개발재원 정책토론회(출력용)

개발재원(Financing for Development) 정책토론회

일시 : 2015년 6월 9일 (화) 13:00 –16:00 장소 : 사랑의 열매 회관 지하1층 대강당 주최 : 주관 : 협력 :

개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회 목차 Ⅰ 프로그램 ······························································

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Ⅱ 발표자료 1. 유엔의 준비 현황과 쟁점 및 한국정부의 대응과 입장 ······················

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- 윤상욱 (외교부 개발협력국 개발협력과 과장)

2. 개발재원 논의에 대한 국제 시민사회의 입장과 제언 ························

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- 민경일 (참여연대 국제연대위원회 실행위원, KoFID 개발재원 T/F)

Ⅲ 토론자료 1. 국제조세와 Capacity Building ········································

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- 이유영 (조세정의 네트워크 동북아 챕터 대표)

Ⅴ 참고자료 1. FfD Revised Draft Outcome (2015.5.6.) ·····························

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2. Key Elements of a Successful Addis Ababa on Financing for Development ····

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- UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network(SDSN) (2015.3)

3. Recommendations for the Post-2015 MOI and FfD ··················

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- Beyond2015 (2015.3) 4. OECD DAC의 ODA 재정의와 시사점 ····································

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- 한국수출입은행 Issue Paper (2015.2) 5. 개발재원총회 정부간 협상 한국대표 발언문 모음 ··························· (1차 문안협상, 2차 문안협상, Post-2015 Joint session)

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프로그램 시간

내용 ●

환영사

- 정현백 (KoFID 공동대표 /참여연대 공동대표) 13:30-13:45 (15분)

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축사

- 김인 (KOICA 전략기획 이사) ●

프로그램 및 발표자 소개

- 이성훈 (KoFID 운영위원장/ 한국인권재단 상임이사)

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- 윤상욱 (외교부 개발협력국 개발협력과 과장)

13:45-14:20 (35분)

유엔의 준비 현황과 쟁점 및 한국정부의 대응과 입장

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개발재원 논의에 대한 국제시민사회의 입장 및 제안 내용 - 민경일 (침여연대 국제연대위원회 실행위원/ KoFID 개발재원 T/F)

[패널토론] (좌장: 이성훈, KoFID 운영위원장/ 한국인권재단 상임이사) - 이유영 (조세정의 네트워크 동북아 챕터 대표) 14:20-15:00 (40분)

- 임소진 (수출입은행 선임연구원) - KOICA 전략기획부 연구개발팀 - 김태균 (서울대학교 국제대학원 교수) - 남수정 (KCOC 정책센터 과장)

15:00-15:10

휴식

(10분) 15:10-15:45 (35분)

청중 질의응답 및 전체 토론

15:40-16:00

마무리 발언 및 정리

(15분)

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개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회

발표자료 1. 유엔의 준비 현황과 쟁점 및 한국정부의 대응과 입장 - 윤상욱 (외교부 개발협력국 개발협력과 과장)

2. 개발재원 논의에 대한 국제 시민사회의 입장과 제언 - 민경일 (참여연대 국제연대위원회 실행위원, KoFID 개발재원 T/F)

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개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회

발표자료 1. 유엔의 준비 현황과 쟁점 및 한국정부의 대응과 입장 - 윤상욱 (외교부 개발협력국 개발협력과 과장)

2. 개발재원 논의에 대한 국제 시민사회의 입장과 제언 - 민경일 (참여연대 국제연대위원회 실행위원, KoFID 개발재원 T/F)

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KoFID 개발재원 정책토론회 “유엔의 준비현황과 쟁점 및 한국 정부의 대응과 입장” 2015.6.9.(화) 윤상욱 외교부 개발정책과장 1. 개발재원이란? ○ 개도국 개발을 위한 동기motivation가 있거나 개발에 대한 영향impact을 주는 모든 공적 또는 민간 자금으로, ▲ODA, ▲기타 공적재원, ▲무역 및 투자를 통해 마련되는 민간재원, ▲개도국 자체 국내재원조세수입

등

을 포괄하는 개념

○ 개발재원 관련 국제 논의 경과 - 1950년대~1990년대 : GNP 대비 0.7% ODA 지원개념 정립 - 2000년~2008년 : MDGs 출범과 개도국의 주인의식 강조 - 2009년~현재 : SDGs 논의와 개발재원의 다변화 2. 몬테레이, 도하에서 아디스아바바까지 ○ (2002년 제1차 개발재원 총회) 몬테레이 컨센서스를 채택하여 MDGs 달성을 위한 6대 개발재원 및 수단*을 최초로 규정 * ① 국내개발재원, ② 국제개발재원(FDI & Other Private Flows), ③ 무역, ④ ODA, ⑤ 외채, ⑥ 구조적 문제

- ▲6대 재원 중 개도국 국내재원을 첫 번째 재원으로 서술하여 개발의 주체가 개도국임을 명시*, ▲ODA/GNI 0.7% 지원을 위한 선진국 노력 재확인, ▲개발 의 원동력으로서 무역의 중요성 강조 * 동 원칙은 원조효과성 제고를 위한 파리선언(2005)의 1원칙인 개도국 주인의식 (ownership)으로 발전

○ (2008년 제2차 개발재원 총회) 도하 선언을 통해 ▲ODA/GNI 0.7% 달성 의지 재확인, ▲원조효과성 제고를 위한 수원국의 노력 필요성, ▲기후변화 및 식량 위기 등 새로운 도전에 대한 공동대응 의지 확인 ○ (2015년 제3차 개발재원 총회) 제3차 총회는 ▲몬테레이 컨센서스 및 도하 선언

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의 이행 현황 점검, ▲개발재원 프로세스 강화, ▲개발재원 조성 저해요인 극복 방안 모색, ▲Post-2015 개발의제 이행 지원을 목적으로 개최 - 현재 문안 협상 진행 중으로 결과를 예단할 수 없으나, ▲Post-2015 개발 의제의 보편성 및 ▲몬테레이 이후 새롭게 나타난 개발협력의 요소와 국제 논의가 적절히 반영되었으며, ▲몬테레이 컨센서스를 보다 구체적이고 행동 지향적인 방향으로 발전 ※ 문안 협상 및 제3차 개발재원 총회 일정 - 제1차 협상 (2015.1.27~29, 뉴욕) - 제2차 협상 (2015.4.13~17, 뉴욕) - 아태지역 개발재원총회 아태지역 고위급회의 (2015.4.29~30, 자카르타) - 회기간 회의 (2015.5.11~15 / 5.26~6.5, 뉴욕) - 제3차 협상 (2015.6.15~19, 뉴욕) - 제3차 개발재원 총회 (2015.7.13~16, 아디스아바바)

3. 제3차 개발재원 총회 결과문서 초안 주요내용 가. 지속가능 개발 재원을 위한 글로벌 프레임워크 (I. A global framework for financing sustainable development) ○ ▲아디스 아바바 개발재원 총회 목적, ▲몬테레이 이후 변화한 국제개발협력 환경, ▲Post-2015 개발의제 이행을 위한 주요 지원 방안 등을 제시 나. 액션 어젠다 (II. Action agenda) 1) 국내 공적재원 (A. Domestic public resources) ○ 지속가능한 개발 및 SDGs 달성을 위한 핵심이 국내재원 동원 및 효과적 활용에 있음을 강조하며, ▲부패 척결, ▲선정(good governance), ▲국내 정책환경(enabling domestic environment), ▲조세수입 증대 및 조세역량 강화, ▲불법자금유출(IFF) 방지, ▲여성의 경제참여도 제고, ▲천연자원 채굴 투명성 강화, ▲필수공적서비스 제공, ▲보조금 철폐 등을 위한 노력 포함 2) 국내 및 국제 민간 비즈니스 및 재원 (B. Domestic and international private business and finance) ○ 지속가능 개발을 위한 민간 재원의 역할을 인정하며, ▲국내 민간 부문의 활동 촉진을 위한 국내 환경 및 규제 체제 창설을 위한 공적 정책의 역할 강화,

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▲금융 포용성 강화, ▲장기 투자 촉구, ▲기업의 사회적 책임(CSR), ▲송금 비용 감소, ▲자선단체 역할 인정, ▲중소기업의 재원 조달, ▲인프라 분야 재원 간극 해결, ▲민관파트너십(PPP)의 역할 강화 등 포함 3) 국제 공적재원 (C. International public finance) ○ 국제 공적재원이 빈곤 퇴치 및 지속가능 개발을 위해 국내 공적재원 동원을 보완하는 중심적 역할(central role)을 수행한다는 인식 하에, ▲ODA 공약 이행 촉구 및 구체적 이행 계획표 마련, ▲다른 재원을 유인하는 촉진적 ODA 역할 인정, ▲ODA 정의 현대화 및 지속가능한 개발을 위한 총공적지원 (TOSSD)에 대한 공개 논의, ▲남남협력, ▲기후 재원, ▲인도주의적 재원, ▲혁신적 개발재원, ▲다자개발은행의 역할, ▲효과적인 개발협력 증진 등 포함 4) 개발 동력으로서의 국제 무역 (D. International trade as an engine for development) ○ 무역이 포용적 경제 성장을 위한 동력이라는 인식하에, ▲WTO 하 보편적이고, 규칙에 기반하고, 공개되고, 비차별적이며 평등한 다자무역시스템 촉진, ▲ DDA 협상의 신속한 타결 촉구, ▲LDCs에 무관세무쿼터(DFQF) 시장접근 이행, ▲무역을 위한 원조(AfT) 증대 등 포함 5) 채무 및 채무건전성 (E. Debt and Debt Sustainability) ○ ▲고채무빈곤국(HIPC) 프로그램을 통한 개도국 채무 조정, ▲지속 불가능한 채무 상황 예방 및 해결을 위한 채무국·채권국간 책임 공유 강화, ▲파리 클럽 등 국가부채 재조정을 위한 협력 프로세스 강화 등 포함 6) 시스템 이슈 (F. Addressing systemic issues) ○ ▲지속가능 개발을 위한 정책 정합성 제고 및 경제·사회·환경적 도전사항 고려, ▲금융위기 이후 위험 확산의 해결을 위한 국제 금융 및 통화 시스템 개혁, ▲국제 금융 안전망 강화, ▲국제 경제 정책 결정, 규범 설정 및 글로벌 경제 거버넌스에서의 개도국 참여 및 목소리 강화, ▲이주민의 이동 및 안전보장을 위한 체제 형성 등 포함 7) 과학, 기술, 혁신 및 역량 강화 (G. Science, technology, innovation and

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capacity building) ○ ▲과학 및 혁신 배양 촉진 체제 형성, ▲기술 및 지식의 이전 촉진, ▲국가 지속가능 개발 전략의 한 요소로 STI(과학, 기술, 혁신) 전략 포함, ▲개도국 으로의 환경적으로 건전한 기술 개발, 확산 및 전파 촉진, ▲전염성·비전염성 질병을 위한 백신 개발 지원, ▲기술의 개발, 확산 및 이전을 촉진하는 온라인 글로벌 플랫폼 형성 등 포함 다. 데이터, 모니터링 및 후속조치 (III. Data, monitoring and follow-up) ○ Post-2015 및 이행을 지원하기 위해 고품질의, 시의적절하고, 신뢰성있는 세 분화된 데이터 활용가능성 제고, ▲데이터의 투명성 제고(IATI 등 활용), ▲데이터 접근성 강화, ▲적절하고 효과적인 후속조치 마련, ▲합의사항 이행을 위한 국가별 진전사항 모니터링, ▲아디스아바바 결과 이행상황 점검 및 지속 추진을 위한 차기 개발재원 총회 계획 등 포함 4. 쟁점 사안 가. 진영별 기본 입장 ○ (개도국) MDGs를 실패로 규정하고, 그 원인으로 ▲개발목표 설정의 오류, ▲공여국의 소극적 ODA 지원 의지를 거론 - 개선책으로 ▲'Monterrey plus' 원칙*, ▲ODA 증액의 구체적 시한설정, ▲ LDCs, LLDCs, SIDS에 대한 특별 대우, ▲기후변화재원의 추가 조성 등 요구 * SDGs는 MDGs보다 포괄적이고 광의의 목표이므로 0.7% 공약보다 확대된 선진 국의 기여가 필요하다는 주장

○ (선진국) MDGs 달성이 미진했던 원인으로 ▲개도국의 취약한 거버넌스, ▲국내 재원 확대 재생산 노력 미흡 등을 거론 - 개선책으로 ▲국내재원 증대, ▲FDI 등 민간재원 유치를 위한 정책적 개선, ▲남남협력의 활용, ▲개발협력의 효과성 제고 등을 강조 나. 주요 이슈별 쟁점 ○ ▲FfD 결과문서와 Post-2015 MOIs와의 관계, ▲개발재원에 있어 1992년 리우 원칙(CBDR: common but differentiated responsibilities) 반영 여부,

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▲ODA 공약 시한 설정, ▲기후변화 재원의 성격(additionality), ▲새로운 글로벌 파트너십의 정의, ▲개발효과성 원칙, ▲새로운 국제 인프라 플랫폼 설립, ▲특정 이슈를 위한 국제기금 창설 등의 이슈에서 현재까지 선진국과 개도국간 현저한 견해차 노정 5. 협상 참여국으로서 한국 정부 입장 가. 기본 입장 ○ 한국으로서는 금번 개발재원 총회에 공여국으로 참여하게 됨을 감안, 과거보다 적극적으로 건설적인 기여를 모색한다는 입장 - ODA를 포함한 개발재원 증액 필요성에 동의하면서도 제3차 FfD의 궁극적 목표가 Post-2015 목표 달성에 필요한 정책 환경(enabling policy framework) 조성에 있다는 인식 하에 협상 참여 중 - 한국의 개발경험을 바탕으로 ▲국내재원 확대, ▲거버넌스, ▲지속가능 경제 성장 정책 등의 이슈에서 적극적 입장을 개진하는 한편, 선진국-개도국간 입장 차가 극명한 이슈에 대해서는 건설적 조정 방안 제시 - 또한, 여성·아동·이민자 등 소외되기 쉬운 계층에 대한 정책적 보호 및 개도 국의 개발 달성에 있어 주요한 역할을 수행하는 기술 및 데이터 역량 강화 필요성을 적극 지지하고, 개발주체 및 재원 확대 등 몬테레이 이후 변화된 국제개발협력 환경을 결과문서가 적절히 반영해야 한다는 입장 나. 주요 이슈별 입장 - (개발재원 총회 결과문서와 Post-2015 개발의제 이행수단간 관계) 새로운 개발체제

하에서의

시너지

도출을

위해

개발재원

총회

결과

문서가

Post-2015 이행수단(MOIs: means of implementations)의 pillar를 구성할 필요 - (국내공적재원) 국내공적재원의 조성과 효과적 사용이 개도국 개발의 핵심으로 규정되고, 이를 위한 개도국 정부의 조세 역량 강화 및 거버넌스 개선 필요 - (국제공적재원) ODA는 취약하고 지원 수요가 높은 국가들에게 여전히 중요 하며, ODA의 촉매제 역할(catalytic role)뿐 아니라 ODA 배분, 여타 개발재원 과의 적절한 조합 등이 더 강조될 필요

- 15 -

- (민간재원) 글로벌 기업의 이윤추구 행위와 SDGs간의 조화를 위한 지침 마련을 지지하되 과도한 규제의무가 부여되지 않도록 접점 모색 - (개발효과성) 효과적인 개발협력을 위한 부산 원칙(①국가 주인의식, ②성과 중심 개발, ③포용적 파트너십, ④투명성 및 상호책무성)의 결과문서 반영 - (모니터링 및 후속조치) 개발재원과 Post-2015 모니터링 프로세스가 긴밀히 연계되어야 하며, 별도의 프로세스를 중복 운용하는 것에는 유보적인 입장. 기존의 효과적인 모니터링 체제를 최대한 활용해야 하며, 이러한 차원에서 부산 글로벌 파트너십(GPEDC: Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation)의 유용성을 결과문서에 반영

- 16 -

개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회

발표자료 1. 유엔의 준비 현황과 쟁점 및 한국정부의 대응과 입장 - 윤상욱 (외교부 개발협력국 개발협력과 과장)

2. 개발재원 논의에 대한 국제 시민사회의 입장과 제언 - 민경일 (참여연대 국제연대위원회 실행위원, KoFID 개발재원 T/F) -

- 17 -

ѐߊ੤ਗ ੿଼ ష‫ۿ‬ഥ

ѐߊ੤ਗ 'G% ֤੄ী ‫؀‬ೠ Ҵઁ द޹ࢎഥ੄ ੑ੢җ ઁ঱

֙ ਘ ੌ ޹҃ੌ BVHVTUJOF NJOO!HNBJM DPN

ଵৈো‫ ؀‬Ҵઁো‫؀‬ਤਗഥ ,P'*% ѐߊ੤ਗ 5'

‫ ݾ‬ର

ই٣झই߄߄ ೤੄ উ ੄ ઱ਃ ղਊ

Ҵઁ द޹ࢎഥ੄ ઁ঱

#FZPOE

&VSPEBE

Ѿ‫ઁ ߂ ۿ‬঱

ଵҊ੗‫ ܐ‬

- 19 -

ржЗ┘грдЭржЗ▀Д▀Д р│дрйД "EEJT "CBCB "DDPSE ╤Р▀КрйдриЧ ╓дрйД ╥Г╥Ч тЖЯтАл▐АтАмр░к█ирйЙ р│дрйД .POUFSSFZ $POTFOTVT

тЖЯтАл╪итАмр│Ю рв╢рж▒ %PIB %FDMBSBUJPO

тЖЯржЗ┘грдЭржЗ▀Д▀Д р│дрйД "EEJT "CBCB

ржЗ┘грдЭржЗ▀Д▀Д р│дрйДтАл ▐ЩтАмрлУр│п ╥Г╥Ч тАв ;FSP %SBGU

тАв 3FWJTFE %SBGU

ржЗ┘грдЭржЗ▀Д▀Д р│дрйД ржЙ "EEJT "CBCB "DDPSE * " HMPCBM GSBNFXPSL GPS GJOBODJOH TVTUBJOBCMF EFWFMPQNFOU .PCJMJ[JOH UIF NFBOT UP JNQMFNFOU UIF QPTU EFWFMPQNFOU BHFOEB

** "EEJT "CBCB "DUJPO "HFOEB " %PNFTUJD QVCMJD SFTPVSDFT # %PNFTUJD BOE JOUFSOBUJPOBM QSJWBUF CVTJOFTT BOE GJOBODF $ *OUFSOBUJPOBM QVCMJD GJOBODF % *OUFSOBUJPOBM USBEF BT BO FOHJOF GPS EFWFMPQNFOU & %FCU BOE EFCU TVTUBJOBCJMJUZ ' "EESFTTJOH TZTUFNJD JTTVFT ( 4DJFODF UFDIOPMPHZ JOOPWBUJPO BOE DBQBDJUZ CVJMEJOH

*** %BUB NPOJUPSJOH BOE GPMMPX VQ

- 20 -

ই٣झই߄߄ ೤੄ উ "EEJT "CBCB "DDPSE Ҵղ ҕҕ੗ਗ %PNFTUJD 1VCMJD 3FTPVSDF

• Ҵղ Ѣߡքझ৬ ઁ‫ ܳب‬ъചೞҊ ࠗಁ ୋѾ ъઑ • ࣁࣻ ૐо ୭੸੄ ઑࣁ ੿଼ ೙ਃࢿ ъઑ (%1੄ ӝળ

Ҵղ৻ ޹рӝস ޹рӘਲ਼ %PNFTUJD BOE *OUFSOBUJPOBM 1SJWBUF #VTJOFTT BOE 'JOBODF • ӝস੄ ࢎഥ੸ ৉ೡҗ ജ҃ ‫ ઁޙ‬ো҅ ೙ਃ • ӝসٜ੉ ܻझ௼ ‫ޙٸ‬ী ై੗ܳ ೞ૑ ‫ޅ‬ೞ‫ ח‬ജ҃ীࢲ੄ ੋࣃ౭࠳ दझమ ઁউ • *OGSBTUSVDUVSF ١ ( ੄ઁ ൚ࣻ

Ҵઁ ҕҕӘਲ਼ *OUFSOBUJPOBM 1VCMJD 'JOBODF • • • •

0%" ৻੄ ‫׮‬নೠ ҕ੸ ੗Ә 00' ъઑ 5044% ѐ֛ ‫ب‬ੑ 0%"੄ ݃઺‫ ޛ‬৉ೡਸ ੉ঠӝೞ‫ ࢲݶ‬ҕ੸ ࢎ੸ ੤ਗ ‫ ܳفݽ‬঱ә ‫׮‬੗ѐߊ਷೯ .%# ৉ೡ ъઑ ജ҃ ࠁѤ Үਭ ֪স ١ ‫׮‬নೠ ࠙ঠ੄ ҴઁӝӘҗ ো҅

Ҵઁ‫ޖ‬৉ *OUFSOBUJPOBM 5SBEF BT BO &OHJOF GPS %FWFMPQNFOU • 850੄ #BMJ 1BDLBHF ঱ә %%"੄ ੉೯਷ ҅ࣘ ୢҳ • ѐ‫ب‬Ҵਸ ਤೠ 4QFDJBM %JGGFSFOUJBM 5SFBUNFOU ਗ஗ ъઑ

ࠗ଻ %FCU BOE %FCU 4VTUBJOBCJMJUZ

• %FCU 4VTUBJOBCJMJUZ ࠙ࢳ ో‫* ۽‬.' 8PSME #BOL %FCU 4VTUBJOBCJMJUZ "OBMZTJT %4"

• 6/$5"%੄ 3FTQPOTJCMF 4PWFSFJHO -FOEJOH BOE #PSSPXJOH ਗ஗ ъઑ • ‫׮‬নೠ ഋక ਗੋ੄ ࠗ଻ ࢚ജ ૑ো ߂ ৮ചী ‫؀‬ೠ ജ৔

Ҵઁद޹ࢎഥ੄ ઁ঱ #FZPOE ϗ %H\RQG 1HWZRUN ۶վଜࠑࡳֲ ࢷ‫ ˃ۿ‬ʎ؈୆ԯ ‫ی׷ݤ‬ୣࢂ ୛Ѱ ࢽ‫ؿ‬ ࠪ ࢂʺࡶ ܹԲଜࠆ ঑˃୘ଜˈ 81߾ ࢷбଜЕ ଐԔ૪ ࠇଟࡶ ܹଭଜˈ ࢑ࡸ

