on how often the action is taken and how often someone is punished for not taking it.

What can be derived from both definitions is that neo-realists see norms as the product of state interests. States are striving for desired outcomes and therefore they create specific norms. Dominant states are able to construct norms which suit their interest. Subsequently norms are the product of rational utility calculations by states (Kacowicz, 2005: 21). This state behaviour is a direct result of the anarchic structure of the international society wherein states act. States are acting in a threatening world 15

wherein they have to avoid the dominance of other states and wherein they try to obtain a leading position themselves. Gilpin (1984: 30-34) describes how dominant powers try to exert control over the system in order to advance their self-interests.

Dominant states can impose a set of rights and rules on other states.

States are willing to obey to norms. However, when their vital interests are at stake moral principles have no real influence in international politics. As soon as the balance of power is threatened states become reluctant to adhere to norms. At that point norms become irrelevant in relation to the primary task of states: survival. This limited attention for norms in neo-realist thinking is opposed to the centrality within constructivism for normative explanations of state behaviour.

1.3 Hypotheses In this chapter the constructivist thinking on the formation of state behaviour was reviewed extensively. Constructivists argue that state interests are subject to change.

These scholars look for normative factors which may impact the identity, preferences and consequently the behaviour of states. A central position in constructivist theory is attributed to norms. It was pointed out how norms may influence state actions. These norms define what is seen as good and appropriate. As norms change, the behaviour of actors will be adjusted as well. Yet, this transition does not occur from one day to another as existing norms are hard to change. Norms do not come in to being by coincidence. Their evolution and impact is largely dependent on the efforts of actors who promote specific norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). In constructivist theory these actors are referred to as norm entrepreneurs. It has been described how these actors aim at the internalization of new norms in state actions.

The constructivist analysis concerning the influence of norms and the role of NGOs seems well suited to explain the outcomes of the Olympic truce project. The Olympic movement functions as a norm entrepreneur by persuading states to live up to the demand of peace during the Olympic Games. What follows is that states are socialized to adhere to the Olympic truce. A constructivist hypothesis on the Olympic truce may be: H1: States will adhere to the Olympic truce for reasons of appropriateness.

Neo-realist scholars disagree on many of the assumptions made by constructivism. The most important difference among theorists of both schools is that 16

neo-realists see state interests as unchangeable. States do not reflect on what behaviour is appropriate. Neo-realists believe that states are acting in a hostile environment. Therefore their primary goal is establishing security. Consequently the attention for norms by neo-realists is limited. Norms are merely seen as tools of states which may be used to advance their objectives. The same accounts for the position of NGOs. Neo-realism sees the state as the primary actor in international relations. Nonstate actors may be used to fulfil state interests. Logically neo-realist scholars will have a rather different notion of the impact of the Olympic truce than constructivists.

It is possible to make out a neo-realist hypothesis on the working of the Olympic truce.

H2: States will adhere to the Olympic truce only at times when it is not in disagreement with their vital national interest.

The debate on the centrality of the state and the influence of norms and nonstate actors will be central in the analysis of the Olympic truce. Constructivism has successfully contested the assumption that state actions are merely the outcome of international structure. Scholars like Martha Finnemore have been able to reveal alternative explanations of state behaviour. Since its emergence in the 1990’s constructivism has succeeded to put the issue of appropriateness on the agenda of international relations theory. However, neo-realist criticism on constructivist assumptions needs to be taken into account, since states remain the most important actors in international relations. An analysis of the Olympic truce is highly interesting in this respect. Hereby it is possible to review whether a non-governmental actor which is mainly occupied with sports has been able to socialize states to adhere to a norm which challenges one of the central topics of states interest, i.e. decision-making on questions of war and peace.

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Chapter 2

The origins of the Olympic truce

In the foregoing it was described how constructivism and neo-realism have different ideas concerning the formation of state behaviour. It was pointed out that both theories have a different notion of the impact norms and non-state actors. This obviously has consequences for the perception of the International Olympic Committee and the Olympic truce initiative. In this chapter it is reviewed what factors prompted the IOC to start the Olympic truce project and the promotion of a norm of Olympic peace. Furthermore attention is paid to the question whether this initiative is consistent with the ambition to keep a distinction between the Olympic Games and politics.

2.1 Ancient Greece The Olympic Truce was not a new idea when it was proposed by IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch in 1990. It is a tradition which originates from ancient Greece.

From the 8th century B.C. every four years as the Olympic Games were organized in Olympia, a cease-fire was agreed. These games were intended to honour Zeus, therefore the truce was equally highly religious. The truce halted hostilities between Greek city-states for a short period of time. Messengers were sent out from Olympia to announce the sacred Olympic truce (Mandell, 1994: 46). At first it lasted from one month before the games until one month after the games. However, as visitors came increasingly from longer distances, the truce continued from three months before the start of the games until three months after games had ended.

This truce did not intend to make an end to wars. The aim was to prevent the disruption of the games. The temporary peace created the possibility to travel safely to and from Olympia for athletes, artists, pilgrims and spectators (Finley and Pleket, 1976: 98-100). Wars and hostilities were resumed after the games. This agreement lasted for twelve centuries, a period of time wherein the cease-fire was hardly violated. In case breach of the agreement occurred violators were fined by Olympic officials. In 420 B.C. Sparta was banned from the games in Olympia for failing to pay a fine after breaking the Olympic truce (Hoberman, 1986: 5). The truce also formed a possibility for silent diplomacy. On different occasions treaties were formed by state

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representatives. In Olympia, the most important treaties between Greek city-states were on public display (Briggs et al., 2004: 25).

The Olympic movement has tried to keep the feats of the truce in ancient times vivid in the minds of many people to date. The Olympic truce has become part of the idiom of the Olympic movement. On different occasions in the 20 th century the truce was used to point out the impact of sports on politics. In 1956 the IOC called for a ‘truce’ in favour of Hungarian athletes, requesting their participation in the Olympic Games in Melbourne. In October 1956 Russian forces had intervened in Hungary suppressing the revolution. The evacuation of the athletes from Hungary and their participation in Melbourne was presented as “the first modern Olympic truce”.1 2.2 Olympism The first Olympic Games of modern time were organized in 1896 in Athens. At that stage the Olympic truce was not articulated as an ambition attached to the Games.

However, from its origin the Olympic movement has had a clear ambition to promote peace.

Coubertin was a French teacher, psychologist and researcher. During his life he published hundreds of articles concerning a wide variety of topics. At an early age Coubertin became an advocate of reform of the educational system in France. He believed that the solutions for the problems in society could be found in education.

Later this belief was to become one of the core ideas in Olympism (Loland, 1995).

Coubertin emphasized the importance of sport in schooling. What he observed was a total neglect of the values of sport and physical education. Coubertin saw the possibility of promoting peace education by using sports. His main objective was to educate and cultivate the individual through sport. He was looking for a way by which political conflicts could be eased. In his opinion sport was the answer to solving both class conflict within France and international conflict between nations. Coubertin wrote: “Wars break out because nations misunderstand each other. We shall not have peace until the prejudices that now separate the different races are outlived. To attain this end, what better means is there than to bring the youth of all countries periodically together for amicable trials of muscular strength and agility?” (Coubertin as cited in Müller, 2000: 360).

1

Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, May 1957, p.46

19

As early as 1891, Coubertin began to advocate international sport competitions as a general contribution to peace. “At the present hour, anger is everywhere in the world: it disturbs both the family hearth and social institutions; it endangers both the tranquillity of the individual and the public peace. But sport is the greatest “pacifier” there is” (Coubertin as cited in Hoberman, 1986: 33-34). He believed that this ideal had to be supported by universities and citizens’ sports societies. In a speech he called for sportsmen to be peace ambassadors (Quanz, 1993: 11-14).

It is believed that the peace movement has had an important influence on Coubertin and on his ideology of Olympism (Quanz, 1993). The peace movement was active at the end of the 19th century. The basic notion of this movement was that states had been able to create domestic order by means of law. It was believed that international relations could equally be ordered by legal rules. Members of the peace movement argued that peace could be organized through international law (Quanz, 1994: 12). First, its influence on the thinking of Coubertin is reflected in the organizational structure of the IOC, which is very similar to the way in which the peace movement was organized. Second, many of Coubertin’s ideas on Olympic internationalism echoed the views held by the peace movement. He focused on an “enlightened patriotism” which was built on positive national sentiments and which abstained from discrimination of other countries and from the glorification of war.

Finally, both the peace movement and the Olympic movement considered education as an important instrument in the promotion of its ideology (Loland, 1995: 58-59).

The ambitions of Coubertin reflected a strong sense of internationalism although in the meantime he had unambiguous nationalistic feelings. As France was defeated in the Franco-Prussian war he aimed at revitalizing the country by popularizing sports in France. Coubertin consistently stressed the dual character of the Games. He dedicated the 1896 Games to both patriotism and world peace (Quanz: 1993, 2).

To date the peace ideal of the Olympic movement is clearly reflected in its main written body, the Olympic Charter. One of its so-called ‘Fundamental Principles’ is referring to the issue of peace and peace building: The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity (Olympic Charter: 9). What can be derived from this ideal, is that the Olympic movement sees sport as a method to build peace. It is believed that Olympism has the capacity to 20

build a peaceful and better world through sport and that it may even play a role in conflict resolution. The IOC sees it as its responsibility to act, as sport has the capacity to unite and teach about respect and tolerance, two values that the IOC perceives as essential in today’s world.2 2.3 Political time frame The timing of the revival of the Olympic truce initiative in the 1990’s was not a coincidence. The truce proposal came at a time wherein the Cold War was drawing to a close. The tensions between East and West were easing and revolutions had occurred in Eastern Europe. No longer did the US and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers, stand opposed to each other. Many publications appeared at the time reflecting, analysing, explaining and predicting developments in world politics.

Theorists wrote about the end of war and world peace and idealism made its come back in international relations. Afterwards this period has been labelled the utopia of 1989 (Bomert and de Lange, 1994: 5).

Important scholarly examples of this post Cold War optimism are articles by Stanley Kober and Francis Fukuyama. In his article ‘Idealpolitik’, Stanley Kober (1990) speaks of a revolution of democracy. He observes a new landscape and calls for encouraging democratic change while safeguarding strategic stability. Democracy is the best guaranty of world peace. International peace is not only the result of the balance of power.

Francis Fukuyama foresees the disappearance of ideologies. The Western liberal democracy will become universally accepted as the final form of human government. He expects a new political thinking, which describes “a world dominated by economic concerns, in which there are no ideological grounds for major conflict between nations, and in which, consequently, the use of military force becomes less legitimate”. In other words: “the death of this ideology means [...] the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states” (Fukuyama, 1989: 1). The visions of Kober and Fukuyama among other authors have been described as utopian.

They predicted a period of peace and stability, whereas others were more pessimistic, warning for crises and war. Mearsheimer (1990) published an article titled ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’. Herein he explores the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. What are the prospects for peace 2

IOC Fact sheet Olympic Truce, 2007, p.1

21

in Europe? Would the risk of war lower or increase? Mearsheimer states that the Cold War contributed to peace in Europe. However, in the absence of the balance of power, an increase is likely of the chances that war and major crises will occur. The Cold War was marked by bipolar distribution of military power, the military equality by the two major powers. Furthermore these powers had the possession of a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer notes that many believe that the threat of war over Europe has lifted. However he thinks that East European states will not become peaceful and democratic states. As a result of the fall of the Soviet Union the risk of a war has rather increased than decreased. “Multipolar systems are notably less stable than bipolar systems because the number of potential bilateral conflicts is greater, deterrence is more difficult to achieve” (Mearsheimer, 1990: 14-19). 3 As the Soviet Union fell away, the balance of power is disturbed. Subsequently the world enters an uncertain and dangerous phase because other nations want to correct the balance (Waltz, 1991, 670).

It was in this timeframe that the idea of the Olympic truce was presented. The ideal of the truce reflected the optimism of the possibilities for peace building.

