Tohidi, n (2009) women and the presidential elections

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Table of contents 1. Islamic Women's Groups and the Quest for Political Representation in Turkey and Iran............................ 1

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Islamic Women's Groups and the Quest for Political Representation in Turkey and Iran Author: Tajali, Mona ProQuest document link Abstract: Â This article presents Islamic women's framing processes in their campaigns to address women's political underrepresentation in Iran and Turkey. It argues that while Turkish women justify their claims through international human rights discourses, Iranian women frame their demands in religious terms to find resonance with political elites. Women's strategic framing processes demonstrate the extent to which women's demands for equal representation are shaped by the political and discursive opportunity structures that arise out of their secular or theocratic contexts.

Links: Linking Service Full text: Â Headnote This article presents Islamic women's framing processes in their campaigns to address women's political underrepresentation in Iran and Turkey. It argues that while Turkish women justify their claims through international human rights discourses, Iranian women frame their demands in religious terms to find resonance with political elites. Women's strategic framing processes demonstrate the extent to which women's demands for equal representation are shaped by the political and discursive opportunity structures that arise out of their secular or theocratic contexts.

In many Muslim-majority countries, Islamic movements and parties tend to negatively view women's access to political leadership positions.1 The dominant gender discourse of these movements, which is often based on patriarchal interpretations of religious texts, views women's proper place to be within the domestic sphere as mothers and wives, and largely denies women an active presence in the public sphere, including in political decision-making. Scholarly analysis of women's activities and involvement in political parties that arise out of Islamic political movements has persuasively argued that despite the high level of women's political participation on behalf of such parties, women tend to have low levels of political representation.2 For instance, a number of scholars have pointed to the fact that many Islamic political parties have mobilized and politicized women to serve merely as campaigners and grassroots organizers to help bring the party to power, or have used women's bodies and dress as public markers of their identity claims. But once in power, the male elites of such parties have often denied women any real power or influence in formal politics.3 Although this kind of discrimination is not exclusive to religious movements and parties, it is often assumed that religiously motivated parties are more detrimental to women's political representation than are their secular counterparts. The works of scholars such as Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris and Steven Fish fall within this line of argumentation by emphasizing religious and cultural barriers, namely Islam and patriarchal attitudes, as the primary reasons for women's limited access to positions of political authority.4 A surprising recent trend that challenges the current literature's overwhelming emphasis on the religious/cultural obstacles that keep women out of political decisionmaking is the modest increases in the percentage of women in political leadership on behalf of some religious political parties in various Muslim-majority countries. For instance, Clark and Schwedler have observed that in Yemen and Jordan the percentage of women assuming political office has modestly increased in the wake of conservative and Islamist forces' rise to power.5 This trend is also present in Turkey and Iran, the two case studies of this research. Regardless of Turkey's secular or Iran's theocratic political frameworks, women's access to political leadership positions increased under the

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watch of conservative and religious forces, and (unexpectedly) not under liberalreformist or secular parties. In Turkey, the recent notable increases in the percentage of female parliamentarians (currently at its highest ever at 17.5%) coincides with the 2002 rise to power of the conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, henceforth AKP, but often called the AK Party by supporters). The AKP was founded in 2001 by members of defunct Turkish Islamist parties (Refah, the Welfare Party; and Fazilet, the Virtue Party). Since its landslide victory in 2002, the AKP, which identifies itself as a "conservative democratic" rather than "Islamist" party, has steadily increased its percentage of popular votes in general elections, although it significantly underperformed in the June 2015 general elections and lost its parliamentary majority.6 Due to the AKP's official support of a secular system in which public displays of religion have a place, I identify this party as "proreligious."

Indeed the AKP has been strategically nominating token amounts of women in electable positions at a higher rate than its secular counterparts in the previous decades.7 Likewise in Iran, the first postrevolutionary female minister was not nominated by a reformist government despite their promise to increase women's access to this position, but rather by President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, a neoconservative who rarely addressed women's issues in his campaigns.8 These expansions of women's access to key leadership positions is despite the fact that the dominant gender discourses of Turkey's AKP and the conservative forces that brought President Ahmadinejad to power generally oppose women in decision-making roles and rather emphasize women's traditional domestic duties. The actors and factors that led to women's rise to political office on behalf of Islamic parties therefore deserve our attention.

This article argues that while religious and cultural obstacles such as traditions and policies of gender segregation play a key role in women's underrepresentation in formal politics, another important factor deserves further scholarly attention: the interaction between women's groups and political elites.9 My ethnographic work in Turkey and Iran demonstrates that recent modest increases in women's political representation on behalf of Islamic parties are largely due to Islamic women's organizing and strategic framing to demand access to political decision-making. As I show, women's groups strategically frame this demand in a way that garners the most support among the public and yields the most pressure on the male elites. Toward this end, women activists strategically choose among the available discursive frames to demand a seat at the table, or may even shift their organizing and framing tactics depending on the larger political and social contexts of their countries.

According to Myra Marx Ferree, contentious actors adopt different kinds of frames, some "resonant" and others "radical," depending on the local structuring of discourses and their own long-term goals.10 Such strategic framing processes on the part of women's rights activists denote their agency as they tactfully build alliances with other women's groups, or pressure party elites by protesting their dominant gender discourses.

This article is the product of months of field research in Turkey and Iran, conducted during multiple visits between 2009 and 2015. To document Islamic women's discourses and strategies that aim to expand women's presence in political leadership roles, I researched the organizing and framing efforts of the most vocal and active Islamic women's groups with this demand in each country. I define Islamic women's groups as those who support a religious way of life and public expressions of piety, but at the same time demand women's active participation in the public sphere. Hence, despite the fact that the majority of such women's groups have risen out of the larger Islamic movements in their countries, they are actively engaged in reformulating or reinterpreting the dominant patriarchal gender discourses of many of their male counterparts and advocate gender equality, including in accessing positions of authority.11 In Iran these groups consist of Jaame Zeinab (properly Jame'eh-ye Zeynab, or the Zaynab Society), an influential conservative women's organization and a registered women's party in Iran, and the Islamic Women's Coalition (E'telaf-e Eslami-ye Zanan), which is a network of several elite Islamic women from the conservative and reformist political camps. In Turkey, Islamic women's organizations have been particularly active on the expansion of head-scarfed women's access to parliament, which has been controversial in Turkey's secular context. These organizations include Capital City 07 December 2016

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Women's Platform (Baskent Kadin Platformu Dernegi, henceforth BKPD), and the Women's Rights Organization against Discrimination (Ayrimciliga Karsi Kadin Haklari Dernegi, henceforth AK-DER). In the course of my research I interviewed directors, board members, and other members of each organization's leadership to learn about their organizing and framing strategies as they interacted and negotiated with male elites on increasing women's nomination and recruitment for political office.12 I also researched party documents, press releases, and media reports concerning party elites' responses to women's organizing.