- 21 -

Ҵղ ҕҕ੤ਗ %PNFTUJD 1VCMJD 'JOBODF ↟

‫־‬૓ࣁ ߂ ੤࠙ߓ ੿଼

↟

ࣁઁѐഄ

↟

ҵ࠺ х୷җ ҕҕ੤ਗ ੤ೡ‫ ׼‬

↟

ࠁಞ੸ੋ Әਲ਼ࢲ࠺झ ઁҕ

↟

‫׮‬Ҵ੸ӝসٜ੄ োрࠁҊࢲ ߊ೯ ੄‫ޖ‬ച

↟

Ҵо ৘࢑੄ ై‫ ࢿݺ‬

↟

ࢿੋ૑ ৘࢑ (FOEFS SFTQPOTJWF CVEHFUJOH

Ҵઁ ҕҕ੤ਗ *OUFSOBUJPOBM 1VCMJD 'JOBODF ↟

(/* ‫ ࠺؀‬ӏ‫ ݽ‬0%" ডࣘ ੉೯ਸ ਤೠ ߑউ ݃۲

↟

ѐߊ࠙ঠী ࢎਊ‫ݽ חغ‬ٚ ੗Ә੄ ై‫ ࢿݺ‬

↟

ࢶ૓Ҵਵ‫ࠗ۽‬ఠ ӝറӝӘ ݃۲ਸ ਤೠ ‫ݒ‬ழ‫ ્פ‬౹‫۽‬਋স

↟

0%" ੿੄ അ‫؀‬ച

↟

ੋ೐‫ۄ‬ҳ୷ ೐‫ં۽‬౟ীࢲ੄ ജ҃җ ࢎഥ৔ೱ ಣо 4BGFHVBSET ળࣻ

↟

‫ݽ‬ٚ Әਲ਼Ѣ‫ې‬ী Әਲ਼Ѣ‫ب ࣁې‬ੑೞҊ 4%(T‫ࢿ׳‬җ ӝറ߸ചܳ ਤ೧ ॳੌ ࣻ ੓‫ ۾ب‬ೣ - 22 -

Ҵղ৻ ޹р੤ਗ %PNFTUJD BOE *OUFSOBUJPOBM 1SJWBUF 'JOBODF ↟ ޹р੤ਗ੄ ଼੐ ੓‫ ח‬੢ӝ ై੗ ↟ 6/੄ ӝসҗ ੋӂী ‫؀‬ೠ ૑ஜਸ ನೣೠ ੋӂҗ ജ҃ ӝળ ੉೯ ↟ ଻ҷ࢑স ై‫࣊פ੉ ࢿݺ‬౭࠳&YUSBDUJWF *OEVTUSZ 5SBOTQBSFODZ *OJUJBUJWF

ҕҕ޹ҙ ഈ۱ 1VCMJD 1SJWBUF 1BSUOFSTIJQ

↟ թ߈ҳ ܻ࠭4PVUIFSO MFE SFWJFX ↟ ҕҕ޹ҙഈ۱੉ Ҵղ ҃ઁ৬ ੗োജ҃ਸ ߊ੹दఆ ࣻ ੓‫ ۾ب‬ ౵౟ցҴоٜ੄ ৉‫ ۝‬ъചܳ ૑ਗ

- 23 -

тАл▐ЦтАмрзЙ 5SBEF тЖЯ

рзЙтАл█ЭтАм╤Кр┤Ъ ▀В ╙Эрг┐ рйЙрй╣ри╕ ридр│а ╓в█▒

тЖЯ

╤РтАл╪итАм╥┤рйД тАл▌╜тАм┘Ъ рг╗рн╣р▓┐рзА тАл╪АтАмр│з тАл▐ЦтАм╥ЩргБ ▀В тАл▐ЦтАмрпкр░аEVUZ GSFF BOE RVPUB GSFF BDDFTTрйД рй╕риК раБрйв

тЖЯ

тАл▐ЦтАмрзЙри╕ р░╛р│а рг╗рйКри╖ ра╝╥Мр▒ГроЦрзА рвОриК р│б ╤к

тЖЯ

тАл▌╜тАм┘Ъ р┤Лр░ХрйД ╓крж╕рг╗рн╣ раБркС╙Ш рк║тАл ╫▒тАм

тЖЯ

1SJODJQMF PG TQFDJBM BOE EJGGFSFOUJBM USFBUNFOU GPS EFWFMPQJOH DPVOUSJFT

тЖЯ

р▒ИрйЧ ркСржбрзА ╥│ргШ█▒ рйУтАлрйЛ ╫ЧтАм╙ВркСр│ж р▓ир│г

раЧрм╗ рлСргШ╨╛тАл рв┐╫ЮтАм%FCU 4VTUBJOBCJMJUZ

тЖЯ

раЧрм╗рвП╤Е рйдриЧри╖ 0%" рзмтАл▀╣ ╫ЧтАм╤Р

тЖЯ

╥┤╨╛раЧрм╗ рйдркСрй┐ри╕ ридр│а тАл╫отАмрйЧ╤А ▀ирй╕ рнУркБ ▌Г█▓

тЖЯ

раЧтАл╫╝тАмр│а раЧрм╗рзА тАл╪АтАмр│зрв▓тАлрм╗раЧ ╫ЧтАмр░Ф╤Ери╕ рджр│п

тЖЯ

римрзВтАл▐ЦтАмрзЙ╤Р▀Кр┤ерйД6/$5"%рйД 1SJODJQMFT GPS 3FTQPOTJCMF 4PWFSFJHO -FOEJOH BOE #PSSPXJOH рдкр│п

- 24 -

ӝറ ӝӘ $MJNBUF 'JOBODF

↟

ࢶ૓Ҵ੄ ૒р੽੸ੋ ചࢳো‫ࠁ ܐ‬ઑӘ ‫ ੸҅ױ‬ತ૑

↟

఍ࣗߓ୹Әী ‫؀‬ೠ ‫׮‬੗р ੉‫࣊פ‬౭࠳ ࣻ݀

↟

ӝറ ӝӘ਷ 0%"ী ࢜‫܂‬ѱ ୶о‫࠙ࠗ חغ‬੐

Ҵઁ Әਲ਼ઁ‫ ب‬ѐഄ 3FGPSN PG (MPCBM 'JOBODJBM *OTUJUVUJPOT ↟੤੿ࠗ࠙ীࢲ੄ ӏ੤ ѐഄ ↟/BUJPOBMMZ PXOFE QBUIT PG SFGPSN GPS .'* ↟

(SFBUFS SFQSFTFOUBUJPO PG EFWFMPQJOH DPVOUSJFT PO UIF CPBSE BOE MFBEFSTIJQ PG JOUFSOBUJPOBM JOTUJUVUJPO GPS GBJS FRVJUBCMF USBOTQBSFOU BOE HFOEFS CBMBODFE EFDJTJPO NBLJOH

↟

ࠛߨ੤ਗృ஖'JHIU BHBJOTU JMMJDJU GJOBODJBM GMPXT

↟

਷‫ץ‬੗࢑ ഥࣻ3FUVSO PG TUPMFO BTTFUT

↟

ࣁӘҙ۲ ഈ۱ਸ ਤೠ ੿ࠗр ઑ૒ ࢸ݀

↟

" CSPBEFS NFUSJD PG XFMM CFJOH UIBO (%1 - 25 -

Ҵઁद޹ࢎഥ੄ ઁ঱ &VSPEBE l Ol Gu G Gk G Gk P⏈GX``W≸㜄G㉘⫱╌㛨G⺴ 㵸SGᵐⵐ㣠㠄SG⽼Ḙ䌨㾌㝴GḴ⥜䚨G㢰䚌⏈G㡔⤱GX`ᵐạG\W㜠ᵐGunvG␜㷨☘㢌G≘䏬㠀 䆠㢸G

Ҵղ੤ਗ ୢ૓ ↟ ୽࠙ೠ ੤ਗҗ ೣԋ ࣁӘ ҙ۲ೠ ੿ࠗр ઑ૒ ѐࢸ ↟ ੿ࠗр ࣁӘ ઑ૒੄ ઙ೤੸ੋ ੄‫ࢎ ޖ‬೦ٜ " DPNQSFIFOTJWF NBOEBUF GPS UIF OFX JOUFSHPWFSONFOUBM UBY CPEZ

৻Ҵੋ ૒੽ై੗৬ Ҵઁ ޹р੤ਗ ↟ ‫ݽ‬ٚ Ҵоܳ ‫࢚؀‬ਵ‫ ۽‬ೞ‫ ో ଼੿ ח‬ ↟ Ҵઁ ޹рӘਲ਼ী ৔ೱਸ ޷஖‫ ח‬ҕҕઁ‫ ߂ ب‬੤ਗਸ ഝਊೞ‫઺ ח‬ਃ ‫ ܳઁޙ‬ ࢸ‫ ݺ‬

- 26 -

Ҵઁ ‫ޖ‬৉ *OUFSOBUJPOBM 5SBEF ↟

‫ݽ‬ٚ ‫ޖ‬৉ഈ੿җ ై੗ઑডী ‫؀‬ೠ ನҚ੸ੋ Ѩషܳ ా೧ ‫ݽ‬ٚ ૑৉ਸ ഛੋೞҊ ੗Ә൒ܴਸ ӏઁೞҊ ࢤ҅৬ উ੿੸ ੌ੗ܻܳ ਤೠ ӂܻܳ ࠁഐೞҊ ҕ੿ೠ ࣁӘ૚ࣻܳ ೞҊ ೙ࣻ੸ੋ ҕҕࢲ࠺झܳ ઁҕ೧ ૑ࣘо‫מ‬ೠ ѐߊਸ о‫מ‬ష‫ ۾‬ೣ

↟

ҕҕࠁѤ ജ҃ ӝࣿѐߊ ࠙ঠীࢲ ѐ‫ب‬Ҵী ࠗ੘ਊਸ ՙ஖Ҋ

੓‫ ח‬૑੸੤࢑ӂ ઁ‫ ب‬Ѩష द೯

0%"৬ Ҵઁ ҕҕ੤ਗ

↟ (/*‫ ࠺؀‬0%" ࠺ਯ ডࣘ੉೯ਸ ਤೠ ҅ദ ࣻ݀ ↟ ҳࣘࢿ ਗઑ ઺‫଻ࠗ ߂ ױ‬ఔх द೯ ‫࢚ޖ‬ਗઑ‫੹ ੄۽‬ജ

‫& ଻ࠗ ৻؀‬YUFSOBM %FCU ↟ ࠗ଻ ҳઑઑ੿ җ੿ਸ ਤೠ ‫׮‬੗р ߨ੸ ୓҅ী ೤੄ೞӝ‫ ۽‬ೠ ডࣘਸ ੤ഛੋೡ Ѫ ӒܻҊ ੉ ୓҅‫ ח‬ನҚ੸੉Ҋ ੋр೙ਃী ‫؀‬ೠ ੽Ӕߨী ӔѢೞҊ ଻‫ޖ‬੗ ‫଻ חژ‬ӂ੗о ଼੐੓‫ ۾ب‬ೞҊ ‫ݽ‬ٚ ҙ҅੗ٜ੄ ӂܻী ӈӝ਎ੌ Ѫ ↟

അઓೞ‫ ח‬ਬ࢑ ࠗ଻ী ‫؀‬ೠ ‫޻ݶ‬ೠ ઑࢎ ૓೯ - 27 -

ҳઑ੸ ‫ ઁޙ‬4ZTUFNJD *TTVFT

↟ ҃ઁ੉गী ‫؀‬೧ ܻ؊भਸ ઁҕೡ ࣻ ੓‫ ח‬Ӗ‫ઁ҃ ߥ۽‬ઑ੿ ਤਗഥ (MPCBM &DPOPNJD $PPSEJOBUJPO $PVODJM ܳ 6/ ղࠗী ࢸ݀

↟ ѐ‫ب‬Ҵ ‫࢚؀‬ਵ‫ ۽‬োр র ‫ ੄۞׳‬ౠ߹ੋ୹ӂ4QFDJBM %SBXJOH 3JHIUT 4%3T ߊ೯

‫઺ ܲ׮‬ਃ ੉गٜ ↟

(%1 ৻ী ࢎഥ৬ ജ҃ ࠙ঠ ࠛಣ١җ ࢿࠛಣ١ ١ਸ ನೣೞ‫ ח‬ ஏ੿ ૑಴ܳ ࣁ਋ӝ ਤೠ ؊ ա਷ ੽Ӕߨ ࣻ݀

↟

଼੐ ੓‫ ח‬Әਲ਼ ӝળ੄ ੉‫࣊פ‬౭࠳

↟

ѐߊ੤ਗীࢲ੄ ৈࢿ੄ ӂܻ

↟

Әਲ਼ ӏઁ ѐഄ

- 28 -

- 29 -

Ѿ‫ઁ ߂ ۿ‬঱

- 30 -

Ѿ‫ઁ ߂ ۿ‬঱

Ҵઁ द޹ࢎഥ ҕ‫ઁ ੄ز‬঱ਸ ઓ઺ ↟ѐߊਸ ੿੄ೞ‫ ח‬ਃࣗ‫ࢎ ח‬ഥജ҃࠙ঠ ࠛಣ١ ‫ઁޙ‬о

ࠂ೤੸ ੘ਊ (%1৬ э਷ ҃ઁ ૑಴‫ࠛ ੄੿ ח۽‬о ↟Ҵղ৻ ੤ਗ ഛࠁܳ ਤೠ ࣁઁ Әਲ਼࠙ঠ ӏઁ ѐഄ ъઑ ↟ҵ୷ਸ ాೠ ѐߊ੤ਗ ݃۲җ ৘࢑ࢎਊ੄ ਋ࢶࣽਤ ઑ੿

ъઑ r.%( ‫࠺ࢿ׳‬ਊ ੹ࣁ҅ ҵࢎ࠺੄ s

Ѿ‫ઁ ߂ ۿ‬঱

↟0%" ӝৈী ‫؀‬ೠ ডࣘ ੉೯ ъઑ (/* ‫ ࠺؀‬١ ↟଼੐੓‫޹ ח‬р ੤ਗী ‫؀‬ೠ ֢۱ ࣁ੉೐о٘ ↟‫ޖ‬৉ઁ‫࢏଻ࠗ ب‬х ١ਸ ాೠ ѐ‫ب‬Ҵ ࠼ҌҴী ഌఖ ↟ҕ੿ೞҊ ҕಣೞҊ ై‫ݺ‬ೞҊ ࢿಣ١ী ӝୡೠ

੿଼Ѿ੿

- 31 -

ଵҊ੗‫ ܐ‬

‫ހ‬పۨ੉ ೤੄‫ ޙ‬.POUFSSFZ $POTFOTVT ↟ ҕध ‫ݺ‬ட਷ .POUFSSFZ $POTFOTVT PG UIF *OUFSOBUJPOBM $POGFSFODF PO 'JOBODJOH

GPS %FWFMPQNFOU

↟ ޹р੗Ә ਬੑ ૐ‫ࢶ ؀‬૓Ҵ੄ ੤੿ࠗ‫ ׸‬ૐо պ੹ઙध ੉റ ਗઑ‫ز‬ӝ੄ ডച ࢎ

క ١ਵ‫ੋ ۽‬ೠ 0%" ӏ‫ ݽ‬хࣗ ١੉ ߓ҃ ↟ 6/ .JMMFOOJVN %FDMBSBUJPOী ನೣ‫࠼ ػ‬Ҍృ஖ܳ ਤೠ ‫ݾ‬಴ٜ *OUFSOBUJPOBMMZ

"HSFFE %FWFMPQNFOU (PBMT *"%( ਸ ਤೠ Ѫ ↟ ৈѐ Ҵ੄ ੿࢚ ߂ ੿ࠗ ‫؀‬಴ Ҵઁӝҳ द޹ࢎഥ ޹рࠗ‫؀ ޙ‬಴ٜ੉ ‫ݽ‬ৈ ѐ‫ب‬Ҵ੄

ѐߊҗ ੤ਗ ഛࠁܳ ਤೠ ߑউ ֤੄ ↟ ࣁ҅ച‫ੋ ۽‬ೠ ӝഥ৬ ਤӝܳ ঱ә ↟ ѐߊ ੤ਗ ੉गܳ (MPCBM BHFOEB‫ࠗ ۽‬пदః‫ ח‬Ѿ੿੸ ৉ೡ ↟ 6/੉ 8# *.' 850 ١җ ഈ۱ೞ‫҅ ח‬ӝ ઁҕ

- 32 -

઱ਃ ղਊ ↟

.PCJMJ[JOH %PNFTUJD 'JOBODJBM 3FTPVSDFT GPS %FWFMPQNFOU

↟

.PCJMJ[JOH *OUFSOBUJPOBM 3FTPVSDFT GPS %FWFMPQNFOU Gm Gk G p BOE PUIFS 1SJWBUF 'MPXT

↟

*OUFSOBUJPOBM { BT BO &OHJOF GPS %FWFMPQNFOU

↟

*ODSFBTJOH p Gm G G{ Gj GPS %FWFMPQNFOU

↟

&YUFSOBM k

↟

"EESFTTJOH z Gp &OIBODJOH UIF $PIFSFODF BOE $POTJTUFODZ PG UIF *OUFSOBUJPOBM .POFUBSZ 'JOBODJBM BOE 5SBEJOH 4ZTUFNT JO 4VQQPSU PG %FWFMPQNFOU

‫ب‬ೞࢶ঱ %PIB %FDMBSBUJPO

↟

֙ ਘ ੌ ਘ ੌ ৌܽ ઁ ର ѐߊ੤ਗഥ੄ Ѿ җ‫ ࢲޙ‬

↟

‫ހ‬పۨ੉ ೤੄‫୓੹ ޙ‬ղਊਸ ੤ഛੋೣ ҳࢿ ਃࣗ ‫ ੌز‬

↟

֙ ҃ઁਤӝ ૒റ ࢚ട ߈৔‫ ؽ‬

↟

.%(Tо ҕध੸ਵ‫଻ ۽‬ఖ‫࢚ ػ‬ട ߈৔‫ ؽ‬

- 33 -

Ҵղ੗ਗ %PNFTUJD 3FTPVSDF .POUFSSFZ ↟

↟

↟

ѐߊ੄ ઱୓‫ ח‬ഈ۱ ‫࢚؀‬Ҵ ҕৈ Ҵ਷ ѐ‫ب‬Ҵ੉ ѐߊী ೙ਃೠ ੤ਗ ਸ ݃۲ೡ ࣻ ੓‫ ۾ب‬૑ਗೞ‫ ח‬Ѫ ੉ ઺ਃ ҽѢߡքझ ੸੺ೠ ੿଼җ ӏߧ੸ ೐ۨ੐ਕ௼ ࠗಁ ୋѾ ബҗ੸ ബਯ੸ ై‫ݺ‬ೞҊ ଼‫ ࢿޖ‬੓‫ ח‬द झమ ੗Ҵղ ై੗ ੗Ҵղ Әਲ਼ दझమ ઺ࣗӝসਸ ਤೠ ݃੉௼‫۽‬౵੉մझ৬ DSFEJU ৉‫۝‬ ъചܳ ਤೠ ѐ‫ب‬Ҵ੄ ੗୓ ֢۱

%PIB

""" ↟%PNFTUJD 1VCMJD 3FTPVSDFT‫ חۄ‬ ઁ‫ݾ‬ਸ о૑Ҋ ੓਺

↟

↟

↟

੉઱֢‫ز‬੗੄ ࣠Ә ࣻ​ࣻ‫ੋ ܐܐ‬ೞ ঱ә ࢿҕࢎ۹ Үജ ਤೠ թթഈҗ 5SJBOHVMBS ഈ۱ ഝࢿച ‫ݺ‬द

ѐߊী ੓য ѐ‫ب‬Ҵ ੗୓੄ ৉ೡਸ ↟/FDFTTBSZ UP QSPWJEF QVCMJD ‫׮‬द ೠߣ ъઑೞҊ ੓਺ HPPET BOE QSPNPUF FRVJUZ ↟Ҵղ Ѣߡքझ৬ ઁ‫ ܳب‬ъചೞҊ ࠗಁ ୋѾ ъઑ ૑ҳୣ੄ ࠼Ҍృ஖ܳ ਤೠ ֢۱੉ ૐоೣী‫ࠛ ب‬ҳೞҊ ࠛಣ١ ૐ‫ ؀‬ ↟4%(T ࢿஂ ਤ೧ ୶о੸ੋ അ࢚ਸ ૑੸ ҕҕ੤ਗ੉ ೙ਃೣ

↟ࣁࣻ ૐо ୭੸੄ ઑࣁ ੿଼ ೙ਃ ੋӂҗ ࢿಣ١ ੋрѐߊ ߈ࠗಁ ࢿ ъઑ (%1੄ ӝળ

ই೐ܻ஠ܳ ೱೠ ‫ب‬਑ ١ী ‫؀‬ೠ ъ ↟&*5* &YUSBDUJWF *OEVTUSJFT ઑ 5SBOTQBSFODZ *OJUJBUJWF प೯ ↟ജ҃੸ ߧદ৬ ࣁࣻ хࣗ ‫ ઁޙ‬োѾ

৻Ҵੋ ૒੽ై੗ '%* .POUFSSFZ ↟

'%* ాೠ ૑ध ߂ ӝࣿ ੹ࣻ Ҋ ਊ ହ୹ ࢤ࢑ࢿ ഛ‫҃ ؀‬੬۱җ ӝসо ੿न ъച ҃ઁࢿ੢ ా ೠ ࠼Ҍ ృ஖ী ઱উ੼

%PIB ↟

"""

ӝস੄ Ҵઁ ై੗о .POUFSSFZ ੉റী ௼ѱ ૐо೮਺ী‫ࠛ ب‬ҳ ↟%PNFTUJD BOE *OUFSOBUJPOBM ೞҊ ই૒‫ై ب‬੗ܳ ҃೷ೞ૑ 1SJWBUF #VTJOFTT BOE 'JOBODF ‫ޅ‬ೠ ݆਷ Ҵоٜ੉ ੓਺ਸ ૑੸ ‫ݾઁ חۄ‬ਵ‫߄ ۽‬Շ঻਺ #

ই೐ܻ஠ Ҵоٜ -%$ --%$ ↟ӝস੄ ࢎഥ੸ ৉ೡҗ ജ҃ ‫ ઁޙ‬ 4*%4ٜਸ ೱೠ ౠ߹ೠ ҙब ഐ Ѿ೤ ↟ ই೐ܻ஠ Ҵоٜ -%$ --%$ ࣗ 4*%4ٜਸ ೱೠ ౠ߹ೠ ҙब ഐࣗ ↟઺ࣗӝসٜ੄ ଵৈ ‫ة‬۰ ↟ ੉ܳ ਤ೧ 0%" 111 ١੉ ݃઺ ‫ ޛ‬৉ೡਸ ೡ ࣻ ੓਺ਸ ঱ә ↟ӝসٜ੉ ܻझ௼ ‫ޙٸ‬ী ై੗ܳ ↟ 111੄ ৉ೡ ࠗп ↟ જ਷ ӝস੄ Ѣߡքझ١ਸ ঱ә ೞ૑ ‫ޅ‬ೞ‫ ח‬ജ҃ীࢲ੄ ೞ‫ ݴ‬6/($৬ *-0 ١ਵ‫ ۽‬೤੄ ੋࣃ౭࠳ दझమ ઁউ ‫ ػ‬ӝস੄ $43 ੸ӓ ଵৈ ഐࣗ ↟ ҕৈҴ ੿ࠗী ޹рӝস ѐߊࢎ স ૓୹ ਤೠ ࣻ୹नਊ ߂ ഈઑਲ਼ ↟ ੉઱֢‫ز‬੗ٜ੄ ࣠Ә੉ ௼ѱ ‫*↟ ט‬OGSBTUSVDUVSF ١ ( ੄ઁ ൚ ࣻ ੗ ઁҕ ߮୊நೖణ ١ ੗Ә ‫؀‬ যդ Ѫਸ ঱әೞ‫۞੉ ݴ‬ೠ Ѫ੉ ୹ ࣻ‫ߊ ױ‬ҷ ܻझ௼ ࠁ੢ ఋ‫׼‬ '%* 0%" ࠗ଻ ఔх ١ਸ ‫↟ ୓؀‬૑ࣘо‫מ‬ೠ ীց૑ ࢿ ઑࢎ ૑ਗ ୢҳ ೧ࢲ‫ ח‬উ ‫ؽ‬ਸ ъઑ ↟

