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Reforming the Navy’s Acquisition Process By Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition knowledgeable acquisition professionals who To consider what improvements could know how to work in the unique defense marbe made in acquisition today, it is important ketplace, who understand the technical dimento understand the environment in which it sions of extraordinarily complex systems, and operates. Within the Department of the Navy who can navigate the bureaucracy and produce (DoN), we are responsible to the warfighter excellent outcomes in spite of it all. and taxpayer to manage and execute upwards With the above in mind, history of $60 billion per year for Navy and and experience have demonstrated Marine Corps development and that programs succeed when they procurement. Clearly, our first prioradhere to basic principles: (a) get the ity is to meet the needs of our sailors requirements right; (b) perform to and marines deployed around the a stable plan; (c) make every dollar world, fighting today’s war. At the count; (d) rely on an experienced same time, we are also responsible to acquisition workforce; and (e) foster bring forward significant advances in Sean J. Stackley a healthy industrial base. capacity and capability that the Navy and Marine Corps will rely upon to maintain naval superiority well into the 21st century. Getting the Requirements Right This must be accomplished in an environment characterized by constrained budgets, increasArguably, requirements definition is the ing system complexity, limited competition, most critical phase in determining the successful a shrinking industrial base operating within a outcome of a major weapon systems program. tough economy and increasingly burdensome Requirements that are underpinned by a requirements associated with the administrathorough assessment of technical feasibility and tion, oversight and reporting of our major a realistic cost estimate are inherently at lower weapon systems programs. It is also important risk of cost or schedule overrun, or performance to understand the essential nature of weapon shortfalls, during program execution. Conversely, systems procurement; neither DoD nor the the preponderance of “failed programs” can defense industry exercises a classic role of buyer trace their undoing to poor understanding of or seller in the free-enterprise system. As a the technical requirements (including what are result, it can be difficult to attract new entrants often referred to as “derived requirements”), cost into a unique, high-entry-cost, and often lessand risk intrinsic to such programs’ operational understood market in the United States. And requirements. Our mandate—to properly define finally, this large government bureaucracy that and seamlessly transition from requirements to envelops defense acquisition discourages risk design, to build, test, field and sustain and to do and thwarts rapid or even timely delivery when, so within agreed budgets and schedules based on in fact, the very nature of weapon systems realistic estimates—necessitates unity of purpose development is risky, and the very pace of and unity of action between the Requirements technology and of the threat demands a faster and Acquisition organizations each step along appropriate response. Given this environment, the way. And it all begins with and hinges upon which is not prone to agility, primary emphasis getting the requirements right. must be placed on the need for experienced, Continued On pAGE 35 ➥
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5 May 2015
Plus:
• F-35 Engine Inspection • Augmented Human Performance
Positioning the Navy Reserve for the 21st Century By Vice Admiral Robin R. Braun, Chief of the Navy Reserve Over the past year, the Navy responded to Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements with tailored force packages of Reserve units and personnel. Reserve V. Adm. Component (RC) soluRobin R. Braun tions met the full range of support required, from Navy core missions to CCDR ad-hoc requirements. Our force structure provided integration options ranging from the mobilization of an entire unit to the activation of a single Individual Augmentee (IA) sailor. In support of their strategic surge roles, nonmobilized sailors maintained their readiness through training and operational support to the Fleet. This model delivers increased flexibility and depth to the Total Force, and the experience gained by Reserve sailors through mobilizations and operational support enhances the Navy Reserve’s interoperability with the Active Component (AC) and the Joint Force. The newly published revision of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower states the following: “To ensure our active and reserve sailors, Marines and Coast Guardsmen—as well as civilians—remain our greatest asymmetric advantage; we will … optimize the total force mix by strategically employing the Selected Reserve, managing differentiated talents to create more adaptive and agile warriors and expanding service opportunities to a wider population in support of peacetime operations and to provide essential surge capacity.” Continued On pAGE 38 ➥
May 5, 2015