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FAMILY CONFERENCE - III
International Family Policies 29-30 NOVEMBER 2014 – ISTANBUL EDITED BY: CÜNEYT DİNÇ
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
FAMILY CONFERENCE - III
International Family Policies
www.jwffamilyconference.org
FAMILY CONFERENCE - III
International Family Policies 29-30 NOVEMBER 2014 - ISTANBUL
FAMILY CONFERENCE - III
International Family Policies
The Journalists and Writers Foundation Press ISBN: XXXXXXXXXXX The views presented are those of authors and do not reflect or represent the views of the editors or the Journalists and Writers Foundation All rights reserved. Copyright JWF. No parts of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted in any form or by any means.
Editor : Cüneyt Dinç Project Editor : Ferin Merve Yılmaz Göksan Text and Cover Designer : Kessaf Ajans Date of publishing : 2015 Limited edition www.gyv.org.tr www.gyvkadinplatformu.org
www.jwffamilyconference.org
FAMILY CONFERENCE - III
International Family Policies 29-30 NOVEMBER 2014 - ISTANBUL
EDITED BY: CUNEYT DINC
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
FAMILY CONFERENCE - III
International Family Policies
www.jwffamilyconference.org
CONTENTS Editor’s Note
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Opening Speech Hüseyin Hurmali
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Keynote Speech Katarina Lindahl
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SECTION I
Family and Law Moderator: Assist. Prof. Semiha Topal
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Modern Family - Surrogacy and Its Problems Diana Bryant
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Catholic Social Teaching and the Family - The Case of Germany Assist. Prof. Cüneyt Dinç
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Family in Islamic Law Prof. Abdülhakim Yüce
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SECTION II
Family and Work Moderator: Assist. Prof. Serap Kavas
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Policy of Women Employment and Family Protection in Nigeria Dr. Pauline. E. Onyeukwu
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Economic Empowerment of Women through Self-employment: A Case Study of ‘Kudumbasree’ Programme in the Kerala State of India Abdul Sathar Gender Equality at the Bottom: Unexpected Consequences of the Family Policy in Japan Prof. Keiko Hirao
Moderator: Fatih Ceran
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SECTION III
Family and Poverty
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Changes in Family Structure, Reason for Growing Poverty: A Case Study of US Assist. Prof. Faisal Nazir
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Child Poverty in Rich Countries, a Costly Mistake for the Future Ignacio Socias
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SECTION IV
Regional Practices Session I
Moderator: Assist. Prof. Önder Çetin
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Family policy in Poland Prof. Alexandr Tsoi
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Family Policies in Romania Before and After The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 Assist. Prof. Selami Ahmet Salgür
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Family Challenge Towards Immigration and Globalization - The Case of Albania Assoc. Prof. Gjon Boriçi
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SECTION V
Moderator: Ms. Didem Dogan
Regional Practices Session II
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International Family Policy in Nigeria - Legal Perspective Sadia Muazu Mayana
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Equal yet Plural? Polygamy and the Status of Women in the United States Cynthia A. Scheopner J.D.
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SECTION VI
Moderator: Mr. Ibrahim Anlı
Regional Practices Session III
Family Policy Of Korea: Focusing On Framework Act On Healthy Families And Long Term Care Insurance Prof. Gyounghae Han Family Formation Crisis in Contemporary Japan Prof. Yuko Ogasawara
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Thailand’s Community Baby-sitting System with Positive Psychology Approach (Life Assets): Strengthening the Positive Parenting in Family Assoc. Prof. Dr. Suriyadeo Tripathi
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Final Declaration Speakers Additional Information Images
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EDITOR’S NOTE All around the world families are facing new challenges and changes and in many cases rapid economic, demographic and cultural changes in various parts of the world, prevent families to fulfill their societal responsibilities. Hence, these new emerging challenges to the family require new answers. As a matter of fact, these answers can never be the same for all the countries. Each society delivers its own answers since each society’s problems have their unique background. However, this diversity of solutions provides us with a possibility to learn from each other. The answers to the challenges to the family are manifold. As such it covers judicial, social, political, and medical topics, whose practical application differs from society to society. Departing from this perspective, the 3rd Family Conference: International Family Policies organized by the Women Platform of the Journalists and Writers Foundation’s on 29th – 30th November 2014 in Istanbul, has focused on these challenges to the family and its regional solutions and aimed to prepare the ground for sharing among the best practices of family oriented-policies. By organizing the third International Family Conference on the international family policies, the Journalists and Writers Foundation which has a General Consultative Status at ECOSOC and its Women Platform participated in the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the International Year of the Family. The conference was also supported by International Federation For Family Development (IFFD) from Spain, NittoKAI from Japan, Istituto Tevere from Italy, Kimse Yok Mu and MARKAFED from Turkey, Thailand Achievement Institute –TAİ from Thailand and Ufuk Dialogue Foundation from Nigeria. The JWF and JWF Women’s Platform took the opportunity to join UNİTE campaign via this international conference to end violence against women, with the motto “Orange YOUR Neighbourhood.”. The conference concentrated on judicial, political and scientific aspects of family policies in various societies. The issues the speakers touched on during the conference ranged from legal aspects, employment, poverty and health and regional practices in (South-) Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. The participants included were academics and/or practitioners of family policy. As such we hoped to develop a bridge between the realm of academic and the realm of policy making fulfilling the general purpose of the International Family Conference. The outcomes of the conference are to be found in the presented publication. The proceeding publication is both in English and Turkish and includes a Final Declaration which is a report formulated by an academic community reflecting the main arguments of all presented talks and papers. Finally, as the conference board we would like to express our gratitude to all participants of the conference and the moderators and the academic advisors including Fatih Ceran, Assist. Prof Önder Çetin, Didem Doğan, Ibrahim Anlı, Assist. Prof Semiha Topal, Assist. Prof Serap Kavas, Assist. Prof. Cüneyd Dinç, Ignacio Socias, Ferin Merve Yılmaz Göksan. Cüneyt Dinç
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OPENING SPEECH Hüseyin Hurmalı
The Vice President of the Journalists and Writers Foundation
Distinguished guests, dear participants, ladies and gentlemen, International Family Conference is an academic gathering which is organized by the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF) and its Women’s Platform in every two years. Since 2010, Family Conferences have aimed to stimulate interdisciplinary and cross-national collaboration and approach to various family issues. As the only NGO from Turkey holding General Consultative Status at ECOSOC we follow closely the United Nations’ active role in enhancing international cooperation in family related issues. We think that family unit has to be protected and empowered in the lights of universal values and basic human rights. Family policies have to be nourished by the good examples that could be seen all around the world. Therefore, such conferences are opportunities to take notice on our best practices. The 2014 International Family Conference is holding its third series on International Family Policies and concentrates on scientific, policy-based and practical attention on legal aspects of family in different societies. As stated in the ECOSOC Resolution adopted in June 2014 , family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society; therefore, we agree that recognizing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all family members should be the cornerstones of family- oriented policies. It could be said that equality between men and women, women’s equal participation in employment and shared parental responsibility are also the essentials of family policies. Not only designing, but also implementing and monitoring these policies require a common intent at national, regional and international level including state participation and civil society. The same Resolution also emphasized the pivotal role of civil society in advocacy, promotion, research, policymaking, policy evaluation in respect of family policy development and capacitybuilding. As one of the prominent CSOs in Turkey, we have adopted this pivotal role as a responsibility and decided to link our series of International Family Conference to the UN agenda. Consulting with the Focal Point on Family at the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the 3rd International Family Conference on International Family Policies is supporting the 20th Anniversary of the International Year of the Family (IYF+20) activities. Dear guests, at these days a world-wide campaign is being held to end violence against women. The United Nations Secretary- General’s Campaign UNiTE to End Violence against Women invites us to take the campaign to our local neighbourhoods with the motto “Orange YOUR Neighbourhood.”
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As part of this 16 days of activism campaign between 25th of November, which is the International Day to Eliminate Violence against Women, and 10th of December, we have prepared orange ribbons for you to wear and thus carry the message of “end violence against women� to your neighbourhoods. We find this issue highly relevant to the agenda of family policies; because we believe that family unit should be based on the protection of basic human rights and violence against women is a direct human rights violation. On this occasion, we would like to highlight that the ECOSOC Resolution encourages Member States to promote family policies that support gender equality and empowerment of women. As I come to the end of my speech, I would like to express my deep gratitude on behalf of the Journalists and Writers Foundation and its Women’s Platform, to the speakers who agreed to present their opinions on this important topic, to the supporter organizations who provided moral and technical support and to all the guests who are here and whose participation made this conference meaningful. It is my sincere wish that this conference strengthens our will to work together for happier families and societies. Thank you!
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KEYNOTE SPEECH Katarina Lindahl Board Chair, UN Women National Committee Sweden
Many warm thanks for inviting me to this exciting conference about families. The importance of family and the role of it differ depending on traditions, cultural and political contexts globally. How we organize our “living together” in families is a cornerstone at the global, national and local level. Different countries, groups, and societies have different ways of defining a family. This is not at least obvious when the UN discusses a definition and the role of it. At the UN led International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo 1994, defining family was too controversial to manage reaching an agreement. The year after in 1995, World Conference on Women in Beijing followed up with similar debates and the discussion turned out to be very difficult and intense. The point was primarily about whether the final document should mention the term family, in the plural or in the singular. It was a big fight about the letters. The problem to solve was whether the UN should speak about “the family” meaning mother, father and children, a nuclear family or not. How we describe a family is more than just a definition of the smallest unit in society. It may also be interpreted as e.g. a description of culture of western culture and heterosexual families. In Cairo as well as in Beijing, defining the family became a keyissue and turned out to be very explosive. In the 1990s, when gay and lesbian groups had begun to openly demand their rights to form a family, this turned out to be a big problem for a number of countries. Some governments and some NGOs worried that the terminology family/families should include such rights. The Vatican State (with only male inhabitants) could not accept any other definition of family than mother, father and child. After days of discussion, it seemed like the traditional terminology of family (without the `s`) should be the “winner”. But, just before the decision-time, some Caribbean states asked for the floor and spoke about their way of organizing their families and societies. They described how they live together in households with different generations and they spoke about some sort of extended families in which people sometimes live together with people who are not their relatives. They argued that they need to be recognized as “real families”. We could say that, since then, the final the decision in Cairo as well as in Beijing and the decision by the UN, could use the term `families` when speaking about families and regards it as an acceptable language. But of course, there are many countries that carefully avoid to use the term families. This may sound as a fight about less important bagatelles, but it is not. It is instead a way of recognizing single mothers, grandparents, LGBT-persons and extended families as equally acceptable as heterosexual mom, dad and child family. Of course, this doesn’t mean that all kinds of families are
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accepted everywhere. For example the Vatican can, together with a number of other countries, only accept heterosexual nuclear families. The Question Remains: What is a Real Family? There is no global accepted answer to such a question. However, when the members declare themselves as a family, in my opinion, we could call it as a family. Societies are different and have different religions and traditions; therefore, it is not possible to unite behind one global definition which is accepted by law in different countries. In my opinion, I would identify a family as a group of people who have decided themselves that they are a family. While defining family, there are some problems faced with. First of all, sometimes, your definition of family could not be in accordance with the traditions and norms of the society. That creates a problem of ‘acceptance`. Besides, sometimes the law of your country does not formally accept your definition. In fact, all societies have legislations or traditions that regulate from a legal point of view what kind of “living together-structure” is accepted by the society as a family, which in return may differ from country to country. A question is whether religion in a society ought to accept the form of family that people chose their own lives or not. Depending on how strong religion influences laws and moral values in a country, this perception differs. To illustrate, in Sweden a young couple come to their parents and say that they have fallen in love and decided to move together. Parents may like or dislike it; however, they actually have very little or no possibility to influence this decision. After some years the young couple will have children and then they often decide to get married, in order to give their children a more secure family situation. The marriage comes after the love at first sight. Besides, we see families of all kinds of different formats. The heterosexual mother, father and their children are the most common family arrangement. However, besides these arrangements we can find other arrangements like non- married couple with children, single parents, divorced parents who are “part-time parents”, next to homosexual couples and parents, etc. Moreover, in different parts of the world we can find different definitions of family. That depends on traditions, political and religious contexts, and also the role of women in society and in the family. When the children are small, it is more common that women work part-time, than that men do so. This is not only due to economic reasons. Legislation about family-issues are of course important because it contains regulations of the status of women as well as the status and protection of children. Most countries have laws and regulations about how responsibilities related to household shall be shared or not shared. Such laws also regulate what will happen if the family is torn apart in a divorce. In addition, in many countries, there are rules and laws regulating how property should be shared, when the adult members of a family have common property. It is common, with many exceptions, that the law stipulates equal share. Nonetheless, there are also countries that by law, tradition or religion denies women to have equal share, especially if she was the one who has initiated the divorce.
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In many countries, it is difficult to go outside of the traditional and religious values and norms. However, these values and some norms create difficulties, especially for women and girls. For example, in some parts of the world, girls may be married off, when they still should be at school. Child marriage is a disaster. Also, in many countries, single or/and divorced mothers who live without a present (not necessary biological) father of the child are accepted. Also, they could get social support. However, in general, single mothers often have a tough situation with a lot of pressure and they often have a part-time work with low salary to manage the situation. Even if the father, by law, is obliged to pay for his child, it may not be enough. How we define a “real family� depends on traditions and on political or religious contexts, but it is also depending on the role of women in society and family. Immigrants come to Europe from many parts of the world, including countries, where young people, especially girls, have a little or less say about their own marriage and family life. For instance, in India, girls lack any rights in relation to family construction where many families have to pay a high economic cost (Doweries) to get their daughters married off. When countries and people collaborate, like in the UN, it is important to find out similarities and differences which have the most importance to different cultures. Such exchange of knowledge and experience, creates a basis for mutual understanding, which is needed within the UN frame. The Role of Family The UN is the only existing global body with members from nearly all countries in the world. This is of course a challenge, but it is also a useful and important possibility to create understanding and share views. A big and important challenge is to find paths for understanding and respectful negotiations during meetings. This is not at least a challenge when governments, NGOs and scientific experts, from all over the world, meet to make joint statements that also include definitions and the role of the family. Societies are organized in different ways, but in all societies the majority of people choose to build on a traditional family arrangements and organizations that encounter the expectations of the society on the role of the family. This is usually an issue for those societies in which traditions and often religious norms have an important role in organizing laws, which are acceptable for politicians and often religious leaders and at the end for the majority of a society. Everywhere the family/families are expected to have an important role in society. However, as a global problem, it is still rare that women are expected have final say on issues of great importance for a family. The impact of women on family matters usually differs from country to country, from culture to culture. Families are sometimes also a place where many, mostly children and women, experience fear of violence and disrespect. In addition, too many children in the world are left by their parents due to different reasons, often poverty. Some of these children create their own families. For example, it was seen in Sub Sahara Africa before HIV positive people got access to medication. War and poverty are other frequent reasons why children in the world sometimes have to create their own family. A family gives possibilities for people of all ages to meet love, respect and quarrel. Most of us, 14
have hopefully experienced families as places where we may feel secure and get love. However, we may find families where violence behind the curtain is common and which must face common economic problems on as a daily challenge. Besides, in some families there is too much alcohol and too little love and also no support among family members. In our world, we may find that in all countries, there are lots of women who not only try to protect their children from abuse, violence and war, but also try to care for their children’s health and fight to save them from hunger. It is greatly important that children have possibilities to develop into adulthood with a feeling of being loved and taken care of. To protect children and help them to become good adults is the role of families. This duty does not only depend on each man and woman; it is an important task for every society to support families to become safe and loving. A family is, at its best, a place for fun and play, love, support and finally for shared responsibilities for children and elders. Finally, a family is also a sort of working place. Children shall be taken care of, food shall be cooked, and elderly people need care and everything else that is needed for managing life. Conclusion There is a need for global understanding (not necessary acceptance) of the reality that there are different values and traditions. The possibility to reach an understanding of the family/families depends on how we manage to understand. It is not necessary to accept differences. We are well aware that values differ depending on the society in which we live. Living together in a family is not only an issue about love or longing for children. Many societies regard it as essential that the definition of “family” is acceptable not only to religious groups and their norms and traditions, but that it is also acceptable to non-religious groups and values in a society. It is not self-evident that a society accepts all different forms of people to choose living together as a family. There are political as well as religious aspects on the issue of defining family. Political aspects that need to be taken into account are about the kind of support society shall/must provide for families. Also, it is important to discover what young people`s cultural, traditional and religious demands, especially for young immigrants are. Youth is a significant part of immigrants of Europe and many of them have their routes in cultures and religions that differ from what is common in their new country. The question remains: What is a real family? There is no single global answer to such question. However, I want to say that a family is constructed when the members define themselves as a family. I want to conclude by asking a few questions: If not all societies have legislation that regulates what kind of “living together” is accepted as a legal family, what will we do? Is it a must that religion accepts the form of family that people chose to organize for their own lives? Thank you.
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SECTION I Family and Law
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MODERN FAMILY - SURROGACY AND ITS PROBLEMS Diana Bryant AO
Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia
Abstract The issue of commercial surrogacy has recently entered the Australian psyche. In all the States and Territories in Australia except for one, commercial surrogacy is illegal. In two of the states and in the Australian Capital Territory that illegality extends to commercial surrogacy contracts contracted outside Australia; in other words those three jurisdictions have created commercial surrogacy as an extraterritorial criminal offence. Despite this many couples and even single parents are taking advantage of advances in technology to have a baby carried by a surrogate mother in overseas countries. In most, but not all cases, the egg is provided by a separate donor, usually anonymous, and the surrogate mother has biological connection with the child she is carrying. For several years the varying laws in different states in Australia have created problems for the Family Court when parties return to Australia with children born from commercial surrogacy in some circumstances legally and in others illegally, and seek parenting orders from the courts. The courts have had to deal with these cases. Although it is illegal in Australia for commercial surrogacy that has not prevented many Australians from going to other countries, particularly those poorer countries in our region and there is a flourishing surrogacy industry in India and Thailand for Australians. The economic capacity of Australians to pay for commercial surrogacy arrangements and the need for impoverished women in these countries to provide for their families makes for enormous power imbalance in the commercial contracts that are contracted. The Commonwealth Attorney-General has recently released a report from the Family Law Council (a statutory family law advisory council) on surrogacy in Australia and the topic came to the attention of the Australian press recently when a Thai surrogate mother revealed that Australian commissioning parents had refused to accept one of twins with health problems and she was left unable to financially care for the child without any support from the parents. My paper will discuss the interface between the availability of technology which enables anyone to commission a child and the problems that can raise for the surrogate mother, unwanted children and lack of regulation about the commissioning parent or parents might be and whether there is anything which would render them unsuitable. Even in the happiest of arrangements into which a surrogate child is brought, it is often the case that the child will grow up without any knowledge, or capacity to know about one half of their genetic makeup. I will discuss these issues, what possible solutions there might be and the extent to which the international community, particularly the Permanent Bureau at The Hague is addressing this issue.
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Introduction I am going to talk this morning about surrogacy and its problems. I want to start with two reflections: I was talking to someone in the morning who said what are the current issues in Australia on family law. I answered the question by stating that one of the issues is surrogacy which is I am going to talk about. Also, if I might comment on something Katerina said earlier about how we describe families, it occurred to me and I have never really thought about this before, I grew up in a single parent family. My parents were divorced and I grew up with my mother and my grandmother so it was a family of women but it never occurred to me for a moment that we were not a family in any traditional sense. If anyone had suggested to me that we were not how you would describe a family, I think I would have been horrified. So there is a huge diversity. I will be talking about surrogacy from a secular, ethical perspective, but I appreciate that in Islamic law there is a religious dimension and the question of whether it is indeed permitted in Islamic law. On a large part; however, I see no difference in secular and all the religious approaches. Both have their sources and concern about lineage and parenthood and the child’s right to know their parents, a right enshrined by the Convention of the Rights of the Child. I will return to that issue a bit later. But let me go back a few steps. The family remains an integral part of societies across the world having and rearing children remains an essential element of society even in those countries like Australia and the US where it is not uncommon to choose to be single. In societies where children and parenthood and motherhood especially are valued, it is understandable that women, who cannot naturally conceive, would want to use all the available options to have a child. Also not just women and married women, loving men in long term same-sex relationships also want to rear a child. Adoption was once a source of children for people who could not conceive themselves. But in Australia, as in many Western countries, adoption has all been dried up. Access by women to contraception and adequate social welfare if a child is born mainly there are very few unwanted births. International adoption can rarely deliver a baby for adoption because once all the entire appropriate checks and balances occur under the International Convention of Adoption, then the child is usually 18 months or 2 years old. And most people want to be able to have a baby. Finally, technology enables babies to be available through surrogacy. Not always but most often, genetic material of one or sometimes both of the couple is being used. In cross border surrogacy, the genetic link is likely to be the male sperm but more often the egg will be from a donor and often an unknown donor. The surrogate mother will thus carry the embryo and often have no biological connection at all to the child. But of course it will have the connection of having carried to child to the birth. Firstly, surrogacy is illegal in almost all the Australian states and secondly in three states in Australia it is also illegal to contract commercial surrogacy arrangements outside Australia. Altruistic surrogacy is allowed but commercial surrogacy is not. Australians have therefor been going offshore for commercial surrogacy arrangements particularly to India and Thailand for some years now. And all that about to change and I want to talk a little bit about what is happening there. Commercial surrogacy as it is illegal in all but one of the states in Australia; however, despite the fact that it is also illegal in three states to contract commercial surrogacy arrangements overseas that has not stopped Australians going overseas to avail themselves of these services. There are many countries which provide surrogacy arrangements. The US is particular one but it is much more expensive for Australians to go to the US than it is to go to one of the South East Asian countries nearby. The very fact of that 18
of course raises one of the issue about exploitation of surrogate mothers which I touch on. As I said the sperm of the man is normally used whereas the egg will normally be from an unknown donor. If you want a Caucasian looking child then you can order a donor egg from somewhere other than an Asian country. Eggs from Ukraine were particularly popular in Thailand and India. I understand also that Georgia exports eggs and I have been told that as Australian women tend to go to Thailand and India, Turkish women can avail themselves of surrogacy arrangements in countries such as Cyprus, Georgia and Turkmenistan. The issue about the donor eggs of course is only one side of the story. Denmark has a very big market in exportation of sperm which they market as Viking sperm. If I had my PowerPoint with me, which I don’t, I have a picture of a little baby in a little blue and white outfit with a little Viking hat on with the caption that says “congratulations, it’s a Viking”. Up until fairly recently in Australia, the media had depicted the sunny side of surrogacy that is descriptions of happy family groups embracing a household with children, they would otherwise not have had. Apparently, and I am sure appropriately happy families. But that is just one small part of the issue of surrogacy… There is a much darker and more problematic side of it, which is now being revealed in Australia as a result of two high profile cases. Just before I talk about those cases, I also touch on some of the problems there are with the law and some of the legal problems in Australia. Each of the states in Australia is responsible for different law about who and who is not a parent as a result of technology. There are different laws in different states about whether a particular surrogacy arrangement will make one of the parties a parent or not. I should also go back and explain that when a child is born in Thailand or India, for example, they are given a passport to enter Australia with the basis of a DNA test, which will then link the father usually as the genetic link. After this process it is possible to enable a passport to be issued for the Australian child. Sometimes there have been mix ups were a child is born and for some reason there is no genetic link to the father. Then that child is not likely to be given any passport and will be without any nationality which is contrary to the International Convention of the Child. Then, in addition to declarations of parentage, most parties who have come back to Australia with their child want to get an order from the Family Court making both parents equally responsible for the child and having rights and entitlements that parenting order give them. The overriding criteria in Australia for deciding a parenting order is what is in the best interest of the child but of course there is a slightly different dimension here. Because in some states the commercial surrogacy outside Australia is illegal, then the parents who are coming back with the child are breaking the law and they know they are breaking the law so there is a public policy issue about whether or not you should make parenting orders in the face of parties knowingly breaking the law. In the Family Court we had some different views expressed by the judges of first instance about what orders to make. The Appeal Court, of which I am part, has not yet had to deal with one of these cases but we probably will soon. At the moment, the consensus seems to be that the best interests really override the public policy issues because, of course, it is not the child`s fault that the parents have broken the law. It is in the interest of the child that the parents do have rights and responsibilities under the law. But there is still some disquiet about that issue. The other thing is that despite the fact that there are laws none of state governments have shown any interest in prosecuting anyone for breaking these rulings. So we have a rather odd situation in Australia where it is contrary to the law but no one is enforcing the law. It is an unhappy state of affairs. If we don’t want to punish we should then probably not make it criminal. In England, there is a slightly different view on whether to make a parenting order. They look at some of the features about the surrogacy. In some of the cases, they tent to say “well is it in the best interest of this child for the parents to have contracted an 19
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arrangement for surrogacy which was unfair or unconscionable which might prohibit the child from knowing who its parents is�. And some of the academic commentaries in Australia have suggested that we might look at some of those features. So if we do get a case in the Appeal Commission it will be quite interesting what we can say about it. In short, as far as our laws concern, our laws in Australia made considerable attention. The Family Law Council which is a body set up to advice the Attorney General on Family Law recently published a report in which it suggested significant number of changes which will improve the position in Australia and I hope that the government will take account and then do something about it. But let me then come on to deal with some of the social issues which make surrogacy problematic. The status of the contract that is negotiated usually doesn’t allow much autonomy to the surrogate mother. Surrogate mothers in the Asian countries are usually poor; they need the money and often tend to not to have any idea about what is in the contract. The clinics that operate particularly in India and Thailand obviously get part of the founding, middle men involve and so some the money of course goes to the middle men and not the surrogate mothers. Some of the contracts are quite unconscionable and include clauses that oblige the surrogate mother to have an abortion if it effects with one of the embryos and the kind of postnatal care that might be provided if there are complications vary much varies depending on the kind of contracts they are on. So like all of these kinds of commercial arrangements there is an opportunity for money to be made by middle men and organizers. There is also the opportunity and the effect of exploiting surrogate mothers. Not all clinics have bad practices but in an unregulated environment as it previously has been the temptation of exploitation exists at all levels. There are two cases in Australia that have changed the way happening in Australia and overseas. The first one was a high profile case that came to light earlier this year: An Australian couple contracted with a Thai surrogate mother with donor egg and the father’s sperm. As it quite often happens they implant more than one egg and on this occasion the mother was carrying twins and one of them were identified with Downs syndrome during the pregnancy. They wanted her to have an abortion but she did not. Both children were born but the parents refused to take the child with downs syndrome. It is a bit unusual in this case that the mother, the surrogate mother, to her absolute credit, who had other children, kept the child and this came to the attention of the Australian case and happily for her a lot of donations were made and she is probably going to be quite financially well of, enough to care for the child. But you can imagine how it raised enormous issues in Australia and although some of us were aware of those current practices most of Australians were not. The second case I want to focus on is the one I had been told about: A case in India about a year before first case, the same thing had happened except the twins were born and both of them were perfectly healthy but the Australian couple only wanted one child. They already had one child so they would only take one of them. I was told about this from two women at the High Commission in India, Delhi, who had been asked to provide a passport for the one child and who were desperately trying to negotiate with the parents to take the other child. In the end, they were unsuccessful and they told me that they did not really know what happened to the other child. Someone came forward and the surrogate mother could not afford to keep it. But in countries where trafficking of children is rife, one has to be really concerned about what might have happened to that child. I talked about that case in the press a little bit, but it did not get any press until recently when I was speaking at conference where the other case was being discussed. I talked about the Indian case, which no one had ever heard of before so the 20
press then interviewed me about the Indian case which was picked up by all of the media so all of a sudden within the space of a few months the Indian case was all over the newspapers. Therefore, I think the Australian public is now starting to understand that surrogacy is a very complicated issue. And I should add that as a result of these two cases, Thailand has just announced that it will ban commercial surrogacy except in the case of a relative. I am not sure that banning it is a good thing. I think regulation is what we should do. I think if you ban it then you force it to go somewhere else. So there will be other countries in South East Asia were the facilities might not be as good. In India as a response to the Indian case being publicized there has been some regulations and the new rules make it mandatory for couples to take custody of children to whom they are genetically connected. The bill also addresses how many pregnancies can be done by one mother. So I think that is pretty interesting. A couple of weeks ago, when this announcement about what the Indians were going to do came on Television, I think that I am the whistle-blower and I have just changed the law in India. Let me finalize by saying that one of my real concerns is that in most cases the egg donor is unknown so with eggs imported from places like Ukraine and Georgia there is absolute no way the children born out of those relationships will know the details of the genetic heritage of their mother. They may know about the surrogate mother, the birth mother, but in most cases they will not and have no right to. This is a direct breach on the Convention of the Rights of the Child. And I think that we, as a society allowing this, are being very reckless, because we know from children who are adopted that many children have an absolute compulsion to seek out natural parents later in life. We also now know from sperm donors in the 1970s that children born from sperm donors want to seek out their biological parents and we are creating a lot of children who in 18-20 years time will want to know who their mother was and there is no way of finding out and that is in breakage of their rights. What about the future? Well we will see what happens in Australia. I think the environment in Australia is now ready for some regulation. And I think that we do need to start looking at how we should be as Australians and we should start to agree with the countries near us on some regulation. The UN, through the permanent bureau, is looking at an international convention on surrogacy and they have already published a Preliminary Report on the issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements. Which I might say, they found that the market has grown by 2000% between 2006 and 2010. So the permanent bureau is looking to do something about it but it will take a while, the gustation period of international conventions is about 10 years, but it is something we should all be concerned about and we should not allow children or surrogate mothers to be exploited this way.
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CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND FAMILY POLICY – THE CASE OF GERMANY Assist. Prof. Cüneyt Dinç
Süleyman Sah University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Science
Abstract The role of religion and religious organizations on the development of social policy and especially for family policy was long time neglected in international welfare state research. It was the work of Kees van Kersbergen who showed that social policy in Europe was not only influenced by socialist ideas, but also by Christian catholic ideas too. Thus, the humble aim of this paper is to demonstrate from a historical sociological perspective how catholic social teaching has an influence on family policy in Germany. As such it tries to depict the transformation of basic religious idea about the family and humanity to a concrete social policy and law for the family, especially in the field of social care, fiscal law family allowance. Introduction For a long time international welfare state research has neglected the influence of religion on formulating social policies and the founding of the welfare state in Europe. The focus was more on the conflict between labor and capital and the later compromise between both which resulted in the founding of social security schemes, protecting the workers against long and short term exclusions from the labor market. This research stream also neglected the fields of care and relief, regarding them as minor elements of the social state (Wilensky, 1975; Korpi, 1983). However, it was the seminal work of Kees van Kersbergen (1995) who referred to the conflict between the Catholic Church and the Nation State in the 19th century in Europe and proved this historical conflict has also affected the development of the Welfare State in Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland. Fallowing the logic of van Kersbergen, the humble aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the Catholic social teaching has been and is still part of German social policy. For this reason, the paper will first reveal the basic ideas of Catholic social teaching. In a next step the paper will show how historically these theological ideas were translated into a political program, becoming later a dominant element of the formulation of the German welfare state. Finally, the paper will display how the idea of catholic social teaching still defines the formulations of contemporary German social policy, especially in the field of family policy and social care. The paper aims to attract to the distinct role of religion as an important element of (social) policy. This is still happening even in secular societies like Germany in which the Churches are wealthy but has no more the same impact on the German population like 60 years before. Thus, it is hoped that the 22
paper gives a fruitful contribution and a new insight to social and family policy discussions. I. The Basic Tenants of The Catholic Social Teaching Catholic social teaching is a social ethic defined and formulated by the Catholic Church in the 19th and 20th century and indirectly implemented by the political parties joined with her in the 20th century. As such, social ethics can define as the science of the moral and legal order of society as a condition of self-realization of mankind (Klose 1980). While individual ethics asks about the responsibility of the single individual towards his social environment, social ethics focuses more on the question of how societal structures and process can and should be structured by society. One of the main goals of social ethics is to ask moral judgments about the social dimension in which people lives. Thus, their central question is than if a given institutional structure is just. At the core of the social and ethical question is the justice postulate: Are social and political relations, structures and standards designed to comply with the general ideas of distributive, commutative and participatory justice? This core question is then the base for the development of solutions offerings in view of existing justice deficits. Thus, social and individual ethical approaches are not opposed to one another, but in a mutual complementary relationship (Anzenbacher 1998) From this basic idea of a distributive just society the Catholic social ethic or social teaching develops its own idea about a just society. The Catholic Church has taught at all times certain virtues for human (co-)existence, which has resulted in the articulating of an original doctrine of “divine order”. Thus, Catholic social teaching comes from the fundamental idea of the ‘Ordo Socialis’ (Just Order), as a reasonable order of social life. According to the ‘Ordo Socialis’ the more the social, legal and economic system of a society is adapted to the principles of the Catholic Church, the more will the political or economic reality will fit into the ideal of (catholic) just society, which in return is regarded as a divine order (Klose 1978, Anzenbacher 1998). While the ‘Ordo Socialis’ idea represents the ideal which the Catholic Church wants to reach and which is a justification for the formulation of social teaching, the teaching itself bases on central ideas about human nature and human existence. As such, the central message of the Catholic social teaching is that the base, medium and aim of all societal institutions must be the human being („Gaudium et spes“ Nr. 25). First, according to the Christian- occidental tradition the human being is a person, i.e. an independent and responsible being who can decide conscientiously in free choice for the good. Second, the dignity of man lies because he as a personal image of God and its unique value that can be taken from him by any authority. Every single man carrying is a distinct purpose in itself and is not a means to some social purpose. Society is merely a relation between singular individuals and it cannot be humanity as such. Third, as an individual, humans cannot live independently for themselves. In their existence human remains dependent on others. Without other people a human being cannot recognize and realize values. Thus, humans’ self-determination cannot mean unbridled arbitrariness and irresponsible freedom. The subjective conscience and action remains on objective values need that can apply to all. (Anzenbacher 1998, Klose 1978). These “Basic certainties about the nature and destiny of man” of the Catholic Church results in return the development of four major social principles as the fundaments of which represent the major doctrines of the catholic social teaching. These social principles deliver the basic orientation for societal action without explaining how to act in a concrete situation As such the catholic social teaching was and 23
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is able to adapt to various historical and societal setting in different catholic societies. Social Principles The first social principle of the catholic social teaching is personality. Personality is an ethic assignment which based on the fact that humans are created in God’s own likeness and the subsequent untouchably of human dignity. The principle of caritas can be described as the oldest ideal, virtue and obligation of the Catholic Church. Ä°t defines the grace of charity and beneficiation of a Christian. The caritas is an attitude that is concretized in the ecclesiastical basic mission of diakonia, i.e. the service for human in the frame of the church. Thus, in its broadest sense, caritas can be also understand as a concrete helping activity, supported by the attitudes of compassion, patience and charity. Here we can find the oldest activities of the Catholic Church which focus on the care for the sick and elderly. In the beginnings of the Church the deacons were the providers of charity. This care for the sick and needy brought the young Christian church quite rapid popularity. In modern times this is widened out to the help for families, prisoners and the societal excluded (Anzenbacher 1998). The social principle of solidarity regulates the reciprocal relationship between the different members of society. It postulates the ideal that everybody in society is responsible for the commonwealth of the others. Solidarity is manifested by the formulation of common values, norms and aims which can only be realized in society. Moreover the catholic social teaching does not limit the principle of solidarity to the realm of particular group solidarity. In fact it postulates solidarity for all humans, regardless of the race, religion or class. The source of solidarity can be found in the bible and the mercy of God for the weak, poor and disabled and the life of Jesus Christ who went the path of solidarity and mercy. Thus, solidarity is an important activity of the Catholic Church. Finally, solidarity shall be realized in natural community of the family, which again is regarded as the cell of society. However, even the state has the obligation to practice solidarity for the weakest of society (Klose 1978, Anzenbacher 1998). The most important catholic social principle for family policy in Germany was and is the principle of subsidiarity. According to the principle of subsidiarity societal tasks, actions and solutions should be made as far as possible self-determined and responsible, so if possible from individuals from the private, from the smallest group or the lowest level of an organization. Only if this is not possible or is associated with considerable hurdles and problems, successively larger groups, public collectives or higher levels of an organization can support or take over the tasks and actions subsidiary. For a curbing of individual self-determination and autonomy for each purpose is accepted. Moreover, the catholic argumentation of subsidiarity bases on natural law perspective, whereas the function of the state is to support the minor and subordinate communities. The duty of the central authorities is performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate or local level (SachĂ&#x;e 1994, Waschkuhn 1995). As such the first and basic unit of society is for the Catholic Church is the family based on the marriage between a man and a woman and whose primary function is to deliver a sanctuary for the creation and nurturing of children. In addition, unlike the protestant church the marriage as the bond between a man and a woman is regarded as a sacrament. Thus, it cannot be dissolved by any institution. In the logic of catholic subsidiary family policy is first to protect the basic existence of family and to support its aforementioned basic functions. Only when the family is not able to fulfill its task, a next 24
level takes (social communities) the responsibility to fulfill the families’ responsibilities. Only when the communities also fail then the state becomes the last resort (Waschkuhn 1995). The big difference of the catholic social teaching in contrast to the other Christian confessions and other religions is that it is formulated by the church and the pope itself, in the concrete form of Papal encyclical. These papal encyclical are circular letters to the bishops of the globe and are addressed to the whole Church, i. e. all Catholics. As such, the papal encyclicals are an important form of statement of the magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church to the parishes (Klose 1978). Under the background of the social upheavals of the second half of the 19th century like the social question or the situation of the laborers forced the Roman Catholic Church and its popes to be concerned with these questions and to provide an official Christian view of the Church to these social issues. Thus, the Catholic Church and the Popes felt a special responsibility to emphasize the Christian view of man and the social responsibility of the individual in the context of social changes caused by industrialization. Thus, these doctrinal writings of the Popes on these social topics played an important role for the development of Catholic social teaching. The most important papal encyclical for the formulation of of the catholic social teaching are in particular the encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) by Pope Leo XIII. and the Quadragesimo anno (1931 ) by Pope Pius XI. The Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo XIII . is considered the “mother of all social encyclicals “ (Klose 1978, Washkuhn 1995). The Quadragesimo anno was formulated by pope Pius XI. 40 years after the formulation of the Rerum Novarum. This papal encyclical was mostly formulated by German speaking catholic clerics and Jesuits, like Gustaf Gundlach and Oswald von Nell-Breuning. The encyclical formulates ideas about the social order and formulates the first time the principle of subsidiarity which will become one of the major social principles and corner stones of catholic social teaching. The encyclical states ( 79 ): “ Every society activity is by its very nature, a subsidiary; they should help to members of the social body, but they must never destroy or absorb them.” The principle of subsidiarity guaranteed a specific social spaces and gives opportunities and ways of appropriate assistance by state or local authorities for the poor and the workers (Waschkuhn 1995) Unlike the catholic social teaching the protestant church never developed a protestant social teaching. In addition, the protestant churches were in the 19th century always monarchist and never questioned the societal, political and economic status quo. Only a minority of Protestants was interested of the social situation of the working class. Thus, the formulation of protestant social teaching was the sum of similar formulations among lay Protestants, who focused on the biblical idea of justice, but not by the protestant church itself. Especially, the pietistic revivalism within Protestantism in Europe was the source of lay social care activism in the 19th century which had again an influence on social thinking in Germany (Jung 2009). II. Christian Democracy as the Political Translation of Catholic Social Teaching The existence of the Catholic Church’s socio political teaching is maybe the first important element of establishing a catholic social policy but it is not enough. Catholic social teaching must be represented in the political arena. Particularly, in democratic parliamentary societies this means that it must fight its battles in the everyday struggle between various political parties, programs and manifestos. In the words of famous political scientist Stein Rokkan (2000) catholic social teaching is translated in the political arena. The followers of distinct political ideology form a party. When this new party formation 25
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is accepted by the ruling class, it tries to overcome the electoral barriers of the parliamentary system and will enter the parliament successfully, hoping to participate in later governments. All political parties in all democratic parliamentary regimes since the 19th and 20th century followed this successive chain. For the catholic movement we can observe that two major factors which favored the successful emergence of Catholic politic parties, the articulation of social catholic ideas and their transformation in concrete social political formulations. First off all, successful catholic parties and the formulation of a catholic social policy happened mostly in societies which were more or less industrialized and in which we could recognize the emergence of a working class (Rokkan 2000, van Kersbergen 1995, Kalyvas 1996). As a matter of fact, the emergence of the social question in many industrial societies resulted in the founding of worker unions and socialist worker movements. However, the Catholic Church never wanted to leave the field to the socialists, and formulated an alternative idea about the solution of the social question. A second factor is the situation of the Catholics in these countries. Of course, catholic parties can be only successful when they have a catholic electoral, i.e. enough voters who can bring them to the national parliaments. It is safe to say that the emergence of catholic parties was successful in those countries where the Catholics were a minority in the 19th century like in Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland and/or the Catholic Church was attacked by ruling secular elites like in France, Belgium, Austria and Italy or by the Protestant majority like in Germany in the 19th century under chancellor Bismarck (van Kersbergen 1995, Kalyvas 1996, Rokkan 2000). In these societies the Catholic Church and the catholic were successful to establish catholic parties and to establish a ‘socio political milieu’ with catholic trade unions, employers’ associations and other catholic organizations (van Kersbergen 1995). In catholic societies like Spain or Portugal in which the Catholic Church was the ally of the ruling elite the Catholics supported conservative parties which never established a form of catholic social teaching but followed more the idea of the social action of lay Catholics. However, the major field of activity of the catholic action was mostly feeding of the poor and the homeless but not really the situation of the workers (Kalyvas, 1996; Kersbergen, 1995). As a result, many workers joined in these countries social democratic and communist parties, which were secular and called for a revolution against “old” values, which included religion and the Church. In Germany rapid industrialization and the prosecution of the Kulturkampf under Chancellor Bismarck between 1871 and 1878 resulted in strengthen political Catholicism. The Catholic Church rejected violence, but was successful in mobilizing support, setting up numerous civic organizations, raising money to pay fines. Moreover the Catholic rallied behind their church and the Center Party. Formed in 1870 the German Centre Party (German: Deutsche Zentrumspartei or just Zentrum) as a lay Catholic political party in Germany during the German Empire (1871 – 1919) and the later Weimar Republic (1919 – 1933) soon won a quarter of the seats in the Reichstag (Imperial Parliament), and its middle position on most issues allowed it to play a decisive role in the formation of majorities. While under Bismarck the confessional character of the Centre Party was more dominant, with Bismarck’s demission in 1890 the social political character of the Party became more dominant. Particularly, the “People’s Association for Catholic Germany” founded in 1890 was an organization that significantly helped by numerous informative lectures and brochures about social political issue and could bind the emerging (catholic) working class to the party. Thus, unlike France but like Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands Germany developed a form of ‘corporate Catholicism’ (Verbandskatholizismus) which 26
united the majority of the Catholics regardless of their class position (Evans 1981, Kallyvas 1996, van Kersbergen 1995). While conservative patriarchal social policy with the aim to weaken the socialist worker movement influenced social policy under Bismarck’s social legislation, social catholic ideas next to conservative protestant ideas about social help also influenced it. However while the demission of Bismarck in 1890 the Centrum Party became a supporting party of the imperial government it has no real influence on social legislation of the Empire. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the coexistence of catholic social teaching, conservative protestant teaching of social help, socialist and liberal ideas of social policy influenced social policy in Germany for the next decades (Boeckh at all 2011: 60). With the end of the German Empire and the founding of the German Weimar Republic in 1919 the Centre Party became together with the social democrat SPD and the left liberal DDP one of the founding parties of the Weimar constitution. Thus the major aim of the Centre Party was the development of the existing social rights and of the existing German social state during the Weimar era (1919 – 1933). The Weimar Constitution of August 11, 1919 led by their social and social policies established in an era of welfare state and democratic social policy. As a product of social catholic, social democratic and liberal ideas the Weimar constitution supplemented social rights with constitutional status to the traditional catalog liberal freedoms. The welfare state became, in addition to the rule of law and democracy, the third source of legitimacy of the state. Especially, the loss of the World War, the fallowing economic crisis has an effect on the founding principles of social policy in Weimar. Thus new schemes for disabled war veterans and their surviving dependents were established. On the other side the Centre Party controlled the ministry of labor during the Weimar Republic and has a significant influence on the social policy of the Weimar Republic. For instance the Centre Party has together with their social democratic coalition partners an important influence on the founded of the unemployment insurance in 1927, which transformed the support of the employed from the communes to a central body. In addition, the Centre party was always part of supported the expansion of a differentiated system of social, health and child care by local authorities and charities, which in was accordance of the social catholic principle of subsidiarity. As such it fostered the institutionalizing of the public welfare organization, which became the central providers of social care and relief in Germany. Thus, social policy in Germany since the founding of the Weimar Republic became a compromise of different social democratic, social catholic and liberal social political concepts, which were negotiated between the political parties (Lampert, Altman 2004, Boeckh at all 2011). With the end of the Second World War and the founding of the German Federal Republic in 1949 the home of the former conservative became the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Unlike the former catholic Centre Party of the Weimar Republic the CDU was a fusion of protestant and catholic conservatives and represented the whole conservative spectrum of the German population. Nonetheless, the catholic part of the party dominated in the early years of the founding of the Federal German Republic the major elements of the economic and social policy. Especially the social catholic wing of the CDU which was organized in the Catholic Employee Movement and Social committees within the party focused on social policy and saw themselves as a counterweight against the economic liberal wing of the party (Zolleis 2008:102). However, while the CDU and as such the principles of Catholic social teaching dominated German social policy, German social policy was and is still an amalgam of three different concepts of social 27
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policy. All these three concepts were negotiated within the three major parties of German policies within the field of politics. First, we can find the liberal bourgeois principle of self-responsibility, which was represented by the liberal FDP which participated in most of all German governments, except for the years 1957 – 1961, 1966 – 1969 and 1998 – 2009. The State shall determine where when and to what extent the individual is responsible for what he must take social risks. For certain income groups and certain social risks this is happening in the form of a government-mandated insurance. The insurance requirement does not preclude that in addition more private provision is made for the vicissitudes of life, which can be supported by the state. Hence, self-responsibility corresponds to performance justice. Those who take more responsibility shall get better more benefits. Second, one can discover the principle of solidarity represented by the Social Democratic Party SPD and which states that all members of society must help each other in the case of emergency. As a matter of case the idea of solidarity justice provides a compensation for risks that meet an individual, but are ultimately causes social with. Examples for concrete forms of solidarity are tax financed monetary support for long-term unemployed or social relief schemes for the poor. However, there are limits for solidarity in cases in which a claim is self-inflicted or has been caused by gross negligence. Finally, there was the social catholic principle of subsidiarity, which is represented by the Christian democratic CDU. The principle of subsidiarity can be understood as prior free justice, which occurs then when self-responsibility and solidarity fail. In addition, it claims that help for the individual must first come from its environment and family and if this is not possible must be transferred to a next higher level of responsibility (civil society, communes, state) Hence, we can see a distinct continuity between the social policy of the Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (Boeckh at all 2011: 140 - 142). On the other side it is safe to say that the social policy of the CDU focused more on family policies and the protection and the monetary relief of families and the preserving and expansion of the existing system of welfare production by public welfare organizations as the major providers of services in the fields of social care and social relief. III. The concrete translation of the catholic social teaching to German social policy Free Public Welfare Organizations as providers of social care Free Public Welfare organizations represent a genuine element of German social policy and especially of the social care system. They represent those public organizations who are there for the prevention and care of in social, health and moral hazard or emergencies. In Germany a number of legally independent organizations work under the head of so called ‘Head organizations of free welfare’. These head organizations in return are non-profit oriented and legitimate their action on religious, humanitarian and political beliefs: Deutscher Caritasverband (catholic), Diakonie (protestant) Zentrale Wohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland (Jewish), German Red Cross (humanitarian), Deutscher Paritatischer Wohlfahrtsverband (humanitarian) and Arbeiterwohlfahrt (social democratic) (Boeßenecker & Vilain, 2013) According to the German social law these head organization have a preeminence in the financing and organization of social care facilities. Thus, 75% of all social care facilities are maintained by these organizations. Especially facilities for child and old age care and hospitals are maintained by these six organizations. Measured in terms of the number of beds the major focus of the work of the public welfare organizations are child and youth care (55%) care services for the elderly (15%) and disability 28
assistance (13%). In addition, their activities include also the maintaining of health care facilities, family support, facilities and services for individuals in specific social situations (unemployment benefits, debt, migration support, addiction aids, etc.) as well as education, training and educational facilities for social and nursing professions. Moreover, with 650000 full time and 300000 part time jobs the public welfare organizations are the major employees in Germany. Among these six organizations the catholic Caritas is the biggest organization, maintaining the majority of all facilities. For instance 32% of child care facilities are controlled by the Caritas, while 28% are controlled by the protestant Diakonie (Frerk, 2005; Boeßenecker & Vilain, 2013). As such the existences of the public welfare organization in Germany are a consequence of the social catholic teaching, especially of the idea of subsidiarity. According to the idea of welfare organizations is that they in case of a social emergency and when the family as the basic unit of society is not able to provide the individual the necessary help, the public welfare organizations as an intermediary between the state and the individual/family provide the relevant services. As such, the state has the function of financing the services of the organization by forms of reimbursement of fees, which in return are paid by the public social and social security institutions (Boeßenecker & Vilain, 2013). However, the German welfare organizations must face some new developments which affect their position as major providers of social care. First off all, the demand for public care services has risen. For instance demographic changes and the rise of the old age population has raised the demand for more care facilities for the elders. In addition, change in law has given every child a right for place in a child care facility. These have resulted in a rise of care facilities. Moreover, care and counselling activities are in need for more professionalization which stars to question the work of the voluntaries that provide their services for free but as non-professional lays. (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, 2004) On the other side, deregulation tendencies since the 1980s and the emergence of for profit providers in the fields of social care has question the privileged position of the free welfare organizations. Especially, the adaptation of parts of social care on principles of market competition has resulted in the economization of social work. Thus, while the principle of subsidiarity is one of the most vital element which has an effect on service providing, new demographic and economic changes has question the constitutional structure of this system. (Monetary) Support of the Family One major element of the social policies of the CDU is the protection and the support of the family as the basic source of society according to catholic social teaching. Especially the CDU led governments since 1950s has expanded a complex system of monetary and fiscal support for the family which should cope with the monetary burden of child rising. As such support for the family means primarily monetary support of families with children. The system of monetary support for families (Familienlastenausgleich) consists of various elements. First parents are able to enjoy fiscal allowances for children (Kinderfreibetrage). The Kinderfreibetrag is a tax allowance which puts a certain amount of money as tax free in the parents’ taxation of income. For instance, in 2010 the amount of exemption was 7002 Euro p. A. for each child, consisting of a general amount of the child and the amount for the care and education of the child. In addition, each parent is generally entitled to the allowance and the claim for the allowance consists for the month of the child’s birth as long as it is entitled to child benefits, i.e. 18 or 23 years. However, the tax allowance for children is not as such a support for children but 29
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represents tax equity between those families who has children and were maybe on parent does not work and those who does not have (Jürgen Boeckh, 2011; Jörg W. Althammer, 2013). A second element of the monetary support for families with children is the child benefits (Kindergeld). While, the child benefits were introduced during the Nazi period in 1936 as a paternalistic instrument of population policy, the system was expanded in Germany. At the beginning child benefits was paid by for the third and fourth child by the so called Family compensation schemes which belonged to the employers mutual insurance association in 1954 and financed by the employer’s contribution. Since 1961 child benefits were paid also for the second child by Federal Employment Office (Bundesanstall für Arbeit), financed by federal funds. After 1975 child benefits for the child are paid (Jörg W. Althammer, 2013). The amount of the child benefits depends on the number of children. In 2010 parents get for the first and second child each 184 Euro, for the third child 190 Euro and 215 Euro for each additional child. The child benefits are paid until the child is 18, or 21 if he is unemployed and respectively 25 if the child still in education. In addition, the benefits are paid usually to parents even if the adult children are still in education. Moreover, the benefits payoff bases on the principle of custodial care. If the parents are separated only the parent who has taken the custody of the child receives the child benefit. However if both parents share the custody of child the split of the child benefit is not possible. This shows that system of child benefits fallows a distinct paternalistic idea of family in which at least both parents care for the children and in which the children are regarded under the protection of the family household (Jörg W. Althammer, 2013). As a third element of monetary support for families with children are child raising benefits (Elterngeld) which was introduced in 2007 by the CDU led government and replaced the former system of parental allowance. It is a monetary compensation transfer from the state for families with small children to support them for the first period in which the mother does not go to work. Parents who finish permanently or interrupt temporally their employment, due of their newborn child are eligible for child raising benefits. As such the child raising benefits should assist parents in securing their livelihood and therefore are designed as pay compensation for the non-working parent. The benefit is generally limited immediately after the child’s birth to twelve months. The amount of parental benefit is based on the net income of the parent who applies for child raising benefits. Parents who were unemployed or have no job before they get their children get only 300 Euro for each month. The idea of the child rising benefit is that it is primarily intended to allow a temporary leave from work without having to accept excessive restrictions on living standards by motivating especially academic household to get more children. Finally, parents who decide to raise their child after its second year are eligible for child care subsidies, which was introduced by the CDU led christ-democratic liberal government in 2012. All parents whose children are older than 15 who do not get any child raising benefits and who decide not to work get subsidies in amount of 150 Euro each month for the next 22 month. While the German welfare regime supports parents who decide not to work permanently or temporally for the children it totally neglects to provide them with sufficient care facilities. First of all since 1996 children older than 3 years are entitled for a place in a kindergarten. Younger children are entitled when both parents must work and even this entitlement is limited and does not mean that it a child gets a place next to the place where it lives (Jürgen Boeckh, 2011; Jörg W. Althammer, 2013).This is reflected by the number of care facilities for children. In 2012 the percentage of children who are in a care facility 30
was 27.6 & while for children between 3 -6 was 93.3%. In addition there is difference between east and west Germany. In Eastern Germany in 2012, which has a tradition of socialist child care, the number of children between 0 -3 who are in a care facility are 49.3 % (Tühringen) and 57.5 % (Sachsen – Anhalt), while the number for the same age group is in Western Germany between 18.1 % (Nordrhein Westfalen) and 42.6% (Berlin) (Statistisches Bundeamt 2012). As such, it became visible that family policy in German has focused and still focuses on the ideal of the mother who does not work and raises the child. This result in the fact that the German social state did not open own care facilities for children and transferred this job to the welfare organization, following the tradition of subsidiarity. Consequently, it is in the tradition of Catholic social teaching and of course the principle of subsidiarity that the first the family is responsible for the care of the child. Thus, German social and family policy which is mostly dominated by the Christ democratic ideal of the CDU tries to support the family monetary, by coping the financial burden of the omission of the mother’s employment. It is interesting that the social policy ın the 2000s still tries to follow the ideal of the mother who cares for its child. Thus, it is safe to safe that the catholic ideals of distinct understanding about family, the division of labor between the parents with the society and the relationship between family, the state and society are still valid, regardless the that the for many the ‘C’ in Christian democratic has lost its importance in actual social policies. Conclusion The aim of this paper was to demonstrate how general religious ideas can shape the development of social policies. Concretely the paper demonstrated how the social ideas and the teachings of the Catholic Church still dominate the basic structure of German social policy. Moreover, the paper showed that this was the result of chain of historical developments. First of all, the anti-clerical assaults from the seculars and the socialist, the emergence of the nation state and the social problems emerging as a result of industrialization in the 19th century forced the Catholic Church to formulate ideas which gave her the possibility to adapt to these new situations. As such these new teachings were then formulated in the Papal encyclical, which became binding documents for all Catholics. In a next step these social teachings were then transformed in political programs and were transferred to the political arena by catholic parties. However, it was clear that only in such countries in which there was a great antagonism between Catholics and non-Catholic and or secular forces catholic Christ-democratic parties emerged. In other countries in which we lack such an antagonism any Christ democratic party emerged and as such the social catholic teaching became not an element of the formulation of social policies. In fact, in these countries the social state and the formulation of social policies were dominated by most liberal, socialist and conservative but not social catholic ideas. Moreover, the article has demonstrated that the basic dominant tenants of catholic social teaching was the idea of subsidiarity, which claimed that in cases of social need, especially in social care for children and elderly, the basic family unit of society should have priority before other institutions. Only if the family was not able to fulfill its duties, this social task should be transferred to a higher level, like the community and then to the municipality. As such the state became as such the last resort of social care and help. Nonetheless, the paper has also revealed that the formulation of the German social state was not the sole result of Catholic social teaching. In fact, it was a compromise and a fusion of liberal, social 31
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democratic and Christ democratic ideas about social policy. Thus, the German social state has social democratic elements like a social security system for long and short term issues, next to liberal elements like supplemental private and voluntary insurance and the social catholic elements –formulated and defended by the CDU - which we can find in the fields of family policy and social care. The paper demonstrates clearly that the social catholic idea of subsidiarity has still an effect on the German social policy. First, subsidiary resulted in the oligopoly of the six public welfare organizations as the only providers of social care. The majority of the facility for child care old age care and hospitals is in the hand of these six nonprofit institutions. For profit organizations have still not an important role in the providing of care, despite a rise of economic pressure and a form of market competition. Second, the paper has depicted how family policy in Germany as major political field of the CDU based on the idea of subsidiarity and the family as the primary provider of care for children, elderly and disabled. Therefore, family policy focuses on families with children and tries to support them monetarily, with the final aim that the mother leaves at least temporally the labor market for the rise of her children. However, despite the fact that the idea of subsidiarity is still a vital column of German social policy it must be noted that demographic and economic changes challenges this situation. Especially, socio structural changes in Germany demonstrate the weakness of the idea of subsidiarity and the idea of family first. The entry of women into the labor market and their wish to make a career in Germany like in all other European societies has resulted that need for child care facilities rises. In fact, this has become a big problem because the system of subsidiarity has neglected the expansion of child care facilities and focused more on monetary support for women who want to leave the labor market. However, the German women refuse to leave the labor market even temporally because of the negative effects for their career. Especially female academicians refuse to get a child. As a result, they not only the fertility rate in Germany fall, but also the age of women get their first child and those one who never get a child rises. Thus, the actual focus on monetary support is not enough to answer to the problems of these women and supports more those parts of the population who were never part of the labor market. As such the German social state is forced to expand its care facilities and to support families who need such facilities. A second element is the threat of neo-liberalism, which demands that all parts of social life must full fill specific criteria of economic efficiency. Even the field of social policy and especially social care is forced to follow principles of cost efficiency and budged planning. In addition, new form of private public partnership and market competition are introduced. This ‘death of the social’ (Rose, 1996) also and will affect the system of public welfare providers. While the six organizations still dominate that market for social care they will be forced to compete with new competitors, due to the fact that the actual number of beds is not enough. Thus, this can result in the emergence of a two class society in which affluent parents can send their children to expansive private child care facilities and the non-affluent part of the population must take the offer of the public welfare organizations. In a nutshell, social catholic teaching has an enormous effect on the development of the German social state and its influence is still evident today in the fields of social care and family policy. However, global and demographic changes challenge this position. Thus, the advocates of the catholic social teaching today are forced to adapt their ideas to the new and changing situation. It is clear that the actual idea of the family as the first provider of care is not realistic anymore. Thus, it will be very interesting observing how German political parties and especially the CDU and also the Catholic Church will answer to this challenge. At this moment it is not totally clear how they will answer to this problem, but for the sake 32
of a realistic and contemporary social policy they must result.
