The Diplomacy Review, Issue 1, December 2020

THE

DIPLOMACY REVIEW

Cultural Diplomacy Francafrique Yoga Culture Russian Revival Battle of the Truth The Power of Non-Power?

Developments in Ethiopia

Israel and the Gulf States Redefining Diplomacy Cultural Diplomacy in ASEAN A culture of listening Brits Aboard America’s decline of soft power under Trump Is 'Soft Power' the New 'Hard Power'?

Dedication from the head editor In order to talk about cultural diplomacy efficiently, we must first strive to define it. Officially, cultural diplomacy is recognised as a sector of foreign policy. In fact, cultural diplomacy is a public policy that aims, within the framework of foreign policy, to export information representative of national culture and multiply interactions with foreign countries within the cultural field. After the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war became less prominent, reducing the need for deterrence policies. Diplomacy is regulated by a new dynamic: governments are trying to resolve their difference through dialogue and not by the use of force. Nevertheless, as a precondition for dialogue, mutual understanding of each other's culture seems indispensable. This is how culture has entered the realm of diplomacy. Its various processes such as conveying a positive image through culture, obtaining the favours of one country, conducting a diplomacy of understanding with another country are the objectives of cultural diplomacy which Joseph Nye called "soft power".

While cultural diplomacy is increasingly welcomed and praised in the international arena, some denounce culture's instrumentalisation to the benefit of politics. Can diplomacy influence cultural processes? Is cultural diplomacy a set of mediation and international understanding processes, or does it translate a form of political opportunism? What remains of creativity or of the formation of cultural identity when it is not appropriated by politics? Dynamics such as the local selective enhancement of identity through "cultural" traits considered representative allows us to consider the power relations at work in diplomacy. This is the great difficulty of cultural diplomacy. While we affirm that cultural diplomacy is necessary, if it is not wholly independent of the state, there will always be a risk that culture will become a political tool.

How can diplomatic activities not be limited by this pressure? If the realm of political opinion is forever heterogenous readers will undoubtedly find pleasure in the varying perspectives offered by this first edition. It is with great pleasure that I publish the first Issue of 2020. I thank all of our writers and contributors for their words, insights, and fantastic work this term.

To Josephine, thank you for your trust

Editor Maeva Bleicher Designeer Kiril Radovenski

CONTENTS 4

THE POWER OF NONPOWER?

11

BY VICTORIA KRUGER

18

BATTLE OF THE TRUTH

BY SAM FOLWER

24

BY LUCIEN ENEV

38

RUSSIAN REVIVAL

BY OMAR KHAN

BRITS ABOARD

REDEFINING DIPLOMACY

BY ANOUSKA JHA

53

ISRAEL AND THE GULF STATES

BY AFEK SHAMIR

58

A CULTURE OF LISTENING

63

BY TIM REIN

68

BY LEA WOWRA

FRANCAFRIQUE

72

BY JOHN MORGAN

78

DEVELOPMENTS IN ETHIOPIA

YOGA CULTURE

BY PRATHAMESH JAGTAP

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN ASEAN

83

AMERICA’S DECLINE OF SOFT POWER

BY SAULET TANIRBERGEN

BY SASHA CHUA

87

IS 'SOFT POWER' THE NEW 'HARD POWER'?

BY HECTOR MCKECHNIE

President Harry Truman signing the Nato treaty in 1949

THE POWER OF NON-POWER? CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMPACT OF SOFT POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA.

BY VICTORIA KRÜGER

P

ower. What do you think of when hearing the term power?

Take a few seconds.

You might associate power with strength and authority. You might think of a country such as China, Russia, the United States, Israel. In this case, your line of thought would accord with the assessment of the World Population Review, which ranked these countries in a worldwide comparison to being among the top 10 most powerful nations of our world. Interestingly, this list of powerful countries agrees almost entirely with a ranking of global nuclear powers.

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Power can be organised into two categories - hard and soft power. Indeed, nuclear power is part of the former category, defined as "tactics employ[ing] means of military force or other coercive strategies to achieve the desired outcome".Alternatively, soft power is an approach of non-violence, mirrored in diplomacy and influence.

However, is the strength of soft power considerable in today’s world?

Presumably, the most prominent example would be the European Union (EU). To say it plainly - "there is no EU army. The issue of defence remains mostly in the hands of the member states. The Treaty of Lisbon states clearly that the aggregated capacity of member state forces is intended outside the union for the strengthening of international security and emphasises a "common Union defence policy" (Article 42(2) TEU). In 2017, some measures of European cooperational defence had been ratified, nonetheless, in the words of the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen "the European Union will never be a military alliance […]. NATO will always be [our] collective defence". The military alliance NATO is explicitly named in the treaty, as "certain Member States, […] see their common defence realised in the NATO" and therefore"be [it] compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework". So, left without an army and trapped in a defence alliance which President Emmanuel Macron famously referred to in 2019 with the following words: “We are experiencing the brain death of NATO”, what are the EU’s possibilities to power? Is the union powerless? Or does soft power provide enough leverage to sustain in the international spectacle of power?

5

Firstly, and contrary to the widespread assumption, the EU’s lack of hard power is contestable. When focussing on nuclear power, only France and the UK have estimated nuclear inventories of 290 deployed and stockpiled warheads, 195 respectively. These levels are comparatively low to the US’ or Russia’s. According to the BBC, the US accounts for 70% of the NATO’s spending of defence, but Germany, France and the UK paid around 47% of the NATO’s civilian and military budget in 2019. Furthermore, Europe is the world’s largest arms exporter and maintains security partnerships around the world. The assumption of the EU’s lack of hard power is hence contestable.

NATO Military, Reuters

6

In 2019, the EU was the second-largest economy in the world. Undeniably, the more dependent a country is to trade, the less incontestable it is. The EU is less dependent on trade than China, but more than the US. Scholars argue that the effectiveness of economic power could be seen as a function of per capita income as the state’s capacity is dependent on its extractive abilities. China outnumbers the EU when considering aggregated income by far. Shifting the view to a more leveling measure such as the GDP per capita (here in thousand dollars), the world bank assessed it to be around 65 in the US, in the EU 35, in China 10 and Russia 12.

Furthermore and contrary to the common belief, the accumulated foreign direct investment outflow of EU member states exceeds these of all other countries. In 2020, the EU accounted for 55.2% of the Official Development Assistance aid, aiming at the promotion of "economic development and welfare of developing countries".

Economic dominance equips the union with a good deal of soft power. Beyond, the EU fundamentally shaped international organisations such as the UN, WTO, or ICC.

It created an extensive network of agreements with neighboring countries and influenced multilateral institutions such as the UN, WTO, or ICC.

7

Let’s shift the perspective to the remaining category: culture. This aspect is historically conditioned but remains of high significance. The world’s most spoken languages are Mandarine, Spanish, English and Hindi. The world’s most popular learned second languages are English, French, Russian and Spanish. 1.2 billion people practice English.

Theses languages connect and draw lines back to their historical origin in "western" countries. Beyond this, QS world University ranking 2020 reveals that 33 of the worlds best Universities are located in Europe, comparing to one in Russia and 32 in North America. Agreed, QS is based in the UK, but Russian international University rankings are for example, mostly coherent with the QS ranking or had been created in cooperation with QS. European Universities attract a global audience which can be seen the approximately 200,000 international students or 34% of the Russel Group's stu-

dent

body.

These considerations are

beyond

the scope of mere politics, but they shape thinking attitudes and lives.

UCL Main Campus Building

8

Interrelated with the concept of soft power is the idea of cultural diplomacy. The Institute of Cultural Diplomacy defines it as "a course of actions, which are based on and utilise the exchange of [..] aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation, promote national interests and beyond." The EU engages in joint cultural events, such as film festivals, the creation of European Culture Houses, Culture and Creativity Programmes, the Erasmus + programme and bilateral support, such as the strengthening of Tunisia’s Cultural Sector. Highly interesting is the European enlargement. Since the union’s foundation in 1993, the six founding countries enlarged the union, comprising 27 member states by today. The union’s entering is bound to the adoption of democratic and legal reforms.

Research shows that the choice of potential new members follows, on the one hand, the logic of consequentiality regarding interest-exchange as well as benefit-maximisation.

On the other hand, member states engage in "a continuous process of arguing about the courses of action which best matched the EU’s principles", among other things the promotion of security, democracy and peace. The EU’s cultural heritage is highly influential when it comes to the union’s actions regarding its international reputation.

The EU’s enlargement can be seen as a process of state crafting utilising identity building.

This concept transfers into the broader international context: captured in the European Security Strategy 2003, the EU has a vested interested in the "well" governing of neighbouring countries. A study conducted in Africa reveals that the EU is largely perceived as a supportive actor fostering the "African efforts to spread peace and security". But in the trade sector, the EU’s actions are seen as protective and paternalistic. It uses coercive instruments to achieve their economic interests. The EU’s economic power entails the possibility of imposing conditionality to agreements of trade and bilateral agreements concerning a potential EU membership as seen in

9

Morocco. Intervention in the Egyptian showed the prioritisation of security and stability over democratic or human rights. Some scholars compare the EU’s foreign policy to "an option between credible civilian power and soft imperialism. With increasing actorness and coherence (a stronger identity) there is a risk that soft imperialism takes over and that the dialogue becomes a monologue." Literature concerning the soft imperialism and imposed cultural alignment of current or new member states appear sporadically. However, such considerations should be made as the optimum of the democratisation is contested. The EU’s exercise of soft power in the sense of identity spreading is thus of ambivalent nature. There is no traditionally formed supreme culture. Human rights are of utmost importance, but cultural diplomacy should be defined by cultural interaction, a two-way street of communication, listening and learning. Ultimately, the question of the EU’s powerfulness shall be returned to you. Do you consider the EU to be a powerful union?

Does soft power prove substantial when comparing it to hard power?

FIN.

10

BRITS ABROAD THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA?

BY SAM FOLWER

M

uch has been made of Britain’s decision to leave the European Union both domestically and abroad. How will trade work? How about security? Or

migration? All of these questions and many more have been analysed in great detail by laymen, journalists, diplomats and ministers. They are looking bigger though provides us with more food for thought. Specific questions surrounding certain parts of any deal are essential, but no one is going to tell their grandchildren about them. Instead, how will Britain be seen by its peers overseas?

British PM Boris Johnson

It’s this question which will dictate whether or not this country can advance to become the ‘Global Britain’ the Prime Minister has promised; where it will stand on the world stage and how large a role it can expect to have in international affairs? As ambitious, this question is to answer, and there is a clear path. We’ll consider how Britain is currently seen as it moves away from the EU and how it was positioned before joining the European Economic Community in 1973. From this, we can have a better idea of whether Britain is set for a bold voyage of discovery or is more likely to remain very much in the EU’s sphere.

We can get valuable insight and evaluation of Britain’s attempts to project itself abroad pre-1973 thanks to a report written by historian Max Beloff for the Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs. The 1965 piece entitled The Projection of Britain Abroad primarily focused on how Britain could use cultural and informational assets to assert itself overseas, as well as the challenges it faced in doing that. ‘Cultural and informational assets’ generally referred to exports of British arts, education, scholars, scientific advances and industrial goods. For Beloff, this was no cerebral question as in his view of all of the world’s powers ‘none is so dependent […] on maintaining friendly relations with other countries’ as Britain, and a crucial aspect of maintaining these relations was through conscious optimistic projection. Using this study as a baseline, we can judge more fairly how Britain’s efforts to assert itself globally have continued and changed in the intervening 55 years but also examine where these efforts are likely to be focused as Britain leaves the EU. One point of comparison that can be made between the 1965 report and today is Britain’s apparent need to place itself globally in a set of nations. Sixty years ago this came as Britain shifted attention away from Europe, beginning to focus money and time in funding aid projects as well as art and lecture tours in areas where post-war Britain had a lower profile such as portions of Asia and Africa.

12

Brexit Movement, Central London

Now Britain very much stands at a similar crossroads; with a Brexit deal still unwritten the proximity of the country’s relationship with the EU is uncertain. Therefore Britain could end up very much still in orbit for the EU, shift to focus on the Atlantic relationship with the US or strike out from both of these pillars and instead create a new set of relationships with nations across the globe but probably prominently featuring Commonwealth states. Each of these three options has its pitfalls and drawbacks. As already mentioned, the lack of a Brexit deal with the EU leaves open both British dependency on the union or a complete abandonment of it. The reasonable middle ground between the two extremes, some sort of trade and political deal with the EU, leaves room open for a tightening of relations with the US. This would both offer the possibility of an enlarged trading partner to make up for any lost EU commerce and a continuation of the ‘special relationship’ of related strategic issues.