A close analysis of this research reveals two significant aspects of women's organizing. First, it highlights that as political agents, Islamic women's rights activists are strategic in their framing processes as they articulate their demands according to the discursive opportunity structure that best suits their contexts and furthers their aims. Such strategic framing denotes women's agency, as they may choose a discursive frame that does not directly resonate with their core identity claim, but rather one that is more effective in garnering support and pressuring political elites. Second, studying these processes revealed that the demand for gender equality and women's political empowerment does not necessarily have to be articulated according to a secular or liberal feminist discourse, but that it can also be framed in religious terms. This observation greatly contributes to our understanding of religiously oriented women's activism - in this case Islamic women - in that regardless of women's own levels of piety and conservatism, they use the most effective discursive frame to influence political elites and win the support of the public. By analyzing how Islamic women themselves justify their access to political leadership positions, this research helps deconstruct the essentialist assumption that views Islamic women simply as oppressed or subjects of male control. It does this by shedding light onto women's voices and efforts of protest against patriarchy and gender discrimination that arise from within Islamic movements.

Depending on the broader cultural and political contexts, this article shows that Islamic women's rights groups in Turkey and Iran may either frame their demands for accessing political office in secular terms, such as by referring to international human rights documents, or in religious terms by basing their claims on gender egalitarian precepts in religious texts. Following Myra Marx Ferree who distinguishes between "resonant" or "radical" activist framing, this work also highlights Iranian and Turkish women's different framing processes given their dissimilar political and social contexts, and the impact of their framing processes.13 While Iranian Islamic women's rights activists have opted for finding "resonance" with the hegemonic regime discourse, their Turkish counterparts put forth a more "radical" framing to restructure the dominant gender discourse of the Turkish religious political movement, particularly the conservative AKP. An important outcome of Turkish Islamic women's strategic framing was that it enabled them to build important alliances with their secular counterparts and together pressure elites for an expanded political presence for women. On the other hand, Iranian Islamic women's groups' use of a religious framing to find resonance with the religious and political elites, led to important shifts in the conceptualization of women in positions of authority within religious circles as well as within society at large.14 To demonstrate the diversity of women's interactions with political elites and strategic framing, below I outline Islamic women's organizing for the nomination of head-scarfed women candidates for the 2011 parliamentary elections in Turkey, and Islamic women's groups' campaigns in 2009 for the appointment of the first female minister in postrevolutionary Iran.

WOMEN AS POLITICAL AGENTS: DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES AND WOMEN'S STRATEGIC FRAMING Scholarship on women's activism has identified a number of factors that assist activists in reaching their political goals, ranging from the activists' degree of mobilization, to how favorable the political climate is, and positive public opinion.15 Scholars research the nature of strategic engagements and interactions between women's rights activists and political elites through usage of two central elements of social movement theory: political opportunity structures16 and framing processes.17 When opportunities arise, women's rights activists have to be prepared to take advantage of them through the construction of gendered framing, or by presenting their demands and concerns in a way that makes people want to join their cause, or by reframing a particular issue to 07 December 2016

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their advantage.18 According to David Snow and Robert Benford, framing processes are used when movement actors act as signifying agents by actively engaging in the production and maintenance of meaning to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists. "Frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action."19 Framing processes are an essential aspect of social movement theory and entail actor agency, as movement activists strategically engage in interpretative action to label, identify, perceive, and articulate events in a way to assemble support for their cause. "Skilled organizers frame their demands to mobilize others, as well as to serve an ideological agenda."20 At times, movement activists walk a fine line between framing their concerns to mobilize grassroots supporters while simultaneously attempting to win over political elites and institutions, who often constitute the sanctioned opposition. For instance, in terms of framing the demand for increasing women's access to political decisionmaking positions, women's rights activists actively engage in awareness raising and politicizing the public regarding the significance of women's political representation, while they also pressure institutions such as political parties to nominate more women to leadership positions. Therefore, women's rights activists have to be strategic in the articulation of their demands in a way that garners the most support and yields the most pressure.

Scholars have argued that women's framing processes that take into account the broader cultural and political contexts, or the "discursive opportunity structures," are more successful.21 When activists tap into the discursive opportunities of their contexts, the articulation of their demands is likely to resonate with political elites and the electorate. However, Myra Marx Ferree problematizes the simplistic relationship between successful activist framing and cultural resonance. She argues that at times activists do not seek cultural resonance, but rather opt for "nonresonant frames," which by definition are radical. "Although resonant ideas appear mainstream and offer conventional forms of success, such as winning popular support and elite allies, radical ideas are attractive to movement actors who seek a restructuring of hegemonic ideas and the interests they express and support."22 To determine which framing processes are radical and which are resonant depends on the local structuring of discourses, or the way that discourses are anchored in key political institutions, such as political parties, courts, or even state media. Such institutions often privilege one discourse over others, resulting in a hegemonic discourse that impacts activists' framing processes.

In this article, I emphasize the strategic nature of activists' framing processes as they articulate their demands using the discursive opportunity structures they deem most effective, given their political and cultural contexts.

In particular I analyze the conditions that lead Islamic women's rights activists to frame their demands in discursive frames that do not necessarily resonate with their core identity claims (and arguably take a radical stance). I also examine why others choose to articulate their demands in ways that find resonance with the ruling elites. I argue that the broader cultural, political, and legal structures of each country at different times and contexts determine Islamic women's groups' framing process, and whether they opt for resonance or radicalism.

My analysis of Islamic women's organizing for increasing women's access to political decision-making positions in Turkey and Iran revealed two specific discursive opportunities used by women's groups in their campaigns.

Depending on their boarder political and cultural contexts, Iranian and Turkish Islamic women's groups strategically chose to frame their demands either within the discourse of international human rights or that of the local regime. I observed that Islamic women's groups and organizations in Turkey, similar to their secular counterparts, are increasingly articulating their demands for women's enhanced access to political leadership through international agreements and human rights conventions of the United Nations and European Union. As I demonstrate below, prior to the 2011 parliamentary elections, these groups demanded head-scarfed women's access to parliament using the nondiscriminatory language of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Turkey, a secular country that has ratified CEDAW, and is a candi21. date country for EU accession, provides its women's rights groups with critical discursive opportunity structures.

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Islamic women's rights groups use a rights-based frame in their demands, even when they are targeting a conservative pro-religious party such as the AKP. On the other hand, given Iran's theocratic political context, women's rights groups across the ideological spectrum, out of legal and tactical necessity, frame and justify their demands for women's increased political representation in religious terms. In an effort to convince the public and ruling elites, Islamic women's rights groups justify women's access to positions of authority through reference to the Qur'anic story of the Queen of Sheba, or through using the discourses of the Islamic Republic's founding religiopolitical leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Such women-centered religious framing enables Iranian women's rights activists to articulate their demands in terms of social justice, gender equality, and women's rights, all of which are presented as compatible with Islam and the Islamic republic's revolutionary ideals.