- 34 -

╥┤ркБтАл▐ЦтАмрзЙ *OUFSOBUJPOBM 5SBEF .POUFSSFZ

тЖЯ

╤Р▀КрйД рзВрлУри╡тАл рв▓█╜тАм╤КркС

тЖЯ

╤РтАл╪итАм╥┤рйЙ ╤╗╥К рйУтАл ╫ЧтАм╨┐ркЩ тАл▐ЦтАмрзЙ рйв▀╖ рзМ╤в р│ж ╥┤ркБтАл▐ЦтАмрзЙ рм╡ рзИ р┤ЫтАл ╪АтАмридр│з 850рйД тАл╪итАмр│Ю╤Р▀К ржпркГтАл╫отАмрзА тАл █Д┘отАм╤РтАл╪итАм╥┤рзА тАл╪АтАмр│а р▒а▀╣ риЛтАл╪АтАмркСроЦ╨╛ рйЙр│птАл╪║тАмржпржа р│г

%PIB

тЖЯ

тЖЯ

6/ -%$ *** #SVTTFM рзА рв▓ рм╗р░ЦтАл▀Д ╪╗тАмрзм ╤НрйЙ рв╢рлУ╥┤┘Ь ри╖ тАл▌╜тАмри╖ -%$рйД рг╗рн╣р▓┐рзА тАл╪АтАмр│з %VUZ 'SFF BOE 2VPUB 'SFF "DDFTT тАл рв┐╫│тАмридр│з ╓в█▒р│б ╤кри╕ рнв╥│

тЖЯ

тЖЯ

"""

╥┤ркБтАл▐ЦтАмрзЙ р▒ар╡д ╤РтАл╪итАм╥┤ рвОрйЙрйД тЖЯ*OUFSOBUJPOBM 5SBEF BT BO тАл▐ЦтАмрзЙрйЙ тАл╫ШтАмржп╒д ╤кри╖ ╥КтАлрйЙрй╕▐ЦтАм &OHJOF GPS %FWFMPQNFOUтАл ╫Ч█ДтАм рлС▌Е рзИрй╣р╡д -%$TтАл▐Ц ╫ЧтАмрзЙ рзЙ ркБтАл▌╛тАмри╡тАл* █╜тАмOUFSOBUJPOBM 1VCMJD тАлраЧ рйД█ЭтАмркТри╡тАлрйЙ █╜тАмрзАрв▓ ▀УркБтАл╪║тАм 'JOBODF ┘НрзА ридроЦр│г ржп рйУри║ри╕ рлСрй╕ тЖЯ850рйД #BMJ 1BDLBHF рж▒╙Щ %%"рйД рйЙр│п раЧркТри╕ рлСрй╕р│ЮтАл ▌┤тАм рйЙ▄│ рнв╥│ рзИ╙ЭрзА римрзЛрв┐╥Ч рй┐ тЖЯ%%"рйД рйЙр│при╖ ╥ЕргШ рнв╥│ роЦрй╕ рйДрлС╨╛ р│ЩриГр│гри╕ ╤КркС ╤РтАл╪итАм╥┤рйЙ ╥┤ркБ тАл▐ЦтАмрзЙ рджрдЭр░орзА ржЙрм▒р│б рг╗ рйУтАл▐Ц █╛╪итАмрзЙри╕ ридр│а риЧркС╨╛ ╤КркСтАл ╪╜тАм

тЖЯ╤РтАл╪итАм╥┤ри╕ ридр│а 4QFDJBM %JGGFSFOUJBM 5SFBUNFOU риЧроЧ ╤КркС

╥┤ркБ ╙Шри│ ▀В ╙Эрг┐р┤И█▒ *OUFSOBUJPOBM 'JOBODJBM BOE 5FDIOJDBM $PPQFSBUJPO

.POUFSSFZ тЖЯ

0%"тАл ╫ЧтАм╤Р▀Кри╕ ридр│а тАл ▄▓╫отАмрйдриЧ┘Ь р▒ар╡д ╙Эрж╕рйД рлТрй╜ р▒ИрйЧ▄│ ридр│з ╤РтАл╪итАм╥┤рйЙ тАл▌ТтАм█▒рй╕рйЙ тАл рг╗ ╪╝тАмрйУтАл █╛╪итАм тАл рн╜раБ ╫Ч╪░тАмрзЙр│бтАл █╜тАм╤КркСтАл╪║тАм╥К рйУри║ рлК рзИ╙ЭрзАрв▓ ╪К ╤КркСтАл ╫Ч╪║тАм╤кри╖ 1SJWBUF %JSFDU *OWFTUNFOU

%PIB

""" тЖЯ5SBEFрзм рг╜рв▓╨╛ ▀Д╒З╥К *OUFSOBUJPOBM 1VCMJD 'JOBODFтАл█ДтАм тАл▌╛ркБ ╫ЧтАмри╕ ╨╛рлС╤▒ тАл ╪╜тАм

рнн╙ФрйД ╥ГркБ рид╙Э рвЪр┤ЯрзАрв▓ 0%"╨╛ ридрн╖тАл ╪╗тАм╤кри╕ рлСрй╕р│ЮтАлтЖЯ ▌┤тАм0%" рз╗рйД тАл╫отАмржир│а ╥Хрй╕ рйЧ╙Ш тАл╫отАмрдж рйЙ▄│ ридр│а ╓в█▒рйЙ ▀У╨╛тАл╪║тАмржп 00' ╤КркС 5044% ╤Р╓Ы тАл╪итАмрйС тЖЯ рйЙ рз╗рзАтАл ╪итАм╥орин раБ╤д ╥Х╥Х ╙Э▀И ржа р│гри╕ ╤КркС рджрв╕ ╓крж╕╥Ч ╓крнг ╤Р▀К рдзтАл █ЭтАмржЙ тЖЯ.%# рзЙр│б ╤КркС раБ▄│ ридр│а 0%"рйД рк║риГрв┐ри╕ ▌Ир│г тЖЯ .POUFSSFZрзАрв▓рзм ▌Грм▓╨╛рлСтАл █╜тАм

0%"╨╛ рзИрй╣р╡д тАл рй╕рз╗╪АтАмрйдрй┐ тАлтЖЯ ╪итАм0%"рйД ▌Грк║тАл ▐ЫтАмрзЙр│бри╕ рйЙржа╙Эр│Ю тАл рв▓▌╢тАм╥Хрй╕ рвОрй╕ рйдриЧ тАл ▄│┘Б▌╜тАмрж▒ риСрйД ╨╛рйв рп╛ раЧраЩри╡тАл рв▓█╜тАм╤Р▀К тЖЯ 0%"рйД р┤м╥Чрв┐ 0%" ╙Щ ри╕ ридр│а ▌Грк║тАл ▐ЫтАмрзЙр│бри╕ рж▒╙Щ &GGFDUJWFOFTT ри╕ ридр│з ╤РтАл╪итАм╥┤рйД ▄╗╪Крдн╥Ч ╤Р▀К ╥Ер┤жрзА тАл╪АтАмр│а тЖЯр┤Ь╥Г раБ╤д ╥орин ╓крж╕ ┘б тАл╫отАмржир│а рзЯ╓Брдн ╤дрй╣р│а рй┐рм╝╥Ч ╥╜ ╤в▀б╓Д раЩржарйД ╥┤ркБ╙Э╙Ш╥Ч рзЛ╥Е рдЭрзА ╙Эрнб▄│ тАл ┘ГтАмр┤м╥Чрй╕рйЛ р▒╡р▒Я╓БрднрйД р│ЩриГрв┐ тЖЯ

- 35 -

╥┤ркБ ╙Шри│ ▀В ╙Эрг┐р┤И█▒ *OUFSOBUJPOBM 'JOBODJBM BOE 5FDIOJDBM $PPQFSBUJPO .POUFSSFZ

тЖЯ

тЖЯ

%PIB

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хࢎ೤‫ ׮פ‬

- 38 -

개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회

토론자료 1. 국제조세와 Capacity Building - 이유영 (조세정의 네트워크 동북아 챕터 대표)

- 39 -

국제조세와 Capacity Building 다국적 기업(Trans-national corporations)이 역외 조세 피난처 체제를 활용한 공격적인 절세 또는 탈세의 시작은 2차 대전 종전 후 본격적으로 그 규모와 정교함을 키우기 시 작했다 볼 수 있다. 이것은 글로벌 교역의 규모와 정교함이 이전과 다르게 발전하면서 두드러지게 발현된 현상이기도 하다. 이전 시기 국경 내(onshore)의 기업활동에서 발생한 소득에 대해 국가와 시장 참여자가 과세표준을 따져본 뒤 합당한 조세를 부과하고 납부하는 체제는 국경 외(offshore) 기업 활동에서 발생한 소득이 증가하고 해외 현지 법인 설립 또는 페이퍼 컴퍼니의 설립이 가 능해지면서 제도적 견고함과 건강성이 훼손되기에 이른다. 때를 맞춰 런던의 시티 금융가는 유로달러 마켓을 발진시켜 각국 중앙은행 통제 너머의 금융자본시장을 창설해 냈고, 스위스, 벨기에, 네덜란드, 리히텐슈타인 등 유럽 대륙권 자 본중개형 소국들은 금융비밀주의와 전문업계의 매개를 통한 금융산업 선도형 발전모델을 만들어 내기에 이르렀다. 영국이 2차대전 종전 후 외견상 독립을 시킨 왕실보호령 국가 들(Crown Dependencies)과 영국 해외영토령 국가들(British Overseas Territories)은 영세율 과 비밀주의를 무기로 이른바 현대판 보물섬으로 자리를 굳히게 되고 급기야 국가 경제 영역 너머에서 그림자 경제(shadow economy)체제의 블랙홀로써 부를 빨아드리기 시작 했다. 조세, 금융, 기업 활동 전반에 있어 만연해진 탈규제로의 전격적 경쟁의 결과 미국 의 경우 델라웨어, 버몬트, 네바다 등 개별 주들이 사실상 역내 조세피난처 체제의 양상 을 띠게 된다. 미국, 영국, 한국 등 글로벌 교역 국가 중 상당수는 속인주의에 기초한 조세체제를 갖추 고 있다. 이에 따르면 자국의 납세자 신분을 유지하는 개인이나 기업은 소득 발생 지역 에 무관하게 전세계 발생 소득(worldwide income)에 대해 세무 신고 및 납세의 의무를 지게 된다. 그런데 문제는 역외 발생 소득의 경우 현지 설립된 실제 영업활동 중인 법인이 현지 투 자 등의 목적으로 역내로 당장 들여 올 수 없는 경우 생기게 된다. 역내로 들여오지 않 은 잠재적 과세 소득에 대한 즉각적 조세부과가 기업활동에 불편함을 초래하고 과세권 남용의 측면이 있다는 점이 부각되게 된 것이다. 그 결과 대부분의 국가들은 역외 발생 소득의 역내 이전이 이루어지기 전까지는 조세 부과를 연기하는 법체계를 갖추게 되고, 다국적 기업들은 역외 발생 소득을 적극적으로 역외 조세도피처로 이전시켜(profit shifting) 국가의 조세권의 즉각적 행사를 회피하게 된다. 또한 고세율 국가에서 발생한

- 41 -

소득 상당 부분을 세율이 낮거나 전혀 없는 국가로 이전해서 과세표준을 줄이는 행위 (tax base erosion)도 등장하게 된다. 글로벌 교역에 있어 역외 금융 체제 및 적극적 조세피난 행위를 통한 기업 활동을 통한 부의 유출 규모는 논자에 따라 천차만별이다. 2007년 금융 위기이전 OECD나 미영 등은 규모를 짐작하는데 있어 적극적이지 않았다. 조제정의네트워크 영국 본부의 한 보고서에 따르면 2000~2015년 기간 동안 기업활동을 통한 역외 조세피난 규모는 약 2조5천억 달 러로 추산된다. 2000년 UN은 ‘새천년발전목표(New Millennium Development Goals)’를 공 개했고 그 종착시점을 2015년으로 설정했다. 글로벌 NGO인 크리스천 에이드는 동 기간 동안 조세피난 행위는 5백6십만 명에 달하는 저개발국 아동들의 목숨을 앗아가는데 재 정적 원인을 제공한다고 보았다. 하루 1천명의 아동의 목숨이 달렸다는 얘기다. 지난번 서울 SDSN Forum에서 제프리 색스 교수의 언급처럼 ‘돈은 소수의 손에 움켜져 있는 실정’이다. 그에 따르면 미국의 자산운용가 수수료 수익 상위 25인은 마켓 리턴에 도 미치지 못한 운용 실적에도 불구하고 각각 수십억 달러가 넘는 소득을 올린다고 한다. 이들이 거두는 천문학적 소득이 바로 조세피난처를 통한 공격적 자산운용에 있음은 여러 차례 지적되어 왔다. 와싱턴 소재 Center for International Policy의 레이먼드 베이커의 보 고서에 따르면 개발도상국과 미개발국가 집단이 2006년 불법적 또는 탈법적 금융거래로 입은 손실액이 약 8,500~1조 달러로 추산됐다. 이는 당시 글로벌 해외원조 총액 1천억 달러의 10배 규모로, “서구인들은 1달러를 테이블 위로 관대하게 건네 주면서 밑으로는 10달러를 뺏어오고 있다”는 말이 나오게 된 연유이기도 하다. 결국 위기가 현실의 문제점을 직시하게 했고 해결책 마련에 골몰하게 했다. 2007년 글로 벌 금융위기 이후 공격적 역외 탈절세와 그로 인한 부의 역외 유출은 각국 정부의 조세 주권확립과 세원 마련, 그리고 조세정의의 실현 차원에서 주요 아젠다로 부각되기에 이 른다. 그 결과 미국, 영국, 독일, 프랑스 등 주요국들과 OECD, World Bank, IMF, UN 등 국제 기구들이 글로벌 엔지오 그룹과 발을 맞추면서 역외조세도피처에 대한 적극적 대응 에 나서고 있다. 역외 조세도피처에 대한 대응은 그 성격상 개별 국가 차원의 대응 및 다자간 또는 국제 적 대응으로 구분하여 살펴볼 수 있다. 각국 정부는 우선 역외 조세도피처에 은닉된 자산을 파악하고 그에 관련된 신고 의무와 처벌 수준을 높이고 있다. 선제적으로 나선 미국은 역외 자산 보유에 대한 신고를 세금 보고 시에만 아니라 재무부에도 따로 보고하도록 제도를 마련했다. 우리나라의 경우도

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이와 유사한 제도를 도입한 바 있다. 또한 전통적으로 탈세 의심 사례에 있어 입증 책임 을 징세 당국 등에 부과해 오던 것을 납세자에게 전가하는 조치도 도입되고 있다. 대표 적인 것이 포괄적정보제출명령제도(John Doe Summons)다. 특정 정체가 드러나지 않은 이를 칭하는 표현이 남성의 경우 John Doe, 여성의 경우 Jane Doe라 하는데, 세무 관련 쟁송에 있어서 탈세 의심자의 구체적 정체가 드러나지 않았다 하더라도 일괄적으로 관련 기관이 보유하고 있는 정보를 세무 당국 등이 법원으로부터 정보 제출 명령장을 발부 받 아 정보접근을 할 수 있게 하는 제도다. 예를 들면 역외 탈세 시도자의 정보를 다량으로 보유하고 있는 금융기관이 있을 경우, 세무 당국은 개인들을 특정하지 못한 경우라도 일 괄적으로 정보 제출을 요구할 수 있게 되는 것이다. 다자간 및 국제적 대응으로 우선 논의되고 있는 것은 역외 조세도피처에 강한 영향력을 행사하고 있는 영국 등에 대한 실제적 압력 행사다. 영국은 앞서 언급한 것처럼 왕실보 호령 국가들과 해외영토령을 중심으로 한 역외 조세도피처의 발흥에 원인제공자란 비판 을 받아 왔다. 이곳의 금융 비밀주의 및 조세도피 체제는 아직도 실제적 영향력을 유지 하고 있는 영국의 의지에 따라 철폐 또는 개선이 이루어질 수 있다는 것이 중론이다. 바하마제도에 만연했던(물론 지금도 그렇지만) 조세탈피 또는 공격적 절세 행각에 대해 보낸 영국 Colonial Office가 영국은행(Bank of England)에 보낸 다음 메모를 보면 그 일 면을 엿볼 수 있다.

비밀주의 특성 상 개별 국가의 정보 접근이 어려운 역외 조세도피 행각은 조세정보교환 체제의 실효성을 배가하는 조치 마련도 요구하고 있다. OECD는 양자간 조세정보교환협 정(Tax Information Exchange Agreement)을 맺을 때 준거가 되는 이른바 Model Convention을 마련한 바 있으나, 그 효과는 실망스러웠다. 현 체제 하에서는 특정 국가 간에 협정을 맺은 경우도 정보교환을 요청하기 위해서는 까다로운 선제조건을 만족시켜

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야만 했던 것이 큰 이유다. 탈세혐의를 입증하고 특정 개인의 정체와 계좌 또는 관련 법 인 등 정보를 요청하는 국가가 요청 전에 파악하기 어려운 내막을 구체적으로 제시한 이 후에야 정보 제공 요청을 할 수 있는 것이다. 이러한 한계를 탈피하고자 하는 것이 자동 조세정보교환협정(Automatic Tax Information Exchange Agreement)이다. 이것이 제대로 도입되면 기존 협정 체제에 존재했던 정보 요청 시 사전 장벽이 없어지게 되어 빠르고 효과적인 정보접근이 가능할 것이라는 기대가 크다. 또한 다국적 기업들의 공격적인 역외 절세 행위인 역외 조세도피처에 설립된 법인에 지 적재산권 사용권과 소득을 이전하여 과세표준을 침식하는 것을 막는 방안도 고려되고 있 다. 실제 발생 매출 기여도, 투자 및 시설 규모, 종업원 수 등을 근거로 하여 징세할 몫 을 산정하는 일종의 공식을 마련하고 적용하여 실질적 경제 기여도에 따른 과세를 하자 는 것이다. 이것이 제대로 적용되면 역외조세도피처로 소득 이전을 통한 절세 또는 탈세 는 힘들어지게 되고 다국적 기업들의 핵심적 경영 중심지이자 거대 시장이기도 한 우리 나라와 같은 역내 체제는 제 몫의 세원을 되찾게 되는 데 크게 도움을 받게 될 것이다. 이러한 방식은 UN과 글로벌 엔지오 그룹 및 전문가 집단에서 지속적으로 주장되어 왔으 나 OECD를 중심으로 한 글로벌 금융 및 상거래의 키 플레이어들은 외면해 온 것이다. 사하라 남부의 자원 부국이면서 식민 경험을 갖고 있는 제3세계권에게 글로벌 교역의 자기 몫을 찾게 해주자는 기본적 취지도 이 방식의 옹호자 측에게는 상당했다. 회계기법 상 소득이 ‘발생하고 인식된(earned)’ 곳에서 과세 목적의 소득을 기록하는 것이 아니라 기업활동 지역과 경제적 실질성의 원칙에서 실제로 연결된 몫에 맞춰 과세소득을 인식하 자는 것이다. 흔히 ‘공식에 따른 산정법(Formulary Apportionment)’ 또는 ‘국가별 보고 방 식(Country-by-country Reporting, “CBCR”)이라 하며, 실제로 OECD와 EU 등에서 특정 산 업 분야에서 이러한 방식으로의 이행이 진행중이다. 한편 CBCR을 쉽게 수식화 하면 다 음과 같이 표현할 수 있다.

즉 다국적 기업의 과세 표준의 원천이 되는 수익에서 ‘노동’ ‘자본’ ‘매출’ 등의 패러미터 에 차지하는 각국의 비중을 따져 자기 몫의 세원을 확보하게 하자는 것이다. SDSD 드래 프트에서도 CBCR이 지속적 발전을 위한 국제 금융, 교역, 조세 분야의 핵심 사안인 점을 수 차례 강조하고 있다.

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그런데 문제는 제3세계 권역의 경우 이 방식이 도입되더라도 ‘자기 몫의 세원 확보’ 과정 에서 시스템 미비로 경쟁(?)에서 밀릴 수 있다는 것이다. 때문에 UN 및 글로벌 엔지오, 심지어는 OECD까지도 이른바 ‘Capacity Building’의 중요 과제로 이를 지적하고 있는 것 이다. 글로벌 개발재원 TF의 방향은 위에서 살펴 본 Capacity Building의 연유에서 보듯 OECD, G20, UN 등 글로벌 다자간 기구 주도의 Capacity Building 이니셔티브에 적극 동참하여 민간 전문가 그룹의 구성 및 참여와 더불어 제3세계 권역의 ‘자기 몫의 세원 확보’ 과정 에 필요한 기구 또는 플랫폼의 설립과 협력 활동의 가능성에 우선 주목해야 한다고 본다.

Tax Justice Network, the Far East Chapter Chapter Leader 이 유 영

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개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회

참고자료 1. Financing for Development Revised Draft Outcome(2015.5.6.)

2. Key Elements of a Successful Addiss Ababa on FfD - UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network(SDSN)

3. Recommendations for the Post-2015 MOI and FfD - Beyond2015

4. OECD DAC의 ODA 재정의와 시사점 - 한국수출입은행

5. 개발재원총회 정부간 협상 한국정부 발언문 모음

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개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회

참고자료 1. Financing for Development Revised Draft Outcome(2015.5.6.)

2. Key Elements of a Successful Addiss Ababa on FfD - UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network(SDSN)

3. Recommendations for the Post-2015 MOI and FfD - Beyond2015

4. OECD DAC의 ODA 재정의와 시사점 - 한국수출입은행

5. 개발재원총회 정부간 협상 한국정부 발언문 모음

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개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회

참고자료 1. Financing for Development Revised Draft Outcome(2015.5.6.)

2. Key Elements of a Successful Addiss Ababa on FfD - UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network(SDSN)

3. Recommendations for the Post-2015 MOI and FfD - Beyond2015

4. OECD DAC의 ODA 재정의와 시사점 - 한국수출입은행

5. 개발재원총회 정부간 협상 한국정부 발언문 모음

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Key Elements of a Successful Addis Ababa Accord on Financing for Sustainable Development A Working Paper prepared by the Leadership Council of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN)

March 19, 2015 Working Paper

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About the SDSN Leadership Council Members of the Leadership Council serve in their personal capacities, so the opinions expressed in this Working Paper may not reflect the opinions of their host institutions. The Working Paper has been endorsed by the members of the Leadership Council, though some may not be in full agreement with every detail. Some members of the Leadership Council do not endorse or cannot be otherwise associated with this report. Their names are highlighted with an asterisk below.

Chairs Laurence Tubiana,* Special Representative of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs for the 2015 Paris Climate Conference (COP-21) and French Ambassador for Climate Negotiations, France.

Xue Lan, Cheung Kong Chair Professor and Dean, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, China.

