Thesis Koen

The Development of Turkish Migration Policies From emigration to immigration country A study of the changing patterns of immigration into Turkey in the context of Turkey’s efforts of becoming a member of the European Union.

Amsterdam, 30 September 2009 University of Amsterdam Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences Department of Political Science Master Thesis Political Science Specialisation European Politics Author: Koen van Dokkum

Supervisor: Dr. Annette Freyberg-Inan Second Reader: Dr. Daniela Obradovic

© Copyright by Koen van Dokkum 2009 2

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

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Preface This work is the final master’s thesis of my studies in Political Science at the University of Amsterdam in the field of EU-Enlargement and Relations with the Neighbourhood.

This thesis covers the development of Turkish migration policies, particularly since the end of the Cold War. It is necessary to consider the development of Turkish migration policies within the process of EU enlargement and, more generally, within the European integration process, since Turkey is currently involved in accession talks with the European Union (EU). I sincerely hope that this thesis sets out a number of elements which can serve for further discussion on the issue of migration into, through, and from Turkey in particular, but also on the debate regarding Turkish accession to the EU and the process of EU-enlargement.

During my entire period of study I was particularly interested in the European Integration project and in European politics in general. When I started off at the University of Amsterdam in 2006, this interest increased significantly. However, at The Hague School of European Studies I was already interested in these subjects and therefore I chose to write my bachelor thesis about the contemporary public debate on European integration in the Netherlands between 2004 and 2006. At that time my understanding of the EU was rather limited compared to the present time, since I have been involved in many theoretical debates, about the nature of the EU, for example, ever since.

I am extremely proud I produced this valuable thesis; however, I did not do it all by myself. Therefore, I would like to thank, first of all, my supervisor, Dr. Annette Freyberg-Inan, for her support, for all the helpful recommendations and for her feedback. Without her contributions and continuous support this thesis would not be the same. Secondly, a word of thanks goes to my family and close friends. They have greatly supported me throughout the years. I am especially very grateful for the help and continuous support of my parents. After some setbacks they not only supported me but, more importantly, they made it in the first instance possible to continue and finish my studies at the University of Amsterdam.

Koen van Dokkum Amsterdam, 30 August 2009

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Table of Contents DG Directorate-General (of the European Union Commission)............................................8 1.1 Research interests..................................................................................................................9 Ben Rosamond, “New Theories of European Integration”, in European Union Politics, ed.

Michelle Cini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 110........................................................20 My main research questions are as follows:.............................................................................................26 How did Turkish migration policy develop, particularly since the end of the Cold War? What was the influence of European Integration on these changes?...........................................26 Europa website, “Dublin II Regulation”, Europa Summaries of EU Legislation”. Available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_per sons_asylum_immigration/l33153_en.htm (last accessed August 16th, 2009)........................41 Migration Watch United Kingdom, “The Lisbon Treaty: more red-tape round our border controls?”, published on 17 March 2008. Available at: http://news.migrationwatch.org.uk/2008/03/the-lisbon-trea.html (last accessed May 20, 2009)......................................................................................................................................................................... 53

Svante E. Cornell, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics”, Orbis, Vol. 45, no. 1 (2001): 31. Available at: http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Cornell_Orbis.htm (last accessed August 30, 2009)..............................................................................123 In this chapter, answers will be formulated to my research questions “How did Turkish migration policy develop, particularly since the end of the Cold War? What was the influence of European Integration on these changes?” These central questions were divided into three sub-questions that helped me formulate the concluding remarks. The sub-questions that were raised in this master’s thesis are as follows: ......................................140 Rosamond, Ben, “New Theories of European Integration”, in European Union Politics, Michelle Cini, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).....................................................................159 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Migration connected with trafficking in women and prostitution”, Report of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, Rapporteur: Ms Zwerver, Netherlands, SOC, doc no.: 9795 25 April 2003. Available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc03/edoc9795.htm. .........................164

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List of Tables Table 1. International migrants by region of destination, 1960 – 2000………………….32 2. Numbers of Immigrants into Turkey, 1923-1995................................................69 3. Statistics concerning applications under the 1994 Regulation by 20 March 1996…………………………………………………………………………… 77 4. Breakdown of Illegal Immigrants arrested by Turkish Security Forces between 1995 and 2001 by nationality…………………………………………………..81 5. Progress Regarding the Signing of Readmission Agreements by Turkey…….114

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List of Figures Figure 1. Asylum applications, EU-27, EU-15 between 1985-2006 ……………………34 2. Illegal Migrants Apprehended by Turkish Security Forces between 19952007..................................................................................................................109

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List of Abbreviations APD approx.

Benelux BSEC Cf., cf.

CFSP CIREFI DG EC ECJ ECSC EEC e.g.

EMU ENP EPC etc.

EU Euratom G-20 ICMC i.e.

IGC IMF IOM JHA km.

MOI NAPAM NATO NGO no.

NPAA PKK SIS TACIS TAK TEU TNAPAM UK UN UNCHR U.S. U.S.S.R. vol.

WTO

Accession Partnership Document Approximate; approximately Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg Black Sea Economic Cooperation Area confer (compare) Common Foreign and Security Policy Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Borders and Immigration Directorate-General (of the European Union Commission) European Community European Court of Justice European Coal and Steel Community European Economic Community exempli gratia (for example) Economic and Monetary Union European Neighbourhood Policy European Political Cooperation et cetera (and so forth) European Union European Atomic Energy Community Group of 20 International Catholic Migration Commission id est (that is) Intergovernmental Conference International Monetary Fund International Organization for Migration Justice and Home Affairs kilometer Turkish Ministry of Interior National Action Plan for Asylum and Migration North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organization Número (number) National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdish Workers’ Party Schengen Information Systems Technical Assistance for the New Independent States and Mongolia Liberation Falcons of Kurdistan Treaty on European Union Turkish National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration United Kingdom United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics volume World Trade Organization

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Chapter 1| Introduction 1.1 Research interests In one of my first lectures at the department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam, a teacher once explained what political science is all about. He stressed that political science is about making the implicit explicit, in other words revealing its salience. A few years later, I still feel this is the most striking characterization of the course of study. Therefore this master’s thesis, which constitutes the final part of my studies, attempts to do justice to this practice.

Research into the EU enlargement process in relation to Turkey can be conducted in numerous ways. This thesis will deal with a particular policy domain, namely migration, which is part of the EU’s enlargement process. The European Commission has been actively involved in bringing justice, freedom and security matters within the ambit of the EU.1 Within the context of the domain of justice, freedom and security, the policies regarding migration will play a central role throughout this thesis. Migration policy encompasses refugee, asylum as well as immigration policies.2 One ambition of this thesis is to explain how European integration has affected this policy domain so far. At the EU level there is evidence for increased cooperation towards harmonized immigration policies. Although this process is taking place slowly, immigration policies have become a central aspect of the acquis communautaire. In other words: it is a crucial element in EU laws and regulations with which candidate countries, such as Turkey, have to comply. The second ambition of this thesis is to examine the effects of EU integration in this policy field on Turkish migration policies.

This thesis aims to evaluate how the Turkish migration policies have changed, in particular since the end of the Cold War. This thesis investigates the influence of the European integration on the changing Turkish migration policies, and in particular the influence of the EU enlargement process.

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See the Treaty of Rome (see Part Two, Articles 17-22; Part Three, Title III, Articles 39-47), the Treaty of Amsterdam and the conclusions of the European Council meeting in Tampere (Finland) in October 1999 for the specific tasks and responsibilities of the Commission in this regard.

2 Throughout this thesis, migration policy includes refugee, asylum, and immigration policies.

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1.2 Theoretical Debate and Research Design Migration is a concept that is difficult to ignore. The importance of this phenomenon is increasing in our globalizing world and it has become a contested concept in the political debates of many western industrialized countries. Both large and small EU member states cannot deny the fact that they are in some ways affected by the phenomenon of international migration. In 2007, almost 19 million third country nationals lived in one of the EU member states.3 In order to better manage migration, EU member states developed a Common Immigration Policy. An important element in this Common Immigration Policy is that there has been a shift towards securing and controlling the EU’s external borders since the adoption of the 1985 European Single Act. The change of policy to a more restrictive one can be interpreted as the response to the large and growing numbers of migrants, legal as well as illegal, that have continued to arrive in EU member states.4 1.2.1 The securitization of migration An often-heard argument when discussing migration to the EU is that of ‘Fortress Europe’. The concept of ‘Fortress Europe’ refers, according to Broeders, to “the development of policies aimed at keeping out (bogus) asylum seekers, irregular migrants and ‘unwanted’ immigrants in general.”5 Borrowing from Ugur, Huysmans explains that Council Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 (which made a distinction between the right of free movement of nationals of Member States and the right of free movement of nationals from third countries) was a crucial decision for the foundation of the concept of ‘Fortress Europe’ concerning the area of immigration.6 Following Broeders, the external borders of the EU have become “formidable boundaries”.7 Because of the technological progress in identification and control systems, borders have been strengthened. Furthermore, Broeders outlines that strict visa 3

European Commission Communication (2007). Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM 512 final, p. 4.

4 European Commission, Justice and Home Affairs, Asylum, “The European Union Policy towards a Common European Asylum system,” European Commission Web Page on Freedom, Security and Justice.

Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/asylum/fsj_asylum_intro_en.htm (last accessed April 23, 2009).

5 Dennis Broeders, “The New Digital Borders of Europe: EU Databases and the Surveillance of Irregular Migrants”, International Sociology, Vol. 22 (2007): 72.

6 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 754-755; see also M. Ugur, “Freedom of Movement vs. Exclusion: A Reinterpretation of the “Insider” – “Outsider” Divide in the European Union”, International Migration Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1995): 967-977.

7 Dennis Broeders, “The New Digital Borders of Europe: EU Databases and the Surveillance of Irregular Migrants”, 72.

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requirements are in place, which makes (legal) entry into the EU extremely difficult.8 These measures are the reason behind the term ‘Fortress Europe’. Symbolically, ‘Fortress Europe’ is often portrayed as the Iron Gate that stands along the SpanishMoroccan border in Ceuta.

That said, the notion of ‘Fortress Europe’ can be illustrated, on the one hand, by the restrictive immigration policies of the individual EU member states and, on the other hand, by the development of an external migration regime. The EU’s external migration regime differs fundamentally from its intra-European migration regime.

Whereas the European Commission is proud to speak of the possibility of unrestricted movement within its intra-European migration policy, it has a different philosophy concerning the management of its external migration regime. Central elements in this philosophy are ‘security’ and the question of how to prevent large migration flows from outside the EU. Not surprisingly, the very purpose of this particular regime is to better stem unwanted immigration.9 Faced with increasing economic and financial globalization, the revival of nationalist and xenophobic movements and political parties, the rise of poverty and the rise of multiculturalism in European societies, the issue of migration has been portrayed as a threat to public order and stability, to cultural identity and to the stability of labour markets. This phenomenon, by which migration comes to be seen primarily as a security threat, is called the ‘securitization’ of migration.10 According to Huysmans, the securitization of migration is fostered by the Europeanization of migration policy. More specifically, the securitization of migration has developed because of the perceived increased necessity to protect internal security and cultural security and because of the crisis of the welfare state.11 This had its repercussion in common regulations addressing migration in Western Europe, which emphasized the need to restrict and control population flows. There are plenty of examples that illustrate the restrictive and control-oriented approach of the EU migration policy.12 The Dublin Convention is a case in point; it sets out criteria for the 8

Dennis Broeders, “The New Digital Borders of Europe: EU Databases and the Surveillance of Irregular Migrants”, International Sociology, Vol. 22 (2007): 7.

9 Christian Joppke, “European Immigration Policies at the Crossroads”, in Developments in WestEuropean Politics, Paul Heywood, Erik Jones and Martin Rhodes (eds.) (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 264-265.

10 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 751-777.

11 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 758.

12 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 756.

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state responsible for processing asylum applications. The Dublin Convention fits well in the securitization discourse on migration policy since it aims to reduce the number of asylum applications. The Convention makes it almost impossible to submit asylum applications in different EU member states, which results in asylum seekers having significantly lower chances of being accepted.13 Also, the responsible member state is obliged to complete the examination of an asylum application with the hope of putting an end to the phenomenon of ‘asylum shopping’. For the operationalization of all this, a computerized system called Eurodac was designed. Eurodac is used to compare the fingerprints of asylum applicants.14 The Dublin Convention and the Eurodac system revealed the restrictive and control-oriented dimension of the EU migration policy; the discourse in which they are embedded is that of securitization.

According to Huysmans, the securitization of migration policy can be considered as the portrayal of the phenomenon of migration as a threat to public order and stability, to cultural identity and to the stability of labour markets.15 In fact, the main suggestion of securitization theory is that security is the result of a social process, which is analyzed by examining so-called securitizing “speech-acts”. These speech-acts articulate threats and fears and consequently legitimize the need to protect public order and preserve domestic stability. As a result, issues become actually “securitized” by the mere fact that these speech-acts consider a particular issue as a security situation.16 In the above-mentioned example the speech-act is the Dublin Convention, which articulates the threat and fear of mass influxes of asylum-seekers in the EU member states.

Another striking example of how migration and asylum have been securitized in the EU can be found in the co-ordination of visa policy in the EU and the readmission agreements which have been agreed upon with neighbouring countries concerning the readmission of illegal immigrants.17 Readmission agreements are part of the EU’s broader strategy for combating illegal immigration, which was adopted by the European Council in Tampere, Laeken and Seville. Readmission agreements involve “reciprocal 13

Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 756.

14 Europaworld, “The Dublin Convention: State Responsible For Examining Applications For Asylum Lodged In One Of The Member States Of The European Communities”, section 7 Available at: http://www.europaworld.org/DEVPOLAWAR/Eng/Refugees/Refugees_DocC_eng.htm (last accessed May 15, 2009).

15 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 751-777.

16 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, no. 4 (2003): 513.

17 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 756.

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undertakings by the EU and third-country partners to co-operate over the return of illegal residents to their country of origin or transit”.18 Thus, according to the readmission agreements, the third country has an obligation to automatically readmit its nationals who come from or have resided in the sending country. Again, it is noticeable that the dominant discourse is one of securitization, as illegal migrants are defined as existential threats to the EU. The perceived necessity of defending internal security as well as the perceived threats posed by immigration resulted in these issues becoming securitized; up until today this is noticeable in the speech-acts and the common regulations which have been set up.

In a way, these institutional developments were heavily influenced by a thematic change in the problematization of the theme of migration. Particularly in the 1980s, migration policy was increasingly framed in a security discourse. Policy debates in these days portrayed migration as a challenge to the welfare state or presented migration as a danger to domestic society. One of the most visible examples in this respect is the Schengen Agreement of 1985, which makes a connection between immigration, asylum, terrorism, transnational organized crime and border controls.19 In fact, according to Virgine Guiraudon, EU migration officials linked the European integration project, migration and security issues by emphasizing the negative and potentially criminal activities associated with free movement of goods, persons and capital. 20 Some authors, like Lodge and Huysmans,21 argue that the development of a security discourse and policies in the field of migration is often portrayed as the only policy response to preserve public order and domestic stability while dealing with rising numbers of (illegal) immigrants and asylum-seekers. A security policy should really be seen here as an instrument to protect a society, a member state, or the whole internal market against the dangers and negative effects of a large influx of immigrants and asylum-seekers. In response to the possible dangers to society, the Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 addresses immigration and asylum 18

Europawebsite, “Readmission Agreements”, Press releases RAPID, Reference: MEMO/05/351 of October 5th 2005. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? reference=MEMO/05/351&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last accessed 5 August 2009).

19 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 756-757.

20 Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2000): 260.

21 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 757, and Juliet Lodge, “Internal Security and Judicial Cooperation”, in The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, ed. Juliet Lodge (London: Pinter, 1993), 315 – 339.

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along the lines of terrorism, transnational crime and external border controls. So migrants and asylum-seekers are primarily seen as a ‘security problem’, while, for example, the human rights question is left untouched.22 1.2.2 Studying Turkey Within the context of this research project on EU enlargement and relations within the region, it is quite interesting to look at how current candidate countries of the EU deal with immigration and migration. One of the current candidate countries is Turkey.

In fact, the EU has maintained relations with Turkey since 1963, which is when an Association Agreement with the EEC was agreed upon.23 In 1987, an official application for full EC membership followed. After having established a customs union with Turkey in 1995, the Helsinki European Council felt that the time was right to move forward, so Turkey was granted the status of a candidate state in December 1999.

Furthermore, the Council determined that the same accession criteria would apply as with all other candidate states: Turkey would have to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey would also be able to make use of the pre-accession strategy. The purpose of this strategy was to pave the path for Turkey’s accession to the European Union.24 Since this European Council decision of 1999, Turkey has in fact been a candidate country for membership of the European Union. The logical consequence was the decision taken by the European Council on 17 December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey.25 As a result of the decision of the European Council, accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey started on 3 October 2005.26 For various reasons, Turkish membership is considered to be a different case compared to previous enlargement rounds. The fact that Turkey stands apart in comparison with previous enlargement cases seems to be picked up by public opinion at large. In particular the “man in the street” seems to be afraid of Turkey coming closer to EU membership, given its size, its Islamic culture and its geographical location. The geographical factors, cultural

22

Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 757.

23 In 1959 Turkey applied for associate membership to the EEC. 24 The Advisory Council on International Affairs of the Netherlands, “Report on Turkey Towards Membership of the European Union”, No. 37 (2004): 33.

25 Financial Times, “The shock of the view: will eastward expansion invigorate the European Union or leave it paralysed?” 28 April 2004.

26 International Herald Tribune, “Turkey and the EU agree on talks”, 4 October 2005.

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differences, the Cyprus question, and human rights issues combine to make the enlargement case of Turkey more challenging than any before.27 Also, the approach of the EU itself towards Turkish EU-membership seems rather ambivalent. According to Brand, that approach has always been ‘two-faced’ in the sense that the longstanding Turkish wish to become member of the Union was always publicly supported, while behind the scenes it has been doubted all along if that wish would ever be realized. 28 An eventual Turkish accession to the EU will have to wait much longer. In fact, it is widely believed that it will take between 10 and 15 years before this large and complex country will be judged ready to enter the EU, if ever.29 Nonetheless, at the time of writing, the EU has already opened 10 out of 35 chapters of EU laws with which Turkey must comply (known as the “acquis”).30 In comparison, only Croatia seems further down the road, since with Croatia 22 chapters have been opened, of which 7 are provisionally closed by now.31 Why is research regarding Turkish (im)migration policies within the context of the EU enlargement process necessary? As a result of the EU enlargement process, interesting changes in Turkish (im)migration policy as well as inside the European Union itself are noticeable. Turkey has experienced dramatic changes in its immigration policies inherited from a rather unique, maybe even strange history. From our Western European perspective we know Turkey primarily as a country of emigration.32 The European public debate on Turkey has been focused, among other things, on the growing concerns that if Turkey were to join the EU, there would be an enormous wave of immigrants to Western Europe.33 However, less mention is made of the fact that Turkey itself has a rich history of immigration and asylum. In fact, since the Ottoman 27

Financial Times, “The shock of the view; will eastward expansion invigorate the European Union or leave it paralysed?” 28 April 2004.

28 Michiel Brand, “The enlarging Europe and its implications for the concept of European identity: the case of Turkey”, Tilburg Foreign Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2004): 104.

29 NRC Handelsblad, “Akkoord na keiharde onderhandelingen over voorwaarden: Turkije kan lid worden van de EU”, 18 December 2004.

30 European Commission – Enlargement, “Overview negotiations with Turkey”. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_t he_eu/negotiations_croatia_turkey/overview_negotiations_tr_en.pdf (last accessed April 23, 2009).

31 European Commission – Enlargement, “Overview negotiations with Croatia”. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_t he_eu/negotiations_croatia_turkey/overview_negotiations_hr_en.pdf (last accessed at April 23, 2009).

32 Kemal Kirişci “Harmonizing Turkish Asylum and Immigration Policy with the EU: Civic and Human Rights Approach vs. Security Approach”, in Record of The High-Level Round Table Conference ‘Turkey and the EU: From Association to Accession?’ 6 – 7 November 2003, Amsterdam (The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Forward Strategy Unit DG European Cooperation, 2003), 99 – 112.

33 Financial Times, “The shock of the view; will eastward expansion invigorate the European Union or leave it paralysed?” 28 April 2004.

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Empire, Turkey can be characterized as a country of asylum and immigration. A recent trend since the Cold War is the fact that Turkey has become a popular destination of transit to the European Union. These irregular migrants come mostly from neighbouring and Asian countries. Not only is Turkey used as a transit country to the wider European space, but also Turkey itself is becoming increasingly popular as final destination for migrants.34 1.3. Turkish migration policies Turkey and the EU are actively co-operating in the management and control of migration flows involving Turkey. In fact, since Turkey’s candidate status for EU membership, Turkey has been busy with harmonizing its domestic legislation with the EU’s acquis communautaire, including in the area of migration.35 In an attempt to explain the changing immigration trends in Turkey a paradox is encountered. On the one hand, the EU has put pressure on Turkey to cooperate more with the EU to prevent large outflows of transit migrants from Turkey towards the EU and to introduce a more ‘generous’ Turkish asylum system.36 On the other hand, Turkey needs to combat the phenomenon of irregular transit migration. This paradox will be addressed in more detail later on, but let us first consider the Turkish asylum system.

Concerning asylum-related issues, the crucial element is Turkey’s position on the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Turkey forms an exception insofar as it is party to this particular convention with a “geographical limitation”. This limitation implies that the convention applies only to those asylum-seekers and refugees who enter Turkey from its European borders. This means that asylum-seekers who enter Turkey from outside Europe do not fall under the provisions of the Convention and cannot be granted refugee status according to Turkish legislation and practice.37 Consequently, the EU has urged Turkey to bring its asylum legislation in line with EU 34

Kemal Kirişci, “Harmonizing Turkish Asylum and Immigration Policy with the EU: Civic and Human Rights Approach vs. Security Approach”, in Record of The High-Level Round Table Conference ‘Turkey and the EU: From Association to Accession?’, 6 – 7 November 2003, Amsterdam (The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Forward Strategy Unit DG European Cooperation, 2003): 99-100.

35 Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 15, no. 4 (2004): 93-94.

36 Kemal Kirişci, “Harmonizing Turkish Asylum and Immigration Policy with the EU: Civic and Human Rights Approach vs. Security Approach”, 106-110; and Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, 88-99.

37 Kemal Kirişci, “Harmonizing Turkish Asylum and Immigration Policy with the EU: Civic and Human Rights Approach vs. Security Approach”, in Record of The High-Level Round Table Conference ‘Turkey and the EU: From Association to Accession?’, 6 – 7 November 2003, Amsterdam (The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Forward Strategy Unit DG European Cooperation, 2003): 100.

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standards, which includes among other things the lifting of the “geographical limitation”.

Next to that the EU has called for the improvement of administrative

capacity and the streamlining of Turkish asylum procedures. In this area work and progress is underway, although it is taking place slowly. At the moment, for instance, the waiting time for the processing of asylum related procedures is too long and, according to the European Commission, needs to be drastically reduced.38 In particular since the end of the Cold War Turkey has been confronted with new forms of immigration. One of these new forms is irregular immigration, which involves migrants of neighbouring countries as well as transit migrants.39 The latter group has grown enormously during the last few years and uses Turkey more and more as a transit route to the European space.40 Therefore it comes as no surprise that the EU is actively involved in this specific area as well. In line with the securitization of migration issues, the EU has put increasing pressure on Turkey to stem this specific transit migration.

Turkey has shown willingness to align its domestic legislation more with international standards, co-operated in the areas of human smuggling and trafficking, and put in place stricter border controls. The progress can, from the EU’s perspective, only be considered limited, though. Much still needs to be done. Turkish detention and deportation procedures need to be improved as well. Apart from the severe material conditions faced by irregular migrants, the process of deportation and detention is highly intransparent and remains a high concern for the EU Commission.41 Thus, on the one hand, the EU supports and encourages Turkey improving asylum policies, but, on the other hand, the EU urges Turkey to fight illegal migration and irregular transit migration. In essence and according to the Turks, the paradox is that the enormous pressure on Turkey to fight illegal transit migration puts the improvements in Turkish asylum policy into jeopardy. In other words, the securitydriven approach of the EU undermines a new and improved Turkish asylum policy. So the need to meet the EU requirements in the area of migration leaves Turkey with some difficulties.

38

European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72.

39 Kemal Kirişci, “Harmonizing Turkish Asylum and Immigration Policy with the EU: Civic and Human Rights Approach vs. Security Approach”, 103.

40 Kemal Kirişci, “Harmonizing Turkish Asylum and Immigration Policy with the EU: Civic and Human Rights Approach vs. Security Approach”, 104.

41 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 71-72.

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One of the most visible difficulties concerns costs of harmonization. Especially the economic, bureaucratic, social and political costs in the framework of the current enlargement negotiations with the EU seem to be a great burden for Turkey. The scenario of Turkey becoming a country of first asylum will bring a significant administrative and economic burden to Turkey. According to Kirisci, it remains to be seen whether Turkey has the capacity to accomplish this. He concludes that, at present, Turkey seems not ready to carry out the tasks associated with the requirements the EU prescribes in the area of asylum and illegal migration.42 In social terms Turkey will have to change into a country that allows asylum-seekers and refugees to integrate. Lastly, the political costs involve the willingness of the Turkish government to pass and implement further legislation that will bring Turkish migration policy into compliance with that of the EU. Another dilemma Turkey faces is a more psychological one. It is the question of why Turkey should raise its standards in the area of migration and introduce more generous policies regarding asylum-seekers and refugees, while EU member states are closing their doors. More precisely, Turkey fears that if it would introduce such an asylum policy, it would serve a EU security objective by serving as a kind of buffer zone to keep out unwanted migration to the EU. This seems to make it less likely that the country would eventually be admitted into the EU. This under the assumption that if Turkey serves as a buffer zone, it does not make sense to make Turkey an EU member.

Marchetti’s theory of the European semi-periphery logic provides a rationale for this assumption. Marchetti developed his theory to explain the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which he sees as a geopolitical policy of the EU to establish a semi-periphery between itself and its farther neighbourhood, which Marchetti referrers to as its periphery. According to Marchetti, the ENP can be considered as a manifestation of the EU’s will to establish “a ring of states to create – or maintain – a functioning semi-periphery (via its neighbours) in order to establish a ‘buffer zone’ to the periphery (the close periphery)”.43 If we apply this logic to the Turkish accession process, the consequence will be that an eventual entry of Turkey into the EU would lead to a situation where the EU would share external borders with ‘close periphery countries’ such as Iran and Iraq. While a semi-periphery around Turkey has 42

Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 89.

43 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, Discussion Paper C158, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, 2006): 16-17.

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not been built, Turkish EU membership would destroy the concept of a semi-periphery.

Following the concept of Marchetti this seems a crucial issue since the semi-periphery buffer protects the EU from unstable, less developed and unfriendly states. Turkey’s function as part of the buffer zone between the EU and the close periphery is likely to result in negative externalities for Turkey. In this context Turkey fears being overwhelmed by asylum seekers and illegal immigrants that come from ‘close periphery countries’.44 Given these observations it makes little sense to admit Turkey to the EU if the country can fulfil its buffer zone function relatively well without EU membership.

The demands made on Turkey are even more paradoxical in a period in which the more prosperous member states are implementing policies that restrict the movement of people into the EU more than ever before. Meanwhile, Turkey is being asked to adopt policies that will lead to growing immigration and a more ‘generous’ asylum system.45 The foregoing shows that migration is increasingly impacting on Turkish – EU relations. This becomes all the more evident if we look at the latest progress reports of the European Commission. The annual progress reports are part of the accession negotiations, which require that the Commission undertakes a formal process of examination. In the yearly progress reports the various chapters of the negotiations are assessed. The reports monitor the preparations made by Turkey on the road to EU membership and are, in that way, important indicators of the current situation. In its 2008 progress report, the Commission concludes that only “limited progress” has been made on the management of irregular migration and in the area of asylum. Furthermore, the European Commission reports that there has been only limited progress regarding the alignment with the acquis communautaire concerning the external borders and the adoption of the Schengen visa system. On visa policies in general, the Commission observed no progress at all.46 1.4 Theoretical framework According to Rosamond, 44

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1996): 309.

45 Kemal Kirişci, “Harmonizing Turkish Asylum and Immigration Policy with the EU: Civic and Human Rights Approach vs. Security Approach”, in Record of The High-Level Round Table Conference ‘Turkey and the EU: From Association to Accession?’, 6 – 7 November 2003, Amsterdam (The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Forward Strategy Unit DG European Cooperation, 2003): 108-111.

46 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 71-73.

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understanding theory is not a self-indulgent exercise that is optional to students of the EU: Rather, being conscious about the theoretical propositions chosen by authors is vital because alternative “readings” of the EU and European integration follow from alternative theoretical premises.47 The above quote stresses persuasively that our understanding is formed by particular conceptual lenses or so called theoretical frameworks. These frameworks determine the questions we ask, and also the answers that we find. In fact, pure empirical knowledge of the EU enlargement process is impossible since our understanding of the empirical facts is always in one way or another based upon assumptions about the nature of the EU. In the field of EU studies there seems to be no shortage of theoretical models and frameworks which can be applied to understand the dynamics of European integration and policy-making. My studies, Political Science, provided me with various conceptual lenses to look at the EU and what is currently at work within it.

In this master’s thesis I will explicitly apply a theoretical approach to my subject of inquiry. The main purpose of using theories in this thesis is to highlight and problematize certain assumptions underpinning the process of EU enlargement and European integration more generally. The theoretical underpinning will draw upon the general argument that migration policy is a policy area in which securitization is taking place. Besides this, it will draw upon Andreas Marchetti’s semi-periphery logic.48

1.4.1 Securitization theory: a closer look Securitization theory was developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, who have become known as the “Copenhagen School”.49 Within securitization theory, perceptions of security and insecurity are viewed as the result of social processes, which are analyzed by examining so-called securitizing speech-acts. These speech-acts 47

Ben Rosamond, “New Theories of European Integration”, in European Union Politics, ed.

Michelle Cini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 110.

48 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, Discussion Paper C158, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, 2006), 3-29.

49 See Ole Weaver, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

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articulate threats and fears. Issues then become actually “securitized” by the mere fact that these speech-acts represent a particular issue as a security situation and are accepted as such by an audience.50 Ole Waever summarizes this as follows: What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.51 According to Didier Bigo, who is another famous scholar specialized in securitization theory, “security […] consists of reassuring and protecting the public, not disturbing and worrying them. But sometimes, in seeking to achieve the former we unintentionally produce the latter.”52 This leads us to a so-called security/insecurity dilemma, which dominates the current immigration debate in Europe. Viewed through the lense of securitization theory, immigration has increasingly become a phenomenon that needs to be controlled, restricted, and, if possible, reduced. Because of the fact that the phenomenon of (im)migration has been portrayed as a threat to public order and stability, there seems to be a kind of fear that comes with it. Following Bigo, despite or even because a policy of “reassuring” the public has been put in place, there will nevertheless be fear spread within societies because of the process of securitization of migration. The consequence of all this is that the issue of (im)migration in Europe will be widely perceived as a threat.53 Meanwhile, migration issues in the European Union have all become subject to securitization and, certainly on the member state level, securitization has become the hegemonic discourse. This may serve European unity, since, according to Waever, securitization is the best possible discourse “for the preservation unity in a world of 50

Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, no. 4 (2003): 513.

51 Ole Waever, O. “Securitization and Desecuritization”, 55.

52 Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, New Political Science, Vol. 26, no. 1 (2004): 48.

53 Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, New Political Science, Vol. 26, no. 1 (2004): 48.

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plurality because of its perceived ability to preserve existing boundaries and keep identity strong and legitimate”. 54 Jef Huysmans further acknowledges the importance of the cultural and economic elements in the discourse, which present the phenomenon of migration as “a cultural and economic challenge to social and political integration”.55 Nowadays, this has become increasingly important in the speech-acts and the overall rhetoric of the institutions dealing with migration issues.56 In essence, the securitization of migration policy can be considered as the portrayal of the phenomenon of migration as a threat to public order and stability, to cultural identity and to the stability of labour markets.57 The securitization of migration issues is fostered by the Europeanization of migration policy. Migration policy became institutionalized in the European Union, and on a practical level more European transnational cooperation was carried out, for instance cooperation between different police forces.

Migration turned out to be an important issue in several intergovernmental for a, such as the Trevi group, the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, and the Schengen Convention. These intergovernmental fora, which were institutionally structured outside the EC framework in a formal sense, led eventually to the incorporation of migration policy into the constitutional structure of the EU. The actual securitization of migration has developed because of the perceived necessity of internal security, cultural security and the crisis of the European welfare state and the perceived threats posed by immigration to all three.58 This had its repercussion in common regulations addressing migration in Western Europe, which emphasized the need to restrict and control population flows.

There are plenty of examples that illustrate the restrictive and control-oriented approach of EU migration policy, for example the coordination of visa policy, the facilitation of readmission agreements and the establishment of Eurodac in the context of the Dublin

54

Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, 48.

55 Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, 39. See also Jef Huysmans, “Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of “Securitizing” Societal Issues”, in Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, Robert Miles and Dietrich Thränhardt (eds) (London: Pinter, 1995), 53-72.

56 Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, 39.

57 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 751-777.

58 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 756-758.

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Convention.59 In fact, the European integration project became connected to migration and security issues by emphasizing the negative and potentially criminal activities associated with free movement of goods, persons and capital.60 As noted by Didier Bigo, the events of 9/11 have boosted the “security continuum” further, resulting in the situation in which at EU level internal and external security concerns have become connected, which led to an even closer link between immigration on the one hand and terrorist threats on the other.61 For instance, looking at the issue of illegal migration, one could conclude that speech-acts addressing this subject allowed the issue to slip into a security continuum that was connected to border controls, terrorism and international crime. As argued by Bigo, the issue was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs, crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe.62 A Turkish scholar, Sühal Şemşit, adds that once the security discourse was established, illegal migration became synonymous for the “undesired form of human mobility” which is often treated as a criminal act. The EU and its member states ‘legitimize’ in this way the need for surveillance, detention, control and penalization of illegal migrants.63 1.4.2 Marchetti’s semi-periphery logic The object of Marchetti’s semi-periphery logic is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).64 According to Marchetti, the ENP should be understood as a geopolitical policy 59

Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 756.

Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2000): 260.

61 Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, New Political Science, Vol. 26, no. 1 (2004): 47. The process of securitization has also had the effect of restricting civil liberties and reinforcing those very same fears that motivated the process of securitization in the first place.

62 Didier Bigo, “The European internal security field: Stakes and rivaliries in a newly developing arena on police intervention”, in Policing Across National Boundaries, Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer, eds (London: Pinter, 1994), 164.

63 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?”, CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 372.

64 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, Discussion Paper C158, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms 60

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with the objective to establish a semi-periphery between the EU and its periphery. The policy was originally designed to govern the EU’s external relations with its “new neighbours”65. However, it soon turned out that the policy seemed to be designed to widen the scope of EU influence while further enlargement efforts were excluded.66 Marchetti argues that the ENP can be considered as a manifestation of the EU’s will to establish “a ring of states to create or – maintain – a functioning semi-periphery (via its neighbours) in order to establish a ‘buffer zone’ to the periphery (the close periphery)”.67 Marchetti views the relations between the centre and the semi-periphery as interdependent and asymmetric. Reciprocal influences make the relations interdependent and the different levels of development, both politically as well as economically, make them asymmetric. Marchetti argues that under the above-mentioned conditions, the ENP can lead to a win-win situation for both the regional centre and the semi-periphery. Also, in the long run this can be a fruitful strategy because the semiperipheral zones will be likely to try to stabilize their (peripheral) neighbours in the future.68 However, it is not necessary to draw such optimistic conclusions from Marchetti’s analysis.

The logic behind the centre – periphery idea fits well into the increased attention the EU has given to its neighbours.69 The concepts of “centre”, “periphery” and “semiperiphery” can be traced back to the neo-Marxist line of thinking, though originally, these notions are derived from World Systems Theory as developed by Immanuel Wallerstein.70 Especially in the context of the current accession negotiations, there is, apart from the geopolitical perspective, also a socio-economic one. As candidate countries progress socio-economically, there is a need for the EU to increase their neighbours’ socio-economic levels accordingly. The rationale is that only in that case Universität Bonn, 2006), 3-29.

65 The following countries are ENP countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine.

66 Andreas Marchetti, “Widening without Enlarging: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the South Caucasus”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 5, no. 2 (2006): 65-66.

67 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, 1617.

68 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, 18.

69 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, 18.

70 Cf. Immanuel Wallerstein, “Tendances et prospectives d’avenir de l’économie monde”, in Analyse des relations internationaux: Approches, concepts et données, Bahgat Korany (ed.) (Montréal: G. Morin 1987), 109. For a summary of Wallerstein’s and other periphery-concepts see in particular Klaus Bürger, Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft als Aufbau einer geopolitischen Semiperipherie? Die Mittelmeerregion im Kontext der regionalen Blockbildung (Berlin 2004, unpublished diploma thesis, FU Berlin).

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they will be able to function well in their future semi-periphery role. The buffer zone now serves to better manage economic migration and related issues.71 Although Turkey is one of the oldest associates in the sense that the country has been offered a roadmap to membership from 1963 onwards, it is doubted whether Turkey will eventually become a full member of the EU. In this respect the EU itself has recognised the unique character of Turkish accession: “Turkey’s accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey’s population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics.”72 This statement illustrates that the EU views Turkey’s accession as something challenging and treats it differently compared to other candidate countries.

Marchetti identifies some problematic and delicate aspects concerning the semiperiphery concept if applied to Turkey.73 The most important one is that with an eventual entry of Turkey into the Union, the EU would share external borders with “close periphery” countries such as Iran and Iraq. Since no semi-periphery has been built around Turkey, Turkish membership would destroy the concept of a semiperiphery. This is problematic in the sense that the EU would be no longer protected from unstable, less developed and unfriendly states. In fact, the semi-periphery buffer function would be pushed aside resulting in a direct geographical link to the close periphery.

Turkey itself faces many challenges, in particular regarding economic migration.

Although we could consider the new geographic situation as an asset for the EU’s foreign policy, it is Turkey that sees itself confronted with numerous problems.74 The most evident one is the Turkish expectation that Turkey will be used as a buffer zone (semi-periphery) to control the unwanted movements of people into the EU. With the history of Turkish migration policies in mind, this expectation of serving “just another security objective” of the EU is extremely relevant. Beneath that there seems to exist a deep mistrust of the EU’s intentions, which touches upon another more fundamental 71

Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, Discussion Paper C158, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, 2006), 18.

72 European Commission, “Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2004) 1202 (Brussels, 06/10/2004): 4.

73 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, 23.

74 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, Discussion Paper C158, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, 2006), 23.

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question behind the research question of this study. Turkey is asked to let asylum seekers and refugees in more easily and recognize them as such, thus permitting recognized asylum seekers to integrate in Turkish society. Turkey is therefore changing its migration policy in a manner which will make the Turkish border, one of the potential new EU external borders, softer. But at the same Turkey is asked to fight the increasing numbers of illegal migrants who want to move on towards EU countries.

Meanwhile, the Turks themselves are confronted with virtually closed EU-internal borders (certainly when it comes to economic migration such as labour migration). All this can serve as important evidence for the suggestion that the EU, although negotiating with Turkey in the framework of EU accession, is not taking Turkey seriously enough as a prospective EU member state. After all, why should Turkey be admitted if it can function as a semi-periphery for the EU by being left outside?

Throughout this thesis the theories presented above will be used as heuristic devices, to better understand and interpret, on the one hand, the European discourse in the policy area of migration and, on the other hand, the development of Turkish migration policies in the context of European integration. The purpose is thus to present an interpretative analysis of the research object. However, in this thesis, the theories serve also as important sources of critique and normative elements. By describing the developments in Turkish migration policies, the theories touch upon some sensitive aspects such as the underlying question to what extent the EU is serious in its intentions to admit Turkey as a full EU member or whether, alternatively, the EU considers Turkey to serve another, security objective by functioning as a buffer zone for keeping out unwanted people moving towards the EU. 1.4.3 Research questions My main research questions are as follows: •

How did Turkish migration policy develop, particularly since the end of the Cold War? What was the influence of European Integration on these changes?

In addition three sub-questions are formulated which should help answer the main research questions: •

How has European cooperation developed in the area of EU migration policies?

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•

What are the most significant developments in Turkish migration policies, in particular since the end of the Cold War, and how did the influence of the EU affect those developments?

•

What are the remaining incompatibilities of Turkish (im)migration law and practises with EU regulations? How do these incompatibilities and underlying dilemmas relate to the accession process and to meeting the requirements of the EU?

Propositions To carry out this research three propositions are formulated, based on the theoretical approaches laid out above. On the basis of a literature study and by obtaining information from interviews, these propositions will be tested and the results will be evaluated.

Proposition 1: Because of the process of securitization of migration, security issues form the most important impetus for closer cooperation in the field of migration on the European level.

EU migration officials have linked the European integration project, migration, and security issues by emphasizing the negative and potentially criminal activities associated with free movement of goods, persons and capital. In this context, security policies in the field of migration are often presented as the only possible policy response to preserve public order and domestic stability while dealing with rising numbers of (illegal) immigrants and asylum-seekers.

Proposition 2: European governments view Turkey as a protective, or peripheral buffer zone against people that want to reach the West. Therefore, there is no real perceived need or even desirability for Turkey to become a member of the EU, because the present situation, Turkey as a peripheral buffer zone around the EU, is in the very interest of the EU, in particular from the perspective of maximizing internal security.

Proposition 3: The remaining incompatibilities in migration policy between the EU and Turkey and the slow progress and resistance of Turkey to harmonizing its migration policy and 27

practices with those of the EU is largely the result of the way the EU, and its member states in particular, handle the issue of Turkish EU-membership.

1.4.4. Relevance of this research After the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, the EU has increased its cooperation in the area of migration at the European level. However, due to the sensitive nature of the domain, a comprehensive approach is still missing. With respect to the broader European integration project, it is valuable to investigate how Europe developed and managed increased cooperation in this policy area. Particularly the securitization of migration plays a crucial role in this analysis.

Turkey, in my view one of the most interesting countries to study concerning migration, is creating new legislation and practises in the area of immigration because of its prospective EU membership. If Turkey would join the EU, the country would form one of the most important external borders of the EU. Therefore, a wellfunctioning, balanced Turkish migration policy will not only contribute to the security of Turkey itself, but also to the security of the wider Union. In fact, the issue of protecting the EU from unregulated and unwanted movements of people forms a crucial element of the EU enlargement process. Especially relevant in this respect is how Turkey deals with challenges and dilemmas arising from its alignment with the European standards in the area of migration.

Turkey’s prospective EU membership is one of the most controversial issues the EU faces. This is all the more relevant in the current era, in which the EU seems to be heading towards post-enlargement. In other words, the EU is increasingly unwilling or perhaps even unable to offer would-be countries the prospect of membership.

The very reason for researching this topic is that although accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU are expected to last at least another ten to fifteen years, Turkey could become an important member state for the Union. It is widely expressed that primarily Turkey’s strategic location is a deciding factor and that, therefore, Turkish membership can be considered an asset to the EU’s foreign policy.

1.4.5 Research method The research will consist mainly of an extensive qualitative literature study. The emphasis will be on official documents, statements, journal articles and press releases.

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Furthermore, this thesis will be written on the basis of input obtained by means of interviews. There are quite some interesting organizations and institutes which can provide valuable insights for the topic at hand. I reduced the possible organizations and institutes to the following list: The Turkey Institute in The Hague; The Migration Policy Group in Brussels; the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies in Amsterdam; the Turkish Embassy in The Hague; the Dutch Embassy in Ankara; the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the European Commission DG Justice, Freedom and Security in Brussels; Europees Parlement Bureau Nederland in the Hague.

1.5 Chapter-by-chapter overview The second chapter of this thesis will focus on the evolution of European cooperation in migration policies. One of the crucial elements in this chapter will be the shift towards securing and controlling the EU’s external borders: the security-driven approach.

The third chapter will give a better understanding of the current situation in Turkey and the developments in Turkish migration policies. These developments will be described starting with the end of the Cold War. In chapter four, the remaining incompatibilities between the expectations of the EU and Turkish migration law and practises and Turkey’s dilemmas in meeting the requirements of the EU are discussed. Moreover, I will describe what still needs to be done in the policy area, according to the EU, and I will show the current strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish migration regime.

The final chapter of the thesis will wrap up my research with a conclusion and some concrete recommendations. In the conclusion direct answers will be formulated to my research questions: How did Turkish migration policy develop, particularly since the end of the Cold War? What role has been played in these changes by European integration?

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Chapter 2| The Evolution of European Cooperation in Migration Policies 2.1 Introduction This chapter will focus on how European cooperation has evolved in addressing migration policies. One of the crucial elements in this chapter is the shift towards securing and controlling the EU’s external borders: the security-driven approach.

Prioritizing security in the field of European migration is often portrayed as the only possible policy response to preserve public order and domestic stability while dealing with rising numbers of (illegal) immigrants and asylum-seekers.

The chapter starts with a description of the role of migration in Europe. First, I will discuss the reasons behind migration, after which I will provide general characteristics of the issue of migration and migration policy in Europe. The chapter will continue with a section which describes the changing perspective on internal security that led to greater cooperation among the European Community and later the European Union.

The security implications of a borderless European area made migration a hot issue in the sense that the EU and its member states seem to be continuously busy with the question how to deal with it. The process of securitization of migration is crucial in explaining the increased cooperation, since the aspect of security forms the most important impetus for closer cooperation in the field of migration on the European level.

I will illustrate this with some concrete examples, such as the Schengen agreement, the Dublin convention, the Maastricht treaty, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Tampere European Council and the Lisbon Treaty.

After having outlined how the EU is attempting to develop common policies on migration, the chapter will close by turning back to the issue of the securitization of migration.

2.2 The role of migration in Europe The media often seem to be keen to portray migration as a new phenomenon, often accompanied with negative connotations. In fact, migration is nothing new: it has always been a constant factor in history. What differs is the nature of migration, the

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motives of the migrants and the regions where migrants settle down.75 The continent of Europe shows a strong increase in the number of immigrants. Whereas in 1960 there were 14 million immigrants in Europe, in 2000 the number had risen to some 32.8 million immigrants.76 Table 1: International migrants by region of destination, 1960 – 2000, in millions77 Region

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

World 75.9 81.5 99.8 154.0 174.9 Developed 32.1 38.3 47.7 89.7 110.3 countries Developing 29.1 35.2 44.5 59.3 80.8 countries excluding USSR Developing 43.8 43.2 52.1 64.3 64.6 countries Africa 9.0 9.9 14.1 16.2 16.3 Asia (a) 29.3 28.1 32.3 41.8 43.8 Latin 6.0 5.8 6.1 7.0 5.9 America and the Caribbean Northern 12.5 13.0 18.1 27.6 40.8 America Oceania (a) 2.1 3.0 3.8 4.8 5.8 Europe (b) 14.0 18.7 22.2 26.3 32.8 USSR 2.9 3.1 3.3 30.3 29.5 (former) (a): Excluding Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. (b): Excluding Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

The aforementioned statistical trend makes clear that migration has become an issue in Europe, and cannot, as previously was the case, be explained by the colonial history of many European states. In fact, globalization has also contributed to new legal and illegal migration flows. Globalization touches upon the very heart of the debate. On the one 75

The Advisory Council on International Affairs, “Migratie en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking: de samenhang tussen twee beleidsterreinen”, no 43 (2005): 7.

76 United Nations, “World Economic and Social Survey 2004”, International Migration, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Table 2 International migrants by region of destination, 1960-2000 (New York: United Nations, 2004), viii. Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wess2004files/part2web/part2web.pdf (last accessed May 12, 2009).

77 United Nations. “World Economic and Social Survey 2004”, International Migration, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Table 2 International migrants by region of destination, 1960-2000 (New York: United Nations, 2004), viii. Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wess2004files/part2web/part2web.pdf (last accessed May 12, 2009).

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hand, globalization can lead to developments that can trigger migration, such as situations where instability prevails. On the other hand, it can create opportunities in the sense that globalization facilitates greater mobility of people, for example greater international labour mobility of (skilled) workers.

In any case, migration is increasing its importance in our globalizing world and has become a contested concept in the political debates of many western industrialized countries. Large as well as small EU member states cannot deny the fact that they are in some ways affected by the phenomenon of international migration. In 2007 almost 19 million third country nationals lived in one of the EU member states.78 Around 400,000 people lodge their asylum applications in the EU each year.79 The report of the Dutch Advisory Board of International Affairs of June 2005 mentions three major root causes of migration movements. The first cause can be found in the numerous conflicts and natural disasters, which give people little prospect for their safety, which leads to the decision to emigrate. The second reason also has a security dimension, but differs from the first cause in that people lack political perspective because of threats from their own government. Thirdly, migration can be a survival strategy or ambition that is explained by a relatively low economic and social perspective in the country of origin. Globalization processes can play a fundamental role in affecting these perspectives.80 As Table 1 shows, Europe changed into a continent of immigration in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Events in Eastern Europe, most notably the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, resulting in the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. led to a large influx of asylum seekers. According to the Austrian EU Presidency’s draft strategy paper on immigration and asylum policy, about ten million people left their homes and about four million entered Western Europe between 1989 and 1994.81 The evolution of asylum seeking in the EU started in the 1970 with some 30,000 asylum applications a year, rising to about 160,000 applications by 1987, reached its 78

European Commission Communication, Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM 512 final (Brussels, 2007): 4.

79 European Report, “Justice and Home Affairs: Eurodac database of asylum-seekers’ fingerprints is launched”, 15 January 2003, IV.8. Available at: http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_028622171854_ITM (last accessed May 14, 2009).

80 Advisory Council on International Affairs, “Migratie en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking: de samenhang tussen twee beleidsterreinen”, no.43 (2005): 8.

81 Austrian Presidency of the European Council. “Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy” (Brussels: EU Council, 1998). Available at: http://www.proasyl.de/texte/europe/eu-a-o.htm (last accessed May 13, 2009).

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highest level in 1992 with some 670,000 asylum applications annually, and decreased to about 300,000 by 1994.82 More recently, the number of asylum applications in the EU has been falling. Figure 1 illustrates the decreasing trend. Whereas in 1992 670,000 asylum applications were lodged in the EU, the number has been decreased to some 192,000 applications in 2006.

Figure 1: Asylum applications, EU-27, EU-15, 1985-2006 (in absolute numbers)83

When in the 1970s the numbers of asylum seekers started to rise, EC member states had just started with the first steps in controlling immigration. With the long postwar period of economic growth coming to an end, Western Europe was increasingly confronted with domestic unemployment, and the need for unskilled migrants fell dramatically.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the number of asylum seekers entering Western Europe remained relatively stable with figures under 100,000 asylum seekers a year.

This started to change, however, in the mid-1980s when the average number of asylum seekers almost doubled to 200,000 and grew to 316,900 in 1989. Not only the numbers of asylum seeking applicants reached levels unprecedented since the Second World 82

Andrew Clapham, “Where is the EU’s Human Rights Common Foreign Policy, and How is it Manifested in Multilateral Fora?” in The EU and Human Rights, Philip Alston, Mara Bustelo and James Heenan, eds (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 660.

83 Piotr Juchno, “Asylum applications in the European Union”, In Statistics in focus: Population and Socials Conditions, Table 1. New asylum applications 1985-2006, 3.

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War, but at the same time, more and more applicants came from different regions. For example, more asylum seekers arrived from Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

Furthermore, the outbreak of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo resulted in the migration of thousands of refugees to Europe.

However, there exists a large discrepancy between member states when it comes to providing protection for refugees. As the Austrian EU presidency observed in an EU strategy paper on migration which it produced in 1998, Germany was by far the largest provider in protecting refugees from the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden found themselves with disproportionately large numbers of applicants as well, while France, Spain and Italy provided relatively little protection for refugees.84 This is from a political perspective highly relevant, because it shows that migration remains a very sensitive policy area in relations between EU member states.

The problem here seems to be that, despite increased cooperation, each EU member state wishes to stick as closely as possible to its own rules and procedures on whether or not to allow asylum seekers and refugees and facilitate the acquisition of national citizenship.85 According to Christian Joppke, a distinction should be made between two different policies when discussing European immigration policy. 86 In general, European immigration policy can be characterized by soliciting and stemming policies. The term “soliciting” refers to the purposive creation of migration waves, whereas stemming deals with the management of existing migration waves. Although policy makers in the United States generally believe that a soliciting policy is the best way to manage or to better stem immigration policy, immigration policies of EU member states are all about ‘stemming’.87 2.3 Changing perspective on internal security The rising political turbulence of the 1970’s, in which Western Europe was confronted with a wave of terrorism, led to greater cooperation among European Community (EC)

84

Austrian Presidency of the European Council, “Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy” (Brussels: EU Council, 1998). Available at: http://www.proasyl.de/texte/europe/eu-a-o.htm (last accessed May 13, 2009).

85 Pim den Boer, Europa, de geschiedenis van een idee (Amsterdam : Uitgeverij Fagel, 2003), 171.

86 Christian Joppke, “European Immigration Policies at the Crossroads”, in Developments in West European Politics, Paul Heywood, Erik Jones and Martin Rhodes, eds (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 260.

87 Christian Joppke, “European Immigration Policies at the Crossroads”, 260-261.

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member states on justice and home affairs (JHA).88 Because of the absence of a treaty base until the coming into force of the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, cooperation in the mid 1970s “took place in a range of poorly coordinated intergovernmental groups which lacked adequate institutional structures, legal instruments and objectives”.89 An example of a rather loose form of cooperation within European Political Cooperation (EPC) was the so-called Trevi group.

The Trevi group was established in 1976 with the objective to counter terrorism and to coordinate policing in the EC. The Trevi group came into being on the initiative of the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, who proposed to set up a special working group to counter terrorism in the EC.90 The Trevi group worked on an intergovernmental basis, thus outside the main EC institutions.91 In a way, this kind of cooperation paved the way for more structured and increased cooperation in the domain of JHA. The 1986 Single European Act, which was primarily intended to complete the single market by the end of 1992, aimed at creating “an area without frontiers, in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”. A frontier-free Europe turned out to be particularly problematic in the field of migration policies of the EC’s member states.92 Especially the “free movement of people” became a tricky problem in dealing with immigration, asylum, and visas for third country nationals who entered the EC in one particular member state and then should have been able to move freely across the EC’s territory. Moreover, the perceived need to address cross-border police cooperation, external border measures to fight international terrorism, drug smuggling and cross-border criminal activities increased significantly. All in all, it became clear that there were widespread security implications of a borderless European area.93 The remaining question was how the EU and the individual member states could 88

Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 561.

89 Jorg Monar, “The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Forces and Costs”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 39, no. 4 (2001): 748.

90 Tony Bunyan, “Trevi, Europol and the European state”, in Statewatching the new Europe (1993), 1-2.

Available at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/handbook-trevi.pdf (last accessed August 18, 2009).

91 Tony Bunyan, “Trevi, Europol and the European state”, 11. The name ‘Trevi’ could refer to the presence at the 1971 meeting of the Dutch Minister Fonteyn (which means fountain), to the name of a famous fountain in Rome, to the Trevi district in Rome, or Trevi is an acronym for either ‘Terrorisme radicalisme et violence’ or ‘terrorism, radicalism, extremism and international violence’ 92 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 562.

93 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 562.

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best address migration, in particular in the area of immigration and asylum. In what follows, an account will be given of how European cooperation in the field of migration developed. When describing these developments, special emphasis will be placed on the securitization of migration issues. A prominent feature here is the shift towards securing and controlling the EU’s external borders more severely.

2.4 Schengen As mentioned earlier, the ideal of a borderless Europe started off in the mid-1980s.

Established as an intergovernmental effort with its institutional structure outside the EC framework, the 1985 Schengen agreement marked the first step towards Europe’s disappearing internal borders and towards the harmonization of migration policies.94 In the town of Schengen in Luxembourg, a multilateral agreement between five EU member states (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) was signed in June 1985. The Schengen agreement launched the abolition of internal borders in the EU and the creation of a common external border around the Schengen area.

Furthermore, it was decided to establish a common border in the participating member states. Because of the fact that the Schengen area was a zone of border free travel, there was a real need to secure its external border. Concrete cooperation was carried out in the areas of visa requirements, asylum applications, fighting illegal immigration, and improving police cooperation in order to fight terrorism and organized crime.95 In a way, the Single European Act of 1986 should have made the Schengen initiative redundant. In that same year, the European Community (EC) initiated socalled ‘ad hoc cooperation’ of which the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration was the most important aspect. The Ad Hoc Group on Immigration proposed the abolition of internal border controls, too. However, because of differing opinions, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark did not want to create a zone of unrestricted travel.96 The three member states did not want to grant the free movement of people to third country nationals but only to EC member state nationals. For that reason, they insisted on keeping their border controls beyond 1992, which is the year that the single market started off.

94

Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 562.

Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 562.

96 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 562.

95

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In spite of the reservations of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, preparations of the Schengen group continued.97 The 1985 Schengen initiative can therefore be considered as a prime example of differentiated integration within the EC or, according to Charles Grant, as an example of the formation of avant-garde groups, in which some ‘hard core’ member states have a different view on European integration resulting in the wish to go ahead with closer integration. In this way, the avant-garde group moves faster in comparison with others in realizing EU integration objectives.98 Initially the Schengen agreement should have come into being in January 1990.

However, due to external and internal developments, the coming into effect of the Schengen agreement was postponed until March 1995. The collapse of communism in 1990 increased the fear of large immigration waves from Central and Eastern Europe. In Germany and France, this led to the rethinking of continuing border checks on non-EC nationals, which implied, by definition, a certain control of all individuals entering the country. For this reason the Schengen agreement needed to be renegotiated even before the coming into force of the initial agreement.99 The convention was eventually signed in June 1990, although it took until 1995 before the “internal borders could be crossed at any point without any checks on persons being carried out”.100 The implementation of Schengen was delayed partly because of political and legal reasons and partly because of the technical difficulties in setting up the Schengen Information Systems (SIS).101 The rationale behind SIS is that participating member states could exchange technological information more easily. The SIS, as a system for linking relevant databases, allowed customs officials to easily look up information on (missing) persons, false passports, arrest warrants, stolen goods and so on. The SIS can be considered a crucial element of the functioning of the Schengen area. The completion of the SIS was first and foremost delayed because of technical difficulties in linking so many and different national databases. However, another factor was political opposition to the SIS. Political and legal problems centered around issues of sovereignty as well as

97

Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 563.

98 Charles Grant, “Europe’s blurred boundaries: Rethinking enlargement and neighbourhood policy” (London: Centre for European Reform, 2006), 5.

99 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 564-565.

100 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 563.

101 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 563-564.

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securing civil liberties. In response, strict privacy and confidentiality laws were passed to guarantee the system’s content and use in a secure manner.102 Schengen II The renewed Schengen agreement (Schengen II) can also be viewed as the first initiative towards harmonizing asylum policy.103 Officially, Schengen II refers to the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders. This renewed version of the Schengen agreement was necessary to make sure that the “internal borders may be crossed at any point without any checks on persons being carried out”.104 The challenge for the Schengen countries was to prevent an asylum-seeker from submitting more than one asylum application in more than one member state. Therefore, rules and regulations were drawn up which clarified which member should deal with the processing of the asylum application. This principle is also known as the principle of first handling, so the first member state dealing with a particular asylum request is also responsible for that individual. If the asylum seeker would go to another Schengen member state, the state where the asylum-seeker initially arrived is obligated to take the individual back. In addition, Schengen made every asylum decision binding on the other participating member states.105 Illegal immigration was one of the other challenges, in particular given the size and nature of the Schengen area’s external borders. Concerning cooperation of national police forces, there already existed a high degree of cooperation between the Schengen countries on a bilateral basis. In the area of visa policy, cooperation focused on the need to make a common list of third countries whose nationals needed a visum to enter the

102

Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 564.

103 EurLex, “The Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders”, Official Journal L 239 , 22/09/2000 P. 0019 – 0062. Available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:42000A0922%2802%29:EN:HTML (last accessed August 3rd, 2009).

104 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 563.

105 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 563-564.

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Schengen area. Furthermore, common rules for granting and denying visa were agreed between the Schengen countries.106 The Schengen agreement was originally intended as a first step towards the abolition of all controls on the EU's internal borders. In this respect, it was decided that Schengen regulations have to accord with those of the EU. All this becomes clear in article 142 of the Convention. The article states, among other things, that the Schengen countries will harmonise their rules and regulations with agreements made at EU level to create an area without internal borders, and that if Schengen regulations conflict with (new) EU regulations, member state regulations have to be adapted: When Conventions are concluded between the Member States of the European Communities with a view to the completion of an area without internal frontiers, the Contracting Parties shall agree on the conditions under which the provisions of the present Convention are to be replaced or amended in the light of the corresponding provisions of such Conventions. The Contracting Parties shall, to that end, take account of the fact that the provisions of this Convention may provide for more extensive cooperation than that resulting from the provisions of the said Conventions. Provisions which are in breach of those agreed between the Member States of the European Communities shall in any case be adapted in any circumstances.107 The worries about mass immigration continued to be on the political agenda as well as some country-specific concerns on which even the Schengen states found it difficult to reach consensus. In particular the Dutch policy on soft drugs led to widespread criticism, and Luxembourg’s bank secrecy laws were a thorn in the flesh of the other member states. At the beginning of the 1990s, these issues led to a certain degree of disarray in the domain of justice and home affairs. For instance, the debate about the legalization of soft drugs led to tensions between the Netherlands, on the one 106

Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 563-564.

107 Article 142(1) as part of Title VIII Final Provisions of the Convention from June 19, 1990, applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Government of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, The Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the gradual abolition of checks at their common border. Available online at: http://www.spjelkavik.priv.no/henning/ifi/schengen/intro.html (last accessed May 15, 2009).

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side, and France and Belgium, in particular, on the other. Belgium was not in favour of legalizing soft drugs and requested the Dutch government to close down all coffee shops in the Belgian border region of the Netherlands.108 The other issue, bank secrecy and so-called ‘tax havens’, is on the top of the political agenda, too. Tax havens have come under pressure since the theme was put on the agenda of the G-20 summit which was held on 2 April 2009 in London.109 The London summit was mainly dedicated to the impact of the economic crisis and was attended by the leaders of the Group of Twenty, plus Spain and the Netherlands (as a representative of the EU), as well as the Ministers of Finance and the presidents of the central banks. Main results of the G-20 summit were an extra boost for the financial world, support to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a global control body for the financial markets. Furthermore, it was agreed to reduce protectionism, and a call to bring an end to tax havens surfaced. It seems that the financial crisis has given an impetus to solve a long lasting problem. Belgium, Liechtenstein and Andorra promised to weaken their bank secrecy laws. This put pressure on countries such as Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland to take similar steps.110 Whereas the first Schengen agreement of 1985 solely focused on the abolition of internal border controls, the renewed Schengen agreement of 1990 focused on immigration and asylum. Only one of the 142 articles deals with free movement, while 36 articles belong to the area of immigration and asylum. External events that took place at the end of 1980s can only partly explain this shift in focus. As argued by Virginie Guiraudon, officials in the interior and justice ministries seized upon a ‘window of opportunity’ to set the agenda of migration as a European security issue.

They could easily do this because the pre-existing international security forums allowed them to do so. In other words, migration was further framed as a security issue (securitized) because of the perceived increased necessity to protect internal security. 111 Therefore, the emphasis on free movement, which was present in the first Schengen

108

Jos Verlaan, “Belgen mordicus tegen softdrugs”, NRC Handelsblad, 23 May 2006.

G-20 Leaders Statement, “The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform” (London, 2 April 2009).

Available online at: http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx (last accessed August 5th, 2009).

110 Melle Garschagen and Egbert Kalse, “Financiële crisis geeft impuls aanpak bankgeheim”, NRC Handelsblad, 9 March 2009.

111 Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2000): 260-261.

109

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agreement, was largely downplayed in the second version, where the emphasis was mainly on the notion of a ‘European security space’, as Bigo has called it.112 Gradually, the Schengen area extended to include almost every member state.

The United Kingdom and Ireland form the exception in the sense that those two EU member states stay outside the Schengen Area. Italy signed the Schengen Convention in 1990, followed by Portugal and Spain in 1991, and Greece in 1992. In December 1994, the parties met in Bonn and decided to apply the Convention in seven countries (Benelux, Germany, France, Portugal and Spain) as of 26 March 1995. Finally, the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement came into force. In the same year, Austria signed Schengen, and in 1996, Denmark, Sweden and Finland also joined the Schengen agreement. Before that, travelers could already move freely between Denmark, Sweden and Finland and non-EU countries Norway and Iceland. Therefore, a special cooperative agreement was concluded with Norway and Iceland to admit these two countries to the Schengen Area. In 2007, the EU enlarged the Schengen Area to include 9 of the 10 countries that had joined the EU in 2004: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta joined the Schengen Agreement.113 Meanwhile, these countries have implemented the Schengen acquis through the lifting of all border controls114 on individuals travelling within the Schengen area. Switzerland, a non-EU country, acceded to Schengen in December 2008. In two referenda, the Swiss population approved the free movement of persons and the opening of the labour market for nationals of the new member states that joined the EU on May 1, 2004.115 2.5 The Dublin Convention The Dublin Convention was signed in the Irish capital of Dublin on 15 June 1990.

However, in 2003 the Dublin Regulation was adopted replacing the provisions of the 1990 Dublin Convention.116 The objective of the Regulation is to

112

Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping”, 261.

113 Cyprus, as well as the new members Romania and Bulgaria, will join the Schengen area later.

114 This includes controls at land and sea borders and since April 2008 also internal air borders.

115 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Europese Samenwerking: Schengen en de Europese Unie”, Available online at: http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/europesesamenwerking/EU,akkoord-vanschengen/schengen-en-de-eu (last accessed May 15, 2009).

116 Europa website, “Dublin II Regulation”, Europa Summaries of EU Legislation”. Available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_as ylum_immigration/l33153_en.htm (last accessed August 16th, 2009).

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identify as quickly as possible the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application, to establish reasonable time limits for each of the phases of determining the Member State responsible, and to prevent abuse of asylum procedures in the form of multiple applications.117 Dublin thus created a system determining the member state responsible for the examination of asylum applications lodged in one of the EC member states to reduce the number of asylum seekers who are sent back from member state to member state and to prevent an asylum seeker from submitting his or her applications in multiple member states.118 Under the provisions of the Dublin Regulation, the country where an asylum seeker first arrives is responsible for processing the asylum application that leads to pressure on border areas. One of the criticisms is that the system cannot provide fair, efficient and effective protection of the legal rights of asylum seekers. The UNCHR was especially concerned about the system’s impact in many cases on the legal rights and personal welfare of asylum-seekers, including their rights to a fair claim examination and, where recognized, to effective protection, as well as the uneven distribution of asylum claims among Member States.119 The Dublin Convention largely overlaps with the goals and measures of the Schengen II agreement. It was the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration that succeeded in transferring certain measures of the Schengen Convention into two separate international conventions. In 1990, these conventions were signed by all EC member 117

Europa website, “Dublin II Regulation”, Europa Summaries of EU Legislation. Available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_im migration/l33153_en.htm (last accessed August 16th, 2009).

118 Agnes Hurwitz, “The 1990 Dublin Convention: A Comprehensive Assessment”, The International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 11, no. 4 (1999): 646-647.

119 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR comments on the European Commission's Proposal for a recast of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national or a stateless person ("Dublin II") (COM(2008) 820, 3 December 2008) and the European Commission's Proposal for a recast of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [the Dublin II Regulation] (COM(2008) 825, 3 December 2008), 18 March 2009. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49c0ca922.html (last accessed 27 August 2009).