References Anzenbacher, A. (1998). Christliche Sozialethik - Einführung und Prinzipien. Paderborn/München: UTB. Boeßenecker, K.-H., & Vilain, M. (2013). Spitzenverbände der Freien Wohlfahrtspflege. Eine Einführung in Organisationsstrukturen und Handlungsfelder sozialwirtschaftlicher Akteure in Deutschland. 2. Auflage. Weinheim: Beltz Juventa. Evans, E. L. (1981). The German Center Party 1870-1933 - A Study in Political Catholicism. Carbondale: Edvardsville. Frerk, C. (2005). Caritas und Diakonie in Deutschland. Aschaffenburg: Alibri Verlag. Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln. (2004). Wohlfahrtsverbande in Deutschland - Auf den Schultern der Schwachen. Köln: Deutscher Institutsverlag. Jörg W. Althammer, H. L. (2013). Lehrbuch der Sozialpolitik, 9., aktualisierte u. überarb. Auflage. Berlin: Springer. Jung, H. (2009). Soziale Marktwirtschaft und Weltliche Ordnung Bd 21. Berlin: ETHd. Jürgen Boeckh, E.-U. H. (2011). Sozialpolitik in Deutschland - Eine systematische Einführung. 3. Auflage. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Kalyvas, S. N. (1996). The Rise of Christian democracy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kersbergen, K. v. (1995). Social Capitalism - A Study of Christian democracy and the welfare state. London: Routledge. Klose, A. (1979). Die katholische Soziallehre. Ihr Anspruch, ihre Aktualität. Wien: Styria. Klose, A. (1980). Katholische Soziallexikon. Insbruck. Korpi, W. (1983). The democratic class struggle. London: Routledge. Rokkan, S. (2000). Staat, Nation und Demokratie in Europe. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Rose, N. (1996, August). The Death of the Social? Re-figuring the territory of government. Economy & Society, 327 - 356. Sachße, C. (1994). Subsidiarität: Zur Karriere eines sozialpolitischen Ordnungsbegriffs. Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, 717 - 738. Statistisches Bundesamt. (2012). Kindertagesbetreuung in Deutschland 2012. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. Waschkuhn, A. (1995). Was ist Subsidiarität? Ein sozialphilosophisches Ordnungsprinzip: Von Thomas von Aquin bis zur “Civil Society”. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Wilensky, H. L. (1975). The welfare state and equality: Structural and ideological roots of public expenditures.
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FAMILY CONFERENCE - III
International Family Policies
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FAMILY IN ISLAMIC LAW Prof. Abdülhakim Yüce
Yüzüncü Yıl University, Faculty of Divinity
Abstract The well-being and hopeful future prospect of a nation is rooted in the healthy set-up and functioning of family, its corner stone. If the phenomenon of family is ignored, fails to perform its function and is subject to wrong practices the fate of an entire nation, not to say, humanity, will be in jeopardy. Just as a living cannot survive when the cells in its body fail to function properly, a nation cannot survive if the family becomes honable to honor its appropriate function, either. If this situation occurs on the scale of the entire humanity, humanity becomes disintegrated and losts its character. It is naturally unthinkable for law, which stipulates and applies principles to establish social order as part of its essential function, not to include any provisions about family, the corner stone of society. As in all legal systems, the Islamic law has also been subjected to legal amendments in order to establish a family, which is referred to in its actual resources and has a significant role, in a legal/valid way, to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties, to conduct it properly and solve any problems that may arise. These regulations were drafted in the early phases under the titles espousal and divorce, then marital union and separation and under the titles personal circumstances and family law within the past century. It is one of the remarkable elements that subjects related to family were tackled in a more detailed way as compared to other matters in the verses of the Quran and the prophet Mohammad’s sayings, the essential references. In other words, these verses and sayings include principles and recommendations about family in the most thorough way that leaves almost no loopholes. Another remarkable point is the following: Islamic law has two regulations expressed by the concepts of accidental and religious. The concept of accidental refers more often to situations that occur among individuals and relate to the rightful share; it is composed of formal legal principles. As for the concept of religious, it is a concept that rather represents the moral aspect of the matter that has to do with the after-life, which is rather called ‘right granted by Allah’. On the other hand, almost every society has customs and traditions that are unique and distinctive. The Islamic law establishes its principles by taking into account the authentic ones among these customs and traditions. Especially when it comes to the family, the effect of customs and traditions cannot possibly be ignored. Therefore, the Family Law in Islam was created by taking into account both the formal law and authentic customs as well as the after-life; naturally, it is open to the creation of appropriate case laws on subjects without any definitive references by taking into account the changing social life. Introduction Family is the cornerstone of society and wholesomeness of family is essential for the well-being of society. If due consideration is not given to family or if it fails to fulfill its functions properly or is 34
home to misguided practices, this will deal a fatal blow on the nation and humanity. It is unthinkable for a legal system which develops and implements principles for safeguarding the social order not to have provisions concerning family which is the cornerstone of society. Like any other legal system and relying on its primary sources that contain a significant amount of information, the Islamic law has introduced legal arrangements for the legal/valid formation of a family, the listing of mutual rights and liabilities of the parties, the smooth functioning of the family and the solution of problems as they emerge. These provisions were classified under such titled as “nikah wa talaq” in early periods, “munakahat wa mufarakat” in later periods and “al-ahwal al-shahsiyyah” (personal matters) and “ahkam al-usrah” (family law) in the last century. It is interesting to note that legal matters related to family are discussed more in detail in the Qur’an and hadiths, which are considered as primary sources, compared to other matters. In other words, the principles and recommendations concerning family law are provided at length without leaving any gap or loophole behind. Another interesting point is that Islamic law contains two specific regulations which are accompanied by the concepts “qada’an” (from a legal perspective) and “diyanatan” (from a religious perspective). The concept qada’an mainly refers to interpersonal matters as well as breaches of rights of people and consists of former legal principles. The concept diyanatan is related to the divine matters as well as breaches of rights of God and, in this context, falls into the otherworldly mattes category. On the other hand, every society has diverse customs and traditions. Islamic law lays down its principles taking into consideration these customs and principles if they are sound. The major role these customs and traditions play in the regulation of these principles cannot be denied. Thus, Islamic family law relies on formal law, sound customs and traditions and the otherworldly matters, and is open to new interpretations on the matters which are not regulated by definitive religious injunctions (nas) if these new rulings take into consideration the social change. For instance, if a woman gets divorced after privately meeting with her husband in true seclusion (khalwat al-sahiha), she has to observe the iddah (period of waiting for three months) before she gets married again. But if this woman knows that she has not had any sexual discourse during the true seclusion with her husband and there wasn’t any likelihood of her being pregnant, and if she doesn’t observe the iddah before getting married again, this marriage is not proper from a legal perspective (qada’an), but permissible from a religious perspective (diyanatan). Indeed, observing the iddah is actually a test for pregnancy. If the woman knows for sure that there wasn’t any sexual intercourse, this wouldn’t entail any religious responsibility. However, from a legal perspective, she would be an offender if she gets married without observing the iddah, and she wouldn’t be allowed to get married in such a state. Indeed, under laws, upon divorce, a woman is required to observe the iddah, i.e., wait for four months and 10 days, before getting married again. Another example is the following assertion which is occasionally debated: a woman is obliged to take care of the child she gives birth to from a religious perspective (diyanatan), but she has no such obligation from a legal perspective (qada’an). Thus, if a father files a complaint with a court, saying, “My wife does not take care of our child,” the judge cannot order the woman to look after the child, but may give some advice to her, saying, “Please take care of your child; it’s a sin to neglect one’s child.” Indeed, a mother is obliged to take care of her child from a religious perspective, not from a 35
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legal one. But if the child refuses to suck milk from another woman except his/her mother or if the father does not have funds to hire a wet nurse, then the mother becomes both religiously and legally responsible for giving suck to her child. Thus, her responsibility emerges in both respects as the life of a person is now at stake. The religion-wise provisions in the Holy Qur’an and hadiths are found in greater number than the legal or judicial provisions or commandments. This in a sense portends to the difference of Islamic law. Indeed, in other systems, legal norms are written while moral principles are generally not written as they are transmitted verbally. But in Islam, these moral principles are found in the basic references which are also sources of formal law and they are recorded also in the legal works, and while a judicial decision is given, reference is also made to these moral principles, and the number of these principles is quite high. In general, breach of moral principles is penalized through reproach, social boycotting etc., but in Islam, such breaches are punished not only with reproach, social boycotting, etc., but also with otherworldly penalties such as being deprived of God’s consent or being afflicted with God’s wrath --which are more severe for believers in comparison to punishments by formal law. This desire for purification, conscientious discomfort and concerns for otherworldly punishments/rewards explain why the history of Islam is rife with stories of believers, particularly including the Companions of the Prophet, applied to the courts confessing the crimes they committed secretly and asking for punishment. In all systems, compliance with moral principles is a source of peace for human psychology and social life, but in divine religions, such compliance brings about great rewards and happiness in the hereafter in addition to those benefits in this world. Like other disciplines of Islamic law, family law relies on these principles and this system as well. Some basic characteristics of family and Islam’s approach to them Like any institution or group, family has certain characteristics. Some of these characteristics have undergone certain changes over time, but as there is no other institution that can replace family, the fundamental characteristics of family should be protected in essence; otherwise, a union which lack these characteristics can hardly be defined as family, and such a union cannot produce the benefits that are expected from family. Some characteristics of family can be listed as follows: Family is an eternal universal institution As noted in divine commandment, “Dwell you, and your spouse, in the Garden” (Sura al-Baqarah, 2: 35) the first two human beings created by our Lord were made spouses of each other back in Paradise, thereby forming the first family. Throughout history, family always existed in all societies and will persist until eternity in Paradise. Indeed, various verses in the Qur’an (Sura az-Zukhruf, 43: 68-73; Sura ar-Ra’d, 13:23) and well as in hadiths indicate that family will continue to exist in Paradise after the end of life in this world. Thus, individuals will be members of families in Paradise as well. Family is a universal institution that came to being with the first man, continued until our time and will persist until eternity. If spouses treat each other with awareness and understanding,
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they will be happy both in this world and the other.1 Family has religious, legal and cultural foundations Family is formed and maintained in compliance with certain religious and legal principles and traditions in every society. This applies to Islamic societies; that is, a number of matters related to family are addressed at length in the Holy Qur’an and hadiths, and certain matters are left to regulation and settlement under specific cultures or traditions of societies. For instance, some of the matters addressed in the Holy Qur’an or in hadiths are as follows: Marriage and family are promoted as lifestyles that fit best to human nature. Advice is given to those who lack financial means for marriage. Principles for selecting the best spouse are laid down. There are rules about how marital ceremonies such as engagement and wedding should be conducted, how spending should be made, how marriage contract should be made, which rights and responsibilities are entailed and how will be relationship with relatives-in-law. Restrictions and freedoms familial affairs of spouses, pregnancy, childbirth, postpartum period, breastfeeding period and duties, child’s rights and responsibilities toward the child are discussed extensively. Division of labor, property regime, mutual duties and responsibilities, methods to be implemented in case of problems, attitudes to be adopted in case of divorce, etc., were addressed in detail. There are numerous topics and details about women, marriage and family which can be added to this list. These elaborate commandments and advices from our Lord and His prophet indicate that the matters concerning women, marriage and family are not simple affairs that can be left to reason, ambitions, desires or wills of individuals. Indeed, these matters have always been main venues for the attacks from the Satan and carnal self (nafs) and constitute primary stumbling blocks for individuals throughout history. Today, damages to, and deviations regarding, woman and family matters have grown so serious that they have the potential to bring about total corruption of humankind. Family has specific form of organization Just like any other social organization, family gets organized in a specific manner. Family is the smallest of social structures and has a limited size. The number of members of this structure varies depending on the type of family. Spouses connected to each other with a bond of marriage as well as the children who are born out of this bond are basic elements of this structure. But, a family does not consist only of parents and children. Indeed, definitions of family draw attention to this fact. For instance, from a sociological perspective, family can be defined as a social unit of individuals who are connected to each other with kinship, marriage and legal as well as emotional bonds, in which these individuals can fulfill their certain needs and acquire basic information and skills about life and join and adapt to social life. If the individuals with bonds of marriage and kinship are members of a family, then this is already an extended family. Indeed, uncles, aunts, grandparents, grandchildren and even parents-in-law and others are connected to each other with bonds of kinship or marriage.
In Radd al-Muhtar, Ibn Abidin (d. 1252/1836), an authority in Islamic law, starts to discuss the matter of marriage contract with the following sentence: “There is no form of worship other than marriage contract and faith, which has been around since the time of Prophet Adam and which will continue in Paradise” (Ibn Abidin, Radd al-Muhtar, II, 258).
1
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The debate about whether Islam focuses on extended or nuclear family may mean nothing in practice. Indeed, Islam attaches great importance to ties with relatives, regardless of their being defined by consanguinity or by marriage, and relatives by consanguinity or by marriage have certain rights and responsibilities toward each other. Even if a man and a woman get married and establish a nuclear family, their responsibilities toward their parents and other relatives do not end. This even affects the property regime. For instance, a rich father cannot give prescribed purifying alms (zakat) to his son or grandson and vice versa... In some cases, a grandfather or a grandchild may be entitled to a portion of the inheritance. Different matters related to privacy may be in question. For example, a person whose wife is alive cannot marry his sister-in-law. The sisters and brothers who are relatives by consanguinity should not become estranged after having got married and established nuclear families, but their mutual rights and responsibilities remain valid to a certain extent. For instance, the father --or if he is not alive, the brother(s)-- of a woman will have certain responsibilities towards her if she gets divorce. Other matters may be compared to this. Therefore, while newly established families in our time tend to nuclear due to the fact they people move to separate homes upon marriage, rights and responsibilities of relatives toward each other continue to a certain extent as if they live in an extended family after marriage. Family has certain goals Family has certain goals it seeks to attain. Each family member contribute to the attainment of these goals according to his/her capacity. These goals include continuation of the next generation, preservation of social morals, ensuring peace and tranquility for spouses, provision of a perfect sanctuary for its members, visiting relatives, eliminating loneliness, making its members earn rewards for goods deeds and gain perfection, facilitating personality development of children and transfer of cultural values. Family is a dynamic structure Family is a dynamic structure which constantly changes and in which members try to adapt to this change. This change is partially caused by the internal structure of family. The increase in the number of family members, age growth, diseases, death, etc., may trigger changes in the needs of a family, urging the family members to change their attitudes. For instance, when a baby is born, this brings about an extensive list of changes in the family as parents should be more careful in their attitudes and behaviors. When our parents become dependent upon our care and start to live with us, this, too, introduces a number of changes to our home. Births, deaths, growth, education and cultural changes, etc., always help a family to preserve its dynamism. Changing environmental conditions may urge a family to change. In case of unemployment, migration, wars, natural disasters, etc., a family uses its internal dynamics to take necessary precautions and try to eliminate or minimize the problems and sometimes, it may undergo a partial formal change. New budget adjustments, investments, loans, starting or closing businesses, etc., also contribute to a family’s dynamism. In short, any emerging situation, be it positive or negative, will keep a family alive and thriving, and the family cannot prosper if its loses its vitality. Family is not independent from other social institution 38
Family affects, and is affected by, law, education, traditions, culture and economy. The continuation and strength of this interaction is the natural outcome of the place and importance of family in society. Cooperation between family and other social institutions contributes to the fulfillment of social functions. Legal arrangements in the socio-economic fields, education curricula and models, and even advertising and other programs and publications and broadcasts should take into consideration this close cooperation and interaction. Otherwise, if an economically beneficial arrangement has the potential to undermine family or render it dysfunction, it should not be implemented. This applies to education and publications and broadcasts. Indeed, social institutions are not independent from each other. Family shares a common house and income Family members generally live under the same roof, i.e., in the same house Separate rooms should be allocated for parents, for girls and for boys to spend the night if it is financially possible. Indeed, after a certain age, girls and boys should not spend night in the same room or in the room of their parents for privacy concerns. The Holy Qur’an commands that the children who have not yet reached puberty should ask for permission before they enter the private room of parents before the morning prayer and during the midday rest and after the night prayer, and the children who have reached puberty should ask for permission whenever they want to enter the private room of their parents (Sura an-Nur, 24: 58-59). In the marital property system Islam introduced, spouses enjoy separate estates as individuals are entitled to have own, separate, and distinct property. Thus, the wife owns the property given to her as bridal-due (amount of payment that is settled between the spouses at the time of marriage, and which the husband is required to make to his bride) or as gift or which she inherits or brings from her father’s house. She can spend this property at will or save it. And she cannot be forced to spend it against her will. A father who have sufficient financial resources or who is healthy enough to work for earning those resources is required to take care of his wife, children and his parents who are unable to take care of themselves. His responsibility continues until his sons reach puberty and his daughters get married. The father is also responsible for taking care of his daughter who returns home after getting divorced, and he cannot force the daughter to work. The wife, too, cannot be forced to work as his husband is required to provide for her subsistence. But if needed, a son may be required to work after puberty. One of the frequent abuses in our time is forced employment of minors. Islam prohibits employment of minors to prevent this abuse. Some Islamic scholars note that even if minors are forced to work despite this prohibition, their parents cannot use their money these children earn.2 Family members are emotionally attached to each other The members of a family are emotionally bonded to each other. It is no doubt that individuals can enjoy the closest and most intimate relationship within the family. Affection, compassion and love are the strongest bonds that ensure the survival of a family. The bond of love that exists between spouses during the establishment of a family will grow with each passing day, especially with children born to the family. A family is the first and natural environment in which unconditional love is cherished and the meaning of affection, compassion, dedication and loyalty is learned through life.
2
M. Ustrushani, Ahkam al-Sighar, (translated by Ä°brahim Canan) 160.
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The fact that two people with different genders and different characters, who have grown up in different cultural environments can come together and spend their lives together with love, respect, affection and compassion is proof of God’s greatness. Indeed, God commands: “And among His signs is that He has created for you, from your selves, mates, that you may incline towards them and find rest in them, and He has engendered love and tenderness between you. Surely in this are sings for people who reflect (Sura ar-Rum, 30: 21). The verse draws attention to three phases in marriage: satisfaction, companionship, and compassion. The early years of a marriage constitute a period in which spouses find peace and satisfaction in many respects, particularly including sexual satisfaction. The second phase is the companionship period in which spouses start to treat each other as close friends, companions and confidants particularly after their fifties. The third phase is the compassion period in which spouses show compassion and affection to each other due to illness and advanced age particularly after their sixties. Having reached this period with happiness, the spouses started to treat each other with affection and compassion and show increased reliance on each other. It is a source of nostalgia for spouses to remember their good old days and shared memories.3 Islamic Family Law and Islam’s Approach to State Family Policies Islam treats family both as a social and a religious institutions and sets forth a number of principles and rules about selection of spouses, establishment of family, its vitality and maintenance, and its breakup. No new ruling can be made about some of these principles. The provisions related to the prohibition of marriage between certain people, the limits of privacy between opposite sexes, the prohibition of adultery, the elements and conditions for marriage contract, the prohibition of remarriage after final divorce, the inheritance shares, the rights and duties of parents and other relatives, etc., cannot be amended. Other provisions are open to new ruling. Indeed, Islamic scholars developed various rulings and policies about family law at different levels throughout Islamic history, but particularly during the last two centuries. The presence of four schools of Islamic law (four madhhabs or juridical schools) as well as of scholars of jurisprudence with different opinions have brought about an immense dynamism and room for improvement. Thus, Islamic law treats family policies of countries from the perspective of these principles and promotes all sorts of legitimate arrangements that are designed to ensure the smooth functioning of families and eliminate problems stemming from or affecting families. It lends support to, and promotes, the arrangements to made about children with unknown children, violence against women, sexual abuse, loneliness of and lack of care for parents and elders, informal marriage, irresponsibility of husbands, marriage age and related abuses, increased number of divorces, assistance and leave to be provided to working women who are pregnant or who give birth to child, family-centered housing policy and architectural arrangements, right of privacy and its protection, etc. I think the rationale behind abortion, euthanasia, and suicide should be examined in depth and analyzed in this context. Likewise, growing number of cases of sexual assault, sexual abuse and incest should be analyzed with regard to pornography and erosion of religious and moral values.
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H.K. Yılmaz, Altınoluk, May, 2006, p. 243, Issue 5.
On the other hand, I believe physical, psychological and sexual attacks on and violence against women are not independent from the violence that has been haunting everyone indiscriminately like a social insanity. In other words, there is an increase in cases of violence against human beings rather than against women, or violence against women has increased in parallel to the rise in violence against human beings. Therefore, policies should be developed in general to combat violence, hate speech, intolerance, sexual perversity, mobbing and the like. Of course, Islamic law supports these policies as it has a say in these matters. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of the practices and arrangements such as family counseling offices, family therapy and guidance centers, pre-trial arbitration boards, and women’s shelters should be discussed in the light of experiences the countries with different cultures had in implementing those practices as well as with findings from field studies. Indeed, each family is special and has privacy. Islam proposes a four-phase approach to the settlement of marital problems, and in the first three phrases, spouses refrain from informing even their closest relatives of their problems, and in the fourth phase, an arbitration board consisting of relatives of both spouses (not of foreigners) should be established (Sura an-Nisa, 4:34). Conclusion Islamic family law has a number of basic characteristics. The most salient characteristic is that it is in harmony with the nature of men and women. Moreover, it relies on positive discrimination toward women, a principle which has just started to be discussed in our time. In Islam, a woman may use all her wealth including the property she brings from her father’s home, the property she inherits and the property she earns through trade for charity and self care. Indeed, when Fatima bint Muhammad was married, Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him, advised her to spend two thirds of her bridal due for ornaments and odor and one third for her clothes. The fact that women historically established numerous charities and foundations thanks to this property regime and the liberty they enjoyed in disposing their property. 4 A distinct characteristic of Islamic family law is that it accommodates a number of provisions that pertain to conscience, morality and the Hereafter in addition to provisions of formal law. Moreover, these provisions are covered in the Holy Qur’an and hadiths more extensively than rule of formal law. These regulations seek to promote and encourage free thought, conscience, sincerity and dedication to God. Therefore, people lead properly lives not because they fear from laws, but because this is what their human nature entails, and this in turn facilitates the way they comply with the laws that are set forth for a sound social order. The fact that there are four schools (madhhabs) of Islamic law adds immense dynamism to Islamic law as well as spacious room for improvement. When new rulings that will be made to address the emerging needs to this, the dynamism of Islamic law will be boosted further. Therefore, while it accommodates certain invariable principles, Islamic law generally lends support the family policies of countries. As a final world, I would like to note that in the Islamic conception, family is eternal as it will survive the life in this world and extend into the life in the next, and when they grow old, spouses 4
Ibn Sa’d, Tabaqat, 8/19.
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tend to reason as such: “My spouse has grown old, deprived of power, strength, youth, beauty and attraction, but in Paradise, we will both be at the age of 33 and have an eternal life. So our mutual loyalty, respect, love, support and fidelity should continue. Already, we had given each other “a most solemn pledge” when we got married (see also Sura an-Nisa, 4:21).
References Aktan, Hamza, İslam Aile Hukuku (Islamic Family Law), in Sosyo-Kültürel Değişim (Turkish Family in Socio-Cultural Change), Ankara, 1992
Sürecinde Türk Ailesi II
Aydın, Mehmet Akif, Mehir (Bridal Due), DİA, 28/399. Bilmen, Ömer Nasuhi, Hukuk-i İslamiye ve Istılahat-ı Fıkhiyye Kamusu (Dictionary of Islamic Law and Terminology of Islamic Jurisprudence), Istanbul, 1970. Esen, Hüseyin, İslam Hukuku ve Uhrevi Sorumluluk (Islamic Law and Otherwordly Responsibility), İslam Hukuku Araştırmaları Dergisi, Issue 8, 2006. Güneş, Ahmet, Dinimizde ve Örfümüzde Nişanlanma (Engagement in Our Religion and Customs), Yeni Ümit Dergisi, Issue 22, p. 83. 2009. Paçacı, İbrahim, Sosyal Hayattaki Değişim Sürecinde İslam Aile Hukuku (Evlenme ve Boşanma Örneği) (Islamic Family Law in the Process of Change in Social Life: Case of Marriage and Divorce), İslam Hukuku Araştırmaları Dergisi, Issue 11, 2008, pp. 59-92. Savaş, Saim, Fetva ve Şer’iyye Sicillerine Göre Ailenin Teşekkülü ve Dağılması (Formation and Breakup of Family according to Fatwas and Judicial Registries), in Sosyo-Kültürel Değişim Sürecinde Türk Ailesi II (Turkish Family in Socio-Cultural Change), Ankara, 1992. Türcan, Talip, İslam Hukukunda İki Farklı Geçerlilik Alanı: Kazai ve Diyani Hüküm Ayırımı (Two Different Spheres of Validity in Islamic Law: Distinction between Legal and Religious Provisions), İslami Araştırmalar Dergisi, Volume 19, Issue 1, 2006. Yüce, Abdulhakim, Dünya ve Ahirete Bakan Yönleriyle Bizim Yuvamız (Our Home with Aspects for this World and the Next), Istanbul 2013.
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SECTION II Family and Work
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WOMEN EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND FAMILY PROTECTION IN NIGERIA Dr.Pauline.E.Onyeukwu, Ph.D
Nigerian Turkish Nile University, Department of Business Administration
Abstract This paper examines the policy of women employment especially young women (mothers) at work in Nigeria’s formal sector. The maternity leave for Nigerian women is officially four months while in United Kingdom UK), it is six months. In order to generate data for the study, descriptive survey research method was used. Data collected from both primary and secondary sources were analyzed using percentage mean scores, while the hypothesis formulated were tested with Pearson chi-square. The findings revealed that despite all the efforts and some progress made over the years regarding policies of women employment, women continue to be at a disadvantage in comparison with men in employment. It also revealed that there is no strong labor law to protect women in Nigeria. In some government ministries, there is no crèche space for breast-feeding mothers. Women are being marginalized due to discrimination resulting from socio-cultural and religious beliefs. The family support system has been weakened due to migration to cities; as such, a young woman, three to four months after delivery is rushing back to work, leaving the child at the care of domestic workers (house helps). These factors cause stress in family. The crux of the matter is that there are no proper bonding between mother and child. These situations have brought about insecurity, cheating, rape, drug abuse, divorce and other vices within families. The policies and politics in Nigeria is affecting women adversely, hence, the family is not getting adequate protection. The paper recommends that the labour laws that would protect young women in Nigeria should be enforced; that the period of maternity leave should be extended to six months; that crèche space should be provided in all government and non-government organizations where mothers could keep their suckling children while at work. Key Words: Employment, EduHomTra and Family Protection, Policy and Women Introduction Nigeria is the African largest economy; it also has the largest population of any African country, estimated to be about approximately over 170 million people of which 49% are females. In the 1960s and 1970s, Nigerian women were mainly housewives. Even the educated ones among them also stayed at home. Hence the saying that: “women education ends in the kitchen”. The trend began to turn in the world social order especially in Nigeria where the traditional family roles are changing as democratic nations creep into the social system. Before now, it was assumed to be written in stone that the man was the provider in the family and the woman, the homemaker. In 45
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Nigeria, women have realized that there is a world outside the kitchen; more women are now joining the work force due to economic necessity. Nigerian Government, just like other nations, signed many international instruments on gender equality in all aspects of employment. The Beijing platform for Action 1995 called for the integration of women in the national development. Starting from 1980s to date, the role of women in nation building became paramount, many women have joined in the development of the country and also to cater for their homes as well. Most of Nigerian women started acquiring high degrees, even more than the men. This is because most of the male went into trade especially those from Eastern Nigeria; therefore, as a result of these changes the women began to occupy some prominent positions in the government. Hence, the primary role of woman in the family began to suffer setbacks. This set back brought about a lot of changes in most Nigerian homes: both positive and negative. This women movement started with the “Generation X”women, those who were born in the 1960s and 70s used the EDUHOMTRA model .
Chart 1. “Women’s Role” Model Source: Author’s design, 2014
The model is the combination of Education, Home-keeping and Trading. Before and slightly after the independence of Nigeria in the year 1960, the number of educated women was less than 20 %.( UNDP, 2006). The rate of discrimination against women was alarming during the pre-independence 1840s-1960 and immediate post- independence 1960s-1970s.The problem of this discrimination against the girl child or women has its root in the nuclear family as far as the Nigerian case is concerned. For instance, in most family set-up, one would find that, the girl child is used as domestic laborer; for cooking meals, sweeping and cleaning the surroundings, fetching water from the streams, family laundry works, babysitting, washing dishes etc. while the boys are allowed to play games and football even early in the morning. More astonishing, some parents will tell you that certain schools, businesses and trades are suitable only for their male children who are to succeed them and not for the girl child who will leave them to husband’s homes. (Ukpata and Onyeukwu,2013). The trend however began to change in favor of the girl child, since change is the only constant thing in life. During the 1980s, the rate of boys out of school began to increase, this was because many of them believe that going to school is a waste of time, they started going into trading. The 46
girls’ enrollment into primary, secondary and tertiary institutions began to increase especially among the Gen-x group. Overtime, most men could no longer meet up with their responsibilities. Hence, the EDUHOMTRA came into lime light in Nigeria. Many women started attending higher institutions, keeping the home and also trading. The income they generated from their trades is used for paying their school fees and supporting their husbands. Therefore, when women began to show their potentials, the slogan “Train a girl child and train a nation” started, and many families started training their girl children to higher schools. The tide took a larger turn. Women started working in both formal and informal sectors. Even though, based on the Nigeria’s population, the potential female labour is 50% but the actual is 31%.The proportion of women in the formal sector is very minimal,( CBN Report,2014). This is because in the case of every social change, there is usually a difference between the actions and attitudes. This is why the world has signed many instruments in order to bridge the gap, and allow women to help in overcoming the economic necessities both at the family level as income/ salary earners, and social level for national development in terms of ideas, creativity, suggestions, decisions, actions, etc.In Britain for example, it took a serious movement to move from Victorian rigidity and complacency to suffrage era in the 20th century. Nigeria just like other nations, has signed many international instruments on gender equality in all aspect of human endeavor including in the area of employment. The Beijing Platform for Action 1995 called for integration of women in the national development. Also there are national commitments towards gender equality in national development. The national gender policy was signed by the Obasanjo administration to address the gender inequality in Nigeria. Despite all these major efforts and some progress that were made over the years, women continued to be disadvantaged in comparison with men in employment. The UNDP’s Human Development Report, which records progress in human development according to indicators of health, education and income, has since 1995 included a Gender Employment Measure (GEM) which reveals that while women are all represented among professional and technical staff, there are fewer women than men working as parliamentarians, administrators and managers in Nigeria. In terms of earned income share, the picture in most sectors is of significant bias in favor of men (UNDP Human Development Reports 2005). While there are no laws barring women from particular fields of employment in Nigeria, women often experienced discrimination under traditional and religious practices. There are credible reports that women face a lot of discrimination in employment in the private sector, particularly in accessing promotion to higher professional positions and salary equality when compared with their male counterpart. While the number of women employed in the business sector has increased over the years, women did not receive equal pay for equal work and often found it extremely difficult to acquire commercial credit or tax deduction or rebates as head of households. Unmarried women in particular endured many forms of discrimination (Country Report on human Rights Practices 2006). Statement of the Problem There are challenges facing women employment policies in Nigeria, such as, short period of maternity leave given to young women at work, discrimination and domestication of women, weak 47
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labour laws to back women at work and so on. The patriarchal nature of Nigerian society had eaten deep into the fabrics of the men and women of the country, in the sense that even if you give some women their due rights; they were clamoring for; they will not accept it because of the cultural, religious, social belief and norms. This is because of age-long norms. This attitude of both Nigerian men and women are carried along by the policy makers on these issues that concern women; this spilled over to the policy of women employment in Nigeria. Nearly six million young men and women enter the labour market every year but only 10% are able to secure jobs in the formal sectors, and just one third of them are women. These few women are mostly young women at child bearing age; still the government policy is adversely affecting them. This is because the labour laws affecting Nigerian women are not being enforced as they should. Most times they are documented and are not implemented. This has negative effect on the formulation of policies that has to do with women employment, both in the formal and informal sector especially in the area of maternity leave and during the period of breast feeding. The children of these young women are being abandoned to the care of house helps and nannies that cannot create a bond between child and mother relationship. The national unemployment rate increased from 1.8 percent points to 25.7 percent in 2012. A breakdown of the unemployment by gender revealed that 27.5 percent were male and 28.3 percent were females, the negative attitude of men towards women employment policy is impacting negatively on family protection. This attitude is affecting Nigerian children; thereby bringing about a lot of negative vices in the country; such as: child neglect, broken families, insecurity, decay of cultural values, divorce, drug addiction,etc.The discrimination against women in Nigeria is doing the country a lot of harm; hence, most Nigerian families are suffering from lack of protection and poverty. It is due to these challenges and more that the researcher was spurred to proffer solutions. Objectives of the Study The general objective of the paper is to stress how women employment policies impact on the family protection in Nigeria. The specific objectives therefore are: • To determine if there is a link between women employment policies and family protection in Nigeria. • To highlight the impact of the short period of four months given to young women for maternity leave on family protection in Nigeria. • To determine whether government policies discriminate against women in formal sector in Nigeria Hypotheses The following hypotheses are raised to guide the paper: • H01: There is no link between women employment policies and family protection in Nigeria. • H02: The four months maternity leave given to young women in Nigerian formal sector do not affect the family protection in Nigeria • Ho3:Government policies do not discriminate against women in Nigerian formal sector. 48
Review of Related Literature A review of relevant and related literature shows that gender issue is a global and very sensitive issue in the twenty-first century, both government, and non-government organizations, have been giving maximum attention to gender issues. Many agreements, policies and treaties have also been signed at both local and international levels but the question remains “to what extent have the policies been implemented? How far and how well have the objectives been achieved? For proper appreciation of the issue, a critical and content review of employment rate will be discussed. It has been documented that constitution making in Nigeria has persistently excluded female legitimacy (Ezielo 2005). This exclusion dates back to the colonial times when women were not allowed to vote. The Clifford constitution of 1922 restricted the electorates to adult male in Calabar and Lagos who have been resident in the city for at least one year and had a gross annual income N100.00. The Richard constitution of 1946 only reduced the property qualification to N50.00, but still restricted the electorate to only adult males who pay their taxes. By Lyttleton constitution 1954, franchise was universal in the East and West, but limited to adult males in the north. It was until 1979 that the right to vote was extended to all Nigerian women (UNIFEM 2002,). In the 1999 constitution promulgated into law by the Arm Forces Ruling Council of Gen.AbdulsalamAbubakar regime, the language of the constitution is in masculine gender. Thus it does not only continue to marginalize women, but also actively discriminate against women particularly in citizenship. On a related development, Uzuegbunam (2009) posits that, the Nigerian gender analysts have in their own part informed the policy makers, government and development agencies about the need to consider the issue of women in development planning and policies as a result of women’s innate potentials in nation building, in Nigeria and Africa at large. The patriarchal structure that operates in all Nigerian communities has failed our system over time and is still failing us. It is an outright discrimination against the ability of women or the girl child to demonstrate their potentials. And in recent past, this patriarchal structure that is operative in Nigeria has received very severe agitation from different women groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the international community. For example, in Uzuegbunam (1999:36) study of ‘Feminism in Decision-making in Igbo land’,
….observed that women’s participation in immediate family decisions, marriage decisions, modern society politics, religious and church decisions, family’s economic income and spending etc is minimal when compared with their male counterpart. On this note, she stressed the dire need to appreciate women’s talents, not only by the society but also by the women themselves.
This will enhance the full realization and development of women’s capabilities. This is in harmony with Adoko’s (2012) earlier position that if women have confidence and courage in themselves, it would be shown by the way other women would give them leadership support and would no longer be seen as cowards before their male counterparts. Eneh(2010) mirrored women as the major source of all developments. Therefore if Nigeria will ever enjoy family protection, all the policies that have to do with women should not be threated with kid’s gloves. In spite of all the strides of women in 49
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both formal and informal sectors in Nigeria, they are still being marginalized and discriminated. Women are victims of nature in Nigeria. As such, the girl child and women are being relegated to the background, religiously, politically, socially, economically; even in making policies that concern them.
Adoko (2012:56) captured similar problems when he states: In some societies, either for religious or cultural reasons, wives are not accorded political power while their sons if they were of age were vested with such responsibility. At the community level, in most traditional societies in Nigeria, a representative was and is appointed to represent each of the families that make up that community when decisions that concern the community are to be taken. In most cases, these representatives are men of high standing, usually, the heads of the families. In event of unavoidable absence of such male figures, a woman no matter how capable she may be was not considered as a substitute in a case of temporary absence or replacement in case of death, rather a male-child in the family would be called upon to perform that role. This child may never, make any contribution.