13

Furthermore, a Biden presidency would be expected to mark a return to American commercial, political and diplomatic norms as compared with the actions of President Trump, allowing the UK to continue to use its well-thumbed playbook of acting as a second-string to the US. But President-elect Biden, unlike his predecessor, is no fan of Brexit so should there be a rift between Britain and the EU come January it appears likely that the US will be opening its arms to offer easy support. In the event of a nodeal Brexit and an unsympathetic America, several government ministers have pointed to ‘Global Britain’. This would see the nation striking individual trade deals with other countries or using World Trade Organisation rules. One area of support that has been floated to help Britain initially has been the Commonwealth of Nations, a community of 54 states of which the vast majority are former British colonies – widely regarded to be a collection of nations broadly supportive of Britain due to their shared history and values. In particular, the likelihood of tightening CANZUK (the governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) ties has been emphasised as the potential source of new trade deals which would springboard Britain to new deals elsewhere as well. However, it appears unlikely that Britain being able to trade with the combined population of 65 million will replace the 450 million in the EU. Beloff wrote his piece in the midst of a turning point in global communication technology. The radio, which had been used for domestic broadcasting for several decades, was beginning to reach its potential to reach a global audience. Alongside this, the television set was becoming a staple of British homes and the first international live broadcast would come just two years after Beloff wrote his report. The development of radio and TV and the significant input of the BBC in both broadcast types offered up the opportunity for Britain to host a global news media organisation, one which would be recognisably British whilst delivering news globally. This has since come to pass, and then some as the BBC World Service as well as numerous BBC regional and language sub-units have increased television and radio globally to become a dominant broadcaster.

14

Outside of Britain, 430 million people listen to the BBC every week, reaching record audiences for the BBC World Service and BBC World News, with broadcasts being made in 42 languages. But when the BBC delivers news and cultural services globally, it is also representing Britain as well as itself – providing an impression of a nation being very much like its media organisation: objective, measured and focused on quality. BBC culture is also very much taken up overseas, 12.2% of the BBC’s expenditure on producing television programmes was covered by money made from selling BBC content outside the UK. Exactly as Beloff considered decades ago, the BBC is the vanguard of British soft power abroad. It at once provides valuable and appreciated services but also well represents its home country. In a post-Brexit Britain, this asset is unlikely to untapped.

Despite

current

government wrangling with the BBC over political bias

in

its

UK

content it would be a remarkable oversight not

to

see

the

potential

of

the

broadcaster to create goodwill

towards

Britain abroad and help facilitate the tightening

of

relationships

old on

which the country may soon rely.

BBC Broadcasting House

15

The greatest point of criticism posed in the 1965 report is that

...Britain was not making enough of its scientific and academic potential. In general, many scholars in British universities were considered too insular and Anglo-centric, engaging only a little with foreign research or events and even then it was more with the US than with European neighbours.

Beloff considered this a vast waste of British academic talent...

, much of which he felt was decaying in ageing institutions and offices when it should be shared with a global student and research community. Gradually Beloff got his wish as Britain engaged much more closely with European universities and institutes as well as pushing its research to international prominence. 2021’s QS world rankings show how much this research has blossomed, with the UK having four universities in the global top 10 (only one less than the US). But one of Beloff’s warning still rings true.

Anyone could take this academic crown if Britain got complacent. His example of the US’ potential to hoover up students no longer attracted to Britain remains possible with the high competition that accompanies shared academic literature, first-languages and learning environment. After any form of Brexit, deal or not, the UK must work to attract international students and intellectuals; this is not only to ensure that the soft influence of having British research at the forefront of decision-making but also to provide a base for industrial and scientific development domestically, as without homegrown skilled workers it is much harder to attract the much-desired foreign investment.

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Britain stands at a crossroads now as it did at the time of Beloff’s report. Some of the issues it faces are the same: needing to find a new role, the unreliability of US relations and intense global competition. All of these must be dealt with tactfully and relatively quickly to ensure a softer Brexit transition. But much of what Britain is yet to face is new: technology has changed how we communicate and understand other countries as well as shifting alliances creating the possibility of Britain being left without a natural bloc of trading allies. These issues are, in a way more serious as there is no roadmap of experience to use. What is very clear though is that Britain needs to manufacture positive image now more than ever because it is not merely good enough to maintain old relations as the situation for trade and geopolitical influence spells the need for new ones too. Fortunately, the UK appears to have an arsenal to deal with this, mainly through a combination of the influential BBC and academic output alongside more traditional ways of exercising power such as through the armed forces and diplomacy.

Whether or not a ‘Global Britain’ is achievable in the near future remain s up for debate, but clearly, the UK has no excuse not to try.

FIN.

17

Skopje, Macedonia

BATTLE OF THE TRUTH THE NORTH MACEDONIAN-BULGARIAN CULTURAL LITIGATION, AND HOW IT IS MERELY A SYMPTOM OF A WIDER EUROPEAN PHENOMENON

BY LUCIEN ENEV.

I

n varietate concordia – “united in diversity” – is the European Union’s motto. It encapsulates in a nutshell, the Union’s founding tenets of peace, cooperation, and

acceptance of cultural differences. But recently, diversity is what hindered further European enlargement. Last November, Bulgaria blocked the progression of North Macedonia on the road to EU membership. Why? Because of the way North Macedonian historiography has and continues to present the relationship between the two neighbouring countries’ historical and cultural legacies. But to understand the origins of the current situation, taking a step back in the past is of the essence.

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COMPLICATED BALKANS Both the territories of nowadays Bulgaria and of North Macedonia were under the Ottoman rule for centuries. In the Balkans, the nation as a modern concept appeared in the late XVIIIth century and developed throughout the XIXth century. The idea of nation and national identity slowly imposed itself under the impulse of urban as well as rural intelligentsias, and revolutionary groups and armed struggles for national liberation began. In 1878, Bulgaria gained its autonomy, but not in the form that it had been promised in the San Stefano Treaty, leaving a territory which it considered ethnically Bulgarian and rightfully hers outside its boundaries: modern-day North Macedonia. So began the story of, on the Bulgarian side – and indeed for some people outside of Bulgaria’s frontiers –, a perceived unfair separation between ethnic “brothers”. Ultimately, there emerged a Macedonian national identity too, which increasingly emancipated itself from the Bulgarian one; the Macedonian language was standardised in the 1940s, and like any nation, North Macedonia built historical myths about its foundation. From the end of the XIXth century up until today, Bulgaria unwillingly had to face the fact that North Macedonia is a separate nation and to accept that its irredentist dreams are just that – dreams.

Today, the litigation between North Macedonia and Bulgaria is mainly centred around language. Bulgarians consider Macedonian as a dialect of Bulgarian which was artificially engineered into a national language and to break the current diplomatic deadlock, among other things Bulgaria even insists that in official documents the EU use the appellation “the official language of North Macedonia” instead of “Macedonian”.

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On the question of language, Alexander Kiossev – Professor in History of Modern Culture at Sofia University – wrote: “Those who argue that the Macedonian language is a dialect of Bulgarian are not clear on the concepts they speak of; they know neither what a dialect is, nor what a language is. (...) They think of languages and the nation in obsolete terms, according to which these are not human constructs, but rather Godgiven.” 2 The reality is that all standard languages are, to some extent, engineered: English, French, or Bulgarian, are no exceptions.

The two countries also fight over the legacy of Gotse Delchev, a nineteenth-century revolutionary. North Macedonians consider Gotse Delchev their national hero, whose fight for the autonomy of their country during the second half of the XIXth century they see as a founding element of their national awakening; the Bulgarians, on the other hand, deny Gotse Delchev being a Macedonian hero altogether since he thought of himself as a Bulgarian. It seems that neither side is willing to accept that he can be a North Macedonian hero while having identified as Bulgarian; Charlemagne, for example, is (quite) incontestably a historical figure shared by both the Germans and the French.

Gotse Delchev Monument in Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria

“CULTURIZED” POLITICS This irruption of a cultural conflict in the highest spheres of diplomatic relations and EU politics has somewhat denatured a debate which should be scholarly, not political; it has transformed it into an over-simplistic dichotomy in which one country is necessarily good and right, and the other evil and wrong, when in fact the truth is that on this issue neither is solely the one nor the other. “The Macedonians go too far with their attempts to differentiate themselves from Bulgarians, and the Bulgarians, with their blind denial of the Macedonian singularity.” 3, said Professor Raymond Detrez – a Belgian specialist of East European culture – in an interview.

But to the regret of many scholars – Bulgarian and Macedonian – the fact remains that the matter has become political. Many intellectuals have written open letters to the governments of both countries, calling them to accept pluralistic interpretations of history, which by definition is not a scientifically exact discipline, and to focus on the present, on building an excellent bilateral relationship, instead of ceaselessly dwelling on the past.

The Bulgarian government’s obstinacy on this cultural issue and its subsequent blocking of the negotiations on North Macedonia’s future EU membership can seem surprising as Bulgaria too would ripe economic benefits from its neighbour’s entry into the Union. The two countries are close trading partners, as in 2019, Bulgaria was North Macedonia’s 3rd most crucial exporting destination, while North Macedonia was in Bulgaria’s top 20 exporting destinations. If North Macedonia were to join the EU, the two neighbours would also benefit from substantial EU funds to build trans-border infrastructures, which would enhance trans-border trade, and therefore be mutually beneficial; economically, this cultural quarrel is a lose-lose situation.

21

What is more, all of this is just a delay: North Macedonia will sooner or later join the EU. And despite not directly taking sides, France and Germany want the historical dispute to be overcome; “reinforced cooperation is in the interest of all”, said France’s President Emmanuel Macron. A dragging on of the deadlock is only a recipe for sour relations in the future.

CULTURE IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE But Bulgaria is certainly not the EU’s “black sheep” with its nationalistic politicisation of culture; instead, it is merely one sheep in a growing herd. It would appear that we have entered an era in which cultural “national interests” are becoming increasingly salient in the European political landscape, notably – although certainly not exclusively – in Eastern Europe. For example, Hungary’s ruling party, FIDESZ, has continually opposed any form of EU pro-immigration policy, which FIDESZ understands as proMuslim immigration because it threatens the Hungarian national identity and culture, which they consider inseparable from Christianity. Similarly, Poland has recently virtually banned abortion because of its supposed incompatibility with Catholic principles, which are central – so Polish right-wing politicians claim – to the Polish identity. In Western Europe, populists brandishing national specificities as electoral slogans are gaining political ground too, and although their parties do not rule – at least not alone –, their impact on society is nevertheless significant; Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini, to only cite two of them, are extremely popular respectively in France and Italy. The former made it to the second round of the French Presidential elections of 2017 and as of now seems to be the only serious opponent of Emmanuel Macron, should he run for re-election in 2022, while the latter was Deputy Prime Minister in Giuseppe Conte’s coalition government until 2019, and still retains popularity amongst a significant portion of the Italian population. Even Germany which, under the leadership of Angela Merkel, often appears like the leading proponent of reasoned, rational, and stable politics within the bloc, has seen a rise in popularity of nationalismpopulism, which raises legitimate questions about the country’s political direction, given Merkel’s approaching retirement after the 2021 autumn elections.

22

Zaev and Borissov in Skopje

The reality is that, regardless of their reasons,

leaders

such as Hungary’s Viktor Poland’s

Orban, Andrzej

Duda, or Bulgaria’s Boyko Borissov – as well as other European populists –

are

indeed

shaping the EU on matters such as immigration and enlargement. Poland is even throwing into question fundamental European values with its reforms on abortion. Still today, national culture guides policy-making and interstate relations more than we think, even in the EU – perhaps THE best embodiment around the world of globalisation and transnational cooperation. It remains to be seen whether this “culturalisation” of diplomacy and politics will pervade the EU and profoundly change it from within, or whether the EU will resist and “stay its liberal, pro-globalisation course”.

FIN.

23

REDEFINING DIPLOMACY GERMANY AND ITS GLOBAL CULTURAL IDENTITY THROUGH THE LENS OF MIGRATION AND GLOBALISATION

BY ANOUSKA JHA.

T

.

his could not be more true in the case of Germany, a nation that is testimony to the notion that history is on a dynamic continuum of ideological and political

change. Since the 19th century, it has experienced what some may call a swinging migration force, wherein the influx of migrants and their impact on german culture has been primarily determined by the political climate that framed society and its ideologies. From 1861-90, as a result of the reductions of transatlantic emigration to the USA due to economic crises, Germany held the largest number of immigrants in the world; approximately 30%. This was due to its vast expansions of high industrialisation and agricultural modernity that drew employable, tax-paying, and often religious migrants who could contribute to Germany’s vast economy, and establish cultural links and reputations on a global scale. The 20th century is a potent example of the intrinsic link between law, migration, and culture, as there are very few historical cases wherein a country’s relationship with the world has been moulded to such an extent by its migration policies. The ‘Century of Refugees’ after the Russian Revolution of 1917, wherein the Weimar Republic became a destination for refugees looking to protect themselves from the implementation of the Soviet system, followed closely by the asylum-opposed National Socialist Party of the 1930s, alludes further to this idea that Germany has been a vacillating player on the diplomatic stage. The 1950s- the present marks dynamic unprecedented shifts in migration and globalisation policies, from the ‘Economic Miracle’ of the Federal Republic in the mid-1940s, the intake of ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s, and the political climax of the end of the Cold War and fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which all revolutionised the image of Germany as a significant player in international relations.