However there was equally awareness of the threats that lay ahead. A combination of confidence and uncertainty regarding international developments lay at the base of the initiative. International changes and tensions were clearly visible at different places in the world. The Berlin Wall had fallen, the Soviet Union was falling apart and new states were forming in Eastern Europe. In South Africa the apartheids regime was on the verge of collapse. Changes were going on rapidly within the country. Furthermore in the late months of 1990 the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait dominated the headlines of the newspapers. Iraq invaded and occupied the country in August 1990. Deliberations were going on within the UN Security council whether or not to intervene. In September 1990 Samaranch referred to these developments on a world scale: “In these troubled times, far be it from us to pass the slightest judgment on the highly complex political problems which are still evolving rapidly as we watch. However, we should be permitted to express our fervent hope that this troubled period will lead to a future which is genuinely better for all”.4 3

John Mearsheimer is a neo-realist scholar. His publications on power politics are highly influential.

The analysis made in this paragraph, on the liberal, neo-realist debate which occurred at the end of the Cold War, is intended at showing the ambiguity which actors in international relations met at the time.

It does not intend to include Mearsheimers’ position on the centrality of the state in the analysis on the working of the Olympic truce.

4 Olympic Review, November 1990, pp.486-488

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2.4 Non-political nature This statement reflects the intention of the IOC to abstain from any political interference. The movement wants to maintain a clear distinction between sport and politics. Hereby it aims at maintaining its impartiality and neutrality. In the Olympic Charter the political abuse of sport and athletes is strongly opposed. Furthermore the IOC requires its members to act free of political considerations and politicians are forbidden to hold speeches at Olympic sites. Nevertheless historical events point out that the Olympic movement has not succeeded to ban political interference. The Olympic Games have been entwined with politics from its early days onwards. In many cases this was outside the power and the will of the movement. A well documented example of a political act surrounding the Games is the terrorist attack on the Israeli team during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. Other well known examples are boycotts of the Olympics in Moscow and Los Angeles. In these cases states refused to participate in the midst of Cold War tensions. In 1980 different western countries abstained from participation in the Games in Moscow because of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Four years later, in a reaction, Russia did not take part in the Los Angeles Olympics.

Yet on other occasions the IOC’s strong will to abstain from political decisions led to painful mistakes. The Games in Berlin in 1936 are commonly known as the Nazi-Olympics. The Olympics were organized by the Nazi’s and used as a propaganda tool for Hitler’s regime. Another major example is the Tlatelolco Massacre that took place in Mexico City in 1968. Only ten days before the start of the Olympics the Mexican army killed approximately 300-500 people and 1500-2000 people were taken prisoner (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Hoberman (1986: 1) has labelled this massacre “the worst crime in Olympic History”. The IOC did not speak out on these events. On these occasions the Games were not halted or postponed because the Olympic movement sees itself as an actor which operates outside the political sphere. Avery Brundage, IOC president from 1952 until 1972, has described the Olympic movement as an “oasis where correct human relations and concepts of moral order still prevail” (as cited in Hoberman, 1986: 118).

Espy (1979) argues that the Olympic Games are inherently political in nature because the Olympic movement consists of nation-states. Since politics is a facet of these nation-states, politics will consequently become part of the Olympic movement.

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The Olympic Games reflect the international system because the nation-state is the most important actor in the Olympic Games. Athletes are seen as the representatives of the states. Although the Olympics were not intended as an arena wherein countries could compete but rather aimed at creating a setting where countries could meet peacefully, in a very early stage states understood the propaganda possibilities of the Games (Espy, 1979). This is seen as a contradiction of the Olympic movement: it claims to be international, but relinquishes moral authority to national governments (Hoberman, 1986: 30). In this light the statement of Avery Brundage declaring that “the Games are between individuals not nations”, was not reflecting the reality (Espy, 1979: 40).

The truce seems to be another example of an activity of the Olympic movement wherein interference in world political matters is not eschewed. Hereby it deliberately gets involved in the political arena. Although the goal of peace is noble, it is in conflict with its own principle of the separation of sports and politics. In promoting the norm of Olympic peace the Olympic movement can become a transnational political actor. This reflects the aspiration of the IOC to become a player in international diplomacy (Beacom, 2004: 95-97).

2.5 Presentation of the truce The renewed Olympic Truce initiative was launched in September 1990. At the 96th session of the International Olympic Committee in Tokyo, IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch presented the idea to the world. In his opening speech Samaranch predicted that Olympism could “become the privileged forum for the encounter, reflection and action of the rising forces of our world. By establishing between them a kind of Olympic truce in keeping with the needs and hopes of our time, these rising forces could come together beneath the symbol of the five interlinked rings to make a reality of those values, ceaselessly proclaimed and ceaselessly called into question: freedom, the greater welfare of all, solidarity and peace”.5 In his statement Samaranch points out that the values proclaimed by the Olympic movement could create the possibility for hostile parties to come together.

Here they can meet, deliberate and solve their problems. The Olympic truce needs to become a project with the aim to fulfil global values. Although these goals present

5

Olympic Review, November, 1990, No. 277, pp. 486-488

24

clear ambitions, other questions rise. How these goals can be achieved, remains rather vague.

According to Samaranch the Olympic Games can provide an environment of conflict solving. Yet, what is it that makes Olympism a so-called “privileged forum�?

First, the IOC is a non-governmental organization which is not bound to states or state interests. It is neutral and does not take a political stand. Secondly, the movement has no personal interests in interfering in conflicts, this makes that it is a trustworthy actor in deliberations. A third aspect is that the Olympic movement is global in its scope.

The ideals Samaranch mentioned in his speech appeal to everybody and do not discriminate between people. As the Olympic ideals are universal this creates the possibility to bring conflicting parties together. The Olympics are a symbol for unity and shared understanding and are appealing to a worldwide public. Hereby the Olympic movement tries to promote the principles of solidarity and peace. The fourth strength comes from the connection of the IOC with sports. The association with sport gives the movement a global reach, as sport benefits from the presumption of innocence (Hoberman, 1986: 29). Sport is believed to be a binding factor both on micro scale and in high politics. As early as in the 1920s it is believed that the IOC was looking to play a role in international politics, by joining forces with the League of Nations. As the League declined this ambition was not achieved (Beacom, 2004: 95). However, what stands out is that the combination of these factors makes the Olympic movement a unique movement in the international arena and subsequently makes the Olympic Truce an interesting tool in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

2.6 Critiques The Olympic truce is likely to be supported globally since peace, respect and tolerance are global values. Nonetheless the truce initiative has been criticized severely. Opponents have not resisted these ideals but their criticism is mainly focussing on the Olympic movement as an institution. These critiques are related to the position of Samaranch, the credibility of the IOC and the gap between the grand ambitions and rhetoric of the IOC and its actual undertakings.

A first kind of critique comes from people who question the position of Samaranch. The former IOC president and prime initiator of the Olympic truce project has a troubled past. During the fascist regime of Franco in Spain he was the 25

government Secretary for Sport. After becoming president in 1980 the IOC went through a period of transformation. After being on the verge of a financial break down, under the guidance of Samaranch the Olympic Games became a commercial successful and consequently financially healthy organization. Nonetheless his leadership style made him largely unpopular. Samaranch appointed many followers to the IOC, securing his own position as a president. Furthermore his preference for boundless luxury is renowned (Van den Heuvel, 2002: 53-55). Some critics believe that the truce initiative came forth of Samaranch’s ambition to obtain the Nobel Peace Prize.6 A second type of critique is related to the IOC as an organization. Like its former president, the IOC as a whole has a serious credibility problem. The revelations in 1998 concerning corruption by its members have had a negative impact on the capability of the IOC to influence international policy issues. These allegations concerned the bidding process for hosting the Olympic Games (Beacom, 2004: 97).

Others question the global scope of the ideal of Olympism. They are sceptical regarding the peace-promoting functions of the Olympic movement. Some critics even argue that Olympism is a false, manipulative ideology of a movement whose driving force is the search for power, prestige and profit. The Games themselves are seen as an arena for political and nationalistic struggle. Therefore it is doubted that the Olympic movement can contribute to a more peaceful world (Loland, 1995: 67). To illustrate this assumption critics point to the fact that human rights are not taken in to account by the IOC. In the choice of the Olympic Games host city, the internal situation seems hardly to be an issue. Examples are the elections of Mexico City, Moscow and Seoul. These were all to a greater or lesser extent cities in countries with a repressive regimes. The Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 form the latest example (Roche, 2002: 171). The IOC is criticized for having wide scale global humanitarian ambitions while ignoring obvious violations. Hoberman (1986: 29) characterizes the ideology of the Olympic movement as amoral. He believes that the movement aims for global participation at all costs, even if this means that moral standards need to be sacrificed. The IOC has included texts on universal ethical principles in its Charter but the movement is not pressuring national governments to live up to these norms. This makes these passages relatively insignificant.

6

‘Politics always most popular Olympic event’, The Salt Lake Tribune, 25 July 1992

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A fourth point of critique is related to the former point although it does not share the concern over the motivations of the IOC. It is believed that the Olympic movement lacks the tools to enforce its normative goals, or it is hesitant to take those steps. Critics perceive this as a danger of the truce initiative. They fear a widening of the rhetoric-reality gap when it turns out that the Truce is unachievable and unenforceable. The truce is highly propagated and has obtained large amounts of attention. However if the Olympic Truce is regularly ignored or broken, the public may become cynical of the project and on the Olympic movement itself. A more important danger is that it may also result in public distrust with regard to the ideal of effective global governance and peaceful coexistence (Roche, 2002: 173).

A final strand of criticism is based on the negative effects of truces in general.

It is claimed that cease-fires create the possibility for hostile parties to organize themselves. In a report by the Canadian International Development Agency truces are described as “a “double-edged sword”- They can be helpful in some situations, but in others they can facilitate ethnic cleansing. Cease-fires are usually negative, i.e., they are excuses for rearming and so on and they do not provide security at all”.7 2.7 Conclusion In this chapter the question has been addressed why the IOC became actively engaged in promoting peace. The answer is four-fold: First, throughout history the Olympics have been associated with peace. The modern Olympic truce is based on a peace tradition related to the Olympics in ancient Greece. Peace ideals have always been included in the principles of the Olympic movement. When Coubertin set up the IOC at the end of the 19th century one of his aims was promoting peace by sports. A second reason why the Olympic movement became actively engaged in peace promotion is related to uncertainties in the international realm. As the Cold-War drew to a close both opportunities and dangers lay ahead for solving conflicts. Thirdly, the characteristics of the organization are well-suited to play a role in international affairs.

The IOC is aware that its impartiality, its global scope and its association with sports make the Olympic movement a potential noteworthy actor in international politics.

Critics of the IOC point to a fourth reason. They believe that the truce initiative came forth of self-interest by the IOC. By promoting the norm of Olympic peace the movement aims at securing its place in international diplomacy, preventing 7

‘From words to action’, Canadian International Development Agency, 2000

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the interruption of the Games, improving its image and revitalize the ideology of Olympism (Hoberman, 1986).

A second question that was addressed in this chapter is how an organization which claims to be non-political can become involved in highly political issues like war and peace. Although the IOC strives to maintain a clear distinction between the Olympic Games and politics it does not feel restrained to interfere in political matters.

For the IOC “non-political” denotes “neutrality”. 8 Earlier, it was pointed out how neutrality has led to painful mistakes. Examples were given of different occasions wherein the Olympic movement failed to act although it had the opportunity or even the obligation to take action. In all these cases it has valued the continuation of the Games higher than the position of repressed persons. To critics it is implausible that this same movement seeks to become an international player in the promotion of peace.

From the foregoing it can be derived that the Olympic movement is a nongovernmental actor which aims at the promotion of an international norm. By introducing the Olympic truce ideal, the movement aims at stopping war for a short period of time. Accordingly the Olympic movement can be regarded as a norm entrepreneur. Although the truce was not presented as a norm of peace, it can be reviewed as such. The initiative aims at setting a standard of appropriate behaviour, it prescribes certain actions while it discourages other behaviour. It seeks to regulate state actions as states are expected to live up to the demand of peace during the Olympics.

