Navy 1.3 (March 17, 2015) by KMI Media Group

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Positioning the Navy for Future Responsibilities Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert describes the current Navy and what it will look like with current funding. As the chartlet below shows, about 95 ships (one-third of the Navy) are deployed around the globe protecting the nation’s interests. This is our mandate: to be where it matters, when it matters.

17 MAR 2015

Plus: • GAO Weapon Systems Report • keel-laying for the USS Colorado

Evaluation of Aircraft Ejection Seat Safety When Using Advanced Helmet Sensors By Randolph R. Stone The DoD Inspector General determined whether DoD aircraft ejection seats meet aircrew survivability and equipment airworthiness requirements for pilots and aircrew wearing helmet-mounted displays (HMDs), night vision goggles (NVGs), or both during flight operations. Background

Strategic Guidance The governing document for president’s budget for fiscal year 2016 (PB-16) is the Secretary of Defense’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR uses the president’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) as a foundation and builds on it to describe the Department of Defense’s role in protecting and advancing U.S. interests and sustaining global American leadership. The DSG and its 10 primary missions of the U.S. armed forces have guided Navy’s planning for the past three years. Validated by the QDR, those missions remain the baseline against which I measure our posture in various fiscal scenarios. Also, 2020 is the “benchmark” year identified by the DSG, and that remains the timeframe on which my assessments are focused. The QDR’s updated strategy is built on three pillars: protect the homeland; build security globally; and project power and win decisively. In support of these, it requires the Navy to “continue to build a future Fleet

that is able to deliver the required presence and capabilities and address the most important warfighting scenarios.” In order to improve its ability to meet the nation’s security needs in a time of increased fiscal constraint, the QDR also calls for the joint force to “rebalance” in four key areas: (1) rebalancing for a broad spectrum of conflict; (2) rebalancing and sustaining our presence and posture abroad; (3) rebalancing capability, capacity, and readiness within the joint force; and, (4) rebalancing tooth and tail. To satisfy these mandates of the QDR strategy, the Navy has been compelled to make tough choices between capability, capacity, and readiness across a wide range of competing priorities. Our fundamental approach to these choices has not changed since I assumed this position. We continue to view each decision through the lens of the tenets I established when I

This report is in response to a request from Congress through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDA A) for fiscal year 2015. Congress requested the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) provide a report that outlines which DoD ejection seat equipped aircraft meet the aircrew survivability and equipment airworthiness requirements for pilots and aircrew wearing HMDs and NVGs. Congress’ concern is that the incorporation of modern HMDs, such as the joint helmetmounted cueing system (JHMCS), increases the risk to pilots during high-speed ejections. Specifically, they are concerned that the aerodynamic forces can lift the helmet off the pilot, causing high neck tension loads during high-speed ejections. They are also concerned that ejection criteria in the DoD Military Handbook 516B, “Airworthiness Certification Criteria,” February 2008, (MILHDBK-516B) for airworthiness certification criteria are not being met; specifically they cited that the 5 percent risk of major injury resulting from an aircraft ejection event was not being met for legacy fighters or fifthgeneration tactical aircraft.

Continued On pAGE 28➥ Continued On pAGE 40 ➥

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March 17, 2015

Table of Contents Editorial Editor

Jonathan Magin jonathanm@kmimediagroup.com Managing Editor

Harrison Donnelly harrisond@kmimediagroup.com Copy Editor

Crystal Jones crystalj@kmimediagroup.com Correspondents

J.B. Bissell • Kasey Chisholm • Catherine Day Michael Frigand • Nora McGann

Art & Design

Positioning the Navy for Future Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Evaluation of Aircraft Ejection Seat Safety When Using Advanced Helmet Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Automated Detection Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 eDIVO Mobile App . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Revitalized ShipShape Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Surface Ship Anti-Torpedo Hard-Kill Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Art Director

Keel-Laying for Submarine Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Ads and Materials Manager

Navy Ordnance in Foreign Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Jennifer Owers jennifero@kmimediagroup.com Jittima Saiwongnuan jittimas@kmimediagroup.com Senior Graphic Designer

Scott Morris scottm@kmimediagroup.com Graphic Designers

Andrea Herrera andreah@kmimediagroup.com Amanda Paquette amandak@kmimediagroup.com

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Annual Assessment of Selected Navy Weapon Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Contract Awards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

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A summary of a the revised maritime strategy recently released by the Navy, which emphasizes operating forward and engaging partners across the globe. A link to the report is provided. An update on the Navy’s destroyer program. The DDG 51 modernization program has successfully met two milestones, including successful installation and testing of baseline 9 combat systems on two destroyers. Additionally, the next Arleigh Burkeclass destroyer will be named in honor of the first master chief petty officer of the Navy, Delbert D. Black.

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Calendar of Events March 17-18, 2015 Precision Strike Forum Springfield, Va. www.precisionstrike.org

March 30-April 1, 2015 Joint Undersea Warfare Technology San Diego, Calif. www.ndia.org/meetings/5260

March 18, 2015 Special Topics Breakfast Speaker: Sean J. Stackley Arlington, Va. www.navyleague.org

April 2, 2015 Coast Guard Intelligence Industry Day Chantilly, Va. www.afcea.org April 12-15, 2015 Sea-Air-Space National Harbor, Md. www.seaairspace.org

March 17, 2015

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Automated Detection Software Sentient has delivered the first Kestrel automated detection software to NAVAIR for use within the Mission Control System package for the MQ-8 Fire Scout. The MQ-8 Fire Scout is an unmanned helicopter that provides U.S. Navy ships with reconnaissance, situational awareness, aerial fire and precision targeting support for ground, air and sea forces. “Automated video analysis tools like Kestrel help maximize the value of the EO/IR sensor package to the tactical operator,” said Captain Jeff Dodge, program manager from NAVAIR.

Kestrel automatically detects hard-to-see objects within the EO/ IR sensor data feed in real-time. Kestrel specializes in detecting small objects on the surface of the ocean, including boats, rubber rafts and people overboard or vehicles and people moving on land. “With well over 15,000 hours of operational in-theatre experience on both manned and unmanned ISR platforms, Sentient has optimized the Kestrel software to perform effectively in the most challenging conditions,” said Tom Bleier, director of business development at Sentient. He added, “Kestrel has been recognized by a growing number of agencies and operators as the gold standard in ISR video analytics. We are pleased to reach this milestone with an important program of record.”

eDIVO Mobile App The Navy launched a new app March 11 named eDIVO, designed to provide junior officers and chief petty officers with quick access to information and resources all conveniently located within one mobile application. The eDIVO app is the creation of two junior officers, Lieutenant Charlie Hymen and Lieutenant John Harry, who were frustrated with the arduous task of sifting through numerous websites and documents in search of military guidance. Today, their idea and determination has led to the eDIVO app, developed by the Navy and now available for free in the App Store and Google Play Store. The eDIVO app aggregates publicly available information providing quick access to more than 44 documents and 8,300 pages of information in one convenient place, significantly decreasing the amount of time it takes to search for frequently needed information.

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In addition, the eDIVO app works disconnected thus enabling use anywhere, whether ashore or afloat. “The basic concept was to design a mobile app to help division officers and chief petty officers with their day-to-day management of personnel and divisional affairs, as well as give them the tools to succeed as effective leaders,” said Hymen. “Actually seeing our app turn into a reality is very fulfilling.” “We are thrilled to see this app launched today in both the Apple and Android platforms because we understand firsthand how this product will make life easier for the division officer,” said Harry. EDIVO is a bring-your-owndevice tool available for smartphones and tablets, and allows the division officers to find applicable information such as basic military requirements, evaluation writing, sexual assault and harassment, legal issues, enlisted advancement, equal opportunity, and navigation

basics. It is designed to help DIVOs take the appropriate steps when faced with typical situations they encounter day to day. Beta testers of eDIVO have given the app positive reviews. Lt. j.g. David Galiyas, assistant plans and policies officer, Amphibious Squadron (COMPHIBRON) 6 said, “Instead of spending countless hours searching for instructions, forms and other essential administration, division officers have all of the necessary tools at their fingertips, and can spend more time leading and developing their sailors. I can’t stress enough how much of a positive impact eDIVO will have on the Surface Navy.” Also included with the app is a Rules of the Road quiz that includes a question bank of more than 1200 questions (and answers) ensuring that those standing watch are equipped with the resources and training they need to keep their ships safe.

Lt. j.g. Hans Lauzen, eDIVO tester and combat information center officer, USS Essex (LHD 2) stated, “EDIVO revolutionizes the way a DIVO can work, and brings being a naval officer into the 21st century. Being able to access key publications, helpful tips, and Rules of the Road quizzes from my phone, I am able to immediately make an impact within my division. It even works on airplane mode so I can use it on the high seas!” The division officer app was developed by the U.S. Navy Sea Warrior Program and produced under an agile development process that allowed an operational utility prototype to be released within six months. This process was specifically designed to develop the eDIVO app and future apps on a short timeline and small budget. Tracen Technologies Inc., a company that specializes in integrated mobile and web solutions, was the software developer.

March 17, 2015

Revitalized ShipShape Program The Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center (NMCPHC) announced the launch of the revitalized ShipShape Program, March 9. The ShipShape Program helps participants achieve healthy weight loss and maintain a healthy weight by facilitating changes in eating and exercise habits. The program aligns to the missions of the 21st Century Sailor and Marine Initiative and Navy Medicine to maintain a healthy, fit and ready force. “We spearheaded an intensive ShipShape Program improvement initiative to enhance curriculum content, facilitator training and participant involvement which we feel increases the value and impact of the program,” said Commander Connie Scott, health promotion and wellness department head at NMCPHC. “We led an in-depth review to assess service member success rates after completing the program, surveyed current ShipShape Program facilitators on best practices and recommendations, reviewed ShipShape Program participant evaluations and conducted a contemporary literature review on management of overweight and obesity in our efforts to improve the program.” “Additionally, we would like to recognize our ShipShape Program facilitators who are essential in providing the needed program

March 17, 2015

outreach assisting servicemembers in meeting readiness requirements, and also provide a resource to improve the health of our beneficiaries and civilian staff,” said Scott. NMCPHC modernized the ShipShape Program curriculum and reporting forms, unveiled a new logo, adopted “Get Ready. Get Fit. Get Healthy” as its tagline and redesigned the ShipShape Program website, which has garnered more than 6,000 unique visits since October 2014. “Over the last two years, approximately 43 percent of active duty fitness enhancement program participants who successfully completed the ShipShape Program have met Navy body composition assessment standards within six months of completing the program,” said Sally Vickers, ShipShape Program manager at NMCPHC. “Through the updated ShipShape Program, we look forward to helping more active duty and reserve service members, beneficiaries, and government civilians meet their weight management goals.” The updated ShipShape Program curriculum ensures that each of the program’s eight sessions covers three essential components for weight management: mindset, nutrition and physical activity. It also integrates engag-

ing activities that promote both participant interaction and individual accomplishments. Reporting form revisions include a consolidated attendance roster and reporting form, auto-population features for follow-up reporting, and other updated features that provide an easy-to-use tool for participant tracking. “In addition to the overall redesign of the program, we also focused on increasing interaction between ShipShape Program facilitators and NMCPHC as the program manager,” said Vickers. “We established a forum via milSuite for facilitators to ask questions, share their experiences, and provide program feedback.” Since November 2014, NMCPHC has trained and/or recertified approximately 130 ShipShape Program facilitators from across the Navy. The ShipShape Program is the official Navy weight management program that assists active duty and reserve military servicemembers, beneficiaries, and government civilians with making healthy behavior changes to reach their weight management goals. The program is administered at local medical treatment facilities and clinics, shipboard commands and other ashore facilities.

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Surface Ship Anti-Torpedo Hard-Kill Capability The NAVSEA Program Executive Office Submarines, Undersea Warfare Systems Program Office (PMS 415) has been tasked to develop a surface ship anti-torpedo hard-kill capability for high-value unit platforms (carriers and combat logistics force ships). This capability will be developed through two separate but associated programs: the torpedo warning system (TWS) and the countermeasure anti-torpedo (CAT). The TWS will serve as a stand-alone detection, alert and tactical control system, and will provide the detection capability necessary for the ship to evade, decoy or defeat the torpedo using existing or future tactics and countermeasures in addition to the CAT. The CAT will be developed separately as a hard-kill countermeasure. TWS and CAT are associated but independent acquisition programs, each with its own defined mission. The CAT will continue development as a common countermeasure for all platforms. The CAT is a high-performance system, including a selfpropelled underwater vehicle that contains complex electronic and mechanical subassembly systems for providing propulsion, steering, navigation, and target detection. The system technologies include acoustic sonar, guidance and control electronics, electrical power,

hydraulic systems, mechanical pumps, and propulsion. The manufacturing processes required to support production must achieve a high level of quality and reliability, and include the necessary environmental (temperature, shock, vibrations, underwater pressure, etc.) test capabilities and certified production test equipment. In addition, some functional item replacement (FIR) and/or torpedo sections may require highly accelerated stress screen testing in order to meet reliability requirements. The CAT consists of the anti-torpedo torpedo (ATT) and the all up round equipment (AURE). The ATT is a small-diameter, quick-reaction hard-kill torpedo countermeasure used to disable incoming threat torpedoes. The ATT will search, home, terminal home and fuse on its target using technology developed under sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research. It consists of the following five major sections: nose, warhead, command and control, powerplant and tail. The ATT is housed in an AURE, which consists of a thin-walled composite canister, electrical cabling to enable communication between the ATT and fire control, and energetics for launching the ATT and the ATT canister.

Keel-Laying for Submarine Colorado Continuing a time-honored shipbuilding tradition, on Saturday, March 7, Ship Sponsor Annie Mabus laid the keel of the submarine Colorado, marking the ceremonial start of construction for the 15th ship of the Virginia class. The event was hosted by General Dynamics Electric Boat at its Quonset Point facility and attended by local and Congressional dignitaries, Navy officials and more than 1,000 employees and family members. Mabus, the daughter of Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, chalked her initials on a steel plate to be affixed in the submarine. Electric Boat employee John Alves then welded Mabus’ initials onto the plate. “Here in Quonset Point and in Groton, in Newport News and around the country, thousands and thousands of exceptionally skilled shipbuilders will build the USS Colorado, the most advanced ship in the world,” said Navy Secretary Mabus. “No one builds warships as well as America. No one.” Along with the other ships of the Virginia class, Colorado represents a revolution in submarine design, construction and mission capability. Its contract delivery date to the Navy is August 2017. Virginia-class submarines have been delivered on budget and ahead of schedule, and displace 7,800 tons, with a hull length

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of 377 feet and a diameter of 34 feet. They are capable of speeds in excess of 25 knots and can dive to a depth greater than 800 feet, while carrying Mark 48 advanced capability torpedoes, Tomahawk land-attack missiles and unmanned underwater vehicles. In April 2014, the Navy awarded a $17.6 billion contract—the largest in Navy shipbuilding history—to build 10 additional vessels.

“Colorado will be a testament to the dedication of the employees of Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding; our supplier network; the leadership of the U.S. Navy, and our supporters in Congress,” said Jeffrey S. Geiger, president of Electric Boat. Serving as the backdrop for the ceremony was the 100-foot, 1,600-ton module that will contain Colorado’s engine room.

March 17, 2015

Navy Ordnance in Foreign Countries By Lorin T. Venable The DoD Inspector General examined management’s assertion of audit readiness1 for the existence, completeness, rights and obligations, and presentation and disclosure of the Department of the Navy’s (DON)2 ordnance located in foreign countries and U.S. territories as of September 30, 2014. DON asserted audit readiness of the existence, completeness, rights and obligations, and presentation and disclosure of DON ordnance, excluding that in the custody of the Army, on February 28, 2013. This examination is the third in a series of examinations of DON ordnance.3 DON management is responsible for its assertion of audit readiness. This examination was conducted in accordance with examination engagement standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting DON’s assertion of audit readiness of the existence, completeness, rights and obligations, and presentation and disclosure of its mission-critical assets and performing other procedures considered necessary. The DoD Inspector General performed the examination using information obtained from Naval Supply Systems Command– Global Logistics Support Ammunitions, Marine Corps Systems Command, and DON Commands for the existence, completeness, rights and obligations, and presentation and disclosure of DON ordnance located in foreign countries and U.S. territories as of September 30, 2014. The DON Ordnance Information System (OIS)4 is the

accountable property (computer) system of record for ordnance assets. As of September 30, 2014, the DON ordnance universe located in foreign countries and U.S. territories in OIS consisted of 138,670,045 assets. The Inspector General tested a nonstatistical sample of 15,830,545 assets for existence, 4,171,512 assets for completeness, and 20,002,057 assets for rights.5 Examples of ordnance assets tested range from missiles and torpedoes to sonobuoys and small arms ammunition. During existence testing, assets were selected from a list that included the entire ordnance inventory at DON activities visited; the OIS records were compared to the on-hand quantities. A discrepancy was noted if the Inspector General could not physically verify an asset or if there was a record-keeping error, meaning the asset was physically verified but did not match the OIS record. For existence testing, the Inspector General reviewed 15,830,545 assets and identified a total of 761 discrepancies. Of the 761 discrepancies, 168 assets could not be physically verified. These assets consisted of empty pallets, shipping container assemblies, or ammunition chests. The command explained that these assets were sometimes reused and reconfigured without properly updating OIS records; therefore, the Inspector General could not physically verify these assets. The remaining 593 discrepancies were considered record-keeping errors. On-hand quantities for cartridges were greater than OIS quantities at two different sites. As a result, these assets were understated in OIS. DON has procedures to research,

identify the status, and correct OIS records. No larger ordnance assets, such as missiles or torpedoes, were missing. During completeness testing, the Inspector General selected assets from DON activities and compared the on-hand quantities to the OIS records. The Inspector General reviewed 4,171,512 assets for completeness and identified 1,500 discrepancies, which were the result of a record-keeping error from a single lot of 7.62-millimeter cartridges. The OIS record for this lot was understated by 1,500 cartridges. The DON assertion of audit readiness for the existence, completeness, rights and obligations, and presentation and disclosure of its ordnance located in foreign countries and U.S. territories as of September 30, 2014, is stated fairly in accordance with DoD Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Guidance Wave 3 Mission Critical Asset Existence and Completeness Audit. Internal Controls According to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123, internal controls should assure the safeguarding of assets from waste, loss, unauthorized use or misappropriation as well as assure compliance with laws and regulations. The Inspector General did not identify any reportable inventory or internal control deficiencies during the examination.

Lorin T. Venable is the CPA Assistant Inspector General, Financial Management and Reporting

Footnotes 1.

Audit readiness in accordance with the November 2013 DoD

DON’s Ordnance Information System was excluded from this

Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Guidance Wave 3

examination.

Mission Critical Asset Existence and Completeness Audit.

DON includes both Navy and U.S. Marine Corps activities.

commands still use the legacy computer system “Retail Ordnance

The Inspector General issued two prior reports: ordnance

Logistics Management System.” When the Inspector General uses

categorized as inside the contiguous U.S. (DoD IG Report No. DODIG-2014-047, March 25, 2014) and afloat ordnance (Report

OIS is the system of record for DON’s ordnance; however some

the term OIS, it collectively refers to both systems. 5.

The Inspector General was able to test a large quantity of assets

No. DODIG-2015-003, October 2, 2014). Therefore, ordnance

because each piece of ordnance is tracked individually. For example,

categorized as inside the contiguous U.S. and afloat in the

an individual bullet counts as one asset.

March 17, 2015

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People

Rear Adm. (lower half) Ron J. MacLaren

Rear Adm. (lower half) John D. Alexander

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Navy Reserve Rear Admiral (lower half) Ron J. MacLaren has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. MacLaren is currently serving as director, Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, Va.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Christopher W. Grady has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Grady is currently serving as commander, Carrier Strike Group One, San Diego, Calif.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) John D. Alexander has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Alexander is currently serving as commander, Task Force Seven Zero, and commander, Carrier Strike Group Five, Yokosuka, Japan.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Michael E. Jabaley Jr., has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Jabaley is currently serving as deputy commander for undersea warfare, SEA-07, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Brian K. Antonio has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Antonio is currently serving as program executive officer for Littoral Combat Ships, Washington, D.C.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Colin J. Kilrain has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Kilrain is currently serving as commander, Special Operations Command, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii.

Rear Adm. (lower half) Christopher W. Grady

Rear Adm. (lower half) Brian K. Antonio

Rear Adm. (lower half) Ronald A. Boxall

Rear Adm. (lower half) Robert P. Burke

Rear Adm. (lower half) Michael E. Jabaley Jr.

Rear Adm. (lower half) Colin J. Kilrain

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Ronald A. Boxall has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Boxall is currently serving as commander, Carrier Strike Group Three, San Diego, Calif.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Andrew L. Lewis has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Lewis is currently serving as commander, Carrier Strike Group Twelve, Norfolk, Va.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Robert P. Burke has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Burke is currently serving as director of operations, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa; deputy commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet; and commander, Submarine Group Eight, Naples, Italy.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) DeWolfe H. Miller has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Miller is currently serving as commander, Carrier Strike Group Two, Norfolk, Va.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Matthew J. Carter has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Carter is currently serving as commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan, and commander, Navy Region, Yokosuka, Japan.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Terry J. Moulton has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Moulton is currently serving as commander, Navy Medicine East, and commander, Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, Va.

Rear Adm. (lower half) Ron J. MacLaren

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Rear Adm. (lower half) Andrew L. Lewis

Rear Adm. (lower half) DeWolfe H. Miller

Rear Adm. (lower half) Terry J. Moulton

March 17, 2015

People Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Bret J. Muilenburg has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Muilenburg is currently serving as commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Rear Adm. (lower half) Bret J. Muilenburg

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) John P. Neagley has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Neagley is currently serving as deputy commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, San Diego, Calif. Rear Adm. (lower half) John P. Neagley

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Nancy A. Norton has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral, and will be assigned as director, Warfare Integration Directorate, N2/N6F, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, District of Columbia. Rear Adm. (lower half) Nancy A. Norton Norton is currently serving as director for command, control, communications and cyber (C4), J6, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii.

Rear Adm. (lower half) Patrick A. Piercey

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Paul A. Sohl has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Sohl is currently serving as commander, Fleet Readiness Centers, and assistant commander for logistics and industrial operations (AIR-6.0), Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Mark R. Whitney has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Whitney is currently serving as deputy commander, logistics, maintenance, and industrial operations, SEA-04, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Ricky L. Williamson has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Williamson is currently serving as commander, Navy Region Mid Atlantic, Norfolk, Va.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Charles A. Richard has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Richard is currently serving as commander, Submarine Group Ten, Kings Bay, Ga.

Navy Captain John G. Hannink has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral and for assignment as deputy judge advocate general of the Navy. Hannink is currently serving as a Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group fellow, Newport, R.I.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Robert D. Sharp has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Sharp is currently serving as director of intelligence, J2, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

March 17, 2015

Rear Adm. (lower half) Paul A. Sohl

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Hugh D. Wetherald has beennominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Wetherald is currently serving as commander, Expeditionary Strike Group Seven, and commander, Amphibious Force, U.S. Seventh Fleet, Okinawa, Japan.

Navy Rear Admiral (lower half) Patrick A. Piercey has been nominated for appointment to the rank of rear admiral. Piercey is currently serving as commander, Carrier Strike Group Nine, San Diego, Calif.

Rear Adm. (lower half) Charles A. Richard

Rear Adm. (lower half) Robert D. Sharp

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Rear Adm. (lower half) Hugh D. Wetherald

Rear Adm. (lower half) Mark R. Whitney

Rear Adm. (lower half) Ricky L. Williamson

Rear Admiral (lower half) Kyle J. Cozad will be assigned as commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group, Norfolk, Virginia. Cozad is currently serving as commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, U.S. Southern Command, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Rear Adm. (lower half) Kyle J. Cozad

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Annual Assessment of Selected Navy Weapon Programs The Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducts an annual assessment of DoD weapon system acquisitions, an area on GAO’s high-risk list. “DoD and Congress have taken meaningful steps to improve the acquisition of major weapon systems, yet programs continue to experience cost and schedule overruns,” the report states. “Further, GAO has emphasized the need to sustain the implementation of acquisition reforms and complete developmental testing before beginning production. With the continuing budgetary pressures, DoD cannot afford to miss opportunities to address inefficiencies in these programs to free up resources for higher priority needs.” Navy Air/Sea has pulled the Navy programs from the report and listed them here.

AIM-9X Block II Air-to-Air Missile (AIM-9X Block II) The AIM-9X Block II is a Navy-led program to acquire shortrange air-to-air missiles for the F-35, the Navy’s F-18 and the Air Force’s F-15, F-16 and F-22A fighter aircraft. It is designed to detect, acquire, intercept and destroy a range of airborne threats. Block II includes hardware and software upgrades intended to improve the range from which the AIM-9X can engage targets, target discrimination and interoperability. It was designated a major defense acquisition program in June 2011. Program Performance (fiscal year 2015 dollars in millions) As of 12/2011

Latest 08/2014

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$180.0

$374.0

107.8

Procurement cost

$4,051.3

$3,248.8

-19.8

Total program cost

$4,231.3

$3,622.9

-14.4

Program unit cost

$.705

$.604

-14.4

Total quantities

6,000

0.0

Acquisition cycle time (months)

15.4

The AIM-9X Block II entered production in June 2011 with mature critical technologies, a stable and demonstrated design and production processes that had been demonstrated on a production line but were not in control. In July 2013, the Navy suspended operational testing due to missile performance issues. The program resumed operational testing in June 2014 after identifying root causes and fixes for these issues. The program expects a full-rate production decision in June 2015,more than a year later than initially planned. The program added a low-rate initial production lot in June 2014, nearly tripling the planned number of missiles procured before its full-rate production decision.

