16 minute read
U.S. SPACE COMMAND STILL DEFINING THE WILD BLUE YONDER
By Arthur G. Sharp
Advertisement
When the newly created U.S. Air Force adopted "The U.S. Air Force" as its official song in 1947 few people envisioned what its opening two lines, “Off we go into the wild blue yonder, climbing high into the sun” would mean in the future. There was no concept of how far the “wild blue yonder’s” parameters spread or how high toward the sun Air Force fliers would soar. Those parameters began taking shape on September 1, 1982, when the U.S. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) was activated. They have yet to be defined finitely, although the AFSPC itself has disappeared into the sun.
The possibility of using space as a battlefield—or anything else—was practically unthinkable until October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, the first artificial Earth satellite. That achievement set in motion a race among nations and commercial ventures to implement their own
space programs. Their initial intentions were good but they soon created problems, and space became a veritable junk yard for orbiting satellites.
By 2018 the Air Force Space Command, the nation’s “space cop,” which was responsible for tracking space junk, was issuing hundreds of alerts daily to warn satellite operators of possible collisions. About 75 percent of the 1,400 satellites orbiting Earth at that time were maneuverable and were moved every three days on average to avert potential collisions. Monitoring those satellites was not what the U.S. government had in mind when it established the AFSPC.
Initially, the program was designed to explore space for peaceful reasons. It was inevitable, however, that military planners would investigate space’s potential as a battlefield, despite a Soviet Radio warning in 1966 that “All of mankind is interested in barring the road toward transforming space into an arena of military rivalries.” U.S. political and military leaders saw a need for an agency to “police” space to establish g
dominance in whatever it entailed. Enter the AFSPC, which did the job for 37 years until it was replaced in 2019.
The original philosophy and mission of the command were simple. It was created to protect the U.S.’s interest in “near” and “orbital” space, protect its right to self-defense, and deter other countries from assuming military domination there. (“Near” space is an area up to about 80,000 feet above Earth, and is considered by the Air Force as part of a country’s sovereign territory. “Orbital” space, the next layer up, is open to everyone for any purpose. They are both part of “geopolitical” space, which entails the interests of the many countries represented above Earth.) The command’s founders believed, in theory at least, that the organization’s primary purpose was deterrence, not militarization. They had to walk a fine line to achieve that goal due to the constraints of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which conflicted with some Air Force visionaries’ concepts of a U.S. space center.
Some Air Force leaders in 1967 foresaw the day when America's global striking force would be controlled from a huge maneuverable command post in space. Their views were more in line with early science writers like Jules Verne and H. G. Wells than reality. They saw the post as the only survivable command and control structure that could protect government and military leaders.
Should such a space-borne command post become necessary, they speculated, it would have to be large enough to carry all electronic gear required to gather, process and disseminate operational information on a global basis. And, it would have to be capable of defending itself against any interference or attacks from the ground or in space. That may have been “pie in the sky” thinking, but they were not far off from the structure of the actual AFSPC when it became a reality fifteen years later—in line with the Outer Space Treaty’s guidelines.
The agreement, officially known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was a multilateral treaty that formed the basis of international space law. It had been negotiated and drafted under the auspices of the United Nations and opened for signature in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on January 27, 1967. The agreement entered into force on October 10, 1967. As of February 2021, 111 countries, including all major spacefaring nations, had become parties to the treaty. Another 23 were are signatories. The treaty influenced the Space Command’s early operations.g
AFSPC’s initial major responsibilities included overseeing the Air Force’s worldwide network of space surveillance and missile warning sites, supervising the research, development, acquisition, and launch of satellites, creating a technology center, conducting a space medicine study, and implementing a space education training program at the Air Force Academy and other academic institutions. Prescient Air Force leaders did not have a proprietary interest in the mission. They planned at the outset to develop a unified program with both the Army and the Navy. That process did not always go smoothly.
Two years into its existence the command was still hammering out agreements with the other services regarding who was responsible for which parts of the military space programs. Those disputes would be resolved in due time as the AFSPC continued to grow. Within two years of its formation it expanded to four bases and numerous ground sensor sites and satellite systems. The command also formed detachments called “tenant units” The command’s initial leaders were focused on the future from the moment they were appointed. They had to play catchup from the beginning, since the Soviets had been operating their version of a space command for a decade already. Therefore, immediate plans in 1982 called for creating a new mission control center at the command’s Cheyenne Mountain complex in Colorado to control anti-satellite systems that weren’t even expected to be operational for a few years. The command’s leaders hit the ground running as soon as its formation was announced—and they and their successors never looked back.
