Do We Have an Obligation to Protect Cultural Heritage?

BY QUINCE PAN

Ahistoric building, a traditional craft, an endangeredlanguage objectsofcultural heritage that give us reasons to protect them. We recoil when we see people destroy an ancient monument without good reason. We feel indignant when a construction company digs up a Roman artefact and puts it back into the pit instead of handing it over to the local museum. Our indignation seems justified supported by legitimate reason. Do we have an obligation to protect cultural heritage? And if we do, what kind of obligationisit?

Becauseofthesignificanceofmoralnorms (vis-à-vis norms of etiquette or rules of a game),itispopulartoseemoralobligation as the archetypal form of obligation, with other kinds of obligation (e.g., legal, political) being either comparable or reducible to moral obligation. Furthermore, it is popular to see all moral obligations as “directed”, “bipolar”, or “second-personal”: owed to people, be theyindividualsorgroups.Onthisaccount, moral obligations are closely associated with claim rights, because one’s moral obligation to φ arises when people are entitled to one’s φ-ing, and thus one wrongs (and warrants blame from and an apologyto)thesepeoplebyfailingto φ.

Suppose that we have such a moral obligation to protectculturalheritage.The people with the strongest claim right to cultural heritage would be the ones most involved with cultural heritage. But who might they be? Looking at the past, one possibility is the creators of heritage objects. But it seems strange that they have a right to the persistence of their creationsevenbeyondtheirdeath.Indeed, “heritage” is a term we apply to objects with historical value, and at the are time of creation, these objects have no historicalvalue.

Looking at the present, one possibility is the contemporaneous beneficiaries of cultural heritage. On this view, we wrong present-day appreciators of cultural heritage if we do not protect heritage objects. But again it seems strange that one has a right to the persistence of a heritageobjectmerelybyvaluingit.

A more promising possibility is the contemporaneous “managers” of cultural heritage, such as the wearers of a traditional costume or the speakers of an endangered language. These managers of cultural heritage have a greater interest in aheritageobjectbecausetheyarenotonly beneficiaries of the object, but also the very people who maintain the heritage object. It is controversial whether people can own heritage objects (e.g., Balinese dance) like property (Matthes, 2018). But, arguendo, let us assume so, for we do speak of cultural objects as theirs

Balinese dance not only as dance originating fromBali,but also the Balinese people’s dance.

Given that managers of heritage objects havearightto theirpersistencebyowning them,whatmightthisrightbe?Anobvious candidate is property rights, because they generate obligations owed to the managers. But there is a mismatch: while property rights secure protection against theft and mischief, they do not secure protection againstneglect.

Despite this mismatch, one might insist that although our obligation to protect heritage objects is different from our obligation to protect property, this difference is one of degree, not kind. On this objection, the Taliban wronged the Bamiyan Valleytribespeoplebydestroying the Bamiyan Buddhas qua the tribespeople’s property, and the Bamiyan Buddhas’ heritage being merely aggravated was not the source of the wronging. However, we would still blame the Bamiyan tribespeople if they themselves had destroyed the Bamiyan Buddhas (presumably their property) indiscriminately, although we would not blame someone who rips his jeans indiscriminately. Furthermore, we would still blame people who indiscriminately destroy archaeological artefacts with no associated manager.

In any case, just like mere appreciators, it seems strange that the managers of a heritage object have any right to its persistence at all. What makes me, a weareroftraditionalJavanese batik fabric, entitled to its persistence in such a way thatobligeshumanityingeneraltoprotect it?

Lookingatthefuture,onepossibilityisthe future custodians of cultural heritage. Turning ourattention to thefutureis wellmotivated, for the very purpose of protecting heritage objects is to ensure their persistence into the future. Moreover,peopleoftensaythattheywant to protect cultural heritage (e.g., heirlooms) “for posterity”, suggesting that future generations stand to benefit in some way from the protection of heritage objects. But howmight future generations benefit from heritage objects, and by virtue of what might future generations havea right toheritageobjects?

Themoststraightforward answer,inspired by environmental ethics, is to link future generations’ benefits and rights, for these benefits are the most salient possible ground of any claim to heritage objects. This answer lends itself to an interest theory of rights, whereby a right is generated by an interest significant enough to warrant safeguarding and enforcement. Thus, future generations may have a right to heritage objects’ persistence because the appreciation of heritageobjectsmaybesofundamentalto theirwell-beingthattheyhaveasignificant interest in the availability of heritage objects.

Butthisanalogywithenvironmentalethics is questionable. Failing to protect the environment will threaten the lives of future generations, whereas failing to protect cultural heritage will only deprive future generations of many heritage objects.Itisdoubtfulhowculturalheritage canbeaninterestsosignificantaslifeitself astogenerateasimilarright.Furthermore, I have hitherto assumed that past and future humans have any rights at all, but even that is contested (Griffith, 2017). If future generations’ right to life hangs in thebalance,culturalheritagewillnotstand achance.