Members: Zakri Abdul Hamid, Science Advisor to the Prime Minister, Malaysia; Irene Agyepong, Professor, Department of Health Policy, Planning, and Management at the University of Ghana’s School of Public Health, Ghana; Zubaid Ahmad, Vice Chairman, Citi’s Institutional Clients Group and Global Head, Practice with Sovereign Wealth Funds, Citi, USA; HE Reem Ebrahim Al Hashimy, Minister of State, United Arab Emirates; Sultan Al Jaber,* Minister of State and Chairman, Masdar, United Arab Emirates; HSH Prince Albert II of Monaco, Head of State, Monaco; Shaukat Aziz, Former Prime Minister, Pakistan; Peter Bakker, President, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Switzerland; Belay Begashaw, Director, Columbia Global Centers | Africa, Kenya; Frances Beinecke, Former President, NRDC, USA; Joseph Bell, Partner, Hogan Lovells, USA; Mohamed Benaïssa, Mayor Of Asilah and Secretary-General, Assilah Forum Foundation, Morocco; David Berry, Partner, Flagship Ventures, USA; Micheline Calmy-Rey, Visiting Professor, University Of Geneva, Switzerland; Joshua Castellino, Professor of Law and Dean, School of Law at Middlesex University, UK; Madhav Chavan, Co-founder and CEO, Pratham, India; Süreyya Ciliv, CEO, Turkcell, Turkey; Paul Collier, Professor, University of Oxford, UK; Mark Cutifani, Chief Executive, Anglo American, UK; Robert Dijkgraaf, Director, Institute of Advanced Study, USA, Bineta Diop, Founder and President, Femmes Africa Solidarité, Senegal; Achim Dobermann, Director, Rothamsted Research, UK; Hendrik du Toit, Chief Executive Officer, Investec Asset Management, South Africa; Jan Egeland, Secretary General, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Norway; Leonel Fernández Reyna, President, Global Foundation for Democracy and Development (FUNGLODE) and Former President, Dominican Republic; Christiana Figueres,* Executive Secretary, UNFCCC, Germany; José María Figueres, President, Carbon War Room, USA; Maria Freire, President, Foundation for the National Institutes of Health, USA; Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, President, Institut Panafricain De Stratégies and Former Foreign Minister, Senegal; Helene Gayle, President and CEO, CARE USA, USA; Tarja Halonen, Former President, Finland and Fellow, Angelopoulos Global Public Leaders, Harvard Kennedy School, USA; James Hansen, Director of Climate Science, Awareness and Solutions program, Earth Institute and Former Director, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, USA; Thomas Heller, Executive Director, Climate Policy Initiative, USA; José Miguel Insulza, Secretary General, Organization Of American States, USA and Former Minister of Interior, Chile; Naoko Ishii, CEO and Chairperson, Global Environment Facility (GEF), USA; Vuk Jeremić, President, Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD), Serbia; Pavel Kabat, Director General and CEO, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Austria; Geoffrey Kent, Founder, Chairman and CEO, Abercrombie & Kent Group of Companies, Kenya; Niclas Kjellström-Matseke, CEO, Novamedia Swedish Postcode Lottery, Sweden; Israel Klabin, Founder and Chairman, Brazilian Foundation for Sustainable Development, Brazil; Barbara Kux, Member of Board of Directors of Total and Henkel, Germany; Markos Kyprianou, Deputy President, Cyprus Democratic Party, Cyprus; Felipe Larraín, Director, Centro Latinoamericano de Políticas Económicas y Sociales (CLAPES-UC) and Professor, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile; Lord Richard Layard, Director, Programme on Wellbeing, London School of Economics and Professor Emeritus, London School of Economics, UK; Frannie Léautier, Partner and Chief Executive Officer, Mkoba Private Equity, Tanzania; Yuan T. Lee, Yuan T. Lee, President Emeritus, Academia Sinica, Taiwan and Immediate Past President, ICSU, France; Klaus Leisinger, Founder and President, Global

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Values Alliance Foundation, Switzerland; Gordon Liu, Director, China Center for Health Economics Research (CCHER), Peking University, China; Jane Lubchenco, Distinguished Professor, Oregon State University, USA; Arun Majumdar, Professor, Stanford University and Former Vice President for Energy, Google Inc, USA; Julia Marton-Lefèvre, Former Director General, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Switzerland, Vladimir Mau, Rector, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Russia; Marcia McNutt, Editor-In-Chief, Science, USA; Amina Mohammed (ex officio), Special Adviser to UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon on Post-2015 Development Planning, USA; Miguel Ángel Moratinos Cuyaubé, Senior Member, Global Dry Land Alliance, Qatar; Romain Murenzi, Executive Director, The Academy of Sciences for the Developing World (TWAS), Italy; Shahid Naeem, Director, Center for Environmental Sustainability, The Earth Institute, Columbia University, USA; Claude Nahon, Senior Vice President, Sustainable Development, EDF Group, France; Sunita Narain, Director General, Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), India; Rebecca Nelson, Professor, Cornell University, USA; Charity Ngilu, Cabinet Secretary for Land, Housing and Urban Development, Kenya; Amadou Niang, Director, MDG Centre of West and Central Africa, Senegal; Cherie Nursalim, Executive Director, GITI Group, Singapore; Leslie O’Donoghue, Executive Vice President of Corporate Development & Strategy, Chief Risk Officer, Agrium, Canada; Ikenna Onyido, Professor and Director, Centre for Sustainable Development, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Nigeria; Rajendra Pachauri, Director-General, TERI, India; HE Mari Pangestu, Former Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, Republic of Indonesia; George Papandreou, Former Prime Minister, Greece; Antonio Pedro, Director, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Subregional Office for Eastern Africa, Rwanda; Paul Polman, CEO, Unilever, The Netherlands; Sabina Ratti, Executive Director, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Italy; Srinath Reddy, President, Public Health Foundation of India, India; Aromar Revi, Director, Indian Institute for Human Settlements, India; Teresa Ribera, Director, Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI), France; Angelo Riccaboni, Rector, University of Siena, Italy; Johan Rockström, Executive Director, Stockholm Resilience Centre, Sweden; Cynthia Rosenzweig, Senior Research Scientist, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, USA; Jeffrey Sachs, Director, the Earth Institute, Columbia University, USA; Paolo Scaroni, Deputy Chairman, Rothschild, Italy; Josette Sheeran, President and CEO, Asia Society, USA; Feike Sijbesma, CEO and Chairman of the Board, DSM, The Netherlands; Vania Somavilla, Executive Director of Human Resources, Health and Safety, Sustainability and Energy, Vale, Brazil; Monsignor Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, Chancellor, Pontifical Academy of Sciences and Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Vatican City; Andrew Steer, President and CEO, World Resources Institute, USA; Pavan Sukhdev, Founder-CEO, GIST Advisory, India; Carl-Henric Svanberg, Chairman, BP, UK and Chairman, Volvo AB, Sweden; John Thwaites, Chairman, Monash Sustainability Institute, Australia; Lena Treschow Torell, President, Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences, Sweden; Ted Turner, Chairman, Turner Foundation and Chairman, United Nations Foundation, USA; Hans Vestberg, President and CEO, Ericsson Group, Sweden; Virgilio Viana, Director General, Amazonas Sustainable Foundation, Brazil; Martin Visbeck, Chair of Physical Oceanography, GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research Kiel, Germany; Nur Hassan Wirajuda, Former Foreign Minister, Indonesia and Member, Council Of Presidential Advisors, Indonesia; Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Courtney Sale Ross Professor of Globalization and Education, New York University, USA; Soogil Young, Professor, KDI School of Public Policy and Management and Former Chairman, Presidential Committee of Green Growth, Korea; Zhou Dadi, Director General (Emeritus), The Energy Research Institute (ERI) of the National Development and Reform Commission, China; Hania Zlotnik, Former Director, UN DESA’s Population Division, USA.

Acknowledgements The SDSN is grateful for financing received from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its work on Financing for Development.

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Table of Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................... 5 1

Introduction: Defining a Successful Outcome for Addis Ababa ................................................. 6

2

Summary of Principal Recommendations ......................................................................................... 7

3

Aligning Finance with Sustainable Development ........................................................................... 9 3.1 3.2 3.3

4

Goal-based Partnerships for the SDGs.............................................................................................. 15 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8

5

Private-Sector Financing ............................................................................................................................... 10 Official Financing .............................................................................................................................................. 10 Climate Investments and Financing.......................................................................................................... 12 Human Capital: Health and Education ..................................................................................................... 15 Infrastructure..................................................................................................................................................... 15 Business Capital ................................................................................................................................................ 16 Natural Capital including Ecosystems and Biodiversity .................................................................. 18 Intellectual Capital: Technologies for sustainable development .................................................. 18 Social Capital including Data and SDG Monitoring ............................................................................. 19 The Important Role of IDA............................................................................................................................ 19 Summary of Pooled Funding Recommendations ................................................................................ 19

Mobilizing and Monitoring New International Development Finance for the SDGs ...... 20 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

Official Development Assistance ................................................................................................................ 20 Private Philanthropy ....................................................................................................................................... 22 Other Official Flows ......................................................................................................................................... 22 Monitoring International Development Finance ................................................................................. 22

6

Reforming International Governance and Mobilizing Non-financial Means of Implementation in Support of Sustainable Development........................................................ 23

7

Accountability, Follow-Through, and Implementation.............................................................. 24

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Acronyms and Abbreviations MDFC – Multilateral Development Finance Committee MDGs – Millennium Development Goals NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations ODA – Official Development Assistance ODA-C – ODA for Climate OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD-DAC – OECD Development Assistance Committee OOF – Other Official Flows OOF-C – OOF for Climate PIDA – Programme on Infrastructure Development in Africa PFM – Private Funds Mobilized PFM-C – PFM for Climate PPP – Public-Private Partnership REDD+ – Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation RDD&D – Research, Development, Demonstration, and Diffusion SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals SDRM – Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism SDSN – Sustainable Development Solutions Network SMEs – Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises TOF – Total Official Financing TOSD – Total Official support for Sustainable Development UMICs – Upper-Middle-Income Countries UN – United Nations UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change WTO – World Trade Organization

BEPS – Base Erosion and Profit Shifting BIS – Bank for International Settlements CCS – Carbon Capture and Storage COP21 – 21st Conference of the Parties under the UNFCCC CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility DBR – Domestic Budget Revenues DFIs – Development Finance Institutions FDI – Foreign Direct Investment FfD – Financing for Development Gavi – The Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunisation; the Vaccine Alliance GCF – Green Climate Fund GDP – Gross Domestic Product GEF – Global Environmental Facility GFATM – Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria GFE – Global Fund for Education GFH – Global Fund for Health GNI – Gross National Income HICs – High-Income Countries IAC - Infrastructure Asset Class IATI – International Aid Transparency Initiative ICT – Information and Communications Technology IDA – International Development Association IDF – International Development Financing IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development IMF – International Monetary Fund IPPFs – Infrastructure Project Preparation Facilities KfW – Reconstruction Credit Institute LDCs – Least Developed Countries LICs – Low-Income Countries LMICs – Lower-Middle-Income Countries MDBs – Multilateral Development Banks

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This Working Paper outlines key elements for a successful outcome document of the 2015 Financing for Development (FfD) Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It builds on the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, the 2008 Doha Declaration on FfD, and the preparations for the post2015 development agenda, including the outcome document of the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2014 Synthesis Report of the UN Secretary-General.

Further, this document draws on recent reports on FfD including the Elements Paper submitted by the co-chairs of the FfD negotiations and reports by the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing, the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), the World Bank, the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, and many others. We refer to these documents and in particular the draft SDSN report1 for the background and analysis behind the recommendations described in this document.

1

Introduction: Defining a Successful Outcome for Addis Ababa

A successful FfD conference will provide the means of implementation for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the climate agreement to be reached at the 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris (COP21). The Addis Ababa Accord should build on the Monterrey and Doha FfD conferences to achieve four interrelated objectives. It should: 1. Align the principles of FfD with the new SDG agenda and adopt clear timelines for implementation. This includes inter alia extensions of the financing successes of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), such as in health; enhanced financing for environmental sustainability including climate finance; the increasing role of the private sector and capital markets in financing sustainable development, particularly for infrastructure; enhanced domestic resource mobilization; and the emergence of new provider countries and philanthropic donors.

2. Increase the volume and quality of private and public financing, including Domestic Budget Revenues (DBR)2 and International Development Financing (IDF). Businesses and private investors will provide an important share of development finance, but concessional and non-concessional public funds are critical for unlocking private resources and for providing public goods. In our usage, IDF comprises Official Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF) and Private Funds Mobilized (PFM) through ODA or OOF.3 Purely commercial private financing complements official resources and IDF. The Addis Ababa Accord will need to specify modalities for tracking commitments and monitoring official and private financing.

3. Commit to effective pooled financing mechanisms to support the SDGs, including a Global Fund for Education (GFE) building on the Global Partnership for Education; a Global Fund for Health Systems (GFH) building on Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and the Global Fund to Fights AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM); new Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for Sustainable Technologies; new initiatives to finance large-scale sustainable infrastructure; and a Global Fund for Smallholder Agriculture and Nutrition 1

Available at http://unsdsn.org/resources/publications/financing-for-sustainable-development/.

Defined as general government tax and non-tax revenues that pass through a government budget, excluding IDF and loans.

3 In current usage, IDF does not include PFM, but we recommend including PFM in IDF, given the importance of PFM for the SDGs. As in other areas of this Working Paper, there will need to be global understanding and agreement on these revised technical definitions.

2

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building on the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). To reduce fragmentation, several ineffective or small-scale programs and mechanisms should be terminated or merged.

4. Ensure that national and global rules for investment, finance, trade, and other “nonfinancial means of implementation� are consistent with the SDGs – particularly in support of resource mobilization and aligning private investments with the objectives of sustainable development. Some priority areas that should be highlighted in the Addis Ababa Accord include integrated business reporting on all dimensions of sustainable development, international tax cooperation and exchange of information, improved disclosure rules on beneficial ownership, and a reform of voting rights in international financial institutions to give more representation to developing countries.

Not every technical detail can be agreed in the Addis Ababa Accord, and implementing the commitments will take time. In particular, the tight fiscal situation in many high-income countries makes significant short-term increases in public financing difficult. For these reasons, the Addis Ababa Accord should highlight clear timelines, shared responsibilities, and modalities for review of commitments and reporting on progress.

2

Summary of Principal Recommendations

Below we summarize 11 principal recommendations for a successful outcome in Addis Ababa.

These recommendations do not aim to cover the entire FfD agenda, but focus on some of the most important transformative elements.

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Table 1: Summary of 11 principal recommendations 1

Agree on indicative financing needs to achieve the SDGs, detailing the categories of private finance, Domestic Budget Revenues, and International Development Finance.

2

Adopt clear standards for Domestic Budget Revenues: 18 percent of Gross National Income (GNI) in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 20 percent in other low-income countries (LICs), 22 percent in lower-middle-income countries (LMICs), 24 percent in upper-middle-income countries (UMICs), and at least 24 percent in high-income countries (HICs).

3

All high-income countries should commit 0.7 percent of GNI in ODA and disburse at least 0.15-0.20 percent of GNI to LDCs. Upper-middle-income countries should commit to 0.1 percent of GNI in ODA.

4

All International Development Finance, including ODA, OOF, and PFM, should be subject to rigorous and transparent reporting through a Multilateral Development Finance Committee (MDFC) that builds on but goes beyond existing mechanisms, such as the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).

5

Commit to providing at least $100 billion per year in climate finance from developed countries by 2020, roughly mobilized as 1/3 ODA for climate (ODAC), 1/3 OOF-C, and 1/3 in PFM-C through ODA-C and OOF-C.

6

ODA-C should be integrated with development financing, but is additional and not included in the 0.7 percent ODA target. As such, ODA-C should be mobilized through new sources, such as an assessed contribution of some $2 per ton of carbon dioxide emissions by each developed country, Financial Transaction Taxes, or levies on international maritime transport and aviation.

7

Encourage individual holders of large wealth to sign the Giving Pledge and donate a significant share of their net worth to the SDGs, particularly through specialized SDG global funds.

8

Agree that the global SDG funds should provide roughly half of all multilateral ODA in the respective sector.

9

Reform global financial regulations to end tax and secrecy havens; reveal the beneficial ownership of companies engaged in cross-border activities; curb abusive tax shifting through an expanded Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) framework that better addresses the needs of developing countries; and require transparent financial and integrated reporting by companies.

10

Make national and international governance, rules, and standards consistent with the objective of achieving the SDGs (including for trade, intellectual property rights, banking and insurance regulation, and business accounting) and mandate periodic public coherence checks.

11

Ensure effective follow-through and accountability on FfD commitments in all major international fora, including the G7/8 and G20, the United Nations, the meetings of the MDBs, and major business groups.

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3

Aligning Finance with Sustainable Development

Sustainable Development requires investments across six complementary forms of capital: infrastructure, human capital, natural capital, business capital, intellectual capital (scientific and technological know-how), and social capital. Each of the six types of capital requires investments by the public sector, the private sector, and the social (not-for-profit) sector, comprising foundations, academia, and social enterprises. In parallel, subsidies that are inconsistent with the objectives of sustainable development need to be phased out.

FfD needs to distinguish between two related concepts: the organizational entity leading a particular investment and the source(s) of financing. When the lead investor is a public entity (a government or a public agency) one speaks of a “public investment.” Alternatively, when the investor is a private company one speaks of a “private investment.” When the main source of financing is the public budget, perhaps augmented by aid flows from abroad, one speaks of “public financing.”4 When the financing is from private sources such as loans or bond sales, one speaks of “private financing.” Many projects and programs involve a mix of public, private, and social investors, and of public and private sources of financing. As a result, the project design often entails a formal partnership of the public and private sectors, or a Public Private Partnership (PPP).

The private sector is the main investor and financier of business capital and makes critical contributions towards other types of capital. The other types of capital typically require a mix of public and private investments, with both public and private financing (Table 2).

Table 2: Main Sources of Investment and Financing by Type of Capital Type of Capital Infrastructure Human Capital

Natural Capital

Main Type of Investor Mix of public and private investment Mainly public investment in health and education, with some private investment Mainly public investments in environmental protection

Business Capital

Mainly private investors

Intellectual Capital

Mix of public and private investors Public regulations and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

Social Capital

4

Main Types of Financing A mix of DBR, IDF, and private financing Mainly DBR, augmented by IDF, and philanthropic support Mainly DBR augmented by IDF, philanthropic funds, and private financing Mainly private financing, except in the case of smallholder agriculture, where public financing tends to play a major role Mix of DBR, IDF, and private financing DBR to support good governance and inclusive policies; private capital to support private sector CSR; philanthropic funds to support NGOs

Philanthropic and other not-for-profit finance is of growing importance. Though provided by private entities, it exhibits the characteristics of public finance.

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3.1 Private-Sector Financing There is enormous potential to tap businesses and capital markets for greatly expanded investments, particularly in energy, other infrastructure, and agriculture. Private financing entails various sources and mechanisms, including the following: x

Bank loans;

x

Bonds, including green bonds, issued by governments or corporations in domestic and international capital markets;

x

Private placements and direct, non-recourse project financing by specialized financial institutions, including insurance companies, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and other asset managers;

x

Direct equity investments, including portfolio flows and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Two challenges related to private-sector financing stand out. First, the volume and access to private sector funds for sustainable development must be increased significantly, especially for low-income countries. This will require changes to the regulatory environment of domestic and international financing, as described further below. Second, existing private-sector financing must be better aligned with the objectives of sustainable development. Regulatory and behavioral changes, including but not limited to integrated reporting for businesses, changes in the regulation of key industries, or the introduction of a price on greenhouse gas emissions and other externalities, must be considered in all countries to better align private investments with the social objective of sustainable development.

As noted earlier, some private sector financing will be mobilized through public guarantees such as export guarantees, political insurance cover, co-financing by official institutions, and so forth.

A certain part of such financing will be classified as IDF under the rubric of PFM (Private Financing Mobilized by official flows). The rules for accounting for such PFM and including it within IDF will need to be agreed on during and elaborated following the Addis Ababa conference.5

3.2 Official Financing Total Official Financing (TOF) is equal to Domestic Budget Revenues (DBR) directed towards the SDGs plus International Development Finance (IDF) from abroad, which also comprises official climate finance, as described further below. IDF in turn comprises Official Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF) that are mainly non-concessional loans by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), and Private Funds Mobilized (PFM) by official financing, such as commercial bonds issued by developing country governments that are enhanced with developed-country guarantees. In arithmetic terms: TOF = DBR + ODA + OOF + PFM. Note that DBR is the product of two ratios: the share of government revenues in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) multiplied by the share of those revenues directed towards the SDGs.

5

The OECD-DAC has recently started work on developing methodologies for estimating such PFM. This work, though at an early stage, makes an important contribution to understanding and tracking private flows for sustainable development. It can help inform an Addis Ababa Accord.

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As agreed in Monterrey, primary responsibility for financing development rests with national governments. All governments should make a good faith effort to raise sufficient overall domestic revenues, and then to allocate those revenues heavily towards the SDGs. The Addis Ababa Accord might adopt the following minimum DBR targets: x

For Least Developed Countries (LDCs): 18 percent of GNI

x

For other low-income countries (LICs): 20 percent of GNI

x

For lower-middle-income countries (LMICs): 22 percent of GNI

x

For upper-middle-income countries (UMICs): 24 percent of GNI

x

For high-income countries (HICs): at least 24 percent of GNI

Similar targets have been set for the share of government revenues directed towards certain development needs. The Abuja Target, for example, calls on developing countries to devote at least 15 percent of government revenues towards health outlays. There are proposals for similar standards in other areas, such as education and agriculture. In general, the Addis Ababa Accord should avoid competition between sectors and therefore focus on standards for the overall share of GNI directed towards the SDGs in the form of DBR. Development finance should be mobilized in a transparent and predictable manner. In cases where the national economy is heavily concentrated in one or more primary commodities (e.g. hydrocarbons, minerals, metals), there may be a case to establish special commodity funds to help manage revenues from the key commodities. DBR should be deployed transparently and predictably, and against published plans and strategies to achieve the SDGs. This may include national multi-year development plans and investment programs. Since the SDGs describe a universal agenda, the same standards for transparency and monitoring DBR must apply to highincome countries.

Most developing countries, particularly the LDCs, will need to augment DBR with IDF, including official climate finance, in order to finance sufficient levels of public investment to achieve the SDGs. The quality of ODA and OOF needs to be improved in three ways. First, the volume of ODA needs to be increased, in line with preceding pledges and future needs. Second, ODA should be directed to countries that cannot finance the investments required by the SDGs out of their own resources. Each provider should strive to commit at least 50 percent of its ODA towards the LDCs by 2020. Multilateral development bank lending (the main category of OOF) should focus mainly on LICs and LMICs, with UMICs receiving mainly technical cooperation.

Third, to reduce the high transaction costs and increase the efficacy and transparency of ODA, at least 50 percent of ODA should be provided through pooled multilateral channels by 2020, up from around 30 percent in 2014. OOF should continue to be provided essentially through the MDBs. Currently no consensus exists on the specific levels of ODA, OOF, and PFM that will be needed for each type of capital investment. Good-quality needs assessments are available for health, and others are emerging for education, water and sanitation, smallholder agriculture, data and other areas, including infrastructure. Table 3 highlights the International Development Financing (IDF) needs for a few selected SDG sectors.6 These are merely illustrative calculations at this 6

For more detailed explanation see Annex 1 of the SDSN Financing for Sustainable Development background paper.