24

The Berlin Wall

Cultural diplomacy is an inevitable outcome of such an intense history, leading to the need for Germany to use its newfound stance as a destination for multiculturalism.

This article explores to what extent Germany has achieved this goal, and will cover a global span ranging from Europe, Africa, and East Asia and these examples will demonstrate how Germany uses culture to remedy itself from its recent turbulent history. More significantly, what does the role of contemporary migration and globalisation policy play in the advancement of cultural relations? Can it be determined that the efforts exalted by German diplomats represent a final push in the field of cultural diplomacy?

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GOETHE INSTITUTE Discussing the growing vastitude of german cultural diplomacy without crediting the work of the Goethe Institute (founded in 1951) would be to abandon the nucleus of the country’s foreign cultural relations. The aim of the institute is mostly to promote the learning of the German language and traditions abroad, to establish harmonious connections with leaders and diplomats. The name ‘Goethe’ itself directly evokes the historical connotations of the infamous writer Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1832), whose employment of the term ‘Welt-Literatur’ was used as an opposing force to the budding nationalism of the Napoleonic Wars. Goethe instead demanded a transnational amalgamation of literature, which viewed the literary world as a ‘totality’ that transcended nationalistic and linguistic boundaries. His emphasis on the need to read literature from countries such as China, England, and India symbolised a refutation of the growing number of xenophobic, nationalistic german poetry in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars in 1812-16. Therefore, the Goethe Institute has successfully preserved this global cultural sentiment, which characterises its lasting influence on the international stage. A fascinating documentary by Deutsche Welle entitled ‘The Last Cultural Diplomat’ explores the work of Klaus-Dieter Lehmann, the president of the Goethe Institute in Germany from 2008-2020, who reshaped the notion of cultural diplomacy in Germany in his 12 years as leader. His emphasis on the need for liberalism, civil society, and democracy as the foundations for prosperity highlight the significance of cultural exchange as a medium of the global confederacy, a timeless quality that symbolises a refreshing humility in an age of vicious political ambition. He states, ‘We are seeing an oversimplification of things and a brutality in disagreements..we need to create a politics that is free and liberal..and we need a cultural education.’ Cultural diplomacy, therefore, is in itself a form of politics removed from its Machiavellian principles; instead, it is a science of cooperation and preservation on a global scale.

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Interestingly, the Goethe Institute was founded in a period where migration dominated domestic policies. The 1940s-50s marked the sudden upsurge in post-war migration, wherein over 8 million inhabitants in the Federal Republic, and 3.6 million in the GDR, were either refugees or ‘ Die Vertriebene’ or expellees from eastern and central Europe. Thus, the institute was founded based on a necessity for cultural cohesion, requiring Germany to maintain peaceful foreign relations to ensure its domestic stability.

EUROPEAN CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: GERMANY AND ITALY- AN ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE TWO NATIONS?.

Very few times in history has there been such an interdependency and collaboration of two nationsGermany and Italy have essentially ridden the potholed path of politics together, their ‘must-win mindset’ of economic policy and prosperity marking the origins of European power politics.

Both countries were founders of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, and have experienced similar revolutions in state affairs. For example, the formation of the German Democratic Republic in 1949 closely followed the Partito Comunista Italiano in 1921, and both nations experienced immense capitalist economic acceleration after WW2, leading to a collective monopolisation of resources and sharing of a common political passage.

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The fascinating impact of these inter-European relations is shown, however, through the sequential migration patterns between Italy and Germany from the mid 20th to 21st century. From 1955, the German Commission introduced Italian ‘guest workers’ into its labour market, essentially providing temporary labour work, leading to a boom in Italian immigration. Whilst this began as mainly short-term labour contracts and rotations, however, led to an abandonment of this bilateral treaty at the end of the 1960s and the creation of the 1961 Rome Treaty, which allowed freedom of movement to Germany for members of the European Common Market. Since then, ItalianGerman migration has certainly experienced fluctuations and has taken place in several waves after the Anwerbestopp (recruitment halt) of 1973, however on the whole, since 1965, there has been a positive net migration of 95,000 Italian migrants to Germany per year. Particularly since 2012, approximately 1,080,936 Italians have migrated to Germany, and 24 % of migrants were in the age bracket of 18-24, showing an increasing young interest in cultural integration. In covering such an expansive data set of migrant statistics, the evidence of its influence lies in how cultural exchange and diplomacy between Italy and Germany has developed.

Surprisingly, despite such close integration between the two countries, there has been a pattern of rising tensions in the last few decades, interestingly for the very reason that there is such close geographic and political distance between them. The ‘euphoria’ of a single shared currency led to changes in collective reliance on the North American market, along with the pre-existing struggles of language barriers and cultural differences.

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Stefan Ulrich of the Süddeutsche Zeitung sums this up exceptionally by describing German-Italian relations as resembling ‘an old-married couple’- there is nothing particularly hostile between them per-say, but that fiery passion of political diplomacy in the 20th century has withered away into a relationship of nods of acknowledgement.

Is this accurate? Perhaps from an economic and political point, yes. For example, the very different approaches to monetary policy, where Germany takes a more rigorous, defensive stance than Italy demonstrates this feeling of growing distance.

Banca d' Italia

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However, as a result of fluctuating Italian migration in Germany, cultural diplomacy remains one of the last standing threads of affiliation. This is demonstrated by the vastitude of artistic influence in both Germany and Italy, where the political journalist D. Desseri describes artists as the ‘cultural diplomats of their national sensitivities’.

Germany’s modern museums and cultural structures act as a paradigm of attraction for Italian artists and architects, whilst Germany is a traditional host destination for major Italian brand events such as Armani and Valentino. A specific example of artistic, cultural diplomacy is the Berlin National Gallery, which is embellished with the work of both ancient and contemporary Italian artists. The Italian Embassy in Berlin and the Italian Culture Center have also organised numerous programs to strengthen the connection between migrants and natives. One prominent example was in November 2017, where the Italian Embassy held an international education conference to offer resources and advice to Italian students who are interested in pursuing higher education in Germany. This reveals the growing reconciliation between the two countries, as the youth see Germany as an inclusive, multicultural, and thriving society which would make the perfect destination for Italian students looking to immerse themselves in such a diverse education system. The event consisted of Italian educators who had worked in Germany and how their migration proved vital to their career prospects and exposure to new companies and organisations. Italy, therefore, resembles the successful outcomes of german migration policy, its ‘Willkommenskultur’ and desire for new refreshing contributions to its society creates a feeling of harmony amongst underlying ‘hard power’ political and economic tensions.

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Giovanni Kronenberg - The Art of the Wunderkammer

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AFRICAN- GERMAN CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: NAMIBIA AND GERMANY- A REMEDY FOR PAST MISTAKES. An outstanding moment in Lehmann’s career is documented by his visit to Namibia in southwest Africa. What distinguishes Namibia from relations with other countries is Germany’s colonial history in the region between 1884-1915. Thus, German-Namibian cultural diplomacy is not just a means of cooperation and friendly artistic exchange, but also a much more powerful means of establishing strong connections in recognition of Namibia's turbulent history. One particular historical event that has driven the need for Germany to involve itself in with Namibian culture and society today is the 1904-08 attack (often termed ‘the forgotten genocide of the 20th century) on the Namibian population, which resulted in over 100,000 victims due to government-sanctioned extermination to eliminate opposition to german settlers. In 2015, the Berlin alliance ‘Völkermord Verjährt Nicht’ presented a petition to the German government to acknowledge its colonial massacres in Namibia as a genocide, leading to increased government dialogue and diplomacy with descendants of its victims, depicting what R. Schellenberg terms ‘a transparent process of reconciliation’. Here the boundaries of ‘soft power’ have been transcended as a way of healing the wounds of the past, and the government's direct involvement in ensuring Namibia can involve itself in german culture presents german cultural diplomacy as an absolute necessity.

Several examples are indicating the expansive cultural exchanges between the two regions; Namibia has also adopted the famous german Oktoberfest and Windhoek Karneval in March and April, which consists of royal balls and parades through the city. Besides, architecture in Namibia also closely resembles that of Germany, with its Romanesque and Gothic buildings. An example is the Christus Kirche, designed by German architect Gottlieb Redecker- the building has an almost flower-topped shape and a German-inspired symmetry, yet its colours and layout blends seamlessly with the warm and sandy background of the Namibian streets, symbolising a sense of intersection between the two cultures 32

Literature and language are also powerful means of manifesting successful cultural diplomacy and this shown through Lehmann’s visit to the Namibian Goethe Institut, in which the learning of the German language is encouraged and popular amongst young people. Lehmann emphasises his need for cultural collaboration through language by stating that ‘Africa changed the way [he] saw the world’ and that only through the linguistic and artistic exchange can the knots of the colonial past be resolved. In 1990, the use of literature to transfer ideas from Namibia across to Germany was shown by the Namibian writer Giselher Hoffman, who wrote several fictional books in the German language. He aimed to use literature as a means of ideological-cultural diplomacy, and his book Die Verloren Jahre, which was published a year after Namibian independence, highlights the sensitive and psychological need for german post-colonial consciousness. The novel tells the story of seven married couples and deals with the themes of national identity, emancipation, and belief. Hoffman intended for these novels to reach not only a Namibian audience but also a German one, essentially using recent political history to create a sense of cultural and humanistic affiliation. The insightful illustrations of hope, fear, and estrangement in the novel make it an embodiment of the notion of cultural exchange and diplomacy itself; it widens an understanding of a nation's history and future desires and cements a shared cultural understanding that functions beyond nationalistic boundaries.

Cover of 'Die Erstgeborenen'

Hence, German-Namibian cultural diplomacy is one that is founded on the complexity and unique colonial history, which makes its cultural exchange and awareness as the binding and healing force between the two nations. Cultural diplomacy is more than a political act; it is also a restorative power.

EAST ASIA AND GERMANY CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: THAILAND AND GERMANY- WHERE MIGRATION MEETS INNOVATION. Migration patterns between Thailand and Germany indicate a growing obligation to exchange diplomatic ideas through culture and art, primarily down to the work of the Goethe Institut. It is perhaps fascinating that two such geographically and culturally dissimilar countries have found a way to use migration as a spring-board into closer relations, acting as evidence of the steadfast nature of ‘soft-power’ as a global force. One need only look at the impact of migration policy in Germany and Thailand in recent years: according to the Statisches Bundesamt, approximately 59,000 Thais migrated to Germany in 2013, and the introduction of Merkel’s immigration Bill in 2015 had resulted in over 1 million East-Asian migrants reading in Germany in 2017. Only earlier this year, Lehmann demonstrated the need to maintain these ties by travelling to Bangkok’s Goethe Institut, to celebrate the Thai partner’s (one of the largest Goethe Institutes in the world) 60th anniversary. What may be deemed as an extraordinary undertaking by the 80-year-old in the midst of the coronavirus, is symbolic of Lehmann’s dedication to cement cultural exchange even after his retirement this year.

In the inspiring documentary dedicated to Lehmann, he discusses the principles of cultural diplomacy and the influence of transnational migration in action when visiting the Hua Lamphong Station in Bangkok, which he describes as a ‘piece of Europe’ modelled on Frankfurt Station.

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Hua Lamphong Station in Bangkok

Architectural parallels are shown through the interior dome shape and giant clocks that mark the centre point of both stations, testimony to the artistic exchanges that have been growing since the 20th century between the two countries. The role of architectural

dialogue

in

German-Thai relations is also shown through the inspiring project of the Büro Ole Scheeren in Bangkok, which in 2018 completed the landmark building of the MahaNakhon Tower. This metropolitan skyscraper overlooks Bangkokfrom 300 feet. The Germany-based architecture company, which has recently opened two new offices in Bangkok and Berlin, expresses its aim for a more global prospect through the building; the tower stands as a centrepiece amongst what Scheeren (the company director) calls ‘the untamable energy of the city’, with its impression of digital pixelation, referring to the growing technological and communicative growth between the countries, as well as a depiction of ‘ancient mountain topography’ implied through the compelling spiral-like structure of the MahaNakhon. Scheeren’s comments on his motives for designing the building highlights the prevalence of its cultural ties, as he claims the architecture represents the city’s ‘aspirations...as one of the unique and powerful qualities’, and that it embodies the ‘inclusiveness of Thai society’. One can therefore view the tower symbolic of diplomacy- the almost ‘unfinished’ structure of the building as a symbol of the evergrowing and steadfast nature of Thai-German unity and migration, and the unique

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structure of the building itself as a mark of universal German solidarity with its Thai partner. Despite being only one example, Ole Scheeren reveals through design, his aim to unify such different nations through the force of culture and ‘soft power’, and the MahaNakhon achieves this by standing as an emblem of the success of German globalisation and migration policy in action.