STRATEGIC FRAMING IN TURKEY: DEMANDING HEAD-SCARFED WOMEN'S PARLIAMENTARY PRESENCE While following the debates surrounding head-scarfed women's access to parliament for the 2011 general election in Turkey, I learned about "an outspoken Justice and Development Party [AKP] woman," as she was referred to by a number of activists. Fatma Bostan Ünsal, herself one of the founding members of the AKP and a member of the party's Central Decision and Administration Board, had publicly advocated about the need for the party to nominate head-scarfed candidates. Given her years of political experience and devotion to the party, Ünsal believed that as a head-scarfed woman, she had the right to have a seat at the decision-making table, along with her male and non-head-scarfed female counterparts. Emphasizing the fact that there is no real ban on head-scarfed women's access to parliament, Ünsal and her colleagues blamed this underrepresentation on male party leaders' discrimination.23 While there had been some regulations banning head-scarfed women's access to universities, no such regulation existed for parliament. The only dress code requirement for the parliament stated that women have to wear "skirt suits," hence outlawing pants for women, but not their head coverings.24 Hence, Ünsal had threatened that if the AKP's leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was not ready to nominate her, she would be willing to run as an independent candidate to "pursue her right to political representation," and in effect resign from a party which she herself had helped found. This threat and her insistence on "rights" and "antidiscrimination" caused the ruling party's fury surrounding her words. Ünsal's outspokenness and her threats to resign from the AKP were part of a larger campaign to shed light on head-scarfed women's demands for political representation, as well as the discriminatory practices of AKP leaders. As a board mem23. ber and former director of an influential Islamic women's organization, the Capital City Women's Platform (BKPD), Ünsal had strategically used her position as an AKP founder to publicly protest the unwillingness of male party leaders to recognize the political rights of head-scarfed women who comprise more than 60% of the total female population in Turkey.25 As an organization that was founded with the mission to bolster head-scarfed women's participation in social and political life, BKPD was at the forefront of encouraging head-scarfed women who had worked for decades within the lower echelons of the AKP to register for parliamentary candidacy for the 2011 election. As a conservative, pro-religious party that was eager to present itself as modern and democratic to Turkey's secular establishment as well as the international community, the AKP recruited a token number of women to parliament. However, none of the women who rose to such decision-making positions wore head scarves, and many had gained their seats at the expense of headscarfed party activists who had helped bring the AKP and its predecessors to power.26 BKPD's extensive lobbying targeted the ruling AKP, since the AKP had the most head-scarfed members and supporters among the major Turkish parties. By 2011, given the public support for constitutional amendments during the 2010 constitutional referendum, the AKP government had consolidated its power over several state institutions, including the judiciary and military, which were notorious for closing parties that were deemed in conflict with Turkey's secular establishment.

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democratically elected, head-scarfed parliamentarian from the Virtue Party, Merve Kavakçi, was prevented from taking her oath in parliament by the opposition secularist party.27 Kavakçi was jeered out of parliament, as then-president Süleyman Demirel accused her of treason since her head scarf signified a "deep fundamentalist threat" to Turkish secularism.28 Significantly, although BKPD directed their public pressure at the pro-religious AKP, it formulated its demands in terms of "gender equality" and "justice," rather than from a religious framework. In their media interviews, Ünsal and her headscarfed colleagues who had also applied for parliamentary candidacy emphasized their right to access the political sphere, a right that is also supported by international human rights documents, such as CEDAW.29 "It is the AKP who needs to solve this problem and respond to the CEDAW Committee's demands to remove discrimination against head-scarfed women."30 CEDAW and its Optional Protocol (OP-CEDAW), both of which Turkey has signed and ratified, have been an important opportunity structure for Turkish women's rights activists to pressure political elites into reforming discriminatory rulings and practices, including addressing the rights of head-scarfed women. Although CEDAW was initially signed as a strategic move by several high-level officials from the foreign ministry in an effort to assist Turkey in its EU membership bid, local women's groups from across the ideological spectrum have nonetheless used it as a tool to improve the state's gender policies.31 Since 2003, OP-CEDAW has also enabled women to bring their cases to the international arena by having their claims of discriminatory treatment be reviewed by a committee of independent experts. In Turkey's 2010 CEDAW meeting, a coalition of 71 nongovernmental organizations provided the CEDAW Committee with a report on the head scarf ban, its impacts on women's rights, as well as the state's failure to implement the convention in removing this discriminatory practice.32 The NGOs' preparedness and insistence eventually resulted in a strong statement from the CEDAW Committee urging Turkey to end the head scarf ban and to take measures to increase access to public and political life for all women.33 The CEDAW Committee's response regarding the ban was considered a great victory for Islamic women's rights activists and party women such as Ünsal.

Feeling empowered and inspired by these comments, members of the Islamic women's rights organization AKDER (Women's Rights Organization against Discrimination) also campaigned for head-scarfed women's right to access parliamentary seats. This nonpartisan group was also founded to address discrimination against headscarfed women in Turkish society, particularly in universities. In the months prior to the 2011 election, AKDER launched a campaign, the slogan of which was "if no head scarf-wearing candidate, then no vote," threatening to boycott the major parties that did not nominate head-scarfed women, a move directed mainly at the AKP. The campaign organizers, similar to BKPD and Fatma Bostan Ünsal, framed their demands in terms of rights and justice, and particularly sought to legitimize their demands by emphasizing CEDAW and other international conventions to which Turkey had committed itself. The organizers believed that this approach would not only win head-scarfed women the support of more secular women's rights activists, but also serve as an important tactic to pressure AKP leaders, who were eager to impress the EU and the international community. According to Ayse Yazir, an AK-DER board member, We realized that despite remaining patient and exhausting all of the internal sources of pressuring our politicians, we were not getting anywhere. So we decided to also utilize the sources of the international community, while continuing our lobbying efforts [inside the country].34 Despite being religiously motivated and pious, many Islamic women's rights activists in Turkey strategically frame their demands for head-scarfed women's right to political representation in secular terms in an effort to appeal to secular sectors of society, while also pressuring pro-religious elites. The main factors that resulted in such framing were the presence of opportunities at the international level such as CEDAW and the EU integration process, Turkey's secular framework, and the unwillingness of ruling elites to address head-scarfed women's political underrepresentation. To many Islamic women's rights activists, AKP leaders' silence on headscarfed women's right to political representation in the months prior to the election, and their subsequent attacks 07 December 2016

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on BKPD's and AK-DER's outspokenness and campaigns on this demand, signaled the party's conservatism and discriminatory inclination.35 Islamic women's rights activists' strategic framing in secular terms was quite radical, as it opposed the dominant and institutionally anchored gender discourse of the party. Women's rights activists' insistence on equal rights and justice was in response to the discriminatory discourse of the AKP, which prioritizes women's traditional domestic roles over their presence in formal politics, and to the injustice that disadvantages qualified head-scarfed women merely because of their dress. Their reference to CEDAW however, enabled them to use an effective institutionalized discourse which was anchored in the international community and supported by Turkey's secular feminists.