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states and resulted in the Dublin Convention on Asylum and the External Borders Convention.120 It should be stressed, however, that both the Dublin Convention and the External Borders Conventions were drafted intergovernmentally, meaning they do not fall within the existing EC framework. Along with the large amount of time needed for ratification, this clearly shows the continuing sensitivity to member states of cooperation in the area of JHA. Finally, as of September 1st 1997, the Dublin Convention came into force in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. For Austria and Sweden the Convention came into being as of October 1st 1997, and for Finland as of January 1st 2008. In December 2008, non-EU member Switzerland became signatory to the new amended Dublin Convention, which is now known as the Dublin Regulation.121 In comparison with Schengen, the Dublin Convention is more focused on asylum procedures. It established a tighter regional asylum procedure in which EC member states need to cooperate more intensively. The objective is twofold: on the one hand to reduce the number of asylum seekers, on the other hand to reinforce the legal position of the asylum seekers by guaranteeing that applications for asylum will be examined by one of the member states.122 In comparing the Schengen agreement with the Dublin Convention, the latter has replaced the essentially similar provisions on asylum law in articles 28 – 38 of the Schengen Convention. However, both Schengen and Dublin share the objective of creating an area without internal borders.123 The Dublin Convention can be welcomed for two reasons. First, the Dublin Convention determines which state is responsible for handling an asylum application lodged in one of the member states of the European Communities.124 Second, by obliging the responsible member state to complete the examination of an asylum application, the drafters hoped to put an end to the phenomenon of ‘asylum shopping’ or 120

Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 565.

121 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 565.

122 Hans Ulrich, “Expanding External and Shrinking Internal Borders: Europe’s Defence Mechanisms in the Areas of Free Movement, Immigration and Asylum”, in Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, David O’keeffe and Patrick M. Twomey, eds (London: Chancery Law Publishing, 1994), 272-273.

123 Peter J. van Krieken (ed.), The Asylum Acquis Handbook. The Foundation for a Common European Immigration Policy (The Hague: Asser Press, 2001), 157.

124 Europaworld ,“The Dublin Convention: State Responsible For Examining Applications For Asylum Lodged In One Of The Member States Of The European Communities”, section 2. Available at: http://www.europaworld.org/DEVPOLAWAR/Eng/Refugees/Refugees_DocC_eng.htm (last accessed May 15, 2009).

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‘refugee in orbit’. For the operationalization of all this, a computerized system, called Eurodac, was designed. Eurodac was specifically used to compare fingerprints of asylum applicants.125 2.6 The Treaty on European Union The 1992 European Council, which gave birth to the Maastricht Treaty, aimed to reach a final outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) negotiations. Among other things, JHA turned out to be a major item on the agenda of the intergovernmental conference on treaty reform. In particular Germany wanted to see a strengthening of the EC’s competences in the area of JHA.126 Eventually, the negotiations resulted in the Treaty on European Union, which is also referred to as the Maastricht Treaty. In comparison with the Single European Act, the Maastricht treaty can be considered a much greater revision of the Rome Treaty, mainly because of its wide-ranging changes.127 The Maastricht treaty outlines a timetable for achieving the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), at the latest by 1999. Moreover, it contains steps in the direction of a political union consisting of the development of common foreign and defense policies as well as a new concept for the EC institutions. Concerning the latter, the treaty widened the EC’s competences in the several policy areas and changed the powers of the various EC institutions.128 With the coming into being of the Maastricht treaty on November 1st 1993, the EC has been generally known as the European Union (EU).129 More specifically, the treaty divides the EU into a three-pillar structure. The first pillar consists of the three existing European Communities (the ECSC, EC and Euratom); the second pillar contains new provisions on a common foreign and security policy (CFSP); and lastly, the third pillar deals with the cooperation between member states on justice and home affairs. Cooperation in pillars two and three is organised on an intergovernmental basis

125

Europaworld, “The Dublin Convention: State Responsible For Examining Applications For Asylum Lodged In One Of The Member States Of The European Communities”, section 7. Available at: http://www.europaworld.org/DEVPOLAWAR/Eng/Refugees/Refugees_DocC_eng.htm (last accessed May 15, 2009).

126 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 566.

127 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 118.

128 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 122-123.

129 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 123 – 126.

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and therefore not subject to the EC institutions. On the contrary, supranational integration takes place in the first pillar.130 The Treaty on European Union ‘Maastricht’ can be considered as the first step to give the EU’s external migration policy a supranational dimension, in other words the establishment of a legal basis for a common migration policy. For example, the bulk of Schengen’s objectives were incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty, although Schengen itself continued to exist independently of the EU. The variety of ad hoc cooperation was included in the EU’s third pillar, where, however, cooperation continued on an intergovernmental basis. In the Treaty, inter alia, the following areas were formulated as “common interest”: asylum; EU external borders; immigration; combating drug addiction; control of international fraud and corruption; judicial cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal matters.131 Although ‘common interests’ differ from common policies, closer cooperation between two or more member states belonged to the possibilities. Article K.7 of title 6 of the Maastricht Treaty states that “the provisions of this Title shall not prevent the establishment or development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States in sofar as such cooperation does not conflict with, or impede, that provided for in this Title”.132 Especially this article can be seen as an acknowledgment that differentiated integration or avant-garde groups are legitimate and will continue to be common feature of cooperation among member states.133 2.7 The Treaty of Amsterdam The Treaty on European Union of 1992 contained a provision that was intended to review the working of the new structure and arrangements. It resulted, however, in a review of only two and half years because the ratification process took much longer than expected.134 Specific recommendations on improvements would first and foremost come from the 1996 IGC. The majority of member states expressed their dissatisfaction with the effects of the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention, in which, 130

Europa website, “Structure of the European Union: the ‘three pillars’”. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/_en/about/abc/abc_12.html (last accessed May 14, 2009).

131 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 566.

132 Maastricht Treaty (1992), article K.7 of title VI concerning the Provisions on Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs. Available online at: http://www.hri.org/docs/Maastricht92/mt_title6.html (last accessed May 17, 2009).

133 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 567-568.

134 Ian Bache and Stephen George, Politics in the European Union (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 183.

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according to the member states, clarity was largely missing. Apart from the deficiencies of the Dublin Convention, it was observed that “ever since the entry into force of Title VI of the EU Treaty, various forms of criticism have been raised against the functioning of asylum and immigration policies under the Maastricht system”.135 In this regard, the most important criticism concerns the efficiency of the third pillar cooperation. The rather disappointing progress in the third pillar in combination with the call to increase the EU’s internal security led to disagreement in the IGC on how to improve and strengthen the EU’s involvement in the area of justice and home affairs.

Although the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) can be considered as relatively modest in its scope because it lacked the decision-making reforms deemed necessary for further EU enlargement, the treaty brought about some radical changes in the realm of justice and home affairs.136 In this respect, we can also speak of the final breakthrough, because with the Treaty of Amsterdam the free movement policies and judicial cooperation of the third pillar (including border controls, visas, asylum, refugees, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters) plus the non-EU Schengen acquis137 were transferred to the first supranational pillar. However, all this was done in the light of transition and “opt-out clauses”, allowing a strong intergovernmental dimension.138 The rather delicate issues of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained in the intergovernmental third pillar and were subject to unanimity. The very purpose of the third pillar is to provide the EU citizens with “a high level of safety within the putative area of freedom, security, and justice.”139 A first observation suggests that because of the improved legal mechanisms and decision-making procedures140, which were part of the treaty, cooperation towards this goal will become 135

Gregory G. Noll and Jens Vedsted-Hansen, “Non-Communitarians: Refugee and Asylum Policies’, in The EU and Human Rights, Philip Alston, Mara Bustelo and James Heenan (eds.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 393.

136 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 570.

137 The Schengen acquis—the original agreement, the convention, and all subsequent decisions on immigration, border controls, police and judicial co-operation—was incorporated into the EU framework, and subsequently split between the first and third pillars to match the appropriate parts of the treaty. See Ben Hall and Ashish Bhatt, “Policing Europe EU Justice and Home Affairs co-operation”, (London: Centre for European Reform, 1999), 10. Available online at: http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p130_policing_europe.pdf (last accessed May 16, 2009).

138 Christian Joppke, “European Immigration Policies at the Crossroads”, in Developments in West European Politics, Paul Heywood, Erik Jones and Martin Rhodes (eds.) (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 264-265.

139 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 571.

140 The European Commission has the right of initiative (shared with member states) in all areas of the third pillar, and the European Parliament takes on a new consultative role on most issues; see Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 571.

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more efficient. The Amsterdam Treaty also addresses the issue of closer cooperation between member states and the possibility of using EU institutions, procedures, and mechanisms. In practice the Council could authorize closer cooperation, acting by qualified majority at the request of those member states wanting to move faster than others.141 The compromise agreed in Amsterdam resulted thus in a new division of labour which should bring about greater coherence and clarity and encourage member states into faster, more effective action in the area of justice and home affairs. Accordingly, the treaty’s objective is to “maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.”142 As this quote illustrates, the security issue plays a crucial role in the sense that external border controls, asylum and immigration policies are viewed as necessary elements in creating a safe and borderless internal market. Kostakopoulou goes a bit further by arguing that “immigration and refugee flows continue to be portrayed as a security problem and the member states’ identification of the sources of insecurity and the logic of control has permeated the first pillar”.143 According to migration expert Sarah Collinson, “the [Draft] Amsterdam Treaty […] represents one of the clearest statements to date of the internal security rationale that underpins and largely defines European cooperation in the area of immigration and asylum policies”.144 In this sense we can conclude that security issues remain the most important impetus for closer cooperation the field of asylum and immigration.145 Finally, almost at the end of the 20th century, the proposed area of freedom, security and justice became more and more a reality. However, further cooperation was highly desirable but also obligatory because of article 63(1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which stipulated that within five years after the entry into force the Council 141

Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 571.

Ben Hall and Ashish Bhatt, “Policing Europe EU Justice and Home Affairs co-operation” (London: Centre for European Reform, 1999), 10. Available online at: http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p130_policing_europe.pdf (last accessed May 16, 2009).

143 Dora Kostakopoulou, “European citizenship and immigration after Amsterdam: openings, silences, paradoxes”, Journal of ethnic and migration studies, Vol. 24, no. 4 (1998): 651.

144 Sarah Collinson, “Coherent Interests? Coherent Policies? The Development of a ‘Common’ Migration Policy in the European Union?”, Conference Paper prepared for University of Notre Dame (Nanovic Institute for European Studies, 1998), 4.

145 Sarah Collinson, “Coherent Interests? Coherent Policies? The Development of a ‘Common’ Migration Policy in the European Union?”, 4.

142

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shall adopt “measures on asylum, in accordance with the Convention of 28 July 1951, the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the Status of Refugees and other relevant treaties”.146 In December 1998, a first step was made with the approval of an action plan, which listed the main policy priorities and the possible means to achieve those priorities in the next five years. A special European Council exclusively devoted to justice and home affairs in Tampere in October 1999 was meant to give further impetus to this as well as provide an overall coherent political strategy.

2.8 Tampere At the 1999 Tampere European Council, EU Heads of State and Government formulated concrete targets based on their achievements. An important part was the creation of “an area of freedom, security and equality”. The European Council declared that the EU “needs a comprehensive approach to migration, addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit”. In this way cooperation in the field of migration, more specifically asylum policy, became an important issue.147 The 1999 Tampere European Council called specifically for the establishment of a ‘common European asylum system’. Since the Amsterdam Treaty and in response to the Kosovo refugee crisis, there was a need to move beyond the rather loose cooperation.

One of the priorities for the EU was the establishment of a common system in which national asylum provisions should become subject to supranational law.148 According to Lavenex, Europe’s response to the Kosovo refugees had been ‘embarrassing’ and reinforced the notion of a ‘Fortress Europe’. Lavenex sees the development of a common European asylum system, in which a shared commitment to humanitarian values is incorporated, as a consequence of these events.149 In particular Germany, Austria and Italy as “front-line” member states, having an external border of the EU, wanted a single asylum and immigration policy. For them much could be gained from a single European asylum and immigration policy, because 146

Andrew Duff, The Treaty of Amsterdam: Text and Commentary (London: The Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1997), 14-15.

147 Sandra Lavenex and Rahel Kunz, “The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations”, European Integration, Vol. 30, no. 3 (2008): 444.

148 Sandra Lavenex, “The Europeanization of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and Institutional Legacies”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 39, no. 5 (2001): 851-852.

149 Sandra Lavenex, “The Europeanization of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and Institutional Legacies”, 856.

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precisely these frontline member states find themselves with a larger proportion of immigrants and asylum-seekers than countries without such external borders. It is worth noting that Germany is facing this problem since the entering into force of the Dublin Convention. For example, in absolute figures Germany received most of the civil war refugees from former Yugoslavia, some 350,000 individuals in total. The smaller EU member states, like Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and non-EU member Switzerland provided 177,500 refugees with temporary residence and protection, whilst France and Britain together granted these rights to only 22,300 people.150 Britain, Denmark and Ireland, not having an external eastern border, were less enthusiastic about a common asylum and immigration policy. For them, closer cooperation seemed sufficient; for example Britain preferred the mutual recognition of national laws and regulations in the area of asylum and immigration. This was far more politically feasible for the British government.151 The final deal in Tampere was that the EU should work towards a ‘common asylum and immigration policy’.152 This specific policy should be a comprehensive policy based on supranational foundations, which makes bilateral actions of individual member states no longer necessary. To reach this objective The Hague Programme153 was introduced in 2004, in which, among other things, priorities were set in the area of justice and home affairs for the period 2005 – 2010.

Following the official documents, the objective of the Hague Programme is

to improve the common capability of the Union and its Member States to guarantee fundamental rights, minimum procedural safeguards and access to justice, to provide protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees and other international treaties to persons in need, to regulate migration flows and to control the external borders of the Union, to fight organized cross-border crime and repress the threat 150

Data obtained from Europäisches Forum für Migrationsstudien (EFMS), Available at: http://www.efms.uni-bamberg.de/ds27_2_d.htm (last accessed May 16, 2009).

151 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 573.

152 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999. Available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#union (last accessed August 18, 2009).

153 The Hague Programme (2004) sets out ten priorities o strengthen freedom, security and justice in the next five years. Available online at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33150.htm (last accessed May 17, 2009).

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of terrorism, to realize the potential of Europol and Eurojust, to carry further the mutual recognition of judicial decisions and certificates both in civil and in criminal matters, and to eliminate legal and judicial obstacles in litigation in civil and family matters with cross-border implications.154 Furthermore, a common asylum and immigration policy should be established by 2010. Member states also agreed to use qualified majority voting and the ‘codecision’ procedure in the areas of asylum and immigration (except legal immigration) from the beginning of 2005.155 The commitment to change the decision-making system for the bulk of EC immigration and asylum law to qualified majority voting in the Council and the use of the co-decision procedure in the European Parliament was implemented by a Council Decision, which was adopted on December 22nd 2004, and came officially into effect on January 1st 2005.156 According to Jörg Monar, the Hague Programme is rather an anticlimax, which he refers to as “Tampere’s modest successor”.157 In the opinion of Monar, the programme contains relatively few innovative aspects in comparison with its predecessor Tampere.

Instead, the Programme focuses on the completion of existing measures and ambitions.

Although Monar regrets the fact that the Programme avoids new controversial issues in the area of asylum and immigrations, he welcomes the fact that the Programme continues with the Tampere method of linking certain objectives to deadlines, for instance the development of a common European asylum system with a common asylum procedure.158 The following quote not only illustrates the continuation of the Tampere method nicely, it shows at the same time the securitization discourse at the 154

The Council of the European Union, “The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security, and justice in the European Union”, 16054/04 JAI559, (Brussels, 13 December 2004): 3. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf (last accessed August 18, 2009).

155 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 580.

156 Council doc. 15226/04, 15 December 2004, cited in “Vetoes, Opt-outs and EU Immigration and Asylum law”, Steve Peers, Statewatch briefing (Essex: University of Essex, 2004), 1. Available online at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/dec/eu-immig-opt-outs3.pdf (last accessed August 14, 2009).

157 Jorg Monar, “The Hague Programme: Tampere’s modest successor”, in Challenge Europe, no 14 Towards a European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2005).

Available online at: http://www.epc.eu/en/ce.asp?

AI=446&LV=177&PG=CE/EN/detail&TYP=CE&l=3&see=y&t=42 (last accessed August 24, 2009).

158 Jorg Monar, “The Hague Programme: Tampere’s modest successor”, in Challenge Europe, no 14 Towards a European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2005).

Available online at: http://www.epc.eu/en/ce.asp?

AI=446&LV=177&PG=CE/EN/detail&TYP=CE&l=3&see=y&t=42 (last accessed August 24, 2009).

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European level: The security of the European Union and its Member States has acquired a new urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The citizens of Europe rightly expect the European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to cross-border problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human rights, terrorism and organised crime, as well as the prevention thereof. Notably in the field of security, the coordination and coherence between the internal and the external dimension has been growing in importance and needs to continue to be vigorously pursued.159 2.9 The Lisbon Treaty In the run up to the intergovernmental conference of 2003-2004, the Convention on the Future of Europe, which prepared the failed Constitutional Treaty, proposed some far reaching reforms concerning asylum and immigration. One of the most striking reforms was the abolition of the third pillar. The Constitutional Treaty also proposed a more limited role for the national parliaments with regard to their control function of the implementation of justice and home affairs policy. Most of these reforms have been transferred to the new Lisbon Treaty. 160 At the time of writing, 26 of the 27 member states have already approved the Lisbon Treaty and 23 member states have deposited their ratification instruments in Rome. Following Article 6 of the Treaty of Lisbon: “this Treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2009, provided that all the instruments of ratification have been deposited, or, failing that, on the first day of the month following the deposit of the instrument of ratification by the last signatory State to take this step.”161 The Lisbon Treaty does not replace other treaties but basically amends the current EU and EC treaties. In fact, the Lisbon Treaty transforms the current treaties in 159

Official Journal of the European Union, “The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union” (3 March 2005): C53/1.

160 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 580-582.

161 European Union Web Page, “EUROPA - Treaty of Lisbon - Taking Europe into the 21st century”.

Available online at: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/take/index_en.htm (last accessed May 20, 2009).

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such a way that it represents the most recent legal shift in European integration. The Lisbon Treaty introduces a major change in the sense that it abolishes the pillar structure, as far as the first and third pillars are concerned. The current ‘third pillar’ (policing and criminal law) will be transferred to Title IV of Part Three of the current Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), concerning immigration, asylum, and civil law.162 If the Lisbon Treaty will be ratified by all member states, the European Community (EC) would be merged into the European Union (EU). As a consequence, TEC would be renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and Title IV of the TEC would be renumbered Title V.163 The new Title V consists of five chapters: 1. General provisions (new articles 67-76 TFEU); 2. Policies on border checks, asylum and immigration (articles 77-80 TFEU); 3. Judicial cooperation in civil matters (article 81 TFEU); 4. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters (articles 82-86 TFEU); 5. Police cooperation (articles 87-89 TFEU).164 Relevant to emphasis is that Title V is preceded by a new article, namely article 3(2) TFEU, which states that: The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.165 If the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified by all member states, this will probably result in more efficient decision-making, since the co-decision procedure166 will be the rule. In 162

Steve Peers, “Legislative Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence and Decision-Making in the Treaty of Lisbon”, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 10 (2008): 219.

163 Steve Peers, “Legislative Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence and Decision-Making in the Treaty of Lisbon”, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 10 (2008): 219 164 P. 29 165 Official Journal of the European Union, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01, vol 50, 17 December 2007. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do? uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML (last accessed 1 September 2009).

166 This means the European Commission will have an exclusive right of initiative, qualified majority voting in the Council and a co-legislative role for the European Parliament.

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addition, this change should lead to increased democracy and transparency since the European Parliament acts as co-legislator instead of its current advisory powers and since the qualified majority principle will apply in the Council instead of the current practice of unanimity. Furthermore, the role of the national parliaments will be more active in examining and delivering opinions regarding JHA issues. An example of this more active role is the ‘emergency brake procedure’. Compared to the initial Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty contains more flexibility clauses.167 However, where articles 82(3) and 83(3) TFEU deal with ‘emergency brakes’, article 69 TFEU underlines the importance of the role of national parliaments in securing compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 168 The Lisbon Treaty would fundamentally transform the competences and decision-making procedures regarding JHA issues. The Lisbon Treaty contains the objective of developing “common policies” for both asylum and immigration, which includes uniform standards for asylum. It proposes to use qualified majority voting (QMV) and co-decision for legal immigration issues, which to a large extent will avoid blocking minorities. Since QMV and co-decision already applies to asylum law and would still do so, we can consider this as fundamental changes to EC/EU competence.169 According to Steve Peers “the Treaty of Lisbon would in many respects confer a broader competence, or at least a clearer competence, upon the European Union as regards immigration and asylum law as compared to the present rules.”170 Finally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty, as this charter would be as strong as the Treaty itself this would result in a greater role for the European Court of Justice (ECJ).171 In addition, along with the changes in competence and decision-making procedures regarding JHA issues, the jurisdiction of the Court regarding immigration and asylum law would also be changed. According to

167

Rick Lawson, “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” in The Lisbon Treaty Meeting Summaries, Europa Institute (ed.) Christa Tobler, (Leiden: Law Factulty of Leiden University, 2008): 29. Available at: http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/9345000/1/j9vvgy6i0ydh7th/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vhv2f03lebxw.doc 168 Rick Lawson, “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, 30.

169 Steve Peers, “Legislative Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence and Decision-Making in the Treaty of Lisbon”, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 10 (2008): 233.

170 Steve Peers, “Legislative Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence and Decision-Making in the Treaty of Lisbon”, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 10 (2008): 246.

171 Migration Watch United Kingdom, “The Lisbon Treaty: more red-tape round our border controls?”, published on 17 March 2008. Available at: http://news.migrationwatch.org.uk/2008/03/the-lisbon-trea.html (last accessed May 20, 2009).

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Steve Peers the application of the Court’s normal jurisdiction in this policy area “would almost certainly lead to a significant increase in the Court’s role in this area.”172 2.10 Securitization in EU migration policy In the foregoing we have seen that the EU is attempting to develop common policies on asylum and immigration in order to better manage migration. At the same time, the EU is strengthening external border security in order to keep out asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. In this way, the EU tries to balance security concerns with economic and humanitarian ones.

However, it seems to be that the security dimension comes first, before economic and humanitarian concerns. In fact, since the adoption of the 1985 European Single Act, the shift towards securing and controlling the EU’s external borders has become apparent. The change of policy to a more restrictive approach can be interpreted as the response to the large numbers of migrants, legal as well as illegal, that have continued to arrive in EU member states.173 In tracing back its origins, we come across a securitization trend that started in the mid-1980s, at a time when the numbers of asylum seeking applicants in Europe reached unprecedented levels. According to Huysmans the increasing economic and financial globalization, the revival of nationalist and xenophobic movements and political parties, the rise of poverty, and the rise of multiculturalism in European societies are all causes of the development that started at the end of the 1980s. Since then, the issue of migration, most notably the rising numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers arriving in Europe, has been increasingly perceived as a threat to national stability and to security in Europe more generally.174 As described in the first part of this chapter, securitization impacted heavily on common regulations. In addressing migration, emphasis was on the need to restrict and control populations flows. There are plenty of examples that illustrate the restrictive and control-oriented approach of EU migration policy.175 The Dublin Convention is a case in 172

Steve Peers, “Legislative Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence and Decision-Making in the Treaty of Lisbon”, European Journal of Migration and Law, vol. 10 (2008): 219.

173 European Commission, Justice and Home Affairs, Asylum,“The European Union Policy towards a Common European Asylum system”, European Commission Web Page on Freedom, Security and Justice. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/asylum/fsj_asylum_intro_en.htm (last accessed April 23, 2009).

174 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 751-777.

175 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 756.

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point, because it sets out criteria for the state responsible for processing the asylum application. Another example can be found in the coordination of visa policy in the EU and the readmission agreements with neighbouring countries concerning the readmission of illegal immigrants.176 The Dublin Convention fits well in the securitization discourse on migration policy since it aims to reduce the number of asylum applications. The Convention makes it almost impossible to submit asylum applications in different EU member states, which leads to the fact that asylum seekers have significantly lower chances of being accepted.177 Also, by obliging the responsible member state to complete the examination of an asylum application, one hoped to end the phenomenon of ‘asylum shopping’. For the operationalization of all this, a computerized system, called Eurodac, was designed. Eurodac was specifically used to compare fingerprints of asylum applicants.178 The Dublin Convention and the Eurodac system revealed the restrictive and control-oriented dimension of European migration policies; the discourse in which they are embedded is that of securitization.

According to Huysmans, the securitization of migration policy can be considered the portrayal of the phenomenon of migration as a threat to public order and stability, to cultural identity and to the stability of labour markets.179 In fact, the main suggestion of securitization theory is that perceptions of security or insecurity are the result of social processes, which are analyzed by examining so-called securitizing speech-acts”. These speech-acts articulate threats and fears and consequently legitimize the very need to protect public order and preserve domestic stability. Issues then become actually “securitized” by the mere fact that these speech-acts represent a particular issue as a security situation and are accepted as such by an audience.180 In the above-mentioned example, the speech-act is the Dublin Convention, which articulates the threat and fear of mass influxes of asylum-seekers in the EU member states.

These institutional developments were heavily influenced by a thematic change in the problematization of the theme migration. Particularly in the 1980s, migration policy was increasingly framed in a security discourse. Policy debates in these days 176

Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 756.

Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 756.

178 Europaworld, “The Dublin Convention: State Responsible For Examining Applications For Asylum Lodged In One Of The Member States Of The European Communities”, section 7. Available online at: http://www.europaworld.org/DEVPOLAWAR/Eng/Refugees/Refugees_DocC_eng.htm (last accessed May 15, 2009).

179 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 751-777.

180 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, no. 4 (2003): 513.

177

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portrayed migration as a challenge to the welfare state or presented migration as a danger to domestic society. One of the most visible examples in this respect is the Schengen Agreement of 1985, which connects immigration and asylum on the one hand, and terrorism, transnational organized crime and border controls on the other.181 In fact, according to Virgine Guiraudon, EU migration officials linked the European integration project, migration and security issues by emphasizing the negative and potentially criminal activities associated with free movement of goods, persons and capital.182 Basically three reasons are responsible for the shift towards securitization of migration policies. It is too simple to state that because of the rising numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers, policymakers in the EU shifted to a more securitarian approach. After all, the second Schengen Agreement of 1990 had already been designed by 1988, which is well before refugee and asylum-seeker numbers peaked at their highest levels. Following Huysmans, the securitization of migration issues are largely fostered by the Europeanization of migration policy. 183 More specifically, according to Huysmans, the actual reasons why securitization of migration has developed are threefold and lie in the perceived necessity of maximizing internal security and cultural security and in the crisis of the welfare state.184 The first role is played by the perceived necessity of internal security. According to Huysmans, the securitization of the internal market should be seen as a key dynamic through which the European integration process is implicated in the securitization of migration. The reasoning behind this is that as soon as internal borders are abolished, transnational flows of goods, capital, services and, most importantly here, people, will challenge national stability and the rule of law.185 The internal market is, according to article 13 of the treaty of the 1986 Single European Act, defined as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”.186 As this quote makes clear, free movement within the EU is firstly focused on abolishing internal border controls.

181

Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 756-757.

182 Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, no.2 (2000): 260.

183 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 758.

184 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 758.

185 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 758.

186 The Single European Act of 1986, article 13 (Luxembourg, 1986). Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/singleuropeanact.pdf (last accessed May 22, 2009).

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However, after the introduction of the Single European Act, European migration policy is also focused on strengthening external border protection and strict border controls.

The rationale is that when internal border controls are downgraded, the need for strengthening the EU’s external borders increases. Only in this way a certain level of control in terms of who can legitimately move about the EU’s territory is guaranteed.187 In fact, article 7 of the 1985 Schengen Agreement illustrates this rationale by stating that the parties shall endeavour to approximate as soon as possible their visa policies in order to avoid any adverse consequences that may result from the easing of controls at the common frontiers in the field of immigration and security.188 So eventually, the border control issue was developed into a wider security question connecting the internal market to ‘an internal security problématique’.189 The expectation and fear, already present when developing Schengen II, was that Europe’s single market would make it all the easier for asylum-seekers, illegal immigrants and criminal organizations to move around Europe. This resulted in closer police and customs cooperation, and later in the institutional framework in which border control, terrorism, international crime and migration were connected with each other in order to provide for a sufficient level of internal security. A prime example of this is Schengen, in which 36 of 142 articles deal with immigration and asylum connecting it to terrorism, transnational crime and border control.190 Second, the securitization trend in migration connects cultural security with migration. Migration is presented as a cultural challenge to social and political integration; the discourse on the clash of civilizations is a good example. Huysmans argues that the way in which the EU deals with migration policy can be considered as rather ambivalent. On the one hand, we notice that EU migration policy confirms nationalist, racist and xenophobic reactions to migrants by portraying them as a problem and danger to societal and political stability. By representing migrants and asylumseekers in such negative terms, the general view that they indeed do not belong to 187

Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 758.

188 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, p.759.

189 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, p. 760.

190 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, p. 756.

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European society is confirmed. In this way, further steps towards the institutionalization of a more inclusive multicultural Europe are largely undermined.191 On the other hand, the EU itself is committed to do its utmost to prevent a possible revival of nationalism, racism and xenophobic reactions. Essentially, the whole European integration project is about multiculturalism, which supports the cohabitation of different nationalities in the social, economic and political spheres.192 A third element which contributes to the negative politicization of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees is the expression of welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural homogeneity.193 In this category belongs the idea that migrants are seen as a group that has no legitimate right to social and welfare provisions. In its most radical form, welfare chauvinism refers to socio-economic stigmatization. In other words, migrants are seen as profiteers who illegitimately try to gain the benefits from the welfare system of a particular community to which they do not belong. In the context of the current debate on the use of the European social welfare systems, the migrant is being portrayed as someone committing welfare fraud. Several metaphors, such as ‘invasion’, ‘flood’ or ‘a tsunami of asylum-seekers’ present migrants as dangerous and as a threat to the European welfare system. These notions have been taken up by political parties who further frame the problematique of migration in a securitized discourse.194

191

Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 766.

192 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 766.

193 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 770.

194 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 768 – 769.

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2.11 Concluding remarks As this chapter has shown, the Europeanization of migration has largely contributed to the development of securitization of migration issues. Various examples have uncovered the securitization-related reasons for closer cooperation. Consequently, the chapter underlined the restrictive and control-oriented approach of the EU, which seems to be present in common regulations, for example those on visa policy, the facilitation readmission agreements and the establishment of Eurodac. Along with the process of Europeanization of migration, it became clear that in all these regulations, migration became connected to the necessity to maitain a certain level of internal security while putting emphasis, in speech-acts, on the negative and potentially criminal nature associated with the free movement of goods, persons, and capital.195 At European level, the hegemonic discourse on Europeanization of immigration can, according to Sandra Lavenex, best be characterised by a “stress on control, the link between threat and immigration and the urgent need, however, to balance humanitarian protection and European security”.196 The humanitarian and moral dimension becomes particularly apparent in the following quote of Romano Prodi, who was the President of the EU Commission between 1994 and 2004: The Union also has an increasing responsibility in the world, due to its position, its tradition of safeguarding peace and human rights and its interest in having a stable international environment in which to achieve its own commercial ambitions.197 The last point touches upon the notion that the EU presents itself to the outside world as a moral institution and as a human rights protector. According to Alessandra Buonfino, the way in which the security focus is formulated forms the main difference between the EU and the European member states, although she adds that the discourse type in which

195

Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2000): 260.

196 Sandra Lavenex, “Migration and the EU’s New Eastern Border: Between Realism And Liberalism, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, no. 1 (2001): 26.

197 Romano Prodi quoted in Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, New Political Science, Vol. 26, no. 1 (2004): 44.

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migration is presented as a security issue (with a strong focus on internal security) is still hegemonic at European level.198 In the following chapter, the main developments in Turkish migration policies will be discussed. After a short historical background, the third chapter will focus on the Turkish migration flows as well as the Turkish domestic legislation and the way Turkey deals with international treaties and the international community regarding the subject of migration more generally.

198

Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, New Political Science, Vol. 26, no. 1 (2004): 45.

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Chapter 3| Developments in Turkish Migration Policies 3.1 Introduction The general perception of Turkey concerning migration is that of a country of emigration. In particular the large numbers of labour migrants migrating to Western Europe throughout the 1960s and 1970s fit well into this perception. According to figures of the Turkish Employment Service, more than 780,000 Turkish workers had migrated to Western Europe by the end of 1973.199 Thereafter, emigration to Western Europe continued through family reunification, resulting in the creation of Turkish communities in the EU member states, particularly in Germany, France and the Netherlands. However, less attention is devoted to the fact that Turkey has long been a receiving country of immigrants and asylum-seekers. While Turkey has up until today relatively little legislation on migration compared to the EU, it is interesting to note how Turkey deals with the issue of migration.200 In this chapter, I will describe the main developments in Turkish migration policies. Writing about the Turkish experience with (im)migration involves, on the one hand, a strong focus on the most important migration flows. On the other hand, it requires an analysis of the Turkish domestic legislation on (im)migration and the way Turkey deals with international treaties and the international community regarding this issue more generally. Before I will discuss the more recent developments in Turkish migration policies, I will first outline the relevant political events prior and after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A review of the turbulent Turkish history201 is essential to gain a better understanding of the Turkish immigration policies of more recent times, in particular the ones since the end of the Cold War.

199

Pierre Hecker, “Focus Migration: Country Profile Turkey”, focus MIGRATION, No. 5 (Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics, 2006): 2.

200 Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey: Challenges of Harmonizing Immigration Policies with the EU”, Draft paper prepared for the Dialogues session on Emerging Countries on Immigration at the HMI World Congress Human Movements and Immigration (Barcelona, 2004).

201 See for example J. Buitkamp, Geschiedenis van het Midden Oosten (Houten/Fibula: Unieboek, 1989), 157-174; and Harm Ramkema (ed.), EUROPA, een politiek handboek (Amsterdam: Instituut voor Publiek en Politiek, 1997), 243-249.

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3.2 Historical background Like the modern Turkish Republic, the Ottoman Empire had a long tradition of accepting immigrants and refugees.202 Throughout its existence, the Empire received large numbers of Muslim as well as Christian and Jewish refugees. They migrated from the Balkans, the Caucasus, and from Turkistan.203 Illustrative is the ending of the war between the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Empire as a result of the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699). During this period, some 130,000 Muslims escaped the Habsburg invasion of Serbia and Bulgaria and migrated to the Ottoman Empire.204 Not only Muslims were welcomed in the Ottoman Empire; also non-Muslim ethnic groups, such as Jews, Hungarians, Poles and Russians were granted asylum and were offered the possibility to integrate in the Empire. Here, the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of the Ottoman Empire becomes extremely apparent. The only loyalty that the Empire asked of its subjects was “no more than not rebelling and paying taxes”.205 According to Kemal Karpat, various migration waves turned the old society of Anatolia, of which the majority of people was Turkish, into the multi-ethnic and linguistic mixture that has become the Turkish nation of today.206 Immigration continued, and between 1876 and 1927, 1,994,999 Muslim immigrants arrived in the lands that still belonged to the Empire. Those people mainly migrated from Balkan countries and the Black Sea region.207 The Greek War of Independence (1821-1829) marked the beginning of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire found itself confronted with nationalistic uprisings in the Balkan region, which it initially did not understand.