The command took a major step forward in 1990 when it took control of all military space launches and of Patrick Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral in Florida and Vandenberg
Air Force Base in California. Patrick, which was developed as a Long Range Proving Ground in 1950, is a vestige of AFSPC’s heritage. To this day it is dedicated to launching missiles. The base is the Department of Defense's East Coast Space Port and home to the 45th Space Wing and the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS), the primary launch site for the Space Force's Eastern Range.
The command’s west coast home was Vanderberg Space Launch Delta 30, which supports launch activities for the Air Force, Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, national programs and various private industry contractors. The sagacity of the original command planners shone through in 1991, when satellites and other space systems played a vital role in defeating Iraqi armed forces in the Persian Gulf War. The war created an opportunity for AFSPC leaders to demonstrate the value of the connection between space capabilities and warfighters on the ground. In 1992 the command assumed responsibility for the management of the National Test Facility at Falcon Air Force Base in Colorado, which was subsequently renamed Schriever Space Force Base. Job one was to make sure that all military forces and their personnel understood and made use of rapidly evolving available space systems, such as SDI, aka “Star Wars.” Another milestone occurred in July 1993 when ICBM forces joined AFSPC. That success led to additional acquisitions by the command and a deviation from the original deterrence mission.
Falcon was designed to handle Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI), a proposed missile defense system intended to protect the United States from attack by ballistic strategic nuclear weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. At the same time the command took over the management of all Air Force satellite communications and the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missiles. g
GPS III SV 2 Launch A Delta IV carrying the GPS III SV2 satellite lifts off from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's SLC-37, Aug. 22. The satellite will become part of a 31 satellite constellation on orbit providing enhanced timing and navigation to civilians and the warfighter. (Photo courtsey of ULA)
Finally, organizers created the Space Warfare Center at Falcon and renamed it the Space Innovation and Development Center. The agency was established to ensure that space capabilities reached the warfighters who needed it. The command’s integration of existing systems and creation of new ones continued at a dizzying pace. The process was not easy. The command was expanding its defensive role into an offensive mode as well. It was also receiving a wake-up call about funding.
In the mid-1990s government “bean counters” looked closely at Space Command’s expenditures. They realized it was consuming roughly one-quarter of the Air Force’s budget and wondered if the government was getting its money’s worth, especially in a domain that was still not viewed as a war theater. That was at a time when the U.S.’s military budgets in general were shrinking, including the Space Command’s. That line of thinking lasted only as long as did the dearth of governments and private companies accelerating their space programs.
As the turn of the 20th century approached space was becoming as crowded as an anthill when a new supply of food arrived. That engendered disputes over territorial rights, interference by one country over another’s satellite signals, and other unforeseen space matters. The increasing need for regulation and control renewed interest in the U.S.’s need to protect its space interests. The 9/11 terrorist attack highlighted that need and demonstrated the command’s fluidity. For the first twenty years of its existence the amoeba-like AFSPC had been adding responsibilities and agencies. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks it gave some up as the amoeba split again. After President Bush ordered military action against Afghanistan and Iraq AFSCP provided extensive space-based support to the U.S. Center Command in areas of communications; positioning, navigation and timing; meteorology; and warning.
The U.S. Space Command that had existed for so many years was disbanded and replaced by a newly established U.S. Northern Command that focused on homeland defense. Space Command disappeared, although its functions remained. They were absorbed by the U.S Strategic Command. The changes were for the most part cosmetic. The Air Force Space Command survived the tinkering, albeit for only a few more years.
The command retained its lead role in the military’s space operations, although it had to share its responsibilities within a new joint entity. The good news was that it raised space to the same status as other headquarters, such as the U.S. Cyber Command, Special Operations Command and Strategic Command. The changes were in response to—and a sign of—the emerging geopolitical and technological trends of the future security environment in space. They didn’t stop there.
In 2005, the Air Force expanded its mission areas to include cyberspace. Concomitantly Air Force leaders assigned responsibility g
for conducting cyberspace operations to AFSPC and activated the Twenty-fourth Air Force to carry it out. Additionally, Headquarters U.S. Air Force activated Air Force Global Strike Command to consolidate all nuclear forces under one command. In concert, AFSPC transferred its ICBM forces to the new command in December 2009. The changes were intended to show America’s strength and resolve in protecting its overall space interests—and its people.