Program Essentials Prime contractor: Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Raytheon Missile Systems Patuxent River, Md. • R&D: $237.9 million • Procurement: $2,613.5 million • Total funding: $2,851.4 million

Procurement quantity:

4,885

Technology and Design Maturity AIM-9X Block II entered operational testing with its critical technologies mature and its design stable and demonstrated. According to the Navy’s May 2011 technology readiness assessment, Block II involves the integration of mature technologies, including a new active optical target detector/datalink, an upgraded electronics unit and new operational flight software. The program estimates that 85 percent of Block II components are unchanged from Block I. The Navy suspended operational testing on the AIM-9X Block II in July 2013 due to missile performance deficiencies related to hardware in the inertial measurement unit and concerns about the missile’s target acquisition time, the latter of which required a software fix. The contractor delivered solutions to these issues in January 2014 and the program re-entered operational testing in June 2014. Operational testing is expected to be complete in January 2015. Production Maturity AIM-9X Block II began production in June 2011, with manufacturing processes that had been demonstrated on a pilot production line but were not in control. Since the start of production, the program has further matured its processes, and program officials stated that they are now at a manufacturing readiness level that indicates they are in control. A production-related issue with the hardware for the inertial measurement unit contributed to the Navy’s decision to suspend operational testing in 2013. Specifically, under certain vibration conditions, the unit’s hinges would fail. The program office reports that changes to the inertial measurement unit’s hinge production process have resolved this issue. Other Program Issues The suspension of operational testing delayed the program’s fullrate production decision from April 2014 to June 2015. Production of AIM-9X Block II continued during the suspension of operational testing, but the program office did not accept delivery of any additional missiles.

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March 17, 2015

To avoid a break in production, the program added another low-rate production lot in 2014 to procure 705 missiles, which is the same quantity that would have been procured in the first full-rate production lot. Program officials said they will accept the risk associated with concurrent production and testing of the missiles, and the costs of any retrofits, rather than further delaying acquisition. Program officials now estimate that they will procure a total 1,086 Block II missiles, or approximately 18 percent of the planned procurement quantity of 6,000 Block II missiles, during low rate production. This is a nearly threefold increase over original estimates.

Program Essentials Prime contractor: Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Raytheon Washington, D.C. • R&D: $657.7 million • Procurement: $3,396.8 million • Total funding: $4,054.5 million

Procurement quantity:

Program Office Comments

Technology and Design Maturity

In commenting on a draft of the assessment, Navy officials noted that the AIM-9X Block II program is meeting cost and performance expectations. Program officials also stated that deficiencies discovered during operational testing were corrected via manufacturing and software improvements. Program officials further noted that the program remains on schedule to successfully complete operational testing, achieve initial operational capability and begin full-rate production.

All four of AMDR's critical technologies—digital-beam-forming; transmit-receive modules; software; and digital receivers/exciters—are approaching full maturity, and program officials state that AMDR is on pace to meet DDG 51 Flight III's schedule requirements. In 2015, the contractor is expected to complete an engineering development model consisting of a single full-size 14-foot radar array— as opposed to the final four array configuration planned for installation on DDG 51 Flight III—and begin testing in the contractor’s indoor facilities. Following the critical design review, scheduled for April 2015, the program plans to install the array in the Navy’s land-based radar test facility in Hawaii for further testing in a more representative environment. However, the Navy has no plans to test AMDR in a realistic (at sea) environment prior to installation on the lead DDG 51 Flight III ship. Though the Navy is taking some risk reduction measures, there are only 15 months planned to install and test the AMDR prototype prior to making a production decision. Delays may cause compounding effects on testing of upgrades to the Aegis combat system since the Navy plans to use the AMDR engineering development model in combat system integration and testing. In August 2014, AMDR completed its final preliminary design review, which assessed both hardware and software. The total number of design drawings required for AMDR has not yet been determined and will be finalized at the program’s critical design review. However, AMDR officials are confident that the robust technology in the prototype represents the physical dimensions, weight and power requirements to support DDG 51 Flight III integration. The AMDR program office provided an initial interface control document listing AMDR specifications to the DDG 51 Flight III program office. Ensuring correct AMDR design parameters is important since the available space, weight, power and cooling for DDG 51 Flight III is constrained, and design efforts for the ship will begin before AMDR is fully matured. The AMDR radar suite controller requires significant software development, with 1.2 million lines of code and four planned builds. The program also plans to apply an open systems approach to available commercial hardware to decrease development risk and cost. The program office identified that the first of four planned builds is complete, has passed the Navy’s formal qualification testing and will enter developmental testing next summer. Each subsequent build will add more functionality and complexity. AMDR will eventually need to interface with the Aegis combat management system found on DDG 51 destroyers. This interface will be developed in later software builds for fielding in 2020, and the Navy plans on conducting early combat system integration and risk reduction testing prior to making a production decision.

Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) The Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) is a nextgeneration radar system designed to provide ballistic missile defense, air defense and surface warfare capabilities. AMDR will consist of an S-band radar for ballistic missile and air defense, an X-band radar for horizon search and a radar suite controller that controls and integrates the two radars. AMDR will initially support DDG 51 Flight III. The Navy expects AMDR to provide a scalable radar architecture that can be used to defeat advanced threats. Program Performance (fiscal year 2015 dollars in millions) As of 12/2011

Latest 08/2014

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$2,060.0

$1,573.9

-23.6

Procurement cost

$6,576.0

$1,884.1

-71.3

Total program cost

$8,636.0

$3,458.0

-60.0

Program unit cost

$.319

$.221

-30.7

Total quantities

27,102

15,652

-42.2

223

178.8

Acquisition cycle time (months)

AMDR’s four critical technologies are approaching full maturity, and officials believe they will meet DDG 51 Flight III's schedule requirements. The program completed its final preliminary design review in August 2014, and anticipates a critical design review in April 2015. The contractor is producing an engineering development model consisting of a full-size, single faced array and the required software. This array will go through testing at the contractor’s indoor facilities and then be installed and tested at the Navy’s land-based test facility after critical design review—but program officials stated it will not be tested at sea prior to installation on DDG 51. DoD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), has not approved the Test and Evaluation Master Plan due to scope concerns with the Navy’s planned testing activities.

March 17, 2015

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Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions)

Other Program Issues AMDR still lacks a Test and Evaluation Master Plan approved by DoD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), as required by DoD policy. DOT&E expressed concerns with the lack of a robust live-fire test plan involving AMDR and the Navy’s self-defense test ship. According to program officials, their current test plan’s models will provide sufficient data to support validation and accreditation and thus verify system performance. Program Office Comments According to the Navy, AMDR is on track to deliver a capability 30 times greater than the radar it will replace. To mitigate development risk and deliver AMDR’s software at the earliest possible delivery date, the contractor is implementing software development approaches to improve productivity, in coordination with robust testing, modeling and live flight test simulations. Further, an AMDR hardware facility—including a fully functioning portion of AMDR’s processing equipment and a software integration lab—is operating at the contractor’s facility to support iterative testing ahead of, and then in support of, production of the engineering development model. In December 2014, a hardware specific critical design review was successfully completed demonstrating that technical performance measures are in compliance with requirements and the hardware design is sufficiently mature to complete detailed design, and will proceed to engineering development model array production.

CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement Helicopter (CH-53K) The Marine Corps’ CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter is intended to transport armored vehicles, equipment, and personnel to support operations deep inland from a sea-based center of operations. The CH-53K is expected to replace the legacy CH-53E helicopter and provide increased range and payload, survivability and force protection, reliability and maintainability, and coordination with other assets, while reducing total ownership cost.

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As of 12/2005

Latest 12/2013

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$4,637.7

$6,735.2

45.2

Procurement cost

$12,898.2

$18,559.2

43.9

Total program cost

$17,535.9

$25,335.5

44.5

Program unit cost

$112.409

$126.677

12.7

Total quantities

156

200

28.2

Acquisition cycle time (months)

119

163

37.0

The CH-53K program continues to move forward toward production, but has not yet fully matured its critical technologies or demonstrated that its design can perform as expected. Failures found during qualification testing have led to a number of unexpected redesigns, which have delayed testing and production. While the ground test vehicle has been delivered, and is currently undergoing tests, problems with qualification of parts have delayed delivery of the first few test aircraft as well as initial testing and first flight, thereby adding risk to the program's ability to execute its schedule. Program Essentials Prime contractor: Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Patuxent River, Md. • R&D: $2,171.6 million • Procurement: $18,559.2 million • Total funding: $20,759.1 million

Procurement quantity:

194

Technology and Design Maturity The CH-53K program's two critical technologies— which are housed within the main rotor blade and main gearbox—have yet to achieve full maturity nearly 10 years after the program began system development. These technologies have successfully been tested using the program's ground test vehicle and will continue to be evaluated when the program begins operational flight testing, which is expected to occur in 2015. Unanticipated design changes to non-critical technology components have caused delays. For example, the CH-53K relies on a number of gear boxes which do not house critical technologies. Several of those gear boxes have suffered setbacks during qualification testing, which has resulted in unanticipated redesigns and schedule delays. In addition, the rear module assembly, which is part of the main gear box, but not associated with the critical technology it houses, required a modest redesign. Testing has also revealed problems with vibration in the drive shaft as well as temperature issues with the top deck engine exhaust. According to the program office, resolutions to these issues have been determined and the necessary redesigns have been made. Program officials reported that the unanticipated number of redesigns has lead to schedule delays and changes to test plans. For example, the program’s first test flight, which was already delayed by one year, will be further delayed while the program determines solutions to issues found in qualification testing. Some of these solutions will be temporary, allowing the program to move forward with testing while they simultaneously incorporate a long-term solution. In one example, qualification testing of the main gear

March 17, 2015

box rear assembly found that three gears—module output, input idler, and tail take-off—were not working as planned and would require redesigns. In the meantime, a temporary solution has been reached that will allow further testing but not full envelope testing. Production Maturity The program’s ground test vehicle was delivered in October 2012 and is currently undergoing full aircraft systems testing. Initial testing of this aircraft, commonly referred to as “light off,” began 11 months later than planned. According to program officials, production of the first engineering demonstration model test aircraft is complete, but the failures in qualification testing have prevented the program from moving forward with the first test flight. The program is taking steps to address these issues but qualification test failures add risk to the program's ability to execute its schedule. Production of the three remaining engineering test aircraft is ongoing, but has been hampered by the same issues that have delayed the first test flight. Qualification failures resulted in instances where fully qualified parts are not available for incorporation onto test aircraft. In these instances, the program has substituted parts that, while qualified as safe for flight, have not yet been fully qualified. These parts will be substituted in the assembly process to enable test aircraft production to continue. As successfully tested, qualified parts become available, they will have to be retrofitted on the test aircraft, which could add further risk to the production and flight test schedule. Program Office Comments The program office concurred with this assessment and noted that it continues to address component, subsystem and system issues as they arise in testing. Also, they noted that performance of the program continues to indicate that the system will meet technical and mission requirements.

DDG 1000 Zumwalt Class Destroyer (DDG 1000) The Navy’s DDG 1000 destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to provide advanced capability for littoral operations and land-attack in support of forces ashore. The ship will feature an electricdrive propulsion system, a total ship computing environment, and an advanced gun system. The lead ship was launched in October 2013, but delivery (comprised of the ship’s hull, mechanical and electrical systems) has slipped from October 2014 until at least August 2015. Construction is under way on the remaining two ships in the class. Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions)

Research and development cost

As of 1/1998

Latest 12/2013

Percent Change

$2,412.7

$10,608.0

339.7

Procurement cost

$34,445.7

$11,888.8

-65.5

Total program cost

$36,858.3

$22,496.9

-39.0

Program unit cost

$1,151.823

$7,498.954

551.1

Total quantities

-90.6

Acquisition cycle time (months)

128

248

93.8

March 17, 2015

While the DDG 1000’s design is largely mature and the program has made progress in developing its critical technologies and delivering mission system equipment, the program faces significant risks as ongoing development and shipboard testing of technologies may result in design changes. The delivery of the lead ship's hull, mechanical and electrical systems is now expected in August 2015, causing a schedule breach to the program’s baseline. The Navy faces significant challenges in meeting that date. Shipboard testing of the hull, mechanical and electrical systems is lagging behind schedule, which will likely affect the timing of installation and activation of any remaining mission system equipment, as well as verification that the integrated combat systems, ship systems and support systems can meet performance requirements.

Program Essentials Prime contractor:

BAE Systems, Bath Iron Works, Huntington Ingalls Industries, Raytheon

Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Washington, D.C. • R&D: $328.1 million • Procurement: $960.4 million • Total funding: $1,288.6 million

Procurement quantity:

Technology Maturity The DDG 1000 program has made progress in developing its critical technologies, but only three of 11 are fully mature and the remaining eight will not be demonstrated in a realistic environment until activation on the lead ship. As of September 2014, almost all of the equipment for the mission systems had been delivered and installed for the first and second ships, and the shipbuilder had begun energizing the ship's gas turbine generators—a key element of the integrated power system. Once energized, the program can begin to activate and test the propulsion and electrical systems without reliance on power from the shore. The program reported that the multifunction radar is installed on the lead ship, but testing of modifications to the radar to include the volume search capability is still ongoing. The program estimates that the shipboard radar will not begin activation until late 2015. According to program officials, seven software releases for the total ship computing environment have been completed to support lead ship activation and delivery, comprising 98 percent of the program’s software development efforts. The program reported that landbased testing of the advanced gun system and tactical guided flight tests of the long-range land-attack projectile have been completed. Design and Production Maturity The DDG 1000 design is largely mature, but ongoing development and shipboard testing of technologies may result in design changes. As of September 2014, the program reported that construction of the first two ships was 92 and 79 percent complete, respectively. However, slower than anticipated progress with the shipboard test program and compartment completions delayed delivery of the lead ship’s hull, mechanical, and electrical systems beyond the program’s baseline schedule of October 2014. While the Navy has not yet approved a revised baseline or determined the cost and schedule impacts of the delay, delivery is now expected in August 2015. Other Program Issues Shipboard testing of the hull, mechanical and electrical systems is lagging behind schedule and will likely affect the timing of activation of

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any remaining mission system equipment, as well as verification that the ship can meet performance requirements. Consequently, there will be little time to identify and fix any problems prior to achieving initial operational capability. In a January 2014 assessment, DoD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation noted risks with the program's development and test strategy and recommended that the Navy develop a strategy to mitigate the risk of not delivering substantial mission capability until after final contract trials. According to program officials, they are now reviewing the strategy of delivering lead ship hull, mechanical and electrical systems followed by subsequent installation, activation and testing of the ship's mission systems to an approach that resembles a more traditional approach that delivers the ship with the mission systems tested and activated to the maximum degree possible with the projected delivery date.

technologies—the aircraft prognostic and health management system—is not mature and the program continues to experience design changes. Developmental testing is progressing, but much of the testing remains, which will likely drive more changes. While manufacturing efforts remain steady, less than 40 percent of the program's critical manufacturing processes are mature—despite the 110 aircraft produced—and problems with the aircraft’s engine have delayed aircraft deliveries and testing. Software development and testing remains a significant risk. Further delays in development may put future milestones at risk. Program Essentials Prime contractor: Program office:

Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy generally agreed with our findings and provided additional information. The Navy stated that the DDG 1000 program has made significant progress in the test and activation phase to support the earliest possible dockside and machinery trials leading to delivery of the ship’s hull, mechanical, and electrical systems. For example, the Navy noted that the program successfully energized the lead ship’s electrical system, brought the Engineering Control System and Total Ship Computing Environment online, activated three of four generators and both propulsion motors, and began rotating port shafting. In addition, the Navy added that initial radar testing has been completed and combat system integration has been initiated, making extensive use of engineering development models to provide early risk reduction and ensure a successful transition to shipboard operational use. The Navy also provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. F-35 Lightning II Program (F-35) DoD’s F-35 program is developing a family of stealthy, strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and U.S. allies, with the goal of maximizing commonality to minimize life-cycle costs. The carriersuitable variant will complement the Navy F/A-18E/F. The Air Force variant is expected to replace the air-to-ground attack capabilities of the F-16 and A-10, and complement the F-22A. The short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant is expected to replace the Marine Corps F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft.

Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions) As of 10/2001

Latest 12/2013

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$41,283.2

$62,000.1

50.2

Funding needed to complete:

Procurement quantity:

Lockheed Martin, Pratt and Whitney Arlington, Va. • R&D: $4,281.3 million • Procurement: $232,730.1 million • Total funding: $239,558.6 million 2,264

Technology Maturity Eight of the program’s nine critical technologies are considered fully mature. The prognostics and health management system—part of the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) and critical to fleet operation and sustainment—is approaching maturity, but slower than expected software development has delayed its completion. The program made adjustments to the helmet-mounted display to address performance shortfalls and determined that the current helmet’s performance was sufficient for the Marine Corps’ initial operational capability in 2015. The program is developing a next-generation helmet that will further enhance night vision and optical performance, and expects this expanded capability to be available in 2016 to support Air Force and Navy initial operational capability. Design Maturity Although the aircraft designs were not stable at their critical design reviews in 2006 and 2007, all baseline engineering drawings have since been released. However, issues discovered in testing continue to drive changes. For example, in 2013, the STOVL test aircraft developed multiple bulkhead cracks during durability testing. Program officials have identified the likely cause of the cracks and plan to incorporate design changes into future production. Fielded aircraft will be retrofitted during their normal scheduled maintenance. In addition, a critical part of the carrier variant’s arresting hook system, the pivot pin, had to be redesigned. The new pin was tested during sea trials in November 2014. With nearly half of developmental testing remaining, the program faces the risk of further design changes.

Procurement cost

$183,154.4

$273,070.7

49.1

Total program cost

$226,354.8

$338,949.6

49.7

Production Maturity

Program unit cost

$78.979

$137.953

74.7

2,866

2,457

-14.3

116

237

104.3

DoD plans to invest about $40 billion in procuring 179 U.S. aircraft through 2014. Aircraft manufacturing deliveries remain steady and the contractor has delivered 110 aircraft to date. The contractor uses statistical process controls as one means to assess critical manufacturing processes. Less than 40 percent of those processes are currently matured to best practice standards. In 2014, late software deliveries and fleet-wide groundings due to an engine fire delayed aircraft deliveries. In addition, part shortages further delayed aircraft deliveries and decreased production efficiency.

Total quantities Acquisition cycle time (months)

Since starting development in 2001, the F-35 program has invested billions of dollars and procured 179 low-rate production aircraft for the United States. However, key gaps in product knowledge persist. One of the critical

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March 17, 2015

Other Program Issues Software development and testing remains a key risk as software is critical to providing required capabilities. To achieve initial operating capability, the Marine Corps and Air Force will accept aircraft with the basic capabilities provided by software Blocks 2B and 3I respectively, while the Navy intends to wait for the full suite of capabilities provided by Block 3F. According to DoD officials, Block 2B development testing is currently about three months behind schedule. The program has pulled additional resources to focus on finishing 2B development and testing and made changes to their test plan, such as rescoping 2B operational testing. Although the program continues to experience delays, their fleet release dates have not been adjusted. Any delays experienced in development testing could put initial operational test and evaluation and full-rate production at risk. In June 2014, an aircraft engine caught fire just before take-off. This incident grounded the entire fleet for about one month, and resulted in flight restrictions and regular engine inspections. While a root cause analysis was conducted that identified a short-term fix to allow the resumption of testing, a final long-term solution has not yet been identified. Program Office Comments In addition to providing technical comments, the program office noted that it appreciates GAO’s review in assisting the program by identifying areas for improvement. The program continues to make slow but steady progress and is executing across the entire spectrum of acquisition, including development, production and operations and sustainment of fielded aircraft. The development program continues to execute to the baseline approved during the March 2012 Milestone B recertification. The biggest technical concern in development is still the timely delivery of software capability to the warfighter. The program implemented changes in how software is developed, tested, measured, and controlled. However challenges remain in speed and quality of software development. Other technical risks the program will continue to monitor are engine and aircraft durability, reliability and maintainability, reprogramming labs for the United States and our partners, and logistics information system maturity.

Gerald R. Ford Class Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN 78) The Navy developed the Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to serve as the future centerpiece of the carrier strike group. The lead ship, CVN 78, is over 80 percent complete and will introduce new propulsion, aircraft launch and recovery, weapons handling, and survivability capabilities to the carrier fleet. Early construction is under way for the first follow-on ship, CVN 79 and the Navy now expects to award the detail design and construction contract in the first half of 2015.

March 17, 2015

Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions) As of 04/2004

Latest 09/2014

Percent Change

$5,087.7

$4,903.1

-3.6

Research and development cost Procurement cost

$32,592.8

$31,314.7

-3.9

Total program cost

$37,680.5

$36,295.9

-3.7

$12,560.151

$12,098.639

-3.7

0.0

137

155

13.1

Program unit cost Total quantities Acquisition cycle time (months)

The Navy awarded a construction contract for CVN 78 in September 2008 when five of the ship’s 13 critical technologies were mature and with only 65 percent of the ship's three-dimensional model complete. Since then, the lead ship’s procurement costs have grown by almost 23 percent from $10.5 billion to $12.9 billion—the limit of the ship’s current legislated cost cap—with four technologies still immature. The ship's critical technologies continue to experience developmental challenges, which poses risks to the ship’s testing and delivery schedule. CVN 79 is also subject to a cost cap of $11.5 billion and its program office has adopted a new two-phased approach to construction to manage its costs. While this strategy may enable the Navy to meet the cost cap, it will also transfer some ship construction to the phase following delivery. Program Essentials Prime contractor:

Huntington Ingalls Industries

Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Washington, D.C. • R&D: $404.5 million • Procurement: $15,977.0 million • Total funding: $16,401.1 million

Procurement quantity:

Technology and Design Maturity The Navy reported nine of CVN 78's 13 critical technologies are now fully mature, with the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) fully maturing this year. Critical technologies are installed and shipboard testing is under way; land-based testing continues for EMALS, advanced arresting gear (AAG), and dual band radar (DBR). While EMALS has launched aircraft on land, it has not yet done so in a sea-based environment in its four-launcher configuration. Due to land-based testing failures, the Navy modified AAG's test strategy to ensure the ship begins flight deck certification in 2016. However, this approach means the system will begin arresting certain aircraft on CVN 78 before completing land-based testing on other aircraft types, risking discovery of new issues after ship delivery. The Navy is also unlikely to demonstrate full maturity of a DBR component radar until the completion of shipboard testing, scheduled to begin in January 2015. Further, the Navy will not install DBR on the follow-on ship (CVN 79) as planned, but intends to purchase an alternative radar at a lower cost. Given the concurrency in testing critical technologies, ship testing and construction, CVN 78 risks further delays. For example, as a result of prior testing, the Navy implemented changes to the design of several key systems, including AAG, EMALS, and DBR. As construction progresses, the shipbuilder is also

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discovering “first-of-class” design changes, which it is using to update the design model to inform CVN 79 construction. Production Maturity With CVN 78 production over 80 percent complete, the shipbuilder appears to have resolved many of the challenges we noted in our September 2013 report. However, the lagging effect of these issues and a concurrent test program is creating a backlog of activities that threaten the ship’s delivery date and could increase costs. Early construction is under way for the first follow-on ship, CVN 79 with about 20 percent of the ship's overall construction effort complete.

support operations with Joint Strike Fighter and Unmanned CarrierLaunched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System. The program intends to provide reliable precision approach and landing capability in adverse environmental conditions. We assessed increment 1A, and as a result of restructuring, previously planned additional increments are no longer part of the program. Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions) As of 07/2008

Latest 08/2014

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$838.9

$1,563.6

86.4

Other Program Issues

Procurement cost

$225.8

$504.2

123.2

In 2007, Congress established a procurement cost cap of $10.5 billion for CVN 78. Since then, legislation increased the cost cap by almost 23 percent to $12.9 billion as the ship's procurement costs increased. Cost and analyses offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense estimated CVN 78's total cost could exceed the cost cap by $300-$800 million. Delivering CVN 78 under its cost cap depends on the Navy’s plan to defer work and costs to the ship's post-delivery period—a strategy that could obscure true costs and likely result in delivery of an incomplete ship. To meet CVN 79’s cost cap of $11.5 billion, the Navy is assuming unprecedented efficiency gains in construction by the shipbuilder and plans to adopt a new two-phased acquisition approach that will shift some construction after delivery. The Navy recently delayed the CVN 79 detail design and construction contract and extended the ship's construction preparation contract. The Navy and DoD have not yet resolved whether a full ship shock trial will be required for CVN 78. Navy officials stated that DoD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation has not approved the Navy's plan to defer this trial to CVN 79. According to the Navy, conducting this trial on CVN 78 would result in additional post-delivery costs and schedule delays. The Navy is awaiting a final determination by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in March 2015.

Total program cost

$1,072.1

$2,075.1

93.6

Program unit cost

Program Office Comments In addition to providing technical comments, the program office noted that the Navy is committed to completing CVN 78 and CVN 79 within their respective cost caps. The Navy and shipbuilder continue to take aggressive steps to control CVN 78 costs and drive affordability, as evidenced by stable cost performance over the past three years. Steps were taken to manage the shipboard test program to ensure cost performance remains stable. The Navy deferred some non-critical work not required at delivery to allow the shipbuilder to focus on critical activities to support delivery and provide the Navy the opportunity to complete work at a lower cost through competition. Deferred work cost is accounted for within the ship's end cost and thus is accounted for within the cost cap. For CVN 79, the Navy is executing a two-phase delivery strategy, whereby select system installations will occur in a Phase 2 construction period, minimizing obsolescence risk and increasing opportunity for competition. All costs for both phases of construction are included within the cost cap.