LOOKING AHEAD - CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES. There appears to be a certain misconception about cultural diplomacy when it is associated with the term ‘soft power’, as it is deemed less prevalent on the political stage and in international affairs. In a world where technology and economic growth carry a hegemonic rule over policies, cultural diplomacy seems as a sort of plenary task to project an image of global harmony. However, Germany stands as an outlier in efforts to promote it, as through the Goethe Institut and other companies such as Büro Ole Scheeren, new dimensions of cultural exchange are being revealed. The work of Lehmann and other german cultural institutions present this form of diplomacy as an embodiment of global unity and dignity- in Thailand, German architecture and education symbolise a dialogue of respect and combined prosperity; in Namibia, an acknowledgement of past mistakes; in Italy, an amalgamation of the two. This leads to a pending question: Where to from here? The retirement of Lehmann in 2020 and the uptaking of the role of president of the Goethe Institut by Carola Lentz marks a shift in cultural diplomacy trajectory. 2020 itself has presented numerous unprecedented challenges that Lentz has recognised as a duty of german society to combat, such as the rise of populism, racial injustice, and the impediments created by the pandemic.

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With regards to political challenges such as populism and race, Lentz describes her new appointment as President as exceptionally vital, as she is now faced with the task of promoting a multicultural dialogue and a ‘protected area’ of free discussion that deals with the role of migration and history as contributors to cultural exchange. The pandemic offers further adversity, as Lentz apologetically admits that unlike Lehmann, her opportunities to travel to the many Goethe Instituts around the world have become limited. Yet, the use of digital communication is an invaluable instrument to retain the successful connections that Germany has made with her counterparts in the last few decades. Perhaps then, 2020 will be a test of the real power of cultural diplomacy. Will it falter in the face of adversity, or remain a humble force for good in a politically unstable world? Very recent events in migration threaten to create broader concerns in diplomatic relations; for example, the decision for the German government to intake the thousands of refugees on the Greek Islands, and the continuous influx of migrants from countries such as Syria and Turkey. Both Lentz and the german government as a whole are faced with the enormous task of not reducing such events down to political pragmatism, but sustaining a humane sense of cooperation between such people and countries, to allow German society to retain its reputation as one of diversity and inclusivity. Thus, we can only look ahead to see whether Angela Merkel’s claim in 2010 that ‘German multiculturalism has utterly failed’ remains accurate, or whether Germany has successfully positioned itself as the world’s ‘last cultural diplomat’.

FIN.

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The Kremlin, Moscow, Russia

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RUSSIAN REVIVAL HOW IS THE KREMLIN USING CULTURAL DIPLOMACY TO EXPAND ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE?

BY OMAR KHAN.

''T

he greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” declared President Vladimir Putin in reference to the dissolution of the Soviet Union from 1988-1991; he

explained that for the Russian people, “it became a genuine tragedy … [as] millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory.” Are we now seeing the Second Gathering of the Russian Lands? Cultural diplomacy has long been recognised as an underestimated, yet highly effective weapon states can wield to enact their foreign policy objectives and the largest nation on Earth is no exception. The Federation’s aim to maintain influence over regions formerly under its predecessor’s direct control is no secret, and cultural diplomacy is one complex, fascinating and strategic method by which they hope to achieve it.

RUSSKIY MIR Russian World. When Putin created the Russkiy Mir Foundation in 2007, he announced its purpose, to promote “the Russian language, as … a significant aspect of Russian and world culture,” though it became clear that there was less of a globalist motive behind its establishment. The Foundation aims to promote a sense of community amongst the Russophone diaspora across the world, most notably in the former USSR. Far from being an independent institution intent on sharing the nuances of Russian culture, the fact that the foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, federal agency head, Konstatin Kosachev, and top Russian Orthodox Church representative, Gregory Alfeev, sit on its board of trustees indicates its direct connection to the Kremlin.

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Moreover, Kosachev leads no ordinary federal agency, but the Rossotrudnichestvo, or agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation. Do not be misled – humanitarian cooperation tends to mean cultural and scientific collaboration in Russian, rather than protecting human rights. The Rossotrudnichestvo, armed with the nominallyindependent Russkiy Mir Foundation, has embarked on a mission to promote a positive image of the Federation, with “centres” established across the globe, the majority in Eastern Europe including eight in Ukraine, four in Moldova, and three each in Bulgaria and Poland. The organisations promote Russian-language schools where knowledge of it has declined and popularises Orthodoxy and pan-Slavic ideals as according to Blitt, 2011, stating that the Foundation is a “proxy body that represents nothing less than a fusion of Orthodox and state institutions”. However, how has the Kremlin deployed them and used its wider powers to expand its sphere of influence?

LITTLE GREEN MEN On 27 February 2014, Russian security forces occupied the Crimean parliament building as it held an emergency session and voted to terminate the government. After a 97% majority voted in favour of union with Russia in a controversial referendum, Crimea was annexed in an act that shocked the world. Despite the sanctions and passionate rhetoric that followed, a perplexing notion lingered in the minds of Western leaders – the conundrum that their widespread condemnation opposed the will of the Crimean people, who showed an intense fervour for the transfer of territory. So how did this happen?

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Criema, Ukraine/Russia, 2014

The Revolution of Dignity also called the Euromaidan Revolution, ousted President Viktor Yanukovych after he postponed the signing of an association agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. When a parliamentary vote of 328-to-0 relieved him of the presidency, Yanukovych requested Russian aid – defending him, Moscow declared his overthrow a coup and supported the counter-protests in eastern and southern Ukraine. The polarisation of the Bread Basket of Europe was never clearer. Interim President Arseniy Yatsenyuk signed the association agreement and his elected successor, the “Chocolate King” oligarch, Petro Poroshenko committed to modernising Ukraine along EU lines – simultaneously, pro-Russian, eastern Ukrainian separatists declared the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and counter-protests in Crimea escalated significantly.

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Crimea has always held a special place within a larger Slavic identity and is even considered a quasi-sacred location. Moreover, it has always had a strong sense of regional identity; for instance, a 2013 study reported that when asked where their homeland was, the majority of residents responded Crimea before Ukraine or Russia.

Nevertheless, the schism with Russia during the death of the Soviet Union created unresolved issues. On 1st December 1991, whilst the Ukrainian independence referendum attracted a 91% majority nationally, there was only a 54% majority in Crimea. Russian efforts helped build a strong base of supporters, and the Russkiy Mir Foundation continued this process: they promoted the Russian language over Ukrainian and undermined the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (based in Kyiv) by popularising the Russian one. Coupled with local movements, this led to a widely held view of Russia as a panacea to their socioeconomic troubles.

Fast-forward to the invasion of the little green men, or unidentified Russian soldiers in February 2014 backing local Berkut riot police in occupying the Isthmus of Perekop and Chonhar Peninsula, effectively cutting Crimea off from the rest of Ukraine and proceeding to allegedly hold parliamentarians at gunpoint whilst they dissolved the Kyiv-backed government in Sevastopol. Protecting the Russophone population was central to the justification of the annexation – according to Sergei Aksyonov (before his ascension to the Crimean premiership), it was his priority to defend the Russophone community’s human rights. Evidence of Russia’s successful soft power came in a 2014 survey that recorded a 5% annual increase in Crimeans in favour of a Russian-Ukrainian merger. Notably, ethnic Ukrainians were not necessarily antiannexation – the greatest divide was between Tatars and ethnic Russians, owing to the horrifying repression of the Tatar community during Soviet times. Language and culture had divided a peninsula that became a microcosm for the whole nation still trapped in conflict today. Crimea demonstrates that the Kremlin treats cultural diplomacy as a weapon equally powerful as the PKP machine guns it provides its soldiers and recognises its place in its foreign policy.

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MOLDOVA’S BESSARABIAN NIGHTS Moldova lies on a fault line between pro-Russian and pro-European spheres, and we can see the effects when the political ground shakes. An example of this is the country’s recent presidential election which also allows us to assess Moscow’s cultural diplomacy towards Moldova.

For almost 500 years, the nation in Bessarabia had not existed as an independent state, prior to the USSR’s dissolution. Following that, pro-Moscow, ethnic Russian separatists established a breakaway state in the west of the country, Transdniestria. The presence of Russian “peacekeepers” in Moldova has long been a source of controversy as has the Kremlin’s influence over the government, both the primary one in Chisinau and the separatist one in Tiraspol. Since 1944, it was Soviet policy to virulently repress any connection to Romania particularly amongst the Moldovan Romanophone population, even converting the script into Cyrillic. Despite independence and the reintroduction of the Latin script, divided loyalties persisted and erupted in a literal division of the sta-

Transdniestria Independence Day, 2018, TCJ

te. Since the early 1990s, Russia has maintained close ties with Transdniestria. Since long-time leader Igor Smirnov’s retirement, Moscow has provided Tiraspol with a prime minister – yet, it refuses to recognise the breakaway region as an independent state to use it against Chisinau when necessary, thus perpetuating the so-called “frozen conflict”.

More broadly, Russian media predominates throughout the nation. Most films, TV shows, concerts, news, arts, and other media outlets are in the Russian language primarily due to the general absence of any independent Moldovan media but also due to the Federation’s greater technological abilities. Despite a 1994 agreement to collaborate on arts, music, youth exchanges, scientific research, Russia’s cultural diplomacy has not yet found a smooth transition to political control, hence its tortured support for Transdniestria and Gagauzia (another pro-Russian breakaway state in Moldova’s south led by ethnic Turks). For instance, though it supplies Transdniestria with free energy, it charges Moldova. As 30% of Moldovan GDP comes from remittances, the ~500,000 migrants in Russia are often used as leverage when dealing with Chisinau.

Moldova, however, has tended to resist Russia’s methods of wielding influence. For example, in 2014 the pro-Russian Partidul Noastru (“Our Party”) was banned though its leader Renato Usatii, connected to Vladimir Yakunin, the Russian Railways chief, was still elected mayor of Balti. After Russia intervened in Donbas, tensions escalated: Moldova expelled five embassy officials for espionage, and a January 2018 law was passed directed at curtailing Russian media presence. Perhaps the greatest example of Russia’s waning cultural influence was the election of Maia Sandu by a 58% majority in November 2020, for though the defeat of pro-Russian Igor Dodon was not an explicit attack on Moscow. Rather a response to the endemic corruption plaguing the state, it demonstrates that no matter how great the Kremlin’s cultural diplomacy may be, a national desire for change cannot be repressed.

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RETURN OF THE GREAT GAME The Great Game was a high-stakes, political competition between the British and Russian Empires in the nineteenth century for influence over Central Asia. Now, more than 100 years later, diplomatic confrontation has returned to the region, but things have changed drastically.

Razhmezhevanie, a Soviet territorial delimiting policy in the 1920s established the nations of Central Asia as we would come to know them following their independence in the early 1990s. The USSR’s successor has striven to maintain their influence over the region and use cultural diplomacy, amongst other tools, to achieve this. Working in

Comission of Rezhmezhevanie of Central Asia

their favour is the fact that the new states inherited Soviet-era institutions and leaders, and that their troublesome transition to market economies was marked by a dependency on exporting natural resources, placing Russia close to, if not at the top of their list of trading partners. However, around thirty years have passed since independence, so has Russian influence kept up?

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Sentiments of the Federation’s “imperialistic behaviour” amongst Central Asian populations has forced Moscow to avoid the more aggressive approach it would take in the Baltics or Ukraine and focus on cultural exchanges, primarily educational programmes. However, Russia has competition. The EU, Turkey, China, Iran, and others have recognised opportunities in the region, and thus a cultural cold war has developed. Under the umbrella of EU National Institutes for Culture, numerous organisations have worked to build relations with Central Asian states including, but not limited to, the: British Council, running English courses and supporting the “WeAlmaty” project intent on developing Almaty, Kazakhstan into a “smart city”; Alliance Française, teaching French and arranging cultural exhibitions on history, art, music and food; Goethe-Institut, teaching German and sharing theatre, radio and newspapers; Zlata, raising awareness of Bulgarian art and music; and, three Houses of Polish Culture too.

Unanimous membership of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Türksoy has seen Turkey increase its presence by promoting Turkish-language schools across the region using the slogan “Brotherhood of Turkish Nations”. Ankara has also financed several higher education institutes such as the successful Manas University in Bishkek.

Even Iran has launched state-operated media outlets in Tajikistan. Russia has responded with not only the Rossotrudnichestvo and Russkiy Mir centres, but also the Pushkin Institute, Gosfilmofond and Russian Academy of Arts to share its culture.

Despite all programmes though, higher education is still the grand prize – it is the opportunity to win over the next generation of leaders. Consequently, Russia has directed its universities to specifically take in more Central Asian students and has worked to exploit their advantage of the Russian-language presence in these communities.

