A Critique of Locke: on the Basis of Species

BY KORUSH LEONARDO CASILLAS-RIVERA

Is nature a compass for morality? If something exists in a purely natural state, does this assume an attachment of moral correctness? What exactly is a ‘state of pure nature’? Can the ‘natural order’ be changed at the hands of the right species? At what point can a species eject itself from the confines of natural order and the pool of resources Earth has provided? And even if mankind, as a collective, does not regard itself as part of that pool, what gives us the right to then appropriateitasweplease?

John Locke’s Second Treatise (1689) offers us a particularly interesting perspective as we navigate these difficult questions. Locke’s claims on the rights humans have over the resources of Earth are heavily influenced by the general consensus of human exceptionalism. This article analyses some of the most problematic aspects of Locke’s thought.

Locke posits a fundamental belief that the resources earth produces, and the animals that depend on them, belong to mankind collectively. In his First Treatise, Locke argues that mankind has been afforded this right to use the fruits of earth and its creatures by God, who imbues man with a natural desire for self-preservation. Furthermore, God planted reason in man, and the understanding that in pursuing his self-preservation, he pursues the Will of God (I.86). In sum, Locke’s belief that humans are separate and above the pool of Earth’s resources is based on their unique faculties of reason, which allow us to contemplate God. However, he also posits that this desire to preserve mankind is a “naturalinclination”.

Some questions emerge from Locke’s argument that the purpose of reason is not to interpret God’s laws of nature, but rather to ‘assure’ and ‘teach’ humanity that it is in fact true. When Locke writes that the law of nature is unwritten and found only in the “minds of men”, does he not imply that God’s desire and Will relies on humanity’s capacity to reason and think, as opposed to existing omnipotently? And, if God’s nature does exist omnipotently, the question of whether reason exists becomes irrelevant, because following the Will of God is a “natural inclination” and therefore not something that can be interpreted subjectively by any form of reason.

In ‘Lyons and Tigers and Wolves’, Jishnu Guha-Majumador argues that faculties of reason allows humans to discover and interpret natural law. This raises the question of how natural law could initially declare man’s right to non-humans. (p.646). Moreover, in the First Treatise, Lockehighlightstheinstinctiveratherthan intellectualcharacterofanimalnature.The natural fear that animals have of man is proof that they ought to be dominated by mankind. However, the concept of reason thatplaceshumanityaboveanimalsistheir reason to understand God and not reason in itself and that their understanding of reason in this context is that they are simply self-aware of their “natural inclination” to preserve themselves. Thus, in Locke’s account, humans and animals find themselves in a state of ‘primordial equality’, defined by the clashing desire of self-preservation in their original states (Wadiwel, War Against Animals, p.152; Guhu-Majumador). From a moral perspective, it is clear that simply being aware of one’s “natural” inclination does not justify the subjugation of all other creatures.Rather,Lockeusesthisrationale to justify humanity’s collective ability to dominate and use animals for their own preservation.

Movingforward,letus,inthisinstance,say thattheabilitytoreasonhasvalueinitself andthatLocke,insomeaspect,wascorrect to push its importance - even separate from God. Guha-Majumador correctly posits that for Locke, dominion over animals is the basis of human equality (p.644). This binary between dominance and subordination relies on Locke’s presupposition that humans are able to reason. In his Essays on Education (3.11.16), Locke expressly defined man as a “corporeal rational creature”. Waldron finds Locke’s definition problematic, pointing out that animals too have the ability to reason. However, where Locke dismisses the distinction of ‘man’ and insteadreferstothosethatareofaspecific level of rationality, he argues that rationality exists on a spectrum which frustratestheneedforequalitytoestablish a binary distinction between those that belong to a class, and those that do not (Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, p.72). Summarily, Locke is wrong to argue that subjection to dominance and subordination is determined on the basis ofreasonorrationality,whenthebinaryof what can and cannot reason is arbitrary, evenonthebasisofLocke’s Christianbelief that God elected man to exercise dominion.

It is arguable that Locke himself undermines the consequential value he places in being human, where he posits that man is nothing but a ‘corporeal rational creature”. Suppose apigwasborn with thelevelof rationality Locke believed to entitle him to be subject and protected by law, would we consider that pig a man, ratherthanapig?Further,howdowedraw a line on how rational one must be to be consideredworthyofprotectionunderthe law? Is it then legitimate to subordinate thedisabled?

The impossibility of objectively determining rationality has controversial implications throughout history, including the subordination of women. Stacey Clifford’s work on the ‘capacity contract’ makes this point, arguing that by placing pre-eminent value on reason and rationality in the context of powerdynamics empowers a select few, at the expense of the many (Clifford, 2014, 97). Any attempts to establish differential capacityamonghumanbeings,sheargues, will undermine progress towards equality (p.643).

Interestingly, in his Essays on Education, Locke himself questions the concept of ‘thinking’. He writes that we have few perspectives that ultimately distinguish us from all other beings (E.4.2.23). GuhaMajumador argues that here Locke raises the prospect of a non-human-centred universe (p.643) in the case that a creature with more advanced faculties than humansisdiscovered.

Guha-Majumador asks an appropriate question – how can Locke construct a political order defined by species-based equality, when the object of equality itself isquestionable?Sherightlyintuitsthatitis arbitrary to assign binary roles of subordinationanddominanceon thebasis of a subjective spectrum of reason/ rationality and, more importantly, the concept of reason and rationality is too complex in itself to truly assign any form offundamentalorintrinsicvalue.

Ultimately, equality on the basis of an arbitraryspectrumofrationalitycannotbe justified if one is to assign position hierarchically.Ifoneistobelieveatallthat equality exists on the basis that rationality/reason is valued, that equality must stretch to any being that possesses, even in the smallest capacity, what we consider to be reason. Though, even this comes with its inherent flaws - at what point can a being be said to possess even the slightest parcel of reason? These answers are, naturally, unclear and thus relates to the purpose of this article - to question the very fibre of what our morality is based on before coming to any concreteconclusioninourperspective.We must constantly challenge the way we perceive the world around us rather than adheringto arbitrarywaysofthinking.

References

Clifford, S. ‘The Capacity Contract: Locke, Disability, and the Political Exclusion of ‘Idiots”, Politics, Groups and Identities, 2(1),pp.97