This indicates that Turkey's secular and democratic (though imperfect) context, in addition to the AKP's unwillingness to address head-scarfed women's political rights led many Islamic women's right activists to strategically refrain from articulating their demands in religious terms. According to feminist theologian Hidayet Tuksal, who wears a head scarf and sits on BKPD's board, "Many Islamic women's rights activists in Turkey support a secular system, but one in which freedom of religious expression is respected."36 Although Tuksal herself is engaged in feminist reinterpretations of religious texts, she did not view this approach as a feasible strategy to address head-scarfed women's access to parliament.

Women are under pressure from a secular system in Turkey, not a religious one. Perhaps if we had our rights denied based on religion we would also pursue a religious discourse. However, it is the secular system that denies our rights, but ironically a pro-religious government that also ignores our cries.37 In the end, although no head-scarfed women were nominated for the 2011 parliamentary elections by the ruling AKP as many activists had pressured for, the larger Turkish women's movement secured a major victory by bringing together diverse groups of women, namely the previously opposing secular and Islamic women.

Secular women's rights activists were witnessing Islamic women's rights activists' expressions of agency as they were contesting patriarchal and discriminatory attitudes of male leaders. BKPD and AK-DER's campaigns and framing process shifted the decades-long image of the head scarf as a symbol of political Islam, oppression, or backwardness, to finally imagining head-scarfed women as independent individuals who can articulate and fight for their rights. These recent developments have made many secular feminists realize that they in fact have a lot in common with Islamic women's rights activists when it comes to tackling misogynous and discriminatory party politics that undermine women's political rights and influence. For instance, the Association for the Support and Training of Female Candidates (KA-DER, or Kadin Adaylari Destekleme ve Egitme Dernegi), which has historically been composed of secular women's rights activists, finally began to address the ban on head scarves for the 2011 election more than a decade after its founding. KA-DER's newer board members began to recognize the discriminatory aspect of the head scarf ban over its religious or political connotations, and even invited Fatma Bostan Ăœnsal to represent head-scarfed women's demands at their events prior to the elections. According to Ăœnsal, "Generally secularist women viewed head-scarfed women as being obedient and stereotypically weak, but when they saw us raising our voices, we gained their respect."38 This important realization has led to a gradual unity between two groups of Turkish women who had rarely seen eye to eye. Similarly, both groups of women's rights activists are finding important allies at the international and transnational levels, given Turkey's democratization within an increasingly globalizing world.

APPOINTMENT OF THE FIRST POSTREVOLUTIONARY FEMALE MINISTER: WOMEN'S STRATEGIC FRAMING IN IRAN'S THEOCRATIC STRUCTURE When President Mahmud Ahmadinejad nominated three women to his cabinet in 2009, everyone but the women who had been working for this outcome was surprised. In a personal interview, Zahra Naderi, the secretary of the Islamic women's organization Jaame Zeinab, explained the neoconservative president's move to me as "completely expected, since Ahmadinejad was under much pressure from women's groups and is the type of person who is likely to make bold moves."39 It was equally surprising when the conservative-dominated Iranian parliament eventually accepted the nomination of one of these female candidates, Marzieh Vahid07 December 2016

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Dastjerdi, who became Iran's first postrevolutionary female minister as the minister of health. Although during Ahmadinejad's presidency, women's rights and status retreated in various ways, ranging from the harassment and arrests of women with bad-hejab (coverings not deemed modest according to strict conservative dress codes),40 to introducing a misogynistic draft of the Family Protection Law,41 and restricting equal access to higher education; the appointment of a female minister, who herself belonged to the conservative camp, was nonetheless an important step towards the realization of women's political rights in theocratic Iran.42 Ahmadinejad's willingness to take this bold move despite his conservative views and lack of commitment to women's issues, as well as the eventual appointment of a female minister by a conservative-dominated parliament deserves an analysis. In particular it is important to evaluate what factors resulted in this important move, since the two more moderate presidents who served before and after Ahmadinejad failed to nominate any women to such high level leadership positions, in spite of their campaign promises to expand women's political roles.43 Based on my research and observations of Iran's political developments, I argue that recent breakthroughs in Iranian women's political representation, such as the appointment of the first postrevolutionary female minister in 2009, were due in large part to women's groups' strategic framing of their demands in religious terms. In contrast to Turkey, Iran's theocratic structure and increasing exclusion from the international community has limited women's rights activists' opportunities to address women's political underrepresentation. Despite the Iranian women's movement's efforts, Iran is still not a signatory to CEDAW, while its theocratic political framework rests ultimate power in the hands of a clerical oligarchy. The neoconservatives' rise to power in 2005 and its subsequent backlash against the objectives of the reform era during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), such as nurturing the development of a civil society and integrating Iran into the international community, further limited women's opportunities to effectively campaign to address women's political underrepresentation. With the closure of most women's magazines and NGOs, and the politicization of the women's movement, many forms of women's rights activism, particularly from reformist and secular circles, were forced underground or relegated to the Internet.44 In such an environment, Iranian women's rights campaigns were attacked by the conservative and ruling factions as being Western-inspired and promoting a human rights framework at odds with Iran's revolutionary and Islamic ideals.45 In response to such hostilities, women's rights activists began to look for other channels through which to increase women's political presence and address their grievances.

In order to find resonance with ruling elites, many Iranian women's rights groups have increasingly framed their demands within a religious framework, while distancing themselves from the international community and its human rights agreements. Within this context, Islamic women's rights groups in Iran, which had already paved the way for more women to enter politics, found important opportunity structures with conservative and neoconservative factions who were eager to increase their electoral and political appeal following the contentious 2009 elections. This opening enabled Islamic women's rights activists, many of whom had strong linkages with Iran's ruling elites, to successfully pressure and lobby male political leaders to nominate a female minister, which was a longstanding demand of women's groups across the political spectrum.46 Jaame Zeinab - Iran's largest and perhaps most active Islamic women's political organization (and also one of the oldest) - has been active in demanding women's increased access to political leadership positions.