Moreover,therelationshipbetweenfuture generations’ right to cultural heritage, if any, and our present-day obligation to protect cultural heritage is tenuous.

Assuming ought-implies-can, it is untenable for us to have an obligation to protect all heritage objects, for it is an impossible task. We must prioritise protecting some heritage objects over others. This relies on our judgment of which heritageobjects areexemplary, and even which objects count as heritage objects in the first place. Such judgment is based on neither the interests of future generations nor certainly their input, but our assessment of historical significance. Such judgment is also irreversibleonce we have chosen which objects to be labelled as “heritage objects” and thus protected, and which objects to be left to neglect or destruction. Therefore, it is unclear how the fulfilment of our obligation to protect cultural heritage serves future generations’ interests.

Altogether, the case for our obligation to protectculturalheritagebeingamoralone isunpromising.

When we recoil upon seeing people destroy an ancient monument, we are not primarily concerned about future generations being deprived of the monument, but rather the value of the monument qua heritageobject.

Value gives rise to obligations because valuefurnishesuswithdeonticreasonsfor appropriate responses to value (e.g., recognition, respect, non-interference, protection), neglect of which is blameworthy. Given the difficulties of construingthevalueofculturalheritagein moral terms, I further contend that if the value of cultural heritage and thus our obligationtoprotectit isnon-moral,itis aesthetic (old-world charm, perhaps). But howdoes theaesthetic valueofaheritage objectarise?

One answer is that a heritage object has intrinsic aestheticvalue:aestheticvalueby virtue of the object’s properties, independent of our reactive attitudes towards those properties. This is a highly controversialposition.Butifit iscorrect,it settles the matter: heritage objects have aesthetic value whether we like it or not, and we have an aesthetic obligation to protectculturalheritage.

A moreinteresting and plausibleansweris that a heritage object has aesthetic value by virtue of people’s valuing it aesthetically. Some have levelled this line of argument against the idea of a sui generis aesthetic obligation (Dyck, 2021; Matheson & Milam, 2021). Because the source of an object’s aesthetic value is peoples’ aestheticresponse totheobject’s properties and not the object’s properties per se, and any obligation which arises fromvalueisowedtothesourceorbearer of value, thus, they conclude, weoweit to the valuers of a heritage object, or even the heritage object itself, to protect it. Voilà,amoralobligationafterall.

However, the fact that appreciators of a heritage object are the source of the heritage object’s aesthetic value does not implythattheyhavearighttotheheritage object.Nordoesitimplythatbyconferring aesthetic value upon the heritage object, we also confer interests and rights upon the heritage object, such that we have a moral obligation to protect the heritage object that is owed to the heritage object. In short, the second premise that any obligation which arises from valueisowed to the source or bearer of value is dubious, for it presupposes that all value generates directed obligations, which are moralinnature.

Therefore, our obligation to protect culturalheritageisanaesthetic,notmoral, one.Fourremarksfollow.

First, none of this precludes the intertwining of different kinds of value. A heritage object (e.g., a historic nature reserve) may instantiate both aesthetic and moral value, such that we have both aesthetic and moral obligations to protect it.

Second, because of its greater intuitive appeal, cultural heritage is a more promising example of aesthetic obligation than highfalutin fine art. Many arguments against aesthetic obligations cite fine art, which is deemed too detached from ordinary people to be conceivable of imposing obligations on them. Cultural heritage poses a challenge to these arguments.

Third, aesthetic and other obligations are not just incommensurable but incomparable. If all obligation is, or is reducible to, moral obligation, one can appeal to a meta-ethical view (e.g., hedonism) to adjudicate between conflicting obligations although a metric is unavailable. Obligations would still be comparable, albeit incommensurable. But astodifferentkindsofobligations,thereis no overarching principle to compare them against. Thus, in a dilemma between obligations of different kinds, the grounds ofeach areinsufficienttodefeattheother obligation. In the end, we simply choose, andincurjustifiedblamefortheobligation thatweomit.

Fourth, as the saying goes, “one person’s modusponens isanother’s modustollens”. My argument merely establishes the conditional, and is committed to neither the antecedent nor consequent. Thus, my view is compatible with the denial of aesthetic obligations and the corresponding denial of our obligation to protectculturalheritage.

References

Dyck, J. (2021) ‘There are no purely aesthetic obligations’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,102(4),pp.592–612.

Griffith, A. M. (2017) ‘The rights of future persons and the ontology of time’, Journal ofSocialPhilosophy,48(1),pp.58–70.

Matheson, B., & Milam, P.-E. (2021) ‘The case against non-moral blame’, in M. Timmons (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Matthes,E.H.(2018)‘Theethicsofcultural heritage’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.12July.