The rise of Balkan nationalism led to forced migration and ethnic cleansing, resulting in an exodus of Muslims from the Balkans to Anatolia as well as an exodus of Christians from Anatolia to the Balkans. During the Balkan War (1912 -1913) around 800,000 Muslims left their homes in the Balkans to settle in Anatolia. The Muslim minority in 202

Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics, (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 62.

203 Turkistan means literally “Land of the Turks”. Turkistan is a region in Central Asia, which is mainly inhabited by Turkic peoples.

204 Turkan Ertuna, “Shaping Turkey’s Immigration Policy”, Research paper presented at the ISA panel Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: Ideas, Identities and Institutions (Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2007): 6.

205 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300 – 1650: the Structure of Power (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 3.

206 Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia), (Boston: Brill, 2002), 23 207 Turkan Ertuna, “Shaping Turkey’s Immigration Policy”, 7.

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the Balkan region came under political pressure in the sense that they did not fit the new nationalist ideological concepts of the newly created nation states in the Balkans.208 However, some Muslims did not leave and stayed behind as minority populations, notably in Bulgaria, Bosnia and Greece. As a response, or more as a self-defensive measure against the ethnic nationalist uprisings in the Balkans, the Ottoman state started to develop and adopt more nationalist ideologies, too.

Following Karpat, this ‘Turkish nationalism’ can be considered as the first example of Muslim ethnic nationalism in the sense that the non-Muslims in Anatolia were perceived as a threat to national security and were successfully forced to leave.209 It was Anatolia that was appointed as “the national heartland of a future Turkish state”.210 In 1915-1916, almost the entire Armenian population became victim of forced migration and the target of organized killings. As a result, between one and one-and-ahalf million Armenians died.211 During the period of 1919 – 1922, Greek armed forces invaded Western Anatolia but were eventually defeated by the Turks. Approximately 400,000 to 500,00 Greek Orthodox Christians fled Western Anatolia, although those living in the central part of Anatolia and along the eastern Black Sea coast remained.212 Mustafa Aydin explains that the Turks fought not only the “Entente invaders” but also the Ottoman sultan and the forces of the old system. Therefore, these instances of forced migration should in part be understood as a way in which Turks sought to break with the Ottoman past before a new Turkish state could be established.213 3.3 Migration movements since the establishment of the new Republic of Turkey Migration flows between Anatolia and the Balkans and vice versa also continued when the new Republic of Turkey had been established, among other reasons because Turkey had experienced tremendous wartime population losses.214 The Lausanne Peace Treaty 208

Pierre Hecker, “Focus Migration: Country Profile Turkey”, focus MIGRATION, no. 5 (Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics, 2006): 2.

209 Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays.

Social, economic, and political studies of the Middle East and Asia (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004): 20-22.

210 Pierre Hecker, “Focus Migration: Country Profile Turkey”, 2.

211 Archief Nederlandse pers van 1878 t/m 1930, “Armeense Genocide”. Available online at: http://www.armeensegenocide.info/pers_nl.html (last accessed August 25, 2009).

212 Pierre Hecker, “Focus Migration: Country Profile Turkey”, 2.

213 Mustafa Aydin, “Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 3, no. 2 (2003): 165.

214 Migration movements from the Balkans to Turkey were heavily encouraged by a series of friendship treaties signed between Turkey and Bulgaria (1925), Greece (1930), Romania (1936) and Yugoslavia (1950), which always included provisions on migration resulting in the arrival of immigrants from these Balkan countries; see European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). “EU-Turkey relations at the

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of 1923 marked the end of the long war period. It included a population exchange agreement between the Turkish Republic and Greece concerning their religious minorities. As a result of this population exchange, approximately 1.3 million ethnic Greeks living in central Anatolia and the Black Sea region had to move to Greece, and some 500,000 ethnic Turks who lived in Greece had to move to Turkey. 215 Here, the formation of Turkish national identity comes into play because it is noticable that the new Turkish Republic denied the existence of ethnic and cultural diversity in the country, with the exception of the ethnic Greeks and ethnic Turks mentioned in the joint agreement on the population exchange in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The reason behind the migration movements into and out of the Turkish Republic was thus a rather “modernist project that aimed to homogenize a society within the geographical area determined by the National Pact”.216 Creating a true Turkish nation state could only be done, according to Atatürk, the most prominent founding father of the young republic, with a uniform and homogeneous society. The traditionally multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society, which was such a common feature of the previous Ottoman Empire, did not fit into the new civic and territorially based formulation of Turkish nationalism anymore. In 1924, Article 88 of the Constitution was adopted, which defined the term “Turk”. The article stipulated that “the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race were, in terms of citizenship, to be Turkish” and therefore have equal rights. However, following Kirisci, compared to “such a formal definition of citizenship and national identity that emphasizes territoriality rather than ethnicity or ‘national belonging,’” the actual practice of who is considered Turk has been very different.217 The actual criterion in determining a person to be Turkish was exclusively religious; in particular preference was given to immigrants with a Sunni or Hanefi religious background. This leads to the conclusion that Turkey not only endorsed another approach compared to the provisions outlined in the Constitution, it also becomes clear that Turkey took a much more

crossroads: migration”, 4th Pan-European Conference on EU Politics (University of Latvia: Riga, 2008), 6-7. Available online at http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-riga/virtualpaperroom/063.pdf (last accessed August 18, 2009).

215 Turkan Ertuna, “Shaping Turkey’s Immigration Policy”, Research paper presented at the ISA panel Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: Ideas, Identities and Institutions (Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2007): 7; Z. Sahin, “Change and Continuity of External Immigration to Turkey”, Stradigma.com, no. 3 (2003).

216 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, no. 3 (2000): 1.

217 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 1.

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restrictive policy with respect to granting refugee status compared to its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire.

As will become clear later on in this chapter, Turkey welcomed many immigrants, but full refugee status was only granted to those people who qualified as potential immigrants, namely to people of ‘Turkish descent and culture’ which were of Sunni-Hanefi background. Turkey was well aware that granting full refugee status meant the opening of the prospect of acquiring citizenship through naturalization. With the ideal of a homogeneous population in mind, legislation that governed immigration into Turkey was needed.218 In the following section the most important piece of legislation will be discussed. It makes clear who is considered an immigrant according to Turkey’s immigration policy, and as a result, who is entitled to enter and stay in Turkey. Again, we observe a close connection to Turkey’s notion of national identity and citizenship.

3.4 The 1934 Law on Settlement Until recently, the 1934 Law on Settlement (Law 2510) could be considered as the most important legal foundation of Turkish immigration policy. The Law opens up the possibility for individuals and groups who are of Turkish descent, ethnicity and culture to be accepted as refugees and immigrants in Turkey. While the Law on Settlement governs immigration into Turkey, the term ‘immigration’ should be seen within the context of the nation building process of Turkey. More specifically, the law was designed to construct “a homogenous sense of national identity based on the precepts of modernism and secularism”.219 The importance of creating such a homogenous sense of national identity was visible in the government’s concern that non-Muslim minorities were still not using the Turkish language. These groups of minorities included not only the Kurdish people but also immigrants who had come from the North-Caucasus, Crimea, and the Balkans.220 With so many immigrants, mainly those who migrated from the Balkans and the Caucasus, who could not speak nor write Turkish and who had maintained their ethnic identities, the main goal of the Law on Settlement became the assimilation of these immigrants who had been settled in Turkey by previous Ottoman governments. The aim, according to a Turkish deputy at that time, was, first, to create “a country which 218

Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 3-4.

Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 4.

220 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 4.

219

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could speak one single language, think and feel alike”.221 The drafters of the law went even further by hoping that “the Turkish state would not anymore have to suspect the Turkishness of any Turk (Turkish citizens)”.222 Second, as expressed by the then Turkish Interior Minister Sükrü Kaya, the other objective of the law was to settle a large group of nomadic tribes (both Kurdish and Turkish) who lived in several parts of Anatolia. Minister Kaya considered it “paramount to settle these nomadic tribes and make the benefits of the Republic accessible to them”.223 That is also the reason why the law divided the population into three groups and into three zones of the country. The first group was made up of those who spoke Turkish and were of Turkish ethnicity. The second group consisted of past immigrants from the Caucasus and the Balkans who did not speak Turkish but were considered to be of Turkish culture. The third group consisted of non-Muslim minorities, the Kurds and Arabs, who did not speak Turkish and were not considered as belonging to Turkish culture.224 The division is to a large extent connected to the notion of the ‘ideal Turkish citizen’. It is noticeable that people who are of Turkish ethnicity and use the Turkish language enjoy a rather privileged status. Naturally, these sorts of practices are not unusual in the process of nation-building. However, what was unusual in Turkey, compared to Western European countries, was that there were such large groups in the Turkish society that were ethnically and linguistically not part of the dominant culture.

In fact, Article 7 of Law 2510 gave immigrants of Turkish ethnicity the right to settle where they wished, with the only exception being areas closed to any settlement. The immigrants who lacked Turkish ethnicity were settled by the government.225 As will become more clear throughout this chapter, the actual practice of granting immigration status according to the criteria of belonging to Turkish culture is somewhat different than the legal text suggests. An example that illustrates this is the preference the Council of Ministers has traditionally given to migration and immigrants from the Balkan countries. Secondly, the main criterion for classifying an individual as Turkish, in practice, seems to be religion. Generally, the following three groups were accepted as immigrants and were granted relatively easy and rapid Turkish citizenship.

221

Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 5.

Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 5.

223 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 5.

224 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 5.

225 Law on Settlement (No. 2510 of 21 June 1934), Article 3, Official Journal, no. 2733 of 21 June 1934.

222

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The first group was the Muslim population from the Balkans, including the original Turkish settlers such as the Bulgarian Turks, the Kosovar Turks, the Albanians, and Bosnians who converted to Islam. The second group is formed by the former Ottoman population of the Caucasus and Crimea, since they were classified as ethnic Turks and shared a common history. The third group was made up of more distant Turkish cousins living in Central Asia who were considered important for the Turkish national imagination, although they did not share a part of the Ottoman history.226 An example of the preferential treatment of the first of these three categories and the relevance of religion is Turkey’s acceptance of the non-Turkish Albanians, Bosnians, and Pomaks of the Balkans, while it refused to accept the Christian Orthodox Gagauz Turks as immigrants, although they were of Turkish descent.227 3.5 Migration movements into Turkey from the interbellum to the post-Second World War years During the 1930s, Turkey was confronted with a large number of refugees from various parts of occupied Europe. The Nazi regime in Germany led to the outflow of approximately 100,000 Jews who sought temporary asylum in Turkey. The vast majority of them used Turkey as their first country of asylum although they were resettled or transiting to Palestine and after 1948 to the new state of Israel. Thus, Turkey was used as a transit country. Many Bulgarians, Greeks, Romanians, and Yugoslavians that migrated to Turkey requested protection as refugees.228 Also, immigration statistics show that some 800 German speaking refugees arrived in Turkey during 1933-1945. Among them were scientists, artists, university professors and Jewish intellectuals, who migrated to Turkey as a result of the excesses of Nazism.229 Although there are no public records available for the exact numbers, according to Vernant, some 67,000 internees and refugees were still present in Turkey at the end of the Second World War.230 It should be stressed that at the end of the Second World War, a majority of this group returned to their respective countries of origin or moved on to other countries. It could be said that this was what the Turkish 226

Kemal Kirisci, “Refugees of Turkish Origin: ‘Coerced Immigrants’ to Turkey since 1945”, International Migration, Vol. 34, no. 3 (1996): 388.

227 Turkan Ertuna, “Shaping Turkey’s Immigration Policy”, 9.

228 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 82.

229 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 10.

230 Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953), 244.

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government had hoped for, because it had always stressed the temporary aspect of this inflow. In fact, Turkish governments never had the intention to grant these people full refugee status and citizenship.231 After the war, Turkey continued this practice of granting temporary refuge as well, as it granted unofficial temporary asylum for Jews again, this time escaping from post-Khomeini Iran and Syria.

As table 2 illustrates, some 846,000 people migrated to Turkey between 1923 and 1945. In the post-war period, migration continued as well, because of the large Country of origin Bulgaria Greece Romania Yugoslavia Turkistan Others

1923 - 1939 19,688 384,000 117,095 115,210 No data 10,029**

1940 - 1945 15,744 No data 4,201 1,671 No data No data

1946 - 1995 603,585* 25,889 1,264 188,040 2,878 17,869

Total

825,022

21,616

839,525

= 1,686,163

* Subsequent to the influx of the 310,000 refugees that sought asylum from Turkey in 1989, 124.678 returned to Bulgaria as of March 1994 ** This figure covers the period 1923 - 1949

proportions of Turks and Pomaks coming from Bulgaria. In 1950-51, Turkey was confronted with a mass influx of 154,000 migrants from Bulgaria. When Turkey and Bulgaria signed a bilateral agreement on family reunification, an additional number of 116,000 arrived in Turkey. Finally, in 1989, a mass exodus of 310,000 Bulgarian migrants started.

Table 2: Numbers of Immigrants into Turkey 1923-1995232

231 232

Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 10.

Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 8.

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The second largest migration movement to Turkey concerned immigrants from Yugoslavia. As table 2 shows, 188,040 immigrants migrated to Turkey, of which many were Albanians and Bosnians.233 The number of immigrants coming from Greece shows a strong decrease from 1946 onwards compared to the situation in 1923-1939.

Especially when the Greek civil war ended in 1949 and the internal situation in Greece began to stabilize, Turkey took a more restrictive approach to its policy of accepting immigrants from Greece. This became even more evident when relations between Greece and Turkey deteriorated from the late 1950s onwards.234 In contrast to immigration from the Balkan region, immigrants from other regions made up a relatively small part of the total number of people who migrated to Turkey.

3.6 Asylum and the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees The immediate aftermath of the Second World War involved different and changing patterns of migration movements throughout Europe and also different refugee flows into Turkey. That is one of the reasons why Turkey, as one of its drafters, signed the Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1951 (Geneva Convention). However, Turkey signed the Geneva Convention with a geographical limitation provided in Article 1 B (1)(a). The geographical limitation meant that Turkey only had an obligation to admit asylum-seekers and refugees from Europe. More specifically, only those people fleeing communist persecution in the Soviet Union and in Eastern European states would be admitted and granted refugee status.235 Turkey signed the Geneva Convention not only with a geographical limitation but also with a time limitation meaning that asylum applications would be accepted only as the result of events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951. When Turkey signed the 1967 Additional Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of the Geneva Convention, it lifted the time limitation. However, Turkey was not prepared to lift the geographical limitation.236 The underlying rationale of the geographical limitation was that those individuals with de jure refugee status would eventually be resettled in third countries.

As this was done by international agencies, such as the International Catholic Migration Commission and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Turkey faced minimal costs related to the sheltering and resettling of the refugees.237 233

Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 8.

Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 9.

235 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 11.

236 Turkan Ertuna, “Shaping Turkey’s Immigration Policy”, 12.

237 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 11.

234

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Statistics of the Turkish government reveal that between 1970 and 1996, approximately 13,552 individuals applied for asylum or refugee status in Turkey and enjoyed in this way protection on the basis of the Geneva Convention.238 The vast majority of these refugees were resettled to third countries; only a small group remained permanently or acquired Turkish citizenship (often through marriages).239 The extension of asylum and refugee status to migrants from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was done for two political reasons. The first one touches upon the Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War. An anti-communist policy included offering help to East European refugees. The second reason was that refugees and asylum-seekers from those areas did not arrive en masse but instead came in small numbers. This led to a certain commitment of West European countries to admit them from Turkey. In this way, Turkey functioned only as a transit country. The added advantage of this practice for Turkey was, apart from the minimal costs, that Turkey was not confronted with any of the social and political problems that the integration of refugees brings along.240 3.6.1 Non-Convention refugees Those refugees and asylum-seekers who arrived from geographical regions outside Europe were generally referred to as ‘non-Convention’ refugees.241 The Iranian refugees who were fleeing the Iranian Revolution of 1979 are a case in point. In the late 1970s, Turkey experienced a changing pattern in its refugee movements. Traditionally, refugee movements involved migration from the Balkans. With the significant migration wave of Iranians to Turkey, this pattern started to change, as immigrants came more and more from the Middle East region and some parts of Africa. Turkey responded with a quite flexible policy which enabled the Iranians to enter Turkey without fulfilling the necessary visa requirements and gave them the right to stay in the country temporarily.

According to Kirisci, this arrangement “worked reasonably well so long as the individuals could present valid passports and had the economic means to sustain

238

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1996): 296.

239 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 11.

240 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 296.

241 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 297.

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themselves”.242 People who could not identify themselves or were caught as illegal immigrants had to appear in court where one was sentenced to symbolic fines.

Concretely, it meant that they eventually were allowed to join those other illegal immigrants that had not been caught.243 In this way, the opportunity was created to go underground and continue the journey through Turkey to Western Europe.

No official statistics seem to exist, but it is estimated that between 1980 and 1991 some 1.5 million Iranians entered Turkey and transited through it. The majority of this group managed to reach their third country on their own. Only a small number approached the UNHCR.244 The reason for this might be the way in which Turkish government officials discouraged Iranians from formally applying for asylum because Turkey did not want to offend the Iranian authorities. The small proportion who insisted on lodging a formal asylum application were however not refused. They had the opportunity to apply for refugee status and seek resettlement into third countries through the UNHCR. The UNHCR was responsible for the task of status determination and Turkish authorities granted temporarily residence permits to those individuals whose cases were being examined by the UNHCR office in Ankara or those who waited for resettlement into third countries. From the late 1980s, other asylum-seekers than Iranians began to profit from this Turkish practice as well. As a result, Turkey saw the arrival of many Iraqi immigrants, along with refugees and immigrants from Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia and Palestine.245 With immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, and from Southeast Asia, Turkey had become a country of asylum. Initially, Turkey continued its working relationship with the UNHCR with the understanding that those people who were recognized by the UNHCR as refugees needed to be resettled and those cases who were rejected had to leave the country. However, faced with increasing numbers of illegal immigrants and the disappearances into illegality of those immigrants whose cases were rejected, Turkey came to the conclusion that its arrangements, which were primarily designed for the Iranian refugees, were outdated and that the system led to massive abuse among an increasing number of immigrants who either tried to stay in Turkey illegally or make 242

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 297.

243 Kirisci, K. “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 297.

244 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 85.

245 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 298.

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their way to Europe.246 At the same time, Turkey came under pressure by the international community because of the way it deported individuals that were in fact genuine refugees. Turkey was further criticised for not respecting the principle of nonrefoulement247 for the non-Convention refugees, facing the argument that Turkey’s practice of “forced return of asylum seekers and refugees constitutes a breach of Turkey’s international legal obligations”.248 Apart from the severe external pressure upon Turkey, the country experienced internal pressure as well. Disputes between the Turkish authorities and the UNHCR intensified after the mass influx of some 460,000 Kurdish Iraqis in 1990-1991 following the Gulf crisis.249 In particular, the dispute involved different interpretations of both sides over the question who should be considered an asylum-seeker and who should not.

Concerned about the protection of their own national security, Turkish authorities created a safe haven in the northern part of Iraq expecting a quick repatriation of the Iraqi refugees coming from there. The safe haven was established with the understanding that this part of Iraq was safe enough from Iraqi governmental persecution. Turkey considered only those refugees who refused to move to the safe part of Iraq as illegal refugees. In addition, Turkey was further concerned that the arrival of large numbers of Kurdish refugees could lead to a detoriation of the Kurdish problem just at a time when the activities of the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK) were particularly on the rise.250 3.7 The 1994 Regulation on Asylum The 1994 Regulation on Asylum can be seen as a direct consequence of the changing migration movements into Turkey from the mid-1980s onwards. Until then, Turkey was 246

Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 12.

To protect refugees from being returned to places where their lives could be threatened the principle of non-refoulement has been laid out in international refugee law, specifically in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It should be stressed that the principle of non-refoulement not only forbids the expulsion of refugees to their country of origin but also to any country in which their lives or freedoms might be threatened. The only exception to this, as stated in article 33(2), is that the person to be expelled constitutes a danger to the community of that country (national security). See: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “Migration > Glossary > Refoulement”, Social and Human Sciences, International Migration and Multicultural Policies. Available at http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.phpURL_ID=4145&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last accessed August 7th 2009).

248 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 86.

249 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 12.

250 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 13; and Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 298.

247

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confronted with a rather manageable flow of Convention refugees. For Turkey, this system worked quite well because of the quick resettlement of the refugees to third countries. As was made clear in the previous section, the turning point of Turkish asylum practice came when large numbers of Iranians began to arrive, followed suit by other non-European immigrants who started to seek asylum in Turkey rather than only moving through.251 With the mass influxes of Iraqi Kurds first in 1988 (51,000 individuals) and then in 1991 (460,000 individuals),252 Bulgarian Turks in 1989 (310,000 individuals),253 and finally the Bosnian Muslims in 1992-1993 (20,000 individuals),254 Turkey had no other option than to extend its legal foundations for asylum policy and adopted the 1994 Asylum Regulation. The Turkish Interior Ministry felt that these migration movements were beyond their control. Particular concern was expressed regarding the increasing number of illegal immigrants.255 In order to control (illegal) migration movements better, the 1994 Regulation on Asylum aimed to make the status determination a task of the Turkish government.

Previously, status determination was the responsibility of the UNCHR. Following article 6, the final decision should be reached “by considering the rights stated in the 1951 Geneva Convention […] and the [1967] Protocol […] relating to the Status of the Refugees, along with the opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries and national agencies”.256 The new role of the Turkish government in determining the status of the asylumseekers is not surprising. In fact, Turkish authorities were already largely concerned about the effects of large-scale migration on national security. According to Fiona Adamson, migration flows affect at least three dimensions of national security: (1) state capacity and autonomy, (2) the balance of power, and (3) the nature of violent conflict. Adamson draws the conclusion that the management of migration forms a greater security challenge to weak and failing states than to advanced post-industrial states.257 From this perspective, Turkey’s concerns about the consequences of large251

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 299.

252 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 12.

253 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 8.

254 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 84.

255 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 299.

256 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 302.

257 Fiona B. Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security”, International Security Vol. 31, no. 1 (2006): 165-199.

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scale migration flows are understandable. In terms of state capacity, we could think of the administrative and organizational issues that arise in the management of migration flows.258 However, the aspect of violent conflict stands out in this case, as Turkey was concerned that the many Iraqis coming from Northern Iraq included PKK militants who tried to enter Turkey.259 For Turkey this increased the need to formulate and implement migration policies, such as the 1994 Regulation, to make Turkey more secure. In this effort, refugee rights were somewhat neglected as the Asylum Regulation introduced very strict regulation governing access to asylum procedures.260 This illustrates the true motivation of the adoption of the Asylum Regulation, namely the need to prevent and control illegal migration as much as possible.

The Asylum Regulation can be welcomed for several reasons. First of all, regularizing the status of asylum seekers and refugees from outside Europe was a step forward compared to the previous situation and practices. The Regulation clearly set out what were the rights and obligations of different actors involved in asylum application and the status determination. As a result, the Turkish system has become more transparent compared to past practice. Next to that, improvement has been taking place concerning the principle of non-refoulement. Before the coming into being of the Regulation, the principle of non-refoulement for those immigrants from outside Europe was not so clearly recognized, which led to tensions between the UNHCR and the Turkish authorities dealing with immigration issues. However, article 29 of the 1994 Regulation provides that “a refugee or an asylum seeker who is residing in Turkey legally can only be deported by the Ministry of the Interior within the framework of the 1951 Geneva Convention […] or for reasons of national security and public order”. The new article dealing with deportation should be interpreted as the Turkish acceptance of the applicability of the principle of non-refoulement to those refugees and asylum seekers from outside Europe.261 However, there are also more critical views on the adoption and the implementation of the 1994 Regulation. One practical problem the 1994 Regulation brought with it was the five-day deadline for filing an asylum request with the Turkish 258

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 302-303.

259 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 86.

260 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 86.

261 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 303.

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authorities. The five-day limit was simply too short for most asylum seekers, as to file a request they had to return to border regions in Eastern Turkey, where they initially entered Turkey. Some Turkish government officials even went so far as to recognize that the five-day limit “does provide a convenient excuse for rejecting cases and deporting people”.262 Moreover, missing the deadline meant that some asylum seekers chose to disappear into illegality.263 There seems to be some truth in this argument, when the statistics shown in table 3 below are considered.

Table 3 on the next page shows various statistics concerning the applications that have been lodged since the implementation of the 1994 Regulation up until March 1996. Because of the relatively low total number of asylum applications264 (2,231) lodged under the 1994 Regulation between November 1994 and March 1996, the five day time limit must have played a crucial role. As argued by Kirisci, the reason for this low figure could also be found in the fact that an unknown number of people did not formally approach the Turkish police because of fear of being deported.265 Five years after the introduction of the Regulation, the Turkish government decided to increase the five-day time limit for lodging an asylum application to ten days, resulting in a concrete improvement of the access to asylum procedures.266

262

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 304.

263 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 304.

264 Currently the new asylum system handles some 4,000-4,500 asylum applications per year.

265 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 307-308.

266 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 87.

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Table 3: Statistics concerning applications under the 1994 Regulation by 20 March 1996267 Another often expressed complaint is that the Turkish police has not always been well informed about the Regulation. The police lacked, particularly in the first few years after the Regulation was introduced, general expertise concerning status determination, a task that was previously carried out by the UNCHR.268 However, from 1997 onwards, the close cooperation between Turkish authorities and the UNCHR was reestablished. A new arrangement provided for close cooperation on asylum status determination and training of officials in asylum law. The current responsibilities of the UNCHR are now status determination, helping refugees register with the Turkish police, and finding a resettlement country for the recognized refugees who are granted temporarily asylum in Turkey. On their part, the Turkish government grants UNCHRrecognized refugees temporary asylum and is responsible for the issuing of residence permits.269 In the past, this was a rather smooth process, but the UNCHR is now Country

Applications

Accepted

Rejected

Pending

Cases not

Iraq Iran Afghanistan Uzbekistan China Sudan Egypt Others Total

1.286 796 13 14 5 2 1 14 2.231

cases 100 287 1 1 4 393

cases 748 137 4 1 6 896

cases 248 218 6 1 4 477

assessed 79 102 12 8 1 201

increasingly confronted with the growing restrictions on immigration of Western European countries. In a way, these restrictions make the efforts of the UNCHR extremely difficult, as many countries take a restrictive stance in accepting refugees.270 According to Kirisci, Turkey views this practice as evidence that the international community, more specifically Western European states, are not prepared for burden267

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 308.

268 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 304-305.

269 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 87.

270 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 307.

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sharing with Turkey. In the perception of Turkish officials, this reinforces their belief that Western European governments see Turkey as “a protective buffer zone against people wanting to reach the West”.271 In more recent times, between 1995 and 2004, Turkish authorities received more than 35,000 asylum applications, which comes down to 4,000 to 4,500 requests annually. Of these applications, more than 17,800 cases have been accepted and the respective immigrants were granted temporary asylum. However, due to the geographical limitation Turkey still maintains, Turkey and the UNCHR resettled nearly 17,400 asylum seekers in third countries. In most cases, these asylum seekers were resettled to Scandinavian countries, Australia, New Zealand or North America.272 3.8 The role of illegal migration In the previous section, it was made clear that illegal migration frequently occurs in Turkey. With the adoption of the 1994 Regulation, Turkey hoped to regain control in managing migration movements into its territory. In this context, particular concern was expressed regarding the increasing number of illegal immigrants, not in the least place because EU member states expressed their dissatisfaction with the rising numbers of illegal immigrants reaching their terrirorities in the 1990s. Many migrants go underground and disappear into illegality because of rejected asylum applications or out of fear of being deported to their country of origin. In any case, this makes illegal migration part of the Turkish migration developments and as such highly relevant in the context of this research.

According to Içduygu, we can divide the Turkish irregular migration273 experience into four different episodes, reflecting not only changes in the characteristics of the migrants and of a particular migratory flow, but also changes in Turkey’s migration policies and practices.274 In the first period, which lasted from 1979 to 1987, irregular migration occurred mainly as a result of the mass influx of Iranians that fled Iran following the regime change in 1979. Içduygu calls this first period the fertilization period, because irregular migration was then a rather new phenomenon and of little 271

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 309.

272 Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey: Challenges of Harmonizing Immigration Policies with the EU”, 2 – 3.

273 Irregular migration movements in Turkey comprise three overlapping types of migrants: 1) refugees and asylum seekers; 2) transit migrants; 3) illegal labour migrants.

274 Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, Project Muse, 90.

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significance, since most of the Iranians were resettled into third countries and stayed only temporarily in Turkey. In the second period from 1988 to 1993, Turkey was confronted with mass influxes of asylum seekers from Iraq and Bulgaria and, since the end of the Cold War, also increasing numbers of economically motivated migrants from former Soviet republics (the maturation period). During the third period, lasting from 1994 to 2000/2001, irregular migration into Turkey accelerated sharply and more migrants drifted into irregularity as a result of overstaying and remaining in Turkey illegally.275 This period can be characterised as the saturation period of Turkish irregular migration, because the Turkish government took a more active and targeted policy towards migration; the 1994 Regulation on Asylum is illustrative for this change in policy. The fourth period, lasting from 2001 onwards, reflects a period of degeneration of irregular migration in Turkey. Turkey continued its active and restrictive policies resulting in a declining trend of migration flows.276 The active policies seem to work in the sense that since 1995 the number of illegal immigrants arrested by Turkish authorities has increased, peaking in 2000 with a total number of 94,514. Since 2001, the numbers of illegal immigrants apprehended by Turkish security forces are declining. In 2004, a number of 61,228 illegal migrants were arrested, a net decline of 33,000 arrests in comparison with 2000.277 As official statistics cannot provide the magnitude of the total number of irregular migrants, it is impossible to prove that the declining trend in arrests means less irregular migrants since it is impossible to say anything meaningful about the number of migrants that avoid apprehension.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that there are still some 200,000 migrants using Turkey as a transit route each year.278 A significant number of these migrants try to make it to Greece while transiting through Turkey. An article published in NRC Next reports on the illegal boat refugees landing on islands off the coast of Greece.279 Some of these illegal migrants, in particular those from Somalia, pay around 10,000 euros for their trip. The article specifically tells about the experience of Agathonissi, which is a small Greece island in the northern Aegan Sea. With a 275

Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, 90.

276 Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, 91.

277 Pierre Hecker, “Focus Migration: Country Profile Turkey”, 5.

278 Pierre Hecker, “Focus Migration: Country Profile Turkey”, 6.

279 NRC Next, “Agathonissi is de vele illegalen zat”, 10 June 2009, 6-7.

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population of some 110 inhabitants, the people of Agathonissi saw some 6,500 illegal immigrants arrive on their island in 2008. Many of these immigrants come from Palestine, Somalia, Sudan or Afghanistan. The arrival of these immigrants is a relatively new phenomenon for the Greek island inhabitants as the first immigrants started to arrive only in 2004.

According to Loukas Tsoukalis, approximately 150,000 illegal immigrants reached the European Union via Greece. In the last five years, a total of 70,780 migrants arrived in Greece. As a transit country, Turkey also facilitates migration to Greece and thus to the lands of the European Union. Although it is difficult to prove, Turks could, as suggested in the newspaper article, direct illegal immigrants to Greek islands, like Agathonossi, with the advice to let their ships run aground or sink, creating in this way an obligation for the Greek coast guards to provide help.280 There may be an element of truth in this argument, particularly given the frustration of Turkish immigration officials who have to stem irregular transit migration in the framework of Turkey’s EU accession and have to respect the rights of asylum seekers and refugees at a time when EU member states keep their borders closed for economically motivated immigrants.281 3.8.1 Explanatory factors of illegal migration In tracing the factors that shape irregular migratory movements to Turkey, we can distinguish four main ones.282 The first factor relates to Turkey’s geographical location between East and West and between South and North bordering in total eight other states. This attracts many people to transit through Turkey illegally in the hope to reach Western countries. The second factor is closely connected to the previous one. Given the fact that many EU member states put in place restrictive immigration policies with increasing immigration border controls around the external borders of the EU, immigrants end up in Turkey as the peripheral buffer zone around the European Union.

Içduygu argues in this respect that “the policies of ‘Fortress Europe’ have diverted the Europe-targeted immigration flows to the peripheral zones around Europe, like Turkey”.283 The third factor deals with Turkey’s relative economic success and prosperity. In its direct neighbourhood, this is seen as a magnet for those seeking a 280

NRC Next, “Agathonissi is de vele illegalen zat”, 10 June 2009, 6-7.

Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey: Challenges of Harmonizing Immigration Policies with the EU”, 5.

282 Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, 89.

283 Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, 90.

281

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better life. Lastly, the fourth factor is more general in the sense that given the relative instability in the region as a result of ongoing political turmoil, people are forced to migrate escaping persecution and hoping to live their lives elsewhere in a more secure environment.284 Because of statistical data obtained from the Foreigners Department of the Turkish Ministry of Interior we can identify where illegal immigrants come from. It must be emphasized that these conclusions are drawn on the basis of those illegal immigrants who have been arrested by the Turkish security forces. Table 4 gives a breakdown of illegal immigrants who have been apprehended by the Turkish police between 1995 and 2001.

Table 4: Breakdown of Illegal Immigrants arrested by Turkish security forces between 1995 and 2001 by nationality285 Nationality

Number of people

Afghanistan

22,017

Bangladesh

9,062

Pakistan

15,754

Iran

17,714

Iraq

73,045

Syria

3,741

Former Soviet Republics (Russia, Ukraine,

58,072

Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia) Bulgaria

4,812

Romania

13,001

Turkey

10,678

Other

94,543

Total

322,439

In the above table, two types of illegal migrants are covered. The first category includes those who overstay their visas in Turkey and those who are arrested because of working illegally in Turkey. These are mostly Romanians and migrants from the former Soviet Republics. The second category which is covered in these statistics are illegal transit migrants, of which the majority (who have been arrested) are from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Those migrants from Iraq are mostly Kurds, though not 284

Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, 89-90.