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System Increment 1A (JPALS Inc 1A) JPALS Increment 1A is a Navy-led program to develop a GPS-based landing system for aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships to www.npeo-kmi.com

$28.976

$76.857

165.2

Total quantities

-27.0

Acquisition cycle time (months)

TBD

The latest cost data do not reflect the June 2014 restructuring of the program as a new acquisition program baseline has not been approved. JPALS Increment 1A began development in July 2008, and both of the program’s currently identified critical technologies were demonstrated in a realistic environment during flight testing in 2013. Program officials reported completing baseline software development as of April 2012. The program began system-level development testing in July 2012 and sea-based testing in December 2012, completing 108 approaches as of July 2013 with no major anomalies reported. According to program officials, no critical manufacturing processes have been identified as JPALS relies primarily on off-the-shelf components. In March 2014, the JPALS program reported a critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach and a new cost and schedule baseline is currently being developed. Program Essentials Prime contractor: Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Procurement quantity:

Raytheon Lexington Park, Md. • R&D: $641.5 million • Procurement: $525.8 million • Total funding: $1,167.3 million 17

Technology, Design, and Production Maturity In June 2014, the JPALS program was restructured to accelerate the development of aircraft auto-land capabilities. The program's technology and design maturity will need to be reassessed to account for this alteration of capabilities, and the program has not yet determined what changes are required. Prior to this restructuring, the program had completed a number of activities to mature its technology and design. JPALS Increment 1A began development in July 2008, and, according to program officials, the two currently identified critical technologies were demonstrated in a realistic environment during sea-based flight testing in 2013. JPALS functionality is primarily software-based, and the program's baseline software development and integration efforts were

March 17, 2015

complete as of April 2012. JPALS Increment 1A held a critical design review in December 2010 and released its all of its expected design drawings at that time. The program began testing a system-level prototype in July 2012, 19 months after its critical design review. Sea-based testing of the system in its current configuration began in December 2012, and program officials reported completing 108 approaches as of July 2013, with no major anomalies identified. The program also completed 70 ship-based auto-landing demonstrations using legacy aircraft as of November 2013. According to JPALS officials, the Increment 1A program has not identified any critical manufacturing processes, as the system's hardware is comprised primarily of off-the-shelf components. The program has accepted delivery of eight engineering development models, seven of which were considered production-representative. Other Program Issues In 2013, the Navy conducted a review of its precision approach and landing capabilities to address budget constraints and affordability concerns. In light of these concerns, as well as other military service and civilian plans to continue use of current landing systems, the Navy restructured the JPALS program. The program was reduced from seven increments to one intended to support the Joint Strike Fighter and Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System. The Navy also accelerated the integration of auto-land capabilities originally intended for the future increments, and eliminated both the integration of JPALS with other sea-based legacy aircraft and the land-based version of the system. These changes increased the development funding required for auto-land capabilities and reduced system quantities, resulting in unit cost growth and a critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach reported in March 2014. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics certified the restructured program and directed the Navy to continue risk reduction efforts to incorporate the auto-land capabilities and return for a new development start decision no later than June 2016. The Navy plans to conduct a preliminary design review for the new system in FY16 and a critical design review in FY17. Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program noted that it concurred with our review. The Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach was a direct result of a reduction in quantities and an acceleration of auto-land capability into the JPALS baseline. The quantity reduction was due to changes in the planned transition to GPS-based landing systems. The Navy decided to terminate both JPALS legacy aircraft integration efforts and ground based systems, and accelerate auto-land capabilities to meet Joint Strike Fighter and Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System requirements. The Joint Strike Fighter will utilize JPALS interim capability as part of its Block 3F software, and the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System will utilize JPALS as a baseline capability for its precision approach landing requirement. The restructured JPALS eliminates future incremental development.

LHA 6 America Class Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA 6) The Navy’s LHA 6 class will replace the LHA 1 Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships. The LHA 6 class is based on the fielded LHD 8 and consists of three ships. The ships feature enhanced aviation capabilities and are designed to support Marine Corps assets in an expeditionary strike group. LHA 6

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construction began in December 2008 and the ship was delivered in April 2014. LHA 7 construction began in July 2013, and delivery is expected in December 2018. The Navy intends to competitively award a contract for LHA 8 in FY16.

Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions) As of 01/2006

Latest 08/2014

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$234.0

$424.1

81.2

Procurement cost

$3,134.1

$9,668.0

208.5

Total program cost

$3,368.1

$10,094.2

199.7

Program unit cost

$3,368.138

$3,364.743

-0.1

200.0

146

182

24.7

Total quantities Acquisition cycle time (months)

LHA 6 began construction in December 2008 with mature technologies, but an incomplete design. The ship delivered in April 2014, after a 20-month delay, and has begun post-delivery activities. This includes a May 2015 planned maintenance period where an estimated $42 million will be spent modifying the flight deck to accommodate the Joint Strike Fighter. LHA 7, which largely shares the LHA 6 design, began construction in July 2013. In October 2014, the Navy modified the ship’s construction contract to incorporate changes to the flight deck at a cost of up to $40 million, but the program is unsure if these changes will affect the December 2018 planned delivery date. Changes to LHA 8 are more significant and include the addition of a well deck. The program is working with two shipyards and intends to competitively award a contract to one of the yards in FY16. Program Essentials Prime contractor: Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Procurement quantity:

Huntington Ingalls Industries Washington, D.C. • R&D: $29.3 million • Procurement: $3,485.9 million • Total funding: $3,516.2 million 1

Technology, Design, and Production Maturity All LHA critical technologies were mature when the program awarded its first construction contract in June 2007. Although not considered critical technologies, the program identified six additional subsystems necessary to achieve capabilities, which were also considered mature. One subsystem, the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System, was restructured to focus on aircraft auto-land capabilities and is it is uncertain when the system will be ready for installation. In the interim, the LHA class will use backup aviation control systems to meet requirements. Program officials do not anticipate any new critical technologies for LHA 8. The Navy took delivery of the lead ship (LHA 6) in April 2014, 20 months later than the contracted delivery date. LHA 6 began construction in December 2008 with only 65 percent of its design completed, as measured by a combination of two- and three-dimensional design products. Subsequent design quality issues resulted in more design changes than anticipated, along with higher levels of rework. The ship is now

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conducting crew familiarization and tests of the combat and mission systems. Post shakedown availability, a planned maintenance period, is currently scheduled to begin in May 2015. During this period, the Navy plans to spend an estimated $42 million to modify the ship’s flight deck to cope with exhaust and downwash from the Joint Strike Fighter. Construction of LHA 7—which largely shares the LHA 6 design—began in July 2013. In October 2014, the Navy modified the ship’s construction contract to incorporate changes to the flight deck to accommodate the Joint Strike Fighter, which may cost up to $40 million. Other design changes to LHA 7 include a new firefighting system and updates to the radar and the command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems. Program officials are unsure if these changes will cause a delay to LHA 7’s expected delivery date of December 2018 as the shipbuilder continues to incorporate the additional work into the ship's construction schedule. Design changes to LHA 8 will be more significant, as the Navy is incorporating a well deck that accommodates two landing craft, and work is under way on design modifications to reduce the ship’s acquisition and life cycle costs. The Navy is working with the two shipyards that it determined were capable of building the ship without major recapitalization to assist with this effort, and intends to competitively award an advanced procurement and detail design contract to a single shipyard in FY16. Other Program Issues As a result of the high level of rework during construction of LHA 6 that led to cost growth and schedule delays, the shipbuilder is pursuing over 120 lessons learned and affordability initiatives for work on LHA 7. The Navy has also included contract incentives to improve the shipbuilder’s performance on LHA 7. However, workforce issues with the yard have contributed to poor cost performance especially in fabricating the ship’s hull. In response, the shipbuilder has revised the way it tasks, supervises, and accomplishes work in an effort to improve quality and hold its employees accountable. Program officials note that although it is too early to determine the effectiveness of the shipbuilder’s actions, the revised strategy appears to be improving cost performance on LHA 7. Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated that the delivery date for LHA 7 was extended to December 2018 as a result of negotiations incorporating the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35B) environmental effect design solutions into the contract. They also stated that the shipyard has made significant performance improvement in the hull shop in recent months, and further stated that if the shipbuilder’s production progress on LHA 7 continues at the current pace, an early delivery may be achievable. Regarding LHA 8, the program office stated a draft request for proposals was issued in January 2015 as part of a competitive acquisition approach involving the detail design and construction of LHA 8 and T-AO(X) Fleet Oiler Replacement (ships 1 through 6) and the contract design support for LX(R). The program office plans to issue an amendment in September 2015 to incorporate updates to the LHA 8 technical data package as a result of early industry involvement affordability efforts.

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) The Navy’s LCS is designed to perform mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare and surface warfare missions. It consists of the ship itself, or seaframe, and the mission package it deploys. The Navy bought the first four seaframes in two designs—the Freedom variant, a steel monohull (LCS 1 and odd numbered ships) and the Independence variant, an aluminum trimaran hull (LCS 2 and even numbered ships)—and subsequently

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awarded a contract for a block buy of up to 10 ships to both contractors. We assessed both seaframe designs. Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions) As of 05/2004

Latest 09/2014

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$939.5

$3,357.5

257.4

Procurement cost

$499.5

$17,773.3 3,

458.2

Total program cost

$1,439.0

$21,334.6 1

382.6

Program unit cost

$359.750

$666.707

85.3

Total quantities

700.0

Acquisition cycle t ime (months)

106

158.5

Cost data are for the seaframe only. Research and development funding includes detail design and construction of two ships. The LCS seaframe program has demonstrated the maturity of 16 of its 18 critical technologies. The program continues to make design changes based on lessons learned from the delivered ships. The next contract award is currently planned for fiscal year 2016, when 24 of the seaframes will already be delivered, under construction or under contract. Several test events—including total ship survivability trials on one variant—have taken place in the past year, but not all of the test reports have been completed. The Navy delayed initial operational capability for the Independence variant, LCS 2, from January 2014 until September 2015. The secretary of defense directed the Navy to assess options evaluating capability and cost for a future small surface combatant. Based on the results of the study, additional changes will be required for the program. Program Essentials Prime contractor:

Austal USA, Lockheed Martin

Program office:

Washington Navy Yard, D.C.

Funding needed to complete:

• R&D: $340.3 million • Procurement: $8,715.4 million • Total funding: $9,182.4 million

Procurement quantity:

Technology Maturity Sixteen of the 18 critical technologies for both LCS designs are mature and have been demonstrated in a realistic environment. However, the Navy indicated that the remaining two are also mature because the overhead launch and retrieval system was demonstrated through last year’s deployment of LCS 1, and LCS 2’s aluminum structure was demonstrated based on its performance in trials and maritime exercises. Yet the Navy stated that the maturity of these technologies has not been formally validated—and no date has been set to do so. Unknowns also remain regarding LCS 2’s hull structure, and test events are scheduled through 2016. Design and Production Maturity To date, the Navy has accepted delivery of four seaframes; LCS 5 through LCS 16 are in various stages of construction and LCS 17 through 24 are under contract. The next contract award is planned for 2016. The Navy continues to incorporate changes into follow-on ship designs, including an

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updated radar starting on LCS 17, and Freedom class gunfire control system improvements. LCS 1 and 2 do not meet certain performance requirements and face capability limitations due to weight growth during construction. As a result, these ships lack the required amount of service life allowance—the margin to accommodate future changes—without removing weight over the ship’s lifetime. The Navy declared initial operational capability for the Freedom variant when LCS 1 deployed to Singapore in March 2013. DoD’s test authority reported in December 2013 on the results of this early fielding with the surface warfare mission package. It noted a number of issues with the seaframe and its planned capabilities, including survivability. The Freedom variant began formal operational testing in fiscal year 2014 and completed total ship survivability trials in October 2014, but the results are not yet available. DoD and Navy test officials have not yet assessed the survivability or cyber defense capabilities of the Independence variant. The Navy continues to develop and test the LCS 2 combat system, and the software and system integration necessary to achieve baseline capabilities will not be complete until September 2015. LCS 2 completed rough water trials in January 2014, the results of which are pending completion of a final test report. The Navy discovered cracks in the mission bay following this testing and imposed a weight limit on the LCS 2 and LCS 4 launch and recovery systems. In lieu of completing final contract trials on the Independence variant, the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey conducted a one-day special trial in August 2014, and the Navy does not plan to complete the acceptance trial for LCS 2. According to the Navy, the initial operational capability of LCS 2 has been delayed until September 2015 as a result of funding restrictions for one type of mission package. Other Program Issues In February 2014, the secretary of defense directed the Navy to contract for no more than 32 ships, citing concerns about the ships’ survivability and lethality. The secretary also directed the Navy to create a task force to evaluate a range of cost and capability options for a future small surface combatant, including an improved LCS. The Navy recommended a modified LCS to satisfy DoD’s small surface combatant requirement and plans to buy 20 additional LCS hulls, which will be reclassified as frigates, starting in FY19.

launched and recovered from LCS seaframes. The Navy plans to deliver capability incrementally and has set interim requirements below the baseline requirements for some of the planned increments. We assessed mission packages’ progress against the threshold requirements that define the baseline capabilities currently expected for each package. Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions) As of 08/2007

Latest 09/2014

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$2,396.1

Procurement cost

$3,452.1

$4,278.9

24.0

Total program cost

$3,982.7

$6,706.6

Program unit cost

$62.230

$104.791

Total quantities

0.0

Acquisition cycle time (months)

The current estimate does not include $3.6 billion of procurement funding for life cycle replacement and modernization of mission systems. The LCS seaframe program has demonstrated the maturity of 16 of its 18 critical technologies. The program continues to make design changes based on lessons learned from the delivered ships. The next contract award is currently planned for FY16, when 24 of the seaframes will already be delivered, under construction or under contract. Several test events—including total ship survivability trials on one variant—have taken place in the past year, but not all of the test reports have been completed. The Navy delayed initial operational capability for the Independence variant, LCS 2, from January 2014 until September 2015. The secretary of defense directed the Navy to assess options evaluating capability and cost for a future small surface combatant. Based on the results of the study, additional changes will be required for the program.

Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office noted that it continues to test the long-term behavior of the LCS 2’s aluminum hull. The program office is modifying LCS 1 and 2 designs to ensure they meet service life allowance requirements. The LCS 2 Combat System is functional and is supporting developmental testing onboard LCS 2. Both variants of LCS achieved operational and developmental testing milestones. In 2015, LCS will achieve Initial Operational Capability for the LCS 2 variant. The intent of the LCS 2 Special Trial was to identify deficiencies, test the ship and deliver a report card to US Fleet Forces Command. The scope included standard underway demonstrations. The program office indicated that, with over four years of robust developmental testing the performance of the ship, and its systems are well understood. The program office also provided technical comments, which were incorporated where deemed appropriate.

Littoral Combat Ship - Mission Packages (LCS MP) The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will provide mine countermeasures (MCM), surface warfare (SUW), and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability using mission packages. Packages include weapons and sensors

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Program Essentials Prime contractor:

Austal USA, Lockheed Martin

Program office:

Washington Navy Yard, D.C.

Funding needed to complete:

Procurement quantity:

• R&D: $340.3 million • Procurement: $8,715.4 million • Total funding: $9,182.4 million 12

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Design and Production Maturity

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)

To date, the Navy has accepted delivery of four seaframes; LCS 5 through LCS 16 are in various stages of construction and LCS 17 through 24 are under contract. The next contract award is planned for 2016. The Navy continues to incorporate changes into follow-on ship designs, including an updated radar starting on LCS 17, and Freedom class gunfire control system improvements. LCS 1 and 2 do not meet certain performance requirements and face capability limitations due to weight growth during construction. As a result, these ships lack the required amount of service life allowance—the margin to accommodate future changes— without removing weight over the ship’s lifetime. The Navy declared initial operational capability for the Freedom variant when LCS 1 deployed to Singapore in March 2013. DoD’s test authority reported in December 2013 on the results of this early fielding with the surface warfare mission package. It noted a number of issues with the seaframe and its planned capabilities, including survivability. The Freedom variant began formal operational testing in FY14 and completed total ship survivability trials in October 2014, but the results are not yet available. DoD and Navy test officials have not yet assessed the survivability or cyber defense capabilities of the Independence variant. The Navy continues to develop and test the LCS 2 combat system, and the software and system integration necessary to achieve baseline capabilities will not be complete until September 2015. LCS 2 completed rough water trials in January 2014, the results of which are pending completion of a final test report. The Navy discovered cracks in the mission bay following this testing and imposed a weight limit on the LCS 2 and LCS 4 launch and recovery systems. In lieu of completing final contract trials on the Independence variant, the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey conducted a one-day special trial in August 2014, and the Navy does not plan to complete the acceptance trial for LCS 2. According to the Navy, the initial operational capability of LCS 2 has been delayed until September 2015 as a result of funding restrictions for one type of mission package. Other Program Issues In February 2014, the secretary of defense directed the Navy to contract for no more than 32 ships, citing concerns about the ships' survivability and lethality. The secretary also directed the Navy to create a task force to evaluate a range of cost and capability options for a future small surface combatant, including an improved LCS. The Navy recommended a modified LCS to satisfy DoD’s small surface combatant requirement and plans to buy 20 additional LCS hulls, which will be reclassified as frigates, starting in FY19. Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office noted that it continues to test the long-term behavior of the LCS 2’s aluminum hull. The program office is modifying LCS 1 and 2 designs to ensure they meet service life allowance requirements. The LCS 2 Combat System is functional and is supporting developmental testing onboard LCS 2. Both variants of LCS achieved operational and developmental testing milestones. In 2015, LCS will achieve Initial Operational Capability for the LCS 2 variant. The intent of the LCS 2 Special Trial was to identify deficiencies, test the ship and deliver a report card to U.S. Fleet Forces Command. The scope included standard underway demonstrations. The program office indicated that, with over four years of robust developmental testing the performance of the ship, and its systems are well understood. The program office also provided technical comments, which were incorporated where deemed appropriate.

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The Navy’s MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to provide a worldwide, multiservice population of mobile and fixed-site terminal users with increased narrowband communications capacity and improved availability for small terminal users. MUOS will replace the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) satellite system currently in operation and provide interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS consists of a network of satellites and an integrated ground network. We assessed both the space and ground segments. Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions) As of 12/2004

Latest 08/2014

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$3,863.5

$4,654.1

20.5

Procurement cost

$3,214.6

$2,882.4

-10.3

Total program cost

$7,119.1

$7,606.0

6.8

Program unit cost

$1,186.518

$1,267.659

6.8

Total quantities

0.0

Acquisition cycle time (months)

Latest acquisition cycle time could not be calculated because the most recent MUOS program baseline does not provide dates for initial operational capability. The MUOS program's critical technologies are mature, its design is stable, and according to the program office, the manufacturing metrics it monitors remain stable. The first satellite was launched in February 2012—26 months later than planned at development start—and the second was launched in July 2013. Shipment of a third satellite was delayed about four months due to problems with the UHF legacy payload and was launched in January 2015. The first two satellites currently provide legacy satellite communications to the warfighter, though more advanced communications using the MUOS waveform are not yet operational. According to the program, development of the waveform was completed in December 2012 and continues to be updated. However, challenges with integrating the waveform with terminals and ground systems persist. Program Essentials Prime contractor: Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Procurement quantity:

Lockheed Martin Space Systems San Diego, Calif. • R&D: $268.0 million • Procurement: $963.5 million • Total funding: $1,231.5 million 1

Technology, Design and Production Maturity The MUOS program's technologies are mature and its design is stable. The first two satellites are on orbit and currently provide operational support to the warfighter in the form of legacy UHF satellite communications. A third satellite was launched in January 2015 and will begin on-orbit testing before it is accepted for operational use. Two other satellites are being built, with a sixth planned for procurement in 2022. We could not assess whether critical

March 17, 2015

manufacturing processes were in control as the program does not collect statistical process control data. However, program officials indicated that there has been no significant change in metrics used to assess production maturity, such as number of defects per 1,000 hours of labor, amount of deferred work and associated risk, and rate of resolving nonconformance issues. Also, the number of manufacturing defects on the space segment has decreased over time, according to the program. Other Program Issues Due to problems with uncommanded shutdowns of the UHF legacy payload during testing, delivery of the third production satellite is delayed until June 2015. The fourth production satellite will now constitute the third satellite for launch, which was ready to ship to the launch site in October 2014. Though the delay constitutes a four-month schedule breach, the program reported there are no cost or performance implications because the satellite is procured under a fixed-price incentive contract and the UHF payloads on orbit are providing sufficient capability. The program office does not expect subsequent satellites to be affected by the same issues, and expects deliveries will meet scheduled dates. Since 2007, we have reported that synchronizing delivery of MUOS satellites with compatible Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) terminals—developed by the Army as the first operational terminals to incorporate the MUOS waveform—has been a challenge. Launching MUOS satellites is important to sustain legacy UHF communications, but use of over 90 percent of MUOS’ planned capability is dependent on resolving issues related to integrating the MUOS waveform, HMS terminals, and ground systems. The MUOS program completed waveform lab testing using a generic hardware platform in December 2012. According to program officials, MUOS successfully demonstrated initial porting and integration of the waveform with HMS in 2013 and has since upgraded waveform software to improve performance. However, operational testing of the waveform, HMS terminal and ground system—initially planned for June 2014—has been delayed due to reliability issues. The program extended testing to fix software issues and continues to work with the Army’s HMS program. The program office stated that operational testing is on track to be completed by December 2015—an 18-month delay—though this will also delay the Army’s fielding of MUOScapable radios. The risk of similar integration issues occurring with future terminals will be reduced, according to program officials, with the recent opening of MUOS labs to all terminal developers for testing and once military standard requirements are published and accessible to industry. The MUOS waveform has been available for integration on other terminal platforms since January 2013, with the latest version released in July 2014. Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.

MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System (MQ-4C Triton) The Navy’s MQ-4C Triton is intended to provide persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Triton will operate from five land-based sites worldwide as a part of a family of maritime patrol and reconnaissance systems. Based on the Air Force RQ-4B Global Hawk air vehicle, the Triton is a critical part of the Navy’s plan to recapitalize its airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets by the end of the decade.

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Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions) As of 02/2009

Latest 07/2014

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$3,327.4

$3,992.4

20.0

Procurement cost

$9,874.4

$8,448.2

-14.4

Total program cost

$13,607.0

$12,766.5

-6.2

Program unit cost

$194.385

$182.378

-6.2

Total quantities

0.0

Acquisition cycle time (months)

120

30.4

The Triton program’s single, identified critical technology is mature. While the design is stable, recent growth in drawings indicates that the program overestimated design stability at the 2011 critical design review. After delays related to software and hardware challenges, the Triton completed initial flight testing and flew its first test aircraft across the country to Maryland, where the Navy will integrate and test the mission systems in preparation for the Triton’s low-rate production decision in December 2015. Triton faces design and production risks as a result of an ambitious schedule to meet the estimated date for the start of production and supplier quality management challenges. In addition, the program’s schedule for development testing extends significantly into production, increasing the risk of cost and schedule growth late in the program. Program Essentials Prime contractor:

Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation

Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Patuxent River, Md. • R&D: $625.1 million • Procurement: $9,404.8 million • Total funding: $10,176.9 million

Procurement quantity:

Technology and Design Maturity The program’s single critical technology—a hydrocarbon sensor—is mature. At the program’s critical design review in 2011, the design was considered stable as the Navy reported that more than 90 percent of its total estimated design drawings were releasable. Since then, the total number of design drawings has increased significantly. When adjusted for this increase, the program would have only had 56 percent of its drawings released at the critical design review. Program officials noted that the drawings releasable at that time included those for the air vehicle only, and did not include other components, including the ground station, which accounted for the largest increase in drawings. Production Maturity The Navy faces supplier quality management challenges that could impact its readiness to begin Triton production in December 2015. DoD has issued at least eight corrective action requests that require the prime contractor to conduct a root cause analysis or take other actions. Most of the requests are related to supplier material and quality management issues. The wing represents one of the program’s most significant challenges. DoD reported that the wing supplier has not yet demonstrated that it can produce a wing that conforms to required specifications. Quality issues have already delayed delivery of the wings for two of the developmental test

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aircraft by at least five months. The Navy is still working to identify and mitigate key manufacturing risks for each major supplier and plans to conduct the executive production readiness review in May 2015, at which time it will reassess Triton manufacturing processes and develop a plan to ensure that those processes are sufficiently mature before the low-rate initial production decision in December 2015.

Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions) As of 12/2006

Latest 07/2014

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$633.4

$896.3

41.5

Procurement cost

$1,782.0

$2,164.3

21.5

Other Program Issues

Total program cost

$2,770.0

$3,060.6

10.5

The program anticipates conducting significant amounts of testing concurrent with production. Triton flight testing was delayed due to problems with the performance of the aircraft’s flight management computer and the aircraft’s wing and tail. Following the resolution of these issues, all three developmental test aircraft were flown across the country to Naval Air Station Patuxent River by December 2014, where the Navy expects to integrate and test the aircraft’s mission systems. The program faces an ambitious schedule in which the Navy expects to complete approximately 13,000 of 25,000 total developmental test points before seeking approval to begin production in December 2015. The remaining 12,000 test points will be completed during production. In addition, the Navy has delayed the start of fatigue testing on the aircraft until 2017, two years after the start of production. According to program officials, this testing has been delayed twice as costs have increased and funding has been diverted to other development activities. Based on the current production schedule, the Navy will have ordered at least 34 aircraft, and delivered at least 22, before the full results of this testing are available in 2023. Without knowledge about the long-term durability of the aircraft, the Navy may have to initially limit its missions or its lifespan. Our previous work suggests that such concurrency in testing and production can increase the risk of discovering deficiencies in production that could require costly design changes and modifications to systems already produced.

Program unit cost

$15.650

$24.290

55.2

Total quantities

177

126

-28.8

Acquisition cycle time (months)

104

170

63.5

The MQ-8 program reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold, resulting in a program restructuring that will incorporate the planned upgrades to the range, endurance and payload for the MQ-8C. According to program officials, these upgrades rely on mature technologies and designs derived from earlier efforts. MQ-8C will continue with developmental testing and will transition to operational testing in the fourth quarter of FY15. Program officials told us that the program will re-enter the acquisition process at production, which is scheduled for March 2016, and may go directly to full-rate production, depending on the success of testing. We could not assess the planned maturity of the program’s production processes as they do not utilize our best practice metrics. Program Essentials Prime contractor:

Northrop Grumman

Program office:

Patuxent River, Md.