In order to comprehend the topic under discussion, some of the key words should be defined. The first question that would help in seeing the correlation between women employment policies and family protection is to ask what a family represents and the types of families applicable in the Nigerian environment. What is Family? Family at its basic level can be explained as the smallest unit of the society consisting of parents and their children. In economics the family is a major agent of population. There are two types of family: the nuclear and the extended family. The nuclear family is a family that is made up of the man, his wife and their children. This can be either polygamous or monogamous. The extended family is made up of relatives outside of the immediate family or many members of the family living together. Nigerian culture believes so much in both the Nuclear and Extended family. This family ties are loosening daily due to migration of people from rural to urban areas. The extended family is shrinking, the young mothers who migrated to urban areas with their husbands no longer have helping hands from their relatives who might not likely to be moving with them from one place to another. Therefore, women at the child bearing age are no longer enjoying the help of their families who would have being of help in a situation where they deliver of a baby. This situation coupled with few numbers of months given to these women of child bearing age in formal sector; is causing a lot of depression in Nigerian homes. The family protection is highly being hampered.(Onyeukwu,2014) Employment of women and Maternity Protection The labour law as contained in 2012 Nigerian Labour law stipulates that in any public or private industrial or commercial undertaking or in any branch thereof, or in any agricultural undertaking or any branch thereof, A woman ; 50
i. shall have the right to leave her work if she produces a medical certificate given by a registered medical practitioner stating that her confinement will probably take place within six weeks. ii. shall not be permitted to work during the six weeks following her confinement. If she is absent from her work in pursuance of paragraph (a) or (b) or of this subsection and had been continuously employed by her, then employer for a period of six months or more immediately prior to her absence;(c) shall not be paid not less than fifty percent of the wages she would have earned if she had not been absent; and (d) Shall in any case if she is nursing her child, shall be allowed half her hour twice a day during her working hours for that purpose. Sub -section (1) of this section shall have effect not withstanding any law relating to the fixing and payment of minimum wage. (e). No employer shall be liable, in his capacity as an employer, to pay any medical expenses incurred during or on account of her pregnancy or confinement. (f). Where a woman; (a) is absent from her work in pursuance of subsection (1) (a) or (b) of this section; or (b) remains absent from her work for a longer period as a result of illness certified by a registered medical practitioner to arise out of her pregnancy or confinement and to render her unfit for work, then, until her absence has exceeded such a period (if any) as may be prescribed, no employer shall give her notice of dismissal during her absence or notice of dismissal expiring during her absence. (g). in subsection (1) (d) of this section, “child” includes both a legitimate and illegitimate child. Many of the stated conditions stated above are in paper, not in practice, for example, a nursing mother immediately after her 4 months of child birth are expected to remain in the office until the normal stipulated closing hour, which is from 8am to 5pm from Monday to Friday. The question now is who is at home to protect the child?. The domestic help (house help), who has either little or no time for the child? Therefore in such situation, the family is not protected as it should be,( Onyeukwu,2014) Woman Employment Labour Rights The 1999 constitution forbids discrimination on the employment rights. Women They should be adequately protected under the Labour Act, nevertheless the reality is that Nigerian women are far from enjoying equal rights in the employment due to domestic burden and biases against women’s employment. In some establishments women are not allowed to get married or pregnant because it is thought that it will reduce their organizational productivity and profit. (DSM, 2013).In line with the fact above, many young women are no longer changing their maiden names; they rather maintain their father’s names even after wedding, so that they could be employed. In certain places, they are given the number of years they have to put in service before they could get married and get pregnant, otherwise, their employment would be terminated.(Onyeukwu,2014) 51
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National Gender Policy (2006) states that the wrong perception of the concept of gender by policy makers, charged with the responsibility of policy articulation and execution continues to challenge gender equality and women’s empowerment goals. Gender inequalities greatly limit women’s access to control over, and use of services and productive resources. The part two of the national Gender policy (2006), talks about the policy goal and objectives. The goal of the gender policy is to build a just society devoid of discrimination, harness the full potentials of all social groups regardless of sex or circumstances, promote the enjoyment of fundamental human rights and protect the health, social, economic and political well-being of all citizens in order to achieve equitable rapid economic growth. To achieve the above goal, the following objectives were mapped. • Establish the framework for gender responsiveness in all public and private spheres and strengthened capacities of all stakeholders to deliver their component mandate of the gender policy; • Develop and apply gender mainstreaming approaches; • Adopt gender mainstreaming as a core value and practice in a social transformation, organizational culture and in the general policy in Nigeria. • Incorporate the principles of convention on the elimination of all forms discrimination against women (CEDAW) and other global regional framework that support gender equality and women empowerment in the country’s laws, legislative processes, judicial and administrative systems. • Achieve minimum thresh hold of representation of women in order to equal opportunities in all area of social, political and economic life for women as well as men. • Undertake women and men specific projects as a means of developing the capacity of both men and women to enable them take advantage of economic and political opportunities to achieve gender equality and women empowerment. • Educate and sensitize all stakeholders on the centrality of gender equality and women empowerment to the attainment of overall national development. All the objectives enumerated above are not helping the plight of young women at their child bearing ages in Nigeria. Gender Bias in Policy of Women Employment in Nigeria Bias is an inclination or prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way considered to be unfair. In the case of Nigeria, it is the female gender that suffers unfair treatment. According to National Gender Policy (2006) “Nigeria as a member of the united nations signed and ratified the various relevant international instruments, treaties and conventions relating to gender equality without reservations. This instrument has always emphasized that member nations should put in place all necessary mechanisms needed to eliminate gender discrimination in national and state statues, customary and religious laws. In Nigeria tradition, customs and stereotyping of social roles and cultural prejudice continuous to militate against enjoyment of right and full participation of women on equal basis with men in national development. The National Gender Policy (2006) point out that Nigeria is a highly patriarchal society where men dominate all sphere of women’s lives. As 52
in other male dominated societies, the social relations of Nigerian women and men are governed by patriarchal systems of socialization and cultural practices, which favor the interest of men above that of women. This practice of sexism has not allowed Nigerian formal sector to fully tap the potentials in Nigerian women. Beijing Platform for Action (1995) states that parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and shall ensure that the women relate in equal terms with the men, the right to participate in the formulation of government policy and perform all public functions at all levels of government. Despite all these agreements and treaties, it can be seen without magnifying lenses that women are not properly carried along in the Nigeria formal sector. (Adigwe,2009:13) Thoraya Ahmed Obaid (2009) in her message on the international women’s Day 8th March called on government to increase investment in women and girls, she said that; “improving women’s wellbeing cannot be accomplished without improving their access to good employment”. She went further to say that investments in women issues are still falling short in some areas, such as, employment, education, and politics and so on.
ECA Press Release No 72 (2004:14) says that; A land mark report on the statues of women in Africa says there is a distinct gap between intention and implementation in relation to women’s rights and equality”; also that “the difficulties countries are having with respect to the full realization of women’s right are due to the persistent negative cultural and religious beliefs against women. These could lead to gender bias which hinders the employment of women in public service
A critical look on the Nigerian Labor Act chapter 198 (laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990) gender bias will be seen in part I and II, however in part III employment of woman was discussed, but the consideration was only in areas of (54) maternity protection, (55)night work (56) underground work (57) regulations (58) offences. Concerning the ratio of employment of women as against men, the labor Act becomes bias. This definitely will continue to put a barrier in the ability of women to contest their marginalization in the employment population. Thus there is need for the Act to be reviewed in order to meet up with the tenets of human rights law and address the marginalization of women in the formal sector. Women Employment Policies and Family Protection Policy can be defined as plans or action agreed or chosen by a government, political party, business or other groups (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2010). When we talk about gender policy we are referring to a set of plans or actions agreed upon by the national government on how issues concerning women and men should be in nation building. Women employment policies are those principles or protocols that guide a relationship between women and their employers in the decisions 53
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to achieve rational outcomes or organizational goals and objectives. While family protection is the provision of parental control to protect children of all ages from social networking risks; cyber bullying and other on-line threats,( Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary,2010) The duo has a symbiotic relationship. Where women employment policy is favorable, the family protection will equally be sound. This is because women are home builders, for example in the United Kingdom the women employment policy is favorable to young women of child bearing age. This is because Feminism in the United Kingdom established political, social and economic equality for women in the early 20th century. In a situation where a woman put to bed, apart from the six month maternity leave, she equally has one year maternity cover. The labour laws protecting women in western world are strong and enforced by law. In Nigeria the reverse is the case. (Onyeukwu, 2014) The discrimination against women in the society is also applicable to the policies of women employment in Nigeria especially the short period of maternity leave and labour laws protecting women in both formal and informal sector, the children from infant to adolescence are no longer getting the necessary parental care “Borrowed ways” of lives are seen among the youth. Therefore crimes are becoming an in thing in the three regions of the country. In the Northern part - Insurgency (Boko Haram); the Western part - ritual killings and in the Eastern part - kidnapping. These are the result of poor family protection, since family protection most times depends on a woman. Therefore, since, women employment policies are not favourable to young women; the family protection is affected negatively. (Onyeukwu, 2014). Family Protection Policies in Nigeria The family policy devotes itself to promoting effective social action for individuals and families by monitoring pressing policy issues, evaluating the potential impacts of new policies; working for effective change and creating strategies to educate and raise awareness resulting in improved quality of life for individual families and society (Policy Institute for family, 2014). Despite the efforts of National Economic Empowerment Strategy (NEEDS) in 2004, and the state Economic Empowerment Strategy (NEEDS, 2005) to bring women to top positions in Nigeria, there is still the strategy issue of women discrimination. Oni B and Akedere (2006) are of the view that, the formal sector employment declined under the Structural Adjustment Programmes, (SAP) of 1986. The effect led to high incident of poverty in the country because the incomes of most income-earners can no longer meet the need of families. Nigerian Government has formulated policies and program response to employment problems in Nigeria to help in family protection, such as: • Directorate of food, roads and rural infrastructures (DFRRI); • National Directorate of Employment (NDE) • Better life for rural women • Family support programme (FSP) • Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP) 54
• People Bank of Nigeria (PBN) • National Board for community Bank (NBCB) • Poverty Alleviation Programme(PAP) and • National poverty eradication programme (NAPEP). These policies and programmes were unable to protect Nigerian Families because of exclusion of women from the core activities. Many other family support programmes like Structural Adjustment Programme(SAP), Better Life for Rural Women, etc., had not actually done much to better the lives of women in Nigeria. The policies of women in employment and those of family protection had not brought the expected changes in the Nigerian families because of discrimination and marginalization of women in key sectors of the country. Methodology The nature of data used in the study is primary (survey) data. The data were collected through the use of structured questionnaire with a focus on women employment policies and family protection in Nigeria. Due to the nature and the strategic importance of the study, it focused on sixty (60) female and forty (40) male residents in Abuja. It would further ensure the inclusion of married couples in all categories of respondents in order to have quality responses. The study simultaneously employed both stratification and random sampling techniques in arriving at the sample size. This is done in-order to ensure true representation as explained earlier. Demographic variables such as: age, gender, educational attainment, marital status etc. were used in the study to serve as control variables. For instance, age, marital status, gender etc. may on their own exert impact on the decision of the respondent particularly those in government establishments in Nigeria. For instance, in Britain, Lewicki et al (1997) found that older employees tend to be more honest than younger employees; as a result more dedicated to their duties and are less distracted. Also marital status was controlled for because research by Hollinger et al (1992) demonstrates that employees who are married are more likely to commit property deviance. It is no gainsaying that location plays a crucial role here, and since most of the studies seen above are done in developed economies; tendencies are that inherent environment in developing economies like Nigeria would have a greater impact even amongst the control variables; which why the study focused on the respondents in Abuja, Nigeria. Assessing Reliability of Items (scales) The standard cronbach alpha coefficient was used to measure the reliability. The Cronbach alpha coefficient has values ranging from 0 to 1, the higher the value the greater the reliability. Values above 0.6 are accepted (Hair, et al., 2006). In this study 0.6 is also used as the minimum level.
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Method of Data analysis Table 2: Respondents Table S/No
Questionnaire
Number of Respondents
Percentage %
1
Distributed
132
100
2
Returned
123
88
3
After list-wise deletion
100
12
4
Total used
100
100
Source: Field survey,(2014)
A total number of 132 questionnaires were distributed. About 123 completed questionnaires were returned; a list-wise deletion was implemented in order to exclude incomplete responses from the responded questionnaires. As a result, a total number of 100 useable questionnaires with about 9 variables were provided for this study, which gave a Chart 2: Demographic Variable of the Respondents (Gender) Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Degree
Source: Field Survey 2014 From the above chart, 60 percent of the respondents were female, while the remaining 40% were male. This shows that more women were willing to respond to the issues concerning them than the male. Chart 3: Respondent Age Range Distribution Age group of respondents
56
Source: Field Survey (2014) SPSS
The respondents ages were as follows: 14% are less than 24 years;41% are between the ages of 25-30 years,also,41% are between the ages of 31-40 years and 4% are above 40 years. The chart reveals that older people more willing to contribute to the subject matter because of experience they have had at home and at work. Chart 4: Educational level of Respondents
Source: Field survey (2014), SPSS
From the bar chart above,36% are gradates,12% are with post graduate degrees,28% have WAEC,20% have primary education while 4% have no formal education. This implies that the people with formal education respond to national issues more than those without formal education. Table 1: The number of years of the employee in the industry Number of years in Frequency the organization
Percentage (%)
Below 1 year
4
4
1-2yrs
12
12
3-5yrs
16
16
6-8yrs
28
28
9-20yrs
36
36
Total
100
100
Source: Field Survey, 2014
Respondents below one year in public sector are 4%,1-2 years-12%;3-5years-16%;6-8yearsare 28%,while those who have worked 9-20 years are 36%.People who have spent more years are willing to respond than with those who had put few or no year in service.
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Table 2: Marrital Status Valid Married
Unmarried
Separated / divorced
Total
Frequency
82
14
4
100
Percent
82.0
14.0
4.0
100.0
Valid Percent
82.0
14.0
4.0
100.0
Cumulative Percent
82.0
96.0
100.0
Source: Field survey,2014
The married people interviewed are 82%, the unmarried are 14%, while the divorced/separated are 4%.The married people showed more interest in the subject matter than the divorce and unmarried because of experience.
Table 3:Respondents with Children Valid Between 1-3 children
More than 3-5 children
No child
Total
Frequency
67
32
100
Percent
67.0
32.0
Valid Percent
67.0
32.0
Cumulative Percent
67.0
99.0
1.0 1.0 1.0 100.0
100.0 100.0
Source: Field survey,2014
Respondents with children between 1-3 were 67%, hence, those with children between 3 and 5 amounts to 32%finally; those with 5 children or more only amounted to 1%. The implication of the above is that those with children respond to the issue more that those without children because of experience. Table 4: Summary of Results and Findings Item
Cronbach's Alpha
Do you agree that: (i) Women employment policies in Nigeria affect family protection
5
0.820
(ii) The 4-months maternity leave provided for the young women in employment in Nigeria is adequate?
5
0.717
(iii) Government employment policies discriminate against women in NIGERIA?
5
0.657
Summary result
3
0.624
Source: Field Work from SPSS 17.0 version by the Author; 2014
From Table 4.1 the results of the reliability test for each of the human resource inadequacy factors is presented. Observation shows that all the alpha values are well above the standardized minimum 58
value (0.6). These statistics reveal that internal consistency of all items (scales) used via the subject matter was achieved and should be used accordingly for the analysis. This is also supported by the overall value of Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of 0.624. Hypothesis re-statement Hypothesis 1: (Null) – There is no relationship between women employment policies and family protection in Nigeria Table 5: Q1.Women employment policies in Nigeria affect family protection
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative Percent
agree
46
46.0
46.0
46.0
strongly agree
30
30.0
30.0
76.0
disagree
10
10.0
10.0
86.0
undecided
14
14.0
14.0
100.0
Total
100
100.0
100.0
Given the result in Table 5, it shows that 76 percent of those responding agreed that women employment policies in Nigeria affect family protection. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis stating that there is no relationship between women employment policies and family protection in Nigeria. Therefore, we accept alternative Hypothesis showing that there is a relationship between women employment policies and family protection. Where the policies are favorable, the family will be well protected, but where they not favourable, the reverse would be the case.
Table 6 : Q2.Do you agree that the four months maternity leave is adequate? Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative Percent
agree
40
40.0
40.0
40.0
strongly agree
40
40.0
40.0
80.0
disagree
10
10.0
10.0
90.0
undecided
10
10.0
10.0
100.0
Total
100
100.0
100.0
Source:Field Survey 2014
From the result in Table 6 above, 80% respondents are of the view that the four months maternity leave is not adequate for young Nigerian mothers. As a result, the Hypothesis 2 (Null) ,that states that the four months maternity leave given to young women,(mothers) in Nigerian formal sector do not affect family protection was rejected.Therefore,the alternative hypothesis was accepted. 59
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Table 7: Q3.Government employment policies discriminate against women in NIGERIA Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative Percent
agree
43
43.0
43.0
43.0
strongly agree
35
35.0
35.0
78.0
disagree
5
5.0
5.0
83.0
strongly disagree
10
10.0
10.0
93.0
undecided
7
7.0
7.0
100.0
Total
100
100.0
100.0
Source: Field Survey 2014
In Table 7 shown above,78 % agree that Nigerian Government employment policies discriminate against women. Therefore we reject the Hypothesis 3(Null) that states that government employment policies do not discriminate against women in Nigeria. Therefore we accepted the alternative hypothesis. Test Statistics Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Chi-Square
33.300a
62.400a
32.480b
Df
4
4
3
Asymp. Sig.
.000
.000
.000
. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 25.0. The result above shows that at five percent significance level; all the three questions tested were statistically significant. As a result, the asymptotic significance level is less than 0.05 otherwise 5% rejection levels meaning that we accept the alternative hypothesis that, there is a relationship between women employment policies and family protection in Nigeria. That the four months maternity leave given to young women (mothers) affect family protection and that the government employment policies discriminate against women in Nigeria. Conclusion The patriarchy model is still in practice in Nigeria, even in this 21st century, unlike countries such as: UK, USA, Germany, etc., where women employment policies are enforced. For example, in UK, the maternity leave for young mothers is six months. In Nigeria, the maternity leave is only 4 months in the formal sector. In fact in most private sectors it is slashed to 2 months. Most Nigerian organizations have no crèche space for the suckling children. Young women at work go through a lot of stress after childbirth; some of them die due to the stress of shuttling from work to the house. The stress usually imposes a lot of dangers to the family protection. The family bond in Nigeria is broken because of the weak labor laws guiding women employment in Nigeria. It is therefore concluded that there is a link between women employment policies and family protection in Nigeria. Where the women are given their deserved rights, the family protection will be at its deserved position and vice 60
versa. The labour laws guiding women employment are not enforced. Therefore the young women cannot enjoy their full rights. Recommendations The paper therefore put forward the following recommendations: • The result in Table 5 shows that 76% of those responding agreed that women employment policies in Nigeria affect family protection.Therefore; the Nigerian National Assembly should pass a bill that all the women employment policies should be aligned with family protection. Especially those that has to do with young working class women of child bearing ages. For example, building a crèche space in all Nigerian organizations, both formal and informal. • From the findings; particularly from the hypothesis two critique, it was shown that the fourmonth maternity leave of young women in Nigeria in both formal and informal sectors are not enough. As a result, it should be extended beyond the period through an extant act of the parliament. • Nigerian government should stop every form of discrimination against women in formal sector, it was revealed in hypothesis 3 tested above that Nigerian Government employment policies discriminate against women. Men and women should have equal rights in organizations
References
Adigwe .J. N (2010): Implication of Gender disparity in Nigeria public service; A thesis submitted to Imo state university Owerri Nigeria Adenekan John (2014): Nigeria: winning the way of poverty, people daily. Wednesday, July 16, 2014 Adoko, O.E. (2012). Obstacle to equitable participation of Nigeria women in politics: A way forward. Journal of development studies vol.1 (1). College of management and social sciences, Kwararfauniversity, Wukari, Nigeria. 1, 78.96. Central Bank of Nigeria,(CBN),Annual Report,(2012):The Nigerian Poverty Profile Democratic socialist Movement, DSM,(2003): A brief Analysis on the situation of women in Nigeria Today. Eneh, J.O. (1997) the role of women in development and peace in Nigeria. Paper presented at the seminar on Government and development in Nigeria at the university of Nigeria nsuka (UNN) 30TH June- 3rd July, 1997.34. 67-79. Egwu,J.U,(2011).The Development of entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship:A book of Readings, Ebonyi state university studies centre,Nigeria,Ebonyi state university press Falola, T.O (2014) the role of Nigerian women, htt/www.google Tuesday September 2014. Fapohunda, T.M (2012): Women and the informal sector in Nigeria: implications for development: Journals of Arts and social sciences: ISSN 2046-9578, volume 4. No 1 Gender in Nigeria Report, (2012): Improving the lives of girls and women in Nigeria; Johannesburg, direct sign and point.
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General provisions as to protection of wages, contracts of employment and terms and conditions of employment in Nigeria. Hornby, A.S (2010) Oxford Advanced learners Dictionary of current English 8th edition. London. Oxford press. Han, W.J and Waldfogel and Washbrook (2009): Public policies and women’s Employment after child bearing: working paper no. 14660 Mbanefo, N. (2001). Women and research priorities” paper presented at the workshop organized by the Nigerian Association of Women Academics at the University of Nigeria Nsukka, 1114th November, (2001). 12, 22-30. Oni B, and Akerele W. O, (2006): Maximizing national Economic Empowerment and development strategy (NEED); Ibadan Nigeria, New World Press. Okorie, U.A, (2013): Women education in Nigeria: problems and implications for family role and stability; Journal; European scientific Journal, October 2013, volume. 9 No. 28 ISSN: 1857-7881 United Nations research institute for social development, UNRISD (2002), Women’s employment and welfare Regimes: Globilization, Expert orientation and social policy in Europe and North America, http.www.goggle.com teusday 05 2014 Geneva, ISSN: 1020-8208. Ukpata, S.I and Onyeukwu, P.E (2014): Empowering women in Africa-Business and Africa-prenuership: the dialectics of social-cultural implement on Economic Development in Nigeria; European journal of business and management Uzoegbunam,A.O.(2004):Nigerian Women in Authority Positions: An Evaluation of their Effectiveness. International journal of studies in the humanities, vol.3(1)
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ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN THROUGH SELF EMPLOYMENT: A CASE STUDY OF ‘KUDUMBASREE’ PROGRAM IN KERALA STATE OF INDIA Abdul Sathar
Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, Department of English Language and Literature
Abstract In the modern socio political scenario, for building an enhanced society, the necessity of women’s role has been strongly experimented. Economic development of women leads to better living status in the family, educational, nutritional, and the health needs of the children were well satisfied. It has been widely accepted that, in most of the cases, women have been the receiving end of the poverty and low standard of living. Hence, economic empowerment of women can play a crucial role in reducing the damages of poverty. It is in this context, the role of the government sponsored women empowerment program called ‘Kudumbasree’ becomes relevant. Kudumbasree is a mission of the Local Self Government of Kerala state, India, to empower women from the grass root level and make them self-sufficient via self-employment opportunities. Kudumbasree is formally registered as the “State Poverty Eradication Mission” (SPEM), a society registered under the Travancore Kochi Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Act 1955. It has a governing body chaired by the State Minister of LSG. The Kudumbasree runs many small scale industries and other various activities like mini funding and ayalkoottam (Neighborhood Groups- NHGs) by its members. The important fact is that no male can be member of this firm. Economic independence through Kudumbasree improved the social participation of its members and brought them to the forefront of the decision making process. The paper is a humble attempt to examine the various women employment policies of the kudumbasree and to analyze how it is possible to implement such a program in a diverse sociopolitical territory. It would explore and analyze what credit instruments have been used and by what extend have they benefited the socio-economically vulnerable sections of the society, viz. unemployed youth, women, etc. It will also study the extent to which Kudumbasree has been able to mobilize upward the women who are the beneficiaries of the project. Keywords: Empowerment, Microfinance, Micro Enterprises, Self Help Groups, Lease Land Farming
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Introduction Empowerment is defined as greater decision-making power, positive thinking on the ability to make change, increasing one’s positive self-image and overcoming stigma and a process of awareness and capacity building leading to greater participation. By women empowerment would be able to develop self-esteem, confidence, realize their potential and enhance their collective bargaining power. It means, increasing the spiritual, political, social or economic strength of women. The empowerment of poor women is a process of ultimate and long lasting change in the existing power relations in favor of oppressed and the marginalized women and requires changes in attitude and behavior of not only women, but of the society. Through empowering women, iconic figure of family, other family members would also be empowered and consequently the whole nation comes in to the process. So, empowering women; politically, socially and economically, should be started from the family. It would mean equipping them to be economically independent, self-reliant, have positive esteem to enable them to face any difficult situation and they should be able to participate in development activities. They should be able to participate in the process of decision making in and out of the family. Many nations, both developed and developing have come forward to develop effective support systems to enable women to participate in economically productive activities and to enhance the status of family. The Constitution of India guarantees to all Indian women equality (Article 14), no discrimination by the state (Article 15(1)), equality of opportunity (Article 16) and equal payment for equal work (Article 39 (d)). Economic progress in any country whether developed or under developed could be achieved through social development. It has been acknowledged in enumerable studies that the social and economic empowerment of women have a significant positive impact on the poverty eradication and economic development of the country. Empowerment can be classified as political empowerment, economic empowerment and social empowerment. Political empowerment of women is regarded as a key factor for economic and social empowerment. India is the first country to reserve 50 per cent seats for women at Local Self Government level from the year 2009 onwards. Kerala state assembly unanimously passed two bills; The Kerala Panchayati Raj (Second Amendment) Bill 2009 and the Kerala Municipality (Amendment) Bill 2009 that reserves 50 per cent seat in local bodies for women in Kerala. Gender equality, a social order in which women and men considered more or less same, is the base of social empowerment of women. Elimination of gender disparities within the family and society by giving same opportunities is an important pre-requisite for empowering women. Gender equality is central to economic and human development in a country. Removing inequalities gives societies a better chance to develop. Fertility rate, sex-ratio and life expectancy are the other important indicators of social empowerment of women. In an empowered society, women get the same space as men in every aspect of life, including public sphere. Economic empowerment is the base for women empowerment. Primarily, they should be economically independent from their spouse and son then only they could find an independent space in the society. It could be identified according to (I) women’s right to property, (ii) women work participation in income earning activities and (iii) women’s accessibility to saving, credit and investment facilities. Modern social activists and women writers found the basic reason for the discrimination which has been faced by the women and their unhealthy condition in the social capital is the lack of self economic space in the existing circumstances and their economic dependency 65
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towards either their spouse or other male family members. A complete economic independency is the one of the best strategies for gaining a healthy social status for women folk. Kerala is a state with an impressive array of achievements in the field of women development and gender equality comparing to other states of India. It has a high female literacy rate of 86.2 percent, a favorable sex ratio of 1084 female/ 1000 male, a low Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) of 13.9 against the national average of 80, low MMR 0.8/1000, high life expectancy ratio of 73- 74 female/ 68-70 male. Kudumbasree, meaning prosperity to family, is now the largest women empowering project which was launched by the government of Kerala formally in 1998 for wiping out absolute poverty from the state under the leadership of poor women through empowering them within and out of the family simultaneously. It aims at the prosperity of the economically backward families in the state under the leadership of Local Self Government (LSG) with the help of National Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) and various Self Help Groups (SHGs). The slogan of the Kudumbasree is “Reaching out to families through women and reaching out to community through families”. Poor women oriented SHG program strives to tackle poverty in an integrated manner through an effective convergence of resources and actions. Kudumbasree aims at empowerment of women to become the active leaders of development rather than passive recipients. Accordingly, women have emerged in large number as leaders in Kerala civil society, especially through Kudumbasree movement. There was a structured attempt introduced by the leadership of Kudumbasree to understand the extent of political empowerment of women during the last decade. The mission is built around three critical components – micro credit, entrepreneurship and empowerment, and has succeeded in addressing the basic needs of the less privileged women, changed their perception, built their confidence, boosted their morale, provided them a more dignified and independent life, rediscovered them economically, socially and politically. The process of empowerment becomes the signal light to their children, their families and the society at large. This is a study which explains different strategies implemented by Kudumbasree project, in the state of Kerala, for economic empowerment of women which aims to develop a better family through that a better society. Let’s have a brief analysis of Kudumbasree, its background, different programs and its socio-political and economic impact on constructing a better family and society in Kerala. Role of Kudumbasree in Women Empowerment Kudumbasree- mode of operation The Community Based Organization (CBO) is the life blood of Kudumbasree. It has developed an innovative methodology to identify the poor using non-economic parameters and organized the poor under well networked CBOs. A three tier CBO is in vogue for effective convergence of the program. Neighborhood Groups (NHGs) Neighborhood group is the association of 20 to 40 women members, belonging to economically backward families. NHG has five office bearers, who are selected from among the members for undertaking various functional activities. They are:
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1. Secretary 2. President 3. Community Health Education Volunteer 4. Income Generation Activities Volunteer 5. Infrastructure Volunteer The Community Health Volunteer is responsible for all the health related activities of the NHG like immunization, nutrition, child care, maternal care and propagation of ideas like cleanliness, hygiene, etc. The Community Infrastructure Volunteer is in charge of the basic infrastructure needs of the NHG such as drinking water, sanitation, housing, drainage, etc. The Community Income Generation Activity Volunteer looks after the banking and income generating activities of the NHG, like departments and organizations to be engaged in promotion of self employment activities. NHG is the grassroots of Kudumbasree. Meetings are convened on a weekly basis in the houses of NHG members. In the meeting, the various problems faced by the members are discussed along with suggestions for improving the situation. And all members bring their thrifts, which have been collected and recycled to the system by way of sanctioning loans. The secretary recodes the proceedings of the weekly gathering and the president chair the meeting and gives guidelines to the group members for further proceedings. Area Development Societies (ADSs) Area Development Societies, the second tier, is formed at the ward level of municipality by 10 -15 NHGs and the five member committee of the all the NHGs constitutes the governing body of the ADS. The ADS has a Chairperson, a Vice chairperson and 7 other members. The Community Organizer of the Municipality acts as the Member Secretary of the ADS. The ADS consists of 1) General body; consisting of all presidents, secretaries and three section volunteers of the federated NHGs 2) Governing Body; constituted by electing a president, secretary and five member committee from among the General Body ADS coordinate and monitor the operations of the NHGs in the respective wards of the local government. It facilitates in getting banking linkages after grading them based on the strength of each NHG. It also evaluates the thrift and credit operations done by each NHG. And it integrates the micro plans of the NHGs and after discussion and scrutiny a consolidated action plan is prepared and is known as Mini Plan. It has to report various activities of each NHG and submit their relevant documents related to finance and administration to Community Development Society (CDS). Community Development Society (CDS) Community Development Society is the apex body at the town level and is the coordinating agency 67
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for program implementation. As in the case of ADS, the CDS has also a general body and a governing body. Chairpersons, Vice chairperson and Members of all the ADSs form the General body. A Project officer of the Municipality acts as the member Secretary of the CDS. The Community Development Society has a President, Vice President and seven other members elected from the General body of the CDS to form the committee of the CDS. The Committee and the Member Secretary constitutes the Governing Body of the CDS. The executive meeting of the CDS evaluates various programs undertaken by the ADSs and takes necessary steps to improve the operations. Various developmental programs initiated under CDS and ADSs include training program for women to start income generating units, water supply, conduct of health education camps, construction of dual pit latrines undertaking micro enterprises, rising of pathways and, cultural programs, etc. The CDS takes loan and disburses to each NHG or its members under bank linkage scheme and Bhavanasree scheme, and it identifies the uncultivated land and facilitates the lease farming under Harithsree program. It explores the chances for making facilities under schemes of various government, semi government and non-governmental agencies which are providing various poverty eradication and women empowerment programs, available to NHGs. The Participatory modeling under Community Development System brought the poor women in Kerala to the mainstream of the social life. They began to participate in the development process with greater dignity. The poor women belonging to the high risk families become empowered and seldom accept poverty as their destiny. They proved beyond any doubt that they could identify their own problems with appropriate solutions. They learned the meanings of ‘self-help’ and ‘self respect’. The united and empowered women fought against discrimination quite valiantly and eventually they got remarkable status in the family and in the society. Variant Self employment programs of kudumbasree Kudumbasree has proved an innovative initiative that has changed the lives of thousands of poor people in the state through its various programs since its inception in 1998. The NHGs are identifying the most critical needs of the members. The micro plans or the NHG plans thus become the basis of delivery of services and resources through the CDS system. Each group is involved in the process of identifying their needs and problems, and accordingly preparing plans and implementing the programs. Kudumbasree Mission focuses on: 1. Training for Change: Empowering women is the prime motto of Kudumbasree. For gaining this great achievement, the decision making power must rest solely in the hands of women. In order to exercise this power, they need proper orientation and training. With the support of UNICEF and NABARD, a number of specially designed training programs are being conducted with focus on community structures, leadership, roles and responsibilities, thrift and credit operation, community financial management and accounting. More than 100,000 women have been trained so far. 2. Education The massive training programs have helped further to strengthen the already existing awareness 68
among women on the need for educating their children and acquiring literary skills for themselves. The poor women are getting realized that their children do need education and that education alone can enhance their status and provide them gainful employment. As a result, the apathy in sending the children to schools has disappeared to a greater extent. 3. Share and Care The NHGs are encouraged to meet as frequently as possible and they meet at least once in a week. In these gatherings, they are able to discuss every problem faced by the members and they find suitable solutions. The NHGs provide space for the poor women to share grieves and joys. 4. Community Health Care Trained Community Health Women Volunteers are now able to provide basic medical care to poor rural and urban women folk. With the emergence of Community Health Volunteers, the health scenario in the less cared-for groups is undergoing a revolutionary change. The incidence of malaria, typhoid, cholera, and diarrhea has come down considerably. 5. Environmental Sanitation Environmental sanitation becomes the matter of greater concern of women today. Lack of sanitary latrines and safe drinking water are the twin basic problems faced by the economically backward people. Concerted efforts are made to address these problems. En numbers of latrines have already been constructed in different part of the state with the help of various Government Departments. 6. The Poor Women’s Bank Thrift and Credit Societies are considered poor women’s banks which are formed with the objective of encouraging poor women to save their meager means to widen the resource base of the NHGs. The heart of the program is the local Neighborhood Groups, where women accumulate their savings in the form of thrift. The state government provides financing in the form of grants and administrative support, but the savings generated within the neighborhood group act as the initial investment. Each member is given an individual pass book. Through this banking system, the economically depended women folk became completely independent from their male folks and they can get loans to meet urgent needs like medical treatment, purchase of school books and uniforms for children, paying off old debts, etc. Today, the Thrift and Credit Societies becomes the largest informal bank in Asia. State and private banks also provide loans to members at very low interest rates. 7. Community Financial Management Successful formation of thrift and credit societies and conduct of income generating activities have led to a large financial flow at NHG and ADS levels. This has necessitated proper maintenance of accounts and keeping records in a systematic way. So the women activists were given proper training in ‘Community Financial Management’. Various Self-Employment Programs Kudumbasree conducts en number of self-employment programs as a part of the strategy to 69
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strengthen economic independency and self-reliance of women. Some of the highlighted projects are listed here. Micro-Finance Operations (MF) With the intention of enhancing the economic status of the less privileged women in the state and promoting saving habits among them and saving them from the clutches of money lenders, Kudumbasree has been implementing the Micro-Finance program. Each NHG act as a Thrift and Credit Society and facilitate the poor to save and to provide easy credit. These have now grown into informal banks for poor women on their doorsteps. Most of the Thrift and Credit Societies are capable of providing financial assistance to income generating activities. The NHGs, which are able to take out loans, are linked with banks under the linkage banking program of NABARD. The repayment of the loan is collected weekly. The main feature of Kudumbasree program is the facility for poor women to save and borrow from their own pooled savings. Micro Enterprises (MEs) Kudumbasree has followed the way of establishing more MEs to empower women economically by providing gainful employment and thereby eradicate absolute poverty from poor households and improving their living standard. Under the ME program, a large number of individual and group enterprises were formed throughout the state. The minimum number of people required for a group enterprise is five. It can start with capital, low risk and low profit at the initial stage. In an advanced stage, some of these enterprises can reach medium capital and medium profit with appropriate technology and market. The ME development program has been implemented both in urban and rural areas of the state. According to the estimation of Kudumbasree, 16,727 micro enterprises are formed in urban areas and 34,679 in rural areas in the state. These MEs are engaged in a wide range of activities in agriculture, industry and service sectors. Various activities like catering groups, tailoring, soap making units, courier service, traditional delicacies, goat rearing, dairy units, rabbit rearing, poultry farming, horticulture, tissue culture, floriculture, paper products, direct marketing, food processing, IT, biotechnology and clean Kerala business have been going on under the ME program. There are immense of job opportunities under these MEs which will be helpful to gain economic freedom. Special Employment Program for Educated Youth/ Yuvasree A special employment program launched by the state government to provide employment opportunities to 50,000 educated youth was assigned to Kudumbasree which is known as Yuvasree. According to a recent study, 632 individual and group enterprises are set up under this project. Lease Land Farming/Haritasree: Kerala, thickly populated state, has severe shortage of land. Even so, large areas of cultivable land are kept idle in the state as owners of land are not interested in farming. Lease Land Farming Programs lend helping hands to those cultivators who have no land at all. Kudumbasree pools uncultivated lands on rent and provides willing cultivators for agricultural operations. Lease land farming aims at helping both the landless poor women of Kudumbasree NHGs and the landowners who are not interested in farming. Other objectives of the program are: 70
• Employment opportunities for women in agricultural sector • Increase in land productivity • Additional income and food security for poor family ensured • Fallow lands under cultivation • Availability of loan from financial institutions • Revamping the agricultural sector The S3 Program: Kudumbasree has evolved a project to build a model in select panchayats on the concept of comprehensive development. The project focuses on self sufficiency, self reliance and sustainability (S3) of the village panchayats. It intends to address the problems of child development, geriatric care, mentally and physically challenged, education, adolescent care, women’s empowerment, enterprise development, unemployment of the educated youth, agriculture/ animal husbandry/ dairy development, revamping traditional sectors, basic minimum needs and destitute identification and rehabilitation. Solid Waste Management/Clean Kerala Business: Kudumbasree tries to tackle the solid waste problem affected many urban and semi-urban areas of the Kerala, by setting up Solid Waste Management units in an organized and planned manner entrusting to women’s entrepreneur groups to segregate, collect and transport solid waste from households, commercial establishments, hotels, etc. GRQ (Goat-Rabbit-Quail) Project: The GRQ project aims at utilizing the inherent advantage of homestead farming practiced by a number of families. This Project is a unique micro enterprises project for rearing the three species together to earn a steady income to the family entrepreneurs. Quail rearing as an activity can ensure a weekly cash flow and that, combined with the quarterly and half yearly cash flow of rabbits and goats, would ensure a source of steady income to the family. Nutrimix-The Baby food Products Production Project The Nutrimix Baby food Production Project is an ambitious project recently launched by the Kudumbasree mission. The Project envisaged starting 500 baby food production units in different parts of Kerala. 21 Nutrimix production units have already been started. It is estimated that 2500 women can find gainful employment through the program, which targets the massive baby food market dominated by big brands. The expected turnover is 2 billion rupees per annum. Self-Employment Programs under SJSRY Swarna Jayanthi Sahari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY) is an anti-poverty program launched by the Government of India aiming give opportunities to the unemployed from the urban areas of the state. It covers the 53 Municipalities and 5 Corporations. Individual enterprises and Group enterprises with 71
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a minimum number of 10 persons can be set up. 1365 group and 15382 enterprises are undertaken under this program. Micro Housing/ Bhavanasree: Micro housing is the housing program of the Kudumbasree to cater to the housing need of the poor families in the state of Kerala. The needy gets loan from different nationalized banks with low interest. Repayment is ensured by tri-party agreement between the beneficiaries, Community Development Societies and the financial institutions/banks. The homeless families who own 1.5 cents of land or landless for whom local government can provide 1.5 cents of land is eligible for micro housing scheme. Children’s’ Neighborhoods/Balasabha It functions as a platform for children to develop their overall capabilities and combines education, entertainment and empowerment. The children from poor families are organized to develop their intellectual faculties by performing cultural activities from time to time. The Kudumbasree mission has organized the children from the risk families into Balasabhas, in local language it functions as a platform of the children, as part of its strategy of “catch them young and nip poverty in buds”. According to the estimation made by Kudumbasree mission, 4291 Balasabhas comprising 751143 children are organized in different places in Kerala. By empowering today’s children the coming generation become empowered automatically. Special School for the Disabled Children /Buds Special Schools, called ‘Buds’, are set up aiming at providing for the developmental, social , and emotional needs of the disabled children. These children are being provided with the necessary medical attention, physical and mental therapy, mobility equipments, hearing aids, and vocational and educational training. Socio-Political Impact of Kudumbasree on Women Now women are becoming socially more active. The socio-cultural and economic changes that have taken place in Kerala through the appropriate interventions of Kudumbasree over a long period of time have influenced the women to a great extent. About 99.5 percent members of the KudumbasreeSHG reported that their morale and confidence have increased substantially. They became active member of society and no longer a passive object. The members of the program developed leadership quality hence achieved political empowerment. The empowered women of Kudumbasree are also playing a key role in shaking up Kerala’s political scene. In 2010, nearly 11,000 Kudumbasree workers contested local elections, and half of them won. In 2011, when the United Democratic Front came in to power, P.K. Jayalakshmi who entered politics through Kudumbasree, was sworn in as the minister for welfare of scheduled tribes and youth affairs in the state cabinet which is a clear evidence of political empowerment of women through kudumbasree mission. In Kerala, though traditionally women were restricted to go out for employment or other social activities, multi-dimensional programs of Kudumbasree mission made remarkable changes in the mobility of women for doing social works. According to the study ‘Evaluation study on Kudumbasree’, conducted by State Planning Board Government of Kerala (2012- august), the majority of women (97.08 %) were free to go out for employment as they desired and reported that they were not restricted by spouse, brother or father. It 72
means they gained a remarkable position in decision making in the family and the society. The study revealed that 95.42 per cent of respondents felt gender equality within the family and 77.08 per cent within the society which expresses the development of social capital of the state. A study done by Planning Commission of India reveals that 62.16% of the members fairly improved their ability to address a group while 21.20% people achieved great courage to speak in the public and only 16.64 % didn’t appear in public. 34.38% members said that they are now good in self-confident, 55.29 % agreed that there is a sequential growth in their self-confident and 10.32 % said that no improvement in attitude, the study discovered. Comparing to other states of India and other developing countries the growth indicates a unique change within a short span of time. Economic Empowerment Kudumbasree is the largest micro finance institution in Kerala. Broad variety of economic activities is under taken by Kudumbasree members, individually as well as jointly. It encompasses areas critical to poor such as micro finance, micro enterprises and lease-land farming, and there for, these activities have revitalized the rural and urban economy to a great extent. To smooth the progress of economic empowerment, suitable skill up gradation training will be given to the members through NHG meetings. One of the best things introduced by the mission is that the Micro Finance system which acts as “banks at door steps�. The thrift and credit societies at neighborhood group level motivate and facilitate the poor to save and provide them with cost effective and easy credit. These MF system grand loan at low interest rate to its members which helps to liberate economically back warded members from the clutches of private money lenders. Normally Banks that initially hesitate to provide financial assistance to women from high risk families have changed their attitude as Kudumbasree effectively strengthened the Community Based Organization. CDS arranges loan to NHG members through bank linkage program. The purpose of taking loans from Thrift and Credit Societies is to meet basic needs of the family, such as education of children, day to day expenditure, construction of house and medical needs. To increase income of the poor people, Micro Enterprises, individual and group, occupy a greater role. Group MEs are formed by the members of a single NHG unit and sometime from more than one unit. MEs are set up in agriculture, industry and service sectors. These MEs are providing countless job opportunities for women which help them to be empowered economically. Modern enterprises such as rubber products, clinical laboratory and computer centers, etc perform better than traditional enterprises. Lease land group farming program helped in changing the negative social outlook towards farming and provided plentiful amount of job opportunities in farming sector. And the MF and MEs helped to increases it beneficiaries skills both personally, speak up opinion and views, and technically, in jobs which they are assigned by. Now women are more aware, better informed and more capable to undertake any tasks, while earlier they were too unaware and unskilled to handle them. Through both an enormous and rapid increase of knowledge, awareness and skills in new areas, as well as the expansion of institutional space, this has opened up a new and hitherto unknown world to women. According to the study by Planning Commission of India among Kudumbasree members exposes that approximately 40% of Kudumbasree project participants improved their income and 85% people responded that they could increase their savings to a fair amount by which they can fulfill their daily 73
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needs. And more than 90 % members get loans from Banks without any delay, the study revealed. Whereas 7 % responded that they were not granted any economic assistance by Banks. To say the least, Kerala women has gained an envious revolution in their daily economic transactions and that has enabled them to run in the front raw of society. Conclusion Kudumbasree program has made a dramatic change in the economic; political and social life of its beneficiaries. They came out of the kitchens and developed a positive attitude towards the society. They have started feeling that they are also an integral part of the society. Their monthly income exceeds the income of their husbands. They got the freedom to spend the money or purchase the things according to their will and wish. . They become more confident in banking, and money transactions, they improved their skill in the co-ordination of meetings and communication skill and public speaking skill also improved. Their roles in meetings as decision makers become more vigorous. The feeling of being productive builds self-assurance, confidence and self-esteem in these women. This helps them to play a part in all social spheres and to create self-dependency. It has proved without any doubt that women empowerment is the best strategy for poverty eradication. Poor and rural women of the state have become active participants in the planning and implementation process of various Kudumbasree programs. The formation of 1,65,840 NHGs of the women from 33, 45, 509 risk families , covering urban, rural and tribal areas of the state helps develop 2, 42, 489 poor women into vibrant micro entrepreneurs. The strategy of participation in developmental process and empowerment adopted in Kudumbasree mission ensures sustainable livelihoods to many poor rural women without any dependency. Hence status of women in families and community has enhanced. Women, who were considered as voiceless and powerless, by male dominated world, now started identifying their inner power, their strength, and their role in reshaping their own destiny. The process of empowerment becomes the beacon light to their children, their families and society at large. To put in a nutshell, the Kudumbasree program made considerable impact in various sectors and areas covering health, education, animal husbandry, dairy development, agricultural sector, child development, empowering women socially, politically and economically and rehabilitation of destitute. It has succeeded in addressing basic needs such as shelter, drinking water, safe latrine, employment etc. Numerous merits of micro finance operations – flexible financial services, transparency in operations, informal banking operations, timely credit and credit at the door steps, low transaction costs, weekly repayment, need based loan disbursement- have built up confidence and self esteem of poor women and enabled them to set up several enterprises simultaneously. A new paradigm of participatory economics has been found emerging in “God’s Own Country”. Kerala’s women empowerment and poverty alleviation programs based on micro-credit system has gained national and international acclaim as an ideal and practicable model of participatory development for eradicating poverty. This is a truly civil society women’s movement. Kudumbasree presents a unique model of participatory development, which can very well be adopted by other developing countries. Previously, countries like India used to learn things from the West and now, it’s time for the West to learn many things from the East.
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References Anand, Jaya S. (1999). Self-Help Groups in Empowering Women: A Study of selected SHGs and NHGs in Kerala. Trivandrum: Center for Development Studies. Burra, Ranadive. Murthy. (2005). Micro-Credit, Poverty and Empowerment: Linking the Triad. New Delhi: Sage Publication. Chavan, Pallavi. R.Ram Kumar. (2002). Microcredit and Rural Poverty- An Analysis of Emperical Evidence. Economic and Political Weekly, 9(3), 28-32. Devika, j. (2007). Fears of Contagion? De politicization and recent conflicts over politics in Kerala. Economic and Political Weekly, 23 (5), 224-234. George, N.D. (2008). Micro Finance Issues and Strategies. Yojana, 37(2), 45-49. Government of Kerala. (1999-2000). Kudumbashree Project: State Poverty Eradication Mission. Annual Report 1999-2000. Trivandrum: Local Self Government Department. Government of Kerala. (2012). Evaluation Study on Kudumbasree- A study report, Planning Commission of Kerala. http://www.kudumbashree.org. John, Jacob. (2009). Kudumbasree Project- A poverty Eradication Program in Kerala, Performance, Impact and Lessons for Other States. Delhi: Kerala Development Society. Kadiyala, Suneetha. (2004). Scaling up Kudumbasree- Collective Action for Poverty Alleviation and Women’s Empowerment. Discussion Paper No. 180, International Food Policy Research Institute. Washington. Prakash, Siva C.S. and Chandarsekar, K.S.(2012). SHGs and socio-economic empowerment: A descriptive analysis based on Kudumbashree project in Kerala. International Journal of Business and Management Tomorrow, 12(4), 1-10. Sauvaget, Catherine. Ramadas, Kunnambath. Somanathan, Thara.(2011). Socio-economic factors and longevity in a cohort of Kerala State, India. Indian Journal of Medical Research, 8 (3), 479-486.