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President Tokayev attends a presentation of the Kazakh alphabet in Latin, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan.

Ultimately, the most important question is how these cultural efforts have been received. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, prior to his nominal resignation to the status of Elbasy, developed a multi-vector policy to escape any one nation’s sphere of influence and balance both Russian and Western interests; for Kazakhstan, this came from a desire to hold political clout matching its vast oil reserves. A cultural manifestation of “multi-vectorism” is the transformation of the Kazakh script from Cyrillic to Latin scheduled for 2025, symbolic of a step away from Moscow. Despite this, though, elites in Nur-Sultan remain Russophiles, and the Russian language is still promoted in educational institutions (e.g. the Miras military academy where the course can be taught in either Russian and Kazakh or Russian and English). Similarly, Tajikistan has opted for the balanced approach especially considering early instability delayed the establishment of relations with Western powers; in 2009, it prepared a bill to remove Russian as the inter-ethnic lingua franca, though it is still seen as closer to Moscow than the West. Kyrgyzstan demonstrates a clear pro-Russian orientation especially amongst the political elites, and the lack of a visible EU presence (despite the foreign aid it provides) helps to enforce this; it should be noted that popular dissent is still prevalent, particularly in Bishkek, though this is typically due to domestic issues rather than foreign alliances. Despite cultural differences, all three remain associated with the Eurasian Economic Union, Moscow’s unfruitful attempt to provide a counterweight to the EU’s customs union.

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Tashkent has promoted mustaqillik (self-reliance) in Uzbek foreign policy over the last decade and has acknowledged the foreign aid it receives from the EU. Notwithstanding this, however, Uzbekistan hosts divisions of prestigious Russian institutions such as the Moscow State University of Lomonosov and the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics.

Though

President

Gurbanguly

Berdimuhamedow

has

stressed

Turkmenistan’s special relations with Russia, local elites in Ashgabat remain suspicious of Moscow’s actions. The Turkmen government, in particular, has proven particularly adept at playing nations off each other by engaging with both the United States and Russia on trade and commercial relationships respectively. This non-alignment strategy of exploiting competition for influence could be something that more Central Asian nations adopt.

Overall, EDB Barometers surveying people across all countries in the region show an overall preference for cultural and educational exchanges with Russia over the EU but have given some indication of waning influence particularly as other attractive countries are mentioned such as Turkey, India and China.

DRAGON VS BEAR China, the hitherto silent superpower has exploded onto the political stage, initiating a cold war with the United States and pursuing its Silk Road Economic Belt initiative with frightening determination. Lying at the centre of that plan is Central Asia. Hence Russia’s biggest opponent, posing a threat even larger than that of the EU, in maintaining influence through cultural diplomacy is the People’s Republic. Communist vs Ex-communist. China has fortified ties and trade links with most Central Asian states to protect its security, energy and economic interests. However, there remains strong anti-China fear throughout the region hence the People’s Republic’s pursuit of cultural diplomacy – they have: opened Confucius Institutes, increased local media coverage in the indigenous languages, provided soft loans, and organised Cultural Exchange Forums. The economic enticement of relations with Beijing is too good for 48

most governments to resist, but there are nonetheless significant problems that Moscow will no doubt attempt to exacerbate, that is if they have not been already.

Firstly, there are large Uighur populations across the region; therefore, concentration camps and alleged genocide in Xinjiang causes serious concern. Second, locals find it difficult to access independent information and receive unbiased facts. Finally, the fear of alienation and fifth columnists is quite prevalent with one Tajik study reporting that people believed Chinese workers in hospitals, restaurants, intentionally do not speak the language to reserve those services for Chinese people, a fear that is no doubt music to Moscow’s ears. Despite this, the growing number of students drawn to China will pose a significant long-term threat to the Kremlin’s thus far successful strategy in Central Asia.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russia's President Vladimir Putin next to Chinese honor guard Beijing, June 8, 2018.

Belarus President Lukashenko and Russian President Putin in Moscow, December 2018

THE UNION STATE When Svetlana Tikhanovskaya fled to Lithuania in August 2020 after her children’s safety was threatened by President Alexander Lukashenko’s administration, the democratic protest movement could have very well fallen apart. However, it did not.

The people continued to resist Belarus’ dictator. Despite the KGB’s violent arrests and kidnappings of opposition leaders, the people are continuing to resist. So what does the view of Minsk look like from the Kremlin? And how will Moscow adapt its cultural diplomacy strategy accordingly?

Your history is fake. Since the early 1990s, Russian propagandists have attempted to convince the people that independent Belarusian history, culture and identity are not real and that even their language is just a “corrupted” version of Russian, in one of the 50

most extreme cultural, diplomatic policies the ex-USSR has pursued. The gradual takeover has enabled this modern Russification process by Rossotrudnichestvo, Russkiy Mir and the Gorchakov Fund of Belarus’ media during the past two decades.Western negligence has also led to Belarus being encompassed in Russian cyberspace, making disinformation easier to spread. The Kremlin’s narrative revolves around Soviet glory, Orthodoxy and pan-Slavism with a 2018 study reporting 25% of people believe the source of their statehood is the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, double those in 2009. The youth, with no memory of the USSR, are fed pro-Russian ideas through educational events such as the Union League of Debates. Finally, that only 3% of the population speak Belarusian daily and the rest use Russian is a significant victory for Moscow.

Yet, 77% hold a positive or neutral image of the EU, and despite the 1996 Union State agreement, only 12.4% support a merger. Moreover, the people calling for democracy on the streets also represents a threat to Russia’s political and cultural hold over the nation. So what is the Kremlin’s plan? The secret Sochi agreement between Lukashenko and Putin nominally called for constitutional reform in Belarus though this is widely seen as the inception of a Moscow-friendly, managed the transition of power, out of Lukashenko’s hands which have been long-awaited by the Kremlin. Ultimately, handing power to the pro-democracy youth risks undermining Russia’s cultural degradation policy and use of Belarus as a buffer state between it and NATO/EU and is therefore not an option. However, the more people that wave the white-red-white flag of the Belarusian Democratic Republic from before Nazi or Soviet takeover, the weaker Moscow’s cultural diplomacy strategy becomes.

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BACK TO THE USSR? Federica Mogherini, and EU High Representative, once said that “culture is a powerful tool to build bridges between people … against those trying to divide us.” Cultural diplomacy should be used to bring people together on both the intranational and international stages, but unfortunately many nations, including the Russian Federation, use it to divide and rule. It does not always work as has been noted but never does any good when it is used for a unilateral geopolitical gain. Putin is trying to rebuild the Soviet Union in everything, but name yet faces an unsurmountable obstacle: free will.

Political and economic diplomacy will always grab the headlines, in one sense, because they are more straightforward and more logical than cultural diplomacy. The latter is a complex, long-term strategy that only the greatest chess grandmasters can wield effectively, and as we have seen: Russia always knows how to play the game.

FIN.

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ISRAEL AND THE GULF STATES A HEAVENLY FUSION OF CULTURES OR AN OPPORTUNISTIC ALLIANCE?

BY AFEK SHAMIR.

T

he green pastures of the white house’s southern lawn presented the perfect symbol for a changing Middle East: hope. The last year exposed a Middle Eastern

affaire de coeur: a secret relationship between enemies that are now being flaunted as a powerful friendship here to stay for the long run. When Israel and the United Arab Emirates agreed to normalise relations in August, and soon after, when Bahrain joined the party, they marked the first peace deals between Israel and an Arab nation since 1994. In the months that followed, trade deals, investments, medical aid and flights were all established, in what promises to be a fruitful diplomatic win for all parties. But how important were state interests to the forming of the Abraham Accords? Could it be that Arab and Israeli cultures are finally learning how to coexist?

Signing of the Abraham Records, Washington

As with any fair deal, every side is due to receive their end of the bargain. Israel manifested its long-standing mantra that peace does not always have to be self-hurting.

On the backdrop of Israel’s loss of the Sinai Peninsula in its peace with Egypt, and its withdrawal from the Gaza strip to advance peace talks with the Palestinians, the Abraham Accords were a living proof that the Middle East is changing its attitudes towards the Jewish State. Apart from halting potential annexation of the Jordan Valley, Israel did not have to give up any land, nor place itself at a critical security risk. It was finally able to prove that it’s Iron Wall’ strategy – stipulating that Israeli strength will make its neighbours realise that their only choice is to acknowledge their existence has paid off. Perhaps more vitally, it confirmed that it could realistically make peace with an Arab state without committing to a two-state solution with the Palestinians and without needlessly conforming to the Arab Peace Initiative.

Refusing to let his Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi steal his thunder at the signing event and instead choosing to fly to Washington personally, Prime Minister Netanyahu utilised the accords as a future election token. Leveraging his diplomatic victory, Netanyahu reminded the Israeli electorate that albeit legal complications, there is only one person who can genuinely lead Israel to become a respected global powerhouse.

Focused on distracting the Israeli public from coronavirus complications, economic hardships, mass protests, and his court hearings, Netanyahu used the ‘peace card’ in countless Knesset debates, interviews, and social media videos.

The UAE, Bahrain and ‘ghost-signee’ Saudi Arabia, appear to have profited as well. Not only did they earn a valuable ally against their regional enemy Iran, but they also gained Israel’s powerful hand in trade, technology and innovation. Early estimates indicate that the normalisation of ties could result in bilateral trade that exceeds $6bn – specifically in the oil, medical, pharmaceutical, fintech, tourism and innovation sectors.

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Furthermore, even though UAE officials point out there is no military element to the agreement with Israel, Washington is due to supply the Emirates with F-35 stealth fighters, MQ-9 Reaper drones, and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, having previously resisted doing this due to an arms export treaty. The UAE hopes that these highly advanced weapons will help place itself in a better position against the Iranian threat. Crucially, The Abraham Accords pave a much shorter road between the Gulf and Washington; one which they hope will prevent an American withdrawal from the Middle East.

It is undoubtable that state interests played a considerable role in the creation of the Abraham Accords. But what makes these any different to other Israeli peace treaties?

Well, since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, it was modelled into what David M. Halbfinger of the New York Times labelled a ‘modern-day Sparta’. Surrounded by enemies who openly called for its destruction, Israelis found the prospect of peace hard to come by. That is why the Camp David Accords in 1979 and the Wadi Araba Treaty in 1994, with Egypt and Jordan respectfully, proved to be so popular with the Israeli public. Yet the 41 yearlong peace with Egypt, is a different type of peace to the one recently celebrated in Washington. The normalisation of relations with the UAE and Bahrain already exhibits far more cordial relations than treaties with Egypt and Jordan.

This makes excellent sense, too. After all, Israel fought an array of wars with its close neighbours, whilst never being in a direct war with the UAE or Bahrain. Crucially, the UAE is attempting to scrape the image in the Arab world that peace with Israel is made for purely strategic goals. It is trying to progress an idea of a peaceful Middle East, where religions are equal and respected, and mutual economic and social co-operation is encouraged.

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The accords commit to "spurring economic growth, enhancing technological innovation and forging closer people-to-people relations”. These came into action far more resolutely than anyone had expected. Even before the finalisation of the deal, the US, the UAE, and Israel jointly established a $3bn ‘Abraham Fund’ to help stimulate private sector investments between the two nations. Furthermore, Israel and the UAE agreed on a stellar 28 direct flights per week, after impressive levels of demand from the Israeli and Emirati public. Considering that the UAE is a short 3-hour flight away from Tel Aviv, offers 0% corporate and income tax, and provides an internationally acclaimed business environment, Israeli businesses are almost inevitably going to expand their horizons to the Gulf. Economic co-operation, in its current form, has a direct correlation to cultural advancements between Israelis and Arabs. A perfect example rests in the recent acquisition of Israel’s most right-wing football club, Beitar Jerusalem, by a member of the Emirati royal family Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Nahyan. Beitar fans are historically notorious for their anti-Arab chants and racist attitude towards the incorporation of Arab players into its squad. Israeli owner Moshe Hogeg, who still owns 50% of Beitar, tells the public: “We want to show to young kids that we are all equal and that we can work and do beautiful things together”. Albeit Shiekh Zayed and Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu

Beitar fans storming their recent training session in protest of the acquisition, most commentators remain hopeful that Israel’s far-right will accept the Emirati investor as a valued shareholder. Sheikh Hamad, when asked in an interview how the deal had come together, responded with a heart-warming answer: “God connected us.”

This cultural connection is one that extends beyond state lines and is gradually developing into a fine-tuned harmony between Judaism and Islam. In the UAE, the Abrahamic Family House is under construction - a shared religious site with an extraordinary mosque, synagogue and church. The synagogue is estimated to be the most expensive one to have been built since the ancient Temple of Solomon, providing reasonable proof that the UAE hopes to welcome its Jewish counterparts with honour.

Furthermore, the UAE’s first-ever kosher restaurant has recently opened in the Burj Khalifa, in a further attempt to attract more Israelis to visit the Gulf. As opposed to Egypt and Jordan, the UAE is attempting to accommodate and integrate Jewish and Israeli culture, proving that interests might not be the only tenant of the deal.