Consisting mostly of elite women who have been educated in religious seminaries in Qom, this society was founded shortly after the 1979 revolution by Maryam Behruzi, herself one of the few women parliamentarians of postrevolutionary Iran. Behruzi's political position and experience, as well as her devotion to the Islamic regime, earned her a number of important alliances with key political and religious figures, including Iran's Supreme Leaders, Ayatollah Khomeini and presently, Ayatollah 'Ali Khamenei. As a women's organization which is closely linked to Iran's conservative political faction, Jaame Zeinab acknowledges gender differences while seeking to redefine the role of women in family and society through highlighting instances of gender equality 07 December 2016

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and justice in Islamic texts. In order to help grant women their true "Islamic rights," the society's members, many of whom are well-versed in Islamic teachings, favor reform of discriminatory legislation, which they view as a product of a patriarchal culture rather than Islam. To bring about such reforms, Islamic women's rights activists have at times reached out to reformist clerics in Iran to reinterpret some of the discriminatory rulings in Islam regarding women.47 Jaame Zeinab also advocates equal access to religious authority and knowledge, and has played a key role in establishing and organizing seminaries (howzehha) strictly for women throughout Iran, particularly in Qom.48 Although the society has not declared itself a feminist organization, its successful efforts in reforming various discriminatory legislations in Iran and emphasis on women's rights from an Islamic discursive framework has led to some scholars categorizing them as "Islamic feminists."49 Situating their demands within a religious framework enabled Jaame Zeinab's efforts for the nomination of a female minister to be viewed as an internal Iranian demand rather than one inspired by the West or due to international influence. Commenting on Jaame Zeinab's understanding of women's roles in the political field, Zahra Naderi, the society's secretary states: Islam is a just religion, which holds women in great esteem. However, many of its gems [regarding women's rights] have been largely overlooked throughout Islam's history, while other rulings have been highlighted. For instance, while hijab is emphasized by our religious scholars, the story of Bilqis [the Queen of Sheba], which justifies women in leadership roles, is not. As a religious women's organization we seek to highlight the religious rulings which we feel have been ignored, and raise public awareness about them, while lobbying political and religious elites.50 Throughout the years, Islamic women's rights groups have succeeded in bringing the issue of "female authority" into the Iranian public sphere in two dominant ways. They have done this firstly by highlighting Qur'anic verses that emphasize gender equality and women in positions of authority, and secondly, by referencing the words and actions of key religious and political figures, ranging from early Islamic female figures - such as the Prophet Muhammad's daughter Fatima and her daughter Zaynab, both of whom were politically involved - to the more recent Ayatollah Khomeini. The venues for these strategic framing processes include the publication of articles in women's journals, women's websites, and occasionally on state-owned radio and television. Given the lack of consensus among Iran's clerical establishment on whether women should have access to positions of authority, Islamic women's rights groups, such as Jaame Zeinab, have at times sought to broadcast the most liberal clerical voices on this issue, the majority of which are from the reformist camp.51 Such strategic broadcasting of clerical voices has led to alliances among women's groups across the political spectrum in Iran, where elite women from the conservative and reformist camps unite around their common demands to exert the most pressure on Iran's ruling elites.

The months prior to the 2009 Iranian presidential elections witnessed a great deal of women's rights groups' organizing as many were eager to address the discriminatory policies of the Ahmadinejad era, and to reemphasize women's rights and status in Iranian politics.52 Women's increased access to political decisionmaking positions was among the central demands of many women's rights groups, including Jaame Zeinab.

However, realizing that many women's rights are often sacrificed to factional rivalry between reformists and conservatives, the conservative-backed Jaame Zeinab sought to build a strategic alliance with key reformist women who support the Islamic Republic and uphold a religious way of life.

Senior members of Jaame Zeinab Society formed the Islamic Women's Coalition (henceforth the Coalition) with renowned former female politicians from the reformist camp such as Elaheh Koolaee, Massoumeh Ebtekar, and Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani. In an effort to shift women's demands away from Iran's factional rivalries, the Coalition did not endorse a particular presidential candidate, but rather publicly demanded that all four candidates put women's rights at the center of their policies, including women's political representation. To distance themselves from secular and feminist women's rights groups, the Coalition's public statements avoided any reference to the international human rights discourse, and instead highlighted its commitment to the Islamic 07 December 2016

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Republic, particularly the ideals of its founder, Ayatollah Khomeini. In a strategic move, the Coalition introduced itself to the public and the ruling elites by launching its first manifesto (biyaniyeh) on the 30th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The first line of this document, which outlined the Coalition's objectives and demands, was a quotation from Khomeini: "Women must participate in all affairs of the country."53 Along with congratulating this important anniversary "which was possible due to both women and men's efforts and sacrifices," the document framed its demands for women's rights and the removal of all forms of discrimination through a religious and revolutionary discourse. Women's lower status in contemporary Iran, this manifesto argued, is a result of a "divergence from the ideals of the Islamic revolution . . . which was rooted in removal of injustice and discrimination."54 Given that the Coalition consisted of women who served in political positions in the Iranian state, their main emphasis was on women's increased access to leadership positions, including the adoption of gender quotas to ensure women's presence in the legislature.

The Islamic Women's Coalition's tactful utilization of Khomeini as a religious and political figure was an effective discursive frame, given Iran's political and social context. This is because reminding conservative clerical figures of Khomeini 's womenfriendly statements would not only signal their departure from his revolutionary ideals regarding gender, and pressure the clerics to abide by them, but would also highlight women's own strong devotion to the Islamic republic and its clerical establishment. In the words of former reformist parliamentarian and member of the Coalition, Elaheh Koolaee, "many women have received their convictions to enter formal politics from Khomeini's speeches and writings at the time of the revolution, it was therefore only expected that Islamic women's rights activists emphasize the same values which helped found the Islamic republic."55 This strategic framing is particularly significant, as Khomeini 's legacy on gender is far from clear and his speeches and writings are open to interpretation and can serve as a basis for supporting or opposing women serving in positions of political authority.56 Nevertheless, Islamic women's rights activists have been persistent in researching and publicizing Khomeini's women-friendly statements, while pointing to the ways that the current regime has departed from his ideals by discriminating against women in decision-making.

Such religious framing also helps Islamic women's rights groups to emphasize the fact that the demand for women's increased access to positions of authority is internally driven and justified by Islam and Khomeini's teachings, rather than externally inspired by the international community. Given the conservative faction's fierce attacks against international human rights conventions, particularly CEDAW, even the reformist members of the Coalition refrained from referencing such treaties, although many had campaigned for Iran to sign CEDAW during the reform era. According to Zahra Naderi, and the Jaame Zeinab secretary who later became the Coalition's secretary, Women's rights activists who advocate Iran to join CEDAW are quickly labeled by male elites as a "feminist" or Westernized [gharb zadeh]. But I say that we do not even need CEDAW, when we have Islam, which in its true from is against all forms of discrimination.57 Islamic women's rights groups' strategic framing and extensive lobbying efforts prior to the 2009 election greatly contributed to the appointment of the first postrevolutionary female minister in Iran.