Funding needed to complete:

Program Office Comments In addition to providing technical comments, the program office noted that the MQ-4C Triton UAS program continues to demonstrate success during its system development and demonstration phase as evidenced by completion of initial envelope expansion in March 2014 and the ferry of all three test aircraft to Patuxent River in late calendar year 2014. While the program has experienced delays to wing delivery for the two system demonstration test articles, production planning is on schedule for aircraft delivery in support of Initial Operational Test & Evaluation. The program is on track to conduct its operational assessment in summer 2015 and is conducting supplier production readiness reviews in preparation for the Milestone C/Low-Rate Initial Production decision review in the first quarter of fiscal year 2016. The Triton Unmanned Aircraft System program benefits from strong support within the Department of the Navy.

MQ-8 (Fire Scout) The Navy’s MQ-8 unmanned aerial vehicle is intended to provide real-time imagery and data in support of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. The MQ-8 system is comprised of one or more air vehicles with sensors, a control station and ship equipment to aid in launch and recovery. The air vehicle launches and lands vertically, and operates from ships and land. The MQ-8 is intended for use in various operations, including surface, anti-submarine and mine warfare. We assessed the latest variant, the MQ- 8C.

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• R&D: $174.6 million • Procurement: $1,726.2 million • Total funding: $1,900.9 million

Procurement quantity:

Technology and Design Maturity According to the program office, MQ-8C has 90 percent commonality with the previously developed MQ-8B, with the primary difference being structural modifications to accommodate the MQ-8C’s larger airframe and fuel system. The MQ-8C relies on mature technologies common to the MQ-8B and has completed all of its planned engineering design drawings as of August 2014. First flight for the MQ-8C occurred in October 2013. The program will continue with developmental testing and transition to operational testing in the fourth quarter of FY15. Despite the separate iteration of development, the MQ-8C did not have a separate system development decision which, according to program officials, was not required. Production Maturity The program has already procured some MQ-8C aircraft under the Navy’s rapid deployment capability procurement process, which enabled the program to bypass many standard acquisition practices. Program officials stated that, as result of the restructuring, the MQ-8C variant will enter the acquisition process at production, which is currently scheduled for March 2016. However, the program may bypass the low-rate decision and proceed straight into full-rate production depending on the success of developmental and operational testing. We could not assess whether critical

March 17, 2015

manufacturing processes were in control as the program does not collect data on statistical process controls or assess process capabilities using manufacturing readiness levels. The program office collects metrics on the status of production from the prime contractor, such as discovery of manufacturing defects and adherence to delivery schedules. Program officials noted that the MQ-8C air vehicle is a commercial airframe procured by the government and provided directly to the prime contractor as government furnished equipment for conversion to a MQ-8C. The prime contractor is responsible for integration of the avionics and working with the aircraft manufacturer to modify the commercial airframe with increased capacity fuel tanks, new electrical systems, and provisions for the unmanned avionics. Other Program Issues The program reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold in April 2014. The breach was triggered after the program included the capabilities of the MQ-8C into the program of record and reduced quantities, leading to an average unit cost increase of 71 percent over the original baseline. In June 2014, the program was certified as essential to national security and allowed to proceed. The restructured program will incorporate the upgraded MQ-8C, as well as radar and weapons capabilities, such as those developed by the Navy.

The program’s one critical technology, the fire suppression system, is mature. Two other significant technologies are still recognized by the program as potential risk areas. The SSC’s critical design review took place in September 2014—six months later than planned, which SSC officials stated was due primarily to the prime contractor’s efforts to transition all subcontractors to fixed-price type contracts. The program reported that only 79 percent of expected engineering design drawings were releasable at the time of the review. The SSC also held its production readiness review in September 2014 and determined that the program was ready to begin fabrication of the test and training craft, which began in November 2014. With recent schedule changes, the program plans to exercise options for a total of eight craft before the delivery of the test craft, currently projected for May 2017. Program Essentials Prime contractor: Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Procurement quantity:

Textron, Inc. Washington, D.C. • R&D: $87.2 million • Procurement: $3,470.5 million • Total funding: $3,577.1 million 71

Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated the restructured MQ-8 program realizes the Navy’s investments in both the MQ-8B and MQ-8C variants and improves alignment with the Navy's small surface combatant fleet requirements. Recent test events provide high confidence in the maturity of the system and have contributed greatly to reducing the risk to successful completion of planned operational testing and fleet introduction. The program office and the Navy also provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.

Ship to Shore Connector Amphibious Craft (SSC) The Navy’s SSC is an air-cushioned landing craft intended to transport personnel, weapon systems, equipment and cargo from amphibious vessels to shore. SSC is the replacement for the Landing Craft, Air Cushion, which is approaching the end of its service life. The SSC is designed to deploy in Navy well deck amphibious ships, such as the LPD 17 class, and for use in assault and non-assault operations. The program entered system development in July 2012 and held its production readiness review in September 2014.

Technology Maturity The SSC program’s single identified critical technology, the fire suppression system, is mature. Two other technologies—the gas turbine engine and the command, control, communication, computer and navigation (C4N) system—were identified by DoD as watchlist items in 2010 because they could need further development or modifications for integration with SSC. In December 2014, a Navy technology review panel revisited these items and found that no new development was necessary, but recommended steps for further testing. The program recognizes the watchlist items, along with integration of the drive train, as potential risk areas. The prime contractor is establishing endurance testing of the entire drive train— including the engine—which is currently planned for early 2016. According to program officials, software development for the C4N system is meeting expectations. The program currently anticipates that more than half the total lines of software code required will be reused from existing code.

Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions)

As of 07/2013

Latest 08/2014

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$589.5

$564.2

-4.3

Procurement cost

$3,577.6

$3,470.5

-3.0

Total program cost

$4,186.9

$4,054.1

-3.2

Program unit cost

$57.354

$55.535

-3.2

Total quantities

0.0

Design Maturity

Acquisition cycle time (months)

135

0.0

The SSC’s critical design review took place in September 2014—six months later than planned. According to program officials, the delay was due primarily to the prime contractor’s efforts to transition all subcon-

March 17, 2015

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tractors to fixed-price type contracts, which proceeded more slowly than anticipated. This also led to delays in transferring design deliverables to the Navy. The program reported that 515 of 651 expected engineering design drawings, or 79 percent, were releasable to the manufacturer at critical design review. According to program officials, two weeks after the critical design review, the amount of releasable drawings increased to 552, or 85 percent of the expected amount. Our prior work in weapons acquisition indicates that successful completion and release to manufacturing of at least 90 percent of design drawings by critical design review is a best practice that demonstrates design stability and readiness to proceed to system demonstration. Production Maturity The SSC held its production readiness review in September 2014—only two weeks after its design review—and determined that the program was ready to begin fabrication of the test and training craft, which started in November 2014. Fabrication of the second craft started two months later in January 2015. The delivery of the test and training craft is a critical event as it represents the first opportunity to demonstrate that the SSC’s capabilities meet requirements before committing to production. However, the program currently plans to enter low-rate production in February 2015, more than two years before the estimated delivery of the test vehicle. In addition, due to delays in the production decision and test schedules, the program plans to exercise low-rate production options for two additional craft and will now have a total of eight under contract prior to delivery of the test craft, currently projected for May 2017. Our prior work has shown that programs with concurrency in development and production run the risk of cost and schedule overruns if deficiencies in the design are not discovered until late in testing and retrofits are required for previously produced craft. Program Office Comments According to the Navy, SSC is a technically mature, low risk program. The Navy-led contract design incorporated lessons learned from 30 years of Navy landing craft, air cushion production and operational experience. A detail design and construction contract was awarded in July 2012. The program successfully held the design review and production readiness review in September 2014, assessing design maturity and readiness, material and component availability, and the industry team’s ability to start and sustain fabrication. At the design review, the command's chief engineer approved the product baseline. Production on the first two crafts began in November 2014 and January 2015, respectively. The program is currently conducting developmental testing, including reliability growth testing, to support the initial production decision. The program office also provided technical comments, which were incorporated where deemed appropriate.

VH-92A Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program The Navy’s VH-92A (formerly designated VXX) program provides new helicopters for executive transport of the president, vice president, heads of state and others. A successor to the terminated VH-71 program, VH-92A’s fleet of 21 operational aircraft (includes trainers) and two test aircraft replaces 19 legacy VH-3D and VH-60N, two trainers and two test aircraft. The program entered development in April 2014; the Navy awarded a development contract in May 2014. Until VH-92As are available, the Navy is extending legacy fleet availability.

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Program Performance (FY15 dollars in millions) As of

Latest

Percent Change

Research and development cost

$2,646.0

Procurement cost

$2,072.0

Total program cost

$4,718.0

Program unit cost

$205.130

Total quantities

Acquisition cycle time (months)

The VH-92A program is using an existing commercial aircraft and incorporating mature technologies. While no new technologies are involved, the government-provided fully configured mission communication system has yet to be tested in an aircraft. The number of design drawings will be finalized at the critical design review, in July 2016. To reduce risk, the program is using engineering development models to demonstrate installation of the VH-92A unique mission communication system and determine the placement of 14 additional antennas. Flight testing of the system’s performance is scheduled to begin in May 2017. The program's schedule anticipates concurrent development testing and production; most aircraft will be under contract before test results are known. To reduce overall program risk, the Navy awarded a fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract for development. Program Essentials Prime contractor:

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation

Program office: Funding needed to complete:

Patuxent River, Md. • R&D: $2,342.9 million • Procurement: $2,072.0 million • Total funding: $4,414.9 million

Procurement quantity:

Technology and Design Maturity The VH-92A entered system development with its mission communication system (MCS), a new system that's technology is critical to the mission, approaching full maturity. While it’s been tested in a laboratory, the full MCS has yet to be flown on board an aircraft. The program will modify a commercially available aircraft for the VH-92A using mostly upgraded technologies that are already on the legacy fleet. The sole exception is the MCS; according to the program office, some of its components will undergo minor modifications to integrate them into the new aircraft. One significant integration and design risk for the program is the installation of the 14 additional antennas on the airframe. Lockheed Martin, a subcontractor, is integrating the government-provided MCS with a modified Sikorsky S-92 airframe and conducting antenna co-site analysis to properly place the antennas and identify any interference issues. According to the program office, a fully configured mission communication system is scheduled for flight testing beginning in mid-2017. The program does not plan to conduct a system-level preliminary design review until September 2015, or about 17 months after development start. The requirement to conduct this review was deferred until after development start. The number of design drawings required for the program will be finalized at the critical design review, currently planned for July 2016.

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Production Maturity

Current Status

The Navy is buying two engineering development and four system demonstration aircraft models. These assets will be used to demonstrate production readiness, as well as the design and maturity of the MCS. The initial engineering model was delivered to Lockheed Martin in the first quarter of 2015. It will undergo a series of tests including ice testing, before returning to Sikorsky in 2016. The low-rate initial production decision is currently scheduled for January 2019. A total of 12 units will be produced in two low-rate production lots. The remaining five units will be acquired in full-rate production. The program plans to utilize a concurrent development and production strategy, with nearly 80 percent of planned aircraft buy will be under contract before developmental testing results are made known. This runs the risk of costly retrofits to existing systems if problems are discovered late in testing. The program office conducted a schedule risk assessment in October 2014, and plans to do so annually.

The Navy is undertaking Flight III detail design activities in FY15 concurrent with AMDR development—a strategy that could disrupt detail design activities as AMDR attributes become more defined. The Navy identifies AMDR integration as posing technical, cost and schedule risks to the Flight III program. In addition to AMDR, Flight III changes include upgrades to the ships’ cooling and electrical systems and other configuration changes intended to increase weight and stability margins. The Navy reports that a prototype of the cooling system is in operation at the vendor’s factory and is undergoing environmental qualification testing. However, the Navy identifies cost and schedule risks to the Flight III program associated with these cooling upgrades. The electrical system upgrades include changes to the distribution system to add and modify switchgear and transformers based on the system installed on LHA 6. The Navy plans to use engineering change proposals to the existing Flight IIA multiyear procurement contracts to construct the first three Flight III ships rather than establish new contracts for detail design and construction. The Navy has allotted 17 months to mature the Flight III detail design ahead of the planned solicitation for these proposals and plans to award construction of the first Flight III ship in FY16, with two follow-on ships in FY17. To support this, per DoD policy the Navy sought congressional approval in 2014 to transfer funds and begin detail design in the fourth quarter of FY14. However, this request was denied, postponing detail design start by several months. In September 2014, the Navy notified Congress that a delayed detail design start may prompt it to delay the introduction of AMDR until FY17.

Other Program Issues In May 2014, the Navy awarded a fixed-priced incentive (firm target) contract with a target price of $1.24 billion to Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, to support the VH-92A development effort. This contract type is designed to control costs and limit risk to the government. A target cost, target profit, profit adjustment formula and maximum amount that may be paid to the contractor by the government, known as a ceiling price, were negotiated. The government and contractor share savings in the event of cost under-runs, and they share cost (up to a point) in the event of over-runs. To ensure these negotiated terms are met, the program must maintain the stability of the requirements and design by limiting the number of approved changes. The program office has a change control process in place which requires three layers of review, of which the last two require senior leadership approval. Program Office Comments According to the program office, the program’s acquisition strategy is based on a foundation of four key elements: a fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract; integrating mature components with no critical technology elements; using an in-production air vehicle; and maintaining the original airworthiness certification authority to certify the VH-92A configuration. During calendar year 2014, the program completed its acquisition and development milestones as planned. Further, the program office also noted that cost estimates remain unchanged from the baseline approved at the milestone B review. The VH-92A fleet of 21 operational aircraft, including training assets, and two test aircraft will replace 19 legacy VH-3D and VH-60N, two training and two test aircraft. The program is on track to complete its preliminary design review later this year. The program office also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

Estimated Program Cost and Quantity (FY15 dollars): Total program:

$42,829.0 million

Research and development:

$3,990.0 million

Procurement:

$38,839.0 million

Quantity:

22 (procurement)

Next Major Program Event Award of first Flight III engineering change proposal, FY16.

DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer (DDG 51 Flight III) The DDG 51 Flight III destroyer will be a multimission ship designed to operate against air, surface, and subsurface threats. As compared to existing Flight IIA ships, Flight III ships will provide increased ballistic missile and area air defense capabilities. Planned configuration changes for Flight III include replacing the SPY-1D(V) radar—currently used on Flight IIA ships— with the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The Navy plans to acquire a total of 22 Flight III ships, beginning with a lead ship in FY16.

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Program Office Comments According to the Navy, AMDR and Flight III development continue on schedule to support implementation on a FY16 ship. Recent completion of critical design review for AMDR hardware mitigates potential that Flight III detail design will be impacted. The Navy plans to report additional details of this strategy to Congress in early 2015.

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Fleet Replenishment Oiler (T-AO(X))

Next-Generation Jammer (NGJ)

The Fleet Replenishment Oiler (T-AO(X)) program is intended to replace the Navy’s 15 existing T-AO 187 Class Fleet Oilers, which are nearing the end of their service lives. Its primary mission is to provide replenishment of bulk petroleum products, dry stores/packaged cargo, fleet freight, mail, and personnel to other vessels while under way. The Navy plans to procure the first T-AO(X) in FY16 and the remaining 16 ships at a rate of one per year beginning in FY18.

The Navy’s Next-Generation Jammer (NGJ) is being developed as an external jamming pod system fitted on EA-18G Growler aircraft. It will replace the ALQ-99 jamming pod system and provide enhanced airborne electronic attack capabilities to disrupt and degrade enemy air defense and ground communication systems. The Navy plans to field capabilities in three increments for different radio frequency ranges, beginning with Increment 1 (mid-band) in 2021, with Increments 2 and 3 (low- and high-band) to follow. We assessed Increment 1.

Current Status The Navy has completed cost and capabilities trade studies, which suggest that T-AO(X) will be able to meet minimum capability requirements within projected costs utilizing existing ship designs and technologies. The Navy plans to employ military unique systems for specific functions, such as under way replenishment. According to an October 2014 technology readiness assessment, the program’s three critical technologies— associated with the ship's underway replenishment system known as Electric Standard Tension Replenishment Alongside Method (E-STREAM)—are fully mature based on the results of land-based and at-sea prototype testing. The most notable of these technologies, Heavy E-STREAM, allows the transfer of cargo at double the standard speed or, alternatively, double the standard load weight. These technologies are required to meet the more robust requirements for under way replenishment associated with the new Ford-class aircraft carriers. The program was granted a waiver for the requirement to conduct competitive prototyping prior to system development start. According to Navy officials, under the revised T-AO(X) acquisition strategy, the Navy anticipates competitively awarding a fixed-price incentive type contract in FY16 for lead ship detail design and construction with options for five follow-on ships at a rate of one per year beginning in FY18. Navy officials indicated that the remaining ships will also be acquired at a rate of one ship per year under two additional contracts. The Navy has identified industrial base instability as a program execution risk, which may compel lead ship construction to begin prior to completion of threedimensional product modeling design—a strategy that has caused cost growth and schedule delays in other Navy programs and is inconsistent with best practices. Estimated Program Cost and Quantity (FY15 dollars): Total program (FY11-19): Research and development (FY11-14): Procurement (FY16-19): Quantity:

$1,823.3 million $55.4 million $1,767.9 million

Current Status In July 2013, DoD approved NGJ Increment 1’s entry into technology development, but its start was delayed by a bid protest. In January 2014, the Navy affirmed a $280 million technology development contract award to Raytheon after GAO sustained portions of BAE Systems' bid protest. Program officials state that the protest resulted in a six-month delay to the program. The start of system development is now planned for February 2016 and the system’s initial operational capability is delayed until 2021. Prior to the bid protest, the Navy completed a 33-month technology maturation phase during which four contractors competitively prototyped technologies and subsystems for Increment 1. The program currently has seven identified critical technologies-transmit/receive modules, circulators, apertures for two separate arrays, and a power generation systemall of which are expected to be approaching full maturity by the start of system development. The Navy has identified four overarching risks for the NGJ Increment 1 program-meeting weight and power requirements, integrating the jamming pods with the aircraft, and maturing critical technologies. According to program officials, they have developed strategies to mitigate these risks, including introducing a weight management control plan; developing power generation prototypes; refining aircraft-pod integration requirements; and monitoring technology maturation plans. In June 2014, the Navy completed two systems engineering reviews on the integration of the NGJ with the EA-18G aircraft and the program plans to conduct a preliminary design review in September 2015, five months before the start of system development. Estimated Program Cost and Quantity (FY15 dollars): Total program:

$6,284 million

Research and development:

$2,830 million

Procurement: Quantity:

$3,450 million 8 (development), 114 (procurement)

Next Major Program Event System development start, May 2016 Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office disagreed that industrial base instability may result in premature start to lead ship construction. According to the program office, before construction start is authorized, the shipbuilder must successfully complete a production readiness review to demonstrate mature ship design and adequate production planning.

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March 17, 2015

Next Major Program Event System development start, February 2016. Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated where deemed appropriate.

Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) The Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 1 is a Navyled program that plans to leverage previous technology demonstration efforts to field an air-launched, long-range, anti-surface warfare missile. The program is using an accelerated acquisition model. It plans to field an early operational capability on Air Force B-1 bombers in 2018 and Navy F/A-18 aircraft in 2019. DoD is currently developing requirements for Increment 2, which could include air-, surface- or sub-surface launched systems. Current Status

Critical design review, February 2016

The OASuW Increment 1 program was initiated in FY13 in response to an urgent operational need for an improved air-launched, anti-surface warfare capability. The program builds upon the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Long-Range AntiShip Missile (LRASM) program and the Air Force’s Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) program. Under the LRASM program, DARPA and the Navy conducted two demonstrations using modified JASSM-ER missiles, and although the missiles hit their targets, the testing was limited and not intended to be operationally realistic. In February 2014, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics approved an accelerated acquisition approach for the OASuW Increment 1 program consisting of five decision points that align with key systems engineering reviews and test events. This approach will also use an integrated developmental and operational test program and will not include a formal, separate initial operational test and evaluation period. Schedule is the key driver for the program because of the urgent need. However, the program's accelerated approach entails certain risks. For example, the program’s eight critical technologies—which include hardware and software related to targeting and low-altitude flight—are not all expected to be demonstrated in a realistic environment until the critical design review in 2016. Also, this approach includes concurrent system-level testing and production, which can increase the risk of late design changes. DARPA competitively awarded the first LRASM contract in 2009, but subsequent contracts to complete missile development and production have been, and are planned to be, awarded on a sole source basis. The Navy plans to pursue a competitive acquisition strategy for OASuW Increment 2. Estimated Program Cost and Quantity (FY15 dollars): Total program:

$1,525.2 million

Research and development:

$1,189.6 million

Procurement: Quantity:

Next Major Program Event

March 17, 2015

$335.6 million 110

Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated its strategy uses an integrated and concurrent design, integration and test program to meet the accelerated schedule. The knowledge point reviews, which they define differently than GAO, are meant to manage this timeline and concurrency. The program intends to meet statutory requirements associated with milestone B at its third knowledge point in FY16.

Ohio-Class Replacement (OR) The Navy’s Ohio-class Replacement (OR) will replace the current fleet of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as they begin to retire in 2027. The Navy began technology development in January 2011 in order to avoid a gap in sea- based nuclear deterrence between the Ohio-class’s retirement and the production of a replacement. The Navy is working with the United Kingdom to develop a common missile compartment for use on OR and the United Kingdom’s replacement SSBN. OR will initially carry the Trident II D5LE missile. Current Status The Navy is continuing to develop and evaluate new technologies to incorporate into OR, including an X- stern configuration; a new propulsor; and an extended-life drive shaft that, according to program officials, will increase the platform’s availability. According to program officials, the Navy continues to prototype and test the Xstern and propulsor technologies on a scale model to minimize risk. In 2014, the contractor and the Navy completed ship specifications and set the ship’s length, both major milestones, as it commits to the space available for ship systems. The program plans to complete 83 percent of the design disclosures—the detailed plans used on the shop floor—prior to the start of construction. In October 2014, the program awarded a contract for production of 17 missile tubes, one of the boat’s critical subsystems. According to program officials,

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these tubes will support the quad pack prototype, testing, and also the United Kingdomâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s replacement SSBN. Officials stated that they are continuing to investigate cost saving options including maximizing equipment reuse from Virginia- and Ohio-class submarines and also leveraging manufacturing techniques, such as robotic welding and modular construction. According to program officials, the Navy is also investigating alternate contracting strategies such as a joint-class block buy with Virginia-class submarines or multi-year contracting, which may provide for additional savings by allowing for volume discounts in material purchases. Multi-year contracting is allowed by statute if, among other things, the design is stable, technical risk is not excessive, and the costs estimates are realistic. It is typically not used with lead ship construction because of the unknowns inherent in Navy lead ship construction.

Four firm-fixed-price contracts to develop preliminary designs for the unmanned aerial vehicle segment were awarded in August 2013 and completed in May 2014, with the Navy assessing each proposed design for technical maturity and its ability to meet requirements. Congress and DoD have continued to debate UCLASS requirements during 2014, raising the possibility of further specification changes. To the extent that changes are made or proposed designs differ from the preliminary designs, the Navy may need to perform further validation. The release of the request for proposals for the design, fabrication, test and delivery of the air segment has been repeatedly delayed and is now expected to occur after a review of all of DoDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ISR&T programs is completed. DoD and program officials have emphasized the need to carefully synchronize UCLASS development and carrier availability for testing to keep the program on schedule. Further delays may affect that synchronization and increase program risk.

Estimated Program Cost and Quantity (FY15 dollars): Total program: Research and development: Procurement: Quantity:

$95,775.7 million $11,801 million $83,974.7 million 12

Estimated Program Cost and Quantity (FY15 dollars): Total program: Research and development:

TBD $2,783.0 million

Procurement:

TBD

Quantity:

TBD

Next Major Program Event Development request for proposal release decision point Program Office Comments In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.

Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) System The Navy's UCLASS system is expected to address a gap in persistent sea-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR&T), and provide precision strike capabilities. The system is made up of three key segments: an air segment; a carrier segment; and a control system and connectivity segment. Current Status

Next Major Program Event

GAO reported in September 2013 that, while the Navy planned to manage UCLASS as a technology development program, its acquisition strategy encompassed activities associated with a program in system development. As such, the Navy would develop, produce and field a system before initiating key oversight mechanisms and reviews that typically govern system development programs. GAO recommended that the Navy hold a formal review to enter system development following the system-level preliminary design review, scheduled for the end of the first quarter of FY16. The Navy did not agree with that recommendation, and a formal review has not yet been scheduled. The Navy considers all four identified critical technologies to be mature, based on demonstrations of an unmanned system from a carrier.