In the next chapter it will be reviewed at what occasion states did adhere to the Olympic truce. Additionally it is considered whether states did act for reasons of appropriateness or as a result of consideration of overriding national interests.

Chapter3

Initial stages

In the previous chapter the emergence of the Olympic truce was reviewed. This chapter is focussing on the early days of the truce project. What have been the accomplishments and obstructions faced by the IOC in the 1990s? The next paragraphs will cover in chronological order the period from the first truce project in 1992 until the adherence of the Olympic truce during the Nagano Olympic Games in 8

Appendix 1. Interview Erica Terpstra

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1998. It is claimed by the IOC that the truce project obtained some clear results. Are the cease-fires in the period of the Olympic Games the direct result of the truce initiative or is it possible to discern additional explanations which challenge the achievements of the truce?

3.1 Barcelona 1992 (25 July-09 August) Background The Olympic Games in Barcelona formed the first occasion wherein the IOC pressed for an international cease-fire during the Games. In the early days of 1992 the international focus was on the crisis in Yugoslavia. Hostilities in the region broke out in the beginning of the year. Half a year earlier, in July 1991, Slovenia and Croatia had declared independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In a referendum in March 1992 a majority of the Bosnian population also voted in favour of a break away from the country. However, Serbs living within Bosnia had boycotted the referendum and were opposed to a separation. These Bosnian Serbs started resistance and got support of extremists from Belgrade. They occupied large parts of the country and thousands of Muslims were deported and killed. The Bosnian government appealed to the United Nations for assistance. The UN recognized BosniaHerzegovina as an independent state. Furthermore the Security Council adopted strict sanctions against Yugoslavia (Rogel, 1998: 31-32). In Security Council Resolution 757 it was decided that all states should end contacts with Yugoslavia. This implied economic, political and scientific contacts. Moreover the resolution included a ban on sports contacts: The Security Council, decided that all states should (8b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting events on their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).9 The sanctions, imposed to punish Serbia for its alleged aggression in Bosnia, implied that the athletes from Yugoslavia could not compete in any international sporting event whatsoever. This also had consequences for their participation in the Olympic Games.

Sports boycotts were a far from new tool to pressure states. In analyses on sports and politics, boycotts are a popular theme. In sports we can discern two types of boycotts, I label them abstention and denial. Both have the same goal: regime 9

UNSC/Res. 757, 30 Mai 1992

29

change in the target state (Schwartzman, 2001: 115). Abstention is most common in sports history. It entails the unwillingness of states to participate in a competition as a result of political events. Many examples can be given of occasions wherein this occurred during the Cold War. In 1956 different states showed their disapproval of the Russian invasion in Hungary by boycotting the Olympic Games in Melbourne. It was described previously how in 1980 the United States and West Germany boycotted the Games in Moscow in a reaction on the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Four years later the Russians responded by absence at the Games in Los Angeles.

The second type of boycott we can discern is denial of participation. The longstanding boycott of South Africa in the Olympics can be put in this category.

From 1970 until 1992 South Africa was banned from the Olympic Games as a direct consequence of its policy of apartheid. Hereby the country was pressured to alter its policies of segregation (Booth, 2003). The United Nations General Assembly also requested its member states to suspend sporting activities with the racist regime and with organizations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid. 10 The Security Council resolution on sport contacts with Yugoslavia can be placed in the latter category as well.

The 1992 boycott was unique, because for the first time in history the UN Security Council included sports in a resolution imposing sanctions. Despite the resolution prohibiting Yugoslav participation, the IOC was dedicated to include athletes from the country in the Barcelona Games. The organization therefore tried to lift the ban. It started intense negotiations with the UN and reached a compromise on the participation of Yugoslav athletes. It was agreed that they were allowed to take part in individual sports, but not in team events. The competitors were not allowed to attend the opening and closing ceremonies. Furthermore Yugoslav athletes did not compete under their own flag but were called ‘independent athletes’. BosniaHerzegovina was granted provisional IOC recognition and allowed to compete under its flag. The IOC did recognize Croatia and Slovenia, these countries were able to compete independently. Athletes from Macedonia, which did not yet receive international recognition as an independent state, could compete in Barcelona under the Olympic flag and anthem.11 Among the teams that had to miss the Games was the men’s water polo team that won a gold medal in the 1988 Olympics at Seoul.

10 11

UNGA/Res. 2396, 2 December 1968 Olympic Review, February-March 1998, pp.5-7

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Nonetheless, the participation of athletes from Serbia and Montenegro can be treated as a major diplomatic success obtained by the IOC. It was proud to have accomplished a boycott free Olympic Games, for the first time since 1972.12 Application of the Truce On the 21 July of 1992, on the eve of the Games the IOC held its annual congress in Barcelona. Here it appealed for the warring factions in the Balkan countries and the rest of the world to observe an Olympic truce during the Barcelona Games. The request contained three points: 1. During the period from the 7th day before the opening of the Olympic Games until the 7th day after the end of these Games, the “Olympic Truce” shall be observed; 2. During the Olympic Truce, [….] all initiatives shall be taken, all group or individual efforts made, to begin and continue to achieve by peaceful means the settlement of conflicts, whether or not of an international nature, with a view to establishing peace; 3. During this period, all armed conflicts, and any acts related to, inspired by or akin to such conflicts, shall cease, whatever the reason, cause or means of perpetration thereof.”13 The demand was addressed to a wide range of actors, among them were “all States, their Heads, governments and assemblies, all intergovernmental organizations in general, and in particular the UN […] all liberation movements; all non-governmental organizations. 14 It was the first time the IOC made the request for an Olympic truce. The initiative obtained international support by UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros Ghali who spoke out on the subject. In a letter he asked Pasqual Maragall, mayor of Barcelona and president of the organizing committee, “to publicly call for the compliance of the 17 July agreement on a truce in the former Yugoslavia. This would be an Olympic Truce in the classical tradition and, perhaps, the beginning of a common bond and increase in civic behaviour”.15 The Olympic peace initiatives were applauded by the international community. First the UN Security Council lived up to the wish of the IOC by granting permission to athletes from Yugoslavia to compete. Despite an international boycott these athletes were able to participate in Barcelona. Additionally the UN Secretary 12

http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/past/innovations_uk.asp?OLGT=1&OLGY=1992 Olympic Review, September 1992, p.429 14 Ibid.

15 Olympic Review, October, 1992, p.473 13

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General made a public demand for observing peace during the Olympic Games. These examples point out that the Olympic movement is seen as an authoritative actor in international relations. Also within Spain the Olympic Truce was a highly debated topic. The Bask separatist liberation movement ETA proposed a two-month truce wherein it would not threaten the Olympic Games in Barcelona.16 Explanations The truce did not manage to fulfil its ambitions. Worldwide hostilities continued during the Olympic Games despite the international support for the initiative. In former Yugoslavia there was no sign of a diminution of the conflict. In his closing speech at the end of the Olympics, Maragall stated that war had “ignored the Olympic truce”.17 In early August for the first time the existence of Serbian concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina was reported.18 Following these events in Resolution 777 of September 17 1992 it was decided by the Security Council that Yugoslavia should be expelled from the UN. However, this severe sanction was not able to stop the atrocities in the Balkan countries either. It is therefore highly unrealistic to suppose that the IOC could have succeeded in bringing the war to a temporary halt. In 1992 the Olympic Truce was a new initiative, it mainly involved an ideal and did not entail direct diplomatic efforts aimed at halting conflicts.

After the mixed results of the truce in Barcelona the IOC reviewed the truce project. It was decided that the impact of the truce had to larger. Samaranch personally discussed the topic with UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali in New York. An important role was also attributed to IOC members and National Olympic Committees. They were asked to approach their national governments to address the Olympic truce project in the General Assembly. 19 The effectiveness of this IOC lobby became clear in October 1993. The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution urging its member states to observe the Olympic truce. The UN was sympathetic to the ideals of the truce. In resolution 48/11 it stated that the truce could offer a valuable contribution towards advancing the 16

‘Eta’s Olympic truce offer finds some favour’, The Guardian, 13 July 1992 Olympic Review, October, 1992, p.575 18 ‘Survivors tell of thousands killed in Serbian camps’, The Guardian, 5 August 1992 17

19

Olympic Review, December 1993, pp.477-479

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purposes and principles of the UN Charter, notably the maintenance of peace and security. As the Olympic truce aims at the peaceful settlement of all international conflicts, the General Assembly urged the its member states to “observe the Olympic Truce from the seventh day before the opening and the seventh day following the closing of each of the Olympic Games, in accordance with the appeal launched by the International Olympic Committee”.20 The resolution was entitled “Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal”. It was accepted without a vote and it did not carry the obligation for states to adhere to it. The UN General Assembly has no capabilities to enforce its resolutions. On issues of war and peace the General Assembly is not a very powerful actor. On security issues the five members of the Security Council are far more influential. Therefore the resolution on the Olympic truce was mainly a symbolic gesture to the Olympic movement. The strength of the resolution on the Olympic truce lay in the collective support for it, as the resolution was adopted unanimously without a vote by all 120 nations within General Assembly.

The broad acceptance points out that the Olympic Games are perceived to be an important global event. The possibilities for a peace initiative attached to this phenomenon were generally acknowledged. The countries within the UN understood the scope of the Olympic Games. Sport is believed to appeal universally and therefore it may help to tackle the factors that contribute to violence among people (Briggs et al., 2004: 63). This was illustrated by a second resolution adopted by the General Assembly. In resolution 48/10 it proclaimed 1994 as the International Year of Sport and the Olympic Ideal. In the text the IOC was praised for its ideal of promoting the understanding among the youth of the world through sport and culture.21 For the UN the resolution on the truce formed a possibility to stress its role as an international actor on peace building activities. In the early 1990s the UN became actively engaged in projects and initiatives promoting peace. In 1992 the UN Secretary General published the ‘Agenda for Peace’. This report makes notice of a changed international system after the Cold War. In this system the conflicts between east and west have ceased but new insecurities generate new conflicts. This has resulted in an increased demand for UN assistance in preventing and solving conflicts.

Peace making, peace keeping, peace building and preventive deployments are the 20 21

UNGA/Res. 48/11, 25 October 1993 UNGA/Res. 48/10, 25 October 1993

33

tools which may be used by the UN to reach these goals. In the Agenda for Peace it is argued that on some occasions a role can also be fulfilled by non-governmental organizations.22 Yet, critics say that having close ties with the IOC does also involve a risk for the UN. This is the danger of being associated with the negative aspects of this organization. The IOC is believed to be committed to commercialism, and thus to global capitalism and the consumer culture. Furthermore the problems of bribery and corruption associated with the Olympic movement at the end of the 1990s could also damage the image of the UN if it is associated with the organization (Roche, 2002: 176). Nonetheless the Olympic Truce obtained support of the United Nations soon after the initiative was launched in 1990. From 1993 onwards, every year ahead of the Olympic Games a resolution is presented to the UN General Assembly by the Games’ host nation.

3.2 Lillehammer 1994

(12 February-27 February)

Background In early 1994 the war in Bosnia was still raging. Serbian, Croatian and Muslim forces were engaged in a dreadful civil war. Cease-fires had been brokered many times but they had collapsed on all these occasions. Notwithstanding the ongoing violence in former Yugoslavia, in February 1994 the Olympic Winter Games were scheduled in Lillehammer, Norway. By a sad coincidence these games were held exactly ten years after the Olympic Games of Sarajevo in 1984. Just a decennium later this former Olympic city was totally ravaged. Now it formed the scene of tense fighting between Bosnian and Serb forces. The streets had become the domain of snipers and Olympic sites had been ruined by bomb shells. The Olympic movement felt responsible to act in the city where it had celebrated the Olympic Games only ten years before.