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GENDER EQUALITY AT THE BOTTOM: UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAMILY POLICY IN JAPAN Prof. Keiko Hirao
Sophia University, Graduate School of Environmental Studies
Abstract Japanese family is in demise. Its people seem to have lost interest in having a family at all. They are marrying later or opting not to marry at all. Today, 20% of men and 10% of women in Japan remain single until they reach the age of 50. Birth rate has long been below the replacement level, and with an unprecedented pace of aging of the society, Japan has to find a way to pay for the increasing cost of social security. This paper examines the consequences of family policies in Japan during the 1970s and 80s by analyzing the work and family histories of young men and women in Japan. Of particular interest is the consequence of the Japanese-type Welfare System advocated by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. This paper argues that the gender blindness and lack of attention to work and family conflict have indirectly caused the present “flight from the family” phenomenon in Japan. The data come from the work and family histories of 2,727 Japanese men and women collected through the Life Course Survey conducted in 2009. The results show a striking lack of change in the pattern of female labor supply. Across the different cohorts, half of women left their first jobs in about four years, and the probability of leaving their jobs did not differ by their educational backgrounds. What has changed is how men work. More men, particularly younger men, are working part-time and they are leaving their first jobs at a comparable pace with that of women. In short, gender equality is being achieved not by the advancement of women’s position but by men being dichotomized into those who can earn a living and those who cannot. This paper will discuss the interconnectedness of family policy and labor policy and the implications on the changes in the work and family structure of Japanese society. It also hopes to provide a platform for open dialogue on international comparisons. Introduction Confronted with decades of economic stagnation, the natural disasters and devastating nuclear power plant accident in Fukushima, “Regeneration of Japan” is avidly discussed and ardently hoped for all over the country. In this context of crises, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched an ambitious plan, publicly known as “Abenomics,” to revitalize Japan’s economy when he came into power in December 2012. The plan consists of three parts, metaphorically called three “arrows”: 76
aggressive monetary policy (monetary easing), fiscal stimulus, and a series of structural reforms known as strategies for economic growth. Abe declared that the key component of the third arrow, the structural reform, would focus on women to enhance economic growth by encouraging participation and advancement of women in the Japanese workforce. “Women have the greatest potential, and allowing them to demonstrate their full abilities is the core of our growth strategy,” reported Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the mainstream economic paper equivalent of The Wall Street Journal (July 14, 2014). The Growth Strategy initially used “full-utilization of women” (josei no katuyou) as a key word, but having realized its political incorrectness, they secretly revised it to “women being more active” (josei no katsuyaku) or a “society where women shine” (josei no kagaku shakai .) The sexist bias embedded in these statements is obvious. Nobody has to have permission for fully developing one’s potential and nobody wants to be objectified or “utilized” by someone else. Apart from the inappropriate wordings, the main point of the role of women discussed in the planned economic growth strategy is to persuade more Japanese women to join the workforce, to remain in the workforce, and to advance higher on the career ladder. Narrowing the gender gap has finally become a serious political agenda and a vital source of economic growth for Japan. It is also hoped to be a solution for the long-term demographic problem of fertility decline and aging of the society. Is the economic argument for closing the gender gap viable? Will it change the Japanese labor structures, employment practices, and government policies which are known to be the strongest “male breadwinner system” among the advanced industrialized countries. Will the Abenomics, really empower women and break the “glass ceiling” that long has been said to be made not of glass but of concrete? In fact, the term glass ceiling has not been circulated that much in the Japanese context of gender discourse. It is partly because the ceiling itself is well beyond the clouds, and thus, invisible to the majority of women. From what has been observed of the Japanese gender structure for the last thirty years through a series of family policies and reforms, I have to be skeptical about the effectiveness of turning to women as a solution to the complex social problems that Japan is facing: fertility decline, labor shortage, breakdown of social security, demise of family, and sustainability of the society. This paper demonstrates the historical background of Abe’s Womenomics and the effects of the family and labor policies in Japan during the 1970s and the 1980s. Of particular interest are the consequences of the “Japanese-type Welfare System” advocated by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the late 1970s. This paper argues that the astounding gender blindness of the policy and the lack of attention to the seriousness of work and family conflict, the contradictions among policies, along with the over-expectations of the family,’s (namely women’s) capacity to provide care, have indirectly caused the present “flight from the family” phenomenon in Japan. This paper shows the results from the analyses of work and family histories of 2,727 Japanese men and women born between 1966 and 1980, collected through the Life Course Survey conducted in 2009. For examining the historical trend, I also use the Social Stratification and Social Mobility Survey (SSM) conducted in 1995 that contains comparable work history data among men and women born between 1925 and 1974. In previewing the results, we see a striking lack of change in the pattern of female labor supply. Across the different cohorts, women left their jobs at an early stage of their careers, worked 77
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intermittently, and the probability of leaving their jobs did not differ by their educational backgrounds. What has changed, however, is how men work. More men are working part-time and their job security has been jeopardized. In short, gender equality is being achieved not by the advancement of women’s position but by men being dichotomized into those who can earn a living and those who cannot. This paper will first present the overview on the present state of the gender gap in Japan. It will then briefly describe how family and labor policies, with contradictory messages on gender issues, have functioned to sustain the male breadwinner system. This paper will discuss the interconnectedness of family and labor policies and the implications on changes in the work-and-family structure of the Japanese society. It also hopes to provide a platform for an open dialogue on international comparisons. Gender Gap in Japan The economic arguments on closing the gender gap have been circulated for about three decades. The arguments contend that mobilizing the “underutilized” female human capital will serve to revitalize the economy. These claims come with a sense of déjà vu. For example, almost a quarter of a century ago, in 1992, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa announced a Cabinet Decision Report titled “Five-Year Plan for a Consumer-conscious Society.” He eagerly emphasized the necessity for women’s full participation and called for structural reforms as following. It is vital to improve social environment where every citizen of the nation can participate and contribute to the society according to their own capabilities. Of particular importance is to allow women to fully and actively participate in society. For this aim, we must re-examine the social institutions, practices, and customs including the fixed gender role attitudes, so that we can implement a gender equal society. (Economic Planning Agency, 1992 p. 8) Reading this passage, one must be astounded by the similarities of the rhetoric and terminology with that of Abe’s initiatives: that it calls for gender equality for economic growth, that full participation of women is necessary, and that it emphasizes the need to restructure the gender role practices that hinder the change. The similarities of the discourse exemplify how modest the change has been in Japan in terms of gender gap. According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2013 by the World Economic Forum, Japan ranked 105th out of 135 countries (World Economic Forum, 2014), blow India (102), Malaysia (103) and Cambodia (104) and just above Korea (111). What is more disappointing is that Japan’s rank has scaled down from 94th in 2010. In the areas of education and health, Japan ranks almost at the top; more than half of the girls enroll in higher education and Japanese women enjoy the highest longevity in the world. When it comes to economic participation and political representation, however, Japanese women lag far behind the rest of the world. Japanese women are quite visible in the labor market. Women consist of 43% of employed workers in Japan. The gender wage gap, however, is one of the worst among the OECD countries. Women earn about 30% less than men do. This figure is alarmingly underestimated because it only compares full-time wages of men and women, excluding the wages of more than half of women (54.7%) who work part-time. Women occupy only 3.9% of the top managerial positions, the second smallest among 78
the developed countries next to Korea. As of this writing Japanese women represent only 8.9% in the House of Representatives when the world average is 22.3%. The low political representation of Japanese women ranks Japan 162nd among 188 countries as reported by Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU, 2014). In many of the international gender indexes, Korea and Japan used to be at tied (at the end of the scale), but in a short time, Korea surpassed Japan by electing a women president and by adopting a quarter system to increase female representation in politics. Meanwhile in Japan, having only five women appointed to Abe’s new Cabinet makes big news. The gender gap in Japan is almost appalling. The Ideology of Japanese-Style Welfare System The persistent gender gap in Japan is, in a sense, the inevitable consequences of the policy that freely rode on the institution of family and women’s unpaid work that provided care for the dependent, the sick, and the elderly. All industrial nations including some European countries with progressive family policies used to have a breadwinner system that assumes “traditional” gender roles and division of housework. This system has been largely challenged internationally since the 1970s by women and governments as women began to increase their participation in the labor market. Japan, however, decided not to take the same route and kept its family and labor policy in place to sustain the male breadwinner system. As everything has a historical background, the root cause can be found in the discourse on the so called Japanese-style Welfare System. Japanese political leaders are known to shown little interest in developing an expensive interventionist welfare state. Japan has, in fact, established quite a generous social security system in the 1960s that includes universal public health coverage, universal pension system, and high quality, publicly subsidized, childcare system. When Japan was hit by two oil crises in the 1970s, the government realized that it could no longer bear the cost of maintaining the welfare system particularly in providing sound care for the aging population. So rhetoric was developed to get around the problem; the capacity of families was exaggerated and it was decided to rely on families as inexpensive sources of care. This position was formalized in 1979 when the ruling Liberal Democratic Party under Prime Minister Ohira released a Cabinet Decision Report titled Seven-Year Plan on New Social Economy (Shin keizai shakai nana kanen keikaku) (Cabinet Office, 1979). This document states that “Japan has achieved high economic development and has caught up with the European advanced countries (p.4)” and that ” it must create a new Japanese-style Welfare Society that utilizes the socio-economic characteristics represented by the hard work-ethics of its citizens and high social mobility (p.22).” In other words, instead of establishing an expensive European style welfare state with institutional care, the government decided to rely on families to take responsibility for caring for the elderly at home. The notion of Japanese-style Welfare System set the direction of the family policy for the following decades. While the Japanese-style Welfare Society was nothing but an ideology and evocations of the past ideal whether real or mythical (Campbell, 1992), it was well circulated among the political circles as a justification to rely on families and individuals and less on state for welfare and care. It was not coincidence that Ezla Bogel’s Japan as Number One was published and made best-seller in 1979. The Japanese public and media were hungry for stories to boost national self-esteem. Here is the logic: unlike Western societies, (whatever specific country it referred to) the Japanese 79
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family has a robust foundation for providing care to the elderly with the strong norm of co-residence with elderly parents at least when they are frail and need care. In fact, the norm of co-residence with elderly parents was made possible and coexisted with the new ideal of nuclear families only through a demographic coincidence; the cohort who formed families during 1955-1975 had a larger number of surviving siblings than any other cohort in Japanese history (Ochiai, 1994=1997=2004). The marriage rate, at that time, remained high, divorce rate was relatively low, and though the birth rate was already below replacement level, the arrival of the bulky cohort of second baby boomers in the early 1970s obscured the looming problems of an aging society. Today, few people talk about the Japanese-style Welfare System, but throughout the 1980s, the Japanese family policy was haunted by this reliance on the mythical image of the “traditional” Japanese family’s structure and practices. Baby Strike and Family Policies in the 1980s Fertility decline became a serious political issue when the government announced in 1990 that the birth rate of the previous year was 1.57. This figure made news because it was lower than 1.58 of the Hose-Fire (hinoeuma) year of 1966 when people deliberately refrained from having babies from the superstitious fear that girls born in this zodiac year would bring bad luck to their future husbands. Even though Japan’s fertility rate had been at below-replacement levels since the 1970s, the decline wasn’t problematized until it had fallen to 1.57. Until the “1.57 Shock,” Japanese family policy in the 1980s had been composed of different sets of policy packages: one aimed at the promotion of gender equality in the workplace, and the other the promotion of child well-being. The former set of policies was managed under the direction of the Ministry of Labor, and the latter under the direction of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. By the time the two ministries were integrated in 1999 as the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW), the family-related policies began to converge as measures to curb the decline in fertility. The overarching main stream policy in the 1980s was to support the male breadwinner system through the Japanese employment system, which consisted of life-time (long-term) employment, seniority wage system, internal labor market, and generous fringe benefits. Since the “economic miracle” of the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese workplace had praised for its disciplined workers and efficient management style. The economic miracle was made possible by the highly gender- segregated, dual labor market because the peripheral position of women served as a convenient backup to sustain the ostensive male breadwinner system by accommodating the fluctuations of labor demands. Generous job security and fringe benefits were granted only to men working in large firms in the core sector. Women were placed on the periphery of the labor structure. Although young women graduating school in their early twenties were hired into full-time positions, they were expected to resign upon marriage and/ or childbirth, and when they were freed from intensive childcare, the labor market welcomed them as temporary part-time workers who could be easily dismissed. Although the plunging birthrate seems to have served as a catalyst forcing the government to make some headway in helping working mothers balance their jobs and childcare responsibilities, the 80
target of the concern stemmed from the fertility decline and the new policy plans ignored the gender structure both in the labor market and in the private sphere. The government’s positions have been inconsistent as to what roles are expected of women and what gender equity in workplace means and, most importantly, how productive and reproductive roles and responsibilities could be shared between the two sexes. First, while the government passed initiatives to promote gender equality with the enactment of the Equal Employment Law in 1985, the tax system and pension plans that favor the breadwinnerhomemaker system were kept intact. As of this writing, if a “dependent spouse” limited her income to 1.03 million yen a year, she would receive tax exemption in addition to credits toward a basic pension without having to contribute pension premiums.1 If her income exceeds this bracket, the net household income would see a substantial decrease by having to pay taxes, pension premium, social security tax, in addition to her husband’s tax-exempt privilege for “supporting” his spouse. These privileges given to a dependent spouse encourage women to limit their labor supply. In other words, the policy subsidizes breadwinner-homemaker families at the expense of families in which both husband and wife work full-time. Second, in ostensible promotion of family-friendliness in the workplace, the government encourage businesses to provide “varied and flexible employment opportunities” and passed the Worker Dispatch Law in 1985. This law was originally designed to regulate the extra-legal system of subcontractor personnel dispatching, but in reality it invited enormous expansion of temporary workers in the Japanese labor market. The “flexible” employment opportunities, which had long been adopted by married women as coping strategies to balance work and family responsibilities, began to be used more openly to provide a pool of cheap and disposable work force for businesses wanting to minimize labor costs. According to the Labor Force Survey, the proportion of part-time workers2 among female workers has increased from 9.6 % in 1965 to 57.7% in 2014. While flexibility may be an advantage of part-time work, the disadvantages include lower hourly wages, ineligibility for fringe benefits, and restricted career prospects. The most serious disadvantage is that they are de facto excluded from receiving maternity and parental leave and other family-friendly benefits.3 In other words, while the government requires large firms to promote their employees to take parental leave, the structural changes in the workforce has made such benefit a rare privilege for a minority of female workers who have retained their full-time positions over marriage and pregnancy. The explanation to the persistence of the gender gap described previously in this paper is quite straight forward. In the first place, the majority of Japanese women do not stay in the labor market due to the difficulty of reconciling work and family conflict. Although Japanese labor law provides parental leave and childcare supports to help combine parenting and employment when children are 1
2
Prime Minister Abe’s plans include abolishing the tax and pension priviledges for “dependent spouses.” Part-time workers are defined as those working less than 35 hours a week.
The ammendment of Child Care Leave Law in 2009 enabled part-time workers to take maternity and child care leave, but in practice, they has to be “qualified” by having “undermined employment period,” which often contradict the personnel parctice of hiring part-time workers.
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very young, many Japanese women still withdraw from the labor force upon childbirth and rarely can resume their regular employment when they return to work. Second, Japanese women’s educational backgrounds have little effect on the probability of their leaving the labor force. That is, statistically, women with diplomas from colleges are no more likely to continue their career upon major life events such as marriage and childbirth. The anomalous relationship between women’s educational background and their labor supply has attracted attention from social scientists since the late 1980s. The lack of association between Japanese women’s levels of education and their attachment to the labor force is counterintuitive to the human capital explanation of the female labor supply. Becker argues that education increases one’s earning potential and the “opportunity cost” of not working (Becker, 1991). Education also possesses a strong socializing effect that reflects and reinforces a strong taste or preference for intrinsic value of work. This in turn leads to higher participation rates in the work force. Therefore, higher education is expected to increase women’s propensity to participate in the labor force. Many labor economists and sociologists have posed questions on the dissociation between Japanese women’s level of education and labor supply, and they have largely attributed the anomalous case of Japan to the time-lag in the change of industrial composition. It was claimed that once the industrial composition of the Japanese female labor force resembles that of Western nations, the effect of a Japanese woman’s education on her labor-force attachment should increase (Mincer, 1985; Osawa, 1993). For the last twenty some years, however, the empirical studies have not supported this time-lag hypothesis. Even among the cohorts born between 1970 and 1980s, we still are not seeing a positive relationship between Japanese women’s education and their labor supply, the details of which are presented in the next section. Discourse on the M-Shape The age distribution of Japanese women’s labor supply shows an M-shape, with the participation rate plunging during the early thirties and two “peaks” at both ends indicating high participation rates in the twenties and forties. This M-shape pattern of Japanese women’s labor-force participation has been well-documented as the coping strategy for Japanese families to reconcile work and conflict by women/wives leaving the labor market during their parenting years, and returning to it later, mostly as part-time workers, when their children have grown. The sporadic patterns of women’s labor force participation exacerbate the gender gap in a cyclical manner. Anticipating the difficulties of combining work and family, many young women chose less demanding jobs even before they had children. From the employers’ viewpoint, there is no incentive for investing their resources for developing the human capital of their female workers, just because they cannot expect them to stay in their firm. The official stance of government in promotion of gender equality, therefore, has been to increase the participation rate of women in their late twenties to the thirties, claiming that mobilizing this latent workforce would boost the economy, just as Abe’s initiative claims today. The White Paper on Women’s Labor of 2010 dedicated a whole chapter on measures to “Dissolution of the M-Shape Curve.” In other words, “lifting the valley of the M-shape curve” has been used to measure the progress in the labor 82
force attachment and improved economic outcomes of female workers. In fact, according to the Labor Statistics, the participation rates among women in the ages of 25 to 39 (the “valley”) has increased over the years, reaching as high as almost 70% in 2012, making the participation curve almost look like a trapezoid. The government and the public have long been misled by the discourse on this M-shape and have forgotten that the curve itself was only a cross-sectional snapshot representing different participation rates of women in different age groups at a specific point in time. Changes in the repeated cross-sectional data does not necessarily portray changes in the degree of labor force attachment of individuals nor does it depict changes in the proportion of women staying in the labor force. In sum, these crosssectional data exemplify the M-shape curve and obscure important dynamics of entry into and exit from the labor force. In order to examine such dynamics we need national representative longitudinal work histories data on individuals. Work Histories of the Lost Generation This section will present the results from the analyses of work and family histories collected through the Japanese General Social Survey 2009 Life Course Study (JGSS-2009LCS) among 2,727 Japanese men and women born between 1966 and 1980. The fifteen-year span includes the cohort of the second baby boomers, those who were born between 1971 and 1974. They came of age in the 1990s when Japan was hit by a recession that would last for decades. Until this cohort came of age, there existed a “model” life course, in which major life events, such as schooling, entry to labor market, marriage and forming a family, occurred in “orderly” with “condensed” timing (Brinton, 1993). That is, everyone was expected to go to school, get a job, get married and have children by a certain age. What happened in the 1990s was the deterioration of the “orderliness” and predictability of one’s life course. The cohort who entered the labor market after the end of “bubble economy,” or more specifically after 1991 when the overheated economic activity collapsed, were later coined as “the lost generation”; they were lost in their transition to adulthood when the Japanese society was going through the major transition of social institutions in adapting to the globalized post-modern economy. Unlike their parents or their older siblings, they could not assume to live the predictable lives that many Japanese had taken for granted. The aim of the Life Course Survey 09 was to depict and analyze the work and family histories of this specific cohort. As the details of the analyses are reported separately (Hirao, 2010), this paper presents only the highlights of those results. When men and women are compared, this cohort still shows clear gender differences. Men are more educated with 38.1% having college diplomas while only 18.4 % of women have the same education levels. Despite the difference in education, men and women were equally likely to obtain full-time positions upon graduation from schools. Well over 80% of them (86.5% for men and 81.3% for women) took full-time positions in their first jobs, and there was no statistical significance in the firm size (28.7% of men and 26.6% of women hired in large firms with 500 or more employees). At the time of survey, however, when they reached the ages of 28 to 44, 85.4% of women had left their first jobs while more than half of men (57.5%) were still working in the same jobs. The median survival time of their first jobs, the time that took half of the respondents to exit their first jobs, differs by gender: 8.3 years for men and 3.9 years for women. What is more striking is the different effect of education on their survival in the first jobs. For men, having higher education significantly increased 83
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their longevity in their first jobs: median survival time for middle-school graduated men was 2.6 years, and it increased to 6.8 years for high school graduates. For college graduates, the median survival time for men was still unobserved. That is, more than half of the men who had college diplomas were still holding their first jobs. For women, the median survival time did not differ so much by education: 2.0 years for middle school graduates, 3.7 years for high school graduates, and 4.7 for college graduates. There are a few years differences among women by education, when these figures are compared with those of men, the gender difference is obvious; the median survival time of women who graduated from college (4.7 years) is much shorter than that of men with high school diplomas (6.8 years). Even among the lost generation, we see the same old story of men having secure jobs and women exiting the labor force early in their career. Has there been any change in this pattern? Why are we still observing this stark gender difference in job tenure? When the data are broken into cohorts and compared across time, however, we should see that an undetected change had occurred. Figure 1. plots the trends of the median survival time of the first job for men and women by cohorts broken into shorter time spans. The right column of the figure shows the data taken from the JGSS2009LCS that I have just described. In order to compare the trend with previous cohorts that JGSS2009LCS did not cover, I used the Social Stratification and Social Mobility Survey conducted in 1995 (SSM95) that contains comparable work history data. The median survival time of the first job for the two cohorts, 1946-1955 and 1956-1965, are juxtaposed in the left column. The results show an astonishing stability in the tenure of women’s first jobs. On average, half of women left their first jobs in four years. The median survival time for men’s first jobs became shorter and shorter. For the cohort born in 1946-1955, it took 13 years for half of the men to leave their first jobs. It then decreased to 11 years for the cohort born in 1955-65, all the way to six years for the youngest cohort born in 1976-80. What changed is not women’s intermittent work patterns but the decreased stability of how men work. Men’s median survival time has become almost as short as that of women.
Figure1. Trends in the Median Survival Time of the First Job by Sex and Cohort Source: Hirao, Forthcoming.
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A similar trend can be observed in the proportion of part-time workers. As noted previously, the enactment of the Worker Dispatch Law resulted in an expansion of part-time workers in the labor force. The expansion first hit women by increasing the proportion of women in part-time jobs from 9.6 % in 1965 to 57.7% in 2014. Recent labor statistics show that now men are not immune to this trend; the proportion of men working part-time increased from only 8.7% in 1990 to 21.9% in 2014. The increase of male part-time workers is particularly pronounced among younger cohort of 15 to 24 years of age:4 from 20% in 1990 to 46.4 % in 2014 reaching as high as the proportion of female part-time workers which is 56.6%. Discussion and Conclusion Fertility decline has been a serious political agenda since 1990. If Japanese women fail to procreate the social security and pension system are doomed to fail. This is because the system was based on the magic of infinity, in which successive generations were assumed to support the preceding ones in return for the earlier benefits they received themselves. Fertility decline is a problem also because it will cause a labor shortage in the long run due to the shrinking size of the productive population. Alarmed by such forecasts, the Japanese government started a number of initiatives for a more “family friendly” and “gender equal” society. In the quarter of a century since Japanese politicians began to address these issues, the gendered structure of society has not yet observed any change. Why are we seeing politicians repeat the same rhetoric today: advancement of women in the workforce and politics, increasing the availability of daycare, reformation of the male-dominated breadwinner system, persuading men to cut down their long hours of work and share more of the childcare responsibilities, etc. As this paper has shown, policies introduced have often been in contradiction regarding what roles are expected of women. On the one hand, women are expected to procreate and are encouraged to limit their labor supply at least when their children are young. On the other hand, women are expected to increase their labor supply without any substantial changes in the work environment and gender relations in the family. The remnants of the much prized Japanese-style Welfare System has hindered changes and kept the breadwinner system quite intact. In asking why it has taken so long for the Japanese society to adopt the prescribed changes for a more gender-egalitarian system, Leonard Schoppa argues that the “exit” dynamics of women have created a vacuum where a “voice” is needed to transform the social structure. The stay-at-home mothers who have “exited” from the labor force have given up their careers no longer have incentives to change the society. Women who delay marriage and wait too long to have a child eventually “exit” from motherhood, and thus lose incentives to fight for a more family-friendly work culture. These women do not share interests with their colleagues who have to leave the office early to pick up their children at day care centers. As it is so difficult and rare to stay in the labor market over marriage and childbirth, Japanese society does not have a strong enough voice to dismantle the breadwinner system (Schoppa, 2010). Moreover, a woman who marries a man with a decent income would has a joint interest with her husband in keeping the breadwinner system intact. 4 Proportion of part-time workers among men also increased in the older cohort. For the cohort of 55-64, it increased from 22.7% in 1990 to 33.5% in 2014.
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In comparing the work-and-family trajectories of women in Japan and Taiwan, Yu (2009) argues that, the Japanese institutional structures which are based on the large-firm model and give men the lion’s share of prestige and economic rewards along with job security. Firms have more incentive to invest in male workers’ career paths and promise job security as workers climb the long corporate ladder and travel long career paths. Meanwhile women employees are placed on the periphery where they are used to accommodate economic fluctuations. In Taiwan, an undersupply of skilled male workers resulted in greater gender equality because the employers were given incentives to retain skilled female workers. In retrospect, the short tenure of female workers in Japan was made possible because of the job security that was granted for a minority of Japanese men. That is, for a woman in Japan, once she is able to marry a decent man with decent income, she had the freedom to exit from the labor force and participate on the home front. The data from the Life Course Survey of 2009 suggest that job security of male workers, which used to be taken for granted, is now being diminished. Young Japanese men have begun to work parttime in proportion as high as that of young women. Similarly, young Japanese men are no more likely to stay in their jobs than young Japanese women are. These results suggest that there are fewer men who qualify to become a breadwinner with stable jobs. Gender equality in Japan is being achieved not by the advancement of women’s position but by men being dichotomized into those who can earn a living and those who cannot. As a result, what we are seeing is the demise of the Japanese family. More precisely, the standard family (hyojun kazoku), the prototype family that the Japanese policy makers have assumed is no longer representative of the Japanese family both in its structure and in its practices. Well over one-third of the households in Japan are single-person households, surpassing the number of the households that consist of parents and unmarried children. Moreover, more than 75% of the Japanese households do not have children under 18 years of age (MHLW 2013). People nod to the news that childcare centers and child-related facilities are now regarded as “nuisances” to local communities because of the “noise” that small children make (Asahi Shimbun 6/3/2014). The Japanese family policies have long ignored the gender gap. Japan now has to face the unexpected outcomes. The Japanese family is now in its demise as the basic institution for procreating its population.
References Becker, G. S. (1991). A Treatise on the Family, Enlarged Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brinton, M. C. (1993). Women and the Economic Miracle: Gender and Work in Postwar Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cabinet Office. (1979). Seven-Year Plan on New Social Economy (Shin keizai shakai nana kanen keikaku) Cabinet Decision Report. http://www.ipss.go.jp/publication/j/shiryou/no.13/data/shiryou/souron/8.pdf. Campbell, J. C. (1992). How policies change: the Japanese government and the aging society. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
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Economic Planning Agency. (1992). Seikatsu taikoku 5kanen keikaku (Five-Year Plan for a Consumer-conscious Society). Cabinet Decision Report (June 30 1992). http://www.ipss.go.jp/publication/j/shiryou/no.13/data/shiryou/souron/10.pdfTokyo. Hirao, K. (2010). Shokugyo Keireki to Kekkon Event:JGSS-2009 Life Course Chosa ni yoru Dotai-teki Bunseki (Work Histories and Marriage Events:Dynamic Analyses of JGSS-2009 Life Course Study). In JGSS Research Center Osaka University of Commerce (Ed.), JGSS Monographs No.10 (pp. 205-216): JGSS Research Center. Hirao, K. (Forthcoming). Miezaru te to miezaru kokoro (Invisible Hand, Invisible Heart). Tokyo: Sophia University Press. Inter Parliamentary Union. (2014). Women in National Parliaments. from http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm Mincer, J. (1985). Intercountry Comparisons of Labor Force Trends and of Related Developments: An Overview. Journal of Labor Economics, 3(1), S1-S32. Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare (MHLW). (2013). Kokumin seikatsu kiso chousa (Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions). http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/k-tyosa/k-tyosa13/. Ochiai, Emiko. (1994=1997=2004). Nijyuisseiki kazokuhe: kazokuno sengotaisei no mikata, koekata (Toward the families of the twenty-first century).� Ochiai, E. (1994). Nijyuisseiki kazokuhe: kazokuno sengotaisei no mikata, koekata (Toward the families of the twenty-first century). Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Osawa, M. (1993). Keizai henka to joshi rodo: Nichibei no hikaku kenkyu (Female Employment and Economic Change: Japan-U.S. Comparison). Tokyo: Nihonkeizai Hyoronsha. Schoppa, L. J. (2010). Exit, voice, and family policy in Japan: limited changes despite broad recognition of the declining fertility problem. Journal of European Social Policy, 20(5), 422-432. World Economic Forum. (2013). The Global Gender Gap Report 2013. from http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ ImpactInvesting_Report_ChartingTheCourse.pdf Yu, W.-h. (2009). Gendered Trajectories: Women, Work and Social Change in Japan and Taiwan. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Acknowledgement The Japanese General Social Survey 2009 Life Course Study (JGSS-2009LCS) is designed and carried out by the JGSS Research Center at Osaka University of Commerce (JointUsage/Research Center for Japanese General Social Surveys accredited by Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology). The data of Social Stratification and Social Mobility Survey conducted in 1995, by the SSM Research Group (PI: Seiyama Kazuo) was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Center for Social Research and Data Archive, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 0000
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CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE, REASON FOR GROWING POVERTY: A Case Study of US. Assist. Prof. Faisal Nazir Islamic University of Science & Technology, India
Abstract Change in the structure of families over the past 40 years has likely contributed to higher poverty rates. Single-mother families are about five times as likely to be poor as married-parent families . Single parent families are economically vulnerable for the simple reason that most of them have only one wage earner. Moreover, women and children in poverty are the source of increasing national concern as the number of families headed by single mothers continues to grow. If the apparent strength of the link between poverty and family structure seems obvious, its nature is less clear. For example, having a child before getting married is associated with an increased likelihood of poverty. However, living in poverty also raises the likelihood of nonmarital childbearing . Implicit in this concern is the belief that living arrangements affect economic well-being of the people. But such a claim raises many questions. Have the decline in two-parent families and the increase in single-parent families increased poverty, or could poverty be a cause rather than a result of single parenthood? If policymakers could reverse the decline in marriage, what might be the economic effects of an increased marriage rate among low-income families? This paper takes up these questions, examining evidence on the implications of changes in family structure for the incomes of families. I examine the extent to which increases in poverty rates can be attributed to the changes in family structure resulting from increased marital breakup, more births to unmarried women, and independent living by elderly women, all leading to a shift toward households headed by women. In general, my study suggests that increases in single parenthood have in fact reduced economic well-being of people especially children. I also found that the decline in marriage has increased poverty, all else equal. I conclude that increases in marriage could be expected to improve economic prospects of people in general and children in particular. Introduction After years of neglect, sociologists have re-discovered the poor. The renewed interest in America’s poor can be traced to the rise in official poverty rates during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Danziger 1982), the emergence of a highly visible urban underclass (Massey 1990; Wilson 1987, 1991), and to conservative and liberal reassessments of the effects of anti-poverty legislation (Ellwood1988; Harrington1984; Murray1984). Over the 1970-1986 period, for example, poverty rates decreased 89
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by nearly one-half among the elderly, but increased by 36 percent among persons less than age 18 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was growing optimism that poverty was in head-long retreat (Lampman 1971; Tobin 1967). At that time, the economy was booming, poverty rates were plunging, and consumer confidence was high. About 30 years later, after nearly a decade of economic growth, just over 11% of the American population remained poor at the turn of the twenty-first century (Dalaker 2001). Three factors that are commonly offered to explain trends in poverty in the latter half of the twentieth century are income growth, economic inequality, and changes in family structure. If per capita incomes rise, on average, because of increasing employment and wages, for example, then it is natural to think that poverty will decline. However, economic inequality can mitigate the overall positive impact of income growth if unemployed and low-income workers do not enjoy the benefits of such growth. The third factor, changes in family structure, particularly the increasing number of female-headed families may be associated with higher poverty rates because such families are economically more vulnerable and are more likely to be poor. This analysis is however guided by the following research question: what was the relative association between trends in poverty over the last half of the twentieth century and changes in family structure? Over the last half of the twentieth century, two contrasting periods stand out. In the first, from 1949 to the early 1970s, income growth was rapid, economic inequality declined the proportion of families headed by single parents increased but remained at fairly low levels, and poverty declined rapidly (Danziger and Gottschalk 1995; Haveman and Schwabish 1999). In the second, from the early 1970s through the late 1980s, economic growth slowed, income inequality increased, the proportion of families headed by single parents and the number of individuals who were living alone rose rapidly, and poverty rates stagnated. Less is understood about trends in the 1990s, a decade when the economy surged, economic inequality and the growth of single-parent families may have reached a plateau, and poverty inclined (Cancian and Reed 2000; Dalaker 2001; Jones and Weinberg 2000). The American family has undergone considerable change over the past several decades. Between 1970 and 2002, the share of children living in two-parent families fell from 85 percent to 69 percent, while the share living in single-parent families more than doubled, from 11 percent to 27 percent. It is now estimated that more than half of all children in the United States will spend all or part of their childhoods in single-parent families . Among such families, cohabitation—a single parent and his or her children living with an unmarried partner— has become increasingly common. About two-fifths of all children born in the early 1990s will spend at least some time in a cohabiting household . Many analysts and policymakers view the decline in marriage and the attendant rise in single parenthood with concern because children in single-parent families tend to have substantially fewer financial resources and are more likely to be poor than children in married-parent families . Changes in family structure and changes in poverty are closely related . Single-mother families are about five times as likely to be poor as married-parent families. Although they are less likely to be poor than they were 50 years ago, single parent families are more common, accounting for a larger share of all poor families. Moreover, eligibility for income support programs, including cash welfare, food stamps, and the Earned Income Tax Credit, are tied to family composition. In recent years, policymakers have sought not only to respond to family changes, but also to influence the decisions people make about marriage, divorce, and childbearing. Thus, poverty policies and family policies are increasingly tied. 90
If the apparent strength of the link between poverty and family structure seems obvious, its nature is less clear. For example, having a child before getting married is associated with an increased likelihood of poverty. However, living in poverty also raises the likelihood of nonmarital childbearing. In addition, decisions about work, marriage, and childbearing are increasingly disconnected. Women are now more likely to work, regardless of marital or parental status. Women are also more likely to have children independent of marriage, and married couples with children are more likely to divorce. Overall, there is greater variety in family forms, the members of any given family are increasingly likely to experience changes in household structure over time, and children are increasingly likely to spend time in families that do not include both biological parents and that may include half siblings or step-siblings. In addition to its relationship to economic well-being, family structure is of interest because children who do not live with both biological parents may be more vulnerable to other risks, even after taking economic factors into account. Recent discussions have emphasized the potential importance of fathers, who are less likely to be part of their children’s lives when parents are divorced or were never married. Moreover, poverty creates challenges that may be difficult to manage with only one available parent, especially as more single mothers work outside the home. Thus, changes in family structure not only place more individuals at greater risk of poverty, but also may increase their vulnerability to challenges associated with poverty. Poverty reflects insufficient resources relative to needs. Income poverty in the United States is measured by comparing cash income to a needs standard. For example, a single woman in 2008 will be considered poor if her income is below $11,201. If she has two children, becoming a single mother and part of a family of three, she will be considered poor if her family income is below $17,346. Thus, even putting aside the demands of motherhood and the potential reduction in hours worked and earnings, the increased financial needs of a larger family will increase the chance of poverty. If she marries, becoming a married couple family of four, the needs standard rises to $21,834. However, a second adult in the household increases the likelihood of a second earner. The potential poverty reduction associated with a second adult also reflects the relatively modest increase in the needs standard with each person added to the household. Economies of scale mean that each additional person adds less than proportional needs. I use this simple model of income and needs to help structure the discussion that follows. The implications for poverty of changes in marriage, childbearing, and work depend on the interrelationships among these factors and their net effects on income and on economic needs. As I will show, the decline in marriage has increased poverty, all else equal. But all else has not remained equal; although women are less likely to be married, they are also more likely to be working. Because these two changes are related, measuring the effect of changes in marriage on poverty is complex. Background Literature William Julius Wilson and Kathryn Neckerman began with data from the 1940 Census, the first to provide detailed information on family structure. Although families headed by single women were then more prevalent among blacks than among whites, most black households with children were headed by men. Even in urban areas, three-quarters of black families were married-couple households. And most single mothers, black or white, were widows. The next forty years transformed 91
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that picture. In 1983, 42 percent of black families were headed by women; the comparable figure for whites was 12 percent. Mary Jo Bane examined the extent to which increases in poverty rates can be attributed to the changes in family structure resulting from increased marital breakup, more births to unmarried women, and independent living by elderly women, all leading to a shift toward households headed by women. Ellwood and Summers reached the conclusion that welfare policies cannot be held responsible either for the decline of intact families or for the rise of illegitimate births among the poor-welfare benefits have fallen, while illegitimacy ratios have risen. June O’Neill suggested that one factor behind the increasing number of black single mothers might be the rising earnings ratio of black women to black men. She also stressed the need to probe more deeply into the causes of black male unemployment, especially in the context of schooling deficiencies and other human capital factors. Lee Rainwater stated, “The feminization of poverty must be understood as a product of the deepening destructiveness of joint families and racist forces, particularly as they have had the effect of further marginalizing black youth in both school and labor market.� Trends in family structure since 1970 Changing patterns of poverty, prospects for the future and the potential of alternative policy interventions all depend on the interrelationships among poverty and marriage, childbearing, family living arrangements, and employment status. In the current policy context, with limited public cash income supports available to reduce poverty, poverty status largely depends on the number of adults in the household, their hours of work and wage rates, and the number of children they have to support. Marriage, divorce, and cohabitation Households that include two adults generally have greater opportunities to avoid poverty, since the second adult on average adds more to potential income than to needs. Thus, declines in marriage and increases in divorce are both poverty increasing. Cohabitating couples may capture the same benefits as marriage, though the implications of cohabitation for official poverty measures, as well as for actual economic well-being, are complex. Marriage rates have fallen over time, increasing the proportion of people living in households that depend on one adult for both earnings and caretaking . The steepest declines in age-specific marriage percentages occurred between 1970 and 1980 and between 1980 and 1990, with more modest declines after 1990 . For example, among women ages 40 to 44, the share married fell from 82 percent in 1970 to 70 percent in 1990 and then to 64 percent in 2006. Rates of cohabitation have increased dramatically, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Most cohabiting unions are relatively short lived, and sharing of resources within such unions less certain. Calculations of the proportion of women who are married or cohabiting show a smaller decline from 83 percent in 1970 to 70 percent in 2006 for women ages 40 to 44.
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Childbearing Changes in marriage patterns interact with changes in childbearing and affect both poverty and the composition of the poor. To the extent that declines in marriage coincide with women having fewer children, reductions in the size of families reduce the resources needed to avoid poverty. The average number of children present in the household has declined over time, falling especially in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1970 women ages 35 to 39 had an average of 2.4 children; by 1990 they had an average of only 1.3 children. Because larger families need more income to avoid poverty, and because greater parenting responsibilities restrict women’s work hours in the paid labor market, the declining numbers of children per woman can be expected to reduce poverty, all else equal. Although declines in family size tend to reduce poverty, growth in the proportion of children born outside of marriage has had the opposite effect. In 1960, 5 percent of all births were to unmarried mothers. By 2006, almost two in five children in the United States were born to an unmarried mother. The increased proportion of births to single mothers increases children’s vulnerability to poverty as more children (and mothers) live in households that include only one potential earner. On the other hand, declines in the number of children per family have tended to reduce poverty. In other words, contemporary women are less likely to have a husband to contribute economic support, but they are also less likely to have a large family to support. Employment All else equal, families are less likely to be poor the greater the number of adults and the fewer the number of children. Households that include adult males are less likely to be poor than those that include only adult females, both because men work more hours on average and because they earn more per hour on average. However, since 1970, women’s labor force participation has increased, especially for women with children. In 1970, about 50 percent of all women ages 30 to 34 worked; from 1990 onward almost 80 percent did. In addition, gender gaps in labor market outcomes have declined .These changes affect the level and distribution of income among families headed by married couples as well as among families with single female heads. They also reflect changes in gender roles and contemporary expectations regarding the caretaking and employment responsibilities of mothers and fathers, which interact with the public policy context. As the relationship between family structure and work has changed, so too has the relationship between family structure and poverty. An accounting of changes in family and poverty must therefore incorporate the dramatic growth in women’s labor force participation and the declining opportunities for men, especially those with less education. Although it remains an important cultural reference point, the “traditional” family, including an employed father, a homemaker mother, and children, is increasingly uncommon. In 2006, only 12 percent of all families fit this model, down from 36 percent in 1970 . In part, this decline reflects a growing disconnect between marriage and childbearing and childrearing. At the same time that single-mother families are more prevalent, increases in women’s own earnings mean they are less vulnerable to economic hardship. Explaining changes in marriage, childbearing, and employment There were substantial declines in marriage, a reduction in the average number of children per 93
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family, and a dramatic increase in the proportion of children born outside marriage since 1970. Over the same period, women’s employment has increased, especially for mothers. In contrast, men, especially those with less education, have experienced stagnant or declining rates of employment. These changes in family structure and employment are interrelated. For example, delays in marriage may reduce fertility, thereby reducing demands for work within the home and facilitating women’s market work. On the other hand, as labor market opportunities for women improve—in absolute terms or relative to men’s—women face higher opportunity costs of leaving employment to have (additional) children, as well as reduced economic incentives to marriage. Decisions to have children outside of marriage may reflect women’s increasing ability to support a family independently, or the short supply of men with family-supporting earnings. Understanding the factors that underlie changes in family formation, and how these have been affected by economic and policy changes, is complicated by the interdependence of economic, social, and demographic changes. Still, an assessment of the causes of family structure and employment changes can inform policy discussions. Consider first the decline in the proportion married, which results in part from people marrying at older ages or not at all. It also reflects higher rates of divorce, only somewhat offset by increases in remarriage. What accounts for these trends? The standard economic model of marriage emphasizes gains from a specialized division of labor in a context where one spouse (generally the husband) commands a substantially higher wage . In this case, marriage creates a context in which the lower-wage spouse can devote herself to home production—raising children, preparing meals, and maintaining the home—leaving the higher-wage spouse to specialize in earning wages. As men’s advantage in the labor market relative to women has declined, so have the potential gains from marital specialization, reducing women’s incentive to marry. In addition, over the same period, increased marital instability increased the risks to women of interrupting their wage employment. As divorce has become more common, the probability that a woman will have to be the primary provider for herself and her children has increased. At the same time, as women’s labor force participation has increased, so has the feasibility of leaving an undesirable marriage. Thus, women’s increasing economic independence may be both a cause and a consequence of greater marital instability. Inequality in the distribution of wages for men has also increased over the past three decades. Younger men with low education were particularly likely to experience stagnant or declining wages. Thus, men’s labor market advantage, and the consequent potential gains for women from marriage, has been particularly eroded for low-income individuals. High rates of incarceration also limit the pool of “marriageable” men with access to family-supporting employment, especially for African Americans . Together with women’s increased economic prospects and the availability of birth control, changes in social norms have made it easier to have sexual relationships and cohabit outside of marriage, to establish households independent of parents or spouses, and to raise children outside of marriage. Thus, as the economic advantage of marriage declined, so has the importance of marriage as a precursor to parenthood . Changes in contraceptive technology and reduced fertility also contribute to women’s increased 94
labor force participation. Of course, it is difficult to distinguish cause and effect; mothers may be more likely to work in the market because they have fewer children, or they may be having fewer children because of the demands of greater labor force participation. Another focus of public debate and research has been the role policy has played in facilitating changes in marriage, childbearing, and employment among low-income women. Concerns about the disincentives to marriage embedded in the welfare system, as well as the vulnerability of the lowincome population to policies aimed at altering family behaviors, have been especially prevalent. Critics of welfare argued that the availability of financial support, and the structure of eligibility rules that targeted single-parent families, discouraged marriage and parental responsibility . The generosity of welfare cannot fully explain changes in marriage, in part because AFDC benefits declined substantially after the mid-1970s over the same period that marriage rates declined and in part because the decline in marriage was also evident among higher-income individuals who never received welfare. Estimates of the magnitude of any negative impact of welfare on marriage vary substantially but generally suggest at most modest effects . Some research suggests that public income supports may increase marriage rates, possibly by helping low-income couples achieve the financial stability seen by some as a prerequisite for marriage . The potential role of child support enforcement on marriage is another area of debate. Policy changes over the past 30 years have substantially increased the proportion of nonmarital births for which paternity is established, and have contributed to more fathers of children born to unmarried parents being ordered to pay child support and making payments . Although child support enforcement and paternity establishment are primarily aimed at increasing the formal economic support provided by nonresident fathers, improved enforcement may also change incentives to marry and have children. The increasing probability of paying and receiving child support might be expected to have offsetting effects on the financial incentives to have children outside of marriage— increasing the costs of nonmarital births for nonresident fathers and decreasing them for resident mothers. For some single men who might otherwise provide few resources to their children, increased child support enforcement may raise the expected costs of fatherhood. In contrast, despite receiving child support or cash welfare, single mothers typically bear most of the responsibility and costs associated with raising children. Changes in welfare benefit levels (or child support payments) may thus have a relatively minor impact on the benefits and costs faced by a single woman considering motherhood . Research suggests that increased child support enforcement is associated with reductions in nonmarital births . Because many nonmarital births are to cohabiting or romantically involved parents, child support enforcement may negatively affect these “fragile families.” Although child support provides financial resources, requirements to establish paternity and a formal child support order, along with efforts to enforce that order, may increase conflict between parents. Noncompliant fathers face enforcement actions that may reduce their willingness and ability to support their children . Over the last three decades, several policy changes have sought to encourage employment and “make work pay” for low-income parents, including an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and expansions of Medicaid and the State Child Health Insurance Program. The EITC provides a substantial earnings subsidy for low-income earners with children, and the expanded availability of public health insurance for low-income children supports the move from welfare to work. Child-care policies, particularly recently expanded subsidies for some low-income families, also facilitate employment. 95
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The impact of changes in family structure and women’s employment on poverty How have the substantial changes in family structure and growth in female employment since 1969 affected poverty rates? Between 1969 and 2006, the poverty rate grew by 1.1 percentage points, from 11.5 percent to 12.6 percent. However, as shown in Table 1, the poverty rate within specific types of family mostly declined. This suggests that an important factor in the growth of the overall poverty rate may have been the shift in population shares by family type. The population shifted from a relatively low poverty group (married couples with children) to family types with higher risks of poverty. One approach to the question, “By how much would overall poverty have increased if there had been a change in family structure but no change in poverty rates for each type of family?” is to construct a counterfactual level of poverty with the 2006 shares of persons by family type and the 1969 poverty rates. This method is known as a “shift-share” analysis because it shifts the population shares while holding poverty rates constant. Using a shift-share approach that controls for education and age, I foundd that the overall poverty rate in 2006 would have been 14.1 percent. Therefore, if all else remained the same as in 1969, the change in family structure would have increased the poverty rate by 2.6 percentage points, from 11.5 percent in 1969 to 14.1 percent in 2006. Including women’s labor force participation in the analysis, I found that growth in women’s work reduced poverty by 1.4 percentage points.