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stage, and they will require further refinement to reach a consensus in Addis Ababa. The SDSN looks forward to working with lead agencies for each sector to refine available estimates.

The table shows that current shortfalls of ODA are equal to tens of billions of dollars per year.

Note the table excludes large investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and other areas, which yield vastly higher shortfalls in OOF and PFM. Table 3: Illustrative and incomplete IDF needs for selected sectors that require large shares of concessional finance (2013$ billion)

Infrastructure Capital Water and Sanitation for the Poor Energy for the Poor Human Capital Education Health Business Capital Smallholder Agriculture Social Capital SDG Monitoring

Current ODA (2013)

ODA in 2020

OOF+PFM7 in 2020

Total IDF in 2020

10

35

5

40

14

35

15

50

13 20

40 40

~0 ~0

40 40

15

30

~0

30

0.25

0.5

~0

0.5

Note: This table excludes the broader and predominantly private investment needs in infrastructure, agriculture, and other areas. See the SDSN background paper for more information.

In the follow-up to the Addis Ababa FfD conference, member states will need to continually update and improve needs assessments to arrive at a widely shared understanding of how the SDGs can be achieved. Such a process has been highly constructive for public health during the MDG period. Indeed, without such needs assessments it becomes impossible to determine whether available financing and other means of implementation are adequate to achieve the SDGs in a given sector or country.

3.3 Climate Investments and Financing Climate financing is a relatively new category of development financing that will inevitably play a large role in the Addis Ababa Accord, the SDGs, and COP21. While all future investments in the six types of capital should be compatible with the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations (mitigation) and resilience to climate change (adaptation), certain investments will be singled out for accounting purposes as “climate investments,” backed by “climate financing.” Separate accounting for climate financing will be needed to assure developing countries that developed countries are indeed helping them to absorb the incremental costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet, such separate accounting must not lead to an artificial operational

7

We do not have a baseline of OOF+PFM for 2013.

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separation of climate and development finance, since both must be integrated and are in many cases operationally indistinguishable.

At least four types of climate investments have been identified in recent policy debates: x

Mitigation: Investments in low-carbon energy systems (e.g. wind, solar, geothermal, carbon capture and storage), reforestation to capture carbon dioxide (e.g. through the REDD+ mechanism), and projects devoted to energy efficiency (e.g. retrofitting of old buildings for insulation and air flow);

x

Adaptation: Investments in natural capital (e.g. flood protection or ecosystem-based resilience), agricultural practices, and infrastructure, and human capital, that aim mainly to strengthen resilience to climate change;

x

Research, Development, Demonstration and Diffusion (RDD&D): Investments in the advancement of early-stage low-carbon technologies and their widespread diffusion;

x

Losses and Damages: Compensation to countries for losses and damages incurred in climate-related disasters such as droughts, floods, and tropical cyclones.

Developed countries have committed to ensuring at least $100 billion per year in climate financing for developing countries from 2020, but confusion reigns on what does and does not count towards this commitment. The Addis Ababa Accord should clarify that the $100 billion comprises International Development Financing (IDF) of various kinds (including ODA, OOF, and PFM). The commitment should exclude purely commercial private flows8 and funds raised by national development banks for use in the same country. Developing countries will in fact need much more than $100 billion per year in climate financing, with the balance mobilized through DBR, additional IDF, and commercial private sector financing.

According to the outcome of the 2014 COP20 in Lima, it seems likely that the $100 billion for 2020 will be divided roughly 50-50 between mitigation and adaptation. This share seems appropriate, particularly given the substantial public finance needs for adaptation. RDD&D and Losses and Damages are not part of the $100 billion commitment and will likely require additional funding.

The Addis Ababa Accord also needs to clarify the meaning of “additional� climate finance.

Developing countries have long insisted, and most developed countries have long acknowledged, that official climate financing should be additional to traditional development financing, because climate financing represents an added hurdle and expense for developing countries. For this reason a dollar of IDF should only be counted once as either climate finance or non-climate IDF. To distinguish the part of IDF devoted to climate financing, the notation ODA-C, OOF-C, and PFM-C could be used. The sum of these categories should reach $100 billion per year by 2020, and we propose that each category contribute an equal share (

8

The distinction between purely commercial flows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI), and PFM is important since public finance should be directed towards leveraging a maximum volume of private resources.

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Table 4). ODA-C cannot be counted towards the commitment to provide 0.7 percent in GNI as ODA.

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Table 4: The public and private components of Official Climate Financing ($ billion)9 Climate Financing Additional climate ODA (ODA-C) Other Official Flows (OOFC) Private Funds Mobilized through public resources (PFM-C) Official climate financing

Minimum Target 2020 33.3 33.3 33.3

100

The most important and convincing way to ensure additional climate financing is to develop new sources of climate financing beyond traditional official sources. A key source of climate financing, and of ODA-C in particular, should be the revenues raised by the governments of developed countries via carbon taxation and the sale or auction of carbon emission permits. If developed countries contributed $2 per ton of carbon dioxide emissions towards ODA-C – raised either through domestic carbon taxation or the sales of emissions permits – they would generate an additional $36 billion in ODA-C, which could in turn leverage OOF-C (mainly loans from multilateral development banks) and PFM-C (mainly private loans and bonds with official guarantees) to reach the full $100 billion in official climate finance effort as of 2020.

Recent sharp falls in the price of fossil fuels provide a unique opportunity for developed countries to scale back fossil-fuel subsidies and introduce carbon pricing in support of ODA-C. Other promising mechanisms for mobilizing public climate finance include domestic revenues collected on new Financial Transaction Taxes and levies on fossil fuel emissions resulting from international aviation and maritime transport.

A significant portion of the $100 billion, perhaps 20 percent, should flow through the new Green Climate Fund (GCF) and another 5-10 percent should flow through an expanded Global Environment Facility (GEF). The rest would flow mainly through MDBs and other development institutions that specialize in co-financing PPPs, particularly those engaged in the areas of infrastructure and the protection of natural capital (Table 5).

Table 5: Disbursement of Official Climate Finance today and by 2020 ($ billion)10 Some Specific Financing Mechanisms Bilateral Green Climate Fund GEF MDBs Private Capital (PFM) Total

Current disbursement

Indicative targets by 2020

24 0 1 13 0-5 38-43

25-30 20 5-10 36 28 At least 100

9

We do not have robust estimates of current flows since there are many contentious issues of measurement and classification. For example, ODA that is currently counted as climate financing is rarely from a source that is additional to non-climate ODA and therefore should not count towards ODA-C, or at least not in full.

10 Current disbursement data cited from: OECD Development Assistance Committee. Climate-related development finance in 2013: Improving the Statistical Picture.

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4

Goal-based Partnerships for the SDGs

Global partnerships around the SDGs can help develop the strategies and mobilize the financing, technologies, and PPPs needed to meet the goals. The experience of the MDGs regarding such goal-oriented partnerships has been very positive, as demonstrated by the success in reducing child mortality and in fighting AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, and polio.

However, goal-based partnerships for non-health MDG priorities have made considerably less progress.

Successful global partnerships are complex and require many different types of partners. From a financing perspective pooled global funds such as Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) have played an enormously positive role. They help to (i) reduce transaction costs and support scaled-up national strategies, (ii) provide a unified interface for mobilizing private financing, expertise and innovation, and (iii) build the understanding of how ambitious sector goals can be achieved and monitored. Global partnerships that lack effective pooled financing mechanisms have been unable to achieve progress similar to that achieved in health.

Since public and private investments and their financing differ markedly across the six types of capital, the Addis Ababa Accord needs to consider each category separately. Designs of goalbased global partnerships should also learn from innovative South-South cooperation.

4.1 Human Capital: Health and Education Two overarching global funds are needed for human capital: a Global Fund for Health (GFH) and a Global Fund for Education (GFE). The GFH would combine existing mechanisms (Gavi, GFATM, Global Finance Facility, and others), and would comprise a financing window to strengthen health systems, so that horizontal approaches to health can be financed – inter alia to prevent and control crises like Ebola. The GFH would disburse a minimum of $15 billion per year as of 2020 compared with a combined total of $5.2 billion today for Gavi and the GFATM. The Global Partnership for Education currently disburses some $0.8 billion in IDF. It should be scaled up by an order of magnitude and be transformed into the GFE combining large-scale, pooled resource mobilization with a delivery model like Gavi and the GFATM. The GFE would disburse a minimum of $15 billion per year as of 2020.

4.2 Infrastructure Most new infrastructure will be financed by private flows, mobilized in part through public funds mediated by MDBs and national government agencies. This is especially true of large-scale infrastructure, like power grids, urban water and sewerage systems, highways, rail, airports, seaports, and information and communication technology (ICT) networks. These investments will amount to trillions of dollars in both developed and developing countries, far beyond any conceivable levels of public finance. Therefore, the private sector will have to play a vital role in financing, often as the lead investor. PPPs will also be critical throughout this sector.

Development banking, at the global, regional, national and sub-national levels, must be enhanced to facilitate the blending of official and private capital. In particular, project preparation and the appropriate channeling of public and private resources to infrastructure must be scaled

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up. Dedicated and innovative institutions for infrastructure finance can mobilize a combination of skills beyond the means of traditional public or private institutions, including investment analysis, public policy, financial mobilization, and public-private coordination. In recent years promising new institutions have been created for infrastructure finance, such as the new UK Green Investment Bank, and the Danish Climate Investment Fund, just to name two notable examples that complement established institutions like the KfW of Germany.

Green bonds may be helpful as well, though the definition and regulation of green bonds is still inchoate and unsatisfactory. What qualifies as a green bond? What advantages – tax, regulatory, reputational or other – should adhere to green bonds? Who will judge what is and what is not a green bond? These issues require urgent clarification and transparent global standards.

The financing issues for ensuring that every poor person has access to basic services (including safe water, sanitation and electricity) are somewhat distinct. Such investments rely on smallscale systems that are less amenable to project finance or other infrastructure financing modalities. They also involve technologies – such as off-grid or micro-grid power supply – that are different from large-scale infrastructure models. And, finally, the poor are often unable to finance the capital required and full operating expenditures, so revenue models are different.

Both ODA for LICs and OOF for LMICs will have to play a significant role in financing basic infrastructure for the poor. The Addis Ababa Accord should call for the establishment of a Global Fund for Water and Sanitation, and a Global Fund for Sustainable Energy for All, specifically devoted to expanding the access to water, sanitation, and sustainable energy for the extreme poor. Each would replace a large number of small and undercapitalized mechanisms, thereby reducing transaction costs while scaling up investments in these sectors.

Enhancing regional infrastructure project planning, development, financing and execution is vital, given the cross-border nature of much of the global infrastructure needs. The Programme on Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and other such regional initiatives in Latin America and Asia, should be supported with additional financing in Addis Ababa. A special section on African infrastructure planning should be considered for the Addis Ababa Accord given the great needs and potential of infrastructure development in the region.

The needed level and direction of global savings flows from institutional investors (pension funds, insurance funds and sovereign wealth funds) towards infrastructure investments should be articulated in the Addis Ababa Accord. Key lessons from the pension systems of Canada and Australia, which have mobilized 5-10 times the amount of pension savings towards infrastructure than other high-income OECD countries, should be studied.

4.3 Business Capital There is one significant area of business where public financing tends to play an important role: smallholder agriculture. With hundreds of millions of poor people working as smallholder farm households, poverty reduction in this sector requires significant public financing to enable smallholders to escape from subsistence and to join the commercial economy. Public financing of smallholder agriculture should be directed towards all three dimensions of sustainable farming: economic improvement and the reduction of hunger, social inclusion (e.g. of women farmers), and environmental sustainability. We recommend a significant expansion of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) to become the world’s Global Fund for

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Smallholder Agriculture and Nutrition.11 An expanded IFAD should work closely with other financing mechanisms, including the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP). It will also be a core mechanism for leveraging private financing for value chains involving smallholder farmers. This global fund should aim to disburse some $10 billion per year by 2020 compared with $0.5 billion today for IFAD. All countries should improve the investment climate to attract long-term business investments compatible with sustainable investment. Business investments should respect economic, social, and environmental objectives of the SDGs, and businesses should report not only on economic flows but also on social and environmental impacts. Countries should take special care to promote small and medium enterprises (SMEs), as they are key to job creation, entrepreneurship, and the creation of upstream and downstream linkages with the investments by large enterprises.

In summary, specific commitments to be considered in the Addis Ababa Accord include: x

Ensuring that prudential standards (e.g. Basel III for banks and Solvency II for insurance companies) do not unnecessarily impede investments in long-term sustainable infrastructure.

x

Fostering a new Infrastructure Asset Class (IAC) to encourage a significant increase in long-term private funding for infrastructure by pension funds, insurance funds, sovereign wealth funds, and other institutional investors. The IAC will be fostered through standardization of financial instruments, disclosure rules, new risk management tools, and other mechanisms. Specifically, efforts to support the creation of a liquid, global project bond market should be outlined in Addis Ababa to mobilize private savings into infrastructure at scale.

x

Defining with precision the new asset class of green bonds, based on newly agreed standards supported by the international financial institutions, credit rating agencies and the corporate sector.

x

Proper pricing of greenhouse gas emissions and ecosystem services to remove market failures.

x

Requiring disclosure of climate risks, including financial risks from future carbon pricing and regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, in all corporate reporting, in order to move private capital towards climate-resilient technologies and projects.

x

Developing domestic bond markets in developing countries, including markets for municipal bonds, to enable and encourage local financing of infrastructure.

x

Developing domestic equity markets to enable companies, including SMEs, to raise equity capital.

11 Such a mechanism would promote agriculture-related nutrition interventions, including food fortification and planting diverse crops by smallholder farmers. Other critical nutrition interventions, such as micronutrient supplementation, are delivered through the health system and should therefore be financed through a Global Fund for Health. The Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement can play an important role in promoting the coordination of integrated nutrition interventions at all levels.

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x

Developing stable, well-capitalized domestic banking sectors to support SME and infrastructure lending.

x

Encouraging the inflow of FDI subject to adequate global and domestic regulatory and disclosure regulations, to ensure that foreign investors operate within the framework of sustainable development.

x

Supporting the scaling-up of infrastructure projects through early-stage support of project development, including through new Infrastructure Project Preparation Facilities (IPPFs) at the MDBs, and general analytical support by the MDBs and other institutions (G20).

4.4 Natural Capital including Ecosystems and Biodiversity All countries should undertake public and private investments to protect natural capital, such as ecosystem functions, freshwater resources, forests, habitat, marine environments, biodiversity, and climate resilience. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) need to be adequately capitalized to help ensure that countries have the official funding necessary for these investments.

Investments in threatened ecosystem services are woefully inadequate. To preserve vital global public goods and the underpinnings of many economies, the GEF must be strengthened and expanded from some $1 billion today to perhaps $6 billion by 2020. The enhanced GEF should provide program funding at scale to support countries in sustainably managing ecosystems and preserving biodiversity. An important focus of the GEF will be to support biomes of global significance and other global public goods. Strengthening the GEF must go hand in hand with improved metrics and improved private value chain initiatives.

4.5 Intellectual Capital: Technologies for sustainable development Sustainable development will require the development and rapid uptake of new technologies that allow for economic growth while reducing the human-induced pressures on the Earth’s ecosystems, biodiversity, and climate. The ongoing revolutions in ICT, genomics, energy, materials science, and other areas can support “smarter” systems for industry, transport, water, land use, waste management, health, and education. FfD must therefore also support the Research, Development, Demonstration, and Diffusion (RDD&D) of new, sustainable technologies.

In order to achieve the SDGs, technological advances will be required in several areas: lowcarbon energy; energy efficiency in buildings, transport, and industry; climate-resilient agriculture; and low-cost, high-quality health and education services relying heavily on new ICTs. To spur the needed technological advances, governments should take the lead in organizing new Public-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Technologies, with PPPs established in each of the priority areas. In energy, for example, PPPs should be established to test the feasibility of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS), storage of intermittent renewable energy, and deployment of “smart grids” in urban economies. In agriculture, PPPs should be established to improve farm systems, economize on water and fertilizer use, and improve crop resilience to climate changes. In health and education, special attention should be devoted to the application of ICTs for expanding the delivery of high-quality health and education services in low-income settings.

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4.6 Social Capital including Data and SDG Monitoring Social capital, signifying high societal trust, requires honesty and the rule of law in the actions of government as well as in business operations. Therefore, investing in social capital means investing in transparency, inclusive policies, and stakeholder participation in investment decision-making. Governments and businesses should report on their financial flows and contracts, and on their performance vis-à-vis the SDGs. New forms of corporate accounting should help businesses to “internalize” the environmental and social externalities of their actions.

Effective monitoring of the SDGs will require modest financial resources relative to other areas, but effective investments in monitoring and data systems underpin progress in all other areas.

The SDSN, in collaboration with other partner organizations, estimates that developing countries will need to spend about $1 billion globally on monitoring and data systems, including underlying systems and frameworks such as national census rounds and civil and vital registrations.12 This corresponds roughly to a doubling of current annual expenditure, of which about half is currently provided in the form of ODA. In other words, ODA for data systems needs to rise from some $250 million to about $500 million per year. As with other SDG investment priorities, a central question is how resources can be pooled and disbursed most effectively – possibly through a multilateral trust fund with an appropriately diverse governance structure.

Given the relatively modest volumes of funding involved and the tremendous payoff that will be generated from effective data systems, these investments are a particularly low hanging fruit for Addis Ababa.

4.7 The Important Role of IDA The World Bank Group’s International Development Association (IDA) provides critical, flexible, large-scale financing for LICs and a few MICs. In this way IDA supports general development financing and complements thematic Global Funds that are needed for core SDG priorities. IDA currently disburses some $18 billion per year and needs to be strengthened further under a post-2015 development finance framework.

4.8 Summary of Pooled Funding Recommendations Table 6 provides a summary of the recommended pooled funding mechanisms and the minimum target disbursements for each fund in the year 2020.

12

http://unsdsn.org/what-we-do/monitoring-the-sdgs/

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Table 6: Indicative resource needs for pooled funding mechanisms for the SDGs ($ billion) Sector Global Fund for Health Global Fund for Education Global Fund for Smallholder Agriculture and Nutrition Global Environment Facility Green Climate Fund Mechanism for funding SDG Monitoring & data revolution Global Fund for Sustainable Energy for All Global Fund for Water and Sanitation International Development Association (IDA)

5

Current Annual Funding Gavi = 1.3 GFATM = 3.9 GPE = 0.8 IFAD = 0.5

Minimum Target 2020 15 15 10

1 Start up Not yet established

6 20 0.5

Not yet established

To be identified

Not yet established

To be identified

18

To be identified

Mobilizing and Monitoring New International Development Finance for the SDGs

The case for ODA remains urgent, as does the case for expanded lending by the Multilateral Development Banks. Many developing countries, especially LDCs, lack the domestic revenues to meet their SDG public investment needs out of domestic resources and to mobilize adequate private financing. Therefore, these countries rely on both ODA and OOF to close financing gaps, and explicit targets are required for both types of flows.

5.1 Official Development Assistance The international target of ODA equaling at least 0.7 percent of GNI remains valid in the SDG period. This is true even for non-climate financing (i.e. traditional areas of development financing such as health, education, and infrastructure). ODA-C should be in addition to the 0.7 percent of GNI target and there should be no double counting of ODA and ODA-C.13 As a matter of political reality many HICs will not meet their ODA target. Of the 29 current DAC members, for example, only five meet the 0.7 percent target (Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) with a sixth country (Netherlands) a traditional member of this group and still close, though now below 0.7. In spite of the fiscal challenges in many HICs, moral suasion should be used to urge all HICs to meet the 0.7 percent target. All HICs below the target should announce clear, multi-year commitments and timelines to raise their ODA towards the 0.7 percent target. Countries that have not yet achieved the 0.7 target should commit to at least halve the gap by 2020.

13

As explained above, ODA-C should account for about a third of the $100 billion committed in climate finance.

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High-income countries (HICs) that are not part of the OECDDAC should also agree to abide by the 0.7 percent of GNI target. UMICs should agree to a new global target for concessional public finance equal to at least 0.1 percent of GNI as of 2020.

Table 7 illustrates the minimum acceptable levels of ODA and other international concessional public finance for the SDGs for the year 2020.

Table 7: Illustrative ODA and public concessional finance targets for 2020 (in 2013 $ billion)

By Provider

Current flows

ODA-C Target

Combined Total

$115

Development finance target (minimum) $266

OECD-DAC members Non-DAC HICs

$30

$296

$7

$22

$3

$25

Non-DAC UMICs Total

$8

$24

$0

$24

$130

$312

$33

$345

ODA and international concessional public finance are without doubt key tools to achieve international security. As such, members of the UN Security Council have a special obligation to provide adequate volumes of development finance, as they are recognized globally as pillars of international security with special rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the international community.

Innovative financing mechanisms provide an important additional source for ODA. The Addis Ababa Accord should resolve to mobilize at least $50 billion through Financial Transaction Taxes and other innovative financing mechanisms by 2020.

The quality and targeting of ODA should be improved in four straightforward ways. First, every provider country should publish its own transparent accounts of ODA following internationally agreed standards, including five-year projections of future ODA flows.

Second, more ODA should be allocated multilaterally, in order to reduce high transactions costs.

Currently, around 70 percent of ODA is bilateral. This should be reduced to 50 percent by 2020.

At least 50 percent of multilateral ODA should flow through specialized sector funds such as the GCF, GEF, the proposed GFH or GFE (Table 6), and the other half through the ODA windows of the MDBs, such as IDA, and other international organizations.

Third, ODA eligibility should be restricted to countries that cannot mobilize adequate resources domestically to finance the needed public investments in the SDG. A particular focus needs to be placed on the poorest countries, so at least 0.15-0.20 percent of GNI should go as ODA towards the LDCs. Many of today’s middle-income countries should graduate from ODA by 2020, though they should of course remain eligible for OOF such as MDB loans. IDA eligibility provides a useful short-hand criterion for ODA eligibility, as it considers countries’ income levels and special needs, such as small-island status. Over time the Multilateral Development Finance Committed (MDFC) described further below should propose eligibility criteria for ODA that are independent from the lending standards of the World Bank or any other MDB.

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Fourth, the globally agreed accounting for ODA has been considerably strengthened by the 2014 High-Level Meeting of the DAC, but it should be revised further to include only SDGrelated financing that directly benefits developing countries. For example, flows for military and security-related expenditures, imputed costs for refugees and students in donor countries, and other distortions should be removed. Total Official support for Sustainable Development (TOSD) is a welcome additional measure for tracking development finance that complements ODA.

5.2 Private Philanthropy An important complement to ODA is private philanthropic giving, much of which is passed through NGOs. Substantial scope exists to increase private philanthropy for the SDGs from both developed and developing countries. The world’s 1,826 billionaires have an estimated net worth of $7.05 trillion. If billionaires accounting for half of this net worth sign the Giving Pledge to donate at least 50 percent of their net worth to philanthropic causes, the combined contributions would total $1.76 trillion. If half of that sum is then directed towards SDG related purposes, the capital contribution would be $880 billion. With an annual payout rate of 5 percent these philanthropists would support $44 billion per year in SDG activities or roughly one third of today’s ODA volumes.