Following the 2009 presidential election and the subsequent protests, despite facing much opposition from a number of clerics on the issue of women in leadership positions, Jaame Zeinab was prepared to take advantage of the available political and discursive opportunity structures. They had access to conservative political elites who dominated the political field, and wanted to win over sections of society in the aftermath of the 2009 political crisis. Indeed, the popular uprising that challenged the regime's legitimacy provided Islamic women's rights groups with an important opportunity to emphasize women's access to political leadership that fit with the Iranian public's calls for democratization and equality. The discursive opportunity structure, which greatly privileged Islamic women's organizations over their secular counterparts, was Iran's religious framework. As learned women with close linkages to Iran's clerical establishment, Jaame Zeinab's senior members were uniquely able to publicly confront the clerical opposition to female political authority.58 Faced with such 07 December 2016

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opportunities, Jaame Zeinab lobbied and strategically engaged with conservative politicians, such as President Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei, and framed its demand for a female minister in religious terms, while emphasizing the political and electoral significance of this move given Iran's political and social context.

Commenting on the process of Vahid-Dastjerdi 's appointment, Jaame Zeinab's former director and a member of the Islamic Women's Coalition, Maryam Behruzi stated that: We met with Ahmadinejad and provided him with a list of qualified women who can serve as ministers . . . and then we directly met with the Supreme Leader to ensure that he does not hold any reservations against women in leadership positions. We followed these steps by tirelessly lobbying members of parliament to approve her nomination, which they did.59 Jaame Zeinab's lobbying efforts faced Ahmadinejad's willingness given his desire to establish his independence from a number of conservative factions, and in turn appeal to the Iranian public following the 2009 political crisis.60 Zahra Naderi credited this important success largely to Behruzi's lobbying and meetings with key state officials, such as Ayatollah Khamenei as well as members of a coalition of 14 conservative groups titled the Front of the Followers of the Imam and the (Supreme) Leader.61 In a strategic move, the society publicized Khamenei 's endorsement to silence clerical opposition on the issue. Islamic women's rights activists' strategic framing and organizing efforts for the appointment of the first female minister of the Islamic republic were also welcomed by a number of secular women's rights activists, many of whom told me that it "broke a major 'taboo' on female political leadership."

Similar to Turkey, the demand for increasing women's access to political decision-making positions has brought together diverse groups of women from opposing political camps. Despite the political clashes between conservatives and reformists, key women from these factions joined forces on the issue of women's political representation.62 Women's groups' coalition building and their use of religious framing to find resonance with the religious and political elites has led to important shifts in the conceptualization of women in positions of authority within the Islamic circles as well as the society at large. Given the level of conservatism of Iran's ruling elites, this discourse shift indicates the amount of leverage that Islamic women's rights groups have over Iran's politicians, and demonstrates the extent to which Iran's supreme leader needs public legitimacy.

CONCLUSION The dominant gender discourse of most religious political movements, such as those in Iran and Turkey, emphasizes women's domestic duties over their presence in formal political decision-making. Although the Islamic political movements in both Iran and Turkey had politicized women and encouraged their public support, they had never sought to have women in positions of authority. However, in recent years it has been conservative and pro-religious parties in Iran and Turkey that have been at the forefront of nominating and recruiting women to higher-level decision-making positions than their secular and liberal counterparts. This article explains that this trend, which has also been witnessed in other majority-Muslim countries, is in large part due to women's groups' lobbying of political elites and their strategic framing efforts to garner the most supporters. It shows the way that discursive opportunity structures in a theocracy and a secular state shape and influence Islamic women's framing processes depending on the political, legal, institutional, and social structures.

This research emphasizes the complex ways that Islamic women's rights activists campaign, including by using a religious frame to appeal to political elites and the public, or making strategic alliances with key civil, political, or religious groups and figures. By moving away from the oppositional and binary notions of secular versus religious or East versus West, Iranian and Turkish women, regardless of their religious or secular tendencies, are eager to enhance their political rights and status within their countries. Examples of the various ways in which these women exerted their agency include when Islamic Turkish women demanded head-scarfed women's access to parliament through the secular and international discourse of CEDAW; or when Islamic Iranian women's rights activists unite forces with their reformist peers to pressure and campaign for women in 07 December 2016

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high level decision-making and engage in a dialogue with clerics.

Turkish Islamic women's strategic framing in secular terms was radical, as it opposed the dominant and institutionally anchored gender discourse of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which, like other conservative parties, emphasizes women's traditional duties within the private sphere as mothers and wives. By using a human rights frame that referenced CEDAW (the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), many Islamic women's rights activists in Turkey protested the AKP's discriminatory policies and attitude towards head-scarfed women. Such strategic framing gained these activists the respect of secular feminists, and enabled them to build alliances with international rights groups, which are often the same organizations that the AKP seeks to appeal to in its push for international integration.63 On the other hand, despite their previous efforts urging Iran to sign CEDAW during the reform era (1997-2005), Iranian Islamic women's rights activists from the reformist camp joined with their conservative counterparts in forming the Islamic Women's Coalition in 2009. When campaigning for the appointment of a female minister they used a religious framing. Given Iran's authoritarian structure, including its antipathy towards the international community, Muslim women's rights activists across the political spectrum considered appealing to Iran's conservative ruling elites by referencing the regime's discourse as more effective than taking a radical approach. Iranian women's strategic framing in religious and revolutionary terms helped shift the Islamic regime's discourse on female authority and break the taboo on women in high-level decisionmaking positions in postrevolutionary Iran. Iranian and Turkish women's innovative framing tactics points to their multiple forms of agency in addressing women's political underrepresentation within their theocratic or secular contexts.

Footnote 1. For the purpose of this article, the term "Islamic movements" refers to ideologically and politically motivated movements that advocate living according to Islamic social mores, see Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). While many Islamic movements are presented as religious revival movements that arise in response to extreme secularization, Westernization, and suppression of religious expression, it is important to note that there is great ideological and practical variety among Islamic movements in different contexts and times. Despite significant ideological shifts however even within the same particular movement, it can be argued that the dominant gender discourse of most Islamic movements are patriarchal in which women hold subordinate positions, see Lihi Ben Shitrit, "Women, Freedom, and Agency in Religious Political Movements: Reflections from Women Activists in Shas and the Islamic Movement in Israel," Journal of Middle East Women's Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3. (Fall 2013), pp. 81107. This is the case with Islamic movements in Iran and Turkey. Although Islamic political discourse is constructed differently in each country (Iran being a theocracy and Turkey being a secular state currently governed by a pro-religious party), the dominant gender discourses of both groups of ruling elites advocate unequal gender agendas.

2. While women's political participation refers to their rate of political involvement as voters or voter recruiters, including their participation in informal or "street" politics as demonstrators or community organizers, their political representation refers to their access to formal decision-making positions..

3. For more, see Yesim Arat, Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2005); Ben Shitrit, "Women, Freedom, and Agency in Religious Political Movements;" Humeira Iqtidar, Secularizing Islamists? Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-udDa'wa in Urban Pakistan (London: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002).

4. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); M. Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," World Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Oct. 2002), pp. 4-37.

5. Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler, "Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist Parties," 07 December 2016

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Comparative Politics, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Apr. 2003), pp. 293-312.

6. Yalçin Akdogan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy, and the AK Parti, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), pp. 49-65.