In summary, my analysis found that, on their own, changes in family structure would have led to a substantial increase in poverty. However, the growth of female employment had important povertyreducing effects over the same period. Conclusion I have shown that changes in family structure, and changes in the implications of family structure for poverty, reflect a complex set of interrelated factors. Fewer people are marrying, and those who are married are on average older and more likely to divorce. The smaller number of married couples are having fewer children, while birth rates for the growing number of unmarried women have increased. Together these trends result in a greater proportion of families headed by single mothers— 96
both because a higher proportion of births take place outside of marriage and because of growth in the proportion of children born within marriage whose parents divorce. Single-mother families, generally relying on the earnings of only one adult, are more than five times as likely to be poor as married-couple families. On its own, the change in family structure has been poverty-increasing. However, a number of factors have had countervailing impacts. Changes in employment, the number of children, and cohabitation have reduced the growth in poverty otherwise associated with the declining proportion of married couple families. However, although increased employment has made women and single mothers less economically vulnerable, it has presumably come at the cost of (unpaid) time spent supporting their family and community. In addition, the standard measure of income poverty used here neglects the nondiscretionary personal costs of employment, such as transportation and child care, and thus overstates the poverty-reducing effects of employment. Similarly, while many unmarried mothers may live with the fathers of their children or other men, cohabiting relationships provide less economic security than marriage, in part because of their relative instability. Several types of public policy responses to the increased diversity and instability of family forms are possible. Some policies explicitly aim to change family structure, for example, to promote marriage or reduce nonmarital births. Although it is too early to know whether recent efforts to promote healthy marriage will be successful, some have argued that even small changes in marriage patterns could produce substantial returns on fairly modest investments . Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that current policy options will dramatically alter the marriage and fertility patterns of the last four decades, most of which generally apply across income groups within the United States as well as in other countries. While some policies to encourage marriage and, especially, reduce unplanned and teen pregnancy, may prove effective, declines in marriage and increases in nonmarital childbearing are unlikely to be reversed by feasible public policies. Other policies aim to respond to changes in family forms; for example, to reduce the negative consequences of nonmarital births and divorce through policies such as child support, or to encourage or facilitate employment, especially among single mothers. These policies will be critical in determining the consequences of family change for the well-being of children. The past 40 years have been a period of increasing diversity in family structures and changing relationships among marriage, fertility, and employment. Children are more likely to spend some time living outside a married couple family. Regardless of whether their mother is married or single, children, especially younger children, are also more likely to live with a mother who is working in the paid labor market. To reduce the economic vulnerability of children and families, public policy must respond to the diversity and instability of family forms. Even if effective policy interventions reducing divorce and nonmarital childbearing are developed, many children will live with only one parent, and many parents will face challenges in meeting the economic and social needs of their families. Recognizing these challenges, public policy must respond in ways that support the increasing complexity of family arrangements and the growing proportion of workers who also have primary responsibility for parenting their children.
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CHILD POVERTY IN RICH COUNTRIES, A COSTLY MISTAKE FOR THE FUTURE Ignacio SocĂas
Director of Communication and International Relations , International Federation for Family Development (IFFD)
Abstract Child deprivation and relative child poverty s show the best present picture of child poverty across the world’s wealthiest nations, though it is difficult to find comparable data on what is happening in those countries as a result of the economic downturn of the last years. But it is obvious that primary services for families are everywhere under cutbacks as austerity measures increase the numbers in need. And it seems clear too that the worst results yet to come. When countries fail to protect children from poverty, they are making one of the most costly mistakes. Not only for children themselves, but the societies must also pay a considerable price – in less skills and productivity, in lack of health and educational achievement, in more unemployment and welfare dependence, in bigger judicial and social protection systems, and in loss of social cohesion Because children have only one chance to develop, the commitment to protection from poverty must be independent of the economic situation. A society that fails to maintain that commitment, even in bad times, is failing its most vulnerable members and accumulating more social and economic problems for the near future. Introduction 25 years after the Convention on the Rights of the Child came to force; the world is still falling short in its promise and commitment to ensure the right to a safe childhood. Child poverty is affecting the lives of millions of children worldwide and conventional strategies are inadequate, as they do not recognize that children experience poverty differently from adults and that they have specific and different needs. What is it about, is there a social cost for it and what recommendations should governments consider overcoming this problem? In 1989, governments worldwide promised all children the same rights by adopting the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. These rights describe what a child needs to sur-vive, grow, participate and fulfill their potential. They apply equally to every child, regardless of whom they are or where they come from. As it has been ratified by 192 countries, it re-mains the most widely accepted and the most quickly ratified human rights treaty in history. Children who fail to meet the minimum acceptable standard of living for the nation where they live are said to be poor. According to UNICEF, children living in poverty are those who experience deprivation of the material, spiritual and emotional resources needed to survive, develop and thrive, leaving them unable to enjoy their rights, achieve their full poten-tial or participate as full and equal members of 98
society (UNICEF, 2005). This and other defi-nitions suggest child poverty is multidimensional, relative to their changing living conditions. Complex interactions of the body, mind and emotions are involved. Child poverty is a global issue and not just one for the developing world. In a review of child wellbeing across 35 industrialized countries, UNICEF found that approximately 30 million children — one child out of every eight across the OECD — is growing up poor (UNICEF Office of Research, 2012). Despite this, child poverty has been largely absent from the post-2015 development debate. And there is an alarming consistency to the global problem: poverty rates are usually highest among children, no matter which region or poverty measure is used. Also, poverty in childhood has especially devastating effects, often distorting children’s physical, cognitive and social development. Poverty can also set children on a lifelong trajectory of low education levels and reduced productivity, and undermine their physical and mental health. Children living in poverty are more likely to become impoverished adults and have poor children, cre-ating and sustaining intergenerational cycles of poverty. While the largest costs of child pov-erty are borne directly by children themselves, society also pays a high price through reduced productivity, untapped potential and the costs of responding to chronic poverty. Child poverty damages children’s life chances and harms us all (UNICEF, 2014)
We can see some examples of the past weeks to see how child poverty is an issue for many countries in the First World: • Child poverty has increased in 23 countries in the developed world since the start of the global recession in 2008, potentially trapping a generation in a life of material deprivation and reduced prospects. A report by UNICEF says the number of children entering poverty during the recession is 2.6 million greater than the number who have been lifted out of it (Sherwood 2014). • Nearly one in four US children lives in poverty, the highest level in 20 years, with a similar proportion not getting enough food to eat. These were among the findings of an article published last week in the medical journal JAMA Pediatrics, entitled Seen but Not Heard: Children and US Federal Policy on Health and Health Care (Damon 2014). • There have also been large increases in child poverty in southern Europe. One in three Spanish children live in poverty or at risk of social exclusion, and the school dropout rate is nearly 25% (Sedghi 2014). • Germans may be seen as comparatively well-off by the rest of the continent, but the nation’s youth are having an increasingly hard time, a new report suggests. Every fifth teenager in Germany lives in poverty or is on the borderline, according to the Catholic church-funded youth poverty monitor 2014 (Colthorpe 2014). • The Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission in UK also claim the target to reduce child poverty by half by 2020 will not be met. Mr. Milburn, a former La-bour minister, said the current government had “discredited existing child poverty targets and failed to put in place new ones”, creating an “unholy mess” (Fidgeon 2014). • Nearly 640,000 Australian children live in a ‘jobless’ family. These children are, on average, 99
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up to three years behind their peers in reading and math by the time they’re 15 years of age. But this doesn’t have to be the case (Duncan 2014). Absolute and Relative Poverty Absolute poverty refers to a set standard which is the same in all countries and which does not change over time. Certain organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, use the absolute poverty threshold of US $1.25 a day per person to measure poverty in developing countries. Relative poverty refers to a standard which is defined in terms of the society in which an individual lives and which therefore differs between countries and over time. Europe and many other developed countries use a relative poverty threshold, typically 50% of the coun-tries’ median income. Relative poverty does not necessarily mean the child is lacking anything, but is more a reflection of inequality in society. Absolute poverty and relative poverty are both valid concepts. The concept of absolute poverty is that there are minimum standards below which no one anywhere in the world should ever fall. The concept of relative poverty is that, in a rich country such as the UK, there are higher minimum standards below which no one should fall, and that these standards should rise if and as the country becomes richer. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation has in recent years asked focus groups drawn from different kinds of households in UK to define a minimum acceptable standard of living – based on need not wants. Advised by experts in health and nutrition, the focus groups came up with a ‘Minimum Income Standard’ which translates into approximately 60% of today’s UK median income (The International Federation for Family Development 2014). It is sometimes argued that the public at large thinks of poverty in an absolute sense and that the concept of ‘relative poverty’ is properly understood only by economists and social scientists. But it is clear from these examples that the popular definition of poverty is in fact a relative one. Children Deprivation UNICEF researchers have estimated the degree to which deprivation is experienced by children in 29 European countries, using a child specific scale (UNICEF 2012). Their paper highlights the considerable differences between countries, suggesting that specific policy measures can be effective in combating child deprivation. The researchers argue that studying deprivation – alongside the overlapping situation of children living in families poor in mone-tary terms – is imperative for understanding the scope and nature of poverty among children. Deprivation analyses are especially useful when studying the situation of children because children do not have equal access to the household’s income, and are more dependent on social goods and services (especially education and health). It represents a significant new development in the international monitoring of child poverty. For the first time, the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, sampling more than 125,000 households in 29 European countries, has included a section on the lives of children aged 1 to 16. 100
Using this data, the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre has constructed the 14-item Child Deprivation Index (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2012). Approximately 85% of the almost 85 million children aged 1 to 16 in 29 European countries have at least 13 of the 14 items in the deprivation index and are therefore ‘not deprived’. The second most obvious fea-ture is that the highest rates of deprivation are to be found in some of the newest and poorest member countries of the European Union. Over 30% are seen to be deprived in Hungary and Latvia, over 50% in Bulgaria and over 70% in Romania. Child Development Index Save the Children, another British initiative, has also developed a measurement of child poverty based on measures of capability, called the Child Development Index (CDI). CDI is an index that combines performance measures specific to children –primary education, child health, and child nutrition– to produce a score on a scale of 0 to 100, with zero being the best with higher scores indicating worse performances (Cobham, Molina and Garde 2012). According to Save the Children, each of the indicators was chosen because it was easily ac-cessible, universally understood, and clearly indicative of child wellbeing. Health measures under five mortality rate; nutrition measures the percentage of children under five who are moderately or severely underweight (which is two standard deviations below the median weight for age of the reference population); and education measures the percentage of primary school age children that are not enrolled in school. In terms of opportunities and capabilities, CDI is the most appropriate measurement of child poverty. 101
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The Child Development Index follows in the footsteps of the United Nations Devel-opment Program’s Human Development Index (HDI). This index established the importance of measuring human wellbeing beyond simple national income measures. The two indices each have three components with broadly common aims.
The CDI monitors child wellbeing in 141 countries, aggregating data on child mortality, underweight and primary school enrolment and. Some recent findings include overall im-provement rates in child wellbeing almost doubled in the first decade of the 21st century; de-veloping countries experienced faster rates of progress than developed countries in the same period; under nutrition remains one of the main factors holding back progress on children’s wellbeing; the proportion of children suffering from wasting – or acute weight loss – actually rose in the second half of the 2000s.
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The Intergenerational Cycle of Poverty The majority of poverty stricken children are born to poor parents. Therefore the causes such as adult poverty, government policies, and lack of education, unemployment, social services, disabilities and discrimination significantly affect the presence of child poverty. Lack of parental economic resources such as disposable income restricts children’s opportunities. Economic and demographic factors such as deindustrialization, globalization, residential segregation, labor market segmentation, and migration of middleclass residents from inner cities, constrain economic opportunities and choices across generation, isolating inner city poor children. “The loss of ‘family values’ is also cited as a major cause of poverty and welfare de-pendency for women and their children (The International Federation for Family Development 2014).” Families raised by a single parent are generally poorer than those raised by couples. In the United States, 6 of 10 long terms poor children have spent time in single parent families and in 2007, children living in households headed by single mothers were five times as likely as children living in households headed by married parents to be living in poverty. Child poverty is an ongoing national concern, but few are aware that its principal cause is the absence of married fathers in the home. Marriage remains America’s strongest antipoverty weapon, yet it continues to decline. As husbands disappear from the home, poverty and welfare dependence will increase, and children and parents will suffer as a result. Many of the apparent negative associations between growing up poor and children’s attainments reflect unmeasured parental advantages that positively affect both parents’ in-comes and children’s attainments, like parental depression. The Children of the Recession After the latest data provided by UNICEF last month, we can say there has been a strong and multifaceted relationship between the impact of the Great Recession on national economies and a decline in children’s wellbeing since 2008 (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2012). The recession has hit young people extremely hard, with the NEET (not in edu-cation, employment or training) rate rising dramatically in many countries. Children feel anx-ious and stressed when parents endure unemployment or income loss, and they suffer family downturns in subtle and painfully evident ways.
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The poorest and most vulnerable children have suffered disproportionately. Inequality has increased in some countries where overall child poverty has decreased, suggesting that tax changes and social transfers intended to help the poorest children have been relatively ineffec-tive. Moreover, children in particularly vulnerable situations – such as those in jobless, mi-grant, lone parent and large households – are overrepresented in the most severe ranges of poverty statistics. No government was prepared for the extent or depth of the recession and none reacted in the same way. Many countries with higher levels of child vulnerability would have been wise to strengthen their safety nets during the prerecession period of dynamic economic growth, which was marked by rising disparity and a growing concentration of wealth. Gov-ernments that bolstered existing public institutions and programs helped to buffer countless children from the crisis –a strategy that others may consider adopting. The problems have not ended for children and their families, and it may well take years for many of them to return to pre-crisis levels of wellbeing. Failing to respond boldly could pose long term risks – for example, there has been a break in the upwards trend in fertility rates. In no region are these risks more problematic than in Europe, where inequality is rising within and between Member States, threatening to undermine the ambitious targets of Europe’s 2020 agenda.
“The economic argument, in anything but the shortest term, is therefore heavily on the side of protecting children from poverty.” (Cobham, Molina and Garde 2012) Even more im-portant is the argument in principle. Because children have only one opportunity to develop normally in mind and body, the commitment to protection from poverty must be upheld in good times and in bad. A society that fails to maintain that commitment, even in difficult eco-nomic times, is a society that is failing its most vulnerable citizens and storing up intractable social and economic problems for the years immediately ahead. Youth Unemployment Unemployment among adolescents and young adults is a significant long-term effect of the recession. Among those aged 15–24, unemployment has increased in 34 of the 41 countries analyzed. 104
Youth unemployment and underemployment have reached worrying levels in many countries. Even when unemployment or inactivity decreases, that does not necessarily mean that young people are finding stable, reasonably paid jobs. The number of 15- to 24-yearolds in part-time work or who are underemployed has tripled on average in countries more exposed to the recession. Contract work has become more common, contributing to the general precar-iousness of labour markets.
Some ILO reports have shown that there is a demonstrated link between youth unem-ployment and social exclusion. “An inability to find employment creates a sense of useless-ness and idleness among young people that can lead to increased crime, mental health prob-lems, violence, conflicts and drug taking (Manzella and Rustico 2011)”. In that sense, lack of responsibility at work or in the family, lack of motivation to be-have properly and having more free time result in a time bomb that makes irregular acts easier, up to the point that some researchers claim to have identified a causal link between increased youth unemployment and increases in crime, specifically property crime and drug offences and, consequently, future employment prospects fall off a cliff for those who commit them. This tendency shows that all it not only about material indigence. In fact, social exclu-sion has been progressively attributed to different reasons. Although income and financial assets are still considered key elements in achieving positive outcomes for children, social exclusion is not primarily concerned with either of them (or with disability) but rather with the broader range of capabilities people enjoy or fail to enjoy (Kahn and Kamerman 2003). The Price to Pay “Failure to protect children from poverty is one of the most costly mistakes a society can make. The heaviest cost of all is borne by the children themselves. But their nations must also pay a very significant price – in reduced skills and productivity, in lower levels of health and educational achievement, in increased likelihood of unemployment and welfare dependence, in the higher costs 105
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of judicial and social protection systems, and in the loss of social cohesion.” (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2012)
The figure presents this information in the form of a league table ranking 35 countries by the percentage of GDP that each country spends on cash transfers, tax breaks and services for children and families. France, the United Kingdom and Sweden head the table, followed by Hungary, Denmark and Belgium. Each of these spends twice as a much – as a proportion of GDP – as countries such as Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Canada, Portugal, Japan and Bulgaria. At the bottom of the table are five countries spending little more than 1% of GDP on cash benefits, tax breaks and services for children and families – the United States, Lithuania, Lat-via, Greece and Malta (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2012). At the start of the recession, not surprisingly, child poverty was lower where public spending on families and children was higher. During the recession, welfare states were ex-pected to increase their public protection spending, and many did. In such countries, the health and well-being of citizens, especially those in financial or social need, are safeguarded by grants, unemployment assistance programs, pensions and other benefits. In a recession, these benefits act as counter-cyclical economic stabilizers. Beyond that, “OECD countries and many others adopted stimulus packages in the ini-tial phase of the recession, pushing up public spending. With the persistence of the recession, however, national revenues fell and deficits increased significantly in many countries. In-creasing pressure from financial markets forced many governments to make budget cuts. The Eurozone’s U-turn was particularly abrupt. (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2014)” 106
It is possible to examine the commitment of governments to the protection of children by looking at the overall level of resources they are prepared to devote to the task. How the money is spent can be as important as how much is spent, but the data nonetheless show a strong relationship between resources ex-pended and results achieved. In all of these countries the lack of priority for children in national budgets shows through in the correspondingly small reductions in relative child poverty that each achieves. The economic argument, in anything but the shortest term, is therefore heavily on the side of protecting children from poverty. Even more important is the argument in principle. Because children have only one opportunity to develop normally in mind and body, the com-mitment to protection from poverty must be up-held in good times and in bad. “A society that fails to maintain that commitment, even in difficult economic times, is a society that is failing its most vulnerable citizens and storing up intractable social and economic problems for the years immediately ahead. (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2012)� Although the recession increased the need for unemployment and pension benefits, driving up social protection spending in many countries, the share spent on family and child-related needs became a lower priority. 2009 marked a turning point in this regard, just when families were under increasing pressure. While the contribution of overall social spending to public spending (blue line) leveled off and then began to rise again, the share of that spending on families and children (blue bars) declined. The same is true in Europe, where social transfers had an uneven impact on child poverty. Interventions in Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom were effective and sustained during the recession. But in more than a third of Euro-pean countries, the ability of governments to reduce child poverty declined, which contributed to worsening living conditions for children. The design and implementation of social programs clearly matters. It is possible to examine the commitment of governments to the protection of children by looking 107
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at the overall level of resources they are prepared to devote to the task. How the money is spent can be as important as how much is spent, but the data nonetheless show a strong relationship between resources expended and results achieved. In all of these countries the lack of priority for children in national budgets shows through in the correspondingly small reductions in relative child poverty that each achieves. Recommendations to Policymakers The long-standing efforts of United Nations to protect human Rights has empower-ment at its core and has been enriched during the past years with the goal of empowering the world’s women and empowering the next generation through the work on youth. I feel that adding families to the agenda would be another step forward, provided it includes the removal of all barriers to the active participation of families in society, especially including decisions on investments in health, housing and education. Too often, the time, effort and money fami-lies invest in their children finds no social or economic incentive by the society benefitting from them, because there are no political instruments to implement it. And this step would in return help also women and children, as they are part of the family. We need to realize “the extent to which family breakdown has contributed to the fem-inization of poverty and the fact that family structure matters in the long term fight against poverty, in particular child poverty. If we are serious about reducing poverty, valuable short term solutions, like food banks and shelters, must partner with long term solutions, which include examining family structure and eradicating family breakdown (Walberg ve Mrozek 2009).” It is because of this reasons that we should aim to promote the integration of a family perspective into policymaking at the national, regional and international levels, which is one of the primary activities of the Focal Point on the Family at United Nations. To implement this perspective in a practical way, we suggest the introduction of a family impact report, as a tool to assess the impact of certain policy measures on opportunities for families. As a long term goal, we also aim to identify and describe the indicators for such a report to be made in different situations and for different purposes (International Federation For Family Development 2003). Recommendations to policymakers should include the following:
• Investment should start during the early childhood years and continue throughout childhood. • Continuum of support without gaps in income or care replacements.
• Family benefits and in-kind services should be seen as investment for the future.
• Progressive universalism/cascaded service delivery to improve efficiency without leaving families or children behind. • Government policy should help reduce childcare cost where necessary.
• Encourage employers to offer workers part time employment opportunities as well as flexible working hours. • Maximizing child support coverage helps to reduce child poverty in sole parent families.
• At least some part of the payment by the nonresident parents should di-rectly go the child. • Child support systems should have simple payment formulae and pro-cedures. 108
References Cobham, Alex, Nuria Molina, ve Maricar Garde. «The Chid Development Index 2012.» Save the Children. 2012. http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/onlinelibrary. Colthorpe, Julie. «One Fifth of Young Germans Live in Poverty.» The Local. 30 May 2014. http:// www.thelocal.de/20140530/poverty-youth-germany-study.
Damon, Andre. «US Child Poverty Remains at Highest Rate in 20 Years.» World Socialist Web Site. 27 October 2014. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/10/27/chil-o27.html.
Duncan, Carol. «Breaking the Poverty Cycle with Education.» ABC. 28 October 2014. http:// www.abc.net.au/local/photos/2014/10/28/4116255.htm. Fidgeon, Tamsın. «Child Poverty Set to Rise, Says Social Mobility Commission.» BBC News. 20 October 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-29686628.
International Federation For Family Development. «Building Blocks of Society .» The Family Watch. September 2003. http://www.thefamilywatch.org/pprs/IFFDPapers23EN.pdf. Kahn, Alfred, ve Sheila Kamerman. Beyond Child Poverty: The Social Exclusion of Children. Newyork: Colombia Univesity, 2003.
Manzella, Pietro, ve Lisa Rustico. Productivity, Investment in Human Capital and the Challenge of Youth Employment. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011.
Sedghi, Ami. «Poverty and Education: A ‘Lost Decade’ for Spain’s Children.» The Guardian. 28 October 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/28/poverty-and-education-a-lost-decade-for-spains-children.
Sherwood, Harriet. «Child poverty up in more than half of developed world since 2008.» The Guardian.28 October2014. http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/oct/28/child-poverty-developed-world-unicef-report-global-recession. The International Federation for Family Development. «Is children well-being a broken promise?» The Family Watch. 1 November 2014. http://www.thefamilywatch.org/pprs/IFFDPapers36EN.pdf. UNICEF. 2005. http://www.unicef.org/sowc05/.
UNICEF. Child Deprivation, Multidimentional Poverty and Monetary Povertyin Europe. Florence: Innocenti Research Centre, 2012. UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. «Children of the Recession.» Report Card 12. Florence: UNICEF Office of Research, 2014.
—. «Measuring Child Poverty: New league tables of child poverty in the world’s rich countries.» Innocenti Reportcard 10. Florence: UNICEF Office of Research, 2012. UNICEF. «UNICEF Issue Brief.» Child Poverty in the Post-2015 Agenda. UNICEF’s Division of Policy and Strategy., 2014.
Walberg, Rebecca, ve Andrea Mrozek. «Private Choices, Public Costs.» Instutite of Marrige and Family Canada. 1 June 2009. http://www.imfcanada.org/issues/private-choices-public-costs.
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SECTION IV Regional Practices Session I
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FAMILY POLICY IN POLAND Prof. Aleksandr Tsoi Lodz University, Poland
Abstract 25 years passed since the transition from state socialism to market economy had begun in Poland. In Poland at the transition to market relations essential demographic changes in family structure have taken place. The population is aging rapidly. The estimated unemployment rate is 14 % to the able-bodied population. The demographic young generation supply is very low, that has led to grave problems in industrial, financial, and social (pension) areas. In the report: 1) the changes that have taken place in governmental support system of Polish families, and the situation in families during the transition to market economy; and, at the present time, how the family policy is changing and in what direction it is developing, are analyzed; 2) measures of governmental influence on family support and the real situation in the Polish family, the situation with the marriage and family institution, the demographic aging of population, are considered; the statistic data, published in public mass media are provided; 3) The attitude of the Catholic Church to the marriage and family institution is shown. Introduction The Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska (Polish) is a country in Eastern (Central Europe). According to the results of the general census 2012, the population is more than 38.5 million people. Poland is a mono- ethnic state: 96.7 % of the population is ethnic Polish (according to the general census of 2002). Article 18 of the Constitution of Poland of April 2, 1997 says: marriage as a union of one man and one woman, family, maternity and paternity are under the defense and protection of the Republic of Poland. Officially, in Poland: “Family policy is a composite policy, which is based on the affirmation of the family with the aim of full respect towards every person who creates it, and harmonious development of the society which is a sum of families. Let us look at the issue of family policy in Poland in economic, demographic and religious aspects. Economic Aspect During the transition to the market economy in 1989 in Poland considerable changes in the family structure took place. The economic aspect is directly connected to the issue of creation and preservation of the family in Poland. Dangerously high debts and deficit of the budget are typical for Poland. The Polish economy is considered to be one of the most successful economies of the transitional period where GDP per capita in 2005 was 50 % higher than the level of the 90s. But in 2005 the World Bank made a study of poverty in the region and estimated that Poland is one of the countries in Europe where the level of absolute poverty has been constantly growing. Labor market 111
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reduction in Poland has a direct attitude to it. The unemployment rate in Poland has been the highest in Europe since 1990s. The general rate of registered unemployment in Poland has been about 1820 % since 2001. It is approximately twice as higher as the average European rate. According to the Central Statistical Department, the official unemployment rate in February, 2003 was 20.6 %, in 2004 was 18 %. In 2014 it is 14 % (Poland Unemployment Rate 2014).
“This is a rather high index”, - Artur Satora, press secretary of the Central Statistical Department of Poland says. In Poland with its 38.5 million populations there are more than 2 million of officially registered unemployed people. The latent (non-registered) unemployment in rural areas is estimated at approximately 1 million people. The number of people employed at unofficial, part-time jobs is also estimated at 1 million people. Almost every seventh resident looks for a job. The shown percentage and numbers are directly connected with unemployment among women and young people. Out of more than 2 million of officially unemployed people more than one million women do not have jobs. Compared to October 2013, the unemployment increase was registered in all regions, and young people with a specialized secondary education and university education account for almost 25 % of the officially registered in the labor exchange. Polish young people often get only provisional contracts of employment or umowy śmieciowe with a very low payment or a part-time employment. Almost 27 % of those who have jobs work with provisional contracts and run a risk of facing poverty due to low payment and absence of stability in the labor market. Many young Poles look for a job abroad. After the country had entered the European Union a big number of Polish people immigrated to Western Europe countries (England, Ireland, Norway, Italy) in search of a job. The majority of migrant workers are people under the age of 35. According to the information of the Polish Statistical Bureau they work and live abroad for more than three months a year, and about one third of them stay abroad for more than a year. In Poland people in the age of 40 to 60 prove to be in demand in the labor market since they are 112
the most advantageous employees for the employer in terms of social maturity, good professional skills and conscientiousness. The government has increased the pension age to 67 years for men, and 65 years for women. The introduction of the new pension age is being implemented gradually. Thereby, Polish young people stay with no chance to get a job in their home country , and the wave of emigration continues to grow. Long unemployment ( people stay without a job for 12 months and more) is also very high and accounts for more than 50 % of the total unemployment. It is not surprising the employment rate in Poland is very low: just 51.5 % in 2003, that is much lower than the average European Union level, where the employment rate is 64 % and 71 % in the USA. According to the general census of population of Poland in 2002, work was the main source of income for about 12.4 million Polish employees (out of 16 million of the total number of able- bodied people in the age of 15 to 60). Approximately 10.7 million people indicated pensions, disability allowances and other pays as their main source of income; at the same time 14.5 million people (9 million of them are under the age of 15) were dependent on those who work. At an average, one working person supports two not working Polish people. The economic growth of Poland is slowed down by a high load on the social insurance system due to such ratio of working and not working people. In Poland the unemployment benefit is approximately 120 euro, or $ 160. It is extremely difficult to get even such a small benefit. The State gives pecuniary aid only to 25% of the registered unemployed, and according to the law the benefit can be given only to those whose employment period is more than 5 years. Poverty is a real problem, especially in families with many children, among young people, elderly people, and households with low incomes that live in rural areas. According to the Statistical Association of the Republic of Poland residents of 26 % of Polish households say that their monetary incomes do not cover their daily needs, and 63 % of households do not have any savings. “Falling zloty” has become another economic problem. The national currency exchange rate of a Polish “zloty” (PLN) - is an important issue for every family. During a short period of time the euro in Poland has become almost 1.5 zloty more expensive. The devaluing of zloty has led to negative consequences for many Poles. Due to the falling of the Polish currency zloty the credit for buying a home in the amount of 300000 zloty has turned out to be 400000, and monthly payments have become 500 euro bigger. It has become unreal for many young families to purchase a separate home. Prices for foodstuffs and goods of basic necessities have increased. Demographic Aging of Population Aging of the society is a serious social problem. According to the UN prognoses, by the year 2050 22 % of the world population will be pensioners. In the developed capitalist countries every working citizen must support one pensioner. The aging of the society problem requires a complex approachsocial, economic and technological. The demographic aging of population occurs when mortality rate exceeds birth rate, and population decline occurs.
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During the socialist period in Poland birth rate increase was observed for 50 years. In the beginning of the 1970s the communist government increased allowances to mothers and prolonged maternity leaves, and decided on the priority of granting homes to young families with many children. Owing to those measures, by the beginning of the 1980s birth rate increased. After 1989 birth rate declined. The transition to free market economy has influenced much birth rate decline which has currently acquired a disastrous scale. Nowadays almost all European are going through a lingering birth rate decline and, therefore, population ageing. Birth rate indexes in most of them are lower than the level of population reproduction. Poland takes the 221 place out of 224 countries in the list of birth rate with a fertility rate (showing the ratio of births to a number of women of reproductive age) of about 1.32 children per woman (2013). It leads to the decline of natural population increase, to natural decrease. For example, in 2013, the natural increase in Poland with a “minus” sign was -17700 people (The population in Poland). Year
Population (thousands)
Births
Mortality
Natural increase
Birth Rate (per thousand)
Mortality Rate (per thousand)
Natural increase rate (per thousand.)
Total Birth Rate
2013
38, 496
369,600
387, 300
-17, 700
9.6
10.1
-0.5
1.25(e
Poland has finished the demographic transition, and the population is being in the stage of intensive ageing. The decline of natural population increase is conditioned by a number of demographic factors; they are based on similar micro level tendencies: • First marriage age increase; • First child birth age increase; • Divorce indexes increase; • Decline of birth rate indexes below the level of population reproduction; • Increase of elderly people number” cited (Smirnov А, 2004). Emigration contributes negatively into the demographic development of the country. In the next 40 years 6 to 8 million people will leave Poland, demographers from the Agency of social insurance (ZUS) have counted (Alarmujące dane dotyczące Polski). In addition to it, migration of able-bodied people to Poland which potentially could make up for the decline of able-bodied population number is low in the majority of European countries. Family is the center of Polish culture. Different generations of the family are in close contact, and weekly many Poles get together to spend their weekends. Poles spend much time at home. For them home is a place for life and meetings where the doors are always open for friends and family members. Sociological surveys show that the majority of Poles consider their family to be more important than their professional career. In Poland children are brought up in austerity, especially in families who live farer from the capital. They are taught to work and treat older people with respect. In Poland it is very difficult to plan the family and children. Abortions are prohibited by the law 114
in this country. Spouses should be very careful not to surround themselves with crying children who need to be fed, raised and brought up. However, fewer children are born year by year. According to the report of Eurostat, the index of poverty factor for Polish families with three and more children increased from 32.8 % in 2010 to 34.6 % in 2011. The price of upbringing a child till the age of 20 in 2010 was 200000 zloty (50000 euro). The state is not to be relied on. All help from the state is restricted to just a small allowance for every child. Periodically the state seeks to influence the birth rate. Families with monthly income less than 500 zloty per person are paid extra allowance in the amount of 400 zloty per month during the 3-year maternity leave. (It is worth mentioning that in January 1993 they adopted a law which restricts abortions in Poland). For giving birth to every child an average family receives 1000 zloty (approximately 250 euro). The child benefit till its age of three is not very high- just 50 zloty per month (approximately 12 euro).The duration of the paid maternity leave is 4 months. In 2014 the government of Donald Tusk has initiated the practice of Card of families with many children which supposes a number of privileges for families with three and more children. In particular, for such families they supposed to sell goods without VAT, to reduce fare in municipal public transport, to reduce public utilities municipal service payment, and etc. However, such measures are unlikely to make young couples have more than one child, as, in the opinion of Poles, such measures are temporary and do not have a long-term perspective. Such pessimism is connected with both political instability and economic problems in the Polish state. Birth rate declines and it directly affects lives of able-bodied Poles. At the same time among the intelligent layer of the Polish society it is common to think that a family with two children is marginal. Low birth rate forms a dangerous social tendency at which life without children becomes a norm. A striking example of birth rate decline consequence is a fact that in Poland in 2014 more than 3000 teachers of primary and secondary schools will be fired, and 8000 will be transferred to positions with lower teacher’s load (i.e. salary reduction), or will be given unpaid leaves. Teacher’s redundancy in Poland will touch every third educational specialist. One of the important components being considered while studying the model of birth rate is marriage. “In Poland the model “DINKY” that is “Double Income, No Kids Yet” is gaining its popularity. This model is connected with the fact that young women after receiving higher education are inclined to prefer work to giving birth and upbringing of children. Another radical model is “LAT”, “Living Apart Together”- to be together living separately. “This model is caused by a necessity, for example, in the case when a husband goes abroad to work, and his wife stays in Poland” Yakub Sadovsky quotes newspaper “Pshekruy”. In Poland the percentage of divorces constantly increases. Cohabitation often becomes an alternative to the official marriage. This is a destructive phenomenon, but there is a sincerity of young people that underlies it, who does not want to create a family seeing how many of them break up nowadays. “According to the data of the Central statistical department of Poland, in the beginning of the 1990s the number of children from extramarital families was 6-7 %. Now this index has reached 17-19 %, and in big cities it is even 22 %! Most of these children have mother and father 115
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who keep their household together” – Yakub Sadovsky quotes newspaper “Pshekruy” (Sadovsky Yakub, Polish family?). At the same time the number of economically and socially inactive elderly people keep growing, and the number of able-bodied people in relation to the whole population decreases. The percentage of Polish population older than 60 by the 2050s according to the UN prognosis will be 35.6 % (in 2000 it was 16.6 %). Very often pensioners live together with their married children to help them with housework and children, as the majority of elderly people need pecuniary help from their children, because the average state pension of just about 110 euro per month is not enough for normal life. There are few homes for old people in the country. People without family members who can give them pecuniary help hardly make both ends meet. In order to solve demographic problems and to level the consequences of law birth rate in 2014 in Poland they have begun to apply a policy of making-up migration due to young Poles born in republics of the former USSR, they have begun to encourage migration of highly skilled workers to different fields of agriculture, industry and science. For example, a permit for temporary work used to be given for 2 years, but now a foreigner has a right to work on the territory of Poland for 3 years with a right of labor contract prolongation. Religious Aspect The catholic model of marriage has been invariable for many centuries. Any marriage consists of two elements – divine and sacramental, and natural and contractual. Marriage is a covenant of a special nature: its period of validity and essential legal consequences are withdrawn from the will of the contracted parties. Marriage is regulated by God’s laws which are not the subject to men’s arbitrary rule. In the latest Code of Canon Law of the Catholic Church which came into effect in 1983 more canons than to any other establishment are devoted to family and marriage. The definition of marriage is given in canon 1055. For Christians marriage is intended for building a family. In the XX century the church idea found its finished expression in the encyclical (the main document of the Pope on different important social and political, religious and moral issues) of Pope John Paul II about the task of a Christian family in the modern world (1981). In the encyclical the Pope confirms, that exactly through the family the man realizes his deep vocation for love. A Christian family is called a small or home church. A family should become a deep and strong community of life and love which has learnt to serve life, work and humaneness. Offering this ideal of a Christian love, the church does not intend to idealize the family. It knows that conflicts occur in the family, people can offend each other, sometimes very painfully. But the church accepts with trust this source human reality which is called a family. The church asserts that it is the family that in due course of time should become a community based on love, respect to a personality, and become a symbol of piece and mercy. From the theological point of view, two questions can be raised: a question about the way of human reproduction which is set by God, and a question about permissiveness or, on the contrary, non-permissiveness of intimacy without a purpose of giving birth to a child. These results in the official prohibition of the Catholic Church to use any means of contraception: only continence from 116
conjugal intimacy is legal, - all other contraceptive means are unconditionally sinful. The Catholic dogma insists that birth control should be the matter of spouses themselves. The Church does not encourage economic help to the countries where birth rate restriction programs are adopted. In Catholicism giving birth to a child is admitted to be the only aim of marriage as it is. The attitude of the Catholic Church to the issue of abortions is absolutely clear: no abortion can be justified. In all cases abortion is an evil. Family models fixed in religion and culture is historically transmitted from generation to generation. The woman’s position in the family is subordinate, but she has a right to speak, and her opinion should be listened to, and all questions should be discussed with her. But the father is responsible for the whole family. The Catholic Church adheres to an inflexible position towards a divorce. The Church calls married people to be true till the end to the word which they have given each other. It is what they call nondissolvability of marriage. The second marriage between Christians does not excommunicate them from Church. But the Catholic doctrine makes no provision for divorce that is why people who get married again are not allowed to receive communion. Those who have divorced, married the second time or live together at their spouse alive are in the state of adultery, according to the Catholic doctrine. The second marriage cannot be blessed in church. Protests against legalization of unisexual marriages and giving them an opportunity to adopt children, which have turned into numerous mass demonstrations in France and other countries, have lately become the most noticeable manifestations of the Catholic doctrine on family and marriage in public sphere. However, as Viktor Khrul’ points out “Principles of proportional democracy, of the power of arithmetic majority give enough grounds to ignore the Catholic doctrine on family and marriage, and to reformulate the concept of family in sociological terms, in accordance with modern morals and social practices: for example, if unisexual partners live together and call themselves a family, then, it is a family with all juridical consequences which follow from this” (Khrul’ Viktor). The Catholic Church respects family and marriage as the society basis which has been laid in human nature by God. It encourages education and takes care of people’s health. The Catholic Church does not impose any restrictions concerning civil rights and responsibilities for its members. All this is true, but the majority of Polish young people do not go to church. Opinion polls results show that Polish young people lose their interest to Catholicism. The main parishioners of the church are elderly people that are why all dogmas of the Catholic Church and preaching of the clergymen are left not heard by people of the reproductive age. Conclusion Family as a society institution in Poland is in crisis. The transition to free market economy in Poland has caused a change in the economic situation, has deprived families of incentives to have children, and has cultivated values of Western Europe in various strata of the society. Low birth rate indexes are consequences of high unemployment rate among people under the age of 30, high expenses for accommodation and inclination of young people to stay longer with their parents than 117
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in other European countries. Nowadays the country is going through a number of economic difficulties: the state debt is 45 % of the GDP, there are problems with adoption and financing of state programs on healthcare, provision of pensions and family policy (reduction of maternity leave allowances, child benefits, privatization of day nurseries, kinder gardens, schools, and etc.). The Catholic Church influence on the youth and the family institution has decreased. These are the main factors which lead to destruction of the family institution and degradation of moral values of the Polish society. In order to preserve the family in Poland it is necessary to create social, economic and political situation favoring giving birth to more children. It is possible only at the combination of many different long-term political measures directed to reaching this purpose. • The government policy which stimulates the country’s economic growth, which is able to reduce unemployment and increase cash incomes, is necessary. • Jobs should be created first of all for young people. It is necessary to create conditions at which it will be advantageous for young people to work in their homeland in Poland. • Low birth rate can be overcome by the improvement of women’s working conditions and paid postnatal leave for a term of two years. • It is necessary to encourage families to give birth to a third child (or more children) owing to favorable long-term pecuniary subsidies of the government. • The state program of building affordable homes for young families is needed. • There should be organized state and public work on the preparation of young people for matrimonial life (acquaintance with its psychological, sexual and spiritual components, practical child care skills, giving first aid in the family, and etc.) References Alarmujące dane dotyczące Polski. Tego nie da się zatrzymać, Do Rzeczy, [in] http://wiadomosci. onet.pl/kraj/alarmujace-dane-dotyczace-polski-tego-nie-da-sie-zatrzymac/bpz5d Smirnov Artyom. Low birth rate and population aging: causes, consequences, policy variants. Prognosis” №1, 2004, с. 185-198, [in] http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2005/0215/analit01. php Catholic moral, [in] http://religion.rin.ru/cgi-bin/religion/show.pl?id=33&id_m=98 Poland Unemployment Rate – 2014, [in] http://ru.tradingeconomics.com/poland/unemploymentrate Results of opinion polls: Young Poles lose their interest to Catholicism], [in] http://www.sedmitza. ru/text/317183.html Sadovsky Yakub, Polish family?, [in] http://www.novpol.ru/index.php?id=844 Stopa bezrobocia wzrosła w listopadzie do 13, 2 proc, [in] http://forsal.pl/artykuly/767185,stopabezrobocia-wzrosla-w-listopadzie-do-13-2-proc.html Unemployment rate in Poland, [in] http://polandinfo.ru/Container/Details/2054; [in] http://www. stat.gov.pl/ 118
Khrul` Viktor (2014), Katolicheskaya model semiyi i braka v publichnoj sphere (The catholic model of family and marriage in public sphere), Moscow, 2014, [in] http://www.religiopolis.org/ documents/7531-katolicheskaja-model-semi-i-braka-v-publichnoj-sfere-moskva-2014. html The population in Poland, [in] https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Население_Польши
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FAMILY POLICIES IN ROMANIA BEFORE AND AFTER THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989 Asist. Prof. Selami Ahmet SALGÜR, Ph.D. University of South-East Europe – Lumina, Romania
Abstract The communist regime in Romania like in the other ex-communist countries has affected social life, the cultural background, the economical context and the religious traditions of the people of this country, including those of the minorities. These effects were accomplished forcefully by the communist government that wanted to create an egalitarian society having no class difference between social groups. Of all the elements that form the life of a society, family is the most important institution and it can be the most easily affected negatively. The aim of this paper is to examine how family policy changed and applied in Romania during the communist regime and which are the changes that occurred in the respective policy after the Revolution of December 1989. This paper also underlines the effects of these policies on family and society. In the first part of the paper, the concept of family policy and its types manifestation are briefly explained. Different approaches about family policy are also discussed in this section. In the second part, the role and status of women during the communist system is underlined. In this part, difficulties of being a woman in the communist system is discussed because the regime considered the woman as a great mother, achieving all her responsibilities at home, but also she had to be a good socialist worker in social life. Family policies during communism are discussed in the third section. ‘The 1966 Law’ concerning prohibition of abortion and its consequences are also examined in this part. In the fourth section, the structure of family in this age is described briefly. The changes in the family policies are examined in the last section. The implementation of the new policies is also discussed in this part of the paper. Key Words: Romania, family policy, women, society, communist regime, Romanian Revolution I.
What is Family Policy?
Family policy can be described as State actions that are prepared to support families and to strength the well-being of family conditions. There are mainly two types of family policies: a. Explicit Family Policy: Policies in which the consequences for families are intentionally organized. b. Implicit Family Policy: Policies that have non-familial goals but they still affect families indirectly. An explicit family policy addresses the problems that families experience in society, and has as its 120
aim the improvement of family living standards (Bogenschneider, 2006). Family policy is basically concerned about family as the most important social institution in a society.