With Saudi Arabia dubbed the next likeliest country in the Gulf to normalise relations with Israel, a cultural revolution is taking place in the Middle East. State interests indeed have, and always will pave the path for diplomacy in the region. However, the Abraham Accords signal that a slightly different approach is materialising. A path that recognises economic and military advantages, but also aspires to tolerate different religions, and aims to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute once and for all.

FIN.

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A CULTURE OF LISTENING AFRICA SPOKEN BY OTHERS

BY TIM REIN

C

hinua Achebe, mostly known for his even-on-Obamas-reading-list book ''Things Fall Apart”, gives in his short essay “Traveling White” a little anecdote about

Wolfgang Zeidler, former president of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (aka the German Supreme Court). This judge – retiring as fashionably as possible – planned to go to Namibia to stack his Vitamin D storage. But before he was able to board his flight, he got “Things Fall Apart” into his hands and after presumably reading it - “[…] closed the Namibia chapter”.

Chinua Achebe

For Chinua Achebe, this decision was an obvious triumph of common sense and humanity (if the judge had taken his flight, he would have probably ended up legitimising some dictator-Esque regime). But because it seemed as if this action would not need any second thought, Achebe was puzzled by the fact that a well-educated, literate man had such a blind spot about Africa. He asks ironically: Did he never read the papers? Of course, Zeidler did, but as Achebe points out: after a lifetime of hearing Africa spoken about by others, he needed to hear Africa speak for itself. He seemed to have listened – maybe for the first time – to the people worth listening to.

MASTERING THE ART OF LISTENING: So, with the words following these words, I want to express my belief that the notion of listening is criminally neglected and that if done correctly it can ease a lot of problems – furthermost in politics. Crucially the task of listening is more demanding than most people think, mainly because we tend to forget it, the older we become. It means treating everything that penetrates our ears for the first time as an equal possibility to what we know so far. No bias or as few as possible should throw its shadow over what has been said.

But this is difficult even if you consider yourself a great listener. Just consider a famous example in Claude-Levis-Straus’ “Triste-Tropiques”. There he argues that cannibalism or child sacrifice can be a well-accepted part of some tribal cultures. While our western-European, ‘Enlighted’ minds would form words like ‘barbaric’ or ‘primitive’, they would in return be shocked about our custom to give away the elderly to a foster home. Of course, we will now have well-rounded arguments to support our worldview, our way of living, but so would they. And can we claim that our state-of-being is better, more rightful, just because we supposedly do everything with reason?

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CONVICTIONS: So, what is the point of these anecdotes besides letting me appear literate? Because I think the way we interact with people of a different culture, make foreign politics, plan the belief heavily tarnishes debt reliefs or developing-aid in our way of living as being the greatest – and thus our firm conviction that everyone should emulate us with the best to their ability. This doesn’t mean our convictions are necessarily wrong, but cultures not obeying them or exploring alternatives are neither.

There are numerous examples during or shortly after the colonisation period where people started drawing lines on the paper creating national states while ignoring the fact that the tribal organisation in some of these regions have prevailed for several centuries or even millennia (keeping the difficult balance in these multi-ethnic environments). But why did these people turn a blind eye? Because they grew up living in national states, regarded this as an achievement and because they just couldn’t accept other forms of living working equally fine. Worst of all the people who were divided or united via the line-drawing exercise these gentlemen were engaged with, weren’t included in this process. Maybe if the colonisers of the past had listened, they would have caused less harm than they subsequently did.

Let’s now turn to the notions of intercultural exchange, cultural diplomacy or international understanding - endeavours I regard as essential for successful global politics. To my mind, these enterprises aim at enabling foreign political decisions based on understanding the culture the other party is immersed in. Blatantly speaking: If I know the intrinsic biases of the other party and the other party knows mine, it is more likely and easier to strike a deal favouring both styles of living.

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Muslim Prayer

If

I,

for

example, know

the

people in a country to

go

prayer

every

day

between 12:00

and

13:00, and I know

how

important it is to them, I might not propose a deal that would require a quarter of the population working through 12:00 until 13:00. So, while better cultural understanding might be a potent tool in problem-solving, one must not forget the limitations that come with it.

The two main limitations I have already mentioned before: Don’t overestimate your culture and your state-of-being and only because you don’t understand their customs it doesn’t make them negligible or unnecessary. The big problem with cultural exchange and diplomacy is that we never fully grasp the essence of something if we haven’t engaged with it for a long, long time. We will always remain outsiders, and we will always be susceptible to the bias of our own culture because we will always find enough reasons to justify why our lifestyle is undoubtedly the best. I mean why should we live the way we live if we, in general, don’t consider it to be the best way of living? Thus, I would argue that if you have a feeling on how people outside your cultural circle behave, think and act, you are probably wrong and project your own bias onto your judgement. On the contrary: If your counterpart focuses on some customs, emphasis

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points that seem quite arbitrary, even negligible to you, you are probably on a good way to approach their thinking appropriately – and thus respectfully. It needs to be remembered: You will almost always be an alien to their thinking.

This doesn’t mean that you have to accept everything they do and say, nor hail there societal functioning as something untouchable. But before you decide and spit out your political proposal or judgement, just listen to them – for longer than you want to – and then start your biased reasoning, as hard as this might be. Or to rephrase Achebe: Let speak Africa for itself, listen carefully and then start thinking.

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DEVELOPMENTS IN ETHIOPIA A NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AWARDED TOO EARLY?

BY LEA WOWRA

I

n 2018, Abiy Ahmed became Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and the embodiment of hope for the East African region. In 2019, he received the Nobel Peace Prize for

reaching a peace treaty with Eritrea that ended 20 years of violent conflict. The international community was dazzled. One year later, developments in Ethiopia do not look as rosy. In midst of a civil war, the Ahmed administration now faces military confrontations with forces loyal to the political leadership in the northern Tigray region that could potentially destabilise the entire Eastern African region. Was this foreseeable? And if so, has the Norwegian Nobel Committee set a wrong example?

PM Abiy Ahmed recieveing Noble Peace Prize, 2018

“For his efforts to achieve peace and international cooperation, and in particular for his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with neighbouring Eritrea” – these were the words that made Abiy Ahmed the Nobel Peace Prize laureate of 2019.

Rightfully so? – Today, Ethiopia is struggling with a civil war – and it is the Ahmed administration that has brought the country to this point. That, despite all the hopes that had been placed in the energetic, charismatic and rapidly promoted young leader.

He seemed to be the turning point in Ethiopian history, someone with the ability to unite the country that had long grappled with ethnic strife. A reformer with both Christian and Muslim background from the Oromo community, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic community that had long complained about marginalisation.

To grasp the conflict that was brewing behind the optimistic headlines, one must look back to when Ahmed took office. The current Prime Minister came to power as part of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition, which had been led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). In 2019, Ahmed replaced the EPRDF with his Prosperity Party with which the TPLF refused to merge. The TPLF had been the dominant political force in Ethiopia for almost 30 years; its political and military power had given it complete control over Ethiopia’s economy and natural resources. It had long been accused, and rightfully so, of human rights violations and corruption – particularly of fuelling donor aid into military budgets. This had culminated in widespread protests in the Oromia and Amhara regions whose respective parties unexpectedly joined forces in 2018 and broke TPLF-hegemony by electing Ahmed Prime Minister.

Ahmed kicked off massive political and economic reforms, many of which directly threatened TPLF-dominance. He privatised state-owned enterprises, introduced new currency notes to fight corruption, lifted censorship regulations, released thousands of political prisoners and journalists that the TPLF-led government had arrested and

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brought about balanced ethnic representation in the military and security sector. He signed a peace treaty with Eritrea which, in turn, outraged TPLF-leaders. An assassination attempt against Ahmed followed in June 2018, initiated by a former TPLF security chief, dismissed by Ahmed, who fled to the Tigray region and has not been handed over since. Meanwhile, deadly ethnic-based conflicts in all regions (except for the Tigray-region) have increased and are said to be financed by TPLF-leaders.

The conflict peaked in September 2020, when the Ahmed administration postponed federal elections due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the region of Tigray, defying the government ban, held its own parliamentary election. Since then, Addis Ababa and Tigray have accused each other of being illegal administrations. The situation further escalated: The TPLF was accused of attacking a governmental military base in the Tigray region and killing and injuring several soldiers. Ahmed called this attack the “crossing of a red line” and issued an ultimatum for the TPLF to surrender. Military confrontation began after its passing and have continued since. Meanwhile, human Amhara militia men Addis Zemen, Ethiopia, on November 10, 2020.

rights organisations are speaking of massacres with hundreds of civilian casualties and missiles fired from the Northern Tigray-region across the Eritrean border. Thousands of refugees have already entered neighbouring Sudan. Ahmed surely has not delivered the swift and surgical military campaign he promised.

To put it bluntly, one could have seen this coming. The long-standing conflict between the TPLF and Eritrea which arose over a territory dispute, that has still not been resolved, persists. The Eritrean regime, in turn, had been supporting Ethiopian opposition groups for years, many of whom were Oromo. Ahmed, from the Oromocommunity himself, antagonised the TPLF consequently when signing the peace treaty and the TPLF refused to accept the treaty as such. Admittedly, the peace treaty significantly decreased the casualties due to the border conflict. However, fighting continues between Eritrean and TPLF-led forces. Thus, the uncomfortable truth is that the peace treaty is jointly responsible for violent conflicts within Ethiopia today – because it has resolved no tensions in the region at all.

Doubtlessly, it is easy to criticise the Ahmed administration today. And this is precisely what is being done. The media is swamped with headlines about the “Nobel Peace Prize-winning bomber-jacket-Abiy.”

Was it wrong to sign a peace treaty although regional tensions had not been resolved?

– Surely not if it minimized casualties significantly.

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Receiving the Nobel Peace Prize can be equated with receiving backing from the “Western World” – or even as “a call for action” as Obama phrased it in 2009 (It surely is questionable whether he lived up to it.). However, a peace treaty is always signed by two parties and, in this case, one party is a draconian, authoritarian regime. Upholding the agreement in this way, thus, undermines living conditions of hundreds of thousands Eritrean refugees and people in Eritrea where draconian policies, that had been justified by the border war, persist. This is not to criticise Ahmed for seeking the peace agreement. However, the Norwegian Nobel Committee could have rather backed his domestic reforms instead, for they are, considering Ahmed’s background, much more revolutionary.

Still, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has not set a wrong example by putting Ahmed on the pedestal. The truth is that a militarily strong and hegemonic party will rarely cede its power to a rival without any backlash. Rooting out corruption and paving the way for democracy certainly is a precarious undertaking. The Covid-19 pandemic, as always, only added fuel to the tensions. Postponing elections is a highly sensitive move in a young democracy whose prime minister committed himself to free and fair elections as well as to strict term limits. Conditions for the Ahmed administration were and are everything but easy.

In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is the centre of gravity. Hopes were high that the country would give rise to a new era of stability and development. Backing Abiy’s effort to curb hostilities by the international community may still have important spill over effects. And if elections in post-corona Ethiopia are free and fair, the Nobel Peace Prize is certainly deserved. For now, we can only hope that the pacific aspirations Ahmed voiced in 2018 will lead to yet another turning point in current developments and finally bring peace to the country. I am certain no Nobel Peace Prize laureate would want to be in his shoes.

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FRANCAFRIQUE FROM IMPERIALISM TO CULTURAL DIPLOMACY, A STUDY OF FRENCH INTERVENTION IN AFRICA.

P

BY JOHN MORGAN.

erhaps the most telling insight into the French political establishments’ view of its former African colonies was given by former president Jacques Chirac when

he said: “Without Africa, France would become a third-rate power”. While this statement certainly overstates the impact Africa has on France’s international standing, it is telling into the French mindset. France’s relationship with its former colonies followed a markedly different path than it’s fellow European imperial powers. After the Second World War, it had become clear that Europe could no longer keep Africa under its colonial grip. With their economies destroyed and local demands for independence gaining traction, the situation had become unsustainable for the main European colonial powers. There were notable exceptions to this. France sought to maintain it’s holding on Algeria, which, unlike its other African colonies, was considered an integral part of metropolitan France. The Iberian dictatorships of Spain and Portugal both fought violent wars of national liberation. However, in general, most countries accepted that colonialism must come to an end.

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The different ways these colonial powers went about decolonisation shaped their relationship with Africa to this day. Great Britain mostly opted for a hard break with their formal dependencies. They tended to either leave entirely or try to hold on to their colonial holding through force. This was the case in Kenya, where the British spent years trying to suppress the Mau Mau uprising. While Britain can boast of the Commonwealth of Nations, the ties to its former colonies are primarily symbolic.