Release request for proposals for design, fabrication, test and delivery of air segment, TBD

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Program Office Comments The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

March 17, 2015

Positioning the Navy for Future Responsibilities ➥ Continued From pAGE 1 took office: Warfighting First, Operate Forward, Be Ready. Overview Sequestration deeply affected the Navy budget in FY13, and we have not yet recovered. Stabilized funding in FY14 and 2015 provided by the BBA, along with an additional $2.2 billion above Navy’s requested budget in FY15, provided limited relief from sequestered Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) funding levels and helped Navy’s overall posture. However, the cumulative effect of budget shortfalls over these years has forced the Navy to accept significant risk in key mission areas, notably if the military is confronted with a technologically advanced adversary or forced to deny the objective of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region while engaged in a major contingency. By “risk,” we mean that some of our platforms will arrive late to the combat zone, and engage in conflict without the benefit of markedly superior combat systems, sensors and networks, or desired levels of munitions inventories. In real terms, this means longer timelines to achieve victory, more military and civilian lives lost, and potentially less credibility to deter adversaries and assure allies in the future. The PB-14 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) submission was the baseline required by Navy to carry out all 10 DSG missions. Over the last three years, however, the Navy funding under sequestration and the BBA was $25 billion less than the PB-13/14 submissions, shortfalls that manifest in the continued erosion of our warfighting advantages in many areas relative to potential adversaries. PB-16 represents the bare minimum to execute the DSG in the world we face, but still results in high risk in two of the most challenging DSG missions that depend on adequate numbers of modern, responsive forces. Should resources be further reduced below PB-16 levels, and certainly if sequestered, the DSG will need to be revised. If budgeted at PB-16 levels, we assess that the Navy of 2020 will: • Include 304 ships in the battle force, of which about 115 will be deployed. This global deployed presence will include

March 17, 2015

more than two carrier strike groups (CSG) and two amphibious ready groups (ARG) deployed, on average. • In the best case, provide “surge” capacity of about three CSGs (by approximately 2018) and three ARGs (by approximately 2020), not deployed, but ready to respond to a contingency. • Deliver forces to conduct the DSG primary mission—deter and defeat aggression—but with higher risk compared to PB-14 due to capacity and readiness challenges. • Conduct, but with greater risk, the DSG primary mission—project power despite anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges—against a technologically advanced adversary compared to PB-14. This is principally due to the slower delivery of new critical capabilities, particularly in air and missile defense, and overall ordnance capacity. The Navy revised the accounting guidelines for its battle force according to requirements set forth in the FY15 National Defense Authorization Act. Numbers in this statement are not directly comparable to those used in prior testimony. The NDAA prohibits inclusion of “…patrol coastal ships, non-commissioned combatant craft specifically designed for combat roles, or ships that are designated for potential mobilization.” Ships that were counted last year, but are no longer counted, are patrol craft (PC) and hospital ships (T-AH). To ensure the Navy remains a balanced and ready force while complying with the reduction in funding below our PB-14 plan, we were compelled to make difficult choices in PB-16, including: slowing cost growth in compensation and benefits; deferring some ship modernization; deferring procurement of 18 of Navy’s most advanced aircraft; delaying over 1,000 planned weapons procurements; and continuing to reduce funding for base facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization. Deferments in PB-16 compound modernization delays we were compelled to accept in PB-15 due to budget constraints. Additional challenges are on the horizon. In the long term beyond 2020, I am increasingly concerned about our ability to fund the Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program—our highest priority program—within our current and projected resources. The Navy cannot procure the Ohio replacement in the

2020s within historical shipbuilding funding levels without severely impacting other Navy programs. Sequestration in FY13 resulted in a $9 billion shortfall in Navy’s budget, as compared to the PB-13 submission. This instance of sequestration was not just a disruption; it created readiness consequences from which we are still recovering, particularly in ship and aircraft maintenance, fleet response capacity, and excessive CSG and ARG deployment lengths. As I testified in November 2013, March 2014 and January 2015, the continuing resolution and sequestration reductions in FY13 compelled us to reduce both afloat and ashore operations, which created ship and aircraft maintenance and training backlogs. To budget for the procurement of ships and aircraft appropriated in FY13, Navy was compelled to defer some purchases to future years and use prior year investment balances to mitigate impacts to programs in FY13 execution. The most visible impacts occurred in operations and maintenance funded activities. Specific impacts to Navy programs include: • Canceled five ship deployments • Delayed deployment of USS Harry S. Truman strike group by six months • Inactivated, instead of repaired, USS Miami • Reduced facilities restoration and modernization by about 30 percent (to about 57 percent of the requirement) • Reduced base operations, including port and airfield operations, by about 8 percent (to about 90 percent of the requirement) • Furloughed civilian employees for six days, which, combined with a hiring freeze and no overtime for six months, reduced our maintenance and sustainment output through lost production and support from logisticians, comptrollers, engineers, contracting officers and planners • Canceled fleet engagements and most port visits, except for deployed ships While the Navy was able to reprioritize within available resources to continue to operate in FY13, this is not a sustainable course for future budgets. The actions we took in 2013 to mitigate sequestration only served to transfer bills amounting to over $4 billion to future years for many procurement programs—those carryover bills were addressed in Navy’s FY14 and FY15 budgets. If we were sequestered

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again, we would be forced to degrade current and future fleet readiness. Shortfalls caused by the FY13 sequestration remain in a number of areas, and the Navy is still working to recover from them. For example, we have not yet caught up from shipyard maintenance backlogs. We are working through shipyard personnel capacity issues to determine when ships can be fit back into the maintenance cycle and are balancing that against operational demands on the ships to ensure we meet the global force management requirement for combatant commands. The result of maintenance and training backlogs has meant delayed preparation for deployments, forcing us, in turn, to extend the deployments of those units already on deployment. Since 2013, many CSGs, ARGs and destroyers have been on deployment for eight to 10 months or longer. This comes at a cost to the resiliency of our people, sustainability of our equipment and service lives of our ships. Maintenance and training backlogs have also reduced Navy’s ability to maintain required forces for contingency response to meet combatant command operational plan requirements. Although the requirement calls, on average, for three additional CSGs and three additional ARGs to deploy within 30 days for a major crisis, Navy has only been able to maintain an average of one group each in this readiness posture. Root causes can be traced to the high operational tempo of the fleet, longer than expected shipyard availabilities and retirements of experienced shipyard workers, but the FY13 sequestration exacerbated the depth of this problem and interfered with our efforts to recover. Assuming a stable budget and no major contingencies for the foreseeable future, I estimate it is possible to recover from the maintenance backlogs that have accumulated from the high operational tempo over the last decade of war and the additional effects of sequestration by approximately 2018 for CSGs and approximately 2020 for ARGs, five-plus years after the first round of sequestration. This is a small glimpse of the readiness “price” of sequestration. Where We Are Today Before describing our FY16 submission, I will discuss the Navy’s current posture, which established the baseline for our PB-16 budget. Congress’s passage of the BBA averted about $9 billion of an estimated $14 billion reduction we would have faced under sequestration in FY14. It enabled us to fund all

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An F/A-18E Super Hornet from the Eagles of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 115 prepares to launch from the USS George Washington. [Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy/by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Paolo Bayas]

planned ship and aircraft procurement in FY14, but cumulatively the shortfalls increased risk in Navy’s ability to execute DSG missions. The BBA still left a $5 billion shortfall below PB-14 in our investment, operations and maintenance accounts. (Congress subsequently added $3.4B in FY14, which added an SSN and increased the Navy’s Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund (SMOSF)). The shortage in funding compelled us to reduce procurement of weapons (many missile types) and aircraft spare parts, defer asymmetric research and development projects, cancel repair and maintenance projects for facilities ashore and defer procurement of maintenance/ material support equipment for the fleet. The recent passage of the FY15 NDAA and Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act averted about $2 billion of the estimated $13 billion reduction that Navy would have faced under sequestration; an $11 billion shortfall remains (as compared to PB-14). Although the funding enabled us to continue the refueling and complex overhaul of the USS George Washington (CVN 73), Navy was forced to balance its portfolio to mitigate the shortfall by making choices between capability, capacity and readiness. We were compelled to further reduce the capacity of weapons and aircraft, slow modernization and delay upgrades to all but the most critical shore infrastructure. As I described in testimony in March 2014, PB-15 represented another iterative reduction from the resources we indicated were necessary to fully resource the DSG missions, making Navy less ready to successfully deter and defeat aggression

and project power despite A2/AD challenges. Continuing along this budget trajectory means that by 2020, Navy will not have recovered sufficient contingency response capacity to execute large-scale operations in one region while simultaneously deterring another adversary’s aggression elsewhere. Also, we will lose our advantage over adversaries in key warfighting areas such as anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, air-to-air warfare, and integrated air and missile defense. Our Strategic Approach to PB-16 In developing our PB-16 submission, we evaluated the warfighting requirements to execute the primary missions of the DSG. These were informed by: (1) current and projected threat, (2) global presence requirements defined by the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), and (3) warfighting scenarios as described in Combatant Commanders’ Operation Plans (OPLANs) and secretary of defense-approved defense planning scenarios (DPS). We used these warfighting scenarios to assess our ability to execute more than 50 end-to-end capabilities, also known as “kill chains” or “effects chains.” These chains identify all the elements needed to provide a whole capability, including sensors, communications (networks), operators, platforms and weapons. To arrive at a balanced program within fiscal guidance, we focused first on building appropriate capability, then delivering it at a capacity we could afford. Six budget priorities guided us: First, maintain a credible, modern and survivable sea-based strategic deterrent.

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Under the New START Treaty, the Navy SSBN force will carry about 70 percent of the U.S. strategic nuclear warheads by 2020. Our PB-16 request sustains today’s 14-ship SSBN force, the Trident D5 ballistic missile and support systems, and the nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) suite. The Ohio-class SSBN will begin retiring, one per year, beginning in 2027. To continue to meet U.S. Strategic Command presence and surge requirements, PB-16 continues to support construction of the first Ohio replacement SSBN in 2021 for delivery in 2028 and first deterrent patrol in 2031. As part of the Navy’s Nuclear Enterprise Review, our PB-16 submission also adds approximately $2.2 billion across the FYDP to: (1) increase shipyard and nuclear strategic weapons facilities (SWF) capacity by funding required civilian end-strength; (2) accelerate investments in shipyard infrastructure; (3) fund additional manpower associated with nuclear weapons surety; and (4) fund key nuclear weapons training systems. Second, sustain forward presence of ready forces distributed globally to be where it matters, when it matters. We continue to utilize cost-effective approaches such as forward basing, forward operating and forward stationing ships in the Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East. Rotational deployments will be stabilized and more predictable through continued implementation of an improved deployment framework called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP). We will distribute our ships to align mission and capabilities to global regions, ensuring highend combatants are allocated where their unique capabilities are needed most. We will meet the adjudicated FY16 GFMAP; this represents about 45 percent of the global

geographic combatant commander (GCC) requests. Sourcing all GCC requests would require about 450 combatant ships with requisite supporting structure and readiness. Third, strengthen the means (capability and capacity) to win in one multiphase contingency operation and deny the objectives of—or impose unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region. PB-16 prioritizes investments to close gaps in critical kill chains, but accepts risk in capacity or in the rate at which some capabilities are integrated into the fleet. Fourth, focus on critical afloat and ashore readiness. PB-16 helps improve the overall readiness of our non-deployed forces, but not to our satisfaction. With a stable budget and no major contingencies for the foreseeable future, I estimate it is possible to recover from the maintenance backlogs by approximately 2018 for CSGs and approximately 2020 for ARGs. Facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization (FSRM) funds are increased for FY16 to arrest the decline of facilities conditions, but then FSRM funds are inadequate for the remainder of the FYDP, in order to fund afloat readiness. Our budget constraints prevent us from funding all but the most critical shore facility upgrades in FY17 and beyond. Fifth, sustain or enhance Navy’s asymmetric capabilities in the physical domains, as well as in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. PB-16 prioritizes capabilities to deal with adversary threats, including electromagnetic spectrum and cyber capabilities and those capabilities that provide joint access developed in concert with other services under the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons

(formerly known as Air-Sea Battle). In line with USCYBERCOM priorities, we are investing in cyber defense-in-depth and expansion of cyber defense initiatives to tactical platform information technology systems, boundary defense solutions for ships, and security improvements for our C4I systems. Sixth, sustain a relevant industrial base, particularly in shipbuilding. We will continue to evaluate the impact of our investment plans on our industrial base, including ship and aircraft builders, depot maintenance facilities, equipment and weapons manufacturers, and science and technology researchers. The government is the only customer for some of our suppliers, especially in specialized areas such as nuclear power. PB-16 addresses the health of the industrial base by sustaining adequate capacity, including competition, where needed and viable. While prioritizing required capabilities, we also sought to sustain a viable industrial base. What We Can Do As described earlier, due to the impact of prior year shortfalls and modernization deferrals in the PB-16 FYDP, we still face significant risk in executing at least two of 10 primary missions of the DSG in 2020. The 2014 update to the 2012 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) and other Navy analysis describe the baseline of ships needed to support meeting each mission. Against that baseline and using a rigorous assessment of over 50 capabilities (with appropriate capacity) necessary to be tactically successful (called end-to-end kill chain analysis), we conclude that with PB-16, the Navy of 2020 will support each of the 10 DSG missions as follows:

The littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) and the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) conduct a replenishment-at-sea from the Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS Pecos (T-AO 197) during exercise Foal Eagle 2015. [Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy/by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Daniel M. Young]

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1. Provide a Stabilizing Presence PB-16 will meet the adjudicated presence requirements of this mission. By increasing the number of ships forward stationed and forward based, and by improving our deployment preparation process called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP), presence improves in some global regions as compared to previous budget submissions. The Navy of 2020: • Provides a global presence of about 115 ships (same as PB-15); an increase over an average of 95 ships deployed today. • Increases presence in the AsiaPacific region. This includes forward deploying an additional SSN to Guam, the most capable DDG to Japan, mobile landing platform (MLP), joint high speed vessel (JHSV), both littoral combat ship (LCS) variants, MQ-8C, P-8A, EA-18G, upgraded F/A18E/F, and E-2D. MQ-4C Triton high endurance unmanned aerial vehicles will operate from Guam in 2017. This presence will assure allies, shape and deter. However, a major maritime operation will require substantial naval forces to swing from other theaters or surge forward from CONUS bases. • “Places a premium on U.S. military presence in—and in support of— partner nations” in the Middle East, by increasing presence by 40 percent to about 36 ships in 2020. Though not counted in Navy’s battle force, 10 of our patrol craft (PC) serve as forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) operating out of Bahrain, and seven LCS will join them by the end of 2020. In 2016, Navy’s first mobile landing platform/afloat forward staging base (MLP/AFSB) will augment the on-station AFSB-Interim (a modified dock landing ship) to support special operations forces and augment mine countermeasure capability. • Continues to evolve our posture in Europe by meeting ballistic missile defense (BMD) European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) requirements with four BMD-capable guided missiles destroyers (DDG) in Rota, Spain, and two land-based sites in Poland and Romania. The first two DDGs arrived in 2014 and all four will be in place by the end of 2015.

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Additional presence in Europe will be provided by forward operating JHSVs and rotationally deployed combatants. • Will provide innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches to security in Africa and South America by deploying one JHSV, on average, to each region. Beginning in FY15, we will deploy one hospital ship (TAH), on average, and, beginning in FY16, add one PC ship, on average, to South America. AFSBs forward operating in the Middle East could also provide additional presence in Africa as required. As available, we are deploying ships for shorter periods (two months at the most) in theaters other than those which they would be primarily assigned (e.g., AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM).

2 Counter-Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CT/IW)

We will have the capacity to conduct widely distributed CT/IW missions. This mission requires special operations forces, Navy expeditionary combat capabilities such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), combined explosive exploitation cells (CEXC), intelligence exploitation teams (IET), and a variety of platforms that can accommodate adaptive force packages. PB-16 procures a third MLP/AFSB in FY17 for delivery in FY20, and funds an enhanced SOF capability on all three AFSBs, which provides more robust medical facilities, improved C4I, and increased accommodation for aircraft, and other SOF-specific equipment. PB-16 also procures ten MQ-8C Fire Scout systems for deployments aboard LCS, which are fundamentally multimission. 3. Deter and Defeat Aggression Navy inherits and continues to experience high risk in this warfighting

mission. Our FSA described the ship force structure necessary to meet this mission’s requirement: to be able to conduct one large-scale operation and “simultaneously be capable of denying the objectives of— or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.” According to the FSA, the Navy has a requirement for a force of 11 CVN, 88 large surface combatants (DDG and CG), 48 attack submarines (SSN), 12 SSBN, 11 large amphibious assault ships (LHA/D), 12 amphibious transport docks (LPD), 11 dock landing ships (LSD), 52 small surface combatants, 10 JHSV, 29 combat logistics force (CLF) ships and 24 command and support ships. Provided sufficient readiness is restored and maintained across the fleet, this globally distributed force will yield a steady state deployed presence of more than two CSG and two ARG, with three CSG and three ARG ready to deploy within 30 days in response to a contingency (“surge”). PB-16 puts Navy on a path to procure the right mix of ships as defined by the FSA; however, the 2020 Battle Force will have a shortfall of small surface combatants due to a gap in FFG and MCM retirements and LCS deliveries. Other sources of risk in this primary mission are less aircraft, modern sensors, networks and weapon procurements across the FYDP. Slowed modernization across the fleet is a serious concern. 4. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations The Navy of 2020 will be able to meet the requirements of this DSG mission. 5. Project Power Despite Anti- Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges Our power projection capability and reconstitution of weapons systems and modernization programs to enable joint assured access have been deferred due to budget constraints over the last three years. This reduces options and decreases our ability to assure access in all domains (space, air, surface, subsurface and cyber). Over the last three years, funding shortfalls required us to reduce procurement in weapons by over 4,000 planned quantities. We continue to take risk in capacity in order to preserve investments in developing future capabilities.

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This reduced procurement of weapons and deferring of air and missile defense capabilities, coupled with joint force deficiencies in wartime information transport, C2 resiliency and airborne ISR, will result in high risk in conducting this DSG mission if we are faced with a technologically advanced adversary. 6. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction This mission has two parts: (1) interdicting weapons of mass destruction as they proliferate from suppliers, and (2) defeating the means of delivery during an attack. PB-16 will continue to meet the requirements for this mission by providing sufficient deployed CSG, ARG and surface combatants, as well as Navy special warfare personnel (SEAL) and EOD platoons, to address the first part. For the second part, BMD-capable DDG exist in sufficient numbers to meet the majority of GCC presence requirements under the GFMAP, and can be postured to counter weapons delivered by ballistic missiles in regions where threats are more likely to originate. That said, missile defense capacity in some scenarios remains a challenge. 7. Operate Effectively in Space and Cyberspace Our PB-16 submission continues to place priority on cyber efforts to build the

Navy’s portion of the DoD’s Cyber Mission Forces and strengthen our cyber defense capabilities afloat and ashore. We have accessed about 80 percent of the 1,750 cyber operators that will form 40 cyber mission teams by the end of 2016; we will continue to recruit, hire and train this force. Additionally, we will align Navy networks with a more defensible DOD Joint Information Environment (JIE) through the implementation of the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) ashore and Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) at sea. We will continue funding for the launch and sustainment of the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), DoD’s newest and most robust solution for extending narrowband ultra high frequency satellite communications (SATCOM) connectivity ashore, in flight, and at sea. Also critical to assured command and control, PB-16 continues funding the installation and sustainment of the Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT), our newest and most robust solution for giving surface and submarine forces access to wideband super high frequency and extremely high frequency SATCOM connectivity. 8. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent This mission is the Navy’s top priority in any fiscal scenario, and our PB-16

submission meets its requirements. Our sea-based strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, credible, and effective today, but Navy is also implementing 27 specific actions based on the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Review recommendations, including oversight, training, policy and process improvements, funded with an additional PB-16 investment of over $400 million in FY16 and over $2 billion across the FYDP. Our PB-16 submission satisfies STRATCOM demand for at-sea SSBN availability through the end of the current Ohio class’s service life. Navy’s PB-16 submission also funds nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) modernization, Trident D5 ballistic missile life extension program (LEP) to maintain a 2017 initial operational capability (IOC), and common missile compartment development on a 2019 delivery timeline. Continued Congressional support for Naval Reactors’ Department of Energy (DoE) funding is essential to maintain life-of-the-ship core reactor design and development synchronization with our Ohio replacement shipbuilding schedule, which ensures lead ship procurement in 2021, and refueling of the land-based prototype. Naval Reactors’ DoE budget also includes the second year of funding for the Spent Fuel Handling Project (SFHP), recapitalization of which is critical to the Navy’s refueling and defueling schedule

The Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS Laramie (T-AO-203) transits alongside the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) during a replenishment-at-sea. [Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy/by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Magen F. Weatherwax]

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of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines. 9. Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities PB-16 will maintain an appropriate capacity of aircraft carriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships and aircraft that are not deployed and are ready for all homeland defense missions. 10. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations Navy’s global presence and training is sufficient to conduct these operations. Modernization The following paragraphs describe specific PB-16 programs that influence our ability to conduct the missions required by the DSG, and the impact of programmatic action: Shipbuilding Navy shipbuilding priorities remain largely consistent with PB-15. Navy will procure 48 ships across the FY16-20 period. Fourteen battle force ships will be delivered in FY16 alone. PB-16: • Maintains funding to support RDTE and advanced procurement of the first Ohio replacement SSBN, our highest priority program. Without increased shipbuilding funding in FY21 and beyond, Ohio replacement SSBN funding will consume the majority of Navy’s annual shipbuilding budget and degrade other shipbuilding programs. Appropriations for SSBN recapitalization are historically consistent with the last period of SSBN procurement between 1974 and 1990. • Fully funds USS George Washington (CVN 73) refueling and complex overhaul. • Procures 10 Arleigh Burke-class DDG (one Flight IIA and nine Flight III) in the FYDP, two per year, resulting in an inventory of 72 by 2020. The first Flight III DDG, which will incorporate the advanced AN/SPY-6 radar (formerly called the air and missile defense radar, or AMDR), will be procured in FY16 and delivered in FY21. • Procures 10 Virginia-class SSNs in the FYDP, two per year, resulting in an inventory of 22 Virginia-class submarines

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(51 total SSNs of all types) by 2020. • Funds the final nine LCS (Flt 0+) across the FYDP (three per year FY16–18). Then beginning in FY19, Navy will procure new Small Surface Combatants (two in FY19, three in FY20) based on upgraded variants of the LCS that Navy will designate as frigates (FF). There will be no construction gap between procurement of the last LCS (Flt 0+) and the first frigate. The new frigate will offer improvements in capability, lethality and survivability. • Funds replacement of LSD amphibious ships with the LX(R) starting with advanced procurement in FY19 and procurement of the first LX(R) in FY20. LX(R) serial production will begin in FY22. • Procures a 12th LPD, which will be developed in parallel with the LX(R) program and incorporate targeted design and construction initiatives to increase affordability. Adding LPD 28 to the inventory will help mitigate expeditionary capability and amphibious lift shortfalls. • Funds four fleet oilers (T-AO(X)) across the FYDP beginning in FY16. T-AO(X) replaces the aging single hull fleet oiler. This new procurement ensures continued combat logistics support to our ships. • Funds five fleet salvage ships (T-ATS(X)) across the FYDP beginning in FY17. These new ships replace the two aging salvage class ships with a single class while improving capability and performance. Combatant Ship Modernization In parallel with shipbuilding, PB-16 continues modernization of in-service platforms to allow our combatants to remain relevant and reach their expected service lives. The ship modernization program does not keep pace to deal with high-end adversary weapons systems by 2020. Flight I and II of the Arleigh Burke-class DDG began mid-life modernization in FY10; 13 will have completed hull mechanical and electrical (HM&E) modernization by the end of 2016, and six of these ships will have also completed combat systems modernization. In FY17, we will begin to modernize the Flight IIA DDGs. However, due to fiscal constraints we were compelled to reduce the combat systems procurements of one DDG Flight

IIA per year, starting in FY16. This will result in some destroyers not receiving combat systems upgrades when originally planned to allow them to pace the threat, particularly in anti-air warfare (AAW) and ballistic missile defense (BMD). In order to maintain force structure that provides air defense commander support to the CSGs, Navy will induct two guided missile cruisers (CGs) into phased modernization in FY15 and an additional two in FY16. This will place a total of four ships in modernization with the intent that each ship period will be limited to four years. We are committed to modernizing a total of 11 CGs in the current modernization program. Without any phased modernization program, the CG class will retire, without replacement, at the end of their service lives between 2020 and 2030. Using the Congressionally directed 2/4/6 plan, the final retirements will occur between 2036 and 2039. Under the Navy’s original PB-15 plan, the final CG retirement would have occurred in 2045, at a significantly reduced cost to the Navy, and would have relieved pressure on a shipbuilding account largely consumed in the 2030s with building Ohio replacement SSBNs and aircraft carriers. We request Congressional support for Navy’s original plan. Nine of 12 Whidbey Island-class LSDs have undergone a mid-life update and preservation program; two are currently being modernized; and one more will be inducted into phased modernization in FY16. Modernization of seven Wasp-class large deck amphibious assault ships (LHD) was delayed by two years, and they will now complete mid-life modernization by FY24. Modernization of the eighth LHD, USS Makin Island, will be addressed in subsequent budget submissions. Warfighting Capability Aviation PB-16 continues our transition, albeit more slowly than desired, to the future air wing. This transition will dramatically improve our capabilities and warfighting capacity across critical “kill chains.” But, funding shortfalls have stretched (deferred) modernization plans in this area. This delay will call into question our ability to deal with near peer competitors, especially if directed to carry out our DoD campaign plan in the 2020 timeframe. Specifically, we

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will continue to field more advanced landbased maritime patrol aircraft (manned and unmanned) to evolve our ISR, ASW and sea control capabilities and capacity. To further these objectives, PB-16 provides the following capabilities: • Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) Increment I capability will field with the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft in 2015, with four air wings transitioned to the E-2D by 2020. This integrates aircraft sensor and ship weapons capabilities, improving lethality against advanced air and missile threats. However, we deferred two E-2D outside the FYDP (procure 24 vice 26). • The F-35C Lightning II, the carrierbased variant of the joint strike fighter, is scheduled to achieve IOC in 2018. However, F-35C procurement will be reduced by 16 airframes (from 54 to 38) across the PB-16 FYDP when compared to PB-15. The F-35C, with its advanced sensors, data sharing capability, and ability to operate closer to threats, is designed to enhance the air wing’s ability to find targets and coordinate attacks. • Continued support for a service life extension program (SLEP) for the legacy F/A-18A-D Hornet to meet our strike fighter inventory needs while integrating the F-35C. With SLEP modifications, some of these aircraft will achieve as much as 10,000 lifetime flight hours, or 4,000 hours and (16 years) beyond their originally-designed life. • To address Navy electronic attack requirements, EA-18G will reach full operational capability in FY17. Replacement of the aging ALQ-99 jamming pods begins in FY21, when the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) Increment I, featuring upgraded capabilities against mid-band frequencies, reaches IOC. NGJ Increment II research and development on low band frequencies remains funded for FY16. • All components of an improved air-to-air “kill chain” that employs infrared (IR) sensors to circumvent adversary radar jamming will be delayed another year. PB-16 increased funding to procure an additional 28 Infrared Search and Track (IRST) Block I sensor pods for F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, for a total of 60, across the FYDP; however, the IRST Block I sensor system will field in 2018 (versus 2017

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The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Louisiana (SSBN 743) returns home following a strategic deterrent patrol. [Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy/by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Ahron Arendes]

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under PB-15) and the improved longerrange IRST Block II will not deliver until 2022 (versus 2019 under PB-15). Improvements continue to the air-to-air radio frequency “kill chain” that defeats enemy jamming at longer ranges. By 2020, 380 jamming protection upgrade kits for F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and EA-18G growler will be delivered. But, we were compelled to defer 180 kits beyond the FYDP. Integrates the Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II) on the F/A-18 by FY20, and procures 1,590 units across the FYDP to enhance carrier air wing precision strike capabilities. V-22 (Navy variant) aircraft have been selected as the solution to the aging C-2 carrier onboard delivery (COD) aircraft. PB-16 procures 24 aircraft over the FYDP with an IOC of FY 2021. The V-22 (Navy variant) extends the range and in increases the flexibility of strike group resupply. Navy’s commitment to the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System (UCLASS) program continues. However, a DoD-wide Strategic Portfolio Review will delay UCLASS air vehicle segment contract award by at least one year. The remaining UCLASS carrier integration and connectivity and control system segments will continue and are funded through the FYDP.