Explicit family policy concentrates basically four family functions: 1. Family creation, 2. Economic support, 3. Child rearing, and 4. Family care-giving. (Ooms, 1990)
Family policies include compensations for the additional cost that having children implies, through family allowances, maternity and paternity benefits, day care subsidies, organizing programs to support involvement of women in the workforce while balancing family expectations. It means that family policy involves various and multiple policies rather than a single monolithic, comprehensive legislative act (Robila, 2012). There are two different approaches to the understanding of family policies: the first approach suggests that parents should organize the family life, balance the work and their income. Moreover, the education of children is also their duty. The State can also be responsible for those duties. According to the second approach, a child as a citizen of the society has his/her own rights. Both parents and society are responsible for the development, education and well-being of children. However, these two models can show convergence in terms of goals and purposes as a result of facing similar demographic, cultural, and economic developments of all the societies (ISSA, 2014). II. What Was It Like Being a Woman in Communist Romania? During the Communist System, there were some targets that the country had to reach at certain stages. According to these targets: The country should endeavor to reach as a multilaterally developed socialist society that will provide affirmation of socialist principles in all sectors of economic and social life, expressing more fully the human personality, a harmonious combination of personal interests with the general aspirations of the whole society. It will mark a higher stage of socialism; will open a phase of transition to the high-communist society. (Falls, 2011) For this reason, the main issue during this period was the strengthening of power and the increasing the number of labor force. The woman was considered as a great mother, achieving all her responsibilities at home, but she had also to be a good socialist worker. In this manner, the system is characterized by a lack of gender sensitivity. It means that there was no discrimination between man and woman when she came to work. The communists claimed that a woman is in the first place a worker, then she ought to be active in the political life and only in the third place she should consider having a family‌(Einhorn, 1998). Communists thought that accomplishing and fulfilling all these duties by women was the dream of all of the women in the country. These conditions should be pursued by all women in order to be happy in their life. 121
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In fact, the communist system in Romania never had a feminine perspective. In other words, there was a male-dominance in the Communist Party and women were encouraged to work and act as men. The Romanian women were also controlled through communist politics and policies of reproduction. Moreover, if women involved in any kind of opposition activity against the regime, they were arrested on the spot, without taking into account their condition, whether they were old, sick, pregnant or teenager. From this point of view, the communist regime can be considered to have been a criminal one. In social life, Romanian women had to work many hours in improper labor conditions. As a result of the equality policy with men, they had also to work in certain cumbersome fields where men could work, such as mining, construction, metallurgy. Moreover, Romanian women had to stand in line for buying basic food, like milk, bread and sugar, which were supplied in limited quantities, depending on the number of members and children that were in a family. There were frequent interruptions of the gas and electricity and also shortage of hot water that was running only certain hours a day or for limited periods in a week. Under these conditions, women were regarding the communist society as a huge prison in which life was even more difficult than in a real prison and they were feeling as they were in a continuous nightmare in everyday life during the communist era. This policy affected the psychology not only of women and men but also the psychology of all the segments of the Romanian society. This policy changed also the relationship between men and women, and between generations, at the work place, in the family and in the public space. III. Family Policies during the First Years of the Communist Age The Romanian family had a high stability structure, based on the main principles of gender roles. In the very first years of the communist age, religion still was at the centre of the society and the family structure. The church had important functions in the daily life of the people. It was involving the significant events of the society such as marriage, divorcement, recording of births, funerals etc. However, the socialist system placed lots of constraints in the space of family life. The regulation of family structure and functions for the new communist State was borrowed from the Soviet family concept. According to this concept, the effect of religion on the family structure and function should have been decreased. This idea affected greatly the structure and life of the Romanian family. Under these circumstances, important events of family life, such as marriage, recording of births became the affair of the government. A simple civil ceremony was needed and sufficed to legalize a marriage by the communist State (Bachman, 1989). In this period, the function of family was assumed in terms that family had responsibility for providing assistance and transmitting the values of the system to the next generations. According to the communist system, everybody was equal without any difference whatsoever between sexes. This meant that woman had equal rights with man and women involved in all forms of social, economic and political life. But all these involvements were outside the domestic activities. This situation created a conflict with the traditional function of women who were homemakers and child caretakers. Both parents in a family had to work full-time, which was a normal acceptable family model at that time. Family was considered as the basic and fundamental unit of the socialist society and it was the main 122
part of the system to influence the younger generation for the continuity of the system. Moreover, the main function of the family was the reproduction of the population. For this reason, family planning was strictly regulated and couples were encouraged to have as many children as possible (Chirot, 1978). Moreover, the State wanted to create a more liberal atmosphere in the family by minimizing the responsibilities or predominance of men. The woman had an equal authority with the man in the family, for instance control over children and family belongings. If a woman wanted to keep her maiden name, she could do it. The State made the formalities for divorcement very simple, especially if there were no children. When both parts agreed to divorce, it was enough to send just a letter to the local office. Abortion was also allowed during this period. The new function and status of Romanian women conflicted completely with the traditional function and status of women. The political family rules were completely against the traditional family rues. Romanian women insisted on playing their essential function which was the traditional role of mother. So, the communist State charged the second role to the women: The social masculine role. Romanian women had equal rights with men, but women had to work twice as much. For this reason, we can say that women had more responsibilities than men did because they were working outside the home like men did, but they had also to do many household duties (Vese, 2001). IV. The 1966 Law During the first two decades of communism in Romania, mother and child caring were important and the regime tried to create good conditions for them. Moreover, the communist State paid attention to increase the birth rate. In fact, the reason for paying attention to raise the birth rate was to increase the population of the social classes which were considered as workers and peasants of the communist State. As a result of this policy, families with numerous children were supported and encouraged by the regime in this period. Indeed, the communist State took care of these families by supplying the economic resources, and other social aids such as goods and services to keep their salaries at lower levels. However, all these good conditions related to families’, mothers’ and children’s welfare started to worsen considerably at the beginning of the 1960s. The main reasons for these changes could be listed as follows: • sudden urbanization of the people living in rural areas, • increased percentage of women on the labor market in the Romanian society, • increasing correspondingly the percentage of divorcement, • significant worsening of life conditions. In fact, all the regulations mentioned in the third section were the main factors of all these changes and these factors caused some very important structural corruptions at the level of the whole Romanian Society. The percentage of divorcements increased suddenly and also the rate of abortions became very high at the same time. This situation was against the State labor policy because the State wanted to realize an extensive industrialization development and planned to increase the Romanian population from 23 to 30 million inhabitants. As a result of these policies, the communist State had reason to 123
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concern about the population of the next generations which would become the workers of the future. Finally, the communist State decided to change the family law in 1966. According to this new law, abortion and divorce were outlawed. It was difficult or more precisely impossible to obtain any contraceptive and also mechanical contraception was not common. Indeed, this new law was simply violating the woman’s rights to decide her family functions and duties. Moreover, the enforcement of this law at the level of the entire Romanian society caused many negative consequences on a long term period in the country. This pro-natality policy was regarded as “animal breeding” by many authors (Vladimir, 1991), because each woman under 45 years of age had to have at least 5 children in order to fulfill her patriotic responsibilities. According to this law, the selling and the purchase of modern contraceptive materials were completely forbidden and each woman was compelled to have a periodical gynecological examination. When a woman was pregnant, she was being monitored until she gave birth to her baby. By doing so, the State was trying to stop any empirical abortion. There were only a few conditions when the abortion was allowed: • when the pregnancy was dangerous for the mother’s life, • when the baby’s life was in danger as a result of a chronicle disease of the mother, • when rape was the reason for the pregnancy. A special commission composed of experienced gynecologists, a public prosecutor and a Secret Political Policy were deciding whether the abortion was needed (Vladimir, 1991). The way this law was implemented was extremely harsh merciless, and many people, including women and gynecologists who disobeyed this law in a way or another, had to spend many years in prison. Moreover, people over 25 years were punished and were forced to pay a 30 percent tax on their salary if they did not have any child, as long as they didn’t have a medical report certifying infertility problems (Johnson, Edwards & Puwak, 1993). All these situations caused to continue many unhappy marriages and unwanted babies throughout the country because of the rapid implementation of the law (Chirot, 1978). Moreover, the marriage age for women decreased to fifteen years to raise the rate of the births by the State in 1984. All these legal changes did not help too much the decrease of the divorce rate and also did not cause an increase in the birth rate. According to a research published in 1988, the divorce rate was getting higher and higher since 1974 progressively. But this rate was still below the divorce rate before 1966. Violence in the family and alcoholism were two main factors for filing for divorce at that time (Bachman, 1989). V. Structure of the Family during the Communist Period As I have mentioned previously, Romania experienced a kind of very destructive time during the communist regime. The State changed all the important social institutions, structures and their functions and introduced insufficient social and economic policies. The most destructive and the worst one was that the people living in the countryside were forced to migrate from rural areas to urban areas in order to implement the policy of industrialization of the country. These people belonged basically to the agrarian society and they had to learn to live in a city and work in a factory. This 124
means that the State forced them into an artificial urbanization and consequently the rural areas were reorganized after this massive dislodgement of the people living in these areas (Nadolu B, Nadolu ID & Asay, 2007). All these structural changes in rural and urban regions affected the structure of the family during the communist regime. Romanian society was basically composed by the extended family model before the communist regime, especially in rural areas. There was also the nuclear family model in urban areas, but it was not common. These two types of family models had some common values: strong feelings of family relationship, high respect for the authority in the patriarchal structure of the family, strong appropriateness of cultural values. As a result of industrialization and urbanization policies undertaken by the communist State, which I have mentioned in the previous paragraph, the extended family model lost its character and the nuclear family model became more common. Consequently, the traditional extended family model was replaced by the nuclear family model especially in urban areas. In the extended family model, three generations were living together in a single household. But in the nuclear family model, there were only two adults and the children. This model was a much more convenient model for the communist regime, because social control was much easier in the nuclear family model. Moreover, it minimized the danger of different structures in society. The percentage of families living together with grandparents decreased to 21.5 percent in the 1960s (Bachman, 1989). In fact, this situation was true basically in urban areas. In rural areas, most of the families were still living with their grandparents. Yet there was a positive side in all this, namely that a still strong kinship between the families was thus preserved. VI. General View on Romania Immediately after 1989 Romania was basically an agrarian country with a traditional composition until the beginning of the 20th century. However, the communist regime implemented industrialization and urbanization programs starting from the early 1950s until the 1970s (Zamfir, 2001). In fact, this policy turned Romania into an underdeveloped and economically inefficient country on a long term period, especially after the post-communist transition. Even the way of changing the communist regime affected the post-communist transition of Romania. There were very profound changes in important political and social institutions which had the power for the last four decades in the society soon after 1989. These institutions and structures lost their influence on and legitimacy in the system. The transition of Romania to the market economy was very difficult and slow compared to the other Eastern European countries. In this period, Romania witnessed many economic transition hardships, such as an increased inflation, high unemployment, decrease of the overall production, deterioration of the welfare State, such as pensions, health care, education and other conditions. Moreover, unemployment became a very serious problem for the country as a result of the economic and social consequences of the revolution (Garai, 2001). This situation affected families with low incomes, especially women who are the most sensitive part of any society. The gap between the rich and the poor people increased as a result of economic inequalities (Haibach, 2001). Unemployment was normally lower in urban areas due to the high educational specifications of individuals. High retirement percentage is another important issue which enhanced the country’s economic problems. The actively working population was of 45.9% in 1992 and it declined to 40.7% in ten 125
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years (Census, 2002). People with low incomes had difficulties to meet the basic requirements and needs of family life. As a result, almost 44% of the population was living at or below the poverty limit (CIA, 2003). Furthermore, there were some other factors that affected the welfare of the people and made them very unhappy and widened the gap between the rich and the poor people, such as excessive corruption, social polarization and growing poverty. According to the results of a national research, 72% of the respondents who were 18 years old and over declared that they were unsatisfied with their life (24% not at all satisfied, 48% not quite satisfied). But a more interesting result was that 48% of the participants declared that their living conditions were worse than before 1989 (BOP, 2003). All these factors and situations made some people regret the break with the communist regime (Chelcea, 2000). VII.Family Policies After 1989 Family policies like the other political, economic and social policies changed during the transition period from the communist regime to the democratic regime. Firstly, analyses were conducted and the new policies were developed. Family planning was the main issue in the changes related to the family policy, because it was forbidden during the communist regime as discussed in the previous sections. The use of contraceptives was allowed, as one of the main changes in the new family policy. The State sanctioned the new family policy in 2000 and started to provide free contraceptives to the people who were unemployed or having low incomes or to students. Their prices are reasonable for the other individuals. Moreover, family doctors in rural zones where there is no family planning clinic are providing them directly to the people. Regulation in maternity leave is another important change in the new family policy. The State started to pay full salary for the maternity leave in the first 8 weeks after the child’s birth, in 2000. As a result of a new regulation made in 2003, both parents can have maternity leave up to 2 years being paid 85% of their salaries (Ministry of Labor, Social Solidarity and Family, 2003). In spite of all these improvements as to maternity leave, families which have a low total income and barely meet their minimum requirements do not want to benefit from the maternity leave and continue to work full-time (Baban, 2000). The protection against family violence is one of the important regulations of the new family policies. A new law is introduced to implement them and a new institution which is called National Agency for Family Protection was established to support the victims of family violence. Moreover, non-governmental organizations started to become sponsors of national advertising campaigns against violence in the family. There are new arrangements also related to child protection. A foster care system which can be a hopeful alternative for the child institutionalization was also introduced (Robila, 2004). VIII.Family Structure After 1989 According to the Romanian Family Code (Codul Familiei, 1954, 1999), only marriages which are made at the legal office guarantee the rights of both spouses. Men can marry at the age of 18 and women at the age of 16, and both spouses have equal rights in the marriage. However, the average age of the first marriage in urban areas is 24, and in rural areas is 22. In fact, women in rural areas start the adult life in early years through marriage because of the living conditions in these areas. As a result of this understanding, the average marriage age between 15 and 19 years is of 18.6% in urban 126
areas, while it is of 48.5% in rural areas (Council of Europe, 2000). In fact, this result shows us the traditional understanding in rural areas that young girls start their adulthood through the marriage. Another important issue related to women living in rural areas is that unpaid workers in families are basically females (72%) and agriculture is the main sector in which they work. Most of them work for low salaries without labor contracts and lacking a social insurance system. This situation makes these young women very vulnerable. During and after the transition from communism to democracy, ‘sex industry’ has become a very important problem for them and as a result of all this, the danger of sexual abuse has significantly increased. Mainly in urban areas, the percentage of abortion has increased after the revolution and reached the highest rate in Europe. Economic difficulties could be one of the reasons for this result because young couples want to have less children or they postpone the decision of having a baby. Furthermore, 6.5% of the Romanian families with children have only one of the two parents. It means that there is a high rate of single mothers. As a result of the insufficient social support, these young single mothers find themselves in a desperate situation (Council of Europe, 2000). IX.Conclusion Nicolae Ceausescu, the communist leader of Romania, defined the role of Romanian woman as “mother of the nation”. This policy aimed to increase the productive capacities of women’s reproduction. In this period, Romanian women were required to meet both roles of reproductive and productive (Banciu, Chipea &Bancila, 2012). As a result of this policy, Romanian women had two functions or duties, namely that of worker and mother. Indeed, the communist regime planned to increase the population of Romania from 23 million to 30 million by the year 2000. The 1966 Law made pregnancy a major policy of the Communist regime. Ceausescu stated that “the fetus is the property of the Romanian Society and anyone who does not want to have any children breaks the law for the continuity of the Romanian nation”. This law was strictly implemented and created unhappy marriages with unwanted children. After the 1989 Revolution, family policy changed as did the other social, economic and political policies. Abortion and the use of contraceptives were allowed again. The most important and serious consequence of this law was the significant decrease of the birth rate. One of the main reasons of this decline of the birth rate is the economic and social conditions of the country during and after the transition period. However, family, social services which contain family life education as a preventing mechanism and family counseling as a prevention and intervention were established and started to function. However, family policy is still required to be developed and modified so that family services should really serve the intended beneficiaries which are the families. References Aivazova, S. (1997). La liberte et l’egalite des femmes dans les pays socialistes d’Europe de l’Est 1960-1980, in Encyclopedie politique et historique des femmes, Paris. Baban, A. (2000). Women’s sexuality and reproductive behavior in post-Ceausescu Romania: A 127
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psychological approach. In: S. Gal & G. Kligman (Eds), Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics and Everyday Life After Socialism (pp.225-257). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bachman, R.D. (1989). Romania: A Country Study, Washington, Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. < http://countrystudies.us/romania/> Retrieved May 25, 2014 Banciu, V,. Chipea, F. & Bancila, I. (2012). The Social Status and Image of the Romanian Women Presented in the Nationalist Discourse of the Dictator Nicole Ceausescu, International Conference on Humanity, History nad Society, IPEDR vol.34, IACSIT Press, Singapore, pp.112-116 Barometrul de Opinie Publica (BOP) (Barometer for Public Opinion) (2002, 2003). Bucharest: SOROS Foundation Bogenschneider, K. (2006). Family policy matters: How policy making affects families and what professionals can do. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Census (2002). Recensamintul populatiei. (Census). Guvernul Romaniei Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2003). Country Reports Chelcea, S. (2000). Justitia sociala socialista si comunismul residual in Romania dupa un deceniu de tranzitie: O analiza secondara (Social socialist justice and residual communism in Romania after a decade of transition: A secondary analysis). Sociologie Romaneasca, 1, p.125-141 Chirot, D. (1978). Social Change in Communist Romania, Social Forces, Vol.57:2 Codul Families (1954, 1999) (Family Code). Romanian Government Council of Europe (2000). Youth Policy in Romania, European Steering Committee for Youth (CDEJ), Budapest Einhorn, B. (1998). Cinderella goes to market. Citizenship, gender and womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s movements in East central Europe, London-New York, p. 148 Falls, I. (2011). Family and Child Education in Communist Romania: Consequences of the Duality of Values and Behaviors, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol.1, No.13, Special Issue Garai, A. (2001). Abordarea psihological a somajului in perioada de transition (Psychological approach of unemployment during the transition). Revista de Psihologie (Psychology Journal), 47(34), p. 261-278 Haibach, J., Rusu, B., Samezelus, T., Szabo, B., & Vonica, S. (2001). Globalisation and the Future of Welfare States â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Germany, Romania and Sweden. Calitatea Vietii, 12(1-4), p.35-47 ISSA (International Social Security Association), <http://www.issa.int/topics/family-policies/introduction>, last retrieved June 6, 2014. Johnson, A.K., Edwards, R. & Puwak, H. (1993), Foster Care and Adoption Policy in Romania: 128
Suggestions for International Intervention â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Child Welfare League of America, Vol. LXXII, no.5 September-October 1993 Ministry of Labor, Social Solidarization and Family (2003). Government of Romania. www.mmss. ro Nadolu, B. Nadolu, I.D. Asay, S.M. (2007), Family Strengths in Romania, Co-published simultaneously in Marriage & Family Review, Vol.41, No.3/4, The Haworth Press, Inc Ooms, T. (1990). Families and government: Implementing a family perspective in public policy. Social Thought, 16(2), 61-78 Robila, M. (2004). Child Development and Family Functioning within the Romanian Context, Families in Eastern Europe, Contemporary Perspectives in Family Research, Voluma 5, pp.141154 Robila, M. (2012). Family Policies in Eastern Europe: A Focus on Parental Leave. Journal of Child and Family Studies, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp 32-41 Vese, V. Isaacs A.K. (2001). Ed. The Condition of Women in Romania during the Communist Period, Political Systems and Definitions of Gender Roles, Universita di Pisa Viorica, B., F. Chipea & I. Bancila. (2012). The Social Status and Image of the Romanian Woman Presented in the Nationalist Discourses of the Dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, International Conference on Humanity, History and Society, IPEDR vol.34, IACSIT Press, Singapore, p.112 Vladimir, T., (1991). Genocid si Demografie, Editura Humanitas, Bucharest Zamfir, C. (2001). Poverty in Romania, Expert Publishing House, Bucharest, p.5
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FAMILY CHALLENGE TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AND GLOBALIZATION - THE CASE OF ALBANIA Assoc. Prof. Gjon Boriçi Illyria College, Albania
Abstract The transition period was very difficult for Albania. The last 40 years before 1991 were very difficult for a country forced to isolation. The Albanian family in the 45 years of communism was very traditional and not out of patriarchal phenomena. Living in a very remote political system, the Albanian family lived within a framework of fear and isolation. After the collapse of communism in Albania in 1991, new challenges were presented in front of the Albanian families. Living for a long time in isolation and facing very difficult economic situation, the Albanian society now was facing the difficulties of capitalism and the consequences of the “longing” Western way of living. After more than 23 years of genuine democracy, the Albanian family still faces high difficulties in finding the true path of constancy, believe and economic stability. These 23 years proved the fragility of the Albanian family and this is seen in the increased number of divorces and family crimes across the country. Immigration is another sharp problem that the Albanian family was forced to test its constraint. The main challenge to overpass was beyond any doubt economic. Was exactly the economy that made possible the collapse of communist countries in the Eastern and Central Europe, opening the way to emigration in big scale. Globalization, which brought the clash of cultures everywhere in the world, in Europe brought in evidence the big gap existing between West and East. Indeed, all knew that between western and eastern Europe have always existed differences, but this time the differences would be even sharper putting in evidence the fragility of the peoples living in the Eastern part of the old continent. Key words: Albania, family, immigration, divorce, politics, war, traffic, stability, Europe, integratio Introduction The age that “conquered” the world after the fall of the Berlin wall is widely known under the term of “globalization”. This phenomenon is in race to be the new system of humanity after the four big ones starting since 1648 with the system of Westphalia. The peoples and countries that till the year 1990 have lived under communist totalitarian regimes, begun to look with surprise the new horizon before their eyes. How could be that peoples frustrated under communist dictatorships could survive in the new capitalist system? Would they after 45 years of isolation to overpass the big gap between them and capitalist countries with developed economies? Which would have been the challenges that the former communist countries would face to adapt themselves to the developed countries of the West? 130
The main challenge to overpass was beyond any doubt economic. Was exactly the economy that made possible the collapse of communist countries in the Eastern and Central Europe, opening the way to emigration in big scale. Globalization, which brought the clash of cultures everywhere in the world, in Europe brought in evidence the big gap existing between West and East. Indeed, all knew that between western and eastern Europe have always existed differences, but this time the differences would be even sharper putting in evidence the fragility of the peoples living in the Eastern part of the old continent. The passing of the borders from peoples of poor countries to rich countries brought political and economic shock in the respective countries. To understand this phenomenon its necessary to make a historic comparison to identify the developments that brought to this massive emigration in the ‘90-ies and to make an evaluation of challenges the demographic changes had in the countries of origin and in the rich countries. (Schaeffer, 2008). Dictatorships and Political Emigration Every European country that lived under a dictatorship, always faced the pressure of people for a better life out of motherland. In the ‘60-ies of XX century, the dictatorships in Portugal, Spain and Greece forced a new wave of workers to live the respective countries searching a better life in the democratic countries of Europe. But, in countries like Italy of Turkey even why that were democracies, the people were living the country because they were not satisfied of the living conditions. Nearly a million of workers left the countries together with their families. (Schaeffer, 1997). Every country living in dictatorship, especially when this system is in its last grasps, the power was eager to let go as much as possible as possible in order to get profit from the massive emigration. Firstly, because the emigration was reducing the tension and the unemployment in the country and secondly, the emigration reduced the political opponents.(Schaeffer, 2008) Its known the fact that when the young people and workers till the age of sixty have no job and stay all the day in the coffee, soon or later will rise in demonstration causing social conflicts that will been unmanageable and as consequence the dictatorial government will fall prey to a violent political revolution. Another advantage that have the countries fresh out of dictatorships, are the remittances. Their countrymen that work abroad send every year in the country of origin hundreds of millions dollars to help their relatives survive at the minimum of the living cost. The remittances together with the revenues of the tourism sector (as in case of Albania) make possible for the new government to have a fragile economic system, but sustainable. (Schaeffer, 1997). Now with the main problems with the massive emigration of the ‘90-ies were not anymore in the former dictatorship countries, but n the western countries with developed economies and with consolidated capitalism. This because for some reasons. First, the capitalist countries were unprepared to welcome such a big “wave” of emigrants. Second, the emigration was so massive that brought social turmoil in the rich countries and as consequence spread of violence and conflict. Third, from the massive emigration were born considerable ethnic minorities in the rich countries. Four, feeling the threat of emigration, the developed countries began to adapt laws and policies that in some cases were discriminating the emigrants bringing a fifth problem. Explosion of violent demonstrations supported in shadow by the governments of the origin countries where the emigrants came from. 131
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(Schaeffer,1990). This element brought a harsh reaction from the part of the Western Europe governments. On 2002, the British Premier Tony Blair and his Spanish homologue Jose Maria Aznar in a meeting of the Council of Europe kept in Seville of Spain required from the European Union the cut of all aids for those countries that do not undertake legal steps to stop the illegal emigration toward the EU countries. (Bhagwati, 2003). Albania and the Albanian Emigration in the 1990s All the Albanian are witnesses of the great democratic movements happened in the end of 1990 and in 1991 and 1992. From a harsh dictatorship, Albania within a decade knew a drastic change. Before the 1990s Albanians were living in a society where everything was controlled from the state, in a massive displacement of people within and abroad. Everything started within the massive entrance in the foreign embassies in Tirana on July 2nd 1990, to the emigration of biblical proportions on March 1991, when thousands of Albanian took the sea in direction of Italy.(Bashkurti, 2004). This displacement had a very high cost in the Albanian living standard. First, the displacement within was accompanied with big problems, conflicts and unpredicted events. The most sensitive problem in nowadays is the property issue. To the lawful owners the land was stolen and were self proclaimed new “owners” the “strong” persons coming from the deepest and most remote areas of the country. The conflicts about the property not in few cases ended in bloodshed even between the members of the same family. Entire cities were deformed from the new buildings without criteria and the pollution reached every possible threat in the health of the citizens. (Papanagos and Sanfey, 2001) Nearly 20% of the population left the country within a decade in search for a better life. Majority of Albanians emigrated in Greece and Italy. For the number of the population Albania has the one of the highest level of immigration. 3/5 of Albanian emigrants living in Greece and 1.5 in Italy and in western Europe. (Papanagos and Sanfey, 2001) In March of 1991, a great number of Albanian citizens entered in the harbor of Durrёs, the greatest of the country. They reached to possess some ships and with them reached the Italian shores. The same situation was repeated later on August 1991 when 18.000 Albanians took the ship from the port of Vlora and landed in the shores of Italy. The illegal emigration was increased during the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and in the end of 1996 reached the number of 350 thousand persons. The flux of emigration had its peak in 1997 as a reason of state collapse and the total chaos that fall into Albania as a consequence of pyramidal schemes debacle.(Hoxha, Dritan) The Divorce - The Albanian Family Blight in the Global Age Toward the Challenge of Integration The divorces according to the Albanian Courts shock even the most prestigious news agencies across the world. According to the “Nation Master” Albania is number 14 in the general rank of divorces across the world and the highest number of divorces in the Balkan region for the number of population.(www.nationmaster/albania/divorces). Greece and Turkey have a lot lower number of divorces compared to Albania. According to the “Nation Master” for 1000 people, 0.83% are divorced. The list of divorces in the world is chaired by the United States and is surprising the fact the ahead of Albania in the divorce issue in Europe are Russia, Finland and Portugal.(Ibid) The capital Tirana, is 132
the city where the divorces happen more often. From the facts on the ground is seen that the divorce is one of the most painful and shocking elements of the Albanian society. The judges says that the principal element of divorce itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s not the economic situation, but the emigration. Many husbands that live abroad have sent the papers of divorce to their wives in homeland. One of two couples that asked to be divorced are emigrants. Another reason is that the women in Albania are becoming more independent and economically strong to afford the life alone for themselves and their children. Unemployment of men is another factor that brings the couples in the verge of divorced. The table 1 presented below gives us a clear picture of marriages and divorces starting since 1990 to 2012 (www.instat.gov.al/al/gigure/statisticaldatabeses.aspx ): Table 1: Marriages and Divorces in Albania Year
Marriages
Divorces
1990
28.992
2.675
1991
24.853
2.236
1992
26.404
2.480
1993
25.963
2.251
1994
27.895
2.108
1995
26.989
2.331
1996
27.690
1.901
1997
24.122
1.430
1998
27.871
2.005
1999
27.254
2.114
2000
25.820
2.168
2001
25.717
3.494
2002
26.202
3.495 3.634
2003
27.342
2004
20.949
2.968
2005
21.795
3.929
2006
21.332
4.075
2007
22.371
3.305
2008
21.290
3.610
2009
26.174
3.606
2010
25.428
3.478
2011
25.556
3.642
2012
22851
3.561
From the numbers is seen that Albania has a big number of divorces. From the study undertaken from the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Nation Masterâ&#x20AC;?, Albania is 14th in the world, the 5th in Europe and the 1st in the Balkan. In some cases the divorce is the solution for a failed marriage, but from the other way the destruction of the family is perhaps one of the greatest damages for the children and their future. 133
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Conclusion The crises of Albanian families are more and more accompanied with a large number of declared divorces in the courts. The average of divorces in the recent years is around 3500 cases in a year. In 100 marriages, nearly 16 of them finish in divorce. In 2012 we have 22851 marriages and 3.561 divorces.(Ibid) In 2012 the average of marriage for the women was 23.5 years old and for the men 29.1 years old. At the age of 34 both genders have an equal number of marriages. At the men of age 35, they compound the triple number of married women. Also, the number of births have declined in Albania. From 82 thousand births in 1990, at the end of 2012 there are 35 thousand births with a reduction of 57%. The death rates are increased to the men and lower to women. 50% of deaths for the women occur after being 80 years old, meanwhile 70% of men die without being 80 years old. (Panorama, 2014)
References Schaeffer, Robert K. ‘Globalization in the 21 Century; How interconnected is the world’ (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research; Abu Dhabi 2008) Schaeffer, Robert K. ‘Power to the people: democratization around the world’ (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997) Schaeffer, Robert K. ‘Power to the people: democratization around the world’ (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997) Schaeffer, Robert K. ‘Warpaths: The politics of partition’ (New York, Hill and Wang 1990) Bhagwati, J. ‘Borders beyond control’, in The Migration Reader (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 2003) Bashkurti, Lisen ‘National identity of Albanians’ (Tirana, GEER 2004) Papanagos Harry, Sanfey Peter (2001) “Intention to emigrate in transition countries: “The case of Albania in Journal or Population Economics”; Nr. 14; fq.491-504 Hoxha, Dritan ‘Emigracioni, migracioni dhe pasojat nё zhvillimin e shtetit dhe tё sigurisё kombёtare www.nationmaster/albania/divorces Panorama, 12.2.2014
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SECTION V Regional Practices Session II
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International Family Policy in Nigeria - Legal Perspective Sadia Muazu Mayana
Federal CapÄątal TerrÄątory Judiciary Abuja, Magistrate, Nigeria
Introduction Nigeria is a diverse country in terms of tribes, cultures and religions. The major religions are Islam and Christianity; the north is predominantly Muslim whereas the southern and eastern parts are predominantly Christian. However, easterners, westerners, southerners and northerners, they migrate within the country. The population is increasing, statistics now point to more than 180 million inhabitants. The system of governance is that of a federal republic. However, until recently, the country was governed by a military dictatorship, which still impacts the way democracy run in the country. We are still practicing and looking to other countries for inspiration, but as a developing nation, we are not where we are supposed to be in the 21th century. Federal and State Laws In order to understand the topic of family policies in Nigeria, it is necessary to understand that there are two sets of laws; federal and state laws. Being a federal system, everything is centered on the capital Abuja, and what is referred to as the federal territory. The main institution when it comes to family policies is that of the Family Court, a particular court manned by staff trained especially to handle cases arising from family issues which are disputes, inheritance issues, violence, abuse etc. The cases are usually handled by a specialized judge, along with a magistrate from our quarters. In the Family Court, the access to the hearings is restricted, due to the sensitive nature of the issues handled. This means that only people who are somehow related to the case are allowed in the court room. The preferred method of solving the issues range from mediations to arbitrations, but usually the most important thing, is to get the family to communicate in order to achieve the desired results. In the Nigerian Constitution, the Chapter 4 is dedicated to the fundamental human rights. The human rights are enshrined in the Constitution, and should any abuse of the rights of an individual occur, he or she can turn to any of the Constitutional Courts to ensure that the right are not being violated. Under the Constitution there is a provision that allows for the Head of Courts to make practice directions and enactments, which are governing proceedings in the courts. The Childâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Rights Act was passed in 2003 and encompasses everything about family life, the rights of children, women and young persons; those most vulnerable in society. Then we have agencies that the government has put in place like NAPTIP (National Agency for Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other related Matters) and the Human Rights Commission. The 137
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Human Rights Commission is for every Nigerian to access. If one’s rights are being tampered with, one can go and complain to the Human Rights Commission. Here, the matter will be investigated, and if the Commission finds that there is basis for a trial, the case can be taken to court. These agencies like the Human Rights Agency, the NAPTIP, the young persons and juvenile agencies, Environmental Protection Board, all do investigations on their own and unlike the courts, they are not dependent of someone making a formal complaint. These are agencies that actually go to the streets looking for cases, so to say, or people who are in violation of the laws that implemented in FCT (Federal Capital Territory) Abuja and they arrest them. They have the right to arrest them, take them into custody and then arraign them before the courts. Family Policies in Nigeria and Situation in Prison There are several challenges when it comes to family policies in Nigeria. Sometimes the cases that appear before the court, cases of family violence, are simply devastating. Other times, unlawful arrests land innocent bystanders in prison, as often the investigation as to who participated in a demonstration or a riot, is not carried out properly. As Nigeria is still battling with the heritage of British colonization, our prison capacity is insufficient, and as a result of this, our prisons are overcrowded. Another reason for this is that people are often imprisoned for being unable to pay relatively small fines, of the equivalent of perhaps 20 or 40 Turkish Liras. As a magistrate or a judge, one is obliged to perform follow-up visits to prison after the verdicts. This is termed as “returning to the case”, and is done in order to try and decrease these unfortunate imprisonments. One then has to defend the decision of why the inmate was incarcerated in the first place, on base of the case files and an interview. In the prisons you encounter cases of molestation, violence, abused women, battered women. During the interviews we conduct with them, they express experiences of having been abused over longer periods of time, and how they have been crying out for help with no result. They have been enduring the abuse for a determined period of time, set up coping strategies, but at one point or the other they could not cope with the abuse any longer and had to take action, an action that, right or wrong, landed them in prison. The majority of the female inmates have endured extended periods of abuse, be it by partners or family members, and in order to escape that situation, they took to drastic measures, often murder, be it by stabbing, poisoning, or even paying someone else to kill their abuser. This means that when you go on these prison visits, you do not go there just as a judge, you go there as a fellow human being. You sit and talk to these people, you find out why they are there. A challenge we have on these visits is that most inmates have not been psychologically evaluated, some have emotional problems which, neglected over time may turn into psychiatric problems. For instance, a woman killed her infant less than 24 hours after she had given birth to her. Ordinarily, as a magistrate, I do not have the jurisdiction to try that case as it is a murder case, but the police, because they needed to arraign her before the court, brought her in on account of disappearance of a minor. At one of these prison visits I met with her, and asked her to divulge the location of the corpse. She was visibly disturbed, both psychologically and emotionally, and kept repeating “I know I have done something wrong, please forgive me!” Those were the only words coming out of 138
her mouth. When sat down in a more relaxed environment, she confided in me that she had had an affair with a refuse collector who, upon learning that she was pregnant, disappeared. She carried the pregnancy to term, but did not go to the hospital for the birth, as she most likely could not afford it. The medical personnel might have helped her deliver the baby anyhow, but she also lacked the educational resources to know where to go. In this sense we found out the background to her actions, but we failed to convince her to show us where she had kept the body of the child. In Nigeria the juvenile delinquents are separated from the adults, as often their crimes are not of as grave a nature as those of the adults. However, in order to discourage them from further pursuing the path of crime and keep them away from the public, we incarcerate them. The family is the seed of the society and these things happen because we have neglected our morals, values and responsibility as parents. We have the legal framework, but in order to implement it we need awareness that the laws exist, an awareness that presently is not there. There is a disconnect between the privileged, educated conference-goers and the ordinary Nigerian on the street, who might not even know the four corners of a classroom. These are the kind of women for whom we need to speak out for, as their voice is not heard. We hold conferences, we access remote areas and visit the villages, but still we need a bigger voice in order to empower the women. A woman is in front of the home, if you provide her with security, access to medical facilities, education for her children, she will be able to be a good parent. Not having maternity leave and the lack of possibilities for women in the workforce to take care of their young children are obstacles to this. For Instance, I recently had a baby. We have four months maternity leave in Nigeria. I took a month off before I gave birth, because it was a difficult pregnancy. Three months later I was expected to resume work. As I couldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t carry a baby into a courtroom, I needed a nanny who would have to be with me. My office was about 50 km from where I live, and there is no nursery at work. Some private organizations have places like that for you to bring in a nanny and a baby, but in the courthouse we do not. This obviously affected my cases; I used to return to several cases but I don´t return to those cases anymore because I donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t get them finished. If I do not bring my baby to work I am always eager to finish what I am doing in court. I often find myself just adjourning my cases and then rushing back home because I believe that is where my primary duty lies. Conclusion
These are the areas we need to deliberate on more, find solutions. Conventions, declarations are very important but you need to change the mind-set. If the environment we live in, actually accept this things from us and accommodate them, life would be easier for everybody.
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EQUAL YET PLURAL? POLYGAMY AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES Cynthia A. Scheopner Senior Researcher, Office of Research Compliance, University of Hawaiâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;i, Manoa
Abstract Polygamy has been illegal in the United States since 1878, but the legal reasoning underlying the ban is now subject to scrutiny based upon the success of same-sex marriage challenges. If civil law cannot forbid marriage between two individuals of the same sex, despite centuries of custom and cultural taboos, how can it prevent marriages of more than two? My research examines the jurisprudence of marriage laws in the United States and its possible international application. In the past year, nineteen of the fifty states have overturned bans on same-sex marriage and each of the remaining states has a court challenge in progress. (Same-sex marriage in the United States, 2014) Many of these challenges claim that having different marriage rules for heterosexual and samesex marriages violates the right to due process in the U.S. Constitution. The attempts to allow legal same-sex marriage began in 1993 with a ruling by the Hawaii Supreme Court, but there was little movement until the US Supreme Court ruling last summer that the federal Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional. Since then, the swiftness and success of the challenges in the individual states has surprised legal observers (Botelho 2014). The legal reasoning used in bans on polygamy and same-sex marriage in the United States differ in one significant aspect: religion. The Supreme Court challenge to polygamy was brought by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (also known as Mormons) under the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion. They sought an exemption to civil laws against bigamy due to their religious belief that polygamy was not only permitted, but religiously required. At the time, all sexual activity outside the marriage of one man and one woman was illegal. Since then, court cases brought under a theory of privacy have removed most restrictions on sexual activity between consenting adults. The change in civil society means that a legal challenge to polygamy that does not rely upon religious grounds might now be successful. Further, the change in the moral climate and increased visibility of polygamous marriages, such as sympathetic television shows, decrease the strength of the legal reasoning used to deny the religious exemption originally. In this paper, I argue that a focus on justice and fairness for women is more fruitful than either of the two historical approaches. This focus improves conditions for women in traditional marriages, as well. Introduction Polygamy has been illegal in the United States since 1878, but the legal reasoning underlying the ban is now subject to scrutiny based upon the success of same-sex marriage challenges. If civil law cannot forbid marriage between two individuals of the same sex, despite centuries of custom 140
and cultural taboos, how can it prevent marriages of more than two? My research examines the jurisprudence of marriage laws in the United States and its possible international application. In the past year, nineteen of the fifty states have overturned bans on same-sex marriage and each of the remaining states has a court challenge in progress. (Same-sex marriage in the United States, 2014) Many of these challenges claim that having different marriage rules for heterosexual and same-sex marriages violates the right to due process in the U.S. Constitution. The attempts to allow legal same-sex marriage began in 1993 with a ruling by the Hawaii Supreme Court, but there was little movement until the US Supreme Court ruling last summer that the federal Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional. Since then, the swiftness and success of the challenges in the individual states has surprised legal observers (Botelho 2014). The legal reasoning used in bans on polygamy and same-sex marriage in the United States differ in one significant aspect: religion. The Supreme Court challenge to polygamy was brought by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (also known as Mormons) under the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion. They sought an exemption to civil laws against bigamy due to their religious belief that polygamy was not only permitted, but religiously required. At the time, all sexual activity outside the marriage of one man and one woman was illegal. Since then, court cases brought under a theory of privacy have removed most restrictions on sexual activity between consenting adults. The change in civil society means that a legal challenge to polygamy that does not rely upon religious grounds might now be successful. Further, the change in the moral climate and increased visibility of polygamous marriages, such as sympathetic television shows, decrease the strength of the legal reasoning used to deny the religious exemption originally. In this paper, I argue that a focus on justice and fairness for women is more fruitful than either of the two historical approaches. This focus improves conditions for women in traditional marriages, as well. United States Legal Landscape In the United States, jurisdiction over family law is generally left to the individual states. This is why challenges to same-sex marriage are currently being waged in each state, either through the legislature or in the state supreme court. There have been two notable exceptions. The first was in the case of polygamy, which was brought from Utah before it was admitted as a state. As a territory, it fell under federal jurisdiction. The second was in the case of interracial marriage. When that case came to the U.S. Supreme Court, some states allowed marriages between white and non-white individuals and others did not. That case, Loving v. Virginia (1967), invalidated the laws of individual states prohibiting interracial marriage, because there was a greater national interest in allowing such marriages everywhere. The treatment of religious freedom is another important issue in cases involving marriage. The initial challenge to polygamy bans was brought by the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) in 1879. (Reynolds v. United States). They claimed that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provided them with an exception to laws prohibiting polygamy because it was required by their religion. The first amendment includes both a prohibition against the establishment of an official religion and a guarantee of the free exercise of religion by individuals: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
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thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. (U.S. Const. amend. I).
Note that the amendment is addressed to the U.S. Congress. The LDS Church would not have been able to make an argument for protection at the state level at that time, because the First Amendment was not applied to the individual states until 1940 (Cantwell v. Connecticut). However, as a federal territory, Utah fell under federal jurisdiction and the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Contemporary challenges to either religious free expression or establishment of religion are brought in federal court. The LDS Church waged the initial battles to permit polygamy as a religious exception to the state laws forbidding it. Although the official church doctrine now eschews polygamy (and same-sex marriage), many religious groups who broke with the LDS church still press the issue. While there is anecdotal evidence that polygamy is practiced by other religions, including Islam, they have not resulted in legal challenges that have reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Polygamy background Joseph Smith, the founding prophet of the LDS Church, reported receiving a revelation that polygamy was not only permissible (as it had been for Old Testament patriarchs) but also required for full human exaltation. In the years that followed, members of the LDS Church considered polygamy, or plural marriage, to be essential for salvation. Smith’s views on polygamy apparently developed as part of his focus on the Old Testament. He became convinced of the theological necessity of polygamy as part of the “restitution of all things.” (Restoration of Jesus Christ’s Church 2014) 1 In 1843, Smith announced two revelations that called for the restoration of Biblical polygamy within the framework of marriage to be solemnized (or sealed) for eternity. The Church did not publicly declare its acceptance of the practice until 1852 when Brigham Young accepted the Smith revelations as part of the Church’s official canon (Harmer-Dionne, 1998, p. 1321). Smith taught that a man would progress through eternity “in proportion to the magnitude of his posterity on earth and that polygamy was a central part of the pursuit of godhood” (Harmer-Dionne, 1998, p. 1320). More wives meant more children and greater future glory. Although first wives had to consent to additional wives, their salvation depended upon being in a relationship with a polygamist male. Men (and women) who rejected the practice of polygamy not only forfeited godhood but also were damned. The Politics of Polygamy The Mormon Church was born into a young country bubbling with religious ferment and revivalism. Abolitionist groups, temperance movements and benevolent and Utopian societies were thriving 2(Van Wagoner, 1989, p. 2). As the church grew, it relocated from New York to Pennsylvania to Ohio and then to central Missouri where a purported “Mormon uprising” brought out the militia. In 1838, This phrase refers to the belief that, following the death of the original apostles, Christians were misled which resulted in the establishment of many, often conflicting, denominations. This period of the Great Apostacy was ended with God’s revelations to Joseph Smith. Part of the work of the LDS Church is to lead the “restitution of all things” before Christ’s second coming.
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The Western New York area was home to new religious sects such as the Believers in Christ’s Second Appearing (the Shakers) and the Harmonists (who moved from Germany following a vision of the angel Gabriel), as well as more traditional Protestant denominations.
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Missouri Governor Linburn Boggs issued what the LDS church considers the nation’s only sanctioned extermination order: “The Mormons must be treated as enemies and must be exterminated or driven from the state, if necessary, for the public good.” Smith’s appeal to the president for protection was unsuccessful3 (McConnell, Garvey & Berg, 2006, p. 112). After 30 church members, including women and children, were killed in an attack, the group moved again, this time to Illinois. By 1840, the LDS church numbered 20,000 and had begun its own missionary work, prompting thousands of new converts, many from the United Kingdom, to immigrate. When local trouble again threatened, Smith formed his own militia and launched his campaign for President of the United States. Smith’s presidential candidacy and prophetic leadership ended when he and his brother were shot to death by a mob in jail while awaiting trial in 1844. Brigham Young led the group to the Salt Lake Valley in what was then Mexico, founding the Territory of Deseret. In 1850, Utah became a territory of the United States with a Mormon population of nearly 100,000 and Young was appointed governor. But, by then, polygamy was a national political issue. Rarely has a religious practice been as closely identified with the faith that inspired it as polygamy was with Mormonism in the late 19th century. For Americans who lived during that time, “Mormon” and “polygamist” were nearly synonymous. For Mormons, polygamy was never a majority practice, but the correctness of the practice was a matter of religious faith. (Kokiasmenos, 2004).
Young’s impact on both the success of the church and its public reputation was enormous. He had taken charge of the Mormon migration to Illinois from Missouri before the move west. In addition to Utah, he oversaw settlements in Nevada, Idaho, Wyoming, Arizona and California. He also spearheaded missionary work in England, which resulted in a dramatic growth of the religion there and increased immigration to the U.S. In addition to his success in proselytization, he was the public face of polygamy -- marrying a reputed 55 wives and siring as many children (Bringhurst, 1986). 4 The 1856 Republican Party Platform called polygamy and slavery “twin relics of barbarism.” Again, armed conflict between Mormons and the government threatened: the nation’s largest military encampment prepared to attack Salt Lake City and Mormons dug in to defend themselves in southern Utah. The standoff was interrupted by the outbreak of the Civil War. (McConnell et al., 2006, p. 112). The battle against polygamy moved to Congress and the courts just as the nation was dealing with the challenges of southern secession and reconstruction. Religious rights When the LDS church began, the federal government was weak and legal power was held by the states. Mormons admired the federal constitution and believed its provisions protecting freedom of religion were divinely inspired. Subject to mob violence in state after state, they learned, to their dismay, that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states and most religious regulation was done at the state level. (Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans, 1845). The Constitution “Buchanan, who later concluded the federal government lacked power to prevent secession, thought it likewise lacked power to prevent Mormon extermination.”
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4 “Young’s commitment was underscored by his eventual marriage to a total of 55 wives (accounts differ) and fathering of fifty-seven children by sixteen of these women.”
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did not protect them or avenge their suffering. So, they claimed the same principles of federalism and majority rule when they established self-governance in the Territory of Utah. Unfortunately, governmental relationships were changing (Barringer Gordon, 2001). As a territory, Utah also did not have the same political status as a state. At the time, it wasn’t clear how much of the states’ power to govern themselves applied before official statehood. The consideration of territorial sovereignty for Utah became part of the debate about states’ rights, slavery and polygamy. For the federal government, polygamy was both a reason to keep Utah out of the Union, and the avenue by which it would pursue the destruction of Mormon political power. But polygamy was not merely a handy foil for those bent on persecuting Mormons. It was the centerpiece of Mormon society, and everything else – marriage laws, economic interactions, social hierarchy, inheritance systems, and local politics – was built around it. (Kokiasmenos, 2004, n.p.)
The image of a theocracy (which included many recent converts who were immigrants) more loyal to its church leader than to the United States government thriving at its western boundary was unsettling to a federal government already warring with southern states.5 (Van Wagoner, 1989, p. 108). In 1862, Congress passed the Morrill Act, the first of a series of statutes designed to end the Mormon practice of polygamy (McConnell, et al., p. 112). It not only outlawed plural marriages in the territories, it also had as its aim to disestablish the Mormon Church and divest it of economic power (Drakeman, 2004, p. 700). Despite its clear intention “to punish and prevent the practice of polygamy in the Territories of the United States and to disapprove and annul certain acts of the territorial legislature of Utah,” it was ineffective, perhaps because nearly all probate judges in Utah were Mormon bishops. Efforts to strengthen the Morrill act in the late 1860’s were unsuccessful (Van Wagoner, 1989, p. 109). President Ulysses S. Grant took a stronger line against the “Mormon menace.” Brigham Young was indicted on charges of “lascivious cohabitation,” but the prosecution ended the Supreme Court due to jury selection problems. Frustrated and embarrassed, President Grant asked Congress for “the ultimate extinguishment of polygamy.” It gave him the Poland Law in 1874. It allowed the U.S. Marshall in Utah to select jury pools, assigned polygamy trials to federal territorial courts (rather than Churchdominated probate courts) and allowed convictions to be appealed to the United States Supreme Court (Drakeman, 2004, p. 700). LDS Church leaders still thought the Constitution would protect them from such legislative over-reaching. They agreed to a test of the anti-polygamy laws with Young’s personal secretary, faithful polygamist George Reynolds. Reynolds: The Test Case The opinion recites that Reynolds believed he had a duty to practice polygamy, based on church teachings including a divine revelation to Joseph Smith and that “the failing or refusing to practice [sic] polygamy by such male members of such church, when circumstances would admit, would be punished, and that the penalty for such failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come” (1878). The
Vice-President Schuyler Colfax, after visiting Salt Lake City in the fall of 1869, argued that “it is time to understand whether the authority of the nation or the authority of Brigham Young is the supreme power in Utah; whether the laws of the United States or the laws of the Mormon Church have precedence within its limits.”
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court saw the question before it as “the guilt of one who knowingly violates a law which has been properly enacted, if he entertains a religious belief that the law is wrong.” After acknowledging that Congress cannot pass a law in the territories that prohibits the free exercise of religion, the Court notes that the word “religion” is not defined in the Constitution. It looked for the meaning in the history of the times in which the first amendment was adopted. This was new ground for the Court. Before Reynolds, regulation of domestic relations and religious conduct fell to the state. But, Utah was a territory and subject to federal jurisdiction so Congress was able to legislate on marriage and other issues traditionally the province of state courts. It was also a new approach to look to the intent of the framers of the Constitution in writing the First Amendment6 (Drakeman, 2004, p. 703). The opinion goes beyond what was needed to address Reynolds’ free exercise claims to invoke strict separationist language from James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, both involved in the Constitutional Convention. Perhaps the intent was to not only dash Mormon hopes of a constitutional right to engage religiously mandated polygamy, but also to send a message that an official state religion could be a block to statehood. One message is certainly clear: no religious conviction will justify polygamy. Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people. At common law, the second marriage was always void, and from the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated as an offence against society. … From that day to this we think it may safely be said there never has been a time in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less severity.(Reynolds, 1878).
On one issue, LDS faithful and the Reynolds court agreed. Marriage is “from its very nature a sacred obligation.” But religious belief cannot provide an exemption from the statutory ban. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously considered that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice? (Reynolds, 1878)
Later courts would be tasked with carving out exceptions to this belief/practice distinction as it became increasingly clear that many actions have religious significance.7
“It certainly was not a necessary component of First Amendment analysis at that point in constitutional history. In dealing with free speech cases of first impression, the Waite court did not seek out the framers’ views or intentions … the degree to which the Chief Justice delved into a detailed analysis of the historical background of the religion clauses is quite unusual.”
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Indeed, few religions in America consist solely of belief – most require some action, whether attending services that might conflict with work schedules, or children selling religious newspapers, or consuming wine or peyote as part of religious services in violation of Prohibition or drug laws. It is arguable that mere religious belief without something more might not even meet the Constitutional definition of religion used by the Supreme Court in considering draft and tax evasion cases. The dictates of conscience are not enough to qualify as a religion in those contexts.