Application of the Truce The International Olympic Committee hoped to create a cease-fire between Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. The initiatives of the IOC were far more extensive than in the run-up to the Barcelona Olympics. In 1992 it appealed for a truce but no extra measures were taken on that occasion. This time the IOC undertook serious diplomatic efforts to arrive at observance of the truce, although it 22

‘An Agenda for Peace’, UNGA/Res. 47/277 - UNSC/Res. 24111, 17 June 1992

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acknowledged that a truce would be very difficult to achieve and to maintain. Juan Antonio Samaranch wrote to all heads of states and governments asking them to support the observance of the Olympic Truce during the Olympic Winter Games. In December 1993 the IOC president personally appealed to U.S. president Clinton for help in arranging a cease-fire in the former Yugoslavia.23 The IOC did also have talks with the Olympic committees from the war torn countries: it entered into direct contacts with Bosnia's Serbs, Croats and Moslems to persuade them of the need for a truce. Samaranch even tried to contact the leaders of the rival Bosnian factions during their talks in Geneva to strengthen his initiative.24 The president of the Croatian Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, Mate Boban, sent a letter to Samaranch referring to the Olympic truce. Herein he stated: “We are determined to observe your initiative to the letter, because this is in line with our vested interest in the establishment of a lasting peace. As you know, BosniaHerzegovina Croats have never been militarily engaged against anybody, except in self-defence”.25 Gruja Bjekovic, the secretary-general of the Bosnian Serb national Olympic committee, reacted in a similar fashion stating that the Bosnian Serbs fully accepted the UN Resolution proclaiming the Olympic truce, although they could not vouch for the Muslim side to do the same. 26 Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic was also dedicated to observe the IOC's call for a truce during the winter Olympics. In a message to the IOC he stated: “We, the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the victims of double aggression are fervently seeking righteous peace and the end of our sufferings. Nevertheless we shall commit ourselves to the observance of this truce, as well as to the release of prisoners, hoping that these actions will meet their aims”.27 The Olympic truce went into effect on February 5, seven days before the start of the Games. Despite the promises by the political leaders of the warring parties the truce did not stand. On the exact same day a shelling on a Sarajevo marketplace killed 68 civilians and left approximately 200 people wounded (King, 2003: 269). In a reaction the IOC denied that the attacks were a provocation of the Olympic movement and it rejected the idea that the attack was planned to coincide with the appeal for an 23

‘Samaranch seeks Clinton help on Olympic truce’, Reuters News, 17 December 1993 ‘Appeal for Olympic truce in Bosnia’, Agence France-Presse, 24 January 1994 25 ‘Mate Boban promises Croats will honour Olympic truce’, BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe & Balkans, 4 February 1994 26 ‘Bosnian Serbs accept “Olympic truce” and organize “mini winter Olympics”’, BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe & Balkans, 5 February 1994 27 ‘Bosnian president welcomes Olympic truce initiative’, Agence France-Presse, 7 February 1994 24

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Olympic truce. Even before the start of the Olympics the Truce seemed to be turning into a failure. During the opening ceremony Samaranch made an appeal to the world: “Ten years ago, we were in Sarajevo for the Olympic Games. A city then dedicated to sport, understanding, friendship and peace. Sarajevo, whose people for over two years have suffered so much. I invite everyone not only all of you here in the stadium, but everywhere around the world, maybe even in your own homes, to stand up for a moment’s silence in memory of Sarajevo. Thank you. Our message is stronger than ever. Please stop the fighting. Stop the killing. Drop your guns.”28 As a sign of compassion a small IOC delegation, headed by Samaranch, visited the cities of Split and Sarajevo from 14 to 16 February. Hereby the IOC wished to show its solidarity with the population of the city that had hosted the 1984 Winter Games. The delegation had a meeting with Itzetbegovic, UN peacekeeping forces, Bosnian Olympic officials and relief agencies.29 From the start of the Games onwards, the shelling of Sarajevo stopped. The temporarily stop of the hostilities in Bosnia during the Olympics was remarkable. Just one day after the Games had ended hostilities resumed as NATO shot four Serbian planes which had entered the Bosnian no-fly zone. It marked the beginning of a new period of hostilities.

However, the hostile factions did adhere to a truce during the Olympic Games.

The temporary halt of the violence created the possibility to inoculate thousands of children by UNICEF (Hirasawa, 2003: 2). Even the Serbian weapons remained silent between 12 and 27 February, although the Serbs were not participating in the Games in Norway. The Security Council resolution on the denial of Yugoslav participation in international sports competitions was still operational. This time, in contrast to its efforts in 1992, the IOC did not seek to overturn the international decision to ban Yugoslavia.

The Truce initiative surrounding the Olympics in Lillehammer did obtain support from several international political leaders. In an address to members of the IOC the Norwegian Prime Minister Brundtland stated that: “The Norwegian Government shares with you the hope that, as a first step, the proposition of an Olympic Truce will be respected by all parties concerned. The strangulation of

28 29

Olympic Review, May 1994, p.124 Olympic Review, March-April 1994, pp.75-77

36

Sarajevo is an affront to the world community and an insult to the Olympic ideal”. 30 Furthermore the IOC received letters of support from different state and government leaders. French President Mitterrand sent a message wherein he backed the IOC appeal for an Olympic truce. British Prime Minister John Major did also support the idea. Other messages of support came from Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Greek Prime Minister Andreos Papandreou and Georgian President Edouard Shevardnadze.31 The international community was clearly backing the initiative.

Samaranch expressed his satisfaction of the achievements which the Olympic movement had obtained during the Lillehammer Olympics. In his closing speech in Lillehammer he stated: “Ten years ago, we were in Sarajevo. After many horrors, the situation now seems to be improving. Let us hope that this truce- to which, in our own limited way, we may have contributed, let us hope that this truce will turn into lasting peace”.32 Explanations It is unclear what influence the Olympic truce proposal had on the temporary ceasefire in Yugoslavia. Although the IOC stresses that the Olympic truce contributed to the period of tranquillity, in scholarly literature on the Bosnian war it is hardly ever mentioned. Let alone as a factor in creating a cease-fire.

It is widely believed that it was a NATO threat of air strikes which prompted the Bosnian Serbs to stop their siege of Sarajevo. This threat was a direct result of the marketplace bombing in Sarajevo on February 5. The NATO allies issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serb forces, threatening with air strikes in case they did not withdraw their heavy weaponry at least twenty kilometres from Sarajevo and place it under UN control. As the threat of military action seemed credible, Bosnian Serb troops complied with NATO's demands. 33 Another explanation for the ceasing of violence in Sarajevo is that the Serbs started their offensive on Gorazde. As most of the international attention was focussing on Sarajevo the military actions could be carried out largely unnoticed elsewhere (King, 2003: 270).

Despite the incident concerning the four Serbian warplanes shot by NATO a cease-fire in Sarajevo was agreed on March 7. This truce held for about three months 30

‘Speech of Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister’, Olympic Review, March-April 1994, p. 65-66 31 Olympic Review, March-April 1994, pp.75-77 32 Olympic Review, May 1994, p.183 33 Human Rights Watch World Report 1995 on Bosnia-Herzegovina

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(King, 2003: 269). Temporary truces were not unique during the war in Bosnia. In 1993 the warring factions held a Christmas truce and in December 1994 a cease-fire was agreed between the Bosnian Serb leadership and the government of BosniaHerzegovina (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1995: 348). At all of these occasions the agreement was broken after a short period of time. The Olympic truce in February 1994 did not form an exception.

3.3 Atlanta 1996

(19 July- 4 August)

The Olympic truce initiative surrounding the Olympics in Atlanta was rather different than on other occasions. Although a resolution was passed by the UN on the ideal, the actions surrounding observance of the truce were carried out by UNICEF. The Olympic movement was not directly involved. Therefore this case is less significant for the analysis made in this thesis. Yet, for reasons of completeness, here it is shortly reviewed how the project unfolded in 1996.

In his opening speech at the Olympic Games in Atlanta, Samaranch referred to the peace agreements which had been reached in Yugoslavia by signing the Dayton Accords in December 1995. “Peace has finally been established in BosniaHerzegovina, where the martyred city of Sarajevo hosted the XIV Olympic Winter Games in 1984. The Olympic Movement is, in a gesture of solidarity, ready to make its contribution to the reconstruction of the sports facilities destroyed during the long war. Yet, we still live in a world where human tragedies persist. Therefore, we urge all parties involved in armed conflict to observe the Olympic Truce and lay down their arms, so that dialogue may be restored as a prelude to peace”. 34 This demand had also been issued by the United Nations. In a resolution adopted by the General Assembly it called for all hostilities to cease during the Olympic Games in Atlanta. 35 The resolution had been introduced by the United States government. The IOC had demanded the Games’ host state to enter the resolution to the UN. This tradition has been observed ever since. At the occasion of the adoption of the truce resolution Samaranch made a declaration at the United Nations in New York. Herein he set out the objective of the Olympic truce. “The Olympic Movement uses its means so that the peoples of the world may live together in a harmonious concert of differences, and in total equality”.36 34

Olympic Review, August-September 1996, p.84 UNGA/RES. 50/13, 7 November 1995 36 Olympic Review, December-January 1995, pp.4-7 35

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The efforts to observe a period of world wide peace during the Olympic Games of 1996 was accompanied by a parallel initiative. In the preparations of the Games, the Atlanta Organizing Committee (ACOG) set up a programme called Olympic Aid Atlanta. This was an initiative in cooperation with UNICEF and it aimed at bringing relief to children in war torn countries during the Olympic Games. The objective was to collect $ 20 million to vaccinate children in areas of armed conflict.

Regions of attention were Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan.37 To be able to help children in these countries UNICEF called for an Olympic truce for a period of 15 days. In Afghanistan the organization did manage to broker a cease-fire among the warring factions. Hereby it hoped to vaccinate three million children. However, July 24 the cease-fire was broken by a rocket attack on Kabul.38 As rockets almost hit the UNICEF headquarter in Kabul, the organization spoke of a cease-fire violation. However, it asserted that its employees would continue their work.39 The attack was carried out by the Taliban. When the fundamentalist movement took over Kabul in September 1996 strict limits were imposed on culture and sports.

Artists were oppressed and works of art were destroyed (Lieberz and Weisberg, 2002: 285). This restrictive policy is believed to be the product of the Taliban’s fundamentalism which entails profound hatred of Western politics and culture (Harpviken, 1999: 867). Sports were also hindered by the regime. In 1999 the IOC decided to ban the Afghan Olympic Committee from the IOC. This was the result of continuing reluctance to abide to international sporting regulations. In a reaction Taliban minister of sports, Abdul Shokour Mutmaen, issued a statement wherein he declared that the IOC was guided by the United States.40 The Taliban did not adhere to the Olympic truce and continued fighting in Afghanistan in July 1996. The movement did not feel bound to international agreements, let alone the ideal of peace during the Olympic Games.

In the case of Atlanta, the Olympic truce was not a goal in itself but a tool intended at bringing relief to children in troubled regions used by UNICEF. Porter Payne, President of ACOG, stated that the Atlanta Olympics were the greatest 37

‘Watching Out for Bombers and Miners’, The Washington Post, July 26 1996 ‘Raketaanval verstoort Olympic Aid’, ANP, 25 July 1996 39 http://www.unicef.org/newsline/afghan.htm 40 ‘Afghanistan wil IOC-lidmaatschap terug’, ANP, 5 October 1999 38

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peacetime event ever.41 Yet, this statement could not be matched by the observation of a world wide Olympic truce. Moreover, the Olympics were disrupted by a bomb explosion in Atlanta, killing one person and wounding 110 people. For the peace ambitions of the Olympic movement Atlanta did not form a success.

3.4 Nagano 1998

(07 February-22 February)

Background The subject of peace began to obtain an increasingly central position in the Olympic movement. In 1998 the Olympic Winter Games were organized in Nagano, Japan.

The motto of the organizing committee was “a festival of world peace and friendship�. Hereby Japan wanted to present itself as a non-violent nation.