Long Range Strike Our precision strike capabilities and capacity will be critical to success in any foreseeable future conflict. Potential adver-

saries have already fielded and continue to develop advanced, long range weapons that will require effective counters. We remain challenged in this area. Accordingly, PB-16: • Funds Virginia payload module (VPM) RDT&E and SCN to accelerate inclusion of VPM on at least one Virginia-class Block V SSN per year in FY19 and 2020. VPM will enable Virginia-class SSNs to mitigate the loss of SSGN strike capacity as they begin to retire in 2026. VPM will more than triple the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) Block IV strike capacity of a VA-class SSN from 12 to 40 missiles. • Supports the existing Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile inventory by extending service life through investments in critical capability enhancements and vital parts to achieve maximum longevity. PB-16 adds 100 Tomahawks in FY16. Production deliveries will now continue through FY18, which minimizes factory impact until the start of Tomahawk Block IV inventory recertification and modernization beginning in FY19. • Invests in future capability by commencing an analysis of alternatives for the next generation land attack weapon (NGLAW), with a planned fleet introduction in the 2024-2028 timeframe, at least a decade prior to the sundown of TLAM Block IV in the 2040s. Anti-Surface Warfare Navy remains challenged in this mission area due to both capability and capacity shortfalls. To deal with potential adversaries’ long-range anti-ship cruise missiles and mari-

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time air defenses, PB-16 implements a plan to deliver a family of anti-surface warfare (ASuW) capabilities. The program maintains current ASuW capability inherent in the Harpoon missile, Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) C-1, and Mk48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) torpedoes. In the near term, we are pursuing options to develop an improved, longer-range ASuW capability by leveraging existing weapons to minimize technical risk, costs, and development time. Five of 10 patrol craft in the Arabian Gulf have been upgraded with short-range Griffin missiles, and the other five will receive them by the end of 2015. Additionally, PB-16 funds enhanced ASuW lethality for LCS by integrating surface-to-surface missiles (Hellfire Longbow) onto those platforms starting in 2017. Navy is evaluating which missile to select to provide upgraded LCS (frigates) an additional and even longer range over-the-horizon missile capability. Also, PB-16 continues to accelerate acquisition of the long range antiship missile (LRASM) air-launched variant, which will achieve early operational capability on F/A-18E/F aircraft in FY19.

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Anti-Submarine Warfare PB-16 sustains our advantage in the undersea domain by delivering the following capabilities, although capacity challenges persist: • Procures 47 P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, replacing the legacy P-3C Orion’s capability and completing the transition by FY19. We continue investments in the development of a

•

high-altitude anti-submarine warfare capability (HAAWC), which is composed of a MK 54 torpedo kit and software support system. Continues installation of ASW combat systems upgrades for DDGs and improved multifunction towed arrays (MFTA) for DDGs and CGs. Both installations will be complete on all DDGs forward based in the Western Pacific by 2018. Continues upgrades to all our P-8A and ASW helicopters in the Western Pacific with sonobuoys and advanced torpedoes by 2018; however, in PB-16 we were compelled to reduce weapons capacity, which equated to cancelling 240 MK 54 lightweight torpedoes. Procures 145 MK 48 ADCAP torpedoes over the FYDP to reduce a wartime requirement shortfall from 30 percent to 20 percent, and invests in modularity and endurance improvements to enable more efficient production, better performance, and future upgradability. Improves surface ASW capability in the LCS ASW Mission Package by employing an MFTA in concert with variable depth sonar (VDS) in 2016. Defers recapitalization of our ocean surveillance ship, T-AGOS(X), from FY 2020 to outside the FYDP, a reflection of our intent to extend the service life of our current T-AGOS vessels. Develops and builds the large displacement unmanned undersea vehicle (LDUUV) in the FYDP to augment submarine capabilities. We will use Office

An E/A-18G Growler from the Shadowhawks of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 141 prepares to make an arrested landing on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. [Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy/by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Chris Cavagnaro]

of Naval Research Innovative Naval Prototype large UUVs to train our fleet operators, preparing them for LDUUV Fleet introduction in the early 2020s. Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare PB-16 puts Navy on a path to maneuver more freely in the electromagnetic spectrum, while strengthening our capability to degrade adversaries’ ability to do so. It maintains our investment in the Ships’ Signals Exploitation Equipment (SSEE) Increment F, which equips ships with a capability to interdict the communications and address and offset elements of adversary kill chains by 2020. PB-16 adds an advanced geo-location capability to SSEE Increment F, which contributes to defeating the “left side” of the adversary’s ballistic missile kill chain and C4ISR systems. It also increases our investment in upgraded electromagnetic sensing capabilities for surface ships via the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 2 that will deliver in 2016, procuring an additional 14 systems. PB-16 begins low rate initial production of SEWIP Block 3 in 2017 to add jamming and deception capabilities to counter advanced anti-ship cruise missiles. PB-16 also stands up Real-Time Spectrum Operations (RTSO) as a program of record. RTSO will provide ships and strike groups the ability to sense, control, and plan the use of spectrum, detect interference, notify the operators of spectrum issues and provide recommended actions allowing for command and control of the electromagnetic spectrum. Our cyber capability continues to afford the Navy a competitive advantage, but we are growing increasingly concerned about potential vulnerabilities that could affect combat readiness. Recognizing these risks, in FY15 the Navy stood up a dedicated task force to evaluate our cybersecurity posture and manage our investment portfolio to ensure we are spending money where it matters most. In addition to evaluating our cyber risk and informing our budget process, the task force will also recommend changes to the Navy’s acquisition and management of our networks and cyber-connected systems. Mine Warfare To enhance our ability to counter mines in the Middle East and other theaters, our PB-16 program sustains investments in the

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LCS mine countermeasures mission package (MCM MP), completing initial testing of its first increment in 2015 and achieving full operational capability in 2019. The MCM MP provides significantly faster rates of waterspace mine clearance over legacy counterparts. PB-16 also sustains our interim AFSB, USS Ponce, in service through at least FY17. USS Ponce provides forward logistics support and command and control to MCM ships and helicopters, allowing them to remain on station longer and sustain a more rapid mine clearance rate. In the near term, PB-16 continues funding for Mk 18 Kingfish unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and Sea Fox mine neutralization systems deployed to the Arabian Gulf today, as well as increased maintenance and manning support for forward-deployed MH-53 airborne mine countermeasures platforms and Avengerclass MCM ships forward based in Bahrain. Readiness Afloat Readiness PB-16 funds ship operations to 45/20 (deployed/non-deployed) steaming days per quarter. overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds an additional 13/4 days (deployed/non-deployed), providing the training and operations required to meet our FY16 GFMAP commitment. PB-16 baseline funds ship maintenance to 80 percent of the requirement, with OCO funding the remaining 20 percent, to continue life cycle maintenance reset of CVNs and surface force ships. To address the workload to be completed in our public shipyards, Navy funds additional workforce (up to 33,500 full-time equivalent workers by FY17) and will send selective submarines to private shipyards in FY16 and FY17. With respect to the Flying Hour Program, PB-16 achieves deployed readiness levels of T2.5/T2.0 (USN/USMC) in accordance with guidance for all carrier air wing (CVW) aircraft. Navy funds aviation depot maintenance to 83 percent of the requirement, which puts the depots at capacity. As aviation depot maintenance throughput improves, the associated F/A-18 flying hours and depot maintenance budgets will increase to the more notional level of 77 percent. PB-16 increases Navy Expeditionary Combat Command FY16 base funding from 42 percent to 80 percent. OCO funds the remaining 20 percent. Due to extended depot repair time, F/A-18A-D availability is reduced and short-

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falls in aircraft will be borne by non-deployed forces. As more legacy F/A-18s approach their 6,000 hour design life and are inducted for assessment and life extension to 8,000 or 10,000 hours, aviation depots are experiencing production challenges resulting in longer-than-expected repair cycle times for these aircraft. Navy has taken steps to better maintain and repair these legacy aircraft and expects to improve depot productivity by 2017, with the backlog fully recovered by 2019. In PB-16, flying hours for these aircraft will reflect the maximum executable profile and achieve T2.0 for deployment, with tailored T-ratings through the training cycle. Year after year, the Navy has consistently provided more global presence than authorized and adjudicated by the GFMAP. In 2013 and 2014, for example, Naval forces provided 6 percent and 5 percent more forward presence, respectively, than planned due to emergent operations and unanticipated contingencies. This unbudgeted usage amounted to greater than 2,200 days in theater over that planned in 2013 and greater than 1,800 days in theater over that planned in 2014. We should operate the fleet at sustainable presence levels, in order for the Navy to meet requirements while still maintaining material readiness, giving ships time to modernize and allowing them to reach their expected service lives. Ashore Readiness To comply with fiscal constraints, we are compelled to continue accepting risk in shore infrastructure investment and operations. PB-16 prioritizes nuclear weapons support, base security, and airport/seaport operations while maintaining our commitment to quality of life programs for our sailors and families. We are funding the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of our facilities at a level to arrest the immediate decline in the overall condition of our most critical infrastructure. Although FY16 marks an improvement in the facilities funding when compared to PB-15, Navy is still below the DoD goal for facilities sustainment. Facilities sustainment also declines in the PB-16 FYDP in order to preserve the operational readiness of our fleet. When restoring and modernizing our infrastructure, we intend to prioritize life/safety issues and efficiency improvements to existing infrastructure and focus on repairing only the most critical components of our mission critical facilities. By deferring less critical repairs, especially for non-mission-critical facilities,

we are allowing certain facilities to degrade and causing our overall facilities maintenance backlog to increase. We acknowledge this backlog must eventually be addressed. Navy will exceed the minimum 6 percent in capital investment in naval shipyards and depots described in 10 USC 2476, with a projected 7.4 percent in FY16. Additionally, we are on track to exceed the target in FY15 with a projected 6.3 percent investment. Our naval shipyards and depots are critical to maintaining the warfighting readiness of our force, and Navy will continue to prioritize investments to address the most critical safety and productivity deficiencies. Audit Readiness Navy is on course to achieve full auditability on all four financial statements by the end of FY17, a legislative mandate. An audit of the Schedule of Budgetary Activity (SBA) began in December 2014. This initial audit is a critical step to identify any weaknesses in business systems and business processes. The Navyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Audit Plan has been greatly improved by lessons learned from our sister Service, the United States Marine Corps, which achieved a clean audit on their SBA in 2013. The remaining challenge to meeting the FY17 mandate is to achieve auditability on the other major financial statement, Navyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s balance sheet. audit readiness on the balance sheet depends primarily on the accuracy of the multibillion-dollar asset line; the Navy has been executing a plan to bring service-wide accountability for major assets (by amounts and value) into compliance with financial audit standards. The Navy is confident that it will be able to undergo an audit of all of its financial statements by FY17 to meet the Congressional requirement. Family Readiness Family readiness is fully integrated into our Navyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s call to be ready. PB-16 continues to provide support for critical programs that support our sailors and their families so that they can adapt to, and cope with, the challenges of balancing military commitment with family life. Navy fleet and family support centers ensure military families are informed, healthy, and resilient through robust programs that include: relocation assistance; non-medical and family counseling; personal and family life education; personal financial management services, information and referral services; deployment assistance,

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domestic violence prevention and response services, exceptional family member liaison; emergency family assistance and transition assistance. Increased stress and longer family separations have amplified program demand and underlined the importance of these support programs and services to ensure the psychological, emotional, and financial well-being of our sailors and their families. Navy child and youth programs continue to provide accessible, affordable, and highquality child and youth development programs through child development centers, youth centers, child development homes and contract child care spaces. All Navy child development centers are DoD certified and nationally accredited, and provide consistent, high-quality care at affordable rates based on total family income. Military Construction The PB-16 military construction program includes 38 projects valued at almost $1 billion to invest in our construction worldwide. We have prioritized funding to enable IOC of new platforms such as LCS, P-8A, F-35C, MH-60 and MQ-4C through the construction of hangars, mission control centers, and various support and training facilities. We are also supporting combatant commander requirements by constructing a landbased Aegis site in Poland and upgrading port facilities in Bahrain. A portion of MILCON funds will recapitalize infrastructure in three naval shipyards and improve the resiliency of utilities systems at seven bases. Three projects will improve the quality of life for our sailors and their families by addressing unaccompanied housing issues in Florida and Maryland and constructing a new child development center in Japan. Health of the Force We measure and track the health of our force using Navy-wide metrics on recruiting, retention, manning levels; unit operational tempo; individual tempo (how often individual Sailors are away from home); morale; stress; sexual assault rates; suicide rates; alcoholrelated incidents, and other factors. Based on a comprehensive study of these metrics and trends, today we rate the overall health of our Navy force as good. Our sailors are our most important asset, they are our “asymmetric advantage,” and we have invested appropriately to keep a high caliber all-volunteer force. At work, the Navy

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is committed to providing our sailors a challenging, rewarding professional experience, underpinned by the tools and resources to do their jobs right. Our obligations don’t stop at the bottom of the brow. I remain focused on dealing with enduring challenges that relate to the safety, health, and well-being of our people, no matter where they are located. We also support our Navy families with the proper quality of life in terms of compensation, professional and personal development, and stability (i.e., deployment predictability). Navy’s 21st Century Sailor Office (OPNAV N17), led by a flag officer, continues to integrate and synchronize our efforts to improve the readiness and resilience of sailors and their families. Specific initiatives that we continue to support in PB-16: 21st Century Sailor Programs Suicide Prevention Preventing suicide is a command-led effort that leverages a comprehensive array of outreach and education. We continue to raise awareness regarding the combination of indicators most common to suicide-prone individuals such as post-traumatic stress, relationship problems, legal and financial problems, periods of transition and mental health issues. We have launched several key initiatives including: (1) mandatory operational stress control (OSC) skills training for units within six months of deployment, (2) new guidance for Navy unit commanders and health professionals to reduce access to lethal instruments under certain conditions, (3) an interactive, scenario-based suicide prevention training tool, (4) an OSC curriculum specific to our Reserve sailors, and (5) specialized Chaplain Corps professional development training on suicide prevention. Our sailors continue to learn about the bystander intervention tool known as “A.C.T.” (Ask–Care–Treat). We also invest in the resilience of our people to help them deal with any challenge. Resilience Our research shows that a sailor’s ability to steadily build resilience is a key factor in navigating stressful situations. Education and prevention initiatives train sailors to recognize operational stress early and to use tools to manage and reduce its effects. Our Operational Stress

Control (OSC) program is the foundation of our efforts to teach sailors to recognize stressors in their lives and mitigate them before they become crises. We expanded our OSC mobile training teams, developed bystander intervention to the fleet training, and deployed resiliency counselors on our aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious ships. The 21st Century Sailor Office is also conducting a Total Sailor Fitness curriculum review and developing a resilience management system to automate the collection and reporting of all destructive behaviors and better coordinate and integrate our resilience efforts. We also launched a new campaign across the fleet in 2015 called “Every Sailor, Every Day,” which emphasizes personal responsibility and peer support, so that Sailors are even more empowered to look out for and help other sailors. Sexual Assault The Navy continues to pursue a deliberate strategy in combatting sexual assault. We continue to focus on preventing sexual assaults, ensuring victims are fully supported, improving investigation programs and processes, and ensuring appropriate accountability. These efforts include making sexual assault forensic exams available on all ships and 24-7 ashore, having a cadre of professional and credentialed sexual assault response coordinators and victim advocates, special victim trained investigators and JAGs, and ensuring commands take all reports of sexual assault seriously and support the victim. We will enhance our response efforts by full implementation of deployed resiliency counselors on large deck ships, enhanced NCIS investigative capability using specially training master-at-arms, and continued legal assistance to victims through our Victims Legal Counsel program. Sustaining a professionalized response and victim advocacy system remains the top priority, but preventing sexual assaults in the first place is an imperative. Our strategy focuses on improving command climate, strengthening deterrence measures, and encouraging bystander intervention. To facilitate the latter, we trained facilitators to lead small, peer-group

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interactive discussions using various scenarios. Likewise, we have focused on raising awareness and accountability regarding retaliation to reduce the potential for re-victimization. A RAND survey of DoD found that 53 percent of retaliation is “social” or “peer,” so we are focusing in on that area. Navy efforts are aligned with SECDEF direction to enhance first line supervisor skills and knowledge in recognizing signs of possible acts of retaliation. Recent Navy survey results show that prevalence of sexual assaults is decreasing, but we remain fully committed to creating and sustaining a culture where sailors understand the importance of treating shipmates with dignity and respect at all times, in all places. Manpower End Strength PB-16 supports an FY16 Navy active end strength of 329,200 and reserve end strength of 57,400. It appropriately balances risk, preserves capabilities to meet current Navy and joint requirements, fosters growth in required mission areas, and provides support to sailors, Navy civilians and families. Programmatic changes tied to force structure and fact-of-life additions resulted in modest PB-16 active component end strength growth. Examples of force structure-related changes include retaining personnel for CVN 73 and its air wing, restoring manpower to nine cruisers that will remain in operation, and building crews for new construction destroyers (DDG 51, DDG 1000) and submarines (Virginia class). PB-16 end strength remains fairly stable across the FYDP, reaching approximately 330, 000 active and 58,900 reserves in FY20. Sea Duty Navy continues to emphasize and reward sea duty. Aggregate fleet manning (what we call “fill”) increased from 93 percent in FY13 to 96 percent in FY14, the equivalent of roughly 3,500 more sailors aboard surface ships. Also, we are very close to achieving our goal of ensuring that more than 90 percent of our sailors are serving in jobs at the required grade with requisite experience and training (what we call “fit”).

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Navy is committed to reducing deployment lengths to seven months, but in recognition of those who have been experiencing longer deployments (over 220 days), in 2014 we began providing additional pay called hardship duty paytempo (HDPT).We have also incentivized and rewarded sea duty, in general, by increasing sea pay. Personnel Management Recruiting and Retention Navy recruiting and retention remain strong, although retaining personnel in certain critical skills continues to present a challenge, particularly as the demands we place on sailors and their families remain high. The threat of looming sequestration, along with a recovering economy, is a troubling combination. We are beginning to see downward trends in retention, particularly among pilots, nuclear-trained officers, SEALs and highly-skilled sailors in information technology, Aegis radar and nuclear specialties. We are using all tools at our disposal, including special and incentive pays, to motivate continued service in these critical fields. Gender Integration Integrating women across the force remain top priorities, because they allow the Navy to tap into the nation’s rich talent pool. Over 96 percent of all Navy jobs are currently available to women, and we expect to open all occupations by early next year. We are also focused on retaining women warfighters by increasing career flexibility through initiatives like the Career Intermission Program, which allows servicemembers to take a hiatus from their careers for up to three years to pursue personal priorities before re-entering the force. One of our major thrusts in FY16 is to increase female accessions of both officer and enlisted in order to provide greater female representation in all operational units by 2025. We are setting a goal of increasing female enlisted accessions to 25 percent and changing the mix of ratings available to provide greater operational opportunity for women to serve. Integration of women into the submarine force is tracking well.

Diversity Demonstrating our continued commitment to diversity, Navy recently established a diversity policy review board, chaired by the vice chief of naval operations. Individual community self-assessments focused on diversity trend analysis are also vetted at my level to ensure each warfighting enterprise remains free of barriers to advancement and committed to equal opportunity to our entire talent pool without regard to race, gender, country of origin or religion. Additionally, Navy offers a range of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education and outreach programs to generate interest by the nation’s youth in these fields and open up opportunities for them to consider potential Navy careers where STEM expertise could be applied. Quality of Service Navy continues to invest in projects designed to improve sailors’ quality of service, which has two components: (1) quality of work, and (2) quality of life. Further, all funds saved through “compensation reform” are directly invested in quality of work and quality of life programs. PB-16 invests in quality of service initiatives such as barracks and training building improvements, greater travel and schools, expanded use of tactical trainers and simulators, and increased funding for spare parts and tools. It also leverages smart technology devices and applications through an “eSailor” initiative to enhance training, communication and sailor career management ashore and afloat. Talent Management As our economy improves and the labor marketplace becomes even more competitive, the battle for America’s talented youth in service continues to heighten. Today’s generation, while remarkably similar in their desire to serve as the rest of us, have different expectations for a career of service. Meanwhile, our personnel policies and information systems are rooted in the assumptions of a previous era. Much like any legacy weapons system, that personnel and learning structure is in need of modernization. Thus, we are examining initiatives to modernize how we manage our

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future force, for example: (1) phase out strict year-group management practices in favor of a milestone-based promotion system, (2) improve lateral flows between reserve and active components to offer more agile pathways of service, and (3) upgrade our information technology, software and tools to enable a more mobile, flexible and accurate personnel delivery system. Further, we plan to build upon our cultural strengths through a number of family-centered initiatives, such as expanded child development and fitness resources, along with greater career flexibility for dual-military and dual-professional families to grow together while serving our nation. Transition Assistance A new transition goals, plans, success (GPS) curriculum replaced the 20-year-old Transition Assistance Program (TAP) to improve career readiness standards and assist separating sailors. The mandatory five-day core curriculum provides Veterans Affairs benefits briefings, the Department of Labor employment workshop, financial management and budgeting, and military to civilian skills crosswalk. Moreover, the DoD Military Life Cycle (MLC) Transition Model, implemented in 2014 in the Navy, is working to begin a sailor’s transition preparation early in their career, by providing opportunities to align with civilian standards long before their intended separation, to achieve their post-military goals for employment, education, technical training, or starting a business. Character Development At all levels in the Navy, we emphasize a culture of integrity, accountability, and ethical behavior. All of these make up the character of our leaders. Good character enables unconditional trust throughout our ranks. This is essential to succeed as a unified, confident and interdependent team. It must be inherent in all our operations. Navy continues to emphasize character development as a priority in our overall leader development efforts, which are outlined in Navy’s 2013 Navy Leader Development Strategy. In 2014, we established the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center (formerly known as the Command Leadership School), which serves as the means by which we guide our efforts. This new command,

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alongside our Senior Enlisted Academy, and leadership and ethics programs at the Naval War College, expands and improves character development initiatives at every level. We are developing an ethics curriculum (courses and modules) that will be embedded in schoolhouses across the fleet. We are also strengthening our Navy Leader Development Continuum, which is the way in which we facilitate development of both officers and enlisted throughout all phases of their careers. We are not learning alone; we draw insights and share best practices with our sister services. The Navy is committed to inculcating into every member of our profession the key attribute of good character. It reflects our Navy heritage and the citizens of our nation expect that we uphold the highest standards of behavior and performance in the execution of duties. Navy Reserve Force Our Navy responded to extraordinary challenges over 13 years of war with the help of reserve sailors. The men and women of our Navy Reserve have increasingly put their civilian careers on hold in order to operate forward, provide critical support to fleet and combatant commanders, and enhance the performance of the joint force. The Navy Reserve is a valuable hedge against an uncertain and challenging security environment; they augment the fleet with unique skills to see us through any challenge. Since 9/11, reserve contributions to the active duty Navy component have been significant—over 73,000 Navy Reserve sailors were mobilized in support of global contingency operations, providing tens of thousands of “boots on the ground” in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa, as well as supporting key missions like those at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo Bay. On any given day, nearly 25 percent of the Navy Reserve force directly supports the Navy worldwide—about 15,000 sailors. Based on our annual assessment of the active/reserve mix, PB-16 continues investments in expanding critical capabilities within the Reserve component including: (1) surge maintenance, by selectively targeting reservists who bring specific, valuable civilian skill sets to the Navy total force; (2) intelligence support, by realigning end strength to support this vital mission; (3) cyber warfare, by ensuring the appropriate mix of reserve manning to augment the active Navy capability; and, (4) high value unit escort, by leveraging the Navy Reserve’s ability to fill short notice requirements using Reserve

coastal riverine force units to assume CONUS high value unit escort missions from the Coast Guard. PB-16 maintains several vital reserve capabilities, including all of the Navy-unique fleet essential airlift assets (C-40A and C-130). These enable the Navy to meet short-notice, missioncritical airlift requirements more responsively than any other logistics option. It also supports airborne electronic attack by fully funding a reserve airborne electronic attack squadron, which is an integral component of Navy’s cyclic operational expeditionary airborne electronic attack deployment capability. Conclusion For the last three years, the Navy has been operating under reduced top-lines generating capability shortfalls amounting to $25 billion less than the president’s budget requests. With each year that the Navy receives less than requested, the loss of force structure, readiness and future investments cause our options to become increasingly constrained. Navy has already divested 23 ships and 67,000 personnel between 2002 and 2012. And we have been assuming significant risk by delaying critical modernizations of our force to keep pace and maintain technological advantage. Unless naval forces are properly sized, modernized at the right pace, ready to deploy with adequate training and equipment and able to respond with the capacity and speed required by combatant commanders, they will not be able to carry out the defense strategy, as written. Most importantly, when facing major contingencies, our ability to fight and win will not be quick or as decisive as required. To preclude a significantly diminished global security role for the nation’s military, we must address the growing mismatch in ends, ways and means. The world is more complex, uncertain and turbulent; this trend will likely continue. Our adversaries’ capabilities are modernizing and expanding. It is, therefore, vital to have an adequate, predictable and timely budget to remain an effective Navy. PB-16 proposes the best balance of Navy capabilities for the authorized amount of funding, and enables the Navy to conduct the ten primary missions outlined in the president’s DSG and the QDR. But, there is considerable risk. PB-16 is the absolute minimum funding needed to execute our DSG. Should resources be further reduced below PB-16 levels, the DSG will need to be revised. If sequestration is implemented in FY16, it will damage our national security.