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Reynolds aftermath Reynolds upheld the constitutionality of the Morrill Act, but it didn’t make the act workable. It was still hard to prove multiple marriages in Utah. Congress created the new offense of “unlawful cohabitation” in the Edwards Act. It was not necessary to prove that either a marriage or sexual relations took place – it was enough that a man lived in the same house with two women (Cannon v. United States, 1885). The act disqualified anyone who approved of polygamy from jury service. It also created a commission to oversee elections and disqualified polygamists or unlawful cohabitators from voting or holding office (Murphy v. Ramsey, 1885). Soon, the commission had disenfranchised and removed Mormon leaders from office. But, that was not enough. In 1887, Congress enacted the Edmunds-Tucker Act that allowed wives to testify against their husbands, required all marriages to be registered with the probate court, disenfranchised women8 and required voters and public officials to swear that they would not commit polygamy nor “aid or abet, counsel or advise, any other person to” do so (McConnell, et al., 2006). The prohibitions against aiding, counseling and advising seem to go beyond conduct to target belief itself – at least expression of the belief. The act also took aim at the Church as an entity. It annulled the territorial act incorporating the Church, directed the Attorney General to wind up its affairs, and it ordered him to collect most of the Church’s real property and use it to benefit the territorial common schools. This dealt a blow to the heart of Mormon society. As part of its beliefs in common ownership, the church owned stock in community herds, general stores, irrigation projects, the newspaper, bank, mines, quarries, ranches and other parts of the economic infrastructure of the territory. (Arrington, 2004). The Act had an exemption for parsonages and temples, which might suffice for mainstream protestant churches, but was wholly inapplicable to the practice of the LDS religion. As soon as the act passed, the United States filed for a decree dissolving the corporation and an order forfeiting all its property but the Temple block in Salt Lake City. The territorial supreme court granted the decree and the United States Supreme Court affirmed (The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 1890). The tactics were familiar. They had recently been employed against the legislatures and courts of southern states to root out slavery, but never against a church. “The campaign against polygamy created a second reconstruction in the West as the national government forcibly retooled marriage in Utah in the late nineteenth century” (Barringer Gordon, 2001). At last, the Church complied. In 1890, LDS Church President Wilford Woodruff issued a Manifesto announcing it had been revealed to him that the Church must cease the practice of polygamy. Inasmuch as laws have been enacted by Congress forbidding plural marriages, which laws have been pronounced constitutional by the court of last resort, I hereby declare my intention to submit to those laws, and to use my influence with members of the Church over which I preside to have them do likewise … And now I publicly declare that my advice to the Latter-day Saints is to refrain from contracting any marriage forbidden by the laws of the land.(DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS official declaration I).
President Harrison granted amnesty to Mormons who complied with the law from then on. What was left of Church property was returned. Utah was granted statehood in 1896 conditioned 8 Utah territory had been the second jurisdiction in the nation to grant women’s suffrage, in part from a mistaken belief that Mormon women would vote to abolish polygamy.
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on a provision in the Utah Constitution that Utah would never approve the practice of polygamy (McConnell, et al., 2006,p. 123; Harmer-Dionne, 1998, p. 1333). Public sentiment was slower to change, however. In 1899, Congress voted overwhelmingly not to allow B.H. Roberts to serve as a representative from Utah because he was a practicing polygamist. But merely being a member of the LDS church was sufficient for public opprobrium, whether or not the individual was actually in a polygamist relationship. In 1904, Congress held an inquiry that included public hearings about whether to seat the senator from Utah, Reed Smoot, who was monogamous (Hardy, 1992, ch. 7). Despite the Manifesto, plural marriages continued for a time. Mormons believed it was made under political duress and did not change the requirement of polygamy for exaltation. As late as 1937, President Herber J. Grant declared, “We never believed polygamy was wrong and never will … [O]ne of the cardinal rules of the Church is to obey the law. So as long as polygamy is illegal we ourselves will strictly enforce the law.” (emphasis added) (Harmer-Dionne, 1998, p. 1337) While confirming the correctness of polygamy, the message also signaled the internalization of the ban. The final push to abandon polygamy came from within. The Church not only stopped approving plural marriages, it excommunicated anyone advocating polygamy. Over the next several decades, the inability to practice this fundamental belief resulted in a conversion so complete as to be Orwellian (Hardy, 1992, ch. 10). The official LDS website now declares, The standard doctrine of the Church is monogamy, as it always has been, as indicated in the Book of Mormon … [T]he standard of the Lord’s people is monogamy unless the Lord reveals otherwise. Latterday Saints believe the season the Church practiced polygamy was one of these exceptions (Polygamy: Latter-day Saints and the Practice of Plural Marriage, n.d.).
The LDS church now recognizes Celestial Marriage as between a man and his sole lawful spouse. From a doctrine central to the exaltation of men as gods, polygamy has been reduced to a historical footnote. However, the change in church doctrine came as the result of an enforced change in practice rather than an organic evolution of Mormon belief. “Polygamy died an unnatural death,” notes HarmerDionne. “After repeated legal attacks and decades of relentless persecution, the LDS Church literally and spiritually abandoned plural marriage” (Harmer-Dionne, 1998, p. 1318). Protected Practices The polygamy battle was framed around marriage. Reynolds declared monogamous marriage to be the very foundation of democracy. Prohibitions against cohabitation took aim at polygamist marriages that were forced underground. Not only was plural marriage outlawed as a status, interpersonal relationships were declared illegal if they fell outside monogamous marriage. At the time, pre- and extra-marital sex was proscribed for all couples, although rarely enforced with the zeal directed toward Mormons. However, the subsequent century has seen profound societal changes. An important line of Supreme Court cases has established that the relationship between individuals is due the same sort of Constitutional protection whether recognized as marriage or not. It began when the Court protected the right of married couples to contraceptives. (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). In a decision that extended the protection to unmarried couples, the Court held there was no reason to treat married and unmarried persons differently, saying they share a right to privacy.
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[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alikeâ&#x20AC;Ś.the married couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 1972).
The interpersonal association itself was accorded status. The Court recognized that relationship was eligible for the same sort of privacy accorded the marital status. The court found a similar protection for same-sex couples in Lawrence v. Texas (2003). To reach its decision, the court distinguished its earlier ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986). In that case, a Georgia statute made sodomy illegal for both heterosexual and same-sex couples. The court observed that although the statute seemed just to prohibit a certain sexual act, the impact is more severe for samesex couples. It again accorded individuals the right to establish a protected interpersonal relationship. Their penalties and purpose, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private or places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. (Lawrence v. Texas 2003).
Similarly, the Virginia Supreme Court recently ruled that the state criminal prosecution of sex between unmarried individuals (fornication) is unconstitutional in light of Lawrence v. Texas. (Martin v. Ziherl, 2005). If the Supreme Court protects relationships between unmarried couples, whether same or opposite sex, it would seem reasonable to assume that relationships among three or more consenting adults should be considered private and protected as well. If it is permissible to live together in a multiple relationship, does it make sense to have that relationship forbidden because the members consider one another to be married? At a minimum, it would seem odd to continue the criminal sanctions against bigamy and cohabitation. In the words of Lawrence v. Texas (2008), â&#x20AC;&#x153;whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, [the relationship] is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.â&#x20AC;? As anti-sodomy statues targeted same-sex couples, so anti-bigamy statutes target polygamists and may be invalidated using the logic of Lawrence. In contemporary society, many marriages are frequent and brief. Even so, only about half of all adults over the age of 15 are married (U.S. Census, 2008). It seems impossible to argue with Reynolds that monogamous marriage is the foundation of democracy in the United States. In a society that is increasingly comfortable with relationships between individuals of the same sex or different races, it is difficult to see what line divides them from plural relationships. Given the highly-publicized sex lives of stars, it would be hard to argue public scandal provides sufficient justification to imprison polygamists as it once did. Religious polygamy revisited Until recently, challenges to the ban on polygamy based on the free expression of religion routinely failed in the lower courts. The Reynolds decision was considered to be controlling, and was cited 148
as an authority as recently as Employment Division v. Smith, (1990). The majority opinion in that case echoed the Reynolds fear that allowing an exception for religious practice here would make it difficult to draw the line anywhere. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun described the attitude of the majority opinion with this quote from Ira Lupu (1989, p. 947): “Behind every free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe.” Individuals have continued to challenge the ban, usually those associated with religion groups that broke with the LDS church when it discontinued polygamy. One such challenge in 2007 asked that a civil marriage license be issued to a third person with an already-married couple. The court of appeals denied it, based on the Reynolds precedent. However, it also asked that polygamy no longer be a violation of criminal law, even if marriage is not permitted. One of the reasons that the appeals court refused that part of the challenge was that the individuals had not actually been threatened with arrest (Bronson v. Swenson, 2007). That situation has now changed. Two popular television programs have returned polygamy to the national attention in the past decade. Big Love was a fictionalized program that aired from 2006 – 2011. It highlighted the lives of what was described as a fundamentalist Mormon family, consisting of a husband with three wives. It won many awards, and opened the door for a reality television program called Sister Wives, which is based on a real family of one husband and four wives.9 The publicity called into question Utah’s policy of no longer actively enforcing the anti-polygamy laws still on the books. The Utah County attorney began an investigation in 2010 into whether the family was breaking the law. State officials admitted that the television program triggered the investigation (Brown v. Buhman, 2014, p. 6). The family moved to Nevada and the county attorney decided not to pursue the matter. However, the family filed a lawsuit claiming that the investigation violated their right to privacy, citing the Texas case on same-sex relationships. (Carlisle, 2014). Although the Kody Brown family gives a religious reason for practicing polygamy, they are not basing their legal challenge on religious free expression, as in Reynolds. They are using the same approach as the line of cases allowing privacy protections for interpersonal relationships, which began with the use of contraceptives by married couples and removed criminal penalties for same-sex relationships. This case has not yet reached the U.S. Supreme Court, but the polygamist family has won a partial victory in the lower court. The federal judge agreed with them that the portion of the law making cohabitation illegal violates their rights under the Constitution (criminal law). The judge did not strike down the part of the law that limits marriage licenses to two individuals (civil law). This one ruling reflects the path taken in the separate same-sex marriage cases, where the criminal penalties were removed by a federal opinion but the civil right to marry continues to be decided by each state (Peralta, 2014). The case makes note of the religious importance of polygamy to the early LDS Church and the State of Utah, as well as the specific family involved. “This decision is fraught with both religious and historical significance for the State of Utah because it deals with the question of polygamy, an issue that played a central role in the State’s development and that of its dominant religion, The Plaintiffs are members of the Apostolic United Brethren Church, a fundamentalist faith derived from nineteenth-century polygamous Mormonism (Brown v. Buhman, 2014, p. 5).
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Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints” (Brown v. Buhman, p. 9). It defers to Reynolds as controlling on the issue of whether there is a free exercise right to practice polygamy. But it notes that the individuals involved in this particular polygamous relationship have are not claiming to be legally married, although they use the terms “wife” and “husband.” Their crime is to have violated cohabitation laws, which the court finds have a “targeted effect on specifically religious cohabitation.” (Brown v. Buhman, p. 23). This is similar to the legal reasoning used in the challenge to sodomy ordinances by same-sex couples, but in this case the relationship at issue has even more priority because it is religious in nature. Harms of polygamy The reasons for opposing polygamy have involved concerns for both society and individuals, historically and in this case: The social harms implied by Reynolds arising from Mormon polygamy – that it introduced practices of Asiatic and African peoples into Christian Western civilization and assisted the Mormon Church in maintaining despotic, anti-democratic patriarchal control over the entire region, threatening all of American democracy – are no longer relevant, to say the least. (Brown v. Buhman, fn. 64, p. 70.) In the current case, state interests in prohibiting polygamy are identified as: • A goal of strengthening or protecting the institution of monogamous marriage. • An interest in regulating marriage as a legal status with entry and exit requirements. • An interest in preventing marriage fraud, of protecting an innocent spouse or additional partner • Preventing the misuse of government benefits associated with marital status. • The concern by some members of society that the institution of marriage is diminished when people deliberately avoid it, especially with multiple partners. • Protecting vulnerable individuals from exploitation and abuse. • Crimes such as incest, unlawful sexual contact with a minor, sexual assault, statutory rape, failure to pay child support are often associated with polygamy. The court found that the first five societal goals cannot be reasons for the law when (1) the relationship has not claimed to be a legal marriage, and (2) any of the benefits it has received are also available to unmarried individuals. The last two state concerns involve protection of individuals, rather than advancing some societal preference for monogamous marriage. In those cases, the court agreed with a prior ruling that restrictions on the practice of religious polygamy could be justified if it involved any of those crimes against persons, however “However, the broad criminalization of the religious practice itself as a means of attacking other criminal behavior is not [justified]” (Brown v. Buhman, p. 71). The opinion notes that women have now received “full legal and moral personhood in society.” The court believes that with the cohabitation prong stricken, the communities engaging in religious 150
cohabitation will have less of a need to be underground and the State can more directly prosecute the independent crimes that are sometimes alleged to be rampant in those communities. Women who have and are aware of their rights will be less likely to end up in abusive situations (Brown v. Buhman, fn 64, p. 71). Polygamy and the Status of Women At the time of the Reynolds opinion, women had few rights in any sort of marriage. According to the common law doctrine of coverture, when a woman married, her person, personal and real property belonged to her husband. “To put it most succinctly, upon marriage the husband and wife became one – him (Zaher, 2002, p. 461). Any income from property she brought into the marriage was controlled by her husband, and if she earned wages outside the home, those wages belonged to him. If he contracted debts, her property went to cover his expenses. Similarly, the father as head of household had complete rights to the labor of children. Custody of children went to the father in the case of divorce, a woman could also lose her children in the event of widowhood or illegitimacy. Perhaps not surprisingly, concern for the safety and welfare of women in marriage – either polygamous or monogamous -- is unmentioned in the Reynolds opinion, which focuses on the societal harms of polygamy. Civil laws have changed in the intervening years, as noted by the Brown opinion, which makes note of the personal harms of polygamy, along with societal concerns. However, it is overly optimistic to hope that “women who have and are aware of their rights will be less likely to end up in abusive situations (Brown, p. 54). Indeed, that seems to place the burden on women, rather than men, to avoid abusive situations. Illicit polygamous relationships are a tiny minority in the United States, yet one in three women have experienced some form of physical violence by an intimate partner (NCADW, 2014). The court assumes that women now in polygamous relationships are somehow unaware of their rights – an assumption not warranted by the facts of the Sister Wives case at hand. Further, the opinion does not explain how women now liberated from legal disability for their polygamous relationships might be able to avoid abusive relationships when other women cannot. At best, it puts them on an equal, but unfortunate, footing. Future focus The history, politics and jurisprudence of polygamy in the United States is unique. However, the concern for the wellbeing of women and children in domestic relationships is universal. The now much-more-real possibility that individuals will be able to live openly in polygamist relationships presents an opportunity to reassess how participants in all interpersonal relationships are treated. The focus on rights to either privacy or religious free expression creates a need to balance the desires of individuals against the norms of society. However, the history of challenges brought under the religion clauses of the First Amendment demonstrates that unpopular religions are more often forced to bring the legal argument because the mainstream religions are accommodated routinely without the need for judicial intervention. Further, it is often the individuals with little social or political power who have the greatest justification for protection. As an example, to weigh the rights of slave owners to their “property” against the rights of slaves to their freedom seems to miscast the issue in a fundamental manner. It is also of no help to tell women they have rights under the law that 151
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they are unable and/or unwilling to exercise against a husband or religious expectations. Rather than competing rights, I suggest a focus on justice and fairness. Specifically with regard to marriage and polygamy, this would prioritize the well-being of children regardless of their domestic situation. In the United States, far more children live in homes with unmarried or single parents than will ever be brought into polygamous relationships. Some live with a succession of adult caretakers in what has been characterized as “serial monogamy.” Nothing in the social status of their parents creates a situation in which one child is more deserving of care and protection than another. Child abuse or neglect must be targeted just because it is harmful to the growth and development of healthy children, wherever they are found. Any debate about the condition of children in polygamous marriages must extend the concern to all children. By extension, women must be protected for their own sake, as well as that of their children. Domestic violence is unjust whether it occurs between a husband and wife or wives, between wives, or other extended family members. Women who are subjected to physical or emotional abuse are not being treated fairly when compared with their abusers, whoever they may be. An examination of the prevalence of domestic violence in polygamous marriages is likely to find that the same conditions obtain as in monogamous marriages: some are violence-prone and others not. Similarly, some marriages may be contracted with girls who are too young or without their full consent and should be opposed regardless of the number of spouses. I do not argue that polygamy is an unproblematic relationship for women. However, saying that polygamy should be illegal because it may harm women and children misses an important opportunity. If we focus on the specific harms that polygamy is believed to produce, rather than the legal status of the relationship, we can work to alleviate them for women and children in every sort of domestic relationship. References Arrington, L.J., (2004). Great Basin Kingdom: An Economic History of the Latter-Day Saints, 1830-1900. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. Barringer Gordon, S. (2001). The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in NineteenthCentury America. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. Botelho, G. (2014, May 21). State-by-state: A frenzied few months on the same-sex marriage front. CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/21/justice/same-sex-marriage-state-breakdown/index. html Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Bringhurst, N.G. (1986). Brigham Young and the expanding American frontier. Utah History Encyclopedia. Retrieved from http://historytogo.utah.gov/people/brighamyoung.html Bronson v. Swenson, 500 F.3d 1099 (2007). Brown v. Buhman, Utah District Court Case No. 2 :11-cv-0652-CW (2014). Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885). Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Carlisle, N. (2014, August 28). Judge finalizes ‘Sister Wives’ ruling as both sides prepare for appeals. The Salt Lake Tribune. Retrieved from: http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/58344666-78/utah-bigamywaddoups-ruling.html.csp
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DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS official declaration I. The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints. Retrieved from https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/od/1?lang=eng Drakeman, E. Reynolds v. United States: The Historical Construction of Constitutional Reality. Constitutional Commentary, 21(3), 697-726. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Hardy, B.C. (1992). Solemn covenant: The Mormon polygamous passage. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois. Harmer-Dionne, E. (1998) Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction. Stanford Law Review. 50(4), 1295-1347. Kokiasmenos, M. (2004). The Dictates of Conscience: Mormon Polygamy and Conflict with the Federal Government. Georgetown University Law Center. Retrieved from http://www.law.georgetown.edu/ glh/kokiasmenos.htm. Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Lupu, I.C. (1989). Where rights begin: The problem of burdens on the free exercise of religion. Harvard Law Review, 102(5) 933-990. McConnell, M.W., Garvey, J.H., Berg, T.C. (2006). Religion and the Constitution (2nd. Ed.) New York, NY: Aspen Publishers. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 36 7(Va. 2005). Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (NCAD). (2014, September) National Fact Sheet (n.p.) Retrieved from http://www.ncadv.org/files/Domestic%20Violence%20Stylized--GS%20edits.pdf Peralta, E. (2014, August 28). Federal judge strikes down part of Utah’s polygamy ban. NPR. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/08/28/343953743/federal-judge-strikes-down-part-ofutahs-polygamy-ban Polygamy: Latter-day Saints and the Practice of Plural Marriage. (n.d.) Newsroom: The Official Resource for News Media, Opinion Leaders and the Public. Retrieved from http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/ ldsnewsroom/eng/background-information/polygamy-latter-day-saints-and-the-practice-of-pluralmarriage Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845). Restoration of Jesus Christ’s Church (2014). Mormon.org. Retrieved from http://www.mormon.org/beliefs/ restoration Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). Same-sex marriage in the United States. (2014, August 22) CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/ interactive/us/map-same-sex-marriage/ The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). U.S. Census Bureau. (2008). America’s Families and Living Arrangements. Retrieved from http://www.census. gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006.html U.S. Const. amend. I Van Wagoner, R.S. (1989). Mormon Polygamy: A History, 2nd Ed. Salt Lake City: Signature Books. Zaher, C. (2002). When a woman’s marital status determined her legal status: A research guide on the common law doctrine of coverture. Law Library Journal, 94(3), p. 459.
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FAMILY POLICY OF KOREA: FOCUSING ON FRAMEWORK ACT ON HEALTHY FAMILIES AND LONG TERM CARE INSURANCE Prof. Gyounghae Han, Ph.D. Seoul National University, Human Development and Family Studies, Korea
Abstract For many years, Korea has been the family-reliant welfare state where family played a primary role in delivering social welfare services to those in needs assistance. Similarly to other East Asian countries where Confucianism has been the strong value governing society, the family has been considered a main intermediary to achieve social welfare in Korea. However, rapid demographic and socio cultural changes in the early and mid. 2000s increased concern about the stability of Korean family and pressed the government to take a more active role in responding to rising family-related issues in social policy. As a result, Korean government enacted the Framework Act on Healthy Families in 2004, which launched an explicit family policy and created a landmark social policy in Korea. Another important development of welfare program in Korea is the introduction of the LongTerm Care Insurance (LTCI) as a response to rapid population aging of the nation. Long Term Care Insurance bill was passed in April 2007 and implemented from July 2008. Main objective of the LTC was to provide quality care to frail elderly and to ease the burden of families providing elder care. Both Framework Act on Healthy Families and LTC signified the paradigm shift in family policy of Korea. In this paper, first the social and demographic changes led to the development of explicit family policy will be reviewed. Then, the characteristics of Framework Act on Healthy Families and Long Term care Insurance of Korea will be reviewed. Accomplishments and challenges we face with implementing these policies and recommendations for future development will be discussed. Introduction For many years, Korea has been the family-reliant welfare state where family played a primary role in providing support to those in needs of assistance. The concept of “family policy” has not been introduced to Korean political discourse or academic research until the early 2000s. Korean government has provided means tested welfare services to low-income and other needy families since 1961, these services and policies lacked a ‘‘family perspective in policymaking’’ (Bogenschneider,2006). However, rapid demographic and socio cultural changes in the late 1990s and early 2000s increased concern about the stability of Korean family and pushed Korean government to take a more active role in responding to rising family-related issues in social policy. As a result, Korean government enacted the Framework Act on Healthy Families in 2004, which launched an explicit family policy and created a landmark social policy in Korea. The Framework Act on Healthy Families was the first explicit family policy in Korea. 155
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Another important development of welfare program in Korea is the introduction of the Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI). Long Term Care Insurance bill was passed in April 2007 and implemented from July 2008. Main objective of the LTC was to provide quality care to frail elderly and to ease the burden of families providing elder care. Both Framework Act on Healthy Families and Long Term Care Insurance signified the paradigm shift in family policy of Korea in two important aspects: From an implicit family policy to an explicit family policy, from private responsibility for family well-being to government and public responsibility. In this paper, first the social and demographic changes led to the development of explicit family policy will be reviewed shortly. Then, the characteristics of Framework Act on Healthy Families and Long Term Care Insurance will be reviewed. The accomplishment and challenges we faced with implementing these policies and suggestions for further development will be discussed. Social and Demographic Changes in Recent Korea Starting from late 1990s, Korean society witnessed very rapid demographic and socio-cultural changes which continued till mid 2000s. These changes resulted in increased concern about the stability of Korean family and the family’s ability to provide care to the family members. These crucial demographic changes include (a) rapidly decreasing fertility rate, (b) rapid population aging (c) changes in marriage and divorce statistics. The first change of concern was the rapid decrease of fertility rate. Similar to China, Japan, and other Asian countries that have been influenced by Confucianism, Korea traditionally maintained high fertility and large families. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Korean government implemented a strong family planning policy based on the assumption that a high fertility rate could undermine the country’s economic growth. However, it took only a few decades for the birth rate to fall to the world’s lowest level, which urged policymakers to take immediate action to respond to this plummeting birth rate. The total fertility rate (TFR), which was 6.0 in 1960 and 4.53 in 1970, dropped below the replacement rate of 2.1 by 1983. It plummeted to 1.65 in 1995, to 1.47 in 2000, and to 1.08 in 2005, the lowest in the world (The World Bank 2009). A second demographic change of concern is the rapid population aging resulted from lowered birth rate and an increased life expectancy. Life expectancy increased from 61.93 in 1970 to 80 in 2007, and 81.44 in 2012. It has been estimated that the proportion of the population aged 65 and above would reach 14 % of the population by 2017, 20 per cent by 2026, and one-third by 2050 (National Statistical Office,2011). Actually, Korea is considered to be the fastest aging society in the world. With such a rapid aging of the population, there is a growing concern about increasing elderly dependency ratio and care issues of the frail old. While population is aging rapidly, nearly half of the Korean women who traditionally has been the main care provider in the family now participate in the labor force. It means that the availability of family for care decreased dramatically in recent Korea. At the same time, family size has shrunk drastically from 4.5 in 1980 to 2.7 in 2010 with decreasing fertility. Decreased family size also means decreased availability of family to provide care to needy members, especially children and elderly… A third demographic issue in the early to mid-2000s was the dramatic changes in marriage and 156
divorce rates. Korea has maintained a strong norm that has subscribed to nearly universal marriage, and marital stability has been emphasized more than marital quality in most marriages. Thus, the marriage rate remained high and the divorce rate remained low until the late 1990s. However, marriage rate decreased while divorce rated increased starting from the late 1990s. The crude marriage rate (CMR) decreased from 9.2 in 1970 to 6.4 in 2013 Whereas the declining marriage rate has not resulted in a decline in the birth rate in most of the Western countries due to high cohabitation rates, the marriage rate trend in Korea is linked directly to the low birth rate. The crude divorce rate (CDR) increased from 0.4 in 1970 to 1.5 in 1995 and 2.9 by 2004(Korea National Statistical Office, 2005). Upsurge of the divorce rate and rapid declining of marriage were considered to be specifically related to the economic crisis Korea experienced around the year of 1997-1998. The Framework Act on Healthy Families Above mentioned demographic changes in the early to mid 2000s were interpreted as negative signals of family functioning and well-being and also as new social risks that threatened the sustainability of Korean society. Thus, policymakers agreed on the urgency to improve the overall well-being of Korean families. As a result, the Korean National Assembly passed the Framework Act on Healthy Families in 2004. The Act went into effect in January 2005. The Ministry of Gender Equality was then expanded to become the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in 2005. This was the first government department to be exclusively in charge of family policy in Korea. The Framework Act on Healthy Families was the first explicit family policy to signify a crucial change in Korean family policy toward a universal and preventive approach. The purpose of the Framework Act on Healthy Families is to promote social responsibility for building healthy families and communities and to improve the well-being of Korean families. Healthy families are defined as families that not only satisfy family membersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; basic needs, but also provide support for maintaining family membersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; quality of life as a happy citizen. One of the important elements of the Act is to require local governments to provide comprehensive and preventive welfare services to families through Healthy Family Support Centers (HFSCs). Certified Healthy Family Specialists who have expertise in family services deliver various family services at HFSCs. The HFSC system has three-tier structure: 1) The Headquarter of HFSCs manages and supports provinces and local HFSCs across the nation. The Headquarter provides the operational guidelines to ensure that local centers uphold similar service quality standards across the nation. In order to maintain service quality, the Headquarter evaluates local HFSCs every 3 years. The Headquarter also provides professional development programs for staff of HFSCs. 2) Province HFSCs develop programs reflecting regional characteristics of Province and needs specific to the area in order to respond to the unique needs of residents in different provinces. Province HFSCs function as a bridge linking the Headquarters to local HFSCs. It also helps manage and evaluate local HFSCs that are under their administrative districts. 3) Local HFSCs provide direct and customized services for families in the community in six areas: (a) Family life education: Family life education program is aimed to improve the quality 157
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of family life and prevent family relationship conflicts. The programs include life span specific programs (i.e., families with young children, families in later life) and theme specific programs (i.e., fatherhood program, couple communication, etc.). (b) Family counseling: In terms of family counseling, local HFSCs provide on-site, or on-line counseling services for family problems at no cost or at very low cost. Local HFSCs also provide counseling and mediation for divorcing couples. Since recent changes in Korean divorce law strongly encourage couples to engage in counseling before they file a divorce, centers offer family counseling to divorcing couples in alliance with family courts. (c) Family-friendly community building programs : Promoting family-friendly culture and building a family friendly community is one of the core missions of local HFSCs. For that purpose, local HFSCs provide family volunteer programs, and self-supporting neighborhood programs for community residents. These programs help families spend time with other families in the community. (d) Complementary child care service: The majority of local HFSCs provide babysitters to families at a low or no cost, after-school programs, and complementary or temporary child care services during school holidays or other no-class days. Local centers also provide support for low-income families with disabled children. (e) Emergency support for vulnerable families : Local HFSCs have emergency support for vulnerable families, such as single-parent families, remarried families, grandparent headed families and teen parents. Centers provide case management services including family life education, counseling, or various supportive services to strengthen these familiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; coping abilities. (f) Community net-working : Local HFSCs build partnerships with community organizations, schools, and local administrations in order to respond to the unique needs of communities more effectively. There has been a steady increase in the number of people who have received services offered by HFSCs in the past 10 years. According to the Headquarters of Healthy Family Support Centers (2010), the number of people who received HFSCs services grew 8.1 times between 2005 and 2009. In 2013, total of 1,900,000 people received HFSCs services. It is 25.7% increase compared to the previous year. In 2009, 32.3% of the center users participated in family life education programs, 21.5% benefited from emergency support services for vulnerable families, 20.7% participated in familyfriendly community building programs,16.8% received family counseling, and 8.6% benefited from complementary child care services. Long Term Care Insurance Respecting and caring for elders has been one of the most important values in Confucianism. Even with rapid socio-cultural changes, it has been said that Confucianism still remains as rather strong value and ethic governing everyday lives of Korean people and society as a whole. Accordingly, filial Piety and strong patriarchal family system have been the back bone of the family care and informal support for the elders in Korea until recently. The government provided public assistance only to those who do not have any family or care-givers among family members. However, Korean government finally accept the fact that with socio-cultural and demographic changes occurring in Korea, family can no longer be the sole care and service provider to the elderly members. The LTCI enactment meant that the Korean government began to take active role to provide care services for fragile older people. Ministry of Health and Public Health took initiative developing detailed LTC plan. In order to be eligible for the LTCI benefit, the insured person requests a care-needs assessment to 158
the National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC). Based on the assessment results, care needs are classified into one of six grades: From first grade, very urgent, to sixth, near to normal functioning. Those who belong to the grade from one to three are entitled to the LTCI benefit. As of 2013, more than 378,000 people(about 6.1% of older people) were entitled to receive benefits. There are three major types of LTCI benefits: Institutional care, home care and cash benefits. Institutional care services provide a set of long-term nursing care and rehabilitation services. Homecare services include visiting nursing care, visiting bath and shower services, day and night care, shortterm care. It is possible to choose between institutional and home-care services if one is eligible for LTCI benefits. The proportion of recipients receiving home-care services slightly decreased from 65.9 % in 2011, to 62.8 % in 2012 and 2013. whereas the proportion of recipients receiving institutional care has slightly increased from 34.1% in 2009 to 37.2% in 2013. This change partly reflects the increased acceptance of institutional care for the frail elderly among Korean people and society. LTCI has cash benefits in a very restricted way such that it is allowed only when formal services are not available in the community. The proportion of cash benefits recipients was only 0.4% in 2009. The monthly payment to an informal family care-giver is 150,000 Korean won (about US $150) and 766,000 Korean won (about US $ 766.) to a qualified non-family care-giver. There has been a lot of debates about the pros and cons of cash benefits. Cash provides greater freedom and choice to recipients, but ultimately it tends to perpetuate the role of families, in particular , role of women in long term care of the elderly by compensating care-givers for their informal care (Lee,2008). While the cash benefit to informal family care-givers is still highly limited, there are an increasing number of family members who have been qualified as a formal care-giver after taking short training courses that the government designed. After obtaining the care-giver qualification, they take care of their own family member who needs care. The proportion of recipients taken care of by their coresiding family member with a care-giver qualification markedly increased from 1.6% in 2008 to 38.4% in 2012(NHIC,2012). If recipients cared for by a non-resident qualified family care-giver are included, the proportion is estimated to be around 49%(NHIC 2011)). This increase reflects the fact Korean elders with care needs prefer to be taken care of by their family members. However, Ministry of Health and Welfare also spotted some fraud cases where family care-givers received the payment without providing care. As a result, the government attempted to reduce the level of the payment for family caregivers, but much concern has been raised since it could negatively affect many family care-givers who actually provide care for their family members. Conclusion As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the Framework Act on Healthy Families and Long Term Care Insurance reflect a paradigm shift in family policy in Korea. The new paradigm has held that family policy should be viewed as a social right. The new paradigm has also focused on social responsibility for family well-being instead of individual family responsibility. It might be too early to tell whether the Framework Act on Healthy Families and Long Term Care Insurance have successfully landed in Korean society. However, it seems safe to say that both policies began to make a difference in the lives of Korean families even within rather short period after their establishment. In spite of the positive changes in family policy in Korea, there are still significant challenges ahead for Korean family policy. First of all, while demands for services rather rapidly increasing , 159
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government funding has grown only slowly. Demand for services often exceeds the service capacity of local centers. Maintaining the quality of service is another challenge. From the experience of implementing these policies, we have learned that family policy should aim at making cultural changes along with institutional changes. Although there is a growing consensus on encouraging a high quality family life, gender and generational differences still exist. It would be critical to promote gender equality in private sectors such as workplaces and communities, so that men can involve more in family life, particularly in care work for the family members. Due to its short history of explicit family policies, , implementation strategies, and evaluation plans for each policy have not yet been fully developed in Korea. In this regards, I would like to emphasize the role of academia in developing sustainable strategies and expanding family policy in Korea. Many Korean scholars have been actively communicating with various audiences including policymakers and participating in the policymaking process. However, there is still room for more rigorous scientific action with regards to policy evaluation. Also, in order to strengthen Korean family policy, Korean researchers need to communicate more effectively with researchers of international communities of family policy.
References Bogenschneider, K. (2006). Family policy matters: How policymaking affects families and what professionals can do (2nd ed.).Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Headquarters of Healthy Family Support Centers. (2010). Annual report on Healthy Family Support Center.(In Korean) Headquarters of Healthy Family Support Centers. (2011). Operational guidelines.(In Korean) Lee, M.(2008).Issues of the long-term care insurance and policy agenda. Welfare Trends, 11-38-46(Korean) Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family(2009). One year long term care Insurance for the elderly. Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family, Seoul. (In Korean) National Health Insurance Corporation (2010). Future strategies for better health security. NHIC, Seoul. (In Korean) National Statistical Office(2013). Statistics for the elderly. National Statistical Office. Seoul. (In Korean) The World Bank. (2009). World Development Indicators
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FAMILY FORMATION CRISIS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN Prof. Yuko Ogasawara
Nihon University, College of Economics, Japan
Abstract This paper examines why young people are finding it increasingly difficult to form families in contemporary Japan. About one in three men and one in five women who are currently thirty-years old are expected to remain single throughout their lives and produce no off spring. The grave situation of the “childless and aging” society has led to the invention of various new phrases, including “parasite singles”, “herbivore men”, “furītā” and “nīto”, to describe youth who do not marry. The motivations, attitudes, and values of young Japanese people have often been called in question by referring to them by such names. In contrast to the opinions that hold individual persons responsible, this paper finds inconsistency at the systemic level. Namely, Japanese youths today are encouraged to design their own life course by making deliberate choices concerning work and intimate relationships, but on the other hand, the Japanese welfare system relies heavily on the notion that the family should take care of its members’ sustenance and well-being. Moreover, the “standard family” consisting of a breadwinning father, stay-at-home mother, and children is given advantageous treatment. Young people are torn between the two contradictory forces that ask at once for diversity and uniformity in family forms. The paper argues that shifting responsibility from the society onto individual persons has made it difficult for public policies to intervene effectively in the current family formation crisis. Keywords: family formation, late marriage, never-married rate, parasite singles Introduction Japanese families are in crisis. The root causes of the problem stem not within the family but outside of it. In the past, the relationship between a mother-in-law and her daughter in-law was, for example, a typical motif in family life repeatedly taken up in novels and TV dramas. While such tense relationship within the family undoubtedly continues to exist, the current dilemma centers on the difficulty of forming familial relationships in the first place. More and more Japanese people are not getting married. In 2010, approximately 20 percent of men and 11 percent of women aged fifty were never married. The never-married rate is expected to rise even further so that among those born in 1985, slightly less than a third of men and almost one fifth of women are predicted to remain single for life. The inability of individuals to form a family has serious effects on the Japanese society, the foremost of which is found in the phrase “childless and aging” society. In this paper, I will examine the reasons why the family formation crisis in contemporary Japan remains unresolved despite its seriousness and the mounting pressure to find remedies. I argue that researchers and social critics, rather than analyzing systemic and societal factors leading to the crisis, have largely tended to view the decision to remain single as a matter of personal choice and responsibility. This has made it difficult for public policies to intervene effectively. 162
In the following section, I begin by analyzing family formation in post-war Japan and by highlighting the radical changes taking place in recent years. Then I discuss the seriousness of the problems caused by those changes. Next, I examine three discourses explaining the increasing absence of marriage by taking note of poplar phrases used to describe youth in Japan. They are “parasite singles”, “herbivore men”, “furītā” and “nīto”. By referring to young people with such phrases, the public shifts the responsibility onto individual persons for their inability to form a family. Here I argue that one of the effects of such discourse has been a neglect of systemic aspects of the family formation crisis, and conclude that that disregard has had grave consequences for the society. Changes in Family Formation Increase in Lifetime Never Marriage For almost forty years from around 1950s to 1980s, Japan was an “everyone-gets-married” society. The overwhelming majority of people got married, and those who didn’t constituted less than 5 percent of the population. Marriage was considered an important element of coming of age. A fully mature adult was expected to get married. In addition, there was a schedule as to when to achieve the marriage union, since a notion of marriageable age existed, particularly for women. Women were likened to “Christmas cakes,” implying that they were popular among men and could “sell” well until age 25, but not later.1 However, the situation has been changing rapidly in recent decades. The first change noted was the postponement of marriage. In 1950 Japanese men on average married for the first time at age 26 and women at age 23. In 2010, men were marrying at the average age of 31 and women at age 29, which means that in the span of sixty years, on average, men became 5 years older and women 6 years older at their first marriage. Thus, bankonka (the tendency for late marriage) quickly became a popular phrase. That the young are increasingly delaying marriage becomes especially apparent when we compare the proportion of men and women never married in 1970 and 2010. While more than half of men in their late twenties were married in 1970, more than 70 percent were never married in 2010. Similarly, almost 80 percent of women in their late twenties were married in 1970. In contrast, almost 60 percent remained unmarried in 2010. A sharp rise in never-married rate is also observed for men and women in their early thirties. While only about 10 percent of men in their early thirties had no experience of marriage in 1970, almost half of them remained single in 2010. Less than 10 percent of women in their early thirties were not married in 1970, but approximately one in three were still single in 2010. Gradually, it has become clear that young Japanese are not only postponing marriage but are not getting married at all. Lifetime never-married rate, estimated from never-married rate for those at age 50, has been increasing steeply, particularly for men. Since 1980, it has increased sevenfold for men and doubled for women, reaching 20.14 percent and 10.61 percent respectively in 2010. The number of Japanese people who remain single throughout their lives is expected to grow still more in the future. According to an estimation by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, in 2035, approximately 30 percent of men and 20 percent of women will remain single throughout their lives. In addition, because the divorce rate is also on the rise, some critics predict that about half of the population born in 1990 will be single at age 50, due to either never marriage 163
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or separation (Miura 2012). Western researchers might be unalarmed by the trends observed in Japan, insisting that legal marriage is also on the decline in their countries and that civil union is increasingly replacing it. However, forming a partnership without legally getting married is decidedly unpopular in Japan. In 2010, less than 2 percent of men and women between the ages of 18 and 34 were living with a partner while remaining legally single. In sum, an alarmingly large number of youths in contemporary Japan are not forming a partnership, either legally or illegally. Consequences of Lifetime without Marriage The consequences of having such a huge proportion of population that has never married or lived with a partner are becoming increasingly visible in Japan. First and foremost, children are not being born. Up until the mid 1970s, the total fertility rate (TFR) generally remained at the population replacement level of more than 2. However, it steadily declined thereafter. In 1990, when the fertility rate for the previous year hit the low of 1.57, Japanese press started talking about the â&#x20AC;&#x153;1.57 shock.â&#x20AC;? The reason why this was a shock was that this TFR level was even lower than that in 1966, a hinoeuma year (year of the firehorse). According to a common superstition, women born in the year of firehorse tend to kill their husbands, which in 1966 led many Japanese couples to refrain from having children. With the introduction of the Angel Plan in 1994, the Japanese government belatedly began taking measures against low fertility. These new policies mainly consisted of providing public daycare services and encouraging work-life balance through the establishment of a childcare leave system and the introduction of shorter working hours for working parents. Despite these efforts, the total fertility rate continued to decline even after the 1.57 shock. It hit the historical low of 1.26 in 2005, and while the most recent rate is somewhat higher--1.43 in 2013--, it is still far below what is necessary to stop the population from decreasing. In 2013, the total population in Japan was 127 million, and the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research estimates that, if the total fertility rate continues to hover around 1.35, the Japanese population will decrease to about two-thirds of its current size in 2060 and further shrink to just one-third in 2110. Childlessness is accompanied by population aging. Already in 2013, Japan became a super-aged society with more than a quarter of the population over age 65. Assuming the birthrate stays at the 1.35 level, those over age 65 are expected to further swell, accounting for as much as 40 percent of the total population in 2060. The huge and rising proportion of the elderly has caused much concern and debate in Japan about the ill effects of population aging on labor supply and productivity, the sustainability of social security systems, and citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; well-being in general. For example, from late 1960s to early 2000s, the dependency ratio was less than 50 percent, implying that roughly two workers supported one person of non-productive age. In 2060, however, the dependency ratio is estimated to rise to 96 percent, which means that Japan will face a difficult economic situation in which each person of non-productive age will be supported by only one worker. A private group of researchers recently made public an outlook on the future of municipalities in Japan. According to their report, even on the assumption that the fertility will somewhat recover, about half of the 1,800 municipalities in Japan are in danger of disappearing by 2040, because the population of young females between the ages of 20 to 39 is expected to more than halve in those 164
towns and villages. In 2010 when the Japan Broadcasting Corporation televised a program by the title of “Muen Shakai” (the Disconnected Society), the phrase “lonely death” (kodokushi), unheard of until then, spread quickly. It was pointed out that approximately 32,000 people died each year without anyone attending their deathbeds. Indeed, more Japanese people are living alone now than never before. The proportion of families consisting of a father, mother, and child(ren) hit the peak in 1975, accounting for as many as 42.5 percent of all households. However, thereafter it steadily decreased, falling to 27.9 percent in 2010. In the same year, for the first time in Japanese history, the number of one-person households exceeded the number of families with parents and child(ren). Today, in almost one in three households, people live alone.2 Explanations for Late and No Marriage Parasite Singles In 1999, sociologist Yamada Masahiro published The Age of Parasite Singles which became an instant bestseller. By calling single persons who continue to live with their parents even after graduation from school “parasite singles,” he drew the public’s attention to the growing tendency among Japanese adult children to avoid taking financial and household responsibilities and to continue depending on their fathers’ wages and mothers’ housework and care. Partly emboldened by the bubble economy of the time, these young salaried men and women were reported to lead rich lives while being single. Because many of them did not have to bear the basic costs of living, they could afford to spend a large portion of their paychecks on travelling abroad, on luxury consumer items, and frequent dinners in expensive restaurants. Yamada argued that young Japanese men and women hesitated to give up their carefree life as singles and assume the burden of setting up households of their own. Comparing easygoing single life with possible hardships in marriage, it was, in his opinion, to some extent rational for them to put off matrimony and parenthood. The “parasite singles” argument helped attribute the cause of the fertility decline to the carefree lifestyle of single men and women. It promoted the view that the youth refused to grow up and assume adult responsibilities. The young people in Japan, therefore, were spoilt and undeserving of public support. In response to this, Schoppa (2006) asserts that Yamada’s theory did damage to the consensus gradually being built at that time among government officials that in order to stop the fertility decline it was necessary to spend a large amount of money on daycare services and childcare leave. Similarly, Newman (2012) attempts to find out why young adults in developed countries around the world are increasingly reluctant to leave their parents’ home. She compares the prolonged dependence of adult children on their parents in six countries including Japan, and finds that the notable feature of Japanese “accordion families” is that the responsibility to take a different pathway to adulthood from what is normally expected is placed on the individuals. Japanese interviewees frequently insisted that a person should be able to master his or her own fate no matter what the surrounding circumstances were. Where Newman differs from Yamada, however, is her assessment that in case of “parasite singles” the fault does not generally lie with them, but, rather, with the father who is usually absent from home and the mother who is too obliging. Her analysis emphasizes the role of the overly indulgent Japanese parents who get in the way of their children’s independence. 165
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Yamada (2007) provides a more sober view of “parasite singles” after the burst of the bubble economy. “Parasite singles” are getting older and so are their parents who may have retired from work. Indeed, he later notes that the rapidly increasing single-mother households in Japan consist of aged mothers whose husbands have passed away and their middle-aged single children (2013). Some middle-aged “parasite singles” are found to be dependent on their parents’ pension money.3 In some cases, the dependency runs the other way around, with aged parents being nursed by their once parasitic children. While Yamada avoids explicit criticism, in his work it is hinted that parasite singles are now forced to pay the price of their youthful willfulness as they are called to take care of their frail parents. According to the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, the proportion of young single people living with their parents has not changed much over the last several decades. Approximately 70 percent of single men age 18 to 34 lived with their parents for the past 30 years. Similarly, 80 percent of single women of the same age range lived in their parents’ home for the past 20 years. Matsuda (2013) argues that because residential patterns have not changed much despite a large increase in the number of people never married, some other factors beside the self-centered values and carefree lifestyle of “parasite singles” must be driving the never-marriage rate up. Herbivore Men The phrase “herbivore men” first appeared in an online column in 2006. In 2008, a woman’s magazine published a special issue on “herbivore men” which attracted considerable attention. In the same year two books Love Science of Herbivore Men written by philosopher Morioka Masahiro, and “Madomoiselle” Herbivore Men Will Change Japan by writer Ushikubo Megumi were published and became bestsellers. The phrase was ranked one of the top ten keywords of the year for 2009. However, the definition of the word differs somewhat by the user. For example, Ushikubo (2008) defines “herbivore men” as those who do not take the initiative in love affairs and do not have strong sexual desires. Morioka (2008) uses it to refer to gentle men of the new generation who do not actively seek sexual partners but instead prefer to “graze in the pasture” side by side with them. Although initially “herbivore men” were viewed positively as persons who are not bound by the traditional gender relationship, gradually the word has come to denote young men who are not only shy when it comes to dating women but are also generally dispirited and sluggish in all matters of life. In extreme cases, some of these men were said, figuratively, to be “fasting”, since they seemed no longer to have interest in real, living women but only in virtual female figures appearing on the internet. It was pointed out that these men were protecting their fragile, glassware-like hearts from being broken by avoiding relationships with living women. Economic Hardship It is by now a common knowledge among the Japanese public that the likelihood of men getting married depends on their wage. Annual income of 3 million yen seems to be the dividing line. According to the Cabinet Office, only about 8 percent of men in their twenties and thirties whose annual income was less than 3 million yen were married in 2010, whereas the rate of marriage ranged from 25 to 40 percent for those with income of over 3 million yen (See table 1). The same survey also found that 27.5 percent of men holding fulltime, regular jobs were married, as opposed to just 4.7 percent 166
of men in non-regular employment. This is not good news for young men who wish to get married, because it is becoming increasingly difficult for young people to find fulltime work with decent pay. Globalization has drastically changed working conditions across the world, and this has had a particularly strong impact on young people. Throughout the world, young workers are struggling to find a well paid job, reasonably stable employment conditions and respectful treatment by employees. Japan is not an exception. The debates about youth employment in Japan, however, acquired a distinctive new character when novel phrases such as “furītā” and “nīto,” came to be used, often derisively, to describe young people in precarious economic situation. “Furītā”, a compound of English and German words “free arbeiter”, first appeared in the late 1980s in a job-placement journal dedicated exclusively to part-time work. The word referred to young people who had not obtained a permanent position upon graduation from school and instead took a parttime job. Because what was regarded as the standard and normal pathway for men was a move from school to full-time, permanent employment without an interval in between, what “furītā” were doing caused deep concern and even horror among the Japanese public. While the initial intention behind the usage of this term may have been to emphasize the positive aspect of the new youth lifestyle, free from organizational imperatives and faithful to one’s values and dreams, “furītā” quickly came to denote a young irresponsible person who refused serious work and continued to enjoy an easy life of a student even after graduation from school. “Nīto” is a Japanese word for NEET, a shorthand expression for someone “not in education, employment, or training.” The word began to appear in research reports in 2003 and spread quickly after a newspaper article entitled “ Nīto, the Youth Who Do Not Work Increased 1.6 Times in Past 10 Years: Without Motivation to Work and ‘Parasitic’ on Their Parents” (May 17, 2004 Sankei Shinbun) came out. From the beginning, discussions about “nīto” questioned young persons’ motivations and attitudes toward life and contained expressions of suspicion that there was something wrong with families with “nīto,” as well as concern that these problem youths were increasing in numbers and becoming a burden to the society. Contrary to such a view, Honda et al. (2006) argued that the majority of “nīto” were healthy young people who only temporarily were not seeking employment for various reasons. Furthermore, they pointed out that the number of “nīto” was not rising as rapidly as thought and certainly not as fast as the number of “furītā.” As the analysis of the phrases “furītā” and “nīto” suggests, economic hardships of the youth in Japan have often been attributed to their own fault. They themselves asked for the predicament they were in because they chose to evade hard work. However, sometimes it is not only the motivation of young people that is regarded with suspicion but also their ability to work. Singling out the perceived inability of young people to contribute to the society through sustained hard work is similar to expressing doubts about their motivation, however, in that it emphasizes the responsibility of the worker for his or her fate and does not question the structure of the labor market. According to this view, if an employee feels capable of accomplishing a task, this confidence will boost his or her motivation and strengthen the will to work hard. However, if an employee feels incapable or incompetent, whatever discontent he or she may have with the workplace and management will be held back. In either case, the full responsibility for the difficulties in obtaining a stable job and working is shifted onto the workers themselves, while labor demand and employers are spared from scrutiny. Thus, it took more time than was necessary for the Japanese public to begin discussing 167
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“furītā” and “nīto” less as a product of personal work ethics and lifestyle and more in association with global economic problems. Even today after much talk about how companies have come to limit the recruitment of young people to fulltime positions, non-regular workers continue to be looked down upon as those who deviate from the social norm. Although the labor market requires a certain amount of irregular employment, the society still tends to penalize those who actually partake in such employment. The contradiction is played out on individual workers as they are somehow expected to come to terms with it and continue to function as a peg in the wheel of the labor force and the economic system. Ironically, their individual efforts to skillfully manage and uphold hope for the future in such despairing conditions contribute to the sustenance of the system.4 In this section we have examined the tendency of the Japanese public to consider not having the experience of marriage as a personal problem. Young people’s motivations and attitudes toward marriage have been questioned in the arguments of “parasite singles” and “herbivorous boys.” Even when their economic means to get married were suspected to be insufficient, the public was generally reluctant to hold the labor market accountable for the difficulties they face. In the next section, I argue that such a view unfairly attributes responsibility to individual men and women by neglecting societal causes for the rise of the proportion of never married. Systemic Factors Diversity in Families Many researchers have discussed changes occurring in Japanese families in terms of individualization (Meguro 1987; Nonoyama 1992; Yamada 2004). The argument goes that people’s lives are nowadays less restricted by tradition and custom and more controlled by individual decisions. As we have seen, one of the consequences of such individualization processes was the gradual disappearance of the notion of marriageable age. There is no longer a proper age at which to get married and individuals are now free to get married at whichever age they like, or for that matter, not get married at all. Beck-Gernsheim (2002) has argued that because of the relaxation of social norms and greater individualization and self-reflexivity, people have come to regard life as a planning project and to write their own “personal biographies.” People today make more deliberate choices about whether to live together, get married, have children, how many to have, and how to combine work and family. As a result, they feel more responsible for the outcomes of the choices they have made. Okubo (2009) similarly maintains that life stories are getting increasingly personal in contemporary Japan. According to Okubo, life stories in the past tended to have fixed formulas either as a story of success in the realm of work, or a story of happiness in the realm of family. However, in recent years stories of happiness are becoming increasingly independent from family life, just as stories of success are becoming separate from work. Because there is no longer a predetermined, universally accepted pathway, people are writing their own stories. That is, a set pattern for success and happiness has disappeared from people’s personal stories. Life is now more of an individual planning project and young people, therefore, must search for a 168
marriage partner on their own. This was not the case in the past when the majority of marriages were arranged by go-betweens. When a person reached marriageable age, his or her relatives, neighbors, or superiors at work would typically step in to introduce what was perceived as a suitable partner. In an arranged marriage, the emphasis was placed more on matching qualifications of the partners, including the family background, and less on having common values and lifestyles. Young people were often expected to decide whether to marry or not after seeing each other only several times. However, the situation has changed drastically in recent decades. The arranged marriage is decidedly on the decline and the so-called love marriage has taken over. If relatives, neighbors, or bosses today try to introduce a marriage partner, they run the risk of being criticized as being overly intrusive. Young people are now left on their own to find a suitable partner. This has brought about konkatsu. Konkatsu is an abbreviation for kekkon katsudō (marriage hunting), just as shūkatsu is a shorthand term for shūshoku katsudō (job hunting). When job hunting, students typically collect information on firms and industries, attend various seminars, study for employment exams, write resumes, and practice and prepare for interviews. Now more parallels are perceived between job hunting and marriage hunting in the sense that, similar to job hunting, preparatory activities are seen as a necessity and a choice between multiple suitors exits. More and more people participate in parties and arranged meetings and attended various seminars for polishing one’s etiquette and appearance with the aim to land a good marriage partner. The phrase konkatsu suggests that marriage is no longer achieved in a single day but requires prolonged effort and work. In order to make marriage happen, some Japanese people register in match-making firms and actively search for a partner. Services provided by firms that offer marriage-counseling and information on prospective partners range from data matching and online search to sponsoring parties, arranging meetings, and holding various seminars. The seminars are different from other services in that participating in them is not expected to lead directly to finding a partner. Rather, they are held to help participants improve the impression they make on the opposite sex and thereby increase the possibility of attracting a partner. From a match-making firm’s point of view, clients are what is sold, and they hope that seminars can improve the quality of their goods. While services provided by contemporary match-making firms and traditional arranged marriages may seem similar, there is an important difference. Even if they are introduced to their future partner through match-making, today’s youth seldom agree to marry someone only on the basis of the potential partner’s background as some of their parents did. Even if acquainted through a match-making firm, they nonetheless desire a love component in their marriage. Therefore, after the introduction, in order to create an opportunity for falling in love, they typically date many times before they reach the decision to get married. A manager of a match-making firm I interviewed complained that nowadays it took more time for a couple to agree to marry than before. The lengthening of the time necessary to come to the decision was a concern for the manager, since his firm receives a part of the payment only after dating couples get engaged. Tanimoto (2008) similarly argues that while love in contemporary Japan does not necessarily lead to marriage, marriage is considered as something that should come as a result of love. According to Tanimoto, during 1990s and 2000s, Japanese people became less and less concerned with the outcome of falling in love and more interested in the very process of being in love. Regardless of whether their love ends in marriage or parting, Japanese people nowadays seek to obtain as much 169
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joy out of love as possible while being engaged in a romantic relationship. In this sense, the romantic love ideology no longer has the power to eliminate love that is not “serious,” or, in other words, no longer possesses the authority to pass judgment on a couple’s relationship by discriminating between “good” love that ends in marriage and “bad” love that does not. However, equally important is the fact that people still insisted on getting married out of love. Tanimoto is of the opinion that making the final decision about the outcome of love is often postponed, not because the resolution to marry has become less important but, on contrary, because its significance is now larger than ever before. Indeed, according to the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, the period of time couples spend dating before getting married is being extended. In 1987, it took couples an average of 2.5 years to get married, while in 2010, it took 4.3 years. Based on her survey on konkatsu, Nirasawa (2013) states that there is one thing in common among Japanese women who make the decision to get married: they all have a strong desire to have children. The wish to become a mother is the reason why many women begin konkatsu in the first place. Older women in particular need a reason over and above the simple desire to marry in order to actually reach the decision to get married. Although some of the explanations that women who participated in the survey gave for agreeing to marry were to please their parents and to secure their livelihood, the most often cited reason for marriage was the desire to become a mother. This implies that these women regard the step from singlehood to marriage as a pathway to motherhood. The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research reports that among the newly wed couples, one in five mentioned pregnancy as the immediate event that led them to marry. Marriage following a pregnancy is called dekichatta-kon in Japan (marriage upon conception), which is freely translated as “shotgun wedding” in English. The number of dekichatta-kon has increased over the last thirty years. According to the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, it accounted for only, approximately, one in ten first births in 1980 but reached a quarter in 2009.5 The analysis so far indicates that Japanese youth are generally hesitant to get married and postpone making the decision unless there is a compelling reason such as pregnancy. This is understandable, since they can no longer rely on social norms and customs to lead their way but are increasingly on their own to curve out their lives. If they choose a wrong marriage partner, it is nobody’s fault but theirs. Thus, many Japanese have become cautious in making life-influencing decisions such as marriage. However, as Beck-Gernsheim (2002) suggests, the fact that contemporary youth must take responsibility for their life is not limited to Japan. Young people in many developed countries face similar situations. Where Japan differs is that its welfare regime is heavily dependent on families. Uniformity in Families Japanese people cannot expect government to offer extensive welfare services as in Scandinavian countries and they cannot purchase various services in the market as in Anglo-Saxon countries. It is primarily families that meet people’s requirements for sustenance and well-being. One of the problems is that the family, as the unit of welfare provision, is defined narrowly. The so-called “standard family” consisting of a breadwinning father, stay-at-home mother (or mother working part-time), and children seems to be considered legitimate and ideal by the authorities, while any other form of family is regarded as inferior. Thus, the standard family receives advantageous tax and social security benefits. Many researchers have criticized the policies that give preferential treatment to stay-at-home wives 170
as out-of-date, but the government has so far been slow to make any changes. The priority that the government gives to the “standard family” in social protection over other forms can be seen, for example, in comparison with single mother households. The majority of single mothers receive a small amount of child rearing allowance and are in great difficulty. Approximately half of single-mother households fall below the relative poverty line in Japan despite the fact that most of the mothers are working. Widowed single-mothers are an exception, however, because they are entitled to a survivor’s pension. The differential treatment of single mothers is legitimized by the reasoning that while a woman becomes a widow involuntarily, she becomes a divorcee of her own free will. Divorced single-mothers are thus in effect penalized for having deviated from the standardfamily norm by choice. It is clear that the persistence on the standard-family norm is incompatible with the increasing emphasis that is placed on people’s free will and choice in designing their life course. The former calls for uniformity in family forms while the latter encourages diversity.6 The Japanese youth are asked to satisfy at the same time the contradictory requirements of forming a uniform standard family and expressing individuality in marriage. I argue that the difficulty of the task, brought about by societal factors, results in their decision to postpone marrying or not to get married at all. However, many discussions on late and no marriage in Japan have been overly concerned with young people’s attitudes, motivations, and values, which is reflected in the popularity of terms such as “parasite singles,” “herbivore men,” “furītā” and “nīto”. In my view, the continuous attempts to find fault with young people and the disregard for the systemic causes of late and no marriage are, partly, to blame for the inability of the society to take effective action against the family formation crisis in Japan. References Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). Reinventing the family : In search of new lifestyles. Cambridge : Polity Press. Brinton, M.C. (1992). Christmas cakes and wedding cakes : The social organization of Japanese women’s life course. In T. S. Lebra (Ed.), Japanese social organization (pp. 79-107). Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press. Fujimori, K. (2010). Tanshin kyūzō shakai no shōgeki. Tokyo : Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha. Honda, Y, Naito, A., & Goto, K. (2006). “Nīto” tte yūna! Tokyo : Kōbunsha. Kawai, K. (2009). Daitoshi no hitori gurashi kōreisha to shakaiteki koritsu. Kyoto : Hōritsu Bunkasha. Kubota, H. (2009). “Kazoku no tayōka” ron saikō. Kazoku Shakaigaku Kenkyū, 21(1), 78-90. Masuda, H. (2012). Jakunen hiseiki koyō rōdōsha to kibō. Shakaigaku Hyōron, 68(1), 87-104. Matsuda, S. (2013). Shōshika ron. Tokyo : Keisō Shobō. Meguro. Y. (1987). Kojinka suru kazoku. Tokyo : Keisō Shobō. Miura, A. (2012). Tsuma to wakaretai otoko tachi. Tokyo : Shūeisha. Morioka, M. (2008). Sōshokukei danshi no rennai gaku. Tokyo : Media Factory. Newman, K.S. (2012). The accordion family : Boomerang kids, anxious parents, and the private toll of global competition. Boston : Beacon Press. Nirasawa, A. (2013). Konkatsu nanmin. Tokyo : Kōbunsha. 171
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Nonoyama, H. (Ed.). (1992). Kazoku fukushi no shiten. Kyoto : Mineruva Shobō. Okubo, T. (2009). Raifu sutōrī no bunseki. Tokyo : Gakubunsha. Schoppa, L.J. (2006). Race for the exits : The unraveling of Japanese’s system of social protection. Ithaca and London : Cornell University Press. Tanimoto, N. (2008). Rennai no shakaigaku. Tokyo : Seikyūsha. Ueno, C. (2013). Onna tachi no sabaibaru sakusen. Tokyo : Bungei Shunjū. Ushikubo M. (2008). Sōshokukei danshi “ojōman”ga nihon o kaeru. Tokyo : Kōdansha. Yamada, M. (1999). Parasito shinguru no jidai. Tokyo : Chikuma Shoten. Yamada, M. (2004). Kazoku no kojinka. Shakaigaku Hyōron, 54(4), 341-354. Yamada, M. (2007). Shōshi shakai nihon. Tokyo : Iwanai Shoten. Yamada, M. (2013), Naze nihon wa wakamono ni reikoku nanoka. Tokyo : Tōyō Keizai Shinpō Sha.