The international situation was tense in the early months of 1998. The United States was pressuring Iraq to collaborate with inspections of its weapon arsenal as required by the Security Council. As the country did not meet its obligations, the US said it was prepared to start a military action against Iraq. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), which was set up in 1991 to carry out inspections on Iraqi nuclear facilities, was heavily obstructed in its work. In 1997 several incidents occurred which caused mounting tension. The inspectors were denied access to possible nuclear weapon construction sites and documents were kept secret. In November inspectors from the US were forced to leave the country. For the US the use of force was a means to assure the compliance of Iraq to the UN Security Council resolutions. As the Iraqi government remained reluctant to cooperate the US threatened to take military action (Byman and Waxman, 2000: 64-65). In his State of the Union address US president Bill Clinton said the US was prepared to carry out a military action against Iraq.42 Application of the truce This tension coincided with the Olympics in February 1998. On 25 November 1997 the UN General Assembly had again unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a truce for the duration of the Olympic Games in Nagano. However, as the tension in Iraq mounted the White House stated that its decision-making would not be affected by any sporting event. It made clear that there were no plans for delaying a possible 41 42

Olympic Review, August-September 1996, p.6 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou98.htm

40

attack on Iraq until after the Games. Within the IOC and the Nagano organizing committee there was fear that the truce resolution would be shattered by an American strike on Iraq.

As host nation of the Olympics, Japan had submitted the resolution for the truce in the General Assembly. In an effort to avert a military action in Iraq during the Olympics, the Japanese government appealed to both the US and Iraq to observe an Olympic truce during the Nagano Olympic Winter Games.43 The country wanted to settle the matter diplomatically and contacted the key players in the conflict. The Japanese Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi demanded of the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to recognize the truce, as Great Britain had stated that it would support the US in a military strike on Iraq. In a joint statement US President Clinton and British Prime Minister Blair made clear that military force would be used if diplomacy failed to bring about unconditional weapons inspections in Iraq. 44 Japan also approached the United States asking to refrain from taking any military action against Iraq during the Winter Olympics. Prime Minister Hashimoto got in touch with President Clinton. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright responded to the Japanese demands by stating that the US was aware of Japan’s concern about the possible outbreak of hostilities during the Games but Japan’s support was demanded in the effort to force Iraq to abide the weapons inspections.45 Samaranch commented on the events that the power of the IOC was very limited.46 Nevertheless the IOC itself was also making attempts to prevent a possible military action. Members of the Olympic movement lobbied in Washington to make sure that the US would abide with the UN resolution and refrain from military action against Iraq during the Games.

In his opening speech of the Games, Samaranch stated his hope that “the appeal of the 185 member states of the United Nations to observe the Olympic truce will foster international dialogue and diplomatic solutions to all conflicts, in an effort to bring human tragedies to an end”.47 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also stressed the importance of the UN truce resolution: “This message was more than a symbol; it expressed the 43

UNGA/Res. 52/21, 25 November 1997 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/longterm/olympics1998/nagano/articles/truce7.htm 45 http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1998/2/210.html#2 46 ‘U.S. have security plans in case of Gulf war’, Reuters News, 6 February 1998 47 Olympic Review, April-May 1998, p.23 44

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international community’s real desire for a peaceful world united against violence. I call upon all nations to observe the Olympic Truce. I am convinced that in this observance, and by working with the International Olympic Committee to promote the Olympic ideal, we will draw the world's attention to what humanity can achieve in the name of international understanding”.48 On February 10, with the Games three days underway, the US embassy in Japan published a statement referring to the Olympic truce. Herein it declared: “The United States respects this call for peace”.49 The US administration announced that it would respect the UN resolution urging all countries to abstain from hostilities during the Winter Olympics. Thus the expected intervention in Iraq was postponed with a clear reference to the Olympic Games. Despite a warning that the diplomatic possibilities were limited, the American government adhered to the truce. The IOC interpreted the US decision to abstain from military action as a clear victory for the Olympic truce. In his speech at the closing ceremony of the Games Samaranch declared: “We hope that the observance of the Olympic Truce during the Nagano Olympic Winter Games has served the purpose of searching for peaceful and diplomatic solutions to the conflicts we are facing today”.50 Explanations The Olympic truce was respected by the US. The lobby of the IOC and Japan as the organizing country appeared successful because no intervention occurred in Iraq during the Olympics. During his visit to Iraq from 20 to 23 February, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan brokered a deal. In the Memorandum on Mutual Understanding, Iraq agreed on the unrestricted continuation of weapons inspections by UNSCOM. Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou commented on the events that the Olympic truce could not be considered as a main factor in this diplomatic success although it was one of the factors contributing to the extension of negotiating time.51 The Olympic truce was a central topic in the deliberations on averting military interference. International diplomacy on the maintenance of the truce was carried out by the Japanese government. Japan was a non-permanent member of the Security 48

Olympic Review, April-May 1998, p.25 ‘US respects Olympic truce but says time running out for Iraq’, Agence France-Presse, 10 February 1998 50 Olympic Review, April-May 1998, p.56 51 ‘ANA hails UN-Iraq agreement’, Athens News Agency Daily News Bulletin, 24 February 1998 49

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Council at the time. The Japanese efforts in promoting diplomacy seem to have been successful. Although their role may have been influential in averting a military operation there have been other factors and actors which may have influenced the decision of the United States.

Among the five permanent members of the Security Council only the US and Great Britain favoured an attack on Iraq. The other permanent members of the Security Council, Russia, France and China were opposed to a military strike and favoured a diplomatic solution. Russian President Boris Yeltsin used tough language to condemn the American plans for military action. Yeltsin warned that a military strike could result in a world war. 52 The US met strong resistance for its plans on a military operation. Most countries agreed on the notion that the Iraqi government had to cooperate with the weapon inspections. However, about the means by which this goal had to be met, opinions differed.

Another possible reason for the US to refrain from interference involved the security of American athletes. Experts indicated that a military action would make American participants of the Olympics a target for terrorism. This rationale might have made the US government cautious to start a war against Iraq.53 3.4 Conclusion States agreed to the demand of Olympic peace at different occasions. During the Olympic Games of Lillehammer in 1994 and Nagano in 1998 hostilities were respectively ceased and postponed. In the former case hostile factions in Yugoslavia stopped fighting. In the latter case the US called off a possible strike on Iraq. In both instances the governments of the Games’ host countries, Norway and Japan, clearly spoke out in favour of the truce. The Japanese government for instance started diplomatic talks to avert military actions during the Games. This resulted in a statement by the US, wherein it said that no military actions would take place during the Olympic Games in Nagano.

Consequently, constructivists may argue that states regarded adhering to the Olympic truce as appropriate behaviour. During the 1990s states were socialized to act in accordance with the proposed cease-fires. The Olympic movement did succeed in creating familiarity with the ideal among states, even though observance was not 52

53

‘UN allies round on Clinton’, The Guardian, 6 February 1998 ‘Troops may protect Olympic squad in Nagano’, Agence France-Presse, 6 February 1998

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generally accepted and still a much debated issue among states and the IOC. Adherence had not completely become a standard of appropriateness by now.

Nonetheless states did agree to the demand at different occasions. Therefore the working of the Olympic truce project during the 1990’s seems to be at least partly in line with the constructivist hypothesis H1, as it was mentioned in chapter 1. It may be argued that state behaviour can be explained by looking at reasons of appropriateness.

Even though national interests were at stake, at different instances states did adhere to the Olympic truce.

Neo-realists may criticize this constructivist explanation as it is not clear whether the cease-fires during the Olympics were really the result of the Olympic truce project. In analyses of the conflicts many reasons are given for the halts in fighting. In academic studies the truce is not mentioned as an explanatory factor in the temporary halt of conflicts. In 1994 NATO issued a warning on Serbian troops, forcing them to withdraw from the Belgrade region. In 1998 the international pressure on the US to suspend an intervention is believed to have been more important than the start of the Olympic Games. Furthermore at two occasions during the 1990s the truce was not observed at all. In 1992 and 1996 hostilities continued during the Olympic Games.

Yet, this criticism can be answered by pointing to the fact that in 1992 the initiative was brand new. For the first time a call for an Olympic truce was made. At that time the Olympic movement did not possess of an apparatus and diplomatic status by which the objective could be matched. After the Barcelona Olympics the truce project was evaluated by the IOC and measures were taken to increase the awareness of states. In 1996 the cease-fire was violated by a non-state actor. The Taliban did not feel bound to the Olympic truce resolution on the agreed by the countries in the General Assembly, among which the Afghan government. 54 The failure of the truce seems to have been related to the fact that fundamentalists continued their resistance against the Afghan central rule, not to the fact that a state was acting in a way intended to secure its national interest.

The realist hypothesis H2, claiming that states will only adhere to the truce in case it is not in breach of their national interest, is only partly correct. By making statements and agreeing to UN resolutions, states have shown to be willing to support

54

UNGA/Res. 50/15, 7 November 1995

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the project. More important, states did live up to the demand of the Olympic movement even at occasions when the interests of the respective states were at stake.

Since the appeal for a cease-fire in Yugoslavia during the Olympic Games in 1992, the truce has been observed at different occasions. Several states have acted in support of the initiative and officials have spoken out their support. Although the results have been mixed, the observations justify a call for more attention by scholars in international relations for the Olympic truce than it has obtained thus far.

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Chapter 4

Olympic truce in the 21st Century

We have seen that during the 1990s the Olympic truce obtained some notable results.

At the start of the new century the project seemed to be doing rather well. In 2000 the IOC managed to bring North and South Korea together at the Sydney Olympics. This success was claimed by the newly formed International Olympic Truce Centre (IOTC). Furthermore the initiative was included in the United Nations Millennium Declaration. This initial optimism surrounding the truce swayed in 2001. The events following the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 changed the substance of the Olympic truce. The effects on the peace initiative will be reviewed in this chapter.

4.1 IOTF and IOTC The idea of a non-governmental organization that would be constantly taking care for the creation, implementation and observation of the Olympic truce was launched in 1998. It was the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs George Papandreou who presented the plan to the members of the IOC. This close involvement of the Greek government with the truce project was not a coincidence. Athens had been appointed as a host of the 2004 summer Olympic Games.

The proposal entailed the creation of an international centre based in Olympia to work on the observance of a worldwide Olympic truce during the 2004 Games.55 Papandreou had been occupied with the truce initiative on earlier occasions. He had raised questions over the efficacy of the Olympic truce and believed that the original ideals of the Olympic Games were under pressure. On the resolutions adopted by the United Nations he commented that nothing came of those proposals.56 In an address at the International Olympic Academy in Olympia, Papandreou outlined four missions of the Greek government regarding the truce project.

1. To implement the Olympic Truce during the 2004 Olympic Games and maintain its momentum throughout the new millennium.

2. To make the Olympic Truce an effective instrument in promoting world peace.

3. To strengthen the Olympic movement’s role in supporting peace, friendship and international understanding.

55 56

‘Officials Seeking Truce for Games’, The Washington Post, 5 February 1998 ‘Greece seeks revival of Olympic Games cease-fire’, The Washington Times, 24 October 1997

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4. To support activities of sport that strengthen a common culture of peace and multiculturalism amongst the youth of our world.

To reach these objectives the International Olympic Truce Centre had to be set up, a non-governmental organization incorporated within the framework of the Olympic Movement.57 In July 2000 the International Olympic Truce Foundation (IOTF) and the International Olympic Truce Centre were officially established. The IOTF is mainly occupied with upholding the observance of the Olympic truce. It is made up of IOC members and prominent individuals from all over the world. The IOTC can be seen as the daily office of the foundation. The Centre is setting up activities in support of the truce.58 However, the initiatives had a broader interest than only bringing conflicts to a halt during the Olympics. Papandreou commented on the necessity of the organization in an opinion article in The Washington Post. Herein he stated that the IOTC aims “to activate the much-neglected potential of the Olympic movement […] as a factor in international rapprochement and public diplomacy”, and “to encourage mutual understanding and confidence between embattled rivals through the use of sport, culture and the promotion of the Olympic ideals of peace, friendship and international understanding”.59 Furthermore the initiatives were not limited to a truce surrounding the Olympics. In 2000 the IOC showed great pride over its accomplishment to bring the North and South Korea together during the Olympics in Sydney. It was seen as the first success obtained by the IOTF.60 In 2000 another success was obtained by the Olympic truce as it was again discussed at the intergovernmental level. The United Nations General Assembly included a paragraph on the Olympic truce in the Millennium Declaration. This declaration was agreed to at the Millennium summit in New York. State leaders gathered here to discuss the UN vision for the 21st century. In the section on Peace, Security and Disarmament the following text was adopted by all states in the General Assembly: “We urge Member States to observe the Olympic Truce, individually and collectively, now and in the future, and to support the International Olympic

57

Address Papandreou at the International Olympic Academy, 27 May 1998 www.olympictruce.org 59 ‘An Olympic Truce’, by George Papandreou, The Washington Post, 9 September 2000 60 ‘2002 Games to Promote World Peace’, AP Online, 26 October 2000 58

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Committee in its efforts to promote peace and human understanding through sport and the Olympic Ideal”.61 The Olympic truce was a widely accepted as a diplomatic tool. It had shown its value on earlier occasions and had become a declared intention for most governments. At the intergovernmental level the ideal was regularly discussed and adhered to.

