A Critique of Locke: on the Basis of Species BY KORUSH LEONARDO CASILLAS-RIVERA
Is nature a compass for morality? If something exists in a purely natural state, does this assume an attachment of moral correctness? What exactly is a ‘state of pure nature’? Can the ‘natural order’ be changed at the hands of the right species? At what point can a species eject itself from the confines of natural order and the pool of resources Earth has provided? And even if mankind, as a collective, does not regard itself as part of that pool, what gives us the right to then appropriate it as we please? John Locke’s Second Treatise (1689) offers us a particularly interesting perspective as we navigate these difficult questions. Locke’s claims on the rights humans have over the resources of Earth are heavily influenced by the general consensus of human exceptionalism. This article analyses some of the most problematic aspects of Locke’s thought. Locke posits a fundamental belief that the resources earth produces, and the animals that depend on them, belong to mankind collectively. In his First Treatise, Locke argues that mankind has been afforded this right to use the fruits of earth and its creatures by God, who imbues man with a natural desire for self-preservation. Furthermore, God planted reason in man, and the understanding that in pursuing his self-preservation, he pursues the Will of God (I.86). In sum, Locke’s belief that humans are separate and above the pool of Earth’s resources is based on their unique faculties of reason, which allow us to contemplate God. However, he also posits that this desire to preserve mankind is a “natural inclination”.
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Some questions emerge from Locke’s argument that the purpose of reason is not to interpret God’s laws of nature, but rather to ‘assure’ and ‘teach’ humanity that it is in fact true. When Locke writes that the law of nature is unwritten and found only in the “minds of men”, does he not imply that God’s desire and Will relies on humanity’s capacity to reason and think, as opposed to existing omnipotently? And, if God’s nature does exist omnipotently, the question of whether reason exists becomes irrelevant, because following the Will of God is a “natural inclination” and therefore not something that can be interpreted subjectively by any form of reason.