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Footnotes Mary Brinton (1992) discusses the metaphor of a Christmas cake for Japanese women who married “on schedule” during the period 1950-1980. 1
For discussion on muen shakai, see Fujimori (2010). Kawai (2009) provides a detailed analysis of the plight of an isolated life in old age. 2
See Ueno (2013) for a discussion on economic violence in which adult children prey on their parents’ pension. Recently several cases have been reported in a succession in which the missing elderly have been found dead and their deaths had been concealed by their off spring in order for them to continue receiving the elderly parent’s pension. 3
See Masuda (2012) for an analysis of how non-regular workers struggle to accept their inferior working conditions. 4
5
Partly due to discrimination, the number of children born out of wedlock is small in
Japan. Only about 2 percent of all children in Japan were born outside marriage in 2009. See Kubota (2009) for a similar discussion on the inconsistency observed between the family created based on the choice for intimate relationships and the family created without such a choice, purely for the purpose of securing sustenance. 6
Table 1 Proportion Of Married Men by Age and Income Annual Income
Men in Their Twenties
Less than 3 Million Yen
8.7
Men in Their Thirties 9.3
3 ~ 3.99 Million Yen
25.7
26.5
4 ~ 4.99 Million Yen
36.5
29.4
5 ~ 5.99 Million Yen
39.2
35.3
6 Million and Over
29.7
37.6
Total
18.9
23.3
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THAILAND’S COMMUNITY BABY-SITTING SYSTEM WITH POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY APPROACH (LIFE ASSETS) STRENGTHEN THE POSITIVE PARENTING IN FAMILY Assoc. Prof. Dr. Suriyadeo Tripathi National Institute for Child and Family Development, Mahidol University
Abstract In the old days, Thai society was metaphorically like a big warm home that all kids could rely on. But the global society in the era of globalization is experiencing rapid technological changes that are causing social immune deficiency especially in child and youth which could bring them turbulence and risky conducts. Community plays a vital role in the personal development of children and adolescents. An understanding and supportive community helps create stronger bonds between young people and their families and peers. In summary, a strong community results in improved health and well-being for all of its members, including its children and youth. The Child and Youth Well-being Project of The National Institute for Child and Family Development, Mahidol university developed an innovative program “Community baby-sitting system positive psychology approach” which aims to strengthen communities by focusing on their children and young people; giving them a mechanism through which they can voice their priorities and concerns. To help achieve this, the program has developed two kind of strategies accordingly which are the positive psychology survey tool of the Life assets of Thai children and youth completely covers newborns to youth aged 25 years old (alpha coefficient 0.89). The tools including a questionnaire; “Life Assets Indicators with five main powers; power of self, family power, power of wisdom, power of peer and activities and power of community” which can be used as a navigator of the individual and social evaluations adolescents’ life based on their important factors in their life. The other strategies is the program developed three stepladders approaching to build up community baby-sitting system. The first step is Team building combination of child and representative of adult from each of immediate environments of child to learn about the weakest assets points in children and youths’ social immunity in various areas as a power of social immunity (Life assets) so that these indicators can be developed or promoted through activities that are in accordance with their needs to develop creative activities. The second step is after action review (AAR) of their own creative activities by their own representative from the team function as a step of facilitator. The Third step is increasing capacity of the team to have their five skill building which contains; skill for system managing, skill for surveillance survey and set up plan, skill for setup creative activities, skill in basic counselor for child and youth and skill for mapping their own social and environment capital for referral system. Community baby-sitting system with three step ladders by using the Life assets positive psychology 174
and reinforcement process approach to build up strength of family power in their own places and their own resources become an important emergence of resiliency in child and youth to living in new digital world. Key to the program’s success is that it listens and respects the opinions of a communities children and youth; placing them at the center of activities. Keywords: life assets, community baby-sitting system, positive psychology, resiliency. Introduction Currently, in this era of globalization is experiencing rapid technological changes that are causing many societal problems. These include problems in the areas of crime and cultural deterioration. In the old days, Thai society was metaphorically full of love with endless care and understanding atmosphere with a secured place that is like a defensive fence for everyone in the community that these little lives could rely on. Nonetheless, chronicle time has altered the way lived. Life depends on the thread of competition. Villagers are individually isolated with no longer kind concerns for each other. Living youngsters now has become the victim of a cruel society and it is day by day deteriorating. While the process of wisdom stimulating and education is all for marks, morality and living skills are ignored. Family, school and community can be counted as the important factors of child life’s development. For older children and youth, peer is also an important influence part too. Among these factors, family is the strongest part to build up social immunity in all age group. To clarify protective indicators in these parts, a panel of children and youth experts which include physician, pediatrician, psychologist social worker, women association experts and many others who had their highly knowledge and experiences was convened to review the process and outcome of intervention and tool since birth to 25 years old. The panel reviewed to define index of protection in Thai life style and culture for rearing children and designed Positive Child and Youth Development in five main powers which are self (inner), family, school or folk wisdom, peer and community. Main concept of this Positive reinforcement process indicates positive cognitive development and mindfulness factors by perception of children to all five parts (self, family, wisdom, peer, and community). The word, “Life Asset” has been mentioned as a specific name for this positive child and youth development process. Life assets is the protective factors which combine cognitive development and mindfulness factors in self and social living lifestyle and cultural. This model development become a significant tools and process for child and youth response by their own perception of their awareness and life skill on self and social competency. Everyone was born with a variety fundamental of life which gradually generated by love and caring of parents from prenatal state to the building blocks of parental guidance. Each life itself is automatically and gradually related by the Life Assets: nice surroundings, good atmosphere within the household, peer, professor and community. All of these factors could bring out the best in one’s life both physical and mental basis. Thus, it models children’s lives to be varied. Dr.Suriyadeo Tripathi said: Do children think or rethink about any actions before doing? We have surveyed and found out that the children with low life assets are at risk of every aspect: drug addiction, premarital sexual behaviors and social harassment, comparing to the group of having good life assets. Having proper power of social
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immunity, the children will have an ability to weigh the pros and cons. If the further questions about being able or unable to raise this kind of asset in one’s awareness, the answer is going to be yes! We can generally teach them since they are in the primary level. Rules and disciplines are being counted too. What if they don’t really have this social immunity? They might decide to do something with emotion not consideration and finally wind up with the harassment act to each other. Three Key Concepts of the Life Assets 1. Change thought and Life change; the thought is jerked at the beginning to fill the questionnaire. The more there are survey, thinking, analysis, activities, repetition and sustainability, the more the thought is jerked till to change their life in a positive mind set. 2. Listen to echo from children; Play the role of good listener leads to the learning sharing and access to children’s hindrance and problems. Being a good listener builds up a good exit and joint creation. The result are that the children will have the cognitive and analytical skills, skills in tackling problems and hindrance constructively, and the feeling pf meaningful participation. These process then provoke cognitive development in them. 3. Working on positive child and youth development systematically; All the activities deriving from the participatory team-working and the systematic working starting from planning, thinking, surveying, analyzing, working creative activities and lesson-learned together will trigger the coexistence in the society and systematic cognition. As a matter of fact, Life Assets are truly vital. It could help improving the children’s lives, the root of the society, to have strength immunity, living among infectious surroundings. That severe attack on children is no different from the antagonists, waiting to deteriorate our nation. Concerning about the importance of children’s lives Life Assets reinforcement, have been working on the project and researches in many aspects for children and youth. The research has been conducted by considering for both social context and our cultures. Consequently, the outcome has been developed to become an index, indicating power of social immunity for children and youth and generally being named as “Life Assets” The direction of implementation was done in 3 based setting: family-based, school-based and community based. The Life Assets positive model survey tool of Thai children and youth (alpha coefficient 0.89) is based on indicators that form a good strategy for and easy method of having youth and their families gain a good awareness of the direction they are taking. However, with the vast differences in ages, customs, traditions, culture, ways of life, and family social characteristics, it was necessary to adapt the Life assets index to make it appropriate for the Thai context and able to be used to measure the Life Assets of Thai children and youth as efficiently as possible. It is characterized by indicators that show the properties for building immunity, including the internal assets of children themselves and external assets, which are composed of friends and activities, schools, families, and communities. The life assets index for children and youth is composed of 48 indicators divided into five large sections power: Power of self, power of family, power of wisdom learning, power of peer and activities and power of community. The tools for children and youth evaluation of this project now have 48 indices. It is divided into 5 aspects, 5 powers and can be chronologically arranged by its importance as following;
1. Power of Self; it could be ranked as the first priority of the Life Assets. If there are any children who 176
lack of this quality, they should be urgently regained and encouraged. The process will mainly deal with an emotional feeling and mental state such as training them to see their value of themselves, EQ control and solving problems with peaceful action.
2. Power of the Family; it is the basic drive from an intimate friendship, supporting, caring each person with love and being a good role model for them too. 3. Power of Intelligence; it is not limited only by education but also eagerness to learn about life’s wisdom. Norms, old traditions and cultures are all simply beautiful and full of wisdom. When one realize to these facts, the feeling of hometown awareness will be raised in his mind. 4. Power of Community; it is the power of close relationship with neighbors, being all together with sympathy and being supported by the authority of the community. 5. Peer Power and Creative Activity; a useful activity with friends can make children know how to be compatible with others, how to love and care each other and how to avoid doing bad things. The positive model survey tool of the life assets of Thai children and youth completely covers newborns to youth aged 25 years old. According to different in development both physically and mentally, the tools and intervention were categorized in 3 area of age group; Neonate and early childhood group (birth to 6 years old), school age group (6-12 years old), adolescent and youth age group (12-25 years old) which have the same conceptual framework of Life Asset Positive Development but different in detail of indicators in accordance with age of development and maturity. The tool is self-applicable by individuals, families and communities in order to measure the weak points in the life assets of children and youth and will aid in formulating strategies for enhancing good life assets for children, youth, families, communities and society at every level and for every nation. The purpose of the survey is to identify weak points in the life assets of children and youth. This tool is a starting point for the development of community strategies for the management of the development of work in the area of children and youth. It will also be a tool that can be used to protect children and youth from risky environments and various risk factors that arise nowadays. The results of measuring the life assets positive model indicators of children since birth to adolescents will allow us to know about the weak points in children and youths’ social immunity in various areas as a power of social immunity so that these indicators can be developed or promoted through activities that are in accordance with their needs. Thailand’s Community Baby-Sitting System with Positive Psychology Approach (Life Assets) Strengthen the Positive Parenting in Family with Three Step Ladder And Actions Community can be counted as an important factor of child life’s development. A closed relationship and understanding atmosphere in the community can connect children’s life with their hometown. The First ladder’s step, team building composite of child youth and adult (with proportionate 50:50) dialogue and working together for creating a creative activity for sharing in the community has to be occurred. The second ladder’s step, participate learning and action with the role of facilitator from the team 177
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building will lead to the interactive learning process. The third-step ladder, the communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s baby-sitting system will be activated with capability of system management, surveillance system as a child watch, basic counseling , referral system and skill to setup creative activities or positive child and youth development References Tripathi S. The nation-wide survey developmental assets in Thai youth Thai Pediatric Journal; 17 (1):2009; 7-15.
Tripathi S. Life Asset Positive model to the base of strong community for children and youth. Thai Health Promotion Foundation; 2009. Tripathi S. The nation-wide study to compare life assets among juvenile detention centerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s youth with illegality in substance abuse and high school students in Thailand. J Adol Health; 48:2011; S75-6. Tripathi S. The National survey of Life Assets (Positive youth Development) among secondary school students in Thailand. J.Adol.Health:Feb.2013 vol.52 (2)S;s6. Tripathi S. & Dekplus team. (2013). Life Assets Positive Development. Samutsakorn: APPA Printing Group Co.,Ltd.
Acknowledgement The Life Assets Positive reinforcement process researchers would like to thanks the National Institute for Child and Family Development, Mahidol University and Thai Health Promotion Foundation.
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FINAL DECLARATION On the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the International Year of the Family designated by the United Nations, the Journalists and Writers Foundation Women’s Platform organised the International Family Conference III – International Family Policies on 29-30 November 2014, with contributions of 17 speakers from 13 different countries, which dealt with family and law, family and work, family and poverty through regional practices, underlined by the presentations. Recognizing the family as a natural and fundamental group unit of societies (E/RES/2014/8), we welcome all the preparations and celebrations happening around the world for this Anniversary. With the spirit of being part of it, Stressing that equality between men and women, especially women’s equal participation in employment, shared parental responsibility and respect to the rights of children should be the essentials of family policies, Acknowledging the evidence that family policies and laws are more effective when targeting the family unit rather than each one of its members; that balancing work and family life helps parents to be co-responsible in their tasks; and that empowering families is essential to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty, Convinced that civil society has a significant role in promoting human rights, assessing family policies and supporting families, we urge governments to consider these recommendations: 1. Family policies should always take into consideration the empowerment of women within the family, especially in their integration to the labour market. 2. Make sure that the law always respects the rights of every member of the family to be part of the decision process within the family. 3. Respect every nation’s peculiarities as long as they don’t violate the international conventions and treaties; and promote mutual understanding between different societies. 4. Make sure that reproductive technologies do not violate the basic rights of all parts involved. 5. Never force women to make a choice between work and family commitments; therefore consider the cost of maternal leave and in-kind services and tax benefits as investment for the society.
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6. Build a legal framework in which the private sector doesnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t get extra cost when their staff receives maternal leave, and the woman has the guarantee to keeping her job. 7. Ensure the universal accessibility and quality of early child education. 8. Ensure that young generations get the skills to find a way to integrate into society and start a family through a proper job. 9. Ensure that families are not replaced in their duties, but supported and made accountable for the help they get from society. 10. Mainstream the family in the sustainable development agenda, and take into account that the achievement of the new Development Goals depends on how well families are empowered to contribute to their achievement.
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SPEAKERS Hüseyin Hurmalı The Vice President of the Journalists and Writers Foundation Turkey Hüseyin Hurmali is the Vice President and the Chief Administrator Officer of Journalists and Writers Foundation. He is also in charge of UN projects. On behalf of the Foundation, he delivers speeches at The African Union and at other various UN platforms such as ECOSOC Annual Ministerial Review (AMR). After graduating from Mathematics Department in Bosphorus University, he worked as a teacher and Olympiad coordinator for nine years at Yamanlar College in Izmir. Meanwhile, he received his Computer Graphics Master’s Degree from Ege Unıversity and then attended University of California, Irvine in 2000. After receiving Master of Science degree from ICS department for Artificial Intelligence, he worked as an administrator in different institutions such as the Board for West America Turkic Council and the Anatolian Cultures and Food Festival in Los Angeles for about eleven years.
Ms. Katarina Lindahlt Board Chair, UN Women National Committee Sweden Ms. Lindahl was born in Stockholm. She has many valuable experience from working with NGOs who is, academically trained as a social worker, Bachelor university of Stockholm, primarily political science. She had been a political advisor for eight years with focus on information, press and advocacy, at one of the parliamentarian parties in Sweden. During this time, she was the only female political adviser at head office of the party. Issues of importance for women and girls became a strong focus for her. Also Secretary general 1987-2007 at RFSU, the Swedish member and founder of International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). During this time, RFSU built important collaborative work with NGOs and Planned Parenthood organization in many countries. The international collaboration had focus on sexual and reproductive health and rights. She regards openness as a core value and a prerequisite for prevention of unwanted pregnancies and combatting HIV/aids and violence. She believes openness will support gender equality and be helpful in developing negotiating skills for women and girls and for men and boys.
Ms. Diana Bryant AO Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia The Honourable Diana Bryant AO was appointed Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia in 2004. Prior to her appointment she was the Chief Federal Magistrate of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (now the Federal Circuit Court of Australia) from 2000-2004 having guided the emergence and growth of that court as the inaugural Chief Federal Magistrate. She one of the two Hague Network Judges for Australia and is presently chairing a working group for the Hague Permanent Bureau in relation to the Child Abduction Convention and is co-chair of the Association of International Family Judges. She has a strong interest in family law policy. She has had a longstanding commitment to the advancement of women in the law and is currently the Patron of Australian Women Lawyers and a committee member of The Australian Association of Women Judges. Chief Justice Bryant received a Centenary Medal in 2001 for her role in the establishment of the Federal Magistrates Court and was made an Officer of the Order of Australia in 2011 for her distinguished service to the judiciary and to the law, particularly to family law policy reform and practice, through the establishment of the Federal Magistrates Court, and to the advancement of women in the legal profession.
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Assist. Prof. Cüneyt Dinç Süleyman Sah University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Science Assist. Prof. Dinç was born 1978 in Germany. He graduated from Universitat Mannheim in Social Sciences in 2003. In 2009 he defended his PhD Thesis about the Turkish Welfare Regime in South European Perspective in the Sociology Department in Universitat Mannheim. Since 2011, he continued at the Sociology Department at Süleyman Şah University in Istanbul/ Turkey. His research areas are the Turkish welfare regime, migration and migrants in Germany and social change among veiled women in Turkey.
Prof. Abdülhakim Yüce Yüzüncü Yıl University, Faculty of Divinity Prof. Yüce was born in 1962. He was graduated from Ankara University Divinity School. He started his PhD study and was appointed as preacher by the State Department of Religious Affairs in the same year. He worked in Cologne, Germany, and Paris, France. Prof. Yüce was appointed as a research assistant in Sufism to Ankara University Divinity School in 1992. In the same year, he completed his PhD with the dissertation on the “Esoteric Aspect of the Qur’anic Commentary of Fakh al-din al-Razi called Mafatih al-ghayb,” which was published with the title Razi’nin Tefsirinde Tasavvuf (Sufism in al-Razi’s Exegesis). Yüce was appointed as an assistant professor of Sufism to the Yüzüncü Yıl University Divinity School in 1993. He became associate professor in 1997, and full professor in 2003. He worked as the Dean of Iğdır University Divinity School and as Vice-President of the same university between 2009 and 2011, and as Dean of the Celal Bayar University Divinity School between 2012 and 2014. Currently, he is a faculty member at the Yüzüncü Yıl University Divinity School.
Dr. Pauline Ebere Onyeukwu
Nigerian Turkish Nile University, Department of Business Administration
Dr. Onyeukwu is a senior lecturer in the Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Arts, Management and Social Sciences, at the Nigerian Turkish Nile University, Abuja, Nigeria. She has received her PhD Degree in Business Management from Ebonyi State University in Nigeria, her Master Degree in Business Management from University of Nigeria and her Bachelor of Science in Business Management from Imo States University in Nigeria. She is the President and Founder of Perfect Help Global outreach, a charitable organization. For many years, she has been teaching management courses in different universities. She has written many books and journal articles both internationally and locally.
Mr. Abdul Sathar Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, Department of English Language and Literature Mr. Sathar is an outstanding research student of Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi which is a reputed central university of India. He pursued his graduation degree in English Language and Literature from Amal College, Calicut University. Along with Post Graduate degree in English literature from JMI he has done Certificate Course in Turkish Language. Mr. Sathar is actively engaging in socio-political and cultural activities in Kerala and Delhi; also he attends many national and international seminars and conferences.
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Prof. Keiko Hirao
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Sophia University, Graduate School of Environmental Studies
Prof. Hirao is a sociologist specializing in the intersections among family, education and work. Her main research interests include gender stratification, intergenerational relations, human capital development, and sustainable lifestyles. She joined the Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies in 2009, after having taught at the Department of Philosophical Anthropology for ten years. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Notre Dame. Prof. Hirao is the author of Child Rearing War Front (Chobunsha, 1991, in Japanese) and chapters in Political Economy of Japan’s Low Fertility (Frances Rosenbluth ed., Stanford University Press, 2006), Women’s Working Lives in East Asia (Mary Brinton ed., Stanford University Press, 2001), Working and Mothering: Images, Ideologies and Identities (Theresa W. Devasahayam and Brenda S.A. Yeoh eds., NIAS Press,2007), and Thinking Body as Intelligence (Mamoru Suzuki ed., Gakken Marketing, in Japanese, 2014)
Assist. Prof. Faisal Nazir
Islamic University of Science & Technology, India
Asist. Prof. Nazir is from the Islamic University of Science & Technology, India. He received his Master of Business Administration with Distinction from Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi with proven research & teaching skills and a strong knowledge base; seeking a research learning experience in a quality institution. Also, he is seeking a platform to use theoretical knowledge and experience as a continuous learning process in order to contribute towards the success & growth of the field and also enhance his skills. Asist. Prof. Nazir was qualified Junior Research Fellowship for Lectureship conducted by University Grants Commission in December, 2013. He presented two research papers in an International Conference at
Jawahar Lal Nehru University.
Mr. Ignacio Socías Director of Communication and International Relations International Federation for Family Development (IFFD) Mr. Socías is Director General of the International Institute for Family Research · The Family Watch, a think tank committed to researching the family and finding solutions to the problems it faces. He is also Director of Communication and International Relations of the International Federation for Family Development, an umbrella organization for Family Enrichment Programs that currently operate in 65 countries on the five continents, directly benefit over 50,000 people annually and has been granted reclassification of the consultative status from special to general by the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. As part of his work for international bodies, he has organized the UN European Expert Group Meeting held in Brussels (2012), and has participated in recent Expert Group Meetings of the Social Policy and Development Division in the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Doha, and New York in 2011 and 2012) and in the EU Family Platform as one of the stakeholders. He is also a member of the Editorial Board of ‘Familia y Cultura’ bulletin and was Director of the 18th International Family Congress ‘Family, School of Human Rights’ (Valencia, 2010). He has been invited to the three editions of the European Demography Forum organized by the European Union (2008-2010), the 7th World Family Summit (Abu Dhabi, 2010), the Hungarian Presidency of the EU in Budapest Conference about Demographic Change (2011), the European Commission Conference on the European Year 2012 for Active Ageing and intergenerational solidarity (2011), the Polish National Parliament (2012), the 9th World Family Summit (Berlin, 2013), the Global Family Forum (Arizona, 2014) and the Doha Conference (Qatar, 2014).
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Prof. Alexandr Tsoi
Lodz University
Prof. Tsoi was born in Uzbekistan in the city of Namangan. In 1980 he graduated from the Namangan State Pedagogical Institute (University). He became Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences (PhD) in Uzbekistan In 1991. From 2005 to 2008, he has been studying (Postdoctoral research) in Moscow, Russia. He was a Professor of the International Ataturk-Alatoo University (Kyrgyzstan). Since September 2010, Prof. Tsoi has been working in Lodz University (Poland). He is researching theoretical issues of Philosophy and Language Culture, Sociology and Sociolinguistics, and Lexicography.
Assist. Prof. Selami Ahmet Salgür
University of South-East Europe – Lumina, Romania
Asist. Prof. Salgür was graduated from the Faculty of Education at Middle East Technical University (METU) in 1994. He had his master’s degree in Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences at University of Bucharest and completed his Ph.D. in Sociology and Social Assistance Faculty of the same university. As an international teacher he has many years of experience as a, mentor, academician and administrator in different countries. He has been currently teaching at the Department of International Relations in University of South East Europe Lumina since 2011. His researches focused basically on education, communication, internationalism and multiculturalism. He is married with two children and
speaks English and Romanian.
Assoc. Prof. Gjon Boriçi
Illyria College, Albania
Assoc. Prof. Boriçi is born in Tirana in 1977. He was graduated from the University of Tirana in History and Philology Faculty. His specialty areas are international relations and political sciences. From 2002 to 2009, he was an Executive Director of the Albanian Diplomatic Academy and editor in chief of “Diplomacy” magazine. He fulfilled the postgraduate studies in Master and PhD in 2004 and 2007 on international relations and political sciences. He has a wide experience in the field of higher education in Albania and Balkans. He is author of many articles and essays mostly on international relations and Balkan problems. He kept several position in different universities in Albania as Dean in the Illyria University and Head of Department of Political Sciences in Albanian University and editor in chief of scientific review “OPTIME”. Currently he is associate professor in the Illyria College in Prishtina, Kosovo.
Ms. Sadia Muazu Mayana
Federal Capıtal Terrıtory Judiciary Abuja, Magistrate, Nigeria
Ms. Mayana is Magistrate at the Federal Capıtal Terrıtory Judiciary Abuja, Nigeria and she is also a lawyer. Previously,she worked as a Senior Registrar in the Court of Appeals and Secretary of Election Petition Tribunal. Besides this, Ms. Mayana is a social and humanitarian worker and attended many projects with several professional bodies. She is an alumni of International Visitors Leadership Program organized by Culture Department at the US Embassy in Nigeria.
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International Family Policies
www.jwffamilyconference.org
Ms. Cynthia A. Scheopner J.D. Senior Researcher, Office of Research Compliance, University of Hawai‘i, Manoa Ms. Scheopner is a philosophy PhD candidate at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Her research is in the intersection of law and religion, with a specialization in Islamic philosophy. She works as a Senior Researcher, directing education and communications for the Office of Research Compliance at UHM. She spent two decades in broadcast news after receiving a Bachelor of Science degree in journalism from the University of Kansas. She also holds a JD (law) from Baylor University and an MA (philosophy) from the University of Colorado. She co-edited Cross Currents: Comparative Responses to Global Interdependence (2013) and is co-author of a chapter titled “Empathy by Design: Enhancing Diversity in Online Participation” in the book Practical Wisdom in the Age of Technology: Insights, Issues and Questions for a New Millennium. She has written several articles in Multicultural America: A Multimedia Encyclopedia, an essay on Santa as cross-cultural connection in
Christmas: Better than a Lump of Coal; and is managing editor of the Encyclopedia of Business, Ethics, and Society.
Prof. Gyounghae Han
Seoul National University, Human Development and Family Studies
Prof. Han received her bachelor’s and master’s degree in Human Ecology from Seoul National University (SNU), Korea and Ph.D. degree in Human Development and Family Studies from the Pennsylvania State University. After joining the faculty of SNU in 1990, she has held various academic and administrative appointments at SNU. She served as Dean of College of Human Ecology and Vice President of University Senate of SNU. She is a founding director of Translational Gerontology and Retirement Research Center and Professor in Charge of ‘The University of Third Age, SNU’. She also runs the ‘SNU Advanced Program for CEOs on Well Aging and Senior Business’.
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Prof. Yuko Ogasawara
Nihon University College of Economics
Prof. Ogasawara works at the Department of Sociology at Nihon University College of Economics. Her main current research interests are changes in family structure, work and family interface, and gender issues. In the past she has studied how men and women differ in resisting the traditional gender roles. She obtained her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Chicago. Her dissertation was published in English by the title Office Ladies and Salaried Men: Power, Gender, and Work in Japanese Companies.
Assoc. Prof. Suriyadeo Tripathi Dean, Mahidol University, National Institute for Child and Family Development Assoc. Prof. Tripathi was graduated Pediatricians at the Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. Further he studied with a subspecialty in Adolescent Medicine at the University of California Sanfrancisco, he later served as the Dean and Director of the National Institute for Child and Family Development in Mahidol University Bangkok, Thailand. With his national level thesis became a national agenda in Thailand as Positive youth development in the name of Life Assets Positive model to build up community strengthen in child adolescent and family development strategies nationwide. With his many kind of position covering as scientific researcher , program planner and mobilization community in the position as a program manager of Child and Adolescent wellbeing from Thai Health Promotion Foundation under supervision of The Prime minister office and also be a policy maker as an executive consultant of Senator Parliament in child and adolescent health section. Since 2001, when he created the Adolescent Center at the Queen Sirikit National Institute for Child Health (Childrenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Hospital), he has worked as an adolescent medicine professional. Also, he has been General Secretary, Adolescent Committee of the Royal College of Pediatrics of Thailand since 2006-2010. He has created Life Assets Positive model (Positive youth Development) in Thailand and it becomes a navigator for implementing plan for community to build up program for development of child and youth in many parts of Thailand and announced by The National council for promotion child and adolescent development leaded by the Prime Minister be a national plan in Child and Adolescent Development. Moreover he has had the opportunity on numerous occasions to be a Consultant in Adolescent Health of the government and executive board of Senator Parliament of Thailand and be a representative from Thai Government to join several kinds of international meeting. Last year he was selected from the Director of John Hopkins Bloomberg Public Health to be a representative in ASEAN region on round table discussion in USA in the topic of Emerging issue in Adolescent Health. Since April 2010 he is a Director and Dean of the National Institute for Child and Family Development , Mahidol University.
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International Family Policies
www.jwffamilyconference.org
Consulting with the the Focal Point on Family at the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA),the 3rd International Family Conference on International Family Policies was in support of the 20th Anniversary of the International Year of the Family (IYF+20) activities. The International Year of the Family, 1994, was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 44/82 of 9 December 1989. The theme of the Year was "Family: resources and responsibilities in a changing world". Its motto: "Building the Smallest Democracy at the Heart of Society". In proclaiming the Year, the General Assembly decided that the major activities for its observance should be concentrated at the local, regional and national levels, assisted by the United Nations system. The United Nations Commission for Social Development was designated the preparatory body and the Economic and Social Council as the coordinating body for the Year. The twentieth anniversary of the International Year of the Family, 2014, offered an opportunity to refocus on the role of families in development; took stock of recent trends in family policy development; share good practices in family policy making; reviewed challenges faced by families worldwide and recommend solutions. Owing to rapid socio-economic and demographic transformations, families find it more and more difficult to fulfil their numerous responsibilities. Many struggle to overcome poverty and adequately provide for the younger and older family members. It is also more and more difficult for them to reconcile work and family responsibilities and maintain the intergenerational bonds that sustained them in the past. In response to these trends, the preparations for IYF+20 focused on exploring family-oriented policies and strategies aiming mainly at confronting family poverty; ensuring work-family balance and advancing social integration and intergenerational solidarity. The preparatory process was to accelerate progress in family policy development; demonstrate its relevance for overall development efforts and draw attention to the role of different stakeholders in achieving these goals. The preparations for the twentieth anniversary included: • International and regional expert group meetings gathering family experts and practitioners to explore recent family trends; analyse family-oriented policies and programmes and review good practices in family policy making. • Research activities, including background papers on family poverty, work family balance and intergenerational solidarity. • Exchange of good practices in family policy. • Observances of the International Days of Families focusing on the themes for the twentieth anniversary. • Side events at the Commission for Social Development. • Government, civil society, academic and private sector initiatives at the national level. • Findings and recommendations from these activities are to guide future action in effective family policy design, monitoring and implementation. Governments, United Nations agencies and bodies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, research and academic institutions and the private sector were encouraged to play a supportive role in promoting the objectives of the twentieth anniversary for the benefit of families worldwide. By organizing the Third International Family Conference: International Family Policies, the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF) and the JWF Women’s Platform participated in the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the International Year of the Family. For more information please visit the website: http://undesadspd.org/Family/InternationalObservances/ TwentiethAnniversaryofIYF2014.aspx
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END VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS To mark the International Day to Eliminate Violence against Women and the 16 Days of Activism against Gender Violence, the United Nations Secretary- General’s Campaign UNiTE to End Violence against Women invited us with the motto “Orange YOUR Neighbourhood.” UN invited us to take the UNiTE campaign to local streets, shops and businesses and to join them in organizing “Orange Events” in our own neighbourhoods between 25th November and 10th December. UN also invited us to reach out to your next door neighbours, local stores, food sellers on the corner of your street, petrol stations, local cinemas, barbers, libraries and post offices— orange YOUR neighbourhood! Reach out to your own neighbours and invite their participation. ORANGE YOUR NEIGHBOURHOOD IN CREATIVE AND VISIBLE WAYS UN invited us to project orange lights and hang orange flags onto local landmarks, ‘orange’ your local supermarket, schools, sports events, tie orange ribbons where you are allowed and organize local ‘orange marches’ on 25th November. Campain invited us and campain invited us send the Campaign your photos, messages, videos—they were showcased on the UNiTE campaign’s website at the end of the 16 Days, and in the “Orange Issue” of the UNiTE campaign newsletter in January 2015. The JWF and JWF Women’s Platform took the opportunity to join this campaign via this international conference on family policies, by inviting the audience to wear the orange ribbon to raise awareness amongst our community about the global pandemic of violence against women and girls. For more information about the UNiTE campaign go to www.un.org/en/women/endviolence
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www.jwffamilyconference.org
Organizers Journalists and Writers Foundation Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF) was established by a group of distinguished writers, scholars, and journalists in 1994 to contribute to peaceful coexistence and dialogue by bringing together intellectuals from all political spectrums with different cultural, religious, ethnic and ideological backgrounds that belong to the many diverse disciplines in science, religion, philosophy, politics, and art. Its mission is to look for ways of building a common living space based on reconciliation and mutual respect. Currently, there are six different platforms relied upon to organize the work of the Foundation; each platform specializes in different aspects of building dialogue. These include the Abant Platform, Dialogue Eurasia, the Medialog Platform, the Intercultural Dialogue Platform, and the Women’s Platform. There is also a Research Centre. To carry its national mission in the international arena, the JWF holds General Consultative Status at the United Nations Economic and Social Council, being the first and only institution to achieve this status in Turkey. www.gyv.org.tr, www.jwf.org JWF Women’s Platform The Women’s Platform was founded in 2009 and aims to promote dialogue and peacebuilding at the local and global scale, by providing democratic arenas for the free and fair discussion of prevailing problems, including the disintegration of the family, gender-based discrimination in various areas, the humanitarian crisis in conflict zones, and highlighting the role of women in peace building, as well as in maintaining and improving peace. www.gyvkadinplatformu.org
Partner The 20th Anniversary of the International Year of the Family
Supporters
SPAIN
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JAPAN
TURKEY
ITALY
TURKEY
THAILAND
NIGERIA
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International Family Policies
www.jwffamilyconference.org
FAMILY CONFERENCE - III
International Family Policies
www.jwffamilyconference.org
FAMILY CONFERENCE - III
International Family Policies
www.jwffamilyconference.org
All around the world families are facing new challenges and changes and in many cases rapid economic, demographic and cultural changes in various parts of the world, prevent families to fulfill their societal responsibilities. Hence, these new emerging challenges to the family require new answers. As a matter of fact, these answers can never be the same for all the countries. Each society delivers its own answers since each society’s problems have their unique background. However, this diversity of solutions provides us with a possibility to learn from each other. The answers to the challenges to the family are manifold. As such it covers judicial, social, political, and medical topics, whose practical application differs from society to society. Departing from this perspective, the 3rd Family Conference: International Family Policies organized by the Women Platform of the Journalists and Writers Foundation’s on 29th – 30th November 2014 in Istanbul, has focused on these challenges to the family and its regional solutions and aimed to prepare the ground for sharing among the best practices of family oriented-policies. By organizing the third International Family Conference on the international family policies, the Journalists and Writers Foundation which has a General Consultative Status at ECOSOC and its Women Platform participated in the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the International Year of the Family. The conference was also supported by International Federation For Family Development (IFFD) from Spain, NittoKAI from Japan, Istituto Tevere from Italy, Kimse Yok Mu and MARKAFED from Turkey, Thailand Achievement Institute – TAİ from Thailand and Ufuk Dialogue Foundation from Nigeria.
www.jwffamilyconference.org