7. An important exception among all of Turkey's political factions is pro-Kurdish groups, which put particular emphasis on women's political representation. The June 2015 parliamentary elections were the first time that a pro-Kurdish party, the Peoples' Democracy Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi, or HDP), entered parliament as a party, rather than independent candidates. Women constituted close to half of HDP candidates.

8. Scholars have argued that President Ahmadinejad represents a new rank among the conservative faction in Iranian politics, referred to by some as "neoconservatives" or "revolutionary hardliners," whose populism, drive for revolutionary ideals, militarism, and social justice distinguishes them from old guard conservatives and clerical elites. For more, see SaĂŻd Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Homa Hoodfar and Shadi Sadr, "Can Women Act as Agents of a Democratization of Theocracy in Iran?" United Nations Research for Social Development, Religion, Politics and Gender Equality Final Research Report (Oct. 2009); Naghmeh Sohrabi, "Conservatives, Neoconservatives and Reformists: Iran after the Election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad," Brandeis University, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief, No. 4 (Apr. 2006).

9. Since expansion of women's political rights and status depends on the willingness and responsiveness of political elites, this research particularly pays attention to the interactions between women's groups and the elites, while they each seek to garner public support to further their interests and satisfy their demands. As Louise Chappell argues, "feminist activists cannot avoid the state," since ultimately it is the state that responds to women's demands. Women's interaction with state institutions in a strategic manner is vital for feminist outcomes. See Louise A. Chappell, Gendering Government: Feminist Engagement with the State in Australia and Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), p. 3.

10. Myra Marx Ferree and Carol McClurg Mueller, "Feminism and the Women's Movement: A Global Perspective," in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 576-609.

11. This research is not about the many women within the Islamic movements in Iran and Turkey who, similar to many of their male counterparts, oppose gender equality, and are silent on the issue of women's political underrepresentation.

12. This article uses pseudonyms for the women quoted to protect their identities, except for those who consented to forego anonymity.

13. Ferree and Mueller, "Feminism and the Women's Movement."

14. Mona Tajali, "Notions of Female Authority in Modern Shi'i Thought," Religions, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Sept. 2011), pp. 449-68.

15. Lisa Baldez, Why Women Protest: Women's Movements in Chile (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Chappell, Gendering Government; Holly J. McCammon, Karen E. Campbell, Ellen M. Granberg, and Christine Mowery, "How Movements Win: Gendered Opportunity Structures and U.S. Women's Suffrage Movements, 1866 to 1919," American Sociological Review, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Feb. 2001), pp. 49-70; Holly J. McCammon, Harmony D. Newman, Courtney Sanders Muse, and Teresa M. Terrell, "Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures: The Political Successes of the U.S. Women's Jury Movements," American Sociological Review, Vol. 72, No. 5 (Oct. 2007), pp. 725-49; Sarah A. Soule and Susan Olzak, "When Do Movements Matter? The Politics of Contingency and the Equal Rights Amendment," American Sociological Review, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Aug. 2004), pp. 473-97.

16. According to Ferree and Mueller, the environment of political opportunity structures consists of both formal institutional arrangements as well as cultural patterns and expectations, including social and ideological shifts, 07 December 2016

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public discourse, and media frames. Ferree and Mueller, "Feminism and the Women's Movement."

17. Baldez, Why Women Protest.

18. Baldez, Why Women Protest; Margaret E. Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

19. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26 (Aug. 2000), pp. 611-39.

20. David S. Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 30 (Aug. 2004), p.

139.

21. "Discursive opportunity structures" are "ideas in the larger political culture that are believed to be "sensible," "realistic," and "legitimate" and that facilitate the reception of certain movement frames. Myrna Marx Ferree adds to this definition by arguing that discursive opportunity structures are institutionally anchored forms of interpretation that shape ideas, and act as hegemonic discourses by providing concrete ways of understanding what an issue means politically in a particular time and context. See McCammon et al., "Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures," p. 731; Myra Marx Ferree, "Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the Abortion Debates of the United States and Germany," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 109, No. 2 (Sept. 2003), pp. 304-44.

22. Ferree, "Resonance and Radicalism," p. 305.

23. Interview by the author with Fatma Bostan Ünsal, June 15, 2011, Ankara.

24. As of November 2013, the bans on headscarves and pants have been lifted for female parliamentarians. For more, see Sebnem Arsu and Dan Bilefsky, "Turkey Lifts Longtime Ban on Head Scarves in State Offices," New York Times, October 8, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/world/ europe/turkey-lifts-ban-on-head-scarves-instate-offices.html; "Turkey Lifts Ban on Trousers for Women MPs in Parliament," Reuters, November 14, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/14/usturkey-parliament-trousers-idUSBRE9AD0G120131114.

25. Dilek Cindoglu, Headscarf Ban and Discrimination: Professional Headscarved Women in the Labor Market (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2011), p. 14.

26. Arat, Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy; Mona Tajali, "Demanding a Seat at the Table: Iranian and Turkish Women's Organizing for Political Representation," (Montreal: PhD Dissertation, Concordia University, 2014); White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey.

27. Kim Shively, "Religious Bodies and the Secular State: The Merve Kavakçi Affair," Journal of Middle East Women's Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 46-72.

28. Merve Kavakci Islam, Headscarf Politics in Turkey: A Postcolonial Reading (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

29. Along with Fatma Bostan Ünsal, a total of about 50 other head-scarfed women applied for candidacy for the AKP, 10 of whom were close colleagues of hers, including another headscarfed AKP founder (Interview, Fatma Bostan Ünsal, June 15, 2011, Ankara).

30. Interview, Fatma Bostan Ünsal, June 15, 2011, Ankara.

31. Turkey signed CEDAW in 1985, and ratified it with some reservations (mostly concerning conflicts with its family law) in 1986. However, in 1999 it withdrew its reservations due to women's activism, particularly by members of the feminist group, Women's Circle, which insisted on CEDAW's implementation. Furthermore, Turkey signed the Optional Protocol of CEDAW in July 2002, which provides women with a more powerful implementation tool. For more, see Gul Aldikacti Marshall, "Authenticating Gender Policies through SustainedPressure: The Strategy Behind the Success of Turkish Feminists," Social Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Fall 2009), pp.

358-78.

32. The Coalition for the Partial Preliminary Evaluation Report by 71 Non-Governmental Organizations of Turkey, "Turkey's Sixth Report on Its Compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women," June 2010.

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33. "Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women," CEDAW, July 12-30, 2010, www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW-CTUR-CO-6.pdf.