France, on the other hand, opted for a third way besides completely breaking off ties or trying to maintain total control through force. In 1960, the French offered their colonies a choice: a clean break or independence while maintaining close ties through a new French Community. In the end, only Guinea would opt for a complete break with its former colonial masters.

In all the rest of France’s colonies, direct control would be replaced by a more subtle form of “Francafrique”. This was a strategy devised by Charles de Gaulle to ensure France maintained substantial influence in Africa. The most blatant form of France continuing to call the shots in its supposedly independent colonies was through the CFA Franc. The CFA Franc is a currency used only in West Africa, yet it controlled by the French treasury. While it does provide monetary stability to developing countries, it has been criticised since it means that these African countries have no say in deciding their monetary policy. It also leads to the humiliating situation of African countries having to ask their former colonial master for permission to borrow what is supposed to be their currency. There are also strong business and economic links, frequently associated with corruption, that maintains strong ties between France and its former African colonies.

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A less visible but still important form of French influence is cultural and linguistic diplomacy. France is unique among former European colonial powers in that it actively promotes its language as a vehicle of soft power. In typical French fashion, this is done through a centralised government institution: The International Organisation of La Francophonie. Its primary purpose is to promote the French language through media and education. Elected in 2017, President Emmanuel Macron has taken this policy to new heights. He plans to spend hundreds of millions of euros to boost the French language to overtake English in Africa. This effort corresponds to other recent French investments in Africa. Most notable is the ongoing French military intervention in the Sahel that began in 2014. The mission was originally launched to push back recent gains made by Islamist insurgents. To this day, the mission continues.

French troops in Sahel

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France’s efforts to use soft power to maintain its influence need to be modernised if they are to succeed. Otherwise, the significant military and security investments they have made in recent years will likely be in vain. Younger generations of Africans are increasingly resistant to France’s historical domination of their countries. President Macron has made some efforts to rebalance the relationship. His recent initiative to return some of the stolen African art and artefacts in French museums is a good start.

But these kinds of cultural measures will only go so far. To maintain real influence in Africa, France will have to remake a relationship that has traditionally depended on corruption and cronyism.

FIN.

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YOGA CULTURE INDIA’S BIGGEST SOFT POWER

BY PRATHAMESH JAGTAP.

I

f China has Panda diplomacy, then India has Yoga!

Today, some form of yoga is practised by over two billion people around the world.

This is dramatically higher than most other forms of physical exercise or sport, representing around 25% of both the Eastern and Western hemispheres of humanity.

Since 2015, June 21st is globally recognised as the International Day of Yoga, when huge groups of practitioners gather and participate in massive events with hours-long virtual and in-person sessions highlighting the spiritual and physical benefits of yoga.

However, the date has very little to do with the ancient Indian traditional practice.

It was symbolically selected due to the Summer solstice in the northern hemisphere, which is known to be the longest day of the year. There is a belief that Shiva, one of the main gods of Hinduism and supposedly the first yogi ever, began sharing the knowledge of yoga on the second full moon after the Summer solstice.

Very few people know, however, that the International Day of Yoga is a direct result of a successful lobby effort by Indian authorities within the structures of the United Nations. In September 2014, during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s very first year in power, he gave an enthusiastic speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) proposing the adoption of an official date for the worldwide promotion of yoga.

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Detail of ‘The Feast of the Yogis,’ Allahabad, 1603–1604

Yoga is an ancient physical, mental, spiritual, and philosophical practise which originated in India over five thousand years ago. The Bhagavad Gita makes two important statements: “yoga-sthah kuru karmaani” (Do your duty with a yoga approach) and “samatvam yoga uchyate” (balance is the essence of yoga). Yoga is an approach to life that focuses on physical balance, mental equilibrium and working towards a harmonious synthesis of diverse elements, including the protection of the environment.

One of India’s most notorious and popular cultural exports is unquestionably associated with positive concepts such as peace, personal fulfilment, health, consciousness, harmony, relaxation, balance, self-improvement, and fitness.

Capitalising on the growing popularity of the practice in many countries, Modi saw a clear opportunity to advance his nationalistic agenda on the global stage, while also strengthening ties with other countries and elevating India’s profile, culture and positive image abroad. Urging the world to embrace yoga, in other words, is the same as asking the international community to pay more attention to India and its current and potential contributions to the world.

By praising India’s roots, history and disseminated wisdom, Narendra Modi is attempting to showcase the country’s remarkable socio-economic development over the past decades, promising economic prospects for the new decade, and the apparent impact of India’s demographics — the country will very likely surpass China in population size by 2024. Establishing a date to revitalise yoga within the world’s leading multilateral organisation is a political statement marking this nation’s rising place in the international scenario.

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This foreign policy move reflects India’s domestic political trends. In November 2014, India established the Ministry of AYUSH (Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy), to develop education, research, and propagation of indigenous alternative medicine systems in India.

Most of India’s embassies and consulates around the world are now used to organise yoga sessions to commemorate June 21, much evidencing the Ministry of External Affairs orchestrated initiative. Military personnel, police officers and other civil servants have been encouraged to practice yoga daily as a compulsory exercise to improve mind and body control.

Furthermore, Narendra Modi himself, as chief of State, has turned himself into an actual and virtual poster boy of yoga: protocols and classes are made available in video format on the internet in official governmental channels using Modi’s 3D avatar as an instructor.

Yoga Day New Delhi, 2019

If until 2019 the International Day of Yoga was all about public events and mass participation, 2020 saw a major indoor and isolationist turn. Due to the social distancing measures and lockdowns that came into force in almost all countries, Modi tried to emphasise the multidimensional solutions that yoga could bring to the problems and challenging times imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Among other words, India’s Prime Minister had claimed the practice helps to strengthen anyone’s immune system. He had also highlighted that yoga stimulates empathy, emotional and psychological stability while also providing a valuable alternative for societies to focus more on preventive health care. Broadly, there is no doubt that yoga represents the pursuit of pleasantness in life as well as the intention of achieving improvement from within.

Just like every human being is an expression of his or her inner experience, other countries should naturally hope that India’s recent nationalistic impetus is essentially guided by tolerance, respect to minorities and diplomatic dialogue rather than divisiveness, conflict, and belligerence.

FIN.

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CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN ASEAN A BEACON OF HOPE FOR INTERCULTURAL PEACE AND COOPERATION?

BY SASHA CHUA.

''T

he great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural”, Huntington (in)famously predicted in his “Clash of Civilization”

thesis in 1993, following the end of the Cold War. At first glance, the idea that different civilizations are destined to clash - particularly between the West and Islam - appear to be vindicated, such as by the Iraq War, the 2015 Migration Crisis, and the election of Donald Trump. The rising populist movements in the West against multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism seem to suggest there cannot be inter-civilizational harmony and collaboration.

Yet, could the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) be the exception?

Early predictions were gloomy, such as that Southeast Asia would become the “Balkans of Asia”, according to Charles Fisher, a British geographer, in 1962. He alluded to the likelihood of systemic violent ethnic conflict in the region, due to it being even more culturally diverse than Yugoslavia. Southeast Asia has five major religions, and hundreds of languages and ethnic groups. However, Muslims live peacefully amongst non-Muslims, and Southeast Asia has more Muslims as a percentage compared to other regions outside the Middle East.

For instance, in Indonesia, the world’s most populous Islamic country, Muslims live harmoniously alongside Hindu-majority Bali. Although there is inter-ethnic conflict in Indonesia, levels have fallen since its successful democratic transition, and a culture of tolerance and inter-ethnic cooperation prevails. Additionally, in Thailand, Chinese and Indian influences co-exist peacefully. Indian influence is alive in its arts, philosophy, writing system and religion, yet many Thais who have Chinese ancestry have accepted this and successfully assimilated into society.

Successful cultural diplomacy is key to Southeast Asia’s intercultural peace and stability. Cultural diplomacy can be defined as “a course of actions that are based on and utilise the exchange of ideas, values and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation, promote national interests and beyond; Cultural diplomacy can be practiced by either the public sector, private sector or civil society.” Cultural diplomacy has been materialising in the region for centuries - initially informally through means such as trade, migration, and the arts - but it has become increasingly institutionalised and formalised following the establishment of ASEAN. Common fear keeps ASEAN together. In the midst of the Cold War, the fear of communism - which threatened the countries’ identity, leadership and future - played a major role in the creation of ASEAN. This shared fear generated solidarity and stronger security, political and economic cooperation. Their collaboration during the Cold War fostered increasing trust and comradeship between members, helping to overcome differences and tensions between countries. This may explain why no two countries have waged war against each other since its founding. This has helped pave the way for the establishment of the ASEAN Charter in 2008 and further regional collaboration in areas ranging from health and education, to environment and defence.

According to George Yeo in the Bonsai, Banyan and the Tao, the fear of being dominated by a major power - such as China, Japan, India or the US - also helps keep it together.

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Multilateralism is prevalent, and is strengthening bonds between countries and promoting national as well as regional interests. For instance, In The ASEAN Miracle, Kishore Mahbubani brings attention to how cooperation between trade ministers and officials have created peer-pressure for countries to adopt free market orientated policies. This has pulled countries closer to the same economic system and values.

Coupled with policies aimed at increasing access to education, it has led to a rapid expansion in the labour force and rising FDI. This has helped make Southeast Asia one of the fastest growing markets in the world - its GDP has increased from US$577 billion in 1999 to US$9.34 trillion in 2019, roughly a sixteen-fold increase. ASEAN is part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which was signed in November 2020. It includes almost one-third of the global population and is projected to add US $186 billion to the global economy, and quicken regional integration and trade liberalisation in Asia. According to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, the RCEP marks “a victory of multilateralism and free trade”, which appeared to be on retreat during Trump’s presidency.

Country leaders at ASEAN cultrural week, 2018

.NAH-NIM EEL YB SOTOHP .KRAP ACISSEJ YB NETTIRW

In addition to multilateralism, the state can also play an important role in maintaining intercultural harmony. Yeo attributes government intervention as one of the major reasons behind Singapore’s success as a peaceful multicultural and multi-racial city, after having experienced race riots in 1964.

Including discouraging Christian missionaries from attempting to convert Muslims to requesting mosques to keep the speakers used for the call to prayer at a low volume; and banning Chinese temples from burning super-large joss sticks, to arresting those who incite racial and religious hatred. Yeo recognises that this may be deemed illiberal, but affirms that this policy receives support from an “overwhelming majority” of Singaporeans.

The actors and mediums for cultural diplomacy has been formally institutionalised through the creation of ASEAN Ministers Responsible for the Culture and Arts (AMCA) and ASEAN Committee on Culture and Information (ASEAN COCI). They a deeper sense of regional community and inclusive culture through a multistakeholder approach. The facilitation of intercultural dialogue through various channels enhances mutual understanding and friendship between nations, and can prevent violent extremism. Most notably, people-to-people exchanges, and collaboration on events and products between different industries, ranging from the creative to tech sector. It has also included the development of school programs and online platforms that spread awareness and appreciation of commonalities in culture and values. Additionally, current initiatives include the ASEAN City of Culture, ASEAN Best of Performing Arts, Heritage in ASEAN, and ASEAN-Dialogue Partner Cultural Exchange Year.

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WRITTEN BY FREYA JIMENEZ. PHOTO BY CALVIN STILLER.

have directed the Strategic Plan for Culture and Arts 2016-2025 which aims at building

ASEAN cultural week, 2018

Cultural diplomacy through multilateralism could be replicated elsewhere. Institutions and organisations aimed at facilitating intercultural dialogue and understanding can be established not only at a regional level, but also globally. If a multi-stakeholder approach is taken, it could help breakdown barriers, and lead to greater intercultural harmony and tolerance internationally. Mahbubani argued that the EU could learn from ASEAN in the geopolitical dimension. For instance, he asserted that an approach of engagement rather than exclusion and sanctions towards adversarial states is more effective in changing their behaviour. ASEAN’s engagement and eventual acceptance of Myanmar as a member in 1997 was instrumental in beginning its peaceful transition away from a military regime. And in building more cordial relations and cooperation across the region. In contrast, US and EU sanctions against Syria led to war.

However, current practices of cultural diplomacy in Southeast Asia is far from perfect in achieving its desired goals. For instance, it continues to be directed at a largely topdown process, meaning there is a far stronger sense of community and identity amongst statesmen and officials rather than the general population. A significant proportion of the general populace remain ignorant about the organisation, and are more concerned with their “safety and sustenance”, rather than “a lofty political and economic bloc”.

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Additionally, many are not knowledgeable about the histories of the region, and what they know about ASEAN comes from an often skewed coverage by Western media.

Hence, more work needs to be done to allow for citizens to feel a stronger sense of belonging and ownership of ASEAN. Additionally, the lack of enforcement mechanisms of decisions in the organisation is a significant structural impediment to cultural diplomacy’s success in the region.