Before Addis Ababa, a concerted attempt should be made to mobilize large-scale private philanthropy directed towards the major global pooled funds, such as the proposed Global Fund for Education, and other key contributors to the goal-based partnerships. With one or more major private-sector philanthropists behind each of these funds, there is much greater chance of success, and much more chance to spur donations by governments, private companies, and other philanthropists. Governments should also commit to creating legal environments that encourage the build-up of philanthropic cultures in developed and developing countries alike.

5.3 Other Official Flows OOFs have become an essential component of international development finance, but current flows are insufficient – particularly given the increasing focus on infrastructure funding. The Addis Ababa Accord should consider a quantitative target for mobilizing OOF through the MDBs and bilateral financial institutions. The precise value and composition for an OOF target should be explored in preparation for the Addis Ababa Conference.

5.4 Monitoring International Development Finance Addis Ababa should adopt a strengthened and expanded monitoring and reporting architecture for IDF, including OECD and non-OECD countries. A new Multilateral Development Finance Committee (MDFC) should ensure annual monitoring by providers and recipients of IDF, including ODA, OOF, and PFM. It will also provide periodic needs assessments of overall IDF needs compatible with achieving the SDGs. The MDFC should build on existing reporting initiatives, including the OECD-DAC and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). Its governance must give full voice to all non-OECD countries, key multilateral institutions (including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, OECD, other MDBs, and UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)), and civil society organizations. Broadbased participation and governance will be key to the success of such an initiative.

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6

Reforming International Governance and Mobilizing Non-financial Means of Implementation in Support of Sustainable Development

Global financial governance must be reformed and strengthened to support financing for the SDGs. At Addis Ababa all member states should resolve to: x

End tax and secrecy havens internationally;

x

Adopt and apply effective rules to reveal the beneficial ownership of companies that engage in cross-border activities;

x

Reform international tax rules and enhance information exchange to curb abusive tax shifting, including by strengthening the BEPS framework and by ensuring that it better reflects the needs of developing countries;

x

Require transparent financial reporting by companies, particularly in the natural resource sectors.

In addition to increasing investments to achieve the SDGs, multilateral and national regulations should steer financing away from investments that are environmentally unsustainable and inconsistent with achieving the SDGs. Such regulatory reforms include carbon pricing and the phase-out of fossil-fuel subsidies in order to curb greenhouse gas emissions.

The governance of International Financial Institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF, must be reformed to better reflect today’s world. In particular voting rights should reflect the distribution of population and GDP. International rules and standards, including for trade, intellectual property rights, banking and insurance regulation, or accounting standards, must be made consistent with the objective of achieving the SDGs. Greater consistency can be achieved through “coherence checks” that determine whether existing rules are consistent with achieving all the SDGs and – if not – how they might need to be amended. Every major rule-setting mechanism and institution should produce a regular report on whether the rules are consistent with achieving all SDGs and which inconsistencies might need to be addressed. Such reports will be made public and discussed in the supervisory body of the mechanism or institution.

The Addis Ababa Conference should announce an effective Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) to provide a work-out process for sovereign debt crises. This process has not been created despite many significant efforts by the IMF and leading international financial figures. The SDRM must take into account the new realities and outlook of sovereign debt including: i) increasing levels of sovereign debt globally and more countries having access to international capital markets, ii) increased level of private sector involvement in sovereign debt ownership and iii) changing imperatives for sovereign borrowing for SDG financing. The SDRM should be led by the IMF.

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7

Accountability, Follow-Through, and Implementation

The Addis Ababa Accord should include mechanisms to monitor its implementation, particularly with regards to the scale, direction, and adequacy of SDG financing: x

Each major standard-setting organization, including but not limited to the World Trade Organization (WTO), IMF, Bank for International Settlements (BIS), International Accounting Standards Board, etc. should track progress in aligning international rules with the SDGs, including through publicly available “coherence checks.�

x

Specialized UN organizations and the World Bank should conduct periodic needs assessments for key SDG investment priorities to estimate the scale of public and private financing that is required to achieve the SDGs. These estimated needs should be compared annually with respect to the quality and scale of domestic and international financing from public and private sources in the respective area.

x

The Multilateral Development Finance Committee (MDFC) described above will track all aspects of international SDG financing and compare them against available needs assessments. Suggestions for improving the performance of targeted financing mechanisms, such as the GCF, GEF, and others should be published periodically and be subject to public consultations.

x

Every meeting of the G20 and G7/8 should review annual reports on FfD implementation and assess to what extent its members are following through on their commitments.

x

Business groups, such as the Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development should report periodically on how businesses report on the SDGs.

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개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회

참고자료 1. Financing for Development Revised Draft Outcome(2015.5.6.)

2. Key Elements of a Successful Addiss Ababa on FfD - UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network(SDSN)

3. Recommendations for the Post-2015 MOI and FfD - Beyond2015

4. OECD DAC의 ODA 재정의와 시사점 - 한국수출입은행

5. 개발재원총회 정부간 협상 한국정부 발언문 모음

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Implementing the Ambition: Beyond 2015 Recommendations for the post-2015 Means of Implementation and Financing for (Sustainable) Development BACKGROUND The Addis Ababa Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) and the post-2015 intergovernmental processes are wholly interconnected. Success in the FfD Conference in July 2015 will pave the way for an ambitious and aspirational Post-2015 Summit in September as well as international progress towards the climate summit in Paris. Strong synergies between the post-2015, FfD and the climate change processes are crucial to achieve Beyond 2015’s vision of ‘an equitable and sustainable world where every person is safe, resilient, lives well, and enjoys their human rights, and where political and economic systems deliver well-being for all people within the limits of our planet’s resources’.

We urge governments and all stakeholders, including the private sector, to aim higher and raise the level of ambition in accordance with the challenges and objectives of both agendas. We need a new understanding of financing that explicitly recognizes human rights as a basis to promote the interlinkages between the three pillars of sustainable development (social, environmental and economic); an understanding which identifies principles which ensure that ‘finance for development’ becomes ‘financing for sustainable development’, which recognises the limits of a growth-focused agenda, and the role that finance providers- especially the private sector- must play in helping us tackle the crucial challenges of climate change and environmental degradation facing our planet.

In the push to shape a FfD conference which underpins the implementation of post-2015 agenda, critical structural and systemic issues which have been identified in the FfD process must continue to be given due attention. While it is sensible to build links which make best use of institutional resources and increase policy coherence for sustainable development, ‘Structural and Systemic Issues’ (as set out in the Monterrey Consensus) are at the heart of addressing global inequalities and deserve significant attention within the post2015 agenda.

While there are synergies between the two processes, it is important to recognise that there are also distinctions; not all financing issues are covered in the current means of implementation (MOI) targets, and not all means of implementation are financial. For example, there is a lack of clarity as to how the FfD outcome will be linked with the post-2015 agenda in terms of monitoring, accountability and follow-up. This needs to be addressed immediately. A follow-up and accountability mechanism must be proposed which, while bringing the two agendas together in a coherent manner, enables all stakeholders, including civil society to track and monitor commitments and implementation in both tracks. Space must be made for people and their organisations to provide feedback on whether the proposed accountability mechanism is adequate to meet this need.

Below we set out our key recommendations for the intergovernmental processes negotiating Financing for Development (FfD) and the Means of Implementation and Global Partnership for Sustainable Development (Post-2015).

FINANCING FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Key Recommendations: Domestic Public Finance 

Member States must adopt equitable progressive taxation and redistribution measures to finance social protection floors for all, and to guarantee income security and access to basic services for all, including the poorest and marginalized groups.

1 - 109 -

  

  

Member States must provide enough finance to implement strong tax reforms, based on demand from receiver countries and ensuring a strong involvement of the public, thus improving domestic resource mobilization. (SG synthesis report, para 98).

Member States must reduce military spending and reallocate public resources towards provision of social services for poverty alleviation, social protection, health care and the promotion of sustainable development.

Member States must provide and promote universal access to financial services, emphasizing inclusive access across income, gender, disability, geography, age, ethnicity and other groupings. Specific barriers to women’s access to finance should be eliminated. Countries should expand financial literacy and establish strong consumer protection agencies. (SG report, para 107).

Member States must establish and effectively implement an obligation for multinational corporations to publish, as part of their annual reports, public country-by-country reporting. Those reports should include key data on profits made, taxes paid; subsidies received; turnover; and number of employees.

Member States must commit to, at the national level, implementing transparent domestic budgeting, with clear budget lines for sustainable development priorities; disaggregated by gender and other key social indicators.

Member States must fully utilise gender-responsive budgeting tools and ensure that commitments to achieve gender equality are reflected in budgetary allocations and wider macro-economic decisionmaking. This should include the prioritisation of financial support for women's rights organisations and fiscal support for initiatives that challenge and address discriminatory social norms and practices for all groups at risk of exclusion.

International Public Finance 



   

  

Developed countries must set binding timetables through national legislation to meet their outstanding 0.7% GNI ODA commitment, and meet their commitments to direct 0.15% - 0.20% of aid to LDCs within five years. These flows must support democratic ownership, transparency, accountability, inclusiveness and maximise poverty eradication impacts. (Adapted from SG Synthesis report, Para 98) Transparency of all resource flows for development – public and private, domestic and international – is essential. All development actors should commit to publishing timely, comprehensive and forwardlooking information on their activities in a common, open, accessible, electronic format, including via the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).

Member States must establish a follow up mechanism on the commitment from developed countries to provide climate finance of at least USD100 billion annually by 2020. A substantial part of these funds should flow through the Green Climate Fund, and be in the form of grants, not loans.

Member States must establish a global fund to finance social protection floors in the poorest countries.

Any potential efforts to modernize ODA and measures of development finance must be done in an open and transparent forum including representatives of donor and recipient countries and other relevant stakeholders (SG synthesis report, Para 92) Member States must ensure that infrastructure projects and services financed with ODA and other sources of public finance comply with environmental and social safeguards, and be fully accessible for and inclusive of all people. This will ensure that ODA and other public finances do not create or perpetuate legal, institutional, attitudinal and physical or ICT barriers to the inclusion and participation of all people, especially the most vulnerable and marginalized.

Member States must commit to ensure that ODA explicitly targets the poorest quintile of the global population, determined through an analysis of disaggregated data.

Member States must agree to set a tax on all financial transactions, including currency, stocks and other value papers, to mobilize additional funds for financing the post-2015 agenda, climate change initiatives and eradicating poverty.

Revenue derived from this tax must be spent on achieving the SDGs and climate agreements.

2 - 110 -

Domestic and international private finance 







Member States must insist on responsible and accountable long-term investment of private financing in sustainable development, and require companies to undertake mandatory economic, environmental, social and governance reporting, accompanied with regulatory changes that ensure that investor incentives are aligned with the SDGs. Member States must commit to hold private actors accountable to the same human rights and environmental standards as public actors including through a clear call for the private sector to implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the core labour standards of the International Labour Organization and United Nations environmental standards. Member States must implement their commitments of these agreements.

Member States must establish strong human rights and environmental accountability mechanisms to determine whether specific actors are appropriate for a partnership in pursuit of the SDGs, to hold companies accountable for their impact on human rights, those most affected by poverty and injustice, and the environment and to prevent any negative impacts.

Member States must make the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative universal, covering all countries, but also adapting and extending coverage to include oil and minerals production companies and commodity traders.

Public Private Partnerships 



Donor agencies, multilateral banks and governments implementing PPPs, including those which engage private sector partners in ‘blended finance’ mechanisms must urgently undertake a Southern led review to ensure that existing finance and aid effectiveness principles are respected or created. These principles must, include transparency, accountability, effectiveness, equitable sharing of the tax burden, and participation of affected communities in the planning, design and implementation of PPPs. The International Aid Transparency Initiative and Open Contracting must be considered as means to facilitate full transparency in PPP arrangements.

Donors must commit that PPPs will support the partner country in increasing their long-term capacity to manage the partnership for the benefit of their domestic economy and the natural environment, and should also provide technical guidance, based on recipient country demand, to ensure that the long-term impacts to the partner country economy and environment are recognised and risks mitigated within the project plans.

Trade   

  

Development partners must commit to enhance capacity building and technical assistance such as Aid for Trade, and support developing countries to increase their share of trade.

The FfD outcome document must call upon developed countries to immediately and fully implement their commitments to grant duty-free, quota-free access for all products of all developing countries and to remove market entry barriers, including non-tariff measures and other trade barriers.

Developing countries must commit to ensure that revenues from trade are used to drive poverty eradication, supporting small business growth, reducing the vulnerability of the poorest households to economic shocks; financing social protection programmes, and strengthening agricultural development productive capacity.

Member States should commit to rapidly eliminate all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, while protecting low income and vulnerable populations from negative impacts.

Member States must reform trade systems to promote equality among trade partners, and commit to implement the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries.

Member States must commit to include binding human rights clauses in all investment treaties and to establish independent and robust mechanisms to monitor the social and environmental implications of trade.

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Debt sustainability  

 

Resources provided for debt relief must not detract from ODA resources.

Member States must agree to create a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes. This comprehensive framework must be situated in a neutral forum; provide a human needs based approach to debt sustainability; hold lenders and borrowers to account for irresponsible behaviour; and give all stakeholders, including civil society, the right to be heard and give evidence.

Member States must agree to undertake efforts to scrutinize existing legacy debt along responsible financing standards. Independent debt auditors should determine the legitimacy of the debt, and all illegitimate debt must be cancelled.

Member States must endorse and implement the UNCTAD Principles for Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, and reinforce the earlier commitments which state that debtors and creditors must share the responsibility for preventing and resolving unsustainable debt situations.

Climate Finance 

 

Member States must phase out all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies (FFS) in developed countries by 2020 and in developing countries shortly thereafter, accompanied by pro-poor policy instruments. Budget resources freed up by FFS phase outs should be redirected to support those most affected by poverty and injustice, and support access to clean, reliable and affordable energy.

Member States must establish a multilateral initiative to create a global price on carbon, to contribute to the multilateral climate finance institutions which form part of a package of measures to phase out fossil fuels.

Member States must ensure that climate finance is new and additional to ODA and accounted for separately.

Reform of global financial institutions    



 

Member States must agree to reform the regulation of the financial sector, to safeguard global financial stability and safeguard poor countries against future economic shocks.

Member States must call upon multilateral financial institutions to work on the basis of nationally owned paths of reform when providing policy advice and financial support, taking into account domestic priorities.

Member States must commit to greater representation of developing countries on the board and leadership of international institutions and to take the necessary actions to ensure that decision-making for these institutions is fair, equitable, transparent and gender balanced.

Member States must reinforce investments in the fight against illicit financial flows, including money laundering, trade mispricing, transnational corruption and bribery. They must eradicate cross-border tax evasion, improve and standardize financial reporting standards to increase transparency, including full transparency of global financial transactions, bank holdings and deposits.

Member States must commit to more vigorous implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, as well as measures to overcome impediments to the return of stolen assets. Member States should agree on measures to ensure information exchange and judicial cooperation (based on SG Synthesis report, para 115).

Member states must support formation of a UN intergovernmental body on tax cooperation. It should be appropriately resourced, and organised so as to ensure truly global representation and cooperation, good decision-making and implementation, and inclusion of expertise in gender and human rights.

Member states should develop and implement a broader metric of well-being than GDP, including the costs of human and environmental capital.

THE MEANS TO IMPLEMENT THE POST-2015 AGENDA Recommendations in the preceding section cover finance and trade issues. The section below covers the non-financial means of implementation.

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Key Recommendations: Participation 





 

People’s participation is a strategic means of implementation for the post-2015 agenda and a key element to make this a people-centered agenda. Member States must commit to implement the post2015 agenda with the full participation of people, especially the most marginalized and vulnerable, and their organisations, through institutionalized multi-stakeholder engagement. .

Member States must recognise transparency and accessibility of data and information as a cross-cutting systemic issue and a principle applying to all aspects of both FfD and post-2015. Without transparency in all aspects of financing for sustainable development, participation and accountability to people is not possible, systems become less effective, and impacts of investments on the poorest cannot be measured.

Therefore, the post-2015 agenda must include a clear commitment to increasing people’s ability to effectively and meaningfully participate in and contribute to policy choices and to hold governments and other actors into account for what they do – or fail to do - to achieve the progress we seek. To do so, Member States must also commit to establishing an enabling environment (in legislation, policy and practice, consistent with international human rights standards) for people and their organisations to carry out their crucial roles as independent development actors in their own right.

The MoI must incorporate approaches that tackle the discriminatory social norms and practices that continue to subordinate women and girls in public and private life, and exclude them from the realisation of their rights.

Member States must recognise volunteerism must be recognized as a powerful and cross-cutting means of implementation which can help expand and mobilize constituencies, and to engage people in national planning and implementation of the post-2015 agenda. (SG Synthesis report, para 131)

Technology and innovation  

Member States must finalize the arrangements for a technology facilitation mechanism, including for the LDCs. Member States must ensure that the global intellectual property regimes and the application of TRIPS flexibilities are fully consistent with and contribute to the SDGs.

Capacity building   

Member States must commit to provide access to a range of financial services and business capacity support for micro, small and medium sized enterprises, building an enabling environment for domesticled sustainable and equitable economic development.

Member States must allocate funds to increase the capacity of people and their organisations to support the implementation and monitoring of the post-2015 agenda, including holding their governments to account.

Member States must enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity building in developing countries to support multi-stakeholder initiatives that inform national plans to implement all sustainable development goals.

Data Monitoring and Accountability  



Governments must make data ‘open by default’ and focus the “data revolution” on the needs of stakeholders in developing countries, Governments must prioritise data collection and strengthen national statistical systems in domestic budgeting and develop disaggregated monitoring systems which can track impact of social investments on the poorest. Data must be disaggregated by, at least, gender, age, ethnicity, disability, rural-urban split, minority status, social status and income quintile.

Governments must implement open data initiatives, including, where appropriate through joining the Open Government Partnership.

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

Data collection, disaggregation and analysis must engage new approaches such as the use of self-reported measures. Data collection processes themselves need to be gender sensitive by, for example: reviewing coding and terminologies; delivering gender training for data collectors; recruiting female enumerators; and carrying out data collection in a manner that is sensitive to the different needs of men and women in terms of, for example, privacy, time of day, and work and caring responsibilities.

Implementation at the national and local level For the post-2015 agenda to become more than an aspirational paper agreement and to make a real difference to people’s lives, governments must start putting in place strategies, institutional plans and mechanisms at the national and local level to ensure implementation. Such strategies could include:  Cross-ministerial commissions  Integration of targets into national and local sustainable development plans  Integration of targets into national and local budgetary processes While governments have the primary responsibility for the implementation of the post-2015 agenda, they must recognise that this agenda goes far beyond government. It is a shared agenda - it is our agenda. As such, people and their organisations must be involved in the implementation process right from the start.

They must be included on political commissions, on groups developing sustainable development plans and budgets. Without this level of participation, it will take much longer to embed the post-2015 agenda at the local and national level.

About this paper This paper is issued on behalf of Beyond 2015. The original draft was produced by the Beyond 2015 FfD Advisory Task Force, co-facilitated by Development Initiatives (UK) and WaterAid Senegal. Numerous members of the Task Force contributed to this first draft, based on their organisational expertise. This draft was then opened for comments by the whole campaign and comments and feedback were received from over a dozen organisations. The redrafting was coordinated by Development Initiatives and WaterAid Senegal, supported by the Beyond 2015 Secretariat, and it was possible to incorporate most of the inputs received. In accordance with the Beyond 2015 protocol on forming policy positions, the final version was signed off unanimously by the Executive Committee of Beyond 2015.

Thanks go to Cordelia Lonsdale (Development Initiatives, UK) and Apollos Charles (WaterAid, Senegal) for the coordination of the drafting process, and also to Elaine Ireland (Sightsavers, UK) Rachele Tardi (Light for the World, USA), Lina Dabbagh (CAN International, Mexico), Mwangi Waituru (VSO, Kenya), Kristina Fröberg (Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment), Martin Tsounkeu, (Africa Development Interchange Network, Cameroon) Nicolas Sautejeau (ACCION, Chile) Claudio Fernandez (Gestos, Brazil), and Tove Maria Ryding (Eurodad, Belgium) for their crucial inputs and expertise.

Diversity of opinion within civil society Whilst Beyond 2015 participating organisations have a range of views regarding the content of a post-2015 framework, the campaign is united in working to bring about the following outcome:  A global overarching cross-thematic framework succeeds the Millennium Development Goals, reflecting Beyond 2015’s policy positions.  The process of developing this framework is participatory, inclusive and responsive to voices of those directly affected by poverty and injustice During the process of writing this paper, different opinions emerged within Beyond 2015 on the links between the post-2015 and the FfD process, and how funds derived from a FTT should be controlled.

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개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회

참고자료 1. Financing for Development Revised Draft Outcome(2015.5.6.)

2. Key Elements of a Successful Addiss Ababa on FfD - UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network(SDSN)

3. Recommendations for the Post-2015 MOI and FfD - Beyond2015

4. OECD DAC의 ODA 재정의와 시사점 - 한국수출입은행

5. 개발재원총회 정부간 협상 한국정부 발언문 모음

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EDCF 이슈페이퍼

EDCF ISSUE PAPER

2015년 2월

Vol.4 No.1

OECD DAC의 ODA 재정의와 시사점

구윤정 선임조사역 (한국수출입은행 OECD DAC 주재원)

OECD DAC는 2014년 12월 각료급회의(HLM)를 통해 양허성 차관의 ODA 적격 기준 및 측정방식을 변경함 으로써(ODA 재정의) ODA 현대화 작업의 첫 단추를 채웠다. 이는 새로운 글로벌 개발목표 수립과 이를 실행 하기 위한 재원마련 계획이 논의될 2015년을 앞두고 향후 개발목표의 방향성 및 재원 활용 방식에 대한 공여국 들의 이해와 인식을 반영한다는 점에서 더욱 주목할 만하다. 이번 EDCF 이슈페이퍼는 이러한 최근 ODA 현대화 및 재정의 논의의 배경, 주요 이슈, 그리고 논의 경과를 살펴보고, 이를 바탕으로 향후 ODA 현대화에 대한 논의 방향과 동 논의가 우리나라 개발협력에 주는 시사점을 정리해보고자 한다.

목차 1. 머리말 2. ODA 현대화 및 재정의 논의 경과와 현황 3. 향후 논의 방향 4. 한국의 개발협력에 대한 시사점

www.koreaexim.go.kr

www.edcfkorea.go.kr

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1. 머리말 OECD 개발원조위원회(DAC)1)는 2014년 12월 각료급회의(HLM)2)를 통해 ODA3) 현대화의 일환인 ODA 재정의 작업을 마무리 지었다. 그동안 OECD DAC의 ODA 통계는 실제 현금흐름을 통계로 집계하는 순지출(net disbursement) 방식4) 으로 측정되어 왔다. 그러나 이 중 양허성 차관(concessional loan)5)의 통계 측정방식에 대해 DAC 회원국들은 2014년 HLM에서 이를 증여등가액(grant equivalent)6) 방식으로 변경하는데 합의하였다. OECD DAC은 또한 양허성 차관에 대한 ODA 적격기준을 재정의함으로써 2012년 HLM을 통해 본격적으로 시작된 ODA 현대화 작업의 첫 단추를 채웠다.