34. Interview by the author with Ayse Yazir, May 30, 2011, Istanbul.

35. To many of Islamic women's rights activists' surprise, the groups which came out the most strongly against the efforts to increase head-scarfed women's access to parliament were AKP leaders and their supporters. For instance, soon after the launch of the "if no head scarf, then no vote" campaign, a prominent Islamist intellectual, Ali Bulaรง, publicly attacked it as a move to "destroy the Islamist movement from within." According to Bulaรง, the campaigners "have stripped the headscarf of its religious significance, reducing it to a simple of human rights inspired by feminism." Quoted in Nicholas Birch, "Turkey: Religious Conservatives Confront Headscarf Dilemma as Election Looms," EurasiaNet, April 11, 2011, www.eurasianet.org/node/63266.

36. Interview by the author with Hidayet Tuksal, June 17, 2011, Ankara.

37. Interview, Hidayet Tuksal, June 17, 2011, Ankara.

38. Interview, Fatma Bostan ร nsal, June 15, 2011, Ankara.

39. Interview by the author with Zahra Naderi, July 11, 2011, Tehran.

40. During Ahmadinejad's presidency (2005-13), a "morality police" was entrusted with the task to crack down on individuals with bad-hejab, or those who did not dress modestly according to strict conservative stands on dress.

41. The Family Protection Bill that was proposed by President Ahmadinejad in 2007 was attacked by many Iranian women's rights activists across the ideological spectrum due to its discriminatory provisions, such as making polygamy easier for men. Women's unified activism has thus far prevented the adoption of this bill. For more, see Hoodfar and Sadr, "Can Women Act as Agents for the Democratization of Theocracy in Iran?"

42. Nayereh Tohidi, "Women and the Presidential Elections: Iran's New Political Culture," Informed Comment (blog), September 3, 2009, www.juancole.com/2009/09/tohidi-women-and-presidential-elections.html.

43. In fact, 2013 was an especially disappointing year for Iranian women's political representation; in contrast with many women's rights activists' expectations, the cabinet ministers of the newly elected and moderate President Hassan Rouhani consisted of only men. The absence of a female minister in 2013 was considered by many women's rights activists as a "serious setback," particularly since many believed that Ahmadinejad broke the taboo on women accessing ministerial positions. For more, see Golnaz Esfandiari, "Perhaps Bowing to Pressure, Rohani Appoints Woman to Iranian Cabinet," Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, August 13, 2013, www.rferl.org/content/rohani-woman-cabinet-iran/25074111.html.

44. Hoodfar and Sadr, "Can Women Act as Agents for the Democratization of Theocracy in Iran?"; Homa Hoodfar and Shadi Sadr, "Islamic Politics and Women's Quest for Gender Equality in Iran," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 6 (2010), pp. 885-903.

45. Interview by the author with Azadeh Fahimi, December 11, 2011.

46. Nazanin Shahrokni, "All the President's Women," Middle East Report, No. 253 (Winter 2009), pp. 2-6; Tajali, "Notions of Female Authority."

47. Samaneh Oladi Ghadikolaei, "The Involvement of Iranian Women in Civil Society: Religious and Secular Activism in Perspective," Zaytoon, Vol. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 17-30.

48. Keiko Sakurai, "Shi'ite Women's Seminaries (Howzeh-ye 'Elmiyeh-ye Khahran) in Iran: Possibilities and Limitations," Iranian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 6 (2012), pp. 727-44.

49. Valentine M. Moghadam, "Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate," Signs, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2002), pp. 1,135-71.

50. Interview, Zahra Naderi, July 11, 2011, Tehran.

51. Tajali, "Notions of Female Authority in Modern Shi'i Thought."

52. Prior to the 2009 presidential election, two important coalitions formed among women's groups across the ideological and political spectrum. The first coalition, called the Convergence of Women (Hamgarayi-ye Zanan) 07 December 2016

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was formed between secular and reformist women, while the second was the Islamic Women's Coalition, which brought together elite conservative and reformist women. Although both coalitions sought to present their demands from the new president in a unified voice, their discursive framings varied: the Convergence of Women mostly articulated its demands using a liberal feminist discourse and advocated Iran's acceptance of CEDAW, while the Coalition of Women justified its demands in religious terms. For a discussion of the Convergence of Women, please see Tajali, "Demanding a Seat at the Table," or Tohidi, "Women and the Presidential Elections."

53. Islamic Women's Coalition, "Biyaniyeh-ye Yakom-e E'telaf-e Eslami-ye Zanan" ["The First Manifesto of the Islamic Women's Coalition"], Bahman 11, 1387 [January 30, 2009], posted on Iranzanan, Azar 6, 1388 [November 27, 2009], www.iranzanan.com/point_of_view/cat_7/000046.php.

54. Islamic Women's Coalition, "The First Manifesto."

55. Interview by the author with Elaheh Koolaee, July 18, 2011, Tehran.

56. For instance, while Khomeini's policies on mandatory veiling or banning positions of judgeship for women can be interpreted as keeping women away from formal politics, his calls for women to vote and have access to higher education can be interpreted as enhancing women's access to the public sphere.

57. Interview, Zahra Naderi, July 11, 2011, Tehran.

58. Tajali, "Demanding a Seat at the Table."

59. Interview by the author with Maryam Behruzi, July 21, 2011, Tehran.

60. Shahrokni, "All the President's Women."

61. Interview, Zahra Naderi, July 11, 2011, Tehran.

62. Jamileh Kadivar, "Women and Executive Power," in Women, Power and Politics in 21st Century Iran, ed.

Tara Povey and Elaheh Rostami-Povey (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 121-36.

63. M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

AuthorAffiliation Mona Tajali is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Middle East Studies at Oxford University. In 2015 she received the Best Dissertation Award from American Political Science Association's Women and Politics Section, for her comparative dissertation, titled "Demanding a Seat at the Table: Women's Organizing for Political Representation in Iran and Turkey." Since 2007 she has also been collaborating with the research wing of the organization, Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), and has co-authored a book, titled Electoral Politics: Making Quotas Work for Women (WLUML, 2011). Her research has appeared in journals such as the Journal of Women, Politics and Policy and Religions. She is grateful to the extensive support and guidance of Homa Hoodfar, Kimberley Manning, Lynda Clarke, Aili Mari Tripp, Nurhayat Kizilkan, as well as feedback from Candice Ortbals, Megan Sholar, and the anonymous reviews of The Middle East Journal.

Subject: Political representation; Political activism; Politics; Decision making; Womens rights movement; Location: Iran Turkey Publication title: The Middle East Journal Volume: 69 Issue: 4 Pages: 563-581 Number of pages: 19 Publication year: 2015

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Publication date: Autumn 2015 Year: 2015 Publisher: Middle East Institute Place of publication: Washington Country of publication: United States Publication subject: Asian Studies, Political Science--International Relations ISSN: 00263141 CODEN: MIEJAX Source type: Scholarly Journals Language of publication: English Document type: Feature Document feature: References DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/69.4.14 ProQuest document ID: 1722198187 Document URL: http://flagship.luc.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1722198187?accountid=12163 Copyright: Copyright Middle East Institute Autumn 2015 Last updated: 2015-10-15 Database: ABI/INFORM Global

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