4.2 Sydney 2000

(15 September-1 October)

In the run-up to the Olympic Games in Sydney the IOC made great efforts to bring South and North Korea together. It aimed for the participation of a single Korean team at the Olympics. This initiative followed a diplomatic breakthrough in the relations between the two countries. In June 2000 the leaders of both countries met for a summit in Pyongyang. It was the first summit ever held between the two countries.

The meeting resulted in an agreement wherein both states spoke out the ambition to work towards reunification and the start of a process of reconciliation.62 One of the topics that were discussed at the summit was participation at the Olympic Games in Sydney. 63 In May 2000 Samaranch sent letters to both governments proposing that their teams would march together at the opening ceremony of the Games. South Korea endorsed the initiative, but North Korea did not reply. At the summit in June the subject was briefly discussed but the details of a joint march were left to lower-ranking officials.64 The summit was attended by Un Yong Kim, IOC member and President of the Korean Olympic Committee. He was a member of the South Korean delegation in Pyongyang. In the aftermath of the meeting, representatives of the NOC’s of both countries showed confidence in a joint entrance of the countries in the Olympic stadium.65 Eventually on September 15 athletes and officials of both countries marched together at the opening ceremony behind the unification flag, representing a unified Korea.

In his closing speech of the Olympic Games, Samaranch stated that the Sydney 2000 Games had shown that: “with the support of the United Nations, the 61

UNGA/Res. 55/2, 8 September 2000 ‘Two Koreas Sign Conciliatory Accord’, The Washington Post, 15 June 2000 63 ‘The Korean breakthrough’, The New York Times, 16 June 2000 64 ‘Down Under, Overtures of Harmony’, The Washington Post, 16 September 2000 65 Olympic Review, August-September 2000, p.73 62

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Olympic Truce can be a reality, as demonstrated by the historical joint parade of the two Korean delegations at the Opening Ceremony”. 66 The accomplishment of the IOC in bringing the two Korea’s together in Sydney was presented as the first victory of the Truce Foundation. 67 The IOC President hailed the work performed by the IOTF. 68 However, this result could not have been obtained without the reconciliation of the countries in 2000. For the first time since the Korean War in 1953, the leaders of both countries had met. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung was awarded the Nobel Peace Price in 2000 for his reconciliation efforts towards North Korea. This diplomatic attempt is referred to as the Sunshine Policy.69 As a result hereof in September the relations among the countries were relatively good. Agreements were made on family reunions, food loans and the rehabilitation of the railway between the countries. Reconciliation was taking place on social, economic and military areas (Ha, 2001: 31). Sporting contacts among the countries were also improved but sports were certainly not at the origin of the amelioration in relations.

4.3 Salt Lake City 2002

(08 February-24 February)

In 2002 the Olympic Winter Games were staged in the United States. Two topics dominated the headlines in the run-up to the event: the increased security measures as a result of the terror-threat and the corruption scandal surrounding the appointment of Salt Lake City as host city of the Olympics. The Olympic truce was not discussed. A debate on this subject had already taken place in November 2001.

Political time frame The events of September 11 2001 have reinvigorated the fierce debate among scholars of international relations on the centrality of the state. Similar to the discussion which emerged at the end of the Cold War, theorists had different opinions of the impact that this political event would inflict on international relations. Many publications have appeared during the 1990s, signifying the end of the state. Broadly we can observe two groups in this debate. One group of scholars has claimed that the state lost its central position. On the other hand some scholars believe that the state will remain the 66

Olympic Review, October-November 2000, p.82 ‘2002 Games to Promote World Peace’, AP Online, 26 October 2000 68 ‘Knight to promote peace and goodwill’, The Sunday Telegraph, 8 October 2000 69 ‘South Korea's Peacemaker’, The New York Times, 15 October 2000 67

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key actor in the international sphere. Both groups see the terrorist attacks and its direct consequences as a confirmation of their views.

One of the proponents of the former group is Kenichi Ohmae. In his much cited ‘The End of the Nation State’ Ohmae (1995: 2) questions the assumption that “nation states [are] the primary actors in today’s global economy”. A borderless economy has made it impossible for states to manage economic affairs. This thought gained prominence during the 1990s. At the base of decreased state power is globalization. David Held defines globalization as “a shift in the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power” (Buzan et al., 1998: 390). As a result of this trend Held claims that it has become almost impossible to make a distinction among domestic and international issues. Therefore “the single minded focus on political power and the state, which is so much at the centre of realism, is insufficient to examine the complexity of the world in which we live” (Buzan et al., 1998: 388).

Thus according to the proponents of globalism the central position of the state is in demise. These theorists have interpreted the 9/11 attacks as a sign hereof. State centrality is challenged by the fact that the terrorist attacks were carried out by individuals who were linked to al-Qaeda and not to a state. The US did start an intervention in Afghanistan but the aim was the removal of a non-state actor. Rosenau 2006: 16-17) describes how events like this reflect the increasingly important role of individuals in world-affairs. States remain of importance but actions of individuals can have consequences on a macro-scale. Rosenau mentions the example of suicide bombers who can influence conflicts that are on the global agenda.

However, many other academics have interpreted the developments following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington as a switch back to state centrism. It is no surprise that this is a typical neo-realist position, as neo-realism is assuming state centrality in international relations.

The criticisms on the realist notion of state centrality have not been without a reply. In a lively debate with David Held, Bary Buzan does not deny the importance of globalization but he draws different conclusions. Buzan distinguishes globalization as a mainly economic phenomenon. He agrees that states may not be able to contain everything within this domain. Yet, even though the state is losing power at the economic terrain, on the political and military side states can still impose their

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influence. The realist scholar therefore concludes that the state remains the central actor in politics (Buzan et al., 1998).

Some scholars go as far as to claim that the era of globalization ended with 9/11 (Veeser, 2004). These authors observe a switch back to state centrism. As a direct result of terrorism, states have renewed their focus on security. The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the anti-terrorism legislation are examples hereof. It is believed that “under the new post-September 11 conditions, states are now required to extend their functions to the fighting of the global ‘war on terrorism’” Consequently states “have re-acquired some of the authority that they might have conceded during the latter part of the twentieth century” (Rizvi, 2004: 164-165).

Application of the truce The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon also impacted international sport. In the immediate aftermath of the killings sporting events were cancelled or rescheduled. In the weeks following the attacks in New York and Washington the IOC issued a statement wherein it declared that the Games in Salt Lake City would take place as originally planned. IOC President Jacques Rogge was quoted: “The Olympic Games are an answer to the present violence and should not be a victim of the violence”, and “the Olympic Games are the best message to guarantee universality and the coming together of athletes of developed and developing countries. There is no better symbol of the world uniting around a cause”. 70 However, equally Rogge pointed out that “The truce is something very difficult to implement.

We’ll do our duty, we'll cooperate and the only thing we can do is hope that it's going to be achieved. When it goes into terrorism, that’s more difficult”. 71 One of Rogge’s first acts following the September 11 attacks was to support the Olympic Truce with a sum of $400,000.72 The events following the September 11 attacks put the Olympic truce under pressure. On October 7 the US started an intervention in Afghanistan. These military actions were aimed at the removal of the Taliban regime. As the 2002 Winter Games were staged in the US, it was the American government’s responsibility to propose a 70

‘IOC Chief: 2002 Games must go on’, The Salt Lake Tribune, 21 September 2001 ‘Rogge gets special IOC powers to act on Salt Lake’, Associated Press Newswires, 19 September 2001 72 ‘War Games: The Greek government and one Greek God push for Olympic Peace’, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 18 December 2001 71

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resolution on the Olympic truce to the UN General Assembly. However, the US was in the midst of a war and it was therefore likely to breach its own resolution.

On November 27 Jacques Rogge met with US President Bush and discussed the possibilities for a truce resolution. During this meeting President Bush pointed out that the US would not propose a resolution calling for a complete cease-fire during the Games. The administration though, stated its willingness of proposing a resolution calling for a safe passage of athletes.73 The resulting truce resolution presented to the UN was less far reaching in its ambitions than earlier resolutions. At previous occasions the General Assembly had demanded its member states the observance of a complete end of all hostilities. For example in 1999 the resolution on the Olympic truce during the Sydney Olympics urged Member States to take the initiative to abide by the Olympic Truce, individually and collectively, and to pursue, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the peaceful settlement of all international conflicts through diplomatic solutions.74 Yet, for the 2002 Olympic Games the truce resolution did no longer call for a cease of hostilities. It merely intended at observing the safety of athletes. The General Assembly requested Member States to observe, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the Olympic Truce during the XIX Olympic Winter Games to be held in Salt Lake City, United States of America, from 8 to 24 February 2002, by ensuring the safe passage and participation of athletes at the Games.75 The definition of the Olympic truce used in the Salt Lake City resolution referred to the concept as used in Ancient Greece when the ‘ekecheiria’ created the possibility to travel safely to Olympia for athletes, officials and supporters. For the IOC this seemed to be the highest possible result. Greece Foreign Minister George Papandreou described the outcome as a success. At least the United States had not completely rejected the ideal of an Olympic truce during the Salt Lake City Games.76

73

‘Bush to bomb through Olympics’, AP Online, 27 November 2001 UNGA/Res. 54/26, 29 November 1999 75 UNGA/Res. 56/75, 10 January 2002 76 ‘Greece considers U.S. debate over Olympic Truce a success’, Associated Press Newswires, 28 November 2001 74

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Alternative explanation It may be believed that the reluctance of states to observe the Olympic truce was related to the corruption scandals surrounding the bids for the organization of the Olympic Games. Potential host cities had provided favours to IOC members hoping to obtain the votes of these respective members. As these practices became publicly known the IOC was pressured by National Olympic Committees, Olympic corporate sponsors and also by western states to make some structural reforms (Roche, 2002: 172).

In chapter 2 it was described how some authors point to the negative consequences of being associated with an organization which is committed to commercialism (Roche, 2002: 176). The corruption scandal therefore seems a logical explanation for the reduced state support for the Olympic truce during the 2002 Games. However, this affair seems not to have been the reason for the changes in state support. Although the revelations of the briberies came to light in 1998, in November 1999 the Olympic truce resolution was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly. Furthermore it was pointed out above that in 2000 the truce ideal was adopted in the UN Millennium Declaration. It therefore is unlikely that the reduced state support in 2001 came forth of reluctance to be associated with the IOC. Moreover on September 6, 2001 the US Senate had proposed a draft resolution on the Olympic truce. Herein it expressed its support for the observance of the truce.

It called on the government to use the Olympic Truce as an instrument to promote peace and reconciliation in areas of conflict.77 At that time the American position was in favour of a cease-fire during the Salt Lake City Olympics. Yet, the events which occurred a few days later clearly changed the US position.

4.4 Recent developments The Olympic Games of Salt Lake City, and more importantly the terrorist attacks of September 11, formed a breakpoint for the Olympic truce project. The initial optimism and support surrounding the initiative faded at this instance. Accordingly the prominence of the truce in international politics lost its significance.