ODA를 포함한 외부 개발재원(external development finance) 관련 국제적으로 합의된 정의와 보고방식을 수립하는 것은 국제개발협력의 책무성(accountability) 논의를 위한 기본 토대를 제공한다는 측면에서 의미가 크며, 공여국들이 실제 개발협력 활동을 설계함에 있어 이러한 측정방식을 고려해야 한다는 점에서 그 영향력 또한 크다. 또한, 새로운 글로벌 개발목표 수립과 이를 실행하기 위한 재원마련 계획이 논의될 2015년7)을 눈앞에 두고 ODA 현대화 작업의

EDCF ISSUE PAPER

중요한 부분인 ODA 재정의가 마무리 되었다는 점은 향후 개발목표의 방향성과 재원 활용 방식에 대한 공여국들의 이해와 인식을 반영한다는 점에서 더욱 주목할 만하다.

본 보고서는 이러한 최근의 ODA 현대화 및 재정의 논의의 배경, 주요 이슈, 그리고 논의 경과를 살펴보고, 이를 바탕 으로 ODA 현대화를 위한 향후 논의방향과 동 논의가 우리나라 개발협력에 주는 시사점을 정리해보고자 한다.

2. ODA 현대화 및 재정의 논의 경과와 현황8) (1) 논의 배경 및 주요 이슈 ODA 현대화 논의는 변화하고 있는 국제개발협력과 경제․금융환경에 따른 외부 개발재원의 유입, 그리고 이에 따른 개발도상국(이후, 개도국) 발전에 기여하는 개발재원 전체를 측정할 수 있는 통계 현대화의 필요성에 근간을 두고

있다. 2012년 기준, DAC 회원국으로부터 개도국으로 유입된 재원규모는 약 4,740억불로 이 중 28%인 1,350억불이 ODA로 분류된다 (OECD, 2014c: 23). 이는 DAC가 ODA 개념을 최초로 정의하였던 60년대 후반, 개도국으로 유입 되는 총 재원 대비 ODA 비중이 50%에 달했던 것과는 크게 달라진 상황이다. 또한 기타공적자금(OOF)9), 해외 직접투자(FDI)10), 자선 재단이나 시민사회기구(CSOs)11)를 통한 민간부문의 증여 자금 등 개발재원 제공 방법 역시

과거에 비해 매우 다양해지고 있다.

그 외에도 개도국 발전을 위한 재원의 일환으로 전통적인 공여국-수원국 간 원조 제공방식 이외에 이민 근로자의 송금(remittances), 남남협력(South-South Cooperation), 민간의 기부 및 해외 개발협력 활동 활성화, 사회적 기업(social business)의 등장과 기업의 사회적 책임 이행 활동의 강화 추세 등 다각화된 재원 조달방식의 잠재력이

1 ) Development Assistance Committee 2) High Level Meeting 3) Official Development Assistance 4) 순지출 방식 = 지출액 - 상환액 5) 국 내에서는 유상원조로 더 많이 알려져 있으나, 국제사회에서는 ‘유상원조 (loan aid)’ 보다는 ‘양허성 차관 (concessional loan)’이라는 용어의 사용을 선호하는 경향이 있음. 양허성 차관은 일반 상업 금융 조건보다 우대 조건의 차관이라는 뜻임.

6) 증여등가액은 ‘차관지원액 - 향후 채권자에게 상환될 차관원리금의 현재가치’로 차관 중에서 증여(grant)에 해당하는 금액을 말함.

7) 2015년은 UN이 시도한 최초의 글로벌 개발계획인 새천년개발목표(Millennium Development Goals, MDGs)의 최종 목표연도로, 국제사회는 동 계획의 성과에 대한 평가와 변화한 개발협력 환경을 반영한 새로운 Post-2015 개발목표를 UN 특별 정상회의(2015년 9월)에서 수립할 계획임. 또한, 제3차 개발재원총회(2015년 7월)와 UN 기후변화협약 당사국 총회(2015년 11월)도 2015년 중 개최되어 지속가능한 개발을 위한 이행수단 및 재원 마련에 대한 구속력 있는 합의를 이룰 것으로 기대됨.

8) 본 장에 정리된 내용은 OECD, 2012a, 2012b, 2014c, 2014e, 2014j; Expert Reference Group on Development Finance, 2013, 2014를 바탕으로 작성되었다.

9) Other Official Flows 10) Foreign Direct Investment 1 1) Civil Society Organizations

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02

높이 평가받고 있다. 한편, 이러한 변화와 함께 ODA 정의에 대한 개념적, 구조적 문제점이 제기되어 왔으며, 이는 크게 다음의 3가지 질문으로 정리된다.

① ODA로 측정될 수 있는 개발협력 활동의 ‘범위’는 어디까지일까? 당초 ODA 개념은 국가간 자원의 이동을 토대로 도입되었다. 이후 실제 측정에 있어서 다양한 개발협력 활동을 포함 하여야 한다는 주장이 제기되었고, 이에 따라 난민이나 유학생 지원 비용, 행정비용 등 공여국 내에서 지출되는 비용도 ODA로 계상되었다. 그러나 이는 개도국 입장에서 가용할 수 없는 ‘유령원조 (phantom aid)’라는 비판을 초래하였다.12) 이외에도 DAC가 규정하는 ODA 지원 적격 개도국13)이 지나치게 느슨하게 설정되어 있다는 지적 등 ODA 측정 범위가 과도하게 넓다는 주장이 제기되기 시작하였다. 반면, 다양한 금융협력 방식을 반영할 수 있도록 ODA 적격 기준을 완화하고, 지속가능한 개발의 필수 조건인 평화와 안보(peace and security) 분야에 대한 지원활동과 기후변화 등

EDCF ISSUE PAPER

글로벌 공공재 투자도 ODA에 포함하자는 주장도 제기되었다.

② ODA 적격 요건으로서 차관의 양허성 정도는? 이는 ODA를 정의14)하는 요건 중 하나인 ‘양허적 성격 (concessional in character)’에 대한 DAC 회원국 간 이견을 해소하고 ODA 통계의 신뢰성을 지속하기 위해 양허성(concessionality)에 대한 정량화된 정의가 필요하다는 인식 에서 기인한다. 최근 국제 자금시장의 저금리 기조가 지속되면서 공여국은 매우 낮은 이자율로 자금차입이 가능해 졌다. 즉, 공여국 정부의 직접적 재정보조 없이도 증여율15) 25%를 초과하는 조건의 ODA 차관지원이 가능한 상황이 되었다. 즉, 공여국과 수원국의 신용도 차이가 많아 공여국이 차입 금리보다 높은 이자율로 차관을 제공하더라도 수원국은 직접 국제 자금시장에서 조달하는 것보다 더 양허적인 자금을 제공받게 된 것이다.

2012년 3월에 있었던 EU에 대한 OECD DAC의 동료평가(peer review)에서 이러한 부분이 지적되었고, 이로써 시작된 유럽투자은행(EIB)16)의 양허성 차관에 대한 ODA 적격성 논쟁이 ODA 재정의 논의로 이어졌다. 이러한 상황을 두고 OECD DAC 내에서는 ‘공여국 정부의 예산 노력(budgetary effort)이 반영되지 않은 차관은 양허적 성격의 자금으로 인정할 수 없다’라는 비판과 ‘수원국 입장에서 상업적 조건보다 유리한 자금은 양허적이다’라는 반론이 충돌 하였다.

③ 현재의 ODA 측정방식이 다양한 개발금융 수단에 적용될 수 있는가? 현재의 ODA 측정방식은 실질적 자금흐름을 지나치게 강조함으로써 여러 개발 금융수단을 통한 개도국 지원 노력을 측정 대상에서 제외하고 있다는 문제점이 제기되었다. DAC가 각국의 ODA 지원 규모를 순지출(net disbursement) 방식으로 발표함에 따라 차관의 총지출액(gross disbursement) 및 지분 투자액에서 차관 상환액과 지분 투자로 인한 수익이 차감되어 반영되므로, 공여국의 ODA 지원 노력은 통계 수치상 당해 년도 차관 집행액 또는 투자 금액뿐 아니라 과거에 지원했던 자금의 상환액과 투자수익에 크게 영향을 받게 된다.

12) 2007년 DAC은 ‘프로그램 가능 원조 (Country Programmable Assistance, CPA)’라는 개념을 도입하여 ODA 통계와 별도로 수원국으로 직접 유입되는 원조 자금 흐름만을 측정하고 있음.

13) 국민소득이 3년 연속 고소득국(high income country, 1인당 GNI U$12,276 이상) 수준 이상이어야 ODA 지원 적격 개도국 목록에서 제외됨.

14) 공 여국의 공공기관(정부부처 포함) 또는 동 기관의 집행기관이 DAC가 인정하는 개도국 및 국제기구에 제공하는 자금으로, 개도국의 경제개발 및 복지증진을 목적으로 하고 양허적 성격이면서 증여율(Grant Element)이 25% 이상이어야 함 (OECD, 2013: para. 44).

15) 차 관의 증여(grant) 수준을 나타내는 지표로, 차관의 명목가치에서 상환 원리금의 현재가치를 차감하여 계산함. 현재가치 계산을 위한 할인율은 10%를 사용하는데 (OECD, 2013: para. 12), 이는 1960년대 말 ODA 정의 과정에서 공여국의 투자 기회비용을 고려하여 설정되었음 (OECD, 2014f: para. 11).

16) European Investment Bank

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또한 투자 사업의 성공에 따른 투자수익이 ODA 측정 시 차감되므로 수익률이 높은 사업에 투자할수록, 즉 개발사업이 성공적일수록 공여국의 지원 노력이 낮게 평가되는 기현상이 나타난다. 개발사업을 위한 자금 동원을 위해 보증을 지원하는 경우에도 최초 보증 지원 시에는 ODA에 반영되지 않다가 사업 실패로 인해 보증금 지급이 일어난 경우 에만 ODA로 계상되는 문제점이 있다. 따라서 적극적인 개발협력 활동을 독려하기 위해 도입된 ODA 측정방식이 다양한 개발금융 수단에 대한 ODA 측정에 적용되지 못하고 오히려 다양한 수단의 활용을 방해하는 요인이 되고 있다는 우려의 목소리가 커지게 된 것이다.

(2) 논의 경과 국제사회는 Post-2015 개발목표 달성을 위해서 DAC 회원국뿐 아니라 모든 개발협력 이해관계자의 활동을 통합 적으로 조망하고 분석할 수 있는 통계체계가 필요하다는 의견에 공감하였다. 이에 따라 OECD DAC는 2012년 HLM

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에서 ODA 개념 현대화 논의의 본격적인 시작을 위한 기본 원칙과 논의 방향을 구체화하였다.

ODA 현대화 논의는 'ODA는 가장 필요로 하는 곳에 필요한 재원동원 효과를 극대화할 수 있는 방식으로 집중되어야 하며, 책무성 원칙을 강화해야 한다는 기본 인식'을 바탕으로 시작되었다. 이에 따라 DAC는 개발 목적성을 가진 모든 공적 지원을 포괄하는 새로운 측정 수단을 개발하고, 공여국의 노력(donor efforts)과 수원국의 혜택(recipient benefit)을 함께 반영할 수 있는 방법을 연구하고, ODA 개념의 현대화 필요성을 면밀히 조사하기로 하였다. 또한, ODA 차관을 둘러싸고 DAC 회원국 간 이견이 대립되고 있는 점을 고려하여 ODA 측정방식 수정을 위한 5가지 원칙17)에

합의하였다.

이에 따라, OECD DAC는 2013년 외부 개발재원 측정과 모니터링 체제를 개선하기 위한 로드맵을 수립하였다. 또한 DAC와 개발재원 통계작업반 18)을 포함한 산하기구 회의, 외부 전문가그룹 회의, 신흥공여국․개도국․개발금융기관․

학계․CSOs 등을 초청한 세미나 및 워크숍 개최, 보고서 발간 등을 진행하여 폭넓은 관계자들의 전문성과 의견을 종합하였다.

① 외부 개발재원 현황 파악 DAC는 우선 다양한 개발금융 수단과 공여기관에 대한 검토․분류 작업을 실시하고, 국제통화기금(IMF)19) 및 세계 은행, OECD와 같은 국제기구의 개발금융 통계체계를 조사하였다. DAC는 또한 수원국의 다각화된 개발금융 수단에 대한 이해 수준과 활용 잠재력에 대한 연구를 진행하였으며, 남남협력과 기타 개발협력 재원을 측정하기 위한 방안도 논의하였다. 이러한 활동은 새로운 포괄적 보고체계의 구축을 위한 선행 작업이라고 할 수 있다. 이러한 선행 작업을 바탕으로 2014년에는 구체적인 성과물로 DAC 통계지침20)의 금융수단 분류체계 개정안과 공적개입을 통해 동원된

민간재원 측정방안을 도출하였다.

17) ① 대중의 비판에도 불구하고 설명이 가능할 것, ② 전반적인 ODA 수준에 급격한 변화를 주지 않을 것, ③ 다자개발재원의 양허성 정의와 기본적 일관성을 유지할 것, ④ ODA 개념 정의를 유지하면서 ODA 차관의 해석을 명확히 할 것, ⑤ ODA 차관을 통해 상업적 이익을 추구하지 않을 것 (OECD, 2012a: para. 18).

18) 기존 ‘ODA 통계작업반’으로 명명하던 것을 최근의 다양한 개발협력 재원을 포함한다는 의미로 ‘개발재원 통계작업반’으로 2012년 4월 명칭을 변경함.

19) International Monetary Fund 20) OECD DAC 통계지침은 ‘Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire’와 ‘Addendum’으로 구성됨 (OECD, 2013).

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우선, 금융수단 분류체계 개정안은 2014년에 열린 제66차 통계작업반 회의에서 회원국의 원칙적인 동의를 얻었고, 현재 OECD 사무국에서 동 내용을 통계지침에 반영하는 작업을 진행 중에 있다. 이 개정안에 따라 OECD DAC는 자금형태와 흐름형태에 대한 면밀한 추적과 히스토리 관리를 위해 기존의 자금형태 분류를 상호배타적으로 재분류 하고, 흐름형태와 채널코드를 변경하고 있다. 현재 진행중인 이러한 절차들은 2015년 중 공식 승인 절차를 밟을 계획 이다. 동 개정안은 특히 개도국의 민간부문 지원 활동에 관련된 통계 수집에 있어 중요한 역할을 할 것으로 기대된다.

공적개입을 통해 동원된 민간재원 측정방안 역시 제66차 통계작업반 회의에서 제안되어 총론 수준의 합의를 이루 었으며, 지난 12월 DAC HLM에서도 관련 논의를 지속하기로 합의하였다. 공적개입을 통해 동원된 민간재원 측정 방안은 우선적으로 보증, 신디케이트론21), 집합투자기구22)를 대상으로 측정방안이 제시되었으며, 2015년에는 메자닌 금융23)과 지분투자 등으로 논의가 이루어질 예정이다. 참고로 그림 1은 공적 보증지원에 의해 동원된 민간재원의

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지리적 분포를 보여주고 있다.

<그림 1> 공적 보증지원에 의해 동원된 민간재원의 지리적 분포

백만불 기준

출처 : Mirabile et al. 2013: 6

② ODA 재정의 OECD 사무국은 ODA 측정 현대화 방식에 대한 3가지 옵션24)을 제시하는 보고서를 DAC 회원국들에게 제안하였다 (OECD, 2014g). 이 보고서는 그간 제기된 ODA 정의에 대한 비판과 문제점들을 반영하고 있으며, 주요 제안 내용은 공여국내에서 지출되는 비용의 ODA 반영 제외 또는 일부 반영, 그리고 차관․지분투자․보증 등 비증여 금융수단 (non-grant financial instruments)의 측정방식에 대한 변경 등이다.

2 1) syndicated loan 22) collective investment vehicles 23) mezzanine finance 24) 3가지 옵션이란 ① 수원국으로 자금흐름이 발생한 공여국 정부의 예산지출만을 ODA로 측정하는 집중된(focused) ODA, ② 공여국 정부의 개발 협력 예산노력을 발생주의에 근거(accrual basis)하여 보고하는 새로운(new) ODA, ③ 기존 방식을 대부분 유지하면서 차관과 지분투자 등을 총지출 방식으로 측정하는 개선된(updated) ODA를 의미함 (OECD, 2014g).

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이 중 공여국 내에서 지출되는 비용을 ODA 측정에서 제외하는 것에 대해서 대부분의 회원국들은 2014년 3월 DAC 고위급회의(SLM)25)를 통해 반대의견을 표명하였다. 또한 일부 회원국은 양허성 측정을 위한 할인율(discount rate)로 기존의 10%가 적합하다는 의견을 제시한 반면, 다수의 회원국의 경우 증여등가액 방식 도입 여부와 기준할인율에 대한 추가 논의가 필요하다는 입장을 표명하였다. 한편, DAC 회원국들은 ODA 지원 적격 개도국 범위 축소를 통해 최빈국(LDCs)26) 및 취약국(fragile states)에 지원을 강화하자는 제안에는 반대하고 새로운 검토 방향을 고안할 것을 주문하기도 하였다.

이후 각국은 증여등가액 방식의 도입 논의를 가장 시급한 과제로 인식하고 DAC 통계작업반 회의를 통해 의견을 개진하였다. 또한 ‘외부자문그룹 (External Reference Group on Development Finance)’27)을 비롯한 다양한 외부 전문가들은 각종 보고서를 발표하여 활발한 논의를 진행하였다. 그 결과, 현행의 현금흐름 측정방식에서 증여등가액

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측정방식으로의 변경은 일부 DAC 회원국들의 반대에도 불구하고 전문가 집단에서 큰 지지를 얻었다.

전문가 집단이 증여등가액 방식으로의 변화를 지지하는 가장 큰 이유는 이 방식이 모든 지원수단에 걸쳐 중립적인 ODA 측정이 가능하기 때문이다. 즉, 증여등가액 방식을 도입함으로써 보다 많은 개발재원을 필요로 하는 Post2015 시대에 걸맞게 다양한 개발금융 수단의 활용을 독려할 수 있다는 것이다. 나아가 증여등가액 방식은 차관의 양허성 수준을 반영하여 ODA 계상액이 결정되므로 공여국의 개도국에 대한 지원 노력을 보다 정확하게 측정할 수 있다는 장점이 있다.

하지만 이에 반대하는 입장에서는, 순지출 방식은 실제 현금흐름을 통계로 집계하기 때문에 해석이 단순하지만 증여 등가액 방식은 할인율, 현재가치 등 전문적 용어에 대한 이해 없이는 실제 지출액과 통계의 비교가 어렵기 때문에 발생주의 회계에 대한 이해가 부족한 대중과 소통하는데 어려움이 크다고 지적한다. 또한 이 방식을 도입하게 되면 할인율 수준이 측정 결과에 미치는 영향이 커지는데,28) 현실적으로 정확한 할인율 채택이 어렵다는 단점이 있기도 하다. 공여국들이 기술적 조작(manipulation)을 통해 ODA 통계를 부풀린다면 국가 간 신뢰는 물론 공여국 정부와 국민 간 신뢰를 무너뜨릴 수 있다는 우려도 제기되었다.

따라서 DAC 통계작업반은 적절한 할인율 설정의 타당성(feasibility)에 대한 기술적 논의에 집중했다. 할인율은 공여국의 재원조달 비용과 개도국 지원을 위해 공여국이 감당해야 하는 위험수준에 의해 결정되는데, 여기서 특히 위험수준의 반영에 대한 이견이 많았다. 수원국별로 위험 수준을 반영한 차등할인율을 적용하는 것이 양허적 개발 재원 수요가 큰 저소득국과 고위험국에 공여국의 지원을 독려하는 긍정적 효과가 있다는 주장이 제기된 반면, 위험수 준을 반영해 차등할인율이 현재의 10% 고정할인율만큼 높아지면 4%~5%대 높은 이자율의 차관도 증여등가액 부분만큼은 ODA로 계상되므로, 이는 양허성 차관을 제공하는 공여국의 고(高) 이자율 정책을 옹호하는 것이 될 수 있다는 주장도 제기되었다. 또한 위험의 정확한 측정은 사후적(ex-post)으로 가능하므로 할인율에 위험수준을 사 전적(ex-ante)으로 반영하지 않고 채무구제(debt relief)와 같은 현실화된 위험에 대한 공여국의 노력을 ODA로 반영 해야 한다는 의견도 제기되었다.

25) Senior Level Meeting 26) Least Developed Countries 27) 외부자문그룹은 2012년 DAC HLM 이후 OECD 사무국의 작업을 지원하기 위해 결성되었으며, UN, 학계, 개발금융기관, 자선재단, 국제금융기구 등에서 파견된 15명의 전문가로 구성됨. 총 3차례의 회의(2013년 10월, 2014년 1월 및 6월)를 토대로 최종 권고안을 DAC에 제시하였음 (Expert Reference Group on Development Finance, 2014).

28) 할인율 수준이 높을수록 차관 원리금 상환액의 현재가치가 낮게 측정되어 증여등가액은 커짐.

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나아가 이로 인해 개도국의 채무부담이 가중될 것이라는 지적도 지지를 얻었다. 따라서 ODA로 인정받기 위한 적격 기준(최소증여율)29)을 설정하여야 한다는 의견이 등장하였다. 이에, DAC 회원국과 전문가 집단은 공여국의 재원조달 비용과 위험수준의 참고치(benchmark)30)로 어떤 것을 채택할 것인지에 대해 논의하였지만, 각국의 다양한 의견 제기로 타협점을 찾지 못했다.

기술적 수준의 논의만 지속하는 것은 더 이상 의미가 없다고 판단한 DAC 의장은 2014년 HLM 계기 양허성 재정의에 대한 합의의 시급성을 강조하며 정치적 타협안을 제안하였다. 증여등가액 방식의 채택 여부가 결정되어야 이후 개발 금융 관련 ODA 재정의 논의가 정확한 방향성을 가지고 이루어질 수 있었기 때문이다. 이후 약 2개월 동안 DAC 의장 제안서31)를 두고 각국 DAC 대표들은 수차례의 비공식 회의를 가졌으며, DAC 의장의 제안으로 7개국32)과 EU 고위급 인사로 구성된 비공식 협의체가 구성되어 정치적 타협 노력을 경주하였다. 그 결과, 2014년 12월 HLM에서 할인율과

EDCF ISSUE PAPER

최소증여율의 구체적 수치까지 포함한 양허성 차관에 대한 ODA 재정의가 합의33)되었다.

최종 합의된 ODA 재정의 내용을 살펴보면, 할인율은 5%를 기초할인율로 하고 소득그룹별로 상위중소득국 1%, 하위중소득국 2%, 최빈국 및 저소득국 4%의 위험조정률을 가산함으로써 최빈국과 저소득국에 더 높은 양허성의 차관이 지원될 수 있도록 고안하였다. 또한, 개도국 채무건전성 악화에 대한 우려 의견을 반영하여 ODA 적격 최소 증여율을 수원국 소득그룹에 따라 상위중소득국 10%, 하위중소득국 15%, 최빈국 및 저소득국 45%로 설정하였고, IMF와 세계은행의 채무건전성 관리체계(DSF)34)에서 제시한 최소증여율(5% 할인율 적용) 준수를 의무화하였다. 본 보고서는 ODA 재정의 논의의 최종 합의결과를 다음의 표 1과 같이 정리하였다. 참고로 그림 2는 변화된 ODA 통계 측정방식을 보여준다.