285 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 94.

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exclusively. Small numbers of Turkmen and Arabs from Iraqi soil have been arrested as well because of illegal residence in Turkey. The political instability in Iraq and the severe economic situation are the main driving forces for these people to enter Turkey illegally.286 Since 2004, the main countries of origin for those apprehended did not change so much in comparison with the situation between 1995 and 2001. The main countries of origin were: Pakistan, Iraq, Moldova, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mauritania, Ukraine, Russia and Iran. The only exception is that by now, two African countries have made it into the top ranking, namely Somalia and Mauritania. This is not entirely unsurprising since Turkey has found itself confronted with more and more asylum seekers from the African continent since 2000, especially from Algeria, Kenya, Somalia, and Nigeria.287 3.9 Turkish Visa Policy and Practice Turkish visa policy and practice is generally referred to as a relative liberal and a very flexible one.288 However, it can also be stated that this policy is rather complex and is largely influenced by past experiences of Turkish migration policies. The current visa policy brings particular advantages for Turkey, both politically as well as economically.

In addition, opportunities are created for Turkey’s neighbouring countries as well as for people that want to enter Turkey only temporarily. At the same time, there is also a downside to this liberal visa policy and practice. The negative consequences of the visa policy have become especially visible in the light of the current accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU. The EU has called for the introduction of stricter rules governing entry into Turkey. In this context, Turkey has to adopt the Schengen visa system and fight illegal migration.

3.9.1 Foundations of Turkish visa policy The foundations of the current Turkish visa policy can be found in the Cold War years and are largely shaped by Turgut Özal, a former Prime Minister and President of Turkey. In fact, Turgut Özal lifted the visa requirement for Greek nationals in 1988.289 286

Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 94.

287 Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, 92.

288 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, European Journal of Migration and Law, no. 7 (2005): 350.

289 Kemal Kirişci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 351-352.

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From 1964 onwards, which is when Greek-Turkish relations deteriorated as a result of the conflict over Cyprus, the visa free travel privileges had been rescinded. Before 1964, Greek citizens could travel and reside to Turkey without restrictions on the basis of a treaty between the two countries from 1930. On the one hand, Özal was of the opinion that the lifting of the visa restrictions would result in economic advantages as more Greeks could travel to Turkey. On the other hand, Özal believed that visa free travel could help improve understanding between the peoples of both countries just at a time when diplomatic relations were almost non-existent given the wide range of conflicts.290 According to statistics compiled from data from the Foreigners Department of the Turkish Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Turkish Statistical Institute, it can be concluded that the number of Greeks that started to enter Turkey increased rapidly from the 1970s onwards. In 1970, 11,313 Greek persons entered Turkey while this number had risen to 19,477 Greek persons in 1980. The growing continued in 1990, when 203,720 Greece nationals arrived in Turkey using the visa free travel system. From the late 1990s onwards, the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece started off resulting in a massive increase of Greek entries. From 1996 to 2004, this number rose from 147,553 to 460,019 persons.291 It should be stressed that, according to Kirisci, the Turkish liberal visa policy was a crucial element for sustaining the rapprochement between the two neighbouring countries. According to Kirisci, this should be seen as a “peace building” effect of the Turkish visa policy.292 This effect became especially visible as a result of the growing number of inter-societal relations between Greek and Turkish civil society organizations, academics, students etc. So the visa practice led to increased interaction, dialogue, cooperation and improved understanding, which can be considered as favorable elements for the rapprochement of both countries.293 Not only Greek nationals enjoyed visa-free travel privileges. Turkey had made visa arrangements with other states too, especially in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Romania was one of the countries with which Turkey had signed a visa290

Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 352.

291 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 355. See in particular Table 2: Entry of Persons from Neighbouring Balkan and Middle Eastern Studies, 1964-2004.

292 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 356.

293 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 357.

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free travel agreement. The agreement was signed in 1968 and remained in effect until 2004. As part of the pre-accession obligations to the EU, Romania was required to impose visa requirements on Turkish nationals marking the end of the visa-free travel period.294 In line with Özal’s objective to expand Turkey’s relations with the Middle East, Turkey signed a visa-free travel with Iran in 1964. Initially, the numbers were relatively modest but after the regime change in Iran, this started to change.295 It led to an explosive increase in the number of Iranian people, mostly regime opponents, entering Turkey throughout the 1980s and 1990s.296 Kirsci concludes that those Iranians living in the border regions used Turkish liberal visa policy mainly for border trade purposes and that only a small number of this group has become illegal immigrants while they overstayed their visas. So quite many Iranians benefited from the Turkish visa policy. 297 However, a significant proportion of the Iranians also used the Turkish visa free travel agreement as a means to seek asylum in Turkey or to get themselves registered as refugee resulting in resettlement in third countries. More recently, Turkey is considered an attractive tourist destination for the Iranian middle-class. In the period 2000 – 2004, some 1,500,000 Iranians visited Turkey under the visa-free travel regime of which only less than 3,000 were arrested for violating the terms of their stay.298 3.9.2 Turkish visa policy as peace building The idea of a greater role in the Middle East region for Turkey was further expressed by the so-called ‘peace pipeline’ which was designed to carry water from Turkey across the Middle East.299 In economic terms, trade between Turkey and the Middle East was stimulated and foreign direct investments of Middle East countries in Turkey expanded.

Turkey also extended its visa policy to Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, hoping for further investments and tourist flows to Turkey. In this way, business contacts and 294

Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 351.

295 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 351.

296 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 355. See in particular Table 2: Entry of Persons from Neighbouring Balkan and Middle Eastern Studies, 1964-2004.

297 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 351.

298 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 351.

299 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 352.

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investments were largely facilitated and encouraged by Turkey’s flexible visa policy. 300 Overall, Turkey seems to be rather successful in creating revenues from tourism, because in 2004 alone more than 16 million foreign nationals entered Turkey, the vast majority of them being tourists. Nearly 6 million of this total were tourists who arrived, in most cases on the sticker visa arrangement, from the former Soviet republics, Balkan, and Middle Eastern states. The Russian tourists are of particular relevance for Turkey’s economy since Russians form the second largest group of tourists entering the country and can be generally considered as ‘high-spenders’. With these revenues from tourism, Turkey can cover a part of its foreign trade deficit.301 Apart from the necessity to generate income from foreign currencies, tourism is an important aspect of the legacy of Turgut Özal. Özal’s idea was to increase the contact among countries in Turkey’s neighbourhood of which the Black Sea region was an important one. Since the Cold War had prevented these kinds of contacts between people of neighbouring countries Özal hoped that from the late 1980s onwards, regional cooperation would increase resulting in more tourism and cultural exchanges, increased trade and commerce, but also cooperation on environmental matters.302 It is before this background that the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Area (BSEC)303 was established.

The BSEC should really be seen as a “multilateral political and economic initiative aimed at fostering interaction and harmony among the Member States, as well as to ensure peace, stability and prosperity encouraging friendly and good-neighbourly relations in the Black Sea region”.304 The BSEC is in the interest of the EU because the Black Sea region is becoming Europe’s major transport and energy transfer corridor and constitutes the second-largest source of oil and natural gas.305 To sustain friendly and

300

Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 353.

301 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 354.

302 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 355-356.

303 On 25 June 1992, the Heads of State and Government of eleven countries, namely Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed in Istanbul the Summit Declaration and the Bosporus Statement giving birth to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).

304 Material adapted from the Web Page of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Available at http://www.bsec-organization.org/Information/Pages/testt.aspx (last accessed July 29th, 2009).

305 Material adapted from the Web Page of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Available at http://www.bsec-organization.org/Information/Pages/testt.aspx (last accessed July 29th, 2009).

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good-neighbourly relations in the Black Sea region, the member states adopted the idea of the “sticker visa” practice.

This specific visa practice was implemented to facilitate the movement of people from the BSEC member states into Turkey. Under the sticker visa practice, visas are issued at the border gates when the sticker visa fee is paid. Although fees for the sticker visa vary from country to country, the amount is usually around US$ 10 for nationals of the Balkan countries, the former Soviet Union, and some Eastern European countries.

Further differentiation is made in the length of time. Sticker visas can be issued for a period of up to 3 months, 1 month or 15 days, varying from country to country.306 Since the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, Turkey extended this practice to a group of new states in the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as to Russia. The easy access into Turkey was something totally new for many people who had been not only ideologically separated, but also physically. During the years of the Cold War, contacts between Turkey and the former Soviet republics were basically non-existent. However from 1990 onwards, the year in which the sticker visa was introduced, contacts with the former Soviet republics as well as with Russia increased significantly. 307 Whereas in 1990 the total number of entries from the Soviet Union and former Soviet Republics was 222,537, the number had risen to 1,6 million entries308 in 1996. Subsequently, the number of entries further increased and reached a total of 2.7 million entries from the ex-Soviet states, including Russia, in 2004. When we add the entries from excommunist Balkan countries and Greece as well as the entries from the Middle East countries, that totals 6,1 million entries out of a total of approximately 16 million overall entries.309 3.9.3 Economic and political impact of Turkish visa policy The introduction of the sticker visa arrangement had economic and political consequences. During the course of the 1990s, easy access led to the development of a

306

Turkan Ertuna, “Shaping Turkey’s Immigration Policy”, 16.

Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of ‘Soft Power’: The Experience of Turkey”, 356.

308 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of ‘Soft Power’: The Experience of Turkey”, 354. See in particular Table 1 Entry of Persons from the Soviet Union and Former Soviet Republics, 1964 – 2004. This figure includes entries under the sticker visa arrangement from the former Soviet Union/Russia, Central Asian Turkic states, countries of the South Caucasus and the Western Newly Independent States (NIS).

309 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of ‘Soft Power’: The Experience of Turkey”, 356.

307

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rather informal import and export activity, which is generally known as “suitcase trade”.310 Especially nationals of the former Soviet Union and former Soviet Republics311 visited Turkey to sell the contents of their ‘suitcases’, which were full of products. In return, these people bought Turkish consumer goods in Istanbul, the Black Sea port city of Trabzon, and in Van, which is close to the border with Iran. Figures obtained from Eder show that this trade amounted to approximately US$ 4 – 5 billion annually during the early 1990s and peaking in 1995, when an estimated trade volume of US$ 10 billion was registered.312 This kind of trade provided many suitcase traders with some additional income, especially those people who suffered economic difficulties after the unwinding of the Cold War. During the course of the 1990s European concerns about a possible mass migration of East Europeans and Russians to Western Europe grew. According to Turkish officials, it is because of their liberal visa policy and practice that this massive flow of people did not occur. They argue that their visa policy “has kept people from having to join the flow of irregular migration to Europe”.313 Hard evidence that supports this argument is missing but there may be some truth to their claim.

3.9.4 The downside of Turkish visa policy: security and control In an attempt to describe Turkey’s liberal visa policy, we should also address the downside of this policy. As a consequence of the relatively easy access into Turkey, the 1990s saw an explosion of so called “Natasha trade”, prostitution of Russian women.314 The opening up of borders in Eastern Europe and the poverty of the former communist countries led to an enormous migration movement from Eastern to Western Europe. In particular the trafficking in women and migrant prostitution has grown since the fall of the Iron Curtain.315 Turkey in particular became one of the most favorite 310

Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 353.

311 In particular nationals from Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Romania, Moldova and from Central Asian republics.

312 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 353.

313 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 353.

314 Donna M. Hughes, “The "Natasha" Trade - The Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in Women”, in The Shadows: Promoting Prosperity or Undermining Stability? Journal of International Affairs (Spring 2000). Available at: http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/natasha.htm (last accessed July 25th 2009).

315 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. “Migration connected with trafficking in women and prostitution”, Report of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, Rapporteur: Ms Zwerver, Netherlands, SOC, doc no.: 9795 25 April 2003. Available at

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destinations for trafficked women from Ukraine and Russia. Turkey’s popularity must be found in its liberal visa policy and in the fact that so many young women in the former communist bloc were unemployed and suffering from the severe economic situation.316 Faced with security and economic repercussions, Turkey responded with the introduction of new legislation to address prostitution as well as trafficking of women into Turkey.

Related to the problem of prostitution is the phenomenon of illegal employment of especially nationals from Iran, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Armenia.

In an effort to prevent illegal labor in Turkey, the Turkish government introduced the Law on Working Permits for Foreigners, which came into being in September 2003.317 The most important aspect of this law is that “as long as it has not been decided differently in bilateral or multilateral agreements that Turkey is a part to, foreigners are obliged to get permission before they start working independently or dependently in Turkey”.318 The new conditions and procedures for obtaining work permits were accompanied with the possibility to impose serious fines against illegal employment.

A third negative aspect of Turkish visa policy concerns ‘hard core’ security. In the period 2003 – 2009, several terrorist attacks were carried out, most of them in Istanbul and Ankara. The terrorist attacks reminded Turkey of the downside of its flexible visa policy and border controls.319 In the case of the November 2003 Istanbul bombings, where 57 people died and around 700 were injured, police investigations revealed that the perpetrators were linked to al-Qaeda.320 More recently, Turkey has been suffering terrorist attacks that have been carried out by a group calling itself TAK (Liberation Falcons of Kurdistan). This group is responsible for the explosion of five bombs in 24 hours in Istanbul, Marmaris and Antalya (popular tourists destinations) resulting in the death of three people and many injured people, of which many were tourists.321 The possibility of terrorist attacks in Turkey remains high given the many terrorist attacks and failed attempts that have been registered. The latest serious attack http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc03/edoc9795.htm (last accessed July 26th 2009).

316 Margot Hornblower Paris, “The Skin Trade”, Time Web Page, published on June 24th, 2001. Available online at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,161939,00.html (last accessed on July 26 th, 2009).

317 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 358.

318 Turkan Ertuna, “Shaping Turkey’s Immigration Policy”, 17.

319 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 358.

320 BBC News Web Page. “Istanbul rocked by double bombing”, BBC News Europe. Published on November 11th, 2003 Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3222608.stm (last accessed July 28th, 2009).

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was carried out in Istanbul on July 9, 2008. The terrorist attack was targeted at the Turkish police guarding the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul. As a result of this attack, three police officers were killed and two other police personnel were injured.

Although responsibility for this specific attack has not been claimed by or assigned to a specific terrorist group, it illustrates the internal security problem quite well.322 In fact, it questions the flexible visa policy and border controls in so far as the police found out that the perpetrators of these attacks had frequently travelled to Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia, and in that way, had enjoyed relatively easy access into Turkey. 323 However, as put forward by Kirisci, we should see all this in its ‘proper context’ since it is only a relatively small number of people out of the millions that enter Turkey each year who violate Turkish law and as a consequence undermine national security. 324

3.10 Concluding remarks To conclude this third chapter, we have seen that the origins of Turkey’s migration policy are largely shaped by several major developments since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The legal documents which regulate migration into Turkey are very much guided by the concept of national identity and the principle of cultural unity (the ideal of a uniform and homogeneous population). The 1934 Law on Settlement (Law 2510) and the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees illustrate this well.325 Since the end of the Cold War, however, Turkey is experiencing new forms of migration, most notably transit migration, illegal migration and growing numbers of asylum seekers who come increasingly from non-European countries.326 Traditionally, refugee movements involved mainly migration from the Balkans. The mass influx of Iranians as a result of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 can be considered as a turning 321

Justus Leicht, “What lies behind the terrorist attacks in Turkey?”, World Socialist Web Site, published by the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI) on September 7th, 2006. Available at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/sep2006/turk-s07.shtml (last accessed July 28th, 2009).

322 U.S. Department of State. Turkey: Country Specific Information. Available online at: http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1046.html (last accessed July 29th, 2009).

323 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 358.

324 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 358.

325 Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, Ankara Review of European Studies, Vol. 5 no. 3 (2006): 126.

326 Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, 126.

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point, because from then on, more and more migrants from the Middle-East region and from Africa started to come to Turkey.

The arrival of all these new immigrants, and especially the mass influx of almost half a million Kurdish Iraqis in 1990-1991 following the Gulf crisis, made Turkish authorities feel that migration movements were getting beyond their control and would turn Turkey into a country of first asylum. Turkey responded with the 1994 Regulation on Asylum in order to control (illegal) migration movements better.327 Whether this new piece of legislation was indeed effective is questionable, given the fact that irregular migration between 1994 and 2001 accelerated sharply and an increasing number of migrants became illegal while they overstayed their visa.

Turkish visa policy is another area in which the Turkish past remains alive.

Initially, this policy was introduced with the objective to expand Turkey’s relations with the Middle East region. Subsequently, quite many neighbouring nationals benefited from this relatively liberal visa policy. However, Turkey itself profited, too; for example business contacts and investments were largely facilitated and encouraged by Turkey’s flexible visa policy.328 However, the most important objective still is to increase the contacts among countries in Turkey’s neighbourhood, of which the Black Sea region forms an important part. Since the Cold War had prevented these kinds of contacts between people of neighbouring countries, it was hoped that from the late 1980s onwards, regional cooperation would increase.

Although the Turkish visa policy had been is criticized in the past because it was feared to lead to a massive flow of illegal immigrants to Europe, Turkish government officials claim that precisely because of the Turkish liberal visa policy, this massive flow of people never occurred.329 Hard evidence that supports this argument is missing, but there may some truth in it. There are, however, also some negative consequences of the relatively easy access into Turkey, for instance the explosion of so called “Natasha trade”, prostitution of Russian women in the 1990s.330 Another negative consequence of Turkish visa policy concerns ‘hard core’ security. In the period 2003 – 2009, several terrorist attacks have been carried out, most of them in Istanbul and Ankara.

327

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 299.

328 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 353.

329 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 353.

330 Donna M. Hughes, “The "Natasha" Trade - The Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in Women”.

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In the next chapter, chapter 4, I will elaborate on the remaining incompatibilities between EU expectations and Turkish migration law and practises. Firstly, I will give a short overview of the present situation. Secondly, I will describe what Turkey needs to do in each area according to the EU and I will analyse the strengths and weaknesses of Turkish migration policies. Lastly, I will address and evaluate Turkey’s dilemmas in meeting EU requirements.

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Chapter 4| Incompatibilities with EU Policy in Turkish Migration Law and Practises and Dilemmas in Meeting EU Requirements 4.1 Introduction Throughout this chapter, the remaining incompatibilities between EU expectations and Turkish migration law and practises and Turkey’s dilemmas in meeting the requirements of the EU are discussed. Furthermore, I will describe what Turkey, according to the EU, needs to undertake in the policy area of migration. To this end, the chapter will first review the Accession Partnership and the adoption of the acquis. The chapter continues with an evaluation of Turkish visa policy, paying special attention to the limited progress that has been made and the consequences for Turkey of implementing the EU acquis in this field. After the visa policy, the issue of protecting the external borders and the fight against illegal migration will be analyzed; here a connection with securitization and with Marchetti’s semi-periphery logic will be made.

This will be followed by an evaluation of the progress in the area of asylum legislation, where the geographical limitation will be a major point on the agenda. Lastly, the more general dilemmas and consequences of the process of EU enlargement are discussed, in which one of the explanations for the slow process on the part of Turkey can be found.

Overall, this chapter will try to show the current strengths and weaknesses of the Turkish migration regime as viewed from the perspective of the EU. In that sense, the chapter forms a kind of balance sheet.

4.2 Accession Partnership and the adoption of the acquis In the previous chapter, it was explained that Turkey’s migration policies have been largely shaped by several major developments since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The legal documents regulating migration are still very much guided by the concept of national identity and the principle of cultural unity. The most important legal provisions regulating migration are the 1934 Law on Settlement (Law 2510), the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, and the 1994 Regulation on Asylum.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey is experiencing new forms of migration, especially transit migration, illegal migration, and increased asylum seekers from more diverse non-European countries. Additionally, Turkish migration law is now affected by the process of accession to the European (EU). In fact, after the Helsinki European 91

Council (December 1999) had welcomed the positive developments in Turkey and recognized Turkey’s official candidacy for EU accession, the EU got more involved and gained more leverage over Turkish migration policies.331 An integral part of the pre-accession strategy is formed by the Accession Partnership Document, which was drafted by the European Commission and adopted on 8 March 2001 and has since been revised three times (in 2003, 2006 and 2008). The revisions are necessary every time Turkey progresses and continues its efforts to prepare for EU accession.332 The objective of the Accession Partnership is “to incorporate in a single legal framework” 1. the priorities for reform with a view to preparing for accession; 2. guidelines for financial assistance for action in these priority areas; and 3. the principles and conditions governing implementation of the Partnership.333 The Accession Partnership Document (APD) stipulates, among other things, the objectives for migration and asylum policy concerning Turkey’s accession to the EU. As such, the APD provides Turkey with guidance in its preparations for accession.

Concerning chapter 24, Justice, freedom and security, the APD of 2008 lists the following priorities: •

Continue to strengthen all law enforcement institutions and align their status and functioning with European standards, including through developing inter-agency cooperation. Adopt a code of ethics and establish an independent and effective complaints system to ensure greater accountability covering all law enforcement bodies,

•

continue efforts to implement the National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration (including through the adoption of a roadmap), increase capacity to combat illegal migration in line with international standards,

331

Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, Ankara Review of European Studies, Vol. 5 no. 3 (2006): 126.

332 Europawebsite, “Partnership for the accession of Turkey”, Summaries of EU legislation. Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/e40111_en.htm (last accessed August 1st 2009).

333 Europawebsite, “Partnership for the accession of Turkey”, Summaries of EU legislation. Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/e40111_en.htm (last accessed August 1st 2009).

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•

conclude urgently a readmission agreement with the EU,

•

make progress in the preparations for the adoption of a comprehensive asylum law in line with the acquis including the establishment of an asylum authority,

•

continue efforts to implement the National Action Plan on integrated border management including through the definition of a precise road map. Steps should be taken to establish the new border law enforcement authority,

•

implement the national strategy on organised crime. Strengthen the fight against organised crime, drugs, trafficking in persons, fraud, corruption and money-laundering.334 To implement the Accession Partnership priorities, Turkey needed to develop a

plan including a timetable. To this end, Turkey published its National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis335 listing in a detailed manner the measures undertaken on asylum and migration issues, including a comprehensive legislative reform. It soon turned out that some of the rather ambitious plans mentioned in the National Programme had to be revised in a more detailed document called the National Action Plan for Asylum and Migration.336 This Action Plan was adopted in March 2005 and can still be considered an ‘ambitious document,’ since the document contains an overview of the current legal practice but also mid-term and long-term goals, among others the Law on Asylum and the Law on Aliens that need to be implemented by the year 2012.337 The Turkish government sees the year 2012 as a deadline for the lifting of the ‘geographical limitation’, which Turkey until now has persistently refused. This has led 334

Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/ EC, 2008/157/EC (L51/4) 26/02/2008. Available at: http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Apd/turkey_apd_2008.pdf (last accessed August 23, 2009).

335 Official Journal of the Republic of Turkey No. 25178 bis, of 24 July 2003. Available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/NPAA/up.htm (last accessed August 1st 2009).

336 The National Action Plan including all relevant legislation can be found in Asylum and Migration Legislation, published as a result of cooperation between the Turkish Ministry of the Interior and UNHCR Turkey as a part of the EU Twinning Project on Asylum and Migration (TR02-JH-03: Support for the Development of an Action Plan to Implement Turkey’s Asylum and Migration Strategy, with the partners Denmark and the United Kingdom), February 2005, pp. 1-63. Available at http://www.unchr.org.tr and http://www.egm.gov.tr (last accessed August 1st, 2009).

337 Lami Bertan Tokuzlu,. “Migration Law in Turkey”, Analytic and Synthetic Notes – Legal Module CARIM-AS 2007/1, Bilgi University, Faculty of Law, Istanbul, Turkey in the context of Cooperation project on the social integration of immigrants, migration, and the movement of persons (MEDA Programme) (2007): 2.

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to intense criticism from various western governments as well as refugee advocacy and human rights groups, while Turkey still only grants the rights of asylum to immigrants with European origins.338 In particular, the EU has criticized this behaviour on several occasions and wishes the lifting of this limitation as soon as possible.339 The adoption of all these legal changes will not only bring Turkey’s national legislation into line with the acquis but it will also create a much more efficient framework for regulating asylum and migration issues, which have until now been regulated by different pieces of legislation.340 4.3 Turkish visa policy In the following paragraphs I will address the remaining incompatibilities with the EU acquis in Turkish visa policies and practises.

4.3.1 EU requirements and current practice Since the Accession Partnership Document (APD) of 2003 called for the alignment of Turkey’s “visa legislation and practice with the EU legislation in the medium term”, Turkey has started to focus its attention on efforts towards harmonisation. Previously, Turkey had been very busy with meeting the Copenhagen political criteria by implementing several reform packages. This resulted in a positive development and marked an important step in the EU-Turkey relations, as the European Council welcomed the decisive progress made by Turkey in its far-reaching reform process and expressed its confidence that Turkey will sustain that process of reform […] It invited the Commission to present […] a framework for negotiations with Turkey […] with a view to opening negotiations on 3 October 2005.341 Kirisçi reveals that, since the prospect of membership negotiations became real, Turkish government officials have become increasingly committed to their tasks, even if 338

Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, 124.

339 Turkan Ertuna, “Shaping Turkey’s Immigration Policy”, Research paper presented at the ISA Panel Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: Ideas, Identities and Institutions (Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2007): 23.

340 Lami Bertan Tokuzlu, “Migration Law in Turkey”, 2.

341 European Commission, Enlargement Newsletter (Brussels, 21 December 2004): 6.

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they doubt the EU’s credibility occasionally. 342 Many Turkish government officials view the introduction of the new measures required by the EU as something positive and as a real improvement concerning border control and security. To quote an anonymous Turkish government official in this respect: “The adoption of the EU negative list and abolition of the ‘sticker visa’ arrangement will make Turkey a more ‘serious’ state capable of truly regulating the flow of people in and out the country”. 343 However, before this is accomplished, Turkey needs to further harmonize its legislation and practices with those of the EU. Although Turkey introduced visa requirements for a number of countries and is in the process of harmonizing with the EU’s visa list, inconsistency between the EU’s negative visa list and that of Turkey still exists. This negative visa list is part of the EU’s common visa policy and provides a common list of third countries whose nationals are required to obtain visas to enter the Schengen territory. Turkey, as a future EU member, is thus obliged to abolish the visafree travel for those countries that are on the EU’s negative visa list, and this is precisely where the difficulty for Turkey arises. The majority of the negative visa list is already harmonized. However, Turkey still needs to include countries such as Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan on the negative visa list. Because Turkey has not put in place visa restrictions for these nationals, they can enter Turkey with solely a valid passport. They are not required to obtain a visa and, consequently, these nationals can travel on to the EU, which is the very reason why the EU is exerting pressure on Turkey.344 A second problem is that Turkey has an agreement with 31 countries that allows citizens of those countries to enter Turkey by buying a “sticker visa” at the airport, maritime port, or border-crossing point. This sticker visa practice is heavily criticized by the EU; it sees this practice “as one that seriously undermines effective border control”.345 Instead of sticker- and stamp-type visas, the EU calls for the adoption of a visa-free regime for those 31 countries or the introduction of issuing visas from Turkish representations in the country of origin.

342

Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, European Journal of Migration and Law, no. 7 (2005): 348.

343 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 349 (quotation of an anonymous Turkish government official).

344 Europawebsite, “Turkey : adoption of the community acquis”, Summaries of EU legislation. Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/community_acquis_turkey/e22 113_en.htm (last accessed August 2nd 2009).

345 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 348-349.

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Next to that, the EU requires the introduction of airport transit visa practice and expects Turkey to renew its passports by introducing biometrical features and making the new Turkish passports compatible with EU standards.346 As Turkey has experienced an increasing threat of identity fraud, the security features in passports were given priority, with the result that the new biometric Turkish passport will be released on January 1st, 2010. According to the 2008 Progress Report on Turkey, in 2007, 493 documents were identified as false and falsified, compared with 469 in 2006. The slight increase in the detection rate for forged documents may be the result of an EU sponsored training, which was given to 200 staff members of the Turkish customs in 2007.347 Lastly, the EU calls for the enhancement of the capacity of Turkish consulates to check for possible falsified documents.348 4.3.2 Limited progress on harmonizing visa policy However, overall, the 2008 Progress Report on Turkey states that no meaningful progress was made on visa policy. The report states that sticker- and stamp-type visas are still issued at the Turkish border and that there is no development on alignment with EU visa lists. Furthermore, the report mentions that there are still several countries that are on the EU’s negative visa list whose citizens can enter into Turkey without a visa.349 Other EU sources, however, admit that there has been limited progress regarding the alignment of visa policy with the EU legislation. In these cases, the progress has come about thanks to the new instructions issued to the Turkish consular and border authorities.350 To explain why the progress on visa policy is so marginal we need to address, on the one hand, some of the pragmatic concerns regarding Turkey’s alignment with the Schengen visa regime and, on the other hand, the current Turkish visa policies and 346

Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 348-349.

347 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72-73.

348 Europawebsite, “Turkey : adoption of the community acquis”, Summaries of EU legislation. Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/community_acquis_turkey/e22 113_en.htm (last accessed August 2nd, 2009).

349 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72-73.

350 Europawebsite, “Turkey : adoption of the community acquis”, Summaries of EU legislation. Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/community_acquis_turkey/e22 113_en.htm (last accessed August 2nd, 2009).

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practices. The rather liberal visa policy of Turkey allowed millions of nationals of neighbouring countries to enter the country relatively freely. It is feared that alignment with the EU’s visa system risks bringing this practice to an end, since candidate countries for EU membership are expected to “accept the Schengen Acquis in full” before accession can take place.351 Kirisci foresees that “there might arise a net cultural, economic, and social loss, as it may resemble the Cold War days when the movement of people between Turkey and these countries was absolutely minimal”.352 Certainly, Kirisçi touches upon a relevant point, as Turkey’s liberal visa policy and practice contributed to rich and important cultural, commercial, social, and political exchanges, in particularly since the end of the Cold War. In this context, Turkey seems reluctant to end these visa free arrangements and is far from enthusiastic about introducing EU visa requirements for its neighbouring countries or countries with which Turkey has close cultural ties.353 Turkey forms no exception in so far as most of the former candidate countries had serious difficulties with implementing EU visa policies as well as with other migration issues subject to alignment. Poland, one of the countries that joined the EU in 2004, is a prime example.354 Like Turkey, Poland was also required to align with the EU visa regime and was confronted with strict visa requirements for countries with which it had close relations, particularly those countries where Polish minorities were situated.

Academics and officials argued that the adoption of the Schengen acquis would lead to a “fortress Europe”. The Ukrainian President Kuchma said in this respect that “the EU is replacing the Iron Curtain with a paper one”, referring to another form of separation in Europe as a direct result of the tension between the Europeanization of domestic politics (the exporting of the acquis) and domestic interests of the candidate country visà-vis neighbouring countries.355 Although the EU seemed to have picked up on this problem following a recommendation of the Enlargement Reflection Group, which stressed that “these practises do not take into account the specific needs and interests of the new members in maintaining their existing links with their eastern neighbours,” 351

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 375.

352 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 377.

353 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 345.

354 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 376.

355 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 376.

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Turkey is facing a similar challenge given the fact that the introduction of visa requirements and tight border controls for countries with which Turkey has close and warm relations might create negative consequences for Turkey.356 4.3.3 Negative externalities of alignment with the EU’s visa regime Firstly, cross-border trade and regional bilateral relations might be negatively affected by the introduction of the EU visa requirements and tight border controls. In particularly, the so-called ‘suitcase trade’ might be harmed and decrease significantly in volume, as traders will no longer have the current relatively easy access in and out of Turkey. Secondly, As in the case of Poland, Turkish minorities living in border areas will experience a more restrictive attitude of customs officials. Thirdly, if entries into Turkey are made more difficult, this could result in deterioration in tourism as well.357 This situation also applies to business relations, especially in the cases of travel from Russia, Ukraine and Iran.358 All in all, the fear and expectation of the strict application of the EU visa regime is that it may result in a significant fall in the number of people coming to Turkey. This loss is not only measured in the context of a decrease in transsocietal relations but seems most of all measured in economic terms and is especially a hot topic since Turkey does not expect to receive the same kind of financial support compared with other candidate countries.359 Moreover, if entries into Turkey are made more difficult, the probability of irregular migration will increase, with the possible result that some of these migrants could try to make it to (other) European Union member states by illegal means. Sandra Lavenex underlines this by arguing that “making the border controls tighter does not necessarily lead to a decrease in irregular migration as expected.”360 Lavenex continues with stressing that tighter border controls create a certain threat for liberal freedoms and for fundamental human rights. A striking example is the case of the Iranians, who make up the largest number of asylum seekers in Turkey. As Kirisci argues, because so many Iranians can enter, leave and re-enter Turkey, they enjoy a kind of “informal 356

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 377.

357 Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, 128 – 129.

358 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 377.

359 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 350.

360 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 379.

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protection”. Some of them also benefit economically from the Turkish visa-free policy, but the prospect of strict visa requirements and tight border controls may lead to an increase in asylum applications and may result in more illegal migrants entering Turkey.361 In section 4.4, I will dedicate more attention to the phenomenon of irregular migration.

Turkish officials are of the opinion that the introduction of the new visa regime will result in a major administrative and financial burden on Turkey. The prospect of issuing visas for nationals from Iran and Russia (both countries are on the EU’s negative visa list) would indeed result in a major burden on Turkey’s consulates and embassies abroad, since almost 1.6 million Russians and more than half a million of Iranian nationals entered Turkey in 2004.362 Thirdly, there is a risk of damaging political and consequently also economic relations (for instance, Turkey depends on Russian gas) with countries, such as Russia, that are profiting from Turkey’s liberal visa policy. In 2004, the Russian President Putin praised Turkey for this specific policy towards Russian nationals and he stressed the benefiting element for both Turkey and Russia. Later on during his official visit to Turkey, Putin criticized the Schengen visa system and contrasted it with the current economic and commercial relations between Turkey and Russia. In this context, he underlined that Turkish businessmen were involved in construction projects worth US$14 billion in Russia.363

361

Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 362-363.

362 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 350.

363 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 350.

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4.3.4 A small price to pay for EU membership?