Space Command leaders touted the need for a strong force to control the nation’s vital security interests in the “new high ground.” They undertook a campaign to convince the American public that sooner or later—most likely sooner—some nation was going to challenge the U.S.’s dominance in space, and that the country had to be prepared for it. They were cognizant that growth in military space operations depended on money, politics, and technology. The leaders focused on the technology aspect of the equation, recognizing that it was subject to funding. Technology and its complementary training had been the primary factors in achieving their historical milestones since 1982—and they would be in the future. Back to 2002. By then the command had an $8 billion budget to work with. There was a significant break in its leadership structure that year when the new general in charge, Lance Lord, took the reins of the Air Force Command, with no responsibilities for other organizations. That was a first. All previous commanders had also led the North American Aerospace Defend Command and the U.S. Space Command. The split was intended to give the Air Force Space Command more focus. Moreover, the Space Commission, which studied military space programs for Congress, had concluded that the U.S. was growing more vulnerable to a “space Pearl Harbor." That heightened interest in appointing a commander who was well versed in technology, which accounted in part for Lord’s appointment. Lord was the first non-pilot to be assigned to the job. He had spent 34 years in nuclear missile and space operations. That was a major change of direction in the command’s evolution. The purpose was to ensure the command was tailoring satellite technology so it worked for the military units fighting wars. That entailed developing different programs and technologies for use in “near” or “orbital” space which varied in cost and adhered to internationally accepted practices and law. g
The complexities of space command’s responsibilities had changed considerably since its inception, and would continue to do so. The command remained equal to the task as its guiding principles evolved. Its primary mission, as stated in Space Command’s “Strategic Master Plan FY 04 (and Beyond)” remained, however: “Space superiority is essential to our vision of controlling and fully exploiting space to provide our military within asymmetric advantage over our adversaries."
The primary mission did not change. AFSPC’s leaders acknowledged that the strategies and tactics relevant to carry it out had to though. They realized that the training and skills that sustained the command’s space operations for the last several decades were not the same ones needed to fight through threats and win in the 21st-century’s contested, degraded, and operationally‐ limited (CDO) environment. To ensure that its forces were prepared to operate in the new reality, they believed that the AFSPC had to transform its culture and build the expertise and skills necessary for its space forces to operate freely, and if necessary, defend themselves in the “global commons” of space. Realistically, changing the culture and meeting new challenges was precisely what they had been doing for years with positive results.
Command leaders had to come to grips with a changing security environment, new fiscal challenges, and budgetary trends in the opening decades of the 21st century. They realized that the continued funding of expensive space systems was no longer assured, and had to assume that it was in fact impracticable. Large, complex systems that require many years of sustained investment to design, develop, field and operate were no longer affordable.
“Moreover, given the growing threat environment, they may place a significant amount of national treasure at increased risk,” the producers of a 2013 “white paper” noted. “While astute mission assurance measures have decreased launch failures to record lows, there is always the risk that a single launch failure, earlyorbit anomaly, environmental event or hostile act could result in the loss of hundreds of millions, or even billions, of dollars.” Command leaders had to bear that fiscal reality in mind as they planned their future strategies in the ever-changing space domain of the future.
They characterized the new domain in terms of an increasing private, industrial, and government presence, including the sustained commercialization of near-Earth space, the exploitation of space resources, an increased human presence in space, and the push to establish a long-term investment on the moon and beyond. It entailed a complex security environment defined by rapid technological change, global access to new capabilities, and the reemergence of strategic competition by America’s adversaries. In short, AFSPC had new challenges to meet. The command that had been so smoothly integrated into the Air Force over an almost four-decade span was itself integrated. g
SUPPORT THE 2A COMMUNITY WITH GREAT PRODUCTS AT AFFORDABLE PRICES.
A major change, and a portent of the future, occurred in July 2018 when the Air Force cyber mission was transferred to Air Combat Command, which generated the greatest capacity for an integrated Information Warfare capability within the Air Force. This allowed AFSPC to focus on gaining and maintaining space superiority and outpacing its adversaries in the space domain. The most significant change came on December 20, 2019, when the Air Force Space Command was re-designated as the U.S. Space Force, becoming the sixth branch of the U.S. military. The name may have changed; the mission did not. The integration process began anew.
The new service was still charged with protecting and defending U.S. national interests at all levels of space, from low earth to geosynchronous earth orbits. Its primary responsibility remained unchanged: provide the U.S. the freedom to operate in an expanded space domain while applying the technology and strategic reach necessary for national security and ensuring that the international commons of space remain free. Those were not easy tasks.
Continued space domain dominance does not—and never has—come without attention to a wide spectrum of fronts, e.g., technology, policy, law, operational processes, and military science. Command leaders recognized from the outset that their ability to succeed in American space domination required several factors:
• the foresight to recognize threats
• the capability to respond to them rapidly
• the availability of in-space logistics enabling highly trained personnel to assimilate information from a multitude of interconnected systems that can operate autonomously
• a procurement process that enabled the command to acquire the weapons and materiel needed to eliminate them
Command leaders have been able to apply these critical elements in their operations since 1982 regardless of the operational and name changes that have taken place since then. They, at least, have been consistent in the transition from the AFSPC to the present Space Force. True, the parameters of the space they have dominated for so many decades still have not been defined. But the goals of the U.S. Air Force Space Command and its successor are not. Different names, same dedication to the mission. That is the history of the command— and its future.