29) 만약 25%가 최소증여율 기준으로 결정된다면, 증여율 25% 이상의 차관은 ODA로 인정되며, ODA 규모는 증여등가액으로 계상되고 증여율 25% 미만의 차관은 ODA로 인정되지 않음.

30) 재원조달 비용의 경우, OECD 수출신용협약에 따른 통화별 차등할인율(Differential Discount Rate, DDR)과 IMF과 세계은행의 5% 고정할인율이 주로 논의되었으며, 위험수준과 관련해서는 수원국 국채의 부도스프레드, OECD 수출신용협약에 따른 수원국별 기준프리미엄률(Minimum Premium Rate, MPR) 등이 참고치(benchmark)로 논의되었음.

31) 할인율 논의에 있어 일부 회원국은 정부간 차관(sovereign lending)과 민간 차관에 대한 할인율이 별도로 논의되어야 한다고 주장한 바 있으며, 동 제안서는 해당 논의가 정부간 차관과 관련된 논의라는 점을 명시하고 있음. 따라서 이후 DAC 논의 및 HLM 합의사항은 정부간 차관의 재정의 에 한정됨.

32) 영국(의장국), 독일, 미국, 벨기에, 스웨덴, 일본, 프랑스 33) 2014 DAC HLM 커뮤니케에서 1개 회원국만이 중소득국(Middle Income Countries, MICs) 앞 차관의 ODA 적격 최소증여율에 대해 현재는 합의가 어려운 상황이라고 언급하고 있음.

34) Debt Sustainability Framework

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<표 1> ODA 재정의에 따른 변화 구분

현행

ODA 적격 기준

변경

1. 공적주체가 제공

1. 공적주체가 제공

2. 수원국의 경제개발과 복지증진에 사용

2. 수 원국의 경제개발과 복지증진에 사용

3. 증 여율 25% 이상

3. 소득그룹별 최소증여율* 이상

(모든 국가에 대해 10% 할인율 적용)

**① LDCs/LICs: 45%(9% 할인율 적용) ② LMICs: 15%(7% 할인율 적용) ③ UMICs: 10%(6% 할인율 적용)

ODA 측정 방식

순지출방식

증여등가액 방식

(총지출액 - 총상환액)

(총지출액 x 증여율)

* 단, DSF 적용 대상국의 경우, DSF에서 규정한 최소증여율(5% 할인) 이상 ** LICs : Low Income Countries, 저소득국 LMICs : Lower Middle Income Countries, 하위중소득국

UMICs : Upper Middle Income Countries, 상위중소득국

EDCF ISSUE PAPER

출처 : 한국수출입은행 경협총괄부 정책연구팀 작성 / 참고문헌 : OECD, 2014a

<그림 2> ODA 통계 측정방식의 변화 순지출액 방식

O

증여등가액 방식

무상원조

D

무상원조

D

총

A

지

차등할인율을 적용하여 이자율, 상환기간 및 거치기간을 기반으로 계산

출 액 ODA

O

양허성 차관

차관 상환액

A 양허성 차관의 증여등가액 ◼ 수 원국의 위험이 높을수록 증여등가액 증가 ◼ 차 관의 양허성 수준이 높을수록 증여등가액 증가 출처 : OECD, 2014b: 3

③ ‘지속가능개발을 위한 총공적개발지원(TOSD)’ 측정방안 개발 가칭 ‘지속가능개발을 위한 총공적개발지원(TOSD)35)’은 ODA를 넘어서는 개발재원 전반에 대한 투명성과 책무성 강화, 지속가능개발을 위한 재원 동원 극대화의 유인체계 제공 등을 위하여 광범위한 공적 개발재원 측정 수단으로 등장한 개념이다. 주요 쟁점은 평화·안보·정의 등 개발을 위한 선행조건(development enabler)에 대한 측정의 외연(outer boundary) 설정, 기후금융(climate finance) 관련 국제적 목표와의 조화로운 보고체계 유지, 공적자금을

통해 동원된 민간재원의 반영 여부와 방식 등이다. 제안된 TOSD의 범주(초안)는 그림 3과 같다.

35) Total Official support for Sustainable Development

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<그림 3> OECD의 총공적개발재원(TOSD) 제안범위

UN 평화유지 활동국 (UNDPKO) 활동

UN 주요 기금 (전체 또는 일부 ODA 적격 기관에 지원)

기타 UN의 필수 평화 유지 활동

EDCF ISSUE PAPER

?

현재 ODA 비적격으로 분류된 UN 주요 기금

1차년도 이후의 난민 비용

탄소 포집 저장 비용 (Carbon capture storage*)

1차년도의 난민 비용 지분, 메자닌 금융

ODA 차관의 증여등가액

평화, 안보

인권 인권 ODA

행정비용 외교활동 비용 (안보, 정의, 기후변화 협상)

증여등가액 보증에 의해 동원된 재원*

TOSD 설정 가능 범위

기타 동원 재원?*

ODA 차관에서 기타 공적재원 차관 증여등가액을 제외한 에서 증여등가액을 부분 제외한 부분

증여등가액 협조융자 수출신용 (AF export credits) 비협조융자 수출신용 (non-AF export credits)

향후 확정 예정 *TOSD 메모 부분

출처 : OECD, 2014h: 4

그간 DAC 회의와 SLM을 통하여 TOSD 개발을 위한 기본적인 접근방식은 윤곽을 잡았으나, 아직 구체적인 합의안은 마련되지 못하였다. TOSD의 범위 및 측정과 관련된 현재까지의 논의는 개도국의 개발을 증진시키거나 개발이 가능한 선행 조건을 마련하기 위한 공여국의 다각적 노력을 자금의 양허성 여부와 상관없이 포괄하여 ‘총지원액 (gross cash-flow)’ 기준으로 측정한다는 것이다 (OECD, 2014i). 2014년 HLM에서 DAC 회원국들은 2015년 7월 에티오 피아 아디스아바바에서 개최 예정인 ‘제3차 개발재원 총회’에서 이해관계자들의 의견을 반영하여 TOSD의 구체적인 범주를 결정하고, Post-2015 개발목표 확정 이후 이를 반영하여 세부적으로 조정한다는 데에 합의하였다.

한편, DAC는 TOSD가 ODA를 보완하는 개념이고 개발재원의 효과적 배분과 활용을 위해 도입되는 것이지 ODA를 대체하는 개념이 아니라는 점을 분명히 하고 있다 (OECD, 2014a: para. 14). 이는 ODA가 개도국의 경제성장과 복지증진에 초점을 두고 있는 반면 TOSD는 광범위하고 보편적인 개발 목표를 배경으로 도입되기 때문에, 공여국들이 TOSD를 중심으로 개발재원을 기획한다면 개도국들에게 돌아가는 재원이 위축될 수 있다는 우려를 불식시키기 위해서다. 그래서 지난 HLM에서 DAC 회원국들은 최빈국 등 ODA가 절실히 필요로 한 곳에 ODA가 더 많이 제공 될 수 있도록 하자는 데 합의한 것이다.

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3. 향후 논의 방향 ODA 재정의 작업을 완료하기 위해서는 크게 2개의 잔여 주제에 대한 합의가 필요하다. 첫째는 평화와 안보 관련 개발협력 활동에 대한 TOSD 반영 방식에 대한 재검토이다. 관련 통계지침을 현실에 맞게 갱신(update)하고 공여국 들의 통계보고 관행을 일치시키기 위한 작업이 2014년말 이미 시작되었으며, 작업 결과를 바탕으로 DAC 회의에서는 평화, 안보, 재건 지원 관련 지출의 TOSD 반영 방식 또는 ODA 계상방식을 논의할 것으로 예상된다.

둘째는 양자 개발금융기관(DFIs)36)을 통한 금융협력 활동의 ODA 계상방식이다. 개도국 민간분야 지원을 주요 업무로 하는 양자 DFIs의 경우, 차관·보증·지분투자 등 다양한 방식으로 개도국 기업을 지원하는 경우가 많은데, 이러한 자금은 시장조건(market terms)으로 지원되기 때문에 ODA로 인정받기 위한 양허성 조건을 충족시킬 수 없다. 그러나 일부 DAC 회원국은 공여국 정부가 DFIs에 제공하는 출연·출자액을 ODA로 계상해야 한다고 주장하고 있으며 (OECD, 2014d: 4), 이는 민간 분야로 하여금 개발사업에 참여할 수 있도록 공적분야의 촉매제 역할을 강조하고 있는

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최근 추세에 힘입어 더욱 강하게 제기될 것으로 보인다.

반면, 정부가 자국의 DFIs에 제공하는 출연·출자액을 ODA에 반영하는 것을 반대하는 측은 정부간 차관(sovereign lending)의 ODA 재정의 결과를 바탕으로 보증·지분투자 등의 다양한 금융수단과 민간차관에 대하여 ODA를 측정 할 수 있도록 증여등가액 측정방식을 발전시켜야 한다고 주장하고 있다. 따라서 보다 설득력 있고 정치력을 갖춘 진영의 주장을 반영한 타협안이 2015년 중 도출될 것으로 예상된다.

TOSD의 경우, 기후금융이나 민간재원 측정과 관련된 현황파악과 측정방식의 보완·개발 작업을 DAC 산하기구와 사무국이 진행하고 있으나, 내부 작업 결과보다는 2015년 중 예정된 제3차 개발재원 총회 등 여러 정상급 국제회의의 논의 결과가 TOSD의 구체화 작업에 더 큰 영향을 미칠 것으로 보인다. 이 외에 TOSD 도입과 관련하여 DAC가 추가로 논의할만한 주제로는 개발재원 확대와 효과성 제고를 위한 TOSD의 기여 방안 및 각국의 정량적 TOSD 목표 37) 설정

등이 있다.

36) Development Finance Institutions 37) ODA 목표(ODA/GNI 0.7%)와 견줄 수 있는 구체적인 목표치

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4. 한국의 개발협력에 대한 시사점 2015년은 Post-2015 개발목표와 이의 이행을 위한 재원 논의가 이루어지는 중요한 해이다. 이러한 흐름 속에서 DAC는 공여국의 향후 개발재원 동원 및 책무성 논의에 있어 실증적 정보를 제공할 수 있는 개발재원 통계체계를 마련하기 위해 노력하고 있다. 그간의 논의 과정과 결과를 종합하여 볼 때, Post-2015 개발목표는 다양한 수단과 노력을 통한 보다 많은 개발재원 동원을 요구하고 있으며 DAC 통계체계는 이러한 점을 반영하여 보다 다양한 개발 금융 수단과 협력 방식을 포괄하는 방향으로 나아나고 있다. 또한 민간재원의 활용을 독려하면서도 개도국의 채무 건전성 악화 등 지속가능한 개발을 해칠 수 있는 잠재 위험에 대해서는 엄격한 잣대를 통해 대응하고 있다.

지난 HLM에서 차관에 대한 양허성 논의가 성공적으로 마무리될 수 있었던 것은 단순한 ODA 공여를 넘어서 개도국의 지속 가능한 성장 기반 마련을 위해 양허성 차관, 보증, 지분투자 등 금융협력 수단의 활용도를 극대화하여

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안정적으로 개발재원을 동원해야 한다는 국제사회의 공감대가 있었기 때문이다. 따라서 한국의 개발협력 시행에 있어서도 이와 같은 국제개발협력 체제의 방향성을 염두에 두고 다양한 개발금융 수단을 도입하고 활용함으로써 보다 효과적인 개발재원 동원방식을 발전시켜 나가야 할 것이다.

이를 위해 우선 개도국 내 민간부문에 대한 투자확대를 위해 개도국이 투자환경을 정비할 수 있도록 다각화된 지원을 제공하는 동시에 레버리지 효과를 통한 대규모 개발재원 동원이 가능하도록 개발금융을 도입하여 개도국으로 양질의 투자가 지속될 수 있는 원조체제를 구축할 필요가 있다. 이와 함께 경제·환경·사회·안보 등 다양한 정책분야의 연관성을 강조하고 있는 새로운 개발목표의 등장이 예견되는 만큼 개발효과성 제고를 위해 조화로운 개발재원 배분이 더욱 필요할 것이다.

마지막으로 TOSD라는 새로운 개발재원 통계지표가 설정되어 가는 과정에서 우리의 개발협력 정책이 기후변화 대응, 이주, 무역, 농업 등 여타 정책 부문과 어떻게 연결되어야 하는지에 대한 심도 있는 한국 ODA의 전략 검토도 필요하다. 한국 ODA가 글로벌 사회의 미래를 위한 성공적 투자가 되기 위해서는 변화하는 환경에 대한 철저한 이해를 바탕으로 지속적으로 ODA 전략을 수정하고 실행해 나가는 수밖에 없기 때문이다.

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11

<참고문헌> Mi rabile, M., J. Benn and C. Sangare (2013). Guarantees for Development. OECD Development Cooperation Working Papers No. 11. Paris, OECD Publishing.

OECD (2012a). 2012 DAC HLM Communique. ______ (2012b). New Directions in DAC Measurement and Monitoring of External Development. DCD/DAC(2012)48/ REV2. ______ (2013). Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System and the Annual DAC New Directions in DAC Measurement and Monitoring of External Development. DCD/DAC(2013)15/FINAL. ______ (2014a). 2014 DAC HLM Communique. ______ (2014b). Background Paper: The Treatment of Loan Concessionality in DAC Statistics. DAC High Level Meeting, 15-16 December 2014. ______ (2014c). Development Co-operation Report 2014. Paris, OECD.

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______ (2014d). Including the Cost of Using Private Sector Instruments in ODA. DCD/DAC(2014)64. ______ (2014e). Measuring and Monitoring External Development Finance. OECD and Post-2015 Reflections, Element 11, Paper 1. Paris, OECD. ______ (2014f). Options on Concessionality. DCD/DAC(2014)29. ______ (2014g). Options for Modernising the ODA Measure. DCD/DAC(2014)3. ______ (2014h). Scoping the New Measure of Total Official Support for Development (TOSD). DCD/DAC(2014)35. ______ (2014i). Toward More Inclusive Measurement and Monitoring of Development Finance - Total Official Support for Sustainable Development. DCD/DAC(2014)66. ______ (2014j). Work Plan for DAC HLM Mandate on Development Finance. DCD/DAC/RD(2014)5/RD2.

Expert Reference Group on Development Finance (2013). Revisiting the ODA Concept. ______ (2014). Final Conclusion and Recommendation.

감수 : 임소진 선임연구원 (한국수출입은행 경협총괄부 정책연구팀)

서울특별시 영등포구 은행로 38 (여의도동 16-1) TEL: 02-3779-6591

FAX: 02-3779-6777

WEBSITE: www.edcfkorea.go.kr

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개발재원(Financing for Development)

정책토론회

참고자료 1. Financing for Development Revised Draft Outcome(2015.5.6.)

2. Key Elements of a Successful Addiss Ababa on FfD - UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network(SDSN)

3. Recommendations for the Post-2015 MOI and FfD - Beyond2015

4. OECD DAC의 ODA 재정의와 시사점 - 한국수출입은행

5. 개발재원총회 정부간 협상 한국정부 발언문 모음

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개발재원총회 정부간 협상 한국정부 발언문 모음: Post-2015 Joint session(2015.04.21.)

Statement by Ambassador Hahn Choong-hee Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations Joint Session between FfD and Post-2015 Processes 21 April 2015 New York

Thank you, Mr. Co-Facilitator,

1.

The Republic of Korea hopes that this joint session will serve as a platform to enhance coherence between the two work streams.

2.

Last week, we had in-depth discussions on how the Addis negotiation will contribute to the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. In this process, the areas of agreements and discrepancies were clearly identified, and the need for strengthened efforts to implement the ambitious development goals of the post-2015 era was reaffirmed.

3.

Korea believes that the Addis outcome should constitute the Means of Implementation (MOI) pillar of the post-2015 development agenda. This would not only preclude possible duplication of efforts, but more importantly ensure strong coherence in order to establish a robust and universal post-2015 framework.

4.

In the course of our negotiations on the means of implementation, the Republic of Korea attaches the highest importance on the following points: 4.1. Enabling environment for all development actors, sound policies and institutions at country level are key to poverty eradication and sustainable development.

Particular attention should be given to capacity building which empowers countries to establish such environment, policies, and institutions.

4.2. Respective roles and capacities of all development actors, whether public or private, north or south, should be taken into consideration in order to maximize development impact. This also applies to diverse types of development resources.

4.3. ODA remains an essential development resource and needs to be better allocated where it is most needed. ODA also needs to play a catalytic role in tapping other development resources with a view to creating synergy.

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4.4. It should be further elaborated how to engage with the private sector and make their financial and non-financial contributions meaningful and positive for the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda.

4.5. The principles of country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and transparency and mutual accountability should be duly considered in all development flows and actors. We see these principles as important underpinnings not only for effective development cooperation but also for the global partnership for sustainable development.

5.

The monitoring and follow-up mechanisms for the FfD and post-2015 processes should also be coherent. Rather than establishing and operating separate parallel mechanisms, Korea believes that a broad, integrated monitoring mechanism built on the existing effective monitoring frameworks is desirable. The potential role of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) should be considered in this regard. It is important to monitor whether development cooperation by diverse stakeholders is implemented effectively in addition to monitoring whether commitments are delivered and progresses are made.

6.

To conclude, once again I would like to emphasize that a coherent and integrated approach is essential in our journey to Addis Ababa, New York, as well as Paris. The successful implementation of the post-2015 development agenda will rely on the mutually reinforcing relationships of these different processes. While remaining committed to the spirit of consensus building and solidarity, the Republic of Korea would like to see forward momentum in aligning the FfD and post-2015 processes through this weekâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s joint session. Thank you. /end/

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개발재원총회 정부간 협상 한국정부 발언문 모음: 1차 문안협상(2015.01.26.)

Statement by the Republic of Korea First Drafting Session on Outcome Document of Third Conference on Financing for Development 27-29 January 2015, New York Thank you, Mr. Co-Facilitator.

The Korean delegation would like to express sincere gratitude in particular to co-facilitators and the Secretariat for their efforts for expediting our discussion.

1.

To begin with, the Republic of Korea welcomes the draft elements for the outcome document of the third United Nations Conference on Financing for Development and emphasizes that the Addis Conference should squarely address the current landscape of development finance in addition to building on the Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration.

2.

In today’s evolving landscape of development finance, we need to acknowledge a wide range of development actors and resources as well as their optimal roles to be assumed. It is encouraging that we now have more actors and more types and larger volumes of resources.

3.

Still, Official Development Assistance (ODA) should remain an essential development resource, especially for those most in need and vulnerable, and the Republic of Korea reaffirms its commitment to continue efforts to expand its ODA. The catalytic role of ODA in mobilizing further resources from the private sector should also be taken into account.

4.

Yet, ODA alone cannot be the means to respond to the transformative development needs we are faced with. Domestic resources are critical as the most direct source of financing for development. Private resources will gain more and more importance to address the new dimension of the sustainable development framework which widely embraces economic, social, and environment issues. The international community should be firm on the complementarity of these resources to ODA.

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5.

The challenge for us is to build a new financing framework which identifies all resources available, mobilizes potential assets from different sources, whether national, international, private, or public, addressing the overall scope of sustainable development goals we are to adopt in September.

6.

Bearing in mind that only sustained and inclusive economic growth will be the ultimate solution to the long-term financing for development needs, we should continue to support developing countries to increase the capacity to maximize the mobilization of domestic resources. Technological cooperation will be a useful area which warrants our attention in this vein.

7.

Forging a renewed global partnership involving all the relevant stakeholders, such as traditional and emerging donors, developing countries, civil society, and the private sector, will be a daunting task. Ensuring that a global partnership makes an enduring and positive impact will require shared principles such as country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, transparency and mutual accountability, as recommended by the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Whatever goals are agreed upon, however many resources are mobilized, our common task is to make sure of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;value for moneyâ&#x20AC;? of the limited resources and maximize the effectiveness through inclusive partnerships. In this regard, Korea takes note of and welcomes the draft elements pointing out the need of inclusive approach for monitoring and follow-up.

8.

Korea commends the excellent work of the intergovernmental committee of experts on sustainable development financing which modernized and categorized various development resources and suggested meaningful ways and challenges in mobilizing and utilizing them.

This will serve as basic groundwork for our further discussions in the run-up to the Addis Conference. The six elements in the UNSGâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s synthesis reports should also be duly reflected during our inter-governmental negotiations.

9.

In closing, Korea would like to underline that the groundbreaking achievements expected in New York and Paris later this year highly depend on the success of Addis. In this regard, in the run-up to the adoption of the transformative development goals, we must stand in solidarity to come up with the diverse means of implementation in Addis, both financial and non-financial. Korea is fully committed to sharing constructive suggestions based on its past development experience during the course of the preparatory process.

Thank you. /End/

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개발재원총회 정부간 협상 한국정부 발언문 모음: 2차 문안협상(2015.04.13.)

Statement by Ambassador Hahn Choong-hee Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations Second Drafting Session on Outcome Document of Third Conference on Financing for Development 13-17 April 2015 New York

----------------------------------------------------------------------------Thank you, Mr. Co-Facilitator.

1.

The Republic of Korea notes that the zero draft takes a comprehensive and balanced approach in addressing the Monterrey and Doha commitments. The Republic of Korea also recognizes that the zero draft fully reflects the changing landscape of international development, especially the respective roles of various development actors.

The Republic of Korea further takes note of the fact that the current zero

draft is more action-oriented than the previous outcome documents by providing specific targets and analysis on the impediments for the mobilization and utilization of development resources.

2.

The Republic of Korea perceives that ODA should remain an essential development resource. While the zero draft well reflects the catalytic role of ODA to mobilize additional resources, whether public or private, the need to maximize impact for sustainable development by better allocating ODA and seeking an appropriate mix of various development resources should also be emphasized.

3.

Governance plays an important role in leading the mobilization of sufficient development resources to the actual implementation of the development goals. In this regard, The Republic of Korea welcomes that the current zero draft addresses the importance of good governance. It is also notable that the zero draft addresses not

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only the significance of domestic governance, but also that of

global governance for

the fight against the illicit financial flows, the assurance of the international aid transparency, and so on.

4.

The Republic of Korea acknowledges that the zero draft emphasizes the importance of domestic resource mobilization (DRM), which is the crux of inclusive and sustained economic growth and sustainable development.

5.

It is notable that the role of the private sector, not just as a source of financing but as a source of innovation and technical development, is well reflected in the zero draft.

As the importance of the private sector is increasing, it is necessary that the zero draft discuss how the activities of the private sector can be consistent with the sustainable development goals, as well as internationally agreed norms for the business sector.

6.

The Republic of Korea believes that the relationship between the negotiations for FfD and the post-2015 development agenda should be further explored and clearly spelled out, including avoiding the duplication of efforts. We also that FfD negotiation should also incorporate the inter-linkage of three dimensions of economic, social, and environmental issues.

7.

To conclude, I would like to share with you that the Republic of Korea co-hosted together with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) the Development Cooperation Forum High Level Symposium in Incheon, Korea, from April 8 to 10 to discuss contending development cooperation issues including FfD and mean of implementation. The Republic of Korea will continue to actively engage in the FfD negotiation process. Thank you very much. /End/

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