The ideal did not disappear completely after 2001. In 2003, 2005 and most recently in November 2007 resolutions were adopted by the UN General Assembly on the Olympic truce. However, the impact of the project has become very limited.

77

S/Res.126.ATS, 6 September 2001

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Therefore the functioning of the truce in this timeframe will only be mentioned shortly.

It is possible to observe some notable deviations in the UN resolutions presented before and after 2001. These differences are related to the used definition, the objectives and scope. Above it was described how the concept of Olympic truce was interpreted differently in 2001. No longer did the resolution call for an end of all hostilities during the Olympic Games. Conversely it referred to the truce as an assurance for the safe passage and participation of athletes and others at the Games.

The latter definition was also used in resolutions before the Olympic Games in Athens (2004) and Turin (2006). Hence, compared to the resolutions presented to the UN before 2001 the content is less far reaching.

Not only did the definition of the truce alter. In the resolutions it is possible to observe a shift in the objectives. Whereas during the 1990’s the truce was a goal in itself, in the resolutions presented after 2001 the truce is described as a means to promote a culture of peace. Originally, UN member states were urged to abide the truce. Since the Salt Lake City resolution the truce has become an instrument for the promotion of peace, dialogue and reconciliation in areas of conflict. Increasingly the Olympic truce has become a tool for development through sport. Consequently the scope of the truce has been enlarged. No longer is it limited to the period of the Olympic Games. Projects may be organized outside the Olympics. Furthermore the scope has also been enlarged in the sense that projects are not limited to the intergovernmental level. Local, regional and national conflicts do also receive attention.

The shift in international support for the truce resolution was a highly debated topic within the IOTF. However, this discussion has ceased. Erica Terpstra acknowledges that the Foundation has accepted this change: “If it turns out that the dream of promoting a peaceful society by sports can not be reached, you should broaden your goal. In that case safe passage and participation becomes the next best solution. A world wide cease-fire may not be reached, but we should maintain that ambition�.78 What may be concluded from the observations made in the previous paragraphs is that states proved to be more hesitant to live up to the demands of the Olympic movement as their priority had shifted towards the control of international 78

Appendix 1. Interview Erica Terpstra

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terrorism. The terrorist attacks in 2001 and the resulting state reactions put limitations on the Olympic peace ideal. Yet, this idea is in disagreement with the conclusions drawn in the report ‘16 Days, the role of the Olympic Truce in the toolkit for peace’, which appeared in 2004. In this report Briggs, McCarthy and Zorbas point at the opportunities for the IOC in solving conflicts between non-state actors. In a world characterized by conflicts which are no longer controlled by states, flexible mechanisms are needed which can operate both within and outside state structures.

The Olympic truce is presented as an example of such a mechanism with potential for conflict resolution (Briggs et al., 2004: 42). The neutrality of sport and the global recognition of the Olympics are crucial elements herein.

However, the authors did not include the changes in international support for the Olympic truce in their study. The alteration, to which the UN resolution on the truce has been subject, is not discussed. The report is therefore not comprehensive and consequently misses the shift made in international relations regarding the truce. It seems therefore to be all too optimistic to argue that the “Olympic Movement might become the ‘next great peace superpower’” as it is claimed in the report (Briggs et al., 2004: 60).

The most recent development surrounding the Olympic truce has been the acceptance of the resolution for the Olympic Games in Beijing by the General Assembly. Again the resolution was adopted without a vote by all UN member states.

The resolution contains the demand of a safe passage of all athletes. This resolution reflects the changed focus of the Olympic movement regarding the truce project. The truce initiative has become an instrument of dialogue and reconciliation.

Whereas initially the aim was the peaceful settlement of all international conflicts during the Olympic Games, in the latest resolution the aim is the creation of a culture of peace and harmony through the use of sport.79 The presentation of the truce resolution was accompanied by a speech by Jacques Rogge to the General Assembly. Herein reference was made to earlier ambitions of the Olympic movement to bring conflicts to a halt. “Sport alone cannot enforce or maintain peace”. Yet, the IOC President did also assert that sport “has a vital role to play in building a better and more peaceful world”.80 79

UNGA/Res. 62/45, 16 October 2007 Speech Jacques Rogge to the United Nations, 31 October 2007: http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_1250.pdf 80

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4.6 Conclusion Up until 2000 the Olympic truce was a highly popular topic among states. At the intergovernmental level the ideal was regularly discussed and observed. However, from 2001 onwards the Olympic movement has been forced to turn its focus towards peace initiatives on a micro scale. It may be argued that this has been the result of an increased dominance of states. International terrorism and the international response to it have left less space for the peace initiatives carried out by a non-governmental actor. The state focus on security has made it impossible for the Olympic movement to achieve a cease-fire during the Olympic Games.

As a result, the truce project is no longer as visible as it was before. The efforts to broker cease-fires among hostile factions became more covert. It is believed that this more restrained procedure increases the chances of success. Although states have remained the central actors in the focus of the IOC, increasingly the peace construction activities are undertaken at a lower level. These include activities organized by the IOTC in refugee camps.81 Nevertheless the Olympic movement has tried to keep the ideal of Olympic peace well-known among the larger public. In November 2001 the IOTF launched an initiative with the aim of showing the global support for the Olympic peace ideal. The Statement of World Personalities called on “world leaders, governments, and International Organizations, to give peace a chance and to agree to join efforts to use the Olympic Truce as an instrument to promote peace and reconciliation in areas of conflict and strife�.82 The statement is signed by heads of states, government leaders, high officials and other international personalities. Hence, the Olympic movement remained dedicated to the ideal of peace during the Olympic Games. As a direct result of the events in 2001 the Olympic movement has become more realistic in its objectives although the original ambition remains present.83 On the basis of the findings in this chapter it can be argued that states remain committed to the ideal of peace during the Olympic Games. Resolutions on the truce are accepted every two years by the General Assembly. Yet, despite this shared notion of appropriateness since 2001 states have not respected a period of peace during the Olympic Games. It turns out that the Olympic movement has not been able to 81

Appendix 1. Interview Erica Terpstra http://www.olympictruce.org/html/personalities_statements.html 83 Appendix 1. Interview Erica Terpstra 82

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convince states to adhere to the truce in its original sense. Although states and state leaders repeatedly voiced their support for the initiative, the observance of peace during the Olympics was no longer an option. Hence, even though states did see adherence to the Olympic truce as the appropriate way to act, the truce was not observed. Therefore, the constructivist hypothesis H1 should be rejected.

Neo-realist theory proves to be more convincing. The neo-realist hypothesis H2 on the Olympic truce, formulated in chapter 1, is accurately reflecting the role of national interest in the decision making of states. As national security was threatened, states were no longer willing to act in compliance to the demand of the Olympic movement. Neo-realists, with their focus on the importance of state interests, are well suited to explain these actions. It has been pointed out that these scholars believe that NGOs can exert influence on states at some occasions but when the interests of states are at stake, their influence is rather limited. Neo-realism argues that states will not act for reasons of appropriateness but instead they act in a way that yields the most beneficial outcomes. As the vital national interests were at stake after the September 11 attacks, states did not comply with the demand of Olympic peace. Analysis of the truce project since 2001 does show that the efforts undertaken by the Olympic movement did not result in observance of the truce. This diminished state support can accurately be explained by neo-realist theory.

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Conclusion The objectives of this study have been two-fold. First, to examine the results which have been obtained by the Olympic truce project and second, to review the factors which play a role in the formation of state behaviour. In the final chapter I will summarize the empirical and theoretical findings. In chapter 1, hypotheses were formed on the observance of the truce from the perspective of constructivist theory and neo-realist theory. In this final chapter it is reviewed which hypothesis poses the best explanation of the positioning of states concerning the Olympic truce in international relations.

Working of the truce In chapter 3 the results of the truce initiative in the 1990s were reviewed. On a number of occasions the Olympic truce has been adhered to since 1992. In 1994 a cease-fire was agreed by Bosnian and Serbian troops during the Lillehammer Games.

The siege of Sarajevo ceased at this occasion. Four years later, in the run-up to the Nagano winter Games, the IOC tried to avert an intervention by the United States in Iraq. In a statement the US administration affirmed its compliance to the truce during the Olympic Games. In both instances the Olympic truce created an ease in the tensions. In Yugoslavia, UNICEF used the temporary cease-fire to vaccinate children in Sarajevo. In Iraq, Kofi Annan was able to broker a deal with Saddam Hussein in February 1998. Thus the aforementioned examples can be treated as successes of the Olympic truce ideal. States did act in accordance with the truce on a number of occasions.

However, it seems that the Olympic truce was not the only factor which contributed to a cease-fire. In both cases there have been other international political factors which have had an impact on the behaviour of states. In scholarly literature on these cease-fires the Olympic Games are hardly mentioned.

In this thesis six initiatives on the Olympic truce were closely reviewed. Only in 1994 and 1998 the truce seems to have been observed successfully. In 2000 the Olympic truce was not implemented in its original sense. The Olympic movement did not strive for a cease-fire among hostile factions but the truce ideal was used to bring the two Korea’s together at the opening ceremony in Sydney. Therefore the 2000

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Olympic Games can be said to have been an example of the influence of the Olympic peace ideal although other factors did also contribute to this result.

In 1992 and 1996 the truce was a clear failure. At the former occasion the war in Yugoslavia continued. Serbs, Bosnians and Croats remained engaged in fighting despite the efforts made by the IOC to include athletes from these countries in the Barcelona Games. At the occasion of Atlanta 1996 a cease-fire was brokered in Afghanistan but this armistice did not manage to hold. A bombing of the UNICEF head quarters in Kabul signified the unwillingness of hostile factions to adhere to the truce.

Thus the truce has been successful in only a limited number of cases. Even in these cases the truce did not result in a world wide cease-fire during the Olympics.

The focus of the initiative has been limited to a number of conflicts. The Olympic movement has paid specific attention to certain conflicts while others raged on. Why certain conflicts have been prioritized by the IOC may be a point of further research.

It has become clear that the consequences of the September 11 attacks have been felt by the Olympic movement as well. Not only did security issues become a new priority, the Olympic truce project was equally hindered. No longer did states agree to the UN resolution calling for a complete end of hostilities during the Olympic Games. In a revision of the text the objective shifted towards peaceful participation.

This was a significant alteration of the original ambition.

Nonetheless state support has not completely disappeared. Numerous statements have been made by state leaders since 2001 wherein they speak out in favour of the truce initiative. The Olympic movement launched a programme which uniquely aimed at showing global support for the peace ideal. In the Statement of World Personalities in Support of the Truce, prominent people stated their willingness to adhere to the truce. It can be said that the Olympic truce has become a global declared intention.

Formation of state behaviour We have seen that states did act in accordance with the Olympic truce at different occasions but equally that from 2001 onwards states became reluctant to adhere to the peace ideals. In this study we are particularly interested in the causes of this state behaviour. Two possible answers were formulated at the end of chapter 1. The constructivist hypothesis H1 claims that states will adhere to the Olympic truce for 59

reasons of appropriateness. On the other hand, neo-realists would assert that states do only adhere to the Olympic truce at occasions when it is not in disagreement with their vital national interest.

It has been pointed out that constructivism emphasises the role of norms.

According to this school of thought norms can influence the identity and interests of states (Checkel, 1998). From this perspective the positioning of states concerning the Olympic truce can be regarded as the direct effect of a norm of Olympic peace.

Norms are believed to set a standard of appropriate behaviour, they can regulate behaviour by prescribing certain actions while disapproving others. The norm of Olympic peace has performed this function during the 1990s by creating a sense of “oughtness” among states (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). The signing of the Olympic truce resolution by all members of the UN can be explained by pointing to the collective notion of appropriateness among states. All resolutions on the Olympic truce have been adopted without a vote. States did support the truce initiative because it was believed to be the appropriate way to act. Even though it was not in the direct interest of states, they did adhere to the demand of the IOC on different occasions.