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Evaluation of Aircraft Ejection Seat Safety When Using Advanced Helmet Sensors ➥ Continued From pAGE 1 Airworthiness Process The airworthiness certification process is employed by the Navy and Air Force to evaluate aircraft airworthiness prior to flight. The certification verifies that a specific air vehicle system can be safely maintained and operated within its described flight envelope and can safely attain, sustain and terminate a flight in accordance with approved usage limits (such as range, speed, weight, altitude and safety). Airworthiness certification is required for any fixed-wing and unmanned vehicle that is new or has had any modifications to its configuration and/or performance envelope. The airworthiness certification requirements are listed in multiple DoD guides, handbooks, military standards, instructions and regulations. The two main criteria are MIL-HDBK-516B and the Joint Service Specification Guides (JSSGs)-2010, October 1998. Both documents are for guidance only and cannot be cited as a contractor requirement. MIL-HDBK-516B establishes the airworthiness certification criteria to be used in determining airworthiness of all manned, unmanned, fixed- and rotary-wing air vehicle systems. It is a foundational document that is used by the system program manager, chief/lead systems engineer and contractors to define their air system’s airworthiness certification basis. The criteria can be tailored and applied at any point throughout the life of an air vehicle system when an airworthiness determination is necessary and whenever there is a change to the functional or product baseline. The handbook has several sections for each function of the aircraft. Each section is matched with a corresponding JSSG. Specifically, MIL-HDBK-516B Section 9, “Crew Systems,” outlines the elements required for verification of escape and egress systems, and life support systems. The MIL-HDBK-516B provides a generalized list of typical data required for airworthiness approval from the services, such as validation, testing and analyses reports used in the certification of aircraft systems. In all instances, complete and accurate documentation of both applicability and system-specific measurable criteria values are critical to ensuring consistent, timely and accurate airworthiness assessments. MIL-HDBK-516B provides a listing of required documents for verification of various aircraft systems, and the JSSG-2010-11, “Crew Systems, Emergency Egress Handbook,” is a template and establishes a common framework to be used by government-industry program teams for developing program-unique requirements documents for air systems. By design, the JSSG is written as a template for requirements and verification criteria with blanks that need to be completed by the program office in order to make the requirements meaningful. The JSSG captures the essential performance objectives needed for aviation systems that are often buried within the how-to detail specifications and military standards. To help program teams understand the basis for each requirement, the JSSG defines the rationale for requirements and guidance on how to apply or tailor them. In this way, program teams can more easily adapt or modify the JSSG sample requirement statements to meet the specific needs of an individual program. MIL-HDBK-516B states, “Verify that the escape systems shall be safe for human use and compatible with the aircraft.” It then cites the JSSG2010-11, which includes detailed requirements, such as egress system acceleration limits. MIL-HDBK-516B also indicates that where the life

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support system interfaces with other air vehicle subsystems, it should not degrade the normal or failure modes of operation ofthose subsystems such as the escape system. Additionally, the system should satisfy the physiological requirements of the occupants during mission, escape and survival. Although the NDA A cites a 5 percent requirement, MIL-HDBK-516B dated February 2008 does not cite a 5 percent probability of human incapacitating injury. However, the “ASC/EN Air worthiness Certification Criteria Expanded Version of Mil-HDBK-516B” dated September 2005, which is specific to the Air Force, lists a 5 percent requirement, but MIL-HDBK-516B dated February 2008 supersedes it. Both the Navy and Air Force use the 5 percent as a best practice. Likewise, the JSSG-2010-11, which is referenced by MIL-HDBK-516B, states that the escape system shall provide a means that allows the crew to abandon the aircraft, within the systems’ defined performance envelope, with no injuries that will compromise their survival. It does not cite the 5 percent probability of major injury as a requirement. However, the JSSG-2010-11 states that analysis shall be provided to show that all reasonable precautions have been taken to reduce the potential for injury during the ejection process. Both the Air Force and Navy use these handbooks to develop and establish their own policies and procedures for granting airworthiness certifications. The following discusses the current Air Force and Navy airworthiness policies. Air Force The Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 62-6, “USAF Airworthiness,” and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 62-601, “USAF Airworthiness,” both dated June 2010, establish the formal airworthiness assessments process to ensure that Air Force operated aircraft are airworthy over their entire life cycle and maintain high levels of safety. The process assigns the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Engineering and Technical Management/Services Directorate (AFLCMC/EN-EZ) as the technical airworthiness authority and serves as an independent body overseeing airworthiness assessments. AFLCMC/EN-EZ issues the military type certificate that provides the evidence that the aircraft system type design is in full compliance with its approved certification basis. Each aircraft platform program office is responsible for granting the military certificate of airworthiness for each individual aircraft showing it in compliance with the military type certificate. AFLCMC/EN-EZ as the technical authority also provides technical guidance and recommendations to the aircraft Program Office to determine if modifications to individual aircraft affect military certificate of airworthiness and/or the military type certificate. The airworthiness certification takes into account the complete airframe and any items worn, installed or operated on or any modifications to the aircraft. The Human System Division (HSD) within AFLCMC performs safeto-fly assessments specific to items worn, by the aircrew during flight. HSD performs integration testing on new items, evaluates system flight safety, and then provides safe-to-fly recommendations to the aircraft program offices. In order to be considered safe to fly, the item should not cause any unacceptable hazards to the user, crew or aircraft, not interfere with proper use of other mission equipment, and not modify or change a configuration/ system that is covered by a technical order. Although HSD does not grant airworthiness certifications, they provide a safe-to-fly recommendation that helps support the platform airworthiness certification process.

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The aircraft program office review all the risks associated with their specific aircraft, the safe-to-fly recommendations, and then make a determination to accept any risks and provide military certificate of airworthiness. Navy Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Instruction 13034.1D, “Flight Clearance Policy for Air Vehicles and Aircraft Systems,” dated March 2010, establishes policy, responsibilities and procedures for executing airworthiness reviews resulting in NAVAIR flight clearances for all Navy air vehicles and aircraft systems. Flight clearance is the formal evidence that an engineering assessment has been successfully completed by the cognizant technical areas, which indicates the aircraft system can be operated with an acceptable level of technical risk. The NAVAIR Flight Clearance Office (AIR 4.0P) maintains the overall responsibility for the Navy’s flight clearances and is the ultimate release authority. All new or modified aircrafts, avionics, software, man-mounted equipment and modifications must go through the flight clearance and airworthiness process. The flight clearance process involves an independent engineering assessment of airworthiness, safety of flight, and risk. The intent of assessing safety of flight is to show that the level of risk (hazard to the system, personnel, property, equipment and environment) has been appropriately identified by the Technical Area Experts, reviewed and accepted by the appropriate authority. Every system has to independently meet airworthiness criteria. For example, the headgear and escape system each go through the verification and certification process individually at a component level and then again at the system level to achieve full ejection system integrated performance for the overall air system configuration. This process builds up to achieve the overall aircraft system airworthiness certification. Helmet-Mounted Devices Both the Navy and Air Force use the standard fixed-wing aircrew HGU55/P helmet that is shown in Figure 1. It weighs about 2.67 pounds with the oxygen mask and visor and designed to withstand windblasts of up to 450 knots equivalent air speed (KEAS). Adding the night vision systems and the helmet-mounted cueing systems, which are affixed to the top/front of the HGU-55/P, can increase the overall helmet weight to almost 5 pounds, depending upon the type of NVG or HMD. Shown in Figure 2 are four NVG and HMD systems: AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggle (NVG), AN/AVS-10 Panoramic NVG (PNVG) (Air Force only), JHMCS, and the Helmet-Mounted Integrated Targeting (HMIT) system (Air Force only). Helmets with NVG or PNVG weigh 4.31 pounds and 4.88 pounds, respectively. Both the NVG and PNVG are to be removed before ejection, as stipulated in the Naval Air training and operating procedures (NATOPS) and Air Force flight manuals. If the aircrew do not remove and stow the NVG or PNVGs before ejection, the ejection forces will dislodge them from the helmet mount and possibly cause injury. Two helmet systems support weapon cueing: JHMCS for the Navy and Air Force, and HMIT for the Air Force only. JHMCS with helmet weighs 4.33 pounds for the day version and 4.81 for the JHMCS helmet with NVGs. The HMIT with helmet weighs 4.77 pounds for the day version and 3.95 pounds for the night version without NVG and 5.05 pounds with NVGs. Both systems are certified to the same windblast level as the base helmet. However, HMDs are not removed and stowed because they are designed to provide facial protection during ejection.

aircraft types. Of those seats, approximately 2,813 are the Advanced Concept Ejection Seat II (ACES II), which is currently the primary ejection seat in operational use by the Air Force. Originally produced and first introduced by McDonnell Douglas in 1978, ACES II is now being built by United Technologies Corporation (UTC), Aerospace System (UTAS), in Colorado Springs, Colo., and supports six aircraft platforms. The ACES II is designed to structurally support windblast forces at a maximum velocity of 600 KEAS and an altitude of 60,000 feet. It provides “safe open-air” ejections for aircrew between 140 to 211 pounds nude body weight and between 0 to 450 KEAS. Above 500 KEAS, limb flail becomes an issue and may lead to injuries. The Air Force notes in their flight manuals that aircrew weighing less than 140 pounds nude body weight have a higher risk of injury above 350 KEAS due to drogue chute deployment. The ACES II seat is used in all aircraft variants that support HMDs and/or NVGs. The Inspector General focused specifically on the ACES II seat because that is where the majority of HMDs and/or NVGs are used, and did not look at other ejection seat equipped aircraft using other seat types because they do not use HMDs and/or NVGs or do not support speeds above 350 KEAS during their flight operation; thus, they are outside the scope of this evaluation. Navy Aircrew Common Ejection Seat (NACES) The Navy has 2,986 ejection seats, with 12 seat variants that support nine aircraft types. Of those seats, approximately 1,958 are Navy Aircrew Common Ejection Seats (NACES), also known as SJU-17 (Table 1). The NACES SJU-17 is the common ejection seat designed for incorporation into the F-18, EA-18G and T-45 aircraft. It is built by Martin Baker and was introduced in 1991 in the F-18C/D aircraft variant, with all other F-18 variants being upgraded to the NACES seat. The Navy is upgrading to this seat because it is the only seat that can support the JHMCS, with other seat variants able to support only NVGs. The NACES was certified up to 600 KEAS and up to 60,000 feet. It provides “safe open-air” ejections for aircrew between 136 to 213 pounds nude body weight and 0 to 450 KEAS. However, within the NATOPS, the Navy notes the safe ejection envelope is reduced to 0 to 350 KEAS when the aircrew is wearing the JHMCS.

Aircraft T/AV-8B EA-6B

Seat Type

# of Seats

AVS‑9 (NVG)

SJU-4, SJU-13, SJU-14

147

GRUEA-7

152

JHMCS

F-18 A/B/C/D

SJU-5, SJU-6

142

F-18 A/B/C/D/E/F

SJU-17

1354

EA-18G

SJU-17

206

F-5

Northrop Improved Rocket

S-3

ESCAPAC IE-1

T-6

MK-US16LB

510

T-38C

MK-US16T

T-45

SJU-17

398

Ejection Seats Advanced Concept Ejection Seat II (ACES II) The Air Force has 5,208 ejection seats in its inventory supporting 12

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ACES 5 The ACES 5 ejection is seat currently under development by UTAS.

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UTAS completed testing in February 2010 and provided results to the Air Force for verification. The Air Force has not completed qualification testing on the seat. Because the seat is not completely qualified, it was not included in this evaluation. The ACES 5 is designed to provide safe ejection for aircrew weighting between 103 to 245 pounds nude body weight from 0 to 600 KEAS. The seat has a passive head and neck protection, arm and leg restraints and a new parachute. The seat is also compatible with current HMDs and/or NVGs.

The MK16 developed by Martin Baker was selected by Lockheed Martin as the ejection seat for the System Development and Demonstration phase of the F-35 program. The seat is designed to provide safe ejection for aircrew weighing between 103 to 245 pounds nude body weight from 0 to 600 KEAS. The Inspector General did not analyze the F-35 seat because a limited number have been delivered, there is limited ejection data, and the F-35 program is still conducting qualification testing of the overall aircraft system.

approximately 7,600 pounds of backward force on the pilot, as shown in Figure 3 Phase B to C. This slows the pilot’s freefall and further stabilizes the seat. At about 1.8 seconds the main parachute then deploys exerting approximately 3,000 pounds of force on the pilot’s body and the ejection seat falls away, as shown in Figure 3 Phases C thru E. The pilot then falls under parachute at a rate of up to 25 feet per second. Finally, the pilot may absorb up to 2,938 foot-pounds of energy at ground impact. Overall, ejection is a violent and dynamic event, which happens extremely quickly once the ejection handles are pulled. If the pilot is not in proper ejection position and does not follow proper procedures, serious injuries or death can occur. The evaluation focused on the initial phases of the ejection, which include the upward forces on the pilot and the initial windblasts experienced by the pilot while leaving the aircraft and entering the wind stream. The initial phases of ejection are where HMDs and/or NVGs are most likely to be the contributing factor to pilot safety and are the focus of the NDA A request due to the aerodynamic forces at high speeds. The parachute deployment and parachute landing fall phases of the ejection were not evaluated because these areas are outside the NDA A request.

Ejection Sequence

Ejection Data Evaluation Summary

Ejection is a multi-phase event that exerts several different forces on the pilot in approximately two seconds (Figure 3). An F-16 ACES II mode 2 ejection at 600 KEAS was used to describe the ejection sequence. A typical ejection sequence lasts two to three seconds from initiation to parachute inflation. When the pilot first pulls the ejection handles the canopy blows off, and the pilot is subjected to approximately 4,000 pounds of upward thrust from the seat catapult, as shown in Figure 3 Phase A and B. This upward force causes a downward reaction on the pilot’s body and can force the head down. The upward force is usually enough to dislodge NVGs; however, the pilot should have removed the NVGs before ejection in accordance with proper procedure.

The Air Force and Navy provided flight hours and ejection data that contained aircraft type, model, speed that the ejection occurred, and the type of injury sustained. The Inspector General limited the data from the Air Force and Navy to only ejection seat equipped aircraft that fly with HMDs and/or NVGs, and further limited it to the Air Force ACES II and Navy NACES seats due to their prevalence and them being the only seats used with HMDs and/or NVGs. The Inspector General did not evaluate the F-35 ejection seat because it is currently still in development, the aircraft has not finished testing, and there is limited ejection data. The Inspector General bound the ejection data and flight hours to fiscal years 1995-2014, and selected FY95 as the bounding condition because night vision goggles were first introduced to the fleet that year.

MK16 – US16E Ejection Seat

Figure 3. Ejection Phases Source: Air Force

Air Force Ejection Data The Air Force provided the OIG ejection data for FY95-14, which covered 203 ACES II ejections on HMDs and/or NVGs-compatible aircraft. Of the 203 ejections, 189 (93 percent) occurred within the safe ejection envelope of 0 to 450 KEAS. Fourteen (7 percent) of those ejections occurred outside the envelope, above 450 KEAS (Figure 4). Figure 4. Air Force Ejection Speed Breakdown On Hmd-Compatible Aircraft

Once the pilot clears the aircraft, she/he will experience windblast forces of up to 1,200 pounds per square foot at 600 KEAS, as shown in Figure 3 Phase B to C. This pushes the pilot’s head back against the seat; limbs are also pushed towards the back of the ejection seat by the wind. At this stage if the helmet is not properly positioned and the chin straps not tight enough, the windblast may cause the helmet to pull up on the head and neck. About 0.4 seconds into the ejection sequence, a rocket fires to stabilize the seat followed immediately by the drogue parachute being deployed, which exerts

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Of 189 ejections occurring below 450 KEAS, 24 (12 percent) resulted in a major or fatal injury. A major injury is considered broken limbs, except fingers

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and toes, internal injuries, and severe burns. There were 24 major and fatal injuries that occurred below 450 KEAS: four due to windblast, one due to ejection shock, nine due to parachute landing fall, six due to ground impact (impacting the ground or other object during the ejection phase), and four being caused by items such as burns and hypothermia. All of the ejections that occurred above 450 KEAS since 1995 resulted in a major or fatal injury. Data show several injuries are occurring during the parachute-landing phase and not during the initial ejection or windblast phase of the ejection (Figure 5). Figure 5. Cause of Injury for all Ejections

Other Ground Impact Parachute Landing Fall Parachute Opening Shock Ejection Shock Windblast

Minor

Major

within the prescribed seat envelope and result in minor injuries (Figure 7). The data support the f light manual, which indicates that there is higher probability of major or fatal injury above 450 KEAS. Navy Ejection Data The Navy provided ejection data from FY95 through FY14 for all aircraft variants. This data was then reduced to only ejection data for HMDs and/or NVGs capable aircraft that contained speed data, which resulted in 94 data points. Upon analysis of the 94 ejections, we found that 88 (94 percent) occurred within the safe ejection envelop of 0 to 450 KEAS and six (6 percent) of the ejections occurred outside the envelope (Figure 8). Figure 8. Navy Ejection Speed Breakdown

Fatal

Head and spinal injuries accounted for eight (4 percent) of the injuries within the 0 to 450 KEAS design envelope. Across the complete ejection data set, which contains ejections occurring at 0 to 750 KEAS, 13 (6 percent) of the major or fatal injuries were spinal or head injuries with most occurring at higher speeds outside the seat performance envelope. Further analysis showed that 25 out of 203 total ejections involved HMDs and/or NVGs (Figure 6). Of those 25 ejections, six ejections were fatal and two resulted in major injuries. The fatal injuries were broken down as follows: three due to ground impact, two due to windblast, and one due to drowning. Also of the six fatal ejections with HMDs and/or NVGs, four were outside the 0 to 450 KEAS safe ejection envelope. The two major injuries were due to windblast and ejection forces, of which one was outside the safe ejection envelope. The remaining 17 ejections resulted in minor or no injuries. Figure 6. Ejections with Helmet-Mounted Devices

The data shows that 28 (32 percent) of the ejections that occurred below 450 KEAS resulted in a major or fatal injury. For the ejections that occurred above 450 KEAS, five resulted in a major or fatal injury (Figure 9). The data support the NATOPS, which indicates that there is higher probability of major or fatal injury above 450 KEAS. The ejection data did not always include the overall cause of the injuries and types of injuries sustained by the aircrew. Furthermore, due to the lack of detail in the Navy’s data, it could not be determined if the aircrew were wearing NVGs and/or HMDs at the time of ejection; thus the Inspector General could not conclude that it contributed to the injury. The reasons why the Navy’s data lacked detail was not evaluated, as it was outside the scope of this evaluation. Safety Risk Analysis Evaluation Summary

Based on the ejection data, most Air Force aircraft ejections occur

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The Navy and Air Force’s safety risk assessments, part of the airworthiness assessment process were evaluated. Both the Navy and Air Force conducted safety risk assessments for the JHMCS and accepted the additional risk to its aircrew. The joint Air Force and Navy program team conducted multiple system-level tests for their respective aircraft at various airspeeds and with manikins of different sizes and weights to understand the impact of JHMCS to an ejection event. The program found that the JHMCS display unit remained intact and met requirements to 450 KEAS; however, the JHMCS display unit was stripped from the helmet at 600 KEAS, leaving the pilot with a visor-less HGU-55/P helmet. They further noted that the integrated chin/ nape strap (ICNS) that functions to stabilize and hold the JHMCS and helmet on the aircrew may induce higher neck tension loads primarily during highspeed ejections, above 450 KEAS. Consequently, the JHMCS was qualified to 450 KEAS for module retention and facial protection based on that being

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the qualification speed for the HGU-55/P helmet and the flight manual recommended top speed for safe ejection. The Air Force stated in its safe-to-fly recommendation that there is no indication that the JHMCS adds significant risk over the current HGU-55/P helmet with ICNS. The Air Force recommended that the JHMCS be employed without operational flight restrictions; however, the Air Force recommended that aircrew flying with it perform neck exercises to strengthen neck muscles. The Navy stated in its risk acceptance letter that JHMCS placed additional weight and aerodynamic drag and lift on the aircrew helmet, causing additional forces to act on the aircrew during ejection. The Navy determined JHMCS represented a serious risk (1D according to MIL-STD-882E). The Navy determined that low-weight pilots have a higher probability of injury and thus have limited their use within the NATOPS. The Navy approved the JHMCS for the F/A-18 for all aircrew except for low-weight pilots, weighing less than 136 pounds, due to the increased risk of injury. Both services accepted the risks and they mitigate risks to the aircrew through restriction and procedures identified in the flight manuals. However, neither service conducted risk assessments on NVGs because, according to procedure, they are to be stowed before ejection. Regardless of the helmet system being worn, if aircrew do not properly wear the helmet at all times and follow proper ejection procedure, they are susceptible to head and neck injuries in the event of an ejection. Furthermore, the ejection data obtained from the Navy and Air Force safety centers was analyzed to determine the actual rate of ejection and probability of injury. Based on analysis of the ejection data combined with the number of flight hours, the Inspector General determined that the rate of ejection is 1.99E-5 per flight hour for the Navy F-18 and 1.68E-5 per flight hour for Air Force ACES II-equipped aircraft, respectively. The Navy F-18 flies an average of 258,134 hours per year and the Air Force ACES II-equipped aircraft fly an average 634,988 hours per year. The Inspector General calculated the rate of major and fatal injury for the Navy is 5.72E-6 and 2.96E-6 per flight hour, respectively. The rate of major and fatal injury for the Air Force is 1.82E-6 and 1.36E-6 per flight hour, respectively (Table 2). Table 3. Ejection Rates Service

Average Flight Hours

Rate of Ejection per Flight Hour

Rate of Minor Injury per Flight Hour

Rate of Major Injury per Flight Hour

Rate of No Injury per Flight Hour

Navy (F-18)

258,134

1.99E05

6.32E-06

5.72E-06

2.96E06

4.93E06

Air Force (HMD Capable Aircraft)

634,988

1.68E05

1.08E-05

1.82E-06

1.33E06

2.90E06

Using MIL-STD-882E, which defines the safety risk acceptance process and assuming that a major or fatal injury would be designated as a catastrophic consequence, the probability of occurrence would be identified as a 1D (catastrophic/remote). This level of risk is usually accepted by the program management office; in this case the aircraft program executive offices. Finding A Ejection Seats With Aircrew Wearing HMDs and/or NVGs Meet Criteria

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DoD ejection seat equipped aircraft with aircrew wearing NVGs and/ or HMDs meet airworthiness criteria in accordance with MIL-HDBK-516B and have been certified safe-to-fly by the appropriate Navy and Air Force safety acceptance authorities. However, both services noted that there is an increased risk of neck injury during high-speed ejections with HMDs and/or NVGs above 450 KEAS, and an increased potential of neck injuries for lowweight pilots. To mitigate these risks, the services placed warnings, notes, cautions and restrictions in the flight manuals. Discussion The analysis of the ejection seat documentation, ejection data, and safety risk analyses for the NVGs and HMDs showed that the seats meet MIL-HDBK-516B airworthiness criteria. The ejection seats were deemed airworthy and provide safe ejections between 0-450 KEAS for aircrew weighing between 136â&#x20AC;&#x201C;213 pounds for the Navy NACES seat and aircrew weighing between 140â&#x20AC;&#x201C;211 pounds for the Air Force ACES II seats. The flight manuals for ejection seat equipped aircraft state that ejections outside these limits pose a greater risk of injury and identify the specific procedures to follow to ensure safe ejection. Both the Navy and Air Force have conducted safety risk assessments and certified the ejection seats with HMDs and NVGs as airworthy. However, both services have placed warning, notes, cautions and restrictions in their flight manuals in regards to ejecting with specific HMDs and directing the removal of the NVGs to mitigate potential risks to the aircrew. The Navy and Air Force noted during their risk assessments that there is an increased risk of injury with the JHMCS above 450 KEAS and for low-weight pilots wearing JHMCS. The Navy cites in their NATOPS that the addition of the JHMCS reduces the safe ejection speed to 350 KEAS and restricts pilots under 136 pounds from flying with the JHMCS to maintain safe ejection conditions. The Air Force flight manuals inform pilots that the JHMCS failed above 450 KEAS thus the safe ejection speeds are lower for aircrew not within the proper weight limits. Furthermore, the analysis of the Navy and Air Force ejection data showed that most ejections were occurring below 350 KEAS. Additionally, the rate of ejection for the Navy F-18 and Air Forces ACES II seat are 1.99E-5 per f light hour and 1.68E-5 per flight hour, respectively, which makes ejection a remote possibility. Furthermore, the average probability of major or fatal injury is 2.95E-6, which is an order of magnitude smaller. The Inspector General believes, based on the evaluation of the safety and ejection data and the calculations of rate of ejection and probability of major or fatal injury, that the ejection seats with HMDs and/or NVGs meet MIL-HDBK-516B criteria. Additionally, if the aircrew is within the prescribed safe ejection operational limits, the addition of HMDs and/or NVGs does not significantly increase the risk of major injury. Finally, it was determined that regardless of the helmet system being worn, if aircrews do not properly wear the helmet at all times and follow proper ejection procedures; they are susceptible to an increased risk of head and neck injuries in the event of an ejection. Recommendation A Although the ejection systems with HMDs and/or NVGs have been deemed airworthy by their respective services, the Inspector General recommends that the Navy and Air Force: 1. Continue to evaluate technology that would improve the overall safety of the pilot during ejections. 2. Ensure consistent documentation of aircraft ejection data to increase the data available for ejections with HMD and/or NVGs thus improving the safety risk analysis. The data should include

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aircraft speed at time of ejection, whether aircrew was wearing HMD and/or NVGs, and type of injury sustained. Ensure increased emphasis during training, annual checkrides, and continually stress awareness that aircrew follow proper ejection procedures as identified in NATOPS and the Air Force flight manuals.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Air Programs Comments The deputy assistant secretary of the Navy, air programs, agreed with the three recommendations, but did not provide details on how the Navy will implement the recommendations. The deputy indicated that investments in developing advanced escape systems and head-mounted display technologies as integrated systems could expand the safe ejection envelope to the aircraft’s full certified airspeed and enable the services to modify and/or remove the existing warnings, notes, cautions, and restrictions. The deputy also noted that other Navy activities may be responsible for implementing the recommendations. Response Comments from the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy, air programs, do not address all the specifics of the recommendations. Therefore, the Inspector General requests further comments in response to the final report. For each recommendation, the comments should: • • • •

state what technology or actions are being pursued to improve the overall safety of the pilots during ejection, provide a plan for how ejection data will be collected, explain how training will be improved, and estimate implementation dates.

ultimately up to Air Education and Training Command and using commands for implementation. Response Comments from the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Human System Division, address all specifics of the recommendations, and no further comments are required. Finding B JSSG Handbook Needs to be Updated The JSSG, “Crew Systems, Emergency Egress Handbook,” dated October 1998 has not been revised or updated as required by DoD 4120.24M, “Defense Standardization Program (DSP), Policies and Procedures.” The handbook should be reviewed and validated every five years. Not updating the handbook can result in the specifications becoming out dated and not taking into account advancements in technology, changes in the industry or new policy. Discussion The JSSG-2010-11 had not been validated in accordance with DoD 4120.24-M, “Defense Standardization Program (DSP), Policies and Procedures.” DoD 4120.24-M requires standards and handbooks to be reviewed every five years to verify that they are valid and do not require revision or cancelation. The JSSG-2010-11 had not been reviewed since October 1998 when the document was originally issued. Additionally, a review of the document showed that it does not address helmet-mounted devices and the expanded pilot population to accommodate the wider range of operational weights. Recommendation B

Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Human Systems Division, Comments

The Inspector General recommends that the Navy and Air Force review and update the JSSG to reflect changes in policy and technology that have occurred in the last 16 years.