Despite these considerable complaints as well as resentment and discomfort with the EU visa regime, Turkey might find the possibility to influence European-level decisionmaking and introduce more flexibility in the visa system if the country were admitted to the EU. In this context, special local visas valid for multiple border crossings could be a solution for Turkey. Notwithstanding the difficulties Turkey is facing, these negative externalities could also be considered a “relatively little [sic] price to pay for EU membership”.364 As seen by previous enlargement rounds, all candidate countries were required to adjust their visa policies to the Schengen visa regime, and most of them, especially those that joined with the 2004 Big Bang, experienced serious difficulties regarding the implementation of the EU legislation.

As argued by Kirisci, Turkish officials and politicians admit that close cooperation with the EU can result in a situation where Turkey will be able to demand a relaxing of the EU visa requirements against Turkish nationals, since Turkey is implementing the EU negative visa list while the country is on the list itself.365 At present, particularly Turkish business people and students are experiencing restrictions, inconsistency in the processing of visa applications among the various EU consulates and more general administrative difficulties when wishing to travel to EU member states. Those groups feel unfair competition compared to EU nationals who are able to travel to Turkey relatively freely; in most cases this comes down to buying a sticker visa at the airport.366 4.4 External borders and the question of illegal migration The management of external borders is seen as a critical aspect of the harmonization process between the EU and Turkey because of the fact that Turkey has both long land and long sea borders that are porous to control. In fact, Turkey shares land borders eastwards as well as southwards with Armenia (328 km), Azerbaijan (18km), Georgia (276 km), Iran (560 km), Iraq (384 km) and Syria (911 km).367 Furthermore, the Aegean 364

M.A. Tugtan, “Possible impacts of Turkish application of Schengen visa standards”, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, vol. 6, no.1 (2004): 33.

365 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 349.

366 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 349.

367 Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, 128.

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Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea form Turkey’s sea borders.

In the debates about the possible accession of Turkey to the EU, an oftenexpressed concern is that with Turkey in the EU, Syria, Iran, Iraq and some states of the Caucasus would be the EU’s new neighbours. Especially these regions were responsible for the substantial proportion of irregular migration that started to arrive in Turkey from the 1990s onwards. Turkish sea borders are another area of concern, as they form the main gate of transit for migrants who are transiting via Greece to other EU member states.368 4.4.1 EU requirements and progress of alignment with the acquis As part of the accession process, Turkey is required to apply the Schengen acquis, which implies, concerning border management issues, that Turkey should implement tighter border surveillance, the unification of border controls under a single civilian institution, and the harmonization of visas. Making the common external EU borders tighter should really be seen as a condition of the internal freedom of movement. Thus, strict border controls at the EU’s external borders are the price to be paid for the removal of internal border controls: “Extending Schengen eastwards thus implies a bargain: free movement westwards at the prize of not allowing free movement from the east.”369 Huysmans makes a valuable contribution by arguing that the link between diminishing internal border controls and strengthening external border controls rests on the double assumption that control of the illegal movement of goods, services, and persons happens primarily at the border, and that the free movement of persons is constituted by abolishing border controls.370 Although Huysmans admits that many people share these assumptions, he questions them and treats them as contestable. One counter-example he mentions is the issue of how illegal migrants arrive in the EU. The emphasis tends to be on smugglers but less 368

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 378.

369 Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, 123.

370 Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU (London and New York: Routledge, 2006): 70.

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attention seems to be on those who stay in a member state after their visas have expired.

This is also a way of becoming illegal.371 Although the 2007 and 2008 progress reports on Turkey stress that only limited progress has been made on alignment with the acquis concerning external borders and Schengen, it is worth mentioning the progress that has been made so far. In 2004, an integrated border management projects department was established. In addition, in 2004 following a cooperation protocol between Turkey and Bulgaria, the Bulgarian border police and the Turkish coast guard have been cooperating to prevent violations of each other’s territorial waters and economic areas.

In 2007 Turkey made further progress with the establishment of a special unit responsible for risk analysis in the customs administration.372 Although this is a step forward, Turkish authorities still need to set up the new border law enforcement authority, a point that was raised in the 2007 regular report on Turkey’s progress.

Besides this, a new sea border checkpoint in Izmir was opened in 2007, as well as two air border checkpoints in Sivas and Malatya.373 In the progress report of 2008 the EU Commission points out that the number of border crossing has increased from 116 to 120 and that a further six border crossing were modernised in 2008. Turkey is currently working on the modernisation of five other border-crossing points. To perform border duties better and as a tool to integrate EU requirements in the daily tasks of border authorities, a “Common Manual of Checks at the EU external borders” was published in 1500 copies and distributed to the relevant border authorities, such as the General Staff, National Police, Customs Undersecretary, Gendarmerie, and the Coast Guard.374 Although this should be seen as a considerable improvement, the other side of the medallion is that Turkish border staff up till now only shows limited awareness of the national strategy on integrated border management and the action plan to implement this particular strategy. Turkey is asked to increase its efforts to implement the national action plan on integrated border management. In this 371

372

Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU, 70.

Europawebsite, “Turkey : adoption of the community acquis”, Summaries of EU legislation. Available

at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/community_acquis_turkey/e22 113_en.htm (last accessed August 2nd 2009).

373 Europawebsite, “Turkey : adoption of the community acquis”, Summaries of EU legislation. Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/community_acquis_turkey/e22 113_en.htm (last accessed August 2nd 2009).

374 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 73.

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context, the 2008 progress report underlines the importance of further enhancing cooperation between all agencies working at the Turkish borders, since there is still no new border law enforcement authority. This increased cooperation should consist of developing joint risk analyses, exchanges of information, and more knowledge of border security studies.375 According to the European Commission, Turkey needs to pay further attention to the training and professionalism of border staff and border police (especially developing language skills), risk-analysis capacity, and modernisation of checking equipment.376 Lastly, the progress report recommends that Turkey further increase cross-border cooperation with its neighbours, since this is, according to the Commission, “a key component of well-functioning border management.”377 4.4.2 The fight against illegal migration One of the most outstanding features of border management and the protection of the EU’s external borders is the “fight against illegal migration”. As Europe was confronted with a large influx of illegal migrants on the shores of Italy, France, Greece, and Spain from the late 1990s onwards, the urgency to act against this phenomenon has increased significantly.378 Migration, and illegal immigrants in particular, are perceived as a danger to domestic society because the securitization process has framed the issue as a security problem.379 According to Didier Bigo, “security […] consists of reassuring and protecting the public, not disturbing and worrying them. But sometimes, in seeking to achieve the former we unintentionally produce the latter.”380 This leads us to a so-called security/insecurity dilemma, which dominates the current immigration debate in Europe.

Viewed through the lenses of securitization theory, immigration has increasingly become a phenomenon that needs to be controlled, restricted, and, if possible, reduced.

This explains the urgency to act against illegal migration in the European Union.

Because of the fact that the phenomenon of (im)migration is portrayed as a threat to public order and stability, there seems to be a kind of fear that comes with it. Following 375

European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, 73.

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 378.

377 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, 73.

378 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 360.

379 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 757.

380 Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, New Political Science, Vol. 26, no. 1 (2004): 48.

376

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Bigo we can see that although or even because a perceived purpose of “reassuring” the public has been put in place, there will nevertheless be fear spread within societies because of the process of securitization of migration. The consequence of all this is that the issue of (im)migration in Europe will always be perceived as a threat.381 Because of this threatening dimension, security must be considered as a concept that “takes politics beyond the established rules of the game” by being framed as a special kind of politics or as above politics. So, when normal politics seemingly fail to tackle the problem, security politics is seen as a legitimate instrument to take extraordinary measures against a threatening development in order to preserve stability or maximize protection.382 Connecting all this with the issue of illegal migration, we notice that speech-acts addressing illegal migration allowed the issue slip into a security continuum that was connected to border controls, terrorism and international crime. According to Jef Huysmans, the side effect of the creation of the internal market was that it would lead to an easing for those who wanted to carry out illegal and criminal activities and to a pathway for illegal immigrants. The expectation of this side effect resulted in the issue of the internal market becoming connected to an internal security problematique.

According to Huysmans, the discourse which articulated this particular side effect and the institutionalization of closer police and customs cooperation produced a security continuum in which border control, terrorism, international crime and migration became connected to one another.383 As argued by Bigo, The issue was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs, crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe.384

381

Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, 48.

382 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, “Security: A New Framework For Analysis” (Colorado: Lynne Riener Publishers, 1998): 21-23.

383 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 751-777.

384 Didier Bigo, “The European internal security field: Stakes and rivalries in a newly developing arena on police intervention”, in Policing across National Boundaries, Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer (eds.) (London: Pinter, 1994): 164.

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Another scholar, Sühal Şemşit, adds that once the security discourse was established, illegal migration became synonymous with the “undesired form of human mobility” which is often treated as a criminal act. The EU and its member states ‘legitimize’ in this way the need for surveillance, detention, control and penalization of illegal migrants.385 It should be emphasised that there is an increasing trend of illegal migration targeting EU countries on all routes, but especially the Mediterranean route seems popular among migrants.386 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 2001, the train bombings of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, and the London bombings on 13 July 2005 underlined the need for internal security and with that the urgency to act against illegal migration, as the issue was perceived as a threat to the stability and security of European member states.387 In fact, one of the key aims of the EU’s border management policy is to create a “common migration policy that manages comprehensively and fights against illegal migration”.388 The securitised nature of this policy area also becomes visible in many of the EU’s official documents, where expressions such as “illegal migration”, “fight against”, and “combat” are frequently used.389 This connects to the theory of securitization, in which the perception of security is viewed as the result of a social process, which is analyzed by examining so-called securitizing speech-acts. These speech-acts articulate threats and fears. Issues then become actually “securitized” by the mere fact that these speech-acts represent a particular issue as a security situation and are accepted as such by an audience.390 Ole Waever summarizes this as follows: What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a 385

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 372.

386 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 380.

387 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 360.

388 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 377.

389 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 377.

390 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, no. 4 (2003): 513.

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ship). By uttering “security” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.391 The issue of illegal migration not only plays an important role on the internal agenda of the EU, but is also perceived as a hot topic for Turkey-EU relations. As a result of the migration flows which are directed towards EU countries, the EU and EU member states perceive migratory flows from neighbour countries, such as Turkey, as a threat to the stability and welfare of their societies, especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.392 Often people become illegal migrants when they overstay their visas and end up working on the black market. It is very difficult to illustrate this with reliable figures, but it is estimated that it concerns over 1 million people in Turkey.393Although we do not know the validity of this number, we can conclude that the phenomenon of illegal migration has been on the rise throughout the 1990s.394 This can also be illustrated by the following data. Figure 2 shows the total number of illegal migrants who were arrested by Turkish security forces between 1995 and 2007. The figure shows that the number of apprehensions peaked at almost 95,000 in 2000, after which the number turned steadily downwards. Between 2003 and 2006, the number of illegal migrants apprehended by the authorities shows signs of stabilisation. Because of the sharp decrease in the number of arrests, the 2003 and 2004 regular reports on Turkey’s progress towards EU accession “indeed acknowledge that the trend in illegal migration via Turkey has shown a decrease and international transit migration flows have been diverted away from Turkey to other routes“.395 However, for 2007 the figure shows a significant increase compared with previous years. In 2007 the number of illegal migrants apprehended by the Turkish 391

Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, On Security, R. Lipschutz (ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 55.

392 Sedef Eylemer, Suhal Semsit and Ilkay Tas, “Securitization of migration policies in EU’s relations with its neighbourhood”, Research paper of Dokuz Eylul University (Institute of Social Sciences, Graduate Department of EU Studies).

393 The Turkish Minister for Labour Affairs and Social Welfare, Yasar Okuyan, announced that there were approximately 1 million illegal immigrant workers in Turkey. See Radikal, December 30, 2000. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs put their numbers at 1.2 million. See Radikal, January 4, 2001, available at http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=Radikal (last accessed August 25, 2009).

394 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 82.

395 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 361.

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authorities was 64,290, compared to 51,983 in 2006. As can be concluded from figure 2, nearly 700,000 illegal migrants were arrested by Turkish security forces between 2000 and 2007. Since full data on 2008 is missing, hard conclusions about a possible new trend upwards cannot yet be drawn. According to a note of the Turkish Embassy in the Netherlands there is, however, evidence that the total number of apprehended illegal migrants in 2008 increased to “more than 65,000.”396 Assuming this figure is roughly correct, it can be concluded that there is a new trend upwards in the number of apprehended illegal immigrants since 2006. This trend might indicate an ever-increasing number of illegal migrants who enter Turkey from economically and politically unstable regions, either to use it as a transit route towards the EU or to use Turkey as destination country.

In a way, the trend can be considered one of the results of the restrictive European migration policies, which keep the concept of “Fortress Europe” alive. Semsit argues that, as long as the EU maintains restrictive migration policies, there will always be people who try to reach European territory by illegal means.397 In the case of Turkey, the latest developments show an increasing trend in the number of illegal migrants.

Continuing with Semsit’s argument, there seems to be evidence that “securitization alone cannot provide a solution to the problem”.398

396

Note of Turkish Embassy in the Netherlands, “Combating Illegal Migration” (The Hague, 2008).

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 380.

398 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 380.

397

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Figure 2: Illegal Migrants Apprehended by Turkish Security Forces 1995 - 2007399

In most cases, the illegal migrants come from Turkey’s neighbouring countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria, but also nationals from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North African countries tend to enter Turkey illegally. 400 Turkey is a particularly popular country for these illegal migrants given its geopolitical setting between East and West and its relatively large informal economy.401 A large part of these migrants transit across Turkey’s territory to reach Greece and other member states of the EU. However, the 399

Data obtained from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-_s-fight-against-illegal-migration.en.mfa (last accessed August 5th 2009).

In addition, various regular reports on Turkey’s progress towards EU accession from 2001 – 2007.

Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/tu_en.pdf (Regular Report 2001, p.

82), http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/uyelik/progre02.pdf (Regular Report 2002, p. 116), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/april/tradoc_116602.pdf (Regular Report 2003, p. 111), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf (Regular Report 2004, p. 140), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1426_final_progress_rep ort_tr_en.pdf (Progress Report 2005, p. 111), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/Nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf (Progress Report 2006, p. 63), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf (Progress Report 2007, p. 63).

400 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 360-361.

401 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 380.

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National Action Plan for Asylum and Migration has called for the introduction of measures to combat illegal migration, which include the construction of reception centres, signing of readmission treaties with countries of origin as well as a readmission treaty between Turkey and the EU.402 4.4.3 Turkish responses to control illegal migration Given the enormous pressure from the EU and from various individual countries to prevent illegal migration, Turkey in return is doing its utmost to stop illegal migration.

In 2001, Turkey decided to join the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Borders and Immigration (CIREFI). Turkish membership can be regarded as beneficial for both parties as Turkey is sharing data with the CIREFI and is participating in bi-annual meetings organised by CIREFI.403 After having joined the CIREFI, Turkey also became a member of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2004. Apart from migration issues, cooperation in the area of combating human trafficking is carried out within the IOM as well.404 In 2006, Turkey assumed the Presidency of the Budapest Process, which is an inter-governmental unofficial cooperation and dialogue forum involving 50 countries’ governments and 10 international organizations. The Budapest Process aims to prevent illegal migration and tries to create sustainable mechanisms in the field of migration management.405 Following Turkey’s harmonization process with the EU acquis, the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy was signed and submitted to the EU Commission. This Action Plan outlines the necessary amendments in Turkish legislation, administrative capacity building and restructuring as well as improvement of the physical infrastructure. Therefore, this particular plan can be considered a massive overhaul compared to the existing border management structure of Turkey.406 As part of the implementation of the Action Plan, several projects have been carried out already. An example is the Turkey-EU Twinning Project on Integrated 402

Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 360.

403 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, 360.

404 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, “Turkey’s Fight against Illegal Migration”, 2.

Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-_s-fight-against-illegal-migration.en.mfa (last accessed August 5th 2009).

405 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, “Turkey’s Fight against Illegal Migration”, 2-3.

Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-_s-fight-against-illegal-migration.en.mfa (last accessed August 5th 2009).

406 Note of Turkish Embassy in the Netherlands, “Combating Illegal Migration” (The Hague, 2008): 2.

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Border Management, which was implemented jointly with France and England in 2006.407 But at the same time Turkey itself is also doing its utmost to enhance cooperation internationally. The country promotes and organizes high-level meetings with countries of origin in order to increase cooperation and encourage these countries to take responsibility in finding solutions to stop illegal migration.408 4.4.4 Legislative alignment Most of the legal measures that Turkey has implemented regarding combating irregular migration consist of amendments to the Turkish Penal Code. For example, migrant smuggling is now defined in article 79 of the new Turkish Penal Code Law No. 5237 (entry into force 1 June 2005).409 These legislative amendments have been implemented following the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its two additional Protocols against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air and to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (accepted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 18 March 2003).410 The legal measures taken by the Turkish government should be seen as a first step to reform Turkey’s migration and asylum policies and as requirements in the framework of the legislative alignment following the EU negotiations.

Improvement regarding the management of illegal migrants in Turkey is, however, still needed, since the EU reports that only “limited progress” has been made.411 The problem of illegal migrants in Turkey is quite alarming, with the apprehension of 64,290 illegal migrants in 2007. In this regard, the EU 2008 Progress Report underlines that the detention and deportation procedures for those apprehended illegal migrants need to be improved. In addition, the Turkish authorities have to provide written reasons for the decision to apprehend a person in a language the person concerned can understand. Up until now, this practice is not always carried out in the way the EU would like. Furthermore, the EU Commission calls for the limitation of the 407

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, “Turkey’s Fight against Illegal Migration”, 2.

Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-_s-fight-against-illegal-migration.en.mfa (last accessed August 5th 2009).

408 Note of Turkish Embassy in the Netherlands, “Combating Illegal Migration” (The Hague, 2008): 2.

409 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, “Turkey’s Fight against Illegal Migration”, 2.

Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-s-fight-against-illegal-migration.en.mfa (last accessed August 5th 2009).

410 Note of Turkish Embassy in the Netherlands, “Combating Illegal Migration” (The Hague, 2008): 2.

411 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 71.

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duration of the detention by law.412 On a more practical level, the material conditions of detention of those apprehended migrants need to be improved, according to the 2008 Progress Report. In particular the detention facilities could be improved to allow for not only a segregation of detainees by gender, but also by age and criminal record.413 Lastly, the European Commission expressed its concern regarding the detained irregular migrants’ access to free legal aid, to asylum procedures, to interpretation services, to psychological and medical assistance, and to educational and recreational facilities. All this needs to be further developed by the Turkish authorities. This also means that closer cooperation between the Turkish and international organisations that are specialised in delivering these services and the authorities managing detention facilities needs to take place in the years to come.414 4.4.5 Readmission agreements Readmission agreements are part of the EU’s wider strategy for combating illegal immigration, which was adopted by the European Councils in Tampere, Laeken, and Seville. Readmission agreements involve “reciprocal undertakings by the EU and thirdcountry partners to co-operate over the return of illegal residents to their country of origin or transit.”415 So, with readmission agreements there is an obligation on the third country to automatically readmit its nationals who come from or have resided in the sending country. The EU views readmission agreements as “cost-effective” instruments in the fight against illegal migration, as they will encourage states to take serious measures against this problematic phenomenon.416 For a long time, Turkey showed resistance in negotiating readmission agreements with third countries. The official position of the Turkish government had been that “Turkey would be prepared to accept the return of persons present in Europe of Turkish nationality or a legal resident of Turkey”.417 Ankara’s official position also applied to those persons “who may have legally transited to Europe via Turkey and 412

European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 71.

413 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72.

414 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72.

415 Europawebsite, “Readmission Agreements”, Press releases RAPID, Reference: MEMO/05/351 of 5 October 2005. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? reference=MEMO/05/351&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last accessed August 5th 2009).

416 Statewatch News online, “EU seeking readmission (repatriation) agreements with 11 countries”.

Available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/oct/06readm.htm (last accessed August 5th 2009).

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were arrested for illegal entry into Europe, as long as the demand for readmission is made within 48 hours of transiting Turkey.”418 However, with the prospect of EU membership, the Turkish position started to change, more specifically following the publication of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis:419 Turkey will initiate, in the medium term, the practises on readmission and expulsion in addition to alignment with the EU legislation required in the pre-accession process. The Turkish government will continue to sign readmission agreements with neighbouring countries and countries of origin covering Turkish citizens, persons illegally transiting through Turkey, and foreign nationals caught during illegal residence in Turkey.

In this vein, Turkey aims to conclude readmission agreements with its Eastern neighbouring countries first, then with countries East of these countries, and finally with its Western neighbouring countries.420 The change of the Turkish policy meant that, first, readmission agreements with sending countries (eastern neighbours) had to be concluded, followed by the transit countries (the neighbours of the eastern neighbours), and finally the target countries (western neighbouring countries).421 Table 5 shows the progress regarding the signing of readmission agreements by Turkey. As this table makes clear, Turkey managed to sign readmission agreements with five countries and is waiting for replies from many countries. However, the same table shows that work is in progress while Turkey is negotiating readmission agreements with 15 countries. Relevant to mention is that the EC progress report of 2008 indicates that Turkey and Pakistan have completed the first round of negotiations on a readmission agreement. In addition, a readmission agreement was proposed by 417

Kemal Kirişci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, in Çarkoúglu, A. and Barry Rubin (eds), Turkey and the European Union : domestic politics, economic integration and international dynamics (London: Cass, 2003): 97.

418 Kemal Kirişci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, in Çarkoúglu, A. and Barry Rubin (eds), Turkey and the European Union: domestic politics, economic integration and international dynamics (London: Cass, 2003): 97-98.

419 Official Journal of the Republic of Turkey No. 25178 bis, of 24 July 2003. Available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/NPAA/up.htm (last accessed August 6th 2009).

420 National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, Official Gazette 25178 24 July 2003. Available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/NPAA/up.htm, (last accessed August 6th 2009).

421 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 382.

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Turkey to Afghanistan.422 Overall, the conclusion can be drawn that Turkey, as a candidate country of the EU, has difficulties in convincing third countries to sign these readmission agreements. Consequently, relatively slow and limited progress has been made regarding the signing of readmission agreements until now.423 Table 5: Progress Regarding the Signing of Readmission Agreements by Turkey424 Signed

Syria (10 October 2001); Greece (8 November 2001); Kyrgyzstan (6 May 2003); Romania (16 January 2004);

Negotiations continuing

Ukraine (7 June 2005) Belarus, Bulgaria, Egypt, Hungary, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Macedonia, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka

No response to Turkey’s offer

Uzbekistan Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia

Apart from the readmission agreements that have to be signed with third countries, Turkey also has to sign such an agreement with the EU. The EU requested Turkey to sign a readmission agreement in March 2003. The Accession Partnership Document (APD) mentions, in this respect, the expectation from Turkey “to reinforce the fight against illegal immigration, negotiate and conclude as soon as possible a readmission agreement with the European Community”. However, since 2006, when the last round of negotiations on a readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU took place, there is no progress on this topic. Although the EU requests Turkey to “conclude urgently a readmission agreement with the EU,” it is argued by Turkish officials that readmission agreements are not always effective.425 Their argument is that the automatic return of migrants from third countries through readmission agreements will lead to a situation where many of them will soon reattempt to reach the homelands of the EU. The large group of illegal migrants from Northern Iraq is a case in point and must be 422

European Commission, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, 71.

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 381-382.

424 Material adapted from Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 381, and from the European Commission, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, 71.

425 Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/ EC, 2008/157/EC (L51/4) 26/02/2008. Available at: http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Apd/turkey_apd_2008.pdf (last accessed August 6th 2009).

423

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seen as explanation why Turkey has been so reluctant to accept the return of Iraqis via Turkey.426 As a result, Turkey has not yet finalised a readmission agreement with the EU. For the Turkish authorities this is a complicated and sensitive issue primarily because Turkish government officials are concerned that once a readmission agreement with the EU is signed, Turkey would be “a dumping ground for unwanted immigrants by the EU.”427 Turkey finds itself in an unequal position, as it would be responsible for those migrants who are sent back to Turkey.

There is some credibility in the argument that Turkey is being built up as a buffer zone (semi periphery) for unwanted immigrants by the EU if we apply Marchetti’s semi-periphery logic. As outlined in the first chapter, Marchetti develops his theory with regard to the ENP, which he sees as a geopolitical policy of the EU, to establish a semi-periphery between itself and its farther neighbourhood, its periphery in the words of Marchetti. According to Marchetti, the ENP can be considered a manifestation of the EU’s will to establish “a ring of states to create – or maintain – a functioning semi-periphery (via its neighbours) in order to establish a ‘buffer zone’ to the periphery (the close periphery)”.428 The semi-periphery buffer protects the EU from unstable, less developed, and unfriendly states. Turkey’s membership in this buffer zone is likely to result in negative externalities for Turkey. In this context, Turkey fears being overwhelmed by asylum seekers and illegal immigrants that come from ‘close periphery countries’ and those people who are sent back to Turkey from third countries through readmission agreements.429 Moreover, the fact that Turkey directly borders the close periphery makes it less likely that Turkey will ever really be accepted as an EU member state. After all, that would mean giving up the benefits of the buffer zone in a very sensitive region.

I now return to one of my claims made in the first chapter of this thesis. One of my core claims is that Turkey is changing its migration policy in a manner which will lead to a situation where the Turkish border, one of the potential new EU external borders, is becoming softer. This means that Turkey is asked to let asylum seekers and 426

Kemal Kirişci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, in Çarkoúglu, A. and Barry Rubin (eds), Turkey and the European Union: domestic politics, economic integration and international dynamics (London: Cass, 2003): 97-98.

427 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 382.

428 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, Discussion Paper C158, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, 2006): 16-17.

429 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1996): 309.

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refugees in more easily and recognize them as such, thus permitting recognized asylum seekers to integrate in Turkish society. As part and parcel of the harmonization, Turkey has to be more generous, for instance in taking back migrants who return as a result of readmission agreements. However, at the same time, we conclude that Turkey is asked to fight the increasing numbers of illegal migrants who want to move on towards EU countries. Meanwhile, the Turks themselves are confronted with virtually closed EUinternal borders (especially when it comes to economic migration such as labour migration).

All this can serve important evidence for the suggestion that the EU, although negotiating with Turkey in the framework of EU accession, is not taking Turkey seriously enough as a prospective EU member state. I conclude that indeed European governments perceive Turkey as a protective, or peripheral buffer zone against people wanting to reach Europe and that these governments are lukewarm at best to speed up the process of Turkey coming closer to EU accession. The urgency with which the EU wants Turkey to sign readmission agreements is an illustration of the fact that the buffer zone function will remain a very important aspect in EU-Turkey relations. The EU, where the issue migration is embedded in a securitization framework, perceives migration flows from neighbouring countries as a threat to its stability and, as a result, EU member states try to do everything they can to reduce and control the pressures that immigrants exert upon their societies. Drawing upon the theoretical argument of Marchetti, I conclude that, at least from the perspective of the EU, there is no real need or even desirability for Turkey to become a member of the EU. The present situation – Turkey as a peripheral buffer zone around the EU – is in the very interest of the EU. If Turkey were admitted, then the EU’s internal security would be, according to the theory presented by Marchetti, threatened. Following this argument, membership of the EU does not make sense if Turkey can fulfill its buffer zone function without full membership.

According to a note on Combating Illegal Migration of the Turkish Embassy in the Netherlands, Turkey cannot be held responsible for “poverty, instability and conflicts in its East”430 all by itself. Furthermore, Turkish officials are concerned that Turkey is being left with its own financial resources to prevent illegal migration. Turkey feels it is not fair that the EU expects Turkey to solve this problem on its own, while at the same time the EU member states together are not able to effectively address this 430

Note of Turkish Embassy in the Netherlands, “Combating Illegal Migration” (The Hague, 2008).

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issue. Given its complexity, quick fix solutions are not the right answer to the problem; instead, shared responsibility, international solidarity, and burden sharing are required according to Turkey.431 Burden sharing on the part of the EU would be highly appreciated given the magnitude of the problem of illegal migration. In addition, burden sharing can serve as an important stimulus regarding the progress of the signing of readmission agreements.

4.5 Developing asylum legislation Since Turkey’s EU candidate status of December 2004, but more concretely following the adoption of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis432 and the National Action Plan for Asylum and Migration,433 Turkey is expected to harmonize its asylum policies and practises with those of the EU.434 Although the demands of the EU are recognized as a ‘sine qua non’ by Turkish authorities, they face enormous difficulties throughout the current accession process in the area of asylum.

In fact, Turkey finds itself under growing pressure to cooperate with the EU.435 On the one hand, the EU expects Turkey to control the flow of illegal transit migrants, but, on the other hand, Turkey has to introduce an asylum policy that allows recognized refugees to stay and integrate in Turkish society. This results not only in slow progress with regard to the implementation of new legislation, as seen in previous enlargement rounds, but it also leaves Turkey facing several tough consequences, which is one of the reasons why the harmonization of migration policies is considered to be so sensitive.436 After having explained what is expected of Turkey concerning the adopting of the EU acquis on asylum, I will move on to the evaluation of the progress and the remaining incompatibilities with the EU requirements. This section will end with the tough 431

Note of Turkish Embassy in the Netherlands, “Combating Illegal Migration” (The Hague, 2008).

Official Journal of the Republic of Turkey No. 25178 bis, of 24 July 2003. Available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/NPAA/up.htm (last accessed August 6th 2009).

433 The National Action Plan including all relevant legislation can be found in Asylum and Migration Legislation, published as a result of cooperation between the Turkish Ministry of the Interior and UNHCR Turkey as a part of the EU Twinning Project on Asylum and Migration (TR02-JH-03: Support for the Development of an Action Plan to Implement Turkey’s Asylum and Migration Strategy, with the partners Denmark and the United Kingdom), February 2005, pp. 1-63. Available at http://www.unchr.org.tr and http://www.egm.gov.tr (last accessed August 6th 2009).

434 Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey: Challenges of Harmonizing Immigration Policies with the EU”, Draft paper prepared for the Dialogues session on Emerging Countries of Immigration at the HMI World Congress Human Movements and Immigration (Barcelona, 2004): 3.

435 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 81.

436 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 100.

432

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consequences for Turkey stemming from the current EU accession process. This will put the progress that has been made so far and the remaining incompatibilities in their proper context.

4.5.1 EU requirements The adoption of the EU acquis on asylum is an integral part of Turkey’s accession process. The 2008 Accession Partnership Document (APD) makes this clear and underlines the need, among other things, to “make progress in the preparations for the adoption of a comprehensive asylum law in line with the acquis including the establishment of an asylum authority.”437 In other words, Turkey has to develop comprehensive asylum legislation that will reflect EU standards. In the light of the increasing number of asylum applications to Turkey, this issue is considered highly important by the EU. In 2007, Turkey received 5,846 asylum requests, which is an increase of 65% compared to 2006, when 3,541 asylum requests were made. These figures underline the need to develop comprehensive asylum legislation. Furthermore, the EU seems to use these figures to legitimize its wish that Turkey should fulfil the tasks of a country of first asylum and develop enough capacity to process asylum applications.438 At the same time, it is common knowledge that the asylum issue is closely linked to the issue of illegal migration.439 The EU expects Turkey to do its utmost to prevent illegal migration and, more importantly, prevent its own use as a path for accessing EU asylum procedures. So, on the one hand, Turkey needs to combat illegal migration, but on the other hand, it needs to weed out potential asylum seekers from the many economically motivated illegal migrants that try to make it to Europe.

In chapter two, I have shown how common EU legislation on migration has emphasized the need to restrict and control population movements. As this securitization process has unfolded internally in the EU, so did a securitization process emerge and develop externally in the enlargement process of the EU (for example, the preconditions of the Copenhagen criteria with which candidate member states have to 437

Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/ EC, 2008/157/EC (L51/4) 26/02/2008.

438 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 80.

439 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 92.

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comply or the condition of aligning with the Schengen acquis which was implemented after the European Council in Tampere).440 In fact, the main suggestion of securitization theory is that security is considered threatened as the result of a social process, which is analyzed by examining so-called securitizing speech-acts. These speech-acts articulate threats and fears. Issues then become actually “securitized” by the mere fact that these speech-acts represent a particular issue as a security situation and are received as such by an audience.441 In this context I mentioned earlier the security continuum proposed

by Didier Bigo. As argued by Bigo, the issue was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs, crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe.442 Turkey has to accept the securitization approach of the EU and is ‘kindly requested’ to follow the Union’s behaviour in this respect. Some important changes are underway; Turkey is currently revising the Asylum Law and the country is busy establishing a new asylum unit, which should bring structural reform in the Turkish legal practice regarding asylum. The EU views this as a development that will bring “fair, equal and consistent access for everyone to asylum procedures, to legal aid and, in particular, to UNCHR staff.”443 Apart from the legislative amendments that Turkey has to adopt, this also includes taking several practical measures, such as the establishment of reception centres for refugees and asylum seekers, the establishment of protection mechanisms, and the development of a national integration programme for the asylum seekers in question.444 Especially the last issue seems to be a major break with Turkey’s past, because the introduction of reception centres and with that the expectation of an 440

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 372.

441 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, no. 4 (2003): 513.

442 Didier Bigo, “The European internal security field: Stakes and rivalries in a newly developing arena on police intervention”, in Policing Across National Boundaries, Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer (eds.) (London: Pinter, 1994): 164.

443 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72.

444 Pierre Hecker, “Focus Migration: Country Profile Turkey”, focus MIGRATION, no. 5 (Hamburg: Hamburg Institute for International Economics, 2006): 6.

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increasing number of recognized asylum seekers means massive legislative and institutional changes, which make permanent stay and integration into Turkish society a reality. At the same time, this already leads to increasing pressure upon Turkey’s current practice of resettling asylum seekers recognized as bona fide refugees to third countries.445 As becomes clear from the above quote from the APD, the EU expresses its dissatisfaction with the absence of comprehensive asylum legislation. According to Kirisci, the EU would like to see a Turkey that takes up its responsibility concerning asylum issues and as a result fulfils the tasks of a country of first asylum.446 The second major issue where Turkey needs to show responsibility, according to the EU, concerns the lifting of the geographical limitation on the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the related 1967 Protocol. This particular limitation is still preserved by Turkey and it plays a major role in relation to the alignment of Turkish asylum policy with that of the EU. The EU has criticized Turkey numerous times for this, and has called for the lifting of this limitation as soon as possible in the context of Turkey’s obligation to align its asylum legislation to the EU practice. However, Turkey continues to impose the limitation until at least 2012, which is when a recommendation to lift the geographic limitation is likely to be submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly.447 Thirdly, Turkey should be capable of carrying out status determination tasks in accordance with the 1951 Convention as well as EU standards. Up until now, Turkey finds itself in a position where it has difficulty managing status determination, a task that has long been entrusted to the UNCHR, and the integration of migrants.448 Managing status determination also requires Turkey to have a certain capacity, an economic base and resources to carry out the tasks in a humane manner that is in accordance with the international requirements of the 1951 Convention.449 The introduction of reception centres as advocated by the EU is a concrete example that 445

Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey: Challenges of Harmonizing Immigration Policies with the EU”, 3.

Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 80.

447 Pierre Hecker, “Focus Migration: Country Profile Turkey”, 7.

448 The 1994 Regulation on Asylum was introduced to increase control over issues related to asylum and illegal migration in and through Turkey. To this end the Regulation foresaw the taking over of a great deal of the task of status determination for asylum seekers from the UNCHR. Material adapted from Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 309; and from Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations, 89.

449 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 89.

446

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follows from the task of carrying out status determination.450 Taking over the task of status determination completely also means a dramatic increase in responsibility, and with that, Turkey will need to show a willingness to allow for integration of the asylum seekers and refugees concerned, which Turkey has strongly resisted up until today. 451 Apart from the necessary legislative and institutional changes, some change should also take place in the mindset of Turkish officials dealing with migration policies. If Turkey wants to deal with today’s migration challenges, it must recognize that this cannot be accomplished with policies and concepts which belong to the previous century. In particular the mindset issue is a sensitive one in Turkey. I will come back to this in more detail when discussing the tough consequences of the harmonization of Turkey’s migration policies with that of the EU. 4.5.2 Evaluation of progress After having outlined the issues that Turkey needs to address during the current EU accession process, we can already make a balance sheet of the progress made so far as well as a list of the remaining incompatibilities concerning Turkish asylum legislation and practices. In the paragraphs that follow, I will therefore evaluate the progress that Turkey has made in the context of the harmonization of asylum policies.

As part of the accession process, Turkey has to align its asylum legislation with that of the EU. I will show where Turkey should improve its efforts and I will try to uncover the reasons why progress has been made or why the progress has been rather limited. Work is under way, as Turkey is currently revising its Asylum Law and busy with the establishment of the new asylum unit. Generally, the conclusion is that there is gradual alignment visible, although Turkey is facing enormous challenges before the country will have harmonized its asylum legislation and practice completely. 452 In the area of asylum, I will discuss the three most important challenges. The first challenge is the geographical limitation, which Turkey still imposes. The second challenge relates to the fact that there are still cases of refoulement occurring in Turkey.

The third and last challenge in the area of asylum deals with the shortages in implementing refugee status determination procedures.

450

Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 90-91.

451 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 91.

452 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72.

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The geographical limitation At the moment, Turkey still imposes its geographical limitation on the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and the related 1967 Protocol.453 This geographical limitation has become a central characteristic of Turkey’s asylum policy; it provides that only those refugees who enter Turkey from the European borders fall under the provisions of the Convention. The EU would like to see Turkey lift this limitation as soon as possible as part and parcel of the adoption of the EU acquis on asylum. 454 In the first Accession Partnership Document (APD) of 2003, the need to start with the alignment of the EU acquis in the field of asylum, including the lifting of the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention, was mentioned as a medium priority under the section of Justice and Home Affairs.455 As can be observed from Turkey’s national program for the adoption of the Accession Partnership, Turkey reacted in a rather cooperative manner, as the country seemed to accept the elimination of the limitation by 2004.456 While Turkey definitely showed its willingness to consider lifting the geographical limitation, 2004 was perhaps a bit too early. Presumably around 2012, more progress can be reported regarding this issue. The Turkish government mentions the year 2012 as the year when a recommendation to lift the geographic limitation is likely to be submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 457 The remaining question is, however, why it is that Turkey experiences difficulties in lifting the geographical limitation of the 1951 Convention while this practice has traditionally drawn criticisms from the EU as well as many human rights organizations. The official explanation as expressed by the Turkish government is that national security reasons and the fear of mass influxes of refugees have been forcing Turkey to continue to impose the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention. This explanation definitely makes sense, given the migration movements from the rather unstable neighbouring countries just after the end of the Cold War. After all, Turkish 453

European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72.

454 Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, Project Muse (2004): 96.

455 Official Journal of the European Union (12.06.2003) “Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey” (2003/398/EC)/L 145/40, 15.

456 Kemal Kirisci, “Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration”, Center for European Studies, Bogaziçi University, (2003): 3. Available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/print.cfm?ID=176 (last accessed August 7 th 2009).

457 Pierre Hecker, “Focus Migration: Country Profile Turkey”, focus MIGRATION, no. 5 (Hamburg: Hamburg Institute for International Economics, 2006): 7.

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authorities have been confronted with the arrival of more than half a million Kurdish refugees fleeing Iraq in 1988 and 1991. In particular these mass influxes of Kurdish refugees made the Turkish authorities extremely concerned because this served, for them, as evidence that some of the highly unstable political regimes in the neighbourhood (Iran and Iraq) would turn Turkey into a country of first asylum.458 The Kurdish refugees and the Kurdish Question At the beginning of the 20th century, it was clear that the nationals of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire realized that their identity was not only determined by their religious community. The founders of the Turkish Republic (1923) tried to modernize Turkey in the interbellum period with the objective to turn Turkey into a national and secular state.

The peace Treaty of Sèvres (1920) provided the independence of the Armenian people as well as autonomy for the Kurds. However, the Kemalists under Atatürk eventually succeeded in preserving a larger part of the Ottoman Empire for the new Republic of Turkey. Atatürk promised the Kurds that the new Turkey would become a country of two peoples. At the peace Treaty of Lausanne, which fixed the borders of the modern Turkey, the issue of the Kurds was not mentioned at all. In fact, from the early 1940s onwards, Turkey denied the existence of non-Turkish populations. With cultural oppression and mass assassination, the Turks made clear to the Kurds that attempts to express Kurdish national identity did not fit the ideal of the Turkish nation-state, which was only preserved for ‘Turks’.459 According to estimations, there are between 25 and 45 million Kurds.460 Some 30 million Kurds live in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Until recently, they were not recognized as a national group, nor a minority.461 In terms of stability, the Kurds pose a great threat, not in the least place because there are Kurdish people who strive for an independent state. In other words, the Kurds began to claim political and cultural rights.

An example of this is the Kurdish dissidence movement Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party), which was founded in November 1978 with a separatist agenda.462 458

Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 83.

459 Michael Stein, “Het broeit als nooit tevoren” NRC Handelsblad, 17 June 1999. Available at: http://www.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Profiel/Koerden/tragiek.html (last accessed August 30, 2009).

460 A more precise census is however not possible.

461 Atlas der Globalisierung: Die Neuen Daten und Fakten zur Lage der Welt, “Kurdistan, Land in vier Staaten” (Berlin: Le Monde diplomatique/taz Verlags- und Vertriebs GmbH, 2006): 126.

462 Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London/New York: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd., 2004): 316.

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The fight for independence has cost a significant number of lives on both sides.

Since 1984, the PKK has been involved in a guerrilla war against the Turkish army in the south west of Turkey. Up until 1999, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict has cost an estimated 30,000 lives, among them Turkish and Kurdish citizens, Turkish armed forces, and PKK militants.463 When Turkey was confronted with the arrival of more than half a million Kurdish refugees fleeing Iraq in 1988 and 1991, this happened at a time when the violent guerrilla war between the PKK and Turkey was particularly on the rise. According to Helen Chapin Metz, the military’s inability to suppress the militant PKK, combined with the international media attention generated in 1988 by the arrival of tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurdish refugees fleeing chemical weapons attacks by their own government, made the Kurdish situation a leading topic of public discourse. 464 The large numbers of Kurdish refugees were an enormous security problem for Turkey because these refugees could join the PKK or at least could support the PKK militants in their violent guerrilla war. In this way, the refugees are important conduits through which the PKK probably could have increased its military actions. The violence between the Kurds and the Turkish army did not decrease until 1996, leading to further improvement since 2002, although violations of human rights are still reported.465 The EU urged the Turkish government to find a political solution for the Kurdish question.

As a response, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that “Turkey must realize the seriousness of this problem and should solve it in a democratic way”.466 The Turkish army, the guardian of the legacy of Kemal Atatürk, still plays an important role in Turkey, and they view the geographical limitation as a tool that serves the Turkish national security. The great influence of the military and security forces 463

Svante E. Cornell, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics”, Orbis, Vol. 45, no. 1 (2001): 31.

Available at: http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Cornell_Orbis.htm (last accessed August 30, 2009).

464 Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Turkey: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1995). Available at: http://countrystudies.us/turkey/70.htm (last accessed August 30, 2009).

465 Amnesty International Report on Turkey of 2008. Available online at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/turkey/report-2008 (last accessed August 30, 2009).

466 Nederlands Dagblad, “Erdogan zoekt oplossing conflict met Koerden”, 14 August 2009. Available at: http://www.nd.nl/artikelen/2009/augustus/14/erdogan-zoekt-oplossing-conflict-met-koerden (last accessed August 30, 2009).

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becomes visible in the impact of their reluctant attitude to considering the lifting of the geographical limitation and their fear of being overwhelmed with refugees and asylum seekers from neighbouring Middle Eastern states.467 Like many EU member states, Turkey also seems generally worried about the possible mass influxes of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. In the Turkish case, this is illustrated with the argument that lifting the geographical limitation is the beginning of Turkey becoming a buffer zone where asylum seekers and refugees will stay as they fail to make it to the EU.468 If the aim is to alleviate these worries, a critical factor seems to be to what extent Turkey feels that the EU is serious about Turkish membership. Here we come back to one of my main arguments throughout this thesis.

At present, there is ongoing debate about the issue of Turkish membership. For example, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed the open-ended character of the accession negotiations with Turkey once more on April 5th, 2009 by saying that “in which manner and way that occurs, whether as a privileged partnership or a full (EU) member state, we are still talking about that”.469 Other member states such as Austria and France already announced that they will hold a referendum on Turkey’s EU accession.470 The French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who can be considered a strong opponent to Turkey’s full EU membership, declared in early July 2009 that “France will not be against the opening of new chapters under the Swedish chairmanship but, of course, these chapters should allow that Turkey should be an associate member of Europe and not a fully-fledged member.”471 The position of the EU’s two largest and most influential member states is thus lukewarm at best. This lack of enthusiasm puts question marks behind the extent to which the EU is indeed serious with respect to Turkish full membership of the EU. Of course, the progress of Turkey up till now is limited and has been achieved in a rather painfully slow manner. The reasons for this slow progress should, however, not only be found in Turkey itself but also in the way 467

Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 88.

468 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 88.

469 EUbusiness Web Page, “EU alone decides Turkish membership: Austrian minister”, published on 7 April 2009. Available online at: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1239105722.86/ (last accessed August 7th 2009).

470 EurActive Web Page, “EU-Turkey relations”, Policy section Enlargement and Neighbours, published on 23 September 2004. Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article129678 (last accessed August 7th 2009).

471 Honor Mahony, “France lays down the law on Turkey's EU progress”, EUobserver Web Page, published on 6 July 2009. Available at: http://euobserver.com/15/28412 (last accessed August 7th 2009).

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the EU handles the issue of Turkish membership, as seen in the reluctant and confusing attitudes of individual member states such as France and Germany. 472 This partly explains the relatively slow progress and resistance by Turkish officials to harmonizing asylum policies and practices.

As concerns asylum issues, the often negative sounds and intense criticisms coming from EU member states reinforce the conviction that the EU is not interested in burden sharing with Turkey, but more in burden shifting. This would support the claim that European governments indeed view Turkey as a protective and peripheral buffer zone, a peripheral buffer zone which is in the very interest of the EU, in particular from the perspective of maximizing internal security.473 This raises questions about whether or not an eventual Turkish membership is actually wanted. Drawing upon Marchetti, it would not make sense to offer Turkey full EU membership because this would largely undermine the buffer function. Although the rhetoric used by EU member states, Germany and France in particular, does not address this issue in these terms in public, they do question Turkey’s EU membership bid in general.

On the other hand, the slow progress, especially in the area of asylum issues, can be attributed in part to the mindset of the Turkish officials dealing with migration policies.474 It is evident that the Turkish concept of national identity needs to be reconsidered, given the fact that the current Turkish practice regarding asylum restricts the possibility of settlement and integration only to individuals who are of “Turkish descent and culture.”475 As examined in chapter 3, it turns out that the founders of the Turkish Republic very much emphasized the cultural (ethnic) homogeneity of Turks and opposed, in that way, non-Turkish immigration.476 The geographical limitation of the 1951 Convention and the practice of resettling refugees to third countries should therefore be viewed against a cultural and ideological background. Likewise, it should be recognized that Turkish migration policy is shaped for a great deal by outdated legislation that is based on events that occurred before the Second World War. Although Turkey still does not want to view itself as a country that is open to immigration, it 472

Honor Mahony, “France lays down the law on Turkey's EU progress”.

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1996): 309.

474 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 100.

475 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 89-90.

476 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1996): 309.

473

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must, however, recognize that the world has changed dramatically since 1934.477 Certainly, it will be difficult to change these concepts in the mindset of the Turkish officials, but this change may help Turkey to succeed in solving and addressing migration issues in the 21st century.

Refoulement The 2008 Progress Report mentions that there are still cases of refoulement occurring in Turkey, and although they are not ‘numerous’ this is a high concern according to the EU Commission.478 The principle of refoulement concerns “the expulsion of persons who have the right to be recognised as refugees”.479 To protect refugees from being returned to places where their lives could be threatened, the principle of non-refoulement has been laid out in international refugee law, specifically in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 33(1) concerning the Prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”) provides that: 1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

It should be stressed that the principle of non-refoulement not only forbids the expulsion of refugees to their country of origin, but also to any country in which their lives or freedoms might be threatened. The only exception to this, as stated in article 33(2), is if the person to be expelled constitutes a danger to the community of that 477

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 309.

478 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72.

479 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Migration > Glossary > Refoulement”, Social and Human Sciences, International Migration and Multicultural Policies. Available at: http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.phpURL_ID=4145&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last accessed August 7th 2009).

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country (national security). In the next section, Turkey’s progress in taking over the formal procedures for determining refugee status is further examined.

Status determination Currently, Turkey is far from implementing refugee status determination procedures.

Turkey is still not capable of managing status determination and integration of refugees and asylum seekers smoothly. Another important and related point is the protection granted to asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey. The protection of asylum seekers remains a high concern while this practice is not in line with EU acquis standards.480 It must, however, be emphasized that the Turkish government has increased its spending to cover the basic needs of asylum seekers, including recognised refugees, “temporary asylum seekers”, and “guests”. Whereas the government spent US$ 135,000 in 2006, it increased this spending up to US$ 550,000 in 2007. Although this can be welcomed as a positive development, further changes in the political and economic realm are still needed. But also assistance and guidance by the EU seem to be critical to reach the level where Turkey can manage status determination procedures on its own.481 The 2008 Progress Report urges Turkey to continue with the training of Turkish officials on refugee status determination procedures. But more importantly, once they have been trained, they need to stay up to date regarding the new asylum and migration system.

Turkey’s civil society is still very limited compared to EU standards, in particular with respect to the network of NGOs addressing refugee needs. Therefore, the Progress Report also calls for the mobilisation of and cooperation with these NGOs and local authorities in order to contribute to an effective integration strategy for refugees and asylum seekers. The Progress Report stresses that cooperation between NGOs and local authorities are “the keys to integration of asylum seekers.”482 The Progress Report further calls for reducing the fees for the six-month temporary residence permits.

Lowering these fees can facilitate the self-reliance of refugees and is therefore perceived as important for integration into Turkey. However, a crucial element for Turkey is the need to show willingness to allow for the integration of the asylum seekers and refugees

480

Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 80-81.

481 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 89-90.

482 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72.

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concerned, which Turkey has strongly resisted up until today. 483 When Turkey signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, it did so with the reservation that refugees in Turkey would not be granted rights that go beyond those enjoyed by Turkish citizens. Current practices illustrate this quite well. For example, acquiring a work permit in Turkey is practically impossible for asylum seekers, although, following the Law on the Work Permits of Foreigners, they are entitled to work and receive social assistance in Turkey.484 Although the Turkish government has a legal obligation, it fails to offer social assistance programmes for asylum seekers. At this stage, the close link between asylum, migrants and illegal migrants becomes particularly apparent, as many seem to be forced to go underground and disappear into illegality. 485 This example shows that there still is ambiguity regarding the implementation of recent reform laws.

Additionally, it shows that an integration strategy should be an integral part of migration policy to ensure that new nationals have a perspective in Turkish society, especially on the labour market.

However, some positive development and progress can be reported in this regard. In the 2008 Progress Report, it is reported that the Turkish Ministry of Interior has initiated the internal administrative procedures to set up an asylum management unit. The EU Commission sees this development as “the first step towards a dedicated authority able to manage both reception and integration issues.”486 Further improvements regarding the administrative capacity and the streamlining of asylum procedures are to be expected in the coming years and should further harmonize Turkish asylum practises with those of the EU. An important challenge for Turkish authorities is to reduce the waiting time for asylum procedures. Many asylum seekers have to wait too long before their applications are processed. Given the increase in the number of asylum applications to Turkey, this practice needs to be improved soon.487 4.5.3 Dilemmas and consequences for Turkey

483

Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 91.

484 Law on the Work Permits of Foreigners, Law No. 4817 of 27 February 2003 published in the Official Gazette No: 6 March 2003: 2540.

485 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 89.

486 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 72.

487 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, 72.

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The opening up of Turkey’s asylum policies to non-Europeans in the years ahead leaves Turkey facing several dilemmas. First of all, a more generous asylum system would mean disturbance in the geographic location that Turkey is situated in.488 Harmonizing its asylum policy will lead to a situation where Turkey’s borders will become softer in the sense that asylum-seekers and refugees can enter Turkey more easily. More importantly, Turkey will have a legal obligation and responsibility to recognize these non-European refugees and asylum-seekers.

Besides, Turkey should let these people integrate into the Turkish society, a sensitive issue for a country that long promoted cultural and ethnic homogeneity.489 In all other areas the EU and Turkey are cooperating to make the Turkish border as hard as possible in order to prevent illegal migrants from accessing the EU via Turkey.

Protecting the EU from unregulated movements of people is one of the most important aspects during the accession process, and, after all, if Turkey would be admitted to the EU, it would form one of the EU’s external borders.490 Along with the process of securitization, Turkey has become one of the countries subject to the immigration debate in Europe. According to Şemşit, in Turkey, migration issues are still not politicized and securitized which is in sharp contrast to the situation in the EU. The following quote shows how the discourse of threats to the internal security and the need to protect EU citizens from possible threats operates in the case of border management: The external borders of the EU play a key role in defining and protecting the area of freedom, security and justice that we all desire.

The control and surveillance of borders contribute to managing flows of persons entering and leaving that area and help protect our citizens from threats to their security. Besides, they constitute a fundamental element in the fight against illegal immigration.491

488

Turkan Ertuna, “Shaping Turkey’s Immigration Policy”, Research paper presented at the ISA Panel Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: Ideas, Identities and Institutions (Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2007): 23.

489 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 101.

490 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 101.

491 Council of the European Union, 11 June 2002, cited in Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe”, New Political Science, Vol. 26, no. 1 (2004): 43.

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Protecting the area of freedom, security, and justice is a response to several fears, among them the fear of mass migration from Turkey to EU member states.

According to Widgren, several aspects feed the importance of migration in EU-Turkey relations. First of all, there is the fact that Turkey is a country at the crossroads of three continents in a relatively unstable region. Secondly, Turkey has been confronted with various types of migration in the past.492 Turkey’s past is reason for concern, particularly if we look at it with securitization theory-lenses. The mass influxes of Kurdish refugees and the increasing number of illegal migrants transiting towards Europe constitute possible sources of problems.

Although we can view the new geographic situation, which progressively includes Turkey in the EU’s legal realm, as an asset for the EU’s foreign policy, Turkey is being confronted with several problems as a consequence. Drawing upon the observations and conclusions of Kemal Kirisçi and Sühal Şemşit, the most outstanding issue is that Turkish government officials fear that Turkey is being built up as a buffer zone (semi periphery) to control the unwanted movements of people into the EU.493 There seems to be some truth in this argument if we add Marchetti’s semi-periphery logic to it. As outlined in the first chapter, Marchetti builds his theory upon the ENP, which he sees as a geopolitical policy of the EU to establish a semi-periphery between it and its farther neighbourhood, its periphery in the words of Marchetti. According to Marchetti, the ENP can be considered as a manifestation of the EU’s will to establish “a ring of states to create – or maintain – a functioning semi-periphery (via its neighbours) in order to establish a ‘buffer zone’ to the periphery (the close periphery)”.494 Applying this logic to the Turkish accession process, the consequence will be that an eventual entry of Turkey into the EU would lead to a situation where the EU would share external borders with ‘close periphery countries’ such as Iran and Iraq. While a semiperiphery around Turkey has not been built, Turkish EU membership would destroy the concept of a semi-periphery.

492

Jonas Widgren, “Turkey on the Threshold to the EU: Will Migration be a Complicating of Facilitating Factor?” Migration and Labour in Europe, ed. Emrehan Zeybekoglu and Bo Johansson (Istanbul: Sefik Matbabasi, 2003): 47.

493 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 88; and Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?”, CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 382.

494 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, Discussion Paper C158, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, 2006): 16-17.

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If the semi-periphery ambition would be given up, this would leave the ENP with some serious implications since the very objective of the ENP, according to Marchetti, is to “establish a semi- periphery around the European Union” with the advantage of “buffering and protecting by at the same time allowing for an increased exchange between the entities involved.”495 A direct geographical link between the EU and the close periphery, Iran and Iraq, would be likely to result in negative externalities for the EU’s internal security. Because without a semi-periphery, the EU would not be able to establish closer links with its neighbours, it would not be able to fulfill its stabilization and strengthening functions anymore. According to Marchetti, “the application of this sort of co-operative constraint is in the vital interest of the EU, because it enables the Union to acquire security and maintain or even gain a certain level of regional influence.”496 Because of these reasons, an abandonment of the semiperiphery ambition is highly unlikely. It allows the EU to increase its leverage in this troublesome region but, most of all, it allows it to protect the centre from possible threats that could be slipped into the EU via the close periphery.

Building a new semi-periphery around Turkey (to allow for Turkish membership) would require a broadening of the ENP to govern relations at the current periphery. This would mean that Iraq and Iran, who have been close periphery countries, would become semi-periphery countries and therefore should be included in the ENP. This could provide opportunities for the EU’s foreign policy in a region which would then actually become Europe’s backyard. However, many in the EU also realize the implications of such a move: “In order to prevent the emergence of long-time negative effects that might fall back on the centre, the centre eventually needs to offer sustainable positive effects to the semi-periphery.”497 In other words, the EU would need to strengthen relations with the new semi-periphery countries and in addition offer them concrete benefits like it has offered to other semi-periphery states, for example offering a stake in the internal market. This is necessary to prevent growing asymmetries because, according to Marchetti, “a comprehensive policy has to combine protective and cooperative measures, i.e. it needs to apply co-operative constraint”.498 Marchetti explains 495

Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, Discussion Paper C158, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, 2006): 27.

496 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, 27.

497 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, Discussion Paper C158, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, 2006): 26.

498 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, 26.

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that the EU cannot have an interest in growing asymmetries because the costs of assuring the own benefits increase with a rise in asymmetries.

The higher the differences are, the higher are the costs to maintain just these differences – the lesser the differences, the smaller the costs.

Therefore, the EU has a vital interest in lessening the differences. This will, however, not lead to equaling out the differences but lead to an equilibrium between profits and costs: adjustment takes place until the maintenance costs are equal to or less than the – perceived – gains.499 A third option might be that Turkey would become a special sort of member state that can continue to function as semi-periphery while being simultaneously a member state of the EU. This option seems paradoxical in the sense that although Turkey would belong to the EU as an official member state, it would at the same time need to function as a semi-periphery country. Thus, Turkey would neither be an ENP country (semiperiphery) nor would it be a full member of the EU. It is unclear if Turkey, in such a situation, would be able to handle the asylum seekers and illegal immigrants that come from ‘close periphery countries’.500 As experienced in the past, Turkey views these neighboring areas to be highly unstable and prone to refugee movements to Turkey.

Turkish governments officials are convinced that “the very nature of the political regimes in Iran and Iraq make Turkey a natural country of asylum for people fleeing these countries.”501 Therefore, in such a scenario there would probably need to be a limitation to the free movement of people from Turkey to the EU, which will probably not be accepted by Ankara.

Undoubtedly, the costs of meeting the EU requirements, in this case adopting the EU acquis on asylum, are quite significant. According to Kirisci, it remains to be seen whether Turkey has the capacity to accomplish this. At the moment, Turkey seems not ready to carry out the tasks associated with the requirements the EU prescribes in the area of asylum and illegal migration. As argued by Kirisci, Turkey is currently not 499

Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, 26.

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1996): 309.

501 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 308.

500

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ready to do this bureaucratically, organizationally, and socio-economically. 502 The scenario of Turkey becoming a country of first asylum will further bring a significant administrative and economic burden to Turkey. However, this issue must not be exaggerated as every accession process also offers both financial as well as technical assistance. Turkey can benefit from this assistance in order to meet the requirements of the EU.503 A more general and not as easily addressed issue is the ‘deep mistrust’ that seems to exist among Turkish officials and increasingly also among Turkish public opinion at large. The 2007 Eurobarometer survey showed that only 49 percent of the Turks still consider EU membership a “good thing”. There seems to be a growing group of Turks who are distrustful of the EU because they wonder why Turkey should meet all the tough EU requirements if the majority of Europeans do not want to see Turkey in the EU anyway.504 The distrustfulness of many Turks becomes very clear when looking at the percentage of Turks that still believe that Turkey will actually join the EU. According to a German Marshall Fund survey, this percentage was 26 percent in 2007, compared to 56 percent among EU citizens.505 These feelings are not only present among ordinary Turks, also Turkish governments and elites do not seem to be confident about the EU’s real intentions and its seriousness to assist Turkey to full EU membership at times.506 Evidence to stimulate the Turkish feeling that the EU is not taking Turkey seriously enough as a prospective member is the manner in which the EU regulates its migration policies. These policies are closely connected with controlled and strict immigration rules that privilege only those highly skilled wanted migrants, while the economically, socially or politically disadvantaged migrants are left out of the EU.507 As this is happening, Turkey is required to control illegal migration, while at the same time, Turkey is asked to introduce an asylum system that will let people in more easily, in particular those coming from non-European countries. In addition, Turkey is obliged to recognize these 502

Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 89.

503 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 100.

504 EurActive Web Page, “Turkey in the EU - What the public thinks”, Policy section EU Priorities and Opinion, published on 29 May 2008. Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/turkey-eu-publicthinks/article-171187 (last accessed August 7th 2009).

505 EurActive Web Page, “Turkey in the EU - What the public thinks”.

506 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 101-102.

507 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 101.

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people as official refugees or process their asylum applications. These issues further feed into the distrust that already exists among many officials and the rather turbulent general relation that Turkey maintains with the EU. 4.5.4 The carrot-stick approach and the old game between Turkey and the EU As was the case during the 2004 enlargement round, candidate member states often experience serious difficulties on their road to EU membership. Indeed, becoming a member of the EU is not an easy task for most candidates, as they are confronted with a rather large acquis that must be embraced.508 As witnessed in the 2004 enlargement, for example in the case of Poland, the strength of the EU membership perspective helped the Polish government elites to overcome the tough challenges in transforming the old Poland into a Poland which seemed ready to take on the responsibility of full EU membership. As argued by Şemşit, Turkey enjoys a much weaker membership perspective compared to Poland, which results in a rather slow response when it comes to implementing legislation in migration issues.509 In fact Şemşit comes to the conclusion that the key factor in the pace of Europeanization in migration issues is the strength of full membership perspective for the country. As Europeanization in toughest matters is directly associated with full membership in the Turkish National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration (TNAPAM),510 the pace of policy transfer is likely to depend on the strength of EU membership perspective.511 In other words, we observed a clear carrot-stick approach in Poland’s enlargement process, in which “full membership served as an attractive and motivating carrot” and, in that sense, EU conditionality was crucial for the development and alignment of migration policies.512 In the case of Turkey’s bid to become a member of 508

John Redmond, “Turkey and the European Union: troubled European or European trouble?”

International Affairs, Vol. 83, no. 2 (2007): 311.

509 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 368.

510 The TNAPAM was prepared by Turkish authorities in December 2004.

511 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 383.

512 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 382.

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the EU, we notice a different pattern. Turkey stands apart in the sense that ‘the carrot’, the prospect full EU membership, is much weaker and much more uncertain than it was for Poland. This is surely a factor which helps explain the turbulent relations between Turkey and the EU. In fact, it has continued the ‘old game’ that is played by Turkey and the EU. Buzan and Diez characterise this game as follows: •

apparent promises of full membership to Turkey by the European Union Community (EC);

•

strong commitments to, and expectation of, eventual membership by Turkey;

•

slow implementation of their commitments by both sides.513 Although the 1963 Ankara Agreements granted Turkey the status of associate

membership of the EC, this status was mainly granted to improve Turkey’s economic situation.514 Still, the EU has made strong commitments and promises of an eventual Turkish membership. As argued by Redmond, this policy has at times been “unclear, ambiguous, or even misleading to the extent that it has at times encouraged high expectations on Turkey’s part when in reality there was no possibility of the country’s accession in the foreseeable future.”515 According to Brand, the rather ambivalent approach of the EU has always been ‘two faced’ in the sense that the longstanding Turkish wish to become a member of the Union was always publicly supported, but behind the scenes, it has been doubted all along if this wish would ever be realized.516 In a way, this policy suits the EU very well, because the EU has always had a certain degree of ambiguity in the relationship with Turkey. Others argue that the EU’s behaviour can be considered as ‘self-serving’ in the sense that the EU needed Turkey on board for security reasons, while its approach in other areas and on occasion was most “unfriendly and insensitive, even hostile”.517 Consequently, Turkey showed slow implementation and “has simply failed to deliver on many of its commitments to the EU”.518 However, this started to change when Turkey was accepted as a candidate 513

Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey”, Survival, Vol. 41, no 1 (1999): 42.

Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey”, 42-43.

515 John Redmond, “Turkey and the European Union: troubled European or European trouble?”

International Affairs, Vol. 83, no. 2 (2007): 307.

516 Michiel Brand, “The enlarging Europe and its implications for the concept of European identity: the case of Turkey”, Tilburg Foreign Law Review, Vol. 12, no. 2 (2004): 104.

517 John Redmond, “Turkey and the European Union: troubled European or European trouble?”

International Affairs, Vol. 83, no. 2 (2007): 307.

518 John Redmond, “Turkey and the European Union: troubled European or European trouble?”

International Affairs, Vol. 83, no. 2 (2007): 307.

514

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country of the EU in 1999. The status of candidate member of the EU resulted in an extensive reform process, which showed catalysing effects whenever the EU responded positively to Turkey’s approaches and progress.519 In this period, Turkey has indeed shown an active willingness and cooperation with the EU to adopt EU legislation in the field of migration. However, in contrast to this is the situation when the EU appears to turn away from Turkey because of slow and imperfect progress on the part of Turkey; this results in a strengthening of the nationalist opponents of reform. When these nationalist opponents of reform become more dominant, a vicious cycle seems to be born that slows down reform completely. 520 Therefore, EU support and more generally EU credibility are essential to further stimulate reform and alignment with the EU acquis in Turkey. For its part, the EU needs to show a willingness to integrate Turkey.

Given the vicious cycle presented by Verney, the uncertainties concerning the outcome of the EU accession process in Turkey risk that Turkey will be further discouraged instead of stimulated to proceed with further important changes. EU conditionality, offering full membership perspective and also a more concrete timetable, are in my opinion important elements in this regard, while they both assist Turkey during the difficult accession process and will, presumably, make change and reform visible earlier and more effective than is the case now.

4.6 Concluding remarks This chapter started with discussing Turkish visa policy, in which Turkey, according to the European Commission, did not make any meaningful progress in 2008. There was no development on alignment with EU visa lists, and the sticker- and stamp-type visas are still issued when entering Turkey. Obviously, it must be very difficult for Turkey to leave behind its liberal visa policy, which allowed millions of people of neighbouring countries to enter Turkey relatively freely. In addition, Turkey fears that cross-border trade and its regional bilateral relations might be negatively affected if it eventually adopts the Schengen acquis in full.

The chapter continued with the management of the external borders of the EU, which is perceived as a crucial element of the harmonization process. In the Turkish case, the long land and long sea borders complicate matters even further. During the accession process, Turkey was asked to implement the Schengen acquis; among other 519

Susannah Verney, “National identity and political change on Turkey’s road to EU membership”, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, no. 3 (2007): 219.

520 Susannah Verney, “National identity and political change on Turkey’s road to EU membership”, 219.

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things, this means that Turkey should increase its border surveillance duties. Because the two latest progress reports mention that only limited progress has been made on alignment with the acquis concerning external borders and Schengen, Turkey should intensify its efforts.

Discussing the progress on external borders undoubtedly means addressing the fight against illegal migration. This section underlined that in the EU, the issue of migration, and the issue of illegal immigrants in particular, are perceived as a danger to domestic society because the securitization process has framed the issue as a security problem. As argued by Şemşit, illegal migration became synonymous for the “undesired form of human mobility” which is often treated as a criminal act. The EU and its member states ‘legitimize’ in this way the need for surveillance, detention, control, and penalization of illegal migrants.521 This also holds true for candidate countries while the EU exports its legislation, via the acquis. In this way, candidate countries, such as Turkey, are being confronted with restrictive measures because of the fact that the EU and EU member states perceive migratory flows from neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, as a threat to the stability and welfare of their societies, especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.522 In the case of Turkey, the latest developments show an increasing trend in the number of illegal migrants which could threaten to move on to the EU, and this makes the prevention of illegal migration from Turkey to the EU a hot topic in Turkey’s accession process.

This chapter also provided evidence in favour of the main arguments of this thesis. It was concluded that European governments do indeed perceive Turkey as a protective or peripheral buffer zone against people wanting to reach Europe. For example, the intense criticisms coming from EU member states concerning asylum issues reinforce the conviction that the EU is not interested in burden sharing with Turkey, but more in burden shifting. This would support the claim that European governments indeed view Turkey as a protective and peripheral buffer zone. The peripheral buffer zone is in the interests of the EU, in particular from the perspective of maximizing internal security.