The Olympic movement is a clear example of a norm entrepreneur. It is an organization which has been able to socialize states. By promotion of the Olympic truce it has aimed at setting a standard of appropriate behaviour. Its goal is worldwide adherence to the truce and hereby it aims at generating a norm of Olympic peace. It can be argued that this norm of Olympic peace has successfully passed the phase of emergence and the phase of acceptance during the 1990’s. The movement has successfully introduced a new idea in international relations and has been able to socialize states to live up to the truce on different occasions. In a rather short period of time it has created familiarity with the Olympic truce among states and within international organizations. The norm was institutionalized in international relations at an early stage. It was included in General Assembly resolutions and in the UN Millennium Declaration. Hence, it can be argued that the norm of Olympic peace has successfully passed the phase of emergence and the phase of acceptance during the 1990’s.

Yet, the norm did not reach the final phase in the evolution of norms, which is internalization by state actors. Since 2001 states have shown to be reluctant to live up to the Olympic truce in its original sense. The UN resolution on the truce was altered

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as states did no longer feel bound to the demand of peace by the Olympic movement.

As a result the Olympic truce lost its initial prominence.

Neo-realist scholars criticize this constructivist attention for norms in the formation of state behaviour. These theorists would argue that the Olympic truce has only been able to exert influence at times wherein it did not harm state interests. As long as it does not weaken their security position, states are willing to conform to the ideal. However, this adherence is not the result of a notion of appropriateness, rather it is based on a rational calculation. Neo-realists perceive the international system as a hostile environment wherein the main objective of states is survival. This anarchic structure is given and forces states to act in a self-interested manner (Waltz, 1990).

State behaviour is explained by using a logic of consequence. States are acting on rational purposes, therefore it is not important to act in a way which is believed to be appropriate or good. The aim is to maximize their interest (Simon, 1985).

Summing-up Constructivist theory is well able to explain the working of the Olympic truce during the 1990’s. The initial support for the initiative points out that the Olympic movement has been able to influence state behaviour. States were socialized to adhere to the demand of peace. Although alternative explanations can also be given for some of these state actions, it tells that states were sensitive to the demands of the Olympic movement. It was pointed out that states did adhere to the initiative at different times even though it was not in their direct interest. At these occasions it was a normative judgment that made states willing to live up to the truce. Even at times when national interests were at stake, peace during the Olympics was highly valued. It can be said that states did observe the Olympic truce for reasons of appropriateness. Hence, constructivism can explain the support for the truce at different occasions during the 1990’s. The constructivist hypothesis H1 on the Olympic truce offers a satisfying explanation of this timeframe.

However, since 2001 the ideal of Olympic peace has lost its initial prominence. States remain willing to speak out their support for the initiative but they are not keen on actually stopping military actions during the Olympic Games. The alteration of the UN resolution on the truce, which has taken place in the run-up to the Salt Lake City Games, points out that national interests dominate the decision making

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of states. The peace initiative set up by the Olympic movement has become secondary to concerns regarding security.

Whereas initially constructivism was more convincing in explaining state actions in relation to the Olympic truce, since 2001 neo-realism with its emphasis on the national interest is best suited to explain the positioning by states. Structural realists may correctly point to the changes which have occurred in the UN resolutions on the Olympic truce. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, states did no longer adhere to a truce resolution as far-reaching as it was before. Military action in Afghanistan during the Salt Lake City Winter Games, aimed at creating international security, was in breach of the Olympic peace ideal. In 2001 the resolution on the Olympic truce presented to the General Assembly was less far reaching than on earlier occasions. This was the direct result of pressure applied by the American government.

This example points out that the Olympic movement cannot operate outside the influence of states. The movement’s acceptance of a weaker resolution is exemplar for the centrality of states. To neo-realists, non-governmental organizations are subject to the interests of states. They are limited to the boundaries which are set by states.

Consequently the neo-realist hypothesis H2 which claims that states will only adhere to the Olympic truce if it does not harm their vital national interests, seems to be a proper reflection of the functioning of the truce project.

The Olympic truce project was launched in 1990. An ancient ideal was revived and obtained remarkable successes in the following decade. Yet, the unprecedented events of September 11 2001 brought this optimism to a halt. The capabilities of the Olympic movement were severely limited as national security proved to be the dominant factor in international relations. Once more, a period of peace for the duration of the Olympic Games has become a distant ideal.

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Appendix

1. Interview Erica Terpstra, Member IOTF

Papendal, Tuesday 10 July 2007, 13:30-14:00 U was dit jaar aanwezig bij de vergadering van het IOTF in Olympia (Griekenland). Wat is daar besproken?

“De voorzitter van het IOTF, Papandreou, heeft een update gegeven van wat hij heeft gedaan. Hij heeft een professioneel apparaat en doet daar veel voorwerk voor. Er is gesproken over de resolutie van de Verenigde Naties en de spreekbeurt die Rogge gaat houden voor de Algemene Vergadering.

Ook is er gesproken over andere activiteiten die kunnen worden ondernomen.

Bijvoorbeeld Olympische educatie met de Olympic Truce als onderwerp. Het IOTF onderneemt allerlei activiteiten op klein niveau, daar begint het mee.

Het idee is dat als je elkaar diplomatiek niet meer weet te vinden dat je elkaar in de sport kan vinden, de samenkomst van Zuid-Korea en Noord-Korea is daar het beste voorbeeld van. Maar door de Olympic truce is het ook mogelijk om strijdende partijen in Afrika die elkaar niet meer weten te vinden via de diplomatieke weg naast elkaar te zetten. Bijvoorbeeld over de situatie in Darfur wordt door de Foundation gepraat namens het IOC.” Als we de VN resoluties over de Olympic Truce bekijken, zien we dat na de aanslagen op 11 september een verandering heeft plaats gevonden in de inhoud van deze resolutie. Hoe is dat binnen het IOTF ontvangen?

“Daarover is binnen het IOTF discussie geweest. Er is de droom en er is de realiteit, je moet proberen een balans te vinden. Als je de droom hebt om via sport een vredevolle samenleving te bewerkstelligen en daar komt geen bal van terecht, dan moet je proberen om je doel te verbreden. Een realistischer doelstelling is dan nodig. Veilig reizen en veilig deelnemen is dan next best.

We streven naar de steun van staatshoofden om het idee van de truce neer te zetten.

Een staakt het vuren kan niet wereldwijd worden bereikt. Maar we moeten het wel blijven nastreven. Dat is de onderliggende gedachte van de truce en dat laten we niet los.

De veranderingen komen door internationale gebeurtenissen en het besef dat er een slag verder moet worden gemaakt die ook wat betekent. Anders worden we een praatgroep.”

Betekent dit dat we geen initiatieven meer zullen zien om groepen op het hoogste politieke niveau samen te brengen?

“Nee, niet zichtbaar maar in wandelgangen gebeurt dat nog wel. Als je tevoren van de daken staat te schreeuwen dat je bezig bent met een poging om leiders bij elkaar te brengen dan lukt het niet. Dan heeft iedereen zich al ingegraven. Dat is een reëlere benadering maar de ambitie blijft dezelfde.”

Voor 2001 kon de Olympic Truce rekenen op grote steun van staten. Na de aanslagen van 11 september hebben staten ander belangen.

“Dat is de realiteit. We proberen daar iets aan te doen maar zonder partij te kiezen.

Lukt dat dan is dat mooi meegenomen, lukt dat niet dan is dat de realiteit. We kunnen niet anders, dat is in de praktijk gebleken. Maar je moet wel de ambitie hebben. Als de sport die ambitie niet heeft wie dan wel?”

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Hoe verklaart u de politieke successen van het IOC in jaren ’90 “De kracht van het IOC is een netwerk en lobby die bijna niemand kan weerstaan. Het IOTF heeft een enorme potentie. Dat komt vooral omdat de kracht van sport zo groot is.

Er zijn veel contactmomenten met staatshoofden en regeringsleiders. Ten tijde van opening Olympische Spelen zijn bijna alle regeringsleiders of hun vertegenwoordigers aanwezig. Dat zijn momenten waarop gelobbyd kan worden.”

Hoe worden de contacten met overheden onderhouden?

“Dan bevind je je op het niveau van Jacques Rogge, IOC leden en de NOC’s. Daar houdt het IOTF zich niet mee bezig. Het IOC is een positieve autoriteit en is politiek neutraal. Haar kracht zit ook in de mensen. De leden hebben internationale allure. Het is een heel sterke lobby groep.”

Wordt het IOTF van buiten af benaderd om in conflicten een oplossing te bieden?

“Ja, maar dan kan ik met het oog op de Olympische Spelen in Peking niets over zeggen. Overigens is dat meer het IOC dan het IOTF.” Samaranch was een voortrekker van het Olympic Truce initiatief. Hoe is de betrokkenheid van Jacques Rogge?

“Rogge is voorzitter van het IOTF en maakt daar veel tijd voor vrij. Hij heeft dezelfde drive als Samaranch. Rogge heeft een andere positie als voorzitter van het IOC. Hij geldt minder als het gezicht van beweging maar hij heeft de autoriteit waarmee hij zichtbaar boven partijen kan staan.”

Het IOC streeft naar een scheiding van sport en politiek, de Olympic truce lijkt daarmee in conflict.

“Nee, de core-business van het IOC is niet het bedrijven van partijpolitiek. Bij de organisatie van internationale evenementen is de core-business het zorgen voor goede faciliteiten voor mensen die aan sport doen.

Sport is een belangrijke activiteit in de samenleving en dus sluiten wij onze ogen niet voor wat er overal gebeurt. Voorzover het geen partijpolitiek is zetten wij ons daar voor in. Dat wil zeggen dat bijvoorbeeld de milieuorganisatie van de VN het IOC een prijs heeft gegeven voor de aandacht voor het milieu. Maar sport is de core-business.

NGOs die aandacht hebben voor de mensenrechten situatie en politieke situatie leggen wij niets in de weg. Wij stellen hen in staat informatie te overleggen aan onze partners, bijvoorbeeld sporters. Maar wij zijn geen tool van deze belangenorganisaties. Wij kiezen geen partij in een conflict. Wat wij proberen is het samenbrengen van strijdende partijen en proberen om daar een oplossing voor te vinden, zonder dat de één de ander dat oplegt. Dat is bijvoorbeeld gebeurd in de kwestie Noord-Korea en Zuid-Korea. Maar ook in Afrika en in vluchtelingen kampen.”

In hoeverre zet de Chinese overheid zich in voor de Olympic truce met het oog op de Spelen van 2008 in Beijing?

“Peking is gezwicht onder de politieke druk omtrent Darfur. De Chinezen zijn bezig op grote schaal politiek te bedrijven in Afrika. Zij leveren wapens aan alles en iedereen in ruil voor invloed en in ruil voor delfstoffen. Zij doen dat dus ook met

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landen die door ons allemaal worden gemeden, dus ook Sudan. Vervolgens is er grote internationale druk geweest op China. Aanvankelijk hebben zij zich hiervoor doof gehouden maar die wapenleveranties zijn inmiddels gestaakt.”

In hoeverre heeft het IOC hier een rol in gespeeld?

“Daar kan ik niets over zeggen.”

Hoe ziet u de toekomst van de Olympic truce?

“Het is een proces, hoe belangrijker de sport in onze samenleving gaat worden, dan denk ik dat dit soort dingen ook steeds belangrijker worden.

Ik denk dat het aan slagkracht gaat winnen. Omdat het intrinsiek een aantal dingen in zich heeft. Dat is respect voor elkaar, geen direct partij kiezen. Dat is de enige manier waarop je met elkaar in dialoog kan gaan. En het heeft ook te maken met een apel aan het gevoel van Fair Play.

Ik heb het als Olympiër zelf erg sterk meegemaakt. Zelf ging ik naar de Spelen tijdens de Koude Oorlog in 1960 en 1964. Opeens voel je je zo’n wereldburger. Voor mij was dat de grootste ervaring die er was. In Athene kwamen hockeyers naar me toe en die vertelden me hoe mooi ze het vonden om in het Olympisch dorp aan te schuiven bij Syriërs, mensen uit Palestina, Joden. Waarom kan dat daarbuiten niet?”

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