The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Human Systems Division, agreed with the three recommendations and will implement them as follows.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Air Programs, Comments

The Air Force is implementing the ACES II Safety and Sustainability Improvement Program (SSIP), which will address both sustainment and safety improvements for ACES II seats. SSIP will focus on improved recovery parachutes to minimize parachute landing fall injuries, faster deploying drogue parachutes for increased stability, passive head and neck protection, and limb restraints. The Air Force already captures ejection data to include airspeed, whether the aircrew was wearing HMDs and/or NVGs, and injuries sustained within the Air Force Safety Automated System, which is the database of record for safety investigations. Although the Air Force does not specifically require the recording of other HMDs being worn, this information is normally captured and reported during the investigations. However, the comments noted that additional improvements to the Air Force Safety Automated System will be pursued to capture the use of other HMDs. The Human Systems Division through the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, aircraft program offices, and Air Education and Training Command and using commands can communicate the need for increased emphasis on proper ejection procedure. However, the proper emphasis and training methodology is

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The deputy assistant secretary of the Navy, air programs, partially agreed with the recommendation. The deputy acknowledged that there is a need to update the JSSG, “Crew Systems Emergency Egress Handbook”; however, he stated that the current document does not directly result in outdated specifications nor does it fail to take advantage of advanced technologies. The deputy also stated that the document provides guidance when developing system requirements and that opportunity exists to apply state-of-the-art technology and current policy via the system specification. In addition, the deputy pointed out that an update would require coordination across the services. Response The Inspector General agrees that the document does not preclude the program from applying state-of-the-art technology within the system specification. However, that the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy, air programs, should coordinate with the Air Force during the review and revision of JSSG-2010-11. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Human Systems Division, Comments The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Human Systems Division, agreed and will begin compiling updated injury criteria for an Air Force

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Airworthiness Bulletin to serve as interim guidance until the JSSG-2010-11 can be updated. The comments also stated that a complete review and revision of JSSG-2010-11 will be coordinated with the Navy by June 2016. Response Comments from the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Human Systems Division, address the specifics of the recommendation, and the actions meet the intent of the recommendation. The Inspector General requests that the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Human Systems Division, provide the DoD OIG with a copy of the Air Force Airworthiness Bulletin when it is completed in June 2015 and a copy of the updated JSSG-2010-11 when it completed in June 2016. Appendix A Scope and Methodology The Inspector General conducted this evaluation from August 21, 2014, through January 12, 2015, in accordance with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. This evaluation was limited to only ejection seat equipped aircraft that fly with NVGs and/or HMDs. The evaluation was limited to the Air Force ACES II and Navy NACES seats due to their prevalence and them being the only seats used with HMDs and/or NVGs. The F-35 ejection seat was not evaluated because the F-35 is still in development, the aircraft has not finished qualification testing, and there is limited ejection data. The DoD IG first met with the Air Force Materiel Command, Life Cycle Management Center, and its Human Systems Division to get an overview of ejection history, ejection forces, and determine which aircraft use ejection seats and HMDs and/or NVGs. The risk assessment for each NVG and/or HMD and evaluated ejection data provided by the Air Force Safety Center were then evaluated to determine if the configurations met airworthiness criteria. Subsequently, the Inspector General met with the Naval Air Systems Command, Air Crew Systems, and repeated the process. Ejection data and flight hours from FY 1995 to 2014 were analyzed. FY 1995 was selected as the bounding condition because it is the year night vision goggles were introduced to the air fleet. During the analysis of the ejection data, aircraft that do not support NVGs and/ or HMDs were disregarded and prepared a controlled/limited dataset. The data were then categorized (or organized) by aircraft type, ejection speed, and injury level. From that limited dataset, which ejections occurred within the envelope was determined. The overall ejection rate and probability of serious or fatal injury were calculated to determine if it met the airworthiness criteria. The safety risk assessments conducted by each service for each HMDs and/or NVGs were also reviewed, specifically for how the safety risks were calculated. The Inspector General reviewed safety risk assessment for the JHMCS and HMIT system. However, no safety risk assessment was done by either Service for NVGs. Appendix B Management Comments on Finding A and Response Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Air Programs Comments

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The deputy assistant secretary of the Navy, air programs, cited that the report was socialized within Naval Air Systems Command/Air Crew Systems, NAVAIRSYSCOM, and stakeholders including the assistant secretary of the Navy (research, development and acquisition) and the chief of naval operations staff. However, the responsibility of implementing the recommendations does not fall solely on NAVAIRSYSCOM; other Navy activities may be responsible for implementation. Response The Inspector General agrees that NAVAIRSYSCOM is not solely responsible for implementing the recommendations. However, it is requested that NAVAIRSYSCOM provide support to the Navy activities implementing the recommendations contained within this report. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Human Systems Division, Comments The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Human Systems Division, generally agreed with Finding A. The comments noted that when the ACES II seat was originally developed, it was not accepted through the current airworthiness process, however it was later reviewed using the current process and deemed airworthy in accordance with MIL-HDBK-516B criteria. The comments from Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Human Systems Division, further stated the report answers the question posed by Congress; however, it does not fully address the complexity of the issues presented by the combination of ejection seats, HMDs, pilot weight, and ejection speed. The report does not quantify the increased risk of low-weight pilots wearing HMDs and/or NVGs. In addition, the comments stated that the risk of light weight pilots sustaining a major injury could be as high as 40 percent, which is stated in the “Report on Health and Safety Risks Associated with Ejection Seats,” May 2014, that it provided to Congress. However, there have not been any low-weight pilot ejections since 1995 with or without HMD and/or NVGs; thus, there is no operational data to validate the prediction. Response The DoD OIG acknowledges that the ACES II seats were originally accepted under a legacy process through an Executive Engineering Independent Review Team, which reviewed the aircraft program prior to first flight and after successful completion of the test program to show the platform was airworthy. The Inspector General also acknowledges that the legacy platforms were then reviewed through the current airworthiness process to show they meet MIL-HDBK-516B criteria. The “Report on Health and Safety Risks Associated with Ejection Seats,” May 2014 was reviewed during the evaluation; however, the 43-precent of major injury for low-weight pilots would be at aircraft velocities close to 600 KEAS. Furthermore, the cited report does not quantify the risk in accordance with MIL-STD-882E principles and only provides a piece of the overall risk analysis for low-weight pilots. The actual ejection data show that, in general, ejections are occurring below 450 KEAS with very few occurring at 600 KEAS. Additionally, the Air Force flight manuals and this report document that there is an increased chance of major injury for low-weight pilots or pilots within the acceptable seat weight limits if the ejections occurs over 450 KEAS. Thus, there was no change to Finding A. Randolph R. Stone is the Deputy Inspector General for Policy and Oversight.

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Contract Awards

13 March

Northrop Grumman Corp. Electronic Systems, Linthicum Heights, Md., is being awarded a $113,276,299 modification under a previously awarded contract (M67854-07-C-2072) to exercise an option for procurement of two additional Ground/ Air Task-Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) low-rate initial production (LRIP) systems. Exercise of this option brings the total production of G/ATOR LRIP systems to six systems. Work will be performed in Linthicum Heights, Md. (55 percent); East Syracuse, N.Y. (24 percent); Stafford Springs, Conn. (5 percent); Wallingford Center, Conn. (2 percent); San Diego, Calif. (5 percent); Camarillo, Calif. (1 percent); Big Lake, Minn. (3 percent); Londonderry, N.H. (2 percent); High Point, N.C. (2 percent); and Woodbridge, Ill. (1 percent), and is expected to be completed by October 2017. Fiscal 2013 procurement (Marine Corps) funds in the amount of $1,396,263, fiscal 2014 procurement (Marine Corps) funds in the amount of $4,320,179, fiscal 2015 procurement (Marine Corps) funds in the amount of $80,992,517 and fiscal 2015 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $22,230,000 will be obligated at the time of award. Contract funds in the amount of $1,396,263 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This modification is awarded against a sole-source contract in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1). The Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va., is the contracting activity. Delphinus Engineering Inc., Eddystone, Pa. (N65540-15-D-0004); General Dynamics Information Technology Inc., Chesapeake, Va. (N65540-15-D-0005); Q.E.D. Systems Inc., Va. Beach, Va. (N65540-15-D-0006); AMSEC LLC, Va. Beach, Va. (N65540-15-D-0007); BAE Systems Inc., Norfolk, Va. (N6554015-D-0008); Epsilon Systems Solutions Inc., Portsmouth, Va. (N6554015-D-0009); and L3 Unidyne Inc., Norfolk, Va. (N65540-15-D-0010), are each being awarded multiple award indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, with an estimated ceiling amount of $90,687,638 for Delphinus

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Engineering Inc.; $89,860,189 for General Dynamics Information Technology Inc.; $87,002,697 for Q.E.D. Systems Inc.; $83,037,863 for AMSEC LLC; $94,497,395 for BAE Systems Inc.; $94,646,444 for Epsilon Systems Solutions Inc.; and $96,342,264 for L3 Unidyne to provide engineering and technical services in support of the Navy Modernization Program which provides installation and technical services for hull, mechanical and electrical systems on U.S. Navy vessels and those of allied navies. The mission of the Navy Modernization Program is to provide hull, mechanical and electrical services and deploying technologies that improve availability, increase reliability, ship mission readiness, and decrease maintenance and workload requirements for machinery systems and components. This contract combines purchases for the U.S. Navy (95 percent) and the government of Poland (5 percent). Foreign military sales to Greece, Australia and Taiwan, are also possible under future options. Work will be performed in various fleet homeports and work is expected to be completed in March 2018. No contract funds will be obligated at the time of award under the base contract. Contract funds will be awarded on a task order basis. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured through the Navy Electronic Commerce Online and Federal Business Opportunities websites, with seven offers received. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, Ship System Engineering Station, Philadelphia, Pa., is the contracting activity. Lockheed Martin, Baltimore, Md., is being awarded a $41,247,030 fixed-price incentive fee modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-11-C-2300) to provide procurement and engineering efforts to incorporate seven fiscal 2014 weight optimization changes and install SeaRAM in the place of the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) on LCS 17 as well as associated engineering support. Lockheed Martin will provide labor and material support services for the procurement and engineering support, and Marinette Marine

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Corp. will conduct the design and production changes onboard the hulls. Work will be performed in Marinette, Wis., and is expected to be completed by December 2019. Fiscal 2015 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funding in the amount of $18,847,827 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair, Bath, Maine, is the contracting activity. Lockheed Martin Corp., Baltimore, Md., is being awarded a $34,557,223 modification to previously awarded contract N00024-11-C-2300 to exercise options for class services efforts and special studies, analyses and reviews for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Lockheed Martin will provide engineering and design services as well as affordability efforts to reduce acquisition and lifecycle costs for the Freedom variant LCS. Work will be performed in Hampton, Va. (32 percent); Marinette, Wis. (27 percent); Moorestown, N.J. (22 percent); and Washington, D.C. (19 percent), and is expected to be complete by March 2016. Fiscal 2014 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funding in the amount of $8,000,000 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. United Technologies, Pratt & Whitney, Military Engines, East Hartford, Conn., is being awarded a $33,928,095 modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee contract (N0001914-C-0026). This modification provides for retrofit modifications to the production thrust recovery, lift systems, and controller systems for low rate initial production VII F135/600 and F135/100 propulsion systems. Work will be performed in Oklahoma City, Okla., and is expected to be completed in December 2016. Fiscal 2013 aircraft procurement (Navy/Marine Corps and Air Force); fiscal 2014 aircraft procurement (Navy/Marine Corps); and international partner funds in the amount of $33,928,095 will be obligated at time

March 17, 2015

Contract Awards of award, $19,920,721 of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract combines purchases for the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps ($30,269,708; 89.22 percent); the U.S. Air Force ($79,982; .24 percent); and the international partners ($3,578,405; 10.54 percent). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity. Environet Inc., Honolulu, Hawaii (N62478-10-D-4019); FOPCO Inc., Kapolei, Hawaii (N62478-10-D-4020); Pioneer Contracting Co. Ltd, Wahiawa, Hawaii (N62478-10-D-4021); Raass Brothers Inc., Provo, Utah (N62478-10-D-4022); San Juan Construction Inc., Montrose, Colo. (N62478-10-D-4023); and TOMCO Corp., Honolulu, Hawaii (N62478-10-D-4024) were awarded a $12,500,000 firm-fixedprice contract modification on a previously awarded multiple award contract on March 6, for construction projects located within the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Hawaii area of responsibility. The work to be performed provides for but is not limited to labor, supervision, tools, materials and equipment necessary to perform new construction, repair, alteration and related demolition of existing infrastructure based

12 March

Kollsman Inc., Merrimack, N.H., is being awarded a $73,400,000 firmfixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinitequantity contract for the Common Laser Range Finderâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Integrated Capability. This contract provides for the low-rate initial production and full-rate production for a maximum of up to 1,500 systems, contractor logistics support, training, technical data, and spare parts. Work will be performed in Merrimack, N.H., and work is expected to be completed March 2020. Fiscal 2015 procurement funds (Marine Corps) in the amount of $7,566,927 will be obligated at time of award under delivery order 0001 and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with three offers received. The Marine Corps

March 17, 2015

on design-build or design-bid-build (full plans and specifications) for infrastructure within the state of Hawaii. Work will be performed in Oahu, Hawaii, and is expected to be completed by September 2015. No funds will be obligated at time of award; funds will be obligated on individual task orders as they are issued. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, is the contracting activity.

tion (Navy) contract funds in the amount of $11,834,000 are being obligated on this award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with eight proposals received. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific, Joint Base Pearl HarborHickam, Hawaii, is the contracting activity (N62742-15-C-1316).

Dawson-Hawaiian Builders I, Honolulu, Hawaii, is being awarded an $11,834,000 firm-fixed-price contract for the design and construction of an armory addition and renovation at Marine Corps Base Hawaii. The work to be performed provides for design and renovation of the existing building and the existing covered unenclosed weapons cleaning area and constructs additions located at each end of the existing building, and new unenclosed covered weapons cleaning areas. The project will demolish the existing gear wash facility. The contract also contains one unexercised option, which if exercised would increase cumulative contract value to $13,019,000. Work will be performed in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and is expected to be completed by August 2017. Fiscal 2015 military construc-

Austal USA LLC, Mobile, Ala., is being awarded a $6,502,918 modification to previously awarded contract (N0002411-C-2301) to exercise an option for special studies, analyses and review efforts for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Austal will provide engineering and design services to reduce acquisition and life cycle costs for the Independence variant LCS. Work will be performed in Mobile, Ala. (72 percent), and Pittsfield, Massachusetts (28 percent), and is expected to be complete by March 2016. Fiscal 2014 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funding in the amount of $2,000,000 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity.

Systems Command, Quantico, Va., is the contracting activity (M67854-15-D-6001).

will be performed in New London, Conn. (20 percent); San Diego, Calif. (20 percent); Norfolk, Va. (15 percent); Bremerton, Wash. (10 percent); Kings Bay, Ga. (10 percent); Portsmouth, N.H. (10 percent); Philadelphia, Pa. (5 percent); Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (5 percent); and Guam (5 percent), and is expected to complete by March 2020. Fiscal 2014 other procurement (Navy) funding in the amount of $58,692 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with FAR 6.302-1 - only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, Ship System Engineering Station, Philadelphia, Pa., is the contracting activity (N65540-15-D-0012).

Hamilton Sundstrand Co., Pomona, Calif., is being awarded a $12,304,295 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract incorporating cost-plus-fixed-fee line items for engineering and technical services to maintain, troubleshoot, repair and modernize the Central Atmosphere Monitoring System (CAMS) Mk I, Mk II and IIA units to ensure their safe operation in support of U.S. Navy submarines. A CAMS unit monitors the amount of gases in the submarine atmosphere, and is considered mission-essential equipment and vital to the deployment of U.S. Navy submarines. Services will also include specialized classroom training for shipboard personnel on the operation of the CAMS. Work

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11 March

Long Wave Inc., Okla. City, Okla., is being awarded an $8,583,356 indefinitedelivery/indefinite-quantity, cost-plusfixed-fee contract for Very Low Frequency (VLF)/Low Frequency (LF) transmitter and antenna support engineering services. This five-year contract includes no option periods. Work will be performed at Government VLF/LF facilities worldwide to include the United States, Puerto Rico, Australia, Italy, Japan, and Iceland (70 percent), and the contractorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s facility in Okla. City, Okla. (30 percent). Work is expected to be completed March 11, 2020. No funds will be obligated at the time of award. Funding will be obligated via task orders beginning in fiscal 2015. The types of funding to be obligated

include operations and maintenance (Navy), research, development, test and evaluation, and other procurement (Navy). Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured via a 100 percent small business set-aside solicitation via publication on the Federal Business Opportunities website and the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command e-Commerce Central website, with one proposal received. The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific, San Diego, Calif., is the contracting activity (N66001-15-D-0068).

Pacific Consolidated Industries LLC, Riverside, Calif., is being awarded an $18,179,476 ceiling-priced, indefinitedelivery/indefinite-quantity contract for the procurement of up to 11 liquid oxygen/ nitrogen generators (two pilot production units and nine production units), including technical data, training material and testing. Work will be performed in Riverside, Calif., and is expected to be completed in March 2020. Fiscal 2015 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $6,026,362 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was solicited via an electronic request for proposals; one offer was received. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, N.J., is the contracting activity (N68335-15-D-0019).

and deep-water mines located by the AN/AQS-24A Mine Detecting Set, and/ or other mine countermeasures assets. The system is used by Navy ships and helicopters. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $76,469,768. Work will be performed in Panama City Beach, Fla. (60 percent); Bahrain (25 percent); Va. Beach, Va. (10 percent); S. Korea (2.5 percent); Japan (2.5 percent), and is expected to be completed by March 2016. No funding is being obligated at time of award. No funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1 (a) (2) - only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division, Panama City, Fla., is the contracting activity (N61331-15-D-0012).

Atlas North America LLC, Va. Beach, Va., is being awarded a $14,085,779 firm-fixed-priced, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity requirements contract for depot level repair, maintenance, modifications, engineering services and spare parts for the AN/SLQ-60 Surface Mine Neutralization System (SMNS) to support the Navy for the currently deployed mine countermeasures legacy systems. The SMNS provides neutralization of shallow

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Huntington Ingalls Inc., Newport News Shipbuilding, Newport News, Va.,

Triton ETD LLC, Breinigsville, Pa., is being awarded a $6,616,860 firm-fixedprice, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for the procurement of up to 500 teardowns, evaluations and repairs for produced I/J Band microwave power modules in support of the Airborne Threat

is being awarded an $8,396,093 costplus-fixed-fee modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-14-G-2114) for fiscal 2015 propulsion plant engineering activity support for CVN 68 class life cycle management. Engineering support services include analyses, configuration management and recommendations for ship change documents. Work will be performed in Newport News, Va., and is expected to complete by March 2016. Fiscal 2015 operations and maintenance (Navy) contract funds in the amount of $8,396,093 will be obligated at the time of award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Newport News, Va., is the contracting activity.

Simulation Organization in support of the U.S. National Guard. Work will be performed in Breinigsville, Pa., and is expected to be completed in March 2020. Fiscal 2013 National Guard and Reserve equipment funds in the amount of $3,292 are being obligated at time of award, all of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1. The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, Calif., is the contracting activity (N68936-15-D-0012). SupplyCore Inc., Rockford, Ill., has been awarded a maximum $90,000,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for maintenance, repair, and operations supplies contract for North central region. This contract was a competitive acquisition and 10 offers were received. This is a five-year base contract with no option periods. Location of performance is Ill. with a March 10, 2020, performance completion date. Using military services are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal year 2015 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pa. (SPE8E3-15-D-0013).

March 17, 2015

Contract Awards

10 March

March

Lion-Vallen Industries, Dayton, Ohio, is being awarded a $24,996,000 firmfixed-price requirements contract for logistics services to manage, support, and operate the Marine Corps Consolidated Storage Program Individual Issue Facility and Unit Issue Facility warehouse network. Contractor support consists of managing individual combat clothing equipment, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense equipment, special training allowance pool, soft-walled shelters and camouflage netting, and contractor-owned contractor-operated Asset Visibility Capability system. Work will be performed in Barstow, Calif. (23 percent); Camp Lejeune, N.C. (18 percent); Camp Pendleton, Calif. (13 percent); Okinawa, Japan (10 percent); Miramar, Calif. (9 percent); Camp Geiger, N.C. (7 percent); Twentynine Palms, Calif. (4 percent); Cherry Point, N.C. (4 percent); Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii (3 percent); Yuma, Ariz. (2 percent); Beaufort, South Carolina (2 percent); Iwakuni, Japan (2 percent); New River, N.C. (2 percent); and Bridgeport, Calif. (1 percent). Work is expected to be completed in February 2016. Fiscal 2015 operations and maintenance funds in amount of $24,996,000 are being obligated at the time of award and funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This was a sole source contract in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304 (c)(1), as implemented by the FAR 6.302-1,

only one source. The Marine Corps Logistics Command, Albany, Ga., is the contracting activity (M6700415-D-0001).

ERAPSCO, Columbia City, Ind., is being awarded a $20,427,800 modification to a previously awarded firm-fixedprice, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (N00421-14-D-0025) to exercise an option for the procurement of up to 5,000 AN/SSQ-125 sonobuoys. Work will be performed in DeLeon Springs, Fla. (52 percent), and Columbia City, Ind. (48 percent), and is expected to be completed in October 2017. No funding will be obligated at time

of award. Funds will be obligated on individual delivery orders as they are issued. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.

Thermo-Fisher Scientific, Franklin, Massachusetts, is being awarded a $19,900,325 firm-fixed-price contract for the provision of thermoluminescent dosimetry equipment and accessories to be used by Department of the Navy personnel who work in the vicinity of radioactive equipment. The equipment being procured is considered commercial-off-the-shelf. Personnel dosimetry is used to measure an individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s radiation exposure and to aid in minimizing exposure. Personnel dosimetry has medical, epidemiological, and legal significance and must be conscientiously practiced by trained personnel with the appropriate approved equipment. Work will be performed in West Bethesda, Md., and work is expected to be completed in March 2020. Fiscal 2013 other procurement (Navy) funding in the amount of $11,888 will be obligated at time of award. Contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1) - only one responsible source and no other supplies will satisfy agency requirements (FAR 6.302-1). Only one source will satisfy the agencyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s needs because it is essential to have complete compatibility and interchangeability between

Rockwell Collins Inc., Government Systems, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, is being awarded an $11,490,540 modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract (N00019-15-D-5501) for the

the new and existing systems. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, West Bethesda, Md., is the contracting activity (N0016715-D-0001). Lockheed Martin Corp., Information Systems and Global Services, King of Prussia, Pa., is being awarded a $7,922,203 modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00019-10-C-0064) for software development in support of the Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System, including system engineering, software, hardware deployment and support, and management efforts required to field the system. This contract combines purchases for the U.S. Navy ($7,853,820; 99 percent) and the government of the United Kingdom ($68,383; 1 percent) under the foreign military sales (FMS) program. Work will be performed in King of Prussia, Pa., and is expected to be completed in November 2017. Fiscal 2015 research, development, test and evaluation; fiscal 2015 other procurement, (Navy); fiscal 2015 operations and maintenance (Navy); fiscal 2011, 2012, 2014 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy), and FMS contract funds in the amount of $7,922,203 are being obligated on this award, $1,231,980 of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.

procurement of 1,695 ancillary equipment items for the AN/ARC-210 family of electronic protection radio equipment for domestic and foreign military sales aircraft. Work will be performed in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and is expected to be completed in September 2018. Contract funds will not be obligated at the time of award. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.