Naturally, the region faces many challenges. Sino-US tensions threaten its unity, and sectarian conflict continues to persist, most notably in Myanmar, one of the newer members of ASEAN. However, tensions between the Muslim Rohingya and Budhhist majority in Myanmar are not reflective of the region as a whole. Huntington’s prediction that cultural fault lines would be the primary source of violent discord in the 21st century is not inescapable, and nor does it have universal implications. As Southeast Asia grows into an increasingly prosperous and integrated region, it has arguably become a beacon of hope for intercultural peace and cooperation, and the continued relevance of multilateralism. This has been in spite of its status as the most culturally diverse region in the world, and being faced with unfavourable conditions such as a history of colonialism, secessionism, and communist insurgencies. Cultural diplomacy has been significant in fostering not only tolerance but also mutual openness and respect between different cultures, and thus providing the necessary conditions for harmony and collaboration. Pluralism is a fact of life, and it is in the interest of different countries and cultures to accommodate and learn from each others’ differences. Diversity should be celebrated rather than condemned. Other regions can take away these lessons from Southeast Asia.

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American Elected-President Joe Biden

AMERICA’S DECLINE OF SOFT POWER UNDER TRUMP WILL BIDEN SUCCEED IN REGAINING IT?

BY SAULET TANIRBERGEN.

''T

his is the time to heal in America,” was the proclamation of President-Elect Biden in his victory acceptance speech on November 7th. In lieu of their victory,

the Biden-Harris campaign came out with a message of unity after four long years of polarisation. Biden pleaded with Americans to come together to tackle their domestic problems, COVID-19 not being the least of them. But, what of America’s diplomatic relations, which so heavily suffered under the Trump administration? How deeply did Trump diminish the USA’s soft power and will Biden be able to restore it?

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The term ‘soft power’ was initially coined by Joseph Nye Jr., professor at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and is defined the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion. Sometimes called the ‘second face of power’, it’s more inconspicuous than it’s counterpart, hard power, which can be measured with military might and economic power. Still, it’s effectiveness as a diplomatic tool in acquiring allies and partners is undeniable. According to Nye, soft power originates from three different sources: political values, culture and foreign policy. A country’s foreign policy will determine its legitimacy, and it’s political values and culture will make it more attractive to the foreign public. Hence, soft power can be exercised in a variety of ways - from the production of movies in Hollywood to America’s entry into various international organisations.

Soft power as a concept became more observed following the US victory in the Cold War. It’s values of liberal democracy and the free market, combined with its aim to be the powerful actors on the international stage, formed a grand strategy that many academics have called ‘liberal hegemony’. The most explicit expressions of soft power were seen among the two post-Cold War presidents, Bush and Clinton. Notably, Bush called the US “a moral nation” and Clinton stated that America’s prosperity relied on promoting democracy abroad. Their vision of America as the Lightbringer of democracy to the rest of the world was so great that it translated into expressions of hard power, as we saw with the Iraq War. However, with Trump’s election, we saw a decline of this post-Cold War international order. Trump abandoned the promotion of democracy abroad and instead praised Putin and Duterte, who both have been endlessly described as authoritarians. He withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, making the US the only country to do so.

Additionally, he has criticised a range of international organisation such as World Trade Organization (WTO) for being “too soft on China” after US tariffs on China were called into question for breaking trading rules. The same fate befell on the World

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World Health Organization (WHO) after the President declared that the US would cut funding of the organisation and pull out its membership amid the pandemic. Long-time alliances, too, became frayed as the President sang praises for Russia and criticised NATO countries for skimping on funding for the organisation.

All in all, Trump pursued what Barry Posen of Foreign Affairs called ‘illiberal hegemony’. His policy of ‘America First’ still seeks to maintain the US’ status as a superpower in both military and economic terms without keeping its promises to allies and organisations or spreading ideas of democracy. Trump’s refusal to concede the recent presidential election only goes to show that the President cares very little for democracy. His eschewing of the very principle of democracy, democratic election, did little to rehabilitate the world’s view of the US, which suffered endlessly over the past four years.

There is clear evidence that Trump’s actions have led to severe deterioration of America’s soft power. According to Gallup polls, only 30% of people surveyed across 134 countries held America under Trump’s leadership in a favourable view. SoftPower30, an annual British index ranking countries’ soft power, initially had the US in the first place in 2016, which rapidly slid down to fifth place in 2019. This is parallel to the apparent rise of Chinese soft power, which manifested itself economically through trade agreements and the infamous Belt and Road Initiative. Even recently, with the COVID-19 pandemic originating in China, attempts to rehabilitate their image have been attempted through the so-called ‘mask diplomacy’. Millions of masks and medical supplies have been sent to Europe by China, including countries like Italy, the Czech Republic, Serbia and Ireland.

So far, the President-Elect’s picks for White House senior staff have been mostly alumni of the Obama administration. That, along with his speeches, send a clear message 85

Biden means to bring America back to the path it pursued before Trump. That includes the ramping up of soft power from the levels that the President reduced it to.

Already, Biden has promised to re-enter various agreements and organisations, including the Paris Climate Agreement and the WHO. Notably, his national security adviser also vowed to rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal, which made waves in diplomatic circles after Trump pulled out of the agreement. Moreover, one of Biden’s top foreign policy priorities seems to repair relationships with the USA’s traditional allies by reiterating his commitment to NATO. On the whole, the tone of America’s foreign policy changing.

Elected-President Joe Biden and Current President Donald Trump

But, a true return to status-quo isn’t in the cards. Trust in American leadership has fallen, and power dynamics have shifted. The US left allies in the lurch in these last four years, and it’s reliability as a partner is no longer assured. Not to mention the fact that Trump still holds a strong base domestically and there has been talk of him running again in 2024. And while I believe that the international community will celebrate America’s ‘return’, it will be long before they will cease being wary.

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IS ‘SOFT POWER’ THE NEW ‘HARD POWER’?

BY HECTOR MCKECHNIE

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wentieth-century history textbooks are dominated by one topic: war. Throughout this age, global society has been blighted by continuous conflict, from which

it has enjoyed little respite. In consequence, the ‘good’ memories which induce fond nostalgia: Lindbergh’s crossing of the Atlantic, Babe Ruth’s astounding ‘homers’, or the charm of a Kennedy Presidency, are made warmer by its peacetime associations. The new ‘n’ easy lifestyle brought about by advanced industrialisation and the booming lab-

Peeter Snayers's 'Siege of Valenza del Po', circa 1650

our market became more accessible. As a nervous world edged its way cautiously through its ‘eyeball to eyeball’ Cold War dramas, it realised that the only way to cling to that prosperity was peace.

Thus, after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the turn of the 21st century, the world has had 20 years to readjust and recalibrate its mission: to pacify and possibly unify its warring factions toward a progressive peace. This road is not clearly mapped, and countries still scramble for the remaining influence and control. Global leaders and diplomats must devise new ways to do so. Instead of tanks, they look to talk. Instead of bombs, they to look to bridge. In short and for the moment, they have prioritised soft power, leaving hard power on the backburner. It is important that we recognise soft power: what it is, how it works, and its consequences.

“The more we learn from history, the less we learn from history”, as Hegel once said, in order to really comprehend anything about something current in our world today, we must commit to not only studying, but crucially learning from the past and implementing the lessons learned, lest we are doomed to repeat those same errors.

The idea of soft power has always existed, but it only gained modern political traction and democratic institutionalisation post-WWII. There are few better examples of this than the Cold War, a 40-year conflict created an environment which demanded the adoption and promotion of soft power. Consequently, every US president during the latter half of the 20th century had to channel the ‘soft power’ mindset: how to dance around the idea of conflict, and instead offer more effective responses and geopolitical strategies.

Perhaps the only reason the world still exists as it does, is due to Kennedy and his administration’s expert manoeuvring to steer the world away from a thermonuclear war tipping-point in Cuba. Even Nixon, for all his later sins, managed to guide the US 88

through a relative period of détente with the USSR. Reagan championed open effort of diplomacy with the USSR, famously walking with Gorbachev in Moscow’s Red Square.

Perhaps best of all was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. All of the aforementioned geopolitical events share one common theme: they were forged in the crucible of soft power. Why did the Wall come down? Was it battered by tanks and men with AK-47s?

No, it was thousands of emotional and exhilarated East and West Germans applying their hammers, chisels and bare hands. No longer were ‘hard’ weapons needed. Unity had proven much more effective.

Similar to the contagious feel-good factors of love and laughter, the display of potential togetherness in Berlin began to affect everyone across the political world. Everyone from the ‘Average Joe’ to egghead academics began to abandon their dour cynicism and joined the party. The millennium turned with the promise of change in the air. The Stanford academic Francis Fukuyama even wrote an article entitled “The End of History”. Most IR and politics students have had their fair share of potshots against this article, and it’s worth giving Fukuyama a bit of context. We might all be thinking ‘what is this extremely intelligent person talking about, and if that’s the true standard of Stanford work, how might I go about applying?’ However, Fukuyama was expressing the momentous wave of optimism that swept through and defined the 1990s. It seemed like the human race had finally found the geopolitical ‘golden ticket’ – an answer to “how to end a war” that didn’t require confrontation. Real proof that ideology was more powerful than guns.

Francis Fukuyama

For all of us millennials/gen-z, we might now self-examine, with our smartphones in our hands and our Air Pods in, and conclude “Actually, forget TikTok and PS5, I want to be young in the 90s”. And you could be forgiven for thinking that. Almost echoing the Roaring 20s, people became lost in the ecstasy of the moment, oblivious to the cliffedge they were hurtling towards. In short, governments became naïve and complacent, and on September 11, 2001 the world, caught off guard, received a very sharp wake-up call. This wake-up call wasn’t the gentle reminder that you had to refocus – it was the frantic, shaky, lurching anxiety that you were now confronted with a situation that required immediate action, zealous action that you were unprepared to take at short notice. Almost haphazardly, the US abandoned its new moral directive, and threw itself vengefully into Iraq and Afghanistan. The results were disastrous.

Why was it so disastrous? Any observer looking at the military and economic might of the US would predict a short conflict with crushing military success. As with all things political, optics are very different to reality, where the reality is that there are symbiotic causes of America’s failure: asymmetric warfare, an uncooperative citizenry, a divided home front, and a lack of intelligence which caused the whole operation to never really reach maximum force. Chief amongst these causes, however, is that the US forgot about its soft power – the power which had, in turn, made the country the world’s only superpower. The once clear and relatively serene political landscape was now ablaze with missiles, mines, and villages in flames.

Back to the present. We no longer live in that unipolar world of the 90s, a world where the end of history was within our grasp. The tidal flow of positivity which cleansed the world has ebbed. The new million-dollar question is: “where can I find a lifeboat?” The only thing we know for certain is that nothing is certain. Capricious countries switch alliances, pandemics lock the planet down, markets crash, the US can elect an autocratic populist egomaniac. With the US bleeding influence, and Multinational Corporations that fly no flag of allegiance wielding seismic power, countries are suddenly feeling uncertain: we aren’t prepared for a world like this. So how do we best stabilise ourselves?

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Ὅρκος, the Fury of Oath-keeping in Greek Mythology, Kunsthistorisches Museum

The answer lies in the past. No, we shouldn’t take up arms and recede into clan warfare, but neither should we all rejoice and sing kumbaya. What we need is a combination of the two that allows us to hark back to the Cold War without creating a new one with China.

To quote my favourite TV show House of Cards, diplomacy should be carried out as so: “shake with your right hand, hold a rock in your left”. This is not to say we should default to intimidation

tactics

and

ignorant bullying diplomacy.

Wherever possible, countries should always intend to reach agreement in a cordial manner.

In today’s world, words really are more powerful than guns. Nevertheless, behind friendly gestures, diplomats must wield real, hard and influential power – the rock that reminds your negotiating partner of the potential damage inflicted if they don’t hold up their end of the bargain.

What does this look like in real life? How do we implement this new form of diplomacy? Firstly, countries need to define what their interests are and let everyone else know about them in clear and unambiguous terms. For the Biden administration

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and the UK, it seems as though Climate Change could be the answer, with the Cop26 summit in Glasgow next year. There also needs to be recognition and appreciation of compromise. For the US and China, it is clear that they have very different national interests. But there is one thing they both seek: economic prosperity. They need to achieve this goal together, through joint ventures, through mutually beneficial financial programmes.

Unfortunately, a golden rule of politics is that it’s all easier said than done. It’s one thing for me to sit here in my student flat sounding off that the US and China need to cooperate more, or that North Korea should abandon its nuclear ambitions and engage in cultural diplomacy with the West. For now, the world is too quirky, too ‘non-polar’ to allow such amelioration. Instead, time and patience are the catalysts required. We have not yet lost sight of the path to universal peace, embarked upon that day at Potsdam which Truman, Churchill, Attlee and yes, even Stalin, initially helped to pave.

We may have strayed from this path once or twice; however, we always seem to find our way back to it. If we continue to progress along it, guided by the ideologies of soft power and mutual cooperation, we will begin to expect, and not just strive for, peace.

FIN.

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