According to the theory of Marchetti, the semi-periphery buffer forms a crucial element in the EU’s neighbourhood policy because it protects the EU from 521

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 372.

522 Sedef Eylemer, Suhal Semsit and Ilkay Tas, “Securitization of migration policies in EU’s relations with its neighbourhood”, Research paper of Dokuz Eylul University, Institute of Social Sciences, Graduate Department of EU Studies.

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unstable, less developed, and unfriendly states.523 This raises questions as to whether or not an eventual Turkish membership is actually wanted. Drawing upon the theory as presented by Marchetti, it would not make sense to offer Turkey full EU membership because this would largely undermine the buffer function.

If Turkey would eventually become a member, this would mean that either: 1) a new semi-periphery needs to be built around Turkey; 2) the concept of a continuous semi-periphery would be destroyed, implying that the buffer to the periphery would not exist anymore; 3) Turkey would become a special sort of member state that can continue to function as semi-periphery while being a member state of the EU. The first option, building a new semi-periphery around Turkey, is in my opinion the most likely to happen. In this way, the EU could increase its leverage in a rather troublesome region but, most important of all, this option is in line with securitization theory, in that the EU takes its role as protector seriously. After all, the EU should protect the centre from possible threats that could spill over from the close periphery into the EU. Because of these reasons, a renewed semi-periphery to secure the centre and gain influence at the periphery is the most likely alternative if Turkey eventually joins the EU. Furthermore, it was illustrated that the leading European heads of state are lukewarm at best about the idea to accelerate the process of Turkey coming closer to membership of the EU. The urgency with which the EU wants Turkey to sign readmission agreements is an example that shows that the buffer zone function will remain a very important aspect of EU-Turkey relations.

Lastly, the chapter considered the dilemmas and consequences for Turkey. The most important issues concern the re-orientation that Turkey needs to undertake in terms of recognizing non-European refugees and asylum-seekers. Besides, Turkey should let these people integrate into the Turkish society, which is a sensitive issue for a country that long promoted cultural and ethnic homogeneity.

523

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3, (1996): 309.

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Chapter 5| Conclusion and Recommendations 5.1 Introduction In this chapter, answers will be formulated to my research questions “How did Turkish migration policy develop, particularly since the end of the Cold War? What was the influence of European Integration on these changes?” These central questions were divided into three sub-questions that helped me formulate the concluding remarks. The sub-questions that were raised in this master’s thesis are as follows: 1. How has European cooperation developed in the area of EU migration policies?

2. What are the most significant developments in Turkish migration policies, in particular since the end of the Cold War, and how did influence of the EU affect those developments?

3. What are the remaining incompatibilities of Turkish (im)migration law and practices with EU regulations? How do these incompatibilities and underlying dilemmas relate to the accession process and to meeting the requirements of the EU? Before I move on, I will briefly explain how this last chapter will unfold. First, a concise summary of my thesis will be presented, including my main conclusions. I will then analyse the implications of my main conclusions and acknowledge the limitations of my research. Finally, I will come up with a few suggestions for further research on this topic.

5.2 Concise summary 5.2.1 The Evolution of European cooperation in the field of migration When the numbers of asylum seekers in Western Europe started to rise from the 1970s onwards, a new era emerged in which the EC started to introduce restrictive and control-oriented measures to prevent large population movements. In the beginning, cooperation among EC member states took place on an intergovernmental basis.524 This 524

Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, Ankara Review of European Studies, Vol. 5, no. 3 (2006): 117.

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rather loose form of cooperation lacked, however, adequate institutional structures, legal instruments as well as concrete objectives. Things dramatically changed when the European integration project was relaunched in the 1980s.525 Especially the 1986 Single European Act should be mentioned in this context as it aimed to complete the single market by the end of 1992 and created “an area without frontiers, in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.”526 The prospect of the abolition of the internal borders boosted cooperation in asylum and migration issues, as there was a perceived need to protect the EC’s internal stability and security. The revised Schengen agreement was illustrative for the shift towards securing and controlling the EC’s external borders.

The shift to a restrictive approach came as a direct response to the securitization of migration issues.527 In fact, since the end of the 1980s, migration issues in Europe have been increasingly perceived as threats to national security and stability. Viewed through the lenses of securitization theory, migration has increasingly become a phenomenon that needs to be controlled, restricted, and if possible reduced. Because of the fact that the phenomenon of migration has been portrayed as a threat to public order and stability, there seems to be a kind of fear that comes with it. The theory of securitization views the construction of threats to security as the result of a social process, which is analyzed by examining securitizing speech-acts. These speech-acts articulate threats and fears and consequently legitimize the very need to protect public order and preserve domestic stability. Issues then become actually “securitized” by the mere fact that these speech-acts represent a particular issue as a security situation and are accepted as such by an audience. For example, in the case of illegal migration, we notice that this issue is presented as an existential threat to the EU. The perceived necessity of internal security as well as the perceived threats posed by illegal migration and immigration resulted it the fact that these issues have become securitized, and up until today we notice this by the speech-acts and the common regulations that have been set up, for example the Schengen agreement, readmission agreements, and the 525

Jorg Monar, “The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Forces and Costs”.

Journal of Common Market Studies, no 39 (2001): 748.

526 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 562.

527 Didier Bigo, Polices en résaux. L’expérience européenne (Paris: Presses de Science Po, 1996); Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5, pp 751-777; and Dora Kostakopoulou, “The Protective Union: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, no. 3 (1998): 497-518.

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protection of the EU’s external borders.528 So, the securitization of migration policy in Europe must be viewed as the portrayal of the phenomenon of migration as a threat to public order and stability, but also to cultural identity and to the stability of the labour market.529 The revised Schengen agreement connected migration issues to threatening phenomena such as terrorism and organized crime and to the need to have strict border controls.530 According to Virgine Guiraudon, EU migration officials linked the European integration project and migration to security issues by emphasizing the negative and potentially criminal activities associated with free movement of goods, persons and capital.531 As EU member states, most notably Germany, were confronted with increasing numbers of asylum seekers after 1989, the time seemed ripe to find common solutions on the European level. The question of migration was pushed onto the agenda for the 1991 IGC, which ultimately resulted in the Treaty on European Union, which can be considered as the first step towards the EU’s external migration policy. According to securitization theory, migration was now incorporated into the supranational dimension of the perceived necessity of internal security and the perceived threats posed by migrants and asylum-seekers.532 The treaty included cooperation on asylum, external borders, immigration, drugs, fraud and judicial, customs, and police cooperation in a separate pillar (the so-called third pillar).

However, as cooperation was exclusively intergovernmental it soon turned out that the high expectations could not be realised.533 A new treaty was signed in Amsterdam in 1997, which marked a fundamental point in the evolution of European cooperation in migration and asylum policy. The treaty aimed to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction

528

Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, no. 4 (2003): 513.

529 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, Journal of Common Markets Studies, Vol. 38, no. 5 (2000): 751-777.

530 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 751-777.

531 Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2000): 260.

532 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration”, 756-758.

533 Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, Ankara Review of European Studies, Vol. 5, no. 3 (2006): 117-118.

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with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.534 Migration is still portrayed as a security problem; Sarah Collinson is right when stating that “the [Draft] Amsterdam Treaty […] represents one of the clearest statements to date of the internal security rationale that underpins and largely defines European cooperation in the era of immigration and asylum policies.”535 The conclusion can be drawn that security issues remain the most important impetus for closer cooperation in the field of migration. This also becomes clear when looking at later cooperation and agreements, such as those in Tampere in 1999 and the continuing fight against illegal migration. In addition, the restrictive and controloriented approach of the EU can be illustrated by common regulation on visa policy, the facilitation of readmission agreements, and the establishment of Eurodac. In all these regulations and measures, migration became connected to the necessity to protect a certain level of internal security while emphasis was put, in speech-acts, on the negative and potentially criminal nature associated with the free movement of goods, persons, and capital.536 5.2.2 Developments in Turkish migration policies Not only was a securitization process developed in the policy-making on migration internally, but migration became securitized in the enlargement process of the EU as well. For this reason, it has been interesting to look at the development of Turkish migration policy, in particular since the end of the Cold War. The emphasis was on the influence EU integration has had on the changes of Turkish migration policy.

In tracing back the origins of Turkey’s migration policy, I conclude that it has been largely shaped by several major developments since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The legal documents which regulate migration into Turkey are very much guided by the concept of national identity and the principle of cultural unity (the ideal of a uniform and homogeneous population). The 1934 Law on 534

Ben Hall and Ashish Bhatt, “Policing Europe EU Justice and Home Affairs co-operation” (London: Centre for European Reform, 1999), 10. Available online at: http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p130_policing_europe.pdf (last accessed May 16, 2009).

535 Sarah Collinson, “Coherent Interests? Coherent Policies? The Development of a ‘Common’ Migration Policy in the European Union?” Conference Paper prepared for University of Notre Dame (Nanovic Institute for European Studies, 1998): 4.

536 Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2000): 260.

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Settlement (Law 2510) and the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees illustrate this quite nicely.537 In fact, Turkey welcomed many migrants, but full refugee status was only granted to those people who qualified as potential immigrants, namely to people of ‘Turkish descent and culture’.538 All other migrants fall under the provisions of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, which Turkey signed with a geographical limitation. This meant that Turkey only had an obligation to admit refugees and asylumseekers that came from Europe. Others with de jure refugee status were eventually resettled in third countries by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR). Apart from the minimal costs of the sheltering and resettling of refugees, Turkey was confronted with only a small group of immigrants that remained or acquired Turkish citizenship as a result of marriages.539 While being its reflection, this policy also kept the ideal of a ‘homogenous Turkish society’ alive.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey is experiencing new forms of migration, most notably transit migration, illegal migration and growing numbers of asylum seekers who come increasingly from non-European countries.540 Traditionally, refugee movements involved mainly migration from the Balkans. The mass influx of Iranians as a result of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 can be considered as a turning point, because from then on, more and more migrants from the Middle-East region and from Africa started to come to Turkey. The response of the Turkish governments to the changing nature of migration movements was in fact quite flexible. For example, the Iranians could enter Turkey without fulfilling the necessary visa requirements and, in this way, they enjoyed the right to temporarily stay in Turkey.

This policy worked reasonably well until the late 1980s.541 From then on, other nationals began to profit from this Turkish practice as well; among them were many Iraqi immigrants, but also immigrants from Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, and Palestine.542 The arrival of all these new immigrants, and especially the mass influx of almost half a million Kurdish Iraqis in 1990-1991 following the Gulf 537

Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, Ankara Review of European Studies, Vol. 5, no. 3 (2006): 126.

538 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, no. 3 (2000): 4.

539 Kemal Kirisci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, 11.

540 Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, 126.

541 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1996): 296.

542 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1996): 298.

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crisis, made Turkish authorities feel that migration movements were getting beyond their control and would turn Turkey into a country of first asylum. Turkey responded with the 1994 Regulation on Asylum in order to control (illegal) migration movements better.543 Whether this new piece of legislation was indeed effective is questionable, given the fact that irregular migration between 1994 and 2001 accelerated sharply and an increasing number of migrants became illegal while they overstayed their visa.

Although Turkish authorities stress that illegal migration into Turkey is declining, largely because of their restrictive policies, they cannot deny the fact that Turkey still forms a major country of destination for illegal migratory flows. In addition, Turkey has become a popular place for transit migrants who try to make it to Europe. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 200,000 migrants use Turkey as a transit route each year.544 Particularly Turkey’s geographical location and relative economic success and prosperity are attracting factors to these transit migrants, but, more importantly, the restrictive immigration policies of the EU with strict border controls around the external borders of the EU result in the fact that many migrants end up in Turkey since it forms a peripheral buffer zone around the European Union.545 All this reinforces the belief, and serves to a large extent as evidence for Turkey, that Western European states are not prepared for burden sharing with Turkey. In the perception of Turkish officials, this reinforces their belief that Western European governments see Turkey as “a protective buffer zone against people wanting to reach the West.”546 The fear of becoming a buffer zone or a dumping ground for unwanted immigrants by the EU also becomes apparent in the debate on the readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU. Turkey has not yet finalised such an agreement with the EU, primarily because Turkish government officials are concerned that once a readmission agreement with the EU is signed, Turkey would become a buffer zone and dumping ground for unwanted immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees by the EU.547 543

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 299.

544 Pierre Hecker, “Focus Migration: Country Profile Turkey”, focus MIGRATION (Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics, 2006): 6.

545 Ahmet Içduygu, “Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses”, Project Muse, 89-90.

546 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1996): 309.

547 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?”, CEU Political Science Journal, no 4 (2008): 382; and Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 88.

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Not only the fear of becoming a buffer zone should be addressed in this context, but also the EU’s behaviour towards Turkey.

In fact, the EU’s behaviour is an important indicator that Turkey is not seen as a serious candidate for EU membership. First of all, from the onset, it was clear that the perspective of full membership for Turkey is much weaker and much more uncertain than it was, for example, for Poland. The turbulent EU-Turkey relations are crucial for understanding this. After all, since 1963, the EU seems to play a game with Turkey in which the EU makes promises of full membership resulting, however, in slow implementation because, in practice, there was no possibility for Turkey to accede to the EU.548 The more recent and ongoing debate since 2004 about the issue of Turkish membership, in which negative sounds and criticisms are often articulated by EU heads of state, seem to have a counter-productive effect upon Turkey. Both government elites and citizens in Turkey seem to loose confidence in the EU’s real intentions and its seriousness to assist and encourage Turkey towards full membership of the EU.549 Closely related to the Turkish feeling that the EU is not taking Turkey seriously enough as a prospective member is the manner in which the EU regulates its migration policies. These policies are closely connected to controlled and strict immigration rules that privilege only highly skilled wanted migrants, while the economically, socially, or politically disadvantaged migrants are left out of the EU.550 As this is happening, Turkey is required to control illegal migration, while at the same time it is asked to introduce an asylum system that will let people in more easily, in particular those coming from nonEuropean countries. In addition, Turkey is obliged to recognize these people as official refugees or process their asylum applications. These issues further feed into the distrust that already exists among many Turkish officials and the rather turbulent relations that Turkey maintains with the EU. 5.2.3 Pressure for change: the influence of EU integration After the Helsinki European Council of 1999, in which Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate member state, the EU got more involved in and gained

548

John Redmond, “Turkey and the European Union: troubled European or European trouble?”

International Affairs, Vol. 83, no. 2 (2007): 307.

549 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 101-102.

550 Kemal Kirisi, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 101.

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leverage over Turkish migration policies.551 In the area of asylum, the influence of the EU becomes apparent in that Turkey is now seriously considering lifting the geographical limitation, a move that it had previously persistently refused. The international community, but in particular the EU, have criticized the limitation and the practice accompanying it on several occasions and called for the elimination of this limitation as soon as possible. The year 2012 is now mentioned as a deadline for the lifting of the ‘geographical limitation’.552 Concerning the harmonization of Turkish visa policy, I conclude that the majority of the negative visa list is already harmonized. However, Turkey needs to further harmonize with the EU’s visa list, as there still exists inconsistency between the EU’s negative visa list and that of Turkey.553 On other issues concerning visa policy, less progress has been made so far. According to the 2008 Progress Report on Turkey, there are still sticker- and stamp-type visas issued at the Turkish border. The slow progress in aligning Turkish visa policy with that of the EU is partly caused by the fact that Turkey fears that introducing visa requirements and tight border controls for those countries with which Turkey maintains close relations might result in negative consequences for Turkey.554 Obviously for Turkey it must be very difficult to leave behind its liberal visa policy, which has allowed millions of people of neighbouring countries to enter Turkey relatively freely. In addition, Turkey fears that cross-border trade and regional bilateral relations might be negatively affected if it eventually adopted the Schengen acquis in full.555 In addition, Turkey expects that irregular migration will increase as a result of the introduction of stricter terms of entry. All this remains to be seen, but in any case, as Lavenex emphasized, “making the border control tighter does not necessarily lead to a decrease in irregular migration as expected.”556

551

Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, Ankara Review of European Studies, Vol. 5, no. 3 (2006): 126.

552 Hasan Keser, “Justice and Home Affairs: Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Immigration policy in the light of the Central and Eastern European experience”, 124.

553 Europawebsite, “Turkey : adoption of the community acquis”, Summaries of EU legislation. Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/community_acquis_turkey/e22 113_en.htm (last accessed August 2nd 2009).

554 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 377.

555 Kemal Kirisci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of “Soft Power”: The Experience of Turkey”, European Journal of Migration and Law, no. 7 (2005): 350.

556 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 379.

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The management of external borders is another issue of concern, and, as such, a critical aspect in the current accession process between Turkey and the EU. Turkish land and sea borders are important gateways for transit migrants who try to make it to the EU.557 As the EU perceives illegal migration as a threat, Turkey is expected to implement tighter border surveillance and unify border controls under a single civilian institution. In 2008, Turkey made only limited progress on alignment with the acquis concerning external borders and Schengen, which means that Turkey should intensify its efforts.558 Turkey is also under extreme pressure from the EU to suppress illegal migration, which has increased enormously since the end of the Cold War. In the field of readmission agreements, the EU’s influence becomes once again visible. Readmission agreements are part of the EU’s wider strategy for combating illegal migration, which was long resisted by Turkey. However, with the prospect of EU membership, the Turkish position started to change, more specifically following the publication of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis,559 which states that Turkey will initiate, in the medium term, the practises on readmission and expulsion in addition to the alignment with the EU legislation required in the pre-accession process. The Turkish government will continue to sign readmission agreements with neighbouring countries and countries of origin covering Turkish citizens, persons illegally transiting through Turkey, and foreign nationals caught during illegal residence in Turkey. In this vein, Turkey aims to conclude readmission agreements first with its Eastern neighbouring countries, and then with countries East of these countries, and finally with its Western neighbouring countries.560 The change of the Turkish policy meant that, first, readmission agreements with sending countries (eastern neighbours) had to be concluded, followed by the transit countries 557

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 378.

558 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 73.

559 Official Journal of the Republic of Turkey No. 25178 bis, of 24 July 2003. Available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/NPAA/up.htm (last accessed August 6th 2009).

560 National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, Official Gazette 25178 24 July 2003. Available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/NPAA/up.htm (last accessed August 6th 2009).

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(the neighbours of the eastern neighbours), and finally the target countries (western neighbouring countries).561 Despite the pressure and the efforts that Turkish security forces undertake, there are some signs that illegal migration is currently still increasing in volume. In this respect, I conclude that there are still many illegal migrants that enter Turkey from economically and politically unstable regions; either they enter Turkey as a transit route to the EU or as destination country.562 From the perspective of the EU this is quite alarming since the issue of migration, and the issue of illegal immigrants in particular, are perceived as a danger to domestic society because the securitization process has framed the issue as security problem. As argued by Şemşit, illegal migration became synonymous for the “undesired form of human mobility” which is often treated as a criminal act. The EU and its member states ‘legitimize’ in this way the need for surveillance, detention, control, and penalization of illegal migrants.563 This also holds true for candidate countries while the EU exports its legislation via the acquis. In this way, candidate countries, such as Turkey, are being confronted with restrictive measures because of the fact that the EU and EU member states perceive migratory flows from neighbour countries, such as Turkey, as a threat to the stability and welfare of their societies, especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.564 Illegal migration will remain a hot item in the current accession talks since the EU reported in 2008 that concerning the improvement of the management of illegal migrants in Turkey, only limited progress has been made.565 5.2.4 The reasons for the slow and limited progress The third proposition examined in this thesis states that the remaining incompatibilities and the slow progress and resistance of Turkey to harmonizing migration policy and practices are the result of the way the EU and its member states in particular handle the issue of Turkish EU-membership. I found out that a great deal of the slow and limited progress by Turkey is indeed the result of the way the EU and individual member states 561

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 382.

562 Note of Turkish Embassy in the Netherlands, “Combating Illegal Migration” (The Hague, 2008).

563 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” 372.

564 Selef Eylemer, Suhal Semsit and Ilkay Tas, “Securitisation of migration policies in EU’s relations with its neighbourhood”. Research paper of Dokuz Eylul University, Institute of Social Sciences, Graduate Department of EU Studies.

565 European Commission, “Turkey 2008 Progress Report”, EU Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2699 (Brussels, 05/11/2008): 71.

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deal with Turkish’s wish to become member of the EU. This effect is supported by at least five factors.

First of all, there seems to be a ‘deep mistrust’ of the seriousness with which the EU deals with the whole accession process. This mistrust characterizes many Turkish officials but also increasingly Turkish public opinion at large. The question the Turks ask themselves is why they have to meet all the tough EU requirements if the majority of Europeans do not want to see Turkey in the EU anyway. Indeed, the position of many EU member states on Turkish accession is lukewarm at best.566 This leaves Turkey with the feeling that the EU is not serious about Turkish membership. Unlike for previous candidate countries, the carrot (the perspective of full EU membership) is much weaker and much more uncertain for Turkey. A weaker membership perspective results in a rather slow response to implementing legislation regarding migration issues.567 So the way the EU and its member states handle the issue of Turkish EU-membership can be considered as an explanation for the slow progress and resistance by Turkish officials to harmonizing migration policy and practices.568 Secondly, the costs of meeting the EU requirements are quite significant for Turkey. Turkey’s prospect of becoming a country of first asylum will bring a significant administrative and economic burden to Turkey. 569 Thirdly, slow implementation seems partly the result of the mindset of the Turkish officials dealing with migration policies.570 What is needed is a reconsideration of the Turkish concept of national identity given the fact that current Turkish migration policy and practice restricts the possibility of settlement and integration only to individuals who are of “Turkish descent and culture”.571 The change of mindset is important while there are still Turkish government officials dealing with migration issues who think that Turkey is well equipped to deal with today’s migration challenges.

566

EurActive Web Page, “Turkey in the EU - What the public thinks”, Policy section EU Priorities and Opinion, published on 29 May 2008. Available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/turkey-eu-publicthinks/article-171187 (last accessed August 7th 2009).

567 Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?” CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 368-383.

568 Honor Mahony, “France lays down the law on Turkey's EU progress”, EUobserver Web Page, published on 6 July 2009. Available at: http://euobserver.com/15/28412 (last accessed August 7th 2009).

569 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 89.

570 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 100.

571

Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 89-90.

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In speeding up the progress, this mindset needs to change to allow Turkey to succeed in addressing migration issues in the 21st century.

Fourthly, the prospect of opening up Turkey’s asylum policies to non-Europeans leaves Turkey with quite a few problems. A more generous asylum system would mean disturbance in the geographic location in which Turkey is situated.572 Harmonizing its asylum policy will lead to a situation where Turkey’s borders will become softer in the sense that asylum-seekers and refugees will be able to enter Turkey more easily. More importantly, Turkey will have a legal obligation and responsibility to recognize these non-European refugees and asylum-seekers. Turkey should let these people integrate in the Turkish society, which is a sensitive issue for a country that long promoted cultural and ethnic homogeneity.573 Fifthly, and most importantly, one of the most important reasons for Turkish’s hesitancy or resistance in fulfilling EU expectations regarding migration policy reform is that Turkey fears that it is being built up as a buffer zone (semi periphery) to control the unwanted movements of people into the EU. This relates back to the first reason above. In fact, the fear by the Turkish authorities that this might happen must really be seen as the expression of the overall feeling that Turkey is not taken seriously enough as a prospective member state by the EU. Turkey fears being overwhelmed by asylum seekers and illegal immigrants that come from ‘close periphery countries’.574 As experienced in the past, Turkey views her neighboring areas to be highly unstable and prone to refugee movements to Turkey. Turkish government officials are convinced that “the very nature of political regimes like those in Iran and Iraq make Turkey a natural country of asylum for people fleeing these countries.”575 Viewed from the Turkish perspective, the EU is keen to articulate negative sounds and intense criticisms, but seems less interested in burden sharing with Turkey.

Instead, Turkey feels that the EU is more interested in burden shifting when it comes to migration. For Turkey, this is evidence that European governments, and the EU more generally, indeed view Turkey as a protective and semi-peripheral buffer zone, a semi572

Turkan Ertuna, “Shaping Turkey’s Immigration Policy”, Research paper presented at the ISA Panel Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: Ideas, Identities and Institutions (Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2007): 23.

573 Kemal Kirisci, “The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union – Turkish Relations”, 101.

574 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1996): 309.

575 Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1996): 308.

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peripheral buffer zone which is in the very interest of the EU, in particular from the perspective of maximizing internal security. This leaves Turkey with the question whether or not an eventual Turkish membership is actually wanted.

In this thesis, all this was connected to Marchetti’s semi-periphery logic.

According to the theory of Marchetti, the semi-periphery buffer forms a crucial element in the EU’s neighbourhood policy because it protects the EU from unstable, less developed and unfriendly states.576 Therefore, I conclude that it would not make sense to offer Turkey full EU membership because this would largely undermine the buffer function, which is in the interest of the EU. Membership of the EU does not make sense if Turkey can fulfill its buffer zone function without full membership and if membership means that it cannot. This conclusion supports Turkey’s feeling that indeed, the EU and the individual member states are not serious enough about Turkey. The EU needs this particular buffer function to protect its centre from possible threats, which could spillover from the close-periphery.577 After all, an eventual entry of Turkey into the EU would lead to a situation where the EU would share external borders with ‘close periphery countries’ such as Iran and Iraq. Since a semi-periphery has not been built around Turkey, Turkish EU membership would destroy the concept of a semi-periphery.

So, Turkey as a buffer zone, is in the very interest of the EU’s internal security. If Turkey were to be admitted to the EU, this internal security would be, according to the theory presented by Marchetti, threatened.

I also assessed the scenario in which Turkey will become a member of the EU. I identified three possible alternatives that fit the theory of the semi-periphery logic. The first alternative is that a new semi-periphery would be built around Turkey. Second, the concept of a continuous semi-periphery would be destroyed implying that the buffer to the periphery would not exist anymore. Thirdly, Turkey would become a special sort of member state that could continue to function as semi-periphery while being a member state of the EU. The first alternative, building a new semi-periphery around Turkey, is in my opinion the most likely. In this way, the EU could increase its leverage in a rather 576

Kemal Kirisci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation’? The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey”, 309.

577 Andreas Marchetti, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery”, Discussion Paper C158, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, 2006): 16-17.

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troublesome region, but most important of all, it proves and is in line with securitization theory, in that the EU takes its role as protector seriously. After all, the EU should protect the centre from possible threats that could spill over from the close periphery into the EU. Because of these reasons, a renewed semi-periphery to secure the centre and gain influence at the periphery is the most likely alternative if Turkey eventually joins the EU. The second alternative is unlikely to happen because the EU would not be in control of regulating the EU’s internal security anymore. The third alternative is, in my opinion, paradoxical in the sense that although Turkey would belong to the EU as an official member state, it would at the same time need to function as a semi-periphery country. Thus, Turkey would neither be an ENP country (semi-periphery), nor would it be a full member of the EU. This bad compromise would likely never be accepted by Ankara and additionally is very difficult to establish and to work with considered from the EU perspective.

The conclusion that the Turks have enough reasons to doubt the EU’s real intentions and seriousness comes, perhaps, as no surprise. After all, the rather ambivalent approach of the EU has always been ‘two faced’ in the sense that the longstanding Turkish wish to become member of the Union was always publicly supported, but behind the scenes it has all along been doubted if this wish would ever be realized.578 However, the theoretical underpinning of the semi-periphery logic sheds new light on the case and can even give new hope in Ankara and to all those who would like to see Turkey in the EU. For this to happen there needs, however, to change a lot, both in the EU and in Turkey.

5.3 The implications of the conclusions I now turn to the implications of the conclusions. These implications should be seen as recommendations that try to bridge the research to a practical level. The first conclusion is that security issues have been the most important impetus for closer cooperation in the field of migration and that, in addition, security will remain the most important impetus in the foreseeable future. In the second chapter, it was explained that EU migration officials linked the European Integration project to migration and security issues by stressing the negative and potentially criminal activities associated with free movement of goods, persons, and capital. A critical aspect is that securitization slipped 578

Michiel Brand, “The enlarging Europe and its implications for the concept of European identity: the case of Turkey”, Tilburg Foreign Law Review, Vol. 12, no. 2 (2004): 104.

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into the supranational arena and took, in a way, precedence over the concept of free movement, making the perceived necessity of internal security and the perceived threats (e.g. illegal migrants) the dominant discourse. The consequence of this is that the issue of migration is presented and portrayed as a security problem. This means that the threat, which migration poses according to the securitization discourse, and consequently the need of protecting internal security, will remain a crucial element in future European cooperation in the area of migration.

On a practical level this becomes particularly visible if we look at the enlargement process of the EU. After having witnessed a securitization process internally, it is noticeable that, externally, migration issues are handled as security issues, too. Because the EU possesses a transforming power over candidate countries that want to become members of the EU, the enlargement process will, among other things, involve the effect that migration issues in candidate countries are subject to securitization as well. As seen in previous enlargements, this will impact heavily on candidate countries, resulting in slow progress. However, the carrot of membership perspective will eventually lead to full harmonization in which the policy area of migration becomes securitized as well.

One of the conclusions of the third chapter is that Turkey’s migration policy has been largely shaped by historical developments since the establishment of Turkey in 1923. Migration into Turkey is very much guided by the concept of national identity and the principle of cultural unity. In other words, the ideal is to have a uniform and homogenous population. Turkey managed to keep the ideal of a homogenous Turkish society alive reasonably well. However, since Turkey is experiencing new forms of migration, most notably transit migration, illegal migration, and increasing numbers of non-European asylum seekers, the ideal of a homogenous Turkish society becomes threatened. In the current process of EU accession, Turkey must now harmonize its legislation with that of the EU. This process evolves, however, very slowly. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the mindset of the Turkish officials is still very much tied to the ideal of a homogenous Turkish society. The changing patterns of migration into Turkey since the end of the Cold War ask for a new way of thinking on the part of the Turkish government officials. With the ongoing accession talks, they are now forced to adopt this new mindset. However, even if these officials are willing to adopt this new mindset, this is especially difficult as long as they do not feel that the EU takes Turkey seriously.

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The conclusion regarding the third proposition is that the remaining incompatibilities and the slow progress and resistance of Turkey to harmonizing migration policy and practices, to a great extent, is indeed the result of the way the EU, and its member states in particular, handle the issue of Turkish EU-membership. For the EU and the member states this means that, if they really want to let Turkey progress and eventually let the country join the EU, a dramatic change in behaviour is needed. This conclusion does not mean that we should see Turkey as a victim; Turkey itself can make a difference, too, for example by addressing the mindset issue.

The conclusion that the EU is not serious about Turkey as a prospective member state can be considered as the reason why the harmonization progress is so limited. In the field of migration, Turkey has concrete indications that it is being built up as a buffer zone (semi periphery) to control the unwanted movements of people into the EU. Although Turkey asked for burden sharing, the EU seems less interested in burden sharing. For Turkey, this is evidence that European governments, and the EU more generally, indeed view Turkey as a protective and peripheral buffer zone. The status quo is in the very interest of the EU, because the EU is caught up in a securitized discourse on the implications of migration for internal security.

Although it is widely recognized that Turkey’s prospective EU membership is one of the most controversial issues the EU faces, this conclusion sheds new light on the case. In my opinion, it will mean that the EU, given its ‘seriousness’ and the necessity to preserve the status quo, will not let Turkey become a member of the Union. ‘Plan B’ would mean granting Turkey the status of membership, but before this can happen, the EU should first strengthen its relations in the Middle East. In this way, a new semiperiphery will be in the making, which will guarantee the EU a certain level of internal security. However, it remains to be seen if the EU succeeds in building such a new ‘ring of friends’, especially given the current state of affairs in countries like Iran and Iraq.

Obviously, Turkey could help the EU in this process as mediator between East and West. Turkey will then however expect more concrete commitments from the EU, most notably a clearer full membership perspective.

5.4 The limitations of this research Notwithstanding the importance of this study I need to mention a few shortcomings and limitations. A first limitation is the fact that I have personally chosen to select the policy area of migration to research the suggestion that the EU is not serious enough about 155

Turkey as a prospective member. For a more complete examination of this suggestion, it is necessary to include other policy areas as well as the general context in which this accession process unfolds. This also would require more fieldwork in Turkey and in Brussels.

Secondly, a great deal of the Turkish literature used might be considered ‘outdated’. The bulk of literature on this issue was published around 2004, when the European Council had to decide whether or not to open accession talks with Turkey. In that sense, one could argue that the literature serves as some kind of promotional material to convince the public at large of the necessity of Turkey joining the EU. However, I think the material I used was certainly not of such quality. All articles that I used were published in academic journals and provide a consistent picture of Turkish migration policies.

Thirdly, this work is limited by the fact that authorities such as the Turkish embassy in the Netherlands did not want to discuss this issue with me in an interview.

They were, however, prepared to send me a short policy note. However, I feel I missed an important opportunity in the sense that I otherwise could have confronted them with my key findings. Furthermore, I had serious difficulties approaching the EU Commission Unit Turkey.

In contrast, the information and feedback I received from an embassy attaché of the Dutch embassy in Ankara was very helpful. Likewise the Turkish Institute in The Hague allowed me to visit a conference on EU-Turkey relations and discuss this subject and its implications.

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5.5 Suggestions for further research In closing, I would like to discuss some suggestions for further research. A first suggestion was already mentioned when discussing the limitations of this research. In researching the EU’s real intentions towards Turkey, a closer look at the more general relations between the EU and Turkey is needed. In addition, such a study could focus on how the accession process actually operates in more detail.

A second suggestion for further research on this topic would be a comparative case study to identify similarities and differences between accession processes. For example, I came across an excellent and concise case study comparing Turkey and Poland.579 This case study looks at how and to what extent migration policies in Poland and Turkey have been Europeanized and securitized during the EU accession process.

Thirdly and lastly, one could do follow-up research five years from now and research whether or not the EU’s behavior and intentions have changed. An additional suggestion might be, under the assumption that there would be change, to take a constructivist approach to explaining and understanding this change better. Such a study could be broadened by looking at the social dimensions (norms, rules, language in speech-acts) of Europeanization and/or securitization as they seem to go hand in hand in the development of a pan-European migration regime.

579

Suhal Şemşit, “Transformation of Migration Policies in Poland and Turkey in the EU accession process: Europeanized and/or securitized?”, CEU Political Science Journal, no. 4 (2008): 368-383.

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